TrustHLT/LaCour huggingface dataset:
GR1 (Government): However, that does not make it a criminal punishment.
GR1 (Government): The fact that a fine is significant does not in itself imply that an offense can be qualified as a criminal offense.
GR1 (Government): The court has even mentioned disciplinary proceedings against lawyers and doctors as an example of offenses that will not become criminal were confined to a central disciplinary context, even where the fine can be described as punitive.
GR1 (Government): In the decision of the court in Irving Brown v. UK,
GR1 (Government): a solicitor was fined with 10,000 pounds in the year 1996.
GR1 (Government): That is considerably higher than the applicant's fines.
GR1 (Government): The government points to document E, a statement from the Office of the Public Prosecutor, confirming that fines imposed under Article 223 of the CPA are not to be entered on criminal records.
GR1 (Government): That indicates that fines in question are more of a disciplinary nature rather than criminal, as fines in general are to be entered on criminal records.
GR1 (Government): Finally, the government points out that there is no possibility to convert these fines into prison term, as was the case, for example, in Roundsburg v. Sweden.
GR1 (Government): Despite that, the court did not find the fines to be of a criminal nature.
GR1 (Government): In light of this, the government submits that Article 6 does not apply under its criminal head to the proceedings in question.
GR1 (Government): In the event that the court considers Article 6 applicable, the government points to the unique circumstances of the case.
GR1 (Government): This is not a typical criminal case and does not carry any significant degree of stigma.
GR1 (Government): It must be borne in mind that the criminal head guarantees will not necessarily apply with their full stringency in all cases, in particular those that do not belong to the traditional categories of criminal law.
GR1 (Government): Let us contemplate what are the main concerns of the case.
GR1 (Government): The answer is the basic protocol between the courts and councils.
GR1 (Government): Two lawyers with decades of experience as defense counsel deliberately did not attend the main hearing in one of the most complicated, extensive, and serious criminal cases before Icelandic courts.
GR1 (Government): It was a high-profile case, one of those large cases resulting from the financial collapse in 2008.
GR1 (Government): The applicant's clients were charged along with two other defendants.
GR1 (Government): As defense counsels, the applicants made all possible requests and motions regarding the procedure of the case on behalf of their clients, as, of course, they were entitled to according to the CPA.
GR1 (Government): In their letters to the district court, the applicants mentioned examples of what they considered to be violations against their clients' rights.
GR1 (Government): The applicants concluded by stating that these alleged violations made them unable to perform their role.
GR1 (Government): A Supreme Court's judgment was rendered in the case of the applicants' clients on 12th of February, 2015.
GR1 (Government): The clients filed an application and complained to this court, among other things, about alleged violations of Article 6.
GR1 (Government): Some of the complaints regarded the same procedural issues that the applicants listed as the reasons for their resignation from the case.
GR1 (Government): In short, the court held in its judgment from 4th of June this summer, the case of Einarsson and others, that there had been no violation of Article 6 in respect of the alleged denial of access to data and the alleged failure to summon witnesses, which were the main reasons given by the applicants for their resignation.
GR1 (Government): In light of this, the government submits that the reason the applicants gave for their resignation simply had no foundation.
GR1 (Government): It is a special consideration how these two competent defense counsels could believe that they were fulfilling their duties towards their clients by resigning three days before the main hearing, although with their client's acceptance.
GR1 (Government): The obvious answer is that the applicants were fully aware of their duties to appear in court and raise these procedural issues in the main hearing in defense for their clients, as was confirmed in the Supreme Court's judgment.
GR1 (Government): The applicants decided not to do so and ignored the judge's ruling on the matter, apparently to obtain a postponement of the main hearing.
GR1 (Government): However, the defense counsels of the two other defendants in the case saw no reason to resign and attended the main hearing as the judge had decided.
GR1 (Government): In the event that Article 6 is considered applicable to the present case, the proceedings, both in the District Court and the Supreme Court, must be viewed as a whole.
GR1 (Government): The question that lies before the court is, therefore, whether the Supreme Court was capable of remedying the defects of the proceedings before the District Court.
GR1 (Government): It should be emphasized that an alleged procedural defect in the District Court's handling of the case does not by itself constitute a violation of Article 6, paragraph 1, if the defect was remedied on appeal.
GR1 (Government): According to the case of Die Kapper versus Belgium, this is the reason for the existence of the rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies.
GR1 (Government): The result is that defects at one level may be put right at a higher level.
GR1 (Government): This depends mainly on two things, the nature of the flaws and the power and scope of review on appeal.
GR1 (Government): The government agrees with the chamber that the flaws were limited to defects in the proceeding at lower level, therefore, not of such nature as to call into question the Supreme Court's ability to remedy the defects on appeal.
GR1 (Government): This is very different from the Die Kapper case, where a fundamental defect involving the actual composition of a national court could not be cured on appeal.
GR1 (Government): According to the CPA, the Supreme Court's scope of view is very wide, since it has the jurisdiction to examine both questions of law and facts.
GR1 (Government): The right of the applicants to defend themselves at the appellant level was not subject to any limitation according to law.
GR1 (Government): And they themselves were able to state all their views during the oral deliberations of the case.
GR1 (Government): The Supreme Court's scope of review was therefore no hindrance for the applicants to resort to all the same defenses as they could before the district court.
GR1 (Government): The wide scope of review made it possible for the Supreme Court to remedy any procedural defect at first instance.
GR1 (Government): The facts of the case are both simple and undisputed.
GR1 (Government): The applicants' absence from the court in the main hearing is a fact, and the communication between the applicants and the district court was conducted with letters and emails.
GR1 (Government): Before the Supreme Court, the applicants never presented any arguments which were beyond its scope of review.
GR1 (Government): In particular, there was no disagreement between the parties as to the facts of the case, as can be seen in the applicants' oral pleadings before the Supreme Court in documents C1 and 2.
GR1 (Government): The applicants' arguments before the Supreme Court concerned the procedural defects at the first instance, the alleged rightfulness of their resignation from the case, and finally, the lawfulness of the presiding judge's action in regard to the relevant provisions of the CPA.
GR1 (Government): The applicants' briefs to the Supreme Court do not reveal any disagreement on the facts, and certainly not a disagreement which a witness testimony, or indeed the testimony of the applicants themselves, would have been necessary to resolve.
GR1 (Government): The applicants have not argued what their own testimonies or witnesses should have demonstrated, as the facts of the case were undisputed.
GR1 (Government): In this respect, it should be pointed out that the Icelandic procedure does not allow character witnesses or witnesses to demonstrate credibility.
GR1 (Government): However, according to the Supreme Court's judgment in the applicants' case, there were means, according to the CPA, that the applicants could have resorted to if they thought this necessary.
GR1 (Government): They could have examined witnesses in a special witness examination procedure at the district court for the purpose of the appeal, in accordance with Article 141 of the CPA.
GR1 (Government): Such witness examination has often been exercised for the purpose of an appeal, and is not subject to the Supreme Court's authorization.
GR1 (Government): So it is the parties themselves who can decide to use this provision.
GR1 (Government): Furthermore, the Supreme Court's judgment states that the applicants could have requested the Supreme Court's permission to examine witnesses and or give statements themselves in accordance with Article 205, paragraph 3 of the CPA.
GR1 (Government): This conclusion of the Supreme Court has been met with profound criticism from the applicants.
GR1 (Government): It is, however, clear that according to the rule of subsidiarity, the court, being an international court, is not in a position to disregard the Supreme Court's interpretation of domestic law unless it can be deemed arbitrary or manifestly unreasonable.
GR1 (Government): The government agrees with the chamber, where it found the Supreme Court's interpretation of domestic law not to be arbitrary or manifestly unreasonable.
GR1 (Government): The applicants argue that these resources are neither effective nor practical, despite the fact that the highest court in Iceland has presented a clear statement in its judgment that these resources were indeed available to them.
GR1 (Government): The government objects to the applicants' claim that only the Supreme Court itself may request testimonies.
GR1 (Government): Indeed, it is subject to the Supreme Court's permission, but that does not exclude the possibility that it is available to case parties as well as the court itself, as stated in the case of Jysylla v. Finland.
GR1 (Government): It is undisputed, however, that the Supreme Court has only once exercised the possibility to take testimonies, and that was ex proprio motu.
GR1 (Government): That in itself does not change the fact that this possibility was available to the applicants according to the CPA and the Supreme Court's judgment.
GR1 (Government): The applicants refer to two reports from administrative committees written in preparation for the establishment of an appeal court in Iceland.
GR1 (Government): The government points out that legal experts agreed for years that it was essential to establish an appeal court, mainly so testimonies on appeal would become the principle instead of the exception.
GR1 (Government): Therefore, it is no surprise that domestic experts emphasize the rarity of testimonies before the Supreme Court.
GR1 (Government): This purpose and motive of these reports should therefore be borne in mind when deciding on their importance for this case.
GR1 (Government): It must be submitted that they cannot be looked upon as binding declaration for the government, contrary to the clear statements in the Supreme Court's judgment.
GR1 (Government): The government agrees with the Chamber that Article 6 did not require the Supreme Court to act ex proprio motu and summon the applicants and witnesses to give oral statements.
GR1 (Government): In relation to this, the cases of Artnarson and Bragasson versus Iceland are not precedents.
GR1 (Government): In both of these cases, the court found that Article 6 had been violated.
GR1 (Government): The Supreme Court had overturned the district court's acquittal and convicted the applicants without summoning them and relevant witnesses.
GR1 (Government): But in the case at hand, the Supreme Court upheld the decision of the district court to fine the applicants.
GR1 (Government): The government emphasizes that overturning from acquittal to conviction seems to be an operating argument in Artnarson and Bragasson.
GR1 (Government): Furthermore, the defendants in those cases were charged with serious offenses against the general penal code and faced long prison sentences unlike the applicants.
GR1 (Government): The government maintains that the Supreme Court also had the possibility to invalidate the district court's judgment regarding the court fines and refer the case back to the district court.
GR1 (Government): The government has strong reservations about the applicants' arguments that everyone involved at the Supreme Court's trial were of the opinion that there was no possibility of a retrial in the first instance.
GR1 (Government): This is simply not the case.
GR1 (Government): The applicant's case regarding the court fines was appealed separately to the Supreme Court and given a separate case number.
GR1 (Government): The case of the applicant's clients was also appealed to the Supreme Court, where it received a different case number and the judgment in that case was rendered almost nine months later.
GR1 (Government): Therefore, the applicant's case was a separate case that could be invalidated and referred back, like in any other case before the Supreme Court, if considered necessary.
GR1 (Government): This has been done on many occasions on the grounds of general rules.
GR1 (Government): The Supreme Court did not state that this was a procedural impossibility.
GR1 (Government): It simply did not find it necessary because it was able to render its judgment based on the case files, the applicant's written observations, and the oral pleadings.
GR1 (Government): As stated by the chamber in the present case, it is for the appealed court to provide a forum for fresh factual and legal determination of the merits of the charge.
GR1 (Government): But it's then for the applicants to avail themselves of the remedies for their defense that are provided for by domestic law.
GR1 (Government): The government points out that both the applicants were represented by legal counsel throughout the proceedings before the Supreme Court.
GR1 (Government): Furthermore, as repeatedly stated, the applicants themselves are very experienced defense counsels with decades in the fields of criminal law and criminal procedure.
GR1 (Government): In light of the resources available to them, the applicants and their counsels should have been familiar with the appropriate defenses before the Supreme Court.
GR1 (Government): From the government's point of view, the applicants argue that they did not present their strongest defense according to the CPA because they were not invited to do so by the Supreme Court.
GR1 (Government): The government cannot agree with this kind of reasoning coming from such experienced counsels.
GR1 (Government): It should be expected that they would avail themselves to every possible defense stipulated in the CPA.
GR1 (Government): As to Article 6, paragraph 2, the government asserts that the applicants enjoyed the same position before the Supreme Court as any other appellant.
GR1 (Government): When judgments from the first instance are appealed, they are not final, and the appellant still has the status of an innocent person pending the procedure before the higher court.
GR1 (Government): The applicants were therefore presumed innocent in the proceedings before the Supreme Court in accordance with the Icelandic Constitution and Article 6.2 of the Convention.
GR1 (Government): Flaws in the process at first instance did not affect this right.
GR1 (Government): The government argues that the entirety of the proceedings was, as a whole, fair and complied with the requirements of Article 6.
GR1 (Government): The government agrees with the Chimpe that assessment of the overall fairness of the proceedings under Article 6, paragraph 1, is according to the court's jurisprudence.
GR1 (Government): The applicants' allegations according to paragraph 2 and 3 were directed at the lack of fairness of being found in absentia by the district court, and then the alleged failure of the Supreme Court to remedy the procedural flaws at the lower level.
GR1 (Government): In such cases, the court has confined itself to examine whether proceedings, as a whole, can be considered fair within the meaning of paragraph 1 of Article 6.
GR1 (Government): The applicants refer to the case of Gurs v. Turkey.
GR1 (Government): The government points out that the case is not a precedent for the present case, as the higher court in Gurs had not full jurisdiction to substitute its own view of the amount of compensation awarded to by the applicants by the first instance court.
GR1 (Government): In the present case, the situation is quite different, as the Supreme Court had the full jurisdiction to substitute its own view on the amount of the fines.
GR1 (Government): The argument of the Chimpe for an overall assessment under paragraph 1 of Article 6 are therefore sound.
GR1 (Government): Now we have come to the question whether there was a breach of Article 7.
GR1 (Government): Although it would be established that Article 6 was applicable under its criminal head in this case, the government submits that there was no breach of Article 7.
GR1 (Government): The applicants disagree with the reasoning of the Chimpe and claim that they could not have foreseen that the fines would be higher than in previous judgments.
GR1 (Government): The government would like to point out, firstly, that it's obvious that Icelandic councils respect the courts and behave accordingly, as can be seen since there are only 10 Supreme Court judgments regarding court fines for councils in the period of six decades in the years 1954 to 2014.
GR1 (Government): Thereof, only two of them concerns councils, failing to attend the main hearing, the applicant's case, and the case of Stefan Karl Kristiansson pending before this court.
GR1 (Government): The Kristiansson case is different from the applicant's case, since the council's non-attendance was not deliberate, but due to an alleged mistake on his behalf.
GR1 (Government): It is simply not correct, as maintained by the applicants, that it is not particularly unusual not to attend the main hearing.
GR1 (Government): And thereby causing a delay in court proceedings.
GR1 (Government): Deliberate non-attendance does not at all happen on a regular basis.
GR1 (Government): Icelandic jurisprudence shows just the opposite.
GR1 (Government): Secondly, the government submits that the court has, when examining Article 7, focused on each individual case and whether the interpretation and application in that certain case has been foreseeable for the particular person at hand.
GR1 (Government): Therefore, the government considers as to the foreseeability of the relevant provisions of the CPA and the amount of fines accordingly, that with the benefit on the basis of the applicant's knowledge, being practicing lawyers, they could reasonably be expected to be able to appreciate that they ran a real risk of being fined for contempt of court.
GR1 (Government): The government also maintains, in the light of the case, of Icelandic jurisprudence and the scale of the case at hand, that the applicants could reasonably have foreseen fines being relatively higher than before.
GR1 (Government): As previously stated, the case in which the applicants did not attend the main hearing was very complicated and extensive.
GR1 (Government): The duration of the trial was two weeks.
GR1 (Government): And in few cases, if any, there have been submitted more evidentiary documents.
GR1 (Government): In addition, there were four accused, who all faced very serious charges and many years of imprisonment.
GR1 (Government): It can therefore be argued that the overall scale and complexity of the case was much more compared to other cases where fines had been imposed.
GR1 (Government): In the case of CR versus the UK, the court also stated that the consequences need not be foreseeable.
GR1 (Government): That the consequences need not be foreseeable with absolute certainty.
GR1 (Government): Experience shows this to be unattainable.
GR1 (Government): Although certainty is highly desirable, the law must be able to keep pace with the changing circumstances.
GR1 (Government): This is in total conformity with the chamber judgment, where it is established that the consistent case law does not outlaw the gradual clarification of the rules of criminal liability through judicial interpretation from case to case.
GR1 (Government): The chamber also confirms that provisions of domestic law with no maximum amounts do not run counter to the requirements of Article 7.
GR1 (Government): Therefore, the amount of fines was not arbitrary, as it was consistent with the essence of the conduct and could have been reasonably foreseen by the applicants.
GR1 (Government): The applicants have argued that the fine amounts are much higher, not only according to domestic jurisprudence, but also in international comparison.
GR1 (Government): The government rejects this and points out that the offenses in the five cases cited by the applicants are not comparable as to the nature and gravity of these actions and the consequences thereof.
GR1 (Government): The applicants omitted, however, to cite Irving Brown versus the UK, referred to by the government earlier.
GR1 (Government): In that case, a fine of 10,000 pounds for offenses of a disciplinary nature were not criminal in nature, and the complaint did therefore not fall within the scope of Article 7.
GR1 (Government): in addition to this deliberation, the government relies on its written observations and for all these reasons submits that there has been no violation of Article 6 and 7 of the Convention.
Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos (JudgeP): I now invite the judges of the Grand Chamber wishing to do so to put their questions to the parties, Judge Pere Pastor Vilanova.
Pere Pastor Vilanova (Judge): J'ai deux questions adressées aux deux partis et qui se focalisent notamment sur l'article 7 de la Convention.
Pere Pastor Vilanova (Judge): En ce qui intéresse, la première, la voilà.
Pere Pastor Vilanova (Judge): Le fait que l'article 223 du Code de procédure pénale ne prévoit aucune limite à l'amende imposée, peut-il poser un problème au titre du principe fondamental de l'état de droit, notamment celui de la séparation des pouvoirs?
Pere Pastor Vilanova (Judge): Et en ce qui concerne la deuxième question, c'est la suivante.
Pere Pastor Vilanova (Judge): En matière purement pénale, est-ce que les peines, qu'il s'agisse de prison ou d'amende, sont-elles fixées clairement dans la loi islandaise au titre de la jurisprudence de la Grande Chambre établie dans Del Río Prada?
Pere Pastor Vilanova (Judge): Je vous remercie, Monsieur le Président.
Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos (JudgeP): Merci beaucoup, Judge Nußberger.
Angelika Nußberger (Judge): I would just have a question concerning the foreseeability of the sanction.
Angelika Nußberger (Judge): And I wanted to know, is this fine or what is fine fix in relation to the potential gain of the lawyers in the case or in relation to the real gain?
Angelika Nußberger (Judge): Or in relation to other factors?
Angelika Nußberger (Judge): I understand that you mentioned also the complexity of the case or perhaps also the potential damages caused by the delay.
Angelika Nußberger (Judge): In which relation was the sanction fixed?
Darian Pavli (Judge): I have a question for the applicant with respect to the third angle criterion.
Darian Pavli (Judge): Now, if I understood correctly, your submission today was that in terms of the severity of the fine, the fact that it is unlimited in theory is sufficient to bring the criminal limbo of Article VI into play.
Darian Pavli (Judge): And my question there is that our case law tends to judge the severity of a sanction based on the actual fine, not the theoretical possibility of a fine.