TrustHLT/LaCour huggingface dataset:
AP2 (Applicant): I also refer to the Supreme Court's March 1994 judgment, which held in terms that the combined 30-year sentence under Article 70 was, quote, just like a new sentence, resulting from but independent of the others to which prison benefits should be applied.
AP2 (Applicant): Thus, in this case, on the 30th of November, 2000, the Audencia Nacional notified the applicant that the sentences from her eight separate proceedings were combined under Article 70.
AP2 (Applicant): And they thereby determined the penalty applicable to her.
AP2 (Applicant): The 2006 Supreme Court judgment sought to overturn that established practice and sought retrospectively to redefine the concept of penalty.
AP2 (Applicant): It is instructive to consider the text of that judgment.
AP2 (Applicant): The Supreme Court considered that the existing practice was contrary to the text of Article 70 and that under Spanish law, it said the combined 30-year term was not the penalty imposed.
AP2 (Applicant): It reasoned that, quote, from a purely literal point of view, the penalty, pena, and the resulting term of imprisonment to be served, condena, are two different things.
AP2 (Applicant): The court also considered that the practice was contrary to its understanding as to the purpose of Article 70.
AP2 (Applicant): It reasoned that, from a teleological point of view, it would not be logical for a copious criminal record to be reduced to a single new sentence of 30 years because that would be to apply Article 70, I quote, in such a way that committing one murder is punished in the same way as committing 200 murders.
AP2 (Applicant): On this premise, the court concluded that each of the original sentences constituted a separate penalty to be served successively and that remission was to be applied accordingly and not based on the 30-year term.
AP2 (Applicant): Put another way, and using the language of the cases of the court, such as Utley, the nature of the 2006 Supreme Court judgment, as applied retrospectively to the applicant in 2008, was to redefine the penalty imposed under Article 70.
AP2 (Applicant): The purpose of that redefinition, as expressed by the Supreme Court itself, was to punish offenders with multiple sentences more severely than they had been punished under the established pre-2006 practice.
AP2 (Applicant): The effect of that redefinition, as applied to the applicant, was to extend the length of her sentence by nine years.
AP2 (Applicant): The question for this court is not whether the interpretation of the Spanish court in 2006 was reasonable.
AP2 (Applicant): The question is whether the Spanish court was entitled to retrospectively adopt that interpretation to increase the punishment of the applicant.
AP2 (Applicant): Article 7 mandates a resounding no to that question.
AP2 (Applicant): The second point I have relates to foreseeability.
AP2 (Applicant): My point is, the concept of foreseeability arises in two distinct senses under the court's case law.
AP2 (Applicant): And that distinction is overlooked by the government, leading, with respect, to an element of confusion in its analysis.
AP2 (Applicant): In the first sense, the penalty incurred for an offense must be clearly defined by law, and therefore must be foreseeable.
AP2 (Applicant): In the second sense, where rules of criminal liability, or as to the penalty incurred, are clarified through judicial interpretation, any such development must itself be consistent with the essence of the offense and must be reasonably foreseeable.
AP2 (Applicant): The applicant's case is that the reinterpretation of the law in 2006, with its redefinition of the penalty, was a U-turn from the established practice and was not reasonably foreseeable.
AP2 (Applicant): That is foreseeability in the second sense identified.
AP2 (Applicant): The applicant's further or alternative case is that the penalty imposed under Spanish law prior to 2006 was never clearly defined and never reasonably foreseeable.
AP2 (Applicant): That is foreseeability in the first sense.
AP2 (Applicant): Indeed, on the logic of the government's own case, that conclusion seems irresistible.
AP2 (Applicant): The government says that prior to 2006, on the one hand, there was a practice, an established practice, to treat the 30-year combined term as akin to a new independent sentence.
AP2 (Applicant): On the other hand, that practice, it says, was flatly contradictory to the text of Article 70.
AP2 (Applicant): And what is more, it says, there was no case law on the point.
AP2 (Applicant): In those circumstances, it's very difficult to see how they can also maintain that prior to 2006, the penalty was clearly defined and reasonably foreseeable.
AP2 (Applicant): My third point is that the government's case on the facts that the applicant, it says, had no subjective expectation of remission, and that this somehow precludes a breach of Article 7, that that case is bad, both in law and in fact.
AP2 (Applicant): The point is irrelevant.
AP2 (Applicant): As I've set out, it is the penalty and the change to the penalty that was not foreseeable, whatever the position in relation to remission.
AP2 (Applicant): The argument also fails because the foreseeability test is objective.
AP2 (Applicant): The question is what could have been foreseen, not was what was foreseen.
AP2 (Applicant): That must be right.
AP2 (Applicant): One of the purposes of a foreseeability test is to determine whether a penalty is clearly defined by law.
AP2 (Applicant): If a penalty is not clearly defined in an objective sense, that position cannot be changed depending on the subjective expectations of a particular individual.
AP2 (Applicant): Finally, the government's point on the facts is also wrong.
AP2 (Applicant): The government relies heavily on the applicant's failure to appeal the 2001 ruling.
AP2 (Applicant): But nothing can be inferred from that action.
AP2 (Applicant): The applicant's entitlement to remission was automatic.
AP2 (Applicant): And indeed, in 2008, the prison authorities sought to apply the accrued remission and to release her, and but for the 2006 Supreme Court judgment, would have been allowed to do so.
AP2 (Applicant): The government's other point about alleged control by an alleged etter policy of non-collaboration until 1993 is not supported by a shred of evidence, it is disputed, even though the government is now seeking to change its original position that the alleged policy ran until 2002.
AP2 (Applicant): And even though that original position was not supported by a shred of evidence.
AP2 (Applicant): In conclusion, distinguished judges, the applicant's claim under Article VII must succeed.
AP2 (Applicant): To hold otherwise would be to dilute the protection of the individual against arbitrary punishment, protection which is absolutely and unconditionally guaranteed by Article VII.
AP2 (Applicant): I will now hand over to Mr. Arquette.
Dean Spielmann (JudgeP): Thank you, Mr. Swaroop.
Dean Spielmann (JudgeP): The floor is Mr. Ivers, please.
AP1 (Applicant): I'm grateful. As Mr. Muller indicated in his opening, Article 5 wasn't addressed at any
AP1 (Applicant): length really by the government in its pleadings, notwithstanding the fact that it's actually freestanding of Article 7. Article 5 of course makes clear that a deprivation of liberty
AP1 (Applicant): can only take place in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law, and that's to be narrowly interpreted as was stated in Van der Leer. The exception upon the applicant's case is
AP1 (Applicant): Article 5.1a, quote, the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent
AP1 (Applicant): court. In Emmen, Germany it was stated, compliance with national law is not however sufficient.
AP1 (Applicant): Article 5.1 requires in addition that any deprivation of liberty should be in keeping
AP1 (Applicant): with the purpose of protecting the individual from arbitrariness. And arbitrariness is precisely
AP1 (Applicant): what has been visited upon this applicant. When you consider firstly the realities of
AP1 (Applicant): what amounts to shifting sands concerning the critical issue of her remission and consequent, we say, arbitrary deprivation of her liberty. We assert, as you've heard, that the redefinition
AP1 (Applicant): of the penalty and the resultant extension in its scope infringes Article 5 as set out.
AP1 (Applicant): It lacked legality for all the reasons previously cited. Moreover, and independently, the failure
AP1 (Applicant): to grant the remission to which she was entitled in law or the lack of legality in respect of its application infringes Article 5, independent of any considerations concerning the penalty execution dichotomy. Whilst Article 5, paragraph 1 doesn't guarantee a prisoner's early
AP1 (Applicant): release, it has been found to guarantee such release, whereas here there's no discretionary element in relation to the remission. And in this regard, it's irrelevant whether it
AP1 (Applicant): be termed a penalty or an execution. In Grava, the applicant's vote, his arguments under
AP1 (Applicant): Article 7 were rejected on the penalty execution dichotomy, but the Court still found an infringement of Article 5 since, quote, the Italian judicial authorities enjoy no discretion but are forced to apply the remission to the extent provided by law. Thus, the failure to grant the remission
AP1 (Applicant): to which she was entitled by law amounted without more, we say, to an infringement of Article 5. The Government wholly ignore this. They submit in paragraph 83 that the
AP1 (Applicant): section judgment indicated that an infringement of Article 5 was dependent on an infringement of Article 7, that they stand or fall together, and that just misstates the judgment. I just
AP1 (Applicant): ask you to look at it. It does no such thing. In particular, the Government fail to recognise
AP1 (Applicant): that even if they were correct in their penalty execution dichotomy about which much of their pleadings concern, concerning Article 7, this wouldn't affect Article 5, since remission decisions clearly concern questions of liberty, as Graver makes emphatically clear.
AP1 (Applicant): What quality must the law have in relation to Article 5? Amour and France, quality of
AP1 (Applicant): law in this sense implies that where a national law authorises deprivation of liberty, it must be sufficiently accessible, precise and foreseeable in its application in order to avoid all risk of arbitrariness. Moreover, as the section judgment made clear, paragraph
AP1 (Applicant): 74, in relation specifically to Article 5, the question is not what's foreseeable at the time the offence was committed, as the Government contend, but what was reasonably foreseeable at the time the offences were consolidated and notified to the applicant.
AP1 (Applicant): Where there's a system in place, as there is in Spain, to consolidate the sentences, where there's a nexus between the offences, it's wholly artificial just to ignore the actual operation of the criminal justice system concerning multiple offending, which was well-defined and refined in Spain at that time and now. As the section judgment relying on previous
AP1 (Applicant): jurisprudence states concerning Article 5, the Court must also verify that the effective duration of the deprivation of liberty, taking account of the applicable rules on remission of sentence, was sufficiently foreseeable for the applicant. How could she have foreseen,
AP1 (Applicant): even with the assistance of legal advice, that the Supreme Court would redefine the penalty, effectively abolish the whole concept of remission for prisoners serving multiple sentences, the inevitable mathematical reality, just do the maths, would depart from its own practice of applying remission to the consolidated sentences, see 1994 and the 2005 judgments, referred to in the three dissenting judgments in Parrot, or that the legal and administrative practice of 30 years would be abandoned, not simply going forward, but retrospectively, 30 years of certainty? How can legality be sustained in those circumstances?
AP1 (Applicant): From the government's own argument, there are two sets of penalties coexisting upon which remission could attach. Any justice system that plays cat and mouse with a prisoner
AP1 (Applicant): in this way offends legality. The essence of Article 5 concerns legal clarity. The evil
AP1 (Applicant): it seeks to cure is procedural and legal. Where there is no certainty, arbitrary power
AP1 (Applicant): prospers. And the government, in the end, are left to assert, as remarkably they do
AP1 (Applicant): when it's boiled down, firstly, that she wouldn't have foreseen any remission applying to her, notwithstanding all of the above indications that it would. Any lawyer, such as myself,
AP1 (Applicant): practicing criminal law, will tell you that any client is going to ask, what does it effectively mean in terms of when I will be released? And they secondly suggest that she should
AP1 (Applicant): somehow have foreseen that the ruling in 2006 would jettison all the national jurisprudence and administrative practice that applied for 30 years until then, and replace it with a scheme, when you really think about it, that involves performing literally thousands of years' work to obtain any realistic reduction on the two for one. It sounds Kafkaesque.
AP1 (Applicant): Effectively remission was abolished for prisoners such as her. I turn to Article 46. It's
AP1 (Applicant): now well established that, exceptionally, in order to assist a state fulfilling its obligations under Article 46, the court can indicate the type of measure. If there is
AP1 (Applicant): realistically only one measure, that is a ground for recommending that measure. But
AP1 (Applicant): for the decision of the Supreme Court in 2006, the applicant would have been released in July 2008. That, fundamentally, is the submission of the government. There's no middle ground.
AP1 (Applicant): In relation to the integrity of the government's submission concerning the Parrott Doctrine, it requires nothing less than a recommendation of her release. It's either right or it's
AP1 (Applicant): wrong.
AP1 (Applicant): Let me deal with two points the government makes straight away. Firstly, they say that
AP1 (Applicant): the cases relied upon by the court in the chamber concerning Article 46 are qualitatively different to this case. That's simply not the case. The Grand Chamber in Adnansi found
AP1 (Applicant): a violation of 5.1 and continued deprivation of liberty, but said that the unenforced presidential
AP1 (Applicant): pardon led to them making that recommendation that it be applied. I'll be just one minute
AP1 (Applicant): more and I'll finish.
AP1 (Applicant): Secondly, they note that no such order was made in other cases cited, but in Emmen, Germany, it wasn't asked for. In Kafkaris, in actual fact, there was still a parole system in place.
AP1 (Applicant): The life sentence by the very ruling had still remained, and a glance at the other cases shows that they're far from qualitatively different.
AP1 (Applicant): And so the applicant has served the lawful period of detention which, in its wisdom, the Spanish state passed upon her. Regret, Mr. President, is a wonderful thing, but it
AP1 (Applicant): has no place in law. Since 1215, Magna Carta, a fundamental protection against arbitrary
AP1 (Applicant): power, has been the writ of habeas corpus which demands of the state, bring me the body.
AP1 (Applicant): And that's all we ask. The government suggests no alternative remedy, but its silence speaks
AP1 (Applicant): volumes. And if we hear anything at all, it's just the faint tap-tap of liberty knocking
AP1 (Applicant): on a door of the state which itself chose the time of its opening. It's nothing more
AP1 (Applicant): or less than that. A straightforward case, we submit. Thank you very much.
Dean Spielmann (JudgeP): Thank you very much, Mr. Ivers.
Dean Spielmann (JudgeP): La parole est à M. Salama, s'il vous plaît.
GR2 (Government): Señor Presidente, señoras y señores jueces del Tribunal, Es igual uno que 132. Es igual un asesinato que 132 asesinatos.
GR2 (Government): La sentencia del Tribunal Supremo Español de 28 de febrero de 2006 dijo que no podía darse el mismo tratamiento penitenciario a quien ha cometido un asesinato que a quien ha cometido 200. Son 200 el número de delitos de asesinato por los que fue condenado Parot
GR2 (Government): en el caso que resolvió la sentencia de 2006. Sin embargo, la aplicación de la doctrina
GR2 (Government): de la sección que aquí recurrimos supone que un asesinato reciba el mismo tratamiento penitenciario que los 132 delitos de asesinato por los que fue condenada la demandante. 24
GR2 (Government): consumados y 108 en grado de tentativa. Señoras y señores, el Gobierno de España
GR2 (Government): pide la revisión de la sentencia de la sección porque es contraria al convenio y a la reiterada jurisprudencia del Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos en la interpretación de los artículos 7 y 5 del convenio. Para la comprensión de este caso comenzaremos
GR2 (Government): por hacer referencia al derecho español vigente al tiempo de los hechos. En relación con
GR2 (Government): la determinación de la pena y el límite de cumplimiento, la demandante en sus alegaciones ante esta gran sala trata de confundir al tribunal sobre el concepto de pena en el Código Penal de 1973, vigente al tiempo de los hechos. Sin embargo, el derecho penal español es
GR2 (Government): clarísimo. La determinación de la pena no se hace en las tres fases a que se refiere
GR2 (Government): la demandante en sus alegaciones ante esta gran sala. No se hace así ni en España ni
GR2 (Government): en ningún otro sitio. El Código Penal de 1973, como cualquier otro Código Penal, fija
GR2 (Government): penas en abstracto. Los tribunales sentenciadores fijan la pena en concreto valorando la gravedad
GR2 (Government): de los hechos. Esta es la pena. Nadie ha discutido que los delitos y las penas del Código Penal
GR2 (Government): de 1973 fueran bien claros, ni que estuvieran igualmente claras las penas impuestas por los 132 delitos de asesinato por los que fue condenada la demandante. En derecho penal
GR2 (Government): español, ya desde el Código Penal de 1870 y hasta el vigente, se prevé que cuando se cometen varios delitos se imponen varias penas. Todos los códigos penales han especificado
GR2 (Government): que las múltiples penas deben cumplirse sucesivamente por orden de gravedad hasta llegar a un límite máximo de cumplimiento. Este límite en el Código Penal de 1973 era de 30 años y en
GR2 (Government): el vigente Código Penal es de 40 años para delincuentes como la demandante. Llegado el
GR2 (Government): límite máximo de cumplimiento y solo entonces se dejan extinguir todas las penas que queden por cumplir. Así lo dice literalmente el artículo 70 del Código Penal de 1973, penas
GR2 (Government): que por lo tanto subsisten hasta el momento en que llega el límite de cumplimiento.
GR2 (Government): Por tanto, en derecho penal español no existe ninguna duda de que por pena se entienden las múltiples penas impuestas por los delitos cometidos. Así, las formas de extinción
GR2 (Government): de la pena se aplican a cada una de las penas impuestas y no al límite de cumplimiento.
GR2 (Government): Tampoco existe un plazo de cancelación de antecedentes penales del límite de cumplimiento, sino de las penas impuestas. La prescripción opera sobre cada una de las penas impuestas
GR2 (Government): y no sobre el límite de cumplimiento. Y, en fin, el indulto se aplica sobre cada una
GR2 (Government): de las penas y no sobre el límite de cumplimiento. Por lo tanto, en derecho penal español nunca
GR2 (Government): ha existido una pena agregada cuando se cometen múltiples delitos, sino que han existido tantas penas como delitos. Todo esto está claro en el derecho penal
GR2 (Government): español desde 1870. Lo decimos porque la demandante trata de confundir al tribunal
GR2 (Government): sobre una cuestión bien clara. En cuanto a la ejecución de la pena, la redención
GR2 (Government): de penas por el trabajo se regulaba en el artículo 100 del Código Penal de 1973. Está
GR2 (Government): transcrito en el párrafo 20 de la sentencia del Río. La naturaleza y finalidad de esta
GR2 (Government): medida era exclusivamente permitir el adelantamiento de la puesta en libertad antes de cumplir las penas impuestas de los condenados que hubieran mostrado, con su conducta en prisión, una actitud favorable a la reinserción. Desde este momento debe quedar claro que,
GR2 (Government): en este caso, no se ha prolongado ni un solo día la pena impuesta a la demandante ni el límite de cumplimiento. Señoras y señores, aquí únicamente estamos
GR2 (Government): discutiendo sobre el cómputo del trabajo y la buena conducta durante la ejecución de la pena. Señoras y señores, la cuestión es, por
GR2 (Government): tanto, si el Tribunal ha decidido ampliar el ámbito del artículo 7 a la ejecución de la pena. Dicho de otro modo, la pregunta que han de responder es si el Tribunal Europeo
GR2 (Government): de Derechos Humanos ha decidido convertirse en juez de cómo los Estados aplican los permisos carcelarios, la libertad condicional y los demás beneficios penitenciarios. Si la respuesta
GR2 (Government): es no, este caso está resuelto. No puede haber violación ni del artículo 7 ni del
GR2 (Government): artículo 5. La sentencia de la sección, dicho con todos
GR2 (Government): los respetos, se equivoca al decir que la sentencia de 2006 aplica retroactivamente el espíritu de las reformas de 2003. Basta con una simple lectura de la sentencia de
GR2 (Government): 2006, transcrita en el párrafo 27 de la sentencia del Río, para ver que todos sus razonamientos se refieren a la correcta interpretación de preceptos del Código Penal de 1973 vigentes al tiempo de los hechos. Si se hubiera hecho una aplicación retroactiva
GR2 (Government): de la reforma de 2003, la demandante hubiera tenido que cumplir sus penas hasta el límite máximo de 40 años, cosa que no ha ocurrido. Como señaló la sentencia del Tribunal Supremo
GR2 (Government): de 2006, el cómputo de la redención de penas sobre el límite máximo de cumplimiento supondría dar el mismo tratamiento penitenciario a quien comete un asesinato que a quien comete 200.
GR2 (Government): Nadie podría entender esta equiparación, por supuesto mucho menos las víctimas, y no se entendería porque sería incompatible con los principios más básicos que compartimos todos los Estados que hemos firmado el convenio.
GR2 (Government): Quiero destacar la enorme autoritas que tiene la sentencia de 2006, adoptada por el Pleno de la Sala de lo Penal del Tribunal Supremo Español, formada por 15 jueces. La jurisprudencia
GR2 (Government): de esta sentencia ha sido confirmada por más de 25 sentencias del Pleno del Tribunal Constitucional Español, integrado por 11 jueces. El Tribunal Constitucional Español, en sus sentencias,
GR2 (Government): citó extensamente y aplicó la jurisprudencia de este Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos, ante el que tenemos el honor de comparecer, en la distinción entre pena y su cumplimiento.
GR2 (Government): Conforme con esa jurisprudencia, concluyó que no había ninguna vulneración ni del artículo 7 ni del artículo 5 del convenio.
GR2 (Government): A continuación, veremos cómo este derecho se ha aplicado a nuestro caso. La demandante
GR2 (Government): fue condenada en ocho procesos distintos, apenas que sumaban más de 3.000 años de
GR2 (Government): prisión por 132 delitos de asesinato, entre otros delitos. Los delitos los cometió entre
GR2 (Government): 1982 y 1987, año en que fue detenida cuando preparaba nuevos atentados. La demandante
GR2 (Government): fue condenada por aplicación del Código Penal de 1973, vigente al tiempo de los hechos, y que definía con total claridad los delitos y las penas. Esta cuestión no ha sido discutida,
GR2 (Government): como reconoce la sentencia del Río en el párrafo 49. Tampoco se ha discutido que las
GR2 (Government): penas se impusieron en procesos justos con todas las garantías. En cinco de las ocho