TrustHLT/LaCour huggingface dataset:
AP1 (Applicant): This dean, together with the curator, appointed the judges of the court of trial in the same disciplinary procedure.
AP1 (Applicant): Had the applicant subsequently sued the church for pecuniary claim before its own ecclesiastical court, this is exactly the same dean who would have decided in his discretionary powers as co-chair of the court whether to start the proceedings on the pecuniary dispute.
AP1 (Applicant): And if yes, he would have appointed the acting judges.
AP1 (Applicant): Hence, the ecclesiastical tribunal cannot in any way qualify as impartial.
AP1 (Applicant): Finally, it is also part of well-established Strasbourg jurisprudence that the right to execution of decisions given by any court is an integral part of the right to a court.
AP1 (Applicant): Otherwise, the provisions of Article VI would be deprived of all useful effect.
AP1 (Applicant): Without going into details here, we refer to our memorandum where we shed light on the deficiencies of the execution of ecclesiastical court's decisions.
AP1 (Applicant): Namely, due to the total lack of sufficiently precise provisions in ecclesiastical law governing execution, the ecclesiastical court's judgments are hardly enforceable.
AP1 (Applicant): To sum up, taking account of the foregoing, the ecclesiastical courts of the Hungarian Calvinist Church, and I emphasize the Hungarian Calvinist Church, cannot under any circumstances be recognized as tribunal established by law.
AP1 (Applicant): The system of ecclesiastical jurisdiction at stake, therefore, does not guarantee the protection of the rights enshrined in Article VI.
AP1 (Applicant): However, the convention is intended to guarantee not rights that are theoretical or illusory, but rights that are practical and effective.
AP1 (Applicant): Due to the obligation imposed by Article I of the convention, the member states shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section I of the convention.
AP1 (Applicant): In case a member state decides, even in pursuance of a legitimate aim, to exclude a certain category of its citizens from state jurisdiction, it must nevertheless ascertain whether there is another legal avenue affording guarantees of Article VI.
AP1 (Applicant): No one may be left standing in an illegal no-man's land.
AP1 (Applicant): Mr. President, members of the court, in his first letter
AP1 (Applicant): to Timothy, Apostle Paul writes, the elders who direct the affairs of the church well are worthy of double honor, especially those whose work is preaching and teaching.
AP1 (Applicant): For scripture says, the worker deserves his wages.
AP1 (Applicant): Honorable judges, you are not called upon to decide whether or not the applicant deserves his wages.
AP1 (Applicant): Conversely, we respectfully invite you to hold that there has been a violation of Article VI, as in absence of other lawful recourse for remedy, the domestic courts should have ruled on the merits of the applicant's claim, since he has had a civil right, and the dispute in no way affected the Calvinist church's autonomy.
AP1 (Applicant): Thank you for your consideration.
Luis López Guerra (JudgeP): Thank you, Mr. Cech.
Luis López Guerra (JudgeP): Now I call Mr. Tallódi.
GR1 (Government): ladies and gentlemen, it's a privilege and a pleasure to have the opportunity to appear before the court to present the oral submissions on behalf of the government of Hungary.
GR1 (Government): I don't think it is necessary to present the position of the government in all details as outlined recently in their memorial of the 20th of June, 2016.
GR1 (Government): I will rather focus on the most important issues raised by the case.
GR1 (Government): But first, let me start with reminding you of what issues are not raised by this case.
GR1 (Government): This case is not about the right of access to court in employment disputes, as suggested by the European Trade Union Confederation in their request for intervention.
GR1 (Government): The case is not about discrimination in access to court on the ground of the ecclesiastical nature of the employer, as suggested by a question raised by the court.
GR1 (Government): This case is not about the procedural immunity of churches or about the exclusion of the domestic courts jurisdiction in certain types of civil law disputes.
GR1 (Government): This case is not and should not be about reviewing the correctness of the interpretation and application of Hungarian civil law by Hungarian courts, as proposed by the applicant.
GR1 (Government): And this case is not about remedying the litigation errors committed by the applicant's counsel of his own choice in domestic proceedings, as sought by the applicant.
GR1 (Government): The only issue that can arise in the present case in accordance with the court's jurisprudence under Article VI is whether the applicant had a civil right under domestic law as a legal ground for his pecuniary claims and whether this issue was examined by the domestic courts.
GR1 (Government): It is clear that the applicant had no such right, and insofar as there was a legal dispute about its existence, it was properly examined by domestic courts at all levels of jurisdiction.
GR1 (Government): Therefore, this case raises one single issue, namely whether Hungarian law should have recognized ecclesiastical law as a source of civil rights under contract law.
GR1 (Government): That issue, however, is outside the scope of Article VI of the Convention and outside the scope of jurisdiction of the court.
GR1 (Government): Let me explain in more detail.
GR1 (Government): This case is not about the right of access to court in employment disputes and not even about discrimination in access to court on the ground of the ecclesiastical nature of the employer.
GR1 (Government): Hungarian law fully guarantees the right of access to court in employment disputes arising under Hungarian law.
GR1 (Government): Ecclesiastical service, meaning performing pastoral activities for a church, as such is not excluded from the scope of employment law, provided that the church and the pastor entered into an employment contract governed by state law.
GR1 (Government): In that case, the rights and obligations of both parties will be governed by state law, subject to the jurisdiction of state courts.
GR1 (Government): In the present case, however, the applicant and his church did not enter into a contract governed by state law.
GR1 (Government): Both parties agreed to enter into a relationship governed by ecclesiastical law, which doesn't give rise to civil rights and obligations enforceable in state courts.
GR1 (Government): As a result of the constitutional principle of secularity, ecclesiastical law doesn't qualify as law in Hungarian courts, and ecclesiastical law is most certainly not part of Hungarian law.
GR1 (Government): Section 204 of the Civil Code, read together with the Church Act, excludes claims arising of ecclesiastical law from the scope of civil rights enforceable in civil courts, and thus qualifies these claims as obligatio naturalis.
GR1 (Government): Accordingly, in the present case, it was not the ecclesiastical nature of the service relationship or the ecclesiastical nature of the employer, but the lack of a legal ground in Hungarian law for the applicant's claims, which excluded access to state courts for their enforcement.
GR1 (Government): The jurisprudence of domestic courts presented by the government in writing clearly shows that the decisive factor for establishing the state court's jurisdiction to deal with an employment dispute between a church and its pastor is whether there is an employment contract between them governed by state law or the parties opted for a service relationship under ecclesiastical law.
GR1 (Government): The case referred to by the applicant in paragraph 90 of his written memorandum, although in that case the employee was not a pastor but the manager of the church's social institutions, also shows that if and when there is an employment contract governed by labor law concluded between the church and its employee, Hungarian courts examine the claims arising from that employment relationship in accordance with the rules of state law.
GR1 (Government): Ecclesiastical law is never a legal basis for the decision of state courts.
GR1 (Government): Any reference to it can be made only in the context of facts or arguments submitted by the parties.
GR1 (Government): I note that there seems to be confusion about the nature of the obstacle preventing the Hungarian courts from determining the applicant's pecuniary claims on the merits.
GR1 (Government): Let me clarify that it was not a procedural obstacle which excluded the termination of the applicant's pecuniary claims against the church.
GR1 (Government): The jurisdiction of state courts in ecclesiastical matters, that is in matters governed by ecclesiastical law, is excluded not by a procedural rule but by substantive provisions of the civil code, which remove such matters from the scope of enforceable civil rights as described in detail in the government's memorial.
GR1 (Government): The Supreme Court discontinued the case not for the reason set out in section 130, paragraph 1.e of the Civil
GR1 (Government): Procedure Code, as it was wrongly stated in the chamber's judgment, namely that the jurisdiction of the Hungarian courts is excluded by the code of civil procedure, but for the reason set out in paragraph f of the same provision, namely that the plaintiff's claim cannot be enforced in judicial proceedings, which is a reference to the nature of the claim as obligatio naturalis within the meaning of section 204 of the civil code.
GR1 (Government): interpretation and application of domestic law is within the competence of domestic courts, and it is not for this court to review the correctness of that interpretation.
GR1 (Government): Although the applicant's submissions apparently managed to confuse the court about what rules are part of domestic law and managed to obfuscate the content of Hungarian law, the court should not engage in an interpretation of domestic law overruling that of the domestic courts, which established that the applicant's claims, as submitted to them, had no legal basis in Hungarian civil law as enforceable civil rights.
GR1 (Government): Bearing in mind the principle of subsidiarity, the court should accept that domestic courts well-versed in Hungarian civil law are in a better position to interpret Hungarian civil law than a court of international law.
GR1 (Government): Furthermore, the present proceedings should not be used as a means of remedying the effects of the legal or tactical errors in litigation committed by the applicant's legal counsel of his own choice during the domestic proceedings.
GR1 (Government): Let me remind you that the domestic court's task is to adjudicate only the claims brought before them and not to find alternative claims which the plaintiff could have successfully raised.
GR1 (Government): The fact is that the applicant has not raised before the domestic courts any claims alternative to the contractual liability of his church.
GR1 (Government): The applicant cannot complain that adjudication on the merits was denied in respect of those claims which he had never raised in domestic courts.
GR1 (Government): Therefore, any legal grounds alternative to the church's contractual liability fall outside the scope of the present case.
GR1 (Government): Any complaints other than about an alleged failure by the Hungarian courts to examine the applicant's pecuniary claims from the perspective of contract law are inadmissible, either for failure to observe the six-month time limit or for failure to exhaust domestic remedies, as explained in detail in the government's memorandum.
GR1 (Government): What is decisive for the applicability of Article VI in the present case is that Hungarian law doesn't recognize ecclesiastical law as a source of civil rights enforceable in civil courts, claims arising from ecclesiastical law don't have a legal basis in substantive domestic law, and therefore Article VI is not applicable to them.
GR1 (Government): In any event, insofar as there was a genuine dispute about the existence of civil rights in the present case, that issue was thoroughly examined by the domestic courts.
GR1 (Government): The issue whether Hungarian law should recognize ecclesiastical law as a source of civil rights under contract law or under labor law is not a matter to be determined in the present proceedings.
GR1 (Government): It is clear both from the object and purpose of Article VI, which is to guarantee procedural fairness, and from the relevant jurisprudence of the court that Article VI cannot serve as a basis for claiming substantive rights that have no legal basis in domestic law.
GR1 (Government): Neither can Article VI be interpreted as guaranteeing a favorable outcome to the applicant.
GR1 (Government): ladies and gentlemen, please let me now make some comments on the applicant's written submissions.
GR1 (Government): The facts presented by the applicant in his memorandum, as well as the rules of ecclesiastical law of the Reformed Church of Hungary, are irrelevant to the present case concerning the issue whether the applicant had a civil right under Hungarian law to be enforced by Hungarian courts.
GR1 (Government): The government note in this respect that the rules of ecclesiastical law are wrongly presented under the heading of domestic law, since those rules are not part of Hungarian domestic law.
GR1 (Government): Neither can the practice of ecclesiastical courts be regarded as case law of the domestic courts, or the findings of an ecclesiastical court be regarded as authoritative interpretation of Hungarian state law.
GR1 (Government): Nonetheless, I note that the Sinoz court's decision of the 4th of June, 1998, submitted by the applicant and delivered at some point of the litigation in the case, giving rise to the constitutional court's decision of the 4th of June, 2003, didn't concern a pastor in ecclesiastical service relationship, suspended in disciplinary proceedings like the applicant in the present case.
GR1 (Government): In any event, it is irrelevant in the present case whether the applicant had access to an ecclesiastical court to enforce his claims under ecclesiastical law, because it doesn't alter the fact that such claims are excluded from the scope of civil rights by virtue of the civil court.
GR1 (Government): The applicant had no civil rights at issue in the case.
GR1 (Government): He had only pecuniary claims without a legal basis in domestic law.
GR1 (Government): Since the facts presented by the applicant are irrelevant to the present case, there are no documents available to the government to verify them.
GR1 (Government): However, based solely on the documents submitted by the applicant, the accuracy of the applicant's statements is highly questionable.
GR1 (Government): As an example, the government note that the remarkable circumstance referred to in paragraph 6 of the applicant's memorandum, that according to the congregation, the pecuniary dispute with the applicant must be resolved by state courts under state law, relates not to the applicant's pecuniary claims of the congregation against the applicant, arising from the use of a real estate without title, but apart from being a proof of the inaccuracy of the applicant's statements, the congregation's position is irrelevant, since it was not a position expressed by a Hungarian judicial authority, but by a private party threatening to enforce their claims in court.
GR1 (Government): Nonetheless, the congregation's position seems to be legally correct, since they apparently based their claims on the rules of civil law on property, and not on any provision of ecclesiastical law.
GR1 (Government): We must also note that the applicant didn't submit any information as to the follow-up to that threat of litigation, whether those claims were indeed enforced in court, or settled out of court, possibly with a discount of the congregation's claims against the applicant's pecuniary claims.
GR1 (Government): As to the applicant's submissions on the applicability of Article VI, the government note that the pecuniary nature of a claim doesn't make it a civil right within the meaning of either Hungarian law or Article VI of the Convention.
GR1 (Government): The pecuniary nature of a claim in itself doesn't create a legal ground for it in substantive law, as required by the jurisprudence of the court to qualify as a civil right, falling within the scope of applicability of Article VI of the Convention.
GR1 (Government): The pecuniary nature of the claim would be relevant from the point of view of applicability of Article VI, only if the claim had a legal ground in substantive law, and the issue to be decided were whether it was of a civil law nature.
GR1 (Government): In the present case, however, the applicant's claim had no legal basis in substantive law.
GR1 (Government): Therefore, Article VI is not applicable to the present case.
GR1 (Government): The issue of what type of decision a civil court delivers when the claim brought before it has no legal ground, whether it dismisses the claim or discontinues the proceedings, is a technical issue in respect of which the high contracting parties have a wide margin of appreciation.
GR1 (Government): And it is not for the court to decide which type of decision should be delivered.
GR1 (Government): However, the government note that contrary to the applicant's allegations, the Supreme Court didn't overrule the findings of the first instance court concerning the lack of a legal ground for the applicant's claims in civil law.
GR1 (Government): Just the opposite, the Supreme Court agreed with the finding that the applicant had no claim under contract law.
GR1 (Government): It only disagreed with the conclusion of dismissing the claim on the merits and considered that the proceedings should be instead discontinued in accordance with the rules of the civil proceedings code.
GR1 (Government): In any event, the issue whether the applicant's claim had a legal ground under Hungarian civil law was fully and thoroughly examined by the Hungarian courts, which thereby satisfied their obligation under Article VI, which only requires that the claim be examined but doesn't guarantee a favorable outcome.
GR1 (Government): The government agreed with the applicant's submission in paragraph 28 of their memorandum that the domestic courts were called on to decide whether the applicant's service agreement with the Carbunes Church fell within the existing categories of contracts.
GR1 (Government): The government agreed with the domestic courts, too, which answered this question in the negative.
GR1 (Government): What is important from the point of view of Article VI is that the question raised before the Hungarian courts was examined and determined.
GR1 (Government): However, what the applicant complains of that is the outcome of the determination falls outside the scope of Article VI and outside the jurisdiction of the court, which is not a court of forced instance determining the original dispute.
GR1 (Government): But considering that we have to examine the applicant's claims for pecuniary damages under Article 41, anyway, which claims are essentially the same as those raised in the domestic proceedings, let us pretend that the domestic courts were wrong and the applicant had a civil law agency contract with the church.
GR1 (Government): And let us determine the applicant's claims under the rules of the Hungarian civil code.
GR1 (Government): The applicant doesn't claim that he was not paid his fees while he performed his pastoral services.
GR1 (Government): His pecuniary claims concern a period when his services were no longer required.
GR1 (Government): That is after the termination of his perpetrated agency contract.
GR1 (Government): He claims 50% suspension allowance, 25% age allowance, and the full wage for the period of his suspension exceeding 120 days up until the date when he found a new employment.
GR1 (Government): However, no such terms are included in his letter of appointment.
GR1 (Government): And no such consequences follow from the termination of an agency contract under the civil law code either.
GR1 (Government): How could we then conclude that the sums of money claimed by the applicant were indeed due to him under his agency contract?
GR1 (Government): Thus, the total sum due to the applicant for his claims well-founded in Hungarian civil law as a consequence of the termination of his perpetrated agency contract was zero.
GR1 (Government): This method of examination only confirms that the applicant's claims brought before the domestic courts have no legal basis in domestic civil law.
GR1 (Government): As regards the applicant's claims of teaching fees, the Supreme Court established in its final decision that this claim had not been raised in accordance with the law.
GR1 (Government): His relevant contract had first been mentioned in his petition for review and not before the first instance court as required by the law.
GR1 (Government): The applicant still could have raised this claim in new proceedings subsequent to the Supreme Court's decision.
GR1 (Government): As regards the applicant's allegations, that recognition of his service as a pastor as a period giving rise to entitlement, the old age pension, proves that he had a civil law right under Hungarian law at issue in the contested proceedings.
GR1 (Government): The government note that such a recognition for social security purposes is not based on any rules of ecclesiastical law, but on the performance of an administrative act by the church under state law, namely, reporting the fact of the pastoral service to the competent Hungarian authorities.
GR1 (Government): In contrast, the applicant's claims arising from his dismissal from his ecclesiastical service were based exclusively on ecclesiastical law, and the dispute at issue could not have been resolved on the ground of state law.
GR1 (Government): Recognizing the fact of pastoral service by social security regulation is consistent with the nature of natural obligations.
GR1 (Government): They are not legal obligations.
GR1 (Government): They cannot be enforced in court.
GR1 (Government): But once they are fulfilled, this fact may entail legal consequences.
GR1 (Government): Mr. President, honorable members of the court, ladies
GR1 (Government): and gentlemen.
GR1 (Government): Finally, let me briefly summarize the government's position on the admissibility and the merits of the present application.
GR1 (Government): The applicant's pecuniary claims arising from the termination of his pastoral service, insofar as they were raised before the Hungarian courts and domestic remedies, were exhausted in accordance with the law, had no legal basis in Hungarian civil law, and therefore, Article VI is not applicable in the present case.
GR1 (Government): The civil code clearly excluded claims arising of ecclesiastical law from the scope of civil rights, and even declared any contract signed for securing an obligatio naturalis to be null and void, thus the dispute concerning the non-fulfillment of such an obligation cannot be regarded as a genuine dispute under civil law for the purposes of Article VI.
GR1 (Government): Nonetheless, domestic courts took the applicant's claim that he did not seek to enforce claims based on ecclesiastical law, and that his appointment letter was a genuine civil law agency contract, very seriously, and gave ample reasons for dismissing this claim as unfounded.
GR1 (Government): Therefore, even if Article VI were found to be applicable in the present case, its requirements were fully met by the domestic proceedings.