[PAGE 1]
Bley broadeasts a “eonfession"

ashed Brains of POW's: Can They Be Rewashed?

These Chiuese clharaeters stand far ksé-nao-pronouneed somethting lke "he now." They mean "braiuiwash." The Chinese coiuedl the word to connote the foreible purging of "unclean" ideas from a man's miad so tirat new ones may be forcibly zub-tituted. But the technique of brain-wasung pas p • washing was perfeeted in the Soviet Cuion. and has n userl to coutrol the thoughts of the people in every Iron ttain county. The American and other Cnited Nations prisonwho were exchanged at Pannnunjom provided a new and firstid insight into how the Reds wash brains.

the Westem world, hsi-neo seems tie. But inteiligence eiäcers in Koere staunping "No Interviews" on lentifeation cards of some homeg American POWs. Ali GI exwers, even after being lown to . were kept under wraps in two hospitals. Visitors reeded two dif-: passes to enter their wards. The .Korean Covernmnent plaaned to xehanged FOK prisonets through onths ot re-edueation witlcut scciug itug to their families.

e reson: the minds of sore of the N's, like the hapless citizens of lin-contiolled countries. had been d by Comrnniat brairwashing. , how the Red teehaique works:

ufesstons aud Coltapse: Eraining statts widh u group-the workers e shop. à clas ci students.a single aer compound-which merts for sevhours each day. Trained "thought mers" coarpel each memter to con-

every past exnerience. every zht, whuch was not "demoeratie." ie leader snd the rest oí the group exeh political fzult and eritiit. No detail is too minor: Does he somy for his ruinousiy taxed farmerats? The "Peopie" are bis true parn:1

ater the initiate must coníess ali over a, stressíag his sins aod espliining proper attítutes hinself. Again he is zized. Agaia he repents and explains. so it goes, meeting alter meeting. In saine way, group members must loaded leetures ("Why Did riea lnvade Korea?") and then disthem "eorreetly." They must make eal "progress regouts" on their friends" rehts, as well as their owa. 112

henever souneone slips ou the paty . he is instaatiy corrcted. He nust nt anì revise sonne mone-untii hé a questio an the subicet, almost laaically, bings a Laudtiessly Com sist answer to ias mind. …

his gradual brainwah continues for lang periods. But for those who resist, or for special cuses who must be dealt with quiekly, there is a niore drustie technique. It invnlves straining the brain of the victim so crueliy that he literally retains no real thoughts of his own and williugly adonts the ideas of his captors.

Viclent physical torture is not generally used. Instend, the subjeet is allowed liatle slcep and weakened by huager, thitst, and despair. Night atter night he is yanked from ftful res: to a dark reon to stand motioniess in a painful position. A brilliant light beats at his ey es. Hour after hour, teams oi speciuists interrogate bim, deny his every enswer, produce "prouf of every "lie." din their ewn stery into his ears. The Central inteiligence Agency thinks some drug c: "ue serum" may possibly be used to speed up his cotlapse.

After one week of this routine in Rea China, for instance, a devoted Catholie missionary. the Rev. Rebert W. Creene (Nswswezx, April 13), feuad that "my mind was ineapable uí reêzction." He even doubted that he was realy a priest, and dreamily wondered if the ineredible charges agains: him ware true. The coinplete process tuikes about three months. By then the prisoner is ready to stand in open court, as Cardinal Mindszenty dil ín fiungay, and comnfes to ctimnes tht could nnt have bappened. Aud he wil believe that he is tetling the tuth.

Number Oue Boys': Al of thee metheds, returted Amnetican pausougrs testifed last week, were used in, t e POW eamps in Nurth Kurea. Prisoners had up to ten hours of ckasses a dsp. They had to make "progress repots." They were told: "You will be puanii if you do not learn your lessous." Ti.e main lesson, according to Sgt. Ode Lawley, was: "The United States started the whele war. Al they cuuld ttlk about was Gereral MacArthur and Presitet: Trumap. They eadled them warniongers.

For willing pupils. called "numnber ca.e boys" by the rest, there were rewardcigarettes. better teod. and even unguarded billets cutside the stockade. anl girls. For "inalicious elemnents.", there were hard-labor "reaetionary camps" and threzts of uneomfoitable cages as muaihment for active tesistance. Possibly for these reasons, rather than out of couvie. tioa, a few prisozers "wrote some pieay bad stus" for Communist magazines: C ers "presched just like the Chinese."

A saail number evidently underwent conceotrated baainrashing. Some went on propaganda tours of the Soviet suteilites, giving party-line "interviews" to te Red press. Others, like Col. Frauk H. Schwabie and Maj. Roy R. Bley. Ametican Marine airen, made public "confe sions" of having waged bacteriologital warfare. Major Bley was qnoted by tie Reds es arimitting that his o "drovped germ bombs" and that he personally handled "genn-bomb sunoke."

I Laughed': South Kerean audhertes believe inany freed ROK soitiers have been deeply influenced. But for the majority of Western prisoners. at lcast. the indoctrintien pregran was apparently crude and jueifective, and it vas speedily dropped in several canips. Most reacted like Navy Hospital Corpsran Thomas H. Waddii! of Fort Worth. Texas: "I just laughed at thenn."

How setiously the few who di! :ot laugh were alfeeted is not yet elear. Oure ofeial in the Far East confidcntiy asserts: "There's nothing to this brainwashing that a good steak and an icecream cone won't cure." The Peutg :n. which hopes so. decided hast weei: to jift the seeurity cover frn all ex-prisotets when they reach the United States. Ry then, it lelt, any "coufusion" in their minds shoukd have been dispelled.

But if the free envirounsent des st elear up the symptoms of hsí-não, corretive treatment-ewashing the lreainmay take a lng time. The Arnny s never lad to face the probleun beture.

[PAGE 2]
VICE ADMIRAL C. TURNER JOY: It's More Than Korea

Viee Admiral C. Tumer Joy, now Superintendent of the U.S. Nasal Aeademy at Amuapolis, wateled every twist of Conuninnist maneuvering as seuior U.N. deiegate to the truce talks from July 1951 unti May 1952. As the Panmmmnjonn tadks resunied, A. T. Hadiey of Newsweek's Washington bureau interviewed Aduniral Joy for his expert slant on the Reds' motives and the prospects for peace.

Why do vou helieve the Chinese and North Koreau Communists decided to reapen the stalled Korean truce talks at this time? Do you think they did this of their pwn volition or as part of an over-alł plan laid down by the Kremlin?

In daling with the Comununists it is ille, not to sav foolish, even for a Cammuuist, to pretend omniseicnce. If I were to guess, I wouid say that the Comumuuists no longer see any advantage to thernseives in playing a waiting game. I think it mus: te elear to thein by now that we are zot going to be vietims of eur own impatience.

Abo, I think it may be a matter of disappoiut cent to them that the change in our natioual administration has not resulted in eay ehange in our nationai attitue toward Korea and, in faet, has resulted only in a reaflrnaton of the validlity of our purpose.

In short, thev have failed to uueoyer any adlvantage in stalliag and are now reals to také their clances on a more denamnie approach. hoping to engineer us into awkward situatíons and to emploit aay mistakes we might make. As for where the idea of resuming the talks arizinated, I do not know, but 1 do aut believe it would ever have beeu acted on without the approval of the Kie:nlín.

Do you think that the Communist invasion of the Kingdor of Laos in Indo-China has any conoection with the truce talks? Is it probable that the Reis are using dhe talks as a shiell for further aggresion in Indo-China?

H we take the tealistie view that we are coudonted by an enciny whose annouuced cljeetive is workd domainaton and that we are in the midkdle uf a war that is fought aronnd the globhe on muiy frauts in many ways, we are ant lkely to regaut an event like the invasion of Laos as heíng unreltted to the over-dl pattrru. On the coutrary, we wll see it as a coufmation of what we know the pattern to be.

It is a mistake to cousider the invasíon of Laus aud the resumption of the huce taßks as isolated fron each other. In the sane breath, 1 wonld say that a great many thinking people mnst be geminely concerned that the net effeet of an eventual trce in Korea would be to create an illusion that the global war is over.

It should be remembered that Ko-

rea is only a phase, though the "most painful phase." of a war that is fought around the globe.

Were you surprised at the. stories of maltrcatiment toid by some of the returuing prisoners of war? What do you think the Reds jope to gain from the exchange of sick and wounded POWs? And do you anticipate that many of our soldiers will have been brainwashed?

1 would have been a lot more surprised il our returning prisoners had not bought back sories cf maltreatment. Oí course, the Connnunists are pot above treating smalł numbers of out prisoners well for propagandi pur. poses. 1 thánk the Conmunist decision to aceept onr propasal on the exehauge of sick and wounled was an alterthought to their decisiou to roquest a resunnption of the tlhs.

The gxchange did not cost them anythäing and served the usefi puurpose of ereating a favorable atinosphere tor the resummptioa of the gaiks. As for brainwashing, il there has been any, the most elicctive antidote will be a breath of free aic aud the sight of home.

How ean we best condueł {urther negotiations with the Communists in Korea? Are there any particular pitfalls the U.S. shouid be wary of in the negutiations?

I have not been involved with the negotiations fer nearly :a ye.ir now and am not conversant with current detailed exchánges. Hence, I aa tot in a position to point out specihe pttalls the Communists are aluravs devising new ones. The impottant nz in negotiating with the Conuuists is to know what you want ad why, and then go after it with patience and unmistakable Srmness. lt isa't complieated; it's just difcuit. .

Of course, by far the besi way to negotiate with the Commuuist in a military situation is to apply suecient military power to give empinasis and meaning to your argurients.

What do you think of the chances for a truce settiemeu now? Do you think that the Conmunists are ready to compromice on foreible repatriation?

There is good reason to beiirve the Communists may want an armistice. Basically, they want to get us of the Korean peninsula. They haveo't been able to drive us of the poninsni. and I believe they see their best hope of doing so through an arnistice ad! the political conference to folion it. You will remember that one topic they insist be taken up at that politieal conferenee is the withdrawal ot ali foreigu forees froumn Korea.

If the Commmunists fnd a way to save face on the prisoner-repattina issue. I belicse we may see au end to the fighting, However, 1 lop no one is so naíve as to belíese that n arnis. tire will be the nagie sulntio ant te end to our probkems in Kauea, let alone de Far East or the waid,

E KOELAN WAR-

38

Nensck, Ma 1. 1"3