TrustHLT/LaCour huggingface dataset:
AP2 (Applicant): Indeed, Germany failed to do what it reasonably could have done, and the investigation did not fulfill the necessary basic objective as required under Article 2.
AP2 (Applicant): The applicant was not involved in the investigation.
AP2 (Applicant): Those who conducted the investigations lacked the necessary independence, and the investigations were delayed and inadequate.
AP2 (Applicant): Therefore, the applicant is concerned with the effectiveness of the investigation as such, and not only with the legal assessment by the federal prosecutor, as the government suggests in its submission and also right now.
AP2 (Applicant): The procedural obligation under Article 2 is an obligation of means and not of results, and the applicant is fully aware of this.
AP2 (Applicant): The point is that regardless of the outcome of the proceeding, Germany breached a number of concrete obligations of conduct with regards to investigative steps, both in Afghanistan and in Germany.
AP2 (Applicant): First, the German investigation failed both to determine whether the strike was absolutely necessary and whether it was proportionate.
AP2 (Applicant): The court held that the use of the term absolutely necessary indicates that a stricter and more compelling test of necessity must be employed.
AP2 (Applicant): Domestic investigations cannot meet the standards of Article 2 if they do not determine whether the use of lethal force by agents of the state did not exceed what then the circumstances demanded.
AP2 (Applicant): Even considering that in times of armed conflict, military necessity comes into play, Germany failed to assess the proportionality of the strike also from a less stringent international humanitarian law perspective.
AP2 (Applicant): Second, Germany failed to promptly assess the consequences of the airstrike.
AP2 (Applicant): Colonel Klein himself delayed sending the battle assessment team more than 10 hours after the strike, and the site was already altered.
AP2 (Applicant): For example, Germany could have sent a drone to take video footage to document the scene.
AP2 (Applicant): Third, Germany never sought to establish the precise number of individuals, let alone of civilians, women, and children who were killed in the airstrike.
AP2 (Applicant): There was no direct contact established with the applicant or any other witnesses amongst the villagers living in the area in order to secure names of people killed, not even after the UN handed over a list of names or when the families appointed a German lawyer.
AP2 (Applicant): The point is not whether further information would have led to insights incriminating the suspects, as the government suggests.
AP2 (Applicant): The point is that establishing and identifying the number of individuals killed would have been important to determine whether the use of force exercised by Germany was not excessive.
AP2 (Applicant): Fourth, German authority risked collusion because they did not separate the military officers involved.
AP2 (Applicant): This would have been of utmost importance, as the federal prosecutor later exclusively relied on the subjective views of the suspects to justify closing the investigation.
AP2 (Applicant): Notably, Germany did not remove nor even temporarily discharge the colonel responsible for the strike.
AP2 (Applicant): Instead, he was tasked with the fact finding the morning after and later even promoted to general.
AP2 (Applicant): Authorities in Germany could have used means of digital communication to enable the prosecutor to take the suspect's testimonies immediately after the incident the same day.
AP2 (Applicant): Instead, the first questioning of the suspects by the military police only took place in the afternoon of September 5, as both suspects expressly refused being questioned by the military police before.
AP2 (Applicant): We therefore contest the government's claim that Colonel Klein was interrogated by German officials on September 4, and we further contest that he was formally interrogated by the ISAF team on the same day.
AP2 (Applicant): German authorities did not conduct an impartial investigation.
AP2 (Applicant): They failed to scrutinize Colonel Klein's perspective and its reasonableness.
AP2 (Applicant): German prosecutors never challenged the version of events provided by the suspects through independent experts or witness testimonies.
AP2 (Applicant): The German government acknowledged that investigators in Germany lacked the specialized military knowledge to interview the suspects and witnesses.
AP2 (Applicant): This shows that the inclusion of independent advice would have been crucial in order to assess the necessity and proportionality of the strike.
AP2 (Applicant): On which basis did German authorities assess whether Colonel Klein's assumption that only Taliban were present was completely plausible?
AP2 (Applicant): Strikingly, the German prosecutors never clarified what the terms insurgent or Taliban meant, as they're very vague, broad terms that do not define legitimate military targets under IHL.
AP2 (Applicant): Even in a difficult conflict environment, German officials could have used modern technology to question witnesses in Afghanistan or even in Germany.
AP2 (Applicant): Six, German authorities failed to request the objects seized by the Afghan security forces at the site.
AP2 (Applicant): These include remnant of arms, stolen weapons, and firearms said to have been carried by the persons attacked.
AP2 (Applicant): Seventh, the Ministry of Defense tried to obstruct the criminal investigation by the general prosecutor, Dresden, from the very beginning.
AP2 (Applicant): The ministry issued an internal instruction not to forward any document in relation to the facts of the incident to the Dresden prosecutor.
AP2 (Applicant): When Dresden received the case, he took his intention to indict the suspects so that the competent criminal courts could adjudicate on difficult legal question.
AP2 (Applicant): The ministry intervened by exercising pressure so that the Dresden prosecutor would relinquish its competence to investigate the case to federal authorities.
AP2 (Applicant): Notably, the federal public prosecutor is under the control of the federal government and bound to its instructions.
AP2 (Applicant): The translated excerpt of the parliamentary inquiry report describes these interventions in detail.
AP2 (Applicant): These flaws show that German authorities violated a number of procedural obligations under Article II.
AP2 (Applicant): But now I would like to draw your attention to another significant breach.
AP2 (Applicant): Germany did not involve the applicant to the extent necessary to safeguard his legitimate interest.
AP2 (Applicant): I was instructed on March 5, 2010, already as a second lawyer of the applicant.
AP2 (Applicant): And when I wrote to the federal prosecutor, six months had already passed without any attempt of the prosecutor to approach the applicant.
AP2 (Applicant): Instead, when my client requested access to the file and to be heard, he was effectively dismissed.
AP2 (Applicant): He and his 12-year-old son were accused by the federal prosecutor of belonging to the Taliban so that the prosecutor could deny access to the case files.
AP2 (Applicant): Apparently, a list of potential victims included a person with a similar name, age 22, as a suspected member of Taliban.
AP2 (Applicant): Seven days after my client requested access to the file, the investigation was declared closed.
AP2 (Applicant): The federal prosecutor actively avoided a decision about the applicant's victim status and refused to hear him in order to close the investigation without any victim's participation.
AP2 (Applicant): My client was granted access to the file on a very limited basis only seven months later in October 2010.
AP2 (Applicant): This exclusion of the applicant is another blatant violation of the procedural rights accorded by the Convention for the Protection of the Right to Life.
AP2 (Applicant): Finally, we will now address the fact that the applicant had no effective remedy at his disposal in violations of Articles 2 and 13.
AP2 (Applicant): Neither the regional High Court nor the federal Constitutional Court assessed the investigation in detail, and no references to obligations under the Convention or this Court's case law were made, in contrast to the recent decision of Henshaw and Stark.
AP2 (Applicant): The government mislead when it refers to an unrelated judgment by the federal Constitutional Court in order to show that the Convention was considered.
AP2 (Applicant): None of the references actually concerned the obligation under the Convention.
AP2 (Applicant): They concern cross-references to German case law.
AP2 (Applicant): Therefore, the German Constitutional Court failed to examine the substance of our claims and violated the applicant's rights to an effective remedy under Articles 2 and 13.
AP2 (Applicant): To conclude, Germany is responsible for the strike that killed the children of the applicant, Abdul Bayan and Neza Rula, and Germany failed to properly investigate the strike and the right to life violations.
AP2 (Applicant): It is on this basis that we ask this Court to declare that Germany violated Articles 2 and 13 of the Convention.
AP2 (Applicant): As Mr Abdulhanan recently emphasised to us, he and the people of his village are still traumatised by the devastating consequences of the bombing.
AP2 (Applicant): He very much appreciates the fact that today's hearing is taking place.
AP2 (Applicant): He wants justice for his sons.
AP2 (Applicant): He wants to be treated like everybody else.
AP2 (Applicant): He's not demanding anything but the application of the Convention in accordance with the Court's long-standing case law.
Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos (JudgeP): La parole est au l'agent du gouvernement français, monsieur Alabrune, vous avez la parole.
TP3 (ThirdParty): Monsieur le Président, mesdames et messieurs les juges, j'ai l'honneur d'intervenir au nom des gouvernements français et britanniques sur la question de la juridiction qui est essentielle pour la présente affaire.
TP3 (ThirdParty): Mon collègue britannique présentera ensuite des observations au nom des deux gouvernements sur la question de l'attribution de la violation allégée ainsi qu'à titre subsidiaire sur la question de l'étendue de l'obligation d'enquête.
TP3 (ThirdParty): Nos deux gouvernements sont d'avis, comme les autres états tiers intervenants, premièrement, que la frappe aérienne à l'origine de la présente affaire ne constitue pas un exercice par l'Allemagne de sa juridiction au sens de l'article 1 de la Convention, et deuxièmement, que l'ouverture d'une enquête par les autorités allemandes sur cette frappe aérienne ne suffit pas, dans les circonstances de l'espèce, à créer un lien juridictionnel entre le requérant et l'État allemand.
TP3 (ThirdParty): S'agissant tout d'abord de la juridiction d'un État au sens de l'article 1 de la Convention, votre Cours a affirmé de manière constante qu'elle est principalement territoriale.
TP3 (ThirdParty): Une telle limitation du concept de juridiction ressort clairement des travaux préparatoires de la Convention, analysés avec beaucoup de soin et de rigueur par la Grande Chambre dans sa décision Bankovitch.
TP3 (ThirdParty): Il ne paraîtrait donc ni fondé ni approprié que l'interprétation de la notion fondamentale de juridiction soit sujette à une interprétation extensive, comme la Grande Chambre l'a encore clairement reconnue dans sa décision Bankovitch.
TP3 (ThirdParty): C'est pourquoi les exceptions à ce principe de la juridiction territoriale doivent être limitées et strictement définies.
TP3 (ThirdParty): Ainsi que le montre l'arrêt de Grande Chambre Alskénie, la Cour n'a admis la juridiction extraterritoriale d'un État que dans deux cas. Premièrement, lorsque cet État
TP3 (ThirdParty): exerce un contrôle effectif sur un territoire étranger et deuxièmement lorsqu'un agent de cet État exerce une autorité et un contrôle en dehors de ses frontières.
TP3 (ThirdParty): Or, aucune de ces deux exceptions n'est applicable à une frappe aérienne menée dans le cadre d'une opération militaire.
TP3 (ThirdParty): À l'étranger, telle que celle qui est en cause dans la présente affaire. S'agissant en premier lieu de
TP3 (ThirdParty): l'exception liée au contrôle effectif d'un territoire, il est évident que l'Allemagne ne contrôlait pas la région de Kunduz, ni la zone de bombardement qui était aux mains des insurgés. Je renvoie sur ce point aux
TP3 (ThirdParty): observations écrites de l'Allemagne et aux états tiers intervenants. S'agissant en second lieu de
TP3 (ThirdParty): l'exception liée au contrôle et à l'autorité exercée par un agent de l'État hors de ses frontières, le critère essentiel à prendre en compte est, selon votre jurisprudence, l'exercice d'un pouvoir et d'un contrôle physique sur les personnes en question.
TP3 (ThirdParty): La décision de grande chambre de l'État est la seule à avoir été prise en question. La décision de grande chambre
TP3 (ThirdParty): Bankovic est claire sur ce point. Une frappe aérienne menée dans
TP3 (ThirdParty): le cadre d'un conflit armé sur une zone de combat active n'atteint pas le degré de contrôle suffisant pour fonder un exercice extraterritorial de la juridiction au sens de la Convention.
TP3 (ThirdParty): Nous invitons ainsi la grande chambre à réaffirmer le caractère essentiellement territorial de la juridiction et, de manière corollaire, le caractère limitatif des exceptions d'application extraterritoriale de la Convention énoncées dans l'arrêt Alskény.
TP3 (ThirdParty): S'agissant à présent de l'enquête ouverte par les autorités allemandes, nos gouvernements sont d'avis que ce seul élément ne suffit pas à créer un lien juridictionnel avec la juridiction entre le requérant et l'Allemagne dans les circonstances de l'espèce. Nous estimons en particulier que
TP3 (ThirdParty): la position adoptée par la Cour dans l'affaire Guset-Lurtelut, qui était justifiée par des circonstances factuelles spécifiques, n'est pas transposable à la présente espèce.
TP3 (ThirdParty): Deux différences fondamentales existent en effet entre la présente affaire et l'affaire Guset-Lurtelut.
TP3 (ThirdParty): Premièrement, l'affaire Guset-Lurtelut et toutes celles qui sont citées dans cet arrêt portaient sur des faits qui se sont déroulés intégralement dans l'espace juridique de la Convention.
TP3 (ThirdParty): Dans ces affaires, la Cour a ainsi accordé un poids particulier aux engagements de coopération en matière pénale liant les Etats-partis à la Convention, mais aussi, dans le cas Guset-Lurtelut, à la situation spécifique de Chypre et de la République turque de Chypre du Nord. Il ressort ainsi clairement de l'arrêt
TP3 (ThirdParty): rendu par la Cour dans cette affaire Guset-Lurtelut que le fondement de son raisonnement est la volonté d'assurer la continuité de la protection des droits conventionnels au sein de l'espace juridique de la Convention et d'empêcher qu'un territoire devienne un refuge pour des personnes suspectées d'avoir commis un crime.
TP3 (ThirdParty): La solution choisie par la Cour s'est donc inscrite dans le contexte spécifique de la coopération pénale entre Etats-partis à la Convention.
TP3 (ThirdParty): Dans la présente affaire, les faits faisant l'objet de l'enquête se sont produits sur le territoire afghan, donc en dehors de l'espace juridique de la Convention.
TP3 (ThirdParty): Ils ne soulèvent pas de questions de coopération pénale entre Etats-partis à la Convention.
TP3 (ThirdParty): Deuxièmement, dans l'affaire Guset-Lurtelut, aucune mesure d'enquête hors de l'espace juridique de la Convention n'était requise.
TP3 (ThirdParty): Il s'agissait pour la Turquie d'adopter des mesures d'enquête sur le territoire de la République turque de Chypre du Nord, territoire qui se trouve sous son contrôle effectif selon la jurisprudence de la Cour.
TP3 (ThirdParty): À l'inverse, dans la présente affaire est en cause une enquête qui nécessitait le recueil de preuves et de témoignages en Afghanistan et, plus précisément, dans la région de Kunduz, qui était à l'époque des faits une zone de combat active et un territoire sur lequel il n'est pas contesté, que l'Allemagne n'exerçait aucun contrôle.
TP3 (ThirdParty): Dans un tel contexte, l'ouverture d'une enquête en Allemagne ne pouvait suffire à établir un lien juridictionnel entre l'Etat défendeur et le requérant au sens de l'article 1 de la Convention.
TP3 (ThirdParty): L'alternative qui consisterait à se fonder pour établir un tel lien juridictionnel sur la seule existence d'une procédure dans un État parti, de n'obstant l'absence de contrôle effectif de l'État sur la situation en cause, risquerait d'aboutir à une application universelle de la Convention.
TP3 (ThirdParty): Elle pourrait aussi dissuader les États partis d'ouvrir certaines enquêtes.
TP3 (ThirdParty): En conclusion, nous invitons la Cour à prendre en compte le fait que l'État défendeur n'exerçait aucun contrôle sur les requérants ni sur le territoire sur lequel ils se trouvaient, et à conclure que, dans ces circonstances, l'ouverture d'une enquête ne crée pas de lien juridictionnel entre l'État défendeur et le requérant au sens de l'article 1 de la Convention.
TP3 (ThirdParty): Je vous remercie de votre attention.
Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos (JudgeP): Sir James Eadie, you have the floor
TP1 (ThirdParty): I start with attribution.
TP1 (ThirdParty): All the intervening states submit that the conduct of the German forces as part of ISAF, and indeed of the other elements of ISAF involved in the strike, is attributable to the UN and not to Germany.
TP1 (ThirdParty): That, we and they submit, is the effect of the international law rules of attribution, to which the Grand Chamber gave effect in Birhami and Surremati.
TP1 (ThirdParty): There is an initial point of principle.
TP1 (ThirdParty): The applicant argues that al-Jadda must be interpreted as overturning the ultimate authority test, as set down in Birhami, and replacing it with one of effective control.
TP1 (ThirdParty): That is wrong.
TP1 (ThirdParty): Al-Jadda distinguished Birhami on the facts.
TP1 (ThirdParty): It did not overturn it.
TP1 (ThirdParty): Birhami remains good law, acknowledging the unique responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security, and also acknowledging that the conditions for implementation of a UN Security Council resolution is for the UN to decide, as the Court noted in Birhami.
TP1 (ThirdParty): We submit that the bases for distinguishing Birhami in al-Jadda have no parallel or analogue here in the context of ISAF's military operations under the auspices of the UN in Afghanistan.
TP1 (ThirdParty): The Grand Chamber in al-Jadda, at paragraphs 80 to 85, identified three particular factors that distinguished the case from Birhami.
TP1 (ThirdParty): The first was that the multinational force had been present in Iraq since the invasion, and thus before the Security Council resolutions authorised its presence.
TP1 (ThirdParty): In Iraq, a command structure with no reference to the UN had thus been in place before the Security Council mandate, and remained in place after that.
TP1 (ThirdParty): Second, the Grand Chamber in al-Jadda found that both the terms of the UN Security Council authorisation and the degree of its ultimate authority were different in al-Jadda from Birhami, at paragraphs 80 to 82.
TP1 (ThirdParty): In particular, the resolutions on Iraq were adopted against the background of the role of the US and UK as occupying powers, paragraph 78, a role which in the Grand Chamber's analysis conferred on them separate authority and responsibility, and undercut the ultimate authority of the UN.
TP1 (ThirdParty): Third, in al-Jadda, organs of the UN had protested about the extent to which security internment was used by the multinational force, paragraph 82.
TP1 (ThirdParty): The factors that distinguished al-Jadda from Birhami do not apply here.
TP1 (ThirdParty): That is evident, we submit, from four features of the operations in Afghanistan that are of critical importance.
TP1 (ThirdParty): First, the International Security Force in Afghanistan, ISAF, was deployed after the Security Council mandate resolution 1386, not before, as in al-Jadda.
TP1 (ThirdParty): Second, neither ISAF nor the member states contributing forces to ISAF were occupying powers in Afghanistan, nor did they have a mandate to exercise governmental functions.
TP1 (ThirdParty): Rather, the governmental functions were exercised by the Afghan Interim Administration, see the Bon Agreement, section 3.
TP1 (ThirdParty): Third, ISAF operates under a structure of unified command over troops from a very large number of states, similarly to KFOR in Birhami, and unlike al-Jadda, there was no command structure in place prior to the UN authorisation.
TP1 (ThirdParty): Those factors were underscored by the English Court of Appeal in the Saddam Hamed case.
TP1 (ThirdParty): The court there held, after a very careful and detailed analysis of all the relevant features, that, and I quote, the chain of delegation of command for ISAF is essentially similar to the chain of delegation and command for KFOR.
TP1 (ThirdParty): That's paragraph 65 of Saddam Hamed.
TP1 (ThirdParty): The conclusion in that case on the facts of the case, that the claimant's detention was attributable to the UK rather than ISAF, was based on the fact that a separate national detention policy was in operation.
TP1 (ThirdParty): There is no suggestion here, however, that Germany established and operated a national targeting policy different from ISAF, and accordingly, the relevant conduct and chain of command remains attributable to the UN.
TP1 (ThirdParty): Further and forth, there is no evidence to suggest that the UN here disapproved of or protested against any relevant conduct of ISAF.
TP1 (ThirdParty): On attribution, we therefore urge the court to affirm the principles clearly set out in its case law, and in particular, the Barami judgment, and to find that it has no jurisdiction, ratione personae, over this matter.
TP1 (ThirdParty): If the court finds jurisdiction and attribution, it will then be necessary for it to assess the impact of IHL on article two of the convention, and it's to that topic I now turn.
TP1 (ThirdParty): As to the approach in principle, see paragraphs 44 to 52 of our observations, our core submission is that where IHL is engaged, the procedural obligations in article two must be interpreted in the light of it.
TP1 (ThirdParty): IHL is the lex specialis.
TP1 (ThirdParty): The ratio of Hassan and the United Kingdom, especially 103 to 104 in the court's judgment, is that IHL can, as such, even lead to the amendment of the convention.
TP1 (ThirdParty): The fact that the conflict in Hassan was an international armed conflict rather than an internal armed conflict is not, we suggest, a proper basis for distinguishing the present case.
TP1 (ThirdParty): The key point is that IHL regulates the relevant activity.
TP1 (ThirdParty): It is right that it should do so in principle.
TP1 (ThirdParty): It was designed and is apt for the purpose of regulating armed conflict, and it is right that it should do so because that is the way, in this special context, in which effect is given to the principle that the procedural obligation under article two is subject to practical considerations of feasibility and must be applied realistically.
TP1 (ThirdParty): As to the relevant content of IHL, I make four short points.
TP1 (ThirdParty): First, IHL does not impose a general duty to investigate all battlefield deaths.
TP1 (ThirdParty): That is not accidental.
TP1 (ThirdParty): It reflects a deliberate choice and a careful balancing of considerations of military necessity and humanity.
TP1 (ThirdParty): Second, IHL does set out a series of detailed rules specifying when states come under a duty to investigate deaths in a theatre of military operations in an armed conflict and what that duty involves.
TP1 (ThirdParty): Thus, IHL does not oblige states to investigate all deaths in theatres of operation, but only those resulting from alleged violations of IHL.
TP1 (ThirdParty): IHL imposes a number of further specific obligations, most notably in relation to grave breaches and war crimes.