TrustHLT/LaCour huggingface dataset:
AP1 (Applicant): In such way, state protected harbor's interests and also society's interests.
AP1 (Applicant): And we can't understand why this regulation couldn't be applied to applicants.
AP1 (Applicant): The only reason was that yes, we started to litigate with the state because they wanted 5% and court decided 2% from cadastral value of this rent.
AP1 (Applicant): But state calculated that also such amount is too high and they adopted these laws about what we are speaking here.
AP1 (Applicant): What about profit of harbor?
AP1 (Applicant): Then honorable judges, you understand that profit of legal entity depends on very many reasons.
AP1 (Applicant): For many, many reasons from business activities, from investment policy.
AP1 (Applicant): There can be company and harbors with billion turnover without any profit.
AP1 (Applicant): Profit we can't use as something why it's not necessary to pay rent or why it's necessary to expropriate property from landowners.
AP1 (Applicant): If we are speaking about possible investments from landowners in harbor territories, then of course there can't be any investment policy if they are not founding their companies.
AP1 (Applicant): The only possibility to invest in harbor from persons who owns properties, who owns land in harbors is to connect their business with harbor land from owner's side, equipment from harbor side, and then business runs.
AP1 (Applicant): Finally if we are speaking also about this profit of harbor, then how can we speak about any profit if till this time they are leasing these plots of land for zero?
AP1 (Applicant): They are leasing plots of land for 1.5% from cadastral value and paying the sum as state,
AP1 (Applicant): the state as land tax.
AP1 (Applicant): Of course there's no profit, but who's responsible for such agreements which are signed till 2050 years?
AP1 (Applicant): These are mainly my answers to the questions and my comments on state arguments.
Nicolas Bratza (JudgeP): Thank you very much, Mr. Radziņš.
Nicolas Bratza (JudgeP): Then I give the floor to Mrs. Reine.
GR1 (Government): I will first provide answers to the judges' questions, and then I will reply to some of the applicants' arguments.
GR1 (Government): I may combine some of the questions, so please excuse me, but that's for the reasons of time.
GR1 (Government): First question was related to the taxes or levies that had to be paid on transaction.
GR1 (Government): The key reply to this question is not the amount of tax, but the restrictions that could be applied on the concrete transaction.
GR1 (Government): There was very little difference.
GR1 (Government): It was 2% and 3% in case of donation agreement, and 3% in case of purchase agreement.
GR1 (Government): But the key difference between two transactions, between the donation agreement and the purchase agreement, that in case of a purchase agreement, the state or municipality would have the first-hand right.
GR1 (Government): That is the key difference.
GR1 (Government): In case of donation, the state could not interfere with the transaction.
GR1 (Government): A minor point, it was 35 euro cents for each of the land plot, but I think if it's three euros or 35 cents in this particular case, that's very little difference, I must be honest.
GR1 (Government): There was a question about more detailed description of the land plots and the use of lands and the constructions that could be found upon them.
GR1 (Government): The first reference that we could find in the archives concerning the exact land plots, it goes back to the end of 1970s.
GR1 (Government): That's the time where that particular area started to develop.
GR1 (Government): The first document that determined somehow the area of the harbor was, after the restoration of Latvia's independence, was the 1992 Riga Council decision, that was decision number 28, that determined boundaries of the harbor.
GR1 (Government): So indeed there are some maybe impreciseness in the Chamber's judgment, but personally I do not find them so dramatic.
GR1 (Government): There are different documents referring to different periods of time, but the first attempt to define the boundaries, the formal boundaries of the harbor was the 92 decision.
GR1 (Government): Then the reference to those particular land plots as belonging to the harbor area is found in the donation contract concluded by the applicants.
GR1 (Government): So the applicants themselves, in concluding donation contracts, referred to the plots of land as belonging to the harbor area.
GR1 (Government): So they were very well aware what they are receiving.
GR1 (Government): That particular area was practically used, as I have already mentioned, for the purposes of the free port since the late 1970s.
GR1 (Government): I must admit it would be difficult today to provide a very, very detailed description of what kind of structures there were built.
GR1 (Government): What we know, that this area was directly linked to the wharf, you could see it in the cadastral map that we have provided the court with.
GR1 (Government): It was directly linked to the wharf, so it could not be bypassed, it's obvious.
GR1 (Government): You can't bypass that area when you deal with freight containers.
GR1 (Government): There was a closed freight container, there was an open freight container, but the purpose of both parts was the same.
GR1 (Government): You had to move freight somehow, you couldn't go elsewhere.
GR1 (Government): Well, I could give you some details on the particular freight percentage.
GR1 (Government): What we could see in 1996, the turnover of freight in the free trade port, that's the area where the applicants' plots of land were located, was 24% of the overall freight container turnover in Latvia, and it was 47% of the freight container turnover in the Riga area.
GR1 (Government): So that's a very significant percentage.
GR1 (Government): Then I have, let me see, let's do a translation.
GR1 (Government): And then the Riga Free Trade Port, moreover, had a specialized freight container.
GR1 (Government): It was adjusted to receive some kind of specific freight containers, and the turnover of that specific freight containers that were subject to some specific rules were 89% of the turnover of those specific freights in Latvia, 89%.
GR1 (Government): That's, well, I think it says it all.
GR1 (Government): That was, it was a question concerning market value of the related property, and again, I would like to turn your attention to the fact that it's extremely difficult to tell the market value of that land since it was not subject to private transactions.
GR1 (Government): You can tell the cadastral value, but this area is not open for private transactions, private law transactions, so it's difficult to say the, to tell the market value.
GR1 (Government): But when it comes to cadastral value, and it's also related to the question on the tax reassessment attempted by the Riga Council, the tax reassessment was based on the cadastral value.
GR1 (Government): In its turn, the cadastral value is, again, a very relative term.
GR1 (Government): There were, the chamber judgment, if I'm not mistaken, refers to three sets of proceedings determining cadastral value of the land.
GR1 (Government): It mislooks one more.
GR1 (Government): There was the fourth cadastral value proceedings, the expert opinion concerning cadastral value of the free port that was conducted in 1999 that basically recognized that all previous assessments was very relative, and the method, the methodology applied for determining the cadastral value was quite erroneous, because to determine cadastral value of a free port, of a harbor, based on the proximity to the city is basically wrong, because it's not the proximity to the city that determines the cadastral value of that land in question, but it had to be relative to other similar harbors in the area to the turnover of the port, and to many other factors.
GR1 (Government): And to many other factors.
GR1 (Government): So that assessment was quite different, and much in the end, the price suggested as a cadastral value was much lower than the one suggested originally, because of the erroneous methodology applied.
GR1 (Government): But in any event, that's, again, a very relative term that may not have decisive effect on the current proceedings as we see it, and I will explain in a few moments why.
GR1 (Government): Regarding Judge Potocki's question on the amendments to the 1992 decision, the applicant's situation, indeed, was the only situation where the concrete amendments have been practically applied, but I must, again, underline that the purpose, the absolute, the ultimate purpose of the mentioned amendments was to prevent similar situations from occurring.
GR1 (Government): And that is one of the reasons why, most probably, the state never needed to apply it again, because the loophole contained in the law had been closed.
GR1 (Government): And I can only say prevention is better than the cure.
GR1 (Government): This is what the state has done.
GR1 (Government): It was a very interesting question.
GR1 (Government): Although it was posed to the applicants, I would like to draw your attention to the evaluation of the land plots concerned when it was acquired by the applicant.
GR1 (Government): It was 500 lots and 1,000 lots, respectively.
GR1 (Government): What is interesting in this concrete case is when the applicant received property, they valued it very low.
GR1 (Government): But when they wanted to sell it, or when the property was expropriated from them, they wanted an extreme amount of money based on completely different criteria.
GR1 (Government): But we're not speaking of a situation where they would have very specific business plans, they have themselves confirmed they never had any business plan, they were not interested in developing the free port area.
GR1 (Government): But then they wanted to have a large amount of money.
GR1 (Government): And the reason is, my question is, why?
GR1 (Government): We're speaking about a period of a couple of years, but it was clear from the very moment they received that port, that these plots of land, they would never use it, they don't need it.
GR1 (Government): They want to sell it and they want to rent it.
GR1 (Government): But when they want to rent it, they don't base their assessment on the value of the land as they themselves suggested when acquiring that land, but base it on a totally different criteria.
GR1 (Government): And then they claim that they have been discriminated against.
GR1 (Government): I think this argument is deprived of logic.
GR1 (Government): I will turn to some of the applicant's arguments, if I may.
GR1 (Government): I think I have a few minutes left.
GR1 (Government): The applicant suggested that completion of the land reform might consist of one by one transaction.
GR1 (Government): So if you take away individual transactions, what's left of the land reform?
GR1 (Government): Nothing.
GR1 (Government): I mean, the land reform has to be somehow completed.
GR1 (Government): And to say that if there has been one transaction, there can be no other transaction, I think life dictates different approach.
GR1 (Government): That's the basic reply to this.
GR1 (Government): Applicants refer to the fact that the law did not prohibit deals as the one they have concluded, but that was exactly the problem.
GR1 (Government): If the law does not prohibit something, it doesn't mean that what is done is just and right.
GR1 (Government): And it doesn't mean that the situation does not need to be rectified.
GR1 (Government): The applicants refer to the 2010 law, which no longer provides restrictions on the amount of compensation.
GR1 (Government): But I'm sorry, you can't compare the situations which has a distance of almost 20 years.
GR1 (Government): It's incomparable.
GR1 (Government): And it's the same as referring to the situation of the National Library.
GR1 (Government): The expropriation of property for the purpose of National Library took place in 2005, that is seven years, no, eight years after the expropriation of the applicant's property.
GR1 (Government): You can't compare those two situations.
GR1 (Government): You may compare the situation that is, where you have some proximity between the events and some other comparison.
GR1 (Government): And the purpose of the National Library project is totally different, is absolutely different.
GR1 (Government): The applicants again referred to the investments and profits.
GR1 (Government): Well, it's very interesting, very interesting approach.
GR1 (Government): First of all, again, we need to compare the two situations.
GR1 (Government): What the applicants suggest is, the state should have endlessly invested in the area, and then paid for its own investment to the applicants.
GR1 (Government): And they say that it's discriminatory that the state adopts another approach, whereby it imposes lower rents on private companies.
GR1 (Government): So private companies invest in the land belonging to the state.
GR1 (Government): So the state does not need to spend its own budgetary resources to promote imports and exports, and development of the harbor area.
GR1 (Government): I think this approach goes against the very logics of the economic policy of the state.
GR1 (Government): Although I understand the applicant's financial interest.
GR1 (Government): I will not comment any other suggestions made by the applicant.
GR1 (Government): If they have any suggestions as to possible corruption, they could go to the law enforcement authorities and submit their applications.
GR1 (Government): That's all I may suggest.
GR1 (Government): In case of Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania, we speak of full reparation.
GR1 (Government): To some extent, it is right.
GR1 (Government): The purpose of the land reform is to repair the former owners whose property was nationalized by the occupying regime.
GR1 (Government): And for that, they have suffered financial and non-pecuniary damage.
GR1 (Government): They could not have used their property, gained profit.
GR1 (Government): But it does not mean in any way that the outcome of the land reform should not be achieving social justice.
GR1 (Government): Those two purposes are simultaneous.
GR1 (Government): They go together.
GR1 (Government): And one does not deprive the other of a meaning.
GR1 (Government): Again, then the applicants compare their situation to the situation of original owners to some extent.
GR1 (Government): I find it difficult to agree with this because again, as I have just mentioned, the original owners suffered as a minimum, even if they have not invested anything in the land plot concern.
GR1 (Government): They have suffered non-pecuniary damage because their property has been deprived by the occupying regime.
GR1 (Government): This, by all means, is not the case of the applicants.
GR1 (Government): They have not been deprived of possessing their property for the period over 50 years.
GR1 (Government): In addition to what, that they have not invested a single cent in the property concern.
GR1 (Government): And then on the other hand, they compare the expropriation of their land to the nationalization in 1940.
GR1 (Government): Again, that's way out of line.
GR1 (Government): They did not suffer any personal damage in the course of expropriation.
GR1 (Government): The circumstances were different, and the purpose was absolutely different.
GR1 (Government): I will come in a few minutes.
GR1 (Government): I have not used my time for this speech, so I'd like to use it now.
GR1 (Government): No, one last thing that I would like to say is the applicants specifically referred that expropriation of their property took place and amendments to the law were adopted in the context of ongoing litigation.
GR1 (Government): This is a manifestly wrong assumption.
GR1 (Government): The litigation that the applicants referred to were litigation concerning rent payments.
GR1 (Government): They had no relation whatsoever to the fact of expropriation.
GR1 (Government): That decision took many months later.
GR1 (Government): That's all I have to say.
Nicolas Bratza (JudgeP): Thank you very much Mrs. Reine.
Nicolas Bratza (JudgeP): We have now then come to the end of the hearing.
Nicolas Bratza (JudgeP): I would like to thank the parties for their interventions and their answers to the court's questions.
Nicolas Bratza (JudgeP): The court will now deliberate on the merits of the case.
Nicolas Bratza (JudgeP): The judgment will be delivered later and the parties will of course be informed of the date of delivery.
Nicolas Bratza (JudgeP): I declare the hearing closed.
Guido Raimondi (JudgeP): Please be seated.
Guido Raimondi (JudgeP): I declare open the public hearing on the merits in the case of Navalny versus Russia.
Guido Raimondi (JudgeP): I have to inform the parties that Judge Murovik-Strom has been replaced by Judge Ilievski.
Guido Raimondi (JudgeP): The five applications were lodged with the court on various dates between 14 May 2012 and 6...
Guido Raimondi (JudgeP): I apologize.
Guido Raimondi (JudgeP): Judge Murovik-Strom has been replaced by Judge Paczolay and Judge Ilievski becomes the third substitute.
Guido Raimondi (JudgeP): My apologies.
Guido Raimondi (JudgeP): The five applications were lodged with the court on various dates between 14 May 2012 and 6 June 2014 on the Article 34 of the Convention by a Russian national, Mr. Alexei Anatolievich Navalny.
Guido Raimondi (JudgeP): The applications were allocated to the third section of the court pursuant to Rule 52, paragraph 1 of the rules of the court.
Guido Raimondi (JudgeP): The applications were communicated to the government on 28 August 2014.
Guido Raimondi (JudgeP): On 2 February 2017, a chamber of the third section delivered its judgment in the case.
Guido Raimondi (JudgeP): It joined the applications and unanimously found violations of Articles 11 and 5 of the Convention and also in regard to parts of the complaints on Article 6.
Guido Raimondi (JudgeP): It declared the applicants' complaints on Articles 14 and 18 admissible but held that it was not necessary to examine them.
Guido Raimondi (JudgeP): On 26 April and 2 May 2017, respectively, the government and the applicant requested that the case be referred to the Grand Chamber in accordance with Article 43 of the Convention and the panel of the Grand Chamber accepted their requests on 29 May 2017.
Guido Raimondi (JudgeP): The respondent governments are represented by their agent, Mr. Mikhail Galperin, representative of the Russian Federation at the European Court of Human Rights, assisted by Mrs. Yana Borisova, Mr. Pavel Smirnov, Mrs. Mariia Zinoveva, Mr. Nikolay Chestnykh, Mr. Rostislav Lesnikov, Mr. Vasiliy Oleynik and Mr. Dmitrii Gazizov, advisors.
Guido Raimondi (JudgeP): The applicant is represented by Mrs. Anna Maralyan and Mrs. Olga Mikhaylova, counsels.
Guido Raimondi (JudgeP): The applicant is also present.
Guido Raimondi (JudgeP): I welcome the representatives in the name of the Court.
Guido Raimondi (JudgeP): Having consulted the agent of the government and the representatives of the applicant, I have determined the order of addresses as follows.
Guido Raimondi (JudgeP): Mrs. Maralyan for the applicant will speak first, followed by Mrs. Mikhaylova, then the applicant Mr. Navalnyy, and finally for the government Mr. Galperin.
Guido Raimondi (JudgeP): I would explain that in addition to interpreting in the two official languages of the Court, English and French, interpreting into Russian has been authorized for the benefit of a group of lawyers participating in the International Law in Advocacy program attending this hearing.
Guido Raimondi (JudgeP): That interpreting is not arranged by the Court and no transcription of the oral translation will be included in the official record of the proceedings.
Guido Raimondi (JudgeP): I call Mrs. Maralyan. Please, you have the floor.
AP1 (Applicant): Mr. President, distinguished members of the court,
AP1 (Applicant): this case raises issues of utmost importance.
AP1 (Applicant): If the restrictions of fundamental rights guaranteed by the convention, motivated by an ulterior purpose, not prescribed by the convention, are accepted, the result will cause profound damage to human rights, democracy, and rule of law in any democratic society.
AP1 (Applicant): In this case, the applicant is a prominent opposition leader whose fundamental rights, as this court has ruled on several occasions, have continuously been violated by the Russian authorities.
AP1 (Applicant): In the present applications, he complained that his rights guaranteed by Articles 5, 6, 11, and 18 of the convention were violated.
AP1 (Applicant): While finding violations of the applicant's rights under Articles 5, 6, and 11, the chamber ruled that there was no necessity to examine the alleged violations of Article 18 in conjunction with Articles 5 and 11.
AP1 (Applicant): The applicant now asks the grand chamber to affirm and expand the findings of the chamber by examining and ruling in favor of the applicant's claim under Article 18.
AP1 (Applicant): Mr. President, within the time provided to the applicant,
AP1 (Applicant): I will summarize the applicant's position presented in detail in his written submissions, that his claims of violations of his right to liberty, freedom of peaceful assembly, and fair trial were substantiated, and that the findings of the chamber are in conformity with the convention.
AP1 (Applicant): I will then address the applicant's discriminatory treatment on the ground of his official views.
AP1 (Applicant): Next, Ms. Mikhailova will present the applicant's
AP1 (Applicant): position, whether there was also a separate violation of Articles 18 read in conjunction with Articles 5 and 11.
AP1 (Applicant): Finally, Mr. Navalny will address the importance
AP1 (Applicant): of this case for the protection of human rights, the rule of law, and democracy, and the chilling effect on these values of restriction of convention rights undertaken for ulterior purposes.
AP1 (Applicant): As an initial matter, the applicant submits that his administrative arrests and detentions were unjustified and carried out under a pretext.
AP1 (Applicant): The applicant was charged with disobeying a lawful order of a police officer and breaching established procedure for the conduct of demonstrations.
AP1 (Applicant): However, video recordings submitted to the court clearly show that the applicant was targeted, surrounded by the riot police, and apprehended without any resistance.
AP1 (Applicant): He was not engaged in any breach of the established procedure for public demonstrations.
AP1 (Applicant): Rather, he participated in solo picketing, spontaneous assemblies, and walkouts.
AP1 (Applicant): Moreover, the authorities had ample opportunity, but unjustifiably failed to draw up administrative offense reports at the place of the applicant's apprehension.
AP1 (Applicant): As to the government's statement that it was not possible to draw up reports on the spot due to the risk that other protesters could obstruct the process, the applicant submits that, first, the police vehicles were in such a distance that it would hardly make it possible to obstruct the work of the police officers.
AP1 (Applicant): Further, there were enough police forces not to permit such an obstruction.
AP1 (Applicant): The applicant also brings to the court's attention that in almost all episodes where an administrative arrest was affected against the applicant, he was released from police stations either when three-hour time limit was to be expired or after the end of that time limit.
AP1 (Applicant): Hence, the applicant questions the statement of the government that he was released immediately after the necessary procedural documents were drawn up.
AP1 (Applicant): The applicant also claims that the actual circumstances of the applicant's arrest and detention are completely at odds with the stated official justifications, and he exposes these justifications as nothing more than bad faith pretext.
AP1 (Applicant): Mr. President, the arrest, pretrial detentions,