TrustHLT/LaCour huggingface dataset:
GR1 (Government): Le voile transparent serait-il un compromis?
GR1 (Government): La réponse est il faut voir le visage.
GR1 (Government): Donc les compromis ne sont possibles que pour entendre que l'on voit le visage et que l'on puisse identifier la personne.
GR1 (Government): Voilà, M. le Président.
GR1 (Government): Si vous voulez bien, je dirais quelques mots pour conclure.
GR1 (Government): Je dirais que les observations orales du Conseil de la Récurrence n'apportent rien de nouveau par rapport aux longues observations écrites déjà produites.
GR1 (Government): Je me réfère donc à nos écrits ainsi qu'à la plaidoirie que je viens de prononcer.
GR1 (Government): Je tiens à souligner que nous rejoignons les observations présentées par le gouvernement belge qui insiste en particulier sur le fait qu'il s'agit ici de montrer en quoi la pratique de la dissimulation du visage est incompatible avec la vie sociale dans notre État de droit et en quoi une telle dissimulation met en danger les conditions du vivre ensemble et en quoi ce qui est en jeu, c'est l'égalité dans la communication sociale et le partage d'un patrimoine commun de valeur fondamentale.
GR1 (Government): J'ajouterai que le débat sur la dissimulation du visage dans l'espace public est présent dans différents pays du Conseil de l'Europe et je me permettrai de contredire le Conseil de la Récurrence quand il évoque le cas espagnol.
GR1 (Government): La décision espagnole ne porte que sur des questions qui sont pas sur le fond.
GR1 (Government): Je voulais dire quelques instants, revenir simplement un instant sur la question de la recevabilité qui nous paraît importante.
GR1 (Government): Je dirais simplement que bien au-delà de cette seule affaire, admettre qu'une loi telle que celle en cause peut être contestée devant vous en l'absence de tout contentieux interne et au mépris de la règle des pisons et de droits de recours est la porte ouverte à une très grande insécurité juridique et à une axio popularis.
GR1 (Government): Sur le fond, je tiens à insister à nouveau sur le fait que la loi en cause a été votée sans encombre par le Parlement français, c'est-à-dire à l'unanimité moins une voix, les suffrages exprimés dans chaque Chambre, à la suite d'un travail très approfondi d'une mission parlementaire regroupant toutes les tendances politiques, majorité et opposition, et après un très large débat démocratique.
GR1 (Government): Je crois qu'il est faux de dire, comme l'a fait le Conseil de la Récurrence, que les femmes voilées...
GR1 (Government): Ce n'est pas parce que je n'ai cité qu'un exemple qu'il n'y a eu qu'une interview.
GR1 (Government): Et je dois dire qu'il y a eu de très nombreuses auditions, puisqu'il y a eu plus de 200 auditions et que les travaux ont duré six mois.
GR1 (Government): Comme je l'ai souligné, le Conseil constitutionnel, à l'occasion de se prononcer sur cette loi, il l'a validée.
GR1 (Government): La Cour de cassation a reconnu sa compatibilité avec l'article 9.
GR1 (Government): Et c'est donc à l'issue d'un processus démocratique exigeant et long, tenant compte de la société civile, que cette loi, qui correspond à une forte conviction existante dans la société française, a été prise.
GR1 (Government): Alors, il convient, nous semble-t-il, de ne pas tomber dans le piège que tente de vous tendre le Conseil de la Récurrence, de l'amalgame entre le port du voile, qui n'est aucunement remis en cause par cette loi, et le port de la burqa du Nicabe.
GR1 (Government): Ce n'est en aucune façon une loi contre la pratique religieuse, mais simplement une loi protégeant les fondements de la vie en société.
GR1 (Government): De nombreuses associations qui défendent les droits des femmes s'émeuvent des tentatives menées pour contester cette loi, qu'elles estiment très utile.
GR1 (Government): Et je rappelle à nouveau, parce qu'il faut le répéter, que la loi interdit la dissimulation du visage, par quelque moyen que ce soit, et pour quelque raison que ce soit.
GR1 (Government): La dissimulation du visage ne concerne pas seulement les droits et libertés de ceux qui choisissent cette pratique, mais aussi les droits et libertés des personnes qu'ils vont rencontrer dans l'espace public.
GR1 (Government): Et c'est très important.
GR1 (Government): Je crois que les questions qui nous ont été posées montrent qu'il y a cette préoccupation.
GR1 (Government): Une loi telle que celle en cause dans la présente affaire relève assurément de la marge d'appréciation qui doit être laissée aux États, et que vous leur reconnaissez.
GR1 (Government): Dès lors qu'elle concilie le respect des valeurs fondamentales de la République française, elle est la première à mettre en place le pluralisme des convictions, la dignité de la personne, l'égalité entre les hommes et les femmes, et des considérations de sécurité publique.
GR1 (Government): Ces valeurs sont celles de la République française, mais elles sont aussi celles du Conseil de l'Europe.
GR1 (Government): La loi du 11 octobre 2010 permet tout à la fois d'assurer le respect des libertés fondamentales prévues par la Convention, et la garantie par l'État, car c'est son devoir, indispensable et minimal, du vivre ensemble dans la société démocratique.
Dean Spielmann (JudgeP): Merci, Madame Belliard, Mr De Mello.
AP1 (Applicant): Mr. President, may I deal with the specific questions
AP1 (Applicant): asked first by Judge Piotrowski?
AP1 (Applicant): The questions in the order asked is, it may be that the applicant in this case does not wear the full face veil or burqa all the time.
AP1 (Applicant): And how does that fit in with the concept, as I understood, the question of victim status?
AP1 (Applicant): First, one must accept and not question that she, in accordance with her inveterate belief, wants to wear it.
AP1 (Applicant): Where, when, and how is a matter of her choice.
AP1 (Applicant): Second, on one single occasion that she chooses to wear it in public, in accordance with the exercise of that choice, is sufficient to engage the regulation and make her liable to prosecution.
AP1 (Applicant): Then dealing with the next question, the alternatives.
AP1 (Applicant): What alternatives are available as opposed to the present?
AP1 (Applicant): Because we have made our submissions that less intrusive measures could and should have been adopted, particularly in the event there is discrimination on suspect grounds.
AP1 (Applicant): First, you have a witness statement indicating that she was prepared to wear a full face veil, which is diaphanous, and her face would be visible.
AP1 (Applicant): The second suggested alternative, bearing in mind it's for the state to make up the case, the state agents might ask her to prove her identity, either by the production of an identity card or to lift her face veil in the event there is a need to identify her in the situation, such as robbery, such as disorder.
AP1 (Applicant): Third, we say that, if needed, she would be willing to submit to security checks.
AP1 (Applicant): Fourth, the ban in this case, as in the case of Arsham, is so wide that we could say that the state could have tailored it by way of example given by the Belgian government.
AP1 (Applicant): The mother wearing a burka goes to collect her child, and the teacher very correctly would say to her, I'm sorry.
AP1 (Applicant): I'm not giving you the child until you lift your veil and show me who you are.
AP1 (Applicant): Are you the mother?
AP1 (Applicant): Fourth, and this might be a sensitive issue, but we accept there might be a call for it, is the training through religious leaders, imams, schools, and so forth at a very early level, indicating to women that you have a choice to wear it, but do not feel forced to wear it.
AP1 (Applicant): There might be examples, such as in the English case law, that a person giving evidence might be required to lift the face veil.
AP1 (Applicant): But whilst being in court, that person may not be required to lift the face veil.
AP1 (Applicant): These are some of the examples that we have put forward.
AP1 (Applicant): Then if I could deal with the next question.
AP1 (Applicant): This is the merits of the case under Article 9.2,
AP1 (Applicant): in short response to the French government's and then subsequently to the Belgium's government's submissions.
AP1 (Applicant): In this case, we submit that the French state has overstepped the margin of appreciation.
AP1 (Applicant): And if you recall, for your note purposes, in our submissions at paragraph 87, in keeping with the Ashland case, the width of the ban is so extensive, and it applies irrespective of the motive.
AP1 (Applicant): And we say, why do women wearing it pose more of a risk or threat than a woman who is exempt because of a religious need from wearing it?
AP1 (Applicant): And it is the expression of that freedom which has been curtailed in the first example, but not so in the second example, notwithstanding there is no threat to disorder.
AP1 (Applicant): And the point, I think, has been made in the question to the French government, the tension.
AP1 (Applicant): It is the obligation of the state to remove the tension.
AP1 (Applicant): But it is the regulation, in a sense, which has instigated the tension.
AP1 (Applicant): And the newspaper articles have confirmed this, a question which impinges, and I think it was raised by Judge Mosey, directed to the French government.
AP1 (Applicant): If the garments worn are partly visible, as has been made by way of a suggestion by the applicant, that she's happy to wear a diaphanous garment, then how does the law apply in those circumstances?
AP1 (Applicant): And of course, it would be for the state to say that the law is clear, foreseeable, accessible, to allow the citizen to predict his or her conduct.
AP1 (Applicant): And we respectfully submit that too is lacking in this particular piece of legislation.
AP1 (Applicant): Then it is also said by both governments that contact is essential.
AP1 (Applicant): Face contact is essential.
AP1 (Applicant): And in the case of France, the position emanates from the high-ranking works of Emmanuel Levinas that face contact is a good thing.
AP1 (Applicant): But we ask certain questions.
AP1 (Applicant): First, what credence is given to the person wearing it, given that she has a free choice to wear it?
AP1 (Applicant): Second, what is the purpose of the contact?
AP1 (Applicant): Is it the teacher who wants to establish the identity of the wearer?
AP1 (Applicant): Is it the shopkeeper who may feel a little unhappy that he's dealing with a person whose face is covered?
AP1 (Applicant): Does the veil inhibit dialogue, such as the example given by the United Kingdom case law, whilst giving evidence?
AP1 (Applicant): Is it necessary to have contact with the person's face?
AP1 (Applicant): And if so, can a polite request be made to the wearer?
AP1 (Applicant): These are questions which are relevant.
AP1 (Applicant): But the underlying theme of our submission is this, to require this disadvantaged group of Muslim women to conform to the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas in reality forces them to depart from their own religion freely chosen.
AP1 (Applicant): And in effect, it is consistent with what we have said, that the state is being partial to one secular view in preference to another religious view held by a minority.
AP1 (Applicant): That is our response to both governments' reliance on the philosophy of face contact.
AP1 (Applicant): We accept there are difficult issues to be raised, but we see a sensible way around this with a compromise in the way that we have suggested.
AP1 (Applicant): May I also point out one final submission.
AP1 (Applicant): The tensions created by the act should also be viewed by the statistics presented by the government.
AP1 (Applicant): As I said in our submissions, that 425 Muslim women have been fined.
AP1 (Applicant): And the reality which Mr. Mumin made
AP1 (Applicant): is that men escape prosecution, and they are the targeted group of persons, as it is suggested by the state, that they are the perpetrators who coerce women to wearing the veil.
AP1 (Applicant): And the legislation as seen in its operation is weighted against women, because they, in effect, whether they are forced or those who are wearing it freely, are the persons who suffer the effects of the prosecution.
AP1 (Applicant): The numbers far exceed the prosecution of men.
AP1 (Applicant): Thank you, Mr. President, members of the court.
Dean Spielmann (JudgeP): Merci beaucoup, M. De Mello.
Dean Spielmann (JudgeP): Nous en arrivons au terme de l'audience.
Dean Spielmann (JudgeP): Je remercie les comparants qui ont assisté à la Cour par leurs interventions et leurs réponses à ces questions.
Dean Spielmann (JudgeP): La Cour va maintenant délibérer sur la recevabilité et le fonds.
Dean Spielmann (JudgeP): L'arrêt sera rendu ultérieurement.
Dean Spielmann (JudgeP): Les partis seront informés de la date du prononcé.
Dean Spielmann (JudgeP): I declare open the public hearing on the admissibility and merits in the case of Hassan against the United Kingdom.
Dean Spielmann (JudgeP): The application was lodged with the court on the 5th of June, 2009, under Article 34 of the Convention by an Iraqi national, Mr. Khadim Resaan Hassan.
Dean Spielmann (JudgeP): The application was allocated to the Grand Chamber of the Court pursuant to Rule 52, paragraph 1 of the Rules of the Court.
Dean Spielmann (JudgeP): The application was communicated to the government on the 30th of August, 2011.
Dean Spielmann (JudgeP): On the 4th of June, 2013, the chamber decided to relinquish jurisdiction in favor of the Grand Chamber.
Dean Spielmann (JudgeP): On the 26th of August, 2013, the president of the Grand Chamber granted leave to the Human Rights Center of the University of Essex to submit written comments as a third party by virtue of Rule 44, paragraph 3 of the Rules of Court.
Dean Spielmann (JudgeP): The government are represented by their agent, Ms. Tomlinson, assisted by Mr. Eadie QC. and Mr. Staker
Dean Spielmann (JudgeP): Council, and by Mr. Addison and Ms. McLeod Advisor.
Dean Spielmann (JudgeP): The applicant is represented by Mr. Otty QC and Mr. Cleaver
Dean Spielmann (JudgeP): Council, assisted by Mr. Shiner, Ms. B. Shiner,
Dean Spielmann (JudgeP): and Ms. L. Shiner Advisors.
Dean Spielmann (JudgeP): I welcome the representatives in the name of the court.
Dean Spielmann (JudgeP): I would also like to welcome a delegation of judges of the Supreme Court of Montenegro, judges from the Supreme Court of Justice of Moldova, judges from the Supreme Court of Poland.
Dean Spielmann (JudgeP): I also welcome the visiting groups of judges and other dignitaries from Georgia, Latvia, Russia, Turkey, Japan, and Korea.
Dean Spielmann (JudgeP): I would explain that in addition to interpreting in the two official languages of the court, English and French, interpreting into Russian and Turkish has been authorized for the benefit of a delegation of Russian judges and a delegation from the Turkish High Council of Judges and Prosecutors.
Dean Spielmann (JudgeP): That interpreting is not arranged by the court, and no transcription of the oral translation will be included in the official record of the proceedings.
Dean Spielmann (JudgeP): Mr. Eadie for the government will speak first,
Dean Spielmann (JudgeP): and then Mr. Otty for the applicant.
Dean Spielmann (JudgeP): I call Mr. Eadie.
GR1 (Government): Members of the court, if I wasn't nervous before, the list of dignitaries that you just read out would be more than sufficient to make me very nervous now.
GR1 (Government): We are in Iraq.
GR1 (Government): The relevant dates are late April and early May 2003, the core focus being between the 23rd of April and the 2nd of May 2003.
GR1 (Government): So that period is almost entirely within the active hostilities phase of the armed conflict.
GR1 (Government): It is not in dispute that that armed conflict was an international armed conflict.
GR1 (Government): It had commenced on the 20th of March 2003.
GR1 (Government): As the Grand Chamber noted in Al-Skaini at paragraph 10 and Al-Jadda at paragraph 26, British forces had captured Basra by the 5th of April 2003.
GR1 (Government): United States troops had gained control of Baghdad by the 9th of April 2003.
GR1 (Government): And major combat operations were declared complete on the 1st of May 2003.
GR1 (Government): From that date, as the Grand Chamber also specifically found in Al-Skaini at paragraph 143 and Al-Jadda at paragraph 77, the US and the UK became occupying powers within the meaning of article 42 of the Hague regulations.
GR1 (Government): Unsurprisingly, therefore, the Grand Chamber in Al-Skaini and Al-Jadda has already applied the 1st of May 2003 as the key date in terms of major combat operations in Iraq coming to an end.
GR1 (Government): That was also the conclusion of the court in Al-Sadun.
GR1 (Government): See paragraph 3 of that decision.
GR1 (Government): It appears that the applicant takes issue with this finding, asserting an earlier date for the end of active hostilities at some point in early April 2003.
GR1 (Government): We submit that there is no basis for doing so.
GR1 (Government): And we've set out our case in detail on that point in our additional observations of the 14th of October 2013 between paragraphs 21 and 31.
GR1 (Government): The issue has been dealt with correctly, as we submit, by the Grand Chamber in Al-Skaini and Al-Jadda.
GR1 (Government): The documents relied upon by the applicant simply do not support his proposition of an earlier end to that active hostilities phase.
GR1 (Government): No doubt, certain major objectives have been achieved earlier in April 2003.
GR1 (Government): But the documents also plainly indicate the fact of serious, ongoing fighting.
GR1 (Government): There is nothing whatever to support a suggestion, which would have to be made by the applicant, that for some unspecified reason, the UK and the USA delayed the declaration of completion of major combat operations for one, two, or even three weeks.
GR1 (Government): This case concerns a man called Tariq Hassan.
GR1 (Government): Early in the morning of the 23rd of April 2003, a military operation was carried out by British forces in Basra.
GR1 (Government): The aim of that operation was to capture a general in the Al-Quds Army, that is, in the army against which the coalition forces were fighting.
GR1 (Government): He was thus a combatant and a legitimate military target.
GR1 (Government): That general is now the applicant before this court.
GR1 (Government): The British forces went to an address believed to be the general's house.
GR1 (Government): They did not find him.
GR1 (Government): It appears that he had already left.
GR1 (Government): But they did find an adult male on the roof of the house with a Kalashnikov AK-47 assault rifle.
GR1 (Government): The fact that many Iraqis might lawfully have carried AK-47s does not mean that the UK forces should have assumed, still less were required to assume, that this individual was lawfully doing so, especially when he had the assault rifle on the roof of the house.
GR1 (Government): And that house was the house of a general in the Al-Quds Army.
GR1 (Government): The key contemporaneous record at GA3, therefore, and we say with good reason, described this individual as, and I quote, a gunman.
GR1 (Government): That is the word used in the record.
GR1 (Government): On being questioned, the individual admitted that he was the brother of the man being sought, that is, of the applicant.
GR1 (Government): According to the applicant's own statements, the soldiers found further firearms in the house.
GR1 (Government): They also, having searched the house, found valuable intelligence material.
GR1 (Government): In those circumstances, and entirely unsurprisingly, the individual was captured.
GR1 (Government): That occurred at about 6.30 in the morning
GR1 (Government): on the 23rd of April, 2003.
GR1 (Government): The individual was Tariq Hassan.
GR1 (Government): Two things are clear, and I will need to return to them.
GR1 (Government): It is clear first that the UK was entitled in international law to detain combatants as prisoners of war in accordance with the Geneva Convention Number Three.
GR1 (Government): The circumstances of Tariq Hassan's capture more than justified detaining him on the basis that he was a suspected combatant.
GR1 (Government): The soldiers on the ground were unsurprisingly not well equipped, and indeed not even authorized to make any final decisions about his status.
GR1 (Government): So he was taken to Camp Bucca, B-U-C-C-A, for that to be done.
GR1 (Government): He was interviewed within two hours of his arrival at the camp.
GR1 (Government): The view was reached that he was probably a civilian.
GR1 (Government): He was interviewed again some 36 hours later on the morning of the 25th of April, 2003.
GR1 (Government): The view about his civilian status was confirmed, and it was additionally concluded that there was no reason to suspect that he was a security risk or a suspected criminal.
GR1 (Government): The decision was therefore taken at that point to release him.
GR1 (Government): I pause there to deal with two things.
GR1 (Government): The first is a suggestion that Tariq Hassan was detained in order to put pressure on the applicant to surrender himself.
GR1 (Government): That suggestion is entirely without foundation.
GR1 (Government): There is nothing in the records that have been discovered to support it.
GR1 (Government): It is undermined by the fact that there were entirely proper and reasonable grounds on which to capture him, not least the fact that he was a gunman at the general's house.
GR1 (Government): As importantly, that suggestion is impossible to reconcile with the fact, which is clearly and unequivocally recorded in the contemporaneous documentation, the fact that a decision was taken to release Tariq Hassan less than 38 hours after his arrival at Camp Bucca.
GR1 (Government): The second matter to deal with is the complaints the applicant makes about recently discovered documentation.
GR1 (Government): We can no doubt all agree that it is unfortunate that it was not discovered earlier.
GR1 (Government): That is for the simple reason that the documentation now provides a much clearer picture, based on the contemporaneous records, of the circumstances of the capture of Tariq Hassan.
GR1 (Government): But we do not accept the criticism now made by the applicant about the late appearance of this material.
GR1 (Government): It is easy in retrospect to assert that further electronic searches could have been made, which would have led to the earlier discovery of the documentation.
GR1 (Government): However, reasonable searches were made electronically in reasonable places.
GR1 (Government): See paragraph 7 of our observations for a description of what was undertaken.
GR1 (Government): And it is unattractive indeed for too strident a criticism to be made in this case, in circumstances in which the applicant himself, for whatever unverifiable reason, delayed for a period of three years before even raising the matter with the British authorities.
GR1 (Government): You have the citation of the Van Aver case, at paragraph 161 to 2, at paragraph 22 of our observations, for the importance the court attaches to the need to make timely complaints.
GR1 (Government): However, the point of real significance here is that the complaints about late discovery of material do not advance the applicant's substantive case at all.
GR1 (Government): They do not do so because he cannot properly, and does not seek, positively to suggest that the documentation now discovered is anything other than genuine and contemporaneous.
GR1 (Government): And once that is accepted, the documentation stands as highly relevant to, indeed, the best contemporaneous evidence of the circumstances of Tariq Hassan's capture.
GR1 (Government): Back to the facts.
GR1 (Government): Following the determination of his status on the 25th of April 2003, he was released to the civilian holding area at Camp Bucca.