TrustHLT/LaCour huggingface dataset:
Iulia Antoanella Motoc (Judge): Vous avez mentionné dans votre exposé oral le fait que même si l'applicant avait été conscient du fait qu'après 2006, il pouvait faire un recours devant les cours chypriote, cet recours, à votre avis, ne pouvait pas mener à une voie effective pour l'applicant. Ca veut dire qu'il y avait une possibilité
Iulia Antoanella Motoc (Judge): que le recours soit exclu par les cours Chypriote.
Iulia Antoanella Motoc (Judge): Ma question est, est-ce que la partie recurrente a vraiment su, a vraiment agi dans la direction de formuler un tel recours et il avait des réticences par rapport à la possibilité d'aboutir à cet recours ou vraiment la partie récurrente est restée d'après 2006 jusqu'à 2007 dans une certaine passivité comme les autres parties l'invoquent ici?
Iulia Antoanella Motoc (Judge): Ma deuxième question est liée au problème de la question préliminaire que vous dites que la Cour suprême de la Lettonie devait mettre par rapport à cette question.
Iulia Antoanella Motoc (Judge): D'après ce que j'ai compris, vous avez dit que cette question préliminaire, à votre avis, était obligatoire dans ce jugement particulier parce que, de votre avis, il n'y avait pas une décision de la Cour de Luxembourg qui était relevante à ce cas avant 2006.
Iulia Antoanella Motoc (Judge): Donc, je voulais voir votre raisonnement par rapport à la question préliminaire. Vous pensez que quand on a affaire au règlement
Iulia Antoanella Motoc (Judge): de Bruxelles 1, en général, il faut avoir une question préliminaire ou il faut avoir une question préliminaire seulement si on n'a pas, comme vous avez dit, une décision claire à cet avis, une décision qui est ressemblable aux décisions que la Cour suprême de l'État doit faire à l'égard de cette affaire.
Iulia Antoanella Motoc (Judge): L'autre question, si vous me pertenez, M. le Président,
Iulia Antoanella Motoc (Judge): est aussi mise à la tiède partie intervenante à la Commission.
Iulia Antoanella Motoc (Judge): Et je voulais vous demander une question plus générale, maintenant, qui tient à l'application de notre considération de Bosphorus qui était invoquée par tous les partis ici.
Iulia Antoanella Motoc (Judge): Comme vous le connaissez très bien, dans notre arrêt de Bosphorus, nous avons invoqué une disposition de la Charte de l'Union européenne pour la protection des droits de l'homme et notamment de l'article 52, alinéa 3, qui fait partie aux conditions minimales qui, au niveau de protection conventionnelle, était le minimum qui était respecté dans le droit de l'Union européenne.
Iulia Antoanella Motoc (Judge): Comment est-ce qu'à la lumière de la jurisprudence postérieure de notre arrêt Bosphorus, de la Cour de justice de l'Union européenne, et comment est-ce qu'à la lumière de l'opinion de 2013, est-ce que vous voyez aujourd'hui que cette condition minimale qui a été mise par nous en Bosphorus à l'époque peut être encore considérée par notre Cour, notamment par rapport à tous les considérants au principe de confiance mutuelle que l'opinion de 2013 nous a fait faire connaissance?
Dean Spielmann (JudgeP): Merci beaucoup. I have a small factual question addressed to the applicant.
Dean Spielmann (JudgeP): In your request to refer the case to the Grand Chamber in paragraph 67, you say that the applicant did not have to expect that there certainly will be any court proceedings in Cyprus as regards his debt to the plaintiff company.
Dean Spielmann (JudgeP): And you mentioned also that you firmly believed that you had repaid the debt to the plaintiff company already before the legal proceedings, before the District Court of Limassol were initiated.
Dean Spielmann (JudgeP): Can you clarify what you mean by firm belief in the context of a potential repayment of the debt? Thank you.
Dean Spielmann (JudgeP): S'il n'y a pas d'autres questions, on va suspendre l'audiance dans 20 minutes.
Dean Spielmann (JudgeP): Maître Liepa.
AP1 (Applicant): Your Honor, in response to a number of questions that were provided to us during the hearing, I would like to return back to the actual circumstance, namely initially to the 1999 when debt deed was signed.
AP1 (Applicant): First of all, the debt deed was signed by Mr. Avotinj,
AP1 (Applicant): the applicant, as a debtor, and his business partners at that time, a fair weather holding company registered in Cyprus, who were mutually very well aware of their whereabouts, including they knew their addresses, their telephone numbers, and other details.
AP1 (Applicant): The document was signed on G Street, or Glasnow Tower Street number four, which was the site where the deed was signed, and then sent by fax to the creditor.
AP1 (Applicant): It was signed in counterparts, not by both parties present.
AP1 (Applicant): The only reason why G Street appeared on the document was to indicate the site where the document was signed.
AP1 (Applicant): That was not an address of Mr. Avotinj,
AP1 (Applicant): and it is well aware, also, the government knows it very well, because the government has, in its annex number 10, included the official transcript, the official document from the registry authority indicating that Mr. Avotinj at that time
AP1 (Applicant): had different address.
AP1 (Applicant): I need also to emphasize that Mr. Avotinj
AP1 (Applicant): had never received on this official address any notification from Cyprus courts.
AP1 (Applicant): The document, the deed, was not signed in presence of the notary public.
AP1 (Applicant): The present person was a secretary of that business enterprise, and Mr. Avotinj had nothing to do
AP1 (Applicant): with that business enterprise.
AP1 (Applicant): The debt was repaid in the year 1999, not by a cash settlement, but rather because by having mutual business structures with the creditor, Fairweather Holdings, the debt was repaid by production of the capital of the mother company of Fairweather Holdings.
AP1 (Applicant): Therefore, it was mutually recognized by both parties that there is no outstanding debt obligations, and therefore, Mr. Avotinj had all reasons to believe
AP1 (Applicant): that he has settled his debt obligations.
AP1 (Applicant): Unfortunately, from today's perspective, we must conclude that no written documentation to that regard was signed between the parties who later on became, in effect, fighting enemies, as it is also obvious from the case file.
AP1 (Applicant): There had been mutual cases filed also in Caribbean courts between those parties.
AP1 (Applicant): Further on, to respond to the question whether the request for preliminary rulings have to be provided by the Latvian court, I would like to refer to the trade agency case of the European Court of Justice, as it has already been indicated, was initiated by the preliminary ruling request of the same Latvian Supreme Court.
AP1 (Applicant): And notably, the trade agency judgment of the European Court of Justice in its paragraph 38 clearly spells out the duties of the Latvian Supreme Court, which would also have to be applied in the case of applicant.
AP1 (Applicant): I quote, the court of the member state in which enforcement is sought has jurisdiction to carry out an independent assessment of all the evidence and thereby, as certain where necessary, whether that evidence is consistent with the information in the certificate for the purpose of establishing first whether the defendant in default of appearance was served with the document instituting proceedings and second, if service was effected in sufficient time in such a way as to enable him to arrange for his defense.
AP1 (Applicant): And here I have to answer another set of questions in relation to those moments of the year of 2006, when and how applicant learned about the Cyprus proceedings and the Cyprus judgment.
AP1 (Applicant): The wording used in our application is quite clear.
AP1 (Applicant): Mr. Awotins learned about the Cyprus case
AP1 (Applicant): and about the judgment taken against him in Cyprus court because of the court bailiff serving a notice which would endanger Mr. Awotins' possession of his property.
AP1 (Applicant): The next day after court bailiff visited Mr. Awotins
AP1 (Applicant): and told about the Cyprus judgment to be enforced, the next day Mr. Awotins immediately
AP1 (Applicant): rushed to the Latgale court of Riga city.
AP1 (Applicant): It was 16th of June, 2006, in order to examine the case.
AP1 (Applicant): Only when examining the case, Mr. Awotins
AP1 (Applicant): learned about the Cyprus judgment and examined it in substance.
AP1 (Applicant): Therefore, we must emphasize that the applicant had never received any documentation from Cyprus courts, neither in form of summons to the court hearing because, and I must emphasize it again, there is no document certifying that Mr. Awotins personally
AP1 (Applicant): received the document, or his proxy, or his lawyer, or his counsel would have received the document summoning him to the Cyprus hearing.
AP1 (Applicant): Neither Mr. Awotins received a judgment of the Cyprus court.
AP1 (Applicant): It was only because of enforcement proceedings that had commenced earlier in the year 2006 how Mr. Awotins learned about the case that
AP1 (Applicant): had been initiated against him.
AP1 (Applicant): And notable that in the 2nd of October in Riga district court hearing, which ultimately took a judgment that was beneficial to Mr. Awotins, his counsel,
AP1 (Applicant): applicant's counsel, stated that no information about enforceability, and consequently, we have no opportunity to consider filing an appeals.
AP1 (Applicant): I must repeat that that was a quote from the minutes of that court hearing, that at that time, the applicant did not know about the judgment taken in the Cyprus court in terms of whether it has been effective because the other party, the creditor, Fairweather Holdings, had not presented the court with the document verifying that Cyprus judgment has entered into a legal effect.
AP1 (Applicant): And therefore, consequently, Mr. Awotins
AP1 (Applicant): did not have an opportunity to consider.
AP1 (Applicant): And here again, I have to quote a decision from the trade agency case that in relation to, and I would like to respond to the question that related necessity to apply for the European Court of Justice with a preliminary ruling request.
AP1 (Applicant): The European Court of Justice has held that referral to European Court of Justice is obligatory unless previous decisions of the European Court of Justice have already dealt with a point of law in question or when the correct interpretation is so obvious as to leave no scope for any reasonable doubt as to the manner in which the question raised is to be resolved.
AP1 (Applicant): However, it must not be forgotten that even in such cases, the national courts remain entirely at liberty to bring a matter before ECJ if they consider appropriate to do so.
AP1 (Applicant): I'm quoting this from the ECHA judgment in SILFED case C-283 slash 81.
AP1 (Applicant): In relation to the government's argument that by recognizing the Cypriot judgment, Latvian courts merely complied with EU law, we must emphasize that the rationale behind the Bosforus presumption has never been to create a loophole for violations of human rights.
AP1 (Applicant): To the contrary, the presumption is based on the main principle that the human rights must be protected on a similarly high level by both EU and the convention.
AP1 (Applicant): Thus, the court has emphasized in the Michaud judgment that it will accept the presumption of equivalent protection only where the rights and safeguards it protects are given protection comparable to that afforded by the court itself.
AP1 (Applicant): Failing that, the state would escape all international review of the compatibility of its actions with the convention commitments.
AP1 (Applicant): We believe that the present case is a great example where Latvia, as a member state of the European Union as well as party to the convention, has escaped all international review of compatibility of its actions in relation to Article 6, Paragraph 1 of the convention.
AP1 (Applicant): From the moment the applicant became aware of the Cypriot judgment, he has continuously maintained that the Cypriot judgment may not be recognized in Latvia.
AP1 (Applicant): And his rights to defense were not respected before the Cypriot court.
AP1 (Applicant): The reply of the Supreme Court of Latvia was that these arguments are simply of no importance.
AP1 (Applicant): The Supreme Court of Latvia also did not refer to ECJ case law and did not refer to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling, although it had an obligation to do so under the case law established by the European Court of Justice.
AP1 (Applicant): In the judgment of the chamber of the court, we agreed with the approach of the Supreme Court of Latvia.
AP1 (Applicant): And it therefore illustrates that the protection of the applicant's rights guaranteed by Article 6, Paragraph 1 in the present case, have been substantially deficient.
Dean Spielmann (JudgeP): La parole est à Mme Līce.
GR1 (Government): In the short time allowed, I will do my best to respond to the court's questions and react to some of the arguments presented by the applicants.
GR1 (Government): We remain at the court's disposal to submit these comments in writing, should the court so require.
GR1 (Government): First of all, let me deal with the factual questions.
GR1 (Government): The question about the address.
GR1 (Government): I have the acknowledgment of decades in front of me.
GR1 (Government): And the first line in that document says, for good and valuable consideration, comma, I, comma, Petris Avotinj, off 4 Glasnoti Street, et cetera, et cetera, in brackets, the borrower.
GR1 (Government): That is the address associated with the applicants.
GR1 (Government): No other address appears anywhere else on that document.
GR1 (Government): As to the payment of the debts, in the proceedings before the regional court, the applicants indirectly, implicitly recognized the existence of the debts.
GR1 (Government): As to the knowledge of the governments, the applicant paid his debts in the course of the enforcement proceedings.
GR1 (Government): And no evidence about payments of debt or settlement of debt has ever been submitted before.
GR1 (Government): I will now turn to more general questions.
GR1 (Government): It has been a well-established case law of this court that when examining the compliance with Article VI of the Convention, the case has to be looked at as a whole.
GR1 (Government): And this is exactly what the Supreme Court did.
GR1 (Government): And in response to Judge Potocki's question, this is exactly what the Supreme Court did.
GR1 (Government): It took into account the applicant's submissions in the lower courts, particularly in the regional courts.
GR1 (Government): As to your question whether the lack of review under Article 34, paragraph 2 of the Brussels I regulation might create difficulties in light of Article VI, I would first of all wish to emphasize that these two provisions, paragraph 2 of Article 34, Brussels bond regulation, and paragraph 1, they are two different mechanisms.
GR1 (Government): As proved by the trade agency case, if the domestic court sees potential difficulties with fundamental price protection in general, it can trigger the mechanism under paragraph 1 of Article 34 of the Brussels I regulation, which did not relate to the present case, because this case is examined under paragraph 2 of the Brussels I regulation.
GR1 (Government): Another question that I would like to address is that this case, again, should be looked at as a whole and taking into account the arguments the applicants advanced during the domestic proceedings.
GR1 (Government): During the domestic proceedings, the applicants never advanced any EU law-related arguments or ever requested the domestic court to submit a request for preliminary ruling.
GR1 (Government): The applicant claims that he was precluded from requesting the Supreme Court to submit such a request.
GR1 (Government): I must, I'm compelled to conclude that the applicant is misleading this court.
GR1 (Government): It is evident from the decision of the Latvian Supreme Court that the applicant indeed was represented in the proceedings before that court, and that the applicant's representative was given an opportunity to express himself.
GR1 (Government): Nothing prevented from applicant to submitting further written requests to the court, including the request to submit a preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice in European Union.
GR1 (Government): As to the appeal procedure in Cyprus, and this is in the same direction as Judge Motok's question, we are in a strong position and maintain that it is well-established case law of this court that mere doubts as to the prospects of success does not release the applicants from an obligation of trying the remedy available for him.
GR1 (Government): In his statement, the representative of the applicant has made reference to the Mihalapa judgments of this particular court.
GR1 (Government): We have addressed that judgment in our written observations.
GR1 (Government): I refer you to paragraph 58.
GR1 (Government): And these two cases are fundamentally different.
GR1 (Government): In the Mihalapa case, the domestic court sent notifications to address manifestly different from that indicated by the applicants.
GR1 (Government): In this case, in the present case, all communication was sent to the address, as I just quoted, indicated in the debt deed.
GR1 (Government): As to the argument that the domestic court was obliged to submit a request for a preliminary ruling, considering that there was no case law from the Court of Justice, again, I must admit that this is somewhat confusing arguments, considering that already in December of 2006, that is before the Supreme Court of Latvia decided the case, the Court of Justice in European Union adopted the ASML judgments, where it had interpreted and explained the application and contents of the Brussels I regulation, paragraph 2 of Article 34.
GR1 (Government): I believe I have briefly addressed the questions and the comments.
GR1 (Government): The applicant's representative noted that the Brussels I regulation could not be interpreted as creating loophole for the state.
GR1 (Government): This government can only agree.
GR1 (Government): But the Brussels I regulation and the system of objecting to the enforcement and recognition of a foreign judgment has likewise not been created to allow for abuse of the rights or allow the applicant to rely on his own inaction to refrain from honoring his contractual obligations.
Dean Spielmann (JudgeP): La Commission de Bruxelles, M. Krämer.
TP1 (ThirdParty): Merci, M. le Président.
TP1 (ThirdParty): Pour répondre d'abord à la question posée par M. le juge Potocki,
TP1 (ThirdParty): il faut voir l'article 34.2 du règlement Bruxelles 1,
TP1 (ThirdParty): qui, certes, vise une situation étroitement circonscrite dans le contexte avec le 1er point de ce même article 34, qui se lit comme suit.
TP1 (ThirdParty): Une décision n'est pas reconnue si la reconnaissance est manifestement contraire à l'ordre public de l'Etat membre requis.
TP1 (ThirdParty): Or, il résulte de la jurisprudence de la Cour de justice de l'Union européenne, et notamment des arrêts Crombar C-798 et Gambazzi C-394-07, que le juge de l'Etat requis peut tenir compte au regard de cette clause de l'ordre public du fait que le juge de l'Etat membre d'origine a statué en violation d'un droit fondamental d'une partie, comme par exemple des violations des droits de la défense, autres que celles visées par le point 2, c'est-à-dire autres que celles découlant du fait d'une signification défectueuse de l'acte introductif de l'instance.
TP1 (ThirdParty): Donc, l'ensemble de ces deux dispositions, 34 paragraphes 1 et 34 paragraphes 2, ou point 1 et point 2, empêchent qu'un arrêt rendu en violation d'un droit fondamental dans un Etat membre doive être exécuté dans un autre Etat membre.
TP1 (ThirdParty): La mécanique des deux dispositions est un peu différente et je dirais même que le 34 paragraphes 1 est plus protecteur parce qu'il ne soumet pas la non-exécution à la condition que la personne lésée ait exercé un recours dans l'Etat membre d'origine.
TP1 (ThirdParty): Donc, toute la problématique de la disponibilité d'un recours à Chypre, qui nous occupe aujourd'hui, ne se poserait pas pour les cas qui ne relèvent pas du point 2, mais du point 1 de l'article 34.
TP1 (ThirdParty): Ensuite, en réponse à la question de M. le juge Spano,
TP1 (ThirdParty): l'article 43, paragraphe 3 du règlement est libellé comme suit.
TP1 (ThirdParty): Le recours dirigé contre la décision d'exécuature est examiné selon les règles de la procédure contradictoire.
TP1 (ThirdParty): Or, il faut lire cette disposition ensemble avec et en la contrastant avec l'article 41, 2e phrase du règlement Bruxelles 1, qui dit que l'exécuature même est octroyée dans une procédure ex parte.
TP1 (ThirdParty): La partie, je cite, la partie contre laquelle l'exécution est demandée ne peut, en cet état de la procédure, lors de l'octroi de l'exécuature, pas l'exécuature, présenter d'observation.
TP1 (ThirdParty): Et donc, si l'article 43, paragraphe 3, précise qu'en cas de recours contre la décision octroyant l'exécuature, la procédure est contradictoire, adversarial, cela veut simplement dire que ce n'est plus une procédure ex parte, mais c'est une procédure inter partes.
TP1 (ThirdParty): Or, c'est différent et c'est à distinguer de la question de savoir quelles sont les règles d'administration de la preuve qui s'appliquent dans cette procédure de recours.
TP1 (ThirdParty): Et là, comme nous l'avons expliqué, et le gouvernement défendant également, le droit de l'union est neutre par rapport aux règles procédurales des Etats membres.
TP1 (ThirdParty): Donc, un Etat membre peut, en matière civile, c'est très communément le cas, évidemment, prévoir que toute partie doit invoquer les faits, y compris le droit d'autres Etats membres, qui sont... qui plaident en sa faveur.
TP1 (ThirdParty): Donc...
TP1 (ThirdParty): Et ne pas prévoir, donc, un examen d'office.
TP1 (ThirdParty): Donc, ce n'est pas du tout en contradiction avec le concept même de procédure contradictoire.
TP1 (ThirdParty): Procédure contradictoire ne signifie pas nécessairement un examen d'office.
TP1 (ThirdParty): Et, en dernier lieu, quant à la question de madame le juge Tog, je comprends cette question comme visant la question de l'équivalence des garanties substantielles offertes par le droit de l'union au sujet de la protection des droits fondamentaux, au sens de la jurisprudence gouvernementale, de la REE Bosphorus.
TP1 (ThirdParty): A cet égard, je rappelle que le point 159 de la REE Bosphorus fait dans une description de l'Etat au moment pertinent, donc en 2006, de la protection des droits fondamentaux dans l'Union européenne.
TP1 (ThirdParty): Et j'ajoute que, depuis lors, le droit de l'union a évolué, notamment du fait que, à partir du 1er décembre 2009, avec l'entrée en vigueur du traité de Lisbonne, la charte a acquis force contraignante, ce qui n'était pas encore le cas au moment de la REE Bosphorus, ce dont mention est faite dans le point 159 de cet arrêt.
TP1 (ThirdParty): Et donc, la charte contient l'article 53...
TP1 (ThirdParty): 52, paragraphe 3.
TP1 (ThirdParty): Je pense que vous y avez fait allusion.
TP1 (ThirdParty): Selon lequel, pour les droits qui correspondent aux droits de la Convention, le sens et la portée de ces droits de la charte est le même que le sens et la portée des droits correspondants de la Convention.
TP1 (ThirdParty): Donc, il y a plutôt un renforcement, un renforcement des garanties substantielles offertes par le droit de l'union par rapport à l'état du droit au moment où l'arrêt Bosphorus a été rendu.
TP1 (ThirdParty): Je vous remercie.
Dean Spielmann (JudgeP): Bonsoir.
Dean Spielmann (JudgeP): Je déclare ouverte l'audience publique sur le fonds de l'affaire Al-Dulimi et Montana Management contre Suisse.