You are given two reports by the government agency.  

Report 1:
T he term digital economy has fluid meaning in different policy contexts. Broadly speaking, this term can refer to any number of everyday economic activities that are connected over computers, mobile phones, or other internet-connected devices. In the realm of international tax policy, though, certain types of activities and markets have been singled out for selective taxation by some jurisdictions—primarily in Europe. Most of these digital economy business models operate in "two-sided markets" in which they provide services to individual users (sometimes at zero charge) and sell other services to businesses (e.g., advertising to users). Proponents of these "digital services taxes" (DSTs) justify them on a number of grounds, including the goal of having multinational corporations (MNCs) pay their "fair share" of taxes, taxing profits purportedly derived from consumers in their jurisdictions, or adapting traditional rules and systems of international taxation to account for new forms of "disruptive" business models that can be conducted virtually over the internet. U.S. opposition to these unilateral taxes has been voiced by several government officials. Robert Stack, while Treasury Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Tax Affairs under President Obama, said that such efforts are primarily political efforts to target U.S. corporations. More recently, Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin has issued multiple statements in opposition to unilateral taxation of digital economy businesses. Some Members of the tax-writing committees in Congress have also criticized these efforts. This report analyzes DST proposals from an economic and policy perspective as they have been introduced, discussed, and adapted in European countries. Some commentators and policymakers argue that MNCs in the digital economy are "undertaxed" or are not paying a "fair share" of taxes in their jurisdictions. Two issues that often underlie these sentiments are (1) the ability of digital economy MNCs to provide services without establishing a physical presence (or "permanent establishment") in the country in which their customers reside and (2) the ability of digital economy MNCs to shift their profits away from countries where they conduct real economy activity (e.g., sales, development, production) toward low-tax jurisdictions where the MNCs are conducting little to no real economic activity. Even if a country is able to establish the right to tax an MNC's profits in the digital economy (via permanent establishment rules), the profits subject to tax in that jurisdiction could be reduced via transfer pricing rules. A commonly held principle across international tax law is that there must be a substantial enough connection between a country and a corporation's activities to establish "nexus" in that country, enabling the country the first right to tax the corporation's income or profits earned from sales in that country. Specific criteria for what constitutes a permanent establishment are written into bilateral tax treaties, but they often require a fixed, physical presence within the country. Once a right to tax has been created, a country can tax a portion of the MNC's cross-border profits that can be sourced to its jurisdiction. MNCs can earn income from local residents without creating a permanent establishment in that jurisdiction. Rules creating a permanent establishment based on physical nexus might not be triggered by digital activities over the internet because "the internet" is not physically located in any one country. The internet is a global network of computers. For example, Google can sell advertising space on its search results to a French business without creating a permanent establishment in France. The physical servers processing the payment and posting the advertisements do not have to be located in France. In response, different countries and intergovernmental organizations have tried or proposed modifying definitions and interpretations of permanent establishment rules to include "digital presence" criteria. These criteria include users, "clicks," or other digital activities with origins in the local jurisdiction. The " Select International Efforts to Tax the Digital Economy " section of this report discusses these proposals in more detail. Transfer pricing rules dictate how profits from transactions between related entities within the MNC should be divided among multiple countries for tax purposes. From the U.S. perspective, transfer pricing rules are intended to prevent taxpayers from shifting income properly attributable to the United States to a related foreign company (and vice versa) through pricing that does not reflect an arm's-length result. In practice, though, the arm's-length standard can be difficult to administer on intra-company transactions within an MNC in which there is no market where independent parties bargain over price. Sophisticated transfer pricing strategies can result in an MNC's global profits being subject to a low effective tax rate across multiple tax jurisdictions. MNCs in the digital economy, in particular, can use transfer pricing strategies to reduce the effective tax rate imposed on their cross-border income, because their primary sources of income are often derived from intangible assets (e.g., patents, algorithms, trademarks, and marketing licenses). These assets are more challenging for "arm's-length" pricing because it is difficult to determine the value of a comparable sale of such unique technologies and services. Additionally, intangible assets can be sold to a corporate entity in a low-tax jurisdiction at relatively low cost as they do not require the relocation of corporate headquarters or physical factories, workforces, etc. The exact tax planning methods used by MNCs can vary, but generally they involve the parent (e.g., located in the United States) selling the income-earning ownership rights to those intangible assets to a subsidiary corporation in a low-tax jurisdiction. Early on, a firm developing a potentially profitable intangible asset in a higher-tax jurisdiction might create a subsidiary in a low-tax jurisdiction and sell or assign the ownership rights to that subsidiary. Creation of this "shell corporation" is primarily a paper transaction for the purposes of holding ownership of the profit-generating intangible asset. One way that this could happen is through a cost-sharing agreement in which a U.S. corporate owner of an existing intangible asset agrees to make the rights available to a foreign affiliate in exchange for other resources and funds to be applied toward the joint development of a new marketable product or service. Under a cost-sharing agreement, a foreign affiliate makes an initial buy-in payment for existing technology that, in theory, should reflect an "arm's-length" price that would be paid by an unrelated party. It then receives the income accruing to that asset. Subsequently, the foreign affiliate shares in the cost of continuing technological development. The cost-sharing payments made by the foreign affiliate to the U.S. corporation are income to the U.S. parent, and the foreign affiliate gains the right to use the advance in technology in a specified foreign market. This results in two outcomes. First, the MNC can use transfer pricing rules to maximize costs attributable to subsidiaries in higher-tax jurisdictions. Thus, the taxable income earned by the subsidiaries in higher-tax jurisdictions is reduced to as close to zero as possible. And second, taxable income realized by the shell corporation in the lower-tax jurisdiction is increased. For example, a U.S. corporation establishes a subsidiary in Jersey, an island in the English Channel with a standard corporate tax rate of 0%. The subsidiary buys an existing mobile phone technology developed by its parent U.S. corporation. The subsidiary has bought the right to earnings from marketing that technology in phones throughout Europe. The original cost-sharing payment to the parent would be subject to U.S. tax. The agreement allows the Jersey subsidiary to use updated versions of that technology in the European market from research conducted in the United States. Although the intangible assets were originally developed and improved in the United States, earnings from the mobile phone sales in Europe flow to the Jersey subsidiary and are taxed at 0%. Concerns over the ability for MNCs to avoid corporate income taxes have led to much discussion within national governments and among developed countries in international economic settings. As some of these discussions have met impasse, for various reasons, some countries have unilaterally proposed or implemented policies to tax digital economy MNCs on specific grounds. This section of the report provides a brief historical overview of these recent discussions and select unilateral DST proposals in Europe. While efforts to tax the digital economy have not been limited to European countries, efforts to develop policy principles and justifications in support of these specific taxes on digital economy markets have primarily been driven by politicians and commentators in Europe, including the United Kingdom. This report will not provide a comprehensive account of each DST proposal or be updated to track the rapid pace of policy modifications and emerging proposals. In 2013, members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and G-20 initiated the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) Project. The result of this multiyear effort is the 2015 BEPS Action Plan, which represents the consensus of the member countries that participated in the BEPS Project. Article 1 of the BEPS Action Plan analyzes the implications that the digital economy could have for modern tax systems, including taxes on corporate profits (i.e., corporate income taxes), withholding taxes (e.g., on royalties), and value-added taxes (VATs). Article 1 acknowledges that "it would be difficult, if not impossible, to ring-fence the digital economy from the rest of the economy for tax purposes" given the importance of digital platforms and business models in modern economies. In light of this finding, though, Article 1 discusses potential new tax principles to enable countries to tax the profits earned by firms in the digital economy. Specifically, Article 1 discusses expanding on the widely accepted principle that profits should be taxed "where value is created" to include the notion that value-creating activities include user interaction. For example, YouTube profits when users post their videos and create content on its channels and generates more revenue in advertisement sales based on increased viewer traffic. Additionally, Article 1 considers using "significant economic presence" rather than physical presence as the standard nexus for sourcing which jurisdiction has the right to tax. "Significant economic presence" could be measured by a corporation's revenues earned from customers in a country. The various DST proposals in Europe share many of the features of digital taxation options discussed in the OECD BEPS report. Following the release of the 2015 BEPS Action Plan, the OECD has continued work in this area with its Task Force on the Digital Economy. On March 16, 2018, the task force released an interim report reflecting three different perspectives by its members. One perspective is that user-value creation has led to a "misalignment between the location in which profits are taxed and the location in which value is created" in some digital economy business models. This user-created value argument, discussed more throughout this report, has been used by many proponents of DSTs. A second perspective is that the challenges of tax policy presented by the digital economy are not exclusive to specific business models and should be addressed within the existing international tax framework for business profits. A third perspective is generally satisfied with recent BEPS recommendations and the existing international tax system and does not see a need for significant reform. Despite divisions reflected in the interim report, the task force aims to create an international consensus on principles for taxing the digital economy with a goal of releasing a final report on conclusions and recommendations by 2020. In March 2018, the European Commission announced a digital tax package containing two proposals. The first proposal would expand the definition of permanent establishment to include cases where a company had significant economic activity through a "digital presence," thereby allowing EU members to tax profits that are generated in their jurisdiction even if a firm does not have a physical presence. Under the proposal, a digital platform would be deemed to have established a "virtual permanent establishment" in an EU member state if it (1) exceeds a threshold of €7 million in annual revenues in a member state, (2) has more than 100,000 users in a member state in a taxable year, or (3) has over 3,000 business contracts for digital services business users in a taxable year. Until that more systemic change in permanent establishment rules is adopted, the second proposal would impose an "interim tax" on certain revenue from digital activities: selling online advertising, online marketplaces (facilitating the buying and selling of goods and services between users), and sales of data generated from user-provided information. The interim DST would apply only to companies with total annual worldwide revenues of at least €750 million and EU revenues of at least €50 million. The European Commission estimated that a 3% tax rate would raise €5 billion annually for member states. Media reports indicate that the EU-wide proposals have stalled partly due to disagreement among member states with different economic interests and questions as to whether the proposals would be legal under EU law. In support of its digital tax proposals, the European Commission argues that existing tax rules do not account for how value is "created by users" in the digital economy: Today's international corporate tax rules are not fit for the realities of the modern global economy and do not capture business models that can make profit from digital services in a country without being physically present. Current tax rules also fail to recognise the new ways in which profits are created in the digital world, in particular the role that users play in generating value for digital companies. As a result, there is a disconnect—or 'mismatch'—between where value is created and where taxes are paid. In discussing "value creation in the digital economy," the European Commission states: In the digital economy, value is often created from a combination of algorithms, user data, sales functions and knowledge. For example, a user contributes to value creation by sharing his/her preferences (e.g., liking a page) on a social media forum. This data will later be used and monetised for targeted advertising. The profits are not necessarily taxed in the country of the user (and viewer of the advert), but rather in the country where the advertising algorithms has been developed, for example. This means that the user contribution to the profits is not taken into account when the company is taxed. Despite the policy pronouncements of the European Commission, member states of the EU disagree on both the long-term (changes to the permanent establishment rules to include digital presence factors) and interim (an EU-wide DST) proposed policies regarding the digital economy. On December 4, 2018, the economics and finance ministers of various EU member states met as part of the EU's Economic and Financial Affairs (Ecofin) Council. As part of its agenda, the Ecofin Council was scheduled to consider a vote on the EU's DST proposal. According to media reports, a vote was not formally considered, as it was apparent that multiple members held out in opposition against the DST. As of the publication date of this report, the issues are still under consideration by the Ecofin Council. Even if opponents to the broad, EU-wide DST proposed by the European Commission successfully block adoption of such a tax, this does not mean that individual members states are also barred from imposing their own national-level DSTs. Policy and political pressure for DSTs still exist within many EU member states. According to one media report, approximately 11 of the 28 EU member states were considering or had adopted DSTs before the Ecofin meeting. In April 2018, Spain announced that it would introduce a DST of 3% to the gross income derived from certain digital services. According to a preliminary text of the proposal, beginning in 2019, the tax will be imposed on certain digital services, including online advertising, online marketplaces, and data transfer service (i.e., revenue from the sales of online user activities) determined from internet protocol (IP) addresses within Spain. The tax would apply only to companies with global revenues for the previous calendar year exceeding €750 million and €3 million in revenues earned in that current year from activities with users in Spain. On October 29, 2018, the Conservative Party introduced a DST as part of its 2018 budget proposal. Specifically, the tax would be levied at 2% on the applicable revenues of "certain digital businesses which derive value from their UK users." Revenue subject to tax include search engines, social media platforms, and online marketplaces derived from the participation of UK users. Users is defined broadly and can include interactions (e.g., payments made or clicks) from UK participants on either side of a two-sided digital market. The tax would apply only to businesses whose revenues from covered business activities exceed £25 million per year and groups that generate global revenues from search engines, social media platforms, and online marketplaces in excess of £500 million annually. There would also be a safe harbor provision that exempts "loss-makers and reduces the effective rate of tax on businesses with very low profit margins." A "review clause" would be included in the DST to ensure that it is still required following further international tax reform discussions. The specifics of the DST are to be detailed in legislation to be considered by Parliament that is expected to be introduced in April 2020. The UK Treasury estimates that the DST will raise £400m by 2022-2023 and £440m by 2023-2024. According to the UK Treasury, the DST serves as "interim action" to "ensure that digital businesses pay tax that reflects the value they derive from UK users" until international corporate tax reform efforts determine a comprehensive method to tax income earned from these types of multinational corporate business models. On December 17, 2018, Bruno Le Maire, Finance Minister of France, announced that the government was going to impose a DST beginning on January 1, 2019. Le Maire said that the tax is estimated to raise around €500 million annually. Details on what activities would be covered and the rate of tax were not provided but may be addressed in legislative sessions. Le Maire's announcement came the week after EU finance ministers did not reach agreement on an EU-wide DST at the December 2018 Ecofin meeting and shortly after President Emmanuel Macron announced billions of euros in tax cuts and spending in response to domestic social unrest. According to media coverage of the announcement, the decision to impose a DST seems to be motivated at least in part by a perceived unfairness in the amount of taxes paid by foreign corporations compared to domestic corporations. This section of the report first identifies the fundamentals of a corporate profits tax before addressing justifications that some have offered for DSTs. DSTs have been characterized as extensions of different types of tax regimes ranging from a tax on corporate profits in the digital economy to something more like a selective or excise tax on specific types of activities that is standalone from income tax regimes. Based policy analysis, though, DSTs resemble a selective tax on revenue (akin to an excise tax) and not as a tax on corporate profits. A tax on corporate profits taxes the return to investment in the corporate sector. Investment is giving up income for consumption today for the promises of higher returns, or earnings, in the future. Investment can be made in tangible assets, such as factories or equipment, or intangible assets, such as patents or trade secrets. The earnings eventually generated by the assets owned by corporations are taxed under the corporate profits tax. As discussed in the "Permanent Establishment" section of this report, domestic tax laws and international agreements provide the first right to tax income at its physical source—that is, where the asset is owned. The locations of a corporation's customers do not determine which country has a right to tax its income. For example, if a U.S. firm manufactures goods in the United States and exports those goods to European countries, then those European countries do not have a right to tax the earnings of the U.S. firm just because of its sale to European customers. Under some tax regimes, countries retain the right to impose a residual tax by taxing foreign-source income (i.e., income earned from overseas) and allowing a foreign tax credit. But the right to impose that residual tax on income from foreign incorporated subsidiaries is based on a domestic corporation owning some minimum percentage of the foreign business entity (i.e., a controlled foreign corporation, or CFC). In the United States, income from foreign branches is taxed currently and eligible for a credit. For example, the United States could tax the income that a firm earned from overseas sales if that firm is owned in part or in full by a U.S. parent in the year that the foreign-source income was earned (i.e., "currently," or not subject to deferral). However, most countries do not exercise this residual right to tax foreign-source income outside of income that can be easily shifted to low-tax countries. European Commission authorities appear to be characterizing their DST proposal as an extension of national-level corporate income taxes. In contrast, the UK has framed its DST as a gross receipts tax and specifically says that it is not an income tax. Regardless of these mixed characterizations, a policy analysis of DSTs indicate that they do not resemble a tax on corporate profits. First, as explained above, international tax rules do not provide countries a right to tax an MNC's cross-border income solely because their residents purchase goods or services provided by that firm. Rather, ownership of assets justifies a country to tax that MNC's profits. Second, DSTs, as they have been introduced thus far, are not structured as taxes on corporate profits. Corporate accounting profit is equal to total revenue minus total cost. Many corporate income tax systems tax corporate profits (along some policy spectrum of resident-based or worldwide-based rules). In contrast, DSTs are structured as "turnover taxes" that apply to the revenue generated from taxable activities regardless of costs incurred to a firm. The first section of the Appendix provides an algebraic illustration to show that a DST may have different consequences for the after-tax accounting profits of a firm than an income tax levied at the same tax rate. Third, DSTs are economically equivalent to excise taxes on intermediate services in the supply chains of various markets. As explained in the "Economic Efficiency" section of this report, the economic incidence of a DST is likely to be borne by purchasers of taxable services (e.g., companies paying digital economy firms for advertising, marketplace listings, or user data) and possibly consumers downstream from those transactions, depending on supply-and-demand conditions in each stage of the supply chain. It could be possible under specific market conditions (i.e., in which firms subject to the statutory incidence of a DST earn supernormal economic profits or have monopoly power) that DSTs could reduce corporate profits of firms in the digital economy. Under this scenario, even though DSTs would not still be structured as a tax on profits (from a plain reading of the implementing law), they could have the economic effect of a tax on profits. For reasons discussed later in this report, though, it would be difficult to demonstrate that digital economy firms generate supernormal economic profits or are monopolies within the larger markets in which they operate. Proponents of DSTs argue that profits earned by MNCs in the digital economy are not adequately taxed on a worldwide basis, as many of these firms have reduced their effective tax rates through international tax planning strategies. As discussed earlier in the " Tax Issues Highlighted by the Digital Economy " section of this report, two prongs of these tax planning strategies include avoiding permanent establishments in higher-tax jurisdictions and using transfer pricing to shift profits to lower-tax jurisdictions. Other strategies that help MNCs, both inside the digital economy and outside, avoid income tax include debt and earnings stripping, avoiding withholding taxes, and contract manufacturing. Critics of basing DSTs on this position could make several arguments. First, revenues lost from profit shifting are lost revenues to the country with the right to tax the corporation that owns the asset, not the country that is home to the corporation's customers. Although many developed economies are concerned with ensuring that profits are taxed from their proper source under international tax laws, a country that imposes a DST on foreign MNCs' income (in which they have no right to tax) is not consistent with the rationale of recouping revenue lost from the profit-shifting practices of that country's firms. Second, tax strategies enabling MNCs to pay little to no tax have been used by a broad array of firms that rely on intangible assets for the majority of their profits, and these firms are not limited to industries in the "digital economy." For example, European Commission authorities recently opened investigations into tax benefits conferred by its members on McDonald's (over royalty payments made by franchisees for use of the company's brand) and Starbucks (over royalty payments for coffee roasting "know-how" and the price of its unroasted beans). Thus, it can be argued that DSTs arbitrarily target firms within the digital economy for allegedly excessive profit shifting. Third, tax policies in a number of countries have recently changed or are scheduled to change in ways that will reduce incentives for profit shifting. These changes will most likely affect firms with the most aggressive profit-shifting strategies, including some digital economy firms. In the United States, a number of provisions enacted in P.L. 115-97 have reduced or will likely reduce economic incentives for U.S. MNCs to engage in profit shifting and tax avoidance. In addition to reducing the top marginal corporate tax rate from 35% to 21% —and, thus, the potential tax savings from profit shifting— P.L. 115-97 contains several other policy changes discouraging profit shifting, such as "Thin capitalization" rules limiting the benefits to earnings and debt stripping, such as reducing the share deductions of interest from 50% to 30% of adjusted taxable income for businesses with gross receipts greater than $25 million and eliminating a safe harbor that exempted firms without high debt-to-equity ratios. A new tax on "global intangible low-taxed income" (GILTI), effectively imposing a 10.5% minimum tax rate on the intangible income of CFCs in years 2018-2025 and 13.125% after 2025. In other words, if U.S. corporations are largely the center of concerns about digital economy MNCs not paying a "fair share" of their worldwide profits in tax, then GILTI provides a "floor" in the amount of tax owed by firms that previously sought out tax homes for their intangible assets in countries that imposed low or zero income tax. A "deemed repatriation" tax on accumulated post-1986 earnings at rates of 15.5% (if held in cash) and 8% (other, noncash assets), with applicable foreign tax credits similarly reduced. In other words, retained earnings of U.S. MNCs that were held abroad (often in low-tax jurisdictions) are now subject to tax. U.S. firms that invert are subject to a number of penalties, such as higher tax rates on the stock compensation of the inverting company's executives, a recapture of the deemed repatriation rate on post-1986 earnings (subjecting these earnings instead to 35% instead of 8% or 15.5%), and application of ordinary individual income tax rates instead of lower qualified dividend/long-term capital gains rates on certain dividends issued from the new foreign parent of the inverting U.S. company. Some European countries have taken efforts to change policies that were characterized by some as enabling tax avoidance among digital economy MNCs. For example, Ireland is phasing out tax provisions by 2020 behind the "double Irish sandwich." Some digital economy firms reportedly used this tax planning strategy to reduce the effective rate of tax on their cross-border income (e.g., advertising sales in Europe) and shift their profits to "tax havens" that impose no tax on corporate income. Furthermore, the Netherlands is considering imposing a withholding tax on royalty payments to low-tax jurisdictions by 2021. Although tax-minimizing international tax planning still exists, policy changes have reduced the benefits of using past strategies that raised concerns of MNCs routing income through a complicated series of international business entities for the primary purpose of reducing tax owed. Fourth, DST proposals are unlikely to affect profit-shifting behavior. As explained above, a tax on corporate profits, in a very general sense, taxes corporate income minus the costs of production. In contrast, DSTs are imposed on gross revenue derived from certain business activities (or "turnover") and do not take into account costs or net profits earned by the taxable firm. Thus, economic incentives for MNCs to shift profits remain unchanged by DSTs as they do not affect profit-maximizing decisions at the margins. As discussed in the " Select International Efforts to Tax the Digital Economy " section of this report, statements by the European Commission and United Kingdom claim that tax regimes are not adequately taxing the "value" created by user contributions and behavioral data that forms a key part of the business models of firms in the digital economy. The user-based value creation argument says that some digital platforms benefit from "network effects," in which the contributions of one user benefit other users and draw more users to utilize the platform. For example, a UK user creates a video on YouTube that is widely shared or promoted among other UK users. The increased user traffic benefits YouTube because more users are seeing advertisements that it has placed on its site. Thus, the video content creator has created "value" to YouTube by generating more advertising revenue to the platform. As another example, Yelp is a website and mobile application that allows users to provide restaurant and business reviews. Yelp generates revenue primarily from targeted advertising placed on its website. As more users provide higher-quality reviews, more users will rely on Yelp. Thus, the quality of user contributions creates "value" for Yelp's business model by increasing advertising revenue. Critics of this user-based "value-creation" argument could make various rebuttals. First, business models in the digital economy do not raise novel or "disruptive" challenges to income tax frameworks. In the digital economy, it is common for firms to operate in two-sided markets, where they sell or provide services to two sets of customers. For example, a social media company could use revenue earned from customers on one side of the market (advertising sales to businesses) to subsidize the free provision of services to customers on the other side of the market (individual platform users). A company providing free health and athletic tracking services can charge lower prices for a wearable device if it can sell aggregated user data to another marketer. This method of earning income across two-sided markets, though, is not new. For example, the advent of radio and television broadcasting in the 1900s operated on the same business model, where individual users consumed free programming in exchange for listening or viewing advertisements from sponsors. Just because French households along the border with Italy listen to Italian advertisements on an Italian radio station does not give France the right to tax the Italian radio station's advertising revenues. By analogy, just because French households are able to view online advertisements placed by a U.S. company on a U.S.-owned social media platform does not give France the right to tax the U.S. social media firm's advertising revenue. Second, the "value created" in the digital economy is achieved by the innovations and assets of the companies themselves, not by the actions of a single user. The companies—not the customers—bear the risk associated with investments in innovative technologies and platforms. They hire the workers, conduct the research, and develop the software, algorithms, and patentable innovations. For example, a key capability of many digital economy platforms is the ability to aggregate large amounts of data points across millions (if not billions) of users and repurpose that information for targeted adverting or directly selling goods and services. The technology enabling the aggregation of the user data and identifying patterns in consumer behavior is what adds value for resale to potential advertisers or retailers. Third, user contributions can be viewed as inputs to digital economy business models. It can be argued that the value of a single user's data or input is worth little to no market value in isolation. This is why users are generally willing to let companies track and collect these data without charge. Even if digital business models that allow individual users to monetize and sell their individual data grow, any income earned by individual users would be subject to tax under existing tax systems. For example, property owners on Airbnb are subject to income taxes and other hospitality fees levied by their national and local governments. YouTube "influencers" that are sponsored by companies pay personal income tax on those earnings to their home countries. Fourth, user contributions can be viewed as a substitute for money exchanged by consumers for the provision of digital services. "Direct provision," in this context, has the same meaning as "sale of" digital services, except there is no money exchanged in the transaction (i.e., bartering). For example, take the market for data generated by user-provided information. Google users agree to have Google track their search queries in exchange for the free use of Google's search engine. Similarly, Facebook users agree to have their likes, posts, and network connections tracked and aggregated for sale to advertisers in exchange for the use of Facebook's social media platform at zero cost. These transactions, it is argued, maximize the economic welfare of both consumers and producers. Consumers benefit because the behavioral data of any one user has little to zero market value (as discussed above), but consumers do value the provision of digital goods and services. Producers of digital services benefit because they are able to generate revenue from repurposing aggregated user data in exchange for operating their digital platforms at little to no cost to users. As another example, Amazon's business model can be viewed like a catalog retail merchant that features the goods of different manufacturers. A catalog retail merchant earns income by selling space to manufacturers for the privilege of featuring their products in the merchant's catalog. The catalog merchant's customers place an order, and the goods—which are typically manufactured from outside of the jurisdiction where the customer is located—are then shipped to the customer. The customers did not "create value" in that business-to-business transaction via their subscription and purchases of the catalog. By analogy, just because a final consumer of goods sold via Amazon resides in the UK or France does not give those countries the right to tax Amazon's revenues. Fifth, the distinction that customers in the digital economy create value while customers in other industries do not could be viewed as arbitrary. Consumers engage in a countless array of activities that enhance a company's "value" in the course of everyday life. Customer reviews and referrals for services—everything from dog walkers to dry cleaners to dentists—have existed for years and can increase a business's revenues. However, consumers usually do not expect a share of those revenues, nor does the act of providing a review give the country in which that customer resides a right to tax the service provider's profits. Additionally, consumers promote certain brands and companies simply by using their goods or services. This sort of "free marketing" improves the reputation of the brand or firm but does not trigger tax liability based on the location of the consumer. The flow of users to one digital economy platform or another are similar in that mass consumer attraction drives revenue. What the digital economy has changed, though, is the speed and scope in which consumer actions can be relayed to others. Excise taxes are typically justified by economic principles or as revenue-raising measures. From an economic perspective, there are four common types of excise taxes: (1) sumptuary (or "sin") taxes, (2) regulatory or environmental taxes, (3) benefit-based taxes (or user charges), and (4) luxury taxes. The first two categories of excise taxes attempt to correct for a perceived "market failure" in which the actions of individuals in the market have negative spillover effects to society. The third category is typically used to limit the burden of funding a government program that tends to benefit a relatively defined or narrow set of beneficiaries. The fourth category, largely repealed in the United States, uses specific taxes as a means to raise revenue in a more progressive manner. Based on these classifications of excise taxes, it appears that a DST primarily serves as a revenue raising measure. The use of digital platforms does not appear to create negative spillovers to society, creating the economic justification for use of excise taxes to raise the price of individual transactions as a means to reduce the burden on society. DSTs do not appear to be a benefit-based tax, as proponents have not called for dedicating the revenue to specific government programs that benefit digital economy MNCs subject to tax. DSTs also do not appear to be clearly a more progressive method of financing government activities compared to income taxes or broad-based consumption taxes (e.g., value-added taxes) that are common in Europe. As discussed below in the " Vertical Equity (Progressivity) " section of this report, DSTs could be a regressive method of financing government spending in the countries that impose them. This section analyzes DST proposals under the standard tax evaluation criteria used by economists. These criteria are used to understand how a tax affects consumer demand and producer supply, whether a tax aligns with common notions of fairness, and administrative issues that could increase tax compliance costs for taxpayers or affect the ability of governments to collect revenue from a tax. Economic efficiency is typically defined as optimal production and distribution of resources in a market. Taxes typically impede, or distort, that optimal allocation of resources by raising the price of the taxed activity. Central to estimating the magnitude of these distortions is determining who bears the economic burden, or incidence, of the tax. The economic incidence of a tax can differ from the statutory incidence (i.e., who is obligated by law to pay the tax) depending on conditions in the affected market. Once the economic incidence of a tax is established, the exact distortions to consumers and producers can be determined as well as any other economic activity that is typically discouraged by a tax. The statutory incidence of the DST is borne by firms that provide covered services. For example, under the Spanish DST, companies that sell online advertising services, provide platforms for online marketplaces and intermediation services, and data transfer services—all to users with IP addresses within Spain's jurisdiction—will be subject to the DST (providing that they meet the threshold requirements). The economic incidence of such a tax could vary depending on the structure and characteristics of those individual markets, as explained in more technical detail in the Appendix . Under one scenario, digital economy firms providing services subject to the DST are perfectly competitive, and the economic burden is borne by the consumers of the digital services in the form of higher prices over the long term. For example, Spain levies its DST on firms that place digital advertisements, based on the revenue earned from showing advertisements on the search results and web pages of users with Spanish IP addresses. In a perfectly competitive market, firms providing digital advertisements earn zero economic profit in that they could not earn a higher rate of return via alternative investments. When faced with the DST, these advertising firms can either (a) exit the industry and pursue higher returns in other industries that are not subject to tax or (b) pass along the tax in the form of higher prices to businesses that purchase the advertising services. The firms purchasing digital advertising could be Spanish companies, but they could also be foreign firms purchasing advertisements that are ultimately targeted to Spanish users. In this case, the imposition of a DST in a competitive market will increase the price of taxable services and lead to a decline in the quantity demanded. The exact magnitude of these changes will depend on the responsiveness, or "elasticity," of the companies purchasing the internet advertising to changes in price. Assuming that companies purchasing the advertising services are also operating in a perfectly competitive market, they are faced with the same options as the firms that sell internet advertising: exit the industry or pass the tax along to consumers of their goods. Higher prices could result in lower consumer demand for the advertised product. The magnitude of this reduced demand depends on the responsiveness of consumer demand to changes in price (i.e., the price elasticity of demand). Thus, a DST imposed on intermediary services can have ripple effects downstream within markets. Under perfect competition, the economic incidence of an upstream DST is ultimately borne by the final consumers of those advertised products. Under an alternative scenario, sellers of digital services (e.g., Google, Facebook, Amazon) could be monopolies, or a small number of firms could have "market power" (the ability to influence the price for their services prevailing in the market), and at least part of the tax is borne by these firms in the form of reduced economic profits. Firms can derive market power from a number of factors. For example, lack of competition could enable one firm to have a significant effect on the prevailing rate of digital advertising services. Also, the presence of complements and substitutes could affect market power. In contrast to firms in perfectly competitive markets, firms that have market power are able to earn positive economic profits, also known as "supernormal profits," because they are able to set a price above their marginal cost of production. Some have argued that digital economy firms are more likely to generate supernormal profits because the marginal cost of scaling production of their business model is relatively low, if not costless. For example, the marginal cost for Facebook to display an advertisement to a user is basically zero. Others argue that some firms generate supernormal profits because they are operating in an oligopoly or near-monopoly. For example, most search results are conducted through Google, and Facebook has the most users among social media platforms. These arguments, though, may not provide clear indication of supernormal profits. A variation of the first argument could have been made during the rise of the retail catalog industry, where the marginal cost of producing a single magazine and mailing it to a consumer was relatively small. However, the presence of competing catalog retailers should have driven the prices of firms down close to their marginal costs (which encompass more than just the cost of printing one additional catalog). The second argument could be seen to misidentify the structure of "two-sided markets" in which many digital economy firms provide services to individual users as well as businesses. For example, Google provides search engine results to individual users (at no cost) and sells advertising space on those search results to businesses. Even if Google dominates the search engine market, it still competes against other firms, such as Facebook, for digital advertising. Digital economy firms also compete with nondigital economy methods of providing advertising services (e.g., television, print, and radio), which could constrain their ability to set prices well above their marginal cost of production. When faced with the DST, a monopolist or firms with market power bear at least some of the tax in the form of lower profit. This analysis is explained in more detail in the Appendix . How much of the tax is passed along to companies buying the advertising placement (and their customers) depends on the elasticities of supply and demand in those markets. Like the analysis in the competitive market, consumers in the affected industries reduce their demand in response to higher prices. The ultimate implication of the analyses above is that DSTs introduce distortions in various markets by reducing the financial return to capital in digital economy industries or by raising the cost of goods and services intermediated through digital platforms. Investment in affected markets would be expected to decrease. An example of the former would shift investment out of digital economy firms (e.g., as retailers purchase more print, television, or radio advertisement instead of internet advertisement or increased sales via brick-and-mortar or catalog outlets instead of digital), while an example of the latter would involve a reduction in demand of the final goods. The exact magnitude of these changes will vary based on the responsiveness of supply and demand in those various markets. Distortions can also arise in different ways depending on how a particular country's DST is applied to different firms. These issues are described more in the " Differential Treatment of Firms " section below. The principle of vertical equity generally implies that taxpayers with a greater ability to pay the tax should generally pay a greater share of their household income in taxes compared to households with a lesser ability. A tax is "progressive" if higher income households pay a greater share of their income in tax than lower-income households, whereas the opposite is true in a regressive tax system. If the economic incidence of DSTs resemble that of an excise tax rather than a tax on corporate profits, as discussed in the " Economic Efficiency " section, this finding also has an impact on the vertical equity analysis of DSTs. A review of the economic literature shows that the majority of the corporate income tax is borne by capital (i.e., the corporation's shareholders) with the residual being borne by labor, or workers. Capital, here in the form of stock ownership, tends to be disproportionately concentrated in higher-income households. In contrast, excise taxes are commonly borne by consumers in the form of higher prices. Excise taxes are often regressive, as lower-income households bear a higher share of their pre-tax income on consuming goods and services than higher-income households. The exact equity effects of DSTs could vary based on different abilities for intermediate firms to pass the tax along to consumers, the nature of the goods and services that they sell, and the responsiveness of consumers in those relative markets. For example, assume that Facebook charges higher prices for advertising on the social media platform to companies, and companies are able to pass those higher advertising costs in full to their customers in the form of higher prices. If one of those companies sells luxury cars and another sells consumer household goods, the DST has more progressive effects in the former case and more regressive effects in the latter. In the aggregate, though, there is little reason to assume that final consumers of goods and services sold through taxable activities in digitized business models are disproportionately higher-income. Thus, it can be expected that a DST affecting a broad range of goods and services is more likely to be regressive than not, especially when compared to a tax on corporate profits. DSTs create unequal economic treatment between similarly situated firms inside and outside of the digital economy. Firms outside of the digital economy can earn just as much global or local revenue as firms taxed under DSTs without being subject to an additional layer of tax on their revenue. Firms outside or inside the digital economy can also engage in profit shifting and "aggressive" transfer pricing to reduce their taxes owed in a country. DSTs, as they have been presented thus far, also create inequalities for firms of similar size based on certain exemptions and thresholds. For example, each of the specific European DST proposals use different or multiple thresholds based on total cross-border profits, revenue generated from covered business activities, "clicks" or interaction based from local users, etc. While proponents of these DSTs with minimum thresholds might have other policy goals in mind (e.g., exempting smaller businesses from potentially costly tax compliance burdens), the exact levels at which these thresholds are drawn among larger MNCs are arbitrary from a policy perspective. Critics of DSTs would argue that the thresholds are drawn to exclude domestic MNCs or to target the taxes to a narrow set of foreign MNCs. Regardless of their rationale, these thresholds create concerns of inequitable treatment between different sectors. In the situation where the tax is fully passed along to consumers, digital firms either charge a higher price (reducing demand) or exit the industry. Where the MNCs subject to the statutory incidence of the tax bear at least a portion of the economic incidence of the DST, then they face a lower return to business investment in that country compared to firms not subject to the DST. Additionally, the UK DST's proposed exemption or "safe harbor" for "low profit" firms could create another layer of equity concerns. If the exemption is based on low profits as calculated by UK tax rules, then firms that are not subject to the UK corporate income tax (because they do not have a permanent establishment in the UK) will not be eligible for the exemption. In other words, if a firm must be subject to the UK corporate income tax to be eligible for exemption then, by definition, the exemption is not available to foreign MNCs. MNCs with similar amounts of global revenue would be subject to different effective tax rates on their worldwide consolidated earnings (across all related entities) based on whether they were subject to UK income taxes or not. An alternative exemption being considered by the UK, based on global consolidated profits, could have some administrative issues, as discussed in the next section of this report. DSTs present several administrative challenges to both the public and private sectors. With regard to the public sector, lawmakers and revenue-collecting agencies will have to clarify exactly what types of activities are subject to tax and which parties bear the statutory burden of paying tax. These decisions affect the costs of administering the tax or the gross revenue collected by the tax. With regard to the private sector, the decisions made by lawmakers and agencies could affect the costs of complying with DST regimes. Technology could present administrative challenges to the implementation of DST proposal. First, some digital economy platforms allow users to opt out of having their data tracked or resold to third parties. Without this information a digital service provider may be able to fulfill a user's desire for privacy, but the absence of the information limits the provider's ability to apply proper taxes based on the customer's jurisdiction. "Do not track" or internet browser plugins that make it more difficult for companies to track users' activities could affect the measurement of data collected from local users. Second, users could reroute their internet traffic to servers outside of the country imposing the DST and mask their physical location. Virtual private network services (VPNs) allow users to access websites while making it appear that their IP addresses are from locations other than their actual locations. VPNs connect users to servers located in different parts of the world. Websites will see that a user's web traffic is originating from the VPN server, which could or could not be in the same jurisdiction as the user. Typically, VPNs are used for anonymity reasons or to bypass firewalls and website censors imposed in certain jurisdictions. VPNs are not sufficient to protecting a user's IP address, as other unmasking techniques (some requiring more effort) can be used. Still, users could use VPNs located outside of the taxing jurisdiction to reduce the flow of user activity attributed to IPs within the taxing jurisdiction, thereby reducing revenue collected from "local" user activity. Even if this does not completely eliminate the revenue base for a DST, VPN use still results in mismeasurement of the amount of revenue attributed to local users. Overall, lawmakers writing DSTs would likely need to consider specifying what level of enforcement would be sufficient for companies to make good faith efforts to source their revenues to local users. More due diligence required by companies to determine the source of their users or unmask user efforts designed to preserve their privacy will impose higher costs to the companies. A lower standard might require fewer resources from firms and be less intrusive on user privacy but reduce the amount of tax raised from local users. Thus, DSTs could present policy tradeoffs between individual privacy concerns and tax revenue collection. Two features of the UK's proposed DST create additional administrative challenges. An exemption based on low UK-source profits could also have unintended consequences for proponents of the DST in the form of reduced revenue. Some digital economy MNCs do have subsidiaries physically located in Europe. For example, these firms might have the purpose of providing customer service or call centers that speak the local language or market the company's lines of business. Generally, these types of business activities are low profit margin. If a digital economy MNC does have a permanent establishment in the UK that earns close to zero profits, thereby owing little to no income tax in the UK, does the tax situation of this local subsidiary justify an exemption for the entire MNC controlled group? If so, the MNC could still be technically generating millions of British pounds in revenue from sales to UK customers over the internet. In contrast, an MNC that does not have a UK subsidiary but also has millions in revenue from sales to UK customers would not be eligible for the low-profit exemption. The clear tax planning implication of such an interpretation of the low-profit exemption is that MNCs should establish a low-profit subsidiary in the UK as a means to claim the low-profit margin exemption. If allowed, then the UK DST would likely raise little to no revenue. Alternatively, the UK could base its low-profit exemption based on worldwide profits of the MNC. In the United States, corporations are required to report a number of tax-related calculations and information on their annual Securities and Exchange Commission filings for shareholders. Among these tax-related data are their effective tax rate and tax paid across all jurisdictions where the firm is subject to tax. However, the tax data reported under financial accounting rules typically varies from actual tax paid. This phenomenon is described as "book-tax differences." For example, different rules for depreciation are typically used for accounting purposes compared to actual tax policy in a jurisdiction (e.g., if the lawmakers in that country decided to speed up cost recovery with the intent of increasing business investment). Thus, an exemption based on financial disclosure forms may not accurately reflect taxable income. U.S. corporations are allowed to claim a tax credit against U.S. corporate income tax liability for income taxes paid to foreign jurisdictions. The rationale is to prevent double taxation of foreign-source income. DSTs are taxes on revenue earned from specific business activities and should not be eligible for U.S. foreign tax credit treatment for several reasons. First, such taxes are not income taxes under common bilateral tax treaty language. Statements from some countries imposing DSTs, such as the UK, indicate that they do not intend DST payments to be creditable against taxes that an MNC might owe in its home country. Nor are DSTs "in lieu of income taxes," as the countries imposing DSTs do have a corporate income tax system. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) could clarify that U.S. bilateral income tax treaties do not provide for a foreign tax credit against U.S. tax for U.S. corporations that make DST payments to foreign jurisdictions. If the IRS does not do so, then Congress could enact legislation denying a U.S. foreign tax credit for such payments. Denying a foreign tax credit could increase the total taxes paid by U.S. MNCs in jurisdictions around the world, but allowing DST payments to be creditable would effectively force the U.S. Treasury (and U.S. taxpayers) to subsidize tax rates imposed by foreign jurisdictions. Policymakers who sympathize with the premise that MNCs in the digital economy are unfairly able to shift profits to low-tax jurisdictions could still disagree with the unilateral response of foreign countries to impose DSTs. The tax on GILTI serves as an alternative policy tool intended to impose higher effective tax rates on U.S. firms in the digital economy. For example, in the 115 th Congress, the No Tax Break for Outsourcing Act ( H.R. 5108 ; S. 2459 ) would have increased the GILTI tax rate to 21% and eliminated the deduction for the return on tangible assets derived by domestic corporations from serving foreign markets in computing GILTI tax liability, among other provisions. As discussed, above, DSTs have the same economic effects as an excise tax. It is not controversial for countries to levy excise taxes on imported as well as domestically consumed goods or services. Such taxes are considered to not distort trade. However, some DST proponents have not explicitly labeled them as "excise taxes," making it unclear how these taxes should be viewed in terms of international agreements. Regardless of the label attached to them, some commentators argued that DSTs violate restrictions on tariffs under the rules of the World Trade Organization. For example, some scholars argue that the high-revenue thresholds for taxation and the exclusion of certain revenues earned by European firms effectively discriminate against the digital exports of U.S. firms. Many proponents of DSTs argue that they are "interim measures" until the international community adopts broader reforms in international tax rules. As mentioned in the discussion of the European Commission's DST proposal, the commission prefers changes, both inside and outside of the EU, in the permanent establishment rules to incorporate some measure of "digital presence." This goal aligns with the EU's goal of a consolidated tax base among its members and formulary apportionment of corporate tax revenue based on a set of factors (e.g., sales, assets, employment), which would result in a shift away from tax allocation based on assets. The form and rationale of DSTs appear to better comport with a formulary apportionment tax being pursued in the EU than a traditional national corporate income tax. The inability for consensus to impose a DST at the European Commission level could lead more individual member states to unilaterally impose their own DSTs. Even if the United States objects to unilateral DSTs, these sovereign countries are generally able to impose their own tax systems (within the boundaries of any other international agreements, such as EU membership). Congress could consider creating "carrots" or "sticks" affecting the policy choices of DST proponents. Tax policy and legal scholars have debated the merits of "potential compromises" that would not require fundamental rewrites of international tax rules. Some of these options would rely on the executive branch for day-to-day negotiations at a bilateral or multilateral level (e.g., at the OECD). Any modification to existing or new tax treaties, though, would require Senate approval. Congress could also direct the executive branch to impose incentives (and disincentives) that would affect key sectors of the EU economy. An evaluation of these emerging ideas and concepts is, however, beyond the scope of this report. DSTs Are Not Structured as Taxes on Profits Corporate profit is generally defined as: (1) π=TR-TC Where π is profit, TR is total revenue, and TC is total cost. This is before taxes. After tax corporate profit, π t , for a firm after imposition of a percentage tax ( t ) on corporate profit, is defined as: 2 πt=(1-t)(TR-TC) In contrast, a DST ( dst ) is levied as a percent of total, gross revenue yielding an after tax profit, π dst , of: 3 πdst=(1-dst)TR-TC Algebraically, equations (2) and (3) are not equivalent. To further illustrate, the following amounts can be substituted: TR = $1,000, TC = $500, and t = 0.03 (or a 3% tax rate). Using these parameters, πt based on a 3% profit tax would be: 4 πt=(1-0.03)($1,000-$500) 5 πt=$485 Using these parameters, πdst based on a 3% DST revenue tax would be: 6 πdst=(1-0.03)$1,000-$500 7 πdst=$470 As shown above, after-tax profit for a corporation subject to a 3% income tax rate (equation 5) is greater than after-tax profit for a corporation subject to a 3% DST (equation 7) in lieu of an income tax. The two taxes are not the same. Effects of a DST on Supply-Demand Conditions in Digital Markets To analyze the economic effects of a DST, the different markets in which digital economy firms operate must be conceptualized. In a general sense, the consumers or buyers in these markets are those that pay money to the supplier or seller for the provision of a service. Many firms in digital economies operate in "two-sided markets" in which they provide services to two different consumers: individual users and businesses. While both sides of these markets could be relevant for calculating DST liability, the markets for the latter group of services are the starting point for analyzing the economic effects of a DST, because these business-to-business transactions are where the statutory incidence of a DST is typically first imposed. For example, in the market for internet advertisements, a clothing company could be the consumer and Google or Facebook could be the seller or supplier. In the market for marketplace sales, a vendor could be the consumer and Amazon could be the seller or supplier. In the market for user data sales, a data transfer firm could be the consumer and Facebook, Google, or Fitbit could the supplier. From an economic perspective, there are two extremes of market structure: perfect competition and monopoly. Most market structures lie somewhere in between. Monopolies rarely exist, and they are typically regulated. For reasons explained below, there are specific reasons why monopolies are likely not to exist in the markets in which DSTs apply. However, firms could have market power if there are barriers to entry. The following analyses examine how a DST would apply, over the long run, in the two extremes of market structure for a digital economy firm facing a downward sloping demand curve. Analysis of a DST in a Competitive Market In perfect competition, firms face a downward-sloping demand curve, and the supply curve is perfectly elastic (horizontal) as increases in output are achieved by new firms entering the industry over the long run. Each firm earns no economic profit, meaning that the opportunity cost of investing in alternative ventures is zero, and each is a price taker in the market (i.e., an individual firm cannot influence the price prevailing in the market). In this scenario, when the government imposes an excise tax, firms must ultimately pass on the cost of the tax to their consumers or exit the market. The market for services provided by firms in the digital economy could be depicted as "perfectly competitive." Under this scenario, many firms are willing to provide a relatively similar service. These markets can be outlined more narrowly to encompass only activities by other digital economy firms (e.g., internet advertising, marketplace sales, data transfer), or they can be outlined more broadly (e.g., consumer advertising, retail outlets, consumer marketing research). In other words, although users typically associate Facebook as primarily a social network and Google as primarily a search engine, both firms may operate and compete in the same market for internet advertising. Additionally, both firms compete in the larger market for consumer advertising alongside television, print, and radio advertisers. If a clothing seller is deciding where to spend his advertising budget, that seller can purchase advertising placements on Facebook, Google, etc. (not to mention television, print, and radio). Similarly, a data transfer company looking to purchase and analyze user data then selling marketing services for another good or service not only has the choice to purchase data from Facebook, Google, etc.; it can also collect data from other companies that collect data and surveys on consumer preferences. Figure A-1 and Figure A-2 illustrate the long-run effects of a DST in a perfect competition scenario with demand curves of different slopes. The demand curves are downward-sloping because consumers demand less of the taxed service as price increases. The different slopes represent scenarios where consumer demand is more responsive, or elastic, to changes in price ( Figure A-1 ) and less responsive, or inelastic ( Figure A-2 ). The supply curves in both figures are flat, or "infinitely elastic" because suppliers, in the aggregate, are able to adjust their capacity to meet whatever level of consumer demand prevails in the market. In both figures, the initial equilibrium (E), before the tax, between the prevailing market price (P) and quantity (Q) is denoted by an asterisk superscript (*). After the tax is applied, the change in equilibrium between price and quantity is denoted by a subscript ( t ). In both figures, the tax is also passed forward to consumers in the form of higher prices. Firms reduce output or some firms exit the market because participants earn zero economic profit. If the DST rate is 3%, for example, then suppliers in a competitive market are assumed to increase price by 3% minus any tax savings (i.e., deductions for excise tax payments from any income tax owed to the jurisdiction imposing the DST). In Figure A-1 , imposition of a DST causes prices to rise and quantity demanded to fall in the market. The magnitude of the change in quantity is roughly similar to the change in price in the illustration below, but in a market with relatively elastic demand, the change in quantity can exceed the change in price. One cause for this phenomenon is the availability of near-substitutes. For example, if television advertisement is equally as effective as internet advertising, then a tax increasing prices of the latter will lead to a larger decline in demand as more companies purchase advertisements on television instead of the internet. In Figure A-2 , imposition of a DST also causes prices to rise and quantity demanded to fall in the market. With a relatively inelastic demand curve, though, the magnitude of the change in price exceeds the change in quantity. This could be caused, for example, by a lack of substitutes (e.g., a strong preference for internet advertising or lack of alternative outlets to online marketplaces to sell goods and services). In this case, the change in price is greater than the change in quantity demanded. Many of the services subject to a DST are intermediate inputs to the final sales of other goods and services. This means that the method of analyzing the effects of the DST would be replicated for each stage in the supply chain. For example, if a DST increases the price of advertising a clothing company's products over the internet, then that clothing company will likely increase the cost of the clothing that it charges its customers (the retail consumer in the country levying the tax). The exact magnitude of the effects will vary depending on elasticities of supply and demand in that downstream market for retail clothing sales. In a perfectly competitive retail clothing market, though, it is anticipated that prices will increase and quantity demanded will decrease. In addition to effects on price and quantity prevailing within a market, DSTs can also have "welfare effects." Under this method of analysis, economists consider changes to consumer surplus, producer surplus, and deadweight loss. Consumer surplus is the total benefit of value of a good or service that consumers receive beyond what they actually pay in the market. It is depicted on a supply-demand graph as the area below the demand curve and above the price. Producer surplus is the benefit to producers from selling a good or service at a price higher than their marginal cost of producing one additional unit. It is depicted on a supply-demand graph as the area above the supply curve and below the price. Deadweight loss is an inefficiency in the market that is typically introduced by government intervention, such as a tax, that results in a loss in economic activity and potential losses to consumer or producer surpluses. In a supply-demand graph of a competitive market, like the ones above, deadweight loss is depicted as the center triangle created after the imposition of a tax. Welfare analyses of the DSTs depicted in Figure A-1 and Figure A-2 indicate that they reduce consumer surplus, have no effect on producer surplus, and create deadweight loss inefficiencies. Before the imposition of a DST, consumer welfare is measured as the areas a + b + c in both figures. This area indicates that consumers are receiving benefits from consuming goods or services subject to DSTs in excess of the price they actually pay for them. This could be in part because social media platforms, shopping on online marketplaces, or using search engines are free to consumers. After the imposition of a DST, though, consumer welfare is reduced to the area a . As producers increase the cost of goods and services subject to a DST, consumer welfare decreases due to higher costs. The area b becomes revenue collected by the government and the area c becomes deadweight loss in economic activity discouraged by the DST. There is no effect on producer surplus, because it does not exist in a perfectly competitive market. In a perfectly competitive market, producers are price takers and earn no economic profit. The main differences in Figure A-1 and Figure A-2 are due to the slope of the demand curve. The relatively inelastic demand in Figure A-2 leads to greater reductions in consumer welfare, more tax revenue collected, and smaller deadweight losses. This is because a relatively inelastic demand curve indicates that consumers are less responsive to changes in price. If consumers are unable to substitute away from goods or services subject to DSTs toward nontaxed activities, then they pay higher prices for taxed activities, and the government collects more revenue. Analysis of a DST in a Monopoly Market Some argue that major firms in the digital economy have "monopoly power." Proponents of this assertion could point out that Facebook is the largest social media platform or that Google is the predominant search engine. Others may say that digital economy platforms create network effects that prevent competition. For example, Facebook is able to maintain its status as the most popular social media platform because the value of interacting on a network with billions of users exceeds a new platform with only a few users. Similarly, Amazon might be characterized as a monopoly because many customers shop and provide reviews on its website, so a vendor looking for exposure to the largest customer base will choose to pay for the service of listing its products on that site compared to a smaller internet marketplace. These views may be seen, by others, as misguided because they are viewing the opposite side of the two-sided markets in the digital economy or defining the "market" too narrowly. As explained in the perfect competition analysis, above, Google and Facebook can be viewed as competitors in the market for selling digital advertising space or data transfer services even if they have some degree of market power on the other side of the market (e.g., search engines and social networks). Additionally, digital economy firms also compete against "non-digital" competitors. For example, in the larger markets for consumer product advertising, internet companies compete with advertising via television, print, and radio. Whether firms have supernormal profits or economic rents in an industry is often difficult to determine. In general, the presence of high accounting profits (total revenue minus total costs) is not indicative of whether a firm has profits in an economic sense. Economic profits take into consideration the opportunity costs of investing in a different income-producing activity. There is typically a risk-free portion of the return to any investment. For example, in the corporate sector this could be the average rate of return of the stock market. However, riskier investments generally require a higher potential return in order to attract capital (also known as the "risk premium"). The point of this distinction is that high accounting profits can be an indication of a higher risk premium. For the sake of argument, Figure A-3 illustrates the effects of a DST in a hypothetical monopoly market where there is one producer. An example of this phenomenon in the digital economy could be a single firm that sells internet advertising, marketplace sales, or data transfers to a potential buyer. Figure A-3 illustrates a monopoly market before the imposition of a tax. In a monopoly market, the seller still faces a downward-sloping demand curve. However, the monopolist does not have a supply curve because it does not accept the price prevailing in the market (like individual sellers in a competitive market). Instead, it sets price (P M ) and output (Q M ) at the intersection of marginal revenue (MR) and marginal cost (MC) to arrive at a profit-maximizing equilibrium (E M ) along the demand curve. The upward-sloping MC represents the fact that the monopolist firm faces increasing marginal costs as it increases the quantity supplied in the market. The monopolist also has an upward-sloping average total cost (ATC) curve, which includes the upward-sloping function of the MC curve plus added fixed costs of production. Unlike producers in the competitive markets in Figure A-1 and Figure A-2 , the monopolist in Figure A-3 earns economic profits, or rents. Economic profit per unit sold is the difference between the price charged by the monopolist (P M ) and the ATC curve, or the distance bc . That average profit per unit times the total number of units sold ( dc ) equals the total economic profit earned by the monopolist, as shown in the gray shaded box ( abcd ). The effects of a DST on a monopoly market are illustrated in Figure A-4 . A DST shifts the demand curve in as consumers of taxed services respond to higher after-tax prices. As a result of the reduced demand, the marginal revenue earned by the monopolist declines, and the MR curve shifts from MR M to MR t . The equilibrium in the market shifts from E M to E t . Quantity decreases from Q M to Q t . The price faced by the consumer in the market increases from P M to P t . The price received by the monopolist, though, decreases from P M to P Mt . The economic profit earned by the monopolist under the new post-tax demand and MR t curves is represented by the gray shaded box ( fghi ). The revenue collected by the government is represented by the dashed-line area just above the monopolist's profit. Changes to deadweight loss is not illustrated on Figure A-4 , but they can be explained in qualitative terms. The presence of a monopoly market creates deadweight loss relative to a competitive market because P M is set higher than the price where supply and demand intersect in the competitive market (e.g., in Figure A-1 and Figure A-2 ). When a tax is introduced on top of the distortions caused by the monopolist, the size of the deadweight loss in the market is further increased.

 

 Report 2:
Disclosure provisions that require commercial actors to convey specified information to consumers occupy an uneasy and shifting space in First Amendment jurisprudence. The First Amendment's Free Speech Clause protects the right to speak as well as the right not to speak, and at least outside the context of commercial speech, courts generally disfavor any government action that compels speech. Indeed, the Supreme Court in 1943 described the First Amendment's protection against compelled speech as a "fixed star in our constitutional constellation." Accordingly, government actions mandating speech are generally subject to strict scrutiny by courts, and will be upheld "only if the government proves that they are narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests." However, the Court has also long accepted a variety of laws that require commercial actors to make certain disclosures to consumers, confirming that Congress can compel certain disclosures, even those involving protected speech, without running afoul of the First Amendment. Commercial disclosure requirements have largely withstood constitutional scrutiny in part because, historically, commercial speech has received less protection under the First Amendment than other speech. The government's ability to more freely regulate commercial speech has been linked to its general authority "to regulate commercial transactions." Thus, notwithstanding the fact that commercial disclosure requirements compel speech, courts generally have not analyzed such provisions under the strict scrutiny standard. Instead, courts have often employed less rigorous standards to evaluate such provisions. The precise nature of a court's First Amendment analysis, however, will depend on the character of the disclosure requirement at issue. In a recent decision, the Supreme Court distilled and explained its prior cases on this subject. First, the Court said that it has upheld some commercial disclosure requirements that target conduct and only incidentally burden speech. This rubric likely only applies if the disclosure provision is part of a larger scheme regulating commercial conduct. If the disclosure provision instead regulates "speech as speech," it might be subject either to intermediate scrutiny, as a government regulation of commercial speech, or to something closer to rational basis review, if the disclosure provision qualifies for review under the Supreme Court's decision in Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel . Some of the Court's recent cases, however, have suggested that in certain circumstances, disclosure requirements may be subject to heightened scrutiny. This report begins with a short background on how courts generally view commercial speech under the First Amendment, then reviews in more detail the possible legal frameworks for analyzing the constitutionality of commercial disclosure requirements. Supreme Court precedent explaining the application of the First Amendment to commercial disclosure requirements is relatively recent. The Court did not squarely hold that purely commercial speech was entitled to any protection under the First Amendment until 1976 in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council . The Court has defined commercial speech alternately as speech that "does 'no more than propose a commercial transaction'" and as "expression related solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its audience." In Virginia Board of Pharmacy , the Court said that commercial speech was protected, but it also emphasized that the First Amendment did not prohibit all regulations of such speech. In particular, the Court said that it foresaw "no obstacle" to government regulation of "false" speech, or even of commercial speech that is only "deceptive or misleading." In subsequent cases, the Court has explained why "regulation to assure truthfulness" is more readily allowed in the context of commercial speech, as compared with other types of speech. While the First Amendment usually protects even untruthful speech, in order to better encourage uninhibited and robust debate, the Court has recognized that regulating "for truthfulness" in the commercial arena is unlikely to "undesirably inhibit spontaneity" because commercial speech is generally less likely to be spontaneous. Instead, it is more calculated, motivated by a "commercial interest." In particular, if a particular advertisement concerns a subject in which "the public lacks sophistication" and cannot verify the claims, the Court has suggested that the government may have a freer hand to address such concerns. Four years after Virginia Board of Pharmacy , in 1980, the Supreme Court set out the standard that generally governs a court's analysis of government restrictions on commercial speech in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission . The Court first explained that commercial speech enjoys "lesser protection" than "other constitutionally guaranteed expression." After emphasizing that First Amendment protection for commercial speech "is based on the informational function of advertising," the Court said that "there can be no constitutional objection to the suppression of commercial messages that do not accurately inform the public about lawful activity." Accordingly, the Court held that the government may prohibit "forms of communication more likely to deceive the public than to inform it" as well as "commercial speech related to illegal activity." But if the regulated "communication is neither misleading nor related to unlawful activity," the government's action is subject to intermediate scrutiny. Under Central Hudson 's intermediate standard, the government must prove that the government's interest is "substantial," and that the regulation "directly advances" that interest and is "not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest." The Central Hudson test continues to govern the constitutional analysis of government acts that infringe on commercial speech. However, in certain circumstances, commercial speech may lose its commercial character if "it is inextricably intertwined with otherwise fully protected speech." And more generally, some members of the Supreme Court have questioned whether commercial speech should categorically receive less protection under the First Amendment, suggesting that in at least some circumstances, infringements on commercial speech should instead be subject to strict scrutiny. Commentators have pointed out that, as a practical matter, Supreme Court decisions have increasingly struck down, rather than upheld, restrictions on commercial speech. Also relevant to the discussion of disclosure requirements, judges and legal scholars have noted that the Court may be adjusting the role of the content neutrality doctrine with respect to commercial speech. As a general matter, if a law is "content-based," in the sense that it "target[s] speech based on its communicative content," it will be subject to strict scrutiny. The Supreme Court stated in Reed v. Town of Gilbert that a regulation is content-based if it "applies to particular speech because of the topic discussed or the idea or message expressed," if it "cannot be 'justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech,'" or if it was "adopted by the government 'because of disagreement with the message [the speech] conveys.'" Disclosure requirements are generally considered content-based, given that they require regulated parties to speak a certain message, and outside the commercial context, ordinarily trigger the application of strict scrutiny. In Central Hudson , however, the Supreme Court explained that in the context of commercial speech, "regulation of its content" is permissible. And, as commentators have pointed out, "the very category of commercial speech is a content-based category." Nonetheless, the Court has struck down certain regulations that prohibit commercial speech solely because its content is commercial, suggesting that content neutrality might be relevant in the commercial sphere. In its 2011 decision in Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc. , the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of a state law prohibiting pharmacies from disclosing certain pharmacy records for marketing purposes. After observing that the law included "content- and speaker-based restrictions on the sale, disclosure, and use of" covered information, the Court concluded that the law was "designed to impose a specific, content-based burden on protected expression" because it applied specifically to marketing, a particular type of speech. Consequently, the law was subject to "heightened judicial scrutiny," notwithstanding the fact that the "burdened speech result[ed] from an economic motive" and was therefore commercial. Ultimately, however, the Court declined to say definitively whether Central Hudson or "a stricter form of judicial scrutiny" should apply because, in the Court's view, the law failed to pass constitutional muster even under Central Hudson . As discussed in more detail below, the shifting role of content neutrality in commercial speech doctrine holds special significance for commercial disclosure requirements: these requirements are content-based because they "compel[] individuals to speak a particular message." At least one legal scholar has suggested that lower courts have read Sorrell as an expression of the Supreme Court's increasing skepticism toward restrictions on commercial speech and, since that decision, have been more likely to strike down commercial disclosure requirements. However, the Court did not expressly limit the reach of Central Hudson in Sorrell or in subsequent cases, suggesting that, at least for now, Central Hudson 's standard of review applies even when a challenged action would otherwise trigger strict scrutiny as a content-based regulation of speech. Indeed, lower courts analyzing commercial disclosure requirements usually ask whether Zauderer or Central Hudson supplies the appropriate standard of review, contemplating at most only intermediate scrutiny —even in cases decided after Sorrell . In its First Amendment jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has generally distinguished between laws that regulate conduct and laws that regulate speech. The Court has held that conduct-focused regulations will not violate the First Amendment by merely incidentally burdening speech. For instance, while the government may regulate prices, attempts to regulate "the communication of prices" implicate the First Amendment. To take another example, the Court has noted that pursuant to "a ban on race-based hiring," a regulation "directed at commerce or conduct," the government "may require employers to remove 'White Applicants Only' signs." To differentiate a regulation targeting conduct from one targeting speech, the Court generally looks to the purpose of the law, asking whether the law appears to target certain content or certain speakers. As part of this inquiry, the Court may also ask whether a regulation applies because of the communicative content of the regulated party's actions. This distinction between speech and conduct is especially significant in the context of commercial speech, given that such speech "occurs in an area traditionally subject to government regulation." Thus, in 1978, the Supreme Court said: "[I]t has never been deemed an abridgment of freedom of speech or press to make a course of conduct illegal merely because the conduct was in part initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of language, either spoken, written, or printed." Numerous examples could be cited of communications that are regulated without offending the First Amendment, such as the exchange of information about securities, corporate proxy statements, the exchange of price and production information among competitors, and employers' threats of retaliation for the labor activities of employees. Each of these examples illustrates that the State does not lose its power to regulate commercial activity deemed harmful to the public whenever speech is a component of that activity. The Court has previously "upheld regulations of professional conduct that incidentally burden speech." For example, the Court upheld an informed consent requirement in Planned Parenthood of S outheastern Pennsylvania v. Casey . The Casey challengers argued that a law requiring doctors to inform patients seeking abortions about "the nature of the procedure, the health risks of the abortion and of childbirth, and the probable gestational age of the unborn child" compelled doctors to speak in violation of the First Amendment. The Court rejected that argument, concluding that while "the physician's First Amendment rights not to speak are implicated," this was "only as part of the practice of medicine, subject to reasonable licensing and regulation by the State." In National Institute of Family and Life Advocates (NIFLA) v. Becerra , the Supreme Court emphasized that the informed consent requirement upheld in Casey was part of the broader regulation of professional conduct: specifically, the practice of medicine. By contrast, the Court held that the disclosure requirement at issue in NIFLA , which required certain health facilities to provide clients with information about state-sponsored services, could not be upheld as "an informed-consent requirement or any other regulation of professional conduct" because it was not tied to any medical procedure. Instead, in the Court's view, the requirement "regulate[d] speech as speech," as opposed to regulating speech only incidentally. While the Court has made clear that the First Amendment does not prohibit such incidental regulation of commercial speech, it has not articulated one overarching standard for evaluating whether such provisions are constitutionally permissible. Its decisions in this area have considered a wide variety of government actions incidentally burdening speech, and it may be that the standard varies according to the nature of the particular speech restriction evaluated. In some cases, the Court has suggested that "the First Amendment is not implicated by the enforcement" of a broader regulatory scheme where the regulated conduct does not have "a significant expressive element" or the statute does not inevitably single out "those engaged in expressive activity." In other cases where the Court has upheld a regulation that it characterized as focused on conduct rather than speech, the Court investigated the strength of the government's interest and asked whether the regulation advances that interest, suggesting that the Court subjected the regulation to some First Amendment scrutiny—albeit using a relatively relaxed standard. The Court has never explicitly held that a commercial disclosure requirement qualifies as a constitutionally permissible incidental restriction on commercial speech. While Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey did involve a disclosure requirement, the Court did not address whether the informed consent requirement involved commercial or noncommercial speech either in Casey or when discussing that requirement in NIFLA . In NIFLA , the Court held that a state law imposing disclosure requirements on clinics providing pregnancy-related services could not be characterized as a regulation that only incidentally burdened speech because the requirement was not tied to any specific medical procedures. However, the Court never expressly stated whether it considered the disclosures to consist of commercial or noncommercial speech. Similarly, in Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman , the Court rejected the application of this doctrine without expressly characterizing the government action as a commercial disclosure requirement. In that case, the Court considered the constitutionality of a state law prohibiting sellers from imposing surcharges on customers who use credit cards. The Supreme Court rejected the argument that this law primarily "regulated conduct, not speech," concluding that the law did not merely regulate pricing, but regulated the communication of prices by prohibiting merchants from posting a cash price and an additional credit card surcharge. The Court then remanded the case to the lower courts to consider the First Amendment challenges in the first instance, leaving open the question of whether the provision could be characterized as a requirement for sellers to disclose an item's credit card price, rather than as a prohibition of certain speech. As these cases suggest, the Court has seemed reluctant in recent years to uphold government actions as conduct-focused regulations that merely incidentally burden speech, especially in the context of compelled disclosure requirements. Instead, the Court has distinguished the few cases upholding government acts as incidental restrictions and subjected disclosure requirements to further scrutiny. Nonetheless, the Court has left open the possibility that commercial disclosure requirements might, in the future, qualify as permissible incidental speech regulation, if they are part of a broader regulatory scheme. If the government regulates "speech as speech," its actions will implicate the First Amendment's protections for freedom of speech and may trigger heightened standards of scrutiny. However, the First Amendment does not prescribe a single analysis for all government actions that potentially infringe on free speech protections. Instead, a court's review will depend on the nature of both the government action and the speech itself. This section first introduces the three possible levels of scrutiny a court might use to analyze a speech regulation and then explains their application to compelled commercial disclosures in more detail. In the context of commercial disclosure requirements, there are three primary categories of First Amendment analysis that may be relevant. First, as a general rule, government actions that compel speech are usually subject to strict scrutiny. To survive strict scrutiny, the government must show that the challenged action is "narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests." Laws are unlikely to meet this "stringent standard." Second, as discussed above, government actions regulating commercial speech generally receive only intermediate scrutiny. The intermediate scrutiny standard, pursuant to Central Hudson , requires a "substantial" state interest and requires the government to prove that the law "directly advances" that interest and "is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest." This standard is less demanding than strict scrutiny, but laws may still be struck down under this test. The final and most lenient category—one specific to commercial disclosure requirements—comes from a 1985 case, Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel . In that case, the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of state disciplinary rules regulating attorney advertising. As relevant here, the rules required advertisements referring to contingent-fee rates to disclose how the fee would be calculated. An attorney who had been disciplined by the state for violating these provisions argued that this disclosure requirement was unconstitutional because the state failed to meet the standards set out in Central Hudson . The Court acknowledged that it had previously held that prohibitions on commercial speech were subject to heightened scrutiny under Central Hudson , and that it had "held that in some instances compulsion to speak may be as violative of the First Amendment as prohibitions on speech." "But," the Court said, "[t]he interests at stake in this case are not of the same order as those" implicated in cases involving the compulsion of noncommercial speech. Instead, the Court noted that the state's provision only involved "commercial advertising, and its prescription has taken the form of a requirement that appellant include in his advertising purely factual and uncontroversial information about the terms under which his services will be available." In this commercial context, the Court said that the attorney's "constitutionally protected interest in not providing any particular factual information in his advertising is minimal," noting that in previous cases it had stated that states might "appropriately require[]" warnings or disclaimers "in order to dissipate the possibility of consumer confusion or deception." Rather than applying heightened scrutiny, the Court held that under these circumstances, "an advertiser's rights are adequately protected as long as disclosure requirements are reasonably related to the State's interest in preventing deception of consumers." The Zauderer Court did warn, however, that commercial disclosure requirements raise First Amendment concerns, observing that "unjustified or unduly burdensome disclosure requirements might offend the First Amendment by chilling protected commercial speech." But the Court rejected the contention that the disclosure requirement before it was unduly burdensome. Instead, the Court concluded that "[t]he State's position that it is deceptive to employ advertising that refers to contingent-fee arrangements without mentioning the client's liability for costs is reasonable enough to support a requirement that information regarding the client's liability for costs be disclosed." Although the state had not submitted evidence that clients were in fact being misled, the Court stated that "the possibility of deception" was "self-evident," making the state's "assumption that substantial numbers of potential clients would be . . . misled" regarding the terms of payment reasonable. Zauderer sets out the most lenient of the three standards of review discussed above, and, as a result, a commercial disclosure requirement is most likely to be upheld if it is reviewed under the rubric of that case. However, the Zauderer standard of review has been interpreted to apply only to certain types of disclosure requirements. As described by the Court and discussed above, the state regulation upheld in Zauderer required "purely factual and uncontroversial information about the terms under which [attorneys'] services [would] be available," and the provision was "reasonably related to the State's interest in preventing deception of consumers." Subsequent cases in both the Supreme Court and the lower courts have tested the extent to which this reasonableness review applies outside of the specific factual circumstances presented in Zauderer . The Supreme Court has decided whether to apply Zauderer review to government acts compelling commercial speech in three significant cases. First, in United States v. United Foods , decided in 2001, the Court invalidated a federal statute that compelled "handlers of fresh mushrooms to fund advertising for the product." United Foods thus involved a compelled subsidy, rather than a compelled disclosure. The Court concluded that these statutorily compelled subsidies for government-favored speech implicated the First Amendment and that "mandat[ing] support" from objecting parties was "contrary to . . . First Amendment principles." The Court held that Zauderer was inapplicable, noting that in the case before it, there was "no suggestion . . . that the mandatory assessments . . . are somehow necessary to make voluntary advertisements nonmisleading for consumers." By contrast, the Court applied Zauderer in a 2010 decision, Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States , another case concerning attorney advertising. In that case, the Court considered an attorney's First Amendment challenges to a federal statute that required "debt relief agencies" to "make certain disclosures in their advertisements." "Debt relief agencies" was a statutorily defined term covering some attorneys who provided clients with bankruptcy assistance. Among other things, agencies advertising "bankruptcy assistance services or . . . the benefits of bankruptcy" were required to disclose that they were "a debt relief agency" that "help[ed] people file for bankruptcy relief under the Bankruptcy Code." Rejecting the challenger's contention that Central Hudson 's intermediate scrutiny governed the disclosure requirement, the Court held instead that "the less exacting scrutiny described in Zauderer " governed its review. The Court concluded that the provision "share[d] the essential features of the rule at issue in Zauderer ." The disclosure requirement was "intended to combat the problem of inherently misleading commercial advertisements—specifically, the promise of debt relief without any reference to the possibility of filing for bankruptcy, which has inherent costs." Further, the law required the covered entities to provide "only an accurate statement identifying the advertiser's legal status and the character of the assistance provided." As in Zauderer , where the "possibility of deception" was "self-evident," the Court was not troubled by the lack of evidence that current advertisements were misleading. Instead, "evidence in the congressional record demonstrating a pattern of advertisements that hold out the promise of debt relief without alerting consumers to its potential cost" was "adequate." The Court ultimately upheld the disclosure requirement as "reasonably related to the [Government's] interest in preventing deception of consumers." Most recently, in 2018, the Court considered the application of Zauderer in NIFLA . That case involved two distinct disclosure requirements imposed by California's Reproductive Freedom, Accountability, Comprehensive Care, and Transparency Act (FACT Act), which regulated crisis pregnancy centers. First, the FACT Act required any " licensed covered facility" to notify clients that "California has public programs that provide immediate free or low-cost access to comprehensive family planning services (including all FDA-approved methods of contraception), prenatal care, and abortion for eligible women," and give the telephone number of the local social services office. Second, any " unlicensed covered facility" had to provide notice that the "facility is not licensed as a medical facility by the State of California and has no licensed medical provider who provides or directly supervises the provision of services." The Court first held that Zauderer 's reasonableness review did not apply to the licensed notice. In the Court's view, the notice was "not limited to 'purely factual and uncontroversial information about the terms under which . . . services will be available.'" The Court explained that the disclosure requirement "in no way relate[d] to the services that licensed clinics provide." The Court said that instead, the law "require[d] these clinics to disclose information about state -sponsored services—including abortion, anything but an 'uncontroversial' topic." The Court ultimately held that the licensed notice could not "survive even intermediate scrutiny." Turning to the unlicensed notice, the Court determined that it did not need to "decide whether the Zauderer standard applies to the unlicensed notice" because the disclosure requirement failed scrutiny even under Zauderer . The Court said that "under Zauderer , a disclosure requirement cannot be 'unjustified or unduly burdensome.'" The Court interpreted this statement to require that the government prove it was seeking "to remedy a harm that is 'potentially real, not purely hypothetical.'" Based on the record on appeal, the Court found that California's stated interest in "ensuring that pregnant women in California know when they are getting medical care from licensed professionals" was "purely hypothetical." Further, the Court held in the alternative that "[e]ven if California had presented a nonhypothetical justification for the unlicensed notice, the FACT Act unduly burden[ed] protected speech" by requiring a government statement to be placed in all advertisements, regardless of an advertisement's length or content. The Court also expressed concern that the unlicensed notice "target[ed]" certain speakers in imposing those burdens by focusing on "facilities that primarily provide 'pregnancy-related' services." While the Supreme Court has emphasized that Zauderer 's reasonableness review is available only for certain types of compelled commercial disclosures, lower courts have disagreed on the precise circumstances required to apply Zauderer . A few requirements have emerged in the case law. First, courts agree that to qualify for review under Zauderer , a commercial disclosure requirement must compel speech that is "factual and uncontroversial." Next, the disclosure must be related to the goods or services the speaker provides. Finally, courts have disagreed on the type of government interest that may be asserted to justify a Zauderer -eligible regulation: while Zauderer itself approved of the challenged disclosure requirement after concluding that the state was permissibly seeking to "prevent[] deception of consumers," lower courts have sometimes applied Zauderer review even where the regulation is not specifically intended to prevent deception. Before discussing the particulars of these requirements, it is worth noting that these elements are related to the Court's overarching justifications for affording the government more leeway to regulate commercial speech. The seminal Supreme Court case establishing that commercial speech is protected by the First Amendment, Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council , tied commercial speech's value to its ability to inform consumers. Critically, the Court said that governments could continue to ban false or misleading commercial speech , noting in another case that "the public and private benefits from commercial speech derive from confidence in its accuracy and reliability." It was against this background that the Court in Zauderer concluded that the provision requiring the disclosure of factual information about contingent fee arrangements did not involve First Amendment interests "of the same order as those" involved in other cases involving the compulsion of noncommercial speech. Accordingly, the state acted reasonably by prescribing that attorneys had to include in their advertising "purely factual and uncontroversial information about the terms under which [their] services [would] be available." The first element for a commercial disclosure requirement to be eligible for Zauderer review is that the government regulation must require the disclosure of "factual and uncontroversial" information. The two parts of Zauderer's initial requirement are often evaluated as one, although courts have sometimes pointed out that "factual" and "uncontroversial," logically, connote two different things. Viewing the two words together, some have characterized the "factual and uncontroversial" requirement as distinguishing regulations that compel the disclosure of facts from those that compel individuals to state opinions or ideologies. As discussed, the Supreme Court has said that the value of commercial speech largely lies in its ability to inform consumers. And in Zauderer , the Court emphasized that because protection for commercial speech is justified by its informational value, the attorney challenging the disclosure requirement had a "minimal" First Amendment interest "in not providing any particular factual information in his advertising." As the Second Circuit has explained: Commercial disclosure requirements are treated differently from restrictions on commercial speech because mandated disclosure of accurate, factual, commercial information does not offend the core First Amendment values of promoting efficient exchange of information or protecting individual liberty interests. Such disclosure furthers, rather than hinders, the First Amendment goal of the discovery of truth and contributes to the efficiency of the "marketplace of ideas." Protection of the robust and free flow of accurate information is the principal First Amendment justification for protecting commercial speech, and requiring disclosure of truthful information promotes that goal. In such a case, then, less exacting scrutiny is required than where truthful, nonmisleading commercial speech is restricted. In this vein, the Supreme Court upheld disclosure requirements regarding the nature of contingent fee arrangements in Zauderer and statements clarifying the nature of the bankruptcy-related assistance provided by debt relief agencies in Milavetz . Lower courts have approved as "factual and uncontroversial" within the meaning of Zauderer a variety of other commercial disclosure requirements, including regulations requiring the disclosure of: country-of-origin information for meat; calorie information at restaurants; the fact that products contain mercury; and textual and graphic warnings about the health risks of tobacco products. By contrast, in a 2015 opinion, the D.C. Circuit concluded that a federal regulation requiring firms to disclose whether their products used "conflict minerals" that originated "in the Democratic Republic of the Congo or an adjoining country" could not be characterized as factual and uncontroversial. The court said that "[t]he label '[not] conflict free' is a metaphor that conveys moral responsibility for the Congo war. . . . An issuer, including an issuer who condemns the atrocities of the Congo war in the strongest terms, may disagree with that assessment of its moral responsibility. . . . By compelling an issuer to confess blood on its hands, the statute interferes with that exercise of the freedom of speech under the First Amendment." Similarly, the Seventh Circuit, in a 2006 opinion, held that disclosure requirements in a state law regulating sexually explicit video games were not "factual and uncontroversial" as required for Zauderer to apply. In relevant part, the law required "video game retailers to place a four square-inch label with the numerals '18' on any 'sexually explicit' video game," and to post signs and provide brochures "explaining the video game rating system." The court held first that the sticker "ultimately communicates a subjective and highly controversial message—that the game's content is sexually explicit." Similarly, the panel concluded that "the message" communicated by the signs and brochures was "neither purely factual nor uncontroversial" because it was "intended to communicate that any video games in the store can be properly judged pursuant to the standards described in the . . . ratings." As mentioned above, some courts have treated "factual" and "uncontroversial" as two distinct requirements. But at times, courts have struggled to define "controversial," standing alone. The D.C. Circuit has suggested that controversial must mean that a disclosure "communicates a message that is controversial for some reason other than dispute about simple factual accuracy." One trial court interpreting a decision of the Second Circuit suggested that "it is the nature of the regulation of compelled speech that controls, not the nature of the legislative debate that gave rise to its enactment." That court then noted that other courts had equated controversial messages with disclosures that are "opinion-based." Courts have disagreed about whether a disclosure may be characterized as "controversial" because it is "inflammatory" or "evoke[s] an emotional response." In NIFLA , the Supreme Court struck down the licensed notice after noting that the required disclosures related to "abortion, anything but an 'uncontroversial' topic," although it did not further explain when a topic is "uncontroversial" for purposes of Zauderer. Second, to be eligible for review under Zauderer , a commercial disclosure requirement must be related to the services provided by the speaker. In Zauderer itself, the Court had noted that the disputed disclosure required the attorney to provide information in his advertising "about the terms under which his services will be available." By and large, lower courts, at least prior to NIFLA, had not treated this relationship to the speaker's services as a distinct requirement. The Court in NIFLA , however, said that this was a necessary prerequisite for Zauderer review and held in that case that the notice requirement for licensed clinics at issue was not "relate[d] to the services that licensed clinics provide" because it instead provided information "about state -sponsored services." Judges have disagreed on whether there exists a third requirement for Zauderer review. In Zauderer itself, the Supreme Court noted that the disclosure requirements at issue in that case were intended to "prevent[] deception of customers." Further, when applying Zauderer review to the bankruptcy-related disclosures at issue in Milavetz , the Court stated that the disclosures were "intended to combat the problem of inherently misleading commercial advertisements." Perhaps most notably, in United Foods , the Court explained its decision not to apply Zauderer by noting that there was "no suggestion" that the compelled subsidies at issue in that case were "somehow necessary to make voluntary advertisements nonmisleading for consumers." The Supreme Court's decisions applying Zauderer have thus suggested that one factor in deciding whether to apply this "reasonably related" review is whether the targeted commercial speech is misleading, or whether the state's interest in requiring the disclosure is to prevent "consumer confusion or deception." Nonetheless, the Court has not squarely held that this is a necessary condition for Zauderer review, and several lower courts have rejected this position. The D.C. Circuit concluded that Zauderer 's justification characterizing "the speaker's interest in opposing forced disclosure of such information as 'minimal' seems inherently applicable beyond" the state's "interest in remedying deception." The Second Circuit has also held that Zauderer review applies more broadly. In rejecting a litigant's argument that the Supreme Court's decision in United Foods limited Zauderer only to laws intended to prevent consumer deception, the Second Circuit said that United Foods "simply distinguishes Zauderer on the basis that the compelled speech in Zauderer was necessary to prevent deception of consumers; it does not provide that all other disclosure requirements are subject to heightened scrutiny." If a commercial disclosure requirement involves only "purely factual and uncontroversial information" about the goods or services being sold, and is therefore eligible for review under Zauderer , then it will be constitutional so long as the disclosure requirement is "reasonably related" to the government's interest. This reasonableness review is relatively lenient, especially as compared with the standards that would otherwise apply to compelled speech. But, as emphasized in NIFLA , even under Zauderer , "unjustified or unduly burdensome disclosure requirements might offend the First Amendment by chilling protected commercial speech." Lower courts had previously come to different conclusions regarding whether "unjustified or unduly burdensome" presented an additional inquiry, to be conducted separately from the reasonableness inquiry otherwise prescribed by Zauderer , or whether instead this inquiry was subsumed by the "reasonably related" inquiry. NIFLA did not entirely resolve this issue, although it did frame its analysis using the "unjustified or unduly burdensome" language rather than the language of rational basis review. In Zauderer , the Supreme Court upheld the contingent fee disclosure after concluding that the requirement was "reasonably related to the State's interest in preventing deception of consumers." But as noted above, lower courts have largely concluded that Zauderer 's reasonableness review may govern the analysis even when the government asserts an interest other than preventing consumer deception. The D.C. Circuit has, so far, largely declined to articulate a clear standard for "what type of interest might suffice." That court did conclude in one case that where the government's interest was "substantial under Central Hudson 's standard," that would qualify as a sufficient interest under Zauderer . Perhaps taking a different approach, in a case upholding a disclosure requirement under Zauderer , the Second Circuit described the state's interest as "legitimate and significant." Other than "the interest in correcting misleading or confusing commercial speech," the federal courts of appeals have upheld commercial disclosure requirements where the government asserted interests in food safety, preventing obesity, "protecting human health and the environment from mercury poisoning," and in protecting health benefit providers "from questionable . . . business practices." By contrast, the Second Circuit held in International Dairy Foods Association v. Amestoy that "consumer curiosity alone is not a strong enough state interest to sustain the compulsion of even an accurate, factual statement." In NIFLA , the Supreme Court indicated that under Zauderer , the government must assert an interest that is "more than 'purely hypothetical.'" As discussed above, the State of California's justification for the notice requiring unlicensed clinics to disclose that they were unlicensed was to "ensur[e] that pregnant women in California know when they are getting medical care from licensed professionals." The Court concluded that the state had "point[ed] to nothing suggesting that pregnant women do not already know that the covered facilities are staffed by unlicensed medical professionals." NIFLA 's requirement that the government provide evidence supporting an asserted interest differs from the Court's approach in Zauderer itself and in Milavetz . In both Zauderer and Milavetz , the Court rejected arguments that the government had failed to present sufficient evidence to support its interest in the disclosure requirement, concluding that in both of those cases, "the possibility of deception" in the regulated advertisements was "self-evident." Although the standard is not entirely clear, it is possible that in future cases the Court could conclude again that a particular advertisement is so obviously deceptive that the government does not need to submit significant evidence proving that the advertisements are misleading. If the government has asserted a sufficient interest, then under Zauderer , it needs to show only that the disputed disclosure requirement is "reasonably related" to that interest. Describing the Supreme Court's decision in Zauderer , the D.C. Circuit has said that the "evidentiary parsing" required by more rigorous First Amendment tests "is hardly necessary when the government uses a disclosure mandate to achieve a goal of informing consumers about a particular product trait, assuming of course that the reason for informing consumers qualifies as an adequate interest." That court further elaborated that "[t]he self-evident tendency of a disclosure mandate to assure that recipients get the mandated information may in part explain why, where that is the goal, many such mandates have persisted for decades without anyone questioning their constitutionality." Similarly, the Second Circuit has observed in one case that "while the First Amendment precludes the government from restricting commercial speech without showing that 'the harms it recites are real and that its restriction will in fact alleviate them to a material degree,'" the First Amendment "does not demand 'evidence or empirical data' to demonstrate the rationality of mandated disclosures in the commercial context." Notwithstanding the suggestion that little evidence is required to show that a disclosure requirement is reasonably related to an appropriate government interest, lower courts have often relied on the government's evidence supporting the disputed requirement when they uphold the provision. This showing may be easiest where the government asserts an interest in preventing misleading speech, given "the self-evident tendency of a disclosure mandate to assure that recipients get the mandated information." Additionally, courts have sometimes held that commercial disclosure requirements fail even this lenient test for rationality, particularly where the government has asserted an interest other than preventing consumer confusion. For example, in National Association of Manufacturers v. SEC , the D.C. Circuit held that a provision requiring companies to disclose whether their products were "conflict free" violated the First Amendment. In defending this rule, the government asserted an interest in "ameliorat[ing] the humanitarian crisis in the [Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)]." In the court's view, however, the government had failed to demonstrate that its measure would achieve this interest. The D.C. Circuit observed that the government had "offered little substance beyond" statements by political officials to support "the effectiveness of the measure." The court assumed that the government's theory "must be that the forced disclosure regime will [lead to boycotts that] decrease the revenue of armed groups in the DRC and their loss of revenue will end or at least diminish the humanitarian crisis there." But in the view of the court, this theory could not justify the regulation, as the idea was "entirely unproven and rest[ed] on pure speculation." To take another example, the Third Circuit struck down a commercial disclosure requirement concerning attorney advertising in Dwyer v. Cappell . In that case, an attorney challenged a state regulation that prohibited attorneys from using quotations from judicial opinions in their advertising unless they presented "the full text" of those opinions. The state argued that such quotations were "inherently misleading because laypersons . . . would understand them to be judicial endorsements." The court, however, said that even assuming "that excerpts of judicial opinions are potentially misleading to some persons," the state had failed "to explain how [an attorney's] providing a complete judicial opinion somehow dispels this assumed threat of deception." The court reasoned that "providing a full judicial opinion does not reveal to a potential client that an excerpt of the same opinion is not an endorsement." Additionally, the court held that the disputed requirement was "unduly burdensome," as it "effectively rules out the possibility that [an attorney] can advertise with even an accurately quoted excerpt of a judicial statement about his abilities." And in the view of the Third Circuit, "that type of restriction—an outright ban on advertising with judicial excerpts—would properly be analyzed under the heightened Central Hudson standard of scrutiny." As Dwyer suggests, courts may strike down disclosure requirements under Zauderer if the requirement is "unduly burdensome." In NIFLA , the Supreme Court held that the unlicensed notice was likely unconstitutional because it "unduly burden[ed] protected speech," noting that it applied to all advertisements for these licensed facilities, regardless of their content. In particular, the majority opinion highlighted one hypothetical discussed at oral argument, noting that "a billboard for an unlicensed facility that says 'Choose Life' would have to surround that two-word statement with a 29-word statement from the government, in as many as 13 different languages." In this instance, the Court said, the notice would "drown[] out the facility's own message," and therefore be unduly burdensome. If a commercial disclosure requirement is not a factual and uncontroversial disclosure related to the speaker's goods or services under Zauderer , courts will likely apply a heightened standard of review. Under prevailing Supreme Court precedent, if a provision does not qualify for Zauderer 's reasonableness review, a court may review the challenged regulation under Central Hudson . As discussed above, Central Hudson established the general standard of review for government restrictions on commercial speech. The Supreme Court described "a four-part analysis:" At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is protected by the First Amendment. For commercial speech to come within that provision, it at least must concern lawful activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers, we must determine whether the regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest. The Court has described the Central Hudson test as "intermediate" scrutiny. If a disclosure requirement affects commercial speech but does not qualify for Zauderer review, courts have generally held that Central Hudson 's intermediate scrutiny applies. However, courts have sometimes suggested that some higher standard of review, more stringent than Central Hudson 's intermediate scrutiny, should apply to commercial disclosure requirements that do not qualify for review under Zauderer . Some lower court judges have concluded that because such disclosures compel particular speech and are by definition not content-neutral, they should be evaluated under strict scrutiny. In contrast to Central Hudson review, which requires the government to show that a law is "not more extensive than is necessary to serve" a "substantial" interest, strict scrutiny "requires the Government to prove that the restriction furthers a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest." The Supreme Court has suggested—but not squarely held—that at least some types of commercial disclosure requirements might be subject to some form of scrutiny more strict than Central Hudson . In NIFLA , the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of state provisions requiring crisis pregnancy centers to make certain disclosures to clients and in their advertising. The Court suggested that the provision requiring licensed facilities to disseminate notices about state-provided services might be subject to strict scrutiny as a content-based regulation of speech, but concluded that it did not need to resolve that question because the notice could not "survive even intermediate scrutiny." Significantly, however, the NIFLA Court never described the licensed notice as involving commercial speech. In the decision below, the Ninth Circuit had held that the notice should not be subject to strict scrutiny because it regulated "professional speech." That court, like other federal courts of appeals, had recognized "speech that occurs between professionals and their clients in the context of their professional relationship" "as a separate category of speech that is subject to different rules." The Ninth Circuit had concluded that speech that was part of the practice of a profession could be regulated by the state, subject only to intermediate scrutiny. The Court rejected this idea, saying that the First Amendment does not encompass a tradition of lower scrutiny "for a category called 'professional speech.'" Ultimately, the Court said that it saw no "persuasive reason" to treat "professional speech as a unique category that is exempt from ordinary First Amendment principles." To the extent that "professional speech" could be seen to overlap with commercial speech, this sentence could be read to suggest that commercial speech should also be subject to "ordinary First Amendment principles." This suggestion would seem to conflict with prior cases saying that commercial speech occupies a "subordinate position in the scale of First Amendment values." Although the NIFLA Court implicitly suggested that disclosure requirements for professionals might constitute commercial speech by evaluating the FACT Act's requirements under Zauderer and Central Hudson , it never expressly clarified whether "professional speech" overlaps with commercial speech. Because the FACT Act's requirements applied outside of the advertising context, it may be open to some debate whether these licensed notices involved commercial speech. The unlicensed notice challenged in NIFLA was required to be included in advertising, and advertisements are "classic examples of commercial speech." But the unlicensed notice was also required to be posted on-site, and the state required licensed facilities to post disclosures on-site or to otherwise distribute the notice to clients directly. Further, in a similar context, at least one federal court of appeals concluded that a Baltimore ordinance requiring certain pregnancy centers to make specified disclosures regulated noncommercial speech. That court said the pregnancy centers were not motivated by economic interest or proposing a commercial transaction, but were instead "provid[ing] free information about pregnancy, abortion, and birth control as informed by a religious and political belief." If the licensed disclosures in NIFLA did not regulate commercial speech, then it would be unsurprising that the Court would consider applying strict scrutiny rather than Central Hudson . Others, however, have pointed out that crisis pregnancy centers, even if they do not charge fees, operate "in a marketplace where other providers generally charge fees," and argued that these centers "are engaged in commercial activity by providing physical and mental health services to pregnant women." And more generally, some have pointed out the similarities between "professional" and commercial speech. The fact that the NIFLA Court did not directly address the relationship between professional and commercial speech may suggest that heightened scrutiny may be necessary with respect to some commercial disclosure requirements. Specifically, the Court did not cite the commercial speech doctrine as "a persuasive reason for treating professional speech as a unique category that is exempt from ordinary First Amendment principles." At least one commentator has argued that the Court's failure to mention Central Hudson —"not even to dismiss it as . . . another inapposite exception to Reed 's general rule [of strict scrutiny]"—may suggest that the Court is seeking to limit Central Hudson 's holding that commercial speech may be more freely regulated than other speech under the First Amendment. Although NIFLA may not have expressly altered the framework used to evaluate commercial disclosure requirements, it may nonetheless signal that the Supreme Court will view them with more skepticism in the future. The majority opinion, authored by Justice Thomas, emphasized that "[t]he dangers associated with content-based regulations of speech are also present in the context of professional speech." Even if "professional speech" is not coterminous with "commercial speech," this statement does seem to suggest that the Court believes content neutrality principles are relevant in the commercial sphere. In dissent, Justice Breyer, viewing the majority opinion as adopting such a view, argued that the majority's approach, "if taken literally, could radically change prior law, perhaps placing much securities law or consumer protection law at constitutional risk." He pointed out that "[v]irtually every disclosure law could be considered 'content based,' for virtually every disclosure law requires individuals 'to speak a particular message.'" In response to Justice Breyer, the NIFLA majority stated that it did not "question the legality of health and safety warnings long considered permissible, or purely factual and uncontroversial disclosures about commercial products." This view echoed the Court's prior statement that "[p]urely commercial speech is more susceptible to compelled disclosure requirements." Following the Court's 2010 decision in Reed , in which the Court articulated a more "precise test to determine whether speech regulations are content based," many lower courts had rejected the idea that content-based requirements affecting only commercial speech should be subject to strict scrutiny, even if they otherwise discriminated based on content under Reed . But because NIFLA appeared to suggest that content neutrality is relevant in the commercial sphere, it seems reasonable to think that lower courts may now be more likely to conclude that strict scrutiny could apply to content-based commercial disclosure requirements. This would be consistent with what some commentators have described as the Court's increasingly heightened scrutiny of restrictions on commercial speech. For now, though, Central Hudson generally continues to govern the analysis of government actions affecting lawful, non-misleading commercial speech, including commercial disclosure requirements that do not qualify for Zauderer review. As discussed, Central Hudson requires that the government prove that its interest is "substantial," and that the regulation "directly advances" that interest and is "not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest." Government regulations are more likely to fail this more rigorous standard than the Zauderer reasonableness standard, often because a court believes there is some less restrictive means available for the government to achieve its goals. Courts will require more "evidence of a measure's effectiveness" under Central Hudson , as compared to Zauderer . However, Central Hudson is more forgiving than strict scrutiny, and courts do uphold government actions infringing on commercial speech under Central Hudson . For example, in Spirit Airlines v. Department of Transportation , the D.C. Circuit concluded that a federal regulation governing the way that airlines must display flight prices "satisfie[d] . . . the Central Hudson test." In the court's view, "[t]he government interest—ensuring the accuracy of commercial information in the marketplace—[was] clearly and directly advanced by a regulation requiring that the total, final price be the most prominent" price displayed. And the regulation was "reasonably tailored to accomplish that end" because the rule "simply regulate[d] the manner of disclosure." Government actions are unlikely to be upheld if a court applies strict scrutiny. Nonetheless, some scholars have argued that many disclosure requirements might survive strict scrutiny, and the Supreme Court has, in rare instances, said that the government may "directly regulate speech to address extraordinary problems, where its regulations are appropriately tailored to resolve those problems without imposing an unnecessarily great restriction on speech." It is possible that a court could hold that the government has a compelling interest in protecting consumers, for example, and that particular disclosures are narrowly tailored to meet that interest. The Supreme Court has long emphasized that the government can regulate commercial activity "deemed harmful to the public." But a court would likely require more proof from the government under strict scrutiny and likely would not simply accept the government's allegations as "self-evident" under such review. Congress has enacted a wide variety of disclosure requirements, many of which arguably compel commercial speech. For example, the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 sets out disclosure requirements for registering securities. Federal law, among a host of other food labeling requirements, requires "bioengineered food" to bear a label disclosing that the food is bioengineered. Direct-to-consumer advertisements for prescription drugs must contain a series of disclosures, including the drug's name and side effects. Certain appliances must contain labels disclosing information about their energy efficiency. Bills in the 115 th and 116 th Congresses have proposed additional disclosure requirements, including a bill that would require large online platforms to disclose any studies conducted on users for the purposes of promoting engagement, and a bill that would require public companies to disclose climate-related risks. Recent Supreme Court precedent suggests that the Court is more closely reviewing commercial disclosure requirements, perhaps moving away from a more deferential treatment of such provisions. In NIFLA , the Court held that a disclosure requirement was likely unconstitutional under Zauderer because the government had not presented sufficient evidence to justify the measure —even though in other cases, the Court had rejected similar challenges to commercial disclosure requirements, saying that the government did not need to present more evidence because the harm it sought to remedy was "self-evident." Further, the Court has recently suggested that if a law regulating commercial speech discriminates on the basis of content—as all disclosure requirements seemingly do —then this content discrimination might subject the law to heightened scrutiny. If the Court further embraces this view, it could be a marked departure from its opinions holding that commercial speech could be regulated on the basis of its content, so long as the government's justification for the content discrimination were sufficiently related to its legitimate interests in regulating the speech. In concurring and dissenting opinions that have been joined by other Justices, Justice Breyer has argued that insofar as the Court's recent decisions suggest that commercial disclosure requirements should be subject to heightened scrutiny, they are inconsistent with prior case law and are not a proper application of the First Amendment. The Supreme Court said in NIFLA that it was "not question[ing] the legality of health and safety warnings long considered permissible, or purely factual and uncontroversial disclosures about commercial products." And lower courts have frequently upheld commercial disclosure requirements, perhaps suggesting that disclosures of the kind cited by Justice Breyer are not in danger of wholesale invalidation under the First Amendment. However, the majority opinion in NIFLA did not clarify what kind of disclosures it would consider permissible, and its opinion made clear that disclosure requirements should be scrutinized in light of the speakers they cover and the burdens they pose. Moreover, although the NIFLA Court said that it was not questioning these disclosures' "legality," it left open the possibility that these disclosure should nonetheless be subject to heightened scrutiny. This statement may mean only that the Court believes that many commercial disclosure requirements would meet a higher standard of scrutiny. At least one federal appellate court seems to have taken NIFLA as a signal that lower courts should more closely scrutinize commercial disclosure requirements. In American Beverage Association v. City & County of San Francisco , the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc , relied on NIFLA to reverse a prior decision that had upheld an ordinance requiring "health warnings on advertisements for certain sugar-sweetened beverages." While a panel of judges had previously concluded that the disclosure requirement was constitutional under Zauderer , the full Ninth Circuit, reviewing that decision, said: " NIFLA requires us to reexamine how we approach a First Amendment claim concerning compelled speech." Namely, the court held that, in light of NIFLA , the health warnings were likely unjustified and unduly burdensome under Zauderer , noting that the regulation required the warnings to "occupy at least 20% of those products' labels or advertisements"—but that the record showed that "a smaller warning—half the size—would accomplish [the government's] stated goals." As such, the court held that the warnings violated the First Amendment "by chilling protected speech." Accordingly, when Congress and federal agencies consider adopting new commercial disclosure requirements, or reauthorizing old ones, it may be wise to develop a record with more evidence demonstrating a need for the regulation. Under any level of scrutiny, courts will examine the government's asserted purpose for the legislation, as well as how closely tailored the disclosure requirement is to achieve that purpose. Under Zauderer , particularly in light of NIFLA , courts may ask for evidence to support the government's claim that the regulated speech is misleading or that the government has some other interest in regulating that speech, and will likely scrutinize the disclosure requirement to make sure it is not unduly burdensome. Under intermediate scrutiny or strict scrutiny, a court may also ask whether the government considered alternative policies that would be less restrictive of speech, examining more closely the government's justifications for choosing a disclosure requirement.

Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 1.

Answer: Several countries, primarily in Europe, and the European Commission have proposed or adopted taxes on revenue earned by multinational corporations (MNCs) in certain "digital economy" sectors from activities linked to the user-based activity of their residents. These proposals have generally been labeled as "digital services taxes" (DSTs). For example, beginning in 2019, Spain is imposing a DST of 3% on online advertising, online marketplaces, and data transfer service (i.e., revenue from sales of user activities) within Spain. Only firms with €750 million in worldwide revenue and €3 million in revenues with users in Spain are to be subject to the tax. In 2020, the UK plans to implement a 3% DST that would apply only to businesses whose revenues exceed £25 million per year and groups that generate global revenues from search engines, social media platforms, and online marketplaces in excess of £500 million annually. The UK labels its DST as an "interim" solution until international tax rules are modified to allow countries to tax the profits of foreign MNCs if they have a substantial enough "digital presence" based on local users. The member states of the European Commission are also actively considering such a rule. These policies are being considered and enacted against a backdrop of ongoing, multilateral negotiations among members and nonmembers of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). These negotiations, prompted by discussions of the digital economy, could result in significant changes for the international tax system. Proponents of DSTs argue that digital firms are "undertaxed." This sentiment is driven in part by some high-profile tech companies that reduced the taxes they paid by assigning ownership of their income-producing intangible assets (e.g., patents, marketing, and trade secrets) to affiliate corporations in low-tax jurisdictions. Proponents of DSTs also argue that the countries imposing tax should be entitled to a share of profits earned by digital MNCs because of the "value" to these business models made by participation of their residents through their content, reviews, purchases, and other contributions. Critics of DSTs argue that the taxes target income or profits that would not otherwise be subject to taxation under generally accepted income tax principles. U.S. critics, in particular, see DSTs as an attempt to target U.S. tech companies, especially as minimum thresholds are high enough that only the largest digital MNCs (such as Google, Facebook, and Amazon) will be subject to these specific taxes. DSTs are structured as a selective tax on revenue (akin to an excise tax) and not as a tax on corporate profits. A tax on corporate profits taxes the return to investment in the corporate sector. Corporate profit is equal to total revenue minus total cost. In contrast, DSTs are "turnover taxes" that apply to the revenue generated from taxable activities regardless of costs incurred by a firm. Additionally, international tax rules do not allow countries to tax an MNC's cross-border income solely because their residents purchase goods or services provided by that firm. Rather, ownership of assets justifies a country to be allocated a share of that MNC's profits to tax. Under these rules and their underlying principles, the fact that a country's residents purchase digital services from an MNC is not a justification to tax the MNC's profits. DSTs are likely to have the economic effect of an excise tax on intermediate services. The economic incidence of a DST is likely to be borne by purchasers of taxable services (e.g., companies paying digital economy firms for advertising, marketplace listings, or user data) and possibly consumers downstream from those transactions. As a result, economic theory and the general body of empirical research on excise taxes predict that DSTs are likely to increase prices in affected markets, decrease quantity supplied, and reduce investment in these sectors. Compared to a corporate profits tax—which, on balance, tends to be borne by higher-income shareholders—DSTs are expected to be more regressive forms of raising revenue, as they affect a broad range of consumer goods and services. Certain design features of DSTs could also create inequitable treatment between firms and increase administrative complexity. For example, minimum revenue thresholds could be set such that primarily large, foreign (and primarily U.S.) corporations are subject to tax. Requirements to identify the location of users could also introduce significant costs on businesses. This report traces the emergence of DSTs from multilateral tax negotiations in recent years, addresses various purported policy justifications of DSTs, provides an economic analysis of their effects, and raises several issues for Congress.