You are given two reports by the government agency.  

Report 1:
The rise of e-commerce has contributed to a fundamental change in the market for counterfeit goods, according to our analysis of documents from CBP, ICE, and international organizations and our interviews with CBP and ICE officials. U.S. agencies and international organizations have observed a shift in the sale of counterfeit goods from “underground” or secondary markets, such as flea markets or sidewalk vendors, to primary markets, including e-commerce websites, corporate and government supply chains, and traditional retail stores. Whereas secondary markets are often characterized by consumers who are knowingly purchasing counterfeits, primary markets involve counterfeiters who try to deceive consumers into purchasing goods they believe are authentic. This shift has been accompanied by changes in the ways in which counterfeit goods are sold. In the past, consumers could often rely on indicators such as the location of sale or the goods’ appearance or price to identify counterfeit goods in the marketplace. However, counterfeiters have now adopted new ways to deceive consumers. For example, as consumers increasingly purchase goods online, counterfeiters may exploit third-party online marketplaces to gain an appearance of legitimacy and access to consumers. When selling online, counterfeiters may post pictures of authentic goods on the websites where they are selling counterfeits and may post pseudonymous reviews of their products or businesses in order to appear legitimate. Additionally, by setting the price of a counterfeit at, or close to, the retail price of a genuine good, counterfeiters may deceive consumers, who will pay the higher price because they believe the goods are real or who believe that they are getting a slight bargain on genuine goods. According to CBP seizure data and CBP officials, the volume, variety, and methods of shipment of counterfeit goods seized by CBP and ICE have changed in recent years. CBP reports indicate that the number of IPR seizures increased by 38 percent in fiscal years 2012 through 2016. According to CBP data, approximately 88 percent of IPR seizures made during this period were shipped from China and Hong Kong. The variety of products being counterfeited has also increased, according to CBP officials. CBP and ICE officials noted that, while many consumers may think of luxury handbags or watches as the most commonly counterfeited goods, counterfeiting occurs in nearly every industry and across a broad range of products. In addition, according to CBP data we reviewed and officials we spoke to, the methods of importing counterfeit goods into the United States have changed in recent years. Specifically, express carriers and international mail have become the predominant form of transportation for IPR-infringing goods entering the United States, constituting approximately 90 percent of all IPR seizures in fiscal years 2015 and 2016, according to CBP data. In an attempt to illustrate the risk that consumers may unknowingly encounter counterfeit products online, we purchased a nongeneralizable sample of four types of consumer products—shoes, travel mugs, cosmetics, and phone chargers—from third-party sellers on five popular e-commerce websites. According to CBP data we reviewed and officials we spoke to, CBP often seizes IPR-infringing counterfeits of these types of products. As table 1 shows, the rights holders for the four selected products we purchased determined that 20 of the 47 items were counterfeit. We did not identify any clear reasons for the variation among the counterfeit and authentic items that we purchased based on the products that they represented, the e-commerce websites where we bought the items, or the third-party sellers from whom we bought them. For three of the four product types, at least one item we purchased was determined to be counterfeit, with results varying considerably by product. Representatives of the rights holders also could not provide a specific explanation for the variation among authentic and counterfeit goods that we received. They noted that the results of covert test purchases can fluctuate depending on enforcement activities and the variety of goods and sellers on a particular website on a given day. Rights-holder testing also showed that we purchased at least one counterfeit item and one authentic item from each of the five e-commerce websites. In addition, our analysis of the customer ratings of third-party sellers from whom we bought the items did not provide any clear indications that could warn consumers that a product marketed online may be counterfeit. For example, we received both counterfeit and authentic items from third- party sellers with ratings that were less than 70 percent positive as well as sellers with ratings that were up to 100 percent positive. Rights holders were able to determine that items we purchased were not authentic on the basis of inferior quality, incorrect markings or construction, and incorrect labeling. Some counterfeit items we purchased were easily identifiable as likely counterfeit once we received them. For example, one item contained misspellings of “Austin, TX” and “Made in China.” Other items could be more difficult for a typical consumer to identify as counterfeit. For example, the rights holder for a cosmetic product we purchased identified one counterfeit item on the basis of discrepancies in the color, composition, and design of the authentic and counterfeit items’ packaging. Counterfeit goods may also lack key elements of certification markings and other identifiers. For example, on a counterfeit phone charger we purchased, the UL certification mark did not include all components of the authentic mark. Figure 1 shows examples of these counterfeit items. The risks associated with the types of counterfeit goods we purchased can extend beyond the infringement of a company’s IPR. For example, a UL investigation of counterfeit iPhone adapters found a 99 percent failure rate in 400 counterfeit adapters tested for safety, fire, and shock hazards and found that 12 of the adapters tested posed a risk of lethal electrocution to the user. Similarly, according to a rights holder representative, counterfeits of common consumer goods, such as Yeti travel mugs, may contain higher-than-approved concentrations of dangerous chemicals such as lead, posing health risks to consumers. According to ICE, seized counterfeit cosmetics have been found to contain hazardous substances, including cyanide, arsenic, mercury, lead, urine, and rat droppings. Representatives of rights holders and e-commerce websites whom we interviewed reported taking independent action to try to protect IPR within their areas of responsibility. For example, both rights holders and e- commerce websites maintain IPR protection teams that work with one another and with law enforcement to address infringement issues. E- commerce websites may also take a variety of steps to block and remove counterfeit items listed by third-party sellers. These efforts rely on data collected through a variety of means, including consumer reporting of counterfeits, rights-holder notifications of IPR infringement, and corporate efforts to vet potential third-party sellers, according to private sector representatives. Our January 2018 report includes information on steps that consumer protection organizations and government agencies recommend consumers take to limit the risk of purchasing counterfeits online. These steps include, for example, buying only from authorized retailers online, avoiding prices that look “too good to be true,” and reporting counterfeit purchases. We identified a number of key challenges that the changes in the market for counterfeit goods can pose to CBP and ICE as well as to the private sector. First, the increasing sophistication of counterfeits can make it difficult for law enforcement officers to distinguish between legitimate and counterfeit goods. Second, as the range of counterfeit goods expands, CBP has a wider variety of goods to screen, which requires CBP officials to have in-depth knowledge of a broad range of products and of how to identify counterfeits. Third, counterfeiters may break up large shipments into multiple smaller express carrier or mail packages to decrease the risk of losing significant quantities of merchandise to a single seizure. This shift toward smaller express shipments of counterfeit goods to the United States poses challenges to CBP and ICE because, according to CBP officials, seizure processing requires roughly the same amount of time and resources regardless of shipment size or value. The changing marketplace also presents challenges to the private sector, according to representatives from rights holders and e-commerce websites. For example, it is more difficult for rights holders and e- commerce websites to identify and investigate individual counterfeit cases, because e-commerce websites face a growing inventory from a larger registry of sellers. Tracking goods from known counterfeiters through various website fulfillment and delivery mechanisms is also a significant challenge for the private sector. Furthermore, the growth of e- commerce has accelerated the pace at which counterfeiters can gain access to consumers or reinvent themselves if shut down. CBP and ICE engage in a number of activities to enhance IPR enforcement; however, while ICE has assessed some of its efforts, CBP has taken limited steps to do so. CBP’s and ICE’s IPR enforcement activities broadly include detecting imports of potentially IPR-infringing goods, conducting special operations at U.S. ports, engaging with international partners, and undertaking localized pilot programs or port- led initiatives. CBP and ICE have collected some performance data on activities we reviewed, and ICE has taken some steps to better understand the impact of its efforts, such as creating a process to track cases it deems significant. However, we found that CBP has conducted limited evaluation of its efforts to enhance IPR enforcement. Consequently, we concluded that CBP may lack information needed to ensure it is investing its resources in the most efficient and effective activities. We recommended in our report that CBP take steps to evaluate the effectiveness of its IPR enforcement efforts; CBP concurred with this recommendation. Our analysis showed that CBP and ICE interagency collaboration on IPR enforcement is generally consistent with the following selected key practices for effective interagency collaboration: (1) define and articulate a common outcome; (2) establish mutually reinforcing or joint strategies; (3) identify and address needs by leveraging resources; (4) agree on roles and responsibilities; and (5) establish compatible policies, procedures, and other means to operate across agency boundaries. For example, the agencies may leverage resources by collocating staff or sharing their expertise. CBP and ICE have also issued guidance and developed standard operating procedures to clarify roles and responsibilities. CBP and ICE also coordinate with the private sector in a variety of ways, such as obtaining private sector assistance to determine whether detained goods are authentic and to conduct training. Representatives of rights holders and e-commerce websites noted that information shared by law enforcement entities is critical to private sector IPR enforcement, such as pursuing civil action against a counterfeiter or removing counterfeit items from websites. In the Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015, Congress provided CBP with explicit authority to share certain information with trademark and copyright owners before completing a seizure. CBP officials stated that they share information about identified counterfeits with e-commerce websites and rights holders to the extent possible under current regulations. However, according to private sector representatives we spoke to, restrictions on the amount and type of information about seized items shared by CBP limit the ability of rights holders and e-commerce websites to protect IPR. CBP officials noted that there are legal limitations to the amount and type of information they can share, particularly if the e-commerce website is not listed as the importer on forms submitted to CBP. Several private sector representatives stated that receiving additional information from CBP would enhance their ability to protect IPR. Representatives of one website noted that information on the exterior of seized packages, such as business identifiers on packages destined for distribution centers, would be helpful for identifying groups of counterfeit merchandise from the same seller. However, according to CBP officials, CBP cannot provide such information to e-commerce websites. Representatives of one e-commerce website noted that ICE sometimes shares information related to an investigation, but that ICE’s involvement in the enforcement process begins only after CBP has identified and seized counterfeit items. Representatives of two e-commerce websites stated that, because of the limited information shared by CBP, they may not be aware of IPR-infringing goods offered for sale on their websites, even if CBP has seized related items from the same seller. According to CBP officials, CBP is reviewing options for sharing additional information with rights holders and e-commerce websites and is assessing what, if any, additional information would be beneficial to share with private sector entities. CBP officials stated that they have not yet determined whether changes to the amount and types of information provided to e-commerce websites would require regulatory changes or additional legal authorities. These officials also said that they have discussed differences in CBP’s and ICE’s information sharing with ICE officials. In our report, we recommended that CBP, in consultation with ICE, assess what, if any, additional information would be beneficial to share with the private sector and, as appropriate, take action to enhance information sharing where possible. CBP concurred with this recommendation. Chairman Hatch, Ranking Member Wyden, and Members of the Committee, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be pleased to answer any questions that you may have at this time. If you or your staff have any questions about this testimony, please contact Kimberly Gianopoulos, Director, International Affairs and Trade, at (202) 512-8612 or gianopoulosk@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement. GAO staff who made key contributions to this testimony are Joyee Dasgupta, Kara Marshall, Katie Bassion, Kristen Timko, Reid Lowe, Sarah Collins, Neil Doherty, Ramon Rodriguez, Helina Wong, Julie Spetz, Kevin Loh, Wayne McElrath, Grace Lui, James Murphy, Mary Moutsos, Justin Fisher, Rachel Stoiko, and Sarah Veale. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.

 

 Report 2:
This report provides responses to frequently asked questions about the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grant. It is intended to serve as a quick reference to provide easy access to information and data. Appendix B presents a series of tables with state-level data. This report does not provide information on TANF program rules (for a discussion of TANF rules, see CRS Report RL32748, The Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) Block Grant: A Primer on TANF Financing and Federal Requirements , by Gene Falk). On January 24, 2019, the President signed legislation ( P.L. 116-4 ) that funds TANF and related programs through June 30, 2019. The legislation permits states to receive their quarterly TANF grants for the 2 nd quarter (January through March) and 3 rd quarter (April through June) of FY2019. Additional legislation would be required to pay TANF grants in the final quarter (July through September) of FY2019. TANF programs are funded through a combination of federal and state funds. In FY2018, TANF has two federal grants to states. The bulk of the TANF funding is in a basic block grant to the states, totaling $16.5 billion for the 50 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, Guam, the Virgin Islands, and American Indian tribes. There is also a contingency fund available that provides extra federal funds to states that meet certain conditions. Additionally, states are required to expend a minimum amount of their own funds for TANF and TANF-related activities under what is known as the maintenance of effort (MOE) requirement. States are required to spend at least 75% of what they spent in FY1994 on TANF's predecessor programs. The minimum MOE amount, in total, is $10.3 billion per year for the 50 states, the District of Columbia, and the territories. TANF was created in the 1996 welfare reform law, the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA, P.L. 104-193 ). A TANF basic block grant amount—both nationally and for each state—was established in the 1996 welfare reform law. The amount established in that law for the 50 states, District of Columbia, territories, and tribes was $16.6 billion in total. From FY1997 through FY2016, that amount remained the same. It was not adjusted for changes that occur over time, such as inflation, the size of the TANF assistance caseload, or changes in the poverty population. During this period, the real (inflation-adjusted) value of the block grant declined by one-third (33.1%). Beginning with FY2017, the state family assistance grant was reduced by 0.33% from its historical levels to finance TANF-related research and technical assistance. The reduced block grant amount is $16.5 billion. Table 1 shows the state family assistance grant, in both nominal (actual) and real (inflation-adjusted) dollars for each year, FY1997 through FY2018. In real (inflation-adjusted) terms, the FY2018 block grant was 36% below its value in FY1997. Figure 1 shows the uses of federal TANF grants to states and state MOE funds in FY2017. In FY2017, a total of $31.1 billion of both federal TANF and state MOE expenditures were either expended or transferred to other block grant programs. Basic assistance—ongoing benefits to families to meet basic needs—represented 23% ($7.1 billion) of total FY2017 TANF and MOE dollars. TANF is a major contributor of child care funding. In FY2017, $5 billion (16% of all TANF and MOE funds) were either expended on child care or transferred to the child care block grant (the Child Care and Development Fund, or CCDF). TANF work-related activities (including education and training) were the third-largest TANF and MOE spending category at $3.3 billion, or 11% of total TANF and MOE funds. TANF also helps low-wage parents by helping to finance state refundable tax credits, such as state add-ons to the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC). TANF and MOE expenditures on refundable tax credits in FY2017 totaled $2.8 billion, or 9% of total TANF and MOE spending. TANF is also a major contributor to the child welfare system, which provides foster care, adoption assistance, and services to families with children who either have experienced or are at risk of experiencing child abuse or neglect, spending about $2.2 billion on such activities. TANF and MOE funds also help fund state prekindergarten (pre-K) programs, with total FY2017 expenditures for that category also at $2.5 billion. TANF and MOE funds are also used for short-term and emergency benefits and a wide range of other social services. For state-specific information on the use of TANF funds, see Table B-1 and Table B-2 . TANF law permits states to "reserve" unused funds without time limit. This permits flexibility in timing of the use of TANF funds, including the ability to "save" funds for unexpected occurrences that might increase costs (such as recessions or natural disasters). At the end of FY2017 (September 30, 2017, the most recent data currently available), a total of $5.1 billion of federal TANF funding remained neither transferred nor spent. However, some of these unspent funds represent monies that states had already committed to spend later. At the end of FY2017, states had made such commitments to spend—that is, had obligated—a total of $1.8 billion. At the end of FY2017, states had $3.3 billion of "unobligated balances." These funds are available to states to make new spending commitments. Table B-3 shows unspent TANF funds by state. This number is not known. Federal TANF reporting requirements focus on families receiving only ongoing assistance . There is no complete reporting on families receiving other TANF benefits and services. Assistance is defined as benefits provided to families to meet ongoing, basic needs. It is most often paid in cash. However, some states use TANF or MOE funds to provide an "earnings supplement" to working parents added to monthly Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) allotments. These "earnings supplements" are paid separately from the regular TANF cash assistance program. Additionally, TANF MOE dollars are used to fund food assistance for immigrants barred from regular SNAP benefits in certain states. These forms of nutrition aid meet an ongoing need, and thus are considered TANF assistance. As discussed in a previous section of this report, TANF basic assistance accounts for about 24% of all TANF expenditures. Therefore, the federal reporting requirements that pertain to families receiving "assistance" are likely to undercount the number of families receiving any TANF-funded benefit or service. Table 2 provides assistance caseload information. A total of 1.2 million families, composed of 3.1 million recipients, received TANF- or MOE-funded assistance in September 2018. The bulk of the "recipients" were children—2.3 million in that month. For state-by-state assistance caseloads, see Table B-4 . Figure 2 provides a long-term historical perspective on the number of families receiving assistance from TANF or its predecessor program, from July 1959 to September 2017. The shaded areas of the figure represent months when the national economy was in recession. Though the health of the national economy has affected the trend in the cash assistance caseload, the long-term trend in receipt of cash assistance does not follow a classic countercyclical pattern. Such a pattern would have the caseload rise during economic slumps, and then fall again during periods of economic growth. Factors other than the health of the economy (demographic trends, policy changes) also have influenced the caseload trend. The figure shows two periods of sustained caseload increases: the period from the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s and a second period from 1988 to 1994. The number of families receiving assistance peaked in March 1994 at 5.1 million families. The assistance caseload fell rapidly in the late 1990s (after the 1996 welfare reform law) before leveling off in 2001. In 2004, the caseload began another decline, albeit at a slower pace than in the late 1990s. During the recent 2007-2009 recession and its aftermath, the caseload began to rise from 1.7 million families in August 2008, peaking in December 2010 at close to 2.0 million families. By September 2018, the assistance caseload had declined to 1.2 million families. Table B-5 shows recent trends in the number of cash assistance families by state. Before PRWORA, the "typical" family receiving assistance has been headed by a single parent (usually the mother) with one or two children. That single parent has also typically been unemployed. However, over the past 20 years the assistance caseload decline has occurred together with a major shift in the composition of the rolls. Figure 3 shows the change in the size and composition of the assistance caseload under both AFDC (1988 and 1994) and TANF. In FY1988, an estimated 84% of AFDC families were headed by an unemployed adult recipient. In FY2016, families with an unemployed adult recipient represented 32% of all cash assistance families. This decline occurred, in large part, as the number of families headed by unemployed adult recipients declined more rapidly than other components of the assistance caseload. In FY1994, a monthly average of 3.8 million families per month who received AFDC cash assistance had adult recipients who were not working. In FY2016, a monthly average of 485,000 families per month had adult recipients or work-eligible individuals, with no adult recipient or work-eligible individual working. With the decline in families headed by unemployed adults, the share of the caseload represented by families with employed adults and "child only" families has increased. In FY2017, families with all adult recipients unemployed and families with employed adult recipients each represented 31% of all assistance families. The latter category includes families in "earnings supplement" programs separate from the regular TANF cash assistance program. "Child-only" families are those where no adult recipient receives benefits in their own right; the family receives benefits on behalf of its children. The share of the caseload that was child-only in FY2017 was 38%. In FY2017, families with a nonrecipient, nonparent relative (grandparents, aunts, uncles) represented 14% of all assistance families. Families with ineligible, noncitizen adults or adults who have not reported their citizenship status made up 9% of the assistance caseload in that year. Families where the parent received Supplemental Security Income (SSI) and the children received TANF made up 9% of all assistance families in FY2017. There are no federal rules that help determine the amount of TANF cash benefits paid to a family. (There are also no federal rules that require states to use TANF to pay cash benefits, though all states do so.) Benefit amounts are determined solely by the states. Most states base TANF cash benefit amounts on family size, paying larger cash benefits to larger families on the presumption that they have greater financial needs. The maximum monthly cash benefit is usually paid to a family that receives no other income (e.g., no earned or unearned income) and complies with program rules. Families with income other than TANF often are paid a reduced benefit. Moreover, some families are financially sanctioned for not meeting a program requirement (e.g., a work requirement), and are also paid a lower benefit. Figure 4 shows the maximum monthly TANF cash benefit by state for a single mother caring for two children (family of three) in July 2016. The benefit amounts shown are those for a single-parent family with two children. For a family of three, the maximum TANF benefit paid in July 2017 varied from $170 per month in Mississippi to $1,201 per month in New Hampshire. The map shows a regional pattern to the maximum monthly benefit paid, with lower benefit amounts in the South than in other regions. Only New Hampshire (at 60% of the federal poverty guidelines) had a maximum TANF cash assistance amount for this sized family in excess of 50% of poverty-level income. TANF's main federal work requirement is actually a performance measure that applies to the states, rather than individual recipients. States determine the work rules that apply to individual recipients. The TANF statute requires states to have 50% of their caseload meet standards of participation in work or activities—that is, a family member must be in specified activities for a minimum number of hours. There is a separate participation standard that applies to the two-parent portion of a state's caseload, requiring 90% of the state's two-parent caseload to meet participation standards. However, the statutory work participation standards are reduced by a "caseload reduction credit." The caseload reduction credit reduces the participation standard one percentage point for each percentage point decline in a state's caseload. Additionally, under a regulatory provision, a state may get "extra" credit for caseload reduction if it spends more than required under the TANF MOE. Therefore, the effective standards states face are often less than the 50% and 90% targets, and vary by state and by year. States that do not meet the TANF work participation standard are at risk of being penalized through a reduction in their block grant. However, penalties can be forgiven if a state claims, and the Secretary of HHS finds, that it had "reasonable cause" for not meeting the standard. Penalties can also be forgiven for states that enter into "corrective compliance plans," and subsequently meet the work standard. The 50% and 90% target standards that states face, as well as the caseload reduction credit, date back to the 1996 welfare reform law. However, the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 (DRA, P.L. 109-171 ) made several changes to the work participation rules effective in FY2007 The caseload reduction credit was changed to measure caseload reduction from FY2005, rather than the original law's FY1995. The work participation standards were broadened to include families receiving cash aid in "separate state programs." Separate state programs are programs run with state funds, distinct from a state's "TANF program," but with expenditures countable toward the TANF MOE. HHS was instructed to provide definition to the allowable TANF work activities listed in law. HHS was also required to define what is meant by a "work-eligible" individual, expanding the number of families that are included in the work participation calculation. States were required to develop plans and procedures to verify work activities. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA, P.L. 111-5 ), a law enacted in response to the sharp economic downturn of 2007-2009, held states "harmless" for caseload increases affecting the work participation standards for FY2009 through FY2011. It did so by allowing states to "freeze" caseload reduction credits at pre-recession levels through the FY2011 standards. HHS computes two work participation rates for each state that are then compared with the effective (after-credit) standard to determine if it has met the TANF work standard. An "all-families" work participation rate is computed and compared with the all-families effective standard (50% minus the state's caseload reduction credit). HHS also computes a two-parent work participation rate that is compared with the two-parent effective standard (90% minus the state's caseload reduction credit). Figure 5 shows the national average all-families work participation rate for FY2002 through FY2017. For the period FY2002 through FY2011, states achieved an average all-families work participation rate hovering around 30%. The work participation rate increased since then. In FY2016, it exceeded 50% for the first time since TANF was established. However, it is important to note that the increase in the work participation rate has not come from an increase in the number of recipients in regular TANF assistance programs who are either working or in job preparation activities. This increase stems mostly from states creating new "earnings supplement" programs that use TANF funds to aid working parents in the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP, formerly food stamps) or who have left the regular TANF assistance programs for work. Figure 6 shows which states did not meet the TANF all-families work participation standards from FY2006 through FY2017. Before FY2007, the first year that DRA was effective, only a few jurisdictions did not meet TANF all-families work participation standards. However, in FY2007, 15 jurisdictions did not meet the all-families standard. This number declined to 9 in FY2008 and 8 in FY2009. In FY2012, despite the uptick in the national average work participation rate, 16 states did not meet the all-family standard, the largest number of states that did not meet their participation standards in any one year since the enactment of TANF. FY2012 was the year that ARRA's "freeze" of the caseload reduction credit expired, and states were generally required to meet higher standards than in previous years. The number of jurisdictions that did not meet the all-families standard declined over the FY2012 to FY2017 period. In FY2017, two jurisdictions did not meet the all-family participation standard: Nevada and Guam. In addition to meeting a work standard for all families, TANF also imposes a second standard—90%—for the two-parent portion of its cash assistance caseload. This standard can also be lowered by caseload reduction. Figure 7 shows whether each state met its two-parent work participation standard for FY2006 through FY2017. However, the display on the table is more complex than that for reporting whether a state met or did not meet its "all family" rate. A substantial number of states have reported no two-parent families subject to the work participation standard. These states are denoted on the table with an "NA," indicating that the two-parent standard was not applicable to the state in that year. Before the changes made by the DRA were effective, a number of states had their two-parent families in separate state programs that were not included in the work participation calculation. When DRA brought families receiving assistance in separate state programs into the work participation rate calculations, a number of states moved these families into solely state-funded programs. These are state-funded programs with expenditures not countable toward the TANF maintenance of effort requirement, and hence are outside of TANF's rules. For states with two-parent families in their caseloads, the table reports "Yes" for states that met the two-parent standard, and "No" for states that did not meet the two-parent standard. Of the 28 jurisdictions that had two-parent families in their FY2017 TANF work participation calculation, 19 met the standard and 9 did not. Appendix A. Supplementary Tables Appendix B. State Tables

Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 1.

Answer: This testimony summarizes the information contained in GAO's January 2018 report, entitled Intellectual Property: Agencies Can Improve Efforts to Address Risks Posed by Changing Counterfeits Market , ( GAO-18-216 ). Changes in the market for counterfeit goods entering the United States pose new challenges for consumers, the private sector, and U.S. agencies that enforce intellectual property rights (IPR). Specifically, growth in e-commerce has contributed to a shift in the sale of counterfeit goods in the United States, with consumers increasingly purchasing goods online and counterfeiters producing a wider variety of goods that may be sold on websites alongside authentic products. For example, 20 of 47 items GAO purchased from third-party sellers on popular consumer websites were counterfeit, according to testing by the products' rights holders (see table), highlighting potential risks to consumers. The changes in the market for counterfeit goods can also pose challenges to the private sector—for example, the challenge of distinguishing counterfeit from authentic goods listed for sale online—and complicate the enforcement efforts of U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). CBP and ICE engage in a number of activities to enhance IPR enforcement; however, while ICE has assessed some of its efforts, CBP has taken limited steps to do so. CBP's and ICE's IPR enforcement activities broadly include detecting imports of potentially IPR-infringing goods, conducting special operations at U.S. ports, engaging with international partners, and undertaking localized pilot programs or port-led initiatives. CBP and ICE have collected some performance data for each of the eight activities GAO reviewed, and ICE has taken some steps to understand the impact of its efforts. However, CBP has conducted limited evaluation of its efforts to enhance IPR enforcement. Consequently, CBP may lack information needed to ensure it is investing its resources in the most efficient and effective activities. CBP and ICE generally collaborate on IPR enforcement, but according to private sector representatives, restrictions on CBP's information sharing limit private sector enforcement efforts. GAO found that CBP and ICE have undertaken efforts that align with selected key practices for interagency collaboration, such as participating in developing a national IPR enforcement strategy and agreeing on roles and responsibilities. However, sharing additional information about seized items with rights-holding companies and e-commerce websites could improve enforcement, according to private sector representatives. CBP officials said they share information to the extent allowed under current regulations, but CBP has not completed an assessment of what, if any, additional information would be beneficial to share with private sector entities. Without such an assessment, CBP will not know if sharing additional information requires regulatory or legal changes.