You are given two reports by the government agency.  

Report 1:
Major disaster declarations can trigger a variety of federal response and recovery programs for government and nongovernmental entities, households, and individuals. FEMA’s Office of Response and Recovery manages the PA grant program, providing funds to states, territorial governments, local government agencies, Indian tribes, authorized tribal organizations, and certain private nonprofit organizations in response to presidentially declared disaster declarations to repair damaged public infrastructure such as roads, schools, and bridges. Figure 1 shows the total amount of PA funds obligated by county from January 2009 through February 2017 for federal disaster declarations. To implement the PA program, FEMA’s staff includes a mix of temporary, reservist, and permanent employees under two authorities, the Stafford Act and Title 5. Reservists make up the largest share of the PA workforce, which consisted of 1,852 employees––1,041 reservists, 634 full-time equivalents, and 177 temporary Cadre of On-Call Response/Recovery Employees––as of June 2017, according to PA officials. Figure 2 summarizes the key characteristics for each type of employee. After a disaster, FEMA sends PA program staff to the affected area to work with state and local officials to assess the damage prior to a disaster declaration. FEMA officials establish a temporary Joint Field Office (JFO) to house staff who will manage response and recovery functions after a declared disaster (including operations, emergency response and support teams, planning, administration, finance, and logistics). Once the President has declared a disaster, PA staff work with grant applicants to help them document damages, identify eligible costs and work, and prepare requests for PA grant funds by developing project proposals. These proposals may include proposals for hazard mitigation if the hazard mitigation work is related to the repair of damaged facilities, referred to as permanent work projects. Immediate emergency measures, such as debris removal, are not eligible for hazard mitigation. Officials then review and obtain approval of the projects prior to FEMA obligating funds to state grantees. Figure 3 describes the process used to develop, review, and obligate PA projects. In addition to rebuilding and restoring infrastructure to its predisaster state, the PA program can be used to fund hazard mitigation measures that will reduce future risk to the infrastructure in conjunction with the repair of disaster-damaged facilities. There is no preset limit to the amount of PA funds a community may receive; however, PA hazard mitigation measures must be determined to be cost effective. Some examples of hazard mitigation measures that FEMA has predetermined to be cost effective, if they meet certain requirements, include installing shut-off valves on underground pipelines so that damaged sections can be isolated during or following a disaster; securing a roof using straps, clips, or other anchoring systems in locations subject to high winds; and installing shutters on windows or replacing glass with impact-resistant material. Applicants can also propose mitigation measures that are separate from the damaged portions of a facility, such as constructing floodwalls around damaged facilities to avoid future flooding. FEMA evaluates these proposals, considering how the proposed measure protects damaged portions of a facility and whether the measure is reasonable based on the extent of the damage, and determines eligibility on a case-by-case basis. FEMA’s Federal Insurance and Mitigation Administration (FIMA) deploys a cadre of mitigation staff to help coordinate and implement hazard mitigation activities during disaster recovery, including PA hazard mitigation. A primary task of these staff is to identify and assess opportunities to incorporate hazard mitigation into PA projects. Generally, if an applicant seeks to incorporate hazard mitigation measures into a PA project, FIMA’s hazard mitigation staff develop a hazard mitigation proposal. We, the DHS OIG, and others have reported past challenges with FEMA’s management of the PA program related to workforce management, information sharing, and hazard mitigation. For example, we reported in 2008 that the PA program had a shortage of experienced and knowledgeable staff, relied on temporary rotating staff, and provided limited training to their workforce, which impaired PA program delivery and delayed recovery efforts after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. We found that staff turnover, coupled with information sharing challenges, delayed projects when applicants had to provide the same information each time FEMA assigned new staff and that poorly trained staff provided incomplete and inaccurate information during their initial meetings with applicants or made inaccurate eligibility determinations, which also caused processing delays. We recommended that FEMA strengthen continuity among staff involved in administering the PA program by developing protocols to improve information and document sharing among FEMA staff. In response, in 2013 FEMA instituted a PA Consistency Initiative, which included hiring new managers for FEMA regional offices, stakeholder training on PA program administration, and using a newly developed internal website to allow staff to post and share information to address continuity and knowledge sharing concerns during disaster operations. FEMA also developed the Public Assistance Program Delivery Transition Standard Operating Procedure to facilitate the transfer of responsibility for PA program activities during cases of staff turnover during recovery operations. Despite FEMA’s efforts to implement our recommendations, the DHS-OIG, in 2016, found continuing challenges after Hurricane Sandy with workforce levels, skills, and performance of reservists, who make up the majority of the PA workforce. Regarding information sharing, in 2008, we also identified difficulties sharing documents among federal, state, and local participants in the PA process and difficulties tracking the status of projects. We recommended that FEMA improve information sharing within the PA process by identifying and disseminating practices that facilitate more effective communication among federal, state, and local entities. In response, FEMA proceeded with the implementation of a grant tracking and management system, called EMMIE, which was used previously in 2007. However, in subsequent years we found weaknesses in how FEMA developed the system and the DHS-OIG found that information sharing problems similar to the ones identified in our 2008 report persisted. Regarding hazard mitigation, we reported in 2015 that state and local officials experienced challenges in using PA hazard mitigation during the Hurricane Sandy recovery efforts because PA officials did not consistently prioritize hazard mitigation, and in some cases discouraged mitigation projects during the PA grant application process, among other challenges. We recommended that FEMA assess the challenges state and local officials reported, including the extent to which they can be addressed, and implement corrective actions, as needed. In response to our recommendation, FEMA developed a corrective action plan that included actions and milestones for reviewing, updating, and implementing PA hazard mitigation policy. FEMA also identified the PA new delivery model as a solution for some of the challenges state and local officials reported. Previously, the OIG also reported that PA program officials did not consistently identify eligible PA hazard mitigation projects, and that PA officials did not prioritize the identification of PA hazard mitigation opportunities at the onset of recovery efforts after the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes. See appendix I for a summary of findings and the status of our past recommendations on challenges with workforce management, information sharing, and hazard mitigation related to the PA program since our last review in December 2008. FEMA’s own internal reviews and outreach efforts have also identified similar challenges. For example, at FEMA’s request the Homeland Security Studies and Analysis Institute assessed the effectiveness and efficiency of the PA program in 2011. The institute’s report outlined 3 key findings and 23 recommendations relating to the PA preaward process. For example, the report found that FEMA could enhance training programs to develop a skilled and experienced workforce; utilize technology and employ web-based tools to support centralized processing, transparency, and efficient decision making; and identify and address potential special considerations, such as hazard mitigation proposals, as early as possible in the preaward process to improve consistency. In 2014, PA program officials analyzed the PA grant process and used input from agency staff and officials involved in various aspects of the program to identify potential improvements. The resulting Public Assistance Program Realignment report found that challenges in workforce management, information sharing, and hazard mitigation continued, and included recommendations for improvement. For example, the report concluded that a shortage of qualified staff, high turnover, unclear organizational responsibilities, and inconsistent training were long-standing and continuing challenges that impaired the PA pre-award process. In addition, from January 2015 to April 2015, FEMA conducted extensive outreach with more than 260 stakeholders across FEMA headquarters, all 10 regions, 43 states, and 4 tribal nations to discuss challenges in the PA program and opportunities for improvement. For example, stakeholders identified challenges with ineffective information collection during the preaward process and suggested identifying special considerations, such as hazard mitigation, earlier in the PA process as an idea for improvement. In response, FEMA began redesigning the PA preaward process to operationalize the results of its 2014 report and address areas for improvement identified through its outreach efforts. FEMA awarded a contract for program support to help PA officials implement a redesigned PA program in 2015. This included a new process to develop and review grant applications, and obligate PA funds to states affected by disasters; new positions, such as a new program delivery manager who is the single point of contact throughout the grant application process; a new Consolidated Resource Center (CRC) to support field operations by supplementing project development, validation, and review of proposed PA project applications; and a new information system to maintain and share PA grant application documents. As part of the new process, PA program officials identified the need to ensure that staff emphasize special considerations, such as hazard mitigation, earlier in the process. Taken together, these efforts represent FEMA’s “new delivery model” for awarding PA program grants. Enhancements in the PA program under the new delivery model are presented in figure 4. Regarding the new delivery model process, FEMA introduced several changes to enhance outreach to applicants during the “exploratory call”— the first contact between FEMA and local officials—and during the first in- person meeting, called the “recovery scoping meeting.” FEMA also revised decision points during the process, when program officials can request more information from applicants, and applicants can review and approve the completion of project development steps. FEMA also incorporated special considerations, such as hazard mitigation, earlier in the new process during the exploratory calls and recovery scoping meetings. The changes and enhancements to the PA grant award process in the new delivery model are presented in figure 5. The new process divides proposed PA projects based on complexity and type of work into three categories—100 percent completed, standard, and specialized—that PA staff manage to expedite review or assign skilled staff to technical projects as needed. If the applicant has already completed work following a disaster, such as debris removal, it is considered “100 percent completed” and JFO staff collect the necessary documents and provide the information to the CRC staff who complete the development of project applications, validate the information, and complete all necessary reviews. Projects that require repairs and further assistance from PA program staff at the JFO include “standard” and “specialized” projects, which include a site inspection to document damages, before the JFO staff provide the information to the CRC. Further, PA program officials assign PA staff based on their skills and experience to standard projects, which are less technically complex to develop, and specialized projects, which are more technically complex and costly. We discuss the new workforce positions FEMA developed for JFOs and CRCs, the new information system FEMA developed to maintain and share PA grant documents with applicants, and FEMA’s efforts to incorporate hazard mitigation into PA projects later in this report. Since 2015, FEMA has invested almost $9 million to redesign the PA program through the reengineering and implementation of the new delivery model, including about $4.7 million for contract support for implementation, and $4 million for acquisition of the new information system. FEMA tested the new delivery model in a series of selected disasters, using a continuous process improvement approach to assess and improve the process, workforce changes, and information system requirements, prior to implementing the new model for all future disasters. For example, FEMA first tested the new process in Iowa in July 2015 and, in February 2016, PA program officials expanded their test to include all of the new staff positions. In October 2016, PA program officials added the new information system to achieve a comprehensive implementation of all of the elements of the new delivery model for the agency’s response to Hurricane Matthew in Georgia, two additional disasters in Georgia in January 2017, and in Missouri, North Dakota, Wyoming, Vermont, and two disasters in New Hampshire from June through August 2017. The timeline for PA’s implementation of the new delivery model is shown in figure 6. According to program officials, FEMA planned to implement the new model for all future disasters beginning in January 2018. However, historic disaster activity during the 2017 hurricane season accelerated full implementation. As a result, on September 12, 2017, FEMA officials announced that, unless officials determined it would be infeasible in an individual disaster, the program would use the new delivery model in all future disasters. According to FEMA’s 2014 PA Program Realignment report and other program documents, PA officials designed the new delivery model to respond to persistent workforce management challenges related to identifying the required number of staff and needed skills and training, among other things, to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the PA preaward process. To address these challenges, PA program officials centralized much of the responsibility for processing PA projects in the CRCs, created additional new positions with specialized roles and responsibilities in JFOs, and established training and mentoring programs to help build the new staffs’ skills. In 2016, PA program officials centralized some of the project activities that otherwise were being carried out at individual JFOs at FEMA’s first new CRC in Denton, Texas. Officials did so by establishing 18 new positions, many of which directly correlated with positions that FEMA deployed to individual JFOs in the legacy PA delivery model. According to PA officials, centralizing positions will improve standardization in project processing, and result in a higher quality work product. As part of the new delivery model, PA program officials created a new hazard mitigation liaison position for PA program staff at the CRC that did not previously exist at individual JFOs. The other new positions that PA program officials either created or centralized at the CRC included two specialized positions responsible for costing and validating PA projects. Previously, the PA project specialist deployed to the JFO would complete these tasks and others; however, the consistency of project development varied across the regions and disasters. In contrast, CRC staff are full-time employees who receive training to specialize in completing standardized project development steps for PA projects from multiple disasters on an ongoing basis. Program officials anticipate that centralizing new specialized staff at the CRCs will also reduce PA administrative costs and staffing levels at the JFOs. For example, staff at the CRCs, such as the new hazard mitigation liaisons and insurance and costing specialists, could support project development for multiple disasters and regions simultaneously, whereas PA previously needed to deploy staff to each JFO to fulfill these roles. In addition, once JFOs operating under the new model send projects to the CRCs for processing and review, FEMA can more rapidly close its JFOs, reducing associated administrative costs. For example, following Hurricane Matthew, FEMA credited the new delivery model, in part, with its ability to close the JFO in Georgia sooner than several other JFOs in neighboring states not involved in the implementation of the new delivery model. PA program officials created new positions with more specialized roles and responsibilities to help PA staff at JFOs provide more consistency in the project development process and guidance to applicants. Program officials split the broad responsibilities previously managed at the JFOs by PA crew leaders and project specialists, into two new, specialized positions—the program delivery manager and site inspector. The program delivery manager serves as the applicant’s single point-of-contact throughout the preaward process, manages communication with the applicant, and oversees document collection. All three PA grant applicants we spoke to following Hurricane Matthew in Georgia greatly appreciated the knowledge and assistance provided by their program delivery managers. Site inspectors are responsible for conducting the site inspection to document all disaster-related damages; determining the applicant’s plans for recovery, coordinating with other specialists, and verifying the information collected with the applicant. Officials expect deployed staff at JFOs can complete the fieldwork faster and provide greater continuity of service to applicants. Further, program officials believe that specializing roles will enable them to provide more targeted training, and improve employee satisfaction. Site inspection, hazard mitigation, and environmental and historic preservation specialists, along with a new Public Assistance program mentor, conduct a site inspection with the applicant to document damages to a historic cemetery in Savannah, Georgia, following Hurricane Matthew in 2016. PA program officials designed new training and mentoring programs for the new positions at the CRCs and JFOs and used a continuous feedback process to update and improve the training, position guides, and task books throughout the implementation of the new delivery model, according to PA officials. According to a June 2017 update of the PA Cadre Training Plan, training for the new model has five major focuses: required training and skills for position qualification; on-site refresher training; mentor training; regional-based state, local, tribal, and territorial training; and training on the new information system. Specifically, officials developed six new training courses, and identified which are required for each position under the new delivery model. For example, a program delivery manager at the JFO is required to complete both the program delivery manager and site inspector specialist courses. As of June 2017, PA program officials had provided at least one new model training course to 93 percent of their cadre (including program delivery manager training to 366 individuals and site inspector training to 1,172 individuals) and planned to provide 28 additional courses through September 2017 to the PA cadre. According to regional and CRC officials, the training courses and mentoring from experienced staff helped maximize new staff’s capabilities in the new process. Throughout the third implementation of the new delivery model, JFO and CRC staff, as well as regional PA staff, stakeholders, and applicants, identified staff skills and training as a key area that needed more attention for full implementation of the new delivery model. Our work and FEMA’s after-action reports from the third test in Georgia identified problems with site inspector skills, which affected the timeliness and accuracy of projects. Specialists and managers at the CRC noted that poorly trained site inspectors did not consistently provide the necessary information from the field, which resulted in delays for the CRC staff to process projects, and after-action reports also identified challenges with site inspector skills. According to a PA applicant in Georgia, the inconsistency of skills and experience of their site inspector resulted in the need to conduct a “do-over” site inspection on one of the applicant’s projects, causing delays. PA staff and state officials attribute much of the site inspectors’ skill gaps to their lack of training and experience in the program. According to PA Region officials, providing timely training will be a resource-intensive challenge for implementing the new delivery model for all future disasters. For example, it can be difficult to train reservists before FEMA deploys them to disasters, and many of the program’s experienced reservists have retired or resigned, resulting in few mentors for the program and a high need to provide training to inexperienced and newly hired staff. PA officials and stakeholders also emphasized the need for FEMA to provide additional training for state and local officials to build capacity and support the goals of the new delivery model. For example, according to JFO officials at the third implementation, the new delivery model increases responsibilities for applicants, who will require more applicant training than FEMA currently provides. According to state officials, applicant capabilities vary, and FEMA should provide training to state and local officials on the new delivery model and the information system before a disaster. Skill gaps among applicants could result in inconsistent implementation of the new process, according to PA staff and stakeholders, and PA staff said that training was important to prevent applicants from reverting back to the legacy PA grant application process. To support full implementation of the new delivery model for all disasters, PA program officials have updated training courses for PA staff and applicants, and planned additional training to address these challenges and other lessons learned through the test implementation. For example, PA officials told us they updated the site inspector training program in May 2017 and scheduled a new site inspector training session in August 2017 to include more hands-on training to help address the skill gaps identified for site inspectors. PA officials created a new training course for FEMA’s regional offices, in part to enable regional PA staff to provide new delivery model training to state and local officials. PA officials also planned to develop a self-paced, online course for state and local officials by the end of 2017. PA officials have not fully assessed the workforce needed for JFO field operations, CRC staff, or FIMA’s hazard mitigation staff to support implementation of the new delivery model for all future disasters. PA program officials developed an initial assessment of the total number of staff needed in the field and the CRCs in 2016 to estimate cost savings associated with consolidating and specializing positions at the CRCs and deploying fewer staff to JFOs. However, the assessment did not identify the number of staff required to fill specific positions, including program delivery managers and hazard mitigation specialists, needed to support the new delivery model for full implementation. In reviewing the test implementations of the new delivery model, we found that inadequate staffing levels at the JFOs and CRCs, and with FIMA’s hazard mitigation staff, affected staffs’ ability to achieve the goals of the new delivery model. Staff levels at the JFO. We identified challenges with having the right number of program delivery managers and site inspection specialists to achieve program goals for customer satisfaction, efficiency, and quality in test implementations of the new delivery model. For example, in the second test implementation of the new delivery model in Oregon in 2016, PA did not deploy enough program delivery managers to the disaster, which resulted in unmanageable caseloads for program delivery managers, according to state and PA officials. PA program officials assigned program delivery managers an average caseload of 12 PA applicants, which was more than they could effectively manage, according to PA staff, and program officials aim for a caseload of 8 to 10 applicants. According to state officials, local officials reported they did not always receive the support they needed from program delivery managers who managed caseloads consisting of dozens of projects at multiple sites for each applicant during the Oregon implementation. As a result of overwhelmed program delivery managers, local officials faced challenges understanding their responsibilities, such as recognizing when they needed to provide information for the project development to proceed, according to state officials. PA staff involved with the third test implementation in Georgia in 2016 and 2017 said there were not enough site inspectors or program delivery managers to fully manage the workload at the JFO. Because of the specialization of roles, projects could not move forward when there were not enough staff to execute the next step in the process. For example, PA staff at the JFO said program delivery managers completed recovery scoping meetings rapidly, but faced a bottleneck in scheduling site inspections because there were more applicants awaiting site inspections than could be fulfilled by the number of site inspection specialists available. Staff levels at the CRC. Staff at the CRC reported challenges with staffing levels during the Oregon and Georgia test implementations, and expressed concerns about when PA officials will staff the CRCs to support full implementation of the new model for all disasters. During the Oregon test implementation, a CRC specialist said there were not enough technical specialists to manage the workload and, as a result, PA program officials had to redeploy site inspectors from their JFO field operations to the CRC to complete costing estimates. During the third test in Georgia, quality assurance specialists said that their workload resulted in added stress trying to complete the work in time while adhering to quality standards. According to CRC specialists in Denton, Texas, PA officials had not determined required staff levels for full implementation, but agreed that workload was too high and program officials needed to determine the appropriate staff levels for each CRC to support full implementation. PA officials were still evaluating CRC processing times and workload management from the Oregon and Georgia test implementations to determine staffing needs, according to PA officials. Further, PA program officials plan to establish a second CRC in Winchester, Virginia, before the end of 2017, but have not determined the number of additional permanent full-time staff needed to support the CRCs for full implementation of the new delivery model. Staff levels for the hazard mitigation specialists. PA officials have not identified the number of hazard mitigation specialists in FIMA’s hazard mitigation cadre needed for full implementation of the new delivery model. According to JFO staff, current hazard mitigation staff levels are insufficient to provide the desired in-person participation of hazard mitigation staff on all recovery scoping meetings to share information on hazard mitigation with applicants and help them identify potential mitigation opportunities. A PA program official said officials missed opportunities to pursue hazard mitigation during the test implementation after Hurricane Matthew in Georgia due to lack of hazard mitigation specialists. In addition, for the test implementation in Oregon, there were not enough hazard mitigation specialists to cover all site inspections and implement their new delivery model responsibilities, according to FEMA’s after-action reports. The absence of hazard mitigation specialists in the early stages of PA project development may cause delays in officials’ identifying hazard mitigation opportunities, according to a FIMA official. PA program officials said they did not work with FIMA to determine the appropriate levels of hazard mitigation staff under the new delivery model because they were refining the new process, but as of June 2017 were working with FIMA to do so. One of the key implementation activities in our Business Process Reengineering Assessment Guide includes addressing workforce management issues. Specifically, this includes identifying how many and which employees will be affected by the position changes and retraining. Further, our prior work has found that high-performing organizations identify their current and future workforce needs—including the appropriate number and deployment of staff across the organization— and address workforce gaps, to improve the contribution of critical skills and competencies needed for mission success. According to a PA program official, their initial workforce assessment was not comprehensive because they were still collecting data required to make informed decisions. PA officials agreed that updating their workforce assessments prior to full implementation could be helpful, and acknowledged that program officials needed to be more proactive applying the lessons learned as they pivot from testing to full implementation of the new delivery model in 2018. FEMA also conducts a standard agency wide workforce structure review every 2 to 3 years, which helps officials determine the appropriate disaster workforce levels. As of June 2017, PA officials were working with other offices within FEMA to expedite the agency-wide assessment of the PA and FIMA hazard mitigation cadres, but did not know when they would complete the assessment. PA officials also acknowledged that they faced an aggressive schedule to complete various planned activities for workforce management, training, and other efforts, in support of full implementation, and that they may not be able to complete all efforts as thoroughly as they would like in order to expedite the transition of the PA program to the new delivery model. The gaps in PA workforce assessment in the JFOs, CRCs, and for FIMA’s hazard mitigation cadre present a risk that PA program managers will not have a sufficient workforce to support the goals of the new delivery model. In addition, the timing and implementation of the hiring and training activities for new PA program staff could take multiple months, and program officials will need to know what staff levels are necessary for full implementation of the new delivery model to inform resource decisions for the program in coordination with other agency offices. According to PA program officials, workforce assessment efforts have been delayed as a result of disaster response and recovery efforts related to Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria. Completing a workforce assessment will help program officials identify gaps in their workforce and skills, which could help PA program officials minimize the effects of long- standing workforce staffing and training challenges on the PA program delivery and inform full implementation for all disasters. costs. For example, EMMIE does not collect information on all of the preaward activities that are part of the PA grant application process. As a result, PA program officials said they, and applicants, must use ad hoc reports and personal tracking documents to manage and monitor the progress of grant applications. PA officials added that EMMIE is not user- friendly and applicants often struggle to access the system. In response to these ongoing challenges, PA program officials developed FAC-Trax— a separate information system from EMMIE—with new capabilities designed to improve transparency, efficiency, and management of the PA program. Specifically, FAC-Trax allows FEMA staff (PA Grants Manager) and applicants (PA Grants Portal), to review, manage, and track current PA project status and documentation. For example, applicants can use FAC- Trax to submit requests for public assistance, upload required project documentation, approve grant application items, and send and receive notifications on grant progress and activities. In addition, the FAC-Trax system includes standardized forms, as well as required fields and tasks that PA program staff and applicants must complete before moving on to the next steps in the PA preaward process. According to PA officials, these capabilities increase transparency, encourage greater applicant involvement, and enhance collaboration and communication between FEMA and grant applicants, to improve efficiency in processing and awarding grant applications and enhance the quality of project development. Further, PA officials said that FAC-Trax could reduce challenges associated with staff turnover during the project development process because the system stores and maintains applicant information and project documentation, making it easier for transitioning staff to assist an applicant. They also said they use FAC-Trax to gather and analyze data that supports management of the PA process, including measuring the timeliness of the grant application process. For example, during the test implementation of the new delivery model in Georgia following Hurricane Matthew, officials were able to document that, on average, program delivery managers took 5 days to conduct the exploratory call and 14 days to hold the recovery scoping meeting with applicants, and CRC officials took 33 days to develop and review grant proposals. Managers use this data to assess staffing needs and identify bottlenecks in the PA process, according to PA officials. FAC-Trax is critical to the new PA delivery model and will be a primary means of sharing grant application documents, tracking ongoing PA projects, and ensuring that FEMA staff and applicants follow PA grant policies and procedures. Given the importance of developing and testing this new information sharing system, we evaluated its development against four key IT management controls—(1) project planning; (2) risk management; (3) requirements development; and (4) systems testing and integration. When implemented effectively, these controls provide assurance that IT systems will be delivered within cost and schedule and meet the capabilities needed by its users. We found that FEMA’s development of FAC-Trax fully satisfied best practices for project planning and risk management, but additional steps are needed to fully satisfy the areas of requirements development and systems testing and integration, as discussed below. See appendix II for the full assessment of each IT management control. PA program officials fully satisfied all five practices in the project planning control area, according to our assessment. Key project planning practices are (1) establishing and maintaining the program’s acquisition strategy, (2) developing and maintaining the overall project plan and obtaining commitment from relevant stakeholders, (3) developing and maintaining the program’s cost estimate, (4) establishing and maintaining the program’s schedule estimate, and (5) identifying the necessary knowledge and skills needed to carry out the program. To address the first and second practices, program officials established detailed plans that describe the acquisition strategy and objectives, the program’s scope, and its framework for using an Agile software development approach, among other key actions. Agile is a method of software development that utilizes an iterative process and constantly improves software based on user needs and feedback. Program officials also developed a plan detailing the program’s approach to deploy and maintain FAC-Trax and established stakeholder groups and an integrated product team to support and oversee the development of FAC-Trax. To address the third and fourth practices, they developed and maintained a master schedule of all implementation tasks and milestones through project completion, and developed a life-cycle cost estimate of over $19 million. Additionally, FAC-Trax’s acquisition performance baseline describes the system’s minimum acceptable and desired baselines for performance, schedule, and cost. Lastly, in regards to the fifth practice, program officials identified the knowledge and skills needed to carry out the program in the FAC-Trax Request for Proposal and FAC-Trax Capability Development Plan. PA program officials fully satisfied all four practices in the risk management control area, according to our assessment. Key risk management practices are (1) identifying risks, threats, and vulnerabilities that could negatively affect work efforts, (2) evaluating and categorizing each identified risk using defined risk categories and parameters, (3) developing risk mitigation plans for selected risks, and (4) monitoring the status of each risk periodically and implementing the risk mitigation plan as appropriate. To address the first and second practices, program officials identified key risks that could negatively affect FAC-Trax in a “risk register”—an online site used to track risks, issues, and mitigating actions. As of May 2017, officials had identified 13 risks in the risk register—four open and nine closed—and evaluated and categorized the identified risks based on the probability of occurrence and scope, schedule, and cost impacts. For example, program officials reported that two of its open risks have a “medium” risk rating—meaning the risk has the potential to slightly affect project cost, schedule, or performance. To address the third and fourth practices, program officials developed and documented risk mitigation plans for all identified risks. For example, program officials planned to mitigate the risk of limited engagement of subject matter experts by identifying and engaging with appropriate experts through workshops, and monitoring the capability development process to identify any issues that may cause project delays. In addition, PA program officials documented the responsible officials, reevaluation date, and risk status, among other things, for each risk in the register, and reviewed and updated risks during weekly and monthly program reviews with stakeholders throughout FEMA. PA program officials fully satisfied four out of five practices in the requirements development control area, according to our assessment. Key requirements development practices are (1) eliciting stakeholder needs, expectations, and constraints, and transforming them into prioritized customer requirements; (2) developing and reviewing operational concepts and scenarios to refine and discover requirements; (3) analyzing requirements to ensure that they are complete, feasible, and verifiable; (4) analyzing requirements to balance stakeholder needs and constraints; and (5) testing and validating the system as it is being developed. To address the first and second practices, program officials developed a requirements management plan outlining how officials capture, assess, and plan for FAC-Trax enhancements, and established a change control process to review, prioritize, and verify user requests for changes to the system and feedback. As of May 2017, the PA program office received 734 change requests related to FAC-Trax, of which program officials completed 420 changes and planned to address an additional 277 entries. Program officials also developed a functional requirements document outlining the high-level requirements for FAC- Trax and detailed operational concepts and scenarios for each phase of the preaward process in the system’s concept of operations. To address the fourth practice, program officials created a standard template to analyze and document the user needs and acceptance criteria for planned system capabilities in March 2017. In addition, PA program officials identified risks and dependencies for recommended changes to FAC-Trax, and balanced the cost and priority of system enhancements as part of the change control process. Lastly, regarding the fifth practice, program officials tested and evaluated FAC-Trax during development, which included validating system enhancements through user acceptance testing. However, program officials did not fully address the third practice— analyzing requirements to ensure they are complete, feasible, and verifiable—because they did not ensure detailed user requirements were necessary and sufficient by tracking them back to higher-level requirements. For example, although program officials reviewed change requests for completeness and followed up with users to verify requirements, officials did not track system enhancements, made in response to detailed user requirements (e.g., allowing users to search PA projects by project number), back to the high-level requirements (e.g., storing data and information provided by the applicant) identified in the FAC-Trax functional requirements document and performance work statement. Officials did not track system enhancements back to high-level requirements because they did not have a complete understanding of basic user needs and system requirements at the beginning of the FAC- Trax effort, according to the PA program manager. A PA official also said the change control process was a way to identify the basic capabilities FAC-Trax needed to have and that tracking enhancements back to high- level requirements could have made the change control process more difficult to manage, and reduced user participation if, for example, users needed to understand how their change requests related to high-level requirements. However, program officials could have tracked enhancements back to high-level requirements themselves using the change control process without putting any additional burden on users. Despite not having a complete understanding of user needs and system requirements at the beginning of the FAC-Trax effort, analyzing whether users’ change requests satisfy higher-level requirements identified in key design and planning documents would have provided officials with a basis for more detailed and precise requirements throughout project development and helped them better manage the project, according to IT management controls. Further, according to the PMBOK® Guide, tracking or measuring system capabilities against approved requirements is a key process for managing a project’s scope, measuring project completion, and ensuring the project meets user needs and expectations. Program officials acknowledged the importance of tracking system enhancements back to documented system requirements. Ensuring that FAC-Trax meets user needs and expectations is especially important because the information system is key to the success of the new delivery model, according to PA officials. By analyzing progress made on documented, high-level requirements, a step that reflects a key IT management control for requirements development, the PA program will have greater assurance that FAC-Trax will provide functionality that meets user needs and expectations. PA program officials did not fully satisfy either of the two practices in the systems testing and integration control area, according to our assessment. Key systems testing and integration practices are (1) developing test plans and test cases, which include a description of the overall approach for system testing, the set of tasks necessary to prepare for and perform testing, the roles and responsibilities for individuals or groups responsible for testing, and criteria to determine whether the system has passed or failed testing; and (2) developing a systems integration plan to identify all systems to be integrated, describe how integration problems are to be documented and resolved, define roles and responsibilities of all relevant participants, and establish a sequence and schedule for every integration step. In regards to the first practice, PA program officials and the FAC-Trax contractor established a test plan that identifies the method and strategy to perform testing, including the necessary tasks, such as responding to user feedback and testing errors, and incorporating necessary resolutions into future work, testing parameters, and the roles and responsibilities of the individuals responsible for testing. However, program officials have not developed system testing criteria to evaluate FAC-Trax, which would align with the practice described above of using criteria to determine whether the system has passed or failed testing. A key feature of Agile software development is the “definition of done”—a set of clear, comprehensive, and objective criteria, that the government should use to evaluate software after each iteration of development. PA program officials said they did not establish a definition of done because officials initially managing the FAC-Trax effort lacked familiarity with system development in the Agile environment. Officials acknowledged the importance of establishing a definition of done and said they are planning to develop one, but have not identified how or when to incorporate it into the development process. According to the TechFAR—the government’s handbook for procuring digital services using Agile processes—the government and vendor should establish this definition after contract award at the beginning of each cycle of software development. By establishing criteria, such as a definition of done, to evaluate the system—a step that reflects a key IT management control for system testing and is an effective practice for applying Agile to software development—the PA program will have greater assurance that FAC- Trax is usable and responsive to specified requirements. In regards to the second practice, PA program officials developed a systems integration plan in June 2017 that identified the potential for integration of FAC-Trax with four FEMA systems, including EMMIE. In addition, program officials included a description of how staff should document integration problems and the resolution of problems in FAC- Trax development and test plans. However, the systems integration plan does not define roles and responsibilities of all participants for system integration activities or establish a sequence and schedule for every integration step for the four FEMA systems. PA officials said that system integration planning for FAC-Trax is in the early stages, but acknowledged the importance of these elements of system integration planning. Officials plan to define roles and responsibilities of all participants for system integration activities and develop the sequence and schedule for every integration step as they add new systems to the FAC-Trax development plan and obtain funding needed for their integration. Nonetheless, FEMA has used FAC-Trax for selected PA disasters since October 2016 and plans to use FAC-Trax for all future disasters. According to IT management controls, agencies should establish the systems integration plan early in the project and revise it to reflect evolving and emerging user needs. By ensuring that the FAC- Trax systems integration plan defines the roles and responsibilities of relevant participants for all integration relationships and establishes a sequence and schedule for every integration step, the PA program will have greater assurance that FAC-Trax functions properly with other systems and meets user needs. FEMA’s new delivery model enhances participation of hazard mitigation staff with the goal of identifying opportunities for mitigation earlier in the PA preaward process, according to PA officials. Two key changes related to hazard mitigation under the new model include (1) an emphasis on engaging with hazard mitigation specialists at the JFO earlier in the PA process and involving them in specific PA preaward activities and (2) the establishment of the PA program’s hazard mitigation liaison at the CRC. For example, position guides direct program delivery managers to coordinate with FIMA’s hazard mitigation specialists prior to recovery scoping meetings, and site inspectors to coordinate with hazard mitigation specialists prior to site inspections to discuss a PA grant applicant’s damages and any potential mitigation opportunities. PA program officials also developed guidance for conducting the exploratory call and the recovery scoping meeting with applicants, which include questions for PA staff to ask on the applicant’s interest in or plans for incorporating hazard mitigation into potential projects. In addition, a new hazard mitigation liaison at the CRC is responsible for reviewing PA projects for hazard mitigation opportunities and serving as a mitigation subject matter expert for the PA program. According to data provided by FEMA, PA grant applicants incorporated hazard mitigation into approximately 18 percent of permanent work projects for all disasters nationwide from 2012 to 2015. During test implementation of the new delivery model, state, PA, and FIMA officials all reported an increase in the number of hazard mitigation activities on PA permanent work projects. For example, state officials who participated in the second new model test in Oregon said that effective communication and coordination between PA and hazard mitigation staff resulted in applicants incorporating hazard mitigation into over 60 percent of permanent work projects. Furthermore, PA officials reported an increase in hazard mitigation during the third test implementation of the new model in Georgia following Hurricane Matthew, where approximately 16 percent of permanent work projects included mitigation, as of June 2017. This represents an increase compared to the PA program’s estimate for the proportion of projects that incorporate hazard mitigation among previous PA hurricane disasters in Georgia, which was about 3 percent, according to PA officials. While PA officials are trying to increase hazard mitigation through the new delivery model, not all disasters present the same number of opportunities to incorporate hazard mitigation. First, the PA program only incorporates hazard mitigation measures for permanent work projects, such as repairs to roads, bridges, and buildings. For example, as of June 2017, approximately 60 percent of the projects FEMA funded in Georgia for the third test implementation after Hurricane Matthew were for emergency work, which is not eligible for hazard mitigation measures. Second, the PA program only funds mitigation measures that officials determine to be cost-effective. In addition, we have previously reported on other factors that affect whether applicants incorporate hazard mitigation into PA projects, such as their capacity to manage and ability to fund hazard mitigation projects. National Planning for Hazard Mitigation In our 2015 report on disaster resilience following Hurricane Sandy, we noted that disaster affected areas have different threats and vulnerabilities, and local stakeholders make the ultimate determination whether or not to incorporate hazard mitigation into a project. Further, without a strategic approach to making disaster resilience investments, the federal government and its nonfederal partners may be unable to fully capitalize on opportunities for mitigation on the greatest known threats and hazards. We recommended that the Mitigation Framework Leadership Group develop an investment strategy to help ensure that federal funds expended to enhance disaster resilience achieve the goal of reducing the nation’s fiscal exposure because of climate change and the rise in the number of federal major disaster declarations as effectively and efficiently as possible. In response, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) plans to issue a final National Mitigation Investment Strategy in 2018. The goals of this strategy include increasing the effectiveness of investments in reducing disaster losses and increasing resilience, and improving coordination of disaster risk management among federal, state, local, tribal, territorial, and private entities. Although the new model establishes hazard mitigation activities for PA and FIMA staff in the preaward process, it does not standardize and prioritize hazard mitigation planning at JFOs in the way FEMA has done with prior PA program policy. Specifically, FEMA’s 2007 PA program policy standardized planning for hazard mitigation across PA recovery efforts by stating that agency and state officials should issue a memorandum of understanding (MOU) early in the disaster, outlining how PA hazard mitigation will be addressed for the disaster, including what mitigation measures will be emphasized, and identifying applicable codes and standards, and any potential integration with other mitigation grant programs. However, PA program officials did not include guidance that standardizes planning for hazard mitigation, such as encouraging the use of an MOU, in FEMA’s 2010 PA program policy, the most recent update to the Public Assistance Program and Policy Guide in April 2017, or the New Delivery Model Operations Manual. As a result, FIMA officials said FEMA and state officials do not consistently issue MOUs that outline how FEMA and the state plan to promote PA hazard mitigation during the recovery effort, explaining that the use of the MOU is based on the preferences and priorities of the FEMA officials involved. When not issuing an MOU, FIMA hazard mitigation staff and PA officials at the JFO meet to determine the extent which hazard mitigation staff interact directly with applicants regarding PA hazard mitigation during the recovery process, according to a FIMA official. Having a consistent approach to planning for and prioritizing hazard mitigation across all disasters is important for FEMA, given that FEMA experienced challenges consistently prioritizing and integrating hazard mitigation across PA recovery efforts, according to GAO and others. For example, in our 2015 report on resilience in the Hurricane Sandy recovery, we found that state and local officials experienced challenges maximizing disaster resilience in the recovery effort because PA officials did not consistently prioritize hazard mitigation during project development. According to FEMA’s National Mitigation Framework, planning is vital for mitigation efforts during disaster recovery, and federal, state, and local officials should establish procedures that emphasize a coordinated delivery of mitigation activities and capitalize on opportunities to reduce future disaster losses. Similarly, the Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plan, which supports FEMA’s National Disaster Recovery Framework, identifies planning as a key task for identifying mitigation opportunities and integrating risk reduction considerations into decisions and investments during the recovery process. FIMA officials agreed that including the development of a formal plan, such as the historical 2007 PA program policy regarding the use of MOUs, for PA hazard mitigation in operations guidance would help program officials plan for and prioritize hazard mitigation. They noted that FIMA’s hazard mitigation field operations guide includes procedures for implementing proposed MOUs to achieve mitigation goals. PA program officials said that, in light of changes to the PA process under the new model and subsequent updates to program policies, the MOU policy from the 2007 PA program policy was outdated. But officials agreed that planning for and prioritizing hazard mitigation at the operational level is important and said they were examining additional ways to incorporate these activities early in the PA process. As FEMA continues to implement the new model, establishing procedures to standardize hazard mitigation planning for each disaster, as it did through prior policy, could improve the prioritization of hazard mitigation in PA recovery efforts and increase the effectiveness of mitigation for reducing disaster losses and increasing resilience. PA program officials developed performance objectives and measures for hazard mitigation in the new delivery model, but could add measures to better align performance assessment for the PA program with FEMA’s broader strategic goals for hazard mitigation. In its strategic plan for 2014–2018, FEMA established an agency-wide goal to increase the percentage of FEMA-funded disaster projects, such as those under the PA program, that provide mitigation above local, state, and federal building code requirements by 5 percentage points by the end of fiscal year 2018. For example, local building codes may require measures for new construction to mitigate against future damage. To align with FEMA’s strategic goal, PA officials would also need to measure the number of PA projects that included mitigation measures that bring any repaired infrastructure to a level above applicable building codes. However, under the new model, FEMA officials developed performance objectives (and associated measures) to increase the number of projects that include hazard mitigation by 5 percent, and increase the total dollars spent on hazard mitigation by 2 percent. While these measures could help to incentivize mitigation, they are not tied to building codes and do not include specific information that FEMA could use to continually assess the PA program’s contributions to meeting the agency’s strategic goal. According to Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, agency management should design control activities, such as establishing and reviewing performance measures, to achieve the agency’s objectives. In addition, our work on leading public sector organizations has found that such organizations assess the extent to which their programs and activities contribute to meeting their mission and desired outcomes, and strive to establish clear hierarchies of performance goals and measures. A clear connection between performance measures and program offices helps to both reinforce accountability and ensure that, in their day-to-day activities, managers keep in mind the outcomes their organization is striving to achieve. FEMA’s ability to evaluate and report on PA hazard mitigation data is constrained, but officials are addressing this challenge through the development of data reporting and analytics capabilities for the PA program’s new information system, according to PA officials. PA program officials developed measures they could use to evaluate the new model during test implementation and compare new model performance to the legacy PA process, and agreed that aligning PA program hazard mitigation goals with FEMA’s agency-wide strategic goals would be helpful. As FEMA continues to develop and implement the new model, developing performance measures and objectives to better inform and support the agency’s broader strategic goals could help to ensure that FEMA capitalizes on hazard mitigation opportunities in PA recovery efforts. FEMA’s Public Assistance grant program is a complicated, multi-billion dollar program that is critical to helping state and local communities rebuild and recover after a major disaster. In recent years, FEMA has undertaken a major reengineering effort to make the PA preaward process simpler and more efficient for applicants and to address challenges encountered during recovery from past disasters. FEMA’s new delivery model represents a significant opportunity to strengthen the PA program and address these past challenges, and growing pains are to be expected when implementing any large reengineering effort. Further, FEMA officials work to implement these changes while supporting response and recovery following disasters, including the catastrophic flooding from Hurricane Harvey in August 2017 and widespread damages from Hurricanes Irma and Maria in September 2017. As such, it is critical that feedback obtained and lessons learned while testing the new model inform decisions and actions as FEMA proceeds with full implementation for all disasters, including the complex recovery efforts in the states and territories affected by Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria. FEMA has redesigned the PA delivery model to address various challenges related to workforce management, information sharing with state and local grantees, and incorporating hazard mitigation into PA projects. FEMA has developed new workforce processes, training, and positions to address past challenges, but completing a workforce assessment that identifies the number of staff needed will inform workforce management and resource allocation decisions to help FEMA ensure a more successful implementation. This is particularly important as FEMA is using the new model for the long-term recovery from the 2017 hurricanes, and FEMA faces capacity challenges as its workforce is stretched thin. Further, FEMA’s new FAC-Trax information sharing system provides FEMA and state and local applicants and grantees with better capabilities to address past challenges in managing and tracking PA projects. In developing FAC-Trax, FEMA implemented many of the key IT management controls that can help ensure that new IT systems are implemented effectively. However, additional steps are needed to fully satisfy the areas of requirements development and systems testing and integration. Finally, FEMA has taken some actions to better promote hazard mitigation as part of its new PA model. However, more consistent planning for hazard mitigation following a PA disaster and developing specific performance measures and objectives that better align with and support the agency’s broader strategic goals related to hazard mitigation could help to ensure that mitigation is incorporated into recovery efforts, which presents an opportunity to encourage disaster resilience and reduce federal fiscal exposure from recurring catastrophic natural disasters. We are making the following five recommendations to FEMA’s Assistant Administrator for Recovery: The FEMA Assistant Administrator for Recovery should complete a workforce staffing assessment that identifies the appropriate number of staff needed at joint field offices, Consolidated Resource Centers, and in FIMA’s hazard mitigation cadre to implement the new delivery model nationwide. (Recommendation 1) The FEMA Assistant Administrator for Recovery should establish controls for tracking FAC-Trax capabilities to the system’s functional and operational requirements to more fully satisfy requirements development controls and ensure that the new information system provides capabilities that meets users’ needs and expectations. (Recommendation 2) The FEMA Assistant Administrator for Recovery should establish system testing criteria, such as a “definition of done,” to assess FAC- Trax as it is developed; define the roles and responsibilities of all participants; and develop the sequence and schedule for integration of other systems with FAC-Trax to more fully satisfy systems testing and integration controls. (Recommendation 3) The FEMA Assistant Administrator for Recovery, in coordination with the Associate Administrator of the Federal Insurance and Mitigation Administration, should implement procedures to standardize planning for addressing PA hazard mitigation at the joint field offices, for example, by requiring FEMA and state officials to develop a memorandum of understanding outlining how they will prioritize and address hazard mitigation following a disaster as it did through prior policy. (Recommendation 4) The FEMA Assistant Administrator for Recovery, in coordination with the Associate Administrator of the Federal Insurance and Mitigation Administration, should develop performance measures and associated objectives for the new delivery model to better align with FEMA’s strategic goal for hazard mitigation in the recovery process. (Recommendation 5) We provided a draft of this report to DHS and FEMA for review and comment. DHS provided written comments, which are reproduced in appendix III. In its comments, DHS concurred with our recommendations and described actions planned to address them. FEMA also provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. With regard to our first recommendation, that FEMA complete a workforce staffing assessment that identifies the number of staff needed at joint field offices, Consolidated Resource Centers, and FIMA’s hazard mitigation cadre, DHS stated that PA, in coordination with the Field Operations Directorate and FIMA, will continue to refine and evaluate staffing needs and update the cadre force structures under the new delivery model. DHS estimated that this effort would be completed by June 28, 2019. This action, if fully implemented, should address the intent of the recommendation. With regard to our second recommendation, that FEMA establish controls for tracking FAC-Trax capabilities to ensure the new information system meets users’ needs, DHS stated that Recovery program managers will update the FAC-Trax Requirements Management Plan and the FAC-Trax Release Plan to ensure the tracking and traceability of FAC-Trax functional and operational requirements. DHS estimated that this effort would be completed by January 31, 2018. This action, if fully implemented, should address the intent of the recommendation. With regard to our third recommendation, that FEMA establish systems testing criteria to assess the development of FAC-Trax; and define the roles and responsibilities, and sequence and schedule for system integration, DHS stated that Recovery program managers will update the FAC-Trax System Integration Plan to include integration with the Deployment Tracking System, Enterprise Data Warehouse, Preliminary Damage Assessment interface, and State Grants Management system interface. DHS estimated that this effort would be completed by June 29, 2018. This action, if fully implemented, should address the intent of the recommendation. With regard to our fourth recommendation, that FEMA implement procedures to standardize planning for addressing PA hazard mitigation at the JFO, DHS stated that PA will update current process documents or develop new documents to better incorporate mitigation into the operational planning phase of the new delivery model. DHS estimated that this effort would be completed by July 31, 2018. This action, if fully implemented, should address the intent of the recommendation. With regard to our fifth recommendation, that PA coordinate with FIMA to develop performance measures and associated objectives for the new delivery model that better align with FEMA’s strategic goals for hazard mitigation in the recovery process, DHS stated that PA will reconvene the PA-Mitigation working group to develop and refine PA related hazard mitigation performance measures. DHS estimated that this effort would be completed by June 29, 2018. This action, if fully implemented, should address the intent of the recommendation. We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Homeland Security and interested congressional committees. If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (404) 679-1875 or CurrieC@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix IV. Appendix II: Assessment of Information Technology Management Controls for the FEMA Applicant Case Tracker (FAC-Trax) Table 2 shows details on the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Public Assistance (PA) program office’s implementation of key practices across four information technology (IT) management control areas for its new information system, the FEMA Applicant Case Tracker (FAC-Trax). PA developed FAC-Trax as a web-based project tracking and case management system to supplement the Emergency Management Mission Integrated Environment (EMMIE) and help resolve long-standing information sharing challenges. To determine the extent to which the FAC-Trax program office implemented IT management controls, we reviewed documentation from the FAC-Trax program and compared it to key management best practices, including the Software Engineering Institute’s Capability Maturity Model® Integration for Acquisition and Development, the Project Management Institute’s Guide to the Project Management Body of Knowledge (PMBOK® Guide), and the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers’ Standard for Software and System Test Documentation. We assessed the program as having fully implemented a practice if the agency provided evidence that it fully addressed the practice; partially implemented if the agency provided evidence that it addressed some, but not all, portions of the practice; and not implemented if the agency did not provide any evidence that it addressed the practice. Table 2. Public Assistance (PA) Program Office’s Implementation of Key Information Technology Management Controls for FAC-Trax PA program officials developed an acquisition plan for FAC-Trax identifying the capabilities the system is intended to deliver, the acquisition approach, and acquisition objectives. Additionally, program officials developed a capability development plan outlining a strategy for the program to obtain approval to acquire FAC-Trax. Lastly, program officials developed a systems engineering plan describing the program’s scope and its framework for using an Agile development approach, as well as a deployment, support, and maintenance plan for FAC-Trax. PA program officials developed an acquisition program baseline detailing FAC-Trax’s cost parameters and a life-cycle cost estimate for the system. As of May 2017, the life- cycle cost estimate for FAC-Trax through fiscal year (FY) 2023 is approximately $19.3 million. PA program officials updated the life-cycle cost estimate for FYs 2016 and 2017 after price negotiations with the FAC-Trax contractor, and will continue to update the estimate as annual budgets are approved, according to the Integrated Logistic Support Plan. The contracting officer’s representative for FAC-Trax performs a cost review at the end of each month, according to program officials. Furthermore, the contractor’s weekly status report includes information on the number of hours worked and the percent of contract value spent. Program officials also review program costs with Office of Response and Recovery, PA, Office of the Chief Information Officer (OCIO), and other program office stakeholders during a weekly program review. PA program officials developed an acquisition program baseline detailing FAC-Trax’s schedule parameters, as well as an integrated master schedule for the system. The integrated master schedule identifies tasks, major milestones, and task dependencies. The PA program manager reviews and updates the integrated master schedule on a weekly basis. Program officials also review FAC-Trax’s schedule with Office of Response and Recovery, PA, OCIO, and other program office stakeholders during a weekly program review. PA program officials identified the knowledge and skills needed to carry out the program in FAC-Trax contract documentation and the capability development plan. Specifically, program officials included an attachment to the FAC-Trax contract listing the required labor categories and corresponding functional position descriptions. Program officials also described the role, position type, minimum grade, and minimum certification for required personnel resources for the acquisition, development, and implementation of FAC-Trax. PA program officials developed, reviewed, and maintained project planning documents and obtained commitment from relevant stakeholders. For example, program officials reviewed and updated the integrated master schedule and costs on a weekly and monthly basis, respectively. Further, program officials reviewed the status of project elements, such as the schedule, quality and technical issues, stakeholders, staffing, cost, and risks, with Office of Response and Recovery, PA, OCIO, and other program office stakeholders during a weekly program review. PA program officials also established tactical, functional, and stakeholder groups, as well as an Integrated Product Team to support and oversee the development of FAC-Trax. FEMA’s Recovery Technology Programs Division (RTPD) has a division-level risk management plan that serves as guidance for all Recovery systems, including FAC- Trax. Program officials identified key risks that could negatively affect FAC-Trax work efforts in RTPD’s “risk register”—an online site used to track risks, issues, and mitigating actions for the division and each program office. Program officials also identified five technical, cost, and schedule risks in the FAC-Trax acquisition plan. Program officials included one of these risks in the risk register, while the remaining four were managed outside of the register. As of May 2017, program officials had identified 13 risks in its risk register—four open and nine closed. The four open risks were (1) limited subject matter expert engagement during requirements development, (2) vacancies in program management office support positions, (3) unresolved service level agreement support and funding issues, and (4) the loss of the authority to operate due to a Trusted Internet Connection that is not compliant with Department of Homeland Security security policy. Program officials evaluated and categorized the identified risks based on the probability of occurrence and scope, schedule, and cost impacts. These four points of measurement are used to calculate an overall risk score. The risk score helps program officials determine a risk’s risk rating—low, medium, or high. For example, program officials reported that two of its open risks have a “medium” risk rating—meaning the risk has the potential to slightly impact project cost, schedule, or performance. In addition, program officials detailed the risk category, probability, and impact for the five risks identified in the FAC-Trax acquisition plan. Program officials developed risk mitigation and contingency plans for each risk in the risk register. For example, program officials planned to mitigate the open risk concerning subject matter expert engagement, by identifying and engaging with appropriate subject matter experts through requirements development workshops scheduled in advance of the sprint they are to support, and monitoring the development of user stories to identify any issues that may cause delays. In addition, program officials described the risk management plan and responsible officials for the five risks identified in the FAC-Trax acquisition plan. PA program officials review and update program risks during a monthly program meeting. Program officials also review program risks with Office of Response and Recovery, PA, OCIO, and other program office stakeholders during a weekly program review. Furthermore, the FAC-Trax contractor provides a weekly status update which includes a section on identified risks. Program officials established re-evaluation dates and recorded updates, including any actions taken, for each risk in the risk register. In addition, program officials were able to provide updates on the four risks identified in the FAC-Trax acquisition plan and managed outside of the register. According to PA officials, these risks were addressed and closed by the approval of program planning documents, such as the mission needs statement, concept of operations, and operational requirements document, following the solutions engineering review, which demonstrates the readiness of the program to proceed with the procurement, in September 2016. Program officials established a requirements management plan outlining how it captures, assesses, and plans for FAC-Trax enhancements, and established a change control process to review, prioritize, and verify user requests for changes to the system and feedback. As of May 2017, the PA program office received 734 change requests related to FAC-Trax, of which program officials completed 420 changes and planned to address an additional 277 entries. PA program officials also facilitated workshops to gather requirements for specific user groups and obtained additional requirements for FAC-Trax through customer feedback on a temporary technology tool— an Access database referred to as the Public Assistance Recovery Information System—used to support an early stage of the new model implementation. Further, program officials developed a functional requirements document outlining the high-level functional and operational requirements for FAC-Trax. PA program officials developed a concept of operations for FAC-Trax detailing operating concepts and scenarios for each phase of the PA preaward process. Program officials also detailed the workflow, phases, business functions, and data inputs and outputs for the re-engineered PA process in FAC-Trax’s functional requirements document. In March 2017, program officials developed a standard template to describe the process, tasks, and data inputs and outputs for specific system capabilities. As part of the change control process, PA program officials meet three times a week to discuss and prioritize change requests. Specifically, program officials review submissions to the change control form to ensure completeness, validate impacts and root cause, and research details for incoming requests. PA program officials also follow up with users to understand and verify requirements. In March 2017, program officials developed a standard template to capture acceptance criteria for specific requirements. However, PA program officials do not track system enhancements back to the high-level requirements identified in FAC-Trax’s operational and functional requirements documentation and performance work statement. PA program officials identified system requirements and constraints in the FAC-Trax concept of operations and functional and operational requirements documents. Further, through its change control process, program officials collect suggestions, issues, and feedback on FAC-Trax and system enhancements from stakeholders, identify risks for change requests, and balance prioritized requirements and estimated level of efforts with projected costs prior to each sprint. In March 2017, program officials developed a standard template to analyze and document the urgency and need for specific requirements. PA program officials and the FAC-Trax contractor established a testing and evaluation plan for the system, developed acceptance criteria for user stories, and obtained feedback from users during and after testing. The testing process concludes with user acceptance testing (UAT). If a change request fails during UAT or a new requirement is discovered during development, the PA program will capture the failed request or new requirement in the product backlog for implementation in a future product release. Key practices Systems testing and integration Developing test plans and test cases PA program officials and the FAC-Trax contractor tested and evaluated the system during development. The FAC-Trax test plan identifies the method and strategy to perform the testing, including the necessary tasks, testing parameters, and the roles and responsibilities of the individuals responsible for testing. However, program officials did not develop system testing criteria to evaluate FAC-Trax. A key feature of Agile software development is the “definition of done”—a set of clear, comprehensive, and objective criteria, that the government should use to evaluate software after each iteration of development. PA program officials developed a systems integration plan in June 2017 that identifies potential integration of FAC-Trax and four FEMA systems, including the Emergency Management Mission Integrated Environment. Specifically, the plan includes data requirements and standards; descriptions of the four systems FEMA plans to integrate with FAC-Trax and the proposed relationship for each connection; and security and access management requirements. In addition, program officials included a description of how integration problems are to be documented and resolved in FAC-Trax development and test plans. However, the systems integration plan does not define roles and responsibilities of all participants for system integration activities or establish a sequence and schedule for every integration step for the four FEMA systems. ● Fully implemented: The agency provided evidence that it fully addressed this practice. ◐ Partially implemented: The agency provided evidence that it addressed some, but not all, portions of this practice. ◌ Not implemented: The agency did not provide any evidence that it addressed this practice. In addition to the contact named above, Chris Keisling (Assistant Director), Amanda R. Parker (Analyst-in-Charge), Mathew Bader, Allison Bawden, Anthony Bova, Eric Hauswirth, Susan Hsu, Rianna Jansen, Justin Jaynes, Tracey King, Matthew T. Lowney, Heidi Nielson, Claire Peachey, Brenda Rabinowitz, Ryan Siegel, Martin Skorczynski, Niti Tandon, Walter K. Vance, James T. Williams, and Eric Winter made key contributions to this report.

 

 Report 2:
The Energy and Water Development appropriations bill includes funding for civil works projects of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), the Department of the Interior's Central Utah Project (CUP) and Bureau of Reclamation (Reclamation), the Department of Energy (DOE), and a number of independent agencies, including the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the Appalachian Regional Commission (ARC). Figure 1 compares the major components of the Energy and Water Development bill from FY2017 through the FY2020 request. President Trump submitted his FY2020 detailed budget proposal to Congress on March 18, 2019 (after submitting a general budget overview on March 11). The budget requests for agencies included in the Energy and Water Development appropriations bill total $38.02 billion—$6.64 billion (15%) below the FY2019 appropriation. (See Table 3 .) A $1.309 billion increase (12%) is proposed for DOE nuclear weapons activities. For FY2019, the conference agreement on H.R. 5895 ( H.Rept. 115-929 ) provided total Energy and Water Development appropriations of $44.66 billion—3% above the FY2018 level and 23% above the FY2019 request. The bill was signed by the President on September 21, 2018 ( P.L. 115-244 ). Figures for FY2019 exclude emergency supplemental appropriations totaling $17.419 billion provided to USACE and DOE for natural disaster response by the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 ( P.L. 115-123 ), signed February 9, 2018. For more details, see CRS Report R45258, Energy and Water Development: FY2019 Appropriations , by Mark Holt and Corrie E. Clark, and CRS Report R45326, Army Corps of Engineers Annual and Supplemental Appropriations: Issues for Congress , by Nicole T. Carter. The FY2020 budget request proposes substantial reductions from the FY2019 enacted level for DOE energy research and development (R&D) programs, including a reduction of $178 million (-24%) in fossil fuels and $502 million (-38%) in nuclear energy. Energy efficiency and renewable energy R&D would decline by $1.724 billion (-83%). DOE science programs would be reduced by $1.039 billion (-16%). Programs targeted by the budget for elimination or phaseout include energy efficiency grants, the Advanced Research Projects Agency—Energy (ARPA-E), and loan guarantee programs. Funding would be reduced for USACE by $2.172 billion (-31%), and Reclamation and CUP by $462 million (-29%). Congress did not enact similar reductions included in the FY2018 and FY2019 budget requests. Congressional consideration of the annual Energy and Water Development appropriations bill is affected by certain procedural and statutory budget enforcement measures. These consist primarily of limits associated with the budget resolution on total discretionary spending and allocations of this amount that apply to spending under the jurisdiction of each appropriations subcommittee. Statutory budget enforcement is derived from the Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA; P.L. 112-25 ). The BCA established separate limits on defense and nondefense discretionary spending. These limits are in effect for each of the fiscal years from FY2012 through FY2021, and are primarily enforced by an automatic spending reduction process called sequestration, in which a breach of a spending limit would trigger across-the-board cuts within that spending category. The BCA's statutory discretionary spending limits were increased for FY2018 and FY2019 by the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (BBA 2018; P.L. 115-123 ), enacted February 9, 2018. However, the BCA discretionary spending limits have not been increased for FY2020. As a result, the limits currently in place for FY2020 are substantially lower than the limits that were in place for FY2019. For discretionary defense spending, the FY2020 limit drops from $647 billion to $576 billion (-11%), while the nondefense limit drops from $597 billion to $542 billion (-9%). A bill to raise the defense and nondefense spending limits for FY2020 and FY2021 was reported by the House Budget Committee April 5, 2019 ( H.R. 2021 , H.Rept. 116-35 ). (For more information, see CRS Report R44874, The Budget Control Act: Frequently Asked Questions , by Grant A. Driessen and Megan S. Lynch.) Several issues raised by the Administration's budget request could generate controversy during congressional consideration of Energy and Water Development appropriations for FY2020. The issues described in this section—listed approximately in the order the affected agencies appear in the Energy and Water Development bill—were selected based on the total funding involved, the percentage of proposed increases or decreases, and potential impact on broader public policy considerations. For USACE, the Trump Administration requested $4.827 billion for FY2020, which is $2.172 billion (-31%) below the FY2019 appropriation. The request includes no funding for initiating new studies and construction projects (referred to as new starts). The FY2020 request seeks to limit funding for ongoing navigation and flood risk-reduction construction projects to those whose benefits are at least 2.5 times their costs, or projects that address safety concerns. Many congressionally authorized USACE projects would not meet that standard. The Administration also proposes to transfer the Formerly Utilized Sites Remedial Action Program from USACE to DOE. For Reclamation, FY2020 funding would be reduced by $461.6 million (29%) from the FY2019 level, to $1.11 billion. For more details, see CRS In Focus IF11137, Army Corps of Engineers: FY2020 Appropriations , by Nicole T. Carter and Anna E. Normand; CRS In Focus IF11158, Bureau of Reclamation: FY2020 Appropriations , by Charles V. Stern; and CRS Report R45326, Army Corps of Engineers Annual and Supplemental Appropriations: Issues for Congress , by Nicole T. Carter. DOE's FY2020 budget request includes three mandatory proposals related to the Power Marketing Administrations (PMAs)—Bonneville Power Administration (BPA), Southeastern Power Administration (SEPA), Southwestern Power Administration (SWPA), and Western Area Power Administration (WAPA). PMAs sell the power generated by the dams operated by Reclamation and USACE. The Administration proposes to divest the assets of the three PMAs that own transmission infrastructure: BPA, SWPA, and WAPA. These assets consist of thousands of miles of high voltage transmission lines and hundreds of power substations. The budget request projects that mandatory savings from the sale of these assets would total approximately $5.8 billion over a 10-year period. The FY2020 budget request includes a proposal to repeal the borrowing authority for WAPA's Transmission Infrastructure Program, which facilitates the delivery of renewable energy resources. The FY2020 budget also proposes eliminating the statutory requirement that PMAs limit rates to amounts necessary to recover only construction, operations, and maintenance costs; the budget proposes that the PMAs instead transition to a market-based approach to setting rates. The Administration has estimated that this proposal would yield $1.9 billion in new revenues over 10 years. The budget also calls for repealing $3.25 billion in borrowing authority provided to WAPA for transmission projects enacted under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 ( P.L. 111-5 ). The proposal is estimated to save $640 million over 10 years. All of these proposals would need to be enacted in authorizing legislation, and no congressional action has been taken on them to date. The proposals have been opposed by groups such as the American Public Power Association and the National Rural Electrical Cooperative Association, and they have been the subject of opposition letters to the Administration from several regionally based bipartisan groups of Members of Congress. PMA reforms have been supported by some policy research institutes, such as the Heritage Foundation. For further information, see CRS Report R45548, The Power Marketing Administrations: Background and Current Issues , by Richard J. Campbell. The FY2020 budget request proposes to terminate both the DOE Weatherization Assistance Program and the State Energy Program (SEP). The Weatherization Assistance Program provides formula grants to states to fund energy efficiency improvements for low-income housing units to reduce their energy costs and save energy. The SEP provides grants and technical assistance to states for planning and implementation of their energy programs. Both the weatherization and SEP programs are under DOE's Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE). The weatherization program received $257 million and SEP $55 million for FY2019, after also having been proposed for elimination in that year's budget request, as well as in FY2018. According to DOE, the proposed elimination of the grant programs is "due to a departmental shift in focus away from deployment activities and towards early-stage R&D." Appropriations for DOE R&D on energy efficiency, renewable energy, nuclear energy, and fossil energy would be reduced from $4.133 billion in FY2019 to $1.729 billion (-58%) under the Administration's FY2020 budget request. Major proposed reductions include bioenergy technologies (-82%), vehicle technologies (-79%), natural gas technologies (-79%), advanced manufacturing (-75%), building technologies (-75%), wind energy (-74%), solar energy (-73%), geothermal technologies (-67%), and nuclear fuel cycle R&D (-66%). DOE says the proposed reductions would primarily affect the later stages of energy research, which tend to be the most costly. "The Budget focuses DOE resources toward early-stage R&D, where the Federal role is strongest, and reflects an increased reliance on the private sector to fund later-stage research, development, and commercialization of energy technologies," according to the FY2020 DOE request. Similar reductions proposed by the Administration for FY2019 were not enacted. The Administration's FY2020 budget request, for the first time since FY2010, would provide new funding for a proposed nuclear waste repository at Yucca Mountain, NV; similar Administration requests for the repository project were not included in the enacted funding measures for FY2018 and FY2019. Under the FY2020 request, DOE would receive $116 million to seek an NRC license for the repository and to develop interim nuclear waste storage capacity. NRC would receive $38.5 million to consider DOE's application. DOE's total of $116 million in nuclear waste funding would come from two appropriations accounts: $90 million from Nuclear Waste Disposal and $26 million from Defense Nuclear Waste Disposal (to pay for defense-related nuclear waste that would be disposed of at Yucca Mountain). DOE submitted a license application for the Yucca Mountain repository in 2008, but NRC suspended consideration in 2011 for lack of funding. The Obama Administration had declared the Yucca Mountain site "unworkable" because of opposition from the state of Nevada. The House voted to provide the Yucca Mountain funding requested for FY2018 and a $100 million increase for FY2019, but the Senate Appropriations Committee did not include it for FY2018, and it was not included in the Senate-passed bill for FY2019. Also as in FY2018, the FY2019 Senate bill included an authorization for a pilot program to develop an interim nuclear waste storage facility at a voluntary site (§304). The enacted FY2019 appropriations measure did not include the House-passed funding for Yucca Mountain or the Senate's nuclear waste pilot program provisions. For more background, see CRS Report RL33461, Civilian Nuclear Waste Disposal , by Mark Holt. The FY2020 budget request would halt further loans and loan guarantees under DOE's Advanced Technology Vehicles Manufacturing Loan Program and the Title 17 Innovative Technology Loan Guarantee Program. Similar proposals to eliminate the programs in FY2018 and FY2019 were not enacted. The FY2020 budget request would also halt further loan guarantees under DOE's Tribal Energy Loan Guarantee Program. Under the FY2020 budget proposal, DOE would continue to administer its existing portfolio of loans and loan guarantees. Unused prior-year authority, or ceiling levels, for loan guarantee commitments would be rescinded, as well as $169.5 million in unspent appropriations to cover loan guarantee "subsidy costs" (which are primarily intended to cover potential losses). On March 22, 2019, after the FY2020 budget request had been submitted, DOE provided $3.7 billion in additional Title 17 loan guarantees for two new reactors under construction at the Vogtle nuclear plant in Georgia. The Vogtle project had previously received $8.3 billion in loan guarantees under the DOE program. The Administration's request for DOE includes $107 million in FY2020 for the U.S. contribution to the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER), which is under construction in France by a multinational consortium. "ITER will be the first fusion device to maintain fusion for long periods of time" and is to lay the technical foundation "for the commercial production of fusion-based electricity," according to the consortium's website. The FY2020 DOE appropriation request, 19% below the FY2020 level, would pay for components supplied by U.S. companies for the project, such as central solenoid superconducting magnet modules. ITER has long attracted congressional concern about management, schedule, and cost. The United States is to pay 9% of the project's construction costs, including contributions of components, cash, and personnel. Other collaborators in the project include the European Union, Russia, Japan, India, South Korea, and China. The total U.S. share of the cost was estimated in 2015 at between $4.0 billion and $6.5 billion, up from $1.45 billion to $2.2 billion in 2008. DOE funding for the project was $122 million in FY2018 and $132 million in FY2019. The Trump Administration's FY2020 budget would eliminate the Advanced Research Projects Agency—Energy (ARPA-E) and rescind $287 million of the agency's unobligated balances. ARPA-E funds research on technologies that are determined to have potential to transform energy production, storage, and use. "This elimination facilitates opportunities to integrate the positive aspects of ARPA-E into DOE's applied energy research programs," according to the DOE request. The Administration also proposed to terminate ARPA-E in its FY2018 and FY2019 budget requests, but Congress increased the program's funding in both years. Because ARPA-E provides advance funding for projects for up to three years, oversight and management of the program would still be required during a phaseout period. According to the Administration budget request, "ARPA-E will utilize the remainder of its unobligated balances to execute the multi-year termination of the program, with all operations ceasing by FY 2022." The FY2020 budget request for DOE Weapons Activities is 12% greater than the FY2019 enacted level ($12.4 billion vs. $11.1 billion). Weapons Activities programs are carried out by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a semiautonomous agency within DOE. Under Weapons Activities, FY2020 funding for nuclear warhead life-extension programs (LEPs) would increase by 10% ($2.1 billion vs $1.9 billion). The two most notable increases within that account are the funding request for W80-4 LEP, which increases by 37% ($898.6 million vs. $654.8 million) and the initiation of funding for the W87-1 LEP. The increase in the request for the W80-4 warhead, which is due to be carried on the new long-range standoff weapon (a new cruise missile), apparently is the result of a new budget estimate, as the Department of Defense is not accelerating development of the missile. The FY2020 request seeks $112 million for the W87-1 warhead (formerly the Interoperable Warhead 1, or IW-I), which received $53 million in FY2019. This warhead is to be carried by the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent, a new land-based missile that is scheduled to enter the force in the 2030s. The FY2020 budget request seeks $10 million for the W76-2 LEP, down from $65 million in FY2019. Work on this warhead is nearly complete. It is a low-yield modification of the current W76 warhead carried by U.S. submarine-launched ballistic missiles. It remains controversial in Congress despite its relatively low price tag. In FY2020, NNSA is seeking $51.5 million, in the Stockpile Systems account, for surveillance efforts for the B83 gravity bomb, the most powerful bomb in the U.S. inventory. This effort represents a 47% increase over the $35 million request in FY2019. The Obama Administration had planned to retire this bomb, but the Trump Administration reversed that decision in its 2018 Nuclear Posture Review. This decision may also prove controversial, as several Senators have been vocal supporters of the plan to retire the bomb. Within the Strategic Materials account in the NNSA budget, funding for Plutonium Sustainment would increase 97%, from $361 million enacted for FY2019 to $712 million requested for FY2020. This increase would support the Administration's plans to produce plutonium pits (or cores) for nuclear warheads at two facilities—Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico and the Savannah River Site in South Carolina. The Administration is seeking $410 million to begin conceptual design and pre-Critical Decision (CD)-1 activities at Savannah River. For more information, see CRS Report R44442, Energy and Water Development Appropriations: Nuclear Weapons Activities , by Amy F. Woolf. DOE's Office of Environmental Management (EM) is responsible for environmental cleanup and waste management at the department's nuclear facilities. The total FY2020 appropriations request for EM activities of $6.469 billion would be a decrease of $706 million (-10%) from FY2019. The budgetary components of the EM program are Defense Environmental Cleanup (-9%), Non-Defense Environmental Cleanup (-20%), and the Uranium Enrichment Decontamination and Decommissioning Fund (-15%). The FY2020 request includes a proposal to transfer management of the Formerly Utilized Sites Remedial Action Program (FUSRAP) from USACE to the Office of Legacy Management (LM), the DOE office responsible for long-term stewardship of remediated sites. The FY2020 LM budget request includes $141 million for FUSRAP, down from $150 million appropriated to USACE for the program in FY2019. According to the DOE budget justification, "USACE will continue to conduct cleanup of FUSRAP sites on a reimbursable basis." Table 1 indicates the steps during consideration of FY2020 Energy and Water Development appropriations. (For more details, see the CRS Appropriations Status Table at http://www.crs.gov/AppropriationsStatusTable/Index .) As of the publication date of this report, no markups had been held. Table 2 includes budget totals for energy and water development appropriations enacted for FY2011 through FY2019, plus the FY2020 request. The annual Energy and Water Development appropriations bill includes four titles: Title I—Corps of Engineers—Civil; Title II—Department of the Interior (Central Utah Project and Bureau of Reclamation); Title III—Department of Energy; and Title IV—Independent Agencies, as shown in Table 3 . Major programs in the bill are described in this section in the approximate order they appear in the bill. Previous appropriations and budget recommendations for FY2020 are shown in the accompanying tables, and additional details about many of these programs are provided in separate CRS reports as indicated. For a discussion of current funding issues related to these programs, see " Funding Issues and Initiatives ," above. Congressional clients may obtain more detailed information by contacting CRS analysts listed in CRS Report R42638, Appropriations: CRS Experts , by James M. Specht and Justin Murray. FY2020 budget justifications for the largest agencies funded by the annual Energy and Water Development appropriations bill can be found through the following links: Title I, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Civil Works, http://www.usace.army.mil/Missions/CivilWorks/Budget Title II Bureau of Reclamation, https://www.usbr.gov/budget/ Central Utah Project, https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/uploads/fy2020_cupca_budget_justification.pdf Title III, Department of Energy, https://www.energy.gov/cfo/downloads/fy-2020-budget-justification Title IV, Independent Agencies Appalachian Regional Commission, http://www.arc.gov/images/newsroom/publications/fy2020budget/FY2020PerformanceBudgetMar2019.pdf Nuclear Regulatory Commission, https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1906/ML19065A279.pdf Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, https://www.dnfsb.gov/about/congressional-budget-requests Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board, http://www.nwtrb.gov/about-us/plans USACE is an agency in the Department of Defense with both military and civilian responsibilities. Under its civil works program, which is funded by the Energy and Water appropriations bill, USACE plans, builds, operates, and in some cases maintains water resources facilities for coastal and inland navigation, riverine and coastal flood risk reduction, and aquatic ecosystem restoration. In recent decades, Congress has generally authorized Corps studies, construction projects, and other activities in omnibus water authorization bills, typically titled Water Resources Development Acts (WRDA), prior to funding them through appropriations legislation. Recent Congresses enacted the following omnibus water resources authorization acts: in June 2014, the Water Resources Reform and Development Act of 2014 (WRRDA, P.L. 113-121 ); in December 2016, the Water Resources Development Act of 2016 (Title I of P.L. 114-322 , the Water Infrastructure Improvements for the Nation Act [WIIN]); and in October 2018, the Water Resources Development Act of 2018 (Title I of P.L. 115-270 , America's Water Infrastructure Act of 2018 [AWIA 2018]). These acts consisted largely of authorizations for new USACE projects, and they altered numerous USACE policies and procedures. Unlike in highways and municipal water infrastructure programs, federal funds for USACE are not distributed to states or projects based on formulas or delivered via competitive grants. Instead, USACE generally is directly involved in planning, designing, and managing the construction of projects that are cost-shared with nonfederal project sponsors. Prior to FY2010, in addition to site-specific project funding included in the President's annual budget request for USACE, Congress, during the discretionary appropriations process, had identified many additional USACE projects to receive funding or had adjusted the funding levels for the projects identified in the President's request. Starting in the 112 th Congress, site-specific project line items added or increased by Congress (i.e., earmarks) became subject to House and Senate earmark moratorium policies. As a result, Congress generally has not added funding at the project level since FY2010. In lieu of the project-based increases, Congress has included "additional funding" for select categories of USACE projects and provided direction and limitations on the use of these funds. For more information, CRS In Focus IF11137, Army Corps of Engineers: FY2020 Appropriations , by Nicole T. Carter and Anna E. Normand. Previous appropriations and the President's request for FY2020 are shown in Table 4 . Most of the large dams and water diversion structures in the West were built by, or with the assistance of, the Bureau of Reclamation. While the Corps of Engineers built hundreds of flood control and navigation projects, Reclamation's original mission was to develop water supplies, primarily for irrigation to reclaim arid lands in the West for farming and ranching. Reclamation has evolved into an agency that assists in meeting the water demands in the West while working to protect the environment and the public's investment in Reclamation infrastructure. The agency's municipal and industrial water deliveries have more than doubled since 1970. Today, Reclamation manages hundreds of dams and diversion projects, including more than 300 storage reservoirs, in 17 western states. These projects provide water to approximately 10 million acres of farmland and 31 million people. Reclamation is the largest wholesale supplier of water in the 17 western states and the second-largest hydroelectric power producer in the nation. Reclamation facilities also provide substantial flood control, recreation, and other benefits. Reclamation facility operations are often controversial, particularly for their effect on fish and wildlife species and because of conflicts among competing water users during drought conditions. As with the Corps of Engineers, the Reclamation budget is made up largely of individual project funding lines, rather than general programs that would not be covered by congressional earmark requirements. Therefore, as with USACE, these Reclamation projects have often been subject to earmark disclosure rules. The current moratorium on earmarks restricts congressional steering of money directly toward specific Reclamation projects. Reclamation's single largest account, Water and Related Resources, encompasses the agency's traditional programs and projects, including construction, operations and maintenance, dam safety, and ecosystem restoration, among others. Reclamation also typically requests funds in a number of smaller accounts, and has proposed additional accounts in recent years. Implementation and oversight of the Central Utah Project (CUP), also funded by Title II, is conducted by a separate office within the Department of the Interior. For more information, see CRS In Focus IF11158, Bureau of Reclamation: FY2020 Appropriations , by Charles V. Stern. Previous appropriations and recommendations for FY2020 are shown in Table 5 . The Energy and Water Development bill has funded all DOE programs since FY2005. Major DOE activities include (1) research and development (R&D) on renewable energy, energy efficiency, nuclear power, fossil energy, and electricity; (2) the Strategic Petroleum Reserve; (3) energy statistics; (4) general science; (5) environmental cleanup; and (6) nuclear weapons and nonproliferation programs. Table 6 provides the recent funding history for DOE programs, which are briefly described further below. DOE's Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) conducts research and development on transportation energy technology, energy efficiency in buildings and manufacturing processes, and the production of solar, wind, geothermal, and other renewable energy. EERE also administers formula grants to states for making energy efficiency improvements to low-income housing units and for state energy planning. The Sustainable Transportation program area includes electric vehicles, vehicle efficiency, and alternative fuels. DOE's electric vehicle program aims to "reduce the cost of electric vehicle batteries by more than half, to less than $100/kWh [kilowatt-hour] (ultimate goal is $80/kWh), increase range to 300 miles, and decrease charge time to 15 minutes or less." DOE's vehicle fuel cell program is focusing on the costs of fuel cells and their hydrogen fuel. According to the FY2020 budget request, "To be cost competitive with gasoline-powered internal combustion engines on a cents-per-mile driven basis, the cost of hydrogen delivered and dispensed needs to be less than $4/gge [gasoline gallon equivalent] (untaxed), and the cost of a durable fuel cell system to be less than $40/kW." Bioenergy goals include the development of "drop-in" fuels—fuels that would be largely compatible with existing energy infrastructure and vehicles, with a goal of $3/gge. Renewable power programs focus on electricity generation from solar, wind, water, and geothermal sources. The solar energy program has a goal of achieving, by 2030, costs of 3 cents per kWh for unsubsidized, utility-scale photovoltaics (PV). Wind R&D is to focus on early-stage research and testing to reduce costs and improve performance and reliability. The geothermal program is to focus on developing "enhanced geothermal systems" with an electricity generation cost target of 20.8 cents/kWh by 2022. In the energy efficiency program area, the advanced manufacturing program focuses on improving the energy efficiency of manufacturing processes and on the manufacturing of energy-related products. The building technologies program includes R&D on lighting, space conditioning, windows, and control technologies to reduce building energy-use intensity. The energy efficiency program also provides weatherization grants to states for improving the energy efficiency of low-income housing units and state energy planning grants. For more details, see CRS Report R44980, DOE's Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE): Appropriations Status , by Corrie E. Clark. The Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response (CESER) was created from programs that were previously part of the Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability. The programs that were not moved into CESER became part of the DOE Office of Electricity (OE). OE's mission is to lead DOE efforts "to strengthen, transform, and improve energy infrastructure so that consumers have access to secure and resilient sources of energy." Major priorities of OE are developing a model of North American energy vulnerabilities, pursuing megawatt-scale electricity storage, integrating electric power system sensing technology, and analyzing electricity policy issues. The office also includes the DOE power marketing administrations, which are funded from separate appropriations accounts. CESER is the federal government's lead entity for energy sector-specific responses to energy security emergencies—whether caused by physical infrastructure problems or by cybersecurity issues. The office conducts R&D on energy infrastructure security technology; provides energy sector security guidelines, training, and technical assistance; and enhances energy sector emergency preparedness and response. DOE's Multiyear Plan for Energy Sector Cybersecurity describes the department's strategy to "strengthen today's energy delivery systems by working with our partners to address growing threats and promote continuous improvement, and develop game-changing solutions that will create inherently secure, resilient, and self-defending energy systems for tomorrow." The plan includes three goals that DOE has established for energy sector cybersecurity: strengthen energy sector cybersecurity preparedness; coordinate cyber incident response and recovery; and accelerate game-changing research, development, and demonstration (RD&D) of resilient energy delivery systems. DOE's Office of Nuclear Energy (NE) "focuses on three major mission areas: the nation's existing nuclear fleet, the development of advanced nuclear reactor concepts, and fuel cycle technologies," according to DOE's FY2020 budget justification. It calls nuclear energy "a key element of United States energy independence, energy dominance, electricity grid resiliency, national security, and clean baseload power." The Reactor Concepts program area includes research on advanced reactors, including advanced small modular reactors, and research to enhance the "sustainability" of existing commercial light water reactors. Advanced reactor research focuses on "Generation IV" reactors, as opposed to the existing fleet of commercial light water reactors, which are generally classified as generations II and III. R&D under this program focuses on advanced coolants, fuels, materials, and other technology areas that could apply to a variety of advanced reactors. To help develop those technologies, the Reactor Concepts program is developing a Versatile Test Reactor that would allow fuels and materials to be tested in a fast neutron environment (in which neutrons would not be slowed by water, graphite, or other "moderators"). Research on extending the life of existing commercial light water reactors beyond 60 years, the maximum operating period currently licensed by NRC, is being conducted by this program with industry cost-sharing. The Fuel Cycle Research and Development program includes generic research on nuclear waste management and disposal. One of the program's primary activities is the development of technologies to separate the radioactive constituents of spent fuel for reuse or solidifying into stable waste forms. Other major research areas in the Fuel Cycle R&D program include the development of accident-tolerant fuels for existing commercial reactors, evaluation of fuel cycle options, and development of improved technologies to prevent diversion of nuclear materials for weapons. The program is also developing sources of high-assay low enriched uranium (HALEU), in which uranium is enriched to between 5% and 20% in the fissile isotope U-235, for potential use in advanced reactors. For more information, see CRS Report R45706, Advanced Nuclear Reactors: Technology Overview and Current Issues , by Danielle A. Arostegui and Mark Holt. Much of DOE's Fossil Energy R&D Program focuses on carbon capture and storage for power plants fueled by coal and natural gas. Major activities include Advanced Coal Energy Systems and Carbon Capture, Utilization, and Storage (CCUS); Natural Gas Technologies; and Unconventional Fossil Energy Technologies from Petroleum—Oil Technologies. Advanced Coal Energy Systems includes R&D on modular coal-gasification systems, advanced turbines, solid oxide fuel cells, advanced sensors and controls, and power generation efficiency. Elements of the CCUS program include the following: Carbon Capture subprogram for separating CO 2 in both precombustion and postcombustion systems; Carbon Utilization subprogram for R&D on technologies to convert carbon to marketable products, such as chemicals and polymers; and Carbon Storage subprogram on long-term geologic storage of CO 2 , focusing on saline formations, oil and natural gas reservoirs, unmineable coal seams, basalts, and organic shales. For more information, see CRS In Focus IF10589, FY2019 Funding for CCS and Other DOE Fossil Energy R&D , by Peter Folger, and CRS Report R44472, Funding for Carbon Capture and Sequestration (CCS) at DOE: In Brief , by Peter Folger. The Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR), authorized by the Energy Policy and Conservation Act ( P.L. 94-163 ) in 1975, consists of caverns built within naturally occurring salt domes in Louisiana and Texas. The SPR provides strategic and economic security against foreign and domestic disruptions in U.S. oil supplies via an emergency stockpile of crude oil. The program fulfills U.S. obligations under the International Energy Program, which avails the United States of International Energy Agency (IEA) assistance through its coordinated energy emergency response plans, and provides a deterrent against energy supply disruptions. DOE has been conducting a major maintenance program to address aging infrastructure and a deferred maintenance backlog at SPR facilities. The federal government has not purchased oil for the SPR since 1994. Beginning in 2000, additions to the SPR were made with royalty-in-kind (RIK) oil acquired by DOE in lieu of cash royalties paid on production from federal offshore leases. In September 2009, the Secretary of the Interior announced a phaseout of the RIK Program. By early 2010, the SPR's capacity reached 727 million barrels. A series of oil sales and purchases since then have resulted in a net reduction of the SPR inventory. Currently, the SPR contains about 649 million barrels. Congress has enacted several laws since 2015 that mandate sales of SPR oil, including the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015 ( P.L. 114-74 ), the Fixing America's Surface Transportation Act ( P.L. 114-94 ), the 21 st Century Cures Act of 2016 ( P.L. 114-255 ), the 2017 Tax Revision ( P.L. 115-97 ), the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 ( P.L. 115-123 ), and the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018. Broadly considered, this legislation requires oil to be sold from the reserve over the period FY2017 through FY2027, totaling 266 million barrels. For more information, see CRS Report R45577, Strategic Petroleum Reserve: Mandated Sales and Reform , by Robert Pirog, and CRS In Focus IF10869, Reconsidering the Strategic Petroleum Reserve , by Robert Pirog. The DOE Office of Science conducts basic research in six program areas: advanced scientific computing research, basic energy sciences, biological and environmental research, fusion energy sciences, high-energy physics, and nuclear physics. According to DOE's FY2020 budget justification, the Office of Science "is the Nation's largest Federal sponsor of basic research in the physical sciences and the lead Federal agency supporting fundamental scientific research for our Nation's energy future." DOE's Advanced Scientific Computing Research (ASCR) program focuses on developing and maintaining computing and networking capabilities for science and research in applied mathematics, computer science, and advanced networking. The program plays a key role in the DOE-wide effort to advance the development of exascale computing, which seeks to build a computer that can solve scientific problems 1,000 times faster than today's best machines. DOE has asserted that the department is on a path to have a capable exascale machine by the early 2020s. Basic Energy Sciences (BES), the largest program area in the Office of Science, focuses on understanding, predicting, and ultimately controlling matter and energy at the electronic, atomic, and molecular levels. The program supports research in disciplines such as condensed matter and materials physics, chemistry, and geosciences. BES also provides funding for scientific user facilities (e.g., the National Synchrotron Light Source II, and the Linac Coherent Light Source-II), and certain DOE research centers and hubs (e.g., Energy Frontier Research Centers, as well as the Batteries and Energy Storage and Fuels from Sunlight Energy Innovation Hubs). Biological and Environmental Research (BER) seeks a predictive understanding of complex biological, climate, and environmental systems across a continuum from the small scale (e.g., genomic research) to the large (e.g., Earth systems and climate). Within BER, Biological Systems Science focuses on plant and microbial systems, while Biological and Environmental Research supports climate-relevant atmospheric and ecosystem modeling and research. BER facilities and centers include four Bioenergy Research Centers and the Environmental Molecular Science Laboratory at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory. Fusion Energy Sciences (FES) seeks to increase understanding of the behavior of matter at very high temperatures and to establish the science needed to develop a fusion energy source. FES provides funding for the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER) project, a multinational effort to design and build an experimental fusion reactor. According to DOE, ITER "aims to provide fusion power output approaching reactor levels of hundreds of megawatts, for hundreds of seconds." However, many U.S. analysts have expressed concern about ITER's cost, schedule, and management, as well as the budgetary impact on domestic fusion research. The High Energy Physics (HEP) program conducts research on the fundamental constituents of matter and energy, including studies of dark energy and the search for dark matter. Nuclear Physics supports research on the nature of matter, including its basic constituents and their interactions. A major project in the Nuclear Physics program is the construction of the Facility for Rare Isotope Beams at Michigan State University. A separate DOE office, the Advanced Research Projects Agency—Energy (ARPA-E), was authorized by the America COMPETES Act ( P.L. 110-69 ) to support transformational energy technology research projects. DOE budget documents describe ARPA-E's mission as overcoming long-term, high-risk technological barriers to the development of energy technologies. For more details, see CRS Report R45150, Federal Research and Development (R&D) Funding: FY2019 , coordinated by John F. Sargent Jr. DOE's Loan Programs Office provides loan guarantees for projects that deploy specified energy technologies, as authorized by Title 17 of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPACT05, P.L. 109-58 ), direct loans for advanced vehicle manufacturing technologies, and loan guarantees for tribal energy projects. Section 1703 of the act authorizes loan guarantees for advanced energy technologies that reduce greenhouse gas emissions, and Section 1705 established a temporary program for renewable energy and energy efficiency projects. Title 17 allows DOE to provide loan guarantees for up to 80% of construction costs for eligible energy projects. Successful applicants must pay an up-front fee, or "subsidy cost," to cover potential losses under the loan guarantee program. Under the loan guarantee agreements, the federal government would repay all covered loans if the borrower defaulted. Such guarantees would reduce the risk to lenders and allow them to provide financing at below-market interest rates. The following is a summary of loan guarantee amounts that have been authorized (loan guarantee ceilings) for various technologies: $8.3 billion for nonnuclear technologies under Section 1703; $2.0 billion for unspecified projects from FY2007 under Section 1703; $18.5 billion for nuclear power plants ($12.0 billion committed); $4 billion for loan guarantees for uranium enrichment plants; $1.18 billion for renewable energy and energy efficiency projects under Section 1703, in addition to other loan guarantee ceilings, which can include applications that were pending under Section 1705 before it expired; and In addition to the loan guarantee ceilings above, an appropriation of $161 million was provided for subsidy costs for renewable energy and energy efficiency loan guarantees under Section 1703. If the subsidy costs averaged 10% of the loan guarantees, this funding could leverage loan guarantees totaling about $1.6 billion. The only loan guarantees under Section 1703 were $8.3 billion in guarantees provided to the consortium building two new reactors at the Vogtle plant in Georgia. DOE committed an additional $3.7 billion in loan guarantees for the Vogtle project on March 22, 2019. Another nuclear loan guarantee is being sought by NuScale Power to build a small modular reactor in Idaho. In the absence of explosive testing of nuclear weapons, the United States has adopted a science-based program to maintain and sustain confidence in the reliability of the U.S. nuclear stockpile. Congress established the Stockpile Stewardship Program in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994 ( P.L. 103-160 ). The goal of the program, as amended by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 ( P.L. 111-84 , §3111), is to ensure "that the nuclear weapons stockpile is safe, secure, and reliable without the use of underground nuclear weapons testing." The program is operated by NNSA, a semiautonomous agency within DOE established by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 ( P.L. 106-65 , Title XXXII). NNSA implements the Stockpile Stewardship Program through the activities funded by the Weapons Activities account in the NNSA budget. Most of NNSA's weapons activities take place at the nuclear weapons complex, which consists of three laboratories (Los Alamos National Laboratory, NM; Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, CA; and Sandia National Laboratories, NM and CA); four production sites (Kansas City National Security Campus, MO; Pantex Plant, TX; Savannah River Site, SC; and Y-12 National Security Complex, TN); and the Nevada National Security Site (formerly the Nevada Test Site). NNSA manages and sets policy for the weapons complex; contractors to NNSA operate the eight sites. Radiological activities at these sites are subject to oversight and recommendations by the independent Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, funded by Title IV of the annual Energy and Water Development appropriations bill. There are three major program areas in the Weapons Activities account. Directed Stockpile Work includes the life extension programs (LEPs) on existing warheads and stockpile services programs that monitor their condition; and maintaining warheads through repairs, refurbishment, and modifications. It also includes funding for research and development in support of specific warheads, and dismantlement of warheads that have been removed from the stockpile. This last activity received more significant funding as the number of warheads in the U.S. stockpile declined after the Cold War; it also provides a source for critical components for warheads remaining in the stockpile. Directed Stockpile Work also involves programs that work on the materials needed for nuclear warheads, including the plutonium pits that are the core of the weapons. Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) includes five programs that focus on "efforts to develop and maintain critical capabilities, tools, and processes needed to support science based stockpile stewardship, refurbishment, and continued certification of the stockpile over the long-term in the absence of underground nuclear testing." This area includes operation of some large experimental facilities, such as the National Ignition Facility at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. Infrastructure and Operations has, as its main funding elements, material recycle and recovery, recapitalization of facilities, and construction of facilities. The latter include two major projects that have generated congressional controversy: the Uranium Processing Facility (UPF) at the Y-12 National Security Complex and the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement (CMRR) Project, which deals with plutonium, at Los Alamos National Laboratory. Nuclear Weapons Activities also has several smaller programs, including the following: Secure Transportation Asset, providing for safe and secure transport of nuclear weapons, components, and materials; Defense Nuclear Security, providing operations, maintenance, and construction funds for protective forces, physical security systems, personnel security, and related activities; and Information Technology and Cybersecurity, whose elements include cybersecurity, secure enterprise computing, and Federal Unclassified Information Technology. For more information, see CRS Report R44442, Energy and Water Development Appropriations: Nuclear Weapons Activities , by Amy F. Woolf, and CRS Report R45306, The U.S. Nuclear Weapons Complex: Overview of Department of Energy Sites , by Amy F. Woolf and James D. Werner. DOE's nonproliferation and national security programs provide technical capabilities to support U.S. efforts to prevent, detect, and counter the spread of nuclear weapons worldwide. These programs are administered by NNSA's Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation. The Materials Management and Minimization program conducts activities to minimize and, where possible, eliminate stockpiles of weapons-useable material around the world. Major activities include conversion of reactors that use highly enriched uranium (useable for weapons) to low-enriched uranium, removal and consolidation of nuclear material stockpiles, and disposition of excess nuclear materials. Global Materials Security has three major program elements. International Nuclear Security focuses on increasing the security of vulnerable stockpiles of nuclear material in other countries. Radiological Security promotes the worldwide reduction and security of radioactive sources, including the removal of surplus sources and substitution of technologies that do not use radioactive materials. Nuclear Smuggling Detection and Deterrence works to improve the capability of other countries to halt illicit trafficking of nuclear materials. Nonproliferation and Arms Control works to "to support U.S. nonproliferation and arms control objectives to prevent proliferation, ensure peaceful nuclear uses, and enable verifiable nuclear reductions," according to the FY2020 DOE justification. This program conducts reviews of nuclear export applications and technology transfer authorizations, implements treaty obligations, and analyzes nonproliferation policies and proposals. Other programs under Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation include research and development and construction, which advances nuclear detection and nuclear forensics technologies. Nuclear Counterterrorism and Incident Response provides "interagency policy, contingency planning, training, and capacity building" to counter nuclear terrorism and strengthen incident response capabilities, according to the FY2020 budget justification. The development and production of nuclear weapons during half a century since the beginning of the Manhattan Project resulted in a waste and contamination legacy managed by DOE that continues to present substantial challenges today. DOE also manages legacy environmental contamination at sites used for nondefense nuclear research. In 1989, DOE established the Office of Environmental Management primarily to consolidate its responsibilities for the cleanup of former nuclear weapons production sites that had been administered under multiple offices. DOE's nuclear cleanup efforts are broad in scope and include the disposal of large quantities of radioactive and other hazardous wastes generated over decades; management and disposal of surplus nuclear materials; remediation of extensive contamination in soil and groundwater; decontamination and decommissioning of excess buildings and facilities; and safeguarding, securing, and maintaining facilities while cleanup is underway. DOE's cleanup of nuclear research sites adds a nondefense component to the EM's mission, albeit smaller in terms of the scope of their cleanup and associated funding. DOE has identified more than 100 separate sites in over 30 states that historically were involved in the production of nuclear weapons and nuclear energy research for civilian purposes. The geographic scope of these sites is substantial, collectively encompassing a land area of approximately 2 million acres. Cleanup remedies are in place and operational at the majority of these sites. Responsibility for the long-term stewardship of them has been transferred to the Office of Legacy Management and other offices within DOE for the operation and maintenance of cleanup remedies and monitoring. Some of the smaller sites for which DOE initially was responsible were transferred to the Army Corps of Engineers in 1997 under the Formerly Utilized Sites Remedial Action Program (FUSRAP). Once USACE completes the cleanup of a FUSRAP site, it is transferred back to DOE for long-term stewardship under the Office of Legacy Management, which is separate from EM and has its own funding account. Three appropriations accounts fund the Office of Environmental Management. The Defense Environmental Cleanup account is the largest in terms of funding, and it finances the cleanup of former nuclear weapons production sites. The Non-Defense Environmental Cleanup account funds the cleanup of federal nuclear energy research sites. Title XI of the Energy Policy Act of 1992 ( P.L. 102-486 ) established the Uranium Enrichment Decontamination and Decommissioning Fund to pay for the cleanup of three federal facilities that enriched uranium for national defense and civilian purposes. Those facilities are located near Paducah, KY; Piketon, OH (Portsmouth plant); and Oak Ridge, TN. Title X of P.L. 102-486 authorized the reimbursement of uranium and thorium producers for their costs of cleaning up contamination attributable to uranium and thorium sold to the federal government. The adequacy of funding for the Office of Environmental Management to attain cleanup milestones across the entire site inventory has been a recurring issue. Cleanup milestones are enforceable measures incorporated into compliance agreements negotiated among DOE, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the states. These milestones establish time frames for the completion of specific actions to satisfy applicable requirements at individual sites. DOE's four Power Marketing Administrations were established to sell the power generated by the dams operated by the Bureau of Reclamation and the Army Corps of Engineers. Preference in the sale of power is given to publicly owned and cooperatively owned utilities. The PMAs operate in 34 states; their assets consist primarily of transmission infrastructure in the form of more than 33,000 miles of high voltage transmission lines and 587 substations. PMA customers are responsible for repaying all power program expenses, plus the interest on capital projects. Since FY2011, power revenues associated with the PMAs have been classified as discretionary offsetting receipts (i.e., receipts that are available for spending by the PMAs), thus the agencies are sometimes noted as having a "net-zero" spending authority. Only the capital expenses of WAPA and SWPA require appropriations from Congress. For more information, see CRS Report R45548, The Power Marketing Administrations: Background and Current Issues , by Richard J. Campbell. Independent agencies that receive funding in Title IV of the Energy and Water Development bill include the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), the Appalachian Regional Commission (ARC), and the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board. NRC is by far the largest of the independent agencies, with a total budget of more than $900 million. However, as noted in the description of NRC below, about 90% of NRC's budget is offset by fees, so that the agency's net appropriation is less than half of the total funding in Title IV. The recent appropriations history for all the Title IV agencies is shown in Table 7 . Established in 1965, the Appalachian Regional Commission (ARC) is a regional economic development agency. It awards grants and contracts to state and local governments and nonprofit organizations to foster economic opportunities, improve workforce skills, build critical infrastructure, strengthen natural and cultural assets, and improve leadership skills and capacity in the region. ARC's authorizing statute defines the Appalachian Region as including all of West Virginia and parts of Alabama, Georgia, Kentucky, Maryland, Mississippi, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia. More than 25 million people currently live in the region as defined. ARC provides funding to several hundred projects each year, with particular focus on the region's most economically distressed counties. Major areas of infrastructure support broadband communication systems, transportation, and water and wastewater systems. ARC has supported development of the Appalachian Development Highway System (ADHS), a planned 3,000-mile system of highways that connect with the U.S. Interstate Highway System. According to ARC, 90.5% of ADHS is currently "complete, open to traffic, or under construction." NRC is an independent agency that establishes and enforces safety and security standards for nuclear power plants and users of nuclear materials. Major appropriations categories for NRC are shown in Table 8 . Nuclear Reactor Safety is NRC's largest program and is responsible for licensing and regulating the U.S. fleet of 98 power reactors, plus two under construction. NRC is also responsible for licensing and regulating nuclear waste facilities, such as the proposed underground nuclear waste repository at Yucca Mountain, NV. NRC is required by law to offset about 90% of its total budget, excluding specified items, through fees charged to nuclear reactor owners and other holders of NRC licenses. As a result, NRC's net appropriation can be as low as 10% of its total funding level, depending on the activities that Congress excludes from fee recovery. For example, excluded items in NRC's FY2019 enacted appropriation are prior-year balances, development of advanced reactor regulations, and international activities. The following hearings have been held by the Energy and Water Development subcommittees of the House and Senate Appropriations Committees on the FY2020 budget request. Testimony and opening statements are posted on most of the web pages cited for each hearing, along with webcasts in many cases. Department of Energy , March 26, 2019, https://appropriations.house.gov/legislation/hearings/budget-department-of-energy . Corps of Engineers (Civil Works) and the Bureau of Reclamation , March 27, 2019, https://appropriations.house.gov/legislation/hearings/budget-us-army-corps-of-engineers-and-bureau-of-reclamation . National Nuclear Security Administration , April 2, 2019, https://appropriations.house.gov/legislation/hearings/budget-department-of-energy-national-nuclear-security-administration. DOE Science, Energy, and Environmental Management Programs , April 3, 2019, https://appropriations.house.gov/legislation/hearings/budget-science-energy-and-environmental-management-programs. Department of Energy , March 27, 2019, https://www.appropriations.senate.gov/hearings/review-of-the-fy2020-budget-request-for-the-us-department-of-energy . National Nuclear Security Administration , April 3, 2019, https://www.appropriations.senate.gov/hearings/review-of-the-fy2020-budget-request-for-the-national-nuclear-security-administration . U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the Bureau of Reclamation , April 10, 2019, https://www.appropriations.senate.gov/hearings/review-of-the-fy2020-budget-requests-for-army-corps-of-engineers-and-bureau-of-reclamation .

Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 1.

Answer: FEMA, an agency of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), has obligated more than $36 billion in PA grants to state, local, and tribal governments to help communities recover and rebuild after major disasters since 2009. Further, costs are rising with disasters, such as Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria in 2017. FEMA recently redesigned how the PA program delivers assistance to state and local grantees to improve operations and address past challenges identified by GAO and others. FEMA tested the new delivery model in selected disasters and announced implementation in September 2017. GAO was asked to assess the redesigned PA program. This report examines, among other things, the extent to which FEMA's new delivery model addresses (1) past workforce management challenges and assesses future workforce needs; and (2) past information sharing challenges and key IT management controls. GAO reviewed FEMA policy, strategy, and implementation documents; interviewed FEMA and state officials, PA program applicants, and other stakeholders; and observed implementation of the new model at one test location following Hurricane Matthew in 2016. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) redesigned the Public Assistance (PA) grant program delivery model to address past challenges in workforce management, but has not fully assessed future workforce staffing needs. GAO and others have previously identified challenges related to shortages in experienced and trained FEMA PA staff and high turnover among these staff. These challenges often led to applicants receiving inconsistent guidance and to PA project delays. As part of its new model, FEMA is creating consolidated resource centers to standardize and centralize PA staff responsible for managing grant applications, and new specialized positions, such as hazard mitigation liaisons, program delivery managers, and site inspectors, to ensure more consistent guidance to applicants. However, FEMA has not assessed the workforce needed to fully implement the new model, such as the number of staff needed to fill certain new positions, or to achieve staffing goals for supporting hazard mitigation on PA projects. Fully assessing workforce needs will help to ensure that FEMA has the people and the skills needed to fully implement the new PA model and help to avoid the long-standing workforce challenges the program encountered in the past. FEMA designed a new PA information and case management system—called the FEMA Applicant Case Tracker (FAC-Trax)—to address past information sharing challenges, such as difficulties in sharing grant documentation among FEMA, state, and local officials and tracking the status of PA projects, but additional actions could better ensure effective implementation. Both FEMA and state officials involved in testing of the new model stated that the new information system allows them to better manage and track PA applications and documentation, which could lead to greater transparency and efficiencies in the program. Further, GAO found that this new system fully addresses two of four key information technology (IT) management controls—project planning and risk management—that are necessary to ensure systems work effectively and meet user needs. However, GAO found that FEMA has not fully addressed the other two controls—requirements development and systems testing and integration. By better analyzing progress on high-level user requirements, for example, FEMA will have greater assurance that FAC-Trax will meet user needs and achieve the goals of the new delivery model. GAO is making five recommendations, including that FEMA assess the workforce needed for the new delivery model and improve key IT management controls for its new information sharing and case management system, FAC-Trax. DHS concurred with all recommendations.