TrustHLT/LaCour huggingface dataset:
AP2 (Applicant): La Cour fait prévaloir, il me semble, une vision plus pragmatique, plus souple, en se rappelant qu'il est quand même extraordinairement difficile pour un retirant individuel d'une prison, d'un centre de rétention, assigné à résidence comme il l'est actuellement, d'apporter des preuves de ce qu'il est, par exemple, soumis à un mandat de recherche en Algérie, quand cette preuve, évidemment, est beaucoup plus simple à rapporter par un Etat.
AP2 (Applicant): Les juridictions administratives sont hiérarchisées, elles appliquent la position du Conseil d'Etat.
AP2 (Applicant): À partir du moment où le Conseil d'Etat a une position différente de la vôtre, évidemment que les tribunaux administratifs vont avoir la même position que le Conseil d'Etat, ou en tout cas, la même manière d'apprécier la charge de la preuve.
AP2 (Applicant): Il n'y a donc, selon moi, rien d'étonnant à ce que le juge du tribunal administratif de Lille juge exactement la même chose que son collègue qui siège à Lyon.
AP2 (Applicant): Dernier point, sur la question de la médiatisation, oui, effectivement, peut-être que le fait que le requérant apparaît sur Google ne change pas grand-chose, dans le sens où il était très probablement déjà connu par les autorités algériennes.
AP2 (Applicant): Ce qui est certain, c'est qu'à l'ère Google, la mention de son nom sur ce moteur de recherche a un effet démultiplicateur de la possibilité pour un Etat d'en savoir un peu plus sur un de ses ressortissants.
AP2 (Applicant): J'espère avoir répondu aux principales questions.
AP2 (Applicant): Peut-être en ai-je oublié, je m'en excuse, mais le temps défile.
Angelika Nußberger (JudgeP): J'invite les juges à poser des questions supplémentaires, s'il y en a.
Angelika Nußberger (JudgeP): Juge Potocki.
André Potocki (Judge): Merci beaucoup, Madame la Présidente.
André Potocki (Judge): Il ne s'agit pas du tout de relancer le débat de façon interminable, mais simplement de revenir sur un point très concret que vous venez d'évoquer.
André Potocki (Judge): Vous avez dit, j'espère ne pas trahir la formulation que vous avez utilisée, il est difficile d'apporter des preuves du risque, risque de violation de l'article 3, lorsque l'on est en détention.
André Potocki (Judge): Ce que je peux comprendre, il est plus difficile, en effet.
André Potocki (Judge): On a moins d'accès extérieur.
André Potocki (Judge): Est-ce que depuis la libération, le requérant a porté des éléments de preuve qu'il n'aurait pas pu apporter parce qu'il était détenu?
Angelika Nußberger (JudgeP): Je redonne la parole à le requérant.
AP2 (Applicant): Très brièvement, non.
AP2 (Applicant): Non, parce que le requérant, dès son élargissement, dès sa libération du centre de détention de Rouen, dans la Loire, est emmené au centre de rétention administrative de Lesquen, dans le Nord.
AP2 (Applicant): Il est privé de liberté.
AP2 (Applicant): Il peut contacter sa famille, certes, mais il n'est pas en mesure de fournir d'autres éléments que ceux qu'il avait déjà.
AP2 (Applicant): Il est actuellement assigné à résidence.
AP2 (Applicant): Il doit pointer 3 fois par jour auprès de la gendarmerie de la commune dans laquelle il réside.
AP2 (Applicant): Donc la mesure privative de liberté est également assez serrée, si l'on peut dire.
AP2 (Applicant): Et il n'est pas davantage en mesure dans ces conditions-là, bien qu'il ait essayé notamment d'avoir un extrait du mandat de recherche dont il fait l'objet, d'apporter davantage de preuves, hélas.
AP2 (Applicant): Sous-titrage ST' 501
Angelika Nußberger (JudgeP): Est-ce que l'agent du gouvernement veut encore ajouter quelque chose sur cette question?
Angelika Nußberger (JudgeP): Non.
Angelika Nußberger (JudgeP): Encore juge O’Leary?
Síofra O’Leary (Judge): Comme M. le juge Potocki, je ne voudrais pas rendre le débat interminable, mais je voudrais
Síofra O’Leary (Judge): creuser un point avec le gouvernement français, qui a clarifié cette question.
Síofra O’Leary (Judge): Effectivement, la demande d'asile constitue dans ce type d'affaires la seule voie de recours effective.
Síofra O’Leary (Judge): Et vous vous fondez sur l'arrêt MX contre France, qui est bien sûr devenu M.A. contre France.
Síofra O’Leary (Judge): Mais est-ce qu'il n'y a pas eu une différence entre les deux affaires?
Síofra O’Leary (Judge): Je laisse de côté la différence soulignée par les avocats du requérant.
Síofra O’Leary (Judge): Mais dans l'affaire MX contre France, on avait une ITF.
Síofra O’Leary (Judge): Mais on n'avait pas à ce stade un arrêté administratif fixant le paier de renvoi.
Síofra O’Leary (Judge): Ce qui rendait, si j'ai bien compris, la voie administrative impossible.
Síofra O’Leary (Judge): En l'espèce, on avait bien à l'époque pertinente l'ITF et l'arrêté administratif, ce qui ouvrait la voie administrative.
Síofra O’Leary (Judge): Alors, je n'exclus pas qu'il pourrait y avoir des conséquences d'une faute d'appel contre le refus du juge du référé Liberté.
Síofra O’Leary (Judge): Mais en présence d'un arrêté administratif fixant le paie de renvoi, pourquoi la voie administrative n'est pas ouverte à un requérant comme le requérant devant nous aujourd'hui?
Angelika Nußberger (JudgeP): Je redonne la parole au représentant du gouvernement.
GR1 (Government): Est-ce que vous me permettez une minute de vérification?
GR1 (Government): Merci. Sur ce point, merci de votre patience.
GR1 (Government): Ce que je voulais dire, c'est que le recours devant le juge administratif est une voie qui est ouverte, mais qui n'a pas de plein droit d'effet suspensif.
GR1 (Government): La voie qui a de plein droit à un effet suspensif, c'est la demande d'asile et le recours à l'offre-prêt.
GR1 (Government): C'est l'élément que je voulais apporter en réponse.
Angelika Nußberger (JudgeP): Merci beaucoup.
Angelika Nußberger (JudgeP): Nous en arrivons au terme de l'audience.
Angelika Nußberger (JudgeP): Je remercie les comparants qui ont assisté la Cour par leur intervention et leur réponse à ces questions.
Angelika Nußberger (JudgeP): La Cour va maintenant délibérer sur la recevabilité et le fonds.
Angelika Nußberger (JudgeP): La décision ou l'arrêt sera rendue ultérieurement.
Angelika Nußberger (JudgeP): Les parties seront informées de la date du prononcé.
Angelika Nußberger (JudgeP): L'audience est levée.
Françoise Tulkens (JudgeP): Please sit down.
Françoise Tulkens (JudgeP): I declare open the public hearing on the admissibility and merits in the case of Animal Defenders International versus the United Kingdom.
Françoise Tulkens (JudgeP): The case was lodged on the 11th September 2008 with the court under Article 34 of the Convention by a non-governmental organization, Animal Defenders International, based in the United Kingdom.
Françoise Tulkens (JudgeP): The application was allocated to the fourth section of the court, pursuant to Rules 52, paragraph 1 of the Rules of the Court.
Françoise Tulkens (JudgeP): The application was communicated to the government on 23rd January 2011.
Françoise Tulkens (JudgeP): Having received the party's submission on 29 November 2011, the chamber decided to relinquish jurisdiction in favor of the Grand Chamber, none of the parties having objected to this relinquishment.
Françoise Tulkens (JudgeP): The government are represented by their agent, Ms. Ahila Sornarajah, assisted by Mr. Martin Chamberlain, counsel,
Françoise Tulkens (JudgeP): and by Ms. Victoria Kaye, Ms. Eleanor Van Heyningen,
Françoise Tulkens (JudgeP): and Mr. Simon White, advisor.
Françoise Tulkens (JudgeP): The applicant is represented by Mr. Hugh Tomlinson
Françoise Tulkens (JudgeP): and Mr. Aidan O’Neill, both Queen's counsel,
Françoise Tulkens (JudgeP): assisted by Ms. Tamsin Allen, the applicant solicitor.
Françoise Tulkens (JudgeP): Ms. Jan Creamer, president of Animal Defender International,
Françoise Tulkens (JudgeP): is also present.
Françoise Tulkens (JudgeP): I welcome the representative of the parties in the name of the court.
Françoise Tulkens (JudgeP): I would also like to welcome a visiting delegation from the Academy of Judges and public prosecutor of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, a visiting delegation from the state constitutional court of Lower Saxony, Germany, as well as a visiting delegation from the constitutional court of Angola.
Françoise Tulkens (JudgeP): I would explain that in addition to interpreting in the two official languages of the court, English and French, interpreting into Macedonian has been authorized for the benefit of the delegation from the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.
Françoise Tulkens (JudgeP): That interpretation is not arranged by the court and no transcription of the oral translation will be included in the official record of the proceedings.
Françoise Tulkens (JudgeP): Having consulted the agent of the government and the representative of the applicant, we have determined the order of addressees as follows.
Françoise Tulkens (JudgeP): Mr. Chamberlain for the government will speak first,
Françoise Tulkens (JudgeP): and then Mr. Tomlinson for the applicant.
Françoise Tulkens (JudgeP): I call Mr. Chamberlain.
GR1 (Government): Madam President, Members of the Court, Messages that are broadcast on television and radio come directly into our homes.
GR1 (Government): They can be instantly communicated to a national audience.
GR1 (Government): They affect us in ways that the written word cannot.
GR1 (Government): Those seeking to advertise their products and services recognise this.
GR1 (Government): So do those seeking to change minds on issues of political significance.
GR1 (Government): That is why the applicant organisation wants to be able to advertise on television and radio.
GR1 (Government): It's also why acquiring advertising space on television and radio, especially on national channels, is expensive for most of us, prohibitively so.
GR1 (Government): In some countries, the view is taken that a message aimed at changing minds on an issue of political significance is no different in principle from a message aimed at encouraging people to buy a product or service, that both are forms of persuasive speech, and that individuals, organisations, and corporations should be permitted to buy airtime for either type of message without regulation or interference by government.
GR1 (Government): That is a perfectly proper view for a democracy to take, but it has consequences.
GR1 (Government): The ability to speak to the public using the most powerful and pervasive media is confined to those who can afford to buy the necessary airtime.
GR1 (Government): The quantity of airtime allocated to any particular view depends on the combined resources of those who share it and wish to communicate it.
GR1 (Government): This has a profound effect both on elections and outside them on the character of public debate on controversial issues.
GR1 (Government): In principle, it can turn democratic influence into a commodity to be bought and sold.
GR1 (Government): That is why the United Kingdom Parliament, in common with the legislatures of most other Council of Europe states, has set its face against an unregulated market in political speech in the broadcast media.
GR1 (Government): As one would expect, the details of the regulatory regimes differ from state to state.
GR1 (Government): The United Kingdom's regime is designed to ensure that a wide range of viewpoints are represented and that the representation of these viewpoints is not unfairly skewed.
GR1 (Government): It has three principal elements.
GR1 (Government): First, a requirement of impartiality imposed on all broadcasters, which prevents them from expressing their own views on political questions and which requires them to treat the views of others even-handedly.
GR1 (Government): Secondly, the provision of free party election, party political, and referendum campaign broadcasts for political parties and for organizations campaigning on either side of a referendum question.
GR1 (Government): Thirdly, the prohibition on political advertising, or PPA, which is the subject of today's application.
GR1 (Government): The sole question for this court is whether the PPA, viewed in the context of the UK's regulatory regime as a whole, is necessary in a democratic society.
GR1 (Government): This is the first time that the Grand Chamber of this court has had occasion to address this question.
GR1 (Government): It is an important one, not just for the United Kingdom, but also for other Council of Europe states.
GR1 (Government): The government submit that this court should apply a broad margin of appreciation to the restrictions at issue in the present case, imposed as they were to safeguard the integrity of the United Kingdom's democratic system, and that the Divisional Court and the House of Lords were correct to hold unanimously that the legislature of the United Kingdom did not exceed that margin any more than those of the other contracting states, which have adopted similar regimes.
GR1 (Government): To set the arguments in this case in context, it's necessary to say a little about the international position upon which the applicants rely extensively in their memorial.
GR1 (Government): The study published in 2006 by the European Platform of Regulatory Authorities shows that of the 31 countries covered, only four left paid political advertising entirely unregulated.
GR1 (Government): All the others imposed some regulation.
GR1 (Government): The EPRA noted that what it termed a wide-reaching ban applied in France, Ireland, Malta, and Spain, as well as in the United Kingdom.
GR1 (Government): Some states, such as Switzerland, Denmark, and Norway, did allow advertising by social advocacy groups, but only because they read this court's decision in VGT as requiring them to do so.
GR1 (Government): The scope and effect of this decision, of course, is one of the matters in issue today.
GR1 (Government): In any event, two things are plain.
GR1 (Government): First, there is a wide consensus among most Council of Europe states that the nature of the broadcast media justifies regulation of a sort that would not necessarily be appropriate for other media.
GR1 (Government): Secondly, as to the precise content of this regulation, Europe does not speak with one voice.
GR1 (Government): It's telling that the Committee of Ministers, when it examined this issue in 1999 and 2007, was not prepared to make a recommendation for a common approach across Europe in the light of the diversity of approaches among the contracting states.
GR1 (Government): The suggestion in the applicants' memorial that European Union law requires a common approach among its member states is wholly misplaced.
GR1 (Government): In particular, the television without frontiers directive applied only to commercial advertising, and in any event, contains specific provisions to ensure that broadcasters could not use that directive to circumvent stricter national rules.
GR1 (Government): The same is true of the current audiovisual media services directive.
GR1 (Government): It's therefore not surprising that the European Convention on Transfrontier Television's standing committee, at its meeting in July 2010, concluded that political advertising lay outside the competence of the European Union.
GR1 (Government): Before going any further, let me address one important point.
GR1 (Government): The government accept that the analysis of the merits of this application must start with the facts of this present case.
GR1 (Government): It is also accepted that the applicant organization is not itself a financially powerful one seeking to distort the public debate on animal welfare issues.
GR1 (Government): A similar observation was made by a chamber of this court about the applicant in the VGT case, and by another chamber about the applicant in the TVVest case.
GR1 (Government): It might be tempting to conclude, therefore, that even if the PPA may be justifiable in general, its application in this particular case was not.
GR1 (Government): But that conclusion could follow only if there was some acceptable and practical way of distinguishing between advertisers on the basis of their financial power, so that only less wealthy speakers could advertise.
GR1 (Government): How could a state set about distinguishing between advertisers in this way without undermining the aims that the PPA seeks to promote?
GR1 (Government): The first difficulty is that it is, in practice, very easy for a powerful individual or corporate interest to use another organization as a vehicle to convey its message, and correspondingly difficult, if not impossible, for a regulator to discover who is actually behind the organization that is seeking to advertise.
GR1 (Government): How is a regulator to tell whether a corporate body claiming to be independent is, in fact, the surrogate of a particular candidate or other wealthy interest?
GR1 (Government): In any event, what is to stop the establishment of multiple small corporate entities, all promoting a particular point of view?
GR1 (Government): Take, for example, the view that man-made climate change is a myth.
GR1 (Government): Each of these corporate entities could honestly claim that it was small enough not to offend whatever financial limit was imposed.
GR1 (Government): Yet the collective effect of the advertising bought by these small corporations would be exactly the same as if one multinational oil company had block-booked weeks or months of airtime.
GR1 (Government): One response to problems of this sort is to suggest some sort of quota system, where a governmental regulator would decide how much airtime is to be allocated to each side of any particular issue.
GR1 (Government): But how exactly is this allocation to be performed?
GR1 (Government): Does the debate on climate change deserve more or less airtime than the debate on how to avoid a further economic recession?
GR1 (Government): Are those who believe in man-made climate change to get the same amount of airtime as those who don't, even though the latter view is held by only a tiny minority of relevant experts?
GR1 (Government): If not, how is the time to be divided up?
GR1 (Government): What about those whose views can't be neatly ascribed to either side of that particular debate?
GR1 (Government): Under the regime that applies in the United Kingdom today, it is the independent broadcasters that make these difficult decisions, discharging their statutory duties of impartiality.
GR1 (Government): But under a partial PPA, they would fall to an organ of the state.
GR1 (Government): These difficulties were expressly recognized in the context of religious advertising in this court's decision in Murphy and Ireland.
GR1 (Government): There, the court noted that a provision which allowed the filtering by the state or any organ designated by it on a case-by-case basis of unacceptable or excessive religious advertising would be difficult to apply fairly, objectively, and coherently.
GR1 (Government): No doubt there are differences between religious and political speech.
GR1 (Government): But in this respect, the analysis in Murphy applies equally to the current situation.
GR1 (Government): It is impossible to see how an organ of the state could operate a quota system for political speech without contravening the principle famously described by Justice Jackson in the US Supreme Court as a fixed star in our constitutional constellation.
GR1 (Government): That is, the principle that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion.
GR1 (Government): That principle, which requires the state, so far as possible, to abjure regulation of political views on the basis of their content, is, of course, also a principle underlying the Article 10 jurisprudence of this court.
GR1 (Government): It is one which underlies the United Kingdom's PPA.
GR1 (Government): Why, then, can't the PPA be confined to political parties and candidates?
GR1 (Government): Well, the first difficulty with this is that it would be too easy to circumvent.
GR1 (Government): A vivid example can be seen in the United States, where the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the Citizens United case means that corporations are allowed to spend as much money as they want on political advertising at election time, whereas candidates who accept public funding are subject to spending limits.
GR1 (Government): The result, as anyone who's followed the recent Republican Party primary campaign will know, has been the establishment of a large number of corporate bodies known as super PACs, which between them have spent vast sums of money running advertisements, promoting their favored candidates, and disparaging the others.
GR1 (Government): The super PACs are, of course, in form, independent corporate entities.
GR1 (Government): Yet in reality, they are closely aligned with particular candidates and often run by their associates.
GR1 (Government): A PPA which applied only to parties and candidates would simply be ineffective.
GR1 (Government): Nor would it be an answer to say that advertisers were not allowed to express their support for particular parties or candidates.
GR1 (Government): Imagine a corporate group advocating Britain's withdrawal from the European Union, or indeed the Council of Europe.
GR1 (Government): Such a group would not need to support any party or candidate expressly.
GR1 (Government): Yet advertising campaigns paid for by it would inevitably favor some parties and candidates over others, more to the point, they would skew the political debate on these and other important issues.
GR1 (Government): Advertising campaigns of this sort were precisely what the House of Lords had in mind when it held unanimously that the PPA was justified.
GR1 (Government): Why then can't the PPA be confined to election periods?
GR1 (Government): The problem here is that it's artificial to regard the electoral process as beginning a certain number of weeks or months before the election itself.
GR1 (Government): The process of changing minds on issues disputed by candidates for an election is an ongoing one.
GR1 (Government): If the voting public is saturated with partisan political advertising for a period of years, a requirement that this advertising must temporarily cease 30 days before an election will hardly serve to level the playing field.
GR1 (Government): Anyway, elections are not the only time when citizens participate in democratic government.
GR1 (Government): Citizens are entitled to and do, in fact, write to their elected representatives, sign petitions, start local action groups, and so forth.
GR1 (Government): Political advertising is as capable of affecting these democratic acts as it is capable of affecting the act of voting.
GR1 (Government): This, then, is why it is justifiable for the United Kingdom's PPA to be framed as broadly as it is.
GR1 (Government): But the explanation I've given is not one which has been dreamed up after the event.
GR1 (Government): The scope of the PPA was considered in very great detail by a number of public bodies before the current legislative regime in the Communications Act 2003 was settled.
GR1 (Government): It was considered by the Neill Committee on Standards in Public Life, by the Joint Committee on Human Rights, and by Parliament itself.
GR1 (Government): The Joint Committee on Human Rights, in particular, considered in some detail whether a narrower restriction would be workable and concluded that it would not.
GR1 (Government): Both the Divisional Court and the House of Lords arrived at the same conclusion.
GR1 (Government): What, then, is the task of the Grand Chamber in this case?
GR1 (Government): The starting point is the principle enunciated by the Grand Chamber in Hatton and the United Kingdom.
GR1 (Government): The court's supervisory function being of a subsidiary nature, it is limited to reviewing whether or not the particular solution adopted can be regarded as striking a fair balance.
GR1 (Government): Of course, this is a case involving political speech.
GR1 (Government): But as the court observed in Castells and Spain, there is no absolute right to engage even in political speech.