prompt_front: You are given a scientific article and a question. Answer the question as concisely as you can, using a single phrase or sentence if possible. If the question cannot be answered based on the information in the article, write "unanswerable". If the question is a yes/no question, answer "yes", "no", or "unanswerable". Do not provide any explanation.

Please answer the questions based on the text provided below. What models are used in the experiment?
Context 1: Introduction
Offensive content has become pervasive in social media and a reason of concern for government organizations, online communities, and social media platforms  One of the most common strategies to tackle the problem is to train systems capable of recognizing offensive content, which then can be deleted or set aside for human moderation  In the last few years, there have been several studies published on the application of computational methods to deal with this problem  Most prior work focuses on a different aspect of offensive language such as abusive language BIBREF0 , BIBREF1 , (cyber-)aggression BIBREF2 , (cyber-)bullying BIBREF3 , BIBREF4 , toxic comments INLINEFORM0 , hate speech BIBREF5 , BIBREF6 , BIBREF7 , BIBREF8 , BIBREF9 , BIBREF10 , and offensive language BIBREF11   Prior work has focused on these aspects of offensive language in Twitter BIBREF3 , BIBREF7 , BIBREF8 , BIBREF11 , Wikipedia comments, and Facebook posts BIBREF2  
Recently, Waseem et  al  ( BIBREF12 ) acknowledged the similarities among prior work and discussed the need for a typology that differentiates between whether the (abusive) language is directed towards a specific individual or entity or towards a generalized group and whether the abusive content is explicit or implicit  Wiegand et al  ( BIBREF11 ) followed this trend as well on German tweets  In their evaluation, they have a task to detect offensive vs not offensive tweets and a second task for distinguishing between the offensive tweets as profanity, insult, or abuse  However, no prior work has explored the target of the offensive language, which is important in many scenarios, e g , when studying hate speech with respect to a specific target 
Therefore, we expand on these ideas by proposing a a hierarchical three-level annotation model that encompasses:
Using this annotation model, we create a new large publicly available dataset of English tweets  The key contributions of this paper are as follows:
Related Work
Different abusive and offense language identification sub-tasks have been explored in the past few years including aggression identification, bullying detection, hate speech, toxic comments, and offensive language 
Aggression identification: The TRAC shared task on Aggression Identification BIBREF2 provided participants with a dataset containing 15,000 annotated Facebook posts and comments in English and Hindi for training and validation  For testing, two different sets, one from Facebook and one from Twitter were provided  Systems were trained to discriminate between three classes: non-aggressive, covertly aggressive, and overtly aggressive 
Bullying detection: Several studies have been published on bullying detection  One of them is the one by xu2012learning which apply sentiment analysis to detect bullying in tweets  xu2012learning use topic models to to identify relevant topics in bullying  Another related study is the one by dadvar2013improving which use user-related features such as the frequency of profanity in previous messages to improve bullying detection 
Hate speech identification: It is perhaps the most widespread abusive language detection sub-task  There have been several studies published on this sub-task such as kwok2013locate and djuric2015hate who build a binary classifier to distinguish between `clean' comments and comments containing hate speech and profanity  More recently, Davidson et al  davidson2017automated presented the hate speech detection dataset containing over 24,000 English tweets labeled as non offensive, hate speech, and profanity 
Offensive language: The GermEval BIBREF11 shared task focused on Offensive language identification in German tweets  A dataset of over 8,500 annotated tweets was provided for a course-grained binary classification task in which systems were trained to discriminate between offensive and non-offensive tweets and a second task where the organizers broke down the offensive class into three classes: profanity, insult, and abuse 
Toxic comments: The Toxic Comment Classification Challenge was an open competition at Kaggle which provided participants with comments from Wikipedia labeled in six classes: toxic, severe toxic, obscene, threat, insult, identity hate 
While each of these sub-tasks tackle a particular type of abuse or offense, they share similar properties and the hierarchical annotation model proposed in this paper aims to capture this  Considering that, for example, an insult targeted at an individual is commonly known as cyberbulling and that insults targeted at a group are known as hate speech, we pose that OLID's hierarchical annotation model makes it a useful resource for various offensive language identification sub-tasks 
Hierarchically Modelling Offensive Content
In the OLID dataset, we use a hierarchical annotation model split into three levels to distinguish between whether language is offensive or not (A), and type (B) and target (C) of the offensive language  Each level is described in more detail in the following subsections and examples are shown in Table TABREF10  
Level A: Offensive language Detection
Level A discriminates between offensive (OFF) and non-offensive (NOT) tweets 
Not Offensive (NOT): Posts that do not contain offense or profanity;
Offensive (OFF): We label a post as offensive if it contains any form of non-acceptable language (profanity) or a targeted offense, which can be veiled or direct  This category includes insults, threats, and posts containing profane language or swear words 
Level B: Categorization of Offensive Language
Level B categorizes the type of offense and two labels are used: targeted (TIN) and untargeted (INT) insults and threats 
Targeted Insult (TIN): Posts which contain an insult/threat to an individual, group, or others (see next layer);
Untargeted (UNT): Posts containing non-targeted profanity and swearing  Posts with general profanity are not targeted, but they contain non-acceptable language 
Level C: Offensive Language Target Identification
Level C categorizes the targets of insults and threats as individual (IND), group (GRP), and other (OTH) 
Individual (IND): Posts targeting an individual  It can be a a famous person, a named individual or an unnamed participant in the conversation  Insults and threats targeted at individuals are often defined as cyberbulling 
Group (GRP): The target of these offensive posts is a group of people considered as a unity due to the same ethnicity, gender or sexual orientation, political affiliation, religious belief, or other common characteristic  Many of the insults and threats targeted at a group correspond to what is commonly understood as hate speech 
Other (OTH): The target of these offensive posts does not belong to any of the previous two categories (e g  an organization, a situation, an event, or an issue) 
Data Collection
The data included in OLID has been collected from Twitter  We retrieved the data using the Twitter API by searching for keywords and constructions that are often included in offensive messages, such as `she is' or `to:BreitBartNews'  We carried out a first round of trial annotation of 300 instances with six experts  The goal of the trial annotation was to 1) evaluate the proposed tagset; 2) evaluate the data retrieval method; and 3) create a gold standard with instances that could be used as test questions in the training and test setting annotation which was carried out using crowdsourcing  The breakdown of keywords and their offensive content in the trial data of 300 tweets is shown in Table TABREF14   We included a left (@NewYorker) and far-right (@BreitBartNews) news accounts because there tends to be political offense in the comments  One of the best offensive keywords was tweets that were flagged as not being safe by the Twitter `safe' filter (the `-' indicates `not safe')  The vast majority of content on Twitter is not offensive so we tried different strategies to keep a reasonable number of tweets in the offensive class amounting to around 30% of the dataset including excluding some keywords that were not high in offensive content such as `they are` and `to:NewYorker`  Although `he is' is lower in offensive content we kept it as a keyword to avoid gender bias  In addition to the keywords in the trial set, we searched for more political keywords which tend to be higher in offensive content, and sampled our dataset such that 50% of the the tweets come from political keywords and 50% come from non-political keywords  In addition to the keywords `gun control', and `to:BreitbartNews', political keywords used to collect these tweets are `MAGA', `antifa', `conservative' and `liberal'  We computed Fliess' INLINEFORM0 on the trial set for the five annotators on 21 of the tweets  INLINEFORM1 is  83 for Layer A (OFF vs NOT) indicating high agreement  As to normalization and anonymization, no user metadata or Twitter IDs have been stored, and URLs and Twitter mentions have been substituted to placeholders  We follow prior work in related areas (burnap2015cyber,davidson2017automated) and annotate our data using crowdsourcing using the platform Figure Eight  We ensure data quality by: 1) we only received annotations from individuals who were experienced in the platform; and 2) we used test questions to discard annotations of individuals who did not reach a certain threshold  Each instance in the dataset was annotated by multiple annotators and inter-annotator agreement has been calculated  We first acquired two annotations for each instance  In case of 100% agreement, we considered these as acceptable annotations, and in case of disagreement, we requested more annotations until the agreement was above 66%  After the crowdsourcing annotation, we used expert adjudication to guarantee the quality of the annotation  The breakdown of the data into training and testing for the labels from each level is shown in Table TABREF15  
Experiments and Evaluation
We assess our dataset using traditional and deep learning methods  Our simplest model is a linear SVM trained on word unigrams  SVMs have produced state-of-the-art results for many text classification tasks BIBREF13   We also train a bidirectional Long Short-Term-Memory (BiLSTM) model, which we adapted from the sentiment analysis system of sentimentSystem,rasooli2018cross and altered to predict offensive labels instead  It consists of (1) an input embedding layer, (2) a bidirectional LSTM layer, (3) an average pooling layer of input features  The concatenation of the LSTM's and average pool layer is passed through a dense layer and the output is passed through a softmax function  We set two input channels for the input embedding layers: pre-trained FastText embeddings BIBREF14 , as well as updatable embeddings learned by the model during training  Finally, we also apply a Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) model based on the architecture of BIBREF15 , using the same multi-channel inputs as the above BiLSTM 
Our models are trained on the training data, and evaluated by predicting the labels for the held-out test set  The distribution is described in Table TABREF15   We evaluate and compare the models using the macro-averaged F1-score as the label distribution is highly imbalanced  Per-class Precision (P), Recall (R), and F1-score (F1), also with other averaged metrics are also reported  The models are compared against baselines of predicting all labels as the majority or minority classes 
Offensive Language Detection
The performance on discriminating between offensive (OFF) and non-offensive (NOT) posts is reported in Table TABREF18   We can see that all systems perform significantly better than chance, with the neural models being substantially better than the SVM  The CNN outperforms the RNN model, achieving a macro-F1 score of 0 80 
Categorization of Offensive Language
In this experiment, the two systems were trained to discriminate between insults and threats (TIN) and untargeted (UNT) offenses, which generally refer to profanity  The results are shown in Table TABREF19  
The CNN system achieved higher performance in this experiment compared to the BiLSTM, with a macro-F1 score of 0 69  All systems performed better at identifying target and threats (TIN) than untargeted offenses (UNT) 
Offensive Language Target Identification
The results of the offensive target identification experiment are reported in Table TABREF20   Here the systems were trained to distinguish between three targets: a group (GRP), an individual (IND), or others (OTH)  All three models achieved similar results far surpassing the random baselines, with a slight performance edge for the neural models 
The performance of all systems for the OTH class is 0  This poor performances can be explained by two main factors  First, unlike the two other classes, OTH is a heterogeneous collection of targets  It includes offensive tweets targeted at organizations, situations, events, etc  making it more challenging for systems to learn discriminative properties of this class  Second, this class contains fewer training instances than the other two  There are only 395 instances in OTH, and 1,075 in GRP, and 2,407 in IND 
Conclusion and Future Work
This paper presents OLID, a new dataset with annotation of type and target of offensive language  OLID is the official dataset of the shared task SemEval 2019 Task 6: Identifying and Categorizing Offensive Language in Social Media (OffensEval) BIBREF16   In OffensEval, each annotation level in OLID is an independent sub-task  The dataset contains 14,100 tweets and is released freely to the research community  To the best of our knowledge, this is the first dataset to contain annotation of type and target of offenses in social media and it opens several new avenues for research in this area  We present baseline experiments using SVMs and neural networks to identify the offensive tweets, discriminate between insults, threats, and profanity, and finally to identify the target of the offensive messages  The results show that this is a challenging task  A CNN-based sentence classifier achieved the best results in all three sub-tasks 
In future work, we would like to make a cross-corpus comparison of OLID and datasets annotated for similar tasks such as aggression identification BIBREF2 and hate speech detection BIBREF8   This comparison is, however, far from trivial as the annotation of OLID is different 
Acknowledgments
The research presented in this paper was partially supported by an ERAS fellowship awarded by the University of Wolverhampton 
Context 3: Introduction
Privacy policies are the documents which disclose the ways in which a company gathers, uses, shares and manages a user's data  As legal documents, they function using the principle of notice and choice BIBREF0, where companies post their policies, and theoretically, users read the policies and decide to use a company's products or services only if they find the conditions outlined in its privacy policy acceptable  Many legal jurisdictions around the world accept this framework, including the United States and the European Union BIBREF1, BIBREF2  However, the legitimacy of this framework depends upon users actually reading and understanding privacy policies to determine whether company practices are acceptable to them BIBREF3  In practice this is seldom the case BIBREF4, BIBREF5, BIBREF6, BIBREF7, BIBREF8, BIBREF9, BIBREF10  This is further complicated by the highly individual and nuanced compromises that users are willing to make with their data BIBREF11, discouraging a `one-size-fits-all' approach to notice of data practices in privacy documents 
With devices constantly monitoring our environment, including our personal space and our bodies, lack of awareness of how our data is being used easily leads to problematic situations where users are outraged by information misuse, but companies insist that users have consented  The discovery of increasingly egregious uses of data by companies, such as the scandals involving Facebook and Cambridge Analytica BIBREF12, have further brought public attention to the privacy concerns of the internet and ubiquitous computing  This makes privacy a well-motivated application domain for NLP researchers, where advances in enabling users to quickly identify the privacy issues most salient to them can potentially have large real-world impact 
[1]https://play google com/store/apps/details?id=com gotokeep keep intl [2]https://play google com/store/apps/details?id=com viber voip [3]A question might not have any supporting evidence for an answer within the privacy policy 
Motivated by this need, we contribute PrivacyQA, a corpus consisting of 1750 questions about the contents of privacy policies, paired with over 3500 expert annotations  The goal of this effort is to kickstart the development of question-answering methods for this domain, to address the (unrealistic) expectation that a large population should be reading many policies per day  In doing so, we identify several understudied challenges to our ability to answer these questions, with broad implications for systems seeking to serve users' information-seeking intent  By releasing this resource, we hope to provide an impetus to develop systems capable of language understanding in this increasingly important domain 
Related Work
Prior work has aimed to make privacy policies easier to understand  Prescriptive approaches towards communicating privacy information BIBREF21, BIBREF22, BIBREF23 have not been widely adopted by industry  Recently, there have been significant research effort devoted to understanding privacy policies by leveraging NLP techniques BIBREF24, BIBREF25, BIBREF26, BIBREF27, BIBREF28, especially by identifying specific data practices within a privacy policy  We adopt a personalized approach to understanding privacy policies, that allows users to query a document and selectively explore content salient to them  Most similar is the PolisisQA corpus BIBREF29, which examines questions users ask corporations on Twitter  Our approach differs in several ways: 1) The PrivacyQA dataset is larger, containing 10x as many questions and answers  2) Answers are formulated by domain experts with legal training  3) PrivacyQA includes diverse question types, including unanswerable and subjective questions 
Our work is also related to reading comprehension in the open domain, which is frequently based upon Wikipedia passages BIBREF16, BIBREF17, BIBREF15, BIBREF30 and news articles BIBREF20, BIBREF31, BIBREF32  Table TABREF4 presents the desirable attributes our dataset shares with past approaches  This work is also tied into research in applying NLP approaches to legal documents BIBREF33, BIBREF34, BIBREF35, BIBREF36, BIBREF37, BIBREF38, BIBREF39  While privacy policies have legal implications, their intended audience consists of the general public rather than individuals with legal expertise  This arrangement is problematic because the entities that write privacy policies often have different goals than the audience  feng2015applying, tan-EtAl:2016:P16-1 examine question answering in the insurance domain, another specialized domain similar to privacy, where the intended audience is the general public 
Data Collection
We describe the data collection methodology used to construct PrivacyQA  With the goal of achieving broad coverage across application types, we collect privacy policies from 35 mobile applications representing a number of different categories in the Google Play Store  One of our goals is to include both policies from well-known applications, which are likely to have carefully-constructed privacy policies, and lesser-known applications with smaller install bases, whose policies might be considerably less sophisticated  Thus, setting 5 million installs as a threshold, we ensure each category includes applications with installs on both sides of this threshold  All policies included in the corpus are in English, and were collected before April 1, 2018, predating many companies' GDPR-focused BIBREF41 updates  We leave it to future studies BIBREF42 to look at the impact of the GDPR (e g , to what extent GDPR requirements contribute to making it possible to provide users with more informative answers, and to what extent their disclosures continue to omit issues that matter to users) 
Data Collection ::: Crowdsourced Question Elicitation
The intended audience for privacy policies consists of the general public  This informs the decision to elicit questions from crowdworkers on the contents of privacy policies  We choose not to show the contents of privacy policies to crowdworkers, a procedure motivated by a desire to avoid inadvertent biases BIBREF43, BIBREF44, BIBREF45, BIBREF46, BIBREF47, and encourage crowdworkers to ask a variety of questions beyond only asking questions based on practices described in the document 
Instead, crowdworkers are presented with public information about a mobile application available on the Google Play Store including its name, description and navigable screenshots  Figure FIGREF9 shows an example of our user interface  Crowdworkers are asked to imagine they have access to a trusted third-party privacy assistant, to whom they can ask any privacy question about a given mobile application  We use the Amazon Mechanical Turk platform and recruit crowdworkers who have been conferred “master” status and are located within the United States of America  Turkers are asked to provide five questions per mobile application, and are paid $2 per assignment, taking ~eight minutes to complete the task 
Data Collection ::: Answer Selection
To identify legally sound answers, we recruit seven experts with legal training to construct answers to Turker questions  Experts identify relevant evidence within the privacy policy, as well as provide meta-annotation on the question's relevance, subjectivity, OPP-115 category BIBREF49, and how likely any privacy policy is to contain the answer to the question asked 
Data Collection ::: Analysis
Table TABREF17 presents aggregate statistics of the PrivacyQA dataset  1750 questions are posed to our imaginary privacy assistant over 35 mobile applications and their associated privacy documents  As an initial step, we formulate the problem of answering user questions as an extractive sentence selection task, ignoring for now background knowledge, statistical data and legal expertise that could otherwise be brought to bear  The dataset is partitioned into a training set featuring 27 mobile applications and 1350 questions, and a test set consisting of 400 questions over 8 policy documents  This ensures that documents in training and test splits are mutually exclusive  Every question is answered by at least one expert  In addition, in order to estimate annotation reliability and provide for better evaluation, every question in the test set is answered by at least two additional experts 
Table TABREF14 describes the distribution over first words of questions posed by crowdworkers  We also observe low redundancy in the questions posed by crowdworkers over each policy, with each policy receiving ~49 94 unique questions despite crowdworkers independently posing questions  Questions are on average 8 4 words long

ground_truth: linear SVM, bidirectional Long Short-Term-Memory (BiLSTM), Convolutional Neural Network (CNN)

linear SVM, bidirectional Long Short-Term-Memory (BiLSTM), Convolutional Neural Network (CNN)

linear SVM trained on word unigrams,  bidirectional Long Short-Term-Memory (BiLSTM),  Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) 

prompt_front: You are given a scientific article and a question. Answer the question as concisely as you can, using a single phrase or sentence if possible. If the question cannot be answered based on the information in the article, write "unanswerable". If the question is a yes/no question, answer "yes", "no", or "unanswerable". Do not provide any explanation.

Please answer the questions based on the text provided below. What is the tagging scheme employed?
Context 2: Introduction
There exists a class of language construction known as pun in natural language texts and utterances, where a certain word or other lexical items are used to exploit two or more separate meanings  It has been shown that understanding of puns is an important research question with various real-world applications, such as human-computer interaction BIBREF0 , BIBREF1 and machine translation BIBREF2   Recently, many researchers show their interests in studying puns, like detecting pun sentences BIBREF3 , locating puns in the text BIBREF4 , interpreting pun sentences BIBREF5 and generating sentences containing puns BIBREF6 , BIBREF7 , BIBREF8   A pun is a wordplay in which a certain word suggests two or more meanings by exploiting polysemy, homonymy, or phonological similarity to another sign, for an intended humorous or rhetorical effect  Puns can be generally categorized into two groups, namely heterographic puns (where the pun and its latent target are phonologically similar) and homographic puns (where the two meanings of the pun reflect its two distinct senses) BIBREF9   Consider the following two examples:
The first punning joke exploits the sound similarity between the word “propane" and the latent target “profane", which can be categorized into the group of heterographic puns  Another categorization of English puns is homographic pun, exemplified by the second instance leveraging distinct senses of the word “gut" 
Pun detection is the task of detecting whether there is a pun residing in the given text  The goal of pun location is to find the exact word appearing in the text that implies more than one meanings  Most previous work addresses such two tasks separately and develop separate systems BIBREF10 , BIBREF5   Typically, a system for pun detection is built to make a binary prediction on whether a sentence contains a pun or not, where all instances (with or without puns) are taken into account during training  For the task of pun location, a separate system is used to make a single prediction as to which word in the given sentence in the text that trigger more than one semantic interpretations of the text, where the training data involves only sentences that contain a pun  Therefore, if one is interested in solving both problems at the same time, a pipeline approach that performs pun detection followed by pun location can be used 
Compared to the pipeline methods, joint learning has been shown effective BIBREF11 , BIBREF12 since it is able to reduce error propagation and allows information exchange between tasks which is potentially beneficial to all the tasks  In this work, we demonstrate that the detection and location of puns can be jointly addressed by a single model  The pun detection and location tasks can be combined as a sequence labeling problem, which allows us to jointly detect and locate a pun in a sentence by assigning each word a tag  Since each context contains a maximum of one pun BIBREF9 , we design a novel tagging scheme to capture this structural constraint  Statistics on the corpora also show that a pun tends to appear in the second half of a context  To capture such a structural property, we also incorporate word position knowledge into our structured prediction model  Experiments on the benchmark datasets show that detection and location tasks can reinforce each other, leading to new state-of-the-art performance on these two tasks  To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that performs joint detection and location of English puns by using a sequence labeling approach 
Problem Definition
We first design a simple tagging scheme consisting of two tags { INLINEFORM0 }:
INLINEFORM0 tag means the current word is not a pun 
INLINEFORM0 tag means the current word is a pun 
If the tag sequence of a sentence contains a INLINEFORM0 tag, then the text contains a pun and the word corresponding to INLINEFORM1 is the pun 
The contexts have the characteristic that each context contains a maximum of one pun BIBREF9   In other words, there exists only one pun if the given sentence is detected as the one containing a pun  Otherwise, there is no pun residing in the text  To capture this interesting property, we propose a new tagging scheme consisting of three tags, namely { INLINEFORM0 } 
INLINEFORM0 tag indicates that the current word appears before the pun in the given context 
INLINEFORM0 tag highlights the current word is a pun 
INLINEFORM0 tag indicates that the current word appears after the pun 
We empirically show that the INLINEFORM0 scheme can guarantee the context property that there exists a maximum of one pun residing in the text 
Given a context from the training set, we will be able to generate its corresponding gold tag sequence using a deterministic procedure  Under the two schemes, if a sentence does not contain any puns, all words will be tagged with INLINEFORM0 or INLINEFORM1 , respectively  Exemplified by the second sentence “Some diets cause a gut reaction," the pun is given as “gut " Thus, under the INLINEFORM2 scheme, it should be tagged with INLINEFORM3 , while the words before it are assigned with the tag INLINEFORM4 and words after it are with INLINEFORM5 , as illustrated in Figure FIGREF8   Likewise, the INLINEFORM6 scheme tags the word “gut" with INLINEFORM7 , while other words are tagged with INLINEFORM8   Therefore, we can combine the pun detection and location tasks into one problem which can be solved by the sequence labeling approach 
Model
Neural models have shown their effectiveness on sequence labeling tasks BIBREF13 , BIBREF14 , BIBREF15   In this work, we adopt the bidirectional Long Short Term Memory (BiLSTM) BIBREF16 networks on top of the Conditional Random Fields BIBREF17 (CRF) architecture to make labeling decisions, which is one of the classical models for sequence labeling  Our model architecture is illustrated in Figure FIGREF8 with a running example  Given a context/sentence INLINEFORM0 where INLINEFORM1 is the length of the context, we generate the corresponding tag sequence INLINEFORM2 based on our designed tagging schemes and the original annotations for pun detection and location provided by the corpora  Our model is then trained on pairs of INLINEFORM3  
Input  The contexts in the pun corpus hold the property that each pun contains exactly one content word, which can be either a noun, a verb, an adjective, or an adverb  To capture this characteristic, we consider lexical features at the character level  Similar to the work of BIBREF15 , the character embeddings are trained by the character-level LSTM networks on the unannotated input sequences  Nonlinear transformations are then applied to the character embeddings by highway networks BIBREF18 , which map the character-level features into different semantic spaces 
We also observe that a pun tends to appear at the end of a sentence  Specifically, based on the statistics, we found that sentences with a pun that locate at the second half of the text account for around 88% and 92% in homographic and heterographic datasets, respectively  We thus introduce a binary feature that indicates if a word is located at the first or the second half of an input sentence to capture such positional information  A binary indicator can be mapped to a vector representation using a randomly initialized embedding table BIBREF19 , BIBREF20   In this work, we directly adopt the value of the binary indicator as part of the input 
The concatenation of the transformed character embeddings, the pre-trained word embeddings BIBREF21 , and the position indicators are taken as input of our model 
Tagging  The input is then fed into a BiLSTM network, which will be able to capture contextual information  For a training instance INLINEFORM0 , we suppose the output by the word-level BiLSTM is INLINEFORM1   The CRF layer is adopted to capture label dependencies and make final tagging decisions at each position, which has been included in many state-of-the-art sequence labeling models BIBREF14 , BIBREF15   The conditional probability is defined as:
where INLINEFORM0 is a set of all possible label sequences consisting of tags from INLINEFORM1 (or INLINEFORM2 ), INLINEFORM3 and INLINEFORM4 are weight and bias parameters corresponding to the label pair INLINEFORM5   During training, we minimize the negative log-likelihood summed over all training instances:
where INLINEFORM0 refers to the INLINEFORM1 -th instance in the training set  During testing, we aim to find the optimal label sequence for a new input INLINEFORM2 :
This search process can be done efficiently using the Viterbi algorithm 
Datasets and Settings
We evaluate our model on two benchmark datasets BIBREF9   The homographic dataset contains 2,250 contexts, 1,607 of which contain a pun  The heterographic dataset consists of 1,780 contexts with 1,271 containing a pun  We notice there is no standard splitting information provided for both datasets  Thus we apply 10-fold cross validation  To make direct comparisons with prior studies, following BIBREF4 , we accumulated the predictions for all ten folds and calculate the scores in the end 
For each fold, we randomly select 10% of the instances from the training set for development  Word embeddings are initialized with the 100-dimensional Glove BIBREF21   The dimension of character embeddings is 30 and they are randomly initialized, which can be fine tuned during training  The pre-trained word embeddings are not updated during training  The dimensions of hidden vectors for both char-level and word-level LSTM units are set to 300  We adopt stochastic gradient descent (SGD) BIBREF26 with a learning rate of 0 015 
For the pun detection task, if the predicted tag sequence contains at least one INLINEFORM0 tag, we regard the output (i e , the prediction of our pun detection model) for this task as true, otherwise false  For the pun location task, a predicted pun is regarded as correct if and only if it is labeled as the gold pun in the dataset  As to pun location, to make fair comparisons with prior studies, we only consider the instances that are labeled as the ones containing a pun  We report precision, recall and INLINEFORM1 score in Table TABREF11   A list of prior works that did not employ joint learning are also shown in the first block of Table TABREF11  
Results
We also implemented a baseline model based on conditional random fields (CRF), where features like POS tags produced by the Stanford POS tagger BIBREF27 , n-grams, label transitions, word suffixes and relative position to the end of the text are considered  We can see that our model with the INLINEFORM0 tagging scheme yields new state-of-the-art INLINEFORM1 scores on pun detection and competitive results on pun location, compared to baselines that do not adopt joint learning in the first block  For location on heterographic puns, our model's performance is slightly lower than the system of BIBREF25 , which is a rule-based locator  Compared to CRF, we can see that our model, either with the INLINEFORM2 or the INLINEFORM3 scheme, yields significantly higher recall on both detection and location tasks, while the precisions are relatively close  This demonstrates the effectiveness of BiLSTM, which learns the contextual features of given texts – such information appears to be helpful in recalling more puns 
Compared to the INLINEFORM0 scheme, the INLINEFORM1 tagging scheme is able to yield better performance on these two tasks  After studying outputs from these two approaches, we found that one leading source of error for the INLINEFORM2 approach is that there exist more than one words in a single instance that are assigned with the INLINEFORM3 tag  However, according to the description of pun in BIBREF9 , each context contains a maximum of one pun  Thus, such a useful structural constraint is not well captured by the simple approach based on the INLINEFORM4 tagging scheme  On the other hand, by applying the INLINEFORM5 tagging scheme, such a constraint is properly captured in the model  As a result, the results for such a approach are significantly better than the approach based on the INLINEFORM6 tagging scheme, as we can observe from the table  Under the same experimental setup, we also attempted to exclude word position features  Results are given by INLINEFORM7 - INLINEFORM8   It is expected that the performance of pun location drops, since such position features are able to capture the interesting property that a pun tends to appear in the second half of a sentence  While such knowledge is helpful for the location task, interestingly, a model without position knowledge yields improved performance on the pun detection task  One possible reason is that detecting whether a sentence contains a pun is not concerned with such word position information 
Additionally, we conduct experiments over sentences containing a pun only, namely 1,607 and 1,271 instances from homographic and heterographic pun corpora separately  It can be regarded as a “pipeline” method where the classifier for pun detection is regarded as perfect  Following the prior work of BIBREF4 , we apply 10-fold cross validation  Since we are given that all input sentences contain a pun, we only report accumulated results on pun location, denoted as Pipeline in Table TABREF11   Compared with our approaches, the performance of such an approach drops significantly  On the other hand, such a fact demonstrates that the two task, detection and location of puns, can reinforce each other  These figures demonstrate the effectiveness of our sequence labeling method to detect and locate English puns in a joint manner 
Error Analysis
We studied the outputs from our system and make some error analysis  We found the errors can be broadly categorized into several types, and we elaborate them here  1) Low word coverage: since the corpora are relatively small, there exist many unseen words in the test set  Learning the representations of such unseen words is challenging, which affects the model's performance  Such errors contribute around 40% of the total errors made by our system  2) Detection errors: we found many errors are due to the model's inability to make correct pun detection  Such inability harms both pun detection and pun location  Although our approach based on the INLINEFORM0 tagging scheme yields relatively higher scores on the detection task, we still found that 40% of the incorrectly predicted instances fall into this group  3) Short sentences: we found it was challenging for our model to make correct predictions when the given text is short  Consider the example “Superglue! Tom rejoined," here the word rejoined is the corresponding pun  However, it would be challenging to figure out the pun with such limited contextual information 
Related Work
Most existing systems address pun detection and location separately  BIBREF22 applied word sense knowledge to conduct pun detection  BIBREF24 trained a bidirectional RNN classifier for detecting homographic puns  Next, a knowledge-based approach is adopted to find the exact pun  Such a system is not applicable to heterographic puns  BIBREF28 applied Google n-gram and word2vec to make decisions  The phonetic distance via the CMU Pronouncing Dictionary is computed to detect heterographic puns  BIBREF10 used the hidden Markov model and a cyclic dependency network with rich features to detect and locate puns  BIBREF23 used a supervised approach to pun detection and a weakly supervised approach to pun location based on the position within the context and part of speech features  BIBREF25 proposed a rule-based system for pun location that scores candidate words according to eleven simple heuristics  Two systems are developed to conduct detection and location separately in the system known as UWAV BIBREF3   The pun detector combines predictions from three classifiers  The pun locator considers word2vec similarity between every pair of words in the context and position to pinpoint the pun  The state-of-the-art system for homographic pun location is a neural method BIBREF4 , where the word senses are incorporated into a bidirectional LSTM model  This method only supports the pun location task on homographic puns  Another line of research efforts related to this work is sequence labeling, such as POS tagging, chunking, word segmentation and NER  The neural methods have shown their effectiveness in this task, such as BiLSTM-CNN BIBREF13 , GRNN BIBREF29 , LSTM-CRF BIBREF30 , LSTM-CNN-CRF BIBREF14 , LM-LSTM-CRF BIBREF15  
In this work, we combine pun detection and location tasks as a single sequence labeling problem  Inspired by the work of BIBREF15 , we also adopt a LSTM-CRF with character embeddings to make labeling decisions 
Conclusion
In this paper, we propose to perform pun detection and location tasks in a joint manner from a sequence labeling perspective  We observe that each text in our corpora contains a maximum of one pun  Hence, we design a novel tagging scheme to incorporate such a constraint  Such a scheme guarantees that there is a maximum of one word that will be tagged as a pun during the testing phase  We also found the interesting structural property such as the fact that most puns tend to appear at the second half of the sentences can be helpful for such a task, but was not explored in previous works  Furthermore, unlike many previous approaches, our approach, though simple, is generally applicable to both heterographic and homographic puns  Empirical results on the benchmark datasets prove the effectiveness of the proposed approach that the two tasks of pun detection and location can be addressed by a single model from a sequence labeling perspective 
Future research includes the investigations on how to make use of richer semantic and linguistic information for detection and location of puns  Research on puns for other languages such as Chinese is still under-explored, which could also be an interesting direction for our future studies 
Acknowledgments
We would like to thank the three anonymous reviewers for their thoughtful and constructive comments  This work is supported by Singapore Ministry of Education Academic Research Fund (AcRF) Tier 2 Project MOE2017-T2-1-156, and is partially supported by SUTD project PIE-SGP-AI-2018-01 
Context 3:  As declining to answer a question can be a legally sound response but is seldom practically useful, answers to questions where a minority of experts abstain to answer are filtered from the dataset  Privacy policies are ~3000 words long on average  The answers to the question asked by the users typically have ~100 words of evidence in the privacy policy document 
Data Collection ::: Analysis ::: Categories of Questions
Questions are organized under nine categories from the OPP-115 Corpus annotation scheme BIBREF49:
First Party Collection/Use: What, why and how information is collected by the service provider
Third Party Sharing/Collection: What, why and how information shared with or collected by third parties
Data Security: Protection measures for user information
Data Retention: How long user information will be stored
User Choice/Control: Control options available to users
User Access, Edit and Deletion: If/how users can access, edit or delete information
Policy Change: Informing users if policy information has been changed
International and Specific Audiences: Practices pertaining to a specific group of users
Other: General text, contact information or practices not covered by other categories 
For each question, domain experts indicate one or more relevant OPP-115 categories  We mark a category as relevant to a question if it is identified as such by at least two annotators  If no such category exists, the category is marked as `Other' if atleast one annotator has identified the `Other' category to be relevant  If neither of these conditions is satisfied, we label the question as having no agreement  The distribution of questions in the corpus across OPP-115 categories is as shown in Table TABREF16  First party and third party related questions are the largest categories, forming nearly 66 4% of all questions asked to the privacy assistant 
Data Collection ::: Analysis ::: Answer Validation
When do experts disagree? We would like to analyze the reasons for potential disagreement on the annotation task, to ensure disagreements arise due to valid differences in opinion rather than lack of adequate specification in annotation guidelines  It is important to note that the annotators are experts rather than crowdworkers  Accordingly, their judgements can be considered valid, legally-informed opinions even when their perspectives differ  For the sake of this question we randomly sample 100 instances in the test data and analyze them for likely reasons for disagreements  We consider a disagreement to have occurred when more than one expert does not agree with the majority consensus  By disagreement we mean there is no overlap between the text identified as relevant by one expert and another 
We find that the annotators agree on the answer for 74% of the questions, even if the supporting evidence they identify is not identical i e full overlap  They disagree on the remaining 26%  Sources of apparent disagreement correspond to situations when different experts: have differing interpretations of question intent (11%) (for example, when a user asks 'who can contact me through the app', the questions admits multiple interpretations, including seeking information about the features of the app, asking about first party collection/use of data or asking about third party collection/use of data), identify different sources of evidence for questions that ask if a practice is performed or not (4%), have differing interpretations of policy content (3%), identify a partial answer to a question in the privacy policy (2%) (for example, when the user asks `who is allowed to use the app' a majority of our annotators decline to answer, but the remaining annotators highlight partial evidence in the privacy policy which states that children under the age of 13 are not allowed to use the app), and other legitimate sources of disagreement (6%) which include personal subjective views of the annotators (for example, when the user asks `is my DNA information used in any way other than what is specified', some experts consider the boilerplate text of the privacy policy which states that it abides to practices described in the policy document as sufficient evidence to answer this question, whereas others do not) 
Experimental Setup
We evaluate the ability of machine learning methods to identify relevant evidence for questions in the privacy domain  We establish baselines for the subtask of deciding on the answerability (§SECREF33) of a question, as well as the overall task of identifying evidence for questions from policies (§SECREF37)  We describe aspects of the question that can render it unanswerable within the privacy domain (§SECREF41) 
Experimental Setup ::: Answerability Identification Baselines
We define answerability identification as a binary classification task, evaluating model ability to predict if a question can be answered, given a question in isolation  This can serve as a prior for downstream question-answering  We describe three baselines on the answerability task, and find they considerably improve performance over a majority-class baseline 
SVM: We define 3 sets of features to characterize each question  The first is a simple bag-of-words set of features over the question (SVM-BOW), the second is bag-of-words features of the question as well as length of the question in words (SVM-BOW + LEN), and lastly we extract bag-of-words features, length of the question in words as well as part-of-speech tags for the question (SVM-BOW + LEN + POS)  This results in vectors of 200, 201 and 228 dimensions respectively, which are provided to an SVM with a linear kernel 
CNN: We utilize a CNN neural encoder for answerability prediction  We use GloVe word embeddings BIBREF50, and a filter size of 5 with 64 filters to encode questions 
BERT: BERT BIBREF51 is a bidirectional transformer-based language-model BIBREF52  We fine-tune BERT-base on our binary answerability identification task with a learning rate of 2e-5 for 3 epochs, with a maximum sequence length of 128 
Experimental Setup ::: Privacy Question Answering
Our goal is to identify evidence within a privacy policy for questions asked by a user  This is framed as an answer sentence selection task, where models identify a set of evidence sentences from all candidate sentences in each policy 
Experimental Setup ::: Privacy Question Answering ::: Evaluation Metric
Our evaluation metric for answer-sentence selection is sentence-level F1, implemented similar to BIBREF30, BIBREF16  Precision and recall are implemented by measuring the overlap between predicted sentences and sets of gold-reference sentences  We report the average of the maximum F1 from each n$-$1 subset, in relation to the heldout reference 
Experimental Setup ::: Privacy Question Answering ::: Baselines
We describe baselines on this task, including a human performance baseline 
No-Answer Baseline (NA) : Most of the questions we receive are difficult to answer in a legally-sound way on the basis of information present in the privacy policy  We establish a simple baseline to quantify the effect of identifying every question as unanswerable 
Word Count Baseline : To quantify the effect of using simple lexical matching to answer the questions, we retrieve the top candidate policy sentences for each question using a word count baseline BIBREF53, which counts the number of question words that also appear in a sentence  We include the top 2, 3 and 5 candidates as baselines 
BERT: We implement two BERT-based baselines BIBREF51 for evidence identification  First, we train BERT on each query-policy sentence pair as a binary classification task to identify if the sentence is evidence for the question or not (Bert)  We also experiment with a two-stage classifier, where we separately train the model on questions only to predict answerability  At inference time, if the answerable classifier predicts the question is answerable, the evidence identification classifier produces a set of candidate sentences (Bert + Unanswerable) 
Human Performance: We pick each reference answer provided by an annotator, and compute the F1 with respect to the remaining references, as described in section 4 2 1  Each reference answer is treated as the prediction, and the remaining n-1 answers are treated as the gold reference  The average of the maximum F1 across all reference answers is computed as the human baseline 
Results and Discussion
The results of the answerability baselines are presented in Table TABREF31, and on answer sentence selection in Table TABREF32  We observe that bert exhibits the best performance on a binary answerability identification task  However, most baselines considerably exceed the performance of a majority-class baseline  This suggests considerable information in the question, indicating it's possible answerability within this domain 
Table TABREF32 describes the performance of our baselines on the answer sentence selection task  The No-answer (NA) baseline performs at 28 F1, providing a lower bound on performance at this task  We observe that our best-performing baseline, Bert + Unanswerable achieves an F1 of 39 8  This suggest that bert is capable of making some progress towards answering questions in this difficult domain, while still leaving considerable headroom for improvement to reach human performance  Bert + Unanswerable performance suggests that incorporating information about answerability can help in this difficult domain  We examine this challenging phenomena of unanswerability further in Section  
Results and Discussion ::: Error Analysis
Disagreements are analyzed based on the OPP-115 categories of each question (Table TABREF34)  We compare our best performing BERT variant against the NA model and human performance

ground_truth: A new tagging scheme that tags the words before and after the pun as well as the pun words.

a new tagging scheme consisting of three tags, namely { INLINEFORM0 }

prompt_front: You are given a scientific article and a question. Answer the question as concisely as you can, using a single phrase or sentence if possible. If the question cannot be answered based on the information in the article, write "unanswerable". If the question is a yes/no question, answer "yes", "no", or "unanswerable". Do not provide any explanation.

Please answer the questions based on the text provided below. Who were the experts used for annotation?
Context 3:  We observe significant room for improvement across all categories of questions but especially for first party, third party and data retention categories 
We analyze the performance of our strongest BERT variant, to identify classes of errors and directions for future improvement (Table 8)  We observe that a majority of answerability mistakes made by the BERT model are questions which are in fact answerable, but are identified as unanswerable by BERT  We observe that BERT makes 124 such mistakes on the test set  We collect expert judgments on relevance, subjectivity , silence and information about how likely the question is to be answered from the privacy policy from our experts  We find that most of these mistakes are relevant questions  However many of them were identified as subjective by the annotators, and at least one annotator marked 19 of these questions as having no answer within the privacy policy  However, only 6 of these questions were unexpected or do not usually have an answer in privacy policies  These findings suggest that a more nuanced understanding of answerability might help improve model performance in his challenging domain 
Results and Discussion ::: What makes Questions Unanswerable?
We further ask legal experts to identify potential causes of unanswerability of questions  This analysis has considerable implications  While past work BIBREF17 has treated unanswerable questions as homogeneous, a question answering system might wish to have different treatments for different categories of `unanswerable' questions  The following factors were identified to play a role in unanswerability:
Incomprehensibility: If a question is incomprehensible to the extent that its meaning is not intelligible 
Relevance: Is this question in the scope of what could be answered by reading the privacy policy 
Ill-formedness: Is this question ambiguous or vague  An ambiguous statement will typically contain expressions that can refer to multiple potential explanations, whereas a vague statement carries a concept with an unclear or soft definition 
Silence: Other policies answer this type of question but this one does not 
Atypicality: The question is of a nature such that it is unlikely for any policy policy to have an answer to the question 
Our experts attempt to identify the different `unanswerable' factors for all 573 such questions in the corpus  4 18% of the questions were identified as being incomprehensible (for example, `any difficulties to occupy the privacy assistant')  Amongst the comprehendable questions, 50% were identified as likely to have an answer within the privacy policy, 33 1% were identified as being privacy-related questions but not within the scope of a privacy policy (e g , 'has Viber had any privacy breaches in the past?') and 16 9% of questions were identified as completely out-of-scope (e g , `'will the app consume much space?')  In the questions identified as relevant, 32% were ill-formed questions that were phrased by the user in a manner considered vague or ambiguous  Of the questions that were both relevant as well as `well-formed', 95 7% of the questions were not answered by the policy in question but it was reasonable to expect that a privacy policy would contain an answer  The remaining 4 3% were described as reasonable questions, but of a nature generally not discussed in privacy policies  This suggests that the answerability of questions over privacy policies is a complex issue, and future systems should consider each of these factors when serving user's information seeking intent 
We examine a large-scale dataset of “natural” unanswerable questions BIBREF54 based on real user search engine queries to identify if similar unanswerability factors exist  It is important to note that these questions have previously been filtered, according to a criteria for bad questions defined as “(questions that are) ambiguous, incomprehensible, dependent on clear false presuppositions, opinion-seeking, or not clearly a request for factual information ” Annotators made the decision based on the content of the question without viewing the equivalent Wikipedia page  We randomly sample 100 questions from the development set which were identified as unanswerable, and find that 20% of the questions are not questions (e g , “all I want for christmas is you mariah carey tour”)  12% of questions are unlikely to ever contain an answer on Wikipedia, corresponding closely to our atypicality category  3% of questions are unlikely to have an answer anywhere (e g , `what guides Santa home after he has delivered presents?')  7% of questions are incomplete or open-ended (e g , `the south west wind blows across nigeria between')  3% of questions have an unresolvable coreference (e g , `how do i get to Warsaw Missouri from here')  4% of questions are vague, and a further 7% have unknown sources of error  2% still contain false presuppositions (e g , `what is the only fruit that does not have seeds?') and the remaining 42% do not have an answer within the document  This reinforces our belief that though they have been understudied in past work, any question answering system interacting with real users should expect to receive such unanticipated and unanswerable questions 
Conclusion
We present PrivacyQA, the first significant corpus of privacy policy questions and more than 3500 expert annotations of relevant answers  The goal of this work is to promote question-answering research in the specialized privacy domain, where it can have large real-world impact  Strong neural baselines on PrivacyQA achieve a performance of only 39 8 F1 on this corpus, indicating considerable room for future research  Further, we shed light on several important considerations that affect the answerability of questions  We hope this contribution leads to multidisciplinary efforts to precisely understand user intent and reconcile it with information in policy documents, from both the privacy and NLP communities 
Acknowledgements
This research was supported in part by grants from the National Science Foundation Secure and Trustworthy Computing program (CNS-1330596, CNS-1330214, CNS-15-13957, CNS-1801316, CNS-1914486, CNS-1914444) and a DARPA Brandeis grant on Personalized Privacy Assistants (FA8750-15-2-0277)  The US Government is authorized to reproduce and distribute reprints for Governmental purposes not withstanding any copyright notation  The views and conclusions contained herein are those of the authors and should not be interpreted as necessarily representing the official policies or endorsements, either expressed or implied, of the NSF, DARPA, or the US Government  The authors would like to extend their gratitude to Elias Wright, Gian Mascioli, Kiara Pillay, Harrison Kay, Eliel Talo, Alexander Fagella and N  Cameron Russell for providing their valuable expertise and insight to this effort  The authors are also grateful to Eduard Hovy, Lorrie Cranor, Florian Schaub, Joel Reidenberg, Aditya Potukuchi and Igor Shalyminov for helpful discussions related to this work, and to the three anonymous reviewers of this draft for their constructive feedback  Finally, the authors would like to thank all crowdworkers who consented to participate in this study 

ground_truth: Individuals with legal training

Yes