TrustHLT/LaCour huggingface dataset:
AP1 (Applicant): The core of the question Jesus raised in this dialogue found in the Gospel of Luke is the issue of competence to adjudicate a material dispute.
AP1 (Applicant): The case which brings us together today also concerns the question of competence.
AP1 (Applicant): Namely, to whom may a former pastor have recourse when seeking payment for his services?
AP1 (Applicant): To state courts or ecclesiastical courts?
AP1 (Applicant): The applicant chose the state courts.
AP1 (Applicant): On the one hand, because the internal law of the Hungarian Calvinist Church clearly stipulates that such disputes shall be governed by state legislation in force.
AP1 (Applicant): On the other hand, in line with the foregoing, the respective congregation advised him formally that the pecuniary dispute at stake must be resolved by state courts under state law.
AP1 (Applicant): However, state courts in both the labor law and civil law proceedings denied to adjudicate the applicant's action on account of lack of competence in ecclesiastical matters.
AP1 (Applicant): At this juncture, it must be observed that the Supreme Court did not uphold the lower court's judgments, but quashed them and discontinued the proceedings.
AP1 (Applicant): It follows that whatever the lower court's findings are, they do not come into play because legally, those judgment do not exist.
AP1 (Applicant): The Supreme Court held that state courts have no jurisdiction in the case at hand, being a matter internal to the church, and therefore did not consider it necessary to rule on the merits.
AP1 (Applicant): In our view, refusing to hear the applicant's claim for compensation on the sole ground that he was a pastor is a clear denial of access to a court in breach of Article 6.1 of the Convention.
AP1 (Applicant): The government, in contrast, allege that Article 6 is not applicable in the present case, as the claim at issue is not recognized as a civil right under Hungarian domestic law.
AP1 (Applicant): They place great reliance on the provisions of Section 204 of the Hungarian Civil Code and qualify, accordingly, the applicant's claim as a natural obligation, not enforceable as a civil right.
AP1 (Applicant): We do opine this standpoint for the following reasons.
AP1 (Applicant): As it appears in the well-set-up case law of the court, the applicability of Article 6.1 in civil matters
AP1 (Applicant): depends, firstly, on the existence of a dispute.
AP1 (Applicant): It is not contested that there has been a dispute between the applicant and the church over the outstanding allowances.
AP1 (Applicant): Secondly, the dispute must relate to rights and obligations, which arguably, at least, can be said to be recognized under domestic law.
AP1 (Applicant): Thirdly, these rights and obligations must be civil ones within the meaning of the Convention.
AP1 (Applicant): According to the government, these last two conditions have not been satisfied.
AP1 (Applicant): Above all, it must be observed that the concept of civil rights and obligations cannot be interpreted solely by reference to domestic law.
AP1 (Applicant): It is an autonomous concept deriving from the Convention.
AP1 (Applicant): According to this court's jurisprudence, Article 6.1 applies irrespective of the party's status,
AP1 (Applicant): the character of the legislation which governs how the dispute is to be determined, and the character of the authority which has jurisdiction in the matter.
AP1 (Applicant): Whether or not a right is to be regarded as civil in light of the Convention, it must be determined by reference to the substantive content and effects of the right under the domestic law of the state concerned, and not its legal classification.
AP1 (Applicant): As opposed to the government, we observe first of all that natural obligations do not necessarily fall outside the field of recognized civil rights.
AP1 (Applicant): What is a naturalis obligatio?
AP1 (Applicant): In Roman law, it qualified as an agreement that could not be enforced by action, but was not in other respects destitute of legal effect.
AP1 (Applicant): Namely, it has merited legal recognition.
AP1 (Applicant): Such an agreement, for instance, could be used as a defense or as a basis for agreements enforceable by action.
AP1 (Applicant): The conclusion may be drawn that even if considered a natural obligation, the applicant's right for his pastoral services is of civil nature.
AP1 (Applicant): Nonetheless, we still do not believe that it is a natural obligation, as its civil law character is indisputable also under the relevant domestic law.
AP1 (Applicant): Notably, as we pointed out in our written memorandum, the Civil Code clearly recognizes pecuniary relations between citizens and other persons, like for example religious communities, as a source of substantive civil rights.
AP1 (Applicant): Accordingly, the civil nature of the relationship on which the applicant based his claim is acknowledged by domestic law as well.
AP1 (Applicant): Furthermore, due to the autonomous concept of civil rights and obligations, this court, in the exercise of its supervisory functions, must also take account the convention's object and purpose and the national legal system of the other contracting states.
AP1 (Applicant): For the states of examples in other member states, in the cases of Dudova and Duda versus the Czech Republic and Bodler versus Germany, it is clearly perceptible that the respective domestic courts considered the pecuniary claims of the former cledgmen to be civil in nature.
AP1 (Applicant): Moreover, the determination of civil rights and obligation, the straddle jurisprudence attributes high importance to the pecuniary dimension.
AP1 (Applicant): In our understanding, the pecuniary nature is a clinching factor bringing a claim under the civil limb of Article VI.
AP1 (Applicant): Accordingly, the court regards as falling within the scope of Article VI proceedings, which do not necessarily fall under civil law in domestic law, but whose result is deceitful for private rights and obligations.
AP1 (Applicant): Such proceedings may have to do in Terelia with running a private clinic, issuing building permission, or getting a license for service alcoholic beverages.
AP1 (Applicant): In the Sambata Bihor Greco-Catholic Parish versus Romania judgment, the court held, for example, that the ownership and use of a religious building is of pecuniary character, falling under the scope of Article VI.
AP1 (Applicant): In all these cases, the court took the view that the private law aspect predominated over the public law ones.
AP1 (Applicant): Let me remind you that the applicant did not complain about either the disciplinary proceedings against him, nor his removal from service.
AP1 (Applicant): What was at stake was his right to his pastoral remuneration, which was, here I emphasize again, not dependent in any way on the outcome of the disciplinary proceedings.
AP1 (Applicant): Consequently, the applicant's service allowance might not in any event be deemed as a purely ecclesiastical matter, but rather an issue of pecuniary character.
AP1 (Applicant): For all the reasons previously mentioned, or from stances that the applicant's claim for his unpaid remuneration, that is the right which was the object of the dispute, might not be considered other than civil in nature.
AP1 (Applicant): And as the last matter of applicability, let me embark on the issue of whether the applicant's right to his remuneration can be said, at least arguably, to be recognized under domestic law.
AP1 (Applicant): It must be borne in mind that the applicant pursued a career as a pastor.
AP1 (Applicant): His remuneration was set out in the appointment letter, which corresponds to the service agreement of ecclesiastical office holders, as we set out in our memorandum.
AP1 (Applicant): Accordingly, the church undertook to provide a defined amount of money as a compensation for his services.
AP1 (Applicant): That is, for his work.
AP1 (Applicant): Besides, the applicant, as a pastor, concluded with the church a separate contract for teaching church history, too.
AP1 (Applicant): Consequently, the income he received in exchange for his work as a pastor was, in fact, his salary responsible for securing his family's subsistence.
AP1 (Applicant): Thus, the question is whether his right for salary was recognized under domestic law.
AP1 (Applicant): Not going into details, suffice it to mention, first of all, that Hungary is a contracting party to numerous international conventions, inter alia, the Equal Remuneration Convention of 1951 and the European Social Charter, which all became part of the domestic law by promulgation.
AP1 (Applicant): Bound by these conventions, the state undertook to recognize the principle of equal remuneration for work of equal value and to ensure the right for a fair remuneration.
AP1 (Applicant): Secondly, in line with the international obligations, the Hungarian constitution also guaranteed the right to equal compensation for equal work without any discrimination whatsoever.
AP1 (Applicant): It laid down that all persons who work have the right to an income that corresponds to the amount and quality of work they carry out.
AP1 (Applicant): Thirdly, the church salary the applicant was given for his pastoral service was not a gift, but was considered by domestic law as income deriving from an employment relationship, and therefore it was subject also to social security contribution to the state pension scheme.
AP1 (Applicant): What is more, the applicant has been in receipt of state pension, the amount of which comprises also the contribution paid pursuant to his pastoral allowances.
AP1 (Applicant): As the records of the Pension Institute demonstrates, the pastoral service is duly recognized by state law as a legal relationship relevant to pension benefit.
AP1 (Applicant): Whatever the respondent government may say, the reality is that the pastoral service allowance in question is an existing civil right fully recognized under domestic law.
AP1 (Applicant): Members of the court, my excellent colleagues on the opposite side argue that disputes arising from ecclesiastical law are expressly excluded from state court's jurisdiction.
AP1 (Applicant): We observe that the rules of exclusion referred to by the government seem vague rather than precise legal provisions by saying, I'm quoting here, no state coercion may be applied in order to enforce internal laws and regulations of churches.
AP1 (Applicant): This way, these rules leave room for a broad, and as it were, limitless interpretation.
AP1 (Applicant): And indeed, the domestic courts accordingly refuse to hear the applicant's case on the sole ground that the dispute originated in an ecclesiastical service, regardless of the civil nature of the pecuniary right it's take.
AP1 (Applicant): We do not contest that it is in the first place for the national courts to interpret and apply domestic law.
AP1 (Applicant): However, it is also settled at case law that this court must ascertain whether the effects of the domestic court's findings are compatible with the convention.
AP1 (Applicant): The almost unlimited margin of interpretation by the national courts of the rules of exclusion inevitably resulted in the total denial of the applicant's rights of access to court.
AP1 (Applicant): We admit that this right is not absolute, but may be subject to limitations.
AP1 (Applicant): In this field, the contracting states enjoy a certain margin of appreciation.
AP1 (Applicant): However, such limitations must pursue a legitimate aim and must be proportionate to that aim.
AP1 (Applicant): And in particular, they must not restrict or reduce the access to a court in such a way or to such an extent that the very essence of this right is impaired.
AP1 (Applicant): To refer back to the site of domestic rules of exclusion, I would like to point out that the question of whether a person has an actionable domestic claim may depend not only on the content of the relevant civil right in national law, but also on the existence of procedural bars preventing or limiting the possibilities of bringing claims to court.
AP1 (Applicant): Hence, a distinction must be made between substantive limitations and procedural bars.
AP1 (Applicant): In this latter category of cases, Article 6.1 may apply.
AP1 (Applicant): According to what I was saying about the recognition of civil rights under Hungarian law, the rules of exclusion referred to might be deemed as procedural bars at best, but in no way deprive the applicant of his substantive civil right.
AP1 (Applicant): Honorable judges, the issue laying at the heart of the present case is a supposed competition of two convention rights.
AP1 (Applicant): Notably, whether freedom of religion takes precedence over a right of access to a court insofar as this latter must give way to an extent that a whole category of individuals be excluded from the protection of Article 6.
AP1 (Applicant): Freedom of religion implies that state authorities must remain neutral and that the state authorities must remain neutral and impartial towards religious communities because it is not their role to determine whether religious beliefs are legitimate or to interfere with the leadership of a religious community.
AP1 (Applicant): Thus, all rights which fall under church autonomy must be related to the essence of the right to freedom of religion, namely the practice of religions, faith, and beliefs.
AP1 (Applicant): In other words, church autonomy confines to religious matters.
AP1 (Applicant): It is therefore necessary to make a clear-cut distinction between disputes of religious and non-religious nature in order to be able to adjudicate whether church immunity comes into play.
AP1 (Applicant): Our firm stance is that only disputes of a religious nature may be exempt from state jurisdiction.
AP1 (Applicant): Purely pecuniary disputes do not affect church autonomy at any event.
AP1 (Applicant): At this point, I must emphasize again that the applicant has never asked the state courts to overrule the decisions of the ecclesiastical courts and to replace him in his office at the church.
AP1 (Applicant): His claim was purely of pecuniary nature and in no way affected religious matters, such as practice of religions, faith or beliefs, or the organization of the church.
AP1 (Applicant): Accordingly, in the present case, there is no competition indeed between freedom of religion and right of access to a court that would justify any restriction.
AP1 (Applicant): It is true, on the other hand, that domestic courts could not ignore the aforementioned procedural bars set forth in domestic law.
AP1 (Applicant): In doing so, however, they should have had to interpret them in light of the substance of freedom of religion with special regard to the previously mentioned essence of church autonomy.
AP1 (Applicant): Therefore, in the course of fulfilling its duty of ascertaining whether the effects of the domestic court's fighting are compatible with the convention, we invite the court to hold that any rules of exclusion or restriction, including the cited Hungarian legislation, may apply only to disputes over religious matters.
AP1 (Applicant): From this outset, it is only a matter of further interpretation to arrive at the conclusion, by analogy with the Eskalinan test, that the exclusion of the applicant's dispute from the guarantees of Article VI cannot be lawful.
AP1 (Applicant): Firstly, because the domestic rules of exclusion shall not be interpreted as applying to non-religious matters, such as pecuniary disputes.
AP1 (Applicant): Secondly, even if these rules are still deemed as expressly applying to pecuniary claims, too, they could not be justified on objective grounds for want of a real threat to the Calvinist church's autonomy.
AP1 (Applicant): In any event, church's immunity cannot be interpreted as an absolute right having regard to the restriction clause in Article 11 of the convention and the Strasbourg case law, according to which religious communities' rights may be subject to legitimate limitations.
AP1 (Applicant): This court has stated on many occasions when it was called upon to rule on the conflict between two rights equally protected by the convention that it must weigh up the interest at stake.
AP1 (Applicant): In the present case, this balancing exercise concerns the applicant's right of access to court on the one hand, and the right of the Calvinist church to autonomy on the other.
AP1 (Applicant): Considering the facts, the balance in our case is fairly one-sided.
AP1 (Applicant): While the church autonomy was not in any way threatened, the applicant was denied even the minimum protection.
AP1 (Applicant): Honorable court, although the government is trying to persuade you that the domestic courts conducted a thorough examination on the merits of the case, the reality is, as I explained right before, that they only consider the mere fact that the dispute had arisen from ecclesiastical service, falling therefore exclusively under church jurisdiction.
AP1 (Applicant): In their view, when he took up the pastoral service, the applicant waived his right to a court in respect of all disputes with the church.
AP1 (Applicant): Before exploring the issue of ecclesiastical jurisdiction with special regard to the applicability of Article VI, let me address these allegations with a few words.
AP1 (Applicant): Firstly, whereas taking up the position of pastor necessarily implies a certain duty of loyalty, such a consent can in no way be interpreted as an unequivocal undertaking not to institute any civil actions against the church.
AP1 (Applicant): An interpretation of that kind would affect the very heart of the right of access to court.
AP1 (Applicant): Moreover, considering that the church's law itself calls upon the application of civil law to certain disputes inside the church, the consent on the applicant's side may not be evaluated as a decision to opt out from the protection of domestic substantive law.
AP1 (Applicant): As a second observation, I draw the court's attention to the fact, again contrary to the government's submissions, that the applicant, as it appears from the case file, claimed before the domestic courts the payment of his remuneration for teaching to the civil nature of which is undisputed.
AP1 (Applicant): However, the domestic courts failed to consider it.
AP1 (Applicant): Now I proceed to the issue of ecclesiastical jurisdiction.
AP1 (Applicant): It must be recalled, first and foremost, that the courts of Hungarian Calvinist Church appear to refrain from hearing cases similar to that of the applicant.
AP1 (Applicant): I'm sure you took notice of the exhaustive enumeration of cases in our written memorandum falling under ecclesiastical jurisdiction set forth by the internal law of the church.
AP1 (Applicant): And you certainly remember the case law of the Calvinist Church we made reference to, where the ecclesiastical court took a firm stance concerning the scope of its jurisdiction.
AP1 (Applicant): Let me remind you that the church's court, in the cited case, refused to hear the claim of a former pastor by saying that the dispute originated in a pastoral.
AP1 (Applicant): Although the dispute originated in pastoral relationship, the case did not correspond to any item of the exhaustive enumeration, and therefore it had no jurisdiction.
AP1 (Applicant): It also had that actions for damages against the church on account of breach of contract do not come under the sphere for disputes reserved exclusively to ecclesiastical jurisdiction.
AP1 (Applicant): It further advanced that in a dispute with the church arising for employment or similar relationship, the plaintiff, also a former pledgeman, cannot be deprived of the right to turn to a secular court.
AP1 (Applicant): Accordingly, the ecclesiastical court transferred the case to the labor court.
AP1 (Applicant): Certainly, there is no need to remind you that the applicant's pecuniary claim was essentially identical to that of the claimant in the mentioned case.
AP1 (Applicant): Under these circumstances, we hardly believe that the applicant's case would have ever been heard by the courts of the Calvinist Church.
AP1 (Applicant): But even considering that departing from its jurisprudence, the ecclesiastical court would have been willing to judge the applicant's claim, such procedures still would not have afforded protection to the applicant as guaranteed under Article VI.
AP1 (Applicant): This court hardly needs to be reminded of the attributes of an independent and impartial tribunal established by law in terms of Article VI.
AP1 (Applicant): We do assert that the ecclesiastical courts of the Hungarian Calvinist Church do not meet these criteria.
AP1 (Applicant): For the following reasons.
AP1 (Applicant): At the outset, I must admit that there are only a few points where we agree with the government.
AP1 (Applicant): One of them is the premise that ecclesiastical law do not qualify as statutes under Hungarian law.
AP1 (Applicant): However, according to the Strasbourg case law, the object of the established by law is to ensure that the judicial organization in a democratic society does have a legal basis somewhere in domestic law.
AP1 (Applicant): Nevertheless, we cannot find any national legislation that would serve directly or indirectly as legal basis for the establishment of the Hungarian Calvinist Church's court system.
AP1 (Applicant): Only the laws of that church purport on ecclesiastical courts.
AP1 (Applicant): Secondly, the expression established by law reflects the principle of the rule of law, which is inherent in the system of protection established by the convention and its protocols.
AP1 (Applicant): It covers not only the legal basis for the very existence of a tribunal, but also compliance by the tribunal with the particular rules that govern it.
AP1 (Applicant): As we pointed out in our memorandum, the procedural rules set forth in church law were tailored strictly to disciplinary proceedings, while pecuniary disputes, differing considerably from disciplinary matters, are not regulated.
AP1 (Applicant): For this reason, ecclesiastical courts are barred from conducting proceedings on pecuniary disputes in a prescribed manner.
AP1 (Applicant): It necessarily implies the absence of protection from arbitrariness in the form of procedural safeguards.
AP1 (Applicant): Third, it is well-established case law of the court that the effect of Article 6.1 is, inter alia,
AP1 (Applicant): to place the tribunal under a duty to conduct a proper examination of the submissions, argument, and evidence adduced by the parties.
AP1 (Applicant): In this regard, suffice it to recall that it is the presidium of the ecclesiastical court, that is, the dean and the curator together, who decide in their discretionary power whether to even start a court proceeding or not.
AP1 (Applicant): Fourthly, the lawfulness of a tribunal must, by definition, also encompass its composition.
AP1 (Applicant): Only those cases are considered to be dealt by a tribunal established by law, where the appointment of the acting judge is subject exclusively to the rules of competences established beforehand in procedural law and in the world schedule.
AP1 (Applicant): If another factor interferes with this mechanism, the court cannot be anymore considered as established by law.
AP1 (Applicant): As to the Calvinist Church's courts, beyond the lack of pertinent procedural rules, it is also worth noting that the acting members of the bench in each particular case are appointed by the coaches of the court, again by the dean and the curator.
AP1 (Applicant): Fifthly, as the issue of independence, a court has to be independent not only of the executive, but of the parties to the proceedings as well.
AP1 (Applicant): Moreover, under the objective name of discourse double test in respect of impartiality, it must be determined whether there are ascertainable facts irrespective of the judge's personal conduct, which may raise doubts as to his or her impartiality.
AP1 (Applicant): In this context, it must be remembered that the disciplinary proceedings were instituted by the applicant's superior dean.