You are given two reports by the government agency.  

Report 1:
To varying extents, Internet content providers—also called “edge providers”—and Internet service providers collect, use, and share information from their customers to enable their services, support advertising, and for other purposes. Many companies describe these and other privacy-related practices in privacy policies, to which consumers may be required to consent in order to use the service. Consumers access such services through a variety of devices, including mobile phones and tablets, computers, and other devices connected to the Internet by wired or wireless means. A nationwide survey that the U.S. Census Bureau conducted for NTIA in 2017 found that 78 percent of Americans ages 3 and older used the Internet. Another nationwide survey that the Pew Research Center conducted in 2018 found that 69 percent of American adults reported that they use some kind of social media platform such as Facebook. No comprehensive federal privacy law governs the collection, use, and sale or other disclosure of personal information by private-sector companies in the United States. Rather, the federal privacy framework for private-sector companies is comprised partly of a set of tailored laws that govern the use and protection of personal information for specific purposes, in certain situations, or by certain sectors or types of entities. These laws include the Fair Credit Reporting Act, which protects the security and confidentiality of personal information collected or used to help make decisions about individuals’ eligibility for such products as credit or for insurance or employment; the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, which protects nonpublic personal information that individuals provide to financial institutions or that such institutions maintain; and the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act which establishes a set of national standards for the protection of certain health information. In addition, as detailed in this report, FTC addresses consumer concerns about Internet privacy using its broad authority to protect consumers from unfair and deceptive trade practices. We have reported on a variety of Internet privacy concerns in recent years that include the collection and use of data such as people’s Internet browsing histories, purchases, locations, and travel routes, including: Internet of things: In 2017, we found that as new and more devices become connected, they increase not only the opportunities for security and privacy breaches, but also the scale and scope of any resulting consequences. Vehicle data privacy: We found in 2017 that most selected automakers reported limiting their data collection, use, and sharing, but their written notices did not clearly identify data sharing and use practices. Information resellers: In a 2013 report on companies that collect and resell information on individuals, we found that no overarching federal privacy law governs the collection and sale of personal information among private-sector companies, including information resellers. We found that gaps exist in the federal privacy framework, which does not fully address changes in technology and the marketplace. Among the issues we noted were the potential need for changes to privacy controls for web tracking, mobile devices, and other technologies. We recommended that Congress consider strengthening the consumer privacy framework to reflect the effects of changes in technology and the marketplace. Such legislation has not been enacted to date. Mobile device location data: In 2012, we found that, according to privacy advocates, consumers are generally unaware of how their location data are shared with and used by third parties. We recommended that FTC consider issuing guidance establishing FTC’s views regarding mobile companies’ appropriate actions to protect location data privacy. FTC implemented that recommendation in 2013. To guide their privacy practices, many organizations and governments have used the Fair Information Practice Principles. As noted above, these principles—which are not limited to Internet privacy—address the collection and use of personal information, data quality and security, and transparency, among other things, and have served as the basis for many of the privacy recommendations federal agencies have made. The Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development developed a version of these principles in 1980 that has been widely adopted and was updated in 2013. In 2000, FTC recommended that Congress enact a consumer Internet privacy statute that would require companies to comply with broad and flexible definitions of the principles, and an FTC commissioner said in a 2014 speech that they are a solid framework and are flexible and effective. While they are principles, not legal requirements, they provide a possible approach for balancing the need for privacy with other interests. Table 1 provides more detailed information about the principles. FTC is primarily a law enforcement agency that, among other responsibilities, currently has the lead in overseeing Internet privacy at the federal level. Specifically, it addresses consumer concerns about Internet privacy, both for Internet service providers and content providers, using its general authority under section 5 of the FTC Act. Section 5, as amended in 1938, prohibits “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.” Although the FTC Act generally empowers FTC to take enforcement action, it prohibits FTC from taking action against common carriers such as telecommunication services, airlines, and railroads under certain circumstances. FTC also does not have jurisdiction over banks, credit unions, or savings and loans institutions. Even though the FTC Act does not speak in explicit terms about protecting consumer privacy, the Act authorizes such protection to the extent it involves practices FTC defines as unfair or deceptive. According to FTC, an act or practice is “unfair” if it causes, or is likely to cause, substantial injury not reasonably avoidable by consumers and not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or competition as a result of the practice. FTC has used this “unfairness” authority to address situations where a company has allegedly failed to properly protect consumers’ data. According to FTC, a representation or omission is “deceptive” if it is material and is likely to mislead consumers acting reasonably under the circumstances. For example, the omission of terms in an advertisement would need to be material and likely to mislead consumers in order to be deceptive. FTC applies this “deceptive” authority to address deceptions or violations of written privacy policies and representations concerning data security. FTC’s Bureau of Consumer Protection investigates Internet privacy complaints from various sources, including consumers, other agencies, Congress, and industry, and also initiates investigations on its own. If the bureau has reason to believe that an entity is engaging in an unfair or deceptive practice, it may forward an enforcement recommendation to the commission. The commission then determines whether to pursue an enforcement action, which can include the following: litigating commission-filed administrative complaints before an FTC administrative law judge; filing and litigating complaints in federal district court seeking preliminary and permanent injunctions, monetary redress for consumers or other equitable relief; or referring complaints seeking civil penalties for violations of rules authorizing such penalties or for violations of administrative orders to the Department of Justice (DOJ) and assisting DOJ in litigating those cases (if DOJ does not take action, FTC can pursue the action on its own). FTC’s Internet privacy enforcement cases may be settled without the imposition of civil penalties. Instead, FTC typically enters into settlement agreements requiring companies to take actions such as: implementing reasonable privacy and security programs; being subject to long-term monitoring of compliance with the settlements by outside entities; providing monetary redress to consumers; forfeiting any money gained from the unfair or deceptive conduct; deleting illegally obtained consumer information; and providing transparency and choice mechanisms to consumers. If a company violates an FTC final consent order, the agency can then request civil monetary penalties in court for the violations. In addition, as discussed below, FTC can seek to impose civil monetary penalties directly for violations of certain privacy statutes and regulations such as the statute pertaining to the Internet privacy of children and its implementing regulations. Although FTC can levy civil penalties up to $41,484 per violation, per day, against an entity that violates a trade regulation rule under the FTC Act, it has not promulgated trade regulation rules under section 5 specific to privacy. Although FTC has not implemented its section 5 authority by issuing regulations regarding Internet privacy, it has issued regulations to implement other statutory authorities. Likewise, other federal agencies use regulations to implement the statutes they are charged with administering. The process by which federal agencies typically develop and issue regulations is spelled out in the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Section 553 of the APA establishes procedures and requirements for what is known as “informal” rulemaking, also known as notice-and- comment rulemaking. Among other things, section 553 generally requires agencies to publish a notice of proposed rulemaking in the Federal Register. After giving interested persons an opportunity to comment on the proposal by providing “data, views, or arguments,” the statute then requires the agency to publish the final rule in the Federal Register. Regulations may be enforced in various ways, for example, by seeking civil penalties for non-compliance. FTC has authority to seek civil penalties, for example, when a company knowingly violates a regulation or, as discussed below, a final consent order. In contrast to the APA section 553 rulemaking process, the rulemaking process that FTC generally must follow to issue rules under the FTC Act is spelled out in the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act amendments to the FTC Act (Magnuson-Moss). The Magnuson-Moss amendments— enacted in 1975 partly in response to industry opposition to FTC’s trade regulations, and amended in 1980—require additional rulemaking steps beyond APA section 553. For example, Magnuson-Moss requires FTC to publish an advance notice of proposed rulemaking in addition to the notice of proposed rulemaking required by the APA, and to offer interested parties the opportunity for an informal hearing involving oral testimony. FTC has not promulgated any regulations using the Magnuson-Moss procedures since 1980; according to FTC staff, the additional steps required under Magnuson-Moss add time and complexity to the rulemaking process. The Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA), enacted in 1998, governs the online collection of personal information from children under the age of 13 by operators of websites or online services, including mobile applications. COPPA required FTC to issue and enforce regulations concerning children’s online privacy and directed FTC to promulgate these regulations using the APA section 553 notice-and- comment rulemaking process. COPPA contained a number of specific requirements that FTC was directed to implement by regulation, such as requiring websites to post a complete privacy policy, to notify parents directly about their information collection practices, and to obtain verifiable parental consent before collecting personal information from their children or sharing it with others. The commission’s original COPPA regulations became effective on April 21, 2000, and amended COPPA regulations took effect on July 1, 2013. According to an FTC staff member, COPPA and FTC’s implementing regulations reflect various principles that are similar to the Fair Information Practice Principles. FCC regulates the telecommunications industry pursuant to the Communications Act of 1934, as amended (Communications Act). FCC follows the APA section 553 notice-and-comment rulemaking process to promulgate regulations implementing the Communications Act. FCC also has an enforcement bureau that pursues violations of its regulations and the Communications Act. The Communications Act establishes separate definitions for “information services” and “telecommunications services” and treats these two types of services differently. Specifically, information services are subject to less regulation by FCC than telecommunications services under the Communications Act. However, FTC is prohibited from regulating telecommunications carriers (a provider of telecommunications services) under the common carrier exemption. Prior to 2015, Internet services were considered information services under the Communications Act, and thus FTC was not prohibited from considering the privacy practices of Internet service providers under its FTC Act authority to protect consumers from unfair and deceptive practices. This changed in 2015 when FCC classified broadband as a telecommunications service, which meant that broadband Internet service providers were considered telecommunications carriers and FCC asserted primary oversight over them. As a result of the reclassification, FTC no longer had jurisdiction over Internet service providers. Once FCC had asserted primary oversight over Internet service providers, FCC promulgated privacy regulations specific to them. However, before the privacy regulations went into effect, Congress repealed them under the Congressional Review Act. In December 2017, FCC reclassified broadband as an information service—reverting Internet service providers’ classification to what it had been prior to 2015. When that reclassification became effective in June 2018, jurisdiction of Internet privacy for Internet service providers was effectively transferred from FCC back to FTC. As a result, FCC currently has limited Internet privacy oversight responsibilities, as shown in figure 1. Perspectives on the benefits of and concerns about the collection and use of consumers’ data from the Internet varied somewhat across stakeholder groups. Various stakeholders we interviewed—including those from academia, industry, and government—said that there should be a balance between the freedom of companies to collect and use consumers’ data needed to provide services and the necessity to protect consumers’ privacy. In general, industry stakeholders highlighted the benefits of data collection and use, such as facilitating innovation, while consumer advocacy groups and other stakeholders emphasized concerns about consumers’ loss of control over their data and their lack of understanding of how companies collect and use their information. Additionally, surveys and other literature that we reviewed on Internet privacy highlighted concerns among consumers. The key benefits of information collection were identified as: Enables certain services. According to two industry stakeholders, the collection and use of consumer data from the Internet enable content providers to provide services. These stakeholders said that sometimes a content provider must collect and use information from consumers to provide the service. For example, a mapping service must collect and use consumers’ current location to provide them with up-to-date directions. Provides low-cost or free services. A representative from a content provider said that revenue from targeted advertising helps allow some content providers’ services to be offered to consumers at little or no charge. Instead of charging a subscription fee, a social media company may be able to provide free service because it uses information that it collects from consumers to target advertisements to users on a customized, user-by-user basis. These ads are targeted to users based on interests they express through their use of social media, among other things. According to a representative from an Internet search engine, using consumer data for targeted advertising may be relatively less important for some kinds of content providers, such as search engines. This company representative said that search engines may use keywords entered for a particular Internet search to provide advertisements relevant to the search. For example, a search for “car insurance” can offer the consumer advertisements from car insurance companies without any additional data from the consumer other than the search’s keywords. Supports innovation and customization. According to some stakeholders, the collection and use of data also benefit consumers through other means such as providing innovative products or customized services. According to a representative from a content provider, the collection of personal information, with consent, for commercial purposes can at times have benefits. The representative said, for example, that collection of images containing identifiable information, like faces, can help in the development of new technologies such as object and facial recognition. According to two content providers, consumers may also benefit from customized services and content. For example, according to a representative from a travel-related company, that company can collect information about a consumer to suggest travel itineraries and suggestions for activities. Additionally, representatives from a consumer advocacy group and a content provider stated that direct-marketing approaches are enabled through data collection. Such marketing approaches allow consumers to receive advertisements that are uniquely tailored to their interests. For example, a consumer that a content provider has identified as being a hiker may receive advertisements for hiking boots. Despite these benefits, public opinion surveys have shown concerns about the collection and use of consumers’ information on the Internet. For instance, recent analyses based on surveys by the Pew Research Center and NTIA showed that the public lacks trust in Internet privacy, a concern that may limit economic activities. NTIA’s survey results show that privacy concerns may lead to lower levels of economic productivity as people decline to make financial transactions on the Internet. According to the NTIA analysis, in 2017, 24 percent of American households surveyed avoided making financial transactions on the Internet due to privacy or security concerns. Consumers NTIA surveyed indicated that their specific concerns were identity theft, credit card or banking fraud, data collection by online services, loss of control over personal information, data collection by government, and threats to personal safety. Stakeholders we interviewed elaborated on some of these concerns: Public disclosure and data breaches. Some stakeholders, including representatives from content providers, said that personal information from the Internet can be publicly disclosed, including through data breaches. An academic and a former FCC commissioner told us that such disclosures are becoming more frequent. Various consumer advocacy groups and state governments continue to report data breaches. This personal information can include financial information such as credit card information, the disclosure of which can result in financial harm to the consumer. It can also include other kinds of sensitive information such as political views or medical conditions, the disclosure of which can cause non-financial harms such as embarrassment or harassment. According to public reports, the 2017 breach of consumer information from Equifax, a credit-reporting agency, resulted in the disclosure of 143 million American consumers’ sensitive information. According to NTIA’s 2017 survey, 45 percent of households surveyed reported major concerns about credit card fraud. Regarding non-financial information, in a recent case FTC alleged that an Internet-based company publicly disclosed patients’ sensitive medical information without their knowledge after patients submitted what they thought were confidential reviews of physicians. According to FTC, these reviews were then publicly posted on the company’s website. Financial and other harms. Stakeholders identified both potential financial and non-financial harms associated with misuse of personal information from the Internet. A former FTC acting chair has said that privacy and data-security incidents can cause injuries that do not only involve financial loss and that it may be difficult to measure this type of non-financial injury. In a February 2018 speech, this former acting FTC chair cited a case that the agency filed involving the misuse of personal information from the Internet that resulted in people losing jobs or job opportunities or being threatened, stalked, and harassed. The acting chair said that in another case, there was evidence that several people committed suicide after their names and other data were disclosed. The commission can, by bringing suit in district court, obtain an order compelling content providers to provide monetary relief to consumers if a data disclosure results in financial harm to a consumer. However, an academic noted that many data disclosures of sensitive information cannot be financially redressed; information can indefinitely persist on the Internet once it is disclosed. Consumers’ lack of understanding. A range of stakeholders we interviewed, including those from industry, said that consumers lack an understanding of how their data are collected and used. Some stakeholders said content providers are insufficiently transparent about how they collect and use data. For instance, content providers’ privacy policies, according to various stakeholders, may contain technical language that is difficult for typical consumers to understand, may be located in a difficult-to-access or inconspicuous part of the content provider’s website, or may be lengthy to the point where it becomes prohibitively difficult for a consumer to set aside enough time to read. Furthermore, according to an academic, companies may have an incentive to intentionally obscure their privacy practices, since clarity could put the companies at a competitive disadvantage. The academic also stated that different privacy policies may apply to different parts of a consumer’s experience on a single website. For example, the academic described how a website may have contracts with third-party vendors for specific services included on the website that consumers use, such as an online shopping cart’s features. The privacy policy for the website and the third-party shopping cart can be separate and unrelated to each other, and consumers may not be aware of this since these policies may never appear to consumers or be hard to obtain. A representative from a consumer advocacy group also mentioned that consumers may be unaware that companies track consumers’ Internet activity in order to target those consumers with customized prices. An academic said that these practices may disproportionately affect people with low computer literacy, as they may not be aware of tracking or know of ways to counteract it. In 2015, we found that the lack of computer and Internet skills is one of the primary barriers people face in using the Internet and that this is a particular problem for certain demographic segments who may lack exposure to or knowledge about computers, such as those of age 65 and older and those with low levels of income and education. Consumer lack of control. Some academics and consumer advocacy groups also identified a lack of control as a concern with respect to Internet privacy—consumers have little or no control over how their information is collected, used, and shared. In a 2015 survey conducted by Pew Research Center, 65 percent of respondents said it is very important to be in control of what information is collected about them. However, according to an academic and a consumer advocacy group we interviewed, privacy policies offer consumers little or no bargaining power, and consumers may be forced to either accept the terms of the policy as written or not use the application or service at all. Furthermore, we recently reported that sometimes consumers’ information is used for purposes that are altogether separate from what those consumers originally anticipated. For example, FTC alleged in an enforcement action that in 2009 and 2010, a company told consumers that it would track the websites they visited in order to provide them with personalized offers, when in fact the company was also transmitting credit card information it collected through such tracking to third parties. The company settled with FTC. We also recently reported on how devices that comprise the Internet of Things pose privacy concerns for consumers, including that information collected by such Internet-connected devices can be used in ways to which the consumer was not given the option to opt out. As discussed above, stakeholders described various types of harm that could result from Internet privacy violations. Regardless of whether violations involve financial or other types of harm, a challenging factor in providing Internet privacy oversight is identifying the responsible parties. A former federal government official with experience in privacy issues said that it frequently is difficult to identify which Internet entity in the chain is ultimately responsible for a privacy-related harm. For example, if a consumer is harmed by the theft of his or her Social Security number, it can be difficult to determine which entity is responsible if multiple entities have suffered data breaches of information systems that contained the Social Security number. In addition to the challenges in identifying responsible parties, the federal government has faced challenges in providing Internet privacy oversight. Our prior work has found that such efforts lack clearly defined roles, goals and performance measures, and that gaps exist in the current privacy framework. We found that during the last decade, FTC filed 101 Internet privacy enforcement actions for practices that the agency alleged were unfair, deceptive, a violation of COPPA, a violation of a settlement agreement, or a combination of those reasons. Most of these actions pertained to first-time violations of the FTC Act for which FTC does not have the authority to levy civil penalties. In those cases where a party violated an FTC regulation or settlement agreement, however, FTC does have the authority to impose civil penalties. The 101 cases—filed between July 1, 2008 and June 30, 2018—involved a variety of products, services, and industries that collect and use personal information from the Internet. During the years for which we examined full-year data, the number of enforcement actions taken per year ranged from 5 in 2010 and 2016 to 23 in 2015. For example, in recent years, FTC took enforcement action against the following entities for alleged conduct that the agency contended violated section 5 or COPPA: a toy manufacturer for collecting personal information from children online without providing direct notice and obtaining their parents’ consent; a computer manufacturer for pre-loading laptops with software that compromised security protections in order to deliver ads to consumers; a mobile ride-hailing business for misrepresenting the extent to which it monitored its employees’ access to personal information about users; a television manufacturer for installing software on its televisions to collect viewing data on 11 million consumers without their knowledge or consent and providing the viewing data to third parties; and a mobile advertising network for deceptively tracking the locations of hundreds of millions of consumers, including children, without their knowledge or consent, to serve them geographically targeted advertising. Of the 101 actions filed during the 10-year period, 51 involved Internet content providers, 21 involved software developers, 12 involved the sale of information or its use in advertising, 5 involved manufacturers, 1 involved an Internet service provider, and 11 involved a variety of different products, such as those provided by rent-to-own companies or certification services. In nearly all 101 cases, companies settled with FTC, which required the companies to make changes in their policies or practices as part of the settlement. FTC levied civil penalties against two of those companies for violating their settlement agreements. Also during this 10-year period, FTC levied civil penalties against 15 companies (a total of $12.7 million) for alleged violations of the COPPA regulations. The COPPA civil penalties ranged from $50,000 to $4 million and the average amount was $847,333. FTC can also seek to compel companies to provide monetary relief to those they have harmed. During this time period, FTC levied civil penalties against companies for violations of consent decrees or ordered monetary relief to consumers from companies for a total of $136.1 million. These payment orders ranged from $200,000 to $104.5 million and the average amount was $17 million. In the majority of these 101 enforcement actions that FTC settled, FTC alleged that companies engaged in practices that were deceptive. Examples of the charges FTC brought include: “Deceptive practices” cases (61 cases): In 2016, FTC alleged that Turn, Inc., an Internet advertising company, continued to track the Internet activities of consumers for targeted advertising purposes after the company had made representations that it would stop doing so. According to FTC, the company led consumers to believe they could turn off such tracking when in fact they were unable to do so. “Unfair practices” cases (4 cases): In 2014, FTC alleged that LeapLab, a data broker, knowingly provided scammers with hundreds of thousands of consumers’ sensitive personal information, including Social Security and bank account numbers. “Unfair and deceptive” practices cases (19 cases): In 2015, FTC alleged that Equiliv Investments, a software developer, lured consumers into downloading its “rewards” application, saying it would be free of malware, when the application’s main purpose was actually to load the consumers’ mobile phones with malicious software to mine virtual currencies for the developer. COPPA and COPPA regulations cases (6 cases): In 2011, FTC alleged that Broken Thumbs Apps, a software developer, had collected information from Internet applications that the developer specifically targeted toward children under the age of 13. FTC’s complaint stated that the company had, among other things, failed to provide notice of what information it collected and how it was used and also had failed to inform parents of these practices and receive their consent as COPPA required. Violation of settlement agreement cases (2 cases): In 2012, Google agreed to pay a $22.5 million civil penalty to settle FTC charges that it misrepresented to users of Apple’s Safari Internet browser that Google would not place tracking cookies or provide targeted ads to those users, violating an earlier settlement agreement between the company and FTC. In 14 of the 101 cases, FTC required companies to be audited by outside entities to monitor compliance with the terms of the settlement. The audit period ranged from 5 years to 20 years, with an average of 17.5 years. As noted above, 2 of the 101 cases involved a violation of FTC settlement agreements. In addition, in March 2018, FTC announced that it is investigating whether Facebook’s privacy practices violate a 2012 Facebook settlement agreement with FTC. In the case that resulted in the 2012 settlement, FTC charged Facebook with deceiving consumers by telling them they could keep their information private, but then allowing it to be shared and made public. Appendix II contains more detailed information about the 101 cases. As stated earlier, in 2015, FCC classified broadband Internet service as a telecommunications service, placing primary oversight of broadband Internet service providers’ privacy practices under FCC’s jurisdiction instead of FTC’s jurisdiction. In 2016, FCC filed a privacy enforcement action against a mobile Internet service provider, alleging, in part, violation of section 222 of the Communications Act and FCC’s Open Internet Transparency Rule. Section 222 requires telecommunications carriers to protect the confidentiality of customers’ proprietary information. In that case, FCC fined Verizon Wireless $1.4 million for failing to disclose that it was inserting “unique identifier headers,” also called “perma- cookies” or “super cookies” (mobile web tracking cookies that users cannot remove), into customers’ Internet traffic over its wireless network. Although the settlement was finalized during the 2015-2017 period when FCC had asserted jurisdiction over the privacy practices of Internet providers, the Verizon Wireless practices occurred prior to the classification of Internet service providers as telecommunications carriers. The investigation therefore did not rely upon FCC’s subsequent assertion of authority over Internet service providers’ privacy practices. In October 2016, after FCC had reclassified broadband as a telecommunications service, the commission issued Internet service provider privacy regulations, asserting its authority under section 222 of the Communications Act. In April 2017, however, Congress repealed these regulations under the Congressional Review Act before they took effect. In December 2017, FCC then reversed its 2015 classification of broadband, and oversight of broadband Internet service providers’ privacy practices reverted to FTC once the decision took effect in June 2018. In explaining the December 2017 decision, FCC’s new chair said that FTC’s privacy oversight approach regarding Internet service providers—using its authority to protect consumers against unfair, deceptive, and anti- competitive practices—had worked well in the past and that this action would “put the nation’s most experienced privacy cop back on the beat.” Under FCC’s new legal approach, it no longer asserts jurisdiction to take enforcement action against Internet service providers for privacy-related matters, including mobile Internet service providers. As part of FTC’s resumption of Internet service provider oversight, FCC and FTC entered into a memorandum of understanding in December 2017 spelling out their roles and responsibilities regarding oversight of these companies. FTC staff said that they regularly communicate with FCC and have an agreement to share Internet privacy complaints. As previously discussed, no federal statute comprehensively and specifically governs Internet privacy across all sectors. FTC oversees some aspects of Internet privacy by using its FTC Act section 5 authority to protect consumers from unfair and deceptive practices. FTC also uses its specific COPPA authority to police the collection and use of personal information from children by online services. Some industry representatives said that FTC’s enforcement has been effective because the agency has expertise and experience in privacy issues and has the flexibility to take enforcement action on a case-by-case basis. In addition, a content provider said that FTC has taken enforcement actions against companies of various sizes in different sectors and has a powerful tool by being able to require companies to be audited by outside entities for up to 20 years. Industry stakeholders we interviewed generally said that “direct enforcement” of a statute is preferable to promulgating and enforcing regulations implementing that statute (which constitutes enforcement of the statute as well). These stakeholders noted several key concerns they believe exist with regulatory versus statutory enforcement of Internet privacy: Regulations can stifle innovation. Two industry stakeholders said that regulations can hinder companies’ ability to innovate. For example, representatives from an Internet service provider said that innovation can stop during the rulemaking process as the industry waits for the regulation to be finalized. Regulations may create loopholes. Representatives from an Internet industry group and a content provider said that regulations can also contain loopholes that can be legally exploited because imprecise language in a regulation may allow a company to legally engage in an action that was originally unforeseen by the regulator. Regulations can become obsolete. Several industry stakeholders said regulations also may become obsolete quickly because the Internet industry is rapidly changing. An Internet industry representative noted that there can be large shifts in the Internet industry from year to year, while it often takes an agency much longer than a year to adopt a rule. Industry stakeholders said the flexibility of FTC’s approach allows FTC to adapt continuously to changing market conditions. Rulemakings can be lengthy. FCC officials said that in some cases, rulemakings can take a long time, especially when the issues are complex and there is no statutory deadline. Our previous work on rulemaking found that length of time required for the development and issuance of final rules varied both within and among agencies. Additionally, while some stakeholders suggested that regulations can clarify acceptable practices, other stakeholders, including from industry and academia, said that enforcement actions can send a similar message. According to both a representative from a content provider and an academic, enforcement actions such as settlement agreements, for example, establish precedents that companies can follow, similar to the way that case law developed by courts provides guidance for companies. Although some industry representatives we interviewed said that FTC’s use of settlement agreements provides companies with guidance, certain trade associations took a different position in a recent case brought before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp. 799 F.3d 236 (3d Cir. 2015). However, the court did not agree with the associations’ arguments. The case involved an enforcement action against Wyndham Worldwide Corporation where FTC alleged that data security failures led to three data breaches at the company in less than 2 years. The court considered whether FTC could bring an enforcement case involving cybersecurity using FTC’s section 5 “unfair practices” authority and, if so, whether Wyndham had “fair notice” that its specific cybersecurity practices could be deemed “unfair.” A group of companies and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce wrote a friend- of-the-court brief supporting Wyndham, criticizing FTC’s “regulation- through-settlements” approach. The companies argued this approach subjects businesses to “vague, unknowable, and constantly changing data-security standards” and businesses often are unaware of the standards to which they are held until after they receive a notice of investigation from FTC, at which point they must settle or expend considerable resources fighting the agency. Potential Limits on Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Remedies A recently decided federal appeals court case illustrates potential limits on the remedies that FTC can order in an “unfair practices” enforcement proceeding. In this 2018 case, LabMD, Inc. v. FTC, 891 F.3d 1286 (11th Cir. 2018), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit found that FTC could not direct a medical laboratory to create and implement wholesale data-security protective measures as a remedy to the laboratory’s alleged unfair practices. FTC had filed a complaint against LabMD under section 5 of the FTC Act for allegedly committing an unfair act or practice by failing to provide reasonable and appropriate security for personal information on its computer networks. The commission found that LabMD’s inadequate security constituted an unfair act or practice and ordered LabMD to take various actions, including establishing and maintaining a reasonable and comprehensive information security program. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit ruled that FTC’s order exceeded its authority because it did not prohibit a specific act or practice but instead, mandated a complete overhaul of the company’s data-security program. FTC had argued that the FTC Act gives it broad discretion to prevent unfair or deceptive acts or practices that injure the general public and that FTC had spelled out standards for LabMD to craft a reasonable security program. The court ruled, however, that such a general approach would make it difficult for a reviewing court to determine if LabMD had complied with the order, in the event of a future FTC challenge. company can reasonably foresee that a court could construe its conduct as falling within the meaning of the statute.” A majority of non-industry stakeholders we interviewed identified limitations in the current Internet privacy oversight approach because they view regulations in conjunction with enforcement as being more effective. These stakeholders include all of the former FTC commissioners we interviewed, three of the four former FCC commissioners we interviewed, and representatives from consumer advocacy groups we interviewed. In addition, a former FCC commissioner said that the current Internet privacy oversight approach is limited in part because he viewed regulations applying equally to all players in the Internet ecosystem in conjunction with enforcement as being more effective. A representative from a consumer advocacy group also said that regulations in conjunction with enforcement are essential for effective privacy protection. Some of these stakeholders noted key ways that they believe Internet privacy regulations can provide clarity to industry and consumers, as well as fairness and flexibility in enforcement: Regulations can provide clarity. An Internet industry group representative said that various companies have favorable views of regulations because they can provide clear expectations about what actions are permissible. Similarly, a former congressional staff member with expertise on privacy issues said that some companies have favorable views of regulations because the regulations often provide clearer expectations about what the companies can do. FCC officials said that with respect to telephone privacy provisions of the Communications Act, the telephone industry wanted rules because it sought greater clarity about what it should be doing, what constituted a violation, how to comply, and what behaviors were acceptable. Regulations may promote fairness. Some other stakeholders discussed the ability of regulations to provide fairness. For example, a former federal enforcement official described regulations as creating a fair and consistent oversight regime across the entire industry in a way that case-by-case enforcement actions do not. Another former federal enforcement official said that regulations give companies fair notice of what actions may be violations and thus help those companies avoid surprising or unexpected enforcement. Regulations can be flexible. An academic said that by targeting behaviors and not specific technologies, regulations can be written in such a way that they do not become obsolete. An academic also said that regulations based on broad performance-standards principles can avoid being overly prescriptive. FCC officials also noted that regulations can be amended to adapt to changes in technology often faster than new laws can be enacted. Furthermore, regulations determined to be obsolete can be repealed. FTC staff told us that the agency systematically reviews all of its regulations every 10 years, even though it is only legally required to review its most significant ones, and that the number of FTC regulations has decreased because the agency determined prior ones were obsolete. The Regulatory Flexibility Act requires federal agencies to analyze the effect of their regulations on small entities. Regulations can be a deterrent. FCC officials said that rules can have a deterrent effect on bad practices in the industry or have a role in mitigating the negative effects of bad practices after they occur. They said, for example, that the practice of pretexting (improperly obtaining people’s telephone records) was greatly curtailed by an FCC regulation prohibiting such practices. They also said that rules can foreclose arguments by companies claiming that because no rule was in place, they had no reasonable notice or awareness that they should behave in a particular way. Consumer advocacy groups and other stakeholders, including some former FTC and FCC commissioners, had concerns about the efficacy of an enforcement approach such as FTC’s approach to Internet privacy oversight, which focuses on enforcing a statute rather than implementing regulations. They said that FTC’s enforcement approach limits the ability of the agency to affect companies’ behavior, and that any enforcement activity occurs after the violation, undesirable behavior, harm, or illegal action has already occurred. A former federal enforcement official also said that regulations can prevent companies from engaging in bad practices in the first instance and thus have a preventive effect. A former FCC commissioner said that by the nature of a direct statutory- enforcement approach (as opposed to rulemaking), an agency would only address a harm after it has occurred. As discussed above, for example, data often cannot be removed from the Internet because copies of the data can exist among many bad actors, and it can be difficult to identify the entity responsible for unwanted disclosures. Therefore, it may be more important to avoid such Internet privacy harms from occurring in the first place. Another former FCC commissioner told us that Internet privacy oversight should be returned to FCC because it has APA section 553 notice-and-comment rulemaking authority and considerable enforcement experience. Representatives from consumer advocacy groups said that FTC’s enforcement action has been insufficient because it investigates only a small portion of actual Internet-privacy violations or takes action regarding only the most egregious or outrageous cases that it can win. FTC has also stated in its strategic plan that it focuses on investigating and litigating cases that cause or are likely to cause substantial injury to consumers and that by focusing on practices that are actually harming or likely to harm consumers, FTC can best use its limited resources. Representatives from an Internet association said that FTC’s Internet- privacy enforcement actions should focus on concrete harms. An FTC staff member from the Division of Privacy and Identity Protection said that the agency has been effective with the limited enforcement resources it has available. Furthermore, the staff member said the agency uses no formal written criteria or template to assess individual cases but considers the size and scale of a company’s effect on consumer privacy when deciding whether to take enforcement action. However, a former FTC commissioner told us that the agency needs more resources to effectively oversee Internet privacy. We asked stakeholders whether it was clear under what circumstances FTC will take Internet privacy enforcement action. In response, some stakeholders said that FTC’s enforcement priorities are reflected in its settlement agreements, which provide information that is similar to a body of case law. Individual commissioners also may issue statements explaining their decisions. Two stakeholders also said that FTC’s closing letters, which the agency sends to companies and posts on its website when it closes an investigation without taking enforcement action, may explain its decisions. Other stakeholders said that more guidance would be helpful to provide additional clarity on how the agency uses its Internet privacy enforcement authority. FTC staff and other stakeholders also said that FTC has provided useful Internet privacy guidance. For example, in 2015, FTC published guidance for businesses on complying with COPPA. Various stakeholders we interviewed said that opportunities exist for enhancing Internet privacy oversight. A key component of FTC’s mission, as specified by the FTC Act, is to protect consumers against unfair and deceptive practices. As discussed earlier, some stakeholders believe that FTC’s reliance on its unfair and deceptive practices authority to address Internet privacy issues has limitations. In addition, although the Fair Information Practice Principles provide internationally recognized principles for protecting the privacy and security of personal information, they are not legal requirements and FTC cannot rely on them to define what constitutes unfair and deceptive practices related to privacy and data security. We stated in our 2013 information resellers report that the current U.S. privacy framework is not always aligned with the Fair Information Practice Principles and that these principles provide a framework for balancing the need for privacy with other interests. We found that there are limited privacy protections under federal law for consumer data used for marketing purposes. We said that although the Fair Information Practice Principles call for restraint in the collection and use of personal information, the scope of protections provided under current law has been narrow in relation to: (1) individuals’ ability to access, control, and correct their personal data; (2) collection methods and sources and types of consumer information collected; and (3) new technologies, such as tracking of web activity and the use of mobile devices. Although we recommended in that report that Congress consider strengthening the consumer privacy framework to reflect the effects of changes in technology and the marketplace, this matter for congressional consideration was not specific to Internet privacy or to the oversight authorities of any particular agency or agencies. As noted above, various stakeholders expressed concern about the ability of consumers to control their data and understand how that data are used. These concerns suggest that companies are not always following the Fair Information Practice Principles, such as that companies’ data practices should be transparent, allow consumers the right to access and edit their data, and limit the collection of data to the extent feasible. Those stakeholders who believe that FTC’s current authority and enforcement approach is unduly limited identified three main actions that could better protect Internet privacy: (1) enactment of an overarching federal privacy statute to establish general requirements governing Internet privacy practices of all sectors; (2) APA section 553 notice-and- comment rulemaking authority; and (3) civil penalty authority for any violation of a statutory or regulatory requirement, rather than allowing penalties only for violations of settlement agreements or consent decrees that themselves seek redress for a statutory or regulatory violation. Stakeholders from a variety of perspectives—including from academia, industry, consumer advocacy groups, and former FTC and FCC commissioners—told us that a privacy statute could enhance Internet privacy oversight by, for example, clearly articulating to consumers, industry, and privacy enforcers what behaviors are prohibited, among other things. In addition, a former FCC commissioner said that a new privacy statute could enhance Internet privacy oversight by creating uniform standards for all players in the Internet ecosystem that is focused on the consumer rather than the regulatory legacy of the companies involved (regulations that apply to specific types of companies based on what they are or used to be, such as telecommunications carriers, cable companies, broadcasters, and mobile wireless providers). The former FCC commissioner said that as companies, technologies, and markets change, there is a question about whether existing law should be modernized. In 2015, FTC staff recommended that Congress enact broad-based legislation that is flexible and technology-neutral, while also providing clear rules of the road for companies about such issues as how to provide choices to consumers about data collection and use practices. Some stakeholders suggested that such a framework could either designate an existing agency as responsible for privacy oversight (such as FTC) or create a new privacy-oriented agency. A representative from a consumer advocacy group mentioned that the European Union, for example, has established the European Data Protection Supervisor, an independent data protection authority, to monitor and ensure the protection of personal data and privacy. Similarly, in Canada, the Office of the Privacy Commissioner, an independent body that reports directly to the Parliament, was established to protect and promote individuals’ privacy rights. Some stakeholders also stated that the absence of a comprehensive Internet privacy statute affects FTC’s enforcement. For example, a former federal enforcement official said that FTC is limited in how it can use its authority to take action against companies’ unfair and deceptive trade practices for problematic Internet privacy practices. Similarly, another former federal enforcement official said that FTC is limited in how and against whom it can use its unfair and deceptive practices authority noting, for example, that it cannot pursue Internet privacy enforcement over exempted industries such as common carriers. In addition, a former FCC commissioner said that it is more difficult for FTC to take effective action because its enforcement comes only after a complaint and after an often lengthy review process. The former FCC commissioner also said that without “ex ante” rules (rules that define prohibited activity before it has occurred), there inevitably will be delay, confusion, and lack of knowledge about what is and is not acceptable behavior. In addition, some stakeholders—including a representative from a consumer group, a former federal enforcement official, and a former FCC commissioner—said FTC’s section 5 “unfair or deceptive practices” authority may not enable it to fully protect consumers’ Internet privacy because it can be difficult for FTC to establish that Internet privacy practices are legally “unfair.” For example, under section 5, FTC has charged companies with committing a “deceptive” practice if their privacy policies said they would not collect or use consumers’ personal information but then did so. However, a former congressional staff member said that companies often write broad and vague policy statements, making it difficult for FTC to charge companies with committing deceptive practices. Instead, according to a representative from a consumer advocacy group, FTC would have to show the companies’ actions were “unfair,” which, according to the representative, is legally difficult to establish. We found in our 2017 report on vehicle data privacy that most automakers’ written privacy notices used vague language. Similarly, we found in our 2012 report on mobile device location data that although companies’ policies stated that they shared location data with third parties, they were sometimes vague about which types of companies these were and why they were sharing the data. Some stakeholders said that FTC relies more heavily on its authority to take enforcement action against deceptive trade practices compared with the agency’s unfair trade practices authority. This was confirmed in our analysis of FTC’s Internet privacy enforcement actions discussed previously. However, a representative from a consumer advocacy group said that FTC’s ability to take such action is limited practically to instances where a company violates its own privacy policy—companies generally can collect and use data in any way they want if they include language in their policies asserting their intent to do so. According to a former FCC commissioner, a privacy statute could clarify the situations in which FTC could take enforcement action. Various stakeholders said that there are advantages to overseeing Internet privacy with a statute that provides APA section 553 notice-and- comment rulemaking authority. As discussed above, that provision lays out the basic process by which so-called informal agency rulemaking shall be conducted, namely, publication of proposed regulations in the Federal Register; an opportunity for public comment (written and possibly oral submission of data and views); and publication of final regulations in the Federal Register with an explanation of the rules’ basis and purpose. Also as noted above, Congress imposed additional rulemaking steps on FTC in the Magnuson-Moss Act when FTC is promulgating rules under section 5 of the FTC Act. These additional steps include providing the public and certain congressional committees with advance notice of proposed rulemaking (in addition to notice of proposed rulemaking). FTC’s rulemaking under Magnuson-Moss also calls for, among other things, oral hearings, if requested, presided over by an independent hearing officer, and preparation of a staff report after the conclusion of public hearings, giving the public the opportunity to comment on the report. Finally, Congress made it easier for the public to appeal FTC’s Magnuson-Moss rules by making the agency meet a higher standard when the rules are challenged in court. FTC staff said that these additional steps add time and complexity to the rulemaking process. In congressional testimony in 2010, the then-Director of FTC’s Bureau of Consumer Protection said that “if Congress enacts privacy legislation, the commission agrees that such legislation should provide APA rulemaking authority to the commission.” According to FTC, this testimony was voted on and approved by the commissioners and, therefore, constituted the commission’s official position at the time. Moreover, according to stakeholders, in many cases regulations can be used to implement statutes. Officials from other consumer and worker protection agencies we interviewed described their enforcement authorities and approaches. For example, officials from the CFPB and the FDA, both of which use APA section 553 notice-and-comment rulemaking, said that their rulemaking authority assists in their oversight approaches and works together with enforcement actions. OSHA officials said that the standards that the agency promulgates under its authority specify what employers are required to do to reduce safety and health risks to workers. Such standards lay out the workplace conditions that must be maintained by employers and require that employers implement certain practices, operations, or processes that ensure worker protections. EEOC officials said that regulations are used to guide investigations that establish whether enforcement action is appropriate. CPSC officials said that the agency conducts consumer protection not only by establishing and enforcing mandatory regulations, but also through collaborative actions such as educating industry, developing consensus voluntary safety standards, removing defective products from the marketplace through voluntary corrective actions, and litigating when necessary. In addition, in contrast to FTC’s approach, FCC has APA section 553 notice-and-comment rulemaking authority and has issued regulations implementing section 222 of the Communications Act using that rulemaking authority to protect the privacy of telephone users. Some stakeholders suggested that FTC’s current ability to levy civil penalties could also be enhanced. Currently, FTC can levy civil penalties against companies for violating certain regulations, such as COPPA regulations, or if the company violates the terms of a settlement agreement already in place. According to most former FTC commissioners and some other stakeholders we interviewed, FTC should be able to levy fines for initial violations of section 5 of the FTC Act. An academic told us that the power of an agency to levy a fine is a tangible way to hold industries accountable. Another academic noted, however, that fines may be relatively less effective in industries where there is limited competition because the costs of those fines may be more effectively passed on to consumers in the form of higher prices for services. In addition, some stakeholders said that payments required by FTC orders are not large enough to act as a deterrent and that companies may consider them to be a cost of doing business. There is a growing debate about the federal government’s role in overseeing Internet privacy. In a July 2018 congressional hearing, FTC’s new chair testified that the FTC Act cannot address all privacy and data- security concerns in the marketplace. The chair said, for example, that FTC’s lack of civil penalty authority for violations of the FTC Act reduces its deterrent capability. He also noted the agency lacks authority over non-profits and over common carrier activity, even though those entities and activities often have serious implications for consumer privacy and data security. In November 2018, FTC’s chair testified before Congress and urged Congress to consider enacting privacy legislation that would be enforced by FTC. A majority of the commission has indicated support for APA rulemaking and civil penalty authority for privacy. FTC also held hearings in September, November, and December 2018 to advance the discussion around privacy issues, among other topics, and FTC plans to hold an additional hearing on data security and consumer privacy in February 2019. In a Federal Register notice, FTC announced that it is interested in the benefits and costs of various state, federal and international privacy laws and regulations, including the potential conflicts among those standards. FTC also indicated that it is particularly interested in the efficacy of the commission’s use of its current authority and the identification of any additional tools or authorities the commission may need to adequately deter unfair and deceptive conduct related to privacy and data security. Also in July 2018, an NTIA official announced that NTIA, in coordination with the Commerce Department’s International Trade Administration and National Institute of Standards and Technology, had recently started holding stakeholder meetings to identify common ground and formulate core, high-level principles on data privacy. Regarding the development of the Administration’s approach to consumer privacy, in September 2018, NTIA requested comments on ways to advance consumer privacy while protecting prosperity and innovation. Our 2009 report on a framework for assessing proposals for modernizing the financial regulatory system similarly found that regulators should have the authority to carry out and enforce their statutory missions. We further said that a regulatory system should be flexible and forward looking, allowing regulators to readily adapt to market innovations and changes, including identifying and acting on emerging risks in a timely way without hindering innovation. These factors are useful considerations as the federal government explores how it can better oversee privacy and data security. Having sufficient and appropriate authorities and providing flexibility to address a rapidly evolving Internet environment could better ensure that the federal government can protect consumers’ privacy. Recent developments regarding Internet privacy suggest that this is an appropriate time for Congress to consider comprehensive Internet privacy legislation. Although FTC has been addressing Internet privacy through its unfair and deceptive practices authority, among other statutes, and other agencies have been addressing this issue using industry-specific statutes, there is no comprehensive federal privacy statute with specific standards. Debate over such a statute could provide a vehicle for consideration of the Fair Information Practice Principles, which are intended to balance privacy concerns with the need for using consumers’ data. Such a law could also empower a specific agency or agencies to provide oversight through means such as APA section 553 rulemaking, civil penalties for first time violations of a statute, and other enforcement tools. Comprehensive legislation addressing Internet privacy that establishes specific standards and includes APA notice-and-comment rulemaking and first-time violation civil penalty authorities could help enhance the federal government’s ability to protect consumer privacy, provide more certainty in the marketplace as companies innovate and develop new products using consumer data, and provide better assurance to consumers that their privacy will be protected. Congress should consider developing comprehensive legislation on Internet privacy that would enhance consumer protections and provide flexibility to address a rapidly evolving Internet environment. Issues that should be considered include: which agency or agencies should oversee Internet privacy; what authorities an agency or agencies should have to oversee Internet privacy, including notice-and-comment rulemaking authority and first-time violation civil penalty authority; and how to balance consumers’ need for Internet privacy with industry’s ability to provide services and innovate. We provided a draft of this report to FTC, FCC, and the Department of Commerce for their review and comment. FTC and FCC provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. The Department of Commerce indicated that it did not have comments. As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the report date. At that time, we will send copies to the FTC chair, the FCC chair, the Secretary of Commerce, and interested congressional committees. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov. If you or members of your staff have any questions about this report, please contact Alicia Puente Cackley at (202) 512-8678 or cackleya@gao.gov or Mark Goldstein at (202) 512-2834 or goldsteinm@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix III. For this review, we interviewed staff from agencies with roles in Internet privacy; officials from other consumer- and worker-protection agencies; stakeholders from consumer advocacy groups, industry groups, Internet service providers, and Internet content providers; academics; and former government officials. To obtain a variety of perspectives, we selected Internet service providers that represented different industry sectors and Internet content providers that provide a variety of information and social media services. Academic stakeholders were selected because of their expertise in privacy, consumer protection, and regulatory issues. We also interviewed former Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and Federal Communications Commission (FCC) commissioners who served during the Barack Obama and George W. Bush administrations and are from different political parties. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) Department of Commerce, National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) Federal Communications Commission (FCC) Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Food and Drug Administration (FDA) Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) The following table identifies 101 Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Internet privacy enforcement actions filed between July 1, 2008 and June 30, 2018 in which the agency alleged a violation of either the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act) or the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA) and implementing COPPA regulations and subsequently entered into a settlement agreement with the target entity. Although some of these cases may involve both Internet data privacy and security issues, this table does not include cases that involved data security issues only. In addition to the contact names above, Andrew Huddleston, Assistant Director; Kay Kuhlman, Assistant Director; Bob Homan, Analyst-in- Charge; Melissa Bodeau; John de Ferrari; Camilo Flores; Erica Miles; Josh Ormond; and Sean Standley made significant contributions to this report.

 

 Report 2:
In November 2011, we reported that over the previous decade, the FBI and GSA conducted a number of studies to assess the Hoover Building and its other headquarters facilities’ strategic and mission needs. Through these studies, they determined the condition of the FBI’s current assets and identified gaps between current and needed capabilities, as well as studied a range of alternatives to meet the FBI’s requirements. According to these assessments, the FBI’s headquarters facilities did not fully support the FBI’s long-term security, space, and building condition requirements. Since our report, the assessment of the Hoover Building has not materially changed. For example: Security: Since September 11, 2001, the FBI mission and workforce have expanded, and the FBI has outgrown the Hoover Building. As a result, the FBI also operates in annexes, including some located in the National Capital Region. During our 2011 review, FBI security officials told us that they have some security concerns—to varying degrees— about the Hoover Building and some of the headquarters annexes. In our report, we noted that the dispersion of staff in annexes created security challenges, particularly for at least nine annexes that were located in multitenant buildings, where some space was leased by the FBI and other space was leased by nonfederal tenants. While this arrangement did not automatically put FBI operations at risk, it heightened security concerns. In addition, in January 2017, we found that the FBI occupies space leased from foreign owners in at least six different locations, including one in Washington, D.C. Further, federal officials who assess foreign investments told us at that time that leasing space in foreign-owned buildings could present security risks, such as espionage and unauthorized cyber and physical access. Space: In 2011, we reported that FBI and GSA studies showed that much of the Hoover building’s approximately 2.4 million gross square feet of space is unusable, and the remaining usable space is not designed to meet the needs of today’s FBI. Moreover, the Hoover Building’s original design is inefficient, according to GSA assessments, making it difficult to reconfigure space to promote staff collaboration. For example, in its fiscal year 2017 prospectus for the proposed FBI headquarters consolidation project, GSA noted that the Hoover Building was designed at a time when FBI operated differently, and it cannot be redeveloped to provide the necessary space to consolidate the FBI Headquarters components or to meet the agency’s current and projected operational requirements. As a result, the FBI reported facing several operational and logistical challenges. We similarly noted in our prior work in 2011 that space constraints at the Hoover Building and the resulting dispersion of staff sometimes prevented the FBI from physically locating certain types of analysts and specialists together, which in turn hampered collaboration and the performance of some classified work. Building condition: In our 2011 report, we noted that the condition of the Hoover Building was deteriorating, and GSA assessments had identified significant recapitalization needs. At that time, we found that GSA had decided to limit investments in the Hoover Building to those necessary to protect health and safety and keep building systems functioning while GSA assessed the FBI’s facility needs. We found that this decision increased the potential for building system failures and disruption to the FBI’s operations. Given that the FBI would likely remain in the building for at least several more years, we recommended that GSA evaluate its strategy to minimize major repair and recapitalization investments and take action to address any facility condition issues that could put FBI operations at risk and lead to further deterioration of the building. In 2014, in response to our recommendation, GSA evaluated its strategy for the Hoover Building and determined it needed to complete some repairs to ensure safety and maintain tenancy in the building. For example, in 2014, GSA funded contracts to waterproof portions of the building’s mezzanine level to prevent water intrusion into the building and repair the concrete facade, small sections of which had cracked and fallen from the building. In July 2017, GSA and FBI officials stated that they cancelled the procurement for the new FBI headquarters consolidation project, noting that the there was a lack of funding necessary to complete the procurement. GSA added that the cancellation of the procurement did not lessen the need for a new FBI headquarters, and that GSA and the FBI would continue to work together to address the space requirements of the FBI. In July 2014, we reported that the swap exchange approach can help GSA address the challenges of disposing of unneeded property and modernizing or replacing federal buildings. GSA officials told us that swap exchanges can help GSA facilitate construction projects given a growing need to modernize and replace federal properties, shrinking federal budgets, and challenges obtaining funding. Specifically, GSA officials noted that swap exchanges allow GSA to immediately apply the value of a federal property to be used in the exchange to construction needs, rather than attempting to obtain funds through the appropriations process. In our 2014 report, GSA officials stated that the exchanges can be attractive because the agency can get construction projects accomplished without having to request full upfront funding for them from Congress. In addition, because swap exchanges require developers or other property recipients to complete the agreed-upon GSA construction projects prior to the transfer of the title to the current property GSA is exchanging, federal agencies can continue to occupy the property during the construction process for the new project, eliminating the need for agencies to lease or acquire other space to occupy during the construction process. GSA has limited experience in successfully completing swap exchange transactions and has cancelled several recently proposed swap exchanges. More specifically, in 2016 we reported that GSA had only completed transactions using the swap exchange authority for two small (under $10-million each) swap exchanges completed in Atlanta, Georgia, in 2001 and in San Antonio, Texas, in 2012. Furthermore, GSA has faced a number of obstacles in its use of this authority. For example, for our 2014 report, we reviewed five projects identified since August 2012 in which GSA solicited market interest in exchanging almost 8-million square feet in federal property for construction services or newly constructed assets. However, GSA chose not to pursue swap-exchanges in all five of these projects, including the proposed FBI headquarters consolidation project. For example, GSA officials told us that there was little or no market interest in potential swap exchanges in Baltimore, Maryland, and Miami, Florida, and that GSA chose to pursue different approaches. Respondents to the solicitations for these two GSA swap exchanges noted that GSA did not provide important details, including the amount of investment needed in the federal properties and GSA’s specific construction needs. In addition, from 2012 to 2015, GSA pursued a larger swap exchange potentially involving up to 5 federal properties located in the Federal Triangle South area of Washington, D.C., to finance construction at GSA headquarters and other federal properties. In 2013, GSA decided to focus on exchanging two buildings, the GSA Regional Office Building and the Cotton Annex, based on input from potential investors. On February 18, 2016, GSA decided to end its pursuit of the exchange, saying in a memorandum supporting this decision that private investor valuations for the two buildings fell short of the government’s estimated values. After the discontinuation of the Federal Triangle swap exchange project, we reported in 2016 that GSA officials noted they planned to improve the swap exchange process, including the property appraisal process, outreach to stakeholders to identify potential project risks for future projects, and to the extent possible, mitigate such risks. However, we also reported that several factors may continue to limit the applicability of the agency’s approach. Specifically, the viability of swap exchanges may be affected by specific market factors, such as the availability of alternative properties. In addition, the specific valuation approach used by appraisers or potential investors may reduce the viability of the swap exchange. For example, in reviewing the proposed Federal Triangle project, we found in 2016 that the proposals from two of the investment firms valued the two federal buildings involved in the proposed swap substantially less than GSA’s appraised property value. In addition, swap exchanges can require developers to spend large sums on GSA’s construction needs before receiving title to the federal property used in the exchanges. We found in 2014 that GSA’s solicitations have not always specified these construction needs in sufficient detail. Consequently, developers may be unable to provide meaningful input, and GSA could miss swap exchange opportunities. In 2014, we recommended that GSA develop criteria for determining when to solicit market interest in a swap exchange. GSA agreed with the recommendation and has since updated its guidance to include these criteria. In January 2017, GSA agreed to a swap exchange for the U.S. Department of Transportation Volpe Center in Cambridge, Massachusetts. After a competitive process, GSA selected the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) as its exchange partner for the existing Department of Transportation (DOT) facility. Per the agreement, MIT will construct a new DOT facility on a portion of a 14 acre site to which DOT has title and, in exchange, will receive title to the remaining portion of the site that will not be used by DOT, which is located near its main campus. GSA indicated that, once completed, the project will provide $750 million in value to the federal government in the form of the design and construction services and value-equalization funds from MIT. Our prior work has identified a number of alternative approaches to funding real property projects. In March 2014, we reported that upfront funding is the best way to ensure recognition of commitments made in budgeting decisions and to maintain fiscal controls. However, obtaining upfront funding for large acquisitions such as the Hoover Building replacement can be challenging. Congress has provided some agencies with specific authorities to use alternative funding mechanisms for the acquisition, renovation, or disposal of federal real property without full, upfront funding. Table 1 outlines selected funding mechanisms, and considerations for each mechanism we identified in our 2014 report. Some of these alternative mechanisms allow selected agencies to meet their real property needs by leveraging other authorized resources, such as retained fees or land swaps with a private sector partner. Funding mechanisms leverage both monetary resources, such as retained fees, and non-monetary resources, such as property exchanged in a land swap or space offered in an enhanced use lease. In some cases, the funding mechanism may function as a public-private partnership intended to further an agency’s mission by working with a partner to leverage resources. Some of these mechanisms allow the private sector to provide the project’s capital—at their cost of borrowing. The U.S. federal government’s cost of borrowing is lower than the private sector’s. When the private sector provides the project capital, the federal government later repays these higher private sector borrowing costs (e.g., in the form of lease payments). In some cases, factors such as lower labor costs or fewer requirements could potentially help balance the higher cost of borrowing, making partner financing less expensive. Our 2014 report also identifies budgetary options—within the bounds of the current unified budget—to meet real property needs while helping Congress and agencies make more prudent long-term decisions. In 2014, we reported that projects with alternative funding mechanisms present multiple forms of risk that are shared between the agency and any partner or stakeholder. Further, we noted project decisions should reflect both the likely risk and the organization’s tolerance for risk. Incorporating risk assessment and management practices into decisions can help organizations recognize and prepare to manage explicit risks (e.g. financial and physical) and implicit risks (e.g. reputational). For example, clearly defined lease terms may help agencies manage risks of costs for unexpected building repairs. Further considerations we noted in our 2014 report include the availability of an appropriate partner—and that partners should bring complementary resources, skills, and financial capacities to the relationship—and management of the relationship with that partner. While different funding mechanisms have been used as an alternative to obtaining upfront funding for federal real property projects, changes to the budgetary structure itself—within the bounds of the unified budget that encompasses the full scope of federal programs and transactions—may also help agencies meet their real property needs. Such alternatives may include changing existing or introducing new account structures to fund real property projects. Our previous work identified options for changes within the current discretionary budget structure and options on the mandatory side of the budget. Alternative budgetary structures may change budgetary incentives for agencies and therefore help Congress and agencies make more prudent long-term fiscal decisions. Chairman Barrasso, Ranking Member Carper, and Members of the Committee, this concludes my prepared statement. I am happy to answer any questions you may have at this time. If you or your staff members have any questions concerning this testimony, please contact me at (202) 512-2834 or wised@gao.gov. In addition, contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement. Individuals who made key contributions to this testimony are Mike Armes (Assistant Director), Colin Ashwood, Matt Cook, Joseph Cruz, Keith Cunningham, Alexandra Edwards, Carol Henn, Susan Irving, Hannah Laufe, Diana Maurer, John Mortin, Monique Nasrallah, Matt Voit, Michelle Weathers, and Elizabeth Wood. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.

Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 1.

Answer: In April 2018, Facebook disclosed that a Cambridge University researcher may have improperly shared the data of up to 87 million of its users with a political consulting firm. This disclosure followed other recent incidents involving the misuse of consumers' personal information from the Internet, which is used by about three-quarters of Americans. GAO was asked to review federal oversight of Internet privacy. This report addresses, among other objectives: (1) how FTC and FCC have overseen consumers' Internet privacy and (2) selected stakeholders' views on the strengths and limitations of how Internet privacy currently is overseen and how, if it all, this approach could be enhanced. GAO evaluated FTC and FCC Internet privacy enforcement actions and authorities and interviewed representatives from industry, consumer advocacy groups, and academia; FTC and FCC staff; former FTC and FCC commissioners; and officials from other federal oversight agencies. Industry stakeholders were selected to represent different sectors, and academics were selected because of their expertise in privacy, consumer protection, and regulatory issues. The United States does not have a comprehensive Internet privacy law governing the collection, use, and sale or other disclosure of consumers' personal information. At the federal level, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) currently has the lead in overseeing Internet privacy, using its statutory authority under the FTC Act to protect consumers from unfair and deceptive trade practices. However, to date FTC has not issued regulations for Internet privacy other than those protecting financial privacy and the Internet privacy of children, which were required by law. For FTC Act violations, FTC may promulgate regulations but is required to use procedures that differ from traditional notice-and-comment processes and that FTC staff said add time and complexity. In the last decade, FTC has filed 101 enforcement actions regarding Internet privacy; nearly all actions resulted in settlement agreements requiring action by the companies. In most of these cases, FTC did not levy civil penalties because it lacked such authority for those particular violations. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has had a limited role in overseeing Internet privacy. From 2015 to 2017, FCC asserted jurisdiction over the privacy practices of Internet service providers. In 2016, FCC promulgated privacy rules for Internet service providers that Congress later repealed. FTC resumed privacy oversight of Internet service providers in June 2018. Stakeholders GAO interviewed had varied views on the current Internet privacy enforcement approach and how it could be enhanced. Most Internet industry stakeholders said they favored FTC's current approach—direct enforcement of its unfair and deceptive practices statutory authority, rather than promulgating and enforcing regulations implementing that authority. These stakeholders said that the current approach allows for flexibility and that regulations could hinder innovation. Other stakeholders, including consumer advocates and most former FTC and FCC commissioners GAO interviewed, favored having FTC issue and enforce regulations. Some stakeholders said a new data-protection agency was needed to oversee consumer privacy. Stakeholders identified three main areas in which Internet privacy oversight could be enhanced: Statute . Some stakeholders told GAO that an overarching Internet privacy statute could enhance consumer protection by clearly articulating to consumers, industry, and agencies what behaviors are prohibited. Rulemaking . Some stakeholders said that regulations can provide clarity, enforcement fairness, and flexibility. Officials from two other consumer protection agencies said their rulemaking authority assists in their oversight efforts and works together with enforcement actions. Civil penalty authority. Some stakeholders said FTC's Internet privacy enforcement could be more effective with authority to levy civil penalties for first-time violations of the FTC Act. Comprehensive Internet privacy legislation that establishes specific standards and includes traditional notice-and-comment rulemaking and broader civil penalty authority could enhance the federal government's ability to protect consumer privacy. Congress should consider developing comprehensive legislation on Internet privacy that would enhance consumer protections and provide flexibility to address a rapidly evolving Internet environment. Issues that should be considered include what authorities agencies should have in order to oversee Internet privacy, including appropriate rulemaking authority.