TrustHLT/LaCour huggingface dataset:
GR1 (Government): The applicant organization, as a human rights NGO, seems to have lost sight of the fact that the handling of personal data by public authorities, such as the police, is purpose-bound.
GR1 (Government): Therefore, the police cannot process personal data for purposes other than prescribed by law and without an explicit authorization by the law.
GR1 (Government): The fact that the requested personal data are available to the police and that their compilation is technically feasible doesn't mean that the procession of those data according to a request from the public is legally possible.
GR1 (Government): The fact that certain personal data are public for some purposes doesn't mean that they are public for any other purposes.
GR1 (Government): The fact that the names of all members of the bar associations and all potential legal aid defense councils are made public by the bar association themselves cannot be construed as an authorization for the police to process and publish those names for purposes not prescribed by law.
GR1 (Government): The purpose of the Data Act itself was to ensure the transparency of the exercise of public power and the use of public funds.
GR1 (Government): In none of these respects, the names of the legal aid defense councils actually appointed by the police constituted relevant information.
GR1 (Government): Legal aid defense councils do not exercise public power and do not manage the state's property, which in itself qualifies as performing a public duty in accordance with the domestic jurisprudence cited by the applicant.
GR1 (Government): Contrary to the applicant's submissions, there is no domestic jurisprudence establishing that private schools fall within the scope of section 19, paragraph 4 of the Data Act, simply on account of performing public services delegated by state authorities and thus qualifying as other persons performing public duties.
GR1 (Government): There is domestic jurisprudence only concerning public educational institutions using public funds for performing their tasks.
GR1 (Government): Private schools might only have fallen under the scope of this provision as direct beneficiaries of public subsidies, whereas the direct beneficiaries of the legal aid system are the defendants and the legal aid lawyers whose fees are much below market fees in the legal aid scheme are only partially compensated for their time spent on performing their civic obligations.
GR1 (Government): Moreover, legal aid fees are determined by law based on the hours actually spent on a case and not at the discretion of the police.
GR1 (Government): Without evaluating the quality of the applicant's research on the functioning of the legal aid defense scheme in Hungary, the government would only point out that the data requested from the police was not necessary and most certainly not essential to that research.
GR1 (Government): The most telling proof of that is that although the applicant organization had received a number of names from the police, none of them was used in the survey.
GR1 (Government): The applicant made a statistical analysis of the data obtained and they could have lawfully obtained similar statistical data from all police departments had they not insisted upon obtaining personal data.
GR1 (Government): In this respect, the government point out that the third party submissions of Fair Trials International relied upon by the applicant only identified a general trend towards enabling external commentators to monitor performance of justice systems through statistical data.
GR1 (Government): Moreover, the government considered that convention case law concerning the violation of Article 6, Paragraph 3, on account of the poor quality of the defense provided by legal aid lawyers doesn't support the applicant's argument that legal aid defense counsels qualify as public authorities whose actions are attributable to the state.
GR1 (Government): The relevant case law rather confirms that states have a positive obligation to protect defendants from violations by private persons, at least in semi-private relations.
GR1 (Government): Summing up the issue of the functioning of the legal aid defense counsel system in Hungary, the government finally point out that there have been no cases against Hungary before the court complaining of the work of the legal aid lawyers.
GR1 (Government): This leads us to the question whether the court wishes to introduce a system of actio popularis through the backdoor of Article 10, as proposed by the applicant reinforced by the third party submissions.
GR1 (Government): Certain that the court will answer that question in the negative, the government will not further elaborate on this point.
GR1 (Government): insofar as Article 10 is applicable to the present case, and should the court find that there has been an interference with the applicant's rights under Article 10, the government consider that that interference was not only in accordance with the law and had a legitimate aim, as set out above, and in the government's memorial, but it was also necessary in a democratic society and proportionate to the aim pursued.
GR1 (Government): The denial of access to the requested data served the protection of the rights of others, as explained in the government's memorial in detail.
GR1 (Government): There was no pressing social need for the restriction of Article 8 rights of legal aid defense councils in the manner proposed by the applicant, since the public interest in monitoring the functioning of the legal aid defense scheme could be achieved by less restrictive means, in particular through statistical data.
GR1 (Government): Although the applicant claims that the requested information was essential for it to form a well-founded opinion on the functioning of the legal aid defense system throughout the country, this argument is contradicted first by the fact that they only requested information from 28 local and regional police departments, out of about 180 police departments countrywide.
GR1 (Government): 17 sets of data obtained versus 28 requested makes not much of a difference in forming a well-founded opinion compared to 150 sets of data which were not requested at all.
GR1 (Government): Moreover, the data in the form that they were requested were not used by the applicant at all in their report on the issue.
GR1 (Government): Furthermore, there were alternative means of obtaining relevant and even more sophisticated, and thus more useful data on the issue, namely in the form of statistical data or by way of cooperation with the national police headquarters, which was indeed made use of by the applicant at some point, and which enabled it not simply to confirm its original presumption of uneven distribution of cases, but to explore the actual reasons therefore.
GR1 (Government): Availability as claimed by the police, or inactivity as presumed by the applicant.
GR1 (Government): Under these circumstances, it cannot be argued that the data requested were essential for forming a well-founded opinion on the issue.
GR1 (Government): Since the alternative means of gathering information enabled the applicant to contribute more effectively to the debate concerning an issue of public interest, the denial of access to the requested information didn't constitute a disproportionate interference, if any, with the applicant's freedom of expression.
GR1 (Government): The government emphasized that in contrast to the case of Társasága Szabadságjogokért versus Hungary, the applicant in this case did not request the relevant data from the Hungarian authorities in any and most form as a secondary claim.
GR1 (Government): See paragraphs 14, 16, and 37 of the judgment in that case.
GR1 (Government): Taking into consideration the aforesaid and maintaining the government's position set out in their memorial of the 7th of September, 2015, I respectfully request the honorable court to find that insofar as Article 10 is applicable, there has been no violation of the applicant's rights under the convention, even by the standards of the most expanded interpretation of that provision.
GR1 (Government): Finally, I would like to make two very brief comments on the applicant's claims for just satisfaction under Article 41 of the convention.
GR1 (Government): First, the government agreed with the applicant organization that the information denied from it and the alleged violation of Article 10 resulting therefrom was so insignificant that it caused no practical or moral prejudice to the applicant, and therefore no claims for non-pecuniary damages are justified.
GR1 (Government): Second, the government find that the applicant's claims for lawyers' fees, as well as the preliminary estimates of the expenses emerging with regard to the present hearing, are excessive, highly excessive, and the government will submit their detailed comments in writing as soon as the actual expenses are verified.
GR1 (Government): Mr. President, that concludes that I
GR1 (Government): wish to say at this stage.
Guido Raimondi (JudgeP): I call now Dr. Sepsi.
AP1 (Applicant): Thank you, Mr. President, members of the Court.
AP1 (Applicant): As the representative of the Hungarian Helsinki Committee, I would like to present you supplementary information to the written contribution of the applicant in three separated but interconnected aspects of the case.
AP1 (Applicant): I will open with a brief outline on the applicant's understanding on the main questions of the applicability of Article 10 of the Convention in the case, where arguments and references will be presented as a reaction to the written contributions of the governments of Hungary and the United Kingdom.
AP1 (Applicant): In the second part of my presentation, I will summarize those characteristics of the Hungarian system of appointed defense councils and also the Hungarian freedom of information legislation, which we think are decisive in the case.
AP1 (Applicant): This will be done also to clarify in which aspects we find the reasoning of the Hungarian government unfounded.
AP1 (Applicant): As I will finish my speech with additional information on the factual basis of the application, mostly in connection with three issues.
AP1 (Applicant): First, the applicant's role in monitoring the protection of human rights and criminal procedures in Hungary.
AP1 (Applicant): Second, the nature and relevance of the research report of the applicant on the practice of the ex-official appointment of defense councils.
AP1 (Applicant): And third, the importance of the specific freedom of information requests, both for the preparation of the report and for establishing a practice for similar requests in the future.
AP1 (Applicant): So let me start with the applicability of Article 10 in the case.
AP1 (Applicant): The application is based on Article 10, and it covers a case where the violation of the Convention is assumed to be based on the fact that Hungarian authorities had failed to disclose information on freedom of information requests, and Hungarian courts had later failed to force these authorities to disclose.
AP1 (Applicant): We see the right of access to information not as a standalone right established by the Convention, but as an inherent right of the freedom of expression.
AP1 (Applicant): According to Article 10 of the Convention, everyone has the right to freedom of expression, and this right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference from public authorities.
AP1 (Applicant): The court reiterated many times that Article 10 also protects the freedom of research as established in the cases Sorgut versus Turkey or Sapan versus Turkey.
AP1 (Applicant): In the present case, it is a fundamental precondition for both the applicant and the general public for holding an opinion in an issue of high public interest to have access to the facts of the operation of the system of ex-official appointments in the criminal justice system.
AP1 (Applicant): It must not be forgotten that the right to ex-official defense councils is guaranteed by the Convention as well, Article 6, paragraph 3, point A. So what is at stake in the present
AP1 (Applicant): case is whether someone, notably a human rights NGO, can assess how a system of state-founded legal assistance operates, the poor quality of which in itself might lead to the establishment of the violation of the Convention.
AP1 (Applicant): Thus by rejecting access to data, the authorities used their information monopoly as a sensory power, so Hungary failed in its negative obligation not to interfere unjustifiably with the rights protected by Article 10, impending the realization of freedom of research, freedom to hold opinions, and freedom of expression.
AP1 (Applicant): Although Article 10 of the Convention does not include any reference to the right to seek information, according to the case law of the court, Article 10 also covers state interference in the process of seeking information.
AP1 (Applicant): The European Court of Human Rights decisions of the last decade clearly advanced towards a broader interpretation of the notion of freedom to receive information.
AP1 (Applicant): And cases like Strudzsanyi-Juhaczeszky-Mátkyi versus the Czech Republic, Társasága-Szabadság-Jugokert versus Hungary, Kennedy versus Hungary, Youth Initiative for Human Rights versus Serbia, and Österreichische Vereinigung versus Austria led to the recognition of a right of access to public information in this respect, and also acknowledged that NGOs such as the applicant may be characterized as social vegetables, and in that connection, their activities were on similar convention protection to that afforded to the press.
AP1 (Applicant): Nearly all of the chambers, four out of five sections of the European Court of Human Rights have already delivered judgments supporting this interpretation.
AP1 (Applicant): The written arguments submitted by the government of the United Kingdom make an interesting division of these cases, but the mere fact that some of them, like Kennedy versus Hungary, could have been solved with the same outcome by other legal arguments does not make this line of cases less convincing or less coherent.
AP1 (Applicant): We do not see these decisions as contradicting earlier judgments of this Court, rather as supplementing them.
AP1 (Applicant): In addition, we do not really see why the cases related to failed requests of personal data, such as Leander versus Sweden, cited by the written submissions of the UK government would be of significance in this case.
AP1 (Applicant): Nevertheless, the applicant does not presume that there is a general obligation for member states to impart public information regardless of the subject of the piece of information concerned.
AP1 (Applicant): Establishing the right to access to information as an inherent right of the freedom of expression is not a unique example of unprecedented activism.
AP1 (Applicant): Important elements of this Court's jurisdiction are based on similarly deduced rights.
AP1 (Applicant): Most notably, Article 6 on fair trial is the basis of the right to access to court, and Article 2 on the right to life is proved to be the basis of the protection of environmental rights under the Convention.
AP1 (Applicant): The wording of the fundamental international documents on the protection of human rights had been formulated decades before technical development and information society led to the general recognition of the freedom of information in modern democracies.
AP1 (Applicant): As the Court has reiterated many times, the Convention is a living instrument.
AP1 (Applicant): The rights enshrined in the Convention have to be interpreted in the light of present-day conditions so as to be practical and effective.
AP1 (Applicant): Sociological, technological, and scientific changes and evolving standards in the field of human rights have to be considered when applying the Convention.
AP1 (Applicant): Similar considerations have led other international bodies of human rights protection to acknowledge aspects of the right to access to information in the process of determination of the scope of freedom of expression.
AP1 (Applicant): The Human Rights Committee came to this conclusion in its general comment number 34 with regard to Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
AP1 (Applicant): While the Inter-American Court of Human Rights held in the case of Claude Reyes and others versus Chile that Article 13 of the American Convention on Human Rights protects access to public information as a part of freedom of expression.
AP1 (Applicant): The Hungarian government argues that the fact that the Member States of the Council of Europe adopted a separate, specific Convention on the right to access to official documents proves that Article 10 was not intended to cover the right to seek information from public authorities, but only the right to receive information that has already been made public.
AP1 (Applicant): It is a rather interesting argument since the specific Convention explicitly refers to Article 10 in its preamble, but it can also be challenged by important counter-examples.
AP1 (Applicant): The adoption of the Istanbul Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence would obviously not prevent the Court to maintain its Article 3, Article 8 and Article 14 practice defending women against violence.
AP1 (Applicant): But we can also refer to Article 10 and the European Agreement on the Protection of Television Broadcasts.
AP1 (Applicant): Nonetheless, the Court has previously relied, for example in the Marx versus Belgium case, on the existence of specific Council of Europe documents in support of establishing a common European approach justifying the dynamic interpretation of the Convention.
AP1 (Applicant): To sum it up, Article 10 of the Convention covers decisions of Member States on denying access to public documents, and it is applicable under the circumstances of the present case because the procedure of Hungarian authorities concerns a direct interference with the applicant's Article 10 rights.
AP1 (Applicant): Second, to the status of the data requested.
AP1 (Applicant): Whether the interference was prescribed by law in the case is mostly determined by the legal status of the requested data.
AP1 (Applicant): As we all know, the data requests in the case were submitted to police headquarters that disclosed the names of defence councils appointed and the number of cases in which each of them was appointed.
AP1 (Applicant): The Hungarian government cited a number of judgments on personal data protection from the Court of Justice of the European Union in its written comments to support its position, but none of them provide us guidance in the present case because the issue here is monitoring the work of public authorities.
AP1 (Applicant): Moreover, the nature of the requested data is in no way related to the private sphere or privacy of the ex-official defence councils, neither to issues falling under the attorney-client privilege or their official confidentiality requirements, as they did not cover any information about the individual cases.
AP1 (Applicant): The system of appointing defence councils is different from Member State to Member State of the Council of Europe.
AP1 (Applicant): However, these differences should not affect the decision of the Court, as the case and the status of the data might well be decided on the basis of the Hungarian public defence system alone, where the duty of the public council is clearly performed as a result of a decision exercising public power and financed by public funds.
AP1 (Applicant): The applicant argued from the start of the national judicial proceedings that the public interest nature of mandatory defence establishes the status of public data of public interest for the requested data.
AP1 (Applicant): The First Instance Court accepted this argument, but the Second Instance Court and the Supreme Court rejected it.
AP1 (Applicant): The definition of the applied article of the Hungarian Freedom of Information Act, namely Article 19, paragraph 4 of the Act on the Protection of Personal Data and the Public Nature of the Public Interest Data, clearly set out in a general manner that unless otherwise provided by law, all personal data of persons performing public duties shall, inasmuch as they are related to their duties, constitute public data of public interest.
AP1 (Applicant): We think that the public data of public interest status, the public nature of the requested information, was clearly provided by the Hungarian legal system on the basis of three facts.
AP1 (Applicant): First, the name of the defence council, regardless of being private or appointed ex officio, cannot be erased from any published court decision since 1 January 2006.
AP1 (Applicant): That is the entering into force of Article 18, paragraph 2, point B of Act 90 of 2005 on the Electronic Freedom of Information, which requires the publication of nearly all decisions of the Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals.
AP1 (Applicant): Second, the ex officio appointed defence council's fee and expenses shall be advanced and often paid by the State.
AP1 (Applicant): In terms of the name and the number of cases, the public funding alone constituted clear ground for the public nature of the data under Hungarian law.
AP1 (Applicant): And third, the court hearings are open to the public, even for the press, and audio and video recordings of the defence council can be made without his or her permission under Article 74B, paragraph 1 of Criminal Procedure Code.
AP1 (Applicant): Accordingly, the appointed defence council's name and the fact that he or she was appointed and how many times he or she was appointed does not constitute personal data protected by the right to informational self-determination.
AP1 (Applicant): Consequently, the courts denied the access to the requested information on the basis of a legal provision that clearly could not have been applied in the case.
AP1 (Applicant): Therefore, the prescribed by law requirement has not been complied with.
AP1 (Applicant): Even if the court had recognised this limitation as prescribed by law, we think that under the Hungarian regulation mentioned above, there is no pressing social need for denying the access to the requested information.
AP1 (Applicant): And now, third and finally, to the consequences of denials.
AP1 (Applicant): The applicant would not normally use any of his 30 minutes of publicity to talk about his own work and activities, but the written submission of the government contains some arguments on the aim and nature of the research and the informational requests which have to be commented on.
AP1 (Applicant): I will submit these remarks along with some other clarifications regarding the facts of the case, which can also be relevant in case the court comes to assess whether the interference had a legitimate aim and whether it was proportionate and necessary in a democratic society.
AP1 (Applicant): The state is not entitled to question or criticise the aim of freedom of information requests or to question the research methodology an individual or an organisation applies.
AP1 (Applicant): However, the government's memorial chose to address in detail the applicant's research methodology and the justifiability and necessity of its freedom of information requests.
AP1 (Applicant): Therefore, the applicant wishes to point out some misleading statements in relation to the research.
AP1 (Applicant): The Hungarian Helsinki Committee is one of only a handful of organisations regularly and systematically monitoring the protection of human rights in Hungary.
AP1 (Applicant): The number of independent Wajdaw organisations actively monitoring Article 6 of the Convention is even smaller.
AP1 (Applicant): Unfortunately, the research report is not just one of several empirical studies accessible on the appointment practice of defence councils, but the first and only of its kind.
AP1 (Applicant): Therefore, without other public sources of information, the findings and grounding of the research have had direct effect on the public and scientific debate on the topic.