prompt_front: Now, answer the following question based on the text below, only give me the answer and do not output any other words.

Question: What is the name of the generative interactive model used in the method?

Read the following text and answer briefly.

Context 1: \section{Introduction}
In recent years, vehicular technology has attracted significant attention from the automotive and telecommunication industries, leading to the emergence of vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communications for improving road safety, traffic management services and driving comfort 
V2X supported by the sixth generation (6G) is envisioned to be a key enabler of future connected autonomous vehicles \cite{9779322}  Although its transformative benefits for leveraging intelligent transportation systems, V2X still face several technical issues mainly related to performance and security 

The integration of sensing and communication (ISAC) has emerged very recently as a revolutionary element of 6G that could potentially help enabling adaptive learning and intelligent decision-making in future V2X applications 
The combination of sensing and communication allows vehicles to perceive their surroundings better, predict manoeuvres from nearby users and make intelligent decisions, thus paving the way toward a safer transportation system \cite{9665433} 
Modernized vehicles are augmented with various types of sensors divided into exteroceptive to observe their surrounding environment and proprioceptive to observe their internal states 
The former like GPS, Lidar, and Cameras are conveyed to improve situational awareness, while latter sensors, such as steering, pedal, and wheel speed, convey to improve self-awareness  

While sensing the environment, vehicles can exchange messages that assist in improving situational- and self-awareness and in coordinating maneuvers with other vehicles 
Those messages like the basic safety (BSMs) and cooperative awareness messages (CAMs) are composed of transmitting vehicle's states such as position and velocity and other vehicles' states in the vicinity  Vehicles might use their sensors, such as cameras and Lidar, to detect road users (e g , pedestrians), which can be communicated with other road users via the V2X messages to improve the overall performance  However, V2X communication links carrying those messages are inherently vulnerable to malicious attacks due to the open and shared nature of the wireless spectrum among vehicles and other cellular users \cite{8336901}  For instance, a jammer in the vicinity might alter the information to be communicated to nearby vehicles/users or can intentionally disrupt communication between a platoon of vehicles making the legitimate signals unrecognizable for on-board units (OBUs) and/or road side units (RSUs) that endanger vehicular safety 
\cite{8553649} 

In addition, the integrity of GPS signals and the correct acquisition of navigation data to compute position, velocity and time information is critical in V2X applications for their safe operation  However, since civil GPS receivers rely on unencrypted satellite signals, spoofers can easily replicate them by deceiving the GPS receiver to compute falsified positions \cite{9226611} 
Also, the long distance between satellites and terrestrial GPS receivers leads to an extremely weak signal that can be easily drowned out by a spoofer  
Thus, GPS sensors' vulnerability to spoofing attacks poses a severe threat that might be causing vehicles to be out of control or even hijacked and endanger human life \cite{9881548} 
Therefore, GPS spoofing attacks and jamming interference needs to be controlled and detected in real-time to reach secured vehicular communications allowing vehicles to securely talk to each other and interact with the infrastructure (e g , roadside terminals, base stations) \cite{9860410} 

Existing methods for GPS spoofing detection include GPS signal analysis methods and GPS message encryption methods \cite{9845684}  However, the former requires the ground truth source during the detection process, which is not always possible to collect  In contrast, the latter involves support from a secured infrastructure and advanced computing resources on GPS receivers, which hinders their adoption in V2X applications  On the other hand, existing methods for jammer detection in vehicular networks are based on analysing the packet drop rate as in \cite{9484071}, making it difficult to detect an advanced jammer manipulating the legitimate signal instead of disrupting it 
In this work, we propose a method to jointly detect GPS spoofing and jamming attacks in the V2X network  A coupled generalized dynamic Bayesian network (C-GDBN) is employed to learn the interaction between RF signals received by the RSU from multiple vehicles and their corresponding trajectories  This integration of vehicles' positional information with vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) communications allows semantic learning while mapping RF signals with vehicles' trajectories and enables the RSU to jointly predict the RF signals it expects to receive from the vehicles from which it can anticipate the expected trajectories 

The main contributions of this paper can be summarized as follows: \textit{i)} A joint GPS spoofing and jamming detection method is proposed for the V2X scenario, which is based on learning a generative interactive model as the C-GDBN  Such a model encodes the cross-correlation between the RF signals transmitted by multiple vehicles and their trajectories, where their semantic meaning is coupled stochastically at a high abstraction level  \textit{ii)} A cognitive RSU equipped with the acquired C-GDBN can predict and estimate vehicle positions based on real-time RF signals  This allows RSU to evaluate whether both RF signals and vehicles' trajectories are evolving according to the dynamic rules encoded in the C-GDBN and, consequently, to identify the cause (i e , a jammer attacking the V2I or a spoofer attacking the satellite link) of the abnormal behaviour that occurred in the V2X environment  \textit{iii)} Extensive simulation results demonstrate that the proposed method accurately estimates the vehicles' trajectories from the predicted RF signals, effectively detect any abnormal behaviour and identify the type of abnormality occurring with high detection probabilities 
To our best knowledge, this is the first work that studies the joint detection of jamming and spoofing in V2X systems 

\section{System model and problem formulation}
The system model depicted in Fig ~\ref{fig_SystemModel}, includes a single cell vehicular network consisting of a road side unit (RSU) located at $\mathrm{p}_{R}=[{x}_{R},{y}_{R}]$, a road side jammer (RSJ) located at $\mathrm{p}_{J}=[{x}_{J},{y}_{J}]$, a road side spoofer (RSS) located at $\mathrm{p}_{s}=[{x}_{s},{y}_{s}]$ and $N$ vehicles moving along multi-lane road in an urban area  The time-varying positions of the $n$-th vehicle is given by $\mathrm{p}_{n,t}=[{x}_{n,t},{y}_{n,t}]$ where $n \in N$  Among the $K$ orthogonal subchannels available for the Vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2I) communications, RSU assigns one V2I link to each vehicle  Each vehicle exchanges messages composed of the vehicle's state (i e , position and velocity) with RSU through the $k$-th V2I link by transmitting a signal $\textrm{x}_{t,k}$ carrying those messages at each time instant $t$ where $k \in K$  We consider a reactive RSJ that aims to attack the V2I link by injecting intentional interference to the communication link between vehicles and RSU to alter the transmitted signals by the vehicles  In contrast, the RSS purposes to mislead the vehicles by spoofing the GPS signal and so registering wrong GPS positions  RSU aims to detect both the spoofer on the satellite link and the jammer on multiple V2I links in order to take effective actions and protect the vehicular network  
The joint GPS spoofing and jamming detection problem can be formulated as the following ternary hypothesis test:
\begin{equation}
    \begin{cases}
        \mathcal{H}_{0}: \mathrm{z}_{t,k} = \mathrm{g}_{t,k}^{nR} \mathrm{x}_{t,k} + \mathrm{v}_{t,k}, \\
        \mathcal{H}_{1}: \mathrm{z}_{t,k} = \mathrm{g}_{t,k}^{nR} \mathrm{x}_{t,k} + \mathrm{g}_{t,k}^{JR} \mathrm{x}_{t,k}^{j} + \mathrm{v}_{t,k}, \\
        \mathcal{H}_{2}: \mathrm{z}_{t,k} = \mathrm{g}_{t,k}^{nR} \mathrm{x}_{t,k}^{*} + \mathrm{v}_{t,k},
    \end{cases}
\end{equation}
where $\mathcal{H}_{0}$, $\mathcal{H}_{1}$ and $\mathcal{H}_{2}$ denote three hypotheses corresponding to the absence of both jammer and spoofer, the presence of the jammer, and the presence of the spoofer, respectively  $\textrm{z}_{t,k}$ is the received signal at the RSU at $t$ over the $k$-th V2I link, $\textrm{g}_{t,k}^{nR}$ is the channel power gain from vehicle $n$ to the RSU formulated as: $\textrm{g}_{t,k}^{nR} = \alpha_{t,k}^{nR} \mathrm{h}_{t,k}^{nR}$, where $\alpha_{t,k}^{nR}$ is the large-scale fading including path-loss and shadowing modeled as \cite{8723178}: $\alpha_{t,k}^{nR}=G\beta d_{t,nR}^{-\gamma}$ 
\begin{figure}[t!]
    \centering
    \includegraphics[height=5 3cm]{Figures/SystemModel_V1 pdf}
    \caption{An illustration of the system model }
    \label{fig_SystemModel}
\end{figure}
$G$ is the pathloss constant, $\beta$ is a log normal shadow fading random variable, $d_{t,nR}=\sqrt{({x}_{n,t}-x_{R})^{2}+({y}_{n,t}-y_{R})^{2}}$ is the distance between the $n$-th vehicle and the RSU  $\gamma$ is the power decay exponent and
$\mathrm{h}_{t,k}$ is the small-scale fading component distributed according to $\mathcal{CN}(0,1)$  In addition, $\mathrm{x}_{t,k}$ is the desired signal transmitted by the $n$-th vehicle, and $\mathrm{v}_{t,k}$ is an additive white Gaussian noise with variance $\sigma_{n}^{2}$  $\mathrm{x}_{t,k}^{J}$ is the jamming signal, $\mathrm{x}_{t,k}^{*}$ is the spoofed signal (i e , the signal that carries the bits related to the wrong GPS positions), $\mathrm{g}_{t,k}^{JR} = \alpha_{t,k}^{JR} \mathrm{h}_{t,k}^{JR}$ is the channel power gain from RSJ to RSU where $\alpha_{t,k}^{JR}=G\beta d_{t,JR}^{-\gamma}$ such that $d_{t,JR}=\sqrt{({x}_{J}-x_{R})^{2}+({y}_{J}-y_{R})^{2}}$ 
We assume that the channel state information (CSI) of V2I links is known and can be estimated at the RSU as in \cite{8345717}  
The RSU is equipped with an RF antenna which can track the vehicles' trajectories after decoding the received RF signals  RSU aims to learn the interaction between the RF signals received from multiple vehicles and their corresponding trajectories 

\section{Proposed method for joint detection of GPS spoofing and jamming}

\subsection{Environment Representation}
The RSU is receiving RF signals from each vehicle and tracking its trajectory (which we refer to as GPS signal) by decoding and demodulating the received RF signals  
The Generalized state-space model describing the $i$-th signal evolvement at multiple levels embodies the following equations: 
\begin{equation} \label{eq_discreteLevel}
    \mathrm{\Tilde{S}_{t}}^{(i)} = \mathrm{f}(\mathrm{\Tilde{S}_{t-1}}^{(i)}) + \mathrm{\tilde{w}}_{t},
\end{equation}
\begin{equation} \label{eq_continuousLevel}
    \mathrm{\Tilde{X}_{t}}^{(i)} = \mathrm{A} \mathrm{\Tilde{X}_{t-1}}^{(i)} + \mathrm{B} \mathrm{U}_{\mathrm{\Tilde{S}_{t}}^{(i)}} + \mathrm{\tilde{w}}_{t},
\end{equation}
\begin{equation} \label{eq_observationLevel}
    \mathrm{\Tilde{Z}_{t}}^{(i)} = \mathrm{H} \mathrm{\Tilde{X}_{t}}^{(i)} + \mathrm{\tilde{v}}_{t},
\end{equation}
where $i \in \{$RF, GPS$\}$ indicates the type of signal received by the RSU  The transition system model defined in \eqref{eq_discreteLevel} explains the evolution of the discrete random variables $\mathrm{\Tilde{S}_{t}}^{(i)}$ representing the clusters of the RF (or GPS) signal dynamics, $\mathrm{f}( )$ is a non linear function of its argument and the additive term $\mathrm{\tilde{w}}_{t}$ denotes the process noise  The dynamic model defined in \eqref{eq_continuousLevel} explains the RF signal dynamics evolution or the motion dynamics evolution of the $n$-th vehicle, where $\mathrm{\Tilde{X}_{t}}^{(i)}$ are hidden continuous variables generating sensory signals, $\mathrm{A} \in \mathbb{R}^{2d}$ and $\mathrm{B} \in \mathbb{R}^{2d}$ are the dynamic and control matrices, respectively, and $\mathrm{U}_{\mathrm{\Tilde{S}_{t}}^{(i)}}$ is the control vector representing the dynamic rules of how the signals evolve with time  The measurement model defined in \eqref{eq_observationLevel} describes dependence of the sensory signals $\mathrm{\Tilde{Z}_{t}}^{(i)}$ on the hidden states $\mathrm{\Tilde{X}_{t}}^{(i)}$ that is parametrized by the measurement matrix $\mathrm{B} \in \mathbb{R}^{2d}$ where $d$ stands for the data dimensionality and $\mathrm{\tilde{v}}_{t}$ is a random noise  

\subsection{Learning GDBN}
The hierarchical dynamic models defined in \eqref{eq_discreteLevel}, \eqref{eq_continuousLevel} and \eqref{eq_observationLevel} are structured in a Generalized Dynamic Bayesian Network (GDBN) \cite{9858012} as shown in Fig ~\ref{fig_GDBN_CGDBN}-(a) that provides a probabilistic graphical model expressing the conditional dependencies among random hidden variables and observable states  The generative process explaining how sensory signals have been generated can be factorized as:
\begin{equation} \label{eq_generative_process}
\begin{split}
    \mathrm{P}(\mathrm{\tilde{Z}}_{t}^{(i)}, \mathrm{\tilde{X}}_{t}^{(i)}, \mathrm{\tilde{S}}_{t}^{(i)}) = \mathrm{P}(\mathrm{\tilde{S}}_{0}^{(i)}) \mathrm{P}(\mathrm{\tilde{X}}_{0}^{(i)}) \\ \bigg[ \prod_{t=1}^{\mathrm{T}} \mathrm{P}(\mathrm{\tilde{Z}}_{t}^{(i)}|\mathrm{\tilde{X}}_{t}^{(i)}) \mathrm{P}(\mathrm{\tilde{X}}_{t}^{(i)}|\mathrm{\tilde{X}}_{t-1}^{(i)}, \mathrm{\tilde{S}}_{t}^{(i)}) \mathrm{P}(\mathrm{\tilde{S}}_{t}^{(i)}|\mathrm{\tilde{S}}_{t-1}^{(i)}) \bigg],
\end{split}
\end{equation}
where $\mathrm{P}(\mathrm{\tilde{S}}_{0}^{(i)})$ and $\mathrm{P}(\mathrm{\tilde{X}}_{0}^{(i)})$ are initial prior distributions, $\mathrm{P}(\mathrm{\tilde{Z}}_{t}^{(i)}|\mathrm{\tilde{X}}_{t}^{(i)})$ is the likelihood, $\mathrm{P}(\mathrm{\tilde{X}}_{t}^{(i)}|\mathrm{\tilde{X}}_{t-1}^{(i)}, \mathrm{\tilde{S}}_{t}^{(i)})$ and $\mathrm{P}(\mathrm{\tilde{S}}_{t}^{(i)}|\mathrm{\tilde{S}}_{t-1}^{(i)})$ are the transition densities describing the temporal and hierarchical dynamics of the generalized state-space model 
The generative process defined in \eqref{eq_generative_process} indicates the cause-effect relationships the model impose on the random variables $\mathrm{\tilde{S}}_{t}^{(i)}$, $\mathrm{\tilde{X}}_{t}^{(i)}$ and $\mathrm{\tilde{Z}}_{t}^{(i)}$ forming a chain of causality describing how one state contributes to the production of another state which is represented by the link $\mathrm{\tilde{S}}_{t}^{(i)} \rightarrow \mathrm{\tilde{X}}_{t}^{(i)} \rightarrow \mathrm{\tilde{Z}}_{t}^{(i)}$ 

The RSU starts perceiving the environment using a static assumption about the environmental states evolution by assuming that sensory signals are only subject to random noise  Hence, RSU predicts the RF signal (or vehciles trajectory) using the following simplified model:
$\mathrm{\tilde{X}}_{t}^{(i)} = \mathrm{A} \mathrm{\tilde{X}}_{t-1}^{(i)} + \mathrm{\tilde{w}}_{t}$, 
that differs from \eqref{eq_continuousLevel} in the control vector $\mathrm{U}_{\mathrm{\Tilde{S}_{t}}^{(i)}}$ which is supposed to be null, i e , $\mathrm{U}_{\mathrm{\Tilde{S}_{t}}^{(i)}} = 0$ as the dynamic rules explaining how the environmental states evolve with time are not discovered yet 
Those rules can be discovered by exploiting the generalized errors (GEs), i e , the difference between predictions and observations  The GEs projected into the measurement space are calculated as:
$\tilde{\varepsilon}_{\mathrm{\tilde{Z}}_{t}^{(i)}}^{} = \mathrm{\tilde{Z}}_{t}^{(i)} - \mathrm{H} \mathrm{\tilde{X}}_{t}^{(i)}$ 
Projecting $\tilde{\varepsilon}_{\mathrm{\tilde{Z}}_t}^{}$ back into the generalized state space can be done as follows:
\begin{equation}\label{GE_continuousLevel_initialModel}
    \tilde{\varepsilon}_{\mathrm{\tilde{X}}_t}^{(i)} = \mathrm{H}^{-1}\tilde{\varepsilon}_{\mathrm{\tilde{Z}}_{t}^{(i)}}^{}=\mathrm{H}^{-1}(\mathrm{\tilde{Z}}_{t}^{(i)}-\mathrm{H}\mathrm{\tilde{X}}_{t}^{(i)}) = \mathrm{H}^{-1}\mathrm{\tilde{Z}}_{t}^{(i)} - \mathrm{\tilde{X}}_{t}^{(i)} 
\end{equation}
The GEs defined in \eqref{GE_continuousLevel_initialModel} can be grouped into discrete clusters in an unsupervised manner by employing the Growing Neural Gas (GNG)  The latter produces a set of discrete variables (clusters) denoted by:
$\mathbf{\tilde{S}^{(i)}}=\{\mathrm{\tilde{S}}_{1}^{(i)},\mathrm{\tilde{S}}_{2}^{(i)},\dots,\mathrm{\tilde{S}}_{M_{i}}^{(i)}\}$,
where $M_{i}$ is the total number of clusters and each cluster $\mathrm{\tilde{S}}_{m}^{(i)} \in \mathbf{\tilde{S}^{(i)}}$ follows a Gaussian distribution composed of GEs with homogeneous properties, such that $\mathrm{\tilde{S}}_{m}^{(i)} \sim \mathcal{N}(\tilde{\mu}_{\mathrm{\tilde{S}}_{m}^{(i)}}=[\mu_{\tilde{S}_{m}^{(i)}}, \Dot{\mu}_{\tilde{S}_{m}^{(i)}}], \Sigma_{\mathrm{\tilde{S}}_{m}^{(i)}})$ 
\begin{figure}[t!]
    \begin{center}
        \begin{minipage}[b]{ 40\linewidth}
        \centering
           \includegraphics[width=2 5cm]{Figures/GDBN pdf}
        \\[-1 0mm]
        {\scriptsize (a)}
        \end{minipage}
        \begin{minipage}[b]{ 50\linewidth}
            \centering
            \includegraphics[width=5 0cm]{Figures/C_GDBN pdf}
           
            {\scriptsize (b)}
        \end{minipage}
        \caption{(a) The GDBN  (b) The coupled GDBN (C-GDBN) composed of two GDBNs representing the two signals received at the RSU where their discrete hidden variables are stochastically coupled }
        \label{fig_GDBN_CGDBN}
    \end{center}
\end{figure}
The dynamic transitions of the sensory signals among the available clusters can be captured in a time-varying transition matrix ($\Pi_{\tau}$) by estimating the time-varying transition probabilities $\pi_{ij}=\mathrm{P}(\mathrm{\tilde{S}}_{t}^{(i)}=i|\mathrm{\tilde{S}}_{t-1}^{(i)}=j, \tau)$ where $\tau$ is the time spent in $\mathrm{\tilde{S}}_{t-1}^{(i)}=j$ before transition to $\mathrm{\tilde{S}}_{t}^{(i)}=i$ 

\subsection{Learning Coupled GDBN (C-GDBN)}
The learning procedure described in the previous section can be executed for each signal type, i e , RF and GPS  After learning a separated GDBN model for each signal type, we analyse the interaction behaviour between RF signal and GPS signal received at the RSU by tracking the cluster firing among $\mathbf{\tilde{S}^{(1)}}$ and $\mathbf{\tilde{S}^{(2)}}$ during a certain experience  Such an interaction can be encoded in a Coupled GDBN (C-GDBN) as shown in Fig \ref{fig_GDBN_CGDBN}-(b) composed of the two GDBNs representing the two signals where their hidden variables at the discrete level are stochastically coupled (in $\mathrm{\tilde{C}}_{t}{=}[\mathrm{\tilde{S}}_{t}^{(1)},\mathrm{\tilde{S}}_{t}^{(2)}]$) as those variables are uncorrelated but have coupled means 
The interactive matrix $\Phi \in \mathbb{R}^{M_{1},M_{2}}$ encodes the firing cluster pattern allowing to predict the GPS signal from RF signal is defined as follows:
\begin{equation} \label{interactiveTM_fromRFtoGPS}
\Phi = 
        \begin{bmatrix} 
            \mathrm{P}(\mathrm{\Tilde{S}_{1}}^{(2)}|\mathrm{\Tilde{S}_{1}}^{(1)}) & \mathrm{P}(\mathrm{\Tilde{S}_{2}}^{(2)}|\mathrm{\Tilde{S}_{1}}^{(1)}) & \dots & \mathrm{P}(\mathrm{\Tilde{S}_{M_{2}}}^{(2)}|\mathrm{\Tilde{S}_{1}}^{(1)}) \\
            \mathrm{P}(\mathrm{\Tilde{S}_{1}}^{(2)}|\mathrm{\Tilde{S}_{2}}^{(1)}) & \mathrm{P}(\mathrm{\Tilde{S}_{2}}^{(2)}|\mathrm{\Tilde{S}_{2}}^{(1)}) & \dots & \mathrm{P}(\mathrm{\Tilde{S}_{M_{2}}}^{(2)}|\mathrm{\Tilde{S}_{2}}^{(1)}) \\
            \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\
            \mathrm{P}(\mathrm{\Tilde{S}_{1}}^{(2)}|\mathrm{\Tilde{S}_{M_{1}}}^{(1)}) & \mathrm{P}(\mathrm{\Tilde{S}_{2}}^{(2)}|\mathrm{\Tilde{S}_{M_{1}}}^{(1)}) & \dots & \mathrm{P}(\mathrm{\Tilde{S}_{M_{2}}}^{(2)}|\mathrm{\Tilde{S}_{M_{1}}}^{(1)}) 
        \end{bmatrix} 
\end{equation}

\subsection{Joint Prediction and Perception}
RSU starts predicting the RF signals it expects to receive from each vehicle based on a Modified Markov Jump Particle Filter (M-MJPF) \cite{9858012} that combines Particle filter (PF) and Kalman filter (KF) to perform temporal and hierarchical predictions  Since the acquired C-GDBN allows predicting a certain signal's dynamic evolution based on another's evolution, it requires an interactive Bayesian filter capable of dealing with more complicated predictions  To this purpose, we propose to employ an Interactive M-MJPF (IM-MJPF) on the C-GDBN  The IM-MJPF consists of a PF that propagates a set of $L$ particles equally weighted, such that $\{\mathrm{\tilde{S}}_{t,l}^{(1)}, \mathrm{W}_{t,l}^{(1)}\}{\sim}\{\pi(\mathrm{\tilde{S}}_{t}^{(1)}), \frac{1}{L}\}$, where $\mathrm{\tilde{S}}_{t,l}^{(1)}$, $l \in L$ and $( ^{(1)})$ is the RF signal type  In addition, RSU relies on $\Phi$ defined in \eqref{interactiveTM_fromRFtoGPS} to predict $\mathrm{\tilde{S}}_{t}^{(2)}$ realizing the discrete cluster of vehicle's trajectory starting from the predicted RF signal according to: $\{\mathrm{\tilde{S}}_{t}^{(2)},\mathrm{W}_{t,l}^{(2)}\}{\sim} \{\Phi(\mathrm{\tilde{S}}_{t,l}^{(1)}){=}\mathrm{P}( |\mathrm{\tilde{S}}_{t,l}^{(1)}), \mathrm{W}_{t,l}^{(2)}\}$  For each predicted discrete variable $\mathrm{\tilde{S}}_{t,l}^{(i)}$, a multiple KF is employed to predict multiple continuous variables which guided by the predictions at the higher level as declared in \eqref{eq_continuousLevel} that can be represented probabilistically as $\mathrm{P}(\mathrm{\tilde{X}}_{t}^{(i)}|\mathrm{\tilde{X}}_{t-1}^{(i)}, \mathrm{\tilde{S}}_{t}^{(i)})$  The posterior probability that is used to evaluate expectations is given by:
\begin{multline} \label{piX}
    \pi(\mathrm{\tilde{X}}_{t}^{(i)})=\mathrm{P}(\mathrm{\tilde{X}}_{t}^{(i)},\mathrm{\tilde{S}}_{t}^{(i)}|\mathrm{\tilde{Z}}_{t-1}^{(i)})= \\ \int \mathrm{P}(\mathrm{\tilde{X}}_{t}^{(i)}|\mathrm{\tilde{X}}_{t-1}^{(i)}, \mathrm{\tilde{S}}_{t}^{(i)}) \lambda(\mathrm{\tilde{X}}_{t-1}^{(i)})d\mathrm{\tilde{X}}_{t-1}^{(i)},
\end{multline}
where $\lambda(\mathrm{\tilde{X}}_{t-1}^{(i)}){=}\mathrm{P}(\mathrm{\tilde{Z}}_{t-1}^{(i)}|\mathrm{\tilde{X}}_{t-1}^{(i)})$  
The posterior distribution can be updated (and so representing the updated belief) after having seen the new evidence $\mathrm{\tilde{Z}}_{t}^{(i)}$ by exploiting the diagnostic message $\lambda(\mathrm{\tilde{X}}_{t}^{(i)})$ in the following form: $\mathrm{P}(\mathrm{\tilde{X}}_{t}^{(i)}, \mathrm{\tilde{S}}_{t}^{(i)}|\mathrm{\tilde{Z}}_{t}^{(i)}) {=} \pi(\mathrm{\tilde{X}}_{t}^{(i)})\lambda(\mathrm{\tilde{X}}_{t}^{(i)})$  Likewise, belief in discrete hidden variables can be updated according to: $\mathrm{W}_{t,l}^{(i)}{=}\mathrm{W}_{t,l}^{(i)}\lambda (\mathrm{\tilde{S}}_{t}^{(i)})$ where:
$\lambda (\mathrm{\tilde{S}}_{t}^{(i)}) {=} \lambda (\mathrm{\Tilde{X}}_{t}^{(i)})\mathrm{P}(\mathrm{\Tilde{X}}_{t}^{(i)}|\mathrm{\tilde{S}}_{t}^{(i)}) {=} \mathrm{P}(\mathrm{\tilde{Z}}_{t}^{(i)}|\mathrm{\Tilde{X}}_{t}^{(i)})\mathrm{P}(\mathrm{\Tilde{X}}_{t}^{(i)}|\mathrm{\tilde{S}}_{t}^{(i)})$ 

\subsection{Joint GPS spoofing and jamming detection}
RSU can evaluate the current situation and identify if V2I is under attack, or the satellite link is under spoofing based on a multiple abnormality indicator produced by the IM-MJPF  The first indicator calculates the similarity between the predicted RF signal and the observed one, which is defined as:
\begin{equation}\label{eq_CLA1}
    \Upsilon_{\mathrm{\tilde{X}}_{t}^{(1)}} = -ln \bigg( \mathcal{BC} \big(\pi(\mathrm{\tilde{X}}_{t}^{(1)}),\lambda(\mathrm{\tilde{X}}_{t}^{(1)}) \big) \bigg),
\end{equation}
where $\mathcal{BC}( ){=}\int \sqrt{\pi(\mathrm{\tilde{X}}_{t}^{(1)}),\lambda(\mathrm{\tilde{X}}_{t}^{(1)}})d\mathrm{\tilde{X}}_{t}^{(1)}$ is the Bhattacharyya coefficient 
The second indicator calculates the similarity between the predicted GPS signal (from the RF signal) and the observed one after decoding the RF signal which is defined as:
\begin{equation}\label{eq_CLA2}
    \Upsilon_{\mathrm{\tilde{X}}_{t}^{(2)}} = -ln \bigg( \mathcal{BC} \big(\pi(\mathrm{\tilde{X}}_{t}^{(2)}),\lambda(\mathrm{\tilde{X}}_{t}^{(2)}) \big) \bigg),
\end{equation}
where $\mathcal{BC}( ){=}\int \sqrt{\pi(\mathrm{\tilde{X}}_{t}^{(2)}),\lambda(\mathrm{\tilde{X}}_{t}^{(2)}})d\mathrm{\tilde{X}}_{t}^{(2)}$ 
Different hypotheses can be identified by the RSU to understand the current situation whether there is: a jammer attacking the V2I link, or a spoofer attacking the link between the satellite and the vehicle or both jammer and spoofer are absent according to:
\begin{equation}
    \begin{cases}
        \mathcal{H}_{0}: \text{if} \ \ \Upsilon_{\mathrm{\tilde{X}}_{t}^{(1)}} < \xi_{1} \ \text{and} \ \Upsilon_{\mathrm{\tilde{X}}_{t}^{(2)}} < \xi_{2}, \\
        \mathcal{H}_{1}: \text{if} \ \ \Upsilon_{\mathrm{\tilde{X}}_{t}^{(1)}} \geq \xi_{1} \ \text{and} \ \Upsilon_{\mathrm{\tilde{X}}_{t}^{(2)}} \geq \xi_{2}, \\
        \mathcal{H}_{2}: \text{if} \ \ \Upsilon_{\mathrm{\tilde{X}}_{t}^{(1)}} < \xi_{1} \ \text{and} \ \Upsilon_{\mathrm{\tilde{X}}_{t}^{(2)}} \geq \xi_{2},
    \end{cases}
\end{equation}
where $\xi_{1} = \mathbb{E}[\Bar{\Upsilon}_{\mathrm{\tilde{X}}_{t}^{(1)}}] + 3\sqrt{\mathbb{V}[\Bar{\Upsilon}_{\mathrm{\tilde{X}}_{t}^{(1)}}]}$, and $\xi_{2} = \mathbb{E}[\Bar{\Upsilon}_{\mathrm{\tilde{X}}_{t}^{(2)}}] + 3\sqrt{\mathbb{V}[\Bar{\Upsilon}_{\mathrm{\tilde{X}}_{t}^{(2)}}]}$  In $\xi_{1}$ and $\xi_{2}$, $\Bar{\Upsilon}_{\mathrm{\tilde{X}}_{t}^{(1)}}$ and $\Bar{\Upsilon}_{\mathrm{\tilde{X}}_{t}^{(2)}}$ stand for the abnormality signals during training (i e , normal situation when jammer and spoofer are absent) 

\subsection{Evaluation metrics}
In order to evaluate the performance of the proposed method to jointly detect jammer and GPS spoofer, we adopt the jammer detection probability ($\mathrm{P}_{d}^{j}$) and the spoofer detection probability ($\mathrm{P}_{d}^{s}$), respectively, which are defined as:
\begin{equation}
    \mathrm{P}_{d}^{j} = \mathrm{Pr}(\Upsilon_{\mathrm{\tilde{X}}_{t}^{(1)}}\geq \xi_{1}, \Upsilon_{\mathrm{\tilde{X}}_{t}^{(2)}} \geq \xi_{2}|\mathcal{H}_{1}),
\end{equation}
\begin{equation}
    \mathrm{P}_{d}^{s} = \mathrm{Pr}(\Upsilon_{\mathrm{\tilde{X}}_{t}^{(1)}}< \xi_{1}, \Upsilon_{\mathrm{\tilde{X}}_{t}^{(2)}} \geq \xi_{2}|\mathcal{H}_{2}) 
\end{equation}
Also, we evaluate the accuracy of the proposed method in predicting and estimating the vehicles' trajectories and the expected RF signals by adopting the root mean square error (RMSE) defined as:
\begin{equation}
    RMSE = \sqrt{ \frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=1}^{T}\bigg( \mathrm{\tilde{Z}}_{t}^{(i)}-\mathrm{\tilde{X}}_{t}^{(i)} \bigg)^{2} },
\end{equation}
where $T$ is the total number of predictions 

\section{Simulation Results}
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the proposed method to jointly detect the jammer and the spoofer using extensive simulations  We consider $\mathrm{N}=2$ vehicles interacting inside the environment and exchanging their states (i e , position and velocity) with the RSU  The vehicles move along predefined trajectories performing various maneuvers which are picked from the \textit{Lankershim} dataset proposed by \cite{5206559}  The dataset depicts a four way intersection and includes about $19$ intersection maneuvers  RSU assigns one subchannel realizing the V2I link for each vehicle over which the vehicles' states are transmitted  The transmitted signal carrying the vehicle's state and the jamming signal are both QPSK modulated  
The simulation settings are: carrier frequency of $2$GHz, BW${=}1 4$MHz, cell radius of $500$m, RSU antenna height and gain is $25$m and $8$ dBi, receiver noise figure of $5$dB, vehicle antenna height and gain is $1 5$m and $3$dBi, vehicle speed is $40$Km/h, V2I transmit power is $23$dBm, jammer transmit power ranging from $20$dBm to $40$dBm, SNR of $20$dB, path loss model ($128 1{+}37 6log d$), Log-normal shadowing with $8$dB standard deviation and a fast fading channel following the Rayleigh distribution 
\begin{figure}[ht!]
    \begin{center}
        \begin{minipage}[b]{ 55\linewidth}
        \centering
            \includegraphics[width=5 0cm]{Results/ObservedTrajectories_reference}
        \\[-1 5mm]
        {\scriptsize (a)}
        \end{minipage}
        \begin{minipage}[b]{ 49\linewidth}
            \centering
            \includegraphics[width=4 9cm]{Results/ObservedRFsignal_Veh1_reference}
            \\[-1 5mm]
            {\scriptsize (b)}
        \end{minipage}
        \begin{minipage}[b]{ 49\linewidth}
            \centering
            \includegraphics[width=4 9cm]{Results/ObservedRFsignal_Veh2_reference}
            \\[-1 5mm]
            {\scriptsize (c)}
        \end{minipage}
        \caption{An example visualizing the received RF signals from the two vehicles and the corresponding trajectories: (a) Vehicles' trajectories, (b) received RF signal from vehicle 1, (c) received RF signal from vehicle 2 }
        \label{fig_receivedRFsignalandTrajectory}
    \end{center}
\end{figure}
\begin{figure}[t!]
    \begin{center}
        \begin{minipage}[b]{ 49\linewidth}
            \centering
                \includegraphics[width=4 5cm]{Results/clusters_trajectory_veh1}
            \\[-1 5mm]
            {\scriptsize (a)}
        \end{minipage}
        \begin{minipage}[b]{ 49\linewidth}
            \centering
                \includegraphics[width=4 5cm]{Results/clusters_trajectory_veh2}
            \\[-1 5mm]
            {\scriptsize (b)}
        \end{minipage}
        \begin{minipage}[b]{0 49\linewidth}
            \centering
            \includegraphics[width=4 5cm]{Results/clusters_RFsignal_veh1}
            \\[-1 5mm]
            {\scriptsize (c)}
        \end{minipage}
        \begin{minipage}[b]{0 49\linewidth}
            \centering
            \includegraphics[width=4 5cm]{Results/clusters_RFsignal_veh2}
            \\[-1 5mm]
            {\scriptsize (d)}
        \end{minipage}
       
        \caption{GNG output after clustering the generalized errors obtained from different experiences: (a) clustered trajectory of vehicle 1, (b) clustered trajectory of vehicle 2, (c) clustered RF signal received from vehicle 1, (d) clustered RF signal received from vehicle 2 }
        \label{fig_GNG_of_receivedRFsignalandTrajectory}
    \end{center}
\end{figure}

The RSU aims to learn multiple interactive models (i e , C-GDBN models) encoding the cross relationship between the received RF signal from each vehicle and its corresponding trajectory  These models allow the RSU to predict the trajectory the vehicle will follow based on the received RF signal and evaluate whether the V2I is under jamming attacks or the satellite link is under spoofing  It is to note that the RSU is receiving only the RF signals from the two vehicles and obtaining their positions after decoding the RF signals  Thus, the RSU should be able to evaluate if the received RF signals are evolving according to the dynamic rules learned so far and if the vehicles are following the expected (right) trajectories to decide whether the V2I links are really under attack or whether the satellite link is under spoofing 

Fig ~\ref{fig_receivedRFsignalandTrajectory}-(a) illustrates an example of the interaction between the two vehicles performing a particular manoeuvre, and Fig ~\ref{fig_receivedRFsignalandTrajectory}-(b) shows the received RF signals by the RSU from the two vehicles  At the beginning of the learning process, RSU performs predictions according to the simplified model defined in \eqref{eq_continuousLevel} where $\mathrm{U}_{\mathrm{\Tilde{S}_{t}}^{(i)}} {=} 0$ 
After obtaining the generalized errors as pointed out in \eqref{GE_continuousLevel_initialModel}, RUS clusters those errors using GNG to learn two GDBN models encoding the dynamic rules of how the RF signal and the GPS signal evolve with time, respectively, as showed in Fig ~\ref{fig_GNG_of_receivedRFsignalandTrajectory} and Fig ~\ref{fig_graphicalRep_transitionMatrices}  RSU can couple the two GDBNs by learning the interactive transition matrix that is encoded in a C-GDBN as shown in Fig ~\ref{fig_interactiveMatrices} 
\begin{figure}[t!]
    \begin{center}
        \begin{minipage}[b]{ 49\linewidth}
            \centering
                \includegraphics[width=4 5cm]{Results/graphTransition_Trajectory_veh1}
            \\[-1 5mm]
            {\scriptsize (a)}
        \end{minipage}
        \begin{minipage}[b]{ 49\linewidth}
            \centering
                \includegraphics[width=4 5cm]{Results/graphTransition_Trajectory_veh2}
            \\[-1 5mm]
            {\scriptsize (b)}
        \end{minipage}
        \begin{minipage}[b]{0 49\linewidth}
            \centering
            \includegraphics[width=4 5cm]{Results/graphTransition_RFsignal_veh1}
            \\[-1 5mm]
            {\scriptsize (c)}
        \end{minipage}
        \begin{minipage}[b]{0 49\linewidth}
            \centering
            \includegraphics[width=4 5cm]{Results/graphTransition_RFsignal_veh2}
            \\[-1 5mm]
            {\scriptsize (d)}
        \end{minipage}
        \caption{Graphical representation of the transition matrices (TM): (a) TM related to the trajectory of vehicle 1, (b) TM related to the trajectory of vehicle 2, (c) TM related to the RF signal received from vehicle 1, (d) TM related to the RF signal received from vehicle 2 }
        \label{fig_graphicalRep_transitionMatrices}
    \end{center}
\end{figure}
\begin{figure}[t!]
    \begin{center}
        \begin{minipage}[b]{ 49\linewidth}
            \centering
                \includegraphics[width=3 8cm]{Results/interactiveMatrix_RFtoGPS_Neu5_veh1}
            \\[-1 0mm]
            {\scriptsize (a)}
        \end{minipage}
        \begin{minipage}[b]{0 49\linewidth}
            \centering
            \includegraphics[width=3 8cm]{Results/interactiveMatrix_RFtoGPS_Neu25_veh1}
            \\[-1 0mm]
            {\scriptsize (d)}
        \end{minipage}
       
        \caption{Interactive transition matrix defined in \eqref{interactiveTM_fromRFtoGPS} using different configurations: (a) $\mathrm{M_{1}}=5$, $\mathrm{M_{2}}=5$, (b) $\mathrm{M_{1}}=25$, $\mathrm{M_{2}}=25$ }
        \label{fig_interactiveMatrices}
    \end{center}
\end{figure}
\begin{figure}[t!]
    \begin{center}
        \begin{minipage}[b]{ 49\linewidth}
        \centering
            \includegraphics[width=4 9cm]{Results/RF_situation1_best_veh1}
        \\[-1 5mm]
        {\scriptsize (a)}
        \end{minipage}
        \begin{minipage}[b]{0 49\linewidth}
            \centering
            \includegraphics[width=4 9cm]{Results/RF_situation1_worst_veh1}
            \\[-1 5mm]
            {\scriptsize (b)}
        \end{minipage}
        \begin{minipage}[b]{0 49\linewidth}
            \centering
            \includegraphics[width=4 9cm]{Results/RF_situation1_best_veh2}
            \\[-1 5mm]
            {\scriptsize (c)}
        \end{minipage}
        \begin{minipage}[b]{0 49\linewidth}
            \centering
            \includegraphics[width=4 9cm]{Results/RF_situation1_worst_veh2}
            \\[-1 5mm]
            {\scriptsize (d)}
        \end{minipage}
        \caption{An example visualizing the predicted and observed RF signals transmitted by the 2 vehicles using different configurations  Predicted RF signal from: (a) vehicle 1 using $\mathrm{M_{1}}{=}5$, $\mathrm{M_{2}}{=}5$, (b) vehicle 1 using $\mathrm{M_{1}}{=}25$, $\mathrm{M_{2}}{=}25$, (c) vehicle 2 using $\mathrm{M_{1}}{=}5$, $\mathrm{M_{2}}{=}5$, (d) vehicle 2 using $\mathrm{M_{1}}{=}25$, $\mathrm{M_{2}}{=}25$ }
            \label{fig_situation1_PredictedRF}
    \end{center}
\end{figure}

\begin{figure}[t!]
    \begin{center}
        \begin{minipage}[b]{ 49\linewidth}
        \centering
            \includegraphics[width=4 8cm]{Results/GPSfromRF_situation1_best}
        \\[-1 0mm]
        {\scriptsize (a)}
        \end{minipage}
        \begin{minipage}[b]{0 49\linewidth}
            \centering
            \includegraphics[width=4 8cm]{Results/GPSfromRF_situation1_worst}
            \\[-1 0mm]
            {\scriptsize (b)}
        \end{minipage}
        %
        \caption{An example visualizing the predicted and observed trajectories of two vehicles interacting in the environment  (a) $\mathrm{M_{1}}{=}5$, $\mathrm{M_{2}}{=}5$, (b) $\mathrm{M_{1}}{=}25$, $\mathrm{M_{2}}{=}25$ }
            \label{fig_situation1_VehiclesTrajectories}
    \end{center}
\end{figure}

\begin{figure}[ht!]
    \begin{center}
        \begin{minipage}[b]{ 49\linewidth}
        \centering
            \includegraphics[width=4 8cm]{Results/rmse_on_trajectory}
        \\[-1 0mm]
        {\scriptsize (a)}
        \end{minipage}
        \begin{minipage}[b]{0 49\linewidth}
            \centering
            \includegraphics[width=4 8cm]{Results/rmse_on_RFSignal}
            \\[-1 0mm]
            {\scriptsize (b)}
        \end{minipage}
        \caption{The average RMSE after testing different experiences and examples of: (a) trajectories and (b) RF signals }
            \label{fig_rmse_onTraj_onSig}
    \end{center}
\end{figure}

Fig ~\ref{fig_situation1_PredictedRF} illustrates an example comparing between predicted RF signals and observed ones based on two different configurations in learning the interactive matrix (as shown in Fig ~\ref{fig_interactiveMatrices})  Also, Fig ~\ref{fig_situation1_VehiclesTrajectories} illustrates an example comparing between the predicted and observed trajectories of the two vehicles using the two interactive matrices depicted in Fig ~\ref{fig_interactiveMatrices}  From Fig ~\ref{fig_situation1_PredictedRF} and Fig ~\ref{fig_situation1_VehiclesTrajectories} we can see that using an interactive matrix with less clusters allows to perform better predictions compared to that with more clusters  This can be validated by observing Fig ~\ref{fig_rmse_onTraj_onSig} that illustrates the RMSE values versus different number of clusters related to the two models representing the dynamics of the received RF signals and the vehicles' trajectories  It can be seen that as the number of clusters increases the RMSE error increases, since adding more clusters decreases the firing probability that explains the possibility to be in one of the $M_{2}$ clusters of the second model conditioned in being in a certain cluster of the first model 

Fig ~\ref{fig_exNormal_Spoofed_JammedTrajectories} illustrates an example of vehicle's trajectory under normal situation (i e , jammer and spoofer are absent), under jamming attacks and under spoofing attacks  Also the figure shows the predicted trajectory which should follow the same dynamic rules learned during a normal situation  After that, we implemented the IM-MJPF on the learned C-GDBN to perform multiple predictions, i e , to predict the RF signal that the RSU is expecting to receive from a certain vehicle and the corresponding trajectory that the vehicle is supposed to follow  IM-MJPF through the comparison between multiple predictions and observations, produces multiple abnormality signals as defined in \eqref{eq_CLA1} and \eqref{eq_CLA2} which are used to detect the jammer and the spoofer 

Fig ~\ref{fig_abnormalitySignals_JammerSpoofer} illustrates the multiple abnormality signals related to the example shown in Fig ~\ref{fig_exNormal_Spoofed_JammedTrajectories}  We can observe that the abnormal signals related to both RF signal (Fig ~\ref{fig_abnormalitySignals_JammerSpoofer}-(a)) and trajectory (Fig ~\ref{fig_abnormalitySignals_JammerSpoofer}-(b)) are below the threshold under normal situations  This proves that RSU learned the correct dynamic rules of how RF signals and trajectories evolve when the jammer and spoofer are absent (i e , under normal situations)  Also, we can see that the RSU can notice a high deviation on both the RF signal and the corresponding trajectory due to a jamming interference from what it has learned so far by relying on the abnormality signals  In contrast, we can see that under spoofing attacks, RSU notice a deviation only on the trajectory and not on the RF signal since the spoofer has affected only the positions without manipulating the RF signal  In addition, it is obvious how the proposed method allows the RSU to identify the type of abnormality occurring and to explain the cause of the detected abnormality (i e , understanding if it was because of a jammer attacking the V2I link or a spoofer attacking the satellite link) 
\begin{figure}[t!]
    \centering
    \includegraphics[width=6 5cm]{Results/trajectories_underJamming_andSpoofing}
   
    \caption{Vehicle's trajectory under: normal situation, jamming and spoofing }
    \label{fig_exNormal_Spoofed_JammedTrajectories}
\end{figure}
\begin{figure}[t!]
    \begin{center}
        \begin{minipage}[b]{ 92\linewidth}
        \centering
            \includegraphics[height=2 6cm]{Results/abnSignal_onRF}
        \\[-1 5mm]
        {\scriptsize (a)}
        \end{minipage}
        \begin{minipage}[b]{ 92\linewidth}
            \centering
            \includegraphics[height=2 6cm]{Results/abnSignal_onGPS}
            \\[-1 5mm]
            {\scriptsize (b)}
        \end{minipage}
        %
        \caption{Abnormality Signals related to the example shown in Fig \ref{fig_exNormal_Spoofed_JammedTrajectories}: (a) abnormality indicators related to the RF signal, (b) abnormality indicators related to the trajectory }
            \label{fig_abnormalitySignals_JammerSpoofer}
    \end{center}
\end{figure}
\begin{figure}[t!]
    \centering
    \includegraphics[height=3 2cm]{Results/Detection_Probability_RFfromGPS_versusPj}
    \caption{Detection probability ($\mathrm{P_{d}}$) versus jammer's power ($\mathrm{P_{J}}$) using different number of clusters $\mathrm{M}_{2}$ }
    \label{fig_jammerDetectionProb}
\end{figure}
\begin{figure}[t!]
    \centering
    \includegraphics[height=3 2cm]{Results/spoofingDetectionProbability_falseAlarm_versusM2}
    \caption{Spoofing detection probability ($\mathrm{P}_{d}^{s}$) and spoofing false alarm ($\mathrm{P}_{f}^{s}$) versus the number of clusters $\mathrm{M}_{2}$ }
    \label{fig_spooferDetectionProb}
\end{figure}

Fig ~\ref{fig_jammerDetectionProb} shows the overall performance of the proposed method in detecting the jammer by testing many situations and examples and by considering different jamming powers which ranges from $20$dBm to $40$dBm  It can be seen that the proposed method is able to detect the jammer with high probabilities (near $1$) and by considering low and high jamming powers  Also, the figure compares the performance in detecting the jammer by varying the number of clusters ($M_{2}$) 
Fig ~\ref{fig_spooferDetectionProb} shows the overall performance of the proposed method in detecting the spoofer by testing different different examples of driving maneuvers  It can be seen that the RSU is able to detect the spoofer with high detection probability and null false alarm versus different number of clusters 

\section{Conclusion}
A joint detection method of GPS spoofing and jamming attacks is proposed  The method is based on learning a dynamic interactive model encoding the cross-correlation between the received RF signals from multiple vehicles and their corresponding trajectories  Simulation results show the high effectiveness of the proposed approach in jointly detecting the GPS spoofer and jammer attacks  
Subsequent work will extend the system model to consider more than two vehicles with different channel conditions and various modulation schemes to evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed method 

\bibliographystyle{IEEEtran}

Context 3: McPherson County (standard abbreviation: MP) is a county located in the U S  state of Kansas   As of the 2020 census, the county population was 30,223  The largest city and county seat is McPherson  The county is named for Civil War General James B  McPherson 

History

Early history

For many millennia, the Great Plains of North America was inhabited by nomadic Native Americans  From the 16th century to 18th century, the Kingdom of France claimed ownership of large parts of North America  In 1762, after the French and Indian War, France secretly ceded New France to Spain, per the Treaty of Fontainebleau  In 1802, Spain returned most of the land to France, but keeping title to about 7,500 square miles 

In 1803, most of the land for modern day Kansas was acquired by the United States from France as part of the 828,000 square mile Louisiana Purchase for 2 83 cents per acre  In 1848, after the Mexican–American War, the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo with Spain brought into the United States all or part of land for ten future states, including southwest Kansas  In 1854, the Kansas Territory was organized, then in 1861 Kansas became the 34th U S  state 

19th century

From the 1820s to 1870s, the Santa Fe Trail passed through, what is now McPherson County  The trail entered the county, east of Canton, then south of Galva, then north of Inman, and west towards Lyons  In 1855, Charles O  Fuller established a ranch adjacent to the Running Turkey Creek Crossing about two miles south and one mile east of Galva  Fuller's Ranch provided accommodations for travelers on the Santa Fe Trail and was probably the first white settlement in McPherson County 

Peketon County was established in 1860, by the passage of a bill by S  N  Wood:  An act to establish Peketon County  Section 1  - That all that territory west of the sixth principal meridian and south of Township 16, in Kansas Territory, be and the same is hereby erected into a county, to be known by the name of Peketon County  On February 17, 1865, Peketon County was abolished, and McPherson County was made a part of Marion County, which extended from the west line of Chase County to the present western boundary of Kansas 

In 1868, Solomon Stephens and L  N  Holmberg were appointed Justices of the Peace—the first officers in what is now McPherson County  The next year (1869) occurred the first election for the township, now the county of McPherson  McPherson was regularly organized as a county in the spring of 1870, a mass meeting being held at Sweadal  Sweadal, the county seat thus selected, was located about one mile and a half southwest of the present site of Lindsborg  In September, however, the County Commissioners resolved to meet at the latter place, McPherson which had already been located some two years 

In April, 1873, a petition was filed for the county seat re-location  It was signed by 483 voters, and a special election was accordingly ordered for June 10  Upon that day, McPherson received 605 votes, New Gottland 325, King City 3 and Lindsborg 1; McPherson's majority over all, 276  In May the McPherson Town Company had offered, as an inducement for the location of the county seat at this point, the free use of rooms for ten years, and the donation of two squares of land on the town site  The offer was accepted the next month, the County Commissioners selecting blocks 56 and 65  Thus the county seat was established at McPherson and has remained since 

As early as 1875, city leaders of Marion held a meeting to consider a branch railroad from Florence  In 1878, Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway and parties from Marion County and McPherson County chartered the Marion and McPherson Railway Company   In 1879, a branch line was built from Florence to McPherson, in 1880 it was extended to Lyons, in 1881 it was extended to Ellinwood  The line was leased and operated by the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway  The line from Florence to Marion, was abandoned in 1968  In 1992, the line from Marion to McPherson was sold to Central Kansas Railway  In 1993, after heavy flood damage, the line from Marion to McPherson was abandoned  The original branch line connected Florence, Marion, Canada, Hillsboro, Lehigh, Canton, Galva, McPherson, Conway, Windom, Little River, Mitchell, Lyons, Chase, then connected with the original AT&SF main line at Ellinwood 

In 1887, the Chicago, Kansas and Nebraska Railway extended its main line from Herington to Pratt   This main line connected Herington, Ramona, Tampa, Durham, Waldeck, Canton, Galva, McPherson, Groveland, Inman, Medora, Hutchinson, Whiteside, Partridge, Arlington,  Langdon, Turon, Preston, Natrona, Pratt   In 1888, this main line was extended to Liberal   Later, this line was extended to Tucumcari, New Mexico and Santa Rosa, New Mexico, where it made a connection with the Southern Pacific from El Paso, Texas   The Chicago, Kansas and Nebraska Railway was absorbed by the Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railway  This line is also called the "Golden State Route" 

20th century
The National Old Trails Road, also known as the Ocean-to-Ocean Highway, was established in 1912, and was routed through Windom, Conway, McPherson 

Geography

According to the U S  Census Bureau, the county has a total area of , of which  is land and  (0 3%) is water 

Adjacent counties
 Saline County (north)
 Dickinson County (northeast)
 Marion County (east)
 Harvey County (southeast)
 Reno County (southwest)
 Rice County (west)
 Ellsworth County (northwest)

Major highways
  Interstate 135
  U S  Route 56
  U S  Route 81
  K-4
  K-61
  K-153

Demographics

The McPherson Micropolitan Statistical Area includes all of McPherson County 

2000 census
As of the census of 2000, there were 29,554 people, 11,205 households, and 7,966 families residing in the county   The population density was 33 people per square mile (13/km2)   There were 11,830 housing units at an average density of 13 per square mile (5/km2)   The racial makeup of the county was 96 53% White, 0 81% Black or African American, 0 34% Native American, 0



ground_truth: The generative interactive model used in the method is called the Coupled Generalized Dynamic Bayesian Network (C-GDBN).

prompt_front: Now, answer the following question based on the text below, only give me the answer and do not output any other words.

Question: What are the datasets used in this community for research?

Read the following text and answer briefly.

Context 2: \section{Introduction}
Underwater robot picking is to use the robot to automatically capture sea creatures like holothurian, echinus, scallop, or starfish in an open-sea farm where underwater object detection is the key technology for locating creatures  Until now, the datasets used in this community are released by the Underwater Robot Professional Contest (URPC$\protect\footnote{Underwater Robot Professional Contest: {\bf http://en cnurpc org} }$) beginning from 2017, in which URPC2017 and URPC2018 are most often used for research  Unfortunately, as the information listed in Table \ref{Info}, URPC series datasets do not provide the annotation file of the test set and cannot be downloaded after the contest  
Therefore, researchers \cite{2020arXiv200511552C,2019arXiv191103029L} first have to divide the training data into two subsets, including a new subset of training data and a new subset of testing data, and then train their proposed method and other \emph{SOTA} methods  On the one hand, training other methods results in a significant increase in workload  On the other hand, different researchers divide different datasets in different ways, 
\begin{table}[t]
\renewcommand\tabcolsep{3 5pt}
\caption{Information about all the collected datasets  * denotes the test set's annotations are not available  \emph{3} in Class means three types of creatures are labeled, \emph{i e ,} holothurian, echinus, and scallop  \emph{4} means four types of creatures are labeled (starfish added)  Retention represents the proportion of images that retain after similar images have been removed }
\centering 
\begin{tabular}{|l|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
Dataset&Train&Test&Class&Retention&Year \\ 
\hline 
URPC2017&17,655&985*&3&15\%&2017 \\
\hline
URPC2018&2,901&800*&4&99\%&2018 \\
\hline
URPC2019&4,757&1,029*&4&86\%&2019 \\
\hline
URPC2020$_{ZJ}$&5,543&2,000*&4&82\%&2020 \\
\hline
URPC2020$_{DL}$&6,575&2,400*&4&80\%&2020 \\
\hline
UDD&1,827&400&3&84\%&2020 \\
\hline 

\end{tabular}
\label{Info}
\end{table}
\begin{figure*}[htbp]
\begin{center}
\includegraphics[width=1\linewidth]{example pdf}
\end{center}
   \caption{Examples in DUO, which show a variety of scenarios in underwater environments }
\label{exam}
\end{figure*}
causing there is no unified benchmark to compare the performance of different algorithms 
In terms of the content of the dataset images, there are a large number of similar or duplicate images in the URPC datasets  URPC2017 only retains 15\% images after removing similar images compared to other datasets  Thus the detector trained on URPC2017 is easy to overfit and cannot reflect the real performance 
For other URPC datasets, the latter also includes images from the former, \emph{e g }, URPC2019 adds 2,000 new images compared to URPC2018; compared with URPC2019, URPC2020$_{ZJ}$ adds 800 new images  The URPC2020$_{DL}$ adds 1,000 new images compared to the URPC2020$_{ZJ}$  It is worth mentioning that the annotation of all datasets is incomplete; some datasets lack the starfish labels and it is easy to find error or missing labels  \cite{DBLP:conf/iclr/ZhangBHRV17} pointed out that although the CNN model has a strong fitting ability for any dataset, the existence of dirty data will significantly weaken its robustness 
Therefore, a reasonable dataset (containing a small number of similar images as well as an accurate annotation) and a corresponding recognized benchmark are urgently needed to promote community development 


To address these issues, we introduce a dataset called Detecting Underwater Objects (DUO) by collecting and re-annotating all the available underwater datasets  It contains 7,782 underwater images after deleting overly similar images and has a more accurate annotation with four types of classes (\emph{i e ,} holothurian, echinus, scallop, and starfish)  
Besides, based on the MMDetection$\protect\footnote{MMDetection is an open source object detection toolbox based on PyTorch  {\bf https://github com/open-mmlab/mmdetection}}$ \cite{chen2019mmdetection} framework, we also provide a \emph{SOTA} detector benchmark containing efficiency and accuracy indicators, providing a reference for both academic research and industrial applications  It is worth noting that JETSON AGX XAVIER$\protect\footnote{JETSON AGX XAVIER is an embedded development board produced by NVIDIA which could be deployed in an underwater robot  Please refer {\bf https://developer nvidia com/embedded/jetson-agx-xavier-developer-kit} for more information }$ was used to assess all the detectors in the efficiency test in order to simulate robot-embedded environment  DUO will be released in https://github com/chongweiliu soon 

In summary, the contributions of this paper can be listed as follows 

  $\bullet$ By collecting and re-annotating all relevant datasets, we introduce a dataset called DUO with more reasonable annotations as well as a variety of underwater scenes 

  $\bullet$ We provide a corresponding benchmark of \emph{SOTA} detectors on DUO including efficiency and accuracy indicators which could be a reference for both academic research and industrial applications  


\pagestyle{empty}
\section{Background}
In the year of 2017, underwater object detection for open-sea farming is first proposed in the target recognition track of Underwater Robot Picking Contest 2017$\protect\footnote{From 2020, the name has been changed into Underwater Robot Professional Contest which is also short for URPC }$ (URPC2017) which aims to promote the development of theory, technology, and industry of the underwater agile robot and fill the blank of the grabbing task of the underwater agile robot  The competition sets up a target recognition track, a fixed-point grasping track, and an autonomous grasping track  The target recognition track concentrates on finding the {\bf high accuracy and efficiency} algorithm which could be used in an underwater robot for automatically grasping 

The datasets we used to generate the DUO are listed below  The detailed information has been shown in Table \ref{Info} 

  {\bf URPC2017}: It contains 17,655 images for training and 985 images for testing and the resolution of all the images is 720$\times$405  All the images are taken from 6 videos at an interval of 10 frames  However, all the videos were filmed in an artificial simulated environment and pictures from the same video look almost identical  
  
   {\bf URPC2018}: It contains 2,901 images for training and 800 images for testing and the resolutions of the images are 586$\times$480, 704$\times$576, 720$\times$405, and 1,920$\times$1,080  The test set's annotations are not available  Besides, some images were also collected from an artificial underwater environment 
  
  {\bf URPC2019}: It contains 4,757 images for training and 1029 images for testing and the highest resolution of the images is 3,840$\times$2,160 captured by a GOPro camera  The test set's annotations are also not available and it contains images from the former contests 
  
  {\bf URPC2020$_{ZJ}$}: From 2020, the URPC will be held twice a year  It was held first in Zhanjiang, China, in April and then in Dalian, China, in August  URPC2020$_{ZJ}$ means the dataset released in the first URPC2020 and URPC2020$_{DL}$ means the dataset released in the second URPC2020  This dataset contains 5,543 images for training and 2,000 images for testing and the highest resolution of the images is 3,840$\times$2,160  The test set's annotations are also not available 
  
  {\bf URPC2020$_{DL}$}: This dataset contains 6,575 images for training and 2,400 images for testing and the highest resolution of the images is 3,840$\times$2,160  The test set's annotations are also not available 
  
  {\bf UDD \cite{2020arXiv200301446W}}: This dataset contains 1,827 images for training and 400 images for testing and the highest resolution of the images is 3,840$\times$2,160  All the images are captured by a diver and a robot in a real open-sea farm 

\begin{figure}[t]
\begin{center}
\includegraphics[width=1\linewidth]{pie pdf}
\end{center}
   \caption{The proportion distribution of the objects in DUO }
\label{pie}
\end{figure}



\begin{figure*}
  \centering
  \subfigure[]{\includegraphics[width=3 45in]{imagesize pdf}}
  \subfigure[]{\includegraphics[width=3 45in]{numInstance pdf}}
  \caption{(a) The distribution of instance sizes for DUO; (b) The number of categories per image }
  \label{sum}
\end{figure*}
\section{Proposed Dataset}

\subsection{Image Deduplicating}
As we explained in Section 1, there are a large number of similar or repeated images in the series of URPC datasets  Therefore, it is important to delete duplicate or overly similar images and keep a variety of underwater scenarios when we merge these datasets together  Here we employ the Perceptual Hash algorithm (PHash) to remove those images  PHash has the special property that the hash value is dependent on the image content, and it remains approximately the same if the content is not significantly modified  Thus we can easily distinguish different scenarios and delete duplicate images within one scenario  

After deduplicating, we obtain 7,782 images (6,671 images for training; 1,111 for testing)  The retention rate of the new dataset is 95\%, which means that there are only a few similar images in the new dataset  Figure \ref{exam} shows that our dataset also retains various underwater scenes 

\subsection{Image Re-annotation}
Due to the small size of objects and the blur underwater environment, there are always missing or wrong labels in the existing annotation files  In addition, some test sets' annotation files are not available and some datasets do not have the starfish annotation  In order to address these issues, we follow the next process which combines a CNN model and manual annotation to re-annotate these images  Specifically, we first train a detector (\emph{i e ,} GFL \cite{li2020generalized}) with the originally labeled images  After that, the trained detector predicts all the 7,782 images  We treat the prediction as the groundtruth and use it to train the GFL again  We get the final GFL prediction called {\bf the coarse annotation}  Next, we use manual correction to get the final annotation called {\bf the fine annotation}  Notably, we adopt the COCO \cite{Belongie2014} annotation form as the final format 
\subsection{Dataset Statistics}
{\bf The proportion of classes}: The total number of objects is 74,515  Holothurian, echinus, scallop, and starfish are 7,887, 50,156, 1,924, and 14,548, respectively  Figure \ref{pie} shows the proportion of each creatures where echinus accounts for 67 3\% of the total  The whole data distribution shows an obvious long-tail distribution because the different economic benefits of different seafoods determine the different breed quantities 

{\bf The distribution of instance sizes}: Figure \ref{sum}(a) shows an instance size distribution of DUO  \emph{Percent of image size} represents the ratio of object area to image area, and \emph{Percent of instance} represents the ratio of the corresponding number of objects to the total number of objects  Because of these small creatures and high-resolution images, the vast majority of objects occupy 0 3\% to 1 5\% of the image area 

{\bf The instance number per image}: Figure \ref{sum}(b) illustrates the number of categories per image for DUO  \emph{Number of instances} represents the number of objects one image has, and \emph{ Percentage of images} represents the ratio of the corresponding number of images to the total number of images  Most images contain between 5 and 15 instances, with an average of 9 57 instances per image 

{\bf Summary}:
In general, smaller objects are harder to detect  For PASCAL VOC \cite{Everingham2007The} or COCO \cite{Belongie2014}, roughly 50\% of all objects occupy no more than 10\% of the image itself, and others evenly occupy from 10\% to 100\%  
In the aspect of instances number per image, COCO contains 7 7 instances per image and VOC contains 3  In comparison, DUO has 9 57 instances per image and most instances less than 1 5\% of the image size 
Therefore, DUO contains almost exclusively massive small instances and has the long-tail distribution at the same time, which means it is promising to design a detector to deal with massive small objects and stay high efficiency at the same time for underwater robot picking 

\section{Benchmark}
Because the aim of underwater object detection for robot picking is to find {\bf the high accuracy and efficiency} algorithm, we consider both the accuracy and efficiency evaluations in the benchmark as shown in Table \ref{ben} 

\subsection{Evaluation Metrics}
Here we adopt the standard COCO metrics (mean average precision, \emph{i e ,} mAP) for the accuracy evaluation and also provide the mAP of each class due to the long-tail distribution 

{\bf AP} -- mAP at IoU=0 50:0 05:0 95 

{\bf AP$_{50}$} --  mAP at IoU=0 50 

{\bf AP$_{75}$} --  mAP at IoU=0 75  

{\bf AP$_{S}$} --   {\bf AP} for small objects of area smaller than 32$^{2}$ 

{\bf AP$_{M}$} --   {\bf AP} for objects of area between 32$^{2}$ and 96$^{2}$ 

{\bf AP$_{L}$} --   {\bf AP} for large objects of area bigger than 96$^{2}$ 

{\bf AP$_{Ho}$} --  {\bf AP} in holothurian 

{\bf AP$_{Ec}$} --  {\bf AP} in echinus 

{\bf AP$_{Sc}$} --  {\bf AP} in scallop 

{\bf AP$_{St}$} --  {\bf AP} in starfish 


For the efficiency evaluation, we provide three metrics:

{\bf Param } --  The parameters of a detector 

{\bf FLOPs} --  Floating-point operations per second 

{\bf FPS} --  Frames per second 

Notably, {\bf FLOPs} is calculated under the 512$\times$512 input image size and {\bf FPS} is tested on a JETSON AGX XAVIER under MODE$\_$30W$\_$ALL  

\subsection{Standard Training Configuration}
We follow a widely used open-source toolbox, \emph{i e ,} MMDetection (V2 5 0) to produce up our benchmark  During the training, the standard configurations are as follows:

  $\bullet$ We initialize the backbone models (\emph{e g ,} ResNet50) with pre-trained parameters on ImageNet \cite{Deng2009ImageNet} 

  $\bullet$ We resize each image into 512 $\times$ 512 pixels both in training and testing  Each image is flipped horizontally with 0 5 probability during training 

  $\bullet$ We normalize RGB channels by subtracting 123 675, 116 28, 103 53 and dividing by 58 395, 57 12, 57 375, respectively 

  $\bullet$ SGD method is adopted to optimize the model  The initial learning rate is set to be 0 005 in a single GTX 1080Ti with batchsize 4 and is decreased by 0 1 at the 8th and 11th epoch, respectively  WarmUp \cite{2019arXiv190307071L} is also employed in the first 500 iterations  Totally there are 12 training epochs 

  $\bullet$ Testing time augmentation (\emph{i e ,} flipping test or multi-scale testing) is not employed 



\subsection{Benchmark Analysis}
Table \ref{ben} shows the benchmark for the \emph{SOTA} methods  Multi- and one- stage detectors with three kinds of backbones (\emph{i e ,} ResNet18, 50, 101) give a comprehensive assessment on DUO  We also deploy all the methods to AGX to assess efficiency 

In general, the multi-stage (Cascade R-CNN) detectors have high accuracy and low efficiency, while the one-stage (RetinaNet) detectors have low accuracy and high efficiency  However, due to recent studies \cite{zhang2019bridging} on the allocation of more reasonable positive and negative samples in training, one-stage detectors (ATSS or GFL) can achieve both high accuracy and high efficiency 

\begin{table*}[htbp]
\renewcommand\tabcolsep{3 0pt}

\begin{center}
\caption{Benchmark of \emph{SOTA} detectors (single-model and single-scale results) on DUO  FPS is measured on the same machine with a JETSON AGX XAVIER under the same MMDetection framework, using a batch size of 1 whenever possible  R: ResNet } 
\label{ben}
\begin{tabular}{|l|l|c|c|c|ccc|ccc|cccc|}
\hline
Method&Backbone&Param &FLOPs&FPS&AP&AP$_{50}$&AP$_{75}$&AP$_{S}$&AP$_{M}$&AP$_{L}$&AP$_{Ho}$&AP$_{Ec}$&AP$_{Sc}$&AP$_{St}$ \\ 
\hline 
\emph{multi-stage:} &&&&&&&&&&&&&& \\

\multirow{3}{*}{Faster R-CNN \cite{Ren2015Faster}}
&R-18&28 14M&49 75G&5 7&50 1&72 6&57 8&42 9&51 9&48 7&49 1&60 1&31 6&59 7\\
&R-50&41 14M&63 26G&4 7&54 8&75 9&63 1&53 0&56 2&53 8&55 5&62 4&38 7&62 5\\
&R-101&60 13M&82 74G&3 7&53 8&75 4&61 6&39 0&55 2&52 8&54 3&62 0&38 5&60 4\\
\hline

\multirow{3}{*}{Cascade R-CNN \cite{Cai_2019}}
&R-18&55 93M&77 54G&3 4&52 7&73 4&60 3&\bf 49 0&54 7&50 9&51 4&62 3&34 9&62 3\\
&R-50&68 94M&91 06G&3 0&55 6&75 5&63 8&44 9&57 4&54 4&56 8&63 6&38 7&63 5\\
&R-101&87 93M&110 53G&2 6&56 0&76 1&63 6&51 2&57 5&54 7&56 2&63 9&41 3&62 6\\
\hline

\multirow{3}{*}{Grid R-CNN \cite{lu2019grid}}
&R-18&51 24M&163 15G&3 9&51 9&72 1&59 2&40 4&54 2&50 1&50 7&61 8&33 3&61 9\\
&R-50&64 24M&176 67G&3 4&55 9&75 8&64 3&40 9&57 5&54 8&56 7&62 9&39 5&64 4\\
&R-101&83 24M&196 14G&2 8&55 6&75 6&62 9&45 6&57 1&54 5&55 5&62 9&41 0&62 9\\
\hline

\multirow{3}{*}{RepPoints \cite{yang2019reppoints}}
&R-18&20 11M&\bf 35 60G&5 6&51 7&76 9&57 8&43 8&54 0&49 7&50 8&63 3&33 6&59 2\\
&R-50&36 60M&48 54G&4 8&56 0&80 2&63 1&40 8&58 5&53 7&56 7&65 7&39 3&62 3\\
&R-101&55 60M&68 02G&3 8&55 4&79 0&62 6&42 2&57 3&53 9&56 0&65 8&39 0&60 9\\
\hline 
\hline 
\emph{one-stage:} &&&&&&&&&&&&&& \\
\multirow{3}{*}{RetinaNet \cite{Lin2017Focal}}
&R-18&19 68M&39 68G&7 1&44 7&66 3&50 7&29 3&47 6&42 5&46 9&54 2&23 9&53 8\\
&R-50&36 17M&52 62G&5 9&49 3&70 3&55 4&36 5&51 9&47 6&54 4&56 6&27 8&58 3\\
&R-101&55 16M&72 10G&4 5&50 4&71 7&57 3&34 6&52 8&49 0&54 6&57 0&33 7&56 3\\
\hline 

\multirow{3}{*}{FreeAnchor \cite{2019arXiv190902466Z}}
&R-18&19 68M&39 68G&6 8&49 0&71 9&55 3&38 6&51 7&46 7&47 2&62 8&28 6&57 6\\
&R-50&36 17M&52 62G&5 8&54 4&76 6&62 5&38 1&55 7&53 4&55 3&65 2&35 3&61 8\\
&R-101&55 16M&72 10G&4 4&54 6&76 9&62 9&36 5&56 5&52 9&54 0&65 1&38 4&60 7\\
\hline 

\multirow{3}{*}{FoveaBox \cite{DBLP:journals/corr/abs-1904-03797}}
&R-18&21 20M&44 75G&6 7&51 6&74 9&57 4&40 0&53 6&49 8&51 0&61 9&34 6&59 1\\
&R-50&37 69M&57 69G&5 5&55 3&77 8&62 3&44 7&57 4&53 4&57 9&64 2&36 4&62 8\\
&R-101&56 68M&77 16G&4 2&54 7&77 3&62 3&37 7&57 1&52 4&55 3&63 6&38 9&60 8\\
\hline 

\multirow{3}{*}{PAA \cite{2020arXiv200708103K}}
&R-18&\bf 18 94M&38 84G&3 0&52 6&75 3&58 8&41 3&55 1&50 2&49 9&64 6&35 6&60 5\\
&R-50&31 89M&51 55G&2 9&56 8&79 0&63 8&38 9&58 9&54 9&56 5&66 9&39 9&64 0\\
&R-101&50 89M&71 03G&2 4&56 5&78 5&63 7&40 9&58 7&54 5&55 8&66 5&42 0&61 6\\
\hline 

\multirow{3}{*}{FSAF \cite{zhu2019feature}}
&R-18&19 53M&38 88G&\bf 7 4&49 6&74 3&55 1&43 4&51 8&47 5&45 5&63 5&30 3&58 9\\
&R-50&36 02M&51 82G&6 0&54 9&79 3&62 1&46 2&56 7&53 3&53 7&66 4&36 8&62 5\\
&R-101&55 01M&55 01G&4 5&54 6&78 7&61 9&46 0&57 1&52 2&53 0&66 3&38 2&61 1\\
\hline 

\multirow{3}{*}{FCOS \cite{DBLP:journals/corr/abs-1904-01355}}
&R-18&\bf 18 94M&38 84G&6 5&48 4&72 8&53 7&30 7&50 9&46 3&46 5&61 5&29 1&56 6\\
&R-50&31 84M&50 34G&5 4&53 0&77 1&59 9&39 7&55 6&50 5&52 3&64 5&35 2&60 0\\
&R-101&50 78M&69 81G&4 2&53 2&77 3&60 1&43 4&55 4&51 2&51 7&64 1&38 5&58 5\\
\hline 

\multirow{3}{*}{ATSS \cite{zhang2019bridging}}
&R-18&\bf 18 94M&38 84G&6 0&54 0&76 5&60 9&44 1&56 6&51 4&52 6&65 5&35 8&61 9\\
&R-50&31 89M&51 55G&5 2&58 2&\bf 80 1&66 5&43 9&60 6&55 9&\bf 58 6&67 6&41 8&64 6\\
&R-101&50 89M&71 03G&3 8&57 6&79 4&65 3&46 5&60 3&55 0&57 7&67 2&42 6&62 9\\
\hline 

\multirow{3}{*}{GFL \cite{li2020generalized}}
&R-18&19 09M&39 63G&6 3&54 4&75 5&61 9&35 0&57 1&51 8&51 8&66 9&36 5&62 5\\
&R-50&32 04M&52 35G&5 5&\bf 58 6&79 3&\bf 66 7&46 5&\bf 61 6&55 6&\bf 58 6&\bf 69 1&41 3&\bf 65 3\\
&R-101&51 03M&71 82G&4 1&58 3&79 3&65 5&45 1&60 5&\bf 56 3&57 0&\bf 69 1&\bf 43 0&64 0\\


\hline 
\end{tabular}
\end{center}
\end{table*}
Therefore, in terms of accuracy, the accuracy difference between the multi- and the one- stage methods in AP is not obvious, and the AP$_{S}$ of different methods is always the lowest among the three size AP  For class AP, AP$_{Sc}$ lags significantly behind the other three classes because it has the smallest number of instances  In terms of efficiency, large parameters and FLOPs result in low FPS on AGX, with a maximum FPS of 7 4, which is hardly deployable on underwater robot  Finally, we also found that ResNet101 was not significantly improved over ResNet50, which means that a very deep network may not be useful for detecting small creatures in underwater scenarios  

Consequently, the design of high accuracy and high efficiency detector is still the main direction in this field and there is still large space to improve the performance 
In order to achieve this goal, a shallow backbone with strong multi-scale feature fusion ability can be proposed to extract the discriminant features of small scale aquatic organisms; a specially designed training strategy may overcome the DUO's long-tail distribution, such as a more reasonable positive/negative label sampling mechanism or a class-balanced image allocation strategy within a training batch 

\section{Conclusion}
In this paper, we introduce a dataset (DUO) and a corresponding benchmark to fill in the gaps in the community  DUO contains a variety of underwater scenes and more reasonable annotations  Benchmark includes efficiency and accuracy indicators to conduct a comprehensive evaluation of the \emph{SOTA} decoders  The two contributions could serve as a reference for academic research and industrial applications, as well as promote community development 
\bibliographystyle{IEEEbib}




ground_truth: URPC2017, URPC2018, URPC2019, URPC2020_ZJ and URPC2020_DL.

prompt_front: Now, answer the following question based on the text below, only give me the answer and do not output any other words.

Question: Who is the county seat of McPherson County?

Read the following text and answer briefly.

Context 3: 32% Asian, 0 06% Pacific Islander, 0 79% from other races, and 1 16% from two or more races   1 94% of the population were Hispanic or Latino of any race  37 1% were of German, 12 9% Swedish, 12 1% American, 6 7% English and 6 3% Irish ancestry according to Census 2000 

There were 11,205 households, out of which 33 00% had children under the age of 18 living with them, 62 50% were married couples living together, 6 00% had a female householder with no husband present, and 28 90% were non-families  25 50% of all households were made up of individuals, and 11 80% had someone living alone who was 65 years of age or older   The average household size was 2 49 and the average family size was 2 99 

In the county, the population was spread out, with 25 40% under the age of 18, 10 30% from 18 to 24, 25 20% from 25 to 44, 21 80% from 45 to 64, and 17 30% who were 65 years of age or older   The median age was 38 years  For every 100 females there were 95 90 males   For every 100 females age 18 and over, there were 92 90 males 

The median income for a household in the county was $41,138, and the median income for a family was $48,243  Males had a median income of $33,530 versus $21,175 for females  The per capita income for the county was $18,921   About 4 20% of families and 6 60% of the population were below the poverty line, including 5 20% of those under age 18 and 8 10% of those age 65 or over 

Government

Presidential elections
McPherson county is often carried by Republican candidates  The last time a Democratic candidate has carried this county was in 1964 by Lyndon B  Johnson 

Laws
Following amendment to the Kansas Constitution in 1986, the county remained a prohibition, or "dry", county until 1996, when voters approved the sale of alcoholic liquor by the individual drink with a 30 percent food sales requirement 

Education

Colleges
 McPherson College in McPherson
 Bethany College in Lindsborg
 Central Christian College in McPherson

Unified school districts
 Smoky Valley USD 400
 McPherson USD 418
 Canton-Galva USD 419
 Moundridge USD 423
 Inman USD 448

School district office in neighboring county
 Goessel USD 411
 Little River-Windom USD 444

Museums
 Birger Sandzén Memorial Gallery in Lindsborg
 McCormick-Deering Days Museum in Inman
 McPherson Museum in McPherson
 Lindsborg Old Mill & Swedish Heritage Museum in Lindsborg
 Kansas Motorcycle Museum in Marquette

Communities

Cities

 Canton
 Galva
 Inman
 Lindsborg
 Marquette
 McPherson (county seat) 
 Moundridge
 Windom

Unincorporated communities
† means a Census-Designated Place (CDP) by the United States Census Bureau 
 Conway
 Elyria†
 Groveland
 Johnstown
 New Gottland
 Roxbury†

Ghost towns
 Alta Mills
 Battle Hill
 Christian
 Doles Park
 Elivon
 King City
 Sweadal

Townships
McPherson County is divided into twenty-five townships   The cities of Lindsborg and McPherson are considered governmentally independent and are excluded from the census figures for the townships   In the following table, the population center is the largest city (or cities) included in that township's population total, if it is of a significant size 

See also
 List of people from McPherson County, Kansas
 National Register of Historic Places listings in McPherson County, Kansas
 McPherson Valley Wetlands
 Maxwell Wildlife Refuge

References

Notes

Further reading

 Wheeler, Wayne Leland  "An Analysis of Social Change in a Swedish-Immigrant Community: The Case of Lindsborg, Kansas " (PhD dissertation, University of Missouri-Columbia; ProQuest Dissertations Publishing, 1959  5905657) 

County
 Through the Years: A Pictorial History of McPherson County; McPherson Sentinel' Heritage House Publishing Co; 1992 
 McPherson County First Courthouse Built About 1869 or 1870; Lindsborg News-Record; March 30, 1959 
 Pioneer Life and Lore of McPherson County, Kansas; Edna Nyquist; Democratic-Opinion Press; 1932 
 A History of the Church of the Brethren in Kansas (includes McPherson College history); Elmer LeRoy Craik; McPherson Daily; Republican Press; 397 pages; 1922 
 Portrait and Biographical Record of Dickinson, Saline, McPherson, and Marion Counties, Kansas; Chapman Bros; 614 pages; 1893 
 Standard Atlas of McPherson County, Kansas; Geo  A  Ogle & Co; 82 pages; 1921 
 Plat Book of McPherson County, Kansas; North West Publishing Co; 50 pages; 1903 
 Edwards' Atlas of McPherson County, Kansas; John P  Edwards; 51 pages; 1884 

Trails
 The Story of the Marking of the Santa Fe Trail by the Daughters of the American Revolution in Kansas and the State of Kansas; Almira Cordry; Crane Co; 164 pages; 1915  (Download 4MB PDF eBook)
 The National Old Trails Road To Southern California, Part 1 (LA to KC); Automobile Club Of Southern California; 64 pages; 1916  (Download 6 8MB PDF eBook)

Mennonite Settlements
 Impact of Mennonite settlement on the cultural landscape of Kansas; Brenda Martin; Kansas State University; 1985/1988  
 Mennonite settlement : the relationship between the physical and cultural environment; Susan Movle; University of Utah; 1975/1886 
 Status of Mennonite women in Kansas in their church and home relationships; Eva Harshbarger; Bluffton College; 1925/1945 

External links

County
 
 McPherson County - Directory of Public Officials
Historical
 , from Hatteberg's People'' on KAKE TV news
Maps
 McPherson County Maps: Current, Historic, KDOT
 Kansas Highway Maps: Current, Historic, KDOT
 Kansas Railroad Maps: Current, 1996, 1915, KDOT and Kansas Historical Society

 
Kansas counties
1867 establishments in Kansas
Populated places established in 1867



ground_truth: McPherson.