TrustHLT/LaCour huggingface dataset:
GR1 (Government): However the minimum term, whether it be a term of finite years or the whole life term, which is equivalent to the tariff period, what's sometimes called the tariff period, is imposed for the purposes of punishment and deterrence.
GR1 (Government): So whether it's the minimum term of 30 years, the 30 year period is concerned with punishment and deterrence, as is the whole life term.
GR1 (Government): And this is explained by the Court of Appeal in the recent judgment, Lord Judge presiding, in the four cases where these matters were considered.
GR1 (Government): Those are the government's response to the first question.
GR1 (Government): I hope we've addressed those points.
GR1 (Government): The second question, has there been any redrafting of the relevant prison service order to reflect the government's position and the domestic court's analysis of Section 30?
GR1 (Government): The short answer to the question is no.
GR1 (Government): But we would submit it doesn't matter for these reasons.
GR1 (Government): First of all, Section 30 is a provision contained in primary legislation.
GR1 (Government): Secondly, the Human Rights Act 1998 ensures that any public authority of which the Secretary of State is one must act compatibly with convention rights, and primary legislation must be interpreted compatibly with convention rights.
GR1 (Government): That Section 30 could be deployed and would be deployed in the manner for which the government contend is clear from the decision of the Court of Appeal in Beaver, to which reference has already been made, and the decision of the Court of Appeal in the second applicant's case, where express reference was made to Section 30.
GR1 (Government): Release would not be ultraviaries because the Minister or the Secretary of State would be required to order release if continued detention were inhuman or degrading.
GR1 (Government): It would be mandated by the Minister's obligation to act in accordance with the human rights contained in the first schedule to the Human Rights Act.
GR1 (Government): So I hope the government have responded to that question.
GR1 (Government): The next question, we were asked if we could provide a single example of a whole life order prisoner being released.
GR1 (Government): May I, for these purposes, say that we dealt with this in our original observations in April 2011, and the short answer is no prisoner serving a whole life term has ever been released on compassionate grounds under Section 30.
GR1 (Government): However, we made two points, having set out the position we made two points.
GR1 (Government): First, it's unsurprising that no one has been released.
GR1 (Government): There are only 42 prisoners, there were 41 at that time, there are now 42 prisoners serving such a term.
GR1 (Government): Secondly, those who are serving lifelong terms have, by definition, committed the most heinous crimes known to English law, and there has been a judicial determination that a whole life term is necessary for the purposes of punishment and deterrence.
GR1 (Government): Given the judicial nature of the sentence, it's hardly surprising that it would only be in exceptional circumstances that the executive should have the power to mitigate the sentence, and when exercising his powers under Section 30, the Secretary of State is certainly not acting as a second court of appeal.
GR1 (Government): But he would be required to consider whether continued detention was inhuman or degrading.
GR1 (Government): Mr. President, may I finally, on this aspect, also invite the Court's attention to certain
GR1 (Government): observations made by Lord Hoffman in the Wellington case, where this point was being made, as it was being made in the observations made to this Court in the extradition cases involving the United States, that no one has been released, either under the governor-released provisions in the United States or otherwise.
GR1 (Government): And Lord Hoffman stated that the argument on analysis created a paradox.
GR1 (Government): The more horrendous the crime, the less likely was release.
GR1 (Government): But on the argument that because there had been no release, that meant there was a breach of some right, it meant that the more horrendous the crime, the stronger the claim would be not to be extradited.
GR1 (Government): Transposed to the domestic context, the short point is the whole life term has been imposed by an independent and impartial tribunal to reflect the seriousness of the offending.
GR1 (Government): And it would be paradoxical to conclude that because there's been no order for release by the executive, the sentence was irreducible or that there'd been otherwise a violation of Article 3.
GR1 (Government): And finally, the government were asked to, if it could conceive of circumstances in which a case might arise where someone would be released.
GR1 (Government): On behalf of the government, we submit it's difficult to conceive of such a case.
GR1 (Government): We submit the fact that it's difficult to conceive of such a case suggests that the position is more theoretical, or the hypothesis is more theoretical than real.
GR1 (Government): And to say at the outset there should be a review to deal with the unlikely hypothesis, we submit should not mean the difference between a violation and non-violation.
GR1 (Government): We do, however, rely on the Section 30 mechanism, and we do invite the court to consider, as of course the court has repeatedly stated it does, the facts of the instant cases where it is not suggested that continued detention does not serve any penological purpose.
GR1 (Government): So, Mr. President, those are the government's response to the questions.
GR1 (Government): Unless the government can assist the court further, those are our submissions today.
Dean Spielmann (JudgeP): Thank you very much indeed, Mr. Perry. Mr. Weatherby, please.
AP1 (Applicant): Judge Sicilianos asked us to clarify our submissions in relation to substantive and procedural violations, and I will seek to do so in short order.
AP1 (Applicant): We say that the substantive violation is the effect at imposition, the effect now, on a prisoner serving an irreducible lifelong term.
AP1 (Applicant): It puts a prisoner who conceivably might be 25 years old in a position of abject hopelessness.
AP1 (Applicant): It is not a matter of sympathy for the prisoner who will necessarily have committed heinous crimes.
AP1 (Applicant): It's a matter of the humanity that the state should be required to show.
AP1 (Applicant): The government have made it clear that their position is, in light of the Chamber's judgment and other authorities, that in effect there is no necessity for any kind of review.
AP1 (Applicant): However, there appears to be a concession that there is a possibility of an Article 3 issue arising in the future.
AP1 (Applicant): That is what I earlier described as Kafkaesque, because the government assert that it is perfectly lawful under the Convention to have a system which declares the permanent exclusion of the prisoner from society, but where there may be a violation in the future, but with no available process.
AP1 (Applicant): So we say that the imposition of a lifelong irreducible sentence puts the prisoner in a position of hopelessness, and that is a substantive breach.
AP1 (Applicant): In terms of a procedural violation, we take the argument of the dissenting opinion in the Chamber's judgments.
AP1 (Applicant): That is, in effect, that there must be a possibility of an Article 3 issue arising in the future, and therefore there must be a review mechanism now, so that the prisoner and everybody else is in the position of knowing what the future holds.
AP1 (Applicant): Let me say that we accept that what we describe as the substantive and the procedural arguments may in fact be very much two sides to the same argument.
AP1 (Applicant): In respect of the case law, we say that the domestic authorities and those of this Court acknowledge that an Article 3 issue may arise at some point in these cases.
AP1 (Applicant): We say that the Court may gain some assistance from the case law that we have cited in our written submissions, and in particular from the 1986 German war crimes case, which asserted that even the most heinous of offending should not lead to the absence of a review.
AP1 (Applicant): It must not preclude a review, because the balance of penological justifications, even where there is very serious offending indeed, is prone to change over time, particularly with maturity and age.
AP1 (Applicant): May I trespass a little on the questions that were asked to the Government, if very swiftly?
AP1 (Applicant): We would say in respect of the first question that whole life tariffs under the statutory guidance that has been cited to you do in fact deal with punishment and deterrence only, and therefore do not deal with and do not accommodate the other penological justifications going forward.
AP1 (Applicant): Can I address the issue of the Secretary of State's policy regarding Section 30, and whether it could in fact be changed to accommodate Article 3?
AP1 (Applicant): The Human Rights Act in the UK requires the Executive and allows the Courts to read down legislation to make such provisions compatible with Convention rights, but it can only do so if such can be accommodated within the nature and purpose of that primary legislation.
AP1 (Applicant): Otherwise the domestic provisions under the Human Rights Act are simply a declaration that the legislation is incompatible with the Convention.
AP1 (Applicant): It is that point which leads to our suggestion that any attempt to accommodate Article 3 within Section 30 would be outside of the plain statutory purpose of that provision.
AP1 (Applicant): Section 30 expressly refers to compassionate release and not conditional release.
AP1 (Applicant): I remind the Court of the submissions I made earlier about the clear distinction made between the two, in particular by the CPT.
AP1 (Applicant): If Section 30 was expressed in such a way as other penological justifications could be considered, then the position might be different.
AP1 (Applicant): But in common with six of the seven judges in the Chamber's cases, we respectfully agree that Section 30 does not provide an answer.
AP1 (Applicant): Let me also say that the recent Court of Appeal case of Oakes, which my friend has referred to, is a restatement of the domestic position, but it makes no suggestion that the Chamber's judgment on this point, the Section 30 point, was wrong.
AP1 (Applicant): I will now briefly reply to a few of the points made by the Government today.
AP1 (Applicant): Staying with the recent case of Oakes in the Court of Appeal, which, as my hon.
AP1 (Applicant): Friend has indicated, delivered a judgment a week before this hearing, the reason that we did not address it in detail in our submissions earlier is that it plainly does not take these matters any further.
AP1 (Applicant): It simply restates the Bieber position without the Section 30 issue, to which I have already spoken.
AP1 (Applicant): I will say before I leave the Oakes case that the Government earlier said that Lord Bingham upheld the legality of whole life tariffs.
AP1 (Applicant): That is correct so far as that statement goes.
AP1 (Applicant): In the case of Hindley, he ruled that whole life tariffs were lawful.
AP1 (Applicant): However, that was in the context of the previous regime, where there was the express 25-year review.
AP1 (Applicant): I have already indicated that a proper analysis of the Debucheville case versus Mauritius would indicate that Lord Bingham would have taken a very different view of the current regime.
AP1 (Applicant): I refer to the House of Lords judgments in Hindley, in particular to a passage by Lord Steyn, which upheld Lord Bingham's position on whole life tariffs.
AP1 (Applicant): On instructions, counsel for the Secretary of State volunteered and gave assurances to the House that this statement means that the Secretary of State is prepared to reconsider and review any whole life tariff decision from time to time, even in the absence of exceptional progress.
AP1 (Applicant): In these circumstances, counsel for the Secretary of State submitted that the policy of imposing a whole life tariff merely involves the expression of the current view of the Secretary of State that the requirements of retribution and deterrence make it inappropriate to release such a prisoner.
AP1 (Applicant): It does not rule out reconsideration.
AP1 (Applicant): The views of Lord Bingham and the House of Lords in Hindley were to uphold not the current whole life system in the United Kingdom, but the previous one, which had a 25-year review mechanism built in.
AP1 (Applicant): The Government say that the problem with the 25-year review is that the life sentence process was judicialised.
AP1 (Applicant): The discretion that the Executive had in a number of different respects was transferred to the judiciary, and therefore that is why the 25-year review went.
AP1 (Applicant): The simple answer to that submission, we say, is that such a review could easily be judicialised itself in that a review could be undertaken by the quasi-judicial body which considers other life sentence issues, the Parole Board for England and Wales.
AP1 (Applicant): So we say that there is no real difficulty in changing the system.
AP1 (Applicant): In respect of the Government's position regarding a review, the Government put forward as a suggestion as to why there is no review, is that the chances of an Article 3 issue arising are tenuous?
AP1 (Applicant): We disagree with that submission for the reasons spelt out, and in particular we again make reference to the German jurisprudence.
AP1 (Applicant): We say that where there is a possibility of a need to rebalance the penological justifications perhaps after 20 or 40 or even 60 years, as we say surely there must be, then there is a clear need for a review, and without such a review there is a substantive and procedural breach.
AP1 (Applicant): Finally in respect of the extradition directive, we simply say that that directive was dealing with other issues and simply did not trespass into the realm within which this argument has been dealt.
AP1 (Applicant): Unless I can be of assistance to the Court, those are our submissions.
Dean Spielmann (JudgeP): Thank you, Mr. Weatherby.
Dean Spielmann (JudgeP): The court will now deliberate on the merits of the case.
Guido Raimondi (JudgeP): I declare open the public hearing on the admissibility and merits in the case of Lopes de Sousa Fernandes versus Portugal.
Guido Raimondi (JudgeP): The application was lodged with the court on 23 August 2013 under Article 34 of the Convention by a Portuguese national, Mrs. Maria Isabel Lopes de Sousa Fernandes
Guido Raimondi (JudgeP): The application was communicated to the government on 13 October 2014.
Guido Raimondi (JudgeP): On 11 March 2016, the government requested that the case be referred to the ground chamber in accordance with Article 43 of the Convention.
Guido Raimondi (JudgeP): And the panel of the ground chamber accepted the request on 2 May 2016.
Guido Raimondi (JudgeP): On 29 July 2016, the president of the ground chamber granted leave to the United Kingdom government and to the government of Ireland to submit written comments under Article 44, paragraph 3 of the rules of the court.
Guido Raimondi (JudgeP): The government are represented by their agent, Mrs. Maria de Fátima Da Graça  Carvalho, Deputy Attorney General, assisted by Mrs. Ana Garcia Marques
Guido Raimondi (JudgeP): and Dr. Maria Elaine Sousa Pina, advisors.
Guido Raimondi (JudgeP): The applicant is represented by her counsel, Mr. Ricardo Sá Fernandes, assisted by Mrs. Inês Rogeiro, Mrs. Andreia Martins,
Guido Raimondi (JudgeP): and Dr. Domingos Machado, advisors.
Guido Raimondi (JudgeP): I also welcome, among others, a delegation of judges from Russia and Luxembourg, as well as a delegation of judges and prosecutors from Belarus.
Guido Raimondi (JudgeP): Mr. Sá Fernandes for the applicant will speak first,
Guido Raimondi (JudgeP): and then Mrs. Da Graça Carvalho for the government.
Guido Raimondi (JudgeP): I would explain that in addition to interpreting in the two official languages of the court, English and French, interpreting into Russian has been authorized for the benefit of the Russian-speaking judges attending this hearing.
Guido Raimondi (JudgeP): I call Mr. Sá Fernandes.
AP1 (Applicant): salutation à la Cour.
AP1 (Applicant): C'est un honneur, mais aussi une grande responsabilité, de participer dans cette audience publique à la Grande Chambre de la Cour européenne des droits de l'homme à propos de ce terrible affaire qui a conduit à la mort de l'époux de la rétérente que nous représentons, Mme Sosefnadj.
AP1 (Applicant): Nous sommes conscientes de l'importance de la jurisprudence qui sera affermie après la demande de renvoi par le gouvernement portugais, à laquelle les gouvernements du Royaume-Uni et de l'Irlande se sont associés.
AP1 (Applicant): A nos jours, la Cour européenne des droits de l'homme est la plus importante référence, on dirait même un phare, dans la construction d'un ordre juridique international qui assure en effet le respect pour les droits de l'homme.
AP1 (Applicant): Dans notre pays, le Portugal, l'influence bénéfique et très stimulante de la jurisprudence de la Cour européenne dans la vie judiciaire portugaise est évidente.
AP1 (Applicant): Dans des sujets comme par exemple la liberté d'expression et la garantie d'une justice en temps sans délai excessif, les Portugais sont débitaires à la Cour d'une gratitude pour un progrès indiscutable de ces étalons de justice.
AP1 (Applicant): Les circonstances de l'espèce.
AP1 (Applicant): Rappelons les circonstances de l'espèce les plus importantes.
AP1 (Applicant): Antonio Rui, l'époux de la requérante, était un homme jeune, robuste et sain.
AP1 (Applicant): Le 25 novembre 1987, l'époux de la requérante fut admis à l'hôpital de Villanova de Gaia, pour être soumis à une polypectomie nasale, l'extraction des polypes nasaux, une intervention simple et courante.
AP1 (Applicant): Deux jours plus tard, après sortie de l'hôpital, l'époux de la requérante a été pris de violents maux de tête et se présenta aux urgences du même hôpital à 1h30 du matin, le 29 novembre.
AP1 (Applicant): Il fut examiné par les médecins de garde, lesquels diagnostiquèrent des troubles d'ordre psychologique et lui ont prescrit des tranquillisants.
AP1 (Applicant): Ils ont même demandé sa sortie de l'hôpital, mais la requérante s'en opposa.
AP1 (Applicant): Le lendemain, à 9h, l'époux de la requérante fut observé par la nouvelle équipe médicale de garde, laquelle s'est aperçue de la gravité de la situation et a demandé des examens médicaux, notamment une ponction lombaire qui détecta une mélangite bactérienne, pseudomonas sépacia, raison pour laquelle, cet après-midi, il fut transféré à l'unité des soins intensifs de l'hôpital.
AP1 (Applicant): Le 30 novembre, un scanner révela l'existence d'un édème cérébral.
AP1 (Applicant): À partir de ce moment-là, il s'est suivi une angoissante évolution jusqu'à son décès, le 8 mars, et entre-temps, il y a eu 4 sorties de l'hôpital, 13 décembre, 23 décembre, 9 janvier et 3 février, lesquelles se sont suivies de nouvelles hospitalisations avec une séquence de complications cliniques que, dans une mesure aucune, sont devenues de la mélangite bactérienne grave, c'est-à-dire des ulcères doignales, diarrhées aigües, douleurs abdominales, anémies très graves avec besoin de transfusions sanguines, colites infectieuses avec ulcères, infections à clostridium difficile, acides, c'est-à-dire liquides anormaux dans l'abdomen, rectolithes, aggravation des douleurs abdominales, péritonites, déclenchées par la préforation d'une ulcère, septicémie et le décès.
AP1 (Applicant): A l'origine de cette chaîne, nous avons la mélangite provoquée par une bactérie hospitalaire qui n'a pas été diagnostiquée et traitée avec la promptitude que les circonstances d'espèce exigeaient, ce qui a eu pour conséquence la nécessité de l'intensification de la maladie, et par conséquence la nécessité de l'intensification de l'action antibactérienne.
AP1 (Applicant): Cette circonstance a déterminé la dégradation de l'état de santé de la victime, en contribuant ainsi pour l'apparition des complications, notamment d'infections opportunistes et d'ulcères qui, se suivant les unes les autres, ont déterminé son décès.
AP1 (Applicant): A l'invention de ce qui précède, c'est correct l'enchaînement de propositions de l'arrêt de la cour.
AP1 (Applicant): Mélangite bactérienne provoquée par une infection hospitalaire, inaction du service d'urgence, ce qui a impliqué un retardement de son traitement pour plus de huit heures, besoin de recourir à une action antibactérienne intense, débilitation générale du patient, déchaînement d'ulcère, apparition d'infections opportunistes qui se sont suivies, jusqu'à la péritonite, qui a déterminé la septicémie, qui a été la cause directe du décès.
AP1 (Applicant): Les questions en debat.
AP1 (Applicant): Tenant en compte ces circonstances d'espèce bien établies par la Cour européenne, voyons quelles sont les principales questions qui posent les gouvernements du Portugal, du Royaume-Uni et de l'Irlande.
AP1 (Applicant): En premier, la question de savoir si l'arrêt de la Cour européenne du 15 décembre a fait une correcte interprétation de l'obligation substantive positive à un soin de santé, comme prévu à l'article 2 de la Convention, en ligne avec la jurisprudence de la Cour, ou si, au contraire, l'affaire de manière erronée, divergeant manifestement de la jurisprudence déjà rendue par la Cour, dans des cas similaires.
AP1 (Applicant): En deuxième, la question de savoir si les fautes commises sont suffisantes pour qu'on établit qu'elles ont contribué de façon importante pour mettre en risque la vie de la victime, qui dans cette affaire a fini pour décéder.
AP1 (Applicant): En troisième, la question de savoir si l'autonomie technique de l'Etat portugais et des expertises scientifiques effectuées a été respectée, ou si, au contraire, la Cour a fait un jugement clinique pour lequel elle n'avait pas la capacité.
AP1 (Applicant): Je vais maintenant développer le débat sur ces trois questions.
AP1 (Applicant): Pour nous, ce sont les questions fondamentales.
AP1 (Applicant): La première question.
AP1 (Applicant): L'arrêt de la Cour commence pour rappeler que la première phrase de l'article 2 impose à l'Etat non seulement de s'abstenir de donner la mort intentionnellement, mais aussi de prendre les mesures nécessaires à la protection de la vie des personnes relevant de sa juridiction.
AP1 (Applicant): Ce point-là est à nos jours pacifique quant à l'interprétation de l'article 2 de la Convention.
AP1 (Applicant): Ensuite, la Cour relève que tels principes sont aussi applicables dans le domaine de la santé publique.
AP1 (Applicant): La Cour dit que les obligations positives énoncées ci-dessus impliquent donc la mise en place par l'Etat d'un cadre réglementaire imposant aux hôpitaux, qu'ils soient publics ou privés, l'adoption des mesures propres à assurer la protection de la vie de leurs malades.
AP1 (Applicant): Cette orientation est la première et cette orientation ne se discute pas non plus.
AP1 (Applicant): En plus, sur la trace de la jurisprudence rendue dans d'autres affaires, la Cour souligne qu'il ne suffit pas l'existence d'une erreur de jugement ou d'une mauvaise coordination entre les professionnels de la santé pour mettre le problème sur l'angle de l'obligation positive de protéger le droit à la vie au terme d'article 2 de la Convention.
AP1 (Applicant): C'est aussi un point qu'on ne discute pas.
AP1 (Applicant): Et c'est surtout à ce propos que les gouvernements du Portugal, du Royaume-Uni et de l'Irlande soutiennent que, dans le cas d'espèces, il y a eu une inversion ou une subversion de la jurisprudence établie.
AP1 (Applicant): Nous croyons cependant que les objections relevées n'ont pas raison d'être.