TrustHLT/LaCour huggingface dataset:
AP1 (Applicant): However, Norway had to follow their penal code as it was at the time of the crime In Breivik, the defendant killed 8 people and injured 9 when he detonated a car bomb in the government district in Oslo He further killed 69 people and injured 33 who were mostly youths attending a summer camp in a shooting rampage at Utøya Island The Court found that there was no doubt that the acts were done with premeditation and under especially aggravating circumstances The defendant was sentenced to preventive detention for a term of 21 years, the maximum sentence allowed under the Norwegian penal code Despite worldwide criticism that his punishment is much too lenient These are concluding remarks There are different estimates of the number of pending war crimes cases in Bosnia and Herzegovina Should the more lenient law or the law that was enforced at the time when these offenses were being committed be more universally applied It would in all probability be a significant tool to more efficiently process these cases The minimum prescribed sentence is 5 years that can be further mitigated to 1 year under specially mitigated circumstances This means that a significant number of low-level suspects would be inclined to accept plea bargains and cost of expensive trials would be avoided All the while victims of war crimes would be satisfied because the perpetrators of crimes were punished An accused party's access to fundamental fair trial rights is a key indicator of equitability in any system of criminal justice As proceedings lose their credibility and integrity without the consistent application of due process standards It would, in the applicant's view, be detrimental not only to the Court of BH But also to the future development of international criminal law and human rights law if it was allowed to give the appearance of inventive penalties for crimes Thus highly politicizing its function, especially in cases such as the applicants Where the alleged conduct in question was without any doubt penalized at the time when it took place Justice must not only be done but also seen to be done by the people as the addresses of all judicial decisions Based on the foregoing reasons, the applicants respectfully request this Court to judge and declare That there has been a violation of Article 6 of the Convention because applicant Mokhtov's rights to a fair trial was violated That there has been a violation of Article 7 of the Convention because applicant Demyanovich and applicant Mokhtov's rights to a non-retractive application of criminal law was violated That there has been a violation of Article 14 of the Convention because both applicants' right of non-discrimination was violated That Bosnia and Herzegovina is liable for these breaches and must pay adequate compensation to the applicants in this respect as provided by Article 41 of the Convention That the expenses incurred by the applicants to have their rights recognized and enforced legal fees must be paid by Bosnia and Herzegovina Thank you Your Honor.
Dean Spielmann (JudgeP): Thank you, Mr. Lejlić.
Dean Spielmann (JudgeP): I now would like to know if there are questions, and I would invite the judges of the Grand Chamber to put any questions they may have to the parties.
Ineta Ziemele (Judge): Since both parties made reference to the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia, I have the following question to both parties, if you could possibly try to answer it.
Ineta Ziemele (Judge): How does the sentencing approach to sentencing in the ICTY compare to the challenge that is brought in the case in front of us as concerns the sentencing policy, I would say?
Ineta Ziemele (Judge): How does that compare?
Ineta Ziemele (Judge): And the reason I'm asking is the following, because as we all know, the ICTY statute expresses verbis, refers back to the domestic law and practice in the respective countries, notably Bosnia and Herzegovina in our case.
Ineta Ziemele (Judge): So I would be much obliged to the parties if you could compare the sentencing practice in ICTY and in the challenged cases.
Dean Spielmann (JudgeP): Thank you. Judge Paulo de Albuquerque.
Paulo Pinto de Albuquerque (Judge): I have two, in fact, three questions.
Paulo Pinto de Albuquerque (Judge): The first one regards the sentencing policy of the state courts compared to the one of the entities courts.
Paulo Pinto de Albuquerque (Judge): Were there in 2004 and 2007 any sentencing guidelines, any established sentencing criteria, either in the case law or in statute or any other form, that could be used by these courts?
Paulo Pinto de Albuquerque (Judge): Second question, which is related to this one, were there in 2004 and 2005, when these cases started, any objective criteria for the allocation of these cases to the state court?
Paulo Pinto de Albuquerque (Judge): We know that in one of these cases that we have now here before us, the case was reallocated, was transferred from its natural jurisdiction to the state court.
Paulo Pinto de Albuquerque (Judge): My question is, was it available at that time, at the decision time, at the moment where the decision, when the decision was taken, any criteria for this decision?
Paulo Pinto de Albuquerque (Judge): So I'm talking about 2004 and 2005, when the allocation decisions were taken.
Paulo Pinto de Albuquerque (Judge): Then related to this problem of the reallocation of the cases, could you provide the questions, I should have explicitly said that, are directed to both parties.
Paulo Pinto de Albuquerque (Judge): Could you provide examples of any cases where the proposed replacement or reallocation of the cases was refused by the state court?
Paulo Pinto de Albuquerque (Judge): Is there any example where the state court refused, rejected the reallocation of the case?
Paulo Pinto de Albuquerque (Judge): And finally, and this question is suggested, has been suggested to me by the arguments presented by the applicants, are there any examples of any sentences of the state court where more lenient sentences were handed out, handed down than the sentences of the entities courts for similar facts?
Paulo Pinto de Albuquerque (Judge): Is there any case where for similar facts, the state court has sentenced the person in a more lenient way than the sentences of the entities courts?
Dean Spielmann (JudgeP): Thank you, Judge Tsotsoria.
Nona Tsotsoria (Judge): I have a question to the respondent government.
Nona Tsotsoria (Judge): You said that in total, the state court rendered 102 judgments between March 2009 and November 2012, out of which only in five judgments, the state court applied the old code.
Nona Tsotsoria (Judge): Please specify how many of those 102 judgments were second instant judgments, and how many of those second instant judgments concerned only war crimes, excluding the crimes against humanity and genocide.
Nona Tsotsoria (Judge): Thank you.
Dean Spielmann (JudgeP): I call Miss Ibrahimovic, please.
Dean Spielmann (JudgeP): Miss Ibrahimovic, please.
GR1 (Government): Response of government of Bosnia and Herzegovina on first question is, in 2004 and 2007, there were no specific guidelines, but only the Criminal Code 2003 legal framework.
GR1 (Government): It is only guidance for the judges, actually, is law.
GR1 (Government): In answer on the question number two, second question, we give an answer.
GR1 (Government): Questioner said, were there any objective criteria for allocation of cases?
GR1 (Government): We said, yes, there were orientation criteria.
GR1 (Government): Public document of prosecution office adopted in 2004 that the court used in all its decisions.
GR1 (Government): Note, there was no decisions on transfer in MAKTOF 2004.
GR1 (Government): It was in exclusive jurisdiction of the court of B&H.
GR1 (Government): Because it was initiated after 1st March 2003.
GR1 (Government): I want to repeat the criteria of prosecution office of B&H.
GR1 (Government): It is gravity of alleged offense, level of responsibility of the perpetrator, and protection of witnesses or victims.
GR1 (Government): Response on third question, I said, was there any case where the state court refused the allocation of the cases?
GR1 (Government): Yes, of course.
GR1 (Government): There are many decisions, because the court decides based on complexity criteria only.
GR1 (Government): So it depends on the complexity of the case.
GR1 (Government): So there is such case, very complexity, very difficult.
GR1 (Government): On the question number four, for similar facts, the state sentences a person is in a more lenient law at the state court than at entity level.
GR1 (Government): This is hard to answer, because there are never cases with same facts.
GR1 (Government): In addition, complex case go to state court and less complex to the entities.
GR1 (Government): Question of the court number five, how does the sentencing of ICTY compare to the challenge in this case?
GR1 (Government): The statute of ICTY, no specific provisions on sentencing, but refers to the practice in former Yugoslavia in terms of sentencing.
GR1 (Government): So the ICTY should, in its practice, respect the sanctions existing of the time in former Yugoslavia.
GR1 (Government): However, the fact that the ICTY impose a long-term imprisonment shows that a certain form of retroactivity is allowed, keeping in mind the principle of legality strictly prescribed in the statute.
GR1 (Government): Yet one question.
GR1 (Government): Regarding question, last question on the number of second instance judgment in war crimes.
GR1 (Government): From Kurtovic decision to date, there were four three-second instance judgments, all in war crime cases, out of which 59 first instance, two are for genocide and around 50 for war crimes.
GR1 (Government): And around half for crimes against humanity.
Dean Spielmann (JudgeP): Thank you, Miss Ibrahimovic. I call Mr. Lejlić, please.
AP1 (Applicant): First, we have response to government.
AP1 (Applicant): I will respond to government, then I will answer the questions, Honorable Judges.
AP1 (Applicant): In response to government's oral submission, we would like to stress that opinion of appeals chambers of court of BH in Kurtović, Lalović, Mihaljević, Navalić, Aškraba, and the Osmić case is completely in line with Antonio Cassez's opinion on application of the law in BH and the reason for when its commission is quoted in applicant Demyanović's original application.
AP1 (Applicant): Regarding the death sentence, the court of BH appeals chambers' reliance upon the generic assertion that the death penalty was enforced at the time of the commission of the offense under the SFRAI-CSE is misleading.
AP1 (Applicant): The court should have noted that as from the date of the general framework agreement on 14 December 1995 and the introduction of the BH constitution on the same date, Bosnia and Herzegovina was bound by the ECHR and the second optional protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
AP1 (Applicant): Personal to Article 2 of the second protocol, no reservation to the abolition of the death penalty is admissible except for a reservation that provides for the application of the death penalty in time of war pursuant to conviction for a most serious crime of military nature committed during war time.
AP1 (Applicant): Therefore, as from 14 December 1995, the application of death penalty was permissible only in time of war.
AP1 (Applicant): According to a decision of the BH Human Rights Chamber in 1998, the word application covers both the imposition and the execution of the death penalty.
AP1 (Applicant): Therefore, the court held that the effect of the second protocol is to impose an absolute prohibition without the possibility of any reservation or exception or execution of the death penalty in time of peace.
AP1 (Applicant): The court reasoned that since no state of war now exists in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the execution of death penalty would not be compatible with either the second protocol or protocol number 6 of the ECHR.
AP1 (Applicant): In addition, court of BH and constitutional court of BH have failed to consider all the laws in force between the time when criminal offenses in question were committed and time of trials of the applicants.
AP1 (Applicant): In this time, criminal code of SFRI was in force, but without the possibility of sentencing an individual to death penalty as explained above.
AP1 (Applicant): Answer to Honorable Judge from Latvia.
AP1 (Applicant): It is supposed to look at the sentencing policies of SFRI, but it does not always address them.
AP1 (Applicant): This is Article 100 of the Statute of ICTY.
AP1 (Applicant): In Oric's case, trial chamber sentenced the accused to two and a half years and referenced former SFRI.
AP1 (Applicant): Of course, it has to be mentioned that ICTY is an ad hoc tribunal, and it still tried cases in accordance with highest human rights standards.
AP1 (Applicant): In addition, ICTY has prosecuted and is prosecuting the highest level perpetrators and the mid and low level perpetrators.
AP1 (Applicant): Honorable Judge from Portugal.
AP1 (Applicant): First question or first answer.
AP1 (Applicant): Sentencing guidelines never existed as such.
AP1 (Applicant): It is a question of applicable law.
AP1 (Applicant): Second answer.
AP1 (Applicant): War crimes strategy was adopted by BH in 2008, and criteria was prescribed then.
AP1 (Applicant): It was a question of very arbitrary made decisions while rules of road were applied that did not contain actual criteria.
AP1 (Applicant): Third.
AP1 (Applicant): Yes, in case of Peric et al., but they were acquitted by the trial chamber, as well
AP1 (Applicant): as Divica Vrdoljak, who was sentenced to five years for war crimes against civilians.
AP1 (Applicant): Fourth.
AP1 (Applicant): Yes, entity courts did give sentences than courts of BH, higher sentences than court of BH in some cases.
AP1 (Applicant): But in all these cases, entity courts only applied criminal code of SFRI as the law that was enforced at the time when these offenses were committed.
AP1 (Applicant): This is exactly the point that applicants are arguing for.
AP1 (Applicant): And only addition to question three, question two, sorry.
AP1 (Applicant): Justice of applicants claim on discrimination is not dealing with jurisdiction, but with the fact that depending on which court, which level tries the case, accused in BH are discriminated against as they are not in the same situation and not equal before law.
AP1 (Applicant): That would be all.
Dean Spielmann (JudgeP): The court will now deliberate on the cases.
Josep Casadevall (JudgeP): Asseyez-vous, je vous prie.
Josep Casadevall (JudgeP): Bonjour.
Josep Casadevall (JudgeP): Je déclare ouverte l'audience publique sur la recevabilité et le front de l'affaire de Tommaso contre l'Italie.
Josep Casadevall (JudgeP): L'affaire a été introduite devant la Cour le 28 juillet 2009 par un ressortissant italien, M. Angelo de Tommaso,
Josep Casadevall (JudgeP): en vertu de l'article 34 de la Convention.
Josep Casadevall (JudgeP): Elle a été attribuée à la deuxième section de la Cour conformément à l'article 52, paragraphe 1er du règlement de la Cour.
Josep Casadevall (JudgeP): La requête a été communiquée au gouvernement le 18 octobre 2011.
Josep Casadevall (JudgeP): Le 25 novembre 2014, une chambre de la deuxième section a décidé de se désaisir au profit de la grande chambre.
Josep Casadevall (JudgeP): Aucune des parties ne s'y étant opposée.
Josep Casadevall (JudgeP): Le gouvernement est représenté par sa coagente, Mme Paula Accardo, assistée de M. Gianluca Mauro Pellegrini,
Josep Casadevall (JudgeP): coagent du gouvernement.
Josep Casadevall (JudgeP): Le requérant est représenté par M. Domenico Conticchio, conseil,
Josep Casadevall (JudgeP): assisté de Mme Liliane Fanizzi et M. Maira Casulli, conseillère.
Josep Casadevall (JudgeP): Je salue les comparants au nom de la Cour.
Josep Casadevall (JudgeP): Je salue également les délégations des présidents des cours d'appel polonaise et des magistrats français de l'Ecole nationale de la magistrature en visite à la Cour.
Josep Casadevall (JudgeP): Ayant consulté la coagente du gouvernement et le représentant du requérant, j'ai fixé ainsi l'ordre de parole.
Josep Casadevall (JudgeP): Nous entendrons successivement Mme Accardo pour le gouvernement et puis M. Conticchio pour le requérant.
Josep Casadevall (JudgeP): Je dois préciser qu'en plus de l'interprétation dans les deux langues officielles de la Cour, l'anglais et le français, l'interprétation en polonais a été autorisée au profit de la délégation des présidents des cours d'appel polonaise en visite à la Cour.
Josep Casadevall (JudgeP): Cette interprétation n'est pas assurée par la Cour et ne fera donc pas partie de l'enregistrement officiel de la procédure.
Josep Casadevall (JudgeP): Avec cette perdue de temps, je donne la parole à Mme Accardo.
GR1 (Government): Dans cette affaire, en suivant l'ordre proposé par la Cour dans ses questions qui ont été soumises au parti, la Cour nous demande si les restrictions que les requérants ont subies pendant la période allant du 4 juillet 2008 au 28 janvier 2009, suite à l'application de la mesure de prévention personnelle de surveillance spéciale par la police, assortie de l'obligation de séjourner dans la commune de résidence, ont comporté une privation de sa liberté personnelle au sein de l'article 5, paragraphe 1.1 de la Convention.
GR1 (Government): Mesdames et messieurs de la Cour, vous nous avez maintes fois indiqué qu'en proclamant les droits à la liberté, les paragraphes 1 de l'article 5 visent la liberté physique de la personne.
GR1 (Government): Dès lors, il ne concerne pas les simples restrictions à la liberté de circuler.
GR1 (Government): Ces restrictions obéissent à l'article 2 du protocole numéro 4.
GR1 (Government): Vous nous avez toujours maintes fois aussi indiqué que pour déterminer si un individu se trouve privé de sa liberté au sein de l'article 5, il faut partir de sa situation concrète et prendre en compte un ensemble de critères comme les genres, la durée, les effets et les modalités d'exécution de la mesure considérée.
GR1 (Government): Entre privation et restriction de la liberté, il n'y a pourtant qu'une différence des degrés ou d'intensité, non des natures ou des sens.
GR1 (Government): Je crois que nous avons bien appris cette leçon et parce que nous nous rappelons que dans l'affaire Guzzardi contre l'Italie, dans l'affaire Guzzardi contre l'Italie, arrêt du 6 novembre 1980, l'assignation à résidence de la petite île de la Sinara a été prise en considération dans les champs d'application de l'article 5 du paragraphe 1 de la Convention.
GR1 (Government): Et nous trouvons un exemple efficace de ce que la Cour nous explique, par exemple, on peut l'invoquer, dans la situation des Napoléons qui étaient confinés sur l'île de Sainte-Hélène, où malgré l'effet d'un non-enfermement en prison, il s'agisserait, si on devait examiner à présent la situation, il s'agisserait du champ d'application de l'article 5 de la Convention.
GR1 (Government): Mais ce n'est pas le cas des restrictions subies par les requérants, qui sont identiques à celles prises en considération par vous dans l'affaire Mono contre l'Italie et tranchées par décision du 8 octobre 2013.
GR1 (Government): Et ces mesures, on trouve la description de ces mesures dans l'exposé des faits.
GR1 (Government): Et comme je dis, c'est identique.
GR1 (Government): Il s'agit des mesures qui sont indiquées dans la décision du tribunal de Bari.
GR1 (Government): Comme dans l'affaire à Nogé, dans l'affaire Mono, les requérants avaient subi la mesure de la surveillance spéciale par la police, assortie de l'obligation de séjourner dans la commune de résidence.
GR1 (Government): Et il y avait même, dans une période très proche, du 7 février 2008 au 6 octobre 2008.
GR1 (Government): Ce qu'il avait subi, la mesure avait été appliquée pour la durée des années, comme dans l'affaire à Nogé.
GR1 (Government): Donc la période, c'était un peu plus d'un mois, plus longue par rapport à l'affaire qui nous concerne.
GR1 (Government): La mesure avait été infligée par le tribunal de Bari.
GR1 (Government): Même cette fois.
GR1 (Government): Tandis que par la suite, la cour d'appel de Bari par décision du 2 octobre 2008 avait annulé la décision pur vice des procédures.
GR1 (Government): Car un renvoi d'audience n'avait pas été communiqué à l'avocat nommé par les requérants.
GR1 (Government): L'avocat était présent en nuisance, mais il s'était éloigné avant la fin de l'audience quand on avait disposé le renvoi.
GR1 (Government): Dans cette affaire, la cour a considéré que les obligations imposées aux requérants, qui sont exactement les mêmes que celles de l'affaire en question, n'avaient pas entraîné une privation des libertés au sens de l'article 5, paragraphe 1 de la Convention.
GR1 (Government): Mais qu'il s'agissait de simples restrictions à la liberté de circulation, qu'il fallait examiner sur l'angle de l'article 2 du protocole 4.
GR1 (Government): Donc, il s'agit, comme j'ai dit, des restrictions qui sont élinkées dans la décision qu'il a appliquée et qui sont exactement les mêmes que celles de l'affaire Mohn.
GR1 (Government): Certaines, ce sont comme des règles de bonne vie qui ont été appliquées à la recherche d'un fruitier de travail dans la démarche de l'article 4.
GR1 (Government): Le travail dans les deux mois suivant la notification de la décision appliquée à la mesure.
GR1 (Government): Vivre honnêtement, ne pas se joindre à des personnes avant subi des condamnations pénales ou soumises à mesure de prévention et de sécurité.
GR1 (Government): La mesure, c'est...
GR1 (Government): Nous avons ne pas s'éloigner de la commune de résidence, mais ce n'est pas dans un sens absolu, car on peut demander la permission de s'éloigner.
GR1 (Government): Par exemple, ne pas porter d'armes ou d'instruments potentiellement offensifs, mais toujours, il y a la limitation s'il s'agit des choses nécessaires pour le travail.
GR1 (Government): On peut, bien sûr, les porter.
GR1 (Government): Les autres prescriptions, par exemple, ne pas s'attarder habituellement dans des bistrots et des tripots.
GR1 (Government): Je crois qu'il ne soit pas des choses très graves.
GR1 (Government): C'est mieux de rentrer les soirs avant 6 heures du soir et ne pas sortir avant 6 heures du matin.
GR1 (Government): Ce ne sont pas de grandes restrictions.
GR1 (Government): Donc, il est évident que les prescriptions considérées dans leur ensemble ne entraînent pas une prévision de la liberté personnelle.
GR1 (Government): Mais comme la Cour l'a décidé dans la Fermon, une restriction, et même dans d'autres affaires, auparavant, ils sont cités même dans la Fermon, une restriction de la liberté de circulation qui relève du champ d'application de l'article 2 du protocole 4.
GR1 (Government): Sur l'angle de l'article 2 du protocole 4, nous observons que ces mesures, dans l'ordre juridique italien, disposent de la garantie de la prévision des lois et de la garantie d'une procédure judiciaire pour leur application, qui doit se baser sur des éléments objectifs.
GR1 (Government): L'élément qui démontre la dangereuseté sociale justifie les mesures comme nécessaires pour prévenir et éviter la commission des crimes et d'infractions pénales.
GR1 (Government): Il est significatif d'observer à ces propos que la Cour constitutionnelle italienne, de son début en 1956, dans la, pour ainsi dire, jeune République italienne, qui tirait son origine du référendum de juin 1946, s'occupait, dans son deuxième arrêt depuis sa prise de fonction, justement d'une disposition de sûreté publique pour mouger en 1931, et en les déclarant en violation de la Constitution italienne, affirmait déjà la nécessité, une mesure telle que l'assignation à résidence forcée était contraire à la Constitution, en tant qu'elle n'était pas fondée sur des éléments objectifs, sur lesquels basait une évaluation des dangereusetés sociales, et que cette évaluation devait être soumise à une autorité judiciaire.