prompt_front: Now, answer the following question based on the text below, only give me the answer and do not output any other words.

Question: 对于PD3.0协议，FS312BH支持的最高诱骗电压是多少？

Read the following text and answer briefly.

Context 1: '无锡速芯微电子有限公司是一家集芯片 研发，销售和服务于一体的国家高新技 术企业，为客户提供高性能，高集成 度，极致体验的全协议快充芯片。 无锡速芯微电子有限公司 FastSOC Microelectronics Co ,Ltd  销售联系方式： 联系人：顾先生 手机：1800 185 3071 邮箱：gpp@fastsoc com 网址：www fastsoc com 地址：无锡市新吴区菱湖大道200号中国物联网国际创新园E-503室 顾工微信号 速芯微公众号 免责声明：本文所述方法、方案均供客户参考，用于提示或者展示芯片应用的一种或者多种方式，不作为最终产品的实际方案。文中所描述的功能和性能指标在实 验室环境下测试得到，部分可以提供第三方测试报告，但是不保证客户产品上能获得相同的数据。本文信息只作为芯片使用的指导，不授权用户使用本公司或者其 他公司的知识产权。本文信息只作为芯片使用的指导，不承担因为客户自身应用不当而造成的任何损失。 **文中信息仅供参考，详情请联系我司获取最新资料” 无锡速芯微电子有限公司 FastSOC Microelectronics Co ,Ltd  产品手册 2023年 
新品快览 FS312A：PD3 0 诱骗- FS312A支持PD2 0/PD3 0最高诱骗电压：20V - FS312AE支持PD2 0/PD3 0 最高诱骗电压：20V支持Emarker模拟功能 - 封装：SOT23-5 VBUS CC1 CC2 DM DP 用电电路 4 7K 0 47uF R C C 1 V D D F U N C C C 2F S 3 1 2 B D M D P EP GND 应用图 FS8628：A+C快充协议CC2 CC1 VBUS CC2 CC1 FS312A FUNC GND VDD 4 7K GND R 用电电路 1uF GND 应用图 多口极简方案 FS8611SP*2+CCM-8611SP-A+7533B-T 双C智能降功率方案 FS8611S USB-C AC-DC 双变压器 7533B-T CCM-8611SP-A FS8611S USB-C 采用2颗FS8611SP搭配CCM-8611SP-A （MCU），7533B-T配合工作 - 支持多种协议 - 支持I2C控制 - 任意单 C 的为 35W - 双 插 降 功 率 ， 三 档 功 率 智 能 配 置：27 4W+7 4W；17 4W+17 4W； 27 4W - BOM极简，成本低 FS312B：PD3 1 诱骗FS8611K*2+CCM-8611K-A+7550B-T 双C方案 - FS312BL支持PD2 0/PD3 0/PD3 1/第三方协议最高诱骗电压：20V - FS312BLE支持PD2 0/PD3 0/PD3 1/第三方协议最高诱骗电压：20V支持Emarker模拟功能 - FS312BH支持PD2 0/PD3 0/PD3 1/第三方协议最高诱骗电压：48V - FS312BHE支持PD2 0/PD3 0/PD3 1/第三方协议最高诱骗电压：48V 支持Emarker模拟功能 - 封装：DFN2x2-6L - 兼容兼容BC1 2、Apple2 4A、 QC2 0 Class A、QC3 0 Class A/B、 FCP、SCP、AFC、低压直充等 - 兼容Type-C PD2 0、Type-C PD3 0、 Type-C PD3 0 PPS、QC4 0协议 - 支持两路DP/DM - 支持CV/CC（分段CC）功能 - 支持定制PDO - 支持A+C双口工作，电压自动回5V - 支持FB/OPTO反馈 - 封装：QFN3x3-20L VPWR FB PowerSystem 100K GND R1 GND 19 VIN 17 FB FUNC1 FUNC2 20 15 18 13 PLUGIND VFB FS8628 QFN3x3-20L AGATE 47K 7 5K 47K 7 5K 1 16 8 7 3 4 5 6 10 9 11 CGATE CVBUS CC2 CC1 CDP CDM AVBUS DM DP ISP ISN 12 应用图 2 V3P3 100Ω 1u EP GND GND CVBUS TYPE- C CC2 CC1 CDP CDM CGND TYPE-A AVBUS DM DP 10n 200 AGND 5mΩ GND FS8611K USB-C AC-DC DC-DC 7550B-T CCM-8611K-A FS8611K USB-C 采用2颗FS8611K搭配CCM-8611K-A （MCU）工作，7550B-T配合工作 - 支持PD2 0/PD3 0/QC2 0/AFC/FCP - 支持PDO定制 - 任意单 C 的为 35W(可定制) - 双插18W（可定制15W/20W） - BOM极简，成本低 FS212C+ACM-212C-A+7550B-T 双C方案 FS212C USB-C AC-DC DC-DC 7550B-T ACM-212C-A FS8623B-A+C方案 AC-DC DC-DC FS8623B USB-A USB-C USB-A 采 用 1 颗 F S 2 1 2 C 搭 配 ACM-212C-A 工 作，7550B-T配合工作 - 支持PD2 0/PD3 0 - 支持PDO定制 - 任意单 C 的为20W - 双插7 5W回5V - BOM极简，成本低 采用一颗FS8623B实现A+C方案 - 兼容兼容Apple2 4A/低压直充 QC2 0 Class A/QC3 0 Class A/B/ FCP/SCP等 - 兼 容Type -C PD2 0 / PD3 0 / PD3 0PPS/QC4 0协议 - 支持PDO定制 - 双插回5V 
多口方案选型 产品选型 受电端芯片选型 速芯微现有多种多口的方案选择：A+C，C+C，C+C+A，C+C+C，C+C+A+A等方案。对于 A+C的方案，可使用1颗芯片实现，也可用多颗芯片来实现。 速芯微现有多种受电端诱骗芯片，客户可根据应用需求进行选择。 受电端诱骗芯片应用领域 筋膜枪 无线充 线材 无人机 产品型号 PD2 0 PD3 0 PD3 1 第三方协议 诱骗电压(V) 控制方式 内置Emarker 定制 封装 FS312A √ √ 5/9/12/15/20 电阻阻值 可变电压策略 SOT23-5 FS312AE √ √ 5/9/12/15/20 电阻阻值 √ (公头专用) 可变电压策略 SOT23-5 FS312BL √ √ √ √ 5/9/12/15/20 电阻阻值 可变电压策略 DFN2x2-6 FS312BLE √ √ √ √ 5/9/12/15/20 电阻阻值 √ (公头专用) 可变电压策略 DFN2x2-6 FS312BH √ √ √ √ 5/20/28/36/48 电阻阻值 可变电压策略 DFN2x2-6 FS312BHE √ √ √ √ 5/20/28/36/48 电阻阻值 √ (公头专用) 可变电压策略 DFN2x2-6 FS312LC √ √ √ 5/9/12 电阻阻值 可变第三方 协议 SSOP10 FS312HC √ √ √ 5/9/12/15/20 电阻阻值 可变第三方 协议 SSOP10 FS2711Q √ √ √ 任意设置 I2C √ QFN3x3-16 FS2711P √ √ √ 任意设置 I2C √ QFN3x3-16 FS2711PA √ √ 全协议 任意设置 I2C √ SSOP10 FS2711SW √ √ 全协议 SSOP10 FS512 √ √ 全协议 任意设置 I2C √ SSOP10 方案 类型 产品型号 单C 单A 双插 A+C方案 FS8623 20W（PPS）（可定制） A口全协议18w 5V共享3A FS8623B 20W（PPS）(可定制) A口全协议18w 5V共享3A FS8628 20W（PPS）(可定制) A口全协议18w 5V共享3A FS8611RPC+FS116DB 65W（PPS）(可定制) A口全协议18w A口：5V/2 4A C口：45W FS8628RC+FS116DB 35W(可定制) A口全协议18w A口：5V（BC1 2，Apple 2 4） C口：20W 方案类型 产品型号 单C1 单C2 C1/C2 C+C方案 FS8611RPB*2 30W(可定制) 30W(可定制) C1/C2：5V/3A(或5V/2 4A) FS8611GH*2 35W（可定制） 35W（可定制） C1/C2:18W（可定制） FS8628P*2 35W（可定制） 35W（可定制） C1/C2：17 4W可定制） FS8611KL*2 20W（可定制） 20W（可定制） C1/C2：5V/1 5 A FS8611PC*2 35W 35W C1/C2：18W FS8611BH*2 65W（可定制） 65W（可定制） C1：45W（可定制）C2：20W（可定制） FS8628RPC+FS8611RB 45W（可定制）） 36W （可定制）） C1：30W（可定制）C2：5V/1 5A（可定制） 方案类型 产品型号 单C1 单C2 单A C1+C2 C1/C2+A C1+C2+A C+C+A FS8611S*2+FS116DB 65W（可定制） 65W（ 可定制）） A口全协议18w 智能分配功率 45W+18W C1/C2：智能分配功率 A：18W（或5V1 5A） FS8612C+FS8628P 100W（可定制） 35W （可定制）） 20W C1：65W C2：20W C1+A：65W+20W C2+A：7 5W+7 5W C1：65W C2：7 5W A：7 5W 其他 
Source-TYPE C协议芯片选型 Source-TYPE A协议芯片选型 速芯微现有多种TYPE-C的快充协议芯片，支持多种协议，支持客户定制，多样化，满 足客户对TYPE C的各种快充需求。 速芯微现有多种TYPE A快充协议芯片，支持全协议，支持定制，满足客户对A口协议的各种需 求。速芯微的TYPE-A快充协议芯片的协议丰富，FS112系列拥有多种的型号；FS116D 系列带插入指示，可搭配TYPE-C快充协议芯片，实现A+C，A+C+C，A+A+C+C等多口方 案，协议丰富，其中FS116A一般用于插入指示使用 Source-TYPE A协议芯片引脚封装图 D+ VSS FB 1 2 3 FS112 6 5 4 D- VDD FUNC GATE VIN FUNC FB LED/PLUG_IN 1 2 3 4 5 FS116D 10 DM 9 8 7 6 DP CSP CSN VSS速芯微的各TYPE-C快充协议芯片之间可搭配使用，实现多口方案，更多详情请咨 询我司工作人员。 多口降功率专用快充协议芯片：FS8611RB，FS8611RC，FS8611RPB，FS8611RPC， FS8612CP。 带I2C快充协议芯片：FS8611S，FS8611SP 产品型号 BC1 2 Apple 2 4 QC2 0 QC3 0 AFC FCP SCP HISCP 大电流直充 封装 FS112 √ √ √ √ √ √ √ SOT23-6 FS112H √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ SOT23-6 FS113 √ v √ √ √ √ √ √ √ SOT23-6 FS116DP √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ SSOP10 FS116DB √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ SSOP10 FS116E √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ SSOP10 FS116A √ √ SSOP10 其他 可定制 PD2 0 PD3 0 PD3 0 PPS 第三方协议 反馈方式 MOS CV/CC 定制 封装 FS212C √ √ FB √ SOT23-6 FS212CM √ √ FB PMOS(可省) √ SOT23-6 FS212D √ √ √ FB √ SOT23-6 FS212DH √ √ √ FB √ SOT23-6 FS212DP √ √ √ FB PMOS √ SOT23-6 FS212DG √ √ √ FB PMOS √ SOT23-6 FS8611G √ √ FB PMOS(可省) √ SOP-8 FS8611K √ √ QC2 0/AFC/FCP FB PMOS(可省) √ SOP8 FS8611J √ √ √ 全协议 FB PMOS(可省) √ SOP8 FS8611B √ √ √ 全协议 FB PMOS(可省) √ SSOP10 FS8611RB √ √ 全协议 FB PMOS √ SSOP10 FS8611RC √ √ 全协议 FB PMOS √ SSOP10 FS8611S √ √ √ 全协议 FB PMOS √ SSOP10 FS8611PP √ √ √ 全协议 FB PMOS √ SSOP10 FS8611BP √ √ √ 全协议 FB PMOS(可省) √ SSOP10 FS8611RPB √ √ √ 全协议 FB PMOS √ SSOP10 FS8611RPC √ √ √ 全协议 FB PMOS √ SSOP10 FS8611SP √ √ √ 全协议 FB PMOS(可省) SSOP10 FS8612 √ √ √ 全协议 OPTO PMOS √ √ SSOP16 FS8612B √ √ √ 全协议 FB PMOS √ √ SSOP16 FS8612BP √ √ √ 全协议 FB PMOS √ √ SSOP16 FS8612C √ √ √ 全协议 FB/OPTO PMOS √ √ QFN4x4-16 FS8612CP √ √ √ 全协议 FB/OPTO PMOS √ √ QFN4x4-16 
'
Context 3: Football Club Urartu (, translated Futbolayin Akumb Urartu), commonly known as Urartu, is an Armenian professional football team based in the capital Yerevan that currently plays in the Armenian Premier League  The club won the Armenian Cup three times, in 1992, 2007 and 2016  In 2013–2014, they won the Armenian Premier League for the first time in their history 

In early 2016, the Russia-based Armenian businessman Dzhevan Cheloyants became a co-owner of the club after purchasing the major part of the club shares  The club was known as FC Banants until 1 August 2019, when it was officially renamed FC Urartu 

History

Kotayk
Urartu FC were founded as FC Banants by Sarkis Israelyan on 21 January 1992 in the village of Kotayk, representing the Kotayk Province  He named the club after his native village of Banants (currently known as Bayan)  Between 1992 and 1995, the club was commonly referred to as Banants Kotayk  During the 1992 season, the club won the first Armenian Cup  At the end of the 1995 transitional season, Banants suffered a financial crisis  The club owners decided that it was better to merge the club with FC Kotayk of Abovyan, rather than disband it  In 2001, Banants demerged from FC Kotayk, and was moved from Abovyan to the capital Yerevan 

Yerevan

FC Banants was relocated to Yerevan in 2001  At the beginning of 2003, Banants merged with FC Spartak Yerevan, but was able to limit the name of the new merger to FC Banants  Spartak became Banants's youth academy and later changed the name to Banants-2  Because of the merger, Banants acquired many players from Spartak Yerevan, including Samvel Melkonyan  After the merger, Banants took a more serious approach and have finished highly in the league table ever since  The club managed to lift the Armenian Cup in 2007 
Experience is making way for youth for the 2008 and 2009 seasons  The departures of most of the experienced players have left the club's future to the youth  Along with two Ukrainian players, Ugandan international, Noah Kasule, has been signed 

The club headquarters are located on Jivani Street 2 of the Malatia-Sebastia District, Yerevan 

Domestic

European

Stadium

The construction of the Banants Stadium was launched in 2006 in the Malatia-Sebastia District of Yerevan, with the assistance of the FIFA goal programme  It was officially opened in 2008 with a capacity of 3,600 seats  Further developments were implemented later in 2011, when the playing pitch was modernized and the capacity of the stadium was increased up to 4,860 seats (2,760 at the northern stand, 1,500 at the southern stand and 600 at the western stand) 

Training centre/academy
Banants Training Centre is the club's academy base located in the Malatia-Sebastia District of Yerevan  In addition to the main stadium, the centre houses 3 full-size training pitches, mini football pitches as well as an indoor facility  The current technical director of the academy is the former Russian footballer Ilshat Faizulin 

Fans
The most active group of fans is the South West Ultras fan club, mainly composed of residents from several neighbourhoods within the Malatia-Sebastia District of Yerevan, since the club is a de facto representer of the district  Members of the fan club benefit from events organized by the club and many facilities of the Banants training centre, such as the mini football pitch, the club store and other entertainments 

Achievements
 Armenian Premier League
 Winner (1): 2013–14 
 Runner-up (5): 2003, 2006, 2007, 2010, 2018 

 Armenian Cup
 Winner (3): 1992, 2007, 2016 
 Runner-up (6): 2003, 2004, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2021–22

 Armenian Supercup
 Winner (1): 2014 
 Runner-up (5): 2004, 2007, 2009, 2010, 2016 

Current squad

Out on loan

Personnel

Technical staff

Management

Urartu-2

FC Banants' reserve squad play as FC Banants-2 in the Armenian First League  They play their home games at the training field with artificial turf of the Urartu Training Centre 

Managerial history
 Varuzhan Sukiasyan (1992–94)
 Poghos Galstyan (July 1, 1996 – June 30, 1998)
 Oganes Zanazanyan (2001–05)
 Ashot Barseghyan (2005–06)
 Nikolay Kiselyov (2006–07)
 Jan Poštulka (2007)
 Nikolay Kostov (July 1, 2007 – April 8, 2008)
 Nedelcho Matushev (April 8, 2008 – June 30, 2008)
 Kim Splidsboel (2008)
 Armen Gyulbudaghyants (Jan 1, 2009 – Dec 1, 2009)
 Ashot Barseghyan (interim) (2009)
 Stevica Kuzmanovski (Jan 1, 2010 – Dec 31, 2010)
 Rafael Nazaryan (Jan 1, 2011 – Jan 15, 2012)
 Volodymyr Pyatenko (Jan 17, 2013 – June 30, 2013)
 Zsolt Hornyák (July 1, 2013 – May 30, 2015)
 Aram Voskanyan (July 1, 2015 – Oct 11, 2015)
 Tito Ramallo (Oct 12, 2015 – Oct 3, 2016)
 Artur Voskanyan (Oct 3, 2016 – Aug 11, 2018)
 Ilshat Faizulin (Aug 12, 2018 –Nov 24, 2019)
 Aleksandr Grigoryan (Nov 25, 2019 –Mar 10, 2021)
 Robert Arzumanyan (10 March 2021–24 June 2022)
 Dmitri Gunko (27 June 2022–)

References

External links
 Official website 
 Banants at Weltfussball de  

 
Urartu
Urartu
Urartu
Urartu



ground_truth: 48V.

prompt_front: Now, answer the following question based on the text below, only give me the answer and do not output any other words.

Question: What happens to the high resolution of what we focus on at dawn or dusk?

Read the following text and answer briefly.

Context 2: Inner Reality Unveiled
Inner Reality Unveiled
by DragonFly on April 18th, 2018, 10:54 pm
There is no direct (literal) view of the actual reality 'out there'  Our inner viewport is ever only that of the model (qualia) of inner and outer reality built by the brain  We see/sense nothing but this model made inside the brain 
We don't see across a room or any scene but only across the model of the room/scene  We don't look through a microscope at an actual object but only look at a model of that object  You get the idea  A reflective color spectrum is used to make it look like that more distinctive color is a surface property of an object modeled 
The brain doesn't model everything, as a lot of it would be clutter, and for what remains as useful to portray the brain still doesn't have the resources to model everything at high resolution and so thus whatever we focus on gets all the high res detail put into it just in the nick of time when we look/focus  At dawn or dusk this high resolution becomes a bit less on what we focus on so that what's off to the left or right can be better noted in the dim light 
So far, nothing astounding here to us, although maybe to everyday folk that we only ever see the inside of the head/brain—the model 
Of course, the shocks get worse, such as that our intentions cannot be those of first cause, self-made people, but from prior causes that we weren't able to choose and be responsible for  What is left, in short, is the freedom of action for these inbuilt intentions to operate, at least when not prevented by the weather or any other controlling factors, which 'freedom of action' amounts to compatibilism 
Other notes on the above are that while we can never know if everything is deterministic, although we know that a lot is, whatever is indeterminate diminishes our modeling and our consistency 
Re: Inner Reality Unveiled
by DragonFly on April 20th, 2018, 3:14 pm
To continue, many feel that the model/qualia is very rich, but there's not anything to compare it to  Some creatures have a fourth primary color to work from and some have more smells and better hearing  Our colors (reflective spectrum) go through some averaging because of the various close frequencies about, but they still have a lot of pop to them  The model seems to be super real, where it has the focused detail, meaning better than real, or super real or surreal; surely colors win out over a bunch of waves (if they could be seen), these colors being very distinctive, which high contrast is what the model seems to be about  Away from the center of focus, the model has to be worse than cartoonish 
Other qualia properties are intense, too, such as pain being able to be very painful, to the max, and such 
Qualia are based on initial isomorphic maps, meaning topographical, when representing the territory  For sounds, the map is for tones from the air vibrations, and for smell it is scents from the molecule shapes; for touch it is a body map  The isomorphism may get carried through even three levels of models, whereafter it seems to become more symbolic and less isomorphic, perhaps indicating that the information is ready to turn into qualia, the point at which the 'hard problem' manifests  It is thought that at least four levels of modules are required for the 'magic' of phenomenal transformation to occur; we have the problem surrounded but not yet solved  Perhaps it is enough to have a truth in lieu of its proof—that there is ontological subjectivity, meaning that it exists, although it may not be fundamental or miraculous 
So, in sum so far, direct realism is an illusion, but is a very useful illusion, which we might better call a fine representation by the model, since the word 'illusion' is more about what's wrong as not really showing its object as substantial and really being behind it  Dreams, then, would be better called illusions; further they demonstrate the power of the structure of the model  When we inspects objects in dreams they look just as good as when we see them awake, although backgrounds come and go inconsistently and there are narrative gaps (all of a sudden we are driving a vehicle without ever having gotten into it, plus the controls are a mystery )
Another illusion is the feeling of having all of the information in a qualia scene as instantly available, as well as feeling that it is all happening in real time, plus that one is directing it all right then and there 
by mitchellmckain on April 21st, 2018, 4:33 am
Yes and all those security cameras in the banks and stores must be a joke because anybody watching cannot see us but only see images on a display screen 
by DragonFly on April 21st, 2018, 12:05 pm
mitchellmckain » April 21st, 2018, 3:33 am wrote: Yes and all those security cameras in the banks and stores must be a joke because anybody watching cannot see us but only see images on a display screen 
You forgot that what the brain maps and models is a reliable representation of what's out there and in here 
by mitchellmckain on April 21st, 2018, 12:16 pm
DragonFly » April 21st, 2018, 11:05 am wrote:
I was being sarcastic in order to point out this very fact  Whether images on a display screen or human consciousness, they are reliable representations and that means they do see what is really out there  The fact that this is indirect is not without logical implications, but not to the extent that you can say we do not apprehend an objective reality 
by TheVat on April 21st, 2018, 12:29 pm
The evolutionary argument is a strong one, also, for the accuracy of our sensory representations of the external world  If you think a tiger's tail is a pretty flower, and try to pluck it, you won't be around long to reproduce 
I invite anyone who thinks that bus hurtling down the street is nothing but a model in the brain to step in front of it 
Your impression of the bus may be indirect, but it has a direct causal chain of connections to the actual bus out there  You are a photon collector, absorbing photons bounced off a bus  That way, it doesn't have to be you that's bounced off the bus 
by DragonFly on April 21st, 2018, 2:19 pm
Mentally healthy responders need not worry about any unreliable representations due to there being no direct realism  As I showed, the representations are even improvements that bring out what is distinctive and important, as well as my indicating of an 'out there'  (The sarcasm thus fell doubly flat, run over by the bus, either because that mode is the nature of the person or this short thread wasn't read well )
The world out there indeed comes to us (we don't reach out and probe it but for such as feeling our way in the dark), via photons for sight, and similarly comes to us in other ways for the other 'distance' senses  That the brain projects the objects back out there where they are, with depth (objects whose radiation came into us) is very useful  This trivia is mentioned here for completeness, for non scientific readers, but all the like herein is not contested 
Back on track now, with derailment attempts ever unwelcome, but actual meaty posts extremely welcome, many neurologists note that awake consciousness doesn't easily get snuffed out, for a people may have many and various brain impairments yet they remain conscious, which, in short, without going through them all, indicates that there probably isn't any one 'Grand Central Station' where consciousness originates but that it may arise from any suitable hierarchy of brain modules 
Consciousness, like life, requires embodiment, and is now thought to have been around in some form since the Cambrian explosion  As evolution proceeds via physical processes it rather follows that consciousness does too  Billions of years of small steps from a stable organism platform can acculuminate into what otherwise seems a miracle, but then again, miracles are instant  When extinction events wipe everything out, the process just starts up again, and probably has, several times over 
Since qualia are structured, such as I described, plus healing the blind spot and more that wasn't put here, this again suggest that qualia have to be constructed from parts the brain has made from interpretations via physical processes 
How the phenomenal transform springs out remains as the central mystery of all  We think that there are larger mysteries, such as if there is any ultimate purpose to Existence, but this one is easy, for it can be shown that there can be no ultimate purpose  (There can be local and proximate purpose ) More an this another time or place 
by mitchellmckain on April 21st, 2018, 4:00 pm
I shall interpret the above as a request for a detailed point by point response to the OP 
DragonFly » April 18th, 2018, 9:54 pm wrote: There is no direct (literal) view of the actual reality 'out there'  Our inner viewport is ever only that of the model (qualia) of inner and outer reality built by the brain  We see/sense nothing but this model made inside the brain 
But this is wrong, derived from delusional semantics as if "seeing" meant absorbing the objects themselves into our brain and mind  Of course, "seeing" means no such thing  "Seeing" means gathering data to construct a mental model of an external reality  We don't, in fact, "see" this inner model at all  This "model" is a product of speculation and abstraction in meta-conscious process of self-reflection 
Our inner viewport is thus one of looking out at the outer reality and not one of looking at the model  We do see across a room -- USING a mental model  We do not see the mental model except by speculative imagination  The most we can say is that by using such a process of mental modeling in order to see, there can be deviations due to a variety of neurological and mental processes being involved, including the role of beliefs in our interpretations  Thus our perceptions cannot be fully separated from our beliefs and our access to the world is fundamentally subjective  The objective can only be fully realized by a process of abstraction through communication with others 
DragonFly » April 18th, 2018, 9:54 pm wrote: The brain doesn't model everything, as a lot of it would be clutter, and for what remains as useful to portray the brain still doesn't have the resources to model everything at high resolution and so thus whatever we focus on gets all the high res detail put into it just in the nick of time when we look/focus  
DragonFly » April 18th, 2018, 9:54 pm wrote: Of course, the shocks get worse, such as that our intentions cannot be those of first cause, self-made people, but from prior causes that we weren't able to choose and be responsible for  What is left, in short, is the freedom of action for these inbuilt intentions to operate, at least when not prevented by the weather or any other controlling factors, which 'freedom of action' amounts to compatibilism 
Your philosophical conclusions here will not be mistaken for scientific observations  Your interpretations are based on your own presumptions which I reject as incorrect  The process of human intention and action is certainly a complex one but the fact remains that the first causes do exist  People may be capable of simply watching much of their life pass by as an minimally participating observer (with all sorts of fatalistic and compatibilist dodges and delusions of objectivity), but others choose to take ownership of the first causes within them as a fully responsible participants in their own life 
Also as I have mentioned numerous times before, there is nothing absolute or guaranteed about this freedom of will  It can certainly be greatly diminished by a great number of things such as drugs, illness, habits, and even beliefs  This just means that we are ill advised to judge others according to our own perception and choices 
DragonFly » April 18th, 2018, 9:54 pm wrote: Other notes on the above are that while we can never know if everything is deterministic, although we know that a lot is, whatever is indeterminate diminishes our modeling and our consistency 
We can know that the experimental results show that there are events not determined by any hidden variables within the scientific worldview  People are free to ignore these results and stubbornly cling to presumptions to the contrary but they are being unreasonable if they expect other people to accept the conclusions which they are deriving from such willfulness 
And to head off the typical strawmen, I am not claiming that determinism has been disproven any more than the scientific evidence for evolution disproves divine intelligent design  Science is not a matter of proof, but of accepting that what the evidence and experimental results show us are the basis of what is reasonable to accept until there is evidence to the contrary 
mitchellmckain » April 21st, 2018, 3:00 pm wrote: But this is wrong, derived from delusional semantics as if "seeing" meant absorbing the objects themselves into our brain and mind  Of course, "seeing" means no such thing  "Seeing" means gathering data to construct a mental model of an external reality  We don't, in fact, "see" this inner model at all  This "model" is a product of speculation and abstraction in meta-conscious process of self-reflection 
Yes, the view point is within the model  We don't literally 'see' across a room  The model gets 'viewed' and navigated and noted and whatnot  The outer reality is not able to be viewed directly but is usefully "looked out at" through a representation  Do you directly see wave frequencies air vibrations, and molecule shapes? I didn't mean 'seeing' in the sense of eye stuff, but I note the word problem 
mitchellmckain » April 21st, 2018, 3:00 pm wrote:
Yes, I was reading a large road sign with many words and the words at the bottom didn't come into focus until I got down to them  Our computers have many more terabytes than the brain has 
mitchellmckain » April 21st, 2018, 3:00 pm wrote: Your philosophical conclusions here will not be mistaken for scientific observations  Your interpretations are based on your own presumptions which I reject as incorrect  The process of human intention and action is certainly a complex one but the fact remains that the first causes do exist  People may be capable of simply watching much of their life pass by as an minimally participating observer (with all sorts of fatalistic and compatibilist dodges and delusions of objectivity), but others choose to take ownership of the first causes within them as a fully responsible participants in their own life 
Total libertarians do claim that they are first cause, self made people at every instant  How does this work? A theory of conscious intentions happening without any underlying physical processes ('you') behind them is the toughest sell of all proposals on the will, so it's no wonder that this 'being free of the will' can't be shown  Plus, why does one want this? Perhaps a distaste for having a will that wills things in the subconscious dark  These trillions of connections firing are not portrayed in consciousness, thank goodness 
Yes, as I said, some is indeterminate, so there is no ignoring  (You don't seem to read well, even when seeing it again when you quote it ) The more indeterminacy the worse we are able to carry our our ability to operate, which minimal and trivial capability is called 'freedom of action'  So be it  We have learned something  People want more than this, though, and so they will have to show that that's possible while still retaining the self/will  How is responsibility gained at any point when one was never responsible for prior causes toward one's being/self that couldn't be chosen?
So, prison time need not be assigned for retribution only, more compassion can be granted for those who did as they had to, and we come to better understand our place in the universe  Life is great for experiencing and living, and fatalism isn't recommended, for it could work against the enjoyment 
P S  There is no point at which ultimate purpose/intention could have been applied to what is eternal, as well as none to be applied to something springing from nothing (which, though impossible, I include for completeness, for the "springing" capability would still be an eternal 'something' )
It's fine with me if you want a fully formed Being with a system of intelligence to be there First, amid nothing else, but to stick to the template of ID, then a Higher ID had to be behind it, etc , or we could just forget about the one-off usage golden template of ID  The universe looks to be tuned, if it is, for mostly a lot of hydrogen gas in endless sparse spaces  It took ten billion years for us to be able to persist a bit in our rarity amid the waste  [/quote]
DragonFly » April 21st, 2018, 3:57 pm wrote:
Yes, as I said, some is indeterminate, so there is no ignoring 
Incorrect  You did not say "some is indeterminate " So either you do not write well, cannot understand the logic of your own words, or you make up things as an excuse to attack other people  In fact, this can be identified with a logical fallacy  "Whatever is indeterminate diminishes our modeling" means our modeling is diminished IF there is anything indeterminate  If A then B does not allow you affirm A, so by equating these two you have committed a logical fallacy  Furthermore it is amazing how far out on a limb you go to concoct such an attack  You said, "we cannot know if everything is deterministic," which is utterly inconsistent with a clam that "some is indeterminate," because if some is indeterminate then you would know that it is NOT deterministic 
DragonFly » April 21st, 2018, 3:57 pm wrote: Total libertarians do claim that they are first cause, self made people at every instant 
The philosophers who claim that we have free actions are called libertarians  The radical opposition that libertarians pose to the determinist position is their acceptance of free actions  Libertarians accept the incompatibility premise that holds agents morally responsible for free actions  Incompatibilism maintains that determinism is incompatible with human freedom  Libertarians accept that there are free actions, and in doing so, believe that we are morally responsible for some of our actions, namely, the free ones 
The libertarian ONLY claims that we do have free will actions and affirm the incompatibility of determinism with free will  There is no claim here that free will is absolute, inviolable, and applies to every action and thus that people are "self made at every instance "
Thus in the following it is clear you are burning an absurd strawman 
DragonFly » April 21st, 2018, 3:57 pm wrote: How does this work? A theory of conscious intentions happening without any underlying physical processes ('you') behind them is the toughest sell of all proposals on the will, so it's no wonder that this 'being free of the will' can't be shown  Plus, why does one want this? Perhaps a distaste for having a will that wills things in the subconscious dark  These trillions of connections firing are not portrayed in consciousness, thank goodness 
Someone only claims the opposition is selling something absurdly silly because they want to make something only slightly less absurd and silly sound reasonable by comparison  But to make sure you understand   
1  Nobody HERE is selling a theory of conscious intention without any underlying physical processes 
2  Nobody HERE is claiming any "being free of the will"
These are indeed nonsense 
1  As a physicalist with regards to the mind-body problem I oppose the idea of conscious intention without any physical processes  Nor would I assert that there are no unconscious processes underlying our conscious intentions  But as I explained in another thread just because there are such processes does not mean we have no responsibility for them or that our intention does not constitute a conscious cause of our action 
2  As a libertarian it is absurd to think free will means freedom from the will  What we reject is the attempt to separate the self from desires and will as if these were some external thing forcing people to do things  This is nothing but pure empty rhetoric on the part of the opposition  Freedom from the will is the OPPOSITE of free will  If you are not acting according to your desire then this is an example of actions without free will 
DragonFly » April 21st, 2018, 3:57 pm wrote: The more indeterminacy the worse we are able to carry our our ability to operate, which minimal and trivial capability is called 'freedom of action' 
Incorrect  This is only because you equate freedom with control  It is not the same thing  Besides the indeterminacy in the laws of physics is only with respect to a system of mathematical laws  It doesn't really say that nothing causes the result, but only that there are no variables to make the exact result calculable 
DragonFly » April 21st, 2018, 3:57 pm wrote: How is responsibility gained at any point when one was never responsible for prior causes toward one's being/self that couldn't be chosen?
Again it is because free will does not equal control  Free will only means you choose how to respond to the situation  It does require an awareness of alternatives, but it does not require an ability to dictate exactly what will happen in the future 
DragonFly » April 21st, 2018, 3:57 pm wrote: So, prison time need not be assigned for retribution only, more compassion can be granted for those who did as they had to, and we come to better understand our place in the universe  Life is great for experiencing and living, and fatalism isn't recommended, for it could work against the enjoyment 
While imprisonment may be an improvement over the old English law, the inadequacies are legion  It was indeed invented as a means of reforming the convicted even if it fails to accomplish this very well  To be sure, "retribution" is a lousy basis for a system of justice  But the point of "mercy" isn't just compassion but to acknowledge the fact that mistakes are part of the process by which we learn  Therefore, coming down on people like a load bricks for any mistake is counterproductive  On the other hand, we would be foolish not to consider whether a person in question is showing any ability to learn from their mistakes  If not, a change of environment/circumstances is probably called for, even if today's prisons largely fail to be environment needed 
Observe that this analysis of justice and mercy has nothing whatsoever to do with free will  The government of a free society should be founded upon what can be objectively established and free will is not one of these things  In the above consideration of justice and mercy, the question of whether a person truly has free will is completely irrelevant 
DragonFly » April 21st, 2018, 3:57 pm wrote: It's fine with me if you want a fully formed Being with a system of intelligence to be there First, amid nothing else, but to stick to the template of ID, then a Higher ID had to be behind it, etc , or we could just forget about the one-off usage golden template of ID  The universe looks to be tuned, if it is, for mostly a lot of hydrogen gas in endless sparse spaces  It took ten billion years for us to be able to persist a bit in our rarity amid the waste 
I consider Intelligent Design to be attack upon science -- shoving theology into a place where it clearly does not belong  Nor do I agree with intelligent design even in theology, for I think that evolution is more compatible with a belief in a loving God (because of the philosophical problem of evil)  Frankly, I consider design to be incompatible with the very essence of what life is 
DragonFly liked this post
Great post, Mitch 
I'm referring to "a lot is determinate", leaving room that some is indeterminate since QM finds this, and some brain doings may be at the micro-macro boundary and be affected, this degrading our ability to operate our intentions 
Here's a "libertarian" example/definition that may fit better:
“Hard Determinism and Libertarianism
Probing further into the free will-debate, we meet two different kinds of incompatibilist positions: hard determinism, which holds that determinism is true and that free will is not compatible with determinism, and libertarianism, which holds that we do have free will and that determinism is false  Given that these positions agree about the definition of determinism, we here actually have a genuine disagreement over fundamental ontological matters – a disagreement about whether determinism is true or not  This is a peculiar question to have strong disagreements about, however, since we know the final answer that we will ever get concerning the truth of determinism: that the state of the world is caused to be the way it is by its prior state at least to some degree, but to what degree exactly can never be known 
The libertarian position has often been criticized with the argument that even if determinism is not true, we still do not have free will, since our actions then simply are the product of a combination of deterministic and indeterministic events that we still do not ultimately choose ourselves, a view referred to as hard incompatibilism  Libertarians do not necessarily accept that this argument shows that we do not have free will, and the reason, or at least a big part of it, should not surprise anyone at this point: they simply define free will differently  According to libertarians, such as Robert Nozick and Robert Kane, one has free will if one could have acted otherwise than one did, and if indeterminism is true, then it may be true that we could have “acted” differently than we did under the exact same circumstances, and that we thereby might have free will in this sense  It should be pointed out, though, that critics of libertarianism are“rightly skeptical about the relevance of this kind of free will  First of all, the free will that libertarians endorse is, unlike what many libertarians seem to think, not an ethically relevant kind of freedom, and it does not have anything to do with the freedom of action that we by definition want  Second, the hard incompatibilist is right that no matter what is true about the degree to which the universe is deterministic, our actions are still caused by prior causes ultimately beyond our own control, which few of those who identify themselves as libertarians seem to want to acknowledge  And lastly, the fact that our actions are caused by causes ultimately beyond our own control does, if we truly appreciated, undermine our intuition of retributive justice, an intuition that libertarians generally seem to want to defend intellectually  So, as many have pointed out already, libertarians are simply on a failed mission 
Together with the want to defend retributive blame and punishment, what seems to be the main motivation for people who defend a libertarian notion of free will seems to be a fear of predeterminism, a fear of there being just one possible outcome from the present state of the universe, which would imply that we ultimately cannot do anything to cause a different outcome than the one possible  Libertarians and others with the same fear have artfully tried to make various models to help them overcome this fear, for instance so-called two-stage models that propose that our choices consist of an indeterministic stage of generation of possible actions, and then our non-random choice of one of them  (It should be noted, in relation to such models, that even if this is how our choices are made, our choice to choose one of these “alternative possibilities” will still be caused by prior causes that are ultimately completely beyond our own control  Nothing changes this fact, again because decision-making is the product of complex physical processes; it is not an uncaused event ) It is generally unclear what the purpose of such models is  Are they a hypotheses we should test? They do not seem to be  Generally, these models most of all seem like an attempt to make the world fit our preconceived intuitions, which most of all resembles pseudoscience 
Fortunately, there is plenty of relief available to the libertarians and other people who have this fear, and it does not involve any unscientific models – neither two-stage, three-stage, nor any other number of stages  The source of this relief is the simple earlier-mentioned fact that we can never know whether there is just one or infinitely many possible outcomes from the present state of the universe  This simple fact gives us all the relief we could ask for, because it reveals that there is no reason to be sure that there is just one possible outcome from the present state of the universe  And, to repeat an important point, we are then left with the conclusion that the only reasonable thing to do is to try to make the best impact we can in the world, which is true no matter whether there is just one possible outcome from the present state of the universe or not, since our actions still have consequences and therefore still matter even in a fully deterministic universe 
Some, especially libertarians, might want to object to the claim that we can never know whether determinism is true or not, and even claim that we in fact now know, or at least have good reasons to believe, that indeterminism is true  Here is neuroscientist Peter Tse expressing something along those lines: “Henceforth, I will accept the weight of evidence from modern physics, and assume ontological indeterminism to be the case ” (Tse, 2013, p  244)  Making this assumption is, however, to take a position on an unanswerable question  Again, rather than making strong claims about this question, we should stick to what we in fact know, namely that we do not know ”
Excerpt From: Magnus Vinding  “Free Will: An Examination of Human Freedom ” iBooks  https://itunes apple com/us/book/free-w     3363?mt=11
To extend the OP's implications of physical processes/causes dominating…
There are still real values in an existence with no ultimate purpose, this 'value' meaning good and bad valences and actions  It would be of great value to lessen suffering and improve well-being in humans and in all species  (Fixed wills are dynamic, simply meaning that they can learn and thus change to a better fixed will )
As for our model of reality, this is consciousness and it is ever our only view point inside the head in a brain, being what it is like to experience the world from the inside out 
by RJG on April 22nd, 2018, 1:07 am
Direct realism is not possible  We humans can only experience 'experiences' (sensations; sense data), not the 'real' things or objects themselves  Furthermore, we have no way of knowing if these experiences represent 'real' objects, or are just simply products of illusion; hallucination, delusion, dream, mirage, etc 
For this reason, solipsism is a possibility (i e  it is just as plausible as it is not), and true self-awareness is not possible (i e  we don't experience objects, including those called 'self')
DragonFly wrote: There is no direct (literal) view of the actual reality 'out there'  Our inner viewport is ever only that of the model (qualia) of inner and outer reality built by the brain  We see/sense nothing but this model made inside the brain 
Braininvat wrote: I invite anyone who thinks that bus hurtling down the street is nothing but a model in the brain to step in front of it 
Isn't it possible to dream or hallucinate stepping out in front of a bus hurtling down the street? This does not mean that the bus (in the dream/hallucination) is actually 'real' 
One does not normally step out in front of a bus (even in dreams) because they think it is not real, - it is the 'fear' (that it might be real, and) being smashed by it, that compels one not to step in front of it 
Braininvat wrote: Your impression of the bus may be indirect, but it has a direct causal chain of connections to the actual bus out there 
Not necessarily  You are assuming there is an "actual" bus out there (instead of a possible "hallucinated" bus)  We have no way of knowing the cause of our mental impressions 
by wolfhnd on April 22nd, 2018, 3:31 am
A bus that we do not step in front of is an extremely low resolution concept of what a bus is  Only the people who design and maintain the bus really know what a bus is at a relatively high resolution  Even then the designer doesn't really know the bus on the street because a bus is not just a collection of parts but takes it's meaning from an even more complex social and physical environment 
If you're a realist you assume that the bus can in theory be defined down to it's subatomic particles and a high resolution image of what it is can be created  The problem is that human perspective such an approach strips meaning from the image 
The other problem is that the kind of truth that a purely scientific approach provides tends to confuse the thing itself with it's mathematical model  The kind of absolutism that math provides is always subjective first because the parameters are always finite but the environment from our perspective is practically infinite and second because the model is an approximation even if 2+2 is always 4  A reductionist approach is a practical necessity that doesn't satisfy the evolutionary imperative for meaning 
The old view that everything can be reduced to cause and effect is itself challenged by the accepted view that determinism itself breaks down at tiny scales  Myself I'm not bothered by the indeterminate because I'm a pragmatist and close enough seems to satisfy practical solutions, scientific issues and philosophical questions  The philosophers goal is to determine what constitutes close enough to preserve life and meaning 
mitchellmckain wrote: If you are not acting according to your desire then this is an example of actions without free will 
If you act according to your desires, then you are it's slave  There is no free-will in slavery 
We don't control our desires  Our desires control us 
by DragonFly on April 22nd, 2018, 10:40 am
“This distinction between subject and object is not just an interesting oddity  It begins at the level of physics in the distinction between the probability inherent in symbolic measurements and the certainty of material laws  The distinction is later exemplified in the difference between a genotype, the sequence of nucleotide symbols that make up an organism’s DNA, and phenotype, its actual physical structure that those symbols prescribe  It travels with us up the evolutionary layers to the distinction between the mind and the brain ”
“These concepts will help us see how neural circuits are structures with a double life: they carry symbolic information, which is subject to arbitrary rules, yet they possess a material structure that is subject to the laws of physics ”
Excerpt From: Michael S  Gazzaniga  “The Consciousness Instinct ” iBooks  https://itunes apple com/us/book/the-co     3607?mt=11
by Neri on April 22nd, 2018, 11:13 am
On this topic, I should like to associate myself with the views of Mitch and BIV and will only add s few additional comments 
The question is not whether our experience is equivalent in every way to what lies outside of us, for such a thing is impossible 
[A perception cannot be exactly the same as a material object, for the former depends upon a sentient being for its existence, whereas the latter does not  Further, it is impossible to know everything that may be predicated of any material object by merely perceiving it ]
The real question is: Do sense impressions correspond to material objects in such a way that they are effective in preserving us from dangers that lie outside of us?
This question veritably answers itself  Only a madman would deny the evidence of his own senses 
It is essential to understand that the correspondence of which I speak depends on the reality of motion [from which we derive the ideas of time and space] 
To keep ourselves safe, it is necessary that we have the ability to know when a material object is moving closer or further from us and to be able to recognize an object as a danger  This, the senses give us, for perceptions like all other experiences are memories [are preserved over time] 
An object is recognized as a danger through prior sensory experiences preserved as long-term memories 
In order to be recognized and remembered as a danger, a material object must have the power to produce a particular human experience of it 
That power is part of the nature of the object and is thus truly reflected in the perception of it—even though there may be more to the object than its power to yield a human perception 
To the reasonable mind, the above comments may properly be seen as statements of the obvious  The curious fact, however, is that a whole school of western philosophy has labored mightily to deny the obvious 
I agree; I'm only delving into the inner experience to see how it works and what may become of that 
by TheVat on April 22nd, 2018, 11:57 am
RJG, this tablet ate the quoted part of your post and somehow hid the submit button, so sorry about the missing comment    
No, I was not assuming the in-the-moment knowledge, but rather that facts about buses are physically verifiable when science is applied  It is not difficult to verify that I was neither dreaming nor hallucinating  We are saved from solipsism by the multiplicity of observers and their reports  We can open a book and read complex prose (something that can't be done in dreams) that reveals areas of knowledge utterly unknown to us and beyond our previous experiences  We have senses enhanced by instruments that can show us photons leaving the photosphere of the sun and bouncing off solid objects like buses in particular and regular patterns, etc  Inner phenomenal reality and external reality are seamlessly connected and interacting - it is only big cranium apes like us who erect a wall of demarcation between them  Or drugs or pathological conditions that disrupt the causal connections 
To say that sensory data is incomplete is not equivalent to saying that it is deceptive  We are deceived only if we imagine that our impressions are complete  Our brains are engineered to find relevant data, not complete data  ("engineered" probably needs quotes)
by TheVat on April 22nd, 2018, 12:00 pm
Had to use Quick Reply window to post the above  Anyone else losing the submit button after Full Editor has been open for a couple minutes?? I will try to make sure this doesn't happen to anyone 
by DragonFly on April 22nd, 2018, 1:58 pm
What else, for now:
“Finally, affective consciousness—emotionally positive and negative feelings—has its own brain circuits, it does not require isomorphic mapping, and it may be experienced as mental states rather than mental images (figure 2 5B; chapters 7 and 8)  Thus, isomorphic maps are only one part of the creation and evolution of subjectivity and “something it is like to be”; many other special and general features (table 2 1) are required to create sensory consciousness and ontological subjectivity ”
“Consciousness-associated attention has several subtypes, including bottom-up (exogenous) versus top-down (endogenous) attention 48 Bottom-up attention is driven by the importance of the incoming stimuli and leads to the animal orienting to things that happen suddenly in the environment  Top-down attention, on the other hand, involves proactive anticipation, maintaining attention by concentration and focusing on goals 
Excerpt From: Todd E  Feinberg  “The Ancient Origins of Consciousness ” iBooks  https://itunes apple com/us/book/the-an     6953?mt=11
by RJG on April 22nd, 2018, 2:58 pm
Neri wrote: The real question is: Do sense impressions correspond to material objects in such a way that they are effective in preserving us from dangers that lie outside of us?
Firstly, we are not consciously aware of the actual causers (the supposed 'real' objects themselves) of these "sense impressions"  We are only consciously aware of the actual "sense impressions" (i e  the actual physical bodily reactions; experiences) themselves,    and of course this is only after they occur (after they impact our body) 
Secondly, we all assume that these "sense impressions" are the result of something 'real' out-there  Whether from a misfiring (hallucinating) brain, or from sensory signals emanating from a real object itself, it is still nonetheless 'real'  We all assume these "sense impressions" are the automatic reaction/response from some 'real' stimuli 
Thirdly, what "preserves us from danger" is NOT the conscious awareness of our sense impressions, but instead, it is the body's automatic RESPONSE to this danger (STIMULI) that "preserves us from danger",    and not the conscious awareness of said response 
Fourthly, if the body auto-responds in a particular way then the likelihood of survivability is enhanced, and if the response is otherwise then it may be diminished 
Neri wrote: To keep ourselves safe, it is necessary that we have the ability to know when a material object is moving closer or further from us and to be able to recognize an object as a danger 
Not so  It is NOT the "knowing" or "recognizing" of the dangerous moving object that "keep ourselves safe"  It is the body's automatic reaction/response to this moving object (stimuli) that "keep ourselves safe" 
Remember, we can only be conscious of (i e  know or recognize) actual bodily reactions/events, and not of other 'external' events  We don't consciously know/recognize how we responded until 'after' we (our body) responds  Our consciousness (knowing/recognizing) is wholly dependent upon our bodily reactions/responses,    NOT the other way around 
Without something (e g  sense impressions; bodily reactions) to be conscious of, then there is no consciousness (   no knowing or recognizing!) 
Braininvat wrote: No, I was not assuming the in-the-moment knowledge, but rather that facts about buses are physically verifiable when science is applied 
Can't one hallucinate they are doing verifiable science?
Braininvat wrote: It is not difficult to verify that I was neither dreaming nor hallucinating   
   We can open a book and read complex prose (something that can't be done in dreams) that reveals areas of knowledge utterly unknown to us and beyond our previous experiences 
I'm not so confident/convinced of this  Have you seen the movie "A Beautiful Mind"?    or have had family members with mental issues?
Braininvat wrote: We are saved from solipsism by the multiplicity of observers and their reports   
   We have senses enhanced by instruments that can show us photons leaving the photosphere of the sun and bouncing off solid objects like buses in particular and regular patterns, etc  Inner phenomenal reality and external reality are seamlessly connected and interacting - it is only big cranium apes like us who erect a wall of demarcation between them 
Isn't it possible to hallucinate these "multiple observers and their reports",    and their "instrumentation" results?
Other than by 'blind faith', how can one really know that their perceptions are the 'true' representations of reality?    I think it is not possible,    I think we can only 'hope' that our personal view is of reality itself 
We can't perceive beyond our current ("suspect") perceptions 
How about that the 'knowing' is done by the brain that built the qualia showing the danger, for the brain thus already has the information available, in whatever form it uses to 'know' 
by TheVat on April 22nd, 2018, 4:50 pm
Isnt it possible to hallucinate these "multiple observers and their reports",    and their "instrumentation" results?
- RJG
For me, that level of arch-skepticism is an epistemic doldrums zone  As David Hume famously observed about a conference on epistemology on Europe, "on finishing their discussion, the participants all departed by means of the doors  " (or similar; don't have exact quote handy ATM)
Whenever I write numbers in dreams they change as I write them and when I read it often fills up with garbage 
I've been lucidly inspecting my dreams  Some flaws are that bugs appear as triangles  Yesterday, I was going to eat in a cafeteria but you had to bring your own plates from home, so I already suspected something  I did find a pile of plates and took one, but I was soon somehow holding the whole pile, which then happened again and again, so, as in these stuck cases, I clench my whole body and that wakes me up  Other times, for lesser problems or to be sure of the dream state, I am able to open one eye and see the window and then go back to the dream  And sometimes the dream perfectly shows an entire scene in fabulous detail, such as a mid summer dusk, with even those whirly things floating through the air 
by mitchellmckain on April 23rd, 2018, 4:00 am
DragonFly » April 20th, 2018, 2:14 pm wrote: The model seems to be super real,
To me, that seems like a completely nonsensical thing to say to  "Seems real" compared to what? By the only standard we have, it is real, for it is the only standard which we have for making such a measurement  What you say is practically Platonic in the implied imagination of some greater reality somewhere else 
DragonFly » April 20th, 2018, 2:14 pm wrote: So, in sum so far, direct realism is an illusion, but is a very useful illusion, which we might better call a fine representation by the model, since the word 'illusion' is more about what's wrong as not really showing its object as substantial and really being behind it 
In philosophy of mind, naïve realism, also known as direct realism or common sense realism, is the idea that the senses provide us with direct awareness of objects as they really are  Objects obey the laws of physics and retain all their properties whether or not there is anyone to observe them [1] They are composed of matter, occupy space and have properties, such as size, shape, texture, smell, taste and colour, that are usually perceived correctly 
In contrast, some forms of idealism claim that no world exists apart from mind-dependent ideas, and some forms of skepticism say we cannot trust our senses  Naïve realism is known as direct as against indirect or representative realism when its arguments are developed to counter the latter position, also known as epistemological dualism;[2] that our conscious experience is not of the real world but of an internal representation of the world 
There is nothing of illusion in direct realism  There is only the foolish rhetoric implying that "direct" in "direct realism" means absorbing the actual object rather than data from those objects  The data IS from actual objects and does provide awareness of actual objects obeying the laws of physics  The implication that anyone is confusing the awareness of an object with the object itself is just ridiculous  Instead you can say that the process of perception is what makes illusions possible  Because we are interpreting data, then it is entirely possible for similar data to suggest something other than what is the case, such as the impression of water from a mirage -- at least until we learn the distinctions 
When you consider the philosophical alternative, plastering the word "illusion" on direct realism implies that idealism is the reality beneath it  And that is an implication I would refute most heatedly  As for indirect realism, as I explained above, I think it is carrying things too far to say that we are experiencing the model instead of reality  Instead I would limits the validity only to the idea that we use a model in the process of perception  In that sense you could say my position is in-between that of direct realism and indirect realism 
DragonFly » April 20th, 2018, 2:14 pm wrote: Dreams, then, would be better called illusions; further they demonstrate the power of the structure of the model  When we inspects objects in dreams they look just as good as when we see them awake, although backgrounds come and go inconsistently and there are narrative gaps (all of a sudden we are driving a vehicle without ever having gotten into it, plus the controls are a mystery )
I think it is unwise to make generalizations about dreams in such a manner  That is not my experience of dreams at all  My impression is that dreams consist of a mental (linguistic) narrative using memory to fill in the details  The only uniqueness in such experiences are the irrational combinations and discontinuities  Because of this, I have no sense this is anywhere near as good as when we see things awake, when we are interpreting fresh new sensory data  For me, this imparts a considerably dim character to the dream experience 
For me dreams are rather comparable to when I envision scenarios for my books  I see them in my mind's eye but not in a manner that is remotely comparable to my experience of reality through the senses  I am not suggesting that everyone experiences dreams this way  On the contrary, the phenomenon of schizophrenia suggests to me that some people can see things in their minds eye with the same vividness of the senses, for otherwise, how can they not know the difference?
DragonFly » April 20th, 2018, 2:14 pm wrote: Another illusion is the feeling of having all of the information in a qualia scene as instantly available, as well as feeling that it is all happening in real time, plus that one is directing it all right then and there 
Calling this illusion is a gross exaggeration  At most it is simply approximation 
by DragonFly on April 23rd, 2018, 11:37 am
'Imagination' (say, of things to happen in a book,) uses the model, too, but the scenes are about 90% transparent, probably so they don't get in the way of the real scenes about 
by DragonFly on April 23rd, 2018, 2:51 pm
Boggling idea of the Subject/Object Cut…
“The Schnitt and the Origins of Life
Physicists refer to the inescapable separation of a subject (the measurer) from an object (the measured) as die Schnitt  (What a great word!) Pattee calls “this unavoidable conceptual separation of the knower and the known, or the symbolic record of an event and the event itself, the epistemic cut 
There is a world of actions that exists on the side of the observer with the observer’s record of an event  There is also a separate world of actions on the side of the event itself  This sounds confusing, but think of the explanatory gap between your subjective experience of an event (I had so much fun body-surfing) and the event itself (A person went swimming in the ocean)  Alternately, you can think of the explanatory gap between the same subjective experience (This is fun) and the goings-on within the brain (Some neurons fired while a person was swimming in the ocean)  These are all just versions of the subject/object complementarity seen in physics  Here is the really wild part: Who’s measuring the events? To examine the difference between a person’s subjective experience and objective reality, do we need a scientist? Who’s measuring the scientist?
Pattee points out that neither classical nor quantum theory formally defines the subject, that is, the agent or observer that determines what is measured  Physics, therefore, does not say where to make the epistemic cut 4 Quantum measurement does not need a physicist-observer, however  Pattee argues that other things can perform quantum measurements  For example, enzymes (such as DNA polymerases) can act as measurement agents, performing quantum measurement during a cell’s replication process  No human observer is needed 
For Schrödinger, the joke was on us  He was trying to point out that there is something missing in our understanding  Pattee got it (in high school) and buckled down to attack the problem  Where should we put the cut, the gap, die Schnitt? With his consuming interest in the origins of life, he came to realize that human consciousness was way too high a layer in the architecture of all living organisms to put the epistemic cut between the observer and the observed, between the subjective experience and the event itself  There are umpteen layers between subatomic particles and human brains  There are plenty of layers between subatomic particles and brains in general (cat or mouse or fly or worm)  Putting the major epistemic cut that high led to the nonsense of Schrödinger’s cat existing as a quantum system  There was no pussyfooting around for Pattee: “I have taken the point of view that the question of what constitutes an observation in quantum mechanics must arise long before we reach the complexity of the brain  In fact, I propose … that the gap between quantum and classical behavior is inherent in the distinction between inanimate and living matter 
There you have it  Pattee proposes that the gap resulted from a process equivalent to quantum measurement that began with self-replication at the origin of life with the cell as the simplest agent  The epistemic cut, the subject/object cut, the mind/matter cut, all are rooted to that original cut at the origin of life  The gap between subjective feeling and objective neural firings didn’t come about with the appearance of brains  It was already there when the first cell started living  Two complementary modes of behavior, two levels of description are inherent in life itself, were present at the origin of life, have been conserved by evolution, and continue to be necessary for differentiating subjective experience from the event itself  That is a mind-boggling idea ”
by mitchellmckain on April 24th, 2018, 1:06 pm
The "like" on the above post is not to be construed as complete agreement with conclusions, but rather more with an abundant approval of the questions and issues raised 
DragonFly » April 23rd, 2018, 1:51 pm wrote: Boggling idea of the Subject/Object Cut…
Absolute agreement here! I have always considered quantum interpretations linking quantum decoherence with human consciousness to be absurd -- with one exception  The one interpretation which makes this link and is not absurd is the Everett Interpretation  THOUGH, I would not count this in its favor! Furthermore, it isn't actually necessary to the Everett Interpretation, for it is quite possible to shift the locus of the decoherence in this interpetation to agree with other interpretations 
DragonFly » April 23rd, 2018, 1:51 pm wrote: For Schrödinger, the joke was on us  He was trying to point out that there is something missing in our understanding 
Agreed! That is how I have always understood the Schrödinger cat thought experiment  It was not to seriously propose the existence of dead-alive cats but to highlight the absurdities which come from the way that quantum physics was usually being presented 
DragonFly » April 23rd, 2018, 1:51 pm wrote: Pattee got it (in high school) and buckled down to attack the problem  Where should we put the cut, the gap, die Schnitt? With his consuming interest in the origins of life, he came to realize that human consciousness was way too high a layer in the architecture of all living organisms to put the epistemic cut between the observer and the observed, between the subjective experience and the event itself  There are umpteen layers between subatomic particles and human brains  There are plenty of layers between subatomic particles and brains in general (cat or mouse or fly or worm)  Putting the major epistemic cut that high led to the nonsense of Schrödinger’s cat existing as a quantum system  There was no pussyfooting around for Pattee: “I have taken the point of view that the question of what constitutes an observation in quantum mechanics must arise long before we reach the complexity of the brain  In fact, I propose … that the gap between quantum and classical behavior is inherent in the distinction between inanimate and living matter 
And here is where we have a disagreement  While I totally appreciate pushing many things such as consciousness, learning, and creativity down to the lowest levels of the divide between the living and nonliving, I personally do not believe that this has anything whatsoever to do with the quantum measurement problem 
DragonFly » April 23rd, 2018, 1:51 pm wrote: There you have it  Pattee proposes that the gap resulted from a process equivalent to quantum measurement that began with self-replication at the origin of life with the cell as the simplest agent 
Furthermore, I think this focus on self-replication as the divide between the living and non-living may be a little behind the times  Metabolism first theories of abiogenesis and the study of prebiotic evolution strongly suggest that key features of the life process are located way before the development of self-replicating molecules such as RNA and DNA  On the other hand, perhaps this idea of self-replication can be extended to processes in prebiotic evolution in which there is a catalysis of chemical reactions which replenish the chemical components  After all, self-maintenance is a definitive feature of the life process and would suggest that any life process must include the regeneration of its components 
DragonFly » April 23rd, 2018, 1:51 pm wrote: The epistemic cut, the subject/object cut, the mind/matter cut, all are rooted to that original cut at the origin of life  The gap between subjective feeling and objective neural firings didn’t come about with the appearance of brains  It was already there when the first cell started living  Two complementary modes of behavior, two levels of description are inherent in life itself, were present at the origin of life, have been conserved by evolution, and continue to be necessary for differentiating subjective experience from the event itself  That is a mind-boggling idea ”
This would only work if you can make a logical connection with this definitive feature of life in a process of self maintenance  I have already suggested a connection between this and consciousness by pointing out that self maintenance requires some kind of awareness of self, both as it is and as it "should be " Without some sort of "should be" in some form there can be no self-maintenance  It should be noted that there are numerous quantitative features to this, such as the clarity with which this goal of self as it "should be" is represented, the determination/flexibility with which it is adhered to (or in other words the range of circumstances which can be handled in holding to this goal) 
by TheVat on April 24th, 2018, 1:52 pm
It seems likely a paramecium does no representing to a self, and is pretty much a cellular machine lacking sentience 
A paramecium is not full of Schnitt  It is not measuring or having goals or anything else  It is an automaton  To think otherwise would be to invite some sort of Bergsonian "elan vital" or other dualistic essence 
The problem with the term "observation" is that it's prejudicial in common parlance  It implies some sort of sentient observer  It implies a subjective aspect  So a more neutral term would be needed when a microbe registers a chance in its environment and contracts or expands or fires up the cilia or dumps the vacuoles or whatever  Or when a Bose Einstein condensate loses its coherence in a wet noisy puddle 
Braininvat » April 24th, 2018, 12:52 pm wrote: It seems likely a paramecium does no representing to a self, and is pretty much a cellular machine lacking sentience 
But it is not a machine for the simple reason that it is not a product of design  The only reasons for which it does things are its own reasons  It is a product of self organization, and the learning process which is evolution 
I certainly agree with the term "biological machinery," which is to say that there is no reason to distinguish things simply on the basis that one uses the interactions of organic chemistry  Thus I think the locus of difference between the living organism and the machine has to do with origins whether it is by design or by learning, evolution, and self-organization 
Braininvat » April 24th, 2018, 12:52 pm wrote: The problem with the term "observation" is that it's prejudicial in common parlance  It implies some sort of sentient observer  It implies a subjective aspect  So a more neutral term would be needed when a microbe registers a chance in its environment and contracts or expands or fires up the cilia or dumps the vacuoles or whatever 
But the problem with this is that the prejudice in language goes both ways with the presumption of an uncrossable divide between the sentient and the non-sentient, when all the evidence points to a continuum going all the way from the non-living to the living to the sentient  And this is not a linear continuum but a rapidly branching tree with many capabilities somewhat arbitrarily (or rather anthropomorphically) lumped into this term "sentience "



ground_truth: It becomes a bit less so that what's off to the left or right can be better noted.

prompt_front: Now, answer the following question based on the text below, only give me the answer and do not output any other words.

Question: What is the name of the most active fan club?

Read the following text and answer briefly.

Context 4:  A second parameter that impacts the learning rate is the variance of the rewards  The reward an agent receives for the plasticity step contains a noise term ξ that is drawn from a zero mean Gaussian distribution with standard deviation σ 
This parameter controls the unreliability of the agent's sensory system, i e , higher σ means that the information the agent gets about the value of the foods it consumes cannot be fully trusted to reflect the actual value of the foods  As σ increases, the learning rate η p decreases, which means that the more unreliable an environment becomes, the less an agent relies on plasticity to update its weights, Fig   
Indeed for some combinations of relatively small distance d e and high reward variance σ, the EA converges to a learning rate of η p ≈ 0  This means that the agent opts to have no adaptation during its lifetime and remain at the mean of the two environments  It is an optimal solution when the expected loss due to ignoring the environmental transitions is, on average, lower than the loss the plastic network will incur by learning via the (often misleading because of the high σ) environmental cues 
A final factor that affects the learning rate the EA will converge to is the frequency of environmental change during an agent's lifetime  Since the environmental change is modeled as a simple, two-state Markov process (Fig  ), the control parameter is the transition probability p tr   When keeping everything else the same, the learning rate rapidly rises as we increase the transition probability from 0, and after reaching a peak, it begins to decline slowly, eventually reaching zero (Fig  ) 
This means that when environmental transition is very rare, agents opt for a very low learning rate, allowing a slow and stable convergence to an environment-appropriate weight vector that leads to very low losses while the agent remains in that environment  As the rate of environmental transition increases, faster learning is required to speed up convergence in order to exploit the (comparatively shorter) stays in each environment 
Finally, as the environmental transition becomes too fast, the agents opt for slower or even no learning, which keeps them ) and the decision (b ) tasks, for a variety of parameters (p tr = 0 01, d e ∈ 0, 0 1,       , 1, and σ ∈ 0, 0 1,       , 1 in all 100 combinations)  Despite the relatively small difference between the tasks, the evolved learning rules differ considerably 
For visual guidance, the lines connect θs from the same run  near the middle of the two environments, ensuring that the average loss of the two environments is minimal (Fig  )  The form of the evolved learning rule depends on the task: Decision vs  Prediction The plasticity parameters θ = (θ 1 ,       , θ 8 ) for the rewardprediction task converge on approximately the same point, regardless of the environmental parameters (Fig  ) 
In particular, θ 3 → 1, θ 5 → −1, θ i → 0 for all other i, and thus the learning rule converges to: Since by definition y t = g(W t X T t ) = W t X T t (g(x) = x in this experiment) and R t = W c X T t + ξ we get: Thus the distribution of ∆W t converges to a distribution with mean 0 and variance depending on η p and σ and W converges to W c  
So this learning rule will match the agent's weight vector with the vector of ingredient values in the environment  We examine the robustness of the learning rule the EA discovers by considering a slight modification of our task  Instead of predicting the expected food value, the agent now needs to decide whether to eat the presented food or not 
This is done by introducing a step-function nonlinearity (g(x) = 1 if x ≥ 1 and 0 otherwise)  Then the output y(t) is computed as: Instead of the MSE loss between prediction and actual value, the fitness of the agent is now defined as the sum of the food values it chose to consume (by giving y t = 1)  Besides these two changes, the setup of the experiments remains exactly the same 
The qualitative relation between η p and parameters of environment d e , σ and p tr is preserved in the changed experiment  However, the resulting learning rule is significantly different (Fig  )  The evolution converges to the following learning rule: In both cases, the rule has the form ∆W t = η p X t [α y R t + β y ] 
Thus, the ∆W t is positive or negative depending on whether the reward R t is above or below a threshold (γ = −β y /α y ) that depends on the output decision of the network (y t = 0 or 1)  Both learning rules (for the reward-prediction and decision tasks) have a clear Hebbian form (coordination of preand post-synaptic activity) and use the incoming reward signal as a threshold 
These similarities indicate some common organizing principles of reward-modulated learning rules, but their significant differences highlight the sensitivity of the optimization process to task details  We now turn to the moving embodied agents in the 2D environment  To optimize these agents, both the motor network's connections and the sensory network's plasticity parameters evolve simultaneously 
Since the motor network is initially random and the agent has to move to find food, the number of interactions an agent experiences in its lifetime can be small, slowing down the learning  However, having the larger motor network also has benefits for evolution because it allows the output of the plastic network to be read out and transformed in different ways, resulting in a broad set of solutions 
The fitness of an agent (measured as the total food consumed over its lifetime) increases over generations of the EA for both the scalar and binary readouts in the sensory network  e  The Pearson correlation coefficient of an evolved agent's weights with the ingredient value vector of the current environment (E 1 -blue, E 2 -red) 
In this example, the agent's weights are anti-correlated with its environment, which is not an issue for performance since the motor network can interpret the inverted signs of food  The agents can solve the task effectively by evolving a functional motor network and a plasticity rule that converges to interpretable weights (Fig  ) 
After ∼ 100 evolutionary steps (Fig  ), the agents can learn the ingredient value distribution using the plastic network and reliably move towards foods with positive values while avoiding the ones with negative values  We compare the dependence of the moving and the static agents on the parameters of the environment: d e and the state transition probability p tr  
At first, in order to simplify the experiment, we set the transition probability to 0, but fixed the initial weights to be the average of E 1 and E 2 , while the real state is E 2   In this experiment, the distance between states d e indicates twice the distance between the agent's initial weights and the optimal weights (the environment's ingredient values) since the agent is initialized at the mean of the two environment distributions 
Same as for the static agent, the learning rate increases with the distance d e (Fig  )  Then, we examine the effect of the environmental transition probability p tr on the evolved learning rate η p   In order for an agent to get sufficient exposure to each environment, we scale down the probability p tr from the equivalent experiment for the static agents 
We find that as the probability of transition increases, the evolved learning rate η p decreases (Fig  )  This fits with the larger trend for the static agent, although there is a clear difference when it comes to the increase for very small transition probabil-ities that were clearly identifiable in the static but not the moving agents 
This could be due to much sparser data and possibly the insufficiently long lifetime of the moving agent (the necessity of scaling makes direct comparisons difficult)  Nevertheless, overall we see that the associations observed in the static agents between environmental distance d e and transition probability p tr and the evolved learning rate η p are largely maintained in the moving agents 
Still, more data would be needed to make any conclusive assertions about the exact effect of these environmental parameters on the emerging plasticity mechanisms  A crucial difference between the static and the moving agents is the function the plasticity has to perform  While in the static agents, the plasticity has to effectively identify the exact value distribution of the environment in order to produce accurate predictions, in the embodied agents, the plasticity has to merely produce a representation of the environment that the motor network can evolve to interpret adequately enough to make decisions about which food to consume 
To illustrate the difference, we plot the Pearson correlation coefficient between an agent's weights and the ingredient values of the environment it is moving in (Fig  )  We use the correlation instead of the MSE loss (which we used for the static agents in Fig  ) because the amplitude of the vector varies a lot for different agents and meaningful The evolved parameters of moving agents' plasticity rule for the g(s) = x, identity (a ) and the step function (Eq 
4) (b ) sensory networks (the environmental parameters here are d e ∈ [0, 1], σ = 0 and p tr = 0 001)  The step function (binary output) network evolved a more structured plasticity rule (e g , θ 3 > 0 for all realizations) than the linear network  Moreover, the learned weights for the identity network (c ) have higher variance and correlate significantly less with the environment's ingredient distribution compared to the learned weights for the thresholded network (d )
conclusions cannot be drawn from the MSE loss  For many agents, the learned weights are consistently anti-correlated with the actual ingredient values (an example of such an agent is shown in Fig  )  This means that the output of the sensory network will have the opposite sign from the actual food value 
While in the static network, this would lead to very bad predictions and high loss, in the foraging task, these agents perform exactly as well as the ones where the weights and ingredients values are positively correlated, since the motor network can simply learn to move towards food for which it gets a negative instead of a positive sensory input 
This additional step of the output of the plastic network going through the motor network before producing any behavior has a strong effect on the plasticity rules that the embodied agents evolve  Specifically, if we look at the emerging rules the top performing agents have evolved (Fig  ), it becomes clear that, unlike the very well-structured rules of the static agents (Fig  ), there is now virtually no discernible pattern or structure 
The difference becomes even clearer if we look at the learned weights (at the end of a simulation) of the best-performing agents (Fig  )  While there is some correlation with the environment's ingredient value distribution, the variance is very large, and they do not seem to converge on the "correct" values in any way 
This is to some extent expected since, unlike the static agents where the network's output has to be exactly correct, driving the evolution of rules that converge to the precise environmental distribution, in the embodied networks, the bulk of the processing is done by the motor network which can evolve to interpret the scalar value of the sensory network's output in a variety of ways 
Thus, as long as the sensory network's plasticity rule co-evolves with the motor network, any plasticity rule that learns to produce consistent information about the value of encountered food can potentially be selected  To further test this assumption, we introduce a bottleneck of information propagation between the sensory and motor networks by using a step-function nonlinearity on the output of the sensory network (Eq 
4)  Similarly to the decision task of the static network, the output of the sensory network now becomes binary  This effectively reduces the flow of information from the sensory to the motor network, forcing the sensory network to consistently decide whether food should be consumed (with the caveat that the motor network can still interpret the binary sign in either of two ways, either consuming food marked with 1 or the ones marked with 0 by the sensory network) 
The agents perform equally well in this variation of the task as before (Fig  ), but now, the evolved plasticity rules seem to be more structured (Fig  )  Moreover, the variance of the learned weights in the bestperforming agents is significantly reduced (Fig  ), which indicates that the bottleneck in the sensory network is in-creasing selection pressure for rules that learn the environment's food distribution accurately 
We find that different sources of variability have a strong impact on the extent to which evolving agents will develop neuronal plasticity mechanisms for adapting to their environment  A diverse environment, a reliable sensory system, and a rate of environmental change that is neither too large nor too small are necessary conditions for an agent to be able to effectively adapt via synaptic plasticity 
Additionally, we find that minor variations of the task an agent has to solve or the parametrization of the network can give rise to significantly different plasticity rules  Our results partially extend to embodied artificial agents performing a foraging task  We show that environmental variability also pushes the development of plasticity in such agents 
Still, in contrast to the static agents, we find that the interaction of a static motor network with a plastic sensory network gives rise to a much greater variety of wellfunctioning learning rules  We propose a potential cause of this degeneracy; as the relatively complex motor network is allowed to read out and process the outputs from the plastic network, any consistent information coming out of these outputs can be potentially interpreted in a behaviorally useful way 
Reducing the information the motor network can extract from the sensory system significantly limits learning rule variability  Our findings on the effect of environmental variability concur with the findings of previous studies that have identified the constraints that environmental variability places on the evolutionary viability of learning behaviors 
We extend these findings in a mechanistic model which uses a biologically plausible learning mechanism (synaptic plasticity)  We show how a simple evolutionary algorithm can optimize the different parameters of a simple reward-modulated plasticity rule for solving simple prediction and decision tasks 
Reward-modulated plasticity has been extensively studied as a plausible mechanism for credit assignment in the brain ; ; and has found several applications in artificial intelligence and robotics tasks ;   Here, we demonstrate how such rules can be very well-tuned to take into account different environmental parameters and produce optimal behavior in simple systems 
Additionally, we demonstrate how the co-evolution of plasticity and static functional connectivity in different subnetworks fundamentally changes the evolutionary pressures on the resulting plasticity rules, allowing for greater diversity in the form of the learning rule and the resulting learned connectivity 
Several studies have demonstrated how, in biological networks, synaptic plasticity heavily interacts with and is driven by network topology   Moreover, it has been recently demonstrated that biological plasticity mechanisms are highly redundant in the sense that any observed neural connectivity or recorded activity can be achieved with a variety of distinct, unrelated learning rules  
This observed redundancy of learning rules in biological settings complements our results and suggests that the function of plasticity rules cannot be studied independently of the connectivity and topology of the networks they are acting on  The optimization of functional plasticity in neural networks is a promising research direction both as a means to understand biological learning processes and as a tool for building more autonomous artificial systems 
Our results suggest that reward-modulated plasticity is highly adaptable to different environments and can be incorporated into larger systems that solve complex tasks  This work studies a simplified toy model of neural network learning in stochastic environments  Future work could be built on this basic framework to examine more complex reward distributions and sources of environmental variability 
Moreover, a greater degree of biological realism could be added by studying more plausible network architectures (multiple plastic layers, recurrent and feedback connections) and more sophisticated plasticity rule parametrizations  Additionally, our foraging simulations were constrained by limited computational resources and were far from exhaustive 
Further experiments can investigate environments with different constraints, food distributions, multiple seasons, more complex motor control systems and interactions of those systems with different sensory networks as well as the inclusion of plasticity on the motor parts of the artificial organisms 



ground_truth: South West Ultras fan club.