TrustHLT/LaCour huggingface dataset:
GR1 (Government): On the basis of voluminous corroborative evidence obtained through the comprehensive investigative activities, I will prove that the applicant's alleged removal from his prison cell at the night of 14 December 2013 never took place.
GR1 (Government): I will first underscore that the applicant's arrest and pretrial detention was lawful under Article 5.1
GR1 (Government): On 21st of May 2013, on the basis of his testimony and other materials of the criminal case file, and in the presence of his lawyer, the applicant was arrested for vote buying, embezzlement, abuse of official power, and trespass.
GR1 (Government): The charges were based on the testimonies of around 2,000 witnesses, which raised a reasonable suspicion that the applicant might have committed an offense, as provided by Article 5.3c of the Convention.
GR1 (Government): The arrest was carried out due to the risk of absconding.
GR1 (Government): There is an important prehistory to that risk.
GR1 (Government): On 30th November 2012, while traveling to Armenia, the applicant attempted to cross the Georgian border using a fake international passport issued in 2011 under the name of another person.
GR1 (Government): But that was not the only wrong committed by the applicant in this case.
GR1 (Government): He also attempted to put pressure on the director of the patrol police in charge of the criminal investigation of the case.
GR1 (Government): The letter reported that the applicant had called him from his mobile phone, bullied him, and demanded that he immediately cease the investigation.
GR1 (Government): The applicant threatened him, saying, quote, you will see what you get for that, the end of quote.
GR1 (Government): This incident clearly demonstrates characteristic features of the applicant, his will to defy the law, his disrespect for law enforcement, his intent to obstruct justice.
GR1 (Government): It is quite natural that while deciding on the applicant's arrest in May 2013, the investigator took account of this event from November 2012.
GR1 (Government): However, that was not all.
GR1 (Government): The same day after the applicant's arrest, as a result of search of the applicant's house, the investigative authorities seized large amounts in cash, specifically euro 54,000, US dollar 33,000, and Georgian lari 29,000.
GR1 (Government): They also learned from official sources that the applicant held at least two more valid diplomatic passports.
GR1 (Government): And the applicant's spouse had left Georgia in a couple of hours after the applicant had received summons to appear before the investigator.
GR1 (Government): The above circumstances would raise in any neutral observer a strong belief that there was a real risk of absconding.
GR1 (Government): Under Article 1711 of the Criminal Procedure Code, a person may be arrested based on a court order if there is a reasonable suspicion that he may have committed a crime for which the law prescribes imprisonment.
GR1 (Government): Under Article 1712E, he may be arrested even without a court order if there is a risk of absconding.
GR1 (Government): And even though Article 1713 prescribes that no arrest without court order may be affected if the aim pursued may be accomplished with a more lenient measure of restraint, the particular circumstances of the applicant's case made it clear that the lenient measure could not secure the applicant's appearance for trial.
GR1 (Government): The next day, as required by Article 5.3 of the Convention
GR1 (Government): and relevant provisions of the domestic law, the applicant was promptly brought before the Kutaisi City Court, which accepted the prosecutor's arguments and ordered the applicant's pretrial detention.
GR1 (Government): The domestic court examined the proportionality of this measure and considered that the circumstances of the case supported existence of the risks of absconding and obstructing justice.
GR1 (Government): In the court's opinion, a less stringent measure of restraint would not be sufficient for the prevention of such risks.
GR1 (Government): The court based its decision on the applicant's history, his intention to travel with a fake ID, and his attempt to influence the course of investigation.
GR1 (Government): Now the applicant claims that no time limit of detention was specified in the decision on the applicant's detention.
GR1 (Government): But the case law of this court gives clear instructions on that.
GR1 (Government): As affirmed by this court, quote, the absence of specific time limits in a detention order cannot, as such, render the deprivation of liberty unlawful within the meaning of Article 5.1,
GR1 (Government): as long as a further reading of the relevant domestic law and practice could allow a detained person to comprehend what the actual duration of the detention was, end of quotation.
GR1 (Government): Article 18.6 of the Constitution and Article 205.2
GR1 (Government): of the Criminal Procedure Code provide that the maximum statutory time limit for pretrial detention is nine months.
GR1 (Government): The Kutaisi City Court explicitly grounded its decision on this.
GR1 (Government): The applicant, as a former Minister of Interior, and his lawyers should have known, and they actually knew, what was the maximum time limits of detention.
GR1 (Government): This means that their claim that the detention was incompatible with Article 5, because no specific time limit was indicated, is totally groundless.
GR1 (Government): The applicant also refers to the court's judgment in Nikolai Shvili versus Georgia, where the court criticized the government because the applicant was first summoned as a witness in an unrelated case and then was arrested.
GR1 (Government): But an important difference that distinguishes the present applicant's case from that of Nikolai Shvili is that the present applicant was not summoned as a witness in regard of a totally unrelated facts, but rather in regard of the very facts for which later he was charged, arrested, and convicted.
GR1 (Government): All the above circumstances sufficiently substantiate compatibility of the applicant's arrest and subsequent detention with the requirements of Article 5.1
GR1 (Government): Therefore, we respectfully request to find no violation of this provision.
GR1 (Government): The applicant's pretrial detention was based on relevant and sufficient reasons to justify his deprivation of liberty from the very first day of his arrest until his conviction by the First Instance Court.
GR1 (Government): On 12th of October, 2012, right after the applicant's political party lost the parliamentary elections and cohabitation between the new government and the former president, the leader of the applicant's political party, began, the president amended regulations on diplomatic passports.
GR1 (Government): In particular, former officials were granted a privilege to retain diplomatic passports for one year following their retirement from their offices.
GR1 (Government): Before that, diplomatic passports had been invalidated from the moment of retirement.
GR1 (Government): By the time of deciding on restraint measure, the applicant still possessed two diplomatic passports issued at the time of his tenure in the office, with which he could easily cross the state border.
GR1 (Government): But even if these passports were confiscated, the applicant, former minister of interior, could have had several fake international passports, the exact number of which would be unknown to the investigative authorities.
GR1 (Government): The risk of influencing witnesses still persisted, too, as the majority of witnesses in the criminal case were the applicant's former employees and subordinates under his direct hierarchical authority in the past.
GR1 (Government): Having due regard to the party's arguments, on 25th of September, 2013, the Cutaisi City Court rejected the applicant's motion regarding the annulment of the measure of restraint.
GR1 (Government): The defense and the prosecution were given equal opportunity to present their arguments against or in favor of the applicant's continued detention.
GR1 (Government): As to the manner the decision of 25th of September, 2013, was taken, contrary to the applicant's assertion, we submit that dismissing the applicant's motion orally and providing an audio record of the relevant court session was fully compatible with the domestic law and respective practice.
GR1 (Government): The judge heard the party's oral submissions and found that there still existed grounds, including the risks of absconding and exertion of pressure on witnesses, which justified continued detention.
GR1 (Government): The whole process was audio recorded, and copies of records were given to the parties.
GR1 (Government): By the way, the applicant never appealed to this decision of the Cutaisi City Court or the manner in which it had been adopted, which he could do under Article 207 of the CCP.
GR1 (Government): Decisions adopted by the Tbilisi and Cutaisi appeals courts, which we have submitted to this court, demonstrate that this remedy has been effective both in theory and in practice.
GR1 (Government): The applicant failed to exhaust domestic remedies, for which reason, in this part of the applicant's complaint, this part of the applicant's complaint is clearly inadmissible.
GR1 (Government): In conclusion, it is apparent that there were relevant and sufficient reasons for continued detention, as that on 25th of September, 2013, the Cutaisi City Court duly examined reasons justifying the applicant's deprivation of liberty.
GR1 (Government): My third submission relates to the applicant's claim that the initiation of the criminal proceedings against him and the subsequent pretrial detention served the purpose of excluding him from the country's political life.
GR1 (Government): This is nothing more than a speculation, which is not supported by any evidence.
GR1 (Government): The government emphasized that the applicant's arrest and pretrial detention was carried out with the sole purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on a reasonable suspicion of having committed offenses.
GR1 (Government): First of all, it was only on 19th of December, 2014, at this stage of providing just satisfaction claims, when the applicant first raised before the court a fresh allegation that he had been removed from his prison cell on 14th of December, 2013.
GR1 (Government): The claim was thus presented one year after the event had allegedly happened.
GR1 (Government): For some reason, the applicant did not take any immediate steps to let the authorities know about the event.
GR1 (Government): Instead, he waited for several days, and only on 17th of December, 2013, he made a public statement about his alleged removal from the prison cell.
GR1 (Government): Promptly, after the applicant made this statement, on 20th December, 2013, the General Inspectorate of the Ministry of Corrections launched an internal inquiry into the applicant's allegations.
GR1 (Government): On 3rd of January, 2014, the investigators questioned the applicant who confirmed the account of events disclosed on 17th of December, 2013.
GR1 (Government): He further noted that in the night of 14th December, the director of prison number nine came alone to his prison cell and told him that he had to take him out of the prison territory.
GR1 (Government): In the prison yard, the applicant saw a dark-colored vehicle and two unknown individuals whom he said he remembered very well.
GR1 (Government): After placement in the vehicle, he was instructed, as he says, to cover his head and face with his own jacket, which he did.
GR1 (Government): Then, his vehicle left the prison compound.
GR1 (Government): The applicant said that they were basically riding through main roads.
GR1 (Government): He even named the streets, even though he claimed that his face was covered.
GR1 (Government): The applicant assumed that he was taken to the building of the penitentiary department.
GR1 (Government): The applicant further indicated that he could also easily recognize the room where the alleged conversation with the then chief prosecutor was held.
GR1 (Government): However, for some reason, he refused to give any description of either the persons or the place.
GR1 (Government): Based on this information, the investigators examined records of 18 video surveillance cameras, operational nearby prison number nine compound, and along the main municipal roads leading to the office of the penitentiary department.
GR1 (Government): However, in the period indicated by the applicant, no vehicle similar to the one described by the applicant was noticed in any of the video records.
GR1 (Government): Records from the applicant's prison cell could not be retrieved because they were automatically deleted in 24 hours.
GR1 (Government): The general inspectorate also obtained witness test statements of the individuals who could have had any information about the story told by the applicant.
GR1 (Government): In particular, the investigators questioned the director and the deputy director of prison number nine who testified that they had been in the prison premises at the material time but declined any involvement in or knowledge of the facts alleged by the applicant.
GR1 (Government): Among other witnesses questioned were two assistant duty officers of prison number nine who were responsible for the supervision of prisoners and registering the exit and entry of inmates in and out of the prison facility.
GR1 (Government): They also questioned the senior inspector of the legal regime division, the two employees of the technical support division who were responsible for the monitoring of surveillance cameras operational in the territory of the prison.
GR1 (Government): None of them confirmed any of the facts alleged by the applicant.
GR1 (Government): The general inspectorate further examined the entry and exit locks of vehicles, but those did not contain any information regarding the applicant's exit from or entry to the prison that night.
GR1 (Government): Having regard to all the above information and evidence which manifestly excluded the applicant's removal from his prison cell in the night in question, on 14th of January 2014, the internal inquiry into the applicant's allegations was closed.
GR1 (Government): On 14th of April 2014, the applicant's lawyer was informed in writing by the chief prosecutor's office, which by then had thoroughly analyzed the results of inquiry by the general inspectorate of the Ministry of Corrections that it had been established that the applicant's removal could not have occurred.
GR1 (Government): This happened eight months before 19th of December 2014 when the applicant filed his allegations with this court.
GR1 (Government): He clearly violated the six month rule under Article 35 of the convention.
GR1 (Government): The applicant's lawyer claims that he informed the court about the incident on 28th of May 2014, but the court refused to include it in the case file.
GR1 (Government): The correspondence was never provided to the government, but even if it was, the applicant has no excuse for missing the six month limit.
GR1 (Government): We therefore request the court to find this part of the application inadmissible as well.
GR1 (Government): But let me go back to the inquiry and its findings.
GR1 (Government): The nature and extent of inquiry demonstrate that the inquiry was conducted in a diligent and consistent manner.
GR1 (Government): In the course of it, the general inspectorate investigators examined all possible documentary evidence and also all witnesses who might have had any information about the applicant's allegations.
GR1 (Government): Had the general inspectorate found any signs of criminal offense in the conduct of the Ministry of Corrections staff, the general inspectorate would have referred the case to the chief prosecutor's office.
GR1 (Government): Despite this, following the chamber's decision, the chief prosecutor office of Georgia decided to look into the case once again.
GR1 (Government): The chief prosecutor's office revisited the records of 18 video surveillance cameras and discovered no vehicle matching the description provided by the applicant at the material time.
GR1 (Government): The re-examination of the prison register books also excluded exit of any vehicle or person from the applicant's prison at the period when he was allegedly removed from the cell and transported to the penitentiary department.
GR1 (Government): In addition, the prosecutors examined every single individual who could have any information regarding defactual circumstances alleged by the applicant, the former chief prosecutor, the former director of the penitentiary department, the prison staff present at the material time, including those responsible for guarding the perimeter, registering the entry and exit of persons and vehicles.
GR1 (Government): Furthermore, they obtained an evidence which was submitted to this court, which makes it crystal clear that the former chief prosecutor was actually at his office, not in the penitentiary department, working on the official correspondence in the Georgian government electronic document management system, when, according to the applicant, he should have a meeting with the applicant.
GR1 (Government): The system records automatically the date and time when a particular correspondence is assigned to and seen by a system customer.
GR1 (Government): The former chief prosecutor, like any other government employee who uses this system, had his own password to this system.
GR1 (Government): To conclude discussions on the investigation of the applicant's alleged removal from his cell, we can say confidently that both the inquiry by the Ministry of Correction General Inspectorate, which was launched right after the applicant's statement, and the investigation by the chief prosecutor's office were conducted thoroughly, diligently, and professionally.
GR1 (Government): And the final outcome of both is the same.
GR1 (Government): The whole story is a fiction invented by the applicant himself to destroy the confidence in the Georgian government domestically and internationally.
GR1 (Government): Now, the applicant challenges the investigative efforts of the government by questioning legitimacy of a 24-hour rule of storing video camera records.
GR1 (Government): To this end, his team obtained a witness statement by the public defender.
GR1 (Government): The letter has indicated that, in his opinion, some video records could have been destroyed before the inquiry was launched.
GR1 (Government): With my due respect to the public defender, his opinion is just an opinion, not the testimony of an eyewitness.
GR1 (Government): Moreover, that the surveillance camera records at the Georgian prisons could not be kept longer than 24 hours can be found in the CPT report of 2014, and even in annual reports of the public defender himself for 2014 and 2015.
GR1 (Government): Whether 24 hours are enough can be a matter of discussion.
GR1 (Government): But there is no room for an argument that this rule was invented specifically for the applicant's case.
GR1 (Government): Actually, it was established quite long before the applicant's arrest and detention.
GR1 (Government): The applicant also made some fervent attempts to mislead the court by stating that he did not have any opportunity to report about his alleged removal before 17th of December.
GR1 (Government): However, the applicant could have filed a complaint with the prison authorities or the public defender of Georgia at any time during three days of his self-imposed silence.
GR1 (Government): All these events may lead one to a reasonable assumption that the applicant, who could have known the 24-hour rule, deliberately waited for several days before he would announce about his alleged removal.
GR1 (Government): That way, he deprived the government of the chance to present another important evidence against the applicant's uncorroborated speculations.
GR1 (Government): In the end, allow me to add a few words about the case law of this court with respect to Article 18.
GR1 (Government): We appealed the chamber judgment inter alia on the reason that it deviated from the previous precedents.
GR1 (Government): In all those cases where the court established a violation of Article 18 of the Convention, improper reasons were drawn either from incontrovertible and direct proof or from the combination of the relevant facts.
GR1 (Government): None is the case in the applicant's situation.
GR1 (Government): As to the burden of proof, according to the court's case law, even where the appearance is speaking in favor of the applicant's claim and the evidence is sufficient to show that there was an arguable claim of improper motives, the burden of proof must remain with the applicant, who must convincingly show that the actions were driven by improper motives.
GR1 (Government): In the instance case, by ignoring the presumption of good faith on the side of the domestic authorities because of non-violation of Article 5.1
GR1 (Government): and shifting the burden of proof to the government, the chamber failed to meet the very high standard of proof developed by the court in its case law.
GR1 (Government): Before the grand chamber, I would like to underline that it is absolutely necessary to uphold this high standard of proof.
GR1 (Government): Otherwise, as the court stressed it in one of its cases, it would have to find violation in every high profile case.
GR1 (Government): Honorable members of the court, having regard to the reasons set out above, the government kindly requests the court, A, to declare the applicant's complaint under Article 5.4 inadmissible
GR1 (Government): for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies, B, to declare inadmissible the applicant's claim under Article 18 in conjunction with Article 5.1
GR1 (Government): as manifestly ill-founded, C, alternatively, to declare inadmissible the applicant's claim under Article 18 in conjunction with Article 5.1
GR1 (Government): on account of the applicant's alleged removal from the cell as being filed in violation of the six-month rule under Article 35 of the Convention.
GR1 (Government): And in any case, to find that there has been no violation of Article 5.1, 5.3, 5.4,
GR1 (Government): and Article 18 in conjunction with Article 5.1
Guido Raimondi (JudgeP): Thank you very much Mr. Baramidze and I thank both parties for their submissions to the
Guido Raimondi (JudgeP): court and I turn towards my colleagues of the Grand Chamber to know whether there are questions for the parties, judge Yudkivska, please.
Ganna Yudkivska (Judge): I have two questions concerning the incident of 14th December, 2013.
Ganna Yudkivska (Judge): And my first question goes to the applicant.
Ganna Yudkivska (Judge): In your submissions, you state that this alleged incident was related to questioning the applicant about two issues.
Ganna Yudkivska (Judge): First, death of Mr. Zhvania in 2005,
Ganna Yudkivska (Judge): and situation with bank accounts of Mr. Saakashvili.
Ganna Yudkivska (Judge): Why you consider that it was important for the authorities to obtain this information at that particular moment?
Ganna Yudkivska (Judge): And my second question is for the government, but the applicant might comment as well, in respect of the effectiveness of investigation into this incident of 14th December, 2013, to which extent the applicant himself was involved into this investigation.
Guido Raimondi (JudgeP): There are no further questions.
Guido Raimondi (JudgeP): So the court will now withdraw for 20 minutes.
Guido Raimondi (JudgeP): After that, the parties will be able to submit brief observations in reply to each other's submissions and reply to the questions put by Judge Judiska.
Guido Raimondi (JudgeP): And now I call the applicants' representatives.
Guido Raimondi (JudgeP): I understand it's Mr. Leach.
Guido Raimondi (JudgeP): Take the floor, please.
AP2 (Applicant): Mr. President, thank you.
AP2 (Applicant): May I start with the point about the destruction of the video evidence after 24 hours?
AP2 (Applicant): Reference was made to a CPT report in 2014.