TrustHLT/LaCour huggingface dataset:
GR1 (Government): The latter of these questions, namely that relating to the applicant's conviction, is easily dealt with by referring to the relevant provisions of domestic law enforced at the time as had been explicitly noted by the chamber.
GR1 (Government): Moreover, the applicant seems to have forgotten that the very same chapter of police act that he cites confers on the police the right to order a crowd to disperse and apprehend noncompliant persons, contrary to the applicant's later claim that the order of the police for the crowd to disperse was not according to law.
GR1 (Government): As to the further question related to the applicant's apprehension, the applicant asserts that the police apprehended him from contumacy towards the police, which then later was changed to a suspicion of rioting.
GR1 (Government): This is incorrect and based on a misreading of the pretrial investigation record.
GR1 (Government): On page 62 of the set record, one finds an initial summary of the pretrial investigation in respect of the applicant.
GR1 (Government): That has been written retrospectively to the initial apprehension and published the 1st of February, 2007.
GR1 (Government): On page 262 of the same pretrial investigation record, one finds the initial minutes taken of the applicant's interview on 10th September, 2006.
GR1 (Government): Therefore, from this pretrial investigation record, it is clear that the fact of the matter is that the applicant was apprehended on the basis of suspected rioting, which after further investigation into the matter was changed to a suspicion of contumacy to the police, of which the applicant was found guilty by domestic force.
GR1 (Government): These facts are important as they have effects on the application of those parts of the domestic law that pertain to the legal basis of applicant's apprehension.
GR1 (Government): The applicant was apprehended on the basis of chapter 1, section 2 of the Coercive Measures Act, which holds in its relevant parts, and I quote, should the precredits for arrest exist and should the carrying out of the arrest otherwise be endangered, a policeman may apprehend a person suspected of an offense even without a warrant for his arrest.
GR1 (Government): The policeman shall notify an official with the powers of arrest the apprehension without delay.
GR1 (Government): Said officer shall decide within 24 hours of the apprehension whether the apprehended person is to be released or arrested.
GR1 (Government): End quote.
GR1 (Government): The prerequisites for arrest in turn are listed in chapter 1, section 3 of the Coercive Measures Act.
GR1 (Government): In this regard, the government notes that the applicant in his written submissions has cited outdated provisions of this act.
GR1 (Government): This is because the act has been amended in 2003 in relation to subsection 2 to read in relevant parts, and I quote, a person suspected with probable cause of offense may be arrested, number 2, if the offense is subjected to punishment of less than two years of imprisonment, but the most severe punishment stipulated for the offense is at the minimum one year of imprisonment.
GR1 (Government): And on the basis of the circumstances of the suspect or on the basis of other facts, it is probable that B, he will make it more difficult to clarify the case by destroying, defacing, altering, or concealing evidence or by influencing a witness, an insured person, an expert, or an accomplice, or he will continue his criminal activity.
GR1 (Government): Further, the applicant has also provided the court with incomplete information in the citation of the Coercive Measures Act by omitting the second paragraph of section 3, which holds, and I quote, where there is a cause to suspect a person of an offense, he may be arrested even though there is no probable cause for the suspicion.
GR1 (Government): But the other prerequisites for arrest stipulated in paragraph 1 exist, and the taking of the suspect into custody is very important because of the expected further clarification.
GR1 (Government): The most severe punishment stipulated for rioting is one year of imprisonment.
GR1 (Government): Rather, further, the police has had reason to suspect that the person suspected of rioting would have continued their criminal activity.
GR1 (Government): Moreover, it was necessary to continue the apprehension of persons suspected of rioting into the morning and following day in order to investigate the suspected offenses.
GR1 (Government): As such, the prerequisites for arrest stipulated in the above-mentioned sections of the coercive measures existed.
GR1 (Government): Therefore, on the basis of both chapter 1, section 2 of the Coercive Measures Act, and section 21, subsection 2 of the Pretrial Investigation Act, the applicant could be held for a maximum of 24 hours.
GR1 (Government): Finally, section 21, subsection 1 of the Pretrial Investigation stipulates, and I quote, no one may be held in criminal investigation for longer than necessary.
GR1 (Government): In this regard, and specifically in relation to the applicant, once the detective chief inspector in charge of the detained persons learned of the applicant's profession, the applicant was then interviewed and released amongst the first apprehended persons.
GR1 (Government): The applicant notes that there were minors who were released before him, erroneously implying that he should have been released among them.
GR1 (Government): In any case, the government reiterates the general rule according to section 24 of the pretrial investigation, that no interrogations are to take place between 10 PM and 7 AM, as the above clarifications of the legal basis of the applicant apprehension and detention show.
GR1 (Government): There were no reasons relating to the investigation for his detention.
GR1 (Government): And it is also obvious that no exceptional circumstances of the kind stipulated under section 24 of the pretrial investigation existed in the present case.
GR1 (Government): The government submits that the only conclusion available here is that the alleged interference was at all times prescribed by law.
GR1 (Government): The government notes that despite the applicant's vacillating approach to his submissions before the grand chamber, he is nevertheless in agreement in government and chamber that those actions permissible by law undoubtedly constitute legitimate objectives.
GR1 (Government): While then, while on the face of it, the applicant dedicates tens of paragraphs to the assessment of the aspect necessary in democratic society constituted in Article 10, Paragraph 2.
GR1 (Government): The vast majority of his submissions are written from the point of view of seeking to assess the police actions on 10 September 2006 as a whole towards all of the members of the press who were present at the event.
GR1 (Government): Given that this is certainly not what the case is about, the government will directly focus its presentation on assessment of whether the alleged interference in the applicant's right to freedom of expression was necessary in a democratic society.
GR1 (Government): The first disagreement between the parties concerns the assessment by the district court of the police's actions towards the applicant and whether he had conducted an assessment of the necessity.
GR1 (Government): They had conducted an assessment of necessity in the democratic society of that conduct.
GR1 (Government): The government points out that in this detailed assessment of the action of the police by the district court is to be found in its consideration of the evidence in question.
GR1 (Government): Indeed, in this light, the judgments need to be read as a whole.
GR1 (Government): The district court further noted that the organizer of the demonstration was unwilling to positively respond to the police's efforts to discuss the orderly progress and safety measures of the event on March.
GR1 (Government): Moreover, since the crowd at large failed to comply with repeated commands to disperse in order to cease the harm being suffered by members of the public and the police, the police was entitled to carry out apprehensions and arrests in their efforts to ensure public safety and restore order.
GR1 (Government): The district court equally notes that when the demonstration became violent, families and children and media representatives were allowed to pass through the police cordon, as much as confirmed by the chamber in paragraph 10 of judgment two.
GR1 (Government): Furthermore, members of the media, including the applicant, were able to report from the very midst of the event and photograph really right up until the very end of the situation, even at extremely close range to the police cordon.
GR1 (Government): Further, it is clear and uncontested on the basis of the applicant's own published account of the events at hand in Suomen Kuvalehti, he had personally with his own ears heard the police's orders to disperse already at 9.30 PM,
GR1 (Government): and he had also noticed that several people were heading towards the exit routes.
GR1 (Government): Yet he had chosen not to leave as the exit routes had seemed to him to be too burdensome.
GR1 (Government): The government observes that after 9.00 PM,
GR1 (Government): the police gave final orders to the remaining crowd at the event site to leave with the express notification that anybody failing to do so would be apprehended.
GR1 (Government): According to the documents, there were, in addition to the applicant, two other photographers, all of whom continued with their documentation of the event.
GR1 (Government): The other photographers left the scene around 9.15 PM,
GR1 (Government): as appears from the district court judgment.
GR1 (Government): No measures were imposed on them at any stage.
GR1 (Government): However, the police ordered the applicant to leave the event site at 9.15 PM
GR1 (Government): as the final apprehensions related to the remaining crowd were being made.
GR1 (Government): He refused to do so.
GR1 (Government): The applicant held to this defiant point of view, despite the fact that, as documents show, at the very time, the other non-company, at the same time, the other non-compliant members of the crowd were apprehended, and the event had come to an end.
GR1 (Government): Consequently, some minutes later, the police apprehended the applicant, as was clear that he continued not to comply with the orders of the police.
GR1 (Government): Moreover, the fact that the applicant consulted with his superior via telephone, asking for advice on whether to stay or leave, clearly indicates that the applicant understood that the order of the police to leave concerned him as well.
GR1 (Government): The district court, too, found it established that the police command could not be construed otherwise, and it clearly concerned everybody present.
GR1 (Government): As to the second point of contention under the necessity requirement, the government submits that the case law of the court cannot be understood in such a manner that as to confer onto journalists a privileged status in relation to the right to freedom of expression.
GR1 (Government): Rather, your court has at time and time observed that it must be borne in mind that the representatives of the media, and I quote, cannot be released from their duty to obey ordinarily criminal law on the basis of that article then of a stem protection.
GR1 (Government): Finally, the government reiterates that the applicant's coverage of the event was not hampered with.
GR1 (Government): He was allowed to phone.
GR1 (Government): His photographs were protected as journalistic sources, and no restrictions on their use were imposed.
GR1 (Government): He was released amongst the first persons on the following day.
GR1 (Government): No penalty was imposed upon his conviction for contumacy.
GR1 (Government): Nothing was recorded on his criminal record.
GR1 (Government): He was not even made to bear his costs.
GR1 (Government): Therefore, the government submits that Alex's interference with the applicant's right to freedom of expression was proportionate to the legitimate aim and pursuit, and moreover, necessary in democratic society.
GR1 (Government): And finally, the government submits that on the analysis of the case, the actions of the police cannot be considered to create a ceiling effect on the right to freedom of expression, contrary to the opinions of Judge Nicolau or Judge De Gaetano expressed in their joint separate dissenting opinion, and now followed by the applicant before the grand chamber.
GR1 (Government): The central claim by the applicant in relation to his ceiling effect argument rests on the validity of his claim that, and I quote, the state convicted a journalist for carrying out his work, even though he had already suffered the consequences of the police's concrete actions, which follows from the first three requirements set out in your court's consistent case law on the creation of ceiling effect.
GR1 (Government): That being, that in order for a ceiling effect to be established and applied to Alex's interference must be related to the actual reporting on the event in question.
GR1 (Government): In this respect, the government reiterates its submission that the applicant's apprehension, detention, and sentencing did not relate to his activities as a journalist but were due to him systematically not complying with clear police orders.
GR1 (Government): Indeed, no other conclusion could be made as contrary to the applicant's extensive assertions.
GR1 (Government): As the chamber noted, the applicant failed to make clear efforts to identify himself as a journalist.
GR1 (Government): And secondly, your court has considered that the sanctions imposed by governments must be found to be disproportionate for the reasons for infringing on the right of freedom of expression to find a ceiling effect.
GR1 (Government): Here, the government observes that the sanctions imposed on the applicant amounted to an offense deemed executable under domestic law.
GR1 (Government): As such, moreover, the applicant was not ordered to pay any costs.
GR1 (Government): And finally, and especially in relation to applying criminal law in cases of alleged infringement of Article 10, your court has stated that the use of criminal sanctions can be understood to be proportionate only in grave circumstances.
GR1 (Government): This phrase, in turn, has been interpreted as inter alia relating to the existence of threat or of violence against the public.
GR1 (Government): In the present case, this requirement is fulfilled as discussed above vis-a-vis the riot.
GR1 (Government): And as such, the use of criminal law sanctions must be understood to be proportionate.
GR1 (Government): As such, the government finds that the argument concerning the potential ceiling effect of disjudgment on the exercise of the journalist profession is completely unfounded.
GR1 (Government): Based on the above considerations, the government invites the court to conclude that there has been no violation of Article 10 of the convention.
Dean Spielmann (JudgeP): Thank you Mr. Kosonen and I now turn to the judges to ask if there are questions.
Dean Spielmann (JudgeP): Judge Hirabella.
Dean Spielmann (JudgeP): I have a question for Judge Hirvelä.
Päivi Hirvelä (Judge): Thank you, Mr. President.
Päivi Hirvelä (Judge): And I have two questions to both parties.
Päivi Hirvelä (Judge): And first to the government.
Päivi Hirvelä (Judge): The government, in the observations and also today, refers to the separate area reserved by the police for the media, which was on the square opposite to Kiasma Museum on the other side of the street.
Päivi Hirvelä (Judge): However, it can be seen from the photos and from the video film that when the situation turned violent, visibility from that area to the scene was blocked by the police cordon, police cabs, and buses.
Päivi Hirvelä (Judge): And my question is, was this area really useful for the journalists to cover the event on the spot when it turned violent?
Päivi Hirvelä (Judge): My second question to the government concerns the apprehension time of the applicant and the legal basis of that.
Päivi Hirvelä (Judge): And the applicant was apprehended for 17.5 hours.
Päivi Hirvelä (Judge): And my question concerns the justification for the last 5.5 hours.
Päivi Hirvelä (Judge): Since according to the Police Act, a person could not be kept apprehended for more than 12 hours, and the longer apprehension time, up to 24 hours by the Criminal Investigation Act, would have been applicable only if arrest was available.
Päivi Hirvelä (Judge): And the applicant was charged and convicted of disobeying police order, and the statutory sanction of that would not have allowed arrest.
Päivi Hirvelä (Judge): Now, I understood from the submission of the government that the government's allegation is that the applicant was apprehended of rioting, and it was only later changed to disobeying police orders.
Päivi Hirvelä (Judge): However, according to the Ombudsman, a bystander who did not take part in violent actions as the applicant could not be apprehended of rioting.
Päivi Hirvelä (Judge): And therefore, the longer apprehension time, this 24 hours, seems to be excluded.
Päivi Hirvelä (Judge): And my question now is, since the legal basis for the apprehension for 12 hours, it's clear, but the question concerns the legal basis for the rest 5.5 hours.
Päivi Hirvelä (Judge): And then I have two questions to the applicant.
Päivi Hirvelä (Judge): And the applicant stated in his observation, and also today, that the police at the scene tried to hamper his journalistic work.
Päivi Hirvelä (Judge): However, in the video films, and in photos, and in witness hearings before the National Court, there did not appear any indication of hindering by the police carrying out his work as a photographer.
Päivi Hirvelä (Judge): And further, the applicant did not raise these allegations before the National Court or before the chamber.
Päivi Hirvelä (Judge): And now, after eight years behind the incidents, after the incidents, he raises new facts.
Päivi Hirvelä (Judge): And I only would like to mention the fact he raised today, here before the grand chamber, for the very first time, the allegation that he wished to give the memory card to the other journalist, which was not permitted by the police.
Päivi Hirvelä (Judge): So my question is, why the applicant did not raise these facts and these allegations before the National Court or before the chamber?
Päivi Hirvelä (Judge): Why the grand chamber is the first stage when these facts come out?
Päivi Hirvelä (Judge): My other question concerns the press card, the badge.
Päivi Hirvelä (Judge): And here, I again refer to the video film and the photo submitted by the applicant.
Päivi Hirvelä (Judge): And in any shots, in any photos taken of the applicant at the scene, the press card cannot be seen.
Päivi Hirvelä (Judge): And my question is, did he have the press card suspending around his neck?
Päivi Hirvelä (Judge): And was it visible when he was working on the spot when the order to disperse was given?
Päivi Hirvelä (Judge): Thank you.
Dean Spielmann (JudgeP): Thank you judge Hirvelä, judge Potocki.
André Potocki (Judge): Merci, M. le Président.
André Potocki (Judge): J'ai deux questions.
André Potocki (Judge): La première s'adresse au gouvernement.
André Potocki (Judge): Si un journaliste avait la crainte que le groupe des derniers manifestants qui refusait d'obéir à la police risquait de subir des mesures brutales, la décision de ce journaliste de rester sur place était-elle liée ou non à son travail d'information?
André Potocki (Judge): Ma seconde question s'adresse au requérant.
André Potocki (Judge): Dans ce que vous avez appelé des situations extrêmes, c'est-à-dire, à mes yeux, des manifestations, des catastrophes, des prises d'otages, est-ce qu'il suffit au journaliste d'invoquer sa mission d'information pour refuser d'obéir à la police?
André Potocki (Judge): Si la réponse, selon vous, dépend des circonstances, quels sont alors, à votre avis, les critères qui doivent guider le comportement des journalistes face à des instructions ou des ordres de la police?
Dean Spielmann (JudgeP): Merci beaucoup, juge Silvis.
Johannes Silvis (Judge): Thank you, Mr. President.
Johannes Silvis (Judge): The essence of the case, as characterized by the applicant, and my first question concerns the applicant, the essence of the case, as characterized by the applicant in the reasons for referring the case to the ground chamber, is the right of the state to restrict the impartation of real-time communications.
Johannes Silvis (Judge): Now, today, the applicant raised the argument that he was refused to hand over the memory card, as already stated in the question of Judge Hirvelä.
Johannes Silvis (Judge): My question is, was this raised before, either before the domestic authorities?
Johannes Silvis (Judge): I haven't seen it in the file.
Johannes Silvis (Judge): And second, has the newspaper tried, during the period of custody, to get hold of this material?
Johannes Silvis (Judge): My second question is for the government and is related to the same matter.
Johannes Silvis (Judge): The government observes that the purpose of arresting the applicant was not to hinder his freedom of expression, but to investigate the offense that he was suspected to have committed.
Johannes Silvis (Judge): And in this connection, the government recalls that the applicant was able to use all of his photographs he may have had from the event.
Johannes Silvis (Judge): Now, my question is, the government acknowledges that at a certain moment in time, the authorities realized that the person apprehended was a journalist.
Johannes Silvis (Judge): This was at 9.30 p.m. or somewhat later the day.
Johannes Silvis (Judge): Have the government considered the possible interest of immediate use of the photographs taken by the person apprehended?
Dean Spielmann (JudgeP): Merci, thank you Judge Silvis. Judge Motoc.
Iulia Antoanella Motoc (Judge): Ma 1re question s'adresse au gouvernement.
Iulia Antoanella Motoc (Judge): Et vous avez dit qu'il y avait des informations concernant lesquelles cette manifestation pouvait tourner dans une manifestation très violente et que c'était l'Agence de sécurité finlandaise qui avait donné cette information.
Iulia Antoanella Motoc (Judge): Dans la mesure où il est possible, je voulais savoir dans quelle mesure les informations qui étaient données par cette agence ont été prises en considération par le déploiement de la police et par la suite, par la manifestation elle-même.
Iulia Antoanella Motoc (Judge): Si vraiment l'information qui a été donnée a été correspondue à l'ampleur de la manifestation et aux actions violentes qui étaient sur place.
Iulia Antoanella Motoc (Judge): La 2e question que je voulais poser s'adresse au récurrent cette fois-ci.
Iulia Antoanella Motoc (Judge): Et je voulais savoir si vraiment...
Iulia Antoanella Motoc (Judge): Comment est-ce que vous percevez dans la jurisprudence de la Cour l'effet dissuasif que nos collègues qui font l'opinion séparée, et vous-même maintenant devant la Grande Chambre, ont fait, ont exposé dans leur opinion séparée?
Iulia Antoanella Motoc (Judge): Est-ce que, comme vous le savez, cet effet dissuasif part de jugements de la Grande Chambre, comprenant Mazaré, et continue avec des autres jugements de la Cour, mais ces jugements-là vont toujours envers la condamnation pénale?
Iulia Antoanella Motoc (Judge): Et une 3e question que je vais mettre en deux parties, si, à part les investigations qui étaient faites par l'Ombudsman, il y avait d'autres investigations qui étaient faites par rapport au comportement de la police, et si vraiment on a trouvé qu'il y avait des plaintes contre le comportement de la police par des manifestants, et si vraiment, si ces plaintes avaient eu lieu, comment est-ce que la fin de cette plainte s'est passée?
Dean Spielmann (JudgeP): Merci beaucoup, Madame Motoc.
Dean Spielmann (JudgeP): Le juge Alexandre Sicilianos.
Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos (Judge): Thank you, Mr. President.
Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos (Judge): I have two questions that are somehow peripheral.