TrustHLT/LaCour huggingface dataset:
AP1 (Applicant): Le délégué au droit de l'enfant nous dit après le court séjour dans le centre d'accueil bruxellois, la famille aurait pris le train pour le centre fait d'asile, arrivé sur place après avoir pris le bus spécial du centre, on leur a refusé l'entrée sous prétexte que l'annexe dont ils disposaient n'était pas valable.
AP1 (Applicant): Incapables de se défendre, ils auraient repris le chemin de Bruxelles ou dépassés par les difficultés, ils se sont rendus au siège de Caritas pour demander la prise en charge dans le cadre d'un retour volontaire.
Guido Raimondi (JudgeP): La parole est maintenant à Mme Niedlispacher.
GR1 (Government): Avant de répondre aux 2 questions posées au gouvernement, je me dois de réagir à ce que vient de dire M. Néraudot,
GR1 (Government): l'affirmation selon laquelle aucun élément nouveau n'aurait été déposé par le gouvernement.
GR1 (Government): C'est inexact, et vous le savez.
GR1 (Government): Nous avons déposé le journal de communication du centre d'hébergement de Bovigny, qui mentionne que malheureusement, pour des raisons qui nous échappent et pour lesquelles il ne m'appartient pas d'essayer d'imaginer, les personnes ne se sont pas présentées.
GR1 (Government): Nous avons eu égard à leur vulnérabilité particulière, puisque c'était vraiment un accompagnement quasi par la main.
GR1 (Government): Les tickets de train leur étaient donnés.
GR1 (Government): Le plan pour arriver là, il pouvait, Madame parle français, parce que nous avons...
GR1 (Government): Monsieur ici de Fédazil a eu des contacts avec Madame qui maîtrisait suffisamment le français pour pouvoir se rendre à 150 km de Bruxelles, et qui était attendu à la gare par un collaborateur administratif qui n'avait que pour mission de les accueillir, de préparer le lit pour bébé et de les accueillir.
GR1 (Government): Alors, il est assez invraisemblable d'entendre qu'un collaborateur administratif d'accueil se charge de l'évaluation de documents et pourrait renvoyer une famille à 150 km.
GR1 (Government): Alors, on se demande aussi comment ils sont rentrés, puisqu'ils étaient censés être dépourvus de moyens, de tickets de transport.
GR1 (Government): Or, nous leur avions donné des tickets pour se rendre à Bovigny, mais pas pour rentrer vers Caritas.
GR1 (Government): Et aussi, pourquoi rentrer vers Caritas?
GR1 (Government): Pourquoi ne pas rentrer vers Fédazil?
GR1 (Government): Et pour suivre la procédure, pourquoi ne pas s'indigner d'avoir été, comme vous le soutenez aujourd'hui, rejeté de Bovigny, où tout les attendait?
GR1 (Government): Donc, c'est assez curieux pour ne pas dire offensant d'être accusé comme ça, de ne pas avoir égard à la situation particulière des intéressés, tout démontre le contraire.
GR1 (Government): Et c'est d'ailleurs la raison pour laquelle, je ne vous le cache pas, Fédazil était choqué par l'arrêt de chambre, mais c'est un reproche que nous devons faire, nous devons nous faire nous-mêmes, gouvernement.
GR1 (Government): Nous avons été incomplets dans notre défense devant la Chambre.
GR1 (Government): Nous n'avions pas produit le journal de communication.
GR1 (Government): Pour répondre, donc, à la question qui est adressée à l'Etat, nous n'allons pas entrer dans les autres questions qui ont été posées aux requérants, puisque vous en êtes conscient.
GR1 (Government): La question qui se pose ici, c'est une question très importante.
GR1 (Government): Vous n'allez pas non plus nous faire l'offense de nous accuser de ne pas avoir conscience de la gravité et de la situation particulière de la famille.
GR1 (Government): La question qui est posée est celle de savoir si elle s'est trouvée dans un état de dénuement extrême, contraire à la dignité humaine, et non pas celle de savoir si la demande d'asile sur le fond aurait dû mener à constater des persécutions concrètes, réelles, en tant que Roms en Serbie.
GR1 (Government): Donc, nous n'allons pas élaborer sur ce volet qui ne nous incombe pas.
GR1 (Government): Concernant l'article 7 de la loi Accueil, eh bien, cet article 7 prévoit que l'accueil peut être plus long que le temps.
GR1 (Government): L'accueil peut être prolongé pour des circonstances particulières, grossesse, scolarité.
GR1 (Government): Madame a bénéficié d'une prolongation lors de sa grossesse.
GR1 (Government): Le paragraphe 3 prévoit une catégorie soupape pour les cas qui ne rentrent pas dans les paragraphes 1 et 2 pour les circonstances liées à la dignité humaine.
GR1 (Government): La famille tombe après la grossesse de Madame clairement dans le paragraphe 3 de l'article 7.
GR1 (Government): Des contacts ont eu lieu entre maître Néraudot et l'assistante sociale de fait d'asile, mais jamais une demande de prolongation de l'aide matérielle n'a été déposée.
GR1 (Government): Nous ne pouvons que le regretter.
GR1 (Government): Je vous l'ai dit, un simple courriel suffit, mais il doit mentionner le mot prolongation.
GR1 (Government): Or, maître Néraudot ne va pas nous reprocher un formalisme excessif dans la demande de mention du seul mot prolongation, puisque son cabinet connaît bien la procédure.
GR1 (Government): Très peu de temps après, en août 2011, un de ses collaborateurs a introduit une demande de prolongation dans une autre affaire.
GR1 (Government): La jurisprudence mentionnée sur l'initiative possible des autorités n'est pas pertinente puisqu'elle est intervenue dans le cadre d'une demande de prolongation introduite, mais refusée sur base des paragraphes 1 et 2.
GR1 (Government): Donc l'autorité de bonne foi, lorsqu'elle se trouve face à une demande basée sur les articles 1 et 2 de l'article 7 de la loi Accueil, doit, si on n'entre pas tout à fait dans les catégories des paragraphes 1 et 2, d'initiative, se poser la question est-ce que le motif qui m'est présenté ici n'entrerait pas davantage dans le paragraphe 3, qui a trait plus aux circonstances liées à la dignité humaine?
GR1 (Government): C'est un cas différent ici.
GR1 (Government): Pas de demande de prolongation, donc forcément pas de décision de refus.
GR1 (Government): Si une demande avait été introduite, une décision de refus aurait comporté des motifs.
GR1 (Government): Là aussi, procès d'intention.
GR1 (Government): Il est erroné de faire référence à l'absence de caractère suspensif d'une demande de prolongation.
GR1 (Government): Une demande de prolongation est suspensive vu qu'elle soit introduite par courrier, fax ou courriel.
GR1 (Government): La 2e question...
GR1 (Government): D'ailleurs, voilà, M. Néraudot, je dois l'ajouter,
GR1 (Government): a préféré introduire une demande de mesure provisoire devant votre cour que de demander la prolongation de l'accueil.
GR1 (Government): Alors que la date de fin de l'aide matérielle était connue depuis 4 mois.
GR1 (Government): Quant à la 2e question, celle de la base de l'aide matérielle octroyée à la famille, du 5 au 7 octobre, la base n'est pas légale.
GR1 (Government): Ce sont les circonstances humanitaires qui poussent Fédasil à reprendre la famille et à lui choisir un lieu d'hébergement adapté à ses besoins particuliers.
András Sajó (JudgeP): Please be seated.
András Sajó (JudgeP): I declare open the public hearing in the case of Simeonovi versus Bulgaria.
András Sajó (JudgeP): The application was lodged with the court on 8 June 2004 under Article 34 of the Convention by three Bulgarian nationals, Mr. Lyuben Filipov Simeonov and his parents,
András Sajó (JudgeP): Mrs. Nelly Nikolova Simeonova and Mr. Filip Lyubenov Simeonov.
András Sajó (JudgeP): It was allocated to the fourth section of the court, pursuant to Rule 52.1 of the rules of the court.
András Sajó (JudgeP): The application was communicated to the government on 23 August 2011 after the court had rejected as inadmissible in a decision of the same date all the complaints of the second and the third applicants and some of the complaints of the first applicant.
András Sajó (JudgeP): On 20 October 2015, chamber of the fourth section rendered a judgment.
András Sajó (JudgeP): On 12 January 2016, the first applicant, Mr. Lyuben Filipov Simeonov,
András Sajó (JudgeP): requested that the case be referred to the Grand Chamber in accordance with Article 43 of the Convention and the panel of the Grand Chamber accepted that request on the 14th of March 2016.
András Sajó (JudgeP): On 20 May 2016, the Association for the Prevention of Torture was granted leave to submit written comments as a third party by virtue of Rule 44.3 of the rules of court.
András Sajó (JudgeP): The government are represented by their agents, Mrs. Milena Kotseva and Mrs. Maria Dimitrova.
András Sajó (JudgeP): The applicant is represented by Mr. Jeremy Mcbride, counsel,
András Sajó (JudgeP): and Mrs. Svetla Margaritova-Vuchkova, counsel.
András Sajó (JudgeP): The applicant's mother, Mrs. Nelly Simeonova, is also present.
András Sajó (JudgeP): I welcome the representatives of the parties in the name of the court.
András Sajó (JudgeP): I also welcome a delegation of judges and prosecutors from the European Judicial Training Network and a delegation of state attorneys from Brazil who are on a study visit to the court.
András Sajó (JudgeP): Having consulted the agents of the government and the representatives of the applicant, I have determined the order of addresses as follows.
András Sajó (JudgeP): Mr. Mcbride for the applicant will speak first,
András Sajó (JudgeP): and then Mrs. Kotseva and Mrs. Dimitrova for the government.
András Sajó (JudgeP): I call Mr. Mcbride.
AP1 (Applicant): and issues. Firstly, the material conditions during detention or remand and the prison
AP1 (Applicant): regime following conviction. Secondly, the right to assistance of a lawyer following
AP1 (Applicant): arrest. And finally, the imposition of a whole life sentence. In respect of all three issues,
AP1 (Applicant): it is the submission of the applicant that the requirements of the Convention have not been fulfilled, and the Court will thus be invited to find violations of the articles concerned.
AP1 (Applicant): As regard the issue of material conditions of detention or remand and the prison regime, the Chamber have already found a violation of Article 3 in this regard. The applicant
AP1 (Applicant): agrees with this finding and notes that the respondent government have made no observations on this matter, other than to indicate that reforms have taken place. In the circumstances,
AP1 (Applicant): the applicant does not wish to address this issue further, other than to request the Court to confirm the finding of the Chamber and to find a violation of Article 3 of the Convention.
AP1 (Applicant): Turning to the question of the assistance of a lawyer, this issue, which is something guaranteed, raises issues under Article 6.3c, together with Article 6.1 of the Convention,
AP1 (Applicant): is something which should never have arisen in this case, because this right is explicitly guaranteed by the Bulgarian Constitution and an array of legislative provisions. Indeed,
AP1 (Applicant): not only is it guaranteed, but in a case such as the applicant's, it is a mandatory requirement given the seriousness of the offence with which the person was arrested.
AP1 (Applicant): But at the time of the applicant's arrest, these provisions were more honoured in the breach than in their observance. This is evident, as in cases referred to in the written observations
AP1 (Applicant): before the Bulgarian Supreme Court, but also in the report of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman and Degrading Treatment, or Punishment, CPT, following its 1999 visit to Bulgaria. This failure is recognised in the written
AP1 (Applicant): observations of the Court, and unfortunately it is not simply a question of shortcomings at the time, it is something which continues, as has been made clear in subsequent reports, most recently in 2015, of the CPT. There, the report notes that invariably the person
AP1 (Applicant): would arrive at the place of detention and be interviewed, and only subsequently would have access to a lawyer. The applicant is not, however, raising a general
AP1 (Applicant): question he is concerned with, specifically with the failure to allow him to have access to a lawyer for three days following his arrest on 3 October 1999.
AP1 (Applicant): The applicant submits that following his arrest he was interrogated on the evening of 3 October, and at the time he asked for the assistance of a lawyer whom he already had been in contact with through his parents, and he was told in response that, despite giving the details of the lawyer, he had seen too many movies and that this was not Bulgaria, not America.
AP1 (Applicant): He repeated this request on several occasions in other places of detention, and was refused on each occasion on the basis that these requests were fanciful.
AP1 (Applicant): He was never informed of the right to be informed of the lawyer he was choosing, despite the requirement in Bulgarian law that he should do so. It is not disputed by the Respondent
AP1 (Applicant): Government that he did not have the assistance of a lawyer between 3 and 6 October, and no justification has been advanced for him being prevented from having had such assistance.
AP1 (Applicant): But the Respondent Government does contest the other submissions of the applicant. It
AP1 (Applicant): suggests that he has not complained about having a lawyer during the three days. This,
AP1 (Applicant): for example, was very clearly a complaint made to the Supreme Court of Cassation, and it was in closure for the first letter submitted to the Court. It also suggested there was
AP1 (Applicant): vagueness in his initial application and in the referral request about this request. But
AP1 (Applicant): in paragraph 14 of his initial letter, the applicant stated, in violation of the rights provided in Bulgarian constitution and Article 73.1 of the CPC, I was refused to have a lawyer
AP1 (Applicant): from the moment of detention and the intervention of a lawyer in the process. They denied me
AP1 (Applicant): access to my preferred lawyer. This was reaffirmed in his application, and in the request for
AP1 (Applicant): referral to the Grand Chamber, the applicant drew attention to the absence of any confidential conversations with a lawyer while in police custody and in the investigation detention centre. Thus, the applicant has been both unequivocal and consistent in complaining
AP1 (Applicant): about the fact that he was denied access to a lawyer during the relevant period, and also about his being interrogated during this period. The applicant was, of course, aware of his
AP1 (Applicant): rights, but it is precisely because he was not guaranteed these rights that he is now raising this issue.
AP1 (Applicant): The issue of the access to a lawyer, as I said, has not been disputed, but there is question raised as to whether or not there was proof of his interrogation. The applicant
AP1 (Applicant): would submit that there is definitely a coexistence of inferences, strong, sufficiently clear, and concordant inferences, that he was interrogated without the assistance of a lawyer during the three days following his arrest. The idea that there was no interrogation in these three
AP1 (Applicant): days would mean that only very minimal actions have been taken with respect to the investigation.
AP1 (Applicant): This seems a remarkably relaxed approach to the investigation, given that Colonel Botto of the National Police Directorate had been assigned to conduct the investigative actions following the applicant's arrest in Sofia. It is hardly convincing that there was no
AP1 (Applicant): interest in speaking to the applicants and seeking explanations as regards the very matter for which he had been arrested. Furthermore, this is not consistent with normal priest
AP1 (Applicant): practice, nor with the obligations arising under Article V.3 of the Convention to ensure
AP1 (Applicant): that there is still a reasonable suspicion justifying the continued deprivation of liberty following a person's arrest.
AP1 (Applicant): Moreover, it does not reflect the practice in Bulgaria, which has been well documented in the rulings of the Bulgarian Supreme Court and also in reports by the CPT and others, in which interrogation without a suspect's lawyer following his or her arrest has been found to be a frequent occurrence. Indeed, a contemporaneous illustration of the general
AP1 (Applicant): practice of interrogating suspects when they do not have the assistance of a lawyer can be seen in the handwritten statement of the applicant's co-accused, Mr. Sabev, also
AP1 (Applicant): on 3 October, which is included in the investigation file as enclosure 4 to the Respondent Government's written observations. This was signed only by him and not by a lawyer, as should be the
AP1 (Applicant): practice if you had the assistance of a lawyer.
AP1 (Applicant): The fact that there is no documentation of the interrogations in the case file is, it is submitted, much more consistent with the exercise of pressure on a suspect to confess, as the applicant has consistently maintained, is what has occurred, than with the absence of any interrogation. In addition, the applicant submits to the investigator who questioned
AP1 (Applicant): him after 6 October, that is, after the three-day period, was aware of his having omitted during his interrogation in Sofia to being involved in the robbery but not the murders, and had relied upon this in the questions which he asked him, as well as threatening to use this confession against him.
AP1 (Applicant): Furthermore, the submission that the applicant was interrogated after his arrest is also the most probable explanation for his being taken first to the National Police Directorate, where Colonel Botov is based, rather than to a detention facility.
AP1 (Applicant): However, even if the applicant had not been questioned, which would be surprising given the statement made by his co-accused following his interrogation, and was simply held in custody, no explanation has been provided as to why his first contact with a lawyer was only three days later, on 6 October 1999.
AP1 (Applicant): This seems very strange, given the awareness of Bulgarian constitutional legal requirements on the part of those responsible for the applicant's detention, and that this detention fell mostly in the working week, so there could not even be a supposed practical difficulty in finding a lawyer for him.
AP1 (Applicant): It is also very strange, to say the least, why there should have been a need to keep the applicant in Sofia for two days without interrogation or access to a lawyer, when no steps involving him were taken to establish his supposed involvement in the offenses for which he was arrested.
AP1 (Applicant): Moreover, there can be no practical difficulties in securing his transfer to Burgas, where he was ultimately taken, since that is no more than four hours from Sofia, but the elapsing time was two days from when he was first arrested.
AP1 (Applicant): Moreover, the medical examination of the applicant, although ordered on 3 October 1999, did not occur while he was in Sofia, but only in the afternoon of 5 October 1999, that is to say after his arrival in Burgas.
AP1 (Applicant): The assessment then stated that there was no biomedical data about traumatic injuries, but the absence of these is not necessarily inconsistent with the claim made by the applicant to the doctor, that he had been kicked by the barriers with boots mainly in the belly.
AP1 (Applicant): Furthermore, it should be borne in mind that during the three days during which the applicant had no assistance from a lawyer, he also had no opportunity at all to make contact with anyone else in the outside world.
AP1 (Applicant): Indeed, the applicant's parents were only informed about his arrest three days after this had occurred.
AP1 (Applicant): In these circumstances, the submission of the applicant that he was questioned by Colonel Bottoff and other investigators should be regarded as well-founded in the absence of any other cogent explanation for the failure to question him during his first three days of detention.
AP1 (Applicant): However, the fact that the applicant was not assisted by a lawyer for the first three days was not considered by the Chamber to have diminished his right to defend himself effectively in the framework of the criminal proceedings, and so it found no violation of Article 6.3c
AP1 (Applicant): taken in conjunction with Article 6.1.
AP1 (Applicant): This finding relied upon several considerations.
AP1 (Applicant): First it relied upon the absence of any case paper indicating the applicant had been questioned, but as I have already submitted, this is not really well-founded.
AP1 (Applicant): There are sufficiently strong, clear, and concordant inferences for concluding that he was interrogated without the absence of a lawyer.
AP1 (Applicant): Secondly, the Chamber relied upon the applicant being assisted by a lawyer of his choice when he remained silent during subsequent interrogations and when he confessed on 21 October 1999.
AP1 (Applicant): The applicant submits that reliance on these considerations is similarly unfounded.
AP1 (Applicant): This is because he had no opportunity to discuss his case in private with the lawyers who attended the first two acknowledged interrogations, that is, on 6 October with the officially appointed lawyer and on 12 October with his chosen lawyer.
AP1 (Applicant): There could be no such possibility because the Burgess District Investigation Service had no facilities for confidential discussions with lawyers.
AP1 (Applicant): In fact, the only place where the applicant could meet these lawyers was the investigator's office and that investigator remained present throughout those meetings.
AP1 (Applicant): Since the applicant never had any opportunity to obtain confidential advice from either lawyer, it is submitted that no consequence should be attached to lawyers being present at the two interrogations since they could not provide any effective assistance.
AP1 (Applicant): This equally applies to the applicant's confession on 21 October, because even then there had been no confidential discussion to retain independent advice.
AP1 (Applicant): Indeed, it is more reasonable to conclude that any pressure that might have applied to him by the investigator to confess would still have remained effective.
AP1 (Applicant): In this connection, it should be noted that the investigator had frequently called the applicant into his office with the explanation that as a gesture of goodwill he would allow him to smoke there.
AP1 (Applicant): This was welcome because it was the only opportunity to leave the cell since there were no exercise facilities in the detention centre.
AP1 (Applicant): But these informal meetings also gave the investigator an opportunity to put pressure on the applicant to confess.
AP1 (Applicant): In doing so, the applicant submits that the investigator was aware of his previous admission during the interrogation in Sofia and had relied upon this in questioning him as well as threatening him.
AP1 (Applicant): It should also be noted that the Chamber seems to have placed emphasis on the applicant having two lawyers during these interrogations, but he only ever had one at a time.
AP1 (Applicant): That is to say, on 6 October it was Mr. Dimcho Todorov and on 12 or 21 October it was Mr.
AP1 (Applicant): Kanem Kanev.
AP1 (Applicant): Mr. Todorov was the lawyer appointed by the investigator and this appointment was made
AP1 (Applicant): despite, as the record of the interrogation shows, the applicant having made it clear that he would not give any explanations until my parents engage a lawyer.
AP1 (Applicant): In other words, he did not want this lawyer.
AP1 (Applicant): Moreover, the decree for Mr. Todorov's appointment, signed only by him, the investigator, was made
AP1 (Applicant): without giving the applicant the list of lawyers from which he could make his choice.
AP1 (Applicant): It was also contrary to the law on the bar, as the appointment should have been made by the Bulgarian bar.
AP1 (Applicant): The Chamber also relied upon the fact that there were no investigative measures of concern to the applicant, but this finding is incorrect, as it was during this period that Mr. Ismailov,