TrustHLT/LaCour huggingface dataset:
GR1 (Government): And as the court made plain in the TV Vest case, even in this area, the lack of consensus among Council of Europe states speaks in favor of allowing a somewhat wider margin of appreciation than that normally accorded with respect to restrictions on political speech in relation to Article 10 of the Convention.
GR1 (Government): Against that background, it would be a very strong thing, indeed, to stigmatize as outside the United Kingdom's margin of appreciation the unanimous judgment of the United Kingdom Parliament and courts.
GR1 (Government): In deciding whether to do so, three matters in particular should be borne in mind.
GR1 (Government): The first is the strength and importance of the interests which the PPA serves.
GR1 (Government): Freedom of expression is valuable precisely because of the role it can play in altering the course of a democratic government or a democratic society.
GR1 (Government): But its ability to play that vital role is diminished if the capacity to influence the debate depends on the resources of the speaker.
GR1 (Government): Permission to air its advertisements in favor of animal welfare will be of little value to the applicant if the response is a deluge of advertisements supporting the status quo placed by much richer pharmaceutical or entertainment interests.
GR1 (Government): The second factor is the limited nature of the PPA.
GR1 (Government): It applies only to the broadcast media.
GR1 (Government): So there is nothing to stop the applicant from conveying its views in newspapers, on the internet, on billboards, by telemarketing, or in leaflets.
GR1 (Government): The applicant, of course, says that this just shows how unnecessary the PPA is.
GR1 (Government): But this court in Murphy took the opposite view.
GR1 (Government): It held correctly that the availability of these other means for conveying the message was highly relevant to the proportionality of a ban limited to the broadcast media, media which it said were accepted by this court and acknowledged by the applicant in that case as having a more immediate, invasive, and powerful impact.
GR1 (Government): The third factor is the regulatory regime as a whole of which the PPA forms only one part.
GR1 (Government): The existence of an obligation of impartiality imposed on all broadcasters and of a right to make free party political, party election, and referendum campaign broadcasts is an essential part of the context in which the PPA must be judged.
GR1 (Government): Neither feature was present in Switzerland when the VGT case was decided, nor in Norway at the time of the decision in TV Vest.
GR1 (Government): Let me deal now with those two cases.
GR1 (Government): First, the decision in VGT.
GR1 (Government): The facts of that case were unusual.
GR1 (Government): The applicant organization was seeking to respond to commercial broadcast advertisements, which were themselves considered by the court to be political.
GR1 (Government): In other words, it was seeking to restore balance to a political debate that had, in the circumstances, become unbalanced.
GR1 (Government): There is nothing that can be regarded as analogous here.
GR1 (Government): The applicant complains that media organizations continue to use primates in TV and radio advertisements, but they're not doing so to make a political point, nor are they engaging in a political debate.
GR1 (Government): They're simply exercising a right which they have under existing law.
GR1 (Government): A group which really did have a political point to make, for example, one seeking to support the adequacy of existing animal welfare standards or oppose their extension, would be prohibited by the PPA from advertising, just as the applicant is.
GR1 (Government): In any event, there are a number of respects in which the reasoning of the chamber in 2001 is open to question.
GR1 (Government): They're set out in the United Kingdom government's memorial, but the essential points are these.
GR1 (Government): First, the chamber gave no explanation for rejecting the submission that the potency and pervasiveness of the broadcast media justified special restrictions not applicable to other media.
GR1 (Government): As I have said, that was a proposition expressly accepted by this court in Murphy.
GR1 (Government): A second related point is that the decision appears to have attached little significance to the availability of alternative media in allowing the applicant to pursue its political objectives.
GR1 (Government): The availability of these alternative media is crucial to any analysis of the proportionality of the PPA, just as it was crucial to the proportionality of the Irish rule at issue in Murphy.
GR1 (Government): Third, the court did not address the effect that removal of the prohibition could have on the impartiality of broadcasting services.
GR1 (Government): Fourth, as I've noted, the court in VGT relied on the fact that the applicant was not a powerful financial group.
GR1 (Government): The same point was made by the chamber in TV Vest.
GR1 (Government): The answer, with respect, is again supplied by the judgment of the court in Murphy.
GR1 (Government): The fact that the applicant was not itself financially powerful could not be relevant unless a workable means could be devised to distinguish between financially powerful groups and others.
GR1 (Government): As I've shown, the United Kingdom Parliament and courts were entitled to conclude that no such means exists.
GR1 (Government): Fifth, the judgment in VGT does not appear to recognize that prohibitions on political advertising are intended to enhance rather than to restrict the quality of free expression in a democracy.
GR1 (Government): The right to speak is worth very little if the speech is, in practice, not heard, because it is drowned out by speech from well-funded opposing interests.
GR1 (Government): Sixth, the court in VGT appears to have paid scant regard to the widespread agreement that the broadcasting of political advertising may be prohibited on the broadcast media, at least during election periods when political speech is at its most important.
GR1 (Government): This is an important starting point, and the applicant organization does not dispute it.
GR1 (Government): It shows that, in principle, it may be justifiable to regulate speech in the broadcast media while leaving speech in other media unregulated.
GR1 (Government): Whether to extend the prohibition beyond election periods must then depend on the judgment of individual contracting states about whether, in the context of their particular regulatory regimes, a prohibition narrowly limited to election periods would achieve the important aims which it seeks to promote.
GR1 (Government): Seventh, the court in VGT appears not to have addressed the fact that there is no European consensus on the need for or scope of a prohibition of political advertising or the effect that this important fact should have on the margin of appreciation afforded by the court.
GR1 (Government): Finally, the suggestion that the Grand Chamber in VGT number 2 reaffirmed the substantive reasoning in VGT is wholly misplaced.
GR1 (Government): The court in VGT number 2 was not concerned with the correctness of its earlier decision at all.
GR1 (Government): The issue before the court was whether the Swiss authorities had committed a further violation of Article 10 by failing to allow the applicant to reopen its domestic proceedings.
GR1 (Government): The question whether a contracting state should make changes to its domestic regime to eliminate a breach of the convention found by this court is, of course, very different from the prior question whether such a breach has occurred in the first place.
GR1 (Government): In TV Vest, the facts were again very different from those of the present case.
GR1 (Government): First, unlike the present applicant, the applicant in TV Vest was a political party.
GR1 (Government): Secondly, unlike in the United Kingdom, the purchase of advertising time was the only method for minority parties in Norway to disseminate their message via the broadcast media.
GR1 (Government): By contrast, in the United Kingdom, broadcasters have an obligation to maintain impartiality between political views and their programming, and a duty to provide free party political, party election, and referendum campaign broadcasts.
GR1 (Government): The court in TV Vest, in fact, went out of its way to say at paragraph 34 that the need for a political party to advertise in Norway was especially pressing, since unlike in many other European states, including the United Kingdom, there was no system of party political broadcasts.
GR1 (Government): Thus, Norway was one of the few contracting states that not only prohibited political advertising on television, but also failed to regulate party political broadcasts.
GR1 (Government): This point the court held was important to bear in mind in determining the scope of the margin of appreciation.
GR1 (Government): It is not surprising that the chamber's judgment in that case turned on the particular characteristics of the regulatory regime under consideration there.
GR1 (Government): The outcome of this case, by analogy, must turn on an analysis of the very different regulatory regime applicable in the United Kingdom.
GR1 (Government): The task of this court is not to design a one-size-fits-all regime capable of application to all Council of Europe contracting states, but to consider whether the carefully considered policy choices made by the United Kingdom Parliament and upheld by its courts have strayed outside the applicable margin of appreciation.
GR1 (Government): The United Kingdom Parliament and courts were entitled to conclude that the PPA, in the context of the other duties imposed on those media, was and is the right way of ensuring and enhancing pluralism and equality in political speech.
GR1 (Government): For these reasons, and those set out in its memorial, the United Kingdom government respectfully invite the court to hold that there has been no violation of the applicant's Article 10 rights.
Françoise Tulkens (JudgeP): Thank you very much, Mr Chamberlain.
Françoise Tulkens (JudgeP): Now I call Mr Tomlinson.
AP1 (Applicant): Madam President, members of the court, in 2005, the applicant NGO prepared a 22nd television advertisement to support its campaign against the exploitation of non-human primates. The
AP1 (Applicant): campaign was called, My Mate's a Primate. The advertisement showed a young girl in a
AP1 (Applicant): cage. It then had a caption which said, a chimp has the mental and emotional age of
AP1 (Applicant): a four year old child. It went on to show a chimpanzee with a voiceover saying that
AP1 (Applicant): although they share 98% of our genetic makeup, they are still caged and abused to entertain.
AP1 (Applicant): This advert can be seen today on YouTube, can be looked at any time on the internet.
AP1 (Applicant): It cannot be shown on television in the United Kingdom. Its broadcast breaches an absolute
AP1 (Applicant): statutory prohibition in the Communications Act 2003. This particular advert is not said
AP1 (Applicant): to be offensive or socially divisive. It's not said that in any way it damages or lowers
AP1 (Applicant): the tone of public debate. It is not in any way objectionable. It is nevertheless banned
AP1 (Applicant): from broadcast on United Kingdom television. This is because under English law, a body
AP1 (Applicant): whose objects are wholly or mainly of a political nature or an advertisement directed towards a political end cannot be broadcast on television or on radio. This statutory ban is absolute.
AP1 (Applicant): In addition, it has three striking features. First of all, there is the extraordinarily
AP1 (Applicant): wide definition of political. This does not just cover an attempt to influence the outcome
AP1 (Applicant): of an election, but it covers any attempt to bring about a change in the law or the policies of government or public officials anywhere in the world. This means, to take
AP1 (Applicant): a contemporary example, nobody in the United Kingdom could broadcast an appeal to citizens in the United Kingdom to write to the government of Syria saying that the government of Syria should change its policies towards humanitarian aid to civilians in Homs. That would be impossible
AP1 (Applicant): because it is an attempt to influence the policies of a foreign government. Put another
AP1 (Applicant): way, in practice, in the United Kingdom, it is impossible to use broadcast adverts to contribute to any debate of general interest. The law does not permit it. The second striking
AP1 (Applicant): feature is this. The ban covers only radio and television. The advert can be shown in
AP1 (Applicant): the cinema, on the internet. It can be shown on video screens in public places. There is
AP1 (Applicant): no prohibition in the United Kingdom on political advertising in the non-broadcast media, although such advertisements are subject to certain content standards. The applicant was able
AP1 (Applicant): to place this advert in newspapers. Other campaigning NGOs, such as Amnesty International
AP1 (Applicant): and the RSPCA, which supported the applicant in the domestic courts, have placed adverts on billboards, in underground stations or in the cinema. The third point, the third
AP1 (Applicant): striking feature, is that this ban applies to everybody. It is not limited to the rich
AP1 (Applicant): and powerful, but also to the poor and to those who have very few means of influencing public opinion. The sole exception is that the ban does not apply to established political
AP1 (Applicant): parties. Those, as Mr Chamberlain said in his address, are permitted to make broadcasts
AP1 (Applicant): at various times, not just at elections. Those broadcasts are free. So the established parties
AP1 (Applicant): can use these important media, but groups which are campaigning on social advocacy issues, such as the applicant, or political parties that are not contesting the threshold number of seats, do not have the same privilege. It is obvious, and it is not in contest, that
AP1 (Applicant): this prohibition is a very serious interference with the Article 10 rights of the applicant.
AP1 (Applicant): It is, of course, prescribed by law, and we accept that it pursues a legitimate aim. So
AP1 (Applicant): the sole issue that the Grand Chamber has to consider is whether it is necessary in a democratic society. As the issue has been framed, the Court considers this point in
AP1 (Applicant): the context of the previous decisions in VGT, Murphy and TVVest. I will return to those
AP1 (Applicant): cases a little later, but the point I want to make now is that they are decisive of the issue before the Grand Chamber. A blanket restriction on political speech of this kind
AP1 (Applicant): is not necessary in a democratic society. Even without these cases, we say the point
AP1 (Applicant): really is clear as a matter of principle. The prohibition does not correspond to any
AP1 (Applicant): oppressing social need. It restricts debate on matters of general interest without serving
AP1 (Applicant): any proper or useful purpose. The closing off from public debate of an important medium
AP1 (Applicant): of public communication is unhealthy and undemocratic. A vital feature of democratic life is the
AP1 (Applicant): openness of public debate, a public place where all voices have a chance to be heard.
AP1 (Applicant): Where debate thrives in the marketplace of ideas, this ban cuts that off in an essential part. We say that the prohibition on political advertising is not necessary in a democratic
AP1 (Applicant): society for four basic reasons. The first, and this is not an issue as I understand it,
AP1 (Applicant): that it is a restriction on political expression and requires therefore the strictest scrutiny by this court. It is of course also a form of prior restraint. Prior restraint also requires
AP1 (Applicant): strict and careful scrutiny. The margin of appreciation must in such a case be a narrow
AP1 (Applicant): one. As the chamber emphasised in VGT, the breadth of the margin is also influenced by
AP1 (Applicant): the fact that what is at stake is not a commercial interest on behalf of the applicant but participation in a debate on matters of general interest. The broad margin of appreciation that Mr Chamberlain
AP1 (Applicant): argues for and which was accorded by the domestic courts is not appropriate. It is not appropriate
AP1 (Applicant): for this additional reason that the bodies that decided to impose and to carry on this ban are themselves part of the status quo, the political establishment which benefits from it in the sense that the political parties that are represented in the United Kingdom Parliament have the benefit of broadcast advertising, free broadcast advertising, a benefit which is not extended to anyone else. That was my first point. The second point is this. As
AP1 (Applicant): I have already said at the outset, the prohibition is on political advertising which is defined in an extraordinarily wide sense. It is not confined to any influence over the democratic
AP1 (Applicant): or election process. It is confined to all forms of attempts to influence public policy
AP1 (Applicant): and social advocacy which is of course what is in issue in this case. Thirdly, there is
AP1 (Applicant): no pressing need for such a wide prohibition. As the Chamber noted in VGT, the fact that
AP1 (Applicant): the prohibition only applies to certain media and not to others suggests that the need for it is not particularly pressing. The Government's submissions today ignore this point because
AP1 (Applicant): although it is right that television and radio go into people's homes, so does the internet which is completely unregulated when it comes to political content. Finally, and this is
AP1 (Applicant): very important in the context of the consideration that this Grand Chamber has to make, in the particular factual circumstances of this case we are dealing with an advertisement which is accepted to be on a matter of general concern which is neither harmful nor offensive and in the particular circumstances of this case the prohibition cannot be justified and indeed the Government does not set out to do so. The Government's position, the beginning
AP1 (Applicant): and the end of the Government's argument on this is that its intention is to prevent democratic debate being hijacked by rich and powerful people because it is said that if the prohibition were to be removed then the rich would dominate the airwaves to the exclusion of all else. But the prohibition affects everybody. It doesn't just silence the rich, it also
AP1 (Applicant): silences the poor and of course it has no effect on the current position where rich people in the United Kingdom and elsewhere can and do purchase newspapers, channel unlimited funds to political parties and campaigns whereas a small financially weak NGO has only a small number of limited opportunities to put its viewpoint across and one of those which is potentially very effective is broadcast, it is prevented from doing so. It is claimed
AP1 (Applicant): that the legislation embodies a balancing of interests to prevent the unfair distortion of public debate but there is no balancing in this case. It is a blanket prohibition
AP1 (Applicant): and it prevents alternative social and political groups from using the broadcast media. At
AP1 (Applicant): the same time, as I've said, there is a party monopoly. The established political parties
AP1 (Applicant): have a number of opportunities to use the broadcast media to support their viewpoints.
AP1 (Applicant): So the political content of the broadcast media is focused very much on the establishment of the status quo while the minority and the marginalised are barred from using this means of communication. That is not something which serves the interests of a democratic society.
AP1 (Applicant): The ban does not preserve, we say, the integrity of the democratic process but in reality distorts it. The United Kingdom, essentially in support of its argument, puts forward these four points.
AP1 (Applicant): Firstly they say that broadcasting is a uniquely powerful medium of communication because this is how Mr Chamberlain began, how it goes into people's homes. But there is no evidence
AP1 (Applicant): or fine-grained analysis to compare with other audiovisual media and the impact that they have. And that's particularly true in the age of the internet. This prohibition was
AP1 (Applicant): introduced at a time when the only medium that went into people's homes was radio and television. Things have changed dramatically over the past two decades. Secondly, the United
AP1 (Applicant): Kingdom says advertising on radio and television is particularly expensive and therefore is only the potential preserve of the rich. Again, there's no analysis of that and no comparison,
AP1 (Applicant): for example, between the costs of a short television advertisement and the costs of an advertisement in the newspapers. The true position, as a matter of obvious common sense,
AP1 (Applicant): is that the costs vary widely across all media. Thirdly, they say a wholly unregulated market
AP1 (Applicant): for the broadcasting of political advertisements would be open, and these are their words, to the potential mischief of partial political advertising. And so in order to avoid this
AP1 (Applicant): mischief of partiality, it's necessary to have a blanket prohibition. But this isn't
AP1 (Applicant): a rational basis for a scheme. As I've already said, excluded from the ban which is designed
AP1 (Applicant): to avoid partiality is a built-in partiality in favour of established political parties.
AP1 (Applicant): If political advertising by the rich were such a threat to the democratic process, then one would have thought it would be more widely regulated. It is not. It is not regulated,
AP1 (Applicant): as I've said, in other media. In reality, the phrase partial political advertising is
AP1 (Applicant): just another name for complaining about free speech. All speech is partial. What the regulation
AP1 (Applicant): of political advertising in the United Kingdom does, and this is part of its design, is to deprive disadvantaged and alternative groups from an opportunity of advancing their views using one of the effective means of communication available. It is claimed by the government
AP1 (Applicant): that its aim is to achieve balance in the broadcast media between different political viewpoints. If so, the ban has failed, because it does not. A whole range of alternative
AP1 (Applicant): viewpoints is excluded from broadcast, the political parties being the only ones who have the access. The approach of the United Kingdom government and the approach of the
AP1 (Applicant): domestic courts is wrongly based on the assumption that there are only two choices. One, a blanket
AP1 (Applicant): ban on political advertising, or secondly, its complete deregulation. The House of Lords
AP1 (Applicant): was, we say, misled by the US example. The constitutional jurisprudence of the United
AP1 (Applicant): States, as we all know, takes an absolutist line on freedom of speech. Under the European
AP1 (Applicant): constitutional order, under both the convention and the charter, the position is very different.
AP1 (Applicant): This allows for, indeed requires, proportionate restrictions on freedom of speech, restrictions which are tailored to balance rights in specific situations. That is what is required in the
AP1 (Applicant): context of political advertising. The United Kingdom places considerable reliance on the
AP1 (Applicant): decision in the Murphy and Ireland case, but that does not assist it. Religion is not politics.
AP1 (Applicant): Religion is a special case. We know that from the terms of the convention itself, where
AP1 (Applicant): specific provision is made under Article 9 in relation to religious rights. The expression
AP1 (Applicant): of religious views gives rise to particular sensitivities, and the court in Murphy rightly recognised that those sensitivities are particularly acute in Ireland. In that case, the court