{time}  1510

  As time has passed, quirks in TRIA have appeared that make it harder
for those policyholders to get their claims paid quickly and fully and
left insurers adrift in the lurch of a clunky will-they/won't-they
certification process.
  Mr. Flood's bill today proposes a modest set of improvements that
will add clarity to the certification process and make it easier for
insurers to pay their claims in a timely manner and easier for
policyholders to recover financially when they need those payments the
most.
  Throughout this process, we have sought feedback from Members on both
sides of the aisle and others as we have moved to get out in front of
this program's scheduled expiration in December 2027 so that everyone
would have an opportunity to review and debate the modest improvements
contained in this measure.
  The reality is that terrorism is now, unfortunately, a permanent
fixture of American life. Whether you are in Los Angeles, the Big
Apple, or Little Rock, this risk does not respect geography, and it
does not go away.
  I urge my colleagues to support Mr. Flood's bill, and I reserve the
balance of my time.
  Mr. CLEAVER. Mr. Speaker, I would like to enter into a colloquy with
the chairman.
  I was appalled by reports that a FEMA employee used their authority
entrusted by the United States to determine access to Federal aid based
on a political yard sign.
  Whether we are talking about FEMA or the Terrorism Risk Insurance
Act, this type of action violates the mission of Federal programs that
Congress designs to work for all Americans.
  Likewise, H.R. 7128 is also designed to avoid anything like that from
happening in the future with regard to the Terrorism Risk Insurance
Program.
  Congress passed TRIA shortly after the horrific September 11
terrorist attacks in an effort to ensure all businesses, not just some,
could access terrorism insurance coverage. Since then, we have
repeatedly reauthorized the act to provide certainty to all American
businesses and the insurance market.
  However, a capricious use of TRIA would undermine the certainty, and,
for that reason, some of the changes we made to the act would ensure
that certainty is a part of what both sides believe to be necessary.
  Mr. Speaker, I know the chairman agrees with me on this matter, and I
value his thoughts as well.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield to the gentleman from Arkansas (Mr. Hill) to
engage in a colloquy with me.
  Mr. HILL of Arkansas. Mr. Speaker, I appreciate the gentleman
yielding, and I agree with his assessment.
  It is true that TRIA was designed to create certainty, not doubt, for
our businesses, indeed our economy at large after something unthinkable
takes place.
  It requires insurance companies to make stand-alone terrorism
coverage available to their clients, who can choose to purchase it or
not in addition to their traditional business insurance coverage.
  That was the system we devised more than two decades ago to provide
continuity after a large-scale terrorism event, as well as to provide
businesses the fastest path to economic recovery.
  It simply would not work within the spirit of the law or the confines
of this reauthorization to pursue pathways that interrupted that system
and flow of that important post-event recovery capital.
  I am very pleased, as my friend from Missouri knows, that Ranking
Member Waters and I have worked to include some small but important
reforms to the post-event process to make sure that policyholders can
get their claims paid more fully and quickly, the way that TRIA
intended.
  Simply put, TRIA should always be about putting affected
policyholders first, and that is represented in the bill text that we
are voting on today.
  I thank the gentleman from Missouri for yielding.
  Mr. CLEAVER. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time to
close.
  Mr. Speaker, TRIA exists because the private market, left alone, will
not provide adequate terrorism risk insurance for businesses,
universities, and policyholders. The losses are too large and

too unpredictable for private insurers to price or absorb alone. We
learned this after September 11 when coverage all but vanished and
commercial reconstruction stalled in New York City.
  Congress stepped in with a Federal backstop, and for over two
decades, TRIA has kept the market functioning. H.R. 7128 reauthorizes
that Federal reinsurance program for 7 years, extending certainty to
small businesses, hospitals, universities, and not-for-profits that
rely on it.
  This is a bipartisan piece of legislation. With TRIA set to expire at
the end of 2027, passing this bill now and by reauthorizing it through
2034 with sensible targeted updates is both timely and necessary.
  Mr. Speaker, I again urge my colleagues to support this bill, and I
yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. HILL of Arkansas. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my
time to close.
  Mr. Speaker, I echo agreement with Ranking Member Cleaver's words
today as well as the chairman of our subcommittee,  Mike Flood, and his
hard work on both sides of the aisle to bring forward this 7-year
reauthorization of this critically important program well in advance of
its expiration.
  Mr. Speaker, what I love about this is the majority and the minority,
working together for the benefit of the American economy, are getting
this done well in advance of any loss or gap in coverage.
  We know it is important. We treasure the fact that we are in the
semiquincentennial year of our country's life, 250 years after the
Declaration of Independence, but everybody in the back of their mind on
this House floor in the coming weeks will be thinking about another
anniversary, one that we are not celebrating with fireworks or bands or
parades, and that is, sadly, the 25th anniversary of the terror attacks
on Washington, New York, and our country at large. It makes us sad, and
we reflect on those who we lost, the claims that we are still paying,
the families that are still mourning.
  This bill is an important reminder that we have an obligation to our
country to do things right, to be thinking about the future, to be
thinking about our Nation's economic growth, prosperity, and the safety
of the American people.
  I urge my colleagues on both sides of the aisle to answer this call
today and support this 7-year reauthorization of our Terrorism Risk
Insurance Program, and I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. ROSE. Mr. Speaker, too often Congress reflexively renews
sprawling federal backstops that the market no longer needs--quietly
gambling with taxpayers' exposure to potentially massive losses while
ignoring the absence of any real market breakdown. This TRIA
reauthorization fits the pattern perfectly: another automatic green
light for an open-ended federal guarantee, despite no evidence of a
genuine market failure.
  I think it's important to recall exactly what Congress intended when
it created the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act, or TRIA. The statute laid
out that the program was established as ``. . . a temporary federal
program that provides for a transparent system of shared public and
private compensation for insured losses resulting from acts of
terrorism, in order to (1) protect consumers by addressing market
disruptions and ensure the continued widespread availability and
affordability of property and casualty insurance for terrorism risk;
and (2) allow for a transitional period for the private markets to
stabilize, resume pricing of such insurance, and build capacity to
absorb any future losses, while preserving State insurance regulation
and consumer protections.''
  That's the law's own language--and the key phrase here is ``temporary
federal program.'' TRIA was never meant to be permanent. It was
designed to give the private market time to adjust, mature, and
ultimately take full responsibility for insuring against terrorism
risk. Yet here we are, twenty plus years later, marking up another
long-term reauthorization that continues to rely on federal involvement
instead of meaningfully reducing it.
  I have great respect for my colleagues who have worked hard on this
proposal, but I believe that H.R. 7128 misses an opportunity. Rather
than putting TRIA on a path toward less government exposure and greater
private-sector responsibility, this bill extends the federal backstop
until December 31, 2034--nearly nine years from now. That's hardly
consistent with the statute's intent of providing a ``transitional''
program.
  I also believe that H.R. 7128 violates the spirit--if not the
letter--of the House Republican floor protocols for the 119th Congress,
particularly the requirement that federal programs be subject to a
sunset ``not later than seven years'' after spending is first
authorized or continued. Under Section 2, H.R. 7128 does not merely
``add seven years'' to a distant end date; it strikes ``2027'' and
inserts ``2034,'' making this authorization effective as soon as the
bill is enacted and keeping TRIA in force through the end of 2034.
  In my view, the proper way to apply our Conference's seven-year
sunset standard is to measure from when the reauthorized program
actually takes effect--namely, when this bill is signed into law and
TRIA's federal backstop is once again authorized. In other words, the
``clock'' should start when we newly authorize or continue the program,
not from the old termination date written in prior law. Viewed that
way, characterizing H.R. 7128 as a simple seven-year extension obscures
the reality that Congress would be reauthorizing a significant federal
program for nearly a decade at once, in tension with our Conference's
stated commitment to regular review and reconsideration of federal
spending and backstop authorities.
  This is especially concerning given that, to date, TRIA has never
been activated. In the 20 plus years since TRIA was enacted, there has
not been a single Treasury-certified act of terrorism that met the
program's financial trigger. Not once has the federal government been
required to step in under TRIA.
  Meanwhile, the private insurance industry has not just done well in
this space--it has thrived under the shelter of a taxpayer-funded
guarantee. According to the Treasury Department, from 2003 to 2023
insurers collected roughly $56.7 billion in terrorism risk premiums.
  That is not the profile of a fragile market in need of permanent
federal protection; it is evidence that insurers have the experience,
capital, and appetite to keep cashing premium checks while the public
absorbs the worst-case downside risks. In effect, taxpayers provide
free reinsurance so that insurance carriers can book steady revenue and
protect record surpluses--a classic example of privatized gains and
socialized risk. Given this track record, the question is no longer
whether insurance companies can begin to shoulder more of the risk, but
why they have been allowed to avoid doing so for this long.
  Yet instead of taking any meaningful steps to scale down taxpayer
exposure or establish a serious glide path for an eventual federal
exit, this bill simply extends the program nearly as-is. I find that
deeply disappointing, because I do not believe the federal government
should be in the business of permanently backstopping risks that the
private sector is clearly capable of handling on its own.
  It did not have to be this way. I offered an amendment that I believe
would have greatly improved this bill by beginning the long-overdue
process of shifting more terrorism risk off taxpayers and back onto the
well-capitalized insurance industry where it belongs.
  First, my amendment would have reduced the federal cost share. Under
current law, the federal government covers 80 percent of covered losses
above insurer deductibles. My amendment would have reset that share to
75 percent and then ratcheted it down by 1 percentage point a year
until it reached 70 percent. This would have created a gradual,
predictable glide path that would give insurers time to adjust while
steadily reducing federal exposure and putting more responsibility back
on the private market where it belongs.
  Second, my amendment would have reduced the circumstances under which
taxpayers are forced to step in. Under current law, the program trigger
remains frozen at $200 million. My amendment would have raised that
trigger by $10 million per year until it reached $250 million, and then
indexed it to inflation using a benchmark selected by the Treasury
Secretary through a rulemaking process. That approach would have kept
the trigger aligned with economic reality instead of shrinking in real
terms and quietly expanding the federal role, ensuring that more of the
risk stays with insurers rather than being shifted to taxpayers.
  Third, my amendment would have shortened the length of the
reauthorization by changing the program termination date to five years
after enactment. Five years provides ample certainty for markets, but
it also respects the fact that TRIA was supposed to be temporary, and
that Congress should regularly revisit the scope of federal
involvement.
  Fourth, my amendment would have forced Treasury to do the serious
homework this bill avoids, laying out how, within a few years, we could
dramatically reduce taxpayer risk and make the industry shoulder a
larger share of the costs. It would have directed Treasury to study how
an annual participation fee on insurers in TRIA could be structured,
including options that generate substantial aggregate fees and deposit
them into a dedicated fund at Treasury that can be used solely to cover
future federal outlays or reimbursements under the program. The study
would have been required to examine fee designs that are proportionate
to insurer size and premiums, so that