TrustHLT/LaCour huggingface dataset:
GR1 (Government): Likewise, even if convicted, the conviction may be quashed at a later stage if some new facts emerge which demonstrate that the conviction is unsafe.
GR1 (Government): But this doesn't mean that there has necessarily been any miscarriage of justice in bringing the prosecution.
GR1 (Government): A person who has been acquitted or who has had a conviction quashed will be treated as innocent of the offense.
GR1 (Government): But neither the European Convention on Human Rights nor the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights requires payment of compensation in these circumstances, nor does the presumption of innocence prevent any inquiry into the underlying facts to decide whether compensation is due.
GR1 (Government): Both the International Covenant through Article 14.6
GR1 (Government): and now the Convention through Article 3 of Protocol 7 recognize that there is only a limited right to compensation.
GR1 (Government): And the right is subject to specific eligibility criteria which require an assessment of what took place.
GR1 (Government): It's common to Section 133 of the Criminal Justice Act, Article 14.6 of the International Covenant,
GR1 (Government): which it implements, and Article 3 of Protocol 7 to the Convention, that a right to compensation only arises if four conditions are satisfied.
GR1 (Government): First, a person must have been convicted of a criminal offense.
GR1 (Government): There is therefore no right to compensation if a person has been charged, detained, or even tried if that person is acquitted at trial or if the prosecution is withdrawn.
GR1 (Government): Secondly, the conviction must have been reversed or a pardon granted because of a new or newly discovered fact.
GR1 (Government): There's no right to compensation, for example, if it's reversed because of an error of law in the trial process or because of a reappraisal of the same facts.
GR1 (Government): Third, the new or newly discovered fact must show conclusively that there was a miscarriage of justice, not merely that the conviction was quashed.
GR1 (Government): And the UK gives effect to that requirement of conclusiveness through the comparable standard of beyond reasonable doubt.
GR1 (Government): And fourthly, the previous nondisclosure of the unknown fact must not be wholly or partly attributable to the individual.
GR1 (Government): These conditions, which are common to all three instruments, make it clear that there is no right to compensation simply because someone has been acquitted or because a conviction has been reversed.
GR1 (Government): The presumption of innocence does not have that effect.
GR1 (Government): A right to compensation of that kind would contradict and rewrite the conditions in Article 14.6
GR1 (Government): and Article 3 of Protocol 7.
GR1 (Government): It would create a far more extravagant right than that found in those obligations.
GR1 (Government): And it would also ignore the reality that a fair criminal justice system means people can have their convictions reversed, where, for example, the safety of the conviction is in doubt, but without that meaning that a miscarriage of justice has occurred.
GR1 (Government): States can, of course, adopt compensation schemes that go wider than the international obligations.
GR1 (Government): Some states, but by no means all, provide compensation where a person is detained for a criminal offense, but no conviction occurs for whatever reason.
GR1 (Government): But compensation in those circumstances is not required by Article 14.6 of the International Covenant
GR1 (Government): or by Article 3 of Protocol 7 of the Convention.
GR1 (Government): But if a state does choose to offer compensation in those extra circumstances, care has to be taken in operating the eligibility criteria.
GR1 (Government): The right to be presumed innocent under Article 6.2
GR1 (Government): must not be infringed.
GR1 (Government): But the court's jurisprudence on such schemes is not directly applicable to compensation required under Article 14.6 or Article 3 of Protocol 7.
GR1 (Government): The scheme required by those articles limits the right to cases where all four conditions are satisfied.
GR1 (Government): And those conditions sit compatibly alongside the right that everyone charged with a criminal offense shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.
GR1 (Government): In the International Covenant, Article 14.6
GR1 (Government): is part of the fair trial rights that includes the presumption of innocence in Article 14.2.
GR1 (Government): And in the Convention, the limited right to compensation under Article 3 of Protocol 7 is found alongside the presumption of innocence in Article 6.2.
GR1 (Government): States can legitimately refuse compensation if any one of the four conditions are not met without infringing the presumption of innocence.
GR1 (Government): By contrast, on the applicant's argument here, compensation would have to be paid whenever a conviction is quashed because of a new fact.
GR1 (Government): Otherwise, the applicant's innocence would be implicitly questioned.
GR1 (Government): We say that argument is wrong for at least three reasons.
GR1 (Government): First, it would be contrary to the intention of the parties to the international conventions.
GR1 (Government): They deliberately limited the right to compensation to cases where a miscarriage of justice has been conclusively demonstrated.
GR1 (Government): This requirement would be redundant if the presumption of innocence meant that compensation had to be paid whenever a reversal occurs on the basis of a new or newly discovered fact.
GR1 (Government): If the applicant were right in her interpretation, it's difficult to see how a state could ever refuse compensation applying this condition without infringing the presumption of innocence.
GR1 (Government): A decision to refuse compensation because no miscarriage of justice has been conclusively demonstrated is wrongly treated by the applicant as involving some sort of expression of doubt over the acquittal, and therefore the applicant's innocence.
GR1 (Government): That interpretation cannot be right.
GR1 (Government): If it were, it would remove one of the four conditions that the parties deliberately included in articulating the right that they put in place.
GR1 (Government): Secondly, the applicant's interpretation is illogical.
GR1 (Government): The need to demonstrate a miscarriage of justice is a deliberate and express recognition that more is required for compensation to be paid than mere reversal of a conviction.
GR1 (Government): There may be many reasons why a conviction is legitimately reversed without that calling into question the propriety of the prosecution that took place.
GR1 (Government): There's no logic in assuming that a reversal, the reversal of a conviction where a new fact comes to light necessarily means the conviction was the result of a miscarriage of justice.
GR1 (Government): In Miss Allen's case, new scientific evidence was discovered that cast doubt on the safety of her original conviction some years before.
GR1 (Government): That doubt was sufficient to justify quashing her conviction.
GR1 (Government): And the assessment of safety is one that's carried out by the Court of Appeal Criminal Division on an appeal against a conviction.
GR1 (Government): As a result, the applicant is now deemed innocent of the offense.
GR1 (Government): But as in Miss Allen's case, a retrial may not be ordered for very simple practical reasons.
GR1 (Government): The most common of these is that the sentence has already been served, and the retrial will serve no sensible purpose.
GR1 (Government): The reversal of the conviction does not mean that the original prosecution was wrongly brought, nor does it mean that no fresh prosecution could be brought now, even with the benefit of the newly discovered fact.
GR1 (Government): It only means the original conviction was unsafe.
GR1 (Government): It's therefore wrong to claim that a miscarriage of justice has been conclusively demonstrated, requiring payment of compensation, where a conviction is quashed.
GR1 (Government): This, however, does not affect the applicant's entitlement to be treated as innocent of the offense.
GR1 (Government): And thirdly, the applicant's interpretation causes potentially absurd results.
GR1 (Government): On her analysis, compensation would be paid whenever a new or newly discovered fact caused a conviction to be reversed, regardless of whether there had been a miscarriage of justice.
GR1 (Government): But yet no compensation would be required where a conviction was reversed because of a misdirection of law or because of a reappraisal of the same evidence, despite the fact that the individual would be similarly deemed to be innocent.
GR1 (Government): If compensation can be refused consistently with the presumption of innocence where those other conditions are not met, there is no reason why it cannot be refused if the condition concerning a miscarriage of justice has not been met.
GR1 (Government): The applicant's argument doesn't recognize the special nature of the right to compensation in Article 14.6 of the International Covenant
GR1 (Government): and Article 3 of Protocol 7 of the Convention.
GR1 (Government): That special nature is something which both the United Nations Human Rights Committee and this court have long recognized.
GR1 (Government): In WJH and Netherlands, the UN Human Rights Committee identified that the presumption of innocence in Article 14.2 of the International Covenant
GR1 (Government): didn't apply to proceedings for compensations under Article 14.6.
GR1 (Government): And that's because proceedings to determine such eligibility are not criminal and do not engage the presumption of innocence.
GR1 (Government): This court reached a very similar conclusion in Seconina in Austria.
GR1 (Government): There, the court was looking at a domestic compensation scheme that offered compensation for persons not convicted at trial rather than a right to compensation under Article 3 of Protocol 7.
GR1 (Government): A breach of Article 6.2 was found
GR1 (Government): where eligibility required an applicant to prove his innocence rather than to prove a miscarriage of justice.
GR1 (Government): And the Austrian court's decision cast doubt over the correctness of the criminal court's verdict to acquit in the way that it was expressed.
GR1 (Government): This court was careful to point out the important difference between that sort of situation and eligibility for compensation under Article 3 of Protocol 7, which was not comparable and which applies solely to a person who has suffered punishment as a result of a conviction stemming from a miscarriage of justice.
GR1 (Government): That eligibility criterion, therefore, depends upon identification of a miscarriage of justice, not proof of innocence.
GR1 (Government): The situation is fundamentally different to the domestic scheme considered in Seconina.
GR1 (Government): Assessment of whether a miscarriage of justice has been conclusively demonstrated must involve some assessment of the evidence that led to the conviction in the first place.
GR1 (Government): And that process does not involve any necessary infringement of the presumption of innocence, nor does it undermine the acquittal that has occurred on reversal.
GR1 (Government): The essential focus is whether, having regard to what is now known of the new fact, a prosecution could properly have been brought against the applicant in the first place.
GR1 (Government): And that decision does not involve interfering with the outcome of the prosecution, nor any acquittal or reversal.
GR1 (Government): Nor does it amount to the voicing of suspicions regarding the applicant's innocence.
GR1 (Government): It's merely a decision that exposing the individual to the criminal justice system did not entail a miscarriage of justice.
GR1 (Government): It's inherent in this criterion that reversals may occur without a miscarriage of justice taking place as the UN Committee and the court correctly recognized in WJH and Seconina.
GR1 (Government): And there is nothing surprising in this result.
GR1 (Government): The eligibility criteria was recently examined by the United Kingdom Supreme Court in the case of Adams and the Secretary of State for Justice.
GR1 (Government): Nine justices examined the true meaning of Article 14.6
GR1 (Government): based on its origins, its wording, and the need for an autonomous interpretation of the international covenant.
GR1 (Government): Previously, there had been a difference of view in a case called Mullen as to whether the right to compensation only applied to a person who was shown to be innocent, described as category one, or whether it also covered cases where the new or newly discovered fact so undermined the evidence that no conviction could possibly have been based upon it, referred to as category two.
GR1 (Government): The Supreme Court reached a majority 5-4 verdict that both categories were covered.
GR1 (Government): But there was unanimity amongst all nine judges on two other important points.
GR1 (Government): First, they unanimously decided that Article 14.6
GR1 (Government): does not require compensation where a new or newly discovered fact merely renders a conviction unsafe.
GR1 (Government): Had the new fact been available at the time of trial, a reasonable jury might or might not have convicted the defendant.
GR1 (Government): But this did not mean a miscarriage of justice had been conclusively demonstrated.
GR1 (Government): And this was described as category three.
GR1 (Government): And there is no dispute that Ms. Allen's case
GR1 (Government): is in that category.
GR1 (Government): Secondly, the Supreme Court unanimously decided that limiting compensation to cases in categories one and two did not infringe the presumption of innocence under Article 6.2.
GR1 (Government): This is either because the presumption doesn't apply at all or because the assessment for compensation doesn't interfere with that presumption in practice.
GR1 (Government): The Supreme Court's unanimous decision on both these topics was clearly correct.
GR1 (Government): And we say the applicant's case fails to deal with that decision properly.
GR1 (Government): And we give three examples of that failure.
GR1 (Government): First, the applicant doesn't address the unanimous decision that the right in Article 14.6 cannot logically
GR1 (Government): include category three cases, such as Ms. Allen's,
GR1 (Government): where the new fact renders a conviction unsafe.
GR1 (Government): But a jury might still have convicted, had it known of the fresh evidence.
GR1 (Government): Lord Phillips explained that an interpretation which included category three cases would give no sensible meaning to the requirement that a miscarriage of justice has to be demonstrated conclusively.
GR1 (Government): Lord Hape similarly explained that fresh evidence which renders a conviction unsafe will usually not be, and will certainly not need to be, of a character to show a miscarriage of justice has been conclusively demonstrated.
GR1 (Government): Secondly, there's no merit in the applicant's argument that small differences in wording between Section 133 of the UK Act and Article 14.6 are significant.
GR1 (Government): The only differences are immaterial, such as translating the word conclusive into beyond reasonable doubt.
GR1 (Government): And there is no difference in substance between these tests.
GR1 (Government): And both were applied by the justices of the Supreme Court interchangeably in their reasoning.
GR1 (Government): And thirdly, the applicant's case depends on the mistaken idea that the decision in Adams creates two categories of acquittal on the merits, and that a person is required to prove innocence for compensation to be paid.
GR1 (Government): That argument is plainly wrong.
GR1 (Government): The autonomous meaning adopted by the Supreme Court was not one of demonstrating innocence.
GR1 (Government): It's one of showing conclusively that there has been a miscarriage of justice.
GR1 (Government): And that's not limited to cases of innocence.
GR1 (Government): And the Supreme Court majority rejected any such interpretation.
GR1 (Government): It's concerned with cases where the evidence has been completely undermined, such that the prosecution should not have been brought at all.
GR1 (Government): Category 2 does not require demonstration of innocence.
GR1 (Government): Instead, it's focused on whether the new fact has conclusively demonstrated that there's been a miscarriage of justice of that kind.
GR1 (Government): As analyzed by the Supreme Court, the principle of the presumption of innocence applied by this court is that it is not open to the state to undermine the effects of an acquittal.
GR1 (Government): But this does not forbid comments on the underlying facts of the case in subsequent proceedings of a different kind, such as a civil claim for damages, when it is necessary to find out what happened.
GR1 (Government): Both Article 14.6 and Section 133 of the 1988 Act
GR1 (Government): are in the category of lex specialis.
GR1 (Government): The general provision for a presumption of innocence does not have any impact on them.
GR1 (Government): A refusal of compensation under Section 133, because it has not been shown that criminal proceedings should not have been brought at all, doesn't undermine the acquittal.
GR1 (Government): The assessment under Section 133 of the UK Act is therefore not based on proof of innocence.
GR1 (Government): Instead, it is about whether a new fact shows beyond reasonable doubt or conclusively that a miscarriage of justice occurred.
GR1 (Government): And that assessment doesn't infringe the presumption of innocence.
GR1 (Government): The court itself has recognized that the right to compensation under Article 3 of Protocol 7 is restricted in nature.
GR1 (Government): And the court has applied the Council of Ministers' own explanatory memorandum as to its meaning.
GR1 (Government): In Biakowski and Poland, the court identified that the right only applies to cases where there has been a serious failure in the judicial process involving grave prejudice to the convicted person.
GR1 (Government): It emphasized that there is no requirement under the article to pay compensation if the conviction has been reversed or a pardon has been granted on some other ground.
GR1 (Government): The court also noted that the article does not seek to lay down any rules as to the nature of the procedure to be applied to establish a miscarriage of justice, this being a matter for domestic law or practice of the state concerned.
GR1 (Government): It's also untenable to suggest that the meaning of Article 3 of Protocol 7 is altered by Article 6.2
GR1 (Government): or that the criterion to demonstrate a miscarriage of justice is somehow removed.
GR1 (Government): That's irreconcilable with the words in the article itself that include this criterion.
GR1 (Government): And it's also inconceivable that the expert authors of the explanatory memorandum on Protocol 7 were not aware of Article 6.2 when explaining its effect.
GR1 (Government): Article 14.6 and Article 3 of Protocol 7
GR1 (Government): can therefore properly be categorized as a form of lex specialis to which the presumption of innocence does not apply, as indicated in WJH and Second ENA, respectively.
GR1 (Government): Moreover, this court's decisions on different domestic compensation schemes that do not give effect to Article 14.6
GR1 (Government): or Article 3 of Protocol 7 are not directly applicable.
GR1 (Government): Thus, the court's decisions in Lamana in Austria, Weizelbraun in Austria, Second ENA in Austria, and Rushidi in Austria were all concerned with compensation payable on an acquittal, where a person had to prove his innocence by showing he or she had been clear of all suspicion.
GR1 (Government): Moreover, the assessment process in those cases was closely linked to the criminal proceedings.
GR1 (Government): And none of them concerned compensation payable under Article 3 of Protocol 7, nor demonstrating conclusively that there had been a miscarriage of justice.
GR1 (Government): Likewise, this court's decisions in Hammann in Norway, Owe in Norway, and Orr in Norway concerned domestic compensation schemes on acquittal, not a reversal of a conviction because of a new fact.
GR1 (Government): Moreover, the application for compensation in those cases were generally dealt with by the same courts that have dealt with the acquittals and were very closely linked to those criminal proceedings.
GR1 (Government): Again, none concerned compensation under the equivalent of Article 3 or Protocol 7, nor the demonstration of a miscarriage of justice.
GR1 (Government): And the same point is also true of each of the domestic schemes of compensation that were an issue in Capo in Belgium, Tendam in Spain, and Puig Panella in Spain.
GR1 (Government): Even if this right to compensation is not treated as a form of lex specialis as such, the assessment reflected in Section 133 of the Criminal Justice Act does not call into question a person's lack of criminal liability.
GR1 (Government): It's not part of any criminal proceedings, nor is it sufficiently or closely linked to criminal proceedings.
GR1 (Government): This court's case law establishes that acquittal of a criminal offense does not mean that no investigation of the underlying facts can ever take place without impugning the presumption of innocence.
GR1 (Government): The applicant's interpretation of the court's observations in Reschiti in Austria or in Sikic in Croatia in this way is clearly wrong.
GR1 (Government): The court has long recognized that even after an acquittal in criminal proceedings, a subsequent civil court can nevertheless investigate the underlying acts.
GR1 (Government): It may still award a victim compensation in civil proceedings without infringing Article 6.2,
GR1 (Government): as noted in Why and Norway.
GR1 (Government): And in Sikic in Croatia, the court recognized that disciplinary proceedings can also inquire into the same facts of a criminal charge after an acquittal without infringing the presumption of innocence.
GR1 (Government): In making these judgments, the court has looked at the closeness between the criminal proceedings and the other civil proceedings.
GR1 (Government): Doing that exercise for Section 133 of the Criminal Justice Act reveals a very clear separation.
GR1 (Government): Amongst other things, a decision on compensation under Section 133 is never a decision taken by the same criminal court that considered the acquittal.
GR1 (Government): The decision is one taken by the executive, not by the judiciary.
GR1 (Government): The decision is taken pursuant to an administrative process and not in criminal proceedings.
GR1 (Government): The decision may be based on different evidence.
GR1 (Government): The Secretary of State can consider the new facts that would not have been available at the criminal trial itself because they were inadmissible or discovered too late.
GR1 (Government): The decision is normally remote in time from the criminal proceedings.
GR1 (Government): An application for compensation may now be made at any time up to two years after the conviction was reversed.
GR1 (Government): And the decision is, in fact, provided on a confidential basis to the applicant.
GR1 (Government): The decision to refuse compensation on the basis that no miscarriage of justice occurred does not call into question the acquittal in any way.
GR1 (Government): The government therefore submits that the presumption of innocence is not engaged at all for decisions under Section 133, where the Secretary of State is merely applying the test for compensation in Article 14.6 of the International
GR1 (Government): Covenant and Article 3 of Protocol 7 of the Convention.
GR1 (Government): Even if the presumption of innocence is potentially engaged, the decision does not involve any necessary infringement of Article 6.2.