You are given two reports by the government agency.  

Report 1:
Since 1952, when a cabal of Egyptian Army officers, known as the Free Officers Movement, ousted the British-backed king, Egypt's military has produced four presidents; Gamal Abdel Nasser (1954-1970), Anwar Sadat (1970-1981), Hosni Mubarak (1981-2011), and Abdel Fattah el Sisi (2013-present). In general, these four men have ruled Egypt with strong backing from the country's security establishment. The only significant and abiding opposition has come from the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, an organization that has opposed single party military-backed rule and advocated for a state governed by a vaguely articulated combination of civil and Shariah (Islamic) law. Egypt's sole departure from this general formula took place between 2011 and 2013, after popular demonstrations sparked by the "Arab Spring," which had started in neighboring Tunisia, compelled the military to force the resignation of former President Hosni Mubarak in February 2011. During this period, Egypt experienced tremendous political tumult, culminating in the one-year presidency of the Muslim Brotherhood's Muhammad Morsi. When Morsi took office on June 30, 2012, after winning Egypt's first truly competitive presidential election, his ascension to the presidency was supposed to mark the end of a rocky 16-month transition period. Proposed time lines for elections, the constitutional drafting process, and the military's relinquishing of power to a civilian government had been constantly changed, contested, and sometimes even overruled by the courts. Instead of consolidating democratic or civilian rule, Morsi's rule exposed the deep divisions in Egyptian politics, pitting a broad cross-section of Egypt's public and private sectors, the Coptic Church, and the military against the Brotherhood and its Islamist supporters. The atmosphere of mutual distrust, political gridlock, and public dissatisfaction that permeated Morsi's presidency provided Egypt's military, led by then-Defense Minister Sisi, with an opportunity to reassert political control. On July 3, 2013, following several days of mass demonstrations against Morsi's rule, the military unilaterally dissolved Morsi's government, suspended the constitution that had been passed during his rule, and installed an interim president. The Muslim Brotherhood and its supporters declared the military's actions a coup d'etat and protested in the streets. Weeks later, Egypt's military and national police launched a violent crackdown against the Muslim Brotherhood, resulting in police and army soldiers firing live ammunition against demonstrators encamped in several public squares and the killing of at least 1,150 demonstrators. The Egyptian military justified these actions by decrying the encampments as a threat to national security. As Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al Sisi consolidates his power amid a continuing macroeconomic recovery, Egypt is poised to play an increasingly active role in the region, albeit from a more independent position vis-a-vis the United States than in the past. Although Egyptian relations with the Trump Administration are solid, and Egypt has relied on the International Monetary Fund (IMF) program to guide its economic recovery, Egypt seems committed to broadening its international base of support. The United States plays a key role in that international base, but Egypt also has other significant partners, including the Arab Gulf states, Israel, Russia, and France. The Egyptian government blames American criticism of its human rights record for preventing closer U.S.-Egyptian ties. From the U.S. perspective, some Members of Congress, U.S. media outlets, and advocacy groups document how Egyptian authorities have widened the scope of a crackdown against dissent, which initially was aimed at the Muslim Brotherhood but has evolved to encompass a broader range of political speech. Egypt's parliament is currently considering whether to adopt a package of draft constitutional amendments that would extend presidential term limits and executive branch control over the judiciary. If Egypt's 2019 constitutional amendments are approved, President Sisi will attain unprecedented power in the political system over the military and the judiciary and, if reelected, will have the potential to remain in office until 2034. He has inserted his older brother and oldest son into key security and intelligence positions while stymying all opposition to his rule and criticism of his government. This consolidation of power and crackdown against dissent has taken place during a period of steady economic growth, which has not benefitted wide swaths of the population. The state has enacted a series of austerity measures to reduce debt in compliance with IMF-mandated reforms. In the year ahead, economists anticipate gross domestic product (GDP) growth of 5.3%, driven by an expansion in tourism and natural gas production. Nevertheless, Egyptians continue to endure double-digit inflation stemming in part from the 2016 flotation of the currency, tax increases, and reductions in food and fuel subsidies. While it is difficult to ascertain how dissatisfied the public is with rising prices, President Sisi has responded to criticisms of his economic policies, stating: "The path of real reform is difficult and cruel and causes a lot of suffering.... But there is no doubt that the suffering resulting from the lack of reform is much worse." The IMF has praised the Egyptian government's record of reform implementation, while also highlighting the need for private sector growth "that will absorb the rapidly growing labor force and ensure that the benefits are perceived more widely." After several years of observers seeing Egypt as more inwardly focused, several recent developments suggest an increasingly active foreign policy. In January 2019, Egypt hosted an international forum on Mediterranean gas which included European and Arab countries together with Israel. A month later, President Sisi was elected head of the African Union for a year-long term. In February 2019, Egypt hosted the first-ever European Union- Arab summit in Sharm el Sheikh, where officials discussed terrorism, migration, and the need for greater European-Arab cooperation to counter a perceived growing Chinese and Russian interest in the Middle East. Personnel moves and other developments in Egypt highlight apparent efforts by President Sisi to consolidate power with the help of political allies, including colleagues from Egypt's security establishment. In June 2018, Sisi reshuffled his cabinet, making key changes to the defense and interior ministries, among other appointments. Sisi appointed Mohamed Ahmed Zaki, former head of the Republican Guard, as defense minister and Mahmoud Tawfik, former head of the National Security Service, as interior minister. According to one account, Sisi may have been rewarding Zaki for his role in arresting former Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi in 2013. In July 2018, parliament passed Law 161 of 2018, providing judicial immunity to senior military commanders for military acts committed during the two-and-a-half-year period beginning with the military coup of July 2013. The new law grants immunity to senior commanders while potentially keeping high-ranking officers on reserve duty for life, making them ineligible to run for president. In order for a senior commander to be prosecuted under this new law, a case would have to be first authorized by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), which President Sisi appoints. According to one analysis, the law deters senior officers from challenging President Sisi (for example, some challenges occurred during the run-up to the 2018 presidential election), thereby acting "as a guarantor of President Sisi's authoritarian rule, setting the stage for him to remain president for life." Per the 2014 Egyptian constitution (article 140), President Sisi, who was reelected in April 2018, may only serve two four-year terms in office (current term ends in 2022). However, his supporters have proposed a set of amendments to the constitution which, if approved by parliament and public referendum, have the potential to make President Sisi eligible for an additional two six-year terms when his current term ends in 2022. Other proposed changes to the constitution include granting the president the authority to appoint all chief justices of Egyptian judicial bodies, and the public prosecutor; requiring that at least one-quarter of the seats in the parliament be allocated to women and reducing the number of the seats in the House of Representatives from 596 to 450; and establishing an upper house of parliament (Senate) consisting of 250 members, two-thirds of whom would be elected and one-third of whom would be appointed by the president. President Sisi has come under repeated international criticism for an ongoing government crackdown against various forms of political dissent and freedom of expression. Certain practices of Sisi's government, the parliament, and the security apparatus have been contentious. According to the U.S. State Department's report on human rights conditions in Egypt in 2017: The most significant human rights issues included arbitrary or unlawful killings by the government or its agents; major terrorist attacks; disappearances; torture; harsh or potentially life-threatening prison conditions; arbitrary arrest and detention; including the use of military courts to try civilians; political prisoners and detainees; unlawful interference in privacy; limits on freedom of expression, including criminal "defamation of religion" laws; restrictions on the press, internet, and academic freedom; and restrictions on freedoms of assembly and association, including government control over registration and financing of NGOs [nongovernmental organizations]. LGBTI persons faced arrests, imprisonment, and degrading treatment. The government did not effectively respond to violence against women, and there were reports of child labor. Select international human rights, democracy, and development monitoring organizations provide the following rankings for Egypt globally: Other human rights issues of potential interest to Congress may include the 2013 convictions of American, European, and Egyptian civil society representatives; the controversial 2017 NGO law; the detention of American citizens in Egypt; and the treatment of Coptic Christians, discussed in the following sections. In 2013, an Egyptian court convicted and sentenced 43 individuals from the United States, Egypt, and Europe, including the Egypt country directors of the National Democratic Institute (NDI) and the International Republican Institute (IRI), for spending money from organizations that were operating in Egypt without a license and for receiving foreign funds (known as Case 173 or the "foreign funding case"). Some lawmakers had protested that those individuals were wrongfully convicted and had requested that the Egyptian government and judiciary resolve the matter. In 2018, a retrial began and, on December 20, 2018, the individuals were acquitted of all charges. In January 2019, U.S. Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo traveled to Cairo, where he remarked: "I was happy to see our citizens, wrongly convicted of improperly operating NGOs here, finally be acquitted. And we strongly support President Sisi's initiative to amend Egyptian law so that this does not happen again. More work certainly needs to be done to maximize the potential of the Egyptian nation and its people. I'm glad that America will be a partner in those efforts." However, Case 173 remains active, as the judiciary has imposed asset freezes and travel bans on several Egyptian civil society activists. In May 2017, President Sisi signed Law 70 of 2017 on Associations and Other Foundations Working in the Field of Civil Work. The parliament had passed this bill six months earlier, and both the passage and signing drew widespread international condemnation. The new law (which replaced a 2002 NGO law) requires NGOs to receive prior approval from internal security before accepting foreign funding. It also restricts the scope of permitted NGO activities and increases penalties for violations, including possible imprisonment for up to five years. However, the government did not issue implementing regulations for the new NGO law. At Egypt's November 2018 World Youth Forum in Sharm el Sheikh, President Sisi announced plans to amend Law 70. According to Sisi, "I want to reassure those who are listening to me inside Egypt and outside of Egypt, that in Egypt, we are keen that the law becomes balanced and achieves what is required of it to regulate the work of these groups in a good way. This is not just political talk." Since then, Egypt's Ministry of Social Solidarity has held multiple rounds of talks with local NGOs aimed at determining which articles of the law need to be amended. A draft proposal is expected to be ready in the spring of 2019, when it will be sent to parliament for consideration. The detention of American citizens in Egypt has continued to strain U.S.-Egyptian relations. Some Members of Congress are concerned about the case of 53-year-old New York resident Mustafa Kassem, who was detained by authorities in 2013 and sentenced to 15 years in prison in a mass trial in September 2018. These lawmakers insist that Kassem, who has been on a limited hunger strike, was wrongfully arrested and convicted, and they have sought Trump Administration support in securing his release from the government of Egypt. In January 2018, Vice President Pence raised Kassem's case directly with President Sisi in a meeting in Cairo, saying "I told him we'd like to see those American citizens restored to their families and restored to our country." Since taking office, President Sisi has publicly called for greater Muslim-Christian coexistence and national unity. In January 2019, he inaugurated Egypt's Coptic Cathedral of Nativity in the new administrative capital east of Cairo saying, "This is an important moment in our history.... We are one and we will remain one." Despite these public calls for improved interfaith relations in Egypt, the minority Coptic Christian community continues to claim that they face professional and social discrimination, along with occasional sectarian attacks by terrorists and vigilantes. Coptic Christians have also voiced concern about state regulation of church construction. They have long demanded that the government reform long-standing laws (with two dating back to 1856 and 1934, respectively) on building codes for Christian places of worship. Article 235 of Egypt's 2014 constitution mandates that parliament reform these building code regulations. In 2016, parliament approved a church construction law (Law 80 of 2016) that expedited the government approval process for the construction and restoration of Coptic churches, among other structures. Although Coptic Pope Tawadros II welcomed the law, others claim that it continues to be discriminatory. According to Human Rights Watch , "the new law allows governors to deny church-building permits with no stated way to appeal, requires that churches be built 'commensurate with' the number of Christians in the area, and contains security provisions that risk subjecting decisions on whether to allow church construction to the whims of violent mobs." For 2019, the IMF projects 5.3% GDP growth for the Egyptian economy, noting that the outlook remains "favorable, supported by strong policy implementation." In 2016, the IMF and Egypt reached a three-year, $12 billion loan agreement, $10 billion of which has been disbursed as of March 2019. Key sources of foreign exchange (tourism and remittances) are up and unemployment is at its lowest level since 2011. In line with IMF recommendations, the government has taken several steps to reform the economy, including depreciating the currency, reducing fuel subsidies, enacting a value-added tax (VAT), and providing cash payments to the poor in lieu of subsidizing household goods (though many food subsidies continue). Egypt's energy sector also is contributing to the economy's rebound. Egypt is the largest oil producer in Africa outside of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and the third-largest natural gas producer on the continent following Algeria and Nigeria. In December 2017, an Egyptian and Italian partnership began commercial output from the Zohr natural gas field (est. 30 trillion cubic feet of gas), the largest ever natural gas field discovered in the Mediterranean Sea (see Figure 3 ). The Egyptian government also has repaid debts owed to foreign energy companies, allowing for new investments from BP and BG Group. Egypt is attempting to position itself as a regional gas hub, whereby its own gas fields meet domestic demand while imported gas from Israel and Cyprus can be liquefied in Egypt and reexported. Israeli and Egyptian companies have bought significant shares of an unused undersea pipeline connecting Israel to the northern Sinai Peninsula (see Figure 4 ). The pipeline will be used to transport natural gas from Israel to Egypt for possible reexport, as part of an earlier 10-year, $15 billion gas deal between the U.S. Company Noble Energy, its Israeli partner Delek, and the Egyptian company Dolphinus Holdings. In January 2019, Egypt convened the first ever Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF), a regional consortium consisting of Egypt, Israel, Jordan, the Palestinian Authority, Cyprus, Greece, and Italy, intended to consolidate regional energy policies and reduce costs. Despite Egypt's positive economic outlook, significant challenges remain. Inflation remains over 11%, making the cost of goods high for many Egyptians. In addition, while the fiscal deficit may be decreasing, Egypt's overall public and foreign debt have grown significantly in recent years and remain high, leading the government to allocate resources (nearly 38% of Egypt's budget) toward debt-service payments and away from spending on health and education. Economists forecast that total public debt will reach 84.8% of GDP and external debt 32% of GDP ($101.7 billion) in 2019. Some observers assert that Egypt's recent economic reforms, while successful in the short term, have not addressed deeper structural impediments to growth. For example, Egypt's industrial sector is heavily dependent upon imports and, as the economy expands, the demand for foreign currency increases. According to Bloomberg , "this means, the more the economy grows, the greater the pressure on dollar reserves. It doesn't help that these were built up almost entirely through foreign borrowing, pushing Egypt's foreign debt from $55 billion in 2016 to $92 billion in late 2018. It won't be long before the country's finances are once again in crisis." Many experts argue that to sustain growth over the long term, Egypt requires dramatic expansion of the nonhydrocarbon private sector. For decades, Egypt's military has played a key role in the nation's economy as a food producer and low-cost domestic manufacturer of consumable products; however, due to political sensitivities, the extent of its economic power is rarely quantified. Egypt's military is largely economically self-sufficient. It produces what it consumes (food and clothes) and then sells surplus goods for additional revenue. Egyptian military companies have been the main beneficiaries of the massive infrastructure contracts Sisi has commissioned. Moreover, military-owned manufacturing companies have expanded into new markets, producing goods (appliances, solar panels, some electronics, and some medical equipment) that are cheaper than either foreign imports or domestically produced goods made by the private sector. President Sisi, who led the 2013 military intervention and was elected president in mid-2014, came to power promising not only to defeat violent Salafi-Jihadi terrorist groups militarily, but also to counter their foundational ideology, which President Sisi and his supporters often attribute to the Muslim Brotherhood. President Sisi has outlawed the Muslim Brotherhood while launching a more general crackdown against a broad spectrum of opponents, both secular and Islamist. While Egypt is no longer beset by the kind of large-scale civil unrest and public protest it faced during the immediate post-Mubarak era, it continues to face terrorist and insurgent violence, both in the Sinai Peninsula and in the rest of Egypt. Terrorists based in the Sinai Peninsula (the Sinai) have been waging an insurgency against the Egyptian government since 2011. While the terrorist landscape in Egypt is evolving and encompasses several groups, the Islamic State's Sinai Province affiliate (IS-SP) is known as the most lethal. Since its affiliation with the Islamic State in 2014, IS-SP has attacked the Egyptian military continually, targeted Coptic Christian individuals and places of worship, and occasionally fired rockets into Israel. In October 2015, IS-SP targeted Russian tourists departing the Sinai by planting a bomb aboard Metrojet Flight 9268, which exploded midair, killing all 224 passengers and crew aboard. Two years later, on November 24, 2017, IS-SP gunmen launched an attack against the Al Rawdah mosque in the town of Bir al Abed in northern Sinai. That attack killed at least 305 people, making it the deadliest terrorist attack in Egypt's modern history. Combating terrorism in the Sinai is particularly challenging due to an array of factors, including the following: Geograph y : The peninsula's interior is mountainous and sparsely populated, providing militants with ample freedom of movement. Demograph y and Culture : The Sinai's northern population is a mix of Palestinians and Bedouin Arab tribes whose relationship to the state is filled with distrust. Sinai Bedouin have faced discrimination and exclusion from full citizenship and access to the economy. In the absence of development, a black market economy based primarily on smuggling has thrived, further contributing to the popular portrayal of Bedouin as outlaws. State authorities charge that the Sinai Bedouin seek autonomy from the central government, while residents insist on obtaining basic rights, such as property rights, full citizenship, and access to government services such as education and health care. Econom ics : Bedouins claim that Egypt has underinvested in northern Sinai, channeling development toward southern tourist destinations that cater to foreign visitors. Northern Sinai consists of mostly flat desert terrain inhospitable to large-scale agriculture without significant investment in irrigation. For decades, the Egyptian state has claimed to follow successive Sinai development plans. However, Egyptian governance and development of the Sinai has been hampered by corruption. Diploma cy : The 1979 Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty limits the number of soldiers that Egypt can deploy in the Sinai, subject to the parties' ability to negotiate changes as circumstances necessitate. Egypt and Israel mutually agree upon any short-term increase of Egypt's military presence in the Sinai. Since Israel returned control over the Sinai to Egypt in 1982, the area has been partially demilitarized, and the Sinai has served as an effective buffer zone between the two countries. The Multinational Force and Observers, or MFO, are deployed in the Sinai to monitor the terms of the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty (see Figure 5 ). Egypt and Israel reportedly continue to cooperate in countering terrorism in the Sinai. In a televised interview, President Sisi responded to a question on whether Egyptian-Israeli military cooperation was the closest it has ever been, saying "That is correct. The [Egyptian] Air Force sometimes needs to cross to the Israeli side. And that's why we have a wide range of coordination with the Israelis." One news account suggests that Israel, with Egypt's approval, has used its own drones, helicopters, and aircraft to carry out more than 100 covert airstrikes inside Egypt against militant targets. In order to counter IS-SP in northern Sinai, the Egyptian armed forces and police have declared a state of emergency, imposed curfews and travel restrictions, and erected police checkpoints along main roads. Authorities also have limited domestic and foreign media access to the northern Sinai, declaring it an active combat zone and unsafe for journalists. According to Jane's Defence Weekly , Egypt may be upgrading an old air base in the Sinai (Bir Gifgafa), where it could deploy Apache attack helicopters and unmanned aerial vehicles for use in counterterrorism operations. While an increased Egyptian military presence in the Sinai may be necessary to stabilize the area, many observers have argued that military means alone are insufficient. These critics say that force should be accompanied by policies to reduce the appeal of antigovernment militancy by addressing local political and economic grievances. According to one account: Sinai residents are prohibited from joining any senior post in the state. They cannot work in the army, police, judiciary, or in diplomacy. Meanwhile, no development projects have been undertaken in North Sinai the past 40 years. The villages of Rafah and Sheikh Zuwayed have no schools or hospitals and no modern system to receive potable water. They depend on rainwater and wells, as if it were the Middle Ages. Egyptian counterterrorism efforts in the Sinai appear to have reduced the frequency of terrorist attacks somewhat. In February 2018, the military launched an offensive campaign, dubbed "Operation Sinai 2018." During the campaign, the military deployed tens of thousands of troops to the peninsula and was able to eliminate several senior IS-SP leaders. One report suggests that unlike previous military operations against militants in the Sinai, this time the Egyptian military armed progovernment tribesmen to assist conventional forces in combating IS-SP. According to one analysis, the military's recent campaign has "to some degree, restricted the militants' movements, destroyed a number of hideouts, and most importantly eliminated several trained and influential elements." However, as in previous major operations, once the military reduces its presence in northern Sinai, terrorist groups may reconstitute themselves. In March 2019, CENTCOM Commander General Joseph L. Votel testified before Congress, stating that the "Egyptian Armed Forces have more effectively fought ISIS in the Sinai and are now taking active measures to address the underlying issues that give life to—to these violent extremist groups and are helping to contain the threat." Outside of the Sinai, either in the western desert near the Libya border or other areas (Cairo, Nile Delta, Upper Egypt), small nationalist insurgent groups, such as Liwa al Thawra (The Revolution Brigade) and Harakat Sawaed Misr (Arms of Egypt Movement, referred to by its Arabic acronym HASM), have carried out high-level assassinations of military/police officials and bombings of infrastructure. According to one expert, these insurgent groups are comprised mainly of former Muslim Brotherhood activists who have splintered off from the main organization to wage an insurgency against the government. On January 31, 2018, the U.S. State Department designated Liwa al Thawra and HASM as Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGTs) under Section 1(b) of Executive Order (E.O.) 13224. The State Department noted that some of the leaders of both groups "were previously associated with the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood." Terrorist attacks against key sectors of the economy continue. In December 2018, a bus carrying a group of Vietnamese tourists to the pyramids in Giza hit a roadside bomb killing 4 people and injuring 11 others. No group claimed responsibility for the attack. In February 2019, a terrorist detonated a suicide bomb he was carrying while being pursued by police, killing himself and two officers near Cairo's popular Khan el Khalili market and famous Al Azhar Mosque. Egypt and Israel have continued to find specific areas in which they can cooperate. In 2018, Israeli and Egyptian companies entered into a decade-long agreement by reaching a $15 billion natural gas deal, according to which Israeli off-shore natural gas will be exported to Egypt for liquefaction before being exported elsewhere (see " The Economy " above). While people-to-people relations remain cold, Israel and Egypt continue to cooperate against Hamas in the Gaza Strip. In mid-November 2018, Egyptian mediation between Israel and Hamas helped calm tensions after an Israeli raid inside Gaza escalated tensions. Egypt reportedly continues to broker indirect Israel-Hamas talks aimed at establishing a long-term cease-fire. Egypt is opposed to Islamist groups wielding political power across the Middle East, and opposes Turkish and Qatari support for Hamas. On the Egyptian-Gaza border, Egypt has tried to thwart arms tunnel smuggling into Gaza and has accused Palestinian militants in Gaza of aiding terrorist groups in the Sinai. In order to weaken Hamas's rule in Gaza, Egypt has sought to restore a Palestinian Authority (PA) presence in Gaza by reconciling it with the PA. Though Egypt has helped broker several agreements aimed at ending the West Bank-Gaza split, Hamas still effectively controls Gaza. Egypt controls the Rafah border crossing into Gaza, the only non-Israeli-controlled entryway into the Strip, which it periodically closes for security reasons. Control over the Rafah border crossing provides Egypt with some leverage over Hamas, though Egyptian authorities use it carefully in order not to spark a humanitarian crisis on their border. Egypt's relations with most Gulf Arab monarchies are strong. Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Kuwait have provided billions of dollars in financial assistance to Egypt's military-backed government since 2013. Saudi Arabia also hosts nearly 3 million Egyptian expatriates who work in the kingdom, providing a valuable source of remittances for Egyptians back home. From 2013 onward, Emirati companies have made significant investments in the Egyptian economy. Egypt transferred sovereignty to Saudi Arabia over two islands at the entrance to the Gulf of Aqaba—Tiran and Sanafir—that had been under Egyptian control since 1950, in a move that sparked rare public criticism of President Sisi. In June 2017, Egypt joined other Gulf Arab monarchies in boycotting Qatar. In Yemen, Egypt is officially part of the Saudi-led coalition against Houthi forces, though its contribution to the war effort has been minimal. The Egyptian government supports Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar and the Libyan National Army (LNA) movement, which controls most of eastern Libya. Haftar's politics closely align with President Sisi's, as both figures hail from the military and broadly oppose Islamist political forces. From a security standpoint, Egypt seeks the restoration of order on its western border, which has experienced occasional terrorist attacks and arms smuggling. From an economic standpoint, thousands of Egyptian guest workers were employed in Libya's energy sector prior to unrest in Libya in 2011, and Egypt seeks their return to Libya and a resumption of the vital remittances those workers provided the Egyptian economy. Diplomatically, Egypt has tried to leverage its close ties to Haftar and the LNA in order to play the role of mediator between the LNA and Fayez al Sarraj, the Chairman of the Presidential Council of Libya and Prime Minister of the U.N.-backed Government of National Accord. Egypt's policy toward Libya also is closely aligned with other foreign backers of the LNA, including France and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Reportedly, the three countries are working in concert to strengthen the position of Haftar in order to facilitate the eventual reunification of the Libyan army. A 2019 LNA offensive into southern Libya has placed additional pressure on the Government of National Accord and may complicate U.S.-backed efforts by the United Nations to facilitate a national dialogue, constitutional referendum, and elections in 2019. To Egypt's south, the government is embroiled in regional disputes with Nile Basin countries, such as Ethiopia, which is nearing completion of the $4.2 billion Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, a major hydroelectric project. Egypt argues that the dam, once filled, will limit the flow of the Nile River below Egypt's agreed share. However, many analysts expect that Egypt will address the dispute by increasing water-use efficiency and investing in desalination, rather than using its military to bomb the dam. Reduced Nile flow into Egypt may exacerbate existing water shortages and cause short-term political problems for the Egyptian government, which faces extensive domestic water needs. In February 2019, President Sisi assumed the one-year chairmanship of the African Union, during which he is expected to promote closer relations with fellow African states. Egypt and Russia, close allies in early years of the Cold War, have again strengthened bilateral ties under President Sisi, who has promised to restore Egyptian stability and international prestige. His relationship with Russian President Vladimir Putin has rekindled, in the words of one observer, "a romanticized memory of relations with Russia during the Nasser era." President Sisi first turned to Russia during the Obama Administration, when U.S.-Egyptian ties were strained, and Egypt seemed intent on signaling its displeasure with U.S. policy. Since 2014, Egypt and Russia have improved ties in a number of ways, including through arms deals. Reportedly, Egypt is upgrading its aging fleet of legacy Soviet MiG-21 aircraft to a fourth generation MiG-29M variant with additional deliveries to Egypt in 2018 (first delivered in April 2017). Egypt also has purchased 46 standard Ka-52 Russian attack helicopters for its air force. Egypt reportedly also has purchased the naval version of the Ka-52 for use on Egypt's two French-procured Mistral-class helicopter dock vessels (see below), and the S-300VM surface-to-air missile defense system from Russia. In August 2018, Egyptian Defense Minister Mohamed Zaki visited Russia, where he attended a Russian arms exhibition. Additionally, Egypt and Russia reportedly have expanded their cooperation on nuclear energy. In 2015, Egypt reached a deal with Russian state energy firm Rosatom to construct a 4,800-megawatt nuclear power plant in the Egyptian Mediterranean coastal town of Daba'a, 80 miles northwest of Cairo. Russia is lending Egypt $25 billion over 35 years to finance the construction and operation of the nuclear power plant (this will cover 85% of the project's total costs). The contract also commits Russia to supply the plant's nuclear fuel for 60 years and transfer and store depleted nuclear fuel from the reactors. As Egyptian and Russian foreign policies have become more closely aligned in conflict zones such as eastern Libya, bilateral military cooperation has expanded. One report suggests that Russian Special Forces based out of an airbase in Egypt's western desert (Sidi Barrani) may be aiding General Haftar. In November 2017, Egypt and Russia signed a draft agreement governing the use of each other's air space. While Egyptian-Russian ties have grown warmer in recent years, they are not without complications. In the aftermath of an October 2015 terrorist attack against a Russian passenger jet departing from Sharm El Sheikh, visits to Egypt by Russian tourists, previously the country's largest source of tourists, dropped significantly. Russian commercial aircraft have resumed direct flights to Cairo but not to Sharm El Sheikh. Egypt and Russia also engaged in a trade dispute in 2016 over Russian wheat imports. Egypt is the largest global importer of wheat, and the largest export market for Russian wheat. Aside from Russia, France stands out as a non-U.S. country with which President Sisi has sought to build a diplomatic and military procurement relationship. In the last five years, as French-Egyptian ties have improved, Egypt has purchased major air and naval defense systems from French defense contractors, including the following: Four Gowind Corvettes (produced by Naval Group)—This deal was signed in July 2014. As part of the French-Egyptian arrangement, some of the Corvette construction has taken place at the Alexandria Shipyard in Egypt. One FREMM multi-mission Frigate (produced by Naval Group)—Named the Tahya Misr (Long Live Egypt), this vessel was delivered to Egypt in 2015. This ship has participated in an annual joint French-Egyptian naval exercise, known as Cleopatra. In February 2015, Egypt purchased 24 Rafale multirole fighters (produced by Dassault Aviation). Under the initial agreement, Egypt and France may enter into a new procurement agreement for 12 additional Rafale fighters. According to the manufacturer, the Rafale has flown in combat in Afghanistan, Libya, Mali, Iraq, and Syria and is used by Egypt, Qatar, and India. In 2018, French officials said that the United States would not permit France to export the SCALP air-launched land-attack cruise missile used on the Rafale to Egypt under the International Trade in Arms Regulation (ITAR) agreement. The United States may have been concerned over the transfer of sensitive technology to Egypt. Two Mistral-class Helicopter Carriers (produced by Naval Group)—In the fall of 2015, France announced that it would sell Egypt two Mistral-class Landing Helicopter Dock (LHD) vessels (each carrier can carry 16 helicopters, 4 landing craft, and 13 tanks) for $1 billion. The LHDs (ENS Anwar El Sadat and ENS Gamal Abdel Nasser ) were delivered in 2016. In 2017, Egypt announced that it would purchase Russian 46 Ka-52 Alligator helicopters, which can operate on the LHDs. In January 2019, French President Emmanuel Macron paid a three-day visit to Egypt, where he raised human rights issues in public and with Egyptian authorities and civil society representatives. According to Macron, "I can't see how you can pretend to ensure long-term stability in this country, which was at the heart of the Arab Spring and showed its taste for freedom, and think you can continue to harden beyond what's acceptable or justified for security reasons." President Trump has praised the Egyptian government's counterterrorism efforts while his Administration has worked to restore high-level diplomatic engagement, joint military exercises, and arms sales. Many commentators initially expected President Trump to bring the United States and Egypt closer together, and that largely has been the case. The Administration has withheld some foreign assistance for policy reasons on at least one occasion, however, and the United States has not had an ambassador in Cairo since June 30, 2017. As evidence of improved bilateral ties, the U.S. Defense Department notified Congress in November 2018 of a major $1 billion sale of defense equipment to Egypt, consisting of 10 AH-64E Apache Attack Helicopters, among other things. The Egyptian Air Force already possesses 45 less advanced versions of the Apache that were acquired between 2000 and 2014. In January 2019, U.S. Secretary of State Michael Pompeo delivered a major policy speech at the American University in Cairo, where he stated: "And as we seek an even stronger partnership with Egypt, we encourage President Sisi to unleash the creative energy of Egypt's people, unfetter the economy, and promote a free and open exchange of ideas. The progress made to date can continue." U.S. officials have not yet publicly criticized efforts by supporters of President Sisi to advance amendments to the constitution (see above) to extend the possibility of Sisi's continued presidency. Human rights advocates have called for Western governments to withhold assistance to Egypt if the amendments are approved. According to Human Rights Watch , "Al-Sisi's government is encouraged by the continued silence of its allies, and if the US, UK, and France want to avoid the destabilizing consequences of entrenching authoritarian rule in Egypt, they should act now." On February 22, 2019, a bipartisan group of national security experts called on U.S. officials to "express strong concern about the amendments to the Egyptian constitution now moving through a rapid approval process." Egypt's poor record on human rights and democratization has sparked regular criticism from U.S. officials and some Members of Congress. Since FY2012, Members have passed appropriations legislation that withholds the obligation of FMF to Egypt until the Secretary of State certifies that Egypt is taking various steps toward supporting democracy and human rights. With the exception of FY2014, lawmakers have included a national security waiver to allow the Administration to waive these congressionally mandated certification requirements under certain conditions. Over the last year, the Administration has obligated several tranches of FMF to Egypt, including the following: In September 2018, the Administration obligated $1 billion in FY2018 FMF. Per Section 7041(a)(3)(A) of P.L. 115-141 , the Consolidated Appropriations Act, FY2018, $300 million in FMF remains withheld from obligation until the Secretary of State certifies that Egypt is taking various steps toward supporting democracy and human rights. In previous acts, the amount withheld had been $195 million. FY2018 FMF for Egypt remains available to be expended until September 30, 2019. In August 2018, the Administration waived the certification requirement in Section 7041(a)(3)(B) of P.L. 115-31 , the Consolidated Appropriations Act, FY2017, allowing for the obligation of $195 million in FY2017 FMF, which occurred in September 2018. However, according to one report, Senator Patrick Leahy has placed a hold on $105 million in FY2017 FMF and is seeking more information on the plight of detained Egyptian-American Moustafa Kassem. In January 2018, the Administration notified Congress of its intent to obligate $1.039 billion in FY2017 FMF out of a total of $1.3 billion appropriated for FY2017. It chose not to obligate $65.7 million in FY2017 FMF. The remaining $195 million had been withheld until a national security waiver was issued in August 2018 (see above). For FY2019, the President requested a total of $1.381 billion in foreign assistance for Egypt, the same amount requested for the previous year. Nearly all of the requested funds for Egypt are for the FMF account. For FY2020, the request is nearly identical from previous years, as the President is seeking a total of $1.382 billion in bilateral assistance for Egypt. The FY2019 Omnibus ( P.L. 116-6 ) provides the following for Egypt: a total of $1.419 billion in bilateral U.S. foreign assistance for Egypt, of which $1.3 billion is in FMF, $112.5 million in ESF, $3 million in NADR, $2 million in INCLE, and $1.8 million in IMET; and a reauthorization of ESF to support future loan guarantees to Egypt; P.L. 116-6 sets the following conditions for Egypt: As in previous years, it requires that funds may only be made available when the Secretary of State certifies that the government of Egypt is sustaining the strategic relationship with the United States and meeting its obligations under the 1979 Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty. As in previous years, the act withholds ESF that "the Secretary determines to be equivalent to that expended by the United States Government for bail, and by nongovernmental organizations for legal and court fees, associated with democracy-related trials in Egypt until the Secretary certifies and reports to the Committees on Appropriations that the Government of Egypt has dismissed the convictions issued by the Cairo Criminal Court on June 4, 2013, in Public Prosecution Case No. 1110 for the Year 2012 and has not subjected the defendants to further prosecution or if convicted they have been granted full pardons ." This last condition (bolded) was added in 2019 to account for the acquittal of the 43 foreign defendants in Case 173 (see above). As in previous years, the FY2019 Omnibus also includes a limitation on ESF, stating that no FY2018 ESF or prior-year ESF "may be made available for a contribution, voluntary or otherwise, to the Civil Associations and Foundations Support Fund, or any similar fund, established pursuant to Law 70 on Associations and Other Foundations Working in the Field of Civil Work [informally known as the NGO law]." As in previous years, the act also includes a provision that withholds $300 million of FMF funds until the Secretary of State certifies that the Government of Egypt is taking effective steps to advance, among other things, democracy and human rights in Egypt. The Secretary of State may waive this certification requirement, though any waiver must be accompanied by, among other things, an assessment of the Government of Egypt's compliance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 2270 and other such resolutions regarding North Korea. There has been some concern in the Administration and Congress over Egypt's alleged weapons procurement from North Korea in recent years. P.L. 115-245 , the Department of Defense (DOD) and Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education Appropriations Act, 2019 and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2019, specifies that the Secretary of Defense may provide Egypt with funds from the Counter-ISIS Train and Equip Fund (CTEF) to enhance its border security. To date, Egypt has not received security assistance from DOD-managed accounts. Between 1946 and 2016, the United States provided Egypt with $78.3 billion in bilateral foreign aid (calculated in historical dollars—not adjusted for inflation). The 1979 Peace Treaty between Israel and Egypt ushered in the current era of U.S. financial support for peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors. In two separate memoranda accompanying the treaty, the United States outlined commitments to Israel and Egypt, respectively. In its letter to Israel, the Carter Administration pledged to "endeavor to take into account and will endeavor to be responsive to military and economic assistance requirements of Israel." In his letter to Egypt, former U.S. Secretary of Defense Harold Brown wrote the following: In the context of the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel, the United States is prepared to enter into an expanded security relationship with Egypt with regard to the sales of military equipment and services and the financing of, at least a portion of those sales, subject to such Congressional review and approvals as may be required. All U.S. foreign aid to Egypt (or any foreign recipient) is appropriated and authorized by Congress . The 1979 Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty is a bilateral peace agreement between Egypt and Israel, and the United States is not a legal party to the treaty. The treaty itself does not include any U.S. aid obligations, and any assistance commitments to Israel and Egypt that could be potentially construed in conjunction with the treaty were through ancillary documents or other communications and were—by their terms—subject to congressional approval (see above). However, as the peace broker between Israel and Egypt, the United States has traditionally provided foreign aid to both countries to ensure a regional balance of power and sustain security cooperation with both countries. In some cases, an Administration may sign a bilateral "Memorandum of Understanding" (MOU) with a foreign country pledging a specific amount of foreign aid to be provided over a selected time period subject to the approval of Congress. In the Middle East, the United States has signed foreign assistance MOUs with Israel and Jordan. Currently, there is no U.S.-Egyptian MOU specifying a specific amount of total U.S. aid pledged to Egypt over a certain time period. Congress typically specifies a precise allocation of most foreign assistance for Egypt in the foreign operations appropriations bill. Egypt receives the bulk of foreign aid funds from three primary accounts: Foreign Military Financing (FMF), Economic Support Funds (ESF), and International Military Education and Training (IMET). The United States offers IMET training to Egyptian officers in order to facilitate U.S.-Egyptian military cooperation over the long term. Since the 1979 Israeli-Egyptian Peace Treaty, the United States has provided Egypt with large amounts of military assistance. U.S. policymakers have routinely justified this aid to Egypt as an investment in regional stability, built primarily on long-running military cooperation and sustaining the treaty—principles that are supposed to be mutually reinforcing. Egypt has used U.S. military aid through the FMF to (among other things) purchase major U.S. defense systems, such as the F-16 fighter aircraft, the M1A1 Abrams battle tank, and the AH-64 Apache attack helicopter. For decades, FMF grants have supported Egypt's purchases of large-scale conventional military equipment from U.S. suppliers. However, as mentioned above, the Obama Administration announced that future FMF grants may only be used to purchase equipment specifically for "counterterrorism, border security, Sinai security, and maritime security" (and for sustainment of weapons systems already in Egypt's arsenal). It is not yet clear how the Trump Administration will determine which U.S.-supplied military equipment would help the Egyptian military counter terrorism and secure its land and maritime borders. Overall, some defense experts continue to view the Egyptian military as inadequately prepared, both doctrinally and tactically, to face the threat posed by terrorist/insurgent groups such as Sinai Province. According to a former U.S. National Security Council official, "they [the Egyptian military] understand they have got a problem in Sinai, but they have been unprepared to invest in the capabilities to deal with it." To reorient the military toward unconventional warfare, the Egyptian military needs, according to one assessment, "heavy investment into rapid reaction forces equipped with sophisticated infantry weapons, optics and communication gear ... backed by enhanced intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance platforms. In order to transport them, Egypt would also need numerous modern aviation assets." In addition to substantial amounts of annual U.S. military assistance, Egypt has benefited from certain aid provisions that have been available to only a few other countries. For example Early Disbursal and Interest - Bearing Account : Between FY2001 and FY2011, Congress granted Egypt early disbursement of FMF funds (within 30 days of the enactment of appropriations legislation) to an interest-bearing account at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Interest accrued from the rapid disbursement of aid has allowed Egypt to receive additional funding for the purchase of U.S.-origin equipment. In FY2012, Congress began to condition the obligation of FMF, requiring the Administration to certify certain conditions had been met before releasing FMF funds, thereby eliminating their automatic early disbursal. However, Congress has permitted Egypt to continue to earn interest on FMF funds already deposited in the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. The Excess Defense Articles (EDA) program provides one means by which the United States can advance foreign policy objectives—assisting friendly and allied nations through provision of equipment in excess of the requirements of its own defense forces. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) manages the EDA program, which enables the United States to reduce its inventory of outdated equipment by providing friendly countries with necessary supplies at either reduced rates or no charge. As a designated "major non-NATO ally," Egypt is eligible to receive EDA under Section 516 of the Foreign Assistance Act and Section 23(a) of the Arms Export Control Act. Over the past two decades, U.S. economic aid to Egypt has been reduced by over 90%, from $833 million in FY1998 to a request of $75 million for FY2019. Beginning in the mid to late 1990s, as Egypt moved from an impoverished country to a lower-middle-income economy, the United States and Egypt began to rethink the assistance relationship, emphasizing "trade not aid." Congress began to scale back economic aid both to Egypt and Israel due to a 10-year agreement reached between the United States and Israel in the late 1990s known as the "Glide Path Agreement," which gradually reduced U.S. economic aid to Egypt to $400 million by 2008. U.S. economic aid to Egypt stood at $200 million per year by the end of the George W. Bush Administration, whose relations with then-President Hosni Mubarak suffered over the latter's reaction to the Administration's democracy agenda in the Arab world. During the final years of the Obama Administration, distrust of U.S. democracy promotion assistance led the Egyptian government to obstruct many U.S.-funded economic assistance programs. According to the Government Accountability Office (GAO), the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) reported hundreds of millions of dollars ($460 million as of 2015) in unobligated prior year ESF funding. As these unobligated balances grew, it created pressure on the Obama Administration to reobligate ESF funds for other purposes. In 2016, the Obama Administration notified Congress that it was reprogramming $108 million of ESF that had been appropriated for Egypt in FY2015 but remained unobligated for other purposes. The Administration claimed that its actions were due to "continued government of Egypt process delays that have impeded the effective implementation of several programs." In 2017, the Trump Administration also reprogrammed FY2016 ESF for Egypt. U.S. economic aid to Egypt is divided into two components: (1) USAID-managed programs (public health, education, economic development, democracy and governance); and (2) the U.S.-Egyptian Enterprise Fund. Both are funded primarily through the Economic Support Fund (ESF) appropriations account. 

 

 Report 2:
DOD defines a hosted payload as an instrument or package of equipment—a sensor or communications package, for example— integrated onto a host satellite, which operates on orbit making use of the host satellite’s available resources, including size, weight, power, or communications. A commercially hosted DOD payload is a DOD payload on a commercial satellite. In general, hosted payloads may be either experimental or operational. Experimental payloads demonstrate new or existing technologies on orbit for potential use on future operational space systems. Operational payloads deliver required capabilities to end users. Hosted payload arrangements may be unsuitable for some missions. For example, some payloads may be too large or need too much power for a host satellite to feasibly accommodate, or may require unique satellite maneuvers that, if exercised, would negatively affect a host satellite’s primary mission. Civil government agencies, like NASA and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), have used or have plans to use commercially hosted payloads. For more information on the commercially hosted payloads that civil agencies have used or plan to use, see appendix I. We and others have identified potential benefits of using commercially hosted payloads to gain space-based capability, such as: Cost savings—Commercially hosted payloads may increase affordability because the government payload owner pays for only a portion of the satellite development and shared launch and ground systems costs, rather than for the entire system. Also, smaller, lighter, and less complex systems may shorten procurement timelines, reduce research and development investment, and reduce risk in technology development. Some government agencies have reported saving hundreds of millions of dollars to date from using innovative arrangements such as hosted payloads. Faster on-orbit capability—Because commercial satellites tend to take less time from concept development to launch than DOD systems do and have relatively frequent launches, hosting government payloads on commercial satellites may achieve on-orbit capability more quickly. Increased deterrence and resilience—Distributing capabilities across more satellites increases the number and diversity of potential targets for an adversary and may make it more difficult for an adversary to decide which assets to attack, serving as a deterrent. Additionally, more frequent launches could increase DOD’s ability to reconstitute its satellite groups—or constellations—more quickly in case of unexpected losses of on-orbit capabilities. Recent strategic and policy guidance government-wide and at DOD have stressed the need for U.S. space systems to be survivable, or resilient, against intentional and unintentional threats—both types of which have increased over the past 20 years. Intentional threats can include purposeful signal jamming, laser dazzling and blinding of satellite sensors, missiles intended to destroy satellites, and ground system attacks. Some unintentional threats to satellites are created by the harsh space environment itself, like extreme temperature fluctuations and radiation, and the growing number of satellites, used rocket parts, and other space debris on orbit, which could collide with orbiting satellites. Continual technology upgrades and industrial base stability— New technologies may be continually incorporated into space systems using hosted payloads, which may be uniquely suited for higher rates of production and launches than traditional DOD satellites. Using commercial satellites for government payloads could help maintain the U.S. commercial space industry’s ongoing technology developments by maintaining stable business and incentivizing new companies to enter the marketplace. Further, increased production may be distributed over multiple contractors—including traditionally lower-tier contractors—to foster more competition. As we reported in October 2014, hosted payloads are among several avenues DOD is considering to increase the resilience of its satellites in the face of growing threats. DOD has been looking at ways to break up larger satellites into multiple smaller satellites or payloads after decades of building large, complex satellites to meet its space-based requirements. The broader concept of breaking up larger satellites into smaller ones is known as disaggregation. In 2014, we reported that DOD lacked critical knowledge about the concept of disaggregation, including how to quantify a broad range of potential effects. At the time, for example, DOD did not have common measures for resilience, which we found is a key consideration in making a choice as to whether to continue with a current system architecture or to change it. Recently, senior DOD officials have also made public statements that indicate a willingness to consider innovative acquisition approaches so that acquisition timelines can be reduced. For example, in a 2016 strategic intent document, the Commander of Air Force Space Command stated that the Air Force should seek innovative acquisition approaches that leverage DOD’s buying power across the industry. Additionally, the Secretary of the Air Force stated that the Air Force is exploring more affordable and innovative ways to acquire its satellite communication services through investments in commercial industry and international partnerships. Opportunities to match a DOD payload with a commercial host can arise in various ways. DOD may first develop a payload and seek to match it with a commercial host, DOD may work in tandem with a commercial company to develop a payload to be hosted, or commercial companies— likely the satellite owner, operator, or system integrator—can first identify upcoming satellite hosting opportunities to DOD. In each scenario, the DOD program (or payload owner) and the commercial host generally consider the basic properties of both the payload and host satellite in attempting to find a match. These properties—including the size, weight, area, power, and required orbital characteristics of the payload and host satellite—should be complementary to create an arrangement that is mutually compatible for each party, according to Aerospace Corporation recommendations and officials we spoke with. Specifically, these properties include: The size of the payload when it is stowed and when it is deployed on orbit, including the available area on the host satellite; The available weight and mass distribution the host satellite can The available power on the host satellite; The thermal requirements of the payload and corresponding capability of the host satellite; The requirements to limit electromagnetic interference—disturbances that affect electrical circuits on the payload and host satellite; The available command, telemetry, and mission data rate requirements of the payload and corresponding capability of the host satellite; The compatibility of interfaces between the payload and host satellite; The pointing accuracy and stability of the host satellite; and The necessary orbits, including altitude and inclination. Other considerations when matching a DOD payload with a host satellite are the compatibility of radio frequency spectrum (spectrum) needs between the payload and host, and the satellite’s intended orbital location. Spectrum is a natural resource used to provide essential government functions and missions ranging from national defense, weather services, and aviation communication, to commercial services such as television broadcasting and mobile voice and data communications. The frequencies, or frequency bands, of spectrum have different characteristics that make them more or less suitable for specific purposes, such as the ability to carry data long distances or penetrate physical obstacles. Each frequency band has a limited capacity to carry information. This means that multiple users operating at approximately the same frequency, location, and time have the potential to interfere with one another. Harmful interference occurs when two communication signals are either at the same frequencies or close to the same frequencies in the same vicinity, a situation that can lead to degradation of a device’s operation or service. As such, a payload or satellite’s specific placement in any given orbit could potentially interfere with a neighboring payload or satellite in the same orbit. In the United States, the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) of the Department of Commerce is responsible for establishing policy on regulating federal government spectrum use and assigning spectrum bands to government agencies. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) allocates spectrum and assigns licenses for various consumer and commercial purposes. Additionally, all government and commercial satellite programs must apply for approval to operate at a given orbital location using a given band of spectrum internationally through the International Telecommunication Union (ITU). The ITU is an agency of the United Nations and coordinates spectrum standards and regulations. In 2011, the Air Force created the Space and Missile Systems Center’s (SMC) Hosted Payload Office (HPO) to provide acquisition architectures that achieve on-orbit capability more quickly and affordably. The HPO uses various resources and capabilities to meet its objectives: Hosted Payload Solutions Contract: In 2014, SMC established the Hosted Payload Solutions (HOPS) multiple award indefinite delivery indefinite quantity (IDIQ) vehicle. According to HPO documents, SMC established the contract—available to all DOD and civil agencies—to streamline commercially hosted payload arrangements by selecting a pool of commercial vendors that government payload owners can use to access space on commercial host satellites. Programs do not have to use HOPS, however, and may contract with commercial companies directly. The HOPS vehicle includes 14 vendors across the commercial satellite industry. SMC awarded task orders for studies to each of the vendors with a contract to gather information on potential host opportunities, orbits and launch schedules, cost estimates for hosting fees, and existing host satellite interfaces. Feasibility Studies: Using the information it gathered from the 14 vendor studies, the HPO stated that it built a database to provide information on potential satellite hosts and the suitability of certain payloads for host opportunities, including cost estimates. The HPO stated that it can use this information to assess the feasibility of a hosted payload opportunity for interested SMC space programs. The HPO also conducts feasibility studies for interested programs based on publicly available information and from industry requests for information. Hosted Payload Interface Design guidelines: The HPO published hosted payload interface design guidelines to provide technical recommendations for hosted payload developers. According to HPO officials, the intent of these guidelines is to reduce integration costs and improve the host-ability of all hosted payloads. Hosted Payload Data Interface Unit: The HPO is developing a secure hosted payload data interface unit to protect payload data from unauthorized access by the host. Following its release of draft documentation to industry stakeholders in March 2018, the HPO is currently integrating National Security Agency requirements into its request for data interface unit prototype proposals. According to HPO officials, the office plans to issue a request for prototype proposals in May 2018, integrate a data interface unit and payload in 2020, and launch the integrated system in 2022. Hosted Payload Expertise: The HPO provides general advice and expertise to programs in the form of hosted payload architectural studies, input on acquisition planning and strategy documents, and other research efforts, according to the office. Since 2009, DOD has launched three experimental payloads on commercial host satellites and plans to conduct three more missions through 2022, as shown in figure 1. DOD estimates that it has achieved cost savings of several hundred million dollars from these experimental payloads. According to DOD officials, DOD expects to realize additional cost savings and be able to place capabilities on orbit more quickly from several hosted payload efforts that are planned or underway. Opportunities for additional hosted payload efforts may arise in the near term amid DOD planning for upcoming and follow-on space systems. Since 2009, DOD has placed experimental payloads—intended to test or demonstrate an on-orbit capability—for three programs on commercial host satellites. Several officials within DOD told us that experimental payloads tend to be smaller, less expensive, and their missions more risk- tolerant than traditional operational DOD payloads. In these ways, they said experimental payloads are better-suited to hosting arrangements than operational DOD payloads. The Air Force has not yet used the HOPS multiple award IDIQ vehicle—which was awarded to facilitate commercially hosted payload arrangements—to match a government payload with a commercial host. The HPO told us that, in 2019, NASA and NOAA will be the first agencies to use the HOPS vehicle to find a host satellite for two of their payloads. Table 1 describes the three experimental payloads hosted on commercial satellites to date. For more information on civilian agencies that use or plan to use commercially hosted payloads, see appendix I. Air Force officials told us that using commercial host satellites for their experimental payloads has saved several hundred million dollars across these programs and shortened timelines for launching payloads into space. For example, the HPO estimated that the Air Force saved nearly $300 million by using a commercial host satellite for its Commercially Hosted Infrared Payload (CHIRP), as compared to acquiring the same capability using a dedicated, free-flying satellite. In addition, Air Force officials estimated that using commercial host satellites for its Responsive Environmental Assessment Commercially Hosted (REACH) effort saved the Air Force approximately $230 million. The REACH effort consists of over 30 payloads hosted on multiple satellites. Further, because of the commercial host’s launch schedule, the Air Force achieved its on-orbit capability sooner than if it had acquired free-flying satellites. In April 2013, we found that the Internet Protocol Routing in Space (IRIS) payload, launched in 2009, was a commercially hosted payload pilot mission that would provide internet routing onboard the satellite, eliminating the need for costs associated with certain ground infrastructure. DOD and Air Force officials told us they are planning to pursue commercially hosted payloads for three programs in the coming decade to achieve cost savings and on-orbit capability more quickly. In each case, officials said they have identified cost and schedule benefits for their respective programs. For example, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) stated that it expects to save approximately $700 million compared to the cost of traditional, free-flying satellites by acquiring its Spacebased Kill Assessment capability as payloads on commercial host satellites, and expects to achieve on-orbit capability years earlier than if it had acquired dedicated satellites for these payloads. Additionally, a program official from the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) told us DARPA plans to use a commercially hosted payload for the Phoenix Payload Orbital Delivery effort to test more affordable ways to access space. Moreover, Air Force officials told us they expect to save $900 million over free-flying satellites by using two Space Norway satellites to fly an Enhanced Polar System Recapitalization payload. Space Norway plans to launch its satellites in 2022, which the Air Force expects will allow it to meet its need for DOD’s required capability. See table 2 for additional details on DOD’s planned hosted payloads. Additional opportunities for commercially hosted payloads may be forthcoming as DOD develops requirements and designs for new and follow-on space programs. DOD has been analyzing various alternatives to explore possible future space system designs and acquisition strategies for several of its upcoming follow-on programs. In these cases, the analysis of alternatives (AOA) study guidance, set forth by DOD’s Office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation, included direction for the studies to consider new approaches for acquiring space capabilities. For example, AOA guidance directed study teams to include hosted payloads or other disaggregated designs, and commercial innovations in technology and acquisition to meet some space mission requirements. Table 3 provides further details of recently completed and ongoing AOAs to study new designs—or architectures—for upcoming follow-on satellite systems. Two factors have contributed to DOD’s limited use of commercially hosted payloads. First, DOD officials identified logistical challenges to matching government payloads with any given commercial host satellite. For example, most of the offices we spoke with cited size, weight, and power constraints, among others, as barriers to using hosted payloads. Second, while individual DOD offices have realized cost and schedule benefits, DOD as a whole has limited information on costs and benefits of hosted payloads. Further, the knowledge it has gathered is fragmented across the agency—with multiple offices collecting piecemeal information on the use of hosted payloads. The limited knowledge and data on hosted payloads that is fragmented across the agency has contributed to resistance among space acquisition officials to adopting this approach. DOD acquisition officials within the Office of the Secretary of Defense told us matching requirements between government payloads and commercial satellites is typically too difficult for programs to overcome. Specifically, they said the cumulative complexity of matching size, weight, power, and spectrum needs; aligning government and commercial timelines; and, addressing concerns over payload control and cybersecurity amounts to too great a challenge. DOD’s Hosted Payload Office is developing tools designed to help address these challenges and DOD offices that have used hosted payloads have also found ways to overcome them. Officials from DOD acquisition and policy offices, as well as Air Force and industry officials we spoke with, cited matching size, weight, and power between DOD payloads and commercial host satellites as a challenge. We similarly found in April 2013 that ensuring compatibility between payloads and host satellites can pose challenges because not all commercial satellites are big enough or have enough power to support hosting a payload. Whether a host satellite can accommodate a payload can depend on the size of the payload. Additionally, according to industry representatives, the space taken up by the hosted payload affects the amount of revenue-generating payloads the host may place on its satellite, such as additional transponders—devices that emit and receive signals—for the communications services it provides to customers. The complexity of integrating a government payload onto a commercial host can also drive the overall cost of the arrangement. However, officials said these challenges can be mitigated through the use of various expertise and lessons learned. HPO officials and industry representatives have proposed several approaches to help match properties like size, weight, and power between a DOD payload and a commercial host satellite. The HPO is developing a hosted payload interface unit that could potentially provide a standard for payload developers and system integrators to develop and test their systems. One commercial company proposed an interface unit that would accommodate a “universal” DOD payload. Additionally, industry experts stated that with sufficient planning and time for system integration, nearly any payload can be accommodated on a host satellite. The HPO issued guidelines in 2017 to assist DOD payload developers in working toward typical payload requirements and standards for host satellites in low Earth orbit and geostationary Earth orbit. These guidelines inform the payload’s electrical power and mechanical designs. The principal guideline—echoed by the successful CHIRP demonstration in 2011—is that the hosted payload must “do no harm” to the mission performance of its host. Also, satellite interfaces can vary from company to company. Some commercial companies had experience with the task—and business opportunity—of integrating multiple customers’ payloads onto satellites since at least the 1990s. Air Force, HPO, and industry officials told us that, ideally, the payload should use the same spectrum allocation as the commercial host. They said that this is due in part to the lengthy satellite registration process that takes place in the United States and through the ITU that must be undertaken prior to placing a satellite on orbit. Some DOD officials added that the process for all new satellites from initial filing to ITU approval takes around 7 years. If a satellite owner registers for one frequency band of spectrum and later requires a different band, the owner has to begin the registration process from the beginning—restarting the 7-year timeline. This can be problematic for DOD payload owners seeking to match their military communications payload with an already-registered host satellite—particularly if the host satellite’s spectrum allocation is incompatible with the DOD payload. HPO and other DOD officials said that very different spectrum needs between payload and host would therefore preclude the match. Moreover, a need for military—as opposed to commercial—spectrum for communications payloads can introduce additional complications. Although a process exists for a commercial satellite owner to license military spectrum for use by a hosted payload, representatives from DOD’s Chief Information Officer’s (CIO) office could cite only one instance where this has happened. One possible explanation stems from a 2012 memorandum from DOD’s CIO that outlines various preferred processes for a commercial host satellite to host military communications payloads. Several industry officials we spoke to said that the various processes outlined in the 2012 memorandum would add to the already-lengthy process of spectrum registration. Further, the memorandum instructs that contractual terms between the payload and host satellite owners should restrict all military spectrum use exclusively to the U.S. military. However, one industry official told us that international entities do not necessarily recognize U.S. military spectrum, and commercial companies that obtain licenses through other countries are permitted to use those frequencies. For example, a senior official of one commercial company we met with stated that the company licensed U.S. military spectrum through another North Atlantic Treaty Organization government after failing to successfully coordinate an FCC request with DOD and NTIA. DOD and industry representatives told us that from a business perspective, it makes little sense for a commercial company to seek hosting opportunities for DOD payloads that require U.S. military spectrum. Government and industry officials we spoke with said that aligning the development and acquisition timelines of a government payload and commercial host satellite is a challenge. The timeline associated with developing government sensors is generally much longer than that of commercial satellites, potentially creating difficulties in scheduling and funding commercially hosted payload arrangements. For example, DOD satellite systems take, on average, over 7 years to develop and launch a first vehicle, while commercial satellite programs typically take between 2 and 3 years. DOD payload owners may find it challenging to accelerate development and acquisition schedules to match those of the commercial satellite host. Additionally, DOD officials we spoke with said that their budget and planning processes require funding commitments up to 2 years in advance of actually receiving those funds. This can further complicate alignment with commercial timelines because the development of a government sensor would need to be underway well in advance of a decision to fund a commercially hosted payload approach. Furthermore, federal law generally prohibits agencies from paying in advance for a future service or from obligating future appropriations. However, several DOD and other government agency officials we spoke with said that it is possible to align government and commercial timelines. For example, MDA adopted the commercial host’s schedule to ensure its Spacebased Kill Assessment payload was ready for integration and launch without delaying the host satellite or worse—missing its own ride to space. DARPA officials told us they were also able to align DARPA acquisition and development schedules with the commercial host. The Air Force’s Enhanced Polar System (EPS) Recapitalization program officials were able to leverage existing documents such as requirements documents and acquisition strategies from the predecessor program to speed up the acquisition process. According to Air Force officials, the EPS Recapitalization program had a unique opportunity to take advantage of the availability of a commercial host and had the support of a high ranking Air Force official that enabled the program to move forward using a commercially hosted payload approach. Some officials cited concerns with combining government and commercial space missions. For example, officials across DOD told us they were wary of losing control over a hosted payload should a commercial company’s needs change. They said that theoretically, a commercial provider could decide to turn off power to the government’s payload if the host satellite needed extra power to perform a certain function. Additionally, DOD space program officials expressed concern that commercial practices for ensuring the mission success of the payload may not be up to government standards—that commercial testing and integration standards may be less robust than those used by traditional government programs to ensure success, adding risk to the government payload. Furthermore, officials in one DOD program office expressed a distrust of commercial host motives in offering to support a government payload on their satellite, suggesting that a company could be intending to steal government technologies. However, industry officials we spoke with said that DOD can generally issue a solicitation that includes necessary stipulations. For example, including a condition to preserve the payload’s priority of mission and other terms to protect the government’s investment may provide some assurance to those officials that perceive security risks. Additionally, some officials we spoke to cited cybersecurity concerns. They cited loss of control over data security as a challenge to using hosted payloads. Officials told us the data could be vulnerable to eavesdropping or manipulation as it travels between government ground systems and the commercially hosted government payload. However, according to HPO officials, the Air Force overcame this challenge on the CHIRP mission by procuring a secure interface that provided a data link between the payload and dedicated transponder and ground terminal. As mentioned previously, the Hosted Payload Office is developing a hosted payload data interface unit to mitigate this challenge by securing payload data communications from the host satellite. DOD, at the department-wide level, has limited information on commercially hosted payloads—mostly due to a lack of experience in using hosted payloads and complexities associated with them. For example, acquisition officials in the Office of the Secretary of Defense told us that DOD needs more data and analysis of the potential costs and benefits. However, realistic cost modeling for commercially hosted DOD payloads is unavailable because costs can vary across potential hosts and DOD has minimal experience using commercial hosts. Similarly, the HPO performs market research and cost estimates based on data from commercial companies, but according to one official in the HPO, the costs tend to vary based on the supply and demand in the commercial satellite industry. Additionally, HPO officials said their cost savings analyses are based on only two real-world commercially hosted DOD payloads— CHIRP and REACH. HPO officials told us that with additional government data they could compare the costs of system architectures that include free-flier satellites with those that use commercially hosted payloads. Additionally, some potential benefits of using commercially hosted payloads, such as resilience, may be difficult to measure. In our 2014 report on disaggregation, we recommended that DOD define key measures related to disaggregation, including developing metrics to measure resilience. DOD is in the process of developing standard metrics for resilience. DOD’s knowledge of commercially hosted payloads is also fragmented across the agency. Several DOD offices are independently conducting activities related to commercially hosted payloads, such as pursuing commercially hosted payload arrangements, developing lessons learned, and determining demand for commercial hosts. For example, MDA officials told us they have developed cost and technical data and lessons learned based on MDA’s Spacebased Kill Assessment payload— launched earlier this year—but have not shared it across the agency. On the other hand, the Space Test Program, also housed within the Air Force’s SMC develops lessons learned on its payloads, which are government payloads on government host satellites and officials there told us they provide lessons learned to the HPO. In October 2017, SMC’s Launch Office sent a request for data on hosted payloads to DOD agencies, research laboratories, and universities, but the HPO was not an active participant in this request. Independent efforts within DOD to collect and analyze cost, schedule, and performance results from hosted payloads can create fragmentation in DOD’s knowledge base and can increase the risk of duplicative efforts within DOD. DOD does not collect or consolidate agency-wide knowledge on commercially hosted payloads and has no plans to do so. Agency officials stated that DOD does not require programs outside of SMC to consult the HPO when seeking commercially hosted payload arrangements. The Air Force established the HPO to facilitate commercially hosted payloads, however, the 2011 Program Management Directive that established the HPO states that the HPO will coordinate with SMC directorates for detailed implementation of hosted payloads but does not address coordination with agencies or directorates outside of SMC. According to an HPO official, programs are not required to use HPO expertise or tools as they pursue using hosted payloads. Further, this official stated that programs are not required to provide any data or lessons learned to the HPO, or any other central point within DOD, following the pursuit or completion of a hosted payload arrangement. The 2011 Program Management Directive directs the HPO to provide lessons learned to SMC directorates but does not direct SMC offices to share information— such as costs, technical data and lessons learned on completed commercially hosted payload efforts—with the HPO. An HPO official indicated that the HPO obtains data through informal communication with those programs using hosted payloads that are willing to share data. We found that limitations and fragmentation of data and knowledge are contributing to resistance within DOD to using hosted payloads. Several DOD acquisition and program officials we spoke with who did not have experience with hosted payloads generally stated that the potential risks to using hosted payloads outweighed the benefits, and that there was little evidence-based analysis to prove otherwise. They were not aware of existing tools that could assist them in making decisions even though the HPO has been developing these tools and has made efforts to share them within SMC. DOD acquisition and program officials consistently cited a preference for maintaining the acquisition status quo over introducing any perceived added risk to their programs. At the same time, however, officials who have used hosted payloads were able to overcome logistical and technical challenges and realize cost savings. However, according to an HPO official, there is currently no requirement in place to facilitate sharing their approaches to doing so. We have reported in the past that DOD’s culture has generally been resistant to changes in space acquisition approaches and that fragmented responsibilities for acquisitions have made it very difficult to coordinate and deliver interdependent systems. Moreover, our past studies of commercial strategic sourcing best practices have found that that leading companies centralize procurement decisions by aligning, prioritizing, and integrating procurement functions within the organization. Establishing the Hosted Payload Office is one step in this direction, but the office is organized under the Advanced Systems and Development Directorate—a research and development organization—under SMC. Moreover, the 2011 directive that established the HPO does not address coordination or responsibilities for agencies or directorates beyond SMC. Consolidating knowledge is important because it allows organizations to share information and data upon which to develop consistent procurement tactics, such as ways to overcome challenges in matching a government payload with a commercial host. As we found in our work on commercial strategic sourcing best practices, organizations that struggled with fragmented information in the past overcame this challenge in part by consolidating their data on costs and spending. While hosted payload acquisitions are not a typical service acquisition, successful organizations have found that these techniques work for highly specialized technical services for which few suppliers exist. As DOD considers new architectures and acquisition approaches, commercially hosted payloads have the potential to play a role in delivering needed capabilities on orbit more quickly and at a more affordable cost than traditional DOD space acquisitions. Placing DOD payloads on commercial satellites might also be an effective method by which to increase resiliency. However, DOD’s experience and the data collected so far are limited in informing decisions on the use of these payloads. DOD would benefit from leveraging the knowledge and information gained from each hosted payload experience. Centralized collection and assessment of agency-wide data would help enable DOD to mitigate the logistical challenges inherent in matching payloads to hosts, and better position DOD to make reasoned, evidence-based decisions on whether a hosted payload would be a viable solution to meet warfighter needs. Without such knowledge, and a way for interested programs to leverage it, DOD may not be fully informed about using hosted payloads and may risk missing opportunities to rapidly and affordably address emerging threats in space. The Secretary of Defense should require programs using hosted payloads to provide cost and technical data, and lessons learned to a central office. In implementing this recommendation, DOD should consider whether the Hosted Payload Office is the most appropriate office to centralize agency-wide knowledge. (Recommendation 1) We provided a draft of this report to the Department of Commerce, NASA, and DOD for comment. The Department of Commerce provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. NASA did not have comments on our draft report. In its written comments, DOD concurred with our recommendation and stated that SMC had initiated a major reorganization since we drafted our report and that under the new organizational construct, the Hosted Payload Office had changed and may not be the appropriate office for centralizing DOD-wide hosted payload knowledge. DOD’s comments are reproduced in appendix II. DOD also provided technical comments which we incorporated as appropriate. We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees, the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of Defense, the Administrator of NASA, and other interested parties. In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-4841 or by email at chaplainc@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix III. As shown in table 4, civil and other government agencies use commercially hosted payloads to enhance navigation systems, monitor environmental pollution, conduct scientific missions, and improve search and rescue systems. Officials from all of the agencies we spoke with cited cost savings and the ability to leverage existing commercial schedules and technologies among the reasons they use commercial host satellites. Cristina T. Chaplain (202) 512-4841 or chaplainc@gao.gov. In addition to the contact named above, Rich Horiuchi (Assistant Director), Erin Cohen (Analyst in Charge), Claire Buck, Jon Felbinger, Stephanie Gustafson, Matthew Metz, Sylvia Schatz, and Roxanna Sun made key contributions to this report.

Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 1.

Answer: Historically, Egypt has been an important country for U.S. national security interests based on its geography, demography, and diplomatic posture. Egypt controls the Suez Canal, which is one of the world's most well-known maritime chokepoints, linking the Mediterranean and Red Seas. Egypt, with its population of more than 100 million people, is by far the most populous Arabic-speaking country. Although it may not play the same type of leading political or military role in the Arab world as it has in the past, Egypt may retain some "soft power" by virtue of its history, media, and culture. Cairo plays host both to the 22-member Arab League and Al Azhar University, which claims to be the oldest continuously operating university in the world and has symbolic importance as a leading source of Islamic scholarship. Additionally, Egypt's 1979 peace treaty with Israel remains one of the most significant diplomatic achievements for the promotion of Arab-Israeli peace. While people-to-people relations remain cold, the Israeli and Egyptian governments have increased their cooperation against Islamist militants and instability in the Sinai Peninsula and Gaza Strip. Personnel moves and possible amendments to the Egyptian constitution highlight apparent efforts by President Sisi to consolidate power with the help of political allies, including colleagues from Egypt's security establishment. President Sisi has come under repeated international criticism for an ongoing government crackdown against various forms of political dissent and freedom of expression. The Egyptian government has defended its human rights record, asserting that the country is under pressure from terrorist groups seeking to destabilize Arab nation-states. The Trump Administration has tried to normalize ties with the Sisi government that were generally perceived as strained under President Obama. In January 2019, U.S. Secretary of State Michael Pompeo delivered a major policy speech at the American University in Cairo, where he stated, "And as we seek an even stronger partnership with Egypt, we encourage President Sisi to unleash the creative energy of Egypt's people, unfetter the economy, and promote a free and open exchange of ideas." The United States has provided significant military and economic assistance to Egypt since the late 1970s. Successive U.S. Administrations have justified aid to Egypt as an investment in regional stability, built primarily on long-running cooperation with the Egyptian military and on sustaining the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. All U.S. foreign aid to Egypt (or any recipient) is appropriated and authorized by Congress. Since 1946, the United States has provided Egypt with over $83 billion in bilateral foreign aid (calculated in historical dollars—not adjusted for inflation). Annual appropriations legislation includes several conditions governing the release of these funds. All U.S. military aid to Egypt finances the procurement of weapons systems and services from U.S. defense contractors. For FY2019, Congress has appropriated $1.4 billion in total bilateral assistance for Egypt, the same amount it provided in FY2018. For FY2020, the President is requesting a total of $1.382 billion in bilateral assistance for Egypt. Nearly all of the U.S. funds for Egypt come from the FMF account (military aid). In November 2018, the U.S. Defense Department notified Congress of a major $1 billion sale of defense equipment to Egypt, consisting of 10 AH-64E Apache Attack Helicopters, among other things. Beyond the United States, President Sisi has broadened Egypt's international base of support to include several key partners, including the Arab Gulf states, Israel, Russia, and France. In the last five years, as French-Egyptian ties have improved, Egypt has purchased major air and naval defense systems from French defense companies.