TrustHLT/LaCour huggingface dataset:
AP1 (Applicant): It follows that in terms of legitimate expectations, there are, on one hand, already existing pecuniary assets, like a regular disability pension benefit.
AP1 (Applicant): And on the other hand, there are pecuniary assets that do not currently exist, but which are expected to be obtained in the future, such as a potential pension benefit to be paid in the future.
AP1 (Applicant): It is therefore clear that both kinds of pecuniary assets qualify as a possession.
AP1 (Applicant): There is no doubt that the applicant had a possession in the form of an existing valuable asset by receiving her disability pension from 2001 to 2009.
AP1 (Applicant): Therefore, what the court has to decide in the present case is whether my client, as of the withdrawal of her disability pension in 2009, has had a legitimate expectation of obtaining the disability benefit again.
AP1 (Applicant): However, before exploring the issue of legitimate expectations, including the core question of the existence of an acceptable right on the side of the applicant, I would like to address a few words to the remarkable proposal of the third party intervener, namely the European Trade Union Confederation, ETUC, which was made as to the interpretation of Article 1 of Protocol Number 1, which regards social security rights.
AP1 (Applicant): The ETUC's approach represents an absolutely new understanding of this issue, which I believe is worth mentioning and even deliberating on.
AP1 (Applicant): What does the ETUC suggest?
AP1 (Applicant): Its starting point is the Demir and Baikara judgment, which concludes that, I'm quoting here, the court, in defining the meaning of terms and notions in the text of the convention, can and must take into account elements of international law other than the convention, the interpretation of such elements by competent organs, and the practice of European states reflecting their common values.
AP1 (Applicant): Based on this, the ETUC examined its submission to pertinent international law and practice, including that of the UN, the ILO, the Council of Europe, and the EU, and outlined the relevant practice of the European states.
AP1 (Applicant): Not going into details here, it found that the overwhelming majority, if not the totality, of Council of Europe member states have accepted the protection against the risk of invalidity.
AP1 (Applicant): This is obvious that the European consensus has emerged in this matter.
AP1 (Applicant): On the strength on this finding, their final conclusion is not less than, quote again, the material scope of Article 1 of Protocol Number 1 should include the right to social security in general and the right to invalid benefits in particular, end quote.
AP1 (Applicant): The ETUC admits that against this conclusion, several arguments might be advanced.
AP1 (Applicant): However, it is quick to add that these arguments are not convincing, and we tend to agree with that.
AP1 (Applicant): Firstly, Hungary's international ratification status concerning, in particular, Part 9 of ILO Convention Number 102 may not be brought into play because the interpretation of the convention does not rely on the status of ratification of an individual country.
AP1 (Applicant): Additionally, we have to underline again what we have already asserted in our memorandum, namely that Act 100 of 1999 promulgated the European Social Charter in Hungary, which is this way, became part of the domestic law.
AP1 (Applicant): Now, when setting forth the minimum standards of the social security system, paragraph 2 of Article 12 of this charter refers to the ILO Convention, thereby even, if indirectly, rendering it part of Hungarian domestic law.
AP1 (Applicant): And to top it all, Hungary is bound by a direct international obligation as well.
AP1 (Applicant): Namely, it has ratified the UN International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, Article 9 of which expressly guarantees the right to social security.
AP1 (Applicant): Secondly, it might be advanced against the ETUC's conclusion that on the state side, the right of protection of a property is considered as mainly a negative obligation, whereas it does not contain positive obligations.
AP1 (Applicant): However, although the court has elaborated ample jurisprudence as to those kinds of obligations, it must be also recognized that there is no clear-cut division between negative and positive obligations.
AP1 (Applicant): Thirdly, we also tend to agree with the ETUC's standpoint, according to which it is of the view that since the court has already acknowledged that social security rights qualify as proprietary rights as long as they are guaranteed at national level, from this starting point, it is only a matter of future interpretation to arrive at the conclusion that Article 1 of Protocol Number 1 should be regarded as containing the fundamental social right to social security in general and invalid benefits in particular.
AP1 (Applicant): As we interpret the ETUC's above position, this does not mean that states would not have the possibility to set up and maintain well-differentiated social security schemes, where the granting of full benefit amounts beyond a certain level of health impairment is subject to the meeting of additional statutory requirements.
AP1 (Applicant): It would, however, mean that no one with a partial or full disability should find themselves in a situation in which not even a minimum supply requisite to basic subsistence is granted to them by the state, even though the amounts could be considerably lower than those granted to persons satisfying additional statutory requirements as well.
AP1 (Applicant): This would undoubtedly place an additional financial burden on member states.
AP1 (Applicant): However, on the one hand, so do other institutions of modern democratic states.
AP1 (Applicant): And on the other hand, this financial burden cannot be compared to the individual burden of those who, owing to their misfortune, lose their working capacity and along with it, their income.
AP1 (Applicant): As regards our interpretation of the ETUC's standpoint, both German and Hungarian constitutional courts seem to have arrived at similar conclusions, which are deduced from the fundamental right to human dignity.
AP1 (Applicant): The German Constitutional Court, in its decision number 1 BVL 1 slash 09, brought on 9 February 2010, ensured the right to social care requisite to basic subsistence for those in need.
AP1 (Applicant): What is more, this social care, according to the judgment, shall secure not only the conditions for basic existence, but at least to a certain degree, the possibility to take part in economic, cultural, and political life as well.
AP1 (Applicant): In the same vein, the Hungarian Constitutional Court, in its decision number 37 slash 2011, held that the state must interfere if the individual is not able to ensure for him or herself a life of dignity in a material sense and lives under the poverty line.
AP1 (Applicant): In other words, human dignity has a function which supports a claim for social benefits.
AP1 (Applicant): Honorable members of the court, however striking and revolutionary the ETUC's conclusion may sound at first hearing, it reflects nothing else than the ever-evolving nature of the convention and its interpretation, which is frequently accelerated by this court as well.
AP1 (Applicant): And indeed, if we take a broader view into the historical evolution of human and civil rights concerning both their mere list and the content thereof, we can see an ever-evolving tendency.
AP1 (Applicant): In this progress, there necessarily has to be a point at which each individual right changes from a mere potential into a substantive and recognized right with all the associated criteria, including judicial assertability.
AP1 (Applicant): It is, of course, for the honorable court to decide whether in the European Human Rights Protection System under the convention, this point in time has arrived for the right to social security and within this to disability benefits.
AP1 (Applicant): It is, however, in our view incontestable that this question may not be swept under the rug.
AP1 (Applicant): And if it is, it will from time to time be raised again and again because the tendencies outlined in the ETUC's submission are sensibly pointing to the full recognition of social security rights and individual benefits as human rights.
AP1 (Applicant): The only question is whether it is happening right now, perhaps in these very proceedings, or only in the future.
AP1 (Applicant): Honorable judges, this court cannot ignore the aforementioned reasons advanced by the third party intervener and must make a thorough examination of them.
AP1 (Applicant): Should the court, as a result of that examination, come to a conclusion that Article 1 of Protocol Number 1 includes the right to invalidate the benefits, at least in an amount required for basic subsistence, we invite you to hold at the same time that the applicant, having been disabled for 15 years, has had a possession.
AP1 (Applicant): However, if the court refrains from drawing such a conclusion, the existence of a possession on the applicant's side may still be established on other grounds.
AP1 (Applicant): Our firm stance is that she had and still has a legitimate expectation to obtain disability benefits.
AP1 (Applicant): Turning now, therefore, to the concept of legitimate expectations, it must be observed that it concerns the question whether an addressee of the norm could, and to what extent, rely on an existing norm.
AP1 (Applicant): It implies that authorities must respect the expectations which they created by their representations.
AP1 (Applicant): The government raised a genuine question, notably, whether legitimate expectations prohibit a change in the law with special regard to the long-lasting and continuous nature of social security relationships.
AP1 (Applicant): In such relationship, according to the government's schema, there are two entry points.
AP1 (Applicant): The first is the starting date of the social security relationship coupled with the payment of contributions.
AP1 (Applicant): The second is the starting date of becoming eligible for receiving the benefit at issue.
AP1 (Applicant): We agree with this schema.
AP1 (Applicant): They further submit that during the time between these two entry points, which is usually many years, the law may be subject to changes.
AP1 (Applicant): We tend to accept this too.
AP1 (Applicant): And we also concur with the government's point, according to which requests for social security benefits are usually not adjudicated on the basis of the law applicable at the time of the first entry point, but rather on the basis of the law enforced at the time of the second entry point.
AP1 (Applicant): The respondent government, with the view of rejecting the applicant's legitimate expectations, places great reliance on the findings in the Richardson versus United Kingdom decision, which is a prominent reflection of the foregoing theorems.
AP1 (Applicant): In that case, the court ruled that Mrs. Richardson
AP1 (Applicant): had no possession because she had not reached the pensionable age, so she was not eligible for the pension benefit.
AP1 (Applicant): According to the government's aforementioned schema, she simply did not reach the second entry point of the social security relationship.
AP1 (Applicant): But this argument hardly seems to be persuasive in the case at hand.
AP1 (Applicant): This is because at the time the law changed to her detriment in 2008, my client, in contrast to Mrs. Richardson, had already
AP1 (Applicant): reached the second entry point by having become eligible for disability pension.
AP1 (Applicant): And she was in receipt of this benefit, of course.
AP1 (Applicant): The fact that the applicant reached the second entry point in 2001 entails that all her subsequent requests for disability allowance, as well as all subsequent straight measures, must be adjudicated on the basis of the law enforced in 2001.
AP1 (Applicant): This is what follows from the aforementioned governmental standpoint.
AP1 (Applicant): Turning to the issue of the applicable domestic law in respect of the existence of an assertable right on the applicant's side, I will go on to make a few references to our memorandum.
AP1 (Applicant): Firstly, we invite the court to bear in mind that well-established case law of the Hungarian Constitutional Court, based on the constitution enforced at the material time, clearly asserted a right to welfare benefits on the part of the individual in need.
AP1 (Applicant): In this context, regard must be paid to the case law of the court, which recognizes the relevance of the domestic law in the determination of possession, despite its autonomous concept.
AP1 (Applicant): Secondly, international conventions enshrining the rights of persons with disability are also of great importance in respect of the question of possession, since many of them became part of the domestic law, as to mention.
AP1 (Applicant): Thirdly, we reiterate that the applicant became eligible for disability benefits by virtue of the law enforced, without any act by the authorities, just because she met the requirements set forth in the applicable legal rules.
AP1 (Applicant): The authorities, therefore, merely asserted her right to benefit, but in no way conferred this right on her.
AP1 (Applicant): Thus, they were not in a position to revoke this right either.
AP1 (Applicant): For this reason, when the disability pension was withdrawn, her substantial right did not cease to exist.
AP1 (Applicant): Consequently, the applicant's right to disability benefit has remained assertable under the applicable terms of 2001.
AP1 (Applicant): It is noteworthy that, in line with the foregoing, the government, in paragraph 17 of their memorandum, does not contest the existence of the applicant's legitimate expectations that were generated by the domestic law enforced in 2001.
AP1 (Applicant): Moreover, they acknowledged if the law had changed to the detriment of the applicant at the time when she was still eligible for the benefit, thereby processing legitimate expectations, she would definitely have an arguable case.
AP1 (Applicant): this is exactly what happened in our case.
AP1 (Applicant): Because, I repeat, the applicant's health has not improved, not even temporarily.
AP1 (Applicant): So she was still eligible for the benefit when the law changed to her detriment.
AP1 (Applicant): Accordingly, neither the following withdrawal of the benefit due to the change in the rules, nor the new law applicable as of 2012, made her legitimate expectation groundless.
AP1 (Applicant): The conclusion may be drawn with special regard to the principle of the rule of law that granting of disability pension in 2001 created for the applicant a reasonable and legitimate expectation according to which she could expect to receive disability benefit as long as she satisfied the criteria applied in 2001, and, of course, if there was no reason for the withdrawal under the rules which were enforced at that time.
AP1 (Applicant): The existence of that continued and recognized legitimate expectation is also well demonstrated by the ensuing periodic reviews.
AP1 (Applicant): Honorable judges, on the one hand, we have just set forth that the applicant has had a possession in form of a continuous legitimate expectation for disability benefit, which is based on her unimproved food, physical condition, and the fulfillment of the additional statutory requirements applicable to her case.
AP1 (Applicant): Nor is it disputed, on the other hand, that her disability pension disbursed beforehand also constitutes a potential benefit beforehand also constitutes a possession.
AP1 (Applicant): No doubt, especially in the light of the Kelton Asponson versus Eisen judgment, that the respondent state interfered with the applicant's right to possession when the payment of this possession was terminated exclusively on account of the change in the law, but without any change in her circumstances.
AP1 (Applicant): This interference, however, did not entail the disappearance of her possession, which continued to exist as a legitimate expectation.
AP1 (Applicant): Based on that legitimate expectation, the applicant requested a new disability benefit in 2012.
AP1 (Applicant): The denial to grant the benefit, despite the outstanding eligibility, constitutes an interference with the right to possession as well.
AP1 (Applicant): This court, in the Poste and Rakho versus Finland judgment, stated that the concept of a continuing situation refers to a state of affairs which operates via continuous activities by or on the part of the state to render the applicant victim.
AP1 (Applicant): After the withdrawal of her disability pension, which is an obvious interference with her right to peaceful enjoyment of possession, the applicant, as a person who had been satisfying the requirements of contributions, was subject to ensuing periodic reviews.
AP1 (Applicant): However, she has been constantly denied disability care, although she has fulfilled all statutory conditions which entitled her to such a benefit in 2001 at the time of the second entry point.
AP1 (Applicant): Due to the withdrawal and the subsequent denials of disability care, she is therefore subject to a continuing restriction in her substantive convention rights.
AP1 (Applicant): Consequently, there has been a continuing interference with the applicant's peaceful enjoyment of possessions.
AP1 (Applicant): It is also part of the well-established Strasbourg case law, to which we made several references in our memorandum, that as long as a continuing situation exists, the six-month period does not commence.
AP1 (Applicant): In the applicant's understanding, this means no less than all state activities implemented throughout the continuing situation may be subject to examination.
AP1 (Applicant): We therefore invite the court to conduct a thorough inquiry into the lawfulness of the determination of the applicant's disability pension in 2009, and to hold that it constitutes an interference with the right to possessions.
AP1 (Applicant): To proceed, this court hardly needs to be reminded that essential conditions for interference to be deemed compatible with Article 1 of Protocol Number 1 are that it should be lawful, must serve a legitimate public or general interest, and must strike a fair balance between the aim that is so to be realized and the personal interest of an individual.
AP1 (Applicant): Honorable court, the government will not address these issues because in its view, the applicant had no possession when the impugned state actions were undertaken.
AP1 (Applicant): However, we have just given a concise outline of why such a stance is untenable.
AP1 (Applicant): Therefore, we do assert that there have been interferences with the applicant's right to possession during a continuing situation.
AP1 (Applicant): These interferences, first of all, were not lawful in terms of the rule of law.
AP1 (Applicant): Let me remind you that in our memorandum, we clearly demonstrated that the new assessment methodology rules can hardly be seen as law.
AP1 (Applicant): And what is more, their application contravenes the principle of prohibition of retroactivity.
AP1 (Applicant): Secondly, though the government did not put forward any argument as to the public interest, the applicant admits that states enjoy a certain margin of appreciation in determining their social security systems.
AP1 (Applicant): However, this liberty of state cannot go as far as impeding vested rights to prevail.
AP1 (Applicant): I reiterate that changes of eligibility rules of social security benefits might only be applied insofar as the person concerned has not yet reached the second entry point, that is, has not yet become eligible for that benefit.
AP1 (Applicant): Thirdly, the applicant affirms that she had to bear an excessive individual burden due to the interferences.
AP1 (Applicant): Despite her continuous illness, her disability benefit was unduly withdrawn, and her subsequent requests were also unduly denied.
AP1 (Applicant): It appears in the well-settled case law of the court.
AP1 (Applicant): The obligation to endure a reasonable and commensurate reduction might be compatible with the convention because it constitutes no essential infringement.
AP1 (Applicant): By contrast, a total deprivation of a pension benefit by definition breaches the essence of one's pension right, imposing an excessive burden on the individual.
AP1 (Applicant): Due to the drastic and unjust series of measures resulting in the total divestiture of the applicant's only mean of subsistence, her day-to-day survival is indeed at risk.
AP1 (Applicant): attacking people with disabilities is the lowest display of power I can think of.
AP1 (Applicant): These words might not sound like a legal argument because they do not come from a legal expert.
AP1 (Applicant): I was quoting the famous American actor Morgan Freeman.
AP1 (Applicant): However, these words pretty well reflect the way that ordinary people in democratic societies think about the care of disabled people.
AP1 (Applicant): In the same vein, we do believe that no state measures can be justified if they deny even the least support from a person in need, a person who has been a respected member of the community, thus leaving her in a hopeless situation forever.
Guido Raimondi (JudgeP): Thank you very much Mr. Cech.
Guido Raimondi (JudgeP): Now I call Mr. Tallódi, you have the floor please.
GR1 (Government): Thank you, Mr. President,
GR1 (Government): honorable members of the court, ladies and gentlemen.
GR1 (Government): It's a privilege and a pleasure to have the opportunity to appear before the court to present the oral submissions on behalf of the government of Hungary.
GR1 (Government): During the written procedure before the court, both parties, as well as the intervening third party, have been given the opportunity to put forward their position.
GR1 (Government): Now the government has the aim to develop the main arguments in support of its standpoint and simultaneously to react on the content of the memorials submitted by the applicant and the third party, where applicable.
GR1 (Government): First of all, let me reaffirm that the government considered that pension rights, including the right to allowances on account of disability, are fundamental human rights to be guaranteed in a democratic society based on the rule of law and had been and are clearly enshrined both in the Constitution and in the fundamental law of Hungary.
GR1 (Government): The present case, however, is not about whether the Convention can afford protection to fundamental social rights, as this question had already been decided in the affirmative.
GR1 (Government): The question is rather whether such protection can be afforded independently from the will of member states when such entitlement had already been withdrawn, thereby elevating the protection mechanism of the Convention to the level of a social charter and creating an independent European social law on an undefined basis without the normal checks and balances that only state legislation can guarantee.
GR1 (Government): First, the government wished to express its critique as to the Chamber judgment and reiterate that the position of the majority, according to which Article 1 of Protocol No. 1
GR1 (Government): to the Convention shall be applicable in the present case, which is flatly incompatible with the Convention, inconsistent with the case law of the Court, and entails serious repercussions with regard to the social security and welfare system not only of Hungary, but all member states of the Council of Europe.
GR1 (Government): In order to substantiate these assertions, the government emphasized that the crux of the whole case is the issue whether before dealing with the question of proportionality there was a property right to start with.
GR1 (Government): The answer in the majority's view had been affirmative.
GR1 (Government): However, the government is of the view that the judgment follows a flawed chain of logic, which never should have substantiated the applicability of Article 1, Protocol No. 1,