TrustHLT/LaCour huggingface dataset:
AP1 (Applicant): Namely, Latvian court did not refer for a preliminary ruling to the European Court of Justice, which was necessary in order to adequately protect the applicant's rights.
AP1 (Applicant): And number two, Latvian courts were not under strict obligation of EU law to grant execution of the Cypriot judgment.
AP1 (Applicant): To the contrary, EU law required Latvian courts to verify whether the applicant's rights to defense were sufficiently respected by the Cypriot courts.
AP1 (Applicant): And I will move on to the answer of the second question.
AP1 (Applicant): That is, is the fact that Latvian courts did not refer for a preliminary ruling before the Court of Justice relevant in this present case?
AP1 (Applicant): The answer is indeed yes.
AP1 (Applicant): The applicant believes that the fact that Latvian courts did not refer to ECJ for a preliminary ruling is relevant in this case because it is one of the reasons why the protection of the applicant's rights to a fair trial were not guaranteed in a manner compatible to Article 6 of the Convention.
AP1 (Applicant): And thus, the presumption of equivalent protection does not apply to the present case.
AP1 (Applicant): I refer to the case already brought up by other parties in this case, Michaux v. France,
AP1 (Applicant): where the court, well, this honorable court, found the presumption of equivalent protection not applicable exactly because the national courts had decided not to refer to the European Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling.
AP1 (Applicant): Therefore, it has been well established by this court that referral to the European Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling or absence of such referral is a condition to be considered when deciding on application of presumption of equivalent protection.
AP1 (Applicant): Pursuant to Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the court or tribunal shall bring the matter before the European Court of Justice under consideration where the interpretation of EU acts is raised in a case pending before those national courts.
AP1 (Applicant): The European Court of Justice has held that referral to ECJ is obligatory unless previous decisions of the ECJ have already dealt with the point of law in question or when the correct interpretation is so obvious as to leave no scope for any reasonable doubt as to the manner in which the question raised is to be resolved.
AP1 (Applicant): That is put forward by the ECJ's judgment in Silfit case C-283 slash 81.
AP1 (Applicant): This concept has been observed also by this honorable court in Strasbourg.
AP1 (Applicant): Notably, the court has emphasized that the national courts must give reasons for not referring to ECJ.
AP1 (Applicant): And failing to do so may constitute violation of Article 6 of the convention.
AP1 (Applicant): In light of this jurisprudence of the ECJ and this honorable court of Strasbourg, the applicant believes that the Supreme Court had to refer to the ECJ in the applicant's case.
AP1 (Applicant): And also because of the following two considerations.
AP1 (Applicant): Number one, the Supreme Court of Latvia in the present case did not in any way substantiate that it is not necessary to have the matter examined by the European Court of Justice.
AP1 (Applicant): We can see from the decision of the Supreme Court that it does not mention a single judgment of ECJ that would substantiate its opinion.
AP1 (Applicant): Number two, on the 31st of January 2007, when the decision of the Supreme Court of Latvia was adopted, there were no case law of ECJ dealing with a particular matter.
AP1 (Applicant): Now the chamber has come up with three judgments in its recent judgment in this case of European Court of Justice in relation to the interpretation of Article 34.2
AP1 (Applicant): of the Brussels regulation.
AP1 (Applicant): These are judgments of December 2006 in the case ASML, of April 2009 in the case Apostolidis, and of September 2012 in the case Trade Agency.
AP1 (Applicant): But it is notable that Apostolidis' judgment, as well as Trade Agency judgment, were adopted after the Supreme Court of Latvia was dealing with a particular applicant's case.
AP1 (Applicant): Therefore, at the time the Supreme Court's decision was adopted in this particular case, the ECJ had not yet dealt with the issue regarding competence of courts when applying Article 32, 34.2 of the Brussels regulation.
AP1 (Applicant): Apologies.
AP1 (Applicant): And thirdly, it is very important that three years after the applicant's case in the Latvian Supreme Court, the same Latvian Supreme Court did what it had to do in the applicant's case.
AP1 (Applicant): That is, it decided to refer to ECJ for a preliminary ruling regarding the same identical issue.
AP1 (Applicant): Namely, in December 2010, the Supreme Court of Latvia referred to ECJ with a question whether, in the case similar to applicant's case, the court is competent to examine for itself the conformity with the evidence of the information contained in the certificate stating that a foreign judgment has come into effect.
AP1 (Applicant): And as a result of this request for a preliminary ruling, ECJ initiated case, trade agency case.
AP1 (Applicant): The approach of the Supreme Court of Latvia in trade agency case proves that the Supreme Court had to refer for a preliminary ruling already in the applicant's case and not only three years later in an identical case.
AP1 (Applicant): Furthermore, it demonstrates that the lack of preliminary ruling in the applicant's case had a direct effect on the outcome of the applicant's case.
AP1 (Applicant): And finally, the applicant disagrees with the government of Latvia that the applicant himself did not request the Supreme Court to refer to ECJ.
AP1 (Applicant): It shall be emphasized that in the hearing of the Supreme Court, which took place on the 31st of January 2007, applicant was not given a possibility to submit his request and express his arguments and opinion on the substance of the case.
AP1 (Applicant): Such rights were given only to one party of the court proceedings, Company Fairweather Holdings, the opposite party.
AP1 (Applicant): Thus, the applicant practically was not in a position to request the Latvian court to refer to ECJ for a preliminary ruling.
AP1 (Applicant): I now move on to the question number three.
AP1 (Applicant): What was the exact limits of competence of Latvian courts in the present case according to the Brussels regulation?
AP1 (Applicant): And did they have discretion?
AP1 (Applicant): What was the scope of this discretion if that was there?
AP1 (Applicant): The court had already established in the Bosphorus judgment that the presumption of equivalent presumption does not apply and the state is fully responsible under the convention for all acts falling outside its strict international legal obligation.
AP1 (Applicant): The applicant does not maintain that the Brussels regulation provides for complete discretion of the national courts in a sense that they could voluntarily refuse recognition of judgment rendered in other member state.
AP1 (Applicant): However, honorable court, Brussels regulations, in this case, paragraph two of the article 34, puts the national courts in a position where they are both entitled and obliged to verify factual and legal circumstances of the proceedings in the other member state.
AP1 (Applicant): Supreme Court of Latvia was not under strict international duty to recognize the Cypriot judgment.
AP1 (Applicant): EU law, to the contrary, under the EU law, Latvian courts were obliged to provide certain legal and factual analysis, which Latvian court, in the case of applicant, failed to do.
AP1 (Applicant): The said conclusion is established first and foremost by the judgment of the European Court of Justice.
AP1 (Applicant): Notably, in trade agency case, the ECJ provided elaborate argumentation on what is the limit of competence for the courts, applying article 34.2 of the Brussels regulation.
AP1 (Applicant): Moreover, the circumstances of apostolidis were manifestly different from the applicant's case because in apostolidis, the defendants were aware of the default judgment and did, in fact, commence proceedings to challenge it.
AP1 (Applicant): Whereas, circumstances in trade agency case were absolutely identical to the applicant's case, and therefore, it should have been applied also to the applicant's matter.
AP1 (Applicant): Thereby, in order to establish the limit of competence of the Latvian courts, in the present case, it is most appropriate to rely on conclusions of the trade agency case judgment.
AP1 (Applicant): The applicant believes that conclusions of trade agency judgment clearly establishes that the Latvian courts were competent to verify the factual and legal circumstances of proceedings in Cyprus in order to establish whether the Cypriot judgment was served to the applicant in a time and manner that would make it possible for the applicant to challenge the Cypriot judgment, as it is clearly indicated by the European Court of Justice and trade agency judgment, articles 38 and 45, respectively.
AP1 (Applicant): After the preliminary ruling in the trade agency case, the said principles have been carefully applied in the practice of the Supreme Court of Latvia.
AP1 (Applicant): Further, on the 2nd of July, 2014, the Supreme Court of Latvia adopted decision in another case, SKC 1255 slash 2014, where the Latvian Supreme Court refused enforcement of a default judgment because the defendant was not served in such a way as to enable him to arrange for his defense.
AP1 (Applicant): It should be noted that in both of these cases, it was not disputed that the defendant has not tried to commence proceedings to challenge the default judgment.
AP1 (Applicant): Finally, in the light of the above mentioned, the applicant disagrees with the allegation of Latvian government and the European Commission that the present case is similar to the case of Povs versus Austria, where the honorable court had concluded that EU law did not provide any discretion for Austrian courts when ordering enforcement of a judgment of Italian court.
AP1 (Applicant): In Povs, the Austrian courts had to apply paragraph 1 of the article 42 of the regulation number 200201 slash 2003, the so-called Brussels II regulation.
AP1 (Applicant): Honorable court, article 42 of the Brussels II regulation requires that the judgment is to be recognized and is to be automatically enforceable in another member state, there being no possibility of opposing its recognition.
AP1 (Applicant): However, paragraph 2 of the article 34 of the Brussels regulation in case of this particular matter is essentially different because both the text and interpretation provided by European Court of Justice requires the courts of the state of enforcement to verify whether the rights of defense have been respected before the courts of the other member state.
AP1 (Applicant): In this regard, I invite the honorable court to take a note of paragraphs 33 to 36 of opinion of Advocate General Julien Cocotte in the trade agency case in ECJ, where the advocate general has neatly explained the difference between both of the Brussels regulation in relation to the competence of the courts of state of enforcement.
AP1 (Applicant): Thereby, the present case is not similar to Povce case because the scope of competence enjoyed by Latvian courts in the present case was much broader in comparison with the Povce case.
AP1 (Applicant): Therefore, in summing up our response to the question number three of the honorable court, the applicant strongly believes that in the present case, the government of Latvia may not rely on the presumption of equivalent protection as a justification of interference with the applicant's rights guaranteed under the Article 6 of the convention.
AP1 (Applicant): And I now will respond to the question number four of the honorable court.
AP1 (Applicant): Could the applicant appeal the judgment of the district court of Limassol of 24th of May 2004?
AP1 (Applicant): And in particular, could he still do it after 16th of June 2006?
AP1 (Applicant): Firstly, in our opinion, it was the obligation of Latvian courts to evaluate whether applicants could appeal the judgment of the district court of Limassol.
AP1 (Applicant): Supreme Court of Latvia, in its decision of 31st of January 2007, did not evaluate the possibility or impossibility to appeal the judgment of the district court of Limassol.
AP1 (Applicant): Secondly, even according to EU law, the possibility for the applicant to appeal against the Cypriot judgment is to be determined by taking into account the defaults of notification of serving of the documents.
AP1 (Applicant): The ECJ, in the ASML Netherlands judgment, had established that it is possible for a defendant to bring proceedings to challenge the default judgment against him only if he was in fact acquainted with its contents, because it was served on him in sufficient time to enable him to arrange for his defense before the courts in the state in which the judgment was given.
AP1 (Applicant): The mere fact is sufficient to conclude that after June 16, 2006, it was not possible within the meaning of Article 34.2 of the Brussels
AP1 (Applicant): regulations for the applicants to commence proceedings to challenge the Cypriot judgment.
AP1 (Applicant): It must be observed that such interpretation has also been supported by the Supreme Court of Latvia in the cases following the applicant's case.
AP1 (Applicant): I had mentioned already the examples.
AP1 (Applicant): Number three, the applicant had no reason even to think that the Cypriot judgment could have been appealable.
AP1 (Applicant): Even the Cypriot judgment did not contain information on possibility or impossibility for the applicant to appeal the judgment.
AP1 (Applicant): Judgment did not even contain information regarding the fact whether the judgment is in force and thereby is enforceable.
AP1 (Applicant): Fourthly, even at this moment of the present hearing, it is not clear whether the applicant could appeal the judgment of District Court of Limassol.
AP1 (Applicant): Even the government of Cyprus has explained that in accordance with Cypriot law, the applicant could try to apply to set aside the judgment as soon as he was informed about it.
AP1 (Applicant): However, government of Cyprus explains that Court of Cyprus may in its own discretion decline to reopen the case if it considers that the conduct of the party applying to reopen the case is inexcusable or cumulus for the judicial process or the right his adversary.
AP1 (Applicant): That is citing from the paragraph 20 of the Cyprus government's opinion.
AP1 (Applicant): Thus, District Court of Limassol was not and still is not directly judgment of District Court of Limassol, was not and still is not directly appealable.
AP1 (Applicant): And ultimately, applicant had no need to appeal the judgment of the District Court of Limassol prior to the court hearing of the Supreme Court of Latvia on 31st of January 2007.
AP1 (Applicant): Because Riga Regional Court, lower instance court, had rejected already in October 2, 2006, the enforcement of the Cypriot judgment.
AP1 (Applicant): And there are no evidences in the case file which prove that Cypriot judgment would be because of the same reasoning that we had already indicated, that there were no evidence in the case file which proved that Cypriot judgment is enforced and is enforceable.
AP1 (Applicant): Therefore, in summary to answer question number four, prior to the court hearing of the Supreme Court of Latvia of the 31st of January 2007, which enforced Cypriot judgment, the applicant's rights were protected and observed by the Latvian courts by rejecting enforcement of the Cypriot judgment for the same reasons as applicant had already mentioned in his application to those courts.
AP1 (Applicant): And now I will answer to the question number five.
AP1 (Applicant): Is the fact that the above-mentioned Cypriot judgment did not contain any mention of potential right to appeal relevant in the present case?
AP1 (Applicant): This fact is of great importance in the present matter.
AP1 (Applicant): Firstly, it is an evidence in itself that the Latvian court did not even consider whether the proceedings conducted before the court of the other state had been in conformity with Article VI of the Convention.
AP1 (Applicant): Such consideration should have included answer to the question whether the defendant had the time necessary in order to prepare his defense or to take the steps necessary to prevent a decision delivered in the fault of appearance.
AP1 (Applicant): Secondly, Article VI, paragraph 1 of the Convention secures to everyone the right to have any claim relating to his or her civil rights and obligations brought before a court or tribunal.
AP1 (Applicant): Possibility to appeal the full judgment could be considered as such right under Article VI, paragraph 1 of the Convention.
AP1 (Applicant): Honorable courts practice, for example, in case Mendel versus Sweden had noted that it is essential to verify whether a person could know and understand in what procedure and time limits it is possible to submit an appeal.
AP1 (Applicant): Especially, that is of great importance if the judgment is delivered by the foreign court and is default judgment.
AP1 (Applicant): If there is no information available on this issue, it is to be considered that possibility to submit an appeal is not practical and effective right of access to court.
AP1 (Applicant): And finally, lack of such information meant that there is no information in the case file regarding the fact whether the foreign judgment was enforced and was enforceable.
AP1 (Applicant): Therefore, in conclusion of our response to the question number five, it shall be concluded that the fact that a superior judgment did not contain any mention on potential right to appeal is relevant in the present case.
AP1 (Applicant): And now I will answer question number six of the honorable court, did the Senate of the Supreme Court of Latvia in its judgment of 31st of January 2007 sufficiently took into account, number one, the separate procedural law and particularly the possibility or impossibility for the applicant to appeal the judgment of District Court of Limassol and the manner in which the applicant was summoned to appear before the above mentioned Cypriot court?
AP1 (Applicant): Honorable court, it is clear from the wording of the decision of the Supreme Court of Latvia of 31st of January 2007 that it did not take into account and did not even evaluate the possibility or impossibility for the applicant to appeal the judgment of District Court of Limassol.
AP1 (Applicant): It can be seen from a number of factual circumstances of the present case.
AP1 (Applicant): The Latvian court in its decision stated, I quote, since Peter Savotin has not appealed court's decision, there is no essential importance of the arguments put forward by the representative of applicant regarding the fact that the respondent was not summoned in proper manner on the hearing of the case in foreign court.
AP1 (Applicant): Honorable court, I conclude that it is clear from the wording of the decision of the Supreme Court of Latvia that it not only did it not sufficiently take into account this said circumstance, but it actually did not take into account those relevant facts at all.
AP1 (Applicant): And now I will proceed to answer the ultimate, the last question of the court, number seven.
AP1 (Applicant): If recognition and execution, as well as the manner in which the procedure of recognition and execution in these jurisdictions was conducted affected the applicant's right to a fair trial within the meaning of Article VI of the convention.
AP1 (Applicant): In the light of aforementioned, it must be concluded that by granting recognition and execution of the superior judgment, the Latvian courts violated the applicant's rights guaranteed by Article VI of the convention.
AP1 (Applicant): As I had explained before, Latvia in present case cannot rely on the presumption of equivalent protection.
AP1 (Applicant): Therefore, the court must access the compliance of the Latvia's activities within the requirements of the convention.
AP1 (Applicant): In his request to the Green Chamber, my client, the applicant, has referred to the court's case law, whereby it is established that principle of equality of arms enshrined in Article VI of the convention applies also to the field of meaning and notifying of the judicial documents to the parties.
AP1 (Applicant): In particular, the applicant relied to the judgment in the case of Miholapa versus Latvia, where the Honorable Court decided that sending notifications to the wrong address, as indicated by the other party, and thereby lacking proper notification of the court hearing, constitutes a violation of Article VI, paragraph one of the convention.
AP1 (Applicant): It is well established by the court judgments in cases Pelligrini versus Italy and Saccoccia versus Austria that in ex quatur proceedings, the domestic courts must examine whether the proceedings conducted before the court of the other state had been in conformity with the Article VI of the convention.
AP1 (Applicant): In a present case, the Supreme Court of Latvia apparently did not examine whether the proceedings before the Cypriot court met the requirements of Article VI, paragraph one of the convention.
AP1 (Applicant): As regards the applicant's argument that he was not properly summoned before the court and was not notified of the court judgment, the Supreme Court of Latvia simply concluded that these arguments are of no importance.
AP1 (Applicant): Thus, by granting recognition and execution of the Cypriot judgment, the Latvian courts violated the applicant's rights guaranteed by paragraph one of the article of the convention.
AP1 (Applicant): The government of Latvia and third parties to this case argue that the applicant failed to demonstrate before Latvian courts that his rights to defense before Cypriot court were not respected and that it was impossible for him to challenge the Cypriot judgment once he became aware of its existence.
AP1 (Applicant): In this regard, I would like to refer once more and summarize the actual circumstances of the case in the time allotted to me.
AP1 (Applicant): First of all, it is not true that applicant failed to demonstrate before the Latvian courts that his rights to defense before the Cypriot court were not respected.
AP1 (Applicant): From the very beginning in the court proceedings, the applicant had stated that judgment of district court of Limassol cannot be enforced since there is no information as to the fact whether the said judgment is enforced.
AP1 (Applicant): Whether it is enforceable and since the applicant was never served with the document which instituted the proceedings, applicant has invariably argued that said circumstance precluded him to arrange for his defense before the courts of the state in which the judgment was given.
AP1 (Applicant): That can be seen from the minutes of those court hearings.
AP1 (Applicant): Secondly, it must be recalled that the applicant firmly believed that he had repaid his debt to the plaintiff company already before the legal proceedings before the district court of Limassol were initiated.
AP1 (Applicant): And therefore, the applicant did not have to expect that there will be any court proceedings in Cyprus as regards his debt to the plaintiff company.
AP1 (Applicant): Third, by the decision of Riga regional courts taken in 2nd of October 2006, the Latvian court rejected the application to enforce the Cypriot judgment.
AP1 (Applicant): And therefore, prior to the court hearing of 31st of January 2007, applicant had no practical need to challenge the Cypriot judgment since the Latvian court had already decided that Cypriot judgment was not enforceable.
AP1 (Applicant): And fourthly, there was no reason for the applicant to consider that Cypriot judgment was enforced and enforceable.