You are given two reports by the government agency.  

Report 1:
Strong relations between the United States and Israel have led to bilateral cooperation in many areas. Matters of particular significance include the following: Israel's own capabilities for addressing threats, and its cooperation with the United States. Shared U.S.-Israel concerns about Iran, within the context of the U.S. exit from the 2015 international nuclear agreement, and growing tension involving Iran and Hezbollah at Israel's northern border with Syria and Lebanon. Israeli-Palestinian issues, including those involving Jerusalem, Hamas and the Gaza Strip, funding for Palestinians, and a possible Trump Administration peace plan. Israeli domestic political issues, including probable corruption-related indictments against Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu and closely contested elections that are scheduled for April 9, 2019. For background information and analysis on these and other topics, including aid, arms sales, and missile defense cooperation, see CRS Report RL33476, Israel: Background and U.S. Relations , by Jim Zanotti; and CRS Report RL33222, U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel , by Jeremy M. Sharp. Israel relies on a number of strengths to manage potential threats to its security and existence. These strengths include robust military and homeland security capabilities, as well as close cooperation with the United States. Israel maintains conventional military superiority relative to its neighbors and the Palestinians. Shifts in regional order and evolving asymmetric threats during this decade have led Israel to update its efforts to project military strength, deter attack, and defend its population and borders. Israel appears to have reduced some unconventional threats via missile defense systems, reported cyber defense and warfare capabilities, and other heightened security measures. Israel has a robust homeland security system featuring sophisticated early warning practices and thorough border and airport security controls; most of the country's buildings have reinforced rooms or shelters engineered to withstand explosions. Israel also has proposed and partially constructed a national border fence network of steel barricades (accompanied at various points by watch towers, patrol roads, intelligence centers, and military brigades) designed to minimize militant infiltration, illegal immigration, and smuggling from Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and the Gaza Strip. Additionally, Israeli authorities have built a separation barrier in and around parts of the West Bank. Israel is not a party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and maintains a policy of "nuclear opacity" or amimut . A 2017 report estimated that Israel possesses a nuclear arsenal of around 80-85 warheads. The United States has countenanced Israel's nuclear ambiguity since 1969, when Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir and U.S. President Richard Nixon reportedly reached an accord whereby both sides agreed never to acknowledge Israel's nuclear arsenal in public. Israel might have nuclear weapons deployable via aircraft, submarine, and ground-based missiles. No other Middle Eastern country is generally thought to possess nuclear weapons. Israeli officials closely consult with U.S. counterparts in an effort to influence U.S. decisionmaking on key regional issues, and U.S. law requires the executive branch to take certain actions to preserve Israel's "qualitative military edge," or QME. Additionally, a 10-year bilateral military aid memorandum of understanding (MOU)—signed in 2016—commits the United States to provide Israel $3.3 billion in Foreign Military Financing and to spend $500 million annually on joint missile defense programs from FY2019 to FY2028, subject to congressional appropriations. Israel's leaders and supporters routinely make the case that Israel's security and the broader stability of the region remain critically important for U.S. interests. They also argue that Israel is a valuable U.S. ally. The United States and Israel do not have a mutual defense treaty or agreement that provides formal U.S. security guarantees. Iran remains of primary concern to Israeli officials largely because of (1) Iran's antipathy toward Israel, (2) Iran's broad regional influence, and (3) the probability that some constraints on Iran's nuclear program could loosen in the future. In recent years, Israel and Arab Gulf states have discreetly cultivated closer relations with one another in efforts to counter Iran. Prime Minister Netanyahu has sought to influence U.S. decisions on the international agreement on Iran's nuclear program (known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA). He argued against the JCPOA when it was negotiated in 2015—including in a speech to a joint session of Congress—and welcomed President Trump's May 2018 withdrawal of the United States from the JCPOA and accompanying reimposition of U.S. sanctions on Iran's core economic sectors. A few days before President Trump's May announcement, Netanyahu presented information that Israeli intelligence operatives apparently seized in early 2018 from an Iranian archive. He used the information to question Iran's credibility and highlight its potential to parlay existing know-how into nuclear-weapons breakthroughs after the JCPOA expires. In his September 2018 speech before the U.N. General Assembly, Netanyahu claimed that Iran maintains a secret "atomic warehouse for storing massive amounts of equipment and materiel." An unnamed U.S. intelligence official was quoted as saying in response, "so far as anyone knows, there is nothing in [the facility Netanyahu identified] that would allow Iran to break out of the JCPOA any faster than it otherwise could." After Netanyahu publicly exposed the Iranian nuclear archive, some former Israeli officials speculated about what action Israel might consider taking against Iranian nuclear facilities if Iran abrogates the JCPOA and expands nuclear activities currently restricted under the agreement. However, Netanyahu had said in an interview that he was not seeking a military confrontation with Iran. Israel and Iran have engaged in hostile action over Iran's presence in Syria. In the early years of the Syria conflict, Israel primarily employed air strikes to prevent Iranian weapons shipments destined for the Iran-backed group Hezbollah in Lebanon. Later, as the Syrian government regained control of large portions of the country with Iranian backing, Israeli leaders began pledging to prevent Iran from constructing and operating bases or advanced weapons manufacturing facilities in Syria. Since 2018, Israeli and Iranian forces have repeatedly targeted one another in and over Syrian- and Israeli-controlled areas. In January 2019, Prime Minister Netanyahu said that Israel had targeted Iranian and Hezbollah targets in Syria "hundreds of times." Limited Israeli strikes to enforce "redlines" against Iran-backed forces could expand into wider conflict, particularly if there is a miscalculation by one or both sides. U.S. involvement in Syria could be one factor in Israeli calculations on this issue. The U.S. base at Al Tanf in southern Syria has reportedly "served as a bulwark against Iran's efforts to create a land route for weapons from Iran to Lebanon." Israeli officials favor continued U.S. involvement in Syria, while also preparing for the possibility that they may need to take greater direct responsibility for countering Iran there. Russia's advanced air defense systems in Syria could make it more difficult for Israel to operate there. Since 2015, Russia has operated an S-400 system at Russia's Khmeimim air base in Lattakia, a city on Syria's Mediterranean coast. To date, however, Russia does not appear to have acted militarily to thwart Israeli air strikes against Iranian or Syrian targets, and Israel and Russia maintain communications aimed at deconflicting their operations. In addition to the S-400 that it owns and operates, Russia delivered an S-300 air defense system for Syria's military to Khmeimim airbase in October 2018. The delivery followed Syria's downing of a Russian military surveillance plane in September 2018 under disputed circumstances, shortly after an Israeli operation in the vicinity. According to an Israeli satellite imagery analysis company, three launchers appeared to be operational as of February 2019. It is unclear to what extent Russia has transferred the S-300 to Syrian military control, and how this might affect future Israeli military action in Syria. An Israeli journalist wrote that "Israel has the knowledge, experience and equipment to evade the S-300, but the fact that additional batteries, manned by Russian personnel, are on the ground, will necessitate greater care [when carrying out future operations against Iran-aligned targets in Syria]." Since the September 2018 incident, Israeli air strikes appear to have decreased somewhat. On March 25, 2019, President Trump signed a proclamation stating that the United States recognizes the Golan Heights (hereinafter, the Golan) to be part of the State of Israel. The proclamation stated that "any possible future peace agreement in the region must account for Israel's need to protect itself from Syria and other regional threats" —presumably including threats from Iran and the Iran-backed Lebanese group Hezbollah. Israel gained control of the Golan from Syria during the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, and effectively annexed it unilaterally by applying Israeli law to the region in 1981 (see Figure 2 ). President Trump's proclamation changed long-standing U.S. policy on the Golan. Since 1967, successive U.S. Administrations supported the general international stance that the Golan is Syrian territory occupied by Israel, with its final status subject to negotiation. In reaction to the U.S. proclamation, others in the international community have insisted that the Golan's status has not changed. In Congress, Senate and House bills introduced in February 2019 ( S. 567 and H.R. 1372 ) support Israeli sovereignty claims to the Golan, and would treat the Golan as part of Israel in any existing or future law "relating to appropriations or foreign commerce." For decades after 1967, various Israeli leaders, reportedly including Prime Minister Netanyahu as late as 2011, had entered into indirect talks with Syria aimed at returning some portion of the Golan as part of a lasting peace agreement. However, the effect of civil war on Syria and the surrounding region, including an increase in Iran's presence, may have influenced Netanyahu to shift focus from negotiating with Syria on a "land for peace" basis to obtaining international support for Israel's claims of sovereignty. As part of the periodic conflict in Syria between Israel and Iran , some Iranian missiles have targeted Israeli positions in the Golan. The Syrian government has denounced the U.S. policy change as an illegal violation of Syrian sovereignty and territorial integrity, and insisted that Syria is determined to recover the Golan. Additionally, observers have argued that the policy change could unintentionally bolster Syrian President Bashar al Asad within Syria by rallying Syrian nationalistic sentiment in opposition to Israel's claims to the Golan and deflecting attention from Iran's activities inside Syria. Since 1974, the U.N. Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) has patrolled an area of the Golan Heights between the regions controlled by Israel and Syria, with about 880 troops from five countries stationed there as of January 2019. During that time, Israel's forces in the Golan have not faced serious military resistance to their continued deployment, despite some security threats and diplomatic challenges. Periodic resolutions by the U.N. General Assembly have criticized Israel's occupation as hindering regional peace and Israel's settlement and de facto annexation of the Golan as illegal. Hezbollah's forces and Israel's military have sporadically clashed near the Lebanese border for decades—with the antagonism at times contained in the border area, and at times escalating into broader conflict. Speculation persists about the potential for wider conflict and its regional implications. Israeli officials have sought to draw attention to Hezbollah's buildup of mostly Iran-supplied weapons—including reported upgrades to the range, precision, and power of its projectiles—and its alleged use of Lebanese civilian areas as strongholds. Ongoing tension between Israel and Iran over Iran's presence in Syria raises questions about the potential for Hezbollah's forces in Lebanon to open another front against Israel. After the September 2018 incident leading to Russia's installation of an S-300 system in Syria (discussed above), Iran reportedly began directly transferring weapons to Hezbollah in Lebanon while reducing Syria's use as a transshipment hub. One Israeli media account warned that Hezbollah's threat to Israel is increasing because of initiatives to build precision-weapons factories in Lebanon and to set up a military infrastructure in southern Syria. In late 2018 and early 2019, Israel's military undertook an effort—dubbed "Operation Northern Shield"—to seal six Hezbollah attack tunnels to prevent them from crossing into Israel. Israeli officials claim that they do not want another war, while at the same time taking measures aimed at constraining and deterring Hezbollah, including through consultation with the U.N. Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). President Trump has expressed interest in brokering a final-status Israeli-Palestinian agreement, and his Administration has supposedly prepared a proposal to facilitate negotiations, but the Administration has repeatedly postponed releasing the proposal. Many factors may account for the delays, including recent U.S. actions regarding Jerusalem, tension in and around the Gaza Strip, reduced funding for the Palestinians, Israeli settlements in the West Bank, and political jockeying and domestic constraints among Israelis and Palestinians. The U.S. decision—announced in December 2017—to recognize Jerusalem as Israel's capital and move the U.S. embassy there has fed U.S.-Palestinian tensions. Israeli leaders generally celebrated the change, but Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) Chairman and Palestinian Authority (PA) President Mahmoud Abbas strongly objected. Many other countries opposed President Trump's actions on Jerusalem, as reflected in action at the United Nations. Claiming U.S. bias favoring Israel, Palestinian leaders broke off high-level political contacts with the United States shortly after the December 2017 announcement and have made efforts to advance Palestinian national claims in international fora. However, the PA continues security coordination with Israel in the West Bank. U.S.-Palestinian tensions appear to have influenced Administration decisions to cut off various types of U.S. funding to the Palestinians, and arguably have dimmed prospects for restarting Israeli-Palestinian talks. In a September 2018 address before the U.N. General Assembly, PLO Chairman/PA President Abbas denounced Administration actions that he characterized as taking disputed Israeli-Palestinian issues—such as Jerusalem's status and Palestinian refugee claims—off the negotiating table. Funding for economic and humanitarian needs in the West Bank and Gaza could become even scarcer. In February 2019, Israel announced that it would withhold a portion of the tax revenue it collects for the PA because—pursuant to a law passed by the Knesset in 2018—Israel had determined that amount represented PLO/PA payments made on behalf of individuals allegedly involved in terrorist acts. In response, Abbas announced that the PA would completely reject monthly revenue transfers from Israel if it withheld any amount, even though the transfers comprise approximately 65% of the PA budget. For February, Israel withheld approximately $11 million from the $193 million due to the PA, with the PA rejecting the entire amount as a result. The PA is reportedly seeking temporary financial support from the private sector and local banks, and also asking the Arab League to follow through on its 2010 decision to provide $100 million per month as a "financial safety net" for the PA. At the end of January 2019, U.S. bilateral aid to the Palestinians—including nonlethal security assistance that Israel generally supports—ended completely due to the Anti-Terrorism Clarification Act (ATCA, P.L. 115-253 ), which became law on October 3, 2018. Two months after the law's enactment, PA Prime Minister Rami Hamdallah informed Secretary of State Michael Pompeo that the PA would not accept aid that subjected it to federal court jurisdiction. Apparently, U.S. aid will not resume unless Congress amends or repeals the ATCA, or the Administration channels the aid differently. Assistant to the President and Senior Advisor Jared Kushner has stated that the Administration will publicly release a peace plan sometime after Israeli national elections, which are set to occur on April 9, 2019. According to Kushner, the peace plan contains detailed proposals on the various issues that divide Israel and the PLO. Many observers express skepticism about the prospect that these proposals can serve as a basis for the serious resumption of bilateral talks, but Kushner has reportedly said that the Administration is focusing on formulating "realistic solutions," and that "privately, people are more flexible." U.S. officials hope to surmount potential obstacles to the peace plan in the Israeli and Palestinian domestic arenas by obtaining political and economic support for the U.S. initiative from key Arab states in the region, including Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Jordan, and Egypt. A number of Arab states share common interests in working behind the scenes with Israel to counter Iranian regional influence. While some diplomatic developments have fed speculation about warming Arab-Israeli ties, reports suggest that key Arab Gulf states remain reluctant to embrace more formal relations with Israel without a resolution of the Palestinian issue. Saudi Arabia's press agency responded to the U.S. recognition of Israel's claims to sovereignty in the Golan Heights by saying that it "will have significant negative effects on the peace process in the Middle East and the security and stability of the region." In a statement with implications both for domestic and international audiences, Prime Minister Netanyahu reportedly said that the March 2019 change in U.S. policy on the Golan proves that countries can retain territory captured in a defensive war. His statement prompted speculation over the possibility that Israeli leaders might consider annexing part of the West Bank and whether the situation in the Golan is sufficiently similar to invite comparison. Days before the April elections, Netanyahu asserted that if he were to lead the next government, he would apply Israeli law to West Bank settlements. The closely contested Israeli national elections—scheduled for April 9, 2019—and the subsequent government formation process will have significant implications for the country's leadership and future policies. Prime Minister Netanyahu faces a challenge from the centrist Blue and White party under the combined leadership of former top general Benny Gantz and former Finance Minister Yair Lapid. Some setbacks for Netanyahu during the campaign have included the attorney general's announcement of probable corruption-related indictments against Netanyahu, new media allegations of possible misconduct relating to Israel's procurement of German submarines, and questions about some individuals or groups possibly spreading rumors against Netanyahu's opponents via social media. Yet, some observers calculate that Netanyahu's Likud could possibly get fewer Knesset seats than Blue and White and still form the next coalition. For more information on the actors involved in the elections, see CRS Insight IN11068, Israel: April 2019 Elections and Probable Indictments Against Prime Minister Netanyahu , by Jim Zanotti and this report's Appendix . In July 2018, the Knesset passed a Basic Law defining Israel as the national homeland of the Jewish people. Some observers have expressed concern that the law might further undermine the place of Arabs in Israeli society, while others view its effect as mainly symbolic. In March 2019, Netanyahu said that Israel is a Jewish, democratic state with equal rights for all its citizens, and "the nation-state not of all its citizens, but only of the Jewish people," reviving domestic debate about the 2018 law and perhaps seeking support during the election campaign from sympathetic voter groups.

 

 Report 2:
As part of the annual budget formulation process for each fiscal year, DOD establishes for each of nine foreign currencies, a foreign currency budget rate (units of foreign currency per one United States (U.S.) Dollar) to use when developing O&M and MILPERS funding requirements for overseas expenditures. Foreign currency budget rates for a particular fiscal year are established approximately 18 months prior to the fiscal year when overseas obligations will be incurred and disbursements made. For example, in June 2015, OUSD(C) issued guidance to, in part, instruct the services on the foreign currency rates to use in building their fiscal year 2017 budgets. In February 2016, as part of the President’s budget, DOD submitted its proposed fiscal year 2017 budget to Congress, and it began incurring obligations against subsequently appropriated amounts on October 1, 2016. DOD has used various methodologies for establishing the foreign currency budget rates. In 2005, we reviewed DOD’s methodology for developing its foreign currency budget rates and reported that DOD’s approach for estimating its foreign currency requirements for the fiscal year 2006 budget was a reasonable approach for forecasting foreign currency rates that could produce a more realistic estimate than its historical approach. In its fiscal year 2006 through 2016 budget requests, DOD used a centered weighted average model that combined both a 5-year average of exchange rates and an average of the most recently observed 12 months of exchange rates. For its fiscal year 2017 request, DOD adjusted its methodology to establish the foreign currency budget rates. Specifically, DOD established its foreign currency rates by calculating a 6-month average of Wall Street Journal rates published every Monday from May 25, 2015, to November 16, 2015. According to an OUSD(C) official, the 6-month average more closely represented foreign currency exchange rates experienced by the department during budget formulation, and it accounted for the strength of the U.S. Dollar, which had increased as compared with its historical 5- year average. DOD’s analysis found that the use of the 5-year historical average would have resulted in substantial gains when compared with gains expected from application of the 6-month average. More specifically, DOD projected gains of about $1 billion using the 5-year average of rates. During the fiscal year for which a budget is developed, DOD incurs obligations for its overseas O&M and MILPERS activities. Those obligations are recorded using the foreign currency budget rates. DOD uses various methods for selecting foreign currency rates to liquidate those obligations through disbursements, which may differ from the budget rates. DOD’s preferred payment method for foreign currency transactions is the Department of Treasury’s (Treasury) comprehensive international payment and collection system—the International Treasury Services (ITS.gov) system—which serves federal agencies making payments in nearly 200 countries. ITS.gov offers a number of rates, including advanced rates available up to 5 days in advance of disbursement, and the spot rate. The spot rate is the price for foreign currencies for delivery in 2 business days. While advanced rates, like spot rates, are based on the current market rate, advanced rates at the time they are selected are generally higher than the spot rate, with the 5-day advanced rate being the highest, because the rates are locked in ahead of the actual value date. While the spot rate can be more cost-effective, it requires immediate transaction processing, which may not be feasible for all disbursements. Differences between obligations incurred at the foreign currency budget rates and the amounts that DOD actually disburses drive gains or losses in the appropriated amounts DOD has available for its planned overseas expenditures. For example, if DOD budgeted for the U.K. Pound at a rate of .6289 (that is, 1 U.S. Dollar buys .6289 U.K. Pounds) as it did in fiscal year 2016, and the rate experienced at the time of disbursement was .6845, then DOD would have requested more funds than were actually needed for transactions involving the U.K. Pound. That would have resulted in a gain from the transaction—meaning that DOD would need less funds than were budgeted for the transaction. Conversely, a current rate that is lower than what was budgeted will result in a loss—and DOD would require more funds than were budgeted for the transaction. Within each of the services’ O&M and MILPERS appropriations accounts, amounts are available for overseas activities. Amounts obligated for overseas activities, along with associated foreign currency gains and losses, are managed by the services as part of the overall management of their O&M and MILPERS appropriations accounts. Service components use foreign currency fluctuation accounts within their O&M and MILPERs appropriations to manage realized gains and losses in direct programs due to fluctuations in foreign exchange rates. The service-level foreign currency fluctuation accounts are maintained at various budgetary levels within the service components. In fiscal year 1979, Congress appropriated $500 million to establish the FCFD account for purposes of maintaining the budgeted level of operations in the MILPERS and O&M appropriation accounts by mitigating substantial gains or losses to those appropriations caused by foreign currency rate fluctuations. FCFD appropriations are different from the O&M and MILPERS appropriations in two ways. First, FCFD account amounts are no-year amounts, meaning that they are available until expended, while in general, O&M and MILPERS appropriations are 1-year amounts and expire at the end of the fiscal year for which they were appropriated. Expired O&M and MILPERS amounts remain available only for limited purposes for 5 additional fiscal years. At the end of the 5-year expired period, any remaining O&M or MILPERS amounts, obligated or unobligated, are canceled and returned to Treasury. Second, FCFD account amounts may be used only to pay obligations incurred because of fluctuations in currency exchange rates of foreign countries, while O&M amounts are available for diverse expenses necessary for the operation and maintenance of the services and MILPERS amounts are available for service personnel-related expenses, such as pay, permanent changes of station travel, and expenses of temporary duty travel, among other purposes. Amounts from the FCFD account may be transferred to service-level foreign currency fluctuation accounts within O&M and MILPERS appropriation accounts to offset losses in buying power due to unfavorable differences between the budget rate and the foreign currency exchange rate prevailing at the time of disbursement. The FCFD account may be replenished in several ways. Amounts transferred from the FCFD to O&M and MILPERS appropriations may be returned when not needed to liquidate obligations because of subsequent favorable foreign currency rates in relation to the budget rate, or because other amounts have become available to cover obligations. A transfer back to the FCFD of unneeded amounts must be made before the end of the second fiscal year of expiration following the fiscal year of availability of the O&M or MILPERS appropriation to which the funds were originally transferred. Amounts may also be transferred to the FCFD account even if they did not originate there. Specifically, DOD may transfer to the FCFD account any unobligated O&M and MILPERS amounts unrelated to foreign currency exchange fluctuations so long as the transfers are made not later than the end of the second fiscal year of expiration of the appropriation. While multiple transfers of these unobligated amounts may be made during a fiscal year, any such transfer is limited so that the amount in the FCFD account does not exceed the statutory maximum of $970 million at the time of transfer. When the FCFD account balance is at the maximum balance, the services normally retain in their service- level O&M and MILPERs foreign currency fluctuation accounts any gains resulting from favorable foreign currency rates. Finally, any amounts transferred, whether from the FCFD account to an O&M or MILPERS account, or from an O&M or MILPERS account to the FCFD, are merged with the account and assume the characteristics of that account, including the period of availability of the funds contained in the account. Visibility of service-level foreign currency fluctuation account and FCFD transactions is maintained through the services’ accounting systems and execution reports. DOD uses the following reports to track its foreign currency funds: Foreign Currency Fluctuations, Defense Report (O&M): provides data on O&M foreign currency gains and losses for each service, by currency, including data on projected gains or losses for any remaining obligations that have not yet been liquidated and disbursed at the time of the report. Foreign Currency Fluctuation, Defense Report (MILPERS): provides data on MILPERS foreign currency gains and losses for each service, by currency, including data on projected gains or losses for any remaining obligations that have not yet been disbursed at the time of the report. In 2013 we analyzed and reported on carryover balances in federal accounts, which amounted to $2.2 trillion in fiscal year 2012, and we found that greater examination of carryover balances by an agency provides opportunities for enhanced oversight of their management of federal funds and may help identify opportunities for potential budgetary savings. Carryover balances are composed of both obligated and unobligated amounts. Only accounts with multi-year or no-year amounts, such as the FCFD, may carry over amounts that remain legally available for new obligations from one fiscal year to the next. DOD’s carryover balances would include FCFD account balances carried from one year to the next. DOD’s FCFD account is composed of unobligated carryover amounts that accumulate when unneeded for transfer to O&M and MILPERS accounts to cover foreign currency fluctuations. FCFD unobligated carryover balances include any expired, unobligated balances from the military services’ O&M and MILPERS accounts, which can include any gains due to favorable foreign currency fluctuations that are not used to cover other losses and that are transferred into the FCFD. DOD revised its foreign currency budget rates in fiscal years 2014 through 2016, which resulted in budget rates in these years that were more closely aligned with rates published by Treasury. Furthermore, the revised budget rates in fiscal years 2014 through 2016 decreased DOD’s projected O&M and MILPERS funding needs. The revised budget rates also decreased potential gains and losses in the amount of funds that DOD had available for its planned overseas expenditures. DOD revised its foreign currency budget rates in fiscal year 2014 and continued to do so in fiscal years 2015 and 2016 before making adjustments to its methodology in fiscal year 2017. According to an OUSD(C) official, the methodology developed in 2017 resulted in budget rates that were more closely aligned with market rates than in previous years, making revision of the 2017 budget rates unnecessary. DOD’s revisions to its foreign currency budget rates in fiscal years 2014 through 2016 resulted in rates that more closely aligned with those published by Treasury. Further, they decreased the expected gains that would have otherwise resulted from a substantial increase in the strength of the U.S. Dollar, in fiscal years 2014 through 2016, relative to other foreign currencies from the time the budget rates were set as compared with the rates available once the fiscal year began. Prior to fiscal year 2014, DOD did not revise its foreign currency budget rates. DOD officials did not provide an explanation for why the budget rates for fiscal years 2009 through 2013 were not revised. DOD developed, in November 2015, a set of standard operating procedures that describe the methodology it used for formulating budget rates for the nine foreign currencies included in its budget submission. These procedures also state that DOD is required to update the budget rates once an appropriation is enacted for the fiscal year. For example, if Congress reduces DOD’s appropriations due to favorable foreign currency rates, such as the $1.5 billion reduction in DOD’s total fiscal year 2016 appropriations, OUSD(C) then revises the budget rates to absorb the reduced funding levels. OUSD(C) officials stated that other factors are also considered when determining whether to revise the foreign currency budget rates, and that the department communicates the revised budget rates to the DOD components and Congress. For example, OUSD(C) assesses the value of each of the nine foreign currencies used to develop the budget request relative to the strength of the U.S. Dollar during the fiscal year. An OUSD(C) official also noted that the effects that the rate changes would have across these foreign currencies are also considered prior to submitting recommended rate revisions to the OUSD(C) leadership for approval. The official stated that one currency may be experiencing a loss, while another is experiencing a gain, which can affect whether to revise the rates and what those revisions should be. Additionally, the OUSD(C) official stated that “significant” projected gains or losses could drive a revision to the foreign currency budget rates, and that an informal $10 million threshold for projected gains and losses is used to determine when the foreign currency budget rates are revised. According to OUSD(C) officials, DOD components and Congress were notified when the budget rates were revised during fiscal years 2014 through 2016, including an explanation for why the rates were revised. OUSD(C) also includes the budget rates for each of the nine foreign currencies on its website and identifies any instances in which the budget rates were revised with the effective date of any rate revisions. Our analysis of DOD’s use of revised budget rates during fiscal years 2014 through 2016 found that the revised budget rates for those years were more closely aligned with rates published by Treasury. More specifically, for the nine foreign currencies included in DOD’s budget, our analysis comparing DOD’s initial and revised budget rates for fiscal years 2009 through 2017 with average Treasury rates for these years found that DOD’s budget rates differed from Treasury rates by less than 10 percent in about 64 percent of the total 162 occurrences we examined. While we are unaware of any criteria that suggest how closely DOD’s foreign currency budget rates should align with market rates, we used 10 percent as a basis for our analysis because Treasury’s guidance states that amendments to its published exchange rates are required if rates differ from current rates by 10 percent or more. We further examined these occurrences to determine what the differences were between the DOD and Treasury rates before and after DOD began revising its budget rates in fiscal year 2014. Of the 162 occurrences we reviewed, there were 90 occurrences included in our comparison for fiscal years 2009 through 2013, and 72 occurrences were included in our comparison for fiscal years 2014 through 2017. Our analysis shows the following: For fiscal years 2014 through 2017, DOD’s budget rates for its nine foreign currencies differed from Treasury rates by less than 10 percent in about 71 percent of the occurrences. This increased from about 59 percent of the occurrences for the period of fiscal years 2009 through 2013, before DOD began revising its rates after the fiscal year began. For fiscal years 2014 through 2017, DOD’s budget rates differed from Treasury’s rates by 10 percent or more after DOD began revising its rates in fiscal year 2014 in about 29 percent of the occurrences, which is a decrease from about 41 percent of the occurrences prior to fiscal year 2014. Figure 2 below shows the number of occurrences in which DOD’s initial and revised rates differed from Treasury rates by less than 10 percent, and the occurrences in which DOD’s rates differed from Treasury rates by 10 percent or more. The occurrences that are less than 10 percent of Treasury rates are most closely aligned with Treasury rates. According to DOD officials, the differences between DOD’s foreign currency budget rates and Treasury rates are driven primarily by market volatility (that is, the differences in the foreign currency rates from when DOD formulates its budget rates, prior to the fiscal year, and the foreign currency rates determined by Treasury when obligated amounts are liquidated through disbursements during the fiscal year). According to the OUSD(C) official responsible for formulating and revising the foreign currency budget rates, the delay that occurs between the time when a budget rate is set (approximately 18 months prior to the beginning of a particular fiscal year) and the actual fiscal year is a major factor for why the budget rate may be revised. According to the official, the market rates experienced during fiscal years 2014 through 2016 were substantially different from those expected when the budget rates for those years were developed. Therefore, DOD revised its budget rates during these years to more closely align with market rates experienced. Specifically, this official stated that DOD revised its budget rates during fiscal years 2014 through 2016 to decrease the expected gains that would have otherwise resulted during these fiscal years from a substantial increase in the strength of the U.S. Dollar relative to other foreign currencies from the time the budget rates were set as compared with more favorable rates available once the fiscal year began. In order to more closely align its budget rates with market rates, DOD introduced a new methodology to establish the foreign currency budget rates for fiscal year 2017 because DOD anticipated approximately $1 billion in projected gains if it used the prior methodology. As a result of this change in the methodology, according to the OUSD(C) official, DOD did not experience substantial gains or losses in fiscal year 2017. Therefore, DOD did not revise its foreign currency budget rates during fiscal year 2017. However, as previously stated, the official did not provide an explanation as to why the budget rates for fiscal years 2009 through 2013 were not revised. DOD’s use of revised foreign currency budget rates decreased DOD’s projected O&M and MILPERS funding needs and any potential gains and losses that would have occurred due to foreign currency fluctuations during fiscal years 2014 through 2016. Because DOD uses its budget rates to establish its projected annual O&M and MILPERS funding requirements for planned overseas expenditures, any revisions to the budget rates affect DOD’s estimate of its funding needs. For example, our analysis shows that as a result of revising its budget rates during fiscal years 2014 through 2016, DOD’s projected funding needs for the period of fiscal years 2009 through 2017 decreased from about $60.2 billion to about $57.5 billion—a decrease of about $2.7 billion. To further show the effect that changing foreign currency rates could have on DOD’s projected funding for planned overseas expenditures for fiscal years 2009 through 2017, we also compared DOD’s projected O&M and MILPERS funding needs, based on its initial and revised foreign currency budget rates, against projected funding needs based on the use of foreign currency rates published by Treasury during the fiscal year. Our analysis shows that DOD’s projected O&M and MILPERS foreign currency funding needs using Treasury rates would have been about $58.4 billion, or about $885 million more than the $57.5 billion that DOD had projected using its initial and revised budget rates. DOD also uses foreign currency budget rates to calculate gains or losses attributable to foreign currency fluctuations. Specifically, DOD determines gains and losses due to foreign currency fluctuations by comparing the budget rate (that is, initial or revised budget rate) used to incur obligations against a more current market rate at the time it liquidates its obligations through disbursements. Therefore, revisions to the budget rates not only change DOD’s projected O&M and MILPERS funding requirements for the fiscal year in which the revisions occur, but also change the baseline from which the potential gains or losses would result when DOD liquidates its overseas O&M and MILPERS obligations through disbursements. For example, in fiscal year 2016, Congress reduced DOD’s total appropriations by $1.5 billion. As a result of this reduction and favorable foreign currency rates, DOD revised its fiscal year 2016 budget rates in February 2016 and applied the revised foreign currency budget rates in its calculations of gains and losses due to foreign currency fluctuations since the beginning of the fiscal year to absorb the reduced funding level. In applying the revised budget rates, a $30 million gain DOD had previously projected became a projected loss of about $186.2 million. The use of revised budget rates also affects the movement of funds from the FCFD account. For example, if the use of the revised budget rate creates a loss and DOD is unable to cover the increased costs to its O&M or MILPERS appropriations, funds from the FCFD account may be used to cover its planned overseas expenditures. DOD has taken some steps to reduce costs in selecting foreign currency rates to liquidate its obligations through disbursements. However, DOD organizations are not always selecting the most cost-effective rates to convert U.S. Dollars, and DOD has not determined whether opportunities exist to achieve additional efficiencies when making disbursements. DOD liquidates its obligations through disbursements for overseas expenditures using Treasury’s ITS.gov system, which provides DOD organizations with a choice of foreign currency rates to apply when making disbursements in a foreign currency. The foreign currency rate chosen determines how many U.S. Dollars must be paid for the transaction. Treasury officials explained that customers may choose either the spot rate or an advanced rate. The spot rate is the price for foreign currencies for delivery in 2 business days. Treasury officials explained that advanced rates are exchange rates that are “locked in” and guaranteed by the bank processing the disbursement 5, 4, or 3 days in advance of payment processing, which is known as the “value date” of a disbursement. Normally, the cost of the rate increases the further from the date of disbursement that it is locked in. While DOD often uses a 5-day advanced rate to make its disbursements, the other rate options available, such as a 3-day advanced and a spot rate, can be more cost-effective. We analyzed data provided by Treasury from its ITS.gov system and found that for disbursements made during the period of June and July 2017, the 5-day advanced rate was more costly than the 3-day advanced rate. In instances where the spot rate was available, we found that it was also more cost-effective than either the 3- day or 5-day advanced rates. For example, for those transactions processed through ITS.gov on June 13, 2017, DOD would have paid 1 U.S. Dollar for .881 European Euros if using the 5-day advanced rate; .883 European Euros if using the 3-day advanced rate; and .889 European Euros if using the spot rate. In the case of the Army, an Army Financial Management Command official provided us information indicating that the service has estimated potential cost savings that would result from more consistently selecting 3-day advanced rates through the ITS.gov system to make overseas disbursements of amounts, rather than the 5-day advanced rate. More specifically, the Army estimated between $8 million and $10 million in annual savings by transitioning from a 5-day to a 3-day advanced rate when selecting foreign currency rates. According to officials, the Army has transitioned all paying locations to the 3-day advanced rate. The Army estimates that these locations have produced $6.04 million in savings through February 2018. Although the Army indicated that it also planned to analyze whether use of the spot rate was feasible, it had not conducted this review at the time of our review. Data provided to us by Treasury from its ITS.gov system indicate that in June and July of 2017, the Air Force used the 5-day advanced rate exclusively for its disbursements, while the Navy and Marine Corps relied on both the 5-day and the 3-day advanced rates. Our analysis of these data show the Air Force would have achieved total savings for those 2 months of about $258,000 if it had made its disbursements using the 3- day versus the 5-day advanced rate. The savings resulting from each transaction varied based on the amount of the transaction. For example, on June 13, 2017, the Air Force disbursed a payment exceeding $3.7 million and would have saved more than $9,000 for that transaction if the 3-day advanced rate had been used. For the same single transaction, if the spot rate had been used instead of the 5-day advanced rate, the Air Force would have saved more than $31,000. The savings associated with the Navy’s and Marine Corps’ disbursements for the same 2-month period showed the potential for less dramatic savings of less than $100 because the Navy and Marine Corps used the 3-day advanced rate as opposed to the 5-day advanced rate for most of its disbursements. Where information on the spot rate was available, its use, as opposed to either the 5-day or 3-day advanced rate, would have resulted in additional savings opportunities for those 2 months. While these examples are illustrative of cost savings opportunities in June and July 2017, Treasury data show that in fiscal year 2016, DOD disbursed more than $11.8 billion through ITS.gov and, as of July 2017, had disbursed more than $9.6 billion through ITS.gov. Our analysis suggests that DOD could achieve further cost savings by more consistently selecting cost-effective foreign currency rates, such as the 3-day advanced or spot rates, with which to make disbursements. In selecting foreign currency rates, DOD’s Financial Management Regulation states that disbursements should be computed to avoid gains or deficiencies (losses) due to fluctuations in rates of exchange to the greatest extent possible. If there is no rate of exchange established by agreement between the U.S. government and the foreign country, then foreign currency transactions are to be conducted at the prevailing rate. The prevailing rate of exchange is the most favorable rate legally available for acquisition of foreign currency for official disbursement and other exchange transactions. Additionally, GAO’s Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government calls for management to periodically review policies, procedures, and related control activities for continued relevance and effectiveness in achieving the entity’s objectives or addressing related risks. DOD disbursement organizations have flexibility in selecting foreign currency rates to use when making disbursements using ITS.gov. There is no DOD-wide requirement for the services to review the rates used to make disbursements and, except for the Army, the services have not conducted such a review. This step is necessary to determine whether there are opportunities for savings by more consistently selecting cost- effective foreign currency rates. We discussed disbursement processes with DOD and Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps financial management officials, including the factors considered when selecting foreign currency rates. In addition, a Defense Finance and Accounting Service official noted that currencies can have criteria specifying when a payment is made and provided us the ITS.gov user’s guide, which addresses “special currency requirements,” such as those that would drive advanced payment for a currency. For example, the user’s guide indicates that payment for transactions involving the Afghanistan Afghani must be made 2 days in advance of the value date, and cannot be made on a Friday. However, information that is contained in the ITS.gov user’s guide and that we received from a Treasury official indicate that none of the nine foreign currencies for which DOD budgets place restrictions on when payment must be made; and therefore, this consideration should not drive the use of a specific rate at disbursement. Marine Corps financial management officials told us that the foreign currency rate selected at disbursement is at the discretion of the disbursing officer based on operational requirements, with the understanding that the most favorable rate for the government is the preference, while balancing mission requirements and the time necessary to process the transaction. These officials acknowledged that the 3-day advanced rate can be more cost-effective to the government but indicated that there are occasions when the 5-day advanced rate should be used because it provides more time to process the payments from deployed locations operating in different time zones or with limited communication capabilities. However, we found that OUSD (C) officials and financial management officials with the headquarters of the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps were not involved in disbursement, were unaware of what rates were being used at disbursement, and had not reviewed the rationale for selecting one rate over another. For example, Air Force and Navy headquarters officials we spoke with were unable to provide insight as to what drives the decision to use one rate over another. One Navy financial management official told us that he was unaware of any Navy policy that directs a specific rate to be used when disbursing funds, and suggested that the absence of such a policy provides the flexibility for officials to determine which approach is best. Headquarters, Marine Corps officials also stated that they did not monitor foreign currency rates used for disbursements or the reasons why one rate was selected over another. Based on our inquiry, officials indicated that they would analyze the foreign currency rates used for disbursements in 2017 and whether opportunities existed to achieve savings by using other rates available through ITS.gov. A Marine Corps official subsequently provided us with information that showed that two of three disbursing offices that currently utilize ITS.gov for disbursements use the 3-day advanced rate exclusively and one uses the 5-day advanced rate. The official noted that a technical issue within ITS.gov has restricted the disbursing office currently using the 5-day advanced rate from choosing any other rate, but that the service was further assessing options to correct the issue. In our conversations with an official in OUSD(C) about why the other services had not reviewed the foreign currency rates used for disbursements to determine what was being paid through ITS.gov and whether there was an opportunity for savings, the official commented that OUSD(C) had not directed the services to conduct any reviews in this area. This official was unaware that different foreign currency rates were used to make disbursements, and assumed that the military services all make disbursements in the same way. However, as discussed above, the services are using different rates resulting in inconsistency across the department. The official further indicated that DOD could perform a review to determine the cost differences of using one disbursement rate over another. Absent a review of the rates the services are using in making disbursements and whether cost savings could be achieved by more consistently selecting the most cost-effective foreign currency rates available for use at disbursement, DOD is at risk for paying more to convert U.S. Dollars for overseas expenditures than would otherwise be required. In fiscal years 2009 through 2016, DOD used the FCFD account to cover losses that the services experienced due to foreign currency fluctuations in 6 of the 8 years we reviewed. However, DOD does not effectively manage the FCFD account balance based on projected gains or losses. Transfers of expired unobligated balances from MILPERS and O&M accounts into the FCFD account have been made to replenish the account balance to the statutory limit of $970 million, without consideration of projected losses due to foreign currency fluctuations. Furthermore, DOD’s financial reporting on foreign currency fluctuations for fiscal years 2009 through 2016 contains incomplete and inaccurate information. In fiscal years 2009 through 2016, DOD transferred approximately $1.92 billion out of the FCFD account to cover losses that the services experienced due to foreign currency fluctuations in 6 of the 8 years we reviewed. For these years, DOD transferred funds from the FCFD account to the services’ MILPERS and O&M accounts during the fiscal year in which the funds were obligated for overseas expenses. The transfer amounts were based on both losses realized from actual disbursements and projected losses for any remaining obligations to be liquidated. The projected losses were calculated based on the current foreign currency market rates as of the time of the calculation. Based on the service-level data we reviewed, all of the services reported that they experienced losses in at least 5 of the fiscal years we reviewed. For example, the Army reported that it experienced losses in its MILPERS account for 5 of 8 years, while the Marine Corps reported that it experienced losses in its O&M and MILPERS accounts in each of the 8 years. In addition to the transfers to cover losses within the services’ MILPERS and O&M accounts, in fiscal year 2013 DOD transferred an additional $969 million to the Defense Working Capital Fund to offset fuel cost losses. Since fiscal year 2012, DOD has maintained the FCFD end-of-year account balance at $970 million—the maximum allowed by statute. To replenish the funds that were transferred out of the FCFD account, DOD transferred unobligated balances to the FCFD account from the services’ O&M and MILPERS accounts. While DOD can also replenish the FCFD account or absorb foreign currency losses in certain currencies by transferring to the FCFD account any gains experienced by the services, our analysis found that DOD did not transfer any gains into the FCFD account for fiscal years 2009 through 2016. Figure 3 shows the transfers into and out of the FCFD account and the end-of-year FCFD account balance for fiscal years 2009 through 2016. Our analysis also shows that DOD transferred funds to maintain the FCFD account at its maximum balance since 2012, despite experiencing fewer losses due to foreign currency fluctuations than it had experienced in fiscal years 2009 to 2011. Of the $1.92 billion transferred from the FCFD account to the services’ MILPERS and O&M accounts to cover losses, $464.5 million was transferred since fiscal year 2012, when DOD began maintaining its FCFD account at the maximum level. During that time, some of the services experienced foreign currency gains, while others experienced losses. For example, at the end of fiscal year 2013 the Navy reported a total realized and projected cumulative gain for its O&M and MILPERS accounts of about $98.6 million. In that same year, the Marine Corps reported a cumulative realized and projected loss for its O&M and MILPERS accounts of approximately $12.7 million. Had DOD not transferred unobligated funds back into the FCFD account, it would have retained a positive balance of approximately $505.5 million. However, DOD maintained the account balance at $970 million by transferring approximately $495.3 million in unobligated balances into the account. As part of its management of the FCFD account balance, DOD analyzes data on realized and projected losses as the basis for transferring funds from the FCFD account to the services’ MILPERS and O&M accounts to cover losses. However, DOD does not consider projected losses when making transfers of unobligated O&M and MILPERS balances into the FCFD account. Figure 4 below shows the FCFD account balance that DOD has maintained in relation to the transfers out of the account to cover losses. Specifically, according to the OUSD(C) official responsible for managing the FCFD account, DOD maintains the FCFD account balance at $970 million to maximize unobligated balances within the military services’ O&M and MILPERS accounts before they are canceled and are no longer available to DOD. In addition, this official stated that DOD prefers to maintain the maximum balance in case it is needed due to sudden, unfavorable swings in foreign currency exchange rates. Our review of the documentation used to make transfers into and out of the FCFD account corroborates that DOD maintains the FCFD account balance to maximize the retention of unobligated balances. Specifically, we found instances in which the documentation states that the transfers of unobligated balances into the FCFD account were made for the purpose of replenishing the account balance to the statutory limit. For example, DOD transferred $89 million from the FCFD account to the Army for losses it had realized and projected in fiscal year 2014, and later transferred unobligated balances of the same amount back into the account. DOD’s documentation states that this transfer of unobligated balances was made for the purpose of replenishing the account to $970 million in order to finance estimated foreign currency losses resulting from the decline in value of the U.S. Dollar. However, the transfer to the Army already covered the realized losses and projected losses for any remaining disbursements. In other words, estimated foreign currency losses had already been accounted for at the time of the transfer to the Army. In addition, based on data reported by the Air Force, Marine Corps, and Navy, DOD had an estimated cumulative gain of about $30 million for fiscal year 2014 based on the other services’ gains and losses, which could have been transferred to the FCFD account to absorb any additional foreign currency losses elsewhere. However, DOD did not transfer those gains to the FCFD account. Similarly, based on data reported by these services, DOD experienced cumulative realized and projected gains of more than $200 million in fiscal year 2013 and about $92.6 million in fiscal year 2015, but it did not transfer any gains to the FCFD account because the account balance had already reached its maximum using transferred unobligated balances. Despite replenishing the account balance to the maximum amount for the purpose of covering additional losses, the FCFD transfers have not been made to fully offset losses in some years, further raising questions about the need to maintain the balance at the statutory cap of $970 million annually. Specifically, in 3 of the 6 years in which DOD transferred funds from the FCFD account to the services’ MILPERS and O&M accounts, DOD did not use the FCFD account to fully cover the losses that the Air Force, Marine Corps, and Navy experienced. In fiscal year 2011, for example, DOD’s transfers out of the FCFD account to these services covered about 88 percent of the reported MILPERS and O&M losses that these services had realized and projected to lose by the end of the fiscal year. In fiscal year 2012, FCFD transfers covered almost 72 percent of the MILPERS and O&M realized and projected losses reported by the Air Force, Marine Corps, and Navy, as of the end of the fiscal year. In fiscal year 2016, DOD FCFD transfers to these services covered approximately 55 percent of their reported MILPERS and O&M realized and projected losses by the end of the fiscal year. The OUSD(C) official we spoke with stated that FCFD transfers to cover losses begin with a request from the services, and the OUSD(C) office and the services then coordinate on the final transfer amount. In addition, some service officials told us that they try to cover their losses using each service’s available funding before reaching out for assistance from the FCFD account. Therefore, based on a service’s ability to cover the loss, it may not always request an FCFD transfer to cover the full amount of realized and projected losses. Further, according to an OUSD(C) official, the timing of a service’s request for an FCFD transfer may also affect any differences between the amount transferred and the actual losses experienced. Specifically, if a service requests a transfer early in the fiscal year based on realized and projected losses, actual losses experienced as of the end of the fiscal year may be greater than or less than the transfer amount due to foreign currency fluctuations. Using transfers of unobligated balances, DOD has maintained its FCFD account balance at the maximum level allowed by statute because it has not analyzed realized and projected losses to determine what size account balance is necessary to meet the intended purpose of the account. In our prior work, we have developed key questions for evaluating federal account balances that agencies may use to identify the amount of the balance necessary to maintain agency or program operations. Through examination of carryover balances, oversight of agencies’ management of federal funds may be enhanced. Specifically, we reported that understanding an agency’s processes for estimating and managing carryover balances provides information to assess how effectively agencies anticipate program needs, and ensure the most efficient use of resources. To estimate and manage carryover balances, agencies may consider such factors as future needs of the account, economic indicators, and historical data. If an agency does not have a robust strategy in place to manage carryover balances or is unable to adequately explain or support the reported carryover balance, then a more in-depth review is warranted. In those cases, balances may either fall too low to efficiently manage operations or rise to unnecessarily high levels, producing potential opportunities for those funds to be used more efficiently elsewhere. When asked about maintaining the balance at a level necessary to cover losses, rather than at the maximum level allowed by statute, the OUSD(C) official indicated that the OUSD(C) takes a cautious approach and prefers to have the additional flexibility allowed by the higher balance. Further, the official stated that it would be difficult for DOD to attempt to base its unobligated balance transfers and the FCFD account balance on analysis and evaluation, given the unpredictable nature and constant volatility of foreign currency rates. Our guidelines on evaluating carryover balances acknowledge that external events beyond an agency’s control can dramatically affect carryover balances. However, the challenges that are inherent in predicting foreign currency rates do not preclude DOD from conducting analysis to glean insight as to the appropriate size for the balance of the account and what potential opportunities for savings might exist. Specifically, our guidelines suggest that agencies would benefit from considering the sources and fiscal characteristics of an account with carryover balances. In this case, the FCFD account can receive funds from transfers of unobligated balances and realized foreign currency gains. In addition, DOD can make multiple transfers throughout a fiscal year and can transfer funds from the FCFD to and from the services’ O&M and MILPERS accounts simultaneously, if necessary. These characteristics of the FCFD account already provide the department with flexibility, indicating that DOD may be positioned to manage the FCFD balance in a more analytical manner based on any projected losses. Without analyzing any realized or projected losses to determine what balance may be needed to meet the FCFD account’s intended purpose, the account balance may be kept at a higher level than is necessary. As a result, although an exact amount is unknown, DOD may be maintaining balances in the FCFD account that are hundreds of millions of dollars higher than needed to cover any losses it has experienced, and these funds may have been more efficiently used in supporting other defense activities or returned to Treasury after the account is canceled by law. DOD prepares financial reports to monitor the status of its foreign currency funds, but some of DOD’s financial reporting on foreign currency fluctuations for fiscal years 2009 through 2016 is incomplete and inaccurate. DOD’s Financial Management Regulation establishes reporting requirements specifically for tracking all transactions that increase or decrease the FCFD. In accordance with that guidance, the services provide data from their accounting systems to the Defense Finance and Accounting Service to generate reports that are used as a tool with which the services and OUSD(C) can monitor how they are expending funds appropriated for overseas expenditures. For O&M appropriations, the Foreign Currency Fluctuations, Defense (O&M) report provides data on foreign currency gains and losses for each service, by currency, including data on projected gains or losses for any remaining obligations that have not yet been disbursed at the time of the report. The Foreign Currency Fluctuations, Defense Report (MILPERS) provides similar information for the MILPERS appropriation. We reviewed end-of-year Foreign Currency Fluctuations, Defense (O&M) and (MILPERS) reports for fiscal years 2009 through 2016 and found that some of the reporting for O&M was incomplete and inaccurate, which hampers the quality of information available to manage the FCFD account. For instance, we found the following: Incomplete data in the Foreign Currency Fluctuations Defense (O&M) reports: In our review of the end-of-year Foreign Currency Fluctuations Defense (O&M) and (MILPERS) reports we observed several instances of incomplete data in the O&M reports, and these affect managers’ ability to make sound decisions to manage foreign currency gains and losses. First, for the Navy, we found that the report data showed, for multiple currencies across fiscal years 2011 through 2016, values in the realized variance column, indicating that the service had experienced a gain or loss in a particular currency; however, the reports showed values of zero in other columns that are necessary for calculating the gain or loss. Second, the Air Force data for the Turkey Lira, in fiscal year 2012, showed a gain or loss without any data indicating what would have driven the gain or loss. Third, in one instance, Marine Corps data on obligations for fiscal year 2011 were missing from the end-of-year reports until 2014. Missing obligation data for these end-of-year reports indicate a limitation in using these reports for tracking actual gains and losses. Inaccurate data in the Army’s Foreign Currency Fluctuations Defense (O&M) reports: The Army’s Foreign Currency Fluctuation Defense (O&M) reports are inaccurate and cannot be used to reliably track gains or losses, and this hinders managers from making sound decisions regarding the Army’s foreign currency gains and losses. The reports are inaccurate in that the Army’s accounting system charges disbursements to the current fiscal year appropriation rather than to the fiscal year appropriation that incurred the obligation, as required by the Financial Management Regulation. According to officials from the Army Budget Office, the Army designed its General Fund Enterprise Business System (GFEBS) to record disbursements to the current fiscal year based on differing interpretations of a previous version of the Regulation. Because the Army is not recording its disbursements to the fiscal year appropriation as the other services are, Army data are inaccurate and cannot be used by the OUSD(C) official responsible for overseeing DOD’s foreign currency program to track the Army’s foreign currency transactions and maintain full visibility of DOD’s overall gains and losses in a given fiscal year. Army Budget Office officials acknowledged that the Army will need to modify its system to record disbursements consistent with Financial Management Regulation guidance, but it has not developed a plan or timeline for doing so. Without accurate reporting of the Army’s foreign currency transactions, DOD lacks information for tracking and helping to manage the Army’s foreign currency gain and losses. DOD’s Financial Management Regulation specifies the data that must be included in the Foreign Currency Fluctuations Defense (O&M) and (MILPERS) reports and the roles and responsibilities of the services as well as the Defense Finance and Accounting Service for ensuring the quality of those data. However, we identified data issues in our analysis that indicate that quality is inconsistent. For example, officials from the Navy stated that they had observed the incomplete data for some currencies and speculated that the incompleteness was attributable to data entry errors. Similarly, according to an OUSD(C) official, the Defense Finance and Accounting Service is notified when discrepancies are found in the reports and the Defense Finance and Accounting Service officials coordinate with the services to correct the data. However, neither Navy nor the Defense Finance and Accounting Service officials have corrected the data. Although DOD’s Financial Management Regulation specifies the data that are to be included, as well as roles and responsibilities of the services and the Defense Finance and Accounting Service, it does not identify who is responsible for correcting erroneous or missing data. According to an OUSD(C) official, correcting reporting issues is an area that OUSD(C), the Defense Finance and Accounting Service, and the services can improve on, and they would benefit from guidance in the Financial Management Regulation that establishes the steps that should be taken for making such corrections. Further, GAO’s Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government and the Federal Accounting Standards Advisory Board’s Handbook of Federal Accounting Standards and Other Pronouncements, as Amended, both establish the importance of using reliable and complete information for making decisions. In addition, DOD’s Financial Management Regulation establishes responsibilities for both the DOD components and the Defense Finance and Accounting Service to establish appropriate internal controls to ensure that financial reporting data are complete, accurate, and supportable, in order for managers to make sound decisions and exercise proper stewardship over these resources. Effectively managing foreign currency gains and losses as well as any projected gains or losses for any remaining obligations that have not yet been liquidated through disbursement requires complete and accurate data. OUSD(C) and service officials recognize the importance of reliable data, as well as the need to take steps to improve the quality of the foreign currency gains and losses data. Without OUSD(C) establishing guidance to ensure that the Foreign Currency Fluctuation Defense (O&M) report data that tracks foreign currency gains and losses are complete, DOD and Congress do not have information to make sound decisions and exercise proper stewardship over resources due to foreign currency fluctuations. Furthermore, until the Army establishes a plan and timeline for modifying its system to record foreign currency disbursements in an accurate manner, the Army and DOD will lack quality information for tracking and helping to manage the Army’s and DOD’s foreign currency gain and losses. Congress provides DOD with a significant amount of funding each year to purchase goods and services overseas and to pay service-members stationed abroad. DOD develops and can revise foreign currency budget rates to determine its funding needs and calculate any gains or losses that result from DOD’s overseas expenditures. The Army has estimated potential cost savings that would result from more consistently selecting a more cost-effective foreign currency rate for making disbursements to liquidate its overseas O&M obligations. However, DOD has not fully determined whether additional cost-saving opportunities exist because the services have not reviewed the rates used for foreign currency disbursements. Absent a review of the foreign currency rates the services are using at disbursement, including whether cost-saving opportunities exist, by more consistently selecting cost-effective foreign currency rates, DOD risks paying more than would be required otherwise. Further, while DOD has used the FCFD account to cover losses that resulted from foreign currency fluctuations, it has not managed the FCFD account balance by basing the transfers of unobligated balances into the FCFD account on an analysis of realized and projected losses. Without basing its FCFD account balance on such analyses, DOD may be maintaining balances in the FCFD account that are hundreds of millions of dollars higher than needed to cover any losses it has experienced, and these amounts may have been more efficiently used supporting other defense activities or ultimately returned to Treasury, once expired. Moreover, DOD has not established guidance and other procedures to ensure that complete and accurate data are included in financial reporting on foreign currency funds, and this limits the quality of information available to effectively manage the FCFD account. We are making the following four recommendations to DOD. The Secretary of Defense ensures that: The Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), in coordination with the U.S. Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps, should conduct a review of the foreign currency rates used at disbursement to determine whether cost-saving opportunities exist by more consistently selecting cost- effective rates at disbursement. (Recommendation 1) The Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) should analyze realized and projected losses to determine the necessary size of the FCFD account balance and use the results of this analysis as the basis for transfers of unobligated balances to the account. (Recommendation 2) The Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) should revise the Financial Management Regulation to include guidance on ensuring that data are complete and accurate, including assignment of responsibility for correcting erroneous data in its Foreign Currency Fluctuations Defense (O&M) reports. (Recommendation 3) The Secretary of the Army should develop a plan with timelines for implementing changes to its General Fund Enterprise Business System to accurately record its disbursements, consistent with DOD Financial Management Regulation guidance. (Recommendation 4) We provided a draft of this report to DOD for review and comment. In its written comments, reproduced in appendix II, DOD concurred with our first, third, and fourth recommendations and outlined its plan to address them. DOD partially concurred with our second recommendation that the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) analyze realized and projected losses to determine the necessary size of the FCFD account balance and use the results of the analysis as the basis for transfers of unobligated balances to the account. DOD also provided technical comments, which we incorporated in the report, where appropriate. In partially concurring with our second recommendation, DOD stated that projecting foreign currency gains or losses can be difficult given that foreign currency rates can be volatile due to various factors, such as trade balances, money supply, and national income, as well as arbitrary disturbances that affect foreign currency rates that cannot be predicted or forecasted, such as the departure of the United Kingdom from the European Union. DOD noted that because of the risk and volatility associated with foreign currency rates, the Congress established the FCFD account. We agree that forecasting foreign currency rates is challenging due to market volatility and include examples in our report of the effect of foreign currency rate fluctuations on DOD’s planned foreign currency obligations. Our report also describes the relationship between gains and losses and foreign currency fluctuations, and the movement of funds from the FCFD account to offset any losses. As our report also discusses, DOD calculates actual and projected losses due to foreign currency fluctuations and uses those projections as the basis, at least in part, for any transfers out of the FCFD account to cover losses experienced in the military services’ O&M and MILPERS appropriations. However, our report also notes that DOD does not consider its calculations of actual and future projected losses when making transfers of unobligated O&M and MILPERS balances to replenish the FCFD account. Instead, since fiscal year 2012, DOD has kept the FCFD account balance at the maximum level allowed by statute by using unobligated balances before they are canceled and are no longer available to DOD, regardless of whether the funds were needed in the account to offset any projected losses. DOD’s comments also stated that projecting gains or losses for foreign currency to determine the size of the FCFD account opens the door to greater uncertainty and risk at a time when the department is working to rebuild readiness and implement the National Defense Strategy. Our report describes the characteristics of the FCFD account that provide DOD with flexibility to manage market volatility, thereby helping to address uncertainty and reduce risk. For example, DOD can make multiple transfers of funds to the FCFD account throughout a fiscal year in response to unforeseen foreign currency fluctuations. The FCFD account can also receive funds from transfers of actual foreign currency gains and/or unobligated balances. As we also noted, DOD made use of its authority to transfer expired unobligated MILPERS and O&M amounts into the FCFD account in the event that actual losses exceeded the projected amounts and additional transfers were deemed necessary. We continue to believe that by analyzing actual and projected losses and basing the transfer of any unobligated balances on these losses, DOD would be better positioned to determine the size of the FCFD account balance that is necessary to meet its intended purpose. Further, such analyses would provide opportunities to more efficiently use unobligated balances for other defense activities or return the balances to Treasury. We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense, the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), the Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of the Navy, the Secretary of the Air Force, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and appropriate congressional committees. In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-5431 or russellc@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix III. To describe the Department of Defense’s (DOD) revised foreign currency budget rates since 2009 and the relationship between the revised budget rates and DOD’s projected Operation and Maintenance (O&M) and Military Personnel (MILPERS) funding needs, we reviewed DOD’s foreign currency budget rates for the period of fiscal years 2009 through 2017, and we identified any years during which DOD revised the initial budget rates. We compared DOD’s initial foreign currency budget rates and revised foreign currency budget rates with rates published by the U.S. Treasury Department (Treasury) for fiscal years 2009 through 2017. This period corresponded with data available to us on DOD’s initial and revised rates and allowed for use of the most current data available, since DOD had not yet decided whether or not to revise the fiscal year 2018 budget rates, while we were conducting our audit work. We chose rates published by Treasury for this comparison because Treasury has the sole authority to establish for all foreign currencies or credits the exchange rates at which such currencies are to be reported by all agencies of the government. Because Treasury rates are issued quarterly, we averaged Treasury’s first and second quarter rates for each currency and compared the Treasury average with DOD’s initial budget rates. Similarly, we computed an average of the third and fourth quarter Treasury rates for each currency and compared them with the DOD initial or revised budget rates, where applicable. These comparisons are meant to show the difference between DOD’s budget rates and Treasury rates for the first 6 months of the fiscal year, and the difference between DOD’s revised exchange rates and Treasury rates for the last 6 months of the fiscal year. Further, we analyzed the extent to which DOD’s budget rates were within 10 percent of Treasury rates during these same years. We chose 10 percent as the basis for our analysis because Treasury’s guidance states that amendments to the quarterly rates will be published during the quarter to reflect significant changes in the quarterly data, such as rate changes of 10 percent or more. Additionally, to understand the effect that revising the budget rates had on DOD’s O&M and MILPERS funding estimates and on potential gains or losses due to foreign currency fluctuations, we used a three-step approach. First, we identified the amount of O&M and MILPERS funds DOD requested for each currency. We converted the U.S. Dollars requested to the total amount of foreign currency needed by multiplying the U.S. Dollars requested by DOD’s initial budget rate. Second, we determined the total amount of U.S. Dollars required using the revised rates by dividing the total amount of foreign currency needed using DOD’s initial budget rate by DOD’s revised budget rate. We used this same approach to determine the total amount of U.S. Dollars required using the average Treasury rates. Third, we computed the differences in DOD’s O&M and MILPERS foreign currency funding needs by subtracting the U.S. Dollars required to meet its foreign currency needs based on the average Treasury rates from the amounts required based on DOD’s initial budget rates and DOD’s revised budget rates, respectively. We discussed further with officials from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, Comptroller (OUSD(C)) the factors considered in revising the rates and whether those factors are communicated within and outside of the department. To evaluate the extent to which DOD has taken steps to reduce costs in selecting foreign currency rates at which to make disbursements and determine whether opportunities exist to gain additional savings, we reviewed accounting standards and any guidelines that exist regarding disbursements and calculations of foreign currency gains and losses, such as DOD’s Financial Management Regulation 7000.14-R, which calls for the use of prevailing foreign currency rates to make disbursements. We also discussed with agency officials how those guidelines are being carried out, and whether DOD or the services have developed guidance that instructs the services in selecting rates used for disbursements in foreign currencies. Additionally, we examined a non-generalizable selection of data for DOD disbursements made during the months June and July 2017 from Treasury’s International Treasury Service (ITS.gov) system to determine which rates DOD used during this period and what savings might be achievable from using alternate rates. We chose data from those 2 months because it was the most recent data available on disbursements at the time Treasury provided the data for our review. Additionally, we discussed with officials from OUSD(C) and the services any analysis and ongoing efforts to transition to more cost-effective rates, including savings that may result. To assess the extent to which DOD has effectively managed the Foreign Currency Fluctuations, Defense (FCFD) account to cover losses, and maintained quality information to manage these funds, we analyzed DOD data for fiscal years 2009 through 2016 on foreign currency gains and losses reported by each of the services as reported in their Foreign Currency Fluctuation, Defense (O&M) and (MILPERS) reports; movements of funds between the FCFD account and the services’ O&M and MILPERS accounts; and the end-of-year FCFD account balances. We chose this time period in order to capture years in which both gains and losses were experienced, and for which DOD had complete data on gains and losses, fund transfers, and end-of-year balances for the FCFD account. Because the Army charges disbursements to the current fiscal year appropriation instead of the fiscal year appropriation that incurred the obligation, we requested that the Army adjust its reported data on foreign currency gains and losses and provide information consistent with how the other services report them, and with DOD’s Financial Management Regulation. However, the Army was unable to provide us with data that were consistent with what was provided by the other services at the time of our review. We, therefore, were unable to use Army data for purposes of comparison with data provided by the other services. We compared the end-of-year FCFD account balances and the use of the account with guidelines established in our prior work on the importance of examining unobligated balances. Additionally, we reviewed and analyzed DOD financial reports on foreign currency gains or losses and compared the reports, including any identified discrepancies, against best practices and standards on accurate reporting and maintaining quality information, such as those in GAO’s Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, and the Federal Accounting Standards Advisory Board’s Handbook of Federal Accounting Standards and Other Pronouncements, as Amended. To determine the reliability of the data used in addressing these objectives, we analyzed DOD and Treasury foreign currency rates, data on DOD foreign currency disbursements, and DOD financial reporting data on foreign currency gains and losses to identify any missing or inaccurate information, and we discussed with agency officials any identified abnormalities and how the information was extracted from systems, when appropriate. We found the data to be sufficiently reliable for the purposes of our reporting objectives, with the exception of the financial reporting on financial gains and losses. Specifically, based on problems with the completeness and accuracy of DOD’s financial reporting on foreign currency gains and losses, we found that these data were not sufficiently reliable for the purpose of computing exact totals for the gains and losses DOD experienced. However, because DOD uses these data as the basis for decisions related to management of the FCFD account, we included the data in our analysis to provide insight into the scope of gains and losses experienced. We also spoke with OUSD(C), military service, and Treasury officials regarding the process and systems used to input the reviewed data and generate the foreign currency reports we reviewed. We conducted this performance audit from February 2017 to April 2018 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. In addition to the contact named above, Matt Ullengren, Assistant Director; and Tulsi Bhojwani, Justin Bolivar, Carol Bray, Amie Lesser, Kelly Liptan, Felicia Lopez, Leah Nash, Randy Neice, Jacqueline McColl, Mike Silver, Roger Stoltz, Susan Tindall, John Trubey, Elaine Vaurio, and Cheryl Weissman made key contributions to this report.

Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 1.

Answer: Strong relations between the United States and Israel have led to bilateral cooperation in many areas. Matters of particular significance to U.S.-Israel relations include Israel's ability to address the threats it faces in its region. Shared U.S.-Israel concerns about Iran and its allies on the nuclear issue and in Syria and Lebanon. Israeli-Palestinian issues. Israeli domestic political issues, including elections scheduled for 2019. Israel relies on a number of strengths to manage potential threats to its security and existence. It maintains conventional military superiority relative to neighboring states and the Palestinians. It also takes measures to deter attack and defend its population and borders from evolving asymmetric threats such as rockets and missiles, cross-border tunneling, drones, and cyberattacks. Additionally, Israel has an undeclared but presumed nuclear weapons capability. Against a backdrop of strong bilateral cooperation, Israel's leaders and supporters routinely make the case that Israel's security and the broader stability of the region remain critically important for U.S. interests. A 10-year bilateral military aid memorandum of understanding (MOU)—signed in 2016—commits the United States to provide Israel $3.3 billion in Foreign Military Financing annually from FY2019 to FY2028, along with additional amounts from Defense Department accounts for missile defense. All of these amounts remain subject to congressional appropriations. Israeli officials seek to counter Iranian regional influence and prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu released new Israeli intelligence on Iran's nuclear program in April 2018, days before President Trump announced the U.S. withdrawal from the 2015 international agreement that constrains Iran's nuclear activities. It is unclear whether Israel might take future military action in Iran if Iranian nuclear activities resume. Since 2018, Israel has conducted a number of military operations in Syria against Iran and its allies, including Lebanese Hezbollah. Israel and Iran also appear to be competing for military advantage over each other at the Israel-Lebanon border. Amid uncertainty in the area, in March 2019 President Trump recognized Israel's claim to sovereignty over the Golan Heights, changing long-standing U.S. policy that held—in line with U.N. Security Council Resolution 497 from 1981—the Golan was occupied Syrian territory whose final status was subject to Israel-Syria negotiation. The prospects for an Israeli-Palestinian peace process are complicated by many factors. Palestinian leaders cut off high-level political contacts with the Trump Administration after it recognized Jerusalem as Israel's capital in December 2017. U.S.-Palestinian tensions have since worsened amid U.S. cutoffs of funding to the Palestinians and diplomatic moves—including the May 2018 opening of the U.S. embassy to Israel in Jerusalem. Palestinian leaders interpreted these actions as prejudicing their claims to a capital in Jerusalem and to a just resolution of Palestinian refugee claims. Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu has welcomed these U.S. actions. The Trump Administration has suggested that it will release a proposed peace plan after Israeli elections, which are scheduled for April 9, 2019. Speculation continues about how warming ties between Israel and Arab Gulf states may affect Israeli-Palestinian diplomacy, though Saudi Arabia said that the U.S. policy change on the Golan Heights would negatively affect the peace process. Bouts of tension and violence between Israel and Hamas in Gaza have continued—reportedly accompanied by indirect talks between the two parties that are being brokered by Egypt and aim for a long-term cease-fire. Domestically, Israel is preparing for the April 9 elections, which are closely contested. Former top general Benny Gantz is combining with former Finance Minister Yair Lapid to challenge Netanyahu, whom the attorney general has recommended be indicted for corruption in three separate cases. The elections and subsequent government formation process will have significant implications for Israel's future leadership and policies.