prompt_front: Now, answer the following question based on the text below, only give me the answer and do not output any other words.

Question: What did Justice Kennedy argue about Quill in Direct Marketing Ass'n v. Brohl?

Read the following text and answer briefly.

Context 1: South Dakota v  Wayfair, Inc  - Harvard Law Review
Fourth Circuit Invalidates Maryland Statute Regulating Price Gouging in the Sale of Generic Drugs 
South Dakota Supreme Court Holds Unconstitutional State Law Requiring Internet Retailers Without In-State Physical Presence to Remit Sales Tax 
Judicial junk, the Court has long thought, is easier to scrap when the erroneous precedent cannot be fixed by Congress, as in constitutional cases 1× 1  See Burnet v  Coronado Oil & Gas Co , 285 U S  393, 405–10 (1932) (Brandeis, J , dissenting); Lee Epstein, William M  Landes & Adam Liptak, The Decision to Depart (or Not) from Constitutional Precedent: An Empirical Study of the Roberts Court, 90 N Y U  L  Rev  1115, 1116 (2015) (“[Justice Brandeis’s] dissenting opinion       now has the status of black letter law ”)  On the flip side, whenever a bad precedent can be corrected by Congress, stare decisis applies with “special force ”2× 2  See Patterson v  McLean Credit Union, 491 U S  164, 172–73 (1989)  The Court, following Justice Brandeis, usually articulates the rule as distinguishing between “constitutional” and “statutory” precedents  See, e g , id  But the distinction is occasionally said to be between “constitutional” and “nonconstitutional cases ” See, e g , Glidden Co  v  Zdanok, 370 U S  530, 543 (1962) (plurality opinion)  Nomenclature aside, the Court has — until now — adhered to Justice Brandeis’s key insight that the important factor is whether or not the mistake may be legislatively corrected  Last Term, in South Dakota v  Wayfair, Inc ,3× 3  138 S  Ct  2080 (2018)  the Court tinkered with this thinking in overruling an outdated dormant commerce clause precedent  Dormant commerce clause decisions technically produce constitutional holdings, but Congress may override them at will 4× 4  See Prudential Ins  Co  v  Benjamin, 328 U S  408, 421–27 (1946)  Under the usual logic of stare decisis, it should take special force to dislodge such precedents  But Wayfair applied the weakened stare decisis of constitutional cases, asserting that the Court must “address a false constitutional premise         whether or not Congress can or will act ”5× 5  Wayfair, 138 S  Ct  at 2096–97 
Emerging from Wayfair is an odd and ominous development in stare decisis doctrine  Odd, because it turns on a formal classification instead of on Congress’s practical ability to fix the problem  Ominous, because the Court’s logic leads far past the dormant commerce clause  Wayfair grants only feeble stare decisis to precedents that set a “constitutional default rule,”6× 6  Id  at 2096 (“While       Congress has the authority to change the physical presence rule, Congress cannot change the constitutional default rule ”)  meaning constitutional decisions that allow for legislative adjustment or override  This new stare decisis analysis makes other precedents setting constitutional default rules more vulnerable — including, perhaps, mainstays of criminal procedure like Miranda v  Arizona7× 7  384 U S  436 (1966)  and Mapp v  Ohio 8× 8  367 U S  643 (1961) 
Since its 1967 decision in National Bellas Hess, Inc  v  Department of Revenue,9× 9  386 U S  753 (1967)  the Court has held that, under the “dormant” or “negative” implication of the Commerce Clause,10× 10  The dormant or negative commerce clause is a judicial derivation from the Commerce Clause “prohibiting States from discriminating against or imposing excessive burdens on interstate commerce without congressional approval,” which “strikes at one of the chief evils that led to the adoption of the Constitution, namely, state tariffs and other laws that burdened interstate commerce ” Comptroller of the Treasury of Md  v  Wynne, 135 S  Ct  1787, 1794 (2015)  states may not compel remote sellers with no physical presence in the state to collect and remit sales taxes 11× 11  See Bellas Hess, 386 U S  at 759–60  In Quill Corp  v  North Dakota,12× 12  504 U S  298 (1992)  the Court refused to overrule the “bright-line, physical-presence requirement” of Bellas Hess, leaning heavily on stare decisis 13× 13  Id  at 317–18  Three Justices joined a concurrence explaining that their decision rested solely “on the basis of stare decisis ” Id  at 320 (Scalia, J , concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)  So the physical presence test remained the law of the land while the internet conquered the earth  Justice Kennedy had joined the Quill majority and Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion emphasizing stare decisis, but by 2015 he had second thoughts  Writing separately in Direct Marketing Ass’n v  Brohl,14× 14  135 S  Ct  1124 (2015)  Justice Kennedy acknowledged that “[t]he Internet has caused far-reaching systemic and structural changes in the economy” and therefore “Quill now harms States to a degree far greater than could have been anticipated earlier ”15× 15  Id  at 1135 (Kennedy, J , concurring)  He concluded with the wish that “[t]he legal system should find an appropriate case for this Court to reexamine Quill and Bellas Hess ”16× 16  Id 
Seldom has a concurring opinion signed by a lone Justice prompted a state to officially declare an emergency  Yet in 2016, in response to Justice Kennedy’s overture, the South Dakota legislature passed a law, S B  106, “to provide for the collection of sales taxes from certain remote sellers       and to declare an emergency ”17× 17  2016 S D  Sess  Laws ch  70 pmbl  217 (codified at S D  Codified Laws § 10-64 (2017))  It required every remote seller to collect and remit sales tax if the seller’s business in South Dakota comprised either a “gross revenue” greater than $100,000 or at least 200 “separate transactions” within one calendar year 18× 18  Id  § 1  Significantly, the law did not apply retroactively 19× 19  Id  § 5  The “emergency” declaration was necessary to give the law immediate effect, for the purpose of “permitting the most expeditious possible review of the constitutionality of this law” by the U S  Supreme Court 20× 20  Id  § 8(8)  As Justice Alito put it, the “South Dakota law [was] obviously a test case ”21× 21  Transcript of Oral Argument at 27, Wayfair, 138 S  Ct  2080 (No  17-494), https://www supremecourt gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2017/17-494_7lho pdf [https://perma cc/8HYH-VU8N] 
Expeditiously, a group of remote sellers challenged the law  After being sued by South Dakota for refusing to register for the newly required sales tax license, Wayfair, Inc , Overstock com, Inc , and Newegg, Inc  moved for summary judgment in South Dakota circuit court on the grounds that S B  106 was unconstitutional under Quill and Bellas Hess — a point South Dakota conceded, indicating that it was seeking review by the U S  Supreme Court to overturn Quill 22× 22  State v  Wayfair Inc , 2017 SD 56, ¶¶ 9–11, 901 N W 2d 754, 759–60  Accordingly, the South Dakota circuit court granted the motion for summary judgment and South Dakota appealed to the state’s highest court 23× 23  Id  ¶ 12, 901 N W 2d at 760  The South Dakota Supreme Court unanimously affirmed, recognizing that South Dakota’s “arguments on the merits” may be “persuasive” but “Quill remains the controlling precedent ”24× 24  Id  ¶ 18, 901 N W 2d at 761  See generally Recent Case, State v  Wayfair Inc , 2017 SD 56, 901 N W 2d 754 (S D  2017), 131 Harv  L  Rev  2089 (2018) 
The U S  Supreme Court vacated and remanded 25× 25  Wayfair, 138 S  Ct  at 2100  Writing for the Court one last time, Justice Kennedy26× 26  Justices Thomas, Ginsburg, Alito, and Gorsuch joined Justice Kennedy’s opinion  pilloried Quill’s physical presence rule as “arbitrary, formalistic,” “anachronistic,” and “unfair and unjust” to both states and brick-and-mortar retailers 27× 27  Wayfair, 138 S  Ct  at 2092, 2095  After all, the rationale of Quill was that remote sellers lacked a sufficiently “substantial nexus” with the state to justify imposing a duty of tax collection 28× 28  Quill Corp  v  North Dakota, 504 U S  298, 311 (1992) (quoting Complete Auto Transit, Inc  v  Brady, 430 U S  274, 279 (1977))  This was wrong even in the mail-order catalog days of 1967 and 1992, but “the Internet revolution has made [Quill’s] earlier error all the more egregious and harmful ”29× 29  Wayfair, 138 S  Ct  at 2097; see also id  at 2092  The rule deprived the states of billions of dollars, since they could not force remote sellers to collect the tax and consumers hardly ever paid it on their own 30× 30  Id  at 2088 (“[C]onsumer compliance rates are notoriously low ”)  Quill “serve[d] as a judicially created tax shelter” for remote retailers who do a great deal of business online 31× 31  Id  at 2094 
Satisfied that Bellas Hess and Quill were wrongly decided, the Court then jumped the hurdle of stare decisis  The Quill Court had feared upsetting reliance interests 32× 32  Quill, 504 U S  at 317 (“Bellas Hess       has engendered substantial reliance and has become part of the basic framework of a sizable industry ”)  Wayfair shrugged off this concern, noting that “stare decisis accommodates only ‘legitimate reliance interest[s]’”; by contrast, reliance on the physical presence rule was largely due to consumers evading their use-tax obligations 33× 33  Wayfair, 138 S  Ct  at 2098 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v  Ross, 456 U S  798, 824 (1982))  Quill had also appealed to Congress’s ultimate authority over interstate commerce as a reason to abide by a precedent, even if wrongly decided 34× 34  See Quill, 504 U S  at 318–19; id  at 320 (Scalia, J , concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“Congress       can change the rule of Bellas Hess by simply saying so ”)  But Wayfair denied that Congress’s ability to change the law was a proper consideration:
While it can be conceded that Congress has the authority to change the physical presence rule, Congress cannot change the constitutional default rule  It is inconsistent with the Court’s proper role to ask Congress to address a false constitutional premise of this Court’s own creation  Courts have acted as the front line of review in this limited sphere; and hence it is important that their principles be accurate and logical, whether or not Congress can or will act in response 35× 35  Wayfair, 138 S  Ct  at 2096–97 
Having dispensed with the physical presence rule, the Court remanded the case to the South Dakota courts to determine in the first instance “whether some other principle in the Court’s Commerce Clause doctrine might invalidate the Act ”36× 36  Id  at 2099  But the Court listed “several features [of South Dakota law] that appear[ed] designed to prevent discrimination against or undue burdens upon interstate commerce ” Id 
Justices Thomas and Gorsuch each filed concurring opinions  Justice Thomas wistfully likened himself to Justice White — who voted for Bellas Hess but against Quill a quarter-century later — and confessed that he “should have joined [Justice White’s dissenting] opinion ”37× 37  Id  at 2100 (Thomas, J , concurring)  Justice Thomas added that the “Court’s entire negative Commerce Clause jurisprudence” is wrong and should be abandoned 38× 38  Id  Justice Gorsuch also wrote separately to express skepticism of the Court’s dormant commerce clause jurisprudence, raising “questions for another day” of whether the doctrine “can be squared with the text of the Commerce Clause, justified by stare decisis, or defended as misbranded products of federalism or antidiscrimination imperatives flowing from Article IV’s Privileges and Immunities Clause ”39× 39  Id  at 2100–01 (Gorsuch, J , concurring) 
Chief Justice Roberts dissented 40× 40  Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan joined the Chief Justice’s dissent  Surprisingly, the dissenting Justices “agree[d] that Bellas Hess was wrongly decided, for many of the reasons given by the Court ”41× 41  Wayfair, 138 S  Ct  at 2101 (Roberts, C J , dissenting)  The dispute between the majority and the dissent turned entirely on the principles and application of stare decisis  Chief Justice Roberts argued that whether or how to reverse Quill should be left to Congress, which “has the flexibility to address these questions in a wide variety of ways” and “can focus directly on current policy concerns rather than past legal mistakes ”42× 42  Id  at 2104  He also pointed to the “baffling” burdens of compliance with the idiosyncratic tax codes of “[o]ver 10,000 jurisdictions,” particularly for small businesses, and doubted that new “software” — the majority’s proposed solution to this mess43× 43  Id  at 2098 (majority opinion) (“Eventually, software that is available at a reasonable cost may make it easier for small businesses to cope with these problems ”)  — would soon solve the problem 44× 44  Id  at 2103–04 (Roberts, C J , dissenting)  In Bellas Hess, the Court reasoned that the dormant commerce clause protects interstate business from being “entangle[d]       in a virtual welter of complicated obligations to local jurisdictions ” Nat’l Bellas Hess, Inc  v  Dep’t of Revenue, 386 U S  753, 759–60 (1967)  The dissent replied that the Court “vastly underestimate[d] the skill of contemporary man and his machines ” Id  at 766 (Fortas, J , dissenting)  The dispute in Wayfair over whether software is up to the task effectively reprised the old debate from Bellas Hess, only this time couched as part of the stare decisis inquiry’s concern for reliance interests rather than as a matter of dormant commerce clause doctrine  While Wayfair acknowledged that “[c]omplex state tax systems could have the effect of discriminating against interstate commerce,” 138 S  Ct  at 2099, the Court remarked that “[t]he physical presence rule is a poor proxy” for an inquiry into any actual burdens imposed on interstate commerce, id  at 2093 
Chief Justice Roberts emphasized that a “heightened form of stare decisis”45× 45  Wayfair, 138 S  Ct  at 2102 (Roberts, C J , dissenting)  applies when “Congress       can, if it wishes, override this Court’s decisions with contrary legislation ”46× 46  Id  at 2101 (first citing Michigan v  Bay Mills Indian Cmty , 134 S  Ct  2024, 2036 (2014) (tribal sovereign immunity); then citing Kimble v  Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 135 S  Ct  2401, 2409 (2015) (statutory interpretation); and then citing Halliburton Co  v  Erica P  John Fund, Inc , 134 S  Ct  2398, 2411 (2014) (judicially created doctrine implementing a judicially created cause of action))  In Quill, the Chief Justice noted, the Court had taken to heart that “Congress may be better qualified” and “has the ultimate power to resolve” the question47× 47  Id  at 2102 (quoting Quill Corp  v  North Dakota, 504 U S  279, 318 (1992))  while Justice Scalia had “recogniz[ed] that stare decisis has ‘special force’ in the dormant Commerce Clause context due to Congress’s ‘final say over regulation of interstate commerce ’”48× 48  Id  (quoting Quill, 504 U S  at 320 (Scalia, J , concurring in part and concurring in the judgment))  Moreover, “[i]f stare decisis applied with special force in Quill, it should be an even greater impediment” afterward since Quill effectively “tossed [the ball] into Congress’s court ”49× 49  Id  (alteration in original) (quoting Kimble, 135 S  Ct  at 2409); cf  Bay Mills, 134 S  Ct  at 2039 n 12 (“When we inform Congress that it has primary responsibility over a sphere of law, and invite Congress to consider a specific issue within that sphere, we cannot deem irrelevant how Congress responds ”)  Because the Court invited Congress to act and then “suddenly chang[ed] the ground rules, the Court may have waylaid Congress’s consideration of the issue ”50× 50  Wayfair, 138 S  Ct  at 2102–03 (Roberts, C J , dissenting) 
In Wayfair, the Court applied the flimsier form of stare decisis to a precedent that could have been overruled by Congress  It did so in the context of a dormant commerce clause case, but Wayfair’s logic extends to all constitutional default rules — that is, constitutional decisions that Congress remains free to change  Not only does Wayfair deviate from the Court’s decades-old stare decisis analysis, it also imperils other precedents that set constitutional default rules 
The Court’s reasoning in Wayfair departs from its prior stare decisis analysis  In 1932, Justice Brandeis posited that stare decisis must bend “in cases involving the Federal Constitution, where correction through legislative action is practically impossible ”51× 51  Burnet v  Coronado Oil & Gas Co , 285 U S  393, 406–07 (1932) (Brandeis, J , dissenting)  The Court has long since adopted his argument,52× 52  See, e g , Smith v  Allwright, 321 U S  649, 665 (1944)  as well as its corollary — that stare decisis commands “special force in the area of statutory interpretation” where “Congress remains free to alter what [the Court has] done ”53× 53  Patterson v  McLean Credit Union, 491 U S  164, 172–73 (1989)  For normative evaluations of heightened stare decisis for statutory precedents, see generally Einer Elhauge, Statutory Default Rules: How to Interpret Unclear Legislation 211–23 (2008); and William N  Eskridge, Jr , Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76 Geo  L J  1361, 1364–1409 (1988)  Justice Brandeis’s logic demands that dormant commerce clause cases, where Congress is free to act, be granted the weightier stare decisis 54× 54  Scholars have noted the curious fact that Justice Brandeis included many dormant commerce clause cases as examples of overruled constitutional precedents  See, e g , Earl M  Maltz, Commentary, Some Thoughts on the Death of Stare Decisis in Constitutional Law, 1980 Wis  L  Rev  467, 468–469, 469 n 11  One explanation for this is that Justice Brandeis sought the authority of Chief Justice Taney’s dictum that the Court’s “opinion upon the construction of the Constitution is always open to discussion” — which referred to the dormant commerce clause  See Burnet, 285 U S  at 408 n 3 (Brandeis, J , dissenting) (quoting The Passenger Cases, 48 U S  (7 How ) 283, 470 (1849) (Taney, C J , dissenting))  In Chief Justice Taney’s time, it was thought that Congress could not override the Court’s dormant commerce clause decisions, see Cooley v  Bd  of Wardens, 53 U S  (12 How ) 299, 321 (1852), so the context of Chief Justice Taney’s dictum does not conflict with Justice Brandeis’s theory of stare decisis  The Court applied this reasoning in Quill, as Chief Justice Roberts underscored 55× 55  Wayfair, 138 S  Ct  at 2102 (Roberts, C J , dissenting) 
Yet the Wayfair majority refused to consider Congress’s authority to legislate as a relevant factor for stare decisis 56× 56  Even Justice Kennedy’s earlier opinion in Direct Marketing contemplated judicially overruling Quill, conspicuously neglecting a possible legislative solution  See supra p  278  The Court even insisted that to do so “is inconsistent with the Court’s proper role,” since Quill embodied “a false constitutional premise of th[e] Court’s own creation ”57× 57  Wayfair, 138 S  Ct  at 2096 (emphasis added)  This refusal breaks from the practical Brandeisian wisdom that has guided the Court’s treatment of precedent for the better part of a century  The point is not that stare decisis should have ultimately propped up Bellas Hess yet again, as Wayfair’s dissenting Justices maintained  After all, a realistic approach that is alert to each branch’s institutional capacities might have led to the conclusion that Congress was actually ill-equipped to overrule Quill  In this vein, the Court could have sensibly pointed out that Congress is unlikely to stick its neck out with a tax hike (or a look-alike) from which only the states would benefit 58× 58  For two practical arguments to this effect, see Brian Galle, Essay, Kill Quill, Keep the Dormant Commerce Clause: History’s Lessons on Congressional Control of State Taxation, 70 Stan  L  Rev  Online 158, 160–62 (2018), https://review law stanford edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2018/03/70-Stan -L -Rev -Online-158-Galle pdf [https://perma cc/22YP-P4V5]; Edward A  Zelinsky, The Political Process Argument for Overruling Quill, 82 Brook  L  Rev  1177, 1191–92 (2017)  Indeed, South Dakota advanced such practical arguments in its brief 59× 59  See Petitioner’s Brief at 54, Wayfair, 138 S  Ct  2080 (No  17-494) (“Congress has little incentive to act here because it would be (or appear to be) authorizing new or greater tax collections from its constituents, while receiving none of the revenue in return ”)  More generally, the Court might have discussed the limits of the states’ influence in the federal system as a reason not to wait for congressional intervention, a topic it has debated on other occasions 60× 60  See Richard H  Pildes, Institutional Formalism and Realism in Constitutional and Public Law, 2013 Sup  Ct  Rev  1, 30–32; see also Galle, supra note 58, at 159 (“Congress is not a trustworthy guardian of state fiscal power, making continuing judicial involvement a more appealing prospect ”)  Or it could have argued that new facts on the ground — namely, the blast of e-commerce that hit like a comet after Quill — overpowered stare decisis of any force, special or plain 61× 61  Two recent studies of stare decisis highlighted the physical presence rule as exemplifying a precedent that may reasonably be overruled due to changed facts  See Bryan A  Garner et al , The Law of Judicial Precedent 364–65 (2016); Randy J  Kozel, Settled Versus Right: A Theory of Precedent 112–13 (2017)  It should be noted that the authors of The Law of Judicial Precedent classify the physical presence rule as a constitutional precedent for stare decisis purposes, thus anticipating the Court’s misstep in Wayfair  Garner et al , supra, at 354–65  Because even statutory precedents may sometimes be overruled,62× 62  See Patterson v  McLean Credit Union, 491 U S  164, 173–74 (1989) (discussing justifications for overruling statutory precedents)  Contra Lawrence C  Marshall, “Let Congress Do It”: The Case for an Absolute Rule of Statutory Stare Decisis, 88 Mich  L  Rev  177 (1989)  the Court could have killed Quill without first planting its constitutional kiss of death 63× 63  Cf  Thomas R  Lee, Stare Decisis in Historical Perspective: From the Founding Era to the Rehnquist Court, 52 Vand  L  Rev  647, 704 (1999) (“Justice Brandeis’       memorable prose has since become a mandatory part of the burial rite for any constitutional precedent ”) 
The Court resisted such arguments  Instead, Wayfair reasoned that Congress’s total ability to correct an erroneous decision counts for nothing when the Court gets the Constitution wrong  That such a theory sprouts from a case like Wayfair, which repudiated a “formalistic distinction,”64× 64  Wayfair, 138 S  Ct  at 2092  is ironic  Wayfair’s stare decisis analysis resorts to the formalism of making constitutional a “magic” word65× 65  See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 21, at 12  rather than asking whether Congress can step in 
Moreover, the Court’s new thinking on stare decisis threatens other constitutional default rules  Wayfair now stands for the proposition that a “constitutional default rule” — a term the Court apparently lifted from South Dakota’s reply brief on the merits66× 66  Reply Brief at 22, Wayfair, 138 S  Ct  2080 (No  17-494) (“Congress is polarized, which makes it critical       to get the constitutional default rule right ”)  — gets only weakened stare decisis  To appreciate why this holding matters, it is worth exploring the concept and scope of constitutional default rules  Contract theory describes default rules as legal rules that the parties may “contract around ”67× 67  See, e g , Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 Yale L J  87, 87 (1989)  Although “constitutional default rule” could be read broadly to include a variety of actors and contracting mechanisms,68× 68  See John Ferejohn & Barry Friedman, Toward a Political Theory of Constitutional Default Rules, 33 Fla  St  U  L  Rev  825, 826 (2006) (“When we speak of default rules in constitutional law, we typically are talking about specifications of ways the government can act (or modify its behavior) to get around a constitutional prohibition ”)  the Court’s use of the term for purposes of stare decisis may be narrowly defined as judicial precedents of constitutional law that “are ultimately subject to congressional control ”69× 69  Gillian E  Metzger, Congress, Article IV, and Interstate Relations, 120 Harv  L  Rev  1468, 1525 (2007) (describing judicially enforceable “constitutional default rules imposing obligations on the states in the name of union [that] are ultimately subject to congressional control”)  The dormant commerce clause is a paradigmatic constitutional default rule because what the Court does today Congress may undo tomorrow  Justice Scalia declared this fact “[t]he clearest sign that the negative Commerce Clause is a judicial fraud,” for “[h]ow could congressional consent lift a constitutional prohibition?”70× 70  Comptroller of the Treasury of Md  v  Wynne, 135 S  Ct  1787, 1808 (2015) (Scalia, J , dissenting)  But that’s what a constitutional default rule is  The Court has allowed Congress to overturn its dormant commerce clause cases since 1891 71× 71  See In re Rahrer, 140 U S  545, 560–62 (1891) 
Dormant commerce clause cases are not the only constitutional default rules  Professor Laurence Tribe’s treatise identifies two others 72× 72  1 Laurence H  Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 6-35 (3d ed  2000)  And in a groundbreaking article, Professor Henry Monaghan revealed “a substructure of substantive, procedural, and remedial rules” forming “a constitutional common law subject to amendment, modification, or even reversal by Congress ”73× 73  Henry P  Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term — Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 Harv  L  Rev  1, 2–3 (1975); see also Susan R  Klein, Identifying and (Re)Formulating Prophylactic Rules, Safe Harbors, and Incidental Rights in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 99 Mich  L  Rev  1030 (2001) (further developing Monaghan’s theory in criminal procedure context)  What follows is a list of six lines of cases beyond the dormant commerce clause that may be fairly described as constitutional default rules  The first two are drawn from Tribe’s treatise while the next four are found in Monaghan’s article:
(1) State Taxation of Federal Instrumentalities: States may not tax instrumentalities of the federal government74× 74  McCulloch v  Maryland, 17 U S  (4 Wheat ) 316, 436 (1819)  — unless Congress consents 75× 75  See, e g , Helvering v  Gerhardt, 304 U S  405, 411 n 1 (1938) (“Congress may curtail an immunity which might otherwise be implied or enlarge it beyond the point where, Congress being silent, the Court would set its limits ” (citations omitted))  One court has described such judicial decisions as setting a “constitutional default rule ” United States v  Delaware, 958 F 2d 555, 560 n 9 (3d Cir  1992) (“[W]e must decide the constitutional default rule for this type of tax, fully aware that Congress could decide at any time to reverse our decision statutorily ”)  (2) Article I, Section 10 Cases: Article I, Section 10 provides that certain prohibitions on the states may be waived by Congress 76× 76  See U S  Const  art  I, § 10, cls  2–3  The Court has taken note of this when considering whether to overrule, for instance, an Import-Export Clause precedent 77× 77  See Hooven & Allison Co  v  Evatt, 324 U S  652, 668 (1945) (“In view of the fact that the Constitution gives Congress authority to consent to state taxation of imports and hence to lay down its own test for determining when the immunity ends, we see no convincing practical reason for abandoning the test which has been applied for more than a century        ”), overruled on other grounds by Limbach v  Hooven & Allison Co , 466 U S  353 (1984)  In Michelin Tire Corp  v  Wages, 423 U S  276 (1976), the Court left open the question whether “Congress may authorize, under the Import-Export Clause, an exaction that it could not directly impose under the Tax Clause ” Id  at 301 n 13  Metzger, however, argues that the Import-Export Clause is free of other clauses’ limits on congressional power  See Metzger, supra note 69, at 1500 & n 120  (3) Bivens Cases: In Bivens v  Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics,78× 78  403 U S  388 (1971)  the Court held that a violation of the Fourth Amendment gives rise to a right to sue for damages 79× 79  Id  at 397  But the Court has also held that “[s]uch a cause of action may be defeated       when       Congress has provided an alternative remedy which it explicitly declared to be a substitute for recovery directly under the Constitution and viewed as equally effective ”80× 80  Carlson v  Green, 446 U S  14, 18–19 (1980)  (4) Miranda Cases: The Miranda Court famously “encourage[d]” Congress and the states to explore alternative “procedures which are at least as effective in apprising accused persons of their right of silence and in assuring a continuous opportunity to exercise it ”81× 81  Miranda v  Arizona, 384 U S  436, 467 (1966)  In Dickerson v  United States, 530 U S  428 (2000), the Court struck down a congressional attempt to effectively abolish Miranda, holding that “Miranda announced a constitutional rule that Congress may not supersede legislatively ” Id  at 444  But Dickerson also stood by Miranda’s “invitation for legislative action” to replace Miranda with an adequate substitute  Id  at 440; see also Michael C  Dorf & Barry Friedman, Shared Constitutional Interpretation, 2000 Sup  Ct  Rev  61 (discussing legislative alternatives to Miranda)  (5) The Police Lineup Case: In United States v  Wade,82× 82  388 U S  218 (1967)  the Court created an exclusionary rule for evidence obtained from a police lineup in violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel but acknowledged that it could be replaced by “[l]egislative or other regulations       which eliminate the risks of abuse ”83× 83  Id  at 239  (6) The Exclusionary Rule Cases: Mapp v  Ohio made the Fourth Amendment “exclusionary rule” binding on the states,84× 84  367 U S  643, 655 (1961)  yet Congress is thought to have the power to replace it 85× 85  See Bivens v  Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed  Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U S  388, 422–24 (1971) (Burger, C J , dissenting) (inviting Congress to replace the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule); Harold J  Krent, How to Move Beyond the Exclusionary Rule: Structuring Judicial Response to Legislative Reform Efforts, 26 Pepp  L  Rev  855, 864–71 (1999) 
All of the above are arguably constitutional default rules set by the Court that remain, to one degree or another, open to congressional revision  The list could be longer or shorter, depending on which default rules the Court will view as constitutional86× 86  A shorter list could be produced by whittling away at the constitutional status of the cases identified by Monaghan  While the Court has held that Miranda is a constitutional decision, Dickerson, 530 U S  at 444, some of the other cases may be viewed as nonconstitutional  See, e g , Collins v  Virginia, 138 S  Ct  1663, 1675–80 (2018) (Thomas, J , concurring) (arguing that Mapp is “nonconstitutional,” id  at 1678 n 5); Richard H  Fallon, Jr  et al , Hart and Wechsler’s The Federal Courts and the Federal System 775–77 (7th ed  2015) (discussing whether Bivens is constitutionally required)  Conversely, a longer list might include any constitutional right that can be waived by a party  See, e g , Daniel A  Farber, Another View of the Quagmire: Unconstitutional Conditions and Contract Theory, 33 Fla  St  U  L  Rev  913, 918 (2006) (describing the Eleventh Amendment as “just a contractual default rule that the states are free to barter away”)  Such a list might also include various constitutionally inspired judicial presumptions  See, e g , Jack Goldsmith & John F  Manning, The President’s Completion Power, 115 Yale L J  2280, 2299 (2006) (describing the Chevron presumption of delegated interpretive power to administrative agencies as “a constitutionally inspired default rule”); Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 Harv  L  Rev  2085, 2097–98 (2002) (describing clear statement rules as “constitutional default rules” reversible by Congress)  Many other decisions could likely be characterized as constitutional default rules; the list above is only an initial stab  and on how it will answer open questions about congressional authority over certain constitutional provisions 87× 87  See, e g , Thomas v  Wash  Gas Light Co , 448 U S  261, 272 n 18 (1980) (plurality opinion) (leaving unresolved whether Congress may limit constitutional full faith and credit obligations); White v  Mass  Council of Constr  Emp’rs, Inc , 460 U S  204, 215 n 1 (1983) (Blackmun, J , concurring in part and dissenting in part) (leaving unresolved “whether Congress may authorize       what otherwise would be a violation” of the Privileges and Immunities Clause); 1 Tribe, supra note 72, § 6-35, at 1243–44 (arguing that Congress cannot override judicial constructions of the Privileges and Immunities Clause); Metzger, supra note 69, at 1486–89 (arguing the opposite)  But the takeaway is clear: weaker stare decisis for constitutional default rules  Pre-Wayfair, one would have thought that stare decisis applies with special force to such precedents, given congressional power to set them straight  Not anymore  Why? Because it is improper to “ask Congress to address a false constitutional premise of th[e] Court’s own creation ”88× 88  Wayfair, 138 S  Ct  at 2096  The Latin for Wayfair’s doctrine is not stare decisis, which should reflect a realistic, working relationship between the legislative and judicial branches  It is mea culpa 
In its zeal to update the Constitution for “the Cyber Age,”89× 89  Id  at 2097  the Court deleted Congress from stare decisis doctrine in constitutional cases  The Court had better options  It could have left Quill on Congress’s doorstep, as the dissent argued  Or it could have justified overruling Quill notwithstanding the special force of stare decisis  Instead, the Court reasoned that it doesn’t matter whether Congress is willing and able to do the job: a constitutional mess calls for a judicial clean-up crew  For constitutional default rules — a category of decisions embracing the dormant commerce clause and sweeping far beyond — Wayfair’s new theory of stare decisis makes the Court’s precedents less sticky and Congress less relevant 
Context 2: \section{Introduction}\label{S1}

The multiple access interferences (MAI) is the root of user
limitation in CDMA systems \cite{R1,R3}  The parallel least mean
square-partial parallel interference cancelation (PLMS-PPIC) method
is a multiuser detector for code division multiple access (CDMA)
receivers which reduces the effect of MAI in bit detection  In this
method and similar to its former versions like LMS-PPIC \cite{R5}
(see also \cite{RR5}), a weighted value of the MAI of other users is
subtracted before making the decision for a specific user in
different stages \cite{cohpaper}  In both of these methods, the
normalized least mean square (NLMS) algorithm is engaged
\cite{Haykin96}  The $m^{\rm th}$ element of the weight vector in
each stage is the true transmitted binary value of the $m^{\rm th}$
user divided by its hard estimate value from the previous stage  The
magnitude of all weight elements in all stages are equal to unity 
Unlike the LMS-PPIC, the PLMS-PPIC method tries to keep this
property in each iteration by using a set of NLMS algorithms with
different step-sizes instead of one NLMS algorithm used in LMS-PPIC 
In each iteration, the parameter estimate of the NLMS algorithm is
chosen whose element magnitudes of cancelation weight estimate have
the best match with unity  In PLMS-PPIC implementation it is assumed
that the receiver knows the phases of all user channels  However in
practice, these phases are not known and should be estimated  In
this paper we improve the PLMS-PPIC procedure \cite{cohpaper} in
such a way that when there is only a partial information of the
channel phases, this modified version simultaneously estimates the
phases and the cancelation weights  The partial information is the
quarter of each channel phase in $(0,2\pi)$ 

The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In section \ref{S4}
the modified version of PLMS-PPIC with capability of channel phase
estimation is introduced  In section \ref{S5} some simulation
examples illustrate the results of the proposed method  Finally the
paper is concluded in section \ref{S6} 

\section{Multistage Parallel Interference Cancelation: Modified PLMS-PPIC Method}\label{S4}

We assume $M$ users synchronously send their symbols
$\alpha_1,\alpha_2,\cdots,\alpha_M$ via a base-band CDMA
transmission system where $\alpha_m\in\{-1,1\}$  The $m^{th}$ user
has its own code $p_m( )$ of length $N$, where $p_m(n)\in \{-1,1\}$,
for all $n$  It means that for each symbol $N$ bits are transmitted
by each user and the processing gain is equal to $N$  At the
receiver we assume that perfect power control scheme is applied 
Without loss of generality, we also assume that the power gains of
all channels are equal to unity and users' channels do not change
during each symbol transmission (it can change from one symbol
transmission to the next one) and the channel phase $\phi_m$ of
$m^{th}$ user is unknown for all $m=1,2,\cdots,M$ (see
\cite{cohpaper} for coherent transmission)  According to the above
assumptions the received signal is
\begin{equation}
\label{e1} r(n)=\sum\limits_{m=1}^{M}\alpha_m
e^{j\phi_m}p_m(n)+v(n),~~~~n=1,2,\cdots,N,
\end{equation}
where $v(n)$ is the additive white Gaussian noise with zero mean and
variance $\sigma^2$  Multistage parallel interference cancelation
method uses $\alpha^{s-1}_1,\alpha^{s-1}_2,\cdots,\alpha^{s-1}_M$,
the bit estimates outputs of the previous stage, $s-1$, to estimate
the related MAI of each user  It then subtracts it from the received
signal $r(n)$ and makes a new decision on each user variable
individually to make a new variable set
$\alpha^{s}_1,\alpha^{s}_2,\cdots,\alpha^{s}_M$ for the current
stage $s$  Usually the variable set of the first stage (stage $0$)
is the output of a conventional detector  The output of the last
stage is considered as the final estimate of transmitted bits  In
the following we explain the structure of a modified version of the
PLMS-PIC method \cite{cohpaper} with simultaneous capability of
estimating the cancelation weights and the channel phases 

Assume $\alpha_m^{(s-1)}\in\{-1,1\}$ is a given estimate of
$\alpha_m$ from stage $s-1$  Define
\begin{equation}
\label{e6} w^s_{m}=\frac{\alpha_m}{\alpha_m^{(s-1)}}e^{j\phi_m} 
\end{equation}
From (\ref{e1}) and (\ref{e6}) we have
\begin{equation}
\label{e7} r(n)=\sum\limits_{m=1}^{M}w^s_m\alpha^{(s-1)}_m
p_m(n)+v(n) 
\end{equation}
Define
\begin{subequations}
\begin{eqnarray}
\label{e8} W^s&=&[w^s_{1},w^s_{2},\cdots,w^s_{M}]^T,\\
\label{e9}
\!\!\!\!\!\!\!\!\!\!\!\!\!\!\!\!\!\!\!\!X^{s}(n)\!\!\!&=&\!\!\![\alpha^{(s-1)}_1p_1(n),\alpha^{(s-1)}_2p_2(n),\cdots,\alpha^{(s-1)}_Mp_M(n)]^T 
\end{eqnarray}
\end{subequations}
where $T$ stands for transposition  From equations (\ref{e7}),
(\ref{e8}) and (\ref{e9}), we have
\begin{equation}
\label{e10} r(n)=W^{s^T}X^{s}(n)+v(n) 
\end{equation}
Given the observations $\{r(n),X^{s}(n)\}^{N}_{n=1}$, in modified
PLMS-PPIC, like the PLMS-PPIC \cite{cohpaper}, a set of NLMS
adaptive algorithm are used to compute
\begin{equation}
\label{te1} W^{s}(N)=[w^{s}_1(N),w^{s}_2(N),\cdots,w^{s}_M(N)]^T,
\end{equation}
which is an estimate of $W^s$ after iteration $N$  To do so, from
(\ref{e6}), we have
\begin{equation}
\label{e13} |w^s_{m}|=1 ~~~m=1,2,\cdots,M,
\end{equation}
which is equivalent to
\begin{equation}
\label{e14} \sum\limits_{m=1}^{M}||w^s_{m}|-1|=0 
\end{equation}
We divide $\Psi=\left(0,1-\sqrt{\frac{M-1}{M}}\right]$, a sharp
range for $\mu$ (the step-size of the NLMS algorithm) given in
\cite{sg2005}, into $L$ subintervals and consider $L$ individual
step-sizes $\Theta=\{\mu_1,\mu_2,\cdots,\mu_L\}$, where
$\mu_1=\frac{1-\sqrt{\frac{M-1}{M}}}{L}, \mu_2=2\mu_1,\cdots$, and
$\mu_L=L\mu_1$  In each stage, $L$ individual NLMS algorithms are
executed ($\mu_l$ is the step-size of the $l^{th}$ algorithm)  In
stage $s$ and at iteration $n$, if
$W^{s}_k(n)=[w^s_{1,k},\cdots,w^s_{M,k}]^T$, the parameter estimate
of the $k^{\rm th}$ algorithm, minimizes our criteria, then it is
considered as the parameter estimate at time iteration $n$  In other
words if the next equation holds
\begin{equation}
\label{e17} W^s_k(n)=\arg\min\limits_{W^s_l(n)\in I_{W^s}
}\left\{\sum\limits_{m=1}^{M}||w^s_{m,l}(n)|-1|\right\},
\end{equation}
where $W^{s}_l(n)=W^{s}(n-1)+\mu_l \frac{X^s(n)}{\|X^s(n)\|^2}e(n),
~~~ l=1,2,\cdots,k,\cdots,L-1,L$ and
$I_{W^s}=\{W^s_1(n),\cdots,W^s_L(n)\}$, then we have
$W^s(n)=W^s_k(n)$, and therefore all other algorithms replace their
weight estimate by $W^{s}_k(n)$  At time instant $n=N$, this
procedure gives $W^s(N)$, the final estimate of $W^s$, as the true
parameter of stage $s$ 

Now consider $R=(0,2\pi)$ and divide it into four equal parts
$R_1=(0,\frac{\pi}{2})$, $R_2=(\frac{\pi}{2},\pi)$,
$R_3=(\pi,\frac{3\pi}{2})$ and $R_4=(\frac{3\pi}{2},2\pi)$  The
partial information of channel phases (given by the receiver) is in
a way that it shows each $\phi_m$ ($m=1,2,\cdots,M$) belongs to
which one of the four quarters $R_i,~i=1,2,3,4$  Assume
$W^{s}(N)=[w^{s}_1(N),w^{s}_2(N),\cdots,w^{s}_M(N)]^T$ is the weight
estimate of the modified algorithm PLMS-PPIC at time instant $N$ of
the stage $s$  From equation (\ref{e6}) we have
\begin{equation}
\label{tt3}
\phi_m=\angle({\frac{\alpha^{(s-1)}_m}{\alpha_m}w^s_m}) 
\end{equation}
We estimate $\phi_m$ by $\hat{\phi}^s_m$, where
\begin{equation}
\label{ee3}
\hat{\phi}^s_m=\angle{(\frac{\alpha^{(s-1)}_m}{\alpha_m}w^s_m(N))} 
\end{equation}
Because $\frac{\alpha^{(s-1)}_m}{\alpha_m}=1$ or $-1$, we have
\begin{eqnarray}
\hat{\phi}^s_m=\left\{\begin{array}{ll} \angle{w^s_m(N)} &
\mbox{if}~
\frac{\alpha^{(s-1)}_m}{\alpha_m}=1\\
\pm\pi+\angle{w^s_m(N)} & \mbox{if}~
\frac{\alpha^{(s-1)}_m}{\alpha_m}=-1\end{array}\right 
\end{eqnarray}
Hence $\hat{\phi}^s_m\in P^s=\{\angle{w^s_m(N)},
\angle{w^s_m(N)+\pi, \angle{w^s_m(N)}-\pi}\}$  If $w^s_m(N)$
sufficiently converges to its true value $w^s_m$, the same region
for $\hat{\phi}^s_m$ and $\phi_m$ is expected  In this case only one
of the three members of $P^s$ has the same region as $\phi_m$  For
example if $\phi_m \in (0,\frac{\pi}{2})$, then $\hat{\phi}^s_m \in
(0,\frac{\pi}{2})$ and therefore only $\angle{w^s_m(N)}$ or
$\angle{w^s_m(N)}+\pi$ or $\angle{w^s_m(N)}-\pi$ belongs to
$(0,\frac{\pi}{2})$  If, for example, $\angle{w^s_m(N)}+\pi$ is such
a member between all three members of $P^s$, it is the best
candidate for phase estimation  In other words,
\[\phi_m\approx\hat{\phi}^s_m=\angle{w^s_m(N)}+\pi \]
We admit that when there is a member of $P^s$ in the quarter of
$\phi_m$, then $w^s_m(N)$ converges  What would happen when non of
the members of $P^s$ has the same quarter as $\phi_m$? This
situation will happen when the absolute difference between $\angle
w^s_m(N)$ and $\phi_m$ is greater than $\pi$  It means that
$w^s_m(N)$ has not converged yet  In this case where we can not
count on $w^s_m(N)$, the expected value is the optimum choice for
the channel phase estimation, e g  if $\phi_m \in (0,\frac{\pi}{2})$
then $\frac{\pi}{4}$ is the estimation of the channel phase
$\phi_m$, or if $\phi_m \in (\frac{\pi}{2},\pi)$ then
$\frac{3\pi}{4}$ is the estimation of the channel phase $\phi_m$ 
The results of the above discussion are summarized in the next
equation
\begin{eqnarray}
\nonumber \hat{\phi}^s_m = \left\{\begin{array}{llll} \angle
{w^s_m(N)} & \mbox{if}~
\angle{w^s_m(N)}, \phi_m\in R_i,~~i=1,2,3,4\\
\angle{w^s_m(N)}+\pi & \mbox{if}~ \angle{w^s_m(N)}+\pi, \phi_m\in
R_i,~~i=1,2,3,4\\
\angle{w^n_m(N)}-\pi & \mbox{if}~ \angle{w^s_m(N)}-\pi, \phi_m\in
R_i,~~i=1,2,3,4\\
\frac{(i-1)\pi+i\pi}{4} & \mbox{if}~ \phi_m\in
R_i,~~\angle{w^s_m(N)},\angle
{w^s_m(N)}\pm\pi\notin R_i,~~i=1,2,3,4 \\
\end{array}\right 
\end{eqnarray}
Having an estimation of the channel phases, the rest of the proposed
method is given by estimating $\alpha^{s}_m$ as follows:
\begin{equation}
\label{tt4}
\alpha^{s}_m=\mbox{sign}\left\{\mbox{real}\left\{\sum\limits_{n=1}^{N}
q^s_m(n)e^{-j\hat{\phi}^s_m}p_m(n)\right\}\right\},
\end{equation}
where
\begin{equation} \label{tt5}
q^{s}_{m}(n)=r(n)-\sum\limits_{m^{'}=1,m^{'}\ne
m}^{M}w^{s}_{m^{'}}(N)\alpha^{(s-1)}_{m^{'}} p_{m^{'}}(n) 
\end{equation}
The inputs of the first stage $\{\alpha^{0}_m\}_{m=1}^M$ (needed for
computing $X^1(n)$) are given by
\begin{equation}
\label{qte5}
\alpha^{0}_m=\mbox{sign}\left\{\mbox{real}\left\{\sum\limits_{n=1}^{N}
r(n)e^{-j\hat{\phi}^0_m}p_m(n)\right\}\right\}
Context 3: Brooksley Elizabeth Born (born August 27, 1940) is an American attorney and former public official who, from August 26, 1996, to June 1, 1999, was chair of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), the federal agency which oversees the U S  futures and commodity options markets  During her tenure on the CFTC, Born lobbied Congress and the President to give the CFTC oversight of off-exchange markets for derivatives, in addition to its role with respect to exchange-traded derivatives, but her warnings were ignored or dismissed, and her calls for reform resisted by other regulators <ref name="nytimes">Goodman, Peter S  The Reckoning - Taking Hard New Look at a Greenspan Legacy, The New York Times, October 9, 2008 </ref> Born resigned as chairperson on June 1, 1999, shortly after Congress passed legislation prohibiting her agency from regulating derivatives 

Early life and education
Born graduated from Abraham Lincoln High School (San Francisco, California) at the age of 16  She then attended Stanford University, where she majored in English and was graduated with the class of 1961   She initially wanted to become a doctor, but a guidance counsellor at Stanford advised her against medicine, so she majored in English literature instead 

She then attended Stanford Law School, one of only seven women in her class   She was the first female student ever to be named president of the Stanford Law Review  She received the "Outstanding Senior" award and graduated as valedictorian of the class of 1964 

Legal career
Immediately after law school Born was selected as a law clerk to judge Henry Edgerton of the U S  Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit  It was during this time that she met her first husband, Jacob C  Landau, who was a journalist covering the Federal courts at the time  Following her clerkship, she became an associate at the Washington, D C -based international law firm of Arnold & Porter  Born was attracted to Arnold & Porter because it was one of the few major law firms to have a woman partner at that time, Carolyn Agger, who was the head of the tax practice  Born took a two-year leave of absence from Arnold & Porter to accompany her first husband to Boston, where he had received a fellowship  During that time she worked as a research assistant to law professor Alan Dershowitz 

Born's early career at Arnold & Porter focused on international trade law, in which she represented a number of Swiss industries and the government of Switzerland  She developed a practice representing clients in numerous complex litigation and arbitration cases involving financial market transactions  Among her high-profile cases was the matter of the Hunt Brothers attempt to corner the market in silver in the 1970s  She made partner at Arnold & Porter, after moving to a three-day schedule to help raise her second child, and eventually rose to be the head of the firm's derivatives practice 

Born was among the first female attorneys to systematically address inequities regarding how the laws treated women  Born and another female lawyer, Marna Tucker, taught what is considered to have been the first "Women and the Law" course at Catholic University’s Columbus School of Law  The class exclusively concerned prejudicial treatment of women under the laws of the United States, past and present   Born and Tucker were surprised to discover that there was no textbook on the issue at the time   Born is also one of the co-founders of the National Women's Law Center  Born also helped rewrite the American Bar Association rules to make it possible for more women and minorities to sit on federal bench 

During her long legal career, and into her retirement, Born did much pro bono and other types of volunteer work



ground_truth: Quill harmed states more than anticipated due to the Internet.

prompt_front: Now, answer the following question based on the text below, only give me the answer and do not output any other words.

Question: What algorithm is engaged in the PLMS-PPIC method?

Read the following text and answer briefly.

Context 2: 
\end{equation}
Assuming $\phi_m\in R_i$, then
\begin{equation}
\label{qqpp} \hat{\phi}^0_m =\frac{(i-1)\pi+i\pi}{4} 
\end{equation}
Table \ref{tab4} shows the structure of the modified PLMS-PPIC
method  It is to be notified that
\begin{itemize}
\item Equation (\ref{qte5}) shows the conventional bit detection
method when the receiver only knows the quarter of channel phase in
$(0,2\pi)$  \item With $L=1$ (i e  only one NLMS algorithm), the
modified PLMS-PPIC can be thought as a modified version of the
LMS-PPIC method 
\end{itemize}

In the following section some examples are given to illustrate the
effectiveness of the proposed method 

\section{Simulations}\label{S5}

In this section we have considered some simulation examples 
Examples \ref{ex2}-\ref{ex4} compare the conventional, the modified
LMS-PPIC and the modified PLMS-PPIC methods in three cases: balanced
channels, unbalanced channels and time varying channels  In all
examples, the receivers have only the quarter of each channel phase 
Example \ref{ex2} is given to compare the modified LMS-PPIC and the
PLMS-PPIC in the case of balanced channels 

\begin{example}{\it Balanced channels}:
\label{ex2}
\begin{table}
\caption{Channel phase estimate of the first user (example
\ref{ex2})} \label{tabex5} \centerline{{
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
\multirow{6}{*}{\rotatebox{90}{$\phi_m=\frac{3\pi}{8},M=15~~$}} & N(Iteration) & Stage Number& NLMS & PNLMS  \\
&&&&\\
\cline{2-5} & \multirow{2}{*}{64}& s = 2 &  $\hat{\phi}^s_m=\frac{3 24\pi}{8}$ & $\hat{\phi}^s_m=\frac{3 18\pi}{8}$ \\
\cline{3-5} & & s = 3 & $\hat{\phi}^s_m=\frac{3 24\pi}{8}$ & $\hat{\phi}^s_m=\frac{3 18\pi}{8}$ \\
\cline{2-5} & \multirow{2}{*}{256}& s = 2 &  $\hat{\phi}^s_m=\frac{2 85\pi}{8}$ & $\hat{\phi}^s_m=\frac{2 88\pi}{8}$ \\
\cline{3-5} & & s = 3 & $\hat{\phi}^s_m=\frac{2 85\pi}{8}$ & $\hat{\phi}^s_m=\frac{2 88\pi}{8}$ \\
\cline{2-5} \hline
\end{tabular} }}
\end{table}
Consider the system model (\ref{e7}) in which $M$ users
synchronously send their bits to the receiver through their
channels  It is assumed that each user's information consists of
codes of length $N$  It is also assumd that the signal to noise
ratio (SNR) is 0dB  In this example there is no power-unbalanced or
channel loss is assumed  The step-size of the NLMS algorithm in
modified LMS-PPIC method is $\mu=0 1(1-\sqrt{\frac{M-1}{M}})$ and
the set of step-sizes of the parallel NLMS algorithms in modified
PLMS-PPIC method are
$\Theta=\{0 01,0 05,0 1,0 2,\cdots,1\}(1-\sqrt{\frac{M-1}{M}})$,
i e  $\mu_1=0 01(1-\sqrt{\frac{M-1}{M}}),\cdots,
\mu_4=0 2(1-\sqrt{\frac{M-1}{M}}),\cdots,
\mu_{12}=(1-\sqrt{\frac{M-1}{M}})$  Figure~\ref{Figexp1NonCoh}
illustrates the bit error rate (BER) for the case of two stages and
for $N=64$ and $N=256$  Simulations also show that there is no
remarkable difference between results in two stage and three stage
scenarios  Table~\ref{tabex5} compares the average channel phase
estimate of the first user in each stage and over $10$ runs of
modified LMS-PPIC and PLMS-PPIC, when the the number of users is
$M=15$ 
\end{example}

Although LMS-PPIC and PLMS-PPIC, as well as their modified versions,
are structured based on the assumption of no near-far problem
(examples \ref{ex3} and \ref{ex4}), these methods and especially the
second one have remarkable performance in the cases of unbalanced
and/or time varying channels 

\begin{example}{\it Unbalanced channels}:
\label{ex3}
\begin{table}
\caption{Channel phase estimate of the first user (example
\ref{ex3})} \label{tabex6} \centerline{{
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
\multirow{6}{*}{\rotatebox{90}{$\phi_m=\frac{3\pi}{8},M=15~~$}} & N(Iteration) & Stage Number& NLMS & PNLMS  \\
&&&&\\
\cline{2-5} & \multirow{2}{*}{64}& s=2 &  $\hat{\phi}^s_m=\frac{2 45\pi}{8}$ & $\hat{\phi}^s_m=\frac{2 36\pi}{8}$ \\
\cline{3-5} & & s=3 & $\hat{\phi}^s_m=\frac{2 71\pi}{8}$ & $\hat{\phi}^s_m=\frac{2 80\pi}{8}$ \\
\cline{2-5} & \multirow{2}{*}{256}& s=2 &  $\hat{\phi}^s_m=\frac{3 09\pi}{8}$ & $\hat{\phi}^s_m=\frac{2 86\pi}{8}$ \\
\cline{3-5} & & s=3 & $\hat{\phi}^s_m=\frac{2 93\pi}{8}$ & $\hat{\phi}^s_m=\frac{3 01\pi}{8}$ \\
\cline{2-5} \hline
\end{tabular} }}
\end{table}
Consider example \ref{ex2} with power unbalanced and/or channel loss
in transmission system, i e  the true model at stage $s$ is
\begin{equation}
\label{ve7} r(n)=\sum\limits_{m=1}^{M}\beta_m
w^s_m\alpha^{(s-1)}_m c_m(n)+v(n),
\end{equation}
where $0<\beta_m\leq 1$ for all $1\leq m \leq M$  Both the LMS-PPIC
and the PLMS-PPIC methods assume the model (\ref{e7}), and their
estimations are based on observations $\{r(n),X^s(n)\}$, instead of
$\{r(n),\mathbf{G}X^s(n)\}$, where the channel gain matrix is
$\mathbf{G}=\mbox{diag}(\beta_1,\beta_2,\cdots,\beta_m)$  In this
case we repeat example \ref{ex2}  We randomly get each element of
$G$ from $[0,0 3]$  Figure~\ref{Figexp2NonCoh} illustrates the BER
versus the number of users  Table~\ref{tabex6} compares the channel
phase estimate of the first user in each stage and over $10$ runs of
modified LMS-PPIC and modified PLMS-PPIC for $M=15$ 
\end{example}

\begin{example}
\label{ex4} {\it Time varying channels}: Consider example \ref{ex2}
with time varying Rayleigh fading channels  In this case we assume
the maximum Doppler shift of $40$HZ, the three-tap
frequency-selective channel with delay vector of $\{2\times
10^{-6},2 5\times 10^{-6},3\times 10^{-6}\}$sec and gain vector of
$\{-5,-3,-10\}$dB  Figure~\ref{Figexp3NonCoh} shows the average BER
over all users versus $M$ and using two stages 
\end{example}


\section{Conclusion}\label{S6}

In this paper, parallel interference cancelation using adaptive
multistage structure and employing a set of NLMS algorithms with
different step-sizes is proposed, when just the quarter of the
channel phase of each user is known  In fact, the algorithm has been
proposed for coherent transmission with full information on channel
phases in \cite{cohpaper}  This paper is a modification on the
previously proposed algorithm  Simulation results show that the new
method has a remarkable performance for different scenarios
including Rayleigh fading channels even if the channel is
unbalanced 


Context 3:  She was active in the American Bar Association, the largest professional organization of lawyers in the United States   Initially Born was named a member of the governing council of the ABA's Individual Rights Section, eventually becoming chairperson   Born and Tucker founded the ABA Women's Caucus, the first organization of female lawyers in the ABA   She held several other senior positions in the ABA, including being named the first woman member of the ABA's Standing Committee on the Federal Judiciary   As a member of the Judiciary Committee, Born provided testimony and opinion on persons nominated for federal judgeships  In 1980 she was named chair of the committee   As chair of the committee, Born was invited to address the U S  Congress regarding the nomination of Judge Sandra Day O'Connor to the U S  Supreme Court 

In 1993, Born's name was floated as a possible candidate for Attorney General of the United States, but Janet Reno was nominated 

In July 2009, Nancy Pelosi appointed Brooksley Born as a commissioner to the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC) 

Born and the OTC derivatives market
Born was appointed to the CFTC on April 15, 1994, by President Bill Clinton  Due to litigation against Bankers Trust Company by Procter and Gamble and other corporate clients, Born and her team at the CFTC sought comments on the regulation of over-the-counter derivatives, a first step in the process of writing CFTC regulations to supplement the existing regulations of the Federal Reserve System,  the Options Clearing Corporation, and the National Association of Insurance Commissioners  Born was particularly concerned about swaps, financial instruments that are traded over the counter between banks, insurance companies or other funds or companies, and thus have no transparency except to the two counterparties and the counterparties' regulators, if any   CFTC regulation was strenuously opposed by Federal Reserve chairman Alan Greenspan, and by Treasury Secretaries Robert Rubin and Lawrence Summers  On May 7, 1998, former SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt joined Rubin and Greenspan in objecting to the issuance of the CFTC's concept release  Their response dismissed Born's analysis and focused on the hypothetical possibility that CFTC regulation of swaps and other OTC derivative instruments could create a "legal uncertainty" regarding such financial instruments,  hypothetically reducing the value of the instruments  They argued that the imposition of regulatory costs would "stifle financial innovation" and encourage financial capital to transfer its  transactions offshore  The disagreement between Born and the Executive Office's top economic policy advisors has been described not only as a classic Washington turf war, but also a war of ideologies,  insofar as it is possible to argue that Born's actions were consistent with Keynesian and neoclassical economics while Greenspan, Rubin, Levitt, and Summers consistently espoused neoliberal, and neoconservative policies 

In 1998, a trillion-dollar hedge fund called Long Term Capital Management (LTCM) was near collapse   Using mathematical models to calculate debt risk, LTCM used derivatives to leverage $5 billion into more than $1 trillion, doing business with fifteen of Wall Street's largest financial institutions   The derivative transactions were not regulated, nor were investors able to evaluate LTCM's exposures   Born stated, "I thought that LTCM was exactly what I had been worried about"   In the last weekend of September 1998, the President's working group was told that the entire American economy hung in the balance   After intervention by the Federal Reserve, the crisis was averted   In congressional hearings into the crisis, Greenspan acknowledged that language had been introduced into an agriculture bill that would prevent CFTC from regulating the derivatives which were at the center of the crisis that threatened the US economy   U S  Representative Maurice Hinchey (D-NY) asked "How many more failures do you think we'd have to have before some regulation in this area might be appropriate?"  In response, Greenspan brushed aside the substance of Born's warnings with the simple assertion that "the degree of supervision of regulation of the over-the-counter derivatives market is quite adequate to maintain a degree of stability in the system"  Born's warning was that there wasn't any regulation of them   Born's chief of staff, Michael Greenberger summed up Greenspan's position this way: "Greenspan didn't believe that fraud was something that needed to be enforced, and he assumed she probably did  And of course, she did "  Under heavy pressure from the financial lobby, legislation prohibiting regulation of derivatives by Born's agency was passed by the Congress



ground_truth: The normalized least mean square (NLMS) algorithm.

prompt_front: Now, answer the following question based on the text below, only give me the answer and do not output any other words.

Question: What award did Brooksley Born receive in 2009?

Read the following text and answer briefly.

Context 3:   Born resigned on June 1, 1999 

The derivatives market continued to grow yearly throughout both terms of George W  Bush's administration  On September 15, 2008, the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers forced a broad recognition of a financial crisis in both the US and world capital markets   As Lehman Brothers' failure temporarily reduced financial capital's confidence, a number of newspaper articles and television programs suggested that the failure's possible causes included the conflict between the CFTC and the other regulators Faiola, Anthony, Nakashima, Ellen and Drew, Jill  The Crash: Risk and Regulation - What Went Wrong, The Washington Post, October 15, 2008 

Born declined to publicly comment on the unfolding 2008 crisis until March 2009, when she said: "The market grew so enormously, with so little oversight and regulation, that it made the financial crisis much deeper and more pervasive than it otherwise would have been " She also lamented the influence of Wall Street lobbyists on the process and the refusal of regulators to discuss even modest reforms 

An October 2009 Frontline documentary titled "The Warning"  described Born's thwarted efforts to regulate and bring transparency to the derivatives market, and the continuing opposition thereto  The program concluded with an excerpted interview with Born sounding another warning: "I think we will have continuing danger from these markets and that we will have repeats of the financial crisis -- may differ in details but there will be significant financial downturns and disasters attributed to this regulatory gap, over and over, until we learn from experience "

In 2009 Born, along with Sheila Bair of the FDIC, was awarded the John F  Kennedy Profiles in Courage Award in recognition of the "political courage she demonstrated in sounding early warnings about conditions that contributed" to the 2007-08 financial crisis   According to Caroline Kennedy, "Brooksley Born recognized that the financial security of all Americans was being put at risk by the greed, negligence and opposition of  powerful and well connected interests     The catastrophic financial events of recent months have  proved them [Born and Sheila Bair] right "  One member of the President's working group had a change of heart about Brooksley Born   SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt stated "I've come to know her as one of the most capable, dedicated, intelligent and committed public servants that I have ever come to know", adding that "I could have done much better  I could have made a difference" in response to her warnings 

In 2010, a documentary film Inside Job further alleged that derivatives regulation was ineffective from the Clinton administration on  Along with fellow whistleblower, former IMF Chief Economist Raghuram Rajan, who was also scorned by the economic establishment, Brooksley Born was cited as one of the authorities arguing that financial derivatives increase economic risk 

 Personal life 
Born is married to Alexander E  Bennett (also retired from Arnold & Porter)   She has five adult children - two from a previous marriage to Jacob Landau and three stepchildren  Notably, Born was named a partner at Arnold & Porter while working part-time so she could raise her two young children   When both of her children were school-age, Born returned to practice full-time 

References

External links
Attorney profile at Arnold & Porter
Brooksley Born (2009 Winner) of the Profiles in Courage Award, with acceptance speech transcript and NECN video

Profile at MarketsWiki
Speeches and statements
"Testimony Of Brooksley Born Chairperson of the CFTC Concerning The Over-The-Counter Derivatives Market", before the House Committee On Banking And Financial Services, July 24, 1998 
"The Lessons of Long Term Capital Management L P ", Remarks of Brooksley Born, Chairperson of the CFTC, Chicago-Kent-IIT Commodities Law Institute, Chicago, Illinois, October 15, 1998 
 Interview: Brooksley Born for "PBS Frontline: The Warning", PBS, (streaming VIDEO 1 hour), October 20, 2009 
Articles
Manuel Roig-Franzia  "Credit Crisis Cassandra:Brooksley Born's Unheeded Warning Is a Rueful Echo 10 Years On", The Washington Post, May 26, 2009
 Taibbi, Matt  "The Great American Bubble Machine", Rolling Stone'', July 9–23, 2009

1940 births
American women lawyers
Arnold & Porter people
Clinton administration personnel
Columbus School of Law faculty
Commodity Futures Trading Commission personnel
Heads of United States federal agencies
Lawyers from San Francisco
Living people
Stanford Law School alumni
21st-century American women
Stanford University alumni



ground_truth: In 2009, Brooksley Born received the John F. Kennedy Profiles in Courage Award.