TrustHLT/LaCour huggingface dataset:
GR1 (Government): Pour la fixation de ce montant, il est vrai, on a tenu compte d'un antécédent qui date de 1998, pour lequel il a été condamné à 2 000 francs.
GR1 (Government): Alors, le montant de la peine a été fixé à la lumière de cet antécédent, qui était d'ailleurs un antécédent, une condamnation pour contrainte et diffamation.
GR1 (Government): Ce n'était pas des petites contraventions.
GR1 (Government): Contrainte et diffamation.
GR1 (Government): J'en prends note aussi, nous prenons note aussi que M.
GR1 (Government): Bédard a prétendu qu'il a payé lui-même les 4 000 francs et qu'il doit rembourser des montants encourus par cette procédure.
GR1 (Government): On en prend note.
GR1 (Government): Pour l'instant, on n'a aucune preuve qu'il a payé ses montants, qu'il va payer ses montants.
GR1 (Government): Nous, nous sommes basés, comme je l'ai dit, à la jurispondance de la Cour dans les affaires Stoll et Dammann.
GR1 (Government): La situation était analogue.
GR1 (Government): Les notes honoraires ont été adressées à l'éditeur, Ringier et Tamedia dans l'affaire Stoll.
GR1 (Government): Et la Cour en a conclu que le requérant n'a pas satisfait aux conditions de l'article 60, alinéa 2 du règlement, c'est-à-dire il doit démonstrer que c'est lui-même qui a supporté les frais.
GR1 (Government): Et cette démonstration, pour l'instant, elle fait défaut.
GR1 (Government): La question du juge Lopez-Guerra, article 293, il est vrai, si on lit l'article, c'est la conception formée du secret qu'a retenue le législateur à l'époque.
GR1 (Government): Mais la jurisprudence a procédé à une interprétation à la lumière de votre jurisprudence et elle ouvre l'examen pour un examen matériel, c'est-à-dire pondération des intérêts en jeu.
GR1 (Government): Dans l'affaire Stoll, un arrêt publié du tribunal fédéral, c'était encore un obiter dicto.
GR1 (Government): D'ailleurs, même si on voulait partir d'une conception matérielle du secret, on arrivait à la conclusion que, maintenant, on discute et cette interprétation a été appliquée dans les affaires suivantes, y compris l'affaire présente.
GR1 (Government): Et on a parlé de la discussion actuelle au sein de la commission des questions juridiques.
GR1 (Government): Là, la commission s'est prononcée avec une majorité de 15 à 7 pour mettre dans la loi ce qui est aujourd'hui la pratique du tribunal fédéral, c'est-à-dire de dire qu'il faut, à la lumière de l'article 10, la pondération des intérêts en jeu dans chaque cas concret.
GR1 (Government): La question de M. Wojticek.
GR1 (Government): On s'est posé la même question.
GR1 (Government): Est-ce que M. Beda avait d'autres pièces du dossier
GR1 (Government): qui ont été transmises?
GR1 (Government): Ma collègue et moi-même, nous nous sommes déplacés à Lausanne pour voir, pour consulter l'intégralité des deux dossiers Pénault.
GR1 (Government): On n'a pas trouvé la réponse.
GR1 (Government): Alors, on a connaissance que des pièces du dossier qui sont relatées dans l'article de l'illustré.
GR1 (Government): Ignorance, il y avait d'autres.
GR1 (Government): La question de M. le juge Deghaetano.
GR1 (Government): Il s'est référé à l'article 185A de l'ancien code de procédure pénale du canton de Vaud.
GR1 (Government): La relation entre les deux alinéas, c'était la première question.
GR1 (Government): Le premier alinéa dit les parties, leurs proches et familles, leurs conseils, collaborateurs, consultants, employés de ceux-ci, ainsi que les experts et témoins sont tenus de respecter le secret de l'enquête envers quiconque n'a pas accès au dossier.
GR1 (Government): Et le paragraphe 2 constitue une exception à cette règle parce qu'il dit la révélation faite aux proches ou familiers par la partie où son conseil n'est pas punissable.
GR1 (Government): Et ça nous amène à la deuxième question posée par M. Deghaetano.
GR1 (Government): Le code de procédure pénale vaudois prévoyait une propre sanction pénale pour les personnes visées au paragraphe 1 de l'article 185A, c'était les parties, les proches, etc.
GR1 (Government): Pour les tiers, comme les journalistes, c'est l'article 293 qui s'applique.
GR1 (Government): Puis, comme j'ai annoncé quelques remarques relatives à la plaidoirie, d'abord l'article de M. Beda
GR1 (Government): concernant cette histoire meurtre sur commande.
GR1 (Government): Où est-ce que je l'ai mis?
GR1 (Government): Alors, on n'a pas inventé cet article.
GR1 (Government): Attendez.
GR1 (Government): Voilà.
GR1 (Government): Tragédie du Grand-Pans, révélation, les nouvelles pistes de l'enquête.
GR1 (Government): Arnaud Beda, 23 juillet 2003.
GR1 (Government): Et comme je l'ai dit, on met volontiers à disposition de la Cour l'ensemble des articles de presse.
GR1 (Government): Une autre observation concernant l'argument qu'il serait impossible pour les journalistes de publier les comptes rendus de procédure pénale jusqu'au moment de l'audience publique.
GR1 (Government): L'argument nous semble dépourvu de fondements.
GR1 (Government): Premièrement, il y a la possibilité pour les autorités de poursuite d'informer le public.
GR1 (Government): On a vu l'exemple de l'ancien code de procédure pénale vaudois.
GR1 (Government): Et deuxièmement, la présente affaire démontre qu'on peut très bien satisfaire aux besoins du public d'être informé sur la base d'informations qui sont accessibles au public ou peuvent être obtenues par un travail de recherche respectant les règles déontologiques.
GR1 (Government): Une deuxième remarque concernant les arrêts que je peux penser à citer, les fameux arrêts « Sunday Times » et « Dupuis ».
GR1 (Government): Il faut bien se rappeler de quoi il s'agissait dans ces deux affaires.
GR1 (Government): « Sunday Times », il s'agissait d'informations confidentielles émanant d'une procédure encore pendante contre une entreprise pharmaceutique.
GR1 (Government): C'était la fameuse affaire du « Contergan ».
GR1 (Government): Le besoin de protection d'une entreprise n'est évidemment pas comparable à celui d'un détenu qui plus est atteint de sa santé psychique.
GR1 (Government): Et l'affaire « Dupuis » et autres, on se souvient, elle avait pour l'origine le livre de deux journalistes, « Les oreilles du président ».
GR1 (Government): C'était l'affaire des écoutes de l'Élysée, écoute téléphonique, mettant en cause le fonctionnement de la justice pénale et du cabinet du président de la République qui avait ordonné ces mesures.
GR1 (Government): Difficile donc de construire une parallèle avec notre affaire.
GR1 (Government): Une autre remarque, on aimerait citer encore une affaire que la Cour a jugée qui est très proche de la nôtre, peut-être la plus proche de la nôtre.
GR1 (Government): C'est l'affaire « Tourancho et Julie contre France » du 12 avril 2006.
GR1 (Government): C'était un article dans le journal « Libération » qui avait publié des extraits de procès-verbaux d'interrogatoire.
GR1 (Government): Les requérants étaient condamnés sur la base de l'article 38, alinéa 1 de la loi sur la liberté de la presse.
GR1 (Government): C'est une loi qui date de 1881.
GR1 (Government): Je me permets de citer cet article.
GR1 (Government): Il est interdit de publier les actes d'accusation et tous autres actes de procédure, criminels ou correctionnels, avant qu'ils aient été lus en audience publique et ce, sous peine de l'amende.
GR1 (Government): Le but est clair.
GR1 (Government): Il s'agit, comme la Cour l'a formulé dans « Sunday Times », d'éviter le spectacle de pseudo-procès dans les médias.
GR1 (Government): D'ailleurs, dans cette affaire « Tourancho », la Cour a admis que la condamnation des journalistes correspondait bien à un besoin social impérieux.
GR1 (Government): Je cite cette affaire parce que le requérant avait dit « De toute façon, ces informations relatées, de toute façon, on les aurait connues une fois à l'audience principale a commencé. »
GR1 (Government): Et je conclue, Monsieur le Président, Mesdames et Messieurs les juges, avec une citation de l'arrêt de la Cour de cassation pénale du canton de Vaud dans notre affaire.
GR1 (Government): Cette Cour aussi applique le principe de la subsidiarité.
GR1 (Government): Elle a examiné l'affaire sous l'angle de l'article 10 et elle a dit « On ne saurait admettre, parce qu'une affaire est émotionnelle et médiatisée, qu'un journaliste puisse, à n'importe quel moment, quel que soit le degré d'avancement de la procédure, publier n'importe quel élément d'un dossier parvenu en sa possession par des voies mystérieuses. »
Dean Spielmann (JudgeP): Merci, M. Schürmann.
Dean Spielmann (JudgeP): I declare open the public hearing on the merits in the case of Vinter and others against the United Kingdom.
Dean Spielmann (JudgeP): The case covers three applications which were lodged with the court under Article 34 of the Convention by British nationals, Mr. Douglas Gary Vinter, Mr. Jeremy Neville Bamber,
Dean Spielmann (JudgeP): and Mr. Peter Howard Moore between the 11th of December
Dean Spielmann (JudgeP): 2009 and the 6th of January 2010.
Dean Spielmann (JudgeP): The applications were allocated to the fourth section of the court, pursuant to Rule 52, paragraph one of the rules of the court.
Dean Spielmann (JudgeP): They were communicated to the government on the 1st of February 2011.
Dean Spielmann (JudgeP): On the 17th of January 2012, a chamber of the fourth section delivered its judgment in the case.
Dean Spielmann (JudgeP): The chamber decided to join the applications and told in respect of all three applicants that there had been no violation of Article 3 of the Convention.
Dean Spielmann (JudgeP): On 12th of April 2012, the applicants requested that the case be referred to the grand chamber in accordance with Article 43 of the Convention.
Dean Spielmann (JudgeP): And the panel of the grand chamber accepted the request on the 9th of July 2012.
Dean Spielmann (JudgeP): The government are represented by their agent, Ms. Laura
Dean Spielmann (JudgeP): Dauban, assisted by Mr. David Perry, QC leading counsel,
Dean Spielmann (JudgeP): Mr. Louis Mably, counsel, and by Mr. John Guess and Ms.
Dean Spielmann (JudgeP): Alison Foulds, advisors.
Dean Spielmann (JudgeP): The applicants are represented by Mr. Richard Horwell, QC,
Dean Spielmann (JudgeP): Mr. Pete Weatherby, QC, and Mr. Luke Hindmarsh, counsel,
Dean Spielmann (JudgeP): assisted by Mr. Simon Creighton, Mr. Barry Woods,
Dean Spielmann (JudgeP): and Professor Dirk van Zyl Smit, advisors.
Dean Spielmann (JudgeP): I would also like to welcome a delegation from the Turkish Council of State and the Italian Superior Council of Military Justice.
Dean Spielmann (JudgeP): Mr. Perry for the government will speak first,
Dean Spielmann (JudgeP): and then Mr. Pete Weatherby, QC, for the applicant.
Dean Spielmann (JudgeP): I would explain that in addition to interpreting in the two official languages of the court, English and French, interpreting in Turkish and Russian has been authorized for the benefit of the Turkish delegation and the Belarusian delegation.
Dean Spielmann (JudgeP): That interpreting is not arranged by the court, and no transcriptions of the oral translations will be included in the official record of the proceedings.
Dean Spielmann (JudgeP): I call Mr. Perry.
GR1 (Government): the applications before the court raise issues which are of profound importance to the government of the United Kingdom.
GR1 (Government): In England and Wales, the mandatory sentence for murder is imprisonment for life.
GR1 (Government): However, the length of time the offender must spend in prison before he is considered for parole is fixed by the sentencing judge as a matter of discretion.
GR1 (Government): This discretion is exercised in accordance with structured guidance set out in statute and always on the facts of the individual case.
GR1 (Government): In cases of the most extreme and unusual gravity, the sentencing judge may order that for the purposes of pure punishment and deterrence, the offender is to spend the rest of his life in prison.
GR1 (Government): Such an order will only be made where the judge is satisfied having taken into account all the features of aggravation and mitigation that the element of just punishment and retribution requires its imposition.
GR1 (Government): It is not a mandatory sentence, nor is it an automatic sentence.
GR1 (Government): And it is important to emphasize that a whole life order is reserved for the most serious cases known to the criminal law.
GR1 (Government): It is a sentence of last resort, the rarest of the rare, and the government submit that the imposition of such a sentence does not involve a violation of Article 3 of the Convention.
GR1 (Government): The government wish to emphasize at this early stage their commitment to the values contained in Article 3 of the Convention.
GR1 (Government): In the government submission, these values are not inconsistent with the principle that just punishment is appropriate for those convicted of criminal offences.
GR1 (Government): And it follows in the government submission that in an appropriate case, it would be neither inhuman nor degrading treatment or punishment for a person to serve a whole life term.
GR1 (Government): Significantly, there is a lack of consensus among member states in this area of sentencing.
GR1 (Government): This was a point recognized by this court in the Kafkaris case.
GR1 (Government): And while the government note that in many member states there is no power to impose a whole life sentence, and it is evident that many member states consider that there is a maximum sentence of imprisonment that can be justified by way of punishment, that is not the policy of the United Kingdom.
GR1 (Government): The policy in the United Kingdom is that some crimes are so serious that they require, as a proportionate response, lifelong incarceration.
GR1 (Government): This policy is long-standing and has been supported by many eminent jurists.
GR1 (Government): For example, Lord Bingham of Cornhill, when Lord Chief Justice, said there was no reason in principle why a crime, if sufficiently serious, should not be regarded as deserving of lifelong incarceration for the purposes of pure punishment.
GR1 (Government): The policy of the United Kingdom is now enshrined in statute.
GR1 (Government): Importantly, this recently enacted statute reflects the settled will of the United Kingdom's democratically elected parliament.
GR1 (Government): Importantly, the domestic courts have consistently held that it is lawful and compatible with Article 3 of the Convention.
GR1 (Government): This includes the recent decision of the Court of Appeal, specially constituted to consider four cases in which whole life terms had been imposed.
GR1 (Government): The court presided over by Lord Judge, Chief Justice, comprised four other senior judges of the Court of Appeal, including the Vice President of the Queen's Bench Division and the Vice President of the Court of Appeal Criminal Division.
GR1 (Government): And the judgment has been provided to the court by the government, and the government invite the court to consider in particular the analysis contained in paragraphs 1 to 30 of the Court of Appeal decision.
GR1 (Government): Similarly, the government rely on the jurisprudence of this court, which is clearly and consistently to the effect that the imposition of a whole life sentence and the serving of such a sentence does not in and of itself raise an issue under Article 3.
GR1 (Government): The government rely on the Kafkaris decision, the Harkins and Edwards decision decided earlier this year, and the Barbara Ahmed decision also decided earlier this year.
GR1 (Government): In submitting that the domestic approach is longstanding, enshrined in statute, consistently upheld by the domestic courts, and in noting the lack of consensus amongst member states, and this court's repeated observation that matters of appropriate sentencing policy largely fall outside the scope of the Convention, the government wish to make what they consider to be a very important submission, and it is this.
GR1 (Government): The policy, the sentencing policy of the United Kingdom, is based on a settled democratic consensus.
GR1 (Government): It is a democratic consensus in respect of an issue which at its core concerns questions of punishment, retribution, justice, humanity, and atonement.
GR1 (Government): These are questions which have long been the subject of ethical, political, and philosophical controversy.
GR1 (Government): They are the subject of continuing rational argument and civilized disagreement.
GR1 (Government): The assessment of what should be deemed to constitute just punishment or inhuman or degrading punishment in a particular circumstance can legitimately produce different answers in different countries, and indeed different answers at different times in the same country for historical and cultural reasons.
GR1 (Government): But in the government submission, it is legitimate for these differing views to be resolved in national communities by arbitration through the democratic process.
GR1 (Government): As Lord Hoffman noted in the Wellington case, when considering Parliament's preservation of the whole-life sentence in the United Kingdom, he emphasized the democratic nature of member states and noted that this was an important factor to be taken into account by the courts when considering the scope and application of Article III.
GR1 (Government): The government submit that this factor is particularly relevant when the court is invited to extend the reach of Article III, as is the case in each of these applications.
GR1 (Government): May I turn to deal with the distinction drawn by the Chamber between the three different types of life sentence, the three different types of life sentence analyzed by the Chamber.
GR1 (Government): First, a life sentence with eligibility for release after a minimum period has been served.
GR1 (Government): Second, a discretionary sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.
GR1 (Government): And third, a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.
GR1 (Government): The government agree that as the Chamber held, the first type of life sentence is clearly reducible and no Article III issue arises, subject of course only to the question of gross disproportionality.
GR1 (Government): Moving to the second and third type of sentence, it is important to emphasize that in the United Kingdom, the third type of sentence, a mandatory whole life order, is simply not available.
GR1 (Government): That is not available to the sentencing courts.
GR1 (Government): This is because whilst in the case of murder, the life sentence itself is mandatory, the decision as to whether to impose a minimum term and its length or a whole life order is a matter of judicial discretion.
GR1 (Government): In the first instance, it is imposed by the sentencing judge and it is subject to review on an appeal against sentence by the Court of Appeal.
GR1 (Government): The judicial decision in question is made in accordance with the detailed guidance set out in Schedule 21 to the Criminal Justice Act 2003.
GR1 (Government): This schedule provides a comprehensive and carefully constructed framework for assessing the seriousness of a particular murder or murders.
GR1 (Government): And all the factors set out within the schedule are commonly accepted factors for assessing the degree of harm occasioned by the offence and the culpability of the offender.
GR1 (Government): They include commonly accepted mitigating factors.
GR1 (Government): It is apparent from the legislation that a whole life order may only be imposed where the seriousness of the offending is exceptionally high.
GR1 (Government): For example, multiple murder involving a substantial degree of premeditation, the abduction of the victim or sexual or sadistic conduct, or the murder of a child involving abduction or sexual or sadistic conduct, or murder for the purpose of advancing a political or religious cause, or murder by an offender previously convicted of murder.
GR1 (Government): The Court of Appeal has emphasised that the language of Schedule 21 is not prescriptive.
GR1 (Government): The judge is not required to impose a whole life order if it would be contrary to the interests of justice.
GR1 (Government): And it has been made clear by the domestic courts that a whole life order should only be imposed where the seriousness of the offending is so exceptionally high that just punishment requires the offender to be kept in prison for the rest of his life.
GR1 (Government): The crucial point in this analysis is that the decision-making process is concerned purely with punishing the offender according to the seriousness of his crime.
GR1 (Government): It is not concerned with an assessment of the offender's dangerousness.
GR1 (Government): The minimum term, or as the case may be, a whole life term, is ordered purely for the purposes of punishment.
GR1 (Government): Following on from this, there are two points of significance in relation to the sentencing exercise, which the government would wish to emphasise.
GR1 (Government): First, the making of the order is an entirely judicial process.
GR1 (Government): Second, at the time the sentence is imposed, consideration is given to all material circumstances, including any mitigating factors.
GR1 (Government): This is in contrast to the position in Kafkaris, where the sentence was in effect a mandatory whole life term, and where the assessment of commonly accepted sentencing considerations was not carried out at the time the sentence was imposed by the independent and impartial judicial officer.
GR1 (Government): Instead, in that case, matters of aggravation and mitigation were considered years later by the executive when determining whether to order discretionary release.
GR1 (Government): And this court held that that post-sentence review of detention was sufficient to render the sentence reducible.
GR1 (Government): In the United Kingdom, in response to decisions of this court, executive review has no place in the sentencing process.
GR1 (Government): It has been concluded, and the government submit properly concluded, that it is exclusively for the independent judiciary to assess and evaluate the commonly accepted sentencing considerations and to determine the just and appropriate sentence, whether sitting as sentencing judges or in the Court of Appeal or in the High Court in transitional cases.
GR1 (Government): In summary, therefore, in relation to the type of sentence, the government emphasised these applications are concerned with discretionary sentences of life imprisonment, judicially imposed, where the possibility of parole has been excluded by judicial order, having taken into account all relevant factors.
GR1 (Government): May I then turn to address the question of when an issue under Article 3 may arise.
GR1 (Government): A central aspect of the Chamber's judgment was its conclusion that an Article 3 issue cannot arise at the moment a discretionary whole life sentence is imposed.
GR1 (Government): Such an issue may only arise at some later point in time if it can be shown that continued imprisonment is no longer justified and that the sentence is irreducible.
GR1 (Government): The government submit that the conclusion of the Chamber is correct.
GR1 (Government): It is consistent with this court's jurisprudence and also the decisions of the domestic courts.
GR1 (Government): It correctly identifies the true reach of Article 3.
GR1 (Government): The key point, the essential point, is that a proportionate sentence cannot be inhuman or degrading at the moment it is imposed or whilst it is being served.
GR1 (Government): It follows, as a matter of consistency and logic, that it is not contrary to Article 3 for an offender to know that his offending deserves lifelong incarceration for the purposes of pure punishment and that he must serve such a term.
GR1 (Government): The government also submit that the Chamber was entirely correct to conclude that if a situation arises where continued detention can no longer be justified, what gives rise to an Article 3 issue is not the sentence itself, but the prisoner's unjustified continued detention.