TrustHLT/LaCour huggingface dataset:
GR1 (Government): Refusal of compensation because a case falls within category 3 rather than categories 1 and 2 doesn't undermine the acquittal itself or the person's entitlement to be treated as innocent of the offense.
GR1 (Government): The reality is that a decision to refuse compensation does not entail any voicing of doubt as to the correctness of the acquittal itself any more than would a decision in disciplinary or civil proceedings investigating the same facts, as in Sikic in Croatia and Vaniak in Croatia.
GR1 (Government): In Miss Allen's case, the refusal of compensation is merely a recognition that no miscarriage of justice has been conclusively demonstrated by the new evidence because a prosecution could properly have been brought on the evidence that remained.
GR1 (Government): It is not a decision that a conviction would or should have resulted.
GR1 (Government): The Secretary of State is only looking to see whether the fresh evidence that caused the acquittal also so undermined the evidence against her that no conviction could possibly be based on it.
GR1 (Government): The ability in principle to refuse compensation in respect of a criminal process without infringing Article VI is also evident from this court's decision in AL and Germany and BOK and the Netherlands, where the court reaffirmed that there is no right to compensation for lawful pretrial detention of an applicant where proceedings against him are subsequently discontinued or have resulted in an acquittal.
GR1 (Government): Finally, the government submits that the absence of any violation of Article VI in the applicant's own case is clear from the facts.
GR1 (Government): The applicant was originally charged and convicted of the manslaughter of her four-month-old son.
GR1 (Government): He had died from what appeared to be injuries of the kind usually associated with shaken baby syndrome.
GR1 (Government): She was prosecuted on the basis that she had killed her son deliberately by shaking him so as to cause bleeding inside his skull.
GR1 (Government): The prosecution case was based on medical evidence that the child's triad of symptoms, brain damage, bleeding under the skull, and bleeding into the retina, strongly indicated non-accidental injury.
GR1 (Government): At trial, the applicant's own medical experts accepted that the findings were consistent with violent shaking but contended that it did not necessarily prove that it had happened.
GR1 (Government): The applicant denied the offense but couldn't explain her son's collapse and death.
GR1 (Government): And after deliberating for a little less than three hours, the jury returned a verdict of guilty of manslaughter.
GR1 (Government): And the applicant was then sentenced to three years' imprisonment.
GR1 (Government): Five years later, a team of medical experts raised a new hypothesis as to an alternative cause for the triad of symptoms.
GR1 (Government): Some of these theories didn't stand up to scrutiny, but there were new disagreements between the medical experts on a number of points concerning the causation of the injuries that have been sustained.
GR1 (Government): In quashing the conviction, the Court of Appeal recognized the prosecution still had a strong case against the appellant, even in light of this new medical knowledge.
GR1 (Government): But it concluded that the conviction was no longer safe because of the disputes of medical opinion.
GR1 (Government): Had those disputes been known at the time of the trial, they would have been left to the jury to decide.
GR1 (Government): In quashing the conviction, the Court of Appeal recognized that the prosecution evidence and arguments were powerful and no specific alternative cause of death had been provided by the defense.
GR1 (Government): But they also recognized that the presence of the triad of symptoms could not automatically lead to a diagnosis of a violent death.
GR1 (Government): And in those circumstances, the fresh medical evidence might reasonably have affected the jury's decision to convict.
GR1 (Government): The conviction was therefore unsafe, and the appeal against the conviction allowed.
GR1 (Government): No retrial was ordered because the applicant had already served her sentence.
GR1 (Government): As a result, the applicant is now treated as innocent of the offense.
GR1 (Government): But the Secretary of State for Justice was entitled to reject her later application for compensation because Miss Allen's situation was not one where any miscarriage of justice had been conclusively shown.
GR1 (Government): The new evidence means the original conviction was unsafe, but it was not evidence which demonstrates that no prosecution could or should not have been brought against her.
GR1 (Government): The Court of Appeal Civil Division rejected Miss Allen's challenge to the Secretary of State's decision and correctly found no fault with that analysis and also no infringement of Article 6-2 in the way that the decision was made or expressed.
GR1 (Government): The applicant is still treated as innocent of the criminal offense, but that does not mean that she satisfies the conditions for compensation under Section 133 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988.
GR1 (Government): For those reasons and those in the government's written submissions, the government submits that Miss Allen's application is either inadmissible or it should be dismissed on its merits.
GR1 (Government): Article 6 does not apply to the decision on compensation here.
GR1 (Government): But even if it does, there's been no violation in this case because the decision to refuse compensation doesn't call into question the correctness of the finding that the applicant's conviction was unsafe and that she bears no criminal liability.
Dean Spielmann (JudgeP): Thank you Mr. Strachan. I call Mr. Southey please, you have the floor.
AP1 (Applicant): Members of the Court, the United Kingdom Government started its submissions this morning with the statement that there is no general right to compensation under international law.
AP1 (Applicant): That's true, however it's irrelevant because the issue in this case is not whether the applicant has a right under the European Convention to compensation.
AP1 (Applicant): It doesn't because the United Kingdom has never signed up to Article 3 of Protocol 7.
AP1 (Applicant): The issue is whether Article 6.2 was violated when the United Kingdom took a decision under
AP1 (Applicant): the existing scheme for compensation that it's enacted.
AP1 (Applicant): In addressing that issue, there are four issues that I'd like to address briefly in these submissions.
AP1 (Applicant): Firstly does Article 6.2 apply to the compensation scheme in question?
AP1 (Applicant): I'll submit that there's insufficient basis for distinguishing this Court's clear case law holding that Article 6.2 applies to compensation schemes intended to compensate people following
AP1 (Applicant): acquittal.
AP1 (Applicant): In particular, the fact that the compensation scheme is intended to ensure compliance with Article 14.6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is, in my submission,
AP1 (Applicant): insufficient reason for holding that Article 6.2 doesn't apply.
AP1 (Applicant): The second issue that I wish to address is the relationship between the compensation decision and the criminal proceedings and whether that's one that permits the applicant to rely on Article 6.2.
AP1 (Applicant): The third issue is whether the reasons why compensation was refused are inconsistent with Article 6.2.
AP1 (Applicant): I'll submit that the reasons were essentially that there were doubts regarding the applicant's innocence and that expression of doubts by the United Kingdom Government is sufficient to mean that Article 6.2 is violated.
AP1 (Applicant): And finally, there are brief submissions that I just want to make about relief.
AP1 (Applicant): Turning to those issues, the first issue, which is whether Article 6.2 applies to the
AP1 (Applicant): compensation scheme in question, the starting point in my submission when considering that issue is the fact that there are a significant number of decisions of this Court holding that Article 6.2 applies when eligibility for compensation is assessed by the State
AP1 (Applicant): following a person's acquittal.
AP1 (Applicant): Examples of the range of situations in which Article 6.2 applies include Puig Penella v.
AP1 (Applicant): Spain, a scheme that provided for the payment of compensation where an individual had been acquitted and it had then been demonstrated that the facts charged did not exist.
AP1 (Applicant): Reschetti v. Austria, compensation that was payable where a person had been placed on
AP1 (Applicant): remand and acquitted.
AP1 (Applicant): Hammond v. Norway, a scheme for compensation where a person was acquitted or the prosecution
AP1 (Applicant): was discontinued.
AP1 (Applicant): Kappo v. Belgium, a scheme that covered those exculpated directly or indirectly by judicial
AP1 (Applicant): decision as well as those who could establish their innocence after proceedings were discontinued.
AP1 (Applicant): The key feature of all these schemes, which are varied, is that following acquittal the State assessed whether it should pay compensation for its actions in bringing a prosecution.
AP1 (Applicant): That key factor is plainly present here.
AP1 (Applicant): The existence of those authorities means it is necessary to consider whether there is any reason for distinguishing them.
AP1 (Applicant): The United Kingdom Government has sought to distinguish the authorities just mentioned by arguing that Article 6.2 is inconsistent with Article 14.6 of the International Covenant
AP1 (Applicant): and its equivalent in Article 3 of Protocol 7 of the European Convention.
AP1 (Applicant): As a consequence, it is argued that Article 6.2 does not imply in the context of a scheme
AP1 (Applicant): intended to ensure compliance with Article 14.6.
AP1 (Applicant): That is an issue that I need to address.
AP1 (Applicant): When looking at that issue, it is important to note that there is no case law directly considering the application of Article 6.2 to schemes that are intended to comply with
AP1 (Applicant): Article 14.6.
AP1 (Applicant): The only decision of this Court that touches on the subject is Szechania v. Austria.
AP1 (Applicant): With respect to this Court, the reference at paragraph 25 of the judgment to the distinction between the domestic scheme being considered and Article 3 of Protocol 7 is unclear.
AP1 (Applicant): It appears to be in a context in which this Court is identifying reasons why Article 6.2
AP1 (Applicant): should not apply to the domestic scheme in question.
AP1 (Applicant): That was a scheme that obviously went beyond that required by Article 14.6 or Article 3
AP1 (Applicant): of Protocol 7.
AP1 (Applicant): An example of how the Court was looking for reasons why Article 6.2 should not apply is
AP1 (Applicant): the reference to the fact that Article 6.2 does not guarantee compensation.
AP1 (Applicant): That appears to imply that this Court regarded the fact that the provision was not intended to comply with Article 14.6 as a reason why Article 6.2 should not apply, the implication
AP1 (Applicant): being that it is easier to argue that Article 6.2 applies when Article 14.6 is in issue.
AP1 (Applicant): That's not surprising.
AP1 (Applicant): Article 14.6 is presumably intended to identify those people who have the greatest right to
AP1 (Applicant): compensation.
AP1 (Applicant): That's why those people are given a right in international law to claim compensation.
AP1 (Applicant): It would be odd if the presumption of innocence didn't apply to that scheme but applied to schemes that were more generous and were meant to compensate those who perhaps the international community would regard as less deserving.
AP1 (Applicant): Turning to the decisions of the United Nations Human Rights Committee, again none of the decisions cited by the United Kingdom Government addresses the issue of the presumption of innocence because it didn't arise on the facts.
AP1 (Applicant): The reasons for refusing compensation did not call into question innocence.
AP1 (Applicant): WJH in the Netherlands is an example of this.
AP1 (Applicant): In that case there had been no final conviction and so the compensation was not payable for that reason.
AP1 (Applicant): So the reason for refusing compensation did not say anything about whether the applicant was innocent.
AP1 (Applicant): Now it's true that the United Nations Human Rights Committee also said that the presumption of innocence does not apply to proceedings for compensation.
AP1 (Applicant): However that demonstrates the difficulties of applying the United Nations Human Rights Committee judgments.
AP1 (Applicant): The case law of this court has repeatedly accepted that Article 6.2 does apply in the
AP1 (Applicant): context of compensation proceedings.
AP1 (Applicant): So one can't adopt the United Nations Human Rights Committee's statement because it's inconsistent with case law of this court.
AP1 (Applicant): The other decisions of the United Nations Human Rights Committee are also ones where the reasons for refusing compensation had nothing to do with doubts about innocence.
AP1 (Applicant): For example in Mahunan v. Finland the reason why compensation was refused was that there
AP1 (Applicant): was no miscarriage of justice as the applicant had merely been pardoned for reasons of equity.
AP1 (Applicant): In Irving v. Australia the issue that resulted in acquittal was the fact that the trial had
AP1 (Applicant): been unfair and not that there was a new or newly discovered fact.
AP1 (Applicant): What these cases demonstrate is that the application of the presumption of innocence does not make the restrictions expressly included in Article 14.6 of the International Covenant or the
AP1 (Applicant): restrictions in its equivalent in Article 3 of Protocol 7 meaningless.
AP1 (Applicant): One can refuse compensation without infringing the presumption of innocence if one does it on the basis that some of the grounds that the matter set out in Article 14.6 are not
AP1 (Applicant): satisfied.
AP1 (Applicant): Of course the fact there is no case law does not undermine the applicant's arguments.
AP1 (Applicant): In the absence of case law the only material that might be said to directly address the issue of Article 6.2 and its application to Article 3 of Protocol 7 is the explanatory
AP1 (Applicant): note.
AP1 (Applicant): And paragraph 7, paragraph 25 rather of the explanatory note to Protocol 7 states that the intention is only to compensate those who are clearly innocent.
AP1 (Applicant): However it doesn't address the presumption of innocence and that means that it's not unclear what is meant by the reference to a person who is clearly innocent.
AP1 (Applicant): Simply doesn't know whether the experts believe that the presumption of innocence applied when determining whether a person is clearly innocent.
AP1 (Applicant): In any event the explanatory note is plainly not binding in the sense that this Court is required to follow it.
AP1 (Applicant): The explanatory note must be reviewed in the light of this Court considering the reasons why Article 6.2 applies to compensation schemes.
AP1 (Applicant): The argument that Article 6.2 applies when consideration is given to Article 14.6 of
AP1 (Applicant): the International Covenant is supported by the factors that this Court has identified as relevant to the application of Article 6.2.
AP1 (Applicant): Firstly this Court held in Hammond v. Norway that the fact that a compensation decision
AP1 (Applicant): is intended to decide whether the state should pay compensation for its actions in bringing a prosecution is a weighty factor that suggests that Article 6.2 applies.
AP1 (Applicant): Secondly Article 14.6 of the International Covenant is intended to decide whether the
AP1 (Applicant): state should pay compensation for its actions in bringing a prosecution.
AP1 (Applicant): In addition in the same judgment in Hammond this Court identified two other factors that were said to mean that Article 6.2 applied.
AP1 (Applicant): Those factors were that the outcome of the criminal proceedings was decisive for the compensation decision and the fact that compensation was decided on the basis of the evidence relied on in criminal proceedings.
AP1 (Applicant): Both of those factors are present when a decision is made as to whether to pay compensation under Article 14.6 of the International Covenant.
AP1 (Applicant): It's the outcome of the criminal proceedings that decides whether compensation is payable.
AP1 (Applicant): That's because compensation is only payable when the conviction is quashed for reasons of fresh evidence.
AP1 (Applicant): It's the evidence that's used in those criminal proceedings that determines whether compensation is payable.
AP1 (Applicant): For example if the compensation, if the conviction rather is quashed because of judicial misdirection Article 14.6 doesn't apply.
AP1 (Applicant): That's true whether or not subsequent evidence proves innocence.
AP1 (Applicant): Whether or not the applicant has correctly identified the factors that cause this Court to conclude that Article 6.2 applied in Hammann and Norway.
AP1 (Applicant): It's still in our submission highly relevant as already noted that this Court has repeatedly held that Article 6.2 applies to provisions compensating persons for loss caused by a
AP1 (Applicant): criminal prosecution.
AP1 (Applicant): That's particularly relevant when at least some of those schemes would appear to have been so broad that they would have covered the State's obligations under Article 14.6.
AP1 (Applicant): For example, Capo v. Belgium covered a person who'd been exculpated and that was apparently
AP1 (Applicant): potentially covering the area covered by Article 14.6 because the scheme was not restricted
AP1 (Applicant): to those who'd been acquitted before the conviction became final.
AP1 (Applicant): The difference between that scheme and this scheme was that the Belgian scheme went beyond that required by Article 14.6.
AP1 (Applicant): It would be surprising in the applicant's submission if Article 6.2 only applied to
AP1 (Applicant): those parts of the scheme that went beyond the international obligations of the Belgian and the other Member States, but not to the part of the scheme where the international community decided there was the greatest need for compensation.
AP1 (Applicant): That suggests that Article 6.2 applies to the compensation scheme in question, whether
AP1 (Applicant): or not it's intended to comply with Article 14.6 of the International Covenant.
AP1 (Applicant): The applicant's submissions do not mean that the criteria set out in Article 14.6
AP1 (Applicant): of the International Covenant become meaningless.
AP1 (Applicant): In particular, the submissions do not mean that a person is entitled to compensation whenever their conviction is quashed.
AP1 (Applicant): The decisions of the United Nations Human Rights Committee provide examples of cases where compensation was refused without infringement of the presumption of innocence.
AP1 (Applicant): It's easy to identify other cases where compensation can be refused without interference with the presumption of innocence.
AP1 (Applicant): For example, if the Court of Appeal were to reverse a conviction as a consequence of evidence that was available to the defence at trial, but the defence failed to deploy, compensation could then be refused.
AP1 (Applicant): It would be refused because the reasons for reversing the conviction had nothing to do with any new or newly discovered fact.
AP1 (Applicant): That would be compatible with the presumption of innocence because it wouldn't suggest that the person who'd been acquitted was anything other than innocent.
AP1 (Applicant): This demonstrates how this case is not an analogy to the situation considered by the Court in Mauillet v. France, where the principle of l'ex specialis was applied.
AP1 (Applicant): This is not a case where the application of a provision of the Convention, in this case Article 6.2, would render a provision of the Protocol, Article 3 of the Seventh Protocol,
AP1 (Applicant): meaningless.
AP1 (Applicant): Article 3 of Protocol 7 continues to have an important role if the applicant's submissions are correct.
AP1 (Applicant): It defines the circumstances where there's a right to compensation, and it imports important restrictions on those rights.
AP1 (Applicant): In fact, the applicant submits that their submissions are consistent with the wording of Article 14.6 of the International Covenant.
AP1 (Applicant): Those provisions do not require innocence to be established, which they could easily have done.
AP1 (Applicant): Indeed the UK government's system doesn't require the establishment of innocence, as compensation is payable when the jury would have been required to acquit the person because there was insufficient evidence of guilt.
AP1 (Applicant): Article 14.6 requires compensation to be paid where a miscarriage of justice has been established.
AP1 (Applicant): What the applicant's written submissions demonstrate is that that phrase, miscarriage of justice, has been used in a number of English-speaking jurisdictions governed by the ICCPR to define the circumstances when an appeal is allowed.
AP1 (Applicant): Appeals are allowed on the basis that a conviction is unsafe, and that demonstrates a miscarriage of justice.
AP1 (Applicant): That implies that a person who's demonstrated that their conviction is unsafe, so that their appeal should be allowed, has demonstrated conclusively that they are a victim of a miscarriage of justice.
AP1 (Applicant): All these matters mean that this scheme, which is intended to comply with Article 14.6, is
AP1 (Applicant): no different, essentially, and cannot be distinguished from the schemes considered in cases such as Puig Penella.
AP1 (Applicant): That means that I need to address a second issue, which is the nature of the relationship between the assessment of compensation in this case and the criminal proceedings.
AP1 (Applicant): The United Kingdom Government argues that the relationship is not sufficiently close.
AP1 (Applicant): The applicant, however, admits that there are a number of factors that suggest a close relationship so that Article 16.2 applies.
AP1 (Applicant): What are these factors?
AP1 (Applicant): Firstly we will see in a moment that the domestic scheme means that the Government is required to determine whether or not the applicant might have been found guilty.
AP1 (Applicant): That demonstrates a close relationship between the outcome of the criminal proceedings and the subsequent compensation decision.
AP1 (Applicant): Secondly the factors identified in Hammond and Norway are all present on the facts of this case.
AP1 (Applicant): The compensation decision is plainly intended to decide whether the United Kingdom Government should pay compensation for its actions in bringing a prosecution.
AP1 (Applicant): It's the outcome of the criminal proceedings that's decisive for that application for compensation.
AP1 (Applicant): If the conviction is quashed as a consequence of fresh evidence, compensation may be payable.
AP1 (Applicant): If the conviction is quashed because of judicial misdirection, compensation is not payable.
AP1 (Applicant): That's true even if evidence is available to demonstrate innocence.
AP1 (Applicant): Thirdly it's the evidence that was adduced in the criminal proceedings that determines whether compensation is payable.
AP1 (Applicant): In particular, evidence obtained after acquittal cannot be considered when determining whether compensation is payable.
AP1 (Applicant): That all demonstrates a close relationship between the criminal proceedings and the compensation decision such that Article 6.2 applies.
AP1 (Applicant): Now I accept the compensation decision challenged is not one of a criminal court.
AP1 (Applicant): It's an administrative decision that was subsequently challenged in the administrative courts of the United Kingdom.
AP1 (Applicant): However Article 6.2 has clearly been held to apply in that sort of context.