TrustHLT/LaCour huggingface dataset:
GR1 (Government): Toutefois, dans le cas concret, au-delà des raisons que la requérante a citées à partir de l'arrêt de la Cour respective, il y a aussi un autre paragraphe, un peu avant, qui spécifie les réseaux concrets par lesquels les juges de la Cour suprême ont considéré que, dans le cas, une audience était inutile, à cause des raisons dont j'ai déjà parlé, qui concernaient les moyens de preuve que la requérante envisageait de présenter, ce qui concernait son conflit avec un inspecteur, ce qui concernait la date de reprise de fonction, ce qui concernait un éventuel projet de décision qui n'a pas été jamais discuté, que nous ne savons pas s'il est vrai ou non.
GR1 (Government): C'était seulement un certain journal qui a parlé de ce sujet.
GR1 (Government): Alors, c'était ces aspects qui étaient l'objet de la production de preuves à l'audience, et c'était aussi par ces motifs que la Cour suprême l'a rejetée.
GR1 (Government): Sur la conversion de la peine d'amende en une peine privative de liberté, ça n'est pas possible, il ne s'agit pas d'une peine pénale.
GR1 (Government): Il n'y a pas eu de modification de la peine à une autre peine quelconque.
GR1 (Government): Sur la connaissance de la composition du Conseil par la requérante.
GR1 (Government): En effet, ce qu'ils savaient auparavant serait la composition générale, la composition des membres qui faisaient partie à ce moment du Conseil.
GR1 (Government): Les membres qui seraient présents dans la journée et dans la date de la session concrète où la délibération a été adoptée, c'était impossible de connaître.
GR1 (Government): Il n'est pas exigible que tous les membres soient présents à la réunion.
GR1 (Government): Il y a encore, je pense, 12 membres qui exigent la présence.
GR1 (Government): Alors, qui sont les personnes qui seront présentes à la session?
GR1 (Government): On ne sait pas auparavant.
GR1 (Government): Même le président du Conseil, il ne sait pas si ce sont les membres A ou B qui seront présents.
GR1 (Government): Il sait seulement que le quorum est exigible.
GR1 (Government): Mais dans le propre jour de la décision, c'est possible de savoir sa figure dans le procès verbal de la session où la délibération est adoptée.
GR1 (Government): Et elle figure aussi, bien sûr, dans la délibération avec tous les noms et toutes les signatures de ces membres.
GR1 (Government): Quant au recours en constitutionnalité, en effet, le gouvernement soulève le défaut de l'utilisation de ce moyen de recours interne en ce qui concerne l'impartialité, l'indépendance de la Cour suprême, de la section du contentiel de la Cour suprême et aussi la question de l'étendue des pouvoirs de la Cour suprême.
GR1 (Government): C'est sur ce sujet que le gouvernement insiste que les moyens de recours internes visant le recours vers le tribunal constitutionnel n'ont pas été épuisés.
GR1 (Government): Concernant la composition du Conseil, en effet, elle est prévue à la Constitution.
GR1 (Government): Donc, dans ce sujet, ce que nous soulevons, c'est que cette question ne faisait pas partie des griefs qui ont été communiqués au gouvernement et que le gouvernement a eu l'opportunité de contester jusqu'à la décision de la Chambre.
GR1 (Government): Je pense que j'ai répondu à la question qui m'a été adressée.
GR1 (Government): Je ne sais pas, M. le Président,
GR1 (Government): si je passe à dire quelque chose ou non.
Guido Raimondi (JudgeP): Vous avez le temps, madame.
GR1 (Government): Concernant les aspects que la récurrente a soulevé, je voudrais seulement invoquer 2 ou 3 points.
GR1 (Government): En premier lieu, je voudrais souligner qu'elle-même reconnaît qu'elle n'a pas soulevé le grief concernant la composition du Conseil dans les 3 requêtes qu'elle a présentées devant la Cour.
GR1 (Government): Sa question a été décidée d'office, on peut le dire, ne faisait pas partie des requêtes.
GR1 (Government): Concernant la question de la modification de la Constitution qui prévoyait auparavant que le président de la République devrait indiquer un membre entre les 2, qu'il pouvait indiquer un membre devrait être en juge et qui a été modifié.
GR1 (Government): Maintenant, il peut indiquer ou non un membre que soit juge.
GR1 (Government): Je dois dire que de toute façon, c'était un juge qui n'était pas élu par leur père.
GR1 (Government): C'était un juge indiqué par le président, un juge prestigieux, bien sûr, mais n'était pas élu par leur père.
GR1 (Government): C'est vrai que quelques secteurs qui défendent surtout que le Conseil soit composé par une grande majorité ou même pour la totalité des juges n'ont pas bien reçu cette modification.
GR1 (Government): Mais à l'opinion publique, elle envisage un Conseil supérieur de la magistrature qui soit ouvert dans la communauté et qui ne se ferme pas dans la magistrature elle-même.
GR1 (Government): Concernant les questions d'incompatibilité des membres qui appartiennent au Conseil et qui ne sont pas des juges.
GR1 (Government): Ils peuvent être là à temps plein et alors ils ont toutes les incompatibilités.
GR1 (Government): S'ils ne sont pas à temps plein, comme ils peuvent l'être, ils sont sujets à tous les empêchements, à qui sont sujets toutes les personnes qui participent à des décisions administratives.
GR1 (Government): Ils doivent se déclarer empêchés s'il y a un conflit d'intérêts.
GR1 (Government): Et même les autres membres du Conseil peuvent et doivent soulever cet empêchement, cette suspension, s'il est le cas.
GR1 (Government): Pour finir, je dois dire qu'effectivement, le cumul d'à peine de la récurrence étatique de la récurrence était de 140 jours, mais selon les documents que j'ai, seulement 100 jours ont été accomplis.
GR1 (Government): Et pour finir, quant au document dont la récurrente parle, qu'elle a demandé au Conseil supérieur de la magistrature la réalisation d'une audience.
GR1 (Government): En fait, je ne connais pas ce document.
GR1 (Government): J'ai consulté le dossier, je n'ai pas vu ce document.
GR1 (Government): Je n'affirme qu'il n'existe pas, mais je n'en ai pas connaissance.
GR1 (Government): La récurrente n'a pas présenté aussi ce document.
GR1 (Government): Ce que je sais, c'est qu'elle a demandé une audience à la Cour suprême et qu'elle a été refusée aussi pour des motifs qui, les témoins et les preuves à présenter, n'avaient pas trait avec l'objet concret et essentiel qui était en cause.
Guido Raimondi (JudgeP): I declare open the public hearing on the admissibility and merits in the case of Magyar Helsinki Bizottság versus Hungary.
Guido Raimondi (JudgeP): The application was lodged with the court on 14 March 2011 under Article 34 of the Convention by a Hungarian non-governmental organization, Magyar Helsinki Bizottság.
Guido Raimondi (JudgeP): The application was allocated to the second section of the court pursuant to Rule 52, paragraph 1 of the Rules of the Court.
Guido Raimondi (JudgeP): The application was communicated to the government on 4 December 2012.
Guido Raimondi (JudgeP): On 26 May 2015, the chamber decided to relinquish jurisdiction in favour of the Grand Chamber.
Guido Raimondi (JudgeP): On 2 September 2015, the President of the Grand Chamber granted the Government of the United Kingdom the organization's media legal defence initiative, Campaign for Freedom of Information, Article 19, Access to Information Programme and Hungarian Civil Liberties Union jointly, and the organization Fair Trials International leave to submit written comments as third parties by virtue of Article 36, paragraph 2 of the Convention and Rule 44, paragraph 3 of the Rules of the Court.
Guido Raimondi (JudgeP): The Government of the United Kingdom were also granted leave to take part in the hearing as a third party government by virtue of Rule 44, paragraph 3 of the Rules of the Court.
Guido Raimondi (JudgeP): The respondent governments are represented by their agent, Mr Zoltán Tallódi, and assisted by Mrs Mónika Weller, co-agent.
Guido Raimondi (JudgeP): The applicant organization is represented by Dr Tamas Fazekas and Dr Tibor Lajos Sepsi, and by Dr Csaba Tordai and Mrs Nóra Novoszádek, advisors.
Guido Raimondi (JudgeP): The United Kingdom government are represented by Mr Jason Coppel, QC counsel, and by Mrs Anna McLeod, agent, and Mrs Asma Mahmood, advisor.
Guido Raimondi (JudgeP): I also welcome the groups of judges from the Supreme Court of Latvia and from the Constitutional Court of Kosovo, judges and prosecutors from Turkey, and judges and prosecutors from the European Judicial Training Network who are on a study visit to the Court.
Guido Raimondi (JudgeP): Having consulted the agent of the government and the applicant organization's representative and the representative of the third party, I have determined the order of addresses as follows.
Guido Raimondi (JudgeP): Mr Tallódi for the government will speak first, and then Dr Sepsi for the applicant organization, Magyar Helsinki Bizottság, and finally Mr Coppel for the United Kingdom government.
Guido Raimondi (JudgeP): I should explain that in addition to interpreting in the two official languages of the Court, English and French, interpreting into Russian and Georgian has been authorized for the benefit of the groups of lawyers from Russia and representatives of the Office of the Public Defender of Georgia attending this hearing.
Guido Raimondi (JudgeP): Translational interpreting is not arranged by the Court, and no transcription of the oral translation will be included in the official record of the proceedings.
Guido Raimondi (JudgeP): I call Mr Tallódi.
GR1 (Government): Mr. President, Honorable Members of the Court,
GR1 (Government): ladies and gentlemen, it's a privilege and a pleasure to have the opportunity to appear before the Court to present the oral submissions on behalf of the Government of Hungary.
GR1 (Government): During the written procedure before the Court, both parties, as well as the intervening third parties, have been given ample opportunity to put forward their arguments.
GR1 (Government): Hence, it is not necessary to repeat now the details of the position of the government outlined recently in their memorial of the 7th of September, 2015.
GR1 (Government): First of all, let me reaffirm that the government considers that the right to defense, as well as the right of access to public information, are fundamental human rights to be guaranteed in a democratic society based on the rule of law, and both rights are clearly enshrined in the fundamental law of Hungary.
GR1 (Government): The present case, however, is not about the existence or significance of the right of access to official documents in general, but whether this right falls within the scope of Article 10 of the Convention.
GR1 (Government): And if so, what are the limits of the jurisdiction of this Court?
GR1 (Government): The first issue to be considered is whether the right of access to information falls within the scope of Article 10 of the Convention.
GR1 (Government): In other words, whether Article 10 is applicable to the present case.
GR1 (Government): The government are of the opinion that the right of access to information is an autonomous right aimed at enhancing transparency and good governance, and it is not simply a part of or auxiliary to the freedom of expression.
GR1 (Government): But even if it were considered as an inherent aspect of the freedom of expression, this aspect was deliberately excluded from the scope of Article 10 by its drafters.
GR1 (Government): Having regard to the wording of Article 10, contrasted with the wording of other international human rights instruments concerning freedom of expression, as well as the travel preparatoire of Article 10, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, and the Court's longstanding jurisprudence in line with its judgment in the case of Leander versus Sweden, the government consider that Article 10 is not applicable to the present case.
GR1 (Government): In the present case, the applicant's freedom of expression within the meaning of Article 10 has not been interfered with.
GR1 (Government): The applicant organization was not prevented from publishing its survey and express its opinion on an issue of public importance, and in contrast to the case of Daman versus Switzerland, the applicant was not sanctioned for receiving information which was given to it by the police in breach of the provisions of Hungarian law.
GR1 (Government): In this case, the applicant's complaint is clearly based on a claim for a right of access to information which doesn't fall within the scope of Article 10.
GR1 (Government): The government are of the opinion that the court should not depart from its position in the case of Leander versus Sweden, namely that the right to freedom to receive information basically prohibits a government from restricting a person from receiving information that others wish or may be willing to impart to him.
GR1 (Government): It follows that Article 10 doesn't confer on the individual a justiciable right of access to information which is not intended to be imparted.
GR1 (Government): Admittedly, the court's judgment in the case of Társasága Szabadságjogokert versus Hungary has widely been interpreted as a departure from that position.
GR1 (Government): However, the government emphasized that the court itself stated in paragraph 36 of the judgment that the case didn't concern the denial of a general right of access to official documents.
GR1 (Government): The government realized that their concession concerning the applicability of Article 10 in that case, based exclusively on considerations of domestic law as in force at that time, proved to have unintended consequences on the development of the jurisprudence of the court, and agree with the British government that unilateral concession cannot serve as a basis for expansion of the Convention into areas which it was not intended to cover.
GR1 (Government): The government are of the opinion that the living instrument approach invoked by the third parties would not justify the extension of the scope of Article 10 either.
GR1 (Government): The right of access to information is not a new aspect to freedom of expression.
GR1 (Government): It was not unknown to the legal systems of the member states of the Council of Europe at the time of drafting Article 10 of the Convention.
GR1 (Government): Yet, it was deliberately omitted from the scope of this provision.
GR1 (Government): This aspect of the right was deliberately not subjected to the international control mechanism established by the Convention.
GR1 (Government): Moreover, the member states of the Council of Europe, the high contracting parties to the Convention, confirmed that Article 10 did not cover the right of access to information when they adopted in 2009 the European Convention on access to official documents.
GR1 (Government): Official documents meaning any information drafted or received and held by public authorities.
GR1 (Government): The explanatory report of that Convention states that it is the first binding international legal instrument to recognize a general right of access to official documents held by public authorities.
GR1 (Government): Moreover, the government point out that the high contracting parties, as recently as 2009, still didn't intend to subject this right to the jurisdiction of the court and opted for the adoption of a separate treaty with distinct supervisory mechanism instead of adopting an additional protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights.
GR1 (Government): The fact that many of the high contracting parties provide for the right of access to information in the domestic law or adopted other international treaties ensuring the right to seek information does not justify that the same right be interpreted into Article 10 of the Convention.
GR1 (Government): In spite of its wording and the intentions of its drafters, the member states of the Council of Europe.
GR1 (Government): One of the reasons for the member states' reluctance to extend the court's jurisdiction to cover the right of access to information is the need to preserve the effective functioning of the court, which has already been facing an immense caseload for years.
GR1 (Government): The number of potential applications inviting the court to carry out a forced instance review of rejected requests for information, like in the present case, as well as the scale and complexity of the issues to be considered in each case are prohibitive in this respect.
GR1 (Government): Therefore, the government considers that the right to seek information is not ensured by Article 10, and the court should not extend the scope of Article 10 to cover this right.
GR1 (Government): Thus, Article 10 is not applicable in the present case, and the application should be declared inadmissible, ratione materie, in accordance with Article 35, Paragraph 3A of the Convention.
GR1 (Government): Should the court find that Article 10 is applicable in cases of denial of access to information, the next issue to be examined is the scope of jurisdiction of the court.
GR1 (Government): The government are of the opinion that the court only has jurisdiction to examine complaints of denial of access to information in cases where the lack of access to a particular piece of information effectively prevents the applicant for expressing, publishing an opinion on an issue of public importance, because there are no alternative means of obtaining that information, and the applicant is liable under civil or criminal law for the factual correctness or well-foundedness of his statements.
GR1 (Government): Only in these cases can be said that denial of access to information interferes with the freedom of expression.
GR1 (Government): The case of Kennedy versus Hungary would have been a close example under slightly different conditions had the applicant been really denied access to the requested information.
GR1 (Government): However, the correct reading of the facts of that case is that the applicant was only prevented by the authorities from publishing information accessible to him.
GR1 (Government): Not having access at all was his own decision.
GR1 (Government): Therefore, this case cannot be regarded to have established the right of access to information under Article 10.
GR1 (Government): Should the court interpret the Kennedy judgment as an authority establishing that Article 10 may be engaged, that the state has failed to comply with an established domestic right of access to information?
GR1 (Government): The government agreed with the opinion of the British government that the court should refrain from interpreting the domestic law itself, and should accept the interpretation given by the domestic court, which is in a better position to interpret the provisions of domestic law, and which is solely competent to do so.
GR1 (Government): Otherwise, the court will become a forced-instance appellate court in freedom of information cases.
GR1 (Government): An exemption to this rule might only be made when, in a most extreme case, the domestic court's judgment is manifestly arbitrary, contrary to a clear and highly specific provision of domestic law, not leaving any room for judicial interpretation.
GR1 (Government): Even if the court found that a domestic right of access to information gave rise to claims under Article 10, it should, under no circumstances, go beyond requiring enforcement of an established right, and examine whether access should have been granted to a particular type of information, as it is proposed by the applicant in the present case.
GR1 (Government): Such an examination would imply the consideration of complex social, political, and legal issues, and the balancing of various interests which falls outside the competence of the court, and can best be carried out by the domestic authorities, most of all by the legislator, which enjoy a wide margin of appreciation in this field, having regard to the lack of consensus across the Council of Europe states, on the extent to which there should be access to state information.
GR1 (Government): Even the Council of Europe Convention access to official documents not yet in force could not provide sufficient guidance to the court, since it sets out only very general framework rules, deferring the detailed regulation to domestic law.
GR1 (Government): The scope of review by the court, as well as the corresponding margin of appreciation of the state, will also depend on whether the rights ensured by Article 10 are construed as entailing only negative or also positive obligations.
GR1 (Government): Any positive obligations under Article 10 have so far arisen as an obligation to protect from interference by private persons, and they should not be construed as an obligation to promote or fulfill by creating alternative venues for expression or providing subsidies, or even information which is not willingly imparted.
GR1 (Government): In any event, having regard to the lack of consensus at the European level, states should enjoy a wide margin of appreciation in choosing the means of fulfilling their eventual positive obligations under Article 10.
GR1 (Government): Summing up the general considerations, the government submit that any right of access to information under Article 10 can only be construed as a right to receive information willingly imparted by others.
GR1 (Government): There is a negative obligation on the part of the state not to hinder unjustifiable access to publicly available information and not to punish anyone for receiving information from public authorities, even if the information was imparted unlawfully.
GR1 (Government): Turning to the facts of the present case, the government are of the opinion that there has been no interference with the applicant's freedom to receive information as protected by Article 10.
GR1 (Government): Neither was there any interference with the applicant's right to impart ideas, since it was not prevented by the lack of the requested information from publishing its survey, nor did the lack of the requested information affect the quality of the applicant's opinion.
GR1 (Government): in spite of the extensive filings by the third party NGOs and the applicant itself on the issue, the government considered that the court should not base its decision in the present case on the importance of the right to defense enshrined in Article 6 of the convention.
GR1 (Government): The significance of that right, or the Legal Aid Defense Council's role in contributing to its fulfillment, has never been called into question by the Hungarian authorities.
GR1 (Government): The issue at dispute was whether Legal Aid Defense Councils in Hungary qualified as persons performing public duties for the purposes of the Data Act, or they contributed to the fulfillment of public tasks by performing their civic duties without qualifying as persons performing public duties within the meaning of the Data Act.
GR1 (Government): This question is to be answered exclusively on the basis of Hungarian law, and this question was answered by the highest judicial organ competent to interpret the relevant provisions of the Hungarian law to the effect that Legal Aid Defense Councils in Hungary did not qualify as persons performing public duties for the purposes of Section 19, paragraph 4 of the Data Act.
GR1 (Government): Since the decision of the Supreme Court was not manifestly arbitrary, there is no reason for this court to rule otherwise.
GR1 (Government): In accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, this court is not competent to reinterpret the provisions of the Hungarian law or to determine what should have been content of Hungarian law.
GR1 (Government): Therefore, the court must conclude, in accordance with the judgment of the Supreme Court, that the applicant organization had no established right of access to information under domestic law.
GR1 (Government): Or, depending on the interpretation of Article 10 chosen by the court as to the scope of an eventual right to information, the court should conclude that the applicant's perverted right to information was restricted in accordance with law.