You are given two reports by the government agency.  

Report 1:
The United States has many international agreements that require treaty partners to provide certain information to IRS, which can help prevent the use of foreign bank accounts to facilitate tax evasion. FATCA goes much further, requiring FFIs to report more detailed information to IRS about their U.S. customers annually. These provisions are important developments in efforts to combat tax evasion by U.S. persons holding investments in offshore accounts. FATCA generally requires certain taxpayers to report foreign financial accounts and other specified foreign financial assets whose aggregate value exceeds specified thresholds to IRS on Form 8938. These taxpayers must report these assets and income generated from such assets to IRS with their tax return on Form 8938. These thresholds vary by filing status—such as single or married filing jointly—and by domestic or foreign residency. FATCA also promotes third-party reporting of foreign financial assets by requiring a withholding agent to withhold 30 percent on certain payments to an FFI unless the FFI or the jurisdiction in which the FFI is located has entered into an agreement with the United States to report certain account information of their U.S. customers. Under such an agreement, participating FFIs report detailed information to IRS annually about accounts held by their U.S. customers using an IRS Form 8966, FATCA Report (Form 8966). According to IRS, FATCA improves visibility into taxable income from foreign sources, and enhances the agency’s ability to identify and pursue taxpayer noncompliance. For example, FATCA allows IRS to compare information reported by FFIs on Forms 8966 to information reported by U.S. persons on Forms 8938. According to IRS, this comparison can be used to ensure taxpayers and FFIs are properly reporting foreign financial assets and income from international investments. This type of comparison is a common IRS enforcement technique. For example, IRS can directly compare information it receives from financial institutions’ IRS Form 1099-INT, Interest Income, against a tax return to determine if the taxpayer reported income generated from interest earned. To facilitate FATCA implementation for FFIs operating in jurisdictions with laws that would prohibit FFIs from complying with the terms of the FFI agreement, Treasury developed two alternative intergovernmental agreements (IGA)—Model 1 and Model 2—to facilitate the effective and efficient implementation of FATCA by removing partner jurisdictions’ legal impediments to comply with FATCA reporting requirements, and reducing burdens on FFIs located in partner jurisdictions. FFIs from countries with Model 1 IGAs report information on U.S. persons’ accounts to their respective host country tax authorities (HCTAs). The HCTAs, in turn, compile the information from FFIs and transmit it to IRS. In contrast, FFIs from countries with Model 2 IGAs, or countries treated as not having an IGA in effect, directly report information on U.S. persons’ accounts to IRS. Separate from the FATCA requirements, regulations implementing the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970 (BSA) also impose a separate self-reporting requirement for foreign accounts. Specifically, certain taxpayers and residents are required to file an FBAR with FinCEN annually if they have financial interest or signature or other authority over one or more foreign financial accounts with a total of more than $10,000, regardless of whether they reside within or outside the United States. Federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies can use information from these reports to combat financial crimes, including terrorist financing and tax evasion. Appendix IV provides a comparison of Form 8938 and FBAR reporting requirements. Figure 1 depicts the flow of foreign financial account information from U.S. persons and FFIs to IRS and FinCEN through the FATCA and FBAR reporting processes. As part of the FATCA reporting requirements, IRS collects information on financial accounts through forms and reports submitted by both taxpayers and FFIs. As part of this effort, IRS requires taxpayers to identify their TINs on Forms 8938 they submit. IRS also requires participating FFIs to report the TINs of each account holder who is a specified U.S. person on Forms 8966. IRS intends to use reported TINs to link Form 8938 data filed by taxpayers to Form 8966 data filed by the FFIs to ensure that taxpayers and FFIs are properly reporting foreign financial assets. However, IRS often could not link account information collected from FFIs to the account’s owner because of incorrect or missing TINs. In July 2018, the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration (TIGTA) found that almost half of new Forms 8966 filed by FFIs did not include a TIN or included an invalid TIN. A consulting firm working with FFIs to implement FATCA reporting requirements told us that FFIs encountered significant challenges obtaining accurate TINs from U.S. persons as part of the self-certification process. For instance, FFIs encountered situations where U.S. persons provided incomplete or inaccurate TINs—such as Social Security Numbers (SSN) with less than nine digits—on forms used to self-certify their status as U.S. persons. FFIs also encountered situations where U.S. persons may not have obtained TINs or were unwilling to provide them to FFIs. Additionally, banking associations told us that it has taken time, effort, and expense for FFIs to report TINs, as they had to upgrade computer systems to collect and record TINs from U.S. customers. Finally, Treasury told us that jurisdictions that have an IGA with the United States but no legal requirement to collect TINs are not in compliance with the requirements of the IGA. Treasury and IRS determined that some FFIs reporting from countries with Model 1 IGAs needed additional time to implement procedures to obtain and report required U.S. TINs for preexisting accounts that are U.S. reportable accounts. Consequently, IRS provided a transition period, through the end of 2019, for compliance with the TIN requirements for FFIs under Model 1 IGAs. Specifically, in September 2017, IRS issued a notice modifying procedures for FFIs reporting from countries with Model 1 IGAs to become compliant with TIN reporting requirements for preexisting accounts. For calendar years 2017-2019, IRS will not determine that certain FFIs in countries with Model 1 IGAs are significantly noncompliant with their obligations under the IGA solely as a result of a failure to report U.S. TINs associated with the FFI’s U.S. reportable accounts, providing they (1) obtain and report the date of birth of each account holder and controlling person whose TIN is not reported, (2) make annual requests for missing TINs from each account holder, and (3) search electronically searchable data maintained by such FFIs for missing required U.S. TINs before reporting information that relates to calendar year 2017 to a partner jurisdiction. As a result, even without any further extensions, calendar year 2020 is the earliest IRS will be enforcing requirements for FFIs from countries with Model 1 IGAs to provide accurate and complete information on U.S. account holders’ TINs to IRS. Without valid TINs on Forms 8966 submitted by FFIs, according to IRS officials, IRS faces significant hurdles in matching accounts reported by FFIs to those reported by individual tax filers on their Forms 8938. As a result, IRS must rely on information such as names, dates of birth, and addresses that the filers and/or FFIs may not consistently report. Without data that can be reliably matched between Forms 8938 and 8966, IRS’s ability to identify taxpayers not reporting accurate or complete information on specified foreign financial assets is hindered, interfering with its ability to enforce compliance with FATCA reporting requirements, and ensure taxpayers are paying taxes on income generated from such assets. In July 2018, TIGTA reported that IRS lacked success in matching FFI and individual taxpayer data because reports FFIs filed did not include or included invalid TINs. This, in turn, affected IRS’s ability to identify and enforce requirements for individual taxpayers. TIGTA recommended, among other things, that IRS initiate compliance efforts to address and correct missing or invalid TINs on Form 8966 filings from FFIs from countries with Model 2 IGAs or without any IGAs with the United States. IRS management said it disagreed with this recommendation because a system to ensure validation of every TIN upon submission of a Form 8966 would be cost prohibitive. However, IRS management said that IRS would address invalid TINs as they are uncovered on other compliance efforts, such as initiating development of a data product to automate risk assessments across the FATCA filing population. IRS also said it continues efforts to systematically match Form 8966 and Form 8938 data to identify nonfilers and underreporting related to U.S. holders of foreign accounts. However, IRS management told us they are waiting until they have a full set of data, including TINs, before doing analysis to develop a compliance strategy. According to TIGTA, IRS management believed that having the FFI’s Global Intermediary Identification Number (GIIN) on Form 8938, which is filed by the taxpayer, would help with matching records. However, Form 8938 instructions identify that the field is optional for taxpayers to complete. TIGTA recommended that to reduce taxpayer burden in obtaining GIINs from FFIs, IRS add guidance to Form 8938 instructions to inform taxpayers on how to use the FFI List Search and Download Tool on the IRS’s website to obtain an FFI’s GIIN. IRS agreed with this recommendation. However, even if an individual taxpayer provided GIINs, IRS may continue to have difficulty matching accounts with U.S. taxpayers if the TIN and name of the account holder reported on the Form 8966 do not match the TIN and name of the taxpayer on the Form 8938. IRS officials said they are aware of these difficulties and have attempted to match Forms 8938 and 8966 based on other criteria such as dates of birth. In its response to our draft report, IRS said that all financial institutions and foreign tax authorities that file required account information receive a notification listing administrative and other minor errors contained in their reporting. According to IRS, its Large Business and International division follows up with foreign tax authorities regarding these errors to ensure the tax authorities are working with financial institutions to correct these errors in compliance with the countries’ IGAs. IRS added it has initiated a campaign addressing FFIs that do not meet their compliance responsibilities with respect to account opening requirements. Additionally, IRS drafted a risk acceptance form and tool addressing risks in implementing FATCA compliance and business process capabilities. This risk assessment focused on the limitations IRS faces due to budget constraints, but did not address the specific risks it faces from not receiving complete and valid TINs on U.S. account holders. We previously reported that risk management could help stakeholders make decisions about assessing risk, allocating resources, and taking actions under conditions of uncertainty. Key management practices for risk management we identified from our prior work include identifying, analyzing, and prioritizing risks; developing a mitigation plan to address identified risks; implementing the plan; and monitoring, reporting, and controlling risks. Without developing a risk mitigation plan to address risks IRS faces from not receiving complete and valid TINs moving forward, IRS may lose opportunities to adjust its compliance programs to better identify U.S. persons who are not fully reporting specified foreign financial assets as required under FATCA. Several IRS databases store data collected from individuals’ electronic and paper filings of Form 8938 and/or elements of parent individual tax returns to which the Form 8938 is attached—the filer’s country of residence and filing status—used to determine specified reporting thresholds for Form 8938 filers. Additionally, data from these databases and other sources are transferred downstream to IRS’s Compliance Data Warehouse (CDW)—a database used for research and analytical purposes. We extracted data from copies of Individual Return Transaction File (IRTF) and Modernized Tax Return Database (MTRDB) data copied into CDW to obtain information reported on Forms 8938 and relevant information from parent tax returns, such as filing status and filers’ country of residence. We found that IRTF and MTRDB had inconsistent and incomplete data. For example, neither database had consistent and complete information on foreign financial account and other asset information submitted by Form 8938 filers. While IRS officials told us that IRTF is the authoritative source for filers of Form 8938, it does not store account and other asset information submitted on Forms 8938. Additionally, IRS officials said MTRDB is not designed to store information submitted on paper filings of Forms 8938 and parent tax returns. Officials from IRS’s Research, Applied Analytics and Statistics (RAAS) division also noted that CDW did not have reliable information from Form 8938 paper filings. Because of the lack of foreign financial asset information from such filings, we could not report complete information on assets reported by Form 8938 filers. Further, IRS does not provide instructions to CDW users on how to extract appropriate data from CDW—such as data copied from IRTF and MTRDB—leading to confusion on which databases to use for extracting Form 8938 and relevant parent tax return data. For example, five distinct tables within CDW are required to identify the TIN, parent form, filing status, country of residence, and amount of foreign assets accurately. Without clear explanations of how data in each of these tables relate to each other and to the underlying filings, errors could be introduced into CDW users’ analyses of foreign asset information. Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government notes that management should use quality information to achieve the entity’s objectives. One attribute of this principle includes processing data into quality information that is appropriate, current, complete, accurate, accessible, and provided on a timely basis. Additionally, the Internal Revenue Manual states that IRS needs to measure taxpayer compliance so that customer-focused programs and services can be enhanced or developed so that compliance information and tools can be improved. According to IRS officials, IRS researchers have been taking additional steps to obtain and review Form 8938 and parent tax return data stored in the Integrated Production Model (IPM) database. They said IPM is the only database that contains complete data from individuals’ electronic and paper filings of Forms 8938 and relevant elements of parent tax returns. IRS officials said that RAAS has been working with IRS’s information technology (IT) division to obtain read-only access to IPM, and import Forms 8938 and 8966 data from IPM into CDW for analysis. However, as of February 2019, this effort has been delayed due to budget constraints. In its response to our draft report, IRS said that obtaining read-only access would require a new technical process and plans to continue working with IT on the feasibility and timeframe for enabling this access. Enabling access to consistent and complete Form 8938 and parent tax return data for compliance staff and researchers from RAAS and other IRS business units would help IRS strengthen its efforts to enforce compliance with FATCA reporting requirements and conduct research to bolster enforcement efforts. However, such efforts may be hampered until IRS can ensure readily available access to such data. We previously recommended that IRS develop a broad strategy, including a timeline and performance measures, for how IRS intends to use FATCA information to improve tax compliance. IRS agreed with this recommendation and developed a strategy for FATCA in July 2013. IRS updated the strategy in 2016 by creating the FATCA Compliance Roadmap as a comprehensive plan to articulate IRS’s priorities to facilitate compliance with FATCA reporting requirements. The roadmap also provided an overview of compliance activities used solely for enforcing FATCA reporting requirements or enhancing existing compliance efforts. However, in July 2018, TIGTA reported that IRS had not updated the FATCA Compliance Roadmap since 2016, and had taken limited or no action on a majority of the planned activities outlined in it. We also found that IRS had not yet evaluated the effects of FATCA, including the effects on voluntary tax compliance. IRS documentation states that only 7 of 31 capabilities outlined in the FATCA Compliance Roadmap were delivered due to funding constraints. As of October 2018, IRS has stopped using the FATCA Compliance Roadmap and has not developed a revised comprehensive plan to manage efforts to leverage FATCA data to improve taxpayer compliance. According to IRS officials, IRS moved away from updating broad strategy documents, such as the FATCA Compliance Roadmap, to focus on individual compliance campaigns. These include a campaign to match individual tax filers to the reports from FFIs, and another campaign to identify FFIs with FATCA reporting requirements who are not meeting all of their obligations. According to what IRS told us, with the passage of time and as FATCA is becoming more integrated into agency operations, it has moved from updating the broad strategy documents focused on FATCA to working on compliance campaigns that incorporate FATCA into overall tax administration. Additionally, IRS and outside researchers plan to study the role of enforcement in driving overall patterns in reporting offshore assets and income generated from such assets. Though IRS maintains that FATCA is more integrated into its operations, TIGTA’s 2018 report concluded that IRS was still unprepared to enforce compliance with FATCA in part because it took limited or no action on the majority of planned activities outlined in the FATCA Compliance Roadmap. Documenting a framework for using FATCA reporting requirements to improve taxpayer compliance and measure their effect is consistent with three steps we found leading public sector organizations take to increase the accountability of their initiatives: (1) define clear missions and desired outcomes; (2) measure performance to gauge progress; and (3) use performance information as a basis for decision-making. We also previously reported that it is important for IRS to use a documented framework that defines a clear strategy, timeline, and plans for assessment. Having such a framework in place can help IRS better allocate resources and avoid unnecessary costs resulting from not having the necessary or appropriate data available to execute its objectives. In light of the challenges IRS faces to collect, manage, and use FATCA data to improve compliance in a resource-constrained environment, employing a comprehensive plan would help IRS maximize the use of collected data and better leverage individual campaigns to increase taxpayer compliance. Without such a plan, IRS’s ability to collect and leverage data collected under FATCA for compliance enforcement and other purposes is constrained. We could not report on total values of foreign financial assets on Forms 8938 in tax years 2015 and 2016. However, we could provide a range of total maximum account values reported on FBARs during the same period. Specifically, we determined that more than 900,000 individuals filed FBARs in calendar years 2015 and 2016, and declared total maximum values of accounts ranging from about $1.5 trillion to more than $2 trillion each year. A little more than one in five—or about 21.7 percent—of the approximately 404,800 Forms 8938 filed with IRS in tax year 2016 were done so from U.S. persons living abroad, with the other 78.3 percent living in the United States. Table 1 shows that a higher proportion of Form 8938 filings from U.S. persons living abroad for tax year 2016 were filed on paper (43.3 percent) than Form 8938 filings from U.S. persons living in the United States during the same period (14.7 percent). We extracted these data from IRTF, which IRS officials said is the authoritative source for filers of Form 8938. However, we could not report complete information on foreign financial assets reported by Form 8938 filers because such data are incomplete; as noted above, IRS databases we used to extract Form 8938 data—IRTF and MTRDB—do not include asset information reported on paper filings of Forms 8938. Of the approximately 404,800 Forms 8938 filed by individuals for tax year 2016—the most recent data available—we could access information on residency of filers and reported foreign financial assets from about 277,600 Forms 8938 that did not indicate that foreign financial assets and values were declared on other forms besides the Form 8938. Of the subset of these Forms 8938, more than one quarter—or about 73,500— reported foreign financial assets in amounts that indicate the Form 8938 may have been filed unnecessarily, since they reported specified foreign financial assets with aggregate values at or below reporting thresholds as of the last day of the tax year. Based on available Form 8938 data from tax year 2016, table 2 shows that about 61,900 filings from U.S. persons living in the United States and about 11,600 filings from U.S. persons living abroad during the same tax year reported specified foreign financial assets with aggregate values at or below end of tax year thresholds. These totals likely understate the total number of Forms 8938 that U.S. persons may have filed unnecessarily in tax year 2016; due to data limitations, these totals exclude Forms 8938 without asset information stored in IRS’s databases, including most Forms 8938 filed on paper and Forms 8938 where filers identified that they declared foreign financial assets on other forms besides the Form 8938. There is no clear explanation as to why some U.S. persons may have filed Forms 8938 unnecessarily. However, we identified a number of potential reasons from focus groups and other interviews with stakeholder groups. In focus groups we conducted, participants expressed confusion about IRS’s instructions for completing the Form 8938 and information provided on IRS’s website. In the instructions for completing Form 8938, IRS described the specific types of foreign financial assets that are to be reported on Form 8938, and the asset value thresholds that must be met for required reporting, depending on the location of residence and filing status of the taxpayer. IRS also posted responses to frequently asked questions on meeting FATCA reporting requirements on its website, and established a separate page on its website comparing foreign financial assets that must be reported on Form 8938 and/or FBAR. Nonetheless, focus group participants reported confusion on whether and how to report investment and retirement accounts and compulsory savings plans managed by their country of residence. In a meeting we convened with an organization representing tax attorneys, they told us taxpayers are unsure about what account values to report on the Form 8938. Tax practitioners participating in another focus group added that they filed Forms 8938 regardless of the aggregate value of the assets because it was too cumbersome for them to identify whether the assets exceeded reporting thresholds as of the end of the year or at any time during the year. IRS officials also cited a number of possible reasons why U.S. persons may be filing Forms 8938 unnecessarily. For example, it may be easier for U.S. persons to report all specified foreign financial assets they hold on the Form 8938, rather than determine whether the value of such assets met applicable thresholds. IRS officials also said that U.S. persons might complete a Form 8938 for reasons besides meeting tax-filing requirements, such as providing evidence of assets for a loan application. IRS’s Taxpayer Bill of Rights states that taxpayers are entitled to clear explanations of the laws and IRS procedures in all tax forms, instructions, publications, notices, and correspondence. Furthermore, one of IRS’s strategic goals is to empower taxpayers by making it easier for them to understand and meet their filing, reporting, and payment obligations. IRS officials said they hosted sessions for tax practitioners at IRS Nationwide Tax Forums to address FATCA reporting requirements. However, they said IRS has not taken direct steps to identify or implement actions to further clarify instructions and related guidance on IRS’s website for completing Form 8938, such as information on which foreign financial assets to report, how to calculate asset values, and determine whether such values exceed required reporting thresholds. Additionally, IRS officials said they have not conducted additional outreach to educate taxpayers on required reporting thresholds under FATCA, or notify Form 8938 filers of instances where aggregate values of specified foreign financial assets reported on Forms 8938 were below reporting thresholds. IRS officials said they have not made efforts to determine whether there is a pattern of unnecessary Form 8938 filings that they could address. Rather, they said they believed resources should be devoted to FATCA implementation in general. However, as shown above, we have identified many tens of thousands of instances where U.S. persons may have filed Forms 8938 unnecessarily. Without assessing factors contributing to unnecessary Form 8938 reporting—and identifying or implementing actions to further clarify and educate taxpayers on FATCA reporting requirements—IRS is missing opportunities to help taxpayers understand their filing and reporting obligations and minimize their compliance burdens while properly meeting their tax obligations. Additionally, IRS may be missing opportunities to reduce costs in processing forms that taxpayers did not need to file. Because of overlapping statutory reporting requirements, IRS and FinCEN—both bureaus within Treasury—collect duplicative foreign financial asset data using two different forms (Form 8938 and FBAR). Our evaluation and management guide for fragmentation, overlap, and duplication states that overlap occurs when multiple agencies or programs have similar goals, engage in similar activities or strategies to achieve them, or target similar beneficiaries. Table 3 shows that individuals required to report foreign financial assets on Form 8938, in many cases, also must meet FBAR reporting requirements. For example, specified individuals with foreign financial accounts exceeding $50,000 in aggregate value on the last day of the tax year must file both Form 8938 and FBAR if such values exceed the minimum Form 8938 thresholds; these thresholds depend on the filing status and address of specified individuals. Table 3 also shows that, in many cases, specified interests in foreign financial assets as defined in Form 8938 instructions are the same as the financial interest in such assets under FBAR. Further, as noted in table 3, the overlapping requirements lead to IRS and FinCEN collecting the same information on certain types of foreign financial assets. For example, both Form 8938 and FBAR collect information on foreign financial accounts for which a person has signature authority and a financial interest in the account. Form 8938 and FBAR also both collect duplicative information on several other types of foreign financial assets, such as foreign mutual funds and accounts at a foreign financial institution that include foreign stock or securities. Overlapping reporting requirements result in most Form 8938 filers also filing an FBAR during the same reporting year. Table 4 shows that close to 75 percent of Form 8938 filers in tax years 2015 and 2016 percent also filed an FBAR for the same year using the same TIN. Overlapping requirements to file both Form 8938 and FBAR increases the compliance burden on U.S. persons and adds complexity that can create confusion, potentially resulting in inaccurate or unnecessary reporting. Focus group participants in all five countries included in our study affirmed that U.S. persons experienced confusion and frustration with having to report duplicative foreign financial asset information on both forms. Focus group participants and others we interviewed also noted that U.S. persons incurred additional financial costs to complete and file both Form 8938 and FBAR. For instance, one tax practitioner in Canada said the charge was about $190 to report four-to-five accounts on an FBAR in addition to charging about $540 for basic tax return packages. An accounting firm based in Japan typically charged between $300 and $800 to complete a Form 8938 and between $150 and $500 to complete an FBAR, depending on the number of accounts reported on the forms. Proposed revisions to regulations implementing BSA proposed by FinCEN may also increase the number of duplicative foreign financial accounts reported on Form 8938 and FBAR. Currently, U.S. persons must report detailed information on all foreign financial accounts on Form 8938 if the value of such accounts and other specified foreign financial assets reaches applicable reporting thresholds. In contrast, U.S. persons are generally exempted from reporting detailed account information on FBARs if they report having signature or other authority over 25 or more foreign financial accounts. FinCEN’s proposed revisions to BSA regulations would eliminate the exemption, requiring U.S. persons to report detailed information on all foreign financial accounts in which he or she has a financial interest if the value of such accounts exceed FBAR’s $10,000 reporting threshold. FinCEN estimated that it will receive account information for the first time on about 5.4 million foreign financial accounts if it finalizes the proposed revisions. In turn, these revisions may lead to increased filings of duplicative asset data on both Form 8938 and FBAR, as U.S. persons may have to report detailed information on all foreign financial accounts using both forms. U.S. persons also face exposure to two different penalty regimes for any failures in accurately and completely reporting foreign financial asset information to two bureaus within Treasury—IRS and FinCEN. Officials from one organization representing U.S. persons living abroad said penalties due to failure to report certain accounts on one or both forms can be significant, even if little or no taxes are owed on those accounts. The duplicative reporting of foreign financial asset data on two different forms also creates additional costs to the government to process and store the same or similar information twice, and enforce reporting compliance with both requirements. In 2012, we recommended that Treasury direct the Office of Tax Policy, IRS, and FinCEN to determine whether the benefits of implementing a less duplicative reporting process exceed the costs and, if so, implement that process. Treasury did not implement our recommendation. While we continue to believe that the agencies should have considered whether less duplicative reporting could have been implemented, we do recognize that FATCA and FBAR were enacted under two different statutes to serve different purposes. As mentioned above, according to IRS, FATCA improves visibility into taxable income from foreign sources and enhances the agency’s ability to identify and pursue taxpayer noncompliance. In contrast, the information reported on the FBAR is collected to identify money laundering and other financial crimes; law enforcement agencies can use BSA information—including information collected from FBARs— to aid regulatory and criminal investigations. Additionally, data collected from Form 8938 and FBAR are used in different systems for use by different bureaus within Treasury. Fully addressing issues stemming from overlapping reporting requirements and the resulting collection of duplicative information—while at the same time ensuring that such information can be used for tax compliance and law enforcement purposes—can only be done by modifying the statutes governing the requirements. Further, IRS and FinCEN have varying degrees of access to foreign financial asset information collected from Form 8938 and FBAR to enforce tax compliance and financial crime laws. FATCA was enacted, in part, to improve visibility into taxable income from foreign sources. However, information provided on Forms 8938 is taxpayer return information protected by section 6103 of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC), which generally prohibits IRS from disclosing information provided on Forms 8938. IRS can share return information with other government agencies and others when it is allowed by statute. For example, under section 6103, IRS may disclose return information related to taxes imposed under the IRC—such as self-employment income tax, Social Security and Medicare tax and income tax withholding—to the Social Security Administration (SSA) as needed to carry out its responsibilities under the Social Security Act. However, according to FinCEN officials, FinCEN, law enforcement, and regulators often cannot access information submitted on Forms 8938. While section 6103 provides other exceptions to disclosure prohibitions—such as allowing IRS to share return information with law enforcement agencies for investigation and prosecution of nontax criminal laws—such information is generally only accessible pursuant to a court order. As noted above, information reported on the FBAR can be used by law enforcement agencies to aid regulatory and criminal investigations. This includes IRS, which has been delegated responsibility from FinCEN to enforce compliance with FBAR reporting requirements. IRS has used FBAR information in addressing taxpayer noncompliance with reporting and paying taxes on foreign assets and income. For example, taxpayers accepted into one of IRS’s offshore voluntary disclosure programs must have filed amended or late FBARs as part of their program applications. Investigators from IRS’s Criminal Investigation division generally reviewed applications to determine if the taxpayer has made a complete and truthful disclosure. IRS examiners can also use information from case files of program participants—such as information disclosed on FBARs— to identify new groups of taxpayers suspected of hiding income offshore. IRS can then choose to continue offering offshore programs and encourage these newly identified groups of taxpayers, as well as all taxpayers with unreported offshore accounts, to disclose their accounts voluntarily. In addition to eliminating overlapping reporting requirements, harmonizing statutes governing foreign financial asset reporting and use of information collected on such assets to make such statutes fully consistent could yield additional benefits to both IRS and the law enforcement community. Specifically, and as shown in appendix IV, there are specified foreign financial assets reported on Form 8938—such as foreign hedge funds and foreign private equity funds—that are not required to be reported on an FBAR. In contrast, there are other specified foreign financial assets reported on an FBAR—such as indirect interests in foreign financial assets through an entity—that are not required to be reported on Form 8938. Without congressional action to address overlap in foreign financial asset reporting requirements, IRS and FinCEN will neither be able to coordinate efforts to collect and use foreign financial asset information, nor reduce unnecessary burdens faced by U.S. persons in reporting duplicative foreign financial asset information. Two reporting systems for sharing foreign account information from foreign financial institutions are in operation globally—FATCA and the Common Reporting Standard (CRS). According to officials from banking associations and a consulting firm, FFIs in the countries where we examined FATCA implementation encountered challenges implementing and now maintaining two overlapping reporting systems for collecting and transmitting account information to other countries for a seemingly similar purpose, and collecting sufficient information from customers to ensure they meet the requirements of both systems. As noted above, we previously identified overlap as occurring when multiple agencies or programs have similar goals, engage in similar activities or strategies to achieve them, or target similar beneficiaries. According to an IRS official, collecting account information under FATCA ushered in an era of greater transparency; as noted above, FATCA’s passage sought to reduce tax evasion by creating greater transparency and accountability with respect to offshore accounts and other assets held by U.S. taxpayers. When FATCA was first introduced, there was no international platform to share account information between countries. The United States and other countries worked together to reach an agreement on the electronic formatting that would be used to share the information. Other countries tax authorities’ became more interested in understanding the financial assets held abroad by their residents through an exchange of account information among themselves. In response, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) established the CRS reporting system for automatic exchange of information among member countries. According to the OECD, CRS was developed with a view to maximize efficiency and reduce cost for financial institutions. Thus, CRS drew extensively on the intergovernmental approach used to implement FATCA reporting requirements for FFIs. Countries participating in CRS exchange account information with each other using OECD’s Common Transmission System, which was modeled on FATCA’s International Data Exchange System. Figure 2 depicts the flow of account information between countries under FATCA and CRS. CRS reporting requirements are in many ways similar to FATCA, including required reporting of the account holders’ name and address, taxpayer identification number, account number, account balance, and income and sales proceeds. However, the requirements differ in significant ways. The biggest differences in requirements are driven by the nature of the U.S. tax system. The United States, like many countries, generally taxes citizens and resident aliens on their worldwide income regardless of where that income is earned. However, the United States differs from other countries because it generally subjects U.S. citizens who reside abroad to U.S. taxation in the same manner as U.S. residents. In contrast to U.S. policy, most other countries do not tax their citizens if they reside in a country other than their country of citizenship. Further, IGAs implementing FATCA require FFIs to report the foreign-held accounts of U.S. citizens and residents—including resident aliens—while CRS requires financial institutions in jurisdictions participating in CRS to report on almost all accounts held by nonresidents of the reporting country. Appendix V provides more detailed information on differences in reporting requirements, due diligence requirements, and definitions under FATCA and CRS. These differences in tax systems drive variations in due diligence procedures between FATCA and CRS. For example, FATCA aims to identify whether an account holder at a foreign institution is a U.S. person based on citizenship and tax residency information. In contrast, CRS aims to identify the tax residency of all account holders of a financial institution, and does not consider citizenship. Due to the multilateral nature of CRS, if an account holder is determined on the basis of the due diligence procedures to have residency in two or more countries, information would be exchanged with all jurisdictions in which the account holder is determined a resident for tax purposes. Under CRS rules, information about foreign accounts held by a U.S. citizen with a tax residence abroad would not be reported to IRS, but rather to the jurisdiction in which they were a resident for tax purposes. Because the United States taxes the worldwide income of U.S. citizens, CRS rules would need to require identification of account holders’ citizenship in member countries where they are residents if FATCA were to be aligned with CRS. Table 5 shows a comparison of individuals reported to IRS under FATCA and hypothetically under CRS. Treasury and IRS, as part of its 2017-2018 Priority Guidance Plan, are considering modifying certain elements of the existing FATCA regulations. For instance, Treasury and IRS are considering coordinating certain documentation requirements for participating FFIs with the requirements under IGAs. In December 2018, Treasury and IRS also proposed regulations intended, in part, to reduce the burdens of FATCA. The proposed regulations included a clarification of the definition of an investment entity that is similar to the guidance published by OECD interpreting the definition of a “managed by” investment entity under CRS. If the United States wanted to adopt CRS, some of the key differences between FATCA and CRS—as outlined above and in appendix V—could be aligned through regulation while others would require legislation. According to Treasury officials, to align FATCA and CRS, Congress would need to revise statutes to: provide for the collection of information for accounts that residents of partner jurisdictions maintain at U.S. financial institutions; require certain U.S. financial institutions to report the account balance (including, in the case of a cash value insurance contract or annuity contract, the cash value or surrender value) for all financial accounts maintained at a U.S. office and held by foreign residents; expand the current reporting required with respect to U.S. source income paid to accounts held by foreign residents to include similar non-U.S. source payments; require financial institutions to report the gross proceeds from the sale or redemption of property held in, or with respect to, a financial account; and require financial institutions to report information with respect to financial accounts held by certain passive entities with substantial foreign owners. While better aligning FATCA and CRS to some extent is possible, anything short of the United States fully adopting CRS would not fully eliminate the burdens of overlapping requirements that FFIs must currently meet under the two different systems. While having the United States adopt the CRS reporting system in lieu of FATCA could benefit FFIs that may otherwise have to operate two overlapping reporting systems, it would result in no additional benefit to IRS in terms of obtaining information on U.S. accounts. Additionally, it could generate additional costs and reporting burdens to U.S. financial institutions that would need to implement systems to meet CRS requirements. The extent of these costs is unknown. Further, adoption of CRS would create the circumstance where foreign accounts held by U.S. citizens with a tax residence in partner jurisdiction—including U.S. citizens who have a U.S. tax obligation—would not be reported to IRS. Tax practitioners and others we interviewed said that U.S. persons living abroad—whether or not they are required to complete a Form 8938—risk being denied access to foreign financial services. U.S. persons and tax practitioners located in four of the five countries where we conducted focus groups and interviews reported that some U.S. persons and U.S.- owned businesses encountered difficulties opening bank accounts with FFIs after FATCA was enacted, with some FFIs closing U.S. persons’ existing accounts or denying them opportunities to open new accounts. One focus group participant, for example, said that the financial institution closed down all accounts including business checking, savings, and money market accounts after FATCA was implemented, requiring this individual to find a local resident who could co-sign on a new account. Costs FFIs would incur from implementing FATCA were cited as a significant factor in increasing barriers faced by U.S. persons in accessing foreign financial services. Officials from one organization representing tax attorneys said that as a result of costs associated with FATCA implementation, FFIs have found it less burdensome to close accounts of U.S. persons or require the accounts to be moved to a Securities and Exchange Commission registered affiliate than comply with FATCA. Tax practitioners and an official from a bankers association added that because FFIs may gain only small margins of profit from U.S. persons, FFIs may believe it is too troublesome to do business with them. Additionally, officials from a foreign government agency told us that because FATCA is expensive for FFIs to continue implementing, banks in their country might charge U.S. persons seeking access to financial services additional fees to account for FATCA implementation costs. Tax practitioners, consultants working with FFIs to implement FATCA reporting requirements, and the National Taxpayer Advocate told us that FFIs with smaller asset sizes such as smaller trust companies were more prone to decline business with U.S persons. Officials from an advocacy group representing U.S. persons living abroad told the National Taxpayer Advocate that some smaller banks declined U.S. persons as customers as a business decision, believing it would cost more for them to comply with FATCA reporting requirements than maintain U.S. expatriates’ accounts. Banking associations we interviewed said that decisions made by FFIs on whether to accept U.S. persons as customers also depends on the overall risks and benefits of taking on individual U.S. persons, shaped in part from risks in not meeting FATCA reporting requirements. Representatives of a banking association and an advocacy group told us that some FFIs decided to avoid doing business with U.S. persons after they became concerned about potential penalties for failure to comply—either willfully or in error—with FATCA reporting requirements. One banking association added that such errors could affect other aspects of FFIs’ relationships with the U.S. government, such as nonprosecution agreements made with the U.S. Department of Justice. Officials from one consulting firm that helped FFIs meet FATCA reporting requirements added that FFIs’ determination of risk depends on many layers, such as the value of clients’ assets or the country in which clients reside or possess citizenship. After FATCA’s implementation, according to officials from the consulting firm, FFIs decided to turn away U.S. persons in some cases because the benefits of doing business with U.S. persons were less than the potential risks. For example, if a U.S. person only maintained a payroll account, the FFI may determine it would not make enough money to account for risks in incorrectly identifying the status of the customer as a U.S. or non-U.S. person. However, focus group participants from two countries said that FFIs may agree to accept U.S persons as customers if they have higher account balances that offset risks from FATCA reporting requirements. One focus group participant, for instance, said banks in his country will do business with a U.S. person if he or she has more than $500,000 in assets. Additionally, U.S. persons and tax practitioners we interviewed said that other factors such as language barriers and U.S. regulations designed to prevent money laundering may also inhibit U.S. persons’ access to brokerage accounts while overseas. Focus group participants and others we interviewed said that Form 8938 reporting requirements contributed to denials of employment and promotion opportunities for U.S. persons living abroad. Treasury officials noted that requirements imposed by FATCA do not directly hinder U.S. persons from gaining employment or promotion opportunities overseas. However, focus group participants, a consulting firm, and a foreign government agency noted that foreign-owned companies and nonprofit organizations such as churches did not want to hire or promote U.S. persons because they wanted to avoid exposing information to the U.S. government on their organizations’ accounts and client trust accounts where the U.S. person would have signature authority. As noted above, a U.S. person is generally required to report on the Form 8938 foreign financial accounts for which the person has signature authority if he or she has a financial interest in the account. Focus group participants and others noted that such requirements have adversely affected the ability of U.S. persons to serve on a corporate board or in a nonprofit organization, or maintain business relationships. Treasury and Department of Commerce officials stationed in one country included in our review added that FATCA implementation has played a role in dissuading foreign-owned corporations in some Asian countries from considering U.S. persons for corporate leadership positions such as directorships. This is in part because FATCA has triggered additional paperwork burden and operating costs for onboarding U.S. employees since they have had to help them meet Form 8938 reporting requirements. Two advocacy groups representing U.S. persons living abroad added that it is also harder for U.S.-based companies to justify relocating U.S. persons overseas and paying for such relocations since they also have had to help their U.S. employees meet Form 8938 reporting requirements in addition to meeting other tax filing requirements. U.S. embassy documents indicate there was increased demand for Social Security Numbers (SSN) since FATCA’s passage in 2010, driven in part by U.S. citizens applying for an SSN to gain access to foreign financial services or resolve outstanding U.S. tax obligations before completing renunciation. However, officials from two organizations representing Americans living abroad cited significant challenges faced by some U.S. persons living abroad in obtaining SSNs required to meet their U.S. tax obligations or obtain financial services. U.S. persons living abroad might not possess an SSN because their parents did not obtain one for them as a minor. Often, this may have been due to the parents leaving the United States when the child was young. State officials also said that U.S. citizens applying for U.S. passports while overseas frequently forget their SSNs or do not know if their parents ever applied for an SSN on their behalf. Officials from organizations representing U.S. persons living abroad added that without an SSN, these persons are unable to claim refunds or other tax benefits when filing their tax returns, or participate in IRS programs to voluntarily disclose previously unreported tax liabilities and assets. Additionally, some might be unable to gain or maintain access to financial accounts or other assets in their countries of residence without an SSN. According to these officials and tax practitioners we interviewed, U.S. persons living abroad face greater challenges in obtaining SSNs than those living in the United States. For instance, they faced difficulties obtaining documentation from the United States that the Social Security Administration (SSA) requires with SSN applications; traveling to Social Security offices and U.S. embassies or consulates to certify documents or submit applications in person; and receiving valid SSNs from SSA in a timely manner to file tax returns or participate in offshore disclosure programs. SSA officials also identified several challenges U.S. persons experience when applying for an SSN from abroad. For instance, SSA officials said that efforts to authenticate documents submitted with SSN applications can cause delays for U.S. persons living abroad in obtaining an SSN. Additionally, SSN applicants living abroad face significantly longer wait times than applicants living in the United States once their applications are processed. According to SSA officials, after an application is processed, it can take 3 to 6 months–-depending on the country’s mail service–-for an individual to receive a Social Security Card. This is significantly longer than the 2-week period it takes SSN applicants to receive a card after mailing in their applications from within the United States. According to Department of State (State) data, the annual number of approvals of requests for renunciations of U.S. citizenships increased nearly 178 percent during a 6-year period, from 1,601 in 2011—the year after FATCA was enacted—to 4,449 in 2016, the most recent year to which full data on renunciations were available. According to U.S. embassy documents and information provided by focus group participants and interviewees across all the countries we examined, FATCA was the reason or a contributing factor in some of these decisions and the resulting increase in total renunciations. Specific effects of FATCA implementation contributing to decisions to renounce U.S. citizenship included reduced access to foreign financial services and employment or promotion opportunities in a foreign-owned company—as identified above from our document reviews, focus groups, and interviews—and burdens in meeting FATCA reporting requirements. However, the extent to which FATCA implementation contributed to increased renunciations is unclear. State officials said that data are unavailable to determine the extent to which these renunciation decisions were the direct result of FATCA because State has no legal obligation to collect information on the motivation behind renunciation of citizenship. In response to concerns about the availability of foreign financial services, Treasury implemented regulations that allow certain low-risk local FFIs to be deemed compliant with FATCA, but only if the FFIs do not implement policies or practices that discriminate against opening or maintaining accounts for specified U.S. persons. Treasury and State also previously established joint strategies to address these challenges. For instance, Treasury and State developed guidance on FATCA that was posted on embassy websites to educate U.S. persons and others. Additionally, Treasury and State officials conducted outreach events and workshops through U.S. embassies and American chambers of commerce worldwide to provide information on FATCA and other tax filing requirements, According to State officials, the U.S. embassies in at least two countries—Switzerland and France—also worked with foreign officials and/or FFIs to increase access to financial services for U.S. citizens residing in those countries. For instance, Treasury and State officials reached agreements with FFIs in Switzerland to provide a wider range of financial services to U.S. persons. Similarly, in 2017, SSA and State implemented an interagency agreement to streamline processes for providing SSNs to U.S. persons living abroad after FATCA’s implementation in 2010. SSA officials said they are also in discussions with State on improving SSA’s website to include more transparent, specific information for SSN overseas applicants about SSA documentation requirements. Tax practitioners, advocacy groups, and Treasury officials we interviewed said FFIs have become more willing to accept U.S. persons as customers compared to when FATCA was enacted in 2010. However, U.S. persons living abroad continue to face issues gaining access to foreign financial services. For example, in a September 2018 letter sent by the Chair of the Finance Committee of the Netherlands House of Representatives to a member of Congress, U.S. citizens born outside the United States and who have never lived, studied, or worked in the United States are effectively being denied access to financial services in the Netherlands. Focus group participants added that some banks will reject U.S. clients or charge heavy fees for them to open an account. Agencies have ongoing efforts to address FATCA-related issues, as listed below, but some are ad hoc, fragmented, or otherwise not part of a broader effort between Treasury and other agencies such as State or SSA to use ongoing collaborative mechanisms to monitor and share information on such issues, and jointly develop and implement steps to address them: Treasury officials said they are participating in discussions with FFIs to address residual issues with access to foreign financial services. However, they said they have not involved other agencies in these discussions. IRS officials, in response to concerns from the French government, said they are developing a program to help streamline foreign asset- related tax compliance requirements for a small group of U.S. born citizens that have been French residents most of their lives without an SSN, and—according to State officials—did not wish to take the necessary steps to renounce their citizenship. However, no effort has been made to address these issues more broadly. State encouraged U.S. citizens to alert the nearest U.S. embassy of any practices they encounter with regard to the provision of financial services. State documents noted that some Americans have been turned away by banks or required to meet a higher deposit threshold in part because of FATCA reporting requirements. State documentation also noted that there have been cases of U.S. citizens with existing bank accounts who have been asked to close them. However, State documentation we reviewed does not highlight collaborative efforts currently underway with Treasury or other agencies to address banking access issues U.S. persons living abroad are presently encountering worldwide. As described above, SSA and State streamlined processes and policies for U.S. persons abroad seeking to obtain SSNs. However, SSA officials said they have not been involved in any ongoing efforts involving Treasury to identify systemic issues and related solutions involving SSNs for the purposes of tax compliance and citizenship renunciations. Treasury officials said they spoke with SSA officials about problems U.S. persons living abroad face in obtaining SSNs, but SSA believed that cycle times for processing SSN applications submitted by U.S. persons living abroad were not significantly greater than for applications submitted by U.S. persons living in the United States, although mailing times could vary significantly and take up to 3 to 6 months. We have previously identified key practices to enhance and sustain interagency collaboration, including defining and articulating a common outcome, establishing mutually reinforcing or joint strategies, and developing mechanisms to monitor, evaluate, and report on results. One goal in IRS’s strategic plan is to collaborate with external partners proactively to improve tax administration, while objectives in SSA’s strategic plan include improving service delivery and expanding service delivery options. Additionally, according to State’s Bureau of Consular Affairs website, one of State’s key priorities is to protect the interests of U.S. citizens overseas, such as through ensuring responsive and efficient provision of consular services overseas. As noted above, there are a host of ongoing issues and challenges for U.S. persons living abroad from implementation of FATCA, such as loss of access to foreign financial services, denial of employment and promotion opportunities overseas, and difficulty obtaining SSNs from abroad. However, Treasury currently lacks a collaborative mechanism to coordinate efforts with other agencies to address these issues, and Treasury officials said they do not plan to establish them. Without effective collaborative mechanisms to monitor and share information and implement cross-agency solutions, future efforts to address such issues will continue to be fragmented and less effective than they otherwise could be. In enacting FATCA, Congress sought to reduce tax evasion by creating greater transparency and accountability over offshore assets held by U.S. taxpayers. Because of FATCA, IRS receives information on foreign financial assets from hundreds of thousands of filers annually. IRS could use this information to help ensure taxpayers holding offshore assets report and pay taxes owed on income generated from such assets. However, to take full advantage of the information, IRS must address key challenges. Specifically, Taxpayer Identification Numbers (TIN) reported by FFIs are often inaccurate or incomplete, which makes it difficult for IRS to match information reported by FFIs to individual taxpayers. As such, IRS must develop a plan to mitigate the risks that these data issues pose to agency efforts to identify and combat taxpayer noncompliance. Lack of consistent, complete, and readily available Form 8938 and related parent individual tax return data also affects IRS’s compliance activities, making it more difficult for IRS business units to extract and analyze FATCA data to improve tax compliance efforts and reduce tax revenue loss from income generated from offshore assets. At the same time, IRS has stopped following its FATCA Compliance Roadmap it developed in 2016 because, according to IRS officials, IRS moved away from updating broad strategy documents to focus on individual compliance campaigns. However, in light of the challenges IRS continues to face in fully integrating FATCA information into its compliance programs, it will not maximize use of such information and effectively leverage individual compliance campaigns unless it employs a comprehensive plan that enables IRS to better leverage such campaigns to improve taxpayer compliance. Our analysis of available data indicates that many of the Forms 8938 filed in tax year 2016 may have been filed unnecessarily. Factors that are contributing to this unnecessary reporting are unclear. While IRS has provided instructions and guidance on its website for completing Form 8938, focus group participants and tax practitioners reported confusion on whether and how to report investments in foreign accounts. Taking steps to identify and address factors contributing to unnecessary Form 8938 reporting would help reduce taxpayer burden and reduce processing costs for IRS. Reporting requirements for foreign financial assets under FATCA overlap with reporting requirements under FBAR. These overlapping requirements—implemented under two different statutes—have resulted in most taxpayers filing Forms 8938 also filing FBARs with FinCEN. Duplicative filings on foreign financial assets cause confusion, frustration, and compliance burdens for taxpayers. Duplicative filings also increased costs to the government to process and store the same or similar information. Modifying the statutes governing the requirements can fully address the issues outlined above, and can allow for the use of FATCA information for prevention and detection of financial crimes. This is similar to other statutory allowances for IRS to disclose return information for other purposes, such as for determining Social Security income tax withholding. Lastly, FATCA has created challenges for some U.S. persons living abroad that go beyond increasing their tax compliance burdens. Some U.S. persons living abroad are still facing issues accessing financial services and employment and obtaining SSNs. Treasury, State, and SSA have taken some steps to address these issues both separately and in coordination with each other. However, Treasury, as the agency ultimately responsible for effective administration of FATCA, currently lacks a collaborative mechanism with State and SSA to address ongoing issues. Establishing a formal means to collaboratively address burdens faced by Americans abroad from FATCA can help agencies develop effective solutions to mitigate such burdens. We are making the following matter for congressional consideration: Congress should consider amending the Internal Revenue Code, Bank Secrecy Act of 1970, and other statutes, as needed, to address overlap in foreign financial asset reporting requirements for the purposes of tax compliance and detection, and prevention of financial crimes, such as by aligning the types of assets to be reported and asset reporting thresholds, and ensuring appropriate access to the reported information. We are making the following four recommendations to IRS: The Commissioner of Internal Revenue should develop a plan to mitigate risks with compliance activities due to the lack of accurate and complete TINs of U.S. account holders collected from FFIs. (Recommendation 1) The Commissioner of Internal Revenue should ensure that appropriate business units conducting compliance enforcement and research have access to consistent and complete data collected from individuals’ electronic and paper filings of Form 8938 and elements of parent individual tax returns. As part of this effort, the Commissioner should ensure that IRS provides clear guidance to the business units for accessing such data in IRS’s Compliance Data Warehouse. (Recommendation 2) The Commissioner of Internal Revenue should employ a comprehensive plan for managing efforts to leverage FATCA data in agency compliance efforts. The plan should document and track activities over time to ensure individuals and FFIs comply with FATCA reporting assess and mitigate data quality risks from FFIs; improve the quality, management, and accessibility of FATCA data for compliance, research, and other purposes; and establish, monitor, and evaluate compliance efforts involving FATCA data intended to improve voluntary compliance and address noncompliance with FATCA reporting requirements. (Recommendation 3) The Commissioner of Internal Revenue should assess factors contributing to unnecessary Form 8938 reporting and take steps, as appropriate, to address the issue. Depending on the results of the assessment, potential options may include: identifying and implementing steps to further clarify IRS Form 8938 instructions and related guidance on IRS’s website on determining what foreign financial assets to report, and how to calculate and report asset values subject to reporting thresholds; and conducting additional outreach to educate taxpayers on required reporting thresholds, including notifying taxpayers that may have unnecessarily filed an IRS Form 8938 to reduce such filings. (Recommendation 4) We are also making the following recommendation to Treasury: The Secretary of the Treasury should lead efforts, in coordination with the Secretary of State and Commissioner of Social Security, to establish a formal means to collaboratively address ongoing issues— including issues accessing financial services and employment and obtaining SSNs—that U.S. persons living abroad encounter from implementation of FATCA reporting requirements. (Recommendation 5) We are also making the following recommendation to State: The Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of the Treasury and Commissioner of Social Security, should establish a formal means to collaboratively address ongoing issues—including issues accessing financial services and employment and obtaining SSNs—that U.S. persons living abroad encounter from implementation of FATCA reporting requirements. (Recommendation 6) We are also making the following recommendation to SSA: The Commissioner of Social Security, in coordination with the Secretaries of State and Treasury, should establish a formal means to collaboratively address ongoing issues—including issues accessing financial services and employment and obtaining SSNs—that U.S. persons living abroad encounter from implementation of FATCA reporting requirements. (Recommendation 7) We provided a draft of this report to the Secretaries of State and the Treasury, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, and Acting Commissioner of Social Security. IRS provided written comments that are summarized below and reprinted in appendix VI. IRS did not state whether it agreed or disagreed with our four recommendations but otherwise provided responses. Regarding our recommendation to develop a plan to mitigate risks with compliance activities due to the lack of accurate and complete TINs of U.S. account holders collected from FFIs (recommendation 1), IRS reiterated that it provided a transition period, through the end of 2019, for compliance with the TIN requirements for FFIs in countries with Model 1 IGAs with the United States. IRS also said that it continued to make progress on improving FATCA filing compliance, citing efforts such as initiating a campaign addressing FFIs that do not meet their compliance responsibilities. While these efforts may help IRS obtain more accurate and complete information from financial accounts, IRS did not specify how it will mitigate the ongoing hurdles it faces in matching accounts reported by FFIs without valid TINs to accounts reported by individual tax filers and ensure compliance. Regarding our recommendation that appropriate business units have access to consistent and complete data collected from Forms 8938 and tax returns filed by individuals (recommendation 2), IRS reiterated that RAAS has been working to obtain read-only access to the IPM database but that limited budgetary resources are delaying implementation. Enabling access to consistent and complete Form 8938 and tax return data would help IRS better target compliance initiatives and leverage limited available enforcement resources. While IRS continues to work on enabling access to IPM, it could still provide clear guidance to its business units for accessing Form 8938 and tax return data in IRS’s Compliance Data Warehouse, as we recommended. Regarding our recommendation to employ a comprehensive plan for managing efforts to leverage FATCA data in agency compliance efforts (recommendation 3), IRS said the resources that would be required to develop a comprehensive plan would be better spent on enforcement activities. While implementing enforcement activities could increase compliance with FATCA reporting requirements, it risks not maximizing the value of such efforts without a comprehensive plan to manage and address the myriad of challenges discussed in this report. Further, it is our belief that IRS’s failure to execute the FATCA roadmap is not justification for abandoning a strategic approach going forward. Regarding our recommendation to assess factors contributing to unnecessary Form 8938 reporting and take appropriate steps to address the issue (recommendation 4), IRS said it will continue to observe filings of Form 8938 and, to the extent that there are unnecessary filings, assess options to inform account holders to reduce reporting and filing burdens followed by appropriate steps to implement any selected options. Our analysis of available data indicates that many Forms 8938 may have been filed unnecessarily. Implementing our recommendation reduces the risk that taxpayers file—and IRS processes—forms unnecessarily. Treasury provided written comments but did not state whether it agreed or disagreed with our recommendation that it lead efforts, in coordination with State and SSA, to establish a formal means to collaboratively address ongoing issues that U.S. persons living abroad encounter from implementation of FATCA reporting requirements (recommendation 5). Treasury said it will work collaboratively with State and SSA to answer questions that Americans abroad have regarding their tax obligations and, where appropriate, to direct U.S. citizens to resources that will help them understand the procedures applied by SSA to apply for an SSN. However, Treasury said it is not the appropriate agency to lead coordination efforts involving foreign employment issues and issues regarding access to foreign financial services and obtaining SSNs. As we noted above, Treasury is ultimately responsible for effective administration of FATCA. As such, it is in a better position than State or SSA to adjust regulations and guidance implementing FATCA to address burdens FFIs and foreign employers face from FATCA implementation while ensuring tax compliance. Additionally, Treasury has an interest in helping U.S. persons receive valid SSNs from SSA in a timely manner to meet their tax obligations. Treasury’s written response is reprinted in appendix VII. State and SSA also provided written comments in which they concurred with our recommendations to establish a formal means to address collaboratively together with Treasury ongoing issues that U.S. persons living abroad encounter with FATCA (recommendations 6 and 7). State and SSA’s written comments are reprinted in appendices VIII and IX, respectively. Treasury, State, and SSA provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees, the Secretaries of State and the Treasury, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, and other interested parties. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-9110 or mctiguej@gao.gov. Contact points for our offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs are on the last page of this report. GAO staff who contributed to this report are listed in appendix X. The objectives of this report are to (1) assess the Internal Revenue Service’s (IRS) efforts to use information collected under the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) to improve taxpayer compliance; (2) examine available foreign financial asset reports submitted by U.S. persons, including submissions that were below required filing thresholds; (3) examine the extent to which the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) administers overlapping reporting requirements on foreign financial assets; (4) describe similarities and differences between FATCA and Common Reporting Standard (CRS) reporting requirements; and (5) examine the effects of FATCA implementation that are unique to U.S. persons living abroad. For our first objective, we reviewed Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration reports and collected information from Treasury and IRS to summarize efforts to collect complete and valid Taxpayer Identification Numbers (TIN) from foreign financial institutions (FFI). We identified criteria from our prior work identifying key practices for risk management. The key practices are derived from the Software Engineering Institute’s Capability Maturity Model® Integration for Development and Office of Management and Budget guidance. We applied these criteria to assess steps IRS has taken to manage risks in not receiving complete and valid TIN information from FFIs. We also applied criteria from our prior work on use of documented frameworks to IRS documentation on FATCA compliance activities to determine the extent to which IRS implemented a comprehensive plan to maximize use of collected data to enforce compliance with FATCA. For our second objective, we identified total maximum account values reported by individual filers of Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) Form 114s (commonly known as the Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts, or FBAR) in calendar years 2015 and 2016. See appendix III for more details on our methodology to evaluate these data. We also summarized the numbers of IRS Forms 8938, Statement of Specified Foreign Financial Assets (Form 8938) filed in tax year 2016, accounting for the data limitations described below. We also identified Forms 8938 filed in tax year 2016—the most recent year for which data were available—with available residency and asset information that reported specified foreign financial assets with aggregate values at or below end-of-year tax thresholds, which vary depending on the location of residence and filing status of such filers. For our third objective, we reviewed IRS and FinCEN documentation, and applied criteria from Fragmentation, Overlap, and Duplication: An Evaluation and Management Guide to identify the extent to which IRS and FinCEN were engaged in overlapping activities, and collecting duplicative information on foreign financial assets held by U.S. persons. We assessed the extent to which individual filers who submitted a Form 8938 in 2015 and 2016 also submitted an FBAR for the same year by determining the number and percentage of Forms 8938 with TINs that also match the TIN listed on the corresponding FBAR for the same year. For the three objectives described above, we assessed the reliability of data submitted on Forms 8938 filed by individuals for tax years 2015 and 2016, the most recent data available. These data were extracted from IRS’s Individual Return Transaction File (IRTF) and Modernized Tax Return Database (MTRDB) through IRS’s Compliance Data Warehouse (CDW). We also assessed the reliability of data from FBARs for calendar years 2015 and 2016 by (1) reviewing documentation about the data and the systems that produced them; (2) conducting electronic tests, such as identifying data with significant numbers of missing Form 8938 or FBAR records, or values of foreign financial assets reported outside an expected range; (3) tracing selections or random samples of data to source documents; and (4) interviewing IRS and FinCEN officials knowledgeable about the data. We also reviewed Form 8938 and relevant parent tax return data stored in IRS databases to determine whether IRS management is using quality information collected from Forms 8938 to achieve its objectives, as defined in our Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government. We determined that data extracted from IRTF on characteristics of Form 8938 filers and from FBAR filings was sufficiently reliable for our purposes, subject to caveats identified in this report. However, we determined we could not obtain complete data on foreign financial assets reported on Forms 8938 filed on paper. For our fourth objective, we reviewed model international agreements and other documentation, and interviewed officials from Treasury, IRS, and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development to compare and contrast FATCA and CRS reporting requirements. We also used the collected information to identify what changes, if any, the United States and other countries could implement to align FATCA and CRS reporting requirements. For our fifth objective, we collected documentation and conducted focus groups and semi-structured interviews with 21 U.S. persons living abroad that were subject to FATCA reporting requirements. We also conducted focus groups and interviews with tax practitioners, banking and CPA organizations, government agencies, advocacy groups representing Americans living abroad, and other organizations from the United States and five other countries (Canada, Japan, Singapore, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom). We selected these countries based on geography, relatively high numbers of U.S. expatriates and Form 8938 filers, tax information sharing agreements, and other tax treaties with the United States. The findings from the focus groups and interviews are not generalizable to other U.S. persons, tax practitioners or organizations, but were selected to represent the viewpoints of U.S. persons, FFIs, and host country tax authorities required to transmit information on foreign accounts and other specified foreign financial assets to IRS. We conducted a thematic analysis of the focus groups and interviews, and reviewed cables from U.S. embassies to identify the unique effects of FATCA implementation on U.S. persons living abroad. We collected documentation from and interviewed Treasury, IRS, Department of State, and Social Security Administration officials on steps to monitor and mitigate such effects. We also identified criteria from our prior work on key practices to enhance and sustain interagency collaboration and mechanisms to facilitate coordination. We applied the criteria to agencies’ collaborative efforts addressing issues U.S. persons living abroad faced from FATCA’s implementation, and identified the extent to which agencies established effective collaborative mechanisms to identify, assess, and implement cross-agency solutions to such issues. We conducted this performance audit from August 2017 to April 2019 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. The following IRS databases store data collected from individuals’ electronic and paper filings of Forms 8938 and/or elements of individual parent tax returns—the filer’s address and filing status—used to determine specified reporting thresholds for Form 8938 filers: Individual Master File (IMF), which serves as IRS’s system for processing individual taxpayer account data. Using this system, accounts are updated, taxes are assessed, and refunds are generated as required during each tax-filing period. Individual Returns Transaction File (IRTF), which stores edited, transcribed, and error-corrected data from the Form 1040 series and related forms for the current processing year and two prior years. Modernized Tax Return Database (MTRDB), which serves as the official repository of all electronic returns processed through IRS’s Modernized e-File system. Tax return data is stored immediately after returns are processed. International Compliance Management Model (ICMM)-FATCA International Returns (ICMM-FIR), which collects, parses, and stores data from incoming form reports–such as Forms 8938 and 8966–into the FATCA Database (FDB), which serves as the repository where ICMM-FIR stores data and from which downstream applications can pull data. Integrated Production Model (IPM), which is a downstream data repository that houses IMF data, information returns, and other data. According to IRS officials, data from IPM are consolidated and made available to a variety of downstream, security certified, systems for use in conducive analysis, case selection, and report preparation. Additionally, data from these and other IRS databases are copied to IRS’s Compliance Data Warehouse (CDW) periodically, which captures data from multiple production systems and organizes the data in a way that is conductive to analysis. Table 6 highlights several problems with the consistency and completeness of Form 8938 and relevant parent tax return data stored across the listed databases. Inconsistent and incomplete data on address and filing status of Form 8938 filers: As noted above, elements of parent tax returns— specifically the filer’s country of residence and filing status—are used to determine specified reporting thresholds for Form 8938 filers. However, IRTF and MTRDB have inconsistent and incomplete data on addresses linked to Form 8938 filers, and report inconsistent numbers of Forms 8938 filed from a U.S. residence. For example, the variable identified as containing data on foreign countries of residence in IRTF shows approximately 8,100 foreign filers in tax years 2015 and 2016, whereas a similar variable in MTRDB shows approximately 89,000 foreign filers for those same years. Additionally, FDB does not contain country codes from paper filings of Form 8938. ICCM-FIR stores information from some elements from parent tax returns—such as TINs and document locator numbers. According to IRS officials, however, ICMM-FIR lacks data on country codes and filing status of Form 8938 filers. IRS officials said that ICMM-FIR was not designed or intended to store data on Form 8938 filers; rather, it was designed to be a database for use in comparing Form 8938 and 8966 data. In general, IRS officials indicated that they would like to adjust the way ICMM-FIR stores data, but that would require modifying the way the database was established. Incomplete data on assets reported on Forms 8938: MTRDB contains detailed information on specified foreign financial assets submitted on electronic filings of Form 8938 and the country code from which the Form 8938 was filed. IRS officials said it is not designed to store information submitted on paper filings of Forms 8938 and parent tax returns. IRS officials said that while IMF processes information transcribed from individual income tax returns, there is no requirement to cross-reference information from the tax return with information submitted with an accompanying Form 8938. Additionally, while IRS officials told us that IRTF is the authoritative source for filers of Form 8938, it does not store account and other asset information submitted from Forms 8938. When asked whether there is any move to store account and other asset information collected from Forms 8938 into IRTF, IRS officials said that the decision on what returns or portions of returns are transcribed are subject to resource constraints and are prioritized from year to year. Table 7 shows that more than 900,000 individuals filed Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) Form 114s (commonly known as the Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts, or FBAR) in calendar years 2015 and 2016, and declared total maximum values of accounts ranging from about $1.5 trillion to more than $2 trillion each year. We are providing a range of estimates because we found a large number of filings made potentially in error. In some cases, for instance, FBAR filers reported more than $100 trillion in foreign financial accounts. We assume many of these filings are likely made in error, but have only limited means to determine which filings have errors, and which filings have accurate information. Because we cannot independently verify the accuracy of all self-reported FBAR data, we decided to present a range of data with (1) a lower bound discarding all FBAR filings reporting total values of reported foreign financial accounts at or above $1 billion; and (2) an upper bound discarding all filings reporting total values of such accounts at or above $5 billion. Table 2 excludes amended and duplicated FBAR filings. This table also excludes FBAR filings that reported a financial interest in 25 or more financial accounts, but reported total maximum account values of $0 from parts II and III of the FBAR. Although we identified problems with the data, we determined they were reliable enough to provide an estimated range of asset values to report the scale of foreign financial accounts held by U.S. persons. Table 8 shows a detailed breakdown of 2015 and 2016 FBAR filings by residence and categories of total maximum account values reported on the FBARs. Appendix IV: Detailed Comparison of Individual Foreign Financial Asset Reporting Requirements 26 U.S.C. § 6038D; 26 C.F.R. §§ 1.6038D-1 to 1.6038D-8. 26 C.F.R. § 1.6038D-2. Filers in this category include those who identify as single, married filing separately, “head of household,” or “qualifying widow(er).” Includes maximum value of specified foreign financial assets (Form 8938) or maximum value of financial accounts maintained by a financial institution physically located in a foreign country (FBAR). Under FATCA, any income, gains, losses, deductions, credits, gross proceeds, or distributions from holding or disposing of the account are or would be required to be reported, included, or otherwise reflected on a person’s income tax return. Under FBAR reporting requirements, a person has signature or other authority if he or she has the authority (alone or in conjunction with another) to control the disposition of money, funds or other assets held in a financial account by direct communication (whether in writing or otherwise) to the person with whom the financial account is maintained. The account itself is subject to reporting, but the contents of the account do not have to be separately reported. In addition to the contact named above, Brian James (Assistant Director), Mark Ryan (Analyst-in-Charge), Ariana Graham, George Guttman, Krista Loose, Daniel Mahoney, Cynthia Saunders, A.J. Stephens, and Elwood White made key contributions to this report. Michael John Bechetti, Ted Burik, and Jacqueline Chapin also provided assistance.

 

 Report 2:
This report provides background information and potential oversight issues for Congress on war-related and other international emergency or contingency-designated funding since FY2001. Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Congress has appropriated approximately $2 trillion in discretionary budget authority designated for emergencies or OCO/GWOT in support of the broad U.S. government response to the 9/11 attacks and for other related international affairs activities. This figure includes $1.8 trillion for the Department of Defense (DOD), $154 billion for the Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and $3 billion for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Coast Guard (see Figure 1 ). This CRS report is meant to serve as a reference on certain funding designated as emergency requirement s or for Overseas Contingency Ope rations/Global War on Terrorism (OCO/GWOT), as well as related budgetary and policy issues. It does not provide an estimate of war costs within the OCO/GWOT account (all of which may not be for activities associated with war or defense) or such costs in the DOD base budget or other agency funding (which may be related to war activities, such as the cost of health care for combat veterans). For additional information on the FY2019 budget and related issues, see CRS Report R45202, The Federal Budget: Overview and Issues for FY2019 and Beyond , by [author name scrubbed]; CRS In Focus IF10942, FY2019 National Defense Authorization Act: An Overview of H.R. 5515 , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]; and CRS Report R45168, Department of State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs: FY2019 Budget and Appropriations , by [author name scrubbed], [author name scrubbed], and [author name scrubbed]. For additional information on the Budget Control Act as amended, see CRS Report R44874, The Budget Control Act: Frequently Asked Questions , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed], and CRS Report R44039, The Defense Budget and the Budget Control Act: Frequently Asked Questions , by [author name scrubbed]. For additional information on U.S. policy in Afghanistan and the Middle East, see CRS Report R45122, Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy , by [author name scrubbed], CRS Report R45096, Iraq: Issues in the 115th Congress , by [author name scrubbed], and CRS Report RL33487, Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response , coordinated by [author name scrubbed]. Congress may consider one or more supplemental appropriations bills (colloquially called supplementals) for a fiscal year to provide funding for unforeseen needs (such as a response to a national security threat or a natural disaster), or to increase appropriations for other activities that have already been funded. Supplemental appropriations measures generally provide additional funding for selected activities over and above the amount provided through annual or continuing appropriations. Throughout the 20 th century, Congress relied on supplemental appropriations to fund war-related activities, particularly in the period immediately following the start of hostilities. For example, in 1951, a year after the start of the Korean War, Congress approved DOD supplemental appropriations totaling $32.8 billion ($268 billion in constant FY2019 dollars). In 1952, DOD supplemental appropriations totaled just $1.4 billion ($11 billion in constant FY2019), as the base budget incorporated costs related to the war effort. A similar pattern occurred, to varying degrees, during the Vietnam War and 1990-1991 Gulf War. During the post-9/11 conflicts, primarily conducted in Afghanistan and Iraq but also in other countries, Congress has, for an extended period and to a much greater degree than in previous conflicts in the 20 th century, appropriated supplemental and specially designated funding over and above the base DOD budget—that is, funding for planned or regularly occurring costs to man, train, and equip the military force. Since FY2001, DOD funding designated for OCO/GWOT has averaged 17% of the department's total budget authority (see Figure 2 ). By comparison, during the conflict in Vietnam—the only other to last more than a decade—DOD funding designated for non-base activities averaged 6% of the department's total budget authority. Supplemental appropriations can provide flexibility for policymakers to address demands that arise after funding has been appropriated. However, that flexibility has caused some to question whether supplementals should only be used to respond to unforeseen events, or whether they should also provide funding for activities that could reasonably be covered in regular appropriations acts. Congress used supplemental appropriations to provide funds for defense and foreign affairs activities related to operations in Afghanistan and Iraq following 9/11, and each subsequent fiscal year through FY2010. Initially understood as reflecting needs that were not anticipated during the regular appropriations cycle, supplemental appropriations were generally enacted as requested, and almost always designated as emergency requirements. Beginning in FY2004, DOD received some of its war-related funding in its regular annual appropriations; these funds were designated as emergency. When funding needs for war and non-war-related activities were higher than anticipated, the Bush Administration submitted supplemental requests. In the FY2011 appropriations cycle, the Obama Administration moved away from submitting supplemental appropriations requests to Congress for war-related activities and used the regular budget and appropriation process to fund operations. This approach implied that while the funds might be war-related, they largely supported predictable ongoing activities rather than unanticipated needs. In concert with this change in budgetary approach, the Obama Administration began formally using the term Overseas Contingency Op erations in place of the Bush Administration's term Global War on Terror . Both the Obama and Trump Administrations requested that OCO funding be designated in a manner that would effectively exempt such funding from the BCA limits on discretionary defense spending. Currently, there is no overall procedural or statutory limit on the amount of emergency or OCO/GWOT-designated spending that may be appropriated on an annual basis. Both Congress and the President have roles in determining how much emergency or OCO/GWOT spending is provided to federal agencies each fiscal year. Such spending must be designated as such within the President's budget request for congressional consideration. The President must separately designate the spending after Congress enacts appropriations for it to be available for expenditure. The emergency funding designation predated the OCO/GWOT designation. Through definitions statutorily established by the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (BBEDCA; P.L. 99-177 ), spending designated as emergency requirements is for "unanticipated" purposes, such as those that are "sudden ... urgent ... unforeseen ... and temporary." The BBEDCA does not further specify the types of activities that are eligible for that designation. Thus, any discretionary funding designated by Congress and the President as being for an emergency is effectively exempted from certain statutory and procedural budget enforcement mechanisms, such as the BCA limits on discretionary spending. Debate of what should constitute OCO/GWOT or emergency activities and expenses has shifted over time, reflecting differing viewpoints about the extent, nature, and duration of U.S. military operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and elsewhere. Over the years, both Congress and the President have at times adopted more, and at times less, expansive definitions of such designations to accommodate the strategic, budgetary, and political needs of the moment. Prior to February 2009, U.S. operations in response to the 9/11 attacks were collectively referred to as the Global War on Terror , or GWOT. Between September 2001 and February 2009, there was no separate budgetary designation for GWOT funds—instead, funding associated with those operations was designated as an emergency requirement. The term OCO was not applied to the post-9/11 military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan until 2009. In February 2009, the Obama Administration released A New Era of Responsibili ty: Renewing America's Promise , a presidential fiscal policy document. That document did not mention or reference GWOT; instead, it used the term OCO in reference to ongoing military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The first request for emergency funding for OCO—not GWOT—was delivered to Congress in April 2009. Since the FY2010 budget cycle, DOD has requested both base budget and OCO funding as part of its annual budget submission to Congress. Beginning with the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (NDAA; P.L. 111-84 ), the annual defense authorization bills have referenced the authorization of additional appropriations for OCO rather than the names of U.S. military operations conducted primarily in Afghanistan and Iraq. In 2011, the BCA ( P.L. 112-125 ) amended the BBEDCA to create the Overseas Contingency Ope rations/Global War on Terrorism designation, which provided Congress and the President with an alternate way to exempt funding from the BCA caps without using the emergency designation. Beginning with the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012 ( P.L. 112-74 ), annual appropriations bills have referenced the OCO/GWOT designation. The foreign affairs agencies began formally requesting OCO/GWOT funding in FY2012, distinguishing between what is referred to as enduring, ongoing or base costs versus any extraordinary, temporary costs of the State Department and USAID in supporting ongoing U.S. operations and policies in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. Congress, having used OCO/GWOT exemption for DOD, adopted this approach for foreign affairs, though its uses for State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs (SFOPS) activities have never been permanently defined in statute. For the first foreign affairs OCO/GWOT appropriation, in FY2012, funds were provided for a wide range of recipient countries beyond the countries in the President's request, including Yemen, Somalia, Kenya, and the Philippines. In addition to country-specific uses, OCO/GWOT-designated funds were also appropriated for the Global Security Contingency Fund. All budgetary legislation is subject to a set of enforcement procedures associated with the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 ( P.L. 93-344 ), as well as other rules, such as those imposed by the Budget Control Act of 2011 ( P.L. 112-125 ) as amended. Those rules provide mechanisms to enforce both procedural and statutory limits on discretionary spending. Enacted on August 2, 2011, the BCA as amended sets limits on defense and nondefense spending. As part of an agreement to increase the statutory limit on public debt, the BCA aimed to reduce annual federal budget deficits by a total of at least $2.1 trillion from FY2012 through FY2021, with approximately half of the savings to come from defense. The spending limits (or caps ) apply separately to defense and nondefense discretionary budget authority. The caps are enforced by a mechanism called sequestration . Sequestration automatically cancels previously enacted appropriations (a form of budget authority) by an amount necessary to reach prespecified levels. The BCA effectively exempted certain types of discretionary spending from the statutory limits, including funding designated for OCO/GWOT. As a result, Congress and the President have designated funding for OCO to support activities that, in previous times, had been funded within the base budget. This was done, in part, as a response to the discretionary spending limits enacted by the BCA. By designating funding for OCO for certain activities not directly related to contingency operations, Congress and the President can effectively continue to increase topline defense, foreign affairs, and other related discretionary spending without triggering sequestration. Congress has repeatedly amended the legislation to raise the spending limits (thus lowering its deficit-reduction effect by corresponding amounts). Congress has passed four bills that revised the automatic spending caps initially established by the BCA, including the following: American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 (ATRA; P.L. 112-240 ); Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013 (BBA 2013; P.L. 113-67 ); Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015 (BBA 2015; P.L. 114-74 ); and Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (BBA 2018; P.L. 115-123 ). On February 9, 2018, three days before President Donald Trump submitted his FY2019 budget request, Congress passed the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (BBA 2018, P.L. 115-123 ). The act raised the discretionary spending limits set by the BCA from $1.069 trillion for FY2017 to $1.208 trillion for FY2018 and to $1.244 trillion for FY2019. The BBA 2018 increased FY2019 discretionary defense funding levels (excluding OCO) by the largest amounts to date—$85 billion, from $562 billion to $647 billion, and nondefense funding (including SFOPS) by $68 billion, from $529 billion to $597 billion. It did not change discretionary spending limits for FY2020 and FY2021. DOD documents indicate the department in recent years has used OCO funding for activities viewed as unrelated to war. For example, the department's FY2019 budget request estimates $358 billion in OCO funding from FY2015 through FY2019. Of that amount, DOD categorizes $68 billion (19%) for activities unrelated to operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria. These activities are described as "EDI/Non-War," referring in part to the European Deterrence Initiative, and "Base-to-OCO," referring to OCO funding used for base-budget requirements. Similarly, a DOD Cost of War report from June 2018 shows $1.8 trillion in war-related appropriations from FY2001 through FY2018 for operations primarily conducted in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria. Of that total, DOD categorizes $219 billion (12%) as other than "war funds." These funds are described as "Classified," "Modularity," "Fuel (non-war)," "Noble Eagle (Base)," and "Non-War." International affairs agencies also began increasing the share of their budgets designated for OCO, and applying the designation to an increasing range of activities apparently unrelated to conflicts. OCO as a share of the international affairs budget grew from about 21% in FY2012 to nearly 35% in FY2017. Unlike DOD, however, the State Department and USAID have not specified whether any OCO-designated funds are considered part of the agencies' base budgets. According to a DOD budget document from FY2016, the Obama Administration planned to "transition all enduring costs currently funded in the OCO budget to the base budget beginning in 2017 and ending by 2020." The plan was to describe "which OCO costs should endure as the United States shifts from major combat operations, how the Administration will budget for the uncertainty surrounding unforeseen future crises, and the implications for the base budgets of DOD, the Intelligence Community, and State/OIP. This transition will not be possible if the sequester-level discretionary spending caps remain in place." The BCA remained in effect and OCO funding was used for base-budget requirements. Some defense officials and policymakers say OCO funding enables a flexible and timely response to an emergency or contingency and provides a political and fiscal safety valve to the BCA caps and threat of sequestration. They say if OCO funding were not used in such a manner and discretionary spending limits remained in place, DOD and other federal agencies would be forced to cut base budgets and revise strategic priorities. For example, former Defense Secretary Jim Mattis has said if Congress allows the FY2020 and FY2021 defense spending caps to take effect, the 2018 National Defense Strategy, which calls for the United States to bolster its military advantage against potential competitors such as Russia and China, "is not sustainable." Critics, including Acting White House Chief of Staff Mick Mulvaney, have described the OCO account as a "slush fund" for military and foreign affairs spending unrelated to contingency operations. Mulvaney, former director of the White House Office of Management and Budget (OMB), has described the use of OCO funding for base budget requirements as "budget gimmicks." Critics argue what was once generally restricted to a fund for replacing combat losses of equipment, resupplying expended munitions, transporting troops to and through war zones, and distributing foreign aid to frontline states has "ballooned into an ambiguous part of the budget to which government financiers increasingly turn to pay for other, at times unrelated, costs." OMB criteria for OCO funding include the combat losses of ground vehicles, aircraft, and other equipment; replenishment of munitions expended in combat operations; facilities and infrastructure in the theater of operations; transport of personnel, equipment, and supplies to and from the theater; among other items and activities. Determining which activities are directly related, tangentially related, or unrelated to war operations is often a point of debate. Some have questioned the use of OCO funding to purchase F-35 fighter jets: "It is jumping the shark.... There's no pretense that it has anything to do with the region." Others have argued it makes sense for the military to use OCO funding to purchase new aircraft to replace planes used in current conflicts and no longer in production: "What are the conditions that are making the combatant commanders and those with train/equip authority to say, 'We need more of this?'" Congress has appropriated approximately $2 trillion in discretionary budget authority for war-related and other international emergency or contingency-designated activities since 9/11. This figure is a CRS estimate of funding designated for emergencies or OCO/GWOT in support of the broad U.S. government response to the 9/11 attacks, as well as other foreign affairs activities, from FY2001 through FY2019. This includes $1.8 trillion for DOD, $154 billion for the Department of State and USAID, and $3 billion for DHS and the Coast Guard (see Table 1 ). These figures do not include emergency-designated funding appropriated in this period for domestic programs, such as disaster response. From FY2001 through FY2009, DOD received $1.8 trillion in appropriations for OCO/GWOT, or approximately 17% of the department's total discretionary budget authority of $10.8 trillion during the period. The department's OCO/GWOT funding peaked in FY2008 both in terms of nominal dollars, at $186.9 billion, and as a share of its discretionary budget, at 28.1% (see Figure 3 ), after the Bush Administration surged additional U.S. military personnel to Iraq. The department's OCO funding also increased as a share of its discretionary spending from FY2009 to FY2010 following the Obama Administration's deployment of more U.S. military personnel to Afghanistan, and again in FY2017 following enactment of legislation in response to the Trump Administration's request for additional appropriations. In FY2019, the department's OCO/GWOT funding totaled $68.8 billion, or 10% of its discretionary spending. In terms of appropriations titles, more than two-thirds of OCO/GWOT funding since FY2001 has been for Operation and Maintenance (O&M)—nearly double the percentage of base budget funding for O&M over the same period (see Figure 4 ). O&M funds pay for the operating costs of the military such as fuel, maintenance to repair facilities and equipment, and the mobilization of forces. DOD describes "war-related operational costs" as operations, training, overseas facilities and base support, equipment maintenance, communications, and replacement of combat losses and enhancements. In terms of the military services, more than half (55%) of OCO/GWOT funding since FY2001 has gone to the Army—more than double the percentage of base budget funding for the service during this period (see Figure 5 ). Emergency appropriations were initially provided as general "defense-wide" appropriations. Beginning in FY2003, as operations evolved and planning developed, allocations increased and were specifically provided for the services. OCO funding for DOD has not decreased at the same rate as the number of U.S. troops in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria has decreased. For example, the number of U.S. military personnel in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria decreased from a peak of 187,000 personnel in FY2008 (including 148,000 in Iraq and 39,000 in Afghanistan) to an assumed level of nearly 18,000 personnel in FY2019 (including 11,958 personnel in Afghanistan and 5,765 personnel in Iraq and Syria)—a decline of approximately 169,000 personnel (90%). Meanwhile, OCO funding decreased from a peak of $187 billion in FY2008 to $69 billion in FY2019—a decline of approximately $118 billion (63%). While the number of U.S. forces in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria has decreased since FY2009, the number of U.S. troops deployed or stationed elsewhere to support those personnel has fallen by a lesser degree and, in recent years, remained relatively steady. For example, the number of support forces—that is, personnel from units and forces operating outside of Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and other countries (including those stationed in the continental United States or otherwise mobilized) decreased from 112,000 personnel in FY2009 to an assumed level of 76,073 personnel in FY2019—a decline of 35,927 personnel (32%). In addition, when these support forces are combined with in-country force levels, the total force level decreases by a percentage more similar to the OCO budget, from 297,000 personnel in FY2009 to an assumed level of 93,796 personnel in FY2019—a decline of 203,204 personnel (68%) (see Figure 6 ). Some of these support forces serve in U.S. Central Command's area of responsibility, which includes 20 countries in West Asia, North Africa, and Central Asia, and whose forward headquarters is based in Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar. According to DOD, the reason OCO funding has not fallen in proportion to the number of U.S. troops in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria is "due to the fixed, and often inelastic, costs of infrastructure, support requirements, and in-theater presence to support contingency operations." For example, in FY2019, the department requested $20 billion in OCO funding for "in-theater support"—nearly 30% of the OCO request and more than any other functional category. However, some analysts have noted the U.S. military's fixed costs in Afghanistan remained relatively stable at roughly $7 billion a year from FY2005 through FY2013 until after the BCA went into effect—and have since increased to roughly $32 billion a year, suggesting "that roughly $25 billion in 'enduring' or base budget costs migrated into the Afghanistan budget, effectively circumventing the budget caps. The actual funding needed for operations in Afghanistan is roughly $20 billion in FY2019." Title 10, Section 101, of the United States Code, defines a contingency operation as any Secretary of Defense-designated military operation "in which members of the armed forces are or may become involved in military actions, operations, or hostilities against an enemy of the United States or against an opposing military force." Since the 1990s NATO intervention in the Balkans, DOD Financial Management Regulations (FMR) have defined contingency operations costs as those expenses necessary to cover incremental costs "that would not have been incurred had the contingency operation not been supported." Such incremental costs would not include, for example, base pay for troops or planned equipment modernization, as those expenditures are normal peacetime needs of the DOD. In September 2010, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), in collaboration with DOD, issued criteria for the department to use in making war/overseas contingency operations funding requests (see Appendix A ). In January 2017, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) concluded the criteria for deciding whether items belong in the base budget or OCO funding "are outdated and do not address the full scope of activities" in the budget request. "For example, they do not address geographic areas such as Syria and Libya, where DOD has begun military operations; DOD's deterrence and counterterrorism initiatives; or requests for OCO funding to support requirements not related to ongoing contingency operations" it states. Section 1524 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 ( P.L. 115-91 ), directed the Secretary of Defense to "update the guidelines regarding the budget items that may be covered by overseas contingency operations accounts." Congress has enacted legislation directing DOD to compile reports on the costs of certain contingency operations. Section 1266 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 ( P.L. 115-91 ) directs the Secretary of Defense to submit the Department of Defense Supplemental and Cost of War Execution report, known as the Cost of War report, on a quarterly basis to the congressional defense committees and the GAO: "Not later than 45 days after the end of each fiscal year quarter, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees and the Comptroller General of the United States the Department of Defense Supplemental and Cost of War Execution report for such fiscal year quarter." The conference report accompanying the Department of Defense and Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education Appropriations Act, 2019 and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2019 ( P.L. 115-245 ) requires DOD to report incremental costs for operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and other countries in the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility and directs: the Secretary of Defense to continue to report incremental costs for all named operations in the Central Command Area of Responsibility on a quarterly basis and to submit, also on a quarterly basis, commitment, obligation, and expenditure data for the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund, the Counter-Islamic State of Iraq and Syria Train and Equip Fund, and for all security cooperation programs funded under the Defense Security Cooperation Agency in the Operation and Maintenance, Defense-Wide Account. DOD's June 2018 Cost of War report to Congress details $1.5 trillion in obligations associated with certain contingency operations from FY2001 through FY2018. That figure includes $757.1 billion for those conducted primarily in Iraq—Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), Operation New Dawn (OND), and Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR); $727.7 billion for those conducted primarily in Afghanistan—Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Freedom's Sentinel (OFS); and $27.8 billion for those conducted primarily in the United States (see Table 2 and Figure 7 ). DOD's quarterly Cost of War reports are intended to provide Congress, GAO, and other stakeholders insight into the how the department obligates war-related appropriations. The reports include base and OCO obligations related to war activities, as well as obligation data broken down by certain major operations, service, component, agency, and appropriation. However, as GAO has noted, "the proportion of OCO appropriations not associated with specific operations identified in the statutory Cost of War reporting requirement has trended upward" in part because the criteria DOD uses for making OCO funding requests is outdated and not always used. More recently, the June 2018 Cost of War report does not appear to reference three recently classified overseas contingency operations targeting militants affiliated with al-Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS): Operation Yukon Journey in the Middle East, Northwest Africa Counterterrorism, and East Africa Counterterrorism. Some observers have noted other limitations to Cost of War reports, such as incomplete accounting of costs, limited distribution of the documents and underlying data, and formatting that makes it difficult to reconcile the data with information contained in budget justification documents. Between FY2001 and FY2018, Congress appropriated a total of $154 billion in OCO funds for State Department and USAID. For FY2018 (the most recent full-year appropriations for foreign affairs agencies), OCO funding amounted to 22% of the total appropriations for State Department, Foreign Operations and Related Programs appropriation. The Obama Administration's FY2012 International Affairs budget request was the first to include a request for OCO funds for "extraordinary and temporary costs of operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan." At the time, the Administration indicated that the use of this designation was intended to provide a transparent, whole-of-government approach to the exceptional war-related costs incurred in those three countries, thus better aligning the associated military and civilian costs. This first foreign affairs OCO request identified the significant resource demands placed on the State Department as a result of the transitions from military-led to civilian-led missions in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as the importance of a stable Pakistan for the U.S. effort in Afghanistan. The FY2012 foreign affairs OCO request included: for Iraq, funding for the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad, consulates throughout Iraq, security costs in light of the then-planned U.S. military withdrawal, a then-planned civilian-led Police Development and Criminal Justice Program, military and development assistance in Iraq, and oversight of U.S. foreign assistance through the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction; for Afghanistan, funding to strengthen the Afghan government and build institutional capacity, support State/USAID and other U.S. government agency civilians deployed in Afghanistan, provide short-term economic assistance to address counterinsurgency and stabilization efforts, and provide oversight of U.S. foreign assistance programs in Afghanistan through the Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction; and for Pakistan, funding to support U.S. diplomatic presence and diplomatic security in Pakistan, provide Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Funds (PCCF) to train and equip Pakistani forces to eliminate insurgent sanctuaries and promote stability and security in neighboring Afghanistan and the region. In subsequent years, the Administration designated certain State Department activities in Syria and other peacekeeping activities as OCO, and Congress accepted and broadened this expanded use of OCO in annual appropriations. In the FY2017 budget request, the Administration further broadened its use of State OCO funds, applying the designation to funds for countering Russian aggression, counterterrorism, humanitarian assistance, and aid to Africa. In addition to OCO funds requested through the normal appropriations process, the Administration in recent years requested emergency supplemental funding (designated as OCO) to support State/USAID efforts in countering the Islamic State and to respond to global health threats such as the Ebola and Zika viruses. For FY2019, the Trump Administration requested no OCO/GWOT funding for the Department of State and USAID, although the FY2019 House and Senate SFOPS bills ( H.R. 6385 and S. 3108 , 115 th Congress) would have appropriated approximately $8 billion in OCO-designated funding for various priorities. The estimated $154.1 billion in emergency and OCO/GWOT appropriations enacted to date for State/USAID includes major non-war-related programs, such as aid for the 2004 tsunami along Indian Ocean coasts, 2010 earthquake in Haiti, 2013 Ebola outbreak in West Africa, and 2015 worldwide outbreak of the Zika virus; as well as diplomatic operations (e.g., paying staff, providing security, and building and maintaining embassies). OCO/GWOT has also funded a variety of foreign aid programs, ranging from the Economic Support Fund to counter-narcotics in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq, among other activities in other countries. Figure 8 depicts the emergency or OCO appropriations for foreign affairs activities. Since 2012, when the OCO designation was first used for foreign affairs, more OCO funds have been appropriated than were requested each year, and those have also been authorized to be used in additional countries. Since January 2002, approximately $3 billion of post-9/11 emergency and OCO-designated funding has been provided to the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) for its traditional homeland security missions and for USCG operations in support of U.S. Navy activities. This funding has been provided at various times as either an appropriation to the Coast Guard's operating expenses accounts, or as a transfer from Navy accounts to the Coast Guard. Open-source information on the use of those funds has varied. One FY2009 supplemental appropriations request included funding as a transfer, with the intent of funding "Coast Guard operations in support of OIF and OEF, as well as other classified activities." The FY2017 OCO request for annual appropriations for Navy Operations and Maintenance included $163 million for Coast Guard operational support for the deployment of patrol boats to the Northern Arabian Gulf and a port security unit to Guantanamo Bay, among other pay and equipment expenses. The Trump Administration initially requested a total of $89 billion in OCO funding for FY2019. All the funding was requested by DOD. In an amendment to the budget after Congress raised the BCA spending caps as part of the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (BBA 2018; P.L. 115-123 ), the Administration removed the OCO designation from $20 billion of the funding, in effect, shifting that amount into the DOD base budget request. In a statement on the budget amendment, Mulvaney said the request fixes "long-time budget gimmicks" in which OCO funding has been used for base budget requirements. Beginning in FY2020, "the Administration proposes returning to OCO's original purpose by shifting certain costs funded in OCO to the base budget where they belong," he wrote. Of the revised amount of $69 billion requested for DOD OCO funding in FY2019: $46.3 billion (67%) was for Operation Freedom's Sentinel (OFS) in Afghanistan and related missions; $13 billion (22%) for Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR) in Iraq and Syria and related missions; $4.8 billion (9%) for the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) to boost the U.S. military presence in eastern Europe to deter Russian military aggression; and $0.9 billion (1%) for security cooperation (see Figure 9 ). The FY2019 OCO budget assumes a total force level (average annual troop strength) of 93,796 personnel. That figure includes: 11,958 primarily in Afghanistan (OFS); 5,765 primarily in Iraq and Syria (OIR); 59,463 for in-theater support; and 16,610 primarily in the continental United States (CONUS) or otherwise mobilized (see Figure 10 ). The number of personnel actually in-country or in-theater at any given time may exceed or fall below those assumed levels. The FY2019 force level assumes an increase of 3,153 personnel (3.5%) from the FY2018 assumed level, all of which is assumed for in-theater support. (For analysis of troop level and budget trends, see the section, " Trends in OCO Funding and Troop Levels ," earlier in this report.) As previously discussed, DOD acknowledges "OCO funding has not declined at the same rate as the in-country troop strength … due to the fixed, and often inelastic, costs of infrastructure, support requirements, and in-theater presence to support contingency operations." The departments lists the following as OCO cost drivers: In-theater support, including infrastructure costs like command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) and base operations for U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) locations; Persistent demand for combat support such as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets used to enhance force protection; Equipment reset, which lags troop level changes and procurement of contingency-focused assets like munitions, unmanned aerial vehicles and force protection capabilities that may not be linked directly to in-country operations; and International programs and deterrence activities, which are linked to U.S. engagement in contingency operations and support U.S. interests but are not directly proportional to U.S. troop presence. DOD also breaks down the FY2019 OCO budget request by functional category (see Table 3 ). By this measure, the largest portion of OCO funding was $20 billion for in-theater support, followed by operations and force protection (including the incremental cost of military operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and other countries), at $14.7 billion; and unspecified classified programs, at $9.9 billion. According to the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), approximately $47 billion (68%) of the FY2019 OCO budget request consists of enduring activities—that is, "those that would probably continue in the absence of overseas conflicts"—that could be funded in the DOD base budget. CBO associates enduring activities with the following DOD functional categories: in-theater support, classified programs, equipment reset and readiness, European Deterrence Initiative, security cooperation, and joint improvised-threat defeat. Executive Branch budget documents for FY2019 show differing projections for how much OCO would be apportioned over the Future Years Defense Program (also known as the FYDP, pronounced "fiddip," the five-year period from FY2019 through FY2023). For example, Table 1-11 in DOD's National Defense Budget Estimates for FY2019, citing OMB data, projects five-year OCO funding at $359 billion. However, Table 1-9 of the same document puts the figure at $149 billion after assuming a higher amount of OCO funding shifting into the base budget. According to OMB, the President's initial FY2019 budget request projected increasing caps on defense discretionary base budget authority by $84 billion (15%) to $660 billion in FY2020 and by $87 billion (15%) to $677 billion in FY2021. It also projected defense funding for Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) totaling $73 billion in FY2020 and $66 billion in FY2021. Thus, projected defense discretionary funding would total $733 billion in FY2020 and $743 billion in FY2021. FY2019 DOD budget documents show the same defense discretionary topline for FY2020 and FY2021. But they list an "Outyears Placeholder for OCO" of $20 billion in fiscal years FY2020-FY2023, and an "OCO to Base" amount of $53 billion in FY2020 and $45.8 billion in each year from FY2021-FY2023. The documents do not break down what accounts or activities are included in these amounts. The emergence of any new contingencies or conflicts would likely change DOD assumptions about OCO needs. Congress has appropriated a total of $68.8 billion for DOD OCO funding in FY2019, including the following amounts: $67.9 billion in defense funds provided in the Department of Defense and Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education Appropriations Act, 2019 and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2019 ( P.L. 115-245 ), which Congress passed on September 26, 2018; and $921 million in defense funds provided in the Energy and Water, Legislative Branch, and Military Construction and Veterans Affairs Appropriations Act, 2019 ( P.L. 115-244 ), which Congress passed on September, 21, 2018. For the Department of State and USAID, as well as the Department of Homeland Security and U.S. Coast Guard, FY2019 OCO levels have not yet been determined. They remain at prorated FY2018 levels because of continuing resolutions (CR) to fund certain agencies through December 21, 2018. The FY2019 House and Senate SFOPS bills ( H.R. 6385 and S. 3108 , 115 th Congress) would have appropriated approximately $8 billion in OCO-designated funding for various priorities. The House committee-reported version of the Homeland Security appropriations bill ( H.R. 6776 , 115 th Congress) would not have appropriated any OCO/GWOT funding for the Coast Guard, while the Senate committee-reported version of the bill ( S. 3109 , 115 th Congress) would have appropriated $165 million for OCO/GWOT funding for the Coast Guard. Any decision by the 116 th Congress to change discretionary defense and nondefense spending limits that remain in effect for FY2020 and FY2021 under the Budget Control Act (BCA; P.L. 112-25 ) could impact future OCO funding levels. Lawmakers may consider the following questions: Will Congress keep the BCA as is and rely on OCO funding that is not subject to the caps to meet agency requirements? Will Congress repeal the BCA and use less OCO funding? Will Congress amend the BCA limits for future years and continue to use OCO funding, as it has in the past? Will Congress significantly reduce DOD and international affairs funding to stay within the BCA caps and not use OCO funding? In a November 2018 report, the National Defense Strategy Commission, a bipartisan panel created by Congress, issued recommendations related to OCO and the BCA. Recommendation No. 24 states, "Congress should eliminate the final two years of caps under the BCA." Recommendation 29 states, "To better prepare for major-power competition, Congress should gradually integrate OCO spending back into the base Pentagon budget. This also requires a dollar-for-dollar increase in the BCA spending caps, should they remain in force, so that this transfer does not result in an overall spending cut." Both House and Senate FY2019 committee-reported appropriations bills from the 115 th Congress included about $8 billion in OCO funding for State/USAID. It remains to be seen if the 116 th Congress will pass this OCO level as requested or extend the continuing resolution. Congress could enact legislation to authorize and appropriate a level of base and OCO spending to meet current or revised discretionary defense spending caps in any number of ways. In FY2019 budget documents from OMB and DOD, the Trump Administration projected increasing defense spending in FY2020 and FY2021 beyond the statutory limits of the Budget Control Act of 2011 ( P.L. 112-25 ), but by differing amounts based on differing OCO projections. These figures serve as possible scenarios or options for Congress to consider. According to OMB budget documents, the President's initial FY2019 budget request projected $733 billion in defense discretionary spending in FY2020, including a base budget of $660 billion (which assumes an $84 billion, or 15%, increase in the BCA defense cap—or repeal of the legislation altogether) and an OCO defense budget of $73 billion (see Figure 11 ). According to DOD budget documents, the President's revised FY2019 budget request projected $733 billion in defense discretionary spending in FY2020, including a base budget of $713 billion (which assumes a $137 billion, or 24%, increase in the BCA defense cap—what would be the largest increase to the BCA defense caps yet—or repeal of the legislation altogether) and an OCO budget of $20 billion. Alternatively, assuming no change in the cap and congressional support for the Administration's projected $733 billion topline in FY2020, Congress could keep the BCA defense cap unchanged at $576 billion and designate an additional $157 billion for OCO. According to OMB budget documents, the President's initial FY2019 budget request projected $743 billion in defense discretionary spending in FY2021, including a base budget of $677 billion (which assumes an $87 billion, or 15%, increase in the BCA defense cap—or repeal of the legislation altogether) and an OCO budget of $66 billion (see Figure 11 ). According to DOD budget documents, the President's revised FY2019 budget request projected $743 billion in defense discretionary spending in FY2021, including a base budget of $723 billion (which assumes a $133 billion, or 23%, increase in the BCA defense cap—or repeal of the legislation altogether) and an OCO budget of $20 billion. Alternatively, assuming no change in the cap and congressional support for the Administration's projected $743 billion topline in FY2020, Congress could keep the BCA defense cap unchanged at $590 billion and designate an additional $153 billion for OCO. As previously discussed, these figures would change with different toplines for the national defense budget function (050). Former Defense Secretary Jim Mattis and the National Defense Strategy Commission have recommended that Congress increase the defense budget between 3% and 5% a year above inflation ("real growth") to meet U.S. strategic goals. President Donald Trump has said the discretionary defense spending request would total $700 billion in FY2020, a decrease of 2% in nominal terms from FY2019. Trump said, "We know what the budget—the new budget is for the Defense Department. It will probably be $700 billion." However, some media outlets have since reported that the President intends to request a discretionary defense budget of $750 billion in FY2020. Senator James Inhofe, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, and Representative Mac Thornberry, ranking member of the House Armed Services Committees in the 116 th Congress, have argued, "Any cut in the defense budget would be a senseless step backward." Thornberry has also said transferring recurring OCO costs into the regular budget "makes sense … it makes for more predictable budgeting, but it's all about what happens on the topline." Representative Adam Smith, chairman of the House Armed Services Committee in the 116 th Congress, has said of the defense budget: "I think the number is too high, and it's certainly not going to be there in the future … We've got a debt, we've got a deficit, we've got infrastructure problems, we've got healthcare, education—there's a whole lot that is necessary to make our country safe, secure, and prosperous." Acting Defense Secretary Patrick Shanahan has talked about a flat topline for national defense: "When you look at the $700 billion, it's not just for one year drop down, [or] a phase, it's a drop and then held constant" over the FYDP. Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer David Norquist, who is also performing the duties of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, at one time was reportedly preparing two budgets for FY2020—one assuming $733 billion for national defense and another assuming $700 billion. An analyst has noted "returning enduring OCO costs to the base budget, particularly a vast majority of those enduring costs over a short period as DOD has outlined, could significantly complicate an agreement between congressional Democrats and Republicans to increase both the defense and nondefense BCA budget caps for FY2020 and FY2021." As analyst noted, "OCO has become an even less-defined pot of money … Congress needs to properly question the DOD budget planners on the future of OCO." In a January 2017 report, GAO concluded, "Without a reliable estimate of DOD's enduring OCO costs, decision makers will not have a complete picture of the department's future funding needs or be able to make informed choices and trade-offs in budget formulation and decision making." The department states it has not fully estimated those costs in part because of the BCA. In a response to GAO, DOD wrote, "Developing reliable estimates of enduring OCO costs is an important first step to any future effort to transition enduring OCO costs to the base budget. In the context of such an effort, the Department would consider developing and reporting formal estimates of those costs. However, until there is sufficient relief from the budgetary caps established in the Budget Control Act of 2011, the Department will need OCO to finance counterterrorism operations, in particular [OFS] and [OIR]." In an October 2018 report, the Congressional Budget Office estimated OCO funding for DOD enduring activities—that is, those that would probably continue in the absence of overseas conflicts—totaled more than $50 billion a year (in 2019 dollars) from 2006 to 2018—and are projected to total about $47 billion a year starting in FY2020. This figure appears to be consistent with projections published by DOD. According to the department's FY2019 budget documents, DOD projected $53 billion for "OCO to Base" in FY2020 and $45.8 billion for "OCO to Base" for FY2021 through FY2023. Some analysts have concluded: Uncertainty created by current reliance on OCO, particularly to fund base budget needs, could be detrimental to national security on three levels: (a) by undermining budget controls and contributing thereby to larger deficits, (b) by generating insecurity in the defense workforce and in defense suppliers, and (c) by creating long-term uncertainty in defense planning. The alternative, transitioning longer-term OCO expenses to the base budget, could be achieved through a combination of increased budget caps, targeted cuts in inefficient Defense programs, and increased revenues. For example, a potential enduring activity in the OCO budget is the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI). It was previously known as the European Reassurance Initiative (ERI), an effort that began in June 2014 to increase the number of U.S. military personnel and prepositioned equipment in Central and Eastern Europe intended in part to reassure NATO allies after Russia's military seized Crimea. As some analysts have noted, "Because it is in the OCO part of the budget request, EDI funding does not include a projection for how much funding will be allocated in future years, which can create uncertainty in the minds of allies and adversaries alike about the U.S. military's commitment to the program." On the other hand, some contend that it is precisely EDI's flexibility that allows the commander of European Command to quickly respond to changing security and posture needs in Europe, and ensure that monies intended for European deterrence will not be redirected to other DOD priorities. In its November 2018 report, the National Defense Strategy Commission quoted the late military strategist Bernard Brodie, who wrote "strategy wears a dollar sign." The panel concluded that relying on OCO funding to increase the defense budget "is not the way to provide adequate and stable resources" for the type of great power competition outlined in the Secretary of Defense's 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS), which calls for the United States to bolster its competitive military advantage relative to threats posed by China and Russia: Because of budgetary constraints imposed by the BCA, lawmakers and the Department of Defense have increasingly relied upon the overseas contingency operations (OCO) fund to pay for warfighting operations in the greater Middle East, as well as other activities and initiatives. Yet this approach to resourcing has produced problems and distortions of its own. For one thing, the amount of money devoted to OCO since the BCA was enacted no longer corresponds to warfighting operations in the greater Middle East. Furthermore, such operations are no longer a top priority as articulated in the NDS. Finally, reorienting the military toward high-end competition and conflict will require new capabilities beyond the current program of record. OCO is not the way to provide adequate and stable resources for such a long-term endeavor, given its lack of predictability and the limitations on what OCO funds can be used to buy." Appendix A. Statutes, Guidance, and Regulations The designation of funding as emergency requirements or for Overseas Contingency Operations/Global War on Terrorism (OCO/GWOT) is governed by several statues as well as Office of Management and Budget (OMB) guidance and the Department of Defense (DOD) Financial Management Regulation (FMR). The Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act (BBEDCA) of 1985 BBEDCA, as amended, includes the statutory definitions of emergency and unanticipated as they relate to budget enforcement through sequestration. The act also allows for appropriations to be designated by Congress and the President as emergency requirements or for Overseas Contingency Operations/Global War on Terrorism . Such appropriations are effectively exempt from the statutory discretionary spending limits. Title 10, United States Code—Armed Forces 10 U.S.C. 101—Definitions Section 101 provides definitions of terms applicable to Title 10. While it does not define overseas contingency operations, it does include a definition of a contingency operations . Administration and Internal Guidance In addition to statutory requirements, the DOD and the Department of State are subject to guidance on OCO spending from the Administration. In October 2006 , under the Bush Administration, then-Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England directed the services to break with long-standing DOD regulatory policies and expand their request for supplemental funding to reflect incremental costs related to the "longer war on terror." There was no specific definition for the "longer war on terror," now one of the core missions of the DOD. In February 2009, at the beginning of the Obama Administration, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) issued updated budget guidance that required DOD to move some OCO costs back into the base budget. However, within six months of issuing the new criteria, officials waived restrictions related to pay and that would have prohibited end-strength growth. In a letter from OMB to the then-Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) Robert Hale, the agency characterized its 2009 criteria as "very successful" for delineating base and OCO spending but stated, "This update clarifies language, eliminates areas of confusion and provides guidance for areas previously unanticipated." GAO subsequently reported that the revised guidance significantly changed the criteria used to build the fiscal year 2010 OCO funding request by: specifying stricter definitions for repair and procurement of equipment; limiting applicability of OCO funds for RDT&E; excluding pay and allowances for end-strength above the level requested in the budget; excluding enduring family support initiatives; and excluding base realignment and closures (BRAC) amounts. OMB again revised its guidance in September 2010 following a number of GAO reports that had concluded DOD reporting on OCO costs was of "questionable reliability," due in part to imprecisely defined financial management regulations related to OCO spending. (as of September 9, 2010) Source: Letter from Steven M. Kosiak, Associate Director for Defense and Foreign Affairs, OMB, to Robert Hale, Under Secretary of Defense, Comptroller, "Revised War Funding Criteria," September 9, 2010. DOD Financial Management Regulations DOD incorporated the September 2010 OMB criteria for war costs into the Financial Management Regulation. Table 1 includes the general cost categories DOD uses in accounting for costs of contingency operations. Appendix B. Transfer Authorities, Special Purpose Accounts In addition to the supplemental appropriations and emergency or OCO/GWOT designation, the Department of Defense and the Department of State also have the authority to shift funds from one budget account to another in response to operational needs. For DOD, these transfers (sometimes called reprogramings ) are statutorily authorized by 10 U.S.C. 2214—Transfer of funds: procedures and limitations. This authority allows the Secretary of Defense to reallocate funds for higher priority items, based on unforeseen military requirements, after receiving written approval from the four congressional defense committees. DOD may also reprogram funds within an account from one activity to another, as long as the general purpose for the use of those funds remains unchanged. Specific limits to transfer or reprogramming authorities have also been added to these general authorities through provisions in annual defense authorization and appropriation acts. The FY2019 defense appropriations bill sets the base budget transfer cap at $4 billion and the OCO transfer cap at $2 billion. The Department of State's OCO transfer authority has been provided in appropriations acts and has specifically authorized the Administration to transfer OCO funds only to other OCO funds within Title VIII SFOPS appropriations, not between OCO and base accounts. The transfer authority is capped, specified by account, and requires regular congressional notification procedures. Overseas Contingency Operations Transfer Fund (OCOTF) The OCOTF was established for DOD in FY1997 as a no year transfer account (meaning amounts are available until expended) in order to provide additional flexibility to meet operational requirements. Transfers from the OCOTF are processed using existing reprogramming procedures. A quarterly report is submitted to the congressional oversight committees, documenting all transfers from the OCOTF to DOD components base budget accounts. Beginning in FY2002, funds to support Southwest Asia, Kosovo, and Bosnia contingency requirements were appropriated directly to DOD components' Operation and Maintenance (O&M) and Military Personnel accounts rather than to the OCOTF for later disbursement. FY2014 was the last year the Administration requested a direct appropriation to the OCOTF. Contingency Operations Funded in the DOD Base Budget As first mandated by section 8091 of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2008 ( P.L. 110-116 ), Congress has required DOD to provide separate annual budget justification documents detailing the costs of U.S. armed forces' participation in all named contingency operations where the total cost of the operation exceeds $100 million or is staffed by more than 1,000 U.S. military personnel. Funding for certain DOD contingency operations has been moved to the base budget request, and is no longer designated as emergency or OCO/GWOT requirements. This movement of funding from the OCO request to the base budget request typically occurs as the operational activities of an enduring contingency operation evolve over time and DOD determines that certain elements of the associated military operations have become stable enough to be planned, financed, and executed within the base budget. For example, funding for Operation Noble Eagle, which provides fighter aircraft on 24/7 alert at several U.S. military bases, was moved from the GWOT request to the base budget request in 2005. Contingency operations and other activities funded wholly or in part through DOD's base budget have included: NATO Operations in the Balkans . The U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force provide support to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization-led operations in the Balkans region. Most U.S. forces are deployed to Kosovo in support of the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR). A small number of U.S. personnel are deployed to the NATO headquarters in Sarajevo in Bosnia and Herzegovina; Joint Task Force - Bravo . U.S. forces support this task force, which operates from Soto Cano Air Base in Honduras and supports joint, combined, and interagency exercises and operations in Central America to counter the influence of transnational organized crime; carry out humanitarian assistance and disaster relief; and build military capacity with regional partners and allied nations to promote regional cooperation and security; Operation Juniper Shield. Previously known as Operation Enduring Freedom-Trans Sahara (OEF-TS), this operation supports efforts to defeat violent extremist organizations in East Africa. This operation also provides military-to-military engagement with partner African countries, as well as readiness for crisis response and evacuation of U.S. military, diplomatic, and civilian personnel; Operation Noble Eagle . This operation funds the continuing efforts to defend the United States from airborne attacks, maintain the sovereignty of the United States airspace, and defend critical U.S. facilities from potentially hostile threats or unconventional attacks; Operation Enduring Freedom- Horn of Africa . This operation was established to support efforts to defeat violent extremist organizations in East Africa; provide military-to-military engagement with partner African countries, as well as readiness for crisis response and evacuation of U.S. military, diplomatic, and civilian personnel throughout East Africa; Operation Enduring Freedom- Caribbean and Central America . A U.S. regional military operation initiated in 2008, under the operational control of Special Operations Command-South, this operation was established to focus on counterterrorism to support DOD's overall military objectives and the larger fight against terrorism. Operation Observant Compass . This operation was established to support the deployment of approximately 100 U.S. military personnel assisting the Ugandan People's Defense Force and neighboring partner African countries in countering the Lord's Resistance Army operations. Operation Spartan Shield. This operation was established to support ongoing U.S. Central Command missions. Other Congressionally Authorized Funds or Programs Through the OCO authorization and appropriation process, Congress has created numerous funds and programs that are designed to finance specific overseas contingency operations-related activities that do not fit into traditional budgetary accounts. Many of these funds and programs are supplied with amounts that are available until expended—however, authorization for the specified fund or program has an expiration date, thereby requiring further congressional action for reauthorization of affected funds or programs. Congress has also provided increased transfer authority to provide greater flexibility for U.S. government activities in situations that are typically unpredictable. Examples of these types of congressionally authorized OCO programs or funds have included: Afghan istan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) and Counter-ISIS Train and Equip Fund (CTEF) . These funds were established to provide funding and support for the training, equipping, and expansion of selected military and security forces in support of U.S. objectives; Counterterrorism Partnership s Fund . This fund was established to provide funding and support to partner nations engaged in counterterrorism and crisis response activities; Command er's Emergency Response Program. This program was established to support infrastructure improvements, such as road repair and construction and enable military commanders on the ground to respond to urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction needs by undertaking activities that will immediately aid local populations and assist U.S. forces in maintaining security gains; Joint Improvised Explosive Device (IEDs) Defeat Fund . This fund was established to coordinate and focus all counter-IED efforts, including ongoing research and development, throughout DOD. Due to the enduring nature of the threat, DOD began moving associated funding to the base budget in FY2010; Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicle (MRAP) Fund . This fund was intended to expedite the procurement and deployment of MRAPs to Iraq and Afghanistan; European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) . Initially the European Reassurance Initiative (ERI), this effort was established to provide funding and support to NATO allies and partners to "reassure allies of the U.S. commitment to their security and territorial integrity as members of the NATO Alliance, provide near-term flexibility and responsiveness to the evolving concerns of our allies and partners in Europe, especially Central and Eastern Europe, and help increase the capability and readiness of U.S. allies and partners;" Global Security Contingency Fund . This fund was established to provide funding for the Department of State and the Department of Defense "to facilitate an interagency approach to confronting security challenges;" Complex Crise s Fund . This fund was established to provide funding through the State Department and USAID "to help prevent crises and promote recovery in post-conflict situations during unforeseen political, social, or economic challenges that threaten regional security;" Migration and Refugee Assistance Fund . This fund was established to provide funding to respond to refugee crises in Africa, the Near East, South and Central Asia, and Europe and Eurasia; and Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative . This initiative was established to provide assistance, including training, equipment, lethal weapons, of a defensive nature; logistics support; supplies and services; sustainment; and intelligence support to the military and national security forces of Ukraine. This is an update to a report originally co-authored by [author name scrubbed], former CRS Specialist in Defense Readiness and Infrastructure. It references research previously compiled by [author name scrubbed], former CRS Specialist in U.S. Defense Policy and Budget; Christopher Mann, Analyst in Defense Policy and Trade; [author name scrubbed], Analyst in U.S. Defense Acquisition Policy; [author name scrubbed], CRS Specialist on Congress and the Legislative Process; and [author name scrubbed], CRS Analyst in Public Finance. [author name scrubbed], Research Assistant, helped compile the graphics.

Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 1.

Answer: Concerns over efforts by U.S. taxpayers to use offshore accounts to hide income or evade taxes contributed to the passage of FATCA in 2010, which sought to create greater transparency and accountability over offshore assets held by U.S. taxpayers. House Report 114-624 included a provision for GAO to evaluate FATCA implementation and determine the effects of FATCA on U.S. citizens living abroad. GAO—among other things—(1) assessed IRS's efforts to use FATCA-related information to improve taxpayer compliance; (2) examined the extent to which Treasury administers overlapping reporting requirements on financial assets held overseas; and (3) examined the effects of FATCA implementation unique to U.S. persons living abroad. GAO reviewed applicable documentation; analyzed tax data; and interviewed officials from IRS, other federal agencies and organizations, selected tax practitioners, and more than 20 U.S. persons living overseas. Data quality and management issues have limited the effectiveness of the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) efforts to improve taxpayer compliance using foreign financial asset data collected under the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA). Specifically, IRS has had difficulties matching the information reported by foreign financial institutions (FFI) with U.S. taxpayers' tax filings due to missing or inaccurate Taxpayer Identification Numbers provided by FFIs. Further, IRS lacks access to consistent and complete data on foreign financial assets and other data reported in tax filings by U.S. persons, in part, because some IRS databases do not store foreign asset data reported from paper filings. IRS has also stopped pursuing a comprehensive plan to leverage FATCA data to improve taxpayer compliance because, according to IRS officials, IRS moved away from updating broad strategy documents to focus on individual compliance campaigns. Ensuring access to consistent and complete data collected from U.S. persons—and employing a plan to leverage such data—would help IRS better leverage such campaigns and increase taxpayer compliance. Due to overlapping statutory reporting requirements, IRS and the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN)—both within the Department of the Treasury (Treasury)—collect duplicative foreign financial account and other asset information from U.S. persons. Consequently, in tax years 2015 and 2016, close to 75 percent of U.S. persons who reported information on foreign accounts and other assets on their tax returns also filed a separate form with FinCEN. The overlapping requirements increase the compliance burden on U.S. persons and add complexity that can create confusion, potentially resulting in inaccurate or unnecessary reporting. Modifying the statutes governing the requirements to allow for the sharing of FATCA information for the prevention and detection of financial crimes would eliminate the need for duplicative reporting. This is similar to other statutory allowances for IRS to disclose return information for other purposes, such as for determining Social Security income tax withholding. According to documents GAO reviewed, and focus groups and interviews GAO conducted, FFIs closed some U.S. persons' existing accounts or denied them opportunities to open new accounts after FATCA was enacted due to increased costs, and risks they pose under FATCA reporting requirements. According to Department of State (State) data, annual approvals of renunciations of U.S. citizenship increased from 1,601 to 4,449—or nearly 178 percent—from 2011 through 2016, attributable in part to the difficulties cited above. Treasury previously established joint strategies with State to address challenges U.S. persons faced in accessing foreign financial services. However, it lacks a collaborative mechanism to coordinate efforts with other agencies to address ongoing challenges in accessing such services or obtaining Social Security Numbers. Implementation of a formal means to collaboratively address burdens faced by Americans abroad from FATCA can help federal agencies develop more effective solutions to mitigate such burdens by monitoring and sharing information on such issues, and jointly developing and implementing steps to address them. GAO is making one matter for congressional consideration to address overlap in foreign asset reporting requirements. GAO is making seven recommendations to IRS and other agencies to enhance IRS's ability to leverage FATCA data to enforce compliance, address unnecessary reporting, and better collaborate to mitigate burdens on U.S. persons living abroad. State and Social Security Administration agreed with GAO's recommendations. Treasury and IRS neither agreed nor disagreed with GAO's recommendations.