You are given two reports by the government agency.  

Report 1:
Many Members of Congress became actively engaged in foreign policy debates over U.S. intervention in the 1992-1995 war in Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereafter, "Bosnia"). Congress monitored and at times challenged the Bush and Clinton Administrations' response to the conflict through numerous hearings, resolutions, and legislative initiatives. Many observers contend that the United States is a stakeholder in Bosnia's future because of the strong impact of U.S. intervention on the postwar Bosnian state. Nearly 25 years after warring parties in Bosnia reached the Dayton Agreement (see below), Bosnia faces numerous internal and external challenges, and the country retains geopolitical importance to U.S. interests in the Western Balkans. As Congress assesses ongoing and emerging security issues in the region, including resilience against malign external influence, renewed conflict, and radicalization, Bosnia's internal politics and its role in Balkan stability may merit further examination. Bosnia has existed in various forms throughout its history: a medieval kingdom, territory held by two major empires, a federal unit, and, since 1992, an independent state. Bosnia's present international borders are largely consistent with its administrative boundaries under later periods of Ottoman Turkish rule. After World War I, Bosnia became part of the newly created Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. It was one of the six constituent republics of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia from 1945 until 1992. Bosnia's constitution stems from the U.S.-brokered Dayton Peace Agreement that ended the country's 1992-1995 war. It recognizes three "constituent peoples": Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs. All three groups are Slavic. Religious tradition is considered a marker of difference among the three ethnic identities: Bosniaks are predominantly Muslim, Serbs are largely Orthodox Christian, and Croats are mostly Catholic. Although Bosnian, Croatian, and Serbian are recognized in Bosnia as distinct official languages, they are mutually intelligible. Bosniaks comprise approximately 50.1% of the population, Bosnian Serbs 30.8%, and Bosnian Croats 15.4%. In this report, Bosnian is used as a non-ethnic term for a person or institution from Bosnia. A Bosnian Serb is an ethnic Serb from Bosnia and a Bosnian Croat is an ethnic Croat from Bosnia. Bosniak refers to Slavic Muslims. Bosnia's religious and cultural diversity is one of its distinctive characteristics. Islam was introduced to part of Bosnia's population during the Ottoman period, although there were also large Catholic, Orthodox Christian, and Jewish communities. Bosnia was the most heterogeneous Yugoslav republic and the only one where no ethnic group formed an absolute majority. During the 1990s, some popular accounts of Bosnia (and the former Yugoslavia) depicted its ethnic relations as "ancient hatreds," implying that the country's ethnic groups cannot peacefully coexist and that the 1992-1995 war was unavoidable. However, many experts on the region reject this thesis. Although Bosnia has experienced episodes of communal violence and bloodshed, most recently during World War II and the 1992-1995 war, its heterogeneous population also has lived in mixed communities for periods of peace. Many experts contend that ethnic conflict often was stoked by domestic leaders who manipulated historical memory and grievances to further their own agendas, or by external powers seeking to rule Bosnia or annex its territory. In the 1980s, Yugoslavia's escalating political and economic crises fueled nationalist movements. Nationalist leaders in Serbia and Croatia appealed to Bosnian Serbs and Croats as ethnic "kin." The party that ruled Croatia for most of the 1990s, the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), established a sister party with the same name to mobilize Bosnian Croats and compete in Bosnia's elections. This gave Croatia an avenue of influence in Bosnian politics. Serbia, led by strongman Slobodan Milošević, likewise had influence over Bosnian Serb leaders. In Bosnia's November 1990 elections—the first competitive elections in decades—voters cast aside the ruling League of Communists party and elected ethnic parties that largely continue to dominate today. Bosnian voters backed independence in a 1992 referendum, following in the footsteps of Slovenia, Croatia, and Macedonia. Bosnian Serbs, who did not want to separate from Yugoslavia, boycotted the referendum. Bosnian Serb forces seized more than two-thirds of Bosnia's territory, and a three-year conflict followed that pitted Serb, Croat, and Bosniak forces against one another. Bosnian Serb leaders declared a "Serb Republic" ( Republika Srpska) in March 1992, while Bosnian Croat leaders proclaimed the Croat Community of Herceg-Bosnia in July. Some Bosnian Croat and Bosnian Serb leaders advocated unification with Croatia and Serbia, respectively, where government factions—including their strongman leaders—likewise wanted to carve a Greater Croatia and Greater Serbia out of Bosnia's territory. Bosniak leaders opposed dismemberment of the state. Bosnia's war was one of the most lethal conflicts in Europe since World War II. Bosnian Serb forces besieged Sarajevo for 44 months. More than 10,000 people, mostly civilians, died due to shelling, sniping, and blockade-related deprivation. Paramilitary factions from neighboring Croatia and Serbia—some of which reportedly had ties to the Croatian and Serbian government—fought alongside Bosnian Croats and Serbs. The Serb-dominated Yugoslav National Army also aided Bosnian Serb forces, giving them a military advantage. In many areas, combatants from the three groups killed or expelled members of other ethnic groups to "purify" territory that they wanted to claim as their own. This "ethnic cleansing" changed Bosnia's demographic landscape. An estimated 100,000 or more Bosnians were killed in the conflict, and roughly half of its population displaced. In addition, an estimated 20,000 or more women and girls were victims of sexual violence. Hundreds of Bosnians have been prosecuted for war crimes at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and in Bosnian courts. In 2016, the ICTY convicted wartime Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić of genocide and war crimes. In 2019, the tribunal rejected his appeal and increased his sentence from 40 years to life. Citizens of Croatia and Serbia have also been indicted for crimes committed in the Bosnian war. Highly publicized incidents in 1994 and 1995 underscored the war's human toll. Bosnian Serb forces bombarded a Sarajevo market in 1994 and 1995, resulting in over 100 civilian deaths. In July 1995, Serb forces commanded by Ratko Mladić seized and executed more than 8,000 Bosniak men and boys in a U.N.-designated safe area around the city of Srebrenica, an incident subsequently seen by some as a consequence of the international community's muddled, ineffectual response to the conflict. The International Court of Justice and ICTY subsequently ruled that the Srebrenica massacres constituted an act of genocide. Mladić was convicted of genocide and other crimes in 2017. These incidents increased pressure on U.S. policymakers to take a stronger role in resolving a conflict that had largely been left to the EU and the United Nations. Under U.S. command, NATO intervened in August and September 1995 with air strikes against Bosnian Serb targets, while allied Bosniak and Croat forces launched a simultaneous offensive in western Bosnia. The United States played a key role in brokering several agreements. The 1994 Washington Agreement ended the "war within a war" between Bosniaks and Croats. In November 1995, leaders from Croatia, Bosnia, and Serbia met at the Wright-Patterson Air Force base in Dayton, OH, to negotiate a peace agreement. U.S. diplomat Richard Holbrooke played a crucial role in brokering the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, more commonly known as the Dayton Peace Agreement. Bosnia's complex political system is a product of the Dayton Agreement; one of its annexes serves as Bosnia's constitution (Annex 4). Its provisions partly reflect the situation on the ground in 1995, including the subdivision of Bosnia into two ethnoterritorial entities ( Figure 1 ): Republika Srpska ("RS"), which Bosnian Serb leaders had proclaimed in 1992, and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina ("FBiH," predominantly populated by Bosniaks and Croats), which was created by the 1994 Washington Agreement. Entity borders were largely drawn to form ethnic majorities, even though they also reflected territorial seizure and ethnic cleansing. Many Bosniaks view the division of Bosnia into these roughly equal entities as awarding the spoils of war to Bosnian Serbs, whom they regard as the aggressors. Many Bosnian Serbs, however, view the Serb-majority entity as a protection against marginalization. The designation of Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs as Bosnia's three "constituent peoples" is a cornerstone of the Dayton system. Numerous government bodies have ethnic quotas requiring equal representation of the three groups. In these power-sharing institutions, delegates from each constituent group may veto measures that go against vital ethnic interests. While these arrangements make Bosnia's political system prone to gridlock, Dayton's negotiators viewed them as necessary to prevent any group from feeling marginalized in a context of low trust. Bosnia is a parliamentary republic with a high degree of decentralization. Its complex, tiered structure includes a central ("state-level") government, the two entities, the autonomous Brčko district, and cantonal and municipal governments. The central ("state-level") government covers the entirety of Bosnia. A three-member presidency is the head of state, and includes one Serb member who is elected by RS voters, and one Bosniak and one Croat member elected by FBiH voters. The Council of Ministers, led by a Chairperson, is roughly equivalent to a cabinet government and prime minister in other parliamentary systems. The Parliamentary Assembly is a state-level legislature with two chambers: a directly elected House of Representatives (42 members) and an indirectly elected House of Peoples (5 Serbs, 5 Croats, and 5 Bosniaks). The state-level government is considered to be weak, despite some expansion of its functions in the 2000s. Its major responsibilities include foreign relations; trade, customs, and monetary policy; migration and asylum policy; defense; and intelligence. Bosnia is further subdivided into two ethnoterritorial entities: Republika Srpska (RS), where Serbs are the largest ethnic group (82%), and the Federation entity (FBiH), where Bosniaks (70%) and Croats (22%) are the largest groups. The two entities have broader policy jurisdiction than the state-level government. Governing functions that are not assigned to the state-level government fall to the entities. These include civilian policing, economic policy, fiscal policy, energy policy, and health and social policy, as well as other issues. Each entity has its own constitution, as well as a president, vice presidents, legislature, and cabinet government with a prime minister. Each entity may establish "special parallel relationships" with neighboring states (i.e., Croatia and Serbia). Numerous entity bodies also incorporate ethnic quotas. Brčko district, a border region in northeastern Bosnia, was initially administered by the international community to allay concerns about RS secession. Brčko's location interrupts RS's contiguity, and both entities initially claimed it. Brčko was later awarded to both entities, but remains a self-governing district whose population is a mix of all three constituent peoples. Some analysts believe it has been relatively more successful than the entities in passing reforms and reintegrating its divided population (e.g., ethnically mixed schools with a common curriculum). FBiH entity is further divided into ten cantons, many of which were drawn to form ethnic Bosniak or Croat majorities. The cantons have jurisdiction in many policy areas, including policing, housing, culture, and education. They also have their own constitutions—based on the FBiH constitution—as well as legislatures and cabinet-style governments. FBiH and RS are further divided into 79 and 64 municipalities, respectively. The Dayton Agreement established a strong oversight role for the international community. The Office of the High Representative (OHR) was created to monitor the implementation of civilian aspects of Dayton. The High Representative is supported by the Peace Implementation Council (PIC), a group of 55 countries and agencies. A 1997 PIC conference empowered the High Representative to impose binding decisions and sanction politicians who obstruct Dayton. Until the mid-2000s, the High Representative used these powers to remove officials deemed to be obstructive to peace and to promote what are considered among the most constructive reforms since Dayton, including merging the entities' armed forces and intelligence services and putting them under new state-level ministries. However, the High Representative's proactive role has since decreased. This is partly due to criticism that the OHR lacks democratic legitimacy and accountability. Bosnian Serb politicians have claimed that the OHR's interventions support Bosniak leaders' preference for a more centralized state. At the same time, some U.S. and EU policymakers believed that the attraction of EU membership could incentivize reforms in place of the OHR's more top-down approach. The international community also plays an ongoing security role. NATO led the Implementation Force (IFOR) and the smaller Stabilization Force (SFOR) that monitored security aspects of the Dayton Peace Agreement. The initial deployment of NATO ground forces to Bosnia numbered nearly 60,000, of which the largest share (approximately one-third) was from the United States. The number of troops subsequently decreased. In 2004, NATO's peacekeeping role was transferred to the EU with the understanding that NATO would assist if necessary. The size of the EU operation (EUFOR Althea) decreased from 7,000 troops in 2004 to roughly 600 troops today. Many analysts contend that the Dayton Agreement helped hold Bosnia together after the war; they point to the absence of widespread violence since 1995 as an indicator of its success. However, observers also question whether Bosnia can function much longer under the Dayton system. They identify several key challenges: Critics claim that Bosnia's political system reinforces the country's ethnic divisions and makes ethnicity a core basis of political identity. The ethnic parties that have dominated politics since the war generally appeal to voters from their respective ethnic communities rather than all Bosnians. Critics accuse ethnic party leaders of inflaming nationalist tensions and manipulating historical memory to distract from corruption and win elections, thus aggravating rather than bridging the deep wounds that remain from the war. In some parts of Bosnia, divisions are further reproduced at the societal level through institutions like segregated schools, which separate schoolchildren from different ethnic groups and teach them different curriculum. Some analysts also contend that the system is too gridlock-prone to pass major political and economic reforms to be passed, even with the incentive of potential EU membership. Bosnia's fractured, overlapping institutions sometimes muddle policymaking jurisdiction and impede coordinated response. Furthermore, power-sharing arrangements create numerous veto points in the legislative process. Government coalitions are typically ideologically broad and unwieldy, creating a further source of potential dysfunction. One of the consequences of these barriers is that it is difficult to pass legislation. The previous state-level Parliament, for example, adopted twelve new laws over the course of its 2014-2018 term. Corruption in Bosnia has roots in the country's wartime economy. A 2000 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report stated that "organized crime and corruption pervade Bosnia's national political parties, civil service, law enforcement and judicial systems. [Ethnic] parties control all aspects of the government, the judiciary, and the economy, and in so doing maintain the personal and financial power of their members." Many observers claim that the situation has improved little since then. In 2018, the High Representative warned that the rule of law has deteriorated, while the U.S. State Department describes the rule of law as "an existential issue." Bosnia's major parties allegedly siphon from the state apparatus and public enterprises in their strongholds to amass wealth and power. Furthermore, parties in power reportedly politicize hiring in Bosnia's public sector, which employs an estimated third or more of the working population. For many Bosnians, satisfactory employment depends on having the right political connections, which creates a dependence that reportedly is exploited during elections. In 2018, the outgoing U.S. ambassador to Bosnia decried the "[Bosnian] politicians who seek to destabilize the country in order to remain in power at all costs for personal profit and protection." Many analysts believe that Bosnia's entrenched ethnic parties benefit tremendously from the status quo and have little incentive to reform the system. Bosnia's MPs are among the best-paid in Europe relative to local incomes, commanding six to eight times the average Bosnian salary. Parties and politicians who gain office in the government or administration often find "a remarkably efficient path to personal enrichment." Politicians are skilled at using veto points to block legislation that threatens their position in Bosnia's patronage system. According to one analyst, Bosnia's patronage system is "the raison d'etre of the political elites and is the main cause of the state's dysfunctionality and resistance to reform." Bosnia's entrenched political class may also fear penalty if serious reforms are enacted and shine the spotlight on malfeasance. Criminal indictments against leaders in neighborhood countries like Romania, Croatia, and North Macedonia highlight this risk. Analysts believe these disincentives make entrenched politicians resistant to external pressure for reform. Several major rounds of U.S.- and EU-brokered constitutional reform efforts, including in 2006, 2008, and 2009, ultimately failed. Germany and the United Kingdom launched a major initiative in 2014 to shift the focus from difficult constitutional reforms to seemingly more feasible socioeconomic reforms that they hoped would improve Bosnia's economy and dismantle patronage networks. The 2015 "Reform Agenda" identified economic, administrative, and legal measures to be adopted by entity- and state-level governments. The process, which required the major parties to commit in writing to the reform framework, was supported by the EU, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank Group, and the United States. As an incentive for politicians to agree to the Agenda, the EU offered the entry into force of Bosnia's long-stalled Stabilization and Association Agreement, which marked the first step toward EU membership. However, most observers view the Reform Agenda as largely unsuccessful; many of its provisions failed when entrenched parties objected to measures that would undercut their dominance. While many officials recognize that Bosnia's political system needs reform, there is little consensus on how to change it or to generate the political will to find common ground so long as the dominant parties remain entrenched. Bosnian Serb leaders have expressed a desire to return to the "original" Dayton system, when the entities had greater competencies in security and justice. Milorad Dodik, who has dominated politics in Republika Srpska since the 2000s, has gone further by repeatedly threatening RS secession. Bosnian Croat leaders from the largest Croat party, the Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia (HDZ-BiH), call for more autonomy for Croats, and have raised the prospect of splitting FBiH to create a third Croat-majority entity. By contrast, Bosniak leaders generally prefer more centralization and the removal of some of the institutional arrangements that they believe contribute to dysfunction and gridlock. Some Bosniak officials also have proposed dismantling the entities or eliminating FBiH's cantons. Survey research documents Bosnian citizens' anger toward the political class and their distrust of political institutions. In a 2018 International Republican Institute survey, 86% of respondents expressed belief that Bosnia is heading in the wrong direction. An estimated 170,000 individuals—disproportionately young and skilled—have emigrated since 2013. Dissatisfaction with education and healthcare, insecurity, and nepotism are cited as key motives to emigrate. Nevertheless, some analysts believe that periods of social discontent in 2014 and 2018, which challenged the system but appeared to transcend ethnic divides, suggest that strengthening Bosnian civil society could increase pressure for reform, and perhaps cultivate a new generation of party leaders. Other observers have put their hopes for reform in Bosnia's so-called "civic parties," which do not have nationalist platforms and typically mobilize voters on the basis of socioeconomic interests rather than ethnicity. While these parties have not matched the results of the ethnic parties, their electoral performance has improved in recent years. Bosnia's challenges came to the forefront during its most recent general election on October 7, 2018 (see Table 1 ). The Central Election Commission (CEC) registered 60 parties and over 3,500 candidates for state-level, entity, and cantonal offices. Observers noted that the campaign climate was more divisive and nationalist in tone than usual. Despite broad voter dissatisfaction, entrenched ethnic parties won the largest vote shares. Almost six months after the election, the parties are still negotiating over government formation at the state level and in FBiH; however, it appears that entrenched ethnic parties will continue to dominate. In March 2019, the leaders of the largest Bosniak, Croat, and Serb parties stated that they had agreed to a set of principles to guide forming the state-level government (the Council of Ministers). Some observers viewed the improved result of civic parties (one-third of the vote in FBiH) as a positive development. Some of the most controversial outcomes concern the elections to the state-level presidency, composed of three members (one Bosniak, one Croat, and one Serb). In a closely fought race, Šefik Džaferović, candidate of the ethnic Bosniak SDA party, narrowly defeated the candidate of the civic SDP party (36.6% and 33.5%, respectively), retaining the lock that the SDA has had on the Bosniak seat in most elections since 1996, but perhaps auguring a future victory by a civic party candidate. Prior to the election, some analysts expressed concern at the prospect of two of the three seats on the presidency being held by the nationalist Bosnian Serb leader Milorad Dodik and his ally, the nationalist Bosnian Croat politician Dragan Čović. Both politicians have explicitly or implicitly challenged the legitimacy of Bosnian statehood and called for greater ethnoterritorial autonomy. However, to the surprise of some observers, Željko Komšić of the civic Democratic Front defeated incumbent Čović for the Croat seat with 53% of the vote. Komšić was previously elected as the Croat member of the presidency in 2006 and 2010, and is considered to be a moderate political figure who generally supports centralizing reforms. In contrast to HDZ-BiH leader Čović, he does not have strong ties to the Croatian government. Komšić's election as the Croat member of the presidency in 2006 and 2010 was mired in controversy amid complaints that he only won with the support of Bosniaks who voted in the election for the Croat member on the presidency rather than the Bosniak member. Komšić identifies as Croat but has been leader of several civic parties. He comes from central Bosnia, and not from the Croat-majority western regions that are the stronghold of the HDZ. Although it is not illegal for Bosniaks to vote for the Croat seat on the presidency rather than the Bosniak seat, some Croat leaders (especially HDZ-BiH and HDZ-1990) claim that it violates the spirit of Dayton and results in illegitimate representation of Croats. Similar accusations of ethnic cross-voting surfaced after Komšić's victory in 2018. Some analysts expect Komšić's victory to harden the HDZ-BiH position on electoral reform (see "Legal Challenges," above) and possibly embolden politicians who seek a separate entity. As most pre-election polls anticipated, RS strongman Milorad Dodik defeated the more moderate incumbent Serb member of the presidency with 54% of the vote. Dodik has dominated entity politics in RS since the mid-2000s as entity prime minister and president. Analysts note that RS's political environment grew more closed as Dodik consolidated power. Dodik has run afoul of the United States and the EU by frequently threatening to hold a referendum on RS secession, questioning the legitimacy of Bosnian statehood, and cultivating close ties to Russia (see below). The U.S. Treasury Department sanctioned him in 2017 for actively obstructing Dayton. Many analysts have expressed concern that Dodik will use his new position to obstruct the workings of the central government while continuing to dictate politics in RS through loyal allies. Shortly after the election he vowed to "work above all and only for the interests of Serbs." One of his first acts as head of state was to call for Bosnia to recognize Ukraine's Crimea region as Russian territory. In December 2018, the National Assembly of RS approved the creation of several new ministries, an act that some view as an attempt to wrest competencies from the state-level government. In early 2019, the RS parliament courted controversy when it passed legislation to create a new commission to reinvestigate the events of Srebrenica, which many view as an attempt to deny or downplay the massacres. Since the election, the formation of governments has proceeded piecemeal, and legal challenges to election law in FBiH (see above, "Legal Challenges") initially cast doubt over the formation of that entity's government. The RS National Assembly approved the new entity government in December 2018. Party leaders continue to negotiate over forming governments in FBiH and the state-level Council of Ministers. Because the FBiH government did not fix electoral legislation before the election, the Electoral Commission adopted a decision to assign delegates to the House of Peoples based on the 2013 census. (The Electoral Commission's actions reportedly came amid strong pressure from U.S. and EU officials). Several Bosniak parties challenged the decision before the Constitutional Court; however, the Court declined to take on the case. Bosnia is one of Europe's poorest countries. The 1992-1995 war caused an estimated $110 billion in damage, and Bosnia's economy contracted to one-eighth of its prewar level. Despite significant reconstruction and recovery since 1995, GDP per capita was $5,148 in 2017, well below the EU average ($33,715) and that of Bulgaria ($8,031), its lowest-ranking member. Nearly one in five Bosnians lives below the poverty level. Bosnia's unemployment rate was 18% in 2018, down from 28% in 2015. Youth unemployment also declined in recent years from 60% to 46%. Nevertheless, these rates are still high by European standards. Since 2015, annual GDP growth has averaged around 3%, but it is largely driven by consumption (much of which in turn is fueled by migrant remittances). The IMF has urged Bosnia to privatize or restructure the nearly 550 state-owned enterprises that comprise roughly 20% of its economy; many of them are unprofitable but allegedly are used by politicians as "cash cows and workplaces for loyal cadres." Bosnia participates in several free trade schemes. In 2006, it joined the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA) alongside other non-EU countries in the region, including other ex-Yugoslav neighbors. Bosnia's Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) with the European Union, which entered into force in 2015, provides for almost fully free trade. A free trade agreement with the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) also entered into force in 2015. The EU is Bosnia's primary trade partner. Germany, Italy, Croatia, Slovenia, and Austria are Bosnia's key EU export markets, accounting for more than half of its exports in 2017. Serbia, another CEFTA signatory, is also an important export market. Bosnia's major exports include vehicle seats, raw materials, leather products, textiles, energy, and wood products. The EU is also Bosnia's primary source of foreign direct investment (FDI). In 2016, 63% of Bosnia's FDI came from EU countries, with Austria, Croatia, and Slovenia the top sources. Serbia is also a significant source of FDI (16.3%). However, Bosnia's fragmented legal and administrative structure create a challenging investment climate. Many relevant laws differ between the two entities. Corruption, entrenched economic interests, and political instability also deter investment. As a result, FDI amounts to just 2% of Bosnia's GDP, well below the Western Balkan average of 5%. Bosnia was the region's lowest-rated country in the World Bank's 2019 Ease of Doing Business Index. U.S. and EU policymakers view the NATO and EU accession processes as a positive force for democratization and reform in the Western Balkans, including Bosnia. According to analysts, this assessment informed the United States' partial retreat from the region in the 2000s and 2010s. EU membership is one of the few policy issues for which there is relatively broad consensus among Bosnia's politicians and population. The EU's "fundamentals first" approach to enlargement in the Western Balkans frontloads the accession process with meeting the core requirements of having a democratic political system and functioning market economy; in Bosnia, the EU is currently focused on issues relating to the rule of law, public administration reform, and economic development. In 2016, Bosnia submitted its application to join the EU. Its current status is potential candidate , which entitles it to receive financial assistance from the EU's Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance II (IPA II). Between 2014 and 2020, Bosnia is expected to receive €552 million in IPA II allocations, making the EU Bosnia's largest source of foreign assistance. Many EU member states provide additional aid to Bosnia through domestic foreign assistance programs. Bosnia's EU membership prospects are uncertain. In a 2018 progress report, the European Commission (the EU's executive) flagged Bosnia's slow implementation of reforms, including the 2015 Reform Agenda (a flagship EU initiative in Bosnia) and numerous domestic and international court rulings (see "Legal Challenges," above). Some analysts question whether Bosnia, under its current political system, would be capable of meeting the membership requirement of harmonizing domestic legislation with the many thousands of provisions in the acquis communautaire, the cumulative body of EU legislation, case law, and regulations. In comparison to EU membership, Bosnian leaders are more divided over the issue of joining NATO. These divisions largely fall along Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Croat/Bosniak lines. Bosnian Serb opposition is rooted in resentment over NATO's role in the Bosnian war, and may also reflect a desire to remain in lockstep with neighboring Serbia, which also does not seek NATO membership. Bosnia joined NATO's Partnership for Peace in 2006 and secured an Individual Partnership Action Plan in 2008. In 2010, NATO indicated that it would launch a Membership Action Plan (MAP)—a program to help aspiring members meet membership requirements—once Bosnia meets several conditions, the most challenging of which is the reregistration of permanent defense installations from entity to state-level government. RS officials have resisted ceding control over defense installations on entity territory. Although Bosnia does not yet meet these requirements, in December 2018 NATO foreign ministers invited Bosnia to activate its MAP by submitting its first Annual National Program. Some analysts interpreted this invitation as a gesture to generate reform momentum in Bosnia's fragile post-election period. The Bosniak and Croat members of the presidency responded positively, but Bosnian Serb leaders (and most Bosnian Serbs) do not want Bosnia to join NATO. In October 2017, the RS National Assembly passed a resolution supporting military neutrality. RS President Željka Cvijanović reiterated this stance after NATO's invitation, and Dodik—now a member of the state-level presidency—also has vowed to pursue military neutrality. Bosnia's relations with Croatia and Serbia are seen as an important component of regional stability. However, bilateral relations have often been fraught as a legacy of the Bosnian war, as well as sensitivities over Croatia and Serbia's relations with Bosnian Croats and Serbs. While democratic gains in Croatia and Serbia after 2000 contributed to improved relations with Bosnia, they remain reluctant to examine or acknowledge their role in the Bosnian war. At times, Bosnian leaders have objected to what they describe as Croatian and Serbian meddling in Bosnia's affairs. Ex-Bosnian Croat member of the presidency Dragan Čović and current Bosnian Serb member of the presidency Milorad Dodik draw support from leaders in Croatia and Serbia and reportedly hold Croatian and Serbian citizenship, respectively, alongside their Bosnian citizenship. The Croatian government financially and politically backed Čović in Bosnia's 2018 elections, and Croatian politicians have raised the issue of Bosnian Croats' constitutional challenges (see above, "Legal Challenges") in forums like the European Parliament, NATO, and the United Nations. These moves prompted three former High Representatives to Bosnia to issue a joint letter expressing alarm over Croatia's "meddling" in Bosnia's internal affairs. The Croatian government also challenged the legitimacy of Željko Komšić as the Croat member of the Bosnian presidency (see above, "2018 General Election"). Some parties in Croatia hold Croatian election campaign events on Bosnian territory to mobilize Bosnian Croat voters with dual citizenship to vote in Croatia's elections. The Serbian government likewise supports Dodik, who is a frequent visitor to Belgrade. Some Serbian politicians have made statements supporting convicted Bosnian Serb war criminals, inflaming an issue that remains highly sensitive in Bosnia. Bosnia and Serbia have an unresolved demarcation dispute over approximately 40 square kilometers of border area, including a railway segment and hydroelectric power stations. Bosnia has dual citizenship treaties with Croatia and Serbia, resulting in hundreds of thousands of Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Serbs acquiring dual citizenship. This has raised jurisdictional issues in cases in which indicted war criminals hold dual citizenship. Despite occasional tensions in their relations, Croatia and Serbia are important economic partners for Bosnia. Both countries are among Bosnia's top export markets and top sources of FDI. As part of its enlargement strategy in the Western Balkans, the EU has embraced a connectivity agenda to improve regional transportation, energy, and infrastructural linkages, reserving up to €1 billion in grants for projects for the period 2015-2020. Officials believe that improved connectivity could benefit bilateral relations and contribute to regional stability. Given its strategic location and relatively small, weak states, the Balkan region has long drawn in more powerful states. Many analysts maintain that as the United States and the European Union have both scaled back their presence in the Balkans to address other issues since the late 2000s, Russia, Turkey, and China partly filled the vacuum. U.S. and EU officials have expressed concern over Russian influence in the Western Balkans, particularly after Russia occupied Ukraine's Crimea region in 2014. Many analysts maintain that Russia does not have a grand strategy in the Western Balkans, but rather aims to prevent Euro-Atlantic integration and shore up its claims to great power status by asserting itself in the EU's "inner courtyard." Analysts have identified several Russian tools in the region, including playing a "spoiler" role, projecting soft power, and leveraging energy dominance. Observers contend that Russia plays a "spoiler" role in Bosnia by exacerbating ethnic divisions, backing illiberal or anti-Western political factions, and helping to militarize RS. They claim that these actions help sustain the dysfunction and gridlock that undermine Bosnia's Euro-Atlantic reform efforts. Russia has supported Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Croat nationalist leaders Milorad Dodik and Dragan Čović. Dodik's meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin just before Bosnia's October 7, 2018 general election was one of nearly ten meetings between the two over the past three years, signaling high-level Russian support. Many experts assert that Russia has been a key ally to Dodik in resisting Western pressure to cooperate on reforms. Moscow has also supported divisive RS policies. When Dodik violated a Bosnian Constitutional Court ruling in 2016 by holding a referendum to establish a controversial "Statehood Day," Russia stood apart from the High Representative and Western diplomats by supporting the initiative. More recently, Russia stated its support for RS's controversial Srebrenica commission (see above). Analysts have also expressed concern at Russia's apparent support for Čović, who has advocated greater autonomy for Croats and the creation of a third Croat entity. Some analysts have expressed concern at Russia's role in RS's security sector. Russian forces have trained RS police special forces on counterterrorism and intelligence. Some observers believe that these exercises contribute to militarization in RS, potentially pushing the police force beyond its civilian law enforcement mandate. Analysts caution that militarization could increase the scale of violence in any confrontation between RS and the Bosnian government. Some Bosnian Serb ultranationalist and veterans groups have fought alongside pro-Russia combatants in Ukraine, and analysts believe they could be mobilized to support RS leaders as well. Russian soft power draws upon religious and cultural kinship with Bosnian Serbs, as well as Russia's history of support during the wars of Yugoslav disintegration. Kremlin-linked media, like Sputnik and RT , amplify existing anti-Western narratives and positively shape public opinion toward Russia. Some local media further propagate Sputnik and RT articles. A 2018 National Democratic Institute media study found that RS media stories about Russia were overwhelmingly positive, while the tone of most stories about the United States and NATO was negative. Pro-Russian media glorifies the Russian military, highlights cultural and religious links between Serbs and Russians, and documents high-level meetings between RS and Russian officials. Economic relations between Russia and RS have deepened in recent years. Russia is the largest source of FDI in RS, and it is largely concentrated in the energy sector. In 2007, Russian state-owned oil company Zarubezhneft bought RS's Bosanski Brod oil refinery, motor oil processing facilities in nearby Modrica, and retailer Banjaluka Petrol. Some analysts believe that these assets—which were purchased without an open tender—give Zarubezhneft influence in RS. In addition to being an important employer, Zarubezhneft is RS's biggest taxpayer; its value-added tax and excise duty contributions reportedly account for 25% of RS budget revenue. Bosnia depends upon Russian natural gas imports via Ukraine. Energy policy is vested in the entities, and Russian natural gas provider Gazprom reportedly has used its market dominance to pit the two entities against one another and undermine projects that would diversify supplies. Many analysts believe that Turkey's influence in Bosnia has increased over the last two decades due to Ankara's close relationship with Bosniak leaders. Some Turkish officials reportedly view Bosnia as a natural sphere of influence given geographic and historical connections. Observers note that Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has at times invoked Ottoman-era ties to Bosnia and religious kinship with Bosniaks as soft power tools. Turkish influence in Bosnia has expanded since Yugoslavia's collapse. During the 1992-1995 war, Turkey gained prestige among Bosniaks by condemning the international arms embargo against Bosnia, arguing that it prevented Bosniaks from defending themselves. Turkey, as well as other predominantly Muslim countries like Iran and Saudi Arabia, reportedly supplied Bosniak forces with arms. Turkish influence has continued since the war's end. Bosnia is one of the top recipients of Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency assistance; much of this support is earmarked for projects to restore Ottoman-era buildings and monuments. A Turkish Cultural Center was established in Bosnia in 2003, and in 2009 the Yunus Emre Foundation, an NGO founded by the Turkish government, opened an office in Sarajevo to promote Turkish language and culture. Turkey has popular support among Bosniaks. In a 2018 International Republican Institute survey, 76% of Bosniak respondents had positive views of Turkey—the strongest support among Bosniaks for any foreign state. Many Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Serbs look to Croatia and Serbia as external protectors, and some analysts believe that Turkey has attempted to establish a similar role for itself vis-à-vis Bosniaks. Observers contend that Erdogan's ruling party has particularly strong ties to the largest Bosniak ethnic party, the SDA. Erdogan and Turkish state-owned media openly supported SDA candidate Bakir Izetbegović in his bid for the Bosniak seat on the presidency in 2014. Some observers believe that Izetbegović's clout within the SDA rests in part on his support from Erdogan. Economic relations between Bosnia and Turkey have deepened in recent years. Turkish FDI in Bosnia accounted for 5.6% of FDI flows in 2016. One notable project is a highway to connect Sarajevo to Belgrade, Serbia. After years of disagreement, Bosnian officials approved the route in February 2019. Turkey is expected to provide funding for some of the expected €3 billion in costs, although the terms of the contract are not yet resolved. Some officials, including French President Emmanuel Macron, have expressed concern over Turkey's alleged ambitions as part of broader EU concern over external influence in the Balkans. However, analysts caution that Turkey's ambitions and capabilities in the Balkans may be overstated. They note that the scope of Turkish investment is sometimes exaggerated in the media, and that proposed projects do not always come to fruition. While Russian and Turkish influence in Bosnia relies in part on soft power, China's presence in Bosnia is primarily economic. Between 2011 and 2019, Chinese investments in Bosnia amounted to an estimated $3.6 billion, primarily in the form of direct lending for energy and transportation projects. Chinese firms have contracts to construct or expand energy plants, including a €350 million loan to construct a coal-fired plant in Stanari, RS. A €1.4 billion deal was signed to construct a highway between Banja Luka and Mlinište. In March 2019, the EU Energy Community criticized the FBiH entity government's decision to guarantee a €600 million loan from China's Exim Bank to build a coal-fired power plant in Tuzla. However, some analysts caution that China's economic influence in Bosnia may be overstated at present. While China's pledged investments in high-visibility projects garner media attention, the actual amount of Chinese FDI is far less than that of the EU. Moreover, many pledged projects do not come to fruition. Nevertheless, EU and U.S. officials have voiced concern over the scope of China's investments in the Balkans, as well as Chinese lending practices. Chinese loans often require recipient state governments to assume the loan burden, potentially leading to high external debt. The EU has also raised concerns that Chinese lending practices violate EU rules in public procurement because they frequently require use of Chinese contractors, laborers, or supplies. In contrast to EU funds, which are partly designed to spur reform, Chinese loans have few conditions and rules linked to transparency or reform. Finally, EU officials have expressed concern that China's economic might could be a source of leverage over recipient states that are candidates or potential candidates for EU membership and thus impede the EU's ability to speak with one voice on relations with China if they do become members. Bosnia was not a core transit country in the "Balkan Route" that hundreds of thousands of migrants and refugees followed in an attempt to reach the EU during heightened flows in 2015 and early 2016. However, recent route shifts have brought more migrant and refugee traffic through Bosnia. Since early 2018, an estimated 23,000 migrants and refugees have entered Bosnia; approximately 25% of them remain in the country. Most of them hope to enter EU territory via Bosnia's neighbor, Croatia, and from there move on and enter the EU's visa- and passport-free Schengen Area. However, the Croatian government has expanded border policing, and apprehended individuals are sent back to Bosnia. The EU provided €2 million in 2018 to help Bosnia respond to the crisis and provide shelter to migrants and refugees who are effectively stranded in Bosnia. The migration crisis has triggered a backlash from some Bosnians, particularly in Una-Sana Canton, which borders Croatia and has the highest concentration of migrants and refugees. Some residents of Bihać, Una-Sana's administrative center, protested against camps situated in their municipality in October 2018, while local authorities in Velika Kladuša, another city in the canton, reportedly obstructed the Ministry of Security's plans to house migrants in a local building. The incident illustrates local backlash as well as the state-level government's difficulty enforcing its decisions, even when it has jurisdiction. Islam was introduced to part of Bosnia's population during Ottoman rule. In socialist Yugoslavia, the semi-official Islamic Religious Community played a key role in religious affairs, including legal rulings and religious education. It was renamed the Islamic Community of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1992, and remains an important religious institution. Islamic tradition in the Balkans, including Bosnia, is generally moderate and secular. The majority of Bosnia's practicing Muslims follow the Hanafi school of Sunni Islam. However, some analysts have expressed concern over the emergence of groups influenced or funded by state and non-state entities in the Arab Gulf states, where more conservative Hanbali Sunni practices are common. Aid workers, missionaries, and "mujahedeen" fighters from the Gulf States promoted transnational Islamist militancy and Salafist Hanbali religious doctrine during Bosnia's 1992-1995 war; Iran's government also supported Bosniak leaders and forces. After the war, Saudi Arabia provided an estimated $600 million in aid to repair and build hundreds of mosques and establish schools and cultural centers that promote socially conservative Sunni views. Iran has also maintained active cultural outreach and other ties to some Bosnian Muslims. Many analysts contend that Salafi groups have limited support in Bosnia because of the traditionally high level of secularism among Bosnian Muslims. They also note that few Bosnian Muslims who subscribe to Salafist ideas and practices have violent intentions, and many of them live in remote rural communities. While most of these groups were not originally affiliated with official religious organizations in Bosnia, the Grand Mufti of Bosnia's Islamic Community exerted pressure on them to acknowledge his authority and his right to monitor religious content. As a result, an estimated 90% of Salafi groups were brought under official structures. Nevertheless, some experts caution that radicalized groups and individuals may pose a terrorist threat despite their small numbers. Radicalized Muslims were implicated in the bombing of a police station in Bugojno in 2010 and a lone-gunman attack on the U.S. Embassy in Sarajevo in 2011. The Islamic State (IS) and Nusra Front's gains in Syria and Iraq in the 2010s altered the dynamic of the terrorism threat in Bosnia and broadened the use of social media in recruitment. Between 2012 and 2017, an estimated 350 Bosnian citizens traveled from Bosnia or Bosnian diaspora communities to fight with armed groups in Iraq and Syria. More recently, returned foreign fighters are seen as a potential threat as the position of the IS and other armed groups has weakened. Bosnia's stock of illegal weapons, mines, and explosives may exacerbate the risk posed by returnees. As of December 2017, officials believed that just over 100 Bosnians remained in Syria (including women and children), roughly 50 had returned to Bosnia, and 70 had been killed in the conflict. In 2014, the Bosnian government introduced new criminal offenses to prosecute foreign terrorist fighters and recruiters. Several dozen returned fighters and domestic recruiters have been convicted of these offenses. While the U.S. State Department describes Bosnia as a "cooperative counterterrorism partner," it warns that Bosnia's political fragmentation and dysfunction could undermine counterterrorism efforts. For example, in 2017 several ministries proposed new measures to tighten counterterrorism efforts; however, they were not enacted due to political gridlock in state-level and FBiH governments. Initially viewed as a "European problem," the Bosnian conflict eventually helped shape the post-Cold War role of the United States and NATO in European security. When the United States assumed greater responsibilities in resolving the conflict, its role was considerable: leading NATO airstrikes, garnering diplomatic support from Russia and European allies, persuading warring parties to agree to a ceasefire, brokering the Dayton Peace Agreement, and deploying 20,000 troops to Bosnia. According to Richard Holbrooke, the U.S. official who brokered the talks, the Bosnian war was a pivotal period in U.S. foreign policy in Europe: "The three main pillars of [policy]—U.S.-Russian relations, NATO enlargement into Central Europe, and Bosnia—had often worked against each other. Now they reinforced each other: NATO sent its forces out of area for the first time in its history, and Russian troops, under an American commander, were deployed alongside them." Some analysts and policymakers believe that the United States' strong hand in resolving the conflict and in shaping Bosnia's political system have made it a stakeholder in Bosnia's future. U.S. officials, often in cooperation with the EU, have intervened to defuse crises and broker reform talks. The United States also has imposed sanctions against Bosnian officials: in addition to Dodik (see above), the U.S. State Department publicly designated Bosnian Serb politician Nikola Špirić (Dodik's associate) for "significant corruption or gross violation of human rights." U.S. policymakers attach strategic importance to Bosnia's stability; many analysts believe turbulence in Bosnia could reverberate in the Balkans and potentially draw in Croatia and Serbia, while instability in other parts of the region could spill over into Bosnia. When the Trump Administration indicated in 2018 that it would consider supporting a potential Serbia-Kosovo agreement to "adjust borders" between the two—a major break with the long-standing EU and U.S. policy to oppose redrawing borders in the Balkans along ethnic lines—some analysts expressed concern that the Administration could reshape long-standing U.S. policy toward Bosnia. However, the new U.S. Ambassador to Bosnia stated in February 2019 that the U.S. will continue to be "guarantor of Bosnia and Herzegovina's sovereignty and territorial integrity." On the other hand, many observers also note that U.S. engagement in Bosnia (and the Western Balkans) decreased under the administrations of President George W. Bush and President Barack Obama. During this time U.S. policymakers turned their focus to geopolitical crises and challenges in other parts of the globe while ceding the regional lead to the EU. Indeed, some analysts have urged the United States to assume a greater role in Bosnia, arguing that Bosnia's current crises warrant it, and that the EU and the United States are more effective in the region when they work together. Congressional interest in Bosnia dates back to the 1992-1995 war. Many Members featured prominently in foreign policy debates over U.S. intervention in the conflict. In 2015, the House passed a resolution describing the Srebrenica massacres as a genocide and urging the United States to continue to support Bosnia's territorial integrity ( H.Res. 310 , 114 th Congress). In the 114 th and 115 th Congresses, a bill was introduced in the Senate to establish an enterprise fund to promote economic development and the private sector in Bosnia ( S. 2307 and S. 864 ). In April 2018, the House Foreign Affairs Committee's Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging Threats held a hearing on Bosnia's prospects ahead of its October 2018 elections. Congress's engagement with Bosnia also continues within the broader context of policy concern over the external influence of China, Turkey, and Russia in the Western Balkans and energy security. As a potential candidate for EU membership and NATO partner, Bosnia is eligible for assistance through the Countering Russian Influence Funds under the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) enacted in 2017 ( P.L. 115-44 ). Through congressionally approved (and sometimes expanded) foreign assistance appropriations, Bosnia has received more than $2 billion in aid since 1995. Between 1996 and 1999, the United States pledged $1 billion of the $4 billion international commitment to implementing Dayton's civilian provisions and helping to rebuild Bosnia. The cost of U.S. military operations in Bosnia since 1992 is estimated at more than $10 billion ( Appendix I ). Bosnia continues to receive U.S. foreign assistance, although the amount has decreased in recent years. Assistance to Bosnia in FY2015 and FY2016 was approximately $33 million each year. In FY2017, it was $53.5 million, and $41.5 million in FY2018. The Administration requested $21 million for FY2019 and $16.9 million for FY2020. Nearly 25 years after the Dayton Peace Agreement, Bosnia faces many challenges. In considering U.S. relations with Bosnia, Members of Congress may consider the following questions: How can the United States encourage Bosnia's government to incorporate the legal rulings of the Bosnian Constitutional Court and the European Court of Human Rights into election legislation and the constitution? How can U.S. foreign assistance be used to counter Russian influence in Republika Srpska, in particular Russia's close ties to Bosnian Serb politicians and its use of local media and Sputnik to amplify anti-U.S. narratives and project pro-Russia soft power? What are the implications of potential militarization in Republika Srpska? How can the United States effectively address this alleged trend? How can the United States support a successful reform initiative that secures transparency and accountability, and facilitates a political community in which politicians and voters are committed to the Bosnian state and socioeconomic challenges that transcend all three ethnic groups? Can the Germany-U.K. initiative from 2015 be revived, or is it better to start from scratch? Are the approximately 600 troops in the European Union Force mission in Bosnia sufficient to stabilize Bosnia if violence breaks out? If Serbia and Kosovo agree to normalize relations by redrawing their borders, how can U.S. policymakers prevent this development from destabilizing Bosnia, particularly given Milorad Dodik's threats to seek RS secession if Kosovo is "partitioned"? How can the United States encourage Croatia and Serbia to engage in Bosnia in a manner that helps bridge ethnic divisions and contributes to Bosnia's territorial integrity and sovereignty? Given the pervasiveness of corruption in Bosnia, how can U.S. assistance most effectively be used to counter it? Does foreign assistance contribute to civic groups and independent media that could serve as a check against corruption? 

 

 Report 2:
DOJ and its components, as well as the judiciary, play important roles in requesting and collecting restitution. DOJ and select components: Prosecutors in DOJ’s Criminal Division and the Criminal Divisions of the 94 USAOs are responsible for overseeing criminal matters, including identifying and notifying victims, determining their losses as part of a case investigation, prosecuting cases and negotiating the terms of plea agreements, of which restitution may be a part. Within DOJ’s Criminal Division, the Money Laundering and Asset Recovery Section manages DOJ’s Asset Forfeiture Program. As previously stated, FLUs within each USAO undertake activities to collect restitution from offenders in their district. Additionally, all USAOs have asset forfeiture staff responsible for forfeiting property seized by law enforcement agencies because the property was used in criminal activities or purchased with the proceeds of criminal activities. According to EOUSA guidance, coordination between the FLU and Asset Forfeiture units is highly encouraged to use forfeited assets as a means to collect on unpaid restitution debts. DOJ requires each USAO to have its own policies and procedures related to debt collection efforts but allows them discretion in developing these policies and procedures to ensure that they are appropriate for local conditions. DOJ also requires USAOs to have policies and procedures to make early, effective, and coordinated asset investigations and recovery a routine part of every case involving victims but allows USAOs to specify these policies and procedures. DOJ’s EOUSA provides USAOs with management assistance, guidance, training, and administrative support. Among other activities, EOUSA provides management assistance to USAOs by administering internal evaluations for each USAO, which are intended to provide on-site management support for that office. Further, EOUSA provides guidance to enhance offices’ efforts to request and collect restitution. Judiciary: Within the judiciary, the 94 federal district courts order restitution, receipt restitution payments, and disburse restitution to victims. Within the federal district where the offender was convicted, a probation officer prepares the presentence investigation report (PSR) for the court, which includes information on the victim’s losses and an offender’s financial information. Probation officers may obtain this information from DOJ, which has the statutory responsibility for the enforcement and collection of criminal debt. The court uses the PSR, among other things, to determine whether to order restitution. If an offender is released to the community by the court and placed on supervision, probation officers are responsible for ensuring the offender abides by the terms of release, including paying any restitution owed to victims. The Clerk of each District Court is responsible for the receipt of restitution from offenders and for disbursing payments to victims. The Judicial Conference is the national policy-making body for the federal courts. The Conference operates through a network of committees created to address and advise courts on a wide variety of subjects such as information technology, personnel, probation and pretrial services, space and facilities, security, judicial salaries and benefits, budget, defender services, court administration, and rules of practice and procedure. The Judicial Conference has taken policy positions on restitution-related issues and has supported legislative proposals to improve the restitution process. AOUSC is the agency within the judiciary that provides a broad range of legislative, legal, financial, technology, management, administrative, and program support services to federal courts. AOUSC is responsible for carrying out Judicial Conference policies and a primary responsibility of AOUSC is to provide staff support and counsel to the Judicial Conference and its committees. USSC is an independent agency within the judiciary which, among other activities, establishes and promulgates detailed sentencing guidelines that judges are to consider in sentencing offenders convicted of federal crimes, including guidelines on when and how to order restitution. Additionally, each district court is required to submit to USSC a report of each offender’s sentence that includes, among other information, details on the offenses for which the offender was convicted; the sentence imposed on the offender; and if the judge departed from the sentencing guidelines, information on reasons why. USSC maintains a database containing sentencing data on federal offenders convicted of felonies or serious misdemeanors, analyzes it and publishes these data on an annual basis. USSC is also statutorily required to annually report to Congress its analysis of sentencing-related documents, including an accounting of districts USSC believes have not submitted appropriate information to the commission, among other things. During the course of a federal criminal investigation, federal prosecutors identify and notify victims, as well as determine their losses in conjunction with the federal agents investigating the case. If a defendant pleads guilty or is found guilty at trial, the prosecutor has the burden of proving the victims’ losses in court. To facilitate this, a Victim-Witness coordinator within the USAO responsible for the case provides victims the opportunity to explain their losses in detail, usually through a Victim Impact Statement. This information is then to be provided to a federal probation officer who uses it to begin a PSR. To develop the PSR, probation officers use information provided by the USAO and may contact victims and verify the loss amounts. Additionally, probation officers will investigate an offender’s economic circumstances— such as if the offender has a job, any assets or any dependents. If a judge determines that restitution is to be ordered, the judge must order restitution for the full amount of a victim’s losses for offenses without consideration of the economic circumstances of the defendant. Judges may decline to order restitution in certain instances, for example, where restitution is discretionary, or in certain cases where the number of identifiable victims makes restitution impracticable or the complexity of calculating restitution would unduly prolong the sentencing process. If the court does not order restitution, or orders only partial restitution, the judge must provide the reason, and judges usually do so in a written Statement of Reasons document. Figure 1 provides an overview of the federal restitution process. Upon imposition of a restitution debt by the court, FLU staff use two mechanisms to determine the collectability of the debt and what collection actions to take. First, FLU staff classify the debt into one of four categories to determine the extent to which the FLU will pursue enforcement actions to collect upon the debt. FLUs classify debts from a Priority Code 1 debt (indicating that FLUs will make collection of this debt the highest priority) to a Priority Code 4 debt (indicating that FLUs will make collection of this debt the lowest priority). Second, FLUs may suspend collection action on criminal debts, regardless of their categorization, under certain circumstances if they determine the debts are uncollectible. FLU staff may also determine that debts are permanently uncollectible and categorize them as Priority Code 4 debts. If a debtor does not provide payment, FLU staff then use various enforcement actions to collect the restitution debt. These can include, among other actions, filing liens against an offender’s property, coordinating with asset forfeiture staff to use forfeited assets to pay the restitution debt, and garnishing wages an offender may earn. Victims can be compensated for losses with the proceeds of forfeited assets through DOJ’s Asset Forfeiture Program and in accordance with law and regulation. Federal regulations provide that the proceeds from forfeited assets are first used to cover program costs associated with forfeiture-related activities and next to pay valid owners, lien-holders, and federal financial regulatory agencies. Forfeited assets can then be distributed to other victims of crime as compensation for their losses if their loss is a direct result of the commission of the offense underlying forfeiture or a related offense. Any remaining funds from the forfeited asset may be placed into official use, distributed to foreign governments, state or local law enforcement agencies as part of the equitable sharing program to enhance cooperation with federal investigations. When victims are eligible for compensation using forfeited assets, DOJ employs two processes: restoration and remission. The restoration process involves the USAO staff requesting funds on behalf of a victim when there is both an order of forfeiture and an order of restitution. Under the restoration process, USAO staff request DOJ’s Money Laundering and Asset Recovery Section to use the forfeited asset to pay a restitution debt. If DOJ approves the request for restoration, the funds from the forfeited property are then transferred to the Clerk of the Court who disburses this money to the victim. The remission process requires a victim of a crime to directly petition DOJ to receive funds from the forfeited property. According to officials in DOJ’s Criminal Division, the courts may not order restitution on behalf of victims who suffered a specific actual loss as a direct result of a crime for a variety of reasons, and therefore the remission process serves as a complement to the restoration process to ensure victims are made whole. For example, these officials stated that, among other reasons, the courts may not order restitution if a defendant dies prior to sentencing or if the case is one in which a court is not required to, and does not, order restitution, but the victim has suffered eligible losses. EOUSA and USAO officials in all six of the offices with whom we spoke told us that prosecutors document requests for restitution in their case files and that their offices employ other internal controls, such as the use of templates and forms, throughout the prosecution process to ensure that prosecutors request restitution as appropriate. EOUSA officials told us that although the agency does not track this information, they believed all USAOs generally document requests for restitution in their offices’ case files. Further, USAO officials in all six offices told us that prosecutors document requests for the court to order restitution in their case files by including this information in a written memorandum. To support prosecutors in documenting this information, all six offices we selected provide prosecutors with a prosecution memorandum template. Of the six templates we reviewed, four explicitly include a section for prosecutors to indicate whether victims have been identified and the extent of any victim losses. In addition to these templates, four of six USAOs we selected had forms that prosecutors could use to identify whether cases have victims and their need for restitution when drafting criminal charging documents. Moreover, officials from two of the six USAOs told us their offices use this form as an internal control to ensure prosecutors have identified all victims and considered their need for restitution, if applicable. All six offices we selected also provided prosecutors templates for drafting plea agreements, and templates we reviewed from all six USAOs included language requesting the offender pay restitution, if applicable. However, prosecutors are not required to use plea agreement templates, nor are they required to request restitution as part of a plea agreement. USAO officials from one office stated that including this language in the plea agreement template served to remind prosecutors of their requirement to consider requesting restitution as stated in the U.S. Attorney’s Manual. Select USAO officials also described various forms of management oversight to ensure prosecutors request restitution as appropriate. Specifically, four USAOs we selected require supervisory review of the form that prosecutors fill out when drafting criminal charging documents, which includes information on victims. Additionally, officials in all six USAOs told us that they require supervisory review of plea agreements for every case. For example, officials from two USAOs told us their office requires the Criminal Chief, the supervisor of all criminal cases, to approve documents in the plea agreement, which may include requests for restitution. Federal courts sent information on sentencing decisions to USSC and USSC had information on restitution decisions for 95 percent of all offenders from fiscal years 2014 through 2016. According to our analysis of USSC data, 214,578 federal offenders were sentenced from fiscal years 2014 through 2016 and restitution was ordered for 33,158 of those offenders, or 15 percent. Collectively, courts ordered these offenders to pay $33.9 billion in restitution during this period. Courts did not order restitution for the remaining 181,420 offenders, or 85 percent. Table 1 shows the number of federal offenders sentenced and ordered to pay restitution for fiscal years 2014 through 2016, as well as the total amount of restitution ordered by the courts. The majority of federal offenders were sentenced for immigration or drug- related offenses, and USAO officials in all six offices we selected told us that these types of offenses do not typically have victims with actual losses. For example, from fiscal years 2014 through 2016, USSC data showed that 131,088 offenders, 61 percent of offenders sentenced, were sentenced for immigration or drug-related offenses and courts ordered 999 (or less than 1 percent) of these offenders to pay restitution. USSC data show that courts ordered restitution more often for offenders sentenced for other offenses, such as fraud. For example, courts sentenced 21,551 offenders for fraud offenses from fiscal years 2014 through 2016, and courts ordered restitution for 15,902 of these offenders, or 74 percent. Table 2 shows the number of offenders sentenced and the number ordered to pay restitution by offenses for which restitution was most often and least often ordered by courts from fiscal years 2014 through 2016. The percentage of federal offenders ordered to pay restitution varied across federal court districts; from 2 percent of offenders in one district to 42 percent in another district. USAO officials we interviewed stated that some of this variation may be due to the types of offenses prosecuted within different districts. For example, officials from one USAO stated that their office, which had a high volume of immigration–related offenders, had few cases in which restitution was applicable. Our analysis of USSC data showed that from fiscal year 2014 through fiscal year 2016 and across all districts, districts with a higher than average rate of immigration-related offenders had lower than average rates of restitution ordered. Conversely, districts with above-average rates of offenders convicted of financial offenses such as fraud, embezzlement, money laundering, tax offenses, counterfeiting or bribery had higher than average rates of restitution ordered, as shown in table 3. Judges indicated on documents sent to USSC that restitution was not applicable and thus did not order it for most offenders sentenced from fiscal years 2014 through 2016—167,230 offenders—or 78 percent of all offenders sentenced during this time period. Our analysis of sentencing information for the remaining offenders found that courts ordered restitution at a higher rate as compared to all offenders. Specifically, after excluding offenders for whom restitution was not applicable and were not ordered to pay it, we found that courts ordered restitution for 70 percent of the remaining 47,348 offenders. EOUSA and USAO officials told us that in cases where there are identifiable victims, restitution may not be ordered for other reasons. EOUSA officials told us that restitution may not be ordered for several reasons, such as when victims provide no proof of their losses or when victims recover compensation through other means, such as through civil proceedings. Further, officials from one USAO told us that victims must provide documentation of their losses for restitution and, if victims are not able to provide this documentation, courts may decline to order restitution. Also, in certain cases, courts are not required to order restitution—such as when there is no identifiable victim or, on the other hand, when the number of identifiable victims is so large as to make restitution impractical, among other reasons. Additionally, the court might not order, or order only partial restitution for other reasons, such as when the value of property the defendant returned to the victim was deducted from the restitution award or because the victim received compensation from insurance. If a court does not order restitution, or orders partial restitution, it is required to provide the reason for its decision and to provide that reason to USSC, but our analysis showed USSC did not always have these data. Specifically, from fiscal years 2014 through 2016, we found that restitution was not ordered—and no reason was documented in USSC data for that decision—for 9,848 offenders (5 percent of the 214,578 offenders sentenced during this time period). Information on offenders’ sentences, including restitution, assists USSC in its continuous reexamination of its guidelines and policy statements and ensures that various sentencing practices are achieving their stated purposes. Further, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government state that management should evaluate issues identified through monitoring activities or reported by personnel to determine whether any of the issues rise to the level of an internal control deficiency. In response to our questions about the missing information on reasons why restitution was not ordered, AOUSC and USSC officials stated that they were unaware of the missing information or why it was missing. Judiciary officials stated that because various entities within the judiciary participate in the process of collecting and recording information on reasons restitution was not ordered, they did not know which entities could take action to improve USSC data. However, as previously discussed, if the court does not order restitution, or orders only partial restitution, the judge must provide the reason, and judges usually do so in a written Statement of Reasons form. The Judicial Conference, along with USSC, has developed guidance to help judges fill out the Statement of Reasons form and AOUSC supports the Judicial Conference in carrying out its policies. Further, courts must provide USSC the written Statement of Reasons form for sentences imposed. USSC is also responsible for collecting, analyzing, and distributing information on federal sentences provided by each district court, including information related to orders for restitution. However, judicial officials, including from the entities listed above, agreed that further studying the missing data may inform the judiciary of the cause of the missing data, as well as any efforts needed to improve USSC information. Courts are required to provide reasons for not ordering restitution and to provide this information to USSC so that the agency can analyze and report on sentencing data. Determining why USSC data are incomplete could help inform the judiciary whether the issue rises to the level of an internal control deficiency and whether additional action can be taken to improve the transparency of sentencing decisions. Doing so could help the judiciary ensure reasons for not ordering restitution are provided consistently in all cases and potentially improve data provided to USSC, in turn supporting its mission to promote transparency in sentencing decisions. Our analysis of DOJ data showed that DOJ collected $2.95 billion in restitution debt from fiscal years 2014 through 2016, half of which was collected on debts imposed during this period. The extent of collections across the 94 USAOs ranged from a high of $848 million in one USAO to a low of $1.2 million in another USAO. The median amount collected for USAOs was $10.7 million. DOJ was more successful at collecting restitution on newer debts—debts imposed from fiscal years 2014 through 2016. Of the $2.95 billion in restitution debt collected, about half was collected from new debts imposed by courts during this time period. Specifically, DOJ collected $1.5 billion (4 percent), of the $34 billion ordered from fiscal years 2014 through 2016. The remaining half of the debt collected during this time frame was collected from debts imposed between fiscal year 1988 and fiscal year 2014. New debts—imposed in fiscal years 2014 through 2016—were also more likely to be fully paid during this time period compared to all debts. Specifically, from fiscal years 2014 through 2016, DOJ collected the full amount of restitution on 4,003 of the 24,950 debts imposed during this time, 16 percent. However, across all debts, including debts imposed prior to fiscal year 2014, DOJ collected the full amount of restitution ordered on only 5 percent of debts. Across all restitution debts, DOJ collected at least some of the debt for one-third of debts and did not collect any restitution on the remaining two-thirds. More than 60 percent of the restitution DOJ collected in fiscal years 2014 through 2016 was owed to non-federal victims ($1.8 billion), including individuals, corporations and state and local governments. An additional 37 percent of restitution was collected on behalf of federal agencies that were victims of crimes. One percent of restitution collected was community restitution, which is restitution collected for drug offenses that otherwise have no victims and which is disbursed to state victim assistance agencies and state agencies dedicated to the reduction of substance abuse, as shown in table 4. AOUSC officials noted that some collected restitution is not disbursed to non-federal victims due to a lack of accurate contact information for these victims. Specifically, according to AOUSC, as of June 2017, courts had more than $132 million in restitution due to 113,260 victims that could not be disbursed because of a lack of accurate contact information for these victims. DOJ is required to provide courts with victim contact information, and victims are to notify DOJ if their contact information changes. However, AOUSC and USAO officials told us that this notification by victims may not always occur. For example, officials in one USAO told us that due to the length of court proceedings, victims may move without notifying the court prior to the disbursement of restitution and, as a result, the court is unable to disburse restitution to those victims. According to our analysis of DOJ data, at the end of fiscal year 2016, $110 billion in restitution was outstanding and USAOs had identified $100 billion of that debt as uncollectible, as shown in figure 2. USAOs may identify debts as uncollectible and suspend collection actions on a debt for a variety of reasons, including that the offender has no, or only a nominal, ability to pay the debt. Probation officials, EOUSA officials, and officials from five of six USAOs we interviewed stated that most outstanding restitution debt is identified as uncollectible and collection action is suspended because many offenders have little ability to pay the debt—a conclusion supported by USSC data. For example, according to USSC data, 95 percent of offenders ordered to pay restitution from fiscal years 2014 through 2016 received a waiver from paying a court-ordered fine, indicating their inability to pay. While courts are allowed to take an offender’s economic circumstances into consideration when issuing fines, they generally may not do so when ordering restitution. As a result, EOUSA and federal probation officials with whom we spoke stated that offenders ordered to pay restitution often do not have an ability to do so and therefore a large amount of restitution orders is uncollectible. Through various guidance documents, DOJ has identified and recommended numerous practices for DOJ prosecutors and FLU staff to use throughout the restitution process to help ensure full and timely restitution for victims. USAO officials in all six offices with whom we spoke stated that, based on their experience, these practices were generally effective. Specifically, DOJ and EOUSA officials identified practices for prosecutors and FLU staff to use when requesting restitution, facilitating court orders for restitution, and collecting restitution and documented these practices in several guidance manuals. Officials we interviewed from all six USAOs stated they were generally satisfied with the guidance from EOUSA and that they thought most of DOJ’s recommended practices were effective when requesting restitution, facilitating court orders for restitution, and collecting restitution. Requesting restitution. Officials we interviewed from three USAOs identified coordination between prosecutors and case investigators prior to sentencing to identify victims and their losses as an important practice for requesting restitution. USAO officials from three of the six offices stated that gathering detailed information on an offender’s financial resources, which include assets that could be forfeited and used to pay a restitution debt, was a very effective practice related to requesting restitution. Facilitating court orders of restitution. Although the courts, and not prosecutors, are responsible for ordering restitution, DOJ guidance identifies several practices that prosecutors can use to facilitate orders of restitution that may increase the likelihood of full and timely restitution for victims. Officials from three of six USAOs stated that the most effective practice related to ordering restitution was ensuring courts ordered restitution as due and payable immediately. Specifically, when offenders cannot pay restitution in an immediate lump-sum payment, the courts must specify a payment schedule through which the offender will pay restitution based on the offender’s ability to pay. In these cases, USAO officials stated that it is effective for prosecutors to ensure the restitution order specifies that restitution is due and payable immediately. According to an EOUSA official, this permits the agency to immediately pursue all collection remedies allowed by law whenever the debtor has or subsequently obtains the ability to pay. Collecting restitution. Officials from all six USAOs stated that using the Treasury Offset Program (TOP), a program that allows for the reduction or withholding of a debtor’s federal benefits, such as a tax refund, was one of the most effective practices for collecting restitution. Specifically, officials in one USAO told us that TOP requires minimal effort for FLU staff and can result in a high amount of collections. As an example, officials from two USAOs told us their respective offices each recovered more than $500,000 dollars in restitution debt in fiscal year 2016 through TOP. Officials from three of the six offices also identified using wage garnishment as an effective practice for collecting restitution. Across all parts of the restitution process, USAO officials we spoke with also consistently identified DOJ recommended practices related to internal and external communication and collaboration as effective for improving the restitution process. Specifically, the officials identified collaboration between various units in the USAO as an effective practice to ensuring restitution for victims. For example, USAO officials in two of the six offices highlighted coordination between Victim-Witness coordinators and prosecutors to help identify victims and quantify their losses as effective to assisting in the request for restitution. Additionally, USAO officials in all six offices stated that strong coordination between FLU personnel and criminal prosecutors to identify an offender’s financial resources and available assets was an effective practice to help ensure FLU staff could collect restitution using those resources or assets. USAO officials from five of six offices identified external communication between FLU and the federal probation office as an effective practice. Specifically, officials from these USAOs stated that FLUs coordinating with probation officers during the offender’s supervision period to enforce restitution terms was an effective practice for collecting restitution. Additionally, according to EOUSA guidance, FLU staff can use outreach and training with other partners such as the probation office to facilitate information sharing on restitution collection issues and officials from five of six USAOs told us that FLUs conducting training and outreach is a very effective practice. In addition, probation officials we interviewed in each of the six federal judicial districts we selected stated that ongoing communication between USAO staff and probation officers is effective to ensuring victims are identified and receive full and timely restitution. Probation officials from one court district emphasized the importance of a good working relationship with the USAO, stating that the probation office and USAO are better able to ensure victims and their losses are accurately identified and defendants’ ability to pay is adequately addressed when working collaboratively. A probation official from another office said that probation officers regularly coordinated with the USAO’s FLU, and this coordination was particularly important on cases involving complex financial crimes, where the offender has a complicated financial portfolio. Further, probation officials from five of six probation offices also stated that attending training conducted by the FLU is a very effective practice. EOUSA and selected USAO officials told us that while these practices may be useful in some circumstances, they may not be effective or applicable in all cases or in all districts. Specifically, practices DOJ recommends may be effective when offenders have the ability to pay restitution but are simply unwilling to do so; however, USAO officials in five of six offices stated that these practices cannot mitigate the fact that many offenders lack the ability to pay restitution because they lack assets and income. Additionally, while EOUSA guidance recommends that FLU staff contact co-defendants or victims for information on the whereabouts or assets of offenders who owe restitution, officials from three USAOs told us this was not effective. According to one official, although co- defendants are sometimes eager to share information, the information is usually unreliable. USAO officials also identified some recommended practices as not applicable to their district. For example, EOUSA recommends that FLU units request Asset Investigation assistance from EOUSA for complex cases involving large amounts of valuable assets. However, USAO officials in a small, rural district with whom we spoke stated that the types of cases their office prosecutes tend not to be the type of financial cases that warranted use of this resource. DOJ has identified improving debt collection—including court-ordered restitution—as a major management initiative in its 2014-2018 Strategic Plan. However, it does not have any measures or goals in place to assess its performance in meeting this initiative or meet requirements that it evaluate its performance in seeking and recovering restitution as required by statute. In 2001, we recommended that DOJ adequately measure its criminal debt collection performance against established goals to help improve collections and stem the growth in uncollected criminal debt. DOJ concurred with this recommendation, and as of fiscal year 2003, annually assessed each district based on established collection goals for that district. However, as of September 2017, DOJ no longer evaluates each district based on established goals. EOUSA officials stated that DOJ no longer uses these performance goals and that the agency did not maintain records for when or why it stopped. EOUSA officials stated that while the agency does not have any measures or goals to assess USAOs’ performance in improving debt collection, including the collection of federal restitution, they are working with DOJ’s Justice Management Division to develop a suite of analytical tools to monitor the collection of debt across all offices. According to DOJ, some of these analytical tools have been implemented and additional tools will be implemented by March 2018. EOUSA officials stated that these tools will help the agency determine which cases are most likely to result in significant collections and the types and timing of enforcement actions that generate maximum debt recovery results. EOUSA officials further stated the analytical tools will allow the agency to compare districts’ efforts based on a variety of factors (e.g., caseload, staff size, and enforcement actions). These analytical tools may provide EOUSA with valuable insight into the present condition of the collection of restitution across USAOs, but they will not provide DOJ with a baseline performance standard that could be used to indicate if USAOs’ efforts to collect restitution debts are having a measurable impact in meeting DOJ’s objective of improving debt collection. Additionally, EOUSA conducts evaluations of each USAO every 4 years, which include a review of FLU operations, but EOUSA officials stated that these reviews do not include oversight of the collection of restitution. Among other aspects of USAO operations, these internal evaluations review the extent to which each FLU is complying with statutory and DOJ requirements related to debt collection, has sufficient program resources, and adequately manages its caseload. However, DOJ and EOUSA officials told us that it did not plan to use these internal evaluations to meet the Justice for All Reauthorization Act of 2016 requirement to evaluate each USAO on its performance in seeking and recovering restitution for victims. Specifically, the officials stated that these internal evaluations are not an appropriate mechanism to meet the law’s requirements because the internal evaluations do not specifically review the seeking and recovery of restitution for victims. According to DOJ officials responsible for the internal evaluation program, these evaluations are largely intended to provide onsite management assistance and analysis of how the USAO allocates its administrative and legal personnel resources rather than the office’s efficacy in collecting restitution. Consistent with requirements outlined in the Government Performance and Results Act Modernization Act of 2010 (GPRAMA), performance measurement is the ongoing monitoring and reporting of program accomplishments—particularly towards pre-established, objective and quantifiable goals—and agencies are to establish performance measures to assess progress towards those goals. While GPRAMA is applicable to the department or agency level, performance measures and goals are important management tools at all levels of an agency, including the program, project, or activity level. Agencies can use performance measurement to make various types of management decisions to improve programs and results, such as developing strategies and allocating resources, including identifying problems and taking corrective action when appropriate. Further, the Justice for All Reauthorization Act of 2016 requires DOJ to evaluate each USAO in its performance in recovering restitution for victims. DOJ and EOUSA officials told us that DOJ does not require USAOs to establish performance measures or goals to assess their progress in improving the collection of restitution. DOJ and EOUSA officials also told us that each USAO could develop performance goals but that they were unaware of the extent to which USAOs did so, and further, they do not track the extent to which USAOs met performance goals. Additionally, these officials stated that because each USAO faces different constraints in its ability to collect restitution, establishing a uniform and consistent performance measure and goal would be challenging. EOUSA officials noted that some USAOs may have more resources, such as more FLU staff or specialized asset investigators, available to pursue collections as compared to other offices and therefore offices with fewer resources could have difficulty meeting a performance goal. Further, EOUSA and USAO officials stated that the extent to which DOJ can collect on a debt is heavily influenced by factors outside of the agency’s control, such as an offender’s ability to pay. USAOs could use information provided by performance measures and goals—such as an office’s ability to meet a performance goal—to make managerial decisions to help address these constraints, such as by increasing the allocation of staff resources. Further, to avoid comparing USAOs to a nationally set performance goal that does not account for specific constraints faced by each office, DOJ could—as it did in fiscal year 2003—require each USAO to establish its own objective, quantitative collection goals based on historical, district-specific collection statistics. Finally, as previously discussed, each USAO already accounts for external factors that affect the collectability of a debt, such as an offender’s ability to pay, by suspending collection action on debts it identifies as uncollectible. Therefore, any performance measures and goals developed could be based solely on debts that the USAO already has determined to be collectible. Stakeholders we interviewed—including officials from one USAO, probation officials in two districts, and officials with DOJ’s Office of Crime Victims—noted that receiving restitution is both emotionally and financially important to victims. Specifically, officials from one USAO and one probation office noted that while many victims may never receive the full amount of restitution ordered, receiving even a minimal amount of restitution is a symbolic victory and that it is important for victims to know the government is making efforts to collect restitution on their behalf. The legislative history of the MVRA echoes these sentiments, providing that even nominal restitution payments have benefits for the victim of crime, and that orders of restitution are largely worthless without enforcement. Yet, according to our analysis, $10 billion of restitution debt DOJ identified as collectible remained outstanding at the end of fiscal year 2016. Further, the extent to which USAOs collected restitution varied widely— from a high of one USAO district collecting nearly 350 percent of all collectible debt in fiscal years 2014 through 2016 to a low of one district collecting less than one percent of collectible debt in the same period. Without performance measures, including the establishment of goals, DOJ cannot assess if this variation is due to factors outside the control of USAOs or due to management deficiencies that require corrective action. Developing performance measures and goals for each USAO related to the collection of restitution would allow DOJ to assess its progress in achieving its major management initiative in improving debt collection— including debts owed to victims as court-ordered restitution. Doing so would also better position DOJ to meet the requirements of the Justice for All Reauthorization Act of 2016 to evaluate offices in their performance in recovering restitution on behalf of victims and to use performance information to improve the practices of offices as needed. Although asset forfeiture and restitution are separate parts of a criminal sentence, DOJ guidance states that using forfeited assets to benefit victims is a way that DOJ can help ensure eligible victims of crime are compensated for their losses. Further, DOJ regulations and policy require that eligible victims receive compensation from forfeited assets before certain other uses, such as official use or equitable sharing. However, while DOJ tracks the amount of compensation provided to victims through forfeited assets, it does not have assurances that forfeited assets are being used to compensate victims to the greatest extent possible. According to DOJ information, the agency made payments of about $595 million to eligible victims other than owners of the property from the Assets Forfeiture Fund from fiscal years 2014 through 2016, or 15 percent of $3.9 billion in paid expenditures during this period, as shown in table 5. As table 5 shows, DOJ can account for cases in which forfeited assets were used to compensate eligible victims who were not owners or lienholders. However, DOJ does not have information on the overall universe of victims who could have been eligible to receive compensation from forfeited assets. Further, it does not have insight into any reasons why funds from forfeited assets were not used for these victims. Specifically, DOJ officials stated that the department collects information on whether victims have been identified in cases associated with forfeited assets, and if restitution is anticipated in these cases, but it does not track the extent to which these victims were ultimately compensated using forfeited assets. Further, DOJ also does not collect information on reasons why victims were not compensated using funds from forfeited assets. While DOJ is required to use forfeited assets to compensate victims before using those assets for certain other purposes, the agency is unable to provide assurances that it is always doing so because it does not have information on the overall universe of victims or reasons why victims were not compensated using forfeited assets. As a result, DOJ does not have a basis to know whether the $595 million provided to victims from fiscal years 2014 through 2016 is the maximum amount of compensation the agency could have provided to victims using forfeited assets. Full use of forfeited assets for victim compensation has long been, and continues to be, a goal of DOJ. In 2005, an interagency task force—led by DOJ and including the Department of Treasury, Office of Management and Budget and AOUSC—developed a strategic plan to improve the collection of criminal debt. Among other goals included in its strategic plan, the task force stated a goal of examining how asset seizure and forfeiture procedures can be used to maximize recoveries for victims. More recently, DOJ reported in its 2014-2018 Strategic Plan that it would make every effort to recover full and fair restitution for victims using the federal forfeiture statutes to preserve and recover criminal proceeds. Specifically, DOJ stated that using federal forfeiture statutes to recover full and fair restitution for victims is one part of its strategy to protect the rights of the American people and enforce the rule of law. Finally, DOJ officials told us they considered providing compensation to victims as one goal of the Asset Forfeiture Program and EOUSA stated in guidance that asset forfeiture is the most widely available and effective tool to seize assets for restitution purposes. Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government call on federal managers to design control activities to achieve the agency’s objectives. These controls can include using quality information to make informed decisions, evaluate the entity’s performance in achieving key objectives, and address risks. DOJ officials told us that they do not track the extent to which victims were not compensated using forfeited assets because USAO staff are not required to request that these assets be used for victim compensation. DOJ officials explained that staff are required to indicate in the agency’s forfeited asset database, the Consolidated Asset Tracking System, if victims exist in cases associated with forfeited assets and if restitution is anticipated in these cases. However, these officials stated that staff are not required to then compensate these victims using the forfeited assets or to indicate why these assets were not used for this purpose. DOJ officials told us that decisions to compensate victims using forfeited assets are best left to the judgment of the USAO staff familiar with the case, such as the prosecuting attorney or asset forfeiture staff. DOJ officials pointed to informal communication and coordination among prosecutors, the FLU, and the Asset Forfeiture unit in each USAO as a means to provide compensation to victims as appropriate. However, communication and coordination among these groups has been a challenge for USAOs, as the DOJ Inspector General found in a June 2015 review of DOJ’s debt collection program. Similarly, during our current review, EOUSA and USAO officials we spoke with identified communication and coordination as an area for improvement. EOUSA officials told us that while they thought that FLU staff and Asset Forfeiture unit staff were collaborating more frequently to use forfeited assets to collect restitution debts since the issuance of the DOJ Inspector General’s report, the extent of collaboration between these two units still varied across USAOs. Further, officials we talked to in two USAOs and one probation office noted that USAO staff could improve their use of forfeited assets for restitution payments. For example, officials in one probation office noted that it was their practice to identify forfeited assets that could be used for compensation in the PSR because they had observed that USAO staff were frequently not applying such assets to victim compensation. While DOJ may allow USAO staff to use discretion when requesting restoration or alerting victims to assets available for compensation, increasing the agency’s understanding of the extent to which assets could have been—but were not—used for victim compensation, and the reasons for those decisions, does not affect that discretion. There are legitimate reasons why victims might not be compensated using forfeited assets; for example, the assets may have other owners or lienholders that must be compensated prior to victims, or offenders may have other means by which to pay victims restitution. However, there are also instances where victims may have not received compensation through forfeited assets as a result of unintentional circumstances. For example, according to DOJ’s Asset Forfeiture Manual, forfeiture actions can proceed faster than the parallel criminal case. Consequently, assets might be equitably shared, placed into official use, or remitted to victims who file petitions long before restitution is ordered, and therefore would not be available for other victims who wait for restitution to be ordered after an offender is sentenced. To avoid this outcome, DOJ recommends that USAOs coordinate to ensure the retention of property for victim compensation. However, although DOJ officials responsible for leading DOJ’s asset forfeiture efforts highlighted the need for expedient coordination when USAO staff are considering using forfeited assets to compensate victims, they stated this may not always occur. As a result, otherwise eligible victims may not always be compensated through forfeited assets. By gathering information about the extent to which assets were used for victim compensation—including when they were not used and reasons why not—DOJ could have a better understanding of potential instances where victims could be, but are not, receiving compensation through forfeited funds and could take steps to address them accordingly. Options for gathering such information could include doing a one-time retrospective study of forfeited assets with victims or anticipated restitution to determine the extent that assets were used for victim compensation, or creating a tracking mechanism through its forfeited assets database, or another system. Gathering information on the extent to which forfeited assets were used for victim compensation, including when not used and reasons why not, could position DOJ to take action to increase the use of these assets for victim compensation if warranted. These actions could include providing funds for increased asset forfeiture staff in USAOs, providing additional training or changing policies or procedures for using forfeited assets to compensate victims. Fully and systematically understanding the extent to which issues, such as a lack of coordination within USAOs, result in victims not being compensated using forfeited assets would give DOJ a basis upon which to develop improvements to the Asset Forfeiture Program. Such information would also provide DOJ and staff at all USAOs with information to evaluate its performance in achieving one of the goals of the Asset Forfeiture Program and taking action to meet the agency goal of protecting the rights of the American people—including the right to full and fair restitution for victims. Restitution serves the criminal justice goal of holding offenders accountable and, to the extent possible, restoring victims of federal crimes to their prior position had the crime not occurred. Many victims are unlikely to receive any meaningful portion of court-ordered restitution owed to them because of offenders’ inability to pay these debts. However, the fact that restitution is difficult to collect does not negate the important responsibilities of the judiciary and DOJ to properly manage and oversee all aspects of the restitution process. By law, courts are to state why they did not order restitution and provide that information to USSC. While this information was collected and recorded in USSC data for most offenders, we found that this information was missing for thousands of offenders. It is important for the judiciary to ensure that this information is consistently collected and recorded to assist USSC in its continuous re-examination of its guidelines and policy statements and ensure that various sentencing practices are achieving their stated purposes. The judiciary could support USSC in this endeavor by determining why this information is missing. Results from this study could help inform the judiciary whether this issue rises to the level of an internal control deficiency and whether additional action can be taken to improve the transparency of sentencing decisions. While DOJ has delegated collection activities for restitution to USAOs, it could provide better oversight to ensure it is making reasonable efforts to collect restitution and meeting its responsibility to victims. USAOs have identified a significant portion of outstanding restitution debt as uncollectible, but they have also identified $10 billion of outstanding restitution debt that could be collected. Developing and implementing performance measures and goals for each USAO would allow DOJ to gauge USAOs’ success in collecting this restitution and, by extension, the department’s success in achieving its major management initiative to increase the collection of debt. Further, DOJ could use performance information to improve the practices of offices in seeking and recovering restitution, consistent with a requirement in the Justice for All Reauthorization Act of 2016. Finally, DOJ could gain greater visibility into the use of forfeited assets to compensate victims by gathering information on cases in which victims have been identified and restitution is anticipated but forfeited assets are not used, and any reasons why. Doing so would better position DOJ to take action to increase the use of forfeited assets to compensate eligible victims if warranted and to provide assurance that it is maximizing the use of asset forfeiture in satisfying restitution debts, one of the agency’s most effective mechanisms for satisfying restitution. We are making three recommendations, including one to the judiciary and two to DOJ. Specifically: Judiciary officials, including AOUSC, USSC, and the Judicial Conference, should determine why USSC data on the reasons restitution was not ordered are incomplete. Additionally, if warranted based on this information, judiciary officials should take action to ensure USSC data records include all required information for orders of restitution. (Recommendation 1) To improve oversight of the collection of restitution we recommend that the Attorney General: Develop and implement performance measures and goals for each USAO related to the collection of restitution, and measure progress towards meeting those goals. (Recommendation 2) In cases where forfeited assets were not used to compensate victims, gather information on reasons why forfeited assets were not used for victims. If warranted based on this information, take action to increase the use of forfeited assets to compensate eligible victims. (Recommendation 3) We provided a draft of this report for review and comment to DOJ, the Judicial Conference of the United States, AOUSC, USSC, and the Federal Judicial Center. DOJ concurred with our recommendations and provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. AOUSC provided written comments, which are reproduced in appendix III. In its written comments, AOUSC noted that it would work with the USSC to address our recommendation. We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees and the Attorney General, the Judicial Conference of the United States, the Directors of AOUSC, the Staff Director of USSC, the Federal Judicial Center and other interested parties. In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov. If you and your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-8777 or goodwing@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions are listed in appendix IV. According to our analysis of data from the U.S. Sentencing Commission (USSC), 214,578 federal offenders were sentenced from fiscal years 2014 through 2016. Table 6 shows the number of offenders sentenced and the number and percentage of offenders ordered to pay restitution for each primary offense of conviction in fiscal years 2014 through 2016. The Department of Justice (DOJ) has identified and recommended numerous practices for federal prosecutors and Financial Litigation Unit (FLU) staff to use throughout the restitution process through various guidance documents. We conducted semi-structured interviews with officials from six U.S. Attorneys’ Offices (USAO) to obtain their views on the restitution process and the extent to which they believed DOJ- recommended restitution practices related to the restitution process were effective. In particular, we spoke with USAO officials from the District of Connecticut; the Southern District of California; the District of New Jersey; the Southern District of Ohio; the District of South Dakota; and the District of Wyoming. Tables 7 through 9 show the results of our semi-structured interviews. In particular, table 7 shows practices related to requesting restitution and the extent to which USAO officials found these practices effective. Table 8 shows practices related to facilitating orders of restitution and the extent to which USAO officials found these practices effective. Table 9 shows practices related to collecting restitution and the extent to which USAO officials found these practices effective. Each table also indicates practices that officials we interviewed considered as most important or effective for helping ensure victims receive full and timely restitution. In addition to the contact named above, Chris Ferencik (Assistant Director); Kathleen Donovan (Analyst-in-Charge); Enyinnaya David Aja; David Alexander; Lacinda Ayers; Carla Brown; Emily Hutz; Janet Temko- Blinder; and Adam Vogt, made key contributions to this report.

Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 1.

Answer: Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereafter, "Bosnia") drew heavily on U.S. support after gaining independence from Yugoslavia in 1992. The United States helped end the Bosnian war (1992-1995), one of the most lethal conflicts in Europe since the Second World War, by leading NATO airstrikes against Bosnian Serb forces, brokering the Dayton Peace Agreement in 1995, and deploying 20,000 U.S. troops. Some Members of Congress became involved in policy debates over these measures, and Congress monitored and at times challenged the Bush and Clinton Administrations' response through numerous hearings, resolutions, and legislative proposals. Since 1995, the United States has been a major source of aid to Bosnia and firmly supports its territorial integrity. The United States also supports Bosnia's aspirations for NATO and European Union (EU) membership. Today, Bosnia faces serious challenges. Nearly 25 years after the Dayton Agreement, Bosnia continues to use part of the Agreement as its constitution, which divides the country into two ethnoterritorial entities. Critics charge that Bosnia's political system is too decentralized to enact the reforms required for NATO and EU membership. They also contend that the ethnic power-sharing arrangements and veto points embedded in numerous government bodies are sources of gridlock. Domestic and international courts have ruled against several aspects of Bosnia's constitution, yet the Bosnian government thus far has failed to implement these rulings. Since Bosnia's independence, its politics has been dominated by ethnic parties representing the country's three main groups: Bosniaks (Slavic Muslims), Croats, and Serbs. These parties have prospered under a system that critics charge lacks transparency and accountability. Critics also maintain that ethnic party leaders use divisive nationalist rhetoric to distract from serious issues affecting the country as a whole, including poverty, unemployment, and stalled political reforms. The Bosnian population exhibits low trust in political parties and the government, and disaffection toward the country's elite. U.S. and EU officials brokered several ultimately unsuccessful rounds of constitutional reform negotiations, and continue to call on Bosnia's leaders to implement reforms to make governance more efficient and effective, dismantle patronage networks, and bring Bosnia closer to EU and NATO membership. However, there is little consensus among the country's leaders on how the country should be reformed. Bosnian Serb leaders from the Serb-majority entity (Republika Srpska) have called for greater autonomy and even secession from Bosnia. Some Bosnian Croat leaders have called for partitioning Bosnia's other entity, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, to create a separate Croat-majority entity. Bosniak leaders, by contrast, generally prefer a more centralized state. Many analysts caution that any move to partition the country could lead to renewed violence, while greater decentralization could make Bosnia's government less functional. U.S. policy has long been oriented toward preserving Bosnia's statehood. Bosnia's 2018 general elections largely returned to power the same entrenched ethnic parties. Of particular concern is the election of Bosnian Serb leader Milorad Dodik to Bosnia's collective presidency. Dodik, a sharp critic of the United States and NATO, has periodically called for a referendum on Republika Srpska's secession. He is under U.S. sanctions for obstructing the Dayton Agreement. In addition to these internal challenges, U.S. and EU officials have expressed concern over external influence in the region. Russia reportedly relies on soft power, energy leverage, and "spoiler" tactics to influence Bosnia, particularly in the Serb-majority entity. Turkish soft power draws on Bosnia's Ottoman-era heritage and Turkey's shared religious tradition with Bosniaks. China is a more recent presence in the region, but its heavy investments and lending have prompted concern on both sides of the Atlantic. Policymakers have also expressed concern at the challenges posed by the return of Bosnians who fought with the Islamic State and Nusra Front in Syria and Iraq. Many observers contend that the United States remains a stakeholder in Bosnia's future because of its central role in resolving the conflict and shaping the postwar Bosnian state. Given the history of U.S. involvement in Bosnia, Bosnia's importance to regional stability in the Balkans, and concerns over Russian and Chinese influence in Bosnia, Members of Congress may be interested in monitoring how the country navigates its internal and external challenges. Congress may also consider future U.S. aid levels to Bosnia and the degree to which such assistance supports the long-standing U.S. policy objectives for Bosnia of territorial integrity, NATO and EU integration, energy security, and resilience against malign influence.