TrustHLT/LaCour huggingface dataset:
GR1 (Government): On the other hand are the rights of homosexuals to equal treatment, and the principle that those who provide services to the public should not be permitted to discriminate on grounds of sexual orientation.
GR1 (Government): How that balance is to be struck, and the circumstances in which private beliefs should be required to give way to wider public concerns, is a matter on which different opinions may be held, attracting therefore a particularly wide margin of appreciation.
GR1 (Government): Ms Liddell sincerely believes, as the Court put it at paragraph 7, that's the Court of Appeals judgment, she sincerely believes that, enabling same-sex unions to be formed was, contrary to God's instructions.
GR1 (Government): Mr McFarlane sincerely believes that homosexual activity is sinful, and that he should do nothing which directly endorses it.
GR1 (Government): Their employers, respectively the London Borough of Islington, a public authority and, relate, a private body, were however committed to the provision of services on a non-discriminatory basis, and to ensuring that members of the public, regardless of their sexual orientation, are treated with dignity and have equal access to services.
GR1 (Government): There can, we submit, be little doubt that promoting equality and tackling discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation is a legitimate, indeed a weighty, aim for a public authority or a private employer.
GR1 (Government): Discrimination affects individuals' sense of self-worth and the public perception of their value as members of the community.
GR1 (Government): The Court has now held on many occasions that particularly convincing and weighty reasons are necessary to justify subjecting individuals to differences in treatment on the grounds of their sexual orientation.
GR1 (Government): It is submitted by Ms Liddell that any interference with her Article 9 and 14 rights was not proportionate, as there were, as she put it, less severe and intrusive means available to Islington.
GR1 (Government): Islington could, it is said, have arranged its services so that other registrars, without Ms Liddell's beliefs, would officiate in civil partnerships.
GR1 (Government): It is also noted by her that other local authorities did not designate marriage registrars as civil partnership registrars if they had religious objections.
GR1 (Government): Those submissions, with respect, do not deal with the aim that Islington was pursuing.
GR1 (Government): In requiring Ms Liddell to register civil partnerships, Islington was not simply ensuring that it had sufficient registrars available to cover the borough.
GR1 (Government): It may well be that by rearranging its services, Islington could in practice have assigned same-sex couples to other registrars, or it could have decided, again on the same pragmatic basis, not to designate Ms Liddell as a civil partnership registrar because of her views on same-sex unions and required others to do so.
GR1 (Government): Similarly, Mr Macfarlane could perhaps have been assigned only heterosexual couples to council.
GR1 (Government): But providing an efficient registrar and counselling service was not the legitimate aim that was and is at issue in this case.
GR1 (Government): Islington and Relate's aim, as found by the Court of Appeal and the Employment Appeal Tribunal respectively, was to provide equal access to services irrespective of sexual orientation and thereby to communicate a clear commitment to non-discrimination.
GR1 (Government): That is in itself a legitimate aim.
GR1 (Government): Islington and Relate were entitled each to conclude that it would undermine its pursuit of that aim to make exceptions for employees as to the work they were required to perform because those employees did not wish to provide services to same-sex couples.
GR1 (Government): Islington and Relate's approach also reflects the decision of the UK legislature as to how competing interests in this area are to be balanced.
GR1 (Government): That legislation in effect, and subject to narrow exceptions, outlawed discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation, save in very limited circumstances.
GR1 (Government): The following legislation applied at the material time in Great Britain.
GR1 (Government): It's now been replaced by the Equality Act 2010, but with essentially the same provisions.
GR1 (Government): The 2003 regulations prohibited discrimination on grounds of religion and belief in employment.
GR1 (Government): Insofar as the applicants complained that Islington or Relate should have altered their policies to accommodate their religious beliefs and not required them, as it required all other employees, to offer services to members of the public irrespective of their sexual orientation, they were able to bring proceedings for indirect discrimination pursuant to Regulation 3.1b.
GR1 (Government): Even if the applicants were disadvantaged by those policies, however, it would not be unlawful to apply the policies if they constituted a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim.
GR1 (Government): That's Regulation 3.b. Roman III.
GR1 (Government): That was thus a factual inquiry for the domestic courts to undertake.
GR1 (Government): Legislation was also put in place to prohibit discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation, in particular in the provision of services and the exercise of public functions.
GR1 (Government): See for that purpose the Equality Act brackets sexual orientation regulations of 2007, referred to and analysed in particular in the Court of Appeals judgment in the Liddell case.
GR1 (Government): Pursuant to Regulation 4.1 of those regulations,
GR1 (Government): it was unlawful to discriminate on grounds of sexual orientation by refusing to provide goods, facilities or services that were otherwise made available to the public.
GR1 (Government): Pursuant to Regulation 3.1, a person discriminates against another
GR1 (Government): by treating them on grounds of their sexual orientation less favourably than others are or would be treated.
GR1 (Government): There were only limited exceptions which applied to organisations, the purpose of which is the practice or advancement of religion or belief.
GR1 (Government): Such organisations were permitted to discriminate on grounds of sexual orientation, in restrictions on membership or in the provision of goods, facilities and services, provided that the restrictions were necessary to comply with the organisation's doctrine or to avoid conflict with strongly held religious convictions of a significant number of the religion's followers.
GR1 (Government): Treating people less favourably on grounds of sexual orientation is thus prohibited unless some clear exception, such as that recognised by Regulation 14, applies.
GR1 (Government): Thus, it is submitted that the Court of Appeal at paragraph 73 in the Liddell case was correct to conclude that the legislature has decided that the requirements of a modern liberal democracy, such as the United Kingdom, include outlawing discrimination in the provision of goods, facilities and services on grounds of sexual orientation, subject only to very limited exceptions.
GR1 (Government): That is a balance that we submit a democratic society is entitled to take.
GR1 (Government): I can deal with Article 14 much more shortly.
GR1 (Government): My submission is that Article 14 adds nothing to the Article 9 analysis in context.
GR1 (Government): It is to be noted that the applicants in the present cases do not suggest that they were less favourably treated than other employees because they were Christians or that members of other faiths were treated more favourably, or insofar as such claims are made, they aren't sustainable on the facts.
GR1 (Government): It is not suggested that Ms O'Wader and Mrs Chaplin were not permitted to wear a visible cross because their employers had some particular animus towards Christians, or that explains, relates or is linked in the treatment of Mr Liddell and Mr Macfarlane.
GR1 (Government): The applicant's contention is that they should have been treated differently to other employees in that their employer's uniform policy or requirement that they provide services to all, regardless of sexual orientation, should have been waived or disapplied to accommodate their religious beliefs.
GR1 (Government): It is thus evident that that raises essentially the same issues as arise under Article 9.
GR1 (Government): In this kind of case, the court has frequently in the past recognised that the reasoning under Article 9 will be equally applicable when that article is read with Article 14.
GR1 (Government): Thus, for example, in Sahin, the Grand Chamber concluded that the applicant's rights protected by Article 9 had not been breached because the ban on wearing the headscarf in the educational institutions in Turkey pursued a legitimate aim and were proportionate.
GR1 (Government): It noted at Para 165 that the reasons which led the court to conclude that there had been no violation of Article 9 incontestably also apply to the complaint under Article 14 taken individually or together with the aforementioned provision.
GR1 (Government): Precisely the same approach was taken by the Grand Chamber in Jewish Liturgical Association, see Para 86.
GR1 (Government): If a decision to ban Islamic headscarves is a justified and proportionate interference with the rights of Muslim women to manifest their religious beliefs pursuant to Article 9, it cannot, we submit, constitute unjustified, disproportionate discrimination against Muslims pursuant to Article 14 read with Article 9.
GR1 (Government): That applies equally to the present cases.
GR1 (Government): The justification for the interference, if any, with Article 9 rights will apply equally to preclude a finding of unjustified discrimination.
GR1 (Government): So, for example, if, for the reasons set out above, requiring Ms Liddell to conduct civil partnerships notwithstanding her Christian beliefs is justified and proportionate pursuant to Article 9, it will not constitute an unjustified failure to treat her as a Christian differently to others who do not share her beliefs so as to breach Article 14.
GR1 (Government): For all these reasons, we invite the court to find that there has been no violation of either Article 9 or Article 9 read with Article 14 in any of these cases.
Lech Garlicki (JudgeP): Thank you very much.
Lech Garlicki (JudgeP): Now I call Mr. James Dingemans for the first of the applicants.
AP2 (Applicant): Mr. President and members of the court, in the case of Miss Oueda, we respectfully ask
AP2 (Applicant): the court to do the following four things. First, to affirm the fundamental importance
AP2 (Applicant): of religious rights, notably absent from the United Kingdom government's submissions.
AP2 (Applicant): Secondly, to repudiate judicial doctrines which have been employed to undermine religious rights and which are not founded on the wording of the Convention. Thirdly, to find violations
AP2 (Applicant): of Article 9 on its own and Article 9 when read with Article 14. And finally, to award
AP2 (Applicant): just satisfaction. My learned friend has taken you to some facts. May I highlight some of
AP2 (Applicant): them. Miss Oueda was a committed, practising, Anglo-Egyptian Christian who wished to wear
AP2 (Applicant): visibly a small cross on a chain around her neck at her place of work at British Airways as a personal expression of faith. Miss Oueda regarded wearing and displaying the cross
AP2 (Applicant): as integral to her identity and being. And she's hardly the first Christian who has wanted
AP2 (Applicant): to wear the cross as a distinguishing feature of her faith. She was working alongside colleagues
AP2 (Applicant): who were able to wear religious symbols and attire, including the Sikh turban, the Sikh bracelet, the Muslim hijab, and the Jewish shawl cap. It was indisputable that wearing
AP2 (Applicant): the cross visibly did not have any detrimental effect on Miss Oueda's ability to do her job.
AP2 (Applicant): British Airways prevented Miss Oueda from wearing her cross. She was told it was jewellery.
AP2 (Applicant): British Airways said that an employee who wished to wear a religious item outside his or her uniform was only permitted to do so if British Airways accepted that it was a mandatory scriptural requirement. British Airways considered that that condition was
AP2 (Applicant): fulfilled in the case of items such as the hijab, the turban, but not fulfilled in the case of the cross. Miss Oueda has never sought to contend that wearing a cross is a mandatory
AP2 (Applicant): scriptural requirement, but it was of great importance to her to be able to wear it visibly.
AP2 (Applicant): And she found the requirement to conceal it, next to colleagues wearing their own religious symbols and attire, a great insult to her. We submit that it is not for British Airways
AP2 (Applicant): or the courts, then deciding on her claim for discrimination, to judge whether the religious symbol is mandatory or not. It's notorious that Islamic scholars disagree on whether
AP2 (Applicant): wearing a hijab is mandatory or not. Internal discussions and memoranda did not alter the
AP2 (Applicant): situation. My learned friend has almost lost a year in submissions. It was May 2006 that
AP2 (Applicant): the issue first arised, and it was until the 3rd of February 2007 that British Airways changed their policy and Miss Oueda was permitted to come back to work and to start to be paid again. British Airways refused to compensate Miss Oueda for her loss of salary, pension
AP2 (Applicant): and benefits during the period she was off work. And Miss Oueda says that they've continued
AP2 (Applicant): to harass her since. She's never received any payment for the period of time that she
AP2 (Applicant): was off work, and unless she succeeds in these proceedings, there will be nothing in the laws of the United Kingdom to stop British Airways from going back to its pre-existing uniform policy, permitting others to wear religious attire and symbols, and preventing Miss Oueda from wearing her cross. The importance of religious rights. Religious freedoms and
AP2 (Applicant): rights guaranteed by Article 9 are some of the most important rights in the Convention.
AP2 (Applicant): That does not mean that they can trump or outrank other rights, but it does mean that they should not be relegated below other rights or undermined by judicial doctrines such as the doctrine of non-interference, especially in circumstances where such doctrines are not derived from the wording of the Convention. There is nothing in the wording of Article
AP2 (Applicant): 9 which justifies the Government's approach that Article 9 stops the moment you cross the threshold of work. If 80% of our lives is spent working, what value is a right that
AP2 (Applicant): ceases the moment you cross the threshold of work? Did sexual orientation rights stop
AP2 (Applicant): the moment that persons crossed the threshold of working for the armed forces? No. Was there
AP2 (Applicant): any difference in wording between the words of Article 8 and 9 which justifies drawing a distinction for work? No. Unless this Court declares and affirms and shows the value of
AP2 (Applicant): religious rights, the worth of religious rights will continue to be diminished. Where is the
AP2 (Applicant): pluralism indissociable from a modern democratic society in that? In our written cases we have
AP2 (Applicant): set out a number of authorities affirming the importance of religious rights. For reasons
AP2 (Applicant): of time I won't go through them, but we do respectfully commend them to the Court. Those
AP2 (Applicant): are propositions that have to be confronted and in our submission are not confronted by the Government's approach. As Lord Nicholls said in Williamson and Secretary of State,
AP2 (Applicant): without the right to express and practise one's belief, freedom of religion would be emasculated. And we submit that the following principles of general application under Article
AP2 (Applicant): 9 can be discerned. First, that they have a primordial place in a democratic society.
AP2 (Applicant): Secondly, that the pluralism indissociable from a democratic society depends on protecting these freedoms. And thirdly, that without the right to express and practise one's beliefs,
AP2 (Applicant): freedom of religion would be an emasculated right. We also submit that Article 9 contains
AP2 (Applicant): within it a positive obligation. That's not new jurisprudence. In Otto Preminger and Austria
AP2 (Applicant): the Court said, the manner in which religious beliefs and doctrines are opposed or denied is a matter which may engage the responsibility of the State. In Józef Kossuth and Poland
AP2 (Applicant): the Court said that whether the case is analysed in terms of a positive duty on the State to take reasonable and appropriate measures to secure the applicant's rights, or in terms of an interference by a public authority to be justified, the applicable principles are broadly similar. And there's nothing in Gildani and Georgia to justify the narrow approach
AP2 (Applicant): contended for by my learned friend. We therefore ask you to repudiate the doctrine of non-interference
AP2 (Applicant): which has been analysed by the courts in the United Kingdom. In Williamson in the Court
AP2 (Applicant): of Appeal, Lady Justice Arden suggested that the doctrine could be expressed in the following manner. A person who can take steps which will avoid any conflict between his beliefs
AP2 (Applicant): and those acts which he claims interferes with those beliefs, or voluntarily accepts a regime which leads to such a conflict, cannot complain of an interference with his freedom to manifest his beliefs. That doctrine was described as harsh, it was described as unlikely
AP2 (Applicant): to be right, and we do respectfully submit that it is plainly wrong. It is inconsistent
AP2 (Applicant): with the proper approach to religious rights, it is impossible to reconcile the doctrine with the general points of principle made by the Court about the importance of religious rights. There is no other fundamental right or freedom which is subjected to this doctrine,
AP2 (Applicant): and there are no material differences between Article 9 and the text of other articles which suggest that this is justified. It is, we submit, worse than the austerity of tabulated
AP2 (Applicant): legalism. It isn't even founded on the wording of the Convention. It is a judicial attempt
AP2 (Applicant): to rationalise authorities which, in our submission, has come up with the wrong answer. Was there
AP2 (Applicant): an interference with the right to manifest in this case? This is question 1 of the Court's
AP2 (Applicant): questions to us, and we submit that the answer was plainly yes, because this was a situation where Miss Aweda wanted to wear her religious symbol next to persons who were wearing their religious symbols. A sincere desire to display universally recognised symbols of faith, whether
AP2 (Applicant): or not it is a scriptural requirement, and however many other people wish to do so, is plainly an expression of religion that falls within the scope of Article 9 protection.
AP2 (Applicant): The act of wearing the cross had no purpose other than to declare and make outwardly manifest her Christian faith, which has worldwide recognition as a symbol that is intrinsic to the faith and was recognised by this Court in Lauzzi and Italy. Then the question is whether it
AP2 (Applicant): was infringed, and BA stopped her from wearing the cross, and we say it is no answer to say that she was permitted to wear it hidden. That required her to conceal her own identity
AP2 (Applicant): next to employees who were entitled to express it. The treatment by the courts in the United
AP2 (Applicant): Kingdom was inadequate. At paragraph 22 of the Court of Appeal's judgement, it was said
AP2 (Applicant): that the jurisprudence of Article 9 adds nothing to Miss Aweda's case. Well, if that is right,
AP2 (Applicant): we respectfully submit that the Court of Appeal have failed to grasp the fundamental importance of Article 9 in these cases. There was a clear infringement of Miss Aweda's right to manifest
AP2 (Applicant): her religious belief, which required justification. Can it then be justified? The Employment Tribunal
AP2 (Applicant): found not. The Employment Appeal Tribunal found not. It was only the majority of the
AP2 (Applicant): Court of Appeal who said it could be justified. But how could it be proportionate when she
AP2 (Applicant): was working next to other colleagues who were entitled to express their religious freedoms?
AP2 (Applicant): In the short time remaining, I will deal with Article 9 and 14. We submit that the United
AP2 (Applicant): Kingdom Government and courts are in breach of obligations under Article 9, read with Article 14. My friend Miss Rose, on behalf of Miss Liddell, will develop the law and
AP2 (Applicant): submissions in respect of that, and we respectfully adopt it. But we do say this. There was nothing
AP2 (Applicant): that my learned friend said, or could be said, to justify the difference in treatment between Miss Aweda and those of her colleagues who were entitled to display their own religious beliefs. What? Because she is a member of a tolerant religion where you are entitled
AP2 (Applicant): to choose, you have less rights? That, we respectfully submit, would be a very unfortunate
AP2 (Applicant): conclusion. Can I just conclude by saying this? Miss Aweda has suffered a real loss
AP2 (Applicant): of earnings, interest on the loss of earnings, real loss of pension, and union dues. The
AP2 (Applicant): process described in paragraph 23.4 of the Employment Tribunal's judgment, by which
AP2 (Applicant): her dress was physically rearranged, with a hand around her neck, tucking it into the front of her blouse, caused her shame, upset, embarrassment and humiliation. It was a violation
AP2 (Applicant): of her, an unconsented touching, and bullying and victimisation. The fact that she has never
AP2 (Applicant): obtained her address is a burning sore to her that continues to this day.
Lech Garlicki (JudgeP): Thank you very much. I call now Ms Rose.
AP1 (Applicant): Mr President and members of the court, my submissions concern the case of Ms Liddell.
AP1 (Applicant): Lillian Liddell was a registrar whose duties included registering and conducting civil marriage ceremonies. She'd been employed in that capacity by the London Borough of
AP1 (Applicant): Islington, a local government authority, since 2002. Some years later, in 2005, new legislation
AP1 (Applicant): came into force in the United Kingdom, under which couples of the same sex were entitled to seek to register civil partnerships, which are for all practical and legal purposes indistinguishable from marriage. Ms Liddell is a Christian. She has a sincere religious belief that marriage
AP1 (Applicant): is only properly a relationship which can be concluded between a man and a woman. For
AP1 (Applicant): that reason, she has a conscientious objection to conducting or registering civil partnerships.
AP1 (Applicant): And she thus asked Islington, before the new law came into force, not to designate her as a civil partnerships registrar under the new law. Islington refused and insisted
AP1 (Applicant): that Ms Liddell, together with all of its other registrars, should change the terms of her employment and should be designated as a civil partnerships registrar. She was
AP1 (Applicant): disciplined for gross misconduct and ultimately forced to resign because of her refusal in these circumstances to act as a registrar of civil partnerships. The issue before this
AP1 (Applicant): court is whether, in treating her in that way, Islington subjected Ms Liddell to unjustified discrimination on grounds of her religious belief, contrary to Article 14 of the Convention, read together with Article 9. And we stress that this is not a claim brought under Article
AP1 (Applicant): 9 alone, it is a claim brought under Article 14, a claim of discrimination. The particular