TrustHLT/LaCour huggingface dataset:
AP1 (Applicant): And further, this standpoint is in line with the recommendations by the Commissioner for Human Rights and the UN Refugee Agency that is made to this Court.
AP1 (Applicant): The final question is hereafter whether the high numbers of refugees in 2015 should allow Denmark with a wider room to limit family reunification than what is otherwise allowed under the Convention and in the Court's case law.
AP1 (Applicant): I have dealt with this question in extension in my written submission and will therefore limit myself to two essential points.
AP1 (Applicant): The first goes to the government's general claim that the Grand Chamber's ruling must be structured in such a manner that the Court takes a cautious approach and in principle leaves it to the Danish government and other European governments to decide on its own immigration politics.
AP1 (Applicant): I submit that the government's claim is wrong and I submit that it is behind, beside the point.
AP1 (Applicant): The reason for this is that when it comes to those fundamental rights, differentiated treatment, the treatment of vulnerable groups, the essential rights to family life, the Court has firmly held that it will carry out an intensive review of the contracting state's claim that there was a public emergency need to limit the rights otherwise afforded under the Convention.
AP1 (Applicant): And I would say that this is particularly so if the government's claim, likewise in the present matter, is not supported truly by evidence and objective assessment of relevant facts, but rather on speculative policy decisions in the wake of a general election.
AP1 (Applicant): The second point goes to the government's margin of appreciation.
AP1 (Applicant): When considering this, I submit that the Grand Chamber must acknowledge that the three-year waiting period surely is at the outer edge of the human rights limitations.
AP1 (Applicant): In the same direction points, and perhaps even more critical, that the Court has held firmly in its present case law, when it comes to differentiated treatment based on a status that is beyond the individual's control, the contracting state's margin of appreciation is very narrow.
AP1 (Applicant): So for instance, when differentiated treatment is based on gender or on race, the Court has ruled that the status, sorry, has ruled that there's no margin of appreciation because the status is inherent and because the individual do not have an ability to change that status.
AP1 (Applicant): There is a very good reason to apply this restriction on state discretion in the present case.
AP1 (Applicant): The reason is that the differentiated treatment by the Danish government is based on one single determining factor, namely that my client has fled the violence in Syria.
AP1 (Applicant): This violence is indisputable a fact or status that is utterly and hopelessly beyond my client's control.
AP1 (Applicant): This overriding fact that the situation is unchangeable for my client and for other Syrian refugees is the crux of the matter as I see it.
AP1 (Applicant): And if the Grand Chamber confers to this, I will respectfully submit that the Court then must afford the government with a narrow margin of appreciation and that a differentiated reunification practice in times where things are difficult should center around a maximum one-year waiting period as also set forth by the Commissioner for Human Rights.
AP1 (Applicant): And this will end my oral submission.
AP1 (Applicant): So thank you, Mr. President, members of the Court.
Robert Spano (JudgeP): Thank you very much indeed, Mr. Dahlager.
Robert Spano (JudgeP): I can also confirm that your presentation was met with clear audio and video.
Robert Spano (JudgeP): I now turn to the Council of Europe Human Rights Commissioner, Mrs. Mijatović.
Robert Spano (JudgeP): You have the floor for ten minutes, please.
TP1 (ThirdParty): Mr. President, distinguished members of the Court, ladies and gentlemen,
TP1 (ThirdParty): I have decided to intervene in this case because the issue of family reunification is key to the lives of many people receiving international protection in Europe.
TP1 (ThirdParty): It is no exaggeration to say that once their basic safety and immediate humanitarian needs are met, ensuring that families can be brought back together again is one of the central preoccupations of many of them.
TP1 (ThirdParty): Indeed, there is ample research showing that devastating effects of concerns about the situation of family members who are left behind, showing the mental well-being of recipients of international protection.
TP1 (ThirdParty): Such concerns have been found to get in the way of language learning, job market orientation and other actions necessary for integration.
TP1 (ThirdParty): In this way, family separation may both negatively affect recipients of international protection and their host societies.
TP1 (ThirdParty): Furthermore, delays in family reunification may leave family members in a vulnerable situation in the country of origin or in the countries in the region to which they have fled.
TP1 (ThirdParty): When family reunification is unduly restricted, this eliminates an important safe and legal route to Council of Europe member states which may let family members to seek dangerous and irregular routes to Europe.
TP1 (ThirdParty): From this perspective, it is of particular concern when member states introduce restrictions on the access to and enjoyment of family reunification for beneficiaries of international protection.
TP1 (ThirdParty): One of the ways in which access to family reunification has been limited has been to introduce long waiting times before a recipient of international protection can file an application for reunification.
TP1 (ThirdParty): In addition, I have been particularly concerned by situations in which different family reunification regimes were introduced for different protection statuses.
TP1 (ThirdParty): While those recognized under the 1951 Refugee Convention are usually exempt from such long waiting times, although they may also face restrictions, they have been increasingly applied to persons with either subsidiary or temporary protection status.
TP1 (ThirdParty): In Denmark, the restrictions on family reunification at issue in the present case is a three-year waiting period applied to persons at risk of death penalty or torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment when this is based on generalized situation in the country of origin.
TP1 (ThirdParty): This same restriction is not applied to those recognized as 1951 Convention refugees or to those for whom risks upon return are not based on a generalized situation.
TP1 (ThirdParty): This court, with regard to 1951 Convention refugees, have found that family unity is an essential right and that family reunion is an essential element in enabling persons who have fled persecution to resume a normal life to be able to return to their country of origin.
TP1 (ThirdParty): Certain elements have played a central role in this court's considerations when reaching that conclusion.
TP1 (ThirdParty): Firstly, refugees cannot be returned and as such they cannot be expected to reestablish family life in their country of origin.
TP1 (ThirdParty): Secondly, the conferral of refugee status confirms that a person has not made a conscious or voluntary decision to leave family members behind and should therefore not be held responsible for the interruption of family life.
TP1 (ThirdParty): And thirdly, refugee status constitutes evidence of vulnerability which should be taken into account in family reunification cases.
TP1 (ThirdParty): In my view, each of the elements I mentioned should apply in the same way to 1951 Convention refugees as they do to persons provided with international protection on other grounds.
TP1 (ThirdParty): When a protection status is granted because a person would face serious human rights violations in his or her country of origin, this clearly marks an individual out as being unreturnable and therefore unable to reestablish family life in the country of origin.
TP1 (ThirdParty): Also, such a protection status clearly acknowledges the threats faced by the person which would mean they cannot be considered as having voluntarily left their country of origin, consciously leaving family members behind.
TP1 (ThirdParty): In addition, as this court has acknowledged, a person's status as an asylum seeker may be evidence of his or her vulnerability.
TP1 (ThirdParty): If this is the case for asylum seekers, this would surely be the case for a person who, having undergone asylum procedure, is recognized as being in need of international protection.
TP1 (ThirdParty): The main justification for the differences in family reunification rights between different status holders is that the need for protection of some of them is supposedly more temporary than for others, such as 1951 Convention of Refugees.
TP1 (ThirdParty): In this light, I have already submitted that a status that is formally more temporary, such as one-year residence permit, invariably leaves open the possibility for renewal.
TP1 (ThirdParty): This means that a person with such a status may be in need of protection for a significantly longer period than covered by the initial permit.
TP1 (ThirdParty): Furthermore, it is noteworthy that certain national groups are disproportionately affected by the introduction of new temporary statuses and the subsequent waiting periods for family reunification.
TP1 (ThirdParty): This is specifically the case for Syrian nationals.
TP1 (ThirdParty): As I have underlined, the impact that these new rules have on certain groups is visible from statistics in various Council of Europe member states, including Denmark.
TP1 (ThirdParty): This is so despite the fact that even at a time when many of these restrictions were introduced in 2015 and 2016, the conflict in Syria and the widely recognized impossibility of return in the vast majority of cases had already been protected.
TP1 (ThirdParty): Given the security situation at that time, it is in my view questionable that it could have been reasonably presumed that the protection status of Syrians could be ended after a one-year period or even in the years following that.
TP1 (ThirdParty): I note that even now, several years after this shift in legislation, the overwhelming majority of Syrians who apply for asylum in EU member states are still granted international protection.
TP1 (ThirdParty): In many cases, restrictions on family reunification in Council of Europe member states have been introduced in the context of increasing arrivals in 2015 and 2016 and associated concerns about pressures on their integration and welfare systems.
TP1 (ThirdParty): In this context, I again express my concern that specific national groups are particularly affected by such restrictions.
TP1 (ThirdParty): I also note that the fact that prolonging family separation is ultimately detrimental to integration efforts.
TP1 (ThirdParty): Furthermore, in many cases, restrictions have been maintained even after the pressures that led to their introduction have eased.
TP1 (ThirdParty): I would also like to share with the Court my concern over the length of the delays in family reunification.
TP1 (ThirdParty): Considering the severe consequences of family reunification and the severe consequences of family separation for beneficiaries of international protections and their family members, the issue paper that my office published in 2017 to address the increasing restrictions on family reunification recommended that member states consider waiting times of more than one year inappropriate.
TP1 (ThirdParty): I further note that the Danish law's waiting period of three years is comparable to the length of time that the Court previously found to be excessive, particularly in the case already mentioned of Tandem Muzinga v. France.
TP1 (ThirdParty): I also note that the period of family separation will likely be much longer than just the three-year waiting period established by Denmark.
TP1 (ThirdParty): Family separation will have already occurred from the moment of flight and endures during the procedure to confer a protection status of the applicant.
TP1 (ThirdParty): Once an application for family reunification can be submitted, its processing and the making of subsequent arrangements for the de facto reunification will take additional time.
TP1 (ThirdParty): In any situation, therefore, family reunification typically takes a long time.
TP1 (ThirdParty): Adding to this three-year waiting period before an application can be made in the first place will therefore significantly prolong family separation and hardship faced both by the beneficiary of international protection and any family members left behind.
TP1 (ThirdParty): To conclude, let me reiterate the importance of the ability of all those granted international protection, regardless of whether this is as a 1951 Convention refugee or under another status, to reunite with family members left behind.
TP1 (ThirdParty): In light of the similar situation of persons with such other statuses to 1951 Convention refugees and the fact that their need for protection is in practice almost never temporary, I believe differential treatment with regards to family reunification and in particular subjecting them to a waiting period cannot be objectively and reasonably justified.
TP1 (ThirdParty): I hope my comment will be helpful to the Court and I thank you for your attention.
Robert Spano (JudgeP): Thank you very much, Madam Commissioner.
Robert Spano (JudgeP): Before I give the floor to the Swiss government, may I remind the parties that Mr. Chablais will speak in French,
Robert Spano (JudgeP): so you may wish to switch to the interpretation provided to you.
Robert Spano (JudgeP): Alors, je me tourne vers le gouvernement suisse.
Robert Spano (JudgeP): Mr. Chablais, vous avez la parole.
Robert Spano (JudgeP): Mr. Chablais.
TP2 (ThirdParty): Voilà, vous m'entendez?
Robert Spano (JudgeP): Très bien, merci.
TP2 (ThirdParty): Monsieur le Président, Mesdames et Messieurs les Juges, l'affaire dont il est question aujourd'hui nous rappelle, à travers le destin du requérant, le drame du conflit syrien et le lot de souffrance qu'il entraîne.
TP2 (ThirdParty): L'affaire illustre aussi le fait que les déplacements de population et les vagues migratoires concernent de nombreux pays européens, y compris ceux qui sont géographiquement éloignés des foyers de tension.
TP2 (ThirdParty): Avec d'autres, la Suisse en fait partie.
TP2 (ThirdParty): Il faut cependant garder à l'esprit que la question qui se pose ici n'est pas celle de la protection à accorder aux personnes qui fuient les persécutions dans leur pays.
TP2 (ThirdParty): La nécessité de cette protection est largement reconnue et admise par nos gouvernements.
TP2 (ThirdParty): Il faut ainsi se réjouir que le requérant ait obtenu, quelques mois seulement après son arrivée au Danemark, une protection temporaire sur la base de la législation relative aux étrangers.
TP2 (ThirdParty): La question qui vous occupe aujourd'hui concerne la façon dont nos États sont tenus de permettre aux personnes bénéficiant d'une protection internationale de mener leur vie familiale, plus particulièrement quant à la possibilité de faire venir leurs conjoints pour les rejoindre.
TP2 (ThirdParty): Cette question dépasse le sort du cas d'espèce.
TP2 (ThirdParty): Potentiellement, ce sont de très nombreuses personnes qui pourraient être concernées par l'issue de cette affaire, et ce, dans plusieurs États membres du Conseil de l'Europe.
TP2 (ThirdParty): Un arrêt de votre cours, qui étendrait les possibilités de bénéficier d'un regroupement familial pour des personnes n'ayant pas obtenu le statut de réfugié, pourrait donc avoir, en Suisse également, des répercussions considérables.
TP2 (ThirdParty): En ce qui concerne le grief de violation de l'article 8, votre cours rappelle régulièrement que les États ont, en vertu d'un principe de droite internationale bien établi, le droit de contrôler l'entrée des non-nationaux sur leur sol, et que la Convention ne garantit pas le droit pour un étranger d'entrer ou de résider dans un pays particulier, voire par exemple une aire contre Pays-Bas, paragraphe 54.
TP2 (ThirdParty): Il s'agit là d'une prérogative essentielle qui appartient aux États, qui doivent pouvoir réagir aux défis posés par les mouvements migratoires transfrontaliers.
TP2 (ThirdParty): Or, ces défis évoluent en fonction de la situation internationale.
TP2 (ThirdParty): Ces dernières années, plusieurs États, dont la Suisse, ont ainsi révisé leurs législations en la matière, y compris quant aux conditions relatives au regroupement familial.
TP2 (ThirdParty): De telles adaptations législatives ont par exemple été introduites suite à la crise des réfugiés en 2015.
TP2 (ThirdParty): Il est donc important qu'à l'avenir, les États puissent continuer à répondre aux situations migratoires nouvelles.
TP2 (ThirdParty): Les décisions de leur Parlement constituent l'expression démocratique de choix politiques qu'il convient de respecter.
TP2 (ThirdParty): Il faut ensuite rappeler que la Cour souligne, de façon constante, que ni la Convention ni ses protocoles ne consacrent le droit à l'asile politique, voire par exemple Ville-Varaja et autres contre le Royaume-Uni, paragraphe 102.
TP2 (ThirdParty): De la même façon, la Convention de Genève relative au statut des réfugiés ne crée pas de droit à l'asile.
TP2 (ThirdParty): Elle ne fonde aucun droit d'entrée individuelle sur le territoire d'un État particulier.
TP2 (ThirdParty): La Convention de Genève ne contient pas non plus de dispositions relatives au regroupement familial des réfugiés, de sorte qu'on ne peut en déduire aucun droit en la matière.
TP2 (ThirdParty): La seule trace d'une référence au regroupement familial se trouve dans l'acte final de 1951 de la Conférence holluzienne des plénipotentiaires sur le statut des réfugiés et des apatrides.
TP2 (ThirdParty): Or, ce document ne contient qu'une recommandation non contraignante qui invite les gouvernements à, je cite, « prendre les mesures nécessaires pour la protection de la famille des réfugiés ».
TP2 (ThirdParty): Une citation.
TP2 (ThirdParty): Cette recommandation les enjoint à faire en sorte que l'unité de la famille soit, je cite, « maintenue ».
TP2 (ThirdParty): Il n'est donc pas question d'inviter les gouvernements à permettre la création d'une unité familiale qui n'a jamais existé auparavant, ni même de recréer une unité de la famille lorsque celle-ci a fait délibérément l'objet d'une séparation avant la fuite du pays d'origine.
TP2 (ThirdParty): Cela étant, dans l'affaire Mugenzi contre France, paragraphe 54, la Cour a souligné à juste titre que l'unité de la famille est un droit essentiel du réfugié, que le regroupement familial est un élément fondamental pour permettre à des personnes qui ont fui des persécutions de reprendre une vie normale.
TP2 (ThirdParty): Cette mise en perspective du droit des réfugiés, en particulier sur la question du regroupement familial, nous paraît essentielle, car votre Cour interprète à juste titre les dispositions de la Convention à la lumière des règles du droit international.
TP2 (ThirdParty): Or, lorsqu'il est question d'examiner, sous l'angle de l'article 8, le souhait d'un demandeur d'asile de pouvoir bénéficier du regroupement familial, il faut s'interroger sur ce que le régime de la Convention de Genève prévoit en la matière.
TP2 (ThirdParty): Et la réponse, nous l'avons vue, est assez claire.
TP2 (ThirdParty): La Convention de Genève ne saurait donc justifier que la Cour étende davantage, au titre de l'article 8, le champ des obligations de l'État en matière de regroupement familial des personnes au bénéfice d'une protection internationale qui n'ont pas obtenu la qualité de réfugié.
TP2 (ThirdParty): Pour ces personnes, c'est le principe 23 répété par la Cour en matière d'immigration qui doit servir de référence.
TP2 (ThirdParty): Or, selon ce principe, l'article 8 ne saurait s'interpréter comme comportant pour un État l'obligation générale de respecter le choix par des couples mariés de leur résidence commune et de permettre le regroupement familial sur son territoire, voire par exemple à Régule, paragraphe 38, ou encore à Régionnesse, paragraphe 107.
TP2 (ThirdParty): Il convient maintenant de s'arrêter sur la seconde question posée au gouvernement danois, soit celle d'une éventuelle violation de l'article 14 en lien avec l'article 8.
TP2 (ThirdParty): La Cour ne considère une différence comme discriminatoire que si elle ne repose pas sur une justification objective et raisonnable, c'est-à-dire si elle ne poursuit pas un but légitime ou s'il n'y a pas un rapport raisonnable de proportionnalité entre les moyens employés et le but visé.
TP2 (ThirdParty): Cependant, toute différence de traitement n'emporte pas automatiquement violation de l'article 14.
TP2 (ThirdParty): Il faut en effet démontrer que des personnes placées dans des situations analogues ou comparables jouissent d'un traitement préférentiel et que cette distinction est discriminatoire.
TP2 (ThirdParty): Dans le cas d'espèces, il est question d'une différence de traitement entre d'un côté un individu n'ayant obtenu qu'une protection subsidiaire de nature temporaire, puisqu'il affluit une situation générale de violence, et de l'autre côté, deux autres catégories d'individus bénéficiant d'une protection plus durable, puisqu'ils sont personnellement exposés à un risque de persécution dans leur pays d'origine.
TP2 (ThirdParty): Le gouvernement suisse soutient que ces différentes catégories d'individus ne sont en réalité pas placées dans une situation analogue ou comparable.
TP2 (ThirdParty): À supposer qu'ils le soient, alors faudrait-il considérer la différence entre eux comme objective et poursuivant un but légitime.
TP2 (ThirdParty): En effet, un risque avéré de persécution individuelle peut justifier une protection plus forte, partant l'octroi d'un statut plus durable qu'un risque de violence généralisée touchant une population ou un groupe de population dans son ensemble.
TP2 (ThirdParty): Le droit suisse de l'asile et des étrangers connaît lui aussi, à l'instar de plusieurs autres pays européens, des distinctions comparables, y compris pour différencier certaines catégories de réfugiés.
TP2 (ThirdParty): Il protège ainsi davantage les individus qui obtiennent l'asile de ceux qui voient leur demande d'asile rejetée et ne sont admis en Suisse qu'à titre provisoire, en raison du fait que leur renvoi est temporairement impossible, illicite ou inexigible.
TP2 (ThirdParty): La nature du séjour des personnes admises provisoirement est par définition beaucoup plus précaire, puisque ces personnes n'ont pas vocation à s'établir durablement dans le pays d'accueil.
TP2 (ThirdParty): Il est donc logique que le regroupement familial de ces personnes puisse être différé.
TP2 (ThirdParty): Cela n'empêche pas que le principe du non-refoulement s'applique à tous ces individus, quelle que soit la catégorie dont ils relèvent.
TP2 (ThirdParty): Bien entendu, si une différence de traitement poursuit un objectif légitime et se fonde sur des critères objectifs, encore faut-il qu'elle ne soit pas manifestement déraisonnable dans ses effets pour les personnes concernées.
TP2 (ThirdParty): Sur ce point, le gouvernement suisse estime qu'un délai de carence de trois ans avant que l'intéressé puisse faire valoir une demande de regroupement familial est raisonnable au regard de l'objectif visé, à savoir une maîtrise de l'immigration et un maintien du bien-être économique de l'État, y compris en assurant une bonne intégration des nouveaux arrivants.
TP2 (ThirdParty): Il est vrai que votre cour, dans son arrêt de tente d'abusing à contre France, a constaté une violation de l'article 8 dans la situation du requérant dont le regroupement familial n'a pu se réaliser que trois ans et demi après le dépôt de sa demande.
TP2 (ThirdParty): Les circonstances étaient cependant bien différentes de l'affaire qui vous occupe aujourd'hui.
TP2 (ThirdParty): En effet, le requérant Tanda Muzinga disposait d'une attestation de réfugié du HDR, tout comme son épouse.