You are given two reports by the government agency.  

Report 1:
T he federal government collects various fees and other charges from businesses and households. Choosing to raise public funds via user fees, as opposed to other means such as taxes, has important administrative and economic consequences. Many fees stem from "business-like activities," in which the government provides a service or benefit in return for payment. For example, many n ational p arks charge entry fees , which then help fund maintenance projects. Some fees are closely tied to regulatory or judicial activities, such as filing or inspection fees, which stem from the federal government's sovereign powers. Other federal fees or charges are intragovernmental transactions that do not involve the public. For example, the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) charges other federal agencies fees to cover the cost of background investigations. For many federal agencies, fees or user charges amount to a minimal portion of budgetary resources. Other regulatory agencies, such as the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO), and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), are wholly or partially funded by user fees and other nontax receipts. User fees from the public accounted for $331 billion in FY2017, about a tenth of total federal receipts ( $3.32 trillion ). Fees and charges generally result from voluntary choices, such as entering a national park. By contrast, the collection of taxes ultimately relies on the government's sovereign power to compel payments. Fees may not be compulsory, but not paying them may make it impossible to carry out many activities legally. For instance, without paying passport application fees and obtaining a passport, people cannot fly to other countries. Nor can businesses issue securities without paying federal filing fees. The statutory basis for each particular fee or user charge varies in specificity and in the degree of discretion granted to the executive branch. For example, authorizing legislation might specify in detail how certain fees are imposed and how proceeds are used. In other cases, federal agencies rely on broader authorities to impose user fees. User fees have several advantages as a means of financing public activities. They are voluntary, they connect the burden of financing activities to those who directly benefit from them, and they can help decentralize decisionmaking by bypassing centralized allocation of resources. At times, proposals to raise fees may encounter less political resistance than proposals to raise an equivalent sum via taxes. On the other hand, the flow of user fees and charges may reflect fluctuations in economic conditions, which may complicate the financing of government operations. Some are also concerned that funding arrangements may bypass regular congressional scrutiny and dilute Congress's power of the purse. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) defines a user fee as a fee assessed to users for goods or services provided by the federal government. User fees generally apply to federal programs or activities that provide special benefits to identifiable recipients above and beyond what is normally available to the public. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) defines the term user charge to include transactions not normally considered fees, such as land or asset sales. OMB's budget preparation documents state that user charges include not only proceeds from selling postage stamps, electricity, and Medicare Part B premiums, but also sales of assets and natural resources, among other categories. The federal government, which operates on a modified cash accounting basis, does not recognize in its budgetary accounts the loss of asset values when it sells assets or natural resources, as a private firm would using typical business accounting methods. For instance, if the government were to sell oil at a price of $60 per barrel that it bought at $120 per barrel, only the current revenues would be reflected in budget accounts. A private firm would normally adjust its balance sheet to reflect a loss. OMB designates whether each account receives collections associated with user charges, and that information is contained within OMB's MAX budget data system. OMB has not released data on those designations. The Budget Appendix that OMB issues annually, while not including information on that designation, does present detailed subaccount-level data that often indicate whether a federal program's budgetary resources rely on fee income. The format of the Budget Appendix, however, makes it an impractical source of data for government-wide research. As far as CRS can determine, a comprehensive and authoritative list of federal fees is not publicly available. Budget and financial documents from OMB and the U.S. Treasury, however, do provide detailed information on offsetting collections and offsetting receipts—the budget categories that typically contain user fees and other charges—as well as information on budgetary accounts. In some cases, account descriptions clearly indicate an association with one or more fees. In other cases, however, whether or not an account receives fees is unclear. For example, an account might be labeled as miscellaneous receipts, or as fines, fees, and penalties. User fees classified as offsetting collections, which go into expenditure accounts, generally can be used without further congressional action. Offsetting collections, as the term suggests, typically count as offsets to spending when accounts are scored to check compliance with various budgetary controls. Scorekeeping is the process of measuring the budgetary effects of legislation. For example, the Budget Control Act of 2011 ( P.L. 112-25 ) imposed caps on specified categories of discretionary budget authority. When evaluating compliance with those caps, scorekeepers (CBO, OMB, and the b udget c ommittees) subtract offsetting collections from budget authority totals. User fees or charges are collected into the U.S. Treasury General Fund or into special fund accounts. Offsetting receipts, which go into receipt accounts, typically require approval through appropriations acts. User fees can be classified as discretionary or mandatory spending, depending on how those fees are authorized. Some payments to the federal government, such as electromagnetic spectrum auction proceeds or offshore continental shelf oil and gas leases that are classified as undistributed offsetting receipts, do not offset spending of any agency, but are recorded as reducing the federal deficit. OMB provides a discussion of budget concepts related to offsetting receipts and offsetting collections, which include the bulk of user fees and charges in terms of dollar amounts, in the President's annual budget submission. More detailed supplementary tables that summarize collections of offsetting receipts and offsetting collections are also provided online. The U.S. Treasury's Bureau of the Fiscal Service issues its annual Combined Statement that reports budget data for all federal agencies at an account level as well as detailed summaries of receipts, including user fees. The Monthly Treasury Statement and a quarterly statement of offsetting receipts provide data on an ongoing basis. As the Treasury's role and responsibilities differ from those of OMB, totals from Treasury sources may not coincide with data issued by OMB due to various budgetary reporting adjustments. GAO has analyzed the administration of various user fees and has set out some principles for the design of those fees . User fees, as noted above, can tie benefits enjoyed by households or firms—such as passports, access to national parks, or approvals to raise investment funds from the public—to payments that can help defray public costs of providing them. An economist's rule of thumb known as the benefit principle, which suggests linking the fiscal burden of publicly provided benefits to those who enjoy those benefits, can promote fairness and efficiency. For example, many would contend that those with the opportunity to travel abroad should shoulder more of the costs of reviewing passport applications and issuing documents than those who do not. Moreover, if fees are set at levels that match the incremental cost of providing benefits, then when an agency is called to expand its work—such as an uptick in demand for passports, park visits, or company registrations—then those fees could fund the needed extra resources. Matching fees to incremental costs, however, is difficult where demand is irregular or unpredictable. OMB guidelines on user fees outline aims similar to the benefit principle, mandating that federal agencies ensure that each service, sale, or use of Government goods or resources provided by an agency to specific recipients be self-sustaining; promote efficient allocation of the Nation's resources by establishing charges for special benefits provided to the recipient that are at least as great as costs to the Government of providing the special benefits; and allow the private sector to compete with the Government without disadvantage in supplying comparable services, resources, or goods where appropriate. OMB mandates that agencies review user fees every other year. OMB also encourages agencies seeking new authority to assess fees to "seek to remove restraints on user charges." In some cases, federal agencies and regulated industries negotiate over user fee levels and the improvements in federal regulatory operations supported in large part by those fees. For instance, pharmaceutical companies negotiate with the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) over fees charged to review drug applications. Over time, the scope of FDA activities supported in part by fees has expanded. Some contend that the FDA's increasing reliance on user fees has tilted the agency's priorities toward industry interests and away from consumer protection responsibilities. One 2005 analysis of the FDA drug review process found that approval times decreased after legislation expanded the agency's reliance on user fees, while it found no statistically significant evidence of a decrease in one proxy measure of drug safety. Federal agencies such as the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) are largely supported from amounts paid by covered industries. The costs and benefits associated with many goods and services mainly involve buyers and sellers. For example, buying a stamp allows a correspondent to mail a letter, which leads the postal service to incur roughly similar costs. Others—at least to a first approximation—are not affected. For other goods, market or market-like transactions may impose costs or convey benefits on third parties. When prices paid by buyers or received by sellers do not reflect spillover costs or benefits to others, economic theory suggests levels of transactions will be inefficient, in the sense that alternative economic arrangements could make all participants—at least potentially—better off. The benefit principle is in some ways similar to the concept of Pigou taxation—that taxing goods linked to negative spillovers, such as pollution, can enhance economic efficiency by diminishing those spillovers. More generally, spillovers are costs borne or benefits enjoyed by one party due to activities of another party where no voluntary exchange or market transaction occurs. Conversely, subsidizing goods or services that provide beneficial spillovers can also increase economic efficiency. For instance, some justify federal tax subsidies to home ownership on the grounds that homeowners generate positive spillovers in their neighborhoods. Charges aimed at limiting negative spillovers are known as Pigou taxes, after the English economist who first articulated the concept. Pigou taxation provides a more narrowly based efficiency rationale for user fees that would limit negative spillovers. Moreover, administering an excise tax imposed on Pigou tax grounds—which would involve a private vendor collecting and remitting tax revenues—differs from user fees and charges collected directly by a government. Nonetheless, the same logic that raising the end-user price of goods linked to negative spillovers can enhance economic efficiency can be applied to the design of user fees. For instance, federal policymakers might choose to charge pharmaceutical companies application fees lower than the full cost of associated approval processes because introducing new drugs onto the market may have wider positive social benefits. The economic suitability of the benefit principle depends on whether the publicly provided benefit has meaningful spillover effects. For example, benefits generated by governments such as national defense or support for basic research are widely shared and thus, arguably, are appropriately supported by general taxation. By contrast, while the broader economy benefits from the ability of firms to raise capital in transparent and competitive markets, the chief beneficiary of having a security offering approved is the issuing firm. Similarly, a family visiting a federal park presumably benefits more than another family that stayed at home. Financing more of park maintenance through general taxation would thus involve an implicit subsidy from nonusers to users, something that reliance on user fees would mitigate. In other cases, the linkage between fees and benefits is not apparent. For example, a 2009 law ( Travel Promotion Act of 2009 , TPA; P.L. 111-145 ) imposed a $10 fee on most international air travelers from visa-waiver countries to fund tourism marketing initiatives . An exact match between the level of user fees and publicly provided benefits may be hard or impossible to determine in many situations. While public corporations operating on a largely commercial basis, such as the Tennessee Valley Authority, may set prices and fees much as a private firm would, many of the federal government's activities are within the public sector because past policymakers considered them to be closely associated with inherently governmental functions—such as providing security—or as services that the private sector would have had trouble providing, such as basic research. The U.S. Postal Service sets rates to cover nearly all of its costs according to a 2006 statutory framework . Subsidized rates for certain classes of mail users, such as the blind, reflect adaptation of pricing schemes to broader social priorities. The proper boundaries between public, private, and nonprofit sectors, of course, is an ongoing concern of policymakers. In many cases, it is difficult to design fees, charges, or taxes that directly influence activities generating negative spillovers. For instance, cars and trucks generate air pollution as well as wear and tear on roadways. Excise taxes on gasoline and other fuels—if set at levels that approximate the costs of pollution and road wear—can motivate drivers to use roads less often when the total costs of driving, including pollution, road wear, and other costs, exceed the benefits of driving. Thus, excise taxes can be a way of using the price mechanism to induce individuals to make decisions that lead to more economically efficient outcomes. Setting excise taxes at levels that reflect all costs to third parties may involve complex estimates. For instance, while higher fuel usage implies greater use of roads and more production of air pollutants, several other factors complicate that linkage. Heavier vehicles may cause disproportionate damage to roads. Vehicles vary widely in fuel efficiency and in the volume of pollutants generated. In addition, driving also imposes congestion costs on other drivers, and those costs vary by location and time of day. One recent analysis estimated that fuel excise taxes addressed less than a third of the air-pollution-related efficiency losses. While excise taxes are a public finance instrument that is distinct from user fees and charges, similar complications may be encountered. In some cases, adopting new fiscal instruments—such as using road charges or tolls—may prove more effective tools in increasing efficiency. In the case of transportation policy, increased economic efficiency, depending on how consumers and policymakers respond, might manifest itself in some combination of higher after-tax incomes, greater provision of publicly provided goods, cleaner air, and less-congested highways. Changes in the design of some user fees or charges might also yield analogous efficiency improvements. Some observers have raised concerns that federal agencies that rely more heavily on user fees may put greater weight on the interests of those paying fees rather than the broader public interest. For instance, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office charges application and examination fees to those seeking to obtain a patent. Certainly, the applicant would be a central beneficiary of a patent, if granted, although many others—including other inventors, business competitors, and consumers—might also be significantly harmed or benefited. Some contend that the Patent Office's reliance on fees motivates it to approve invalid patents . Tying patent fees narrowly to the benefits obtained by the applicant, while overlooking wider spillover effects, might then result in poor decisions. Of course, nonfinancial policy instruments, such as applicable laws, regulations, or congressional oversight, may affect outcomes more directly. Administrative concerns may also play a role. In some cases, where the costs of collecting fees are high relative to the costs of providing public services, imposing user fees may be a suboptimal choice of funding. For instance, federal courts collect more in PACER fees (which provide access to court documents ) than is needed to maintain the underlying computer system , with excess fees being earmarked for other court improvements. Some argue that funding that system and other court improvements with general revenues would allow broader access to court filings and related public documents, which one proposal ( H.R. 6714 introduced in the 115 th Congress ) would have implemented. Charging access fees above incremental costs—which for electronic documents may be minimal—can limit access to public information. Eliminating PACER user fees , however, may require Congress to shift that fiscal burden elsewhere. Other policy concerns also may play a role. Ability to pay among households varies widely; a national park entrance fee that one family regarded as trivial might deter another family. Policymakers may also wish to express preferences for identifiable groups, such as the elderly, children, or veterans. The classification of fees, charges, taxes, and even negative loan subsidy amounts hinges on budget concepts outlined above along with scorekeeping rules and precedents. In some cases, the distinctions made to categorize a given receipt might seem arbitrary to some. For example, the Travel Promotion Act fees imposed on most international air travelers convey n o special benefit on them, but are not categorized a s tax es . Refundable biofuel tax credits are counted as negative taxes in budget documents rather than as subsidy outlays. Those distinctions, however, can affect the tax treatment of those receipts. For instance, a firm can generally deduct an excise tax from its gross revenues, but typically cannot deduct a fee. Some governments have instituted user fees to fill shortfalls in tax revenues. The economic burden of higher fees or charges might be less obvious and therefore subject to less resistance than broad-based taxes. For example, policymakers in several states have sought to avoid increases in general taxes by increasing fee revenues. That strategy may have two downsides. First, more narrowly focused fees set at higher levels could cause greater economic distortions than smaller taxes applied to a broader base. Second, more narrowly based fees might be less stable in economic downturns. To the extent that fees diverge from the incremental costs of publicly provided services, sudden fiscal adjustments might be required. If benefits from federal operations are distributed narrowly enough to justify financing them via user fees or charges, one might ask whether those activities should be carried out by the private sector. State and local governments and the federal government have privatized many services previously provided by government. Foreign governments have also privatized provision of goods and services once delivered by the public sector. Some activities, however, may involve inherently governmental responsibilities that would be difficult to devolve to the private sector. A 1997 GAO report noted that rigorous evaluations of cost savings of privatization initiatives at the state and local government level were not common. GAO also noted that privatization increased the need for oversight and evaluation, although some local officials deemed that the "weakest link" in privatization initiatives. Others note that while privatization may yield efficiency gains, it may also lead to policy or operational failure. Conflicts between executive branch agencies, which often have sought greater flexibility to use funds to respond to public priorities as they see them, and Congress, which has sought to defend its fiscal prerogatives and ability to set federal policy priorities, are long-standing. In 1849, Congress sought to bolster its powers of the purse by passing the Miscellaneous Receipts Act , which required all government revenues, aside from postal sales, to be deposited into the U.S. Treasury "at as early a day as practicable, without any abatement or deduction on account of salary, fees, costs, charges, expenses, or claim of any description whatever…" Over time, Congress set out exceptions to the modern version of the Miscellaneous Receipts Act that let agencies charge user fees, accept gifts, and collect and retain fines and penalties within specified limits or as detailed in appropriations laws. Some legislative proposals, such as H.R. 850 (115 th Congress) , would eliminate most exceptions and require most fees and charges to be deposited in the U.S. Treasury General Fund. Congress could fund agencies and activities directly through annual appropriations. Funding through lump-sum appropriations, as opposed to via user fees, however, might change incentives facing decisionmakers and could affect federal operations and programmatic outcomes. Congress could constrain agency discretion by requiring more user fee proceeds be either subject to annual appropriations or deposited in the U.S. Treasury General Fund, although that may limit agencies' capacity to respond to new public demands and other changing conditions, as the Government Accountability Office (GAO) has noted . Some inspectors general and congressional committees have also called for tighter, more efficient, and more consistent financial management of user fee funds. During the mid-1980s, Congress, with GAO support, conducted a comprehensive review of so-called "backdoor spending"—an informal term for budget authority provided in laws other than appropriations acts—including spending supported by user fees, which was updated in 1996 . A narrower follow-up in 2017 covering five agencies concluded that "all entities GAO examined have policies and procedures to manage and report on their permanent funding authorities," but that "some, however, could improve practices to manage funds and report information that facilitates oversight." Sweeping changes to the budgetary treatment of user fees, however, could add new pressures on the congressional appropriations process. Proposals to require that most fees be collected into the Treasury General Fund and that activities previously supported by those fees be funded by annual appropriations could create new demands on appropriations committees. Such proposals could also affect the division of responsibilities among authorizing committees and appropriations committees. Statutory texts governing many fees, including those noted above, have evolved over many years and involve substantive policy decisions, often related to industry or programmatic concerns. Congress may also enhance its oversight of agencies reliant on user fees by requiring more timely and detailed financial reports as well as more precise and systematic explanations of linkages between those fees and associated programs. OMB and Treasury issue extensive information on user fees and charges. Nonetheless, the format and level of detail of published data make it difficult to address some government-wide policy questions regarding user fees and charges. Congress could modify laws governing the President's budget submission (31 U.S.C. 1105) to require OMB to release data that it collects on which budget accounts receive material amounts of user fee and user charge revenues. That could allow Congress to track and analyze user fees and charges more easily. In particular, it would also provide a means to distinguish discretionary and mandatory fees and charges, which could be useful in understanding the effects or constraints imposed by budget enforcement measures. That might provide Congress with a clearer view of its fiscal options when considering budgetary measures. Mandating that OMB or other agencies provide more data would probably require additional budgetary resources to cover costs of new personnel and capabilities. Congress can promote economic efficiency and an equitable sharing of public burdens by choosing appropriate means of financing federal operations. User fees and charges, as noted above, can help tie the costs of supporting specific federal operations with those who benefit from them. Even if closely regulated industries may find federal requirements, inspections, or approval processes burdensome, they also presumably benefit from the increased demand for their products that carry the imprimatur of explicit or implicit federal approval. Federal regulation and inspection operations, however, also serve broader interests of consumers, taxpayers, and related industries. To the extent that inherently governmental responsibilities motivate federal operations, the argument for using general revenues may be stronger. If benefits of federal actions are more narrowly distributed, the case for financing operations with user fees or charges may become stronger. Of course, the structure and administration of federal inspection and regulation plays a central role in enhancing efficiency and minimizing burdens borne relative to benefits enjoyed.

 

 Report 2:
The U.S. Constitution does not clearly specify how military bases should be managed. Article II, Section 2, appoints the President as the commander-in-chief, with the implied power to deploy, and redeploy, the armed forces as necessary for national defense. In common practice, this has included the authority to create and close military installations needed to accommodate and train personnel under the President's command. However, Article I, Section 8, charges Congress with the responsibility to raise armies, maintain a Navy, and regulate the militia. Through annual authorization and appropriation legislation, Congress legislates policy for managing DOD real property assets and funds the construction, maintenance, operation, and disposal of military infrastructure. Throughout most of American history, the President has exercised broad, relatively unchallenged authority for opening, closing, or realigning military installations. Congress largely deferred to the Executive branch primarily because the President, as commander-in-chief, is empowered with the responsibility of deploying military forces. Prompted by large-scale closures of World War II era infrastructure during the 1960s and 1970s, Congress enacted legislation in 1977 that effectively limited the Executive branch's ability to close or realign major military installations. The new statute, later codified as 10 U.S.C. 2687 (Section 612 of the Military Construction Authorization Act of 1978, P.L. 95-82 ), generally required DOD to conduct comprehensive and lengthy assessments of major basing decisions as part of a congressional report-and-wait process. These assessments could be challenged in court on environmental grounds or on questions related to their sufficiency, further lengthening delays. The new legislation effectively halted DOD's ability to close or realign domestic bases of significant size. In the decade that followed the passage of 10 U.S.C. 2687, congressional pressure grew to accommodate DOD basing priorities. By 1988, ongoing negotiations between the Secretary of Defense and the House and Senate Armed Service Committees led to new legislation ( P.L. 100-526 ) that authorized a limited number of base closures based on the oversight of an independent panel. Though later modified, the effort marked the beginning of the first Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process, which was intended to insulate base closings from considerations such as favoritism or other political interference. Widely considered a success, the 1988 BRAC legislation was taken up again and modified in succeeding BRAC rounds; first in 1991, 1993, and 1995; and again in 2005. The modern BRAC process refers to a temporary authority that amends the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 ( P.L. 101-510 ), hereinafter referred to as the Base Closure Act , and features a framework of elements that entrusts an independent commission with certifying closure and realignment recommendations made by the Secretary of Defense. In general, the process has required the Secretary to submit a list of military installations recommended for closure or realignment to an independent, bipartisan BRAC commission. After analyzing the Secretary's recommendations, the commission may accept, reject, or modify the list. Upon completing its review, the commission forwards its final findings and recommendations to the President. Upon acceptance of commission's recommendations, the President then submits them to Congress. If the President does not submit the recommendations to Congress within the timeframe required under the Base Closure Act, the BRAC process is terminated. Upon receipt of the report from the President, Congress has the opportunity to disapprove of the recommendations in toto through the enactment of a joint resolution. The hallmarks of this framework include establishment of an independent commission whose members are appointed by the President, in consultation with congressional leadership (and the advice and consent of the Senate); reliance on objective and uniform criteria for evaluating basing recommendations; GAO review and certification of DOD data; deliberations that include open hearings, solicitation of feedback, installation visits, and data available for public review; requirement that the commission's final list of closure and realignment actions be accepted or rejected in its entirety; and presidential and congressional off-ramps that would terminate the BRAC process when certain conditions are not met. The timeline to complete an entire BRAC round has varied; however, the most recent one conducted in 2005 took approximately 10 years, from authorization to completion (end of the six-year BRAC implementation period). Key milestones of a typical BRAC timeline include DOD force structure plan, infrastructure inventory, and analysis of options (up to four years); nomination and confirmation of BRAC commissioners; DOD submission of BRAC recommendations (and associated reports) to the commission; commission deliberations (typically four months); final report sent to the President for approval; 45-day deadline for Congress to reject recommendations in their entirety (Joint Resolution of Disapproval) or allow implementation to begin; DOD implementation (two years to begin; six years to complete); and DOD disposal of real property (indeterminate). BRAC is often characterized as a cost efficiency measure that enables DOD to more effectively manage its real property assets by allowing it to shed excess infrastructure, but historically, potential costs and savings have been a consideration that have ranked below military value. No BRAC round has established cost savings targets, floors, or ceilings. During BRAC rounds in 1991, 1993, and 1995, Congress required the Secretary of Defense to develop and report a set of objective selection criteria that would be used for identifying bases for closure and realignment. For the 2005 round, Congress amended the BRAC statute to require the Secretary to regard military value (defined below) as the primary consideration. Other factors, such as potential costs and savings, were explicitly categorized as lower priority. Because the amended legislative language reflected longstanding DOD policy, the 2005 BRAC criteria appear almost identical when compared with previous versions, with additional language added for emphasis or included for explanatory examples. The excerpt below indicates the 2005 BRAC selection criteria. Emphasized text (in italics) represents new language not included as part of the 1995 criteria. SEC. 2913. SELECTION CRITERIA FOR 2005 ROUND. (a) FINAL SELECTION CRITERIA.—The final criteria to be used by the Secretary in making recommendations for the closure or realignment of military installations inside the United States under this part in 2005 shall be the military value and other criteria specified in subsections (b) and (c). (b) MILITARY VALUE CRITERIA.—The military value criteria are as follows: (1) The current and future mission capabilities and the impact on operational readiness of the total force of the Department of Defense, including the impact on joint warfighting, training, and readiness. (2) The availability and condition of land, facilities, and associated airspace (including training areas suitable for maneuver by ground, naval, or air forces throughout a diversity of climate and terrain areas and staging areas for the use of the Armed Forces in homeland defense missions) at both existing and potential receiving locations. (3) The ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization, surge, and future total force requirements at both existing and potential receiving locations to support operations and training. (4) The cost of operations and the manpower implications. (c). OTHER CRITERIA.—The other criteria that the Secretary shall use in making recommendations for the closure or realignment of military installations inside the United States under this part in 2005 are as follows: (1) The extent and timing of potential costs and savings, including the number of years, beginning with the date of completion of the closure or realignment, for the savings to exceed the costs. (2) The economic impact on existing communities in the vicinity of military installations. (3) The ability of the infrastructure of both the existing and potential receiving communities to support forces, missions, and personnel. (4) The environmental impact , including the impact of costs related to potential environ mental restoration, waste management, and environmental compliance activities. The transfer and disposal of DOD real property made available following the implementation of a BRAC round is a complex process that may extend for years beyond the initial six-year implementation window. Disposal may be delayed or otherwise affected by the participation of local and state communities and the degree to which environmental remediation by federal authorities is necessary. The graph below shows the total acreage from previous BRAC rounds yet to be disposed. The Base Closure Act authorizes a variety of conveyance mechanisms not otherwise available for the transfer and disposal of federal property, a process typically performed by the General Services Administration (GSA). Under a BRAC, conveyance authority is delegated from GSA, through the Secretary of Defense to the various military departments, which receive special approval to supersede GSA regulations with BRAC specific regulations. The primary difference between the routine disposal of federal property and real property conveyed under a BRAC is the role of local communities. Under normal (non-BRAC) circumstances, the General Services Administration (GSA) is directly responsible for disposing of any surplus federal real property, which includes defense property. A military department in possession would, for example, declare property as excess to its needs and turn over the administration of a site to the GSA. The GSA would then follow a number of consecutive steps for disposal of federal property laid out in statute. It would first offer the excess property to other federal agencies. If none expressed an interest, the excess property would be declared surplus . The GSA would then offer the surplus property to state or local governments and non-profits that might use it for a public benefit ( public benefit conveyance) , such as a homeless shelter or medical center. Finally, if the property has neither been transferred nor conveyed in the previous steps, the surplus property would be offered for sale to the public. Under a BRAC, local communities can significantly affect the BRAC property transfer and disposal decisions, which are managed by the Secretary of the responsible military department. Once approved for closure, communities around an installation typically organize a Local Redevelopment Authority (LRA) for the purpose of creating and executing a redevelopment plan for the property. While the plan is not binding on DOD, the Department has been statutorily directed to give the plan considerable weight. DOD makes economic development grants and technical support available through its Office of Economic Adjustment (OEA) to assist LRAs with the process. In recent BRAC rounds, Congress has authorized a special transfer authority that has permitted DOD to transfer title to property at less than fair market value, or even at no cost, if the LRA agrees to certain conditions designed to create employment at the former defense facility. This has been referred to as an Economic Development Conveyance (EDC). DOD has asserted that savings generated from BRAC are generally the result of avoiding the cost of retaining and operating unneeded infrastructure, with upfront costs eventually offset by annual savings. Between FY2012 and FY2018, the Department consistently argued for a new BRAC, asserting that "absent another BRAC round, the Department will continue to operate some of its installations sub-optimally as other efficiency measures, changing force structure, and technology reduce the number of missions and personnel." Emphasizing the potential cost savings, DOD has suggested a new "efficiency-focused BRAC" could save the Department billions of dollars annually: "Savings from BRAC rounds are real and substantial. The last five BRAC rounds are collectively saving the Department $12B annually. A new efficiency-focused BRAC could save the Department an additional ~$2B annually (based on the '93/'95 rounds)." In its ongoing series of BRAC-related reports, the GAO has noted the unreliability of DOD cost savings estimates. In 2013, GAO concluded that, though the Department had achieved annual recurring savings as the result of the 2005 round, visibility into the outcome has been limited due to missing and inconsistent recordkeeping. Similar studies have raised questions about the data DOD has used to predict and monitor BRAC effectiveness, long-term savings, and outcomes. For example "... the services did not develop baseline operating costs before implementing the BRAC recommendations, which would have enabled it to determine whether savings were achieved." "... We found that DOD's process for providing the BRAC commission with cost and savings estimates was hindered by underestimating recommendation-specific requirements and that DOD did not fully anticipate information technology requirements for many of the recommendations." "The department cannot provide documentation to show to what extent it reduced plant replacement value or vacated leased space as it reported in May 2005 that it was intended to do.... In addition, DOD bundled multiple closures ... thus limiting visibility into the estimated costs and savings for individual closures and realignments." "... DOD has not reported to Congress how the cleanup of emerging contaminants, especially certain perfluorinated compounds, at installations closed under BRAC will significantly increase the estimated (BRAC) cleanup costs." "... We found that OSD (Office of the Secretary of Defense) did not have a fully developed method for accurately collecting information on costs, savings, and efficiencies achieved specifically from joint basing, and that OSD had not developed a plan to guide joint bases in achieving cost savings and efficiencies...." "... DOD has not committed to take action on some of our recommendations related to implementing any future BRAC rounds, such as improving DOD's ability to estimate potential liabilities, and savings to achieve desired outcomes." In its final report to the President, the 2005 BRAC commission noted DOD's initial estimate of savings had been "vastly overestimated," and suggested that the Department had claimed savings that were "not truly savings in the commonly understood sense of the term." Reflecting on the quality of cost estimates and savings associated with 2005 BRAC round, Anthony Principi, Chairman of the 2005 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission, has suggested opportunities exist for the DOD to improve its analysis by adopting more consistent accounting practices and inclusive metrics: To start, DoD has to do a better job estimating the true cost of any closure or realignment.... Second, the cost of base realignment actions (COBRA) accounting procedure, used by DoD as a basis of comparison among scenarios, should include cost estimates for environmental restoration not just "clean to current use" standards. In addition, COBRA or some other cost evaluation process should also include transportation and infrastructure costs and burden sharing with the federal government.... In addition to refining DOD accounting metrics, some observers have suggested congressional visibility into BRAC cost and long-term effectiveness could be improved by amending the process to require the Department to disclose how closure and realignment recommendations meet expected cost saving and reduced infrastructure targets. A BRAC process is the chief means by which DOD disposes of excess infrastructure. Each year between 2013 and 2017, the Department requested a new BRAC round as a means of realizing greater efficiency and reducing excess infrastructure. It has also attempted to allay concerns related to the 2005 BRAC experience - marked by unexpectedly high costs and complexity - by emphasizing cost savings and efficiencies rather than force transformation. In April 2016, DOD submitted to the House Armed Services Committee an I nfrastructure C apacity R eport (interim version) that assessed 22% of the Department's base infrastructure excess to its needs. The methodology used in the report—required by Section 2815 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY2016 (P.L. 114-92)—remained consistent with excess capacity reports submitted prior to the 1998 and 2005 BRAC rounds round. The Department stated its purpose for obtaining "a sense of excess and whether excess remains after various changes, such as (prior) BRAC or force structure reductions." A final infrastructure capacity report, submitted to Congress in October 2017, modified the original excess capacity estimate to 19%. The Department concluded its infrastructure capacity analysis by arguing it had established sufficient justification for a new BRAC round, a process that would allow it to more effectively dispose of excess infrastructure and manage remaining real property assets. The Department believes we have addressed all congressional concerns.... The time to authorize another BRAC round is now. The BRAC process requires considerable time to analyze and develop recommendations, have those recommendations reviewed by the independent BRAC Commission, and then implemented over a six-year period of time. The longer authorization is delayed, the longer the Department will be forced to expend valuable resources on unnecessary facilities instead of weapons systems, readiness, and other national security priorities. Critics of the Department's methodology for estimating excess infrastructure have asserted it includes unreasonable research assumptions and metrics, undermining the basis for DOD's conclusion. For example, observers have cited the report's reliance on Cold War baseline values to establish excess capacity, inconsistent application of existing metrics for measuring capacity shortfalls, and overly broad categorization schemes. Some observers have also cited longstanding data management challenges that continue to affect the Department's ability to measure current excess facility inventory and utilization rates. Others have noted the dearth of data that support DOD claims related to BRAC effectiveness and the disposal of excess property. During a news briefing on the FY2019 defense budget, Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller) David L. Norquist noted that the Department had declined to propose a BRAC round that year, stating that it would work instead to focus on internal reforms while preparing for a financial audit. And so, I think we're looking at doing two things, going forward. One is, working with Congress to find common areas where we can make reforms and changes that don't create the same types of obstacles. The other is that we are undergoing a financial-statement audit that includes a look at property, and assets and investments and improving the accuracy of the data behind it. And as a view of being able to take advantage of the data coming out of that process, to help us make better decision-making on real property. But, yes, you are correct, there is not (a) request for another BRAC round in this budget. In testimony before the Senate Appropriations Committee Subcommittee on Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies, Lucian Niemeyer, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Energy, Installations and Environment, indicated DOD would be working in FY2019 to improve its excess infrastructure accounting processes and demolish unneeded infrastructure: In lieu of another request for legislation in FY 2019 to authorize an additional Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) round, we will review our facilities, to include facility usage optimization review to ensure we have a better accounting of excess infrastructure. We also have proposed for FY 2019 increased efforts to demolish unneeded or obsolete facilities over the course of this year. The 2005 BRAC round was unique among all previous rounds due to its relative size, scope and complexity. (See Figure 2 for comparison of major and minor BRAC actions between rounds.) Colloquially called "the mother of all BRACs," the objectives of the 2005 round were primarily about transforming military infrastructure; however, unanticipated expenses have played a role in shaping subsequent congressional views of the BRAC process and, according to many observers, dampened support for consideration of a new round. Savings estimates submitted during the 2005 round were overvalued by as much as 67%, according to GAO analysis, with one-time implementation costs rising from $21 to $35.1 billion. GAO found that the $14.1 billion increase was due primarily to the rising cost of new construction associated with subsidiary projects not included in the original BRAC implementation plan. Referring to the implementation of the 2005 round, Assistant Secretary Niemeyer, noted, "BRAC legislation effectively limited the ability of Congress to oversee BRAC implementation costs and the Department made deliberate decisions to use BRAC implementation as a recapitalization tool, expanding facility requirements and associated costs." To address congressional concerns about spiraling costs in new BRAC rounds, DOD has periodically proposed legislative language that would constrain the Secretary's ability to recommend BRAC actions that would not yield savings within 20 years and to emphasize recommendations that would yield net savings within five years. Each year, Congress appropriates funding for the Department of Defense Base Closure Account, part of the Military Construction Defense-Wide appropriation. With no BRAC round authorized or underway, the primary purpose of continuing BRAC appropriations is to fund the environmental cleanup and caretaker functions at bases that were closed under prior rounds (see Figure 3 ). In FY2020, the Trump Administration has requested $278.5 million for BRAC continuing environmental and caretaker costs, with $158.3 million provided for the Navy (57%), $66.1 million for the Army (24%), and $54 million for the Air Force (19%). The total request represents a $63 million decrease (19%) from FY2019 enacted levels ($342 million). In FY2018, Congress urged DOD to accelerate environmental remediation at BRAC sites. In report language, appropriators stated that additional funds were provided to speed environmental remediation at installations closed under previous rounds. Accelerated cleanup.—The agreement includes additional funding to accelerate environmental remediation at installations closed during previous Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) rounds. Priority should be given to those sites with newly identified radiological cleanup cost. There are many factors hindering the cleanup of BRAC sites. However, strategic investments can lead to quicker clean-ups and faster turnover of DOD property to the local community. Therefore, the Department is directed to submit to the congressional defense committees a spend plan for the additional BRAC funds not later than 30 days after enactment of this Act. Congressional authorizers and appropriators have regularly inserted language into annual defense legislation that would disallow the use of funds for the purpose of a new BRAC round. In FY2019, for example, though DOD did not propose a BRAC, authorizers inserted language into the annual NDAA that prohibited a new round: SEC. 2703. Prohibition on Conducting Additional Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Round. Nothing in this Act shall be construed to authorize an additional Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) round. A similar provision was included in the final FY2019 defense appropriations bill: SEC. 8122. None of the funds made available by this Act may be used to propose, plan for, or execute a new or additional Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) round. In 2017, Members in both chambers proposed legislation that would have authorized a new round of base closures. Though no legislation for a full BRAC was enacted, a provision included the following year in the final FY2019 NDAA. Under the new scenario described by Section 2702 of the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 ( H.R. 5515 , P.L. 115-232 ), BRAC-like actions are authorized within the confines of a state based on the recommendation of the governor and support of local communities affected by the proposed actions. Unlike a traditional BRAC process, the new authorities would forgo the creation of an independent review panel. The Secretary of Defense is, instead, required to deliver a report of planned BRAC actions to congressional defense committees and, following a 90-day waiting period, begin implementation. For details, please refer to "In-State BRAC" in Appendix A of this report. The BRAC related legislative proposals above illustrate the flexibility Congress has for amending or adopting the template of past BRAC processes that DOD has called "the only fair, objective, and comprehensive process to achieve these goals (eliminating excess infrastructure)." Congress may consider whether future legislative proposals for base closures and realignments will adopt the lessons learned from previous rounds while retaining the basic framework, or fundamentally alter the process. No BRAC legislation has so far been proposed in the 116 th Congress. Additionally, the Department has asserted that it does not intend to use the new BRAC-like authorities authorized by Section 2702 of the FY2019 NDAA. To date, DOD has received no state requests under this authority. Appendix A. Legislative References BRAC Authorizing Legislation 1988 Round The Defense Authorization Amendments and Base Closure and Realignment Act, enacted October 24, 1988 (P.L.100-526) 1991, 1993, 1995 Rounds National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991, enacted November 5, 1990 (P.L. 107-107, Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, Title XXIX) 2005 Round National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, ( P.L. 101-510 ; amended the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 ( P.L. 101-510 ) 10 U.S.C. 2687, 10 U.S.C. 993 Summary In 1977, Congress enacted 10 U.S.C. 2687, the first statutory restriction on the President's ability to close or realign military installations. Amended over the years, the statute has retained its essential elements, establishing procedures the Secretary of Defense must follow before closing a military installation where a threshold number (currently 300) of civilian personnel are authorized to be employed, or realigning an installation that involves a reduction by more than 50% (or 1,000) of civilian workers. A more recent statute, 10 U.S.C. 993, introduced additional reporting requirements that would restrict the Secretary's ability to realign installations if the plan would affect more than 1,000 assigned members of the Armed Forces. In-State BRAC Section 2702 of the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 ( H.R. 5515 , P.L. 115-232 ) authorizes new in-state BRAC authorities. Text of the provision is included below in its entirety. SEC. 2702. ADDITIONAL AUTHORITY TO REALIGN OR CLOSE CERTAIN MILITARY INSTALLATIONS. (a) Authorization.—Notwithstanding sections 993 or 2687 of title 10, United States Code, and subject to subsection (d), the Secretary of Defense may take such actions as may be necessary to carry out the realignment or closure of a military installation in a State during a fiscal year if— (1) the military installation is the subject of a notice which is described in subsection (b); and (2) the Secretary includes the military installation in the report submitted under paragraph (2) of subsection (c) with respect to the fiscal year. (b) Notice From Governor of State.—A notice described in this subsection is a notice received by the Secretary of Defense from the Governor of a State (or, in the case of the District of Columbia, the Mayor of the District of Columbia) in which the Governor recommends that the Secretary carry out the realignment or closure of a military installation located in the State, and which includes each of the following elements: (1) A specific description of the military installation, or a specific description of the relevant real and personal property. (2) Statements of support for the realignment or closure from units of local government in which the installation is located. (3) A detailed plan for the reuse or redevelopment of the real and personal property of the installation, together with a description of the local redevelopment authority which will be responsible for the implementation of the plan. (c) Response to Notice.— (1) Mandatory response to governor and congress.—Not later than 1 year after receiving a notice from the Governor of a State (or, in the case of the District of Columbia, from the Mayor of the District of Columbia), the Secretary of Defense shall submit a response to the notice to the Governor and the congressional defense committees indicating whether or not the Secretary accepts the recommendation for the realignment or closure of a military installation which is the subject of the notice. (2) Acceptance of recommendation.—If the Secretary of Defense determines that it is in the interests of the United States to accept the recommendation for the realignment or closure of a military installation which is the subject of a notice received under subsection (b) and intends to carry out the realignment or closure of the installation pursuant to the authority of this section during a fiscal year, at the time the budget is submitted under section 1105(a) of title 31, United States Code, for the fiscal year, the Secretary shall submit a report to the congressional defense committees which includes the following: (A) The identification of each military installation for which the Secretary intends to carry out a realignment or closure pursuant to the authority of this section during the fiscal year, together with the reasons the Secretary of Defense believes that it is in the interest of the United States to accept the recommendation of the Governor of the State involved for the realignment or closure of the installation. (B) For each military installation identified under subparagraph (A), a master plan describing the required scope of work, cost, and timing for all facility actions needed to carry out the realignment or closure, including the construction of new facilities and the repair or renovation of existing facilities. (C) For each military installation identified under subparagraph (A), a certification that, not later than the end of the fifth fiscal year after the completion of the realignment or closure, the savings resulting from the realignment or closure will exceed the costs of carrying out the realignment or closure, together with an estimate of the annual recurring savings that would be achieved by the realignment or closure of the installation and the timeframe required for the financial savings to exceed the costs of carrying out the realignment or closure. (d) Limitations.— (1) Timing.—The Secretary may not initiate the realignment or closure of a military installation pursuant to the authority of this section until the expiration of the 90-day period beginning on the date the Secretary submits the report under paragraph (2) of subsection (c). (2) Total costs.—Subject to appropriations, the aggregate cost to the government in carrying out the realignment or closure of military installations pursuant to the authority of this section for all fiscal years may not exceed $2,000,000,000. In determining the cost to the government for purposes of this section, there shall be included the costs of planning and design, military construction, operations and maintenance, environmental restoration, information technology, termination of public-private contracts, guarantees, and other factors contributing to the cost of carrying out the realignment or closure, as determined by the Secretary. (e) Process for Implementation.—The implementation of the realignment or closure of a military installation pursuant to the authority of this section shall be carried out in accordance with section 2905 of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 (title XXIX of P.L. 101-510 ; 10 U.S.C. 2687 note) in the same manner as the implementation of a realignment or closure of a military installation pursuant to the authority of such Act. (f) State Defined.—In this section, the term ``State'' means each of the several States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, American Samoa, Guam, the United States Virgin Islands, and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands. (g) Termination of Authority.—The authority of the Secretary to carry out a realignment or closure pursuant to this section shall terminate at the end of fiscal year 2029. Appendix B. BRAC Acreage Disposal Status, By State

Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 1.

Answer: The federal government collects various fees from businesses and households. Choosing to raise public funds via user fees, as opposed to other means such as taxes, has important administrative and economic consequences. Many fees stem from "business-like activities," in which the government provides a service or benefit in return for payment. For example, many national parks charge entry fees, which then help fund maintenance projects. Such fees and charges that result from voluntary choices, such as entering a national park, are distinguished from taxes—which stem from the government's sovereign power to compel payments. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) defines a user fee as a "fee assessed to users for goods or services provided by the federal government. User fees generally apply to federal programs or activities that provide special benefits to identifiable recipients above and beyond what is normally available to the public." User fees and charges have several advantages as a means of financing public activities. They are voluntary, they connect the burden of financing activities to those who directly benefit from them, and can help decentralize decisionmaking by bypassing centralized allocation of resources. Some have expressed concerns that user fee arrangements may bypass regular congressional scrutiny and dilute Congress's power of the purse. Collections of fees and charges may also be more sensitive to economic fluctuations, which could complicate financing of programs dependent on those revenue streams. Many user fees or charges are classified as offsetting collections, which are deposited into expenditure accounts. Offsetting collections can be used to offset agency spending and typically require no further congressional approval to use. Other fees and charges are classified as offsetting receipts, which are collected into revenue accounts and typically require congressional authorization to be spent. User fees and charges can be classified as discretionary or mandatory spending, depending on how they are legally authorized. The levels and administration of some fees are specified in detailed statutory text, while other fees are created under broader agency authorities. Certain agencies, such as the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), have increased their reliance on user fees in past decades. Some critics have raised concerns that increased reliance on user fees could shift incentives facing those agencies. Some legislative proposals, such as H.R. 850 introduced in the 115th Congress, would limit or eliminate most exceptions and require most fees and charges to be deposited in the U.S. Treasury General Fund. Congress could fund agencies and activities now funded in whole or in part via user fees directly through the annual appropriations process. Such proposals would mark a departure from past practice. Statutory text governing many fees has evolved over many years and involves substantive policy decisions, often related to the industry or programmatic concerns. A general change in funding from user fees and charges to annual appropriations would likely shift the division of responsibilities between authorizing committees and appropriations committees. Congress may also enhance its oversight of agencies reliant on user fees by requiring more timely and detailed financial reports as well as more precise and systematic explanations of linkages between those fees and associated programs. Congress could also ask for greater transparency in fiscal data. While the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the U.S. Treasury Bureau of the Fiscal Service provide extensive data on user fees and charges, it is difficult to conduct governmentwide analyses using publicly available sources. Congress could mandate more detailed and more easily accessed data on user fees and charges. Additional funding may be needed to develop the capacity to issue those data.