Security Council resolution 357 (1974) [on a cease-fire in Cyprus, and on resumption of negotiations]
Symbol: S/RES/357(1974)
Date: 1974-08-14
Meeting record: S/PV.1792
Subjects: CEASEFIRES|INTERCOMMUNAL NEGOTIATIONS|CYPRUS|CYPRUS QUESTION
Notes: Calls for a cease-fire in Cyprus and for a resumption of negotiations.
In: Resolutions and decisions of the Security Council, 1974. - S/INF/30. - 1975. - p. 8. - (SCOR, 29th year).

Resolution 357 (1974)
of 14 August 1974

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 353 (1974) of 20 July, 354
(1974) of 23 July, and 355 (1974) of 1 August 1974,

Deeply deploring the resumption of fighting in Cyprus, contrary to the provisions of its resolution 353 (1974),

1. Reaffirms its resolution 353 (1974) in all its
provisions and calls upon the parties concerned to implement those provisions without delay;

2. Demands that all parties to the present fighting
cease all firing and military action forthwith;

3. Calls for the resumption of negotiations without
delay for the restoration of peace in the area and constitutional government in Cyprus, in accordance with
resolution 353 (1974);

4. Decides to remain seized of the situation and on
instant call to meet as necessary to consider what more
effective measures may be required if the cease-fire is
not respected.

Adopted unanimously at the
1792nd meeting.

Texto español (official Spanish version): Estados a que obren con la mayor moderación y se
abstengan de toda acción que pudiere agravar la
situación.
Aprobada por unanimidad
en la 1783a. sesión.

Decisión

En su 1784a. sesión, celebrada en privado el 24 de
julio de 1974, el Consejo de Seguridad aprobó el texto
del siguiente comunicado, distribuido de conformidad
con el artículo 55 del reglamento provisional del
Consejo:

“El Consejo de Seguridad celebró en privado su
1784a. sesión el 24 de julio de 1974 para proseguir
su debate sobre la situación en Chipre. El Secretario General comunicó al Consejo que había recibido
una carta de fecha 24 de julio de 1974 del Ministro
de Relaciones Exteriores de Turquía. El Consejo tomó nota del contenido de dicha carta, que se va a
publicar”?*,

Resolución 355 (1974)
de 1 de agosto de 1974

El Consejo de Seguridad,

Recordando sus resoluciones 186 (1964), de 4 de
marzo de 1964, 353 (1974), de 20 de julio y 354
(1974), de 23 de julio de 1974,

Observando que todos los Estados han declarado
que respeten la soberanía, la independencia y la integridad territorial de Chipre,

Tomando nota de la declaración hecha por el Secretario General en la 1788a. sesión del Consejo de
Seguridad,

Pide al Secretario General que tome las medidas
apropiadas a la luz de su declaración y que presente
un informe completo al Consejo, teniendo en cuenta
que la cesación del fuego será la primera medida en
el proceso de la plena aplicación de la resolución 353
(1974) del Consejo de Seguridad.

Aprobada en la 1789a. sesión por 12 votos contra
ninguno y 2 abstenciones
(República Socialista Sovié-
tica de Bielorrusia y Unión
de Repúblicas Socialistas
Soviéticas)*5,

Resolución 357 (1974)
de 14 de agosto de 1974

El Consejo de Seguridad,

Recordando sus resoluciones 353 (1974) de 20 de
julio, 354 (1974) de 23 de julio y 355 (1974) de
19 de agosto de 1974,

24 Ibid., 1784a. sesión.
25 Un miembro (China) no participó en la votación.

Deplorando profundamente la reanudación de la lucha en Chipre, en contravención de las disposiciones
de su resolución 353 (1974),

1. Reafirma su resolución 353 (1974) en todas
sus disposiciones y encarece que las partes interesadas
apliquen esas disposiciones sin demora;

2. Exige que todas las partes en la presente lucha
cesen todo fuego y toda acción militar inmediatamente;

3. Encarece que se reanuden las negociaciones sin
demora para el restablecimiento de la paz en la región
y del orden constitucional en Chipre, en conformidad
con la resolución 353 (1974);

4. Decide seguir examinando la situación y mantenerse pronto para reunirse de inmediato, según sea
necesario, a fin de considerar qué medidas más eficaces
pueden precisarse si no se respeta la cesación del fuego,

Aprobada por unanimidad
en la 1792a. sesión.

Decisión

En su 1793a. sesión, celebrada el 15 de agosto
de 1974, el Consejo decidió invitar al representante
de Argelia a participar en el debate de la cuestión sin
derecho de voto.

Resolución 358 (1974)
de 15 de agosto de 1974

El Consejo de Seguridad,

Profundamente preocupado por la continuación de
la violencia y el derramamiento de sangre en Chipre,

Deplorando profundamente el incumplimiento de su
resolución 357 (1974) de 14 de agosto de 1974,

1. Recuerda sus resoluciones 353 (1974), de
20 de julio, 354 (1974) de 23 de julio, 355 (1974)
de 19 de agosto de 1974 y 357 (1974);

2. Insiste en la plena aplicación de las citadas resoluciones por todas las partes y en la observancia inmediata y estricta de la cesación del fuego.

Aprobada por unanimidad
en la 1793a. sesión.

Resolución 359 (1974)
de 15 de agosto de 1974

El Consejo de Seguridad,

Tomando nota con preocupación, por el informe del
Secretario General sobre los acontecimientos ocurridos
en Chipre*s, y en particular los documentos S/11353/
Add.24 y 25, de que están aumentando las bajas entre

20 Véase Actas Oficiales del Consejo de Seguridad, Vigésimo
Noveno Año, Suplemento de julio, agosto y septiembre de
1974, documento S/11353 y adiciones.

Texte français (official French version): le-feu sera la première mesure sur la voie de l’application intégrale de la résolution 353 (1974) du Conseil de sécurité.

Adoptée à la 17898 séance
par 12 voix contre zéro,
avec 2 abstentions (République socialiste soviétique
de Biélorussie et Union des
Républiques socialistes soviétiques)25.

Résolution 357 (1974)
du 14 août 1974

Le Conseil de sécurité,

Rappelant ses résolutions 353 (1974) du 20 juillet,
354 (1974) du 23 juillet et 355 (1974) du 1 août
1974,

Déplorant vivement la reprise des combats à Chypre, à l’encontre des dispositions de sa résolution
353 (1974),

1. Réaffirme sa résolution 353 (1974) dans toutes
ses dispositions et engage les parties intéressées à appliquer ces dispositions sans retard;

2. Exige que toutes les parties aux présents combats
cessent tous tirs et toute action militaire immédiatement;

3. Demande que les négociations reprennent sans
retard en vue du rétablissement de la paix dans la ré-
gion et de l’ordre constitutionnel à Chypre, conformément à la résolution 353 (1974);

4. Décide de demeurer saisi de la situation et prêt
à se réunir instantanément en tant que de besoin pour
examiner quelles mesures plus efficaces pourraient être
nécessaires si le cessez-le-feu n’est pas respecté.

Adoptée à l'unanimité à la
1792e séance.

Décision

A sa 1793° séance, le 15 août 1974, le Conseil a
décidé d’inviter le représentant de l’Algérie à participer, sans droit de vote, à la discussion de la question.

Résolution 358 (1974)
du 15 août 1974

Le Conseil de sécurité,

Profondément préoccupé par la poursuite des actes
de violence et de l’effusion de sang à Chypre,

25 L'un des membres (Chine) n'a pas participé au vote.

Déplorant profondément la non-observation de sa ré-
solution 357 (1974) du 14 août 1974,

1. Rappelle ses résolutions 353 (1974) du 20 juillet, 354 (1974) du 23 juillet, 355 (1974) du 1 août
1974 et 357 (1974);

2. Insiste sur la mise en œuvre complète des ré-
solutions ci-dessus par toutes les parties et sur l’application immédiate et rigoureuse du cessez-le-feu.

Adoptée à l’unanimité à la
17936 séance.

Résolution 359 (1974)
du 15 août 1974

Le Conseil de sécurité,

Notant avec inquiétude, d’après le rapport du Secrétaire général sur la situation à Chypre”, et en
particulier les documents S/11353/Add.24 et 25, que
le nombre des victimes est en augmentation parmi le
personnel de la Force des Nations Unies chargée du
maintien de la paix à Chypre en conséquence directe
de l’action militaire qui se poursuit encore à Chypre,

Rappelant que la Force des Nations Unies a été stationnée à Chypre en plein accord avec les Gouvernements de Chypre, de la Turquie et de la Grèce,

Considérant que le Secrétaire général a été prié par
le Conseil de sécurité, dans sa résolution 355 (1944)
du 1" août 1974, de prendre les mesures appropriées
eu égard à la déclaration qu’il a faite à la 1788° séance
du Conseil et dans laquelle il a traité du rôle, des fonctions et des effectifs de la Force et de questions connexes découlant des tout derniers événements politiques se rapportant à Chypre,

1. Déplore profondément le fait que des membres
de la Force des Nations Unies chargée du maintien de
la paix à Chypre ont été tués ou blessés;

2. Exige que toutes les parties intéressées respectent pleinement le statut international de la Force des
Nations Unies et s’abstiennent de toute action qui
pourrait mettre en danger la vie et la sécurité de ses
membres;

3. Prie instamment les parties intéressées de manifester fermement, clairement et sans équivoque qu’elles
sont disposées à honorer les engagements pris par elles
à cet égard;

4. Exige en outre que toutes les parties prêtent leur
concours à la Force des Nations Unies dans l’exécution
de ses tâches, y compris ses fonctions humanitaires,
dans toutes les zones de Chypre et pour toutes les sections de la population chypriote;

26 Voir Documents officiels du Conseil de sécurité, vingtneuvième année, Supplément de juillet, août et septembre 1974,
document S/11353 et additifs.

Русский текст (official Russian version): ность и воздерживаться от любых действий, ко-
торые могут еще более усугубить ситуацию.

Принята единогласно
на 1783-м заседании.

Решение

На 1784-м закрытом заседании 24 июля 1974
года Совет Безопасности утвердил текст следую-
щего коммюнике, выпущенного в соответствии с
правилом 55 временных правил процедуры Со-
вета:

«Совет Безопасности провел свое 1784-е за-
крытое заседание 24 июля 1974 года, продол-
жив обсуждение вопроса о положении на Кип-
ре. Генеральный секретарь информировал Со-
вет о получении письма министра иностранных
дел Турции от 24 июля 1974 года. Совет при-
нял к сведению содержание этого письма, ко-
торое будет опубликовано ?*».

Резолюция 355 (1974)
от 1 августа 1974 года

Совет Безопасности,

напоминая о своих резолюциях 186 (1964) от
4 марта 1964 года, 353 (1974) от 20 июля и 354
(1974) от 23 июля 1974 года,

отмечая, что все государства заявили о своем
уважении суверенитета, независимости и терри-
ториальной целостности Кипра,

принимая к сведению заявление Генерального
секретаря, сделанное им на 1788-м заседании Со-
вета Безопасности,

предлагает Генеральному секретарю принять
соответствующие меры в свете его заявления и
представить Совету полный доклад с учетом то-
го, что прекращение огня будет являться первым
шагом в полном осуществлении резолюции 353
(1974) Совета Безопасности.

Принята на 1789-м заседа-
нии 12 голосами при 2 воз-
державшихся | (Белорусская
Советская Социалистичес-
кая Республика, Союз Со-
ветских — Социалистических
Республик), причем никто
не голосовал против ®5.

Резолюция 357 (1974)
от 14 августа 1974 года

Совет Безопасности,

напоминая о своих резолюциях 353 (1974) от
20 июля, 354 (1974) от 23 июля и 355 (1974) от
| августа 1974 года,

®** Там же, 1784-е заседание.
*% Один члеп Совета (Китай) в
вовал.

голосовании не участ-

глубоко сожалея о возобновлении боевых дей-
ствий на Кипре вопреки положениям сего резо-
люции 353 (1974),

|. вновь подтверждает свою резолюцию — 353
(1974) во всех се положениях и призывает зани-
терссованные стороны — безотлагательно — выпо.-
нить эти положения;

2. требует, чтобы все стороны, участвующие в
настоящий момент в боевых действиях, незамед-
лительно прекратили весь огонь и военные дей-
ствия;

3. призывает к безотлагательному Возобновлс-
нию переговоров с целью восстановления мира в
этом районе и конституционного правительства

на Кипре в соответствии с резолюцией 353
(1974);
4. постановляет по-прежнему следить за о0-

становкой и, при необходимости, немедленно со-
браться для обсуждения того, какие более эф-
фективные меры могут потребоваться, если не
будет соблюдаться прекращение огня.

Принята единое ‘асно
ча 1792-м заседании.

Решение

На 1793-м заседании 15 августа 1974 года Со-
вет принял решение пригласить представителя
Алжира принять участие без права голоса в 0б-
суждении данного вопроса.

Резолюция 358 (1974)
от 15 августа 1974 года

Совет Безопасности,

будучи глубоко обеспокоен продолжением на-
силия и кровопролития на Кипре.

глубоко сожалея по поводу невыполнения сго
резолюции 357 (1974) от 14 августа 1974 года

.

1. напоминает свои резолюции 353 (1974) от
20 июля, 354 (1974) от 28 июля, 355 (1974) от
1 августа и 357 (1974) от 14 августа 1974 года;

2. настаивает на полном осуществленин выше-

указанных резолюций всеми сторонами и на не-
медленном и строгом соблюдении прекращения
ОГНЯ.

Принята сдиногласно
на 1793-м заседании.

Резолюция 359 (1974)
от 15 августа 1974 года

Совет Безопасности,

отмечая с озабоченностью, что, как следует из
доклада Генерального секретаря о событиях на
Книре 26, в частности из документов 5/11353/

№ См. Официальные отчеты Совета Безопасности, ова0-

цать девятый год. Дополнение за июль, авецст и сентябрь
1974 года, документ $/11353 и добавления.

中文文本 (official Chinese version): 施 ， 增 强 派 在 联合 国 驻 塞浦路斯 维持 和 平 部 队 的 分 道
队 。

一 九 七 四 年 七 月 二 十 三 日
第 354(1974) 号 决议

安全 理事 会 ，

重审 其 一 蕊 七 四 年 七 月 .十 日 第 353(1974) 号 决
议 的 规定 ，

要 求 现在 战斗 的 所 有 各 方 立即 遵守 安全 理事 会 第
353(1974) 呈 决议 第 2 段 , 该 段 要求 立 即 停止 该 地 区 的
一 切 射击 ， 并 要 求 所 有 国家 力行 克制 ， 避 免 采 取 任 何
可 使 局 势 进一步 恶化 的 行动 。

第 一 七 八 三 次 会 议 一 臻 通过 。

决 是

一 九 七 四 年 七 月 一 十 四 日 安全 理事 会 非 公 开 举行
第 一 七 八 四 次 会 议 批 准 依据 理事 会 暂行 议事 规则 第 五
十 五 条 发 布 的 下 列 公报 全 文 ，

“安全 理事 会 于 一 九 七 四 年 七 月 二 十 四 日 以
非 公开 方式 举行 第 一 七 八 四 次 会 议 继续 讨论 塞 浦
路 斯 局 势 。 秘 书 长 通知 理事 会 收 到 土耳其 外 交 部
长 一 九 七 四 年 七 月 -十 四 日 来 信 。 理 事 会 业已 注
意 该 信 内 容 。 该 信 将 耶 发 表 。%%

一 汽 二 加 年 从 月 一 月
第 355(1974) 号 决议

安全 理事 会 ，

园 原 一 九 六 四 年 三 月 码 日 第 186(1964) 号 、 一 九
七 四 年 七 月 二 十 日 第 353(1974) 导 和 一 九 七 四 年 七 月
工 十 三 有 日 第 354(1974) 号 决议 ，

注意 到 所 有 国家 都 已 宣称 它们 尊重 塞浦路斯 的 主
权 、 独 立 和 领土 完整 ，

最 国王 ， 第 L 从 四 次 会 以 。

注意 到 秘书 长 在 安全 理事 会 第 一 七 八 八 次 会 议 上
所 作 的 声明 ，

请 秘书 长 参照 他 的 声明 采取 适当 行动 ， 并 向 理事
会 提出 一 个 详尽 的 报告 ， 顾 及 停火 是 充分 执行 安全 理
事 会 第 353(1974) 号 决议 的 第 一 步 。
第 一 七 入 九 次 会 议 以 十 二 早
对 零 标 ， 二 昧 ( 白 仙 罗斯
苏 维 境 社 会 主义 共和 国 和
苏维埃 社会 主义 共和 国联
胃 ) 弃 权 通 过 。 吕

一 九 七 四 年 八 月 十 四 上 日
第 357(1974) 号 决议

安全 理事 人 金 ，

团 原 其 一 九 七 四 年 七 月 二 十 日 第 353 (19747 号 、
一 九 七 四 年 七 月 二 十 三 日 第 354 (1974) 号 和 一 九 七 四
年 八 月 一 日 第 355(1974) 号 决议 ，

对 塞浦路斯 境内 再 度 发 生 战斗 , 违反 第 353(1974)
号 决议 的 规定 ， 漆 表 和 遗憾，

1. 重申 第 353 (1974) 号 决议 中 的 所 有 各 项 规
定 ， 并 促请 有 关 各 方 毫 不 迟延 地 执行 这 些 规 定 !

2. 要 求 参 加 这 次 战斗 的 所 有 方面 立即 停止 一 切
射击 和 军事 行动

3. 促请 依照 第 353 (1974) 号 决议 剖 不 迟延 地 恢
复 谈 判 ， 以 期 恢复 该 地 区 的 和 平 及 塞浦路斯 的 符合 宪
法 的 政府

4. 决定 继续 注视 该 地 局 势 ， 并 于 必要 时 立刻 召
集会 议 ， 以 审议 停火 如 未 获 尊 重 时 需 采 取 何 种 更 有 效
的 措施 。

第 一 七 妃 二 次 仿 议 一 致 通 过。

决 定

一 九 七 四 年 八 月 十 五 日 理事 会 第 一 七 九 三 次 会 议
决定 邀请 阿尔 及 利 亚 代表 参加 讨论 本 问题 , 无 投票 权 。

足 ，' 理 书 国 (中 HH 本 参 员 投 开 。


Draft resolution (S/11446/Rev.1):
UNITED NATIONS

SECURITY
COUNCIL

Distr.
GENERAL

S/11446/Rev.1
1h August 197h

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland:
revised draft resolution

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 353 (197k) of 20 July 197k, 354 (1974) of
23 July 197k, and 355 (1974) of 1 August 197k,

Deeply deploring the resumption of fighting in Cyprus contrary to the
provisions of its resolution 353 (197k),

1. Reaffirms its resolution 353 (1974) in all its provisions and calls upon
the parties concerned to implement those provisions without delay;

2. Demands that all parties to the present fighting cease all firing and
military action forthwith;

3. Calls for the resumption of negotiations without delay for the
restoration of peace in the area and constitutional government in Cyprus in
accordance with resolution 353 (1974);

L, Decides to remain seized of the situation and on instant call to meet as

necessary to consider what more effective measures may be required if the ceasefire is not respected.

TU-21532

Meeting record:
20 p.

UNITED NATIONS

SECURITY COUNCIL
OFFICIAL RECORDS

TWENTY -NINTH YEAR Le

nd ,
1792 MEETING: 14 AUGUST 1974 SATAY Cee

NEW YORK

CONTENTS

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/1792) 46500008 5080008830008 aS [DD IN BN AN IE ON BN BN BN ON
Adoption of the agenda «..coviiriiiiriirecioisesaseransseons ceesrrees RP

The situation in Cyprus:

(«@) Letter dated 16 July 1974 from the Secretary-General to the President
of the Security Council (S/11334);

(hb) Letter dated 16 July 1974 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus
te gn ed Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council
(S/1133S8):

(¢) Letter dated 20 July 1974 from the Permanent Representative of Greece
os united Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council
(S/11348);

(d) Letter dated 28 July 1974 from the Acting Permanent Representative
of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the United Nations addressed
to the President of the Security Council (S/11389);

(¢) Letter dated 13 August 1974 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus
19 ihe United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council
(S/11444);

(N Letter dated 13 August 1974 from the Permanent Representative of Greece
Rey nied Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council
{ 11448)..... EEE EE EE EEE EE NNN Sous ss ees eRe RRERIOS FEE EEE EN] EEE E EEX

S/PV.

Page
]

1792

. NOTE

Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United
Nations document,

Documents of the Security Council (symbol S/...) are normally published in
quarterly Supplements of the Official Records of the Security Council, The date
of the document indicates the supplement in which it appears or in which information about it is given.

The resolutions of the Security Council, numbered in accordance with a
system adopted in 1964, are published in yearly volumes of Resolutions and
Decisions of the Security Council. The new system, which has been applied
retroactively to resolutions adopted before | January 1965, became fully operative
on that date.
SEVENTEEN HUNDRED AND NINETY-SECOND MEETING
Held in New York on Wednesday, 14 August 1974, at 2 a.m.

President: Mr. Yakov A. MALIK
(Union of Soviet Socialist Republics).

Present: The representatives of the following States:
Australia, Austria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist
Republic, China, Costa Rica, France, Indonesia, Iraq,
Kenya, Mauritania, Peru, Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland, United Republic of Cameroon and
United States of America.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/1792)
1. Adoption of the agenda

2. The situation in Cyprus:

(a) Letter dated 16 July 1974 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security
Council (S/11334);

(hb) Letter dated 16 July 1974 from the Permanent
Representative of Cyprus to the United
Nations addressed to the President of the
Security Council (S/11335);

(¢) Letter dated 20 July 1974 from the Permanent
Representative of Greece to the United
Nations addressed to the President of the
Security Council (S/11348);

(«) Letter dated 28 July 1974 fiom the Acting
Permanent Representative of the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics to the United
Nations addressed to the President of the
Security Council (S/11389); '

(¢) Letter dated 13 August 1974 from the
Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the
United Nations addressed to the President
of the Security Council (S/11444);

(N Letter dated 13 August 1974 from the
Permanent Representative of Greece to the
United Nations addressed to the President
of the Security Council (S/11445)

The meeting was called to order at 3.25 a.m,

Adoption of the agenda
The agenda was adopted.

The situation in Cyprus: :

(a) Letter dated 16 July 1974 from the Secretary.
General to the President of the Security Council
(S/11334);

(b) Letter dated 16 July 1974 from the Permanent
Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations
addressed to the President of the Security Council
(S/11338);

(¢c) Letter dated 20 July 1974 from the Permanent
Representative of Greece to the United Nations
addressed to the President of the Security Council
(S/11348);

(d) Letter dated 28 July 1974 from the Acting Permanent
Representative of the Union of Soviet Soclalist
Republics to the United Nations addressed to the
President of the Security Council (S/11389);

(¢) Letter dated 13 August 1974 from the Permanent
Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations
addressed to the President of the Security Council
(S/11444);

(N Letter dated 13 August 1974 from the Permanent
Representative of Greece to the United Nations
addressed to the President of the Security Council
(S/11448)

1. The PRESIDENT (translation from Russian):
In accordance with decisions taken by the Council
at previous meetings [/779thst meetings), 1
intend, with the consent of the Council, to invite the
representatives of Cyprus, Turkey, Greece, Yugoslavia, Romania, India and Mauritius to participate,
without the right to vote, in the Council's consideration
of the question of the situation in Cyprus.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Rossides
(Cyprus), Mr. Olcay (Turkey) and Mr. Carayannis
( Greece) took places at the Council table,

2. The PRESIDENT (trunslution from Russian):
In view of the limited number of places available at
the Council table, | propose to invite the representatives of Yugoslavia, Romania, India and Mauritius
to take the places reserved for them at the side of
the Council chamber, on the understanding that they
will be invited to take a place at the Council table
when it is their turn to make a statement.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Job
(Yugoslavia) and Mr, Jaipal (India) took the places
reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.

3. The PRESIDENT (transiation from Russian):
As members of the Security Council have already
been informed. this urgent meeting of the Council
has been convened at such a tute hour at the request
of the representatives of Cyprus, Greece and the
United Kingdom in connexion with the recent events
occurring in Cyprus.

4. [should like to draw the attention of the members
to the following documents which have been circulated
today: document S/11444, containing the text of a
letter dated 13 August from the representative of
Cyprus to the President of the Security Council;
document S/1144S, containing the text of a letter
dated 13 August from the Permanent Representative
of Greece to the President of the Security Council;
document S/11446. containing the text of a draft
resolution submitted by the United Kingdom. Before
the convening of this meeting, during consultations
with the Council members, a revised version of this
draft resolution was agreed upon which has been
circulated in document S/11446/Rev.1.

S. In ~iew of the need for the prompt adoption
of a draft resolution on this item as a result of the
situation in Cyprus and in connexion with the events
relating to the Cyprus question, 1 understand that
the members of the Council are ready to vote on
the English text of the draft resolution, without waiting
for it to be translated into the other official working
languages of the Council.

6. In accordance with the afore-mentioned understanding I intend, if there is no objection, to put draft
resolution S/11446/Rev.1 to the vote now.

A vote was taken by show of hands.
The draft resolution was adopted unanimously.'

7. The PRESIDENT (translation from Russian):
The Security Council will now hear those representatives who have indicated a desire to speak after
the vote.

8. Mr. RICHARD (United Kingdom): It is almost
exactly two weeks since the Security Council last
met on Cyprus (/789th meeting] and adopted
resolution 35S (1974). 1 make no apology, Mr. Presi.
dent, for having been one of those instrumental in
summoning the Security Council to a meeting, even
though it is now 3.35 in the morning. 1 did so
because it seemed to my delegation and my Govern.
ment important that there should be a firm, a clear,
an unambiguous and a speedy resolution adopted by
the Council expressing its view upon the events that
have taken place in Cyprus and in Geneva in the
last few days.

9. 1 do not want tonight to raise the temperature
more than is perhaps necessary. | certainly do not
wish to say anything which would exacerbate a
situation which is already grave. But members of the
Council will know that fighting has restarted in Cyprus

1 See resolution 357 (1974),

itself, and members will know that that fighting
seems to be serve.

10. It will be recalled that resolution 355 (1974)
requested the Sccretary-General to take appropriate
action in the light of his statement to the Council
which, among other things, reported the Declaration
by the Foreign Ministers of Greece, Turkey and
the United Kingdom at the conclusion of the first
Geneva conference {see S/11398]). That Declaration
envisaged a continuing role for the United Nations
Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), taking
account of the new situation which had then arisen.
The Declaration was seen by my Government, and
I think after analysis by the Council as a whole, as
a first step towards the full implementation of Council
resolution 353 (1974). And may 1 reiterate, if it nceds
reiteration, that the Government of the United
Kingdom regards resolution 353 (1974) as the basis
upon which any lasting settlement in Cyprus has to
seen.

tl. Since the passage of resolution 355 (1974), the
Secretary-General has reported developments to the
Council at regular intervals, and in particular he
submitted an interim report on 10 August [S///433).
The work which was envisaged for UNFICYP by the
Geneva Declaration under its paragraph 3 (a), namely,
the establishment of a security zone at the limit of
the areas occupied by the Turkish armed forces, god off
to a slow start. The first task, as we saw it, was to try
to establish a cease-fire line that would be accepted
by all parties. The work was, if I use a neutral
phrase, hampered by alterations in troop dispositions,
even while the process of demarcation was continuing.
However, by 8 August a de facto cease-fire line
had been agreed, subject to a number of reservations,
even though it could not be held in every respect to
be the line obtaining at the time of the signature
of the Geneva Declaration on 30 July.

12. Onedifficulty in securing acceptance of the ceasefire line was the contention that the recommendations
in paragraph 3 of the Geneva Declaration should be
implemented as a whole and that insufficient progress
was being made on paragraph 3 (hb), namely the
evacuation of the Turkish enclaves by Greck or
Greek Cypriot forces.

13. It was against this background and in this
atmosphere that the Geneva conference resumed on
8 August. As a first step. the Foreign Ministers of
Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom instructed
officials to report on the problems of the exchange
of prisoners, the demarcation of the ceasc-fire line
and the evacuation of Turkish Cypriot villages. The
Secretary-General's representative was invited to
participate as an observer at that initial meeting und
in subsequent plenary meetings.

14. There then followed a scries of bilateral
consultations, which included the representatives. of
Cyprus. It emerged from these consultations that
Turkey was pressing for the principle that there
should be two autonomous administrative regions in
a united Cyprus. The United Kingdom representative
made it clear that he would explain, but would not
advocate, these ideas to Mr. Clerides, but only on
the basis that the Turkish Government did not
intend to expand the areas occupied by Turkish
forces, and on the understanding that there would
have to be a clear commitment on the withdrawal
of Turkish troops. This proposal caused grave
difficulties for the Greek Cypriot representatives.
The Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom made
it clear in those exchanges that future constitutional
questions of this nature were essentially for the Cypriot
people themselves to decide.

1S. On the evening of 10 August it was possible
to hold a meeting with the representatives of Cyprus
as well us the three Foreign Ministers. No decisions
were reached, but it was agreed that Mr. Clerides
and Mr. Denktas would continue the discussions
between themselves.

16. The following day it was announced that the
National Guard would evacuate a number of Turkish
villages which were occupied or surrounded by it.
The Greek Cypriot authorities also agreed to release
a number of Turkish prisoners.

17. During the following two days, discussions
continued on possible new constitutional arrangements, either of a cantonal nature or based on two
autonomous areas under one unitary State. In the
latter stages of the conference, however, the Turkish
representative tabled proposals for a clearly defined
Turkish Cypriot zone covering 34 per cent of the
island, together with a demand for a constructive
reply to these proposals within a short deadline. 1
regret to say that attempts to secure an extension
of this deadline for consideration of this proposal
and of counter-proposals submitted by Mr. Clerides
met with no success at all. The Greek Cypriot
counter-proposal conceded administrative autonomy
and some grouping of Turkish villages but excluded
the possibility of a geographical zone or of population
movements. Against that background, the final
meeting searching for a way out of the deadlock
lasted for seven hours yesterday. This was
unsuccessful, and the conference broke down at
2.15 a.m. Geneva time today, 14 August.

18. At the conclusion of the conference Mr. Clerides
stressed that he did not reject the Turkish proposals
and was prepared to consider them with an open mind
if he were allowed 48 hours. The Turkish representatives were unable to agree to that request. The
conference, therefore, dispersed. but the Greek. the
Greek Cypriot und the United Kingdom delegations
expressed their willingness to return tomorrow,
Thursday, and the Turkish Cypriot representative
expressed similar willingness if the Turkish Govern.

ment also agreed. It is a matter of profound regret
to my delegation and to my country that a request
for an adjournment of that nature could not in fact
be conceded by the Turkish representatives at Geneva
and that hostilities have now been recommenced.

19. Inthe afore-mentioned circumstances we thought
that it was right to seek an urgent meeting of the
Council and to put on record how the conference
has failed. We wish to stress that diplomatic means
of resolving this problem have not been exhausted,
and for that reason I hope | have been studied in
my approach this evening and moderate in my
language. 1 also wish to express the hope that
negotiations may be resumed at a very early date,
if possible on Thursday. As | have already indicated,
my Government, the Greek Government and the
Greek Cypriot Government’~—and, [| understand,
even the Turkish Cypriot community—would be
prepared to accept this.

20. With that object in view, my delegation submitted
the draft resolution that has now been adopted by
all the members of the Council.

21. 1 would appeal to the Government of Turkey
to stop the fighting in Cyprus. | would appeal to it
to make a reality of resolution 353 (1974), which it
has accepted. It is not possible for this Council or
for any set of negotiators to solve the centuriesold enmity between Greece and Turkey and between
Greek and Turk in a matter of days, but what we
had hoped to achieve in Geneva and what we hoped
the Security Council might help to achieve was that
by resolving the problems of Cyprus we should find
a way of at least lessening the enmity between
those two nations.

22. Mr. MVOGO (United Republic of Cameroon)
(interpretation from French): My delegation voted in
favour of the draft resolution that the Council has
just adopted. This support means, first, that my
delegation wishes to confirm the positive vote it cast
at the time of the adoption of resolution 353 (1974).
It means also that my Government firmly supports
the principle of respect by all Member States for the
independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of
the Republic of Cyprus. Finally, in voting for the
draft resolution that the Council has just adopted
my delegation expresses the hope that the Geneva
negotiations on Cyprus will resume very shortly
within the framework laid down by resolution 353
(1974), without overlooking the provisions of the
present resolution.

23. The PRESIDENT (translation from Russian):
I call on the representative of Greece.

? Subscquently, the United Kingdom delegation submitted a
modification whereby the words “the Greek Cypriot Govem.
ment” would be replaced by the words the Greek Cypriots.
24. Mr. CARAYANNIS (Greece): As our last
meeting on this item, we finished, | would not say
on a tone of optimism as | am afraid that **optimism"’
is too big a word to apply to Cyprus, but anyway
on a tone of hope. The Geneva Declaration was
signed. Poor as it was in comparison with resolu.
tion 353 (1974), it nevertheless represented a first
step towards the same goal and as such it was
described around this table by most of the representa
tives. The Council had adopted a resolution giving
a new mandate to the Secretary-General, enabling
him to cope with the new situation and his new
tasks.

25. At that meeting | expressed the hope that after
those developments human lives would be spared in
both camps. Since then, human lives huve been lost
in both camps, and more human lives are being lost
at this very moment and will be lost in the days to
come.

26. 1 see from the report of the Secretary-General
(S/11353/Ac1.21) that among the casualties are five
members of the Finnish contingent and four members
of the British contingent, who have been wounded.
1 express the sympathy and gratitude of my Govern.
ment to the representative of the United Kingdom
and to the Government of Finland.

27. The prestige of the United Nations and the
Security Council has suffered and will suffer.

28. 1 do not have to go into the details of the
continuous Turkish violations and the step-by-step
enlargement of the occupied territory. They are too
many, and they have been fully reported by the world
press. 1 feel 1 do not need to convince anybody.
However, in spite of the tragedy of the moment,
I must mention certain dates.

29. The invasion started in the early hours of
20 July, and. in the words of the representative of
Turkey, it met with fierce resistance. Who offered
the resistance? The National Guard. which is the
name given to the army of Cyprus, helped by all
Greek Cypriots who could carry arms and the
6350 Greek officers who were there to train the National
Guard. Those officers were incorporated in the
National Guard. Everybody knew it. They had to
fight alongside the Guard, and they did fight. And,
DY the way, | suppose that most of them have been
ed.

30. There was a time when we had more troops
in the island, always at the invitation of the Cyprus
Government, and cverybody will remember that,
because of the continual Turkish threats. those
troops were withdrawn after an arrangement with
Turkey in 1967,

31. The fierce fighting, as my Turkish colleague
called it. went on for two and a half days. and in

4

spite of the Security Council appeal for an immediate
cease-fire on the first day of the invasion, a cease:
fire was arranged after many delays and difficulties
only on 22 July at {400 hours Greenwich mean time.
The Turkish Government accepted that cease-fire.
In his letter to the Secretary-General of 22 July,
the Prime Minister, Mr. Ecevit, wrote ** Accordingly,
necessary instru. “ns are issued to the Turkish troops
to cease fire effe. re as from 1400 hours GMT on
22 July." [See d,11356.1 The Turkish Government deliberately did not implement the cease-fire,
and the reason was that it wanted to occupy more
territory.

32. A second cease-fire was signed in Geneva on
30 July, effective 2200 hours Geneva time. The fighting
went on, as everybody in the world knows and as
I myself informed the Council at its meeting of
31 July with respect to the Turkish attack against
the villages of Lapithos and Karavas. Those villages
have, of course, fallen since, and the Turkish forces
are well west of them.

33. In any case, the overwhelming fact is that the
territory held by Turkey at the date and time of the
first cease-fire has tripled. 1 put that before the
Council for its judgement, and | do not even have
to prove it. Maps have been published not only in
this country but all over the world, in all newspapers
and in all magazines—maps in beautiful colours:
different colours for the first cease-fire, different
colours for the second cease-fire, different colours
for today.

34. The expulsion of the Greek population from the
occupied area went almost parallel with the expansion
of the territory held by Turkey. Again, all this was
fully reported all over the world, and 1 shall quote
from the Secretary-General's report of S August:

*Most of the male population of the Greek
Cypriot villages were taken prisoner and escorted
by Turkish troops into the arcas of Boghaz
Geunyely and Orta Keuy. Some of the women and
children of many villages were eventually told to
leave their villages and to cross the lines into
territory controlled by the National Guard. Others
were transported. without their possessions, to
Nicosia by bus and set free with instructions to
cross the green line into the Greek Cypriot sector
of the city." [S/11333/|Add.1S. para. 8 (b))

If anybody had any doubt as to the Turkish intentions,
1 suppose he now has the proof. But even that proof
is no longer needed. In Geneva. everything was
said. There are no longer any doubts.

‘3S. And so I come to the Geneva conference. My

Government went to the: first Geneva conference
in conformity with resolution 353 (1974). It was the
Security Council which sent my Government to
Geneva. Its first preoccupation was to stop the fighting.
I do not think there is anything unusual in that. It
has always been the practice, and especially so in the
United Nations, first to stop fighting and then to
start talking. We failed. From the very beginning,
Turkey insisted on having all its demands accepted
before it stopped fighting and occupying more territory.
In any case, the result was the Geneva Declaration
members have before them. Let us see what it says.
In paragraph 1, it says that the parties

**recognized the importance of setting in train,
as a matter of urgency, measures to adjust and to
regularize within a reasonable period of time the
situation in the Republic of Cyprus on a lasting
basis, having regard to the international agreements
signed at Nicosia on 16 August 1960 and to
resolution 353 (1974) of the Security Council. They
were, however, agreed on the need to decide
firston certain immediate measures”. (See §///398.]

36. That means that the Declaration makes a clear
distinction between measures which are urgent and
measures which are immediate.
measures on which there is a need to decide first
~those are the actual words of the Declaration,
and | emphasize the word ‘first’ are: first, the
cease-fire; secondly, a security zone, the evacuation
of Turkish enclaves, policing by UNFICYP of mixed
villages and the exchange of prisoners and civilians.
Then the Declaration deals with the urgent problem
of finding a lusting solution acceptable to all parties.

37. What happened after the Declaration was signed
is known by everybody, but I have some numbers
members probably do not know. Thirty-five square
kilometres inhabited by 11,000 people—mainly Greek
Cypriots—were added to the territory occupied by
the Turkish army on 30 July at 2200 hours.

38. | received a few hours ago an order of the
Commander-in-Chief of the Turkish Army in Cyprus,
dated 30 July, the day of the signing of the Declaration.
This order had fallen into the hands of the Greek
Cypriot army, and | shall read it out:

**28th Infantry Division Partisan Siklik, 3 July.
Operation Order.

**1, Situation. Enemy position as discussed
during briefing and indicated on the map.

*2. Mission: the 28th Division, having the
objective of extending and ensuring the security
of the area occupied, will attack on 30 July and
occupy a line running from Hill 1023 west of
Lapithos, Bassi, Sisklipos village.**

39. It is a very long order and 1 am not going to
read it all out. It says, **Necessary preparations will
have to be made'*. All this was an order given to the
Turkish soldiers on 30 July, the day the Geneva
Declaration was signed.

The immediate

40. My Government went to the second phase of the
Geneva conference utterly shocked by such behaviour
and only because it was determined not to leave
unexplored the slightest hope of peace, no matter
how small and doubtful it might be. The argument
was advanced by the Turkish Government at the
second Geneva conference that the package of the
immediate measures to be taken must be implemented
as a whole, and therefore the Turkish Army had to
continue fighting and occupying territory because the
National Guard of Cyprus had not evacuated the
Turkish enclaves. The Cypriot Government had made
it clear from the very beginning that it was ready
to evacuate the enclaves and hand over the responsibility in an orderly way to UNFICYP. It was not
expanding its holdings nor killing people. But you
have to admit, Mr. President, that one has to stop
doing something in order to start doing something
else. The fighting had never stopped. When it did stop,
at the beginning of the second Geneva conference,
and a cease-fire line was finally drawn after interminable efforts by the Greek and United Kingdom
delegations, the evacuation of the enclaves
immediately started.

41. 1 read from paragraph 3 of the Secretary.
General's report of 12 August:

*In the evening of 11 August, UNFICYP
headquarters was informed by the National Guard
that they were prepared to begin withdrawal from
Turkish enclaves which had been occupied by
‘Greek or Greek Cypriot forces’. The following
Turkish Cypriot villages were evacuated Sunday
evening: Alekhtora, Evdhimou. Ayios Thomas,
and Plataniskia, all in Limassol district, and
Mandria and Kouklia in Paphos district. On
12 August, the National Guard evacuated the
Turkish sectors of Larnaca/Scala and Paphos/
Ktima. In accordance with the role of UNFICYF
pursuant to Security Council resolution 353 (1974),
UNFICYP has assumed responsibility for the
protection of those areas.’ [S/1/353/Add.20.]

And all this before any arrangements were made on
the security zone, even before any decisions were
taken on how the supervision of this buffer zone
would operate—the arrangements and decisions
envisaged in subparagraph 3 (4) of the Geneva
Declaration us immediate measures.

42. Another reason which made by Foreign Minister
decide to attend the second Geneva conference in
spite of the Turkish bad faith was his belief that
it was urgent to take measures for the exchange of
prisoners, military and civilian, and of the aumerous
Greek Cypriots in the Turkish occupation zone. It
is astonishing, and characteristic of the Turkish
methods and intentions, that, after imposing all
possible measures of protection for the Turks in
the non-occupied parts of the island, including the
keeping of order by Turkish Cypriot police, Turkey
-

still refuses to allow any activity other than relief
to the UNFICYP troops in the occupied territory.

43. Allow me to refer to the interim report of the
Secretary-General of 10 August. It deals almost
exclusively with the UNFICYP activities in the nonoccupied part of the island: there is only one
paragraph for the Turkish-controlled area, namely,
paragraph 17, which reads as follows:

**Within the Turkish-controlled area, UNFICYP
activities are centred on humanitarian and relief
measures in Kyrenia and: certain surrounding
villages, especially Bellapais. These activities
include the delivery of food to a considerable
number of small isolated groups.” [S/11433.)

44. This situation is unbelievable, and it is
unacceptable to my Government. The Turkish
authorities have even refused to allow S00 women,
children and old men to return to their homes in
the occupied zone.

45. 1 now come to the search for a lasting settlement
in the island. This is the most interesting, the most
unbelievable and the most shocking part of the
conference. It started when the three participants
became five with the addition of representatives of
the Cypriot Government and of the Turkish Cypriots.
The Turkish Foreign Minister proposed the division
of the island into separate geographical zones and
demanded that a decision be taken for any constitutional negotiations to be based on this principle.
The Acting President of Cyprus and the Greek
Foreign Minister remarked that Cyprus was an
independent and sovereign country, a Member of
the United Nations, and that it was not up. to the
Geneva conference to dictate its constitution to
Cyprus. The United Kingdom Foreign Minister
declared that the United Kingdom did not feel that
it had any right to interfere in the constitutional
problem of Cyprus. We tried to suggest that if Turkey
invaded Cyprus to protect its Constitution, as the
Turkish Government contends. it did, it would then
be only reasonable to take the Constitution as it is.
the Constitution based on the 1960 Treaty of
Guarantee® referred to in the Geneva Declaration,
eventually accept whatever modifications had been
accepted up to this time by both ‘parties. and try to
agree on other modifications that would make it more
practical under the present circumstances. That was
flatly rejected.

46. Now [ would like to make a point here. We have
never accepted thut the Treaty of Guarantee gives
Turkey the right to invade Cyprus for whatever
reason, and 1 do not think that there are many in
the United Nations who accept this predominance
of a treaty over the Charter. But if we were to
accept for a moment this un-United Nations—if

* United Nations, Treaty Series, vol: 382, p.

1 may call it that—mentality, | think it should be
obvious that the right of invasion is granted in order
to bring things back to constitutional legality. If the
intention is to change the Constitution and divide
the island and move masses of the population,
then I would humbly submit that the Turkish Army
is not legally on the island, not even on the basis
of the Turkish interpretation of the Treaty of
Guarantee. It is occupying the territory of a State
Member of the United Nations illegally, even by
Turkish standards, because by our standards the
action is illegal anyway.

47. In spite of all this, the Geneva conference
started yesterday examining constitutional proposals
under the Turkish threat that if the Turkish conception
of geographical partition was not accepted military
operations would rcsume in the island. This is the
precise reason why the buffer zone has not been
accepted until this moment in spite of the fact that,
in accordance with the Geneva Declaration, it was
one of the immediate measures to be taken, right
after the cease-fire, because the road to further
advance should remain open to the Turkish Army.

48. Let us have a look at the different proposals.
I quote from the Turkish Cypriot proposal:

*The Republic of Cyprus shall be an independent
binational State. The Republic shall be composed
of two federated States with full control and
autonomy within their respective geographical
boundaries. The urea of the Turkish Cypriot State
shall cover 34 per cent of the territory of the
Republic falling north of the general line starting
from Lefka and going through Nicosia to Famagusta."

This was, of course, rejected.

49. You may ask why 34 per cent of the territory?
The Turks are only 18 per cent of the population.
I have the answer. Because the Turkish army is there.

50. Mr. Clerides was drafting his counter-proposal
when the Turkish Foreign Minister cume out with a
proposal of his own, not from Cyprus but from the
mother country. This is the Turkish proposal:

“The Republic shall comprise two autonomous
zones, one Turkish and the other Greek. The
Greek Cypriot zone shall be composed of two
districts. The uarca of the autonomous Turkish
Cypriot zonc will be equivalent to approximately
34 per cent of the territory of the Republic.”
—The word ‘approximately’ is here—""The
Administration of each of the autonomous zones
shall have complete control over its geographical
area.’

This was on the basis of take it or leave it. until
midnight. Some more time was finally, and with

4 Quoted In in French by the speaker,

much difficulty, arranged and the latest proposals
came out. | am quoting from Clerides’ proposal:

“The constitutional order of Cyprus shall retain
its bi-communal character based on the coexistence
of the Greek and Turkish communities within the
framework of a sovereign, independent and integral
republic. The coexistence of the two communities
shall be achieved in the context of institutional
arrangements regarding an agreed allocation of
powers and functions between the central govern.
ment having competence over State affairs and the
respective autonomous communal administrations
exercising their powers on all other matters within
areas to be established as in paragraph S hereinbelow. The Greek and Turkish communal
administrations shall exercise their powers and
functions in areas consisting respectively of the
purely Greek and Turkish villages and municipalities. For the purpose of communal administration,
such villages and municipalitics may be grouped
together by the respective communal authorities.
For the same purpose, mixed villages shall come
under the communal authority of the community
to which the majority of their inhabitants belong.
Legislative authority over the respective communal
administrations shall be exercised by the Greek
and Turkish members of the House of Representa.
tives constituted in separate councils for this

purpose.’

It will up to the Council to decide which of the
three projects is closets to resolution 353 (1974).
It may possibly find even Mr. Clerides’ project far
away from it.

$1. The Government of Cyprus was not able to
accept the Turkish constitutional proposals in Geneva.
The Government of Greece takes the attitude that
no sovereign. independent State could accept such
proposals at gun point from an outside country.
It will be up to each Member of the United Nations
to take a position on this issue. The situation is
extremely serious. For Cyprus itself it is dramatic.
For the United Nations it calls for a reappraisal of
its fundamental purposes.

$2. The Group of Non-Aligned Countries at the
United Nations issued a declaration the other day.
1 quote from that declaration:

**The tragic situation of Cyprus is a grave warning
to all non-aligned countries and calls for their
united action. The threat to the independence

“and security of one non.aligned country is a
threat to the security of all of them."

1. for my part, would agree.
83. Asx Greece and Turkey are the two countries

most closely connected with Cyprus 1 should like to
close by referring to clear written indications of the

positions of the two respective Governments. | quote
from the declaration of the Greek: Government of
6 August:

“Greece is in favour of the maintenance of the
independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and
unity of Cyprus. The above-mentioned clements
would allow the Cyprus State to continue its nonaligned policies. Furthermore, the Greek Government is in favour of the demilitarization of the
Republic of Cyprus inasmuch as the concentration
and accumulation of armed forces in the island will
result in the annihilation of the international entity
of Cyprus. Greece feels that the first urgent step to
be taken to this effect is the withdrawal of the
Turkish forces which invaded Cyprus. This will
enable Greece to withdraw all Greece officers
and other military personnel presently in the island
in conformity with Security Council resolution 353
(1974). It is Greece's position that resolution 353
(1974) must be implemented in all its provisions
and as soon as possible.’

And 1 repeat, that we are ready to take out of
Cyprus the Greek officers and any other military
personnel in the island any time. together with the
Turkish army.

$4. 1 now quote from The Washington Post of
11 August. It is a telegram from Ankara:

“In Ankara a high Government official said
that Turkey is determined to press for acceptance
of its plan for a Cyprus solution even at the
cost of renewed fighting on the island. ‘There will
not be a third round of Geneva talks’, said the
official. ‘We will get peace, either in Geneva

talking, or in Cyprus fighting’ °°.

55. We all know a bit of history, and we all know
what is meant by gunpoint diplomacy. Those of us
who are old enough can remember Hitler and
Munich. We had hoped they were past experiences.
1 will not go into the final hours of the Geneva
conference, as [| think they were very plainly
explained by the representative of the United
Kingdom. As a matter of fact, what Mr. Clerides
said was: **Give me time to consider your proposal’,
But it was not possible; time was not given: and
fighting is going on.

$6. Mr. LECOMPT (France) (interpretation from
French): The failure, which we hope is only
temporary, of the negotiations in Geneva has led the
delegations of Greece. Cyprus and the United Kingdom
to'request the urgent mecting of the Council.

$7. Even before we had enough time to meet. the
Turkish Air Force had bombed certain targets,
particularly Nicosia, causine many casualties and
wounding nine soldiers of the United Nations Force.
This was reported to us two hours ago in a report of

the Secretary-General, which emphasized once again,
if that were necessary, the seriousness of the situation
which is threatening peace and security in the castern
Mediterranean.

58. By this time tomorrow—=now, even at this very
moment—the war could spread over Cyprus and once
again affect populations which have already been
seriously harmed. Aware of the dramatic nature of
this situation. the nine countries of the European
Economic Community met yesterday evening while
negotiations were still continuing: they decided to
make a new and pressing approach the Governments
of Ankara and Athens.

$9. As speak, I do not know whether that approach
was made in both capitals, It was essentially a
solemn appeal to the two parties to pursue the course
of negotiation, to the exclusion of any other means.
The nine countries, the text adds, feel that they must
give both parties a most solemn warning of the
responsibilities that would be incurred in the eyes
of the European Community by the one that resorted
to military action at the risk of starting a conflict,
with incalculable consequences.

60. Speaking now on behalf of my Government,
I would say that we sincerely deplore the excessive
haste with which the Turkish Government interrupted
last evening's negotiations. and particularly the
military action which the Turkish forces have just
begun. War is not the way to solve the difficult
problems separating the two communities on Cyprus.
On the contrary, it can only complicate and delay
a solution, without any of the parties concerned
finally being able to gain the least benefit.

61. Here | must recall the rule that as long as
negotiations are acceptable to one of the partners—and
the request for a 36-hour postponement was not a
refusal to negotiate—the other should abstain from
making it impossible to carry on the negotiations.
Also | must concur with the urgent appeal which
our colleague from the United Kingdom addressed a
few moments ago to the Turkish Government.

62. However for the time being. the Council, which
has the major responsibility for peace, the
maintenance of world had to act.- | had at least to
require full implementation of resolutions 353 (1974)
and 354 (1974) and, particularly, respect of the ceasefire throughout the island—in other words, an end to

the fighting which is how going on. It had also

urgently to appeal to the parties to resume negotiations
without delay: and. in conclusion. it had to state
that it would remain seized of the situation. This
has been done, and | hope its appeal will be heeded.

63. Mr. SCALI (United States of America): My
delegation deeply regrets that almost a month after
the adoption of resolution 353 (1974) we have found
it necessary to meet once ugain in this hall to consider

new steps to end the violence on the island of
Cyprus. We regret this all the more because this
return of violence was so unnecessary. Promising
negotiations had been going forward in Geneva
pursuant to resolution 353 (1974) and in keeping with
the Charter of the United Nations and the Treaty of
Guarantee establishing the State of Cyprus. But,
unhappily, in the absence of a conciliatory spirit
at the conference table, those negotiations have been
interrupted and the guns of war are speaking again.

64. The United States is convinced that only through
such negotiations can a settlement emerge which will
restore constitutional government to Cyprus and peace
and stability in the eastern Mediterranean.

6S. As the Council is aware, the United States has
lent its total support to this process. My Govern.
ment did this because of its close relations with its
allies, Greece and Turkey, because of its commitment
to the independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus,
because of its concern for the welfare of the Cypriot
people of both communities and, also, but not least,
because of its overriding concern for peace in the
area.

66. We have given our full support to the valiant
and tireless efforts of the United Kingdom, a guarantor
Power under the London-Zurich agreements, to
bring about a measure of common understanding at
Geneva which would point the way towards a new
constitutional arrangement in Cyprus which takes into
account the new realities. In this role we have been
in constant touch with all of the parties so as to do
whatever we could to encourage the negotiating
process.

67. The United States has taken heart from the
restoration of constitutional government in Greece,
50 ably led by Prime Minister Caramanlis. The Greek
Government has pursued with diligence the search
for arrangements to restore constitutional government
in Cyprus. As a guarantor Power, Greece has
legitimate interests which must be fully recognized.

68. We also pay a tribute to the people of Cyprus,
of both communities, who have endured many
hardships in the past month. *

69. The Acting President of Cyprus, Mr. Clerides,
and the Turkish Vice-President, Mr. Denktas, have
both made major contributions in this complicated
process of negotiation.

70. Turkey also has legitimate interests which must be
fully recognized. My Government made clear
yesterday in a public statement its view that the
position of the Turkish community on Cyprus requires
considerable improvement and protection, as well as
a greater degree of autonomy.

71. My Government considers that it is the duty of
the Council to do everything in keeping with resolu-
tion 353 (1974) to aid in bringing the parties back
to the negotiating table. It is only at that table that a
consensus can emerge leading to a settlement which
will be satisfactory to all the parties and which will
bring peace and stability once again to that area.

72. The duty of the Council is simply this: we must
call for an immediate end to the fighting and we must
call for the earliest resumption of negotiations. My
Government pledges that it will continue its own
efforts towards the end that the voice of reason will
again be heard and the voice of the cannons will
once more be stilled.

73. The PRESIDENT (translation from Russian):
[ call on the representative of Cyprus.

74. Mr. ROSSIDES (Cyprus): The situation in
Cyprus—and it is Cyprus which is really the suffering
party—is very critical. It is a situation that goes
beyond mere words. The salient fact—apart from all
the other aspects—is that we have in Cyprus at the
present moment a Power with a military force of some
40,000 men, a Power which by reason of its membership of a strong military alliance possesses the means
to attack a small, undefended, unassisted country,
a country that is independent, a country that is a
Member of the United Nations, a country that is
entitled to all the rights of independence, freedom
and territorial integrity, a country that has the right
of protection under the Charter, which provides that
force shall not be used by one State against
another.

75. If we examine all the circumstances, we see that
the situation in Cyprus today is not merely comparable
but almost identical to the situation before the Second
World War of a small country that was attacked on
exactly the same grounds: the protection of a minority.
Everyone knows that those grounds were merely a
pretext for destroying that country and its independence. Any encyclopedia—again 1 must turn to an
encyclopedia—will show the real purposes that
Hitlerite Germany had in mind when it purported
to be protecting the rights of the German minority
in Czechoslovakia. At that time the big Powers found
it more convenient not to oppose the aggressor—
despite the fact that under the Covenant of the
League of Nations it was their obligation to protect
that small country. But they preferred to trifle with
the rights of a small country in order to appease
the aggressor. For many reasons they found it more
convenient to side with the aggressor than with the
victim.

76. But there is in the very structure of the cosmos a
power that is called the moral power: crime and
retribution. In the case of the abandonment of the
small country to which | have just referred, the
retribution did come-=but it fell on all mankind.
through the Second World War.

77. The situation in Cyprus today is a symbol.
However small Cyprus is, it is the symbol of. the
breakdown of whatever international legal order and
security exist. Otherwise, it could not have been
accepted that this country could be pounded from the
air in a war that has now lasted for over two weeks.

78. Every cruel means of war has been used,
including napalm bombs. Turkey has been in command
of the air. There has been no other Power disputing
Turkey's domination of the air and the scas. Cyprus
has no fleet, no air force, and no anti-aircraft guns.
Would anyone have thought it possible that the
international community would stand and watch this
crime being committed, without turning a hair? That
would have seemed unimaginable, particularly in the
present age, the age of the United Nations, the age
of the Charter. It is true that the League of Nations
had a Covenant, but that Covenant contained no
principles: it was merely an arrangement for keeping
the peace. At that time war had not been prohibited;
war was still considered a normal process. The Charter
brought the change that war was to be treated as
a crime and that force was not to be used by one
country against another except in the exercise of
self-defence. Therefore, under the Charter Turkey is
committing a crime, because it is not acting in
self-defence but in naked aggression.

79. We have been striving for so many years to find
a definition of aggression. Well, here it is; this is
the picture of aggression. Could this be described as
anything else but direct aggression?

80. Under paragraph 5 of resolution 353 (1974), a
conference was to be held, and indeed it was held.
But there are four paragraphs that precede paragraph $
of that resolution, namely the paragraph that called
on Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom to enter
into negotiations for the restoration of peace in the
area and constitutional government in Cyprus. What
did those four other paragraphs provide for? First,
there is the paragraph calling upon all States to respect
the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity
of Cyprus. Turkey is supposedly one of the countries
which is to ente. into negotiations for the restoration
of peace in the area and was one of the guarantors—the
irony of the situation—of the independence, territorial
integrity and security of Cyprus. Now that country is
called upon, as is every other State, to respect
the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity
of Cyprus.

81. We do not have to go very far to see what
the degree of respect Turkey has for the independence
and territorial integrity of Cyprus—no farther than
what is happening tonight, even if we forget everything
else.

82. What is happening tonight? I have here before me
u cable that reached me just a little while ago from
the Acting President of Cyprus, Glafcos Clerides,
which states:

“Since 4.45 this morning, 14 August, Cyprus, of
half a million population, is suffering without any
provocation on its part, without any notice
whatsoever, the cowardly attack by Turkey, a
country of 36 million, by air, by sea and by land.
You are requested to communicate to other
Ambassadors and Governments and the United
Nations and express the indignation of all the people
and Government of Cyprus at this situation and
ask for the assistance of all peace-loving countries.'*

83. What is the situation that unfolds before the
Security Council out of this picture? Where are we?
Are we in the days before the Se¢ond World War?
Is there no Charter? What is the meaning of signing
the Charter? What is the meaning of having a
Charter? What is the meaning of having the United
Nations and the Security Council if we have no respect
for the principles of the Charter and if we have no
human feeling when such a crime is committed in
cold blood? 1 have no doubt that our very affable
and smiling colleague, the representative of Turkey,
will find many excuses for it. Surely he will have many
excuses and many unproven stories. I can assure
members that the Turkish Cypriots in Cyprus have
had more rights than the Greek Cypriots have had.
They have had freedom of movement all over the
island when the Greek Cypriots were prevented by
force by the Turkish Cypriots in the exercise of that
right on over 100 public roads, including main
communication roads. It is a strange thing that the
18 per cent minority has had such force as to prevent
the majority from moving in the island, yet that is a
fact. It has been commented on repeatedly by the
Secretary-General in a number of his reports that the
Turkish Cypriots could move everywhere—and |
could easily quote the documents. Yet, in order not
to create trouble and in order not to use force,
there was no effort by the Government to free those
public roads.

84. Were the Germans in Czechoslovakia suffering?
Let us see what the encyclopaedia says about that:
**They were by no means an oppressed minority,
but Hitler, conforming to Nazi grand strategy, through
Henlein. insisted they were’. He actually and officially
asked for autonomy for the Sudetens. It is the same
thing. In Cyprus the Turkish Cypriot leadership is
prompted by Turkey in the same way as Henlein
was prompted by Hitler, seeking under the guise of
autonomy to destroy the independence of Czechoslovakia. In this case it is for the destruction of
the independence of Cyprus and for no other reason,

8S. Turkey is not concerned with the welfare of the
Turkish Cypriots. I can assure members it is not. It is
only concerned with grabbing a part of Cyprus. That
is the clear situation that we have to face. And it
wants to grab it how? By partitioning it, and then

10

cventually annexing it. That is the programme that
has existed and exists,

86. What we see today, therefore, is nothing less
and nothing more than the continuation of that policy
now having run amuck. As | said before, this is really
bankruptcy with regard to the whole world—the
bankruptcy of international legal order and security,
but in this particular case it is also the bankruptcy
of the so-called Treaty of Guarantee, because it is
exposed by its reality. the bankruptcy of any idea
that a guarantor is anything other than, as in the
case of Turkey,.an aggressor under the guise of a
guarantor.

87. What is the Treaty of Guarantee? What does it
say and how can this Treaty of Guarantee remain
valid, with Turkey as a member when Turkey behaves
in this way? The two other members may remain
guarantors, but not Turkey. The Treaty of Guarantee
clearly provides for the independence, territorial
integrity and security of the Republic of Cyprus; it
also provides that there should be no annexation or
union with either Greece or Turkey or any other
country, and no partition.

88. In the event of a breach of the provisions of
that Treaty, the three guarantor countries undertake
to consult together with respect to the representations
or measures necessary to ensure observance of those
provisions. We have not heard any invitation by
Turkey to Greece and the United Kingdom to consider
serious representations or measures to ensure
observance of those provisions. Article IV of the
Treaty says:

*In so far as common or concerted action may
not prove possible, each of the three guaranteeing
Powers reserves the right to take action, with
the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs
created by the present Treaty.™

It speaks here of concerted action. and concerted
action is explained in the sume article as *‘measures
necessary to ensure observance'’. If that concerted
action may not prove possible—which means peaceful
representation measures—thefi separate action is
possible, but not violation of the Charter and such
violations and aggression as would create the present
situation. Therefore | submit that this Treaty of
Guarantee has been torn to pieces by Turkey. Now,
whether the other guarantors would like to take that
torn Treaty of Guarantee and put the pieces together
is another question, but Turkey has becn not only the
aggressor against Cyprus but also the aggressor against
the Treaty of Guarantee. If the Treaty of Guarantee
had been respected. we should not have seen the
situation existing today—if it had been interpreted
in its real sense of representations or other peaceful
measures for re-establishing the situation, and not by
the use of force and aggression in violation of the
Charter.
89. At the present moment we have the resolution
which was adopted today. The resolution, fortunately,
in this case, provides what should have been provided
in the previous cease-fire. In this resolution the
Security Council not only reaffirms resolution 333
(1974) in all its provisions and demands that the
parties to the present fighting cease all firing and
military action forthwith, but also decides to remain
seized of the situation and on instant call to meet
as necessary to consider what more effective measures
may be required if the cease-fire is not respected.
That i{s what presents a hopeful situation. By that
provision something practical must be done to enforce
the cease-fire, because if it is not enforced the situation
will be further aggravated—and will be perilous not
only for Cyprus but for the whole world, for | am
perfectly certain that in a world which accepts this
situation there is very slender hope for peace or
survival,

90. 1 want to say only a few words with regard to
resolution 353 (1974), which is reaffirmed. Apart from
the call for respect for the sovereignty of Cyprus, it
calls for a cease-fire—a call which has not been
respected—it demands an immediate end to foreign
military intervention and it requests the withdrawal
without delay of foreign military forces in Cyprus.
Those four conditions should have been implemented
wholly—or in part at least with regard to withdrawal—
before the negotiations started. The parties should have
gone to the negotiations with a cease-fire operating
and with immediate cessation of intervefition and then
discussed the situation. But what happened? This is
the other salient point in this situation. We have an
enormous country destroying open cities in violation
of all international legal order and The Hague
Convention of 1907-—bombing open towns and civilian
populations. Not only that but we have had the other
characteristic. ugain regrettably reminding us of
Hitler and his tactics. of negotating at gunpoint. It
demunds at gunpoint that its terms be accepted. What
are the terms? To make a State within a State in
Cyprus: something wholly unworkable and unacceptable; that State, the Turkish State, is to be 34 per cent
of the total area, whereas the Turkish population is
only 18 per cent. So that is another characteristic
of the arrogant attitude of Turkey. It has insisted on
both occasions to have negotiations at gunpoint,
saying: **I will continue and intensify my aggression
against Cyprus unless you accept my terms within
s0 many hours''—24 or 36.

91. That is the situation that the Security Council
has to meet effectively in the event that Turkey again
does not comply,

93. The PRESIDENT (translation from Russian):
1 call on the representative of Turkey.

93. Mr. OLCAY (Turkey) (Interpretation from
French): 1 do not wish to deny the seriousness of
the circumstances which have led the Security Council

04.

to meet at such a late hour. It was with great
reluctance that the representative of Turkey felt it
necessary to half the meetings in Geneva—and | use
that word deliberately—talks not negotiations.

From the very beginning of the second stage
it became apparent that the substantive probicms
which seemed to have been defined when the
Declaration was adopted were interpreted in a way
which was totally different by the signatories and
later by those who had been invited to join in the
negotiations. The autonomy which seemed to have
been accepted even at that time—according to the
description of the representative of the United
Kingdom of his views of what occurred last week—
apparently was not as clearly accepted as it had
seemed from a perusal of the document which
had been signed in Geneva. Who to believe and
what to believe?

95. Reference has been made to the fact that all
the diplomatic resources had not been exhausted.
It seems that when one is at the end of a table
where one is supposed to be sitting as a judge and
one can resort to the subterfuge of last-minute delays
it is easy to say that all diplomatic resources have
not been exhausted. It is not the same when these
negotiations have been going on, these diplomatic
means being used for over a decade while the
international community turned a deaf ear to the
appeals of the community which was driven to
despair in Cyprus—and | am speaking of the Turkish
Cypriot community, no matter what was said by
Mr. Rossides, who seems to have a much more
optimistic view of the conditions in which that
community was attempting to live.

96. One of the things that was already revealing
in Geneva, and which remains so today, is the fact
that, for example, the representative of the United
Kingdom spoke—and 1 shall quote his words in his
own language—of the ‘Greek Cypriot Government'”
and the “Turkish Cypriot community’. If that is
not a lapsus, it would seem to indicate a mentality
that would explain, at least partially, the failure of
the meetings in Geneva. And the fact that that
was deliberately repeated by the representative of
Greece confirms any doubts I might still have on
that point.

97. The representative of Greece spoke of the
Cypriot army. 1 should like to ask him some
questions, but let me say 1 am not expecting an
answer at this very late hour. What is the Cypriot
army? On what basis was it established? In the breach
of what agreements solemnly agreed to? In the
violation of what Constitution that had already been
cast to the ground and trampled upon? Was it the
same Cypriot army of a country which is supposedly
non-aligned of which a new Greck general from
Athens has just been appointed commander by
decree? | nm saying all this to show you that the
problems of Cyprus were not discussed in Geneva,
The problems of Cyprus are so deep! They sometimes
stem from a philosophical approach to problem
solving, and sometimes from a lack of political
realism, but, also unfortunately, only too often, from
a lack of good faith. | shall quote some examples.

98. The representative of Greece spoke of Greek
villages in the Turkish occupied zone. The representa
tive of Greece spoke of an occupied zone, of Turkish
occupation, which, he said, had grown by leaps
and bounds. 1 should like to ask him, whether the
Turkish villages that were subjugated, destroyed and
made uninhabitable do not take up any space in the
Cypriot territory? Is the occupation of those villages
not occupation because it is a Greek island at least
in the eyes of the Greeks in Athens and in Cyprus?
How many times, has the territory subjugated by the
Greeks been expanded? Does geometrys apply only
when it is a question of Greeks and not when it is a
question of Turks in Cyprus?

99. All this may explain why the Turkish negotiators
in Geneva did not consider that all the shilly
shallying and refusals to comply with the demands
stipulated in the text accepted in Qeneva—which
| think all came from Greece of the Greeks in
Cyprus—were unimportant and could be disregarded.
They did not consider that the essence was the
cease-fire, with which Turkey should comply—while
the rest, of course, could wait. However that might
be. the same Geneva Declaration referred—and this
is what 1 have been leading up to—to the basic
problem. which should be paramount because it is
only on the basis of security that the settlement of
the substantive issues might convince the Turks that
it would realty be possible to build a lasting peace
in Cyprus and also to apply all the other provisions
of the Geneva Declaration.

100. And now to return to what occurred in Geneva
last week, this time 1 think the game was, on the one
hand, non-application of the Geneva Declaration as
a whole. and. on the other, refusal to discuss the
substance. Mr.’ Clerides began by refusing to hold
talks with the guarantor Powers as such, because
his personal interpretation of the Declaration
enabled him to adopt this deviant. approach. And yet
if Mr. Clerides was there, it was at the invitation
of those Powers, it seems to me.

101. Mr. Clerides—unless it was the representative
of Greece—requested a return to the 1960 agreement,
which by the way implies that he had violated that
ngrecment. But the Constitution can take it: whenever
the violators of the Constitution find it to their
advantage to do so, they revive it and it ceases to
be a dead letter. However, in 1960 the Constitution
included a number of provisions which, had they
been applied—and | am only too willing to believe
Mr. Rossides when he says the intention was to
apply them in good fuith—would have meant we

should not be in the situation in which we find
ourselves today.

102. For 10 years, the Turkish representatives here
tried to revive a system as similar as possible to
that of 1960. Having failed on several occasions, and
having reached the point of no return several times,
those same representatives here and in Cyprus raised
the question of a federal State, a State which would
enable Cyprus to remain what the Turks always
wanted it to remain, namely, a truly independent
State, as opposed to a temporary solution pending
union with the mother country or some veiled form of
enosis—in other words, a second Greek State giving
Greece two votes in the United Nations or enabling
it to play the dual role of a State which is part of an
alliance when it is a question of Greece or part of
the non-aligned world when it was a question of the
Cypriot Republic, but, in any case, receiving
instructions, or inspiration if the word **instructions’
is not appropriate, from the same source—namely,
from Athens. )

103. 1 would have preferred my Greek colleague to
make no mention of the Greek refugees in an island
where the Turks, in the world's eyes, were living
as refugees but did not attract much attention at a
time when the situation on the island was no threat
to world peace and tranquillity. As far as the peace
and tranquility of the Turks was concerned, there
was always some way to settle the problem. It was
only when they decided that the Turks should no
longer live as refugees in their own country that the
problem reached its present state of acuteness.

104. The representative of Greece here said that the
Turks were overreaching themselves in claiming
34 per cent of the territory as the basis for establishing
an autonomous administration to be set up as the
basis of a viable constitution for Cyprus. 1 believe
I can explain this figure. which may seem strange to
those who are unfamiliar with the Cypriot problem
—and God knows there are many who do not
understand the problem of Cyprus in general or in
detail, Before they were dispossessed of their land
in Cyprus during the last 10 years, and before they
were forced to take refuge in the enclaves, the Turks
owned 34 per cent, at least 34 per cent, of the land
and of the villages where they made a living by
practising agriculture. The land registries of the
municipalities, if they have not been changed or
falsified in recent years, are evidence of this. But this
certainly is not the reason for the failure of the
negotiations. The failure was due to the basic
philosophical concept, the refusal to recognize that
the Turkish Cypriots have been and should remain

- masters of their island to the same degree as the

12

Greeks. .

10S. 1 will not go into the details of the negotiations,
because 1 do not feel that we are competent to. do
s0. | must, however, emphasize that if during
10 days in Geneva we have only begun to consider
a constitution for Cyprus, this is hardly an accident.
The representative in Geneva of the Greek community
of Cyprus played a double role which is quite familiar
to us. Whenever attempts were made to reach a
solution to the problem of Cyprus, we were faced
with a strange situation. Whenever the Greeks from
Greece seemed to be entertaining the idea of a
constitution that appeared suitable to us, they would
state that unfortunately, the Greek Cypriots refused
to heed the advice given them by the Greeks from
Greece—who are represented by 650 officers in
Cyprus: sometimes there are more, but at the present
time there are 650 of them, and sometimes they have
the nerve to go in for coups d'état. At other times
when there was hope for some agreement between
the representatives of the Greek Cypriots and the
Turkish Cypriots, Athens would find that the Turks
were going too far and what was being asked
of the Greek Cypriots was not acceptable,
and they would agree. This seems to be the kind of
game that was being played in Geneva. It went on
for 10 days. Proposals were made, and the Greek
representatives said they wanted 36 hours to study
them before submitting a reply, and my Government
refused, and so the negotiations were suspended.
Do you know what happened their? Well, what
happened was that the Greek Foreign Minister made
a statement to the press immediately afterwards,
saying that the Turkish proposal was inadmissible
because it was contrary to the spirit and the letter
of the 1960 agreements. 1 wonder whether he had to
wait 36 hours to issue that reply. which was
immediately forthcoming from the Greek representative as soon as the negotiations were suspended.
This is of course just an indication, an indication
we think important for the future of the negotiations,
which we hope will continue.

106. Much has been made of the non-alignment of
Cyprus, to which my Greek colleague seems very
much attached. That non-alignment is hardly
compatible with two basic positions taken by the
Creeks from Greece and the Greeks in Cyprus,
First of all, in order for the Greek Cypriots and
Cyprus as a whole are to become a truly non-aligned
State, the army of that island should no longer be
under the command of a Power which is, juridically
speaking, foreign to that island. As regards the
withdrawal of forces, the representative of Greece
used the words ‘‘together with the Turkish army.
After a presence of |S years, | thank the representative of Greece for his generosity. However, | notice
incidentally that nothing is said about the tremendous
fighting potential that has been created in Cyprus
by Greece. by all the Greeks, in violation of all
gality.

107. As regards the future status of Cyprus, despite
the fact that certain circumstances have compelled
us to. place troops on the island, I once again
solemnly state my country's firm attachment to the

13

independence, the sovercignty and the territorial
integrity of Cyprus, as well as to its freely-chosen
status, the status of a non-aligned country. The
Turkish presence—~and | have repeated this many
times here—has been and remains today the only
guarantee of that status, or of any other status
-=why not a neutral status on the Austrian model?
Anything is possible in Cyprus—anything—but with
one proviso: that the Turkish Cypriots must participate
in any status under conditions of equality and security.
Only such conditions can ensure them, after 1S years
of experience—rather regrettable experience—a truly
federal! system.

108. In reply to Mr. Rossides I must tell him once

again that, personally, I do not recognize his right

to speak on behalf of the Turkish community. That

community has never been represented in the United
ations.

109. This is all that I would have to say if he
had not made certain comments which require a very
brief reply. I can make this reply in five minutes.

110. First of all, I should like to: mention his
insistence—contrary to all logic and to all historical
and political reality—on speaking of a minority"
while referring to the profound nature of a conflict
and the difficulties we Turks are having in finding
a solution. | should have been very pleased to
discover so late in history and so early this
morning that Mr. Rossides and his administration
finally believe that the principle of pacta sunt
servanda is sacrosanct, because they stated that we
had violated certain arrangements or certain treaties,
certain constitutional provisions, which apparently had
been unilaterally denounced and considered as so
many scraps of paper—f{ollowing Hitler's exemple,
which he has referred to so often today—by
Archbishop Makarios.

111. In conclusion, allow me to reiterate that if the
appeels contained in paragraph 3 of the resolution
Just adopted by the Council are really considered
by Greece and by the representative of the Greek
community in Cyprus with all the seriousness called
for by negotiations—I emphasize the word **negotiations’ —rather than as delaying tactics or a refusal
to deal with the basic problems—then my Government
will be very happy to comply with this resolution.

112. The PRESIDENT (translation from Russian):
Since there are no further names on the list of
speakers, 1 should like to speak in my capacity as
representative of the UNION OF SOVIET
SOCIALIST REPUBLICS.

113. The Council has met urgently at this late hour
in order to consider again the very dangerous situation
which has arisen in Cyprus. The Geneva acgotiations
have failed. Military operations have resumed on
the island, and they have claimed further victims
and caused further suffering to the Cypriot people
and “further destruction of property. The extremely
dangerous development of events both for the fate
of the Cypriot people and for the cause of peace
has demonstrated the complete failure of the efforts
of those who have striven to demobilize the Council
and to condemn it to inactivity on the pretext
that on Cyprus all is peaceful, the situation is
normal, the cease-fire is generally being observed
and even that progress has been made towards the
establishment of peace.

114. Despite the three resolutions adopted by the
Council on Cyprus, the situation in Cyprus has in
no way improved, but, rather, has become even
more complex. As the Soviet delegation has already
pointed out at previous meetings of the Security
Council, the Council, as a result of the actions of
certain circles, has not only been unable thus far to
ensure implementation of resolution 353 (1974),
adopted 24 days ago. but is now facing a situation
which requires the adoption of more resolute, more
urgent and more effective measures for the immediate
implementation of all the provisions of that resolution,
which is the basis both for putting an end to foreign
military intervention in Cyprus and for a political
settlement. Not a single one of the basic provisions
of that resolution is being implemented; the fighting
has not only not ceased, it has resumed on an even
broader scale. Foreign military intervention against
a sovereign State, the Republic of Cyprus, which is
a Member of the United Nations and a non-aligned
country, is continuing and expanding. Not only have
foreign forces not been withdrawn from the island,
but their numbers are increasing. The military
occupation of the territory of Cyprus is expanding.

11S. The lawful Government of the Republic of
Cyprus. headed by President Makarios, and all its
institutions continue to be unable to function or to
exercise full authority throughout the island. As has
already been observed. the burning question continues
to be whether or not the Republic of Cyprus, a
Member of the United Nations, is an independent
sovereign State.

116. Events confirm the correctness of the evaluation
made in the statement of the Soviet Government
to the effect that certain NATO circles are trying
to put an end to the existence of an independent
Cyprus by means of direct military intervention.
These circles are making the independent statehood
and territorial integrity of Cyprus an object of cynical
bargaining for the purpose of strengthening their
military and strategic positions in the eastern
Mediterranean. Events have shown that they are trying
to present the world with a fait accompli in the
partitioning of Cyprus.

117. The States which are perpetrating military
intervention against the sovereign Republic of Cyprus
have not only failed to hecd the appeals of the

4

Security Conncil to halt the intervention and
immediately withdraw their forces and all military
personne! from the territory of Cyprus, but, on the
contrary, arc continuing to expand the intervention
with the clear aim of keeping their forces on the
island for an indefinite period. Steps are being taken
to partition the Republic of Cyprus on the pretext
of establishing a so-called security zone and setting
up two administrations in Cyprus. All this is being
done with the knowledge of the principal NATO
countries. Whereas in the formal meetings of the
Council they make a show of speaking against and
voting against ‘aggression and in favour of the
independence of Cyprus and the restoration of
constitutional government, outside the formal meetings
of the Council they object to proposals for the
Council to take truly effective measures to defend the
independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity
of Cyprus. This places a serious international
responsibility upon them towards the United Nations
and the entire world,

118. As it once again considers the Cyprus question
as an urgent matter and under conditions in which
hostilities have been resumed, the Council must also
take into account the demands of the non-aligned
States Members of the United Nations. They constitute
the overwhelming majority of the membership of the
Organization. In the declaration adopted by those
countries on 6 August, they appealed for the immediate
and full implementation of resolution 353 (1974)
and emphasized that

**delay in the withdrawal from the Republic of
Cyprus of all foreign military personnel poses a
direct threat to international peace and security
and to the stubility of the eastern Mediterranean
region®’,

119. Consequently, the withdrawal! of foreign forces
and military personnel from the territory of the
Republic of Cyprus is the key to the solution of the
problem because the implementation of this
requirement can ensure peace, security and territorial
integrity for Cyprus. This alone will ensurc the
maintenance of that country's sovereignty, and the
countries of the castern Mediterranean region and all
those who cherish the cause of Cyprus and the cause
of peace will then be able to live in peace without
anxiety over the possibility of the outbreak of a new
military conflict. the emergence of a new hotbed of war
which might easily spread fur beyond the borders of
that small island.

120. The Security Council must urgently put an end
to all outside interference in the internal affuirs of
Cyprus and ensurc the immediate withdrawal of all
foreign forces from the island.

121. Today in the Security Council we are all
witnesses to the failure of the two Geneva conferences
concerning Cyprus. No matter how many attempts are
made to convince us by those who declaimed at
this table about the inactivity of the Council and its
refusal to take effective measures to implement
resolution 353 (1974) on the pretext that success had
been achieved in Geneva, we again emphasize the
argument advanced by the Soviet Government on
28 July on the subject of the Geneva negotiations.
The statement of the Soviet Government noted:

“Any decision which was not in conformity with
the interests of the Cypriot people could only lead
to further aggravation of the situation and to fresh
conflicts.” [§/11390.)

122. 1 do not think that anyone here today would
dare to dispute this statement. The collapse of the
Geneva negotiations is the direct result of attempts
to solve the Cyprus question within the narrow circle
of NATO. That approach proved to be completely
ill-founded. It is contrary to the interests of the
independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity
of Cyprus,

123. The second reason for the failure of the Geneva
negotiations is the disregard for the demands of all
peace-loving States that all measures be taken
immediately for the implementation of resolution 353
(1974) in its entirety. Now we have to observe
once again that, not only has time been lost. but it
has also become necessary to enlist the assistance
of the Security Council, which should actively
intervene in the prevailing situation and attempt
finally to achieve immediate implementation of
resolution 353 (1974).

124. We note with great satisfaction that today's
resolution, while not sufficiently strong, was adopted
by all 1S members of the Council. This calls for a
greater role for the Council in settling the Cyprus
question. The Council should take the settlement of
this question into its own hands. Attempts-to deal with
this matter within the narrow circle of NATO countries
have been a complete failure. In this connexion, among
other measures, it is urgently necessary and advisable
to dispatch to Cyprus a mission composed of members
of the Council: the Soviet Union continues to insist on
this. More effective action on the part of the Council
is also being demanded by the overwhelming majority
of States Members of the United Nations—the
powerful group of non-aligned countries. The
declaration of those countries, to which 1 have
already referred. states:

**The tragic situation of Cyprus is a grave warning
to all non-aligned countries and calls for their
united action. The threat to the independence and
security of one non-aligned country is a threat to
the security of all of them.”

This is absolutely true. However, this could have been
avoided through the timely adoption of the measures
proposed by those countries. including the measures

13

which the Soviet Union proposed for adoption in the
Council. We sincerely hope that the representatives
of the non-permanent members of the Council will
fight more actively for implementation of the: provisions of the declaration adopted by the group of
non-aligned countries.

125. In supporting the independence, sovereignty
and territorial integrity of Cyprus and the status of the
Republic as a non-aligned State, the Soviet Union is
guided by considerations of principle. These derive
from the very essence of Soviet foreign policy-—a
policy of repulsing aggression and protecting the
lawful rights of all peoples, both great and small, a
policy of peace and international détente. Those who
are striving to maintain an independent Cyprus and to
guarantee peace and security in that region can count
on the understanding and co-operation of the Soviet
Union.

126. The proposal by the Soviet Union—contained,
as you will recall, in its draft resolution (S//139! |—is
still before the members of the Council. As proposed
by the delegation of the Soviet Union, the Council
should again consider the adoption of effective
measures to guarantee the independence of Cyprus
and the immediate withdrawal of all foreign forces
and military personne! present in Cyprus in violation
of its sovereignty, independence and territorial
integrity.

127. Although it voted for the resolution just adopted
by the Council, because of the obvious need for its
speedy adoption, the Soviet delegation wishes to state
that it would have preferred a stronger resolution
providing for more effective measures. The Soviet
delegation said this also at today's informal meeting
of members of the Council. The Soviet Union firmly
advocates complete implementation of resolution 353
(1974); it favours immediate and complete implemen.
tation of all parts and provisions of that resolution.
As has ‘already been stated and agreed. we reserve
the right to submit proposals along these lines at a
later stage.

128. And now, as PRESIDENT, 1 call on the
representative of Cyprus.

129. Mr. ROSSIDES (Cyprus): I shall try not to
take up too much of the Council's time. but [ must
reply to certain statements made by the representative
of Turkey.

130. When Turkey invaded Cyprus on 20 July. its
Prime Minister issued a statement to the effect that
its purpose was completely peaceful. that everyone
should keep quite calm because its only aim was to
re-establish the constitutionality of Cyprus. Of course,
I am not saying that we believed that statement for
a moment. But let us see what was the degree of
good faith of our neighbour Turkey in issuing that
statement. It insisted that its concen was above
.
-

all the return of constitutionality, in respect of the
coup and Archbishop Muakarios, Lut that it was
acting also out of its concern that the situation that
had caused the withdrawal of the Turkish Cypriots
from the Government and the Council of Ministers
should be returned to normal,

131. Yet, at the meeting of 10 August in Geneva,
when the Greek Cypriots proposed that there should
be a bicommunal Council of Ministers with propor.
tionate representation for the Turkish minority, the

Turkish side rejected that proposal. They rejected

the proposal because they wanted a geographical
division of the territory as a means towards partition,
with all the disastrous consequences that that would
entail for the people of Cyprus. That shows the
remarkably bad faith of Turkey. In fact, it did not
accept a return to constitutionality. In fact, it did not
invade Cyprus with peaceful aims. On the contrary,
its aim was the destruction of the independence of
Cyprus, the destruction of the Treaty of Guarantee,
the destruction of every treaty and every agreement
entered into by Turkey in respect of Cyprus. It
refused to comply with the first cease-fire and the
second cease-fire, both of which it had accepted.
instead of beginning to withdraw its forces, it
brought in even larger forces, until it now has
about 40.000 men on that little island: and it is
constantly bringing in arms, tanks, and so on, for the
purpose of carrying on a war against the people of
Cyprus. And when | say “the people of Cyprus’,
| mean all the people of Cyprus. for the Turkish
Cypriots are also suffering from this war.

132. The real purpose of the war is the aggrandizement of Turkey through a colonialist, imperialist
policy in respect of Cyprus. That is the reality.

133. The representative of Turkey, in saying that
Cyprus is not non-aligned. is entirely wrong. It is not
for him to decide whether or not Cyprus is non-aligned.
It is non-aligned in its policy and it has been so
all along in the United Nations. It is not the few
officers from Greece in the National Guard that
determine anything because the National Guard does
not formulate the policy of Cyprus.

134. [believe we have had a discussion of the whole
problem here. whereas what is needed is to stop the
fighting in Cyprus so that there can be cool discussion,
It seems to me that cool und effective discussion
is not possible in the Geneva conference of the
guarantors for obvious reasons whch have been
demonstrated here and in Cyprus. Therefore. we wish
to have the United Nations more involved in this
problem and in its solution. Consequently, we would
gladly sec u mission from the United Nations go
to Cyprus. examine the situation and take a greater
interest in the solution of the problem. Indeed.
Cyprus is a Member of the United Nations and
its guarantee and protection is the United Nations
itselfmthe Sceurity Council and the United Nations

16

as a whole. We come here to seek protection. No
other protection has come to Cyprus during these
two weeks, because Cyprus does not belong to any
military alliance. That is the proof of its nonalignment. The non-aligned countries do not have an
army, nor do they have military pacts that would
enable them to come to the rescue of Cyprus by
force. Is that why Cyprus is being torn to pieces
and, at the same time, being told that it is not
non-aligned? That is adding insult to injury.

135. Cyprus has followed a policy consistent with its
principles, which are the principles of the Charter,
It has %llowed a policy which has always been
constructive towards peace, towards world under.
standing and towards the progress of humanity in the
right direction, which is not war and which is not
the use of force, but the very opposite of that-—in
other words, everything that is entailed in the
concept of non-alignment.

136. The PRESIDENT (translation from Russian):
1 call on the representative of Greece.

137. Mr. CARAYANNIS (Greece): | am not going to

take much of the Council's time at this late hour.

My Turkish colleague made several references to my
statement. | do not really think there is any need to

answer him. His statements differ from mine because

he has different policies from mine, and his position

is well known to all members of the Council, just as

my position is well known.

138. 1 shall confine myself to replying to what he
said about the Geneva conference by quoting the
following from a dispatch of Agence France Presse
dated today:

**In Geneva it looked as though Turkey had decided
to use military methods in the diplomatic field’ .4

139. 1 should like to refer to only one point in the
statement of the representative of Turkey. In my
statement | referred only incidentally to the 34 per cent
of the territory of Cyprus which Turkey is demanding
for the autonomous part of Cyprus. In thinking of
Cyprus, we do not think in lerms of percentages.
Turkey of course does. But [ did not quite understand
the point he was making when he said that he is
interested in the Turkish population of the island. Is
he interested in terms of human beings or in terms
of real estate?

140. The PRESIDENT (translation from Russian):
1 call on the representative of Turkey.

141, Mr. OLCAY (Turkey): | shall be very brief.
In answer to the question put by my colleague from
Greece, 1 would say: both.

142. Inanswer to Mr. Rossides, 1 would again request
him to refrain, if possible. from speaking on behalf
of the Turkish Cypriots. Secondly, I would say that
past history, as well as the history of the last month,
has been distorted by him this morning. 1 would
therefore invite all members to check his statements
aguinst more trustworthy sources.

143. The PRESIDENT (translation from Russian):
1 call on the representative of Cyprus.

144. Mr. ROSSIDES (Cyprus): With respect to the
statement made by the representative of Turkey that
he does not permit me to speak on behalf of the Turkish
Cypriots. 1 think he is not entitled to dictate who
represents the Turkish Cypriots, unless he claims that
he represents them. The Turkish Cypriots are part of
the island of Cyprus und | can speak on behalf of the
bulk of the Turkish Cypriots but not on behalf of the
ugents of Turkey. I know that the bulk of the Turkish
Cypriots have also suffered from these actions of
Turkey, though obviously not to the same extent,

145. 1 should like to point out also that the represen.
tative of Turkey seems to dispute the accuracy of
my statement. Does he dispute the bad faith of
Turkey in speaking about constitutionality, pretending
to support constitutionality, but rejecting anything that

is constitutional, bringing catastrophe and upheaval
and havoc to the island? Does he dispute the bad faith
of Turkey in agreeing to the cease-fire and then refusing
to comply with the cease-fire in spite of an express
agreement? Does he deny the bad faith of Turkey in
accepting the cease-fire of the United Nations and in
violating it at the same time? Does he deny the fact that
Turkey was trying to negotiate under the threat and
use of military force—uprecedented conduct since the
time of Hitler? Does he deny these facts? Does he
deny that Turkey brought about the breakdown of the
negotiations by that threat of the use of force, and
precisely by that threat—'* Unless you give me a reply
within so many hours | am going to attack the island
with my superior force''? Does he deny the inhumanity
of this conduct? Does he deny the violation of the
Charterin its every aspect by that conduct? If he denies
these things. then of course we know where Turkey
stands,

146. The PRESIDENT (translation from Russian):
1 call on the representative of Turkey.

147. Mr. OLCAY (Turkey): I do.

The meeting rose at 6 a.m.

Voting Summary
Yes: 015 | No: | Abstentions: | Non-Voting: | Total voting membership:
Y AUSTRALIA
Y AUSTRIA
Y BELARUS
Y CHINA
Y COSTA RICA
Y FRANCE
Y INDONESIA
Y IRAQ
Y KENYA
Y MAURITANIA
Y PERU
Y USSR
Y UNITED KINGDOM
Y CAMEROON
Y UNITED STATES