TrustHLT/LaCour huggingface dataset:
GR1 (Government): The second and third applicant had specifically been observed talking to a known leader of a Danish hooligan group, as well as issuing orders to other individuals known to be part of the Danish hooligan community.
GR1 (Government): And they were on their way to the ongoing fight between the different hooligan groups.
GR1 (Government): As to the second criteria, that the person concerned must be made aware of the specific acts he or she is to refrain from committing, the Danish government recalls the current uncertain state of the interpretation of this particular criteria under subparagraph B.
GR1 (Government): The majority of the judges in the Ostendorf case found that the applicants in that case had been made aware that the police intended to avert hooligan violence, and that he was under an obligation to refrain from arranging and participating in such violence for two reasons.
GR1 (Government): Firstly, he'd been ordered by the police to stay with his group, and he was warned that he would be arrested if he left the group.
GR1 (Government): Secondly, the police had escorted the group earlier in the day, and had searched the group members for instruments typically used in hooligan brawls.
GR1 (Government): The majority of judges did, however, not discuss whether either of these two reasons separately on their own would have been sufficient to make the applicant aware of his obligations.
GR1 (Government): Thus, the question remains whether it was sufficient under Article 5, paragraph 1, subparagraph B, that the police previously that day had escorted the group and searched them in order for the applicant to be made aware of the acts that he were to refrain from committing.
GR1 (Government): Practical considerations must be included in the interpretation of this criteria.
GR1 (Government): It is evident that situations can arise in which a national police force may need to take immediate action to maintain law and public order, where there's no sufficient time to give a specific forewarning to the individuals concerned.
GR1 (Government): In the case from the United Kingdom, the Supreme Court explicitly mentioned the example of hooligan violence, where two hooligan groups collide, and the police has no alternative but to detain ringleaders immediately and for a short period of time.
GR1 (Government): The United Kingdom Supreme Court found that understanding subparagraph B as including a limitation on the police to first make the person aware of the acts they may not commit may leave the police effectively powerless in their efforts and obligations to protect the public.
GR1 (Government): We would argue that the circumstances of that case are very similar to those of the present case before the court.
GR1 (Government): When it comes to crowd control in the event of hooligan brawls, requiring that the police first give a direct warning and then a way to see if the hooligans concerned follow through on the warning before the police can decide to detain them, it's simply not a viable option.
GR1 (Government): Such a requirement would entail a disproportionate amount and impractical use of police resources, and more importantly, seriously hamper the ability of the police to protect persons and property in the event of hooligan disturbances.
GR1 (Government): In the present case, we argue that the applicants were made aware of the concrete and specific obligations incumbent on them by the visible and long-term presence of a substantive number of uniformed police officers in close proximity of the Danish hooligans on the day of the football match.
GR1 (Government): Allow me in this regard to direct the court's attention to page 11 and 15 of the applicants' memorial, where they seem to agree with the government's understanding of the criteria enshrined in subparagraph B and its application in the present case.
GR1 (Government): In addition to the criteria just discussed, the court in its case law has established two other criteria for lawful detention under subparagraph B. Firstly, the detention
GR1 (Government): must not be of a punitive character, and secondly, the basis for detention ceases to exist when the relevant obligation has been fulfilled.
GR1 (Government): As to the first criteria, we will briefly state the obvious, namely that the applicants were detained solely for the purpose of preventing their participation in and planning of hooligan violence.
GR1 (Government): Contrary to what the applicants have stated in their memorial, the detention was not in any way of a punitive character.
GR1 (Government): As to the other criteria, allow me once more to stress that the applicants were released as soon as practically possible based on the assessment of the situation in the city conducted by the police at regular intervals throughout the day.
GR1 (Government): The Danish courts in two instances have validated this ongoing assessment made by the police.
GR1 (Government): On the basis of the arguments stated in our written observations and reiterated here today, the Danish government submits that the measures taken by the Copenhagen police were proportionate to the aim of securing the fulfillment of the applicants' obligations and that the detention was therefore justified under Article 5, paragraph 1, subparagraph C.
GR1 (Government): I will now turn to question 5 from the court pertaining to the question of whether the detention of the applicants were justified under subparagraph C of Article 5, paragraph 1.
GR1 (Government): Should the court, contrary to what the Danish government anticipates, find that the detention of the applicants cannot be justified under subparagraph B, we alternatively argue that the detention would, in any circumstances, be justified under subparagraph C.
GR1 (Government): The criteria for lawful detention under subparagraph C has been examined in the court's case law referred to earlier in our submission today, namely the Lawless case and recently the Ostendorff case.
GR1 (Government): In Ostendorff, the court found that subparagraph C authorizes the detention of a person also when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offense.
GR1 (Government): As we have argued earlier, the Copenhagen police in the present case made an assessment very similar to that of the police in the Ostendorff case, namely to detain the applicants in order to prevent them from committing a criminal act.
GR1 (Government): If the police had not detained the applicants, there would have been a concrete and imminent risk that they would have committed a number of criminal acts, participating in and arranging further hooligan violence.
GR1 (Government): As to the other criteria for detention under subparagraph C, the court in Ostendorff was divided on the interpretation of the subparagraph.
GR1 (Government): The majority found that detentions are only justified under subparagraph C if they are affected for the purpose of bringing a person before a competent legal authority in order to decide the merits of the case.
GR1 (Government): In other words, to initiate criminal proceedings against the detainee.
GR1 (Government): In their dissent, the minority of two judges rightly pointed out that this interpretation unduly restricts the purpose of bringing the detainee before a judge to deciding on the merits.
GR1 (Government): The deciding judges underlined that such an understanding removes the possible purpose of bringing a person before a judge to examine whether the deprivation of liberty in itself was lawful.
GR1 (Government): As the minority states, Ostendorff represents a shift from the court's previous understanding of subparagraph C, since in the lawless case of 61, the court clearly recognizes both these options.
GR1 (Government): Allow me to recall here the previous mentioned judgment from the United Kingdom Supreme Court, in which the Supreme Court reaches a conclusion very similar to that of the dissenting judges in the Ostendorff case.
GR1 (Government): Returning to our case, the applicants were detained for a very short period of time before being released again.
GR1 (Government): And afterwards, they requested that their cases brought before the Danish courts.
GR1 (Government): Here, the lawfulness of that detention was examined thoroughly in two instances.
GR1 (Government): On this basis, the Danish government admit that their detention met the criteria in subparagraph C.
GR1 (Government): Allow me to emphasize that such an interpretation, in the opinion of the Danish government, is necessary in order to allow the police to have sufficient and effective means for crowd control, and thereby avoiding hooligan brawls in connection with football matches.
GR1 (Government): And allow me further to stress that when interpreting Article 5, the court itself has stated, for example, in the Ostend case, that it is important not to make it impracticable for the police to fulfill their duties of maintaining order and protecting the public.
GR1 (Government): This is provided, of course, that individuals are protected from arbitrary detention of liberty.
GR1 (Government): These two requirements are complementary.
GR1 (Government): When balancing them, a pragmatic approach is necessary.
GR1 (Government): On the one hand, it's important to be aware of the practical implications of placing requirements that are too strict on the police.
GR1 (Government): If the police cannot lawfully detain a person for a short period of time when necessary to avert the risk of imminent violence, it could render the police powerless when it comes to maintaining public order and security at mass events as a football game.
GR1 (Government): On the other hand, it goes without saying that national law must contain clear safeguards against arbitrary deprivation of liberty.
GR1 (Government): It follows that national laws allowing the police to use preventive detention as a last resort must be clear, precise, and accessible to the public, as is the case of Section 5 of the Danish Police Act.
GR1 (Government): Further, in case of a claim that the police have exceeded their powers, persons subject to preventive detention must have a quick and easy access to judicial review of the lawfulness of the detention.
GR1 (Government): Such access is available under Danish law.
GR1 (Government): If a detention is found to have been unlawful under Danish law, this, of course, warrants compensation.
GR1 (Government): Mr. President, your honors, distinguished members
GR1 (Government): of the court, getting to the end of my submission, I will now turn to answering question 6 posed by the court.
GR1 (Government): On the basis of the arguments presented by the Danish government, we maintain that the detention of the applicants were lawful under either Article 5, paragraph 1, subparagraph C, or Article 5, paragraph 1, paragraph B, or Article 5, paragraph 1, subparagraph C.
GR1 (Government): In conclusion, allow me to stress our major points.
GR1 (Government): Firstly, the detention of the three applicants were lawful under Danish law.
GR1 (Government): The Copenhagen police conducted an individual assessment with regard to each of the three applicants and found it necessary to detain each of the applicants to prevent them from participating in hooligan brawls and arranging further hooligan violence.
GR1 (Government): Less intrusive measures would not have sufficed in specific circumstances of the case.
GR1 (Government): Based upon regularly conducted assessment of the situation in the city on the day of the football match, the police also deemed it necessary to detain the applicants for more than six hours.
GR1 (Government): And the Danish court, in two instances, have confirmed the legality of this assessment.
GR1 (Government): Secondly, Article 5 of the convention should not be interpreted in such a way that makes it impossible for the police to perform the legitimate and indeed expected duties.
GR1 (Government): The police must have effective measures of crowd control.
GR1 (Government): The police must be able to take immediate action to avert an imminent risk of disturbance of the public order and security, and to ensure the safety of individuals, for example, in connection with football matches, which are likely to be disturbed by hooligan violence.
GR1 (Government): The government of Denmark agrees, of course, that such an interpretation of Article 5, according to which national laws may allow the police to use preventive detention, require that the national law is clear, precise, and accessible to the public in order to avoid arbitrary deprivation of liberty.
GR1 (Government): Furthermore, under such national laws, persons subject to preventive detention must have a quick and easy access to judicial review of the lawfulness of their detention.
GR1 (Government): On this basis, the government of Denmark respectfully requests that the court find no violation of Article 5 of the convention in the present case.
GR1 (Government): And with these remarks, the government of Denmark thereby concludes its initial submission.
Guido Raimondi (JudgeP): Mr. Rehfeld, I call now Mr. Bonnez, please, you have the floor.
AP1 (Applicant): Thank you. Mr. President and Honourable Judges of the Court, the applicants submit that the
AP1 (Applicant): detention they have been subjected to is in breach of Article 5 in the European Convention on Human Rights. The applicants also submit that the deprivation of liberty was contrary
AP1 (Applicant): to the national law. In particular, they find that that part of their detention that exceeded
AP1 (Applicant): the statutory six-hour limit was in breach of Article 5, as well as national law. The
AP1 (Applicant): three applicants were detained on two different locations by the police in Copenhagen on 10 October 2009, where Denmark were playing Sweden at the National Football Stadium in the World Cup qualifiers. Mr. B and Mr. A, the second and the third applicant, were detained in
AP1 (Applicant): the afternoon as they were walking together with a relatively small group of people in a pedestrian street not far from Amertorps Square, where a fight between some football supporters had broken out. Mr. S, the first applicant, was arrested approximately one
AP1 (Applicant): and a half hours later in another area of central Copenhagen. It is reported that a
AP1 (Applicant): total of 138 football fans were arrested during the day. It is worth mentioning that, according
AP1 (Applicant): to the Danish authorities and the applicants themselves, none of the three applicants are believed to have participated in any kind of unruly behaviour during the day in Copenhagen.
AP1 (Applicant): Mr. V and Mr. A had arrived in Copenhagen earlier in the day together with a group of
AP1 (Applicant): football supporters from their own team from the city of Aarhus. The whole group had made
AP1 (Applicant): their way to a pub in central Copenhagen. After having spent some time in the pub, the group
AP1 (Applicant): had decided to move on to another pub, preferably a bigger one. After having left the pub on
AP1 (Applicant): foot, the police detained Mr. V and Mr. A, but no other members of the group. According
AP1 (Applicant): to testimonies from police officers, both Mr. V and Mr. A, as well as the rest of the
AP1 (Applicant): group, were quiet and behaved well in the pub and after they had left the pub. In other
AP1 (Applicant): words, according to the police, there had been no trouble on the part of the group or on the part of Mr. V and Mr. A at any time during the day. Shortly before their arrest,
AP1 (Applicant): the group was stopped by the police and ordered to turn around and walk back and then into a side street. The group complied with that order as they immediately turned around and
AP1 (Applicant): did exactly what they were told. The arresting officers were told by the leaders in charge
AP1 (Applicant): of the police operation to arrest two persons from the group. The officers were further
AP1 (Applicant): told to pick the two who, in the eyes of the police officers, looked the most like ring leaders. That happened to be Mr. V and Mr. A. During the ensuing court proceedings, a
AP1 (Applicant): police officer testified in the Danish courts that he had seen Mr. V talking to a leader
AP1 (Applicant): of a hooligan group from the Copenhagen area while in the pub. This policeman further testified
AP1 (Applicant): that he had also heard Mr. V and Mr. A giving orders to others, albeit the policeman was
AP1 (Applicant): unable to give any details about these orders, let alone if the orders were related to football hooliganism or any other subject. The first applicant, Mr. S, was detained while he was
AP1 (Applicant): standing in the street together with a few other persons. A policeman who happened to
AP1 (Applicant): be in a police car parked on the opposite side of the road has testified that he was approached by a member of the public and was told by the same member of the public that he had overheard Mr. S planning a hooligan brawl on his mobile phone. The policeman could
AP1 (Applicant): see Mr. S talking on a mobile phone from his car. He immediately approached Mr. S and learned
AP1 (Applicant): that Mr. S had previously been detained by the police in connection with football matches.
AP1 (Applicant): He then detained Mr. S. He did not secure the identity of the member of the public that
AP1 (Applicant): had drawn his attention to Mr. S and presumably heard Mr. S talking on his phone. There's
AP1 (Applicant): no information available that suggests that the police have examined whether calls pertinent to hooliganism had been made from Mr. S's phone. One of them had no ticket. Yes, what
AP1 (Applicant): about the two others? Also, it's not illegal to be in the city without having a city. He
AP1 (Applicant): might be to the place with a mere purpose to enjoy himself or to be together with his friends outside the football stadium. Mr. V, Mr. A and Mr. S were detained between seven
AP1 (Applicant): and eight hours. Upon their release, the court trained back to all as quickly as possible.
AP1 (Applicant): All three applicants flatly denies that they had any plans to get involved in brawls during their stay in Copenhagen. All three applicants feel that they have been deprived of their
AP1 (Applicant): liberty in a wholly arbitrary fashion, which is exasperated by the fact that even simple time limits in national law were deliberately ignored by the police. In the present case,
AP1 (Applicant): domestic law sets out a six-hour time limit and still does so today. Neither the wording
AP1 (Applicant): of section 5.3 of the Danish Police Act nor the preparatory work allows for an extension
AP1 (Applicant): of that strict time limit for other purposes than due to practical difficulties in dealing with a large number of arrests. The authorities have never advanced the view that the reason
AP1 (Applicant): to extend the applicants' detention beyond six hours was due to the handling of a large number of detainees. The applicants submit that in accordance with the court's case
AP1 (Applicant): law, it is essential that the conditions for deprivation of liberty under domestic law be clearly defined and that the law itself is foreseeable in its application so that it meets the standards of lawfulness set out by and inherent in the Convention. This requires
AP1 (Applicant): the law to be sufficiently precise for the individual to foresee his or her position and set a high standard to the quality of national law. The applicants argue that the
AP1 (Applicant): relevant Danish law does not meet these requirements. The fact that none of the applicants at any
AP1 (Applicant): point were warned that they would be detained if they did not behave in a specific way is a particularly blatant breach of Article 5. The fact that they were not detained for the
AP1 (Applicant): purpose to be brought before court also indicates that the detention does not comply with Article 5. Neither Article 5 paragraph 1 subparagraph B or subparagraph C, none of these are applicable
AP1 (Applicant): for the detention of the applicants in this case. It is obvious that a comparison of the
AP1 (Applicant): detention in the present case can be made with the detention carried out in the case of Ostendorf versus Germany, which was decided by the court on 7 March 2013. Mr Ostendorf
AP1 (Applicant): was detained only for about four hours while he was in Frankfurt am Main to watch a football match. The police claimed that he was the leader of a hooligan group. He had arrived
AP1 (Applicant): in Frankfurt am Main earlier in the day by train together with a group of persons from Bremen. They had been searched by the police and some members of the group had been found
AP1 (Applicant): in possession of objects frequently used by hooligan groups. In their fights, the police
AP1 (Applicant): had ordered them to stay in a specific pub until they were ready to walk to the stadium in one single group under police surveillance. They were also told that they would be detained
AP1 (Applicant): if they attempted to leave the group. Mr Ostendorf was found hiding in the pub's ladies lavatories
AP1 (Applicant): after the group had left the pub. The display on his phone indicated he had communicated
AP1 (Applicant): with a person from Frankfurt am Main, hence he was detained. None of the three applicants
AP1 (Applicant): in the present case had received any instructions from the authorities as to what to do in order to avoid being preventively detained. No weapons or other items relevant to hooliganism had
AP1 (Applicant): been found on them or on other members of their group for that matter. Nor had the applicants
AP1 (Applicant): or other members of their groups been involved in any disruptive behaviour during their stay in Copenhagen. Mr B and Mr A complied with the orders given by the police shortly before
AP1 (Applicant): their arrests to turn around as soon as they were told to do so. The applicants do not
AP1 (Applicant): disagree with the minority's conclusion on page 28 of the Ostendorf judgement, where the minority concludes that Mr Ostendorf was detained in order to prevent him from committing specific criminal acts and regulatory offences. The minority points out that it was not for
AP1 (Applicant): the mere fact that he had left his group, which was under police surveillance on the way to the stadium, that Mr Ostendorf had been detained. Strictly speaking, the minority
AP1 (Applicant): is right. It was not for the mere fact that he had left the group that he was arrested.
AP1 (Applicant): But in the applicants' view, the fact that Mr Ostendorf did try to avoid the police surveillance by leaving the group and hiding out in the women's lavatory was a predominant reason for his detention. Had he stayed with the group and not tried to hide in the women's
AP1 (Applicant): lavatory, there is no reason to believe that he would have been detained whatsoever. In
AP1 (Applicant): the applicants' view, the detention of Mr Ostendorf was triggered by the mere fact that he apparently had communicated on his phone with persons attached to the Frankfurt & Main supporters and that he had left the group after having been told by the police not to do so. It is hard not to reach the conclusion that the majority in the Ostendorf case attached
AP1 (Applicant): considerable weight to the fact that Mr Ostendorf possibly had communicated with Frankfurt & Main supporters and had sought hide in the women's lavatory, despite the fact that he and the rest of the group had been expressly told by the police to stay in the group if they didn't want to be detained. In paragraph 95 in the court's assessment, the majority
AP1 (Applicant): explicitly points out that the applicant by the police prior to his arrest was ordered to stay with the group of football supporters with whom he had travelled from Bremen and who were to be escorted by the police to the football stadium. If paragraph 94 is read