You are given two reports by the government agency.  

Report 1:
As we have previously reported, 911 services have evolved from basic 911—which provided Americans with a universally recognized emergency number—to Enhanced 911 which also routes calls to the appropriate call center and provides information about the caller’s location and a call back number. NG911 represents the next evolution in 911 services by using IP-based technology to deliver and process 911 traffic. Under NG911, call centers will continue to receive voice calls and location information, but will also be able to accommodate emergency communications from the range of technologies in use today. In addition, NG911 systems provide call centers with enhanced capabilities to route and transfer calls and data, which could improve call centers’ abilities to handle overflow calls and increase information sharing with first responders. Generally speaking, 911 communications begin when a caller dials 911 using a landline, wireless, or Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) system. Once a 911 caller places an emergency call, a communications provider receives and routes the call to the appropriate call center, along with the caller’s phone number and location (i.e., street address for a landline caller, approximate geographic location for a wireless caller, and the subscriber’s address for VoIP). Calls and data may be routed to 911 call centers using legacy methods (i.e., routing calls across traditional telephone networks) or NG911 methods (i.e., routing calls and other data through IP-networks). Once the call reaches a call center, trained call takers and dispatchers determine the nature of the emergency and dispatch first responders, typically using a variety of equipment and systems, including call handling systems, mapping programs, and computer aided dispatch. Figure 1 illustrates the 911 communications and dispatch process. As illustrated in figure 1, NG911 systems use IP-networks capable of carrying voice plus large amounts of data. These emergency-services networks are typically deployed at the state or regional level with multiple call centers connecting to the network. However, the existence of an IP- network alone does not constitute an NG911 system. As defined by standards developed by the emergency communications community, an NG911 system should have the capability to, among other things: provide a secure environment for emergency communications; acquire and integrate additional data for routing and answering calls; process all types of emergency calls, including multimedia messages; transfer calls with added data to other call centers or first responders. While NG911 systems must possess certain capabilities, it is important to note that states and localities may make decisions about which capabilities they intend to use to best meet their needs. In addition, states and localities have the authority to make decisions about what NG911 equipment, systems, and vendors to use; thus, the configurations of these systems vary. According to a panel of experts convened by the National 911 Program, the transition to NG911 may require a variety of technical and operational changes to current 911 systems and processes. For example, technical changes can include upgrades to networks or installing new hardware or software in 911 call centers. Operational changes can include the need for additional training or the development of new policies and procedures (e.g., new procedures for processing or storing multimedia). These technical and operational changes may also have effects on 911 funding and state and local governance structures, which we will discuss in more detail later in this report. According to an FCC advisory body that examined NG911 systems architecture in 2016, while NG911 systems are implemented in a variety of ways at the state or local level, NG911 implementation can occur gradually and in phases. According to this model, NG911 implementation occurs on a continuum that begins with legacy 911 systems and ends with a fully deployed NG911 national end-state where all individual 911 call centers nationwide would be connected. The NG911 implementation model identifies activities that take place as part of the NG911 transition, many of which occur concurrently, such as: planning (e.g., conducting feasibility studies, preparing databases, establishing governance models); acquiring, testing, and implementing NG911 system elements (e.g., establishing an emergency-services IP-network, location-based call routing, processing multimedia); connecting call centers within a jurisdiction (i.e., jurisdictional end- state in which all call centers are fully NG911 operational, supported by agreements, policies, and procedures); and connecting NG911 systems nationwide (i.e., national end-state in which all call centers in the nation are fully NG911 operational, supported by agreements, policies, and procedures). In addition, because 911 services provide an essential function, the implementation of NG911 generally involves using both the legacy system and the NG911 system simultaneously for a period of time, according to the FCC advisory body, to ensure 911 services are not disrupted as new system elements are tested and implemented. Deploying and operating 911 is the responsibility of 911 authorities at the state and local level. As we have previously reported, all 50 states and the District of Columbia collect—or have authorized local entities to collect—funding for 911 from telephone service subscribers, and methods within each state for collecting funds vary. FCC, as required by statute, reports to Congress annually on the states’ collection and distribution of 911 fees and charges. There are approximately 6,000 call centers nationwide that process 911 calls, often at the county or city level, and these centers can vary greatly in size and technical sophistication. The state and local governance structures that oversee 911 operations also vary by location. For example, we previously reported that some states collect fees or charges for 911 and administer a statewide 911 program. Other states authorize local entities to collect fees or charges for 911 and administer 911 programs at the local level. Still other states use a combination of these approaches. According to a panel of experts convened by the National 911 Program, historically, 911 authority has been coordinated and maintained locally with no requirement to coordinate with other jurisdictions. However, the transition to NG911 enables connection of 911 systems. Thus, as previously mentioned, the NG911 transition may require technological and operational changes, as well as changes to 911 policies and governance responsibilities for states and localities. While deploying and operating 911 is the responsibility of entities at the state and local level, federal agencies—including NHTSA, NTIA, FCC, and DHS—have responsibilities to support state and local implementation, including through facilitating coordination of activities among 911 stakeholders and administering federal grants, for example: NHTSA houses the National 911 Program as part of its Office of Emergency Medical Services (Office of EMS) to provide national leadership and coordination for the NG911 transition throughout the United States, as previously mentioned. According to NHTSA, the fiscal year 2017 budget for the National 911 Program was $2.74 million. Among other activities, which we will discuss later in this report, the National 911 Program surveys states on progress implementing NG911 and reports this survey data annually. FCC issues orders and regulations for 911 service providers on topics relevant to NG911, such as 911 reliability, location accuracy, and text- to-911. FCC also sponsors advisory bodies comprised of government and industry experts that study relevant topics and provide recommendations related to NG911, such as the Task Force on Optimal Public Safety Answering Point Architecture and the Communications, Security, Reliability, and Interoperability Council. While there are no federally mandated time frames for implementing NG911, the Next Generation 911 Advancement Act of 2012 requires specific actions of some federal agencies as outlined in table 1, below. In addition, according to the National 911 Program, as states and localities continue to implement NG911, and begin to explore interconnection with other states’ 911 systems, federal agencies may need to take steps to help ensure state NG911 networks are interoperable and connected. We will discuss actions taken by federal agencies to assist states and localities to implement NG911 later in this report. According to NHTSA’s most recent national survey, state and local progress implementing NG911 varies, and about half of all states reported being in some phase of transition to NG911 in 2015. While a few states are well into statewide implementation, NHTSA officials told us that no state had completely implemented all NG911 functions. Additionally, as of the fall of 2017, none of the selected states we spoke with were processing multimedia—such as images or audio/video recordings—through their 911 systems due to concerns related to privacy, liability, and the ability to store and manage these types of data, among other things. The national survey data, based on responses from 45 states, measured the extent to which NG911 planning and acquisition of NG911 equipment and services were occurring, and the extent to which basic NG911 functions were operational at the state and local levels in 2015. Planning: This measure includes state and local NG911 plans for governance, funding, system components, and operations. In this context, system components refer to an emergency services IP-based network, NG911 software, system and information security, and databases, among other things, according to NHTSA’s survey. In total, 25 of 45 states reported having a state or at least one local NG911 plan in place; conversely, 18 states reported having no NG911 plan in place at either the state or local level—which may indicate they are in the early stages of planning for the NG911 transition or have not yet begun the transition to NG911. Acquisition: These measures identify states or local entities that have defined their NG911 needs and awarded contracts, and then installed and tested acquired NG911 components and services. Twenty-four states reported awarding at least one contract at the state or local level for NG911 components and services. Twenty-three states reported having installed and tested NG911 components and services at either the state or local level. NG911 services: This is a measure of 911 authorities that have some basic, functioning NG911 infrastructure in place. In total, 21 states reported having some level of basic NG911 services in place at the state or local level. Of these 21 states, 10 reported that all 911 authorities within the state were using NG911 technology to process emergency calls. Another 7 of these states reported that 25 percent or less of their state’s 911 authorities were using NG911 technology to process emergency calls. Federal officials, industry stakeholders, and state and local 911 officials we interviewed from nine states identified a number of challenges to implementing NG911, including challenges related to funding, evolving technology and operations, and governance. Funding: State and local officials in four of nine selected states identified insufficient funding as one of the challenges they face in implementing NG911. Additionally, FCC, NHTSA, and industry reports noted that state and local financing strategies are generally insufficient to fully implement NG911. Specifically, these reports note that the need to provide new capital for NG911 implementation while simultaneously funding legacy operational costs during the transition can strain state and local funding. Limited funding: Officials in three states told us that their current funding may not be able to support the upfront costs of infrastructure and equipment acquisitions associated with the transition to NG911. Further, officials said they will need to simultaneously fund both the new NG911 and legacy 911 systems currently in operation until the NG911 systems are fully operational. To address these challenges, a Minnesota official told us about how the state leveraged economies of scale to reduce overall costs through cost sharing between multiple call centers and of call centers consolidating operations from 114 to 104 call centers. Additionally, a Virginia official told us that to cover the upfront costs of transitioning to NG911, the state plans to borrow from the state treasury and then repay the treasury with future-year fee collections. Fee diversion: Diversion of fees intended for 911 costs to non-911 activities may affect a state’s or locality’s ability to cover NG911 transition costs and necessitate identifying alternative funding sources. The FCC’s 2016 annual report on 911 fees indicates that for calendar year 2015, all but two of the states that responded to FCC’s 911 fee survey affirmed that their state or jurisdiction collects fees from phone users to support or implement 911 services. State and local authorities also determine how these 911 fees can be used. FCC’s report also indicated that eight states and Puerto Rico reported diverting a total of more than $220 million (or approximately 8.4 percent) of 911 fees collected to non-911 purposes. Some of these diverted funds were directed to other public safety programs, and others were diverted to either non-public safety or unspecified purposes. According to one state official, had it not been for 911 fees being diverted to non-911 purposes, funding would have been sufficient to cover the NG911 transition without having to go to the state legislature for additional funding. However, officials in the other eight selected states told us that either fee diversion was not an issue in their state or that the diversion of funds had not affected their state’s ability to implement NG911. Evolving technology and operations: Officials in eight states told us that the retirement of legacy infrastructure and the transition to IP-based systems introduces new technical and operational challenges for call centers and states, as well as for equipment and service providers. Interoperability: Officials in three selected states mentioned that connecting to neighboring networks—whether within or between states—could pose challenges. For example, officials mentioned that states and localities may have obtained different equipment, software applications, or service providers – all of which can make interconnections difficult. Officials in Maine and New Hampshire told us that differences in service providers can also be a challenge to seamlessly connecting to neighboring systems. In an instance where two states (Minnesota and North Dakota) have worked to connect their 911 systems, both states used the same service provider, which officials said allowed for fewer barriers to connection. Cyber risks: Officials in three states told us that the transition from a traditional system that only transmits voice traffic to an IP-based system that transmits voice and data traffic has significantly increased the risk of a cyber-attack. This can be a challenge because managing cyber risks is a new and evolving role for state and local 911 authorities. Approaching the transition to NG911 without managing these risks could result in disrupted or disabled call center operations and ultimately a delayed response to an emergency situation. Multimedia: Officials in three states mentioned potential implementation challenges related to accepting and processing multimedia such as audio recordings, images, and videos. More specifically, one official said they did not have procedures to manage or store these multimedia files once received. In addition, another official raised privacy and liability concerns. Call routing: One of the core services of an NG911 system is the ability to have calls routed to the appropriate call center based on a wireless caller’s physical location, instead of the location of the cellular tower that receives and transmits the call. An FCC-sponsored working group reported that there are several options for achieving this and each option has unique positive and negative aspects. One challenge officials in two states noted was that rather than a single, nationwide approach to routing these calls, state and local 911 authorities would need to work individually with the wireless carriers to determine how to best implement location-based call routing. Governance: FCC has noted that transitioning to NG911 will likely result in new roles and levels of coordination between state 911 authorities, local 911 authorities, 911 call centers, and 911 service providers. Further, relationships among authorities at the state and local level may change as states work to interconnect NG911 systems. State and local officials noted that these types of governance challenges can apply in a variety of situations, including within or between states. Evolving roles: As previously mentioned, 911 governance structures vary among states. These varying governance structures may pose different challenges. For example, some states have a centralized structure in which a single government agency is responsible for statewide 911 system’s administration and policy. Officials in two states told us that although they faced challenges transitioning to NG911, their states’ centralized 911 structure eased the transition in their states because there was uniformity in policy and technology, among other things, coming from a single statewide authority. In other states, 911 systems are primarily a local responsibility and organized with decentralized authorities and resources. In these instances, there may be specific challenges related to transitioning to an interconnected NG911 system. Such challenges may include the need for increased levels of coordination among numerous jurisdictions with potentially disparate organizational structures, levels of funding, and priorities. An official also noted that there are governance challenges related to connecting states and evolving relationships between 911 authorities and service providers. Informing decision makers: One of the challenges identified by officials in two states is differing levels of experience and understanding by state and local officials as to what NG911 priorities should be for timely implementation. To help with this understanding, the federal government is making efforts to educate state and local authorities on how to facilitate policymaker understanding as well as provide regular updates to stakeholders on recent NG911 developments. We discuss some of these efforts later in this report. While state and local entities have the primary responsibility for implementing NG911 technology and services, federal agencies are taking actions to assist state and local 911 entities to address NG911 implementation challenges. Actions taken include developing resources, offering technical assistance, and convening stakeholders. More specifically, we identified selected activities that were taken by NHTSA, NTIA, FCC, and DHS that address some of the funding, technology, and governance challenges raised by state and local 911 stakeholders, for example: Cost study: NHTSA’s National 911 Program and NTIA, in consultation with FCC and DHS, plan to issue a study of the range of costs for 911 call centers and service providers to implement NG911 systems. According to NHTSA officials, the cost study will present a nationwide view, rather than a state-by-state view, on the progress of NG911 implementation and its associated costs. Grant program: NHTSA and NTIA are preparing to jointly administer a $115 million grant program to improve 911 services, including the adoption and operation of NG911 services. In September 2017, NHTSA and NTIA issued a notice of proposed rulemaking outlining implementing regulations for the grant program. NHTSA and NTIA expect to award the grants in 2018. Technology standards: The National 911 Program issued an annual guide in 2017 that stressed the importance of using open technology standards for NG911 services. The guide provides a list of standards that have been recently updated and an analysis that identifies whether existing standards fully address NG911 processes and protocols. Cybersecurity guides: DHS issued a guide in 2016 that identified cybersecurity risks for NG911 and risk mitigation strategies. According to DHS officials, the National 911 Program provided input on this guide. In addition, an advisory body tasked by FCC to examine 911 call-centers’ architecture issued a report in 2016 that provided a cybersecurity self-assessment tool for call centers and guidance on cybersecurity strategies. Governance plans: To address challenges related to the evolving roles for state and local 911 authorities, the National 911 Program issued a guide in 2016 that provided practices for states to consider when interconnecting NG911 networks, and DHS issued a guide in 2015 for emergency communications officials for establishing, assessing, and updating their governance structures. In addition, an FCC advisory body issued a report in 2016 that identified NG911 governance approaches, issues, and recommendations for states, localities, and call centers to consider when planning for the deployment of NG911. In addition to federal agency efforts to assist the state and local 911 community, the National 911 Program is in the early stages of establishing an interagency initiative to create a National NG911 Roadmap. As part of this initiative, the National 911 Program plans to convene the 911 stakeholder community to identify tasks that need to be completed at the national level by the federal government and other public and private-sector organizations to support the creation of a national, interconnected NG911 system. Additional details regarding this planned activity are described in further detail later in this report. For additional information on federal actions to address state and local NG911 challenges, see appendix II. As the lead entity for coordinating federal NG911 activities, the National 911 Program has taken a variety of actions to assist the state and local 911 community, in collaboration with other federal agencies. However, the program lacks goals and performance measures to assess whether these activities are achieving desired results. National 911 Program officials stated that they initiate program activities based on feedback received from the 911 community. In addition, officials said the program’s activities fall within the tasks established in the Next Generation 911 Advancement Act of 2012. However, the National 911 Program does not have a means to assess its progress toward meeting its responsibilities established in the 2012 Act. National 911 Program officials said the Office of EMS—the office within NHTSA in which the program is housed—has a strategic plan, but it is outdated and does not contain specific goals or performance measures related to 911 or NG911 implementation. Officials said the Office of EMS has held preliminary discussions to begin updating its strategic plan by January 2019 and plans to include goals and performance measures related to 911 and NG911 services. Office of EMS officials told us the Office of EMS strategic plan will be jointly developed with the National 911 Program. However the Office of EMS had not yet developed a draft strategic plan during the time of our review. Federal internal control standards call for management to clearly define objectives in order to achieve desired results. According to these standards, an entity determines its mission, establishes specific measurable objectives, and formulates plans to achieve its objectives. These standards state that management sets objectives in order to meet the entity’s mission, strategic plan, and goals and requirements of applicable laws and regulations. In addition, our work on leading practices for managing for results indicated that an agency’s strategic goals should also explain what results are expected from the agency and when to expect those results. Further, these goals form a basis for an entity to identify strategies to fulfill its mission and improve its operations to support the achievement of that mission. As the lead entity for coordinating federal NG911 efforts, the National 911 Program faces a complex and challenging task of assisting the 911 community while the nation’s 911 systems undergo a major transformation. However, without specific goals and related performance measures, the National 911 Program is unable to assess how well its activities are achieving results in relation to its responsibilities identified in the 2012 Act. As the National 911 Program and the Office of EMS consider creating a strategic plan, ensuring that the plan includes specific goals and related measures for the National 911 Program would help officials better understand whether the program’s activities are effectively assisting states and localities in transitioning to a fully integrated national NG911 system, and help identify any programmatic changes that might be needed. As previously mentioned, the National 911 Program is in the early stages of establishing an interagency initiative to create a National NG911 Roadmap. This initiative will convene the 911 stakeholder community to identify national-level tasks that need to be completed by federal agencies and other organizations to realize a national, interconnected NG911 system. According to the National 911 Program, a list of the national-level tasks needed to advance NG911 implementation nationwide has not been created to date. In addition, state officials we spoke with said there are certain issues related to interoperability and cybersecurity that federal agencies need to address before states can connect their respective state NG911 systems. To address these issues, NHTSA’s National 911 Program issued a request for proposal (RFP) in August 2017 for managing the roadmap development process and awarded a contract in September 2017. While the National 911 Program is taking steps to develop a National NG911 Roadmap, the program does not have a plan to identify: (1) roles or responsibilities for federal entities to carry out national-level tasks or (2) how the program plans to achieve the roadmap’s objectives. NHTSA’s NG911 roadmap RFP specifies that by identifying a list of national-level tasks that are developed and adopted by the 911 stakeholder community, the roadmap could serve as a blueprint to carry out these tasks and thereby ensure the interoperability of the nation’s NG911 system. However, the National 911 Program does not have plans for the entities participating in the development of the roadmap to be assigned roles and responsibilities for executing the roadmap’s national- level tasks. National 911 Program officials told us the National 911 Program does not plan to assign roles and responsibilities because NHTSA does not have the authority to require or assign tasks for other entities. Additionally, program officials view the simultaneous identification of tasks and assignments of responsibility for those tasks as a risk to facilitating a candid and productive discussion with entities participating in the roadmap initiative. However, officials stated it may be appropriate for agencies participating in the roadmap initiative to perform specific tasks after the roadmap is finalized. We have previously examined interagency collaborative mechanisms and identified certain key issues for federal agencies to consider when using these mechanisms to achieve results. Our prior work has found that following leading collaboration practices, such as clarifying roles and responsibilities of agencies engaged in collaboration, can enhance and sustain collaboration among agencies and provide an understanding of who will do what in support of meeting the aims of the collaborative group. As stated above, the RFP specifies that a roadmap developed by and adopted by 911 stakeholders could serve as a blueprint to carry out the roadmap’s tasks. Securing the commitment of agencies to assigned roles could help organize the collaborative group’s joint and individual efforts and thereby better facilitate decision making. As we have previously found, a lack of clarity on the roles and responsibilities of agencies participating in an interagency effort—such as the execution of the roadmap’s tasks—may limit agencies’ abilities to effectively achieve shared objectives. Given the complexity of the task and the number of agencies that could be involved, following selected leading collaboration practices for the roadmap initiative—particularly with regard to collaborating with roadmap stakeholders to clarify their roles and responsibilities (whether during the creation of the task list or afterwards)—could reduce barriers to agencies effectively working together to achieve the national-level tasks. While clarifying the roles and responsibilities of roadmap stakeholders for the execution of the roadmap’s tasks is an important collaborative step, the National 911 Program has additional responsibilities as the lead entity for the initiative. However, National 911 Program officials are unable to clearly articulate how the program will proceed following the completion of the roadmap. National 911 Program officials said without knowing the contents of the roadmap, it would be premature to specify how the roadmap’s national-level tasks would be completed. Officials stated that once the roadmap is completed, possible next steps may include identification of timelines, deadlines, and a mechanism for tracking progress, among other things, but officials stated that these steps are not required in the roadmap RFP. As stated above, federal internal control standards call for management to clearly define objectives in specific terms. According to these standards, management defines what is to be achieved, who is to achieve it, how it will be achieved, and the time frames for achievement. Without a clear plan for how the National 911 Program would take next steps to support the implementation of the roadmap’s objectives and tasks, the National 911 Program may not be prepared to take effective action once the roadmap is completed. We have previously found that having an implementation plan can assist agencies to better focus and prioritize goals and objectives, and align planned activities. Once the roadmap is completed, developing an implementation plan that details what is to be achieved and how it will be accomplished will place the National 911 Program in a better position moving forward to support the completion of the national-level tasks. The current 911 system is undergoing a historic transition. With no federal requirement that states transition to NG911 services, federal leadership is critical to addressing interoperability challenges and promoting the goal of an interconnected national system. As the lead federal entity for fostering coordination and collaboration among federal, state, and local 911 authorities, the National 911 Program plays a critical role in coordinating NG911 implementation efforts to improve the nation’s 911 services. However, this program—in collaboration with other federal agencies— faces a complex and challenging task to help move approximately 6,000 independent 911 call centers toward an interconnected national NG911 system. In addition, given that the NG911 transition is still in its early stages and is an ongoing effort, it is difficult to assess the effectiveness of various federal actions to assist states and localities in the transition. In light of these challenges, without specific goals and related measures to assess effectiveness, the National 911 Program may be hindered in determining whether it is making progress towards its stated mission. Through the roadmap initiative, the National 911 Program has taken important first steps in identifying the need for actions at the national level, in order to fully realize the desired end-state of a national, interconnected NG911 system. However, while identifying needed next steps is essential, equally important to the collaborative effort’s success is (1) defining and agreeing on the roles and responsibilities of the entities best suited to undertake these actions, and (2) developing plans for how the National 911 Program will support implementation to achieve the roadmap’s objectives. If taken, these actions could help further NG911 implementation nationwide and help the National 911 Program and federal agencies in assisting states and localities to improve these lifesaving services. We are making the following three recommendations to the Administrator of NHTSA regarding the National 911 Program: develop specific program goals and performance measures related to NG911 implementation. (Recommendation 1) in collaboration with the appropriate federal agencies, determine roles and responsibilities of federal agencies participating in the National NG911 Roadmap initiative in order to carry out the national-level tasks over which each agency has jurisdiction. (Recommendation 2) develop an implementation plan to support the completion of the National NG911 Roadmap’s national-level tasks. (Recommendation 3) We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of Transportation, Commerce, and Homeland Security and FCC for their review and comment. In its comments, reproduced in appendix III, the Department of Transportation agreed with the recommendations. The Departments of Transportation and Homeland Security also provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. The Department of Commerce and FCC had no comments. As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees, the Secretary of the Department of Transportation, the Secretary of the Department of Commerce, the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, the Managing Director of the FCC, and other interested parties. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-2834 or goldsteinm@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix IV. Our objectives were to examine (1) progress states and localities are making to implement Next Generation 911 (NG911) and the challenges they have faced and (2) how federal agencies have addressed state and local implementation challenges and planned next steps. To describe state and local progress in implementing NG911 and background information on fee collection and costs, we analyzed select survey data elements from the 2016 National 911 Progress Report and the Eighth Annual Report to Congress on State Collection and Distribution of 911 and Enhanced 911 Fees and Charges, maintained by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) respectively. More specifically, we analyzed the most recent state-provided data (from calendar year 2015) related to the planning and implementation of NG911 at the state and local levels, as well as NG911 cost and 911-related revenue data. We assessed the reliability of these data by reviewing relevant documents and discussing data elements with staff responsible for collecting and analyzing the data. We also conducted our own testing to check the consistency of the data. We found the data from both sources to be sufficiently reliable for our purposes to describe states’ progress in implementing NG911 and provide background on 911 fee collection and costs. While these data provide the best nationwide picture of NG911 implementation and fee collection, and are reliable for our purposes, there are some limitations on how the data can be used. Since we did not validate the state-reported responses, our findings based on these data are limited to what states reported. Additionally, regarding the 2016 National 911 Progress Report data, there are limitations to (1) making comparisons between states because states have different approaches to implementing NG911 and (2) ascertaining year-over-year progress because reporting is voluntary and states’ response rates can vary year to year. To describe implementation challenges that states and local authorities may be encountering, we selected a non-generalizable sample of 10 states as case studies, based upon a variety of factors, including reported progress in implementing NG911, statewide planning and coordination, reported number of annual 911 calls, whether states diverted 911 fees to other uses, and variation in geographic location. We selected these states, in part, based on their responses to the two aforementioned surveys. Based on the aforementioned criteria, we selected the following states to include as case studies: California, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Dakota, South Dakota, Vermont, and Virginia. We reviewed documents and interviewed state officials from all of these states except Nevada about NG911 implementation progress, challenges, federal actions, and any additional assistance needed. We contacted 911 officials in Nevada but did not receive responses. We also interviewed local officials in four of the selected states. While not generalizable to all states, the information obtained from our case studies provides examples of broader issues faced by states and localities in managing the NG911 transition. To determine how federal agencies have addressed state and local implementation challenges and planned next steps, we reviewed relevant statutes, regulations, and documentation of federal agency actions and plans, and our prior reports. We also interviewed officials from federal agencies, including NHTSA, the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA), FCC, and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), about federal actions taken and plans for next steps. To understand planning activities undertaken by NHTSA’s National 911 Program, and its planned project to develop a National NG911 Roadmap, we reviewed the National 911 Program’s internal planning documents, the program’s request for proposal to develop a national roadmap, the program’s written responses to our questions, and interviewed National 911 Program officials. In addition, we interviewed officials from national associations representing emergency-response- technology companies, wireless and wireline phone carriers, emergency- communications entities, and groups representing deaf and hard-of- hearing consumers to gain their perspectives on federal actions taken and next steps. We assessed the National 911 Program’s strategic- planning activities against leading practices for performance management found in our prior work on strategic planning and goal setting and federal internal control standards. We assessed the National 911 Program’s planned activities for the national roadmap project against federal internal control standards and selected key practices to enhance interagency collaboration identified in our prior work. We conducted our work from January 2017 to January 2018 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. Description of challenge State and local funding may not be sufficient to support costs associated with transitioning to NG911 equipment and infrastructure. Transitioning from legacy infrastructure to Internet Protocol-based systems presents technical and operational challenges such as interoperability and cybersecurity risks. Federal actions Grant resources: The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration’s (NHTSA) National 911 Program issued on its website a list clarifying which of the fiscal year 2016 emergency-communications grants may be used for NG911 services. Program officials said they developed this list in collaboration with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Cost study: NHTSA’s National 911 Program and the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA), in consultation with the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and DHS, plan to issue a study of the range of costs for 911 call centers and service providers to implement NG911 systems and on the nationwide progress of implementing NG911 services. Grant program: NHTSA and NTIA are preparing to jointly administer a $115 million grant program to improve 911 services, including the adoption and operation of NG911 services. NHTSA and NTIA expect to award the grants in 2018. Funding mechanisms: An advisory body tasked by FCC issued a report in 2016 that identified common costs and funding mechanisms for 911 officials to consider. The report also introduced a 911 funding sustainment model designed for use by 911 officials to calculate their financial needs to support a transition to NG911 implementation. Guides on technology standards and procurement practices: In 2017, NHTSA’s National 911 Program issued an annual guide on emergency- communications technology standards that stressed the importance of using open technology standards for NG911 services. The National 911 Program issued another guide in 2016 that provides information on procuring goods and services related to NG911 such as practices for call centers to consider when developing their request for proposals and contracts. Examining emerging technology issues: In 2017, FCC tasked a public- private advisory council to recommend how FCC can promote the NG911 transition, enhance the reliability of NG911, and mitigate the threat of 911 outages. Prior to that tasking, the FCC advisory council issued a report in 2016 that explored location-based routing issues and discussed transition considerations from legacy 911 to NG911. NG911 cybersecurity guide and technical assistance: DHS, with input from NHTSA’s National 911 Program according to DHS officials, issued a guide in 2016 that identifies cybersecurity risks for NG911 and risk mitigation strategies. In addition, DHS provides NG911 technical assistance for states seeking assistance with strategic planning and technology integration. In a separate effort, an advisory body tasked by FCC to examine 911 call center architecture issued a report in 2016 that provides a cybersecurity self- assessment tool for call centers and guidance on cybersecurity strategies. Description of challenge States may face a range of challenges related to evolving roles for state and local 911 authorities that could hinder NG911 implementation. Federal actions Guides on state and legislative planning: NHTSA’s National 911 Program issued guides on state 911 planning and legislative issues to consider for NG911 and awarded a contract in September 2017 to update those guides. In 2016, the National 911 Program issued a guidebased on the experiences of Iowa, Minnesota, North Dakota, and South Dakota that identifies practices to consider for states interconnecting NG911 networks across state lines. Exploring NG911 governance implementation issues: In 2016, an advisory body tasked by FCC issued a report that identifies NG911 governance approaches, issues, and recommendations for states, localities, and call centers to consider when planning for the deployment of NG911. In 2013, FCC also issued a report that details recommendations to Congress for transitioning from legacy 911 to NG911 networks. Guide on emergency communications governance structures: In 2015, DHS and the National Council of Statewide Interoperability Coordinators issued a guide that provides characteristics of effective governance approaches and best practices for officials to establish, assess, and update their governance structures. In addition to the contact named above, Andrew Huddleston (Assistant Director), Jean Cook (Analyst in Charge), Camilo Flores, Steven Rabinowitz, Malika Rice, Kelly L. Rubin, Michael Sweet, Hai Tran, Marika Van Laan, and Michelle Weathers made key contributions to this report.

 

 Report 2:
The Railroad Retirement Board (RRB), an independent federal agency, administers retirement, survivor, disability, unemployment, and sickness insurance for railroad workers and their families under the Railroad Retirement Act (RRA) and the Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act (RUIA). These acts cover workers who are employed by railroads engaged in interstate commerce and related subsidiaries, railroad associations, and railroad labor organizations. Lifelong railroad workers receive railroad retirement benefits instead of Social Security benefits; railroad workers with nonrailroad experience receive benefits either from railroad retirement or Social Security, depending on the length of their railroad service. The number of railroad workers has been declining since the 1950s, although the rate of decline has been irregular and recent years have seen increases in railroad employment after reaching an all-time low of 215,000 workers in January 2010. Recently, railroad employment peaked in April 2015 to 253,000 workers, the highest level since November 1999, and then declined through FY2017, falling to 221,000 workers. The total number of beneficiaries under the RRA and RUIA decreased from 623,000 in FY2008 to 574,000 in FY2017, and total benefit payments increased from $10.1 billion to $12.6 billion during the same time. During FY2017, the RRB paid nearly $12.5 billion in retirement, disability, and survivor benefits to approximately 548,000 beneficiaries. Almost $105.4 million in unemployment and sickness benefits were paid to approximately 28,000 claimants. This report explains the programs under RRA and RUIA, including how each program is financed, the eligibility rules, and the types of benefits available to railroad workers and family members. It also discusses how railroad retirement relates to the Social Security system. For a quick overview of this topic, see CRS In Focus IF10481, Railroad Retirement Board: Retirement, Survivor, Disability, Unemployment, and Sickness Benefits . The RRA authorizes retirement, survivor, and disability benefits for railroad workers and their families. In December 2017, there were a total of 526,100 RRA beneficiaries, decreasing from 672,400 in 2001. This decline might partly result from the decline in railroad employment in the past five decades. The average monthly benefit for each beneficiary was about $1,986 in 2017, which increased from $1,043 in 2001, reflecting the growth in average wages and prices (see Figure 1 ). The railroad retirement, disability, and survivor program is mainly financed by payroll taxes, financial interchanges from Social Security, and transfers from the National Railroad Retirement Investment Trust (NRRIT) (see Figure 2 ), all of which accounted for 93.9% of the $12.7 billion gross funding of the RRA program during FY2017. The remaining 6.1% of the program was financed by federal income taxes levied on railroad retirement benefits, interest on investment and other revenue, and general appropriations to pay the costs of phasing out vested dual benefits. Payroll taxes, which provided 47.0% of gross RRA funding in FY2017, are the largest funding source for railroad retirement, survivor, and disability benefits. Railroad retirement payroll taxes are divided into two tiers—Tier I and Tier II taxes. The Tier I tax is the same as the Social Security payroll tax: railroad employers and employees each pay 6.2% on earnings up to $132,900 in 2019. The Tier II tax is set each year based on the railroad retirement system's asset balances, benefit payments, and administrative costs. In 2019, the Tier II tax is 13.1% for employers and 4.9% for employees on earnings up to $98,700. Tier II taxes are used to finance Tier II benefits, the portion of Tier I benefits in excess of Social Security retirement benefits (such as unreduced early retirement benefits for railroad employees with at least 30 years of railroad service), and supplemental annuities. Tier I payroll taxes are deposited in the Social Security Equivalent Benefit Account (SSEBA), which pays the Social Security level of benefits and administrative expenses allocable to those benefits. The SSEBA also receives or pays the financial interchange transfers between the railroad retirement and Social Security systems. The financial interchange with Social Security provided 32.6% of gross RRA funding in FY2017. The purpose of the financial interchange is to place the Social Security trust funds in the same position they would have been in, if railroad employment had been covered under Social Security since that program's inception. Tier II tax revenues that are not needed to pay current benefits or associated administrative costs are held in the National Railroad Retirement Investment Trust (NRRIT), which is invested in both government securities and private equities. NRRIT transfers provide another revenue source for railroad benefits, and they were 14.3% of gross RRA funding in FY2017. Prior to the Railroad Retirement and Survivors' Improvement Act of 2001 ( P.L. 107-90 ), surplus railroad retirement assets could only be invested in U.S. government securities—just as the Social Security trust funds must be invested in securities issued or guaranteed by the U.S. government. The 2001 act established the NRRIT to manage and invest the assets in the Railroad Retirement Account in the same way that the assets of private-sector and most state and local government pension plans are invested. The remainder of the railroad retirement system's assets, such as assets in SSEBA, continues to be invested solely in U.S. government-issued or -granted securities. The combined fair market value of Tier II taxes and NRRIT assets is designed to maintain four to six years' worth of RRB benefits and administrative expenses. To maintain this balance, the Railroad Retirement Tier II tax rates automatically adjust as needed. This tax adjustment does not require congressional action, according to Section 204 of the 2001 act. To be insured for railroad benefits, a worker must generally have at least 10 years of covered railroad work or 5 years performed after 1995 and "insured status" under Social Security rules (generally 40 earnings credits) based on combined railroad retirement and Social Security-covered earnings. An insured railroad worker's family may be entitled to receive railroad retirement benefits. If a worker does not qualify for railroad retirement benefits, his or her railroad work counts toward Social Security benefits. Of the total $12.5 billion benefit payments during FY2017, 60.0% (or $7.5 billion) were paid in retirement annuities to retired workers, 8.0% (or $1.0 billion) in disability annuities, 14.4% (or $1.8 billion) in spouse annuities, and 16.8% (or $2.1 billion) in survivor annuities. Tier I annuities are designed to be nearly equivalent to Social Security Old Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance benefits. Tier I annuities are calculated using the Social Security benefit formula and are based on both railroad retirement and Social Security-covered employment. However, Tier I annuities are more generous than Social Security benefits in certain situation. For example, at the age of 60, railroad workers with at least 30 years of covered railroad work may receive unreduced retirement annuities. At the full retirement age (FRA), which is gradually increasing from 65 to 67 for Social Security and railroad retirement beneficiaries, insured workers with fewer than 30 years of service may receive full retirement ann uities. Alternatively, workers with fewer than 30 years of service may, starting at the age of 62, receive annuities that have been reduced actuarially for the additional years the worker is expected to spend in retirement. Tier I benefit reductions for early retirement are similar to those in the Social Security system. As the FRA rises, so will the reduction for early retirement. If a railroad employee delays retirement past FRA, Tier I annuities are increased by a certain percentage for each month up until the age of 70, which is identical to the benefit increase provided by Delayed Retirement Credits under the Social Security system. In general, Social Security benefits are subtracted from Tier I annuities, because work covered by Social Security is counted toward Tier I annuities. Beneficiaries insured by both systems receive a single check from the RRB. Railroad retirement annuities may also be reduced for certain pensions earned through federal, state, and local government work that is not covered by Social Security. For early retirees who continue to work for a nonrailroad employer while receiving the retirement benefit during the year prior to FRA, Tier I benefits are reduced by $1 for every $2 earned above an exempt amount ($17,040 in 2018). After Tier I benefits are first paid, they increase annually with a cost-of-living adjustment (COLA) in the same manner as Social Security benefits. Retirement annuities are not payable to workers who continue to work in a covered railroad job or who return to railroad work after retirement. Tier II retirement annuities are paid in addition to Tier I annuities and any private pension and retirement saving plans offered by railroad employers. They are similar to private pensions and based solely on covered railroad service. Tier II annuities for current retirees are equal to seven-tenths of 1% of the employee's average monthly earnings in the 60 months of highest earnings, times the total number of years of railroad service. Tier II annuities are increased annually by 32.5% of the Social Security COLA. Tier II annuities are not (in contrast to Tier I annuities) reduced if a worker receives Social Security benefits or a government pension that was not covered by Social Security. For railroad retirees and spouses who work for their last pre-retirement nonrailroad employer while receiving retirement benefits, Tier II annuities are reduced by $1 for every $2 earned, capped at 50% of the Tier II annuity. There is no cap to the earnings-related reduction in railroad Tier I or Social Security benefits. In addition, the earnings-related reduction applies to all Tier II beneficiaries regardless of age, whereas for railroad Tier I and Social Security benefits, the earnings-related reduction applies only until the beneficiary reaches FRA. Tier II payroll taxes also finance a supplemental annuity program. Supplemental annuities are payable to employees first hired before October 1981, aged 60 with at least 30 years of covered railroad service or aged 65 and older with at least 25 years of covered railroad service, and a current connection with the railroad industry. In addition, general revenues finance a vested dual benefit for those who were insured for both railroad retirement and Social Security in 1974 when the two-tier railroad retirement benefit structure was established. Neither supplemental annuities nor vested dual benefits are adjusted for changes in the cost of living during retirement. Supplemental annuities are subject to the same earnings reductions as Tier II benefits; vested dual benefits are subject to the same earnings reductions as Tier I benefits. Railroad workers may be eligible for disability annuities if they become disabled regardless of whether the disability is caused by railroad work. The RRB determines whether a worker is disabled based on the medical evidence provided during the application process. Railroad workers found to be totally and permanently disabled from all work may be eligible for Tier I benefits at any age if the worker has at least 10 years of railroad service. Totally disabled workers may also receive Tier II benefits at the age of 62 if they have 10 or more years of service. Occupational disability annuities are also payable to workers found to be permanently disabled from their regular railroad occupations, if the worker is at least 60 years old with 10 years of service (or any age with 20 years of service), and with a current connection to the railroad industry. A five-month waiting period after the onset of disability is required before any disability annuity can be payable. Disability annuities are not payable if a worker is currently employed in a covered railroad job. Disability benefits are suspended if a beneficiary earns more than a certain amount after deducting certain disability-related work expenses. The Tier I portion of disability benefits may be reduced for the receipt of workers compensation or government disability benefits. In any month that a worker collects a railroad retirement or disability annuity, his or her spouse may also be eligible for a spousal annuity equal to or greater than the benefit he or she would have received if the worker's railroad work had been covered by Social Security. A spouse is eligible for a spousal annuity when he or she reaches the same minimum age required for the worker (i.e., either at the age of 60 or 62, depending on years of the worker's service). At any age, a spouse may be eligible for a spousal annuity if he or she cares for the worker's unmarried child under the age of 18 (or a child of any age that was disabled before the age of 22). An individual must have been married to the railroad worker for at least one year before he or she applies for the spousal annuities, with certain exceptions. A qualifying spouse receives 50% of the worker's Tier I benefit before any reductions (or, if higher, a Social Security benefit based on his or her own earnings). Spouses may also receive 45% of the worker's Tier II benefit before any reductions. Divorced spouses of retired or disabled railroad workers may also be eligible for spousal annuities. A divorced spouse may receive 50% of the worker's Tier I benefit before reductions, but no Tier II benefits. To qualify, the former spouse must have been married to the worker for at least 10 years and must not currently be married (remarriages if any must have terminated); both the worker and former spouse must be at least 62 years old. For spouses, as for railroad workers, Social Security benefits are subtracted from Tier I annuities. The Tier I portion of a spouse annuity may also be reduced for receipt of any pension from government employment not covered by Social Security based on the spouse's own earnings. Spouses are subject to reductions based on the primary worker's earnings as well as on their own earnings. For example, for early retirement, spouses are subject to different benefit reductions from workers. Finally, spouse annuities are reduced by the amount of any railroad benefits earned based on their own work. After the worker's death, surviving spouses, former spouses, children, and other dependents may be eligible to receive survivor annuities, which are paid in addition to any private life insurance offered by railroad employers. To be insured for survivor annuities, the worker must have had a current connection with the railroad industry at the time of death. Railroad survivor annuities are generally higher than comparable Social Security benefits because railroad workers' families may be entitled to Tier II annuities as well as Tier I annuities (as noted above, Tier I annuities are equivalent to Social Security benefits). In cases where no monthly survivor annuities are paid, a lump-sum payment may be made to certain survivors. The widows and widowers of railroad workers may be eligible to receive survivor annuities. At FRA, a surviving spouse may be eligible for 100% of the worker's Tier I annuity (or his or her own Social Security or railroad retirement Tier I benefit, if higher). The widow(er) may also receive up to 100% of the worker's Tier II annuity. As early as the age of 60 (or age 50, if disabled), widows and widowers may receive reduced survivor annuities. A qualifying widow(er) must have been married to the deceased railroad worker for at least nine months, with certain exceptions. At any age, a widow(er) caring for a deceased worker's child under the age of 18 may receive a survivor annuity equal to 75% of the worker's Tier I annuity, as well as up to 100% of the worker's Tier II annuity. Widow(er)s who are the natural or adoptive parent of the deceased worker's child do not have to meet the length of marriage requirement. Survivor annuities may also be payable to a surviving divorced spouse or remarried widow(er). To qualify for benefits, a surviving divorced spouse has to be married to the employee for at least 10 years and is unmarried or remarried after age 60 (age 50 for disabled surviving divorced spouse). A surviving divorced spouse who is unmarried can qualify for benefits at any age if caring for the employee's child who is under age 16 or disabled. Benefits are limited to the amounts Social Security would pay (Tier I only) and therefore are less than the amount of the survivor annuity otherwise payable. Railroad workers' children may also receive survivor annuities. To qualify, a child must be unmarried and under the age of 18 (or 19 if still in high school). Disabled adult children may qualify if their disability began before the age of 22. Eligible children receive 75% of the worker's Tier I annuity and 15% of the worker's Tier II annuity. In addition, if a worker's parent was dependent on the worker for at least half of the parent's support, he or she may receive 82.5% of the worker's Tier I annuity and 35% of the worker's Tier II annuity after reaching age 60. Survivor annuities are not payable to a current railroad employee, and survivor annuities are reduced by any railroad retirement benefit the survivor has earned through his or her own railroad work. Survivors receive the same reductions as retired workers for Social Security benefit receipt; they also have reductions from government pension receipts that are not covered by Social Security. A family maximum applies to survivor benefits, usually applicable when three or more survivors receive benefits on a worker's record (not counting divorced spouses). In summary, Table 1 provides data on railroad retirement, survivor, and disability annuities as of June 2018. Railroad workers may qualify for daily unemployment and sickness benefits under the Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act (RUIA). These monetary benefits are paid in addition to any paid leave or private insurance an employee may have. For sickness benefits, a worker must be unable to work because of illness or injury. Sickness benefits are distinct from disability benefits because they are intended to cover a finite, temporary period of time. Workers may not earn any money while receiving unemployment or sickness benefits. Figure 3 displays the monthly number of beneficiaries with unemployment and sickness benefits from January 2002 to July 2018, respectively. Although the number of sickness beneficiaries stayed relatively stable over time, the number of unemployment insurance beneficiaries increased significantly during and after the most recent economic recession from 2007 to 2009. Railroad unemployment and sickness benefits are financed solely by railroad employers' payroll taxes, based on the taxable earnings of their employees. Employers' tax rates depend on the past rates of unemployment and employees' sickness claims. For calendar year 2018, the employer tax rate ranges from 2.2% to 12.0% on the first $1,560 of each employee's monthly earnings. The payroll tax proceeds not needed immediately for unemployment and sickness insurance benefits or operating expenses are deposited in the Railroad Unemployment Insurance Account maintained by the Treasury. This account, together with similar unemployment insurance accounts for each state, forms a Federal Unemployment Insurance Trust Fund whose deposits are invested in U.S. government securities, and the Railroad Unemployment Insurance Account receives interest based on these deposits. During FY2017, payroll tax contributions from railroad employers totaled $126.4 million and interest income was about $4 million. The RUIA provides for employers to pay a surcharge if the Railroad Unemployment Insurance Account falls below an indexed threshold amount. The surcharge is added to the employer's tax rate. However, the total tax rate plus the surcharge cannot exceed the maximum rate of 12.0%, unless the surcharge is 3.5%, in which case the maximum tax rate is increased to 12.5%. From 2004 through 2010, the surcharge was 1.5%. The surcharge in 2011 was 2.5% and 1.5% in 2012 with no surcharges in 2013 or 2014. The surcharge in 2018 was 1.5%, the same as the level in the past three years. Eligibility for railroad unemployment and sickness benefits is based on recent railroad service and earnings. The annual benefit year begins on July 1. Eligibility is based on work in the prior year, or the base year. To qualify in the benefit year beginning July 1, 2018, railroad workers must have base year earnings of $3,862.50 in calendar year 2017, counting no more than $1,545 per month. New railroad workers must also have at least five months of covered railroad work in the base year. To receive unemployment benefits, a worker must be ready, willing, and able to work. The maximum daily unemployment and sickness benefit payable in the benefit year that began July 1, 2018, is $77, and the maximum benefit for a biweekly claim is $770. However, due to sequestration pursuant to the Budget Control Act of 2011 ( P.L. 112-25 , as amended), the maximum daily benefit of $77 is reduced by 6.2% to $72.23 and the maximum biweekly benefit is reduced by 6.2% to $722.26 through September 30, 2019. Railroad workers receive these benefits only to the extent that they are higher than other benefits they receive under the RRA, the Social Security Act, or certain other public programs, including workers compensation. Unemployment and sickness beneficiaries may receive normal benefits for up to 26 weeks in a benefit year or until the benefits they receive equal their creditable earnings in the base year if sooner. Employees with at least 10 years of covered railroad service may qualify for extended benefits for 13 weeks after they have exhausted normal benefits. Table 2 displays the number and average weekly amount of RUIA benefits paid in June 2018. Workers who apply for unemployment benefits are automatically enrolled in a free job placement service operated by railroad employers and the RRB. 

Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 1.

Answer: Each year, millions of Americans call 911 for help during emergencies. However, the nation's legacy 911 system relies on aging infrastructure that is not designed to accommodate modern communications technologies. As a result, states and localities are upgrading to NG911, which offers improved capabilities, such as the ability to process images, audio files, and video. While deploying NG911 is the responsibility of state and local entities, federal agencies also support implementation, led by NHTSA's National 911 Program, which facilitates collaboration among federal, state, and local 911 stakeholders. GAO was asked to review NG911 implementation nationwide. This report examines: (1) state and local progress and challenges in implementing NG911 and (2) federal actions to address challenges and planned next steps. GAO reviewed relevant statutes, regulations, and federal agency reports and plans. GAO also analyzed NHTSA's survey data on state 911 implementation for calendar year 2015, the most recent year for which data were available, and interviewed federal officials, state and local officials from nine states (selected to represent different regions and various phases of NG911 implementation), and officials from industry and advocacy groups. The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration's (NHTSA) National 911 Program's most recent national survey on Next Generation 911 (NG911) implementation indicated that about half of states were in some phase of transition to NG911 in 2015, but that state and local progress varied. Specifically, 10 states reported that all 911 authorities in their state processed calls using NG911 systems; however, 18 states reported having no state or local NG911 transition plans in place—which may indicate these states were in the early phases of planning for the transition to NG911 or had not yet begun. GAO spoke with state and local 911 officials in 9 states, which were in various phases of implementing NG911, and found that none of the 9 selected states were accepting images, audio files, or video. State and local 911 officials identified a number of challenges to implementing NG911. Such challenges are related to funding, evolving technology and operations, and governance. For example, officials in 3 states said that the current funding they collect from telephone service subscribers may not be sufficient to support NG911's transition costs while simultaneously funding the operation of existing 911 systems. Federal agencies—including NHTSA, the National Telecommunications and Information Administration, the Federal Communications Commission, and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security—have responsibilities to support NG911 implementation, such as through coordinating activities and administering grants, and are taking actions to assist state and local entities in addressing challenges to NG911's implementation. Such actions include developing resources, offering technical assistance, and convening stakeholders to explore emerging NG911 issues. For example, as the lead entity for coordinating federal NG911 efforts, NHTSA's National 911 Program is developing resources on NG911 topics, such as federal funding and governance structures. While the National 911 Program is taking steps to facilitate the state and local transition to NG911, the program lacks specific performance goals and measures to assess its progress. Without such goals and measures, it is not clear to what extent the program is effectively achieving its mission. In 2018, the National 911 Program plans to establish an interagency initiative tasked with creating a National NG911 Roadmap. This roadmap is intended to identify next steps for the federal government in supporting the creation of a national, interconnected NG911 system. While the National 911 Program is taking steps to develop a list of national-level tasks as part of its roadmap initiative, the program does not have a plan to identify: (1) roles or responsibilities for federal entities to carry out these tasks or (2) how the program plans to achieve the roadmap's objectives. Collaborating with the appropriate federal agencies to determine federal roles and responsibilities to carry out the roadmap's national-level tasks could reduce barriers to agencies effectively working together to achieve those tasks. Furthermore, developing an implementation plan that details how the roadmap's tasks will be achieved would place the National 911 Program in a better position to effectively lead interagency efforts to implement NG911 nationwide. GAO recommends that NHTSA's National 911 Program develop performance goals and measures and, for the National NG911 Roadmap, determine agencies' roles and responsibilities and develop an implementation plan. NHTSA agreed with GAO's recommendations.