You are given two reports by the government agency.  

Report 1:
IT systems supporting federal agencies and our nation’s critical infrastructures are inherently at risk. These systems are highly complex and dynamic, technologically diverse, and often geographically dispersed. This complexity increases the difficulty in identifying, managing, and protecting the numerous operating systems, applications, and devices comprising the systems and networks. Compounding the risk, federal systems and networks are also often interconnected with other internal and external systems and networks, including the Internet. This increases the number of avenues of attack and expands their attack surface. As systems become more integrated, cyber threats will pose an increasing risk to national security, economic well-being, and public health and safety. Advancements in technology, such as data analytics software for searching and collecting information, have also made it easier for individuals and organizations to correlate data (including PII) and track it across large and numerous databases. For example, social media has been used as a mass communication tool where PII can be gathered in vast amounts. In addition, ubiquitous Internet and cellular connectivity makes it easier to track individuals by allowing easy access to information pinpointing their locations. These advances—combined with the increasing sophistication of hackers and others with malicious intent, and the extent to which both federal agencies and private companies collect sensitive information about individuals—have increased the risk of PII being exposed and compromised. Cybersecurity incidents continue to impact entities across various critical infrastructure sectors. For example, in its 2018 annual data breach investigations report, Verizon reported that 53,308 security incidents and 2,216 data breaches were identified across 65 countries in the 12 months since its prior report. Further, the report noted that cybercriminals can often compromise a system in just a matter of minutes—or even seconds, but that it can take an organization significantly longer to discover the breach. Specifically, the report stated nearly 90 percent of the reported breaches occurred within minutes, while nearly 70 percent went undiscovered for months. These concerns are further highlighted by the number of information security incidents reported by federal executive branch civilian agencies to DHS’s U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT). For fiscal year 2017, 35,277 such incidents were reported by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in its 2018 annual report to Congress, as mandated by the Federal Information Security Modernization Act (FISMA). These incidents include, for example, web-based attacks, phishing, and the loss or theft of computing equipment. Different types of incidents merit different response strategies. However, if an agency cannot identify the threat vector (or avenue of attack), it could be difficult for that agency to define more specific handling procedures to respond to the incident and take actions to minimize similar future attacks. In this regard, incidents with a threat vector categorized as “other” (which includes avenues of attacks that are unidentified) made up 31 percent of the various incidents reported to US-CERT. Figure 1 shows the percentage of the different types of incidents reported across each of the nine threat vector categories for fiscal year 2017, as reported by OMB. These incidents and others like them can pose a serious challenge to economic, national, and personal privacy and security. The following examples highlight the impact of such incidents: In March 2018, the Mayor of Atlanta, Georgia, reported that the city was victimized by a ransomware cyberattack. As a result, city government officials stated that customers were not able to access multiple applications that are used to pay bills or access court related information. In response to the attack, the officials noted that they were working with numerous private and governmental partners, including DHS, to assess what occurred and determine how best to protect the city from future attacks. In March 2018, the Department of Justice reported that it had indicted nine Iranians for conducting a massive cybersecurity theft campaign on behalf of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. According to the department, the nine Iranians allegedly stole more than 31 terabytes of documents and data from more than 140 American universities, 30 U.S. companies, and five federal government agencies, among other entities. In March 2018, a joint alert from DHS and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) stated that, since at least March 2016, Russian government actors had targeted the systems of multiple U.S. government entities and critical infrastructure sectors. Specifically, the alert stated that Russian government actors had affected multiple organizations in the energy, nuclear, water, aviation, construction, and critical manufacturing sectors. In July 2017, a breach at Equifax resulted in the loss of PII for an estimated 148 million U.S. consumers. According to Equifax, the hackers accessed people’s names, Social Security numbers (SSN), birth dates, addresses and, in some instances, driver’s license numbers. In April 2017, the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) testified that the IRS had disabled its data retrieval tool in early March 2017 after becoming concerned about the misuse of taxpayer data. Specifically, the agency suspected that PII obtained outside the agency’s tax system was used to access the agency’s online federal student aid application in an attempt to secure tax information through the data retrieval tool. In April 2017, the agency began notifying taxpayers who could have been affected by the breach. In June 2015, OPM reported that an intrusion into its systems had affected the personnel records of about 4.2 million current and former federal employees. Then, in July 2015, the agency reported that a separate, but related, incident had compromised its systems and the files related to background investigations for 21.5 million individuals. In total, OPM estimated 22.1 million individuals had some form of PII stolen, with 3.6 million being a victim of both breaches. Safeguarding federal IT systems and the systems that support critical infrastructures has been a long-standing concern of GAO. Due to increasing cyber-based threats and the persistent nature of information security vulnerabilities, we have designated information security as a government-wide high-risk area since 1997. In 2003, we expanded the information security high-risk area to include the protection of critical cyber infrastructure. At that time, we highlighted the need to manage critical infrastructure protection activities that enhance the security of the cyber and physical public and private infrastructures that are essential to national security, national economic security, and/or national public health and safety. We further expanded the information security high-risk area in 2015 to include protecting the privacy of PII. Since then, advances in technology have enhanced the ability of government and private sector entities to collect and process extensive amounts of PII, which has posed challenges to ensuring the privacy of such information. In addition, high- profile PII breaches at commercial entities, such as Equifax, heightened concerns that personal privacy is not being adequately protected. Our experience has shown that the key elements needed to make progress toward being removed from the High-Risk List are top-level attention by the administration and agency leaders grounded in the five criteria for removal, as well as any needed congressional action. The five criteria for removal that we identified in November 2000 are as follows: Leadership Commitment. Demonstrated strong commitment and top leadership support. Capacity. The agency has the capacity (i.e., people and resources) to resolve the risk(s). Action Plan. A corrective action plan exists that defines the root cause, solutions, and provides for substantially completing corrective measures, including steps necessary to implement solutions we recommended. Monitoring. A program has been instituted to monitor and independently validate the effectiveness and sustainability of corrective measures. Demonstrated Progress. Ability to demonstrate progress in implementing corrective measures and in resolving the high-risk area. These five criteria form a road map for efforts to improve and ultimately address high-risk issues. Addressing some of the criteria leads to progress, while satisfying all of the criteria is central to removal from the list. Figure 2 shows the five criteria and illustrative actions taken by agencies to address the criteria. Importantly, the actions listed are not “stand alone” efforts taken in isolation from other actions to address high- risk issues. That is, actions taken under one criterion may be important to meeting other criteria as well. For example, top leadership can demonstrate its commitment by establishing a corrective action plan including long-term priorities and goals to address the high-risk issue and using data to gauge progress—actions which are also vital to monitoring criteria. As we reported in the February 2017 high-risk report, the federal government’s efforts to address information security deficiencies had fully met one of the five criteria for removal from the High-Risk List— leadership commitment—and partially met the other four, as shown in figure 3. We plan to update our assessment of this high-risk area against the five criteria in February 2019. Based on our prior work, we have identified four major cybersecurity challenges: (1) establishing a comprehensive cybersecurity strategy and performing effective oversight, (2) securing federal systems and information, (3) protecting cyber critical infrastructure, and (4) protecting privacy and sensitive data. To address these challenges, we have identified 10 critical actions that the federal government and other entities need to take (see figure 4). The four challenges and the 10 actions needed to address them are summarized following the table. In addition, we also discuss in more detail each of the 10 actions in appendices II through XI. The federal government has been challenged in establishing a comprehensive cybersecurity strategy and in performing effective oversight as called for by federal law and policy. Specifically, we have previously reported that the federal government has faced challenges in establishing a comprehensive strategy to provide a framework for how the United States will engage both domestically and internationally on cybersecurity related matters. We have also reported on challenges in performing oversight, including monitoring the global supply chain, ensuring a highly skilled cyber workforce, and addressing risks associated with emerging technologies. The federal government can take four key actions to improve the nation’s strategic approach to, and oversight of, cybersecurity. Develop and execute a more comprehensive federal strategy for national cybersecurity and global cyberspace. In February 2013 we reported that the government had issued a variety of strategy- related documents that addressed priorities for enhancing cybersecurity within the federal government as well as for encouraging improvements in the cybersecurity of critical infrastructure within the private sector; however, no overarching cybersecurity strategy had been developed that articulated priority actions, assigned responsibilities for performing them, and set time frames for their completion. In October 2015, in response to our recommendation to develop an overarching federal cybersecurity strategy that included all key elements of the desirable characteristics of a national strategy, the Director of OMB and the Federal Chief Information Officer issued a Cybersecurity Strategy and Implementation Plan for the Federal Civilian Government. The plan directed a series of actions to improve capabilities for identifying and detecting vulnerabilities and threats, enhance protections of government assets and information, and further develop robust response and recovery capabilities to ensure readiness and resilience when incidents inevitably occur. The plan also identified key milestones for major activities, resources needed to accomplish milestones, and specific roles and responsibilities of federal organizations related to the strategy’s milestones. Since that time, the executive branch has made progress toward outlining a federal strategy for confronting cyber threats. For example, a May 2017 presidential executive order required federal agencies to take a variety of actions, including better manage their cybersecurity risks and coordinate to meet reporting requirements related to cybersecurity of federal networks, critical infrastructure, and the nation. Additionally, the December 2017 National Security Strategy cites cybersecurity as a national priority and identifies related needed actions, such as including identifying and prioritizing risk, and building defensible government networks. Further, DHS issued a cybersecurity strategy in May 2018, which articulated seven goals the department plans to accomplish in support of its mission related to managing national cybersecurity risks. The strategy is intended to provide DHS with a framework to execute its cybersecurity responsibilities during the next 5 years to keep pace with the evolving cyber risk landscape by reducing vulnerabilities and building resilience; countering malicious actors in cyberspace; responding to incidents; and making the cyber ecosystem more secure and resilient. These efforts provide a good foundation toward establishing a more comprehensive strategy, but more effort is needed to address all of the desirable characteristics of a national strategy that we have previously recommended. The recently issued executive branch strategy documents did not include key elements of desirable characteristics that can enhance the usefulness of a national strategy as guidance for decision makers in allocating resources, defining policies, and helping to ensure accountability. Specifically, the documents generally did not include milestones and performance measures to gauge results, nor did they describe the resources needed to carry out the goals and objective. Further, most of the strategy documents lacked clearly defined roles and responsibilities for key agencies, such as DHS, the Department of Defense (DOD), and OMB, who contribute substantially to the nation’s cybersecurity programs. Ultimately, a more clearly defined, coordinated, and comprehensive approach to planning and executing an overall strategy would likely lead to significant progress in furthering strategic goals and lessening persistent weaknesses. For more information on this action area, see appendix II. Mitigate global supply chain risks. The global, geographically disperse nature of the producers and suppliers of IT products is a growing concern. We have previously reported on potential issues associated with IT supply chain and risks originating from foreign- manufactured equipment. For example, in July 2017, we reported that the Department of State had relied on certain device manufacturers, software developers, and contractor support which had suppliers that were reported to be headquartered in a cyber-threat nation (e.g., China and Russia). We further pointed out that the reliance on complex, global IT supply chains introduces multiple risks to federal agencies, including insertion of counterfeits, tampering, or installation of malicious software or hardware. In July 2018, we testified that if such global IT supply chain risks are realized, they could jeopardize the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of federal information systems. Thus, the potential exists for serious adverse impact on an agency’s operations, assets, and employees. These factors highlight the importance and urgency of federal agencies appropriately assessing, managing, and monitoring IT supply chain risk as part of their agency-wide information security programs. For more information on this action area, see appendix III. Address cybersecurity workforce management challenges. The federal government faces challenges in ensuring that the nation’s cybersecurity workforce has the appropriate skills. For example, in June 2018, we reported on federal efforts to implement the requirements of the Federal Cybersecurity Workforce Assessment Act of 2015. We determined that most of the Chief Financial Officers (CFO) Act agencies had not fully implemented all statutory requirements, such as developing procedures for assigning codes to cybersecurity positions. Further, we have previously reported that DHS and DOD had not addressed cybersecurity workforce management requirements set forth in federal laws. In addition, we have reported in the last 2 years that federal agencies (1) had not identified and closed cybersecurity skills gaps, (2) had been challenged with recruiting and retaining qualified staff, and (3) had difficulty navigating the federal hiring process. A recent executive branch report also discussed challenges associated with the cybersecurity workforce. Specifically, in response to Executive Order 13800, the Department of Commerce and DHS led an interagency working group exploring how to support the growth and sustainment of future cybersecurity employees in the public and private sectors. In May 2018, the departments issued a report that identified key findings, including: the U.S. cybersecurity workforce needs immediate and sustained improvements; the pool of cybersecurity candidates needs to be expanded through retraining and by increasing the participation of women, minorities, and veterans; a shortage exists of cybersecurity teachers at the primary and secondary levels, faculty in higher education, and training instructors; and comprehensive and reliable data about cybersecurity workforce position needs and education and training programs are lacking. The report also included recommendations and proposed actions to address the findings, including that private and public sectors should (1) align education and training with employers’ cybersecurity workforce needs by applying the National Initiative for Cybersecurity Education Cybersecurity Workforce Framework; (2) develop cybersecurity career model paths; and (3) establish a clearinghouse of information on cybersecurity workforce development education, training, and workforce development programs and initiatives. In addition, in June 2018, the executive branch issued a government reform plan and reorganization recommendations that included, among other things, proposals for solving the federal cybersecurity workforce shortage. In particular, the plan notes that the administration intends to prioritize and accelerate ongoing efforts to reform the way that the federal government recruits, evaluates, selects, pays, and places cyber talent across the enterprise. The plan further states that, by the end of the first quarter of fiscal year 2019, all CFO Act agencies, in coordination with DHS and OMB, are to develop a critical list of vacancies across their organizations. Subsequently, OMB and DHS are to analyze these lists and work with OPM to develop a government-wide approach to identifying or recruiting new employees or reskilling existing employees. Regarding cybersecurity training, the plan notes that OMB is to consult with DHS to standardize training for cybersecurity employees, and should work to develop an enterprise-wide training process for government cybersecurity employees. For more information on this action area, see appendix IV. Ensure the security of emerging technologies. As the devices used in daily life become increasingly integrated with technology, the risk to sensitive data and PII also grows. Over the last several years, we have reported on weaknesses in addressing vulnerabilities associated with emerging technologies, including: IoT devices, such as fitness trackers, cameras, and thermostats, that continuously collect and process information are potentially vulnerable to cyber-attacks; IoT devices, such as those acquired and used by DOD employees or that DOD itself acquires (e.g., smartphones), may increase the security risks to the department; vehicles that are potentially susceptible to cyber-attack through technology, such as Bluetooth; the unknown impact of artificial intelligence cybersecurity; and advances in cryptocurrencies and blockchain technologies. Executive branch agencies have also highlighted the challenges associated with ensuring the security of emerging technologies. Specifically, in a May 2018 report issued in response to Executive Order 13800, the Department of Commerce and DHS issued a report on the opportunities and challenges in reducing the botnet threat. The opportunities and challenges are centered on six principal themes, including the global nature of automated, distributed attacks; effective tools; and awareness and education. The report also provides recommended actions, including that federal agencies should increase their understanding of what software components have been incorporated into acquired products and establish a public campaign to support awareness of IoT security. For more information on this action area, see appendix V. In our previously discussed reports related to this cybersecurity challenge, we made a total of 50 recommendations to federal agencies to address the weaknesses identified. As of August 2018, 48 recommendations had not been implemented. These outstanding recommendations include 8 priority recommendations, meaning that we believe that they warrant priority attention from heads of key departments and agencies. These priority recommendations include addressing weaknesses associated with, among other things, agency-specific cybersecurity workforce challenges and agency responsibilities for supporting mitigation of vehicle network attacks. Until our recommendations are fully implemented, federal agencies may be limited in their ability to provide effective oversight of critical government-wide initiatives, address challenges with cybersecurity workforce management, and better ensure the security of emerging technologies. In addition to our prior work related to the federal government’s efforts to establish key strategy documents and implement effective oversight, we also have several ongoing reviews related to this challenge. These include reviews of: the CFO Act agencies’ efforts to submit complete and reliable baseline assessment reports of their cybersecurity workforces; the extent to which DOD has established training standards for cyber mission force personnel, and efforts the department has made to achieve its goal of a trained cyber mission force; and selected agencies’ ability to implement cloud service technologies and notable benefits this might have on agencies. The federal government has been challenged in securing federal systems and information. Specifically, we have reported that federal agencies have experienced challenges in implementing government-wide cybersecurity initiatives, addressing weaknesses in their information systems and responding to cyber incidents on their systems. This is particularly concerning given that the emergence of increasingly sophisticated threats and continuous reporting of cyber incidents underscores the continuing and urgent need for effective information security. As such, it is important that federal agencies take appropriate steps to better ensure they have effectively implemented programs to protect their information and systems. We have identified three actions that the agencies can take. Improve implementation of government-wide cybersecurity initiatives. Specifically, in January 2016, we reported that DHS had not ensured that the National Cybersecurity Protection System (NCPS) had fully satisfied all intended system objectives related to intrusion detection and prevention, information sharing, and analytics. In addition, in February 2017, we reported that the DHS National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center’s (NCCIC) functions were not being performed in adherence with the principles set forth in federal laws. We noted that, although NCCIC was sharing information about cyber threats in the way it should, the center did not have metrics to measure that the information was timely, relevant and actionable, as prescribed by law. For more information on this action area, see appendix VI. Address weaknesses in federal information security programs. We have previously identified a number of weaknesses in agencies’ protection of their information and information systems. For example, over the past 2 years, we have reported that: most of the 24 agencies covered by the CFO Act had weaknesses in each of the five major categories of information system controls (i.e., access controls, configuration management controls, segregation of duties, contingency planning, and agency-wide security management); three agencies—the Securities Exchange Commission, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the Food and Drug Administration—had not effectively implemented aspects of their information security programs, which resulted in weaknesses in these agencies’ security controls; information security weaknesses in selected high-impact systems at four agencies—the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, OPM, and the Department of Veterans Affairs—were cited as a key reason that the agencies had not effectively implemented elements of their information security programs; DOD’s process for monitoring the implementation of cybersecurity guidance had weaknesses and resulted in the closure of certain tasks (such as completing cyber risk assessments) before they were fully implemented; and agencies had not fully defined the role of their Chief Information Security Officers, as required by FISMA. We also recently testified that, although the government had acted to protect federal information systems, additional work was needed to improve agency security programs and cyber capabilities. In particular, we noted that further efforts were needed by agencies to implement our prior recommendations in order to strengthen their information security programs and technical controls over their computer networks and systems. For more information on this action area, see appendix VII. Enhance the federal response to cyber incidents. We have reported that certain agencies have had weaknesses in responding to cyber incidents. For example, as of August 2017, OPM had not fully implemented controls to address deficiencies identified as a result of its 2015 cyber incidents; DOD had not identified the National Guard’s cyber capabilities (e.g., computer network defense teams) or addressed challenges in its exercises; as of April 2016, DOD had not identified, clarified, or implemented all components of its support of civil authorities during cyber incidents; and as of January 2016, DHS’s NCPS had limited capabilities for detecting and preventing intrusions, conducting analytics, and sharing information. For more information on this action area, see appendix VIII. In the public versions of the reports previously discussed for this challenge area, we made a total of 101 recommendations to federal agencies to address the weaknesses identified. As of August 2018, 61 recommendations had not been implemented. These outstanding recommendations include 14 priority recommendations to address weaknesses associated with, among other things, the information security programs at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, OPM, and the Security Exchange Commission. Until these recommendations are implemented, these federal agencies will be limited in their ability to ensure the effectiveness of their programs for protecting information and systems. In addition to our prior work, we also have several ongoing reviews related to the federal government’s efforts to protect its information and systems. These include reviews of: Federal Risk and Authorization Management Program (FedRAMP) implementation, including an assessment of the implementation of the program’s authorization process for protecting federal data in cloud environments; the Equifax data breach, including an assessment of federal oversight of credit reporting agencies’ collection, use, and protection of consumer PII; the Federal Communication Commission’s Electronic Comment Filing System security, to include a review of the agency’s detection of and response to a May 2017 incident that reportedly impacted the system; DOD’s efforts to improve the cybersecurity of its major weapon DOD’s whistleblower program, including an assessment of the policies, procedures, and controls related to the access and storage of sensitive and classified information needed for the program; IRS’s efforts to (1) implement security controls and the agency’s information security program, (2) authenticate taxpayers, and (3) secure tax information; and the federal approach and strategy to securing agency information systems, to include federal intrusion detection and prevention capabilities and the intrusion assessment plan. The federal government has been challenged in working with the private sector to protect critical infrastructure. This infrastructure includes both public and private systems vital to national security and other efforts, such as providing the essential services that underpin American society. As the cybersecurity threat to these systems continues to grow, federal agencies have millions of sensitive records that must be protected. Specifically, this critical infrastructure threat could have national security implications and more efforts should be made to ensure that it is not breached. To help address this issue, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) developed the cybersecurity framework—a voluntary set of cybersecurity standards and procedures for industry to adopt as a means of taking a risk-based approach to managing cybersecurity. However, additional action is needed to strengthen the federal role in protecting the critical infrastructure. Specifically, we have reported on other critical infrastructure protection issues that need to be addressed. For example: DHS did not track vulnerability reduction from the implementation and verification of planned security measures at the high-risk chemical facilities that engage with the department, as a basis for assessing performance. Entities within the 16 critical infrastructure sectors reported encountering four challenges to adopting the cybersecurity framework, such as being limited in their ability to commit necessary resources towards framework adoption and not having the necessary knowledge and skills to effectively implement the framework. DOD and the Federal Aviation Administration identified a variety of operations and physical security risks that could adversely affect DOD missions. Major challenges existed to securing the electricity grid against cyber threats. These challenges included monitoring implementation of cybersecurity standards, ensuring security features are built into smart grid systems, and establishing metrics for cybersecurity. DHS and other agencies needed to enhance cybersecurity in the maritime environment. Specifically, DHS did not include cyber risks in its risk assessments that were already in place nor did it address cyber risks in guidance for port security plans. Sector-specific agencies were not properly addressing progress or metrics to measure their progress in cybersecurity. For more information on this action area, see appendix IX. We made a total of 21 recommendations to federal agencies to address these weaknesses and others. These recommendations include, for example, a total of 9 recommendations to 9 sector-specific agencies to develop methods to determine the level and type of cybersecurity framework adoption across their respective sectors. As of August 2018, all 21 recommendations had not been implemented. Until these recommendations are implemented, the federal government will continue to be challenged in fulfilling its role in protecting the nation’s critical infrastructure. In addition to our prior work related to the federal government’s efforts to protect critical infrastructure, we also have several ongoing reviews focusing on: the physical and cybersecurity risks to pipelines across the country responsible for transmitting oil, natural gas, and other hazardous liquids; the cybersecurity risks to the electric grid; and the privatization of utilities at DOD installations. The federal government has been challenged in protecting privacy and sensitive data. Advances in technology, including powerful search technology and data analytics software, have made it easy to correlate information about individuals across large and numerous databases, which have become very inexpensive to maintain. In addition, ubiquitous Internet connectivity has facilitated sophisticated tracking of individuals and their activities through mobile devices such as smartphones and fitness trackers. Given that access to data is so pervasive, personal privacy hinges on ensuring that databases of PII maintained by government agencies or on their behalf are protected both from inappropriate access (i.e., data breaches) as well as inappropriate use (i.e., for purposes not originally specified when the information was collected). Likewise, the trend in the private sector of collecting extensive and detailed information about individuals needs appropriate limits. The vast number of individuals potentially affected by data breaches at federal agencies and private sector entities in recent years increases concerns that PII is not being properly protected. Federal agencies should take two types of actions to address this challenge area. In addition, we have previously proposed two matters for congressional consideration aimed toward better protecting PII. Improve federal efforts to protect privacy and sensitive data. We have issued several reports noting that agencies had deficiencies in protecting privacy and sensitive data that needed to be addressed. For example: The Department of Health and Human Services’ (HHS) Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) and external entities were at risk of compromising Medicare Beneficiary Data due to a lack of guidance and proper oversight. The Department of Education’s Office of Federal Student Aid had not properly overseen its school partners’ records or information security programs. HHS had not fully addressed key security elements in its guidance for protecting the security and privacy of electronic health information. CMS had not fully protected the privacy of users’ data on state- based marketplaces. Poor planning and ineffective monitoring had resulted in the unsuccessful implementation of government initiatives aimed at eliminating the unnecessary collection, use, and display of SSNs. For more information on this action area, see appendix X. Appropriately limit the collection and use of personal information and ensure that it is obtained with appropriate knowledge or consent. We have issued a series of reports that highlight a number of the key concerns in this area. For example: The emergence of IoT devices can facilitate the collection of information about individuals without their knowledge or consent; Federal laws for smartphone tracking applications have not generally been well enforced; The FBI has not fully ensured privacy and accuracy related to the use of face recognition technology. For more information on this action area, see appendix XI. We have previously suggested that Congress consider amending laws, such as the Privacy Act of 1974 and the E-Government Act of 2002, because they may not consistently protect PII. Specifically, we found that while these laws and guidance set minimum requirements for agencies, they may not consistently protect PII in all circumstances of its collection and use throughout the federal government and may not fully adhere to key privacy principles. However, revisions to the Privacy Act and the E-Government Act have not yet been enacted. Further, we also suggested that Congress consider strengthening the consumer privacy framework and review issues such as the adequacy of consumers’ ability to access, correct, and control their personal information; and privacy controls related to new technologies such as web tracking and mobile devices. However, these suggested changes have not yet been enacted. We also made a total of 29 recommendations to federal agencies to address the weaknesses identified. As of August 2018, 28 recommendations had not been implemented. These outstanding recommendations include 6 priority recommendations to address weaknesses associated with, among other things, publishing privacy impact assessments and improving the accuracy of the FBI’s face recognition services. Until these recommendations are implemented, federal agencies will be challenged in their ability to protect privacy and sensitive data and ensure that its collection and use is appropriately limited. In addition to our prior work, we have several ongoing reviews related to protecting privacy and sensitive data. These include reviews of: IRS’s taxpayer authentication efforts, including what steps the agency is taking to monitor and improve its authentication methods; the extent to which the Department of Education’s Office of Federal Student Aid’s policies and procedures for overseeing non-school partners’ protection of federal student aid data align with federal requirements and guidance; data security issues related to credit reporting agencies, including a review of the causes and impacts of the August 2017 Equifax data breach; the extent to which Equifax assessed, responded to, and recovered from its August 2017 data breach; federal agencies’ efforts to remove PII from shared cyber threat indicators; and how the federal government has overseen Internet privacy, including the roles of the Federal Communications Commission and the Federal Trade Commission, and strengths and weaknesses of the current oversight authorities. In conclusion, since 2010, we have made over 3,000 recommendations to agencies aimed at addressing the four cybersecurity challenges. Nevertheless, many agencies continue to be challenged in safeguarding their information systems and information, in part because many of these recommendations have not been implemented. Of the roughly 3,000 recommendations made since 2010, nearly 1,000 had not been implemented as of August 2018. We have also designated 35 as priority recommendations, and as of August 2018, 31 had not been implemented. The federal government and the nation’s critical infrastructure are dependent on IT systems and electronic data, which make them highly vulnerable to a wide and evolving array of cyber-based threats. Securing these systems and data is vital to the nation’s security, prosperity, and well-being. Nevertheless, the security over these systems and data is inconsistent and urgent actions are needed to address ongoing cybersecurity and privacy challenges. Specifically, the federal government needs to implement a more comprehensive cybersecurity strategy and improve its oversight, including maintaining a qualified cybersecurity workforce; address security weaknesses in federal systems and information and enhance cyber incident response efforts; bolster the protection of cyber critical infrastructure; and prioritize efforts to protect individual’s privacy and PII. Until our recommendations are addressed and actions are taken to address the four challenges we identified, the federal government, the national critical infrastructure, and the personal information of U.S. citizens will be increasingly susceptible to the multitude of cyber-related threats that exist. We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees. In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact Nick Marinos at (202) 512-9342 or marinosn@gao.gov or Gregory C. Wilshusen at (202) 512-6244 or wilshuseng@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix XII. Critical Infrastructure Protection: DHS Should Take Actions to Measure Reduction in Chemical Facility Vulnerability and Share Information with First Responders. GAO-18-538. Washington, D.C.: August 8, 2018. High-Risk Series: Urgent Actions Are Needed to Address Cybersecurity Challenges Facing the Nation. GAO-18-645T. Washington, D.C.: July 25, 2018. Information Security: Supply Chain Risks Affecting Federal Agencies. GAO-18-667T. Washington, D.C.: July 12, 2018. Information Technology: Continued Implementation of High-Risk Recommendations Is Needed to Better Manage Acquisitions, Operations, and Cybersecurity. GAO-18-566T. Washington, D.C.: May 23, 2018. Cybersecurity: DHS Needs to Enhance Efforts to Improve and Promote the Security of Federal and Private-Sector Networks, GAO-18-520T. Washington, D.C.: April 24, 2018. Electronic Health Information: CMS Oversight of Medicare Beneficiary Data Security Needs Improvement. GAO-18-210. Washington, D.C.: March 6, 2018. Technology Assessment: Artificial Intelligence, Emerging Opportunities, Challenges, and Implications. GAO-18-142SP. Washington, D.C.: March 28, 2018. GAO Strategic Plan 2018-2023: Trends Affecting Government and Society. GAO-18-396SP. Washington, D.C.: February 22, 2018. Critical Infrastructure Protection: Additional Actions Are Essential for Assessing Cybersecurity Framework Adoption. GAO-18-211. Washington, D.C.: February 15, 2018. Cybersecurity Workforce: Urgent Need for DHS to Take Actions to Identify Its Position and Critical Skill Requirements. GAO-18-175. Washington, D.C.: February 6, 2018. Homeland Defense: Urgent Need for DOD and FAA to Address Risks and Improve Planning for Technology That Tracks Military Aircraft. GAO-18-177. Washington, D.C.: January 18, 2018. Federal Student Aid: Better Program Management and Oversight of Postsecondary Schools Needed to Protect Student Information. GAO-18-121. Washington, D.C.: December 15, 2017. Defense Civil Support: DOD Needs to Address Cyber Incident Training Requirements. GAO-18-47. Washington, D.C.: November 30, 2017. Federal Information Security: Weaknesses Continue to Indicate Need for Effective Implementation of Policies and Practices. GAO-17-549. Washington, D.C.: September 28, 2017. Information Security: OPM Has Improved Controls, but Further Efforts Are Needed. GAO-17-614. Washington, D.C.: August 3, 2017. Defense Cybersecurity: DOD’s Monitoring of Progress in Implementing Cyber Strategies Can Be Strengthened. GAO-17-512. Washington, D.C.: August 1, 2017. State Department Telecommunications: Information on Vendors and Cyber-Threat Nations. GAO-17-688R. Washington, D.C.: July 27, 2017. Internet of Things: Enhanced Assessments and Guidance Are Needed to Address Security Risks in DOD. GAO-17-668. Washington, D.C.: July 27, 2017. Information Security: SEC Improved Control of Financial Systems but Needs to Take Additional Actions. GAO-17-469. Washington, D.C.: July 27, 2017. Information Security: Control Deficiencies Continue to Limit IRS’s Effectiveness in Protecting Sensitive Financial and Taxpayer Data. GAO-17-395. Washington, D.C.: July 26, 2017. Social Security Numbers: OMB Actions Needed to Strengthen Federal Efforts to Limit Identity Theft Risks by Reducing Collection, Use, and Display. GAO-17-553. Washington, D.C.: July 25, 2017. Information Security: FDIC Needs to Improve Controls over Financial Systems and Information. GAO-17-436. Washington, D.C.: May 31, 2017. Technology Assessment: Internet of Things: Status and implications of an increasingly connected world. GAO-17-75. Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2017. Cybersecurity: DHS’s National Integration Center Generally Performs Required Functions but Needs to Evaluate Its Activities More Completely. GAO-17-163. Washington, D.C.: February 1, 2017. High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-17-317. Washington, D.C.: February 2017. IT Workforce: Key Practices Help Ensure Strong Integrated Program Teams; Selected Departments Need to Assess Skill Gaps. GAO-17-8. Washington, D.C.: November 30, 2016. Electronic Health Information: HHS Needs to Strengthen Security and Privacy Guidance and Oversight. GAO-16-771. Washington, D.C.: September 26, 2016. Defense Civil Support: DOD Needs to Identify National Guard’s Cyber Capabilities and Address Challenges in Its Exercises. GAO-16-574. Washington, D.C.: September 6, 2016. Information Security: FDA Needs to Rectify Control Weaknesses That Place Industry and Public Health Data at Risk. GAO-16-513. Washington, D.C.: August 30, 2016. Federal Chief Information Security Officers: Opportunities Exist to Improve Roles and Address Challenges to Authority. GAO-16-686. Washington, D.C.: August 26, 2016. Federal Hiring: OPM Needs to Improve Management and Oversight of Hiring Authorities. GAO-16-521. Washington, D.C.: August 2, 2016. Information Security: Agencies Need to Improve Controls over Selected High-Impact Systems. GAO-16-501. Washington, D.C.: May 18, 2016. Face Recognition Technology: FBI Should Better Ensure Privacy and Accuracy. GAO-16-267. Washington, D.C.: May 16, 2016. Smartphone Data: Information and Issues Regarding Surreptitious Tracking Apps That Can Facilitate Stalking. GAO-16-317. Washington, D.C.: May 9, 2016. Vehicle Cybersecurity: DOT and Industry Have Efforts Under Way, but DOT Needs to Define Its Role in Responding to a Real-world Attack. GAO-16-350. Washington, D.C.: April 25, 2016. Civil Support: DOD Needs to Clarify Its Roles and Responsibilities for Defense Support of Civil Authorities during Cyber Incidents. GAO-16-332. Washington, D.C.: April 4, 2016. Healthcare.gov: Actions Needed to Enhance Information Security and Privacy Controls. GAO-16-265. Washington, D.C.: March 23, 2016. Information Security: DHS Needs to Enhance Capabilities, Improve Planning, and Support Greater Adoption of Its National Cybersecurity Protection System. GAO-16-294. Washington, D.C.: January 28, 2016. Critical Infrastructure Protection: Sector-Specific Agencies Need to Better Measure Cybersecurity Progress. GAO-16-79. Washington, D.C.: November 19, 2015. Critical Infrastructure Protection: Cybersecurity of the Nation’s Electricity Grid Requires Continued Attention. GAO-16-174T. Washington, D.C.: October 21, 2015. Maritime Critical Infrastructure Protection: DHS Needs to Enhance Efforts to Address Port Cybersecurity. GAO-16-116T. Washington, D.C.: October 8, 2015. Cybersecurity: National Strategy, Roles, and Responsibilities Need to Be Better Defined and More Effectively Implemented. GAO-13-187. Washington, D.C.: February 14, 2014. Information Resellers: Consumer Privacy Framework Needs to Reflect Changes in Technology and the Marketplace. GAO-13-663. Washington, D.C.: September 25, 2013. Privacy: Alternatives Exist for Enhancing Protection of Personally Identifiable Information. GAO-08-536. Washington, D.C.: May 19, 2008. Federal law and policy call for a risk-based approach to managing cybersecurity within the government, as well as globally. We have previously reported that the federal government has faced challenges in establishing a comprehensive strategy to provide a framework for how the United States will engage both domestically and internationally on cybersecurity related matters. More specifically, in February 2013, we reported that the government had issued a variety of strategy-related documents that addressed priorities for enhancing cybersecurity within the federal government as well as for encouraging improvements in the cybersecurity of critical infrastructure within the private sector; however, no overarching cybersecurity strategy had been developed that articulated priority actions, assigned responsibilities for performing them, and set time frames for their completion. Accordingly, we recommended that the White House Cybersecurity Coordinator in the Executive Office of the President develop an overarching federal cybersecurity strategy that included all key elements of the desirable characteristics of a national strategy including, among other things, milestones and performance measures for major activities to address stated priorities; cost and resources needed to accomplish stated priorities; and specific roles and responsibilities of federal organizations related to the strategy’s stated priorities. In response to our recommendation, in October 2015, the Director of OMB and the Federal Chief Information Officer, issued a Cybersecurity Strategy and Implementation Plan for the Federal Civilian Government. The plan directed a series of actions to improve capabilities for identifying and detecting vulnerabilities and threats, enhance protections of government assets and information, and further develop robust response and recovery capabilities to ensure readiness and resilience when incidents inevitably occur. The plan also identified key milestones for major activities, resources needed to accomplish milestones, and specific roles and responsibilities of federal organizations related to the strategy’s milestones. Since that time, the executive branch has made progress toward outlining a federal strategy for confronting cyber threats. Table 1 identifies these recent efforts and a description of their related contents. These efforts provide a good foundation toward establishing a more comprehensive strategy, but more effort is needed to address all of the desirable characteristics of a national strategy that we recommended. The recently issued executive branch strategy documents did not include key elements of desirable characteristics that can enhance the usefulness of a national strategy as guidance for decision makers in allocating resources, defining policies, and helping to ensure accountability. Specifically: Milestones and performance measures to gauge results were generally not included in strategy documents. For example, although the DHS Cybersecurity Strategy stated that its implementation would be assessed on an annual basis, it did not describe the milestones and performance measures for tracking the effectiveness of the activities intended to meet the stated goals (e.g., protecting critical infrastructure and responding effectively to cyber incidents). Without such performance measures, DHS will lack a means to ensure that the goals and objectives discussed in the document are accomplished and that responsible parties are held accountable. According to officials from DHS’s Office of Cybersecurity and Communications, the department is developing a plan for implementing the DHS Cybersecurity Strategy and expects to issue the plan by the end of calendar year 2018. The officials stated that the plan is expected to identify milestones, roles, and responsibilities across DHS to inform the prioritization of future efforts. The strategy documents generally did not include information regarding the resources needed to carry out the goals and objectives. For example, although the DHS Cybersecurity Strategy identified a variety of actions the agency planned to take to perform their cybersecurity mission, it did not articulate the resources needed to carry out these actions and requirements. Without information on the specific resources needed, federal agencies may not be positioned to allocate such resources and investments and, therefore, may be hindered in their ability meet national priorities. Most of the strategy documents lacked clearly defined roles and responsibilities for key agencies, such as DHS, DOD, and OMB. These agencies contribute substantially to the nation’s cybersecurity programs. For example, although the National Security Strategy discusses multiple priority actions needed to address the nation’s cybersecurity challenges (e.g., building defensible government networks, and deterring and disrupting malicious cyber actors), it does not describe the roles, responsibilities, or the expected coordination of any specific federal agencies, including DHS, DOD, or OMB, or other non-federal entities needed to carry out those actions. Without this information, the federal government may not be able foster effective coordination, particularly where there is overlap in responsibilities, or hold agencies accountable for carrying out planned activities. Ultimately, a more clearly defined, coordinated, and comprehensive approach to planning and executing an overall strategy would likely lead to significant progress in furthering strategic goals and lessening persistent weaknesses. The exploitation of information technology (IT) products and services through the supply chain is an emerging threat. IT supply chain-related threats can be introduced in the manufacturing, assembly, and distribution of hardware, software, and services. Moreover, these threats can appear at each phase of the system development life cycle, when an agency initiates, develops, implements, maintains, and disposes of an information system. As a result, the compromise of an agency’s IT supply chain can degrade the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of its critical and sensitive networks, IT-enabled equipment, and data. Federal regulation and guidance issued by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) set requirements and best practices for mitigating supply chain risks. The Federal Acquisition Regulation established codification and publication of uniform policies and procedures for acquisition by all executive branch agencies. Agencies are required by the Federal Acquisition Regulation to ensure that contracts include quality requirements that are determined necessary to protect the government’s interest. In addition, the NIST guidance on supply chain risk management practices for federal information systems and organizations intends to assist federal agencies with identifying, assessing, and mitigating information and communications technology supply chain risks at all levels of their organizations. We have previously reported on risks to the IT supply chain and risks originating from foreign-manufactured equipment. For example: In July 2018, we testified that if global IT supply chain risks are realized, they could jeopardize the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of federal information systems. Thus, the potential exists for serious adverse impact on an agency’s operations, assets, and employees. We further stated that in 2012 we determined that four national security-related agencies—the Departments of Defense, Justice, Energy, Homeland Security (DHS)—varied in the extent to which they had addressed supply chain risks. We recommended that three agencies take eight actions, as needed, to develop and document policies, procedures, and monitoring capabilities that address IT supply chain risk. The agencies generally concurred with the recommendations and subsequently implemented seven recommendations and partially implemented the eighth recommendation. In July 2017, we reported that, based on a review of a sample of organizations within the Department of State’s telecommunications supply chain, we were able to identify instances in which device manufacturers, software developers and contractor support were reported to be headquartered in a leading cyber-threat nation. For example, of the 52 telecommunications device manufacturers and software developers in our sample, we were able to identify 12 that had 1 or more suppliers that were reported to be headquartered in a leading cyber-threat nation. We noted that the reliance on complex, global IT supply chains introduces multiple risks to federal agencies, including insertion of counterfeits, tampering, or installation of malicious software or hardware. Figure 5 illustrates possible manufacturing locations of typical network components. Although federal agencies have taken steps to address IT supply chain deficiencies that we previously identified, this area continues to be a potential threat vector for malicious actors to target the federal government. For example, in September 2017, DHS issued a binding operating directive which calls on departments and agencies to identify any use or presence of Kaspersky products on their information systems and to develop detailed plans to remove and discontinue present and future use of the products. DHS expressed concern about the ties between certain Kaspersky officials and Russian intelligence and other government agencies, and requirements under Russian law that allow Russian intelligence agencies to request or compel assistance from Kaspersky and to intercept communications transiting Russian networks. On May 11, 2017, the President issued an executive order on strengthening the cybersecurity of federal networks and critical infrastructure. The order makes it the policy of the United States to support the growth and sustainment of a workforce that is skilled in cybersecurity and related fields as the foundation for achieving our objectives in cyberspace. It directed the Secretaries of Commerce and Homeland Security (DHS), in consultation with other federal agencies, to assess the scope and sufficiency of efforts to educate and train the American cybersecurity workforce of the future, including cybersecurity- related education curricula, training, and apprenticeship programs, from primary through higher education. Nevertheless, the federal government continues to face challenges in addressing the nation’s cybersecurity workforce. Agencies had not effectively conducted baseline assessments of their cybersecurity workforce or fully developed procedures for coding positions. In June 2018, we reported that 21 of the 24 agencies covered by the Chief Financial Officer’s Act had conducted and submitted to Congress a baseline assessment identifying the extent to which their cybersecurity employees held professional certifications, as required by the Federal Cybersecurity Workforce Assessment Act of 2015. However, we found that the results of these assessments may not have been reliable because agencies did not address all of the reportable information and agencies were limited in their ability to obtain complete and consistent information about their cybersecurity employees and the certifications they held. We determined that this was because agencies had not yet fully identified all members of their cybersecurity workforces or did not have a consistent list of appropriate certifications for cybersecurity positions. Further, 23 of the agencies reviewed had established procedures for identifying and assigning the appropriate employment codes to their civilian cybersecurity positions, as called for by the act. However, 6 of the 23 did not address one or more of 7 activities required by OPM in their procedures, such as reviewing all filled and vacant positions and annotating reviewed position descriptions with the appropriate employment code. Accordingly, we made 30 recommendations to 13 agencies to fully implement two of the act’s requirements on baseline assessments and coding procedures. The extent to which these agencies agreed with the recommendations varied. DHS and the Department of Defense (DOD) had not addressed cybersecurity workforce management requirements set forth in federal laws. In February 2018, we reported that, while DHS had taken actions to identify, categorize, and assign employment codes to its cybersecurity positions, as required by the Homeland Security Cybersecurity Workforce Assessment Act of 2014, its actions were not timely and complete. For example, DHS did not establish timely and complete procedures to identify, categorize, and code its cybersecurity position vacancies and responsibilities. Further, DHS had not yet completed its efforts to identify all of its cybersecurity positions and accurately assign codes to all filled and vacant cybersecurity positions. Table 2 shows DHS’s progress in implementing the requirements of the Homeland Security Cybersecurity Workforce Assessment Act of 2014, as of December 2017. Accordingly, we recommended that DHS take six actions, including ensuring that its cybersecurity workforce procedures identify position vacancies and responsibilities; reported workforce data are complete and accurate; and plans for reporting on critical needs are developed. DHS agreed with our six recommendations, but had not implemented them as of August 2018. Regarding DOD, in November 2017, we reported that instead of developing a comprehensive plan for U.S. Cyber Command, the department submitted a report consisting of a collection of documents that did not fully address the required six elements set forth in Section 1648 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016. More specifically, DOD’s 1648 report did not address an element related to cyber incident training. In addition to not addressing the training element in the report, DOD had not ensured that staff were trained as required by the Presidential Policy Directive on United States Cyber Incident Coordination or DOD’s Significant Cyber Incident Coordination Procedures. Accordingly, we made two recommendations to DOD to address these issues. DOD agreed with one of the recommendations and partially agreed with the other, citing ongoing activities related to cyber incident coordination training it believed were sufficient. However, we continued to believe the recommendation was warranted. As of August 2018, both recommendations had not yet been implemented. Agencies had not identified and closed cybersecurity skills gaps. In November 2016, we reported that five selected agencies had made mixed progress in assessing their information technology (IT) skill gaps. These agencies had started focusing on identifying cybersecurity staffing gaps, but more work remained in assessing competency gaps and in broadening the focus to include the entire IT community. Accordingly, we made a total of five recommendations to the agencies to address these issues. Four agencies agreed and one, DOD, partially agreed with our recommendations citing progress made in improving its IT workforce planning. However, we continued to believe our recommendation was warranted. As of August 2018, all five of the recommendations had not been implemented. Agencies had been challenged with recruiting and retaining qualified staff. In August 2016, we reported on the current authorities chief information security officers (CISO) at 24 agencies. Among other things, CISOs identified key challenges they faced in fulfilling their responsibilities. Several of these challenges were related to the cybersecurity workforce, such as not having enough personnel to oversee the implementation of the number and scope of security requirements. In addition, CISOs stated that they were not able to offer salaries that were competitive with the private sector for candidates with high-demand technical skills. Furthermore, CISOs stated that certain security personnel lacked the skill sets needed or were not sufficiently trained. To assist CISOs in carrying out their responsibilities and better define their roles, we made a total of 34 recommendations to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and 13 agencies in our review. Agency responses to the recommendations varied; as of August 2018, 18 of the 34 recommendations had not been implemented. Agencies have had difficulty navigating the federal hiring process. In August 2016, we reported on the extent to which federal hiring authorities were meeting agency needs. Although competitive hiring has been the traditional method of hiring, agencies can use additional hiring authorities to expedite the hiring process or achieve certain public policy goals. Among other things, we noted that agencies rely on a relatively small number of hiring authorities (as established by law, executive order, or regulation) to fill the vast majority of hires into the federal civil service. Further, while OPM collects a variety of data to assess the federal hiring process, neither it nor agencies used this information to assess the effectiveness of hiring authorities. Conducting such assessments would be a critical first step in making more strategic use of the available hiring authorities to more effectively meet their hiring needs. Accordingly, we made three recommendations to OPM to work with agencies to strengthen hiring efforts. OPM generally agreed with the recommendations; however, as of August 2018, two of them had not been implemented. The emergence of new technologies can potentially introduce security vulnerabilities for those technologies which were previous unknown. As we have previously reported, additional processes and controls will need to be developed to potentially address these new vulnerabilities. While some progress has been made to address the security and privacy issues associated with these technologies, such as the Internet of Things (IoT) and vehicle networks, there is still much work to be done. For example: IoT devices that continuously collect and process information are potentially vulnerable to cyber-attacks. In May 2017, we reported that the IoT has become increasingly used to communicate and process vast amounts of information using “smart” devices (such as fitness trackers, cameras, and thermostats). However, we noted that this emerging technology also presents new issues in areas such as information security, privacy, and safety. For example, IoT devices, networks, or the cloud servers where they store data can be compromised in a cyberattack. Table 3 provides examples of cyber- attacks that could affect IoT devices and networks. IoT devices may increase the security risks to federal agencies. In July 2017, we reported that IoT devices, such as those acquired and used by Department of Defense (DOD) employees or that DOD itself acquires (e.g., smartphones), may increase the security risks to the department. We noted that these risks can be divided into two categories, risks with the devices themselves, such as limited encryption, and risks with how they are used, such as unauthorized communication of information. The department has also identified notional threat scenarios, based on input from multiple DOD entities, which exemplify how these security risks could adversely impact DOD operations, equipment, or personnel. Figure 6 highlights a few examples of these scenarios. In addition, we reported that DOD had started to examine the security risks of IoT devices, but that the department had not conducted required assessments related to the security of its operations. Further, DOD had issued policies and guidance for these devices, but these did not clearly address all of the risks relating to these devices. To address these issues, we made two recommendations to DOD. The department agreed with our recommendations; however, as of August 2018, they had not yet been implemented. Vehicles are potentially susceptible to cyber-attack through networks, such as Bluetooth. In March 2016, we reported that many stakeholders in the automotive industry acknowledge that in-vehicle networks pose a threat to the safety of the driver, as an external attacker could gain control to critical systems in the car. Further, these industry stakeholders agreed that critical systems and other vehicle systems, such as a Bluetooth connection, should be separate in-vehicle networks so they could not communicate or interfere with one another. Figure 7 identifies the key interfaces that could be exploited in a vehicle cyber-attack. To enhance the Department of Transportation’s ability to effectively respond in the event of a real-world vehicle cyberattack, we made one recommendation to the department to better define its roles and responsibilities. The department agreed with the recommendation but, as of August 2018, had not yet taken action to implement it. Artificial intelligence holds substantial promise for improving cybersecurity, but also posed new risks. In March 2018, we reported on the results of a forum we convened to discuss emerging opportunities, challenges, and implications associated with artificial intelligence. At the forum, participants from industry, government, academia, and nonprofit organizations discussed the potential implications of this emerging technology, including assisting with cybersecurity by helping to identify and patch vulnerabilities and defending against attacks; creating safer automated vehicles; improving the criminal justice system’s allocation of resources; and improving how financial services govern investments. However, forum participants also highlighted a number of challenges and risks related to artificial intelligence. For example, if the data used by artificial intelligence are biased or become corrupted by hackers, the results could be biased or cause harm. Moreover, the collection and sharing of data needed to train artificial intelligence systems, a lack of access to computing resources, and adequate human capital were also challenges facing the development of artificial intelligence. Finally, forum participants noted that the widespread adoption raises questions about the adequacy of current laws and regulations. Cryptocurrencies provide an alternative to traditional government-issued currencies, but have security implications. In February 2018, we reported on trends affecting government and society, including the increased use of cryptocurrencies—digital representations of value that are not government-issued—that operate online and verify transactions using a public ledger called blockchain. We highlighted the potential benefits of this technology, such as anonymity and lower transaction costs, as well as drawbacks, including making it harder to detect money laundering and other financial crimes. Because of these capabilities and others, we noted the potential for virtual currencies and blockchain technology to reshape financial services and affect the security of critical financial infrastructures. Lastly, we pointed out that the use of blockchain technology could have more security vulnerabilities as computing power increases as a result of new advancements in quantum computing, an area of quantum information science. In January 2008, the President issued National Security Presidential Directive 54/Homeland Security Presidential Directive 23. The directive established the Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative, a set of projects with the objective of safeguarding federal executive branch government information systems by reducing potential vulnerabilities, protecting against intrusion attempts, and anticipating future threats against the federal government’s networks. Under the initiative, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was to lead several projects to better secure civilian federal government networks. Specifically, the agency established the National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC), which functions as the 24/7 cyber monitoring, incident response, and management center. Figure 8 depicts the Watch Floor, which functions as a national focal point of cyber and communications incident integration. The United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT), one of several subcomponents of the NCCIC, is responsible for operating the National Cybersecurity Protection System (NCPS), which provides intrusion detection and prevention capabilities to entities across the federal government. Although DHS is fulfilling its statutorily required mission by establishing the NCCIC and managing the operation of NCPS, we have identified challenges in the agency’s efforts to manage these programs: DHS had not ensured that NCPS has fully satisfied all intended system objectives. In January 2016, we reported that NCPS had a limited ability to detect intrusions across all types of network types. In addition, we reported that the system’s intrusion prevention capability was limited and its information-sharing capability was not fully developed. Furthermore, we reported that DHS’s current metrics did not comprehensively measure the effectiveness of NCPS. Accordingly, we made nine recommendations to DHS to address these issues and others. The department agreed with our recommendations and has taken action to address one of them. However, as of August 2018, eight of these recommendations had not been implemented. DHS had been challenged in measuring how the NCCIC was performing its functions in accordance with mandated implementing principles. In February 2017, we reported instances where, with certain products and services, NCCIC had implemented its functions in adherence with one or more of its principles, as required by the National Cybersecurity Protection Act of 2014 and Cybersecurity Act of 2015. For example, consistent with the principle that it seek and receive appropriate consideration from industry sector-specific, academic, and national laboratory expertise, NCCIC coordinated with contacts from industry, academia, and the national laboratories to develop and disseminate vulnerability alerts. However, we also identified instances where the cybersecurity functions were not performed in adherence with the principles. For example, NCCIC is to provide timely technical assistance, risk management support, and incident response capabilities to federal and nonfederal entities, but it had not established measures or other procedures for ensuring the timeliness of these assessments. Further, we reported that NCCIC faces impediments to performing its cybersecurity functions more efficiently, such as tracking security incidents and working across multiple network platforms. Accordingly, we made nine recommendations to DHS related to implementing the requirements identified in the National Cybersecurity Protection Act of 2014 and the Cybersecurity Act of 2015. The department agreed with our recommendations and has taken action to address two of them. However, as of August 2018, the remaining seven recommendations had not been implemented. The Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014 (FISMA) requires federal agencies in the executive branch to develop, document, and implement an information security program and evaluate it for effectiveness. The act retains many of the requirements for federal agencies’ information security programs previously set by the Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002. These agency programs should include periodic risk assessments; information security policies and procedures; plans for protecting the security of networks, facilities, and systems; security awareness training; security control assessments; incident response procedures; a remedial action process, and continuity plans and procedures. In addition, Executive Order 13800 states that the President will hold agency heads accountable for managing cybersecurity risk to their enterprises. In addition, according to the order, it is the policy of the United States to manage cybersecurity risk as an executive branch enterprise because risk management decisions made by agency heads can affect the risk to the executive branch as a whole, and to national security. Over the past several years, we have performed numerous security control audits to determine how well agencies are managing information security risk to federal information systems and data through the implementation of effective security controls. These audits have resulted in the identification of hundreds of deficiencies related to agencies’ implementation of effective security controls. Accordingly, we provided agencies with limited official use only reports identifying technical security control deficiencies for their respective agency. In these reports, we made hundreds of recommendations related to improving agencies’ implementation of those security control deficiencies. In addition to systems and networks maintained by federal agencies, it is also important that agencies ensure the security of federal information systems operated by third party providers, including cloud service providers. Cloud computing is a means for delivering computing services via information technology networks. Since 2009, the government has encouraged agencies to use cloud-based services to store and process data as a cost-savings measure. In this regard, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) established the Federal Risk and Authorization Management Program (FedRAMP) to provide a standardized approach to security assessment, authorization, and continuous monitoring for cloud products and services. FedRAMP is intended to ensure that cloud computing services have adequate information security, eliminate duplicative efforts, and reduce costs. Although there are requirements and government-wide programs to assist with ensuring the security of federal information systems maintained by federal agencies and third party providers, we have identified weaknesses in agencies’ implementation of information security programs. Federal agencies continued to experience weaknesses in protecting their information and information systems due to ineffective implementation of information security policies and practices. In September 2017, we reported that most of the 24 agencies covered by the Chief Financial Officers (CFO) Act had weaknesses in each of the five major categories of information system controls (i.e., access controls, configuration management controls, segregation of duties, contingency planning, and agency-wide security management). Weaknesses in these security controls indicate that agencies did not adequately or effectively implement information security policies and practices during fiscal year 2016. Figure 9 identifies the number of agencies with information security weaknesses in each of the five categories. In addition, we found that several agencies had not effectively implemented some aspects of its information security program, which resulted in weaknesses in these agencies’ security controls. In July 2017, we reported that the Security Exchange Commission did not always keep system security plans complete and accurate or fully implement continuous monitoring, as required by agency policy. We made two recommendations to the Security Exchange Commission to effectively manage its information security program. The agency agreed with our recommendations; however, as of August 2018, they had not been implemented. In another July 2017 report, we noted that the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) did not effectively support a risk-based decision to accept system deficiencies; fully develop, document, or update information security policies and procedures; update system security plans to reflect changes to the operating environment; perform effective tests and evaluations of policies, procedures, and controls; or address shortcomings in the agency’s remedial process. Accordingly, we made 10 recommendations to IRS to more effectively implement security-related policies and plans. The agency neither agreed nor disagreed with the recommendations; as of August 2018, all 10 recommendations had not been implemented. In May 2017, we reported that the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation did not include all necessary information in procedures for granting access to a key financial application; fully address its Inspector General findings that security control assessments of outsourced service providers had not been completed in a timely manner; fully address key previously identified weaknesses related to establishing agency-wide configuration baselines and monitoring changes to critical server files; or complete actions to address the Inspector General’s finding that the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation had not ensured that major security incidents are identified and reported in a timely manner. We made one recommendation to the agency to more fully implement its information security program. The agency agreed with our recommendation and has taken steps to implement it. In August 2016, we reported that the Food and Drug Administration did not fully implement certain security practices involved with assessing risks to systems; complete or review security policies and procedures in a timely manner; complete and review system security plans annually; always track and fully train users with significant security responsibilities; fully test controls or monitor them; remediate identified security weaknesses in a timely fashion based on risk; or fully implement elements of its incident response program. Accordingly, we issued 15 recommendations to the Food and Drug Administration to fully implement its agency-wide information security program. The agency agreed with our recommendations. As of August 2018, all 15 recommendations had been implemented. In May 2016, we reported that a key reason for the information security weaknesses in selected high-impact systems at four agencies—National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Office of Personnel Management, and Department of Veterans Affairs—was that they had not effectively implemented elements of their information security programs. For example, most of the selected agencies had conducted information security control assessments for systems, but not all assessments were comprehensive. We also reported that remedial action plans developed by the agencies did not include all the required elements, and not all agencies had developed a continuous monitoring strategy. Table 4 identifies the extent to which the selected agencies implemented key aspects of their information security programs. Accordingly, we made 19 recommendations to the four selected agencies to correct these weaknesses. Agency responses to the recommendations varied. Further, as of August 2018, 16 of the 19 recommendations had not been implemented. DOD’s monitoring of progress in implementing cyber strategies varied. In August 2017, we reported that the DOD’s progress in implementing key strategic cybersecurity guidance—the DOD Cloud Computing Strategy, DOD Cyber Strategy, and DOD Cybersecurity Campaign—has varied. More specifically, we determined that the department had implemented the cybersecurity objectives identified in the DOD Cloud Computing Strategy and had made progress in implementing the DOD Cyber Strategy and DOD Cybersecurity Campaign. However, the department’s process for monitoring implementation of the DOD Cyber Strategy had resulted in the closure of tasks as implemented before the tasks were fully implemented. In addition, the DOD Cybersecurity Campaign lacked time frames for completion and a process to monitor progress, which together provide accountability to ensure implementation. We made two recommendations to improve DOD’s process of ensuring its cyber strategies are effectively implemented. The department partially concurred with these recommendations and identified actions it planned to take to address them. We noted that, if implemented, the actions would satisfy the intent of our recommendations. However, as of August 2018, DOD had not yet implemented our recommendations. Agencies had not fully defined the role of their Chief Information Security Officers (CISO), as required by FISMA. In August 2016, we reported that 13 of 24 agencies covered by the CFO Act had not fully defined the role of their CISO. For example, these agencies did not always identify a role for the CISO in ensuring that security controls are periodically tested; procedures are in place for detecting, reporting, and responding to security incidents; or contingency plans and procedures for agency information systems are in place. Thus, we determined that the CISOs’ ability to effectively oversee these agencies’ information security activities can be limited. To assist CISOs in carrying out their responsibilities and better define their roles, we made a total of 34 recommendations to OMB and 13 agencies in our review. Agency responses to the recommendations varied; as of August 2018, 18 of the 34 recommendations had not been implemented. Presidential Policy Directive-41 sets forth principles governing the federal government’s response to any cyber incident, whether involving government or private sector entities. According to the directive, federal agencies shall undertake three concurrent lines of effort when responding to any cyber incident: threat response; asset response; and intelligence support and related activities. In addition, when a federal agency is an affected entity, it shall undertake a fourth concurrent line of effort to manage the effects of the cyber incident on its operations, customers, and workforce. We have reviewed federal agencies’ preparation and response to cyber incidents and have identified the following weaknesses: The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) had not fully implemented controls to address deficiencies identified as a result of a cyber incident. In August 2017, we reported that OPM did not fully implement the 19 recommendations made by the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT) after the data breaches in 2015. Specifically, we noted that, after breaches of personnel and background investigation information were reported, US-CERT worked with the agency to resolve issues and develop a comprehensive mitigation strategy. In doing so, US-CERT made 19 recommendations to OPM to help the agency improve its overall security posture and, thus, improve its ability to protect its systems and information from security breaches. In our August 2017 report, we determined that OPM had fully implemented 11 of the 19 recommendations. For the remaining 8 recommendations, actions for 4 were still in progress. For the other 4 recommendations, OPM indicated that it had completed actions to address them, but we noted further improvements were needed. Further, OPM had not validated actions taken to address the recommendations in a timely manner. As a result of our review, we made five other recommendations to OPM to improve its response to cyber incidents. The agency agreed with four of these and partially concurred with the one related to validating its corrective action. The agency did not cite a reason for its partial concurrence and we continued to believe that the recommendation was warranted. As of August 2018, three of the five recommendations had not been implemented. The Department of Defense (DOD) had not identified the National Guard’s cyber capabilities (e.g., computer network defense teams) or addressed challenges in its exercises. In September 2016, we reported that DOD had not identified the National Guard’s cyber capabilities or addressed challenges in its exercises. Specifically, DOD had not identified and did not have full visibility into National Guard cyber capabilities that could support civil authorities during a cyber incident because the department has not maintained a database that identifies National Guard cyber capabilities, as required by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007. In addition, we identified three types of challenges with DOD’s cyber exercises that could limit the extent to which DOD is prepared to support civilian authorities in a cyber incident: limited access because of classified exercise environments; limited inclusion of other federal agencies and critical infrastructure owners; and inadequate incorporation of joint physical-cyber scenarios. In our September 2016 report, we noted that DOD had not addressed these challenges. Furthermore, we stated that DOD had not addressed its goals by conducting a “tier 1” exercise (i.e., an exercise involving national-level organizations and combatant commanders and staff in highly complex environments), as stated in the DOD Cyber Strategy. Accordingly, we recommended that DOD (1) maintain a database that identifies National Guard cyber capabilities and (2) conduct a tier 1 exercise to prepare its forces in the event of a disaster with cyber effects. The department partially agreed with our recommendations, stating that its current mechanisms and exercises are sufficient to address the issues highlighted in our report. However, we continued to believe the recommendations were valid. As of August 2018, our two recommendations had not been implemented. DOD had not identified, clarified, or implemented all components of its incident response program. In April 2016, we also reported that DOD had not clarified its roles and responsibilities for defense support of civil authorities during cyber incidents. Specifically, we found that DOD’s overarching guidance about how it is to support civil authorities as part of its Defense Support of Civil Authorities mission did not clearly define the roles and responsibilities of key DOD entities, such as DOD components, the supported command, or the dual-status commander, if they are requested to support civil authorities in a cyber incident. Further, we found that, in some cases, DOD guidance provides specific details on other types of Defense Support of Civil Authorities-related responses, such as assigning roles and responsibilities for fire or emergency services support and medical support, but does not provide the same level of detail or assign roles and responsibilities for cyber support. Accordingly, we recommended that DOD issue or update guidance that clarifies DOD roles and responsibilities to support civil authorities in a domestic cyber incident. DOD concurred with the recommendation and stated that the department will issue or update guidance. However, as of August 2018, the department had not implemented our recommendation. DHS’s NCPS had limited capabilities for detecting and preventing intrusions, conducting analytics, and sharing information. In January 2016, we reported that NCPS had a limited ability to detect intrusions across all types of network types. In addition, we reported that the system’s intrusion prevention capability was limited and its information-sharing capability was not fully developed. Furthermore, we reported that DHS’s current metrics did not comprehensively measure the effectiveness of NCPS. Accordingly, we made nine recommendations to DHS to address these issues and others. The department agreed with our recommendations and has taken action to address one of them. However, as of August 2018, eight of these recommendations had not been implemented. The nation’s critical infrastructure include both public and private systems vital to national security and other efforts including providing the essential services, such as banking, water, and electricity—that underpin American society. The cyber threat to critical infrastructure continues to grow and represents a national security challenge. To address this cyber risk, the President issued Executive Order 13636 in February 2013 to enhance the security and resilience of the nation’s critical infrastructure and maintain a cyber environment that promotes safety, security, and privacy. In accordance with requirements in the executive order which were enacted into law in 2014, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) facilitated the development of a set of voluntary standards and procedures for enhancing cybersecurity of critical infrastructure. This process, which involved stakeholders from the public and private sectors, resulted in NIST’s Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity. The framework is to provide a flexible and risk-based approach for entities within the nation’s 16 critical infrastructure sectors to protect their vital assets from cyber-based threats. Since then, progress has been made to protect the critical infrastructure of the nation but we have reported that challenges to ensure the safety and security of our infrastructure exist. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) had not measured the impact of its efforts to support cyber risk reduction for high- risk chemical sector entities. In August 2018, we reported that DHS had strengthened its processes for identifying high-risk chemical facilities and assigning them to tiers under its Chemical Facility Anti- Terrorism Standards program. However, we found that DHS’s new performance measure methodology did not measure reduction in vulnerability at a facility resulting from the implementation and verification of planned security measures during the compliance inspection process. We concluded that doing so would provide DHS an opportunity to begin assessing how vulnerability is reduced—and by extension, risk lowered—not only for individual high-risk facilities but for the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards program as a whole. We also determined that, although DHS shares some Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards program information, first responders and emergency planners may not have all of the information they need to minimize the risk of injury or death when responding to incidents at high-risk facilities. This was due to first responders at the local level not having access or widely using a secure interface that DHS developed (known as the Infrastructure Protection Gateway) to obtain information about high-risk facilities and the specific chemicals they process. To address the weaknesses we identified, we recommended that DHS take actions to (1) measure reduction in vulnerability of high-risk facilities and use that data to assess program performance, and (2) encourage access to and wider use of the Infrastructure Protection Gateway among first responders and emergency planners. DHS concurred with both recommendations and outlined efforts underway or planned to address them. The federal government had identified major challenges to the adoption of the cybersecurity framework. In February 2018, we reported that there were four different challenges to adopting the cybersecurity framework, including limited resources and competing priorities, reported by entities within their sectors. We further reported that none of the 16 sector-specific agencies were measuring the implementation by these entities, nor did they have qualitative or quantitative measures of framework adoption. While research had been done to determine the use of the framework in the sectors, these efforts had yielded no real results for sector wide adoption. We concluded that, until sector-specific agencies understand the use of the framework by the implementing entities, their ability to understand implementation efforts would be limited. Accordingly, we made a total of nine recommendations to nine sector-specific agencies to address these issues. Five agencies agreed with the recommendations, while four others neither agreed nor disagreed; as of August 2018, all five recommendations had not been implemented. Agencies had not addressed risks to their systems and the information they maintain. In January 2018, we reported that the Department of Defense (DOD) and Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) identified a variety of operations and physical security risks related to Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast Out technology that could adversely affect DOD missions. These risks came from information broadcast by the system itself, as well as from potential vulnerabilities to electronic warfare- and cyber-attacks, and from the potential divestment of secondary-surveillance radars. However, DOD and FAA had not approved any solutions to address the risks they identified to the system. Accordingly, we recommended that DOD and FAA, among other things, take action to approve one or more solutions to address Automatic Dependent Surveillance- Broadcast Out-related security risks. DOD and FAA generally agreed with our recommendations; however, as of August 2018, they had not been implemented. Major challenges existed to securing the electricity grid against cyber threats. In October 2015, we testified on the status of the electricity grid’s cybersecurity, reporting that entities associated with the grid have encountered several challenges. We noted that these challenges included implementation monitoring, built-in security features in smart grid systems, and establishing metrics for cybersecurity. We concluded that continued attention to these issues and cyber threats in general was required to help mitigate these risks to the electricity grid. DHS and other agencies needed to enhance cybersecurity in the maritime environment. In October 2015, we testified on the status of the cybersecurity of our nation’s ports, concluding that steps needed to be taken to enhance their security. Specifically, we noted that DHS needed to include cyber risks in its risk assessments that are already in place as well as addressing cyber risks in guidance for port security plans. We concluded that, until DHS and the other stakeholders take steps to address cybersecurity in the ports, risk of a cyber-attack with serious consequences are increased. Sector-specific agencies were not properly addressing progress or metrics to measure their progress in cybersecurity. In November 2015, we reported that sector-specific agencies were not comprehensively addressing the cyber risk to the infrastructure, as 11 of the 15 sectors had significant cyber risk. Specifically, we noted that these entities had taken actions to mitigate their cyber risk; however, most had not identified incentives to promote cybersecurity in their sectors. We concluded that while the sector-specific agencies have successfully disseminated the information they possess, there was still work to be done to properly measure cybersecurity implementation progress. Accordingly, we made seven recommendations to six agencies to address these issues. Four of these agencies agreed with our recommendation, while two agencies did not comment on the recommendations. As of August 2018, all seven recommendations had not been implemented. Advancements in technology, such as new search technology and data analytics software for searching and collecting information, have made it easier for individuals and organizations to correlate data and track it across large and numerous databases. In addition, lower data storage costs have made it less expensive to store vast amounts of data. Also, ubiquitous Internet and cellular connectivity make it easier to track individuals by allowing easy access to information pinpointing their locations. the effectiveness of these procedures. Based on a survey of the schools, the majority of the schools had policies in place for records retention but the way these policies were implemented was highly varied for paper and electronic records. We also found that the oversight of the school’s programs was lacking, as Federal Student Aid conducts reviews but does not consider information security as a factor for selecting schools. out provisions of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. We made three recommendations to CMS related to defining procedures for overseeing the security of state-based marketplaces and requiring continuous monitoring of state marketplace controls. HHS concurred with our recommendations. As of August 2018, two of the recommendations had not yet been implemented. Poor planning and ineffective monitoring had resulted in the unsuccessful implementation of government initiatives designed to protect federal data. In July 2017, we reported that government initiatives aimed at eliminating the unnecessary collection, use, and display of Social Security numbers (SSN) have had limited success. Specifically, in agencies’ response to our questionnaire on SSN reduction efforts, the 24 agencies covered by the Chief Financial Officers Act reported successfully curtailing the collection, use, and display of SSNs. Nevertheless, all of the agencies continued to rely on SSNs for important government programs and systems, as seen in figure 10. Given that access to data is so pervasive, personal privacy hinges on ensuring that databases of personally identifiable information (PII) maintained by government agencies or on their behalf are protected both from inappropriate access (i.e., data breaches) as well as inappropriate use (i.e., for purposes not originally specified when the information was collected). Likewise, the trend in the private sector of collecting extensive and detailed information about individuals needs appropriate limits. The vast number of individuals potentially affected by data breaches at federal agencies and private sector entities in recent years increases concerns that PII is not being properly protected. The emergence of IoT devices can facilitate the collection of information about individuals without their knowledge or consent. In May 2017, we reported that the IoT has become increasingly used to communicate and process vast amounts of information using “smart” devices (such as a fitness tracker connected to a smartphone). However, we noted that this emerging technology also presents new issues in areas such as information security, privacy, and safety. Smartphone tracking apps can present serious safety and privacy risks. In April 2016, we reported on smartphone applications that facilitated the surreptitious tracking of a smartphone’s location and other data. Specifically, we noted that some applications could be used to intercept communications and text messages, essentially facilitating the stalking of others. While it is illegal to use these applications for these purposes, stakeholders differed over whether current federal laws needed to be strengthened to combat stalking. We also noted that stakeholders expressed concerns over what they perceived to be limited enforcement of laws related to tracking apps and stalking. In particular, domestic violence groups stated that additional education of law enforcement officials and consumers about how to protect against, detect, and remove tracking apps is needed. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has not ensured privacy and accuracy related to the use of face recognition technology. In May 2016, we reported that the Department of Justice had not been timely in publishing and updating privacy documentation for the FBI’s use of face recognition technology. Publishing such documents in a timely manner would better assure the public that the FBI is evaluating risks to privacy when implementing systems. Also, the FBI had taken limited steps to determine whether the face recognition system it was using was sufficiently accurate. We recommended that the department ensure required privacy-related documents are published and that the FBI test and review face recognition systems to ensure that they are sufficiently accurate. Of the six recommendations we made, the Department of Justice agreed with one, partially agreed with two, and disagreed with three. We continued to believe all the recommendations made were valid. As of August 2018, the six recommendations had not been implemented. In addition to the contacts named above, Jon Ticehurst, Assistant Director; Kush K. Malhotra, Analyst-In-Charge; Chris Businsky; Alan Daigle; Rebecca Eyler; Chaz Hubbard; David Plocher; Bradley Roach; Sukhjoot Singh; Di’Mond Spencer; and Umesh Thakkar made key contributions to this report.

 

 Report 2:
With the passage of the NDAA in December 2016, PLCY is to be led by an Under Secretary for Strategy, Policy, and Plans, who is appointed by the President with advice and consent of the Senate. The Under Secretary is to report directly to the Secretary of Homeland Security. Prior to the NDAA, the office was headed by an assistant secretary. Since the passage of the act, the undersecretary position has been vacant, and as of June 5, 2018, the President had not nominated an individual to fill the position. According to PLCY officials, elevating the head of the office to an undersecretary was important because it equalizes PLCY with other DHS management offices and DHS headquarters components. The NDAA further authorizes, but does not require, the Secretary to establish a position of deputy undersecretary within PLCY. If the position is established, the NDAA provides that the Secretary may appoint a career employee to the position (i.e., not a political appointee). In March 2018, the Secretary named a Deputy Under Secretary, who has been performing the duties of the Deputy Under Secretary and the Under Secretary since then. As shown in figure 1, PLCY is divided into five sub- offices, each with a different focus area. As of June 5, 2018, the top position in these sub-offices was an assistant secretary and two of the five positions were vacant. As of June 5, 2018, 6 of PLCY’s 12 deputy assistant secretary positions were vacant or filled by acting staff temporarily performing the duties in the absence of permanent staff placement. The NDAA codified many of the functions and responsibilities that PLCY had been carrying out prior to the act’s enactment and, with a few exceptions as discussed later in this report, were largely consistent with the duties the office was already pursuing. According to the act and PLCY officials, one of the office’s fundamental responsibilities is to lead, conduct, and coordinate departmentwide policy development and implementation, and strategic planning. According to PLCY officials, there are four categories of policy and strategy efforts that PLCY leads, conducts, or coordinates: Statutory responsibilities: among others, the Homeland Security Act, as amended by the NDAA, includes such responsibilities as establishing standards of validity and reliability for statistical data collected by the department, conducting or overseeing analysis and reporting of such data, and maintaining all immigration statistical information of U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services; the Immigration and Nationality Act includes such responsibilities as providing for a system for collection and dissemination to Congress and the public of information useful in evaluating the social, economic, environmental, and demographic impact of immigration laws, and reporting annually on trends in lawful immigration flows, naturalizations, and enforcement actions, Representing DHS in interagency efforts: coordinating or representing departmental policy and strategy positions for larger interagency efforts (e.g., interagency policy committees convened by the White House), Secretary’s priorities: leading or coordinating efforts that correspond to the Secretary of Homeland Security’s priorities (e.g., certain immigration or law-enforcement related issues), and Self-initiated activities: opportunities to better harmonize policy and strategy or create additional efficiencies given PLCY’s ability to see across the department. For example, PLCY officials said that DHS observed an increase in e-commerce and small businesses shipping items via carriers other than the U.S. Postal Service, thus exploiting a gap in DHS monitoring, which covers the U.S. Postal Service and other traditional shipping entities. PLCY officials noted that DHS’s interest in addressing e-commerce issues occurred just before opioids and other controlled substances were being mailed through small businesses and the U.S. Postal Service. As a result, PLCY developed an e-commerce strategy for, among other things, the shipping of illegal items and how to provide information to U.S. Customs and Border Protection before parcels are shipped to the United States from abroad. In accordance with the NDAA, as PLCY leads, conducts, and coordinates policy and strategy, it is to do so in a manner that promotes and ensures quality, consistency, and integration across DHS and applies risk-based analysis and planning to departmentwide strategic planning efforts. The NDAA further provides that all component heads are to coordinate with PLCY when establishing or modifying policies or strategic planning guidance to ensure consistency with DHS’s policy priorities. In addition to the roles PLCY plays that are directly related to leading, conducting, and coordinating policy and strategy, the office is responsible for select operational functions. For example, PLCY is charged with operating the REAL ID and Visa Waiver Programs. The NDAA also conferred responsibilities to PLCY that had not been responsibilities of the DHS Office of Policy prior to the NDAA’s enactment. Among other things, the NDAA charged PLCY with responsibility for establishing standards of reliability and validity for statistical data collected and analyzed by the department, and ensuring the accuracy of metrics and statistical data provided to Congress. In conferring this responsibility, the act also transferred to PLCY the maintenance of all immigration statistical information of the U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services. PLCY has established five performance goals: build departmental policy-making capacity, coordination, and foster the Unity of Effort, mature the office as a mission-oriented, component-focused organization that is responsive to DHS leadership, effectively engage and leverage stakeholders, enhance productivity and effectiveness of policy personnel through appropriate alignment of knowledge, skills, and abilities, and accountability, transparency, and leadership. PLCY officials stated that the office established the performance goals in fiscal year 2015 and they were still in effect as of fiscal year 2018. As previously discussed, DHS has eight operational components. DHS also has six support components. Although each one has a distinct role to play in helping to secure the homeland, there are operational and support functions that cut across mission areas. For example, nearly every operational component has, as part of its security operations, a need for screening, vetting, and credentialing procedures and risk- targeting mechanisms. Likewise, nearly all operational components have some form of international engagement, deploying staff abroad to help secure the homeland before threats reach U.S. borders. Finally, as shown in figure 2, different aspects of broad mission areas fall under the purview of more than one DHS operational component. PLCY is responsible for coordinating three key DHS strategic efforts: the QHSR, the DHS Strategic Plan, and the Resource Planning Guidance. The QHSR is a comprehensive examination of the homeland security strategy of the nation that is to occur every 4 years and include recommendations regarding the long-term strategy and priorities for homeland security of the nation and guidance on the programs, assets, capabilities, budget, policies, and authorities of DHS. The QHSR is to be conducted in consultation with the heads of other federal agencies, key DHS officials (including the Under Secretary, PLCY), and key officials from other relevant governmental and nongovernmental entities. The DHS Strategic Plan describes how DHS can accomplish the missions it identifies in the QHSR report, identifies high-priority mission areas within DHS, and lays the foundation for DHS to accomplish its Unity of Effort Initiative as well as various cross-agency priority goals in the strategic plan, such as cybersecurity. The Resource Planning Guidance describes DHS’s annual resource allocation process in order to execute the missions and goals of the QHSR and DHS Strategic Plan. The Resource Planning Guidance contains guidance over a 5-year period and informs several forward- looking reports to Congress, including the annual fiscal year Congressional Budget Justification as well as the Future Years Homeland Security Program Report. Although PLCY has effectively carried out key coordination functions at the senior level related to strategy, PLCY’s ability to lead and coordinate policy have been limited due to ambiguous roles and responsibilities and a lack of predictable, accountable, and repeatable procedures. According to our analysis and interviews with operational components, PLCY’s efforts to lead and coordinate departmentwide and crosscutting strategies—a key organizational objective—have been effective in providing opportunities for all relevant stakeholders to learn about and contribute to departmentwide or crosscutting strategy development. In this role, PLCY routinely serves as the executive agent for the Deputies Management Action Group and the Senior Leaders Council, which involve analytical and coordination support. PLCY also provides support for deputy- and principal-level decision making. For example, the Strategy and Policy Executive Steering Committee (S&P ESC) meetings have been used to discuss components’ implementation plans for crosscutting strategies, PLCY’s requests for information from components for an upcoming strategy, and updates on departmentwide strategic planning initiatives. According to PLCY and operational component officials, PLCY also provides leadership for the Resource Planning Guidance and Winter Studies, both of which help inform departmentwide resource decision- making. For example, officials from one operational component stated that PLCY’s leadership of the Resource Planning Guidance is a helpful practice for coordination and collaboration on departmentwide or crosscutting strategies. The officials stated that PLCY reaches out to ensure that the component is covering the Secretary’s priorities and this helps the component to ensure that its budget includes them. Furthermore, PLCY develops and coordinates policy options and opinions for the Secretary to present at the National Security Council and other White House-level meetings. For example, PLCY officials told us that, in light of allegations of Russian involvement in using poisonous nerve agents on two civilians in Great Britain, PLCY coordinated the collection of information to develop a policy recommendation for the Secretary to present at a National Security Council meeting. PLCY has encountered challenges leading and coordinating efforts to develop, update, or harmonize policy—also a key organizational objective—because it does not have clearly-defined roles, responsibilities, and mechanisms to implement these responsibilities in a predictable, repeatable, and accountable way. Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government states that management should establish an organizational structure, assign responsibility, and delegate authority to achieve the entity’s objectives. As such, an organization’s management should develop an organizational structure with an understanding of the overall responsibilities and assign these responsibilities to discrete units to enable the organization to operate in an efficient and effective manner. An organization’s management should also implement control activities through policies. It is important that an organization’s management document and define policies and communicate those policies and procedures to personnel, so they can implement control activities for their assigned responsibilities. In addition, leading collaboration practices we have identified in our prior work include defining and articulating a common outcome, clarifying roles and responsibilities, and establishing mutually-reinforcing or joint strategies to enhance and sustain collaboration, such as the work that PLCY and the components need to do together to ensure that departmentwide and crosscutting policy is effective for all relevant parties. According to PLCY officials, in general, PLCY is responsible for leading the development of a policy when it crosses multiple components or if there is a national implication, including White House interest in the policy. However, PLCY officials acknowledged that this practice does not always make them the lead and there are no established criteria that define the circumstances under which PLCY (or another organizational unit) should lead development of policies that cut across organizational boundaries. PLCY officials said the lead entity for a policy is often announced in an email from the Secretary’s office, on a case-by-case basis. According to PLCY officials, once components have been assigned responsibility for a policy, they have generally tended to retain it, and PLCY may not have oversight for crosscutting policies that are maintained by operational components. Therefore, there is no established, coordinated system of oversight to periodically monitor the need for policy harmonization, revision, or rescission. In the absence of clear roles and responsibilities, and processes and procedures to support them, PLCY and officials in 5 of the 8 components have encountered challenges in coordinating with each other. Although PLCY and most component officials we interviewed described overall positive experiences in coordinating with each other, we identified multiple instances of (1) confusion about which parties should lead and engage in policy efforts, (2) not engaging components at the right times, (3) incompatible expectations around timelines, and (4) uncertainty about PLCY’s role and the extent to which it can and should identify and drive policy in support of a more cohesive DHS. Confusion about who should lead and engage. Officials from one operational component told us that they were tasked with leading a departmentwide policy development effort they believed was outside their area of responsibility and expertise. Officials in another operational component stated that components sometimes end up coordinating among themselves, but that policy development could be more effective and efficient if PLCY took the role of convener and facilitator to ensure the departmentwide perspective is present and all relevant stakeholders participate. Officials from a third component stated that they spent significant time and resources to develop a policy directly related to their component’s mission. As the component got ready to implement the policy, PLCY became aware of it and asked the component to stop working on the policy, so PLCY could develop a departmentwide policy. According to component officials, while they were supportive of a departmentwide policy, PLCY’s timing delayed implementation of the policy the component had developed and wasted the resources it had invested. Moreover, officials from four operational components told us that sometimes counselors from outside PLCY, such as the Secretary’s office, have led policy efforts that seem like they should be PLCY’s responsibility, which created more confusion about what PLCY’s ongoing role should be. PLCY officials agreed that, at times, it has been challenging to define PLCY’s role relative to counselors for the Secretary, and acknowledged that clear guidance to define who is leading which types of policy development and coordination would be helpful. Not engaging components at the right times. Officials from 5 of 8 operational components told us that they had not always been engaged at the right times by PLCY in departmentwide or crosscutting policies that affected their missions. For example, officials from an operational component described a crosscutting policy that had significant implications for some of its key operational resources, but the component was not made aware of the policy until it was about to be presented at the White House. Officials from another component stated that they learned of a new policy after it was in place and had to find significant training and software resources to implement it even though they viewed the policy as unnecessary for their mission. PLCY officials stated that, while they intend to identify all components that should be involved in a policy, there are times when PLCY is unaware a component is developing a policy that affects other components. PLCY officials said they will involve other components when PLCY becomes aware that a component is developing such a policy. PLCY officials stated that it would be helpful to have a process and procedures for cross-component coordination on policies to help guide engagement regardless of who is developing the policy. Incompatible expectations around timelines. Officials at 4 of 8 operational components stated that short timelines from PLCY to provide input and feedback can prevent PLCY from obtaining thoughtful and complete information from components. For example, officials from one component stated that PLCY asked them to perform an analysis that would inform major, departmental decision-making and quickly provide the analysis. Component officials told us that they did not understand why PLCY needed the analysis on such an accelerated timeline, which seemed inappropriate given the level of importance and purpose of the analysis. Officials from another component told us that PLCY had not always provided enough time to provide thoughtful feedback; therefore, component officials were not sure if PLCY really wanted their feedback. Officials from a third component stated that sometimes PLCY did not provide sufficient time for thoughtful input or feedback that had cleared the component’s legal review, so component officials elected to miss PLCY’s deadline and provide late feedback. PLCY officials told us that, frequently, timelines are not within their control, a situation that some component officials also noted during our interviews with them. However, PLCY officials agreed that a documented, predictable, and repeatable process and procedures for policies may help ensure PLCY provides sufficient comment time when in its control and may provide a basis to help negotiate timelines with DHS leadership in other situations. PLCY officials stated that, even with a documented process and procedures, there would still be circumstances when short timelines are unavoidable. Uncertainty about PLCY’s role in driving policy harmonization. Policy officials at 6 of 8 operational components told us that they were unsure or not aware of PLCY’s role in harmonizing policy across the department, and stated a desire for PLCY to be more involved in harmonizing or enhancing departmentwide and crosscutting policy or for greater clarity about PLCY’s responsibility to play this role. As previously discussed, PLCY’s policy and strategy efforts fall into four categories—statutory responsibilities, interagency efforts, Secretary’s priorities, and self- initiated activities; these activities include efforts to better harmonize policies and strategies. According to PLCY officials, the category with the lowest priority is self-initiated activities. PLCY officials stated that PLCY makes tradeoffs and rarely chooses to work on self-initiated projects over its other three categories of effort. According to the officials, PLCY’s work on the other three higher-priority categories is sufficient to ensure that the office is effectively leading, conducting, and coordinating strategy and policy across the department. Given its organizational position and strategic priorities, PLCY is uniquely situated to identify opportunities to better harmonize or enhance departmentwide and crosscutting policy, a role that is in line with its strategic priority to build departmental policymaking capacity and foster Unity of Effort. In the absence of clear articulation of the department’s expectations for PLCY in this role, it is difficult for PLCY and DHS leadership to make completely informed and deliberate decisions about the tradeoffs they make across any available resources. In addition to statutory authority that PLCY received in the NDAA, PLCY officials stated that a separate, clear delegation of authority—a mechanism by which the Secretary delegates responsibilities to other organizational units within DHS—is needed to help confront the ambiguous roles it has experienced in the past. PLCY officials stated that past efforts to finalize a delegation of authority have stalled during leadership changes and that the initiative has been a lower priority, in part, due to where PLCY is in its maturation process and DHS is in its evolution into a more cohesive department under the Unity of Effort. As of May 2018, the effort had been revived, but it is not clear whether and when DHS will finalize it. According to a senior official in the Office of the Under Secretary for Management, a delegation of authority is important for PLCY. He described the creation of a delegation of authority as a process that does more than simply delegate the Secretary’s authority. He noted that defining PLCY’s roles and responsibilities in relation to other organizational units presents an opportunity to engage all relevant components and agree on appropriate roles. He said that, earlier in the organizational life of the Office of the Under Secretary for Management, it went through a process like this, which has been vital in it being able to carry out its mission. He said now that PLCY has a deputy undersecretary in place, this is a good time to restart the process to develop the delegation of authority. Until the delegation or a similar process clearly and fully articulates PLCY’s roles and responsibilities, PLCY and the operational components are likely to continue to experience limitations in collaboration on crosscutting and departmentwide policy. PLCY determines its workforce needs through the annual budget process, but systematic identification of workforce demand, capacity gaps, and strategies to address them could help ensure that PLCY’s workforce aligns with its and DHS’s priorities and goals. To determine its workforce needs each year, PLCY officials told us that, as part of the annual budget cycle, they work with PLCY staff and operational components to determine the scope of activities required for each PLCY area of responsibility and the associated staffing needs. PLCY officials said there are three skill sets needed to carry out the office’s responsibilities: policy analysis, social science analysis, and regional affairs analysis. PLCY officials explained that the office’s priorities can change rapidly as events occur and the Secretary’s and administration’s priorities shift. Therefore, according to PLCY officials, their staffing model must be flexible. They said that, rather than a defined system of full-time equivalents with set position types and levels, PLCY officials start with their budget allotment and consider current and potential emerging needs to set position types and levels, which may fluctuate significantly from year to year. In addition, PLCY officials stated that PLCY staff are primarily generalists and, given the versatility in skill sets of their workforce, PLCY has a lot of flexibility to move staff around if there is an emerging need. For example, if there is an emerging law enforcement issue that affects all law enforcement agencies, PLCY may be tasked with developing a policy to ensure the issue is addressed quickly and that the resulting policy is harmonized across the department and with other law enforcement agencies, such as the Department of Justice. While PLCY completes some workforce planning activities as part of its annual budgeting process, PLCY does not systematically address several aspects of the DHS Workforce Planning Guide that may create more efficient operations and greater alignment with DHS priorities. According to the DHS Workforce Planning Guide, workforce planning is a process that ensures the right number of people with the right skills are in the right jobs at the right time for DHS to achieve the mission. This process provides a framework to: align workforce planning to the department’s mission and goals, predict, then assess how evolving missions, new processes, or environmental conditions may impact the way that work will be performed at DHS in the future, identify gaps in capacity, develop and implement strategies and action plans to address capacity and capability gaps, and continuously monitor the effectiveness of action plans and modify, as necessary. The DHS Workforce Planning Guide stipulates that an organization’s management should not only lead and show support during the workforce planning process, but ensure alignment with the strategic direction of the agency. Moreover, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government states that management should use quality information to achieve the entity’s objectives. For example, management uses an entity’s operational processes to make informed decisions and evaluate the entity’s performance in achieving key agency objectives. According to PLCY officials, the current staffing paradigm involves shifting the office’s staff when new and urgent issues arise from the Secretary or White House, and adding these unexpected tasks to staff’s existing responsibilities. However, this means that tradeoffs are made, resulting in some priority items taking longer to address or not getting attention at all. PLCY officials stated that they have been caught off-guard at times by changes in demands placed on PLCY and had to scramble to address the new needs. Additionally, PLCY officials said they have a number of vacancies, which hamper the office’s ability to meet certain aspects of its mission. For example, PLCY’s Office of Cyber, Infrastructure, and Resilience was created in 2015. According to PLCY officials, PLCY has had some resources to address cyber issues, however, there has not been funding to staff this office and an assistant secretary has not been appointed to lead it. Therefore, PLCY officials stated that PLCY has not been able to address its responsibilities for infrastructure resilience. Similarly, PLCY has limited capacity for risk analysis. A provision of the NDAA provides that PLCY is to: develop and coordinate strategic plans and long-term goals of the department with risk-based analysis and planning to improve operational mission effectiveness, including consultation with the Secretary regarding the quadrennial homeland security review under section 707 [6 U.S.C. § 347]. However, PLCY officials acknowledged that their focus on identifying needs for risk analyses and conducting them has been limited, in part, because DHS disbanded the risk management office. Officials from one component told us that they contribute to a report that PLCY coordinates, called Homeland Security National Risk Characteristics, which is prepared as a precursor to the DHS Strategic Plan. PLCY officials stated that, outside of these foundational documents and some risk-based analyses completed as part of specific policy development efforts, PLCY does not have the capacity to complete any additional risk analysis activities. Although PLCY officials said they conduct some analysis of potential demands as a starting point for how to allocate PLCY’s annual staffing budget, these efforts are largely informal and internal and have not resulted in a systematic analysis that provides PLCY and DHS management with the information they need to understand the effects of resource tradeoffs. Also, PLCY officials said they track accomplishments toward PLCY’s strategic priorities as part of a weekly meeting and report, however, officials acknowledged they do not analyze what role workforce decisions have played in achieving or not achieving strategic priorities. Moreover, although PLCY officials stated that they have intermittent, in- person, informal communication about resource use, they have not used the principles outlined in the DHS Workforce Planning Guide to systematically identify and communicate workforce demands, capacity gaps, and strategies to address workforce issues. According to PLCY officials, they have not conducted such analysis, in part, because the Secretary’s office has not requested it of them or the other DHS offices that are funded in the same part of the DHS budget. Regardless of whether the Secretary expects workforce analysis as part of the budgeting process, the DHS Workforce Planning Guide could be used within and outside of the budgeting process to help inform resource decision making throughout the year. PLCY officials stated that at the PLCY Deputy Under Secretary’s initiative, they recently began a review of all relevant statutory authorities, which they will map against the current organizational structure and day- to-day operations. The Deputy Under Secretary plans to use the results of the review to enhance PLCY’s efficiency and effectiveness, and the results could serve as a foundation for a more holistic and systematic analysis of workforce demand, any capacity gaps, and strategies to address them. Employing workforce planning principles—in particular, systematic identification of workforce demand, capacity gaps, and strategies to address them—consistent with the DHS Workforce Planning Guide could better position PLCY to use its workforce as effectively as possible under uncertain conditions. Moreover, using the DHS guide would help PLCY to systematically communicate information about any workforce gaps to DHS leadership, so there is transparency about how workforce tradeoffs affect PLCY’s ability to support DHS goals. As discussed earlier, officials from PLCY and DHS operational components praised existing mechanisms to coordinate and communicate at the senior level, especially about strategy. However, component officials identified opportunities for PLCY to better connect at the staff level to identify and respond to emerging policy and strategy needs. Leading practices for collaboration that we have identified in our prior work state that it is important to ensure that all relevant participants have been included in a collaborative effort, and positive working relationships among participants from different agencies or offices can bridge organizational cultures. These relationships build trust and foster communication, which facilitate collaboration. Also, as previously stated, PLCY has mechanisms like the S&P ESC to communicate and coordinate with operational components and other DHS stakeholders at the senior level (e.g., Senior Executive Service officials). However, PLCY does not have a mechanism to effectively engage in routine communication and collaboration at the staff level (e.g., program and policy specialists working at operational components to oversee or implement policy and strategy functions). Specifically, officials with responsibility for policy and strategy at 6 of 8 operational components told us that they did not have regular contact with or know who to contact at PLCY for questions about policies or strategies, or that the reason they knew who to contact was because of existing working relationships, not because of efforts PLCY had undertaken to facilitate such contacts. In addition, some component officials noted that, when they tried to use the PLCY website to coordinate, they found it to be out of date and lacking sufficient information. PLCY officials acknowledged that the website needs improvement. They stated that the office has developed improved content for the website, but does not have the necessary staff to update the website. According to the officials, the needed staff should be hired soon and improved content should be on the website by the end of summer 2018. Although officials at 5 of the 8 operational components we interviewed stated that the quality of PLCY’s coordination and collaboration has improved in the past 2 years or so, component officials offered several suggestions to enhance PLCY’s coordination and collaboration, especially at the staff level. Among these were: conduct routine information sharing meetings with staff-level officials who have policy and strategy responsibilities at each operational component, clearly articulate points of contact, their contact information, and their portfolios at PLCY as well as at other policy and strategy stakeholders, ensure the PLCY website is up-to-date with contact information for PLCY and components that work in strategy and policy areas, and with relevant information about crosscutting strategy and policy initiatives underway, host a forum—such as an annual conference—to bring together policy and strategy officials from PLCY and DHS components to share ideas and make contacts, and prepare a standard briefing for component officials with strategy and policy responsibilities to help ensure that staff at all levels understand what PLCY does, how it works, and opportunities for engagement on emerging policy and strategy needs or identified harmonization opportunities. For example, officials from one component told us that they would like PLCY officials to have in-person meetings with component staff to discuss what PLCY does, who to contact in PLCY, where to find information about policies and strategies, and other relevant information to ensure a smooth working relationship between the component and PLCY. According to PLCY officials, the office recognizes the value of creating mechanisms to connect staff, who work on policy and strategy at all levels in DHS. PLCY officials said they have historically done a better job in coordinating at the senior level, but are interested in expanding opportunities to connect other staff with policy and strategy responsibilities. PLCY officials stated that they are considering creating a working group structure that mirrors existing organizational mechanisms to coordinate at the senior level, but have not taken steps to do so. Routine collaboration among PLCY, operational components, and other DHS offices at the staff level is important to ensure that PLCY is able to carry out its functions under the NDAA, including the effective coordination of policies and strategies. A positive working relationship among these stakeholders can build trust, foster communication, and facilitate collaboration. Such enhanced communication and collaboration across PLCY and among component officials with policy and strategy responsibility could help the department more quickly and completely identify emerging, crosscutting strategy and policy needs and opportunities to enhance policy harmonization. PLCY’s efforts to lead, conduct, and coordinate departmentwide and crosscutting policies have sometimes been hampered by the lack of clearly-defined roles and responsibilities. In addition, PLCY does not have a consistent process and procedures for its strategy development and policymaking efforts. Without a delegation of authority or similar documentation from DHS leadership clearly articulating PLCY’s missions, roles, and responsibilities—along with defined processes and procedures to carry them out in a predictable and repeatable manner—there is continuing risk that confusion and uncertainty about PLCY’s authority, missions, roles, and responsibilities will limit its effectiveness. PLCY employs some workforce planning, but does not systematically apply key principles of the DHS Workforce Planning Guide to help predict workforce demand, and identify any workforce gaps and design strategies to address them. Without this analysis, PLCY faces limitations in ensuring that its workforce is aligned with its and DHS’s priorities and goals. Moreover, the results of this analysis would better position PLCY to communicate to DHS leadership any potential tradeoffs in workforce allocation that would affect PLCY’s ability to meet priorities and goals. PLCY could enhance its use of mechanisms for collaboration and communication with DHS stakeholders at the staff level. Implementation of additional mechanisms at the staff level for regular communication and coordination, including providing up-to-date information to stakeholders about the office, could help PLCY and operational components to better connect in order to identify and address emerging policy and strategy needs. We are making the following four recommendations to DHS: The Secretary of Homeland Security should finalize a delegation of authority or similar document that clearly defines PLCY’s mission, roles, and responsibilities relative to DHS’s operational and support components. (Recommendation 1) The Secretary of Homeland Security should create corresponding processes and procedures to help implement the mission, roles, and responsibilities defined in the delegation of authority or similar document to help ensure predictability, repeatability, and accountability in departmentwide and crosscutting strategy and policy efforts. (Recommendation 2) The Under Secretary for Strategy, Policy, and Plans should use the DHS Workforce Planning Guide to help identify and analyze any gaps in PLCY’s workforce, design strategies to address any gaps, and communicate this information to DHS leadership. (Recommendation 3) The Under Secretary for Strategy, Policy, and Plans should enhance the use of collaboration and communication mechanisms to connect with staff in the components with responsibilities for policy and strategy to better identify and address emerging needs. (Recommendation 4) We provided a draft of this report for review and comment to DHS. DHS provided written comments, which are reproduced in appendix I. DHS also provided technical comments, which we incorporated, as appropriate. DHS concurred with three of our recommendations and described actions planned to address them. DHS did not concur with one recommendation. Specifically, DHS did not concur with our recommendation that PLCY should use the DHS Workforce Planning Guide to help identify and analyze any gaps in PLCY’s workforce, design strategies to address any gaps, and communicate this information to DHS leadership. The letter described a number of actions, including actions that are also described in the report, which PLCY takes to help ensure alignment of its staff with organizational needs. In the letter, PLCY officials pointed to the workforce activities PLCY undertakes as part of the annual budgeting cycle. We acknowledge that the actions described to predict upcoming priorities and resource needs as part of the annual budgeting cycle are in line with the DHS workforce planning principles. However, as we noted, there are opportunities to apply the workforce planning principles outside the annual budgeting cycle to provide greater visibility and awareness of resource tradeoffs to management inside PLCY and in the Secretary’s office. In the letter, PLCY officials made note of the dynamic and changing nature of its operational environment, stating that it often required them to shift resources and priorities on a more frequent or ad hoc basis than many organizations. We acknowledged in the report that PLCY’s operating environment requires it to maintain flexibility in its staffing approach. However, PLCY has a number of important duties, including helping foster Unity of Effort throughout the department and helping to ensure the availability of risk information for departmental decision making, that require longer-term, sustained attention and strategic management. During interviews, PLCY officials acknowledged that striking a balance between these needs has been difficult and at times they have faced significant struggles. The report describes some areas where, during the time we were conducting our work, it was clear that some tasks and functions, such as risk analyses, lacked the resources or focus necessary to ensure they received sustained institutional attention. It is because of PLCY’s dynamic operating environment, coupled with the need for sustained institutional attention to other key responsibilities, that we recommended PLCY undertake workforce planning activities that would help generate better information for PLCY and DHS management to have full visibility and awareness of gaps and resource tradeoffs. Finally, the letter stated that because PLCY is a very small and flat organization, it is able to identify capacity gaps and develop action plans without obtaining all of the data collected through each recommended element, worksheet, form, and template of the model proposed in the DHS Workforce Planning Guide. We acknowledge that it would be counterproductive for PLCY to engage in data collection and analysis that are significantly more elaborate than its planning needs. Nevertheless, we continue to believe that PLCY could use the principles more robustly, outside the annual budgeting process, to help ensure that it identifies and communicates the effect that resource tradeoffs have on its ability to accomplish its multifaceted mission. We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees and the Secretary of Homeland Security. In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please contact me at (404) 679-1875 or CurrieC@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made significant contributions to this report are listed in Appendix II. In addition to the contact named above, Kathryn Godfrey (Assistant Director), Joseph E. Dewechter (Analyst-in-Charge), Michelle Loutoo Wilson, Ricki Gaber, Dominick Dale, Thomas Lombardi, Ned Malone, David Alexander, Sarah Veale, and Michael Hansen made key contributions to this report.

Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 1.

Answer: Federal agencies and the nation's critical infrastructures—such as energy, transportation systems, communications, and financial services—are dependent on information technology systems to carry out operations. The security of these systems and the data they use is vital to public confidence and national security, prosperity, and well-being. The risks to these systems are increasing as security threats evolve and become more sophisticated. GAO first designated information security as a government-wide high-risk area in 1997. This was expanded to include protecting cyber critical infrastructure in 2003 and protecting the privacy of personally identifiable information in 2015. This report provides an update to the information security high-risk area. To do so, GAO identified the actions the federal government and other entities need to take to address cybersecurity challenges. GAO primarily reviewed prior work issued since the start of fiscal year 2016 related to privacy, critical federal functions, and cybersecurity incidents, among other areas. GAO also reviewed recent cybersecurity policy and strategy documents, as well as information security industry reports of recent cyberattacks and security breaches. GAO has identified four major cybersecurity challenges and 10 critical actions that the federal government and other entities need to take to address them. GAO continues to designate information security as a government-wide high-risk area due to increasing cyber-based threats and the persistent nature of security vulnerabilities. GAO has made over 3,000 recommendations to agencies aimed at addressing cybersecurity shortcomings in each of these action areas, including protecting cyber critical infrastructure, managing the cybersecurity workforce, and responding to cybersecurity incidents. Although many recommendations have been addressed, about 1,000 have not yet been implemented. Until these shortcomings are addressed, federal agencies' information and systems will be increasingly susceptible to the multitude of cyber-related threats that exist. GAO has made over 3,000 recommendations to agencies since 2010 aimed at addressing cybersecurity shortcomings. As of August 2018, about 1,000 still needed to be implemented.