You are given two reports by the government agency.  

Report 1:
The DRC is a vast, mineral-rich nation with an estimated population of about 83 million people and an area that is roughly one-quarter the size of the United States, according to the United Nations. Figure 1 shows the DRC’s provinces and adjoining countries. Since gaining its independence from Belgium in 1960, the DRC has undergone political upheaval and armed conflict. From 1998 to 2003, the DRC and eight other African countries were involved in what has become known as “Africa’s World War,” which resulted in a death toll of an estimated 5 million people in the DRC, according to the U.S. Department of State (State). The eastern DRC has continued to be plagued by violence, often perpetrated against civilians by illegal armed groups and some members of the Congolese national military. Notably, in 2012, an illegal armed group occupied the city of Goma and other cities in the eastern DRC and clashed with the Congolese national army. During this time, the United Nations reported numerous cases of sexual violence against civilians, including women and children, which were perpetrated by armed groups and some members of the Congolese national military. In 2017, the United Nations reported that serious violations of human rights remain widespread in the DRC, including continued acts of sexual violence by government security forces as well as nonstate armed groups. Various industries, particularly manufacturing industries, use the four conflict minerals specifically named in the Dodd-Frank Act—tin, tungsten, tantalum, and gold—in a wide variety of products. For example, tin is used to solder metal pieces and is also found in food packaging, steel coatings on automobile parts, and some plastics. Tungsten is used in automobile manufacturing, drill bits and cutting tools, and other industrial manufacturing tools and is the primary component of filaments in incandescent light bulbs. Most tantalum is used to manufacture capacitors that enable energy storage in electronic products such as cell phones and computers or to produce alloy additives used in turbines in jet engines. Gold is held as bullion by central bank reserves and used in making jewelry and also in the electronics industry, for example, to manufacture cell phones and laptops. In August 2012, SEC adopted its conflict minerals disclosure rule in response to Section 1502(b) of the Dodd-Frank Act. The act required that SEC promulgate disclosure and reporting regulations regarding the use of conflict minerals originating from the DRC and covered countries. In the summary section of the adopting release for the rule, SEC noted that to accomplish the goal of helping to end the human rights abuses in the DRC caused by the conflict, Congress chose to use the Dodd-Frank Act’s disclosure requirements to bring greater public awareness of the sources of companies’ conflict minerals and to promote the exercise of due diligence on conflict mineral supply chains. The SEC disclosure rule addresses the four conflict minerals named in the Dodd-Frank Act from the DRC and covered countries. The rule outlines a process for companies to follow, as applicable, to comply with the rule (see app. II). The process broadly requires a company to 1. determine whether it manufactures, or contracts to be manufactured, products with “necessary” conflict minerals; 2. conduct a reasonable country-of-origin inquiry (RCOI) concerning the origin of those conflict minerals; and 3. exercise due diligence, if appropriate, to determine the source and chain of custody of those conflict minerals, adhering to a nationally or internationally recognized due diligence framework, if such a framework is available for these necessary conflict minerals. If companies choose to disclose that their products are “DRC conflict free,” the SEC disclosure rule requires companies to obtain an independent private-sector audit (IPSA). Our review of companies’ conflict minerals disclosures filed with the SEC in 2017 found that, in general, they were similar to disclosures filed in the prior 2 years. In 2017, a similar number of companies filed conflict minerals disclosures as in 2015 and 2016. Based on our review of a generalizable sample, we found that almost all companies that filed conflict minerals disclosures in 2017 reported performing inquiries about their conflict minerals’ country of origin, similar to the results we previously reported for 2016 and 2015. In their 2017 disclosure reports, many companies described actions they took to improve data collection processes, and most companies indicated challenges in determining the country of origin. Our review of company filings found that almost all companies required to conduct due diligence, as a result of their country- of-origin inquires, reported performing it. SEC issued revised guidance in April 2017, indicating that the SEC’s Division of Corporation Finance would not recommend enforcement action if companies did not report on specified due diligence disclosure requirements. In 2017, 1,165 companies filed conflict minerals disclosures—almost as many companies as filed in 2016 and 2015 (1,230 and 1,281 respectively). Our analysis of a generalizable sample of filings found that an estimated 90 percent of the companies that filed in 2017 were domestic and an estimated 10 percent were foreign companies, similar to the domestic-to-foreign ratio we found in 2016 and 2015. While not all companies reported the minerals used, of those that disclosed this information, an estimated 69 percent reported using tin, 54 percent reported using tantalum, 59 percent reported using tungsten, and 63 percent reported using gold, figures that are similar to the percentages reported in 2016. Our analysis of a generalizable sample of 2017 filings found that, as in 2016 and 2015, almost all companies that filed conflict minerals disclosures indicated that they performed country-of-origin inquiries. Specifically, an estimated 100 percent of the companies reported that they performed such an inquiry, similar to the percentages that we estimated reported doing so in 2016 and 2015. As a result of the inquiries they conducted, an estimated 53 percent of companies reported in 2017 whether the conflict minerals in their products came from covered countries—similar to the estimate of 49 percent in 2016 and in 2015 but significantly higher than the estimate of 30 percent in 2014 (see fig. 2). In the filings we reviewed, many companies indicated they had taken actions to improve their data collection processes, such as gathering missing information about their supply chains and working with suppliers to encourage conflict-free sourcing. In interviews, representatives of selected companies that filed conflict minerals disclosures in 2017 and other industry participants noted that (1) awareness among suppliers about the use of conflict minerals had continued to increase and (2) the process for collecting data on supply chains had become more routine and standardized. However, as in prior years, our review of filings found that most companies reported challenges in determining the country of origin of conflict minerals, in part due to lack of access to suppliers and complex supply chains involving many suppliers and processing facilities. Our review of company filings found that almost all companies that were required, as a result of their country-of-origin inquires, to conduct due diligence on the source and chain of custody of the conflict minerals in their products reported doing so. In 2017, an estimated 96 percent reported conducting due diligence, compared with 96 and 97 percent in 2016 and 2015 respectively. An estimated 87 percent of companies in 2017 reported using a due diligence framework prescribed by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) guidance for conducting due diligence on the source and chain of custody of the conflict minerals in their products. That result is comparable to an estimated 92 percent that we reported in 2016 and an estimated 95 percent that we reported in 2015. The remaining 13 percent of the companies that reported conducting due diligence in 2017 did not specify a framework for their due diligence activities. After conducting due diligence, an estimated 37 percent of the companies reported in 2017 that they were able to determine that their conflict minerals came from covered countries or from scrap or recycled sources, compared with an estimated 39 and 23 percent in 2016 and 2015, respectively. An estimated 47 percent of the companies in 2017 reported that they could not definitively confirm the source of the conflict minerals in their products, compared with an estimated 55 and 67 percent in 2016 and 2015, respectively. However, as in previous years, almost all of the companies that reported conducting due diligence in 2017 reported that they could not determine whether the conflict minerals financed or benefited armed groups. Four companies in our sample reported determining that the minerals in their products did not finance or benefit armed groups in covered countries, and declared some products “DRC- conflict free.” Three of these companies included the required independent private-sector audit (IPSA) report, and one company did not include an IPSA report. Overall, a total of 16 companies filed an IPSA report in 2017, compared with 19 in 2016. In April 2017, the SEC’s Division of Corporation Finance issued revised guidance indicating that it would not recommend enforcement action to the Commission if companies did not report on specified due diligence disclosure requirements. The SEC disclosure rule requires companies, if applicable, to report on their due diligence in a conflict minerals report (see app. II for additional detail on the disclosure requirements). SEC’s Division of Corporation Finance staff told us that they received inquiries from a small number of companies about the filing process for 2017. In response to these inquiries, these staff noted that they advised companies that the companies had the flexibility to determine whether or not to report on their due diligence and to report their country-of-origin inquiry findings in either the Form SD or in a conflict minerals report. However, the Division of Corporation Finance staff also told us that, regardless of the division’s revised guidance, the SEC could still initiate enforcement action if companies do not report on their due diligence, as required by the SEC disclosure rule. In our sample, three companies cited the updated guidance and other statements issued by the SEC in their filings as a rationale for not reporting on due diligence activities. In interviews, representatives of some companies and other industry participants told us that even though the revised guidance and other statements made by the SEC raised some uncertainty about the filing process, generally, companies plan to continue to report similar conflict minerals disclosure information. We identified two new population-based surveys since our last report related to sexual violence in Burundi and Uganda published in 2018; the most recent information for eastern DRC and Rwanda is from 2016. We also identified some new case-file data on sexual violence in the DRC; however, as we reported previously, case-file data on sexual violence are not suitable for estimating an overall rate of sexual violence. We identified two new population-based surveys related to sexual violence that were conducted in Uganda and Burundi in 2016 and 2017, respectively, and whose results were published in 2018. The Uganda Demographic and Health Survey was conducted from June to December 2016 by the Uganda Bureau of Statistics with technical assistance from ICF International. The survey estimated that 12.7 percent of women nationwide, ages 15-49, reported they had experienced sexual violence in the 12-month period preceding the survey, while 21.9 percent reported they had experienced sexual violence at some point in their lifetime. In addition, 4 percent of men nationwide, ages 15-49, reported they had experienced sexual violence in the 12-month period preceding the survey, while 8.3 percent reported they had experienced sexual violence at some point in their lifetime. The Burundi Demographic and Health Survey was conducted from October of 2016 to March of 2017 by the Burundi Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies with technical assistance from ICF International. The survey estimated that 12.7 percent of women nationwide, ages 15- 49, reported they had experienced sexual violence in the 12-month period preceding the survey, while 23.1 percent reported they had experienced sexual violence at some point in their lifetime. In addition, 1.9 percent of men nationwide, ages 15-49, reported they had experienced sexual violence in the 12-month period preceding the survey, while 6.1 percent reported they had experienced sexual violence at some point in their lifetime. The most recent information on the rate of sexual violence for eastern DRC and Rwanda is from 2016 and is discussed in our previous reports. Figure 3 shows the publication dates for the population-based surveys with data on rates of sexual violence in the eastern DRC, Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi that have been published since 2007. State and United Nations entities have provided additional case-file information about instances of sexual violence in the DRC and adjoining countries. State’s annual country reports on human rights practices provided the following case-file data pertaining to sexual violence in the DRC and Burundi: DRC. In 2017, the UN documented 267 adult victims and 171 child victims, including two boys, of sexual violence in conflict. This violence was perpetrated by illegal armed groups as well as state security forces and civilians and was concentrated in North Kivu Province and in the Kasai region, according to State. Burundi. One government organization—Humara Center— responsible for investigating cases of sexual violence and rape received 197 cases of sexual and gender-based violence through early December 2017, according to State. Observers stated many women were reluctant to report rape, in part due to fear of reprisal, according to State. In addition, UN entities reported the following case-file data about sexual violence in the DRC: DRC. In 2017, the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC verified 195 cases of conflict-related sexual violence, with illegal armed groups responsible for 80 percent of the cases and DRC security forces responsible for the remaining 20 percent. United Nations officials we interviewed raised concerns about a resurgence of sexual violence in certain regions in the DRC due to a variety of factors, including political instability arising from the government’s postponement of the presidential election originally scheduled to take place in November 2016. We provided a draft of this report to the SEC, State, and the U.S. Agency for International Development for comment. SEC provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. State and USAID did not provide comments. We are sending copies of this report to appropriate congressional committees and to the Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Secretary of State, and the Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development. The report is also available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-8612 or gianopoulosk@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix III. In this report, we provide information about (1) companies’ disclosures filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in 2017 compared with disclosures filed in the prior 2 years and (2) the rate of sexual violence in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo and neighboring countries published in 2017 and early 2018. To examine the fourth annual company disclosures filed with the SEC in 2017 in response to the SEC disclosure rule, we downloaded the specialized disclosure reports (Form SD) and conflict minerals reports (CMR) from SEC’s publically available Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval (EDGAR) database in September 2017. We downloaded 1,165 filings identified as Form SDs and the CMRs included in EDGAR. To review the completeness and accuracy of the EDGAR database, we reviewed relevant documentation, interviewed knowledgeable SEC officials, and reviewed prior GAO reports on internal controls related to SEC’s financial systems. We determined that the EDGAR database was sufficiently reliable for identifying the universe of SD filings. We reviewed the conflict minerals section of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act) and the requirements of the SEC disclosure rule to develop a data collection instrument (DCI) that guided our analysis of Form SDs and CMRs that contain the information disclosed by the filing companies. Our DCI was not a compliance review of the Form SDs and CMRs. The questions were written in both yes-no and multiple-choice formats. An analyst reviewed the Form SDs and CMRs and recorded responses to the DCI for all of the companies in the sample. A second analyst also reviewed the Form SDs and CMRs and verified the responses recorded by the first analyst. Analysts met to discuss and resolve any discrepancies. We randomly sampled 100 Form SDs from a population of 1,165 to create estimates generalizable to the population of all companies that filed. All estimates based on our sample have a margin of error of plus or minus 10 percentage points or less at the 95-percent confidence level. Because we followed a probability procedure based on random selections, our sample is only one of a large number of samples that we might have drawn. Since each sample could have provided different estimates, we express our confidence in the precision of our particular sample’s results as a 95-percent confidence interval. This is the interval that would contain the actual population value for 95 percent of the samples we could have drawn. We also attended an industry conference on conflict minerals and spoke with company representatives to provide additional perspective. To address our second objective, we identified and assessed any information on sexual violence in the eastern DRC and the three adjoining countries—Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi—that had been published or otherwise had become available in 2017 and early 2018. We discussed the collection of sexual violence–related data in the DRC and adjoining countries, including population-based survey data and case-file data, during interviews with U.S. Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development officials and with representatives of nongovernmental organizations and researchers whom we interviewed for our prior review of sexual violence rates in the eastern DRC and adjoining countries. We also interviewed officials from the United Nations Population Fund and the United Nations Special Representative of the Secretary-General in New York on Sexual Violence in Conflict. In addition, we conducted Internet searches to identify new academic articles containing any additional information on sexual violence published in 2017 and early 2018. We conducted this performance audit from September 2017 to June 2018 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) conflict minerals disclosure rule requires certain companies to file a specialized disclosure report, known as the Form SD, if the company manufactures, or contracts to have manufactured, a product or products containing conflict minerals that are necessary to the functionality or the production of those products. The rule also requires each company, as applicable, to provide a description of the measures the company took to exercise due diligence in determining the source and chain of custody of the conflict minerals, the facilities used to process them, their country of origin, and the efforts made to determine the mine or location of origin with the greatest possible specificity. Form SD provides general instructions for filing conflict minerals disclosures and specifies the information that companies must provide. Companies were required to file under the rule for the first time by June 2, 2014, and annually thereafter on May 31. Figure 4 shows the SEC’s flowchart summarizing the conflict minerals disclosure rule. In addition to the individual named above, Godwin Agbara (Assistant Director), Farahnaaz Khakoo-Mausel (Analyst-in-Charge), Diana Blumenfeld, Andrew Kurtzman, Justin Fisher, Grace Lui, David Dayton, Christopher Keblitis, and Michael McAtee made key contributions to this report. Conflict Minerals: Information on Artisanal Mined Gold and Efforts to Encourage Responsible Sourcing in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. GAO-17-733. Washington, D.C.: August 23, 2017. SEC Conflict Minerals Rule: 2017 Review of Company Disclosures in Response to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission Rule. GAO-17-517R. Washington, D.C.: April 26, 2017. Conflict Minerals: Insights from Company Disclosures and Agency Actions. GAO-17-544T. Washington, D.C.: April 5, 2017. SEC Conflict Minerals Rule: Companies Face Continuing Challenges in Determining Whether Their Conflict Minerals Benefit Armed Groups. GAO-16-805. Washington, D.C.: August 25, 2016. SEC Conflict Minerals Rule: Insights from Companies’ Initial Disclosures and State and USAID Actions in the Democratic Republic of the Congo Region. GAO-16-200T. Washington, D.C.: November 17, 2015. SEC Conflict Minerals Rule: Initial Disclosures Indicate Most Companies Were Unable to Determine the Source of Their Conflict Minerals. GAO-15-561. Washington, D.C.: August 18, 2015. Conflict Minerals: Stakeholder Options for Responsible Sourcing Are Expanding, but More Information on Smelters Is Needed. GAO-14-575. Washington, D.C.: June 26, 2014. SEC Conflict Minerals Rule: Information on Responsible Sourcing and Companies Affected. GAO-13-689. Washington D.C.: July 18, 2013. Conflict Minerals Disclosure Rule: SEC’s Actions and Stakeholder- Developed Initiatives. GAO-12-763. Washington, D.C.: July 16, 2012. The Democratic Republic of Congo: Information on the Rate of Sexual Violence in War-Torn Eastern DRC and Adjoining Countries. GAO-11-702. Washington, D.C.: July 13, 2011. The Democratic Republic of the Congo: U.S. Agencies Should Take Further Actions to Contribute to the Effective Regulation and Control of the Minerals Trade in Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. GAO-10-1030. Washington, D.C.: September 30, 2010.

 

 Report 2:
Several U.S. agencies have roles and responsibilities related to the screening and vetting of NIV applicants, as shown in table 1. Key Visa Adjudication Process Terms Validity period: The length of time during which a nonimmigrant visa (NIV) is valid for use by a foreign national seeking to travel to a U.S. port of entry and apply for admission into the United States. Entries: The number of applications for admission into the country permitted under a single NIV. Reciprocity arrangements: An understanding or arrangement between the U.S. government and another country on the length of time visas issued by either or both nations are valid for admission. There are many NIVs, and for the purposes of this report, we have placed the majority of NIVs into one of seven groups, as shown in table 2. The validity period and number of entries varies depending on (1) the particular NIV and (2) reciprocity arrangement with an individual’s country of nationality, among other factors. For example, a foreign national of one country may be issued a tourist visa valid for 1 year that allows for a single U.S. entry, while a foreign national of another country may be issued a tourist visa valid for 5 years and that permits multiple entries. However, the authorized period of stay—that is, the amount of time that the nonimmigrant is permitted to remain in the United States after being admitted—has no relation to the validity period. For more information on the various NIVs, see appendix I. State is generally responsible for the adjudication of NIV applications, and manages the NIV application process, including the consular officer corps and its functions at more than 220 visa-issuing posts overseas. Depending on various factors, such as the particular NIV sought, the applicant’s background, and visa demand, State officials noted that the length of the visa adjudication process can vary from a single day to months. This screening and vetting process for determining who will be issued or refused a visa contains several steps, as shown in figure 1: Petitions. Prior to State’s adjudication process, some NIVs require applicants to first obtain an approved petition from U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), as shown in table 3. For example, applicants seeking an employment-based NIV or a U.S. citizen’s foreign national fiancé(e) seeking U.S. entry to conclude a valid marriage, must obtain an approved petition from USCIS prior to applying for their NIV. The petitioner (i.e., a U.S. citizen, organization or business entity) completes the petition on behalf of the applicant (i.e., the beneficiary), and the petition would be submitted to a U.S.-based USCIS service center for adjudication. USCIS Background Checks. As part of the adjudication process for visas requiring a USCIS-approved petition before the NIV application is submitted to State, USCIS conducts background checks on U.S.- based petitioners and foreign beneficiaries. For example, petitioner and beneficiary information is screened against TECS—DHS’s principal law enforcement and antiterrorism database that includes enforcement, inspection, and operational records. Further, for U.S. citizens petitioning for a K-1 visa on behalf of their fiancé(e), an FBI fingerprint check may also be required of the U.S. citizen petitioner. If the background checks identify a potential match to derogatory information, the background check unit at the USCIS service center that received the petition is to conduct further research to confirm the match, such as running checks against other government systems and collaborating with other government agencies. If all background check hits have been resolved and documented, and there is no reason not to proceed, USCIS will adjudicate the petition. In fiscal year 2017, USCIS reported that it received about 640,000 petitions for NIVs, and approved over 550,000. NIV Application. After having obtained USCIS approval of the NIV petition, as applicable, the foreign national begins the consular process by completing an online NIV application, known as a DS-160. Upon submitting an application, the applicant can schedule an interview at a post overseas and pays the processing fee. Key Visa Adjudication Process Terms Inadmissible: Individuals are inadmissible to the United States if they fall within the classes of foreign nationals defined as such under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), as amended, Pub. L. No. 82-414, tit. II, ch. 2, § 212(a), 66 Stat. 163, 182-87 (1952) (classified, as amended, at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)), such as foreign nationals who have engaged in terrorist or criminal activities or previously violated U.S. immigration law. If a visa applicant is found inadmissible, and has not obtained a waiver from the Department of Homeland Security, the applicant would be statutorily ineligible for a visa. Ineligible: An individual is ineligible for a visa if it appears to the Department of State consular officer, based on the application or supporting documentation, that the applicant is not qualified to receive a visa under any provision of law. If the consular officer decides that an applicant is ineligible for visa issuance, the refusal may be based on statutory grounds of inadmissibility under INA § 212(a), or may be due to the individual’s failure to otherwise satisfy the applicable eligibility requirements for the particular visa, as defined in the INA. For example, a consular officer may refuse a J-1 exchange visitor visa to an applicant coming to the United States to perform services as a member of the medical profession if the applicant does not either demonstrate competency in oral and written English or hold a degree from an accredited school of medicine, as required of such visa applicants under INA § 212(j). eligibility concerns related to visa applicants. Prior to adjudicating the visa application, consular officers must review all such security check results. Some applicants are not subjected to all of the security checks depending on certain characteristics, such as age and visa category. For example, State does not generally require that fingerprints be collected for applicants who are either under 14 years old or over 79 years old, or for foreign government officials seeking certain visas. As needed, some applicants undergo an interagency review process called a security advisory opinion (SAO), which is a multi-agency, U.S-based review process for certain NIV applicants. For example, SAOs are mandatory in cases of certain security check hits, a foreign national’s background, or a foreign national’s intention while in the United States. In addition, consular officers have the discretion to request an SAO for any visa applicant. Through the SAO process, consular officers send additional information on applicants to U.S.- based agencies, who review that information against their holdings. Department of State data indicate that consular officers made over 180,000 requests for SAOs for NIV applicants in fiscal year 2017. Adjudication. If the consular officer determines that the applicant is eligible for the visa on the basis of the application, supporting documentation, and other relevant information such as statements made in an interview, he or she will take the applicant’s passport for final processing, but the visa cannot be printed until all security checks have been returned and reviewed. If the consular officer determines that the applicant is inadmissible to the United States or otherwise ineligible under the applicable visa eligibility criteria, he or she informs the applicant that the visa has been refused, and identifies the provision(s) of law under which the visa was refused. Recurrent vetting. In March 2010, shortly after the December 2009 attempted bombing by a foreign national traveling to the United States on a valid visa, CBP began vetting individuals with NIVs on a recurrent basis. This program has led State to revoke visas after they have been issued when information was later discovered that rendered the individual inadmissible to the United States or otherwise ineligible for the visa. In addition, CBP analysts may take other actions as needed after identifying new derogatory information, such as recommending that the airline deny boarding to the traveler because the traveler is likely to be deemed inadmissible upon arrival in the United States (known as a no-board recommendation) or making a referral to ICE, which may seek to remove the individual if already within the United States. According to NCTC, KFE also conducts recurrent vetting of NIV holders against emerging threat information. The total number of NIV applications that consular officers adjudicated annually (or, NIV adjudications) peaked at about 13.4 million in fiscal year 2016, which was an increase of approximately 30 percent since fiscal year 2012. In fiscal year 2017, NIV adjudications decreased by about 880,000 adjudications, or about 7 percent. Figure 2 shows the number of applications adjudicated each year from fiscal year 2012 through 2017. Appendix II includes additional data on NIV adjudications related to this and the other figures in this report. Annual Monthly Trends. State data from fiscal years 2012 through 2016 indicate that NIV adjudications generally followed an annual cycle, ebbing during certain months during the fiscal year; however, adjudications in fiscal year 2017 departed slightly from this trend. Specifically, from fiscal years 2012 through 2016, the number of NIV adjudications typically peaked in the summer months. State officials noted that the summer peak is generally due to international students who are applying for their visas for the coming academic year. However, in fiscal year 2017, the summer months did not experience a similar increase from previous months, departing from the trend over the previous five fiscal years, according to State data. Instead, NIV adjudications peaked in December of fiscal year 2017. State officials attributed some of the decline in fiscal year 2017 to a decrease in Chinese NIV applicants, which we discuss later in this report. Figure 3 shows monthly NIV adjudications for fiscal years 2012 through 2017. State data on NIV applications adjudicated from fiscal years 2012 through 2017 indicate that the number of adjudications by visa group, applicant’s country of nationality, and location of adjudication were generally consistent, with some exceptions. Visa Group. From fiscal years 2012 through 2017, about 80 percent of NIV adjudications were for tourist and business visitors as shown in figure 4. The next largest groups were visas for students and exchange visitors and temporary workers, which accounted for an average of 9 percent and 6 percent, respectively, of all adjudications during this time period. Although adjudications for visas in some categories increased, others decreased over time. For example, as shown in figure 5, NIV adjudications for temporary workers increased by approximately 50 percent from fiscal years 2012 through 2017 (592,000 to 885,000). During the same time period, adjudications for tourist and business visitors also increased by approximately 20 percent overall (from 8.18 million to 9.97 million), but decreased from fiscal years 2016 to 2017. However, NIV adjudications for student and exchange visitor visas decreased by about 2 percent from fiscal years 2012 through 2017 (1.01 million to 993,000) overall, but experienced a peak in fiscal year 2015 of 1.2 million. Appendix I includes additional information on NIV adjudication by visa group from fiscal years 2012 through 2017. State officials identified reasons to explain these trends: Temporary Workers. Although there was an increase in adjudications across all types of temporary worker visas, the largest percentage increase was for H-2A visas, which are for foreign workers seeking to perform agricultural services of a temporary or seasonal nature. Specifically, adjudications of H-2A visas increased by 140 percent from fiscal years 2012 to 2017 (from about 71,000 to 170,000). State officials noted that H-2A visas are not numerically limited by statute. Further, State officials stated that they believe U.S. employers are increasingly less likely to hire workers without lawful status and are petitioning for lawfully admitted workers, which in part led to an increase in H-2A visa demand. Tourist and Business Visitors. State officials partly attributed the overall changes to tourist and business visitor visas to the extension of the validity period of such visas for Chinese nationals, which represented the largest single country of nationality for tourist and business visitor visas in fiscal year 2017 (17.7 percent). In November 2014, the United States and the People’s Republic of China reciprocally increased the validity periods of multiple-entry tourist and business visitor visas issued to each other’s citizens for up to 10 years. The change in policy was intended to support improved trade, investment, and business by facilitating travel between the two countries. According to State officials, extending validity periods can create an initial increase in demand for such visas, followed by a period of stabilization or even decline as NIV holders would be required to apply for renewal less frequently. According to State officials, in early fiscal year 2015, the increase in the validity period to 10 years for such visas created a spike in Chinese demand in fiscal year 2015, and by fiscal year 2016, the initial demand for these visas had been met and Chinese economic growth was simultaneously slowing, resulting in fewer adjudications for such visas in fiscal year 2017. State data for this time period indicate that the number of adjudications for tourist and business visitor visas for Chinese nationals increased from 1.58 million in fiscal year 2014 to 2.54 million in fiscal year 2015, followed by a decline to 2.34 million in fiscal year 2016 and 1.76 million in fiscal year 2017. Student and Exchange Visitors. Similar to tourist and business visitors, State officials partly attributed the overall changes in student and exchange visitor visa adjudications to the extension of the validity period of such visas for Chinese nationals, which represented the largest single country of nationality for student and exchange visitor visas in fiscal year 2017 (19 percent). In November 2014, the United States extended the validity period of the F visa for academic students from 1 year to 5 years. State officials noted that similar to tourist and business visitor visas, there was an initial surge in Chinese F-visa applicants due to the new 5-year F-visa validity period that began in fiscal year 2015, but the number dropped subsequently because Chinese students with such 5-year visas no longer needed to apply as frequently for F visas. State data for this time period indicate that the number of visa adjudications for F visas for Chinese nationals increased from about 267,000 in fiscal year 2014 to 301,000 in fiscal year 2015, followed by a decline of 172,000 in fiscal year 2016 and 134,000 in fiscal year 2017. Applicant’s Country of Nationality. In fiscal year 2017, more than half of all NIV adjudications were for applicants of six countries of nationality: China (2.02 million, or 16 percent), Mexico (1.75 million, or 14 percent), India (1.28 million, or 10 percent), Brazil (670,000, or 5 percent), Colombia (460,000, or 4 percent), and Argentina (370,000, or 3 percent), as shown in figure 6. Location of Adjudication. State data indicate that the geographic distribution of NIV adjudications across visa-issuing posts worldwide remained relatively consistent from fiscal years 2012 through 2017. NIV adjudications from visa-issuing posts in the Western Hemisphere comprised the largest proportion worldwide during this time period; however, this proportion decreased from 48.8 percent in fiscal year 2012 to 41.7 percent in fiscal year 2017. During the same time period, the proportion of NIV adjudications at visa-issuing posts in other regions increased slightly. For example, the percentage of NIV adjudications from posts in Africa increased from 3.8 percent to 5.5 percent, and the percentage of adjudications from posts in South and Central Asia increased from 7.9 percent to 11.2 percent from fiscal years 2012 through 2017. Figure 7 provides the proportion of NIV adjudications at visa- issuing posts from each region from fiscal years 2012 through 2017. The percentage of NIVs refused—known as the refusal rate—increased from fiscal years 2012 through 2016, and was about the same in fiscal year 2017 as the previous year. As shown in figure 8, the NIV refusal rate rose from about 14 percent in fiscal year 2012 to about 22 percent in fiscal year 2016, and remained about the same in fiscal year 2017; averaging about 18 percent over the time period. As a result, the total number of NIVs issued peaked in fiscal year 2015 at about 10.89 million, before falling in fiscal years 2016 and 2017 to 10.38 million and 9.68 million, respectively. The NIV refusal rate can fluctuate from year to year due to many factors. For example, according to State officials, removing a large, highly- qualified set of travelers from the NIV applicant population can drive up the statistical refusal rate. State officials also noted that when a country joins the Visa Waiver Program or a visa for certain nationalities increase from 1-year to 10-year visa validity periods, these individuals no longer apply for visas and affect the overall refusal rate. Further, State officials noted that changes in political and economic conditions in individual countries can affect visa eligibility, which in turn affects the overall refusal rate. State officials noted that the degree to which an applicant might seek to travel to the United States unlawfully is directly related to political, economic, and social conditions in their countries. For example, if global or regional economic conditions deteriorate, more applicants may have an incentive to come to the United States illegally by, for example, obtaining a NIV with the intent to unlawfully stay for a particular time period or purpose other than as permitted by their visa, which then would increase the number of NIV applications that consular officers are refusing. From fiscal years 2012 through 2017, the refusal rate varied by visa group. The highest refusal rate was for tourists and business visitors, which rose from about 15 percent in fiscal year 2012 to over 25 percent in fiscal year 2017, as shown in figure 9. Other visa categories, such as foreign officials and employees, transit and crewmembers, and fiancé(e)s and spouses, had refusal rates below 5 percent during this time period. State officials noted that because different visa categories have different eligibility and documentary requirements, they have different refusal rates. For example, F, J, and H visas require documentation of eligibility for student, exchange, or employment status, respectively. According to State data, while the majority of NIV refusals from fiscal years 2012 through 2017 were a result of consular officers finding the applicants ineligible, a relatively small number of refusals were due to terrorism and other security-related concerns. NIV applicants can be refused a visa on a number of grounds of inadmissibility or other ineligibility under U.S. immigration law and State policy. For the purposes of this report, we have grouped most of these grounds for refusal into one of seven categories, as shown in table 4. State data indicate the more than 90 percent of NIVs refused each year from fiscal years 2012 through 2017 were based on the consular officers’ determination that the applicants were ineligible nonimmigrants—in other words, the consular officers believed that the applicant was an intending immigrant seeking to stay permanently in the United States, which would generally violate NIV conditions, or that the applicant otherwise failed to demonstrate eligibility for the particular visa he or she was seeking. For example, an applicant applying for a student visa could be refused as an ineligible nonimmigrant for failure to demonstrate possession of sufficient funds to cover his or her educational expenses as required. Similarly, an applicant could be refused as an ineligible nonimmigrant for indicating to the consular officer an intention to obtain a student visa to engage in unsanctioned activities while in the United States, such as full-time employment instead of pursuing an approved course of study. According to State data, the second most common reason for refusal during this time period was inadequate documentation, which accounted for approximately 5 percent of refusals each year. In such cases, a consular officer determined that the application failed to include necessary documentation for the consular officer to ascertain whether the applicant was eligible to receive a visa at that time. If, for example, the applicant provides sufficient additional information in support of the application, a consular officer may subsequently issue the visa, as appropriate. Our analysis of State data indicates that relatively few applicants— approximately 0.05 percent—were refused for terrorism and other security-related reasons from fiscal years 2012 through 2017. Security- related reasons can include applicants who have engaged in genocide, espionage, or torture, among other grounds. Terrorism-related grounds of inadmissibility include when an applicant has engaged in or incited terrorist activity, is a member of a terrorist organization, or is the child or spouse of a foreign national who has been found inadmissible based on terrorist activity occurring within the last five years, among other reasons. As shown in figure 10, in fiscal year 2017, State data indicate that 1,256 refusals (or 0.05 percent) were based on terrorism and other security-related concerns, of which 357 refusals were specifically for terrorism-related reasons. In calendar year 2017, the President issued two executive orders and a presidential proclamation that required, among other actions, visa entry restrictions for nationals of certain countries of concern, a review of information needed for visa adjudication, and changes to visa (including NIV) screening and vetting protocols and procedures (see timeline in figure 11). Initially, the President issued Executive Order 13769, Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry Into the United States (EO-1), in January 2017. In March 2017, the President revoked and replaced EO-1 with the issuance of Executive Order 13780 (EO-2), which had the same title as EO-1. Among other things, EO-2 suspended entry of certain foreign nationals for a 90 day period, subject to exceptions and waivers. It further directed federal agencies—including DHS, State, DOJ and ODNI—to review information needs from foreign governments for visa adjudication and develop uniform screening and vetting standards for U.S. entities to follow when adjudicating immigration benefits, including NIVs. In September 2017, as a result of the reviews undertaken pursuant to EO-2, the President issued Presidential Proclamation 9645, Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry into the United States by Terrorists or Other Public-Safety Threats (Proclamation), which imposes certain conditional restrictions and limitations on the entry of nationals of eight countries—Chad, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Somalia, Syria, Venezuela and Yemen—into the United States for an indefinite period. These restrictions are to remain in effect until the Secretaries of Homeland Security and State determine that a country provides sufficient information for the United States to assess adequately whether its nationals pose a security or safety threat. Challenges to both EOs and the Proclamation have affected their implementation and, while EO-2’s entry restrictions have expired, the visa entry restrictions outlined in the Proclamation continue to be fully implemented as of June 2018, consistent with the U.S. Supreme Court’s June 26, 2018, decision, which held that the President may lawfully establish nationality-based entry restrictions under the INA, and that Proclamation 9645 itself “is squarely within the scope of Presidential authority.” A more detailed listing of the executive actions and related challenges to those actions brought in the federal courts can be found in appendix III. Our analysis of State data indicates, out of the nearly 2.8 million NIV applications refused in fiscal year 2017, 1,338 were refused due to visa entry restrictions implemented in accordance with the executive actions. To implement the entry restrictions, in March 2017, State directed its consular officers to continue to accept all NIV applications and determine whether the applicant was otherwise eligible for a visa without regard to the applicable EO or Proclamation. If the applicant was ineligible for the visa on grounds unrelated to the executive action, such as having prior immigration violations, the applicant was to be refused on those grounds. If the applicant was otherwise eligible for the visa, but fell within the scope of the nationality-specific visa restrictions implemented pursuant to the applicable EO or Proclamation and was not eligible for a waiver or exception, the consular officer was to refuse the visa and enter a refusal code into State’s NIV database indicating that the applicant was refused solely due to the executive actions. More than 90 percent of the NIV applications refused in fiscal year 2017 pursuant to an executive action were for tourist and business visitor visas, and more than 5 percent were for students and exchange visitors. State data also indicate that the number of applications adjudicated for nationals of the 7 countries identified in EO-1—Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen—decreased by 22 percent in fiscal year 2017, as compared to a 7 percent general decrease in NIV adjudications worldwide that year. For example, as shown in table 5, the decrease in adjudications from fiscal years 2016 to 2017 for nationals of the 7 countries identified in EO-1 ranged from around 12 percent to more than 40 percent. As directed by the executive actions, DHS, State, DOJ, and ODNI took several steps to enhance NIV screening and vetting processes given their responsibilities for implementing the presidential actions. Among other things, the responsibilities included: (1) a review of information needed for visa adjudication; (2) the development of uniform screening standards for immigration programs; and (3) implementation of enhanced visa screening and vetting protocols and procedures. Review of information needed for visa adjudication. In accordance with EO-2, DHS conducted a worldwide review, in consultation with State and ODNI, to identify additional information needed from foreign countries to determine that an individual is not a security or public-safety threat when adjudicating an application for a visa, admission, or other immigration benefit. According to State officials, an interagency working group composed of State, DHS, ODNI, and National Security Council staff was formed to conduct the review. To conduct this review, DHS developed a set of criteria for information sharing in support of immigration screening and vetting, as shown by table 6. According to DHS officials, to develop these criteria, DHS, in coordination with other agencies, identified current standards and best practices for information collection and sharing under various categories of visas to create a core list of information needed from foreign governments in the visa adjudication process. For example, State sent an information request to all U.S. posts overseas requesting information on host nations’ information sharing practices, according to State officials. To assess the extent to which countries were meeting the newly established criteria, DHS officials stated that they used various information sources to preliminarily develop a list of countries that were or were not meeting the standards for adequate information sharing. For example, DHS officials stated that they reviewed information from INTERPOL on a country’s frequency of reporting lost and stolen passport information, consulted with ODNI for information on which countries are terrorist safe havens, and worked with State to obtain information that State officials at post may have on host nations’ information sharing practices. According to the Proclamation, based on DHS assessments of each country, DHS reported to the President on July 9, 2017, that 47 countries were “inadequate” or “at risk” of not meeting the standards. DHS officials identified several reasons that a country may have been assessed as “inadequate” with regard to the criteria. For example, some countries may have been willing to provide information, but lacked the capacity to do so. Or, some countries may not have been willing to provide certain information, or simply did not currently have diplomatic relations with the U.S. government. As was required by EO-2, State engaged with foreign governments on their respective performance based on these criteria for a 50-day period. In July 2017, State directed its posts to inform their respective host governments of the new information sharing criteria and request that host governments provide the required information or develop a plan to do so. Posts were directed to then engage more intensively with countries DHS’s report preliminarily deemed “inadequate” or “at risk”. Each post was to submit an assessment of mitigating factors or specific interests that should be considered in the deliberations regarding any travel restrictions for nationals of those countries. DHS officials stated that they reviewed the additional information host nations provided to State and then reevaluated the initial classifications to determine if any countries remained “inadequate.” On September 15, 2017, in accordance with EO-2, DHS submitted to the President a list of countries recommended for inclusion in a presidential proclamation that would prohibit certain categories of foreign nationals of such countries from entering the United States. The countries listed were Chad, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Syria, Venezuela, and Yemen— which were assessed as “inadequate,” and Somalia, which was identified as a terrorist safe haven. The Presidential Proclamation indefinitely suspended entry into the United States of certain nonimmigrants from the listed countries (see table 7) and directed DHS, in consultation with State, to devise a process to assess whether the entry restrictions should be continued, modified or terminated. In September 2017, State issued additional guidance to posts on implementation of the Presidential Proclamation. As of July 2018, State continues to accept and process the NIV applications of foreign nationals from the eight countries covered by the Proclamation. Such applicants are to be interviewed, according to State guidance, and consular officers are to determine if the applicant is otherwise eligible for the visa, meets any of the proclamation’s exceptions, or qualifies for a waiver. Development of uniform screening standards for U.S. immigration benefit programs. Consistent with EO-2, State, DHS, DOJ, and ODNI developed a uniform baseline for screening and vetting standards and procedures by the U.S. government. According to State officials, an interagency working group comprised of State, DHS, DOJ, and ODNI staff is implementing these requirements. Based on its review of existing screening and vetting processes, DHS officials stated that the working group established uniform standards for (1) applications, (2) interviews, and (3) security system checks (i.e., biographic and biometric). Regarding applications, DHS officials stated that the group identified data elements against which applicants are to be screened and vetted. In February 2018, DHS Office of Policy officials stated that they had taken steps to create more consistency across U.S. government forms that collect information used for screening and vetting purposes, such as State’s DS-160 NIV application as well as 12 DHS forms. For example, officials stated that they anticipate issuing Federal Register notices announcing the intended changes to such forms. Regarding interviews, DHS officials stated that the working group established a requirement for all applicants seeking an immigration benefit, including NIV applicants, to undergo a baseline uniform national security and public safety interview. DHS officials stated that the working group modeled its interview baseline on elements of the refugee screening interview. To help implement this standard, DHS officials stated that the department is offering more training courses in enhanced communications (i.e. detecting deception and eliciting responses) and making such courses accessible to other U.S. government entities and U.S. officials overseas. Regarding security checks, the working group identified certain checks that should be conducted for all applicants seeking an immigration benefit, including NIV applicants. For example, DHS officials stated that the working group concluded that all applicants for U.S. immigration benefits should be screened against DHS’s TECS, among other federal databases. In February 2018, DHS Office of Policy officials stated that they were also exploring the extent to which current screening and vetting technologies can be expanded. For example, technology that is being used to screen applicants for counterterrorism concerns can potentially be modified to screen applicants for other concerns such as public safety or participation in transnational organized crime. However, these officials noted such changes to technology can take a long time. DHS officials stated that each department and agency is responsible for implementing the uniform standards for their relevant immigration programs. For example, with regard to maintaining information electronically, State officials stated that for nonimmigrant and immigrant visas, as of May 2018, they collected most, but not all, of the application data elements. In addition to executive actions taken in calendar year 2017, the President issued National Security Presidential Memorandum 9 on February 6, 2018, which directed DHS, in coordination with State, DOJ, and ODNI, to establish a National Vetting Center to optimize the use of federal government information in support of the national vetting enterprise. This memorandum stated that the U.S. government must develop an integrated approach to the use of intelligence and other data, across national security components, in order to improve how departments and agencies coordinate and use information to identify individuals presenting a threat to national security, border security, homeland security, or public safety. The center is to be overseen and guided by a National Vetting Governance Board, consisting of six senior executives designated by DHS, DOJ, ODNI, State, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Department of Defense. Further, within 180 days of the issuance of the memorandum, these six departments and agencies, in coordination with the Office of Management and Budget, are to jointly submit to the President for approval an implementation plan for the center, addressing, among other things, the initial scope of the center’s vetting activities; the roles and responsibilities of agencies participating in the center; a resourcing strategy for the center; and a projected schedule to reach both initial and full operational capability. On February 14, 2018, the Secretary of Homeland Security selected an official to serve as the Director of the National Vetting Center and delegated the center’s authorities to CBP. DHS Office of Policy officials stated in February 2018 that the center is intended to serve as the focal point of the larger screening and vetting enterprise, and will coordinate policy and set priorities. The center will use the uniform baselines for screening and vetting standards and procedures established per EO-2 to set short- and long-term priorities to improve screening and vetting across the U.S. government. Further, these officials stated screening and vetting activities will continue to be implemented by the entities that are currently implementing such efforts, but roles and responsibilities for screening and vetting for immigration benefits may be modified in the future based on the work of the center. According to DHS Office of Policy officials, efforts to implement National Security Presidential Memorandum 9, such as the development of an implementation plan, are ongoing as of June 2018. Implementation of new visa screening and vetting protocols and procedures. In response to the EOs and a March 2017 presidential memorandum issued the same day as EO-2, State has taken several actions to implement new visa screening and vetting protocols and procedures. For example, State sought and received emergency approval from the Office of Management and Budget in May 2017 to develop a new form, the DS-5535. The form collects additional information from a subset of visa applicants to more rigorously evaluate applicants for visa ineligibilities, including those related to national security and terrorism. The new information requested includes the applicant’s travel history over the prior 15 years, all phone numbers used over the prior 15 years, and all email addresses and social media handles used in the last 5 years. State estimated that, across all posts, the groups requiring additional vetting represented about 70,500 individuals per year. We provided a draft of the sensitive version of this report to DHS, DOJ, State, and ODNI. DHS, DOJ, and State provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until seven days from the report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to the Secretaries of Homeland Security and State, the Attorney General, and the Director of National Intelligence. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-8777or GamblerR@gao.gov. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix IV. There are many nonimmigrant visas (NIV), which are issued to foreign nationals such as tourists, business visitors, and students seeking temporary admission into the United States. For the purposes of this report, we placed the majority of NIVs into one of seven groups. In the following enclosures, we provide a descriptive overview of each group on the basis of our analysis of the Department of State’s (State) fiscal years 2012 through 2017 NIV data. Each enclosure also contains the following: Description of the group. In this section, we provide a narrative description of the group, as well as a table of the specific NIVs that comprise the group. Characteristics of the applicants. In this section, we provide the number of annual NIV adjudications for fiscal years 2012 through 2017, the specific NIVs adjudicated in fiscal year 2017 within the group, the regions to which applicants applied for these NIVs in fiscal year 2017, and the top five nationalities that applied for NIVs in the group in fiscal year 2017. Issuances. In this section, we provide the number of NIVs issued within this group for fiscal years 2012 through 2017. Refusals. In this section, we provide the refusal rate for the entire NIV group for fiscal years 2012 through 2017. For the NIVs that were refused in fiscal year 2017 for this group, we also provide the top ground for refusal. NIV applicants can be refused a visa on a number of grounds of inadmissibility or other ineligibility under U.S. immigration law and State policy. However, across all visa groups, the top categories were either ineligible nonimmigrant or inadequate documentation: Ineligible nonimmigrant. For most NIV categories, the applicant is presumed to be an intending immigrant until the applicant establishes to the satisfaction of the consular officer that he or she is entitled to a nonimmigrant status. An applicant may be refused under this provision if, among other things, the consular officer determines the applicant lacks sufficient ties to his or her home country, or intends to abandon foreign residence; that evidence otherwise indicates an intent to immigrate to the United States permanently; or that the applicant is likely to violate the terms of the visa after being admitted. Inadequate documentation. The consular officer determined that the application is not in compliance with the INA because, for example, it lacks necessary documentation to allow the consular officer to determine visa eligibility. In such cases, the applicant would not be found eligible for the visa unless and until satisfactory documentation is provided to the consular officer or after the completion of administrative processing, such as security advisory opinions. Visa types (FY 2017) (9,968,157 adjudications) Region in which applicant applied (FY 2017) (9,968,157 adjudications) percent from fiscal years 2012 through 2015, and declined by about 13 percent from fiscal years 2015 to 2017. ● The refusal rate for tourist and business visitor visas generally increased each year from fiscal year 2012 through fiscal year 2017. ● The vast majority of refusals in fiscal year 2017 were due to the applicant’s inability to overcome the presumption of his or her intent to immigrate or meet the visa’s eligibility criteria. Issued visas, fiscal years 2012 through 2017 (in thousands) Visa refusal rates, fiscal years 2012 through 2017 (percentage) Visa types (FY 2017) (992,855 adjudications) Region in which applicant applied (FY 2017) (992,855 adjudications) ● The refusal rate for student and exchange visitor issuances decreased each year from fiscal years 2015 through 2017. visas peaked in fiscal year 2016, and slightly declined in fiscal year 2017. ● The vast majority of refusals in fiscal year 2017 were due to the applicant’s inability to overcome the presumption of his or her intent to immigrate or meet the visa’s eligibility criteria. Issued visas, fiscal years 2012 through 2017 (in thousands) Visa refusal rates, fiscal years 2012 through 2017 (percentage) Visa types (FY 2017) (884,667 adjudications) 19% 10% 16% Region in which applicant applied (FY 2017) (884,667 adjudications) ● Generally, the refusal rates for temporary worker years 2012 through 2017. visas decreased from fiscal years 2012 through 2017. ● Department of State officials noted, for example, that H-2A visas are not numerically limited by statute. They also stated that they believe U.S. employers are increasingly less likely to hire workers without lawful status and are petitioning for lawfully admitted workers. ● In fiscal year 2017, temporary worker visas were most frequently refused because the applicant did not provide adequate documentation to the consular officer. Issued visas, fiscal years 2012 through 2017 (in thousands) Visa refusal rates, fiscal years 2012 through 2017 (percentage) Visa types (FY 2017) (330,117 adjudications) Region in which applicant applied (FY 2017) (330,117 adjudications) ● The refusal rates for transit and crewmember visas about 8 percent from fiscal years 2012 through 2017 (from about 295,000 to 320,000). varied over the period of fiscal years 2012 through 2017. ● Specifically, issued C-1/D visas increased over the ● The majority of refusals in fiscal year 2017 were same time period, but the number of issued visas for the remaining visa types in this category have decreased. due to the applicant’s inability to overcome the presumption of his or her intent to immigrate or meet the visa’s eligibility criteria. Issued visas, fiscal years 2012 through 2017 (in thousands) Visa refusal rates, fiscal years 2012 through 2017 (percentage) Visa types (FY 2017) (166,187 adjudications) Region in which applicant applied (FY 2017) (166,187 adjudications) ● The refusal rates for foreign official and employee visas remained under 4 percent. ● In fiscal year 2017, foreign official and employee visas were most frequently refused because the applicant did not provide adequate documentation to the consular officer. Issued visas, fiscal years 2012 through 2017 (in thousands) Visa refusal rates, fiscal years 2012 through 2017 (percentage) Visa types (FY 2017) (68,580 adjudications) Region in which applicant applied (FY 2017) (68,580 adjudications) ● Generally, refusal rates for treaty trader and investor increased over the period of fiscal years 2012 through 2017. visas increased slightly over the period of fiscal years 2012 through 2017. ● Issuances for E-3 visas nearly doubled from fiscal ● The majority of refusals in fiscal year 2017 were year 2012 through 2017, but comprise a small percentage of this category overall. due to the applicant’s inability to overcome the presumption of their intent to immigrate or meet the visa’s eligibility criteria. Issued visas, fiscal years 2012 through 2017 (in thousands) Issued visas, fiscal years 2012 through 2017 (in thousands) Visa refusal rates, fiscal years 2012 through 2017 (percentage) Visa types (FY 2017) (40,533 adjudications) Region in which applicant applied (FY 2017) (40,533 adjudications) ● Refusal rates for fiancé(e) and spouse visas were fluctuated over the period of fiscal years 2012 through 2017, but increased overall during this time period. relatively low during the period of fiscal years 2012 through 2017. ● Most refusals in fiscal year 2017 were due to inadequate documentation from the visa applicant, potentially indicating that such applications failed to include necessary documentation for the consular officer to ascertain whether the applicant was eligible to receive a visa at that time. Issued visas, fiscal years 2012 through 2017 (in thousands) Visa refusal rates, fiscal years 2012 through 2017 (percentage) Nonimmigrant visas (NIV) are issued to foreign nationals such as tourists, business visitors, and students seeking temporary admission into the United States. The Department of State (State) is generally responsible for the adjudication of NIV applications, and manages the application process, including the consular officer corps and its functions at more than 220 U.S. embassies and consulates (i.e., visa-issuing posts) overseas. Depending on various factors, such as the particular NIV sought, the applicant’s background, and visa demand, State officials noted that the length of the visa adjudication process can vary from a single day to months. This appendix provides descriptive statistics of NIV adjudications, issuances, and refusals for fiscal years 2012 through 2017. Specific details are shown in table 8 below. State data from fiscal years 2012 through 2016 indicate that NIV adjudications generally followed an annual cycle, ebbing during certain months during the fiscal year; however, adjudications in fiscal year 2017 departed slightly from this trend. Specifically, from fiscal years 2012 through 2016, the number of NIV adjudications typically reached its highest peak in the summer months, as shown in table 9. For example, State officials noted that a summer peak is generally due to international students who are applying for their visas for the coming academic year. There are many NIVs, and for the purposes of this report, we have placed the majority of NIVs into one of seven groups. Table 10 includes the annual NIV adjudications, issuances, and refusal rates, for each visa group for fiscal years 2012 through 2017. NIV applicants seeking to travel to the United States represent many different nationalities, but the countries of nationality with the most NIV adjudications have remained relatively consistent in recent years. Table 11 provides the top 25 countries of nationality for NIV adjudications for fiscal years 2012 through 2017. NIV applicants can apply for their NIVs at more than 220 visa-issuing U.S. posts overseas. Table 12 describes the regions to which NIV applicants applied from fiscal years 2012 through 2017. NIV applicants can be refused a visa on a number of grounds of inadmissibility or other ineligibility under U.S. immigration law and State policy. For the purposes of this report, we have grouped most of these grounds for refusal into one of seven categories, and group the remaining into a miscellaneous category, as shown in table 13. From January through October 2017, the administration took various executive actions establishing nationality-based entry restrictions for certain categories of foreign nationals from designated countries. This appendix supplements information included in this report to provide a more comprehensive presentation of changes to U.S. immigration policy affecting nonimmigrant and immigrant entry into the United States, and outlines the legal standards applied, and precedent developed and relied upon, by federal courts in resolving challenges to the executive actions. In particular, it describes relevant aspects of the executive actions specifically addressed in this report—Executive Orders 13769 and 13780, both titled Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States, and Presidential Proclamation 9645, Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry into the United States by Terrorists or Other Public-Safety Threats—that imposed visa entry restrictions on certain countries’ nationals and included provisions addressing NIV screening and vetting, as well as other executive actions on immigration issued by the current administration. Furthermore, this appendix provides a detailed account of the interrelated challenges to these executive actions brought in the federal courts through June 2018. In summary, on March 6, 2017, the President issued Executive Order (EO) 13780, Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry Into the United States, which instituted visa and refugee entry restrictions, and an accompanying memorandum addressed to the Secretaries of State and Homeland Security and the Attorney General, calling for heightened screening and vetting of visa applications and other immigration benefits. EO 13780 stated that it is U.S. policy to improve the screening and vetting protocols and procedures associated with the visa-issuance process and U.S. Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP). Enforcement of sections 2(c) and 6(a) of EO 13780 which established visa entry restrictions for nationals of six countries of particular concern—Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen—for a 90-day period, and suspended all refugee admissions for 120 days, was enjoined by federal district court orders issued in March 2017. On appeal, the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Fourth and Ninth Circuits generally upheld these decisions. Upon review by the U.S. Supreme Court in June 2017, the injunction was partially lifted except with respect to foreign nationals who have bona fide ties to the United States Implementation of EO 13780 commenced on June 29, 2017. On September 24, 2017, pursuant to section 2(e) of EO 13780, the President issued Presidential Proclamation 9645, Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry Into the United States by Terrorists or Other Public-Safety Threats. This proclamation restricts entry into the United States of certain categories of foreign nationals from eight countries—Chad, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Somalia, Syria, Venezuela, and Yemen—for an indefinite period. Preliminary injunctions issued by the U.S. District Courts for the Districts of Maryland (Maryland federal district court) and Hawaii (Hawaii federal district court) in October 2017 prohibited implementation of these visa entry restrictions except with respect to North Korean and Venezuelan nationals. On December 4, 2017, the U.S. Supreme Court issued two orders staying these district court injunctions; and on January 19, 2018, the Supreme Court granted the government’s petition for review of the December 22, 2017, decision of the Ninth Circuit, which partially affirmed the Hawaii federal district court’s preliminary injunction. As of June 2018, these latest visa entry restrictions continue to be fully implemented consistent with the Supreme Court’s June 26, 2018, decision, which held that the President may lawfully establish nationality-based entry restrictions, and that Proclamation 9645 itself “is squarely within the scope of Presidential authority.” The following sections describe these executive actions and related litigation in greater detail. On January 27, 2017, the President issued EO 13769, Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry Into the United States, which directed a review of information needs for adjudicating visas and other immigration benefits to confirm individuals seeking such benefits are who they claim to be, and are not security or public-safety threats. To temporarily reduce investigative burdens during the review period, the EO suspended U.S. entry for nationals of seven countries of particular concern—Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen. In addition, EO 13769 put USRAP on hold for 120 days and indefinitely barred admission of Syrian refugees. Shortly after its issuance, however, the EO faced numerous legal challenges in federal courts across the country involving various constitutional and statutory issues such as detainee applications for writs of habeas corpus, alleged religious or nationality-based discrimination, and the extent of the EO’s applicability to certain categories of foreign nationals, including U.S. lawful permanent residents (LPR) and dual nationals holding passports issued by a listed country as well as another nation not subject to visa entry restrictions. On February 3, 2017, the Washington federal district court entered a nationwide temporary restraining order (TRO) prohibiting enforcement of the EO’s entry restrictions. In rejecting the government’s argument that a TRO only cover the particular states at issue, the court reasoned that partial implementation would “undermine the constitutional imperative of ‘a uniform Rule of Naturalization’ and Congress’s instruction that the ‘immigration laws of the United States should be enforced vigorously and uniformly.’” On February 9, 2017, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the nationwide injunction, thereby denying the government’s emergency motion for a stay of the Washington federal district court’s TRO pending appeal, because the government did not show a likelihood of success on the merits of its appeal, or that failure to enter a stay would cause irreparable injury. On March 6, 2017, however, the President issued EO 13780, which revoked and replaced EO 13769, and established revised restrictions on entry for nationals of the same countries of particular concern, except Iraq. On March 6, 2017, the President signed EO 13780, Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry Into the United States, which revoked and replaced EO 13769 and put in place revised visa and refugee entry restrictions, and issued an accompanying memorandum calling for heightened screening and vetting of visa applications and other immigration benefits. In general, sections 2(c) and 6(a) of EO 13780 barred visa travel for nationals of six designated countries—Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen—for 90 days, and all refugee admission for 120 days. On March 15, 2017, sections 2 and 6 of the EO were enjoined on statutory grounds (i.e., based on potential violation of U.S. immigration law) pursuant to the order of the Hawaii federal district court granting the plaintiffs’ motion for a TRO. On March 16, 2017, the Maryland federal district court issued a preliminary injunction barring implementation of visa entry restrictions on a nationwide basis with respect to nationals of the six listed countries. On May 25, 2017, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the Maryland federal district court’s injunction on constitutional grounds (i.e., based on potential violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution). On June 12, 2017, the Ninth Circuit generally affirmed the Hawaii federal district court’s ruling, but vacated the district court’s order to the extent it enjoined internal review procedures not burdening individuals outside the Executive Branch, therefore permitting the administration to conduct the internal reviews of visa information needs as directed in the EO. On June 14, 2017, the President issued a memorandum to the Secretaries of State and Homeland Security, Attorney General, and Director of National Intelligence, directing that sections 2 and 6 of EO 13780 were to be implemented 72 hours after all applicable injunctions are lifted or stayed. On June 26, 2017, the Supreme Court granted, in part, the government’s application to stay the March 15 and 16 injunctions of the Hawaii and Maryland federal district courts, as generally upheld on May 25 and June 12 by the Fourth and Ninth Circuits. The Court explained that the administration may enforce visa and refugee travel restrictions under sections 2 and 6 except with respect to an individual who can “credibly claim a bona fide relationship with a person or entity in the United States.” In the case of a visa or refugee applicant who is the relative of a person in the United States, such foreign national would be exempt from entry restrictions provided the family connection with their U.S. relative meets the “close familial relationship” standard. The Court further explained that a qualifying relationship with a U.S. entity would have to be formal, documented, and formed in the ordinary course, and not for the purpose of evading EO 13780. On June 29, 2017, the day that implementation of EO 13780 began, the State Department issued guidance providing that a close familial relationship exists for the parents, spouse, children, adult sons or daughters, sons and daughters-in-law, and siblings of a person in the United States, but not for such person’s grandparents, grandchildren, uncles, aunts, nephews, nieces, sisters-in-law, brothers-in-law or other relatives. The State of Hawaii filed a motion with the Hawaii federal district court seeking, among other things, a declaration that the partial injunction in place after the Supreme Court’s ruling prohibited application of travel restrictions to fiancés, grandparents, grandchildren, brothers and sisters in-law, aunts, uncles, nieces, nephews, and cousins of persons in the United States. On July 13, 2017, the Hawaii federal district court ruled, among other things, that section 2 of the EO, generally barring travel to the United States for nationals of certain countries, does not apply to the grandparents, grandchildren, brothers and sisters in-law, aunts, uncles, nieces, nephews and cousins of persons in the United States, who were initially excluded from the administration’s interpretation of “close family.” The government appealed this decision to the Supreme Court. On July 19, 2017, the Supreme Court denied the government’s motion seeking further clarification of its June 26 ruling, stayed the Hawaii federal district court’s order to the extent it included refugees covered by a formal assurance from a U.S.-based resettlement agency within the scope of the preliminary injunction, pending appeal to the Ninth Circuit, and left unchanged the district court’s broader formulation of exempt “close family.” On September 7, 2017, the Ninth Circuit upheld the Hawaii federal district court’s definition of close family members who are not to be subjected to travel restrictions, and rejected the government’s argument that refugees who had undergone a stringent review process and been approved by U.S.-based resettlement agencies lack a bona fide relationship to the United States, thus allowing admission of such refugees. On September 11, 2017, the Supreme Court temporarily enjoined aspects of the Hawaii federal district court’s holding that would permit admission of certain refugees with formal assurances from a U.S. resettlement entity. The next day, on September 12, 2017, the Supreme Court indefinitely stayed the Ninth Circuit’s September 7 ruling with respect to refugees covered by a formal assurance, thereby permitting the administration to suspend entry of such refugees. On September 24, 2017, pursuant to section 2(e) of EO 13780, the President issued Presidential Proclamation 9645, Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry Into the United States by Terrorists or Other Public Safety Threats, which expanded the scope and duration of visa entry restrictions from six to eight countries, and from a 90-day to an indefinite period for the listed countries. On September 25, 2017, in light of the September 24 proclamation, the Supreme Court directed the parties to file briefs addressing whether, or to what extent, the cases before it regarding EO 13780 are moot. On October 10, 2017, after receiving the parties’ supplemental briefs, the Supreme Court decided that because section 2(c) of EO 13780 expired on September 24, there was no live case or controversy; and without expressing a view on the merits, the Court vacated and remanded the Maryland case to the Fourth Circuit with instructions to dismiss as moot the challenge to EO 13780. On October 24, 2017, consistent with its October 10 ruling, the Supreme Court also vacated and remanded the Hawaii case related to EO 13780 to the Ninth Circuit with instructions to dismiss it as moot. Consequently, after challenges to EO 13780 visa and refugee entry restrictions, as curtailed by the Supreme Court’s ruling of June 26, 2017, were rendered moot, litigation continued with respect to the President’s proclamation of September 24, 2017. On September 24, 2017, pursuant to section 2(e) of EO 13780, the President issued Presidential Proclamation 9645 (the Proclamation), Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry Into the United States by Terrorists or Other Public-Safety Threats, which imposes certain conditional restrictions and limitations on entry into the United States of nationals of eight countries—Chad, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Somalia, Syria, Venezuela, and Yemen—for an indefinite period. According to the Proclamation, travel restrictions are tailored to each nation’s information sharing and identity management deficiencies based on standard immigration screening and vetting criteria established by the Secretary of Homeland Security, and are to remain in effect until such time as the Secretaries of Homeland Security and State determine that a country provides sufficient information for the United States to assess adequately whether its nationals pose a security or safety threat. On October 17, 2017, the Hawaii federal district court issued a TRO, on statutory grounds, enjoining on a nationwide basis the implementation and enforcement of travel restrictions provided for under the Proclamation, except with respect to North Korean or Venezuelan nationals. On the same day, the Maryland federal district court granted in part plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction, primarily on constitutional grounds, thereby prohibiting implementation of visa entry restrictions nationwide, except for nationals of North Korea and Venezuela as well as other covered foreign nationals who lack a credible claim of a bona fide relationship with a person or entity in the United States. On October 20, 2017, the Hawaii federal district court converted its October 17 TRO into a preliminary injunction, thereby continuing the nationwide prohibition on enforcement or implementation of the suspension on entry for nationals of Chad, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen. The district court did not stay its ruling or hold it in abeyance should an appeal be filed in the Ninth Circuit. On November 13, 2017, the Ninth Circuit granted, in part, the government’s request for an emergency stay of the Hawaii federal district court’s preliminary injunction, thereby allowing visa entry restrictions to go into effect with respect to the nationals of Chad, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen. However, consistent with the Supreme Court’s June 2017 ruling, the court ordered that those with a bone fide relationship to a person or entity in the United States not be subject to such travel restrictions. On November 20, 2017, the government petitioned the Supreme Court for a stay of the preliminary injunction issued by the Hawaii federal district court, pending consideration and disposition of the government’s appeal from that injunction to the Ninth Circuit and, if that court affirms the injunction, pending filing and disposition of a petition for a writ of certiorari and any further proceedings in the Supreme Court. On November 28, 2017, plaintiffs in the challenge to the Proclamation arising out of Hawaii asked that the Supreme Court deny the government’s request to lift the partial injunction left in place by the Ninth Circuit. On the same day, plaintiffs in the case arising out of Maryland requested that the Supreme Court not grant a stay of the federal district court’s preliminary injunction. In both cases, plaintiffs assert that the more expansive visa entry restrictions violate U.S. immigration law; additionally, for the Maryland case, plaintiffs argue that such restrictions are unconstitutional as a form of discrimination based on national origin. On December 4, 2017, the Supreme Court issued two orders staying the Maryland and Hawaii federal district courts’ orders of October 17 and 20 that preliminarily enjoined implementation of the Proclamation, pending decisions of the Ninth and Fourth Circuits in the government’s appeals, and of the Supreme Court regarding a petition for a writ of certiorari (if sought). As a result, the Proclamation’s visa entry restrictions were permitted to go into full effect unless and until they are either enjoined by the courts of appeals and a writ of certiorari is not sought thereafter, or the Supreme Court either denies a petition for certiorari (thereby resulting in termination of the Supreme Court’s stay order) or grants such petition followed by a final injunction prohibiting current or future implementation of the Proclamation’s restrictions. The Supreme Court further noted its expectation that the courts of appeals will render decisions “with appropriate dispatch,” in light of both courts having decided to consider their respective cases on an expedited basis. On December 8, 2017, the Department of State announced that it began fully implementing the Proclamation, as permitted by the Supreme Court, at the opening of business at U.S. embassies and consulates overseas. On December 22, 2017, the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part the Hawaii federal district court’s October 20 order enjoining enforcement of visa entry restrictions under the Proclamation, while limiting the preliminary injunction’s scope to foreign nationals who have a bona fide relationship with a person or entity in the United States. Without reaching plaintiffs’ constitutional claims, the court of appeals concluded that the Proclamation exceeded the scope of authority delegated to the President by Congress under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), in particular, sections 202(a)(1)(A) (immigrant visa nondiscrimination) and 212(f) (presidential suspension of, or imposition of restrictions on, alien entry), by deviating from statutory text, legislative history and prior executive practice; not including the requisite finding that entry of certain foreign nationals would be detrimental to U.S. interests; and contravening the INA’s prohibition on nationality-based discrimination in the issuance of immigrant visas. However, the court stayed its decision, given that the Supreme Court’s December 4 order lifted the federal district courts’ injunctions pending not only review by the courts of appeals, but also “disposition of the Government’s petition for a writ of certiorari, if such writ is sought.” On January 5, 2018, the government filed a petition for a writ of certiorari seeking review of the December 22, 2017, judgment of the Ninth Circuit which left in place the Hawaii federal district court injunction of the Proclamation’s visa entry restrictions for individuals with bona fide ties to the United States. On January 19, 2018, the Supreme Court granted the government’s certiorari petition and will therefore consider, and issue an opinion on the merits of, the Ninth Circuit’s decision. On February 15, 2018, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the preliminary injunction granted by the Maryland federal district court on constitutional grounds, but stayed its decision pending the outcome of the Ninth Circuit case before the Supreme Court. The court of appeals found that “laintiffs offer undisputed evidence that the President has openly and often expressed his desire” to bar the entry of Muslims into the United States. Therefore, the court concluded that, in light of the President’s official statements, the Proclamation likely violates the Establishment Clause as it “fails to demonstrate a primarily secular purpose,” and also goes against the basic principle that government is not to act with religious animus. On February 23, 2018, Fourth Circuit challengers filed a petition for a writ of certiorari seeking for the Supreme Court to consolidate their case with the Court’s ongoing review of the Ninth Circuit decision. These petitioners requested that the Court additionally consider their argument that the preliminary injunction should not have been limited to individuals with a bona fide relationship to a person or entity in the United States. On February 26, 2018, the Supreme Court granted Fourth Circuit petitioners’ motion to expedite consideration of their certiorari petition. On April 10, 2018, the President issued a proclamation announcing that because Chad has improved its identity-management and information sharing practices sufficiently to meet U.S. baseline security standards, nationals of Chad will again be able to receive visas for travel to the United States. On June 26, 2018, the Supreme Court held that the President lawfully exercised the broad discretion granted to him under INA § 212(f) (presidential suspension of, or imposition of restrictions on, alien entry), by issuing Proclamation No. 9645, which established nationality-based visa entry restrictions applicable to categories of foreign nationals from eight (now seven) countries for an indefinite period. In addition, while three individual plaintiffs had standing to bring an Establishment Clause challenge to entry restrictions prohibiting their relatives from coming to the United States, the Court found the Proclamation to be legitimate on its face as a way to prevent entry of certain foreign nationals where the government determines there is insufficient information for visa vetting. As a result of the Supreme Court’s June 26, 2018, decision, which held that the establishment of nationality-based entry restrictions is a lawful exercise of the President’s broad discretion in matters of immigration and national security, the visa entry restrictions imposed on categories of foreign nationals from certain countries pursuant to Presidential Proclamation 9645 continue to be fully implemented , as they have been since the Supreme Court’s December 4, 2017, orders staying the lower courts’ injunctions. On October 24, 2017, the same day the 120-day suspension of refugee admissions under EO 13780 expired, the President signed EO 13815, Resuming the United States Refugee Admissions program With Enhanced Vetting Capabilities, which resumed USRAP and directed that special measures be applied to certain categories of refugees posing potential threats to the security and welfare of the United States. On December 23, 2017, the Washington federal district court issued a nationwide preliminary injunction on aspects of EO 13815 (and its accompanying memorandum), thus prohibiting the administration from: (1) temporarily suspending admission of refugees from 11 previously identified countries of concern, and reallocating resources from the processing of their applications during the 90-day review period (except for those lacking a bona fide relationship with a person or entity in the United States); and (2) indefinitely barring admission of, and application processing for, all following-to-join refugees. On January 5, 2018, the Washington federal district court denied the government’s motion for reconsideration of the court’s December 23, 2017, order temporarily halting enforcement of refugee entry restrictions that were to be implemented as part of the resumption of USRAP under the EO. Specifically, the government “ask the court to ‘modify its preliminary injunction to exclude from coverage refugee applicants who seek to establish a on the sole ground that they have received a formal assurance from a resettlement agency.’” In denying the government’s motion for reconsideration, the court relied on the September 7, 2017, decision of the Ninth Circuit which, among other things, rejected the notion that refugees with formal assurances from U.S.-based resettlement agencies do not meet the Supreme Court’s bona fide relationship standard. The court treated this Ninth Circuit ruling as binding precedent given that the Supreme Court’s indefinite stay of September 12 neither vacated the Ninth Circuit’s decision, nor provided any underlying reason(s) that would allow another court to discern its rationale. On January 9, 2018, the Washington federal district court also denied the government’s emergency motion for a stay of the court’s December 23, 2017, preliminary injunction, pending appeal to the Ninth Circuit. On January 31, 2018, DHS announced additional security measures to prevent exploitation of USRAP. Specifically, these security measures include additional screening for certain nationals of high-risk countries, a more risk-based approach to administering USRAP, and a periodic review and update of the refugee high-risk countries list and selection criteria. Therefore, as of June 2018, while the administration has announced additional security measures to strengthen the integrity of USRAP, the Washington federal district court’s December 23, 2017, preliminary injunction of EO 13815 continues to: (1) prohibit implementation of the temporary suspension of admission, and reallocation of resources from processing applications, of refugees from 11 previously identified countries of concern; and (2) forbid enforcement of the indefinite bar on entry of following-to-join refugees. In addition to the contact named above, Kathryn Bernet (Assistant Director), Colleen Corcoran, Eric Hauswirth, Thomas Lombardi, Amanda Miller, Sasan J. “Jon” Najmi, Erin O’Brien, Garrett Riba, and Dina Shorafa made significant contributions to this report.

Question: Write a one-page summary of the report 1.

Answer: Over the past decade, the United States and the international community have sought to improve security in the DRC. In the eastern DRC, armed groups have committed severe human rights abuses, including sexual violence, and reportedly profit from the exploitation of “conflict minerals”— in particular, tin, tungsten, tantalum, and gold, according to the United Nations. Congress included a provision in the 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act that, among other things, required the SEC to promulgate regulations regarding the use of conflict minerals from the DRC and adjoining countries. The SEC adopted these regulations in 2012. The act also included a provision for GAO to annually assess the SEC regulations' effectiveness in promoting peace and security and report on the rate of sexual violence in the DRC and adjoining countries. In this report, GAO provides information about (1) companies' conflict minerals disclosures filed with the SEC in 2017 compared with disclosures filed in the prior 2 years and (2) the rate of sexual violence in the eastern DRC and adjoining countries published in 2017 and early 2018. GAO analyzed a generalizable random sample of SEC filings and interviewed relevant officials. GAO reviewed U.S., United Nations, and international organizations' reports; interviewed DRC officials, and other stakeholders; and conducted fieldwork in New York at the United Nations headquarters. GAO is not making any recommendations. GAO's review of companies' conflict minerals disclosures filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in 2017 found that, in general, they were similar to disclosures filed in the prior 2 years. In 2017, 1,165 companies filed conflict minerals disclosures—about the same as in 2016 and 2015. Percentages of companies reporting country-of-origin inquiries in 2017 were also similar to the percentages from those 2 prior years. As a result of the inquiries they conducted, an estimated 53 percent of companies reported in 2017 whether the conflict minerals in their products came from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and adjoining countries—similar to the estimated 49 percent in 2016 and 2015 but significantly higher than the estimate of 30 percent in 2014 (see figure). In their 2017 disclosure reports, many companies described actions they took to improve data collection processes, and most companies indicated some challenges in determining the country of origin. Similar to the prior 2 years, almost all companies required to conduct due diligence, as a result of their country-of-origin inquiries, reported doing so. After conducting due diligence to determine the source and chain of custody of any conflict minerals used, an estimated 37 percent of these companies reported in 2017 that they were able to determine that their conflict minerals came from covered countries or from scrap or recycled sources, compared with 39 and 23 percent in 2016 and 2015, respectively. Four companies in GAO's sample declared their products “DRC conflict-free,” and of those, three included the required Independent Private Sector Audit report (IPSA), and one did not. In 2017, 16 companies filed an IPSA; 19 did so in 2016. GAO found information on the rate of sexual violence in the 2017 Uganda and Burundi Demographic and Health Surveys. For Uganda, 22 percent of women and 9 percent of men reported they had experienced sexual violence at least once in their lifetime. For Burundi, 23 percent of women and 6 percent of men reported they had experienced sexual violence at least once in their lifetime. The most recent information on the rate of sexual violence for eastern DRC and Rwanda is from 2016 and is discussed in our previous GAO reports.