TrustHLT/LaCour huggingface dataset:
GR2 (Government): La Cour avait statué l'Etat en question se doit, avec tous les moyens légaux et diplomatiques dont il dispose envers les Etats-tiers et les organisations internationales, d'essayer de continuer à garantir la jouissance des droits et libertés énoncées dans la Convention.
GR2 (Government): En l'espèce, la Suisse a assumé ses obligations.
GR2 (Government): Premièrement, elle s'est investie et elle s'investit toujours pour une amélioration du système onusien.
GR2 (Government): Deuxièmement, elle a fait le maximum pour améliorer la situation individuelle du requérant.
GR2 (Government): Qu'en est-il d'abord de l'engagement de la Suisse à New York?
GR2 (Government): La Suisse a initié une initiative en 2005 et elle préside informellement un groupe de 11 Etats dits les like-minded.
GR2 (Government): À chaque révision de la résolution al-Qaïda, le groupe soumet au Conseil de sécurité de nouvelles propositions visant à renforcer l'équité de la procédure des régimes de sanctions.
GR2 (Government): Nombre de ces propositions ont été reprises par le Conseil de sécurité, notamment, et j'en cite quelques-unes, le point focal et le bureau du médiateur, ainsi que les procédures y afférentes.
GR2 (Government): Il faut encore signaler qu'en 2009, le Parlement suisse a constaté que les sanctions prises au nom de la lutte contre le terrorisme court-circuitent, c'est le mot utilisé par le Parlement, les droits fondamentaux.
GR2 (Government): Le Parlement a invité le gouvernement par la motion dite Marti à informer le Conseil de sécurité que les sanctions ne seront plus appliquées lorsque certaines conditions sont remplies.
GR2 (Government): Le Parlement a de ce fait souhaité envoyer un signal fort au Conseil de sécurité dans le contexte de l'affaire Nadin.
GR2 (Government): Le gouvernement a mis en oeuvre cette motion, en envoyant une lettre au comité des sanctions al-Qaïda.
GR2 (Government): Le comité lui a répondu par lettre en lui rappelant l'obligation inconditionnelle de la Suisse de suivre les décisions du Conseil de sécurité selon les articles 25 et 103 de la charte.
GR2 (Government): Le gouvernement en a informé le Parlement et reste en contact régulier avec celui-ci.
GR2 (Government): Ainsi, le Parlement a proposé à la Commission de la sécurité ainsi le Parlement a pris connaissance de l'engagement diplomatique de la Suisse la dernière fois au printemps 2014.
GR2 (Government): Le refus de classement par le Parlement vise avant tout, et c'est lui qui le dit, à maintenir la pression sur le gouvernement et à le charger de poursuivre son engagement diplomatique auprès de l'ONU.
GR2 (Government): Ensuite, la Suisse a soutenu les requérants individuellement, non seulement par le déblocage d'une somme totale de plus d'un million de francs suisses, mais également en leur accordant le droit d'être entendu dans la procédure nationale et en suspendant la procédure nationale à deux reprises pour leur permettre de déposer une demande de radiation à New York.
GR2 (Government): La Suisse a d'ailleurs transmis la première demande au comité puisqu'en 2004, le point focal n'était pas encore en existence.
GR2 (Government): La Suisse a ainsi pris toutes les mesures qui restaient en son pouvoir pour assurer le respect de la Convention.
Dean Spielmann (JudgeP): Merci beaucoup, Monsieur l'Ambassadeur Zellweger.
Dean Spielmann (JudgeP): Je donne maintenant la parole au gouvernement britannique et à l'Etat-National.
Dean Spielmann (JudgeP): Monsieur...
Dean Spielmann (JudgeP): Ah, vous...
Dean Spielmann (JudgeP): Excusez-moi, donc.
Dean Spielmann (JudgeP): Monsieur Schürmann, vous voulez encore ajouter quelque chose?
GR1 (Government): Oui, deux minutes, M. le Président,
GR1 (Government): juste pour conclure.
GR1 (Government): Nous avons affaire à une constellation dans laquelle il est difficile de séparer des éléments portant sur la recevabilité d'une part et du bien-fondé de la requête d'autre part.
GR1 (Government): La Chambre le confirme au paragraphe nolant 3 de son arrêt en affirmant qu'elle examinera dans le cadre du bien-fondé l'argumentation développée par le gouvernement et les tierces intervenants sous l'angle de la compatibilité rationne personnelle.
GR1 (Government): Nous confirmons donc les conclusions présentées dans notre mémoire, à savoir à titre principal la déclarée irrecevable, la requête pour incompatibilité rationne personnelle, titre subsidiaire de déclarée irrecevable la requête pour incompatibilité rationne matérielle et à titre plus subsidiaire encore à dire qu'il n'y a pas eu violation de la Convention.
GR1 (Government): Pour ce qui est de l'éventuel octroi d'une satisfaction équitable, nous nous permettons de renvoyer aux conclusions présentées au paragraphe 65 à 68 de notre mémoire.
GR1 (Government): Nous n'avons pas connaissance d'autres demandes que les requérants auraient déposées pour la procédure devant la Grande Chambre.
Dean Spielmann (JudgeP): Merci, M. Schürmann, pour cette précision.
Dean Spielmann (JudgeP): Maintenant, je donne la parole à l'attorney general, M. Wright, vous avez la parole.
TP2 (ThirdParty): Thank you, Mr. President.
TP2 (ThirdParty): Members of the court, there is, I submit, a single crucial question in this case.
TP2 (ThirdParty): Does the convention, despite its particular role and importance, fall to be interpreted and applied within the system of international law?
TP2 (ThirdParty): The United Kingdom's answer to this question is an emphatic yes, a response that it considers to be strongly supported by the past decisions of the Grand Chamber that are being referred to in this case.
TP2 (ThirdParty): It follows from that yes that where, exceptionally, a contracting party is obliged to act inconsistently with a right of access to a court under Article 6 as a result of obligations arising under binding resolutions of the United Nations Security Council, the obligations under those resolutions must prevail in accordance with well-established principles of law.
TP2 (ThirdParty): Alternatively, Article 6 is correctly understood as establishing a right that is not absolute and consistent with this court's past jurisprudence, which, after all, allows to the state a certain margin of appreciation, is satisfied, its proportionality test is satisfied, where there is no access due to the impact of generally recognized rules of public international law.
TP2 (ThirdParty): The provisions of the United Nations Charter that lead to either of these outcomes, Articles 25, 48, and 103, are well known to this court.
TP2 (ThirdParty): Article 103 has given obligations under the charter superior effect, prevailing in the event of conflict over other obligations under international treaties.
TP2 (ThirdParty): It so states in express terms.
TP2 (ThirdParty): Article 103 constitutes a long and well-established principle of priority that has frequently been reaffirmed or upheld.
TP2 (ThirdParty): Reaffirmed in a series of international instruments, including in Article 30, paragraph 1 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, and in the 1970 Friendly Relations Declaration.
TP2 (ThirdParty): It has been upheld by the International Court of Justice on a number of occasions, and it has been acknowledged and applied by this court.
TP2 (ThirdParty): And consistent with all of that, it is to be emphasized that this is not a principle that is ultimately at odds with the protection of human rights or at odds with the convention.
TP2 (ThirdParty): And there are two points here.
TP2 (ThirdParty): First, looking at the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, in prime position, Article 1.1 is maintaining international peace
TP2 (ThirdParty): and security.
TP2 (ThirdParty): Establishing such peace and security is a fundamental precursor to promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.
TP2 (ThirdParty): Articles 25 and 103 of the Charter are critical to enabling the Security Council to fulfill its primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security under Article 24, which is in turn the essential foundation upon which human rights and freedoms rest.
TP2 (ThirdParty): Secondly, looking at the objects and purposes of the convention, its preamble invokes the aim of the Council of Europe.
TP2 (ThirdParty): That aim is recorded at Article 1 of the Council statute, paragraph C of which provides inter alia that, and I quote, participation in the Council of Europe shall not affect the collaboration of its members in the work of the United Nations.
TP2 (ThirdParty): This suggests that the drafters of the convention did not see its provisions as cutting across the Charter or Article 103, which plays a fundamental role in the context of the Charter and of collective security.
TP2 (ThirdParty): Consistent with this, the convention has been registered with the UN under Article 102 of the Charter.
TP2 (ThirdParty): As such, the contracting parties have indicated that they regard their agreement as one under international law and thus subject to Article 103.
TP2 (ThirdParty): The applicants nonetheless approach this case as if Article 103 was of no bearing.
TP2 (ThirdParty): They make two central contentions.
TP2 (ThirdParty): First, that there is no conflict between Switzerland's obligations under the various Security Council resolutions and under Article 6.
TP2 (ThirdParty): And second, that the listing mechanisms of the Security Council are to be tested by reference to a standard of equivalent protection.
TP2 (ThirdParty): And in this, reliance is placed on the judgment of the second section and on this court's judgment in the Bosphorus case.
TP2 (ThirdParty): Both these contentions are misconceived.
TP2 (ThirdParty): As to the first, the court has sought in its past cases to avoid inconsistency by striving for harmonious interpretation, including by way of applying a presumption that the Security Council does not intend to impose an obligation that leads to a breach of human rights, for example, in the case of al-Jadda.
TP2 (ThirdParty): But that is just a presumption and no more.
TP2 (ThirdParty): Just as in the Nada case, that presumption is rebutted where, as here, clear and explicit language is used in the Security Council resolutions at issue.
TP2 (ThirdParty): The various UN General Assembly and other statements that the applicants now deploy cannot somehow rewrite the plain wording of a binding Security Council resolution.
TP2 (ThirdParty): In particular, the applicants can point to no materials that suggest that the Security Council, which has under the charter the primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security, has intended to retract or modify its decision on what is required for international peace and security, as set out in the plain and mandatory wording of Resolution 1483.
TP2 (ThirdParty): Likewise, this is not a case where there is latitude or discretion in how to implement a given measure such that it is appropriate to review whether the exercise of that discretion is in compliance with applicable provisions of the Convention.
TP2 (ThirdParty): That is something on which each member of the second section was agreed.
TP2 (ThirdParty): The Security Council resolutions at issue have left no discretion at all to the respondent state.
TP2 (ThirdParty): It follows that this is not a case where apparent inconsistencies can be resolved by a particular interpretation of the Security Council resolutions at issue, as the applicants contend.
TP2 (ThirdParty): Nor, as to the applicant's second contention, can conflicting obligations be resolved to the extent, but only to the extent, that a principle of equivalent protection is satisfied.
TP2 (ThirdParty): The Bosphorus case is not the answer.
TP2 (ThirdParty): There are two related points, both of which were passed over by the majority in the second section.
TP2 (ThirdParty): First and most obviously, Bosphorus is not a case where the impact of Articles 25 and 103 of the Charter was at issue.
TP2 (ThirdParty): It concerned the impact on Convention obligations of the transfer by a contracting state of sovereign power to the European community, and nothing more.
TP2 (ThirdParty): The principles stated in the Bosphorus judgment, on which the second section placed such emphasis, were developed by reference to the interplay between the Convention and obligations, which were plainly subsequent under EU treaties.
TP2 (ThirdParty): Neither Bosphorus nor prior cases such as Matthews concern the very particular impact of Article 103 of the Charter, which applies and must apply, regardless of whether the conflicting treaty obligation pre or post states UN membership.
TP2 (ThirdParty): Were it otherwise, UN member states would in effect establish reservations to their obligations under the Charter in relation to their prior treaties, thus undermining both the Charter and all prospects of a cohesive approach to maintaining international peace and security.
TP2 (ThirdParty): Secondly, Bosphorus concerns the case of how to reconcile two competing international law obligations operating on the same plane.
TP2 (ThirdParty): But here, the question is no longer one of compliance with the given provision of the Convention, because pursuant to Article 103, that provision is displaced to the extent that there is a conflict with obligations under the UN Charter.
TP2 (ThirdParty): Thus, the contracting party is not faced with a dilemma, as the majority of the second section put it, and as the applicant has argued.
TP2 (ThirdParty): There is a strict rule of hierarchy in play, and moreover, one that predates the conclusion of the Convention by a number of years, and was well known and understood by those drafting the Convention.
TP2 (ThirdParty): The majority judgment simply did not address these points.
TP2 (ThirdParty): So the United Kingdom does not ask the court to go against its prior jurisprudence.
TP2 (ThirdParty): Rather, because of the very special status of Article 103, the international law backdrop now before the court is quite different to that before the court in Bosphorus.
TP2 (ThirdParty): Nor, I submit, are the applicants assisted by the approach of the European Court of Justice in the Cardi 1 case.
TP2 (ThirdParty): This also raised different issues in a different context.
TP2 (ThirdParty): The simple point is that the Court of Justice was considering an EU measure, not the direct impact of a binding UN Security Council resolution on a UN member state.
TP2 (ThirdParty): It was made clear that the challenge within the community legal order would not entail any challenge to the primacy of the Security Council resolution in international law.
TP2 (ThirdParty): No such reasoning is available here.
TP2 (ThirdParty): There is no interposing layer of EU law in this case, and the challenge is directly to the primacy of Resolution 1483 as a matter of international law.
TP2 (ThirdParty): And the same basic point applies to the applicant's reference to the decision of Ahmed in the UK Supreme Court.
TP2 (ThirdParty): In Ahmed, the only question was what was required to give effect to a UN Security Council resolution in domestic law, an order in council or a specific act, an issue quite different to today's.
TP2 (ThirdParty): So the United Kingdom strongly agrees with the views expressed by judges Lorenzen, Raimondi, and Josien on all these points, and with the analysis in the dissenting opinion more generally, including to the effect that Article 6 in any event allows for its application in a given case to be limited by fundamental obligations under the charter.
TP2 (ThirdParty): The existence of such a limitation is confirmed by the court's jurisprudence on sovereign immunity, dating back to the Al-Azani against the UK case.
TP2 (ThirdParty): Even in a stark case involving allegations of torture, the court correctly applied Article 6 within the context of generally recognized rules of international law.
TP2 (ThirdParty): The International Court of Justice, in its judgment in the jurisdictional immunities case, also came to the conclusion that violations of norms of use cogens did not lead to a lifting of sovereign immunity.
TP2 (ThirdParty): In this case, the court is not looking at how Article 6 is impacted where the underlying allegation is of torture, as in Al-Azani, or some other norm of use cogens.
TP2 (ThirdParty): The underlying claim here is of deprivation of property, which evidently does not introduce a norm of use cogens or even engage an absolute right.
TP2 (ThirdParty): Moreover, a claim of sovereign immunity brings the avenues of redress open to a claimant to a complete halt, whereas the sanctions committee mechanism does provide some recourse for an individual who considers that he has been incorrectly listed.
TP2 (ThirdParty): By contrast, the approach of the majority is deeply problematic.
TP2 (ThirdParty): As the respondent has argued, it establishes a situation where, although a contracting party is bound by the charter to freeze a listed person's assets and transfer these to the development fund for Iraq or its successor, its domestic courts must review whether such persons should be listed at all.
TP2 (ThirdParty): If the domestic court comes to a different view on listing, on the majority's view, the inescapable logic is that the contracting party cannot comply with its clear obligations under the charter.
TP2 (ThirdParty): Thus, Articles 25 and 103 are entirely undermined, with primacy in the international hierarchy being accorded to the Convention.
TP2 (ThirdParty): But what is appropriate to preserve international peace and security could not be a matter for this court.
TP2 (ThirdParty): Stepping back, the analysis of the majority in the second section appears to have been that contracting parties to the Convention could only and did only transfer sovereign power to the UN Security Council pursuant to Article 25 of the charter, to the extent that the Security Council assured equivalent protection with respect to decisions made in meeting its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.
TP2 (ThirdParty): Yet there is nothing in the wording of Articles 25 and 103 to that effect, and the functioning of the mechanisms for maintaining peace and security depends on reciprocity.
TP2 (ThirdParty): If certain UN member states contracting parties to the Convention place restrictions on their compliance with decisions of the Security Council under Article 25 of the charter, the inevitable outcome is that other states will cease to see Article 25 as a hard and fast rule, with the result that the only global mechanism for maintaining international peace and security is placed under threat.
TP2 (ThirdParty): So I conclude by returning to my opening point.
TP2 (ThirdParty): The Convention sits within the framework of international law that is strongly confirmed by the Grand Chamber's approach in the al-Atsani line of cases.
TP2 (ThirdParty): International law recognizes that it is the Security Council that decides on measures necessary to preserve and maintain international peace and security, and accords superior force to its decisions in this respect.
TP2 (ThirdParty): The United Kingdom has intervened in this case because of the importance to the international community as a whole of these foundational principles which cannot be bypassed and must not be undermined.
TP2 (ThirdParty): these are my submissions on behalf of the United Kingdom.
Dean Spielmann (JudgeP): Thank you, Attorney General.
Dean Spielmann (JudgeP): Je donne maintenant la parole au gouvernement français, Monsieur de Bergues.
TP1 (ThirdParty): Monsieur le Président, mesdames et messieurs les juges, la présente affaire amène en substance à se poser deux questions.
TP1 (ThirdParty): La première question vise à déterminer si, au regard de l'article 1er de la Convention, votre cours est compétente, rationnée, personnée pour examiner les mesures litigieuses prises par la Suisse en application de la résolution 1483-2003 du Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies.
TP1 (ThirdParty): La seconde question, qui ne se pose que si votre cours se juge compétente, vise à déterminer si l'article 6 de la Convention impose aux juridictions nationales de contrôler le bien fondé de ces mesures prises par la Suisse, malgré la règle de conflit qui figure à l'article 103 de la Charte des Nations Unies.
TP1 (ThirdParty): En ce qui concerne la première question, le gouvernement français continue de penser que votre cours n'est pas compétente pour examiner la conformité à l'article 6 de la Convention des mesures litigieuses prises par la Suisse.
TP1 (ThirdParty): À cet égard, il convient de rappeler que l'article 1er de la Convention reconnaît à toute personne relevant de la juridiction de la Cour les droits et libertés définis au titre 1 de la Convention.
TP1 (ThirdParty): Ainsi, la notion de juridiction au sens de l'article 1er est une condition nécessaire pour qu'un État puisse être tenu pour responsable des actes ou des omissions qui lui sont imputables et qui sont à l'origine d'une allégation de violation des droits et libertés énoncées par la Convention.
TP1 (ThirdParty): En l'espèce, dans son arrêt, la Chambre a considéré que cette condition était remplie au motif que la résolution 1483-2003 du Conseil de sécurité chargerait les États d'agir en leur nom propre pour mettre en oeuvre cette résolution au niveau national.
TP1 (ThirdParty): Je vous renvoie au point 91 de l'arrêt de la Chambre.
TP1 (ThirdParty): Cependant, le gouvernement français ne partage pas cette interprétation.
TP1 (ThirdParty): En effet, contrairement à ce qu'a jugé la Chambre, il faut considérer que les mesures prises par la Suisse ne l'ont pas été en son nom propre, mais pour le compte des Nations unies, du Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies.
TP1 (ThirdParty): En effet, il faut rappeler, cela a été dit, mais je le répète, la Charte des Nations unies a instauré un système de sécurité collective au sein duquel la responsabilité principale du maintien de la paix et de la sécurité internationale est confiée, en vertu de l'article 24 de la Charte, au Conseil de sécurité.
TP1 (ThirdParty): Pour accomplir sa mission, il appartient au Conseil de sécurité et à lui seul de constater, en application de l'article 39 de la Charte, je cite, l'existence d'une menace contre la paix, d'une rupture de la paix ou d'un acte d'agression.
TP1 (ThirdParty): Et donc, il appartient au Conseil de sécurité de décider les mesures qui seront adoptées pour maintenir ou rétablir la paix et la sécurité internationale, en vertu du chapitre 7 de cette charte.
TP1 (ThirdParty): Il incombe aux Etats membres d'appliquer les décisions prises par le Conseil de sécurité, en application de l'article 25 de la Charte.
TP1 (ThirdParty): Ainsi, dans un avis consultatif du 21 juin 71, relative aux conséquences juridiques pour les Etats de la présence continue de l'Afrique du Sud en Namibie, la Cour internationale de justice a rappelé, je cite, que lorsque le Conseil de sécurité adopte une décision au terme de l'article 25 de la Charte, il incombe aux Etats de se conformer à cette décision, ne pas l'admettre, serait privé cet organe principal des fonctions et pouvoirs essentiels qu'il tient de la charte.
TP1 (ThirdParty): Le caractère contraignant des résolutions du Conseil de sécurité concernant le maintien et le rétablissement de la paix et de la sécurité internationale résulte également de l'article 48, paragraphe 2 de la charte, qui, je vous le rappelle, stipule que ces résolutions sont exécutées par les membres des Nations unies directement et grâce à leur action dans les organismes internationaux appropriés dont ils font partie.
TP1 (ThirdParty): Ainsi, en l'espèce, la Suisse était tenue d'appliquer la résolution 1483-2003 du Conseil de sécurité en sa qualité de membre des Nations unies.
TP1 (ThirdParty): D'ailleurs, cela a été dit, je le répète, cette résolution ne laissait aux Etats membres de l'organisation des Nations unies aucune marge d'appréciation, contrairement à ce que prétendent les requérants.
TP1 (ThirdParty): Et d'ailleurs, la Chambre en a convenu.