TrustHLT/LaCour huggingface dataset:
AP2 (Applicant): And the answer to that is that the statement was obtained on the 4th of March, 2010.
AP2 (Applicant): By that time, it was, and it is still, our belief that the statute of limitations had actually expired in Macedonia, and that rendered any remedies ineffective.
AP2 (Applicant): And the statute of limitations would have expired by January 24, 2009, so more than a year earlier.
AP2 (Applicant): And that is the reason why we did not submit it.
AP2 (Applicant): We did not believe it would be of any use in that context.
AP2 (Applicant): Secondly, I'd like to point out that whatever the re-characterization of the criminal offense by the Macedonian prosecutor may be, and whatever effects that might have on the lapsing of the statute of limitations, we dispute that there are any effects, and we dispute that re-characterization, because we do not see that it has any factual basis.
AP2 (Applicant): But whatever that decision was by the Macedonian prosecutor, we were simply not aware of it, because the Macedonian prosecutor simply failed to notify the applicant for almost two years of what the decision was and what the legal basis was.
AP2 (Applicant): So in short, by 4th of March, 2010, the date we obtained that statement by the former official, we believed that the statute of limitations had lapsed.
AP2 (Applicant): Could that statement be used?
AP2 (Applicant): I believe that was Judge Viage's second point.
AP2 (Applicant): Could that statement be used by this court, given that there is a condition placed in there by the author of the statement that it can only be used for the purpose of these proceedings?
AP2 (Applicant): We did not believe that that or anything else in the statement should represent an obstacle to the court's use of that piece of evidence as the court sees fit.
AP2 (Applicant): We believe that under the rules of the court and the jurisprudence of the court, the court has significant broad discretion to make whatever use it sees fit of the evidence that comes before it and the court obtains and draw any inferences from that evidence that the court estimates.
AP2 (Applicant): I'd like to address secondarily and shortly a couple of other points in response to points made by the government.
AP2 (Applicant): The government representative stated that there was no communication with the prosecutor after the filing of the criminal complaint.
AP2 (Applicant): That is not correct.
AP2 (Applicant): The applicant's Macedonian lawyer, my colleague, Mr. Medarsti, sitting here, made several inquiries
AP2 (Applicant): by telephone and spoke directly with the case prosecutor, the same person who had terminated the investigation both before the lapse of the statute of limitation and after the lapse of the statute of limitation and was repeatedly told, amazingly in hindsight, by the person who had terminated the investigation that there was nothing new.
AP2 (Applicant): There was no significant developments.
AP2 (Applicant): It was ongoing.
AP2 (Applicant): There was nothing new.
AP2 (Applicant): And that is remarkable.
AP2 (Applicant): We would like to point out that that refusal to notify the victim and his representative is not only, in fact, and contrary to what was said, a violation of Macedonian law and practice.
AP2 (Applicant): There is a duty to notify the applicant.
AP2 (Applicant): But it is most certainly a violation of the duty of the Macedonian state under this court's case law.
AP2 (Applicant): Under Article III, there's a duty to keep the applicant duly informed.
AP2 (Applicant): It is part of the humane treatment and the proper duty to investigate, to involve the applicant, and keep the applicant properly informed.
AP2 (Applicant): And the failure to inform the applicant was a dismal failure of that duty under Article III.
AP2 (Applicant): It was also argued by the government that the remedy chosen by the applicant was not effective because it would have been more effective if the criminal complaint was brought against identified persons rather than unidentified persons.
AP2 (Applicant): And of course, it might be plausible in theory, whenever possible, you should try to identify the perpetrators.
AP2 (Applicant): It might not be the easiest thing in the circumstances of this case when you're a victim of a top secret operation.
AP2 (Applicant): But beyond that, the statistics that the government themselves provided in their recent submission to the Grand Chamber show that while naming your perpetrators could be somewhat more effective, there's a lot of prosecutions of cases where the perpetrators are not named that are still successful in Macedonia.
AP2 (Applicant): It is a perfectly reasonable remedy, and in fact, the only course of action that was open to the applicant under the circumstances.
AP2 (Applicant): And finally, the government here for the first time introduced a new legal argument that, in fact, the statute of limitations has not lapsed to this day because of this supposed recharacterization of the offense by the Macedonian prosecutor.
AP2 (Applicant): We believe that there is no basis whatsoever under Macedonian law for that recharacterization because the provision used of the criminal code used by the prosecutor that was supposedly applicable here requires evidence of severe physical damage that Macedonian legal practice has interpreted as heavily debilitating physical and mental damage continuing for several years.
AP2 (Applicant): There was nothing in the applicant's criminal complaint arguing that there was that kind of severe debilitating harm within the meaning of Macedonian law.
AP2 (Applicant): And the reason for that is because we didn't think the evidence was there, otherwise we would have put it in there.
AP2 (Applicant): So there is a specific definition under Macedonian law.
AP2 (Applicant): So we do not believe that recharacterization by the prosecutor has a basis.
AP2 (Applicant): But that notwithstanding and irrespective, at this point in time, with the benefit of hindsight and having seen the reaction of the Macedonian investigative and criminal authorities to this case on this date, we do not believe that whatever theoretical remedies there may be in the law books in Macedonia, that those would, as of now, be of any effect.
AP2 (Applicant): And whatever they may be, we are no longer required to try and exhaust them.
Nicolas Bratza (JudgeP): Thank you very much, Mr. Pavli.
Nicolas Bratza (JudgeP): We have then come to the end of the hearing.
Nicolas Bratza (JudgeP): The court will now deliberate on the admissibility and merits.
Nicolas Bratza (JudgeP): The court's decision and or judgment will be delivered later.
Nicolas Bratza (JudgeP): The parties will be informed of the date of delivery.
Nicolas Bratza (JudgeP): And the hearing, I declare the hearing closed.
Dean Spielmann (JudgeP): Please be seated, I declare open the public hearing on the merits in the case of Pentikäinen  against Finland.
Dean Spielmann (JudgeP): The application was lodged with the court on the 19th of February, 2010, under Article 34 of the Convention by a Finnish national, Mr. Markus Veikko Pentikäinen.
Dean Spielmann (JudgeP): It was allocated to the fourth section of the court, pursuant to Rule 52, Paragraph 1 of the Rules of Court.
Dean Spielmann (JudgeP): On the 4th of February, 2014, the chamber of the fourth section declared the application admissible and found by five votes to two that there had been no violation of Article 10 of the Convention.
Dean Spielmann (JudgeP): On the 30th of April, 2014, the applicant requested that the case be referred to the Grand Chamber in accordance with Article 43 of the Convention, and the panel of the Grand Chamber accepted his request on the 2nd of June, 2014.
Dean Spielmann (JudgeP): The Finnish government are represented by their agent, Mr. Arto Kosonen, Director at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Dean Spielmann (JudgeP): assisted by Ms. Sanna Heikinheimo
Dean Spielmann (JudgeP): from the Ministry of the Interior, Ms. Tuula  Majuri from the Ministry of Justice,
Dean Spielmann (JudgeP): Ms. Mia Spolander from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Dean Spielmann (JudgeP): and Mr. Paavo Kotiaho
Dean Spielmann (JudgeP): from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Advisors.
Dean Spielmann (JudgeP): The applicant, who is also present, is represented by Mr. Jussi Salokangas
Dean Spielmann (JudgeP): and Mr. Valtteri Matilainen, counsel.
Dean Spielmann (JudgeP): I welcome the representatives of the parties in the name of the court.
Dean Spielmann (JudgeP): I also welcome the delegation of members from the Ukrainian judiciary on a study visit at the court.
Dean Spielmann (JudgeP): I would explain that, in addition to interpreting in the two official languages of the court, English and French, interpreting into Ukrainian has been authorized for the benefit of the delegation of members from the Ukrainian judiciary attending this hearing.
Dean Spielmann (JudgeP): This interpreting is not arranged by the court and no transcription of the oral translation will be included in the official record of the proceedings.
Dean Spielmann (JudgeP): Having consulted the agent of the government and the representatives of the applicant, I have determined the order of addresses as follows.
Dean Spielmann (JudgeP): The representatives of the applicant, Mr. Salokangas
Dean Spielmann (JudgeP): and Mr. Matilainen will speak first,
Dean Spielmann (JudgeP): and then Mr. Kosonen for the government.
Dean Spielmann (JudgeP): I call Mr. Salokangas.
AP1 (Applicant): Dear Mr. President and distinguished members of the Court,
AP1 (Applicant): We have recently seen conflicts in the Member States of the Convention, where journalists have risked their safety and even their lives for media freedom.
AP1 (Applicant): The Court has often noted that a journalist plays an eminent role as the public watchdog of the government.
AP1 (Applicant): Only a journalist can gather and impart real-time information and cover both sides of a story when the government is a counterparty.
AP1 (Applicant): The earlier Chamber judgments on this particular case shocked journalists within and beyond the states of the Convention.
AP1 (Applicant): The European Federation of Journalists and the International Federation of Journalists decided to support the applicant's submission to the panel of the Grand Chamber.
AP1 (Applicant): The Grand Chamber now will have the opportunity to set a standard for how journalists should be treated in extreme situations and to what extent the state can intervene in the journalistic work and the public's right to access to information.
AP1 (Applicant): I would like to summarize briefly the circumstances and the facts in the light of the government's written submission and the Chamber's judgment.
AP1 (Applicant): The SMAS-ASEM demonstration in Skiasma Square attracted extensive media attention.
AP1 (Applicant): The applicant was sent by his employer, Suomen Kuvalehti, to gather and impart information from the area.
AP1 (Applicant): The employer publishes a prestigious publication that focuses on social issues.
AP1 (Applicant): The magazine aimed to make in-depth analyses of the social issues brought to the light by the demonstration.
AP1 (Applicant): Therefore it was necessary that the applicant was in the scene until the very end of the demonstration.
AP1 (Applicant): Some 500 bystanders, a core group up to 50 demonstrators, and some 50 journalists gathered at Skiasma Square, which was the departure point of the march.
AP1 (Applicant): The police had made security preparations for the event by deploying 480 police officers.
AP1 (Applicant): By Finnish standards, the scale of police preparations was exceptional.
AP1 (Applicant): Police announced that the march would not be allowed, but a peaceful demonstration could be held in front of Skiasma Square.
AP1 (Applicant): The police formed a police line and did not allow protesters to leave.
AP1 (Applicant): After that, a core group of about 15 protesters tried to break through the police line.
AP1 (Applicant): The police ended the demonstration and cordoned off Skiasma Square after 30 minutes from the start of the event.
AP1 (Applicant): First nobody was allowed to leave the cordoned area, and after an hour police formed some checkpoints which the people could use to leave the area.
AP1 (Applicant): The situation developed in such a way that the applicant's interest focused on the seemingly excessive force and actions of the police.
AP1 (Applicant): The police had detained bystanders with excessive force and some without any lawful reason.
AP1 (Applicant): Because the sudden actions of the police were provocative, controversial and questionable, the applicant saw that as a member of press he had to remain at the scene to gather and impart information for the public which they have a right to receive.
AP1 (Applicant): As the court has noted in the Törköyhti vs. Iceland, excess conduct of the police
AP1 (Applicant): is looked on as a serious public concern.
AP1 (Applicant): The government has stated that their security preparations for the demonstration were justified.
AP1 (Applicant): The government has also noted that they had to secure the security of citizens and put an end to the demonstration.
AP1 (Applicant): Indeed the applicant also accepts the view of the government.
AP1 (Applicant): The applicant has never contested this fact.
AP1 (Applicant): However, the government failed to secure the applicant's right to freedom of expression.
AP1 (Applicant): Additionally it is unclear to the applicant why the government has sent DVD video footage to the court from other violent incidents that happened on another day and therefore have no relevance to the present case.
AP1 (Applicant): I would like to draw the court's attention that the case is lodged for the violation of Article 10 of the Convention and not the Article 11 of the Convention which the government seems to be referring.
AP1 (Applicant): Now I move on the violation of Article 10 of the Convention.
AP1 (Applicant): Article 10 of the Convention guarantees that everyone has freedom of expression.
AP1 (Applicant): Freedom of expression consists of gathering, imparting and publishing information.
AP1 (Applicant): The right can be subject to conditions and restrictions.
AP1 (Applicant): The court has noted in Sunday Times vs. the United Kingdom that the eminent role of the
AP1 (Applicant): press in democratic society is to impart ideas and opinions on political matters and other matters of public interest.
AP1 (Applicant): Strong reasons must be provided for any measure affecting this role of the press and limiting access to information which the public has right to receive.
AP1 (Applicant): As the court has noted in Observer and Guardian vs. the United Kingdom, the number of exceptions
AP1 (Applicant): must be narrowly interpreted.
AP1 (Applicant): The court has established a three-stage test to verify that the limiting of freedom of expression is justified.
AP1 (Applicant): First it has to be established interference to the freedom of expression has occurred.
AP1 (Applicant): As the Chamber has correctly noted, the presumption exists that there was an interference because the applicant was on the scene as a journalist.
AP1 (Applicant): During the detention, the applicant could not impart real-time information to the publisher's website.
AP1 (Applicant): Just after the apprehension, the applicant wanted to give the memory cards from his cameras to his colleague to ensure that the people would have access to this information right away, but the police did not allow this.
AP1 (Applicant): In other words, the applicant's journalistic sources were confiscated for the period of detention.
AP1 (Applicant): The applicant was not only removed from the scene and detained overnight, but was also charged by a prosecutor and convicted by the District Court of Helsinki.
AP1 (Applicant): Indeed it is quite clear that there was interference in his journalistic work.
AP1 (Applicant): Mr. President, if you allow, my colleague Mr. Mattilainen would now describe the second
AP1 (Applicant): stage of the verification as to whether the interference was prescribed by Finnish law.
Dean Spielmann (JudgeP): Yes, thank you, Mr. Matilainen.
AP3 (Applicant): Mr. President, distinguished members of the court,
AP3 (Applicant): the applicant holds a view according to which the state interference described by Mr. Salokangas
AP3 (Applicant): has not been prescribed by Finnish domestic law enforced during the relevant time.
AP3 (Applicant): First of all, at the outset, I would like to mention that few crucial sections of domestic law were not referred before the four chamber, at least not with the same diligence as they have now been brought forth in the applicant's written submissions.
AP3 (Applicant): The applicant considers that he has had the right to supplement the facts, first of all, because they are facts by nature to which the whole case should be founded in the first place, and secondly, because it is the state's first and foremost duty to know the relevant content of its own legislation.
AP3 (Applicant): Moreover, the state should have taken into account also the facts that speak on behalf of the applicant.
AP3 (Applicant): Now, as for the domestic law, according to the Constitution of Finland, the Assembly Act, and the Police Act, the duty of the police is to maintain a public order and for this purpose to give necessary instructions and orders.
AP3 (Applicant): The term necessary within the aforementioned legislation implies that while performing this duty, all competing basic rights needs to be taken into account with due regard.
AP3 (Applicant): Moreover, under the Constitution of Finland, everyone, even journalists, are equal before the law, as the government has correctly observed in its written submissions.
AP3 (Applicant): It cannot nevertheless be presumed that formal equality shall overrule every other basic right possibly at stake.
AP3 (Applicant): In fact, by referring to equality in this context and in this particular case, the state seems to admit that it has not even tried to take into consideration the basic right of freedom of expression as executed by the applicant.
AP3 (Applicant): Nonetheless, the applicant admits that it might not be an easy task to make such a necessity assessment between competing basic rights, for example, in protests, where masses of people behave aggressively and where events might transform rapidly.
AP3 (Applicant): However, the smash as a demonstration in general can hardly be described as such an event, as we have seen from the documentation attached to the applicant's written submissions.
AP3 (Applicant): Moreover, at least at the time of applicant's apprehension, the protest was already quelled, even if some protesters were still left at the scene.
AP3 (Applicant): In your court's precedent, Giselle versus Switzerland, the national authorities' conduct, by which they had not made any kind of distinction between potentially violent individuals and peaceful demonstrators, was regarded as not prescribed by local domestic law.
AP3 (Applicant): The Finnish government has also observed in its written submissions that the reason for the applicant's arrest did not turn on his acting as a photographer.
AP3 (Applicant): However, in this context, one must bear in mind your court's case of Nechafli versus Azebaijan, where, irrespective of the police's true intention to interfere with the applicant's journalist activity, relevance was given to the journalist's clear efforts to identify himself as a journalist and to the fact that the journalist was simply doing his work and observing the event.
AP3 (Applicant): In the present case, it is indisputable that the applicant was not part of a demonstration and that he conducted himself in a peaceable manner during the events in question.
AP3 (Applicant): Even if the somewhat questionable declaration by the police to consider the smash as a demonstration as a riot would be deemed to remain within the member state's margin of appreciation, the decision of the police after this declaration to categorically apprehend everyone left at the scene, whether or not they were involved in violent acts, has not been necessary.
AP3 (Applicant): It has also been evident for the police that the applicant was a journalist performing his journalistic tasks and that he was not a threat to public order nor to any individual security that would have required to apprehend the applicant.
AP3 (Applicant): The circumstances being such, the applicant's apprehension was not necessary for the sake of public order and as such not prescribed by domestic law either.
AP3 (Applicant): At least the general criminal law principle of minimum intervention should have required the police, instead of apprehension, to order the applicant to present himself for interrogation at a later date.
AP3 (Applicant): However, the applicant was apprehended for contumacy towards the police for about 18 hours.
AP3 (Applicant): According to the Pretrial Investigation Act, a suspect who has not been arrested needs to be present in the criminal investigation for longer than 12 hours at the time unless the prerequisites for an arrest are met.
AP3 (Applicant): If the prerequisites for an arrest are met, a suspect needs to be released in 24 hours at the latest.
AP3 (Applicant): The prerequisites for an arrest are set out in the Coercive Measures Act, according to which the suspect may be arrested for an offense where the most severe penalty exceeds imprisonment for one year.
AP3 (Applicant): Now, what is relevant here?
AP3 (Applicant): Only the offense of rioting but not contumacy towards the police is such a criminal act, and therefore, permitting the police to arrest the suspect.
AP3 (Applicant): In this context, one cannot either emphasize too much that the time limits for any kind of coercive measures are only maximum limits.
AP3 (Applicant): And while applying them, the authorities need always to take into account the principle of minimum intervention on behalf of an individual.
AP3 (Applicant): Given the applicant's clearly and visibly peaceful conduct during the demonstration and his clear and successful efforts to identify himself as a journalist, no evidence of any kind whatsoever of him having rioted existed at any time that might have justified his arrest or prolonging the apprehension for over 12 hours.
AP3 (Applicant): It is worth pointing out also that interrogating a suspect between 10 PM and 7 AM was legal during the relevant time if suspect was only to request this.
AP3 (Applicant): In current case, the applicant had indeed made clear for the authorities his will to be interrogated as soon as possible from the very beginning of his detention.
AP3 (Applicant): For these reasons, the detention of the applicant for about 18 hours was not prescribed by domestic law.
AP3 (Applicant): Thirdly and lastly, the district court's decision was not reasoned sufficiently, a failure which is contrary to the Finnish criminal procedural act.
AP3 (Applicant): As a member of the European Convention on Human Rights, the Finnish courts are obliged to be familiar with the convention's content and to apply all the case law related to it.
AP3 (Applicant): Concerning the question as to whether the interference had been necessary in a democratic society, the district court came only to a laconic conclusion according to which the interference had been necessary.
AP3 (Applicant): This decision was nevertheless made without drawing any kind of distinction whatsoever between the different competing interests as required by the convention, but also directly by the domestic law itself.
AP3 (Applicant): Hence, for the applicant and for the public, it has not been clear at all on what legal reasoning the judgment was based and what was the pressing social need for the state interference.
AP3 (Applicant): Therefore, neither the district court decision, as manifestly unsubstantiated, was prescribed by domestic law.