You are given two reports by the government agency.  

Report 1:
The Federal Reserve's (the Fed's) responsibilities as the nation's central bank fall into four main categories: monetary policy, provision of emergency liquidity through the lender of last resort function, supervision of certain types of banks and other financial firms for safety and soundness, and provision of payment system services to financial firms and the government. Congress has delegated responsibility for monetary policy to the Fed, but retains oversight responsibilities to ensure that the Fed is adhering to its statutory mandate of "maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates." The Fed has defined stable prices as a longer-run goal of 2% inflation—the change in overall prices, as measured by the Personal Consumption Expenditures (PCE) price index. By contrast, the Fed states that "it would not be appropriate to specify a fixed goal for employment; rather, the Committee's policy decisions must be informed by assessments of the maximum level of employment, recognizing that such assessments are necessarily uncertain and subject to revision." Monetary policy can be used to stabilize business cycle fluctuations (alternating periods of economic expansions and recessions) in the short run, while it mainly affects inflation in the long run. The Fed's conventional tool for monetary policy is to target the federal funds rate —the overnight, interbank lending rate. This report provides an overview of how monetary policy works and recent developments, a summary of the Fed's actions following the financial crisis, and ends with a brief overview of the Fed's regulatory responsibilities. In December 2008, in the midst of the financial crisis and the "Great Recession," the Fed lowered the federal funds rate to a range of 0% to 0.25%. This was the first time rates were ever lowered to what is referred to as the zero lower bound . The recession ended in 2009, but as the economic recovery consistently proved weaker than expected in the years that followed, the Fed repeatedly pushed back its time frame for raising interest rates. As a result, the economic expansion was in its seventh year and the unemployment rate was already near the Fed's estimate of full employment when it began raising rates on December 16, 2015. This was a departure from past practice—in the previous two economic expansions, the Fed began raising rates within three years of the preceding recession ending. Since then, the Fed has continued to raise rates in a series of steps to incrementally tighten monetary policy. The Fed raised rates once in 2016, three times in 2017, and four times in 2018, by 0.25 percentage points each time. The Fed has stated that "some further gradual increases in ... the federal funds rate" are necessary to fulfill its mandate. The Fed describes its plans as "data dependent," meaning they would be altered if actual employment or inflation deviate from its forecast. Although monetary policy is now less stimulative than it had been at the zero lower bound, the Fed is still adding stimulus to the economy as long as the federal funds rate is below what economists call the "neutral rate" (or the long-run equilibrium rate). To illustrate, the federal funds rate is currently similar to the inflation rate, meaning that the real (i.e., inflation-adjusted) federal funds rate is around zero. However, there is uncertainty as to what constitutes a neutral rate today. By historical standards, a zero real interest rate would be well below the neutral rate, but the neutral rate appears to have fallen following the financial crisis, so that current rates may be close to the neutral rate today. Typically, the Fed keeps interest rates below the neutral rate when the economy is operating below full employment, at neutral levels when the economy is near full employment, and above the neutral rate when the economy is at risk of overheating. Indeed, the Fed identifies this as one of its "three key principles of good monetary policy." Because of lags between changes in interest rates and their economic effects, in the past, the Fed has often preemptively changed its monetary policy stance before the economy reaches the state that the Fed is anticipating. In this business cycle, the Fed has maintained a (progressively less) stimulative monetary policy throughout the expansion, boosting economic activity. In one sense, this policy could be viewed as having successfully delivered on the Fed's mandated goals of full employment and stable prices. The unemployment rate has been below 5% since 2015 and is now lower than the rate believed to be consistent with full employment. Other labor market measures are also consistent with full employment, with the possible exception of the still-low labor force participation rate. Economic theory posits that lower unemployment will lead to higher inflation in the short run, but inflation has not proven responsive to lower unemployment in recent years. After remaining persistently below the Fed's 2% target from mid-2012 to early 2018 as measured by core PCE, inflation has remained around 2% in 2018 as measured by headline or core PCE. Economic growth has also picked up beginning in the second quarter of 2017, after being persistently low by historical standards throughout the expansion. Contributing to the 2018 growth acceleration, a more expansionary fiscal policy (larger structural budget deficit) added more stimulus to the economy in the short run. Two notable policy changes contributing to fiscal stimulus in 2018 were the 2017 tax cuts ( P.L. 115-97 ) and the boost to discretionary spending in FY2018 and FY2019 agreed to in P.L. 115-123 . The Fed did little to offset this fiscal stimulus, as the pace of monetary tightening in 2018 was only slightly faster than in 2017. Despite strong economic data (which is only available with a lag), the Fed announced in January 2019 that it would be "patient" before raising rates again in light of increased economic uncertainty and financial volatility. The Fed's intended policy path poses risks. If the Fed waits too long to raise rates again, the economy could overheat, resulting in high inflation and posing risk to financial stability. As an example of how overly stimulative monetary policy can lead to the latter, critics contend that the Fed contributed to the precrisis housing bubble by keeping interest rates too low for too long during the economic recovery starting in 2001. Critics see these risks as outweighing any marginal benefit associated with monetary stimulus when the economy is already so close to full employment. Raising rates more quickly would also provide more "headroom" for the Fed to lower rates more aggressively during the next economic downturn. The potential percentage point reduction in rates before hitting the zero bound is currently smaller than the rate cuts that the Fed has undertaken in past recessions. Alternatively, there is uncertainty about whether strong growth, low unemployment, inflation around 2%, and the generally benign economic environment will continue. Economic expansions do not "die of old age"; nevertheless, the current expansion is already the second longest on record and cannot last forever. The flattening of the yield curve (i.e., long-term Treasury yields are similar to short-term Treasury yields) is seen by some as a warning signal that rates are too high. Although there is a risk of stimulative monetary policy causing the economy to overheat, there is also a risk that tightening too quickly could be harmful if the economy slows. Some critics would prefer clear evidence that inflation is above the Fed's target or financial conditions are unstable before the Fed raises rates again. Monetary policy refers to the actions the Fed undertakes to influence the availability and cost of money and credit to promote the goals mandated by Congress, a stable price level and maximum sustainable employment. Because the expectations of households as consumers and businesses as purchasers of capital goods exert an important influence on the major portion of spending in the United States, and because these expectations are influenced in important ways by the Fed's actions, a broader definition of monetary policy would include the directives, policies, statements, economic forecasts, and other Fed actions, especially those made by or associated with the chairman of its Board of Governors, who is the nation's central banker. The Fed's Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meets every six weeks to choose a federal funds target and sometimes meets on an ad hoc basis if it wants to change the target between regularly scheduled meetings. The FOMC is composed of the 7 Fed governors, the President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, and 4 of the other 11 regional Federal Reserve Bank presidents serving on a rotating basis. The Fed targets the federal funds rate to carry out monetary policy. The federal funds rate is determined in the private market for overnight reserves of depository institutions (called the federal funds market). At the end of a given period, usually a day, depository institutions must calculate how many dollars of reserves they want or need to hold against their reservable liabilities (deposits). Some institutions may discover a reserve shortage (too few reservable assets relative to those they want to hold), whereas others may have reservable assets in excess of their wants. These reserves can be borrowed and lent on an overnight basis in a private market called the federal funds market. The interest rate in this market is called the federal funds rate. If it wishes to expand money and credit, the Fed will lower the target, which encourages more lending activity and, thus, greater demand in the economy. Conversely, if it wishes to tighten money and credit, the Fed will raise the target. The federal funds rate is linked to the interest rates that banks and other financial institutions charge for loans. Thus, whereas the Fed may directly influence only a very short-term interest rate, this rate influences other longer-term rates. However, this relationship is far from being on a one-to-one basis because longer-term market rates are influenced not only by what the Fed is doing today, but also by what it is expected to do in the future and by what inflation is expected to be in the future. This fact highlights the importance of expectations in explaining market interest rates. For that reason, a growing body of literature urges the Fed to be very transparent in explaining what its policy is, will be, and in making a commitment to adhere to that policy. The Fed has responded to this literature and is increasingly transparent in explaining its policy measures and what these measures are expected to accomplish. The Federal Reserve uses two methods to maintain its target for the federal funds rate: The Fed can also change the federal funds rate by changing reserve requirements, which specify what portion of customer deposits (primarily checking accounts) banks must hold as vault cash or on deposit at the Fed. Thus, reserve requirements affect the liquidity available within the federal funds market. Statute sets the numerical levels of reserve requirements, although the Fed has some discretion to adjust them. Currently, banks are required to hold 0% to 10% of customer deposits that qualify as net transaction accounts in reserves, depending on the size of the bank's deposits. This tool is used rarely—the percentage was last changed in 1992. Each of these tools works by altering the overall liquidity available for use by the banking system, which influences the amount of assets these institutions can acquire. These assets are often called credit because they represent loans the institutions have made to businesses and households, among others. The Fed's control over monetary policy stems from its exclusive ability to alter the money supply and credit conditions more broadly. The Fed directly controls the monetary base , which is made up of currency (Federal Reserve notes) and bank reserves. The size of the monetary base, in turn, influences broader measures of the money supply, which include close substitutes to currency, such as demand deposits (e.g., checking accounts) held at banks. The Fed's definition of monetary policy as the actions it undertakes to influence the availability and cost of money and credit suggests two ways to measure the stance of monetary policy. One is to look at the cost of money and credit as measured by the rate of interest relative to inflation (or inflation projections), and the other is to look at the growth of money and credit itself. Thus, it is possible to look at either interest rates or the growth in the supply of money and credit in coming to a conclusion about the current stance of monetary policy—that is, whether it is expansionary (adding stimulus to the economy), contractionary (slowing economic activity), or neutral. During the high inflation experience of the 1970s the Fed placed greater emphasis on money supply growth, but since then, most central banks including the Fed have preferred to formulate monetary policy in terms of the cost of money and credit rather than in terms of their supply. The Fed conducts monetary policy by focusing on the cost of money and credit as proxied by the federal funds rate. A simple comparison of market interest rates over time as an indicator of changes in the stance of monetary policy is potentially misleading, however. Economists call the interest rate that is essential to decisions made by households and businesses to buy capital goods the real interest rate. It is often proxied by subtracting from the market interest rate the actual or expected rate of inflation. If inflation rises and market interest rates remain the same, then real interest rates have fallen, with a similar economic effect as if market rates (called nominal rates) had fallen by the same amount with a constant inflation rate. The federal funds rate is only one of the many interest rates in the financial system that determines economic activity. For these other rates, the real rate is largely independent of the amount of money and credit over the longer run because it is determined by the interaction of saving and investment (or the demand for capital goods). The internationalization of capital markets means that for most developed countries the relevant interaction between saving and investment that determines the real interest rate is on a global basis. Thus, real rates in the United States depend not only on U.S. national saving and investment but also on the saving and investment of other countries. For that reason, national interest rates are influenced by international credit conditions and business cycles. How do changes in short-term interest rates affect the overall economy? In the short run, an expansionary monetary policy that reduces interest rates increases interest-sensitive spending, all else equal. Interest-sensitive spending includes physical investment (i.e., plant and equipment) by firms, residential investment (housing construction), and consumer-durable spending (e.g., automobiles and appliances) by households. As discussed in the next section, it also encourages exchange rate depreciation that causes exports to rise and imports to fall, all else equal. To reduce spending in the economy, the Fed raises interest rates and the process works in reverse. An examination of U.S. economic history will show that money- and credit-induced demand expansions can have a positive effect on U.S. GDP growth and total employment. The extent to which greater interest-sensitive spending results in an increase in overall spending in the economy in the short run will depend in part on how close the economy is to full employment. When the economy is near full employment, the increase in spending is likely to be dissipated through higher inflation more quickly. When the economy is far below full employment, inflationary pressures are more likely to be muted. This same history, however, also suggests that over the longer run, a more rapid rate of growth of money and credit is largely dissipated in a more rapid rate of inflation with little, if any, lasting effect on real GDP and employment. Economists have two explanations for this paradoxical behavior. First, they note that, in the short run, many economies have an elaborate system of contracts (both implicit and explicit) that makes it difficult in a short period for significant adjustments to take place in wages and prices in response to a more rapid growth of money and credit. Second, they note that expectations for one reason or another are slow to adjust to the longer-run consequences of major changes in monetary policy. This slow adjustment also adds rigidities to wages and prices. Because of these rigidities, changes in the growth of money and credit that change aggregate demand can have a large initial effect on output and employment, albeit with a policy lag of six to eight quarters before the broader economy fully responds to monetary policy measures. Over the longer run, as contracts are renegotiated and expectations adjust, wages and prices rise in response to the change in demand and much of the change in output and employment is undone. Thus, monetary policy can matter in the short run but be fairly neutral for GDP growth and employment in the longer run. In societies in which high rates of inflation are endemic, price adjustments are very rapid. During the final stages of very rapid inflations, called hyperinflation, the ability of more rapid rates of growth of money and credit to alter GDP growth and employment is virtually nonexistent, if not negative. Either fiscal policy (defined here as changes in the structural budget deficit, caused by policy changes to government spending or taxes) or monetary policy can be used to alter overall spending in the economy. However, there are several important differences to consider between the two. First, economic conditions change rapidly, and in practice monetary policy can be more nimble than fiscal policy. The Fed meets every six weeks to consider changes in interest rates and can call an unscheduled meeting any time. Large changes to fiscal policy typically occur once a year at most. Once a decision to alter fiscal policy has been made, the proposal must travel through a long and arduous legislative process that can last months before it can become law, whereas monetary policy changes are made instantly. Both monetary and fiscal policy measures are thought to take more than a year to achieve their full impact on the economy due to pipeline effects. In the case of monetary policy, interest rates throughout the economy may change rapidly, but it takes longer for economic actors to change their spending patterns in response. For example, in response to a lower interest rate, a business must put together a loan proposal, apply for a loan, receive approval for the loan, and then put the funds to use. In the case of fiscal policy, once legislation has been enacted, it may take some time for authorized spending to be outlayed. An agency must approve projects and select and negotiate with contractors before funds can be released. In the case of transfers or tax cuts, recipients must receive the funds and then alter their private spending patterns before the economy-wide effects are felt. For both monetary and fiscal policy, further rounds of private and public decisionmaking must occur before multiplier or ripple effects are fully felt. Second, monetary policy is determined based only on the Fed's mandate, whereas fiscal policy is determined based on competing political goals. Fiscal policy changes have macroeconomic implications regardless of whether that was policymakers' primary intent. Political constraints have prevented increases in budget deficits from being fully reversed during expansions. Over the course of the business cycle, aggregate spending in the economy can be expected to be too high as often as it is too low. This means that stabilization policy should be tightened as often as it is loosened, yet increasing the budget deficit has proven to be much more popular than implementing the spending cuts or tax increases necessary to reduce it. As a result, the budget has been in deficit in all but five years since 1961, which has led to an accumulation of federal debt that gives policymakers less leeway to potentially undertake a robust expansionary fiscal policy, if needed, in the future. By contrast, the Fed is more insulated from political pressures, as discussed in the previous section, and experience shows that it is willing to raise or lower interest rates. Third, the long-run consequences of fiscal and monetary policy differ. Expansionary fiscal policy creates federal debt that must be serviced by future generations. Some of this debt will be "owed to ourselves," but some (presently, about half) will be owed to foreigners. To the extent that expansionary fiscal policy crowds out private investment, it leaves future national income lower than it otherwise would have been. Monetary policy does not have this effect on generational equity, although different levels of interest rates will affect borrowers and lenders differently. Furthermore, the government faces a budget constraint that limits the scope of expansionary fiscal policy—it can only issue debt as long as investors believe the debt will be honored, even if economic conditions require larger deficits to restore equilibrium. Fourth, openness of an economy to highly mobile capital flows changes the relative effectiveness of fiscal and monetary policy. Expansionary fiscal policy would be expected to lead to higher interest rates, all else equal, which would attract foreign capital looking for a higher rate of return, causing the value of the dollar to rise. Foreign capital can only enter the United States on net through a trade deficit. Thus, higher foreign capital inflows lead to higher imports, which reduce spending on domestically produced substitutes and lower spending on exports. The increase in the trade deficit would cancel out the expansionary effects of the increase in the budget deficit to some extent (in theory, entirely if capital is perfectly mobile). Expansionary monetary policy would have the opposite effect—lower interest rates would cause capital to flow abroad in search of higher rates of return elsewhere, causing the value of the dollar to fall. Foreign capital outflows would reduce the trade deficit through an increase in spending on exports and domestically produced import substitutes. Thus, foreign capital flows would (tend to) magnify the expansionary effects of monetary policy. Fifth, fiscal policy can be targeted to specific recipients. In the case of normal open market operations, monetary policy cannot. This difference could be considered an advantage or a disadvantage. On the one hand, policymakers could target stimulus to aid the sectors of the economy most in need or most likely to respond positively to stimulus. On the other hand, stimulus could be allocated on the basis of political or other noneconomic factors that reduce the macroeconomic effectiveness of the stimulus. As a result, both fiscal and monetary policy have distributional implications, but the latter's are largely incidental whereas the former's can be explicitly chosen. In cases in which economic activity is extremely depressed, monetary policy may lose some of its effectiveness. When interest rates become extremely low, interest-sensitive spending may no longer be very responsive to further rate cuts. Furthermore, interest rates cannot be lowered below zero so traditional monetary policy is limited by this "zero lower bound." In this scenario, fiscal policy may be more effective. As is discussed in the next section, some argue that the U.S. economy experienced this scenario following the recent financial crisis. Of course, using monetary and fiscal policy to stabilize the economy are not mutually exclusive policy options. But because of the Fed's independence from Congress and the Administration, the two policy options are not always coordinated. If Congress and the Fed were to choose compatible fiscal and monetary policies, respectively, then the economic effects would be more powerful than if either policy were implemented in isolation. For example, if stimulative monetary and fiscal policies were implemented, the resulting economic stimulus would be larger than if one policy were stimulative and the other were neutral. Alternatively, if Congress and the Fed were to select incompatible policies, these policies could partially negate each other. For example, a stimulative fiscal policy and contractionary monetary policy may end up having little net effect on aggregate demand (although there may be considerable distributional effects). Thus, when fiscal and monetary policymakers disagree in the current system, they can potentially choose policies with the intent of offsetting each other's actions. Whether this arrangement is better or worse for the economy depends on what policies are chosen. If one actor chooses inappropriate policies, then the lack of coordination allows the other actor to try to negate its effects. When the United States experienced the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression, the Fed undertook increasingly unprecedented steps in an attempt to restore financial stability. These steps included reducing the federal funds rate to the zero lower bound, providing direct financial assistance to financial firms, and "quantitative easing." These unconventional policy decisions continue to have consequences for monetary policy today, as the Fed embarks on monetary policy "normalization." The bursting of the housing bubble led to the onset of a financial crisis that affected both depository institutions and other segments of the financial sector involved with housing finance. As the delinquency rates on home mortgages rose to record numbers, financial firms exposed to the mortgage market suffered capital losses and lost access to liquidity. The contagious nature of this development was soon obvious as other types of loans and credit became adversely affected. This, in turn, spilled over into the broader economy, as the lack of credit soon had a negative effect on both production and aggregate demand. In December 2007, the economy entered a recession. As the housing slump's spillover effects to the financial system, as well as its international scope, became apparent, the Fed responded by reducing the federal funds target and the discount rate. Beginning on September 18, 2007, and ending on December 16, 2008, the federal funds target was reduced from 5.25% to a range between 0% and 0.25%, where it remained until December 2015. Economists call this the zero lower bound to signify that once the federal funds rate is lowered to zero, conventional open market operations cannot be used to provide further stimulus. The Fed attempted to achieve additional monetary stimulus at the zero bound through a pledge to keep the federal funds rate low for an extended period of time, which has been called forward guidance or forward commitment . The decision to maintain a target interest rate near zero was unprecedented. First, short-term interest rates have never before been reduced to zero in the history of the Federal Reserve. Second, the Fed waited much longer than usual to begin tightening monetary policy in the current recovery. For example, in the previous two expansions, the Fed began raising rates less than three years after the preceding recession ended. With liquidity problems persisting as the federal funds rate was reduced, it appeared that the traditional transmission mechanism linking monetary policy to activity in the broader economy was not working. Monetary authorities became concerned that the liquidity provided to the banking system was not reaching other parts of the financial system. As noted above, using only traditional monetary policy tools, additional monetary stimulus cannot be provided once the federal funds rate has reached its zero bound. To circumvent this problem, the Fed decided to use nontraditional methods to provide additional monetary policy stimulus. First, the Federal Reserve introduced a number of emergency credit facilities to provide increased liquidity directly to financial firms and markets. The first facility was introduced in December 2007, and several were added after the worsening of the crisis in September 2008. These facilities were designed to fill perceived gaps between open market operations and the discount window, and most of them were designed to provide short-term loans backed by collateral that exceeded the value of the loan. A number of the recipients were nonbanks that are outside the regulatory umbrella of the Federal Reserve; this marked the first time that the Fed had lent to nonbanks since the Great Depression. The Fed authorized these actions under Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act, a seldom-used emergency provision that allowed it to extend credit to nonbank financial institutions and to nonfinancial firms as well. The Fed provided assistance through liquidity facilities, which included both the traditional discount window and the newly created emergency facilities mentioned above, and through direct support to prevent the failure of two specific institutions, American International Group (AIG) and Bear Stearns. The amount of assistance provided was an order of magnitude larger than normal Fed lending, as shown in Figure 1 . Total assistance from the Federal Reserve at the beginning of August 2007 was approximately $234 million provided through liquidity facilities, with no direct support given. In mid-December 2008, this number reached a high of $1.6 trillion, with a near-high of $108 billion given in direct support. From that point on, it fell steadily. Assistance provided through liquidity facilities fell below $100 billion in February 2010, when many facilities were allowed to expire, and support to specific institutions fell below $100 billion in January 2011. The last loan from the crisis was repaid on October 29, 2014. Central bank liquidity swaps (temporary currency exchanges between the Fed and central foreign banks) are the only facility created during the crisis still active, but they have not been used on a large scale since 2012. All assistance through expired facilities has been fully repaid with interest. In 2010, the Dodd-Frank Act changed Section 13(3) to rule out direct support to specific institutions in the future. From the introduction of its first emergency lending facility in December 2007 to the worsening of the crisis in September 2008, the Fed sterilized the effects of lending on its balance sheet (i.e., prevented the balance sheet from growing) by selling an offsetting amount of Treasury securities. After September 2008, assistance exceeded remaining Treasury holdings, and the Fed allowed its balance sheet to grow. Between September 2008 and November 2008, the Fed's balance sheet more than doubled in size, increasing from less than $1 trillion to more than $2 trillion. The loans and other assistance provided by the Federal Reserve to banks and nonbank institutions are considered assets on this balance sheet because they represent money owed to the Fed. With the federal funds rate at its zero bound and direct lending falling as financial conditions began to normalize in 2009, the Fed faced the decision of whether to try to provide additional monetary stimulus through unconventional measures. It did so through two unconventional tools—large-scale asset purchases (quantitative easing) and forward guidance. With short-term rates constrained by the zero bound, the Fed hoped to reduce long-term rates through large-scale asset purchases, which were popularly referred to as quantitative easing (QE). Between 2009 and 2014, the Fed undertook three rounds of QE, buying U.S. Treasury securities, agency debt, and agency mortgage-backed securities (MBS). These securities now comprise most of the assets on the Fed's balance sheet. To understand the effect of quantitative easing on the economy, it is first necessary to describe its effect on the Fed's balance sheet. In 2009, the Fed's emergency lending declined rapidly as market conditions stabilized, which would have caused the balance sheet to decline if the Fed took no other action. Instead, asset purchases under the first round of QE (QE1) offset the decline in lending, and from November 2008 to November 2010, the overall size of the Fed's balance sheet did not vary by much. Its composition changed because of QE1, however—the amount of Fed loans outstanding fell to less than $50 billion at the end of 2010, whereas holdings of securities rose from less than $500 billion in November 2008 to more than $2 trillion in November 2010. The second round of QE, QE2, increased the Fed's balance sheet from $2.3 trillion in November 2010 to $2.9 trillion in mid-2011. It remained around that level until September 2012, when it began rising for the duration of the third round, QE3. It was about $4.5 trillion (comprised of $2.5 trillion of Treasury securities, $1.7 trillion MBS, and $0.4 trillion of agency debt) when QE3 ended in October 2014, and has remained at that level since. Table 1 summarizes the Fed's QE purchases. In total, the Fed's balance sheet increased by more than $2.5 trillion over the course of the three rounds of QE, making it about five times larger than it was before the crisis. This increase in the Fed's assets must be matched by a corresponding increase in the liabilities on its balance sheet. The Fed's liabilities mostly take the form of currency, bank reserves, and cash deposited by the U.S. Treasury at the Fed. QE has mainly resulted in an increase in bank reserves, from about $46 billion in August 2008 to $820 billion at the end of 2008. Since October 2009, bank reserves have exceeded $1 trillion, and they have been between $2.5 trillion and $2.8 trillion since 2014. The increase in bank reserves can be seen as the inevitable outcome of the increase in assets held by the Fed because the bank reserves, in effect, financed the Fed's asset purchases and loan programs. Reserves increase because when the Fed makes loans or purchases assets, it credits the proceeds to the recipients' reserve accounts at the Fed. The intended purpose of QE was to put downward pressure on long-term interest rates. Purchasing long-term Treasury securities and MBS should directly reduce the rates on those securities, all else equal. The hope is that a reduction in those rates feeds through to private borrowing rates throughout the economy, stimulating spending on interest-sensitive consumer durables, housing, and business investment in plant and equipment. Indeed, Treasury and mortgage rates have been unusually low since the crisis compared with the past few decades, although the timing of declines in those rates does not match up closely to the timing of asset purchases. Determining whether QE reduced rates more broadly and stimulated interest-sensitive spending requires controlling for other factors, such as the weak economy, which tends to reduce both rates and interest-sensitive spending. The increase in the Fed's balance sheet has the potential to be inflationary because bank reserves are a component of the portion of the money supply controlled by the Fed (called the monetary base ), which grew at an unprecedented pace during QE. In practice, overall measures of the money supply have not grown as quickly as the monetary base, and inflation has remained below the Fed's goal of 2% for most of the period since 2008. The growth in the monetary base has not translated into higher inflation because bank reserves have mostly remained deposited at the Fed and have not led to increased lending or asset purchases by banks. Another concern is that by holding large amounts of MBS, the Fed is allocating credit to the housing sector, putting the rest of the economy at a disadvantage compared with that sector. Advocates of MBS purchases note that housing was the sector of the economy most in need of stabilization, given the nature of the crisis (this argument becomes less persuasive as the housing market continues to rebound); that MBS markets are more liquid than most alternatives, limiting the potential for the Fed's purchases to be disruptive; and that the Fed is legally permitted to purchase few other assets, besides Treasury securities. On October 29, 2014, the Fed announced that it would stop making large-scale asset purchases at the end of the month. Now that QE is completed, attention has turned to the Fed's "exit strategy" from QE and zero interest rates. The Fed laid out its plans to normalize monetary policy in a statement in September 2014. It plans to continue implementing monetary policy by targeting the federal funds rate. The basic challenge to doing so is that the Fed cannot effectively alter the federal funds rate by altering reserve levels (as it did before the crisis) because QE has flooded the market with excess bank reserves. In other words, in the presence of more than $2 trillion in bank reserves, the market-clearing federal funds rate is close to zero even if the Fed would like it to be higher. The most straightforward way to return to normal monetary policy would be to remove those excess reserves by shrinking the balance sheet through asset sales. The Fed does not intend to sell any securities, however. Instead, it is gradually reducing the balance sheet by ceasing to roll over securities as they mature, which began in September 2017—almost three years after QE ended. Initially, it allowed only $6 billion of Treasuries and $4 billion of MBS to run off each month, which was gradually increased to $30 billion of Treasuries and $20 billion of MBS per month, where it will remain until normalization is completed. The Fed believes that it would only cease shrinking the balance sheet or use QE again in the future if it its ability to stimulate the economy using reductions in the federal funds rate were insufficient. The Fed intends to ultimately reduce the balance sheet until it holds "no more securities than necessary to implement monetary policy efficiently and effectively." The Fed has stated that it foresees a balance sheet size that is consistent with this goal will be larger than it was before the crisis. In part, that is because other liabilities on the Fed's balance sheet are larger—there is more currency in circulation now than there was before the crisis, and the Treasury has kept larger balances on average in its account at the Fed. But the balance sheet will also be significantly larger because the Fed decided in January 2019 to continue using its new method of targeting the federal funds rate even after normalization is completed. Under the new method, the federal funds rate is not determined by supply and demand in the market for bank reserves, and the Fed would prefer to maintain abundant bank reserves so that it does not have to use open market operations to respond to changes in banks' demand for reserves. By contrast, if it went back to the pre-crisis method of targeting the federal funds rate, only minimal excess reserve balances would be necessary (but perhaps more than before the crisis), so its balance sheet could be much smaller. The Fed has not yet announced when the wind-down will be completed or how large the balance sheet would be upon completion, but the January 2019 FOMC minutes noted the wind-down could be completed as soon as this year. In that case, the balance sheet would not be much smaller than its current size of $4 trillion when normalization is completed—more than four times larger than its pre-crisis size. Although the Fed has stated that it intends to eventually stop holding MBS, the Fed would still have sizable MBS holdings in 2025, according to projections from the New York Fed. In order to raise the federal funds rate in the presence of large reserves, the Fed has raised the two market interest rates that are close substitutes—it has directly raised the rate it pays banks on reserves held at the Fed and used large-scale reverse repurchase agreements (repos) to alter repo rates. In 2008, Congress granted the Fed the authority to pay interest on reserves. Because banks can earn interest on excess reserves by lending them in the federal funds market or by depositing them at the Fed, raising the interest rate on bank reserves should also raise the federal funds rate. In this way, the Fed can lock up excess liquidity to avoid any potentially inflationary effects because reserves kept at the Fed cannot be put to use by banks to finance activity in the broader economy. In practice, the interest rate that the Fed has paid banks on reserves has been slightly higher than the federal funds rate, which some have criticized as a subsidy to banks. Reverse repos are another tool for draining liquidity from the system and influencing short-term market rates. They drain liquidity from the financial system because cash is transferred from market participants to the Fed. As a result, interest rates in the repo market, one of the largest short-term lending markets, rise. The Fed has long conducted open market operations through the repo market, but since 2013 it has engaged in a much larger volume of reverse repos with a broader range of nonbank counterparties, including the government-sponsored enterprises (such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac) and certain money market funds, through a new Overnight Reverse Repurchase Operations Facility. The Fed is currently not capping the amount of overnight reverse repos offered through this facility. There has been some concern about the potential ramifications of the Fed becoming a dominant participant in this market and expanding its counterparties. For example, will counterparties only be willing to transact with the Fed in a panic, and will the Fed be exposed to counterparty risk with nonbanks that it does not regulate? The Fed has distinct roles as a central bank and a regulator. Its main regulatory responsibilities are as follows: B ank regulation . The Fed supervises bank holding companies (BHCs) and thrift holding companies (THCs), which include all large and thousands of small depositories, for safety and soundness. The Dodd-Frank Act requires the Fed to subject BHCs with more than $50 billion in consolidated assets to enhanced prudential regulation (i.e., stricter standards than are applied to similar firms) in an effort to mitigate the systemic risk they pose. The Fed is also the prudential regulator of U.S. branches of foreign banks and state banks that have elected to become members of the Federal Reserve System. Often in concert with the other banking regulators, it promulgates rules and supervisory guidelines that apply to banks in areas such as capital adequacy, and examines depository firms under its supervision to ensure that those rules are being followed and those firms are conducting business prudently. The Fed's supervisory authority includes consumer protection for banks under its jurisdiction that have $10 billion or less in assets. P rudential regulat ion of nonbank systemically important financial institutions . The Dodd-Frank Act allows the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) to designate nonbank financial firms as systemically important (SIFIs). Designated firms are supervised by the Fed for safety and soundness. Since enactment, the number of designated firms has ranged from four, initially, to none today. R egulation of the payment system . The Fed regulates the retail and wholesale payment system for safety and soundness. It also operates parts of the payment system, such as interbank settlements and check clearing. The Dodd-Frank Act subjects payment, clearing, and settlement systems designated as systemically important by the FSOC to enhanced supervision by the Fed (along with the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, depending on the type of system). M argin requirements . The Fed sets margin requirements on the purchases of certain securities, such as stocks, in certain private transactions. The purpose of margin requirements is to mandate what proportion of the purchase can be made on credit. The Fed attempts to mitigate systemic risk and prevent financial instability through these regulatory responsibilities, as well as through its lender of last resort activities and participation on the FSOC (whose mandate is to identify risks and respond to emerging threats to financial stability). The Fed has focused more on attempting to mitigate systemic risk through its regulations since the financial crisis, and has also restructured its internal operations to facilitate a macroprudential approach to supervision and regulation.

 

 Report 2:
The Buy American Act of 1933 was enacted during the Great Depression when there was a need to create and preserve jobs for American workers, and it established a preference for the federal government to buy domestic end products. Many of the products the federal government buys—including aircraft engines and medical supplies—are end products that may be subject to the requirements of the Buy American Act. Further, the Buy American Act does not apply to products that are purchased for use outside the United States or obtained through contracts under the micro-purchase threshold, which was generally $3,500 in fiscal year 2017. end products manufactured in the United States provided that (a) the product is a commercially available off-the-shelf item; or (b) the cost of the components mined, produced, or manufactured in the United States exceeds 50 percent of the total cost of all components. End products that are not considered domestic under the Buy American Act are treated as foreign. This characterization is based on the origin of the end product—that is, where the product is manufactured or produced—and not the vendor’s location. For example, a vendor located in Finland may supply end products manufactured in the United States, in which case these products would be treated as domestic products. Conversely, a vendor located in the United States may supply end products manufactured in Finland. In this case, the end products would be considered foreign. Although the Buy American Act establishes a preference for domestic end products, there are situations in which agencies can procure foreign end products through established exceptions to the Buy American requirements. In addition, under the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, the United States has waived domestic purchasing requirements—including the Buy American Act—for certain acquisitions of foreign end products from countries that are party to international trade agreements or are considered designated countries by the U.S. Trade Representative. In implementing the Buy American Act, the FAR sets forth several exceptions that permit federal agencies to buy foreign end products. These include situations when a domestic end product is not produced in sufficient quantities or cases where the cost would be unreasonable to buy a domestic end product. The steps that contracting officers must take to determine or document an exception will vary depending on the circumstances of the acquisition. For example, a written determination from the Head of Contracting Activity (HCA) or a delegate may be necessary to determine non-availability in some cases. However, a written determination may not be required when an acquisition is conducted through full and open competition, is synopsized, and no domestic offer is received. Other exceptions to the Buy American Act restrictions on the purchase of foreign products, such as the exception for commercial information technology, are blanket exceptions that do not require a written determination. In addition, some agencies have specified additional considerations that must precede a determination and what level of authority is appropriate for certain determinations. The five Buy American Act exceptions that apply government-wide and the corresponding determination standards in the FAR are listed in Table 1. Individual federal agencies may make blanket determinations of situations in which the Act’s restrictions should not apply to that agency’s procurements, when it is not in the public interest to restrict the purchase of foreign end products. For example, over the years, DOD has entered into reciprocal procurement agreements with 27 foreign counterparts. DOD determined that it would be inconsistent with the public interest to apply the Buy American Act restrictions on products from these 27 qualifying countries. Thus, if an offer includes end products from a qualifying country, those products are not restricted by the Buy American Act and the acquisition of qualifying country end products does not require higher approval. This public interest exception for qualifying countries applies only to contracts awarded by DOD. Federal agencies can purchase eligible foreign end products from designated countries when the Buy American Act’s requirements are waived because of the terms of an international trade agreement or other criteria, such as a designation by the U.S. Trade Representative as a least developed country. In accordance with the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, the president has the authority to waive the Buy American Act. For eligible products that come from countries covered by the World Trade Organization’s Government Procurement Agreement, Free Trade Agreements, and the Israeli Trade Act, the Buy American Act has been waived so that these items receive nondiscriminatory consideration and are on equal footing with domestic end products. In total, these agreements cover approximately 60 countries—overlapping with all but two of the DOD qualifying countries. Appendix II highlights the overlap. Unlike DOD’s blanket public interest exception for qualifying countries, the Buy American Act requirements are only waived under a trade agreement if the acquisition is of a certain value set by the U.S. Trade Representative. Current trade agreement thresholds, at or above which the requirements are waived, range from $25,000 for contracts for eligible products from Canada to $180,000 for the 45 other parties to the World Trade Organization’s Government Procurement Agreement. Table 2 lists the parties eligible for trade agreements and the associated threshold for supply contracts. The FAR specifies certain conditions in which trade agreements do not apply, even if the acquisition is above the requisite threshold value set by the U.S. Trade Representative. In these cases, the Buy American Act would apply. These conditions include, but are not limited to: acquisitions that do not use full and open competition, when the limitation of competition would preclude the procedures applicable to acquisitions covered by trade agreements; certain sole-source acquisitions for commercial items using simplified acquisition procedures; acquisitions set aside for small businesses; acquisition of ammunition, arms, or war materials, or for purchases indispensable for national security or national defense purposes; and acquisitions from federal prison industries or nonprofit agencies employing people who are blind or severely disabled. If the contracting officer determines that a trade agreement applies to a particular acquisition, which waives the Buy American restrictions, that determination does not require additional review at a higher level. This is similar to other circumstances where Buy American Act restrictions do not apply, such as for the acquisition of products for use outside the United States or contracts valued below the micro-purchase threshold. The Buy American Act’s applicability is based on the country of origin of the product being supplied, rather than the country of the vendor offering the product to the government. Vendors who propose to do business with the U.S. government are required to certify as to where their products are manufactured or produced—whether in the United States or in a designated country covered by the Trade Agreements Act. Vendors can provide an annual certification applicable to all of their contracts through the federal government’s contractor registry, known as the System for Award Management (SAM). Through SAM, a vendor identifies the country of origin for foreign products associated with a broad category of products. For example, a vendor could state that it provides aircraft components that originate in France and Mexico. Vendors also have the option not to certify the origin of their products in SAM, but instead provide information about foreign end products in their individual offers for contracts. Contracting officials include the relevant clauses in solicitations and contracts in accordance with regulation to require vendor certification. For example, the clause at FAR 52.225-2, Buy American Certificate, requires the offeror to certify that each end product is a domestic end product, or list any foreign end products and their country of origin. Once a contract is awarded, the awarding agency must enter certain information into FPDS-NG, a government-wide database for contract awards and obligations. The Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) within the Office of Management and Budget provides the overall direction for FPDS-NG, which is managed by the General Services Administration. FPDS-NG data can be populated through the individual systems agencies use to develop contracts. Agencies are responsible for the quality of the information transmitted to FPDS-NG, including data captured on the contract value and whether the foreign product acquisition is authorized by one of the Buy American Act exceptions or a trade agreement. This information is recorded at the contract level, or at the delivery order level for orders from indefinite delivery contracts. For certain product categories—essentially those that represent end products—FPDS-NG requires that contracting staff enter information in the “Place of Manufacture” drop-down data field, as shown in Figure 1. This field must be populated for all reported manufactured end products, including those valued under the micro-purchase threshold, which at the time of our review was generally $3,500. Options in this field include indicating that the product is made in the United States, or that it is made outside the United States and qualifies under one of the Buy American Act exceptions, or that it is subject to the requirements of a trade agreement instead of the Buy American Act requirements. In 2018, FPDS-NG data on agencies’ historical reporting of the use of Buy American exceptions were added to the website on which agencies post contracting opportunities (www.fbo.gov). According to OFPP, this allows vendors selling domestic products to more easily see how agencies acquire foreign goods pursuant to Buy American Act exceptions. In fiscal year 2017, the federal government obligated approximately $7.8 billion for the acquisition of foreign end products, which accounts for less than 5 percent of total federal contract obligations for end products in that year. We observed differences in how civilian agencies and DOD apply Buy American Act exceptions and waivers. In our review of 38 contracts and orders from four agencies—DOD, HHS, DHS, and VA—we found 6 instances where the place of manufacture information was misreported in FPDS-NG. We further identified system limitations in how FPDS-NG captures information. Based on our analysis of FPDS-NG data, almost 40 percent of federal contract obligations in fiscal year 2017—totaling approximately $196 billion—were for domestic and foreign end products, such as aircraft parts, that may be subject to the Buy American Act. Less than 5 percent of these obligations—approximately $7.8 billion—were reported as foreign end products. This is consistent with the information agencies reported in FPDS-NG in the previous 4 years, with foreign end products accounting for approximately 3 to 8 percent of goods subject to Buy American Act restrictions between fiscal years 2013 through 2016. The foreign end products in fiscal year 2017 primarily came from South Korea, the United Kingdom, Afghanistan, Canada, Mexico, and the United Arab Emirates, which together accounted for almost half of the total foreign end products reported. Appendix III shows the federal government’s obligations for foreign end products from various countries for fiscal year 2017. The procurement of foreign end products is permitted by the flexibilities available under the Buy American Act’s exceptions and waivers. Agencies also procured foreign end products through means separate from the exceptions allowed under the Buy American Act, primarily in cases where the Act would not apply. Agencies reported obligating more than $700 million to procure foreign end products by applying one of the five government-wide Buy American Act exceptions—such as domestic non-availability or unreasonable cost—in FPDS-NG for fiscal year 2017. Agencies reported obligating approximately $550 million to procure foreign end products as permitted by the Trade Agreements Act, which waives the Buy American Act’s domestic preference requirements for US trading partners when eligible products are covered by trade agreements and are above certain dollar thresholds. DOD also obligated nearly $2.9 billion to procure foreign products from countries with which it has reciprocal procurement agreements, using what is referred to as the DOD qualifying country exception. This is an exercise of the authority available to agencies under the Buy American Act’s public interest exception. DOD determined that it is not in the public interest to restrict the purchase of foreign end products from 27 countries. All but two of these qualifying countries are also US trading partners, so some of these awards for eligible products may be authorized by a trade agreement. However, the qualifying country exception allows DOD to procure foreign end products without regard to dollar thresholds or other trade agreement eligibility limitations. Agencies also procured foreign end products, such as fuel, to be used outside the United States, in which circumstance the Buy American Act’s requirements do not apply. For fiscal year 2017, these obligations accounted for almost $3.7 billion—about 47 percent of all dollars obligated for foreign end products, as reported in FPDS-NG. Figure 2 highlights fiscal year 2017 obligations, including agencies’ reported spending on foreign end products under the Buy American Act exceptions and other means. DOD accounted for more than 80 percent—roughly $6.4 billion—of the total obligations for foreign end products in fiscal year 2017. Almost all of DOD purchases were either for use outside of the United States, so were not subject to Buy American Act restrictions, or were reported under the public interest exception for DOD qualifying countries. In contrast, civilian agencies report a more varied mix of the exceptions and waivers of the Buy American Act. The civilian agencies—which are unable to apply DOD’s qualifying country exception—were more likely to report buying foreign end products based on trade agreements or another exception to the Buy American Act requirements. Figure 3 shows how DOD and the civilian agencies acquired foreign end products authorized by the various exceptions and waivers of the Buy American Act. From our review of FPDS-NG data, the civilian agencies are more likely to cite one of the five Buy American Act exceptions or a trade agreement waiver when buying foreign end products, and thus take corresponding actions to document or approve the authority cited. For example, in our review of contracts from four agencies, VA obligated $71,000 for medical imaging equipment from Canada, and had to consider whether a trade agreement waiver applied. The manufacturer was determined to be the only source available and the contracting officer determined the acquisition was authorized by a Buy American exception based on domestic non-availability, which can require additional review. In contrast, DOD may make a similar contract award for equipment from Canada based on the qualifying countries exception. DOD acquisitions, then, may be authorized by exceptions such as domestic non-availability when a required item does not come from a qualifying country. For example, we reviewed a $744,000 DOD award for vehicle equipment that was only available from South Africa—which is not one of the DOD qualifying countries and not covered by any of the trade agreements—so the acquisition was authorized by the domestic non-availability exception. In addition, the civilian agencies also reported buying foreign end products for use outside the United States but to a lesser extent than DOD. For example, this included one of the contracts we reviewed, an HHS award for Ebola vaccines manufactured in the Netherlands, with $44.7 million obligated in fiscal year 2017. This contract was reported as used outside the United States because it is primarily stored overseas. FPDS-NG is the primary means for capturing procurement data regarding the Buy American Act, but we found that agencies may not always input reliable information on the extent to which exceptions or waivers authorized the acquisition of foreign end products. In addition, some aspects of how FPDS-NG is structured could lead to additional data reporting errors. In the non-generalizable sample of 38 contracts and orders we examined from DOD, HHS, DHS, and VA, we found 6 awards where information related to the Buy American Act was incorrectly reported in FPDS-NG. In three of the six contracts, agencies recorded the wrong exception or waiver, most often because of an error when reporting the place of manufacture in FPDS-NG. For example, DOD reported a $22,000 contract for vehicle equipment from South Africa as a Buy American Act exception due to unreasonable cost. But the contract file indicated that the exception that applied was domestic non-availability. DOD officials acknowledged the error and corrected it in FPDS-NG during the course of our review. In the three remaining contracts, agencies misreported whether an end product came from the United States or another country. For example, DHS incorrectly recorded that an $18 million contract was for aircraft accessories and other parts manufactured in the United States, even though file documentation showed the contract was for Italian-produced spare parts from the original equipment manufacturer. The Italian- produced spare parts were available from existing inventory maintained by the manufacturer and were needed immediately to meet a mandatory operational requirement. Officials from DHS acknowledged the recording oversight, attributed it to a mistake when entering information in FPDS- NG, and have since corrected the error in response to our observation. Additionally, FPDS-NG has system limitations that could hinder complete and accurate reporting of Buy American Act information: DOD Qualifying Country Exceptions and Trade Agreement Waivers. FPDS-NG requires that information on the type of Buy American Act exception or waiver applied be provided when end products are reported as foreign. But FPDS-NG does not identify errors associated with this process. For example, we reviewed an $8.3 million DHS contract for engines manufactured in Germany that was recorded as a DOD qualifying country exception in FPDS-NG, although this exception is not available to civilian agencies. Contracting officials corrected the data in FPDS-NG during the course of our review. Further, FPDS-NG does not prevent agencies from reporting trade agreement waivers when the contracts are valued below applicable thresholds or waivers do not apply, such as for small business set asides. For example, in the fiscal year 2017 data we reviewed, more than 5 percent of contract obligations reported for trade agreement waivers were for awards set-aside for small businesses, which would not be eligible under the Trade Agreements Act. OFPP officials noted that because of the various dollar thresholds applicable to different trade agreements, adding automatic thresholds in FPDS-NG to guide contracting staff in reporting an applicable trade agreement could lead to additional data errors in the procurement database. Awards under the Micro-purchase Threshold. Although the Buy American Act requirements do not apply to contract awards valued below the micro-purchase threshold—generally $3,500 in fiscal year 2017—the FPDS-NG ‘Place of Manufacture’ field does not have an option to indicate whether a contract is under the threshold. Instead, contracting officers entering information for awards under the micro- purchase amount must still state whether the product is domestic or foreign. If the product is foreign, the officials must select a Buy American Act exception authorizing the purchase, even though no exception is needed at these dollar levels. As a result, when agencies report in FPDS-NG that a Buy American Act exception or waiver applied for a procurement valued at less than $3,500, that information would not be accurate. Based on our review, this may have involved about $16 million in fiscal year 2017 obligations. Awards for both Foreign and Domestic Products. When reporting data for contracts that include multiple end products from both the United States and a foreign country, FPDS-NG only allows for one country of origin to be identified. Contracting officers told us that they typically will report a foreign end product in FPDS-NG when the foreign products account for the preponderance of the contract value. Thus, in cases where a contract includes foreign end products that do not account for the preponderance of the contract’s value, the value of these foreign end products would not be reported in FPDS-NG. We have previously reported that FPDS-NG has similar limitations in other fields, such the type of product or service provided, which prevent contracting officers from identifying more than one condition. According to OFPP, a recent change in the FAR requiring contract reporting at the line item level should provide greater transparency of all products included in a contract. Buy American Act Exceptions and Waivers under Indefinite Delivery Contracts. The way FPDS-NG captures data for Buy American Act exceptions and waivers for some indefinite-delivery contracts results in inaccurate data reporting. When an indefinite- delivery contract is initially awarded, FPDS-NG functionality does not give contracting staff the option to enter information for the ‘Place of Manufacture’ field. Instead, this information is typically captured once an order is placed on the contract. In our review of FPDS-NG data across the four agencies, however, we found that in some cases obligations are reported on the initial indefinite delivery contract so the Buy American Act exceptions or waivers are not recorded. This occurred with multiple agencies, but particularly at HHS, where information for almost 28 percent of HHS obligations for end products in fiscal year 2017 was not captured in FPDS-NG because the obligations were reported in the system through the initial contracts rather than orders. As a result, the applicability of the Buy American Act for HHS contracts totaling almost $1.9 billion in fiscal year 2017 was unreported in FPDS-NG. DOD, DHS, and VA officials told us they identified FPDS-NG reporting as an area of concern. GAO Standards for Internal Controls in the Federal Government state that management should use quality information to support objectives, and that such data should be complete and accurate. In response to the 2017 Executive Order calling for federal agencies to assess their implementation of the Buy American Act requirement, OFPP officials told us they are identifying potential strategies for improving the information agencies submit to FPDS-NG. As OFPP weighs potential options for FPDS-NG reporting, implementing enhancements to reduce data entry errors and ensure that the data collected are complete and accurate would help enable the system to provide the most useful information possible. Ensuring information is correctly reported in FPDS- NG is critical because the data are used to inform procurement policy decisions and facilitate congressional oversight. The four agencies we reviewed—DOD, HHS, DHS, and VA—took different approaches to provide training and guidance for the Buy American Act requirements. Contracting officers faced challenges when procuring products subject to the Buy American Act. For example, we found instances in which contracting officers applied a waiver or exception to contracts where the waiver did not apply and did not have complete guidance for required determinations or reviews. There also were challenges in confirming product origin information when vendors did not provide consistent information. The four agencies we reviewed varied in the mix of training and guidance provided to aid contracting officers in implementing the requirements of the Buy American Act. Three of the four agencies—DOD, DHS and VA— supplemented the federal acquisition regulation, which implements the requirements of the Buy American Act and Trade Agreements Act, with their own acquisition regulations. In addition, DHS and DOD have recently updated existing training or added new training and guidance. VA issued policy memoranda in 2017, emphasizing the importance of meeting Buy American Act requirements, but has not added training or provided specific guidance. HHS does not provide department-level training or guidance related to the Buy American Act. Most of the DHS and DOD contracting officers we spoke to reported that they had attended training and several found the guidance provided by the training to be helpful. HHS and VA contracting officials described confusion due to the lack of resources available at their respective agencies. In 2017, in response to a series of recommendations from the DOD Inspector General to re-emphasize Buy American Act training and guidance, the Defense Acquisition University introduced an updated training course that specifically focuses on the requirements and implementation of the Buy American Act. While not mandatory, a June 2017 memo notified all DOD services and the defense agencies that members of their contracting workforce should complete this training as part of their professional development. At the current pace of enrollment, DOD officials anticipate approximately 18,000 people will have taken this course by the end of September 2018, which is a seven-fold increase over previous graduation rates. Incorporated into these trainings were supplemental on-the-job tools to assist contracting officers when awarding contracts for end products subject to the Buy American Act requirements. One such tool is a flowchart outlining applicable solicitation provisions or contract clauses based upon the awarded contract’s total dollar value. DOD contracting officials we interviewed from Defense Logistics Agency’s (DLA) Land and Maritime division had completed the agency-level Buy American Act training and said it served as a good refresher, with some noting that most of the training they had received on the subject came when they were first hired. DOD provides regulations and guidance on Buy American Act requirements through both the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) and the accompanying Procedures, Guidance and Information. DOD contracting officers use the provisions and clauses in DFARS to address the public interest exception for DOD qualifying countries. In addition, as a part of the updated training, the Defense Pricing and Contracting Office developed two documents to provide additional Buy American Act guidance. One outlines a step-by-step approach contracting officers can follow to determine whether the Buy American Act applies to their particular procurement and, if so, whether the use of an exception or waiver is appropriate. The second assists contracting officers with evaluating all offers—foreign and domestic— when price is the determining factor. In addition, we found that DLA supplements the available Defense Acquisition University training and guidance with a robust level of support, including annual training and subject matter expertise. DLA contracting officers told us that while they found the updated training helpful, they also appreciated the training course internal to their agency, as it addresses the types of procurements they typically handle in their day-to- day work, such as buying spare parts. Further, DLA contracting officers noted that they use the job aid provided through the local training. DHS introduced training courses in 2017 that specifically focus on the requirements and implementation of the Buy American Act, including a mandatory training course for DHS contracting officers. DHS reported that 94 percent of contracting staff had taken the required course as of April 2018. DHS developed these courses in response to the 2017 Executive Order to ensure its staff was familiar with the Buy American Act requirements. Incorporated into these training courses are supplemental on-the-job tools to assist contracting officers when awarding contracts for end products subject to the Buy American Act requirements, such as a flowchart outlining applicable solicitation provisions or contract clauses based upon contract dollar value. Contracting officials generally view the training and tools they received as beneficial. For example, several DHS contracting officials we interviewed said that the agency’s new course provided a helpful review on the topic, while one contracting officer specifically noted that the course materials are useful to new staff, to help them understand the Act’s waivers and exceptions. DHS also revised its acquisition manual in December 2017 to add further detail regarding the Buy American Act requirements. Specifically, DHS updated its acquisition manual to provide contracting officers more explicit FPDS-NG reporting instructions for procurements subject to the Buy American Act, as well as discretion to purchase domestic end products at or below the micro-purchase threshold. Additional changes include increasing the documentation and level of managerial review required to use several of the exceptions to the Buy American Act. For example, prior to 2018—which includes the time period in which the DHS contracts and orders we reviewed were awarded—the head of individual contracting offices had the authority to approve domestic non-availability and unreasonable cost exceptions, with a notification made to the DHS Chief Procurement Officer. But under the new policy, the use of these exceptions must have the concurrence of the HCA—who is responsible for contracting activities within individual DHS components—and be approved by the department’s Chief Procurement Officer. Table 3 outlines these changes. In September 2017, VA issued guidance to reinforce existing Buy American Act requirements. The policy memorandum encourages the HCAs within VA to institute reviews of awarded contracts subject to the Buy American Act to ensure compliance. As of September 2018, policy officials did not know how many HCAs had taken this step. Further, the guidance emphasizes the importance of Buy American Act training for its acquisition workforce. VA policy officials explained that the Buy American Act is introduced in several VA training courses, but the agency does not have a specific course on implementing the Buy American Act requirements or provide additional instruction or tools. During the course of our review, VA officials said that some of the HCAs had added internal training on the Buy American Act. In addition, VA contracting staff has the option of taking training offered outside the agency, such as the updated Defense Acquisition University course on the Buy American Act. This training is not required. Contracting officials we spoke to at VA said they struggled with the details of awarding contracts subject to Buy American Act requirements because they are not provided sufficient agency-specific training and guidance on the topic. Moreover, several contracting staff noted an increased need for training due to recent changes in VA contracting practices. Specifically, in response to a 2016 Supreme Court decision, VA has increased contracting efforts with veteran-owned small businesses through the Veterans First Contracting Program. As a result, contracting officials explained they have reduced their use of schedule contracts, in which the determinations related to the Buy American Act requirements were made with the initial awards. As one contracting officer explained, prior to this change, more than 90 percent of her division’s procurements were through VA schedule contracts in which Buy American Act applicability had already been established. However, this shift in contracting practices means contracting officers will more frequently need to consider the applicability of the Buy American Act, but contracting officers have not received specific guidance or training to do so. Noting the significance of this change, one contracting officer stated she approached VA management to obtain Buy American Act training for her division, but such training was not available. Federal internal controls state that agencies should ensure that training is aimed at developing and retaining employee knowledge, skills, and abilities to meet changing organizational needs. In September 2018, we reported that VA was experiencing difficulties implementing multiple aspects of the Veterans First policy, and we recommended that VA provide more targeted implementation training. As VA moves forward to implement this training, incorporating the Buy American Act requirements will be important to provide greater assurance that staff has the knowledge and skills needed to navigate the changing procurement environment. HHS does not have agency-level Buy American training or guidance. The HHS Acquisition Regulation Supplement does not address foreign acquisitions. HHS officials told us that efforts to develop guidance that would address Buy American Act requirements are underway, but they do not know when they will be finalized and made available to contracting officers, and could not describe the extent to which they will address Buy American Act implementation. The HHS contracting officers we interviewed discussed informal Buy American Act training their divisions had developed because department-level training was not available. For example, at HHS’ National Institutes of Health, a contracting official told us about a training course she recently developed because her office was taking on the administration of additional contracts for which the Buy American Act requirements would apply. Contracting officers at HHS’ Office of Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority described informal training on the agency’s contract writing system— included as part of their weekly internal staff meetings—that provides additional guidance on how to appropriately complete certain data fields relevant to the Buy American Act. In our analysis of 38 contracts from across the four agencies, we found that agencies faced various levels of challenge in applying the Trade Agreements Act waivers and Buy American Act exceptions to acquire foreign end products. This was particularly apparent in cases where contracting officers had to determine if a trade agreement applied or cases which required a determination that a domestic end product was not sufficiently available, in accordance with the domestic non-availability exception to the Buy American Act requirements. Contracting staff also had difficulty determining the origin of products in light of incomplete or conflicting information. Of the six contracts we reviewed reporting that a trade agreement applied to the foreign end products purchased, we found two cases in which this waiver did not apply to the contracts in question. The value of the contract is one determining factor for whether a trade agreement waives the Buy American Act requirements, although the FAR also states additional factors that would affect applicability under a trade agreement. The two contracts we found, both from VA, had total dollar values at award— $8,435 and $11,950, respectively—that were less than any of the thresholds at which trade agreement waivers of the Buy American Act are applicable. Both contracts were for products from countries that are party to the World Trade Organization Government Procurement Agreement, so the value of the acquisition would have to be equal to or exceed $191,000—the threshold that was in effect at the time of award—for waivers from Buy American requirements to apply. Contracting officials in both cases were generally unaware that the applicable threshold was not met, making the trade agreement waiver inapplicable. Although VA has added Buy American Act guidance since these contracts were awarded early in fiscal year 2017, the information currently available does not provide sufficient detail to assist contracting officers when awarding contracts in these situations. For example, the guidance VA provided contracting officers in September 2017 does not emphasize consideration of the applicable trade agreement thresholds or include information on how contracting officers should determine the applicable waiver or exception. When contracting officers procure foreign end products, the type of waiver or exception used to support the purchase matters—particularly when required additional steps and review are not completed because the wrong waiver or exception was applied. We found that the two VA contracts with foreign end products were incorrectly reported as the Trade Agreements Act waiver having applied. If one of the other Buy American Act exceptions permitting purchases of foreign end products had applied, contracting officers may have been required to obtain higher-level review or complete a written determination. In addition, we reviewed contracts that show some of the complexities contracting officers face beyond applying the dollar thresholds when determining if an award for foreign end products is eligible under the Trade Agreements Act waiver of the Buy American Act. Specifically, we found instances where DHS contracting officials took different approaches for non-competed awards for similar foreign-manufactured products. For example, we reviewed a non-competed $58 million DHS award for acquiring spare aircraft parts from an original equipment manufacturer located in a foreign country that is party to the World Trade Organization Government Procurement Agreement. DHS reported in FPDS-NG that the procurement was waived by the Trade Agreements Act. However, we also reviewed two other sole-source awards from DHS for similar products—spare aircraft parts from two separate manufacturers in foreign countries that are also party to the World Trade Organization Government Procurement Agreement—that were instead reported as subject to the Buy American Act, but excepted due to the non-availability of domestic products. Contracting officers may come to different conclusions for similar products, in part, because of the multiple factors that have to be considered when determining whether an acquisition is subject to the Buy American Act and whether any waivers or exceptions apply. However, available guidance does not always address these complexities. For example, agencies need to decide if other conditions, such as the procurement of products deemed indispensable for national security or national defense purposes apply to an acquisition that would make a trade agreement inapplicable. Further, if the product’s country of origin is considered a designated country under the World Trade Organization Government Procurement Agreement, officials need to determine that the product is eligible under that agreement. DHS updated its training and guidance for the Buy American Act, which includes a job aid outlining at what dollar values solicitation provisions and contract clauses under a trade agreement waiver are applicable. However, it does not address other situations in which contracts may not be eligible under the Trade Agreements Act, such as non-eligible products or products for national defense purposes. For the other agencies in our review, we found that DOD’s updated Buy American Act training and its acquisition supplement both address trade agreement eligibility, but HHS does not yet have Buy American guidance to address this topic. Federal internal control standards state that agencies should communicate quality information internally to achieve their objectives and that they should select the appropriate methods of communication. When written guidance is not available, agencies may miss opportunities to ensure appropriate steps are taken to meet Buy American Act requirements. Our review of 38 contracts also included 8 contracts for foreign end products pursuant to the domestic non-availability exception. In certain situations, such as when contracts are awarded without full and open competition, this exception requires an approved written determination. The FAR establishes requirements for domestic non-availability determinations, but agencies can delegate the level of review required or specify information to be included in the determination. Three of the agencies we reviewed—DOD, DHS, and VA—provide supplemental guidance on the process for making determinations, including who must make the determination when applying a domestic non-availability exception. However, DHS policy officials told us that when the agency uses the domestic non-availability exception for a sole-source acquisition, the written justification that the FAR requires for non- competed awards should suffice as the documentation to support the non-availability determination as well. The practice of using sole-source justifications to support Buy American determinations is not addressed in DHS guidance. According to DHS policy updated in 2018, determinations of domestic non-availability must be concurred with by the HCA and approved by the Chief Procurement Officer. Federal and DHS acquisition regulations, however, state that some justifications can be approved at a lower level. In the absence of further guidance, this difference in approval levels could result in inconsistent application within the department. In addition, as previously noted HHS does not yet have Buy American Act guidance so the department does not provide information on how to make determinations. According to federal internal control standards, agencies should communicate quality information internally to achieve their objectives and that they should select appropriate communication methods. When written guidance is not available, agencies may miss opportunities to ensure that contracting officers take the steps needed to meet requirements when applying a domestic non-availability exception. Knowing the country of origin of the products the federal government buys is necessary to implement the Buy American Act, but contracting officers do not always have access to accurate information on originating countries. The FAR and the DFARS provide various clauses which, when incorporated into contracts, require vendors to certify that the end products they provide to the government are domestic and, if necessary, declare the foreign countries from which they provide products. Vendors frequently certify this information through the System for Award Management (SAM), the government-wide system used to collect vendors’ annual representations and certifications. Contracting officers may rely on the information vendors provide about their product origins, but they are generally expected to take actions to verify incomplete or conflicting information when they have reason to believe that a vendor will be providing a non-compliant product. We found that SAM certifications and offers did not always include accurate information on end products from foreign countries. In 6 of the 38 contracts that we reviewed—from DHS, HHS, and VA—the vendors certified that they only provided domestic end products although the end products provided were foreign. In all of these cases, the contracting officers knew that the acquisitions included foreign end products. For example, we reviewed two DHS awards for spare aircraft parts from an Italian-based company, one of which was reported in FPDS-NG under the domestic non-availability exception to the Buy American Act, and the other which was incorrectly reported as being manufactured in the United States but has since been corrected. Contracting officials said they knew the parts were made in Italy based on extensive experience contracting with the company and, in part, because they had visited the production location. Contracting officials—including some at HHS and VA—said they use SAM as their primary source to determine whether the vendor is offering domestic end products. Others reported some awareness of the limitations of SAM certifications. At all four agencies, contracting officials emphasized that it is important to ask questions when end product origin information is not readily available—or if there is conflicting information—but agency guidance that we reviewed does not address this need or provide information on how to do so. Only the local training offered by DOD’s DLA addresses other sources of information, which officials said was helpful because it is specific to the industries with which they work. Instead, some officials described how they rely on their experience to know how to verify products’ origins but this can be problematic, particularly with newer staff. For example, in one contract we reviewed VA contracting officials acknowledged that a new contracting specialist at VA did not follow-up when the product origin certification was not provided and assumed all of the items procured were domestic. During the course of our review, the contracting specialist’s supervisor said that she contacted the vendor and learned that some of the items provided were in fact foreign end products. The foreign products were not considered to account for the preponderance of the contract so were not reported in FPDS-NG, but the contracting officer was acting with incomplete information at the time of award. Further, in 4 of the 38 contracts that we reviewed, it is not clear how contracting staff took steps to obtain product origin information in situations where it was not provided in SAM. In these cases—which include contracts for both domestic and foreign end products—the vendors had opted not to certify their product origins in SAM, but instead said that they would provide the information with their individual proposals. However, based on the information in the contract files, the proposals did not include this information. For example: Three of the contracts we reviewed from HHS—all reported as purchasing end items manufactured in the United States—did not certify product origin in SAM. The supervising contracting officer for two of the awards explained that his contracting staff regularly check the vendor’s written representations and certifications provided in the offer, because the SAM certifications are general and do not always apply to the specific equipment they buy. However, the three contract files we reviewed did not include manufacturing or origin information. The vendor for a DHS contract that was reported as manufactured in the United States did not certify this information in SAM. The contracting officer said that he checks SAM for product origin information, but in the documents we reviewed there is no evidence of the information in the contract file. Federal internal control standards state that agencies should communicate the necessary quality information needed to achieve the agency’s objectives, thereby enabling personnel to address risks. Providing guidance regarding the situations in which contracting officers should verify product origin information with vendors may help agencies better meet the requirements of the Buy American Act. Although purchases for foreign end products account for less than 5 percent of federal procurement spending in fiscal year 2017, it is important that these purchases be consistent with the domestic- purchasing restrictions in the Buy American Act. This requires that Buy American Act exceptions and trade agreement waivers be used only when applicable, and that agencies report accurate data on the extent to which they are used. However, data reporting errors by contracting staff and FPDS-NG limitations mean that data on the use of exceptions and waivers are not fully captured. The federal agencies all have responsibilities to ensure Buy American Act data are accurate and complete. The lack of good data can hinder congressional oversight of the extent to which foreign end products are procured as authorized by one of the exceptions or waivers of the Buy American Act. Agencies have taken varied approaches for providing information to contracting officers that navigate the complexities and nuances associated with applying the different Buy American Act exceptions or trade agreement waivers. DOD has added such detailed information through its revised training course and policy guidance. Adding these types of targeted information to address challenging areas would help contracting officers at other agencies implement the Buy American Act’s domestic preferences, as well as related exceptions and waivers. Further, to accurately determine how exceptions and waivers apply requires complete product origin information. Although the responsibility to certify the origins of products supplied to the federal government rests with the contractors, contracting officers would benefit from resources that help them identify information that may be inconsistent, to ensure that accurate information is available. We are making four recommendations, one each to the Office of Management and Budget, DHS, VA, and HHS. The Director of the Office of Management and Budget should instruct the Office of Federal Procurement Policy: To facilitate additional training to improve the understanding of the contracting workforce regarding the Buy American Act requirements; and To facilitate clarifying revisions to FPDS-NG, where needed, and provide training and guidance for recording Buy American Act information in FPDS-NG to improve the accuracy of the Buy American data. (Recommendation 1) The Secretary of Homeland Security should clarify existing guidance in the Homeland Security Acquisition Manual or update training to help contracting officials: Identify the factors that should be considered in order to determine the applicability of the Trade Agreements Act and waiver of the Buy American Act; Document determinations of the use of Buy American exception for domestic non-availability and ensure the required approvals are obtained, particularly when such determinations are evidenced through justifications for other than full and open competition; and Identify sources of information available for determining product origin and the steps they should take to verify information that is inconsistent. (Recommendation 2) The Secretary of Veterans Affairs should clarify existing guidance, or provide training or other instruction, to help contracting officials: Address the applicability of the Buy American Act requirements and provide instruction on how to implement the requirements, including in any training developed to implement the Veterans First policy; Identify the factors that should be considered in order to determine the applicability of the Trade Agreements Act and waiver of the Buy American Act; and Identify sources of information available for determining products’ origins and the steps they should take to verify information that is inconsistent. (Recommendation 3) The Secretary of Health and Human Services should provide guidance, training, or other instruction to help contracting officials: Identify the factors that should be considered in order to determine the applicability of the Trade Agreements Act and waiver of the Buy American Act; Document determinations of the use of Buy American exceptions for domestic non-availability and ensure the required approvals are obtained; and Identify sources of information available for determining products’ origins and the steps they should take to verify information that is inconsistent. (Recommendation 4) We provided a draft of this report to DOD, HHS, DHS, VA, and the Office of Management and Budget for review and comment. DOD reviewed the report, but did not offer comments. HHS, DHS, and VA provided written responses, which are reproduced in Appendices IV, V, and VI of this report, respectively. A senior official within the Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) at the Office of Management and Budget provided a response via email. In addition, HHS, DHS, and OFPP provided technical comments, which we incorporated into the report where appropriate. In their responses, HHS, DHS, VA agreed, and OFPP generally agreed, with our findings and recommendations. The written response from HHS and DHS included information on the steps each agency plans to take to address the recommendations. Specifically, HHS stated that the agency will evaluate ways to provide additional training and guidance to contracting officials. DHS stated that it will provide guidance on the applicability of the Buy American Act and the Trade Agreements Act in certain situations and the documentation and approvals required when awarding non-competed contracts that require an exception. Additionally, DHS plans to update training regarding actions contracting officers should take when there are discrepancies in product origin information. VA concurred with our three-part recommendation and described some of the actions the agency plans to take in response. However, VA’s comments do not fully address our recommendation. Specifically, we recommended that VA clarify guidance or provide training to identify factors that could help contracting officers determine the applicability of Trade Agreements Act waivers of the Buy American Act. The comments from VA, however, only restate the existing Buy American Act exceptions and make no mention of Trade Agreements Act waivers. Further, we recommended that VA identify sources of information regarding product origin and the steps to be taken to verify inconsistent product origin information. VA’s response only noted that contracting officers are responsible for conducting market research and ensuring that all product origin requirements are met. VA did not outline any additional steps the agency would take to help contracting officers navigate the complexities inherent in this area. Going forward, VA will need to develop a more robust and responsive approach in order to fully implement our recommendation. We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees; the Secretaries of the Departments of Defense, Health and Human Services, Homeland Security, and Veterans Affairs; the Director of the Office of Management and Budget; and other interested parties. In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-4841 or woodsw@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix VII. The objectives of this report are to assess the extent to which (1) the federal government procures foreign products through Buy American Act exceptions and waivers; and (2) selected agencies provide training and guidance to implement the Buy American Act requirements. To address both of these objectives, we reviewed relevant laws and policies, such as sections of the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR); the Buy American Act as amended; the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 as amended; federal acquisition regulation supplements from audited agencies such as the Department of Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS); the Executive Order “Buy American, Hire American” of 2017; the World Trade Organization’s Agreement on Government Procurement; and memorandums, policy, guidance, and instructions related to the Buy American Act. To assess the federal government procurement of foreign products, including those procured through citing exceptions and waivers of the Buy American Act, we analyzed data from the Federal Procurement Data System-Next Generation (FPDS-NG) for fiscal year 2017, which was the most recent and complete data available at the time of our review. We analyzed procurement data in FPDS-NG across the federal government in fields relevant to the Buy American Act’s domestic preference requirements, including the product service code, country of product origin, and place of manufacture, in addition to fields such as the contract value and dollars obligated. We reviewed the place of manufacture field in particular as it contains information on how the Buy American Act applies to the contract, including whether the preponderance of the obligations is for manufactured end products and, if so, whether they are manufactured in or outside of the United States. When manufactured outside of the United States, this field also captures the reason the purchase was permissible, which we analyzed to assess the dollar obligations associated with the various Buy American exceptions or trade agreement waiver reported, as well as when products were used outside of the United States. We also analyzed data from FPDS-NG to identify the countries where foreign end products were reported to be manufactured and the associated dollars obligated in fiscal year 2017. In addition, we met with officials from the Office of Management and Budget, Office of Federal Procurement Policy to better understand ongoing reviews of the data in FPDS-NG that pertains to the Buy American Act. In our analysis of FPDS-NG data, we took steps to minimize issues that might affect data reliability. Specifically, we analyzed FPDS-NG data to identify potential errors and inconsistencies, such as non-eligible agencies reporting the use of exceptions for DOD qualifying countries, or reporting trade agreement waivers for contracts valued less than minimum thresholds for trade agreements. We made minor adjustments to minimize potential data reporting issues, including aggregating the exceptions reported, and where appropriate, limiting our analysis to one year of data, fiscal year 2017. Based on these steps, we determined that FPDS-NG data were sufficiently reliable to allow us to calculate the approximate extent of obligations for foreign end products and the use of the Buy American Act exceptions and the Trade Agreements Act waiver. However, we are unable to precisely determine the amount spent on foreign end products through the use of exceptions and waivers because of the reporting errors and data system limitations we identified in this report. Using FPDS-ND data, we identified four agencies—the Departments of Defense (DOD), Health and Human Services (HHS), Homeland Security (DHS), and Veterans Affairs (VA)—that had the highest fiscal year 2017 obligations in the product codes for manufactured products, which are potentially subject to the Buy American Act restrictions. In addition, to identify trends and determine if there were variations in reported obligations for foreign end products in the past, we reviewed FPDS-NG data on the Buy American exceptions and trade agreement waivers in fiscal years 2013 through 2017. To assess the extent to which selected agencies are providing training and guidance to implement the requirements of the Buy American Act, we reviewed training course materials and regulations, policies, and other guidance available at the four agencies in our review—DOD, HHS, DHS, and VA—to determine the extent to which they address the Buy American Act requirements. In addition, we reviewed training materials available to government employees through sources such as the Federal Acquisition Institute. We interviewed policy officials from the four agencies to understand how training and guidance had been implemented. We further reviewed relevant inspector general reports from the DOD Inspector General issued between 2015 and 2018, which made several recommendations to improve compliance with the Buy American Act, among other requirements. Within the four agencies, we selected contracting offices that reported obligating fiscal year 2017 dollars for awards with foreign end products and awards with US-manufactured end products. We specifically focused on offices that reported a sufficient amount of foreign end product obligations and a sufficient number of contract awards to allow us to select multiple contracts. We also considered offices with a variety of Buy American exceptions and waiver types reported, in order to select a mix of contracts. The contracting offices selected were as follows: DOD: Defense Logistics Agency, Land and Maritime HHS: National Institutes of Health and the HHS Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response DHS: United States Coast Guard VA: Veterans Health Administration From these offices, we selected a non-generalizable sample of 38 contracts and delivery orders awarded in fiscal year 2017. At each agency, we selected awards to include a mix of end items produced by domestic and foreign manufacturers and, when products were reported as foreign manufactured, a mix of the various exceptions and waivers cited. We also include awards across a range of value for dollars obligated above the micro purchase threshold—ranging from approximately $5,000 to more than $100 million—to ensure we reviewed awards both above and below the various thresholds at which the Trade Agreements Act waiver might apply. Additionally, our sample included awards for similar types of end products across agencies, including aircraft parts at DOD and DHS and medical supplies at HHS and VA, to compare practices in different agencies. We originally selected 40 awards for review—10 from each agency—but removed two awards from our sample. One was an HHS award that we determined was awarded using Other Transaction Authority and was not subject to the Buy American Act. The second excluded contract was from DHS, which was modified after award to reflect that it was an information technology service rather than a product. As a service, it would not be subject to the Buy American Act. We reviewed the contract files for each of the 38 awards in our sample, including documentation such as the contract and task order award, solicitations, vendors’ offers or response to proposals, determination and finding memos, and FPDS-NG output documents. In addition, we reviewed the certifications each vendor provided in the System for Award Management (SAM) at the time of contract award. We interviewed contracting officials responsible for each of the 38 contracts and task orders to understand how they addressed the Buy American Act requirements, including how they determined exception or waiver applicability and product origin. We also reviewed any agency-specific or local training and guidance, tools, or job aids available to assist contracting officers in implementing the Act’s requirements We conducted this performance audit from October 2017 to December 2018 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on audit objectives. The United States maintains trade relationships with other countries whose specific negotiated terms results in different levels and types of applicability for waivers and exceptions to the Buy American Act. Figure 4 depicts the range of relationships that the United States maintains with other nations that allow for less restrictive purchasing of foreign end products by the federal government. The federal government purchases foreign end products from various countries. Figure 5 highlights the different amounts of contract obligations for foreign end products from these countries for fiscal year 2017. The highest category, over $500 million, includes 4 countries that account for almost 40 percent of all federal procurement of foreign end products. Countries where the federal government obligated less than $5 million for the procurement of foreign end products are not included. In addition to the contact named above, Candice Wright, Assistant Director; and Jennifer Dougherty, Analyst-in-Charge, managed this review. Skip McClinton; Erin Stockdale; Adam Cowles; Stephanie Gustafson; Julia Kennon; Anne Louise Taylor; and Robin Wilson made key contributions to this report.

Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 1.

Answer: Congress has delegated responsibility for monetary policy to the Federal Reserve (the Fed), the nation's central bank, but retains oversight responsibilities for ensuring that the Fed is adhering to its statutory mandate of "maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates." To meet its price stability mandate, the Fed has set a longer-run goal of 2% inflation. The Fed's control over monetary policy stems from its exclusive ability to alter the money supply and credit conditions more broadly. Normally, the Fed conducts monetary policy by setting a target for the federal funds rate, the rate at which banks borrow and lend reserves on an overnight basis. It meets its target through open market operations, financial transactions traditionally involving U.S. Treasury securities. Beginning in 2007, the federal funds target was reduced from 5.25% to a range of 0% to 0.25% in December 2008, which economists call the zero lower bound. By historical standards, rates were kept unusually low for an unusually long time to mitigate the effects of the financial crisis and its aftermath. Starting in December 2015, the Fed has been raising interest rates and expects to gradually raise rates further. The Fed raised rates once in 2016, three times in 2017, and four times in 2018, by 0.25 percentage points each time. In light of increased economic uncertainty and financial volatility, the Fed announced in January 2019 that it would be "patient" before raising rates again. The Fed influences interest rates to affect interest-sensitive spending, such as business capital spending on plant and equipment, household spending on consumer durables, and residential investment. In addition, when interest rates diverge between countries, it causes capital flows that affect the exchange rate between foreign currencies and the dollar, which in turn affects spending on exports and imports. Through these channels, monetary policy can be used to stimulate or slow aggregate spending in the short run. In the long run, monetary policy mainly affects inflation. A low and stable rate of inflation promotes price transparency and, thereby, sounder economic decisions. The Fed's relative independence from Congress and the Administration has been justified by many economists on the grounds that it reduces political pressure to make monetary policy decisions that are inconsistent with a long-term focus on stable inflation. But independence reduces accountability to Congress and the Administration, and recent legislation and criticism of the Fed by the President has raised the question about the proper balance between the two. While the federal funds target was at the zero lower bound, the Fed attempted to provide additional stimulus through unsterilized purchases of Treasury and mortgage-backed securities (MBS), a practice popularly referred to as quantitative easing (QE). Between 2009 and 2014, the Fed undertook three rounds of QE. The third round was completed in October 2014, at which point the Fed's balance sheet was $4.5 trillion—five times its precrisis size. After QE ended, the Fed maintained the balance sheet at the same level until September 2017, when it began to very gradually reduce it to a more normal size. The Fed has raised interest rates in the presence of a large balance sheet through the use of two new tools—by paying banks interest on reserves held at the Fed and by engaging in reverse repurchase agreements (reverse repos) through a new overnight facility. In January 2019, the Fed announced that it would continue using these tools to set interest rates permanently, in which case the balance sheet may not get much smaller than its current size of $4 trillion. With regard to its mandate, the Fed believes that unemployment is currently lower than the rate that it considers consistent with maximum employment, and inflation is close to the Fed's 2% goal by the Fed's preferred measure. Even after recent rate increases, monetary policy is still considered expansionary. This monetary policy stance is unusually stimulative compared with policy in this stage of previous expansions, and is being coupled with a stimulative fiscal policy (larger structural budget deficit). Debate is currently focused on how quickly the Fed should raise rates. Some contend the greater risk is that raising rates too slowly at full employment will cause inflation to become too high or cause financial instability, whereas others contend that raising rates too quickly will cause inflation to remain too low and choke off the expansion.