TrustHLT/LaCour huggingface dataset:
AP1 (Applicant): Je pense que c'était la 3e intervention des juges qui se recoupe un petit peu, et qui, pour se placer dans l'histoire, donc, il y avait l'intervention de l'OTAN, il y avait une catastrophe dans le pays, il y avait, donc, le changement du gouvernement Milosevic à l'époque, donc, une sorte, comme aujourd'hui, la révolution arabe, c'était une révolution contre Milosevic, entre guillemets, et, après, donc, la constitution des nouvelles autorités, qui, pour le dire clairement, s'est posée un petit peu avec, parce que les soldats qui étaient répondus présents étaient considérés un petit peu comme, si vous voulez, les gens de Milosevic qui étaient prêts à combattre l'OTAN, donc, il y avait toutes sortes de problèmes pour avoir ces indemnités payées, et, de toute façon, il y avait toujours, comme aujourd'hui en Serbie, des problèmes financiers, donc, qui ne sont pas étrangères, maintenant, aux États beaucoup plus puissants que la Serbie, et, justement, donc, les pourparlers duraient presque tout le temps à partir de 2004.
AP1 (Applicant): De 2004, donc, on a entamé les pourparlers avec les réservistes qui étaient restés impayés, et, aujourd'hui, ça peut nous sembler, donc, naïf de leur part, mais il faut comprendre les gens qui ont quelque chose dans les mains, donc, une créance contre l'État, mais, en quelque sorte, donc, ils ne peuvent pas s'opposer très fermement à cet État parce qu'on connaît, donc, toujours, entre créanciers et débitaires, donc, il y a ce rapport de force.
AP1 (Applicant): Et, là, vraiment, le gouvernement a eu toutes les forces dans ses mains, et les citoyens, comme les citoyens, donc, n'avaient rien du tout.
AP1 (Applicant): Alors, donc, ils décidaient de mener ces pourparlers, et, justement, au mois de janvier 2008, parce qu'avant, il y avait des protestations qui avaient vraiment une ampleur, donc, sérieuse, le gouvernement, comme je l'ai dit tout à l'heure devant vous, donc, il a choisi, il l'a dit aussi dans le mémoire, de choisir, donc, les plus combatifs, c'était apparemment les gens de ces, soi-disant, municipalités sous-développées, qui étaient les plus combatifs, et il s'imposait à l'État, selon les dires de l'État, de calmer, donc, c'était l'intérêt public de les calmer en négociant plus avec eux qu'avec les autres réservistes qui étaient aussi impayés que les premiers.
AP1 (Applicant): Et là, donc, on a cet accord, et nos clients, d'une façon officieuse, ont pris la signature, et ont entamé à nouveau les protestations pour avoir les mêmes droits.
AP1 (Applicant): Donc, il est clair aussi, dans les demandes devant les juridictions internes, qu'ils se basent, et sur les textes de 1999, qui prévoyaient le paiement des compensations des indemnités, et aussi sur les accords, parce qu'à notre vie juridiquement, la discrimination, justement, repose sur cela, parce qu'on a deux groupes qui sont traités différemment, mais qui sont strictement en même position par rapport à l'État.
AP1 (Applicant): Et c'est pour cela, donc, qu'on a choisi les deux fondements juridiques pour les demandes.
AP1 (Applicant): Après aussi, on nous a...
AP1 (Applicant): Peut-être que ce n'était pas vraiment à l'ordre, mais les deux questions se rapprochaient.
AP1 (Applicant): Après, donc, M. le juge Popovit,
AP1 (Applicant): justement, de la Serbie, qui connaît cette situation mieux, peut-être, que les autres, parce qu'il a vécu quelques années...
Dean Spielmann (JudgeP): Maître, maître s'il vous plaît, je vous signale que votre temps de réplique de dix minutes est déjà expiré. Je vous demanderai de répondre aux questions et de conclure.
AP1 (Applicant): Non, non, non, je réponds aux questions.
Dean Spielmann (JudgeP): Maître, en dénant le temps qui vous est imparti, c'est-à-dire 10 minutes, et je vous signale que le temps est déjà expiré, donc je vous prie de répondre aux questions dans un temps qui ne devrait pas dépasser 2 minutes, s'il vous plaît.
AP1 (Applicant): Ah oui, mais il me reste 4e question du juge pour vous, combien ils étaient payés pour épargner votre temps aujourd'hui.
AP1 (Applicant): Donc, j'ai la liste exacte de paiements, mais c'est dans votre dossier, parce que c'est le jugement de première instance de niche qui a justement mis pour chacun des requérants les dates exactes de participation dans les combats contre l'OTAN.
AP1 (Applicant): Et votre question, M. le Président,
AP1 (Applicant): par rapport à la Constitution.
AP1 (Applicant): Malheureusement, donc, le maître Aleksis n'a pas évoqué l'article 21 dans sa demande devant le...
AP1 (Applicant): Mais peu importe, dans la décision que j'ai citée déjà, c'est Oustamne Jalba, 20 ans 56, 2011, qui était rédigé aussi par M. Aleksis
AP1 (Applicant): pour un autre groupe de réservistes, donc qui était strictement la même, donc le même texte que pour les requérants.
AP1 (Applicant): Dans la décision de la Cour constitutionnelle, on peut trouver que, et c'est pas exact, donc c'est aussi une réplique par rapport à ce qui a été dit par le gouvernement, c'est pas vrai que la Cour constitutionnelle ne peut pas se saisir d'une question si elle a dans son dossier les éléments.
AP1 (Applicant): Donc, dans ce dossier que je viens de citer, la Cour constitutionnelle s'est saisie de la question de la discrimination et justement, il a répondu de la façon que j'ai déjà citée devant vous.
AP1 (Applicant): Mais l'article 21 n'était pas cité dans la Jalba des requérants.
AP1 (Applicant): C'est juste, je pense.
Dean Spielmann (JudgeP): Thank you Ms. Isailović, I call Mr. Carić.
GR1 (Government): First of all, let me answer the questions put by the distinguished court.
GR1 (Government): Mr. Honorable Judge Villiger asked
GR1 (Government): concerning the salary nature of compensation.
GR1 (Government): Namely, per diems were originally compensation for temporary living separately from their families, for the officers and professional soldiers, as prescribed by army rules cited in paragraph 7 of written observation annex 1.
GR1 (Government): By decision of the chief of headquarters of 3rd April 1999, which was adopted during the 1919 war, the right to per diems was also extended to reservists who performed assignments in units under particular difficult conditions and of particularly psychophysical conditions.
GR1 (Government): This is the beginning of the answer to the second question put by the distinguished Judge Steiner.
GR1 (Government): And I will also answer the question concerning the legal basis for agreement.
GR1 (Government): The agreement is based on the decision of the government.
GR1 (Government): Stemming from the Social Security Act, prescribing a grant of social aid to group persons in certain territories as the result of the negotiations with the strike committees.
GR1 (Government): With regard to the question concerning evidences put by the distinguished Judge Popovic, the government could provide evidence on the exact amounts of payments of funds transferred to each of seven municipalities from the budget.
GR1 (Government): The municipalities further distributed the funds concerned according to the criteria regulated by commission consisting of representatives of the strike committees and local self-government.
GR1 (Government): Concerning the question also put by Judge Popovic concerning the adequacy of measures, the government intends to resolve dissatisfaction of war veterans by adopting laws in cooperation with them, which will also include the right of those who had not been declared war-desailed persons.
GR1 (Government): The right to benefits is now only exercised by those who had certain disability, and the main request of the Resolves is to grant this right to all participants in the war.
GR1 (Government): Also concerning a question made by the President of the Court, Mr. Spilman, the applicant did not
GR1 (Government): rely on Article 21 of the Constitution, and they referred to Article 36 of the Constitution, which concerned equal protection before courts.
GR1 (Government): According to Article 422, paragraph 1.11 of Civil
GR1 (Government): Proceedings Act, a process that is finished with the final decision of the court may be reopened upon request of the party if before the constitutional court violation of human rights in civil proceedings has been found.
GR1 (Government): The provision of Article 87 of the Constitutional Court Act provides that if the human rights of a number of people are violated and some of them have filed a constitutional complaint, the decision of the constitutional court refers also to a person who did not file a constitutional appeal if they are in the same legal situation.
GR1 (Government): From the above, it follows that the applicants had the opportunity to apply for reopening of the proceedings, not only when the constitutional court ruled proceedings on constitutional complaints filed by them, but after the constitutional court ruled concerning on appeal of claimants who were in the same legal situation.
GR1 (Government): In any case, after the constitutional court's decision of 7 November 2012, this is the case Labu-Nikolic and others, the applicants were able to use this legal way.
GR1 (Government): This conclusion is confirmed by the decision of the Supreme Court of Cassation concerning the possibility for reopening the proceedings in accordance with the above-mentioned provisions of the Civil Proceedings Act.
GR1 (Government): This is a revision decision of 9 November 2011 and 3 November 2011.
GR1 (Government): Now, I would like to say something about the allegations made by the applicants.
GR1 (Government): As regards the allegation of the applicants on precisely listed names and amounts of per diems being forced by the government, they are absolutely groundless because military operations do not last for 20 hours every day.
GR1 (Government): The government may submit certified copies of these lists to prove they had not been forged if the court insists on this.
GR1 (Government): And also, in this 10 minutes observations to the questions put by the court, the attorney of the applicant mentioned regime of Milosevic and the status of veterans.
GR1 (Government): It is untrue because three political structures were changed.
GR1 (Government): But the government did not recognize that in any way, as we elaborated in our previous statements.
GR1 (Government): So I would like to thank the distinguished court for the attention.
GR1 (Government): And with this, we concluded our responses to the questions put by the court.
Dean Spielmann (JudgeP): Thank you. We have now come to the end of the hearing.
Dean Spielmann (JudgeP): The judgment will be delivered later and the parties will be informed of the date of delivery.
Guido Raimondi (JudgeP): I declare open the public hearing on the admissibility and merits in the cases of S., V., and A. versus Denmark.
Guido Raimondi (JudgeP): The applications were lodged with the court on 8 June 2012 under Article 34 of the Convention by three Danish nationals, Mr. S., Mr. V., and Mr. A..
Guido Raimondi (JudgeP): The applications were allocated to the second section of the court pursuant to Rule 52, Paragraph 1 of the rules of the court.
Guido Raimondi (JudgeP): The applications were communicated to the government on 7 January 2014.
Guido Raimondi (JudgeP): On 11 July 2017, the chamber decided to relinquish jurisdiction in favor of the grand chamber.
Guido Raimondi (JudgeP): The government are represented by their agent, Mr. Tobias Elling Rehfeld, assisted by Mrs. Nina Holst-Christensen, co-agent, Mr. Christian Wegener, and Mr. Jan van Deurs advisors.
Guido Raimondi (JudgeP): The applicant is represented by Mr. Claus Bonnez, counsel, assisted by Mr. Tobias Stadarfeld Jensen and Mrs. Hanne Ziebe, advisors.
Guido Raimondi (JudgeP): Mr. Elling Rehfeld for the government will speak first,
Guido Raimondi (JudgeP): and then Mr. Bonnez for the applicant.
Guido Raimondi (JudgeP): I call Mr. Elling Rehfeld.
GR1 (Government): of the court.
GR1 (Government): It's an honor to appear before you this morning on behalf of the Danish government.
GR1 (Government): The case before you concerns a matter of general public interest, interpretation of Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights, and the possibility of the police to use preventive detention in situations of vital public interest.
GR1 (Government): As the court is well aware, the present case concerns the preventive detention of three applicants on the 10th of October 2009 by the Copenhagen police.
GR1 (Government): On that day, a high-profile football match took place in Copenhagen between Denmark and Sweden for the qualification to the World Cup.
GR1 (Government): Thousands of peaceful football fans, families, and children had traveled to Copenhagen from all parts of Denmark and Sweden to celebrate their national teams and enjoy the traditionally good-humored neighboring competition.
GR1 (Government): However, prior to the match, the police had received information that hooligan groups intended to prey on this peaceful sport event and initiate hooligan brawls in connection with the match.
GR1 (Government): The police had prepared accordingly, and 186 police officers were deployed throughout Copenhagen to maintain law and order.
GR1 (Government): The police observed the first major fight break out between Danish and Swedish hooligans around 3.40 PM
GR1 (Government): on the main pedestrian street in the city center of Copenhagen.
GR1 (Government): As another group of Danish hooligans were heading towards this fight, the police decided to detain a small number of individuals from this group in order to prevent them from escalating the situation.
GR1 (Government): The second and third applicants were part of that group.
GR1 (Government): Turning to the first applicant, he was detained approximately one hour later.
GR1 (Government): A witness deemed highly credible by the police had contacted the police with information that he had just overheard the applicant calling other people by phone, inciting them to join him in a fight against Swedish hooligans.
GR1 (Government): The police released the three applicants approximately 7 and 1 half hours after they had been detained, when the police assessed that the risk of further fighting between the different hooligan groups had diminished sufficiently after a day of running clashes in Copenhagen between hooligan fractions, leading to the arrest and detention of more than 130 persons.
GR1 (Government): after this very brief summary of the facts, let me now address the question of whether these detentions were lawful under Danish law.
GR1 (Government): The answer to this question is yes.
GR1 (Government): The criteria for lawful detention are set out in the Danish Police Act, section 5, paragraph 3.
GR1 (Government): Under this provision, the police may detain persons deemed to cause a risk of disturbance of public order and danger to the safety of individuals and public security.
GR1 (Government): According to the Travert Propertoire of the Police Act, a crucial point is the probability that the risk or danger will occur if the police do not intervene.
GR1 (Government): Of course, the police may only detain a person if it is considered necessary, and if less intrusive measures are deemed insufficient to avert such a risk or danger.
GR1 (Government): The police must assess this in each individual case.
GR1 (Government): In the present case, the police had conducted the individual assessments required by the Police Act, establishing that it was indeed necessary to detain the applicants to reduce the risk of further disturbances between the Danish and Swedish hooligans.
GR1 (Government): We firmly hold that under these circumstances, the police made the correct assessment by detaining the hooligans, including the second and third applicants.
GR1 (Government): Simply giving a forewarning to the group of hooligans heading towards the fight in the city center by ordering them to leave would have been insufficient.
GR1 (Government): Nor would it have made sense for the police to redirect the group towards the national football stadium, as all circumstances clearly indicate that the hooligans would not have obeyed by this instruction.
GR1 (Government): Indeed, one of the applicants, applicant number three, did not even have a ticket for the match.
GR1 (Government): In both situations, the hooligans involved would just have met up elsewhere to initiate or participate in the fighting.
GR1 (Government): Similar arguments apply to the first applicant.
GR1 (Government): He was overheard planning and inciting others to join him in a fight against Swedish hooligans, thus creating a situation that presented a concrete and an imminent risk of disturbance of the public order, a risk that would have been insufficiently dealt with if the first applicant had just been ordered to leave his location at the time.
GR1 (Government): Furthermore, confiscating his mobile phone would also have been insufficient.
GR1 (Government): He could easily have acquired one elsewhere and continued his planning.
GR1 (Government): In this specific situation, it is clear to us that the police, as part of their crowd control measures on the day of the match, was left with no other option than to detain the applicants in order to avoid further escalation of the violence.
GR1 (Government): Now, let me turn to the lawfulness of the length of their detention.
GR1 (Government): Under section 5, paragraph 3 of the Danish Police Act, detention should not extend beyond six hours where possible.
GR1 (Government): However, under status in the Traveau Propertoire of the Police Act, the six-hour period can be extended in special situations.
GR1 (Government): The applicants were released from detention after 7 and 1 1⁄2 hours, which was as soon as the police assessed that the risk of further hooligan violence had diminished sufficiently in the city of Copenhagen.
GR1 (Government): Upon release, the applicants requested a judicial review of the lawfulness of the detention.
GR1 (Government): A particularly easy access to such a review is available under section 469 of the Danish Administration of Justice Act.
GR1 (Government): During this subsequent judicial review in two instances, both the District Court of Aarhus and the High Court of Western Denmark reached the conclusion that the detention were lawful under section 5 of the Police Act.
GR1 (Government): Specifically, both court instances concluded that there were no basis for invalidating the correctness of the assessment made by the police with regards to the concrete and imminent risk posed by the applicants of disturbance of the public order and danger to the safety of individuals and public security on the day of the match.
GR1 (Government): The Danish courts thus, in effect, reached the conclusion that the detentions of the applicants were in accordance with the procedure prescribed by international law as required by Article 5, Paragraph 1 of the Convention.
GR1 (Government): allow me now to say a few general remarks about preventive detention and crowd control.
GR1 (Government): Preventive detention is a vital tool for the police in situations where crowd control is necessary.
GR1 (Government): The concept is known in many of the member states of the Council of Europe.
GR1 (Government): Crowd control concerns situations where the police, in order to keep the peace and maintain public order, need to detain individuals during mass events, for example, in a situation of a large football match where aggressive supporters have assembled and the risk of hooligan brawls is imminent.
GR1 (Government): It is in these types of situations imperative for the police to have effective means available, such as preventive detention, in order for the police to be able to deflate an otherwise escalating situation.
GR1 (Government): Having touched upon these introductory points on crowd control, I will now turn to the central question in the case at hand.
GR1 (Government): Was the preventive detention of the three applicants justified under Article V, paragraph 1, subparagraph B, or subparagraph C?
GR1 (Government): When analyzing the court's case law, it is clear that there has been a change in the understanding and interpretation by the court of these subparagraphs.
GR1 (Government): This development took its starting point in the 60s with the court's judgment in Lawless v. Island
GR1 (Government): No. 3 from 1961.
GR1 (Government): In that case, the court concluded that preventive detention could fall within the scope of subparagraph C.
GR1 (Government): The court, however, was divided on this matter in the more recent judgment in Ostendorff v. Germany
GR1 (Government): from 2013, a judgment from the fifth section of the court.
GR1 (Government): In the Ostendorff case, the majority found that the preventive detention of a German hooligan was justified under subparagraph B, but not justified under subparagraph C.
GR1 (Government): Consequently, the majority, in our view, moved away from the previous interpretation of the court in Lawless v. Island.
GR1 (Government): However, the court was divided on the issue with the minority in the Ostendorff case finding that the detention was indeed justified under subparagraph C, favoring a return to the interpretation in the Lawless case.
GR1 (Government): This fundamental question of the applicability of Article V has also been the focus of national jurisprudence.
GR1 (Government): A relevant example is the judgment of 15 of February 2017 from the United Kingdom Supreme Court, R v. Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis.
GR1 (Government): In that case, the United Kingdom Supreme Court found that preventive detention should be justified under subparagraph C, even if it is clear from the outset that the deprivation of liberty is not affected for the purpose of bringing the individual concerned before the courts to decide on the merits of the case.
GR1 (Government): As demonstrated, the case before the court today is an excellent opportunity for the court to revisit and articulate the understanding and interpretation by the court of subparagraph B and C in situations of preventive detention.
GR1 (Government): the court has asked the Danish government to answer six specific questions.
GR1 (Government): The Danish government has submitted its answers in the written observation to which we refer as regard to questions 1, 2, and 3.
GR1 (Government): We will not go further into these questions.
GR1 (Government): Today, we will instead focus on the questions 4, 5, and 6.
GR1 (Government): I now turn to the first of these questions, question 4.
GR1 (Government): Let me start by briefly mentioning the criteria for lawful detention under subparagraph B as set out in the court's case law.
GR1 (Government): As stated in the Ostendorf case, the main criteria for detention under subparagraph B is that the person detained has failed to fulfill a specific and concrete obligation incumbent on him or her.
GR1 (Government): The court has made clear that this obligation must be very closely circumscribed.
GR1 (Government): If a person is under an obligation not to commit an offense, the person must have taken clear and positive steps indicating intent of non-fulfillment.
GR1 (Government): Also, the person must have been made aware of the offenses he or she is to refrain from committing.
GR1 (Government): The Danish government is of the opinion that these two criteria are met in the present case.
GR1 (Government): The three applicants were subject to a clear obligation to refrain from committing criminal offenses, such as instigating or taking part in fights and hooligan violence, which are criminal offenses under Danish law.
GR1 (Government): Notwithstanding that the obligation to refrain from committing these offenses is closely circumscribed under Danish law, the applicants had taken clear and positive steps towards committing such offenses rather than indicating an intent of not committing the offenses.
GR1 (Government): As we mentioned earlier, the first applicant was overheard calling other individuals, trying to incite them to join him in a fight against Swedish hooligans, a situation very similar to that of the Ostendorf case.