TrustHLT/LaCour huggingface dataset:
GR1 (Government): Entre les années 80 et 2000, 20 ans, 15 ans sont passés.
GR1 (Government): Il était toujours indépendant d'alcool.
GR1 (Government): Il avait toujours des crises.
GR1 (Government): Je demande, si parce qu'il était triste, parce qu'il continuait à consommer de l'alcool, parce qu'il parlait parfois qu'il n'avait des intérêts à la vie, etc.,
GR1 (Government): je demande si ça suffit pour l'interner compulsivement ou pour le faire soumettre à des mesures restrictives de la liberté.
GR1 (Government): Alors, il serait sur ce régime pendant 15 ans.
GR1 (Government): Et après le 1er avril, le jour qu'il a fait la 1re tentative de suicide, il devrait être suivi continuellement au sujet des mesures très restrictives pour combien de temps?
GR1 (Government): Jusqu'à quel temps?
GR1 (Government): En effet, il a eu une évaluation sur sa situation.
GR1 (Government): Le médecin a conclu, à partir des entretiens qu'il a eu avec lui les jours suivants, que c'était une chose qui s'est passée comme réaction à quelque chose de négatif, le fait d'avoir pas obtenu le permis de conduire.
GR1 (Government): Et elle, selon la connaissance qu'elle avait de la malade et selon ses connaissances de la science psychiatrique, elle a considéré que le risque était contrôlé.
GR1 (Government): Elle n'a dit pas qu'il n'y avait pas de risque.
GR1 (Government): Elle a dit que le risque était contrôlé et que les mesures adéquates seraient la médication, l'accompagnement, une plus limitation restant au pavillon au 1er temps.
GR1 (Government): Et après, elle a entendu qu'il pourrait déjà sortir et commencer à aller chez sa mère, etc.,
GR1 (Government): et donc, elle a fait un entrainement d'une façon évolutive.
GR1 (Government): Elle savait qu'il y avait peut-être quelques risques.
GR1 (Government): Elle a dit même, seulement si nous soyons dédiés, nous pourrions éviter tout risque.
GR1 (Government): Les juges internes ont dit qu'il y a toujours la présence d'un risque dans les maladies mentales.
GR1 (Government): Mais on va entraîner compulsivement, soumettre à des mesures continues de vigilance tous les personnes qui présentent ce danger.
GR1 (Government): C'est ma dernière question. Merci.
Guido Raimondi (JudgeP): Merci beaucoup, Madame.
Guido Raimondi (JudgeP): I thank both parties for their submissions and their answers to the questions of the court.
Guido Raimondi (JudgeP): The judgment will be delivered later, and the parties will be informed of the date of delivery.
András Sajó (JudgeP): I declare open the public hearing on the merits in the case of Satakunnan
András Sajó (JudgeP): Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy against Finland.
András Sajó (JudgeP): The application was lodged with the court on 18th November 2012 under Article 34 of the convention by two Finnish limited liability companies, Satakunnan
András Sajó (JudgeP): Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy .
András Sajó (JudgeP): The application was allocated to the first section of the court, pursuant to Rule 52.1 of the rules of the court.
András Sajó (JudgeP): On 21st July 2015, a chamber of that section declared the complaints concerning Article 6 and 10 of the convention admissible and the remainder of the application inadmissible and delivered a judgment in which it held that there had been a violation of Article 6 of the convention and no violation of Article 10 of the convention.
András Sajó (JudgeP): On 21st October 2015, the applicant companies requested that the case be referred to the Grand Chamber in accordance with Article 43 of the convention, and the panel of the Grand Chamber accepted the request on 14th December 2015.
András Sajó (JudgeP): On 28th January and 23rd March 2016, respectively, the president granted leave to the European Information Society Institute, Nordplus Law and Media Network, Article 19, the Access to Information Program, and the Hungarian Civil Liberties Union to submit written comments as third parties by virtue of Rule 44.3 of the rules of the court.
András Sajó (JudgeP): Respondent governments are represented by the agent, Ms. Krista Oinonen,
András Sajó (JudgeP): director of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, assisted by Ms. Anu Talus, Ms. Helena Hynynen, Ms. Satu
András Sajó (JudgeP): Sistonen, and by Mr. Ato Kosonen, advisors.
András Sajó (JudgeP): The applicant companies are represented by Mr. Pekka Vainio, counsel.
András Sajó (JudgeP): I welcome the representatives in the name of the court.
András Sajó (JudgeP): I would also welcome the groups of judges from Liechtenstein, Russia, Serbia, and Ukraine, who are on a study visit to the court.
András Sajó (JudgeP): Having consulted the agent of the government and the representative of the applicant companies, I have determined the order of addresses as follows.
András Sajó (JudgeP): Mr. Vainio for the applicant companies
András Sajó (JudgeP): will speak first, and Ms. Oinonen for the government.
András Sajó (JudgeP): I would explain that in addition to interpreting in the two official languages of the court, English and French, interpreting into Russian has been authorized for the benefit of groups of judges from Russia and Ukraine attending this hearing.
András Sajó (JudgeP): That interpreting is not arranged by the court, and no transcription of the oral translation will be included in the official record of the proceedings.
András Sajó (JudgeP): Now I would like to call Mr. Vainio, please.
AP1 (Applicant): Thank you, Mr. President and distinguished judges of the Grand Chamber.
AP1 (Applicant): On behalf of the applicants, I have the honor to present the following.
AP1 (Applicant): I wish to address the esteemed Grand Chamber on four questions in which I attempt to further develop my argumentation and to some extent also to reply to certain observations presented by the government.
AP1 (Applicant): At first, I'd like to examine the concept of journalism in this case and some of its implications.
AP1 (Applicant): Secondly, I'd like to present some points on the need to protect privacy in this case.
AP1 (Applicant): Thirdly, I wish to present certain remarks concerning the applicants' claim for just satisfaction.
AP1 (Applicant): And finally, I'd like to present some concluding remarks concerning the importance of freedom of expression and the possible impact that the ruling in this case could have in it.
AP1 (Applicant): Now on the concept of journalism, can we define journalism and should we do that in the first place? Which ends would be served by the usage of this concept of journalism.
AP1 (Applicant): The European Court of Justice in its preliminary ruling defined not journalism per se, but journalistic purposes referred to in the Directive 95-46EC. The Court stated that activities
AP1 (Applicant): had journalistic purposes if the sole purpose of them was to submit information, opinions, or ideas to the public. This definition has also been adapted in the proposed data protection
AP1 (Applicant): regulation in the European Union.
AP1 (Applicant): Now the purpose. There the focus is on what is being done in general to impart information,
AP1 (Applicant): opinions, or ideas, not on the content of the information, the opinions, or the ideas submitted, just the nature of the activity. For instance, the act of writing, but not
AP1 (Applicant): on what is actually written.
AP1 (Applicant): Your court has in its case law, if you allow me to present an interpretation, utilized the concept of journalism to recognize those violations of freedom of expression that could have the most severe consequences to democracy. The damage done to civilized society could
AP1 (Applicant): indeed be more severe if a journalist is silenced than if somebody else is silenced.
AP1 (Applicant): As I recall, your court has not for the time being used the concept of journalism to restrict anybody's freedom of expression.
AP1 (Applicant): Now the ruling of the Supreme Administrative Court of Finland focused on the content of the actual publication of the applicants, not to the act of writing, but on what was actually written. The ruling was, in a nutshell, since the applicant's database is published
AP1 (Applicant): almost in its entirety, these actions are not to be regarded as merely submitting information opinions or ideas to the public.
AP1 (Applicant): Even more summarized, since nearly all collected information is published, the purpose is not just to publish information. Even today, I personally cannot grasp this reasoning.
AP1 (Applicant): Also the representative of the government has asked the court to look at what has actually been written, the content of the publication. I was requested to send more copies of the
AP1 (Applicant): Veropersi magazine to provide accurate conception of its contents.
AP1 (Applicant): In the written submissions in 2014, 2 June, paragraph 39, the government states, and I quote, publishing taxation data, which are published public as such extensively and in an unaltered form, as a record, and without journalistic comments on such data, mainly satisfies the curiosity of readers. End of quotation.
AP1 (Applicant): Also in government submissions 2016, paragraph 70, the government refers to the manner and extent of the applicant's publication.
AP1 (Applicant): Now as I have stated already in writing, I feel that the basic manner of publishing by the applicants has been the same than that of other publishers of taxation data in Finland.
AP1 (Applicant): It's the form of categorized lists of names and of taxable income. As to the extent, there
AP1 (Applicant): is a significant difference. So what did the applicants do wrong? Too much information,
AP1 (Applicant): unedited information, focus on the content of the paper. And the conclusion is not journalistic.
AP1 (Applicant): The consequence is a ban to collect and to process personal data if it's intended to be published. This I would call a de facto proactive ban to a newspaper.
AP1 (Applicant): I must say that Finnish law does not allow prior censorship. There are only very minor
AP1 (Applicant): exceptions to that. Neither does the Personal Data Act, to my interpretation, at least according
AP1 (Applicant): to its preparatory documents. The law was not intended to be applied to information
AP1 (Applicant): that was to be published. That was to be examined in retrospect.
AP1 (Applicant): Now what does this lead to? Can't I just say out or publish a piece of information, even
AP1 (Applicant): of personal data, I have discovered? Do I have to edit it first? And should there be
AP1 (Applicant): a quantitative restriction to how much information can be published? The crucial circumstance
AP1 (Applicant): in the applicants' activities was the quantity of tax data published, as has been duly noted by the minority in the fourth section of your court.
AP1 (Applicant): In November 2009, the Data Protection Board in Finland forbade the companies from collecting tax data insofar that it was to be published in the same quantity that was done in 2001.
AP1 (Applicant): Nothing was mentioned on acceptable quantities, however. Collecting data that was not to be
AP1 (Applicant): published was not forbidden either.
AP1 (Applicant): The learned agent of the government has in his written remarks in paragraph 108 noted that the applicants could have continued publishing if they had changed their activities so as to comply with the Personal Data Act. I have to ask how. They were banned from collecting
AP1 (Applicant): the data they were to publish. As to the manner and extent, no guidelines whatsoever have
AP1 (Applicant): been provided, neither by the data protection ombudsman nor by the domestic courts.
AP1 (Applicant): The data protection ombudsman explicitly stated that the database of taxes and data lacked legal grounds, the database of the applicants lacked legal grounds, and that it was an entirely different matter when traditional media published such information. I refer to annex B1 by the
AP1 (Applicant): government and a letter from the data protection ombudsman annexed as number 3 by the applicants.
AP1 (Applicant): It is an entirely different matter when traditional media publishes taxation data. So are there
AP1 (Applicant): really two separate but unequal categories of publishers in Finland, traditional media and the rest?
AP1 (Applicant): And is this a question on the right to publish taxation data? In paragraph 112 of the written
AP1 (Applicant): submissions of the government, it is said, in perfect accordance with the Supreme Administrative Court, I might add, the matter did not concern the right to publish taxation data as such, but the handling of personal data. My question is, how can you differentiate them in this
AP1 (Applicant): case? If it's personal data that is published, how can you separate them? If one cannot collect
AP1 (Applicant): and process that data one aims to publish, how could one possibly publish it?
AP1 (Applicant): And if the provisions of the Personal Data Act are at the core here, and not at all the overall right to impart information to publish the data, and the result is this, a proactive ban, I would ask, does such applying of the Personal Data Act really comply with the Article 10 of the European Convention of Human Rights?
AP1 (Applicant): Now the criterion is the quantity of data, and to some extent also the editing of it, or absence of that. Now I do have to make the following comparison. This was also referred
AP1 (Applicant): to by the interveners, Article 19 and others. May it please the Court. Mossack Foncheka,
AP1 (Applicant): the Panama Papers. Twelve million individual documents that were obtained unlawfully by
AP1 (Applicant): violating the attorney-client privilege. Pieces of that information have been published, and
AP1 (Applicant): there is, or at least has been, a search engine online with which one can seek information from the entire database. I tried it. Tax administrations of several countries have
AP1 (Applicant): expressed their willingness to buy information from that database. Now the applicants fully
AP1 (Applicant): realize that the right to utilize this data is not to be assessed here, but I do have a point.
AP1 (Applicant): Numerous arguments, excellent ones, have been presented why this data should not be published by the press or utilized by tax administration. I'd like to mention two arguments that have
AP1 (Applicant): so far not been heard. Nobody has yet claimed that this data may not be utilized by the
AP1 (Applicant): press because there is too much of it. And nobody has yet argued that this information
AP1 (Applicant): could not be published because it has not been edited in any way. And my point.
AP1 (Applicant): Conclusively, I'd like to argue that when assessing freedom of expression and the right to impart information, perhaps we should neither hold the quantity of data nor the degree of editing it as suitable criteria at all.
AP1 (Applicant): Concerning the concept of journalism, your court has in its case law duly focused on the accuracy and the bona fide of the actual conduct. Pointing the finger at the content
AP1 (Applicant): is very dangerous and should always be done with extreme caution.
AP1 (Applicant): Now the accuracy of the information published by the applicants has not been questioned.
AP1 (Applicant): Know that they have conducted bona fide. The concept of journalism has so far been utilized
AP1 (Applicant): in this case not as an instrument of recognizing those violations of Article 10 that are most harmful to democracy, but to restrict.
AP1 (Applicant): The concept of journalism as applied in this case turns out to be a gateway to full and complete freedom of expression. If this is accepted, this leads to the next problem.
AP1 (Applicant): Who is to be the gatekeeper? Public administration? Government? I'm sure there are countries not
AP1 (Applicant): so far in which volunteers shall not be hard to find.
AP1 (Applicant): And next I would like to focus on privacy and public interest as opposed to it. As has
AP1 (Applicant): been pointed out by the interveners, Article 19 and others, if personal data is made readily available to public, this presupposes that there is a public interest. In Finland, and
AP1 (Applicant): concerning tax data in particular, this has been expressly stated in the legislative process.
AP1 (Applicant): To that extent, the public interest in publication outweighs the privacy right of citizens. The
AP1 (Applicant): choice has already been made by the legislature.
AP1 (Applicant): At this stage, I would like to point out one, and I might add one quite rare imprecision in the government's written submissions. 31st of March 2016, paragraph 26, with a quotation
AP1 (Applicant): from the government bill. That's the part where the term gossip calendar is mentioned.
AP1 (Applicant): But this particular piece in government's bill refers to the possibility of digitally transferring tax data directly from the tax administration to the media, not to the possibility of publishing such data. As the applicants did collect their data from the public tax
AP1 (Applicant): records manually, this particular possibility of receiving the data directly and digitally is of no relevance here. Neither is the legislative work concerning it.
AP1 (Applicant): Now was there a violation of privacy? The government has referred to people who have
AP1 (Applicant): contacted the Data Protection Ombudsman's office concerning my client's newspaper.
AP1 (Applicant): I refer to Annex 2. First of all, there are contacts, numerous contacts that appear to
AP1 (Applicant): be from the same people who, for some reason, are active in the matter. Secondly, I fail
AP1 (Applicant): to see how such a contact that is listed shows that there was a violation of the privacy of these people or that of somebody else. The nature of the alleged violations have
AP1 (Applicant): not been elaborated. I would also like to refer to the Data Protection
AP1 (Applicant): Ombudsman's findings in government's Annex B1, in which the Data Protection Ombudsman replied to one of these very persons that had contacted him. He replied that he saw
AP1 (Applicant): no violation of privacy that would supersede freedom of expression. That person's taxable
AP1 (Applicant): income had been in the online search machine upheld by Helsingin Sanomat. By that online
AP1 (Applicant): service, one was able to receive desired tax data concerning individuals, quite like in the SMS service upheld by the applicants, albeit that there again is a significant difference in quantity of the data contained. No violations of anybody's privacy have been
AP1 (Applicant): presented. What would even be the violation or the harm done by the applicants? People
AP1 (Applicant): receive information they could easily obtain also elsewhere. What is the significant difference?
AP1 (Applicant): If one leaves through Veropersi or some other paper, one receives an SMS message or makes a phone call to tax administration. In any case, one may obtain the taxation data concerning
AP1 (Applicant): the desired certain individual. Insofar, the choice between protection of privacy and the
AP1 (Applicant): right to access taxation data as well as to publish it is made in law. And the applicant's
AP1 (Applicant): view is that there is neither need nor legal ground to choose again.
AP1 (Applicant): A couple of remarks concerning the applicant's claims of just satisfaction. Firstly, referring
AP1 (Applicant): to the causal link concerning the damages and the proposed violation of the applicant's fundamental rights. With the risk of oversimplifying this, I'd like to make this in five undeniable
AP1 (Applicant): points. One, the applicants used to publish a newspaper, and together with the teleoperator
AP1 (Applicant): company, they had an SMS service. Two, these activities brought income to the applicants.
AP1 (Applicant): Three, the applicants were banned from collecting and processing tax data to these purposes.
AP1 (Applicant): Four, the applicants complied to the ban. Five, the seized activities no longer brought
AP1 (Applicant): income. I do see an obvious causal link there.
AP1 (Applicant): As to the amount of damages presented, the representative of the government has noted in paragraph 173 that the proof provided, which is an affidavit by my client's accountant, does not suffice in the absence of the actual account books and other such material. The
AP1 (Applicant): entire books, seriously. The registry of this court has already had more than its fair share
AP1 (Applicant): of work with this case.
AP1 (Applicant): Now the statement, the affidavit, is based on the bookkeeping. And there's just one remark
AP1 (Applicant): I'd like to add. The financial statements and balance sheets of corporations are matters
AP1 (Applicant): of public record in Finland. This is data that anybody can have access to. That is even
AP1 (Applicant): easier than getting the taxes and data of individuals, if possible.
AP1 (Applicant): The corporate financial statements are taken into the company register, out of which the government has provided data even in this case. The learned representative of the government
AP1 (Applicant): has not denied the accuracy of these numbers. He just said that the applicants did not provide
AP1 (Applicant): enough data to support these numbers. Again, allow me to say this, a question of quantity.
AP1 (Applicant): But I have no doubt in my mind if there had actually been any inaccuracies in these numbers.
AP1 (Applicant): The perceptive representatives of the government would have denied their accuracy. They did
AP1 (Applicant): not. The numbers are accurate.
AP1 (Applicant): Finally I'd like to present some conclusive remarks. I'd like to refer the court's attention
AP1 (Applicant): to two causes of development concerning freedom of expression. The first one is somewhat promising,
AP1 (Applicant): and the second one is somewhat worrying. The first ongoing cause of development is the
AP1 (Applicant): evolution of new forms of mass media that may distinguish from traditional journalism.
AP1 (Applicant): Forms of new media develop towards dealing with ever larger masses of information and also exchanging such masses. The Internet has had the effect that media has expanded
AP1 (Applicant): outside the scope from the traditional press. This has been convincingly pointed out by
AP1 (Applicant): the intervening parties.
AP1 (Applicant): European Information Society in its intervention particularly pointed out that the scale at which information is submitted can as such be valuable. Quantity could be good after
AP1 (Applicant): all. As is stated by the European Information Society, the judgment in this case could have
AP1 (Applicant): consequences on even forthcoming data processing and information publishing technologies, such means and technologies that do not even exist yet.
AP1 (Applicant): These technologies may even play a more important role in imparting information than the traditional journalistic activities. The Grand Chamber's ruling in this case might affect even these
AP1 (Applicant): forthcoming forms of mass media. And as the intervening parties have noted, it is desirable
AP1 (Applicant): to rather encourage than to restrict these developing and forthcoming forms of media.
AP1 (Applicant): The second ongoing course of development is the increasing threats of freedom of expression, even in its traditional form. Freedom of expression is not just some right for an individual to
AP1 (Applicant): speak his mind or a right of another individual to hear this. It's that too, of course, but
AP1 (Applicant): it's so much more. History has shown us that when fundamental human rights are threatened,
AP1 (Applicant): freedom of expression tends to be the first target. It's the cornerstone that secures
AP1 (Applicant): the rest of the building. Even the other fundamental rights are guarded by it.
AP1 (Applicant): At present, we see threats towards freedom of expression increasing and becoming geographically closer to us than they have been in decades. I could imagine heads of state not so far