TrustHLT/LaCour huggingface dataset:
GR1 (Government): Mais c'est aussi le cas en Italie, où un avant-projet de loi interdisant le port d'unicab et de la burqa a été approuvé par une commission parlementaire en août 2011.
GR1 (Government): Il doit encore être adopté par le Parlement.
GR1 (Government): En 2012, aux Pays-Bas, un projet de loi similaire interdisant d'avoir le visage couvert dans les espaces publics, les établissements scolaires, les hôpitaux et les transports publics pour des raisons de sécurité a été discuté.
GR1 (Government): En Suisse, les électeurs du canton du Tessin ont approuvé à plus de 65 % par référendum l'interdiction de la dissimulation du visage dans les lieux publics.
GR1 (Government): Certes, d'autres pays jugent préférable, plutôt que de recourir à la loi, de laisser chaque institution, chaque établissement, chaque juridiction apprécier au cas par cas, dans les circonstances propres à chaque espèce, s'il convient ou non d'interdire le port du voile intégral.
GR1 (Government): Nous ne sommes pas certains qu'une traite d'approche soit en tout point préférable, notamment en ce qu'elle fait reposer sur des individus, magistrats, directeurs d'écoles ou autres, une appréciation délicate par nature, et les laisse en définitive, seuls et parfois démunis, face à des revendications qui les dépassent et qui font l'objet parfois de controverses vives.
GR1 (Government): En témoigne ainsi, par exemple, ce cas ayant reçu une certaine attention publique d'un juge britannique appelé à se prononcer sur le point de savoir si une prévenue pouvait comparaître dissimulée sous un voile intégral.
GR1 (Government): Dans son ordonnance, ce magistrat a regretté, en termes non équivoques, qu'il lui revienne de régler seul une question complexe relevant, selon lui, du domaine de la loi.
GR1 (Government): À ce qui précède, compte tenu des objectifs et de l'importance des principes en jeu essentiels pour l'Etat et la société, la France n'a pas outrepassé sa marge d'appréciation en posant des limites mesurées à la liberté vestimentaire dans l'espace public.
GR1 (Government): La loi soumise à l'examen de la Cour vise à sauvegarder des valeurs qui sont au cœur de la République et dont, selon le gouvernement, le Conseil de l'Europe doit être le garant.
GR1 (Government): S'agissant de l'article 8 de la Convention, son applicabilité en l'espèce ne va pas de soi.
GR1 (Government): La loi ne concerne que l'espace public et non les lieux de vie privée.
GR1 (Government): Par ailleurs, on voit mal en quoi l'interdiction porterait atteinte à d'autres aspects de la vie privée, tels que l'intimité ou l'intégrité de la personne.
GR1 (Government): S'agissant de l'article 14, l'invocation de la discrimination en fonction du sexe ne vous retiendra pas longtemps.
GR1 (Government): L'un des objectifs essentiels de la loi est justement de lutter contre la discrimination fondée sur le sexe, que constitue l'effacement de la femme de l'espace public par le biais du port du voile intégral.
GR1 (Government): Quant à la prétendue discrimination à l'encontre des musulmans, et en particulier des femmes musulmanes, il convient de rappeler que la pratique du voile intégral n'est en rien une pratique courante parmi les millions de femmes musulmanes vivant en France.
GR1 (Government): Elle a d'ailleurs été fortement critiquée par les éminentes personnalités musulmanes entendues au cours des travaux préparatoires de la loi.
GR1 (Government): Au surplus, l'interdiction ne vise pas uniquement le voile intégral, mais, sauf exception, toute pratique de dissimulation du visage.
GR1 (Government): Pour conclure, je soulignerai que la liberté religieuse n'est nullement menacée en France, pas plus que la liberté de se vêtir à sa guise sous la seule réserve des comportements extrêmes.
GR1 (Government): Mais je soulignerai aussi que la dissimulation intégrale du visage dans l'espace public porte atteinte à l'égalité entre les personnes, à la dignité de la personne et aux fondements de la vie en société, qui sont au cœur de nos valeurs et de celles du Conseil de l'Europe.
GR1 (Government): Il s'agit de valeurs sur lesquelles il n'est pas possible de transiger.
GR1 (Government): Il convient de mettre en balance la perception subjective que certaines personnes peuvent avoir de ce qui est admissible au nom des libertés garanties par la Convention, et le devoir qui incombat l'État de garantir les conditions nécessaires à la vie en commun dans une société démocratique.
GR1 (Government): C'est pourquoi, dans l'hypothèse où vous jugeriez cette requête recevable, je vous invite à considérer qu'en adoptant la loi contestée par Mme Saës, l'État a fait un usage approprié de sa marge d'appréciation et trouvé un juste équilibre entre la liberté vestimentaire dans l'espace public et les principes fondamentaux qu'il a pour mission de protéger.
Dean Spielmann (JudgeP): Merci Madame Belliard. Je donne maintenant la parole à messieurs De Mello et Muman.
AP1 (Applicant): it is our pleasure to address you.
AP1 (Applicant): In these proceedings, I will define the full-face veil as a burka, and I'll stick to that jargon.
AP1 (Applicant): First, the applicant has not attended the hearing because of the ban, the publicity, and the possible hostile reaction.
AP1 (Applicant): This new law bans her right to take part in these proceedings in reality.
AP1 (Applicant): I would invite the court, Mr. President,
AP1 (Applicant): not to draw any adverse inferences from her non-attendance, even if it is suggested by the respondent's state that her claim lacks genuineness.
AP1 (Applicant): The anonymity that is granted to her is, in fact, a recognition of the dilemma that she has been placed.
AP1 (Applicant): The Canadian and UK case law does not compel a witness or defendant to use the full-face veil if it would mean that a case is prejudiced unfairly.
AP1 (Applicant): But in fact, a woman defending a prosecution against this new regulation for wearing a full-face veil or the burka will be expected to be uncovered, the strikes at the heart of a right to have a fair trial.
AP1 (Applicant): Next, the victim status.
AP1 (Applicant): The striking feature in this case is the threat of prosecution for wearing a burka, irrespective of the motive for wearing it.
AP1 (Applicant): Just like the applicant in Dijon 30 years ago, this court is faced with an unpopular theme.
AP1 (Applicant): The present law is a new one.
AP1 (Applicant): Some member states are considering it.
AP1 (Applicant): Our question we ask is, do you expect that she should only become a victim after being prosecuted?
AP1 (Applicant): And if she has to be put through that passage and suffer the consequences of a conviction, that too might affect her career.
AP1 (Applicant): There is evidence in a witness statement that she has changed her practice of wearing the burka once the law took effect.
AP1 (Applicant): This itself is a disadvantage, and she feels like a prisoner in her own home.
AP1 (Applicant): Next, the exhaustion of remedies.
AP1 (Applicant): The administrative court in France has ruled that the law banning the burka is compatible with Article 9, the respondents' written submissions at paragraph 205.
AP1 (Applicant): We respectfully submit that the new regulation is prescriptive.
AP1 (Applicant): It amounts to a prohibition on wearing it in public places.
AP1 (Applicant): There are no defenses available.
AP1 (Applicant): And the reasons for wearing the burka is not or are not relevant.
AP1 (Applicant): Individual facts are not investigated in the criminal proceedings.
AP1 (Applicant): And therefore, it cannot be said she is not a victim simply because she hasn't been prosecuted.
AP1 (Applicant): Our case is based on Articles 8, 9, 10, and 14.
AP1 (Applicant): In relation to Article 8, we make about eight or nine points.
AP1 (Applicant): First, the effect of the legislation is to keep her, as we contend, a prisoner in her own home at the time she wants to wear the burka in public.
AP1 (Applicant): Second, wearing it in public gives her an extended sense of privacy.
AP1 (Applicant): Her face, like one's DNA, is highly individualistic.
AP1 (Applicant): The concealment of a face in a public zone is her right to privacy whilst interacting with the public.
AP1 (Applicant): Wearing a burka does not, we say, convey a sign of extremism.
AP1 (Applicant): Third, the prohibition constitutes a denial of autonomy and self-determination taken by an adult woman freely chosen.
AP1 (Applicant): An assumption is made by the state that wearing the burka amounts to self-denial, confinement, and the state must intervene to liberate her and protect her from herself.
AP1 (Applicant): Next, it affects her psychological integrity and dignity.
AP1 (Applicant): It exposes her to the real risk of prosecution, and a conviction constitutes a stigma.
AP1 (Applicant): Next, in the case of a woman forced to wear the veil, the prosecution is an added evil to her troubles.
AP1 (Applicant): She's punished by coercion to wear the veil and faces the threat of conviction.
AP1 (Applicant): The invitation to undergo civic rehabilitation in any of these proceedings is an affront to her self-respect, amounts to severe humiliation, and she's required, give up your religious dress code in the name of secularization.
AP1 (Applicant): She's made to feel unpatriotic, torn between her loyalty to the state and her own autonomy.
AP1 (Applicant): For those reasons, we respectfully contend Article 8 is engaged.
AP1 (Applicant): As far as 9 goes, Article 9, the respondent reluctantly accepts that Article 9 is engaged.
AP1 (Applicant): It's not for the court to investigate the validity of the applicant's belief, and her witness statement sets out the nature of the belief.
AP1 (Applicant): The measure in this case, it relegates religious expression to a purely private sphere where the practice is least needed.
AP1 (Applicant): In a home, she's free to wear it.
AP1 (Applicant): An exception is made that she can wear it at the mosque.
AP1 (Applicant): We contend that these exceptions are too narrow and, in practice, are meaningless to her.
AP1 (Applicant): We say that it seeks to protect the comfort of the majority in public places by requiring a small disadvantaged group not to wear religious clothing in public for fear of offending the majority.
AP1 (Applicant): And we remind you that the protection of one religion and the concomitant non-protection of others imports disparate impact destructive of the religious freedoms of collectivity.
AP1 (Applicant): Any ordinary citizen is prevented from wearing the burqa at the time she's not performing public services, going about her normal activities in a peaceful way.
AP1 (Applicant): Mere day-to-day wearing of the burqa is banned, even though it is worn for purely personal, non-political reasons and where it is worn without compulsion.
AP1 (Applicant): The prohibition is the compulsion which is imposed on this group who wear it.
AP1 (Applicant): Even though they're not subject to compulsion from their male peers at home.
AP1 (Applicant): And the respondent, we note in the written and oral submissions, is no longer, as we understand it, relying on secularization as a legitimate aim.
AP1 (Applicant): Though this, as we understand it, was a ground for introducing the legislation.
AP1 (Applicant): May I say three brief things about Article 10.
AP1 (Applicant): First, prohibiting a person wearing a garment in public as an expression of religious freedom is offensive to Article 10.
AP1 (Applicant): Second, we ask the question, can the right of the majority not to be offended by a Muslim woman wearing the burqa trump or defeat her right to express herself in the clothing she wears in public without creating any sense of disorder?
AP1 (Applicant): We respectfully submit the state has interfered with freedom of expression, it would appear, on grounds of public morality and sensibilities.
AP1 (Applicant): As far as legitimate aim is concerned, we say we do not accept that concepts such as protecting the dignity and gender equality are legitimate aims.
AP1 (Applicant): We have dealt with this in our written submissions and I don't propose to say very much.
AP1 (Applicant): The most difficult issue is the margin of appreciation.
AP1 (Applicant): In this case, our main thrust is that the respondent is to be accorded a narrow margin of appreciation for these reasons.
AP1 (Applicant): Firstly, the state has a positive obligation to protect private life if Article 8 is engaged, where the intrusion is severe and affects an intimate aspect of identity or her lifestyle as described in the witness statement.
AP1 (Applicant): There is a serious interference with the private life in this case and the measure conflicts with an important and very intimate aspect of individual rights under 8, 9, 10, coupled with 14.
AP1 (Applicant): Secondly, the nature of the activities involved affects the scope of the margin of appreciation.
AP1 (Applicant): The nature of activities in this case are low level and purely inoffensive.
AP1 (Applicant): There is a lack of evidence presented to the court that the dignity of women is curtailed by the wearing of the burqa or that they are coerced into it.
AP1 (Applicant): The Council of State thought that the concept of dignity could not justify general ban as set out in the report.
AP1 (Applicant): We say, furthermore, she belongs to a small vulnerable group, some 2,000 estimated wearers.
AP1 (Applicant): There is no evidence that the victim group has been consulted with the exception of one woman heard by the Gerin Commission.
AP1 (Applicant): The width of the ban extends to public places.
AP1 (Applicant): It affects ordinary citizens wearing ordinary clothing.
AP1 (Applicant): We describe it as ordinary clothing without any political connotations.
AP1 (Applicant): This surely must limit the deference according to the state.
AP1 (Applicant): It's true that whilst there is no consensus within the member states, and we say notably presently only France and Belgium have banned it in public places, and my learned friend has given you examples of other member states, we say that other member states with a strong Muslim population have not banned the burqa in the way that the French state has done.
AP1 (Applicant): You know that the Spanish Supreme Court has ruled against the ban in public buildings, and you also know that the United Kingdom Court has allowed the defendant to wear it though not whilst giving evidence.
AP1 (Applicant): The French Constitutional Council on the 7th of October 2010 allowed the measure to pass.
AP1 (Applicant): It was a short brief, but did not accept the Council of States' thorough rejection of a wide ban.
AP1 (Applicant): And finally on this point, the Parliamentary Assembly in 2010 stated in Resolution 1743 that a general ban would deny women who freely desire to wear it the right to cover their face and urge member states to develop targeted policies to raise women's awareness.
AP1 (Applicant): But there is another additional reason for defining the scope of the margin of appreciation.
AP1 (Applicant): And this deals specifically with the state's submission to you, a positive assertion that in the case of Mansingh, the Turban cases, the court's jurisprudence shows that public security, public order is a legitimate aim which justifies the uncovering of the face.
AP1 (Applicant): May we say this, in three recent cases, the United Nations Human Rights Committee has taken a different view from the European Courts of Human Rights on the subject of the right to manifest religion by wearing religious attire.
AP1 (Applicant): And we have the cases of Mansingh, Jasveer Singh and Ranjit Singh.
AP1 (Applicant): The Strasbourg Court did not find that the restrictions placed on the applicants' freedom of religion constituted a violation of Article 9 as they were justified on the grounds of public safety, public order and rights and freedoms of others.
AP1 (Applicant): Notably, the Strasbourg Court recognised that France in all three cases had a margin of appreciation.
AP1 (Applicant): In contrast, in virtually indistinguishable cases, the Human Rights Committee found a violation of Article 18 of the ICCPR, which, Mr. President, members of the court,
AP1 (Applicant): you know, corresponds with Article 9, though not word for word.
AP1 (Applicant): We respectfully submit that this court could take into account the response of the Human Rights Committee because Article 53 of the European Convention of Human Rights contains guidance as to the construction of the Convention in relation to other human rights agreements, and particularly where France is a party to, namely the ICCPR.
AP1 (Applicant): We respectfully submit that there is no principle why it is inappropriate not to consider the approach of the Human Rights Committee in those cases when defining the permissible limitations on the right to manifest religion in the context of public security or public order, given in particular that France has made a positive assertion that these cases support their case.
AP1 (Applicant): Secondly, the Human Rights Committee's judgment in this case affirms and accords with the principles enunciated by way of example by Judge Tolkien's dissenting opinion in Sahin that where there has been interference with a fundamental right, the court's case law clearly establishes that mere affirmations do not suffice.
AP1 (Applicant): They must be supported by concrete examples.
AP1 (Applicant): Thirdly, we say in order to ensure that the restrictions on the applicant's freedom of religion is proportionate, this court ought to consider the legitimacy of the state's assertions rather than affording the state a wide margin of appreciation.
AP1 (Applicant): Otherwise, there is a danger that the mere worries and fear of the majority will readily overrule the rights and freedoms of persons belonging to religious minorities.
AP1 (Applicant): The Strasbourg Court does take into account relevant rules and principles of international law governing relations between contracting parties, and the court also takes into account the Vienna Convention, Article 31 to 33.
AP1 (Applicant): This, of course, does not mean that you, Mr President, members of the court, are bound slavishly to follow the judgments of the committee.
AP1 (Applicant): However, Mr President, we are not the poor relatives in this jurisprudence.
AP1 (Applicant): The entire world looks up to this court, and for very good reasons.
AP1 (Applicant): May I move to another very difficult aspect of the case, and that is Article 14.
AP1 (Applicant): We respectfully submit that the legislation, though neutral on its face, has a disparate impact on a disadvantaged group, namely Muslim women.
AP1 (Applicant): It sends a sectarian message.
AP1 (Applicant): Muslim women may not wear religious clothing, that's the burqa, in public.
AP1 (Applicant): The majority of the indigenous population in France are invariably Christians, and in reality, the regulation does not affect them.
AP1 (Applicant): In reality, the ban is not likely to affect others, but only this narrow, small group.
AP1 (Applicant): Mr President, some 2,000 Muslim women have stopped wearing the burqa since the law being introduced.
AP1 (Applicant): There is no evidence that this was a result of persuasion.
AP1 (Applicant): There is no evidence that this group of women have since changed their habits, or have chosen to move freely in public.
AP1 (Applicant): We say there is evidence that women have chosen, like the applicant, to remain prisoners in their own home at times they want to wear it.
AP1 (Applicant): Now, motive is not material in a case where it is alleged there's discrimination, but we note that President Sarkozy told the National Assembly in 2009 the burqa is not welcome on the territory of France.
AP1 (Applicant): This led the Parliamentary Commission being set up to consider the law banning the burqa.
AP1 (Applicant): The burqa is not only unwelcome, it is now illegal.
AP1 (Applicant): We take the view, and respectfully submit, Mr President, that this is a case which is very close to being one of direct discrimination, and this discrimination is based on suspect grounds, namely gender, ethnicity, and religion.
AP1 (Applicant): If this is a case purely of indirect discrimination, then we respectfully submit that very weighty reasons for this discrimination must be provided by the state to justify the discriminatory measure, even if the discrimination is an indirect one.
AP1 (Applicant): The measure in this case treats a historically disadvantaged group in a way that worsens the situation of this very small group, and we say that it is not justified because prosecuting them does not liberate them.
AP1 (Applicant): It increases their alienation.
AP1 (Applicant): May I deal finally with the issue of proportionality before I pass on the floor to Mr Moorman?
AP1 (Applicant): First, there is no evidence that women's dignity has been affected by the wearing of the burqa.
AP1 (Applicant): It is their dignity which is directly affected.
AP1 (Applicant): Second, it impinges on autonomous decisions taken by adult women on ordinary affairs.
AP1 (Applicant): Third, there is no evidence that this group wears the burqa to convey extremist views, as we have said.
AP1 (Applicant): Fourth, there is no evidence that the wearing of the burqa causes disorder.
AP1 (Applicant): Unveiling these women do not make them better citizens or facilitate integration.
AP1 (Applicant): Secularism has overshadowed multiculturalism by requiring minorities to forsake their own culture for those of the majority common values.
AP1 (Applicant): And finally, this measure is disproportionate reaction to a disadvantaged minority group with no evidence of a threat to social order, equality, liberty, or fraternity, other than to offer social comfort to the views of the vociferous majority.
AP1 (Applicant): And the New York Times has described the current law as banning a burqa, a kind of reverse Talibanism.
AP1 (Applicant): I pass you on now to Mr Moorman.
AP1 (Applicant): Thank you, Mr President.
Dean Spielmann (JudgeP): Thank you, Mr. De Mello, Mr. Muman.
AP2 (Applicant): Distinguished members of the court, in the ten minutes or so that I have left, I too have the honour to be making submissions in support of the SAS delegation.
AP2 (Applicant): My submissions focus on and demonstrate the realities, contradictions, perversities, inequalities and absurdities of life under the ban.
AP2 (Applicant): Under the law it is not an offence to conceal a face when it is done for the purpose of party, artistic or traditional events, as well as for covering the face for religious processions when they have a traditional character.
AP2 (Applicant): Consider then the following examples.
AP2 (Applicant): A satirist wanting to mock the veil, or equally this law, is permitted to wear the veil in public.
AP2 (Applicant): The applicant is not.
AP2 (Applicant): The street performer on the Champs-Élysées who wishes to cover her face as part of her performance is permitted to do so.
AP2 (Applicant): The applicant cannot.
AP2 (Applicant): The party-goer who wishes to mask her face for the purpose of fancy dress, the masquerade ball, the Carnival de Paris, is permitted to do so.
AP2 (Applicant): The Catholic lady who wishes to manifest her religious belief, or equally cultural values, during the religious processions of the Nice Carnival, which takes place in the two weeks preceding Lent, the Paris Carnival after the Feast of Food, or the Dunkirk Carnival between Epiphany and Mardi Gras, is permitted to cover her face in public.
AP2 (Applicant): If the applicant wishes to wear her veil during the holy month of Ramadan or on the holy day of Eid, she is prohibited to do so.
AP2 (Applicant): Comedies, satire and the arts are given greater credence under the law than the applicant's fundamental convention rights.
AP2 (Applicant): Wit and humour are given greater priority under the law than the applicant's deeply and sincerely held religious belief and cultural practice.
AP2 (Applicant): The choice to dress in a certain way for party reasons is given greater protection under the law than the applicant's compulsion for religious and cultural reasons to dress in a particular way.