You are given two reports by the government agency.  

Report 1:
SSA’s mission is to deliver Social Security services that meet the changing needs of the public. The Social Security Act and amendments established three programs that the agency administers: Old-Age and Survivors Insurance provides monthly retirement and survivors benefits to retired and disabled workers, their spouses and their children, and the survivors of insured workers who have died. SSA has estimated that, in fiscal year 2019, $892 billion in old-age and survivors insurance benefits are expected to be paid to a monthly average of approximately 54 million beneficiaries. Disability Insurance provides monthly benefits to disabled workers and their spouses and children. The agency estimates that, in fiscal year 2019, a total of approximately $149 billion in disability insurance benefits will be paid to a monthly average of about 10 million eligible workers. Supplemental Security Income is a needs-based program financed from general tax revenues that provides benefits to aged adults, blind or disabled adults, and children with limited income and resources. For fiscal year 2019, SSA estimates that nearly $59 billion in federal benefits and state supplementary payments will be made to a monthly average of approximately 8 million recipients. SSA relies heavily on its IT resources to support the administration of its programs and related activities. For example, its systems are used to handle millions of transactions on the agency’s website, maintain records for the millions of beneficiaries and recipients of its programs, and evaluate evidence and make determinations of eligibility for benefits. According to the agency’s most recent Information Resources Strategic Plan, its systems supported the processing of an average daily volume of about 185 million individual transactions in fiscal year 2015. SSA’s Office of the Deputy Commissioner for Systems is responsible for developing, overseeing, and maintaining the agency’s IT systems. Comprised of approximately 3,800 staff, the office is headed by the Deputy Commissioner, who also serves as the agency’s CIO. SSA has long been challenged in its management of IT. As a result, we have previously issued a number of reports highlighting various weaknesses in the agency’s system development practices, governance, requirements management, and strategic planning, among other areas. Collectively, our reports stressed the need for the agency to strengthen its IT management controls. In 2016, we reported that SSA’s acting commissioner had stated that the agency’s aging IT infrastructure was not sustainable because it was increasingly difficult and expensive to maintain. Accordingly, the agency requested $132 million in its fiscal year 2019 budget to modernize its IT environment. As reflected in the budget, these modernization efforts are expected to include projects such as updating database designs by converting them to relational databases, eliminating the use of outdated code, and upgrading infrastructure. Among the agency’s priority IT spending initiatives in the budget is its Disability Case Processing System, which has been under development since December 2010. This system is intended to replace the 52 disparate Disability Determination Services’ component systems and associated processes with a modern, common case processing system. According to SSA, the new system is to modernize the entire claims process, including case processing, correspondence, and workload management. However, SSA has reported substantial difficulty in the agency’s ability to carry out this initiative, citing software quality and poor system performance as issues. Consequently, in June 2016, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) placed the initiative on its government- wide list of 10 high-priority programs requiring attention. As previously mentioned, Congress enacted federal IT acquisition reform legislation (commonly referred to as FITARA) in December 2014. This legislation was intended to improve agencies’ acquisitions of IT and enable Congress to monitor agencies’ progress and hold them accountable for reducing duplication and achieving cost savings. It includes specific requirements related to seven areas: (1) agency CIO authority enhancements, (2) federal data center consolidation initiative, (3) enhanced transparency and improved risk management, (4) portfolio review, (5) IT acquisition cadres, (6) government-wide software purchasing program, and (7) the Federal Strategic Sourcing Initiative. In June 2015, OMB released guidance describing how agencies are to implement FITARA. The guidance identifies a number of actions that agencies are to take to establish a basic set of roles and responsibilities (referred to as the common baseline) for CIOs and other senior agency officials and, thus, to implement the authorities described in the law. More recently, on May 15, 2018, the President signed Executive Order 13833, Enhancing the Effectiveness of Agency Chief Information Officers. Among other things, this executive order is intended to better position agencies to modernize their technology, execute IT programs more efficiently, and reduce cybersecurity risks. The order pertains to 22 of the 24 Chief Financial Officers Act agencies; the Department of Defense and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission are exempt. For the covered agencies, including SSA, the executive order strengthens the role of the CIO by, among other things, requiring the CIO to report directly to the agency head; to serve as the agency head’s primary IT strategic advisor; and to have a significant role in all management, governance, and oversight processes related to IT. In addition, one of the cybersecurity requirements directs agencies to ensure that the CIO works closely with an integrated team of senior executives, including those with expertise in IT, security, and privacy, to implement appropriate risk management measures. In June 2018, we issued a report that examined the cybersecurity workforce of the government. We noted that most of the 24 agencies we examined had developed baseline assessments to identify cybersecurity personnel within their agencies that held certifications, but the results were potentially unreliable. However, SSA’s baseline was found to be reliable because it addressed all of the reportable information, such as the extent to which personnel without professional certifications were ready to obtain them or strategies for mitigating any gaps. Further, we found that most of the 24 agencies had established procedures to assign cybersecurity codes to positions, including SSA. We also have ongoing work at SSA, including reviewing its cybersecurity workforce; standardized approach to security assessment, authorization, and continuous monitoring; cybersecurity strategy; and intrusion detection and prevention capabilities. From July 2011 through January 2018, we issued a number of reports that addressed specific weaknesses in SSA’s management of IT acquisitions and operations and in the role of its CIO. These reports included 15 recommendations aimed at improving the agency’s efforts with regard to data center consolidation, incremental development, IT acquisitions, and software licenses. We also made a recommendation to SSA to address weaknesses related to the role of the CIO in key management areas. SSA has taken steps to improve its management of IT acquisitions and operations by addressing 14 of the 15 recommendations that we previously directed to the agency regarding data center consolidation, incremental development, IT acquisitions, and software licenses. Data center consolidation. OMB established the Federal Data Center Consolidation Initiative in February 2010 to improve the efficiency, performance, and environmental footprint of federal data center activities. The enactment of FITARA in 2014 codified and expanded the initiative. In addition, pursuant to FITARA, in August 2016, the Federal CIO issued a memorandum that announced the Data Center Optimization Initiative as a successor effort to the Federal Data Center Consolidation Initiative. Further, in August 2016, OMB released guidance which established the Data Center Optimization Initiative and included instructions on how to implement the date center consolidation and optimization provisions of FITARA. Among other things, the guidance required agencies to consolidate inefficient infrastructure, optimize existing facilities, improve their security posture, and achieve cost savings. In addition, the guidance directed agencies to develop a data center consolidation and optimization strategic plan that defines the agency’s data center strategy for fiscal years 2016, 2017, and 2018. This strategy is to include, among other things, a statement from the agency CIO indicating whether the agency has complied with all data center reporting requirements in FITARA. Further, the guidance indicates that OMB is to maintain a public dashboard to display consolidation-related cost savings and optimization performance information for the agencies. In a series of reports that we issued from July 2011 through August 2017, we noted that, while data center consolidation could potentially save the federal government billions of dollars, weaknesses existed in agencies’ data center consolidation plans and data center optimization efforts. Specifically with regard to SSA, in 2011, we reported that the agency had an incomplete consolidation plan and inventory of IT assets. In 2016, we reported that SSA did not meet any of the seven applicable data center optimization targets, as required by OMB. In addition, in 2017, we reported that the agency had an incomplete data center optimization plan. We stressed that until SSA completed these required activities, it might not be able to consolidate data centers, as required, and realize expected savings. We made a total of four recommendations to SSA in our 2011, 2016, and 2017 reports to help improve the agency’s reporting of data center-related cost savings and to achieve data center optimization targets. As of September 2018, SSA had implemented all four recommendations. Consequently, the agency is better positioned to improve the efficiency of its data centers and achieve cost savings. In addition, we reported in May 2018 that the agencies participating in the Data Center Optimization Initiative had communicated mixed progress toward achieving OMB’s goals for closing data centers by September 2018. With regard to SSA, we noted that the agency had not yet achieved its planned savings but that its data centers were among the most optimized that we reviewed. In particular, while SSA reported that it planned to save $1.08 million on its data center initiative from 2016 through 2018, it had not achieved any of those savings. However, the agency reported having met the goal of closing 25 percent of its tiered data centers. Further, SSA reported the most progress among the 22 applicable agencies in meeting OMB’s data center optimization targets. Specifically, SSA reported that it had met four of the five targets. (One other agency reported that it had met three targets, 6 agencies reported having met either one or two targets, and 14 agencies reported meeting none of the targets). Consequently, we did not make any additional recommendations to SSA in our May 2018 report. We also have ongoing work involving SSA related to agencies’ progress on closing data center and achieving optimization targets. Incremental development. OMB has emphasized the need to deliver investments in smaller parts, or increments, in order to reduce risk, deliver capabilities more quickly, and facilitate the adoption of emerging technologies. In 2010, it called for agencies’ major investments to deliver functionality every 12 months and, since 2012, every 6 months. Subsequently, FITARA codified a requirement that covered agency CIOs certify that IT investments are adequately implementing incremental development, as defined in the capital planning guidance issued by OMB. Further, subsequent OMB guidance on the law’s implementation, issued in June 2015, directed agency CIOs to define processes and policies for their agencies to ensure that they certify that IT resources are adequately implementing incremental development. In November 2017, we reported that 21 agencies, including SSA, needed to improve their certification of incremental development. We pointed out that, as of August 2016, agencies had reported that 103 of 166 major IT software development investments (62 percent) were certified by the agency CIO for implementing adequate incremental development in fiscal year 2017, as required by FITARA. With regard to SSA, we noted that only 3 of the agency’s 10 investments primarily in development had been certified by the agency CIO as using adequate incremental development, as required by FITARA. In addition, we noted that SSA’s incremental development certification policy did not describe the CIO’s role in the certification process or how CIO certification would be documented. However, accurate agency CIO certification of the use of adequate incremental development for major IT investments is critical to ensuring that agencies are making the best effort possible to create IT systems that add value while reducing the risks associated with low-value and wasteful investments. As a result of these findings, we recommended that SSA ensure that its CIO (1) reports major IT investment information related to incremental development accurately, in accordance with OMB guidance; and (2) updates the agency’s policy and processes for the certification of incremental development and confirm that the policy includes a description of how the CIO certification will be documented. SSA agreed with our recommendations and implemented both of them. Thus, the agency should be better positioned to realize the benefits of incremental development practices, such as reducing investment risk, delivering capabilities more rapidly, and permitting easier adoption of emerging technologies. IT acquisitions. FITARA includes a provision to enhance covered agency CIOs’ authority through, among other things, requiring agency heads to ensure that CIOs review and approve IT contracts. OMB’s FITARA implementation guidance expanded upon this aspect of the legislation in a number of ways. Specifically, according to the guidance, CIOs may review and approve IT acquisition strategies and plans, rather than individual IT contracts, and CIOs can designate other agency officials to act as their representatives. In January 2018, we reported that most of the CIOs at 22 selected agencies, including SSA, were not adequately involved in reviewing and approving billions of dollars of IT acquisitions. In particular, we found that SSA’s process to identify IT acquisitions for CIO review did not involve the acquisition office, as required by OMB. In addition, we noted that SSA had a CIO review and approval process in place that fully satisfied the requirements set forth in OMB’s guidance. However, while SSA provided evidence of the CIO’s review of most of the IT contracts we examined, the agency had not ensured that the CIO or a designee reviewed and approved each IT acquisition plan or strategy. Specifically, of 10 randomly selected IT contracts that we examined at SSA, 7 acquisitions associated with those contracts had been reviewed and approved, as required by OMB. We pointed out that, until SSA ensured that its CIO or designee reviewed and approved all IT acquisitions, the agency would have limited visibility and input into its planned IT expenditures and would not be effectively positioned to benefit from the increased authority that FITARA’s contract approval provision is intended to provide. Further, the agency could miss an opportunity to strengthen the CIO’s authority and the oversight of IT acquisitions—thus, increasing the potential to award IT contracts that are duplicative, wasteful, or poorly conceived. Accordingly, we made three recommendations to SSA to address these weaknesses. As of September 2018, the agency had made progress by implementing two of the recommendations: to ensure that (1) the acquisition office is involved in identifying IT acquisitions and (2) the CIO or designee reviews and approves IT acquisitions according to OMB guidance. By taking these actions, SSA should be better positioned to properly identify and provide oversight of IT acquisitions. However, SSA has not yet implemented our third recommendation that it issue guidance to assist in the identification of IT acquisitions. SSA stated that, in September 2017, it updated its policy for acquisition plan approval to address this recommendation; however, upon review of this policy, we did not find guidance for identifying IT acquisitions. Without the proper identification of IT acquisitions, SSA’s CIO cannot effectively provide oversight of these acquisitions. Software licenses. Federal agencies engage in thousands of software licensing agreements annually. The objective of software license management is to manage, control, and protect an organization’s software assets. Effective management of these licenses can help avoid purchasing too many licenses, which can result in unused software, as well as too few licenses, which can result in noncompliance with license terms and cause the imposition of additional fees. As part of its PortfolioStat initiative, OMB has developed policy that addresses software licenses. This policy requires agencies to conduct an annual, agency-wide IT portfolio review to, among other things, reduce commodity IT spending. Such areas of spending could include software licenses. In May 2014, we reported on federal agencies’ management of software licenses and determined that better management was needed to achieve significant savings government-wide. Of the 24 agencies we reviewed, SSA was 1 of 22 that lacked comprehensive policies that incorporated leading practices. In particular, SSA’s policy partially met four of the leading practices and did not meet one. Further, we noted that SSA was among 22 of the 24 selected agencies that had not established comprehensive software license inventories—a leading practice that would help the agencies to adequately manage their software licenses. As such, we made six recommendations to SSA to improve its policies and practices for managing software licenses. These included recommendations that the agency develop a comprehensive policy for the management of software licenses and establish a comprehensive inventory of software licenses. SSA agreed with the recommendations and, as of September 2018, had implemented all six of them. As a result, the agency should be better positioned to manage its software licenses and identify opportunities for reducing software license costs. While SSA has taken steps that improved its IT management in the areas of data center consolidation, incremental development, IT acquisitions, and software licenses, we reported in August 2018 that the agency had not fully addressed the role of the CIO in its policies. As previously mentioned, FITARA and the President Executive Order 13833, among other laws and guidance, outline the roles and responsibilities for agency CIOs in an attempt to improve the government’s performance in IT and related information management functions. Within these laws and guidance, we identified IT management responsibilities assigned to CIOs in six key IT areas: Leadership and accountability. CIOs are responsible and accountable for the effective implementation of IT management responsibilities. For example, CIOs are to report directly to the agency head or that official’s deputy and designate a senior agency information security officer. Strategic planning. CIOs are required to lead the strategic planning for all IT management functions. An example of a CIO requirement related to the strategic planning area is measuring how well IT supports agency programs and reporting annually on the progress in achieving the goals. IT workforce. CIOs are to assess agency IT workforce needs and develop strategies and plans for meeting those needs. For example, CIOs are responsible for annually assessing the extent to which agency personnel meet IT management knowledge and skill requirements, developing strategies to address deficiencies, and reporting to the head of the agency on the progress made in improving these capabilities. IT budgeting. CIOs are responsible for the processes for all annual and multi-year IT planning, programming, and budgeting decisions. For example, CIOs are to have a significant role in IT planning, programming, and budgeting decisions. IT investment management. CIOs are to manage, evaluate, and assess how well the agency is managing its IT resources. In particular, CIOs are required to improve the management of the agency’s IT through portfolio review. Information security. CIOs are to establish, implement, and ensure compliance with an agency-wide information security program. For example, CIOs are required to develop and maintain an agency-wide security program, policies, procedures, and control techniques. In our August 2018 report, we noted that SSA, along with 23 other agencies, did not have policies that fully addressed the role of the CIO in these six key areas, consistent with the laws and guidance. To its credit, SSA had fully addressed the role of the CIO in the IT leadership and accountability area. In particular, the agency’s policies addressed the requirements that the CIO report directly to the agency head, assume responsibility and accountability for IT investments, and designate a senior agency information security officer. However, the policies did not fully address the role of the CIO in the other five areas (i.e., strategic planning, workforce, budgeting, investment management, and information security). For example, the agency’s policies did not address the IT workforce area at all, including the requirements that the CIO annually assess the extent to which agency personnel meet IT management knowledge and skill requirements, develop strategies to address deficiencies, and report to the head of the agency on the progress made in improving these capabilities. Further, SSA’s policies minimally addressed the requirements for IT strategic planning. Specifically, while the agency’s policies required the CIO to establish goals for improving agency operations through IT, the policies did not require the CIO to measure how well IT supports agency programs and report annually on the progress in achieving the goals. Table 1 summarizes the extent to which SSA’s policies addressed the role of its CIO, as reflected in our August 2018 report. As a result of these findings, we made a recommendation to SSA to address the weaknesses in its policies with regard to the remaining five key management areas. In response, the agency agreed with our recommendation and, subsequently, stated that it planned to do so by the end of September 2018. Following through to ensure that the identified weaknesses are addressed in its policies will be essential to helping SSA overcome its longstanding IT management challenges. In conclusion, effective IT management is critical to the performance of SSA’s mission. Toward this end, the agency has taken steps to improve its management of IT acquisitions and operations by implementing 14 of the 15 recommendations we made from 2011 through 2018 to improve its IT management. Nevertheless, SSA would be better positioned to effectively address longstanding IT management challenges by ensuring that it has policies in place that fully address the role and responsibilities of its CIO in the five key management areas, as we previously recommended. Chairman Johnson, Ranking Member Larson, and Members of the Subcommittee, this completes my prepared statement. I would be pleased to respond to any questions that you may have. If you or your staffs have any questions about this testimony, please contact Carol C. Harris at (202) 512-4456 or harriscc@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this testimony statement. GAO staff who made key contributions to this statement are Kevin Walsh (Assistant Director), Jessica Waselkow (Analyst in Charge), and Rebecca Eyler. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. 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 Report 2:
T he federal government collects various fees and other charges from businesses and households. Choosing to raise public funds via user fees, as opposed to other means such as taxes, has important administrative and economic consequences. Many fees stem from "business-like activities," in which the government provides a service or benefit in return for payment. For example, many n ational p arks charge entry fees , which then help fund maintenance projects. Some fees are closely tied to regulatory or judicial activities, such as filing or inspection fees, which stem from the federal government's sovereign powers. Other federal fees or charges are intragovernmental transactions that do not involve the public. For example, the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) charges other federal agencies fees to cover the cost of background investigations. For many federal agencies, fees or user charges amount to a minimal portion of budgetary resources. Other regulatory agencies, such as the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO), and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), are wholly or partially funded by user fees and other nontax receipts. User fees from the public accounted for $331 billion in FY2017, about a tenth of total federal receipts ( $3.32 trillion ). Fees and charges generally result from voluntary choices, such as entering a national park. By contrast, the collection of taxes ultimately relies on the government's sovereign power to compel payments. Fees may not be compulsory, but not paying them may make it impossible to carry out many activities legally. For instance, without paying passport application fees and obtaining a passport, people cannot fly to other countries. Nor can businesses issue securities without paying federal filing fees. The statutory basis for each particular fee or user charge varies in specificity and in the degree of discretion granted to the executive branch. For example, authorizing legislation might specify in detail how certain fees are imposed and how proceeds are used. In other cases, federal agencies rely on broader authorities to impose user fees. User fees have several advantages as a means of financing public activities. They are voluntary, they connect the burden of financing activities to those who directly benefit from them, and they can help decentralize decisionmaking by bypassing centralized allocation of resources. At times, proposals to raise fees may encounter less political resistance than proposals to raise an equivalent sum via taxes. On the other hand, the flow of user fees and charges may reflect fluctuations in economic conditions, which may complicate the financing of government operations. Some are also concerned that funding arrangements may bypass regular congressional scrutiny and dilute Congress's power of the purse. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) defines a user fee as a fee assessed to users for goods or services provided by the federal government. User fees generally apply to federal programs or activities that provide special benefits to identifiable recipients above and beyond what is normally available to the public. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) defines the term user charge to include transactions not normally considered fees, such as land or asset sales. OMB's budget preparation documents state that user charges include not only proceeds from selling postage stamps, electricity, and Medicare Part B premiums, but also sales of assets and natural resources, among other categories. The federal government, which operates on a modified cash accounting basis, does not recognize in its budgetary accounts the loss of asset values when it sells assets or natural resources, as a private firm would using typical business accounting methods. For instance, if the government were to sell oil at a price of $60 per barrel that it bought at $120 per barrel, only the current revenues would be reflected in budget accounts. A private firm would normally adjust its balance sheet to reflect a loss. OMB designates whether each account receives collections associated with user charges, and that information is contained within OMB's MAX budget data system. OMB has not released data on those designations. The Budget Appendix that OMB issues annually, while not including information on that designation, does present detailed subaccount-level data that often indicate whether a federal program's budgetary resources rely on fee income. The format of the Budget Appendix, however, makes it an impractical source of data for government-wide research. As far as CRS can determine, a comprehensive and authoritative list of federal fees is not publicly available. Budget and financial documents from OMB and the U.S. Treasury, however, do provide detailed information on offsetting collections and offsetting receipts—the budget categories that typically contain user fees and other charges—as well as information on budgetary accounts. In some cases, account descriptions clearly indicate an association with one or more fees. In other cases, however, whether or not an account receives fees is unclear. For example, an account might be labeled as miscellaneous receipts, or as fines, fees, and penalties. User fees classified as offsetting collections, which go into expenditure accounts, generally can be used without further congressional action. Offsetting collections, as the term suggests, typically count as offsets to spending when accounts are scored to check compliance with various budgetary controls. Scorekeeping is the process of measuring the budgetary effects of legislation. For example, the Budget Control Act of 2011 ( P.L. 112-25 ) imposed caps on specified categories of discretionary budget authority. When evaluating compliance with those caps, scorekeepers (CBO, OMB, and the b udget c ommittees) subtract offsetting collections from budget authority totals. User fees or charges are collected into the U.S. Treasury General Fund or into special fund accounts. Offsetting receipts, which go into receipt accounts, typically require approval through appropriations acts. User fees can be classified as discretionary or mandatory spending, depending on how those fees are authorized. Some payments to the federal government, such as electromagnetic spectrum auction proceeds or offshore continental shelf oil and gas leases that are classified as undistributed offsetting receipts, do not offset spending of any agency, but are recorded as reducing the federal deficit. OMB provides a discussion of budget concepts related to offsetting receipts and offsetting collections, which include the bulk of user fees and charges in terms of dollar amounts, in the President's annual budget submission. More detailed supplementary tables that summarize collections of offsetting receipts and offsetting collections are also provided online. The U.S. Treasury's Bureau of the Fiscal Service issues its annual Combined Statement that reports budget data for all federal agencies at an account level as well as detailed summaries of receipts, including user fees. The Monthly Treasury Statement and a quarterly statement of offsetting receipts provide data on an ongoing basis. As the Treasury's role and responsibilities differ from those of OMB, totals from Treasury sources may not coincide with data issued by OMB due to various budgetary reporting adjustments. GAO has analyzed the administration of various user fees and has set out some principles for the design of those fees . User fees, as noted above, can tie benefits enjoyed by households or firms—such as passports, access to national parks, or approvals to raise investment funds from the public—to payments that can help defray public costs of providing them. An economist's rule of thumb known as the benefit principle, which suggests linking the fiscal burden of publicly provided benefits to those who enjoy those benefits, can promote fairness and efficiency. For example, many would contend that those with the opportunity to travel abroad should shoulder more of the costs of reviewing passport applications and issuing documents than those who do not. Moreover, if fees are set at levels that match the incremental cost of providing benefits, then when an agency is called to expand its work—such as an uptick in demand for passports, park visits, or company registrations—then those fees could fund the needed extra resources. Matching fees to incremental costs, however, is difficult where demand is irregular or unpredictable. OMB guidelines on user fees outline aims similar to the benefit principle, mandating that federal agencies ensure that each service, sale, or use of Government goods or resources provided by an agency to specific recipients be self-sustaining; promote efficient allocation of the Nation's resources by establishing charges for special benefits provided to the recipient that are at least as great as costs to the Government of providing the special benefits; and allow the private sector to compete with the Government without disadvantage in supplying comparable services, resources, or goods where appropriate. OMB mandates that agencies review user fees every other year. OMB also encourages agencies seeking new authority to assess fees to "seek to remove restraints on user charges." In some cases, federal agencies and regulated industries negotiate over user fee levels and the improvements in federal regulatory operations supported in large part by those fees. For instance, pharmaceutical companies negotiate with the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) over fees charged to review drug applications. Over time, the scope of FDA activities supported in part by fees has expanded. Some contend that the FDA's increasing reliance on user fees has tilted the agency's priorities toward industry interests and away from consumer protection responsibilities. One 2005 analysis of the FDA drug review process found that approval times decreased after legislation expanded the agency's reliance on user fees, while it found no statistically significant evidence of a decrease in one proxy measure of drug safety. Federal agencies such as the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) are largely supported from amounts paid by covered industries. The costs and benefits associated with many goods and services mainly involve buyers and sellers. For example, buying a stamp allows a correspondent to mail a letter, which leads the postal service to incur roughly similar costs. Others—at least to a first approximation—are not affected. For other goods, market or market-like transactions may impose costs or convey benefits on third parties. When prices paid by buyers or received by sellers do not reflect spillover costs or benefits to others, economic theory suggests levels of transactions will be inefficient, in the sense that alternative economic arrangements could make all participants—at least potentially—better off. The benefit principle is in some ways similar to the concept of Pigou taxation—that taxing goods linked to negative spillovers, such as pollution, can enhance economic efficiency by diminishing those spillovers. More generally, spillovers are costs borne or benefits enjoyed by one party due to activities of another party where no voluntary exchange or market transaction occurs. Conversely, subsidizing goods or services that provide beneficial spillovers can also increase economic efficiency. For instance, some justify federal tax subsidies to home ownership on the grounds that homeowners generate positive spillovers in their neighborhoods. Charges aimed at limiting negative spillovers are known as Pigou taxes, after the English economist who first articulated the concept. Pigou taxation provides a more narrowly based efficiency rationale for user fees that would limit negative spillovers. Moreover, administering an excise tax imposed on Pigou tax grounds—which would involve a private vendor collecting and remitting tax revenues—differs from user fees and charges collected directly by a government. Nonetheless, the same logic that raising the end-user price of goods linked to negative spillovers can enhance economic efficiency can be applied to the design of user fees. For instance, federal policymakers might choose to charge pharmaceutical companies application fees lower than the full cost of associated approval processes because introducing new drugs onto the market may have wider positive social benefits. The economic suitability of the benefit principle depends on whether the publicly provided benefit has meaningful spillover effects. For example, benefits generated by governments such as national defense or support for basic research are widely shared and thus, arguably, are appropriately supported by general taxation. By contrast, while the broader economy benefits from the ability of firms to raise capital in transparent and competitive markets, the chief beneficiary of having a security offering approved is the issuing firm. Similarly, a family visiting a federal park presumably benefits more than another family that stayed at home. Financing more of park maintenance through general taxation would thus involve an implicit subsidy from nonusers to users, something that reliance on user fees would mitigate. In other cases, the linkage between fees and benefits is not apparent. For example, a 2009 law ( Travel Promotion Act of 2009 , TPA; P.L. 111-145 ) imposed a $10 fee on most international air travelers from visa-waiver countries to fund tourism marketing initiatives . An exact match between the level of user fees and publicly provided benefits may be hard or impossible to determine in many situations. While public corporations operating on a largely commercial basis, such as the Tennessee Valley Authority, may set prices and fees much as a private firm would, many of the federal government's activities are within the public sector because past policymakers considered them to be closely associated with inherently governmental functions—such as providing security—or as services that the private sector would have had trouble providing, such as basic research. The U.S. Postal Service sets rates to cover nearly all of its costs according to a 2006 statutory framework . Subsidized rates for certain classes of mail users, such as the blind, reflect adaptation of pricing schemes to broader social priorities. The proper boundaries between public, private, and nonprofit sectors, of course, is an ongoing concern of policymakers. In many cases, it is difficult to design fees, charges, or taxes that directly influence activities generating negative spillovers. For instance, cars and trucks generate air pollution as well as wear and tear on roadways. Excise taxes on gasoline and other fuels—if set at levels that approximate the costs of pollution and road wear—can motivate drivers to use roads less often when the total costs of driving, including pollution, road wear, and other costs, exceed the benefits of driving. Thus, excise taxes can be a way of using the price mechanism to induce individuals to make decisions that lead to more economically efficient outcomes. Setting excise taxes at levels that reflect all costs to third parties may involve complex estimates. For instance, while higher fuel usage implies greater use of roads and more production of air pollutants, several other factors complicate that linkage. Heavier vehicles may cause disproportionate damage to roads. Vehicles vary widely in fuel efficiency and in the volume of pollutants generated. In addition, driving also imposes congestion costs on other drivers, and those costs vary by location and time of day. One recent analysis estimated that fuel excise taxes addressed less than a third of the air-pollution-related efficiency losses. While excise taxes are a public finance instrument that is distinct from user fees and charges, similar complications may be encountered. In some cases, adopting new fiscal instruments—such as using road charges or tolls—may prove more effective tools in increasing efficiency. In the case of transportation policy, increased economic efficiency, depending on how consumers and policymakers respond, might manifest itself in some combination of higher after-tax incomes, greater provision of publicly provided goods, cleaner air, and less-congested highways. Changes in the design of some user fees or charges might also yield analogous efficiency improvements. Some observers have raised concerns that federal agencies that rely more heavily on user fees may put greater weight on the interests of those paying fees rather than the broader public interest. For instance, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office charges application and examination fees to those seeking to obtain a patent. Certainly, the applicant would be a central beneficiary of a patent, if granted, although many others—including other inventors, business competitors, and consumers—might also be significantly harmed or benefited. Some contend that the Patent Office's reliance on fees motivates it to approve invalid patents . Tying patent fees narrowly to the benefits obtained by the applicant, while overlooking wider spillover effects, might then result in poor decisions. Of course, nonfinancial policy instruments, such as applicable laws, regulations, or congressional oversight, may affect outcomes more directly. Administrative concerns may also play a role. In some cases, where the costs of collecting fees are high relative to the costs of providing public services, imposing user fees may be a suboptimal choice of funding. For instance, federal courts collect more in PACER fees (which provide access to court documents ) than is needed to maintain the underlying computer system , with excess fees being earmarked for other court improvements. Some argue that funding that system and other court improvements with general revenues would allow broader access to court filings and related public documents, which one proposal ( H.R. 6714 introduced in the 115 th Congress ) would have implemented. Charging access fees above incremental costs—which for electronic documents may be minimal—can limit access to public information. Eliminating PACER user fees , however, may require Congress to shift that fiscal burden elsewhere. Other policy concerns also may play a role. Ability to pay among households varies widely; a national park entrance fee that one family regarded as trivial might deter another family. Policymakers may also wish to express preferences for identifiable groups, such as the elderly, children, or veterans. The classification of fees, charges, taxes, and even negative loan subsidy amounts hinges on budget concepts outlined above along with scorekeeping rules and precedents. In some cases, the distinctions made to categorize a given receipt might seem arbitrary to some. For example, the Travel Promotion Act fees imposed on most international air travelers convey n o special benefit on them, but are not categorized a s tax es . Refundable biofuel tax credits are counted as negative taxes in budget documents rather than as subsidy outlays. Those distinctions, however, can affect the tax treatment of those receipts. For instance, a firm can generally deduct an excise tax from its gross revenues, but typically cannot deduct a fee. Some governments have instituted user fees to fill shortfalls in tax revenues. The economic burden of higher fees or charges might be less obvious and therefore subject to less resistance than broad-based taxes. For example, policymakers in several states have sought to avoid increases in general taxes by increasing fee revenues. That strategy may have two downsides. First, more narrowly focused fees set at higher levels could cause greater economic distortions than smaller taxes applied to a broader base. Second, more narrowly based fees might be less stable in economic downturns. To the extent that fees diverge from the incremental costs of publicly provided services, sudden fiscal adjustments might be required. If benefits from federal operations are distributed narrowly enough to justify financing them via user fees or charges, one might ask whether those activities should be carried out by the private sector. State and local governments and the federal government have privatized many services previously provided by government. Foreign governments have also privatized provision of goods and services once delivered by the public sector. Some activities, however, may involve inherently governmental responsibilities that would be difficult to devolve to the private sector. A 1997 GAO report noted that rigorous evaluations of cost savings of privatization initiatives at the state and local government level were not common. GAO also noted that privatization increased the need for oversight and evaluation, although some local officials deemed that the "weakest link" in privatization initiatives. Others note that while privatization may yield efficiency gains, it may also lead to policy or operational failure. Conflicts between executive branch agencies, which often have sought greater flexibility to use funds to respond to public priorities as they see them, and Congress, which has sought to defend its fiscal prerogatives and ability to set federal policy priorities, are long-standing. In 1849, Congress sought to bolster its powers of the purse by passing the Miscellaneous Receipts Act , which required all government revenues, aside from postal sales, to be deposited into the U.S. Treasury "at as early a day as practicable, without any abatement or deduction on account of salary, fees, costs, charges, expenses, or claim of any description whatever…" Over time, Congress set out exceptions to the modern version of the Miscellaneous Receipts Act that let agencies charge user fees, accept gifts, and collect and retain fines and penalties within specified limits or as detailed in appropriations laws. Some legislative proposals, such as H.R. 850 (115 th Congress) , would eliminate most exceptions and require most fees and charges to be deposited in the U.S. Treasury General Fund. Congress could fund agencies and activities directly through annual appropriations. Funding through lump-sum appropriations, as opposed to via user fees, however, might change incentives facing decisionmakers and could affect federal operations and programmatic outcomes. Congress could constrain agency discretion by requiring more user fee proceeds be either subject to annual appropriations or deposited in the U.S. Treasury General Fund, although that may limit agencies' capacity to respond to new public demands and other changing conditions, as the Government Accountability Office (GAO) has noted . Some inspectors general and congressional committees have also called for tighter, more efficient, and more consistent financial management of user fee funds. During the mid-1980s, Congress, with GAO support, conducted a comprehensive review of so-called "backdoor spending"—an informal term for budget authority provided in laws other than appropriations acts—including spending supported by user fees, which was updated in 1996 . A narrower follow-up in 2017 covering five agencies concluded that "all entities GAO examined have policies and procedures to manage and report on their permanent funding authorities," but that "some, however, could improve practices to manage funds and report information that facilitates oversight." Sweeping changes to the budgetary treatment of user fees, however, could add new pressures on the congressional appropriations process. Proposals to require that most fees be collected into the Treasury General Fund and that activities previously supported by those fees be funded by annual appropriations could create new demands on appropriations committees. Such proposals could also affect the division of responsibilities among authorizing committees and appropriations committees. Statutory texts governing many fees, including those noted above, have evolved over many years and involve substantive policy decisions, often related to industry or programmatic concerns. Congress may also enhance its oversight of agencies reliant on user fees by requiring more timely and detailed financial reports as well as more precise and systematic explanations of linkages between those fees and associated programs. OMB and Treasury issue extensive information on user fees and charges. Nonetheless, the format and level of detail of published data make it difficult to address some government-wide policy questions regarding user fees and charges. Congress could modify laws governing the President's budget submission (31 U.S.C. 1105) to require OMB to release data that it collects on which budget accounts receive material amounts of user fee and user charge revenues. That could allow Congress to track and analyze user fees and charges more easily. In particular, it would also provide a means to distinguish discretionary and mandatory fees and charges, which could be useful in understanding the effects or constraints imposed by budget enforcement measures. That might provide Congress with a clearer view of its fiscal options when considering budgetary measures. Mandating that OMB or other agencies provide more data would probably require additional budgetary resources to cover costs of new personnel and capabilities. Congress can promote economic efficiency and an equitable sharing of public burdens by choosing appropriate means of financing federal operations. User fees and charges, as noted above, can help tie the costs of supporting specific federal operations with those who benefit from them. Even if closely regulated industries may find federal requirements, inspections, or approval processes burdensome, they also presumably benefit from the increased demand for their products that carry the imprimatur of explicit or implicit federal approval. Federal regulation and inspection operations, however, also serve broader interests of consumers, taxpayers, and related industries. To the extent that inherently governmental responsibilities motivate federal operations, the argument for using general revenues may be stronger. If benefits of federal actions are more narrowly distributed, the case for financing operations with user fees or charges may become stronger. Of course, the structure and administration of federal inspection and regulation plays a central role in enhancing efficiency and minimizing burdens borne relative to benefits enjoyed.

Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 1.

Answer: SSA delivers services that touch the lives of almost every American, and relies heavily on IT resources to do so. Its systems support a range of activities, such as processing Disability Insurance payments, to calculating and withholding Medicare premiums, and issuing Social Security numbers and cards. For fiscal year 2018, the agency planned to spend approximately $1.6 billion on IT. GAO has previously reported that federal IT projects have often failed, in part, due to a lack of oversight and governance. Given the challenges that federal agencies, including SSA, have encountered in managing IT acquisitions, Congress and the administration have taken steps to improve federal IT, including enacting federal IT acquisition reform legislation and issuing related guidance. This statement summarizes GAO's previously reported findings regarding SSA's management of IT acquisitions and operations. In developing this testimony, GAO summarized findings from its reports issued in 2011 through 2018, and information on SSA's actions in response to GAO's recommendations. The Social Security Administration (SSA) has improved its management of information technology (IT) acquisitions and operations by addressing 14 of the 15 recommendations that GAO has made to the agency. For example, Incremental development . The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has emphasized the need for agencies to deliver IT investments in smaller increments to reduce risk and deliver capabilities more quickly. In November 2017, GAO reported that agencies, including SSA, needed to improve their certification of incremental development. As a result, GAO recommended that SSA's CIO (1) report incremental development information accurately, and (2) update its incremental development policy and processes. SSA implemented both recommendations. Software licenses . Effective management of software licenses can help avoid purchasing too many licenses that result in unused software. In May 2014, GAO reported that most agencies, including SSA, lacked comprehensive software license policies. As a result, GAO made six recommendations to SSA, to include developing a comprehensive software licenses policy and inventory. SSA implemented all six recommendations. However, SSA's IT management policies have not fully addressed the role of its CIO. Various laws and related guidance assign IT management responsibilities to CIOs in six key areas. In August 2018, GAO reported that SSA had fully addressed the role of the CIO in one of the six areas (see table). Specifically, SSA's policies fully addressed the CIO's role in the IT leadership and accountability area by requiring the CIO to report directly to the agency head, among other things. In contrast, SSA's policies did not address or minimally addressed the IT workforce and IT strategic planning areas. For example, SSA's policies did not include requirements for the CIO to annually assess the extent to which personnel meet IT management skill requirements or to measure how well IT supports agency programs. GAO recommended that SSA address the weaknesses in the remaining five key areas. SSA agreed with GAO's recommendation and stated that the agency plans to implement the recommendation by the end of this month. GAO has made 15 recommendations to SSA to improve its management of IT acquisitions and operations from 2011 through 2018, and 1 recommendation to improve its CIO policies. While SSA has implemented nearly all of them, it would be better positioned to overcome longstanding IT management challenges when it addresses the CIO's role in its policies.