prompt_front: Now, answer the following question based on the text below, only give me the answer and do not output any other words.

Question: How does the conduction gap depend on the strain direction?

Read the following text and answer briefly.

Context 1: \section{Introduction}

In spite of being an attractive material with excellent electronic properties \cite{ahcn09},  practical applications of graphene as in conventional semiconductor devices are still questionable due to its gapless nature  In particular, the ON/OFF current ratio is low while the saturation of current is poor in pristine graphene transistors \cite{schw10}  Many efforts of bandgap engineering in graphene \cite{yhan07,khar11,lher13,jbai10,zhan09} have been made to solve these issues  The pioneer technique proposed \cite{yhan07} is to cut 2D graphene sheets into 1D narrow nanoribons  In 2D graphene sheets, some options as Bernal-stacking of graphene on hexagonal boron nitride substrate \cite{khar11}, nitrogen-doped graphene \cite{lher13}, graphene nanomesh lattice \cite{jbai10,berr13} and Bernal-stacking bilayer graphene \cite{zhan09} have been explored  However, the possibility to open a sizable bandgap in graphene as large as those of standard semiconductors is still very unlikely  In particular, it requires a very good control of lattice geometry and edge disorder in narrow graphene nanoribbons (GNRs) \cite{quer08} and in graphene nanomesh lattices \cite{hung13}, while the bandgap opening in bilayer graphene by a perpendicular electric field may not be large enough for realistic applications \cite{fior09}  Other methods should be further verified by experiments 

\begin{figure}[!t]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=2 8in]{Fig01 pdf}
\caption{Schematic of unstrained/strained graphene junctions investigated in this work }
\label{fig_sim1}
\end{figure}

On the other hand, graphene was experimentally demonstrated to be able to sustain a much larger strain than conventional semiconductors, making it a promising candidate for flexible electronics (see in a recent review \cite{shar13})  Indeed, strain engineering has been suggested to be an alternative approach to modulating efficiently the electronic properties of graphene nanomaterials  In particular, the bandgap has periodic oscillations in the armchair GNRs \cite{ylu210} while the spin polarization at the ribbon edges (and also the bandgap) can be modulated by the strain in the zigzag cases  In 2D graphene sheets, a finite gap can open under large strains, otherwise, it may remain close to zero but the Dirac points are displaced \cite{cocc10,per209,pere09,huan10}  Many interesting electrical, optical, and magnetic properties induced by strain in graphene have been also explored, e g  see in \cite{bunc07,pere09,kuma12,per010,pell10,guin10,tlow10,zhai11} 

Besides, local strain is a good option to improve the electrical performance of graphene devices \cite{pere09,ylu010,fuji10,juan11,baha13}  For instance, it has been shown to enhance the ON current in a GNR tunneling FET \cite{ylu010} and to fortify the transport gap in GNR strained junctions \cite{baha13}  In a recent work \cite{hung14}, we have investigated the effects of uniaxial strain on the transport in 2D unstrained/strained graphene junctions and found that due to the strain-induced shift of Dirac points, a significant conduction gap of a few hundreds meV can open with a small strain of a few percent  This type of strained junction was then demonstrated to be an excellent candidate to improve the electronic operation of graphene transistors  It hence motivates us to further investigate the properties of this conduction gap so as to optimize the performance of graphene devices  On the one hand, the effects of strain should be, in principle, dependent on its applied direction  On the other hand, because the appearance of conduction gap is a consequence of the shift of Dirac points along the $k_y$-axis, it is predicted that this gap should also depend on the transport direction  Note that here, Oy (Ox) - axis is assumed to be perpendicular (parallel) to the transport direction  The effects of both strain and transport directions will be clarified systematically in the current work 

\section{Model and calculations}

In this work, the $\pi$-orbital tight binding model constructed in \cite{per209} is used to investigate the electronic transport through the graphene strained junctions schematized in Fig  1  The Hamiltonian is ${H_{tb}} = \sum\nolimits_{nm} {{t_{nm}}c_n^\dag {c_m}}$ where $t_{nm}$ is the hopping energy between nearest neighbor \emph{n}th and \emph{m}th atoms  The application of a uniaxial strain of angle $\theta$ causes the following changes in the $C-C$ bond vectors:
\begin{eqnarray}
 {{\vec r}_{nm}}\left( \sigma \right) &=& \left\{ {1 + {M_s}\left( \sigma, \theta \right)} \right\}{{\vec r}_{nm}}\left( 0 \right) \\
 {M_s}\left( \sigma, \theta \right) &=& \sigma \left[ {\begin{array}{*{20}{c}}
 {{{\cos }^2}\theta  - \gamma {{\sin }^2}\theta }&{\left( {1 + \gamma } \right)\sin \theta \cos \theta }\\
 {\left( {1 + \gamma } \right)\sin \theta \cos \theta }&{{{\sin }^2}\theta  - \gamma {{\cos }^2}\theta }
 \end{array}} \right] \nonumber
\end{eqnarray}
where $\sigma$ represents the strain and $\gamma \simeq 0 165$ is the Poisson ratio \cite{blak70}  The hopping parameters are defined as $t_{nm} \left( \sigma \right) = t_0 \exp\left[-3 37\left(r_{nm} \left( \sigma \right) /r_0 - 1\right)\right]$, where the hopping energy $t_0 = -2 7$ $eV$ and the bond length $r_{nm} \left( 0 \right) \equiv r_0 = 0 142$ $nm$ in the unstrained case  Therefore, there are three different hoping parameters $t_{1,2,3}$ corresponding to three bond vectors ${\vec r}_{1,2,3}$, respectively, in the strained graphene part of the structure (see Fig  1)  Here, we assume a 1D profile of applied strain, i e , the strain tensor is a function of position along the transport direction Ox while it is constant along the Oy-axis  The transport direction, $\phi$, and strain direction, $\theta$, are determined as schematized in Fig  1  Based on this tight binding model, two methods described below can be used to investigate the conduction gap of the considered strained junctions 

\textbf{Green's function calculations } First, we split the graphene sheet into the smallest possible unit cells periodically repeated along the Ox/Oy directions with the indices $p/q$, respectively (similarly, see the details in \cite{hung12})  The tight-binding Hamiltonian can therefore be expressed in the following form:
\begin{eqnarray}
{H_{tb}} = \sum\limits_{p,q} {\left( {{H_{p,q}} + \sum\limits_{{p_1},{q_1}} {{H_{p,q \to p_1,q_1}}} } \right)}
\end{eqnarray}
where $H_{p,q}$ is the Hamiltonian of cell $\{p,q\}$, and $H_{p,q \to p_1,q_1}$ denotes the coupling of cell $\{p,q\}$ to its nearest neighbor cell $\{p_1,q_1\}$  We then Fourier transform the operators in Eq  (2) as follows:
\begin{eqnarray}
 {c_{p,q}} = \frac{1}{{\sqrt {{M_{cell}}} }}\sum\limits_{{\kappa_y}} {{e^{i{q\kappa_y}}}} {{\hat c}_{p,{\kappa_y}}},
\end{eqnarray}
where $M_{cell}$ is the number of unit cells and $\kappa_y \equiv k_y L_y$ with the size $L_y$ of unit cells along the Oy direction  The Hamiltonian (2) is finally rewritten as a sum of $\kappa_y$-dependent 1D-components:
\begin{eqnarray}
{H_{tb}} &=& \sum\limits_{{\kappa_y}} {\hat H\left( {{\kappa_y}} \right)} \\
\hat H\left( {{\kappa_y}} \right) &=& \sum\limits_p {{{\hat H}_{p \to p - 1}}\left( {{\kappa_y}} \right) + {{\hat H}_p}\left( {{\kappa_y}} \right) + {{\hat H}_{p \to p + 1}}}\left( {{\kappa_y}} \right) \nonumber
\end{eqnarray}
With this Hamiltonian form, the Green's function formalism can be easily applied to compute transport quantities in the graphene strained junction with different transport directions  In particular, the conductance at zero temperature is determined as:
\begin{eqnarray}
 \mathcal{G} \left( \epsilon \right) = \frac{{e^2 W}}{{\pi h L_y}}\int\limits_{BZ} {d{\kappa_y} \mathcal{T}\left( {\epsilon, {\kappa_y}} \right)}
\end{eqnarray}
where $\mathcal{T}\left( {\epsilon,{\kappa_y}} \right)$ is the transmission probability computed from the Green's functions  The integration over $\kappa_y$ is performed in the whole first Brillouin zone  As in ref  \cite{hung13}, the gap of conductance (conduction gap) is then measured from the obtained data of conductance 

\textbf{Bandstructure analyses } To determine the conduction gap of strained junctions, we find that another simple way based on the analysis of graphene bandstructures could be efficiently used  It is described as follows  Since the conductance is computed from Eq  (5), the appearance of conduction gap is essentially governed by the gaps of transmission probability, which is determined from the energy gaps in the unstrained and strained graphene sections  These energy gaps can be defined directly from the graphene bandstructures  Therefore, our calculation has two steps, similar to that in \cite{hung14}  From the graphene bandstructures obtained using the tight-binding Hamiltonian above, we first look for the energy gaps $E_{unstrain}^{gap}\left( {{\kappa_y}} \right)$ and $E_{strain}^{gap}\left( {{\kappa_y}} \right)$ for a given $\kappa_y$ of two graphene sections  The maximum of these energy gaps determines the gap $E_{junc}^{gap}\left( {{\kappa_y}} \right)$ of transmission probability through the junction  Finally, the conduction gap $E_{cond gap}$ is obtained by looking for the minimum value of $E_{junc}^{gap}\left( {{\kappa_y}} \right)$ when varying $\kappa_y$ in the whole Brillouin zone 

In particular, the energy bands of strained graphene are given by
\begin{eqnarray}
 E\left( {\vec k} \right) =  \pm \left| {{t_1}{e^{i\vec k{{\vec a}_1}}} + {t_2}{e^{i\vec k{{\vec a}_2}}} + {t_3}} \right|
\end{eqnarray}
where the plus/minus sign corresponds to the conduction/valence bands, respectively  For a given direction $\phi$ of transport, in principle, the vectors $\vec L_{x,y}$ defining the sizes of unit cell along the Ox and Oy directions, respectively, can be always expressed as ${\vec L_x} = {n_1}{\vec a_1} + {n_2}{\vec a_2}$ and ${\vec L_y} = {m_1}{\vec a_1} + {m_2}{\vec a_2}$ with $\cos \phi = \frac{{{{\vec L}_x}\vec L_x^0}}{{{L_x}L_x^0}}$ and $\sin \phi = \frac{{{{\vec L}_x}\vec L_y^0}}{{{L_x}L_y^0}}$ while $\vec L_{x,y}^0 = {\vec a_1} \pm {\vec a_2}$  Note that $n_{1,2}$ and $m_{1,2}$ are integers while $\frac{{{m_1}}}{{{m_2}}} =  - \frac{{{n_1} + 2{n_2}}}{{{n_2} + 2{n_1}}}$, i e , ${\vec L_{x}} {\vec L_{y}} = 0$  In other words, we have the following expressions
\begin{eqnarray}
{{{\vec a}_1} = \frac{{ - {m_2}{{\vec L}_x} + {n_2}{{\vec L}_y}}}{{{n_2}{m_1} - {n_1}{m_2}}};\,\,\,{{\vec a}_2} = \frac{{{m_1}{{\vec L}_x} - {n_1}{{\vec L}_y}}}{{{n_2}{m_1} - {n_1}{m_2}}}}
\end{eqnarray}
On this basis, the energy bands can be rewritten in terms of $\kappa_{x, y} = \vec k \vec L_{x,y} \left( { \equiv {k_{x,y}}{L_{x,y}}} \right)$ by substituting Eqs  (7) into Eq  (6)  This new form of energy bands is finally used to compute the conduction gap of strained junctions 

As a simple example, in the case of $\phi = 0$ (armchair direction), we calculate the conduction gap as follows  First, Eq  (6) is rewritten in the form
\begin{eqnarray}
 E_{\phi = 0}\left( {\vec \kappa} \right) =  \pm \left| {{t_1}{e^{i\kappa_y/2}} + {t_2}{e^{ - i\kappa_y/2}} + {t_3}{e^{ - i\kappa_x/2}}} \right|
\end{eqnarray}
with the vectors $\vec L_{x,y} \equiv \vec L_{x,y}^0$  Using this new form, the energy gap of strained graphene for a given $\kappa_y$ is determined as
\begin{equation}
{E_{strain}^{gap}}\left( {{\kappa_y}} \right) = 2 \left| {\sqrt {{{\left( {{t_1} - {t_2}} \right)}^2} + 4{t_1}{t_2}{{\cos }^2}\frac{{{\kappa_y}}}{2}}  + {t_3}} \right|
\end{equation}
while ${E_{unstrain}^{gap}}\left( {{\kappa_y}} \right)$ is given by the same formula with $t_1$ = $t_2$ = $t_3$ $\equiv$ $t_0$  The gap of transmission probability through the junction is then determined as ${E_{junc}^{gap}}\left( {{\kappa_y}} \right) = \max \left[ {E_{unstrain}^{gap}\left( {{\kappa_y}} \right),E_{strain}^{gap}\left( {{\kappa_y}} \right)} \right]$ and, finally, the conduction gap is given by ${E_{cond gap}} = \min \left[ {E_{junc}^{gap}\left( {{\kappa_y}} \right)} \right]$ for $\kappa_y$ in the whole Brillouin zone 

We would like to notice that the Green's function calculations and the banstructure analyses give the same results of conduction gap in the junctions where the transition region between unstrained and strained graphene sections is long enough, i e , larger than about 5 to 6 nm  In the case of short length, as discussed in \cite{baha13,hung14}, this transition zone can have significant effects on the transmission between propagating states beyond the energy gaps and hence can slightly enlarge the gap of conductance, compared to the results obtained from the bandstructure calculations 

\section{Results and discussion}

\begin{figure}[!t]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=3 0in]{Fig02 pdf}
\caption{Dependence of graphene bandgap (in the unit of eV) on the applied strain and its direction: tensile (a) and compressive (b)  The radius from the central point indicates the strain strength ranging from 0 (center) to 30 $\%$ (edge of maps) while the graphene lattice is superimposed to show visibly the strain direction  The orange circle corresponds to the strains of $\sigma = 23 \%$ }
\label{fig_sim2}
\end{figure}
\begin{figure}[!t]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=3 4in]{Fig03 pdf}
\caption{Conductance ($G_0 = e^2W/hL_y$) as a function of energy in graphene strained junctions for $\sigma = 4 \%$ with different strain directions  The transport along the armchair direction ($\phi = 0$) is considered  The data obtained in a uniformly strained graphene is displayed for the comparison }
\label{fig_sim6}
\end{figure}
\begin{figure*}[!t]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=5 8in]{Fig04 pdf}
\caption{Local density of states (left panels) and corresponding transmission coefficient (right panels) for three different wave-vectors $k_y$ obtained in an unstrained/strained graphene junction of $\sigma = 4 \%$, and $\theta \equiv \phi = 0$  On the top is a schematic of graphene bandedges illustrating the strain-induced shift of Dirac points along the $k_y$-direction }
\label{fig_sim4}
\end{figure*}
\begin{figure*}[!t]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=5 6in]{Fig05 pdf}
\caption{Maps of conduction gap in unstrained/strained graphene junctions: tensile (a,c) and compressive cases (b,d)  The transport is along the armchair $\phi = 0$ (a,b) and zigzag $\phi = 30^\circ$ directions (c,d)  The strain strength ranges from 0 (center) to 6 $\%$ (edge of maps) in all cases }
\label{fig_sim4}
\end{figure*}
First, we re-examine the formation of the bandgap of graphene under a uniaxial strain  From Eq  (9), it is shown that a strain-induced finite-bandgap appears only if ${E_{strain}^{gap}}\left( {{\kappa_y}} \right) > 0$ for all $k_y$ in the first Brillouin zone, i e , ${k _y} \in \left[ { - \frac{\pi}{L_y}, \frac{\pi}{L_y}} \right]$, otherwise, the bandgap remains zero  Hence, the condition for the bandgap to be finite is either
\begin{equation*}
 \left| {{t_1} - {t_2}} \right| > \left| {{t_3}} \right|\,\,\,\,\,{\rm{OR}}\,\,\,\,\,\left| {{t_3}} \right| > \left| {{t_1} + {t_2}} \right|
\end{equation*}
and the corresponding values of bandgap are
\begin{equation*}
 {E_{gap}} = 2\left( {\left| {{t_1} - {t_2}} \right| - \left| {{t_3}} \right|} \right)\,\,\,\,\,{\rm{OR}}\,\,\,\,\,2\left( {\left| {{t_3}} \right| - \left| {{t_1} + {t_2}} \right|} \right)
\end{equation*}
This result was actually reported in \cite{per209,hase06}  We remind as displayed in Fig  2(a) that a finite bandgap opens only for strain larger than $\sim 23 \%$ and the zigzag (not armchair) is the preferred direction for bandgap opening under a tensile strain \cite{per209}  We extend our investigation to the case of compressive strain and find  (see in Fig  2(b)) that (i) the same gap threshold of $\sigma \simeq 23 \%$ is observed but (ii) the preferred direction to open the gap under a compressive strain is the armchair, not the zigzag as the case of tensile strain  This implies that the properties of graphene bandstructure at low energy should be qualitatively the same when applying strains of $\left\{ {\sigma ,\theta } \right\}$ and of $\left\{ {-\sigma ,\theta + 90^\circ} \right\}$  This feature can be understood by considering, for example, strains of $\left\{ {\sigma , \theta = 0} \right\}$ and of $\left\{ {-\sigma , \theta = 90^\circ} \right\}$  Indeed, these strains result in the same qualitative changes on the bond-lengths, i e , an increased bond-length $r_3$ and reduced bond-lengths $r_{1,2}$  However, for the same strain strength, because of the exponential dependence of hoping energies on the bond-lengths, the compressive strain generally induces a larger bandgap than the tensile one, as can be seen when comparing the data displayed in Figs  2(a) and 2(b)  To conclude, we would like to emphasize that a large strain is necessary to open a bandgap in graphene  This could be an issue for practical applications, compared to the use of graphene strained junctions explored in \cite{hung14} 

We now go to explore the properties of conduction gap in the graphene strained junctions  In Fig  3, we display the conductance as a function of energy computed from Eq  (5) using the Green's function technique  As discussed above, a small strain of a few percent (e g , 4 $\%$ here) can not change the gapless character of graphene, i e , there is no gap of conductance in the case of uniformly strained graphene  However, similar to that reported in \cite{hung14}, a significant conduction-gap of a few hundreds meV can open in the unstrained/strained graphene junctions  The appearance of this conduction gap, as mentioned previously, is due to the strain-induced shift of Dirac points and is explained as follows  Actually, the strain causes the lattice deformation and can result in the deformation of graphene bandstructure  Therefore, the bandedges as a function of wave-vector $k_y$ in unstrained and strained graphene can be illustrated schematically as in the top panel of Fig  4  As one can see, the shift of Dirac points leads to the situation where there is no value of $\kappa_y$, for which the energy gaps $E_{unstrain}^{gap}\left( {{\kappa_y}} \right)$ and $E_{strain}^{gap}\left( {{\kappa_y}} \right)$ are simultaneously equal to zero  This means that the transmission probability always shows a finite gap for any $\kappa_y$  For instance, the energy gap is zero (or small) in the unstrained (resp  strained) graphene section but finite in the strained (resp  unstrained) one in the vicinity of Dirac point $k_y = K_{unstrain}$ (resp  $K_{strain}$)  Accordingly, as illustrated in the pictures of LDOS in the left panels of Fig  4 and confirmed in the corresponding transmissions in the right panels, clear gaps of transmission are still obtained  Far from these values of $k_y$, $E_{unstrain}^{gap}\left( {{\kappa_y}} \right)$ and $E_{strain}^{gap}\left( {{\kappa_y}} \right)$ are both finite (e g , see the LDOS plotted for $k_y = K_{gap}$) and hence a finite gap of transmission also occurs  On this basis, a finite gap of conductance is achieved  More important, Fig  3 shows that besides the strength of strain, the strain effect is also strongly dependent on the applied direction  For instance, the conduction gap takes the values of $\sim$ 295, 172 and 323 meV for $\theta = 0$, $30^\circ$ and $90^\circ$, respectively 

Below, we will discuss the properties of the conduction gap with respect to the strain, its applied direction, and the direction of transport  Note that due to the lattice symmetry, the transport directions $\phi$ and $\phi + 60^\circ$ are equivalent while the applied strain of angle $\theta$ is identical to that of $\theta + 180^\circ$  Hence, the data obtained for $\phi$ ranging from $-30^\circ$ to $30^\circ$ and $\theta  \in \left[ {0^\circ ,180^\circ } \right]$ covers the properties of conduction gap in all possible cases 

In Fig  5, we present the maps of conduction gap with respect to the strain and its applied direction in two particular cases: the transport is either along the armchair ($\phi = 0$) or the zigzag ($\phi = 30^\circ$) directions  Both tensile and compressive strains are considered  Let us first discuss the results obtained in the armchair case  Figs  5(a,b) show that (i) a large conduction gap up to about 500 meV can open with a strain of 6 $\%$ and (ii) again the conduction gap is strongly $\theta$-dependent, in particular, its peaks occur at $\theta = 0$ or $90^\circ$ while the gap is zero at $\theta \approx 47^\circ$ and $133^\circ$ for tensile strain and at $\theta \approx 43^\circ$ and $137^\circ$ for compressive strain  In principle, the conduction gap is larger if the shift of Dirac points in the $\kappa_y$-axis is larger, as discussed above about Figs  3-4  We notice that the strain-induced shifts can be different for the six Dirac points of graphene \cite{kitt12} and the gap is zero when there is any Dirac point observed at the same $\kappa_y$ in the two graphene sections  From Eq  (9), we find that the Dirac points are determined by the following equations:
\begin{eqnarray*}
  {\cos}\frac{\kappa_y}{2} &=& \pm \frac{1}{2}\sqrt{\frac{{t_3^2 - {{\left( {{t_1} - {t_2}} \right)}^2}}}{{{t_1}{t_2}}}}, \\
  \cos \frac{{\kappa_x}}{2} &=& \frac{{{t_1} + {t_2}}}{{\left| {{t_3}} \right|}}\cos \frac{{\kappa_y}}{2},\,\,\,\sin \frac{{\kappa_x}}{2} = \frac{{{t_2} - {t_1}}}{{\left| {{t_3}} \right|}}\sin \frac{{\kappa_y}}{2},
\end{eqnarray*}
which simplify into ${\cos}\frac{\kappa_y}{2} = \pm \frac{1}{2}$ and, respectively, $\cos \left( {\frac{{{\kappa _x}}}{2}} \right) = \mp 1$ in the unstrained case  Hence, the zero conduction gap is obtained if
\begin{equation*}
  \frac{{t_3^2 - {{\left( {{t_1} - {t_2}} \right)}^2}}}{{4{t_1}{t_2}}} = \frac{1}{4}
\end{equation*}
Additionally, it is observed that the effects of a strain $\{\sigma,\theta\}$ are qualitatively similar to those of a strain $\{-\sigma,\theta+90^\circ\}$, i e , the peaks and zero values of conduction gap are obtained at the same $\theta$ in these two situations  To understand this, we analyze the strain matrix $M_s \left(\sigma,\theta\right)$ and find that in the case of small strains studied here, there is an approximate relationship between the bond lengths under these two strains, given by \[{r \left( \sigma, \theta \right)} - {r \left( -\sigma, \theta + 90^\circ\right)} \simeq \sigma \left( {1 - \gamma } \right) r_0,\] which is $\theta$-independent for all \emph{C-C} bond vectors  It implies that there is a fixed ratio between the hopping energies $t_i \left( \sigma, \theta \right)$ and $t_i \left( -\sigma, \theta + 90^\circ\right)$ and hence there is the similar shift of Dirac points in these two cases 
\begin{figure}[!t]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=3 4in]{Fig06 pdf}
\caption{Map showing the dependence of conduction gap on the directions ($\theta,\phi$) for $\sigma = 4 \%$  The top is a diagram illustrating the rotation of Dirac points in the \emph{k}-space with the change in the transport direction $\phi$ }
\label{fig_sim6}
\end{figure}
\begin{figure*}[!t]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=5 5in]{Fig07 pdf}
\caption{Maps of conduction gap obtained in tensile/compressive strained junctions  The transport along the armchair/zigzag directions is considered in (a,b)/(c,d), respectively  The strains $\sigma_c = -2 \%$ and $\sigma_t = 2 \%$ are applied in (a,c) while $\sigma_c = -1 \%$ and $\sigma_t = 3 \%$ in (b,d) }
\label{fig_sim4}
\end{figure*}

We now go to analyze the properties of conduction gap shown in Figs  5(c,d) where the transport is along the zigzag direction $\phi = 30^\circ$  In fact, the conduction gap in this case can reach a value as high as that of the case of $\phi = 0$ but has different $\theta$-dependence  In particular, the conduction gap has peaks at $\theta \approx 47^\circ$ and $133^\circ$ for tensile strain and at $\theta \approx 43^\circ$ and $137^\circ$ for compressive strain, where it is zero in the case of $\phi = 0$  It is also equal to zero at $\theta = 0$ and $\theta = 90^\circ$ where the peaks of conduction gap occur in the latter case of $\phi = 0$  The relationship between these two transport directions can be explained as follows  On the one hand, based on the analyses above for $\phi = 0$, we find that for a given strength of strain, a maximum shift of Dirac points along the $k_y$-axis corresponds to a minimum along the $k_x$-one and vice versa when varying the strain direction $\theta$  On the other hand, as schematized in the top of Fig  6 below, the change in the transport direction results in the rotation of the first Brillouin zone, i e , the $k_x$ (resp  $k_y$) axis in the case of $\phi = 30^\circ$ is identical to the $k_y$ (resp  $k_x$) axis in the case of $\phi = 0$  These two features explain essentially the opposite $\theta$-dependence of conduction gap for $\phi = 30^\circ$, compared to the case of $\phi = 0$ as mentioned  Again, we found the same qualitative behavior of conduction gap when applying the strains of $\{\sigma,\theta\}$ and $\{-\sigma,\theta+90^\circ\}$ 

Next, we investigate the conduction gap with respect to different transport directions $\phi$  We display a ($\theta,\phi$)-map of conduction gap for $\sigma = 4 \%$ in Fig  6 and, in the top, an additional diagram illustrating the rotation of Dirac points in the $k-$space with the change in the transport direction  It is clearly shown that (i) a similar scale of conduction gap is obtained for all different transport directions, (ii) there is a smooth and continuous shift of $E_{cond gap}-\theta$ behavior when varying $\phi$, and (iii) the same behavior of $E_{cond gap}$ is also observed when comparing the two transport directions of $\phi$ and $\phi+30^\circ$, similarly to the comparison above between $\phi = 0^\circ$ and $30^\circ$  The data plotted in Fig  6 additionally shows that $E_{cond gap}$ takes the same value in both cases of $\{\phi,\theta\}$ and $\{-\phi,-\theta\}$ with a remark that the strains of $-\theta$ and $180^\circ-\theta$ are identical  Moreover, the values of $\theta$ and $\phi$, for which the conduction gap has a peak or is equal to zero, have an almost linear relationship  In particular, the relationship for conduction gap peaks is approximately given by $\theta = \theta_A - \eta_s \phi$  For tensile strains, $\eta_s$ takes the values of $\sim 1 5667$ and $1 4333$ for $\theta_A = 0$ and $90^\circ$, respectively  On the opposite, it is about $1 4333$ and $1 5667$ for $\theta_A = 0$ and $90^\circ$, respectively, for compressive strain cases  All these features are consequences of the rotation of Dirac points in the $k$-space with respect to the transport direction $\phi$ as illustrated in the diagram on the top and the lattice symmetry of graphene 

Finally, we investigate other junctions based on compressive and tensile strained graphene sections  The idea is that in this type of strained junction, the shifts of Dirac points are different in two graphene sections of different strains, which offers the possibilities to use smaller strains to achieve a similar conduction gap, compared to the case of unstrained/strained junction  In Fig  7, we display the maps of conduction gap with respect to the directions of compressive ($\theta_c$) and tensile ($\theta_t$) strains in two cases of transport direction $\phi = 0$ (armchair) and $30^\circ$ (zigzag) for given strain strengths  Indeed, as seen in Fig  7(a,b), with smaller strains $\left\{ {{\sigma _c},{\sigma _t}} \right\} = \left\{ { - 2\% ,2\% } \right\}$ or $\left\{ { - 1\% ,3\% } \right\}$, similar conduction gap of about 310 meV can be achieved (see Figs  7(a,b)) while it requires a strain of 4 $\%$ in the unstrained/strained junctions discussed above  However, since the shift of Dirac points is strongly dependent on the direction of applied strains and the transport direction, the properties of conduction gap are more complicated than in the latter case  In particular, our calculations show that the preferred transport directions to achieve a large conduction gap are close to the armchair one  Otherwise, the conduction gap is generally smaller, similarly to the data for $\phi = 30^\circ$ compared to $\phi = 0$, as shown in Fig  7  Additionally, it is shown that the preferred directions of applied strains in the case of $\phi = 0$ are close to ${\theta _c} \equiv {\theta _t} = 0$ or $90^\circ$ 

\section{Conclusion}

Based on the tight binding calculations, we have investigated the effects of uniaxial strain on the transport properties of graphene strained junctions and discuss systematically the possibilities of achieving a large conduction gap with respect to the strain, its applied direction and the transport direction  It has been shown that due to the strain-induced deformation of graphene lattice and hence of graphene bandstructure, a finite conduction gap higher than 500 meV can be achieved for a strain of only 6 $\%$  Moreover, as a consequence of the shift of Dirac points along the $k_y$-axis, the conduction gap is strongly dependent not only on the strain strength but also on the direction of applied strain and the transport direction  A full picture of these properties of conduction gap has been presented and explained  The study hence could be a good guide for the use of this type of unstrained/strained graphene junction in electronic applications 

\textbf{\textit{Acknowledgment }} This research in Hanoi is funded by Vietnam National Foundation for Science and Technology Development (NAFOSTED) under grant number 103 02-1012 42  We also acknowledges the French ANR for financial support under the projects NANOSIM-GRAPHENE (Grant no  ANR-09-NANO-016) and MIGRAQUEL (Grant no  ANR-10-BLAN-0304) 


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Context 3: Brooksley Elizabeth Born (born August 27, 1940) is an American attorney and former public official who, from August 26, 1996, to June 1, 1999, was chair of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), the federal agency which oversees the U S  futures and commodity options markets  During her tenure on the CFTC, Born lobbied Congress and the President to give the CFTC oversight of off-exchange markets for derivatives, in addition to its role with respect to exchange-traded derivatives, but her warnings were ignored or dismissed, and her calls for reform resisted by other regulators <ref name="nytimes">Goodman, Peter S  The Reckoning - Taking Hard New Look at a Greenspan Legacy, The New York Times, October 9, 2008 </ref> Born resigned as chairperson on June 1, 1999, shortly after Congress passed legislation prohibiting her agency from regulating derivatives 

Early life and education
Born graduated from Abraham Lincoln High School (San Francisco, California) at the age of 16  She then attended Stanford University, where she majored in English and was graduated with the class of 1961   She initially wanted to become a doctor, but a guidance counsellor at Stanford advised her against medicine, so she majored in English literature instead 

She then attended Stanford Law School, one of only seven women in her class   She was the first female student ever to be named president of the Stanford Law Review  She received the "Outstanding Senior" award and graduated as valedictorian of the class of 1964 

Legal career
Immediately after law school Born was selected as a law clerk to judge Henry Edgerton of the U S  Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit  It was during this time that she met her first husband, Jacob C  Landau, who was a journalist covering the Federal courts at the time  Following her clerkship, she became an associate at the Washington, D C -based international law firm of Arnold & Porter  Born was attracted to Arnold & Porter because it was one of the few major law firms to have a woman partner at that time, Carolyn Agger, who was the head of the tax practice  Born took a two-year leave of absence from Arnold & Porter to accompany her first husband to Boston, where he had received a fellowship  During that time she worked as a research assistant to law professor Alan Dershowitz 

Born's early career at Arnold & Porter focused on international trade law, in which she represented a number of Swiss industries and the government of Switzerland  She developed a practice representing clients in numerous complex litigation and arbitration cases involving financial market transactions  Among her high-profile cases was the matter of the Hunt Brothers attempt to corner the market in silver in the 1970s  She made partner at Arnold & Porter, after moving to a three-day schedule to help raise her second child, and eventually rose to be the head of the firm's derivatives practice 

Born was among the first female attorneys to systematically address inequities regarding how the laws treated women  Born and another female lawyer, Marna Tucker, taught what is considered to have been the first "Women and the Law" course at Catholic University’s Columbus School of Law  The class exclusively concerned prejudicial treatment of women under the laws of the United States, past and present   Born and Tucker were surprised to discover that there was no textbook on the issue at the time   Born is also one of the co-founders of the National Women's Law Center  Born also helped rewrite the American Bar Association rules to make it possible for more women and minorities to sit on federal bench 

During her long legal career, and into her retirement, Born did much pro bono and other types of volunteer work  She was active in the American Bar Association, the largest professional organization of lawyers in the United States   Initially Born was named a member of the governing council of the ABA's Individual Rights Section, eventually becoming chairperson   Born and Tucker founded the ABA Women's Caucus, the first organization of female lawyers in the ABA   She held several other senior positions in the ABA, including being named the first woman member of the ABA's Standing Committee on the Federal Judiciary   As a member of the Judiciary Committee, Born provided testimony and opinion on persons nominated for federal judgeships  In 1980 she was named chair of the committee   As chair of the committee, Born was invited to address the U S  Congress regarding the nomination of Judge Sandra Day O'Connor to the U S  Supreme Court 

In 1993, Born's name was floated as a possible candidate for Attorney General of the United States, but Janet Reno was nominated 

In July 2009, Nancy Pelosi appointed Brooksley Born as a commissioner to the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC) 

Born and the OTC derivatives market
Born was appointed to the CFTC on April 15, 1994, by President Bill Clinton  Due to litigation against Bankers Trust Company by Procter and Gamble and other corporate clients, Born and her team at the CFTC sought comments on the regulation of over-the-counter derivatives, a first step in the process of writing CFTC regulations to supplement the existing regulations of the Federal Reserve System,  the Options Clearing Corporation, and the National Association of Insurance Commissioners  Born was particularly concerned about swaps, financial instruments that are traded over the counter between banks, insurance companies or other funds or companies, and thus have no transparency except to the two counterparties and the counterparties' regulators, if any   CFTC regulation was strenuously opposed by Federal Reserve chairman Alan Greenspan, and by Treasury Secretaries Robert Rubin and Lawrence Summers  On May 7, 1998, former SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt joined Rubin and Greenspan in objecting to the issuance of the CFTC's concept release  Their response dismissed Born's analysis and focused on the hypothetical possibility that CFTC regulation of swaps and other OTC derivative instruments could create a "legal uncertainty" regarding such financial instruments,  hypothetically reducing the value of the instruments  They argued that the imposition of regulatory costs would "stifle financial innovation" and encourage financial capital to transfer its  transactions offshore  The disagreement between Born and the Executive Office's top economic policy advisors has been described not only as a classic Washington turf war, but also a war of ideologies,  insofar as it is possible to argue that Born's actions were consistent with Keynesian and neoclassical economics while Greenspan, Rubin, Levitt, and Summers consistently espoused neoliberal, and neoconservative policies 

In 1998, a trillion-dollar hedge fund called Long Term Capital Management (LTCM) was near collapse   Using mathematical models to calculate debt risk, LTCM used derivatives to leverage $5 billion into more than $1 trillion, doing business with fifteen of Wall Street's largest financial institutions   The derivative transactions were not regulated, nor were investors able to evaluate LTCM's exposures   Born stated, "I thought that LTCM was exactly what I had been worried about"   In the last weekend of September 1998, the President's working group was told that the entire American economy hung in the balance   After intervention by the Federal Reserve, the crisis was averted   In congressional hearings into the crisis, Greenspan acknowledged that language had been introduced into an agriculture bill that would prevent CFTC from regulating the derivatives which were at the center of the crisis that threatened the US economy   U S  Representative Maurice Hinchey (D-NY) asked "How many more failures do you think we'd have to have before some regulation in this area might be appropriate?"  In response, Greenspan brushed aside the substance of Born's warnings with the simple assertion that "the degree of supervision of regulation of the over-the-counter derivatives market is quite adequate to maintain a degree of stability in the system"  Born's warning was that there wasn't any regulation of them   Born's chief of staff, Michael Greenberger summed up Greenspan's position this way: "Greenspan didn't believe that fraud was something that needed to be enforced, and he assumed she probably did  And of course, she did "  Under heavy pressure from the financial lobby, legislation prohibiting regulation of derivatives by Born's agency was passed by the Congress   Born resigned on June 1, 1999 

The derivatives market continued to grow yearly throughout both terms of George W  Bush's administration  On September 15, 2008, the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers forced a broad recognition of a financial crisis in both the US and world capital markets   As Lehman Brothers' failure temporarily reduced financial capital's confidence, a number of newspaper articles and television programs suggested that the failure's possible causes included the conflict between the CFTC and the other regulators Faiola, Anthony, Nakashima, Ellen and Drew, Jill  The Crash: Risk and Regulation - What Went Wrong, The Washington Post, October 15, 2008 

Born declined to publicly comment on the unfolding 2008 crisis until March 2009, when she said: "The market grew so enormously, with so little oversight and regulation, that it made the financial crisis much deeper and more pervasive than it otherwise would have been " She also lamented the influence of Wall Street lobbyists on the process and the refusal of regulators to discuss even modest reforms 

An October 2009 Frontline documentary titled "The Warning"  described Born's thwarted efforts to regulate and bring transparency to the derivatives market, and the continuing opposition thereto  The program concluded with an excerpted interview with Born sounding another warning: "I think we will have continuing danger from these markets and that we will have repeats of the financial crisis -- may differ in details but there will be significant financial downturns and disasters attributed to this regulatory gap, over and over, until we learn from experience "

In 2009 Born, along with Sheila Bair of the FDIC, was awarded the John F  Kennedy Profiles in Courage Award in recognition of the "political courage she demonstrated in sounding early warnings about conditions that contributed" to the 2007-08 financial crisis   According to Caroline Kennedy, "Brooksley Born recognized that the financial security of all Americans was being put at risk by the greed, negligence and opposition of  powerful and well connected interests     The catastrophic financial events of recent months have  proved them [Born and Sheila Bair] right "  One member of the President's working group had a change of heart about Brooksley Born   SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt stated "I've come to know her as one of the most capable, dedicated, intelligent and committed public servants that I have ever come to know", adding that "I could have done much better  I could have made a difference" in response to her warnings 

In 2010, a documentary film Inside Job further alleged that derivatives regulation was ineffective from the Clinton administration on  Along with fellow whistleblower, former IMF Chief Economist Raghuram Rajan, who was also scorned by the economic establishment, Brooksley Born was cited as one of the authorities arguing that financial derivatives increase economic risk 

 Personal life 
Born is married to Alexander E  Bennett (also retired from Arnold & Porter)   She has five adult children - two from a previous marriage to Jacob Landau and three stepchildren  Notably, Born was named a partner at Arnold & Porter while working part-time so she could raise her two young children   When both of her children were school-age, Born returned to practice full-time 

References

External links
Attorney profile at Arnold & Porter
Brooksley Born (2009 Winner) of the Profiles in Courage Award, with acceptance speech transcript and NECN video

Profile at MarketsWiki
Speeches and statements
"Testimony Of Brooksley Born Chairperson of the CFTC Concerning The Over-The-Counter Derivatives Market", before the House Committee On Banking And Financial Services, July 24, 1998 
"The Lessons of Long Term Capital Management L P ", Remarks of Brooksley Born, Chairperson of the CFTC, Chicago-Kent-IIT Commodities Law Institute, Chicago, Illinois, October 15, 1998 
 Interview: Brooksley Born for "PBS Frontline: The Warning", PBS, (streaming VIDEO 1 hour), October 20, 2009 
Articles
Manuel Roig-Franzia  "Credit Crisis Cassandra:Brooksley Born's Unheeded Warning Is a Rueful Echo 10 Years On", The Washington Post, May 26, 2009
 Taibbi, Matt  "The Great American Bubble Machine", Rolling Stone'', July 9–23, 2009

1940 births
American women lawyers
Arnold & Porter people
Clinton administration personnel
Columbus School of Law faculty
Commodity Futures Trading Commission personnel
Heads of United States federal agencies
Lawyers from San Francisco
Living people
Stanford Law School alumni
21st-century American women
Stanford University alumni



ground_truth: Peaks occur at certain strain directions, while the gap is zero at others.

prompt_front: Now, answer the following question based on the text below, only give me the answer and do not output any other words.

Question: Can someone sell or modify the Agency Spotter Content?

Read the following text and answer briefly.

Context 4: South Dakota v  Wayfair, Inc  - Harvard Law Review
Fourth Circuit Invalidates Maryland Statute Regulating Price Gouging in the Sale of Generic Drugs 
South Dakota Supreme Court Holds Unconstitutional State Law Requiring Internet Retailers Without In-State Physical Presence to Remit Sales Tax 
Judicial junk, the Court has long thought, is easier to scrap when the erroneous precedent cannot be fixed by Congress, as in constitutional cases 1× 1  See Burnet v  Coronado Oil & Gas Co , 285 U S  393, 405–10 (1932) (Brandeis, J , dissenting); Lee Epstein, William M  Landes & Adam Liptak, The Decision to Depart (or Not) from Constitutional Precedent: An Empirical Study of the Roberts Court, 90 N Y U  L  Rev  1115, 1116 (2015) (“[Justice Brandeis’s] dissenting opinion       now has the status of black letter law ”)  On the flip side, whenever a bad precedent can be corrected by Congress, stare decisis applies with “special force ”2× 2  See Patterson v  McLean Credit Union, 491 U S  164, 172–73 (1989)  The Court, following Justice Brandeis, usually articulates the rule as distinguishing between “constitutional” and “statutory” precedents  See, e g , id  But the distinction is occasionally said to be between “constitutional” and “nonconstitutional cases ” See, e g , Glidden Co  v  Zdanok, 370 U S  530, 543 (1962) (plurality opinion)  Nomenclature aside, the Court has — until now — adhered to Justice Brandeis’s key insight that the important factor is whether or not the mistake may be legislatively corrected  Last Term, in South Dakota v  Wayfair, Inc ,3× 3  138 S  Ct  2080 (2018)  the Court tinkered with this thinking in overruling an outdated dormant commerce clause precedent  Dormant commerce clause decisions technically produce constitutional holdings, but Congress may override them at will 4× 4  See Prudential Ins  Co  v  Benjamin, 328 U S  408, 421–27 (1946)  Under the usual logic of stare decisis, it should take special force to dislodge such precedents  But Wayfair applied the weakened stare decisis of constitutional cases, asserting that the Court must “address a false constitutional premise         whether or not Congress can or will act ”5× 5  Wayfair, 138 S  Ct  at 2096–97 
Emerging from Wayfair is an odd and ominous development in stare decisis doctrine  Odd, because it turns on a formal classification instead of on Congress’s practical ability to fix the problem  Ominous, because the Court’s logic leads far past the dormant commerce clause  Wayfair grants only feeble stare decisis to precedents that set a “constitutional default rule,”6× 6  Id  at 2096 (“While       Congress has the authority to change the physical presence rule, Congress cannot change the constitutional default rule ”)  meaning constitutional decisions that allow for legislative adjustment or override  This new stare decisis analysis makes other precedents setting constitutional default rules more vulnerable — including, perhaps, mainstays of criminal procedure like Miranda v  Arizona7× 7  384 U S  436 (1966)  and Mapp v  Ohio 8× 8  367 U S  643 (1961) 
Since its 1967 decision in National Bellas Hess, Inc  v  Department of Revenue,9× 9  386 U S  753 (1967)  the Court has held that, under the “dormant” or “negative” implication of the Commerce Clause,10× 10  The dormant or negative commerce clause is a judicial derivation from the Commerce Clause “prohibiting States from discriminating against or imposing excessive burdens on interstate commerce without congressional approval,” which “strikes at one of the chief evils that led to the adoption of the Constitution, namely, state tariffs and other laws that burdened interstate commerce ” Comptroller of the Treasury of Md  v  Wynne, 135 S  Ct  1787, 1794 (2015)  states may not compel remote sellers with no physical presence in the state to collect and remit sales taxes 11× 11  See Bellas Hess, 386 U S  at 759–60  In Quill Corp  v  North Dakota,12× 12  504 U S  298 (1992)  the Court refused to overrule the “bright-line, physical-presence requirement” of Bellas Hess, leaning heavily on stare decisis 13× 13  Id  at 317–18  Three Justices joined a concurrence explaining that their decision rested solely “on the basis of stare decisis ” Id  at 320 (Scalia, J , concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)  So the physical presence test remained the law of the land while the internet conquered the earth  Justice Kennedy had joined the Quill majority and Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion emphasizing stare decisis, but by 2015 he had second thoughts  Writing separately in Direct Marketing Ass’n v  Brohl,14× 14  135 S  Ct  1124 (2015)  Justice Kennedy acknowledged that “[t]he Internet has caused far-reaching systemic and structural changes in the economy” and therefore “Quill now harms States to a degree far greater than could have been anticipated earlier ”15× 15  Id  at 1135 (Kennedy, J , concurring)  He concluded with the wish that “[t]he legal system should find an appropriate case for this Court to reexamine Quill and Bellas Hess ”16× 16  Id 
Seldom has a concurring opinion signed by a lone Justice prompted a state to officially declare an emergency  Yet in 2016, in response to Justice Kennedy’s overture, the South Dakota legislature passed a law, S B  106, “to provide for the collection of sales taxes from certain remote sellers       and to declare an emergency ”17× 17  2016 S D  Sess  Laws ch  70 pmbl  217 (codified at S D  Codified Laws § 10-64 (2017))  It required every remote seller to collect and remit sales tax if the seller’s business in South Dakota comprised either a “gross revenue” greater than $100,000 or at least 200 “separate transactions” within one calendar year 18× 18  Id  § 1  Significantly, the law did not apply retroactively 19× 19  Id  § 5  The “emergency” declaration was necessary to give the law immediate effect, for the purpose of “permitting the most expeditious possible review of the constitutionality of this law” by the U S  Supreme Court 20× 20  Id  § 8(8)  As Justice Alito put it, the “South Dakota law [was] obviously a test case ”21× 21  Transcript of Oral Argument at 27, Wayfair, 138 S  Ct  2080 (No  17-494), https://www supremecourt gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2017/17-494_7lho pdf [https://perma cc/8HYH-VU8N] 
Expeditiously, a group of remote sellers challenged the law  After being sued by South Dakota for refusing to register for the newly required sales tax license, Wayfair, Inc , Overstock com, Inc , and Newegg, Inc  moved for summary judgment in South Dakota circuit court on the grounds that S B  106 was unconstitutional under Quill and Bellas Hess — a point South Dakota conceded, indicating that it was seeking review by the U S  Supreme Court to overturn Quill 22× 22  State v  Wayfair Inc , 2017 SD 56, ¶¶ 9–11, 901 N W 2d 754, 759–60  Accordingly, the South Dakota circuit court granted the motion for summary judgment and South Dakota appealed to the state’s highest court 23× 23  Id  ¶ 12, 901 N W 2d at 760  The South Dakota Supreme Court unanimously affirmed, recognizing that South Dakota’s “arguments on the merits” may be “persuasive” but “Quill remains the controlling precedent ”24× 24  Id  ¶ 18, 901 N W 2d at 761  See generally Recent Case, State v  Wayfair Inc , 2017 SD 56, 901 N W 2d 754 (S D  2017), 131 Harv  L  Rev  2089 (2018) 
The U S  Supreme Court vacated and remanded 25× 25  Wayfair, 138 S  Ct  at 2100  Writing for the Court one last time, Justice Kennedy26× 26  Justices Thomas, Ginsburg, Alito, and Gorsuch joined Justice Kennedy’s opinion  pilloried Quill’s physical presence rule as “arbitrary, formalistic,” “anachronistic,” and “unfair and unjust” to both states and brick-and-mortar retailers 27× 27  Wayfair, 138 S  Ct  at 2092, 2095  After all, the rationale of Quill was that remote sellers lacked a sufficiently “substantial nexus” with the state to justify imposing a duty of tax collection 28× 28  Quill Corp  v  North Dakota, 504 U S  298, 311 (1992) (quoting Complete Auto Transit, Inc  v  Brady, 430 U S  274, 279 (1977))  This was wrong even in the mail-order catalog days of 1967 and 1992, but “the Internet revolution has made [Quill’s] earlier error all the more egregious and harmful ”29× 29  Wayfair, 138 S  Ct  at 2097; see also id  at 2092  The rule deprived the states of billions of dollars, since they could not force remote sellers to collect the tax and consumers hardly ever paid it on their own 30× 30  Id  at 2088 (“[C]onsumer compliance rates are notoriously low ”)  Quill “serve[d] as a judicially created tax shelter” for remote retailers who do a great deal of business online 31× 31  Id  at 2094 
Satisfied that Bellas Hess and Quill were wrongly decided, the Court then jumped the hurdle of stare decisis  The Quill Court had feared upsetting reliance interests 32× 32  Quill, 504 U S  at 317 (“Bellas Hess       has engendered substantial reliance and has become part of the basic framework of a sizable industry ”)  Wayfair shrugged off this concern, noting that “stare decisis accommodates only ‘legitimate reliance interest[s]’”; by contrast, reliance on the physical presence rule was largely due to consumers evading their use-tax obligations 33× 33  Wayfair, 138 S  Ct  at 2098 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v  Ross, 456 U S  798, 824 (1982))  Quill had also appealed to Congress’s ultimate authority over interstate commerce as a reason to abide by a precedent, even if wrongly decided 34× 34  See Quill, 504 U S  at 318–19; id  at 320 (Scalia, J , concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“Congress       can change the rule of Bellas Hess by simply saying so ”)  But Wayfair denied that Congress’s ability to change the law was a proper consideration:
While it can be conceded that Congress has the authority to change the physical presence rule, Congress cannot change the constitutional default rule  It is inconsistent with the Court’s proper role to ask Congress to address a false constitutional premise of this Court’s own creation  Courts have acted as the front line of review in this limited sphere; and hence it is important that their principles be accurate and logical, whether or not Congress can or will act in response 35× 35  Wayfair, 138 S  Ct  at 2096–97 
Having dispensed with the physical presence rule, the Court remanded the case to the South Dakota courts to determine in the first instance “whether some other principle in the Court’s Commerce Clause doctrine might invalidate the Act ”36× 36  Id  at 2099  But the Court listed “several features [of South Dakota law] that appear[ed] designed to prevent discrimination against or undue burdens upon interstate commerce ” Id 
Justices Thomas and Gorsuch each filed concurring opinions  Justice Thomas wistfully likened himself to Justice White — who voted for Bellas Hess but against Quill a quarter-century later — and confessed that he “should have joined [Justice White’s dissenting] opinion ”37× 37  Id  at 2100 (Thomas, J , concurring)  Justice Thomas added that the “Court’s entire negative Commerce Clause jurisprudence” is wrong and should be abandoned 38× 38  Id  Justice Gorsuch also wrote separately to express skepticism of the Court’s dormant commerce clause jurisprudence, raising “questions for another day” of whether the doctrine “can be squared with the text of the Commerce Clause, justified by stare decisis, or defended as misbranded products of federalism or antidiscrimination imperatives flowing from Article IV’s Privileges and Immunities Clause ”39× 39  Id  at 2100–01 (Gorsuch, J , concurring) 
Chief Justice Roberts dissented 40× 40  Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan joined the Chief Justice’s dissent  Surprisingly, the dissenting Justices “agree[d] that Bellas Hess was wrongly decided, for many of the reasons given by the Court ”41× 41  Wayfair, 138 S  Ct  at 2101 (Roberts, C J , dissenting)  The dispute between the majority and the dissent turned entirely on the principles and application of stare decisis  Chief Justice Roberts argued that whether or how to reverse Quill should be left to Congress, which “has the flexibility to address these questions in a wide variety of ways” and “can focus directly on current policy concerns rather than past legal mistakes ”42× 42  Id  at 2104  He also pointed to the “baffling” burdens of compliance with the idiosyncratic tax codes of “[o]ver 10,000 jurisdictions,” particularly for small businesses, and doubted that new “software” — the majority’s proposed solution to this mess43× 43  Id  at 2098 (majority opinion) (“Eventually, software that is available at a reasonable cost may make it easier for small businesses to cope with these problems ”)  — would soon solve the problem 44× 44  Id  at 2103–04 (Roberts, C J , dissenting)  In Bellas Hess, the Court reasoned that the dormant commerce clause protects interstate business from being “entangle[d]       in a virtual welter of complicated obligations to local jurisdictions ” Nat’l Bellas Hess, Inc  v  Dep’t of Revenue, 386 U S  753, 759–60 (1967)  The dissent replied that the Court “vastly underestimate[d] the skill of contemporary man and his machines ” Id  at 766 (Fortas, J , dissenting)  The dispute in Wayfair over whether software is up to the task effectively reprised the old debate from Bellas Hess, only this time couched as part of the stare decisis inquiry’s concern for reliance interests rather than as a matter of dormant commerce clause doctrine  While Wayfair acknowledged that “[c]omplex state tax systems could have the effect of discriminating against interstate commerce,” 138 S  Ct  at 2099, the Court remarked that “[t]he physical presence rule is a poor proxy” for an inquiry into any actual burdens imposed on interstate commerce, id  at 2093 
Chief Justice Roberts emphasized that a “heightened form of stare decisis”45× 45  Wayfair, 138 S  Ct  at 2102 (Roberts, C J , dissenting)  applies when “Congress       can, if it wishes, override this Court’s decisions with contrary legislation ”46× 46  Id  at 2101 (first citing Michigan v  Bay Mills Indian Cmty , 134 S  Ct  2024, 2036 (2014) (tribal sovereign immunity); then citing Kimble v  Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 135 S  Ct  2401, 2409 (2015) (statutory interpretation); and then citing Halliburton Co  v  Erica P  John Fund, Inc , 134 S  Ct  2398, 2411 (2014) (judicially created doctrine implementing a judicially created cause of action))  In Quill, the Chief Justice noted, the Court had taken to heart that “Congress may be better qualified” and “has the ultimate power to resolve” the question47× 47  Id  at 2102 (quoting Quill Corp  v  North Dakota, 504 U S  279, 318 (1992))  while Justice Scalia had “recogniz[ed] that stare decisis has ‘special force’ in the dormant Commerce Clause context due to Congress’s ‘final say over regulation of interstate commerce ’”48× 48  Id  (quoting Quill, 504 U S  at 320 (Scalia, J , concurring in part and concurring in the judgment))  Moreover, “[i]f stare decisis applied with special force in Quill, it should be an even greater impediment” afterward since Quill effectively “tossed [the ball] into Congress’s court ”49× 49  Id  (alteration in original) (quoting Kimble, 135 S  Ct  at 2409); cf  Bay Mills, 134 S  Ct  at 2039 n 12 (“When we inform Congress that it has primary responsibility over a sphere of law, and invite Congress to consider a specific issue within that sphere, we cannot deem irrelevant how Congress responds ”)  Because the Court invited Congress to act and then “suddenly chang[ed] the ground rules, the Court may have waylaid Congress’s consideration of the issue ”50× 50  Wayfair, 138 S  Ct  at 2102–03 (Roberts, C J , dissenting) 
In Wayfair, the Court applied the flimsier form of stare decisis to a precedent that could have been overruled by Congress  It did so in the context of a dormant commerce clause case, but Wayfair’s logic extends to all constitutional default rules — that is, constitutional decisions that Congress remains free to change  Not only does Wayfair deviate from the Court’s decades-old stare decisis analysis, it also imperils other precedents that set constitutional default rules 
The Court’s reasoning in Wayfair departs from its prior stare decisis analysis  In 1932, Justice Brandeis posited that stare decisis must bend “in cases involving the Federal Constitution, where correction through legislative action is practically impossible ”51× 51  Burnet v  Coronado Oil & Gas Co , 285 U



ground_truth: No.

prompt_front: Now, answer the following question based on the text below, only give me the answer and do not output any other words.

Question: What award did Brooksley Born receive in 2009?

Read the following text and answer briefly.

Context 4: S  393, 406–07 (1932) (Brandeis, J , dissenting)  The Court has long since adopted his argument,52× 52  See, e g , Smith v  Allwright, 321 U S  649, 665 (1944)  as well as its corollary — that stare decisis commands “special force in the area of statutory interpretation” where “Congress remains free to alter what [the Court has] done ”53× 53  Patterson v  McLean Credit Union, 491 U S  164, 172–73 (1989)  For normative evaluations of heightened stare decisis for statutory precedents, see generally Einer Elhauge, Statutory Default Rules: How to Interpret Unclear Legislation 211–23 (2008); and William N  Eskridge, Jr , Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76 Geo  L J  1361, 1364–1409 (1988)  Justice Brandeis’s logic demands that dormant commerce clause cases, where Congress is free to act, be granted the weightier stare decisis 54× 54  Scholars have noted the curious fact that Justice Brandeis included many dormant commerce clause cases as examples of overruled constitutional precedents  See, e g , Earl M  Maltz, Commentary, Some Thoughts on the Death of Stare Decisis in Constitutional Law, 1980 Wis  L  Rev  467, 468–469, 469 n 11  One explanation for this is that Justice Brandeis sought the authority of Chief Justice Taney’s dictum that the Court’s “opinion upon the construction of the Constitution is always open to discussion” — which referred to the dormant commerce clause  See Burnet, 285 U S  at 408 n 3 (Brandeis, J , dissenting) (quoting The Passenger Cases, 48 U S  (7 How ) 283, 470 (1849) (Taney, C J , dissenting))  In Chief Justice Taney’s time, it was thought that Congress could not override the Court’s dormant commerce clause decisions, see Cooley v  Bd  of Wardens, 53 U S  (12 How ) 299, 321 (1852), so the context of Chief Justice Taney’s dictum does not conflict with Justice Brandeis’s theory of stare decisis  The Court applied this reasoning in Quill, as Chief Justice Roberts underscored 55× 55  Wayfair, 138 S  Ct  at 2102 (Roberts, C J , dissenting) 
Yet the Wayfair majority refused to consider Congress’s authority to legislate as a relevant factor for stare decisis 56× 56  Even Justice Kennedy’s earlier opinion in Direct Marketing contemplated judicially overruling Quill, conspicuously neglecting a possible legislative solution  See supra p  278  The Court even insisted that to do so “is inconsistent with the Court’s proper role,” since Quill embodied “a false constitutional premise of th[e] Court’s own creation ”57× 57  Wayfair, 138 S  Ct  at 2096 (emphasis added)  This refusal breaks from the practical Brandeisian wisdom that has guided the Court’s treatment of precedent for the better part of a century  The point is not that stare decisis should have ultimately propped up Bellas Hess yet again, as Wayfair’s dissenting Justices maintained  After all, a realistic approach that is alert to each branch’s institutional capacities might have led to the conclusion that Congress was actually ill-equipped to overrule Quill  In this vein, the Court could have sensibly pointed out that Congress is unlikely to stick its neck out with a tax hike (or a look-alike) from which only the states would benefit 58× 58  For two practical arguments to this effect, see Brian Galle, Essay, Kill Quill, Keep the Dormant Commerce Clause: History’s Lessons on Congressional Control of State Taxation, 70 Stan  L  Rev  Online 158, 160–62 (2018), https://review law stanford edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2018/03/70-Stan -L -Rev -Online-158-Galle pdf [https://perma cc/22YP-P4V5]; Edward A  Zelinsky, The Political Process Argument for Overruling Quill, 82 Brook  L  Rev  1177, 1191–92 (2017)  Indeed, South Dakota advanced such practical arguments in its brief 59× 59  See Petitioner’s Brief at 54, Wayfair, 138 S  Ct  2080 (No  17-494) (“Congress has little incentive to act here because it would be (or appear to be) authorizing new or greater tax collections from its constituents, while receiving none of the revenue in return ”)  More generally, the Court might have discussed the limits of the states’ influence in the federal system as a reason not to wait for congressional intervention, a topic it has debated on other occasions 60× 60  See Richard H  Pildes, Institutional Formalism and Realism in Constitutional and Public Law, 2013 Sup  Ct  Rev  1, 30–32; see also Galle, supra note 58, at 159 (“Congress is not a trustworthy guardian of state fiscal power, making continuing judicial involvement a more appealing prospect ”)  Or it could have argued that new facts on the ground — namely, the blast of e-commerce that hit like a comet after Quill — overpowered stare decisis of any force, special or plain 61× 61  Two recent studies of stare decisis highlighted the physical presence rule as exemplifying a precedent that may reasonably be overruled due to changed facts  See Bryan A  Garner et al , The Law of Judicial Precedent 364–65 (2016); Randy J  Kozel, Settled Versus Right: A Theory of Precedent 112–13 (2017)  It should be noted that the authors of The Law of Judicial Precedent classify the physical presence rule as a constitutional precedent for stare decisis purposes, thus anticipating the Court’s misstep in Wayfair  Garner et al , supra, at 354–65  Because even statutory precedents may sometimes be overruled,62× 62  See Patterson v  McLean Credit Union, 491 U S  164, 173–74 (1989) (discussing justifications for overruling statutory precedents)  Contra Lawrence C  Marshall, “Let Congress Do It”: The Case for an Absolute Rule of Statutory Stare Decisis, 88 Mich  L  Rev  177 (1989)  the Court could have killed Quill without first planting its constitutional kiss of death 63× 63  Cf  Thomas R  Lee, Stare Decisis in Historical Perspective: From the Founding Era to the Rehnquist Court, 52 Vand  L  Rev  647, 704 (1999) (“Justice Brandeis’       memorable prose has since become a mandatory part of the burial rite for any constitutional precedent ”) 
The Court resisted such arguments  Instead, Wayfair reasoned that Congress’s total ability to correct an erroneous decision counts for nothing when the Court gets the Constitution wrong  That such a theory sprouts from a case like Wayfair, which repudiated a “formalistic distinction,”64× 64  Wayfair, 138 S  Ct  at 2092  is ironic  Wayfair’s stare decisis analysis resorts to the formalism of making constitutional a “magic” word65× 65  See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 21, at 12  rather than asking whether Congress can step in 
Moreover, the Court’s new thinking on stare decisis threatens other constitutional default rules  Wayfair now stands for the proposition that a “constitutional default rule” — a term the Court apparently lifted from South Dakota’s reply brief on the merits66× 66  Reply Brief at 22, Wayfair, 138 S  Ct  2080 (No  17-494) (“Congress is polarized, which makes it critical       to get the constitutional default rule right ”)  — gets only weakened stare decisis  To appreciate why this holding matters, it is worth exploring the concept and scope of constitutional default rules  Contract theory describes default rules as legal rules that the parties may “contract around ”67× 67  See, e g , Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 Yale L J  87, 87 (1989)  Although “constitutional default rule” could be read broadly to include a variety of actors and contracting mechanisms,68× 68  See John Ferejohn & Barry Friedman, Toward a Political Theory of Constitutional Default Rules, 33 Fla  St  U  L  Rev  825, 826 (2006) (“When we speak of default rules in constitutional law, we typically are talking about specifications of ways the government can act (or modify its behavior) to get around a constitutional prohibition ”)  the Court’s use of the term for purposes of stare decisis may be narrowly defined as judicial precedents of constitutional law that “are ultimately subject to congressional control ”69× 69  Gillian E  Metzger, Congress, Article IV, and Interstate Relations, 120 Harv  L  Rev  1468, 1525 (2007) (describing judicially enforceable “constitutional default rules imposing obligations on the states in the name of union [that] are ultimately subject to congressional control”)  The dormant commerce clause is a paradigmatic constitutional default rule because what the Court does today Congress may undo tomorrow  Justice Scalia declared this fact “[t]he clearest sign that the negative Commerce Clause is a judicial fraud,” for “[h]ow could congressional consent lift a constitutional prohibition?”70× 70  Comptroller of the Treasury of Md  v  Wynne, 135 S  Ct  1787, 1808 (2015) (Scalia, J , dissenting)  But that’s what a constitutional default rule is  The Court has allowed Congress to overturn its dormant commerce clause cases since 1891 71× 71  See In re Rahrer, 140 U S  545, 560–62 (1891) 
Dormant commerce clause cases are not the only constitutional default rules  Professor Laurence Tribe’s treatise identifies two others 72× 72  1 Laurence H  Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 6-35 (3d ed  2000)  And in a groundbreaking article, Professor Henry Monaghan revealed “a substructure of substantive, procedural, and remedial rules” forming “a constitutional common law subject to amendment, modification, or even reversal by Congress ”73× 73  Henry P  Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term — Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 Harv  L  Rev  1, 2–3 (1975); see also Susan R  Klein, Identifying and (Re)Formulating Prophylactic Rules, Safe Harbors, and Incidental Rights in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 99 Mich  L  Rev  1030 (2001) (further developing Monaghan’s theory in criminal procedure context)  What follows is a list of six lines of cases beyond the dormant commerce clause that may be fairly described as constitutional default rules  The first two are drawn from Tribe’s treatise while the next four are found in Monaghan’s article:
(1) State Taxation of Federal Instrumentalities: States may not tax instrumentalities of the federal government74× 74  McCulloch v  Maryland, 17 U S  (4 Wheat ) 316, 436 (1819)  — unless Congress consents 75× 75  See, e g , Helvering v  Gerhardt, 304 U S  405, 411 n 1 (1938) (“Congress may curtail an immunity which might otherwise be implied or enlarge it beyond the point where, Congress being silent, the Court would set its limits ” (citations omitted))  One court has described such judicial decisions as setting a “constitutional default rule ” United States v  Delaware, 958 F 2d 555, 560 n 9 (3d Cir  1992) (“[W]e must decide the constitutional default rule for this type of tax, fully aware that Congress could decide at any time to reverse our decision statutorily ”)  (2) Article I, Section 10 Cases: Article I, Section 10 provides that certain prohibitions on the states may be waived by Congress 76× 76  See U S  Const  art  I, § 10, cls  2–3  The Court has taken note of this when considering whether to overrule, for instance, an Import-Export Clause precedent 77× 77  See Hooven & Allison Co  v  Evatt, 324 U S  652, 668 (1945) (“In view of the fact that the Constitution gives Congress authority to consent to state taxation of imports and hence to lay down its own test for determining when the immunity ends, we see no convincing practical reason for abandoning the test which has been applied for more than a century        ”), overruled on other grounds by Limbach v  Hooven & Allison Co , 466 U S  353 (1984)  In Michelin Tire Corp  v  Wages, 423 U S  276 (1976), the Court left open the question whether “Congress may authorize, under the Import-Export Clause, an exaction that it could not directly impose under the Tax Clause ” Id  at 301 n 13  Metzger, however, argues that the Import-Export Clause is free of other clauses’ limits on congressional power  See Metzger, supra note 69, at 1500 & n 120  (3) Bivens Cases: In Bivens v  Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics,78× 78  403 U S  388 (1971)  the Court held that a violation of the Fourth Amendment gives rise to a right to sue for damages 79× 79  Id  at 397  But the Court has also held that “[s]uch a cause of action may be defeated       when       Congress has provided an alternative remedy which it explicitly declared to be a substitute for recovery directly under the Constitution and viewed as equally effective ”80× 80  Carlson v  Green, 446 U S  14, 18–19 (1980)  (4) Miranda Cases: The Miranda Court famously “encourage[d]” Congress and the states to explore alternative “procedures which are at least as effective in apprising accused persons of their right of silence and in assuring a continuous opportunity to exercise it ”81× 81  Miranda v  Arizona, 384 U S  436, 467 (1966)  In Dickerson v  United States, 530 U S  428 (2000), the Court struck down a congressional attempt to effectively abolish Miranda, holding that “Miranda announced a constitutional rule that Congress may not supersede legislatively ” Id  at 444  But Dickerson also stood by Miranda’s “invitation for legislative action” to replace Miranda with an adequate substitute  Id  at 440; see also Michael C  Dorf & Barry Friedman, Shared Constitutional Interpretation, 2000 Sup  Ct  Rev  61 (discussing legislative alternatives to Miranda)  (5) The Police Lineup Case: In United States v  Wade,82× 82  388 U S  218 (1967)  the Court created an exclusionary rule for evidence obtained from a police lineup in violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel but acknowledged that it could be replaced by “[l]egislative or other regulations       which eliminate the risks of abuse ”83× 83  Id  at 239  (6) The Exclusionary Rule Cases: Mapp v  Ohio made the Fourth Amendment “exclusionary rule” binding on the states,84× 84  367 U S  643, 655 (1961)  yet Congress is thought to have the power to replace it 85× 85  See Bivens v  Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed  Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U S  388, 422–24 (1971) (Burger, C J , dissenting) (inviting Congress to replace the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule); Harold J  Krent, How to Move Beyond the Exclusionary Rule: Structuring Judicial Response to Legislative Reform Efforts, 26 Pepp  L  Rev  855, 864–71 (1999) 
All of the above are arguably constitutional default rules set by the Court that remain, to one degree or another, open to congressional revision  The list could be longer or shorter, depending on which default rules the Court will view as constitutional86× 86  A shorter list could be produced by whittling away at the constitutional status of the cases identified by Monaghan  While the Court has held that Miranda is a constitutional decision, Dickerson, 530 U S  at 444, some of the other cases may be viewed as nonconstitutional  See, e g , Collins v  Virginia, 138 S  Ct  1663, 1675–80 (2018) (Thomas, J , concurring) (arguing that Mapp is “nonconstitutional,” id  at 1678 n 5); Richard H  Fallon, Jr  et al , Hart and Wechsler’s The Federal Courts and the Federal System 775–77 (7th ed  2015) (discussing whether Bivens is constitutionally required)  Conversely, a longer list might include any constitutional right that can be waived by a party  See, e g , Daniel A  Farber, Another View of the Quagmire: Unconstitutional Conditions and Contract Theory, 33 Fla  St  U  L  Rev  913, 918 (2006) (describing the Eleventh Amendment as “just a contractual default rule that the states are free to barter away”)  Such a list might also include various constitutionally inspired judicial presumptions  See, e g , Jack Goldsmith & John F  Manning, The President’s Completion Power, 115 Yale L J  2280, 2299 (2006) (describing the Chevron presumption of delegated interpretive power to administrative agencies as “a constitutionally inspired default rule”); Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 Harv  L  Rev  2085, 2097–98 (2002) (describing clear statement rules as “constitutional default rules” reversible by Congress)  Many other decisions could likely be characterized as constitutional default rules; the list above is only an initial stab  and on how it will answer open questions about congressional authority over certain constitutional provisions 87× 87  See, e g , Thomas v  Wash  Gas Light Co , 448 U S  261, 272 n 18 (1980) (plurality opinion) (leaving unresolved whether Congress may limit constitutional full faith and credit obligations); White v  Mass  Council of Constr  Emp’rs, Inc , 460 U S  204, 215 n 1 (1983) (Blackmun, J , concurring in part and dissenting in part) (leaving unresolved “whether Congress may authorize       what otherwise would be a violation” of the Privileges and Immunities Clause); 1 Tribe, supra note 72, § 6-35, at 1243–44 (arguing that Congress cannot override judicial constructions of the Privileges and Immunities Clause); Metzger, supra note 69, at 1486–89 (arguing the opposite)  But the takeaway is clear: weaker stare decisis for constitutional default rules  Pre-Wayfair, one would have thought that stare decisis applies with special force to such precedents, given congressional power to set them straight  Not anymore  Why? Because it is improper to “ask Congress to address a false constitutional premise of th[e] Court’s own creation ”88× 88  Wayfair, 138 S  Ct  at 2096  The Latin for Wayfair’s doctrine is not stare decisis, which should reflect a realistic, working relationship between the legislative and judicial branches  It is mea culpa 
In its zeal to update the Constitution for “the Cyber Age,”89× 89  Id  at 2097  the Court deleted Congress from stare decisis doctrine in constitutional cases  The Court had better options  It could have left Quill on Congress’s doorstep, as the dissent argued  Or it could have justified overruling Quill notwithstanding the special force of stare decisis  Instead, the Court reasoned that it doesn’t matter whether Congress is willing and able to do the job: a constitutional mess calls for a judicial clean-up crew  For constitutional default rules — a category of decisions embracing the dormant commerce clause and sweeping far beyond — Wayfair’s new theory of stare decisis makes the Court’s precedents less sticky and Congress less relevant 



ground_truth: In 2009, Brooksley Born received the John F. Kennedy Profiles in Courage Award.