The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from
Arkansas (Mr. Hill) and the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Lynch)
each will control 20 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Arkansas.

                             General Leave

  Mr. HILL of Arkansas. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all
Members may have 5 legislative days to revise and extend their remarks
and include extraneous material on this legislation.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentleman from Arkansas?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. HILL of Arkansas. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
  Mr. Speaker, I include in the Record the Congressional Budget Office
score for this bill.

  EFFECTS ON DIRECT SPENDING AND REVENUES OF LEGISLATION CONSIDERED UNDER SUSPENSION OF THE RULES IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES WEEK OF JULY 13, 2026
                                                                                                        Additional
                                                           Effect on Direct                           Information on                   Suspension Bill
           Bill Number                     Title               Spending        Effect on Revenues  Direct Spending and                     Text at
                                                                                                     Revenue Effects                    doc.house.gov
H.R. 6556........................  Failing Bank          Increase by at       Increase by at       Would increase       ...........  https://
 Acquisition           Least $500K.         Least $500K.         direct spending by                docs.house.gov/
                                    Fairness Act, as                                                $1 million,                       billsthisweek/
                                    amended.                                                        increase revenues                 20260713/
                                                                                                    by $1 million, and                HR6556_SUSxml.pdf
                                                                                                    result in no
                                                                                                    increase in the
                                                                                                    deficit.

  Mr. HILL of Arkansas. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of H.R.
6556, the Failing Bank Acquisition Fairness Act, offered by my friend
from Massachusetts.
  When a bank fails, regulators need to move fast to protect
depositors, preserve confidence in our financial system, consider
potential buyers, and minimize disruption to families, businesses, and
communities. All of that often takes place in a very short period of
time, between Friday at close of business and Monday morning at opening
for business. At that same time, those decisions should be made by a
process that is fair, transparent, and promotes competition.
  Under current law, Federal regulators are generally prohibited from
approving a merger or acquisition of a failed or failing bank if the
resulting institution would control more than 10 percent or more of
deposits nationwide.
  However, regulators are allowed to waive these concentration limits
under certain circumstances. H.R. 6556 restricts when those
concentration limits can be waived to situations in which there are no
other qualified bidders for that failed bank and the transaction is
necessary to prevent significant economic disruption or adverse effects
on U.S. financial stability.
  This legislation helps address concentration in the U.S. banking
sector and promote a more transparent, competitive, and accountable
approach to resolving failing banks. This legislation includes critical
guardrails, such as requiring regulators to report to Congress within
30 days of a waiver on why the waiver was granted, why other qualified
alternatives were not selected, and any recommendations for legislative
or regulatory changes to improve competition for future bank
resolutions.
  That transparency helps to ensure that these decisions are made in
the best interests of depositors; our financial system at large; and,
of course, the American people. This is a practical, bipartisan reform
that strengthens oversight, promotes competition, and reinforces
confidence in the bank resolution process, while preserving regulators'
ability to respond to bank failures.
  Mr. Speaker, I thank my friend from Massachusetts (Mr. Lynch) for his
leadership on this legislation, and I urge my colleagues on both sides
of the aisle to support H.R. 6556.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. LYNCH. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 6556, the Failing Bank
Acquisition Fairness Act, which I introduced in December 2025.
  Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Arkansas (Mr. Hill) and the
gentlewoman from California (Ms. Waters), our ranking member, who
advanced this legislation unanimously within the committee.
  Specifically, the Failing Bank Acquisition Fairness Act will prevent
megabanks from dominating the bidding process for acquiring a failed
bank if there are other eligible bids from well-capitalized and well-
managed small and midsized banks.
  In the three decades since 1994, the number of commercial banks has
declined in this country by approximately 50 percent, hollowing out the
small and midsized institutions that have traditionally housed local
community capital.
  Small to midsized banks are unable to compete with the larger
institutions in the failed bank acquisition process, even when
attainable opportunities arise which might result in a more favorable
result for depositors and impacted businesses and communities.
  For example, after the collapse of the First Republic Bank, Silicon
Valley Bank, and Signature Bank in 2023, which were the second, third,
and fourth largest bank failures in U.S. history, as part of the
resolution process, Federal regulators, including the FDIC, structured
an immensely favorable acquisition process to allow JPMorganChase,
America's biggest bank at the time, to acquire the nearly $230 billion
in assets and $103 billion in deposits from the failed First Republic
Bank.
  Multiple midsized banks sought to acquire First Republic Bank but
failed to compete with J.P. Morgan's sheer asset holdings, estimated to
be close to $4 trillion.
  As part of that deal, the FDIC also entered into a comprehensive loss
sharing agreement with JPMorganChase to incentivize that purchase.