prompt_front: You are given a scientific article and a question. Answer the question as concisely as you can, using a single phrase or sentence if possible. If the question cannot be answered based on the information in the article, write "unanswerable". If the question is a yes/no question, answer "yes", "no", or "unanswerable". Do not provide any explanation.

Please answer the questions based on the text provided below. Who were the experts used for annotation?
Context 1: Introduction
Privacy policies are the documents which disclose the ways in which a company gathers, uses, shares and manages a user's data  As legal documents, they function using the principle of notice and choice BIBREF0, where companies post their policies, and theoretically, users read the policies and decide to use a company's products or services only if they find the conditions outlined in its privacy policy acceptable  Many legal jurisdictions around the world accept this framework, including the United States and the European Union BIBREF1, BIBREF2  However, the legitimacy of this framework depends upon users actually reading and understanding privacy policies to determine whether company practices are acceptable to them BIBREF3  In practice this is seldom the case BIBREF4, BIBREF5, BIBREF6, BIBREF7, BIBREF8, BIBREF9, BIBREF10  This is further complicated by the highly individual and nuanced compromises that users are willing to make with their data BIBREF11, discouraging a `one-size-fits-all' approach to notice of data practices in privacy documents 
With devices constantly monitoring our environment, including our personal space and our bodies, lack of awareness of how our data is being used easily leads to problematic situations where users are outraged by information misuse, but companies insist that users have consented  The discovery of increasingly egregious uses of data by companies, such as the scandals involving Facebook and Cambridge Analytica BIBREF12, have further brought public attention to the privacy concerns of the internet and ubiquitous computing  This makes privacy a well-motivated application domain for NLP researchers, where advances in enabling users to quickly identify the privacy issues most salient to them can potentially have large real-world impact 
[1]https://play google com/store/apps/details?id=com gotokeep keep intl [2]https://play google com/store/apps/details?id=com viber voip [3]A question might not have any supporting evidence for an answer within the privacy policy 
Motivated by this need, we contribute PrivacyQA, a corpus consisting of 1750 questions about the contents of privacy policies, paired with over 3500 expert annotations  The goal of this effort is to kickstart the development of question-answering methods for this domain, to address the (unrealistic) expectation that a large population should be reading many policies per day  In doing so, we identify several understudied challenges to our ability to answer these questions, with broad implications for systems seeking to serve users' information-seeking intent  By releasing this resource, we hope to provide an impetus to develop systems capable of language understanding in this increasingly important domain 
Related Work
Prior work has aimed to make privacy policies easier to understand  Prescriptive approaches towards communicating privacy information BIBREF21, BIBREF22, BIBREF23 have not been widely adopted by industry  Recently, there have been significant research effort devoted to understanding privacy policies by leveraging NLP techniques BIBREF24, BIBREF25, BIBREF26, BIBREF27, BIBREF28, especially by identifying specific data practices within a privacy policy  We adopt a personalized approach to understanding privacy policies, that allows users to query a document and selectively explore content salient to them  Most similar is the PolisisQA corpus BIBREF29, which examines questions users ask corporations on Twitter  Our approach differs in several ways: 1) The PrivacyQA dataset is larger, containing 10x as many questions and answers  2) Answers are formulated by domain experts with legal training  3) PrivacyQA includes diverse question types, including unanswerable and subjective questions 
Our work is also related to reading comprehension in the open domain, which is frequently based upon Wikipedia passages BIBREF16, BIBREF17, BIBREF15, BIBREF30 and news articles BIBREF20, BIBREF31, BIBREF32  Table TABREF4 presents the desirable attributes our dataset shares with past approaches  This work is also tied into research in applying NLP approaches to legal documents BIBREF33, BIBREF34, BIBREF35, BIBREF36, BIBREF37, BIBREF38, BIBREF39  While privacy policies have legal implications, their intended audience consists of the general public rather than individuals with legal expertise  This arrangement is problematic because the entities that write privacy policies often have different goals than the audience  feng2015applying, tan-EtAl:2016:P16-1 examine question answering in the insurance domain, another specialized domain similar to privacy, where the intended audience is the general public 
Data Collection
We describe the data collection methodology used to construct PrivacyQA  With the goal of achieving broad coverage across application types, we collect privacy policies from 35 mobile applications representing a number of different categories in the Google Play Store  One of our goals is to include both policies from well-known applications, which are likely to have carefully-constructed privacy policies, and lesser-known applications with smaller install bases, whose policies might be considerably less sophisticated  Thus, setting 5 million installs as a threshold, we ensure each category includes applications with installs on both sides of this threshold  All policies included in the corpus are in English, and were collected before April 1, 2018, predating many companies' GDPR-focused BIBREF41 updates  We leave it to future studies BIBREF42 to look at the impact of the GDPR (e g , to what extent GDPR requirements contribute to making it possible to provide users with more informative answers, and to what extent their disclosures continue to omit issues that matter to users) 
Data Collection ::: Crowdsourced Question Elicitation
The intended audience for privacy policies consists of the general public  This informs the decision to elicit questions from crowdworkers on the contents of privacy policies  We choose not to show the contents of privacy policies to crowdworkers, a procedure motivated by a desire to avoid inadvertent biases BIBREF43, BIBREF44, BIBREF45, BIBREF46, BIBREF47, and encourage crowdworkers to ask a variety of questions beyond only asking questions based on practices described in the document 
Instead, crowdworkers are presented with public information about a mobile application available on the Google Play Store including its name, description and navigable screenshots  Figure FIGREF9 shows an example of our user interface  Crowdworkers are asked to imagine they have access to a trusted third-party privacy assistant, to whom they can ask any privacy question about a given mobile application  We use the Amazon Mechanical Turk platform and recruit crowdworkers who have been conferred “master” status and are located within the United States of America  Turkers are asked to provide five questions per mobile application, and are paid $2 per assignment, taking ~eight minutes to complete the task 
Data Collection ::: Answer Selection
To identify legally sound answers, we recruit seven experts with legal training to construct answers to Turker questions  Experts identify relevant evidence within the privacy policy, as well as provide meta-annotation on the question's relevance, subjectivity, OPP-115 category BIBREF49, and how likely any privacy policy is to contain the answer to the question asked 
Data Collection ::: Analysis
Table TABREF17 presents aggregate statistics of the PrivacyQA dataset  1750 questions are posed to our imaginary privacy assistant over 35 mobile applications and their associated privacy documents  As an initial step, we formulate the problem of answering user questions as an extractive sentence selection task, ignoring for now background knowledge, statistical data and legal expertise that could otherwise be brought to bear  The dataset is partitioned into a training set featuring 27 mobile applications and 1350 questions, and a test set consisting of 400 questions over 8 policy documents  This ensures that documents in training and test splits are mutually exclusive  Every question is answered by at least one expert  In addition, in order to estimate annotation reliability and provide for better evaluation, every question in the test set is answered by at least two additional experts 
Table TABREF14 describes the distribution over first words of questions posed by crowdworkers  We also observe low redundancy in the questions posed by crowdworkers over each policy, with each policy receiving ~49 94 unique questions despite crowdworkers independently posing questions  Questions are on average 8 4 words long  As declining to answer a question can be a legally sound response but is seldom practically useful, answers to questions where a minority of experts abstain to answer are filtered from the dataset  Privacy policies are ~3000 words long on average  The answers to the question asked by the users typically have ~100 words of evidence in the privacy policy document 
Data Collection ::: Analysis ::: Categories of Questions
Questions are organized under nine categories from the OPP-115 Corpus annotation scheme BIBREF49:
First Party Collection/Use: What, why and how information is collected by the service provider
Third Party Sharing/Collection: What, why and how information shared with or collected by third parties
Data Security: Protection measures for user information
Data Retention: How long user information will be stored
User Choice/Control: Control options available to users
User Access, Edit and Deletion: If/how users can access, edit or delete information
Policy Change: Informing users if policy information has been changed
International and Specific Audiences: Practices pertaining to a specific group of users
Other: General text, contact information or practices not covered by other categories 
For each question, domain experts indicate one or more relevant OPP-115 categories  We mark a category as relevant to a question if it is identified as such by at least two annotators  If no such category exists, the category is marked as `Other' if atleast one annotator has identified the `Other' category to be relevant  If neither of these conditions is satisfied, we label the question as having no agreement  The distribution of questions in the corpus across OPP-115 categories is as shown in Table TABREF16  First party and third party related questions are the largest categories, forming nearly 66 4% of all questions asked to the privacy assistant 
Data Collection ::: Analysis ::: Answer Validation
When do experts disagree? We would like to analyze the reasons for potential disagreement on the annotation task, to ensure disagreements arise due to valid differences in opinion rather than lack of adequate specification in annotation guidelines  It is important to note that the annotators are experts rather than crowdworkers  Accordingly, their judgements can be considered valid, legally-informed opinions even when their perspectives differ  For the sake of this question we randomly sample 100 instances in the test data and analyze them for likely reasons for disagreements  We consider a disagreement to have occurred when more than one expert does not agree with the majority consensus  By disagreement we mean there is no overlap between the text identified as relevant by one expert and another 
We find that the annotators agree on the answer for 74% of the questions, even if the supporting evidence they identify is not identical i e full overlap  They disagree on the remaining 26%  Sources of apparent disagreement correspond to situations when different experts: have differing interpretations of question intent (11%) (for example, when a user asks 'who can contact me through the app', the questions admits multiple interpretations, including seeking information about the features of the app, asking about first party collection/use of data or asking about third party collection/use of data), identify different sources of evidence for questions that ask if a practice is performed or not (4%), have differing interpretations of policy content (3%), identify a partial answer to a question in the privacy policy (2%) (for example, when the user asks `who is allowed to use the app' a majority of our annotators decline to answer, but the remaining annotators highlight partial evidence in the privacy policy which states that children under the age of 13 are not allowed to use the app), and other legitimate sources of disagreement (6%) which include personal subjective views of the annotators (for example, when the user asks `is my DNA information used in any way other than what is specified', some experts consider the boilerplate text of the privacy policy which states that it abides to practices described in the policy document as sufficient evidence to answer this question, whereas others do not) 
Experimental Setup
We evaluate the ability of machine learning methods to identify relevant evidence for questions in the privacy domain  We establish baselines for the subtask of deciding on the answerability (§SECREF33) of a question, as well as the overall task of identifying evidence for questions from policies (§SECREF37)  We describe aspects of the question that can render it unanswerable within the privacy domain (§SECREF41) 
Experimental Setup ::: Answerability Identification Baselines
We define answerability identification as a binary classification task, evaluating model ability to predict if a question can be answered, given a question in isolation  This can serve as a prior for downstream question-answering  We describe three baselines on the answerability task, and find they considerably improve performance over a majority-class baseline 
SVM: We define 3 sets of features to characterize each question  The first is a simple bag-of-words set of features over the question (SVM-BOW), the second is bag-of-words features of the question as well as length of the question in words (SVM-BOW + LEN), and lastly we extract bag-of-words features, length of the question in words as well as part-of-speech tags for the question (SVM-BOW + LEN + POS)  This results in vectors of 200, 201 and 228 dimensions respectively, which are provided to an SVM with a linear kernel 
CNN: We utilize a CNN neural encoder for answerability prediction  We use GloVe word embeddings BIBREF50, and a filter size of 5 with 64 filters to encode questions 
BERT: BERT BIBREF51 is a bidirectional transformer-based language-model BIBREF52  We fine-tune BERT-base on our binary answerability identification task with a learning rate of 2e-5 for 3 epochs, with a maximum sequence length of 128 
Experimental Setup ::: Privacy Question Answering
Our goal is to identify evidence within a privacy policy for questions asked by a user  This is framed as an answer sentence selection task, where models identify a set of evidence sentences from all candidate sentences in each policy 
Experimental Setup ::: Privacy Question Answering ::: Evaluation Metric
Our evaluation metric for answer-sentence selection is sentence-level F1, implemented similar to BIBREF30, BIBREF16  Precision and recall are implemented by measuring the overlap between predicted sentences and sets of gold-reference sentences  We report the average of the maximum F1 from each n$-$1 subset, in relation to the heldout reference 
Experimental Setup ::: Privacy Question Answering ::: Baselines
We describe baselines on this task, including a human performance baseline 
No-Answer Baseline (NA) : Most of the questions we receive are difficult to answer in a legally-sound way on the basis of information present in the privacy policy  We establish a simple baseline to quantify the effect of identifying every question as unanswerable 
Word Count Baseline : To quantify the effect of using simple lexical matching to answer the questions, we retrieve the top candidate policy sentences for each question using a word count baseline BIBREF53, which counts the number of question words that also appear in a sentence  We include the top 2, 3 and 5 candidates as baselines 
BERT: We implement two BERT-based baselines BIBREF51 for evidence identification  First, we train BERT on each query-policy sentence pair as a binary classification task to identify if the sentence is evidence for the question or not (Bert)  We also experiment with a two-stage classifier, where we separately train the model on questions only to predict answerability  At inference time, if the answerable classifier predicts the question is answerable, the evidence identification classifier produces a set of candidate sentences (Bert + Unanswerable) 
Human Performance: We pick each reference answer provided by an annotator, and compute the F1 with respect to the remaining references, as described in section 4 2 1  Each reference answer is treated as the prediction, and the remaining n-1 answers are treated as the gold reference  The average of the maximum F1 across all reference answers is computed as the human baseline 
Results and Discussion
The results of the answerability baselines are presented in Table TABREF31, and on answer sentence selection in Table TABREF32  We observe that bert exhibits the best performance on a binary answerability identification task  However, most baselines considerably exceed the performance of a majority-class baseline  This suggests considerable information in the question, indicating it's possible answerability within this domain 
Table TABREF32 describes the performance of our baselines on the answer sentence selection task  The No-answer (NA) baseline performs at 28 F1, providing a lower bound on performance at this task  We observe that our best-performing baseline, Bert + Unanswerable achieves an F1 of 39 8  This suggest that bert is capable of making some progress towards answering questions in this difficult domain, while still leaving considerable headroom for improvement to reach human performance  Bert + Unanswerable performance suggests that incorporating information about answerability can help in this difficult domain  We examine this challenging phenomena of unanswerability further in Section  
Results and Discussion ::: Error Analysis
Disagreements are analyzed based on the OPP-115 categories of each question (Table TABREF34)  We compare our best performing BERT variant against the NA model and human performance  We observe significant room for improvement across all categories of questions but especially for first party, third party and data retention categories 
We analyze the performance of our strongest BERT variant, to identify classes of errors and directions for future improvement (Table 8)  We observe that a majority of answerability mistakes made by the BERT model are questions which are in fact answerable, but are identified as unanswerable by BERT  We observe that BERT makes 124 such mistakes on the test set  We collect expert judgments on relevance, subjectivity , silence and information about how likely the question is to be answered from the privacy policy from our experts  We find that most of these mistakes are relevant questions  However many of them were identified as subjective by the annotators, and at least one annotator marked 19 of these questions as having no answer within the privacy policy  However, only 6 of these questions were unexpected or do not usually have an answer in privacy policies  These findings suggest that a more nuanced understanding of answerability might help improve model performance in his challenging domain 
Results and Discussion ::: What makes Questions Unanswerable?
We further ask legal experts to identify potential causes of unanswerability of questions  This analysis has considerable implications  While past work BIBREF17 has treated unanswerable questions as homogeneous, a question answering system might wish to have different treatments for different categories of `unanswerable' questions  The following factors were identified to play a role in unanswerability:
Incomprehensibility: If a question is incomprehensible to the extent that its meaning is not intelligible 
Relevance: Is this question in the scope of what could be answered by reading the privacy policy 
Ill-formedness: Is this question ambiguous or vague  An ambiguous statement will typically contain expressions that can refer to multiple potential explanations, whereas a vague statement carries a concept with an unclear or soft definition 
Silence: Other policies answer this type of question but this one does not 
Atypicality: The question is of a nature such that it is unlikely for any policy policy to have an answer to the question 
Our experts attempt to identify the different `unanswerable' factors for all 573 such questions in the corpus  4 18% of the questions were identified as being incomprehensible (for example, `any difficulties to occupy the privacy assistant')  Amongst the comprehendable questions, 50% were identified as likely to have an answer within the privacy policy, 33 1% were identified as being privacy-related questions but not within the scope of a privacy policy (e g , 'has Viber had any privacy breaches in the past?') and 16 9% of questions were identified as completely out-of-scope (e g , `'will the app consume much space?')  In the questions identified as relevant, 32% were ill-formed questions that were phrased by the user in a manner considered vague or ambiguous  Of the questions that were both relevant as well as `well-formed', 95 7% of the questions were not answered by the policy in question but it was reasonable to expect that a privacy policy would contain an answer  The remaining 4 3% were described as reasonable questions, but of a nature generally not discussed in privacy policies  This suggests that the answerability of questions over privacy policies is a complex issue, and future systems should consider each of these factors when serving user's information seeking intent 
We examine a large-scale dataset of “natural” unanswerable questions BIBREF54 based on real user search engine queries to identify if similar unanswerability factors exist  It is important to note that these questions have previously been filtered, according to a criteria for bad questions defined as “(questions that are) ambiguous, incomprehensible, dependent on clear false presuppositions, opinion-seeking, or not clearly a request for factual information ” Annotators made the decision based on the content of the question without viewing the equivalent Wikipedia page  We randomly sample 100 questions from the development set which were identified as unanswerable, and find that 20% of the questions are not questions (e g , “all I want for christmas is you mariah carey tour”)  12% of questions are unlikely to ever contain an answer on Wikipedia, corresponding closely to our atypicality category  3% of questions are unlikely to have an answer anywhere (e g , `what guides Santa home after he has delivered presents?')  7% of questions are incomplete or open-ended (e g , `the south west wind blows across nigeria between')  3% of questions have an unresolvable coreference (e g , `how do i get to Warsaw Missouri from here')  4% of questions are vague, and a further 7% have unknown sources of error  2% still contain false presuppositions (e g , `what is the only fruit that does not have seeds?') and the remaining 42% do not have an answer within the document  This reinforces our belief that though they have been understudied in past work, any question answering system interacting with real users should expect to receive such unanticipated and unanswerable questions 
Conclusion
We present PrivacyQA, the first significant corpus of privacy policy questions and more than 3500 expert annotations of relevant answers  The goal of this work is to promote question-answering research in the specialized privacy domain, where it can have large real-world impact  Strong neural baselines on PrivacyQA achieve a performance of only 39 8 F1 on this corpus, indicating considerable room for future research  Further, we shed light on several important considerations that affect the answerability of questions  We hope this contribution leads to multidisciplinary efforts to precisely understand user intent and reconcile it with information in policy documents, from both the privacy and NLP communities 
Acknowledgements
This research was supported in part by grants from the National Science Foundation Secure and Trustworthy Computing program (CNS-1330596, CNS-1330214, CNS-15-13957, CNS-1801316, CNS-1914486, CNS-1914444) and a DARPA Brandeis grant on Personalized Privacy Assistants (FA8750-15-2-0277)  The US Government is authorized to reproduce and distribute reprints for Governmental purposes not withstanding any copyright notation  The views and conclusions contained herein are those of the authors and should not be interpreted as necessarily representing the official policies or endorsements, either expressed or implied, of the NSF, DARPA, or the US Government  The authors would like to extend their gratitude to Elias Wright, Gian Mascioli, Kiara Pillay, Harrison Kay, Eliel Talo, Alexander Fagella and N  Cameron Russell for providing their valuable expertise and insight to this effort  The authors are also grateful to Eduard Hovy, Lorrie Cranor, Florian Schaub, Joel Reidenberg, Aditya Potukuchi and Igor Shalyminov for helpful discussions related to this work, and to the three anonymous reviewers of this draft for their constructive feedback  Finally, the authors would like to thank all crowdworkers who consented to participate in this study 
Context 2: Introduction
Abusive language refers to any type of insult, vulgarity, or profanity that debases the target; it also can be anything that causes aggravation BIBREF0 , BIBREF1   Abusive language is often reframed as, but not limited to, offensive language BIBREF2 , cyberbullying BIBREF3 , othering language BIBREF4 , and hate speech BIBREF5  
Recently, an increasing number of users have been subjected to harassment, or have witnessed offensive behaviors online BIBREF6   Major social media companies (i e  Facebook, Twitter) have utilized multiple resources—artificial intelligence, human reviewers, user reporting processes, etc —in effort to censor offensive language, yet it seems nearly impossible to successfully resolve the issue BIBREF7 , BIBREF8  
The major reason of the failure in abusive language detection comes from its subjectivity and context-dependent characteristics BIBREF9   For instance, a message can be regarded as harmless on its own, but when taking previous threads into account it may be seen as abusive, and vice versa  This aspect makes detecting abusive language extremely laborious even for human annotators; therefore it is difficult to build a large and reliable dataset BIBREF10  
Previously, datasets openly available in abusive language detection research on Twitter ranged from 10K to 35K in size BIBREF9 , BIBREF11   This quantity is not sufficient to train the significant number of parameters in deep learning models  Due to this reason, these datasets have been mainly studied by traditional machine learning methods  Most recently, Founta et al  founta2018large introduced Hate and Abusive Speech on Twitter, a dataset containing 100K tweets with cross-validated labels  Although this corpus has great potential in training deep models with its significant size, there are no baseline reports to date 
This paper investigates the efficacy of different learning models in detecting abusive language  We compare accuracy using the most frequently studied machine learning classifiers as well as recent neural network models  Reliable baseline results are presented with the first comparative study on this dataset  Additionally, we demonstrate the effect of different features and variants, and describe the possibility for further improvements with the use of ensemble models 
Related Work
The research community introduced various approaches on abusive language detection  Razavi et al  razavi2010offensive applied Naïve Bayes, and Warner and Hirschberg warner2012detecting used Support Vector Machine (SVM), both with word-level features to classify offensive language  Xiang et al  xiang2012detecting generated topic distributions with Latent Dirichlet Allocation BIBREF12 , also using word-level features in order to classify offensive tweets 
More recently, distributed word representations and neural network models have been widely applied for abusive language detection  Djuric et al  djuric2015hate used the Continuous Bag Of Words model with paragraph2vec algorithm BIBREF13 to more accurately detect hate speech than that of the plain Bag Of Words models  Badjatiya et al  badjatiya2017deep implemented Gradient Boosted Decision Trees classifiers using word representations trained by deep learning models  Other researchers have investigated character-level representations and their effectiveness compared to word-level representations BIBREF14 , BIBREF15  
As traditional machine learning methods have relied on feature engineering, (i e  n-grams, POS tags, user information) BIBREF1 , researchers have proposed neural-based models with the advent of larger datasets  Convolutional Neural Networks and Recurrent Neural Networks have been applied to detect abusive language, and they have outperformed traditional machine learning classifiers such as Logistic Regression and SVM BIBREF15 , BIBREF16   However, there are no studies investigating the efficiency of neural models with large-scale datasets over 100K 
Methodology
This section illustrates our implementations on traditional machine learning classifiers and neural network based models in detail  Furthermore, we describe additional features and variant models investigated 
Traditional Machine Learning Models
We implement five feature engineering based machine learning classifiers that are most often used for abusive language detection  In data preprocessing, text sequences are converted into Bag Of Words (BOW) representations, and normalized with Term Frequency-Inverse Document Frequency (TF-IDF) values  We experiment with word-level features using n-grams ranging from 1 to 3, and character-level features from 3 to 8-grams  Each classifier is implemented with the following specifications:
Naïve Bayes (NB): Multinomial NB with additive smoothing constant 1
Logistic Regression (LR): Linear LR with L2 regularization constant 1 and limited-memory BFGS optimization
Support Vector Machine (SVM): Linear SVM with L2 regularization constant 1 and logistic loss function
Random Forests (RF): Averaging probabilistic predictions of 10 randomized decision trees
Gradient Boosted Trees (GBT): Tree boosting with learning rate 1 and logistic loss function
Neural Network based Models
Along with traditional machine learning approaches, we investigate neural network based models to evaluate their efficacy within a larger dataset  In particular, we explore Convolutional Neural Networks (CNN), Recurrent Neural Networks (RNN), and their variant models  A pre-trained GloVe BIBREF17 representation is used for word-level features 
CNN: We adopt Kim's kim2014convolutional implementation as the baseline  The word-level CNN models have 3 convolutional filters of different sizes [1,2,3] with ReLU activation, and a max-pooling layer  For the character-level CNN, we use 6 convolutional filters of various sizes [3,4,5,6,7,8], then add max-pooling layers followed by 1 fully-connected layer with a dimension of 1024 
Park and Fung park2017one proposed a HybridCNN model which outperformed both word-level and character-level CNNs in abusive language detection  In order to evaluate the HybridCNN for this dataset, we concatenate the output of max-pooled layers from word-level and character-level CNN, and feed this vector to a fully-connected layer in order to predict the output 
All three CNN models (word-level, character-level, and hybrid) use cross entropy with softmax as their loss function and Adam BIBREF18 as the optimizer 
RNN: We use bidirectional RNN BIBREF19 as the baseline, implementing a GRU BIBREF20 cell for each recurrent unit  From extensive parameter-search experiments, we chose 1 encoding layer with 50 dimensional hidden states and an input dropout probability of 0 3  The RNN models use cross entropy with sigmoid as their loss function and Adam as the optimizer 
For a possible improvement, we apply a self-matching attention mechanism on RNN baseline models BIBREF21 so that they may better understand the data by retrieving text sequences twice  We also investigate a recently introduced method, Latent Topic Clustering (LTC) BIBREF22   The LTC method extracts latent topic information from the hidden states of RNN, and uses it for additional information in classifying the text data 
Feature Extension
While manually analyzing the raw dataset, we noticed that looking at the tweet one has replied to or has quoted, provides significant contextual information  We call these, “context tweets"

ground_truth: Individuals with legal training

Yes

prompt_front: You are given a scientific article and a question. Answer the question as concisely as you can, using a single phrase or sentence if possible. If the question cannot be answered based on the information in the article, write "unanswerable". If the question is a yes/no question, answer "yes", "no", or "unanswerable". Do not provide any explanation.

Please answer the questions based on the text provided below. What learning models are used on the dataset?
Context 2:  As humans can better understand a tweet with the reference of its context, our assumption is that computers also benefit from taking context tweets into account in detecting abusive language 
As shown in the examples below, (2) is labeled abusive due to the use of vulgar language  However, the intention of the user can be better understood with its context tweet (1) 
(1) I hate when I'm sitting in front of the bus and somebody with a wheelchair get on 
INLINEFORM0 (2) I hate it when I'm trying to board a bus and there's already an as**ole on it 
Similarly, context tweet (3) is important in understanding the abusive tweet (4), especially in identifying the target of the malice 
(3) Survivors of #Syria Gas Attack Recount `a Cruel Scene' 
INLINEFORM0 (4) Who the HELL is “LIKE" ING this post? Sick people    
Huang et al  huang2016modeling used several attributes of context tweets for sentiment analysis in order to improve the baseline LSTM model  However, their approach was limited because the meta-information they focused on—author information, conversation type, use of the same hashtags or emojis—are all highly dependent on data 
In order to avoid data dependency, text sequences of context tweets are directly used as an additional feature of neural network models  We use the same baseline model to convert context tweets to vectors, then concatenate these vectors with outputs of their corresponding labeled tweets  More specifically, we concatenate max-pooled layers of context and labeled tweets for the CNN baseline model  As for RNN, the last hidden states of context and labeled tweets are concatenated 
Dataset
Hate and Abusive Speech on Twitter BIBREF10 classifies tweets into 4 labels, “normal", “spam", “hateful" and “abusive"  We were only able to crawl 70,904 tweets out of 99,996 tweet IDs, mainly because the tweet was deleted or the user account had been suspended  Table shows the distribution of labels of the crawled data 
Data Preprocessing
In the data preprocessing steps, user IDs, URLs, and frequently used emojis are replaced as special tokens  Since hashtags tend to have a high correlation with the content of the tweet BIBREF23 , we use a segmentation library BIBREF24 for hashtags to extract more information 
For character-level representations, we apply the method Zhang et al  zhang2015character proposed  Tweets are transformed into one-hot encoded vectors using 70 character dimensions—26 lower-cased alphabets, 10 digits, and 34 special characters including whitespace 
Training and Evaluation
In training the feature engineering based machine learning classifiers, we truncate vector representations according to the TF-IDF values (the top 14,000 and 53,000 for word-level and character-level representations, respectively) to avoid overfitting  For neural network models, words that appear only once are replaced as unknown tokens 
Since the dataset used is not split into train, development, and test sets, we perform 10-fold cross validation, obtaining the average of 5 tries; we divide the dataset randomly by a ratio of 85:5:10, respectively  In order to evaluate the overall performance, we calculate the weighted average of precision, recall, and F1 scores of all four labels, “normal”, “spam”, “hateful”, and “abusive” 
Empirical Results
As shown in Table , neural network models are more accurate than feature engineering based models (i e  NB, SVM, etc ) except for the LR model—the best LR model has the same F1 score as the best CNN model 
Among traditional machine learning models, the most accurate in classifying abusive language is the LR model followed by ensemble models such as GBT and RF  Character-level representations improve F1 scores of SVM and RF classifiers, but they have no positive effect on other models 
For neural network models, RNN with LTC modules have the highest accuracy score, but there are no significant improvements from its baseline model and its attention-added model  Similarly, HybridCNN does not improve the baseline CNN model  For both CNN and RNN models, character-level features significantly decrease the accuracy of classification 
The use of context tweets generally have little effect on baseline models, however they noticeably improve the scores of several metrics  For instance, CNN with context tweets score the highest recall and F1 for “hateful" labels, and RNN models with context tweets have the highest recall for “abusive" tweets 
Discussion and Conclusion
While character-level features are known to improve the accuracy of neural network models BIBREF16 , they reduce classification accuracy for Hate and Abusive Speech on Twitter  We conclude this is because of the lack of labeled data as well as the significant imbalance among the different labels  Unlike neural network models, character-level features in traditional machine learning classifiers have positive results because we have trained the models only with the most significant character elements using TF-IDF values 
Variants of neural network models also suffer from data insufficiency  However, these models show positive performances on “spam" (14%) and “hateful" (4%) tweets—the lower distributed labels  The highest F1 score for “spam" is from the RNN-LTC model (0 551), and the highest for “hateful" is CNN with context tweets (0 309)  Since each variant model excels in different metrics, we expect to see additional improvements with the use of ensemble models of these variants in future works 
In this paper, we report the baseline accuracy of different learning models as well as their variants on the recently introduced dataset, Hate and Abusive Speech on Twitter  Experimental results show that bidirectional GRU networks with LTC provide the most accurate results in detecting abusive language  Additionally, we present the possibility of using ensemble models of variant models and features for further improvements 
Acknowledgments
K  Jung is with the Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, ASRI, Seoul National University, Seoul, Korea  This work was supported by the National Research Foundation of Korea (NRF) funded by the Korea government (MSIT) (No  2016M3C4A7952632), the Technology Innovation Program (10073144) funded by the Ministry of Trade, Industry & Energy (MOTIE, Korea) 
We would also like to thank Yongkeun Hwang and Ji Ho Park for helpful discussions and their valuable insights 

ground_truth: Naïve Bayes (NB), Logistic Regression (LR), Support Vector Machine (SVM), Random Forests (RF), Gradient Boosted Trees (GBT),  Convolutional Neural Networks (CNN), Recurrent Neural Networks (RNN)

Naïve Bayes (NB), Logistic Regression (LR), Support Vector Machine (SVM), Random Forests (RF), Gradient Boosted Trees (GBT), CNN, RNN

prompt_front: You are given a scientific article and a question. Answer the question as concisely as you can, using a single phrase or sentence if possible. If the question cannot be answered based on the information in the article, write "unanswerable". If the question is a yes/no question, answer "yes", "no", or "unanswerable". Do not provide any explanation.

Please answer the questions based on the text provided below. On which tasks do they test their conflict method?
Context 3: Introduction
Modelling the relationship between sequences is extremely significant in most retrieval or classification problems involving two sequences  Traditionally, in Siamese networks, Hadamard product or concatenation have been used to fuse two vector representations of two input sequences to form a final representation for tasks like semantic similarity, passage retrieval  This representation, subsequently, has been used to compute similarity scores which has been used in a variety of training objectives like margin loss for ranking or cross-entropy error in classification 
We have also witnessed word or phrase level similarity to create alignment matrices between two sequences BIBREF0 , BIBREF1   These alignment matrices has proved to be very useful to model the relationship between two word representations as well fuse the relevant information of one sequence into another  Empirical evidences have shown this alignment procedures have significantly performed better then simple concatenation or element-wise multiplication, especially for long sentences or paragraphs 
Attention works on creating neural alignment matrix using learnt weights without pre-computing alignment matrix and using them as features  The main objective of any attentive or alignment process is to look for matching words or phrases between two sequences and assign a high weight to the most similar pairs and vice-versa  The notion of matching or similarity maybe not semantic similarity but based on whatever task we have at hand  For example, for a task that requires capturing semantic similarity between two sequences like "how rich is tom cruise" and "how much wealth does tom cruise have", an attentive model shall discover the high similarity between "rich" and "wealthy" and assign a high weight value to the pair  Likewise, for a different task like question answering, a word "long" in a question like "how long does it take to recover from a mild fever" might be aligned with the phrase "a week" from the candidate answer "it takes almost a week to recover fully from a fever"  Thus, attention significantly aids in better understanding the relevance of a similar user query in a similar measurement task or a candidate answer in a question answering task  The final prediction score is dependent on how well the relationship between two sequences are modeled and established 
The general process of matching one sequence with another through attention includes computing the alignment matrix containing weight value between every pair of word representations belonging to both of the sequences  Subsequently, softmax function is applied on all the elements of one of the two dimensions of the matrix to represent the matching probabilities of all the word of a sequence with respect to one particular word in the other sequence 
Since attention always looks for matching word representations, it operates under the assumption that there is always a match to be found inside the sequences  We provide a theoretical limitation to it and propose another technique called conflict that looks for contrasting relationship between words in two sequences  We empirically verify that our proposed conflict mechanism combined with attention can outperform the performance of attention working solely 
Related Work
Bahdanau et al  BIBREF2 introduced attention first in neural machine translation  It used a feed-forward network over addition of encoder and decoder states to compute alignment score  Our work is very similar to this except we use element wise difference instead of addition to build our conflict function  BIBREF3 came up with a scaled dot-product attention in their Transformer model which is fast and memory-efficient  Due to the scaling factor, it didn't have the issue of gradients zeroing out  On the other hand, BIBREF4 has experimented with global and local attention based on the how many hidden states the attention function takes into account  Their experiments have revolved around three attention functions - dot, concat and general  Their findings include that dot product works best for global attention  Our work also belongs to the global attention family as we consider all the hidden states of the sequence 
Attention has been widely used in pair-classification problems like natural language inference  Wang et al  BIBREF5 introduced BIMPM which matched one sequence with another in four different fashion but one single matching function which they used as cosine  Liu et al  BIBREF6 proposed SAN for language inference which also used dot-product attention between the sequences 
Summarizing, attention has helped in achieving state-of-the-art results in NLI and QA  Prior work in attention has been mostly in similarity based approaches while our work focuses on non-matching sequences 
How attention works
Let us consider that we have two sequences INLINEFORM0 and INLINEFORM1 each with M and N words respectively  The objective of attention is two-fold: compute alignment scores (or weight) between every word representation pairs from INLINEFORM2 and INLINEFORM3 and fuse the matching information of INLINEFORM4 with INLINEFORM5 thus computing a new representation of INLINEFORM6 conditioned on INLINEFORM7  
The word representations that attention operates on can be either embeddings like GloVe or hidden states from any recurrent neural network  We denote these representations as u = INLINEFORM0 and v = INLINEFORM1   We provide a mathematical working of how a general attention mechanism works between two sequences, followed by a explanation in words: DISPLAYFORM0
Explanation: Both are sequences are non-linearly projected into two different spaces (eqn 1) and each word representation in INLINEFORM0 is matched with that in INLINEFORM1 by computing a dot-product (eqn 2)  INLINEFORM2 is a M X N matrix that stores the alignment scores between word INLINEFORM3 and INLINEFORM4 (eqn 2)  Since, the scores are not normalized, a softmax function is applied on each row to convert them to probabilities (eqn  3)  Thus, each row contains relative importance of words in INLINEFORM5 to a particular word INLINEFORM6   Weighted sum of INLINEFORM7 is taken (eqn  4) and fused with the word representation INLINEFORM8 using concatenation (eqn 5) 
Limits of using only Attention
Attention operates by using dot product or sometimes addition followed by linear projection to a scalar which models the similarity between two vectors  Subsequently, softmax is applied which gives high probabilities to most matching word representations  This assumes that there is some highly matched word pairs already existing and high scores will be assigned to them  Given a vector INLINEFORM0 =( INLINEFORM1 ,   , INLINEFORM2 ) on which softmax function is applied, each INLINEFORM3 INLINEFORM4 (0, 1)  It is observable that the average value of INLINEFORM5 is always INLINEFORM6   In other words, it is impossible to produce a vector having all INLINEFORM7 < INLINEFORM8 when two sequences have no matching at all 
In cases, where one or more word pairs from two different sequences are highly dissimilar, it is impossible to assign a very low probability to it without increasing the probability of some other pair somewhere else since INLINEFORM0 = 1 
For example, when we consider two sequences "height of tom cruise" and "age of sun", while computing the attention weights between the word "height" and all the words in the second sequence it can be observed that their no matching word in the latter  In this case, a standard dot-product based attention with softmax won't be able to produce weights which is below 0 33 (=1/3) for all the words in the second sequence with respect to the word "height" in the first sequence 
Conflict model
We propose a different mechanism that does the opposite of what attention does that is computing how much two sequences repel each other  This works very similar to how attention works but inversely 
We demonstrate a general model but we also realize that there can be other variants of it which may be worked out to perform better  Our approach consists of using element wise difference between two vectors followed by a linear transformation to produce a scalar weight  The remaining of the process acts similar to how attention works  Mathematically, we can express it as: DISPLAYFORM0
where INLINEFORM0 INLINEFORM1 INLINEFORM2 is a parameter that we introduce to provide a weight for the pair  The two word representations INLINEFORM3 and INLINEFORM4 are projected to a space where their element wise difference can be used to model their dissimilarity and softmax applied on them can produce high probability to more dissimilar word pairs 
It is good to note that conflict suffers from the same limitation that attention suffers from  This is when a pair of sentences are highly matching especially with multiple associations  But when the two methods work together, each compensates for the other's shortcomings 
Combination of attention and conflict
We used two weighted representations of INLINEFORM0 using weights of attention and conflict as computed in Eqn  (4) and (8) respectively  Our final representation of a word representation INLINEFORM1 conditioned on INLINEFORM2 can be expressed as: DISPLAYFORM0
where A and C denote that they are from attention and conflict models respectively 
Relation to Multi-Head attention
Multi-head attention, as introduced in BIBREF3 , computes multiple identical attention mechanism parallelly on multiple linear projections of same inputs  The parameters of each attention and projections are different in each head  Finally, they concatenate all the attentions which is similar to how we concatenate conflict and attention  However, they use dot-product to compute each of the attention 
Our combined model that contains both attention and conflict can be thought of as a 2-head attention model but both heads are different  Our conflict head explicitly captures difference between the inputs 
Visualizing attention and conflict
We observe how our conflict model learns the dissimilarities between word representations  We achieve that by visualizing the heatmap of the weight matrix INLINEFORM0 for both attention and conflict from eqns  (3) and (8)  While attention successfully learns the alignments, conflict matrix also shows that our approach models the contradicting associations like "animal" and "lake" or "australia" and "world"  These two associations are the unique pairs which are instrumental in determining that the two queries are not similar 
The model
We create two models both of which constitutes of three main parts: encoder, interaction and classifier and take two sequences as input  Except interaction, all the other parts are exactly identical between the two models  The encoder is shared among the sequences simply uses two stacked GRU layers  The interaction part consists of only attention for one model while for the another one it consists of attention and conflict combined as shown in (eqn 11)   The classifier part is simply stacked fully-connected layers  Figure 3 shows a block diagram of how our model looks like 
Task 1: Quora Duplicate Question Pair Detection
The dataset includes pairs of questions labelled as 1 or 0 depending on whether a pair is duplicate or not respectively  This is a popular pair-level classification task on which extensive work has already been done before like BIBREF7 , BIBREF8   For this task, we make the output layer of our model to predict two probabilities for non-duplicate and duplicate  We sample the data from the original dataset so that it contains equal positive and negative classes  Original dataset has some class imbalance but for sake simplicity we don't consider it  The final data that we use has roughly 400,000 question pairs and we split this data into train and test using 8:2 ratio 
We train all our models for roughly 2 epochs with a batch size of 64  We use a hidden dimension of 150 throughout the model  The embedding layer uses ELMO BIBREF9 which has proven to be very useful in various downstream language understanding tasks  Our FC layers consists of four dense layers with INLINEFORM0 activation after each layer  The dropout rate is kept as 0 2 for every recurrent and FC linear layers  We use Adam optimizer in our experiment with epsilon=1e-8, beta=0 9 and learning rate=1e-3 
Task 2: Ranking questions in Bing's People Also Ask
People Also Ask is a feature in Bing search result page where related questions are recommended to the user  User may click on a question to view the answer  Clicking is a positive feedback that shows user's interest in the question  We use this click logs to build a question classifier using the same model in Figure 3  The problem statement is very similar to BIBREF10 where they use logistic regression to predict whether an user would click on ad  Our goal is to classify if a question is potential high-click question or not for a given query  For this, we first create a labelled data set using the click logs where any question having CTR lower than 0 3 is labelled as 0 and a question having CTR more than 0 7 as 1 
Our final data resembles that of a pair-level classifier, as in Task 1, where user query and candidate questions are input  With these data set, we train a binary classifier to detect high-click and low-click questions 
Quantitative Analysis
For both tasks, we compute classification accuracy using three model variants and report the results in Table 1 and Table 2  We observe that model with both attention and conflict combined gives the best results 
We also show the training loss curve for both the models having attention and attention combined with conflict respectively  Figure 4 and 5 shows these curves for Task 1 and Task 2 respectively  The curves are smoothed using moving average having an window size of 8  We notice that the conflict model has much steeper slope and converges to a much better minima in both the tasks  It can also be noticed that in the training procedure for the model which has both attention and conflict, the updates are much smoother 
Qualitative Comparison
We also show qualitative results where we can observe that our model with attention and conflict combined does better on cases where pairs are non-duplicate and has very small difference  We have observed that the conflict model is very sensitive to even minor differences and compensates in such cases where attention poses high bias towards similarities already there in the sequences 
Sequence 1: What are the best ways to learn French ?
Sequence 2: How do I learn french genders ?
Attention only: 1
Attention+Conflict: 0
Ground Truth: 0
Sequence 1: How do I prevent breast cancer ?
Sequence 2: Is breast cancer preventable ?
Attention only: 1
Attention+Conflict: 0
Ground Truth: 0
We provide two examples with predictions from the models with only attention and combination of attention and conflict  Each example is accompanied by the ground truth in our data 
Analyzing the gains
We analyzed the gains in Task 1 which we get from the attention-conflict model in order to ensure that they are not due to randomness in weight initialization or simply additional parameters  We particularly focused on the examples which were incorrectly marked in attention model but correctly in attention-conflict model  We saw that 70% of those cases are the ones where the pair was incorrectly marked as duplicate in the previous model but our combined model correctly marked them as non-duplicate 
Conclusion
In this work, we highlighted the limits of attention especially in cases where two sequences have a contradicting relationship based on the task it performs  To alleviate this problem and further improve the performance, we propose a conflict mechanism that tries to capture how two sequences repel each other  This acts like the inverse of attention and, empirically, we show that how conflict and attention together can improve the performance 
Future research work should be based on alternative design of conflict mechanism using other difference operators other than element wise difference which we use 

ground_truth: Task 1: Quora Duplicate Question Pair Detection, Task 2: Ranking questions

Quora Duplicate Question Pair Detection, Ranking questions in Bing's People Also Ask