TrustHLT/LaCour huggingface dataset:
AP2 (Applicant): in the present case, the freedom of a Muslim of race to opt for the civil law or not to be deprived from access to civil law, in accordance to the convention and other human rights instruments, is essential for the whole legal and political framework that civic citizenship entails, namely, a global equality of citizens before the law, beyond origin or religion.
AP2 (Applicant): The Court of Cassation does undermine the legitimate expectation of the applicant that fundamental norms of rule of law are universally applicable.
AP2 (Applicant): This is why the applicant's right to fair proceedings and to enjoy the inherited properties have been violated on the basis of discriminatory treatment.
AP2 (Applicant): Last, with regard to justice satisfaction claims, according to Article 41, we refer to the claims presented already in our observations.
AP2 (Applicant): In addition to them, we need to add expenses with regard to the present hearing that we have already submitted to the registry.
Guido Raimondi (JudgeP): Thank you very much, Professor Tsitselikis.
Guido Raimondi (JudgeP): And now, thank you to both parties for their submissions.
Guido Raimondi (JudgeP): And now I invite my colleagues, the judges of the Grand Chamber, to put before the parties the questions they have.
Guido Raimondi (JudgeP): Judge Sicilianos, please.
Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos (Judge): C'est une question qui s'adresse principalement au gouvernement.
Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos (Judge): Dans l'arrêt litigieux, la Cour de cassation a affirmé sans plus d'éléments la compatibilité du traité d'Athènes avec la Convention européenne des droits de l'homme.
Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos (Judge): Ma question est la suivante.
Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos (Judge): Est-ce qu'il y a d'autres arrêts dans l'ordre juridique hélénique qui approfondissent cette question de compatibilité entre le traité d'Athènes et la Convention?
Guido Raimondi (JudgeP): Merci beaucoup, juge Nußberger.
Angelika Nußberger (Judge): I would have three questions.
Angelika Nußberger (Judge): The first question, I understand if our applicant had not been a Muslim but a Christian Orthodox, it would be the same situation as long as she is married to a Muslim.
Angelika Nußberger (Judge): So a mixed marriage would not make a difference.
Angelika Nußberger (Judge): But if you now turn the situation around and the applicant would not be a woman but a man, and she would make a will, and she had also two sisters, so the same situation as we have here but changing the sexes.
Angelika Nußberger (Judge): If she then dies, I understand that the will would probably also be invalid.
Angelika Nußberger (Judge): But what would then be the exact percentage what the husband would inherit?
Angelika Nußberger (Judge): The applicant's lawyer said it would be higher.
Angelika Nußberger (Judge): But I would like to know, would it be?
Angelika Nußberger (Judge): Now it's one quarter.
Angelika Nußberger (Judge): So what exactly would it be?
Angelika Nußberger (Judge): How would it be calculated?
Angelika Nußberger (Judge): My second question is about the role of the notary public.
Angelika Nußberger (Judge): The applicant's lawyer said that there are many wills drafted in front of a notary public in this region.
Angelika Nußberger (Judge): So I understand that the notary public is a legal expert.
Angelika Nußberger (Judge): So doesn't he have a duty to give advice, to say, to inform about the Court of Cassation's jurisprudence holding wills in this way invalid and warning them that this might be the consequence?
Angelika Nußberger (Judge): And could there have been a possibility for designing the inheritance rights in a way that the woman would become 100% heir?
Angelika Nußberger (Judge): And my last question is, so we also have the two sisters in the whole family situation.
Angelika Nußberger (Judge): So I understand these two sisters had a legitimate expectation to be heirs of their brother.
Angelika Nußberger (Judge): So if now the lower court's judgment had become final, what about the legitimate expectation of the sisters?
Angelika Nußberger (Judge): Wouldn't that be also sort of an expropriation concerning their legitimate expectation to become heirs of their brother under Sharia law?
Guido Raimondi (JudgeP): Judge Laffranque, please.
Julia Laffranque (Judge): Thank you very much, Mr. President.
Julia Laffranque (Judge): And I thank the parties for their observations.
Julia Laffranque (Judge): There seems to be at least an agreement as far as the international treaties, or in particular the Lausanne Treaty, is concerned that it does not mandate the application of sharia law.
Julia Laffranque (Judge): And also, the Article 43 of the Lausanne Treaty stresses the balance between the respect of minorities on the one hand and the order public on the other hand.
Julia Laffranque (Judge): And my question is related to the legal certainty in this case, and also to a certain extent to the legitimate expectations.
Julia Laffranque (Judge): It's more directed to the government, but of course the applicant is also there to answer if she so wishes.
Julia Laffranque (Judge): The draft law that has been explained by the government and that has been sent very recently to the parliament is there to resolve the uncertainty, as was said also this morning.
Julia Laffranque (Judge): At the same time, the government argues that the applicant should have known that in her case, the sharia law will apply.
Julia Laffranque (Judge): So my question is that the government stresses that there was never a reference made to the applicant's own religion in the reasonings of the judgments.
Julia Laffranque (Judge): However, if I read the judgments, the courts said that it is about succession relations between Muslims, and they have jurisdiction between Muslims, the muftis.
Julia Laffranque (Judge): So this is, for instance, said also at the Court of Appeal of Trusse, the second judgment after the Supreme Court judgment when the case came back to the appealed court in 2015.
Julia Laffranque (Judge): So the government says that the plan reformed is to strengthen the protection of the rights of the members of Muslim minority, and mostly women and children.
Julia Laffranque (Judge): But at the same time, the government says that it is not about the religion or the gender of the applicant.
Julia Laffranque (Judge): So Judge Nußberger has touched upon this, but if the applicant would have been a Greek national of other confession, let's say Greek Orthodox, would then the will of her Muslim husband still be invalid in this case?
Julia Laffranque (Judge): And also, if and to what point if the late husband would have explicitly withdrawn from the Muslim will, as the government also said, what does it actually mean?
Julia Laffranque (Judge): Because it's not known to the court that there exist any expressive verbal stipulations in Greek legislation concerning the withdrawal in beforehand from the Muslim will.
Julia Laffranque (Judge): And are there any case law, is there any case law of the national courts where they have stressed that this is possible, or has this occurred?
Julia Laffranque (Judge): Because the government also says that the husband had any right, as long as he lived, to transfer validly and duly all his property to his wife.
Julia Laffranque (Judge): But that would have meant probably to have a gift, to give a gift to his wife or something else.
Julia Laffranque (Judge): But would have that otherwise also not been covered by the Muslim law if we were taking the jurisprudence of the court of cassation?
Julia Laffranque (Judge): So this is the question.
Julia Laffranque (Judge): As far as the second question is concerned, it is about the legitimate expectation.
Julia Laffranque (Judge): The legitimate expectation on the one hand of the applicant, and on the other hand of the sisters of the deceased husband, and the relation to what I have just asked as a first question concerning the legal certainty and the foreseeability, and concerning the fact that there seems to be not a problem concerning the interpretation of the treaties as such, but interpretation of the treaties by the jurisdictions, by the different jurisdictions.
Julia Laffranque (Judge): The applicant has in its observations in paragraph 27 said that the sisters had already inherited their parents, their deceased parents, according to the succession rules provided by the civil law.
Julia Laffranque (Judge): And my question is then about the legitimate expectations of the sisters, because they already had inherited in one case according to the civil law.
Julia Laffranque (Judge): And what would have been then their expectations, whether in this time it would have been civil law or sharia law that would have been applied?
Julia Laffranque (Judge): Thank you very much.
Guido Raimondi (JudgeP): Thank you very much, Judge Koskelo.
Pauliine Koskelo (Judge): My question perhaps overlaps to some extent some of the previous questions.
Pauliine Koskelo (Judge): But I would like to have a clarification from both parties, if possible, regarding the decisive reason why the will was declared invalid.
Pauliine Koskelo (Judge): I understand from the Court of Cassation's judgment that the Court of Cassation referred to the category of the property in question, that it was held in full ownership or the mulki type of property.
Pauliine Koskelo (Judge): So was this the reason why the will was declared invalid?
Pauliine Koskelo (Judge): Or was the reason, did it have to do with who was the beneficiary of the will?
Pauliine Koskelo (Judge): I think from the applicant's side, we heard that she lost the inheritance because she was a Muslim wife.
Pauliine Koskelo (Judge): So it is not entirely clear to me what was really the reason.
Pauliine Koskelo (Judge): Was it the type of property in question?
Pauliine Koskelo (Judge): Or was it the question, who was the beneficiary?
Pauliine Koskelo (Judge): What if the beneficiary had been someone else, a third person, not a family member at all?
Pauliine Koskelo (Judge): Would the will have been valid or invalid?
Paul Lemmens (Judge): I have two questions relating to the prohibition of discrimination.
Paul Lemmens (Judge): The first question is addressed specifically to the government.
Paul Lemmens (Judge): The government have replied to the questions by the court in two ways.
Paul Lemmens (Judge): In the first place, they answered with respect to Article 6, taken alone or in combination with Article 14.
Paul Lemmens (Judge): And in the second place, they argued with respect to Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.
Paul Lemmens (Judge): And the conclusion of the government was that that article is not applicable.
Paul Lemmens (Judge): And I assume that that is the reason why Article 14 did not come into the discussion.
Paul Lemmens (Judge): The applicant, however, has also mentioned Article 14 in combination with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.
Paul Lemmens (Judge): My question to the government is, can we assume that the arguments relating to Article 14, relating to Article 6, would also apply to Article 14 in combination with Article 1, Protocol No. 1, if that latter article would be applicable?
Paul Lemmens (Judge): And the second question is one to both parties.
Paul Lemmens (Judge): When we are dealing with discrimination issues, the case law of the court is that a treatment – a difference of treatment is discriminatory if it has no objective and reasonable justification.
Paul Lemmens (Judge): In other words, if it does not pursue a legitimate aim or if there is not a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be realized.
Paul Lemmens (Judge): We have heard something about the legitimate aim, but not so much about the reasonable relationship of proportionality.
Paul Lemmens (Judge): Something has been said about it, but I would like to invite the parties to say more how they see this issue of proportionality.
Robert Spano (Judge): Just one, there have been many questions, so I want to pose one question, which is related to the question just posed by Judge Lemmens, and it relates to the applicability of Article I of Protocol I.
Robert Spano (Judge): The applicants are making a claim of discrimination, so they are inviting the court to apply Article XIV in conjunction with Article I of Protocol I.
Robert Spano (Judge): In the pleadings of the parties, both in the applicants' and government's observations, there is a debate on whether there is an adequate recognition at domestic level of any kind of property rights.
Robert Spano (Judge): We're talking about the three-fourths which the applicant loses because of the application of Sharia law.
Robert Spano (Judge): And there is a debate on whether there was a legitimate expectation.
Robert Spano (Judge): May I, however, ask both parties to focus here on a different line of case law, which is in discrimination claims of this sort, we are asking ourselves the court whether but for the condition applied, that is the application of Sharia law, the person in question would have had the benefit afforded to him.
Robert Spano (Judge): So I'm asking you not to focus on, if you may, on whether the property right existed or not, which is one line of case law, but the line of case law in discrimination type cases of property rights, where we're asking ourselves whether the mere fact that a condition has been applied in a discriminatory manner and has limited property rights, therefore, Article I of Protocol I is triggered or applicable.
Robert Spano (Judge): I want to, if you have time during the interval, to look at a case called Fabris versus France, paragraph 52 of that.
Robert Spano (Judge): And I invite you to make a comment on whether that has any bearing on the views of the parties.
Guido Raimondi (JudgeP): If there are no more questions...
Guido Raimondi (JudgeP): Ah yes, Judge Eicke, please.
Tim Eicke (Judge): Sorry, just two short questions.
Tim Eicke (Judge): One is, we're here, of course, looking at a complaint under the convention in the context of the Lausanne Treaty and possibly the Sèvres Treaty, the provisions of which are primarily addressed to Turkey on its face, and then, of course, applied in reverse to Greece by Article 45 of the Lausanne Treaty.
Tim Eicke (Judge): And I'd like to understand from the parties whether it is right for this court, and if so, how, to have regard to the impact any of our rulings might have on minorities in Turkey, who, of course, bound by both treaties, too.
Tim Eicke (Judge): And as I said, if so, how.
Tim Eicke (Judge): The second question relates to, ties into the question from Judge Sicilianos.
Tim Eicke (Judge): There is an assertion that the interpretation by the Court of Cassation is consistent with the court's case law, and we've heard about Article 6, Article 1 of the first protocol, and Article 14.
Tim Eicke (Judge): But I wonder if anybody has given thought to how it is compatible with our case law under Article 9, not forcing the negative right of freedom of religion, which force the right not to practice and reveal one's belief, and the prohibition on states to ask individuals, in this case, the testator, about his or her beliefs and or to force them to follow the tenets of their religion against their choice.
Tim Eicke (Judge): I wonder if you could address us on that, please, too.
Guido Raimondi (JudgeP): If there are no more questions, the court will now withdraw, say, until 10 to 11, following which the parties will be able to submit brief observations in reply to each other's submissions and reply to questions from the judges.
Guido Raimondi (JudgeP): The hearing is resumed and I call Mrs. Pelekou.
GR1 (Government): Mesdames et messieurs les juges, je vais essayer de répondre à la totalité, ou presque, de vos questions en clarifiant et en portant certaines précisions en même temps aux questions soulevées par la partie requérante lors de son intervention.
GR1 (Government): Je vais donc commencer par la question qui semble être la question prédominante et qui a été posée, à notre avis, par plusieurs juges de votre cours, la question de la religion de la requérante et si elle avait été, finalement, un facteur déterminant pour l'issue du procès national qui a été mis en cause entravant les articles, aux articles 6 et 1 du 1er protocole.
GR1 (Government): Eh bien, la réponse, clairement, est non.
GR1 (Government): La religion de la requérante ne fut en aucun cas déterminante.
GR1 (Government): En fait, l'issue du procès national aurait été identique, même si le défunt avait mis sur son testament comme héritier son voisin, un homme de confession non musulmane.
GR1 (Government): Donc, la requérante, concrètement, ne peut pas se prétendre victime de discrimination en raison de sa religion, encore moins de son sexe, en violation des articles 6 et 1.
GR1 (Government): Pour la même raison, et je réponds à la question posée par M. le juge du Royaume-Uni,
GR1 (Government): il n'est pas question de violation de l'article 9 dans l'affaire sous examen, devant vous.
GR1 (Government): Concernant la 2e question de Mme la juge Nüberger, si je prononce correctement votre nom, concernant les notaires, oui, les notaires ont une obligation d'informer les partis qui se présentent devant eux pour rédiger un acte notaire de leurs droits et des éventuels risques qu'ils encourt.
GR1 (Government): Et ceci n'a pas été fait, tout évidemment, en l'occurrence.
GR1 (Government): Concernant la question des sœurs du défunt, des belles-sœurs de la requérante, et de leur attente légitime d'acquérir également des droits patrimoniaux, la réponse est que, bien évidemment, elles avaient initialement une espérance légitime en raison de l'application depuis longtemps de leurs règles coutumières, qui, par la suite, est devenue un droit bien établi, selon la jurisprudence nationale, car il a été reconnu par un arrêt de la Cour suprême, de la Cour de cassation, irrévocable.
GR1 (Government): Concernant la deuxième question du juge au titre d'Alpany, concernant la réforme qui est sous adoption, et comment va-t-elle renforcer, généralement, les droits des membres de la minorité, il faut préciser que cette réforme a une envergure bien plus large que les questions posées par rapport à la requérante dans l'affaire sous examen.
GR1 (Government): Donc, cette réforme vise à toutes les relations familiales, ainsi qu'aux relations de succession, de sorte à ce que les personnes qui choisirent pour disposer de leur fortune par testament après la mort puissent exercer ce droit sans aucune contestation.
GR1 (Government): Donc, on n'est pas dans le cas de la requérante ici, parce que ce n'est pas son propre droit à tel qui a été de rédiger un testament, qui a été atteint.
GR1 (Government): J'avance avec la question posée par la Finlande, par Mme la juge au titre de Finlande, si la catégorie de la propriété léguée était importante.
GR1 (Government): On l'a déjà dit, oui, en combinaison avec le fait que la partie de Mandresse, donc les sœurs du défunt, ainsi que ce dernier, était membre d'une minorité de caractère religieux.
GR1 (Government): Pour renverser un petit peu l'argument, c'est que si la propriété n'était pas des mulques, mais c'était de la forêt, par exemple, personne n'aurait droit à léguer cette propriété.
GR1 (Government): Je viens sur la question de l'éventuelle entrave à l'ordre public qui a été soulevée par la partie requérante en raison de la religion et du sexe de la requérante, qui n'est pas posée, qui n'est vraiment pas posée dans cette affaire, parce que, comme on l'a dit, ce n'étaient pas ces deux facteurs qui ont joué un certain rôle.
GR1 (Government): Et je vais terminer par la question de proportionnalité, qui a été également posée.
GR1 (Government): Pour nous, cette proportionnalité a été réservée car le but visé, c'était le transfert total de la propriété léguée à la requérante.
GR1 (Government): Ce but aurait été très bien préservé si le défunt avait transféré sa propriété en vie à son épouse, et cela, il pouvait le faire indépendamment de sa qualité de membre de la minorité musulmane.
GR1 (Government): Je termine avec l'article 41.
GR1 (Government): Le gouvernement observe que les demandes de la requérante n'ont pas été reprises devant votre Chambre lors de la procédure écrite.
GR1 (Government): Toutefois, il se refait que la rémunération de la rémunération de la rémunération dans ses observations écrites.
GR1 (Government): Il clarifie tout autant que l'acte notaire enregistré par la requérante faisait référence uniquement aux propriétés léguées en Grèce.
GR1 (Government): Donc, ce sont que ces propriétés qui ont fait l'objet du litige en question.
GR1 (Government): Et le gouvernement termine par une observation générale et cette observation générale, le gouvernement est bien conscient du fait que le contexte général de l'affaire peut poser des doutes quant à des traitements discriminatoires contraires aux acquis européens.
GR1 (Government): Mais cet état d'esprit général, il ne faut en aucun cas nous inciter à négliger les défaillances juridiques dont souffre concrètement la requête sous examen en tant que requête individuelle.
Guido Raimondi (JudgeP): Merci beaucoup, Madame Pelekou.
Guido Raimondi (JudgeP): Je comprends que le gouvernement a terminé.
Guido Raimondi (JudgeP): Non, Madame Telalian.
GR2 (Government): Thank you, Mr. President.
GR2 (Government): Mr. President, allow me to take up a comment that was made
GR2 (Government): earlier by the Council for the applicants regarding the territorial application of the Treaty of Lausanne.
GR2 (Government): Although I explained, I think, quite clearly what Article 45 of the treaty stipulates, I feel obliged to supplement my comments, earlier comments.
GR2 (Government): And let me start by saying that there is a well-established principle of international law regarding the territorial scope of the application of international treaties.
GR2 (Government): And according to this principle, this scope may also be inferred by reason of their subject matter, their terms, or the circumstances of their conclusion.
GR2 (Government): And this is well reflected, actually, in the commentary to draft Article 58 of the Vienna Convention on Law of Treaties.
GR2 (Government): Actually, it's paragraph two of this commentary.
GR2 (Government): So allow me to emphasize once more that the letter of Article 45 is very clear in this respect, because according to this article, the minority protection system of the Lausanne Treaty applies only to the Muslim minority inhabitants of Western Thrace.
GR2 (Government): Actually, the drafters of the treaty were aware at that time that the only such minority that remains in Greek territory was the Muslim minority that was excluded from the compulsory exchange of populations.
GR2 (Government): I mentioned earlier the treaty on the basis of which this was done.
GR2 (Government): So both from the letter of Article 45, but also from the background historical context, it is very clear that the Treaty of Lausanne is applicable only when it comes to protection of minority provisions, applies only to the area of Western Thrace.
GR2 (Government): Let me also emphasize that the reason why, when it comes to Greece, the convention speaks only about one minority, the Muslim minority, but when it comes to Turkey, it uses the minority in plural.
GR2 (Government): This is not by chance.
GR2 (Government): This was very carefully drafted in order exactly to encapsulate these questions and the realities on the ground, the historical realities on the ground at that time.
GR2 (Government): Now, let me now answer another question.
GR2 (Government): Question in French in French in French in French in French in French in French in French in French in French in French in French in French in French in French in French in French Now, I would like to turn to another question which was similar to the question put by Judge Sicilianos, and this has to do actually with, as I understood it, it has to do with the reciprocity principle that is included in the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923 in Article 45.
GR2 (Government): Let me say that we in Greece, the successive Greek governments have accorded protection to this minority without linking this protection to interstate relations.