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1. Between 10:20 and 11:45 AM, 12 February 1952, the writer engaged in a long, involved, and somewhat heated discussion concerning "Artichoke" and related matters with

2. In general, it may be stated that akarguments were that the Agency was doing nothing along "Artichoke" lines and that it was time for. the Agency to make up its mind whether or not an extensive program for "Artichoke" should be put in effect or whether the general idea should be aholished. While not directly critical of I&Sogteuu in the opinion of the writer, made it perfoctly clear that he regarded the general viewpoint of I&Scsancszas more or less of a stumbling block, or at least a"block, in the way of "Artichoke" work.

Showed the writer a long document which apparently was merely a proposal for extensive "Artichoke" Work hoth here and abroad and involved the outlay of approximatelyre x This plan more or less provided for the establishment of a laboratory in the United States (somewhere locally) and a large working area overseas.

1) OSI would recruit or have already been promised medical men, and scientists, etc. who would be availatle for the application.of the latest possible techniques of all types to overseas subjects.

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2) These technicians would be trained and produced hy rarious agencies in.the lnited.States.suich as Azaahas recentiy resienedl: and otber.agencies, possibly including at

3) These men would be a sort of super-expert, con-. bining psychiatry,-psycholosy, and medical knowledge and would tackle the subjects in the field.

L)The subiects would be primarily individuals or individuals whom the Agency wisifed

STÁNGATO PORN HO. IL

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE: 12 February 1952

Conversation betweer on 12 February 1952.

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to do away with.
specificaliy that there were
or all types where plenty of sunject material could be had.

5) The very latest "ideas" would be used including electroshock, lysergic acid, drugs, electroencephalograph, hypnosis, etc., etc.

6) The old."Dluebird" idea of an interrogation team would, of course, be dons away with since. these experts could administer the drugs, carry on interrogation, and handle the whole work themselves, apparently on an individual basis.

plan indicated that there would have to be a co-ordinator, a sort of combination doctor, businessman, and administrator, who would he the overall director of the Project and, apparently, there would be two permanent staffs, one here F and one inte These staffs wonld be fairly large and would include at least one GS-l5, one GS-ll, and one GS-13 and, it is believed, about four other employees at Grades 1l, 9, 5, and u, etc. The plan also indicated that these positions would be interchangeable between here and the field.

8) This plan also, as stated above, called for the establishment of some sort of latoratory here in the United States, hut details of the type of laboratory were not fully set out nor was the basic reason for such a laboratory explained.

5. seemed unusually interosted in and was apparentiy quite impressed with the theories ocsarp
electroshock treatment zmweesg has advanced in this connection. efficacious and lelt the electroshock was more advantageous.
as continuing to work on a sort of polygraph device that. couiu cs used in large-scale screening projects to determnine whether or not there were individuals who might be of interest to us. He particularly stressed the "scuealer" device that could be operated very simply by showing an incividual pictures which would in turn create physiological reacticns which would produce the squealing sound. when pressed for specific information as to whether

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or not the elctroshock treatment had heen used to ohtain information from individuals ,rgtated that it. had heen used, but not extensively and he also admitted that, it had been used in cases involving people not attempting to conceal information. He stated that this was one of the tdeas for the large-scale project -- that this electroshock technique could be tried out more successfully overseas.

6. also mentioned the possible usage of the pre-frontal lobotomy and stated that he thought this technique could be applied to individuals the Agency was ngt longer concerned with in the overseas areas on an experimental basis.

of no particular importance in the matter of interrogation and stated that any psychiatrist or clinically trained psychologist could obtain the answers since they specialized in this anyway. aseemed to helieve that the psychiatrist or doctor would be all that would be necessary in applying the medical techniques, handling the questions, etc., etc. He stated that the case officer and interpreter could assist but that the technical expert or psychiatrist would be sufficient to handle the entire job.

he had taiked to were not impressed by the uso of drugs in this type of work, but admitted that other techniques were not and could not be readily made available. He constantly referred to the fact that that was the idea of the program-- to take every technique overseas and try it in these cases. ssstated emphaticellythat no matter who was assigned to the "Artichoke" work frotrgrs staff, that srrs answer would he an emphatic "no" in regards to the whole situation. He spoke somewhat critically ofso aud stated that he had no background for this type.of work. lie stated that there were plenty of voung,medical officers at other places who knew more about this. than saeend his entire staff.

trainees for this type of work furnished us. The writer toltwar that there had been several trainees but at the prosent time there was no one attached to this office as a trainee. rwas critical of the fact that Personnel and recruiting people had failed to turn up people to be tràined along these lines and further stated that the Agency could. never produce individuals either medical men or sciontist,s who would be willing to work along these lines and that he had alrsady been promised, as stated ahove, a'number of individuals who yculd be technically trained and could be used in thase projects. asked the writer whether or not we had any case in which we nad immediate interest and the writer stated that there were none to his knowladge as of the present date. He stated that he shouid be informed

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about all casen and the writer told him ther? were no cases comtemplated in the future except the one that was to have heen handled in November and the writer informed him that it was merely under consideration and further activity along this line was not known to the writer spectflcally. eyas critical of the lack of cases heing furnished by the operative divisions in this conneetion.

10 asked the writer if he was aware of the
fact tha xhad studied or done work along hypnotic and/
or drug lines düring The writer toeme he was quite
aware of the fact that urrrnad particinatec io hvonotic experiments
but was not avare of aiy extensive researcigtsoad done along these
lines. esdid not furnish any reports in this connection to the
writerend sge has never briefed the writer fully on the activities of Sawee although for a year the writer has beer urging soneonn to talk withd eeu out toss thatrrewas not regarded as a top authority on hypnosis,
arsssrastated that most of the men (specialists in hypnosis) would not touch this type of work if they knew it would be "tainted", but he felt that sra. could be prevailed upon to do it.

ll. As a general rule, it would appear to the writer that was apparently disturbed by an overall lack of progress on the "Artichoke" work. The writer assured him that Security helieves in largescale progressive and intelligent research, but that a security problem was a strong factor in any large-scale project, particularly overseas. It is the writer's opinion that gdoes not understand the fact that irrespective of extensive research and theoretical ideas, nons of the "new" techniques or "new" drugs could possihly be used against given cases at the present time. The writer attempted to make it clcar to pmsasehat right now, on very short notice, this oflice could assemble a tean and attack any one given case. The writer admitted that whether or not the operation would he successful was unknown, although a fair . chance of success would appear to be present. The writer made none and has made no glowing claims for the drug-irypnosis technique, hut pointed out teecrsrhat there was a lot of difference in being able to attack a-case immediately in fact or trying some undeveloped attack on a case with possible disastrous results.

12. For a matter of record,. the writer wishes to point out that in many ways he is in complete agreement withes insolar as extensive research and actual case work is.seaessary to solve the problem. The writer does not agrée with hat unless vast research is carried on, the project should be anandoned. The writer feels that at all times, the Agency, somewhere in its ramifications, should have team of individuals capable on short notice of apnlying the "Artichoke" technigue to specific cases since it may well be that at any given moment a supreme effort might have to be made to break a vital case. The writer

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agrees witheathat as a matter: of policy, the Agency should Co ahead and sponsor, pay for, initiate and assist large-scale research along "Artichoke" lines. The writer, however, is not at all impressed with talk of new techniques and new drugs and what wonders would be accomplished by psychiatrists, M.D.s, scientists, etc., etc. Furthermore, the writer does not understand why electroshock treatment or techniques using lysergic acid should be regarded as superior by anyone as compared with the more familiar amytal and pentothal, etc. While not totally successful, amytal, pentothal, etc. have af least been used with some auccess in the United States and elsewhere and'electroshock, lysergic treatments,etc. at present are little more than theories only. The writer toldlasrtathat he personally supoorted the idea ofextensive researchi-in this matter and that he along with h senad agreed that overseas work along these lines was essential to develop the techniques.

that there were many security problems involved in the laying on of extensive overscas operations. The writer also pointed out to Shat objections, of course, would be raised to certain things, not only by Security, but more emphatically bre and tand that the laying on of extensive projects such as might be desirous would call for,extensive planning and considerable preparation in advance.g ass stated that he had proposed these ideas six months ago anc if they had been carried out as he suggested that all work would have been operational today in the field. He stated that in his opinion, this could not be operational for at lcast six more months even if the work was able to start tomorrow.

lu. In concluding the discussion,raadmitted that the writer did see eyc to eye with him on many questions and although the writer attempted to make it very cloar to him that policy was not his business, he is certain that this point is not clearly understood by

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Vulnerability of U.S. to unconventional attack Consultant to OSI

Knock ofr key people. How knock off key guys Project. (0:S.S.) NaturalCauses

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Query--ghould facts on he dug up? Are they of interest tos Probably yes. At any rate, wo need know enough more about it to decida how much interast we have in it.

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Above data given toehby

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