TrustHLT/LaCour huggingface dataset:
GR1 (Government): In the written memorial, the government submitted a number of alternative pleadings, but they are only relevant if the court adopts a wrong starting point by concluding that Article VI is applicable, that the domestic courts wrongly interpreted Hungarian law, and the applicant had a genuine civil law claim under Hungarian law, or that the applicant was prevented from enforcing his pecuniary claims before a Hungarian court, not by a rule of substantive law excluding his claims from the scope of civil rights, but by a procedural obstacle.
GR1 (Government): Forced to take this wrong starting point, the government would argue that the applicant has waived his right of access to secular courts by opting for entering into a legal relationship governed by ecclesiastical law, or that the lack of jurisdiction of Hungarian courts was justified by the freedom of religion and the constitutional principle of secularity without disproportionately affecting the applicant's pecuniary interests, since the jurisdiction of secular courts was excluded only in matters governed exclusively by ecclesiastical law, while the churches and their employees remain free to conclude an employment contract governed by the rules of state law, subject to enforcement by state courts and churches, don't enjoy immunity from state courts' jurisdiction in any legal dispute governed by state law.
GR1 (Government): However, hoping that the court will respect the principle of subsidiarity and will not overrule domestic courts' interpretation of Hungarian law, I will not elaborate on the alternative pleadings in more detail.
GR1 (Government): Instead, I would like to draw the court's attention to the case law of British courts, which in a different legal system, reached the same conclusion about the nature of the service as a church minister, as did the Hungarian legislature, and do not recognize the relationship between the minister and his or her church as an employment relationship unless it is expressly stipulated so by the parties in a contract.
GR1 (Government): In President of the Methodist Conference versus Partif, dating back to 1983, judges considered that the spiritual nature of the functions of the minister, the spiritual nature of the act of ordination, and the doctrinal standards of the Methodist church, which are so fundamental to that church, and to the position of every minister in it, make it impossible to conclude that any contract, let alone a contract of service, came into being between the minister and the Methodist church.
GR1 (Government): The arrangements between the minister and the church were found to be non-contractual.
GR1 (Government): It was also stated that the starting point of any consideration of the relationship between the Methodist church and its ministers must be an examination of the faith and doctrine to which they subscribe and they seek to further.
GR1 (Government): The concept of a minister as a person called by God, a servant of God and the pastor of his local church members, seems to be central to the relationship.
GR1 (Government): I know that it is exactly the examination of issues of faith and doctrine what Hungarian courts are expected to avoid pursuant to the principle of secularity as enshrined in the Hungarian fundamental law.
GR1 (Government): The above approach was confirmed by the UK Supreme Court in 2013 in President of the Methodist Conference versus Preston.
GR1 (Government): In addition to the question of the parties, considerations of the manner in which a minister was engaged and the rules governing his or her service remain decisive in determination whether the relationship between the church and the minister qualifies as an employment contract.
GR1 (Government): Under Hungarian law, it is also the nature of the law governing the service relationship which is decisive in such a dispute.
GR1 (Government): I'm convinced that the court can find no violation of Article VI in this case unless it completely misunderstood or misinterpreted the relevant domestic law, or it is extended to the scope of applicability of Article VI beyond its object and purpose and departed from its well-established case law by giving such an autonomous meaning to the notion of civil rights, which would transform this procedural right into a legal basis for claiming rights not having any legal basis in substantive domestic law, or by setting the standard whereby claims are fairly examined only if they are granted.
GR1 (Government): As regards the applicant's claims for just satisfaction, I submit that they are ill-founded and highly excessive under all headings, even in an admissible and well-founded case.
Luis López Guerra (JudgeP): Thank you for your submissions and I now invite the judges of the Grand Chamber wishing to do so to put their questions to the parties, Judge Griţco.
Valeriu Griţco (Judge): I have a question to the applicants.
Valeriu Griţco (Judge): For what kind of activities and or services the applicant has requested compensation from the Hungarian Calvinist Church in front of state courts?
Valeriu Griţco (Judge): And the second question, whether those activities were at least partially governed by the state law?
Valeriu Griţco (Judge): If so, please give a relevant example or examples.
Luis López Guerra (JudgeP): Thank you very much.
Luis López Guerra (JudgeP): Judge Motoc.
Iulia Antoanella Motoc (Judge): Ma 1re question s'adresse au requérant du gouvernement et concerne la question de l'épuisement des voies de recours internes par rapport à la 1re requête qui a été introduite par le requérant en 2007.
Iulia Antoanella Motoc (Judge): Et il semble que le récurrent soutient qu'il avait épuisé les voies de recours internes parce qu'une requête à la Cour suprême n'était pas possible à ce moment-là sous la législation hongroise de l'époque.
Iulia Antoanella Motoc (Judge): Et le gouvernement semble avoir une autre opinion sur cette question.
Iulia Antoanella Motoc (Judge): Ma 2e question concerne le problème de contrôle de consonnalité.
Iulia Antoanella Motoc (Judge): La décision de la Cour consonnelle de 2003, statut sur certains principes concernant la relation entre le droit ecclésiastique et le droit de l'Etat.
Iulia Antoanella Motoc (Judge): Il semble qu'il n'y a pas une unité d'interprétation de cette décision de 2003.
Iulia Antoanella Motoc (Judge): Et je voulais vous demander d'abord quel est le statut juridique de ces décisions dans l'ordre juridique hongrois.
Iulia Antoanella Motoc (Judge): Et deuxièmement, quelle est la pratique qui a été suivie par les Etats et par les organes ecclésiastiques suivant cette décision de la Cour consonnelle de 2003?
Iulia Antoanella Motoc (Judge): Finalement, ma dernière question s'adresse au problème des tribunaux ecclésiastiques.
Iulia Antoanella Motoc (Judge): Je voulais vous demander...
Iulia Antoanella Motoc (Judge): Ça, c'est une question qui est adressée au gouvernement.
Iulia Antoanella Motoc (Judge): Si ces tribunaux ecclésiastiques ne sont pas tenus par les lois hongroises, comme vous avez dit, je suppose qu'ils sont tenus par la Constitution.
Iulia Antoanella Motoc (Judge): Comment est-ce qu'on peut adresser des questions qui tiennent à la validité des jugements de ces tribunaux par rapport à la Constitution de l'Etat hongrois?
Luis López Guerra (JudgeP): Merci, Juge Wojtyczek.
Krzysztof Wojtyczek (Judge): Thank you, Mr. President. I have several questions. The first one is addressed to the applicant,
Krzysztof Wojtyczek (Judge): and I would like to clarify one point in the submissions in the applicant. Does the applicant
Krzysztof Wojtyczek (Judge): say that he has a right recognized under domestic law, or is the position of the applicant that he just has an arguable claim but no right recognized under domestic law? Is this about
Krzysztof Wojtyczek (Judge): a right or is this about an arguable claim? Then the second question. The second question
Krzysztof Wojtyczek (Judge): is also addressed at the applicant, and it concerns remuneration for teaching religion.
Krzysztof Wojtyczek (Judge): Is the claim of the applicant based on the same contract? Has there been a contract for
Krzysztof Wojtyczek (Judge): the allowance, the service allowance, or has there been a separate contract? Is the claim
Krzysztof Wojtyczek (Judge): concerning remuneration for teaching religion based on the same legal basis? Is there a
Krzysztof Wojtyczek (Judge): separate legal basis, and if so, what's this legal basis for this claim? And then the third
Krzysztof Wojtyczek (Judge): question, it also concerns, it is also addressed at the applicant. The government says that
Krzysztof Wojtyczek (Judge): the claim concerning remuneration for teaching religion was raised too late, and that it was rejected on formal grounds, yet it was possible to raise the same claim again before Hungarian courts. Does the applicant agree with the statement of the government, or does
Krzysztof Wojtyczek (Judge): the applicant want to defend another point of view on this specific issue? Thank you.
Luis López Guerra (JudgeP): Thank you very much, President Nußberger.
Angelika Nußberger (Judge): I would have three questions to the applicants.
Angelika Nußberger (Judge): The first question, you referred to a case where the ecclesiastical court decided not to adjudicate the case, but to refer it to the labor court.
Angelika Nußberger (Judge): I would like to know on what basis, or why did it refer it to the labor court?
Angelika Nußberger (Judge): Was it because they said it's based on state law and not on ecclesiastical relationship in this specific case?
Angelika Nußberger (Judge): And what did the labor court then do?
Angelika Nußberger (Judge): Second question, let's argue that the ecclesiastical court system is not compatible with Article 6 of the Convention, because there's a discretion, there might be a problem of independence, et cetera.
Angelika Nußberger (Judge): So if the applicant had gone to the ecclesiastical courts, and then there would have been a problem, let's say they would argue that the final outcome was arbitrary, could they have brought it in some way to the constitutional court or to a state court to claim that the system has not functioned in a compatible with rule of law?
Angelika Nußberger (Judge): And the third question, let's assume the court finds a violation.
Angelika Nußberger (Judge): Let's assume the procedure is reopened.
Angelika Nußberger (Judge): Let's assume in the reopened procedure, the civil court changed their jurisprudence and accept a claim.
Angelika Nußberger (Judge): What would be the final outcome?
Angelika Nußberger (Judge): Because I understand it could never be enforced against the church.
Angelika Nußberger (Judge): So if the church refuses to pay in the end, it would remain a theoretical claim, if I understand correctly.
Angelika Nußberger (Judge): I would like to have some clarification.
Angelika Nußberger (Judge): And perhaps one last question to the government.
Angelika Nußberger (Judge): The government has argued that the applicant has not argued damages under tort law, and he could have done so.
Angelika Nußberger (Judge): And that was a problem in your view of exhaustion of domestic remedies.
Angelika Nußberger (Judge): But would you say he would have an arguable claim concerning damages under tort law?
Luis López Guerra (JudgeP): Thank you very much, now V.P. Sajó.
András Sajó (Judge): It seems to me that there is some contestation regarding the teaching of history of religion.
András Sajó (Judge): The government referred to the position of the Supreme Court that this claim has not been raised in the domestic proceedings.
András Sajó (Judge): And therefore, it was belated at that stage.
András Sajó (Judge): Now, I would like to have the views of the parties in regard of the documents submitted to the court, namely the preparatory claim to the court of first instance, then all the appeals made by the applicant, where, for example, on page 2 of the original preparatory document, it expressly claims that they did pay for one week the amount for teaching of religion, but they didn't pay for the rest.
András Sajó (Judge): So it seems to me that in the documents, there is reference to this.
András Sajó (Judge): And I would like to hear the views of the parties, whether this claim has been made or not.
András Sajó (Judge): I really don't understand at this stage.
András Sajó (Judge): Given the submitted documents.
András Sajó (Judge): Now, assuming for the sake of argument that this claim has been properly made, as already indicated by Judge Griţco, this resulted in teaching in a school.
András Sajó (Judge): Is there an applicable state law which governs the legal position of someone in the position of the applicant in public education?
András Sajó (Judge): I assume that this school was part of the public education system, or some kind of public law applied to this.
András Sajó (Judge): This is also a question I would like to be answered.
András Sajó (Judge): Was the school, the foundation school, was that under the jurisdiction of the state?
András Sajó (Judge): If so, what were the applicable laws?
András Sajó (Judge): I ask this because in the case referred to several times, namely the decision of the Constitutional Court in 2003, was related to a professor of theology, right?
András Sajó (Judge): If I understand correctly, this is a question to the government.
András Sajó (Judge): And in that case, at the end of the day, the law of higher education was found applicable to that professor of theology at a denominational university.
András Sajó (Judge): Maybe I completely misunderstand.
András Sajó (Judge): This is a very complicated situation.
András Sajó (Judge): So I just would like to have clarification on the second legal issue.
András Sajó (Judge): What was the situation in the case of the Constitutional Court case?
András Sajó (Judge): Now again, this is primarily to the government.
András Sajó (Judge): Assuming for the sake of the argument that the case is admissible, so there is an issue of access to a court.
András Sajó (Judge): Of course, this is governed by Golder.
András Sajó (Judge): Golder is not an absolute rule.
András Sajó (Judge): It knows implicit exceptions.
András Sajó (Judge): What could be?
András Sajó (Judge): The government refused to enter into the merit, I understand perfectly well.
András Sajó (Judge): But assuming that it is admissible, what could be, in the view of the government, a ground to apply the implicit exceptions under Golder?
András Sajó (Judge): Is there any specific ground not to allow access to a court, which is, in principle, possible, once again, under Golder?
András Sajó (Judge): And the very last question I would like to clarify.
András Sajó (Judge): The government said that the service contract was, or sorry, not contract.
András Sajó (Judge): That's exactly the issue.
András Sajó (Judge): The service relationship or service contract under exclusively ecclesiastical law, probably a better approach to this, was terminated at the time when the applicant asked for the 50%.
András Sajó (Judge): And my understanding is that he was suspended, and the relationship at that point in time has not been terminated, because that occurred later at the end of the disciplinary proceedings.
András Sajó (Judge): So if you could clarify whether this was an ongoing relationship until the end of the final disciplinary decision, or it was already terminated at the moment when the disciplinary proceedings started.
Luis López Guerra (JudgeP): Okay, then the court will now withdraw for, let's see, 25 minutes, following which the party will be able to submit brief observations in reply to each other's submissions and reply the questions to the judges.
Luis López Guerra (JudgeP): Well, the hearing is now resumed and I call Mr. Cech.
AP1 (Applicant): The President, members of the court, I have to be quick because you made a lot of questions, fortunately, to clarify this highly unusual case.
AP1 (Applicant): As to the questions of Judge Gritzko concerning the duties of the applicant, whether his duties was governed partly, at least by domestic law, and whether he has the possibility to apply to make application before domestic courts.
AP1 (Applicant): A few examples, let me point out that he was the pastor of the congregation, so he was responsible to keep the money, the donations of the congregations.
AP1 (Applicant): He was responsible in the name of the congregation to submit tax reports every year.
AP1 (Applicant): For this reason, he represented the congregation before state courts as pastor before state authority, and of course, in front of third parties as well in civil relationships.
AP1 (Applicant): So my answer is that partly, he has duties under state law.
AP1 (Applicant): Secondly, let me turn to the questions made by Judge Motok.
AP1 (Applicant): First of all, she asked whether the applicant had the possibility to bring his claim before the Supreme Court in the first proceedings based on labor law.
AP1 (Applicant): He had the possibility, but regarding the context of the final judgment of the Second Instance Court, he did not raise this claim before the Supreme Court, but he tried to find another legal base to raise this claim before domestic courts.
AP1 (Applicant): We know, as we submitted, the content of the Constitutional Court's decision of 2003, which lays down that based on state laws and the separating operating church law rules, it cannot be excluded that two distinct systems of rules may regulate similar relationship.
AP1 (Applicant): However, the Constitutional Court did not clarify how this principle operates in the case at that hand and how domestic courts have to apply this principle laid down.
AP1 (Applicant): That's why this question is, in our view, unsettled.
AP1 (Applicant): Continuing with the question raised by Judge Vojticek, what was the first, whether it was a right or an argue up claim on the part of the applicant, our firm stance is he has a civil right, as it is the very ecclesiastical law which conferred civil rights on the applicant by rendering such claims under state jurisdiction as we outlined in our written memorandum.
AP1 (Applicant): As far as the remuneration for teaching is concerned, I have to refer back to a written memorandum.
AP1 (Applicant): The applicant was appointed as a pastor of the congregation in an appointment letter which corresponds to the service agreement of ecclesiastical office holders.
AP1 (Applicant): But beside this appointment letter, he concluded another separate contract for teaching church history also with the church.
AP1 (Applicant): This contract falls under civil law.
AP1 (Applicant): As to the question whether he raised his claim coming from his teaching duties before the lower domestic courts, I may refer to the questions or observations raised by Judge Shojo that this question, as you find it at your disposal in the documents, this question was raised before the lower courts as well.
AP1 (Applicant): However, this question remained unsettled by the lower courts.
AP1 (Applicant): Referring to the third question, Judge Bojticek, when the applicant was denied by the labor court and the second instance court, he brought another claim based on the same facts but based on different legal provisions of civil law.
AP1 (Applicant): And that's why this claim is not the same as legally, is not the same as what he raised before.
AP1 (Applicant): Now, turning to the questions raised by Judge Nussberger who made reference to the case law of the ecclesiastical court we shed light in our memorandum and in our pleading.
AP1 (Applicant): The ecclesiastical court in that case rejected the applicant's claim on the basis that the claim does not correspond to any of the items of the exhaustive list set forth in the ecclesiastical legislation.
AP1 (Applicant): And that's why this ecclesiastical court called that it had no jurisdiction in the case.
AP1 (Applicant): Pursuant to this decision of the synod court in that case, the labor court dismissed the applicant's claim, that applicant's claim, because the labor court disagreed with the findings of the synod court and held that it has no jurisdiction.
AP1 (Applicant): In the second instance, court upheld this judgment.
AP1 (Applicant): So that applicant had no chance to bring his claim and to have his claim adjudicated by any judicial instance.
AP1 (Applicant): The next question is whether the applicant could have had recourse to other judicial bodies, for example, after supposing that the ecclesiastical court would have heard his case.
AP1 (Applicant): We don't know, or we are sure, that based on the same premises set forth in the judgments, in the state court's judgments in the present case, the ecclesiastical court's judgment could not be revised by state courts.
AP1 (Applicant): And according to the domestic law, we are from stances that such judgment could not be revised even by the constitutional court.
AP1 (Applicant): And finally, whether the judgment of a state court could have been enforceable according to the state law.
AP1 (Applicant): I refer to the findings of the constitutional court.
AP1 (Applicant): The constitutional court held that in case a state court makes a judgment, this is enforceable under state law against the church.
AP1 (Applicant): And now, finally, the questions raised by Judge Shojo.
AP1 (Applicant): We agree with his observation that, as I mentioned right before, that the claim concerning the fees for teaching were raised for the very first moment in the civil law proceedings.
AP1 (Applicant): As to the school's position in the legal system, I must point out that this is the very origin of this case.
AP1 (Applicant): Because the applicant shed light on a problem that there are parallel obligations and rights concerning the school, because the school was found by the church, however, was financed by a foundation which falls under state jurisdiction.
AP1 (Applicant): So we cannot decide, therefore, whether at the relevant time this school fell under state or ecclesiastical jurisdiction.
AP1 (Applicant): Sorry for saying that.
AP1 (Applicant): I cannot clarify this issue today.
AP1 (Applicant): And finally, let me address a few words to the government's observation.
AP1 (Applicant): We agree with the government that it is not an employment dispute, indeed.
AP1 (Applicant): And we agree that because the applicant did not contest that his removal from service.
AP1 (Applicant): That's why we cannot say that it is a purely labor law dispute between the parties.
AP1 (Applicant): As to the facts, I don't want to discuss with the facts as against the government, because in the case law we've made reference to the pastor of the case, the plaintiff of that case, was also a pastor and not only a teacher at the university.
AP1 (Applicant): We raise legitimately the question that if neither domestic courts nor ecclesiastical courts are willing to or are reluctant to hear the pecuniary claim of the applicant, then how the protection of Article VI was afforded to the applicant.
AP1 (Applicant): We think that he was not afforded with this protection.
AP1 (Applicant): That's why there has been a violation.
AP1 (Applicant): And finally, my highly respected colleague from the government made reference to the natural obligations and to the rules of domestic law, which expressly exclude the adjudication of such claims from state jurisdiction.
AP1 (Applicant): I have to point out only that he did not refer precisely to any relevant domestic provisions which would exempt such claims from the state jurisdiction.
AP1 (Applicant): much.
Luis López Guerra (JudgeP): Thank you very much, Mr. Cech.
GR1 (Government): Concerning the question of the status of ecclesiastical law in Hungarian law, I would like to say that there is no possibility of binding complaints to the constitutional court against judgments of ecclesiastical court or against any internal rules of churches.
GR1 (Government): The principle of secularity requires state authorities to refrain from examining any issues of doctrine of churches, and it helps for the constitutional court as well.