You are given two reports by the government agency.  

Report 1:
The federal government, through the Department of Energy, operates four regional power marketing administrations (PMAs), created by statute: the Bonneville Power Administration (BPA), the Southeastern Power Administration (SEPA), the Southwestern Power Administration (SWPA), and the Western Area Power Administration (WAPA). Each PMA operates in a distinct geographic area of the coterminous United States (see Figure 1 ). Congressional interest in the PMAs has included diverse issues such as rate setting, cost and compliance associated with the Endangered Species Act (ESA; P.L. 93-205 ; 16 U.S.C. §§1531 et seq.), and questions of privatization of these federal agencies. In general, the PMAs came into being because of the government's need to dispose of electric power produced by federal dams constructed largely for irrigation, flood control, or other purposes, and to achieve small community and farm electrification—that is, providing service to customers whom it would not have been profitable for a private utility to serve. With minor exceptions, these agencies market the electric power produced by federal dams constructed, owned, and operated by the Corps of Engineers (Corps) and the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation (BOR). PMAs must give preference to public utility districts and cooperatives (e.g., "preference customers"), selling their power at cost-based rates set at the lowest possible rate consistent with sound business principles. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) regulates PMA rates to ensure that they are set high enough to repay the U.S. Treasury on schedule for the portion of federal facility costs that have been allocated to hydropower beneficiaries. Since FY2011, power revenues associated with the PMAs have been classified as discretionary offsetting receipts (i.e., receipts that are available for spending by the PMAs), thus the agencies are sometimes noted as having a "net-zero" spending authority. Only the capital expenses of WAPA and SWPA require appropriations from Congress. Each PMA also has unique elements and regional issues that affect its business. They are discussed in alphabetical order. Created by the Bonneville Project Act of 1937 (16 U.S.C. §832) just before the completion of two large dams in the Pacific Northwest—Bonneville Dam in 1938 and Grand Coulee Dam in 1941—BPA was the first PMA. Though it serves a smaller geographical area, BPA is on par with WAPA (which serves the largest area) in the size of its transmission system. The agency operates and maintains about 75% of the high voltage transmission lines in its service territory, which includes Idaho, Oregon, Washington, western Montana and small parts of eastern Montana, California, Nevada, Utah, and Wyoming. BPA also markets wholesale electricity from 31 federally owned hydropower facilities in the Northwest. These generation facilities are owned both by the Corps and BOR. BPA differs from the other three PMAs in that it is self-financed: it receives no federal appropriations. Since passage of the Federal Columbia River Transmission System Act of 1974 (16 U.S.C. §838), BPA has covered its operating costs through power rates set to ensure repayment to the Treasury of capital and interest on funds used to construct the Columbia River power system. BPA also has permanent Treasury borrowing authority, which it may use for capital on large projects. This money is repaid with interest, through power sales. As of 2018, BPA had $5.53 billion of bonds outstanding to the U.S. Treasury, with BPA's current borrowing authority capped by Congress at $7.70 billion. BPA has also looked at other financing options as it approaches its debt limit, looking at nonfederal debt refinancing, lease-purchases, and other asset management strategies. BPA has initiated strategies and a financial plan to address a changing power generation and demand market, as it endeavors to meet its mandate for cost-based electric power rates. These plans are outlined in its Strategic Plan for 2018 to 2023, and address goals from financial health to infrastructure modernization. Wholesale power prices in the United States are generally trending downward, while BPA's firm power rates have trended upward. BPA repays its funding from the U.S. Treasury largely through electricity sales to customers. While BPA generates its electricity from hydropower (which is traditionally one of the lower-cost means of power generation), increasing amounts of renewable electricity from growing wind and solar capacity installations in the Pacific Northwest are challenging BPA's price competitiveness, and perhaps its ability to repay its debts in a timely manner. In 2014, BPA entered into the Regional Cooperation Agreement (RCA) with the State of Washington to address the debt of Energy Northwest, a "joint action agency formed by the Washington state legislature in 1957" to manage public power utility costs. Energy Northwest owns and operates four electric power generation facilities: White Bluffs Solar Station, Packwood Lake Hydroelectric Project, Nine Canyon Wind Project, and the Columbia Generating Station. The Regional Cooperation debt is "the issuance of new bonds by Energy Northwest to refund outstanding bonds shortly before their maturities when substantial principal repayments were and are due." According to BPA, this allows for "integrated debt management" for the combined total debt portfolios of BPA and Energy Northwest, with a net effect reducing the "weighted average interest rate and the maturity of BPA's overall debt portfolio" over the life of the program. This refinancing, according to BPA, has enabled BPA to prepay higher-interest-rate federal obligations, and has "preserved or restored U.S. Treasury borrowing authority." However, the debt service of the RCA is "borne by BPA ratepayers through BPA rates." BPA estimates that the "aggregate potential principal amount" of RCA refunding through bonds issued in fiscal years 2019 through 2030 could exceed $4.0 billion. BPA is responsible for maintaining and modernizing the generation and transmission infrastructure of its systems, and preserving and enhancing its physical and cybersecurity. With energy and capacity markets changing in the western United States (especially with the growing need to integrate increasing amounts of variable renewable sources), and the development of the Energy Imbalance Market (EIM) in the West, BPA is considering whether to join the EIM, and how this might affect its operations and customers. Environmental, fishing, and tribal advocates have sued the federal government over concerns that operating rules for hydropower dams on the Columbia and Snake Rivers (i.e., operations consistent with the National Marine Fisheries Service Biological Opinion) are inadequate to ensure survival of species threatened or endangered under the Endangered Species Act. In addition, several environmental groups filed a lawsuit blaming the dams for warm river waters in summer 2015 that resulted in the deaths of about 250,000 adult sockeye salmon migrating up the Columbia and Snake Rivers. Some of these parties have sought to remove the four lower dams on the Snake River to ensure survival of some salmon and steelhead species. In 2016, a federal judge overturned a previous management plan for the dams, finding that it would not be sufficient to protect salmon runs, and ordered a new management plan that could include removing the dams. However, in 2018, President Trump issued a Presidential Memorandum accelerating the process for a new management plan, requiring the biological opinion to be ready by 2020. The memorandum ordered the Secretary of the Interior and the Secretary of Commerce "to appropriately suspend, revise, or rescind any regulations or procedures that unduly burden" water infrastructure projects so they "are better able to meet the demands of their authorized purposes." How this will affect the fish endangerment finding is unclear at this time. The Southeastern Power Administration was created in 1950 by the Secretary of the Interior to carry out the functions assigned to the Secretary by the Flood Control Act of 1944 (P.L. 78-534) in 11 states (Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, and West Virginia). SEPA is unique among the four PMAs in two ways. It is the smallest PMA, with just over 40 employees, and, unlike the other three agencies, SEPA does not operate or maintain any transmission facilities, and thus contracts with other utilities for transmitting the federal power it markets to more than 12 million consumers. Southeastern markets approximately 3,400 MW of power produced at 22 multipurpose water projects, operated and maintained by the Corps. SEPA's facilities are aging; for instance, in 2018 it reported that its Cumberland System customers have agreed to fund $1.2 billion of planned rehabilitations of the nine hydroelectric facilities in the Corps' Nashville District. According to SEPA, it has an overcapacity issue. Projections for electricity load growth (in consultation with its preference customers) made before the 2008 economic downturn reportedly led to SEPA acquiring additional capacity it currently does not use. As a result, municipalities and electric cooperatives in SEPA's service area will have to make economic decisions regarding how to handle this excess capacity. As of 2018, at least one preference customer has terminated its contract with SEPA due to this issue. Section 5 of the Flood Control Act of 1944 (P.L. 78-534) established the Southwestern Power Administration. SWPA markets hydroelectric power in Arkansas, Kansas, Louisiana, Missouri, Oklahoma, and Texas from 24 multipurpose Corps dams with a combined capacity of 2,194 MW. SWPA serves more than 100 preference customer utilities with more than 8 million end-use customers. The agency manages nearly 1,400 miles of high-voltage transmission lines. SWPA is the only U.S. electrical balancing area supported solely by hydroelectric generation, and its use of the reservoirs and river systems within the SWPA marketing area must be balanced with flood control and other required uses so that the power needs of its customers can be met. SWPA states that it uses alternative financing and offsetting collection authorities to fund expenses and purchase power to help SWPA meet its obligations while minimizing congressional appropriations. Periodically, SWPA has been challenged by low water conditions. It has a rain-based water supply—rather than one that is snow-based, like the mountain snowpack water supply of WAPA and BPA—and sells power from a comparatively small reservoir system which stores that water. Extended dry periods sometimes mean that SWPA must purchase replacement power and energy to meet its contractual obligations. This means that SWPA requires congressional authority to use its revenues from power sales over the long term—across high and low water years. Prior year balances have been available to Southwestern so that we are financially prepared and able to achieve rate stability for our customers. This authority is critical to operating our program according to sound business principles. Southwestern's program is funded by authority to use receipts, alternative financing, and other authorities approved by Congress, including appropriations, which represent only 6.5% of Southwestern's total program. Created by the Department of Energy Organization Act of 1977 ( P.L. 95-91 ), WAPA is the newest and largest of the PMAs in terms of service area. WAPA's service area covers 1.3 million square miles, and its power—transmitted by a high voltage grid over 17,000 miles long—serves customers in 15 western states. WAPA markets and transmits hydropower from 56 federal dams operated by BOR, and the Corps. It also sells hydropower power produced by facilities administered by the International Boundary and Water Commission, and markets the United States' 24.3% share (547 megawatts) of the coal-fired Navajo Generating Station in Arizona. In addition to the types of public bodies traditionally served as preference customers by the other PMAs, WAPA has developed a policy to give preference to Native American tribes regardless of their utility status. WAPA has been working with other regional entities to address the changing electric power needs of its customers. In 2014, WAPA published its Strategic Roadmap 2024, titled "Powering the Energy Frontier." The document is intended to serve as WAPA's strategic plan to guide the agency's actions for the next 10 years. However, according to some, the developing Energy Imbalance Market in the West may provide additional options for WAPA to address transmission development needs to balance regional generation and demand. An issue of continuing importance to WAPA is its role in relieving transmission congestion within its marketing area. There are a number of constrained transmission paths in the West whose limited capacity to transfer power may reduce the ability of utilities to serve electric loads on a seasonal or ongoing basis. In 2009, Section 402 of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act ( P.L. 111-5 ) amended the Hoover Power Plant Act of 1984 to give WAPA authority to borrow up to $3.25 billion from the U.S. Treasury to pursue transmission projects that integrate renewable generation sources into the electric transmission grid. The law provides authority to construct and upgrade transmission lines to help deliver renewable resources to market. Western created the Transmission Infrastructure Program, also known as TIP, to implement this new initiative. Several transmission projects have been initiated under the program. Previous budget proposals and legislation have proposed repealing WAPA's loan authority, but to date, none of these proposals have been enacted. In 2015, WAPA's Upper Great Plains (UGP) region joined the Southwest Power Pool (SPP), a Regional Transmission Organization (RTO). Under the operating agreement with SPP, WAPA was required to transfer functional control of UGP's eligible transmission facilities to SPP. WAPA is the first PMA to formally join an RTO, and states that benefits to date from joining SPP have significantly exceeded the original estimate of $11.5 million per year. WAPA reports that two of its other regions are considering joining SPP. For Water Year 2017, WAPA reported that it delivered 26,148 gigawatt-hours of hydroelectric power to its customers, which is 101% of average annual power sales. The West has been experiencing periodic droughts for a number of years, resulting in lower snowmelts and less water in storage and available for power generation. To help smooth the resulting annual differences, a "drought-adder" reduction program has been implemented in recent years. A drought-adder charge was levied to help repay deferred drought costs accrued during the 2000s in the Rocky Mountain and Upper Great Plains regions. The balance was paid a year ahead of schedule and, as of this year, has resulted in $40 million annual savings for more than 50 percent of WAPA's customers in Colorado, Wyoming, Montana, Kansas, Nebraska, the Dakotas and the western sections of Minnesota and Iowa. This is the second year that 417 of WAPA's customers, out of 700, have had a rate reduction. The drought-adder component of the rate remains available to WAPA to adjust to the variable hydropower resource—a lasting risk if drought conditions persist in WAPA's territory. Moderate to extreme drought conditions have been reported in parts of the western United States. In addition to issues specific to individual PMAs, some recent proposals have applied to multiple PMAs. In 2018, the Trump Administration proposed to sell the transmission assets owned and operated by the federal Power Marketing Administrations. The proposal suggested that "eliminating or reducing" the federal government's role in owning and operating transmission assets and increasing the private sector role would "encourage a more efficient allocation of economic resources and mitigate unnecessary risk to taxpayers." The proposal calls for federal transmission infrastructure assets (lines, towers, substations, and/or rights of way) to be sold, with the private sector and/or state and local entities potentially taking over the transmission functions now provided by the PMAs. The Federal entities that would result after such sales could contract with other utilities to provide transmission service for the delivery of Federal power just as the Southeastern Power Administration, which does not own transmission lines, already does. The proposal reports that according to the Administration's FY2019 budget justification, the sale of federal transmission assets would result in a net budgetary savings of $9.5 billion, in total, over a 10-year window. Reportedly, the Administration dropped the plan due to stakeholder opposition, with the Department of Energy stating that such a sale of PMA transmission assets would not proceed unless directed by Congress. Proposals to sell all or part of the PMAs are not new, and have been made in some form by almost every President since Reagan. However, Congress has sought to prevent executive branch alterations of PMA structures and authority. Under Section 208 of the Urgent Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1986 ( P.L. 99-349 ), the executive branch is prohibited from spending funds to study or draft proposals to transfer from federal control any portion of the assets of the PMAs unless specifically authorized by Congress. The Trump Administration divestment proposal could have had an indirect impact on the original congressional intent for the PMAs to provide electricity at the lowest possible cost. This in turn could require changes to the following provisions: Flood Control Act of 1944, as amended (FCA; 16 U.S.C. §825s et seq. ); The 1937 Bonneville Project Act (BPA; 16 U.S.C. §832c ); and The Reclamation Project Act of 1939 (RPA; 43 U.S.C. §485h(c)) . These laws also stipulate a preference of public bodies for the sale of federal power. Selling federally owned transmission assets could potentially affect the "lowest possible" rates of sale, and the statutory preference for publicly or cooperatively owned utilities to be the vehicle for sale of electric power produced by federal facilities.

 

 Report 2:
The minority leader of the modern House is the head of the "loyal opposition." As the minority party's nominee for Speaker at the start of a new Congress, the minority leader traditionally hands the gavel to the Speaker-elect, who is usually elected on a straight party-line vote. The speakership election illustrates the main problem that confronts the minority leader: the subordinate status of the minority party in an institution noted for majority rule. As David Bonior, D-MI, explained: "This body, unlike the other, operates under the principle that a determined majority should be allowed to work its will while protecting the rights of the minority to be heard." Minority party lawmakers are certain to be heard, but whether they will be heeded is sometimes another matter. Thus, the uppermost goal of any minority leader is to recapture majority control of the House. The minority leader is elected every two years by secret ballot of his or her party caucus or conference. These party leaders are typically experienced lawmakers when they win election to this position. The current minority leader, Kevin McCarthy, R-CA, served 12 years in the House, including as majority leader, prior to assuming his current role (a position he also held during his time in the California state assembly). Speaker Nancy Pelosi, D-CA, served in the House for 16 years when she first became minority leader in the 108 th Congress (2003-2004). Following her first tenure as Speaker from 2007 to 2010, Pelosi was again elected minority leader in the 112 th Congress (2011-2012), at which point she was a 24-year veteran of the House. When her predecessor, John Boehner, R-OH, was elected minority leader in the 110 th Congress (2007-2008), he had served in the House for 18 years including as majority leader, committee chair (Education and the Workforce), and, prior to that, chair of the Republican Conference. Richard Gephardt, D-MO, began his tenure as minority leader in the 104 th Congress (1995-1996) as an 18-year House veteran and a former majority leader and chair of the Democratic Caucus. Gephardt's predecessor, Robert Michel, R-IL, became minority leader in 1981 after 24 years in the House. Much like his successors, John Rhodes, R-AZ, had served in the House for 20 years when he was elected minority leader in 1973. While the position itself is usually occupied by Members with significant House experience, the roles and responsibilities of the minority leader are not well-defined. To a large extent, the duties of the minority leader are based on tradition and custom. Representative Bertrand Snell, R-NY, minority leader from 1931 to 1938, described the position in the following way: He is spokesman for his party and enunciates its policies. He is required to be alert and vigilant in defense of the minority's rights. It is his function and duty to criticize constructively the policies and programs of the majority, and to this end employ parliamentary tactics and give close attention to all proposed legislation. Since Snell's description, other responsibilities have been added to the job. Broadly speaking, the role of the minority leader in the contemporary Congress is twofold: to serve as the leader and spokesperson for the minority party, and to participate in certain institutional prerogatives afforded to Members in the minority. How the minority leader handles these responsibilities is likely to depend on a variety of elements, including personality and contextual factors; the size and cohesion of the minority party; whether or not the party controls the White House; the general political climate both inside and outside the House; and expectations of the party's performance in upcoming elections. The next section of the report discusses the historical origin of this position, and the sections that follow take account of the various party and institutional responsibilities of the minority leader. To a large extent, the position of minority leader is a late-19 th -century innovation. Prior to this time congressional parties were often relatively disorganized, so it was not always evident who functioned as the opposition floor leader. Decades went by before anything like our modern two-party congressional system emerged on Capitol Hill with official titles for those who were selected as party leaders. However, from the beginning days of Congress, various House Members intermittently assumed the role of "opposition leader." Some scholars suggest that Representative James Madison of Virginia informally functioned as the first "minority leader" because in the First Congress he led the opposition to Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton's fiscal policies. During this early period, it was common for neither major party grouping (Federalists and Republicans) to have an official leader. In 1813, for instance, a scholar recounts that the Federalist minority of 36 Members needed a committee of 13 "to represent a party comprising a distinct minority" and "to coordinate the actions of men who were already partisans in the same cause." In 1828, a foreign observer of the House offered this perspective on the absence of formal party leadership on Capitol Hill: I found there were absolutely no persons holding the stations of what are called, in England, Leaders, on either side of the House.... It is true, that certain members do take charge of administration questions, and certain others of opposition questions; but all this so obviously without concert among themselves, actual or tacit, that nothing can be conceived less systematic or more completely desultory, disjointed. Internal party disunity compounded the difficulty of identifying lawmakers who might have informally functioned as a minority leader. For instance, "seven of the fourteen speakership elections from 1834 through 1859 had at least twenty different candidates in the field. Thirty-six competed in 1839, ninety-seven in 1849, ninety-one in 1859, and 138 in 1855." With so many candidates competing for the speakership, it is not at all clear that one of the defeated lawmakers then assumed the mantle of "minority leader." The Democratic minority from 1861 to 1875 was so completely disorganized that they did not "nominate a candidate for Speaker in two of these seven Congresses and nominated no man more than once in the other five. The defeated candidates were not automatically looked to for leadership." In the judgment of one congressional scholar, since 1883 "the candidate for Speaker nominated by the minority party has clearly been the Minority Leader." However, this assertion is subject to dispute. On December 3, 1883, the House elected Democrat John G. Carlisle of Kentucky as Speaker. Republicans nominated J. Warren Keifer of Ohio, who was Speaker the previous Congress. But Keifer was viewed by his colleagues as a discredited leader in part because as Speaker he arbitrarily handed out "choice jobs to close relatives ... all at handsome salaries." Keifer received "the empty honor of the minority nomination. But with it came a sting—for while this naturally involves the floor leadership, he was deserted by his [party] associates and his career as a national figure terminated ingloriously." Representative Thomas Reed, R-ME, who later became Speaker, assumed the de facto role of minority floor leader in Keifer's stead. "[A]lthough Keifer was the minority's candidate for Speaker, Reed became its acknowledged leader, and ever after, so long as he served in the House, remained the most conspicuous member of his party." Although congressional historians disagree as to the exact time period when the minority leadership emerged officially as a party position, it seems safe to conclude that the position was established during the latter part of the 19 th century. This era was "marked by strong partisan attachments, resilient patronage-based party organizations, and ... high levels of party voting in Congress." These conditions were conducive to the establishment of a more highly differentiated House leadership structure in which Members assumed more specialized roles within the institution. (See the Appendix for a list of House minority leaders selected since 1899.) One other historical point merits brief mention. Until the 61 st Congress (1909-1910), "it was the custom to have the minority leader also serve as the ranking minority member on the two most powerful committees, Rules and Ways and Means." Today, the minority leader no longer serves on these committees but does chair the Republican Steering Committee, a party leadership committee responsible for making recommendations to the Conference regarding the committee assignments of House Republicans. The minority leader has a number of formal and informal party responsibilities. Formally, the rules of each party specify certain roles and responsibilities for their leader. For example, under Republican Conference rules for the 116 th Congress (2019-2020), the minority leader nominates party members to the Committees on Rules and House Administration, subject to Conference approval. Republican Conference rules also authorize the minority leader to appoint a "Leadership Member" to the Committee on the Budget who "will serve as the second highest-ranking Republican on the committee," and to "recommend to the House all Republican Members of such joint, select, and ad hoc committees as shall be created by the House, in accordance with law." Beyond their formal responsibilities, minority leaders are expected to handle a wide range of informal party assignments. Lewis Deschler, a former House Parliamentarian (1928-1974), summarized the diverse duties of a party's floor leader: A party's floor leader, in conjunction with other party leaders, plays an influential role in the formulation of party policy and programs. He is instrumental in guiding legislation favored by his party through the House, or in resisting those programs of the other party that are considered undesirable by his own party. He is instrumental in devising and implementing his party's strategy on the floor with respect to promoting or opposing legislation. He is kept constantly informed as to the status of legislative business and as to the sentiment of his party respecting particular legislation under consideration. Such information is derived in part from the floor leader's contacts with his party's members serving on House committees, and with the members of the party's whip organization. These and several other party roles merit further discussion because they influence significantly the minority leader's overarching objective: to retake majority control of the House. "I want to get [my] members elected and win more seats," said former Minority Leader Richard Gephardt, D-MO. "That's what [my party colleagues] want to do, and that's what they want me to do." Five activities illustrate how minority leaders seek to accomplish this primary goal. Minority leaders are typically energetic and aggressive campaigners for party incumbents and challengers. For example, they assist in recruiting qualified and competitive candidates; they establish "leadership PACs" to raise and distribute funds to House candidates of their party; they encourage party colleagues not to retire or run for other offices so as to limit the number of open seats the party would need to defend; they coordinate their campaign activities with congressional and national party campaign committees; they encourage outside groups to back their candidates; they travel around the country to speak on behalf of party candidates; and they encourage incumbent colleagues to make significant financial contributions to the party's campaign committee. In the weeks leading up to the 2018 congressional elections, for instance, Minority Leader Pelosi was actively campaigning for Democratic incumbents and challengers: With 21 days until the midterm elections, the California Democrat and House minority leader is crisscrossing the country fundraising and rallying the Democratic troops—and plotting her return to the speakership.... In the third quarter [of 2018], Pelosi will report raising $34.2 million for Democrats, including $30.5 million for the DCCC [Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee]. She is by far the biggest source of cash for House Democrats and House Democratic candidates. The minority leader, in consultation with other party colleagues, has a range of strategic options that can be employed to advance minority party objectives. The options selected depend on a wide range of circumstances, such as the visibility or significance of the issue and the relative degree of cohesion within the majority and minority parties. For instance, a majority party riven by internal dissension—as occurred during the early 1900s when "progressive" and "regular" Republicans were at loggerheads, or beginning in the late 1930s when a "conservative coalition" of Southern Democrats and like-minded Republicans emerged—may provide the minority leader with greater opportunities to achieve party priorities than if the majority party exhibited high degrees of party cohesion (and could simply outvote the minority). Among the variable strategies available to the minority party, which can vary from bill to bill and be used in combination or at different stages of the lawmaking process, are the following: Cooperation . The minority party supports and cooperates with the majority party in building winning coalitions on the floor. Inconsequential Opposition . The minority party offers opposition, but it is of marginal significance, typically because the minority is so small. Withdrawal . The minority party chooses not to take a position on an issue, perhaps because of intraparty divisions or to spotlight divisions within the majority party. Innovation . The minority party develops alternatives and agendas of its own and attempts to construct winning coalitions on their behalf. Partisan Opposition . The minority party offers strong opposition to majority party initiatives, but does not counter with policy alternatives of their own. Participation . The minority party is in the position of having to consider the views and proposals of a same-party President and to assess their majority-building role with respect to the President's priorities. A look at one minority leadership strategy—partisan opposition—may suggest why it might be employed in specific circumstances. The purposes of obstruction are several, such as frustrating the majority party's ability to govern or attracting media attention to the alleged ineffectiveness of the majority party. "We know how to delay," remarked Minority Leader Gephardt. Dilatory motions to adjourn, appeals of the presiding officer's ruling, or numerous requests for roll call votes, including on noncontroversial items like approving the House Jou rnal , are standard time-consuming parliamentary tactics. By stalling action on the majority party's agenda, the minority leader may be able to launch a campaign against a "do-nothing Congress" and convince enough voters to elevate the party to the House majority. To be sure, the minority leader recognizes that outright opposition carries risks. As a congressional scholar explains, "A program of consistent opposition to majority party proposals and a refusal to engage in compromise, while electorally valuable, means forsaking policy gains that may otherwise have been achieved." Another important aim of the minority leader is to develop an electorally attractive agenda of ideas and proposals that unites party members and appeals to core electoral supporters as well as independents and swing voters. Despite the minority leader's limited ability to set the House's agenda, there are still opportunities to raise minority priorities. For example, the minority leader may file discharge petitions in an effort to bring minority priorities to the floor. If the required 218 signatures on a discharge petition can be obtained—a number that demands at least some support from the majority—minority initiatives can be brought to the floor even despite opposition from the majority leadership or the committee(s) of jurisdiction (or both). As a GOP minority leader explained, the challenge here is to "keep our people together, and to look for votes on the other side." Minority leaders may engage in a range of activities to publicize their party's priorities and to criticize those of the opposition. For instance, to keep their party colleagues "on message," they ensure that their party colleagues are sent packets of suggested press releases or "talking points" for constituent meetings in their districts; they help to organize "town hall meetings" in Members' districts around the country to publicize the party's agenda or a specific priority, such as health care or tax reform; they sponsor party "retreats" to discuss issues and assess the party's public image; they create "theme teams" to craft party messages that might be conveyed during the one-minute, morning hour, or special order period in the House; they conduct surveys of party colleagues to discern their policy preferences; they establish websites and Twitter feeds to highlight party priorities; they organize task forces or issue teams to formulate party programs and to develop strategies for communicating these programs to the public; and they appear on various media programs or write newspaper articles to win public support for the party's agenda. House minority leaders also hold joint news conferences with party colleagues and consult with their counterparts in the Senate. The overall objectives are to develop a coordinated communications strategy, to share ideas and information, and to present a united front on issues. Minority leaders also make floor speeches and may close debate for their side on major issues before the House. They must also be prepared "to debate on the floor, ad lib , no notes, on a moment's notice," remarked Minority Leader Michel. In brief, minority leaders are key strategists in developing and promoting the party's agenda and in outlining ways to respond to the opposition's arguments and proposals. A "Dear Colleague" letter delivered to House Democratic offices ahead of the August 2018 recess illustrates the point. In the letter, Minority Leader Pelosi outlined the party's agenda and provided this guidance to her Democratic colleagues: A key part of our For The People agenda is to clean up corruption to make Washington work for the American people.... To honor the pledge of our For The People agenda, a Democratic majority will swiftly act to pass tougher ethics and campaign finance laws and crack down on the conduct that has poisoned the GOP Congress and the Trump Administration.... In district events and on social media, we must drive home the clear contrast between the corruption of the GOP Congress and the better deal that Democrats are offering the American people. We will own August with strength, confidence and clarity, as we make our case to the American people. If his or her party controls the White House, the minority leader confers regularly with the President and his aides about issues before Congress, the Administration's agenda, and political events generally. Strategically, the role of the minority leader will vary depending on whether the President is of the same party or the other party. In general, minority leaders will work to advance the goals and aspirations of their party's President in Congress. When Robert Michel, R-IL, was minority leader (1981-1994), he typically functioned as the "point man" for Republican Presidents. President Ronald Reagan's 1981 policy successes in the Democratic-controlled House were due in no small measure to Minority Leader Michel's effectiveness in wooing so-called "Reagan Democrats" to support, for instance, the Administration's landmark budget reconciliation bill. There are occasions, of course, when minority leaders will fault the legislative initiatives of their President. On an Administration proposal that could adversely affect his district, Michel stated that he might "abdicate my leadership role [on this issue] since I can't harmonize my own views with the administration's." Minority Leader Gephardt publicly opposed a number of President Clinton's legislative initiatives, from "fast track" trade authority to various budget issues, and Minority Leader Pelosi came out against a multilateral trade agreement with Asian-Pacific countries negotiated by the Obama White House. When the President and House majority are of the same party, then the House minority leader assumes a larger role in formulating alternatives to executive branch initiatives and in acting as a national spokesperson for his or her party. "As Minority Leader during [President Lyndon Johnson's] Democratic administration, my responsibility has been to propose Republican alternatives," said Minority Leader Gerald Ford, R-MI. Greatly outnumbered in the House, Minority Leader Ford devised a political strategy that allowed Republicans to offer their alternatives in a manner that provided them political protection. As Ford explained, We used a technique of laying our program out in general debate. When we got to the amendment phase, we would offer our program as a substitute for the Johnson proposal. If we lost in the Committee of the Whole, then we would usually offer it as a motion to recommit and get a vote on that. And if we lost on the motion to recommit, our Republican members had a choice: They could vote against the Johnson program and say we did our best to come up with a better alternative. Or they could vote for it and make the same argument. Usually we lost; but when you're only 140 out of 435, you don't expect to win many. Ford also teamed with Senate Minority Leader Everett McKinley Dirksen, R-IL, to act as national spokesmen for their party. They held a press conference every Thursday following the weekly joint leadership meeting, a tradition that began with Ford's predecessor as minority leader, Charles Halleck, R-IN. When Minority Leaders Dirksen and Halleck appeared together they were dubbed the "Ev and Charlie Show" by the press, and the "Republican National Committee budgeted $30,000 annually to produce the weekly news conference." Minority status, by itself, is often an important inducement for minority party members to stay together, to accommodate different interests, and to submerge intraparty factional disagreements. To hold a diverse membership together often requires extensive consultations and discussions with rank-and-file Members and with different factional groupings. As Minority Leader Gephardt said, We have weekly caucus meetings. We have daily leadership meetings. We have weekly ranking Member meetings. We have party effectiveness meetings. There's a lot more communication. I believe leadership is bottom up, not top down. I think you have to build policy and strategy and vision from the bottom up, and involve people in figuring out what that is. Gephardt added that "inclusion and empowerment of the people on the line have to be done to get the best performance" from the minority party. Other techniques for fostering party harmony include the appointment of task forces composed of party colleagues with conflicting views to reach consensus on issues; daily meetings in the l eader's office (or at breakfast, lunch, or dinner) to lay out floor strategy or political objectives for the minority party; periodic retreats to allow party members to discuss issues and interact with one another outside the confines of Capitol Hill; and the creation of new leadership positions as a way to reach out and involve a greater diversity of party members in the leadership structure. Beyond the party responsibilities of the minority leader are a number of institutional obligations associated with their position as a top House official. Many of these assignments or roles are spelled out in the standing rules of the House, while others have devolved upon the position in other ways. To be sure, the minority leader is provided with extra staff resources—beyond those accorded him or her as a Representative—to assist in carrying out diverse leadership functions. There are limits on the institutional role of the minority leader, because the majority party exercises disproportionate influence over the legislative agenda, partisan ratios on committees, staff resources, administrative operations, and the day-to-day schedule and management of floor activities. Under the rules of the House, the minority leader has certain roles and responsibilities. They include, among others, the following: Under Rule XIII, clause 6(c), the Rules Committee may not issue a "rule" that prevents the minority leader or a designee from offering a motion to recommit with instructions during initial House consideration of a bill or joint resolution. This motion allows the minority leader (or a designee) to offer a policy alternative to what the majority is proposing and obtain a floor vote on the minority's preferred solution. Under Rule IX, clause 2, a resolution "offered as a question of privilege by the Majority Leader or the Minority Leader ... shall have precedence of all other questions except motions to adjourn." This rule further references the minority leader with respect to the division of time for debate of these resolutions. If offered by the majority or minority leader, a valid question of privilege—one that involves "the rights of the House collectively, its safety, dignity and the integrity of its proceedings"—receives immediate consideration by the House. Rule II, clause 6, states that the "Inspector General shall be appointed for a Congress by the Speaker, the Majority Leader, and the Minority Leader, acting jointly." This rule further states that the minority leader and other specified House leaders shall be notified of any financial irregularity involving the House and receive audit reports of the inspector general. Under Rule X, clause 2, not later "than March 31 in the first session of a Congress, after consultation with the Speaker, the Majority Leader, and the Minority Leader, the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform shall report to the House the authorization and oversight plans" of the standing committees along with any recommendations it or the House leaders have proposed to ensure the effective coordination of committees' oversight plans. Rule X, clause 5, stipulates, "At the beginning of a Congress, the Speaker or a designee and the Minority Leader or a designee each shall name 10 Members, Delegates, or the Resident Commissioner from the respective party of such individual who are not members of the Committee on Ethics to be available to serve on investigative subcommittees of that committee during that Congress." Another institutional prerogative of the minority leader is attendance at meetings of the Intelligence Committee. Rule X, clause 11, provides, "The Speaker and the Minority Leader shall be ex officio members of the select committee but shall have no vote in the select committee and may not be counted for purposes of determining a quorum thereof." In addition, each leader "may designate a respective leadership staff member to assist in the capacity of the Speaker or Minority Leader as ex officio member." In addition, the minority leader has a number of other institutional functions. For instance, the minority leader is sometimes statutorily authorized to appoint individuals to certain federal entities. The minority leader also selects three Members to serve as Private Calendar objectors—the majority leader names the other three—and serves on various commissions and groups, including the House Office Building Commission, the United States Capitol Preservation Commission, and the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group. After consultation with the Speaker the minority leader may convene an early organizational party caucus or conference. Informally, the minority leader maintains ties with majority party leaders to learn about the schedule and other House matters, consults with the majority with respect to reconvening the House per the usual formulation of conditional concurrent adjournment resolutions, and forges agreements or understandings with them insofar as feasible. By House tradition, time is not charged to their side when party leaders, including the minority leader, make extended remarks on the floor. Given the concentration of agenda control and other institutional resources in the majority leadership, the minority leader faces real challenges in promoting and publicizing the party's priorities, serving the interests of his rank-and-file Members, managing intraparty conflict, and forging party unity. The ultimate goal of the minority leader is to lead the party into majority status. Yet there is no set formula on how this is to be done. "If the history of elections is any guide," wrote a congressional scholar, "it seems apparent that the congressional record of the minority party is only one of many factors that may result in majority status. Most of the other factors cannot be controlled by the minority party and its leaders ." There is one central dilemma that confronts the minority leader: inferior numbers. This limitation can be overcome on occasion with the right strategic approach, but on many issues this might not be possible. One study of the House minority party summarizes the strategic challenge succinctly: The minority party in the House faces a strategic problem: how do you respond when given only a small slice of the legislative pie? Do you accept the slice you've been given, bargain for more, or use every means at your disposal to win the right to cut the pie yourself? It is this problem, and how the minority party chooses to solve it, that underlies the logic of minority party politics in the House of Representatives.

Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 1.

Answer: The federal government, through the Department of Energy, operates four regional power marketing administrations (PMAs), created by statute: the Bonneville Power Administration (BPA), the Southeastern Power Administration (SEPA), the Southwestern Power Administration (SWPA), and the Western Area Power Administration (WAPA). Each PMA operates in a distinct geographic area. Congressional interest in the PMAs has included diverse issues such as rate setting, cost and compliance associated with the Endangered Species Act (ESA; P.L. 93-205; 16 U.S.C. §§1531 et seq.), and questions of privatization of these federal agencies. In general, the PMAs came into being because of the government's need to dispose of electric power produced by dams constructed largely for irrigation, flood control, or other purposes, and to achieve small community and farm electrification—that is, providing service to customers whom it would not have been profitable for a private utility to serve. With minor exceptions, these agencies market the electric power produced by federal dams constructed, owned, and operated by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) and the Bureau of Reclamation (BOR). By statute, PMAs must give preference to public utility districts and cooperatives (e.g., "preference customers"), and sell their power at cost-based rates set at the lowest possible rate consistent with sound business principles. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission regulates PMA rates to ensure that they are set high enough to repay the U.S. Treasury for the portion of federal facility costs allocated to hydropower beneficiaries. With energy and capacity markets changing in the western United States (especially with the growing need to integrate increasing amounts of variable renewable sources), and the development of the Energy Imbalance Market in the West, BPA and WAPA may have to adapt their plans with regard to generation needs and how transmission systems are developed. In 2018, the Trump Administration proposed to sell the transmission assets (lines, towers, substations, and/or rights of way) owned and operated by the federal Power Marketing Administrations. The proposal suggested that "eliminating or reducing" the federal government's role in owning and operating transmission assets, and increasing the private sector's role, would "encourage a more efficient allocation of economic resources and mitigate unnecessary risk to taxpayers." The resulting PMA entities would then contract with other utilities to provide transmission services for the delivery of federal power, similar to what SEPA does currently. Reportedly, the proposed sale of PMA assets was dropped after opposition to the plan emerged from stakeholders. Under Section 208 of the Urgent Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1986 (P.L. 99-349), the executive branch is prohibited from spending funds to study or draft proposals to transfer from federal control any portion of the assets of the PMAs unless specifically authorized by Congress. Environmental, fishing, and tribal advocates have sued the federal government over concerns that operating rules for hydropower dams on the Columbia and Snake Rivers (i.e., the National Marine Fisheries Service Biological Opinion) are inadequate to ensure survival of species threatened or endangered under the ESA. In 2016, a federal judge overturned a previous management plan for the dams, finding that it would not be sufficient to protect salmon runs, and ordered a new management plan that could include removing the dams. However, in 2018, President Trump issued a Presidential Memorandum accelerating the process for a new management plan, requiring the biological opinion to be ready by 2020. Since FY2011, power revenues associated with the PMAs have been classified as discretionary offsetting receipts (i.e., receipts that are available for spending by the PMAs), thus the agencies are sometimes noted as having a "net-zero" spending authority. Only the capital expenses of WAPA and SWPA require appropriations from Congress.