TrustHLT/LaCour huggingface dataset:
AP1 (Applicant): The boy, then 10 months old, was subsequently placed in emergency foster care.
AP1 (Applicant): The child welfare services immediately proceeded to apply for the child to be placed in their care.
AP1 (Applicant): On December 10, 2010, by decision of the county social welfare board, the boy was placed in the care of the child welfare services.
AP1 (Applicant): The applicant was granted contact rights of two hours, four times a year.
AP1 (Applicant): On 13th of December, 2010, immediately after the board's decision, the child was moved to the foster parents, who would subsequently become his adoptive parents.
AP1 (Applicant): In its judgment of 6th of September, 2011, the district court upheld the board's decision, but extended the visitation rights to one hour, six times per year.
AP1 (Applicant): District court also expressed that it could not conclude that the placement of the child would last until he was an adult.
AP1 (Applicant): The applicant is a practicing Muslim.
AP1 (Applicant): Nevertheless, her child was placed with a practicing Christian family.
AP1 (Applicant): There, he would follow the daily life of the foster family and become an integral part of their Christian lifestyle, including eating pork and going to church with them.
AP1 (Applicant): Shortly after the child was placed with the foster parents, they stopped using his Muslim full name.
AP1 (Applicant): The family belongs to a local chapter of the Mission Covent Church of Norway.
AP1 (Applicant): As its name suggests, the foundational idea of the Mission Covent Church of Norway is evangelizing.
AP1 (Applicant): Its members' main task is to re-celetize.
AP1 (Applicant): Also, this church does not believe in infant baptism, but practices instead something called believers' baptism, where the person being baptized has actively accepted Jesus.
AP1 (Applicant): The main part of the social network of the family and their familial network was within the Mission Covent Church.
AP1 (Applicant): The foster mother also played a central role in the church.
AP1 (Applicant): She led the worship services.
AP1 (Applicant): During his placement, the applicant's son was actively subjected to and made to become part of the foster family's religious practice.
AP1 (Applicant): On the other hand, the applicant's own wishes for her son's religious upbringing were dismissed by the child welfare services.
AP1 (Applicant): Furthermore, on 11 September 2013, the child welfare services applied to the county social welfare board for an order to withdraw the applicant's parental responsibilities for the child and to consent to the foster parents adopting him.
AP1 (Applicant): On 21 March 2014, the board granted the child welfare services request.
AP1 (Applicant): The applicant appealed this decision.
AP1 (Applicant): On 21 November 2014, the district court upheld the board's decision.
AP1 (Applicant): The applicant appealed further to the high court, Lagmansretten in Norwegian, where on 27 May 2015, the majority of the court by 4 to 1 upheld this decision.
AP1 (Applicant): On 23 September 2015, the Supreme Court's appeal leave committee refused the applicant leave to appeal.
AP1 (Applicant): Following the adoption, the foster parents baptized the child in the Christian tradition of their church and gave him a new first name to reflect his new religious identity.
AP1 (Applicant): The foster family's intentions in this regard were well known to the domestic authorities when they reviewed the case.
AP1 (Applicant): I come then to the first of my three legal points.
AP1 (Applicant): Should the grand chamber revise the chamber judgment's determination as to violation of Article 8?
AP1 (Applicant): There are three reasons why the grand chamber should not revise the chamber judgment's determination as to Article 8.
AP1 (Applicant): First, the applicant requested that the case should be referred to the grand chamber only as regards the religious aspect and the remedies.
AP1 (Applicant): The Article 8 determination of the chamber was not among the reasons why the applicant requested that the case be referred to the grand chamber.
AP1 (Applicant): Second, the Norwegian government explicitly and clearly accepted the chamber's judgment of 17 December 2019 as binding.
AP1 (Applicant): Norway notified the court and the applicant of the position it had taken.
AP1 (Applicant): See, the email correspondence from the agent to the applicant enclosed in Appendix 16.
AP1 (Applicant): The applicant put faith and confidence in the government's stated position when the applicant made its request under Rule 73.
AP1 (Applicant): As the court has said in numerous cases, the government, and I quote, cannot put the court's arguments which are consistent with the position it previously adopted.
AP1 (Applicant): See, Pine Valley Development, LPD, and others versus Ireland, paragraph 47, and also Colompar versus Belgium, paragraph 32.
AP1 (Applicant): Grand chamber should not allow the government to reopen a question that was not among the grounds relied on by the applicant in her request for a referral.
AP1 (Applicant): And the government is, in any event, is stopped from now arguing that there is no breach of Article 8, a breach it previously accepted vis-a-vis both the court and the applicant.
AP1 (Applicant): But third, the government's substantive contentions as regards Article 8 are, in any event, wrong and should not lead to the grand chamber to revise the chamber's findings as regards Article 8.
AP1 (Applicant): The government's agent has argued in his written submissions that the chamber, in its judgment, erred in the application of the principles expressed in Strandlobben.
AP1 (Applicant): See the submissions in paragraph 111 to 117.
AP1 (Applicant): First, the agent argues that the chamber did not sufficiently adhere to the doctrine expressed in paragraph 213 of Strandlobben.
AP1 (Applicant): Secondly, the agent argues that the chamber did not refer to the facts that supported the position that there were compelling reasons and that deprivation of parental responsibility and consent to adoption clearly were the best interest of the child.
AP1 (Applicant): Thirdly, the agent argues that the chamber appears to have omitted in its judgment the very detailed assessment given by the high court, where the interests of the applicant and her situation are carefully balanced against the interests of the child.
AP1 (Applicant): These contentions, which criticize the judgment the government previously has accepted as binding, are all wrong.
AP1 (Applicant): The chamber's unanimous judgment follows the principles expressed in Strandlobben.
AP1 (Applicant): It is balanced and thorough in its reasoning.
AP1 (Applicant): However, when the applicant's rule 73 request as regards Article 9 was referred to the Grand Chamber, the Norwegian government saw it as an opportunity to cause the Grand Chamber to overturn two recent judgments where the chamber had found a violation of Article 8.
AP1 (Applicant): These judgments are Hernehult versus Norway and Pedersen and Others versus Norway, which were both delivered 10 March 2020, just two months before this case was referred to the Grand Chamber.
AP1 (Applicant): The Norwegian argument in the rule 73 requests relating to those two judgments was that the court had departed from the Strandlobben principles.
AP1 (Applicant): The Norwegian government's appeal was refused, but the Grand Chamber panel on 7 September 2020.
AP1 (Applicant): However, the government is raising the same argument here again.
AP1 (Applicant): This court's chamber judgment and the Norwegian Supreme Court have in the judgment and dialogue incrementally clarified Article 8 questions set out in Strandlobben and in the chamber judgment in the present case.
AP1 (Applicant): Article 8 submissions by the Norwegian government lawyers have been rejected at all the different stages before us.
AP1 (Applicant): In this connection, the applicant has noted the recent remarks the government's agent reported in two articles of the Norwegian press, see Appendix 18 and 19.
AP1 (Applicant): We will not say anything about those statements which speak for themselves, other that, regrettably, they represent the approach of the Office of the Attorney General to the judgments of the court.
AP1 (Applicant): A crucial point that was made in Strandlobben is that there need to be very exceptional circumstances to conclude that it is in the child's best interest to be adopted and thus sever the family ties, see paragraphs 207 to 209.
AP1 (Applicant): The mere fact that the child lives in foster care because the parents cannot provide adequate care for the child will not constitute such very exceptional circumstances.
AP1 (Applicant): The applicant's situation did not constitute such very exceptional circumstances that might allow adoption against the applicant's will.
AP1 (Applicant): I now come to my second point.
AP1 (Applicant): Has there been a violation of Article 9 and or Article 2 of Protocol Number 1?
AP1 (Applicant): According to Article 9.1, everyone has the right to exercise the freedom of thought, conscience, and religion.
AP1 (Applicant): Furthermore, Article 9 guarantees the right not only to hold a religious belief, but to manifest it.
AP1 (Applicant): Worship, teaching, practice, and observance are all mentioned specifically in Article 9 as forms of manifestation.
AP1 (Applicant): Only in extreme circumstances can the state interfere with this right to manifest one religion or belief.
AP1 (Applicant): The term practice, as employed in Article 9.1, does not cover each act which is motivated or influenced by religion or belief.
AP1 (Applicant): But for any parent, to raise a child in accordance with their own religion or belief is a direct manifestation of their religion or belief.
AP1 (Applicant): This practice is at the core of the perception of what religious freedom is.
AP1 (Applicant): Furthermore, the practice of raising a child in accordance with the parent's religious conviction is universal to all religions and belief systems.
AP1 (Applicant): It is something that all religions and belief systems have in common, regardless of their ethnic, linguistic, and cultural roots.
AP1 (Applicant): A Hindu mother wants her child to be raised in Hinduism, a Jewish couple in Judaism, Christian parents in Christianity, and so on.
AP1 (Applicant): And we will all react if our children are raised by force in a different religion or conviction than our own.
AP1 (Applicant): The applicant, it is a natural expression of her faith to raise her child in accordance with Islam.
AP1 (Applicant): And state authorities have a positive obligation to guarantee the applicant this freedom, express her faith.
AP1 (Applicant): In this case, after the adoption, the foster parents became his legal parents.
AP1 (Applicant): By consenting to the adoption, the government also gave its consent to the foster parents to change the name and to baptize him in their Christian faith.
AP1 (Applicant): At the same time as the adoption was approved, the child was given a new forename to reflect his new religious identity and to raise his Muslim identity.
AP1 (Applicant): In fact, the foster parents stopped using the child's forename already shortly after he was placed with them over the objections of the applicant.
AP1 (Applicant): Please see the appendix 4 and 5.
AP1 (Applicant): The name change is highly relevant in this particular case, as it falls within the scope of Article 9.
AP1 (Applicant): And I will now demonstrate how.
AP1 (Applicant): The court has on previous occasions dealt with the significance of a child's first name.
AP1 (Applicant): The court's case law is regarded as issue is telling of whether Article 8 should be interpreted in light of Article 9, or whether there might be an independent violation of Article 9.
AP1 (Applicant): In Guillaume versus France, the court ruled that the choice of a child's forename by its parents falls within their private sphere.
AP1 (Applicant): Thus, the question of giving a child a certain name falls within the ambit of Article 8.
AP1 (Applicant): This view was upheld in later judgments, in Salonen versus Finland and in Johansson versus Finland.
AP1 (Applicant): Salonen versus Finland, the couple's request to give their daughter a specific first name was refused by the Finnish authorities, on the grounds that they did not comply with the domestic practice.
AP1 (Applicant): The applicant alleged in Teralia that the refusal to register their daughter's name violated the rights of freedom of thought under Article 9.
AP1 (Applicant): The commission had found that the applicants' complaint that their right to freedom of thought was violated by the refusal to register the proposed name did fall within the ambit of Article 9.
AP1 (Applicant): However, this particular application was declared inadmissible as a whole, because the commission did not find that the particular name the parents had wanted to give their daughter was, and I quote, a manifestation of any belief in the sense that some coherent view on fundamental problems can be seen as being expressed thereby.
AP1 (Applicant): The incident case, the first name given to the child by the applicant has a strong religious motivation and meaning.
AP1 (Applicant): The child was named after the Muslim prophet.
AP1 (Applicant): The name has an immediate religious connotation to everyone who hears it.
AP1 (Applicant): This particular name is also considered to be the superior name to give to a male child in Islam.
AP1 (Applicant): Therefore, the child's name also carries a significance that goes beyond the private domestic sphere.
AP1 (Applicant): The name connects the child to other practicing Muslims.
AP1 (Applicant): It is a marker of his religious belonging and identity.
AP1 (Applicant): This reasoning brings us right back to the core of Article 9.
AP1 (Applicant): Article 9 intersects with the content of other provisions in the convention.
AP1 (Applicant): Article 8 is often evoked alongside Article 9.
AP1 (Applicant): Holding a belief or conviction is deeply intimate and private matter that makes up the identity of any given individual.
AP1 (Applicant): Seen as such, Article 8 can be interpreted in the light of Article 9.
AP1 (Applicant): But exercising a particular religion or belief is not solely a private matter.
AP1 (Applicant): Freedom of religion or belief extends beyond the private and familial sphere.
AP1 (Applicant): Article 9 clearly states that everyone has the right to manifest their religion or belief either alone or in community with others and in public or in private.
AP1 (Applicant): For example, in gatherings or congregations with like-minded worshippers.
AP1 (Applicant): Also, if proselytizing falls within the scope of Article 9, as the court established in 1993 landmark judgment of Kokinakis versus Greece, the practice of raising a child within one's own family or a child within one's own religion falls within the scope of Article 9.
AP1 (Applicant): Raising a child within one's own religion is in fact fundamental to the fulfillment of religious freedom.
AP1 (Applicant): Parents have the right to ensure the religious and moral education of the children in conformity with their own conviction.
AP1 (Applicant): Article 9 is as closely interwoven with Article 2 of Protocol 1.
AP1 (Applicant): In the instant case, the applicant raised the issue of her child's religious education on numerous occasions, all of which are well documented.
AP1 (Applicant): She was time and again rebuffed by the child welfare services as bothersome.
AP1 (Applicant): At one point, she was told by the child welfare services, and here I quote, we cannot choose a religion or culture for our children.
AP1 (Applicant): See Appendix 6.
AP1 (Applicant): Applicant was instead told by the same child welfare services that her child would follow the daily life of the foster parents and their family, including eating pork and following them to the church.
AP1 (Applicant): Mr. President, members of the court, this is a violation of Article 2, Protocol 1.
AP1 (Applicant): The fact that a child is taken into care does not cause the parents to lose all their rights under Article 1.
AP1 (Applicant): See Olsen versus Sweden in paragraph 95.
AP1 (Applicant): In the judgment Folgerud and others versus Norway, the Grand Chamber set out the general principles of the interpretation of Article 2 of Protocol 1.
AP1 (Applicant): It held in paragraph 84, two sentences of Article 2 of Protocol 1 must be interpreted not only in the light of each other, but also in particular of Article 8, 9, and 10 of the convention.
AP1 (Applicant): The state is forbidden to pursue a name of indoctrination that might be considered as not representing parents' religious and philosophical convictions.
AP1 (Applicant): That is the limit that must not be exceeded.
AP1 (Applicant): Furthermore, the choice of foster family in this case contributed to the alienation of the child from the applicant since the foster family's religious convictions was so far removed from the applicants.
AP1 (Applicant): The negative effects of these choice were further aggravated by the fact that the foster family belongs to a Christian church that actively proselytizes.
AP1 (Applicant): As already observed, the word mission in the same name of the church refers to evangelizing, to the practice of seeking to convert others to Christianity.
AP1 (Applicant): The child's baptism into the Mission Common Church of Norway immediately after his adoption is thus a perfectly logical consequence, given the fact that he had been indoctrinated into this faith for years.
AP1 (Applicant): Against this background, the domestic courts do not really take into account the applicants' arguments relating to the alleged violation of Article 9 of the convention.
AP1 (Applicant): Let it be said that it is not a process against the foster parents who are now the adoptive parents.
AP1 (Applicant): It is a process against the Norwegian government.
AP1 (Applicant): The foster family had not been sufficiently informed by the Norwegian authorities about how to respect and take into account the religious identity of the foster child and their duties not to convert the child into their own religion.
AP1 (Applicant): The foster placement agreement enclosed in Appendix 20 says nothing about this issue.
AP1 (Applicant): Nor did the foster parents receive any training as regards their conduct during the visits by the applicant in relation to the possible religious differences.
AP1 (Applicant): Based on the circumstances of our case, there is a violation of Article 9 and or Article 2 of Protocol Number 1.
AP1 (Applicant): In the memorial, we also argue that Article 9 must be interpreted in light of Article 14.
AP1 (Applicant): That is because the rights expressed in Article 9 and other provisions of the conventions are supplemented by Article 14, which prohibits discrimination in the enjoyment of those rights.
AP1 (Applicant): If the court finds that there has been a violation of the applicant's rights of freedom of religion under Article 9, the court must view it in conjunction with Article 14.
AP1 (Applicant): I come finally to the third point, the binding force and execution of judgment governed by Article 46 of the convention.
AP1 (Applicant): Article 46 applies to every judgment in which the court has found a breach of the convention.
AP1 (Applicant): The provision means that the court's findings impose on the responding state a legal obligation to put an end to the breach and make reparations for its consequences.
AP1 (Applicant): One recent judgment is especially relevant when we examine this question, as it resembles the facts of the instant case.
AP1 (Applicant): This judgment is Omurefe versus Spain.
AP1 (Applicant): The case is analyzed in the Norwegian article Decisions of the European Court of Human Rights in Cases of Protection of Private Life and Family Life 2019,2020.
AP1 (Applicant): See Appendix 17.
AP1 (Applicant): In Omurefe versus Spain, the applicant was a Nigerian national who was residing illegally in Spain at the time.
AP1 (Applicant): The applicant voluntarily let the child welfare services take on the care of her child when he was two months old.
AP1 (Applicant): She was then informed that the plan was a temporary placement with a view to reuniting her with her son in the medium term, provided that the care situation had improved.
AP1 (Applicant): However, shortly thereafter, the mother was deprived of parental responsibility and the child was placed in a foster home with a view to adoption.
AP1 (Applicant): All visitation contact between the applicant and the child was suspended.
AP1 (Applicant): The applicant lodged an appeal and was finally successful.
AP1 (Applicant): A domestic court awarded her one hour of contact, each month under supervision.
AP1 (Applicant): But in the meantime, the authorities proceeded with the adoption, which was carried out despite the applicant's objections.
AP1 (Applicant): In this case, the court found that there had been a violation of Article 8.
AP1 (Applicant): In the judgment, the court asked the national authorities to re-examine the situation of the applicant and her son in light of the judgment and to assess the possibilities for contact between the two, taking account of the child's situation and with the child's best interest in mind.
AP1 (Applicant): Furthermore, the court observed that under Article 46, the most appropriate way of redressing this type of violation would be to put the applicant in the same situation she would have been if the convention had not been violated.
AP1 (Applicant): The court delivered its judgment on 23rd June 2020.
AP1 (Applicant): The adoption of the child was authorized in October 2015.
AP1 (Applicant): While the child had been living with his foster parents since the summer of 2009.
AP1 (Applicant): This judgment is only available in French and I will read directly from it, paragraph 71.
AP1 (Applicant): The court considers that the most appropriate way of redressing a violation of Article 8 of the Convention, in a case such as this one, is to put the applicant in the same situation she would have been if the Convention had not been violated.
AP1 (Applicant): In Habedat v. Spain, a case which also concerned the taking of children into care following an adoption, the court reached a similar conclusion as to remedy granted.
AP1 (Applicant): This approach to reparation is also that which conforms the best to the general international law and the law of state responsibility.
AP1 (Applicant): As the Permanent International Court of Justice observed in the celebrated factory at Chorzow, and this decision is also cited by the court in Papamika Loupolos and others v. Greek in paragraph 36, reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act and reestablish the situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not been committed.
AP1 (Applicant): The court has, however, not formulated similar conclusions in their decisions against Norway.
AP1 (Applicant): Therefore, we would like to ask the court to make a statement regarding this issue in the present case, its specific circumstances taken into consideration.
AP1 (Applicant): The Norwegian Civil Procedure Code provides in section 31 5 and 4 for reopening of cases where the judgment misapplied the Convention, not dissimilar to the Spanish provisions the court relied on and referred to in Omurafe v. Spain and Hadadal v. Spain.
AP1 (Applicant): To illustrate why it is important that the court adds the judgment's dispositive something regarding this issue, I make reference to the two new paper articles in appendix 18 and 19, which I have already mentioned before.
AP1 (Applicant): The articles show that the agent has adopted and propagated the view that a mere stipulation of a violation of an article of the Convention seems to be reparation in itself.
AP1 (Applicant): No domestic remedies are needed.
AP1 (Applicant): This is a dangerous approach because when such a position is expressed by a high-ranking official, the national courts may wrongfully be led to believe that cases such as the present one merit no further action.