Security Council resolution 293 (1971) [on extension of the stationing in Cyprus of the UN Peace-keeping Force]
Symbol: S/RES/293(1971)
Date: 1971-05-26
Meeting record: S/PV.1567
Subjects: UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus|PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS|CYPRUS|CYPRUS QUESTION
Notes: Extends the stationing in Cyprus of the UN Peace-keeping Force.
In: Resolutions and decisions of the Security Council, 1971. - S/INF/27. - 1972. - p. 1. - (SCOR, 26th year).

Resolution 293 (1971)
of 26 May 1971

The Security Council,

Noting from the report of the Secretary-General of
20 May 1971 4 that in the present circumstances the
United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus is still
needed if peace is to be maintained in the island,

Noting that the Government of Cyprus has agreed
that in view of the prevailing conditions in the island
it is necessary to continue the Force beyond 15 June
1971,

Noting also from the report the conditions prevailing
in the island,

1. Reaffirms its resolutions 186 (1964) of 4 March,
187 (1964) of 13 March, 192 (1964) of 20 June,
193 (1964) of 9 August, 194 (1964) of 25 September and 198 (1964) of 18 December 1964, 201
(1965) of 19 March, 206 (1965) of 15 June, 207
(1965) of 10 August and 219 (1965) of 17 December 1965, 220 (1966) of 16 March, 222 (1966) of
16 June and 231 (1966) of 15 December 1966, 238
(1967) of 19 June and 244 (1967) of 22 December
1967, 247 (1968) of 18 March, 254 (1968) of 18
June and 261 (1968) of 10 December 1968, 266
(1969) of 10 June and 274 (1969) of 11 December
1969, and 281 (1970) of 9 June and 291 (1970) of
10 December 1970, and the consensus expressed by
the President at the 1143rd meeting on 11 August
1964 and at the 1383rd meeting on 25 November
1967;

2. Urges the parties concerned to act with the utmost
restraint and to continue determined co-operative efforts
to achieve the objectives of the Security Council, by
availing themselves in a constructive manner of the
present auspicious climate and opportunities;

3. Extends once more the stationing in Cyprus of
the United Nations Peace-keeping Force, established
under Security Council resolution 186 (1964), for a
further period ending 15 December 1971, in the
expectation that by then sufficient progress towards a
final solution will make possible a withdrawal or
substantial reduction of the Force.

Adopted unanimously at the
1567th meeting.

4 Ibid., document S/10199.

Texto español (official Spanish version): RESOLUCIONES APROBADAS Y DECISIONES TOMADAS POR EL CONSEJO
DE SEGURIDAD EN 1971

Parte I. Cuestiones examinadas por el Consejo de Seguridad en cumplimiento de su responsabilidad de mantener la paz y la seguridad internacionales

LA CUESTION DE CHIPRE!

Decisión

En su 1567a. sesión, celebrada el 26 de mayo de
1971, el Consejo decidió invitar a los representantes
de Chipre, Turquía y Grecia a participar, sin voto, en
la discusión del tema titulado “Carta, de fecha 26 de
diciembre de 1963, dirigida al Presidente del Consejo
de Seguridad por el Representante Permanente de
Chipre ante las Naciones Unidas (S/5488)?: informe
del Secretario General sobre la Operación de las
Naciones Unidas en Chipre (S/10199)”3.

Resolución 293 (1971)
de 26 de mayo de 1971

El Consejo de Seguridad,

Tomando nota de que, según el informe del Secretario General de 20 de mayo de 1971*, en las actuales
circunstancias sigue siendo necesaria la Fuerza de las
Naciones Unidas para el Mantenimiento de la Paz en
Chipre si se quiere mantener la paz en la isla,

1 El Consejo adoptó también resoluciones o decisiones sobre
esta cuestión en 1963, 1964, 1965, 1966, 1967, 1968, 1969 y

2 Véase Actas Oficiales del Consejo de Seguridad, Decimoctavo Año, Suplemento de octubre, noviembre y diciembre
de 1963.

3 Ibid, Vigésimo Sexto Año, Suplemento de abril, mayo y
junio de 1971.

*4 Ibid., documento S/10199.

Tomando nota de que el Gobierno de Chipre ha
convenido en que, en vista de las condiciones existentes
en la isla, es necesario mantener en ella la Fuerza después del 15 de junio de 1971,

Tomando nota también de las condiciones existentes
en la isla según lo expuesto en el informe,

1. Reafirma sus resoluciones 186 (1964) de 4 de
marzo, 187 (1964) de 13 de marzo, 192 (1964) de
20 de junio, 193 (1964) de 9 de agosto, 194 (1964)
de 25 de septiembre y 198 (1964) de 18 de diciembre
de 1964, 201 (1965) de 19 de marzo, 206 (1965) de
15 de junio, 207 (1965) de 10 de agosto y 219 (1965)
de 17 de diciembre de 1965, 220 (1966) de 16 de
marzo, 222 (1966) de 16 de junio y 231 (1966) de
15 de diciembre de 1966, 238 (1967) de 19 de junio
y 244 (1967) de 22 de diciembre de 1967, 247
(1968) de 18 de marzo, 254 (1968) de 18 de junio y
261 (1968) de 10 de diciembre de 1968, 266 (1969)
de 10 de junio y 274 (1969) de 11 de diciembre de
1969, y 281 (1970) de 9 de junio y 291 (1970) de
10 de diciembre de 1970, así como el consenso expresado por el Presidente en la 1143a. sesión, celebrada
el 11 de agosto de 1964, y en la 1383a. sesión, celebrada el 24 de noviembre de 1967;

2. Exhorta a las partes interesadas a que actúen
con la mayor mesura y a que continúen en cooperación sus decididos esfuerzos para alcanzar los objetivos
del Consejo de Seguridad aprovechando de manera
constructiva el ambiente y las oportunidades propicios
que hay en la actualidad;

3. Prorroga una vez más por un nuevo plazo, que
expirará el 15 de diciembre de 1971, el estacionamiento
en Chipre de la Fuerza de las Naciones Unidas para
el Mantenimiento de la Paz, creada por la resolución
186 (1964) del Consejo de Seguridad, con la esperanza
de que para entonces se hayan realizado progresos
suficientes hacia una solución definitiva a fin de que
sea posible retirar o reducir considerablemente la
Fuerza.

Aprobada por unanimidad
en la 1567a. sesión.

Decisión

En su 1612a. sesión, celebrada el 13 de diciembre
de 1971, el Consejo decidió invitar a los representantes
de Chipre, Turquía y Grecia a participar, sin voto,
en la discusión del tema titulado “Carta, de fecha
26 de diciembre de 1963, dirigida al Presidente del
Consejo de Seguridad por el Representante Permanente
de Chipre ante las Naciones Unidas (S/5S488)": informe del Secretario General sobre la Operación de las
Naciones Unidas en Chipre (S/10401)”*.

Resolución 305 (1971)
de 13 de diciembre de 1971

El Consejo de Seguridad,

Tomando nota de que, según el informe del Secretario General de 30 de noviembre de 19717, en las
actuales circunstancias sigue siendo necesaria la Fuerza
de las Naciones Unidas para el Mantenimiento de la
Paz en Chipre si se quiere mantener la paz en la isla,

Tomamdo nota de que el Gobierno de Chipre ha
convenido en que, en vista de las condiciones existentes

5 Ibid., Decimoctavo Año, Suplemento de octubre, noviembre y diciembre de 1963.

S Ibid., Vigésimo Sexto Año, Suplemento de octubre, noviembre y diciembre de 1971.

7 Ibid., documento S/10401.

en la isla, es necesario mantener en ella la Fuerza después del 15 de diciembre de 1971,

Tomando nota también de las condiciones existentes
en la isla según lo expuesto en el informe,

1. Reafirma sus resoluciones 186 (1964) de 4 de
marzo, 187 (1964) de 13 de marzo, 192 (1964) de
20 de junio, 193 (1964) de 9 de agosto, 194 (1964)
de 25 de septiembre y 198 (1964) de 18 de diciembre
de 1964, 201 (1965) de 19 de marzo, 206 (1965) de
15 de junio, 207 (1965) de 10 de agosto y 219
(1965) de 17 de diciembre de 1965, 220 (1966) de
16 de marzo, 222 (1966) de 16 de junio y 231 (1966)
de 15 de diciembre de 1966, 238 (1967) de 19 de
junio y 244 (1967) de 22 de diciembre de 1967,
247 (1968) de 18 de marzo, 254 (1968) de 18 de
junio y 261 (1968) de 10 de diciembre de 1968,
266 (1969) de 10 de junio y 274 (1969) de 11 de
diciembre de 1969, 281 (1970) de 9 de junio y 291
(1970) de 10 de diciembre de 1970, y 293 (1971) de
26 de mayo de 1971, así como el consenso expresado
por el Presidente en la 1143a. sesión, celebrada el
11 de agosto de 1964, y en la 1383a. sesión, celebrada
el 24 de noviembre de 1967;

2. Exhorta alas partes interesadas a que actúen con
la mayor mesura y a que continúen y aceleren en
cooperación sus decididos esfuerzos para alcanzar los
objetivos del Consejo de Seguridad aprovechando de
manera constructiva el ambiente y las oportunidades
propicios que hay en la actualidad;

3. Prorroga una vez más por un nuevo plazo, que
expirará el 15 de junio de 1972, el estacionamiento en
Chipre de la Fuerza de las Naciones Unidas para el
Mantenimiento de la Paz, creada por la resolución 186
(1964) del Consejo de Seguridad, con la esperanza de
que para entonces se hayan realizado progresos suficientes hacia una solución definitiva a fin de que sea
posible retirar o reducir considerablemente la Fuerza.

Aprobada en la 1612a. sesión por 14 votos contra ningunos.

83 Un miembro (China) no participó en la votación.

DENUNCIA DEL SENEGAL?

Decisiones

En su 1569a. sesión, celebrada el 12 de julio de
1971, el Consejo decidió invitar a los representantes

9 El Consejo adoptó también resoluciones o decisiones sobre
esta cuestión en 1963, 1965 y 1969.

del Senegal y Guinea a participar, sin voto, en la discusión del tema titulado “Denuncia del Senegal: carta,
de fecha 6 de julio de 1971, dirigida al Presidente del
Consejo de Seguridad por el Representante Permanente
del Senegal ante las Naciones Unidas (S/10251)”1,

10 Véase Actas Oficiales del Consejo de Seguridad, Vigésimo
Sexto Año, Suplemento de julio, agosto y septiembre de 1971.

Texte français (official French version): RESOLUTIONS ADOPTEES ET DECISIONS PRISES
PAR LE CONSEIL DE SECURITE EN 1971

Première partie. — Questions examinées par le Conseil de sécurité en tant qu’organe
responsable du maintien de la paix et de la sécurité internationales

LA QUESTION DE CHYPRE"

Décision

A sa 1567° séance, le 26 mai 1971, ke Conseil a
décidé d'inviter les représentants de Chypre, de la
Turquie et de la Grèce à participer, sans droit de vote,
à la discussion de la question intitulée ‘“Lettre, en date
du 26 décembre 1963, adressée au Président du Conseil de sécurité par le représentant permanent de
Chypre auprès de l'Organisation des Nations Unies
(S/5488*); rapport du Secrétaire général sur l’Opération des Nations Unies à Chypre (S/10199#)".

Résolution 293 (1971)
du 26 mai 1971

Le Conseil de vécurité,

Notant que, selon le rapport du Secrétaire général,
en date du 20 mai 19714 la présence de la Force des
Nations Unies chargée du maintien de la paix à Chypre
demeure nécessaire dans les circonstances tes si
l'on veut que la paix soit maintenue dans l’île,

! (Question ayant fait l’objet de résolutions ou décisions de
la pat du Consetl en 1963, 1964, 1965, 1966, 1967, 1968,
1969 et 1970.

3 Voir Documents offictels du Conseil de sécurité, dix-huitième année, Supplément d'octobre, novembre et décembre
1961.

4 lbed , vingt-vaième année, Supplément d'avril, mai et juin
1971

4 1tid., document S/10199.

Notant que le Gouvernement chypriote est convenu
que, en raison de Ja situation qui règne dans l'île, il
est nécessaire de maintenir la Force des Nations Unies
en fonctions au-delà du 15 juin 1971.

Notant également \a situation qui règne dans Vle,
telle qu’elle ressort du rapport.

1. Réaffirme ses résolutions 186 (1964) du 4 mars,
187 (1964) du 13 mars. 192 (1964) du 20 juin, !93
(1964) du 9 août, 194 (1964) du 25 septembre et
198 (1964) du 18 décembre 1964, 201 (1965) du
19 mars, 206 (1965) du 15 juin. 207 (1965) du 10
août et 219 (1965) du 17 décembre 1965. 220 (1966)
du 16 mars, 222 (1966) du 16 juin et 231 (1966) du
15 décembre 1966, 238 (1967) du 19 juin et 244
(1967) du 22 decembre 1967, 247 (1968) du 1%
mars, 254 (1968) du 18 juin et 261 (196&) du 10 decembre 1968, 266 (1969) du 10 juin et 274 (19691
du 11 décembre 1969, et 281 (1970) du 9 juin et
291 (1970) du 10 décembre 1970, ainsi que les con.
sensus exprimés par le Président à la 1143" séance.
le 11 août 1964, et à la 1383" séance, le 25 novembre
1967;

2. Prie instamment \cs parties intéressées de fire
preuve de la plus grande modération et de poursuivre
résolument leurs efforts concertés en vuc d'atteindre
les objectifs du Conseil de sécurité, en mettant à profit
de façon constructive le climat et l'occasion propices
actuctis;

3. Prolonge à nouveau, d’une période prenant fin
le 15 décembre 1971, le stationnement à Chypre de
la Force des Nations Unies chargée du maintien de la
paix, qu’il a créée par sa résolution 186 (1964), dans
l'espoir que des progrès suffisants dans la voie d'une
solution finale auront été accomplis d'ici là pour per-
mettre le retrait de la Force ou une réduction substantielle de son effectif.

Adoptée à l'unanimité
à la 1567° séance.

Décision

Â sa 1612° séance, le 13 décembre 1971, le Conseil
a décidé d'inviter les représentants de Ch , de la
Turquie et de la Grèce à participer, sans droit de vote,
À la discussion de la question intitulée “Lettre, en date
du 26 décembre 1963, adressée au Président du Conseil
de sécurité q le représentant permanent de Ch
auprès de l'Organisation des Nations Unies (s/5488f) :
rapport du Secrétaire général sur l'Opération des
Nations Unies à Chypre (S/10401%)".

Résolution 305 (1971)
du 13 décembre 1971

Le Conseil de sécurité,

Notant que, selon le rapport du Secrétaire général,
en date du 30 novembre 1971”, la présence de la Force
des Nations Unies chargée du maintien de la paix à
Chypre demeure nécessaire dans les circonstances pré-
pentes si l'on veut que la paix soit maintenue dans
, e,

5 Ibid. dix-huitième année, Supplément d'octobre, novembre
et décembre 1963

* fbid., vingt:sixième année, Supplément d'octobre, novembre
et décembre 1971.
7 Ibid, document 8/10401.

Décisions

À sa 1569* séance, le 12 juillet 1971, le Conseil a
décidé d'inviter les représentants du Sénégal et de la
Guinée à participer, sans droit de vote, à la discussion
de la question intitulée “Plainte du Sénégal : lettre,
en date du 6 juillet 1971, adressée au Président du
Conseil de sécurité par le représentant permanent du

9 Question ayant fait l'objet qe résolutions ou décisions de
Ja part Conseil en 1963, 1965 et 1968.

Notan: que le Gouvernement chypriote est convenu
que, en raison de la situation qui règne dans l’île, il
est nécessaire de maintenir la Force des-Nations Unies
en fonctions au-delà du 15 décembre 1971,

Notant également la situation qui règne dans l’île,
telle qu'elle ressort du rapport,

1.R ses résolutions 186 (1964) du 4 mars,
187 (1964) du 13 mars, 192 (1964) du 20 juin, 193
(1964) du 9 août, 194 (1964) du 25 septembre et
198 (1964) du 18 décembre 1964, 201 (1965) du
19 mars, 206 (1965) du 15 juin, 207 (1965) du 10
août et 219 (1965) du 17 décembre 1965, 220 (1966)
du 16 mars, 222 (1966) du 16 juin et 231 (1966) du
15 décembre 1966, 238 (1967) du 19 juin et 244
(1967) du 22 décembre 1967, 247 (1968) du 18
mars, 254 (1968) du 18 juin et 261 (1968) du 10 dé-
cembre 1968, 266 (1969) du 10 juin et 274 (1969)
du 11 décembre 1969, 281 (1970) du 9 juin et 291
(1970) du 10 décembre 1970, et 293 (1971) du 26
mai 1971, ainsi que les consensus exprimés par le
Président à la 1143° séance, le 11 août 1964, et à la
13B3° séance, le 25 novembre 1967;

2. Prie instamment les parties intéressées de faire
preuve de la plus grande modération et de poursuivre
de manière accélérée et résolue leurs efforts concertés
en vue d'atteindre les objectifs du Conseil de sécurité,
en mettant à profit de façon constructive le climat et
l'occasion propices actuels;

3. Protonge à nouveau, d’une période prenant fin lc
15 juin 1972, le stationnement à Chypre de la Force
des Nations Unies chargée du maintien de la paix, qu’il
a créée par sa résolution 186 (1964), dans l'espoir
que des progrès suffisants dans la voie d’une solution
finale auront été accomplis d'ici là pour permettre
le retrait de ia Force ou une réduction substantielle
de son effectif.

Adoptée à la 1612€ séance
par 14 voix contre zéro®.

S L'un des membres (Chine) n'a pas participé au vote.

SENEGAL®

Sénégal auprès de l'Orgaüisation des. Nations Unies
(S/102511)",

À sa 1570 séance, le 13 juillet 1971, le Conseil a
décidé d'inviter les représentants du Mali, du Soudan

10 Voir Documents officiels du Conseil de sécurité, vinetsixième année, Supplément de juillet, août et septembre 1971.

Русский текст (official Russian version): РЕЗОЛЮЦИИ И РЕШЕНИЯ,
ПРИНЯТЫЕ СОВЕТОМ БЕЗОПАСНОСТИ В 1971 ГОДУ

Часть 1. Вопросы, рассматривавшиеся Советом Безопасности в порядке возложенной на
него ответственности за поддержание международного мира и безопасности

ВОПРОС О КИПРЕ!

Решение

26 мая 1971 года Совет на своем 1567-м за-
седании постановил пригласить представителей
Кипра, Турции и Греции принять участие без
права голоса в обсуждении пункта, сформули-
рованного следующим образом: «Письмо По-
стоянного представителя Кипра при Организа-
ции Объединенных Наций от 26 декабря 1963
года на имя Председателя Совета Безопасности
(5/5488)°: доклад Генерального секретаря об
операциях Организации Объединенных Наций
на Кипре (5/10199)»3.

Резолюция 293 (1971)
от 26 мая 1971 года

Совет Безопасности,

отмечая на основании доклада Генерального
секретаря от 20 мая 1971 года*, что при суще-
ствующих обстоятельствах присутствие Воору-
женных сил Организации Объединенных Наций
по поддержанию мира на Кипре все еще необ-
ходимо для поддержания мира на острове,

1 Резолюции или решения по этому вопросу были также
приняты Советом в 1963-1970 годах.

2 См. Официальные отчеты Совета Безопасности, во-
семнадцатый год, дополнение за октябрь, ноябрь и де-
кабрь 1963 года.

8 Там же, двадцать шестой год, дополнение за апрель,
май и июнь 1971 года.

* Там же, документ $/10199.

отмечая, что правительство Кипра согласи-
лось с тем, что ввиду существующей на остро-
ве обстановки необходимо продлить пребыва-
ние Вооруженных сил после 15 июня 1971 года,

отмечая также, исходя из доклада, существую-
щую на острове обстановку,

1. подтверждает свои резолюции 186 (1964)
от 4 марта, 187 (1964) от 13 марта, 192 (1964)
от 20 июня, 193 (1964) от 9 августа, 194 (1964)
от 25 сентября и 198 (1964) от 18 декабря 1964
года, 201 (1965) от 19 марта, 206 (1965) от 15
июня, 207 (1965) от 10 августа и 219 (1965) от
17 декабря 1965 года, 220 (1966) от 16 марта,
222 (1966) от 16 июня и 231 (1966) от 15 де-
кабря 1966 года, 238 (1967) от 19 июня и 244
(1967) от 22 декабря 1967 года, 247 (1968) от
18 марта, 254 (1968) от 18 июня и 261 (1968)
от 10 декабря 1968 года, 266 (1969) от 10 июня
и 274 (1969) от 11 декабря 1969 года и 281
(1970) от 9 июня и 291 (1970) от 10 декабря
1970 года, а также общее мнение, выраженное
Председателем на 1143-м заседании 11 августа
1964 года и на 1383-м заседании 25 ноября
1967 года,

2. настоятельно призывает заинтересованные
стороны действовать с крайней сдержанностью
и продолжать прилагать решительные совмест-
ные усилия к достижению целей Совета Безо-
пасности, конструктивно используя существую-
щую благоприятную обстановку и ВОозМмОоЖНо-
сти;

3. продлевает еще раз пребывание на Кипре
Вооруженных сил Организации Объединенных
Наций по поддержанию мира, созданных в со-
ответствии с резолюцией Совета Безопасности
186 (1964), на новый срок, истекающий 15 де-
кабря 1971 года, предполагая, что достаточный
прогресс, достигнутый к тому времени в окон-
чательном разрешении проблемы, сделает воз-
можным вывод или значительное сокращение
Вооруженных сил.

Принята единогласно
на 1567-м заседании.

Решение

18 декабря 1971 года Совет на своем 1612-м
заседании постановил пригласить представите-
лей Кипра, Турции и Греции принять участие
без права голоса в обсуждении пункта, сформу-
лированного следующим образом: «Письмо По-
стоянного представителя Кипра при Организа-
ции Объединенных Наций от 26 декабря 1963
года на имя Председателя Совета Безопасности
($/5484)°: доклад Генерального секретаря об
операциях Организации Объединенных Наций
на Кипре (5/10401)»$.

Резолюция 305 (1971)
от 18 декабря 1971 года

Совет Безопасности,

отмечая на основании доклада Генерального
секретаря от 30 ноября 1971 года’, что при су-
ществующих обстоятельствах присутствие Во-
оруженных сил Организации Объединенных На-
ций по поддержанию мира на Кипре все еще
необходимо для поддержания мира на острове,

отмечая, что правительство Кипра согласи-
лось с тем, что ввиду существующей на острове

5 Там же, восемнадцатый год, дополнение за октябрь,
ноябрь и декабрь 1963 года.

в 'Гам же, двадцать шестой год, дополнение за октябрь,
ноябрь и декабрь 1971 года.

т Гам же, документ $/10401.

обстановки необходимо продлить пребывание
Вооруженных сил после 15 декабря 1971 года,

отмечая также, исходя из доклада, существую -
щую на острове обстановку,

1. поддерживает свои резолюции 186 (1964)
от 4 марта, 187 (1964) от 13 марта, 192 (1964)
от 20 июня, 193 (1964) от 9 августа, 194 (1964)
от 25 сентября и 198 (1964) от 18 декабря 1964
года, 201 (1965) от 19 марта, 206 (1965) от 15
июня, 207 (1965) от 10 августа и 219 (1965) от
17 декабря 1965 года, 220 (1966) от 16 марта,
222 (1966) от 16 июня и 231 (1966) от 15 декаб-
ря 1966 года, 238 (1967) от 19 июня и 244 (1967)
от 22 декабря 1967 года, 247 (1968) от 18 марта,
254 (1968) от 18 июня и 261 (1968) от 10 декаб-
ря 1968 года, 266 (1969) от 10 июня и 274 (1969)
от 11 декабря 1969 года, 281 (1970) от 9 июня
и 291 (1970) от 10 декабря 1970 года и 293
(1971) от 26 мая 1971 года, а также общее
мнение, выраженное Председателем на 1143-м
заседании 11 августа 1964 года и на 1383-м за-
седании 25 ноября 1967 года,

2. настоятельно призывает заинтересованные
стороны действовать с крайней сдержанностью,
продолжать прилагать решительные совместные
усилия и активизировать их для достижения
целей Совета Безопасности, конструктивно ис-
пользуя существующую благоприятную обста-
новку и возможности;

3. продлевает еще раз пребывание на Кипре
Вооруженных сил Организации Объединенных
Наций по поддержанию мира, созданных в со-
ответствии с резолюцией Совета Безопасности
186 (1964), на новый срок, истекающий 15 июня
1972 года, предполагая, что достаточный про-
гресс, достигнутый к тому времени в оконча-
тельном разрешении проблемы, сделает воз-
можным вывод или значительное сокращение
Вооруженных сил.

Принята на 1612-м засе-
дании 14 голосами, при
этом никто не голосовал
против.

8 Один член Совета (Китай) не принимал участия В
голосовании.

ЖАЛОБА

Решения

12 июля 1971 года Совет на своем 1569-м за-
седании постановил пригласить представите-
лей Сенегала и Гвинеи принять участие без
права голоса в обсуждении пункта, сформули-

® Резолюции или решения по этому вопросу были так-
же приняты Советом в 1963, 1965 и 1969 годах.

СЕНЕГАЛА®

рованного следующим образом: «Жалоба Се-
негала: письмо Постоянного представителя Се-
негала при Организации Объединенных Наций
от 6 июля 1971 года на имя Председателя Со-
вета Безопасности (5/10251)»1!°,

10 См. Официальные отчеты Совета Безопасности, двад-
цать шестой год, дополнение за июль, август и сентябрь
1971 года.

中文文本 (official Chinese version): 一 九 七 一 年 安全 理事 会 通过 的 决议 及 决定

第 一 部 分 .

安全 理事 会 依据 其 维持 国际 和 平 及 安全 的 职责 审议 的 问题

塞浦路斯 问题 :

决定
一 九 七 一 年 五 月 二 十 六 日 ， 理 事 会 第 一 五 六 七 次
会 议决 定 邀 请 塞浦路斯 、 土 耳 其 及 希腊 代表 参加 讨论
下 列 项 目 ， 但 无 投票 权 : “一 九 六 三 年 十 二 月 二 十 六
日 塞浦路斯 驻 联合 国 常 驻 代 表 致 安全 理事 会 主席 函

《3/5488):2 秘书 长 关于 联合 国 在 塞浦路斯 行动 的 报
告 书 〈S/10199)”。3

一 九 七 一 年 五 月 二 十 六 日
第 二 九 三 号 决议 (1971)

安全 理事 会 ，

1 一 九 六 三 年 、 一 九 六 四 年 、 一 九 六 五 年 ,一 九 六 六
年 、 一 九 六 七 年 、 一 九 六 八 年 、 一 九 六 九 年 及 一 九 七 〇 年 理
事 会 也 曾 就 本 问题 通过 决议 或 决定 。

2 参看 安全 理事 会 正式 纪录 ， 第 十 八 年 ， 一 九 六 三 年
十 请、 十 一 月 及 十 二 月 份 补 编 。

3 同上 ， 第 二 十 六 年 ， 一 九 七 一 年 四 月 、 五 月 及 六 月
份 补 编 。

鉴于 一 九 七 一 年 五 月 二 十 日 秘书 长 报告 4 称 ， 如
欲 维持 塞浦路斯 和 平 ， 在 目前 情况 下 仍然 需要 联合 国
驻 塞 浦 路 斯 维持 和 平 部 队 驻 防 ，

获 坟 塞浦路斯 政府 已 同意 , 由 于 该 岛 现 有 情况 , 该
部 队 在 一 九 七 一 年 六 月 十 五 日 以 后 仍 须 继续 驻 留 ，

又 鉴于 该 报告 所 载 该 岛 的 现 有 情 襄 ，

1 重申 理事 会 一 九 六 四 年 三 月 四 日 第 一 八 六 号
决议 〈1964)， 三 月 十 三 日 第 一 八 七 号 决议 〈1964)，
六 月 二 十 日 第 一 九 二 号 决议 〈1964), 八 月 九 日 第 一 妃
三 号 决议 (1964)， 九 月 二 十 五 日 第 一 九 四 号 决议
《1964)， 及 十 二 月 十 八 日 第 一 九 八 号 决议 〈1964)， 一
九 六 五 年 三 月 十 九 日 第 二 O 〇 一 号 决议 〈1965), 六 月 十
五 日 第 二 O 〇 六 号 决议 〈1965), 八 月 十 日 第 二 O 〇 七 号 决
议 〈1965), 及 十 二 月 十 七 日 第 二 一 九 号 决议 〈1965)，
一 九 六 六 年 三 月 十 六 日 第 二 二 O 〇 号 决议 (1966)， 六
月 十 六 日 第 二 二 二 号 决议 (1966)， 及 十 二 月 十 五 日
第 二 三 一 号 决议 〈1966), 一 九 六 七 年 六 月 十 九 日 第 二
三 八 号 决议 〈1967) 及 十 二 月 二 十 二 日 第 二 四 四 号 决

议 〈1967)， 一 九 六 八 年 三 月 十 八 日 第 二 四 七 号 决议

4 同上 ， 文 件 S/10199。
《1968)， 六 月 十 八 日 第 二 五 四 号 决议 〈1968) 及 十 二
月 十 日 第 二 六 一 号 决议 〈1968), 一 九 六 九 年 六 月 十 日
第 二 六 六 号 决议 〈1969) 及 十 二 月 十 一 日 第 二 七 四 号
决议 〈1969), 及 一 九 七 O 〇 年 六 月 九 日 第 二 八 一 号 决议
(1970) 及 十 二 月 十 日 第 二 九 一 号 决议 1970), 以 及 主
席 在 一 九 六 四 年 八 月 十 一 日 第 一 一 四 三 次 会 议 及 一 九
六 七 年 十 一 月 二 十 五 日 第 一 三 八 三 次 会 议 所 表示 的 共
同意 见 ，

2， 促请 关系 各 方 力 自 克制 ， 并 积极 利用 当前 良
好 情况 及 机 会 继续 坚决 合作 ， 以 达成 安全 理事 会 的 目
标 ;

3. 再 次 延长 依据 安全 理事 会 第 一 八 六 号 决议
《1964)》 建立 的 联合 国 驻 塞浦路斯 维持 和 平 部 队 的 驻
防 期 限 至 一 九 七 一 年 十 二 月 十 五 日 ， 期 望 属 时 对 达成
最 后 解决 当 已 有 足够 进展 ， 介 可 撤退 或 大 量 裁减 该 部

队 。
第 一 五 六 七 次 会 议 一 臻 通过

决定

一 九 七 一 年 十 二 月 十 三 日 ， 理 事 会 第 一 六 一 二 次
会 议决 定 邀 请 塞浦路斯 、 土 耳 其 及 希腊 代表 参加 讨论
下 列 项 目 ， 但 无 投票 权 : “一 九 六 三 年 十 二 月 二 十 六
日 塞浦路斯 驻 联合 国 常任 代表 致 安全 理事 会 主席 范
〈S/5488):5 秘书 长 关于 联合 国 在 塞浦路斯 行动 的 报
告 书 〈S/104017”。6

一 九 七 一 年 十 二 月 十 三 日
第 三 〇 五 号 决议 (1971)

安全 理事 会 ，
鉴于 一 九 七 一 年 十 一 月 三 十 日 秘书 长 报告 书 7 称

5 同上 ， 第 十 入 年 ， 一 九 六 三 年 十 月 、 十 一 月 及 十 二 月
份 科 编 。

6 闻 上 ， 第 二 十 六 年 ， 一 九 七 一 年 十 月 、 十 一 月 及 十
二 月 份 补 编 。

7 同上 ， 文 件 S/10401。

如 和 欲 维持 塞浦路斯 和 平 ， 在 目前 情况 下 仍然 需要 联合
国 驻 塞浦路斯 维持 和 平 部 队 驻 防 ，

获 筷 塞浦路斯 政府 已 同意 , 由 于 该 岛 现 有 情况 , 该
部 队 在 一 九 七 一 年 十 二 月 十 五 日 以 后 仍 须 继续 驻 留 ，

又 监 于 该 报告 所 载 该 岛 的 现 有 情况 ，

1 重申 理事 会 一 九 六 四 年 三 月 四 日 第 一 八 六 号
决议 〈1964)， 三 月 十 三 日 第 一 八 七 号 决议 (1964)，
六 月 二 十 日 第 一 九 二 号 决议 〈1964), 八 月 九 日 第 一 九
三 号 决议 (1964)， 九 月 二 十 五 日 第 一 九 四 号 决议
(1964)， 及 十 二 月 十 八 日 第 一 九 八 号 决议 〈1964)， 一
九 六 五 年 三 月 十 九 日 第 二 O 一 号 决议 1965), 六 月 十
五 日 第 二 O 〇 六 号 决议 (1965)， 八 月 十 日 第 二 〇 七 号 决
议 〈1965) 及 十 二 月 十 七 日 第 二 一 九 号 决议 (1965)，
一 九 六 六 年 三 月 十 六 日 第 二 二 〇 号 决议 (1966)， 六 月
十 六 日 第 二 二 二 号 决议 1966)， 及 十 二 月 十 五 日 第 二
三 一 号 决议 (1966)， 一 九 六 七 年 六 月 十 九 日 第 二 三 八
号 决议 1967) 及 十 二 月 二 十 二 日 第 二 四 四 号 决议
(1967)， 一 九 六 八 年 三 月 十 八 日 第 二 四 七 号 决议
(1968)， 六 月 十 八 日 第 二 五 四 号 决议 (1968) 及 十 二 月
十 日 第 二 六 一 号 决议 (1968)， 一 九 六 九 年 六 月 十 日 第
二 六 六 号 决议 (1969) 及 十 二 月 十 一 日 第 二 七 四 号 决议
(1969)， 一 九 七 O 年 六 月 九 日 第 二 八 一 号 决议 (1970)
及 十 二 月 十 日 第 二 九 一 号 决议 (1970)， 一 九 七 一 年 五
月 二 十 六 日 第 二 九 三 号 决议 (1971)， 以 及 主席 在 一 九
六 四 年 八 月 十 一 日 第 一 一 四 三 次 会 议 及 一 九 六 七 年 十
一 月 二 十 五 日 第 一 三 八 三 次 会 议 所 表示 的 共同 意见 ，

2 促请 关系 各 方 力 自 克 制 ， 并 积极 利用 当前 良
好 情况 及 机 会 继续 并 加 速 坚 决 合作 ， 以 达成 安全 理事
会 的 目标

3， 再 次 直 长 依据 安全 理事 会 第 一 八 六 号 决议
〈1964) 建立 的 联合 国 驻 塞 浦 路 斯 维持 和 平 部 队 的 驻
防 期 限 至 一 九 七 二 年 六 月 十 五 日 ， 期 望 届时 对 达成 最
后 解决 当 已 有 足够 进展 ， 介 可 撤退 或 大 量 裁减 该 部
队 。

第 一 六 一 二 次 会 议 以 十 四 昧
对 堆 通 过 8

8 有 一 理事 国 《〈 中 国 ) 并 未 参加 投票 。


Draft resolution (S/10209):
i

UNITED NATIONS

SECURITY N
C O U iN C | L 25 May 1971

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

DRAFT RESOLUTION

The Security Council,
Noting from the report of the Secretary-General of 20 May 1971 (s/10199)

that in the present circumstances the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus

ig still needed if peace is to be maintained in the island,

Noting that the Government of Cyprus has agreed that in view of the prevailing
conditions in the island it is necessary to continue the Force beyond 15 June 1971,

Noting also from the report the conditions prevailing in the island,

1. Reaffirms its resolutions 186 (1964) of 4 March, 187 (1964) of 13 March,
192 (1964) of 20 June, 193 (1964) of 9 August, 194 (1964) of 25 Septerber and
198 (1964) of 18 December 1864, 201 (1965) of 19 March, 206 (1965) of 15 June,

207 (1965) of 10 August and 219 (1965 of 17 December 1965, 220 (1966) of

16 March, 222 (1966) of 16 June and 231 (1966) of 15 December 1966, 238 (1967) of

19 June and 24l (1967) of 22 December 1967, 247 (1968) of 18 March, 254 (1968) of
18 June and 261 (1968) of 10 December 1968, 266 (1969) of 10 June and 27h (1969) of
11 December 1969, and 281 (1970) of 9 June and 291 (1970) of 10 December 1970 and
the consensus expressed by the President at the 1143rd meeting on 11 August 1964 and
at the 1383rd meeting on 24 November 1967;

2. Urges the parties concerned to act with the utmost restraint and to
continue determined co-operative efforts to achieve the objectives of the Security
Council by availing themselves in a constructive manner of the present auspicious
climate and opportunities;

3. Extends once more the stationing in Cyprus of the United Nationg
Peace-keeping Force, established under Security Council resolution 186 (1964),
for a further period ending 15 December 1971, in the expectation that by then
sufficient progress towards a final solution will make possible a withdrawal or

substantial reduction of the Force.

71-10881

Meeting record:
UNITED NATIONS

SECURITY COUNCIL
OFFICIAL RECORDS

TWENTY-SIXTH YEAR

th
1567 MEETING: 26 MAY 1971

NEW YORK

CONTENTS
Page
Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/1567) .. «i 1
Expression of thanks to preceding Presidents ............. our... 1
1

Adoption of the agenda... . oo

Letter dated 26 December 1963 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to
the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/5488):
Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus

(S/10199 and COorr.1) «ov vot te

S/PV.1567
NOTE

Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with
figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.

Documents of the Security Council (symbol 8/. . .) are normally published in quarterly
Supplements of the Official Records of the Security Council. The date of the document
indicates the supplement in which it appears or in which information about it is given.

The resolutions of the Security Council, numbered in accordance with a system
adopted in 1964, are published in yearly volumes of Resolutions and Decisions of the
Security Council. The new system, which has been applied retroactively to resolutions
adopted before 1 January 1965, became fully operative on that date.
FIFTEEN HUNDRED AND SIXTY-SEVENTH MEETING
Held in New York on Wednesday, 26 May 1971, at 10.30 am.

President: Mr. Nsanzé TERENCE (Burundi).

Present: The representatives of the following States:
Argentina, Belgium, Burundi, China, France, Italy, Japan,
Nicaragua, Poland, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Syria, Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/1567)
1. Adoption of the agenda.

2. Letter dated 26 December 1963 from the Permanent
Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council
(5/5488):

Report of the Secretary-General on the United
Nations Operation in Cyprus (S/10199 and Corr.1).

Expression of thanks to preceding Presidents

1. The PRESIDENT (interpretation from French): First of
all, T have the greatest pleasure in expressing my gratitude
to my immediate predecessors, the Ambassador of Argentina, who presided over the Council for the month of
March, and the Ambassador of Belgium, who presided for
the month of April. Although they were not faced with
events which made it necessary for them to convene a
meeting of the Security Council, in their capacity as
Presidents of the Council they nevertheless endeavoured to
maintain contacts and consultations to everyone's satisfaction. It is therefore on behalf of all members of the
Security Council that I express my gratitude to them for
having successfully discharged their functions.

Adoption of the agenda
The agenda was adopted.

Letter dated 26 December 1963 from the Permanent
Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed
to the President of the Security Council (S/5488):
Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations

Operation in Cyprus (8/10199 and Corr.1)

2. The PRESIDENT (interpretation from French): In
accordance with the usual practice of the Council when
dealing with the question now before it, I propose, with the
consent of the Council, to invite the representatives of
Cyprus, Turkey and Greece, pursuant to their request to be
allowed to participate in the discussion of the question

without the right to vote, to take places at the Security
Council table.

At the imitation of the President, Mr. Z. Rossides
(Cyprus), Mr. U. H. Bayiilken (Turkey) and Mr. D. Bitsios
(Greece) took places at the Security Council table.

3. The PRESIDENT (interpretation from French): The
Security Council will now take up the question of Cyprus
on the basis of the report of the Secretary-General of 20
May 1971 [S/10199 and Corr.1}. Members of the Council
have before them also the draft resolution which has been
prepared during informal consultations /§/10209/.

4. A certain number of representatives have expressed the
wish to speak before the vote on the draft resolution.
Before calling on them, however, I should like to welcome
and express my congratulations to Ambassador George
Bush of the United States, who is participating in the
meetings of this United Nations organ for the first time. It
was a great pleasure for me, in order to enable him to be
present on this occasion, to make arrangements to advance
the date of this meeting, which had originally been set for
28 May. I am sure that we can count on having him share
with us here, with his characteristic dynamism, the responsibilities and duties of the Security Council, as well as its
rights and powers, bringing with him a new air due in part
to his youth, which I feel corresponds perfectly to the
qualities of the African leadership.

5. The first speaker inscribed on my list is the representative of Cyprus, on whom I now call.

6. Mr. ROSSIDES (Cyprus): Mr. President, it is my pleasant duty, if I may be permitted to do so, to offer you our
sincere congratulations on the occasion of your assuming
the presidency of this august body for a second time. Your
experience and diplomatic skill, combined with your many
other qualities, make it specially appropriate for you to
preside over the debate on the renewal of the mandate of
the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus
(UNFICYP), particularly since you know the problem of
Cyprus so well.

7. Before I enter upon the subject before us I wish on this
occasion to extend to the Government and people of
Turkey the sincere condolences of my delegation and my
Government on the tragic loss of life and property that has
occurred in that country as a result of recent earthquakes.
Having ourselves been victims of similar catastrophes in the
past, we in Cyprus can understand the tragic situation that
has arisen and feel every sympathy and compassion for the
unfortunate victims in Turkey.

8. I wish to thank you, Mr. President, and the Council for
giving me this opportunity to participate in this debate and
to put forward our views on the United Nations Force in
Cyprus.

9. We meet again for the renewal of the mandate, and on
this occasion I wish first to state the consent of Cyprus for
such renewal, considering that under the resolution it is
Cyprus that must signify its consent, and I wish to express
my Governments appreciation of the positive work
UNFICYP has been carrying out in contributing to the
maintenance of peace and its efforts to normalize the daily
life of the people of Cyprus, In that connexion I should like
to convey to the Commander of the Force, Major-General
D.Prem Chand, and to the officers and ten under his
command, the expression of our appreciation.

10. I should like now to reiterate once more our deep
gratitude to the Secretary-General for his genuine concern
about the question of Cyprus over the years and his
dedicated efforts to contribute to a just and peaceful
solution of the problem and, furthermore, our admiration
of his wise leadership of the United Nations and his
outstanding services in the cause of peace and progress in
the world. As time goes by we admire him more and more.
We wish to see him as Secretary-General for as long as he
thinks he can possibly serve this Organization.

11. We also express appreciation to Mr, Osorio-Tafall for
his very patient and constructive work on the island, which
has been useful on many occasions, as also to the
collaborators and assistants of the Secretary-General,
Mr. Ralph Bunche, Mr. Rolz-Bennett, who served until
recently, and Mr. Guyer.

12. I take this opportunity to say a few words about
Mr. Rolz-Bennett and express our deep sorrow at his
absence today. He has for many years been a very familiar,
helpful and respected figure as one of the Secretary-General's closest collaborators on the question of Cyprus--
and, of course, on other subjects also—and his deep
knowledge of the question of Cyprus, coupled with his
many qualities and his dedication to duty, will be greatly
missed,

13. In meeting to renew the mandate the Security Council
must consider the Secretary-General’s report covering the
United Nations peace-keeping operations in Cyprus over the
past six months [/S/10199 and Corr.1]. The report shows
that within that period the situation with regard to any
recurrence of fighting has been generally calm. Indeed in
this respect it has actually been calmer than any of the
preceding periods. Thus there have been only four shooting
incidents, of which three are attributed to Turkish Cypriot
armed elements and onc to Government security forces—all
without casualties or any consequences. Furthermore, the
report notes that “emphasis continues to be given with
encouraging results to the prevention of incidents, as well as
to the maintenance of the status quo in sensitive areas”
[ibid., para, 32].

14. As appears from the report, the co-operation that had
emerged between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots on
economic matters continued and increased. Thus in the
economic field contacts have been maintained, especially in
the private sector and in a number of semi-autonomous and
non-governmental institutions. In the Government Produc.
tivity Centre there has been growing Turkish Cypriot
participation and the same can be said of the Dekelia Trade
Training Centre organized under an agreement between the
Governments of Cyprus and Britain. Similarly, there is
greater interest and increasing participation of Turkish
Cypriots in agricultural projects undertaken by the Government with the assistance of FAQ and the World Food
Programme. In public services further progress towards
normalization was noted in respect of electricity for
Turkish Cypriot villages, new water schemes and telephone
and postal services.

15. However, in that respect the necessity for an inte.
grated economic policy is all too apparent. Such a policy
would greatly benefit all concerned but more importantly
the Turkish Cypriots. It is therefore regrettable that the
Turkish Cypriot leadership still prevents progress in that
direction. To us that seems an anachronistic approach, Ata
time when great nations that have had deep national
differences are striving to integrate their economies it seems
particularly odd and inexplicable that in Cyprus a small
Turkish community is still following the opposite course.
As the report points out,

“It... will be difficult to utilize fully and rationally
the human and other resources of the island if the present
trend towards separate economic development is maintained, especially when the preparation of the new
Five-Year Plan for 1972 to 1976 is in its final stages. It
has been suggested in this connexion that one way to
foster some form of intercommunal economic co-operation would be the establishment of closer links between
the Greek and Turkish Cypriot co-operative movements
and regular exchanges of views between Greek and
Turkish Cypriots within economic planning institutions.
[1bid., para. 41.]

16. The Cyprus Government for its part, as is stated in the
report,

“has reiterated its willingness to help raise the [Turkish
Cypriots] living standards and to allocate funds for
investments in Turkish Cypriot-controlled areas, provided
it has [the necessary] over-all supervision and financial
control over such projects” [ibid., para. 40].

It is further observed that:

“The military situation has continued to be relatively
calm... but UNFICYP’s efforts to bring about a re
laxation in the areas of direct confrontation have failed,
as in the past, to produce any positive results.” [/bid.,
para. 26.]

17. In this respect it may be recalled that proposals made
by UNFICYP regarding deconfrontation were agreed to by
my Government but regrettably the Turkish Cypriot
leadership did not accept them;! similarly, they rejected a
mmber of suggestions subsequently made to them by the
Special Representative of the Secretary-General which, as
the report says, if agreed to, could, at minimum risk to
them, help to generate an atmosphere of increased mutual
confidence and contribute significantly to the improvement
in the living conditions of their community.

18. In his present observations the Secretary-General
refers to the problem of de-escalation and deconfrontation
as one “of crucial importance for a return to normal
conditions” [ibid., para. 84]. It may be recalled that the
report of the Secretariat survey team of 1969 that went
over the whole situation of Cyprus in relation to UNFICYP
emphasized the importance of this problem of military
confrontation: unless solved or attenuated by the moving
of the forces farther apart, it would cause the presence of
the United Nations Force to continue to be necessary. I say
this to emphasize the need for this deconfrontation which
really seems absolutely necessary in respect of the positions
held over three and a half years of calm. In his present
observations the Secretary-General refers to the problem of
de-escalation again and remarks:

“Although this has for a long time now been the subject
of persistent efforts by UNFICYP,... no substantial
progress has been made during the period under review.
An important factor in this impasse is the contention of
the Turkish Cypriot leadership that a return to normal
conditions in this field cannot take place without
impairing its position with regard to the basic issues of
the Cyprus problem which are under discussion in the
intercommunal talks”. [fbid.]

19. This seems a strange explanation. Mere deconfrontation or lessening of the degree of proximity of the two
armed posts does not in the least alter the stefus quo and
could not affect the positions of the parties in the talks. On
the contrary by the resulting relaxation in the tension it
creates a better climate. As a matter of fact, the normal
thing is that you have normalization first to help promote a
solution. You cannot wait for the solution in order to bring
normalization. Indeed, the main resolution adopted by the
Security Council on 4 March 1964 [186 (1964) sees two
duties: the duties for normalization, and a different thing
for the solution of the problem. Of course, it is understood
that you first normalize, conciliate and proceed to bring a
better climate before you can hope for the solution. So if
we prevent the normalization it is as if we were preventing
the solution.

20. From the report we see that the training activity of
the Turkish Cypriot armed elements has continued to
increase while that of the Government armed forces has as
before remained at the same level.

21, Referring to what is called “periods of considerable
military display and acute sensitivity” [S/10199 and
Con. 1, para. 26] the report notes that:

1 See Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-fourth
Year, Supplement for October, November and December 1969,
document $/9521, para. 77.

“Throughout most of the period, uniformed Turkish
Cypriot “ghters... continued to appear in the Turkish
Cypriot quarter of Limassol, marching to and from their
training area” and in a number of instances “appearing in
full uniform and parading with weapons.” [Ibid.
para. 29.]

Strong protests, therefore, from UNFICYP had become
necessary to restore the status quo.

22. The report refers also to the Government’s concern at
the “apparent increase in Turkish Cypriot fighter presence
and activity throughout the island” and “‘at the intensive
overt training programmes now being carried out in Turkish
Cypriot-controlled areas.” Particularly perturbing was the
“stepping up of the distribution of locally manufactured
arms and ammunition, since full freedom of movement”
was ensured to all the Turkish Cypriots “by the Government early in 1968.” [Ibid., para. 27.]

23. Thus accentuated military preparations and intense
distribution of arms throughout the island appear to have
been so far the Turkish Cypriot response to the Government’s gesture of normalization by unilaterally lifting all
restrictions and all check points and searches at the risk of
internal security.

24. We have also definite information that the Turkish
Cypriots have been supplied with very heavy weapons,
apart from the light weapons that they have manufactured
themselves continually, the source of which could be
understood to be that of the Turkish contingent in Cyprus.
I will not go into detail on this subject at present but itis a
matter of concern as it indicates a trend on this point.

25. On the Government effort at normalization so vitally
needed for promoting a peaceful solution, the report
remarks with regret that there has been no improvement on
the long-standing problem of freedom of movement. On
this freedom of movement there have been repeated urgings
by the Secretary-General in his previous reports, and in the
present report there is a call for reciprocal action by the
Turkish Cypriot leadership to the Government's notmalization measures in lifting all restrictions, even at the
risk of internal security, which remain unheeded. As a
result, this abnormal situation continues in which all
Turkish Cypriots, without exception, enjoy full freedom of
movement in all parts and on all roads of the island. In
contrast the Greek Cypriots, namely, 80 per cent of the
population, are forcibly prevented not only from entering
the Turkish enclaves but also from using over a hundred
public roads and even main communication roads.

26. In addition, Greek Cypriot farmers are still being
denied access to their fields which lie in Turkish Cypriotcontrolled areas, while Turkish Cypriot farmers are allowed
by the Government to cultivate their lands even within

prohibited military areas.

27. This unbalanced situation is due to the fact that in its
policy of retaining peaceful conditions on the island—in
co-operation with the United Nations Force—the Government has consistently refrained from any forcible measures
for the purpose of ensuring the necessary freedom of
movement on all roads for all the inhabitants of Cyprus—
notwithstanding its unquestionable power to do so.

28. In the observations of the report of December 1970,
the Secretary-General notes:

“It is with regret that I have once again to voice my
disappointment that, notwithstanding the persistent ef
forts of my representatives in Cyprus, no significant
advance has been made towards a return to normal
conditions, especially to freedom of movement along all
roads for unarmed citizens.” [S/10005, para. 116.]

29. At the last meeting of the Security Council on this
question a number of members spoke of the need for
normalization and referred to three aspects: deconfrontation, freedom of movement for all Cypriots, and return of
displaced persons to their villages. I have already dealt with
the first two. Regarding the third, displaced persons, there
has been a significant development through my Government’s putting forward a concrete formula for the repair
and reconstruction of damaged Turkish houses and other
buildings in twenty-one villages.

30. This serves to demonstrate once again the good faith
of the Government towards normalization and its sincere
wish to facilitate the return of Turkish Cypriot displaced
persons to their villages,

31. As is stated in the current report of the Secretary-General, this formula which was put forward in the form of
a letter dated 13 February 1971 from Mr. Clerides to
Mr. Denktash, provides for the repair or reconstruction of
Turkish Cypriot houses in thirteen villages by 31 August
1971, and the same would apply as a second stage for eight
more villages by the end of 1971, provided that the Turkish
Cypriot inhabitants of the first thirteen villages in fact do
return,

32. It will no doubt be appreciated that this stipulation
regarding the two stages is indeed necessary since repaired
buildings, if left unoccupied, deteriorate both from natural
causes and from furtive removal of building materials, and
thus require additional financial expenditure to make them
habitable. This is what in reality did happen in several cases
during the past four years when Turkish houses were
repaired by the Government at considerable expense and
the Turkish leaders did not allow the inhabitants of those
houses to return, as in the villages of Skylloura, Ayios
Vasilios, Lapithos and others. The Turkish villagers who
returned did so only in very sinall numbers.

33. In approaching this question in a positive and realistic
manner the Government proposal provides an opportunity
to the Turkish Cypriots to respond in the spirit in which
this proposal was made, and it should be recalled that the
urgency of this matter was stressed by the Turkish Cypriot
leaders,

34. However, three months have already elapsed without a
positive response; yet it is to be hoped that such a response
may soon be forthcoming. As the Secretary-General put it
in his previous report:

“With some goodwill it should be possible to approach
the whole problem, which affects thousands of Turkish
Cypriots, from a humanitarian rather than from a
political point of view.” [Ibid., para. 84.]

35. Security Council resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March
1964, which is the basic resolution, provides for a twopronged effort of the United Nations on the problem of
Cyprus, namely, first, that of peace-keeping and normalization through the establishment of the United Nations
Force in the island and, second, that of peace-making
through the appointment of 2 Mediator.

36. The former task, which was entrusted to the United
Nations Force, is being performed in a most useful and
valuable way. The latter, that of mediation, was performed
by the Mediator who produced a report? which was a
constructive, middle-course plan for the solution of the
problem; it was endorsed by the Secretary-General, and it
has generally been regarded as a positive basis for a

solution. :

37. We are at present following another procedure on the
same basis, the procedure of local talks which come asa
sequel to and within the framework of the Secretary- :
General’s good offices; it falls within the United Nations
peace-keeping effort under the aforementioned resolution.
The talks have in many ways been useful and constructive
and have helped to improve the situation significantly. The
exchange of visws is a channel of communication towards
mutual understanding for a common purpose -that of
achieving a peaceful, just and democratic solution to the
problem. The continuance of the talks has received general
support. The interlocutors, Mr. Clerides and Mr. Denktash,
in a number of public statements, have made it clear that
although they still disagree on fundamental issues they will
continue the talks as the best, and perhaps the only way to
find a peaceful and agreed solution.

38. These talks initiated in 1968 on the agreed basis of an
independent unitary State and with a view to overcoming
unworkable provisions in the Constitution have, however,
run into difficulties and have been practically stalled for
nearly thirty months on the question of local government,
The difficulties arose in respect of the degree and extent of
the division involved in the Turkish Cypriot proposals. In.
this connexion it should be recalled that local government
is an entirely new element as it did not exist in the
Constitution in respect of which the talks are being
conducted. Upon universally accepted norms, “local
Government”, both in its meaning and its application, is
intended to refer to specific geographical areas. It is never
based on ethnic criteria, nor could it be conceived as
extending from the bottom to the top of the administrative
structure, for it would then cease to be local and would in
reality create a State within a State.

39. The obvious result of such unworkable provisions
would be the collapse of the State itself, bringing about a
confused situation fraught with the gravest dangers and
threats to international peace and, what is still worse, with

2 Ibid., Twentieth Year, Supplement for January, February and
March 1965, document §/6253.
the disaster of partition looming on the horizon. As I have
already said on another occasion, partition is the saddest lot
and the worst calamity that can befall any country and its
people. This has been amply demonstrated in repeated cases
over the years. A glance around the world today shows that
war is waged continually and human suffering never ends in
those countries that have had the unfortunate fate of being
partitioned.

40. All the people of Cyprus, Greek and Turkish alike,
should be deeply concerned with saving their country and
themselves from a misfortune of such magnitude.

41. In the current talks on the Constitution of Cyprus, my
Government has made all possible concessions in an effort
to reach accommodation by repeated and increasingly
accommodating proposals. There is, however, a certain limit
beyond which separatism cannot be pushed without imperilling the independence of the State and its very
existence, And it is on this very issue that the talks have
hinged, as is wellknown to all who follow closely the
developments in Cyprus. The need for a more positive
approach to the problem has become all too obvious,
particularly since the very constructive and accommodating
package-proposals made by the Government on 30 November 1970. It is therefore to be hoped that the Turkish
Cypriot side will, in a positive spirit of co-operation, join in
an effort to overcome the difficulties that have arisen on
this issue so that in that spirit the talks may proceed on a
fruitful course towards the achievement of a peaceful and
lasting solution on the agreed basis of an independent
unitary State within the principles of the Charter. In doing
so, we would be following the course called for by the
Secretary-General in his observations in paragraph 83 of the
report for a peaceful solution based on the independence
and sovereignty of a unitary State of Cyprus.

42. The PRESIDENT (interpretation from French): I now
call upon the representative of Turkey.

43. Mr. BAYULKEN (Turkey): First of all, Mr. President,
I'should like to join the previous speakers in extending our
congratulations to you on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council. All our good wishes are with
you.

44. 1 should also like to express my thanks to Ambassador
Rossides for his very kind words with regard to the
earthquake disaster that struck Turkey a few days ago. I
appreciate his expression of kind sentiments.

45. Mr. President, I thank you and the members of this
Council for allowing me to present the views of my
Government on the item before the Council today. The
Council is convened to consider the renewal of the mandate
of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus. Once
again the Secretary-General’s comprehensive report provides the customary terms of reference for our deliberations
this morning.

46. As usual, the report includes almost all the practical
aspects of the issue: the operation of UNFICYP, activities
towards preventing a recurrence of fighting and contri
buting to the restoration and maintenance of law and order,

activities towards a return to normal conditions, intercommunal talks; and finally, in the concluding part, we
have the observations. The Secretary-General begins the
pertinent part of the report with the observation that:

“It is with concern that I am compelled to report to the
Security Council that in the period under review there has
been little perceptible improvement in the situation in
Cyprus and no indication of progress towards a negotiated solution of the underlying problems of the island.”
[S/10199 and Corr.1, para. 78.]

47. Indeed, it is this aspect of the problem that requires
full attention. On several occasions my Government expressed its concurrent views with this assessment by the
Secretary-General that there has been very little improvement indeed in the situation in Cyprus and no substantial
progress towards a peaceful and agreed solution.

48. If in the last three years the intercommunal talks have
not made substantial progress, if they have not penetrated
the heart of the problem, it is because mistrust between the
two communities has prevailed —mistrust has even been
fostered. This aspect of the problem has constantly been
emphasized in the reports of the Secretary-General, including the present one. Consequently, efforts with respect
to normalization, as well as efforts to return to constitutional order, have suffered from this lack of trust. Let us
take normalization first.

49. First, the report indicates no notable progress in the
economic field which concerns the livelihood of the
Turkish community. It is almost exclusively the Greek
Cypriots that benefit from international programmes of aid
and technical assistance, as well as all the revenues of the
Republic, although the Turkish community pays some
duties and taxes. It was only after insistent urgings that
some of the programmes were partially extended to the
Turkish Cypriots.

50, Secondly, even public services such as water supply,
telephone, electricity and postal services are not effectively
available to the Turks. There have been six months of
planning and talks regarding the supply of electricity to the
Turkish villages, but if ever these talks are concluded and
the plans implemented, still less than 20 per cent of the
Turkish Cypriot villages will be covered. I take this
information from the report.

51. Thirdly, the Turkish Cypriots have been eliminated
from the social insurance plan, Continued requests have not
produced any feasible results from 1964 onward,

52. Fourthly, the 20,000 displaced Turkish Cypriots, in
the eighth year of their displacement, are kept away from
their homes. Discussions which produced elaborate plans on
the part of the Greek Cypriot community have not,
unfortunately, been directed solely to humanitarian ends.
On the contrary, these plans have sought to bring the
displaced persons unconstitutionally under the political and
juridical authority of the Greek Cypriot administration,
They constitute one fifth of the population of the Turkish
community, namely, 20,000 people.
53. Finally, movement in the island has not become
completely free. True, given the political motivation of the
Greek Cypriot leadership I have already described, one
cannot be surprised that freedom of movement has not
been established.

54. On this issue 1 should like to clarify two points. As
stated by Mr. Kiigiik, Vice-President of the Republic of
Cyprus, in a letter dated 17 May 1971 [see S/10200],
Greek Cypriot civilians who have a legitimate business can
enter the Turkish controlled areas. Furthermore, it is not
correct to say that the Turks enjoy full freedom of
movement in all parts and on all roads of the island, for the
Turkish Cypriots are denied access to some areas which are
unconstitutionally declared sensitive or restricted areas by
the Greek Cypriot administratiosn. In fact, these restricted
areas are much larger in extent than the areas under the
control of the Turkish Cypriots.

55. On the question of normalization, it is the Turkish
community that is subject to all the deprivation, and what
could be more natural than its desire to achieve normalcy?
I believe that the Greek Cypriot leadership stretches its
credibility when it seeks to impute inhibitions to the
Turkish Cypriots on this issue. So much for normalization.

56. It is not only mistrust but diversion in the objectives
of the communities in the talks that has prevented real and
final progress.

57. Members of the Council will recall that the basic issue
in the island rests on the adjustment of the sovereign entity
of the two communities in the governing of the island in
such a manner that neither community is constitutionally
soluble. Indeed, as also very pertinently underlined in the
report of the Secretary-General, the re-declaration of an
ultimate political objective other than the continuation of
the independence has gravely endangered not only the
process of confidence building, but also all the efforts for a
peaceful solution of the problem,

58. In March, statements demanding enosis—the annexation of the island—emanated with a new momentum from
leading Greek Cypriots. This stream of statements reached
its peak on 14 March 1971, when the most responsible of
them all, Archbishop Makarios, emphatically declared:

“Cyprus is Greek. Cyprus was Greek since the dawn of
its history and will remain Greek. Greek and undivided
we have taken it over. Greek and undivided we shall
preserve it. Greek and undivided we shall deliver it to

reece.”

59. In addition, this pro-enosis campaign was supplemented with a series of acts of harassment against the
Turkish Cypriot community. I have sent many communications in this respect to the Secretary-General,

60. This morning I have presented yet another communication to the Secretary-General concerning a very recent
example of such acts, Regrettably, I shall have to relate it.

61. On the night of 23 May 1971, only two days ago,
Mr. Ismet Kotak, a Member of Parliament, a member of the

Executive Council for Labour, Co-operatives and Rehabilitation of the Turkish Community, and three Turkish
representatives accompanying him, were manhandled and
assaulted by armed Greek Cypriot policemen near Famagusta. On a road in this locality, their car was stopped and
these prominent Turkish Cypriot leaders were manhandled
and assaulted on the spot by armed Greek Cypriot
policemen without any cause or provocation. Then they
were illegally arrested and taken to the Greek Cypriot
Police Headquarters in Famagusta where they were interrogated and later released.

62. That is the treatment that the prominent members of
the Turkish Community are receiving when returning from
a very innocent visit to some areas in Cyprus. In fact the
area from which they were coming back was just a mixed
village in Cyprus, Nergisi. It was not even a visit to an
entirely Turkish Cypriot village.

63. Incidents of this grave nature are bound to have
negative effects on the process of confidence-building, and,
moreover, they result in a further aggravation of the tension
in the island which, if not checked, may develop an
explosive character.

64. In Mr. Kigik’s letter of 17 May, the Council was also
informed about some actions concerning the implementation of this ultimate political objective such as affiliating
Greek Cypriot federations, trade unions, telecommunication services, banking institutions, student and
youth organizations with similar organizations in Greece;
Gresk Cypriot National Guards taking an oath of allegiance
to the Kingdom of Greece and playing the Greek national
anthem at all official ceremonies as if it was the national
anthem of the Republic of Cyprus, and so on.

65. The attention of the Council was drawn to the scope
of the action in pursuance of this ultimate political
objective. This policy was reiterated in unequivocal terms
when at a meeting it was disclosed that on 9 March 1971
Archbishop Makarios had said he would never cease to
work for enosis and that he would never sign an agreement
which excluded enosis.

66. Such statements by the most authoritative Greek
Cypriot quarters are not an expression of “the natural
ethnic sentiments of the large majority of the [Greek/
Cypriot people for union with Greece”, as Mr. Rossides
claimed in his letter of 6 May 1971 [§/10187]. Rather, as
the Secretary-General indicates in his report, they constitute an irrefutable revelation of an ultimate political
objective and the disclosure of the official policy of the
Greek Cypriot Community.

67. This openly expressed policy of enosis, and the
consequent enosissminded approach to problems, are the
main reasons—I repeat, the main reasons—why the intercommunal talks have been unproductive until now. This
irreconcilable Greek Cypriot state of mentality pursues an
ultimate political objective rather than the continuation of
the independence of Cyprus as a final and permanent
solution. Continuation of independence was the basic
accord which made the initiation of intercommunal talks
possible. Any attitude contrary to this basic accord, thus
denying the Turkish Community's vested constititional and
legitimate rights and interests is bound to stall the
intercommunal talks, and for very obvious reasons.

68. The Turkish Cypriot Community has followed a
constructive and patient line in the talks, but its demands
for the reiteration and restoration of its legitimate and
constitutional rights and interests, as well as its demands for
effective guarantees against a future attempt to change the
international status of the island, have constantly been
labelled as “divisionist” or “intransigent” by the Greek
Cypriot Community in order to conceal an ultimate
political objective: namely, the abrogation of the independence and the recolonization of the Turkish Community. It
is an historical fact that partition for the Turkish Community has always been a self-defensive measure against
recolonization vis-a-vis demands and activities for enosis.
Take enosis away and respect the Turkish Community’s
partnership and rights, and you will not hear of partition.

69. Cyprus became an independent State as an outcome of
international agreements reached among Turkey, the
United Kingdom and Greece, as well as between the two
communities. This independence rests on two communal
pillars and on equal footing with the Greek Cypriot
Community. The Turkish Cypriot Community has inalienable and undeniable rights and interests in the independence, the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of the
island.

70. Once this fact was realized, I believe, Cyprus would
not only be an island where the two communities happily
and peacefully lived within the framework of an agreed
constitution, but would also constitute a strong link rather
than a subject of dispute between Turkey and Greece,
which have close historical, ethnic and contractual ties with
this island and its peoples.

71. Nevertheless, the Turkish Cypriot Community has
already stated its determination to continue to the end the
search for all possibilities of reaching a peaceful solution,
and I am sure that the members of the Security Council
have noted with satisfaction the recent assurances given in
his letter to the Secretary-General by Mr. Fazil Kiiciik,
Vice-President of the Republic of Cyprus, that the Turkish
Community would continue to work for permanent independence based on a compromised peaceful solution,
irrespective of whether the Greek side chooses to misrepresent the policy of defending the Turkish Community’s
vested rights and interests as “divisive” or as an attempt to
create a “State within a State” in order to justify the
uncompromising Greek Cypriot attitude and aims.

72. My Government has also repeatedly expressed its wish
to see an early and peaceful solution to the Cyprus
problem. I take pleasure in stating once again that the
Turkish Government has always been ready to work
constructively for a just and equitable solution to this
oroblem, effectively safeguarding the independence of
Cyprus as well as the respective rights and interests of the
wo communities within the framework of the balance
>stablished, recognized and respected at the inception of
he State.

73. Before concluding, allow me to express once again my
Government's appreciation to our distinguished Secretary-General, U Thant, and his assistants both here and in
Cyprus—Mr. Osorio-Tafall, his Special Representative,
Major-General D.Prem Chand, the Commander of the
Force, Mr. Ralph Bunche, Under-Secretary-General for
Special Political Affairs, Mr, Guyer, his political assistant—
as well as to all members of UNFICYP for their dedication
and constructive work. Our appreciation also goes to
contributing countries and the members of the Security
Council which make it possible for UNFICYP to continue
its important task.

74. May I also be permitted to express our appreciation to
Mr. Rolz-Bennett for all his past efforts in this matter and
to wish him all the best for the future?

75. I think that my statement takes care of almost all the
points that were raised this morning in the statement of
Ambassador Rossides, but let me just offer one or two
clarifications. I do not intend to say anything that may
make this debate either an acrimonious one or a very long
one. I should merely like to offer one or two clarifications
which [ believe are needed.

76. First of all, with regard to normalization I stated the
basic and important point. Ambassador Rossides referred to
Security Council resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964
and rightly said that a return to normal conditions was
prescribed in the resolution. That is true, but of course it
should be borne in mind that the reference to a return to
normal conditions is preceded in the 4 March resolution by
another statement of fact and obligation that relates to
“the maintenance and restoration of law and order”. When
law and order is restored, when the constitutional rights are
respected, there is no difficulty in restoring normal condi-

tions in Cyprus.

77. Another point was that the Greek Cypriot leadership
had information that some heavy armaments were supplied
to the Turkish Cypriot community. I am really puzzled as
to the source of this information because less than a week
ago my Government approached UNFICYP about the new
and additional importation of Cobra anti-tank guns to
Cyprus and asked for an inquiry about it. The Turkish
community expressed its concern about this increase in
armaments. To say that the Turkish community is receiving
heavy equipment from the Turkish contingent on the island
is, T believe, either entire misconstruction or misinformation, because I am sure that Ambassador Rossides knows
perfectly well what sort of equipment is permitted to the
contingents of Greece and Turkey on the island. There is a
specific list, and this list is known by UNFICYP, by the
United Nations and also by Mr. Rossides and by the Greek
Cypriot leadership. Therefore, to speak of heavy equipment
is to use a very strange term. [ do not want to draw myself
into a useless and acrimonious debate in this connexion,
but I should like just to point to the fact that since the
treaties were entered into the attitude and the behaviour of
the Turkish contingent has been impeccable, and its record
is spotless when one recalls the very tragic events of 1963,
1964, and so forth, and the attitude of this contingent. So I
think that that is a very wrong and unjust imputation, and I
reject it.
78. Concerning the refugees, I think my main statement
took care of the main reasons, But I should nevertheless
like to quote from the report of the Secretary-General, to
show that the programme, prepared by the Greek Cypriot
community, is not so much to help the Turkish refugees
who would be prepared to go to their homes. In paragraph
52 the report states:

“In its programme, the Government reiterates that
returning Turkish Cypriots will come under Government
administrative control and policing as well as being
subject to the jurisdiction of its courts. It also reserves the
right to restrict temporarily the retum to mixed villages
of certain individuals whose presence in its view might
cause difficulties to peaceful village coexistence. The
Government has farther renewed its offer of some
provisional resettlement aid, but feels that it cannot
consider compensation and damage claims of Turkish
Cypriots without at the same time considering Greek
Cypriot claims.”

We have information that some time ago 500 Greek
Cypriots were already compensated for damages sustained
in the events.

79. These are conditions which mean that the Turkish
Cypriot community would surrender its defence of the
rights and interests it acquired under the treaties, and
should forget all its struggles to maintain its rights. If it is
so, then I believe there would have been no use meeting
here today just for the extension of the mandate of
UNFICYP.

80, I think Ambassador Rossides touched upon the
Turkish Cypriot freedom-fighters. In the report in regard to
the military preparedness of the two sides, there are some
remarks, and he made some allusions to them. What I can
say is that it is a perfectly well-known fact that these
fighters comprise an organization that is designed solely for
defence, in nature and in purpose, an organization that has
no offensive-destructive weapons such as tanks, cannons or
armored carriers.

81. As regards the intercommunal talks and the allusions
‘to creating a State within a State, and so forth, I shall not
repeat what we have been saying all along during the
meetings of the Security Council. 1 believe that my main
statement made it quite clear why these talks arc stalled
and what is the main reason for the lack of progress. But as
I said—and I repeat--we should like to express the hope that
in spite of everything the representatives of the two
communities, whose outstanding qualifications are well
known, will work hard in order to reach a basic agreement
on the framework of the constitution which will take care
of the interests and legitimate rights of both communities
and will pave the way later on for an over-all agreement on
the question of Cyprus.

82. The PRESIDENT (interpretation from French): | now
call on the representative of Greece.

83. Mr. BITSIOS (Greece) (interpretation from French):
Mr. President, my delegation is very happy to see you
presiding over the deliberations of the Council, especially at

this meeting devoted to further consideration of the
question of Cyprus. I should like to congratulate you and
extend to you our best wishes. May I also express to
Ambassador Bayiilken the deep sympathy of my delegation
for the victims of the recent earthquakes in his country?
We share the emotions which our colleagues of the Turkish
delegation feel at hearing this sad news.

84. The Secretary-General’s report dated 20 May 1971 |
[5/10199 and Corr.1] informs us about developments in |
Cyprus during the last six months, and I thank you, |
Mr. President, and the members of the Council for allowing |
me to make a few observations on behalf of my Govern- :
ment. I should like to start by saying that we agree to the |
recommendation of U Thant concerning the extension of
the mandate of UNFICYP for a further period of six
months, because it is due to his desire to contribute to the
maintenance of calm on the island of Cyprus and will thus
provide valuable assistance to those in Nicosia who are
negotiating for the solution of the problem. This desire of |
the Secretary-General’s is fully consonant with the policy
guiding the Government of Greece,

85. The records of the Security Council testify to the ;
consistency of our attitude. They further reveal that we ;
insisted at an early date on the fact that time was of the
essence because, as I stated here as early as 11 December
1969 [1521st meeting], lack of movement in the Nicosia
conversations threatened to lead to a hardening of opposing |
positions and to make success more difficult,

86. The Secretary-General, in his observations, in large |
part attributes the slow pace of these conversations to a |
lack of confidence on both sides in Cyprus. The Secruity
Council was aware of this important factor when if
requested both parties of the population to work fora
return to normalcy and instructed UNFICYP to contribute
to this goal. The obvious hope of the Council was thata
return to a normal situation would lead to an easing of
tension, which, in tum, would engender a climate of
confidence likely to foster the political settlement of the
problem, Each of the parties can examine its conscience
and see to what extent it has heeded the appeal of the
Council. The moment is not propitious for drawing up 2
balance sheet now.

87. 1 will limit myself to reminding the Council of
measures gradually taken by the Government of Cypiusto
ensure a return to normalcy. Those measures culminated on
7 March 1968 in the removal of all restrictions to the
movement of persons and goods.

88. I would also note the more recent but equally
constructive role of the Government in the field of
economic co-operation, investment, the labour force, the
normalization of public services, and its proposals in favour
of displaced persons, which are mentioned in paragraphs 38
to S5 of the Secretary-General’s report.

89. Furthermore, the contribution of the Cyprus Govern
ment to the development of the Nicosia conversations has
been positive. It is not up to me to deal with the detas,
and I would merely recall the contents of paragraph 61 of
the report.
90. These are concrete facts, which are infinitely more
weighty than words. Words fly away, and only acts reveal
intentions and enable an observer to obtain an objective
view of the situation and the way in which it develops.

91. We also agree with the statement of the Secretary-General that intercommunal talks “are unquestionably not
only the best but in the present circumstances probably the
only way to an agreed settlement.” [S/10199 and Corr. 1,
para, 81.]

92. On 3 April 1971 the Under-Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs, Mr. Palamas, speaking in the name of the
Greek Government, stated:

“Greece is interested in a peaceful and equitable
solution. On our part we avoid public statements and
replies. We do everything that is in our power to facilitate
progress and the success of intercommunal talks. We
believe that these talks will continue not only because
they constitute a reasonable procedure accepted by all
parties concerned, but also because we do not see who
would assume the heavy responsibility of interrupting
them,”

93. All previous statements from the Greek Government
were conceived in the same spirit. They testify to our wish
to see both parties in Cyprus conciliate their differences,
establish a State machinery capable of functioning adequately, and thus to find a way to live together in an
independent, sovereign and unified State, as advocated in
the report of the Secretary-General.

94. That is the wish I express at the end of my statement
because, as far as we are concerned, we believe, with the
philosopher Heraclitus, that “opposites work together and
that it is from diversity that the most beautiful harmonies
result.”

95. The constant interest shown by our eminent Secretary-General in the question of Cyprus has earned him our
fullest gratitude. We shall never cease to support his efforts.
We should also like to thank his assistants, Mr. Ralph
Bunche and Mr. Roberto Guyer. This leads me to think of
and express our best wishes to Mr. José Rolz-Bennett, who
spared no efforts over many long years to contribute to the
pacification of Cyprus and ensure the well-being of its
inhabitants. To his successor, Mr. Guyer, we wish full
success in his new task. We are convinced that he will put
his great talents and experience to the service of peace.

96. On the spot, in Cyprus, the Special Representative of
the Secretary-General Mr. Osorio-Tafall, and the Commander of the Force, General Prem Chand, continue their
constructive efforts with infinite patience and unlimited
goodwill. We are most grateful to them.

97. THE PRESIDENT (interpretation from French): As
no other representative wishes to speak before the vote, I
should like to make a statement. First of all I regard the
members of the Security Council as an organic entity. From
that point of view the traditional quorum in other
assemblies cannot apply in this organ, whose scope is
unique. That is why I was led to delay for a few moments
the opening of this meeting so as to allow all members to be

present. Some major unforeseen difficulties arose to which
I had to attend, causing me to be a little late in arriving. I
would express my admiration to those members who
arrived most punctually and would ask them, as well as the
Secretary-General, to accept my apologies.

98. The silver anniversary ceremonies a few months ago,
marking the end of the adolescence and the beginning of
the maturity of the United Nations; the dawn of a new
decade, my unshakeable faith in this Organization in
general and my deep veneration for the Security Council in
particular, and my ardent passion for interracial brotherhood on the scale of our human race are the reasons for
which I must discharge a prior duty, that of inaugurating
this meeting with an introductory statement which, it
seems to me, in my capacity as President, is not only
appropriate but imperative,

99. I would feel grave remorse if I resisted the imperatives
of my conscience which resolutely call upon me to insist
again on the fundamental aspects of the Security Council’s
mission. After the commemorative session as before it, I
had the honour and pressing obligation to stress the colossal
but exalting task of the Security Council which is to work
for the benefit of mankind.

100. The United Nations has just emerged from its years
of adolescence. Happily, it has survived the crisis inherent
in adolescent behaviour. Would it be wise to claim that the
deluge has passed and rest on our laurels? 1 agree with the
statement of Victor Hugo that “adolescence is the most
delicate of all transitions, but also the beginning of
womanhood and the end of girlhood.” A quarter of a
century has granted the world community a respite to alter
and correct its course. It has been helped by extenuating
circumstances.

101. In its youth, our Qrganization faced acute crises and
open conflicts; it was shaken by international tensions and
wracked by local or regional conflicts.

102. What will be its fate now that it embarks upon its
phase of crystallization and full maturity? Must it constantly founder, or is it resolved to reassert its mission? Is
it enough to engage in endless recriminations against the
Security Council to cure'it of its ills? Is it enough for the
doctor to diagnose the illness without curing the patient, or
without prescribing an antidote?

103. The viability and the effectiveness of the Security
Council in the field of peace will be fully assured only if the
causes that previously weakened it are eradicated.

104. When I had the privilege of presiding over the first
meeting last year, seventeen months ago, my irresistible
propensity for appealing as powerfully as possible for the
strengthening of the effectiveness of this body led me, in a
statement similar to this one, firmly to ask the Council to
recover its rights and powers and make full use of them,

105. Let me quote from a speech that I made then:

“At its age our Organization is faced by many tempfations—the temptation to sink in routine activities to

pp MTA Em emir eens
make insufficient cfforts, to persist in its refusal to
recover . . . the sublime ideal of universal peace which the
Council has the weighty task of guarding throughout our
planet makes it imperative for all the members to...
adopt a more dynamic attitude which would enable the
Council to face its tremendous responsibilities.

[1]

“The objectives of the United Nations make it incumbent upon all members of the Security Council, mainly
the great Powers which have primary responsibility, to
take a stand against the de facto measures taken by
Governments that have revolted against the United
Nations...” [1527th meeting, paras. 12 and 16.]

106. Richelieu was right when, in his Maximes d ‘Etat he
wrote that in political matters everyone conceives of public
affairs according to his own mind,

107. On the basis of that maxim, a retrospective glance
upon the achievements of the past twenty-five years reveals
a tremendous gap between dream and reality, But the same
glance shows tangible results achieved by the United
Nations in general and especially its main body, the
Security Council.

108. Therefore a sense of justice prevents us from downgrading the merits of the United Nations or, a fortiori, from
condemning it as a whole. On the contrary, it was able to
dominate the various events that threatened its very
existence.

109. As a happy witness of the success achieved mainly in
the past decade, during which this international Organization has been led by a man as devoted as U Thant, to whom
I wish to pay a highly deserved tribute for his intellectual
talents and the superiority of the human qualities he has
devoted to the quest for peace while confronting opposing
ideologies and navigating in the midst of contradictory
events, this Council was not always able to overcome all the
tribulations in its path and reach the ultimate ideals which
the objectives and noble and imperative principles of the
Charter entrust to him,

110. It is the giants who, in the last analysis bear the full
brunt of the destiny of mankind and the primacy of peace.
My apologia for the preponderant part of the great Powers
in the safeguarding of peace is not made in order to
catalogue them, nor to view them as titans who would
overshadow all the other States. It is a conclusion realistically dictated by the undeniable hegemony of the five
giants: the United States, the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, France, the People’s Republic of China and the
United Kingdom. They exercise their supremacy by dint of
the nuclear weapons at their disposal as also their over-Whelming might in all political, economic and military
ields.

111. There is no doubt that they are best able to ensure
the salvation of mankind if they are determined to make of
this Council 2 powerful instrument for peace, To reach that
indispensable objective the four giants of the Security
Council, together with another giant, the People’s Republic

10

of China, whose triumphal entry into this Organization
should be speeded up, must revive the significance of the
rights and powers attributed to and reserved for the
permanent members by the Charter. The considerable
prerogatives they enjoy entitle them to protect this great
body against the insolent contempt some Governments
show for the Security Council.

112. Invested with unlimited powers, when in harmony
they could act as dependable and supreme guarantors of
peace and the authority of the United Nations.

113. Security and peace are not within the exclusive
purview or sole competence of the five Powers because
according to Article 2 of the Charter it is the collective
efforts of all Member States that are responsible for the fate
of the world. The role of each State, no matter what its
resources, is important as that of a member of one single
human family,

114. The stationary nature of politics makes it mandatory
to find a genius capable of adapting it to the universe asit
evolves. “To reach truth,” Descartes said, “we must once in
our lifetime abandon all preconceived opinions and reconstruct from the beginning all the systems of our knowledge.” Without being an unconditional advocate of it, one
must admit that this Cartesian thesis comprises a good deal
of truth and is applicable to the political machinery that
guides the conduct of international affairs.

115. The gap, characteristic of our time, between political
activity and the level of other human progress, is extremely
striking. While science and technology are striving to
overtake each other in speed and compete for primacy,
politics seems to be lagging behind. The rules for directing
international affairs are still modelled on ancient patterns.
The tremendous speed of human progress in all other fields
makes it ever more obvious that political activity mostly
remains wedded to forms and traditions which sometimes
go back twenty-five centuries. Some examples will illustrate
that political reality.

116. Thus, in the face of the magnificent triumphs of
science and technology we see a disconcerting contrast
between the luminous progress of creative thought from
Pythagoras to Galileo, from Lavoisier to Einstein, and the
slow miotion of political thought.

117. In many respects the speeches mentioned by Thucydides in the fifth century before our era fully apply to our
own international problems although the intellectual, soci:
ological and technical environment is completely different.
It is surprising to note that policies applied in the
international area are still hamstrung by methods followed
by. men whose memory has been blurred by history:
Pericles, Disraeli, Caesar, Napoleon and Mazarin, all giants
in their day but meaning nothing in our own, all authors of
political maxims which were a stroke of genius then but are
quite insignificant now.

118. The procedures and principles used in the treaties of
Westphalia and Vienna are still fashionable, The same wars
are born around the same borders under the same grandiose
but wasteful historical processes. In this era of the atomic
bomb our frozen international law continues to lead to
armed conflicts which are the normal activity of States,
whilst the criterion of sovereignty is construed as the right
to unleash hostilities. In acute contrast to the constantly
increasing speed of transport communications and, unfortunately, missiles, the problems of sovereignty and borders
remain subject to notions that were current in the days of
slow caravan, and plodding cavalcades.

119. In international forums, political behaviour remains a
prey of collective impulses. Dependable technology and
rational organization are applied everywhere except in the
political field, which remains open to sentimental improvisation or to violence. And the regrettable consequence is
that the life of international organizations is characterized
by harmful periodic fluctuations which are sometimes akin
to the way in which nature spontaneously restores the
balance in animal societies, including human society.

120. How is it possible in the nuclear era for antagonists
still to be incapable of imagining any solution other than
war to their traditional competition? Just as in the Middle
Ages every Government considers itself justified in stating
that its armaments are there to preserve peace. And each
one considers that its weapons are defensive and those of
the other side offensive, and that its war would be a “just

Kl

war.

121. One can therefore not beg the question whether our
civilization, in the final analysis, is not condemned to die of
this frightening sophistry, which is sincere in addition. In
any case, we must remember that all civilizations prior to
ours died by war.

122. Thus, Bergson seems to have been right when he
stated that “the future of mankind remains unknown
because it depends upon mankind.” This strange paradox,
this sophism justifies the sarcastic remark of Jean Jaurés
who said:

“It seems, the Heads of State themselves proclaim it
that all the peoples want peace and that human progress
points in that direction. But this peace, which everybody
wants, can only be guaranteed by universal arming to the
teeth! Let all peoples be covered with heavy armour and
bristle with bayonets at a cost of billions. Let all budgets
be taken over by military expenditures. This is a
condition for peace! Human reason has gone so far that
it cannot maintain a peace which everybody desires
without arming everyone with the gun and the sword.”

123. One is often tempted to judge the actions of great
Powers without mercy, without patiently examining the
reasons which inspire their national and international
policy, without understanding the ultimate reasons for their
position. I must admit that supremacy, if it is used on
behalf of peace, overbearing as it may superficially seem, is
reassuring if it is possible to understand its scope. If the five
gigantic Powers (the four in this Council and China which is
about to join them) in a framework of peace and security,
adapt attitudes almost leading to the de facto abdication of
their omnipotence, it is because they find it difficult to
conciliate their obligations on the national level towards
their citizens and the fundamental obligation towards the

11

objectives of the United Nations. Thus, interpenetration of
interests and interrelation of causes threaten to transform
thie virtual abdication into a final capitulation of the five
great Powers.

124. In the final analysis, if we wish to avoid that, it
would seem beneficial to envisage the creation of an
apolitical brain-trust which would not come above the
Security Council and substitute itself for any body of the
United Nations but, rather, serve as a kind of intellectual
general staff which would strive to remedy the immobility
of present international customs which are still dominated
by old-fashioned systems in complete contrast with the
development of today’s world. This new “think tank” in
the United Nations would be a crucible for international
relations; it would lead our Organization to move at the
same pace as all other human activities, it would free it
from the shackles of obsolete traditions. It would avoid any
duplication with the Secretariat. This brain-trust would be
composed of outstanding specialists in international politics, devoid of any partisan allegiance or ideological bias
and would be free from any external or internal influence,
devoted to the ideals of the Charter and recruited from
various institutions, particularly the universities, among
international civil servants and on the five continents,

125. This initiative, if approved by the United Nations,
would be a powerful step towards the ultimate ideal in the
direction of the destinies of our world where the problems
of peace among nations and harmony among races confront
each other, where the needs and interests are pitted against
one another, as are the ambitions of States and of human

collectivities.

126. While expressing my thanks for the patience with
which the members of the Council listened to me, I am
compelled to propose a solution, since the time remaining is
most brief. I have many speakers listed to speak after the
vote. Therefore, I should like, in order to limit our work for
this afternoon, to invite the members of the Council to pass
on to the vote so that at the next meeting statements may
be made relating to the draft resolution which will have

been voted upon at that time.

127. 1 hear no objections to this proposal, and I shall
therefore put to the vote the draft resolution contained in
document S/10209.

A vote was taken by show of hands.

In favour: Argentina, Belgium, Burundi, China, France,
Italy, Japan, Nicaragua, Poland, Sierra Leone, Somalia,
Syria, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of
America.

The draft resolution was adopted unanimously.3
128. The PRESIDENT (interpretation from French): Pur-

suant to unofficial consultations during the meeting, a
second meeting has been scheduled for 4 p.m.

3 See resolution 293 (1971).

129. Mr. TOMEH (Syria): I have asked to speak on a point
of clarification. Am 1 correct in understanding, Sir, that
you have decided to defer all statements to the afternoon
meeting?

130. The PRESIDENT [interpretation from French): That
is precisely the proposal which I intended to make:
perhaps, in order to preserve a certain degree of uniformity,
we might start our statements this afternoon from beginning to end, if this proposal is acceptable to the members of
the Council,

131. Mr. TOMEH (Syria): With all due respect to the
Chair, it seems to me that since we still have some time left,
and since there is a long list of speakers, we might perhaps
start by hearing two or thiee speakers before the meeting is
adjourned.

132. The PRESIDENT (interprefation from French): We
have a while left, if a speaker were to take the floor it might
save a few minutes’ time.

133. Mr. BUSH (United States of America): My statement
is reasonably short. Before I give it, let me join the previous
speakers in expressing our condolences to the Government
of Turkey. Our President today made a statement in which
he said that he had instructed our Ambassador, Ambassador
Handley, in Turkey to receive recommendations from the
Government for any appropriate aid, and I join the others
who very eloquently expressed the concern of this Council
about that disaster.

134. Since this is my first opportunity to represent the
United States in the Security Council, I should like to
recall—and violate—an excellent precedent set by my
predecessor, Ambassador Yost. At the Council’s 1565th
meeting, Ambassador Yost set an example of restraint in
the practice of mutual congratulation which has been a
feature of the Council’s work for some years, I am told. I
am entirely in favour of this sort of reciprocal self-denial,
but I could not let this opportunity pass without expressing
my pleasure at serving with such a distinguished membership on the Council. Both as representatives of your
Governments and as individuals, T know each of you isin a
position to make a unique contribution to the work of the
Council in the all-important field of international peace and
security.

135. Having thus made an inroad on one of Ambassador
Yost’s reforms, I will adhere to two other practices that he
initiated, Although T have the highest regard for His
Excellency the President of the Council I will refrain from
congratulating him on assuming the Presidency this month.
He has too many real accomplishments to his credit to be
praised for an alphabetical accident of succession to the
Presidency. I do want to thank him for his very generous
opening remarks and his words of welcome to me, the
newest of your members. Second, I should like the
Secretariat to note that the United States waives the right
to consecutive interpretation for all interventions unless a
specific statement to the contrary is made before the
United States representative begins his remarks.

136. We have before us a somewhat cheerless document—
the Secretary-General’s report on the United Nations

12

operations in Cyprus. Although the United Nations Force —
and all United Nations personnel connected with the
Cyprus operation—have performed their duties with great
ability, we are at least as far from a solution now as we
were six months ago. The Secretary-General speaks of “an
aggravation of tension”, in his report rather than the
relaxation which is necessary for progress. He notes that
should the intercommunal talks break down-which re.
mains a dismal but real possibility—“‘a new and major crisis
would mote than likely erupt”.

137. In these circumstances, we of course supported the
extension of the mandate. The Secretary-General’s report
makes it plain that without the United Nations presence a
serious threat to international peace and security could
easily develop on the island. The United Nations Force has
played an invaluable role during the past six months,
helping to defuse potentially inflammatory situations. Yet
it is not only in times of crisis that the United Nations
presence is essential. The Secretary-General’s report shows
the supportive and catalytic role that UNFICYP plays in
preventing friction and promoting progress in everyday
situations, in economic development as well as the preservation of order.

138. Since becoming the United States representative to
the United Nations, I have frequently been asked by
Americans to catalogue the Organization’s achievements.
There are many of these, but Cyprus is one of the
outstanding areas where the United Nations is performing
the role that most of us believe it was primarily created
for—the preservation of peace in a situation where an
outside agency is absolutely indispensable. I think we can
all be proud of the Cyprus operation as a peace-keeping
operation in the true sense of this word.

139. At the same time, my Government wishes to caution
that UNFICYP can assist in creating a climate in which
agreement may be reached, but can do no more than that.
It is up to the parties directly and intimately involved to
demonstrate the good faith, the spirit of compromise and,
above all, the necessary statesmanship to resolve the
underlying political difficulties. The world community is
not prepared indefinitely to bear the burdens created by
failure to come to grips with the need for mutual
concessions.

140. The mechanisms for resolving the Cyprus conflict
exist, in the intercommunal talks. As we have stated in the
past, the United States firmly supports these talks and
believes they provide the best procedure for reaching an
agreement which will safeguard the legitimate rights of ait
elements in Cyprus within a unified and independent State.
In the interim we welcome the Secretary-General’s comments on deconfrontation, de-escalation and refugee resettlement. Efforts by both sides to reach agreement on these
outstanding problems would reduce tensions and the
possibilities of violent incidents, thus enabling the local
negotiations to concentrate on the basic issues that are
before them. I join the Secretary-General in calling upon
the leaders of all parties to give impetus to these negotiations by exerting their best and most statesmanlike efforts
to reach a mutually acceptable accommodation so that
there may be an equitable, lasting and peaceful solution.
My Government believes that the discussion in this Council
should convey this conviction clearly to the parties concerned. I also join the Secretary-General in urging all parties
concerned to refrain from any activities, or statements,
especially statements referring to enosis or partition, which
would aggravate the already delicate situation. Only a step
such as this can bring the abatement of tensions, the
atmosphere of mutual confidence and statesmanship, which
certainly must take place in order to be a prelude to
progress.

141. Finally, let me say a few words about the problems
of meeting UNFICYP’s costs. We have all noted the
Secretary-General’s report on the increasingly perilous state
of financing. To support peace-keeping as a principle—and
who of us here, certainly, does not; I think we all do—is
fine, but unless we are prepared to support it in practical
terms our words mean very little. My Government has
pledged up to 40 per cent of the costs to the Organization
for UNFICYP. Much of that sum has already been paid to
the Organization, but we have been unable to turn over all
of it because sufficient pledges and payments to cover the
other 60 per cent have been lacking. In effect, we hold in
escrow a large sum of money, pending receipt by the
United Nations of matching funds. Many nations pledged
sums for UNFICYP in the past, but have not done so within
recent years. Other nations, some of them with a direct
interest in the maintenance of peace in the Mediterranean
area, have never pledged anything at all. The United States
is fully prepared to play its part, but we believe that the
clear interest of other States in preserving the peace on this
island should be reflected in their financial support of the
United Nations operation. We earnestly entreat all nations
to recognize that we have a joint responsibility and
obligation to assure UNFICYP’s success and to take the
steps necessary to that end by making contributions now.

142. The PRESIDENT (interpretation from French):
Since brief thanks addressed to the last speaker will not run
counter to his convictions, I wish to extend my thanks to
him.

143. Mr. JAMIESON (United Kingdom): First, Mr. President, allow me to congratulate you on assuming the
Presidency of our Council. It is customary also to congratulate the outgoing President; this is the first meeting we have
had this month and we did not meet at all in April, nor for
that matter in March. However, my experience in Committees of the Security Council allows me to say how fortunate
we have been in the delegations in the chair in the last three
months.

144. It would have been nice to think that the absence of
meetings of the Security Council in the last three months
represented an absence of controversy and conflict in the
world. Unfortunately it does not do this, though perhaps it
signifies a realization that there is little point in calling for a
meeting of the Security Council unless we have some idea
where we are going, unless there is a reasonable prospect
that agreement on a certain course of action is possible, as
for example has been the case today.

145. From this point of view, namely, that we are able to
agree on a positive course of action in regard to Cyprus, my

13

delegation was happy to vote in favour of the resolution
that has been unanimously adopted. But it was with mixed
feelings that we did so, because we have to regret that the
positive course is no more than a repeat performance of
what we have been doing for the last seven years. If we are
not careful we shall be fivalling one of those long-running
Broadway productions; but if so it will be a tragedy, not a
spectacular,

146. As the Secretary-General reminds us in his report,
which once more provides a clear if necessarily pessimistic
picture of the situation in the island, this is the nineteenth
time that he has recommended a renewal of UNFICYP’s
mandate. My delegation shares the Secretary-General’s
concern that the blue berets of the Force should not come
to be regarded as a permanent part of the landscape in
Cyprus. My Prime Minister made much the same point in
the House of Commons on 2 March when he said in
connexion with peace-keeping:

“We have endeavoured to support the United Nations in
this, but for too long a United Nations force has been
needed in Cyprus. We wish to see a settlement there and
an end to the need for a peace-keeping operation. A more
determined effort is now required to resolve the differences which took the Force there seven years ago, for one
reason, namely, that there are other possibilities of
peace-keeping forces being required in other parts of the
world. I do not believe that we shall be able to persuade
other countries constantly to support the United Nations
in peace-keeping endeavours if they find that a peacekeeping force is not a means to resolve a situation and to
give time for diplomacy to work, but is merely a
permanent commitment which seems to be unending.”

147. The fact of the matter is that the United Nations has
done a magnificent job in keeping the peace in Cyprus.
Unfortunately, however, less success has been achieved in
making the peace. Here again I would like to quote from
something my Prime Minister has said, this time during his
speech in the commemorative session of the General
Assembly last October. He said:

“I want to emphasize that the task of the peace-keepers
should, of course, be a temporary one. Too often we take
them for granted, as I have said, and little is done to deal
with the problems that took them there. They are there
to hold the ring while the peace-making machinery of our
Organization is brought into action to tackle the problem
at its roots.”

148. It is in this context that my delegation has noted the
Secretary-General’s suggestion that there should before long
be a comprehensive review of the problem and that
members of the Security Council should give thought to
constructive alternatives to the present arrangement. Quite
clearly to continue indefinitely with the present situation is
an admission of failure. It is therefore not only inevitable

“but right that the Secretary-General should have to think in

these terms. My Government, of course, shares the Secretary-General’s belief that the intercommunal talks continue

4 Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fifth Session,
Plenary Meetings, 1881st meeting, para. 97.
io provide the best hope of making progress towards a
solution of the basic problems of the island. It is of vital
importance that these talks should go on and we urge both
sides to continue to take part in them with the maximum
flexibility and goodwill. This is the first priority and clearly
the primary contribution to a constitutional settlement
must come from the parties themselves. But we must all,
whether members of the Security Council or representatives
of the States particularly concerned, bend ail our efforts to,
and use all our ingenuity in, seeing whether there is
anything more that can be done to promote quicker
progress, to reduce the physical dangers represented by the
degree of armed confrontation on the island, and to
contribute fo the creation of conditions in which UNFICYP
is no longer necessary and to the re-creation of an
atmosphere in which all the people of the island can live in
peace and prosperity.

149. At this point I would like to express my delegation’s
thanks once more to the Secretary-General for his report. I
should also like fo express our gratitude to the Secretary-General’s Special Representative, Mr. Osorio-Tafall, to
Mr. Rolz-Bennett, formerly the Under-Secretary responsible
for this question, to whom all our sympathies go out for his
premature retirement because of ill-health, and to his
successor, Mr. Roberto Guyer, who has just visited the
island for the first time. We are confident that Mr. Guyer’s
wide experience of diplomacy will help us at last towards a
solution to this problem which has concerned us for so
long. I should also like to take this opportunity to express
my delegations admiration for the work which General
Prem Chand and the men under his command are performing in Cyprus on behalf of us all.

150. My delegation was prepared to accept the Secretary-General's recommendation that UNFICYP’s mandate
should be extended for a further six months, on the
understanding, now confirmed, that it had the general
support of members of the Council and of the parties to the
dispute. We noted the Secretary-General’s view that any
sizable reduction of the Force would be inadvisable at this
stage. We agree with this assessment, but we hope that the

14

Secretary-General will, in consultation with the Force
Commander, continue to keep the possibility of further
reductions under close review.

151. My Government is willing to keep its troop contingent in Cyprus for the period: of the renewed mandate, We
are prepared to make a financial contribution in support of

the Force up to a total figure of £875,000 sterling, that is

$2.1 million at the current rate of exchange, for the period
of the renewed mandate. This figure will include both the
extra costs of the British contingent, and, as before, a cash
element which will not exceed the previous level of
£625,000 sterling.

152. Finally, 1 would like to draw attention to what the
Secretary-General says in his report about the deficit on the
UNFICYP account, and to the remarks which the representative of the United States has just made on the same
subject. My delegation has often expressed its concern
about the deficit and about the way in which the operation
is financed. But recently the number of contributions has
even been declining. In these circumstances we support the
plea which has been made by the representative of the

United States. We hope that those countries which have ©

contributed in the past will at least continue to do so, and
that other countries will consider whether they also ought

not to give their financial support to this peace-keeping |

operation.

153. I cannot close without associating my delegation :
with those others that have expressed sympathy to the
delegation of Turkey on their recent new tragic earthquake,

I would ask Ambassador Bayiitken to accept on behalf of
my delegation and transmit to his Government and people
our sincere condolences.

154. The PRESIDENT (interpretation from French): 1

propose with the consent of the Council to adjourn the

meeting. We shall meet again at 4 p.m., as was agreed in

private consultations.

The meeting rose at 1.10 p.m.

Lithp in United Nations, New York

Price: $U.S. 1.00 (or equivalent in other currencies)

82010—July 1973-2,050

Voting Summary
Yes: 015 | No: | Abstentions: | Non-Voting: | Total voting membership:
Y ARGENTINA
Y BELGIUM
Y BURUNDI
Y CHINA
Y FRANCE
Y ITALY
Y JAPAN
Y NICARAGUA
Y POLAND
Y SIERRA LEONE
Y SOMALIA
Y SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC
Y USSR
Y UNITED KINGDOM
Y UNITED STATES