You are given two reports by the government agency.  

Report 1:
Since its founding in 2006, the National Popular Vote (NPV) initiative has promoted an agreement among the states, an interstate compact that would effectively establish direct popular election of the President and Vice President without a constitutional amendment, while retaining the structure of the electoral college system. The United States is unique among "presidential" republics by providing an indirect election to choose its chief executive. The President and Vice President of the United States are selected not by registered voters, but by the electoral college, electors appointed in the states "in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct.... " Alexander Hamilton, who was "present at the creation" of the Constitution in 1787, commented favorably on the electoral college system in The Federalist : The mode of appointment of the Chief Magistrate of the United States is almost the only part of the system, of any consequence, which has escaped without severe censure, or which has received the slightest mark of approbation from its opponents.... I venture somewhat further, and hesitate not to affirm that if the manner of it be not perfect, it is at least excellent. It unites in an eminent degree all the advantages the union of which was to be wished for. Notwithstanding Hamilton's endorsement, the first proposal to change the electoral college system by constitutional amendment was introduced as early as 1800, and since that time more than 700 proposals to reform or eliminate the college have been introduced in Congress. Reform advocates have long focused on the fact that it does not provide for direct democratic election, that less-populous states are afforded an arithmetical advantage due to the assignment of two electors to each state, regardless of population, and that the winner-take-all system makes it possible for candidates to win an electoral college majority and the presidency, while gaining fewer votes than their principal opponents in the popular election. Between 1949 and 1979, Congress considered amendments to reform the electoral college, or replace it with direct popular election, in committee and on the floor of both chambers. Proposed amendments must, however, meet the requirements of the Constitution's Article V, which calls for two-thirds approval by both houses of Congress, and ratification by three-fourths of the states; to date, no electoral college reform proposal has met these requirements. Proponents of the National Popular Vote initiative contend that their plan will achieve direct popular election while circumventing the requirements of Article V, and will guarantee that the popular vote winners will always be elected President and Vice President. The fundamentals of the electoral college system were established by Article II, Section 1 of the U.S. Constitution, and subsequently revised by the Twelfth Amendment. The Constitution's minimal provisions have been complemented over the past two centuries by a range of federal and state laws, political party procedures, and enduring political traditions, leading to the system as it exists today. The salient features of the contemporary system are detailed below. The electors are collectively known as the electoral college; although this phrase does not appear in the Constitution, it gained currency in the early days of the republic, and was recognized in federal law in 1845. The electoral college has no continuing existence; its sole purpose is to elect the President and Vice President. Each state is allocated a number of electors equal to the combined total of its U.S. Senate and House of Representatives delegations. The District of Columbia is also allocated three electors. At present, the total is 538, reflecting the combined size of the Senate (100 Members), the House (435 Members), and the District of Columbia electors. Any person may serve as an elector, except Senators and Representatives, or any other person holding an office of "trust or profit" under the United States. Article II, Section 1 of the Constitution empowers the states to "appoint [electors], in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct.... " This grant of authority provides the constitutional basis claimed for the NPV initiative. In practice, all states currently provide for popular election of their electoral college delegations. Candidates for the office of elector are nominated by political parties and other groups on the presidential ballot in each state. In most cases, the candidates for the office of elector are nominated by the state party committee or the party's statewide convention. The winning presidential nominees must gain a national majority of 270 or more electoral votes, out of the 538 total, in order to be elected. If no ticket of candidates attains a majority, then the House of Representatives elects the President, and the Senate the Vice President, in a procedure known as contingent election. Candidates for the office of elector are selected by their respective political parties. They are expected to vote for the presidential and vice presidential candidates to whom they are pledged. Some states seek to require them to so vote by law or other means, but most constitutional scholars hold that the electors remain free agents under the Constitution, and that they may vote for any person they choose. On rare occasions, an elector will vote for a different candidate, or abstain from casting a vote for any candidate; he or she is known as a "faithless elector." The goal of presidential campaigns under the existing system is to win by carrying states that collectively cast a majority of electoral votes. Political parties and presidential campaigns tend to focus on states that are closely contested (widely referred to as "battleground" states), or that have large delegations of electoral votes, or both. Winning a majority of the more populous and/or battleground states is considered crucial to obtaining the necessary electoral vote majority. In 48 states and the District of Columbia, the presidential/vice presidential ticket winning the most popular votes (a plurality or more) in that state is awarded all its electoral votes. That is to say, the winning party's entire ticket of electors is elected. This is referred to as the "winner-take-all" or "general ticket" system. Presidential Election Day is set by law for Tuesday after the first Monday in November every fourth year succeeding the election of President and Vice President. On Presidential Election Day, voters cast one vote for the candidates they support. They are, however, actually voting for the state political party "ticket" of electors supporting those presidential and vice presidential candidates. Presidential electors assemble on the first Monday after the second Wednesday in December following the general election. They meet in their respective states, not collectively, and cast separate votes by ballot for the President and Vice President. After the electors vote, the results are sent by the states to Congress and various other federal authorities. On January 6 of the year following a presidential election, Congress meets in a joint session to count the electoral votes and make a formal declaration of which candidates have been elected President and Vice President. A range of factors contributed to the emergence of the National Popular Vote initiative in the first decade of the 21 st century. A major source was frustration by reform advocates after three decades of failed attempts to secure congressional approval for a direct popular election amendment. A more immediate spur was the contentious and disputed presidential election of 2000, which is regarded as having been a major factor contributing to the development of the NPV proposal. One of the factors cited for the emergence of the NPV initiative has been the exacting requirements set by the Constitution for amendments, in this case, a direct popular election constitutional amendment. As noted previously, approval by two-thirds of Members present and voting is required in both houses when Congress proposes an amendment, followed by ratification by three-fourths of the states, 38 at present, usually within a seven-year period specified by Congress. Between 1948 and 1979, Congress debated electoral college reform at length; throughout this time, hundreds of reform proposals were introduced in both chambers. They generally centered on one of two courses: "end it" by eliminating the entire electoral college system and establishing direct popular election, or "mend it" by reforming its more controversial provisions. Between 1948 and 1979, proposed amendments were the subject of hearings in the Senate and House Judiciary Committees on 17 different occasions, while electoral college reform was debated in the Senate on five occasions and twice in the House during this period. Proposals were approved by the necessary two-thirds majority twice in the Senate and once in the House, but never in the same Congress. Following the 1979 defeat of a direct popular election amendment on the Senate floor, and the retirement or defeat of prominent congressional advocates, the question of electoral college reform largely disappeared from public attention and Congress's legislative agenda. Although Senators and Representatives continued to introduce reform proposals, few received action beyond routine committee referral, and in time, the number of measures introduced dropped to zero. Even after the presidential elections of 2000 and 2016, in which the winner of the electoral vote won fewer popular votes than his opponent (a so-called "misfire") , there was little evidence that Congress was prepared to consider an electoral college reform amendment. Proposals to replace the electoral college system with direct popular election continued to be introduced, but in dwindling numbers as the years passed. No proposal for direct popular election was introduced in the 113 th Congress. By comparison, 41 direct popular election or electoral college reform amendments were proposed in the 95 th Congress (1977-1978). Following the 2016 election, however, four constitutional amendments introduced late in the 114 th Congress proposed eliminating the electoral college and replacing it with direct election. To date in the 116 th Congress, three amendments to establish direct popular election by constitutional amendment have been introduced, but no action beyond committee referral has been taken on them. Until recently, survey research findings showed public support for presidential election reform through direct popular election by sizable margins. As early as 1967, the Gallup Poll reported that 58% of respondents supported direct election, compared with 22% who favored retaining the electoral college. More recently, Gallup's 2013 survey recorded that 63% of respondents favored an amendment providing for direct election, while 29% favored retention of the electoral college. Following the 2016 election, however, overall support for direct election was measured at 49% in favor to 47% opposed. It is arguable that the change in public attitudes was influenced by the 2016 election results, in which the Republican nominees won the election with a majority of electoral votes, but fewer popular votes than their Democratic opponents. For instance, Gallup reported a shift to greater support for the electoral college system by respondents who identified themselves as "Republican" or "Lean Republican." Conversely, already high levels of support for direct popular election among respondents who identified themselves as "Democratic" or "Lean Democratic" rose still further in the post-2016 election Gallup Poll. To date, CRS has identified one survey that was specifically designed to measure public commitment to the NPV initiative. A March 27, 2019, Politico/Morning Consult poll posed relevant questions on the presidential election process and the NPV compact. The first question, which presented a general outline of the existing electoral college system and the generic alternative of direct popular election, reported that respondents preferred direct election by 50% to 34% for retaining the electoral college, and 16% reporting "Don't know/No opinion." The next question explained the proposed NPV compact and asked respondents' preference for NPV or the electoral college method. Although the level of support for NPV was lower than that measured for generic direct popular election, a plurality of respondents to this question favored the "National Popular Vote Interstate Compact" by a plurality of 43% in favor, to 33% opposed and 23% who reported "Don't know/No opinion." The disputed presidential election of 2000 was arguably a catalyst for new thinking on electoral college reform . Following a closely contested campaign, Republican candidates George W. Bush and Richard Cheney were elected over Democratic nominees Al Gore Jr. and Joseph Lieberman following a bitter dispute over election results in Florida tha t was ultimately decided by the Supreme Court . The high court's decision left Bush and Cheney with a narrow plurality in Florida of 537 popular votes and a similarly narrow electoral college majority of 30 states with 271 electoral votes, while their Democratic opponents took 20 states and the District of Columbia with 266 electoral votes (one District of Columbia elector cast a blank ballot in protest against the outcome) . It was the first election since 1888 in which the candidates elected uncontestably won fewer popular votes than their principal opponents : the Gore / Lieberman Democratic ticket gained 50,992,335 popular votes to 50,455,156 for Bush / Cheney. The se election results generated considerable discontent with the system. Some critics argued for a constitutional amendment, but the 107 th Congress faced a heavy legislative workload throughout this period, which initially included enactment of President George W. Bush's legislative program and was later expanded to urgent responses to the terrorist attacks of September 1 1, 2001 . Rather than focus on the lengthy process associated with consideration of a constitutional amendment, Congress focused on legislati ve remedies. The Help America Vote Act of 2002, passed in response to the numerous irregularities in voting systems and procedures revealed by the 2000 election, mandated election administration reforms and v oting system technology enhancements (funded in part by federal grants to the states) intended to ensure accurate and timely voting and vote tabulation in future elections. In 2016, the presidential election was again won by nominees who gained a majority of electoral votes but fewer popular votes than their major party opponents. Although proposals to amend the Constitution to provide direct popular election were introduced in response to this occurrence late in the 114 th Congress , and again in the 115 th Congress, the 2016 results did not result in the degree of c ontroversy a nd activism that followed the electoral college "misfire " of 2000. T he following factor may have contributed to this situation : i n 2000, a shift in Florida's electoral votes from Bush/Cheney to Gore/Lieberman would have changed the election result; by comparison, in 2016, a shift in the state with the closest vote margin, Michigan , would not have altered the election. While the 2000 election's "misfire" did not result in consideration of a constitutional amendment, it did prompt considerable study and investigation into new approaches to electoral reform among scholars of the presidential election process and political activists. Law professors Robert W. Bennett of Northwestern University, Vikram Amar of the University of California-Davis, and Akhil Amar of Yale University School of Law are generally credited as the intellectual godparents of the concept that ultimately evolved into the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact, which relies on the Constitution's broad grant of power to each state to "appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct [emphasis added], a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress." Project FairVote, an issue advocacy group self-described as a nonprofit, nonpartisan "501(c)(4)" organization, appears to have been an incubator of the NPV concept. FairVote has supported NPV for "over a decade," and was an early supporter of National Popular Vote Inc., the plan's official advocacy group; moreover, longtime FairVote board members Robert Richie and the late Representative John B. Anderson were early supporters of the National Popular Vote initiative and contributors to its manifesto, Every Vote Equal . As noted previously, the NPV initiative was the ultimate result of the various studies and proposals offered following the presidential election of 2000. The NPV initiative seeks to establish direct popular election of the President and Vice President through an interstate compact, rather than by constitutional amendment. Ideally, under the compact's provisions, legislatures of the 50 states and the District of Columbia would pass legislation binding the signatories to appoint presidential electors committed to the presidential/vice presidential ticket that gained the most votes nationwide . If all 50 states and the District of Columbia were compact members, this would deliver a unanimous electoral college decision for the candidates winning a plurality of the popular vote. Specifically, the plan calls for an agreement among the states, an interstate compact effected through state legislation, in which the legislature in each of the participating states agrees to appoint electors pledged to the candidates who won the nationwide popular vote . State election authorities would count and certify the popular vote in each state, which would be aggregated and certified as the "nationwide popular vote." The participating state legislatures would then choose the slate of electors pledged to the "nationwide popular vote winner," notwithstanding the results within their particular state s . To ensure success, the initiative would come into effect only if states whose total electoral votes equal or exceed the constitutional majority of 270 were to approve the plan. If the nationwide popular vote were effectively tied, the states would be released from their commitment under the compact, and could choose electors who represented the presidential ticket that gained the most votes in each particular state. One novel NPV provision would enable the presidential candidate who won the national popular vote to fill any vacancies in the electoral college with electors of his or her own choice. States would retain the right to withdraw from the compact, but if a state chose to withdraw within six months of the end of a presidential term, the withdrawal would not be effective until after the succeeding President and Vice President had been elected. The NPV advocacy effort is managed by National Popular Vote Inc., a "501(c)(4)" nonprofit corporation established in California in 2006 by Barry Fadem, an attorney specializing in initiative and referendum law, and John R. Koza, Ph.D., an automated systems scientist and entrepreneur. As a 501(c)(4) entity, it is permitted to engage in political activity in furtherance of its goal, without forfeiting its tax-exempt status, so long as this is not its primary activity. NPV states on its website that its "specific purpose is to study, analyze and educate the public regarding its proposal to implement a nationwide popular election of the President of the United States." Dr. Koza serves as chairman of NPV Inc., and Mr. Fadem serves as president. NPV's advisory board includes former Senators and Representatives of both major political parties. In 2006, National Popular Vote Inc. published a detailed handbook, Every Vote Equal: A State-Based Plan for Electing the President by National Popular Vote . This publication, in its fourth edition at the time of this writing, provides a detailed account of various issues related to the NPV initiative, including the electoral college, earlier reform efforts, interstate compacts, the text of the proposed compact, a strategy for advancing the initiative, and a 340-page section addressing "myths about the National Popular Vote Compact." National Popular Vote Inc. maintains an office in Mountain View, CA. Supporters in various state legislatures began to introduce measures to adopt the interstate compact shortly after NPV's inaugural press conference on February 23, 2006. The NPV Compact has been introduced at various sessions in the legislatures of all 50 states and the Council of the District of Columbia, which performs the functions of a state legislature in the nation's capital, and has received some form of active consideration in 38 states and the D.C. Council. Among other activities, NPV maintains a regular communications program of email newsletters announcing activities and soliciting readers to petition governors and state legislators to support the compact. At the time of this writing, NPV claims that 3,112 state legislators have either sponsored or cast a recorded vote in their respective legislatures for the compact. NPV also claims endorsements from legislators and endorsements by the New York Times , Los Angeles Times , Chicago Sun-Times , Minneapolis Star Tribune , Boston Globe , Miami Herald , and other newspapers. NPV also advocates use of the citizen initiative process where available to enact state adherence to the compact; it asserts that when Article II, Section 1, clause 2 grants authority to the states to appoint "in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct," the authority extends to the states' entire lawmaking process, which in some states includes the proposal and passage of legislation and constitutional amendments through citizen initiative. The citizen initiative approach to the interstate compact, however, has yet to be used at the time of this writing. At the time of this writing, in May 2019, the following 14 states and the District of Columbia have adopted the National Popular Vote Compact. Collectively, they are assigned a total of 189 electoral votes. The National Popular Vote Interstate Compact has been introduced since its inception in all 50 states and the District of Columbia. States that have adopted NPV at the time of this writing are listed in chronological order, by year of adoption, as follows: Hawaii (4 electoral votes), 2008; Illinois (20 electoral votes), 2008; Maryland (10 electoral votes), 2008; New Jersey (14 electoral votes), 2008; Washington (12 electoral votes), 2009; Massachusetts (11 electoral votes), 2010; District of Columbia (3 electoral votes), 2010; Vermont (3 electoral votes), 2011; California (55 electoral votes), 2011; Rhode Island (4 electoral votes), 2013; New York (29 electoral votes), 2014; Connecticut (7 electoral votes), 2018; Colorado (9 electoral votes), 2019; Delaware (3 electoral votes), 2019; and New Mexico (5 electoral votes), 2019. After initial momentum in 2008, when four states joined the compact in one year, NPV made slower progress toward its goal of approval by states accounting for 270 electoral votes. Highlights were California's approval in 2011, which added 55 electoral votes to the tally, and New York's accession to the compact in 2014. Beginning with Connecticut's approval in 2018, followed in 2019 by Colorado, Delaware, and New Mexico, 24 additional electoral votes were added to the NVP count, bringing the total to 189, 70% of the 270 votes needed for NPV to go into effect. By early May 2019, legislation to join the NPV had been introduced in the current session of at least one chamber of the legislature in 14 states that controlled a combined total of 150 electoral votes. As of April 17, the compact had been approved in Nevada by the Assembly (lower chamber of the legislature) and in Oregon by the Senate. Accession by these two states would raise the NPV member total to 202 electoral votes. Conversely, proposals to rescind approval of the NPV Interstate Compact have been introduced in the legislatures of Connecticut, Hawaii, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and Washington, to date; none has been approved. Some observers note that, despite NPV's assertion of bipartisan support, all the jurisdictions that have joined the compact to date could be identified as "leaning" Democratic or "solid" Democratic in their support of the Democratic Party, as classified by a recent Gallup survey. For instance, 11 of the 14, including California, Delaware, the District of Columbia, Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New Mexico, Rhode Island, and Vermont, were found by Gallup to be among the "most solidly Democratic states in 2017." Alluding to this fact, one commentator observed that [a]ll the states to have joined so far are very blue. Until some purple states and red states sign on, the compact has little in the way of territory to conquer.... The seven states where President Obama won [in 2012] by the widest margins, along with D.C., have joined. So have three others—New Jersey, Illinois and Washington—where Obama won by at least 15 percentage points. But none below that threshold have done so. The 2016 presidential election results in Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, and New Mexico, the most recent adherents to the NPV compact, arguably confirm this observation—the Democratic candidates won the popular vote in all four states, by margins of between 4.9% in Colorado to 13.7% in Connecticut. On the other hand, several states where the NPV remained under active consideration in 2019—Arizona, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, North Carolina, Ohio, and South Carolina—were carried by the Republican presidential ticket in 2016. As the NPV campaign developed momentum in the states, particularly between 2008 and 2011, defenders of the existing arrangements and the electoral college announced measures to promote retention of the electoral college system. In October 2011, the Heritage Foundation, a conservative public policy institute, released a report opposing the NPV compact. That same month, Roll Call reported that the State Government Leadership Foundation, a project of the Republican State Leadership Committee, would begin a campaign to defend the electoral college and counter recent NPV gains. Further activity, however, does not appear to have been undertaken by these groups by the time of this writing. Arguments in support of and opposed to the National Popular Vote proposal resemble those advanced in favor of and against direct popular election of the President. The central issue turns on the question of the asserted simplicity and democratic attractiveness of the direct election idea as compared to a more complex array of factors cited by supporters of the electoral college system. Proponents of the NPV initiative arguably share the philosophical criticism voiced by proponents of direct popular election, who maintain that the electoral college system is intrinsically undemocratic—it provides for "indirect" election of the President and Vice President. This, they assert, is an 18 th century anachronism, dating from a time when communications were poor, the literacy rate was much lower, and the nation had yet to develop the durable, sophisticated, and inclusive democratic political system it now enjoys. They maintain that only direct popular election of the President and Vice President is consistent with modern democratic values and practice. Beyond this fundamental challenge, critics cite what they identify as a wide range of technical failings of the electoral college arrangement. Perhaps the most prominent of these is that the electoral college system can result in the election of a President and Vice President who have won the electoral vote, but gained fewer popular votes than their major opponent. This condition results at least in part from the nearly universal reliance on the "winner-take-all" or general ticket system of awarding electoral votes in the states, which is also criticized by NPV advocates. Under the general ticket system, the candidates winning the most popular votes in a state (a plurality is sufficient) are awarded all that state's electors and electoral votes; under these circumstances, a presidential ticket can gain all of a state's electoral votes on even a slim margin of popular votes. Presidents were elected in 1876, 1888, 2000, and 2016 who received fewer popular votes than their major party opponents, while the runner-up in both popular and electoral votes was elected by the House of Representatives when four candidates split the vote in the presidential election of 1824. NPV supporters advocate the compact on the grounds of fairness and respect for the voters' choice. At the core of their arguments, they assert that the process would be simple, national, and democratic; the NPV interstate compact would provide de facto for a single, democratic choice, allowing all the nation's voters to choose the President and Vice President directly, with no intermediaries. The "people's choice," they assert, would win in every election, and every vote would carry the same weight in the election, no matter where in the nation it was cast. No state would be advantaged, nor would any be disadvantaged. According to NPV, the central argument in favor is that the compact "would guarantee the Presidency to the candidate who receives the most popular votes [or at least a plurality] in all 50 states (and the District of Columbia)." According to NPV, there would never again be a presidential election "misfire" or another "wrong winner." Other elements of the electoral college system criticized by NPV advocates (and other electoral college reformers) would arguably disappear or be rendered irrelevant. These include the faithless elector phenomenon, the general ticket system's asserted "disfranchisement" of voters who backed the losing candidates, and various asserted "voting power" advantages attributed to large (populous) states, small states, states with large populations of noncitizens, states with low rates of voter participation, and populous states with concentrations of minority-group voters. In addition, the NPV compact would almost certainly eliminate the need for contingent election of the President and Vice President under the Twelfth Amendment. NPV advocates also assert the compact would provide a practical benefit to states that tend to be noncompetitive in presidential elections and which therefore receive fewer campaign visits by major party candidates. With "every vote equal," NPV maintains that presidential and vice presidential nominees and their organizations would need to spread their presence and resources more evenly as they campaigned for every vote nationwide, rather than concentrate on winning key "battleground" states. They assert that, under the present system candidates have no reason to poll, visit, organize, campaign, or worry about the concerns of voters of states that they cannot possibly win or lose. This means that voters in two thirds of the states are effectively disenfranchised in presidential elections because candidates concentrate their attention on a small handful of "battleground" states. In 2004, candidates concentrated over two-thirds of their money and campaign visits in just five states; over 80% in nine states, and over 99% of their money in just 16 states. For instance, NPV notes that California voters seldom see the presidential or vice presidential nominees or benefit from campaign spending because the Golden State, having voted Democratic since 1988, is considered to be reliably "blue," and Democratic Party candidates are said to take its 55 electoral votes for granted. They also note that Republican candidates make few California appearances, but, NPV asserts, for the opposite reason: why spend time and resources in support of an apparently hopeless cause? Similar arguments made by NPV on the Republican side apply to Texas, a state that has voted for Republican presidential nominees since 1980. In 2016 for instance, NPV claims that no Democratic nominee participated in a general election campaign event in California or Texas, while a Republican nominee appeared in only one campaign event in each of those states. By comparison, according to their calculations, the hotly contested battleground states of Florida, North Carolina, and Pennsylvania received, respectively, 71, 55, and 54 candidate appearances. According to NPV's analysis of campaign appearances, the 2016 major party candidates for President and Vice President appeared at a total of 375 campaign events during the general election campaign, but they visited only 12 states; by NPV's calculation, 38 states and the District of Columbia were bypassed during the campaign. NPV advocates also maintain that the concentration of campaign resources, advertising, and candidate appearances in battleground states depresses turnout in "flyover" states, where candidates make few campaign appearances. The U.S. Elections Project report, America Goes to the Polls, 2016 , appears to offer statistics consistent with this assertion, finding that the participation rate of the population eligible to vote in 14 battleground states was 65% in the 2016 presidential election, as opposed to comparable nationwide turnout of 60%. It also reports findings similar to those advanced by NPV: 95% of campaign visits during the 2016 campaign were made in battleground states, as was 99% of "ad spending." The NPV manifesto also cites a Brookings Institution study of the 2004 presidential election in support of its argument, stating, "Because the electoral college has effectively narrowed elections like the last one to a quadrennial contest for the votes of a relatively small number of states, people elsewhere are likely to feel that their votes don't matter." It should be noted, however, that a range of other political, social, cultural, and economic factors may also contribute to the disparity in turnout between battleground and non-battleground states. NPV further suggests that the disparity in participation may ultimately damage the ability to govern on the state and local levels and could have a negative impact on the legitimacy of public institutions: Diminished voter turnout in presidential races in non-battleground states weakens down-ballot candidates, thereby making the state even less competitive in the future. Governance—not just electioneering—is affected by the winner-take-all rule. National Popular Vote opponents oppose the compact on various grounds. Some argue that it is unconstitutional or "anticonstitutional," that is, contrary to the Founders' intentions and the spirit of the nation's fundamental charter. It is also asserted that NPV would solve few of the electoral college system's alleged problem issues and would create some of its own. Finally, some observers note that the NPV compact is an interstate compact as defined in Article I, Section 10, clause 3 of the Constitution, and as such would be subject to congressional approval. This issue is examined in greater detail in a separate section of this report. On the most fundamental philosophical basis, opponents might argue that the NPV compact violates one of the basic principles of majoritarian democracy: it does not require that candidates win a majority of the popular vote in order to gain the presidency. Rather, it would anoint as winner the ticket that gains more popular votes than any other. A majoritarian democracy, it may be argued, should require a majority in order to elect; it may be further noted that the existing system, by comparison, requires a majority in the electoral college. As one commentary noted only the strictest of majoritarians desire a purely majoritarian presidential election system, and those individuals should be deeply troubled by the prospect of plurality presidencies, which the NPVC [sic] expressly countenances. Indeed, the NPVC promises to create more difficulties and "misfires" in its own way than the Electoral College system its proponents so earnestly seek to replace. Further, opponents might ask how the NPV compact would function in the event of a multicandidate election, a phenomenon that recurs from time to time in U.S. presidential elections. One commentator posited the following problematic scenario under such circumstances: Under the compact, one can easily imagine a multi-candidate race in which a candidate would win, say, a thirty-four percent plurality of the popular vote nationwide while losing in every state and D.C. If all of the states and D.C. were signatories to the compact, all the electoral votes in such a hypothetical race would be awarded contrary to the will of voters choosing electors (still not voting directly for President under this plan). Would the United States accept a President who wasn't the choice of sixty-six percent of those voting, nor even the choice of a single state? The existing electoral college system, NPV skeptics might also assert, is a fundamental element in the federal constitutional arrangements established by the Constitution. Fearing "the tyranny of the majority," the Founders established a system of government that provides checks and balances designed to restrain the majority and secure minority rights. These principles are also embedded in the structure of federal elections: the Senate, the House of Representatives, and the presidency were deliberately provided with different terms of office and different electorates, and the states were given an important role in the federal election process. In particular, through the electoral college the United States elects its national Presidents and Vice Presidents in a state-based federal election. Successful nominees are compelled under this system to present a broad political vision that commands nation-spanning "concurrent majorities" and appeals to the great variety of Americans. As in the case of the Senate, less populous states are accorded a small numerical advantage by assignment of two at-large electors reflecting the Constitution's equal apportionment of Senators to each state regardless of its population. The NPV initiative, they could claim, would discard the Founders' intentions in favor of what they consider to be a flawed "majoritarian" presidency that would ill-serve a continent-spanning and profoundly diverse republic. Another criticism centers on the use of the NPV compact to effect a fundamental change in the presidential election process and a de facto amendment to the Constitution, but without following the procedures set out in Article V. Critics may note that NPV's founders admit their plan is an "end run" around the Constitution. Proponents might counter with the argument that Article V presents too high a hurdle for what they consider a necessary reform of the system. Opponents, however, could respond that the Founders intended the various supermajority requirements in Congress and the states to ensure that successful constitutional amendments enjoy broad national support. The bare majority of electoral votes required to implement NPV, they might note, meets none of these supermajority requirements. As one study critical of the NPV initiative concluded, because the use of an interstate compact "does not conform to the constitutional means of changing the original decisions of the Framers, NPV could not [therefore] be a legitimate innovation." A final argument on this line might be that one "end run" around the amendment process might lead to others, setting a dangerous precedent for similar efforts in the future. Opponents might note that the NPV would eliminate the electoral college system's multiplier effect generated by the winner-take-all or general ticket system used in 48 states and the District of Columbia, which tends to magnify the winning ticket's margin of victory, and is said to confer greater legitimacy to the victors. For instance, in 2016, Republican nominee Donald Trump's clear electoral vote majority of 304 votes (56.5% of the total), compared with Democratic nominee Hillary Clinton's 227 (42.2% of the total) could be said to reinforce and confirm his victory, notwithstanding Clinton's plurality of the popular vote (48.2%), compared with Trump's 46.1%. From a practical standpoint, NPV opponents might argue that the NPV would actually lead to an increase in contested election results and legal challenges in the states, as the political parties maneuver to claim every possible vote. They assert that the existing tabulation of popular votes within each state reduces contested results and recounts. Under NPV, the incentive to gain every vote would arguably lead to far broader disputes and widespread recounts at every level of election administration. As a Heritage Foundation study concluded Under the NPV … any suspicions necessitating a recount in even a single district would be an incentive for a national recount.... The prospect of a candidate challenging "every precinct, in every county, in every state of the Union" should be abhorrent to anyone who witnessed the drama, cost, delay, and undue litigation sparked by the Florida recount of 2000. Opponents might also assert that the increased incidence of recounts would be further complicated by wide-ranging disparities in state procedures, potentially leading to prolonged periods of uncertainty following close presidential elections. Critics may also note that the NPV plan contains no "statute of limitations," unlike proposed constitutional amendments, for which Congress typically sets a seven-year ratification period. Where, critics may ask, is a similar time limit that would "sunset" the NPV compact, after which it would expire or return to "square one"? According to its website, NPV was launched on February 23, 2006; if it were a constitutional amendment proposed by Congress, it would have expired on February 23, 2013, since by the end of the customary seven-year deadline it was "ratified" by only eight states and the District of Columbia. By what reasoning, they might ask, should the NPV be exempt from the standards of timeliness and contemporaneity Congress customarily sets for constitutional amendments? Opponents might reject claims that, under NPV, campaign spending and candidate appearances would be spread and scheduled more widely, beyond the current concentration of time and resources in battleground states. They might argue that spreading campaign resources and candidate events in non-battleground states is a questionable argument to justify a fundamental change in the presidential election process. Campaign appearances and spending, they could assert, should not be considered to be a local economic stimulus package, nor are the amounts in question sufficient to make much of a difference in the economic condition of most states. As one critical analysis notes, "... the nation does not hold presidential elections to foster local economic development." Moreover, they might continue, it is equally dubious to assert that nominees will slight the concerns of citizens of the non-battleground states from which they draw their greatest support, or that concentrated campaigning in the battleground states somehow "disenfranchises" voters in others. In the modern era, a small percentage of voters actually attends an in-person presidential or vice presidential candidate appearance. Television (especially broadcast and cable TV news networks), social media, the internet, and newspapers—not the traditional rallies, torchlight parades, and handbills—dominate presidential election campaigns in the 21 st century. In addition to policy issues discussed previously, some observers have also raised questions related to the NPV initiative based on the fact that it is an interstate compact as defined in the Constitution. Others have questioned whether NPV might conflict with some provisions of the Voting Rights Act. The NPV initiative has been described by its supporters variously as a bill, a state-level statute, and an interstate compact. The latter reference necessitates an analysis of whether the initiative complies with the Compact Clause of the Constitution. An interstate compact—under the broadest understanding—is a contract between two or more consenting states. The Supreme Court has further suggested that an interstate compact often requires reciprocal commitments between the governments of two or more states, such that one state's commitment is conditioned on the action of another state and no state can unilaterally repeal its commitment. The use of interstate compacts predates the Constitution, as the Articles of Confederation contained a similar Compact Clause that provided a qualified prohibition on states entering into any agreements between them without the consent of Congress. The chaos resulting from the disunity created by the Articles of Confederation prompted the Framers of the Constitution generally to "impose more uniformity" among the states, resulting in a Constitution that wholly prohibits states from entering into any treaties, alliances, and federations. Nonetheless, the Constitution maintained the Articles of Confederation's qualified prohibition on interstate compacts and agreements, allowing states to enter into an interstate compact so long as the participating states seek the consent of Congress. Specifically, the Compact Clause provides that "No State shall, without the Consent of Congress ... enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State.... " While the historical rationale for Article I's qualified prohibition on interstate compacts is unclear, the Compact Clause generally reflects the view of the Framers that states should be able to work cooperatively together, as well as the concern that unchecked interstate alliances might threaten the harmony of the Union or the authority vested by the Constitution in the federal government. As the Supreme Court noted in Cuyler v. Adams , "By vesting in Congress the power to grant or withhold consent, or to condition consent on the states' compliance with specified conditions, the Framers sought to ensure that Congress would maintain ultimate supervisory power over cooperative state action that might otherwise interfere with the full and free exercise of federal authority." The Compact Clause places no limits on what might be done through an interstate compact other than the requirement of congressional consent. In the early years of government under the Constitution, compacts were used almost exclusively to settle boundary disputes. Beginning with the establishment of the Port of New York Authority in 1921, however, compacts began to be used to address more complex, regional issues requiring intergovernmental cooperation. Some compacts are merely advisory in form, but others may be regulatory, with significant powers granted to multistate commissions. More recently, compacts have addressed such wide-ranging concerns as mental health treatment, law enforcement and crime control, education, driver licensing and enforcement, environmental conservation, energy, nuclear waste control, facilities operations, transportation, economic development, insurance regulation, placement of children and juveniles, disaster assistance, and pollution control. Approximately 200 interstate compacts are in effect today. Accordingly, the central legal issue with respect to the Compact Clause is whether a given interstate compact requires the consent of Congress. While a "literal" reading of the Compact Clause "would require the States to obtain congressional approval before entering into any agreement among themselves, irrespective of form, subject, duration, or interest to the United States [emphasis added]," the Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected such a reading. In 1893, in Virginia v. Tenness e e , Justice Stephen Field, writing for the Court, contended that a broad reading of the Compact Clause would "embrace all forms of stipulation, written or verbal, and relating to all kinds of subjects[,]" requiring congressional consent to agreements "which the United States can have no possible objection or have any interest in interfering with," as well as those that "may tend to increase ... the political influence of the contracting states, so as to encroach upon or impair the supremacy of the United States.... " Surmising that the Compact Clause could not have been intended to have such a broad reach, Justice Field concluded that the Clause prohibits states from entering into compacts without congressional consent only when the underlying compact is "directed to the formation of any combination tending to the increase of political power in the States, which may encroach upon or interfere with the just supremacy of the United States." The Supreme Court has subsequently reaffirmed Justice Field's "functional view of the Compact Clause," and, accordingly, generally where an agreement does not fall within the scope of the Compact Clause as envisioned by the Court in Virginia v. Tennessee , the agreement "will not be invalidated for lack of congressional consent." Whether the NPV initiative requires congressional consent under the Compact Clause first requires a determination as to whether NPV even constitutes an interstate compact. At times, its supporters have resisted framing the initiative as an interstate compact, arguably out of concern for running afoul of the Compact Clause's provisions. For example, Professor Akhil Amar has argued that because the initiative does not create a "new interstate governmental apparatus," the NPV should not be considered an interstate compact, as NPV compact signatory states are merely exercising power collectively that each state could exercise on its own. It is unclear, however, whether the creation of a new interstate governmental entity formed out of an agreement between two or more states is necessary, as opposed to sufficient, in order to deem an agreement as being an interstate compact subject to the Compact Clause. While the Supreme Court, in Northeast Bancorp , suggested that a "joint organization or body" formed out of an interstate agreement is a "classic indic[ium] of a compact," the Court has never adopted a definition of an interstate compact that solely rests on the existence of an interstate governmental body. Instead, the Court appears to have adopted a broader definition of what an interstate compact can entail. For example, in Virginia v. Tennessee , the Court noted that the words "compacts" and "agreements" are synonymous and "cover all stipulations affecting the conduct or claims of the parties." In other words, when two or more states enter into a stipulated agreement whereby one state agrees to perform an act in consideration for a reciprocal act by the other state(s), that agreement can be considered an interstate compact. This broad definition of a compact appears to encompass the NPV compact, as the initiative requires signatory states to agree mutually to appoint their electors to the winner of the national popular vote. Moreover, NPV binds each assenting state, as no member state can withdraw from it within six months or less of the end of a President's term. Because NPV prohibits states from freely "modify[ing] or repeal[ing] [the agreement] unilaterally" and requires "reciprocation" of mutual obligations, it appears that the initiative can be described as an interstate compact. Assuming the NPV initiative is an interstate compact, the question remains whether it is one that implicates the Compact Clause. The answer to that question primarily depends on whether NPV is "directed to the formation of any combination tending to the increase of political power in the States, which may encroach upon or interfere with the just supremacy of the United States ." In other words, the "test" for whether a particular interstate compact requires congressional consent is centrally concerned with vertical balances of power between the federal government and the states; namely, "whether the Compact enhances state power quoad the National Government." While the NPV arguably increases the political power of the states that have consented to it by ensuring that those states' desired outcome for the presidential election—the awarding of the majority of electoral votes to the presidential candidate supported by the majority of the voting populace—it is unclear how that increase in political power would be at the expense of the power of the federal government. After all, the Constitution provides the federal government with no role in determining the members of the electoral college. One scholar has suggested that the NPV initiative would lead to a vertical alteration of power by eliminating the possibility that the House of Representatives would resolve a presidential election in the absence of an electoral majority for a single candidate because it is premised on a majority of electoral votes going to a single candidate. The House of Representatives, however, has decided only two presidential elections in American history, and whether such an arguably hypothetical and de minimis diminishment of federal power through the NPV would be sufficient to require congressional consent under the Compact Clause is simply unresolved by the relevant case law. While the Supreme Court's case law interpreting the Compact Clause is centrally concerned with vertical federalism concerns (i.e., the balance of power between the state and federal governments), the Court has recognized a potential secondary rationale suggested for the Compact Clause: to preserve the horizontal balance of powers among the various states. And horizontal federalism concerns could very well be implicated by the Compact Clause, as the provision appears to have been included in the Constitution out of concern both for the supremacy of the federal government and unity among the various states. Whether the NPV compact threatens the powers of nonconsenting states has been the subject of much debate among academics. Those in support of the initiative have contended that the nonconsenting states do not lose any power as a result of the NPV. According to this line of argumentation, even under the NPV, all states would retain their right to select the electors of their choosing, as nonmember state electors would still be counted in the electoral vote. Others, however, have pointed to the underlying premise of the NPV—to enhance the political power of more populous states in presidential elections—as evidence that the initiative diminishes the power of nonconsenting states. In other words, while non-compacting states would still retain the power to appoint electors, the influence that comes with that power would arguably be diminished because a state's role in the national election would be defined by its percentage of the popular vote and not by its percentage of electors, warranting congressional interest in approving a compact that effectuated such a change in national elections. Ultimately, however, whether the NPV actually threatens the power of nonconsenting states is a debate that remains active within academia but would likely be the source of considerable litigation if the initiative ever became effective. If congressional consent is needed for the NPV, that consent can take various forms. Usually congressional consent to an interstate compact takes the form of a joint resolution or act of Congress specifying its approval of the text of the compact and adding any conditions or provisions it deems necessary, often embodying the compact document. As with most congressional actions, consent to an interstate compact must occur with the approval of both houses and must be signed by the President before it becomes law. Rarely has the President vetoed or threatened to veto consent legislation by Congress. While congressional consent to an interstate compact is most often explicit, consent by Congress may also be implied by subsequent acts of Congress as "[a]n inference clear and satisfactory that Congress ... intended to consent" to a compact may be sufficient. Congress may also delegate its power to approve a compact to a federal official so long as an "intelligible principle" against which approval can be measured is apparent. Ultimately, if congressional consent is truly needed for NPV to be effective, the initiative might have difficulty ever being enacted because the approval of both houses of Congress and the President would likely necessitate additional hurdles beyond the already challenging task of amassing support at the state level for the NPV. Beyond the legal issues raised with respect to the Compact Clause, the NPV initiative also potentially raises other broader constitutional concerns, including whether the states can functionally obviate the role of the electoral college through the NPV. Article II of the Constitution establishes that the election of the President should occur indirectly through the election by the electoral college. The choice of an indirect election for the President was a deliberate one by the Framers of the Constitution, because, while noting the importance that the "sense of the people" should influence the choice for President, they found it "equally desirable" for the "immediate election" of the President to be made by a body representative of distinct state interests and removed from the threat of unchecked majoritarianism. The result was that the Constitution established a presidential election process that was "manifestly nonmajoritarian," with the electoral college, a body established to represent the distinct views of each state, as the centerpiece of the election process. The central constitutional issue presented by the NPV, therefore, is whether the states, through an interstate compact, can functionally transform the presidential election system enshrined in the Constitution into a more majoritarian process. Supporters of the NPV argue that the Constitution provides the legal means for states to transform the presidential election system into one where the President is elected based solely on the result of the national popular vote. Specifically, clause 2 of Article II, Section 1 of the Constitution provides the states with the power to "appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct," the electors who represent the state in the electoral college. Facially, the Constitution's primary limitation on the power of a state to select its electors is the final number of electors awarded to each state. While perhaps an argument can be made that the structure, logic, and history of the Constitution place limits on the manner or method in which a state chooses its electors, the text of the Constitution simply does not impose any such limits. Supreme Court case law also supports reading Article II of the Constitution to broadly provide states with wide discretion as to the manner in which its electors are selected. Specifically, in 1892 in McPherson v. Blacker, a unanimous Supreme Court upheld a Michigan law providing for the election by individual congressional district of presidential electors against a challenge that the law violated Article II of the Constitution. In so holding, the Court placed great emphasis on a number of state laws that existed shortly after the ratification that provided a variety of "modes of choosing the electors," including selection by the legislature itself, by a "vote of the people for a general ticket," "by vote of the people in districts," or by some permutation of those methods. Viewing this evidence together with the text of Article II and the historical evidence from the Constitutional Convention led the Court to broadly conclude state legislatures have "conceded plenary power ... in the matter of the appointment of electors," allowing the Michigan law to stand. Applying McPherson to the case of the NPV, the argument can and has been made that if the states have plenary power with respect to the manner of how electors are appointed, the power necessarily allows states to select electors in line with the results of the national popular vote. More recently, supporters of the NPV have relied on the Supreme Court's 2015 ruling in Arizona Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission (AIRC) —which held that the State of Arizona had wide discretion under the Elections Clause of the Constitution to select the method by which the state provided for redistricting —to argue that the states retain broad discretion in selecting electors under Article II, which uses similar language to the provision interpreted in AIRC. Others have argued that the structure of the Constitution and historical evidence suggest that the states do not have such vast discretion in appointing electors as to functionally transform the election for President into a national popular referendum. As noted elsewhere in this report, the electoral college was created by the Framers to ensure that states with the least population retained power in the selection of the President, providing a check against domination by the most populous states. The electoral college, being a product of the choices of individual state legislatures, was envisioned by the Framers as a body that would represent the specific interests of a given state, as opposed to the undifferentiated nation at large. Accordingly, it may be argued that allowing the most populous states to collude to ensure that the national popular vote, as opposed to the wishes of an individual state, dictates the results of a state's slate of electors, could arguably be irreconcilable with the Framers' intentions with respect to the electoral college. As such, for those who find the NPV compact constitutionally suspect under Article II, McPherson 's broad pronouncements about the nature of a state's power to appoint electors should be viewed in the context of that particular case, where the state of Michigan was attempting to appoint its electors based on the votes of an individual district in the state, as opposed to the state as a whole. In contrast to the law at issue in McPherson , with NPV, there appears to be no evidence contemporaneous with the ratification of the Constitution of a state selecting its electors in accordance with the results of the national popular vote. Unlike the State of Michigan in McPherson , an NPV state's electors might not be a product of the views of the state at the time of the election, but instead would reflect national popular sentiment about who should be the President. Moreover, the Supreme Court, in interpreting arguably analogous language from Article I of the Constitution allowing states to regulate the manner of the selection of the Members of the House of Representatives and Senate, concluded that the states cannot exercise their delegated authority in a way that would "effect a fundamental change in the constitutional structure." The question that remains is whether the Court in a future case challenging the NPV compact would interpret the states' authority under Article II to appoint electors to be broad enough to allow the President to be selected as a result of the national popular vote, a question that, given the lack of any precise precedent respecting the constitutionality of the NPV compact under Article II, will likely remain unresolved until such time. Other critics claim the NPV compact might violate Sections 2 and 5 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA). Writing in Columbia Law Review , David Gringer invokes the voting power theory. He argues that the plan conflicts with Section 2 of the VRA because moving from "a state-based [vote] to a national popular vote dilutes the voting strength of a given state's minority population by reducing its ability [voting power] to influence the outcome of presidential elections." Gringer also asserts that the NPV compact may violate Section 5 of the act. In 2013, however, the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated Section 4(b) of the VRA, which contained a formula prescribing which states and jurisdictions with a history of discrimination were required to obtain prior approval or "preclearance" under Section 5 before changing any voting standard, practice, or procedure. Although the Court invalidated only the coverage formula in Section 4, by extension, Section 5 has been rendered currently inoperable. Prior to the Supreme Court ruling, Gringer argued that the NPV compact would qualify as a covered practice under Section 5, and that the legislatures of all the "covered" states would have been required to obtain preclearance before implementing the compact. Responding to this point, National Popular Vote Inc. noted the following: The National Popular Vote bill manifestly would make every person's vote for President equal throughout the United States in an election to fill a single office (the Presidency). It is entirely consistent with the goal of the Voting Rights Act. There have been court cases under the Voting Rights Act concerning contemplated changes in voting methods for various representative legislative bodies.... However, these cases do not bear on elections to fill a single office (i.e., the Presidency). In 2012, the Justice Department's Civil Rights Division specifically declined to challenge California's accession to the NPV compact on VRA grounds. The states' authority to appoint electors by any method their legislatures choose is not absolute. Federal court decisions have struck down state laws concerning appointment of electors that were found to be in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of equal protection: Although Clause 2 (of Article II, Section 1 of the Constitution) seemingly vests complete discretion in the states, certain older cases had recognized a federal interest in protecting the integrity of the process. Thus, the Court upheld the power of Congress to protect the right of all citizens who are entitled to vote to lend aid and support in any legal manner to the election of any legally qualified person as a presidential elector.... [I]n Oregon v. Mitchell (42 U.S. 112 (1970)), the Court upheld the power of Congress to reduce the voting age in presidential elections and to set a thirty-day durational residency period as a qualification for voting in presidential elections. Although the Justices were divided on the reasons, the rationale emerging from this case, considered with Williams v. Rhodes , (393 U.S. 20 1968)) is that the Fourteenth Amendment limits state discretion in prescribing the manner of selecting electors and that Congress in enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment may override state practices that violate that Amendment and may substitute standards of its own. Critics of the electoral college system have sought direct election of the President and Vice President without success for more than two centuries. The NPV initiative represents a novel effort to achieve this goal by use of an interstate compact that would circumvent the stringent requirements necessary for the proposal and ratification of constitutional amendments. Since its inception in 2006, NPV has achieved a degree of success: 14 states and the District of Columbia, controlling a total of 189 electoral votes, have joined the compact since 2008. Progress has arguably been sporadic, however, notwithstanding active campaigning by National Popular Vote Inc. Over the course of more than a decade, NPV has heretofore failed to develop a sustained momentum toward its stated goal of states controlling 270 electoral votes. The action of three states in joining NPV to date in 2019 marks the most activity in a single year since 2008; it remains to be seen whether this trend will continue. To date, certain Democratic-leaning states have joined the compact. The arguable lack of support in Republican-controlled state legislatures raises questions about further accessions to the compact in the immediate future, particularly given the fact that the GOP controlled both legislative chambers in 30 states following the 2018 elections. To date, while the NPV initiative has generated interest among supporters of direct popular election of the President, it does not appear to have gained widespread awareness among the public at large. The findings of the March 27, 2019, Politico/Morning Consult survey cited earlier in this report arguably suggest that greater public knowledge of NPV might spur popular support for the compact. This might then contribute to further momentum if additional states were to join, particularly populous ones like Florida (29 electoral votes), Georgia (16 electoral votes), and Ohio (18 electoral votes) where the compact was under active consideration in 2019. Under these circumstances, proponents might be energized and encouraged by a sense of progress for the initiative. At the same time, NPV opponents could be expected to coalesce around the issues identified earlier in this report, and renew and increase their efforts in defense of the electoral college system. The activities of both might ultimately bring the NPV initiative to the more immediate attention of Congress.

 

 Report 2:
According to the President’s budget, the federal government plans to invest more than $96 billion for IT in fiscal year 2018—the largest amount ever budgeted. Despite such large IT expenditures, we have previously reported that investments in federal IT too often result in failed projects that incur cost overruns and schedule slippages, while contributing little to the desired mission-related outcomes. For example: The tri-agency National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System was disbanded in February 2010 by the White House’s Office of Science and Technology Policy after the program spent 16 years and almost $5 billion. The Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Secure Border Initiative Network program was ended in January 2011, after the department obligated more than $1 billion for the program. The Department of Veterans Affairs’ Financial and Logistics Integrated Technology Enterprise program was intended to be delivered by 2014 at a total estimated cost of $609 million, but was terminated in October 2011. The Department of Defense’s Expeditionary Combat Support System was canceled in December 2012 after spending more than a billion dollars and failing to deploy within 5 years of initially obligating funds. The United States Coast Guard (Coast Guard) decided to terminate its Integrated Health Information System project in 2015. As reported by the agency in August 2017, the Coast Guard spent approximately $60 million over 7 years on this project, which resulted in no equipment or software that could be used for future efforts. Our past work has found that these and other failed IT projects often suffered from a lack of disciplined and effective management, such as project planning, requirements definition, and program oversight and governance. In many instances, agencies had not consistently applied best practices that are critical to successfully acquiring IT. Such projects have also failed due to a lack of oversight and governance. Executive-level governance and oversight across the government has often been ineffective, specifically from CIOs. For example, we have reported that some CIOs’ roles were limited because they did not have the authority to review and approve the entire agency IT portfolio. In addition to failures when acquiring IT, security deficiencies can threaten systems once they become operational. As we previously reported, in order to counter security threats, 23 civilian Chief Financial Officers Act agencies spent a combined total of approximately $4 billion on IT security-related activities in fiscal year 2016. Even so, our cybersecurity work at federal agencies continues to highlight information security deficiencies. The following examples describe the types of risks we have found at federal agencies. In November 2017, we reported that the Department of Education’s Office of Federal Student Aid did not consistently analyze privacy risks for its electronic information systems, and policies and procedures for protecting information systems were not always up to date. In August 2017, we reported that, since the 2015 data breaches, the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) had taken actions to prevent, mitigate, and respond to data breaches involving sensitive personal and background investigation information. However, we noted that the agency had not fully implemented recommendations made to OPM by DHS’s United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team to help the agency improve its overall security posture and improve its ability to protect its systems and information from security breaches. In July 2017, we reported that IT security at the Internal Revenue Service had weaknesses that limited its effectiveness in protecting the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of financial and sensitive taxpayer data. An underlying reason for these weaknesses was that the Internal Revenue Service had not effectively implemented elements of its information security program. In May 2016, we reported that the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, OPM, and the Department of Veteran Affairs did not always control access to selected high-impact systems, patch known software vulnerabilities, and plan for contingencies. An underlying reason for these weaknesses was that the agencies had not fully implemented key elements of their information security programs. In August 2016, we reported that the IT security of the Food and Drug Administration had significant weaknesses that jeopardized the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of its information systems and industry and public health data. Congress and the President have enacted various key pieces of reform legislation to address IT management issues. These include the federal IT acquisition reform legislation commonly referred to as the Federal Information Technology Acquisition Reform Act (FITARA). This legislation was intended to improve covered agencies’ acquisitions of IT and enable Congress to monitor agencies’ progress and hold them accountable for reducing duplication and achieving cost savings. The law includes specific requirements related to seven areas: Agency CIO authority enhancements. CIOs at covered agencies have the authority to, among other things, (1) approve the IT budget requests of their respective agencies and (2) review and approve IT contracts. Federal data center consolidation initiative (FDCCI). Agencies covered by FITARA are required, among other things, to provide a strategy for consolidating and optimizing their data centers and issue quarterly updates on the progress made. Enhanced transparency and improved risk management. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and covered agencies are to make detailed information on federal IT investments publicly available, and agency CIOs are to categorize their investments by level of risk. Portfolio review. Covered agencies are to annually review IT investment portfolios in order to, among other things, increase efficiency and effectiveness and identify potential waste and duplication. Expansion of training and use of IT acquisition cadres. Covered agencies are to update their acquisition human capital plans to support timely and effective IT acquisitions. In doing so, the law calls for agencies to consider, among other things, establishing IT acquisition cadres (i.e., multi-functional groups of professionals to acquire and manage complex programs), or developing agreements with other agencies that have such cadres. Government-wide software purchasing program. The General Services Administration is to develop a strategic sourcing initiative to enhance government-wide acquisition and management of software. In doing so, the law requires that, to the maximum extent practicable, the General Services Administration should allow for the purchase of a software license agreement that is available for use by all executive branch agencies as a single user. Maximizing the benefit of the Federal Strategic Sourcing Initiative. Federal agencies are required to compare their purchases of services and supplies to what is offered under the Federal Strategic Sourcing Initiative. In June 2015, OMB released guidance describing how agencies are to implement FITARA. This guidance is intended to, among other things: assist agencies in aligning their IT resources with statutory establish government-wide IT management controls to meet the law’s requirements, while providing agencies with flexibility to adapt to unique agency processes and requirements; strengthen the relationship between agency CIOs and bureau CIOs; strengthen CIO accountability for IT costs, schedules, performance, and security. The guidance identifies a number of actions that agencies are to take to establish a basic set of roles and responsibilities (referred to as the common baseline) for CIOs and other senior agency officials; and thus, to implement the authorities described in the law. For example, agencies are to conduct a self-assessment and submit a plan describing the changes they intend to make to ensure that common baseline responsibilities are implemented. In addition, in August 2016, OMB released guidance intended to, among other things, define a framework for achieving the data center consolidation and optimization requirements of FITARA. The guidance directs agencies to develop a data center consolidation and optimization strategic plan that defines the agency’s data center strategy for fiscal years 2016, 2017, and 2018. This strategy is to include, among other things, a statement from the agency CIO indicating whether the agency has complied with all data center reporting requirements in FITARA. Further, the guidance indicates that OMB is to maintain a public dashboard to display consolidation-related costs savings and optimization performance information for the agencies. Congress has recognized the importance of agencies’ continued implementation of FITARA provisions, and has taken legislative action to extend selected provisions beyond their original dates of expiration. Specifically, Congress and the President enacted laws to: remove the expiration date for enhanced transparency and improved risk management provisions, which were set to expire in 2019; remove the expiration date for portfolio review, which was set to expire in 2019; and extend the expiration date for FDCCI from 2018 to 2020. In addition, Congress and the President enacted a law to authorize the availability of funding mechanisms to help further agencies’ efforts to modernize IT. The law, known as the Modernizing Government Technology (MGT) Act, authorizes agencies to establish working capital funds for use in transitioning from legacy IT systems, as well as for addressing evolving threats to information security. The law also creates the Technology Modernization Fund, within the Department of the Treasury, from which agencies can “borrow” money to retire and replace legacy systems, as well as acquire or develop systems. Further, in February 2018, OMB issued guidance for agencies to implement the MGT Act. The guidance was intended to provide agencies additional information regarding the Technology Modernization Fund, and the administration and funding of the related IT working capital funds. Specifically, the guidance allowed agencies to begin submitting initial project proposals for modernization on February 27, 2018. In addition, in accordance with the MGT Act, the guidance provides details regarding a Technology Modernization Board, which is to consist of (1) the Federal CIO; (2) a senior official from the General Services Administration; (3) a member of DHS’s National Protection and Program Directorate; and (4) four federal employees with technical expertise in IT development, financial management, cybersecurity and privacy, and acquisition, appointed by the Director of OMB. Congress and the President enacted the Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014 (FISMA) to improve federal cybersecurity and clarify government-wide responsibilities. The act addresses the increasing sophistication of cybersecurity attacks, promotes the use of automated security tools with the ability to continuously monitor and diagnose the security posture of federal agencies, and provides for improved oversight of federal agencies’ information security programs. Specifically, the act clarifies and assigns additional responsibilities to entities such as OMB, DHS, and the federal agencies. Table 1 describes a selection of OMB, DHS, and agency responsibilities. Beyond the implementation of FITARA, FISMA, and related actions, the current administration has also initiated other efforts intended to improve federal IT. Specifically, in March 2017, the administration established the Office of American Innovation, which has a mission to, among other things, make recommendations to the President on policies and plans aimed at improving federal government operations and services. In doing so, the office is to consult with both OMB and the Office of Science and Technology Policy on policies and plans intended to improve government operations and services, improve the quality of life for Americans, and spur job creation. In May 2017, the Administration also established the American Technology Council, which has a goal of helping to transform and modernize federal agency IT and how the federal government uses and delivers digital services. The President is the chairman of this council, and the Federal CIO and the United States Digital Service Administrator are among the members. In addition, on May 11, 2017, the President signed Executive Order 13800, Strengthening the Cybersecurity of Federal Networks and Critical Infrastructure. This executive order outlined actions to enhance cybersecurity across federal agencies and critical infrastructure to improve the nation’s cyber posture and capabilities against cyber security threats. Among other things, the order tasked the Director of the American Technology Council to coordinate a report to the President from the Secretary of DHS, the Director of OMB, and the Administrator of the General Services Administration, in consultation with the Secretary of Commerce, regarding the modernization of federal IT. As a result, the Report to the President on Federal IT Modernization was issued on December 13, 2017, and outlined the current and envisioned state of federal IT. The report focused on modernization efforts to improve the security posture of federal IT and recognized that agencies have attempted to modernize systems but have been stymied by a variety of factors, including resource prioritization, ability to procure services quickly, and technical issues. The report provided multiple recommendations intended to address these issues through the modernization and consolidation of networks and the use of shared services to enable future network architectures. Further, in March 2018, the Administration issued the President’s Management Agenda, which lays out a long-term vision for modernizing the federal government. The agenda identifies three related drivers of transformation—IT modernization; data, accountability, and transparency; and the workforce of the future—that are intended to push change across the federal government. The Administration also established 14 related Cross-Agency Priority goals, many of which have elements that involve IT. In particular, the Cross-Agency Priority goal on IT modernization states that modern IT must function as the backbone of how government serves the public in the digital age and provides three priorities that are to guide the Administration’s efforts to modernize federal IT: (1) enhancing mission effectiveness by improving the quality and efficiency of critical services, including the increased utilization of cloud-based solutions; (2) reducing cybersecurity risks to the federal mission by leveraging current commercial capabilities and implementing cutting edge cybersecurity capabilities; and (3) building a modern IT workforce by recruiting, reskilling, and retaining professionals able to help drive modernization with up-to-date technology. Most recently, on May 15, 2018, the President signed Executive Order 13833, Enhancing the Effectiveness of Agency Chief Information Officers. Among other things, this executive order is intended to better position agencies to modernize their IT systems, execute IT programs more efficiently, and reduce cybersecurity risks. The order pertains to 22 of the 24 Chief Financial Officer Act agencies: the Department of Defense and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission are exempt. For the covered agencies, the executive order strengthens the role of agency CIOs by, among other things, requiring to report directly to their agency head; to serve as their agency head’s primary IT strategic advisor; and to have a significant role in all management, governance, and oversight processes related to IT. In addition, one of the cybersecurity requirements directs agencies to ensure that the CIO works closely with an integrated team of senior executives, including those with expertise in IT, security, and privacy, to implement appropriate risk management measures. In the February 2017 update to our high-risk series, we reported that agencies still needed to complete significant work related to the management of IT acquisitions and operations We stressed that OMB and federal agencies should continue to expeditiously implement FITARA and OMB’s related guidance, which include enhancing CIO authority, consolidating data centers, and acquiring and managing software licenses. Our update to this high-risk area also stressed that OMB and agencies needed to continue to implement our prior recommendations in order to improve their ability to effectively and efficiently invest in IT. Specifically, from fiscal years 2010 through 2015, we made 803 recommendations to OMB and federal agencies to address shortcomings in IT acquisitions and operations. In addition, in fiscal year 2016, we made 202 new recommendations, thus, further reinforcing the need for OMB and agencies to address the shortcomings in IT acquisitions and operations. As stated in the update, OMB and agencies should demonstrate government-wide progress in the management of IT investments by, among other things, implementing at least 80 percent of our recommendations related to managing IT acquisitions and operations within 4 years. As of May 2018, OMB and agencies had fully implemented 489 (or about 61 percent) of the 803 recommendations. Figure 1 summarizes the progress that OMB and agencies have made in addressing our recommendations as compared to the 80 percent target. Overall, federal agencies would be better positioned to realize billions in cost savings and additional management improvements if they address these recommendations, including those aimed at implementing CIO responsibilities, review of IT acquisitions; improving data center consolidation; and managing software licenses. In all, the various laws, such as FITARA, and related guidance assign 35 IT management responsibilities to CIOs in six key areas. These areas are: leadership and accountability, budgeting, information security, investment management, workforce, and strategic planning. In a draft report on CIO responsibilities that we have provided to the agencies for comment and plan to issue in June 2018, our preliminary results suggest that none of the 24 agencies we reviewed had policies that fully addressed the role of their CIO, as called for by federal laws and guidance. In this regard, a majority of the agencies fully or substantially addressed the role of their CIOs for the area of leadership and accountability. In addition, a majority of the agencies substantially or partially addressed the role of their CIOs for two areas: information security and IT budgeting. However, most agencies partially or minimally addressed the role of their CIOs for two areas: investment management and strategic planning. These preliminary results are shown in figure 2. Despite these shortfalls, most agency officials stated that their CIOs are implementing the responsibilities even if the agencies do not have policies requiring implementation. Nevertheless, the CIOs of the 24 selected agencies acknowledged in responses to a survey that we administered for our draft report that they were not always very effective in implementing the six IT management areas. Specifically, our preliminary results show that at least 10 of the CIOs indicated that they were less than very effective for each of the six areas of responsibility. We believe that until agencies fully address the role of CIOs in their policies, agencies will be limited in addressing longstanding IT management challenges. Figure 3 depicts that extent to which the CIOs reported their effectiveness in implementing the six areas of responsibility. Beyond the actions of the agencies, however, our preliminary results indicate that shortcomings in agencies’ policies also are partially attributable to two weaknesses in OMB’s FITARA implementation guidance. First, the guidance does not comprehensively address all CIO responsibilities, such as those related to assessing the extent to which personnel meet IT management knowledge and skill requirements, and ensuring that personnel are held accountable for complying with the information security program. Correspondingly, the majority of the agencies’ policies did not fully address nearly all of the responsibilities that were not included in OMB’s guidance. Second, OMB’s guidance does not ensure that CIOs have a significant role in (1) IT planning, programming, and budgeting decisions and (2) execution decisions and the management, governance, and oversight processes related to IT, as required by federal law and guidance. In the absence of comprehensive guidance, CIOs will not be positioned to effectively acquire, maintain, and secure their IT systems. Based on our preliminary results, 24 agency CIOs also identified a number of factors that enabled and challenged their ability to effectively manage IT. As shown in figure 4, five factors were identified by at least half of the 24 CIOs as major enablers and three factors were identified by at least half of the CIOs as major challenges. Specifically, most agency CIOs cited five factors as being enablers to effectively carry out their responsibilities: (1) NIST guidance, (2) the CIO’s position in the agency hierarchy, (3) OMB guidance, (4) coordination with the Chief Acquisition Officer (CAO), and (5) legal authority. Further, three factors were cited by CIOs as major factors that have challenged their ability to effectively carry out responsibilities: (1) processes for hiring, recruiting, and retaining IT personnel; (2) financial resources; and (3) the availability of personnel/staff resources. As our draft report states, although OMB has issued guidance aimed at addressing the three factors that were identified by at least half of the CIOs as major challenges, the guidance does not fully address those challenges. Further, regarding the financial resources challenge, OMB recently required agencies to provide data on CIO authority over IT spending; however, its guidance does not provide a complete definition of the authority. We believe that in the absence of such guidance, agencies have created varying definitions of CIO authority. Further, until OMB updates its guidance to include a complete definition of the authority that CIOs are to have over IT spending, it will be difficult for OMB to identify any deficiencies in this area and to help agencies make any needed improvements. In order to address challenges in implementing CIO responsibilities, we intend to include in our draft report recommendations to OMB and each of the selected 24 federal agencies to improve the effectiveness of CIOs’ implementation of their responsibilities for each of the six IT management areas. FITARA includes a provision to enhance covered agency CIOs’ authority through, among other things, requiring agency heads to ensure that CIOs review and approve IT contracts. OMB’s FITARA implementation guidance expanded upon this aspect of the legislation in a number of ways. Specifically, according to the guidance: CIOs may review and approve IT acquisition strategies and plans, rather than individual IT contracts; CIOs can designate other agency officials to act as their representatives, but the CIOs must retain accountability; CAOs are responsible for ensuring that all IT contract actions are consistent with CIO-approved acquisition strategies and plans; and CAOs are to indicate to the CIOs when planned acquisition strategies and acquisition plans include IT. In January 2018, we reported that most of the CIOs at 22 selected agencies were not adequately involved in reviewing billions of dollars of IT acquisitions. For instance, most of the 22 agencies did not identify all of their IT contracts. In this regard, the agencies identified 78,249 IT- related contracts, to which they obligated $14.7 billion in fiscal year 2016. However, we identified 31,493 additional contracts with $4.5 billion obligated, raising the total amount obligated by these agencies to IT contracts in fiscal year 2016 to at least $19.2 billion. Figure 5 reflects the obligations that the 22 selected agencies reported to us relative to the obligations we identified. The percentage of additional IT contract obligations we identified varied among the selected agencies. For example, the Department of State did not identify 1 percent of its IT contract obligations. Conversely, 8 agencies did not identify over 40 percent of their IT contract obligations. Many of the selected agencies that did not identify these IT contract obligations did not follow OMB guidance. Specifically, 14 of the 22 agencies did not involve the acquisition office in their process to identify IT acquisitions for CIO review, as required by OMB. In addition, 7 agencies did not establish guidance to aid officials in recognizing IT. We concluded that until these agencies involve the acquisitions office in their IT acquisition identification processes and establish supporting guidance, they cannot ensure that they will identify all IT acquisitions. Without proper identification of IT acquisitions, these agencies and CIOs cannot effectively provide oversight of these acquisitions. In addition to not identifying all IT contracts, 14 of the 22 selected agencies did not fully satisfy OMB’s requirement that the CIO review and approve IT acquisition plans or strategies. Further, only 11 of 96 randomly selected IT contracts at 10 agencies that we evaluated were CIO-reviewed and approved as required by OMB’s guidance. The 85 IT contracts not reviewed had a total possible value of approximately $23.8 billion. We believe that until agencies ensure that CIOs are able to review and approve all IT acquisitions, CIOs will continue to have limited visibility and input into their agencies’ planned IT expenditures and will not be able to use the increased authority that FITARA’s contract approval provision is intended to provide. Further, agencies will likely miss an opportunity to strengthen CIOs’ authority and the oversight of IT acquisitions. As a result, agencies may award IT contracts that are duplicative, wasteful, or poorly conceived. As a result of these findings, we made 39 recommendations in our January 2018 report. The recommendations included that agencies ensure that their acquisition offices are involved in identifying IT acquisitions and issuing related guidance, and that IT acquisitions are reviewed in accordance with OMB guidance. OMB and the majority of the agencies generally agreed with or did not comment on the recommendations. In our February 2017 high-risk update, we stated that OMB and agencies needed to demonstrate additional progress on achieving data center consolidation savings in order to improve the management of IT acquisitions and operations. Further, data center consolidation efforts are key to implementing FITARA. Specifically, OMB established the FDCCI in February 2010 to improve the efficiency, performance, and environmental footprint of federal data center activities. The enactment of FITARA in 2014 codified and expanded the initiative. In a series of reports that we issued from July 2011 through August 2017, we noted that, while data center consolidation could potentially save the federal government billions of dollars, weaknesses existed in several areas, including agencies’ data center consolidation plans, data center optimization, and OMB’s tracking and reporting on related cost savings. In these reports, we made a total of 160 recommendations to OMB and 24 agencies to improve the execution and oversight of the initiative. Most agencies and OMB agreed with our recommendations or had no comments. As of May 2018, 80 of these 160 recommendations remained unimplemented. Further, we recently reported in May 2018 that the 24 agencies participating in OMB’s Data Center Optimization Initiative (DCOI) had communicated mixed progress toward achieving OMB’s goals for closing data centers by September 2018. Over half of the agencies reported that they had either already met, or planned to meet, all of their OMB- assigned goals by the deadline. This would result in the closure of 7,221 of the 12,062 centers that agencies reported in August 2017. However, 4 agencies reported that they do not have plans to meet all of their assigned goals and 2 agencies are working with OMB to establish revised targets. With regard to agencies’ progress in achieving cost savings, 24 agencies reported $3.9 billion in cost savings through 2018. The 24 agencies also reported limited progress against OMB’s five data center optimization targets for server utilization and automated monitoring, energy metering, power usage effectiveness, facility utilization, and virtualization. As of August 2017, 1 agency reported that it had met four targets, 1 agency reported that it had met three targets, 6 agencies reported having met either one or two targets, and 14 agencies reported meeting none of the targets. Further, as of August 2017, most agencies were not planning to meet OMB’s fiscal year 2018 optimization targets. Specifically, 4 agencies reported plans to meet all of their applicable targets by the end of fiscal year 2018; 14 agencies reported plans to meet some of the targets; and 4 reported that they did not plan to meet any targets. Figure 6 summarizes agency-reported plans to meet or exceed the OMB’s data center optimization targets, as of August 2017. In 2016 and 2017, we made 81 recommendations to OMB and the 24 DCOI agencies to help improve the reporting of data center-related cost savings and to achieve optimization targets. As of May 2018, 71 of these 81 recommendations have not been fully addressed. In our 2015 high-risk report’s discussion of IT acquisitions and operations, we identified the management of software licenses as an area of concern, in part because of the potential for cost savings. Federal agencies engage in thousands of software licensing agreements annually. The objective of software license management is to manage, control, and protect an organization’s software assets. Effective management of these licenses can help avoid purchasing too many licenses, which can result in unused software, as well as too few licenses, which can result in noncompliance with license terms and cause the imposition of additional fees. As part of its PortfolioStat initiative, OMB has developed policy that addresses software licenses. This policy requires agencies to conduct an annual, agency-wide IT portfolio review to, among other things, reduce commodity IT spending. Such areas of spending could include software licenses. In May 2014, we reported on federal agencies’ management of software licenses and determined that better management was needed to achieve significant savings government-wide. Of the 24 selected agencies we reviewed, only 2 had comprehensive policies that included the establishment of clear roles and central oversight authority for managing enterprise software license agreements, among other things. Of the remaining 22 agencies, 18 had policies that were not comprehensive, and 4 had not developed any policies. Further, we found that only 2 of the 24 selected agencies had established comprehensive software license inventories, a leading practice that would help them to adequately manage their software licenses. The inadequate implementation of this and other leading practices in software license management was partially due to weaknesses in agencies’ policies. As a result, we concluded that agencies’ oversight of software license spending was limited or lacking, thus potentially leading to missed savings. However, the potential savings could be significant considering that, in fiscal year 2012, 1 major federal agency reported saving approximately $181 million by consolidating its enterprise license agreements, even when its oversight process was ad hoc. Accordingly, we recommended that OMB issue a directive to help guide agencies in managing software licenses. We also made 135 recommendations to the 24 agencies to improve their policies and practices for managing licenses. Among other things, we recommended that the agencies regularly track and maintain a comprehensive inventory of software licenses and analyze the inventory to identify opportunities to reduce costs and better inform investment decision making. Most agencies generally agreed with the recommendations or had no comments. As of May 2018, 78 of the 135 recommendations had not been implemented. Table 2 reflects the extent to which the 24 agencies implemented the recommendations in these two areas. Since information security was added to the high-risk list in 1997, we have consistently identified shortcomings in the federal government’s approach to cybersecurity. We have previously testified that, even though agencies have acted to improve the protections over federal and critical infrastructure information and information systems, the federal government needs to take the following actions to strengthen U.S. cybersecurity: Effectively implement risk-based entity-wide information security programs consistently over time. Among other things, agencies need to (1) implement sustainable processes for securely configuring operating systems, applications, workstations, servers, and network devices; (2) patch vulnerable systems and replace unsupported software; (3) develop comprehensive security test and evaluation procedures and conduct examinations on a regular and recurring basis; and (4) strengthen oversight of contractors providing IT services. Improve its cyber incident detection, response, and mitigation capabilities. DHS needs to expand the capabilities and support wider adoption of its government-wide intrusion detection and prevention system. In addition, the federal government needs to improve cyber incident response practices, update guidance on reporting data breaches, and develop consistent responses to breaches of personally identifiable information. Expand its cyber workforce planning and training efforts. The federal government needs to (1) enhance efforts for recruiting and retaining a qualified cybersecurity workforce and (2) improve cybersecurity workforce planning activities. Expand efforts to strengthen cybersecurity of the nation’s critical infrastructures. The federal government needs to develop metrics to (1) assess the effectiveness of efforts promoting the National Institute of Standards and Technology’s (NIST) Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity and (2) measure and report on the effectiveness of cyber risk mitigation activities and the cybersecurity posture of critical infrastructure sectors. Better oversee protection of personally identifiable information. The federal government needs to (1) protect the security and privacy of electronic health information, (2) ensure privacy when face recognition systems are used, and (3) protect the privacy of users’ data on state-based health insurance marketplaces. As we have previously noted, in order to take the preceding actions and strengthen the federal government’s cybersecurity posture, agencies should implement the information security programs required by FISMA. In this regard, FISMA provides a framework for ensuring the effectiveness of information security controls for federal information resources. The law requires each agency to develop, document, and implement an agency- wide information security program. Such a program includes risk assessments; the development and implementation of policies and procedures to cost-effectively reduce risks; plans for providing adequate information security for networks, facilities, and systems; security awareness and specialized training; the testing and evaluation of the effectiveness of controls; the planning, implementation, evaluation, and documentation of remedial actions to address information security deficiencies; procedures for detecting, reporting, and responding to security incidents; and plans and procedures to ensure continuity of operations. Since 2010, we have made 2,733 recommendations to agencies aimed at improving the security of federal systems and information. These recommendations have identified actions for agencies to take to strengthen technical security controls over their computer networks and systems. They also have included recommendations for agencies to fully implement aspects of their information security programs, as mandated by FISMA. Nevertheless, many agencies continue to be challenged in safeguarding their information systems and information, in part because many of these recommendations have not been implemented. As of May 2018, 793 of information security-related recommendations we have made have not been implemented. In order to determine the effectiveness of the agencies’ information security programs and practices, FISMA requires that federal agencies’ inspectors general conduct annual independent evaluations. The agencies are to report the results of these evaluations to OMB, and OMB is to summarize the results in annual reports to Congress. In these evaluations, the inspectors general frame the scope of their analysis, identify key findings, and detail recommendations to address the findings. The evaluations also are to capture maturity model ratings for their respective agencies. Toward this end, in fiscal year 2017, the inspector general community, in partnership with OMB and DHS, finalized a 3-year effort to create a maturity model for FISMA metrics that align to the five function areas in the NIST Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity (Cybersecurity Framework): identify, protect, detect, respond, and recover. This alignment is intended to help promote consistent and comparable metrics and criteria and provides agencies with a meaningful independent assessment of their information security programs. This maturity model is designed to summarize the status of agencies’ information security programs on a five-level capability maturity scale. The five maturity levels are defined as follows: Level 1 Ad-hoc: Policies, procedures, and strategy are not formalized; activities are performed in an ad-hoc, reactive manner. Level 2 Defined: Policies, procedures, and strategy are formalized and documented but not consistently implemented. Level 3 Consistently Implemented: Policies, procedures, and strategy are consistently implemented, but quantitative and qualitative effectiveness measures are lacking. Level 4 Managed and Measurable: Quantitative and qualitative measures on the effectiveness of policies, procedures, and strategy are collected across the organizations and used to assess them and make necessary changes. Level 5 Optimized: Policies, procedures, and strategy are fully institutionalized, repeatable, self-generating, consistently implemented and regularly updated based on a changing threat and technology landscape and business/mission needs. In March 2018, OMB issued its annual FISMA report to Congress, which showed the combined results of the inspectors general’s fiscal year 2017 evaluations. Based on data from 76 agency inspector general and independent auditor assessments, OMB determined that the government-wide median maturity model ratings across the five NIST Cybersecurity Framework areas did not exceed a level 3 (consistently implemented). Table 3 shows the inspectors general’s median ratings for each of the NIST Cybersecurity Framework areas. In its efforts toward strengthening the federal government’s cybersecurity, OMB also requires agencies to submit related cybersecurity metrics as part of its Cross-Agency Priority goals. In particular, OMB developed the IT modernization goal so that federal agencies will be able to build and maintain more modern, secure, and resilient IT. A key part of this goal is to reduce cybersecurity risks to the federal mission through three strategies: manage asset security, protect networks and data, and limit personnel access. The key targets supporting each of these strategies correspond to areas within the FISMA metrics. Table 4 outlines the strategies and their associated targets. In conclusion, FITARA and FISMA present opportunities for the federal government to address the high-risk areas on improving the management of IT acquisitions and operations, and ensuring the security of federal IT, thereby saving billions of dollars. Most agencies have taken steps to execute key IT management and cybersecurity initiatives, including implementing CIO responsibilities, requiring CIO review of IT acquisitions, realizing data center consolidation cost savings, managing software assets, and complying with FISMA requirements. The agencies have also continued to address the recommendations that we have made over the past several years. However, further efforts by OMB and federal agencies to implement our previous recommendations would better position them to improve the management and security of federal IT. To help ensure that these efforts succeed, we will continue to monitor agencies’ efforts toward implementing these recommendations. Chairmen Meadows and Hurd, Ranking Members Connolly and Kelly, and Members of the Subcommittees, this completes my prepared statement. I would be pleased to respond to any questions that you may have at this time. If you or your staff have any questions about this testimony, please contact David A. Powner, Director, Information Technology, at (202) 512- 9286 or pownerd@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement. GAO staff who made key contributions to this testimony are Kevin Walsh (Assistant Director), Chris Businsky, Rebecca Eyler, Meredith Raymond, and Jessica Waselkow (Analyst in Charge). 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Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 1.

Answer: The National Popular Vote (NPV) initiative proposes an agreement among the states, an interstate compact that would effectively achieve direct popular election of the President and Vice President without a constitutional amendment. It relies on the Constitution's grant of authority to the states in Article II, Section 1 to appoint presidential electors "in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct.... " Any state that joins the NPV compact pledges that if the compact comes into effect, its legislature will award all the state's electoral votes to the presidential ticket that wins the most popular votes nationwide, regardless of who wins in that particular state. The compact would, however, come into effect only if its success has been assured; that is, only if states controlling a majority of electoral votes (270 or more) join the compact. By early May 2019, 14 states and the District of Columbia had joined the compact. After early momentum—eight states and the District of Columbia joined the NPV Compact between 2007 and 2011—the pace of state accessions slowed through 2018. Since then, four additional states joined, bringing the total number of electoral votes controlled by NPV member states to 189. During the same period, legislation to join the compact had been introduced during the current session in at least one chamber of the legislature in 14 additional states that control an additional 150 electors. The NPV initiative emerged following the presidential election of 2000, in which one ticket gained an electoral vote majority, winning the presidency, but received fewer popular votes than its opponents. NPV grew out of subsequent discussions among scholars and activists about how to avoid similar outcomes in the future and to achieve direct popular election. Proponents of NPV assert that it would guarantee the presidential candidates who win the most popular votes nationwide will always win the presidency; that it would end the inequities of the general ticket/winner-take-all system of awarding electoral votes; and that candidates would extend their focus beyond winning the "battleground states," campaigning more widely and devoting greater attention to issues of concern to other parts of the country. They further assert that NPV would accomplish this while avoiding the exacting standards set for the proposal and ratification of constitutional amendments. Opponents argue that NPV would undermine the authority of states under the Constitution and the Founders' intention that presidential elections should be both national and federal contests; that it is an admitted "end run" around the Constitution that would circumvent the amendment process; and that it might actually lead to more disputed presidential elections characterized by politically contentious state recounts. The NPV has also been debated on legal grounds. Some observers maintain that it must be approved by Congress, because it is an interstate compact that would affect key provisions of constitutional presidential election procedures. NPV Inc., the organization managing the initiative's advocacy campaign, responds that congressional approval is not necessary because NPV concerns the appointment of electors, a subject that falls within state constitutional authority, and that the Supreme Court has previously rejected arguments that similar compacts would impair the rights of nonmember states. Other critics claim that NPV might violate the Voting Rights Act by diluting minority voter influence and avoiding the recently invalidated preclearance requirement for election procedure changes in covered jurisdictions. In response, NPV Inc. has asserted that the compact is "entirely consistent with the goal of the Voting Rights Act." This report monitors the NPV's progress in the states and will identify and analyze further developments as warranted.