Security Council resolution 825 (1993) [on the decision of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to withdraw from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons]
Symbol: S/RES/825(1993)
Date: 1993-05-11
Meeting record: S/PV.3212
Subjects: IAEA|IAEA. Director General|Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (1968)|NUCLEAR FACILITIES|NUCLEAR MATERIALS|ON-SITE INSPECTION|DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA|NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION|NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS|DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS|CONSULTATIONS|VERIFICATION
Notes: Concerns the decision of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to withdraw from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
Summary: Calls upon the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to honour its non-proliferation obligations under the Treaty and comply with its safeguards agreement with IAEA as specified by the IAEA Board of Governors' resolution of 25 Feb. 1993; requests the Director General of IAEA to continue to consult with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea with a view to resolving the issues which are the subject of the Board of Governors' findings and to report to the Security Council on his efforts in due time; urges all Member States to encourage the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to respond positively to this resolution, and encourages them to facilitate a solution.

Resolution 825 (1993)
of 11 May 1993

The Security Council,

Having considered with concern the letter dated 12 March 1993
from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea dated 12 March 1993 3 addressed to the President of
the Security Council concerning the intention of the Government of the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to withdraw from the Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 4 and the report of the
Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, 2

Recalling the statement made by the President of the Council on 8
April 1993 1 in which the members of the Council welcome all efforts
aimed at resolving this situation and, in particular, encourage the
Agency to continue its consultations with the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea for proper settlement of the nuclear verification issue
in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea,

Noting in that context the critical importance of the Treaty, and
emphasizing the integral role of Agency safeguards in the implementation of the Treaty and in ensuring the peaceful uses of nuclear energy,
and reaffirming the crucial contribution which progress in non-proliferation can make to the maintenance of international peace and
security,

Recalling the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the
Korean Peninsula 5 by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and
the Republic of Korea, which includes establishment of a credible and
effective bilateral inspection regime and a pledge not to possess nuclear
reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities,

Noting that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is party to the
Treaty and has concluded a full-scope safeguards agreement as required
by that Treaty,

Having also considered with regret the Agency's Board of Governors' findings contained in its resolution GOV/2645 of 1 April 1993 2
that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is in non-compliance
with its obligations under the safeguards agreement that it concluded
with the Agency, 2 and that the Agency is not able to verify that there
has been no diversion of nuclear materials required to be safeguarded
under the terms of the safeguards agreement on nuclear weapons and
other nuclear explosive devices between the Agency and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea,

Taking note of the statement made on 1 April 1993 7 by the Russian
Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
and the United States of America, the depositaries of the Treaty, which
questions whether the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea's stated
reasons for withdrawing from the Treaty constitute extraordinary events
relating to the subject-matter of the Treaty,

Taking note also of the letter of reply to the Director-General of the
Agency from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea dated 22 April
1993 which, inter alia, encourages and urges the Director-General to
hold consultations with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on
the implementation of the safeguards agreement, and noting also that
the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has expressed its willingness to seek a negotiated solution to this issue,

Welcoming recent signs of improved cooperation between the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Agency and the
prospect of contacts between the Democratic People's Republic of
Korea and other Member States,

1. Calls upon the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to
reconsider the announcement contained in the letter of 12 March 1993?
and thus to reaffirm its commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;‘

2. Also calls upon the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to
honour its non-proliferation obligations under the Treaty and comply
with its safeguards agreement with the Agency as specified by the
Agency's Board of Governors’ resolution GOV/2636 of 25 February
1993;

3. Requests the Director-General of the Agency to continue to
consult with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea with a view to
resolving the issues which are the subject of the Board of Governors’
findings and to report to the Security Council on his efforts in due time;

4. Urges all Member States to encourage the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea to respond positively to the present resolution, and
encourages them to facilitate a solution;

5. Decides to remain seized of the matter and to consider further
action if necessary.

Adopted at the 3212th meeting by 13 votes to none
with 2 abstentions (China, Pakistan).



1 S/25562.
2 S/25556, annex.
3 Official Records of the Security Council, Forty-eighth year, Supplement for April, May and June 1993, document S/25405. 
4 United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 729, No. 10485. See CD/1147 of 25 March 1992 
5 See CD/1147 of 25 March 1992
6 Official Records a, the Security Council, Forty-eighth
Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1993.
7 Ibid., Supplement for April, May and June 1993,
document S/25515, annex.

Texto español (official Spanish version): NACIONES
UNIDAS S

Consejo de Seguridad

Distr.
GENERAL

S/RES/825 (1993)
11 de mayo de 1993

ai € FRI CT cm PCT.Lo Vs ZLZ— Ú Lc ——;;—]——o——;—l—:oó A A AA AA ANA LAA AAN EL
RESOLUCION 825 (1993)

Aprobada por el Consejo de Seguridad en su 3212a. sesión,
celebrada el 11 de mayo de 1993

El Consejo de Seguridad,

Habiendo examinado con preocupación la carta de fecha 12 de marzo de 1993
(S/25405) dirigida al Presidente del Consejo por el Ministro de Relaciones
Exteriores de la República Popular Democrática de Corea en relación con la
intención del Gobierno de dicha República de retirarse del Tratado sobre la no
proliferación de las armas nucleares (el Tratado) y el informe del Director
General del Organismo Internacional de Energía Atómica (OIEA) (S/25556),.

Recordando la declaración del Presidente del Consejo de Seguridad de 8 de
abril de 1993 (S$/25562) en que los miembros del Consejo acogen con beneplácito
todas las gestiones encaminadas a resolver la situación y, en particular,
exhortan al Organismo Internacional de Energía Atómica a que prosiga sus
consultas con la República Popular Democrática de Corea sobre el arreglo
adecuado de la cuestión de la verificación nuclear en la República Popular
Democrática de Corea,

Observando en ese contexto la importancia crítica del Tratado, poniendo de
relieve el papel integral que cabe a las salvaguardias del Organismo en la
aplicación del Tratado y en la utilización de la energía nuclear con fines
pacíficos y reafirmando la esencial contribución que los progresos en materia de
no proliferación pueden aportar al mantenimiento de la paz y la seguridad
internacionales,

Recordando la declaración conjunta de la República Popular Democrática de
Corea y la República de Corea en relación con la desnuclearización de la
peninsula de Corea, que incluye el establecimiento de un régimen bilateral de
inspección fidedigno y eficaz y la promesa de no poseer instalaciones de
reprocesamiento nuclear ni de enriquecimiento de uranio,

Tomando nota de que la República Popular Democrática de Corea es parte en

el Tratado y ha concertado un acuerdo amplio de salvaguardias, de conformidad
con lo previsto en el Tratado,

93-27439 (s: fu.
S/RES/825 (1993)
Página 2

Habiendo examinado también con pesar las conclusiones a que llegó la Junta
de Gobernadores del Organismo Internacional de Energía Atómica en su resolución
de fecha 12 de abril de 1993 en el sentido de que la República Popular
Democrática de Corea no cumple con las obligaciones derivadas del acuerdo de
salvaguardias concertado entre el Organismo y la República Popular Democrática
de Corea (INFCIRC/403) y de que el Organismo no está en condiciones de verificar
que no ha habido desviación de los materiales nucleares que se han de
salvaguardar en virtud de las condiciones del acuerdo de salvaguardias entre
el OIEA y la República Popular Democrática de Corea para la producción de armas
nucleares u otros artefactos explosivos nucleares,

Tomando nota de la declaración de fecha 12 de abril de 1993 formulada por
los Estados Unidos, la Federación de Rusia y el Reino Unido, depositarios del
Tratado (S/25515), en que se cuestiona si los motivos que aduce la República
Popular Democrática de Corea para retirarse del Tratado constituyen
acontecimientos extraordinarios relacionados con la materia del Tratado,

Tomando nota de la carta de respuesta de la República Popular Democrática
de Corea al Director General del Organismo Internacional de Energía Atómica, de
fecha 22 de abril de 1993, en que, entre otras cosas, se exhorta y se insta al
Director General a que celebre consultas con la República Popular Democrática de
Corea sobre la aplicación del acuerdo de salvaguardias; tomando nota además de
que la República Popular Democrática de Corea ha expresado su voluntad de llegar
a una solución negociada a esta cuestión,

Acogiendo con beneplácito los indicios recientes de mayor cooperación entre
la República Popular Democrática de Corea y el Organismo Internacional de
Energía Atómica y la perspectiva de que se entablen contactos entre esa
República y otros Estados Miembros,

1. Exhorta a la República Popular Democrática de Corea a que reconsidere
el anuncio que hizo en su carta de 12 de marzo de 1993 y, de esta manera,
reafirme su adhesión al Tratado;

2. Exhorta además a la República Popular Democrática de Corea a que
cumpla con sus obligaciones en materia de no proliferación derivadas del Tratado
y con el acuerdo de salvaguardias concertado con el Organismo Internacional de
Energía Atómica a que se refiere la resolución de la Junta de Gobernadores del
Organismo de fecha 25 de febrero de 1993;

3. Pide al Director General del Organismo Internacional de Energía
Atómica que prosiga las consultas con la República Popular Democrática de Corea
con miras a resolver las cuestiones objeto de las conclusiones de la Junta de
Gobernadores y presente a su debido tiempo un informe al Consejo de Seguridad
sobre las gestiones que haya realizado;

4. Insta a todos los Estados Miembros a que exhorten a la República
Popular Democrática de Corea a que responda en forma positiva a la presente
resolución y les exhorta a facilitar una solución;

5. Decide seguir ocupándose de la cuestión y considerar la posibilidad de

adoptar nuevas medidas en caso necesario.

Texte français (official French version): NATIONS
UNIES S

Conseil de sécurité

Distr.
GENERALE

S/RES/825 (1993)
11 mai 1993

LR 22e ——————_———_—_—_————
RESOLUTION 825 (1993)

Adoptée par le Conseil de sécurité à sa 3212e séance,
le 11 mai 1993

Le Conseil de sécurité,

Ayant considéré avec inquiétude la lettre du Ministre des affaires
étrangères de la République populaire démocratique de Corée en date du
12 mars 1993 adressée au Président du Conseil (S/25405) concernant l‘intention
du Gouvernement de la République populaire démocratique de Corée de se retirer
du Traité sur la non-prolifération des armes nucléaires (le Traité), et le
rapport du Dire.Leur général de l’Agence internationale de l'énergie
atomique (AIEA) (S/25556),

Rappelant la déclaration du Président du Conseil de sécurité en date du
8 avril 1993 (S/25562) par laquelle les membres du Conseil accueillent tous les
efforts entrepris pour résoudre cette situation et, en particulier, encouragent
l’AIEA à poursuivre ses consultations avec ia République populaire démocratique
de Corée dans la perspective d'un règlement approprié de la question de la
vérification des installations nucléaires en République populaire démocratique
de Corée,

Notant, dans ce contexte, l’importance déterminante du Traité, soulignant
le fait que les accords de garanties de l‘’AIEA font partie intégrante de la mise
en oeuvre du Traité et de la garantie d’une utilisation pacifique de l'énergie
nucléaire, et réaffirmant la contribution primordiale que le progrès en matière
de non-prolifération peut apporter au maintien de la paix et de la sécurité
internationales,

Rappelant la déclaration commune de la République populaire démocratique de
Corée et de la République de Corée sur la dénucléarisation de la péninsule
coréenne, qui prévoit l’établissement d’un régime crédible et effectif
d’inspections bilatérales ainsi qu’un engagement à ne pas posséder
d'installations de retraitement nucléaire et d'enrichissement d’uranium,

Notant que la République populaire démocratique de Corée est partie au

Traité et a conclu un accord complet de garanties ainsi que requis par ce
dernier,

93-27437  (F) J..…-
S/RES/825 (1993)
Page 2

Ayant également considéré avec regret les concius:ons du Conse:i des
gouverneurs de l‘’AIEA contenues dans sa résolution du ler avril 1993, suivant
lesquelles la République populaire démocretique de Corée ne respecte np: es
cbligations qui lui incombent en vertu de son accord de garanties avær :’Agence
(INFCIRC/403), et que !'AIEA n’est pas à même de confirmer qu'L. n’y à pas eu de
détournement Ze matières nucléaires devant être soumises aux garanties en vertu
de l’accord de garanties entre l'AIEA et la République populaire démocratique de
Corée au profit d'armes nucléaires ou d’autres dispositifs explosifs nucléaires,

Notant la déclaration en date du ler avril 1993 des Etats-Unis d'Amérique,
de la Fédération de Russie et du Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d'Irlande
du Nord (S/25515), dépositaires du Traité, qui s’interrogent sur le fait de
savoir si les raisons données par la République populaire démocratique de Corée
pour son retrait du Traité constituent des événements extraordinaires au regard
de l’objet du Traité,

Notant la lettre de réponse de la République populaire démocratique de
Corée au Directeur général de l’AIEA en date du 22 avril 1993 qui, entre autres,
encourage et invite instamment le Directeur général à entreprendre des
consultations avec la République populaire démocratique de Corée sur la mise en
oeuvre de l'accord de garanties; notant également que la République populaire
démocratique de Corée a exprimé sa volonté de rechercher une solution négociée à
cette question,

Accueillant les signes récents d’une coopération accrue entre la République
populaire démocratique de Corée et l’AIEA ainsi que la perspective de contacts
entre la République populaire démocratique de Corée et d’autres Etats membres;

1. Appelle la République populaire démocratique de Corée à reconsidérer
l’annonce contenue dans la lettre du 12 mars 1993 et, par là, à réaffirmer son

engagement envers le Traité;

2. Appelle de surcroît la République populaire démocratique de Corée ä
honorer les obligations de non-prolifération lui incombant au titre du Traité et
à se conformer à l’accord de garanties conclu avec l’AIEA ainsi que prescrit par
la résolution du Conseil des gouverneurs de l’Agence en date du 25 février 1993;

3. Prie le Directeur général de l’AIEA de poursuivre ses consultations
avec la République populaire démocratique de Corée afin de résoudre les
questions soulevées par les conclusions du Conseil des gouverneurs et de faire
rapport à temps au Conseil de sécurité sur ses efforts;

4. Prie instamment tous les Etats membres d’encourager la République
populaire démocratique de Corée à répondre positivement à cette résolution, et
les encourage à faciliter une solution;

5. Décide de rester saisi du dossier et d'envisager une action ultérieure
du Conseil de sécurité si nécessaire.

Русский текст (official Russian version): ОРГАНИЗАЦИЯ

ОБЪЕДИНЕННЫХ НАЦИЙ

\, Совет Безопасности
М О15 г.
ее СЕМЕВА!.

5/ВЕ5/ 825 (1993)
11 Мау 1993

РЕЗОЛЮЦИЯ 825 (1993),

принятая Советом Безопасности на его 3212-м заседании 11 мая 1993 года

Совет Безопасности,

рассмотрев с озабоченностью письмо министра иностранных дел Корейской
Народно-Демократической Республики (КНДР) от 12 марта 1993 года на имя
Председателя Совета (5/25405) относительно намерения правительства КНДР выйти из
Договора о нераспространении ядерного оружия (Договора) и доклад Генерального
директора Международного агентства по атомной энергии (МАГАТЭ) (5/25556),

ссылаясь на Заявление Председателя Совета Безопасности от 8 апреля 1993 года
(5/25562), в котором члены Совета приветствуют все усилия, направленные на
урегулирование этой ситуации, и, в частности, призывают МАГАТЭ продолжать
проводимые им консультации с КНДР в целях надлежащего урегулирования вопроса о
ядерном контроле в КНДР,

отмечая в этой связи исключительно большое значение Договора и подчеркивая
ключевую роль гарантий МАГАТЭ в осуществлении Договора и в обеспечении
использования ядерной энергии в мирных целях, и вновь подтверждая важнейший
вклад, который прогресс в области нераспространения может внести в поддержание
международного мира и безопасности,

ссылаясь на Совместную декларацию КНДР и Республики Корея (РК) об объявлении
Корейского полуострова безъядерной зоной, которая, в частности, предусматривает
установление пользующегося доверием и эффективного двустороннего инспекционного
режима и обязательство не обладать установками по переработке ядерного топлива и
обогащению урана,

отмечая, что КНДР является участником Договора и заключила всеобъемлющее
Соглашение о гарантиях в соответствии с требованиями этого Договора,

93-27438. В
5/ВЕ5З/ 825 (1993)
Расе 2

рассмотрев также с сожалением выводы Совета управляющих МАГАТЭ, содержащиеся
в его резолюции от 1 апреля 1993 года, в отношении того, что КНДР не соблюдает
свои обязательства по Соглашению о гарантиях между МАГАТЭ и КНДР ( !МЕС1ВС/ 403) и
что МАГАТЭ не в состоянии проверить, не имело ли место отвлечение ядерных
материалов, которые должны подпадать под гарантии в соответствии с положениями
Соглашения о гарантиях между МАГАТЭ и КНДР, для целей ядерного оружия или других
ядерных взрывных устройств,

принимая к сведению Заявление Российской Федерации, Соединенного Королевства
и Соединенных Штатов, являющихся депозитариями Договора, от 1 апреля 1993 года
(5/25515), в котором высказывается сомнение в том, что приведенные КНДР причины
выхода из Договора можно квалифицировать как исключительные обстоятельства,
связанные с содержанием Договора,

принимая к сведению ответное письмо КНДР на имя Генерального директора
МАГАТЭ от 22 апреля 1993 года, в котором к Генеральному директору обращены
рекомендация и настоятельный призыв провести консультации с КНДР по вопросу об
осуществлении Соглашения о гарантиях; принимая к сведению также, что КНДР
заявила о своей готовности вести поиск решения этой проблемы путем переговоров,

приветствуя наметившиеся в последнее время признаки улучшения сотрудничества
между КНДР и МАГАТЭ и перспективы контактов между КНДР и другими государствами-
членами,

1. призывает КНДР пересмотреть заявление, содержащееся в письме от
12 марта 1993 года, и таким образом вновь подтвердить свою приверженность
Договору;

2. призывает далее КНДР соблюдать свои обязательства в области
нераспространения по Договору и соблюдать свое Соглашение о гарантиях с МАГАТЭ,
как указывается в резолюции Совета управляющих МАГАТЭ от 25 февраля 1993 года;

З. просит Генерального директора МАГАТЭ продолжить консультации с КНДР в
целях урегулирования проблем, которые являются предметом выводов Совета

управляющих, и в надлежащие сроки представить Совету Безопасности доклад о своих
усилиях;

4. настоятельно призывает все государства-члены призвать КНДР положительно
откликнуться на данную резолюцию и рекомендует им содействовать поиску решения;

5. постановляет заниматься этим вопросом и рассмотреть вопрос о дальнейших
действиях Совета Безопасности в случае необходимости.

中文文本 (official Chinese version): 1993 年 3 月 12 晶
朝鲜 民主 主义 人 民 共 和 国
常 驻 联合 国 代表 给 安全 理事 会 主席 的 信

1993 年 3 月 19 日
秘书 长 给 安全 理事 会 主席 的 信

秘书 长 的 说 明
决 定

1993 年 4 月 8 日 进行 协商 后 , 主席 代表 安理会 成 员 向 新
闻 媒 介 发 表 声明 ”如 下 ，

“安全 理事 会 各 成 员 注意 到 国际 原子 能 机 构 总
干事 汉 斯 . 布 利克 斯 博士 1993 年 4 月 6 日 的 口头 声明
和 书面 报告 。” 安 理会 成 员 还 注意 到 1993 年 3 月 12 日
朝鲜 民主 主义 人 民 共 和 国 常 驻 代表 给 安全 理事 会 主
席 的 信 , ” 信 中 附 有 该 国外 交 部 长 的 信 , 其 中 提 及
《不 扩散 核武 器 条 约 》” 第 十 条 。

“安理会 备 成 员 关切 已 发 生 的 局 势 。 在 这 方面 ，
它们 重申 《条 约 》 的 重要 性 和 《条 约 》 各 当 事 方 名
守 该 《条 约 》 的 重要 性 。

“安理会 各 成 员 支 持 朝鲜 民主 主义 人 民 共 和 国
和 大 韩 民 国 发 表 的 《 关于 朝鲜 半岛 非 核 化 的 联合 宜
言 》。”

“安理会 各 成 员 欣 见 旨 在 解决 此 局 势 的 所 有 各
项 努力 , 特别 鼓励 国际 原子 能 机 构 继续 同 朝鲜 民主 主
义 人 民 共 和 国 协商 并 作出 建设 性 努力 , 适当 解决 在 朝
鲜 民主 主义 人 民 共 和 国 的 核 核 查 问题 。

“安理会 各 成 员 将 继续 关注 此 局 势 。”

1993 年 5 月 11 日 ,安理会 第 3212 次 会 议决 定 邀 请 朝鲜
民主 主义 人 民 共 和 国 和 大 韩 民国 代表 参加 对 下 列 项 目的
讨论 ,但 无 表决 权 ，

了 全

S/25562 。

” “《 安 全 理事 会 正式 记录 , 第 四 十 八 年 ,1993 年 4
月 、5 月 和 6 月 份 补 编 》,S/25556 号 文件 ,附件 。

” “同上 ,S/25405 号 文件 。
” 联合国 《条 约 汇编 》, 第 729 着 ,第 10485 号 。

见 1992 年 3 月 25 日 CD/1147 。

“1993 年 3 月 12 日 朝鲜 民主 主义 人 民 共 和 国 常 驻
联合 国 代表 给 安全 理事 会 主席 的 信 (S/25405)，”

“1993 年 3 月 19 日 秘书 长 给 安全 理事 会 主席 的 信
(S/25445)1”

“秘书 长 的 说 明 (S/25556) ”。”

1993 年 5 月 11 日 第 825 (1993) 号 决议
安全 理事 会 ，

关切 地 审议 了 1993 年 3 月 12 日 朝鲜 民主 主义 人 民 共 和
国外 交 部 长 给 安全 理事 会 主席 的 信 , ”内 称 朝鲜 民主 主义
人 民 共 和 国政 府 有 意 退 出 《 不 扩散 核武 器 条 约 》,” 以 及
国际 原子 能 机 构 总 干事 的 报告 ，

回顾 1993 年 4 月 8 日 安理会 主席 的 声明 , ”其 中 安理会
成 员 欢 迎 为 解决 这 一 情况 所 作 的 一 切 努 力 ,并 特别 鼓励 国
际 原子 能 机 构 继续 同 朝鲜 民主 主义 人 民 共 和 国 磋商 , 以便
适当 解决 在 朝鲜 民主 主义 人 民 共 和 国境 内 核 材料 的 核查
问题 ，

注意 到 这 方面 该 《条 约 》 极 为 重要 , 强调 国际 原子 能
机 构 的 保障 办 法 是 实施 该 《条 约 》 和 确保 和 平 使 用 核能
的 组 成 部 分 ,并 重申 不 扩散 核武 器 方面 的 进展 对 维持 国际
和 平 与 安全 可 以 作出 关键 性 的 贡献 ，

回顾 《朝鲜 民主 主义 人 民 共 和 国 和 大 韩 民 国 关 于 朝
鲜 半岛 非 核 化 的 联合 宜 言 》,” 其 中 包括 建立 一 种 可 信和 而
有 效 的 双边 检查 制度 , 并 知 言 不 拥有 核燃料 后 处 理 和 钠 浓
缩 设施 ，

注意 到 朝鲜 民主 主义 人 民 共 和 国 是 该 《条 约 》 的 纺
约 国 并 且 已 经 按照 该 《条 约 》 的 要 求 签署 了 一 项 全 面 保
障 协定 ，

赴 幅 地 审 议 了 国际 原子 能 机 构 理事 会 1993 年 4 月 1 日
第 GOV/2645 号 决议 ”中 所 载 的 调查 结果 , 内 称 朝 鲜 民 主 主

” 《安全 理事 会 正式 记录 , 第 四 十 八 年 ,1993 年 7 月 、
8 月 和 9 月 份 补 编 》,S/26311 号 文件 。

146
义 人 民 共 和 国 未 遵守 根据 国际 原子 能 机 构 和 朝鲜 民主 主
义 人 民 共 和 国 的 《 保障 协定 》” 所 负 的 义务 , 并 称 该 机 构
无 法 证 实 该 机 构 和 朝鲜 民主 主义 人 民 共 和 国 缔结 的 《 保
障 协定 》 的 规定 必须 置 于 保障 办 法 管制 下 的 核 材 料 没 有
转 用 于 核武 器 或 其 他 核 爆炸 装置 ，

注意 到 1993 年 4 月 1 日 该 《条 约 》 保 管 国 俄罗斯 联邦 、
大 不 列 颠 及 北 爱 尔 兰 联合 王国 和 美国 的 声明 , ”其 中 质问
彰 鲜 民主 主义 人 民 共 和 国 所 宣称 的 退出 《条 约 》 的 理由
是 否 构 成 与 《条 约 》 主题 有 关 的 非常 事件 ，

又 注意 到 1993 年 4 月 22 日 朝鲜 民主 主义 人 民 共 和 国 给
国际 原子 能 机 构 总 干事 的 复 信 , 其 中 除 其 他 外 ,鼓励 并 促
请 总 干事 就 《 保障 协定 》 的 执行 问题 同 朝鲜 民主 主义 人
民 共 和 国 磋商 , 又 注意 到 朝鲜 民主 主义 人 民 共 和 国 已 经 认
示 愿 意 通过 谈判 为 这 一 问题 寻求 解决 办 法 ，

欣 见 朝鲜 民主 主义 人 民 共 和 国 和 国际 原子 能 机 构 的
合作 最 近 有 改善 的 迹象 , 朝鲜 民主 主义 人 民 共 和 国 和 其 他
会 员 国 有 接触 的 希望，

1. 委 汶 朝鲜 民主 主义 人 民 共 和 国 重 新 考虑 1993 年 3
月 12 日 信 ” 中 的 宣告 ,并 从 而 重申 决心 信守 《 不 扩 艇 核武
器 条 的?

2. 又 委 求 朝鲜 民主 主义 人 民 共 和 国有 懂行 根据 《条
约 》 所 负 的 不 扩散 义务 ,并 按照 国际 原子 能 机 构 理事 会
1993 年 2 月 25 日 第 GO0V/2636 号 决议 ”的 具体 规定 , 遵守 它
同 该 机 构 签订 的 《 保障 协定 》”

3， 请 国际 原子 能 机 构 总 干事 继续 同 朝鲜 民主 主义
人 民 共 和 国 磋 商 , 以 期 解决 理事 会 调查 结果 中 所 指 的 问题 ，
并 适时 和 间 安 全 理事 会 报告 他 所 作 的 努力

4. 促请 全 体会 员 国 鼓励 朝鲜 民主 主义 人 民 共和 国
积极 响应 本 决议 , 并 鼓励 会 员 国 协助 达成 一 种 解决 办 法 ;

宇

同上 ,《1993 年 4 月 、5 月 和 6 月 份 补 编 》,S/
25515 号 文件 ,附件 。

5. 决定 继续 处 理 此 案 , 并 于 必要 时 考虑 由 安理会 采
取 进 一 步 的 行动 。

第 3212 次 会 议 以 13 景 对
零 果 、2 票 弃权 (中
国 、 马 基 斯 坦 ) 通 过

关于 塔吉克 斯 坦 局 势 的 项 目

塔吉克 斯 坦 局 势
决 定

1993 年 4 月 26 日 ,秘书 长 写 信 ” 给 安全 理事 会 主席 , 信
中 提 及 他 1992 年 12 月 21 日 的 信 , 其 中 通知 安理会 ,打算 向
塔吉克 斯 坦 派 遗 一 个 由 政治 、 军 事 和 人 道 主义 官员 混合
组 成 的 联合 国 小 组 , 监测 地 面 上 的 局 势 。 这 个 小 组 称 为 联
合 国 塔吉克 斯 坦 观 察 团 ( 联 塔 观察 团 ) ,已 于 1993 年 1 月 21
日 开始 工作 , 并 向 秘书 长 提供 了 关于 塔吉克 斯 坦 冲 突 局 势
的 宝贵 的 最 新 情报 。 根 据 联 塔 观察 团 最 近 的 报告 ,秘书 长
断定 除非 采取 紧急 行动 达成 停火 ,并 在 有 关 各 方 之 间 开 始
政治 对 话 , 否则 这 场 对 抗 可 能 升级 , 尤其 是 在 塔吉克 斯 坦
与 阿富汗 边界 地 区 。 因 此 ,秘书 长 在 征求 了 塔吉克 斯 坦 政
府 和 其 他 有 关 方面 的 意见 之 后 , 决定 任命 伊 斯 马 特 . 基 塔
尼 大 使 作为 他 的 塔吉克 斯 坦 问题 特使 。 基 塔 尼 大 使 约 在
三 个 月 后 向 秘书 长 报告 取得 的 结果 。 在 此 情况 下 , 秘书 长
认为 必须 将 联 塔 观察 团 的 任务 期 限 再 延长 三 个 月 , 以便 它
继续 进行 其 监测 和 人 道 主义 工作 。

1993 年 4 月 29 日 ,安全 理事 会 主席 写 信 ”通知 秘书 长
如 下 ，

” ”安理会 在 1992 年 也 曾 通过 关于 这 个 问题 的 决议
或 决定 。

”  SV/25697 。

区

S/25698 。

147

النص العربي (official Arabic version): 5 ‏لمم المتحدة‎ ١

.10318117
ه5117

ال
يه م .+ (1993) 8/228/825
4 ل : ‎١‏ لمن 3 #قلا 11

القرار ق0كام (1997)

الذي اتخذه مجلس الأمن في جنسته ‎“١١١‏
‏المعقودة في ‎١١‏ أيار /مايو ‎١47‏

إن مجلس الأمن؛

وقد نظر بقلق في الرسالة الواردة من وزير خارجية جمهورية كوريا الد يمقراطية الشعبية المؤرخة
‎١"‏ آذار /مارس ‎٠947‏ والموجهة الى رئيس المجلس (5/25405) فيما يتعلق باعتزام حكومة جمهورية كوريا
الد يمقراطية الشعبية الانسحاب من معاهدة عدم انتشار الأسلحة النووية (المعاهدة). وفي تقرير المدير
العام للوكالة الدولية للطاقة الذرية (5/25556)؛

وإذ يشير الى بيان رئيس مجلس الأمن المؤرخ + نيسان /ابريل ‎١987‏ (3/25562) الذي رحب فيه
أعضاء المجلس بجميع الجهود الرامية الى تسوية هذه الحالة. ولا سيما تشجيع الوكالة الدولية للطاقة الذرية
على مواصلة مشاوراتها مع جمهورية كوريا الد يمقراطية الشعبية لايجاد تسوية ملائمة لمسالة التحقق النووي
في جمهورية كور يا الد يمقراطية الشعبية.

إذ يلاحظ في هذا الصدد ما لمعاهدة عدم انتشار الأسلحة النووية (المعاهدة) من أهمية حاسمة.
وإذ يؤكد الدور الأصيل لضمانات الوكالة الدولية للطاقة الذرية في تنفيذ المعاهدة وفي تأمين استخدام
الطاقة النووية في الأغراض السلمية. وإذ يؤكد من جديد المساهمة الحاسمة التي يمكن أن يقدمها التقدم
في مجال منع الانتشار لصون السلم والأمن الدوليين؛

وإذ يشير الى الإعلان المشترك لجمهورية كوريا الد يمقراطية الشعبية وجمهورية كوريا بشأن جعل
شبه الجزيرة الكورية. خالية من الأسلحة النووية الذي يتضمن إنشاء نظام تفتيش ثنائي جد ير بالثقة و فعال
وتعهدا بعدم حيازة مرافق لا عادة التجهيز النووي وإثراء اليورا تيوم.؛

وإذ يلاحظ أن جمهورية كوريا الد يمقراطية الشعبية طرف في المعاهدة وأنها أبرمت اتفاقا كاملا

للضمانات حسبما تقضي هذه المعاهدة.؛

93-4 ل

(1993) 5/2285/825
2 ©و32ط

وقد نظر أ يضا مع الأسف في النتائج التي توصل إليها مجلس محافظي الوكالة الدولية للطاقة الذرية
والواردة في قراره المؤرخ ‎١‏ نيسان/ابريل ‎١9597‏ ومفادها أن جمهورية كوريا الد يمقراطية الشعبية لا تمتثل
لالتزاماتها بموجب اتفاق الضمانات المبرم بين الوكالة الدولية للطاقة الذرية وجمهورية كوريا الد يمقراطية
الشعبية (11120180/403). وأن الوكالة غير قادرة على التحقق من عدم تحويل مواد نووية يتعين خضوعها
للضمانات بموجب أحكام اتفاق الضمانات المبرم بين الوكانة الدولية للطاقة الذرية وجمهورية كوريا
الد يمقتراطية الشعبية الى أسلحة نووية أ غيرها من الأجهزة المتفجرة النووية.

وإذ يلاحظ البيان الصادر في ‎١‏ نيسان/ابريل ‎١949*‏ عن الاتحاد الروسي والمملكة المتحدة والولايات
المتحدة. وهي الأطراف المودعة للمعاهدة (5/25515). الذي يشكك فيما إذا كانت الأسباب التي ذكرتها
جمهورية كوريا الديمقراطية الشعبية للانسحاب من المعاهدة تمثل أحداثا استثنائية تتصل بموضوع
المعا هد ة.

وإذ يشير الى الرسالة التي ردت فيها جمهورية توريا الد يمتراطية الشعبية على المد ير العام للوكالة
الدولية للطاقة الذرية والمؤرخة 9 نيسان /ابريل ‎١547‏ والتي جاء فيها. ضمن أمور أخرى. أنها تشجع وتحث
المدير العام على عقد مشاورات مع جمهورية كوريا الد يمقراطية الشعبية بشأن تنفيذ اتفاق الضمانات؛
وإذ يلاحظ أيضا أن جمهورية كوريا الديمقراطية الشعبية أعربت عن استعدادها للسعي الى حل هذه
القضية بالتفاوض.

وإذ يرحب بالدلائل الأخيرة لتحسن إمكانيات التعاون بين جمهورية كوريا الد يمقراطية الشعبية
والوكالة الدولية للطاقة الذرية و باحتمالات قيام اتصالات بين جمهورية كوريا الد يمقراطية الشعبية ودول

0

ا عضا ب 1 حر ى 4

‎-١‏ | يطلب الى جمهورية كوريا الد يمقراطية الشعبية أن تعيد النظر في الإعلان الوارد في
الرسالة المؤرخة ‎١9‏ آذار /مارس ‎١4#‏ وبالتالي أن تعيد تأكيد التزامها بالمعاهدة؛

‏" - يطلب كذلك الى جمهورية كوريا الد يمقراطية الشعبية أن تفي بالتزاماتها المتعلقة بعدم
انتشار الإسلحة النووية بموجب المعاهدة وأن تمتثل لاتفاقها مع الوكالة الدولية للطاقة الذرية بشأن الضمانات
حسيما حدده قرار مجلس محافظى الوكالة الدولية للطاقة الذرية المؤر اخ ‎٠‏ شباط ا قبراير 9597؛

‏» - يطلب الى المدير العام للوكالة الدولية للطاقة الذرية أن يواصل التشاور مع جمهورية كوريا

‏الد يمقراطية الشعبية بهدف ايجاد حل للمسائل التي هي موضع النتائج التي توصل إليها مجلس المحافظين
وأن يقدم الى مجلس الأمن في الوقت المناسب تقريرا عن جهوده.

‏93-4 .أ

(1993) 5/2355/825
3 و23

على تشجيع جمهورية كوريا الد يمقراطية الشعبية على

1 يحث جميع الدول الأاعضاء
الاستجادة لهذا القرار ويشجعها على تسهيل إيجاد حل:

يقرر أن يبقي هذه المسألة قيد النظر وأن ينظر في إمكانة اتخاذ مجلس الأمن اجراءات

- 0

93-4

Draft resolution (S/25745):
UNITED S

NATIONS

Co A) Security Council

N] 4 o 4 Vi Distr.

NT GENERAL
§/25745
10 May 1993
ENGLISH

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH/FRENCH

France, Hungary, Japan, New Zealand, Russian Federation, Spain,

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United
States of America: draft resolution

The Security Council,

Having considered with concern the letter from the Minister for Foreign
Affairs of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) dated 12 March 1993
addressed to the President of the Council (S/25405) concerning the intention of
the Government of the DPRK to withdraw from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons (the Treaty) and the report of the Director-General of the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) (S/25556),

Recalling the Security Council presidential statement of 8 April 1993
(5/25562) in which the members of the Council welcome all efforts aimed at
resolving this situation and, in particular, encourage the IAEA to continue its
consultations with the DPRK for proper settlement of the nuclear verification
issue in the DPRK,

Noting in that context the critical importance of the Treaty, and
emphasizing the integral role of IAEA safeguards in the implementation of the
Treaty and in ensuring the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and reaffirming the
crucial contribution which progress in non-proliferation can make to the
maintenance of international peace and security,

Recalling the Joint Declaration by the DPRK and the Republic of Korea (ROK)
on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, which includes establishment of
a credible and effective bilateral inspection regime and a pledge not to possess
nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities,

Noting that the DPRK is party to the Treaty and has concluded a full-scope
safeguards agreement as required by that Treaty,

Having also considered with regret the IAEA Board of Governors’ findings
contained in its resolution of 1 April 1993 that the DPRK is in non-compliance
with its obligations under the IAEA-DPRK safeguards agreement (INFCIRC/403), and
that the IAEA is not able to verify that there has been no diversion of nuclear
materials required to be safeguarded under the terms of the IAEA-DPRK safeguards
agreement to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices,

93~27365 (E) 110593

110593 ah
§/25745
English
Page 2

Noting the 1 April 1993 statement by the Russian Federation, the United
Kingdom and the United States, the depositories of the Treaty (S/25515), which
questions whether the DPRK's stated reasons for withdrawing from the Treaty
constitute extraordinary events relating to the subject-matter of the Treaty,

Noting the letter of reply by the DPRK to the Director-General of the IAEA
dated 22 April 1993 which, inter alia, encourages and urges the Director-General
to hold consultations with the DPRK on the implementation of the safeguards
agreement, noting alsgc that the DPRK has expressed its willingness to seek a
negotiated solution to this issue,

Welcoming recent signs of improved cooperation between the DPRK and the
IAEA and the prospect of contacts between the DPRK and other Member States,

i. Calls upon the DPRK to reconsider the announcement contained in the
letter of 12 March 1993 and thus to reaffirm its commitment to the Treaty;

2. Further calls upon the DPRK to honour its non-proliferation
obligations under the Treaty and comply with its safeguards agreement with the
IAEA as specified by the IAEA Board of Governors’ resolution of
25 February 1993;

3. Requests the Director-General of the IAEA to continue to consult with
the DPRK with a view to resolving the issues which are the subject of the Board
of Governors’ findings and to report to the Security Council on his efforts in
due time;

4. Urges all Member States to encourage the DPRK to respond positively to
this resolution, and encourages them to facilitate a solution;

S. Decides to remain seized of the matter and to consider further
Security Council action if necessary.

Meeting record:
UNITED
NATIONS

PROVISIONAL ©

sS/pv.3212
11 May 1993

ENGLISH

EE ES a RE EE ER ES RG EGR

President:

Members:

PROVISIONAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE THREE THOUSAND
TWO HUNDRED AND TWELFTH MEETING

Held at Headquarters, New York,
at 5.40 p.m.

on Tuesday, 11 May 1993,

Mr, VORONTSOV

Brazil

Cape Verde

China

Djibouti

France

Hungary

Japan

Morocco

New Zealand

Pakistan

Spain

United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland

United States of America

Venezuela

(Russian Federation)

Mr.
Mr.
Mr,
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr,

Sir

Mrs.
Mr,

de ARAUJO CASTRO
JESUS

LI Zhaoxing
OLHAYE

MERIMEE

ERDOS

HATANO
BENJELLOUN-TOUIMI
O'BRIEN

MARKER

YANEZ BARNUEVO

David HANNAY
ALBRIGHT
ARRIA

This record contains the original text of speeches delivered in English

and interpretations of speeches in the other languages.

The final text will

be printed in the Official Records of the Security Council.

Corrections should be submitted to original speeches only.

They should

be sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned, within
one week, to the Chief, Official Records Editing Section, Office of Conference
Services, room DC2-750G, 2 United Nations Plaza, and incorporated in a copy of

the record.

93-85828

4431vV (E)
S/pPV.3212
2-b

The meeting was called to order at 5.40 p.m.

ADOPTION OF THE AGENDA

The agenda was adopted.

LETTER DATED 12 MARCH 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE DEMOCRATIC
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA TC THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF
THE SECURITY COUNCIL (S5/25405)

LETTER DATED 19 MARCH 1993 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ADDRESSED TO THE
PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL (S/25445)

NOTE BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL (S/25556)

The PRESIDENT (interpretation from Russian): I should like to
inform the Council that I have received letters from the representatives of
the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea, in which
they request to be invited to participate in the discussion of the item on the
Council's agenda. In accordance with the usual practice, I propose, with the
consent of the Council, to invite those representatives to participate in the
discussion without the right to vote, in accordance with the relevant
provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of
procedure.

There being no objection, is so decided.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Pak (Democratic People's Republic

of Korea) and Mr. Yoo (Republic of Korea) took places at the Council table.

RYA RR VS
O

The PRESIDENT (interpretation from Russian): The Security Council

will now begin its consideration of the item on the agenda.

The Security Council is meeting in accordance with the understanding
reached in its prior consultations.

Members of the Council have before them document §/25745, which contains
the text of a draft resolution submitted by France, Hungary, Japan,
New Zealand, the Russian Federation, Spain, the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America. |

I should like to draw the attention of the members of the Council to the
following documents: 8/25576, letter dated 9 April 1993 from the Permanent
Representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the United
Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council; S5/25581, letter
dated 12 April 1993 from the Permanent Representative of Bulgaria to the
United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General; 5/25593, letter dated
April 13 1993 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of
Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General; §/25595,
letter dated 15 April 1093 from the Permanent Representative of the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea to the United Nations addressed to the President of
the Security Council; S§/25734, letter dated 4 May 1993 from the Permanent
Representative of Paraguay to the United Nations addressed to the
Secretary-General; and §/25747, letter dated 10 May 1993 from the Permanent
Representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the United
Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council.

The first speaker is the representative of the Democratic People's

Republic of Korea, and I now call on him.
S/PV.3212
7
Mr. PAK (Democratic People's Republic of Korea): I should first of
all like to congratulate you, Sir, on your assumption of the presidency of the
Security Council for the month of May. My thanks also go to your predecessor,
Mr. Jamsheed K.A. Marker, Permanent Representative of Pakistan.

As this is the first time that I have spoken in this Council, I wish to
extend my greetings to His Excellency Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali,
Secretary-General of the United Nations.

Before I make my statement, I should like to remind members of the
Security Council that I have officially requested the Security Council,
through its President, to consider at this meeting issues related to the abuse
by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) of the safeguards agreement
between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and IAEA. I hope that my
request, contained in document S/25747, will be considered as a formal agenda
item, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the United Nations Charter
and the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council.

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea's withdrawal from the Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the problems in
implementing the safeguards agreement cannot be considered to wreck world
peace and threaten the security of other countries.

No legal or technical grounds can be found to discuss the so-called
"nuclear problem" at the United Nations Security Council.

The withdrawal of our country from the NPT was based on our full right
under the Treaty, a right that belongs to every sovereign Member State. Our
refusal to allow the special inspection of military installations unrelated to
nuclear activities that was demanded by the United States and some IAEA
Secretariat officials cannot be regarded as so-called "non-compliance" with

the safeguards agreement.
S/PV.3212
8

(Mr. Pak, Democratic People's
Republic of Korea)

The delegation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is therefore
opposed to discussion of the so-called "nuclear problem" at the United Nations
Security Council,

The draft resolution introduced by the United States is aimed at
infringing upon the sovereignty of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea,
a State Member of the United Nations, and at stifling its socialist system.

Though the adoption of this draft resolution by the Security Council is
forced by the demand of the nuclear super-Power, it will be rejected
absolutely, since it is unreasonable and in contravention of paragraph 4,
Article 2, Chapter I of the United Nations Charter and of paragraph 4,
Article 3 of the IAEA Statute, which call for respect of the sovereignty of
the member States.

As to our withdrawal from the NPT, it is a self-defence measure based on
a State's right to withdraw from the Treaty in the exercise of its national
sovereignty, in case a State party to the Treaty decides that its supreme
interests are threatened.

As clearly noted in the statement of the Government ¢f the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea issued on 12 March, we declared that we were
unavoidably withdrawing from the NPT because of an abnormal situation in which
the United States, those forces hostile to us and some officials of the IAEA
secretariat are abusing the NPT so as to stifle our socialist system.

The major reason that forced us to withdraw from the NPT was the fact
that the United States kep" increasing nuclear threats against us and
manipulated some officials of the IAEA secretariat to open our military bases

and disarm us,
S/PVv.3212
9-10

(Mr, Pak, Democratic People's
Republic of Korea)

Firstly, the United States has escalated its nuclear threat against us
while maintaining its nuclear weapons deployed in south Korea, contrary to the
fact that we joined the NPT and have since fulfilled our obligations under the
NPT in good faith. The United States resumed the suspended "Team Spirit"
joint military exercises while we allowed IAEA inspections, thereby increasing
the nuclear threat against us. Such American nuclear threats against us
constitute a flagrant violation of the NPT as well as of
resolution 255 (1968), adopted by the Security Council on 19 June 1968.

Secondly, the United States and its followers fabricated the
“inconsistencies in principle”. We have in good faith discharged our
obligations under the safeguards agreement. The Democratic People's Republic
of Korea, after signing the safeguards agreement on 30 January 1992 - which
went into force on 10 April 1992 - provided the IAEA with an initial report on
nuclear materials subject to the safeguards and on the design information of
its nuclear facilities on 4 May 1992, far in advance of the set time, which
had been the end of May.

With a view to bringing into the open all its nuclear activities, the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea even provid=d the IAEA with lists of

those nuclear facilities exempt from the safeguards and of its scientific

research institutes.
S/PV.3212
11

(Mr. Pak, Democratic People's
Republic of Korea)

We invited the IAEA delegation, led by its Director General, to come from
11 to 16 May 1992 and we showed the nuclear facilities which the IAEA |
delegation requested to see, and all other projects which the Agency found
suspicious.

We exerted made sincere efforts, in cooperation with the inspectors,
during their six rounds of visits to our country from May 1992 to
February 1993. The head of the IAEA inspection team repeatedly thanked our
operators for their active cooperation, which was explicitly mentioned in the
reports submitted by the Director General to the IAEA Board of Governors.

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea, since the safeguards agreement
came into effect, has sincerely discharged its obligation under the Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and the six rounds of inspections
have proved that its nuclear activities have a solely peaceful purpose.

The United States and some officials of the IAEA Secretariat fabricated
the "inconsistencies in principle".

The fourth ad hoc inspectiion team, which visited our country from
2 to 14 November 1992, attempted to threaten us. saying that "more nuclear
materials should be declared", that this would be "the last chance to modify
the initial report" and that "a tragic consequence would follow if the chance
were passed up". However, after having become acquainted with the conditions
of the Nyongbyon nuclear facilities and having held consultations with the
operators, they admitted that most of their views had been based on a hasty
conclusion.

The sixth ad hoc inspection team visited our country from 26 January to
6 February 1993 and claimed that they found two "inconsistencies in principle".

The first of the "inconsistencies in principle" was that the composition and
S/PV.3212
12

(Mr. Pak, Democratic People's
Republic of Korea)

quantity of plutonium we declared to the IAEA did not correspond to what had
been calculated by the IAEA, The second of the “inconsistencies in principle”
was that the isotopic composition of plutonium did not correspond to that of
the liquid waste.

During the negotiations with the fourth, fifth and sixth ad hoc
inspection teams and at the talks with the IAEA Secretariat in Vienna in
December 1992 and February 1993, we elucidated, in a scientific and
technological way, the mistakes in calculation made by the IAEA on the
composition and quantity of plutonium, and explained that the difference in
the composition of plutonium and liquid waste arose when the solution from the
basic plutonium-extraction experiment in 1975 was put together in the waste
tank.

At the talks, the IAEA Secretariat admitted its mistakes in the
calculation and proposed that another negotiation be held.

The sixth ad hoc inspection team flew back to Vienna on 8 February; it
did not even have time to de the promised recalculation.

At the meeting of the Board of Govermors of ‘the IAEA held on
9 February 1993, the Director General demanded a "special inspection" of our
two “suspicious locations", under the pretext of the "inconsistencies in
principle" - in accordance with the scenario already worked out, The
inspection of "suspicious locations" is part of United States manoeuvring
aimed at opening our military sites. The United States attempted to abuse the
north-south nuclear control subcommittee for its purpose of opening our
military sites. It tried again through the IAEA inspection. Since all such
attempts proved to be unsuccessful, it resumed the "Team Spirit" joint

military exercises to threaten us.’
S/PV.3212
13

(Mr. Pak, Democratic People's
Republic of Korea)

With a view to achieving its aim of opening our military sites, the
United States cooked up delusive "intelligence information" and "satellite
photos" which falsified our military sites as being nuclear-related, and then
turned the "information" and "photos" over to the IAEA and its followers.

In September 1992 the IAEA Director General demanded access to the two
"suspicious locations". Out of respect for his position as Director General
we allowed the IAEA inspectors authorized by him to visit the two “suspicious
locations" on 12 and 14 September. One location was a civilian object and the
other was a military one. The two inspectors authorized by the Director
General visited these locations twice - even with monitoring devices -
claiming that they "asked to see them again so that other people would not
need to see them again". However, they misused the visit to confirm the
correctness of the intelligence information provided by the United States.

On 22 December 1992 the IAEA Director General again asked for permission
to "visit", drill and take samples at the already-visited military
installation and another military installation.

At the bilateral talks held in Pyongyang from 20 to 22 January 1993, the
IAEA delegation, led by the director of the foreign relations department,
insisted on visiting those locations, saying that "there is reliable evidence
from intelligence information and satellite photos that the locations are
related to nuclear materials", while recognizing that the Agency had no legal
ground to use any intelligence or satellite information provided by a third
country. Those remarks of the IAEA officials proved that the IAEA takes the
directives of the United States as its law or regulations, instead of the
safeguards agreement, the IAEA statute, resolutions of the Board of Governors,

and so forth.
S/PV.3212
14

(Mr. Pak, Democratic People's
Republic of Korea)

The resolution adopted at the meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors held
on 1 April 1993 characterized our refusal of the inspection of the "two
locations" as "non-compliance" with the safeguards agreement. This is
absolutely unjustifiable. The "two locations" are not related to nuclear
activities. The Agency's Director General has doubts about these two
locations, on the ground that they are "nuclear facilities" according to the
satellite information provided by the United States. This "intelligence
information" and "satellite information" is fabricated, and it is
impermissible to use it in the inspection.

The "inconsistencies in principle" and the two "suspicious locations" are
the motives for the "special inspection" faked by some officials of the Agency
Secretariat, including the Director General, under the directives of the
United States. The "inconsistencies in principle" and the two "suspicious
locations" are matters of different characteristics, apart from the safeguards
agreement.

The Agency experts admitted that the "inconsistencies in principle" arose
from the miscalculation and agreed to clarify the matter at the future
negotiations, and that the two "suspicious locations" were fabricated on the
basis of the false satellite information provided by the United States, a
belligerent party vis-a-vis the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

The "inconsistencies in principle" and the two "suspicious locations"
revealed the unreasonable inspection activities of the Director General and

some officials of the Agency Secretariat.
S/PV.3212
15

(Mr. Pak, Democratic People's
Republic of Korea)

Some officials of the Agency Secretariat, including the Director General,
discarded the principle of impartiality and became servants implementing the
policy of the United States. Although they fully understood that the
intelligence or satellite information could not be used in the inspection,
they did not hesitate to act like servants, saying that the satellite and
intelligence information was "reliable" as it was provided by the United
States. By doing so they blocked the way to clearing up the "inconsistencies
in principle”.

Thirdly, some officials of the IAEA Secretariat derailed from the
function of officials of the international organization and became servants of

the United States.
S/PV.3212
16

(Mr. Pak, Democratic People's
Republic of Korea)

Some officials of the IAEA secretariat systematically turned over the
information on the inspection results to hostile forces, including the United
States.

On 6 May 1992, the IAEA Director General told the representatives of the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea in Vienna that,

"in accordance with its Statute, IAEA cannot disclose to the third

parties the contents of the DPRK's initial report, In my view, the DPRK

may just as well inform them of the contents of its initial report as
much as it sees fit, in order to bring earlier the improvement of the

DPRK's relations with the United States and Japan",

On 10 June 1992, a high-ranking IAEA official called an informal meeting
of the IAEA Board of Governors. That official briefed them on his visit to
the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and on the course of the first
ad hoc inspection and disclosed the details of the capability of the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea's nuclear facilities.

On 13 November 1992, south Korea's Munhwa Broadcasting Corporation
declared that the

"U.S. Administration is now in the process of close analysis of
information on the inspections of north Korea obtained from the IAEA."
The same broadcasting corporation reported on 8 November 1992 that IAEA was
known to be planning to send a high-level delegation to Pyongyang immediately
after the fourth ad hoc inspection.

The Director General informed us of his intention to send a negotiating
mission to our country on 16 November, eight days after the report.

The information on the replacement date for the reactor core should

belong only to us and IAEA.
S/PV.3212
17

(Mr. Pak, Democratic People's
Republic of Korea)

The Washington Post reported on 13 January 1¢93 that the

"IAEA information director disclosed in the telephone interview that
north Korea indicated the reactor core is to be replaced in mid-1993, and
accordingly, the Agency is waiting for it".

The United States manipulated the IAEA inspection.

The United States was informed of our nuclear plan by the Agency's
Director General, who called for a joint hearing of the United States
Congress, held on 22 July 1992, which forced him to conduct a "special
inspection" and a "surprise inspection".

The United States cooked up the delusive information with regard to our
nuclear activities and offered it to IAEA. The IAEA Director General took
this intelligence information as a good excuse for a "special inspection" call
at the meeting of the Board of Governors held in February 1993,

The United States Central Intelligence Agency stated in 1992 that

"the United States must include its trustworthy persons in the 'special

inspection' group".

Under this directive of the United States, the Director General attempted to
designate inspectors whose countries have no diplomatic relations with our
country, even after he had been notified of our position that we would not
accept such IAEA officials as members of the inspection team.

The Washington Post disclosed on 13 January 1993 that

"some U.S. officials argued north Korea has hidden radioactive waste

produced at the Nyongbyon nuclear reactor".

This became a signal urging the inspection of the two "suspicious locations".
S/pV.3212
18

(Mr. Pak, Democratic People's
Republic of Korea)

The Japanese Central Report reported in June 1992 that the United States

Assistant Secretary of Defense who attended the high-level talks between the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States said, "North Korea
moved its nuclear-weapon facilities into the underground" and "North Korea
attempted to disguise the nuclear-weapon development project". This
facilitated IAEA's "special inspection" and "surprise inspection".

Fourthly, our refusal to allow the Agency's unlawful inspection of the
"suspicious locations" is nothing but a sovereign State's full exercise of a
fair right, and it can never be considered non-compliance with the safeguards
agreement.

The safeguards agreement and the IAEA Statute do not stipulate that all
sites which the Agency finds suspicious should be open to inspection. In his
report submitted in December 1991 to the Board of Governors, the Director
General requested the right to use intelligence and satellite information
provided by the third country in its inspection process, while admitting the
Agency's right for inspection in accordance with the safeguards agreement was
not a legal ground for special inspection.

At that time many non--nuclear-weapon States rejected the Director
General's suggestion lest the Agency fall prey to the super-Power. At the
joint hearing of the United States Congress held on 22 July 1992, the Director
General deplored that

"the Agency is unable to exercise the right of special inspection

stipulated in the safeguards agreement",
and that

"the Agency has no lejal foundation and means to implement special

inspection".
S/PV.3212
19

(Mr. Pak, Democratic People's
Republic of Korea)

The Agency is given the right to special inspection only when agreement
is reached between us and IAEA, according to Articles 73 and 77 of the
safeguards agreement. The special inspection under the safeguards agreement
can be conducted only when the belief arises, in the process of inspecting the
declared nuclear materials and nuclear facilities, that nuclear materials
exist in certain places. There is by no means a stipulation that all the
objects which the Agency finds suspicious should be open for special
inspection.

The United States, a belligerent party vis-a-vis the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea, cooked up the delusive information, as well as satellite
information, with regard to our nuclear activities and transmitted it to the
IAEA secretariat and other countries in order to stifle our socialist system.
Some officials of the IAEA secretariat, under the directive of the United
States, attempted to inspect our military facilities with fabricated
intelligence and satellite information.

The refusal to allow the inspection forced by the belligerent State and
based on the intelligence and satellite information is a sovereign State's
proper right to self-defence, and it can therefore never be regarded as
non-compliance with the safequards agreement.

Fifthly, the United Nations should not argue about our "non-compliance"
with the safeguards agreements.

The resolution adopted at the meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors on
the charge of "non-compliance" with the safeguards agreements is an
unjustifiable one which distorted the facts, under the manipulation of the

United States.
S/PV.3212
20

(Mr. Pak, Democratic People's
Republic of Korea)

The "inconsistency in principle" and "suspicious sites" are made up by
the United States, a belligerent party to the Democratic People's Republic of
Korea. It has been proved that the "inconsistency in principle" was caused by
a mistake in the calculating methods of the Agency and that the "suspicious
sites" are based on satellite information provided by the United States.

We have faithfully implemented the safeguards agreement. It is in
conformity with the safeguards agreement and the Statute of the Agency that we
rejected the Agency's request to inspect "suspicious sites" that are not
related to nuclear activities.

There is no legal ground for the United Nations to deal with the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea's withdrawal from the NPT.

The United States labelled our rejection of the inspection of "suspicious
sites" as "non-compliance" with the safeguards agreement with the aim of
imposing collective sanctions on us.

It was an intentional act by the Director General of the Agency when he
said that he could not provide verification, since the inspection by the
Agency was in its initial stage. In his report to the IAEA Board of Governors
and in meetings with officials of our country, the Director General said that
IAEA's inspection of our country was in its initial stage and would take a

long time.
S/PV.3212
21

(Mr. Pak, Democratic People's
Republic of Korea)

The Agency did not even conclude its inspection of our nuclear materials
and nuclear facilities. Only subsidiary rulings on three facilities were |
made; those on four other facilities are yet to be made. Although Agency
scientists called for negotiations with us, admitting that "inconsistencies in
principle" were due to mistakes in their calculations, the Director General
blocked even negotiations.

The "suspicious sites" suggested by the Director General are conventional
military bases that have nothing to do with nuclear facilities.

The United Nations has no right to debate our country's withdrawal from
the NPT. Signing, accession to, termination of and withdrawal from the Treaty
are legal actions within the sovereign rights of an independent State, and no
one is entitled to interfere in these. There are no international norms that
allow sanctions with regard to the signing and withdrawal from the Treaty.

The signing and withdrawal on the part of a sovereign State in accordance with
the relevant Treaty are recognized to be lawful.

The United Nations should not discuss our "non-compliance" with the
safeguards agreement. The ringleader of "non-compliance" with the safeguards
agreement is not the Democratic People's Republic of Korea but the United
States and some officials of the secretariat of the IAEA, Some officials of
the IAEA secretariat intentionally invented this "inconsistency" under
manipulation by the United States.

The United Nations should give an impetus to the IAEA secretariat so it

can implement the safeguards agreement in accordance with the terms of the
S/PV.3212
22

(Mr. Pak, Democratic People's
Republic of Korea)

agreement and the Agency statute. The United Nations should prevent
international scientific and technical organizations from becoming involved in
carrying out the policy of the big Powers.

Some officials of the IAEA secretariat are gravely violating the
sovereignty of a State party to the Treaty - a non-nuclear-weapon State - by
applying a double standard at the behest of the United States. Its
application of a double standard to my country attains the highest perfection
in terms of its injustice.

The Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea joined the
Treaty in accordance with the ideal and purpose of withdrawing United States
nuclear weapons from south Korea and of removing the nuclear threat to us.

It is none other than the ited States that continues to modernize its
nuclear arsenals, increase the nuclear threat to our country - a
non-nuclear-weapon State - and help South Africa and Israel in their nuclear
armament in contravention of the fundamental ideal and purpose of the Treaty.
The IAEA is conniving at a violation of the Treaty by the United States
without saying a word. And the IAEA is not taking any action against Japan,
which is now hastening to enter the ranks of nuclear Powers by stockpiling
more plutonium than necessary, or against south Korea, which is feverishly
accelerating the development of nuclear weapons under the United States
nuclear umbrella. If the double standard employed by some officials of the
secretariat is tolerated, the nuclear Powers will not hesitate at will to make
a mockery of the fate of non-nuclear-weapon States and to encroach on their

sovereignty. Today they are threatening our sovereignty by applying a double
S5/PV.3212
23

(Mr. Pak, Democratic People's
Republic of Korea)

standard to my country, but tomorrow another non-nuclear-weapon State will be
the target.

The Security Council should not deviate from international justice and
principle of equity. The Security Council should not allow the application of
a double standard that condones the acts of the injurer, which is trying to
threaten with nuclear weapons and disarm my country, while making an issue
about my country, which is the victim.

If the Security Council intends to consider the implementation of NPT and
safeguards agreement impartially, it should discuss without fail the acts of
the United States and some officials of the IAEA secretariat who obey it,
actions which encroach on the sovereignty of a State party to the Treaty by
abusing the statute of the IAEA and the safeguards agreement.

The Security Council is trying to adopt a draft resolution encroaching
upon our sovereignty, when an agreement was made to hold negotiations between
my country and IAEA, when negotiations are in the offing between the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States. This action
permits the strong-arm tactics of a nuclear Power and ignores the requirements
of the Charter of the United Nations, the statute of the IAEA and the norms of
international law, that disputes should be resolved through dialogue and
negotiations. Article 33 of Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations
stipulates that the parties to any dispute the continuance of which is likely
to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security shall seek a

solution by negotiation.
S/PV.3212
24

(Mr, Pak, Democratic People's
Republic of Korea)

The very convening of the Security Council blocks the efforts towards
dialogue, at a time when there are positive signs regarding the efforts
towards negotiations to solve our so-called "nuclear problem" and the nuclear
question of the Korean peninsula.

If the Security Council adopts the draft resolution introduced by the
United States demanding forcible inspections of our military installations,
this would be tantamount toc encroachment on the sovereignty of my country and,
furthermore, would result in heightened tension in the situation on the Korean
peninsula and would pose a threat to the peace and security of the world.

If the Security Council permits the strong-arm tactics of a nuclear
Power, the non-nuclear-weapon States and the small countries of the thira
world will no longer trust the present Security Council,

My delegation considers that if the Security Council wants to contribute
to peace and security on the Korean peninsula in conformity with its mission,
it should not put pressure on us but should seek ways of solving fairly the
nuclear problem of the Korean peninsula and should take measures that would
actually be helpful. I hope the Security Council will not follow in its own
footsteps of mistakes in dealing with the Korean question; I hope it will
rather act in conformity with the requirements of the present situation and
international justice.

If the Security Council adopts an unjustifiable draft resolution putting
pressure on my country and ignoring the principle of equity, we will be
compelled to take corresponding effective measures in self-defence.

We do not speak empty words.
S/PV.3212
25

(Mr. Pak, Democratic Pegple's
Republic of Korea)

Our so-called nuclear problem is not an issue to be discussed by the
Security Council; even it it is discussed, it cannot be solved without
comprehensively resolving nuclear problem of the Korean peninsula. The
nuclear issue of the Korean peninsula can be resolved only through
negotiations between our country and the United States. This is because the
nuclear issue of the Korean peninsula began with the deployment of United
States nuclear weapons in south Korea; it was created also by means of the
"suspicious sites" fabricated by the United States.

The United States is a belligerent party vis-a-vis our country. History
shows us that pressures and sanctions applied against one party at the request
of a belligerent party do not solve the problem but, on the contrary, help
aggravate the disputes and finally cause armed conflicts.

Adoption of a draft resolution encroaching upon our sovereignty with the
help of the strong-arm tactics of the United States would only serve to
aggravate the situation on the Korean peninsula, leading to unpredictable
events.

Recently, we responded positively to overtures by the United States with
respect to holding high-level talks; there has been working-level contact in
that regard. At this time. we cannot but have doubts concerning the
intentions of the United States, which has introduced the present draft
resolution, Under these circumstances, the proper act would be for the United
States to withdraw the draft resolution.

Finally, I would like to express my hope that the Security Council will

act in accordance with its mission.
S/PV.3212
26

The PRESIDENT (interpretation from Russian): I thank the

representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for his kind words
addressed to me.

The next speaker is the representative of the Republic of Korea, on whom
I now call. |

Mr. YOO (Republic of Korea): I should like to thank the members of
the Security Council for allowing me the opportunity to address this meeting.

Let me first congratulate you, Mr. President, on your assumption of the
presidency of the Security Council for the month of May. In light of your
extensive diplomatic experience and outstanding ability, I believe the Council
will benefit greatly from your able guidance. Allow me also to express our
appreciation of the superb performance of your predecessor, Ambassador Marker
of Pakistan, during his term as President of the Council for the month of
April.

Having listened to the statement by the representative of the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea a moment ago, I cannot suppress a deep sense of
regret and sadness over the fact that the representatives of the two halves of
Korea have to be present here before this international forum at the
discussion of a matter concerning the security of our Korean people, and
express such divergent views on how a question of developing weapons of mass
destruction would affect the future of the same people. However, it is my
sincere hope that today's meeting of the Council will prove to be a major
departure away from this sad situation towards one where reason and common
‘sense prevail.

During the past few years, despite some regional and ethnic discords, we
have witnessed positive changes sweeping across the world. They

understandably raised expectations that we are entering a new era of world
S/PV.3212
27

(Mr. Yoo, Republic of Korea)
history. However, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's rejection of
the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) special inspections, coupled
with the announcement of its intention to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT), have put to the test the will of the international community to
create a safer world.

Today, as a State Member of the United Nations with a direct stake in the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea's nuclear issue, the Republic of Korea
would like to express its grave concern over the state of affairs and call on
the international community to take determined action.

When the Democratic People's Republic of Korea joined the
Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1985, we sincerely welcomed the step and looked
forward to the early signing of a safeguards agreement between the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea and the IAEA. But it took as long as seven years
for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to respond to the calls of the
international community. Nevertheless, we all welcomed the long-delayed step
and hoped that the implementation of the safeguards agreement would bring
transparency and openness to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's
nuclear programme. Contrary to our hopes, however, six rounds of ad hoc
inspections conducted by the IAEA have only revealed discrepancies between the
IAEA's findings and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's declarations,
In his report to the Board meeting of February 1993, the Director General of
the IAEA outlined five main areas of inconsistencies. The most serious of
them involves the number of possible clandestine reprocessing operations and
the quantity of plutonium undeclared and unsafeguarded, which in our view is

central to the issue.
S/PV.3212
28

(Mr. Yoo, Republic of Korea)

Instead of responding positively to the request for special inspections
by the IAEA on 25 February 1993, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea
surprised the world by announcing on 12 March its intention to withdraw from
the NPT. What concerned us most was that this announcement came at a time
when the IAEA was seeking specific clarifications regarding the correctness
and completeness of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's initial report
on nuclear materials.

Having exhausted all means available under its Statute to resolve the
issue, the IAEA consequently referred the matter to the Council by reporting
the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's non-compliance with its safeguards
agreement. The Agency also brought attention to its inability to verify that
there has been no diversion of nuclear material to nuclear weapons or other
nuclear explosive devices.

Let me make some brief observations on the reasons offered by the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea for rejecting the IAEA's special
inspection and for its decision to withdraw from the NPT.

First, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea asserts that the
inspection of the two facilities, which it claims are military sites, would
constitute a violation of sovereignty. The Democratic People's Republic of
Korea's characterization oI the two sites as military sites in no way
immunizes them from inspection. It is the right of the IAEA under the
Agreement with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to inspect locations
which it has bona fide reasons to believe are nuclear-related, regardless of
whether they are military or not. Furthermore, the Director General of the
IAEA has repeatedly expressed willingness to discuss arrangements to minimize

the security concerns of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
S/PV.3212
29

(Mr. Yoo, Republic of Korea)

Secondly, with regard to the claim that the "Team Spirit" Exercise is a
nuclear war rehearsal, we reiterate that the exercise is purely defensive in
nature and involves conventional weapons only. This has been confirmed by
observers from more than a dozen countries, including member States of the
Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission in Korea.

Thirdly, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has charged that some
officials of the IAEA secretariat are partial and are influenced by an
unfriendly party. This allegation is compeletely unfounded. We would like
to point out that the IAEA Board of Governors reaffirmed its full confidence
in the secretariat in the resolution of 18 March.

The reasons offered by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea are
without foundation. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea's announcement
of its intention to withdraw from the NPT and its refusal to allow inspections
of two suspected nuclear sites, in addition to the many other facts that have
become known by now, only serve to deepen our suspicion that the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea is indeed engaged in a nuclear weapons programme.

Allow me to take a look at this issue from a broader political
perspective. By refusing IAEA inspections of suspected nuclear sites and by
deciding to pull out of the NPT, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea
poses a serious threat to international peace and security, in both the global
and regional contexts.

First, there is the threat to the NPT regime and the IAEA safeguards
systems in particular. Nuclear non-proliferation and the ultimate elimination
of nuclear weapons are foremost among the concerns of the post-cold-war
world. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea's announcement of its

intention to withdraw from the NPT runs directly counter to the international
§/PV.3212
30

(Mr. Yoo, Republic of Korea)

efforts for nuclear non-proliferation. True, every party has the right to
withdraw from the Treaty. However, the Treaty also stipulates that this right
be exercised only when extraordinary events jeopardize supreme national
interest. If States parties to the NPT could withdraw from the Treaty
whenever they found it politically expedient, we could not expect the
non-proliferation Treaty regime to function effectively.

The NPT system has global imperatives. But nowhere else in the world is
an effective NPT regime needed more urgently than on the Korean peninsula
where military tensions still run high even four decades after the war ended.
If the NPT fails on the Korean peninsula on its first test, it does not have

much hope elsewhere. Specifically, we are concerned that the IAEA is not able
to verify the correctness and completeness of the inventory. Any failure by
the IAEA to fulfil its legal responsibility of undertaking a special
inspection under Articles 73 (b) and 77 of the safeguards agreement will harm
the IAEA's credibility and thus undermine the very raison d'8tre of the
safeguards system, In this regard, I cannot fail to recall that the IAEA

reaffirmed its right to undertake special inspections during its Board of

Governors meeting in February 1993.
S/PV.3212
31

(Mr. Yoo, Republic of Korea)

Secondly, the steps the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has taken
have serious implications for the security and stability of North-East Asia,
If the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's nuclear suspicions are not.
removed, it could result in a costly and dangerous arms race in North-East
Asia and beyond.

Thirdly, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's measure deals a
serious blow to our past achievements in easing tension on the Korean
peninsula. The inter-Korean dialogue will become very difficult if not
impossible, given the intimidating environment that would prevail should north
Korea come to possess nuclear weapons of any sort. We simply cannot accept
possession of nuclear weapons by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
If there is no shift in the attitudes of the Democratic People's Republic of
Korea, we may be compelled to review our policies towards the north in their
entirety.

We believe that denuclearization is the most important and fundamental
prerequisite for a stable and peaceful Korean peninsula. In this conviction,
the President of the Republic of Korea made in October 1991 a Special
Announcement of a Nuclear-free Korean Peninsula. This served as the basis for
the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, which
took effect in February 1992. In the latter Declaration, the Republic of
Korea and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea agreed not to possess
nuclear reprocessing or uranium enrichment facilities and to conduct mutual
inspections to verify the implementation of the agreement. We believe that a
nuclear-free Korean peninsula will rest on the twin pillars of IAEA
inspections and mutual inspections between the south and the north. The
Democratic People's Republic of Korea's actions, however, threaten to reduce

this Declaration to empty promises.
S/pv.3212
32

(Mr. Yoo, Republic of Korea)

At the conclusion of the summit meeting on 31 January 1992, the Security
Council declared that:
"The members of the Council will take appropriate measures in the case of

any violations notified to them by the IAEA". (S/PV.3046, p. 145 (a-z))

This declaration reflects the unequivocal stance of the international
community against the threat of nuclear proliferation. Accordingly, I believe
that the primary obligation to stop nuclear-weapons development by the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea rests with the international community
as a whole and particularly on the Security Council, which is entrusted with
the maintenance of international peace and security under the Charter. As the
country which would be most threatened by a nuclear-armed Democratic People's
Republic of Korea, the Republic of Korea will join the efforts of the
international community and do its best to achieve the denuclearization of the
Korean peninsula.

I appeal once again to the reason and conscience of the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea to retract the announcement of its intention to
withdraw from the non-proliferation Treaty; to remedy its non-compliance with
the IAEA safeguards agreement by receiving special inspections as called for
in the IAEA resolution of 25 February 1993; and to agree to mutual inspections
in accordance with the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean
Peninsula.

The Republic of Korea believes that the time has come for the
international community to act on the troubled situation surrounding the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea's nuclear development. We are of the
view that the draft resolution now before the Council is appropriate and
well-balanced and that its adoption will reaffirm the united stance of the

international community on this issue. I hope that the draft resolution the
S/PV.3212
33

(Mr. Yoo, Republic of Korea)
Council will act on today will be the last measure that the international
community needs to take to resolve any suspicion about the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea's nuclear development.

If the Democratic People's Republic of Korea comes forward sincerely to
resolve the issue on a fundamental basis, it will certainly have the
corresponding positive responses from the international community. For its
part, the Republic of Korea is prepared to engage in talks with the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea on the nuclear issue, if that would contribute to
finding a solution. While renewing its commitment to do whatever is in their
capacity for a peaceful and satisfactory solution of this matter, the
Government and the people of the Republic of Korea will be awaiting with
earnest anticipation this Council's acts of leadership, which will turn the
current crisis into an opportunity for the future.

The PRESIDENT (interpretation from Russian): I thank the

representative the Republic of Korea for his kind words addressed to me.

Mrs. ALBRIGHT (United States of America): I should like to make

some brief remarks in response to the statement of the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea.

Saturday is my birthday. Although I am sure that this was not his
intention, I would like to thank the representative of the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea for putting us into a time-warp and making me feel 40 years
younger. I would, however, like to address some of the ridiculous charges he
has made in the worst cold-war rhetoric,

The issue under discussion concerns north Korea's failure to adhere to
its obligations under a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) and a subsequent announcement that it intends to withdraw

from the Non-Proliferation Treaty. I wish to emphasize that these disputes
S/7PV.3212
34

(Mrs. Albright, United States)
concern international agencies and the international community, and not any
single country. The United States, like a number of other nations, provides
information and technical support to the IAEA at the Agency's request to
support the implementation of safequards on nuclear materials and facilities.
The IAEA comes to its own conclusions about whether countries are complying
with safeguards requirements, drawing primarily from information obtained by
its own inspectors but taking into account information provided by member
Governments.

Based on their visits to north Korean nuclear facilities, IAEA inspectors
have identified discrepencies in north Korea's declaration of the amount of
plutonium it obtained from reprocessing nuclear fuel, Consequently, the IAEA
Board of Governors has determined that north Korea is not in compliance with
its safeguards agreement and has referred the matter to the Security Council.

The adoption of this draft resolution today will reflect concerns shared
by a number of countries about actions taken by one in contravention of the
principles of an international organization. Charges that the United States
poses a nuclear threat to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea are
totally unfounded. Our policy has been and will continue to be consistent
with that announced by then south Korean President Roh Tae Woo in late 1991
that there are no nuclear weapons in south Korea. Moreover, since 1978, the
United States has publicly offered assurances on the non-use of nuclear
weapons to non-nuclear-weapon States:

"The United States will not use nuclear weapons against any
non-nuclear-weapon State party to the non-proliferation Treaty or any
comparable internationally binding commitment not to acquire nuclear

explosive devices except in the case of an attack on the United States,
5/pPV.3212
35

(Mrs. Albright, United States)

its territories or armed forces, or its allies by such a State allied to

a nuclear-weapon State or associated with a nuclear-weapon State in

carrying out or sustaining the attack."

North Korea has claimed on a number of occasions that the United
States-Republic of Korea military exercise called "Team Spirit" is nuclear and
offensive in nature. This claim is also unfounded. As the north Koreans are
fully aware, "Team Spirit" is a purely defensive conventional exercise
conducted in an East-West rather than a North-South axis. I would also note
that military observers of "Team Spirit" exercises, including representatives
from Poland and the former Czechoslovakia - members of the Neutral Nations
Supervisory Commission - have publicly verified the defensive nature of the
exercise. We and the Republic of Korea have invited north Korea to send
military observers to "Team Spirit" for many years. North Korea has not
accepted this invitation.

The PRESIDENT (interpretation from Russian): I now call on the

representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
8/PV.3212
36

Mr. PAK (Democratic People's Republic of Korea): I consider it
necessary to clearly state our stand once again concerning the accusations
made against us by the representatives of the United States and south Korea
over the issues of our withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and our so-called "non-compliance" with the safeguards
agreement.

Cur decision to withdraw from the NPT was a self-defence measure taken in
connection with the extraordinary situation created by the United States, a
nuclear State, against us and with an unjustifiable resolution by the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as a result of manipulation by the
United States, threatening the supreme interest of our country.

Our country's accession to the NPT on 12 December 1985 was intended, with
the help of this Treaty, to remove the nuclear threat against our country and
to turn the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone. However, the danger of
nuclear war continued to exist on the Korean peninsula, and a tense military
situation still prevailed there. Under such circumstances, we could not
conclude the safeguards agreement to the NPT, Therefore, we demanded that the
United States and the south Korean side create conditions and an environment
on the Korean peninsula suitable to concluding a safequards agreement.
Belatedly, however, during the period from September 1991 to January 1992, the
United States and the south Korean side made some positive statements and
showed some positive signs, including "withdrawal of nuclear weapons", a
"declaration on the absence of nuclear weapons" the "suspension of the 'Team
Spirit' military exercise", in response to our demand.

We trusted these positive signs by the United States and south Korean
side and signed the safeguards agreement on 30 January 1992, The Supreme

People's Assembly of my country approved the safeguards agreement on 9 April
S/PV.3212
37

(Mr. Pak, Democratic

People's Republic of Korea)
last year on the condition that none of the depositary States of the NPT
deploy nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula and threaten us with nuclear
weapons.

After the entry into force of the safeguards agreement, we made the
utmost effort to faithfully comply with the agreement. It is already well
known to the world that we submitted an initial report on our inventory of
nuclear material to the secretariat of the IAEA far in advance of schedule
and, up until 19 February 1993, submitted to six rounds of ad hoc inspections
in good faith.

During this period, we handed over hundreds of documents on accounts and
operation records to the IAEA inspection team and assisted in the work of
sealing 80 locations, installing observation equipment at six locations and
sampling 90 pieces.

We saw to it that the general provisions of the subsidiary arrangements
became effective: we agreed on the subsidiary arrangements on three
facilities; and we held final-stage discussions of the subsidiary arrangements
at other facilities, In addition, we showed facilities and other
nuclear-related facilities under construction to the IAEA inspection team and
enabled it to visit vsuspicious sites" loudly advertised by the Western media
in the past.

As for our displaying a highly cooperative spirit, even the Director
General of the IAEA himself mentioned it on several occasions. Despite this,
an abnormal situation was created by the IAEA that branded us, who had
faithfully complied with the safeguards agreement, as in "non-compliance", and

it adopted at its Board of Governors meeting an unjustifiable resolution
S/PV.3212
38

(Mr, Pak, Democratic
People's Republic of Korea)

transferring the so-called nuclear problem of our country to the United
Nations.

A behind-the-scenes plot exists, that demands clarification. It is
related to manoeuvres by the United States and south Korean side aimed at
opening up our conventional military bases with a view to stifling the
socialist system of our country. The United States and south Korean side,
unable to open our military sites through the meetings of the North-South
Joint Committee on Nuclear Control, declared the resumption of the "Team
Spirit" joint military exercise as a way of pressuring us, The resumption of
this exercise, openly declared by the United States and the south Korean side
this year, posed a new threat to the security of our country and the nation.

At the same time, the United States manipulated the inspection of our
country by the IAEA. As is already known, the United States forced the
Director General of the IAEA to undertake "special inspection" and "surprise
inspection", fabricated the "espionage satellite photos" with the aim of
opening up our military sites and distributed them systematically to the
secretariat of the IAEA and satellite States of the United States. It even
conducted the analysis of the samples by receiving the results of the
inspections.

The grounds for the "special inspection" that some officials of the
secretariat of the IAEA came up with consisted of so-called "non-compliance
with the safeguards agreement". That "non-compliance", according to them, is
that we do not recognize the "inconsistency in principle" and that we do not
agree with the demands of the IAEA for access to the two sites.

That being the case, who originated them? They were originated by the
S/PV.3212
39

(Mr. Pak, Democratic
People's Republic of Korea)

United States and some officials of the IAEA secretariat as a result of the
manipulation of the United States. The "inconsistency in principle", as was
made clear in consultation with us, was originated by the IAEA's "principled
mistakes in counting", and the "two sites" were originated by "espionage
satellite photos" provided by the United States.

According to the present safeguards system, the IAEA has no right to use
"intelligence information" and "espionage satellite photos" provided by a
third party in its inspection work. However, at the secretariat meeting of
the IAEA Board of Governors in January this year created suspicion over our
military sites, connecting them with nuclear-related facilities through a
slide show of "espionage satellite photos" provided by the United States, and
as a result, the resolution on special inspection was adopted.

The United States is a belligerent party to our country and is the
culprit that has fabricated and distributed "espionage satellite photos". We
did not accept the IAEA proposal for access to the two sites, considering that
this proposal by some officials of the secretariat was not in line with the
statutes and safeguards agreement but an unjustifiable demand based on
"espionage satellite photos", which it is forbidden to use in an inspection,
and this, if allowed, could set a precedent.

As I mentioned earlier, if we who have made efforts to faithfully comply
with the safeguards agreement are branded as in "non-compliance", if the
creation of "inconsistency" by counting mistakes and the utilization of
"espionage satellite photos" in inspections are recognized as justifiable,
then we could not but be doubtful of such an international order.

We were compelled to withdraw from the NPT under paragraph 1, Article 10
S/PV.3212
40

(Mr. Pak, Democratic
People's Republic of Korea)

of the Treaty for self-defence. Our withdrawal from the NPT is intended to
safeguard the supreme interest of our country and its people and at the same
time represent the aspirations of third-world countries to establish an
international order based on independence and to oppose domination and
subjugation.

The nuclear threat of the United States against us and its attempts to
enforce a "special inspection" today may be applied to other countries
tomorrow. The Western media have not made a big issue of Japan, which has
recently openly been stockpiling plutonium. Instead, they are loudly alleging
that such countries as Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Egypt, India, Iran,
Libya, Pakistan and Syria either possess nuclear weapons or are attempting to

acquire them,
§/PV.3212
41

(Mr. Pak, Democratic People's
Republic of Korea)

We believe that this is part of the plot by the United States to create
doubts about the nuclear activities of these countries.

Today our country is in a confrontational state with a United States
military force of 40,000, with a constant nuclear threat against us. No other
countries in any part of the world are under a United States nuclear threat as
our country is, Some countries are demanding that we "revoke" our measure of
withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty, in collaboration with the United
States. Since this measure of withdrawal constitutes a sovereign right
decisively exercised for self-defence, no country is entitled to trample upon
this right of ours.

In particular, the United States is the culprit that has imposed a
nuclear threat against us and has manipulated the IAEA inspection. Therefore,
the United States should not demand that we "revoke" our measure of
withdrawal. Instead, it should publicly apologize to us for creating the
situation which compelled us to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

The south Korean side betrayed the agreement. with us, participated in the
nuclear war exercise against its nation, and tried to impair the supreme
interests of the nation by leaving the issue - which should be solved within
the framework of the nation - to the outside. As a result, the south Korean
side is not entitled to talk about the "cancellation" of our measure,

Before concluding, I should like to recommend to those representatives
that have charged us with the issue of our withdrawal and "non-compliance"

that they behave in an independent spirit and with contemplation.
S/PV.3212
42
The PRESIDENT (interpretation from Russian): It is my understanding

that the Security Council is ready to proceed to the vote on the draft
resolution before it. If I hear no objection, I shall take it that that is
the case.

There being no objection, it is so decided.

I shall now call on those members of the Council who wish to make

statements before the voting.

Mr, LI Zhaoxing (China) (interpretation from Chinese): First of
all, allow me, Sir, to congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency
of the Security Council for the month of May. I am confident that with your
talent and extensive diplomatic experience, the Security Council will
successfully complete its tasks for this month. I should also like to thank
your predecessor, Ambassador Marker of Pakistan, who impressed us all with the
remarkable skill and efficiency with which he conducted the Council's work
last month,

China, as a State party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons, has all along opposed nuclear proliferation and supported
denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. China does not wish to see nuclear
weapons on the peninsula, whether in the north or in the south, or to have
them introduced there by a third party.

In our view, the nuclear issue concerning the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea is mainly a matter between the Democratic People's Republic
of Korea and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), between the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States, and between the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea. It should
therefore be settled properly through direct dialogue and consultation between

the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the three other parties
S/PV.3212
43

(Mr. Li Zhaoxing, China)
concerned, respectively. In this connection, China opposes the practice of
imposing pressures.

China has indicated from the very beginning that it is not in favour of
having this issue handled by the Security Council, let alone having a
resolution adopted on this issue by the Council. This is because the
Council's involvement will not contribute to the appropriate settlement of the
issue; on the contrary, it might easily complicate the matter and lead to the
intensification and escalation of the contradictioms,

Based on the foregoing position, we shall abstain in the vote on this
draft resolution.

The nuclear issue concerning the Democratic People's Republic of Korea
has now reached a crucial and sensitive stage. The Democratic People's
Republic of Korea and the IAEA have already conducted consultations on the
issue of nuclear verification and made certain arrangements regarding the
question of inspections, At the same time, the United States has expressed
its willingness to hold bilateral talks with the Democratic People's Republic
of Korea on the relevant issues, and contacts on this matter have already
begun. All these are welcome developments. We hope that the parties
concerned will adopt a practical, flexible and constructive attitude that will

enable the talks to yield positive results.
S/PVv,.3212
44
The PRESIDENT (interpretation from Russian): I thank the
representative of China for the kind words he addressed to me.
I now put to the vote the draft resolution in document $/25745.

A vote was taken by show of hands.

In favour: Brazil, Cape Verde, Djibouti, France, Hungary, Japan,
Morocco, New Zealand, Russian Federation, Spain, United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States
of America, Venezuela

Against: None

Abstaining: China, Pakistan

The PRESIDENT (interpretation from Russian): The result of the
voting is as follows: 13 votes in favour, none against, and 2 abstentions.
The draft resolution has been adopted as resolution 825 (1993).

I shall now call on those members of the Council who wish to make
statements following the voting.

Mr. HATANO (Japan): May I congratulate you, Sir, on your assumption
of the presidency of the Security Council. I should also like to express my
sincere appreciation to your predecesessor, Ambassador Marker. Under his able
guidance, the Council achieved positive results during the month of April,

After the two long presentations by the Democratic People's Republic of
Korea, it is not necessary to dwell upon the history of the problem before
us. But let me say that in early 1992 Japan, and the international community
as a whole, welcomed the fact that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea
and the Republic of Korea had issued a joint declaration on the
denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, and that the Democratic People's

Republic of Korea, after persistent appeals by the international community
S/PV.3212
45

(Mr. Hatano, Japan)

over a number of years, had finally concluded the safeguards agreement with
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). I must say that it is all the
more deplorable that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea subsequently
refused to accept the inspections stipulated in the agreement with the IAEA
and has decided to withdraw from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons.

These new developments have deepened concern throughout the international
community regarding the possible development of nuclear weapons by the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and have serious implications for the
peace and security of the region as well as of the entire world. Indeed, the
withdrawal by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea from the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is a challenge to the non-proliferation
regime itself.

For those reasons, Japan cannot but join the international community in

expressing grave concern.
S/PV.3212
46

(Mc. Hatano, Japan)

On 8 April the President of the Security Council issued a statement on
this matter. Since then there have been signs of improved cooperation between
the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the IAEA, but we note that the
key issues remain unresolved. Japan therefore urges the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea to comply fully, unconditionally and immediately with its
obligations under the safeguards agreement with the IAEA. We also urge the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea to retract its announcement to withdraw
from the NPT contained in its letter of 12 March.

Let me respond very briefly to the Democratic People's Republic of
Korea's reference to Japan's plutonium programme. Japan maintains the
principles of not possessing nuclear weapons, not producing them and not
introducing them into its territory. Japan is a party to the NPT and fully
honours its obligations, including that of inspection under the safeguards
agreement. Japan has fully cooperated with the IAEA and is counted as one of
the countries where full safeguards are smoothly conducted. This reference by
the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is therefore regarded as a futile
attempt to divert the attention of the international community from its own
possible development of nuclear weapons.

Time is limited. Two months have already passed since the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea announced its intention to withdraw from the NPT.
We call upon the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to take concrete steps.
without delay and to heed the voice of the international community, as
expressed in this resolution. If the Democratic People's Republic of Korea
fails to respond positively and soon to the resolution we have just adopted, I
am afraid the Security Council will be obliged to take up this matter again to

consider further action,
S/PV.3212
47

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Japan for his kind
words addressed to me.

Mr. MERIMEE (France) (interpretation from French): One month ago.
the members of our Council clearly expressed, in the form of a presidential
statement, their concern over the situation upon which we were briefed in this
forum on 6 April by the Director General of the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA). We must take note that since that time, there has been no
fundamental change in the situation.

Despite the urgent appeals of the international community, the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea continues, as is indicated by the various
communications received by the Council, in its refusal to fully comply with
the commitments undertaken under the safeguards agreement entered into with
the IAEA. At the same time, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has not
yet announced its intention to revoke its decision to withdraw from the Treaty
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

This state of affairs makes it necessary today for the Council to
manifest, clearly and unambiguously, its determination to see the emergence of
an early settlement for this grave situation which seriously jeopardizes both
the stability of the Korean peninsula and, to an even greater extent, the
future of non-proliferation regimes.

The resolution we have just adopted, in the drafting of which my
delegation took an active part, attests to this resolve to settle a disturbing
situation which, it should once more be noted, represents an important
disagreement between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the whole
of the international community and not, as some would sometimes portray it, a

simple bilateral crisis.
S/PV.3212
48

(Mr. Mérimée, France)

The above notwithstanding, the text of the resolution is not intended to
be threatening, and it does take into account some of the prospects opening up
in parallel to our multilateral framework. Now that we are at last seeing
readiness on the part of the Pyongyang authorities to enter into a special
bilateral dialogue with one of the members of the Council, a depository State
of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, this resolution represents, above all, a
solemn and firm appeal by the Council for reason - that is to say, an appeal
for respect for commitments freely entered into and for keeping the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea in the international community. This text is not,
therefore, an end in itself.

However much importance is attached in this forum to the primacy of
dialogue, my delegation believes that the Council cannot much longer be
acquiescent in the face of the procrastination of the Pyongyang authorities.
They should be fully aware that the patience of the international community is
not unlimited.

This coming 12 June, when the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's
withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty becomes effective, is a date that
is today very much on our minds. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea
must realize that the passing of that deadline will not exonerate it and that
it will prompt our Council, as is provided for in the resolution we have
adopted, to draw all the appropriate conclusions.

Mr. ERDOS (Hungary) (interpretation from French): Yesterday, in a
room adjacent to this Chamber, delegations of the States parties to the Treaty
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) began a lengthy process of
preparation for the 1995 Conference at which the functioning of the Treaty

will be subjected to a detailed review. The work accomplished there in recent
S/PV.3212
49-50

(Mr. Erdds, Hungary)
days has shown the crucial importance the signatory countries attach to the
Treaty and its future in our world full of uncertainties.

One must note that those signatory countries are today faced with an
extraordinary situation. Two months have passed since the Government of the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea announced its intention to withdraw from
the Treaty. Throughout that period of time, the relevant organs of the
international community - the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and
the Security Council - and a great number of States have expressed their views
on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's decision and their hope that it
would reverse its decision and respect its obligations under its safeguards
agreement with IAEA. Hungary, for its part, also found it necessary to
declare that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's decision was
worrisome in that it could undermine the effectiveness of the
non-proliferation regime, :eopardize international security and have
unfavourable effects on inter-Korean dialogue, and that the decison would thus
work against the fundamental interests of the Democratic People's Republic of

Korea itself.
S/PV.3212
51

(Mr. Erdos, Hungary)

Recently, great efforts have been undertaken by the United Nations and by
individual Governments to make the Democratic People's Republic of Korea
reconsider the announcement contained in its letter of 12 March 1993. The
present meeting of the Security Council and the resolution we have just
adopted on the matter are integral elements of the efforts aimed at further
facilitating improved cooperation between the Democratic People's Republic of
Korea and the IAEA, and at seeking a positive solution to the issue.

Bungary's co-sponsorship and vote in favour of resolution 825 (1993) signify
our unreserved support for the efforts of the Director General of the IAEA and
for the activities undertaken by States Members of the United Nations intended
to encourage the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to respond positively
to the resolution.

Mrs. ALBRIGHT (United States of America): The United States is
pleased that the Security Council has passed this resolution. It is now clear
that the international community is united in its grave concern over North
Korea's non-compliance with the nuclear safeguards agreement it has with the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and its decision to withdraw from
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). It is also
clear that the international community is dedicated to making every effort to
convince North Korea to reaffirm its commitment to the NPT by retracting its
announcement of 12 March and to comply fully with its IAEA safeguards
agreement as specified in the IAEA Board of Governors resolution of
25 February 1993.

I would repeat what I said on 8 April, after the Council President had

issued a statement on these issues:
5/PV.3212
52

(Mrs. Albright, United States)
"My Government joins other members of the Council in expressing full
and complete support for the IAEA and the NPT. We view the IAEA and the

NPT as cornerstones of international peace and of nuclear

non-proliferation, Along with the Council's other members, the United

States also fully supports the North-South joint declaration on the

denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. Complete implementation of its

freely taken responsibilities under this declaration by North Korea is
critical for peace and security on the peninsula. This includes its
pledge not to possess nuclear reprocessing or uranium enrichment
facilities".

The United States notes that the Council President's statement of 8 April
"welcome([s] all efforts aimed at resolving this situation" (§/25562), and that
the resolution passed today urges Member States to facilitate a solution. My
Government is prepared to play its part in this process in order to help
achieve the objectives of the international community. We have announced
publicly that we would be willing to meet with North Korea to help resolve, as
part of the international community's efforts, the situation resulting from
actions North Korea has taken in the nuclear area.

We welcome the recent visit to North Korea by IAEA inspectors to perform
routine monitoring and maintenance functions and hope that such cooperation
will continue. By fulfill'ng its nuclear-related responsibilities, North
Korea can take significant steps towards improved relations with the rest of

the world.
5/PV.3212
53

Sir David HANNAY (United Kingdom): The matter we are considering
needs to be seen in a wider context. The threat posed by the proliferation of
nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction was underlined in the
statement of the President of the Security Council at its meeting at the level
of Heads of State or Government on 31 January 1992, when he said that

"'The proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction constitutes a

threat to international peace and security'". (8/PV.3046, p. 145)

We all have an interest in strengthening international efforts to stop
proliferation. At the heart of the effort to prevent proliferation of nuclear
weapons is the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). This
successful Treaty now has 157 parties. It is my Government's belief that we
should work for universal membership of the Treaty, and that it should be
indefinitely extended at the 1995 extension and review Conference.

Critical to the continuing success of the Treaty is the IAEA's ability,
through its safeguards agreements, to verify that parties honour their
commitments. My country is working, notably with our European partners, to
strengthen the IAEA safeguards regime,

Against this background, we welcomed the accession of the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea to the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1985 and the
conclusion of a safeguards agreement with the IAEA in January 1992. We also
welcomed the six inspections which the IAEA has carried out in the Democratic
- People's Republic of Korea.

What we regret is that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea
suspended this cooperation by refusing to permit further inspections of two
sites which the Agency considers necessary to verify non-diversion of nuclear

material required to be safeguarded. Despite the Agency's persistent efforts,
S/PV.3212
54

(Sir David Hannay, United Kingdom)
the Democratic People's Republic of Korea continues to refuse inspection of
these sites. On 1 April, the IAEA's Board of Governors decided by an
overwhelming majority that this placed the Democratic People's Republic of
Korea in breach of its safeguards agreement, which it had voluntarily entered
into. |

In addition, on 12 March the Democratic People's Republic of Korea
announced its intention to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty. My
delegation does not question the right of States to withdraw from treaties if
such withdrawal is in accordance with the provisions of the treaty concerned,
Article 10, paragraph 1, of the Non-Proliferation Treaty requires that in
exercising its national sovereignty a party withdrawing from the Treaty shall
give notice of such withdrawal to all other parties to the Treaty and to the
Security Council three months in advance, and that such notice shall include a
statement of the extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of the
. Treaty, which it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests

In their statement of 1 April, the three co-depositaries of the Treaty -
the Russian Federation, the United States of America and the United Kingdom - .
questioned whether the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's stated reasons
for withdrawal in fact constitute extraordinary events related to the subject
matter of the Treaty. I note also that the Democratic People's Republic of
Korea remains bound by its obligations under its safeguards agreement.

It is therefore entirely right in our view that this matter has now been
referred to the Security Council as required by article 12 (c) of the statute
of the Agency, and in accordance with article 19 of the Democratic People's

Republic of Korea's safequards agreement. We therefore supported the
S/pVv.3212
55

(Sir David Hannay, United Kingdom)
statement of the President of the Council on 8 April, in which he expressed
the concern of the members of the Council at the situation which had arisen.

The resolution we have just adopted is a further necessary step by the
Council in seeking a solution to this situation and in underlining the serious
view the Council takes of it.

It is, in the view of my Government, absolutely essential that this issue
be treated multilaterally as well as bilaterally. We accept that there is an
important role to be played by bilateral contacts, but we also underline that
what we are talking about here are multilateral disciplines maintained by
multilateral organizations such as the International Atomic Energy Agency. It
is therefore absolutely right and proper that this Council should play its
role in handling that aspect.

We do not seek confrontation. What we would like to see is a
satisfactory solution by which the Democratic People's Republic of Korea
honours its non-proliferation obligations and reverses its intention of
withdrawing from the Non-Proliferation Treaty. We welcome the continuing
efforts of the IAEA to carry out its work in the Democratic People's Republic
of Korea and we note that some improvement has occurred recently. We also
welcome the prospect of contacts between the Democratic People's Republic of
Korea and other States, which we hope will lead to a satisfactory outcome from
which all concerned could benefit. Meanwhile, the Council must remain seized
of the matter. It may need to be prepared to consider further action as

necessary.
S/PV,3212
56

Mr, de ARAUJO CASTRO (Brazil): I wish to congratulate you warmly,

Sir, on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council and on the
achievements already accomplished since the beginning of the month, A
‘heartfelt word of recognition is also in order to your predecessor,

Ambassador Jamsheed Marker of Pakistan, for the remarkable skills he displayed
in conducting the deliberations of the Council in the month of April.

As a member of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA), Brazil supported the resolutions adopted by the Board on
25 February, 18 March and 1 April 1993 on the situation that has arisen
between the Agency and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. In the
Security Council, Brazil joined in supporting the presidential statement on
the same subject issued on 8 April 1993.

Brazil participated in the deliberations that led to the adoption today
of resolution 825 (1993), bearing in mind our commitment to the objective of
the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. We are pleased to note that the
spirit of cooperation displayed by the sponsoring delegations during these
negotiations permitted the adoption, with our support, of a resolution which
adequately takes into account the concerns we had expressed with regard to the
references in the text to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons, on which our position is well known.

Brazil welcomes the fact that developments are taking place which tend to
facilitate a satisfactory solution to the question addressed in the resolution
we have just adopted, and we encourage the Democratic People's Republic of
Korea and others concerned to respond positively to the resolution.

The PRESIDENT (interpretation from Russian): I thank the

representative of Brazil for his kind words addressed to me.
S/PV.3212
57
Mr. ARRIA (Venezuela) (interpretation from Spanish): Venezuela has

been following with particular concern the developments triggered by the
announcement by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of its withdrawal
from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. We refuse to
accept a debate which tries to restrict the discussion, presenting it as if it
were a conflict between two or three countries. On the contrary, this is a
matter that, by its very nature, is of profound concern to all countries of
the world and not only, as has been claimed, to the nuclear Powers; and it is
very important that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea understand
this. It is appropriate at this point for my country to state that it
recognizes the importance of the statement made by the depositaries of the
Treaty and takes note of the resolution adopted by the Board of Governors of
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on 1 April 1993.

We reiterate today the presidential statement of the Security Council of
8 April, after it had seen the report of the Director General of the IAEA.
That statement reaffirmed that it was important that the parties to the Treaty
comply with it, and it urged that efforts be continued to find an early
solution to the nuclear verification issue in the Democratic People's Republic
of Korea, which cannot be ignored. This was particularly called for by the
non-nuclear countries, such as my own, which represent the majority of the
States Members of the United Nations.

Venezuela concurred with those views, which were also clearly set forth
in the statement by Heads of State or Government of the States members of the

Security Council on 31 January 1992, to the effect that at the present time
S/PV.3212
58

(Mr. Arria, Venezuela)

"There are new favourable international circumstances under which
the Security Council has begun to fulfil more effectively its primary

responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and

security ..." (8/PV.3046, p. 141),
and that compliance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty and its safeguards
regime is of critical importance in this regard.

It is clear that the implications of withdrawal by the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea from the Non-Proliferation Treaty are extremely
serious and are of concern to the entire international community. Such
withdrawal has grave implications for international security in a region which
is barely beginning to recover from the traumas and divisiveness of the cold
war. For this reason, my country cannot but be in favour of the prompt and
effective defusing of a situation which seems to be moving towards a
resurgence of tension in this area, In this exceptional historical and
regional context, all the countries of the region and all those that have
special links with its security bear the primary responsibility for bringing
about conditions conducive to the relaxation of tensions and to disarmament
and non-proliferation,

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea has the highest
responsibilities in this respect - responsibilities which, in our opinion,
give that country's participation in the Non-Proliferation Treaty and its
safeguards system very particular significance. The exercise of the right -
clearly recognized by the Treaty itself as belonging to all parties - to
withdraw from the Treaty is not what is in dispute. But that Republic cannot
fail to take into account the context of its decision, which, I would repeat,

is of particular interest to the entire international community.
S/PV.3212
59

(Mr. Arria, Venezuela)

My country believes that it is only on the basis of a process of
consultations between the IAEA and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea
that it will be possible to find a lasting solution. For this reason, we urge
both parties to do their utmost and to exercise maximum prudence in this
respect. We are convinced that no measure that could be taken by the Security
Council could take the place of the indispensable climate of understanding and
trust which needs to prevail if the aims of the Non-Proliferation Treaty are
to be strengthened.

Lastly, we should not lose sight of the fact that all these efforts must
be seen in the context of the process of reunification and reconciliation in
the Korean peninsula which was agreed to by its leaders in December 1991 and
which is of such far-reaching significance, particularly for the security of
north-eastern Asia in the coming years. There is no place there for so-called
nuclear diplomacy or a nuclear presence.

Mr. O'BRIEN (New Zealand): New Zealanders have strong feelings
about nuclear weapons. We are greatly concerned at the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea's announcement of its intention to withdraw from the Treaty
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. We regard the Treaty as
constituting a fundamental plank in the international disarmament and arms
control regime. We consider adherence to the Treaty as substantive proof of a
State's commitment to nuclear weapons control,

Like others who have spoken this evening, New Zealand fully subscribes to
the statement made by the Security Council on 31 January 1992 at the level of
Heads of State and Government that

"The proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction constitutes a

threat to international peace and security." (S/PV.3046, p. 145)
S/PV.3212
60

(Mr. O'Brien, New Zealand)

When he addressed the General Assembly at its forty-seventh session, the
New Zealand Prime Minister emphasized the dangers of nuclear proliferation and
the need to strengthen the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA)
safeguards regime.

Accordingly, New Zealand strongly supports and was a co-sponsor of the
draft resolution. We call earnestly on the Democratic People's Republic of
Korea to abide by its safeguards agreement with the IAEA and to rescind its
notice of withdrawal from the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty.

Such action would, we believe, have positive benefits for global and
regional security and for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea itself.
Many in the international community and in the Asia-Pacific region, New
Zealand among them, may be prepared to consider a new and more positive
chapter in relations with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea if
concerns about its nuclear programmes are adequately addressed. Conversely,
if the Democratic People's Republic of Korea continues on its current path, we
are concerned that this will have worrying consequences for both international
and regional stability and will severely compromise the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea's prospects of being accepted as a partner in the

Asia-Pacific region.
S/pV.3212
61
Mr. YANEZ BARNUEVO (Spain) (interpretation from Spanish): My
delegation co-sponsored and voted in favour of the resolution that has just
been adopted by the Security Council.

Spain believes that the proliferation of nuclear weapons poses a grave
threat to world peace and security and that universal compliance with the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the complete fulfilment
of the obligations it imposes are the best guarantee of the non-proliferation
of such weapons.

The Spanish Government wishes to place on record the profound concern it
has already expressed on other occasions at the decision of the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea, reported to the Security Council and the
depositary States on 12 March 1993, to withdraw from the non-proliferation
Treaty, a step which, if not revoked before as we would wish, would take
effect three months after notification in accordance with Article X of the
Treaty.

We are also concerned about the lack of full cooperation between the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) with regard to the full implementation of the safeguards
agreement that came into force on 10 April 1992. The acts and decisions of
the IAEA, which were taken in accordance with its Statute and the safeguards
agreement itself and in which Spain participated, have my country's full
support. I should like to point in particular to the IAEA Board of Governors'
resolution of 1 April 1993, which states, as reflected in the resolution we
have just adopted, that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is in

non-compliance with the safeguards agreement now in force.
§/pPV.3212
62

(Mr, Yanez Barnuevo, Spain)

The resolution we have just adopted sends a clear message from the
security Council and calls upon the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to
reconsider its withdrawal from the non-proliferation Treaty and to honour its
obligations to the IAEA in accordance with the safequards agreement, as
specified in the IAEA Board of Governors' resolution of 25 February 1993.
Spain trusts that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea will give careful
attention to the content of Security Council resolution 825 (1993), that it
will understand the gravity and import of the appeal being addressed to it by
the Security Council and that it will accordingly take the appropriate action
to respond to the concerns of the international community.

The Spanish delegation expresses the hope that, in the next few weeks,
the Security Council will have good news concerning the results of the
consultations to be pursued by the Director General of the IAEA with the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea. We offer our full cooperation to that
end with a view to achieving an appropriate solution preserving the integrity
and effectiveness of the international non-proliferation régime.

Mr. MARKER (Pakistan): Pakistan reaffirms its abiding commitment to
the objective of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, particularly within
the context of nuclear disarmament. In this regard, I would also wish to
reiterate that, despite our reservations which stem from the flawed nature of
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Pakistan has been
willing to adhere to the Treaty, provided that our concerns about the threat
of nuclear weapons in the South Asian region could be met in a

non-discriminatory, equitable and credible manner.
[1

S/PV.3212
63

(Mr, Marker, Pakistan)

We acknowledge the importance not only of the nuclear non-proliferation
Treaty but also of regional non-proliferation arrangements. We therefore
fully endorsed the Joint Declaration by the Democratic People's Republic of
Korea and the Republic of Korea on the denuclearization of the Korean
peninsula. Pakistan attaches the utmost importance to scrupulous adherence to
all aspects of international agreements by all the parties concerned. It is
for this reason that we supported the resolution of the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors on the implementation of the
safeguards agreement between IAEA and the Democratic People's Republic of
Korea.

Since, in our view, the problem that has arisen between the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea and the IAEA was referred to the Security Council,
under paragraph C of Article XII of the IAEA Statute, in a rather precipitate
manner, we abstained in the voting on the IAEA Board of Governors' resolution
of 1 April 1993. However, the Security Council statement of 8 April 1993,
which marked a prudent step to revert to consultations between the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea and IAEA, was fully endorsed by Pakistan. We
continue to support the efforts and consultations between the IAEA and the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea for resolving the problem through
negotiations. We also welcome the efforts being undertaken by various
countries to contribute towards a negotiated solution of the issue.

The original draft resolution presented by the sponsors contained a
number of elements on which we had serious reservations. We accordingly
suggested a few amendments. We are grateful to the sponsors for accommodating
some of our suggestions. However, we regret that our difficulties with regard
to the seventh preambular paragraph and operative paragraph 1 could not be

resolved.
S/PV.3212
64

(Mr. Marker, Pakistan)

Article X of the non-proliferation Treaty clearly recognizes the right of
a State Party to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary
events related to the subject-matter of the Treaty had jeopardized its supreme
interests. This decision has been left entirely to the State party
concerned. The seventh preambular paragraph is therefore, in our view,
inconsistent with the letter and spirit of Article X of the non-proliferation
Treaty, particularly when read in conjunction with operative paragraph 1 of
the resolution.

We support the consultations and contacts between the IAEA and the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea which are aimed at resolving this
issue. Thus, steps which would complicate both the process of negotiations
between the IAEA and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and a dialogue
between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and other interested parties
should best be avoided. It is because of these factors that my delegation was
constrained to take the decision to abstain in the voting on the resolution
which has just been adopted by the Security Council.

The PRESIDENT (interpretation from Russian): I shall now make a
statement in my capacity as representative of the Russian Federation.

The Russian Federation received with profound concern the announcement of
the Democratic People's Republic of Kcrea on 12 March of its intention to
withdraw from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

As a depositary of that Treaty - one of the key instruments aimed at
ensuring peace and security - we cannot remain indifferent to steps tending to
undermine the nuclear non-proliferation régime, no matter who may take them.
The withdrawal of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea from the Treaty
would be a serious threat “0 regional and international security and would

undermine efforts to implement the Joint Declaration of the south and north on
S/PV,.3212
65

(The President)
the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. This step by the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea is a source of particular regret in that it has
been taken at a time when the international community has expressed doubts
concerning the nature of its nuclear programme.

In this context, we feel the consideration of this problem in the
Security Council to be of particular importance. In our view, multilateral
efforts should work in tandem with a search for a solution to this problem
through bilateral channels between interested parties. That is why we

supported the adoption of the relevant IAEA resolution.
S/PV.3212
66

(The President)

We view as justified the adoption of the draft resolution submitted to
us, which is a reflection of the concern of the world community at Pyongyang's
actions.

In our view, the resolution is balanced and non-confrontational, clearly
indicating the concern of the Security Council regarding the existing
situation and its desire to find a political solution to the problem.

We call on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to retract its
announcement and to abide fully by its obligations under the Treaty and also
the obligations under the safequards agreement, which remain in force. In
this connection, we firmly support the efforts of the IAEA aimed at the
implementation of this agreement,

We are convinced that strict observance by the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
is, above all, in the interests of the north Korean party itself and is also
in the interests of stability and security on the Korean peninsula.

I now resume my functions as President of the Security Council,

There are no further names on the list of speakers. The Security Council
has thus concluded the present stage of its consideration of the item on the
agenda.

The Security Council will remain seized of the matter.

The meeti r at 7.4 m.

Voting Summary
Yes: 013 | No: 000 | Abstentions: 002 | Non-Voting: 000 | Total voting membership: 015
Y BRAZIL
Y CAPE VERDE
A CHINA
Y DJIBOUTI
Y FRANCE
Y HUNGARY
Y JAPAN
Y MOROCCO
Y NEW ZEALAND
A PAKISTAN
Y RUSSIAN FEDERATION
Y SPAIN
Y UNITED KINGDOM
Y UNITED STATES
Y VENEZUELA