prompt_front: Now, answer the following question based on the text below, only give me the answer and do not output any other words.

Question: How many years has KSTP-FM 102.1 been on the air?

Read the following text and answer briefly.

Context 1: KSTP (1500 AM; SKOR North) is a commercial AM radio station licensed to Saint Paul, Minnesota  It is the flagship AM radio station of Hubbard Broadcasting, which also owns several other television and radio stations across the United States   KSTP has a sports radio format and is the ESPN Radio Network affiliate for Minneapolis-St  Paul   The radio studios are  on University Avenue in Minneapolis, shared with sister stations KSTP-FM, KSTP-TV, KTMY, and KSTC-TV  On weekdays, KSTP airs local sports shows from 9 a m  to 9 p m  and carries ESPN programming weekday mornings, late nights and weekends  Some KSTP shows are simulcast on other sports radio stations in the region 

KSTP runs the maximum power for AM stations, 50,000 watts   It shares clear-channel, Class A status on 1500 AM with WFED in Washington, D C   KSTP broadcasts a directional signal at night, using a three-tower array, with its transmitter on U S  Route 61 at Beam Avenue in Maplewood   Programming is also heard on 250 watt FM translator K235BP at 94 9 MHz in Bemidji 

History

WAMD and KFOY
KSTP's start in 1928 was the product of a merger between two pioneering Twin Cities stations: WAMD ("Where All Minneapolis Dances") in Minneapolis, first licensed on February 16, 1925 to Stanley E  Hubbard, and KFOY in St  Paul, first licensed on March 12, 1924 to the Beacon Radio Service in St  Paul 

Following a few test transmissions, WAMD made its formal debut broadcast on February 22, 1925  (In later interviews Stanley Hubbard traced WAMD's start to April 1924 ) It was located at the Marigold Dance Garden, and featured nightly "Midnight Frolics" broadcasts by the ballroom's orchestra  It is claimed that WAMD was the first radio station to be completely supported by running paid advertisements  Effective June 15, 1927, WAMD was assigned to 1330 kHz 

On November 11, 1927 WAMD's transmitter site at Oxboro Heath on Lyndale Avenue South burned down, two weeks after the station had been sold to the National Battery Company  An initial arrangement was made to carry WAMD's programs over WRHM (now WWTC), transmitting on WAMD's 1330 kHz frequency  Beginning on November 24, 1927 the WAMD broadcasts, still on 1330 kHz, were shifted to KFOY's facility in St  Paul  (At this time KFOY was assigned to 1050 kHz)  The next day it was announced that National Battery had purchased KFOY, and as of December 1, 1927 both KFOY and WAMD were reassigned to 1350 kHz  WAMD continued making regular broadcasts until the end of March 1928, while KFOY, although it continued to be licensed for a few more months on a time-sharing basis with WAMD, ceased operations at this point 

National Battery Company
In mid-December 1927, the National Battery Company announced it had received permission from the Federal Radio Commission (FRC) to build a new station, with the call letters KSTP, operating from a transmitter site to be constructed three miles south of Wescott  The next month it was reported that the new station, still under construction, had been assigned to 1360 kHz  KSTP made its debut broadcast on March 29, 1928  Although technically it was a separate station from WAMD and KFOY, both of which were formally deleted on April 30, 1928, overall KSTP was treated as the direct successor to a consolidated WAMD and KFOY 

Hubbard became the merged station's general manager, acquiring controlling interest in 1941  A month after the merger, KSTP became an affiliate for the NBC Red Network   It remained with NBC for 46 years  On November 11, 1928, under the provisions of the FRC's General Order 40, KSTP was assigned to a "high-powered regional" frequency of 1460 kHz  The only other station assigned to this frequency was WTFF in Mount Vernon Hills, Virginia (later WJSV, now WFED, Washington, D C )  On February 7, 1933, the FRC authorized KSTP to increase its daytime power to 25 KW  In 1938 and 1939 KSTP also operated a high-fidelity AM "experimental audio broadcasting station" Apex station, W9XUP, originally on 25,950 kHz and later on 26,150 kHz  In 1941, as part of the implementation of the North American Regional Broadcasting Agreement, KSTP was assigned to its current "clear channel" frequency of 1500 kHz, with the provision that it and WJSV, as "Class I-B" stations, had to maintain directional antennas at night in order to mutually protect each other from interference  An FM station, KSTP-FM, was founded in 1946 but shut down in 1952 

Hubbard reportedly acquired an RCA TV camera in 1939, and started experimenting with television broadcasts   But World War II put a hold on the development of television   In 1948, with the war over, KSTP-TV became the first television station in Minnesota   With KSTP 1500 already associated with NBC Radio, KSTP-TV became an NBC Television Network affiliate   From 1946 to 1952, KSTP also had an FM counterpart   KSTP-FM 102 1 was only on the air four years   There were few radios equipped to receive FM signals in that era, and management decided to discontinue FM broadcasts 

MOR and Top 40
As network programming moved from radio to television, KSTP programmed a full service Middle of the Road (MOR) radio format, in the shadow of its chief competitor, CBS Radio affiliate 830 WCCO  In 1965, a new FM station, reviving the KSTP-FM call sign, was put on the air, largely simulcasting the AM station   But by the late 1960s, KSTP-FM began a separate format of beautiful music   KSTP was the radio home of the Minnesota Vikings football team from 1970 to 1975  

In 1973, KSTP broke away from its longtime adult MOR sound and became one of four area stations at the time to program a Top 40 format  "15 KSTP, The Music Station" competed with Top 40 AM rivals WDGY, KDWB and later, WYOO  The competition would eventually shake itself out, with outrageous rocker WYOO dropping out after being sold in 1976, and then the staid WDGY switching to country music the following year   As for uptempo hits station 15 KSTP, it went from a tight Top 40 format to leaning adult rock in 1978, to leaning adult contemporary in 1979, to evolving into adult contemporary/talk by 1980   In 1982, it officially shifted to talk   Most Top 40 rock music, by this time, had moved to the FM band 

Past Personalities

Notable hosts who have been on KSTP include John Hines, Jesse Ventura, Larry Carolla, Tom Barnard, Big Al Davis, Don Vogel, John MacDougall, Griff, Mike Edwards, Geoff Charles, Joe Soucheray, James Lileks, Leigh Kamman, Barbara Carlson, Peter Thiele, Tom Mischke, Jason Lewis, Chuck Knapp, Machine Gun Kelly, Charle Bush, Mark O'Connell and Paul Brand  These broadcasters were supported by producers such as Bruce Huff, Rob Pendleton, Alison Brown, Jean Bjorgen, David Elvin (who Vogel dubbed the "Steven Spielberg of Talk Radio"), Mitch Berg and others 

The station has, for the most part, emphasized local hosts over the years   But in 1988, KSTP was one of Rush Limbaugh's first affiliates when his conservative talk show was rolled out for national syndication   (Clear Channel-owned KTLK-FM took over rights to Limbaugh's show in January 2006)  Other syndicated hosts previously heard on KSTP include Sean Hannity, Bruce Williams, Larry King, and Owen Spann 

Sports Radio
KSTP switched to Sports Radio on February 15, 2010   As the station had to wait for ESPN's contract with rival KFAN and its sister station KFXN to expire, it did not become an ESPN Radio affiliate until April 12, the same day that the Minnesota Twins were scheduled to play the first game in their new ball park, Target Field, against the Boston Red Sox   As a result Coast to Coast AM and Live on Sunday Night, it's Bill Cunningham were retained during this period   One ESPN Radio network program, The Herd with Colin Cowherd, was picked up by KSTP immediately following the format change 

In 2018, the station was approved for an FM translator on 94 1 FM, broadcasting from a transmitter atop the IDS Center in downtown Minneapolis  The two-watt signal threw most of its power to the west, preventing interference to low powered FM stations on the same channel including WFNU-LP in St  Paul  With only two watts of power, however, the signal was limited to the immediate downtown area surrounding the IDS Center   It later acquired a 250 watt translator, K235BP at 94 9 MHz   The original translator was discontinued 

On January 15, 2019, KSTP rebranded as "SKOR North" (a reference to the Vikings team song/chant, "Skol, Vikings"), with local programming between 12 noon and 7 pm  About a year later, in May of 2020, KSTP suspended most of its local programming and laid off nearly all of its local staff  Station management cited the economic toll of the coronavirus for the changes  Sports broadcasting continues, primarily composed of ESPN radio network broadcasts 

Sports Teams

KSTP-AM served as the radio flagship for the Minnesota Vikings football team from 1970 to 1975 

On August 1, 2006, the station announced that it would be the new flagship station for the Minnesota Twins baseball team, effective with the start of the 2007 season  The Twins had been on rival WCCO since arriving in Minnesota in 1961   KSTP served as the flagship for the Twins until the end of the 2012 season, when games moved to 96 3 KTWN-FM (now KMWA)   The Twins have since returned to WCCO 830 

The switch to a fairly weak FM station caused dissent among some listeners, particularly in communities that had trouble picking up KSTP 1500   Although KSTP is the state's second most powerful AM station, it must operate directionally at night, delivering a reduced signal to parts of the market  WCCO, by comparison, offers a signal with a wider coverage area during the day than KSTP does, with WCCO's non-directional 50,000 watt signal  In response, the Twins have expanded the number of affiliates 

On March 9, 2011, KSTP announced it would be the new flagship for the University of Minnesota Golden Gophers men's and women's basketball and men's ice hockey, ending a 68-year run on WCCO  The rights have since moved to KFXN-FM, which already aired Gopher football 

On March 2, 2017, KSTP announced it would be the first radio broadcaster for Minnesota United FC   The move brings live soccer action to 1500 AM 

Previous logos

References

External links
KSTP website

FCC History Cards for KSTP (covering 1928-1980)
Radiotapes com Historic Minneapolis/St  Paul airchecks dating back to 1924 including KSTP and other Twin Cities radio stations 
Rick Burnett's TwinCitiesRadioAirchecks com has additional airchecks of KSTP and other Twin Cities radio stations from the '60s and '70s, including Chuck Knapp's 2nd show on KSTP 

Hubbard Broadcasting
ESPN Radio stations
Peabody Award winners
Radio stations in Minneapolis–Saint Paul
Radio stations established in 1925
1925 establishments in Minnesota
Minnesota Kicks
Sports radio stations in the United States
Clear-channel radio stations 
Context 2: \section{Introduction}
Underwater robot picking is to use the robot to automatically capture sea creatures like holothurian, echinus, scallop, or starfish in an open-sea farm where underwater object detection is the key technology for locating creatures  Until now, the datasets used in this community are released by the Underwater Robot Professional Contest (URPC$\protect\footnote{Underwater Robot Professional Contest: {\bf http://en cnurpc org} }$) beginning from 2017, in which URPC2017 and URPC2018 are most often used for research  Unfortunately, as the information listed in Table \ref{Info}, URPC series datasets do not provide the annotation file of the test set and cannot be downloaded after the contest  
Therefore, researchers \cite{2020arXiv200511552C,2019arXiv191103029L} first have to divide the training data into two subsets, including a new subset of training data and a new subset of testing data, and then train their proposed method and other \emph{SOTA} methods  On the one hand, training other methods results in a significant increase in workload  On the other hand, different researchers divide different datasets in different ways, 
\begin{table}[t]
\renewcommand\tabcolsep{3 5pt}
\caption{Information about all the collected datasets  * denotes the test set's annotations are not available  \emph{3} in Class means three types of creatures are labeled, \emph{i e ,} holothurian, echinus, and scallop  \emph{4} means four types of creatures are labeled (starfish added)  Retention represents the proportion of images that retain after similar images have been removed }
\centering 
\begin{tabular}{|l|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
Dataset&Train&Test&Class&Retention&Year \\ 
\hline 
URPC2017&17,655&985*&3&15\%&2017 \\
\hline
URPC2018&2,901&800*&4&99\%&2018 \\
\hline
URPC2019&4,757&1,029*&4&86\%&2019 \\
\hline
URPC2020$_{ZJ}$&5,543&2,000*&4&82\%&2020 \\
\hline
URPC2020$_{DL}$&6,575&2,400*&4&80\%&2020 \\
\hline
UDD&1,827&400&3&84\%&2020 \\
\hline 

\end{tabular}
\label{Info}
\end{table}
\begin{figure*}[htbp]
\begin{center}
\includegraphics[width=1\linewidth]{example pdf}
\end{center}
   \caption{Examples in DUO, which show a variety of scenarios in underwater environments }
\label{exam}
\end{figure*}
causing there is no unified benchmark to compare the performance of different algorithms 
In terms of the content of the dataset images, there are a large number of similar or duplicate images in the URPC datasets  URPC2017 only retains 15\% images after removing similar images compared to other datasets  Thus the detector trained on URPC2017 is easy to overfit and cannot reflect the real performance 
For other URPC datasets, the latter also includes images from the former, \emph{e g }, URPC2019 adds 2,000 new images compared to URPC2018; compared with URPC2019, URPC2020$_{ZJ}$ adds 800 new images  The URPC2020$_{DL}$ adds 1,000 new images compared to the URPC2020$_{ZJ}$  It is worth mentioning that the annotation of all datasets is incomplete; some datasets lack the starfish labels and it is easy to find error or missing labels  \cite{DBLP:conf/iclr/ZhangBHRV17} pointed out that although the CNN model has a strong fitting ability for any dataset, the existence of dirty data will significantly weaken its robustness 
Therefore, a reasonable dataset (containing a small number of similar images as well as an accurate annotation) and a corresponding recognized benchmark are urgently needed to promote community development 


To address these issues, we introduce a dataset called Detecting Underwater Objects (DUO) by collecting and re-annotating all the available underwater datasets  It contains 7,782 underwater images after deleting overly similar images and has a more accurate annotation with four types of classes (\emph{i e ,} holothurian, echinus, scallop, and starfish)  
Besides, based on the MMDetection$\protect\footnote{MMDetection is an open source object detection toolbox based on PyTorch  {\bf https://github com/open-mmlab/mmdetection}}$ \cite{chen2019mmdetection} framework, we also provide a \emph{SOTA} detector benchmark containing efficiency and accuracy indicators, providing a reference for both academic research and industrial applications  It is worth noting that JETSON AGX XAVIER$\protect\footnote{JETSON AGX XAVIER is an embedded development board produced by NVIDIA which could be deployed in an underwater robot  Please refer {\bf https://developer nvidia com/embedded/jetson-agx-xavier-developer-kit} for more information }$ was used to assess all the detectors in the efficiency test in order to simulate robot-embedded environment  DUO will be released in https://github com/chongweiliu soon 

In summary, the contributions of this paper can be listed as follows 

  $\bullet$ By collecting and re-annotating all relevant datasets, we introduce a dataset called DUO with more reasonable annotations as well as a variety of underwater scenes 

  $\bullet$ We provide a corresponding benchmark of \emph{SOTA} detectors on DUO including efficiency and accuracy indicators which could be a reference for both academic research and industrial applications  


\pagestyle{empty}
\section{Background}
In the year of 2017, underwater object detection for open-sea farming is first proposed in the target recognition track of Underwater Robot Picking Contest 2017$\protect\footnote{From 2020, the name has been changed into Underwater Robot Professional Contest which is also short for URPC }$ (URPC2017) which aims to promote the development of theory, technology, and industry of the underwater agile robot and fill the blank of the grabbing task of the underwater agile robot  The competition sets up a target recognition track, a fixed-point grasping track, and an autonomous grasping track  The target recognition track concentrates on finding the {\bf high accuracy and efficiency} algorithm which could be used in an underwater robot for automatically grasping 

The datasets we used to generate the DUO are listed below  The detailed information has been shown in Table \ref{Info} 

  {\bf URPC2017}: It contains 17,655 images for training and 985 images for testing and the resolution of all the images is 720$\times$405  All the images are taken from 6 videos at an interval of 10 frames  However, all the videos were filmed in an artificial simulated environment and pictures from the same video look almost identical  
  
   {\bf URPC2018}: It contains 2,901 images for training and 800 images for testing and the resolutions of the images are 586$\times$480, 704$\times$576, 720$\times$405, and 1,920$\times$1,080  The test set's annotations are not available  Besides, some images were also collected from an artificial underwater environment 
  
  {\bf URPC2019}: It contains 4,757 images for training and 1029 images for testing and the highest resolution of the images is 3,840$\times$2,160 captured by a GOPro camera  The test set's annotations are also not available and it contains images from the former contests 
  
  {\bf URPC2020$_{ZJ}$}: From 2020, the URPC will be held twice a year  It was held first in Zhanjiang, China, in April and then in Dalian, China, in August  URPC2020$_{ZJ}$ means the dataset released in the first URPC2020 and URPC2020$_{DL}$ means the dataset released in the second URPC2020  This dataset contains 5,543 images for training and 2,000 images for testing and the highest resolution of the images is 3,840$\times$2,160  The test set's annotations are also not available 
  
  {\bf URPC2020$_{DL}$}: This dataset contains 6,575 images for training and 2,400 images for testing and the highest resolution of the images is 3,840$\times$2,160  The test set's annotations are also not available 
  
  {\bf UDD \cite{2020arXiv200301446W}}: This dataset contains 1,827 images for training and 400 images for testing and the highest resolution of the images is 3,840$\times$2,160  All the images are captured by a diver and a robot in a real open-sea farm 

\begin{figure}[t]
\begin{center}
\includegraphics[width=1\linewidth]{pie pdf}
\end{center}
   \caption{The proportion distribution of the objects in DUO }
\label{pie}
\end{figure}



\begin{figure*}
  \centering
  \subfigure[]{\includegraphics[width=3 45in]{imagesize pdf}}
  \subfigure[]{\includegraphics[width=3 45in]{numInstance pdf}}
  \caption{(a) The distribution of instance sizes for DUO; (b) The number of categories per image }
  \label{sum}
\end{figure*}
\section{Proposed Dataset}

\subsection{Image Deduplicating}
As we explained in Section 1, there are a large number of similar or repeated images in the series of URPC datasets  Therefore, it is important to delete duplicate or overly similar images and keep a variety of underwater scenarios when we merge these datasets together  Here we employ the Perceptual Hash algorithm (PHash) to remove those images  PHash has the special property that the hash value is dependent on the image content, and it remains approximately the same if the content is not significantly modified  Thus we can easily distinguish different scenarios and delete duplicate images within one scenario  

After deduplicating, we obtain 7,782 images (6,671 images for training; 1,111 for testing)  The retention rate of the new dataset is 95\%, which means that there are only a few similar images in the new dataset  Figure \ref{exam} shows that our dataset also retains various underwater scenes 

\subsection{Image Re-annotation}
Due to the small size of objects and the blur underwater environment, there are always missing or wrong labels in the existing annotation files  In addition, some test sets' annotation files are not available and some datasets do not have the starfish annotation  In order to address these issues, we follow the next process which combines a CNN model and manual annotation to re-annotate these images  Specifically, we first train a detector (\emph{i e ,} GFL \cite{li2020generalized}) with the originally labeled images  After that, the trained detector predicts all the 7,782 images  We treat the prediction as the groundtruth and use it to train the GFL again  We get the final GFL prediction called {\bf the coarse annotation}  Next, we use manual correction to get the final annotation called {\bf the fine annotation}  Notably, we adopt the COCO \cite{Belongie2014} annotation form as the final format 
\subsection{Dataset Statistics}
{\bf The proportion of classes}: The total number of objects is 74,515  Holothurian, echinus, scallop, and starfish are 7,887, 50,156, 1,924, and 14,548, respectively  Figure \ref{pie} shows the proportion of each creatures where echinus accounts for 67 3\% of the total  The whole data distribution shows an obvious long-tail distribution because the different economic benefits of different seafoods determine the different breed quantities 

{\bf The distribution of instance sizes}: Figure \ref{sum}(a) shows an instance size distribution of DUO  \emph{Percent of image size} represents the ratio of object area to image area, and \emph{Percent of instance} represents the ratio of the corresponding number of objects to the total number of objects  Because of these small creatures and high-resolution images, the vast majority of objects occupy 0 3\% to 1 5\% of the image area 

{\bf The instance number per image}: Figure \ref{sum}(b) illustrates the number of categories per image for DUO  \emph{Number of instances} represents the number of objects one image has, and \emph{ Percentage of images} represents the ratio of the corresponding number of images to the total number of images  Most images contain between 5 and 15 instances, with an average of 9 57 instances per image 

{\bf Summary}:
In general, smaller objects are harder to detect  For PASCAL VOC \cite{Everingham2007The} or COCO \cite{Belongie2014}, roughly 50\% of all objects occupy no more than 10\% of the image itself, and others evenly occupy from 10\% to 100\%  
In the aspect of instances number per image, COCO contains 7 7 instances per image and VOC contains 3  In comparison, DUO has 9 57 instances per image and most instances less than 1 5\% of the image size 
Therefore, DUO contains almost exclusively massive small instances and has the long-tail distribution at the same time, which means it is promising to design a detector to deal with massive small objects and stay high efficiency at the same time for underwater robot picking 

\section{Benchmark}
Because the aim of underwater object detection for robot picking is to find {\bf the high accuracy and efficiency} algorithm, we consider both the accuracy and efficiency evaluations in the benchmark as shown in Table \ref{ben} 

\subsection{Evaluation Metrics}
Here we adopt the standard COCO metrics (mean average precision, \emph{i e ,} mAP) for the accuracy evaluation and also provide the mAP of each class due to the long-tail distribution 

{\bf AP} -- mAP at IoU=0 50:0 05:0 95 

{\bf AP$_{50}$} --  mAP at IoU=0 50 

{\bf AP$_{75}$} --  mAP at IoU=0 75  

{\bf AP$_{S}$} --   {\bf AP} for small objects of area smaller than 32$^{2}$ 

{\bf AP$_{M}$} --   {\bf AP} for objects of area between 32$^{2}$ and 96$^{2}$ 

{\bf AP$_{L}$} --   {\bf AP} for large objects of area bigger than 96$^{2}$ 

{\bf AP$_{Ho}$} --  {\bf AP} in holothurian 

{\bf AP$_{Ec}$} --  {\bf AP} in echinus 

{\bf AP$_{Sc}$} --  {\bf AP} in scallop 

{\bf AP$_{St}$} --  {\bf AP} in starfish 


For the efficiency evaluation, we provide three metrics:

{\bf Param } --  The parameters of a detector 

{\bf FLOPs} --  Floating-point operations per second 

{\bf FPS} --  Frames per second 

Notably, {\bf FLOPs} is calculated under the 512$\times$512 input image size and {\bf FPS} is tested on a JETSON AGX XAVIER under MODE$\_$30W$\_$ALL  

\subsection{Standard Training Configuration}
We follow a widely used open-source toolbox, \emph{i e ,} MMDetection (V2 5 0) to produce up our benchmark  During the training, the standard configurations are as follows:

  $\bullet$ We initialize the backbone models (\emph{e g ,} ResNet50) with pre-trained parameters on ImageNet \cite{Deng2009ImageNet} 

  $\bullet$ We resize each image into 512 $\times$ 512 pixels both in training and testing  Each image is flipped horizontally with 0 5 probability during training 

  $\bullet$ We normalize RGB channels by subtracting 123 675, 116 28, 103 53 and dividing by 58 395, 57 12, 57 375, respectively 

  $\bullet$ SGD method is adopted to optimize the model  The initial learning rate is set to be 0 005 in a single GTX 1080Ti with batchsize 4 and is decreased by 0 1 at the 8th and 11th epoch, respectively  WarmUp \cite{2019arXiv190307071L} is also employed in the first 500 iterations  Totally there are 12 training epochs 

  $\bullet$ Testing time augmentation (\emph{i e ,} flipping test or multi-scale testing) is not employed 



\subsection{Benchmark Analysis}
Table \ref{ben} shows the benchmark for the \emph{SOTA} methods  Multi- and one- stage detectors with three kinds of backbones (\emph{i e ,} ResNet18, 50, 101) give a comprehensive assessment on DUO  We also deploy all the methods to AGX to assess efficiency 

In general, the multi-stage (Cascade R-CNN) detectors have high accuracy and low efficiency, while the one-stage (RetinaNet) detectors have low accuracy and high efficiency  However, due to recent studies \cite{zhang2019bridging} on the allocation of more reasonable positive and negative samples in training, one-stage detectors (ATSS or GFL) can achieve both high accuracy and high efficiency 

\begin{table*}[htbp]
\renewcommand\tabcolsep{3 0pt}

\begin{center}
\caption{Benchmark of \emph{SOTA} detectors (single-model and single-scale results) on DUO  FPS is measured on the same machine with a JETSON AGX XAVIER under the same MMDetection framework, using a batch size of 1 whenever possible  R: ResNet } 
\label{ben}
\begin{tabular}{|l|l|c|c|c|ccc|ccc|cccc|}
\hline
Method&Backbone&Param &FLOPs&FPS&AP&AP$_{50}$&AP$_{75}$&AP$_{S}$&AP$_{M}$&AP$_{L}$&AP$_{Ho}$&AP$_{Ec}$&AP$_{Sc}$&AP$_{St}$ \\ 
\hline 
\emph{multi-stage:} &&&&&&&&&&&&&& \\

\multirow{3}{*}{Faster R-CNN \cite{Ren2015Faster}}
&R-18&28 14M&49 75G&5 7&50 1&72 6&57 8&42 9&51 9&48 7&49 1&60 1&31 6&59 7\\
&R-50&41 14M&63 26G&4 7&54 8&75 9&63 1&53 0&56 2&53 8&55 5&62 4&38 7&62 5\\
&R-101&60 13M&82 74G&3 7&53 8&75 4&61 6&39 0&55 2&52 8&54 3&62 0&38 5&60 4\\
\hline

\multirow{3}{*}{Cascade R-CNN \cite{Cai_2019}}
&R-18&55 93M&77 54G&3 4&52 7&73 4&60 3&\bf 49 0&54 7&50 9&51 4&62 3&34 9&62 3\\
&R-50&68 94M&91 06G&3 0&55 6&75 5&63 8&44 9&57 4&54 4&56 8&63 6&38 7&63 5\\
&R-101&87 93M&110 53G&2 6&56 0&76 1&63 6&51 2&57 5&54 7&56 2&63 9&41 3&62 6\\
\hline

\multirow{3}{*}{Grid R-CNN \cite{lu2019grid}}
&R-18&51 24M&163 15G&3 9&51 9&72 1&59 2&40 4&54 2&50 1&50 7&61 8&33 3&61 9\\
&R-50&64 24M&176 67G&3 4&55 9&75 8&64 3&40 9&57 5&54 8&56 7&62 9&39 5&64 4\\
&R-101&83 24M&196 14G&2 8&55 6&75 6&62 9&45 6&57 1&54 5&55 5&62 9&41 0&62 9\\
\hline

\multirow{3}{*}{RepPoints \cite{yang2019reppoints}}
&R-18&20 11M&\bf 35 60G&5 6&51 7&76 9&57 8&43 8&54 0&49 7&50 8&63 3&33 6&59 2\\
&R-50&36 60M&48 54G&4 8&56 0&80 2&63 1&40 8&58 5&53 7&56 7&65 7&39 3&62 3\\
&R-101&55 60M&68 02G&3 8&55 4&79 0&62 6&42
Context 3: South Dakota v  Wayfair, Inc  - Harvard Law Review
Fourth Circuit Invalidates Maryland Statute Regulating Price Gouging in the Sale of Generic Drugs 
South Dakota Supreme Court Holds Unconstitutional State Law Requiring Internet Retailers Without In-State Physical Presence to Remit Sales Tax 
Judicial junk, the Court has long thought, is easier to scrap when the erroneous precedent cannot be fixed by Congress, as in constitutional cases 1× 1  See Burnet v  Coronado Oil & Gas Co , 285 U S  393, 405–10 (1932) (Brandeis, J , dissenting); Lee Epstein, William M  Landes & Adam Liptak, The Decision to Depart (or Not) from Constitutional Precedent: An Empirical Study of the Roberts Court, 90 N Y U  L  Rev  1115, 1116 (2015) (“[Justice Brandeis’s] dissenting opinion       now has the status of black letter law ”)  On the flip side, whenever a bad precedent can be corrected by Congress, stare decisis applies with “special force ”2× 2  See Patterson v  McLean Credit Union, 491 U S  164, 172–73 (1989)  The Court, following Justice Brandeis, usually articulates the rule as distinguishing between “constitutional” and “statutory” precedents  See, e g , id  But the distinction is occasionally said to be between “constitutional” and “nonconstitutional cases ” See, e g , Glidden Co  v  Zdanok, 370 U S  530, 543 (1962) (plurality opinion)  Nomenclature aside, the Court has — until now — adhered to Justice Brandeis’s key insight that the important factor is whether or not the mistake may be legislatively corrected  Last Term, in South Dakota v  Wayfair, Inc ,3× 3  138 S  Ct  2080 (2018)  the Court tinkered with this thinking in overruling an outdated dormant commerce clause precedent  Dormant commerce clause decisions technically produce constitutional holdings, but Congress may override them at will 4× 4  See Prudential Ins  Co  v  Benjamin, 328 U S  408, 421–27 (1946)  Under the usual logic of stare decisis, it should take special force to dislodge such precedents  But Wayfair applied the weakened stare decisis of constitutional cases, asserting that the Court must “address a false constitutional premise         whether or not Congress can or will act ”5× 5  Wayfair, 138 S  Ct  at 2096–97 
Emerging from Wayfair is an odd and ominous development in stare decisis doctrine  Odd, because it turns on a formal classification instead of on Congress’s practical ability to fix the problem  Ominous, because the Court’s logic leads far past the dormant commerce clause  Wayfair grants only feeble stare decisis to precedents that set a “constitutional default rule,”6× 6  Id  at 2096 (“While       Congress has the authority to change the physical presence rule, Congress cannot change the constitutional default rule ”)  meaning constitutional decisions that allow for legislative adjustment or override  This new stare decisis analysis makes other precedents setting constitutional default rules more vulnerable — including, perhaps, mainstays of criminal procedure like Miranda v  Arizona7× 7  384 U S  436 (1966)  and Mapp v  Ohio 8× 8  367 U S  643 (1961) 
Since its 1967 decision in National Bellas Hess, Inc  v  Department of Revenue,9× 9  386 U S  753 (1967)  the Court has held that, under the “dormant” or “negative” implication of the Commerce Clause,10× 10  The dormant or negative commerce clause is a judicial derivation from the Commerce Clause “prohibiting States from discriminating against or imposing excessive burdens on interstate commerce without congressional approval,” which “strikes at one of the chief evils that led to the adoption of the Constitution, namely, state tariffs and other laws that burdened interstate commerce ” Comptroller of the Treasury of Md  v  Wynne, 135 S  Ct  1787, 1794 (2015)  states may not compel remote sellers with no physical presence in the state to collect and remit sales taxes 11× 11  See Bellas Hess, 386 U S  at 759–60  In Quill Corp  v  North Dakota,12× 12  504 U S  298 (1992)  the Court refused to overrule the “bright-line, physical-presence requirement” of Bellas Hess, leaning heavily on stare decisis 13× 13  Id  at 317–18  Three Justices joined a concurrence explaining that their decision rested solely “on the basis of stare decisis ” Id  at 320 (Scalia, J , concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)  So the physical presence test remained the law of the land while the internet conquered the earth  Justice Kennedy had joined the Quill majority and Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion emphasizing stare decisis, but by 2015 he had second thoughts  Writing separately in Direct Marketing Ass’n v  Brohl,14× 14  135 S  Ct  1124 (2015)  Justice Kennedy acknowledged that “[t]he Internet has caused far-reaching systemic and structural changes in the economy” and therefore “Quill now harms States to a degree far greater than could have been anticipated earlier ”15× 15  Id  at 1135 (Kennedy, J , concurring)  He concluded with the wish that “[t]he legal system should find an appropriate case for this Court to reexamine Quill and Bellas Hess ”16× 16  Id 
Seldom has a concurring opinion signed by a lone Justice prompted a state to officially declare an emergency  Yet in 2016, in response to Justice Kennedy’s overture, the South Dakota legislature passed a law, S B  106, “to provide for the collection of sales taxes from certain remote sellers       and to declare an emergency ”17× 17  2016 S D  Sess  Laws ch  70 pmbl  217 (codified at S D  Codified Laws § 10-64 (2017))  It required every remote seller to collect and remit sales tax if the seller’s business in South Dakota comprised either a “gross revenue” greater than $100,000 or at least 200 “separate transactions” within one calendar year 18× 18  Id  § 1  Significantly, the law did not apply retroactively 19× 19  Id  § 5  The “emergency” declaration was necessary to give the law immediate effect, for the purpose of “permitting the most expeditious possible review of the constitutionality of this law” by the U S  Supreme Court 20× 20  Id  § 8(8)  As Justice Alito put it, the “South Dakota law [was] obviously a test case ”21× 21  Transcript of Oral Argument at 27, Wayfair, 138 S  Ct  2080 (No  17-494), https://www supremecourt gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2017/17-494_7lho pdf [https://perma cc/8HYH-VU8N] 
Expeditiously, a group of remote sellers challenged the law  After being sued by South Dakota for refusing to register for the newly required sales tax license, Wayfair, Inc , Overstock com, Inc , and Newegg, Inc  moved for summary judgment in South Dakota circuit court on the grounds that S B  106 was unconstitutional under Quill and Bellas Hess — a point South Dakota conceded, indicating that it was seeking review by the U S  Supreme Court to overturn Quill 22× 22  State v  Wayfair Inc , 2017 SD 56, ¶¶ 9–11, 901 N W 2d 754, 759–60  Accordingly, the South Dakota circuit court granted the motion for summary judgment and South Dakota appealed to the state’s highest court 23× 23  Id  ¶ 12, 901 N W 2d at 760  The South Dakota Supreme Court unanimously affirmed, recognizing that South Dakota’s “arguments on the merits” may be “persuasive” but “Quill remains the controlling precedent ”24× 24  Id  ¶ 18, 901 N W 2d at 761  See generally Recent Case, State v  Wayfair Inc , 2017 SD 56, 901 N W 2d 754 (S D  2017), 131 Harv  L  Rev  2089 (2018) 
The U S  Supreme Court vacated and remanded 25× 25  Wayfair, 138 S  Ct  at 2100  Writing for the Court one last time, Justice Kennedy26× 26  Justices Thomas, Ginsburg, Alito, and Gorsuch joined Justice Kennedy’s opinion  pilloried Quill’s physical presence rule as “arbitrary, formalistic,” “anachronistic,” and “unfair and unjust” to both states and brick-and-mortar retailers 27× 27  Wayfair, 138 S  Ct  at 2092, 2095  After all, the rationale of Quill was that remote sellers lacked a sufficiently “substantial nexus” with the state to justify imposing a duty of tax collection 28× 28  Quill Corp  v  North Dakota, 504 U S  298, 311 (1992) (quoting Complete Auto Transit, Inc  v  Brady, 430 U S  274, 279 (1977))  This was wrong even in the mail-order catalog days of 1967 and 1992, but “the Internet revolution has made [Quill’s] earlier error all the more egregious and harmful ”29× 29  Wayfair, 138 S  Ct  at 2097; see also id  at 2092  The rule deprived the states of billions of dollars, since they could not force remote sellers to collect the tax and consumers hardly ever paid it on their own 30× 30  Id  at 2088 (“[C]onsumer compliance rates are notoriously low ”)  Quill “serve[d] as a judicially created tax shelter” for remote retailers who do a great deal of business online 31× 31  Id  at 2094 
Satisfied that Bellas Hess and Quill were wrongly decided, the Court then jumped the hurdle of stare decisis  The Quill Court had feared upsetting reliance interests 32× 32  Quill, 504 U S  at 317 (“Bellas Hess       has engendered substantial reliance and has become part of the basic framework of a sizable industry ”)  Wayfair shrugged off this concern, noting that “stare decisis accommodates only ‘legitimate reliance interest[s]’”; by contrast, reliance on the physical presence rule was largely due to consumers evading their use-tax obligations 33× 33  Wayfair, 138 S  Ct  at 2098 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v  Ross, 456 U S  798, 824 (1982))  Quill had also appealed to Congress’s ultimate authority over interstate commerce as a reason to abide by a precedent, even if wrongly decided 34× 34  See Quill, 504 U S  at 318–19; id  at 320 (Scalia, J , concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“Congress       can change the rule of Bellas Hess by simply saying so ”)  But Wayfair denied that Congress’s ability to change the law was a proper consideration:
While it can be conceded that Congress has the authority to change the physical presence rule, Congress cannot change the constitutional default rule  It is inconsistent with the Court’s proper role to ask Congress to address a false constitutional premise of this Court’s own creation  Courts have acted as the front line of review in this limited sphere; and hence it is important that their principles be accurate and logical, whether or not Congress can or will act in response 35× 35  Wayfair, 138 S  Ct  at 2096–97 
Having dispensed with the physical presence rule, the Court remanded the case to the South Dakota courts to determine in the first instance “whether some other principle in the Court’s Commerce Clause doctrine might invalidate the Act ”36× 36  Id  at 2099  But the Court listed “several features [of South Dakota law] that appear[ed] designed to prevent discrimination against or undue burdens upon interstate commerce ” Id 
Justices Thomas and Gorsuch each filed concurring opinions  Justice Thomas wistfully likened himself to Justice White — who voted for Bellas Hess but against Quill a quarter-century later — and confessed that he “should have joined [Justice White’s dissenting] opinion ”37× 37  Id  at 2100 (Thomas, J , concurring)  Justice Thomas added that the “Court’s entire negative Commerce Clause jurisprudence” is wrong and should be abandoned 38× 38  Id  Justice Gorsuch also wrote separately to express skepticism of the Court’s dormant commerce clause jurisprudence, raising “questions for another day” of whether the doctrine “can be squared with the text of the Commerce Clause, justified by stare decisis, or defended as misbranded products of federalism or antidiscrimination imperatives flowing from Article IV’s Privileges and Immunities Clause ”39× 39  Id  at 2100–01 (Gorsuch, J , concurring) 
Chief Justice Roberts dissented 40× 40  Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan joined the Chief Justice’s dissent  Surprisingly, the dissenting Justices “agree[d] that Bellas Hess was wrongly decided, for many of the reasons given by the Court ”41× 41  Wayfair, 138 S  Ct  at 2101 (Roberts, C J , dissenting)  The dispute between the majority and the dissent turned entirely on the principles and application of stare decisis  Chief Justice Roberts argued that whether or how to reverse Quill should be left to Congress, which “has the flexibility to address these questions in a wide variety of ways” and “can focus directly on current policy concerns rather than past legal mistakes ”42× 42  Id  at 2104  He also pointed to the “baffling” burdens of compliance with the idiosyncratic tax codes of “[o]ver 10,000 jurisdictions,” particularly for small businesses, and doubted that new “software” — the majority’s proposed solution to this mess43× 43  Id  at 2098 (majority opinion) (“Eventually, software that is available at a reasonable cost may make it easier for small businesses to cope with these problems ”)  — would soon solve the problem 44× 44  Id  at 2103–04 (Roberts, C J , dissenting)  In Bellas Hess, the Court reasoned that the dormant commerce clause protects interstate business from being “entangle[d]       in a virtual welter of complicated obligations to local jurisdictions ” Nat’l Bellas Hess, Inc  v  Dep’t of Revenue, 386 U S  753, 759–60 (1967)  The dissent replied that the Court “vastly underestimate[d] the skill of contemporary man and his machines ” Id  at 766 (Fortas, J , dissenting)  The dispute in Wayfair over whether software is up to the task effectively reprised the old debate from Bellas Hess, only this time couched as part of the stare decisis inquiry’s concern for reliance interests rather than as a matter of dormant commerce clause doctrine  While Wayfair acknowledged that “[c]omplex state tax systems could have the effect of discriminating against interstate commerce,” 138 S  Ct  at 2099, the Court remarked that “[t]he physical presence rule is a poor proxy” for an inquiry into any actual burdens imposed on interstate commerce, id  at 2093 
Chief Justice Roberts emphasized that a “heightened form of stare decisis”45× 45  Wayfair, 138 S  Ct  at 2102 (Roberts, C J , dissenting)  applies when “Congress       can, if it wishes, override this Court’s decisions with contrary legislation ”46× 46  Id  at 2101 (first citing Michigan v  Bay Mills Indian Cmty , 134 S  Ct  2024, 2036 (2014) (tribal sovereign immunity); then citing Kimble v  Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 135 S  Ct  2401, 2409 (2015) (statutory interpretation); and then citing Halliburton Co  v  Erica P  John Fund, Inc , 134 S  Ct  2398, 2411 (2014) (judicially created doctrine implementing a judicially created cause of action))  In Quill, the Chief Justice noted, the Court had taken to heart that “Congress may be better qualified” and “has the ultimate power to resolve” the question47× 47  Id  at 2102 (quoting Quill Corp  v  North Dakota, 504 U S  279, 318 (1992))  while Justice Scalia had “recogniz[ed] that stare decisis has ‘special force’ in the dormant Commerce Clause context due to Congress’s ‘final say over regulation of interstate commerce ’”48× 48  Id  (quoting Quill, 504 U S  at 320 (Scalia, J , concurring in part and concurring in the judgment))  Moreover, “[i]f stare decisis applied with special force in Quill, it should be an even greater impediment” afterward since Quill effectively “tossed [the ball] into Congress’s court ”49× 49  Id  (alteration in original) (quoting Kimble, 135 S  Ct  at 2409); cf  Bay Mills, 134 S  Ct  at 2039 n 12 (“When we inform Congress that it has primary responsibility over a sphere of law, and invite Congress to consider a specific issue within that sphere, we cannot deem irrelevant how Congress responds ”)  Because the Court invited Congress to act and then “suddenly chang[ed] the ground rules, the Court may have waylaid Congress’s consideration of the issue ”50× 50  Wayfair, 138 S  Ct  at 2102–03 (Roberts, C J , dissenting) 
In Wayfair, the Court applied the flimsier form of stare decisis to a precedent that could have been overruled by Congress  It did so in the context of a dormant commerce clause case, but Wayfair’s logic extends to all constitutional default rules — that is, constitutional decisions that Congress remains free to change  Not only does Wayfair deviate from the Court’s decades-old stare decisis analysis, it also imperils other precedents that set constitutional default rules 
The Court’s reasoning in Wayfair departs from its prior stare decisis analysis  In 1932, Justice Brandeis posited that stare decisis must bend “in cases involving the Federal Constitution, where correction through legislative action is practically impossible ”51× 51  Burnet v  Coronado Oil & Gas Co , 285 U



ground_truth: Four years.

prompt_front: Now, answer the following question based on the text below, only give me the answer and do not output any other words.

Question: Does DUO contain more instances per image than COCO?

Read the following text and answer briefly.

Context 2: 2&57 3&53 9&56 0&65 8&39 0&60 9\\
\hline 
\hline 
\emph{one-stage:} &&&&&&&&&&&&&& \\
\multirow{3}{*}{RetinaNet \cite{Lin2017Focal}}
&R-18&19 68M&39 68G&7 1&44 7&66 3&50 7&29 3&47 6&42 5&46 9&54 2&23 9&53 8\\
&R-50&36 17M&52 62G&5 9&49 3&70 3&55 4&36 5&51 9&47 6&54 4&56 6&27 8&58 3\\
&R-101&55 16M&72 10G&4 5&50 4&71 7&57 3&34 6&52 8&49 0&54 6&57 0&33 7&56 3\\
\hline 

\multirow{3}{*}{FreeAnchor \cite{2019arXiv190902466Z}}
&R-18&19 68M&39 68G&6 8&49 0&71 9&55 3&38 6&51 7&46 7&47 2&62 8&28 6&57 6\\
&R-50&36 17M&52 62G&5 8&54 4&76 6&62 5&38 1&55 7&53 4&55 3&65 2&35 3&61 8\\
&R-101&55 16M&72 10G&4 4&54 6&76 9&62 9&36 5&56 5&52 9&54 0&65 1&38 4&60 7\\
\hline 

\multirow{3}{*}{FoveaBox \cite{DBLP:journals/corr/abs-1904-03797}}
&R-18&21 20M&44 75G&6 7&51 6&74 9&57 4&40 0&53 6&49 8&51 0&61 9&34 6&59 1\\
&R-50&37 69M&57 69G&5 5&55 3&77 8&62 3&44 7&57 4&53 4&57 9&64 2&36 4&62 8\\
&R-101&56 68M&77 16G&4 2&54 7&77 3&62 3&37 7&57 1&52 4&55 3&63 6&38 9&60 8\\
\hline 

\multirow{3}{*}{PAA \cite{2020arXiv200708103K}}
&R-18&\bf 18 94M&38 84G&3 0&52 6&75 3&58 8&41 3&55 1&50 2&49 9&64 6&35 6&60 5\\
&R-50&31 89M&51 55G&2 9&56 8&79 0&63 8&38 9&58 9&54 9&56 5&66 9&39 9&64 0\\
&R-101&50 89M&71 03G&2 4&56 5&78 5&63 7&40 9&58 7&54 5&55 8&66 5&42 0&61 6\\
\hline 

\multirow{3}{*}{FSAF \cite{zhu2019feature}}
&R-18&19 53M&38 88G&\bf 7 4&49 6&74 3&55 1&43 4&51 8&47 5&45 5&63 5&30 3&58 9\\
&R-50&36 02M&51 82G&6 0&54 9&79 3&62 1&46 2&56 7&53 3&53 7&66 4&36 8&62 5\\
&R-101&55 01M&55 01G&4 5&54 6&78 7&61 9&46 0&57 1&52 2&53 0&66 3&38 2&61 1\\
\hline 

\multirow{3}{*}{FCOS \cite{DBLP:journals/corr/abs-1904-01355}}
&R-18&\bf 18 94M&38 84G&6 5&48 4&72 8&53 7&30 7&50 9&46 3&46 5&61 5&29 1&56 6\\
&R-50&31 84M&50 34G&5 4&53 0&77 1&59 9&39 7&55 6&50 5&52 3&64 5&35 2&60 0\\
&R-101&50 78M&69 81G&4 2&53 2&77 3&60 1&43 4&55 4&51 2&51 7&64 1&38 5&58 5\\
\hline 

\multirow{3}{*}{ATSS \cite{zhang2019bridging}}
&R-18&\bf 18 94M&38 84G&6 0&54 0&76 5&60 9&44 1&56 6&51 4&52 6&65 5&35 8&61 9\\
&R-50&31 89M&51 55G&5 2&58 2&\bf 80 1&66 5&43 9&60 6&55 9&\bf 58 6&67 6&41 8&64 6\\
&R-101&50 89M&71 03G&3 8&57 6&79 4&65 3&46 5&60 3&55 0&57 7&67 2&42 6&62 9\\
\hline 

\multirow{3}{*}{GFL \cite{li2020generalized}}
&R-18&19 09M&39 63G&6 3&54 4&75 5&61 9&35 0&57 1&51 8&51 8&66 9&36 5&62 5\\
&R-50&32 04M&52 35G&5 5&\bf 58 6&79 3&\bf 66 7&46 5&\bf 61 6&55 6&\bf 58 6&\bf 69 1&41 3&\bf 65 3\\
&R-101&51 03M&71 82G&4 1&58 3&79 3&65 5&45 1&60 5&\bf 56 3&57 0&\bf 69 1&\bf 43 0&64 0\\


\hline 
\end{tabular}
\end{center}
\end{table*}
Therefore, in terms of accuracy, the accuracy difference between the multi- and the one- stage methods in AP is not obvious, and the AP$_{S}$ of different methods is always the lowest among the three size AP  For class AP, AP$_{Sc}$ lags significantly behind the other three classes because it has the smallest number of instances  In terms of efficiency, large parameters and FLOPs result in low FPS on AGX, with a maximum FPS of 7 4, which is hardly deployable on underwater robot  Finally, we also found that ResNet101 was not significantly improved over ResNet50, which means that a very deep network may not be useful for detecting small creatures in underwater scenarios  

Consequently, the design of high accuracy and high efficiency detector is still the main direction in this field and there is still large space to improve the performance 
In order to achieve this goal, a shallow backbone with strong multi-scale feature fusion ability can be proposed to extract the discriminant features of small scale aquatic organisms; a specially designed training strategy may overcome the DUO's long-tail distribution, such as a more reasonable positive/negative label sampling mechanism or a class-balanced image allocation strategy within a training batch 

\section{Conclusion}
In this paper, we introduce a dataset (DUO) and a corresponding benchmark to fill in the gaps in the community  DUO contains a variety of underwater scenes and more reasonable annotations  Benchmark includes efficiency and accuracy indicators to conduct a comprehensive evaluation of the \emph{SOTA} decoders  The two contributions could serve as a reference for academic research and industrial applications, as well as promote community development 



ground_truth: Yes, DUO has 9.57 instances per image while COCO contains 7.7.

prompt_front: Now, answer the following question based on the text below, only give me the answer and do not output any other words.

Question: What did Justice Kennedy argue about Quill in Direct Marketing Ass'n v. Brohl?

Read the following text and answer briefly.

Context 3: S  393, 406–07 (1932) (Brandeis, J , dissenting)  The Court has long since adopted his argument,52× 52  See, e g , Smith v  Allwright, 321 U S  649, 665 (1944)  as well as its corollary — that stare decisis commands “special force in the area of statutory interpretation” where “Congress remains free to alter what [the Court has] done ”53× 53  Patterson v  McLean Credit Union, 491 U S  164, 172–73 (1989)  For normative evaluations of heightened stare decisis for statutory precedents, see generally Einer Elhauge, Statutory Default Rules: How to Interpret Unclear Legislation 211–23 (2008); and William N  Eskridge, Jr , Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76 Geo  L J  1361, 1364–1409 (1988)  Justice Brandeis’s logic demands that dormant commerce clause cases, where Congress is free to act, be granted the weightier stare decisis 54× 54  Scholars have noted the curious fact that Justice Brandeis included many dormant commerce clause cases as examples of overruled constitutional precedents  See, e g , Earl M  Maltz, Commentary, Some Thoughts on the Death of Stare Decisis in Constitutional Law, 1980 Wis  L  Rev  467, 468–469, 469 n 11  One explanation for this is that Justice Brandeis sought the authority of Chief Justice Taney’s dictum that the Court’s “opinion upon the construction of the Constitution is always open to discussion” — which referred to the dormant commerce clause  See Burnet, 285 U S  at 408 n 3 (Brandeis, J , dissenting) (quoting The Passenger Cases, 48 U S  (7 How ) 283, 470 (1849) (Taney, C J , dissenting))  In Chief Justice Taney’s time, it was thought that Congress could not override the Court’s dormant commerce clause decisions, see Cooley v  Bd  of Wardens, 53 U S  (12 How ) 299, 321 (1852), so the context of Chief Justice Taney’s dictum does not conflict with Justice Brandeis’s theory of stare decisis  The Court applied this reasoning in Quill, as Chief Justice Roberts underscored 55× 55  Wayfair, 138 S  Ct  at 2102 (Roberts, C J , dissenting) 
Yet the Wayfair majority refused to consider Congress’s authority to legislate as a relevant factor for stare decisis 56× 56  Even Justice Kennedy’s earlier opinion in Direct Marketing contemplated judicially overruling Quill, conspicuously neglecting a possible legislative solution  See supra p  278  The Court even insisted that to do so “is inconsistent with the Court’s proper role,” since Quill embodied “a false constitutional premise of th[e] Court’s own creation ”57× 57  Wayfair, 138 S  Ct  at 2096 (emphasis added)  This refusal breaks from the practical Brandeisian wisdom that has guided the Court’s treatment of precedent for the better part of a century  The point is not that stare decisis should have ultimately propped up Bellas Hess yet again, as Wayfair’s dissenting Justices maintained  After all, a realistic approach that is alert to each branch’s institutional capacities might have led to the conclusion that Congress was actually ill-equipped to overrule Quill  In this vein, the Court could have sensibly pointed out that Congress is unlikely to stick its neck out with a tax hike (or a look-alike) from which only the states would benefit 58× 58  For two practical arguments to this effect, see Brian Galle, Essay, Kill Quill, Keep the Dormant Commerce Clause: History’s Lessons on Congressional Control of State Taxation, 70 Stan  L  Rev  Online 158, 160–62 (2018), https://review law stanford edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2018/03/70-Stan -L -Rev -Online-158-Galle pdf [https://perma cc/22YP-P4V5]; Edward A  Zelinsky, The Political Process Argument for Overruling Quill, 82 Brook  L  Rev  1177, 1191–92 (2017)  Indeed, South Dakota advanced such practical arguments in its brief 59× 59  See Petitioner’s Brief at 54, Wayfair, 138 S  Ct  2080 (No  17-494) (“Congress has little incentive to act here because it would be (or appear to be) authorizing new or greater tax collections from its constituents, while receiving none of the revenue in return ”)  More generally, the Court might have discussed the limits of the states’ influence in the federal system as a reason not to wait for congressional intervention, a topic it has debated on other occasions 60× 60  See Richard H  Pildes, Institutional Formalism and Realism in Constitutional and Public Law, 2013 Sup  Ct  Rev  1, 30–32; see also Galle, supra note 58, at 159 (“Congress is not a trustworthy guardian of state fiscal power, making continuing judicial involvement a more appealing prospect ”)  Or it could have argued that new facts on the ground — namely, the blast of e-commerce that hit like a comet after Quill — overpowered stare decisis of any force, special or plain 61× 61  Two recent studies of stare decisis highlighted the physical presence rule as exemplifying a precedent that may reasonably be overruled due to changed facts  See Bryan A  Garner et al , The Law of Judicial Precedent 364–65 (2016); Randy J  Kozel, Settled Versus Right: A Theory of Precedent 112–13 (2017)  It should be noted that the authors of The Law of Judicial Precedent classify the physical presence rule as a constitutional precedent for stare decisis purposes, thus anticipating the Court’s misstep in Wayfair  Garner et al , supra, at 354–65  Because even statutory precedents may sometimes be overruled,62× 62  See Patterson v  McLean Credit Union, 491 U S  164, 173–74 (1989) (discussing justifications for overruling statutory precedents)  Contra Lawrence C  Marshall, “Let Congress Do It”: The Case for an Absolute Rule of Statutory Stare Decisis, 88 Mich  L  Rev  177 (1989)  the Court could have killed Quill without first planting its constitutional kiss of death 63× 63  Cf  Thomas R  Lee, Stare Decisis in Historical Perspective: From the Founding Era to the Rehnquist Court, 52 Vand  L  Rev  647, 704 (1999) (“Justice Brandeis’       memorable prose has since become a mandatory part of the burial rite for any constitutional precedent ”) 
The Court resisted such arguments  Instead, Wayfair reasoned that Congress’s total ability to correct an erroneous decision counts for nothing when the Court gets the Constitution wrong  That such a theory sprouts from a case like Wayfair, which repudiated a “formalistic distinction,”64× 64  Wayfair, 138 S  Ct  at 2092  is ironic  Wayfair’s stare decisis analysis resorts to the formalism of making constitutional a “magic” word65× 65  See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 21, at 12  rather than asking whether Congress can step in 
Moreover, the Court’s new thinking on stare decisis threatens other constitutional default rules  Wayfair now stands for the proposition that a “constitutional default rule” — a term the Court apparently lifted from South Dakota’s reply brief on the merits66× 66  Reply Brief at 22, Wayfair, 138 S  Ct  2080 (No  17-494) (“Congress is polarized, which makes it critical       to get the constitutional default rule right ”)  — gets only weakened stare decisis  To appreciate why this holding matters, it is worth exploring the concept and scope of constitutional default rules  Contract theory describes default rules as legal rules that the parties may “contract around ”67× 67  See, e g , Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 Yale L J  87, 87 (1989)  Although “constitutional default rule” could be read broadly to include a variety of actors and contracting mechanisms,68× 68  See John Ferejohn & Barry Friedman, Toward a Political Theory of Constitutional Default Rules, 33 Fla  St  U  L  Rev  825, 826 (2006) (“When we speak of default rules in constitutional law, we typically are talking about specifications of ways the government can act (or modify its behavior) to get around a constitutional prohibition ”)  the Court’s use of the term for purposes of stare decisis may be narrowly defined as judicial precedents of constitutional law that “are ultimately subject to congressional control ”69× 69  Gillian E  Metzger, Congress, Article IV, and Interstate Relations, 120 Harv  L  Rev  1468, 1525 (2007) (describing judicially enforceable “constitutional default rules imposing obligations on the states in the name of union [that] are ultimately subject to congressional control”)  The dormant commerce clause is a paradigmatic constitutional default rule because what the Court does today Congress may undo tomorrow  Justice Scalia declared this fact “[t]he clearest sign that the negative Commerce Clause is a judicial fraud,” for “[h]ow could congressional consent lift a constitutional prohibition?”70× 70  Comptroller of the Treasury of Md  v  Wynne, 135 S  Ct  1787, 1808 (2015) (Scalia, J , dissenting)  But that’s what a constitutional default rule is  The Court has allowed Congress to overturn its dormant commerce clause cases since 1891 71× 71  See In re Rahrer, 140 U S  545, 560–62 (1891) 
Dormant commerce clause cases are not the only constitutional default rules  Professor Laurence Tribe’s treatise identifies two others 72× 72  1 Laurence H  Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 6-35 (3d ed  2000)  And in a groundbreaking article, Professor Henry Monaghan revealed “a substructure of substantive, procedural, and remedial rules” forming “a constitutional common law subject to amendment, modification, or even reversal by Congress ”73× 73  Henry P  Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term — Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 Harv  L  Rev  1, 2–3 (1975); see also Susan R  Klein, Identifying and (Re)Formulating Prophylactic Rules, Safe Harbors, and Incidental Rights in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 99 Mich  L  Rev  1030 (2001) (further developing Monaghan’s theory in criminal procedure context)  What follows is a list of six lines of cases beyond the dormant commerce clause that may be fairly described as constitutional default rules  The first two are drawn from Tribe’s treatise while the next four are found in Monaghan’s article:
(1) State Taxation of Federal Instrumentalities: States may not tax instrumentalities of the federal government74× 74  McCulloch v  Maryland, 17 U S  (4 Wheat ) 316, 436 (1819)  — unless Congress consents 75× 75  See, e g , Helvering v  Gerhardt, 304 U S  405, 411 n 1 (1938) (“Congress may curtail an immunity which might otherwise be implied or enlarge it beyond the point where, Congress being silent, the Court would set its limits ” (citations omitted))  One court has described such judicial decisions as setting a “constitutional default rule ” United States v  Delaware, 958 F 2d 555, 560 n 9 (3d Cir  1992) (“[W]e must decide the constitutional default rule for this type of tax, fully aware that Congress could decide at any time to reverse our decision statutorily ”)  (2) Article I, Section 10 Cases: Article I, Section 10 provides that certain prohibitions on the states may be waived by Congress 76× 76  See U S  Const  art  I, § 10, cls  2–3  The Court has taken note of this when considering whether to overrule, for instance, an Import-Export Clause precedent 77× 77  See Hooven & Allison Co  v  Evatt, 324 U S  652, 668 (1945) (“In view of the fact that the Constitution gives Congress authority to consent to state taxation of imports and hence to lay down its own test for determining when the immunity ends, we see no convincing practical reason for abandoning the test which has been applied for more than a century        ”), overruled on other grounds by Limbach v  Hooven & Allison Co , 466 U S  353 (1984)  In Michelin Tire Corp  v  Wages, 423 U S  276 (1976), the Court left open the question whether “Congress may authorize, under the Import-Export Clause, an exaction that it could not directly impose under the Tax Clause ” Id  at 301 n 13  Metzger, however, argues that the Import-Export Clause is free of other clauses’ limits on congressional power  See Metzger, supra note 69, at 1500 & n 120  (3) Bivens Cases: In Bivens v  Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics,78× 78  403 U S  388 (1971)  the Court held that a violation of the Fourth Amendment gives rise to a right to sue for damages 79× 79  Id  at 397  But the Court has also held that “[s]uch a cause of action may be defeated       when       Congress has provided an alternative remedy which it explicitly declared to be a substitute for recovery directly under the Constitution and viewed as equally effective ”80× 80  Carlson v  Green, 446 U S  14, 18–19 (1980)  (4) Miranda Cases: The Miranda Court famously “encourage[d]” Congress and the states to explore alternative “procedures which are at least as effective in apprising accused persons of their right of silence and in assuring a continuous opportunity to exercise it ”81× 81  Miranda v  Arizona, 384 U S  436, 467 (1966)  In Dickerson v  United States, 530 U S  428 (2000), the Court struck down a congressional attempt to effectively abolish Miranda, holding that “Miranda announced a constitutional rule that Congress may not supersede legislatively ” Id  at 444  But Dickerson also stood by Miranda’s “invitation for legislative action” to replace Miranda with an adequate substitute  Id  at 440; see also Michael C  Dorf & Barry Friedman, Shared Constitutional Interpretation, 2000 Sup  Ct  Rev  61 (discussing legislative alternatives to Miranda)  (5) The Police Lineup Case: In United States v  Wade,82× 82  388 U S  218 (1967)  the Court created an exclusionary rule for evidence obtained from a police lineup in violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel but acknowledged that it could be replaced by “[l]egislative or other regulations       which eliminate the risks of abuse ”83× 83  Id  at 239  (6) The Exclusionary Rule Cases: Mapp v  Ohio made the Fourth Amendment “exclusionary rule” binding on the states,84× 84  367 U S  643, 655 (1961)  yet Congress is thought to have the power to replace it 85× 85  See Bivens v  Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed  Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U S  388, 422–24 (1971) (Burger, C J , dissenting) (inviting Congress to replace the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule); Harold J  Krent, How to Move Beyond the Exclusionary Rule: Structuring Judicial Response to Legislative Reform Efforts, 26 Pepp  L  Rev  855, 864–71 (1999) 
All of the above are arguably constitutional default rules set by the Court that remain, to one degree or another, open to congressional revision  The list could be longer or shorter, depending on which default rules the Court will view as constitutional86× 86  A shorter list could be produced by whittling away at the constitutional status of the cases identified by Monaghan  While the Court has held that Miranda is a constitutional decision, Dickerson, 530 U S  at 444, some of the other cases may be viewed as nonconstitutional  See, e g , Collins v  Virginia, 138 S  Ct  1663, 1675–80 (2018) (Thomas, J , concurring) (arguing that Mapp is “nonconstitutional,” id  at 1678 n 5); Richard H  Fallon, Jr  et al , Hart and Wechsler’s The Federal Courts and the Federal System 775–77 (7th ed  2015) (discussing whether Bivens is constitutionally required)  Conversely, a longer list might include any constitutional right that can be waived by a party  See, e g , Daniel A  Farber, Another View of the Quagmire: Unconstitutional Conditions and Contract Theory, 33 Fla  St  U  L  Rev  913, 918 (2006) (describing the Eleventh Amendment as “just a contractual default rule that the states are free to barter away”)  Such a list might also include various constitutionally inspired judicial presumptions  See, e g , Jack Goldsmith & John F  Manning, The President’s Completion Power, 115 Yale L J  2280, 2299 (2006) (describing the Chevron presumption of delegated interpretive power to administrative agencies as “a constitutionally inspired default rule”); Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 Harv  L  Rev  2085, 2097–98 (2002) (describing clear statement rules as “constitutional default rules” reversible by Congress)  Many other decisions could likely be characterized as constitutional default rules; the list above is only an initial stab  and on how it will answer open questions about congressional authority over certain constitutional provisions 87× 87  See, e g , Thomas v  Wash  Gas Light Co , 448 U S  261, 272 n 18 (1980) (plurality opinion) (leaving unresolved whether Congress may limit constitutional full faith and credit obligations); White v  Mass  Council of Constr  Emp’rs, Inc , 460 U S  204, 215 n 1 (1983) (Blackmun, J , concurring in part and dissenting in part) (leaving unresolved “whether Congress may authorize       what otherwise would be a violation” of the Privileges and Immunities Clause); 1 Tribe, supra note 72, § 6-35, at 1243–44 (arguing that Congress cannot override judicial constructions of the Privileges and Immunities Clause); Metzger, supra note 69, at 1486–89 (arguing the opposite)  But the takeaway is clear: weaker stare decisis for constitutional default rules  Pre-Wayfair, one would have thought that stare decisis applies with special force to such precedents, given congressional power to set them straight  Not anymore  Why? Because it is improper to “ask Congress to address a false constitutional premise of th[e] Court’s own creation ”88× 88  Wayfair, 138 S  Ct  at 2096  The Latin for Wayfair’s doctrine is not stare decisis, which should reflect a realistic, working relationship between the legislative and judicial branches  It is mea culpa 
In its zeal to update the Constitution for “the Cyber Age,”89× 89  Id  at 2097  the Court deleted Congress from stare decisis doctrine in constitutional cases  The Court had better options  It could have left Quill on Congress’s doorstep, as the dissent argued  Or it could have justified overruling Quill notwithstanding the special force of stare decisis  Instead, the Court reasoned that it doesn’t matter whether Congress is willing and able to do the job: a constitutional mess calls for a judicial clean-up crew  For constitutional default rules — a category of decisions embracing the dormant commerce clause and sweeping far beyond — Wayfair’s new theory of stare decisis makes the Court’s precedents less sticky and Congress less relevant 



ground_truth: Quill harmed states more than anticipated due to the Internet.