You are given two reports by the government agency.  

Report 1:
With the passage of the NDAA in December 2016, PLCY is to be led by an Under Secretary for Strategy, Policy, and Plans, who is appointed by the President with advice and consent of the Senate. The Under Secretary is to report directly to the Secretary of Homeland Security. Prior to the NDAA, the office was headed by an assistant secretary. Since the passage of the act, the undersecretary position has been vacant, and as of June 5, 2018, the President had not nominated an individual to fill the position. According to PLCY officials, elevating the head of the office to an undersecretary was important because it equalizes PLCY with other DHS management offices and DHS headquarters components. The NDAA further authorizes, but does not require, the Secretary to establish a position of deputy undersecretary within PLCY. If the position is established, the NDAA provides that the Secretary may appoint a career employee to the position (i.e., not a political appointee). In March 2018, the Secretary named a Deputy Under Secretary, who has been performing the duties of the Deputy Under Secretary and the Under Secretary since then. As shown in figure 1, PLCY is divided into five sub- offices, each with a different focus area. As of June 5, 2018, the top position in these sub-offices was an assistant secretary and two of the five positions were vacant. As of June 5, 2018, 6 of PLCY’s 12 deputy assistant secretary positions were vacant or filled by acting staff temporarily performing the duties in the absence of permanent staff placement. The NDAA codified many of the functions and responsibilities that PLCY had been carrying out prior to the act’s enactment and, with a few exceptions as discussed later in this report, were largely consistent with the duties the office was already pursuing. According to the act and PLCY officials, one of the office’s fundamental responsibilities is to lead, conduct, and coordinate departmentwide policy development and implementation, and strategic planning. According to PLCY officials, there are four categories of policy and strategy efforts that PLCY leads, conducts, or coordinates: Statutory responsibilities: among others, the Homeland Security Act, as amended by the NDAA, includes such responsibilities as establishing standards of validity and reliability for statistical data collected by the department, conducting or overseeing analysis and reporting of such data, and maintaining all immigration statistical information of U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services; the Immigration and Nationality Act includes such responsibilities as providing for a system for collection and dissemination to Congress and the public of information useful in evaluating the social, economic, environmental, and demographic impact of immigration laws, and reporting annually on trends in lawful immigration flows, naturalizations, and enforcement actions, Representing DHS in interagency efforts: coordinating or representing departmental policy and strategy positions for larger interagency efforts (e.g., interagency policy committees convened by the White House), Secretary’s priorities: leading or coordinating efforts that correspond to the Secretary of Homeland Security’s priorities (e.g., certain immigration or law-enforcement related issues), and Self-initiated activities: opportunities to better harmonize policy and strategy or create additional efficiencies given PLCY’s ability to see across the department. For example, PLCY officials said that DHS observed an increase in e-commerce and small businesses shipping items via carriers other than the U.S. Postal Service, thus exploiting a gap in DHS monitoring, which covers the U.S. Postal Service and other traditional shipping entities. PLCY officials noted that DHS’s interest in addressing e-commerce issues occurred just before opioids and other controlled substances were being mailed through small businesses and the U.S. Postal Service. As a result, PLCY developed an e-commerce strategy for, among other things, the shipping of illegal items and how to provide information to U.S. Customs and Border Protection before parcels are shipped to the United States from abroad. In accordance with the NDAA, as PLCY leads, conducts, and coordinates policy and strategy, it is to do so in a manner that promotes and ensures quality, consistency, and integration across DHS and applies risk-based analysis and planning to departmentwide strategic planning efforts. The NDAA further provides that all component heads are to coordinate with PLCY when establishing or modifying policies or strategic planning guidance to ensure consistency with DHS’s policy priorities. In addition to the roles PLCY plays that are directly related to leading, conducting, and coordinating policy and strategy, the office is responsible for select operational functions. For example, PLCY is charged with operating the REAL ID and Visa Waiver Programs. The NDAA also conferred responsibilities to PLCY that had not been responsibilities of the DHS Office of Policy prior to the NDAA’s enactment. Among other things, the NDAA charged PLCY with responsibility for establishing standards of reliability and validity for statistical data collected and analyzed by the department, and ensuring the accuracy of metrics and statistical data provided to Congress. In conferring this responsibility, the act also transferred to PLCY the maintenance of all immigration statistical information of the U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services. PLCY has established five performance goals: build departmental policy-making capacity, coordination, and foster the Unity of Effort, mature the office as a mission-oriented, component-focused organization that is responsive to DHS leadership, effectively engage and leverage stakeholders, enhance productivity and effectiveness of policy personnel through appropriate alignment of knowledge, skills, and abilities, and accountability, transparency, and leadership. PLCY officials stated that the office established the performance goals in fiscal year 2015 and they were still in effect as of fiscal year 2018. As previously discussed, DHS has eight operational components. DHS also has six support components. Although each one has a distinct role to play in helping to secure the homeland, there are operational and support functions that cut across mission areas. For example, nearly every operational component has, as part of its security operations, a need for screening, vetting, and credentialing procedures and risk- targeting mechanisms. Likewise, nearly all operational components have some form of international engagement, deploying staff abroad to help secure the homeland before threats reach U.S. borders. Finally, as shown in figure 2, different aspects of broad mission areas fall under the purview of more than one DHS operational component. PLCY is responsible for coordinating three key DHS strategic efforts: the QHSR, the DHS Strategic Plan, and the Resource Planning Guidance. The QHSR is a comprehensive examination of the homeland security strategy of the nation that is to occur every 4 years and include recommendations regarding the long-term strategy and priorities for homeland security of the nation and guidance on the programs, assets, capabilities, budget, policies, and authorities of DHS. The QHSR is to be conducted in consultation with the heads of other federal agencies, key DHS officials (including the Under Secretary, PLCY), and key officials from other relevant governmental and nongovernmental entities. The DHS Strategic Plan describes how DHS can accomplish the missions it identifies in the QHSR report, identifies high-priority mission areas within DHS, and lays the foundation for DHS to accomplish its Unity of Effort Initiative as well as various cross-agency priority goals in the strategic plan, such as cybersecurity. The Resource Planning Guidance describes DHS’s annual resource allocation process in order to execute the missions and goals of the QHSR and DHS Strategic Plan. The Resource Planning Guidance contains guidance over a 5-year period and informs several forward- looking reports to Congress, including the annual fiscal year Congressional Budget Justification as well as the Future Years Homeland Security Program Report. Although PLCY has effectively carried out key coordination functions at the senior level related to strategy, PLCY’s ability to lead and coordinate policy have been limited due to ambiguous roles and responsibilities and a lack of predictable, accountable, and repeatable procedures. According to our analysis and interviews with operational components, PLCY’s efforts to lead and coordinate departmentwide and crosscutting strategies—a key organizational objective—have been effective in providing opportunities for all relevant stakeholders to learn about and contribute to departmentwide or crosscutting strategy development. In this role, PLCY routinely serves as the executive agent for the Deputies Management Action Group and the Senior Leaders Council, which involve analytical and coordination support. PLCY also provides support for deputy- and principal-level decision making. For example, the Strategy and Policy Executive Steering Committee (S&P ESC) meetings have been used to discuss components’ implementation plans for crosscutting strategies, PLCY’s requests for information from components for an upcoming strategy, and updates on departmentwide strategic planning initiatives. According to PLCY and operational component officials, PLCY also provides leadership for the Resource Planning Guidance and Winter Studies, both of which help inform departmentwide resource decision- making. For example, officials from one operational component stated that PLCY’s leadership of the Resource Planning Guidance is a helpful practice for coordination and collaboration on departmentwide or crosscutting strategies. The officials stated that PLCY reaches out to ensure that the component is covering the Secretary’s priorities and this helps the component to ensure that its budget includes them. Furthermore, PLCY develops and coordinates policy options and opinions for the Secretary to present at the National Security Council and other White House-level meetings. For example, PLCY officials told us that, in light of allegations of Russian involvement in using poisonous nerve agents on two civilians in Great Britain, PLCY coordinated the collection of information to develop a policy recommendation for the Secretary to present at a National Security Council meeting. PLCY has encountered challenges leading and coordinating efforts to develop, update, or harmonize policy—also a key organizational objective—because it does not have clearly-defined roles, responsibilities, and mechanisms to implement these responsibilities in a predictable, repeatable, and accountable way. Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government states that management should establish an organizational structure, assign responsibility, and delegate authority to achieve the entity’s objectives. As such, an organization’s management should develop an organizational structure with an understanding of the overall responsibilities and assign these responsibilities to discrete units to enable the organization to operate in an efficient and effective manner. An organization’s management should also implement control activities through policies. It is important that an organization’s management document and define policies and communicate those policies and procedures to personnel, so they can implement control activities for their assigned responsibilities. In addition, leading collaboration practices we have identified in our prior work include defining and articulating a common outcome, clarifying roles and responsibilities, and establishing mutually-reinforcing or joint strategies to enhance and sustain collaboration, such as the work that PLCY and the components need to do together to ensure that departmentwide and crosscutting policy is effective for all relevant parties. According to PLCY officials, in general, PLCY is responsible for leading the development of a policy when it crosses multiple components or if there is a national implication, including White House interest in the policy. However, PLCY officials acknowledged that this practice does not always make them the lead and there are no established criteria that define the circumstances under which PLCY (or another organizational unit) should lead development of policies that cut across organizational boundaries. PLCY officials said the lead entity for a policy is often announced in an email from the Secretary’s office, on a case-by-case basis. According to PLCY officials, once components have been assigned responsibility for a policy, they have generally tended to retain it, and PLCY may not have oversight for crosscutting policies that are maintained by operational components. Therefore, there is no established, coordinated system of oversight to periodically monitor the need for policy harmonization, revision, or rescission. In the absence of clear roles and responsibilities, and processes and procedures to support them, PLCY and officials in 5 of the 8 components have encountered challenges in coordinating with each other. Although PLCY and most component officials we interviewed described overall positive experiences in coordinating with each other, we identified multiple instances of (1) confusion about which parties should lead and engage in policy efforts, (2) not engaging components at the right times, (3) incompatible expectations around timelines, and (4) uncertainty about PLCY’s role and the extent to which it can and should identify and drive policy in support of a more cohesive DHS. Confusion about who should lead and engage. Officials from one operational component told us that they were tasked with leading a departmentwide policy development effort they believed was outside their area of responsibility and expertise. Officials in another operational component stated that components sometimes end up coordinating among themselves, but that policy development could be more effective and efficient if PLCY took the role of convener and facilitator to ensure the departmentwide perspective is present and all relevant stakeholders participate. Officials from a third component stated that they spent significant time and resources to develop a policy directly related to their component’s mission. As the component got ready to implement the policy, PLCY became aware of it and asked the component to stop working on the policy, so PLCY could develop a departmentwide policy. According to component officials, while they were supportive of a departmentwide policy, PLCY’s timing delayed implementation of the policy the component had developed and wasted the resources it had invested. Moreover, officials from four operational components told us that sometimes counselors from outside PLCY, such as the Secretary’s office, have led policy efforts that seem like they should be PLCY’s responsibility, which created more confusion about what PLCY’s ongoing role should be. PLCY officials agreed that, at times, it has been challenging to define PLCY’s role relative to counselors for the Secretary, and acknowledged that clear guidance to define who is leading which types of policy development and coordination would be helpful. Not engaging components at the right times. Officials from 5 of 8 operational components told us that they had not always been engaged at the right times by PLCY in departmentwide or crosscutting policies that affected their missions. For example, officials from an operational component described a crosscutting policy that had significant implications for some of its key operational resources, but the component was not made aware of the policy until it was about to be presented at the White House. Officials from another component stated that they learned of a new policy after it was in place and had to find significant training and software resources to implement it even though they viewed the policy as unnecessary for their mission. PLCY officials stated that, while they intend to identify all components that should be involved in a policy, there are times when PLCY is unaware a component is developing a policy that affects other components. PLCY officials said they will involve other components when PLCY becomes aware that a component is developing such a policy. PLCY officials stated that it would be helpful to have a process and procedures for cross-component coordination on policies to help guide engagement regardless of who is developing the policy. Incompatible expectations around timelines. Officials at 4 of 8 operational components stated that short timelines from PLCY to provide input and feedback can prevent PLCY from obtaining thoughtful and complete information from components. For example, officials from one component stated that PLCY asked them to perform an analysis that would inform major, departmental decision-making and quickly provide the analysis. Component officials told us that they did not understand why PLCY needed the analysis on such an accelerated timeline, which seemed inappropriate given the level of importance and purpose of the analysis. Officials from another component told us that PLCY had not always provided enough time to provide thoughtful feedback; therefore, component officials were not sure if PLCY really wanted their feedback. Officials from a third component stated that sometimes PLCY did not provide sufficient time for thoughtful input or feedback that had cleared the component’s legal review, so component officials elected to miss PLCY’s deadline and provide late feedback. PLCY officials told us that, frequently, timelines are not within their control, a situation that some component officials also noted during our interviews with them. However, PLCY officials agreed that a documented, predictable, and repeatable process and procedures for policies may help ensure PLCY provides sufficient comment time when in its control and may provide a basis to help negotiate timelines with DHS leadership in other situations. PLCY officials stated that, even with a documented process and procedures, there would still be circumstances when short timelines are unavoidable. Uncertainty about PLCY’s role in driving policy harmonization. Policy officials at 6 of 8 operational components told us that they were unsure or not aware of PLCY’s role in harmonizing policy across the department, and stated a desire for PLCY to be more involved in harmonizing or enhancing departmentwide and crosscutting policy or for greater clarity about PLCY’s responsibility to play this role. As previously discussed, PLCY’s policy and strategy efforts fall into four categories—statutory responsibilities, interagency efforts, Secretary’s priorities, and self- initiated activities; these activities include efforts to better harmonize policies and strategies. According to PLCY officials, the category with the lowest priority is self-initiated activities. PLCY officials stated that PLCY makes tradeoffs and rarely chooses to work on self-initiated projects over its other three categories of effort. According to the officials, PLCY’s work on the other three higher-priority categories is sufficient to ensure that the office is effectively leading, conducting, and coordinating strategy and policy across the department. Given its organizational position and strategic priorities, PLCY is uniquely situated to identify opportunities to better harmonize or enhance departmentwide and crosscutting policy, a role that is in line with its strategic priority to build departmental policymaking capacity and foster Unity of Effort. In the absence of clear articulation of the department’s expectations for PLCY in this role, it is difficult for PLCY and DHS leadership to make completely informed and deliberate decisions about the tradeoffs they make across any available resources. In addition to statutory authority that PLCY received in the NDAA, PLCY officials stated that a separate, clear delegation of authority—a mechanism by which the Secretary delegates responsibilities to other organizational units within DHS—is needed to help confront the ambiguous roles it has experienced in the past. PLCY officials stated that past efforts to finalize a delegation of authority have stalled during leadership changes and that the initiative has been a lower priority, in part, due to where PLCY is in its maturation process and DHS is in its evolution into a more cohesive department under the Unity of Effort. As of May 2018, the effort had been revived, but it is not clear whether and when DHS will finalize it. According to a senior official in the Office of the Under Secretary for Management, a delegation of authority is important for PLCY. He described the creation of a delegation of authority as a process that does more than simply delegate the Secretary’s authority. He noted that defining PLCY’s roles and responsibilities in relation to other organizational units presents an opportunity to engage all relevant components and agree on appropriate roles. He said that, earlier in the organizational life of the Office of the Under Secretary for Management, it went through a process like this, which has been vital in it being able to carry out its mission. He said now that PLCY has a deputy undersecretary in place, this is a good time to restart the process to develop the delegation of authority. Until the delegation or a similar process clearly and fully articulates PLCY’s roles and responsibilities, PLCY and the operational components are likely to continue to experience limitations in collaboration on crosscutting and departmentwide policy. PLCY determines its workforce needs through the annual budget process, but systematic identification of workforce demand, capacity gaps, and strategies to address them could help ensure that PLCY’s workforce aligns with its and DHS’s priorities and goals. To determine its workforce needs each year, PLCY officials told us that, as part of the annual budget cycle, they work with PLCY staff and operational components to determine the scope of activities required for each PLCY area of responsibility and the associated staffing needs. PLCY officials said there are three skill sets needed to carry out the office’s responsibilities: policy analysis, social science analysis, and regional affairs analysis. PLCY officials explained that the office’s priorities can change rapidly as events occur and the Secretary’s and administration’s priorities shift. Therefore, according to PLCY officials, their staffing model must be flexible. They said that, rather than a defined system of full-time equivalents with set position types and levels, PLCY officials start with their budget allotment and consider current and potential emerging needs to set position types and levels, which may fluctuate significantly from year to year. In addition, PLCY officials stated that PLCY staff are primarily generalists and, given the versatility in skill sets of their workforce, PLCY has a lot of flexibility to move staff around if there is an emerging need. For example, if there is an emerging law enforcement issue that affects all law enforcement agencies, PLCY may be tasked with developing a policy to ensure the issue is addressed quickly and that the resulting policy is harmonized across the department and with other law enforcement agencies, such as the Department of Justice. While PLCY completes some workforce planning activities as part of its annual budgeting process, PLCY does not systematically address several aspects of the DHS Workforce Planning Guide that may create more efficient operations and greater alignment with DHS priorities. According to the DHS Workforce Planning Guide, workforce planning is a process that ensures the right number of people with the right skills are in the right jobs at the right time for DHS to achieve the mission. This process provides a framework to: align workforce planning to the department’s mission and goals, predict, then assess how evolving missions, new processes, or environmental conditions may impact the way that work will be performed at DHS in the future, identify gaps in capacity, develop and implement strategies and action plans to address capacity and capability gaps, and continuously monitor the effectiveness of action plans and modify, as necessary. The DHS Workforce Planning Guide stipulates that an organization’s management should not only lead and show support during the workforce planning process, but ensure alignment with the strategic direction of the agency. Moreover, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government states that management should use quality information to achieve the entity’s objectives. For example, management uses an entity’s operational processes to make informed decisions and evaluate the entity’s performance in achieving key agency objectives. According to PLCY officials, the current staffing paradigm involves shifting the office’s staff when new and urgent issues arise from the Secretary or White House, and adding these unexpected tasks to staff’s existing responsibilities. However, this means that tradeoffs are made, resulting in some priority items taking longer to address or not getting attention at all. PLCY officials stated that they have been caught off-guard at times by changes in demands placed on PLCY and had to scramble to address the new needs. Additionally, PLCY officials said they have a number of vacancies, which hamper the office’s ability to meet certain aspects of its mission. For example, PLCY’s Office of Cyber, Infrastructure, and Resilience was created in 2015. According to PLCY officials, PLCY has had some resources to address cyber issues, however, there has not been funding to staff this office and an assistant secretary has not been appointed to lead it. Therefore, PLCY officials stated that PLCY has not been able to address its responsibilities for infrastructure resilience. Similarly, PLCY has limited capacity for risk analysis. A provision of the NDAA provides that PLCY is to: develop and coordinate strategic plans and long-term goals of the department with risk-based analysis and planning to improve operational mission effectiveness, including consultation with the Secretary regarding the quadrennial homeland security review under section 707 [6 U.S.C. § 347]. However, PLCY officials acknowledged that their focus on identifying needs for risk analyses and conducting them has been limited, in part, because DHS disbanded the risk management office. Officials from one component told us that they contribute to a report that PLCY coordinates, called Homeland Security National Risk Characteristics, which is prepared as a precursor to the DHS Strategic Plan. PLCY officials stated that, outside of these foundational documents and some risk-based analyses completed as part of specific policy development efforts, PLCY does not have the capacity to complete any additional risk analysis activities. Although PLCY officials said they conduct some analysis of potential demands as a starting point for how to allocate PLCY’s annual staffing budget, these efforts are largely informal and internal and have not resulted in a systematic analysis that provides PLCY and DHS management with the information they need to understand the effects of resource tradeoffs. Also, PLCY officials said they track accomplishments toward PLCY’s strategic priorities as part of a weekly meeting and report, however, officials acknowledged they do not analyze what role workforce decisions have played in achieving or not achieving strategic priorities. Moreover, although PLCY officials stated that they have intermittent, in- person, informal communication about resource use, they have not used the principles outlined in the DHS Workforce Planning Guide to systematically identify and communicate workforce demands, capacity gaps, and strategies to address workforce issues. According to PLCY officials, they have not conducted such analysis, in part, because the Secretary’s office has not requested it of them or the other DHS offices that are funded in the same part of the DHS budget. Regardless of whether the Secretary expects workforce analysis as part of the budgeting process, the DHS Workforce Planning Guide could be used within and outside of the budgeting process to help inform resource decision making throughout the year. PLCY officials stated that at the PLCY Deputy Under Secretary’s initiative, they recently began a review of all relevant statutory authorities, which they will map against the current organizational structure and day- to-day operations. The Deputy Under Secretary plans to use the results of the review to enhance PLCY’s efficiency and effectiveness, and the results could serve as a foundation for a more holistic and systematic analysis of workforce demand, any capacity gaps, and strategies to address them. Employing workforce planning principles—in particular, systematic identification of workforce demand, capacity gaps, and strategies to address them—consistent with the DHS Workforce Planning Guide could better position PLCY to use its workforce as effectively as possible under uncertain conditions. Moreover, using the DHS guide would help PLCY to systematically communicate information about any workforce gaps to DHS leadership, so there is transparency about how workforce tradeoffs affect PLCY’s ability to support DHS goals. As discussed earlier, officials from PLCY and DHS operational components praised existing mechanisms to coordinate and communicate at the senior level, especially about strategy. However, component officials identified opportunities for PLCY to better connect at the staff level to identify and respond to emerging policy and strategy needs. Leading practices for collaboration that we have identified in our prior work state that it is important to ensure that all relevant participants have been included in a collaborative effort, and positive working relationships among participants from different agencies or offices can bridge organizational cultures. These relationships build trust and foster communication, which facilitate collaboration. Also, as previously stated, PLCY has mechanisms like the S&P ESC to communicate and coordinate with operational components and other DHS stakeholders at the senior level (e.g., Senior Executive Service officials). However, PLCY does not have a mechanism to effectively engage in routine communication and collaboration at the staff level (e.g., program and policy specialists working at operational components to oversee or implement policy and strategy functions). Specifically, officials with responsibility for policy and strategy at 6 of 8 operational components told us that they did not have regular contact with or know who to contact at PLCY for questions about policies or strategies, or that the reason they knew who to contact was because of existing working relationships, not because of efforts PLCY had undertaken to facilitate such contacts. In addition, some component officials noted that, when they tried to use the PLCY website to coordinate, they found it to be out of date and lacking sufficient information. PLCY officials acknowledged that the website needs improvement. They stated that the office has developed improved content for the website, but does not have the necessary staff to update the website. According to the officials, the needed staff should be hired soon and improved content should be on the website by the end of summer 2018. Although officials at 5 of the 8 operational components we interviewed stated that the quality of PLCY’s coordination and collaboration has improved in the past 2 years or so, component officials offered several suggestions to enhance PLCY’s coordination and collaboration, especially at the staff level. Among these were: conduct routine information sharing meetings with staff-level officials who have policy and strategy responsibilities at each operational component, clearly articulate points of contact, their contact information, and their portfolios at PLCY as well as at other policy and strategy stakeholders, ensure the PLCY website is up-to-date with contact information for PLCY and components that work in strategy and policy areas, and with relevant information about crosscutting strategy and policy initiatives underway, host a forum—such as an annual conference—to bring together policy and strategy officials from PLCY and DHS components to share ideas and make contacts, and prepare a standard briefing for component officials with strategy and policy responsibilities to help ensure that staff at all levels understand what PLCY does, how it works, and opportunities for engagement on emerging policy and strategy needs or identified harmonization opportunities. For example, officials from one component told us that they would like PLCY officials to have in-person meetings with component staff to discuss what PLCY does, who to contact in PLCY, where to find information about policies and strategies, and other relevant information to ensure a smooth working relationship between the component and PLCY. According to PLCY officials, the office recognizes the value of creating mechanisms to connect staff, who work on policy and strategy at all levels in DHS. PLCY officials said they have historically done a better job in coordinating at the senior level, but are interested in expanding opportunities to connect other staff with policy and strategy responsibilities. PLCY officials stated that they are considering creating a working group structure that mirrors existing organizational mechanisms to coordinate at the senior level, but have not taken steps to do so. Routine collaboration among PLCY, operational components, and other DHS offices at the staff level is important to ensure that PLCY is able to carry out its functions under the NDAA, including the effective coordination of policies and strategies. A positive working relationship among these stakeholders can build trust, foster communication, and facilitate collaboration. Such enhanced communication and collaboration across PLCY and among component officials with policy and strategy responsibility could help the department more quickly and completely identify emerging, crosscutting strategy and policy needs and opportunities to enhance policy harmonization. PLCY’s efforts to lead, conduct, and coordinate departmentwide and crosscutting policies have sometimes been hampered by the lack of clearly-defined roles and responsibilities. In addition, PLCY does not have a consistent process and procedures for its strategy development and policymaking efforts. Without a delegation of authority or similar documentation from DHS leadership clearly articulating PLCY’s missions, roles, and responsibilities—along with defined processes and procedures to carry them out in a predictable and repeatable manner—there is continuing risk that confusion and uncertainty about PLCY’s authority, missions, roles, and responsibilities will limit its effectiveness. PLCY employs some workforce planning, but does not systematically apply key principles of the DHS Workforce Planning Guide to help predict workforce demand, and identify any workforce gaps and design strategies to address them. Without this analysis, PLCY faces limitations in ensuring that its workforce is aligned with its and DHS’s priorities and goals. Moreover, the results of this analysis would better position PLCY to communicate to DHS leadership any potential tradeoffs in workforce allocation that would affect PLCY’s ability to meet priorities and goals. PLCY could enhance its use of mechanisms for collaboration and communication with DHS stakeholders at the staff level. Implementation of additional mechanisms at the staff level for regular communication and coordination, including providing up-to-date information to stakeholders about the office, could help PLCY and operational components to better connect in order to identify and address emerging policy and strategy needs. We are making the following four recommendations to DHS: The Secretary of Homeland Security should finalize a delegation of authority or similar document that clearly defines PLCY’s mission, roles, and responsibilities relative to DHS’s operational and support components. (Recommendation 1) The Secretary of Homeland Security should create corresponding processes and procedures to help implement the mission, roles, and responsibilities defined in the delegation of authority or similar document to help ensure predictability, repeatability, and accountability in departmentwide and crosscutting strategy and policy efforts. (Recommendation 2) The Under Secretary for Strategy, Policy, and Plans should use the DHS Workforce Planning Guide to help identify and analyze any gaps in PLCY’s workforce, design strategies to address any gaps, and communicate this information to DHS leadership. (Recommendation 3) The Under Secretary for Strategy, Policy, and Plans should enhance the use of collaboration and communication mechanisms to connect with staff in the components with responsibilities for policy and strategy to better identify and address emerging needs. (Recommendation 4) We provided a draft of this report for review and comment to DHS. DHS provided written comments, which are reproduced in appendix I. DHS also provided technical comments, which we incorporated, as appropriate. DHS concurred with three of our recommendations and described actions planned to address them. DHS did not concur with one recommendation. Specifically, DHS did not concur with our recommendation that PLCY should use the DHS Workforce Planning Guide to help identify and analyze any gaps in PLCY’s workforce, design strategies to address any gaps, and communicate this information to DHS leadership. The letter described a number of actions, including actions that are also described in the report, which PLCY takes to help ensure alignment of its staff with organizational needs. In the letter, PLCY officials pointed to the workforce activities PLCY undertakes as part of the annual budgeting cycle. We acknowledge that the actions described to predict upcoming priorities and resource needs as part of the annual budgeting cycle are in line with the DHS workforce planning principles. However, as we noted, there are opportunities to apply the workforce planning principles outside the annual budgeting cycle to provide greater visibility and awareness of resource tradeoffs to management inside PLCY and in the Secretary’s office. In the letter, PLCY officials made note of the dynamic and changing nature of its operational environment, stating that it often required them to shift resources and priorities on a more frequent or ad hoc basis than many organizations. We acknowledged in the report that PLCY’s operating environment requires it to maintain flexibility in its staffing approach. However, PLCY has a number of important duties, including helping foster Unity of Effort throughout the department and helping to ensure the availability of risk information for departmental decision making, that require longer-term, sustained attention and strategic management. During interviews, PLCY officials acknowledged that striking a balance between these needs has been difficult and at times they have faced significant struggles. The report describes some areas where, during the time we were conducting our work, it was clear that some tasks and functions, such as risk analyses, lacked the resources or focus necessary to ensure they received sustained institutional attention. It is because of PLCY’s dynamic operating environment, coupled with the need for sustained institutional attention to other key responsibilities, that we recommended PLCY undertake workforce planning activities that would help generate better information for PLCY and DHS management to have full visibility and awareness of gaps and resource tradeoffs. Finally, the letter stated that because PLCY is a very small and flat organization, it is able to identify capacity gaps and develop action plans without obtaining all of the data collected through each recommended element, worksheet, form, and template of the model proposed in the DHS Workforce Planning Guide. We acknowledge that it would be counterproductive for PLCY to engage in data collection and analysis that are significantly more elaborate than its planning needs. Nevertheless, we continue to believe that PLCY could use the principles more robustly, outside the annual budgeting process, to help ensure that it identifies and communicates the effect that resource tradeoffs have on its ability to accomplish its multifaceted mission. We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees and the Secretary of Homeland Security. In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please contact me at (404) 679-1875 or CurrieC@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made significant contributions to this report are listed in Appendix II. In addition to the contact named above, Kathryn Godfrey (Assistant Director), Joseph E. Dewechter (Analyst-in-Charge), Michelle Loutoo Wilson, Ricki Gaber, Dominick Dale, Thomas Lombardi, Ned Malone, David Alexander, Sarah Veale, and Michael Hansen made key contributions to this report.

 

 Report 2:
The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford Act), as amended, establishes the process for states or tribal entities to request a presidential disaster declaration. The act also generally defines the federal government’s role during the response and recovery after a disaster and establishes the programs and process through which the federal government provides disaster assistance to state, local governments, tribal entities and individuals. In addition to its central role in recommending to the President whether to declare a disaster, FEMA has primary responsibility for coordinating the federal response when a disaster is declared as well as recovery, which typically consists of providing grants to assist state and tribal entities to alleviate the damage resulting from such disasters. Once a disaster is declared, FEMA provides assistance through the IA, Public Assistance, and Hazard Mitigation Assistance programs. For instance, some declarations may provide grants only for IA and others only for Public Assistance. Hazard Mitigation Assistance grants, on the other hand, are available for all declarations if the affected area has a FEMA-approved Hazard Mitigation plan. The process for requesting assistance is the same for the three types of assistance. Under the Stafford Act, states’ governors or tribal chief executives may request federal assistance, if state and tribal resources are overwhelmed after a disaster. As part of the request to the President, a governor or tribal chief executive must affirm that the state or tribe has implemented an emergency plan and that the situation is of such severity and magnitude that effective response is beyond the capabilities of the state or tribal entity, among other things. After a state or tribe submits a request for disaster declaration through FEMA’s regional office, the regional office is to evaluate the request and make a regional recommendation through the RVAR, which is submitted to FEMA headquarters for further review. The FEMA administrator then is to review the state’s or tribe’s request and the RVAR, and recommend to the President whether a disaster declaration is warranted. Figure 1 shows the process for a disaster declaration from the time a disaster occurs until the President approves or denies a declaration request. The IA program provides financial and direct assistance to disaster victims for expenses and needs that cannot be met through other means, such as insurance. The IA comprises five different programs as shown below. When states or tribal entities request disaster declarations, they may request assistance under any or all of the five programs. Likewise, when the President makes a disaster declaration, the declaration may authorize IA which may also include any or all of the five IA programs. 1. Individuals and Households Program provides assistance to eligible disaster survivors with necessary expenses and serious needs which they are unable to meet through other means, such as insurance. According to FEMA headquarter officials, direct assistance is provided to individuals to meet housing needs. 2. Crisis Counseling Program assists individuals and communities by providing community-based outreach and psycho-educational services. 3. Disaster Legal Services provides assistance through an agreement with the Young Lawyers Division of the American Bar Association for free legal help to survivors who are unable to secure legal services adequate to meet their disaster-related needs. 4. Disaster Case Management Program involves a partnership between a FEMA disaster case manager and a survivor to develop and carry out a Disaster Recovery Plan. 5. Disaster Unemployment Assistance provides unemployment benefits and reemployment services to individuals who have become unemployed as a result of a major disaster and who are not eligible for regular state unemployment insurance. In accordance with its responsibilities under the Stafford Act, FEMA issued a regulation in 1999 that outlines the six factors regional and headquarters officials are to consider when assessing requests for a disaster declaration and when developing a recommendation to the President for a federal disaster declaration. The regulation states that FEMA considers the six factors not only to evaluate the need for IA but also to measure the severity, magnitude, and impact of the disaster. The state or tribe provides information on these factors when submitting its disaster declaration request. The six factors for IA include the following: 1. Concentration of Damages—characterizes the density of the damage in individual communities. The regulation states that highly concentrated damages “generally indicate a greater need for federal assistance than widespread and scattered damages throughout a state.” For example, concentration of damage data includes the numbers of homes destroyed, homes with major or minor damages, and homes affected. 2. Trauma—the regulation provides conditions that might cause trauma including large numbers of injuries and deaths, large-scale disruption of normal community functions, and emergency needs such as extended loss of power or water. 3. Special Populations—FEMA considers the impact of the disaster on special populations, such as low-income populations, the elderly, or the unemployed. 4. Voluntary Agency Assistance—involves the availability and capabilities of voluntary, faith, and community-based organizations, and state and local programs to help meet both the emergency and recovery needs of individuals affected by disasters. 5. Insurance Coverage—addresses the level of insurance coverage among those affected by disasters. Because disaster assistance cannot duplicate insurance coverage, as recognized in the regulation, if a disaster occurred where almost all of the damaged dwellings were fully insured for the damage that was sustained, FEMA could conclude that a disaster declaration by the President was not necessary in accordance with this factor. 6. Average Amount of Individual Assistance by State—according to the regulation, there is no set threshold for recommending IA. However, it states that the averages, depicted in table 1, may prove useful to states and voluntary agencies as they develop plans and programs to meet the needs of disaster victims. The inference is that these averages generally indicate the amount of damages that could be expected for a state based on its size (small, medium, and large). The averages contained within the regulation and depicted in table 1 are based on disasters that occurred between July of 1994 and July of 1999. The President declared 57 percent of all IA declaration requests from calendars years 2008 through 2016, with total IA obligations of approximately $8.6 billion. FEMA received 294 IA declaration requests from calendar years 2008 through 2016. Of these, the President declared 168 requests (57 percent), and 51 percent of these declarations were from Regions IV and VI, as shown in table 2. Additionally, of the 126 IA declaration requests denied by the President, Regions X and IX had the highest percentage of denials, at 71 percent (10 out of 14) and 67 percent (12 out of 18), respectively, and Region I had the lowest percentage of denials at 13 percent (2 out of 15), as shown in table 3. See appendix I for the number of IA declarations requested, declared, and denied by states and tribes from each FEMA region for disaster declarations requested from calendar years 2008 through 2016. According to a FEMA headquarters official, when a disaster declaration is denied, FEMA sends a denial letter to states or tribes based on the review of all the information available. The letter generally states that the damage was not of such severity and magnitude as to be beyond the capabilities of the state, affected local governments, and voluntary agencies, and accordingly the supplemental federal assistance is not necessary. Of the emergency management officials we interviewed in 11 states, officials in five states reported that FEMA provided a rationale behind the denial, while officials in three states reported that no rationale was provided. Among the various types of disasters for which IA declaration requests were received, severe storms, flooding, and tornados accounted for the highest number of IA requests, with drought, fishery closure, and contaminated water being the least common, as shown in table 4. FEMA obligated a total of approximately $8.6 billion in IA for disaster declarations made from calendar years 2008 through 2016. These actual obligations were provided to 46 states and they ranged from less than $1 million to more than $1 billion as shown in figure 2. See appendix II for FEMA’s IA actual obligations by state and type of disasters for disaster declarations made from calendars years 2008 through 2016. Additionally, actual obligations for IA declarations made from calendar years 2008 through 2016 varied greatly by FEMA region, as also shown in figure 3. For example, FEMA Region VI had the highest obligations at around $3.3 billion. Region X had the lowest obligations at $24.8 million. As shown in table 5, the amount of obligations for disasters declarations also varied greatly by state. For example, Louisiana had the highest obligations at approximately $2 billion, followed by New York and Texas at about $1.3 billion and $1.1 billion, respectively. The state with the lowest obligations was the U.S. Virgin Islands at about $2,100. Six of FEMA’s 10 regional offices reported using all six regulatory factors when evaluating states’ or tribes’ IA declaration requests. Officials from the other 4 regions reported using five of the six factors, with the exception being the average amount of individual assistance by state factor. These officials noted that they do not use this factor because FEMA considers the factor to be outdated or they consider all of the factors holistically. Officials from FEMA’s regional offices also generally reported that the extent to which they consider the six IA regulatory factors equally in all cases varies, depending on the circumstances of the related disaster. Specifically, officials from 7 of the 10 regions stated that they use the regulatory factors on a case-by-case basis as certain factors are more relevant than others based on the disaster. For example, if a tornado hits a rural community and completely destroys all properties within the community with no death or injury, then the regulatory factor for trauma may not be as applicable, while the concentration of damages regulatory factor would have greater relevance. On the other hand, if a tornado hits the center of a town resulting in damages with death and injuries, then the trauma regulatory factor would become more important to consider. Additionally, officials in 3 of the 10 regions reported that in addition to the six regulatory factors, they also take into account institutional knowledge and staff experience when evaluating the regulatory factors. For example, officials in one region stated that their staff have more than 10 years of IA declaration experience, and as such, they are familiar with the extent of the information needed and collect the information accordingly. Based on our analysis of RVARs from July 2012 through December 2016 used to recommend approving or denying IA requests, FEMA regional offices did not consistently obtain and document information on all elements of the IA regulatory factors. As described earlier, FEMA regions are to use the RVAR to document information on the IA factors and to recommend to the FEMA administrator whether a disaster should be declared. According to FEMA headquarters officials, FEMA developed the RVAR template in June 2012 to help ensure consistency across regions when making recommendations to headquarters on IA declaration requests. Officials stated that prior to the template, information on the six factors was mainly provided in narrative format. The new template listed the various elements found within each of the six regulatory factors, guiding the regional offices to provide information based on those elements. For example, instead of providing a general narrative on the trauma factor, the new template listed the elements to be provided under trauma, such as the number of injuries and deaths, as well as information on power outages and disruption of other community functions and services. Also, instead of summarizing the concentration of damages factor, the template allowed regional offices to categorize the damage concentration as low, medium, high, or extreme. Furthermore, the template also provided a uniform format to present quantitative information such as the number of homes destroyed; whether home damages are major or minor; the number of homes affected; and level of home ownership. See appendix III for a sample RVAR template. We analyzed 81 RVARs developed by the 10 FEMA regions from July 2012 through December 2016 and found that regions did not consistently obtain and document information on all elements related to each of the six regulatory factors in their RVARs. As shown in table 6, all 81 RVARs had at least some elements documented but not all for each of the IA regulatory factors. For example, for the IA concentration of damages regulatory factor, the six elements to be addressed include the number of homes destroyed, damaged or affected, damage concentration, and damage to critical facilities. While 44 of the 81 RVARs documented all of the six elements, 37 documented some but not all of the elements. Similarly, for the trauma regulatory factor, the four elements to be addressed include injuries, death, power outages, and disruption of community functions. While 30 of the 81 RVARs documented all of the four elements, 51 documented some but not all of the elements. For the insurance coverage factor, while five RVARs documented all of the elements, 73 RVARs documented some but not all of the elements. Elements under this factor include home ownership, insurance, and flood insurance, when applicable. None of the six regulatory factors were fully documented across all RVARs. See appendix IV for detailed information on the extent to which all of the elements of the six regulatory factors were documented in the RVARs from July 2012 through December 2016. FEMA headquarters officials acknowledged that information related to all the elements for each of the IA regulatory factors were missing from the RVARs. They stated that they had not collected all information on all factors because one factor may have more weight than another based on the specific incident that has occurred. However, they also indicated that they do not fully know and have not evaluated all of the reasons why a region may have omitted information on an element of a factor. FEMA headquarters officials agreed that having complete information on all elements of the regulatory factors in the RVARs would assist in their recommendation process. Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government suggest that agencies should establish and operate monitoring activities to ensure that internal controls—such as the documentation of all of the elements of the IA regulatory factors FEMA regions considered—are effective, and to take corrective actions as appropriate. Because it is unclear why regions are not completely documenting all elements related to the current six regulatory factors, such an evaluation could help FEMA identify whether any corrective steps are needed. Doing so could help FEMA ensure it is achieving its stated goals in providing consistency in the evaluation process and in the types of factors it considers. Officials we interviewed in 9 of the 10 FEMA regions and state emergency management offices in all 11 states reported the positive relationship they maintain with each other as a strength in the IA declaration process. For example, both FEMA regional officials and state emergency management officials stated that they have a good working relationship and are in regular communication via telephone or in-person meetings with each other. Also, state emergency management officials we spoke to stated that whenever they are in need of assistance, they know they can reach out to FEMA regional officials for assistance. However, FEMA regional and state emergency management officials we spoke to also reported various challenges with the process. These include the subjective nature of the IA regulatory factors given the lack of eligibility thresholds, the lack of transparency in the decision-making process, and difficulty gathering information on IA regulatory factors. Subjective nature of the IA factors and lack of eligibility thresholds. Officials from 9 of 10 FEMA regions stated the subjective nature of the IA program is a challenge; and officials in 6 of the 10 regions also said they found the lack of eligibility thresholds a challenge. An official in one region stated that unlike FEMA’s Public Assistance program, which has minimum thresholds for eligibility, it is unclear when states should apply for IA funds. Under the Public Assistance program, for example, for states or tribes to qualify for assistance, they must demonstrate that they have sustained a minimum of $1 million in damages and the impact of damages must amount to $1.00 per capita in the state. An official in another region explained that although the subjectivity of the IA factors provides flexibility in determining the type of IA program needed, having some quantifiable criteria could help officials explain to states why their requests were denied or approved. Similarly, officials we interviewed in 7 of the 11 states said they found the subjective nature of the factors with no threshold to be a challenge. A state emergency management official in one state said this subjectivity makes it difficult to determine whether or not the state should make an IA request. A state emergency management official in another state reported that the subjectivity can cause the IA declaration process to be inconsistent, and it is not always clear how or why certain declarations were approved and others were not. Further, a state emergency management official in an additional state also pointed to the subjective nature of the factors with no threshold as a reason for not being able to provide a more detailed rationale behind a declaration denial. To illustrate this, table 7 shows how four states requested IA declarations related to the same tornado in 2012 and varied in what they reported across the six IA factors, such as the levels of damages incurred, special populations among their residents, and insurance coverage. Two of these four states—Kentucky and Indiana—received IA declarations and the other two—Ohio and Illinois—were denied. Lack of transparency. Another challenge reported by FEMA regional and state emergency management officials was the lack of transparency in how FEMA evaluates and provides a recommendation to the President on whether a declaration is warranted. For example, officials we interviewed in 4 of 10 regions indicated the lack of transparency as a challenge. A FEMA official in one region stated that the region would like more transparency regarding what FEMA headquarters recommends to the President and whether the President’s decision aligns with FEMA’s recommendation. State emergency management officials we interviewed in 10 of 11 states also reported that lack of transparency with the IA process is a challenge. For example, an emergency management official in one state said it is not clear how or if FEMA considers all of the factors. Also, an emergency management official in another state reported that it was unclear to him why his state’s declaration request was denied while the requests of other states with similar incidents were declared. Difficulty gathering information on IA regulatory factors. Officials in 4 of 10 FEMA regions reported difficulty gathering information, such as income or insurance coverage, as a challenge. An official in one region stated that it is difficult to obtain information related to IA factors from states. For example, the official said that calculating the concentration of damages is difficult absent technical guidance from FEMA headquarters, as the current guidance only accounts for the number of structure damage but not the impact of damage. Further, officials in two FEMA regions stated that states lack a dedicated IA official, making it difficult for state officials, who play multiple roles, to provide the necessary information related to the IA factors in their IA declaration request. Additionally, a state emergency management official in one state also reported that lack of staff resources in her state makes it difficult to verify all the local damage assessments prior to making a declaration request. Pursuant to the Sandy Recovery Improvement Act of 2013, in November 2015, FEMA issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to revise the six current IA regulatory factors to the following proposed factors: state fiscal capacity and resource availability; uninsured home and personal property losses; disaster-impacted population profile; impact to community infrastructure; casualties; and disaster-related unemployment. According to FEMA headquarters officials, the revisions aim to provide more objective criteria, clarify the threshold for eligibility, and speed the declaration. The officials said the proposed rule also seeks to provide additional clarity and guidance for all the established factors. Table 8 shows FEMA’s description of current and proposed IA factors. FEMA received public comments from 14 states in the Federal Register during the comment period for the proposed rule and proposed guidance. The 14 states expressed concern about the proposed factor for state fiscal capacity and resource availability, including the reliability and relevance of data sources such as total taxable resources. These states expressed concern that the data collection necessary to meet the new requirements would fall upon them, adding to the cost burden of completing an IA disaster declaration request. They also explained that the use of total taxable resources and other similar data is not an effective way to assess a state’s current ability to provide resources following a disaster. Also, these states indicated that the data points such as total taxable resources and per capita personal income that would be used to evaluate state fiscal capacity are outdated and inaccurate and would be an inefficient way to evaluate a state’s true fiscal capacity to respond to a disaster. Regarding the other five proposed factors, several states in their comments raised questions about ambiguities in interpreting the factors or the feasibility and cost of gathering related data. For example, in regards to the factor on disaster impacted population, five states expressed concern that the data required for the disaster-impacted population factor would be a cost burden to the state or that the data would be inappropriate for evaluation. Additionally, two states said unemployment related to a disaster incident for the disaster-related unemployment factor would be hard to quantify in the first 30 days following a disaster. They stated that this was especially an issue given that states work to submit an IA disaster declaration request as soon as possible following a disaster. According to the Office of Management and Budget’s Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs website, the projected date for finalization of the proposed rule is September 2018; however, as of April 2018, FEMA officials stated that they were not certain whether that timeframe would be met. Until the proposed rule is finalized, we will not know the extent to which the various challenges FEMA regions and state officials raised in our interviews and in comments on the proposed rule will be addressed. FEMA has obligated over $8.6 billion nationwide in IA from calendar years 2008 through 2016, highlighting the importance of FEMA’s evaluation of states’ and tribes’ IA declaration requests. FEMA’s regional offices evaluate the request and make a regional recommendation through the Regional Administrator’s Validation and Recommendation, which documents information on all relevant IA regulatory factors. FEMA has developed the Regional Administrator’s Validation and Recommendation to ensure regions consistently obtain and document the information needed by FEMA to make a disaster declaration recommendation to the President based on the IA regulatory factors. However, FEMA’s regional offices do not consistently obtain and document information on all elements of the current IA regulatory factors. Because it is unclear why regions are not always documenting all of the elements related to these factors, evaluating the reasons why could help FEMA identify if any corrective steps are needed. Doing so could also help FEMA ensure it is meeting its stated goals in providing consistency in the evaluation process and in the types of factors it considers. We recommend that the Administrator of FEMA evaluate why regions are not completing the Regional Administrator’s Validation and Recommendations for each element of the current IA regulatory factors and take corrective steps, if necessary. We provided a draft of this report to DHS for its review and comment. DHS provided written comments, which are summarized below and reproduced in full in appendix V. DHS concurred with the recommendation and described planned actions to address it. In addition, DHS provided written technical comments, which we incorporated into the report as appropriate. DHS concurred with our recommendation that FEMA evaluate why regions are not completing the Regional Administrator’s Validation and Recommendations for each element of the IA regulatory factors and take corrective steps, if necessary. DHS stated that a FEMA working group consisting of headquarters stakeholders will draft survey questions for FEMA region officials to identify the common reasons why an element of an IA regulatory factor may not be addressed within a RVAR. According to DHS, the working group will also analyze, assess, and present the findings of the survey responses to FEMA senior leadership, and if needed, FEMA will develop and send a memorandum to the regions with additional guidance regarding the appropriate preparation of RVARs. DHS stated that the estimated completion date is in the fall of 2018. These actions, if implemented effectively, should address the intent of our recommendation. We will send copies of this report to the Secretary of Homeland Security, the FEMA Administrator, and the appropriate congressional committees. If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (404) 679-1875 or curriec@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix VI. Table 9 provides the total number of Individual Assistance declaration requests made, declared, and denied, by region, state, and tribe for disaster declarations requested from calendar years 2008 through 2016. Table 10 provides Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) Individual Assistance (IA) actual obligations for declarations made from calendar years 2008 through 2016 by state and type of disaster. As part of the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) declaration process, FEMA’s regional offices are to evaluate states’ or tribes’ declaration requests, including the IA declaration request, and make a recommendation called the Regional Administrator’s Validation and Recommendation (RVAR) and submit the RVAR to FEMA headquarters. In June 2012, FEMA headquarters issued a template for FEMA regional offices to use in developing the RVAR as identified in figure 3. Tables 11 through 16 provide information on each element of the 6 Individual Assistance (IA) regulatory factors documented in the Regional Administrator’s Validation and Recommendation (RVAR) from July 2012 through December 2016 by the Federal Emergency Management Agency region. In addition to the contact named above, Aditi Archer (Assistant Director), Su Jin Yon (Analyst-In-Charge), Hiwotte Amare, Eric Hauswirth, Susan Hsu, Jun S. (Joyce) Kang, Christopher Keisling, Heidi Nielson, Hadley Nobles, Anne Rhodes-Kline, and Jerome (Jerry) Sandau made significant contributions to this report.

Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 1.

Answer: GAO has designated DHS management as high risk because of challenges in building a cohesive department. PLCY supports cohesiveness by, among other things, coordinating departmentwide policy and strategy. In the past, however, questions have been raised about PLCY's efficacy. In December 2016, the NDAA codified PLCY's organizational structure, roles, and responsibilities. GAO was asked to evaluate PLCY's effectiveness. This report addresses the extent to which (1) DHS established an organizational structure and processes and procedures that position PLCY to be effective, (2) DHS and PLCY have ensured alignment of workforce with priorities, and (3) PLCY has engaged relevant component staff to help identify and respond to emerging needs. GAO analyzed the NDAA, documents describing specific responsibilities, and departmentwide policies and strategies. GAO also interviewed officials in PLCY and all eight operational components. According to our analysis and interviews with operational components, the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans' (PLCY) organizational structure and efforts to lead and coordinate departmentwide and crosscutting strategies—a key organizational objective–have been effective. For example, PLCY's coordination efforts for a strategy and policy executive steering committee have been successful, particularly for strategies. However, PLCY has encountered challenges leading and coordinating efforts to develop, update, or harmonize policies that affect multiple DHS components. In large part, these challenges are because DHS does not have clearly-defined roles and responsibilities with accompanying processes and procedures to help PLCY lead and coordinate policy in a predictable, repeatable, and accountable manner. Until PLCY's roles and responsibilities for policy are more clearly defined and corresponding processes and procedures are in place, situations where the lack of clarity hampers PLCY's effectiveness in driving policy are likely to continue. Development of a delegation of authority, which involves reaching agreement about PLCY's roles and responsibilities and clearly documenting them, had been underway. However, it stalled due to changes in department leadership. As of May 2018, the effort had been revived, but it is not clear whether and when DHS will finalize it. PLCY does some workforce planning as part of its annual budgeting process, but does not systematically apply key principles of the DHS Workforce Planning Guide to help ensure that PLCY's workforce aligns with its and DHS's priorities and goals. According to PLCY officials, the nature of its mission requires a flexible staffing approach. As such, a portion of the staff functions as generalists who can be assigned to meet the needs of different situations, including unexpected changing priorities due to an emerging need. However, shifting short-term priorities requires tradeoffs, which may divert attention and resources from longer-term priorities. As of June 5, 2018, PLCY also had a number of vacancies in key leadership positions, which further limited attention to certain priorities. According to PLCY officials, PLCY recently began a review to identify the office's authorities in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (NDAA) and other statutes, compare these authorities to the current organization and operations, and address any workforce capacity gaps. Employing workforce planning principles—in particular, systematic identification of workforce demand, capacity gaps, and strategies to address them—consistent with the DHS Workforce Planning Guide could better position PLCY to use its workforce as effectively as possible under uncertain conditions and to communicate effectively with DHS leadership about tradeoffs. Officials from PLCY and DHS operational components praised existing mechanisms to coordinate and communicate at the senior level, especially about strategy, but component officials identified opportunities to better connect PLCY and component staff to improve communication flow about emerging policy and strategy needs. Among the ideas offered by component officials to enhance communication and collaboration were holding routine small-group meetings, creating forums for periodic knowledge sharing, and maintaining accurate and up-to-date contact information for all staff-level stakeholders. GAO is making four recommendations. DHS concurred with three recommendations, including that DHS finalize a delegation of authority defining PLCY's roles and responsibilities and develop corresponding processes and procedures. DHS did not concur with a recommendation to apply the DHS Workforce Planning Guide to identify and communicate workforce needs. GAO believes this recommendation is valid as discussed in the report.