TrustHLT/LaCour huggingface dataset:
GR1 (Government): The court also explicitly mentioned and discussed the impact of Article 6, Paragraph 3 of the Convention on the proceedings.
GR1 (Government): Furthermore, there were a number of corroborative elements which added to the overall picture.
GR1 (Government): There were statements by other witnesses about the events on the night of the incident.
GR1 (Government): There were mobile phone and GPS data showing the presence of the applicant and his accomplices in the immediate vicinity of the witness's apartment at the precise time of the crime.
GR1 (Government): In fact, right at the end of the trial, when it became clear that his presence in the apartment at the relevant time was beyond any doubt, the applicant himself admitted as much.
GR1 (Government): And then he came up with a story.
GR1 (Government): He stated that he wanted to spend a nice evening with his friend and two prostitutes, when suddenly one of the prostitutes, for whatever reason, became nervous and jumped off the balcony, which was two meters high.
GR1 (Government): He further said that he jumped and ran after the woman because he had had trouble with prostitutes in Kassel and was afraid that she would alarm the police.
GR1 (Government): That was his description of events.
GR1 (Government): The conversations obtained by phone tapping, which were reported and discussed at great length in the judgment, however, lent support to ONP's version of events rather than to that of the applicant.
GR1 (Government): In fact, they fit the ONP's version like a glove.
GR1 (Government): In any case, they represent very strong supporting evidence.
GR1 (Government): The judgment of the regional court runs to more than 150 pages, as I've said.
GR1 (Government): This shows in what detail and how carefully the court analyzed the evidence and weighed the relevant factors.
GR1 (Government): Nonetheless, another key question for the regional court was necessarily whether ONP were credible.
GR1 (Government): Judge Powerford voiced doubts about that in her separate opinion.
GR1 (Government): However, I submit that these doubts were based on several misunderstandings on her part.
GR1 (Government): Contrary to Judge Powerford's assumption, ONP were, in fact, lawfully resident in Germany.
GR1 (Government): And their occupation was, surprising as it may be, legal.
GR1 (Government): Actually, the police report describes them as law-abiding people, exactly what Judge Powerford claims they were not.
GR1 (Government): The corroborative statements were not, as Judge Powerford had it, given by unidentified neighbors.
GR1 (Government): Rather, they were well-documented and thoroughly evaluated in the judgment.
GR1 (Government): This again demonstrates the danger of the court in Strasbourg attempting to substitute its own view of the facts, of which it can necessarily only have preliminary knowledge, for that of the local court, which has seen the evidence at first hand.
GR1 (Government): The local court came to the conclusion that, even bearing in mind the reduced value of the evidence, the overall picture of the events was sufficiently clear to not leave any doubt, and I concur.
GR1 (Government): We submit that this thorough evaluation of the evidence in full awareness of the applicant's rights under the convention led to the right conclusion that it amounted to a fair trial.
GR1 (Government): This brings us again to the Al-Khawaja judgment.
GR1 (Government): In that case, the court underlined the fact that its first and foremost task under Article VI of the convention is to evaluate the overall fairness of the proceedings by looking at the criminal proceedings as a whole.
GR1 (Government): There can, in our view, be no doubt that the proceedings in Göttingen seen as a whole were fair.
GR1 (Government): the final question that the Grand Chamber should ask is, looking at the proceedings as a whole, should the applicant have been acquitted?
GR1 (Government): Are there really any doubts about the applicant's guilt or about the fairness of the proceedings?
GR1 (Government): I fear that if the court came to that conclusion, that would send the message that intimidation of witnesses, if forceful enough, can actually succeed.
GR1 (Government): And on a more general note, the principle of the Al-Khawaja and Tahiri judgment that the court will look at the overall fairness of the proceedings must stand.
GR1 (Government): The court should resist the temptation to use the convention to export rules of evidence, which are particular to a certain procedural system, into fundamentally different legal systems.
GR1 (Government): This is not the function of the convention.
Dean Spielmann (JudgeP): I now turn to the judges to ask me the questions.
Dean Spielmann (JudgeP): And Judge Hirvelä and Judge Luis López Guerra.
Päivi Hirvelä (Judge): I have two questions to the government.
Päivi Hirvelä (Judge): And my first question is, what is the reason for not ordering the counsel to the applicant during the witness interrogation by the investigating judge?
Päivi Hirvelä (Judge): And the reason for my question is the national law, since according to the Code of Criminal Procedure, Article 141, the Defense Counsel, in the circumstances of the case, in my understanding, was mandatory during the preliminary proceedings.
Päivi Hirvelä (Judge): And my second question, I understood from the government's submission today that the investigating judge had a good reason to exclude both the applicant and the counsel from the witness hearing, since they endangered the purpose of the hearing.
Päivi Hirvelä (Judge): However, we can read from the Code of Criminal Procedure, Article 168C, that the prosecutor accused and the defense counsel shall be permitted to be present during the judicial examination of a witness by the investigating judge.
Päivi Hirvelä (Judge): However, the judge may exclude the accused from being present at the hearing if his presence would endanger the purpose of the investigation.
Päivi Hirvelä (Judge): But the law does not speak of the counsel at all in this respect.
Päivi Hirvelä (Judge): And my question is, if the counsel were ordered at that stage, what would have been the legal basis to exclude the counsel from the witness hearing?
Päivi Hirvelä (Judge): And my aim with this both question is to clarify the legal basis for the interrogation and whether it was carried according to the national law.
Dean Spielmann (JudgeP): Thank you, Judge López Guerra.
Luis López Guerra (Judge): My question is put to both parties, the applicant and the government.
Luis López Guerra (Judge): It results from the dossier that during the time of the facts, object of the judgment of the Göttingen court, that is during the 3rd of February, and also when the witnesses O and P gave a declaration to the investigating judge, that is the 19th of February, both witnesses O and P were illegally in Germany.
Luis López Guerra (Judge): And they left Germany very shortly after the declaration to the investigating judge.
Luis López Guerra (Judge): In the written observations of the applicant before this Grand Chamber, it is maintained that the witnesses O and P may have failed to attend the trial because they could have rendered themselves liable to prosecution in Germany for unauthorized entry and residence, and therefore they feared arrest.
Luis López Guerra (Judge): My question is, when the witnesses O and P made the declaration before the investigating judge, that is around the 19th of February, could they also, or reasonably, have feared or have suspected that they were liable to arrest or any other form of restrictive or punitive measure if they remained in Germany?
Luis López Guerra (Judge): I say that because also the regional judge, according to the paragraph 25 of the Chamber of Judgment, the regional court in Göttingen explained that minor contradiction in the statement of the witnesses could be explained by their concern not to disclose their illegal residence status and activities to authorities.
Luis López Guerra (Judge): And also it seems the court considered that the witnesses maybe had failed problems with the police because of the situation of illegal residence.
Luis López Guerra (Judge): So in sum, the question would be, it would have been reasonable to presume or to suspect that the witnesses would leave Germany shortly after the declaration by fear of any police or judicial measure against them.
Dean Spielmann (JudgeP): Any other question?
Dean Spielmann (JudgeP): No. So we will have a short break and we will resume the hearing at 10.45.
Dean Spielmann (JudgeP): The hearing is resumed, so I give the floor to Mr. Meyer-Mews, Bitte sehr.
AP1 (Applicant): Herr Präsident, hohes Gericht, wenn ich das richtig sehe, richtet sich nur eine Frage an den Beschwerdeführer, und das ist die Frage, welche Repressalien, welche Gefahren die Zeugen zu erwarten hatten, weil sie sich möglicherweise illegal in Deutschland aufgehalten haben.
AP1 (Applicant): Ich glaube, dass die Frage des illegalen Aufenthalts, also etwa die Frage, ob lettische Staatsangehörige zum damaligen Zeitpunkt des Friereniveaus im Jahr 2006 schon EU-Freizügigkeit genossen haben, ich glaube, dass das dahinstehen kann.
AP1 (Applicant): Fest steht Folgendes.
AP1 (Applicant): Die beiden Zeuginnen O und P waren nicht das erste Mal in Deutschland, um der Prostitution nachzugehen.
AP1 (Applicant): Die Prostitution war 2006 schon legal in Deutschland.
AP1 (Applicant): Das ist unbestritten.
AP1 (Applicant): Aber sie waren nicht das erste Mal hier.
AP1 (Applicant): Sie sind, sie haben keinen Gewerber angemeldet, sie haben hier keine Steuern bezahlt.
AP1 (Applicant): Sie sind sozusagen nicht auf der ordnungsgemäßen Art und Weise nach Deutschland eingereist.
AP1 (Applicant): Und selbstverständlich ist es so, das erleben wir drei als Anwälte, die wir auch im Ausländerrecht tätig sind, was die Kollegen Lamm und Rotter angeht.
AP1 (Applicant): Und ich bin in der Vergangenheit im Ausländerrecht tätig gewesen.
AP1 (Applicant): Wir erleben das immer wieder, dass Prostituierte in Abschiebungshaft genommen werden, weil sie jedenfalls nicht zum Zwecke der nicht Angemeldeten der illegalen Prostitution hier nach Deutschland einreisen durften.
AP1 (Applicant): Sie dürfen als EU-Bürger einreisen, um Dienstleistungen zu erbringen, legale Dienstleistungen nach den innerstaatlichen Regeln oder Dienstleistungen in Empfang zu nehmen, also beispielsweise, um sich ärztlich behandeln zu lassen.
AP1 (Applicant): Das dürfen sie, alles andere dürfen sie nicht.
AP1 (Applicant): Also insofern denke ich, es ist schon eine besondere Situation, dass diese Zeugen nicht in Haft genommen worden sind.
AP1 (Applicant): Man kann sich auch vorstellen, dass das unter anderen Umständen, wenn es diese Tat nicht gegeben hätte, möglicherweise der Fall gewesen wäre.
AP1 (Applicant): Das ist eigentlich das, was ich zu der Frage sagen kann.
AP1 (Applicant): Ich möchte die Gelegenheit benutzen und noch einen Hinweis geben.
AP1 (Applicant): Die Zeuginnen konnten in der Hauptverhandlung nicht vernommen werden, aus dem einfachen Grund, weil sie sich nicht vernehmen lassen wollten und weil das, da sie nicht in Deutschland aufhältig sind, nicht durchsetzbar gewesen ist.
AP1 (Applicant): Das kann man nach deutschem Recht nicht durchsetzen.
AP1 (Applicant): Man kann versuchen, diese Zeuginnen in ihrem Heimatland nach dem Rechtshilfeübereinkommen zu vernehmen.
AP1 (Applicant): Und das ist, der Vertreter der Bundesregierung hat darauf hingewiesen, gründlich schiefgegangen.
AP1 (Applicant): Das hat nicht geklappt.
AP1 (Applicant): Die Zeuginnen haben sich nicht so verhalten, wie das deutsche Strafverfahrensrecht von Zeugen verlangt.
AP1 (Applicant): Und ich möchte eine Kontrollüberlegung anregen.
AP1 (Applicant): Der Gerichtshof möge sich mal überlegen, was wohl passiert wäre, wenn es sich um Entlastungs- oder um Zeugen handelt, ich sage es mal so, wenn es sich um Zeugen handelt, die den Angeklagten belasten können, aber nicht möchten.
AP1 (Applicant): Ob in einer solchen Situation etwa Maßnahmen des Zeugenschutzes oder des Ausschlusses etwa der Staatsanwaltschaft stattgefunden hat.
AP1 (Applicant): Man könnte darüber nachdenken, dass man sagt, na gut, wenn du dich jetzt selber belasten müsstest, dann sagst du jetzt der Zeuge aus, wir lassen aber den Staatsanwalt vorne weg.
AP1 (Applicant): Der kommt hier nicht in die Vernehmung rein, damit dir nichts passiert.
AP1 (Applicant): Das passiert ja auch nicht.
AP1 (Applicant): Der Zeuge, der belasten ist gegen den Angeklagten Aussagen kann oder gegen den Beschuldigten und das nicht möchte, der Zeuge hat Repressalien zu erwarten.
AP1 (Applicant): Und insofern gibt es hier eine ganz, ganz unterschiedliche Behandlung, die auch mit Waffengleichheit nicht viel zu tun hat.
AP1 (Applicant): Ich danke Ihnen für Ihre Aufmerksamkeit.
Dean Spielmann (JudgeP): Danke schön.
Dean Spielmann (JudgeP): Herr Behrens oder wer will das doch ergreifen? Herr Behrens, bitte sehr.
GR1 (Government): I would like to come to the questions put to the government.
GR1 (Government): First, the questions put by Judge Huberli.
GR1 (Government): The question of mandatory appointment of counsel.
GR1 (Government): Section 141 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, in its first subparagraph, mentions the mandatory appointment of defense counsel at the stage where there is an indictment.
GR1 (Government): It is mandatory when the accused is indicted, at that point in the proceedings.
GR1 (Government): During the investigative stage, defense counsel may be appointed.
GR1 (Government): That is subsection 3 of section 141.
GR1 (Government): So it is not mandatory at that stage.
GR1 (Government): It is a possibility.
GR1 (Government): The section 168C of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that the defense counsel shall be permitted to be present during judicial examination.
GR1 (Government): However, if you look at subsection 5 of that section, that reads in our official translation, the persons entitled to be present shall be given prior notice of the dates set down for the hearings.
GR1 (Government): And then the second sentence reads, the notification shall be dispensed with if it endangers the success of the investigation.
GR1 (Government): That's the legal basis why there was no notice to anyone during the investigative phase of the hearing before the investigating judge.
GR1 (Government): Coming to the question of Judge López-Guerra, the court in Göttingen, when they were saying that the witnesses may have been afraid of getting into trouble with the police, was discussing the question, why didn't they go to the police immediately after the crime?
GR1 (Government): And at that stage, I agree, the witnesses, as I said, may have been afraid that they were in some way illegally acting and that they might run into trouble.
GR1 (Government): But once their friend, who had the same experience in Kassel, had persuaded them and actually given the police notice of the crime, on the 12th, the police came to the apartment and we have submitted the protocol of that search.
GR1 (Government): It was not a search, it was a visit to the apartment.
GR1 (Government): The police officer noted that there was no indication of any illegal activity, neither residence nor occupation.
GR1 (Government): He noted that in the protocol and the witnesses were aware of that.
GR1 (Government): They were aware that the police was not going to give them any trouble about what they were doing or why they were staying there.
GR1 (Government): So on the 14th, before any of the hearings, before the police and the investigating judge took place, it was clear to them they would not run into any trouble with the German police.
GR1 (Government): So, of course, it's clear that you have to ask the question, why didn't they go to the police immediately after the crime?
GR1 (Government): But I think that's easily understandable, given the whole situation.
GR1 (Government): I would also like to say one or two words about the cases mentioned, Piers and Hümmer, which are rather different from this one.
GR1 (Government): In those cases, we were not dealing with intimidation of witnesses.
GR1 (Government): They were dealing with situations where family members didn't want to testify, which is a quite different situation and cannot be compared to a procedural situation as we have it here.
Dean Spielmann (JudgeP): Anyone else?
Dean Spielmann (JudgeP): Thank you for your interventions.
Dean Spielmann (JudgeP): I would now like to invite the...
Dean Spielmann (JudgeP): We have now come also to the end of the hearing, and I thank the parties for their interventions and answers to the court's questions.
Dean Spielmann (JudgeP): Now, the court will deliberate on the merits, and the judgment will be delivered later.
Guido Raimondi (JudgeP): Je déclare ouverte l'audience publique sur le fonds de l'affaire Bărbulescu contre la Roumanie.
Guido Raimondi (JudgeP): L'affaire a été introduite devant la Cour le 15 décembre 2008 par un ressortissant roumain, M. Bogdan Mihai Bărbulescu,
Guido Raimondi (JudgeP): Elle a été attribuée à la 4e section de la Cour conformément à l'article 52, paragraphe 1 du règlement de la Cour.
Guido Raimondi (JudgeP): Le 12 janvier 2016, une chambre de la 4e section a rendu un arrêt dans l'affaire.
Guido Raimondi (JudgeP): Dans celui-ci, la chambre a déclaré la requête recevable en ce qui concerne le grief tiré de l'article 8 de la Convention et irrecevable pour le surplus.
Guido Raimondi (JudgeP): La chambre a conclu en non-violation de l'article 8 de la Convention.
Guido Raimondi (JudgeP): Le 12 avril 2016, la partie requérante a demandé le renvoi de l'affaire devant la Grande Chambre conformément à l'article 43 de la Convention.
Guido Raimondi (JudgeP): Cette demande a été acceptée par le Collège de la Grande Chambre le 6 juin 2016.
Guido Raimondi (JudgeP): Le 30 août et le 2 septembre 2016, respectivement, le gouvernement français et la Confédération européenne et la Confédération européenne des syndicats ont été autorisés à intervenir en qualité de tiers dans la procédure écrite en vertu de l'article 44, paragraphe 3 du règlement.
Guido Raimondi (JudgeP): Le gouvernement défendeur est représenté par son agente, Mme Catrinel Brumar, du ministère des Affaires étrangères, assistée de M. George-Virgil Gavrilă, conseil,
Guido Raimondi (JudgeP): et par Mme Livia Alexandrina Rusu, conseillère.
Guido Raimondi (JudgeP): Le requérant est représenté par M. Emeric Domokos-Hâncu
Guido Raimondi (JudgeP): et Ovidiu Juverdeanu, conseil.
Guido Raimondi (JudgeP): Je salue également les juges de la Cour de cassation française et de la Cour suprême de Moldova, ainsi que le magistrat norvégien, polonais, suisse et turc en visite à la Cour.
Guido Raimondi (JudgeP): Je dois expliquer qu'en-dessus de l'interprétation dans les deux langues officielles de la Cour, l'anglais et le français, l'interprétation en polonais et en turc a été autorisée au profit du groupe de magistrats polonais et turcs qui assistent à cette audience.
Guido Raimondi (JudgeP): Cette interprétation n'est pas assurée par la Cour, ne fera donc pas partie de l'enregistrement officiel de la procédure.
Guido Raimondi (JudgeP): Ayant consulté l'agente du gouvernement et les représentants du requérant, j'ai fixé ainsi l'ordre de parole.
Guido Raimondi (JudgeP): Nous entendrons successivement maître Domokos-Hâncu et Juverdeanu pour le requérant, puis madame Brumar et madame Gavrilă pour le gouvernement.
Guido Raimondi (JudgeP): La parole est à maître Domokos-Hâncu.
Guido Raimondi (JudgeP): Vous avez la parole maître, je vouse en pris.
AP1 (Applicant): Mr. President and honorable judges,
AP1 (Applicant): it is an honor to be here today, but also a great responsibility as lawyers who strongly believe in the values that are the sacred goals of your mission, values which should always prevail over injustice and unfairness.
AP1 (Applicant): Our mission today is also to determine a clear guideline for every kind of situation in the future that will imply the private life in the workplace, so easily to be interfered with by the employer, especially when using modern ways of communication.
AP1 (Applicant): Our cases raise some fundamental questions.
AP1 (Applicant): Is spying in the workplace allowed?
AP1 (Applicant): Would anyone like their private communication violated without consent and for the single reason that it occurred during working hours?
AP1 (Applicant): Or would anyone like their private communication violated for the purpose of sustaining a previously decided termination of the labor agreement and for the sole reason to sustain such dismissal?
AP1 (Applicant): Or how Professor Pierce put it in a well-documented opinion, expressed also over the internet, is work privacy dead?
AP1 (Applicant): When considering what to say here today before the court, we thought we would present the case as Judge Pinto said it in the dissenting opinion, like an opportunity, like an opportunity for the court to set standards as to work privacy and protection of communication that occurred during working hours.
AP1 (Applicant): But this case is much more than setting standards.
AP1 (Applicant): Because such standards already exist.
AP1 (Applicant): Because such standards are already provided by the previous case law of the court.
AP1 (Applicant): So now we are here to enforce the standards, to further refine the standards, but taking into consideration the realities of modern communication through the internet.
AP1 (Applicant): So this case is before anything else about enforcing the standard and the correct application of Article 8 of the Convention.
AP1 (Applicant): This case is also a chance to protect the fundamental private life in face of ad hoc, non-transparent internet surveillance in the workplace.
AP1 (Applicant): It's about sanctioning an abuse and about serving justice, even if it's in the ultimate instance.
AP1 (Applicant): It's also about the state failing to protect Mr. Barbulescu's fundamental human right
AP1 (Applicant): to private life, including privacy of his personal communication and protection of personal data.
AP1 (Applicant): It is also the best occasion for the court to further develop its case law in the field of privacy with regard to employees' internet communication in an ever-changing world where the line between personal and work communication is shrinking continuously and can be diluted until there is none.
AP1 (Applicant): And finally, it is a chance to say no to spying in the work relationship and thus support healthy development of human relationships in the workplace.
AP1 (Applicant): On the other hand, this case is not, and I emphasize, is not about protecting any fundamental right of the employer.
AP1 (Applicant): And in any circumstance, any fundamental right of the employer that could prevail over the fundamental human right to privacy.
AP1 (Applicant): Finally, this is a case of many.
AP1 (Applicant): As we said it even from the beginning, workers do not abandon their right to privacy every time they walk through the doorstep of the workplace.
AP1 (Applicant): On the other hand, workers have a legitimate expectation that a substantial degree of privacy exists in the workplace.
AP1 (Applicant): And why?
AP1 (Applicant): Because they develop a significant part of their relationship in the workplace.
AP1 (Applicant): I wonder if there is anybody here that does not develop human relationships in the workplace.
AP1 (Applicant): On this road, we will firstly show that both the fundamental human right to private life as well as access to internet have been previously acknowledged by the court and significantly developed by the court.
AP1 (Applicant): Secondly, we will show that the principles set out in the working document on the surveillance and the monitoring of electronic communication in the workplace have not been observed.
AP1 (Applicant): As the monitoring in this case was not transparent, was not necessary, was not fair towards Mr. Borbulescu,
AP1 (Applicant): and by no means was proportional with any interest it tried to balance.
AP1 (Applicant): Thirdly, we will show a personal view over the case, coming from the first voice of the first advocate in this case.
AP1 (Applicant): This voice is crucial to the case.