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JOINT HEARING BEFORE THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON HEALTH AND SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH OF THE COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RESOURCES UNITED STATES SENATE NINETY-FIFTHI CONGRESS FIRST SESSION

AUGUST 3. 1977

Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Intelligence and Committer on Human Resourres

9640611

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE WASHINGTON : 197T

Fur sal. by ih Superiatendent of Iucmments. t.s Goverupmeni Printipg Omce Stock N. 052 071-04357-1

PROJECT MKULTRA, THE CIA'S PROGRAM OF RESEARCH IN BEHAVIORAL MODIFICATION

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SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

(Estntüshri by 8. Res. 4c(. a4th Cong. 2) sess.)

DANI. K. INU}TE. Hawaii, Chaim» BARlY GoLisWATER. Ariypb. Tier Choirmo»

BCH BAYH. Indiana
ADLA}1SHVJSON, p
WILLLAY HATHAWA). Mit
WAlTER 1, HUDblESTDN homeky
JsPH R. HN. JH. laRar
koOURT MoNN. NortCaroh
GARRAT,!
JANH1 PATRCK MONHAN. XWYOTA
CLIrfokD P CAsE, New Jersey
JAkE GiARN, Utah
CHAELI. MeC. MATHHAS. Ja.. MarIand
JAMLS B. PEARSON. KaESaS
JoIINRCRAFEE, RhIsand
1HAG 11GAR. Indians
MA/URWALO, WotitE

RoRT. BYRl, We VIretria, 1r Otme Memher

WHILM G MLLER. Saß DoCCtor EEDElYsHuwFE Mmoit Nta Dite Atri13H. łst,Chffhrh

COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RESOIRIES

HARRSNA. WHLLIAVS 1E.NW JR. Choírn

HNNINORANILIT! Wet Virzisia C111N1P}1 R1 11WAEMKFNNI1YMaaCh3tts G1RN1SN.WpD THOA11.INM AANCANS1A,aj11 W]E1]1U1,11UT11WA.Matr HNN,1WK1I3. JE. Mg

?U K 33V1Ts New York 3CHAR1 S. NOHWER1. Ponnsylvanie RHERT T STAFFoR1. Vernont OED:N1 11ATH.11) JdNn CHArEE. Rhdsland F. 1. RAI AKAWA. Cafnia

SatrmJ Purvasr. Gont Causz: ad staf Director MRzn M WhnTAEER CL' Crrt DNA ZiMvrEM. orit Conse

SIRMMTTIIONHIATHAND SCFNTFRRESEARCH

ETWARIMKENNEY, Mat-huset. Chairman

GAYAR]NELON. W0H WILLIAM1MATHAWAYMR UARSN A WHIddAMS, JE. Ne JTy (ex ein,

RIHAn S SelWITKEl. Pepnrvana JACOE K JAVITS. New York JuS 1 rHVEE Rher sand

LswRtNci. HoRuttz, Proteesional Staf Member Javln WiNsToN Minarily teunsr!

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CONTENTS

Statements of: Pate
Admiral Stansfield Turner, Director. Central Intelligence Agency: ac
companied by: Frank Laubinger, Offier of Technical Servicr, Cen
tral latelligence Ageney: Al Brndy. Otice of Inspertor tieneral.
Central Intelligenre Ageney ; Ernest Mayerfeld, Offce uf General
Counsel, (entral Intelligenee Ageney, and George Cary, Legislative
Conmnsel. Central Inteßligenv Ageney. X
Philip Goldmau. former enjloyee. Central Intelligeyce Ageney 501
Jolu dittiuger. forier emphoyee. Ceutral Intelligetee Ageney. 51
Apqendix A.-XVIl. Testing and U'se of Chemical and Biulogical Agents
by the Intelligence (ommunity
Appendis R.—Iocuments Referring to Discuvery of Additional MKULTRA
Material 103
Aptendlix C.-Documents Referriug to Subprojects.. 109
Material Snbuitted for the Record:
Psychological Assessments. 17
"Truth" Itugs in Interrogatiun. 27
Construetion of Gorman Annex. 30
Sulgrojeet 54 41
Drug Testing in Foreign tountries 铭
MKSEARCH. OFTENCHICKWIT. 109
Etuploçees Termianted Because of Their Participation in MKULTRA
Subprojert3. 110
QKHILTOP Defiuition.. 171

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PROJECT MKULTRA. THE CIA'S PROGRAM OF RESEARCH IN BEHAVIORAL MODIFICATION

WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 3, 1077

U.S. SEN ATE. SELEST COMMTIEE ON INTELLIGENCE. AND SURUOMMITTEE DN HEALTH AND SCTENTIFRe RESEARCH OF TIE COMMUTTEE UN HUMAN RESOURCES, Washington, D.C.

The committees met, pursuant to notice, at 9:07 a.m. in room 1202. Dirksen Senate Ofice Buihding, Senator Daniel K. lnouye (chairman of the Seleet (ommitter on Intelligence) presiding.

Present: Senators Inouye (presiding), Kennedy, Goldwater, Bayh. Hathaway. Huddleston, Hart, Schweiker, Case, Garn, Chafee, Lugar and Wallop.

Also present : William G. Miller, staf director. Select Committee on Intelhigeae; Dr. Lawrence Horowiiz. stafl dtirertor. Sabeomittee on Health and Scientific Research: andt profossiomał statf members of both committees.

Senator INouvr. The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence is meeting today and is joined by the Subcommittee on Health and Scientifie Research chaired by Senator Edward Kennedy of Mazsachusetts and Senator Richard Schweiker of Pennsylvania. Senator Hathaway and Senator Chafee are memlers of both committees. We are to hear tostimony fron tie Direetor of Central Intelligence. Adm. Stansfield Turner, and from other Ageney witnesses on issues concerning new documents supplied to the committee in the last week on drug testing conducted by the Central Intelligence Ageney.

It should be made clear from the outset that in general, we are focusing on events that happened over 12 or as long às 25 years ago. It. should be empbasized that the programs that are of greatest concern have stopped and that we are reviewing these past events in order to better understand what statutes and other guidelines might be pecessary to prevent the recurrence of such abuses in the future. We also need to know and understand what is now being done by the CIA in the feld of behavioral research to be certain that no current abuses are occurring.

I want to commend Admiral Turner for his full cooperation with this committee and with the Subcommittee on Health in recognizing that this issue needed onr attention. The CIA has assisted our committees and staffs in their investigative efforts and in arriving at remedies which wil) serve the best interests of our country.

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The reappearance of reports of the abuses of the drug testing progran and reports of other previonsly anknown drug programs and project- for behavioral coutrol underlinue the necessity for effective oversight prorrdures both in the executive branch and in the Congress. The Select Commnittee on hntolligencr has been working very elosely with President Carter. the Vice President. and Admiral Turner anl his associates in developing basie concepts for statutory guidelines which will govern all activitics of the intelligence agencies of the United States.

In fact. it is my expectation that the President will soon annonnce his dreisions on how lue has decidet the intelligence agencies of the U'nited State- shall je organizedl. Thi- conmmitter will be working closely with the President and Admiral Tuner in placing this new strueóure mnder the law and to develop efleetive oversight procedures.

It is clear that effective oversight repires that infoumeation must he full and fonrthroming. Full aud tiaely inforanation is obvionsly necessary if tle committee ant the publie is to be confident that any trangressjons can be deal with quirkly and foreefully.

One purpose of this hearing is to give the comuittee and the publie an understanling of what new informuation has been diseovered that adds to the khowtedge already available from previous Church and Keunsly iuquiries, and to hear the reasons why these doenments were no! available to the Chureh anl Kendy committrres, It is also the purpos of this hearing to aldhress the issues raised by any additional illegal or imuptoper artivities tat have euerged fron the files and to develop remnédies to prevent sueh itmproper activities from oceurring again. agimn.

Fially, thuere is an olligation on the part of both this committee and te ClA to make every effort to heh thuese individual- or institutions that muay have beet hartaesl by any of these imuproper or illegal artivities. I anu certain theat Adniral Turner will work with this conmitter to -ro that this will le done.

I wonld now like 1a welomae the most distingished Senator fromn Massachnisetts. the chairman of te Health Subcommittee, Senator Kemedy. Remeqy. 21 nr-

Senator Kessepy. Thank you yery mueh. Mr. Chairman. We are delightel to join together in this very important area of puhlie inquiry anri pupn oncte. quiry and publie interest. 1

Sóme 2 years ago, the Setate Health Subeomnittee lheard chilling tetimouy about the hnmman eserimentatiott activitirs of the Ceutral Iatelligence Ageney. The Depnty Dirretor of the CIA revealedl that over 3o miversities atel institutions were- involvedl in an "extensive testing and exteritaentation" prograta which inehaded covert drug test- on nnwitting citizens "at all social leveł. high anl low. native Anericans and foteign." Steveral of these tests involsed ihe admninistration of Lsh to "unwitting subjects in social situations. urmuon 1 1.

At least one death. that of Dr. Olsen. tesulted from these activities. The Agenet itsrl adknowledgel that dhese tests made liutle scientifie seuse. The agents doing the nionitoring wene not qualified seientife observers. The test subjects were seldoo accesihle bevond the first hours of the test. in a numiber of iustapce, the test snbjeet beame ill for houns or days, and eteetive followup was imqosible.

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Other experiments were equally offensive. For example, heroin adliets werè enticed into participating in LSI experiments in order to get a reward—heroin.

Perhaps most disturling of all was the faet that the extent of experimentation on human subjerts was unknown. The records of all these activities were de-troyed in January 19tà. at the instruetion of then CIA Direetor Richart Helms. Iu spite of persistent inquiries by both the Health Subomnumnittee and the Intelligence Committee. no additional records or information were fortheonting. And no one no single individual—could he found who remembered the details, not the Dircctor of the CIA. who ordlered the douments destroyed, not the official responsible for the progranı. nor any of his associates.

We belioved that the record, incomplete as it was, was as complete as it was going to be, Thuen one individual. through a Freedom of Information request, accomplished what two U.S. Senate committees could not, Hle spurred tle ageney into fnling additional reeords pertaining to the CIA's program of experimentation with hnuman subjects. These new recorls were diseoered by the ageney in March, Their existence was not marle known to the Congress until Jnly.

The records reveal a far more extensive series of expériments than had previonsly been thought. Eighty-six universities or institutions were involved, New instanres of unethica! lehavior were revealed.

The intelligence coanunity of this Nation, which requires a shroud of seereey in order to operate. has a very saered trost from the American people. The CIA's program of buman experimentation of the fifties anl'sixties violated that trust, It was violated again on the day the bulk of thwe ageney's rerords were destroved in 1973. It is violated eaeh time a responsible ofhcial refuses to recollect the details of the program. The best safeguard against abu-es in the future is a complete publie accoating of the abuses of the past.

I think thi- is illustrated, as Chairuan Inoive pointed out. These are issues, are questions that happened in the fifties and sixties, and go back some 15, 20 yenr- ago. lit they are front page news today, as we see in the major newspapuos and on the television and in the media of this country: and the reason they are. I think, is becanse it just continuously begins to trickle out. sort of, month after month. and the best way to put this period behind us, obviously, is to have the full information, and l think that is the desire of Admiral Turner and of the members of this committee.

The Central Intelligonce Ageney drugged American citizens without their knowledge or consent. 1t usesl university facilities and personnel without their knowledge. It fuaded leading researchers, often without their knowledlge.

These institutes, these individuals. have a rigbt to know who they are and how and when they were usedì. As of today, the Ageney itself refuses to declassify the names of those institntions and individuals, quite appropriately, 1 núght say, with regardl to the individuals under the Privaey Act. It seems to me to be a fundamental responsibility to notify those individual- or institutions, ratler. I think many of them were eaught up in an unwitting manner to do researeh for the Ageney. Many researrhers, distingnished researchers. some of our most ontstanding members of our scientifie connunity, involved in

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this network, now really do not kuow whether they were involved or not, and it seens to me that the whohe health and climate in terms of our umniversity and our scientite and iualt): facilities are entitled to that respomse. that respotse. 1 . 4 o nf tho terr

So. I intenl to do all I ean to persnade the Ageney to. at the very least, officially inforn thuos institutions and individnal- invoived. least,othciany mioru snus m. introduced

Two years ago. when these abuses were first revealed. I introduced legislation, with Senator Sehweiker and Senator Javits. designed to minimizs the qotentiał for any similar ahses in the future. That legislation expanded the jurisliction of the National Comtnission on Human Subjcets of Bioniedical aud Behavioral Researeh to cover all federaßy funled rsearel: involving human subjects. The rescareh initially was just direeted toward HEW aetivities, bnt this legislation covered DODas well asthe (1A. covered 10as wen asue1x. maosnab capalility

This Nation has a hiomnediral and behavioral researeh capalility second to none. It has head for subjeets of HEW funded researeh for the past 3 years a system for the protection of human subjects of hiomedical and bebavíoral rescarch second to none, and the Human Experimmentation Commuission la- proven its vahne. Today: hearings an the record alrcady established underscore the need to espand its jurisdieton. inrisdiction. e d d Somate

The CLA supported that legi-lation in 1975, audl it passed the Senate unauinonsly la-t year. 1 b-lieve it i- necled in order to assure all our people ihat they will have the degrre of pruteetion in hauman experinentation that they deserve and have every right to expeet, perimentatton thal mes arr am m 1 y  il med with

Senator IxotyE. Thank you very much. Now we will proceed with the hearing. Adniral Turner? re hearmg. Aumat A mnn …fllw]

[The prepared Satenient of Admiral Turuer follows:]

I'REFARED STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL. STANSFIEID TURNER, DIREUTOR OF CENTRAL JSTEL11GENCE

4

Mr. Chairmau : In my letter to you of Jaly 15. 19īī. I reported our recent discavery uf seven hoxes of documents related to I'roject MKiLTRt, a closely held CIA proje t condueted frodn 193-194. A yaa may reall. MKULTRA was an "ambrella project" under w hich tvrtain sensiive subprojeets were funded. invohiug anoug nther shings rscarch on drugs and behavioral usditication. Dar ing the Rockefeller Commission aud Chnreb Comtuittee investigations in 19t5. the eTyptonyui becane publicty known when details of the drug-related death of Dr. Frank Osn were jullicizedl. hu 1a3 Ir. Oson. a civilian enpdoyee of the Army at Furt Detrirk. leajwed to his death fron a boteł toonn windos in New York City abaut a weeh after having unwittingly consuued Lsb aduinistered to hin as an experitnent at a meeting of 1s1 rrsearehers called by (1A. bin as an exrriment at a meeung  1 r intoment with bebavioral

Most of what was knouu alont 1he Ageney's insoletent with behavioral drugs dnring the investigations in p9z was coniainedl in a repori on Projeet MKUlTRA preparek by the Jnspwstor General's ofhce in 163. As a resull of that report's reconunneudations, unwitting testing of drugs on U.s. citizens was sutsegtentty disroutinued The- MKIITRA-related rejort was made avnilalle to the Chrch Conmittee jnvestigators anul to the stan of Senator Kennedy's Subconuuittee on Realth. tutil the rerent diseovery, it was believed that all of the MKl'LTRA ties dealing with behavioral moditication had been destroyed in 1973 on the prders of the then retiring thief of the Oftire of Technical Service. with the authorization of the then Hl. as has tett previonsly reportel. Almost all of the pople whe had had any rounestion with the ashects of the projet which interested Senate investigators in p75 were no longer with the Ageney at that tine. Thns, thure was liile detailet knogtedge of the Mkll.TRA subprojects available 1o Cls during the Church Comnnittce investigations, This lack of nvnilable details, ¿oreover, was prolably not wholly attributable to the

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destruction of MKILTRA fles in 1973: the 1963 repurt on MKILTRA bs the lustector (tral notes on page 14: "Presrnt practice is to maintain n records of th llauming and approval of test prograus." of te jlanning and approvai o us pve t had not vet had an

Wh n I reorted tu you last on this matter. tuy staf had not yet had an opuortmtity to review the newly located material in depth. This has now been aceomuplished, and I am in a pasition to give yon a deseriution of the coutents of the recuvered material. 1 lelieve you will le nost interested in the following astects of the revent discovery : is of tle recent discovery: a l  as not nreviously found;

How the mnaterial was discovered and why it was not previously found: .r thie rerently located material;

The pature of ths recemy aateu m... How mueh new infornntiou there is in the taterial which may not have tasa previcuely known and reported to Senate iuvestignturs: aut ntaf this nd to

Whar we believe the most sumneam a»ps  m-To begir, as 1o how we disrovered thuse material. Tha- materiał bad been sent to uur Retired Records Center ontsid. of Washington and was discuvered there as a result of the exteusive seüarel eforts of an eulhogsre charged with re sponsibility for mnintaining our holdings ou twhavjoral drugs and for resjutding tà Frerloju of lnformation Aet requests on this sulject. Iwring the thurch Commmittee investigation in 19Tã, searrhes for Mk1'ITRA-related material were made ly exatnining tsoth the active and retired reords of al branrhes of Clà coasidered at all likely to have had associativn with MktLTRA documents. The retired rerurds of the Budget and Fiseal Sretion of the Braneh respnsitle for such work were not searehed, however This was beczuse tinatucial jajers assoriated witt sensitive projects sneh as MkULTRA were normaly naintained hy the Branch itself under the projeet hle, uot hy tht Budget and Fiseai Section. ln thre rase at hauad. bowever. the newly hsated material was sent to the Retired Rocords tenter in 19to ty the Budget and Fiseal Sertion as part of 1ts ou n retired kułdings. The rrason for thi- dejarture frou morual prosadure is not known. As a result of ii. however. the material escajed retrieval and destruction in paī3 by 1he then-retiring bürertor of the otice as well as discuvery in 1975 by cIA oftficials respuotding lo Seuate investigators. by CIA ofticials respuottng 1o Memaur mrcu nvin o stone unturned

The enplorer whio located this materìa did so by leaviug no stoue unturned in his efüris to restnd to FolA requests. lle revirwed all listings of material of this Brnnch stured at the Retired Rerurds tenter. inelnding tose of the Buiget and Fiseal Sertion and. thus. discovrrel the MkULTtiA-related doenments which had hen wuissed in thr provions searrlies. In sumu, the Ageuey faited to uucotvr tbes püarticular duuuent\~ in 1t3 in the process of attempting to destroy then : it similarly failed to louate them in ta75 in response to the Church Conmitte hearings. 1 an vonvinctdl that dhere was Bo attempt to comeal this materitl huring tl vartier siarehe. material during tlue earíter srarene. Next. as to thre nature of the recently located material. it is impwrtant to t terial. it is imrtatt to realize that the recvered fulders are tinaice folders. The balk of the mnterial in thetu emsists of apurovals for advanre of foels. vouehets, acrountings. and the like-nst of which are nod very informatise as tu the natnre of the aetivities tr were udertaken. Oeeasioual jrojeet proposels or mmoranda cotumenting ou somn aspeet of a subprojoet are seatterd tiroughont this material. In general, howeter. t recoveredí material dos uos inrlndr statns retsrts or other doruments relating to ojerationat ctsiteratiots or progress in the various sutprojetts. thouigh sone elaboratian of tho notívities coutemplated does appear. Thae rerovered documents fall rmghls into thrr categories: i recovered docunents fall rougty nto rarre ar First. there are Ha MKt iTkA subjrojots, many of which apear to have -  f which appear to have somne comectio with rescarrh into bhaviural moditicatiou, drué ueguisition and testing or administering drugs snrrejtitionsly and testing or administeriug urugs surrepummu, ü.... 1 TRA tapers. including

Secvnd. there are two hoxes of muiseaneous Mki1TRA tapers. inchnding audi reprts and tnancial stateuent- fronu "eutnu" (ie inbruediary) funting techanisms used to cmmccal lAs smonsorship of various research projeet. prujeet. …ui ortain intelligence

Finally. there are 3 ablitional subqrojests couerruing certain intelligence activities previonsly funded ualer MKUtTRA which have nothing to do eithuer with luhavioral mnodifcation, drugs. and tusins or with ans other related matters. tatmd moiters - -nnt-into

We have attenqted to groop the astisities covered by the l49 subprojeets into catugories under deserinttve headings. In broat outline. at least, this prescnts the contents tf these files. The activities are placed in the following tä rategories:

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1. Research into the effects of bhavioral drugs and/or alcohol:

17 suluproieets prolably rot inrolving humaß testing: 1

14 subiroieets definitely invoßvíug tests on human volunteers;

10 sutprojects protalfy ineluling tesis on hunan volunteers. Wbile not known, sonnt of thiese subjirojerts may have inrluded tests on unwitting sub jeels as well : J⁺

f suburojeetsinvoßving tests on unwitting suisjeets.

2. Rseareh an hyptosis : s snbprojeet, includiug 2involving hypuosis and drugs in corubination.

3. Acuuisition of chomicals or drugs: 7 subprojeets.

4Ass of magiiansarusefnl in er orations: eg surreptitimsde livers of trug-related materials : 4 snhnoojeets.

5. Studies of human belavior. sleel researeh. and behavioral changes during psyelothrrupy : 1 subprojects

G. Library srarebes and attendanre at senuinars and internationul conferences on tahuyioral muditication : G sutprojects.

7. Motivational studies, studies of defectors. assessment, and training teeh tioues: 23 subprojeets.

s lolygraph reseirch : 3 sutprojrets. é. roygra resm, smr

9. Funding mechanisns for MK1l.TRA external researeh activities: 3 subprojocts

tü. Recarch on drugs. toxins, aud tintogicals in hmmnan tissue: pruvision of exutie jathogons and the capability to inrorporate then in efective delivery systems : G subprojeets. s

11. Aclivitirs whose objectises canmot be determuined from availatle documentation : 3 snlgrojeets.

1 Sulqropsis invołving funding support for unsiecifed activities connecied with the Aroy» Sperial teration、 Bivisitı at Ft. Delrick. Md. This aetivity is outlin in Rok 1 «f the Chrh tomnitter Repurt- pp. 33. Se Appeadix A. pp. tAE. Uoder CIA- Projt MKNAOMI. the Army Assisted ClA in develop ing. testing. and maintaining tjelogicał agnts and delivery systeus for use against humans as well as against animals and erops. The ohjectives of these subprujmnts cantot l iduutifet fron the rervered material leroml the faet the! tha motey was to le nst where nornal funding chantels would require more wrlrien ur ortl justitcation than appeared desirable for seeurity Teasons ar u lere oqnratiptualcousid-rition dictated short lead titus for jurclases. Alont \$11wa\~ivldurin tn\~r13-asurojert.

13. Siugl nlgpreit- in sneh areas as efectsof ehriro-shock. harassment techniqmes for afnsive ts. amalysis of extrasensory tsrcepion. gus prupeled sprars amt aerl and four subprit- invlvlng erop anl uaterial sabotage

34 onoor two sabrojoson earl of the fo lowing:

"Blood tirouping" research. emmtrolling the activity of animals, epergy sturae and transfer in organi systems; and

stimula- and resprtse in biologicat systemus

15. Three subprojits canscelled tefure any work was done on them having to da with lalmratury drug sereuing. researeh on brain concussion. and researeh on biologiranly aetive tnaterials tohe tested through the skin on human yolunteers.

Now, as to how much tew the recovered material adds tu what has previousty bern repurted to the Chureh Commlitee and to Senator Kennedy's Subcomnittee un Hatth on nbese togiee. tho answer Is alditional detaß. for the most part : ez the names of prevlonisly uuidemtitied rescarcher- and institutiovs associated on either a witting or unwitting basis witl MktlTRA activities. and the nanes of CIA ufícials whi apprued or tuouitoted the various subprojects. Sone new substantivr material fs also present e.g. detatl- conpruing projwsals for experimentation and clinical testing assorciated with varimns resrarch projurts. and R possilly immprojer contrilotinn by ClA to o private institution. However. the priuripal types of activities included have. for the inost part. cither been outlined to sone extent or generally deseribet in what was proviomusty available to ClA in thc way of documentation and was suplied by (lA to Senate iuvestigators. For example : r ut exattpr 110

Financial dishmrscment records fur the pwerinl 10fo- 196t for 76 of the 149 nunlmered MKULTRA subprojeets had Isrn recovered from the Ofce of Finance by tlA and were made avaílable to thu Church Cotnmuittee investigators in August or sepertr me or Septeruber 1975.

The 19e3 Inspector General reprt on MKULTRA made asailable to both the Charel: Commnittee and Seuator Kenneds's Subcommitter mentions electro-shock

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and harassment substances (1t. 4. 10) : overt testing oà unwitting l.S. citizens (pn. 7. 1o-12) ; the search for bew tuaterials through arrangements with specialists in universities. pharnaceutiral hunses, hospitats. state and federal institutions, and private researeh organizations (pp. 7. 0) : and the fact that the Technical Service Iivisiou of ClA had initiated 14 subprojects related to tbe control of human belavjor between 193-163 (p. 21).

The relevant section of a 195t Insjuotor (eueral report on the Terbnica) Servjce Division was also made avallutle to the (hurch Commnittee staf. That report dissusses technigues for hunan assessment and unortlodox methods of com munication (p. 2o]): diserediting and disatling materials which can be covertty aduinistered (1p 201-20,; studie- on magicians' art» as applied to cuvert operations (p. 202: speciße fuiling merlanisms fur researeh performed outside of C1A (1, 202-2. 205) ; rescarch being dmne on \*K" 1knockout) material, alcobol toleranct. nnd 1ypnotism (p. 2n」 ; resereh ou Ls . 24 ; enti-personpel harassment and assassiuation delivery systeus including aerosod generators and other spray devices p, 206-2os, : th rol of Fori letrirk in suport of CIA's Biological Chemical Wurfure caputbility (. s, : and muatrrial satiotsge research (p. 2os). Murh of this material is rterttd in the (hurch Conmittee Report, Rok 1. 1t. 3s-422. 1See Apemdix A. pp. t-1021.

The nist signißcänt new daia discuvered are, frst, the names of researchers and institutions wbo partiripated in the MkI'lTRA projert and, secondly, a possilly iuptojer contribnution by (IA to a private justitution. We are now in possession of 1he namues of 1s5 non-government researchers and assistants who are identitedl in the recoverell material dealing with the 149 subprojects, The pamnes of No inslitutiuts where work was doae or with which these people were amliated are also mentioned.

The institutious include 4 colleges or universities, 15 researrh foundations or chemical or phnrmaceutical compmnies and the lke. 12 lospitals or cllnics {in addition to those assoxiated with universitis), and 3 peual institutions. While the identities of sonue of these peoglr aud institutions were kuown presiously, the diseovery of the new identities adts to our knowledge of MktlTRA.

The facts as they pertain to the possibly improzr contribution are as follows: One project involves a contrilntion of 3too to a bnilding fund of a private mediral institution. The faet that a contribution was made was previously known; indeed it was nentioned in a 1957 Inspector General report on the Technical Service Division of tlA. pertinent portions of which bad been re viewed by the Church Conmittee staff. The newly discovered material, however. makes it clear that this contribution was quade through an intermediary. which made it appear to be a private donntion. As a private donation. the contribution was then matched by federal funds, The institution was not made aware of the true source of the gift. This project was approved by the then DCl, and coneurred in by (lA's top managemneut at the time, includling the then General Counsel who wrotr an opánion supporting the legality of the contrilution. Af+hn

The recently discivered documents give a greater insight into the scope of the unwitting drug testing but contribnte little more than thiat. We pow have collabworating information that some of the unwitting drug testing was carried on in safehouses in San Francisco and New York City, and we have identifed that three inilividuals were involved in this undertakiug as opaused to the previously reported one person. We also know now that some unwitting testing took place on crininal sexuat psycbopaths confined at a State bospltal and that, additionally. resrarch wns done on a knock-ont or "K" drug in parallel with research to develep tain killers for eancer patients. ne the

These. then are the princijat findiugs identified to date in our review of the recuvered material, As noted enrlier, we bulieve thr detail ou the identities of researrlers and institutions involvel in (la's sponsorship of drugs and behavioral mulifcation is a new element and one whieh poses a considerable prohlem. Most of the people aud institutions invulved are not aware of Agener spotsorship We should ceriainly assune that the researchers and institutiops which eooperated with ClA on a witting basis acted in good faith and in the lelief that they were aiding their goverument it a legitimßte and projer purpose. I In-lieve we alt have a moral obligation to these rescarchers and institutions to proteet then fron any uujustifiel embarrassment or damage to their reputations whirl revelation of tleir identities might bring. In addition. I have a legal chligttuou uuder the Privney Act not tu publisly diselose the names of the in dividual reseitrciers without their consent. This is especially true, of course, for

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[PAGE 11]
those researehers and institutious wbich were unwitting particijants in ClAsistsorrd activities.

Neverthehs. recognizing the righi and the need of loth the Senate Seloet Commnittee on Intelhgence ad the Setate Subuvmnitte on lalh to investigate the circunstances of these artivities in whatever detail they cousider neressiry. I au providing your conmittee with sll of the nanes on a elassitidl baasis. 1 hol»: that this will faeititate your itvestigation while prateting the individuals and institations iavolved. Let me eptasize that the Mkt LTRA events are 12 to 25 years in the qast. I assure yot tha the (lA is in no way engageì iu either witting or unwitting tesfing of drngs today.

Finally. 1 am working closely with the Auorney General and with the Seere tary of Henlth. Education and Welfare on this muatter. We are making available In the Attartey Geleral whatever maierials h may deenh neeessary to any investigation he may elect to mudertake. We ar working with toth the Attorney Gemeral aml the Sesretary of Healh. Edncation and Wrlfiro to deteruine whether it is practicable from this nen evidenre to attemjt to identify auy of ta persons to whom drugs may teave beeu admivistered nnwittingly No sneh hamrs are psart of these rord. bnt we are workiug to determine if there are adeptate clues to lead to their ideutilicatiot : aad if so, how 1o go alsont fultilling the Government's resisonsibilities in the marter.

TESTIMONY OF ADM. STANSFIELD TURNER. DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE. ACCOMPANIED BY FRANK LAUBINGER. OFFICE OF TECHNICAL SERVICES: AL BRODY. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL: ERNEST MAYERFIELD. OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL: AND GEORGE L. CARY, LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL

Admirał TursER. Thank yon. Mr. Chairman. I would like to begin by thanking yon and Seuator Kennedy for having a joint hearing this morning. I hope this will expedite and facilitate our getting all the information that both of your committees need into the recordquickly.

I woull like also to thank you both for prefacing the remarks today by reminding us al that the events ahout which we are here to talk are 12- to 21-vears old. They in no way repnesent the enrrent activities or policies of the Central Intellionce Ageney.

What we are here to do is to give you att the information that we now have and whieh we did not previously have on a subjeet known as Project MKULTRA. a project which took place from 1953 to 1964. It was an umbrella project under which there were numerous subprojects for researeh, among other things, on drugs and behavioral mnodlification. What thr new materiał that we offer today is a supplemnent to the consideralle material that was made available in 197à, during the Chunrch commnittee heavings, and also to the Senate Subcommittee on Health and Scientifie Research.

At that time, the (IA offered up all of the information and documents it helieved it hal available. The principal one available at that time tlheat gave the greatest amount of informmation on this subject wa- a report of the CLA- Inspeetor General written in 1ae, and which led direetly to the termination of this activity in 1964. 13 years ago.

The information available in 19tà to the varions investigating group was indeed sparse. first because of the destruetion of material theat took place in 1973. as detailed hy Senator Konnedy a minnte ago. with the concurrence of the then Direetor of Centra! Intelligence and under the supervision of the Direetor of the Of. … of Technical Services that supervised Projeet MKULTRA.

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[PAGE 12]
The material in 197s was also sparse because most of the (IA people whe head been involed in 1üs to 1964 in ttis aetivity had retired frona the Ageney. 1 would further add that 1 think the miaterial was sparse in puart lriause it was the practice at that timne not to keep detailed recorls in this category.

For in-tance, the 19i report of the Inspector Goneral notes:

Prestent ponetict is to maintaiu bo rerords of the plauning and approsal of test programs.

In brief, there were few records to begin with and less after the destrnetion of 1973.

What 1 would like to do now, though, is to proceed and let you know what the new material adds to our knowledge of this topie, and 1 will start by descrihing how the material was discovered and why it wa- hot previousty discovered. The material in question. sone seven boxes, had been sent to our Retired Records Center outside of the Washington area. It was discovered there as the result of an extensive search by an employee charged with ths responsibility for maintaining our holdings ou behavioral draugs aud for responding to Freedom of Iuformation Aet repuestsonths subjeet.

Buring the Church committee investigation of 1975, searehes for MKILTRA-related miaterial were male hy examining both the active and the retired records of all of the branehes of CIA considered likely to have had an association with MKUL/TRA documents. The retired records of the Budget and Fiseal Section of the braneh that was responsille for sucl work were not searched. however, This was because the finaucial paper associatedl with seusitive projects such as MKULTRA were nornally maintained by the boansh it self under the project title, MKILTR.A. not hy the Budlget and Fiscal Section under a special budget tile.

In the case at hand, however. this newly located material had been sent to the Retired Reeordk- (enter in 19τo by the Budget and Fisca) Section of this braneh as part of itsown petived holdings. In short, what shotld have been tikd by te braneh itslf was fihed by the Budget and Fisrai Section, and what should hae len filed undter the projeet title, MktLTRA, was tiled umder budget and fiseal matters. The reasou for this departure frou the norma! procedure of that time is simply hot known, and as a result of it, however. the naterial eseaped retrieval and destruction in 1973, as well as disonvery in 1975.

The cnplovee who located this matevial did so by leaving no stone untmrmedl in his eflorts to resuond to a Frredon of Information Aet reonest, or several of theu. in faet, He peviewed all of the listings of mnaterialofthis braneh,storrdat te Retirrd Records Center. ineluding those of the Budget an Fiseal Sertion, and thus discovered the MKI'LTRA-related docmments, which hat been missed in the previous searehes.

hn sun, the ageney failed to uneover these partienlar docnments in 1973. in the process of attempting to destroy them. It siuilarly failed to locate them in 19z5, iu respouse to the Chureh comnittee hearings. 1 an personally persuided that there is no evidence of any attempt to conceal thüs material during the earlier searehes. Moreover, as we wil discuss as we proceed. 1 do not believe the material itself is such that

[PAGE 13]
there would he a motiye on the part of the CIA to withhold this, having diselosed what it did in 1975,

Next, let me move to the nature of this recently located material, It is important to remember what I have just noted. that these folders that were diseoxveredt are finaner folders. Thee bulk of the material in them consists of approvals for the advance of funds, vouchers, and accountiugs and such, nost of which are not very informative as to the natnre of the aetivities that they were supporting. Oceasional project proposals or mettoranda connienting on sone aspect of a subproject ar seattered throughont this material. In general. however. the recovered naterial does not inchude overall status reports or other doenments relating to opwrational considlerations. or to the progress on various subprojects. though somue claboration of the activities contemplated os appear fromn tine to time.

There are roughly three categories of projects. First. there are 149 MKILTRA subprojects, many of whicl appear to have some conneetion with research into beleavioral nodification. drug acquisition and testing. or atâministering drugs surreptitious)y. Second. there are two boxes of miseeRaneons MKU1l.TRA papers. including audit reports and finaneial statements fron iutermediary funding nechanisms used to conceal CIA sponsorship of various research projects.

Finally, there are 33 adlitiona) subqurojects coneerning certain intelligenee activities previously funded under MKULTRA but which have nothing to do either with behavioral modifications. drugs and toxins, or any closely relatelmatter.

We have attempied to group the activities covered by the 149 subprojeets into categories under deseriptive headings. In broad ontline, at least. this presents the contents of these files. The following 15 catugories are the ones we have divided these into.

First, researeh into the efferts of behavioral drugs and 'or alcohol. Within this. there are 17 projects probably not involving human testing. There are 14 subprojeets detinitely involving testing on human voluuteers. Thete are 13 subqrojeets probably ineludiug tests on human volunteers and 6 sulprojeets involving tests on unwitting hunan beings.

Second. there is resarelı on hypnosis, eight subprojects. including two involving hypnosis ad drugs in combìnation,

Third. there are seven project- on the acquísition of chemicals or drugs.

Föurth. four subproject- on the aspects of the magieian's art. useful in covert operations, for instance, the surreptitious delivery of drug relanl materials.

Fifth. there are nine projects op studies of human behavior, sleep research. and behavioral change during psychotherapy.

Sixth, tere are projeets on library searches and attendants at seminars and international conferenes ou behavioral modifcations.

Seventh, there are 23 prujerts on motivational studies, studies of defertons, asses-ments of blavior and training techniques.

Eighth, there are thrre subparojects on polygraph research.

Ninth. there are three subproiect- on fumding mechanisms for MKULTRA'sexternal researeh activities.

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[PAGE 14]
Tenth, there are six subprojects on research on drugs. toxins, and biologicals in human tissue. provision of exotie pathogens. and the capability to incorporate thein in efective delivery systems. eapabity to mneorpor iinc hoec nature

Eleventh, there are three subprojects on activities whose nature simply cannot be determined. simply cannot be qetermeu. s..lin suvrt for ul-

Twelfth. there are sulqnojeets involving funding support for unspecifiedl activities conducted with the Army Special Operations Division at Fort Detrich. Md. This activity is outlined in Book I of the Church committee report. pages 388 to 389. (See Appendix A, pp. 68–69). 68–69). - -iatA the CTA in

Under CIA's Project MKNAOMI. the Army assisted the CIA in developing. testing. and maintaiting hiological agents and delivery system、 for use against humans as well as against animals and erops. in sucl aruas as the effects

Thirteenth, there are single subprojects in sueh areas as tne enecis of electrosbock. harassment techniques for ofensive use, analysis of extrasensory perception. gas propelled sprays and aerosols, and four subprojects involymg erop aa ma subprojects involvíng erop and material sabotage. -1. 7th follarinσ: blood

Fourteenth, one or two subprojects on each of the following: blood grouping research: controlling the activities of animals: energy storage and transfer in organic systems; and stimulus and response in biological systems. botogicat systems. lt hfam ant work

Finally. 15th, there are three subprojects canceled before any work was done on them having to do with laboratory drug sereening, research on brain concussion. and research on biologically active materials. matertals. -1. diaoramd material adds

Now, let me address how much this newly discovered material adds to what has previously been reported to the Chureh committee and to Senator Kennedy's Subeomnittee on Health. The answer is basically additional detaii. The principal types of activities included in these documents have for the most part been outlined or to some extent generally deseribed in what was previously available in the way of docunentation and which was supplied by the CIA to the Senate investigators. Senato investigators. --f-th erind of 1960

For example, financial disbursement records for the period of 1960 to 1961 for 76 of these 149 subprojects had been recovered by the Office of Finance at CIA and were made available to the Church committee investigators. For example, the 1963 Inspector General report on MKUIT'RA made available to both the Church committee and the Subcommnittee on Health mentions electroshock and harassment substances. covert testing on unwitting U.S, citizens, the search for new materials through arrangements with specialists in hospitals and universities, and the fact that the Technical Service Division of CIA had initiated 144 subprojects related to the control of human behavior. behavior. -5. ioã In=nector General

For instance also, the relevant section of a 1957 Inspector General report was also made avnilable to the Church committee staf. and that report discusses the techniques for human assessment and unorthodox methods of comnunication, discrediting and disabling materials whieh can be covertly administered. studies on magicians' arts as applied to covert operations, and other similar topics. as applied to covert operauons, ana o L diccovered are. first.

The most signifieant new data that has been discovered are, first, the names of researchers and institutions who participated in

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[PAGE 15]
MKULTRN urajeete. and secomul. a possibly imptoper contribution by the CIA to a privae institutioni. We are now in the possession of the tauues of 1s5 tongovermment researehers and assistants who are identitiedì in the reroveredl material dealing with these 149 subnojiets.

There arr also nmcs of so institution- where work was done or wit whjel theze people were atliliated. The institutions inehude 44 colheges or nniversities, 15 research fonndation or clhemical or pharmacentical comnpanie- or the hike, 12 hospital- or clinics. in adition to thore associtel with the universities. and à penal institudions.

While the identities of some of these peophe and instittion- were known previonsly. the disravery of the nen identities adds to our knowledge of MKILTRA

The facts a- they pertain to the possihly improper contribution are as follows. One projert involves a contribution of S3taooo to a buihding futd of a private medical it-titution. The faet that that contrilathon was made was previonshy known. hdeed, it was mentioned in the 1957 report of th: In-pretor General on ihe Technical Serxice Division of C1A that supervised MKI1TRA. and pertinent portions of this had been reviewrł hy the Chnrch committee staf.

The newly discoveted material. bowever. makes it elear that this contrihattion was made thtougl an intermediary, whieh nade it ajpear to hu a private donation. A- a private donation. the contribution wa- tet matehd by Feleral fund-. The institution was not made aware of the trrne sotoce of the gift. This poject was approved he the then Director of Central Intelligence and coneurred in by CIA's toji hanagenuent ineluling the then General Connsel. who wrote an ojanio suppoarting the legality of the contrilmtion.

'The rervntly disovered documents also give greater insight into the scuge of the unwitting nature of the drug testing. but contribnte bule more than that. We now do have corroborating informnation that some of the uuwitting drng testing was carriel out in what is known in the intelligence trade as safe honses in San Francisco and in New York City. and we have identifiedl that thaee individnals were involved in this undertaking. whereas we previonsly reported there was only one perzon.

We also koow now that some mwitting testing took place on criminal sexual p-yehopaths confinedl at a State hospital. and that additionally rrseaieh was done on a knockout or K drug in parallel with pescarch to develop painkillers for cancer patients.

These, then. are the principal fmlings identifiol to date in onr review of thi- recovered material. As noted carlier, we believe the detail on the identities of researhers andt institutions involved in Cìs sponsorship of drug aund behavioral modifeation research is a new elemcnt and one which paoses a considerabe problen, Most of the people anl institutions involved were pot aware of ClA sponsorship. We shomld certainly as-une that the researehers and institutions which cooperated with ClA on a witting basis aeted in good faith and in the belief that they were aiding their Govermment in a legitimate and proper imrhose.

I believe that we alt have a moral obligation to these researchers and institutions to protect them from any unjustified embarrassment

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13

or dlamage to their repmtations which revelation of their identities migha bring. In addition. 1 have a legal obligation under the Privaey Act not to publicly diselose the naies of the inlividual researehers withont their consent.

This is especially true, of course. for thos resparchers and instituton- which were uuwitting participants in ClA sponsored activities. 11..-1.1 41.

Nonetheless. Mr. Chairman. I certainly recognize the right and the need of both the Senatr Seleet Commtnittee on Intelligence and the Senate Subcomunittee on Health and Scientitic Rescarch to investigate the circuunstances of theze activities in whatever detail you consider necessary. I an providing your comnmittee with all of the documentetion, inchuling all of the names. on a classitied basis, I hope that this will farilitate your investigation while still protecting the individuals and the institation- involsed.

Let me emphasize again that the MKITTKA events are 12 to 24 years in the past, and I assure you that (lA is in no way engaged in either witting or unwitting testing of drugs today.

Finally. I am working closely with the Attorney General on this matter. We are making available to the Attorney General whatever materials be may deem necessary to any investigations that he may eleet to undertake. Beyond that, we are also working with the Attorney General to determine whether it i» practicable from this new evidence to identify any of the persons to whom drugs may have been administered unwittingly. No sueh nannes are part of these records, We have not identifiedl the individuals to whon drugs were administered, but we are trying now to determine if there are adequate clues to lead to their ideutification, anl if so how lust to go about fulfilling the Goverunept's respopsihilities in this matter.

Mr. Chairman. as we procced with that process of attempting to identify the individuals and then determining what is our proper responsihility to them. I wil keep both of these committees fully advi-ed. 1 thapk von, sir.

Senator IxouyE. Thank yon very much. Admiral Turner. Your spirit of cooperation is mneli apptrrciatel. I would like to announce to the conunittee that in order to give every member an opportunity to participato in this hearing. thnt we would set a time limit of 10 minutes per Senator.

Adlmiral Turner. please give this comnittee the genesis of MKUT TRA. Who or what conmittee or commizzion or ageney was responsible for dreamuing up this grandiose and sinister project, and why was it necessary? What is the rationale or justification for such a project and wa- thie President of the Uuited States aware of thi-?

Adlmiral Tuksen. Mr. Chairman, I an going to ask Mr. Brody on my right, who is a long-time member of the CIA to address that in more detail. I believe everything that we know about the genesis was turned over to the Chureh committee and is contained in that material. Basically. it was a CIA-initiated project. It started out of a coneern of our being taken advantage of by other powers who would use drugs against our perzomnel. and it was approved in the Ageney. I have asked the question vou just asked me, and have been assured that there is no evidenee within the Ageney of any involvement at higher echelons. the White House, for instance. or specifie approval. That does not say there was not. but we have no such evidence.

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Mr. Brody, would yon amplify on my comment- there, please?

My. Bropy. Mr. Chairuari. 1 really have very little to add to that. To my knowhedge, there was no Presidential knowledge of this projeet at ta tie. It was a (lA projeet, an as the admiral said, it was a projrt designed to attempt io counteraet what wa- then thought to be a serions thrcat hy our chennies of nsing druge against us. Most of w hat else we kmow abont it is in the Senate Church commmnittee report. Setator Iso re. Were the authorized memnbers of the Congress made aware of this projeet through the budgetary process?

Mr. Bropy. We have no knowledge of that. sir.

Senator Ixourye. Are vo suggesting that it was intentionally kept away fron the Congress and the Presidlent of the United States?

Aìmirul Tt rser. No, sir, We are onby saving that we have no evidenee on: way or the other as to whether the Congress was informed of this particular project. There are no recordl- to juhicate.

Semator Isot yE. Adniral Turner, are you personally satisfed by actual investigation that this newly discoverel information was not jntentionally kept away fron the Sonate of the United States?

Admiral Teexer. I have no way to prove that. sir. That is my conyietio fron evervthing I have secen of it.

Semator Isotyi. Now, we have been advised that these documents were initially diseovered in Mareh of this vear, ant yon were notified in luly of thi- year, or Jnne of this year. and thu committee was notified in huly. Can vou tell us why the Direetor of Contral Intelligence wa- notifiedl 3 months after its initial discovery. why the delay?

Almiral Tuustr. Yes, sir. All this started with several Freedom of Information Aet reqmests, and Mr. Laubinger on my left was the individual who tok it upon himself to pursue these requests with great diligonue, ad got permission to go to the Retired Records Center, and then made the decision to look not only under what would be the experted -ubjert files. Hat through every file with which the braneh that coudurtedl this tyu: of activity had any conceivable connection.

Very late in Mareh, he diseovered these seven hoxes. He arranged to have then shippedl from the Retirel Records Center to Washington. to our headqnarters. They arrived in early April. He advised his appropriate superiors, who asked him how long he thought it would take him to go thromgh these and sereen them appropriately. clear them for Freedom of Hforuaation Aet release.

There are, we originally estimated, 5o pages here. We now think that waz an underestination, and it may be eloser to S,tto pages. He estinated it wonld] take alont 45 davs or into the midtle of May to do that, He was told to proceed, and a- he did -o there wa- nothing mcovered in the begimming of these 149 cases that appearedt partienlarly startling or particalarly additive to the knowledge that had alrealy been given to the Chreh committee, some details, but no major revelations.

He and his asso iates proceeded with deliberateness, but not a great sense of urgeney. There were other interferiug aetivities that eame and dcuanded hi- time also. Ie was pot ahde to put lot pereent of his time on it. anl therr dil not appear to be cau\~e for a great rush here. We were trving to bu responsive to the Freedom of lnformation Aet regnest within the limits of or manpower and outr priorities.

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In early Jane. however, hu disovered two projects, the one related to K irng- and the one related to the funling at the institution, and realizel inmedliately that he had substantial new imnformation, and he immeliately reported this to his superiors.

Two artions were taken. Ohe was to notify the lawyers of the principal Freedbon of Information Aet requestor that we would have substantiad new material and that it woudd be fortheoming as rapidly as possibhe, and the serond was to start a nemorandu up the chaín that indicatel his belief that we shouldl notify the Senate Seleet Committee on lntelligence of this diseovery berause of the charaeter at least of these two dowuments.

A- that priseeded u from the 13th of June, at each echelon we had to go thurotgh the legal office, th- legislative liaison office anl at each ehuelon alonut tha saune question was asked of húmn: Have vou gone through all of this, so that when we notify the Senate Select Committce we do not notify half of the itportant relevations and not the other half! The last thing I want. Mr. Chairman. is in any way to be on any topic. give the appearane on any topie of leing recalcitrant. relutaut, or having to have vou drag things ont of me, and ıny suhorlinates. mneh to my plea-ure, had each asked. have you really gone throngh these ooo pages enough to know that we are not going to ucover a boubshelldown at the botton?

By late June, about the 2th. this process reacled my deputy. He notified me after his review of it on the Tth of July, which is the first I knew of it. 1 began readling into it. I asked the sane probing questiun dirvet|y, 1 then notified my superiors, and on the 1áth delivered to von my letier letting yon know that we had this. and we have been working. many people. many honre since then. to be sure that what we an: telling vou today does inehule all the relevant material.

Senator İxoryr. i would bike to commend Mr. Laubinger for his diligence and expertise. lut was this diligence the result of the Freedotn of lnformation Aet or could thi- diligence have been exorcised durier the Chnreh hearings? Why was it not exereised?

Almiral Tuesrr. There is no question that theoretically this diligen e conld have been exerrised at any timne, and it may well be that the Fpedon of lnformation Aet has made ns more aware of this. Wonld you sqeak for yourel. plea-e.

Mr. LstBaNcEk. I really dloi't attribute it. Senator. to diligence so nunch as thoroughness. lf you can imagine the pressures under an organization trying to responel, which 1 think the CIA did at the time of the Chmpeh comnittee hearings. th halways of the foor I an on were full of boxes frota our recordls center. Every box that anyone thosught could possibly contain anything was called up for seareh. It wasone of a frantie éflort fo comply.

Whhen the pre-sure of that situatiou cool- down, and you can start laoking at thing systemnaticalhy. you are apt to fiud thinge that you wouldn't under the heat of a crash prograna, and that is what happened here.

Senator Isot vE, Thannk ton very moeh. Senator Kennedy ?

Semator KeNMmy. Adhmnital Turner. this is an enormously distressing report that you give tothe Anerican Congress and to the American people tolay, Granted, it hapjuned many years ago, but what we are

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basirally talking alont is an: activity which took place in the country that invahved the jarversion and thie corruption of many of our outstanding rescareh ccnters in thi- conntry. with ClA funds. where some of our top reseanrchers were unwittingly involved in researeh sponsored by the Ageney in whirh they had uo knowkedge of the backgrouudlor the support for.

Much of it was done with Atuerican citizens who were completely maknosing in terms of taking varionus drugs, and there are perhaps any nuvder of Americnns whio are walking around today on the east coast o wesi coast who were given drugs. with all the kind- of physical and pyehological damnage that can le eausesl. We have gone over that in very careful detail. and it is significant and severe indeed.

I do not know what could he done in a lhess demoeratie country that woull be pure alien to our own fraditions than wa- realiy done in this marrow area, and as youi give this rejort to the committee. I would like to get some sense of your own concern about this type of activity. anut how you react, havinig assmsed this imuportant responsibility with the confidence of President Carter and the overwhehoing support. obviously. of the, Congres. uder this set of circumstapces.

Idid not get mùch of a fevling in reviewing your statement here this morning of the kinl of abhorrence to this type of past aetivity which I think the American people woukd certainly deplore and which I believe that yon do, hut could yon commnent upon that question, and also perhap- give us what ideas yon have to insire that it cannot happen again?

Admiral TurxEn. Senator Kemnedy, it is totally abhorrent to me to think of nsing a humnan luing as a guinea pig and in any way jeoqardizing hj- life and bis health. mo matter how great ihe cause. I am not here to pas judgnent on may porheer-sors. bnt I can assure you that this is totally beyod the pah- of my contetaplation of activities that the(A or any other of our intelligenee agencies shond undertake,

I au taking and have taken what 1 bdieve are adeqpuate steps to insnre that -neh thing-are not confinuing tolay.

Senator Krxsrny. Could you tell u- a litte bit about that?

Adndral TuesEn. 1 hrave a-ked for a speiał report azsuring me that there ate no drug activities extant. that is, drug aetivities that involve expsrinentation. Oh ionsly. we collert intelligence alsnt drugs and drug u-t in nther romntries, hot there are no espurimneniations being conducted by the Central IntrRigence Ageney, and 1 have had a -pecial clieck ntade lwcause of another ineident that wa- macovered some years ago ahont the unanthorized retention of sone toxie materials at the ClA. I haye had an actual iu-peetion made of the storage phaees and the certifcation fromn the peonle in charge of thoe that thrre are no sneh ctemicad bological aiateriat- presena in our keeping, and 1 have issuedexpress order- that that shall not he the case.

Beyotd that. I have 1o rely in large measure on my sense of command anl dirertion of the quiphe amd their know ledge of the attitude I have jast expressealto yomn in thi- regard.

Senator Krx seay. I think deat is tery cotmmendahle.

Admuiral TrrNEn. Thank you. sir.

Senator Kesxeny. I think it is important that thr American people mnderstad that.

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[PAGE 20]
You know, mnch of the rescareh whieh is our area of interest that wa- hing done hy tae Ageney and te whrole involved sconence of activities dlone by the Agency. I am ronvinced could have been done in a legitimate way through the research programs of the Nationa) Institutes of Meutal Hralth, other sponsored activities. I mean, that is some oter question. laut 1 think you went to an awful lot of trouble, where these thig- could have been.

Let me aok you specifically. on the followmp of MKULTRA. are there now-1 shink yon have an-wered. hut I waunt to get a complete answer about any experimentation- that are being done on hnan beingz, whether it is drugs or behavioral alteration- or patterns or any snpport. either direetly or indiretly. being puovided hy the Ageney in termns of amy experimnentation on hnuman beiugs.

Admiral'TuesEe. There is no experimentation with drug- on hmnan beings, wittingor mwitine. inrcondueted m any way.

Senator KesxEpy. All right. Or laing supported indireetly? I mean, are you contraetel ont?

Admiral Turxre. Orbeing in any way supported.

Senator KeNNEpy. All right. Hon alont the momdrng experimentation onr Committee has sern-psyehosmrgery, for example, or psychological rescarch?

Admiral Tunsrn. We are continually involved in what we call asses-ment of hehavior. For instance, we are trying to continually improve our polygraph proeedures to. yon know. assesz whether a person is lying or not. Thi- does not involve any tampering with the individual body. Thi- involves stulying recorls of people's behavior under different cireumstances. and so on. lot it is not an experimental thing. Have I dezeribed that accmrately. Al?

Mr. Broay. Yes.

Senator Kex Nepy. Well. it is linited to those areas?

Admiral TurxEr. Yes: it does not involve attempting to modify behavior. It only involves studying behmavior conditons. but not trying to actively modify it. a- wa- one of the objeetives of MKULTRA.

Senator Kyssiny. Well. we are scarce on time, but 1 am interested in the other areas beside- polygraph where you ate doing it. Maybe you ean either re-pond now or suhiit it for the record, if you wonld do that. Would yom provide that for the record?

Admiral Tunsun. Yes.

{The material on peyehological assessment: follows :]

Psyehological assessments are iwrforuseí as a service to olicers in the operafions direeturate who recruit and ur handle agenis. Exrept for people jnvolved in training runrses. the subjerl\~ of the assessments are foreign nationals. The assessmonts are gelerally doue todeteruuine the tuost sqovessful taetic to persuade the suhjort fo accept coveri emglay ment ly the (Ia, and to nake an appraisal of his reliability and truthfulness.

A majority of the work is done by » staf of traind psyehologists, some of whon are siationrd overscars. The assesstuenis they dhe miar be either direet ur indirect. ltirest assessmueuts invoive a jersulal inierview of the subjeet by the pechudogist. When luossible tlse suttjeet is askaral to conitlete a formal "intelligenre tes1" whith is actaally u disgnised psyrhologial test, Dudividuals being assesł are pot given drugs. nor are thy subjected to physicał harassnaent or torture. Whcn operating conditions ure sush thut a face-to-face iuterview is not possille, 1he psyehotogist tay do an indireet assssment. using as soutre uaterials deseriptions of he snijeel ha others, iuterviews with people who know hin, specimens of his writings. ete.

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[PAGE 21]
The other psychologiral assesstnents involve handwriting analysis or graphological assesshcnt. The worh is done by a pair of trained graphokogists, assisted by a »mal mumber of measuremetl terhuiciane. They grnrraily reuuire at least a lage pf handwritten seript by the subjeet. Measureinents are made of about 3te dinerent writing characteristies, und ihese are charied and furnished to the graplologist for assssments.

The pschojogists also gae ceurses iu psychological assessment tu group of operations oticers, to sharpen their owl capabilitirs to size up iwople. As part of the trannng cvurse, the instructor doe a psycbulogicał assrssment of each studeut. Tie students ar witting lmrticijants, and results are discussed with thew.

i is iuportant to reiterate that psychological assessments are only a service to the operatious oticerz. in the tiual apalşsis, it is the respnusibility of the oratiols otier to devide how a potential agent should b approached, or to make a judgement as lo whether auy agont is telling the truth.

Admiral TuuNeR. The kind of thing we are interested in is, what will motivate a man to beçome an agent of the tnited States in a dittieult situation. We have to be familiar with that kind of attitudinal response that we can expeet from people we approach to for one reason or another berome our spies, bui I will be happy to submiit a very specifc listing of tlese. n

Senator KExNepy. Would you do that for the committee!

In the followup, in the MKSEARCII. in the OFTEN, and the ClIlCKWIT, could you give us aiso a report on those particular prograns?

Admiral Tuux. Yes, sir.

Senator KeNNEny. Did they involve experimentation, human experinentation!

Admiral Tu. No, sir.

Senator KeNNEpY. None of them?

Admiral TtRsER. Let me say this, that CHICKWIT program is the code nanue for the (IA particijation in what was basically a Department of Defense program. This progran was summnarized and reported to the Church committee, to the Congress, and I have since they have been rementioned in the press in the last 2 days here, I have not. had tine to go through and personałly review them. I have ascertained that all of the fiies that we had and made available before are intact, and I have put a special order out that nobody will enter those files or in any way touch then without my permission at this point, but they are in the Retired Revords Center outside of Washington, and they ate available.

1 an not prepared to give you full details on it. lbecause I simply haven't read into that part of our history, but in adlition I woull sug gest when we want to get into that we should get the Department of Defense in with us.

Senator KeyNeay. Well. you will supply that information to the Intelligenee Coumittee, the relevant, I miean, the lealth aspeets, obriously, and the research we are interested in?

Ailmiral TuuNER. Yes, sir.

Senator Ken sepy. Will you let us know. Admiral Turner?

Admiral Turser. I will be happy to.

[See p, 169 for the material referred to.]

Senator KesNepy. Thank you. I am rumning ont of time. Do you support the extonsion of the protection of human subjeets legislation to include the C1A and the DOb? Yon coamented fa orably on that

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before, and I an hopeful we can get that on the calendar early in September, and that is our strong interest.

Admiral Turyen. The CIA certainly has no objection to that proposed legislation. sir. It is not my role in the administration to be the supporter of it or the endorser of it.

Senator KeNNepy. As a personal matter. since you have reviewed these subjeets, would you comnent? I know it is maybe unusual, but you can understand what we are attempting to do.

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

Sonator KenNepy. From your own experience in the ageney, you can understand the value of it.

Just finally, in your own testimony now with this additional information, it seems quite apparent to mò that vou can reconstruct in very careful detail this whole project in ternis of the responsible CIà officials for the program. You have so indicated in your testimony. Now with the additional information. and the people, that have been revealed in the examination of the documents, it seems to be pretty clear that you can track that wholo program in very careful detail. and I would hope. you know. that you would want to get to the bottom of it, as the Congress does as well.'I will come back to that in my next round, Thank you very much.

Senator INotYE. Senator Goldwater?

Senator GolpwatEr. I have no questions.

Senator IxorTE. Senator Schweiker?

Senator SchwEIkER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral Turner, I would like to go back to your testimony on page 12. where you discuss the contribution to the building fund of a private medical institution. You state. "Indeed, it was mentioned in a 1957 Inspertor General report on the Technical Service Division of CIA. pertinent portions of which had been reviewed by the Church commíttee staff." I would like to have you consider this question very carefully. I served as a member of the original Church committee. My staffer did a lot of the work that you are referring to here. He made notes on the IG'> report, My question to you is, are you saying that the section that specifically delineates an improper contribution was in fact given to the Church comuittee staf to see?

Admiral TuRNER. The answer to your question is "Yes." The information that a contribution had been made was made available, to the best of ny knowledge.

Senator ScuweikEn. Only certain sections of the report were made available. The report had to be reviewed out at Langley; it was not reviewed here, and copies were not given to us here. 1 just want you to carefully consider what you are saving. because the only record we have are the notes that the stafl' took on anything that was of signifcance.

Admiral Turxer. My understanding was that Mr. Maxwell was shown the relevant portion of this report that disclosed that the contribution had been made.

Senator Scnweixer. To follow this up further, I'd like to say that I think there was a serious flaw in the way that the IG report was handled and the Church committee was limited. I am not making any accusations, but because of limited necess to the report, we have a situ-

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[PAGE 23]
ation where it is not even clear whether we actually saw that material or not, simply because we could not keep a copy of the report under the provedures we had to foilow. We were limited by notetaking, and so it is rather ambiguous as to just what was seen and what was not seen. I certainly hope that the new Intelligence Cominittee will not be bound by procedures that so restrict its ability to exercise effective oversight. oversight. …… A dmiral that we used

I have a second question. Does it concern you, Admiral, that we used a subaerfuge whieh resulted in the use of Federal construe:ion grant funds to finance facilities for these sorts of experinents on our own people? Because as I understand what you are saying, while the CLA mayb only put up Sotãoeo, this triggered a resjonse on the part of the Federal Government to provide on a good faith basis matching hopital funds at the sane level. We put up more than \$1 million of matching funds, sone based on an allegedly private donation whieh was really CIA money. as realy  1A money. ]、that?

1en't there something basically wrong with that? 1snt there somethung pasicany wur

Aduniral TursEr. I certainly believe there is, As I stated, the Gen» eral (ounsel of the ClA at that time rendered a legal opinion that this wa» a legal undertaking, and again 1 an hesitant to go back and rovisir the atinosphere. the laws, the attitudes at that time, so whether the romnsel wa» on good legal grounl or not. I amn not enough of a lawyer to he sue, but it certainly would oreur to ne if it happened today a- a very questionabe aetivity. todax as à very questiunaure a o. -f…- …k worked on and

Senator ScuweikER. Well. I think those of us who worked on and anendet the Hill-Burton Act and other bospital construction assistance laws over the years, would have a rather diferent opinion on the lega? intent or objeet of Congress in passing laws to provide hospital construction project money. These funds weren't intended for ihis. ths. :wbiah turned

It repind- me a little bit of the shellfi-h toxin situation which turned up when I was on the Chureh committee. The Publie Health Service was used to produce a deadly poison with Public Health money. Here we are using general hospital construetion muoney to carry on a series of drug experinents. drnig expermens. 1 1hinl.-

Admiral Turxre. Exeuse me, sir. If I conld just be, I think. aeeurate, I don't think any of this 3o0o or the matehing fund- were used to conduct drug experiments. They were used to build the hospital. Now, the (IA then put more money into a fonndation that was comnducting researeh ou the CIA's behalf sipposedly in that hospital, so the inient was certainly there, hut the money was not used for exprinentation. expermcntatioi. A fo biel and

Senator Schwelken. Well, 1 understand it was used for brieks and mortar, Baut the brieks were used to build the facility where the experiment- werr carried on; were they not! ment nerr carriea on, eis s, :1dt hor were

Admirat Ti RNer. We do not have positive evidence dhat they were. It certainly woußl seem that that was the intent, but I do not want to draw pferences here. draw mterences mere: - dh woner for

Sebator Scnwetker. Well. why else would they give this money for the banlding fund if the building was not used for a purpose that beneditel thie ClA program? benetite th1 prograu: 114CA

Adtuira! TunNEi. 1 certainly draw the inference that the CIA expectel 1o bemtit from it, and sone of the worling says the General

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Counsel's opinion was that this was legal only if the ClA was going to derive adeqnate beheft from it. lat, sir. there is no evidence of what benefi was derived. benefit was derived. 11ue urotty good beneft

Senator Sumweaem. There must have been some pretty good benefits at sake. The Atomie Energy Conumision was to bwar a share of the cost, and when they backel out for sone reason or another, the CIA pieked up part of their tab. So, at two different points there were inslications that ClA decisionmakers though there wa- great benefit to lue drived frona whatever happned within the brick and mortar wall of that facility. walk of that tacunty. -:-w I am anly taking the

Admiral ToksEr. You are absolutely right. I am only taking the position that I eannot snbstantiate that there was leneft derived. position that I eannot suosuama u •Joemmont, say that the CIA

Senator Scnwrnkek. The agreement doemmnents say that the CIA would have access to onesixthof the space involved in the construction of the wing. so how woald you enter into an agreennent that speeifeally says that you will have access to and use of one-sixth of the space and not perfornn something in that space! 1 camnot believe it was eny?y. n0 rmo m hd luthofns

Ailniral Tenser. Sir, I au not disputing you at all, bat both of us are saying that the inferenee is thut one-sixth of the space was used, that experinentation was done, and so on, but there is no factual evidenee of what went on as a result of that payment or what went on in that hospital. lt is just missing. It is not thiat it dlidn't happen.

Senator Scuwrikee. Admira! Turner. one other SematorCwt.ma…

Senator KENsEbr. Would the Senator yiełd on that point?

Selañor Senwriken. I understand that in the ageney's documents on the agrverent it was explicitly stated that one-sixth of the facility would be designated fur ClA use and made available for ClA researeh. Are you familiar- saren. e no mmmmu

Mr. Brouy. Senator, ns I recall. you are right in that there is a mention of one-sixth, lnt any mneution at all has todo with planning. There are no substquent reports as to what happened after the construetion took place. took pare. Vl Ti

Senator SuwEnke. Adnivał Turner, I read in the New York Times that pari of this series of MKtLTRA experimnents involved an arrangeunent with the Federal Bureau of Nareoties to test LSD surreptitiou-hy on mnwitting patrons in bars in New York and San Francisco. Somne of the subjects brecame violently ill and were hospitalizedl. I wonler if you would just briefly describe what we were doing there anl how it was earried out ? 1 assime it was through a safe houte operation. 1 don't believe your statement went into muèh detnil.

Admiral TuesFr. 1 dil mention the safe house operation in my statetent, sir. and theat is how these were carried out. What we have learned fron the new dommaentation is the location and the da'es at which the safe houses were ruu by the CIA and the identification of three indlividuals who were asowiated with running those safe houses. We know something about the constrnetion work that was done in them berause there were contracts for this. Beyond that. we are pretty mueh drawing inferenees as to the ting that went on as to what you are saving here.

Senator Seuwenken. Well, the subjects were uuwitting. You can infer that much, right?

Admiral TE. Right.

[PAGE 25]
Senator Schwlkrr. If you happened to be at the wrong bar at the wrong place aud time, you got it.

Mr. Bropy. Senator, that would be-contacts were made, as we understand it, in barz, et eetera, and then the people may have been invited to these safe houses. There really isn't any indication as to the faet that this took place in the bars.

Adntiral Tursek. We are trying to be very precise with you, sir, and not draw an inference here. 'There are 6 cases of these 149 where we have enough evidence in this new documnentation to substantiate that there was unwitting testing and sone of that invalves these safe houses. There are other cases where it is ambiguous as to whether the testing was witting or voluutary. There are others where it was clearly voluntary.

Senator Scnweiken, Of course, after a few drinks, it is questionable whether informed consent means anything to a person in a bar anyway.

Aduuiral TukseR. Well. we don't have any indication that al} these cases where it is amnbiguous involved drinking of any kind. There are cases in penal institutions where it is not clear whether the prisoner was given a choiee or not. I don't know that he wasn't given a choice. but I doni positively know that he was, and I classify that as an ambiguous ineident.

Señator Ixot rE. Your time is up, Senator.

Senator Huddleston?

Senator Huiolestox. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Aduiral Turner. you stated in your testimony that you are convineedl there was no attempt to conceal this recently discovered documentation during the earlier searches. Did you question the individuals conueted with the earlier search before you made that judgment?

Aduniral Trrxen. Yes: I haven't. I don't think, questioned every. body who Jooked in the files or is still on our payroll who looked in the tiles bark in 1975, but Mr. Laubinger on mny left is the best authority on this. and I have gone over it with him in some detail.

Senator Hipouestos. But you have inquired, you think. sufficienthy to assure yourself that there was no intent on the part of any person to conceal these records from the previous committee?

Admiral Turxer. I am persuaded of that both by my questioning of people and by the cireumstances and the way in which these documeits were filed. by the faet which I did not and should have mentioned in muy testimony. that these were not the official files. The ones that we have received or retrieved were copies of files that were working files that somebody hnd used, and therefore were slipped into a different location, and again I say to you. sir. I can't imagine their delilwrately concealing these partieular fles and revealing the other things that they did reveal in 19ta. I don't see the motive for that. berause these are not that damming compared with the overal material that was provided.

Senator Humpurstos. Is this the kind of operation that if it were continuing now or if there were anvthing similar to it, that you would feel compelled to rrport to the Seloet Committer on Inielligence?

Admiral Tursen.' Yes, sir. You mean. if I discovered that something like this were going ou without my knouledge? Yes. I would feel alsotutely the reqnirement to—

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Senator HumplestoN. But if it were going on with your knowledge, would you report it to the committee? I azsume you would.

Adwiral Tunsek. Yes. Wel, it would not be going on with my knowledge. but theoretically the answer is yes, sir.

Senator Hrimiestos. Wel. then, what suggestions would you have as we devise charters for the various intelligence agencies? What provision would you suggest. to prohibn thi- kind of activity from taking place? Would you suggest that it ought to be specifically outlined in a statutory charter setting out the parameters of the permissible operation of the various agències?

Admiral Tcryen. I think that certainly is something we must consider as we look at the legislation for charters. I am not on the face of it opposed to it. I think we would have to look at the particular worling as we are going to have to deal with the whole charter issue as to exactly how precise you want to be in delincating restraints and curbs on the intelligence activities.

Senator Hupolestos. In the case of sensitive type operations, which this certainly was. which might be going on today, is the oversight activity of the ageney more intensive now than it was at that time?

Admiral Tuasen. Much more so. I mean. J have briefed you. sir. and the committee on our sensitive operations. We have the Intelligence Oversight Board. We have a procedure in the National Security Council for approval of very sensitive operations. I think the amount of spotlight focused on these activities is many, manyfold what it was in thes 12 to 24 vears ago.

Senator Hrpolestoy. How about the record keeping?

Admiral TurNeR. Yes: I can't imagine anyone having the gall to think that he ean just blithely destroy records today with all of the attention that has come to this, and certainly we are emphasizing that that is not thr case.

Senator HvupiestoN. Admiral. I was particularly interested in the activity that took place at the U.S. Public Health Service Hospital at Lexington. Ky.. in which a Dr. Harris Ishell conducted experiments on people who were presumably patients there. There was a narcoties institution, I take it. and Dr. Isbell was. according to the New York Timnes story, carrying on a secret series of correspondence with an individual at th ageney by the name of Ray. Have you identified who that person is?

Admiral Tursen. Sir, I find myself in a difficult position here at a public hearing to confirn or deny these names in view of my legal responsibilities under the Privacy Act not to disclose the nanes of inividuals here.

Senator Hrpptestox. I am just asking you if you have identified the person referred to in that artiele as Ray. I am not asking you who he was. I just want to know if you know who he is.

Admiral TuRNER. No. I am sorry. was this W-r-a-y or R-a-y?

Senator HuppLesrox. It is listel in the news artiele as R-a-y, in quotations.

Admiral Tursen. No, sir. we have not identified him.

Senator HuppLesnus. So you have no knowledge of whether or not he is still a member of voir stafl or connected with the Ageney in any way. Have you attempted to identify him?

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[Pause.]

Admirat TunNEr. Senator. we have a former employee whose first name is Ray who may have hadl some comnection wifh these sctivitios emne non wun ues acuvres.

Senator HvopLestos. You suspeet that but you have not verifed that at this tinue, or at least you arr pot in a position to indicate that you have verified it?

Admiral TensER. That is correet.

Senator HUmmlEstoN. Thank you.

Thank you. Mr. Chairman.

Senator IxouvE. Senator Wallop?

Senator WAtlor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral Turner. not all of the-and in no way trying to exeuse you of the hideous nature of some of these projects, but not all of the projects under MKVLTRA are of a sinistér or even a noral nature. Is that a fair statement?

Admiral TIRNER. That is correct.

Senator Waior. Looking down through some of these 17 projects not involving human testing, aspects of the magician'- art, it doesn't seen as though there is anything very sinister about that. Studies of human behavior and shep research, library searchez. Now, those things in their way are still of interest, are they not, 1o the process of intelligence gathering?

Admiral Turser. Yes. sir. I have not tried to indicate that we either are not doing or wouldl not do any of the things that were involved in MKULTRA. bat when it comes to the witting or unwitting testing of people with drugs. that is certainly verboten, hut thiere are other things.

Senator Wsltor. Even with vohunteer patients? I mean. I am not trying to put you on the spot to say whether it is going on, but I mean. it is not an uicormmon thing. is it, in the prisons of the Inited States for the Pullie Health Service to coaduet varion- kinds of experiments with vaccines and. say. sunburn ereans? I know in Arizona they have done so.

Admiral Trryen. My understanding is. Jots of that is anthorized. but I am not of the opinion that this is not the CIA's business. and that if we peed some ipformafion in that category. I would prvfer to go to the other appuupriate anthorities of the Govermment and ask thento get it for us rather than to in any way

Senator Wsutae, Well. you know, you have library searches and attemdants at the matimnal seuimars, Thi- is why 1 wanted to ask von if the bulk of these projects were in any way the kinds of things that the Agenes might not do now, A Pr-ident would pot have been horriftd hy the li-t of the legitinate tvies of things. Isn't that probably the case?

Ahiral Tuaytn. Yes. sir.

Scnator Wautar. And if it did in faet app ar in the IG report, is there any reason to suppose that the Presidept did not know of this projoet? Yon said thore wa- no reason 1o suppo-e that he did, but let me reverse that. I- there any reason to snppose that they did not?

Admiral TuRNER. No.

Sonator Wsujor. Well. vou know. I just caunot imagine vou or literally anybody undertaking projecte of the magnitude of dollars here and jnst not knowing about it. not informting your superior that

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these were going on. especially when certain itemns of it appear in the Inspeetor (eneral's report on hulget mmntters. Inspector Gieneral s report on uugs 1: 0 1 l it is that far hack to

Adniral Tuünen. Well. I find it diflicult when it is that far back to hypothesize what the proerdures that the Direetor was using in terms of informing his superiors were. It is quite a diferent climate fron today. and i think we do a lot more informing today than they did back then, but 1 find it very diflicult to guess what the level of know)- edge was. edge was. cocond-aness it but

Senator Wallor. I am realy not asking you to second-guess it, but it just seems to me that. while the past is past, and thank goodness we are operating under diferent sets of eircunstances, I think it is naive for us to suppose that these things were condueted entirely without the knowledge of the Presidents of the Uuited States during those times. It is just the kinds of rescareh information thiat was being songht was vital to the United States, not the means. but the information that they were trving to find. were tryingto nna. i vüta1? Did

Admira! Turser. I an sorry. Yonr question is. was this vital? Did we view it as vital? we yiew 11 as vutal! 1 L-\~ninathat

Senator Walaor. Well. your implication at the beginning was that it was a response to the kinds of bebavior that were seen in Cardinal Mind-zenty's trial and other things. I mean, somehody must have thought that this was an important defensive reaction, if nothing else. on the part ot the t nuird suares on the part of the United States. - T iuct don't

Aduniral TurNen. Yes, sir, I au sure they did. but again I just don't know how high that permeated the executive braneh. know mow mgnat me s till imnortant

Senator Wallop. But the kinds of information are still important to you. I mean, I an not suggesting that anyone go back and do that kinrd of thing again, but l'u certain it would be of use to you to know what was going to happen to one of your agents assuming someone had put one of these things into his bloodstream, or tried to modify his behavior. DenV10T, ooon

Admiral Tunser. Ahsolutely. and you know, we would be very concerned if we thought there were things like truth serums or other things that onr agents or others coull be subjeeted to by use or improper use of drugs hy other powers against our people or agents. hhut aro

Senator Waiior. Are there? I don't ask you to name them, but are there such serum-? mere sucn serums: Tl h ta

Admiral Tuasen. I don't know of them if there are. I would have to answer that for the record, sir.

Senator WaLlor. I would apprecinte that.

[The material referred to follows:]

"TRITI" 1RUGS IN INTERRIGATION

The sparch for efertive aids to inierrogation is probably as old as man's need ti obíain infortuatiou fron an uproonrative souret nud as tersistent as bis inpatience to shorteut any tortuous path tn the annals of police investigation. physisasl eareion bas at iines been substitutedl for gainstaking atud timeoonsuming inquiry in the hlief tha, direet metbil produce quick resuls sir Juines Stephens. writing in 1ss3. ratioaalizes a gristy example of "third degree" prar ticrs ly the pulice f India : "li is far pleasanter tu sit comafortabiy in the shade rubbitg red jerber in a jwor devils eyes thn to go abuut in the sut hunting up evilebpce." evinenre. \$.- nociet.

Mure recently, goliee officials in some countrios have turted to drugs for assistanee in extraeting cmfessions fron accnsed persons, drugs wbich are esumed

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to relas the iudividnals defonses tothe puiut that he unkmowingly reveals truths he has tuvn trying to romreat. This itvestigative teehnipae. Jowover humanitaria» as an alternative in physical torture. stili raises serious questious of individaal rights and biberties. ln this conntry. whero drugs have gaíned only marginal acoptaner in policr work, their nse has prsoked cries of "pyoholagical third degree" and has prerípítated medienlegal controversies that after a quarter of a century still ocásionally fare into the on.

The use of sorcalled "trntl" drne in polier work is similar to the arerpted peychiatri practicr of nareo-analysis: the differersce in the two procedures lies i their difiront obitives The pliee invesligator is cokrrued with enárical trutt that may te used against the suspr1, and shrefore ahas1 solely with prodatire truth: the nsefußtss of the susiet's revelations dozetds ultimately on ihir aceptauee in evidlter ty a cunrt of taw. Tbe psyrliatist. cu the other hand. aeitg Dhe satat "iruih" drngs in diagnsis abd treatnuent of the muentallv in. is prinarily conernet with pspehological truth or psyehobgicnl rralitr rater than enpirica) fart. A puatients atrrutiotes are rrafity for hinu al th the they occur. and an arenratr aeiat uf thst fautasies al dehusions, raher than reliatle reculleetiop otf past eveuts. cin he the key to recuvers.

The notion of drugs rapable of illuninatiug hidden recesses of the mind tel iag to hoal the meutally ill and preveuting or ruversing the nuisrarriage of justice. has providesd nu vxorrdiugiy duratle theme fur the prs nnd peptilar literature. Whil aektowkeiging that "iruth stnut" is a misnomur twiee over-the drugs are sot sera ant they do mot necessarily briug torth jroluative truthjourualistic accmumuts continue to exzbuit the aplual of the ter. The formnla is to play mp a few spectaenlar "truih" drug sucessess and tu imply that the drugs are more psligned ian neosl be anl more widely ebujoytd in eriminaì iuvestgation than can othciaty teaduitted.

Any trehnique that prumises an inerement of suecess in extraeting information fromu a uucouupliant sorer is ipsr, facto of interest in intelligenee operations. If tha ethiral cousieration whieh jn Westeru rounirirs inhibit the use of narcoiuterrogatioi in pulier work are fett alsu in tntelligotee. the Western services must at least Ia: preparest against its possible empioynent ly the adversary. An unndlerstanding of truth" drugs, their charartrristir aetions, aud their potentialities. junsiti and negatise. for eliciting tseful iuformations is fundameutal to au adequate defense nraínst them.

This disenssion. meant so belp toward sueh an uuderstanding. draws urimarily upou openly putlishut muateriais. It has the liuitatious of pojecting fron crintnal investigative prartices and fron the permissive atmosuhere of drug psyehotherapy.

SOPCLAMINE AS "TATTH SERUM"

Eatiy in this tuntury physicians begau 1o employ scotolamine, along with morpline and ehhoroforu, to induee a state of "twilight sleep" during ehildbirth A constitment of hrtbat. sropalanine was knon to prodie sedatimn nud drowsinuss. cofusiou and disoricutation. incootdination. and ammesia for events experiented during iutoxiration. Yet pbysicians moted thal womet in twilight sleep answerrd questions aeenratoly aud often voluntsered exeedingly eandid remarks

Jo mt22 it occnrred to Rodert House, a Dallas. Texas obstetrician. thai a simiiar technigue uight Ie engdoyed in the interrogatio of suspected crininals, and he arranged to mntervirw mnder seomlanmine twn prisoners in the Danas county jail whose guilt spnaed chearly coutiruned. tnler the drug, bott men deniml the eharges on which they wrre held; atd both, uwon trial. were founl not guilgy. Enthosiastie at this smtass, House cnehuded tbat a patient mnder the infuene of scup olatmine "cantot create a lie. . , and there is no power to think or reason." [14} His exjeriment and this (onclusion attracte) wide atiention. and the idea of a "truth" drug was thu- lamnehed nsn the pubdie eonsrtousness.

The phrase "truth serun" is believed to have appeared first in a news repurt of Hlanses exerinent iu (he Los Aaghs Rcezard. sometime in z. Hmse resisted the tern for a whike hnt eentually catne to eaploy it regalarly himself. He pube lishod some eleven articies on seogwdamine in the years t9zt-trnu, with n natico. alle inereise hu jalemiea) zal as tine went on. What had begun as something of a scteutiße statearnt turaud fually jnto a dedicated erusade by the "fathter of truth serum" on hehalf of hi- ofspring, wherein he was "grossly indulgent of its way ward behmayior and stuiblborniy proond of its minor aebievenents "{n]

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Only a handful of cases In wbich scopolamine was used for police interrogation came to publie notice. thangh there is evidence suggesting that some police forces may have used It extensively. {2. 16) One polire writer claims that the thrent of scujwolantine interrogation bas been etfective in exiracting confessions from criuinal snspects, wh are told they will frst be rendered unconscious by chtoral hydrate plaeed covertly in their toftre or drinking water. [16] chtorai nyarate pacea coven m svdonine wos shartls die.

Because of a number of undesirahle side efects. scoplamine was shortls dis-. qualifed as a "trutb" drug. Among the most disabling of the side efeets are hallucinations, disturbed perception. somnalence, and pbrsiologiral pbenomena such as headache, rapid heari. and blarred visioß. which distraet the subjeet fronı the ceutral purpse of the interview. Furthcrmore. the physical action is long. far antlasting the psrchological efects. Seopolamine continues, in sone cases. to make anesthesia and surgery safer hy drçing the mouth and throat and reducing seere tious that might ohstruet the air passages. Bat the fantastically, almost painfully. dry "deseri" month bronghi on by the drug is hardly conducive to free talking. eveu in a tractalile subject.

THE BARBITI'RATES

The first suggestiou that drngs might Sacilitate communication wlth emotionaßy distnrbed patirut- came quite èy aevident in 1916. Artimur S. Jovenbart and his assniates at the University of Wisconsin. experimentlng with respiratory stimnlants. were surprised when. after an mjection of sodiun eyanide. a catatonie jatient who had laug heen mute and rigid snddenly relaxed, upened his eyes. and even answered a few questions. By the early 193o's a mumber of psychiatrists were experinenting with drugs as an adjunet tu estahlished nethods of therapy. ililitr that drugs

At about this time police ofcials. still attraeted ty tne possunmu taa uruss migh help in the interrogation of suspects and witnesses. turned to o class of deptessant drng- known as the barbiturates, By la3s (larence W. Muehlberger. head of the Michigan Crinue Jetection Labnratory at East Lansing. was using barbiturates on reluciant suspect». though police work continued to he hampered by the euris tejestiol of drug-induced confessions excep in a few carefulls circumsribedinstances.

The barbiturates. first synthesized in 1903. are among the oldest of modern drugs and the most versatile of all depressauts. In this half-century some 2.500 have been prezrired. and alont two dozen f these have won an important place in meline. Au estinatetd thre to four billion doses of barhiturates are preserilad ly physirians in the Tnited States eaeh year. and they have cone to be known hy a variery of comumurreiat names and colorful slang expressions: "gooftalłs." Luminal. Nembutal, "red devil." "yellow jackers." "pink ladies." ete. Three uf then which are usel in narcoanalysis and have seen service as "truth" drugs are sdinn amçtal tatoharbital. pentotbal sodium (tbiopental), and toa lesser exteut seconal isecolarbital.

A、 oue plarmacologist explains it. a subjeet coming under the infnenee of a barbiturate injosted intraveunnsly goes through all the stages of progressive druakomtuess. tat the time sale is on the order of minutes instead of bours. Outwardly the seation efert is dramatic. esjcially if the subject is a psyehiatrie putient in teusitn. His features lacken. his body relaxts. Some people are monnentarily excited; a few lweme silly and giggly. Ths nsually tesses, and tast suijerts fall asleej. energing later in disoriented semi-wakefulness.

The descent iuto narvosis and beyond with progre-sively larger doses can he divided as follows:

1. Sedlative stage.

11. Incosiousless, wth exaggeratei repxes (hyperactire age).

I. Iucohscjoustess, without reßex even tu paiuful stimuli.

iv. Peath.

Whether alt thesr stages can le distinguished in ans given subjeet depends largely on the dose aut the rapidity with which the drug is induced. In anesthesia. stages I and Il may last only two or three seconds.

The ßrst or sedlative stage cau lu further divided :

Plane 1. No evident effert. ur sllgh sodative effeet.

Plane 2. Clondiness. caluness, amnesia. tTpon recovery, the subject will not remepber what hapsaed at this or "lower" planes or stages.)

Plane 3. Shurred speech. old thonght patterns disrupted. inatility to inte grate or learn new latlerus. Poor courdination. Suljeet lecomes unaware of paniful stímuli.

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Plane 3 is the psychiatrle "work" stage. It may last only a few minutes, but it can he extepded by further slow injection of drug. The nsual practice 1s to bring the subject quickly to Stage II and to conduet the interview as he paases back into the sedative stage on tbe way to full consciousuess.

CLINICAL AND EXPERIMENTAL BTUDIES

The general abhorrence in Western countries for the use of chemical agente "to make peojle do things againet their will" bas precluded serious ssstematic etudy (at least as putlished openty) of the poteutialities of drugs for interroga. tlon. Louis A. Gottscbalk. surveying their use in infornation-seekiug inter. views.[13} cites I36 tefereuces; but only two touch upon the extraction of lutelligence bnformation, and oue of these cotcludes merely that Russian technigues in iuterrogation and Indoctrination are derived fron age-old police methiods and do not depend on the use of drugs. On the validity of confessions obtained with drugs, Gottschalk found onls three published exierimental studies that he deetied worth reporting

One of these reported experiments by D. P. Morris iu which intravenous sodium amstal was helpful in deteeting malingerers.[12] The subjects, soldiers, were ot first sulleu. uiegativistic, and noti-productive under amytal. hut as the interview proceeded they revealed the fact of and causes for their malingering. Uaually the interviews turned up a nenrotic or psyebotic basis for the deception.

The other two confession studies, leing more reievant to the highly specialized. untouched area of drugs in intelligence futerrogatiot, deserve more detailed review.

Gerson and Victoroff(12] conducted amrtal interviews with 1T neuropeyehiatrie patlents, soldiers who had charges against then. at THiton Generai Hospital, Fort Dis. First tbey were interviewed without amytal by a peychiatrist. who. neither iguoring nor stressing their situation as prisoners or suspects under serutiny, urged each of theur to divcuss his social and famils background, his arny career, and his verslot of the charges peuding against hinm

The patients were told only a few mtnutes iu advance that narcoanalysis would be perfuruedt. The doetor was considerate, but posttive and forthright. He indi. cated that thes had no choice hut to submit to the procedure. Tbeir attitudes varied from unqsstioning conuplianee to dowbright refusal.

Each putient was brought to conilete narcosis and permitted to sleep. As he lecame semiconsrious and could be stimulatedt to speak, he was held in this stage with additional auastal while the questioning proeeded. fie was questione frst about intocuuus matters fronu his hackgrognd that he hat discussed before receiving the drue. Whenever possibte. he was manipmlated into bringing up bimself the charges pending against hinu before being questioned atunt them. If be did this it: a tou futly couscions state, it proved more efielive ta ask him to "talk atuout that later" and to interjose a tople that would dimiuish snspicion. delaying the luterrogatiot on his eriminal activity uatił he was back ju the projer stage of narcosis,

The prowedure differed from therajeutic narconnalysis in seteral ways: the setting. the type of patients, and the kiud of "truth" ronght. Also, the snhjects were kept in twilight conseiousness longer than usunl. Tlus state proved ricbest in yield of admissinns prejudicial tu the subjeet. In it his spwech was thick. mumbling, aud disconnecteù. but his diseretio was markediy rednred. This vatuable interrogation period. Iasting only tive to ten minutes at a time, could be reinduerd by injecting more amytal and putting the patient tuck to sleep.

The interrogation tecluipe variet froni ease fo case areording to background Information abont the patient. the serionsvess of the cinrges. the patient's attltude under uareusis aut his rapywort with ihe dowtor. Somnetimes it was uspful to pretend. as the patient grew more fully conscious, that he had already confessed during the amnestie perind of the interrogation. and tu urge him, while bis menory and sptse of self-protection were still limite, to coptinue to elaborate the details of what he had "uiready descriled." When it wns olvions that a subjeet was withholding the truth. his denials were quiekty passet over and ignored. and thu kes questios wouht le reworded hn a pew apqroach.

Sevetal patients revealed fantasies, fears, and defusions approaching delrium. muueh of whieb rould rendily be distinguished fron reality. Rut sonpetimes there was ne way for the eximuinor to distinguish truth fromn fnutasy rxrept by refer etre tu other souroes. Oe subjeel claimed to have a ehild that did not exist,

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another threaiteued to kill on sight a stepfather who had tuel dead a Fear, mod yet another confessed to partiipating in a robbery wben in fset he had only purcbasl god- fron the psriicitauts. Testimony couceruing dates and specife pares was uutrustworthy and often contradictory lecause of the patient's loss of timneseuse. 1lis veracity in citing names and events proved questionahle. Becaus of his comnfusion ahout actual eveuts and what he thought or feared had happeted. the twtient at tires mauaged to coral the trutl unintentionally.

As the subirct rerived, he would becoue aware tha! he was being questioned about his seerets and. depeuding uznn his persality, his feat of disoovery, or the degrer of his disiliustuument with the doctur. grow negativistic, hostile, or pbysically aggressive. Oecasjrsally patients had to Ja: forribly restrpined during this jsriri to prevynt jujury tu themselves or others as the dotot continued to tuterrugate. Somue patients, moved ly ferce atd diffuse anger. the assumption thal th) had arealy ben trirked into confessing. snd a still linited sense of (üseretion, detiaatiy aeknnw ledgil their gnilt and chalieuged the observer to "do sotiethitg about it " As the exoitemend passed. souae fell back on their origjnal stories and otbers veritied Dhe eonfessi) materia). During the follow-up interview nine of the 1τ admitted the validity of their euufessions; eight repaudiated their confessions and rrafirmed their earlier accounts.

Winl respui to the reliabiliry of the resuts of surh interrogation, Gerson and Victopoft rouiclude that tersistent, cateful questinning can reduce ambiguities in drug interrogation, bet camot elininate theat alogether.

At lenst one expuriment has shown tbat suhjerts are capahle of maintaining a lie whiie uuler the tutiuente of a harbiturate. Redlich aud his associates at Yatelā] aduinisteredl sodinn aniytał to nine voluuteers, students and professionabs. who had previously. for purpwuses of the experiment. revealed shameful und guili-prtuing eptsoies uf ibeir 1sst aud then invented fais self-proteetive sturies to cover thrtn. ln neatrhy every case the cover story retained some elements of the guilt inherent in thetrue slory.

Inder the influenct of the drug. the subjects were crossexamined on their cover stories tbr a secoud investigator. The resats, though not defnitive. shawed thai nornal individuals wbo bad good defenses and no overt potbologiesl traits could stiuk to their invented stories atul refuss eoufession. Neurotic individuals with strog uacouscimus self-punitiv tendencies. on the other hand. both confessed sore easily and were incliuel to substitute fantasy fur the truth, copfessing toofetses mver actunlly conmitted

In recent years drug therapy has maade xone use of stimulants. most notably anmpbetamine (Beuzedrine and its relative methamphetamine (Methedrine). These drugs. used either abomr or foltowiug intravenous barbiturates, produce an ontponiriug of ideas. elotions, and neniories whieh has been of help in diagmosiug mental disorders. The potential of stimniants in interrogation has re ceived little attention. anless in unpuhdished work. In oue study of their peschiatrio use Brusseì rf al. [7] maintain t)nt nethedrine gives tbe liar no fime to think ot fo organize his dapt jons. onry the drug takes huold. they siy, an fnsurnonntalle urge to jkur uut speerh trats the malingerer. Gottschalk, on the other hand. says that this elaiiu is extravagant. asserting without elaboration that the study lacke pruper comtrols. 13j It is evudent that the conbined use of tarbiturates and stimulants, perheps along with ataraxics (tranqullizers), should be further explored.

CBSIRVATIONK PRUM PRACTRCE

J. M. MacDonald. who as a psychiatrist for the Distriet Courts of Denver has had extensive experience wit)i nareoanalysis. says that drug interrogation is of donbtful valne in obtaining confessions fu crites. triminal suspwets under the infuenre of barbiturates may delbberately wilhhold information. persist in giving uniruthfuí answers, or falsely confess to srines they did not commit. The pspehopathtie personality. it jurticular. appoars to resist successfully the infuenie of drugs.

MacDouald tells of a criminal psychopath who. having agreed io narco-interrogation. received 1.5 grams of soutium anytal over a period of fve hours. This man feigned amnesia and gave a falsr aironnt of a murder. "le displayed litle or ho remorst as he tfaisely : deseribed the rrime. including buurial of the bsody. Indeed he was very solf-possessed and hr apeared alauost ta enjoy the examinatiun. Fron tine tu tine he womld rquest that more anytal } injeeted."[21]

MacDonald concludes that a person wt gives flse information prior to re

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ceiving drugs is likelt tn give fals. inforuation also under nareosis, that the drng- arr uf liile vahua- for revraling dueltios. aud that tbey are more efertive in reheasing uneunsciomsty repressed material than in evoking cosciousiy suppress d inforuation.

Auother tsyuhia'riss knowt for his wtrh with eriminls. L. Z. Fredmat. gnve sliuno anytal ti. mnen aused of varioas civil and mltitary antsocial nets. The subierts were nrntally uustalde, their conulitious rauging fron chararter disurders tn nenroses aud msyehuses. The drug muterviews pruved usyetatricalh beuetcial to the patienis. bat Freedaan foml tlhat his viow of oijoetive reality was seltote inproset by ttroir revelatotis. He was unable to say on the hasis af th marro-interrogaioa whether a given aet had nr had mat oenrrel. Like Mar-Ihnatd he fuund that tsyehosathtie individuals ctn duy to the Iwinr of anconsjsmes crins thateery ohjetix sigh indirates they he tmmumitteu. la)

F. c Inlau. Profesur of Law al Northwester University, whu has had constdbera!de experienet observing and psrticipsitng ln "irith" drug tesis. claims th: ths are onrasimnlly efeetive on ersons wh wouid hae disekosed the truth auway had thuey taen projmrly inlerrogatd. lat that a rson deter mmnd tu li will usoaltr l ahlr to emniinu th dieepijon ubder drugs

The tuo tuiłititry Iryrhiatrists whu Bade the uoet cstetsive use of uareuanal ysis dnring the war years. Ro H. Grinker nnd Jobn t. Sjegel. eonehtd thal in almest alt cases thes roukd obtain fron theit patints csscntially the same matiriil ad giv thn 1h sane natiopal releasr by thray withot the use 11 dirugs, uruvidel they had suticient time

Thu tsutre uf thuse cmnens fronu professionals of long experience is that drugs prusid- rapid aoess to iuformuatiou that is tsyefíairicaliy usfut bt of donèéfn) valltis a cupirical truth. The satoe pyehtogiral nfornation and a l alultrated enpiritn iruth ean b obtained fron fuly consios subjects throgh m-drug trtetlera and skilfa wliee interrogatio

AFPIICATRON TO CI INTFRROKIATION

The alnnst total nlsttrt of controled exsrimental studies of "iruttt" drugs snl ih srt aud aneedotal uatúro uf jeycbtairie and pudir evidenre reguire that exirapolatiots to intrlligctee oeratiuns té made with esre. Stll, enough is kmwu ;alul th drugs arlinm to suggest rertain rotsiderations ateetitg the piirufotheir tsin mterrogatot\~.

It shonl ln lrar frun th foregoing that at bes n drug can only serve as nu aidl to ah interrogator who has a sure understaudig of the psyehotogy and terlipesuf tormnan! inerrogatio. In soue restts, ibeed. the demands on his skill will tu mnreastt ln il bafing mivute ot irutb aud fuutasy in drug-indued wirtal. Anl the tenkney against wliel ho nust guard in ttt interrogate to give the rsponsrs thai srem to tu- wanted withon regard fur faets will be heightened b drugs: the literature alaruuds with uwarnitgs that a subjtet in tatousis is extrruel suggestible

I senus jussibte that ttis suggosfibitity aodl the towered guard uf the nateotic siate migh te pa to advantage in lh cas of a subjtt fvigning ignorance of a banrnag. er some other skil sat had temue automuatie with him. Liptonfo fondl snlanu aytut htfut in determiniug whether a foreign subjel was merely preueading mno! tu muderstanl Engtish By estension. oe ea guess that a drugged intorrugitoe tight hat dituliy maiutaiaing the prezense taar l did mot conprehnd h ilion of a profession he was trying to hid

There is tfie furiher probhen of bostility in the interrogator's relationship to a resistaure souro. The aecumulated knowledege almnu "trutb drug reaction has vo largely sron ttient-physician retatiousbins of trust nud ronfdenue. The subiet in unreuanuhrsis is nsualhy qenivated a prioi to cerate with the jsvrhitri-i, pjthr tu ohtain reliof fruqu mental sufering or to conirilmie to a sieutiti stuuly. tvyu ju pulice work. whre au ataosplere of anxiety wad threat ma ln dmia, a rolatiohshi ef trus fruenth assetis itslí n drug is aduitisteredì h àt tpedicnì mth iuntnd by a xtri1 code af ettics: the suspect agrin to utulorgo uarrotualysis i a drrat büd for turrlatation of hhs lestimoay trosts both drug and psyvhiatrist. howovet apprebensitely ; amt tinally, as Freluau anun Mtaehonald lrave iadirated, the pdice teyeloatrist frequenty deols wih u sich" erininal, an sou order of patient-physician relationshil muessatily evolves.

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Raroly has a drug interrogation involved "potmal" individuais in a bostile or grtuinely threatening milieu. It was fron a northreateting experimental setting thuant Erir Lindemann could say that his "torial" subjects "reported a geueral sense of euploria. ease and coufidence. and they exhibited a marked increas it: talkativeness and commnnicability."[1s] Gersom and Vietoroff list poor distor-psitient rapjort as one factor interferiug with the completeness and authenticity of confessions hy the Fort Dix soldier. eaughí as they were in a romumand pwrforuance and told they had no choice hut to submiit to nartoiplerrogation. iplerrogation. Fromn all indications, subject-interrogator rapjort is usually crncial to obtain- urt is usually crucial to obtain ing the psyehotogical releas which may lead tu unguarded disclosures. Role-playing on the part of the interrogator mighi ie a possible solutiou to the problem of establishing rapport with a drugget subjeet, In therapy. the Rritish arcoanalyst Willian: Sargent recommends that the therajist delberately distort the facts of the patient's lifeexperiencr to achieve heightened emotiount response and abrrartion.127] 1n the druuken state of narcoanalysis patients are prone to arcept the therajist's false constructions. There is reason to expot that a drugged subjeet wuuld comuuannicate freely with an interrogator playing the role of relative. colleague. physician. imnedinte sapwrior. or any other person to whom his barkgrontél indicated he woald be responisive. barkgrontl indicated he wouttd te resrse. Even when rapport is pwor, however, ther. renains one facet of drug sction .. ramains one facet of drug action eminently explritalle in interrogation—the fact that subjects emerge fron narcosis feeliug they have revealed a great deal, even when they bave not. As Gerson and Victoroff deaonstrated at Fort 1ix, this psyehological set provides a major opening for oltaining genuine confessions.

POSSIRLE VARIATIONS

In studies b Beecher and his assoclates.[3-6] one-third to one-half the individuals tested proved to be placelu reactors. suljects who respond with symptomuatie relief to the administration of any springe. pill., or capsule, regerdless of what it contaius. Altbough no studies are knowu to have been made of the plarebu pbenonnenon as appliel to narco-interrogation, it seens reasobable that when a subjeet's sense of guilt interferes with produetive interrogation. a placebo for pseudlo-narcosis could have the effect of alsolviug hin of the responsibility for his aets and thus clear the way for free commmuication. It is notable that placetus are most likely to lw efective in situations of stress. The individuals most likely to react to placthus are the more anxious, more self-centered, more dependent on outsidle stimulation. those who express their needs more freely socially, talkers who drain of anxiety by conversing with others. The nonreaetors are those elinically tuore rigid and with better than average ebotional coutrol. No sex or I.Q. differences tetween reuetors and non-reactors have been fomd. found. dnas with hvnnotic trance

Anonher passibility might be the comubined use of drugs with hypnotie trance andò jst-hyptatie suggestion: hyptansis tonld presmmaily prevent sny recollee tion of the drug exjerienre. Whether a subjeet can be trought to trance against his will or unaware. however, is a matter of soune disagreemeut. Orne, in a survey of the pwotential uses of hyposis in iuterrogation,t23l asserts that it is donbtful, desjite nany apparent indivatious ta the conutrary. that trance can be induced in resistant sutjeets. It unny l sssille, he adds, to hpuotize a subjeet unaware. bot this wuuld require a jositive relationship with the hypuotist not likely to lu fontuł in the interrogation setting. lu: fontuł in the interrogaton sesng t emnloved when only light

In melical hypnosis. pentothal slinm is sometimes employed when only light traner has been induced anl deeter nareosis is desired. This procedure is a possibility for interrogatiun. but if a satisfactory level of narcosis could be achieved through hypuotie trance there would appear to be no need for drugs.

DEFENSIVE MEASUBES

There is no knuwn way of building tolerance for a "truth" drug withont creating a disabling addiction, or of arresting the action of a larbiturate once lnduced. The uuty full sufeguard against aareo-intorrogation is to prevent the administration of thr drug. Short of this, the lwst defense is to make use of the same knuwledgr that suggests drugs for ofensive operations: if a subjoet knows that on emerging from nareusis he will halve an exaggerated notion of how mcch be has reveaßed he can letter resolve to deny he has said auything.

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The disadvantages and shortcomings of drugs in otensive operations become positive features of the defense pausture. A subject in narco-interrogation is intosicated. wavering befween deep sleep and seni-wakefulness. His spech 1s garbiol and irrational, the anouut of ontpat drasticany diminished. Drugs disrupt estallished thomght patterns, jncluding the wil to resist, but ther do so indiscriminately and thus also interfere with the patterns of sustantive infor. mntion the interrogatot seeks. Even under the conditions most favorable for the interrogator, output will be contaminated iy fantasy, distortion, and untrath

Possibly the most efrctive way to artu oneself against narcointerrogation would le to udergo a "dry ruu." à trial drug interrogation with output tapesì for playlack would fatmiliarize au individnal with his own reaetions to "truth" drugs. and this fumiliariiy wonld heip to redue the eneets of harassment by the interrogator before aud after the drug has been adbninistered. Fron the visw point of the intelligene service. the trial exzosure of a particnlar operative to drugs migh? provile a rough benehnark for assessiug the kind and amount of inforuuation be wonud divuige in marovsis.

There nay be eotueern over the possibility of drng addiction jutentionally or aecidentally induceò bş an adversary servire. Most drugs will eause addiction wih probouged use. ant the harbiturates are no exception, Iu recent stadies rt the U.s. Pullir Hoalth Service lospital for addiets in Lexington, Ky., suhjects rerpiveì harge doses of iarlitnra: uvet a perioš of months. Upon removal of the drug. they experienred pcute withultawal sympdoms and behaved in every reskwu like ehraie alroshoios

Becaus- their actio is extremely sbort. however. aud because there is little likelihuuaì that they wonutd be administeredl regularly over a prolomged period. barhjuurate "truth" drugs preseut slight risk of opseratiouał addiction. If the adversary servicr were intent on ereating addietiont in order ta. exploit withdrawal. it wonld tuave otlier. nore rapid meaus of producing states as unpleasant as witslraual syujsoms

The halhurinatory anui psyehosouitnetie drugs sueb as mescatine. muarihuapa. Ls) 25. and umirtotine are sometintes mistakenly assoiated with narcoauaivtie interrugatiar. Thes drugs distort the pereeptioa and interpretation of the sensory iupa to the ceutrul teervos system and affeet vision. andition, sme)l, the seusatiol: of thie size of tulys parts and their pwsition in suare. ete. Mesealine and Lsh-25 have Imen useł 1n ereate experimentaí "pschotic states." and in Dinor way as aidsin esychotherapy.

Since iuformation obtaied fronu a puerson in a psyohotie drng state would be uurealistic. bizarre. atnl estreuely dificnlt to assess. tho self-administratton of Lsii. 2ã. wiivb is efeetive in ninate dosages. might in swial rireunstantes ofer an ojerative tenorary proteetiop agaipss interrugation. Coceivaly. on the othrr hand. ar adversary servire could use such drugs to proince auxiety or terror in nttdicalty mrsordnsticatedl subieets muabe to distinguish drug-induced psychasis frun artual insuity. An enliglifeturd ojerative cołd not le thds frigtteued. however. kuowiug that thr efeet of these balturinogenic sgents is transieu! in mormal íułividnuls.

Most broadly. there is evidence that drugs have least effeet on wel-ndjusted individuals with got defenses and gol entotional control and that anyone who can withstan the siress of ctupwtent interrogatios in thu wakíng stare cau do so ip naroosis. The pxsentiaì resourves for resistance thus apuear to lie within the iudividual.

CON1USIONS

The salient point» that energe fron: this discussion ate the following. No sueh magir brew as the tsqatlar totion of srntht srum exists. The barhituratex, by disrugtiug defeusive patterns, may sotuetitues le helpful àn iuterrogatiat, but even mnder the best coditiots they wil elcit au outzns rotauitastl b) deel tiom. fantasy. garbleł sph. pte. A maajor vulmerahülity they prohme in the subjeet is a tendetey to belirvr he has reveaed maore than he has. ht is possihle. however, for both horual individual aud uyehotaths to resist drng interrogation; it seets likoly that any indisiluat wlo cap witlostand ordinary iutensive interrogatir can hoßd oní in nareosis. The lust gid to a defense against nareo-intertogation is foreknowledge of th proess aei iis limiations. There is an acnto ned for coqirolled ex«erineutat studies odf drug reaetion. notmnly to depressants but also to stinulanuts and ta counèjnatious of dejressants, stinuulatts. and Btarnxies

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REFERENTES

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Admiral Turuer. 1 appreciate that these tawdry activities were taking place long before your watch. andl 1 think you have correctly labeßed them as abhorrent, but not only were they abhorrent, it seems to ne they were rather bnmngled, amateurish experiuents that don't seem to have been handled in a very scientitie way, at least from the scanty evidence we have.

It. seens to me that there were the minimum of reports and the Ageney didn't have the ability to call it quits. It went on for some 12 years, as yout mentioneł. What 1 would like to get to is, are you convineed now in your Ageney that thosr scientife experiments. Regitimate ones that you were conducting with polygraph and so forth, were being copdocteid in a scientife manner and that you are handling it in a correet mamner to get the best information that you are secking in the end?

Admiral Turser. Yes. I an, and I also have a sense of confidence that we are limiting oursolves to the areas where we need to be involved as opposed to areas where we can rely on others.

Senator Cnarer, I am convinced of that from your report. I just do hope that you have people who are trained in not only handling this tyjie of experiment. but in preparing the proper reports and drawing the proper data frou the reports. You are convineed that you have this type of people?

Admiral Tursen. Yes, sir.

Sesator Cusree. The second point I am interested in was the final lines in yonr testinony here, which I believe are very important, and that is that the Agenéy is doing all it can in cooperation with other branches of the Government to go about tracking down the identity of those who were in sonie way adversely affected. and see what can be done to fulfill the government's responsibilities in that respect. I might adl that 1 eomnend you in that. and I hole you wilì pursue it vigorously.

A hospital in my State was involved in these proceedings, and it is unelear exactly what did take plaee, so I have both a parochial interest in this and a ñational interest as well, aud 1 do bope you will press on with it. It involves not only you, I apuueciate. but also HEW and perhapsthe Attorney General.

Admirał TuRsEn. Thank yon, sir. We will.

Senator Cnaree. Thank yon. Thank you. Mr. Chairman.

Senator Isouvr. Thank you very much,

Admirat Turner. MKUiTRA subproject 3 was a projeet involving the surreptitious admninistation of Lsb on unwiuting persons, was it not?

Admiral TuRNER. Yes. sir.

Seuator Ixotre. In February 1934, and this was in the vety early stages of MkULTRA, the Director af Central Iatelligenee wrote to the technical serviees staf ofljcials criticizing their judgment because they had participated in an exjeriment involving the administration of LsD on an mnwitting basis to Dr. Frank Oson. who later conmitted suiside. Now, the idividuals eriticized wery the sane iudividuals who werr pesponsible for this subprojeet 3. involvíng exaetly the same praetices, Even though these jndividals were elearly aware of the dangers of surreptitions administration and had bueen eríticized by the Director

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of Cenfral InteBigence, subprojeet 3 was not terminated immediately after Dr, O}son's death.

In faet. according to documents, it contined for a number of years. Can vou provide this comnittee with auy explanation of how such testing coild have continned under these circumnstances?

Adhiral TurNEn. No, sir. I really can't.

Senator IxotyE. Are the individuals in the technical services who carried on subproject 3 stil on the (IA payroll

Admiira) Tunser. I am sorry. Are you asking. are they today?

Senator IsotYE. Y’es.

Aduiral TurNeR. No, sir.

Senator Ixorye. What would you do if you criticized officials of the technical services staf and they continuetl to carry on experimentatiom for a mumuber of years?

Admiral Tursen. I would do two things, sir. One is. I would be sure at the beginning that 1 was explicit erough that they knew that I didn't want that to be continuedł anywhere else. and two. if 1 found it being continued, I would roll sone heads.

Senator 1xorve. Could you provide this committee with information as to whether the indbividials involvel hal their beads rolled?

Admiral Turser. I don't believe there is any evidenee they did, but I will double check that.

1See p. 1ã0 for mnaterial referred to.)

Senator Ixouye. As you know, Senator Huddleston and his subcommittee are deeply involved in the draftiug of charters and guidelines for the intelhigence community. We will be neeting with the President tonorrow, Oir concern is, I think. a basie one. (an anything like this œecur again?

Admirał Tuaxen. I think it wonld be very, very unlikely, frst, becanse we are all mueh more conseious of these issues than we were back in the fifties, second. because we have such thorough oversight procedures. I cannot inagine that this kind of activity conld take place today without sone member of the CIA itself bypassing me. if I were authorizing this, and writing to the lntelligence Oversight Board, and blowing the whistle on this kind of activity.

I am also doing my very best. sir. to encourage an openness with mvself and a free commnnication in the Agency. so that 1 am the one who finds these things if they should happen. The faet is that we must keep you and your conmittee and now the new committee in the House inforimed of our seusitive activities. 1 think all of these add up to a degree of serutiny such that this kind of extensive and fagrant activity couldl not happen tolay without it coming to the attention of the proper authorities to stop it.

Senator INorYE. A sad aspect of the MK1LTRA projeet was that it naturally invobved the people who unwittingly or wittingly got involved in experinentation. I woukl appreciate it if you would report back to this comnittee in 3 months on what the Ageney has done to notify these individuals and these institutions. and furthermore, to notify us as to what steus- haave leen taken to identify victims, and if identified. what you have done to assist them, monetarily or otherwise.

Admiral Terser. Al right. sir. 1 will te happy to.

Senator GoupwatEr. Will the Senator yield'?!

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Senator Isorre. Yes. sir.

Senator Gouawatek. I wonder if he could inehude in that report for our juformation only a eomplete listing of the indivihuals and the experimnents done on them, and whether they were witting or unwitting. volnteer or nonvolunteer, and what has been the result in each case. Ithink that would be interesting.

Admiral TunNer. Fine. Yes, sir.

Semator IxoryE. Senator Kennedly?

Seuator KENNEpy. Thank yon. ltis your intention to notify the individuals who have been the subjects of the research, is that right, Adhmiral Turner? Do vou intend to notify those individuals?

Admiral TuRNER. Yes.

Senator Kesxeby. 1f you can identify them. you intend to notify them!

Admiral Turser. Yes.

Senator Kesxeny. Anl you intenl to notify the universities or researeh centers as weß!

Aduirał Trrsen. Senator. I an torn on that. I understand your opening staternent. I ppt mvself in the position of the president of one of those universities, let's say. If he were witting-if his university had been witting of this activity with us, he has aceess to all that information today. Hf he wer not witting, I wonder if the process of informing hin might put his institutjon's repntatiou in more jeopardy than letting them go on the way they are today. not knowing. I realhy don't khow the equities here.

Senator Kessepy. Well. the problem is. alì yon have to do is piek up the newspapers and you see these universities mentioned. In many instances. I thüink yon are putting the muiversity people at an extraordinary disudvantage, where there i- a conplete ehange of admuinistraton. and they uay for one reason or another not have information that they are uler suspicion. There is innuendo: there is rumor. I cannot help but believe that it will just get smeared all over the newspapers in spite of all the security steps that have been taken.

Î seems to me that those uiversities shouid be entitled to that information, so that the oues with other aduinistrations can adapt proce. dares to protect those uiversities. The importance of preserving the indejendence of our researeh areas and the communities seens to me to be a very fupdamnontal kinl of question about the protection of the integrity of our universities and our researeh centers.

Adhíral Trrset. You ary saying that vou feel that if we identify thun privately to themselves, we can benießt them mn an adequate way to cover the risk that this will lead to a miore publie diselosure? There are lots of the so who bave not been identifed publiely at this point.

Senator Kes seny. 1 think the universities themselves should be notifed. I think then the mniversities can take whatever steps in teruns of their setting up the procedures to proteet their own kinds of integrity in terms of the futute. I would certainly hope that they wonld feel that they coull make a publis comnuent or a publie statoment on it. I think it is of general publie intetest- partieularly for the people that are iuvolved in those utiversities, to have sone kind of awareness of whether they were used or were not userl and how they were used.

I think they are entitled to it, ant quite frankly. if there is a publie official or an oficiał of the university that you notify and he wants

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for his own particular reasons not to have it public, I don't see why those in a lesser echelon or lower echelon who have been etfectively used hy it should not have the information as well. Dy l smu o nae m m : nl than

So, 1 would hoge that you would notify the universities and then also indicate to the public. I ean't conccive tlat this infornation will not be put out in thê new»papers. and it puts the university people at an extraordinary disadvantage. and of course some of it is wrong, which is the fact of the matter. and I think some umiversity officinl saying. wel, it isn't so, is a lot diferent than if they know it is confirmed ar it is not confimmed in terms of the Ageney itself. 1 think that there is a responsibility there. there is a respaonemmmy u nvina

Admiral TursEk. I have great symupathy with what you are saying. I have already notified one institution because the involvement was so extensive that I thought they really nerded to proteet themselves, and I am most anxious to do thi» in whatever way wil help all of the people who were perhaps unwitting participants in this, and the difficulty I will have is, I can't quite do, I think, what you suggested, in Oat I may not be able to teß an institution of tlhe extent and nature of its participation. its participauon. 1.-4  on in

Senator KeNxepr. Well. you can tell them to the best of your information, and it seenıs to me that just baeauso the umiversity or an individaal is going to be emharrassedl is not a reason for classifying the information. So. 1 would hop-1 mean. 1 obviously speak as an individua! Senator, but I foel that that is an inevedible disservice to the innocent individual» and. 1 think. a disservice to the integrity of the mniversities unless they are notifed. to be able to develop procedures vou are developing with regards to your own institution and we are trying to in terins of the Congiesz. Certainly the universities are entitled to the same. e entea toure same.

Adbniral Tursen. Yes. Not all of these, of course. were unwitting.
Senator RENNLPY. HDaSUE. Senator Kes suy. That's right.

Admiral Turxer. Many of then were witting, and therefore they can take al those precautionary steps on their own, but I am perfeetly open to doing this. I an only interested in doing it in a way that when identifying a uuiversity it will not lead to the publie disclosure of the inlividuals. whom I am not allowed to diselose. and so on.

Senator KesNEpy. That could be done, it soens to me. Sénator RENNEDY. Datn…

Admiral Tursen. So. we will see if we can devise a way of notifying these institutions on a private basis so that they can then make their own decision whether their epitie- are best served by their announeing it publiely or their attempting to maintain it mng  puneiy ur uen anrnjae t⁺1 511.. - te nel rou

Senätor Kixsepy. Or you. 1 wonler. What if they were to ask you to announce or indicate? to anpomnce or muae : :-1: i that T

Admiral Turxen. My personal conscience. sir, at this time, is that I would be doing a disscive to these universities if 1 notifiel te publie. it fials

Senatar Kesseny. Would yon meet with sone umversuty omeiaus and ask what their views are or whether they feel that the preservation of the integrity of the mniversities woußd be better served or not? I think that would b usefnl to find out fron smal), large. private, and publie universities' oflicials how they view the integrity pupure universues omcias u i ét prasidents

Admiral Tursrn. Fine. I will phone several uaiversity presidents today who are my friends and who are not involved in this, and ask them what they thiuk te eqaities would be.

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Senator KeNNeny. All right. Yon let us know. too.

Admira) Trrsee. But I an nod sure that I see that there is any grent h m fit in my notifying the puablie as opposed to the uiversity notifymng then. Let hita have lis choice whether he wantseach institution wants to have it nade publie.

Senator KrsNeby. Yes The faet would remain that the institution's credibility waudld be better served if the institutio's president were to deny it and the university indicated that it did not participate in that program than if the university wer to deny it and the Ageney says notliing. It seems to me that that wouhdl be the stronge-t. and the only way that that is going to ho credilde. I would vahne it if you womłd get sone injmt from universities as to what they believe i- the fairest way in termn- of the pre-ervation of the integrity of the universities.

Let me. if I coußd. ask on the question of the use of these safe hoises. as I understand fron infornation that was provided to us in the coure of our last commnittee, the testing of varíous drugs on indivilnals happened at al social levels. high and 3ow. it happened on native Americans and also on foreigo nationals. That is what I under stand was the natunre of the projert itself.

Now. I an. just wondering whether those tests were conducted at the two lorations on the east coast and the west roast which were known as safe houses. Ta your knowledge. is that correet?

Aduiral TrrNEk. Yes.

Senator Kesseay. In ternus of the research in this particular program. it didl not gu hweyond the safe houses loeated on the east coast and the west caast! Ilelieve l atu correct on that.

Ahnira! Trisrn. That type of unwitting testing of sort of randomly selertedl indivibal, yes.

Senator Kessray. It was just loeated in those two places?

Admiral Tueser, To the best of our hnowledge. there were only two locations.

Senator KyNsens. Well. how do we interpret randonly seheeted! Admiral Torxu. Wel, a- oppossd to prisoñers in a prison who were somehow seleeted.

Semator Kexxeny. All right. Do you know from this information how many people were reeruited during this period?

Admiral'Trasce. No idea.

Senato KrxNupy. Hi yo know approxinately?

Admiral Turxer. I asked that qestion the other day. and we just don't have-apparrtly wo are very-well. either there were no recordls kept of the aetuaal numbers nnd types of jwople tested or they were destroved.

Semator IxotYr, Senator Sehweiker.

Senator ScnweiEn, Thank yon, Mr, Chairman.

Adtiral Turner. I would like to comme hack to the experiments which may have been conheted at the hospital researeh faeilities whieh the CIA helped fo finance. It wasn't clear to me from your previous answers what kind of work was done theve. I gather you are unclear on that. too. frot youur rennarks, yet 1 fud in the CIA doeumentatior whicl yon have supplied as. a list deseribing some of the advantages the Ageney hoped to gain. It says :

(a) Our sixth of the total space in the mw hospitai wing will be svailable to the t'hemical bivisiom of Tss • • • : (b) Agemry spsnsorshp of sensitive researeh

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profects will le couipletely deninhle: (e) Full prufessional cover will be provided for u 1u thiree büiuhemiral empdogees nf the Chemieal Divisirp: (d) Human ationts and volunteers fur experinuental us wil 1e availatle under controlled clinical conditions with th full sujervision of

and there is a blank, something has been deleted.

It scens pretty elear to ue what they intended to do in that partieular wing. Doesn't it to you? Why would you go to sueh elaborate pruparations. to buy part of the wing, bring three of your own personiel there. give them a cover. and give theu access to patients? Why would you go to sueh trouble and expense to arrange aßl that, if you weren't plamning to experiment on people in the hospital?

Admirał Turxrk. I agrée with you loo percent. sir. Those were clearly the intentions. I have no evidence that it was carried ont in that way. I an not trying to lae defensive, Senator. 1 am only trying to be ahsolutely precise here.

Senator Sciwelker. Well, then, as to the nature of what was done there. the last paragraph on the same page of the document says, "The farilities of the hospital and the ability to conduet controlled experimentation- under safe clinical conditions using materials with whiclh any ageney connection must be completely deniable will aug ment and conuement other progranıs recently taken over by TSS. sueh as." and then ther's another deletion.

Now, the words following "such as" have been deleted. That is still ela-sitied. or at least it was removed when this document was sanitized and released, It seens to be that whatever was deleted right there would gìve yon a pretty gool elue as to what they were doing. since it says that th activities wonld "angmuent and complement other prograns undertaken hy TSS. So. I have trouble understanding why you don't know what was contemphatod. Just the fact that similar programs are reforred to in the docinnent. though what they are is still deleted, should enalle you to check it ont.

You could look at what went on in the similar programs mentioned following the "such as" in the classitied version of thìs document.

Adnuirał TursEl. Senator. 1 have not said that we don't know what was conteanlated being dote there. We do not know what was done there.

Senator SenwEaker. Why did you delete that reference? Why is that stil ciassified. that partieular projeet of whatever it is?

Admúral Trrsea. 1 don't knon thás particular ease. We will get you the exaet answer to that one anò infoan you about it, but it is qute prolahle that that other case in umrelated to this in thewell. not unrelatedl, but thai that was a project that still deserves to he clsssißed.

[The material referred to follows:]

Construetion of the Gorman Antex was begnu in 197 and the Annes was ddicated in Marel tasti. of the sverat MkllTRA projeets conducted at Georgetown oniy one involving hunan testiug coverel a tine sqan subsequent 1 Mareh 1a. Suiprujtt  ran froa  to 1, thus it is ssibe that the fitai foaur years tjao jaei uf the subprojeet could have been speut in the torman Anuex. However. there is na reference to the Gorman Annex or a "ew Autey" in Suigrnject 45 jsiers. teither is ttere auy mention of the sut pjt oving toa aen bntioa in at ot latt r yas.

Authorization, to contibute CIA fuuds toward construetion of the Gornan Aasey is contalard in Sulprujeet 35 uf MklLTRA. Recently disoovered material indicated that Dr. Gesrhickter coptiuned his rerareh for sleel aud ammesiaurałnrang drngs muker leujert MKsEAReH tlrough July 19oi at Georgetowb U'uiversity llospital. Rut it is iunjussilsle to desermine if tbe facilities of the Goriuan Anns were involved.

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Senator Seiwüiken. I thuink that would give ns a pretty good clue as to what was going to be done in the wing the ClA heled to finance.

Was there any indication at all in the peeordls yon found that the projeet ultimately used caneer pmtients or terminially ill patients in connection with this faciity?

Admirał Turyen. Fa sarry. 1 nrissed your question beeause I was uying to get the data on the last one. 1 will read you the blank.

Senator SenwEnkER. Go ahend

Admirat TrBsER. QKHLLTOP. I doesn't help yon. huit-Senator SchwErkEk Can yon telì us what that is. or i- it stil cha-itiod!

Aduiral Trnsen. I don't ksow, aud I assumie fron the faet that we deleted it. it i- still elassified, lant 1 will get you that an-wer. sir.

Senator Senwriker. Thank you. I'd like to see that information. [See p. 171 for material referred to. }

Now my next question wa-: i- tiere any indication. Admiral. that projeeis i that particular eenter involvèdt eMperimentation on terminally ill cancer patients?

Admiral Tunsén. I missed the first part of your question, sir. I am very sorry.

Senator SoíweikEr. Do yon have any indication that some experinents in the farility usedl terminally ill cancer patients as subject-? Yon do acknowlelgè in your statenaent and it is clar from oiher documents that these kind- of experiments were at sone point being done somewhere. My question i-, is thre any indlication that caucer patients or terminally ill patient- were expetimented with in this wing?

Admiral Tensér. Yes, it does appear theve is a connection here, sir. Senator SeuwEkrk. The other question I bead relates to the development of something which has been ealled the perfeet coneussion. A séries of exprinents toward theat enl were deseribed in the ClA doeuntent». 1 wouder if yon would just tell us what your unuderstanding of parfect concussion is.

Admiral Tinsen. Is that in my testimony. sir. or in some other doeument?

Senator ScuwekER. Subprojeet 54. MKULTRA, which involved examination of techmiques 1o cause brain comncussions an amtesia by using weapons or sound waves to strike individuals without giving warning and withont leaving any clear physical marks, Someone dubbed it "perfeet concussion"-mayb: that was joeti lirense on the part of our staf rather than your poets over there. I wonder if yon could just tell us wltat brain conenssion exzeriments were ahont?

Aduiral Tunsen. This project. No. 54, was cancelel. and never carried ont.

Senator ScuweikEr. Well. I do helieve the first year of the project in 19ã5 was carriesd out by the Ofice of Naval Researeh, according to the information that you supplied us. The ClA seens to lave been parbripating in Mome way at that point, hercanse the preords go on to say that the expsrimenter at ONR found ont about CLA's role, discovered thuat it was a cover. and then the projeet was transferred to MKULTRA in 1956. Again. this is all fromi the backup material you have given ns. So. it was canceled at sonne time. I at not disagreeing

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with thai. bunt apparently for at least a year or two. somebody was investigating th prohuetion of brain coneussions with special blackjacks. sound waves, and other nthod- as detaiiedl in the backup material.

Aduira! Trrxen. The data available to me is that this project was never funded by the (lA. but I will d uble-chek that and furnish the infornation for the reeord for you as to whether there was ever any conneetion here and if so. what the nature of the work was.

[Thu material referred to follow»:]

Mr. Lasbiuger corrected his testinony regarding Suhpmject 54 during the Seqstemalur 21. 1977 hearings before tbe Subcommittee on Health avd Scientitie learoh of the Inman Resources Comumittee. The relevant portion is reprodued below:

Mr. LavarytueR. On projeet 51, it bas got a ratber sensational projosal in there. in terus of the work that they projose to do, aud you asked about the projosal aud 1 said. in faet. it was never funded under MKlLTRA. Now. I overlooked--at least. my meuory did not serve nie correctly when I went through that fh folder to st one menorandum dated January 10, 1956, which makes it quite clear, as a mialtter of fact. that that proposaì was based on prior work that was funded by the Agency.

Sentor ScnwEtkER. Br what?

Mr. LatsixGtR. By the CIA. So, that information was in their fle folder. It dił mot hitplen to le in my head when I testitied.

Senator Nonweiken. I thiuk I might have read you that. and that is why I argued at the tiue with yon, becanse I thirk I had in front of me, as I recałl, sops. indjcation that it was funded ihere. I did read that to you. So, Fou did suuply it to us: tuere is no argunuent atout that information.

Mr. Lstisge. Perhaus 1 am sort of hendstrong. myself, and in ny own view. I an reading apder the lLTRA project. that if it had been funded puder U'LTR. it wouldl bave had a project numiet and identified as such. The thing that threw me was thai it was fuded. aptsirently, outside of ans MKUl.TRA activity anad it was under the normał contracting process. so that it was not inehuded in MKULTRA as any work dome under that funding utubrella.

Thu- file folder that you have and 1 have. right here, makes it quite clear, however. thai a years work wss done throgh navs funding-a navy funding niehaisn-on whieh the proposaì was txsed that ultimasely came into the MKll.TRA program. That seond projsal was never funded. So. there was ronfliut aud 1. personally. 1 think, introduceì a little bit of confusion in that in 1uy testimony.

Senator NcnwrikEs. Well. do you ngree or not agree with DoD's statement berr that even though the initial funding was navy, it was really a copduit for the (IA?

Mr. LaraNGrR. I think that is correct.

Senator Scuweiker. Yes: I wonld appreciate that. I would like to know how it went from ONR to ClA after a year. Soneho»ly made a derision to make that transfer, anl to make this an MKULTRA sulject. There had to be some sort of review that led tu a deeision to contime that kind of conenssion\~total tlackout, uxinnn anesia. and whatever ebe it was you were interested in-study and testing.

Me. LauBisGer. Senator, if I may try to say a few word- on thai the fles that were avaiable to us for inspection, which are limited. inlicated that thete was a projeet being earried on by the Navy having to do with the efeets of ban enneussjon, The CIA developed an interest in that, and consideped fundling i. ht actually never did. and as the admniraì testitied. the MKULTRA is merely a fonding mechanism. a place they go for money to do sheh things. b there is no evidence that I know of that that projeet was ever funded.

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Senator Scuwrtken. Well. I an confused. beenuse here again is another quote from a dlowcmmnent that we have seen, which you have releasel and supplied to us :

Fulluving is the technical progress made under the eurrent [deleted] contract : fai Siurialized instrumentation and nunerous testing techniqurs have been deveboped to obtain the desired dynanir data: (b) eunsideratl data has now been obtaiuel suporting the resouancecavilation theory of brain roncussion: and tr prelimitary aereleratior threshold data bas leen oblained for a fuid-fitled glass sinulatel sknll

It gos on to talk abont a blast range and a 2,50o-square-foot laloratory. The docunent notes that "Thiree blast test series have been run to date." It deseribes a special blackjack device. "a pancake-type blackjack gis ing a high peak imjaet force with a low unit surface pressure." of thi. worb

I agree the records are inconchusive as to the results of fhis work. but it certainly seenrs that some testing was done. 1- osition

Mr. Laubiscta. Senator, you are putting us in the same position I think you were stating that yon were in earler in referring to doeuments not before us, but 1 believe you are quoting fron a proposal that someone sent to the Ageney to fumd this work. and he is referring to past work. The past work woald have eueompassed a lot of things like that. bu CIA was not involvel with that. e fvovr

Senator Scnwetken. What do you mean, Admiral on page 6 of your testimony when you mention projeets using muagician's art? How do magieians get into the spook business! magerans ger mto t sn wun - la to lin the mickey

Almniral Tursen. 1 have interpreted this as to how to slip the mickey into the finn, bat I would like to ask mny advisers here to comment. mo ue ,  1 uat t i snrrentitious

Mr. Bropy. I think that is essentially ii. Senator. It is surreptitious
alministration of material to soneone, deceptive practices. how to
distract someonc's attention while you are doing something elso, as
I understandl it. l1 wa- alo some type of a covert commiunication
projeet iuvolved with the stuly of how magicians and their assistants
perhals counmmunicate informatiom to one another without having other
people knou it. This is the type of thing that was involved. sir. PopR… Senatur ScuwEtEr. Thank you, Mr. Chairmian. wvivrr Thank vou, Mr. Chairman.

Senator 1souyE. Senator Hhuddleston?

Somator Hrmpuestus. Thank you. Mr. Chairman. Senator HUppuEsTuN, 1munk you. .

Adniral. in your checking these newhy discovered doeuments and interviewing mneuler» of the CIA statl, did you find information that wouldł confirm the contention deseribed hy the reporters for the New York Times that thi- 1ype of cxperimentation was begun out of a fear at the Ageney that foreign powers might have had drugs whieh wodl allow them to alter the bebavior of Amuerican eitizens or agents or mennbers of the Araned Forces who were taken into eustody, and which would haxe resalted in false confessions and the like? 1s my question clear! question clear! evsonally read the documen-

Admiral Tu RNEk. Yes, sir. 1 haven't personally read the doeumentation on that. In my diseussions witli the people who are well informed in this area at thee Ageney. I am told that that is the case. formed in this area at te gen an Senatot Hupmisros. Was thère any evidence or any indication that vidonce or any indication that there were other motives that the Ageney might also be looking for diugs theat coull be applied for other purpuses, sueh as debilitating an indivihuał or even killing another person? Was tlhiis part of this kind of expuerimentation?

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Admiral TuRNer. Yes: I think there is, I have not seen in this series of docuuentation evilence of desire to kilł, but 1 think the project turned it- character fron a defensive to an offensive one as it went along, anl there certainly was an intention here to develop drugs that could lbe of use.

Senator RubntEstoN. The projeet continued for some time after it was learned that. in fact. foreign powers did not have sueh a drug as was at first feared, didn't it?

Aduuiral Tuaser. That is my understanding. Yes. sir.

Senator Hunnurstox. Is there any indication that knowledge gained as a result of these experiments has been useful or is being applied in any way to present operations?

Mr. Bropy. Senator. I am not sure if there is any body of knowledge. A great deal of what there was. I gather. was destroyed in 1973. I would like todefer to Frank hore. Do you know of any?

Mr. Lußınges. I know of no drugs or anything like that developed under this program that ever reached operational use or are in use today.

Senator Hrppuestos. So apparently any information that was gathered was apparently usuless and not worth continuing, not worth further development on the part of the Ageney.

Mr. Lauaixéer. I am having ditlirulty bearing your questions.

Senator HuppEstoy. I can hardly hear myself.

Admiral TukNek. I think the answer to your question is that we have no evidenee of great usefuìness on this. and yet I think we should remember

Senator Hupptestox. Well. is it accurate to say that this experimentation produced few useful results or had little application at al to the operations of the Ageney or anybody else as far as we know?

Admiral TrrsEk. I think thiat is basically correct. At the same time. I wonldl point out that we had two CI prisoners in China and one in the Soviet Union at this time. and we were concerned as to what kinds of things might be dlone to then. bt I an not saying that

Senator Hinpu.rstos. Have yon deterted any sign that any other nation is continuing or has in the past conducted experiments simiłar to this or with a similar objective?

Admiral Turser. I an not prepared to answer that one off the top of my head. sir. but I will get it to you.

[The material referred to follows:]

We paintain ua fles of ur-to-date iníornatiop op the testing of drugs in foreigu conutries. Somne sears ag. we occasionaßy woad review foreigu research on autibiotirs and phormßeeyticals in conneetjon with publie health and civil defetse assesments. For a fw sears beginning in ls we assesus forpign researeh on Ls], umier Iroje1 ARTICHOKE tecanse of concern that such drugs mieht tw emploved ginst Ageney and other l.8. personnel. Information relarive to this work has already been provisied to relerant Committees. In this early work we also ocensionaßly looked at foreign haman experimentation; we long ago eliniiated ogt holdings on this sutject and no collection requirements are any longer served. As tnsunur interest in this area has drope of ant higher priurity areas need attentien. we have virtually uo present coverage with the possible excejtion of an oerasional scamning of the litetature for a specifo urigratu. Tu the lest of our knowledge pe other uuit in the Intelligence ¿'ommuuits is trackitg tbis subjeet pow.

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Senator Htiests. You don't know whether any of your agents anywhere in the world have been subjected to any kind of procedure like this?

Admiral Turser. We certainly know of other powers conducting researrht in these areas. yes.

Senator HrmpiestoN. Do you know how they go about that research? Admiral Tunnen. It is pretty sketchy. the information we have.

Senator Hunou.esmus. Do you know of any other organization in this country or any institution that has conducted extensive research on unwitting inlividuals and through unwitting institutions?

Admiral TurNEk. Well, I have read something in the newspapers about this, but I have not familiarized myself with it in specifies.

Senator Htmpurstos. It is not a normal mode of operation for human researeh, is it?

Admiral Turxer. No. sir.

Senator HummEsTos. Thank you. Mr. Chairman.

Senator Isouyr. Senator Wallop?

Senator Waiior. Mr. Chairman. I only have one to follow up on Senator Huddleston's questious and my earlier ones. You are not really saying, are yon. Admiral Turner, that there are no mind-altering drugs or beliavior modification procedures which have been used by forrign powers?

Admiral Trrsen. No, sir. I am not.

Seuator Wartor. I drew that inference partly in answer to my question that you knew of no truth serom. Maybe that is a misnomer, but surely there are relaxants that make tongues looser than they would otherwise be. Isn't that true?

Amiral TuuNEn. Yes.

Senator Wator. So I think it is fair to say, too, that the experience of many American prisoners of war in the Korean confliet would indicate that there are behavior modifcation procrdures in use by foreign powers of n fairly advanced degree of sophistication.

Admirat TuryEr. Yes, sir.

Sonator Wsilor. Again, I will just go back and say I think this must have been part of the motivation. I don't think you would have mentionedt Cardiua) Mind-zenty had you thought his behavior was normal at the time or had anvbody else. So. I would just again say I think it is a little bit scapegoating. I don't think the object of this hearing is in any way to lay blane on those passed or those dead or otherwise. but I think it is a little bit scapegoating to say that it stopped with the directors of the CIA or the DCI's of the time. Also I think it is a litile bit seapegoating to say they didn't even know it. but that it was some lower echelon acting alone.

I think this was a behavior pattern that was prevalent in those years, ant I think the object leson is that we have discovered. we think and we hope, through your assurances and other activities of the Congress. mneans of avoiding future incidents of that kind. I thank yon, Mr. Chairman.

Senator IxotyE. Senator Chafee?

Senator CuareE. No questions.

Senator Ixouyr. Senator Kennedy. I think you have another question,

[PAGE 48]
Senator Kessu. Just talking abont the two safe houses on the cast and west cost a- being the sonrres for the unwiting trials. now, the importanee of this and the magnitade of it, I tink. is of signiticance. becuse we have seen fron vour records that these were used over a poriol of s or at vears. andl the munbers coold have been considerable. Yau ane mahle to deteriaine. at kast in your own research. whai the mmulers would Be and what thedrugs were. how many people were involved. bat it could have been considerable during this period oftine.

It wold certainly appear to te in exanining the docunents and the flow charis of cash ship- that were expenled in these areas that it was cotsiterahle. hut theat is a judgneutat factor on it, but I think it is important to ty and find ont what the Ageney is attempting to do tu gel to the bottouof it.

Now, the principal agent that was involved as I understand it is deceatsel and has been decea-ed for 2 years. The overalt agent. Mr. Gottieb, has indicatedl a fuzzy memnory abont this whole area. He has testitied lefone the lntelligonce Committee. Yet he was responsibh. for thn whole program. Then. the Director had indicated the destructio of the various materials and unfamiliarity with the project.

Now. you lmave jndicated in your testimnony today that there are two additionial agents on page 9 of yoar testinony. you indirated there are two ndditioal agents which you have uncovered at the bottom of it. and you say, the nanus of (lA ofirial- who approved or monitored the varjous projects. You talk adout the two additional agents in your testimony.

Now. I au jnst wondering if you intend to interview those agents to find ont exartly what is bring done. I suppose, first of all, shouldn't the project tuennager know what was lring done ?

Aduiral Tuixee. Ohr fitst problem. Senator. is that we have been uable to assuiate an indlividual with those nanues at this point. We are still hmrrowing to fiel out who these people are. We haven't identified then a- having been (LA employees, and we don't know whether these were false mnmes.

Semator KENxEiy. You are tracking that down. as 1 understand it? Adbmiral Tunsre. Yes. sir

Senator Kexseny. You are traeking that down, and you have every intention of interviewing those people to find out whatever you can abont the prugran and project

Admiral Trnxvn. My only hesitatiot here is whether I will do this or the hustice Heparonent

Senator Kessroy. It will be pursued. though, I understand? Admiral TuBsEn. Yes. sir.

Senator Kes sepy. Either through the Ageney or through the Jusfice Iepartment?

Admiiral Tu rsEn. [Nods in the aflirmative.]

Senator KeN NEpy. I、 it plausible that the director of the program would not understand or know ahnt the details of the program? 1s it plausible that Jr. Gottlicb would not understand the ful range of activitiesinthose particnlar safe houses?

一

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Admiral TuRNen. Iet me say it is wnlikely. 1 don't know Mr. Gottlieb, -. 1d t 1

Serator KrssEpy. Has anylsonly in the Ageney talked with Mr. Gottlisb to fuudl ot alout this?

Admiral TuusEk. Not since thi- revelation ha- come out. Ama1.

Senator KessEpy. Not since this rpvelation? Well, why not?

Armra1rRNER Temsevm A rmiral TuksEr. He has left our employ. Senator.

Senator KessEpy. Does that mean that anylody who leaves is, you know,covered for lifetine

Admiral TunsE. No. -ir. AdmiTal LURNER. NO. -Ir.

Senator KeNNEny. Why wouldn't you talk with him and find out? You have new information abont this prograu. It has been a natter of considerablo interest loth to our conmittee and to the Intelligence Conumittre. Why wouldul't you talk to Mr. Gottlieb? Connmttee. Why wouant you qas 1.

Admiraì TurNEr. Well, again, I think the issue is whether this chouda he done he the Hustire Department or ourselves. should be done by te tsure apu

Senator KeNsEpy. Welì, are we wrestling around because you and Attornry Goneral Bel can't agree

AdmiralTURsER. No. sir. AdmTaI1URNER, NO,S1.

Sntor Kvesrny [eontinuingl. On who ought to do it? Senator RENNEm qom mmE

Admiral Turser. We are procceding together in complete agreement as to how to go. 1 have. in conneetion with trying to find all of these Americans or others who were unwittingly testel. I have some considerable coneern about the CIA running aromnl this country interviewing and interrogating people, lucanuse I don't want to give any inpression that we are doing domestie intrlligence. inpression inat we are uomug un :. thi. aase That

Senator KEs sepy. I am just talking about one, in this case. That was the man who was respon-ible for the whole program, and to find out whether auyone within the Ageney sinee you have had this new material has talked 1o Gottlieb since 197à, and if the answer is no, I want to know why not, no, t want lo knon wo moa, d in connection

Admniral TussEr. The reason h: was not interviewed in conneetion with the 1975 hearings was that he had left the employ of the CIA and there was a concern on the part of the Ageney that it would appear to the investigators that the (IA was in some way trying to influence hin and infhuence his testituouy lwofore the commitiee. If these committees have no objection, we would le happy to contact Dr. Gottlieb and see if he ean augment anything here in this new information. though I don't think there is much in this new information that he can add to as opposed to what was available in 1975. that he can add to as opposeu o wna von come to the

Senator Kesseny. Well, you see, Admiral Turner, yon come to the two coumnittees this morning and indicate that now at last we have the information. We don't have to be coneerned about anything in the future on it. Now, I don't know how you can give those assurances to the members of these committees as well as to the American people when yon haven't sinee 197ä even talked to the principal person that was in charge of the progran, and the records were destroyed, He is thie fellow that wa- running the progran, and the Ageney has not talked to him since the deveßopnent of this new material. talked to hum smce the deveropuem ui ez m sriotics involved.

Adniral Tuasen. Our only concern here is the proprieties involved, and we will dig into this and work with the Justice Department on

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who, if cither of us. should get into discussions with Dr. Gottlieb so as not to prejudire any legal rights that may be involved here, or to appear in any way to be improper.

SenatorKessear. Wél, do I understand you have not contacted the Justiee Departmeut abonut thi- particular case since the development of this new material about Gottliel?

Aduiral Trryen. Not abont Gottlieb specifically. We have contacted him,

Senator Krsxeor. Well. it is amazing to me. I mean. can you understand the dificulty that any of us might have in terms of comprehending that when vou develop a whole new serie- of materials that are on the front page of every newspajer in the country and are on every television. I nean. that means something. bmt it does not nean nearly as nuch as the interest that we have in the fact about the testing of unwitting Amerieans, and every single document that the staf reviews has Mr, Gottlieb's name on it and you come up to tell us that we don't have to worry any nore. we have these other fual facts, and Mr. Gottheb has not lren talked to!

Admiral Turyen. Sir. I am not saying that these are in any way the final facts. I an saving these are all the facts we have available.

Senator Keysrpy. And you have not talked to the person who was in charge of the program, so what kind of value or what kind of weight can we give it?

Admiral TunsER. We are happy to talk to him. I think the issue hete again is one of propriety and how to go about this. We have not, I believe. enough new informnation about Gottlieb's participation here to signal that his interview would be that much more revealing than what was revealed in 1975,

Senator KeNNEny. The importanece of it. I think. from our point of viow. is. he would know the drug- that were administered. the volume of drugs, how it was adninistered, and in terms of your ability to follow up to proteet thes people and their health. to the extent that it can le done, theat opportmnuity is being lost.

I want to get on to some others, but will you give us the asurance that you will get alold of Gotthieb or that you will talk to Attorney General Bell and talk with Gottlieb?

Admiral TurNeR. Yes. sir.

Senator Kexxzay, And let us know as to the extent of it, I don't soe how we can fufill our responsibility in this area on the drug testing withont our hearing fron Gottlieb as well, but I think it is important that yon do so. particularly since all of the materials have been destroved

Thes other two agents, have they talked to them?

Admiral TueNER. We don't know who they are, sir. We are trying to track dowu and ser whether these nanes can be releated to anybody. Senator Kexxeny. That is under active investigation by the Ageney? Admirał Tursun, Yes, sir.

Senator Kesseoy. And you have the intention of talking to those people whien vou locate themn, Is that correct?

Admniral Tunser. Yes, sir. under the same cireumstances as Gottlieb. Senator Kexsriy. And you have people working on it?

Admuiral TUrNER. Yes, sir.

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Senator Krs NEpr. With regardd- to the activities that took place in these safo hynises, as I understand from the records, two-way mnirrors were nsed. Isthat vour mnderstanding?

Admoiral Turser. Yes. sir. We have records that constrnction was done to pt iu two-way mirrors.

Senator Kissevy. And they were placed in the bedroom. as I understand.

[Pas.}

Senator KEN Neny. Well, we have documnent

Admiral TursEr. I believe that was in the Chuereh record, bnt I don't have the details.

Senator KrssEpy, And rather elaborate decorations were added, as I understand, at least, to the oe in San Francisco. in the Iedroom, whieh are French cansean dancerr, floral pietures, drapery, inehnding mstallation of helroom mirrors, three franed Toulouse Lautree posters with black silk mats, and a nunler of other—red belroon curtains and recoriling equipment. and then a series of doeuments which were provided to the comnittee whch indicate a wide proliferation of diferent ca-h for ș1o0, generally in the ș1óo range over any period of tine on the particular checks. Even the names are bloeked out, as to the person who is receiving it. Cash for undereover agents, operating exjenses. drinks, entertainent while admini-tering. and then it is daslied out, and then the other doemnnents, that would suggest, at least with the signature of your prineipal agent out there. that "eallelto the operation, midnight. andl elimax.

What can you telì us that it might suggest to you about what techniqaues were being used by the Ageney in terms of reaching that sort of broad-based grump of Americans that were being evidently enticed for testing in terms of drugs anud others? Do you draw any kind of conclusion about what might have leen going on out there in these safe bouses?

Adntiral Tursen. No, sir.

[General langhter.]

Senator Ki sseny. There is a light side to it. but there is also an enormously serious side. Aud that is thuat at least the teclmiques which are usel or were used in tern- of testing, and trying to find ont exactly the range of drugs used and the mumbers of people involved and exaetly what that operation wa- abut, as well as the constant reiteration of the use of siaß sums of cash at irregnlar intervals. A variety of different teebniques were employed bnt there is an awful lot of docnnentation putting these matters together.

Whun you look at th: faet that it is a broad rauge population that has bwen tested, testel in these two areas. with the kind of cash slips that were usel in this, peayment merhanisms and deeorations and al of the rest, we are not able to put a botton line on it but one thing is for sure. and that is, Gottlieb know-. That is one thing for sure, because his name appears on just abmnt every one of tlhese documents. and it is. I think, very important to finl out what his understanding is of thue nature of that. So, we will hear more albout that.

Admtiral Tursrr. I believe Gottlieb has been interviewed by the Congress.

Semator Kes Neny. That's right. he has, and in reviewing the record. it is not very satisfaetory, and it just seens with the new information

[PAGE 52]
and the new domnaentation and the new memoranda-and be did not have the chiecks at that tiic-and with the wide varicty of diferent puemoramrla witì. his hate on ii, his memory could be stimulated on that.

Thank you.

Senator Isote. 1 would like to thank the admiral and his staff for particiunting in thá- hearing. I beliove the record should show that this heariug was held at the- requet of the Ageney and the admiral. Ht was not held lwecause we insisted mpon it. It was a volunteer effort on the part of the Ageney. I think the record should also indicate that Adiniral Turner has forwarded to this committee a classifed file including all of the names of the institutions and the persons involved as the exmermenors.

1 should also indicate that Dás hearing is just one step involved in the comuittee's invostigation of drug abnse. Just as you have had mueh work in going over the kooo pages, the staff of ihis committee has had cqual prableuu. lat 1 woudl like the record to show that vou have made thcse papers and docmnents available to the committee. I thank you for that.

A- part of the ongoing investigation, we had intended to call upon many dozens of others, experimentors, or those officials in charge, and one of those will be Dr, Gottlich.

In thanking you. I woukd like to say this to the American people. that what we have experieneed this morning in this committee room i- mot heing huplicatol in any other committee room in any other part of the worhl. I donbt that very much. Our Agency and our intelligence couumnunity has leen umder uueh eriticism and ha- been subjected to much abrse. in many cases justifed, but this is the most open society thai I can think of. For example, in Greai Britain there are about six people who are aware of the identity of the man in charge of intelligence, In ot ler countrie-, siilar comditions exist. Here in the United States we not only kuow Admiral Turner, we have had open hearings with bim. suelt as thi-. The confirrzation hearings were all open.

In a fow woek-. the Senate of the United States will debate à resolution to decide upon whether we should disclose the amounts and funds heing used for conterintelligence and natioal intelligence. I would hope that in presentiug this issue ta the public, the nuedia will take note that the Agency has cooperated and will continue to. The abuse that we have learmed alboat thi- morning is one I hope will pever happen again. lnt without constant over-ight on the part of the Exeentivo Oficr, on the par of the Congress. it could happen again. It is important therefore that we coutinue in this oversight aetivity.

So. once again, Adairal. I thank yon very much for helping us. We will continne to call upon you for your assistanee. We would like to submit to you several quesiious that the mnemnbers and staf have prepared. We hope you will look them over carefully and prepare responses for the record, sir.

Senator KeNNEny. Mr. Chairman?

Senator IxouYE. Yes. sir?

Senator KeNsEpy, I. too, want to thank Admiral Turner for his responsivenes. I have had meeting- with him in the committees and also conversations. telephone conversations, and private meetings. and

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I have found hin personaly to he extremely responsive. and it is a very. dißlirnlt challenge whieh he has accepted in heading this Ageney. 1 want you to knon. jersonally. k. too, wonkd bike to see this put behind us. 1 tou't think we are quite there yet in terms of this particular area that we are interested in. I think the Intelligenee Committee has special responsibilities in this areat of the testing, so we look forward to working with yona in expediting the time that we van pnt it behind, lut it does seem to me that we have to dig in and finish the chapter. So. I want to personaßy express mny aupreciation to you. Admiral Tnrner, and thank you for your cooperation and your help, and I look for ward to working with you.

Admtral LURNER. 1nans Muu. Admira) TrrsER. Thank yon.

Selator HcoptEspu. Mr. Chairman. 1 am not sure you emphasized this enough, buat 1 think the record ought ta show that Admiral Turner informed tbe Seleet Committee on his own initiative when the new dosunntatio was fount. The docnmnentation has been made availahle to us yoluntarily. in a spirit of cooperation. 1 5 n\~atin +hat

I think this shows a vast ditferenee from the mode of operation that esi-tel prior to the formation at least of the Chureh committee, and a diference that is very helpful a dnerene man ismrs mp.

Senator Isotyu. Thank you very much. Thank you very much, Admirai. Atmral. 111n

We would now like to call upon Mr, Philip Goldman and Mr. John Gittinger. Gnttmger. :1 l the

Mr, Goldman and Mr. Gittinger, will you please rise and take the oatn. oath. lout to sire is

Do you solemly swear that the testimony yon are about to give is thie trith. thee whaole truth anl nothing hut the truth. so help you, God?

Mr, GotoM N. I do.

Mr. GrTriNorE. 1 do.

Setator Isoa yE. Thank you, sir Setator INoYE, Lnank you, NU.

Mr. Goldman. will you identify yourself. and after that. Mr. tnnnger. Gittinger. 11-:\_it1

Senator Krsseny. Before we start in. we had a third witness. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Pasternar, who planned to testify. traveled to Washingto -he lives in Washington. and was contacted revently-with the intention of testifying thi- morning. And sonething—he ealled us lat. thi- morning and iulicated that he wanted to get a counsel bfore hu would wish to testify.

Sepator INoryE. Mr. Goldman.

Mr. Golhman, will you idlentify yourself, sir.

TESTIMONY OF PHILIP GOLDMAN, FORMER EMPLOYEE. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Mr. Gorapus. I am Philip Goldman. Mr. GorimN. I an tmupsrougan

Seuator Isouyr. And you are a former employee of the Central Intellignce Agoney?

Mr. GoLom As. Over 10 years ago. Mr.GolnMAN, Oer INaS Ag

Senator Ixoryr. And you were employed at the time when MKULTRA was in operation? Mlt LA was in qperaon: --ntinn at the

Mr. GotayN. There were some MKULTRA'- in operation at the time I was there.

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Senator INorre. And Mr. John Gittinger, are you a former employee of the Central Intelligence Agency ?

TESTIMONY OF JOHN GITTINGER, FORMER EMPLOYEE, CENTRALINTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Mr. GitTiNGEr. I am. Mr. GITTINGER. 1 a..

Senator INotye. Are you still an employee?

Mr. GITTINGER. No. Senator INoure. Were you a member of the Agency at the time MKULTRA was in operation?

Mr. GiTTINGER. Yes.
Senator INouYe. 'Thank you. enator m Thank vou. Senator Kennedy.

Senator KenNepr. I want to welcome both of you to the committee. If we could start with Mr. Goldman. Were you the project engineer for the safe houses in either San Francisco or New York? or the sate nouses m em. C--Drnaisco

Mr GotnmaN. I know of no safe house in San Francisco. Mr. GoLDMAN, 1 know o nu saic u 1A

Senator KeNNeny. How about in New 1urn: v-nv How about in New York?

Mr. GolomaN. I knew of one facility that was established there, anrthing of its operation.

but 1 didnt know anyuing o rs operauon. Senator KeNNenr. Were you a monitor on any testing of drugs on
unwitting persons in San Francisco?

Mr. GolDMAN. No. Senator KeNNenr. Well. we have a classified document here that was provided hy the Agency that lists your name as a monitor of the prociate it if von wonld look

gram and  would appreci u Mr. GoiomaN. I think the misunderstanding arises because I was
proiect officer.

Senator KeNNepy. Well. would you take a look at that [Mr. Goldman inspected the document.] Mr. GolnmaN. This document as it states is correet. However,

mv-Senator KeNsEnY. That document is correct! Mr. Golomn. As far as I see on the first page, the project. But

my e kevny. Well. could I get it back. please. Senator KENNEDr.nemvvu i1a :licato that vou were a monitor of the program. That would indicate tnai you nerr a mon

Mr. Goinmax. I was in charge of disbursing the moneys to Morgan Hall. H811.

Somator KEN sEpy. To whom was that? Senator KexsEpy. To whom was unat :

Mr. GotpmaN. To the individual whose name was listed at the top

of that document. Senator KeNNepy. And you knew that he was running the project
:- e-- Trannieo? in San Francisco!

Mr. Gorpman. I knew he was the person who was in charge out there. J.

Senator KeNsEDy, All right. Senator KeNsEDy. All right.

Mr. Golomax. But I had no knowledge nor did I seek knowledge of actually what he was doing, because there would be other things involved.

I did receive 1 a

Senator KenNeDY. What were you doing?

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Mr. GolumaN. 1 was collecting-I had to be sure that all the receipts that ever were turned in balanced with the moneys that were paid out to see that everything was run all right. There was no illegal use of funds as far as we could determine try the receipts and cash. use o1 nus a 1a t indiontas

Senator KeNNepy. So even though the Ageney doeiinent indicates that you were a monitor for the prograin, one of the few monitors of that particular program which you muentioned for San Franeiseo and Mill Valley. Calif.. you deseribed your responsibility only as a carrier of money. is that correct? ut -secin

Mr. GonumyN. I would say as a disburser or carrying out—seeing that the moneys were handled properly. There wa- within that1 don't know what's done or what he did do in eonjunetion with other peuple, peuple, 11mant of

Semator KEN sEpy. Were you responsible for the disbursement of all the funds? the tuns: -- +l lcl- to him

Mr. GoupmaN. I was responsible for turning over the check to him. Sunator Kessevy. And what did you know of the progran itself? wbot be

Mr. Gotumas. The omly thing I knew of the program was what ne furpished us in teris of receipts and that sort of thing. I didn't indalge or concern myself in that. ange orcuncen msen mronee Tu 1-  romine it

Seuator KixsEiy. You still wrote, and Ill let you examine it it's a cla-sitied document—but you wrote a rather substantive review of the program in May of 1963, talking ahout the experiments. the fa tual data that had been collected, covert and realistie feld trials. about the necessity of those particular-and talked about the effeetiveness of the various programns. the efficieney of various delivery systete. That doesu't sound to me like someone who is only systehne, 1hat doesu i sounu to me nae if I conld

Mr. GolpouaN. Wel. if you would refresh my memory, if I could read this I would certainly agree with whatever is said there, if it was wriuten. wrnten. l se Yonve

Senator Kesyvay. I an trying to gather what your role was. You've indicated first of all that you didn't know alout—you knew about a safe house in New York; now we find out that you're the carrier for the rrsonrees as well and the agent in San Francisco. We find out now that th CIA put vou ar a mnonitor. You're testifying that you only were the courier. and bere we have just one document, and there are many othur- that talk about Ohe substance of that program with yonr name on it and I an just trying to find ont exaetly what role you were ulaving. mlaynng. -1.. li. an.l T am

Mr. Goupuy. The only thing I can telt you abont this and I am drawing comptetely on my memory is that this individual who was in charge out there conductet these things and reportedt then back to the Aeney, I didn't participate in any of then. Al I know was that he furuished ne with rereipts for thing- that were done and toll of the work that thy had done. work that Hey nat qone. lan mcaints

Senator Késsriy. Well, that doemment covers more than receipts. Mr. Gotnmas, Yes. it tells of what—they had condurted work out there. iPre. 3 n1mnh9

Senator Krssepy. It describes, does it not ? Real the paragraph 2 Mr Goumx. "A numler of covert"- Mr.GMN,Anm

Senator K.xyrpy. Well, you can't read it, it's a chassifel document. and I don't kuow why, quite frankly, hut it relates to the sulstance

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of those prograns and your name is signed to the memorandums on it. I an not interested in you trying to rèview for us now what is in the docunent. but I think it would be unfortnnate if we were left with the opinion that all yon were was a courier of resourres when we see a document with your name on it, signed. that talks about the substance of the program. And what were interested in is the substance of the prograi. We have the recent documents that were provided hy the Ageney, which do indicate that yoa were at least involved in the substance, and I'nı just trying to find out whether you're willing to toll us about that. tell us about that. avortbing that

Mr. Gotpss. 1 am perfectly willing to telì you everything that I ean remember. I can remember. Lor anvthino

c üvvenv But vou can't remeimnber anything, Senator KENNEpy. But you can I remrmm

Mr. (oupmss. I can't renenber the substantive parts of these thinos. I really can't. things, 1 reallv can't. -\~

eatan Krvvrny Of the program that was taking place. Senator KenNEpy. Ut the progra una

Do you have any greater familiarity with what was happening in New York?

Mr. GolDMaN. No, no.
Senator KeNNEny. And you have the same funetion with regards N-ーVA-?

to New York? Mr. GoLpmay. The same function with regard to New York. Senator KENNEdy. Did you ever go to San Franciseo?

Mr. GOLDMAN. Yes. Mr. GOLDMAN. Yes.

Senator KesNeny. Did you meet with the agent in charge? Mr. GOLDMAN. Yes.

Mr. (OLPMAN. 1eS.

Sanator Kvsyroy. And why did you meet with him? Senator KENNEpY. nn »ny u …

Mr. Golomas. To discuss some of the receipts and things that were there to find out if these were indeed true expenditures and to find out if everything was going along all right for the work that was being dana

one. Senator Kexyepy. What work was being done? Senator KeNNEDy. Wnat wors a

Mr. Goupmyx. No. the reports of these things and whatever was being done. I don't know who he reported to but he did report to somehody. somebody. nd aut ahout the work

Senator Kexseor. You travel out there to find out about the work that's being done, and what does he tell you. that the work is being done well and done well and- -1. ah hat nre doing Was

Mr. Golpas. He told me that the work that they were doing was going along, progressing satisfactorily. bnt to be very frenk with you Sonator Kryxeny. But he didn't tell you what the work was? Sonator KENNEDy. Bu ne ququ: «

Mr. Golpmax. To be very frank with yon. Senator. I cannot remember the things that happened back in those days. I've been away from the company-from the Ageney for over 10 years. and that is even farther back than that, and that was just about the time when I first engaged in this. so it was my first- first engaged in thus. so it was my nu orins of s100 checks. to

Senator Kessepy. Did they dislurse a series of \$100 checks. to your recollection? vour recollection? L f o hava it there. then

Mr. Golpas. I don't recollect it. but if you have it there, then they did. jey did. nC-ulinl7

Senator KeNsepy. Did you know Dr. Gottlieb?

Mr. GouMN. Yes.

一

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Senator KenNepy. How did you know Dr. Gottlieb?

Mr. GoLdMAN. He had been head of the division when I was recruited. cruteu. n

Senator Kensepy. Did you talk to him about these programs? Did vou have anything to do with hinn during this period of time?

Mr. (oraman. 1 didn't have anything to do with him until I would say probably in the sixties.

Senator KenNepr. And can you tell us what you had to do with him then?

Mr. GoapmN. Just what you see there on the papers.

Senator KeNsenr. Well, that is the request for the money and he approves it.

Mr. Golpmax. That is the request for money and he approves it. and I am quite sure that I probably discussed with him whether the work was going along all right. whether his reports were being turned in, and whether he was satisfied with the way things were going and did he have any complaints about the way other people were requesting him, but I did not engage myself in anything he wâs doing.

Senator KeNNepr. Well, did you get the impression that Gottlieb knew what was going on?

Mr. Gounmas. I didn't ask.

Senator Krsnepy. But you told him that your impression that what was going on even though you didn't know what was going on, was going on well. I guess? [Laughter.}

Mr. Golomas. I told Gottlieb what you saw in there was that the things appeared to be going along all right. I was repeating and parroting back the words that were given to me while I was there.

Senator Kennzdr. What was the money being spent for, do you know?

Mr. GolpmaN. No; I can't recall that, sir.

Senator KeNNeny. Would you remember if we told you it was red curtains and can-can pietures

Mr. GolpmaN. No. sir.

Senator KeNNEpr. Floral pictures and the rest.

Mr. GolpmaN. No, sir.

Senator KENNEnr. Recorders.

Mr. GoLoMaN. No, sir.

Senator KenNeny. Recorders and two-way mirrors.

Mr. GolnmaN. Wait, hold on. You're slipping a word in there now. Senator KeNNepy. But you would have authorized those funds, would you not, since you were the-

Mr. Golpman. Did vou say two-way mirrors?

Senator KENNEpY. Yes.

Mr. GolpmaN. Where?

Sonator KeNNrpy. In the safe houses.

Mr. GoLDMAN. Where!

Senator KENNEDY. San Francisco.

Mr. GoLDMAN. No.

Senator KENsEpy. How about New York?

Mr. GolpmaN. Yes

Senator Keysepy. You remenber now that you approved expenditures for New York?

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55

Mr. GoinMaN. Yes. Mr. GOLDMAN. 1 e.

Sonator KvxNepY. Wiat were those expenditures for? Senator KENNEY. Wat weir uo apen.

Mr. GolomN. That was a transfer of money over for the use in an apartment in New York by the Bureau of Narcoties. It was for their use. their use. \_1.1--fmht ec moin0

Senator KeNNenr. Do you have any knowledge of what was going on in tne aparuemt: on in the apartment? 11- :had haen veed ac-

Mr. Golnmx. No. sir, other than I know that it had been used, accordling to the information that I have been given. it was used by the Bureau of Nareoties to make meetings with individuals who they were interested in with regard to pushing dope—not pushing dope, but selling narcoties and that sort of thing. ing narroties anu tat sont u qmg. -- -anonsihitities and

Senator KexNeny. Well, I am sure you had many responsibilities and it's a long time ago, but the Ageney does indicate that you were project nonitor for that particular program.

Mr. Goupss. That's correct. Mr, (oMAN. 1 nat S CorT.

Senator Kesnepr. Your own testimony indicates you went out to review the expenditures of funds to find out whether they were being wisely used, that you came back and talked to the project director, Mr. Gottlieb. to give him a progress report about what was going on out there. tere.

Mr. GoldmaN. Yes, sir, I did. Mr, GoLDMAN. 1 es, Su, 1 uiu.

Senator Kesyenr. All those things are true, and yet you draw a complete blank in terms of what was the project itself. That's where the record is now. the record is now. - ia the proiects nor did

Mr. Gouuas. I did not go out there to review the projects nor did I come back and talk with Mr. Gottlieb and review what I had observed in terms of any projects that they-that is. other parts of the Agency might have in operation there. 1 simply reported back those things which were told to me by the individual out there whoand I carried them back and they are contained in the report that you have in front of you, word tor woru, jut a of vou, word for word, just as it was given to me. -d baiss cuhsten-

Senator KeNxepy. The report that you examined here is a substantive report on the particular program and project. And I don't think anyone who wasn't familiar with the project—this is a personal evaluation—could write a report on the substance of it without knowing about it. Now, that's mine. Maybe you can't remember and recollect, and that's and that's Ak-- in thinrs that I

Mr. Golnmas. No; everything I put down in there is things that I was told while I was out there. and if there was any ancillary information involved in there I can tell you I just don't remember that. I really don't. don't. Ltim lot of time has

At the time—that was some years ago. At the time—a lot of time has passed since then and I have made quite sure that if I could recollect it at all, I would do it. If you have sone papers and you want me to certify whiether yes, this is so or that is so, I can do that, but I can't recall it mentally. it mentally. ----- Thare ere others

Senator Kexsepr. You just certified the principal. There are others up here.

I would like to go to Dr. Gittinger.

Mr. Girtisoer. It's Mr. Gittinger. Mr. (ITTINOER. HUS MIr. Atg.

Senator KexNedy. How long did you serve with the Ageney

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Mr. GITTiNGER. Twenty-six years.

Senator KENNEny. Excuse me?

Mr. GiTriNaER. Twenty-six years.

Senator KeNNinY. Twenty-six years.

And at some point you moved into the operational support side, is that correct?

Mr. GiNGER. Yes.

Senator Kexsepy. And did you know Sidney Gottlieb?

Mr. GitTiNGER. Yes, sir.

Senator KeNsEly. And did he inforn you about the research projeets involving LSD?

Mr, GrrrıNeER. Yes, sir,

Senator Kesseby. lt is my understanding that you were also aware of sone of the drug testing projeçts conducted on unwinting subjects on the west coast using the Bureau of Narcoties people in the operation. Is that true!

Mr. GITTINGER. I was.

Senator Ixotre, Exeuse me. Would you speak into the microphone? I cannot lear you.

Mr. GIrTINGER. Sorry.

Senator KexNepr. Do you know whieh drugs were involved in those tests?

Mr. GirtisüeR. ISD. And I can't remember for sure mel of the others. What is the sulstance of maribuana, cannabis, is that right. that can be deliveret ly other than smoking?

Senator KENNEpY. Cannabis!

Mr. GirrisGen. There had been some diseussion of that : yes.

Senator KesNEpy. And was heroin also used?

Mr. GrtriNGER. Heroin used by CIA?

Senator Kex Neny. No. In the west coast operation.

Mr. GirrıNGEn. Alsolutely not.

Senator KexNepr. Now, to your knowledge. how were the drugs administered to the unwitting subjects?

Mr. GirrixaEr. 1 have no diréet knowledge.

Senator Key NEpy. Why did you go to the safe houses?

Mr. Girrisüer. lt's a very compheated story. Just in justification of myself, this came up just day before yesterday. I have not really had enough time to get it al} straightened in my mind, so I ranble.

Senator KessEby. Well, yoù take your time and tell us in your own work. Weve got some time lere.

Mr. Girrrisüek. My responsibilities which would involve any of the period of time that yout wer talking alsout really was not dlirectly related to drugs at all. 1 was a psyehologist chargeil with the responsí- bility of trying to develop as mich information as I could on various cultures. overseas cultures. anthropotogical type data. if von follow what I mean. I was also engaged in trying to work out ways and means of asseesíng people aní maderstanding people.

I originally beeamne involved in this through working on Chinese colture. and over a series of tinne I was introdueed to the problem of brainwashing, which is the thing that really was the most compelling thing in relationship to this, and became charged with the responsibility of trying to finl out a little bit about inierrogation techniques.

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And anong other things. we decided or I decided that one of the best sourees of intertogation techniques would be trying to locate and interview and become involved with expetienced police interrogators in the country and experienced people who had renl practical knowledge of interrogation. The reason for this is that we had become pretty well convineed after the experience of the brainwashing problems coming out of China. that it was the techniques of the interrogator- that were causing the individualsto make confessions and so forth in relationship to this, rather than any kind of drugging and so forth, So we were very much interested in interrogation teclmniques. and this led to me being introdured to the agent in the west coast. and I began to talk to him in connection with these interrogation techniqurs.

Senator KexNeny. OK. Now. that is the agent that ran the tests on the west coast on the unwitting people. That's where you come in, correct?

Mr. Girtinger. If I undlerstand—would yon say that again?

Senator Kryymny. The name Morgan Hall has been-that is the naue that has been used.

Mr. GITTINGER. Yes.

Senator Kesseuy, And that is the agent that you met with

Mr. GirTiNGEn. That is right.

Senator Kes NEpy. And you met at the safe house.

Mr. GirTiNcen. Yes, sir.

Sonator KrNNEby. Whom did you meet witb in the safe house?

Mr. Girrsuzr. This is the part that is hard for me to say, and I am sorry that I have to. In conneetion with sone work that we were doing. we needel to have sonre infornation on sexual habits. Morgan Hal provided inforuants for ne to talk to in connection with the sex halits that I was interested in trying to find information. During one period of time the safe house, as far as I was concerned. was used for just these particular type of interviews. And I diln't see the red curtains.

Senator Kex sepy. Those were prostitutes, were they ?

Mr. GirTiNGER. Yes, sir.

Senator KrsNepr. How many different times were you there that you had similar

Mr. Girriscn. 1 couldn't possibly say with any certainty on that. Fonr or five times.

Senator Kes Neny, Four or fve times.

Mr. GirriNuEr. Over-rou remember now. the period that I'm talking abut when 1 would have any involvenent in tlis is from about 1956 to 1961. So it's alout a 4- or 5-year period wlich is the only time dat I know anything abont what you are talking about here today.

Senator Krssror. Did Morgan Hall make the arrangements for the prostitutesto nuet with you?

Mr. GurTiNoER. Yes, sir.

Senator Krsseny. Did the interviews that you had have anything to do with druge?

Mr. Grrriseen. Wel. as I tried to explain carlier when this was being discussel a little bit beforehand. again 1 think it is pretty hard for nost peoule now to recognize how little there was known about drugs at the period of time that we are talking about, becanse the

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drug age or the drug culture comes later on. Consequently, those of us who had any rcspnsibility iu this area were interested in trying to get as much information as we coald on the sobeuktnre. the subeulture drug grotpe. and ohviotsly the Burean of Narcoties represented a nean- of doing thiz. Conseguently. other types of things that were involvel in disenusion- at that tine woußd have to do with the undergromnd use of drugs, Whwen I ain talking abont this 1 an talking about the folk ways in termns of unwitting use of drugs. Did these people that I was talking to have any information abont this and on rare insances they wrre able to tell me about their use, and in most cases this would hargely turn out to be a Mickey Finn or something of that sort rather thant anything esoterie.

I also wa- very noch interested because we had relatively little ioforuation. helieve i or not, at that tiue. in terms of the various reaetions that people were having to drugz. Therefore. these qeople were very informative in terms of they knew a great deal of informaton about reactions,

Senator Kis NEny. At least you gathered-or am I correet in a-suming that you gatherel the impression that the prostitutes that yon had talked to were able to ship the drigs to people as 1 understand it. Did you forn any impression on that!

Mr. Grrrixoe:. I certainly did not form the impression that they did this as a rale or--

Senator Kes NEpy. But they had the knowledge.

Mr. GrrrisueR. They had the knowledge or some of them had had knowledge of this heing done. But again, as it turned out, it was largely in this area of knockoun drops.

Semator KEssEpy. Looking back now did you formn any impression about how the Ageney was actually testing the broad spectrum of social classes in these saf houses! With the large disbnrsal of eash in small quantities. SIo bill- aul the kinds of elaborate deeorations and two-way mirror» in the bedroous and all the rest, is there any question in yonr own min w hat was going on in the safe honses, or the tech niques that were being used to ahninister these drugs?

Mr. Grrrisoen. 1 tind it very difienlt to answer that question. sir. I had abrolutely no dirert knowledge there was a large number of this. I had no knowledge that anyone oiher tran—than Morgan Hall was in any way involved in thae utwitting administration of drugs.

Senator KessEny. But Gottlieb would know. would he not ?

Mr. GrrrisGEe. I beleve so. yes. sir.

Senator KEsxEoy. Could we go into the Human Eeology Foundation and talk alont that and how it was usd as an insirumnent in terns of the smppori of researeh?

Mr. GirTisGEn. Yes, sir.

Semator Kesxeny, Could yon deseribe it to us? Conll you deseribe the Hhuman Eeology Fondation. how it funetioned anlhow it worked?

Mr. Grrrisurn. May 1 tell something about how it evolved, which 1 think is important!

Senator KENxEnY. Sure.

Mr. GrrixeEl, The Society for the Investigation of Human Eeology. so-cabod, was ue:ually a-l an confused here now as to whether I should name you names.

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Senator KexNEDr. Well, we're not interested in names or institutions, so we prefer that you do not. That has to be worked out in arrangements between Admiral Turner and the individuals and the institutions.

But we're interested in what the Foundation really was and how it funetioned and what its purpose was.

Mr. (irrtiscri. Welł, it was estallished to undertake research in the general area of the behavioral seienees. It definitely had almost no focus o interest in, say. drug-related type of activities except in a very minor way, becanse it was largely set up to attempt to gaín a certain auuount of inforuation and to fund projeets which were psychologicał. soeiological. anthropological in character. It was established in the sense of a period of tine that a lot of u- who are in it wish we could do it over again, but we were interested in trying to get together a panel of the most representative higlr-level behavioral scientists we could to oversee and help in terms of developing the Society for the Investigation of Human Erology type of prograt.

The Agency in effect provided the money. They did not direct the projects. Now, the fact of the matter is. there are a lot of innocent people who received the Society for the Investigation of Human Ecology money which 1 know for a fact they were never asked to do anything for the CIA but they did get through this indirectly. They had no knowledge that they were getting CIA money.

Senator Kesnepr. Over what period of tine did this take place?

Mr. GirriNGER. As far as I was concerned. it was the period of time ending in 1961. I believe the Human Ecology fund finally phased out in 1965, but I was not involved in this phasing out.

Senator KexNenr. Can you give the range of the different sort of individual projects of the universities in which it was active?

Mr. Girtinger. Well. it would have as many as—I am very fuzzy on my memory on the number of projocts. It is over 10, 20. 30.

Senator KexNznr. After it made the grants, what was the relationship of the Agency with the results of the studies? The Foundation acquired the money to nake the grants from the Agency, and then it made the grants to these various research programs.

Mr. GrTTINGER. Yes, sir.

Senator Kexseny. And that included eight universities as well as individual researchers?

Mr. GITTiNGER. Yes. sir.

Senator KeNsepy. Then what follow-up was there to that, sir!

Mr. Girrixgen. Well. in every sense of the word, the organization was run esactly like any other foundation. and it carried with it the same thing in terms of making certain that the people that they had given money to used it for the purpose for which it had been granted, that they had access to any of the reports that they had put out. but there were no strings attached to anvbody. There wasn't any reason they couldn't publish anything that they put out.

Senator Kexyeny. What sort of budget are we talking about here! Mr. Grrryoer. I honestly do not rememher. I would muess we are talking in the realm of about \$150,000 a year. but don't hold me to that. because I don't know.

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Senator Kennedr. What is your view about such funding as a professional person, in terms of compromising the integrity of a university. sir?

Mr. Girrinorr. Well. obviously. sir. insofar as today there is no question about it. I will have to say at the time that we were doing this there was quite an entirely differont kind of an attitude, and I do know for a fact that we moved to start towards phasing out the Society for the Investigation of Human Ecology and the Human Ecology Fund for the very reason that we were beginning to recognize that it was moving into an areà but this would be compromised.

Senator Keysepy. Well. that is commendable, both your attitude and the reasons for it, but during that period of time it still was involyedì in behavior rescareh programs, as I understand it.

Mr. Grrrinoer. Yes. sir. On its own. in connection with this, it participated again, and these again were not CIA-directed projects. but these were all things which would theoretically contribute to the general knowledge at the time where the things like the study of the Hungarian refngees-obviously. the study of the Hungarian refugees who came to this country after the Hungarian revolt was a very useful exercise to try to get information abont the personality characteristics of the Communists and so forth.

Senntor Ktxyeor. Were there other foundations that were doing similar kinds of work?

Mr. GitrisGEr. Not to my knowledge, sir.

Senator KENNEdr. You believe-

Mr. GirrixeEr. Yon mean. CIA. other CIA?

Senator KENNeny. Right.

Mr. Girrinorn. Well. my answer is in the sense that I know of no other CIA foundations. no. There were. of course. other foundations doing similar kinds of work in the United States.

Senator Krxyeny. Have yon heard of the Psychological Assessmenis Foudation?

Mr. GirtscEr. I certainly have.

Senator KexNEpy. What was that? What function did that have?

Mr. Girriyoer. Now, this was bringing us up to a different era. I believe the functions of that organization have nothing whatsoever to do with the things that are being talked about here while I was associated with it.

Senator Kyxsrny. Rather than getting into the work. it wns another foupdation. was it not? It was another foundation supported by the Agency?

Mr. Girrrvorr. What. the Psychological Assessment?

Senator KessEny. Yes.

Mr. GiTTiNoER. No. sir. it was not.

Senator Kesxepr. It did not get any support at all from the Agency?

Mr. GirrixoER. Oh, yes. sir. It did get support. but it was a business firm.

Senator Kessepy. It was a business but it got support from the Agency?

Mr. Girrinoen. It got money from it. but it definitely was not in MKULTRA or in auy way associated with this.

3.

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Senator KexNeny. All right. I want to thank you for your helpful testimony, Mr. Gittinger. It is not easy to go back into the past. I think you have been very fair in yonr characterizations, and I think it is quite appropriately indicated that there are different standards now from what they were 25 years ago. and I think you have responded very fairly and completely to the inquiries. and 1 think with a good deal of fecling about it.

You are a person who is obviously attempting to serve the country's interest. so I want to thank you very much for your statement and for your helpful timeliness.

Mr. Girrixorn. Thank you. sir.

Senator IsotyE, Senator Case?

Senator Case. Thank you. Mr. Chairman. I am sorry that I had another committee that I had to complete the hearing with this morning before I got here.

I shalì read the testimony with very great interest, and I appreciate your testimony as I have heard it. I would like to comment just on one point, and that is. it relates to a story in the press yesterday about part of this program involving the funiding of a grant at a foreign university. I 'would like to elieit from you a comnent as to the additional sensitivity and difficulty that that practice involves from your standpoint as a scientist, as well as a citizen. if vou will.

Mr. Grrrisgen, 1 will say it was after the faet thinking. It was utter stupidity the way thing- worked ont to have used some of this money ouiside the U'nited States when it was CIA money. I can eategorically state to my knowledge and 1 don't claim a complete knowledge all the way across of the huiman ecology funetions, but to my knowledge, and this is unfortunate, those people did not know that they were getting money fron CI, and they were not asked to contribute anything to CIA as such.

Sepator Case. It would le interesting to try to examine this by turning the thing around and thinking what we would think if this happened fron a foreign oflicial ageney to our own university. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator lNou yE. Senator Sehweiker.

Senator Sonweiken. Thank you. Mr. Chairman

Dr. Golhnan. I wonder if you would tell us what your training and educational background is?

Dr. Gouunmas. I have already given a biography for the record.

Senator ScnwEtkER. I have not seen it. Who has it? Is it classifed? We may have it for the reeord, but may I ask you to briefly describe your training and background for ns now? I hope it is no secret.

Dr. Gounmas. Well. I was told if I was asked this to say that. I was told that by your staf people, but I have no objection to telling you. I am a resident from Pennsylvania, southwest Pennsylvania, Lancaster County. I went to Penn State, and I am in nutrition.

Senator ScHwEIkEn. In what?

Dr. GoN. Nutritien.

Senator Scuwetken. Were you in charge of a section or segment of the CIA in your past capacity?

Dr. Gotpmas. During the time I was with that organization. I was in charge of one small section of it, one small segment of it; yes.

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Senator Scíwetker, What was the function or purpose of that section that you headed(

Dr. Goipmss. To provide support for the other parts of the division. Senator Scnwetkén. Where in the chain of command woukd that put you in relation to Dr, Gottlieb?

Dr, Gou,pyAN. Pretty far down the line.

Senator Sonweakes. Mr. Gittinger. I would just like to ask you a few questions. We apprecjate your frankness and candor with the committee. and we realize this is a very difficult area to go into. I am not quite clear on two matters that were raised earlier. First, were the safe houses we were talking abont here used on occasion by the prostitutes you referred to?

Mr. Girrixger. I really have not the slightest idea.

Senmtor Seiwenee. Were the prostitntes used in any way to slip the enstomers drug for observation purposes?

Mr. Girrixcen. Not to niy direct knowledge.

Senator Scuwensrk. Would you have been in a position to know the answer to either of these questions?

Mr. Girrisoea. May I say. probably not, and may I make an aside to explain a litte bit of this, please. sir?

Seiator Scuwrikrn. Mr. Gittinger. a monent ago you mentioned brainwasling techniques. as one area that you had. 1 giess. done some work in. How wonkd you characterize the state of the art of brainwashing today? Who has the most expertise in this field. and who is or is not doing it in terms of other govermments?

During the Korean war there was a lot of serious discussion about brainwa-hing techniques heing nsedl by the North Koreans. and I ann interestuì in tinling out what thue state of the art is today. as vou see it.

Mr. Grrrixcrn. Weß, of course, there has been a great deal of work on thi\~. and there is still a great deal of controversy. I can tell you that as far as I knew. by 1961. 1962. it was at least proven to my satisfaction that brainwashing, so caßedl. is some kind of an esoteric device where drugs or minl-altering kinds of conditions and so forth were used. did not exist even thonugh "The Manchnrian Candidate" as a novie really set us back a loug time, beeaase it made something impossible look plausible. Do you follow what I mean? But by 19c2 and 1963, the general ilea that we were able to come up with is that brainwa-hing was hargely a proeess of isolating a human being. keeping him out of contaet. putting huim under long stress in relationship to interviewing and interrogation, and that they could produce any change fhat way without having to resort to any kind of esoteric means.

Senator Senweiken. Are there ways that we can ascertain this from a distance when we see a captive prisoner either go on television, in a photograph. or at a press conferrnce? In other words. are there certain signs that you have learned to recognize from yoor technical background. to tell when brainwashing has occurred? Or is that very diffrult to do?

Mr. Grrrasern. It is difieult to do. I think it is posible now in terms of looking at a pieture of somebody who has been in enemy hands for a long period of tin. We can get somne pretty goot ideas of what kind of cireuustances he has been under, if that is what vou mean.

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Senator Scuweiken. That is al} I have. Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
Senator IsouYr. Thank you very much.

Before adjouning the hearings. I would like to have the record show that Ir. Goldman and Mr. Gittinger have voluntarily cooperated with the committee in staff interviews, that they appear this morning voluntarily, and they are not under subpena.

Gent lemien. I realize that this experience may have been an unhappy one and possibly a painful oae. Therefore, we thank you very much for participating this morning. We also realize that the eireumistances of that tine difkered very much fron this day. and possibly the national attitude. the national politicał attitude' condoñed this type of activity. So. we have not asked you to come here as persons who have committed crimes, but rather in hope that you can assist us in studying this problem so that it will not occur once again. In that spirit we thank you for your participation, and we look forward to working with you further in this case.

Thank you very much.

Senator KeyNepy. Mr. Chairman, I would like also to thank the witnesses. These are difficult matters, and I think all of us are very grateful.

Senator Scuwetken. I think the witnesses should know that though it may not always seen that way, what we are trving to do is to probe the past andl look at the policies of the past to afect the future. I think our emphasis really is on the futnre. not the past. but it is important that we Jearn fron the past as we formulate policies and legislation for the future. I hope that all of the witnesses who did come before us voluntarily this morning. inehuding Admiral Turner respect the fact that we are questioning the past to learn about the future. I think it shoull be looked at in that light.

Senator KeNNEpy. I think that is the spirit in which we have had these hearings. It seems to me that from both these witnesses and others. Goutlieb knows the infornation and can best respond, and we are going to make every effort in the Senate Health Committee to get Mr. Gottlieb to appear, and we obviously look forward to eooperating with Senator Inouye and the other members of the committee in getting the final chapter written on this, but we want to thank you very much for your appearance here.

Senator Ixorvi. The hearing will stand in recess, subjeet to the eall of the Chair.

{Whereupon. at 12:12 p.mu., the hearing was recessed, subject to the call of the Chair.]

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APPENDIX A

XVII. TESTING AND USE OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGI-CAL AGENTS BY THIE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

Under its mandate  the Select Committee has studied the testing and use of chemical and biological agents by intelligence agencies. Detailed deseriptions of the prograns conducted by intelligence agencies involving chemical and biological agonts will be included in a separately published appendix to the Senate Selert Committee's report. 'This section of the report will discuss the rationale for the programs, their monitoring and control, and what the Committee's investigation has revealed about the relationships among the intelligence agencies and about their relations with other govermnent agencies and private institutions and individuals.? stitutrons and mnaiviquuz. would ne chemi.

Fears that countries hostile to the United Srates would use chemical and biological agents against Americans or America's allies led to the development of a defensive progran designed to discover techniques for American intelligence agencies to detect and counteract chemical and biologicai agents. The defensive orientation soon became secondary as the possible use of these agents to obtain information from, or gain control over, enemy agents became apparent. trom, or gain comuroi ove, snemn g -al-hiah could

Research and developnent programs to find materials which could be used to alter human belavior were initiated in the late 1940s and early 195os. These experimental prograis originally included testing of drugs involving witting hunan subjects. and culminated in tests using unwitting. nonvohunteer hunan subjeets. These tests were designed to determine the potential effects of chemical or biological agents when used operationally against individuals unaware that they had received a drug. nad receivea a urug- --aitive hr the in-

The testing programs were considered highly sensitive by the intelligence agencies administering them. Few people. even within the agencies, knew of the programs and there is no evidence that either the executive branch or Congress were ever informed of them. The highly compartmented nature of these programs may be explained in part by an observation made by the CIA Inspector General that, "the knowledge that the Agency is engaging in unethical and illicit activi-

'Senate Resolution 21 directs the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities to investigate a number of issues: Activities to investigate a number or issues: \_munit cnnducted illegal

"(a) Whether agencles within the intelligence community conducted llegal domestic activities (Section 2(1) and (2)): domestic activities (ection) anu. -:-tance communit cooper

"(b) The extent to which agencies within the intelligence community cooperate (Section 2(4) and (8)) ; ate (Section 2(4) and (8)) ; -----iann! nrersight of intel-

"(c) The adequacy of executive branch and congressional oversight of intelligence activities (secnionauu ). ligence activities (Section 2(7) and (11)); d na iohts nf American citi-

"(d) The adequacy of existing laws to safeguard the rights of American citizens (Section 2(13))." zens (Section 2(13)). -n Tha prorrams were higbly

The details of tbese programs may never he known. The programs were higbly comnartmented. Few records were kept. What little documentation existed for the CIA's principai program was destroyed early in 1973.

(385)

(65)

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386

ties would have serious repercussions in political and diplomatic circles and would be detrimental to the accomplishment of its missions."

The research and development prograu, and particularly the covert testing programs, resulted in massive abridgments of the rights of American citizens, sometimes with traric consequences. The deaths of two Americans " can be attributed to tiiese prograns; other participants in the testing programs may still suffer from the residual effects. While some controlled testing of these substances might be defended, the nature of the tests, their scale, and the fact that they were continued for years after the danger of surreptitious administration of LSI) to unwitting individuals was known, demonstrate a fundamental disregard forthe value of human life,

The Soleci Committee's investigation of the testing and use of chemical and biological agonts also reise serious questions about the adequacy of command and control procedures within the Central Intelligence Agency and military intelligence, and about the relationships amoug the intelligence agencies, other governmental agencies, and private institutions and individuals, The CIA's normal administrative controls were waived for programs involving chemical and biological agents to proteet. their security. According to the head of the Audit Branch . the CI.A. these waivers produced "gross administrative failures." They pr . ted the CIA's internal review mechanisms (the Office of General C.nsel, the Inspector General. and the Audit Staf) fron adequately supervising the programs. In general. the waivers had the paradoxical edlect of providing less restrictive administrative controls and less effective internal reviey for controversial and highly sensitive projeets than those governing normal Ageney activities.

The security of the programs was proteeted not only by waivers of normal adiinistrative controls. but also by a high degrée of compartmentation within the CIA. This compartmentation excluded the CIA's Medical Staf from the principal research and testing program employing chemical and biological agents.

It also"may have led to agency policymakers receiving differing and ineonsistent responses when they posed questions to the CIA component involved.

Jurisdictional uncertainty within the CIA was matched by jurisdictional conflict among the varicus intelligenee agencies. A spirit of cooperation and reciprocal exchanges of information which initially charaeterized the programns disappeared. Military testers withheld information from the CIA. ignoring suggestions for coordination from their superiors. The ClA similarly failed to provide information to the military on the CIA's testing program. This failure to cooperate was conspicuously manifested in an attempt by the Army to conceal

66

\* CIA Inspector General's Survey of TSD, 1957, p. 217.

" On Jannary S. 1953. Mr Harold Bhaver died of circulatory collapse apd heart failure foloaing an intravenous injection af a synthetic mescaline derivatice while a sutject of tests conducted by New York State Psychiatric Institute under a contract let By the U.S. Arms Chemicał Corps. The Committee's investigetioa into drng tosting br U'.S. intelligenee agencies focused on the testing of LSD. however. the committec did receire a copy of the t.S. Artiy Inspector General's Report, issued on Oetober 1975, on the events apd círcumstapces of Mr. Blaver's deatlı Iis death wes directly atributable to tbe administratioc of the synthetic mescaline derivative.

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their overseas testing program. which included surreptitious administration of LSD. from the CIA. Learning of the Army's program, the Ageucy surreptitiously attempted to obtain details of it.

The-lecision to institute one of the Army's LSD feld testing projects had been based, at least in part, on the finding that no long-term residual effects had ever resulted from the drug's administration. The CIA's failure to inform the Army of a death which resulted from the surreptitious administration of LSD to unwitting Americans, may well have resulted in the institution of an unnecessary and potentially lethal program.

The development, testing, and use of ch vical and biological agents by intelligence agencies raises serious questions about the relationship between the intelligence community and foreign governments, other agencies of the Federal Government, and other institutions and individuals. The questions raised range from the legitimacy af American complicity in actions abroad which violate American and foreign laws to the possible compromise of the integrity of public and private institutions used as cover by intelligence agencies.

A. THE PROGRAMS INVESTICATED

1. Project CHATTER

Project CHATTER was a Navy program that began in the fall of 1947. Responding to reports of "amazing results" achieved by the Soviets in using "truth drugs." the program focused on the identification and testing of. such drugs for use in interrogations and in the recruitmer:-of ageuts. The résearch included laboratory experiments on animals and hun:,subjects involving Anabasis aphylla, scopolamine. and mescaline in. order to determine their speech-inducing quali ties. Overseas experiments were conducted as part. of the project.

The project expanded substantially during the Korean War, and ended shortly after the war, in 1953.

2. Project BLUEBIRD/ARTICHOKE

The earliest of the CIA's major programs involving the use of chemical and biological agents. Project BLUEBIRD, was approved by the Director in 1950. Its objectives were:

(a) discovering means of conditioning personne) to prevent unauthorized extraction of infornation from them by known means. (b) investigating the possibility of controì of an individual by application of special interrogation techniques, (e) memory enhancement. and (d) establishing defensive means for preventing hostile control of Agency personnel.

As a result of interrogations condueted overseas during the project. arother goal was addedthe evaluation of ofensive uses of unconventtal interrogation techniques, including hypnosis and drugs. In August 1951, the project was renamed ARTIClÍOKE. Projeet ARTI-CHOKE included in-house experimnents on interrogation techniques, conducted “under medical and security controls which would ensure

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'Cla memorandum to the Select Committee, "Bebavioral Drugs and Testing." 2/11/75.

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that no damage was done to individuals who volunteer for the experiments." Overseas interrogations utilizing a combination of sodium pentothal and hypnosis after physical and psychiatric examinations of the subjects were also part of ARTICHOKE.

The (fice of Scientific Intelligence (OsI). which studied scientific advances by hostile powers, initially led BLUEBIRD/ARTICHOKE efforts. In 1952. overall responsibility for ART1CHOKE was transferred fron OsI to the Inspection and Security Office (I&SO), predecessor to the present Ofice of Security. The CIA's Technical Servjers and Mediral Stafs were to be called upon as needed: OSI would retain liaison function with other government agencies. The change in leadership from an intelligence unit to an operating unit apparently refloeted a change in emphasis; from the study of actions by hostile powers to the use, both for offensive and defensive purposes, of squvial interrogation techniques—primarily hypnosis and truth sernms.

Representatives from each Ageney unit involved in ARTICHOKE met almost monthly to discuss their progress. These discussions includuì the planning of overseas interrogations\* as well as further exprimentation in the U.S.

Information abont project ARTICHOKE after the fall of 1953 is scarve. The ClA maintains that the project enied in 1956, but evidence suggest- that Office of Security and Office of Medical Services use of "special interrogation" techniques continued for several years thercafter.

3. MKNAOMI

MKN.AOMI was another major CIA program in this area. In 1967, the CIA summarized the purposes of MKNAOMI:

(a) To provide for a covert support base to meet clandestine opcrational requirements.

(b)'To stockpile severely incapacitating and lethal materials for the specife use of TSD [Technical Services Division].

(c) To maintain in operational readiness special and unique items for the dissemination of biological and chemical materials.

(d) To provide for the required surveillance. testing. upgrading, and evaluation of materials and items in order to assure absence of defects and complete predictability of results to be expected under operational conditions.

Under an agreement reached with the Army in 1952, the Special Operations Division (SOD) at Fort Detrick was to assist CIA in developing, testing, and maintaining biological agents and delivery

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Momorandum frota Robest Tasior. O/D.P tn the Asisiant Deputy (Inspection and Stcarity) and Chief of the Medical Staff. 322/52.

\*Memorandon from U. Marshad Chidwop. Assistant Director. Scientiae Intelligen. to the Deputs Tirctor/Pians (DDP "Pmfet ARTICHOKE." 8/29/52. "Progress Report. Project ARTICHOKE." 1/12/03

• Memorandum from Chief. TSD/Biologicat Hranch to Chiet. TSD "MKNAOMl: Funding. Ohiectites, "nd Acenmntishments" 10/is/6t. n. t. For a fuller descrir tion of MKNAOMI and the relationship between CiA and SOD. see p. S60 ff.

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svstems. By this agreement, CIA acquired the knowledge, skill, and facilities of the Army to develop biological weapons suited for CIA use.

SOD developed darts coated with biological agents and pills containing several ditrrent biological agents which could remain potent for weeks or montìs. SOD also developed a special gun for firing darts coated with a chemical which could allow CIA agents to incapacitate a guard dog, enter an installation secretly, and return the dog to consciousness when leaving. SOD scientists were unable to develop a similar incapacitant for lumans. SOD) also physically transferred to CIA personnel biological agent- in "bnlk" form, and delivery devices, including some containing biologieal agents.

In addition to the CIA's interest in biological weapons for use against humans, it also asked SOI) to study use of biological agents against crops and animals. In its 196ī memorandun. the CIA stated:

Three methods and systemns for carrying out a covert attack against crops and causing severe crop loss have been developed and evaluated under feld conditions. This was accomplished in anticipation of a requirement which was later developed but was subsequently scrubbed just prior to putting into action."

· MKNAOMI was terminated in 1970. On November 25. 1969, President Nixon renounced the use of any form of biological weapons that kill or incapacitate and ordered the disposal of existing stocks of bacteriological weapons. On February 14. 1970, the President clarified the extent of his eailier order and indicated that toxins—chemicals that are not living organisms hut are produced by living organisms—were considered biological weapons subject to his previous directive and were to be destroyed. Althougl: instrueted to relinquish control of material held for the CIA by SOD. a CIA scientist acquired approximately 11 grams of shellfish toxin from SOD personnel at Fort De. trick which were stored in a little-used CIA laboratory where it went undetected for five years.1°

4. MKULTRA

MKULTRA was the principal CIA program involving the research and development of chenical and biological agents. It was "concerned withi the researel aud development of chemical, biological,'and radiological materials capable of employment in clandestine operations to control humnan behavior." u

In January 1973, MKULTR.A records were destroyed by Technical Services Division personnel acting on the verbal orders of Dr. Sidney Gottlieb, Chief of TSD. Dr. Gotlieh has testified, and former Director Helms has confirmed. that in ordering the records destroved. Dr. Gottlieh wos carrying out the verbal order of then DCI Helms.

MKULTRA began with a proposal from the Assistant Deputy Director for Plans. Richard Helnis, to the DCl. outlining a special

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1did. p. 2.

senate Select Committee. 9/16/75, Hearings. Vo. 1.

Memorandum from the C1A Insjector General to the Director, 7/26/63.

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fur. ling mechanism for highly sensitive CIA rescarch and developmeut projects that studied the use of biological and chemical materials in altering human behavior. The projects involved :

Researeh to develop a capability in the covert use of biological and chemical materials. This a:ca involves the produetion of various physiokogical conditions which could support present or future clandestine operations. Aside from the offensive potontial, the developmuent of a comprehensive capability in this field of covert chemical and biological warfare gives us a thoraugh knowledge of the eneny's theoretical potential. thus enabling us to defend ourselves against a foe who might not be as restrained in the use of these techniqjues as we are.12

MKULTRA was approved by the DCI on April 13. 1953 along the lines proposd by AbbP Helms.

Part of the rationale for the establishment of this special funding mu hanism was its extreme sensitivity. The Inspector General's survey of MKILTRA in 196) noted the following reasons for this sensitivity :

a. H-eareh u. the nanipulation of human behavior is considlurl by ma:. , anthorities in medicine and related fields to l professio y unethical. therefore the repntation of professional partieipants in the MKULTRA.program are on occasion in jeopardy.

b. Some MKt'I.TRA activities raise questions of legality implicit in the original chatter.

e. A final phase of the testing of MKILTRA products places the rights and interests of U.S. citizens in jeopardy.

d. Publie lisclosure of some aspects of MKlLTRA actié- ity could induce serious advere reaction in U.S. publie opinion. as well as stimulate ofeusive and defensive action in this feld on the part of foreign intelligence services."

Oser the ten-year life of th progran. many "additional avennes to the control of haman hehavior" were designated as appropriate for investigation under the MKILTRA charter. These include "radiation. eloctroshoek, varions fields of psvchology, psychiatry, sociology, and anthropology. graphology. harassmuent substances, and paramilitary device- and materials."

The rseareh and development of materials to be used for altering human lelavior consisted of three phases: first. the seareh for materials suitable for study: seconl. laboratory testing on vohuntary human subieets in various types of in-titotions: théird, the application of MKULTRA materials in normal life settings.

The scarch for suitable materials was conducted through standing arrangenent、 with speialists in universities, pharmaceutical houses. hospitals, state and federal institutions. and private research organi-

70

390

" Memorandum from ADDP Homs to DCI Dulles, 4/3/53. Tab A. Pp. 1-2.

-1 t on MKILTRA, 1903, . 1-2

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391

zations. The annual grants of funds to theso specialists were made undher ostensible rescarch foundlation auspices, thereby concealing the CIA's interest from the specialist's institution.

The next phase of the MKULTRA program involved physicians, toxicologists, and other specialists in mental, narcoties, and general hospitals. and in prisons. Utilizing the products and findings of the basic research phase. they conducted intensive tests on human subiects

One of the first studies was conducted by the National Institute of Mental Health. This study was intended to tes: various drugs. inchding hallucinogenies. at the NIMII Addiction Research Center in Lexington, Kentueky. The "Lexington Rehabilitation Center," as it. was then called, was a prison for drug addiets serving sentences for drug violations.

The test subjects were volunteer prisoners who. after taking a brief physical examination and signing a general consent form, were administered hallucinogenic drugs. As a reward for participation in the progran. the adliets were provided with the drug of their addietion.

LSI was one of the materials tested in the MKULTRA program. The fnal phase of LSI) testing involvedl surreptitious administration to unwitting nonvolunteer subjects in normal life settings by undercover oflicers of the Bureau of Narcoties acting for the CIA.

The rationale for such testing was "that testing of materials under accepted scientife procedures fails to disclose the full pattern of reactions and attributions that may occur in operational situations."s

Accorling to the CIA. the advantage of the relationship with the Bureau was that

test subjeets could be sought and eultivated within the setting of narcoties control. Sone subjects have been inforners or members of suspert criminal elements from whom the [Bureat of Narcoties] has obtained results of onerational vahue through the tests. to the other hand, the effictireness of the su'xtiners on indiriduals ot all social lerels, high and low. natire Am rican and forcigu, is of great siguificauce and testing hus borr pu rjorined on a raricty of individuals within these cat goràs. [Eiphasis added. ] 16

A special procolure, designated MKDELTA. was esablished to goveri the use of MKULTRA materials abroud. Such materials were nsed on a mumnbaer of occasions. Because MKI'LTRA records were destroved. it is imnpossible to reconstruet the operational use of MKIL.TRA materials by the CIA overseas: it has been determined that the use of tuese materials abroad began in 1953, and possibly as early as 1950.

Dungs werr usel primarily as an aid to interrogations. but MKILTRA MKbELTA materials were also used for harassment. diseredliting, or disabling purposes. Aecording to an Inspeetor General Survey of the Technical 'Services Divisiou of the CIA in 1957—an inspection which did not discaver the MKILTR A nrojeet involving the surreptitions adninistration of LSD to unwitting, nonvolunteer

71

Ihid. p. 21.

pbid, pp. 11–12.

[PAGE 74]
subjects—the CIA had developed six drugs for operational use and they had been used in six different operations on a total of thirty-three subjects." By 1963 the number of operations and subjects had increased substantially.

In the spring of 1963, during a wide-ranging Inspector General survey of the Technical Services Division, a member of the Inspector General's staf, John Vanec, learned about MKU'LTRA and about the proiect involving the surreptitious administration of LSD to unwitting, nonvoluntary human subjects. As a result of the discovery and the Inspector General's subsequent report, this testing was halted and much tighter administrative coutrols were inposed on the progran. According to the CIA, the project was decreased significantly each budget year until its complete termination in the late 1960s.

5. The Tcsting of LSD by thc Army

There were three major phases in the Armv's testing of LSD. In the first. LSD) was administered to more than 1,00 Ameriean soldiers who volunteered to be subjects in chemical warfare experiments. In the second phase. Material Testing Program EA 1729, 95 volunteers received LSI) in clinical experiments designed to evaluate potential intelligence uses of the drug. In the third phase, Projects THIRD CHANCE and DERBY HAT. 16 unwitting nonvolunteer subjects were interrogated after receiving LSD) as part of operational field tests.

B. CIA DrUG TesTiNG ProGrAMs

1. The Rationalc for the Testing Programs

The late 1940s and early 1950s were marked by concern over the threat posed by the activities of the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of C'hina, and other Communist bloc countries. lnited States concern over the use of chemical and biological agents by these powers was acute. The belief that hostile powers had used chemical and biological agents in interrogations. brainwashing, and in attacks designed to harass, disable, or kill Allied personnel created considerable pressure for a "defensive" program to investigate chemical and biological agents so that the intelligence community could understand the meclianisms by which these substances worked and how their effects could be defeated."

Of particular concern was the drug LSD. The CIA had received reports that the Soviet Union was engaged in intensive efforts to produce ISD): and that the Soviet Union had attempted to purchase the world's supply of the chemical. As one CIA officer who was deeply involved in work with this drug deseribed the climate of the times: "[1t] is awfully hard in this day and age to reproduce how frightening all of this was to us at the tine. particularly after the drug scene has become as widespread and as knowledgeable in this country as it did. But we were literally terrified, because this was the one material that we

72

"1bid, 1957, p 201.

" Thus en offcer in the Ofice of Security of the CLA stresuol the "urgency of the discovery of teclniques and metbod that would pernit our personnel, in the event of their capture by the enemuy. to resist or defvat enens tnterrogation." (Minmutes of the ARTICHOKE conference of 10/22/53.)

[PAGE 75]
393

had ever been able to locate that really had potential fantastic possibilities if used wrongly."

But the defensive orientation soon became secondary. Chemical and biological agents were to be studied in order "to perfect techniques . . for the abstraction of information from individuals whether willing or not" and in order to "develop neans for the control of the activities and mental capacities of individuals whether willing or not."z One Agency official noted that drugs would be useful in order to "gain con: trol of bodies whether they were willing or not" in the process of removing personnel from Europe in the event of a Soviet attack." In other programs, the CIA began to develop, produce, stockpile, and maintain in operational readines materials which could be used to harass. disable, or kilì specific targets."

Reports of research and development in the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, and the Comnunist Bloc countries provided the basis for the transmutation of American programs from a defensive to an offensive orientation. As the Chief of the Medical Staff of the Central Intelligence Ageney wrote in 1952:

There is ample evidence in the reports of innumerable interrogations that the ('ommunists were utilizing drugs, physical duress, electric shock. and possibly hypnosis against their enemies. With such evidence it is difficult not to keep from becoming rabid about our apparent laxity. We are forced by this mounting evidence to assume a more aggressive role in the developnient of these techniques, but must be cautious to maintain strict inviolable control because of the havoc that coulł be wrought hy such techniques in unscrupulous hands."

In order to meet the perceived thireat to the national security, substantial prograns for the testing and use of chemical and biological agonts—ineluding projeets involving the surreptitious administration of IsI) to unwitting nonvolunteer subjects "at all social levels, high and low, native American and foreign"-were conceived, and implemented. Theze progranıs resulted in substantial violations of the rights of individuals within the U'nited States.

r.

73

Testimony of C1A officer, 11 21 5. p. 33 …

Me-tnorandum from the birrctor of Security to ARTICHOKE representatives. Subjeet: "ARTIcHoKE Restatement of Program."

ARTiHOKE mmorandm, T30 53. 2 mr1

The Insjactor General's Report of 1üt nn the Techuical Services Division noted that "Six specitic products have been developred and are available for operational use. Three of thenn are diserediting aud disahling materials which can te adnitistered unwittingly und lermit the exereise of a mneasure of controt over the actiuns of the subject." A memorandoa 1

A memorandun for the Chief. TsD. Bjological Branch to the (hief, TSD. 10/IS.67, deseribed two of tie ohjectives of the CIA's Project MKNAOM1 as: "to stockjile severely incapavitating and lethal materials fur the sjwcife use of TSi" and "to matntain in operationat readiness spevtal and unigue items for the dissemination of biological and chenical materals" natrs"

國

"Memorandun froun the Chief of the Medite Sta, 1/25/52

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394

Although the CIA recognized these efects of LSD to unwitting individuals within the United States, the projeet continued."\* As the Deputy Director for Plans, Richard Hetmis, wrote the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence during discussions which led to the cessation of unwitting testing:

While I share your uneasiness and distaste for any program whiel tends to intrude upon an individual's private and legal prerogatives, I believe it is necessary that the Ageney maintain a central role in this activity, keep current on enemy capabilities the manipulation of human behavior, and maintain an offensive capability."

There were no attempts to secure approval for the most controversial aspect- of these programs from the executive branch or Congress. The nature and extent of the programs were closely held seerets; even I'I McCone was not briefed on all the details of the progran involving the surreptitious administration of LSD until i963. It was decmed inperative that these programs be concealed from the American people. As the CIA's Inspeetor General wrote in 1957:

Precautions must be taken not only to protect operations froni exposure to enemy forces but also to conceal these activities from the American public in general. The knowledge that the Ageney is engaging in unethieal and illicit activities would have serious repercussions in political and diplomatic cirvles anl would be detrimental to the arcomplishmnent of its mision."

2. The Death of Dr. Frank Olson

The most tragie result of the testing of LSD by the CIA was the death of lr. Frank Olson, a civilian employee of the Army, who died on November 27, 19ã. Hi- death followet his participation in a CIA experiment with 1SD. As part of this experiment, Oísan unwittingly received approximately To mierograns of ls1 in a glass of Cointrèau he drank on November 19, 1953. 'Fhe drug had been phared in the bottle by a (1y ofliror, lr. Rolert Lashbrook, as part of an experiment he and br. Suiney Gottlieb performed at a mecting of Army and CIAscienti-ts.

Shortly after this experiment. Olson exhibited symptons of paranoia and srhizophrenia. Accompanied by Dr. Lashbiook. Okon sought peychiatrie assistance imn New York City fromn a physician, Dr. Harold Abranson. whose research on LSb had been funded indireetly by the €IA. While in New York for treatment. Olson fell to his đeath fron a tonth story window in the Statler Hotel.

" Fven during the disrussions which led to the termination of the unvitting testing. the ll' turned duwn the option of laltng sueh tests witten the ts. and contimuing thrm abroand despite the faet that the Tecbuical Servires Division had candueted numerons opwratlons abroatd making use of Lst. The PDP made this decision on the basis of serurity poting that the psst eftorte overseas had resnitl in "naking an inordiratr munber of foreign nationads witting of out role in th very sezusitixe actisiry " tMenmranduma for the Hepuis Director of testral Dntothgetee trom the Deputy Jiteetor tus Plans. 12 1í ta, p. 2) 1d. 2 3

" t o. sarvey of Tsp, 195r. p. 217

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395

a. Background.—Olson, an expert in aerobiology who was assigned to the Special Operations Division (SOD) of the U.S. Army Biological Center at Canp Detrick, Maryland. This Division had three primary functions:

(1) assessing the vulnerability of American installations to biological attack;

(2) developing techniques for offensive use of biological weapons; and

(3) biological research for the CIA."

Professionally, Olson was well respected by his colleagues in both the Arny and the CIA. Colonel Vincent Ruwet, Olson's immediate superior at the tine of his death, was in almost daily contact with Olson. According to Coloneł Ruwet : "As a professional man . . . his ability . . . was outstanding."" Colonel Rüwet stated that "during the period prior to the experiment . . . I noticed nothing which would lead me to believe that he was of unsound mind."" Dr. Lashbrook, who had monthly contacts with Olson from early 1952 until the time of his death, stated publiely that before Olson received LSD, “as far as I know, he was perfeetly normal." This assessment is in direct contradiction to certain statenients evaluating Olson's emotional stability nade in CIA internal memoranda written after Olson's death.

b. Thc Ésjn rimeut.—On November 18, 1953. a group of ten scientists from the CIA and Camp Detrick attended a semi-annual review and analysis conference at a cabin located at Deep Creek Lake, Maryland. Three of the participants were from the CIA's Technical Services Staf. The Detrick representatives were all from the Special Operations Division.

According to one CIA official, the Special Operations Division participants "agreed that an unwitting experiment would be desirable."" This account directly contrndicts Vincent Ruwet's recollection. Ruwet recalls no such disrussion, and has asserted that he would remember any such discussion because the SOD participants would have strenuously objected to testing on unwitting subjects."

In May, 1953. Richard Helms. Assistant bjP. held a siaf meeting which the Chief of Technical Services Staft attended. At this meeting Helns "indicated that the drug [LSD] was dynamite and that he shoulì be advised at all tines when it was intended to use it." In addition. the then DIP. Frank Wisner, sent a memorandum to TSS stating the requirement that the Dbl personally approve the use of LSD. Gottlieb went ahead with the experiment," securing the ap-

" Staff summary of Vineent Ruwet Interview. R/13/75. p. 3.

Memorandum of Col. Vincent Ruwet, To Whom It May Concern, no date. P.2\_

Ruwet Memorandum, p. 3.

"Joseph B. Treaster, Nere York Times, 7/19/75. p. 1.

Memorandum for the Record from Lýman Kirkpatrick, 12/1/53, p. 1.

Rmwet (staf summary). S/13 75. p. 6.

• Inspector General Diary, 12/2/53.

"¿bid Ir. Gottlril las testified that he does not rememher either the nieeting with Helms nor the Wisner menorandum. (Gottlieb, 10/1s/75. p. 16.)

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396

proval of his immediate supervisor. Neither the Chief of TSS nor the DDP specifically authorized the experiment in which Dr. Olson participated.

According to Gottlieb.³ a "very small dose" of LSI) was placed in a bottle of'Cointreau which was served after dinner on Thursday, November 1a. The drug was placed in the liqueur by Robert Lashbrook. Al) but two of the SOD) participants received LSD. One did not drink; the other had a heart condition.: About twenty minutes after they finished their Cointreau. Gottlieb informed the other participants that they had reveived ISD.

Dr. Gottlieb stated that "up to the time of the experiment," he observed nothing unusual in Olson's behavior.a Onee the experinient was underwav, Gottlieb recalled that "the drug had a definite effect on the group to the point that they were boisterous and laughing and they could not continue the meeting or engage in sensible conversation." The meeting continued until about 1:00 a.m., when the participants retired for the evening. Gottlieb recalled that Olson, among others, complained of "wakefulness" during the night." According to Gottlieb on Friday morning "asidle from some evidence of fatigue, I observed nothing unusual in [Olson's] actions. conversation, or general behavior." Ruwet recalls that Olson "appeared to be agitated" at breakfast, but that he "did not consider this to be abnornal under the circumstances."

e. Th T'rcatm, nt.—The following Monday. November 23. Olson was waiting for Ruwet when he eame in to work at 7 :3o a.m. For the next two davs Olson's friends and fanily attempted to reassure him andl help hin "snap out" of what appeared to be a serious depression. On Tuesdav, Olson again came to Ruwet and, after an hour long con-

Dr. Gottliel testifed that "given the information we knew up to this time, and based on a lot of our own self administration. we thought it was a fairly benign substance in terrs of puteutial harm." This is in confiet not only with Mr. Helns' statement but also with material w bich had twen supuliel tu tbe Teehnieal Services Staf. In one luug menorandlnm on current researeh with LsD wbich was supptied to Tsi. Henry Beecher descrited the dangers inrolved with such research in a prophetic manner, "The second reason to doubt Professor Rothtand cam wheu 1 raised the questiop as to any accidents which had srisen from the use of Lsil-25 le said in a very positive way. 'none.' As it turned out this answer could le called overly positive. for later on in the evening I was discussing the matter with Ior. W. A. Stohl. Jr.. a tsrchiatrist in Bleulera's Clinie in Zurich where I had gone at Rothland's insistence. Stohl. when asked the some nuestion. replied. 'yes.' and added spontaneousiy. 'there is a case Profussor Rothland knows alout. In Geneva a womuan physician who had been subjert tu deprexsjon to sonie extent took Lsn-25 in an experinent and became severely and suddenlv denressed and committed suicide three weeks later. While the conection is not detiuite, commou knowledge of this conld hnrdly have allowed the rsitire starement Rothland termitted himself. This case is a waruing to us to avoid engaging subjects who are depressel. or who have been subjrct tu depression." Dr Gottlieb testiñed that he had no recollection of ejther the retwrt or that particular section of it. (Sidmey Gottliet testimony. 10.19/75.178.1

Memorandum of Shefheld Edwards for the record, 11,28/53, p. 2.

國

Lashbromk tstat summary1. 719, , p. 3.

Gottlieh Memorandum, 12/7/53 p. 2.

Edwards menoranduo. 11./25 53. p. 3.

Gottliet memorandum. 127.53. p. 3.

" Ruwet meniorandutu. p. 3.

[PAGE 79]
versation, it was decided that medical assistance for Dr. Olson was desirable."

Ruwet then called Lashbrook and informed him that "Dr. Olson was in serious trouble and needed inimediate professional attention." Lashbrook agreed to make appropriate arrangements and told Ruwet to bring Olson to Washington, D.C. Ruwet and Olson proceeded to Washington to meet with Lashbrook, and the three left for New York at about 2:30 p.m. to meet with Dr. Harold Abramson.

At that time Dr. Abramson was an allergist and immunologist practicing medicine in New York City. He held no degree in psychiatry. but was aswiated with rescarch projects supported indirectly by the CIA. Gottlieb and Dr. Lashbrook both followed his work closely in the early 19ãos." Sinee Olsun needled iedical help. they turned to Dr. Abramson as the doctor elosest to Washington who was experienced with LSD and cleared by the CIA.

Ruwet. Lashhrook. and Olson remained in New York for two days of consultations with Abranson. On Thursday, November 26, 1953, the three flew back to Washington so that Olson could spenl Thanksgiving with his family. En route from the airport Olson told Ruwet that he was afraid to face his fantily. After a lengthy discussion. it was decided that Olson and Lashbrook would return to New York. and that Ruwet would go to Frederick to esplain these events to Mrs. Olson."

Lashbrook and Olson flew back to New York the same day, again for consultations with Abramson. They spent Thursday night in a Long Island hote] and the next morning returned to the city with Abramson. In further diseussions with Abramson. it was agreed that Olson should be placed under regular psyehiatric care at an institution closer to his home."

d. Th, Iouth.—Because they could not obtain air transportation for a return trip on Friday night. Lashbrook and Olson made reservations for Saturday morning and checked into the Statier Hotel. Between the time they checked in and 10:00 p.m.; they watched television. visited the cocktail lounge, where each ltad two martinis, and dinner. According to Lashbrook. Olson "was cheerful and appeared to enjoy the entertainment." He "appeared no longer particulary depressed, and alniost the Dr. Olson I knew prior to the experiment."

After dinner Lashbrook and Olson watched television for about an hour, and at 11 :0o. Olson suggested that they go to bed, saying that "he felt more relaxed and contented than he had since [they] came to New York."" Olson then left a call with the hotel operator to wake them in the morning. At approximately 2:30 a.mn. Saturday. November 2s. Lashbrook was awakened by a' loud "erash of glass." In his report on the incident, he stated only that Olson "had erashed through the closed window blind and the elosed window and he fell to his death from the window of our room on the 1oth floor.""

397

-

h.

77

" Ibid.. p. 4.

" Lashhtook memorandu. 12/7 53. p. 1.

" Stat sunmary of Dr. Harold Abramson interview, T/29/75, p. 2.

“Tashbrook meporandum, 12/7 53. p. 3.

Abr mson memorandum, 12.4/53.

"Lashorook meinorandum. 12/7/53. p. 3. a7

" Ibid. p. 4.

"Ibid.

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Inmediately after finding that Olson had leapt to his death, Lashbrook telephoned Gottlieb at his bome and informed him of the ineident." Gottlieb called Ruwet and informed him of Olson's death at approximately 2:4 a.m.sº Lashbrook then called the hotel desk and reported the incident to the operator there. Lashbrook called Abranison and informed him of the oceurrence. Abramson told Lashbrook he "wanted to be kept out of the thing completely." but later changed his mind and agreed to assist Lashbrook."

Sliortly thereafter. unìformed police officers and some hotel emplovees came to Lashbrook's room. Lashbrook toll the police he didn't know why (lson had committed suicide, but he did know that Olson "suffered from ulcers."sz

e. The Afterwnath.—Following Dr. Olson's death. the CIA made a substantial efort to ensure that his family reccived death benefits, but did not notify the Olsons of the cireumstances surrounding his demise. The Agency also made considerable efforts to prevent the death bring connected with the CIA. and supplied complete cover for Lashbrook so thiat his association with the CIÀ would remain a seeret.

After Dr. Olson's death the CIA conducted an internal investigation of the incident. As part of his responsibilities in this investigation, the General Counsel wrote the Inspector General, stating:

I'm not happy with what seems to be a very casual attitude on the part of TSS representatives to the way this experiment was conlaeted and the remarks that this is just one of the risks running with sciontifie experinentation. I do not eliminate the need for taking risks, bt I do believe, especially when human health or life is at stake, that at least the prudent. reasonable measures which can be taken to minimize the risk must be taken and failure to do so was culpable negligence. The actions of the various individuals concerned after effects of the experiment on Dr. Olson became manifest also revealed the failure to observe normal and reasonable precautions."

As a result of the investigation DCI Allen Dulles sent a personal letter to the Chief of Technical Onerations of the Technical Services Staf who had approved the experiment criticizing hin for "poor juhguuent ... in authorizing the use of this drug on such an unwitting basis and without proximate mediral safegnards." Dulles also sent a letter to Dr. Gotthieb, Chief of the Chemical Division of the Technical Services Staf, eriticizing hin for reconnending the "unwitting application of the drug" in that the proposal "did not give sufficient emphasis for medical collaboration and for the proper consideration of the rights of the indlividual to whon: it was being administered."s

78

1

CIA Field Offire Report. 12 '3,'53. . 3.

" Ruwet Memorandum. p. 11.

Ihid.

Memoraudum from PCI to Sidney Gotrliel, 2/12'54.

"Memoramtomn from 1CI Chiof. Technical Oprrntiops, Ts. 2/12/54

CIA Field Ofier Report, 12,3/53, p. 3.

: Memoraudum frot the Goneral Connset to the Inmpector General. 1/4/54.

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399

The letters were hand carried to the individuals to be read and returned. Although the Jetters were critical. a note from the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence to Mr. Helms instructed him to inforn the individuals that: These are not reprimands and no personnel file notation are being made." ss

Thus, althiough the Rockefeller Commission has characterized them as such, these notes were explicitly not reprinands. Nor did participation in the events which ledl to Ir. Olson's death have any apparent efet on the advancement within the (lA of the individuals involved.

3. The Surreptitious Administration of LSD to Unuitting Non-V'olunteir Human Subjccts by the CIA After the Death of Dr. Olson

The death of Dr. Olson could be viewed. as some argued at the time, as a tragic accident, one of the risks inherent in the testing of new substances. It might be argued that LSb was thought to be benign. After the death of Dr. Olson the dangers of the surreptitious administration of LSD were clear, vet the CI continued or initiated "a project involving the surreptitious administration of LSI to nonvolunteer human subjects. This program exposed numerous individuals in the United States to the risk of death or serious injury without their informed consent. without nedical supervision, and without necessary follow-up to determine any long-term effects.

Prior io the Olson experiment, the Director of Central Intelligence had approved MKULTRA, a researeh progran designed to develop a "capability in the covert use of biological and chemical agent materials." In the proposal describing MKULTRA Mr. Helms, then AlDP. wrote the Director that :

we intend to investigate thr development of a chemical material which causes a reversible non-toxic aberrant mental state. the specifie nature of which can be reasonably well predicted for each individual. This material could potentially aid in disrrediting individuals, eliciting information, and implanting suggestions anl other foruts of mental control.s

On February 12. 1954. the Director of the Central Intelligence Ageney wrote TSs officials eriticizing then for "poor judgnent" in administering LsD) on "an unwitting hasis and without proximate medial safeguards" to Dr. Olson anl for the lack of "proper considcration of the right- of thue individual to whom it was being administered."» On the same day. the Inspeetor General reviewed a report on Sulprojeet Nunler 3 of MKUITRA, in which the same TSS oflicers who had just received letters from the Direetor were quoted as stating that one of the purposes of Subprojeet Number 3 was to

79

"Note from DDCI to Richant Relms, 2/1374.

\*The 1963 1 Report, which deserited the project involviag the surreptitious administration of LSD. placed the projoet leginning In J955. Otber CIA documents reveal that it was ia exisiepce as early as February 1954. The Clà bas toid the Committee that the projeet laeg n in 1a3 and tbat the experiment which led to Dr. Olson's death was part of the project.

Menorandum from AbbI itrns to 11 Dulles. 4/3.53. tab A. p. 2.

"Memorandum from 1u1 to Sudhey Gottlieh. 2/12 54; and memorandum from DUI to Chief of Operations, TSS, 2/12/54.

[PAGE 82]
"observe the behavior of unwitting persons being questioned after having been given a drug."o There is no evidence that Sutproject Number 3 was terminated even though these oficers were unequivocally aware of the dangers of the surreptitious administration of LSD and the necessity of oblaining informed consent and providing medical safeguards. Subproject Number 3, in fact, used metliods which showed even less concern than did the OLSON experiment for the safety and security of the participants. Yet the evidence indicates the project continued until 1963.61 contiued unt 1vo. th tost might make

In the project. the individual conducting the test might make initial contact with a prospective subject selected at random in a bar. He would then invite the person to a "safehouse" where the test drug was administered to the subject through drink or in food. CIA personnel might debrief the individual conducting the test, or observe the test by using a one-way mirror and tape recorder in an adjoining room. room. fo,nyof the subiects.

Prior consent was obviously not obtained fron any of the subjects. There was also, obviously, no medical presereening. In addition, the tests were condlucted by individuals who were not qualified scientifie observers. There were no medical personnel on hand either to administer the drugs or to observe their effects, and no follow-up was conducted on the test subjects.

As the Inspestor General noted in 1963:

A significant limitation on the effectiveness of such testing is the infeasibility of performing scientitic observation of results. The [individuals conducting the test] are not qualified scientific observers. Their subjects are seldom accessible beyond the first hours of the test. The testing may be useful in perfecting delivery techniques, and in identifying surface characteristics of onset, reaction, attribution, and side-effect.

This was particularly troublesome as in a number of instances, . . . the test subject has become ill for hours or days, including hospitalization in at least one ease, and the agent could only follow up by guarded inquiry after the test subjeet's retuirn to normnal life. Possible sickness ant attendant economie loss are inherent contingent eflects of the testing.63

Paradoxically, greater eare seens to have been taken for the safety of forvign nationals against whom LSD was used abroal. In several cases medical examinations were performed prior to the use of LsD."

80

400

Mem…randum to Inspector General from Chief. Insiection and Review, on Sbprot #3 of MKULTRA. 2/10,54.

" iG Report on MKULTRA, 13

1 bid., p. 12. lbid. According to the IG's survey is 163, physicians associated with MITR uld be ade avaa  a MKtI.TRA could be made available in an emergency. hl for the operatioual

The Technical Services Division whictı was responsible for the operational use of LsD abroad took the position that "no physical examiuation of the subject is required prior to administration of [LSD] bs TSS trained personnel. A pbysi-

[PAGE 83]
Moreover, the administration abroad was marked by constant observation made possible because the material was being used against prisoners of foreign intelligence or security organizations. Finally, during certain of the LSD) interrogations abroad, local physicians were on call, though these physicians had had no experience with LSD) and would not be toid that hallucinogens had been administered..s -dminiotntion nf

The CIA's project involving the surreptitious administration or LSD to unwitting human subjects in the United States was finally halted in 1903, as a result of its discovery during the course of an Inspeetor General survey of the Technical Services Division. When the Inspector General learnel of the project, he spoke to the Deputy Director for Plans, who agreed that the Director should be briefed. The DDP made it clear that the DCI and his Deputy were generally familiar with MKI'LTR.A. He indicated. however, that he was not sure it was necessary to brief the DDCI at that point. sul  as s .

On May 24. 196, the 1Il' advised the lnspectot General that he had briefed the Director on the MKILTRA program and in particular had covered the question of the surreptitious administration of LSD to unwitting hunan subjects. According to the Inspector General, the DDP said that "the Director indicated no disagreement and therefore the testing' will continue." tne tesung w conmue,

One copy of an "Eyes Only" draft report on MKULTRA was prepared by the Inspector General who recommended the termination of the surreptitious administration project. The project was suspended following the Inspwetor General's report.

On December iī, 1963s, Deputy Director for Plans Helmns wrote a memo to the DDCI, who withi the Inspector General and the Executive Director-Comptroller had opposed the covert testing. He noted two aspects of the problem: (1) "for over a decade the Clandestine Services has had the mission of maintaining a capability for infuencing human lehavior:" and (2) "testing arrangements in furtherance of this mission should be as operationally realistic and yet as controllable as possible." Helms argued that the individuals must be "unwitting" as this was "the only realistic method of maintaining the capability, considering the intended operational use of materials to influence hunan behavior as the operational targets will certainly be unwitting. Should the suljeets of the testing not be unwitting, the program would only be "pro forma" resulting in a "false sense of accomplishment and readiness." : Helms continued :

401

81

cian need not be present. There is no danger medicallş in the use of thls material as handled by Tss trained personuel." Tbe Offies of Medical Services had taken the pusition that LSp) was "medirally dangerous." Roth the Office of Securits aud the Ofice of Medical Services argued that Lsp "should not be administered unless prrceded by a medical examination... and shonld be administered oply ly ur in the presenue of a physician who had studied it and its epeet." (Menerandum from Jame Angleton, Chief, Counterintellgence Staf 1o Chief of Operatjons. 12.12 57, pp. 1-2. atjons. 12.12 1, . 1-. -at  Aieπnosis

Physicians might le called with the bope that they would make a diaguosis of mental breakdown which wonld be useful in diseredlting the individual who was the subject of the ClA interost. vas the subject oí tne 13 mnierosı. --1 R/t5/02 n1

國

" Memorandum for the Record prepared by the Inspector General, 5/15/63, p. 1. 1bid., p. 2.

[PAGE 84]
402

If one grants the validity of the mission of maintaining this unusual capability and the necessity for unwitting testing. there is only then the question of how best to do it. Obviously, the testing should be conducted in such a manner as to permit the opportunity to observe the results of the administration on the target. It also goes without saying that whatever testing arrangoment we adopt must afford maximumn safeguards for the protection of the Ageney's role in this activity, as well as minimizing the possibility of pbysical or emotional daunage to the individual tested.ss

In another memo to the Director of Central Intelligence in June. 1964. Ilrlms again raizel the issue of unwitting testing. At that time Genera! Carter. then acting DCI. approved several changes in the MKUl,'TRA program proposed by Mr. Helms as a result of negotiations between the Inspeetor General and the DDP. In a handwritten note. lowever. Director Carter added that "unwitting testing will be subjeet to a separate decision."

No specific decision was made then or soon after. The testing had been halted and, according to Walter Elder, Executive Assistant to DCI MeCone. the DCI was not inclined to take the positive step of authorizing a resumption of the testing. At least through the summer, the DDP did not press the issue. On November 9, i964. the DDP raised the issue again in a memo to the DCI, calling the Director's attention to what he descrihed as "several other indications during the past year of an apparent Soviet aggressiveness in the field of coveitly administered chemicals which are, to say the least, inexplicable and disturbing."ro

Helns noted that because of the suspension of covert testing. the Ageney's "positive operationa) capability to use drugs is diminishing, owing to a lack of realistic testing. With increasing knowledge of the state of the art, we are less capable of staying up with Soviet advances in this field. This in turn results in a waning capability on our part to restrain others in the intelligence community (such as the Department of Defense) from pursuing operations in this area."n

Helns attribnted the cessation of the unwitting testing to the high risk of embarrassment to the Ageney as well as the "moral problem." He noted that no better covert situation had been devised than that whieh had been used, and that "we have no answer to the moral jssue." :2

Helus asked for cither resumption of the testing project or its definitive cancellation. He argued that the status quo of a research and developneut program without a realistie testing progran was causing the Ageney to live "with the illusion of a capability which is becoming minimal aud furthermore is expensive." u Once again no formal action was taken in response to the Helms' request.

82

Meniorandum from DDP Helais to DDUI Carter. 12/1T/63.

Memorandum from DDP Helms 1o DC1. G/0, GH, 1. 3.

" Ihid, 11,9/64. p. 1.

" 1bid. Pp. 1-2.

nid. 2.

1bid.

[PAGE 85]
From its beginning in the carly 1950's until its termination in 1963 the program of surreptitious administration of ISI) to unwitting nonvolunteer hunian subjects demonstrates a failure of the CIA's leadership to pay adequate attention to the rights of individuals and to provide effective guidance to CIA employees. Though it was known that the testing was dangerous, the lives of subjects were placed in jeopardy and their rights were iguored during the ten years of testing which followed IDr. Olson's death. Although it was clear that the laws of the United States were being violated. the testing continued. While the individuals involved in the Olson experiment were admonished by the Director, at the same time they were also told that they were not being reprimanded and that their "bad judgment" would not be made part of their personnel records. When the covert testing project was terminated in 196ä, none of the individuals involved were subject to any disciplinary aetion.

4. Monitoring and Control of the Testing and l'se of Chemical and Biological Agent& by the C1.A

The Select Committee found numerous failures in the monitoring and control of the testing and use of chemical and 'biological agents within the (IA." An analysis of the failures can be divided into four sections: (a) the waiver of normal regulations or requirements; (b) the problems in anthorization procredures: (c) the failure of internal review mechanisus such as the Ofice of General Counsel. the Inspecetor General. anl the Audit Staft: and (d) the effeet of compartmentation and competition within the CIA.

a: Thé Waicer of Administratire Controls.—The internal controls within any ageney rest on: (1) elear and coherent regulations; (2) clear lines of autliority : and (3) clcar rewards for those who conduct themslves in accord with ageney regulations and unlerstandable and immnediate sanctions against those who do not. In the case of the testing and use of chemical and biological agents, normal ClA administrative controls were waived. The destruction of the documents on the largest CIA program in this area constituted a prominent example of the waiver of normal Ageney procedures hy the Director.

These documents were destroyed in carly 1973 at the order of then DCI Richard Hehins. According to Helms. Dr. Sidney Gotlieb, then Director of TSD:

. , , cane to me and said that he was retiring and that I was retiring and he thought it would be a goo fdea if these files were destroyed. And I also believe part of the reason for our thinking this was advisable was there had been relation. ships with outsiders in government ageneies and other organizations and that these would be sensitive in this kind of a thing but that sinee the program was over and finished and done with, we thought we would just get rid of the files as

403

83

" Section 2(9) of S. Res. 21 instructs the Committee to examine : the "extent to which U'nited States iatelligence agencies are gorerued by Exocutive Orders rules, or regulations either pullisbed or secret."

[PAGE 86]
well, so that anybody who assisted us in the past would not be subject to follow-up or questions, embarrassment, if you will,7s

The destruction was based on a waiver of an internal CIA regulation. CSI 70–10, which regulated the "retirement of inactive records." As Thomas Karamessines, then Deputy Director of Plans, wrote in regulation CSI-70-10: "Retirement is not a matter of convenience or of storage but of conscious judgment in the application of the rules modified by knowledge of individual component needs. The heart of this judgment is to ensure that the complete story can be reconstrueted in later years and by people who may be unfamiliar with the evente " u s unuammnat wnun une events.

The destruction of the MKULTRA documents made it impossible for the Select Committee to determine the full range and extent of the largest CIA research program invoiving cheniical and biological agents. The destrurtion also prevented the CIA fron locating and providing medical assistance to the individuals who were subjects in the progran. Finally, it prevented the Committee fron determining the full extent of the operations which made use of materials developed in the MKULTRA program."

Froni the incelition of MKULTRA normal Agency procedures were waived. In 1953, Mr. Helms, then Assistant Deputy Director for Plans, proposed the establishment of MKULTRA. Under the proposal six peréent of the research and development budget of TsD would be expended "without the establishment of formal contractual relations" because contracts would reveal government interest. Helms also voted that qualified inlividuals in the field "are most reluctant to enter into signed agreements of any sort which connect them with this activity since such a connection would jeopardize their professional reputa-

84

"Richard Helms testimony. 9/11/75. p. 5.

Many Agency documents recording confidential relationships with individuals and organizations are retained without pntlic disclosure. Moreover, in tbe case of MKt'LTRA tbe (lA had spent millinns of dollars developing hoth materials and delivery systems whiel could be used by the (landestine services ; the reconstruetion of the research and development progran would be difirutt if not impos. sible, without the docunents, and at least one assistant to Dr. Gottlieb protested against the document destruction on thosr grounds. 1.

Clandstine Services Institution (Cs1) T0-1n When asked br the Select Comamitte abnt the regularnty of the prourdure tr which he authorized Dr. Gotrlieh to desttoy the MkUL.TRA reoorl\~. Helms respnded :

"Weil. that's hard to say whether it would te part of the regutar procedure or not, tcaue the reovrd destruetion prograua is coudueted according to a certain patteru. There's a regular revurd destruction pattern in the Ageney monitored bs certain psople and done a certain way. Su that anything outside of that, I suppuose. would hate buul unusual. In otber words, there were douments being destroyed because sonedudy had raised this specife issue rather than bcause they were eneompassel in the regular records destruction progran. So I think the answer tu your question is probably Fes." (Helms testinuony, 9/11/75. p. 6.)

" Even prior tu the destruction of documents, the MKU'LTRA records were far fron conplete. As the Insqetor General noted in 19i3:

"Files are notably incomgplete. puuorly otganized. and lacking in evaluative statemeats that might gire jetspeetive to matagement policies over time. A substantial portioa of the MKtL.TR recurd appears to rest in the memories of the prinripal othors anl is therefore almuost certain to be lost with their departures." (IG Rt  MKULTRA. p. 23.)

[PAGE 87]
tions".' Other Ageney procedures. i.e., the forwarding of documents in support of invoices and the provision for regular audit procedures. were also to be waived. On April 13, 1953, then DCI Allen Dulles approved MKULTRA. noting that security considerations precluded handling the project through usual contractual agreements.

Ten years later investigations of MKlLTRA by both the Inspector General and the Audit Staf noted substantial deficiencies which resulted from the waivers. Because TSI) had not reserved the right to audit the books of contractors in MKI'LTRA, the CIA had been unable to verify the use of Agency grants by a contractor. Another firn had failed' to estallish controls and safeguards which would assure, "proper accountability" in use of governmnent funds with the result that "funds have been used for purposes not contemplated by grants or allowable under usual contract relationship." The entire MKIITRA arrangenent was conlemnet for having administrative lines which were unclear. overly permissive controls, and irresponsible supervision.

The head of the Audit Braneh noted that inspections and audits: led us to see MKULTRA as frequently having provided a device to escape normal administrative controls for research that is not especially sensitive, ns having allowed practices that produpe gross administrative failures. as having permitted the establishment of special relationships with unreliable organizations on an unacceptable hasis. and as having producel. on at least one occasion. a cavalier treatment of a bona fide contracting organization.

While admitting that there may be a need for special mechanisms for handling sensitive projects. the Chief of the Audit Branch wrote that "both the terms of reference and the ground rules for handling such special projocts should be spelled out in advance so that diversion from normal channels does not mean ahanionment of controls.

Special procedures may be necessary to ensure the security of highly sensitive operations. To prevent the erosion of normal internal control mechanisnis. such waivers should not be extended to less sensitive operations. Moreover. only those regulations which would endanger security should be waived: to waive regulations generally would result in highly seusitive and controversial projects having looser rather than stricter adninistrative controls. MKNAOMI, the Fort Detriek CIA projeet for researeh and development of chemical and biological agents. provides another exanple where eforts to protect the security of agency activties overwhelmed administrative controls. No written records of the transfer of agents such as anthrax or shellfish toxin were kept, "because of the sensitivity of the area and the desire to keep any possible use of materials like this recordless." The

405

85

"Memorandum from ADDP Helms to DCI Dultes, 4/3.53, Tah. A, p. 2.

"Memorandun: from IG to Chief, TSD, 11/S/63, as quored in memorandum from Chief. Audit Branch.

"The memorandum suggested that administratire exclusions. becnuse of the importance of such decisions. shonid requlire the personnt approval of the Deputy Dircctor of Central Intelligence on an individuat case basis. Present CIà polics is that only the DCI can authorize certain exemptions from regulations.

" Sidney Gottlieb testinpony. 10,/18/75, Hearings, Vol. 1, p. 61.

[PAGE 88]
result was that the Ageney hal no way of determining what materials wete on haid, arat conld not be certain whether delivery systemns such as dart guns, or deadly substances sach as cobra venon had been issmed tothe field.

b. Aathorization.—The destruction of the doruuents regarding MKULTRA made it diticult to determine at what level specitie projeets in the program were authorized. 'This problem is not solely a re. suit of the dorcnment destruction. however. Even at the height of MKtLTRA the 1G notet that. at least wit rezpect to the surreptitioms administration of LsD, the "present practice is to maintain no rerurds of the plamning and approyal of test programe. W1.:1

White it is clear tha Allen Dulles authorized MKULTRA. the reeord s unehar as to who anthorizedò sparifis projects such as that invohing the surreptitious adminóstration of Ls to umwitting nonvohuntrer humnan subjeets. Even given the sensitive and controversial natare of the project, there is no evidence that when John MeCone replaced Allen Dulkes as the Direetor of the Central Intelligence Ageney he wa- briefed on the details of thás projeet and asked whether it shonl! be continued. Even daring the lfca diseussions on the propriety of utwitting testing, the DpP questioned whethaer it was "néces. stry to brirf Geteral Carter," the Deputy Direetor of Central Inteligonce and the Direetor'- "alter ago," becanse ClA oficers felt it necessary to keep details of the project restricted to an absohute minimum numherofjnople."

In May of jaai. Dbl Helhas told the Inspeetor Gem ra! that the covent testing progran was authorized hsaise he had gone to the Dirvctor, briefed hum on it and "the Director indlicatel no disagreement and therefore the testing will continne." Such authorization even for noncontroversial matters is chrariy les desirable than explient aunthorization: in areas smch as the surreptitious administration of drugs. it is particularly nndesirahhe. Yet according to testimony

4

86

406

1G Reort on MKILTRA, 1963. p. 14. 4

Avrording to an assstant to lr. cottliet, there were annaal brietings of the DI atd the lP pu MKE1TRA by thr Chef f TsIr hdpaty. Hower, a May 15, l3 Mmuorandnn fur the Rootd fron the Iaspertor General noted that Mr Mesone had mot luen briefed in detait atont the progrann. Mr Metoncs Eeeutise ofeer, Walter Ektet. trstitied that it wa- "lrfdl alparent t na" that niiher Mr. Mconr nor Gelperal Carter, thea thh llul, was aware of the surrežtitit aiminisratin projet "ur if they had let àriefod thes had not under sp à." Eldet. 12, 1s 75, 1. 13.) Mr. MrCom tetitied tha' h "did not krow" whrther har taßked to anyotae about the prajeet but that to uhe hal told latn alout i: in a way th muld hase mathdi on al the hghts"thhan Metae testinony. 2 3 76. p. 10 1

"Artording t. Ehlers testimuny. "mo Depty Diroctor. to my knowhkge. hasever been hriefet or was it ever thonght temsiry tu britf tam to the exten to w hietyou wont brief the hiretor

Jt Memarandaa for the Revord. 5 15 63

On the qetotof authorization of the cert testitg prgran. ¿tkr tostited as fulous: …11..

"Bne my reasonable judgtnent is dhat this aas considerei to be in the area af cntittitg approtal, havine ne been appresedla tte Hirector." Tl.

Thir thuty of atßotizaton crre over frun obe aimuimstraiot to the next sem ptrtrnlatly inapütotiate fr less vitdh, hghy tive ttions wlnh uel trmcit  nis attentionhy sulnrdnates. wold hottis lo the atrtitDretor

[PAGE 89]
407

before the Committee, authorization through lack of agreement is even more prevalent in sensitive situntions.

The unaut horized retention of shellfish toxin by Dr. Nathan Gordon and his subordinatcs, in violation of a Presidential Directive, may have resulted from the failure of the Director to issue written instructions to Agency officials. The retention was not authorized by senior oficials in the Agency. The Dirvctor, Mr. Helms, hau instructed Mr. Karamessines. the Depity Director of Plans, and Dr. (ottlieb, the Chief of Technical Services Division, to relinquish control to the Army of any chenical or biological agents being retained for the CIA at Fort Detriek. Dr, Gottlieb passed this instruetion on to Dr. Gordon. While orders may be disregarded in any organization, one of the reasons that D)r, Gordon used to defend the retention was the fact that he had not received written instructions forbidding it."

In some situations the existence of written instructions did not prevent unauthorized actions. According to an investigation by the CIA's Inspector General TSD officers had been informed orally that Mr. Ie»s was to be "advised at all times" when LSD) was to be used. In addition TSI) had received a memo advising the staff that LSD was not to be used without the permission of the DDP, Frank Wisner. The experinent involving Ir. Olson went ahead without notification of either Mr. Wisner or Mr. Helms. The absence of clear and immediate punishuent for that act must undereut the force of other internal instructions and regulations.

One last issue must be raised about authorization procedures within the Agencv. Chemieal agents were used abroad until 1959 for discrediting or disabling operations, or for the purpose of interrogations with the approval of thie Chief of Operations of the DDP. Later the approval of the Deputy Director for Plans was requited for such operations. Although the medical staf sought to be part of the approval process for these operations, they were excluded because, as the Inspector General wrote in 1957 :

Operational deterinations are the responsibility of the DD)P and it is he who should advise the DCI in these respects, just as it is he who is responsible for the results. It is completely unrealiztic to consider assigning to the Chief, Medical Staif, (what, in efect, would be authority over clandestine operations.)"

Given the expertise and training of physicians, participation of the Medical Staf might well have been useful.

Questions about authorization also exist in regard to those agencies which assisted the CIA. For instance, the projeet involving the surreptitious administration of LSI) to unwitting non-volunteer human subjects was conducted in coordination with the Bureau of Nareotics and Dangerous Drugs. There is sone question as to the Commissioner of Narcotics' knowledge about the project.

87

Mr. Elder was asked whether the process of bringing forward a description of actimus ly the Ageney in getting apqroval through the absence of disagreement was a commou our He resuomnded. "It was not unoommon. .. . The more sensitive thr projeci the nore likely it would tean toward being a common practice, based on the need ta keep the wriiten rrourd to a minimum.

" Nathan Gordan testimony. 9/16/75, Bearings, Vol. 1.

1957 1G Report.

[PAGE 90]
In 1963, the Inspector General noted that the head of the BNDD had been briefed alsnut the projeet, but the IG's report did not indicate the level of detail províded to him. Dr. Gottlieb testified that "I remember meeting Mr. Anslinger and had the general feeling that he was aware." Another CIA officer did not recall any discussion of testing on unwitting subjects when he and Dr. Gottlieb met with Commissioner Anslinger.

In a memorandum for the record in 1967 Dr. Gottlieb stated that Harry Giordano, who replaced Mr. Anslinger, told Dr. Gottlieb that when he levame Commissioner he was "only generally briefed on the arrangements, gave it his general blessing, and said he didn't want to know the details." The same memorandun states, however, that there were several comments which indicated to r. Gottlieb that Mr. Giordano was aware of the substance of the project. It is possible that the Commissioner provided a general authorization for the arrangement without understanding what it entailed or considering its propriety. À reluctance to seek detailed information from the CIA, and the ClA's hesitaney to volunteer it, has been found in a number of instanees during the Select Committee's investigations. This problem is not confined to the executive branch but has also marked congres. sional relationships with the Ageney.

e. Interual lericu.—The waiver of regulations and the absence of docunentation make it difficult to determine now who authorized which activities. More importantly, they made internal Ageney review neehanisms much less efective. Controversial and highly sensitive projects which should have been subjeet to the most rigorous inspeetion lacked effective internal review.

Given the role of the General Counsel and his reaction to the surreptitious administration of LSD to Dr. Olson, it would have seemed likely that he would be asked about the legality or propriety of any subsiquent projects involving such administration. This was not done. Ho did not learn about this testing until the 1oio's. Nor was the General Counsel's opinion sought on other MKULTRA projects. though these had been characterized by the Inspector General in the 1957 Report on TSI) as"unethical and illicit."

There is no mention in the report of the 1957 Inspector General's survey of TSD of the project involving the surreptitiuus administration of LSD. That projeet was appareutly not brought to the attention of the survey team. The Inspector who diseovered it during the IG's 1963 survey of TSD recalls coming upon evidence of it inadvertently,

" ClA, Iospector General's report on TSD, 195t. p. 217.

88

•Gottlieb, 10/18/75, p 28

" The IG's report on MKU'LTRA In 1963 stated :

"The original charter dcuments specifed that TSD malntain exacting control of MKl'LTRA activities. In so doing. biwever, TSI) has pursued a phi-Josophy of ntinimum dorumentation in keeping with the high sensitivity of sone of the projeets. Some fles were found to present a reasonahls complete record. including most sensitive matters, while others with parallel oljectives contained little or no data at all. The lack of consistent records precluded use of routive insjection procedures snd raised a variety of questions concerning management and fiscal controls."

B

[PAGE 91]
rather than its having been called to his attention as an especially sensitive project." sensitive projet. ----1 h-in

Thus both the General Counsel and the Inspector General, the principal internal mechanisms for the control of possibly improper actions, were excluded from regular reviews of the projeet. Whien the project was discovered the Executive Director-Coniptroller voiced strong op position to it: it is possible that the project would have been terminated in 1957 if it had been called to his attention when he then served us Inspector General. as fnin

The Audit Staf, which also serves an internal review function through the examination of Agency expenditures, also encountered substantial diffieulty with MKULTRA. When MKULTRA was first proposed the Audit Staff was to be excluded from any function. This was soon changed. However, the waiver of normal "contractual procedures" in MK(LTRA inereased the likelihood of "irregularities" as well as the difficulty in detecting them. The head of the Audit Braneh charaeterized the MKULTRA procedures as "having allowed practices that produced gross administrative failures," including a lack of controls within outside contractors which would "assure proper accountability in use of government funds." 1t also diminished the CIA's capacity to verify the accountings provided by outside firms. CAStapa

d. Conpartmentatiin. and Jurisdictional Conflict Within the Agcncy.-As has been noted. the testing and use of chemical and biological agents yas treated as a highly sensitive activity within the CIA. This resulted in a high degree of compartnentation. At the same tine substantial jurisdictional conflict existed within the Ageney between the Technical Service» Division, and the Office of Medical Seryices and the Qffice of Security. lces ana te omce v u. …-ltbaro

This compartmentation and jurisdictional conflict may well have led to duplication of effort within the CIA and to Agency policymakers being deprived of useful information.

During the early 195o's first the BLUEB1RD Committee and then the ARTICHOKÈ Conmittee were instituted to bring together reptesentatives of the Ageney components which had a legitiinate interest in the area of the alteratiun of human behavior. By 1957 both these comnittees had fallen into disuse. No information went to the Technical Services Division (a component supposedly represented on the ARTICHOKE Committee) abont ARTICHOKE operations being condueted by the Oflice of Security and the Office of Medical Services. The Technical Services Division which was providing support to the Clandestine Services in the use of chenmical and biological agents, but provided little or no information to either the Ofce of Security or the Ofice of Medical Services. As one TS1) officer involved in these prograns testifed: "Although we were acquainted, we certainly didn't share experiences."

89

" Even after tbe Inspector came upon it the IG did not perform a complete investigation of it. It was discovered at the end of an extensive survey of TSD and t. Inspctor was in the process of being transferred to another post within the Ageney.

Testimiony of CIA ofieer, 11,/21/75. P. 14

[PAGE 92]
QKHIll.TOl, another group designed to coordinate research in this area also had little success. The group met infrequently—only twiee a year—and little speeifie infornation was exchanged. Concern over cacnmgeu.

Concern over security obviously played soue role in the failure to share information,\* but this appears not to be the only reason. A TSD officer stated that the Office of Medical Services simnply wasn't "particularly interested in what we were doing" and never sought such information." On the other hand, a representative of the Ofice of Medical Services consistently sought to have medical personnel participate in the use of chemical and biological agents suggested that Ts]) did not inform the Office of Medical Services in order to prevent their involvement.

Jurisdietional confliet was constant in this area. The Office of Security, which had teen assigned responsibility for direction of ARTICÍOKE. consistently sought to bring TSI operations involving psyehochemicals under the ARTICHOKE umbrella. The Oflice of Medieal Servives sought to have OMs physicians advise and participate in the operational use of drugs. As the Inspector General deseribed it in 1937, "the basie issue is concerned with the extent of authority that should be exereised by the Chief, Medical Staff, over the activities of Ts]) which eneroach upon or enter into the medical feld," and which are conducted by Tsi) "without seeking the prior approval of the Chief, Medical Staf, and often without informing him of their nature and extent."

As was noted previously, because the projects and programs of TSD stemned directly from operational needs controlled by the Db]'. the 1G recomnuended no further supervision of these activities by the Medical Staff :

It is completely unrealistic to consider assigning to the Chief, Medical Staff, what, in effect. would be authority over clanlestine operations. Furthrrmor, some of the acfirities of Chemia? lirisiou are rot ony urorthontor but unethical and xometimes illegal. The Pll ix in a better position. to craluat th justipistion jor such oprations than the Chiej, Medical Ntaff." [Emphasis added.]

Because the advice of the Director of Security was needed for "evaluating the risks involved" in the programs and because the knowledge that the CIA was "engaging in unethical and illicit aetivities woull have serious repercussions in political and diplomatie cireles," the H reconmended that the Dircetor of Seeurity be fully advised of TS]'s activities in these areas.

Even after the Insprtor General'» Report of 1957. the compartmentation and jurisdietionat contliet continued. They may have hiad a sub-

F

90

"Tle rue set of minates from a QüHlLI.Top meeting indcated that individuids in the ofice of Medical Services stressed the nevì for more rontaet. s  e roat.

When asked why inforaation on the surreqtitious administration of Lsh was mot presnted to th AkTiHoNE comnntte, hr Guttlirt responded: "I inagine she oply reason woald have lsrn a cotern for broadening the awaretees of its exrstence."

"CIA er 1 21 15. p 11

1b1d.

1G Surey of TsP, 1a7. p. 25

[PAGE 93]
stantial negative impact on policymaking in the Ageney. As the Dep uty Chief of the Counterintelligence Staf noted in 1s5s, due to the diferent positions taken by TSS. the Office of Security, and the Office of Medical Services on the use of chemical or biological agents, it was possible that the individual who authorized the use of a chemical or biological agent could be presented with "incomplete facts upon which to make a decision relevant to its use." Even a committve set up by the DI)P in 19s to attempt to rationalize Agency policy did not have access to records of testing and use. This was due, in part. to excessive compartmentation, and jurisdictional confliet.

C. COVERT TESTING ON HUMAN SUBJECTS BY MILITARY INTELLIGENCE GROUPS: MATERIAL TESTING PRRAM EA 1729, PROJECT THIRD CHANGE, AND PROJECT DERBY HAT

EA 1729 is the designator used in the Army drug testing program for lysergic acidl diethylamide (IS1). Interest in LSD was originally aroused at the Army's Chemical Warfare Laboratories by open literature on the unusual effects of the compound." The positive intelligence and coumnterintelligence potential envisioned for compounds like LsD, and suspected Soviet interest in sueh materials.1 supported the developmnent of an Amuerican military capability and resulted in experinients condncted jointly by the US, Arny Intelligenee Board and the Chenical Warfare Laloratories.

These experiments. designed to evaluate potential intelligence uses of LSD, were known collectivrly as "Material Testing Progran EA t7g9." Two projeets of particular interest conducted as part of these "xperuments, "THIIRD CHANCE" and "DERBY HAT", involved the administration of LsD to unwitting subjeets in Europe and the Far East.

In many resperts. the Ariny's testing programs duplicated research which had alrcady been condueted hy the CIA. They certainly involved the risks inherent in the early phases of drug testing. In the Army's tests, as with those of the CiA, individual rights were also subordinated to national security considerations; informed consent aud followup examinations of subjects were neglected in efforts to maintain the seerecy of the tests. Finally, the command and control problems which were apparent in the CIN's programs are paratleled by a lack of clear anthorization aud supervision in the Armny's programs.

7

91

" ISAINTC staf study. "Material Testing Program, EA 1729." 10,'15.59, p. 4. This same USAINTC study cited "A 19 (several years prior to initial U.S. interest in 1.S1- 25) report that the Soviets puurehased a large quantity of LSD-o5 from the Sandoz Company in 1i5t, repured to be suficieni for 50 milion doses." (bul. p. 101

Geuerally acceqded Sovirt methuds and counterintelligence concerns were also strotg mootivating factors in thue initiation of this reseanh:

"A primary instißratio for feld esperinmntarion in inteltignee with EA 1T20 is the connterintelligene or defnse inplicarion. We kmw that the rnemy philosopts crmdoats any kind of vmreion or violence for intetligenre purposes. There is proof that his ittelhigcte suriice has usedl drugs in the past There is strong evideme of keen interest in Es ttu ls bin. 'f fur no other purse than to knun what tr espuet frun enety intetligcnee use of the matorial aud to, thus, be prepared to cmnter it. fiekl exjurinntation is justited." (fbíd. p. 34)

[PAGE 94]
1. Scope of Testing

Between 1955 and 1958 research was initiated by the Army Chemical Corps to evaluate the potential for LSD as a chemical warfare incapacitating agent. In the course of this research, LSD was administered to more than 1,00) American volunteers who then participated in a series of tests designed to ascertain the effects of the drug on their ability to function as soldiers. With the exception of one set of tests at Fort. Bragg, these and subsequent laboratory experiments to evaluate chemical warfare potential were conducted at the Army Chemical Warfare Laboratories, Edgewood, Maryland.

In 195s a new series of laboratory tesis were initiated at Edgewood. These experiments were condueted as the initial phase of Material Testing Program EA 1729 to evalnate the intelligence potential of LSD, and included LSI) tests on 95 volunteers. As part of these tesis, three structured experiments were conducted:

1. LSD was administered surreptitiously at a simulated social reception to volunteer subjects who were unaware of the purpose or nature of the tests in which they were participating;

2. LSI) was administered to volunteers who were subsequently polygraphed; and

3. LSi) was administered to volunteers who were then confined to "isolation chambers".

These structured experiments were designed to evaluate the validity of the traditional security training all subjects had unlergone in the face of unconventional. drug enhanced, interrogations.

At the conclusion of the laboratory test phase of Material Testing Program EA 1729 in 1960, the Army Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (ACSI) autliorized operational feld testing of LSD. The first feld tests were conducted in Europe by an Army Special Purpose Team (SPT) during the period from May to August of 1961. These tests were known as Projeet THIRD CHANOE and involved eleven separate interrogations of ten subjects. None of the subjects were volunteers and none were aware that they were to reccive LSD. All but one subject, a U.S. soldier implicated in the theft of classifiel documents, were alleged to be foreign intelligence sources or agents. While interrogations of these individnals were only moderately successful, at least one subject (the U'.S. soldier) exhibited symptons of severe paranoia while umnder the influence of the drng.

The second series of feld teste. Project DERBY HAT, were condueted by an Army SPT in the Far East during the period fron August to Novèmler of 1962. Seven subjects were interrogated under DERBY ILAT. all of wlmm were forvign nationals either suspected of dealing in narcoties or imnplicatel in foreign intelligence operations. The puarpose of this sevonêd set of experimrnts was to colleet additional data on the utility of LsD) in fiehd interrogations. and to evaluate any diterent efleets the drug might have on "Orientals."

92

412

Buspeetor General of the Army Report. "U'se uf Volunterrs ín Chenical Agent Rescarch." 3:10 76, p. 13s

[PAGE 95]
2. Inadequate Coordination Among Intelligence Agencies

On October 15, 1959, the U.S. Army Intelligence Center prepared lengthy staf study on Material Testing Program EA 1729. The stated purpose of the staff study was: "to determine the desirability of EA 1729 on non-US subjects in selected actual operations under controlled conditions. It was on the basis of this study that operational field tests were later conducted.

After noting that the Chemical Warfare Laboratories began experiments with LSD on humans in 1955 and had administered the drug to over 1.000 volunteers, the "background" section of the study concluded :

There has not been a single case of residual ill effect. Study of the prolific scientific literature on LSD-25 and personal communication between U'S Army Chemical Corps personnel and other researchers in this field have failed to disclose anl authenticated instance of irreversible change being produced in normal humans by the drug.

This conclusion was reached despite an awareness that there were inherent medical dangers in such experimentation. In the body of this sane study it is noted that :

The view has been expressed that EA 1729 is a potentially dangerous drug, whose pharnaceutical actions are not fully understood and there has been cited the possibility of the continuance of a chemically induced psychosis in chronic form. particularly if a latent schizophrenic were a subject, with: consequent claim or representation against the U.S. Government.1º

An attempt was made to minimize potential medical hazards by careful selection of subjects prior to field tests. Rejecting evidence that the drug might be hazardous, the study continued:

The claim of possible permanent damage caused by EA 1729 is an unproven hvpothesis based on the characteristic effect of the material. While the added stress of a real situation may increase the probability of permanent adverse effect, the resulting risk is deemed'to br slight by the medical research personnel of the Chemical Warforc Laboratories. To prevent even such a slight risk, the proposed plan for field experimentation calls for overt, if possible, or contrivedthrougl-ruse, if necessary. physical and mental examination of any real situation subject prior to employment of the subject.105

This conclusion was drawn six years after one death had occurred which could be attributed. at least in part, to the effects of the very drug the Army was proposing to feld test. The U'SAINTC staff, however. was apparently anaware of the circumstances surrounding Dr. Olson's death. This lack of knowledge is indicative of the

413

93

Ihid p. 25

USAINTC statf study. "Material Testing Program EA 1729." 10/15/5e, p. 4. hid p. 4.

w fhid.

95-408 ☐ . 77 . :

[PAGE 96]
general lack of interageney communication on drug related reseairch. As the Oetolr 19a9 stuly noted, "therr has been no coordination with other intelligenee ngencies up to the present." 19

On Decembwr 7. 1950, the Army Assistant Chief of Staff for Inteligenee (ACSI. apparently a Genera] Willems) was briefed on the proposeL operational use of LSD by USAINTC Projeet Officer Jacobson, in preparation for Project THURD CHANCE. Generat Willems expressed concern that the projeet hal not been coordinated with the FBI anl the CLA. He is quited as saying "that if this projeet is going to be worth anvthine it [1sl] shouldì be used on higher types of non-I.S, subject-" in other word- "staffers." He indiented this could be accomplished if the CIA were brought in. The summary of the briefing prepared by a Major Mehovsky continues: "Of particular note is that ACSI did not direet coorlination with CIA and the FBI but only mnentioned it for consideration by the planners." 1e:

Àfter the briefing. four colonels. two lieutenant colonels and Major Mehovsky met to disruss interageney cooperation with CIA and FB1. The group con-ensus was to postpione eforts towarl coorlination:

Lt. Col. laeobson commentel that before we coordinate with CIA we shoald have more fartual fimlings from field experimentation. witl coanterintelligenee eases that will strengthen our position and proposal for cooperation. This approach was agrerl to by the conderees.ies

Had such coorlinatinn leen achieved, the safety of these experiments might have ben viewed diterently anl tho tests themselves might have been seen as mmnecessary.

3. Suhordimation of Iudicidual Rights to National Security Considorations

Just as many of these experiments may have been unnecessury. the nature of th. operational tests (polygraph-assisted interrogations of drnggel susperts) retleets a basie disregard for the fudamental human righis of the subjects. The interrogation of an American soldier as part of the TH1lRD CHANCE 1961 tests is an example of this disregard.

The "uip report" for Project TIRD CILANCE. dated September 6, 196t, recomnt- the cireumnstanees surrounding and the results of the tests as follows:

[Thw subjeet] was a U'.S. soldier who had confessed to theft of classified docmunents. Conventional methols had failedl to aseertain whether espionage intent was involved. A significant new admajssjon by sübjeet that he told a fellow soldlier of the theft while he still had the documents in his possession was obtained during the EA 1729 interrogation along with other variations of Subjeet's previons accomnt. The interrogation results were deemed by the loeal operational authority satisfaetory evidlence of Subject's claim of innocence in regard to espionage intent.

94

Ihid. p. 6.

Mehov-ky Fact Sheet, 1279/60, p. 1.

1. p. à. . -

SPT Trip Report. Operation THRD CHANCE. 9/6/61. p. 5.

[PAGE 97]
The subjeet apparently reacted very strongly to the drug, and the interrogation, while productive, was dificult. The trip report concluded :

(1) This case demonstrated the ability to interrogate a subjeet profitably throughout a lighly sustained and almost incapacitating reaction to EA 1729.

(2) The apparent value of bringing a subject into the EA 1729 situation in a highly stressed state was indicated.

(3) 'The usefulness of employing as a duress factor the device of inviting the subject's attention to his EA 1720- intuenced state and threatening to extend this state indefinitely even to a permanent condition of insanity, or to bring it to an end at the discretion of the interrogators was shown to be effective.

(4) The need for preplanned precautions against extreme paranoiac reaction to EA 1729 was indicated.

(5) It was brought to attention by this case that where subject has undlergone extended intensive interrogation prior to the EA 1729 episode and has persisted in a version repeatedly during conventional interrogation, adherence to the same version while under EA 1729 influence. however extreme the reaction, may not necessarily be evidence of truth but merely the ability to adhere to a well relearsed story.uu

This strong reaction to the drug and the accompanying discomfort this individual suffered were exploited by the use of traditional interrogation techniques. While there is no evidence that physical violence or torture were employed in connection with this interrogation, physical and psychological techniques were used in the THIRD CHANCE experiments to exploit the subjects" altered mental state, and to maximíze the stress situation. Jacobson described these methods in his trip report :

Stressing techniques employed included silent treatment be. fore or after EA 1729 adntinistration. sustained conventional interrogation prior to EA 1729 interrogation, deprivation of food, drink, sleep or bodily evacuation, sustained isolation prior to EA 1729 administration, hot-cold switches in approach, duress "pitches", verbal degradation and bodily discomfort, or drainatized threats to subjeet's life or miental health.111

Another gross violation of an individual's fundamental rights occurred in September 1962 as part of the Army's DERBY HÄT tests in the Far East. A suspected Asian espionage agent was given 6 mierograms of LSD per kilogram of bodyweight. The administration of the drug was completed at 1o35 that morning:

At 1120, sweating becamne evident. his pulse became thready. He was placed in a supine position. He began groaning with expiration and became semicomatose,u

95

1id, pp. 17-18.

Ihid. p 13.

DERiY HAT" Medical and Pharmacological Report: Case #1. 9/20/62. P. 110 2.

[PAGE 98]
416

For the next 28 minutes, the subject remained semicomatose.

At 1148, responses to painful stimuli were slightly improved.
At 1155, he was heled to a sitting position.

At 1200, he became shocky again and was returned to supine position.

At 1212. he was more alert and able to sit up with help

At 1220, Subject was assisted to the interrogation talle.

At 1230. he began moaning he wanted to die and usually ignored quesfions. Rarely he stated "he didn't know."

At 125o, his phasic alertness persisted. He frequently refocused his eyes with eyelid assistance, He frequently threw his head back witheves closed.

At 1330, he was slightiy more alert. He was forced-walked for 5 minutes. He physically woud cooperate until he became shocky again (sweating, thready pulse, pale).us

For the next three hours the subject remained in about the same condition. Continued attempts at interrogation yielded no relevant answers. Six hours after receiving the drug, the subjeet began giving relevant answers to qnestions. Eight and one-half hours after the initial dosage, the subjeet was polygraphed. The interrogation continned for seventeen and one-half hours after the drug was administered.

There was some psychological and medical sereening of the individuals tested within the United States. in Europe, and in Asia. The proposal for the field experimentation in fact called for such examinations, The fact of presereening did not eliniinate the risk of injury; the availability of medical staf did. however, limit injnry and niay well have prevented the death of one or more of the subjects. As the medical corps member of the tean which surreptitiously alministered the LSD noted. "one subject ... did collapse after the interrogation and the presence of the medical officer was not only of value to the subject but to the interrogation team who were thus assured that an uunecessary untoward result would not oceur."ta

In the Octoler 15, 1959,'USAINTC staff study, moral and legal ramifcations of covert administration of ISD in feld conditions were considered.

It was always a tenet of Army Intelligence that the basic Anerican principle of the dignity and welfare of the individual will not be violated. .. . A more meticulous regard for the prohibition against violence or duress is taken in praetice when the susject is a Us eitizen or ally as against an actual or potential enemy. in peace as against war. ánd in respect to thie nature of the crime. . . . In intelligence, the stake- involved and the interests of national secirity may permit a more tolerant interpretation of moral-ethical values, but not legal limits, through necessity. . . . Any clain

1bid. p. D10 3.

96

" SPT Trin Relort, Oration THIRD CHANCE. 7/25/61. P. 1.

[PAGE 99]
against the US Government for alleged injury due to EA 1729 must be legally shown to have been due to the material. Proper security and appropriate operational techniques can protect the fact of employment of EA 1729.u\*

On the basis of this evaluation, the st :ly concluded that in view of "the stakes involved and the interests of national security," the proposed plan for field testing should be approved.

The surreptitious administration of drugs to unwitting subjects by the Army raises serious constitutional and legal issues. The consideration given these issues by the Army was wholly insufficient. The character of the Army's volunteer testing progrom and the possibility that drugs were simply substituted for other forms of violence or duress in field interrogations raises serious doubts as to whether national security imperatives were properly interpreted. The "consent" forms which each American volunteer signed prior to the administration of LSI) are a case in point. These forms contained no mention of the medical and psychological risks inherent in such testing, nor do they mention the nature of the psychotrophic drug to be administered:

The general nature of the experiments in which I have vol:nteered. lave been explained to me from the standpoint of jüusible huzards to my health. It is my understanding thiat the experiny :- are so designed, based on the resuits of aniñals and urvious human experimentation, thot the anticipated results will justify the performance of the experimont. I undlerstand further that experiments will be so conducted as to avoid all unnecessary physical and medical suffering and injury, and that I will bc àt liberty to request that the cxperimonts be terminated at any time if in my opinion I have reached the physical or mental state where continuation of the experiments becomes undesirable.

/ recog»ize that in the pursuit of certain experiments transitory discomfort may occur. I recognize. also, that under these circumstances, I must rely upon the skill and wisdom of the physician superrising the erperiment to institute whatever medical or surgical neasures are indicated. [Emphasis added.] u

The exclusion of any specific discussion of the nature of LSD in these forms raises serious doubts as to their validity. An "understand. ing .. . that the anticipated results will justify the performance of the experiment" withont full knowledge of the nature of the experiment is an ineomplete "understanding." Similarly, the nature of the experiment linited the ability of both the subject to request its request its termination and the experimenter to implement such a request. Finally, the euphemnistic characterization of "transitory discomfort" and the agreement to "rely on the skill and wisdom of the physician" conbine to conceal inherent risks in the experimnentation and' may be viewed as disolving the experimenter of personal responsibility for danaging aftereffects. In summary, a "volunteer" program in which subjects are not fully informed of potential hazards to their persons is "volunteer" in name only.

1

97

417

USAINTC staf «tndy. "Materiat Testing Program EA 1729," 10/15/59, p. 26. us Sample rolunteer consent form.

[PAGE 100]
This problem was compounded by the security statements signed by each volunteer before he participated in the testing. As part of this statement, potential subjects agreed that they would:

, not divulge or make available any information related to U.S. Army Intelligence Center interest or participation in the Department of the Army Medical Research Volunteer Program to any individual, nation, organization, business, association, or other group or entity, not officially authorized to receive such information.

I understand that any action contrary to the provisions of this statement will render me liable to punishment under the provisions of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.

Under these provisions, a volunteer experiencing aftereffects of the test might have been unable to seek immediate medical assistance.

This disregard for the well-being of subjects drug testing is inexcusable. Further, the absence of any comprehensive long-term medical assistance for the subjects of thiese experiments is not only unscientific; it is also unprofessional.

4. Lack of Normal Authorization and Supervision

It is apparent from documents supplied to the Committee that the Army's testing programs often operated under informal and nonroutine authorization. Potentially dangerous operations such as these testing prograins are the very projects which ought to be subject to the closest internal scrutiny at the highest levels of the military command structure. There are numerous examples of inadequate review, partial consideration, and inconmplete approval in the administration of these programs.

When the first Army program to use LSD on American soldiers in "feld stations" was authorized in May 1955, the Army violated its own procedures in obtaining approvai. Under Army Chief of Staff Memorandumn 385, such proposals were to be personally approved by the Secretary of the Army. Although the plan was submitted to him on Apri) 26, 1956, the Seeretary issned no written authorization for the project, and there is no evidence that he either reviewed or approved the plan. Less than a month later, the Army Chief of Staff issued a memorandu authorizing the tests.12

Subscquent testing of LSD under Material Testing Program EA 1729 operated generally under this authorization. When the plans for this testing were originally discussed in early 195s by ofhicials of the Arny Intelligence Center at Fort Holabird nnd representatives of the Chemical Warfare (enter at Edgewood Arsenal, an informal proposal was formulated. This proposal was submittedl to the Medical Research Directorate at Edgewood by the President of the Army 1ntelligence Board on June 3, 195s. There is no evidenee that the plan was approved at any level higher than the President of the Intelli gence Board or the Commanding General of Edgewood. The approval at Edgewood appears to have been issued by the Conunander's Adjutant. The Medical Research Laboratories did not submit the plan to the Surgeon General for approvał (a standardt procedure) because

98

418

"\* Sauople Volunteer Securlts Statenent.

Iuspectur General of the Army Report, "Use of Volunters in Chemical Agent Resarch." 3/10 76, p. 100.

[PAGE 101]
the new program was ostensibly covered by the authorizations granted in May 1956.121

The two projects involving the operational use of LSD (THIRD CHANCE and DERBY HAT) were apparently approved by the Army Assistant Chief of Staf for Intelligence (General Willems) on December 7, 1960. This verbal approval came in the course of a briefing on previous drug programs and on the planned feld experimentation. There is no record of written approval being issued by the ACSI to authorize these specific projects until January 1961, and there is no record of any specific knowledge or approval by the Secretary of the Army.

Ön February 4, 1963, Major General C. F. Leonard, Army ACSI, forwarded a copy of the THIRI) CHANCE Trip Report to Army Chief of Staff, General Earl Wheeler.  Wheeler had apparently requested a copy on February 2. The report was routed through a Gencral Hamlett. While this report included background on the origins of the LSD tests, it appears that General Wheeler may only have read the conclusion andrecommendations." The office memorandum accompanying the Trip Report bears Wheeler's initials,s

5. Termination of Testing

On April 10, 1963, a briefing was held in the ACSI's office on the results of Projects THIRD ČHANCE and DERBY HAT. Both SPT's concluded that more field testing was required before LSD could be utilized as an integral aid to counterintelligence interrogations. Iuring the presentation of the DERBY HAT results, General Leonard (Deputy ACSI) directed that no further field testing be undertaken."After this meeting the ACSI sent a letter to the Commanding General of the Army Combat Developments Command (CDC) requesting that he review THIRD CHANCE and DERBY HAT and "make a net evaluation concerning the adoption of EA 1729 for future use as an effective and proftable aid in counterintelligence interrogations." 1 On the same day the ACSI requested that the CDC Cominànder revise regulation FM 30–17 to read in part:

. . . in no instance will drugs be used as an aid to interrogations in counterintelligence or security operations without prior permission of the Department of the Army. Requests to use drugs as an investigative aid will be forwarded through intelligence chamnels to the OACSI, DA, for approval. ...

Medical research has established that information obtained through the use of these drugs is unreliable and invalid. ...

It is considered that DA [Army] approval must be a prerequisite for use of such drugs because of the moral, legal, medical and political problems inherent in their use for intelligence purposes.

}bid.

99

图

1bíd.., pp. 135. 137, 138.

Mehovsky Faet Sheet. 12/9/60

Memorandun fron leonard to Wheeler. 2/+/63.

" SGS memorandum to Wheeler through Hamlett, 2/5/G3. 1fbir.

Maj. F. Barnett, memorandumn for the tecord, S/12/03.

Yamaki memoranduin for the record, 7/16/63.

[PAGE 102]
The sulsequent aloption of this regulation marked the effective termination of field testing of 1S by the Army.

The oflicial termination date of these tésting programs is rather unclear, but a later ACSI memo indicates that it may have occurred in September of 1963. On the 19th of that month a mecting was held between Dr. Van Sims (Edgewood Arsenal), Major Clovis (Chemical Research Laboratory), and ACSI representatives (General Ieholn: aul Colonel Schmidt). "As a result of this conference a determination was made to suspend the program and any further activity pending a more profitable and suitable use." ie

D. COOPERATION AND COMPETITION AMONG THE INTELLIGENCE COM-MUNITY AGENCIES AND BETWEEN TIIESE AGENCIES AND OTHERINDIVIDUALS AND INSTITUTIONS

vne s nitryence vummtliy Relationships among intelligence community agencies in this ares varied considerably over time, ranging fron full cooperation to intense and wastefut competition. The early period was marked by a high degree of cooperation among the agencies of the intelligence community. Although the military dominated research involving chemical and biological agents, the information developed was shared with the FB1 and the CIA. But the spirit of cooperation did not continue. The failure by the military to share information apparently breached the spirit, if not the letter, of conumands from above.

As noted above, the Army Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence was briefedl on the proposed operational testing of LS] under Projeet THIRI) CHANCÉ, and expressed concern that the project had not been coordinated with FßI and CIA. Despite this request. no coordination was achieverl between the Army and either of these agencies. Had such cooperation been forthcoming, this project may have been evalnateit in a diferent light.

The competition betwèen the agencies in this area reached bizarre levels. A military officer told a (CIA representative in confidence about the military's field testing of LSI in Europe under Project TIIRD CHANCE. and the CIA promptly attempted to learn surreptitiously the nature and extent of the program. At roughly the same time Mr. Helms arguedl to the Dbel that the unwitting testing program should be continued, as it contribmnted to the CLA's capability in the area and thus allowed the CIA "to restrain others in the intelligenee commumnity (such as the Department of Defense) from pursuing operations." ise

The MKNAOMI program was also marked by a failure to share information. The Army Special Forces (the principal eustomer of the Special Operations Division at Fort Dietrick) and the CIA rather than attempting to coordinate their eforts promulgated different requirements which varied only slightly. This apparently resulted in some duplication of effort. In order to insure the security of CIA operations, the Ageney would request materials from SOD) for operational use withont fully or accurately deseribing the operational requirements. This tesultedl in limitations on SOD's ability to assist the CIA.

420

100

Undatel AsO menorandunu. p. 2.

Memorandum from 1he D1P to the 1I, 11/9 04. p. 2.

[PAGE 103]
2. Rclationships Betueen the Intelligence Community Agencies and Forcign Liaison Services

The subjeets of the CIA's operational testing of chemical and biological agents alroad were generally being held for interrogation by foreign intelligence or security organizations. Although information about the use of drugs was generally withheld from these organizations, cooperation with theni necessarily jeopardized the security of CIA interest in these materials. Cooperation also placed the American Government in a position of complicity in actions which violated the rights of the subjects, and which may have violated the laws of the country in which the experiments took place.

Cooperation between the intelligence agencies and organizations in forvign countries was not limited to relationships with thie intelligence or internal security organizations. Some MkULTRA research was conductedl abroad. While this is, in itself. not a questionable practice, it is important that such research abrond not be undertaken to evade American laws. That this was a possibility is suggested by an ARTI-CHOKE memorandun in which it is noted that working with the scientists of a foreign country "might te very advantageous" since that government "permitted certain activities which were not permitted by the U'nited States government (i.e., experiments on anthrax, etc.)."1si

3. The Jelationships Betureen the Intclligence Community Agencies and Other Aqencies of the l'.S. Gorerument

Certain U.S. government agencies actively assisted the efforts of intelligenee agencies in this arva. One form of assistance was to provide "cover" for researeh contracts let by intelligence agencies, in orter to disguise intelligence community interest in chemieal and biological agents.

Other forins of assistance raise more serious questions. Although the CIA's projret involving the surreptitious aduinistration of LSD was conlucted by Bureau of Narcoties personnel, there was no open conncetion between the Bureau personnel and the Ageney. The Bureau was serving as a "cut-out" in order to make it difficult to trace Agency participation. The cut-out arrangement, however, reduced the CIA's ability to control the prograu. The Ageney could not control the process by whieh suhjects were selected and rultivated, and could not regulate follow-up after the testing. Moreover, as the CLA's Inspector General noted: "the handling of test subjeets in the last analysis rests with the {Bureau of Narcoties] agent working alone. Suppression of knowledge of eritical results from the top ČIA management is an inherent risk in these operations."w The arrangement also made it impossible for the Agency to be certain that the decision to end the surreptitious admninistration of LsD) would be honored by the Bureau personnel.

The arrangement with the Bureau of Narcoties was deseribed as "informual," 53 Th: informality of the arrangement compounded the problem is aggravated by the fact that the 40 Committee has had vir-

101

421

JG Ret on MK1LTRA. 163. p. H4.

ART1CtOKE Memorandum. 6'13.52

Ibid This was taken by one Ageney oficial to meau that there would be no written conttact and no forinal meehanism for payment. (Elder, 12/18/75. p. 31.)

[PAGE 104]
apparent unwillingness on the part of the Bureau's leadership to ask for details, and the Cl's hesitation in volunteering information. These problems raise serious questions of comunand and control within the Bureau.

4. Relationships Betwcen thc Intelligonce Community Agencies and Other Institutions and Individuals, Public and Prirate

The Inspector General's 1963 Survey of MKULTRA noted that "the researeh and development" phase was condueted through standing arrangements with "specialists in universities, pharmaceutical houses, hospitals, state and federal institutions, and private research organizations" in a manner which concealedl "from the institution the interests of the CIA." Only a few "key individuals" in each institution were "mnade witting of Ágeney sponsorship." The research anl developmuent phase was succeeded by a phase involving "physicians, toxicologists. and other specialists in mental, narcoties, and general hospitals and prisons. who are provided the prodncts and findings of the basie rescareh projeets and proceed with intensive testing on human subjects." 13 mr

Accordling to the Inspector General, the MKULTRA testing programs were "conductedl under accepted scientifie procedures. where health permits. test subjects are voluntary participants in the prograns." is This was clearly not true in the project involving the surreptitious administration of LSD. whieh was marked by a complete lack of sereening, medical supervision, opportnnity to observe, or medical or psyclological follow-up..

The intelligence ageneies allowed individual researchers to design their project. Experiments sponsored by these researehers (which inelnded one where nareoties addlicts were sent to Lexington, Kentucky. who were rewarded with the drug of their addiction in return for participation in experiments with LsD) call into question the decision ly the agencies not to fix guidelines for the experiments.

Thi MKULTRA research and development program raises other questions, as well. It is not elear whether indiviluals in prisons. mental. narcoties and general hospitals can provide “informed consent", to participation in experiments sueh as these. There is doubt as to whether institutions should be unwitting of the ultimate sponsor of research being done in their favilities. The nature of the arrangements also made it impossible for the inlividuals who were not aware of the sponsor of the research to exercise any choice about their participation hased on the spousoring organization.

Although greater precantions are now being taken in researeh conducted on behalf of the intelligence commuuity ageacies. the dilemma of classification remains. These agencies obviously wishel to conceal their interest in certain forns of research in order to avoid stimulating interest in the same areas by hostile governments. In some cases today contractors or rescarehers wish to coneeal their connection with these agencies. Yet the fact of elassitication prevents open discussion and debate upon whieh scholarly work depends.

102

422

Ibid. p. 9.

1bid. p 10.

[PAGE 105]
MENORANDUI FOR: Deputy Directot of Central Intelligence THROUGH : Deputy Director for Science znd Technolof: SUBJECT : Request for Guidance on Handling Recently Located NKULTRA Haterial

、

1. (U/AIvO) This nenoransu is to advisc you that sdditional NKULTRa documents have been discovered and to obtain your approval for follow-on actions tequired. Paragraph 7 contains a reconnended course of action.

, 2. (U/AIUO) As a result of John flarks FO1A request (F-76-374), B11 of the MU'ITRA matcria1 in OTS possession was reviened for possible release to hin. Following that reviev, the CTs naterial in the Retired Records Center was sezrched. It was durins that latter search that the subproject files were lccated anong the retired records of the Ots Budg=t and Fiscal Section. These files were not discovered earlier as the earlier searches nere linited to the exaninatior ot the active and retired records of those branches considered most likely to have gene:ated or have had access tp NKULTRA docunents. Those branches included: Chenistry, Biological, Behavioral Activities, and Contracts Management. Becaus= Dr. Gottlieb retrieved and destroyed aii the MKULTRA documents he was able to locate. it is not surpTisins that the earlier seatch for MKULTRA documents, directed at areas where they were nost likely to be found, was unsuccessful. The purpose of establishing the MKULTRi mechanisn was to linit knowledge of the sensitire work being performed to those with an absolutc nseJ to know. If those precepts had been followed. the recently found B&F files should have contained onlr financial and administrative documents. (ln retrosrect, I realize that

國

103

APPENDIX B DOCUMENTS REFERRING TO DISCOVERY OF ADDI-TIONAL MKULTRA MATERIAL

22 June 1977

[PAGE 106]
FüJECT: Request for Guidance Dn Hanzlins Receir Located MiULTR Neterial

Serious errDr Was nosi ind PrOpOsiIs 2r degrees, teasonibl TeseミT funced thTou the o7 neroranju=

t 5
1
0 2 5
1 F

2

[PAGE 107]
105

SuliCt: Rccues for Guidance on Randling Recently iccate,EULTEA Naterial

The ceatribztiez could be controversizl in that it was mace thrcur & zechanisr naking it apnear to be a private donsticn. Frivate donations qualified for, ande tezeivei, an ecual anount of Federal matchins iunds. A letzer fro the Office cf Gcarral Counsel dated 21 Februarr is: azzesting to the legality of this funding is in the fiie.

6.(o) The Legislazive Counsel hes been made avart ci the existence of these adcitienal MKUlTRi The Nasks zsse is in litiçation aré ve are committed to advise Mr. Xarks ci the existence ci these files shortly. and to deiver the relcarsbie raterizl te his attorneys by 31 Jv. à éetter from the Inforzaticn and Privacy

;. (C) There are new tuo actions that should be taien:

a. Rciense arpropristely ssnitited mzterial to Xr. sttores as recuired by FOla litigztion.

t. loior= the Senats Sclcct Connittee of the existezcs ci the tecently lecsted records prior te infcrsise Er. Narks' attorneys.

It is receenied that you approve of both of these seticns.

S (U/ave) If adcitional details on the contents oi this ztorisl ars desired, the OTs officers most fazilia with it sre pepsred to brief you ai your convenience.

Divi s. toroi

Daviζ S. Brandwein DiTcctor Oiiicc of Tschnical Sctvice

[PAGE 108]
Weshengon  C 20505

The Honorable Dantel K. Inouye, Chairman

Select Committee on Intelligence

United States Senate

Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

During the course of l975 when the Senate Committee, chaired by Senator Church, was investigating intelligence activities, the CIA was asked to produce documentation on a program of experimentation with the effect of drugs. Under this project conducted from 1953 to 1964 and known as "MK-ULTRA." tests were conducted on American citizens in some cases without their knowledge. The CIA, after searching for such docuamentation, reported that most of the documents on this matter have been destroyed. I find it my duty to report to you now that our continuing search for drug related. es well es other documents, has uncovered certain papers which bear on thfs matter, Let me hasten to add that I am persuaded that there was no previous attempt to conceal this material in the original 1975 exploration." The material recently discovered was in the retired archives filed under financial accounts and only uncovered by using extraordinary and extensive search efforts. In this connection, Incidentally, I have personally commended the employee whose diligence produced this find.

Because the new material now on hand is primarily of a fínancial nature, it does not present a complete picture of the field of drug experimentation activity but it does provide more detail than was previously available to us. For example, the following types of activities were undertaken:

a. Possible additional cases of drugs being tested on American citizens, without their knowledge.

b. Research was undertaken on surreptitious methods of administering drugs.

c. Sore of the persons chosen for experimentation were drug addicts or alcoholics.

d. Research 1nto the development of a knockout or "K" drug was performed in conjunction with being done to develop pain killers for advanced cancer patients, and tests on such patients were carried out.

106

The Diredtor of Cental Intedliegence

[PAGE 109]
There is a possibility of an improper payment to a e. private institution.

The drug related activities described in this newly located material began aimost 25 years ago. I assure you they were discontinued over 10 years ago and do not take place today.

In keeping with the President's commitment to disclose any errors of the Intelligence Community which are uncovered, I would like to volunteer to testify before your Committee on the full details of this unfortunate series of events. I am in the process of reading the fairly voluminous material involved and do want to be certain that I have à complete picture when I talk with the Committee. I will be in touch with you next week to discuss when hearings might be scheduled at the earliest opportunity.

I regret having to bring this issue to your attention, but I know that it is essential to your oversight procedures that you be kept fully informed in a timely manner.

Yours sincerely

t taure

STANSFIELD TURNER

2

107

[PAGE 110]
APPENDIX C DOCUMENTS REFERRING TO SUBPROJECTS

DRAT 1 Hy 1953

MEMORUODOM POR TEE RECORO

SULEET: Projeet L, Subproject 2

1. project 2 is deig st up to provie  se eicient toloi to the HL pog.

C 2. er \* prcctirinc pevesetrtat and  facuity sencer of thr eis 75 positicce have ineluded Chie Neuropsychiatriat eca cief of the Peychietc Sectioc and Oss experience during Wcrld Var I. Ee tas bees of ve  the ge N fields  ol adviso ( C as and in setting up projects there, and e bes ccssultrt, be has bean of value in contacting irdividuals in the doze vark hizself which hes cortributed to the Hzraa fielá. s C corect vi h -B-

3. Subproject 2 vouls inelude:

4. Xiscellazaous resenrch and testizg serrices in the seDeral fieid of MCiRA.

b. Services as a costart and cut-out for pt'ects in the Mria field, priarily chose located in ca arts.

e. Monitoriag of selected pra'ects in the Mata field, vhep located nthe centroizsrea.

d. Services as s seneral consultant and mdviscr is the field.

h. Tue total cost or thias project 1e sot to exceed ,650.0c for a parzod of one yesr.

C5.  clerri through TOP ST a  comtact basis.

109

96-41 0- 17-8

[PAGE 111]
110

[PAGE 112]
PROFOEAL.

Objective: To study the possible sybergistic actioa of drugs vhich y be sppropriate for use in ebolisbing consciousnesa.

Situation: There is resson to beliete that two ar more druga, used in combicetion, are more effectire thzn single drugs. The sabioed effect of sos druga, suct ss conbiustiocs of barbiturates, arekncva, With other coabications,, the degree af syzergisa is not kova. L considerstle synergisa i found to ezist, two possibilities must be considered: (l) that a particularly weful cobinstio y be found, sad (2} ttat a particular cbinatiou msy be bazardous becsuse of its effect on respirstion or some cther vital functiou. To mioiaize bazards, snimal experimeats should precede buao experiments.

Propcsal: Allocation of \$l000 for animel experimests, to be drava on as teeded. Ttat experiseuts be conducted inforrally

Bat vichout a specific gant, and vitt appropriate cover.

[PAGE 113]
FROPCSAL

Objective: To study metbods for the administration of drugs without ths kowledge of the patient. Preparation of a mousl. 7

Method: A survey of methods vhics bare beeo used by eriminals for surteptiticus adnizistrstion of drugs. Acalysis of the psycbodynamics of eituations of this nsture.

Propcsal: That \$l00o be allocated for this purpose, funds to te requested es needed.

112

[PAGE 114]
dale A JUN I:L

MPHOHAROTN POEI THE EXRD

SELET : Pojt H, Sbject

i. Sebprojeot 2 ia being ieitiated to prorid nd icit s poitn 一C g o e  g

2. is  practicing paychiatriet in nd a facityer of Se bas bean of valne in the ct,  nd connitant, contacting indiridule in the are, and oingout be o resrch og

. Sbpojt  o  e fn

(a) Mscallansous resesrch and testing earvioss in e   f

(b) Serices as s cootaot and catout for projects in the M ed,ry thoe Loted a th

(o) Mocitoring of sslected projeots in the MULá field, vh located in the osotr

(d) Sic   g tt nd ie in ths M field.

(e) Be vonld aot ss medical adrisor and oonsltant C to ertablish-

C vill be roinberped for his eervicee and xpanse upos roceipt af en inroios at lr intervals, Whan travel aperss are incutred through afc ier, thayvbe otednd rejnburwed io the Lrelmner; thst is, consistant vith stacdard Governmect allovanoee,

113

[PAGE 115]
114

HEMORANDEN FOR TEE REC ORD

SUBJECT: ProJect MKULTRA, Subproject 16

1. Subproject 16 is a continuation of Subproject 3, vbich involved the establishment and maintenance of faciiities for the realistic testins of certain researeh and developsent items of interest to CD/TSS and AFD/TSS. The facilities vere set up under Sutproject 3, and Subproject 16 is interded to provide for the continued maintenance of the facilities.

2. Subproject 3 was originally intended to provide funds for the maintenance of the facilities for one year; but it turns out that the costs of alterations, equipmect, and initial supplies vere underestinated in Subproject 3; bence the necessity to establiah Subproject 16 at this time.

3. Subproject 16 vill be conducted bye.C m Certain support activities will be prcvided by CD/Tss and AFD/TSS.

h. The estimsted cout for a period of one year 1 \$7,7k0.00.

FACCRAM APFROVED AND RECCMENDED:

APFROVED FOR OELIGATION OF FUDS:

Date: 13 Cel-14075

Original Only.

[PAGE 116]
eco in thc az o the no occaed 8 20'tat fe sake  unfaty joiat accout betvee 2d céne of ny absesce, fllorse or death you couli reec7er
foit sonhsybsisess. The Saak vasa little eticky alout openiis in the abeences of fre asocer
Lao' found it bard to underatand ho. got by all there ara'vithout & bunk account Rovever, 1.offered to provilt an
rellent referenrs in a goverz ecd 2:e the sone7-lerders and be Lezedietels vrote refcrençe Io: aleo Lindly aaid he s vell and s plessedto afarier jou think sood icec, the Jott al
aclosed and retea thes to And po that the sccout Le oened I sugst have funds deposited via Cashier's checr S dered checks ecn ed peve a1so 9. stationery considered this ight ncilitate peyneat of Wat vith suopicious baaks; lenllords; 4 the peraonality in tbe fora of is takirg a little See you Mondes, the Sth.

115

[PAGE 117]
SUBECT: Projct 1L, Subproject 23

1. The scope of this project is interiedto eacosass all these ectivties nov ensaed in by tze At te preses: time the varicus Tojects at thss facility ( and  are being concludei and it ia isezed desiracle from the atanipoirt of secuity and efficienc to replase these projects vith s sinale project core geceral ia its nppack C

2. T sttacted propoaal r Dr.icotes the extert of the ioveatizations tznt his facilities vill allos his to carry out on the zatarials developed in the three projects referred to in paraph i, as vell as certate otber mteriais o ttsrst to clso serves es o gezeral cossultart to thés ca/ts3. Dr. diision sniprovides cover and eut-out facilities te tze Acens.

(CT The total cost of ts posct for a periot of oe s vill 3. c ex1 2,700.00.,

L.Dr. s been ntei a Top Secret Clearzce b the Azener end is uy cepasle o pretectias te security of she Gorerert's inteest in suck matters as thii. 1

FRCCRC: APEICVED

AF R 07 FID3:

116

HEMORATUN POR TT NECCRD

[PAGE 118]
117

Thw pet iastae  coctred vt chdl ty vic

I - It is poposed te stot arlat of i ds i ts pcalogial c that ae a present day e ad ce sybesise cev cbd agts er to oy ts ic d.

2- e vurious ch at forertigsted or syetbrsisad vll be terted tdeese cic tit affecta vill bo studíed by à rariety of autay technics, sach u blood presare deterinations, bruochialdilatation recordings, edocrine effects, ete, C pete anil facilitles will be istained tor ths pupose andpatbolegic atudy vil be carried out on tha affected orgss vh ths anim are sacrificed.

chical ents, and aproprias laborstor procedures v be perored, soch ae blood coosta, srinayais, etc. to detarnine the affectirenass and the ride thedertg

4- dequste report l be mitted ef the fíndia at quterly iaters.

5 - Proposed badgut;

Totai salaries for persomel

\$30, 700.00

gther trenditun

tatl. soipelintmnce t facilitdes 4,000.00
, 4,000,00
pet 1,000.00
Tra,sdicti, e. 2,000,00

Toc ther odits

22,000.00

TOIELL

\$ 42, 700.00

2.

[PAGE 119]
MEMORADUH FOR TEE RECOED

S: Inr in the Se f boject 2, Poject

1. Due to acoosiderble increuse in the scope of the work under. at the directiop of TSs/CD under Subyroject 23, taken Project ML, the \$42,700.0 sm originally obligsted for this work is insufficiest to corer the year's sosts. It is therefore proposed to add \$15,00o.00 to thet already obligated umder this Subproject.

2. The total cost of thie Subproject for the period 28 Jamuary 1954 to 28 January 1955 v111 thue amount to \$57,700.00.

3. The iocrtase ia ecope responsible for this proposal consists of the derelopment and partial financing of tro ney eorces of biologicaliy actire eompounds of interest in the progras Tss/cD is cazrying out.

Chrmical Dirision, TSS

APPEOVED POR OELTLATIOR FORS:

APPZOTED:

Datr: 6.1 16191

orig

118

[PAGE 120]
SUDJECT:

Authorization for Payment of Certain Dxpenses Under Project MCULIRA, Subproject 23

1. In order to carty a the work of the sbove Subproject, it vas necessery to test the effects of certain chemical subatances when adiiriatered to huran beings. Certain of the maticipeted effects iavolved mental fumctioos vhich precluded the use of mental defectives for this particular study.

2. In vlev or these ciroumstances the project engineer, vith versal approval fros bis chief, authorized the contractor to pay the hospitals expenses of certain peraons suffering from incurable cancer for the privilege of studying the efrects of these cheaicals duriag their terelcal illzessee. The total funds expended in this fashion amounted to \$658.05 and full valuo vas received.

3. It is requested that the Chief, TSS indicate his koovleige and spproval of thie particular expenditure for audit puposes.

TSS/Chemical Division

APPROVED:

Distibution: Ay31-144. Orig. - TSS/CD

Chief, TS7 Chenical Divieion

119

25 August 1955

MEMORANTUM FOR: THE REC CRD

[PAGE 121]
MEcAuDM FR: Director of Centrai Iztelligence

SUDJECT : Poj L, Subrjet 35

1. While the Directer's statutory authority to expend funds for coafidentiel purposes is not limited by lav, we believe thet a gift of Goverrsent funis as such vould exceed the intest of the Cozgress in grenting that pover. Ecvever, where , girt is made for the express purpose of producicg sozething ef value to this Agency vhicii cannct cthcrvise be obtainei aré there is a reasonable expectetion that the value may be received, the sift may in effect be an expenditure for proper official purposes.

2. In Subproject 35, it is stated that the donation in question vould achieve certain ends desired by Tss. Thsre seeas to be no question that those ends vould be advastageous, so the main questicns appear to be whether they couid not be ettained by sore direct, norzal methods, and, ir not, vhether the returu is necessery and reasonsble in relaticn to the donation.

3. We ere in no position to review the requirezents of Tss cr to eporaise the advantages thet would result froz this project. We do not cctent, thererore, on the value received if the project results is the benefits foresesn. We feel ve should cerceat on fectors arfectirg the probsbility of achieving those ends. In a legal sense, there is little cr no ccntrol. Once the furds are dorated, the iniividuel, his fouiation, or the hospital cculd conceivably refuse to wors fcr us or allow us the use oi the facilities.

4. Practically, the contrcl seess to be established as vell as cirezstances perait. Certairly, as long as the individual is alive end in bis present position, ve have every reason to expect his cosplete cooperatica in the future as is the past, unless through sc.ne ast or fault of our own be is aliennted. Even in the event of his death or incspacity, there appeers to te a reasonable

Dosngraded to:

dy cutzerfty of: 187475

ae:  197?

二 22:27;C  127475

Copy # l of l copy

120

21 December 1954

[PAGE 122]
121

enenee er soncinsira sho icect. i5 these pralacilisies erponr sursiricn: to chtsin an aueqte rei fer te expeniltue, teore sen be ro legl ceetion to this aspuct o the rojzcs.

5. It should be coted that there ere tvo éircucstances vhich recuire ccnsideraticn in e fizol detcinatics. As stated in Secticn V, cu contrirution, by sprearins to be frss a private souree, vouic inerease ths mntehinz Coverrrant contribution by a siziiar arout whici wold not be the case ir it vere kov thet this vas in fsct a Covern-ant coneribution niso. Secenilv, it is the statcd selisy of the hospital to chrea the Covermmeri eid cstereial orcsnisaticrs SC ser cest cvarhend on rosearch csntrasts, vhereas norprefit foumiaticnr pey crly circct costs but cs overhead. Deca-se of tre ostvnsibie seurze, our frajects vill noz bs chareed overheed. This could te construed es rorilly wrongl to the bespital, as nereslly we veuld pey the So per cens cverbesd chargo for prcjects garfored directiy for us, but I boiicve this can be ofiset, at lesst to the acoust or cur donation, end perhezs by the further zawot by whizs the otker Goverrcest ecstributiors are increnzed by cur üsratzcn. In ty cece, if tcs proicet ia s preser ons ani cuss be perforred in this senner, securiry diczctes these circstences ezd they, therorers, do not Frsent a Legal cbstocle es such.

6. We Taised the ouertien yhether fuds for the hospitel corstrvsticn covid not be cbtained fros otaer norl cheritable the individuel conzerned eculd raise adequace funds fres private resources, but it wms the positien of Tss ttat if this were the case ve weuld tot obtaia the-comitient rros the incividul and the dees of centrcl vhich this project is desigmed to ahieve.

LAHREICE H. HCUOTON Genersi Cousel

Darcndel tei y sutheriy e: cats: n? 1

Copy # l of l capy

[PAGE 123]
8 Apr11 1955

H2:CRJDM FOR: Chier, DD/P/TCS CIDJDOT : Anendcent to SubrrEjest 35 or Project tazT

Wa have noted yeur πemcrantu er 6 April 1955 to the

Ditecser requestins an inerasse cf c250,Oc0 for the TEs

FED budget for this Frojset. This request deos not cfroct

in any vay the ceerts in y menorinim of 21 Decerbzr 1954.

maded to: ot: J: 1077

E IDET: CL BY 1ST75

Copy " l of i copy

C-H

[PAGE 124]
5 May 1555

A Forticn ef the Rozssrch end Develcpcat Prcgrca of Tss/cical Divicicn is drvoted to the iocovary cf the foll-ving ssvarials cd cotheds:

l. Substances vhich vill prezots jlloziesl thinkieg end iulsivezsas to a poiat vharo the rccipimt voulá be discreited in publie.

2. Subetances vhich ircrease the efficiency of meatation ard parcepticn.

3. latorials hich vill provezt or counteract tha intcxiciti-s cffost ef alcoaol.

4. latarinls uhieh vill prouote the intoricatir offest of alcobol.

5. Hatoricls which vill produes the sis nd ts of recoisd casos ia a rversibls ay o that thcy y be ucsi ior maliuserins, ote.

ó. lateriala which vill rcder the induction of byosia enaisr or othorwiso cahence its uoofilaesa.

7. Substneos vhich vill erhazee tho ability of iai-. tiducis to withatazd pritaviea, torvra and ooorcica Curing intertczicica ci po-called "beaiasshina".

B. Materials cri phyzeal zathods vhich vill prouce anesia for oronts precoiirg ani dirig thuir uso.

9. Faysical rothods of preusirg chok ad ensica over teniel paricùs of tiis and eapable or crreptitious use.

10. Substiress vhieh prolcce physicnl diaabiezant such as paralysis of the lezs, ecute scezia, eic.

H7 1.

123

[PAGE 125]
124

ll. Substeneoe thiah vill prohice "pure" cupheria vith no tabseuent let-acn

12. Subatszces vhish alter pzrsonzlity struetura in suoh a way that ths tanisray of tha recipicat to beccze depsndeat ue eosher parscz is cuncod,

13. L rateril vch uill cause seatal conñusics of sush a typs that tha irividual der its irlucnes vill iní it difticrlt to mintain a fetrication uier questicning.

14. Subetencos vich vill lever tho anbitica and gonaral veriinc efsicicncy of ten vdan adninistared in udetootable acounts,

15. Substencss vhich presote vesmoss or diptortion of ths oyecizht or heariag fceulties, pr:ferably withcut perzarsat effccts.

1ć. à kcekut pill vhich can cureptiticasly be adninistcred in crinks, feod, aigarettea, as cn cercsol, ete., vhich will be cua to use, proride a carima of cosia, i de sitello fer cos by egent tes on en ad hoo tasis.

17. à rstarial uhich can de suroptiticusly adziniatored by tho atze routea and vaich in very rnli ezate vill ke it ipossibie for 4 n to perfc s ppoical activity vhatover.

The devoloant of taterieis of this tyçs follous tha etaazed practics ef sueh sthial dug housoo ao Cpsrr-K d 1e is è pelaticoly routiro prcoecue to devoacp a crug to the point ef ka tostias. Cuirarily, ths drug bevses depend upca tho cervicts ef privata phrciciana fer the fizal eliniosl testiuz. Teo physiciars aro viilias to ascazo the roccnsibility of sueh tests in crer to tárrce tho seicsce of mediains, It is dircialt cd seretirss irposibla fer Tss/cD to ofrer fach en inccccat with repect to ita predzots. Ls practice, it hes been porsibls to uss cutrids clcared contractors for tho prelizionay phares ef this vezk. lovovor, that part vhieh iavolves hes tosting at eifzotive doao levels preseats socurity probleas vhich aannot to hzdlsd by the orlizary ccntrscter.

[PAGE 126]
The proposed facility sozcsors a unique oppertmity for the secure banllins c sien ciiaicel testine ia cssitioa to the sanr ciraatages cutlined ie tho project preposai. Tho sceurity preblcs csnticnei above cre lininstod by the fact that the rorponsibility for tho testin, idll rest cersietoly paa tie royicic i tha hositel ri te vorá vay cecaiy ta reke o tat c toste concictel accoráizs to the reccjisrd prcctices cnd cabidy auequrt ord.

125

96-408 (). 77 - 9

[PAGE 127]
10 May 1955

SUBPROJECT 3S OF PROJECT MKULTRA

1. Subproject 35 as approved by the DCī on 15 Januarv 1055 contemplated a -B
financial contribution of \$125, 000 to Uhe
participate in the constructsion of a nee research wing to cost S, \_, 00o
ezelusive of furnishings and equięment, Agency funds wil be transmitted cut.out ichβ
thzauhthe
will result in one-axs i e sace an the new resear wtg being made
availible for Agency-sponsozed research involving covert biolngical and
chemucal techniquts of warfare.

2. At that time (15 January 195)iwith CLAencouzagement indicated  willingaess to centribute Ssco, (ct to the construetion fund. The building fand was to have bees raised as foliowe:

\$1, 000, 000. Contributed by - B 250, D00 - Donanon fro ch n mhled y Ci

1, 250, 000 - Matching f\_nds under Public Law 221 equal to the amcnt cf :e twe above contributoze

500,000-B

\$3,000,000 - TOTAL

3. Sines it now appears that te expected contributionb,will not be forthcoing, permission is requested to increare Le Agency's contribution by \$2s0, 300 winch :ll zesult iu a financial atuation a follows;

1, 500, 000 - Matehin furds undct Pubiic La 221 equal to the amount of the two above contributions

\$J,000, 000 - TOTAL

4, The Agency's contribution would thus total \$375, oco. Tine investment,
together with the eqeal sum resultng from maiched funds, is fullv usufed C
in - onion of TSs tor rcasons which will be explzincd by Cinef, TSs, and Dr, S:dney Gottheb, Chef, TSS/Chemicai Division.
Tie scope of subproject 35 has not changed sirce the Director originally
approved a request by I55 for permission to spend \$i25, 000 of available

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. r in t ts urpose through the contrale and proceduree established
!L. A the time subpreject 35 was set up within the scope of
I .sh KLD ro:ram, security consideratons and cover arrangetente
urrr rarc: ally reviewed and the Office of General Counsel assisted in legel
, ririnarioa, With the exception of fundinz arranzements, no changes in
:  :ragram ave since been made. L

, Finds to cover zhe previouzly approved sum of Sl25, 000 are avzilable wit n lhe TSS oudget for FY 55 and have bpen set aside. The TSS td ci, however, tacks funds with. which to cover the supplemental sum of \$2-, 020, and it is requested that the TSsudget be iacreased by thie mount. Supplementary funds available for tutpro eet 35 can definitely be obligaled by the end of FY SS.

y h7 05: 200 te:  L977 12 1:Y.2: CL NY 16705

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AMENDMENT TO SUBPROJECT IS, PROJECT MKULTRA

For the Purpose of Estebliehing a Cover Organization for Highly Sensitive Propects in the Field of Biologcal, Chemcal and Radoiogical Warfaze

I. Background of Subproject 15.

In January 1955 approval was given by the DCl L Subproect 35 ol Project MKULTRA. The documents which lead te this approval (ancluding comments of the OGC) are attached herewith as Tabs 2, A and 3.

Project MKULTRA is the framework ol prbcedurel and controls under which research projecta in certain higbiy sensitive fields are carried out by Tss. A dsscr:ption of the baskground of Project MULTRA may be found on p+c ) ol Tab A.

Subproject Js estaslishes cover under which the Chemical Division of DDiP/TS5 would conduct certain senative prejecta ia the f:eld, of hialogicnl and chemical warfare and conalets of a proposed artarr-ten: wherebv the Agencr covertly sorributee funds te auaet she n the constructiea of a new resrarch wir. Cor :on of these funcs s to be made through :herc as cut-out so that thr  oc rman -/ unw:tting of Agency participelion in tte L.sn pr-am, Projects ouid laier be carried out by the Chemcal Divisien csing she Sacilstirs ol the new research wing, and Agency employees would be able to parzcipate in the work without the University or the Hospilai authozilies at:ng aware of Acency interest, Subproject 35 contempiated the conizibution of Azency funda to assist in the construct:on of fac.lies. Future research work would be carried out through the is rut-out znd ould be - A sepa-ately funded under existint procede-es ard conirols.

cea. and the backrond of-0 metccarr drscraed or page  ol Tab A. C: the sar Faee tare ce found  furthe: deecription ef thr

I. Butiding Fund.

The University will require \$3, OCc, 000 for the siz-storv addition to the haepital exclusive of the coat of land, heating and power supply which are bein provided by the University. Under Putle ia» 22l, Subappropriation

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663, datnd 26 August I954, funds ase available to match funds raissd tor this purpose by the University.

When Subrraject 35 was liret prepared, it was hopud and expected that the furde rcquired would de provided as follows: The University has allocated \$), Cc0, Co to this project and will assume upkeep and staffin obiigations.

os acreed that il thr Agency would provide d n a zrant of Si25, 000, the Fund would match ths amount and make a tatal donatson of \$250, O0o 1o the University Building Fund. At that time dsssions witha +B ndicaed ia:ould contraute s,00 to trr ouild.ng Froject on the basis that radidjogical research would be conducted in the new wing snd that the construktion of the aew facilitier was of intrrest to that Agency. In sunmary, the financiet situation ss to hava been as followe: 8

\$1,000,000-3 250, 000- Donaton from of which - \$125,000 waa supphied by CLA)

1, 250, 000 - Matched Fands under Public Law 221

It was recognized that the Federal contribution gr31, 250, 000 under Publie Law Z2l would be sreminglv inated bv reason of the inclusion al the ClA contribution in that of it was felt that the value to the Ageney wae such that thls inflation of the Federal contribution was more than justificd by the importanee of the over-all proirct and thar furthermore, the inelusion of the CiA contribution in that ofas the best meand of maintaining security. B

111.-8

ζ -8 The original informsl conumitment on the par: of P was fizst obtained throuch verhal discussions =ith which wtre fcliowed up by an exchange of carrespordetcr betweer tne DC: and C Unfortunately at that time is fully occupied with the controverat corcrrnino thr and cortinied rantart irk

ordinates resulted in  dccisian thatould not or woslt not contribute ta the Buitding Fund, but would Se ing to support an annusl rcsearch program amounting to \$50, 000 to S75, 0oa It Le not B

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knoun whether this change in policy wes Buggested ar-C whether it prignated with him, Be that as it may, when the change in polcy became appasent, it wua andent that additional funds would be required to complete the hoapital construction.

IV. Sug7coted Funding.

It is now sugzeated that the \$3, 000, 000 required for the hospital wing be provided as followe:

\$1,000,000
\$00, 000 - Donation íro- (including \$375, 000 supplied by CLA)
1, 500, 000 - Matched Funda (rom Public La 221
\$3,000,000-TOTAL

The donation from would thup conaist of the original \$125, 000 te be supplhed by CLA plus the sum of \$125, 000 to be provided by the Fund and a supplemeotal CLà contribution of \$250, 000. Originally Subprojeet 35 requested permission to make a contrioutian af \$125, 000 to the buslding fund aad approval was given. This approvai is enclosed àetrwith as Tab 2, The purpoae of this amendment to Subproject 35 is to request parmissioa to contribute an add:tional S250, 000 to the building constructon fund through It should be noted thatthe tetal Government contributuon to tòr haspital fund still remsizs wachanged at \$l, 875,G00. The increase in the sise ef the contributaon by the Fund is not out of keeping with pther opezations of Pand will → pet arouse undue comment because of its magzutude. The or:g:aally approved contribution has pot as yet been traneminted to and neither the 1 6 original contribution nor the supplement weuld be paid tountil - B funds adecuate to complete the prejtet are made available. Taie condition was specified ay the DC! in approving the original contributian.

V. Source of CIA Funds.

Funds te cover the inilially approved sun of \$i2s, 000 are available and have heen segregated for this puzpose within the TSs FY 1955 Budget fer Research and Develoument. Insufficient funda remaia in the TS5 budget to coves the supplementary sum of \$230, 000, and it ia therefore requested that the T55 budgrt be increased by this amount and that the sncrease be made available to Supreect 35 of Preject MKULTR.

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VI. Comments by the Office of General Counael.

Tab J ie a memorandum from the Generai Counsel to the DCl dated 21 Deccmber 1954, commenting os Subproject 35, and statiag in part that there are no fundamental legal objections if the probable benefits are considered a fais return for this expenditure. The amendment ta the Subproject contemplates only an increase in funds and in no way changes any other aspcet of the project. The ptaject has beea referred back to the OGC evez though no cbange in its structure is contemplated, and Tab 4 containe his, comments.

VIS. Just:fication.

The advantages and benefits accruing to the Agency outlined in Tab A are felt by T55 to pronde adequate and complete justificatton for the expenditure of the additional sum herein requested which brings the total CIà contribution to \$375, 000. The most important of these advantages and benefits may be summarized as follows: {Fuller explanations may be found ip Tab A).

s. One-sixth oí the total space in the ot= hospitsi wínz will be available to the Chemical Division ef T5S, thereby ptovidung laboratary and office space, technical assistants, equipment and experimental animals.

b. Agency sponsorship of sensitivt research projects will ba completely deruable.

e. Full proíessionsl cover will be previded for up to three biochemical emptoyees of the Chemical Divisien

d. Muman patients and volunteers fer experimental use will be ava:lable under control:ed clinica! cord:t:ors within the full upev

Subproject 35 was originally concelved in October and November of l954, and the casuing six months have indicated that increasing emphatis and ampastance are being placed on the Chemicsl Division's work in this field, The fscsltties of the hospital and the ability to conduct eontrolled experimente unier safe clinical conditons usinz materials with which any Agency cunnertior must be cempletely demable will augmert and complement ether programe sscently taken over by TSS, such a

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li was origiraliy thought that at least 18 months would elapse after the building furds had bern raised before the facilitzes would be finished and couid se oc:usied bv T5s. This lengthe delay has nen tesr overcome. W -B s ra.sea tne  Cou wc his Func wi ostensiy contriaute, he wii taen be allowed to use existing space in the present hospitai in atder that he may buld up the ersanzaton which will later occupy the new wing. This means that TSS will be able to begin to take advantaze of this cover mituation within & matter of monthe instead of wziting for à year and a ha.

vui. Seeartty.

Securty matters and Setails are being co-oréinated wiih the TS5 Liaisor. and Security Officez. Secuzity of tiansmttal oi the fands and cover arrangemenis are described in Tab A and remain unchanged.

IX. Aremt w rC

The agreemert with s deactibed in Tab A, and e exten: of his co-operation and tse coniro; over his actions remain unchanged.

X. Resultant Fisancial Saving,

The total contzibution of \$375, 000 by CIA will result in an addit:onsl \$375, 0c0 in matehing funds provided under Puble Law 221, it is felt that the expenditure of these tetal funds is justified by the importance of the progrars which wili be pursued at the new fasility. Even theugh the Cla contributien is incrrased under this amended project, the totzi ol Federal funds rema,na uncsaiged. The ust of this facility wil: allew work to procced under conditions of cover and security which would be imposbible to oti\_ip clscwhere wiiholt an expenditure af equvalenl ar grrater funds. In adtien, bv fundinz individual projecte fer thas facility through the

B. schare vilibeincurrrd ior overhead expenst. 1f reacarerojecis,are openly ponsored by the-U. 5. Governmen, it.s cusiom to pay an ovethead rale tquiver to a oí salares.However, is non-proít lund, such as soonsora research, the tunds granted for the work ere customariiy usid onty to pay tor salasies, equipment and suppises, but not oucrhead. The Acney thut buys conaiderably more research throuan. wpuld be the case  no cut-out were used.

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Perevih the fle on Rza, Snsprojeet 35, vith ou ceszento on the logol Bsrects. hile there is no ltal ccntrol sni there are certain ineidental coasideraticns, thore is no findomental legal cbjoction if cns probatlo bensfite are considsred a fair roteral for this expendisure.

General Counsel

(DATE)

FORM NO. 10.1O: JAN 195Z

[PAGE 135]
SUBPROJECT 35 - PROJECT MKULTRA
For the purpose of estzbliehing a cover organization for highly
sensitive pro,ests in the field al covert Biological, Chemical and Radiological Warlare

I. Background of Project MKULTRA.

In 1953 the DCI spproved Project MKULTRA which establlshed procedures and controls under which research projects in certain highly sensitive fields could be carried out by T5s without the necessity of s:g-ing thr usual contracte, The approved procedures apply H over-all Research and Development budget, and no add.licnz. luncs sre requized, Controla established in the Project Review Commttee approval of the Research and Development program (other thas the signing of e contract) remain unchanged, and special provisions tor sudit are included. All files are retained by TSS.

These procedures and controls were spproved since it is bighly undesirable from 4 policy and security point al view that contracts be signed indicating Agrncy er Government interest in this field oí endeavor, ln a great many instances the work must be conducted by individusls who sre not and shouid not be aware of Agency interest, in other cases the individuzls izvolved are unwilling to have their pames on s contract which remaine out of theiz control in our files. Zxperience has ahown that qualifzed, competent individuals in the field of physiclogicsl, psychiatric snd other biological sciencea are very reluctant to enter intc signed apreements oi sny sori which would connect them ith this activity since such connectios might serioualy jeopardize thetr professional reputations.

When Project MKULTRA was approved, it was not centemplated that it would be used for the establishment of cover. Over forty individual resrarch and development projects havs been \*atablished under this framework and have been carried out extremely successtuliy, both faam technical and adminiatrative poinis of view. The experiencr gsined in handling thrse prejects has emphasized thai establishment of better cover borh for the projeste and for sasociated Agency scientists is ol utmort importance. Subproject 35 would establish such cover.

Ionrec to: …13

1171745

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I. Background of the

Th wainorpoated in-I has a Board of Director ef sux membcrs, one o1 wao. ho act\* as Exrcutive - 4 Director ol the Fund. : has colicited funds from various - individuals to finance a program ol basic research in the chemotherapy of cancer, asthme, bypertension, psychosomatic disorders and other chrbnic discares, Since ls:-e co-operated with.the. 8 Chemical Division of TSS and acteu smouthly azd efficiently, both as a cut-out for dealing with contracters in the felds af covert chemical and biologcal waríarr, and as a prime contractsr for certain aress of biologiczl research. Projects prctently beins handled lor the Agency by the Fund are sdministered under the couizo!s sad procedurer previously approved for MKULTRA.

1 Ba prund -C

internationav known a in the leic c:.tsearch and is In shn rasi he re:.e assccaied in resrah capacity with both the 8 De-ing tne ar served ala C in the Eureau oi Medicine and S-rgery inthe Navy. Since then he hau maintained a conaulting relationship to the Navy medical research pre-Er4m. s TCP SECRET cleared end ittng of Agency -C ponsorship of tne programe carrird out by the Fund ee are two other members of the Fund's Board al Directors.

V d-0

a.tv erazs in a capaa to rase luncs i errctina n reu clinical research wing on the ezistins The arh ngwll cs: ofa buiid.ng aix stcrler nich. 320 (eet lung and 50 feet wide. Two-thirde el thc space will be research laborataries and offizcs while l00 resrarch beds elil occupy the remainder. 2ri-C pation in the fund-raising rampaign ouilined beiau wi rebut in his having control af one-sixth of the totai space in addiiion to the bane-

5. s ta:d

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meat and general out patient facilitien, In this effort, s - has secured the emthusiaste support of the medical faculty ans tae olficers of the University who have carzied the preliminary arrangemente forward to the maximum extent of their resources.

v. Financial Situation.

The University will require abcut \$3, 000, 000 for thc story additioa. This sum is exclusive of the eoat of land and the heating and power supply, which are aiready availatle It the site. At the present tirae under Public Law 22l, funds are available to match funds raised by the University. The Univers:ty has allocsted \$1, 00, 000 to ths project and will assume upheep and staffing cbligations. msagreed tha: if CIA - C will prov:de y-rantof Si25,000. will -B match th:s amoni ans neac  o.ai donation of \$250, 000 to the University Buildiag Fund, This Agency's contribution will be made under the condition that it will be rafanded if constzuction does not take place.

T5s ha dscued ths itustion with -1 andsecoag \$etic ta tse su aing project on the basis the: er ill de conducted in the new wing.  iough aware of our interest in the building, is uawitting of our apec.fic fields of resrateh .and individual projects, In summary, the financial situation ould be aé follows:

\- B {\$125, 000 sup : C1] 1,250, 00c - Matched /:-ds from Pabiic Law 221 500.ctsc) - B \$3,000,COC-TOTAL

Although it is recogaized that the Federal con:ribution of \$1, 250, 000 under P. L. 221 is seengis nf.ated bv reason of the intlusion af the ClA contribution in that or rdhrsaam actually the value to the Cin is - β \$250, 005 and not just \$125, 000, the amount of CIa's contribution: furthermate the inclusion of the CiA coutrabution in that of - s .s the best method of maintaining security.

torraded to:

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VI. Difficulties Faced by TSS.

It has been generally recognized for some time that the external research activities of the Chemica: Divisioa of TSS in the field of covert biologicai, chemical and radiological warfare are soreiy in peed of proper cover. Although Project MKULTRA provides excellent administrative and financial cover for projecta, it does not afford cover for scientific ot techaical personnel. MKULtRA has been used for 一 B dealing through es  cut-out and for working dircctly with ind:viduals or-prtvate companies. The use ofn\_ : the future will be tacreasingly iimted due to

(a)' The increasing number of people who, albeit properly cleared, are awere of the Agency connection with

(b) The (eeling by  that the Agency C emyiovees contartias him (Drs. Goutlied, etc.l have no cover of any sort and - C conseauently txpose him to unnecessiry tré highiy undesirable prrsonal sisk; and

(c} The wideapread iatra-Agency awartness of the nature of the relaticaship between the Fund snd the Agency-

Another serious problem faced by TSS/CD as a reault al lack si suitable cover is the difficulty in planping sareers for technical and scientific personnel in the Sological lield. A long-range career concept of actvities in this fieid inevitably ineludes proper cover for the individua: cencerned. The availab:lity of research facilitics to toive many of the abovr pro.s, ands wiliing and sbte to make any reasonable arrangements to suit our needs. Up to three Cherical Divisian employees can be integrated into progrzm faz work in the new houpital wing on the Agtncy's tessarch projeets. Although career planning wis not a consideration when planning the pracedures and controls established by Project MKULTRA, nevertheiess this particular sutproject, in addition to its primary objective, will be of very great secondary help

taaraded to: i. s0ar117 5: 157475 i t:

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in simplilying and eliminating many of the very swkward and dangerous conditions fating certain Chemucal Division employees.

VLl. Advantages and Benefits Accruing to TSS.

The contemplated arrangements will remult in many advantages and benefits, inctuding the following:

(a) Ope-sixth of the tota) apace in the new researcb in turn, will be availeble te the Chemicai Diviaion of TSS. This ill pravide laboratory and office spacr, techmcai assistanta, equipment and experimeatal enimals for use oí Chemical Division personnel in connection with specific futuze projecta.

(b) The cost of Chemical Divisinn projects which are to be carried out under this cover will be covered by funds made available through Projeet MKULTRA, and projects ill be subject to the proceduzes and controis established lor MKULTRA. The funds wali be passed through -B as has been done in the pist. in turn wilt enther pay expesses directly or transier the money to the University for ths purpose. Each project will be individually funded based on its particular budget, and there will de no other continuing or recurring charges for items sucd as space, lacilities, ete.

(c) The Agency's spensorsbip of supsitive research projects would be completely denisbie sizce no connection would eziat detween the University and the Agency.

(d) Excelient profeseional cover would be provided for up to three bie-chemical employees of the Chemical Divisicn of Tss. This would allow open - attendance al scientilic meetingu. the advancement of pepsanal atanding in the acicntific wotlá, and as such, would conatitute a mayor efficlency and

Peraced to:

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motale booster,

(e) Human patienis and volunteera for experimental use will be available under excellent clinica: conditiens with the full supervision of

(f) There ouid be available the equivalent of a bospital safehouse.

[g) It is expected that tbe output of useful results of the Chemical Divusian in the bio-chemical field wili be greatly improved through the more efficient use of tethnical peraonnel who wpuid be able to spend mcre of theiz time on actual laboratory work.

(b) - 1

(i) Excellent facilities would be provided for zecruiting ne scientific personael since members of the Chemical Division working under this covet will be in daily contact with members of the Graduate School of the University.

(D The regular University librar) and reprint service will be mvailable ss a source of technical information.

VIl. Funding.

It is proposed that \$125, 000 be granted to f-13 approval is granted, TSS will arrange for paymeat to be made under the procedures and controis of MKUL7RA. These funds would come out of the presently approved TSS Research and Development budget for FY 195s and ne new (unds are :aveive2. The funds would be transierred aagrant tcv in tur-o ili arch these funds with an equal amount and donate à tota: of S250, oc0 to the University as outtined in paragraph V. The sum af \$i25, 000 would be entirely in the nature of a grant and would in due

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courie be merged -ith the emire \$3.o0o, 00d raiged for the construetion of the wing. The Agency would rrtain no residual interest in the buiidins or tatle to any equpment or facilities purchased with this meney.

This singie grant will constitute the Agency's entire participation in
the rew respita! wing, and there will be no recurring obligatione in
the form of annual support of the hospita: or additional grzzts. Transaarwillbe made B
ssior ef Agency funda to
throu: previously eatatlished covezchannels set up by the
r similar transmittale in the past. The donation or - -B ks wli te shown as having been received fron.

. In the future when T\$S sponsors sensitive research projects which are h preect - B to be carred outc it has wili be individually financed tàroug: been in the past in accordance with previcusly established procedures and conttols using aliouted portions of the annual Research and Deveiopment budget, The University will be totally unwitting ef Agency sponsorship, and the prsjects to every outward appesraace wsll be sponsored by

In the event oath, ll contisue in being snd any sctivities uader this project will be continued chrough  - ind wili be unalfected by his death.

IX. Memorandum of Agreement.

\- c A memorandum of agreement will be sgned with outi.ning to the greatest extuat passible the arrangcments under which the hospitai space under his control wali be made avallacle to Chemical Division pereonne: and the manner in which tover wall be previded and other benefits ottained, No contract will be signzd since would be unable to reflect any oi the Ageacy's cnrtrzctual t: -s in his G arrangements with the University wheniakes tz dezation in question. Tht memorandum ai agreement wiil be relained in TSS.

X. Security.

All securiry ma'ters and details are being cosordinated with the T\$5/ Liaisen and Setrrce.

12

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XI. Resulrant Financial Saving.

The \$125, 000 to be contributed 5y CtA plus the \$125, 200 in matching fund provided urder . L, 221 to the Building Fund wili be more than offset in a few years by the savings whisk wi sescit fzom use of ths non-profit fund. Ia researck project at ssk: other educa. 1 tional non-proft institution is spoasores by the C. S. Government, it is customary tor the Goverament to pay for saiaries, ecnizten'. 4 suppies, etc, and for overhead as weil. In the case of  rasoss the overhead aeucts to So ef salaries. However, ià non. prc: loncation such askipansots research ea 1 B non-profit institunon, the funds granted tor the work are customarily used to pay for salaries, equipment and supplies but not for overhead. The Government dollar thua buys considerabiy more research through Sror nan would be the case i no cut-out were used. -8

Xil. Lesal Mastera,

Ths mater ha been discussed withetetzaf the Cice -A of Genezal Counsti, and be is fuliy aware of al cetas srrounding this grant.

2o ded

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LIECRAN⊃LIFOR: TH RECGRD

SUDJECT I:12 Report, Viutt 7 Aprt 1323

1. Ths ur:ers af Ihis trl. wit te make arraesscsts ior ctusi  tna ple veue potics t cue nly te be tht otho vsit, a\_  pre pireu humtl accarciatly.

2. It war explaiied tact it would nut be soeuitla to carry over fuce beyou  ca oí the eurre isl vens. Tbereicry all tork would nave to Su conpleted mad all peyracts made rrior to 30 Jins, Ts d-acline apesred accsaoie to bi, and it was aeraed rat i woul.aa my ici vherl th:re to receve reports nd ae to nl i a  j.d aot havo a currezt Linancial repert, but he satumatei that (usas curreatly ca baaa wovls ba about suiciant for reaiing expendiutures. lis airued to send te jociasy ihin tke nut lo sys a aore eact etatemet ci currnt caiancs  etiatna rea penciers.I tried to imprese an hur stroagly tht traasfsr oi aciisiozal sande ends or retuza of ipendeo finds must be complated cli csfore ue eud of tte ecal year.

3. Cf the 30 cases called foz in the oriçiaal desi,o 13 beve bean copletad {dut oalv  have ten traascrised írom the ta,us). In edcitsa there are 8 czsee in pro\_tcss lol wbicz teo are alrcauy ia icterviaw and ó zre worked up to the point of hiving the liats pf quastioas prepared). It as grsri tuat ta mest tue deaiinae we oulu tave to Lalt the dcbigs to thuae Lo casee.

4. It lo apparcat thars ee iuvnived ia the acmznistrative probles af the project that he is rut payaç aay atentiou to the reaults. Siace to cate cir  cases have beea transcrbed tieze d no way of sulil3 it is coE vut of it. l ssswe ssere ere ne sraate reicts. Lecause t vees ol av l  v atut t uthay ed, N is pozslcio, tawever, tt our oa aaalys rf the data ay dredge doretng ofvls, alli1 Lobe o ts poat.

\$. ave me his ucusl lc invciveù talk so to üsuliies be bad snccunterrc whica accouct ior tae delaye. Hs alea tai\_ed at scns

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lengih about s "experlats" witk bypnosis, dens aspeets et -hles 1 are nulily bur-raieieg. è nally he mace quite a piech sor costisciés sorno sucb project an thas Doxt yver, "wtia realtsic, =pueiic deadliass." I told har ve would jiseuss possitilties aiter toe prrsuat project wea compisted ad we bad  chaco to ciossly cxamine the tae.

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[PAGE 145]
The -experisent designed to test the effectiveness of eertain sedicstien in causing inçiviiuals to release guardsd inforsation bas been cczr.eted in sccorzance vith the orizinal ezperimenta desig, vit tt e:eption thas 25 insteac o 3ć cases ware usei. tis sacter was dissussed in mare detail in zy lettes of Jy l5. Abstriets on i s cases, traseriptios o he intervievi, Vechsler-Bellevue Intelligeace Tattt giver st re heepitsl and previsusiy iivez a: tis ciinis, post-experimental rarkings and evaltisn eeeta, nd & schedle covepin the drug ad-i-istration have all beer submitted to you under sepzrate cover.

Pnclosed is  finaneial statemect which repr ients the finel ccotiri o? the fuis allocated by you for use Ln tis project. If, for your purpose, you require a more detaiiei summary of whes specitis professionai services were perforzei or more detail wits reference to travel ezpenses or any oter item, kindiy let me know. 1

compensated in an anount exseedinc tha: paid ta Dr. Thi\$ vas occasiened by the fact that De  steni ziez ti cre theles rrs e ?rison seectiag cases the: s.ss: se s.ae.e for Je poie. It was frc= thr cases selected by bis tat the subjects used in the txperisant were ficaiiy chosen.

I have been instructed to vrite a check to the 5ociety for th balance ln the account as ai today. I vod iike to

144

[PAGE 146]
MP.

145

Pace To

nelay tnis matter for a Sev days. Several chesks have been vritten daring recon: lays, and I would like to be sure they cleared the tank in refore clcsing out the account. You will receive a cnesk in Lhe aount of sil5o.25 early nexs veek.

If there is any additioral infortion requised, I vill be happy to cooperate.

[PAGE 147]
a s  tss,   4 e (,1) ea. at te pres ti thera ce ene br  o-to () athosss elasied  srial-al payencps.cro  fs l   n s Lae r - c
v  é h - - C le o out tr Lvectiion.

() inveia dneiuapelie rerers,pzie,ittc

1.

146

[PAGE 148]
suseto vin n   s   sere n  lvl  n.

To feot ran pe suated for to resch ta -C e,a pcheici o hes d in 1 patia s vii i n uc  ph and oien .

ent his   tt ef h

C Factice. A te psen t ho is eclusiy oti s ti to ps. e l hd ive icnce i. As  pa  t d exoiv  iC the ficld ef eacter cltures, Oriemal , ísin, e. e so d d nter ratio rth ee a hs aned in areoas

Pd te Ty rr e: 1745 ee: Ja 1377 L2 22\_: C  107475

147

[PAGE 149]
\- , S)

C-qT: H -3 - s , aivatopgn . .

fC Ma aae ia nre e hs we  n te traat pae  u l petis. o rerrs sicsto have noc ters Leleeted dt t s rete verè in a dtien io L pent étia.

e t e taer prsicarral a cor  Lo sleete. :-

148

[PAGE 150]
149

£2 272; CL h: 13745 ter  vadt n e c v  s Lneato, Lvith Leostica n a iviv  atien.La tha t    pf    st e satia  a eion  L a a ttrictrocaniael acote dπtin.

A o  d led guid so f in the usa of thats ds.

Insiein a  tecta fr ervenca, the flls aljesiives uill ta secha:

2) hoess c to elesd o rave dies aeaí of vios  n lo er en te tasis e preriusly oarod rr.

2)  psit, th d plecta   erraed  d eati,

3) Peui Le s to ntraiso e, ie-, a, s ou costrellitle faster is veleetia eups. adistrtie e  will te dae both cea ant mwTentitioucly.

rc  de  i

e te: 13

[PAGE 152]
MEHORANOUH FOR TEE RECORD

SUBJECT: Project MKULTRA, Subproject 42

1. Subproject h2 1s to be conticued for tbe same purposes ss .7 vtea priginsliy estebliebed: to support dEDes covert? and resliptic field trialn of certain resesrcb and develcpeeot iteos of iaterest to TSD, aod to mintain the physicnl faeilities recuired fer these t:lals.

2. In the past yeor s gumber of covert and reelistic field trizle have been succesefully carried out. The results of these experinects have provided factual date essential to eeteblisking protocols for  qusber of conte=pleted operttioos. A contiountion of covert and realistic field trinls ere Decesaitated by the proiuctisn of gev aaterials in TSD prograes, particularly in areas requiring deteilsd kaovledae of the effectiveness pad efficiency of delive: systems. Additioral triels ere also necessitated by the need tor better controlled "field-type" experiments.

3. The estizated cost of ths project 1s \$5,000.00 for e period of six months. Chargem ahould be made ngainst Allotuent 1125-1390-3502.

h. Accountins for funds and equipment under this subprojeet has been establisbed on s detailed basis with the auditor and vill ccotisue ss in the pest. :

151

[PAGE 153]
5.  ie aporoved tor TOp  by the Agency nd operates under cover for purposes cr this subproject.

Distribution: Oricinal only.

152

[PAGE 154]
153

MEHCRANDUM FCR THE RECAD

SLBJECT: Project HKULTA, Subproject 42

1. Subproject L2 is bein- crtatlished to provide fcr the continued suppcrt of the bacilties, and as stch, o se faces, in the naw locaticn, will cortinze to Fivice a mears for the realistic testing of certcin  and D itezs of interest to CD/TSS and APD/TSS. C

2. Subproject 42 will be concucted by Mr. a seaman. Certcin suppert activitaes wili be pruviles oy CD/TSS and AFD/TSS.

3. The estixzted cost for & period of cne year is se.3cc.00, startin6 1 March 1955.

Chier TSS/Chenical Division

ALPRCVED FLA OBLIGATICN CF FUES:.

22710055

Uriginal Only.

APPROVED FOR ADDITIOIIAL CLIGAICN F FUS:(\$2,089.34)

[PAGE 155]
ST Projt-. Subprojct 5

1. The scope of this project ia intended te encoess those activittes nov engage in by the z Noro Le its owo facies urcer Lhe drection ef Tss, Chessa Division. These astivities viil take the for of trree lizes of biochenical invescigatiou; mazely, the euraze-like effect or certaia thiols, the preparation of hyérogenated guicolises and indoie akaioids, ard the coetinved study af diphenciic ccmpaunds. Ie adsstian to the above investigations, the presest biologisal testing ard assaying seshriqves vill be siaterated aad brcadened to include cardovasar and anticarenogeaic effecta of copounds re ting ros the above poas.

2. The ettached prpo fro dicates the axtant of the icvesigations that his facies v alow hia to cary out on the mtarials deveioped is the three lines of researet referred to tn paragrah \_vtl as cera other ses s general conrtaat to tis Divisioa and pesvidas cover cut-out fecilitiss to the Ageney.

3. The toti cost of this project for  periot s? oze jear vill tot exsed S, 00,00, At the present tize, the m of \$ie,00.00 is beias ccisted, the daase of the total to be cosmicsed at a later date,

C by the kgeny, d is y cspaie of protectin the seurity of the Goveseat's iaterest in this matser.

TSS, Chezica Davisicn

APFTED FCR CBLIGATION FOS:

APFJED:

154

MEMORDM FOR: THE AESRD

2mn 7

[PAGE 156]
HERAOIH FOR: T LICORD S: Po, Sbjet 45

l. The seope of this project is istecdad to sncospess all thasr actvied aov eed io by the ri ks under the airection of ISs/co. These activities tase tae fors of three lises or biochacicel investigation, zamely, the Carare-like affect of cartain thiols, the preparatica of bydrogenated quisoliass and indole alkaloids snd a prog aa of isvestigation of toxic cerebrsl rtates. This last investigatins will iacluce bio-essay and chezical analysis of various body fluida of aaisals ia vhich ceretrai tozssias bave been produced, It is the aim of tzis progras to anceavor to ndarstand the ci of ucs states a tox: deri, re copa, and cerebral toxicity fros poifscnizr. In ordar to contisue the , establiabed "covar sctivities af térsnd  make avallasie à

peol of sot ects for testing purpoees, e wrsorksrfecta of corpounds reslting frog the abova prograk uill beevaated.

(c) 2.The stiaed propol fro  iadicates the artant of the inveatigations that his facilisies vill allou his to aarry cut oz the naterials developeć in the three linas of research referred to in paraapt one. aavli as certain otber msteriais of
(c) interest to Tss/.tso seres as genaral coantant to this Divisioo and provides cover aas cut-cut fesilities \*e the 4

3. the total cost of this project for a period of ene year vill oot ezceed \$l00,000, Chargee ahould ba made ageiast allotzeat 6-25C2-10-001.

(C) ing or a copy of taonual audit raport be made avsilable for L.a bea reuested to sutt syccount-(B) the sponsor'a inspectioa. Also, it has been requeated that any uzexpeaded fuads ssall be returned to the igensy.

Titie to any persest equfpoent parebased by fusds prarted B z be retaised by ther lieu of higher overhead rites.

\* other than ite activities an a cut-out

155

[PAGE 157]
6. It vas mtually agreed thet dorsestaties rad eecesttrr for
travl rpess vct re nory reihtle by tbea
l confor vi the accepte prastices of 7.  to coy vith the rreof the r o t,

(#

TSS,CE DET APFETD:

LPRFOLION F FTDS:

Chief, TSs/ebeaicai Div\_aien

Atachorst: Propose

Distritutios: Ori y

156

[PAGE 158]
157

1800

The research to be undertakan durtng the tweipe sonth \_. period jor vhich financial support te requested will be deooted to the continuied cnalysis of the neurl and endocrine nsshantsm of atress and the chemtcal cgents that tnlusncs it. Ihe screening procedures are beed largely upon c further crclyets of phases of stress cnd the iniluences of thte phyatologie behaptor compiex upon both hody snd skin temperatures se detailed in the cccompany ing report.

The chemiici synthssts o neu compounds utll be continued

Cese chemtecl age wl: be screened for thetr caxceity to provcke atress or to suFiress the stress reactton in tts acuse or chronte phases. Animal testing wiil tnoluce phcmacologis screerins and preper tozicity stustes oj these compounds as. heretefore.

Chemicsl agents that haze been found setine and uithin a suttabie tczietsy ranse utll be a\_bsectes to eliniecl screening on eppropriste pattenis, the tntsiai seree-tne zetne carried out on advcnced =snser patierts, The ameuns of noney istoted to chemteal eynthesis, houezer, rs bes irther reiceed, Chestcal eotpcunds aucilczie frch ticisrtc sources cs sell sa those syntheetsed in er prejecs sill be screened, pariicuiariy those thct are cetipe in either raising or lovering dody tenperasire.

as heretoore any cpents uhish prove to be of tnteress rn hh an trartlant

-4011-77-11

[PAGE 159]
amimal cueors and on sancer pattènte. zhte canosr phase of the project iil be constdpred- a by-product of the major oojeattoe, whtch wtll be directed te the problem of stress.

158

WARNING NOTICE SESSIBVE LTEIOGESCE SOURCES'ONO METAODS INVOLVED

[PAGE 160]
1 E: iDT: CD A

159

MEMOPANDUM FOR: THE RECORD : Continuation of MYULTPA, Subprejeet Ne.
SUBIECT 1. The scope of this subproject isciudes ali those activities
now engaged la bye 755
under the dirertion of TSs CD with the exceptias of those cutout
funetions specifisaly mentssed ie esrcectien wit other MKULTRA
subprcjects. In general, tue research effort ander this subpecject
ili continue alonz the lises laid dowe in previocs years, These
involve the syattesis and ptortacalogica: aad clinica! evaluation
of ccmpouads of those chetal families known to have application
in the psychécbeical end "K" felds. During the past year importaai
pregress bas been made in the area relmted to stressor compouads
and the relationship of these mzterials to the physiclogica: pathways
thrcugh shich both stzess and the reactise to it are madiated in 11
butzn beisgs. As is indieated is the attached propasal, the work
of the past year has progressed to the poins where more defisitive
experimetts os tbe strete rraction can be carried out. Primazily
this was brought about by the characterizatiou of several naw
mateztals which produce stzets resction in humane and the applica
tion of sae new elinieal metseds of rearurins the extent of the e:stitbance produced. Durins tas next yeaz preportionally ore effart wil: be expesded on the probiem of the develcpment of new

1

[PAGE 161]
ia desirabie in this directioc and because à nsw appzoach to the problem bas ben worked out. 7

the Agency, provides services ef a sensitive nature an an ad hoc basis, and serves ap a cut-out in procuremsnt problems.

3. The total cost of this project for a period of one year ü.j will oot exceed \$71, 500.00. Charges ehould be made againnt

Allement 0525-1009-4902.

C 4, reror has been sequested to submit a curmary accecating or a copy of the Fund's ascual audit report for the sponsor's iaspection. Also, it has been reqtested that any unexpeaded funda shall be returaed to tbe Agency.

5. Title to aay prrmaneat equipmeat purchassd y fands B granted naoott sbal be retained by rcsrzar, io lieu of highe: pve:tead raten 6. It was mutually agreed that decuneatation and apcounting 2 fer travel expeases wbicà are norzally reimbursable by Q shali cosform with the accepted practicee of the Fuod.

ae to:CL 1 117 :18475 CaL:e 1977 22 I: CL Y 157473

160

[PAGE 162]
MOHCRAETIN POR:  RCORD 一

1.  seópe ef this subprepect tncloda a thow setivitiee er th drt /ptl of tho outou fumations epeetfielly wratiooed in comactios vitb other MCLR rbprojecte. In pueri, te reuarch eftart mder this subproject ril ecatioe aog the Lie Ld dovt La prrious yeers. tese he t  e n c a t    to py.  c r to cse  eti uect ee "mockout" problrs. bouh or poust rubstaaces ban becos arsilshis lateiy to e sah e cheagt  pbesis sortbvtila. in coeci vit te ce t aould  aoted tat cart s e a project atvt: onpot e furter explotted et
3 tat facilty vill be pursurd at  the fue. Por th
reucn it y be seceuary to suppirmnt the tincirge ef thie rubproject troa tie to tie durlug the yer due to incrs of scope.

Agrcy, prordes serics ot a sezeitie atue o a s hoc bsis, assu cutoutst bis,

161

[PAGE 163]
162

, ..
2125-139C-3902.

C d rued secousting or & eopy of the Pund's annual sudit report for ths sposr's Lsectic. Aleo, it hn be zequsted that y uended funds sball be retuned to the Agezey.

5. le to y pnt t  y  ted C t.

6. It ws wtuy agreed that documentetion and sccounting for tavel expeus vhich a ally reiaburable by r sbali coufore vith the sccepted practicee af the Pud.

APPROVED FOR OBLIGATCN O FUMDS:

MeseLrca tirector

Attachtent: Proposa and Budgt

pistribution; Original y

[PAGE 164]
24 Januzry 1964

IEVORANDUN FOR : THE RECORD

SUBJECT : MXULTRA, Subproject 149

of supporting realistic tests of certain developsent itens and delivery systezs of interest to TSD.BB. lin

2. During the course of development it is sometinee found that certain very necessiry experimects or tests are aot suited to ordinary laboratory facilities. At the same timé. it sould be difficult if not iapossible to coaduct such tests as operatiqnal field tests. This project is designed to provide a czpability and facilities to fill this intermediate requirenent.

3. The activities under this subproject vill be conducted by r. r. an indavidual in the import and export busizess, icholdsTOp : SECRET Treasury Departnent cleatince and a SECRET Agency approval. He is completely eitticg of the aims and goals of his activities.

4. Nrpossrsses ucique facilities and personal abilities wlich makes hie invaluatle in ttis kied nf testirg operation.Er becnuse of his peculzar.faleuzs and

163

[PAGE 165]
capabilities as vell, u his excellent coanections vith all of the local lav ensorceaant agencies, vill provide a unique and essential capability. Secause Mr.is no longer resident of thearea, it in necessury that a suitable replacement be provided is order that s capability for conticuance of our ectivities be maintained.

5. The #stimated cost of the project 1s \$l0,000.00 for s period of one jear. Charges should be made against Allotment Mumber 4l25-l390-J902. Reizburzement will be sade for services randered.

6. Accountiog for funds advenced and any equiyment under this subproject vill be in sccordance with accounting proced.

7. A memorandum of agreezent along lines establishec by previous audit recomzendations in like situations vill be

executed.

164

Distribution: Original only

[PAGE 166]
165

sts.E: Request for Support of Research on the Mechani at rain Concussion

1. This is a request for financiai suppert for resrareh on the mshanis of brain concussion for the perlod 1 Feb 1956 to i Fes 1957.

2. The resacance-cavitation theoty upon which this researt is te be bazes B dt bee aentrd in the proposal subriited to the

3. The program as originally subritted estinated the duratior of the progras tc be fro. trree to five years requessing a total of \$72,109 for the initial

4. At the recuent of the c reduced budget was subrited.

5. a-o\_nting to \$2-,925. wes then avarded to the ta supor this progran fro i Fet 1955

6. The prcgtess zade to date under the above contrect can be mprarized as fclicws:

A. RESEARTH FASTLITLES

The following rescerch feeilities hsve bren established for the hnvastigation af the rery diverse asects or te prclans Deie tudird:

At=tsi o? s\_are feet of lsboratory and office space esizped vith man af she diversied mietinsry and aparatus neceaaary for rescarch in thas field.

b. Blast Range

BGB u Aiist rge  e ertalisher tra located aparexiately Coe the mi scorsr. Tris ata is owmed by e and is closed to tha publie. Three blasl test-series have beun run to date.

190 ba::wr of h ccavcrs. Atert area hs been aszignd for this

[PAGE 167]
166

B. FERSONONEL

Both full-time techiicel parsonnel and part-tine professional research peraonnel have been acquired and indoctrinatad reiative to thair spesuic fwnction. 1

C. TECHICAL PROORESS

Foliowing is the technical progress made under the eurrent

Speeialised instnumentation and numerocs testing tachriques have bean devsloped to abtsio the desired dynaxic data.

b. Considerable data has now been obtsined supporting the resonance-cavitation theery of briin concussion.

Preli-inary acceleration thresbold data has been obtained e. for a fluid-filled glass simulated akull.

d. Data pas been obteined on the nsture and tbe magitude of pressire fluctuetions within a glsss simulated siull subject to elther inpact or sound wares propagated in air.

e. Iritial studies have been made on the simulated glass skull sttenpting to estaslish the cavitatian pettars for vamous types of impact.

7. The prspesed rethod and progran plan rerain the same as stated in the cririnal proposal, exsept icr the temporary deletion af the isrersion blast study.

B. The current level of activity on this project can be indicated by the most recent briling to the tis for the morth of Noverher, which arsunted to \$4.034.61.

In the intrrest of efficiency and econory it is requested thst at lesst 9. this level af artivity be maantained for the coning year.

WARNING NOTIEE STAr TLOGCNCE C.O ETHOOS HRVOLVED

[PAGE 168]
167

Trottur, W, serines brain concusslon as.en assentially transient atate due to sead irjur bnsch is of snatentanzous onset, \*anifests wisespread syrplons of purely paralytic kind, does not as suct corprise any evidense of strictural erebral injury, an is alszy fos b anre fr the pstos, acnert of the ascizer.."

10,2 The Leplicstion of the underlined pcrtion of the above statcest is tha: if a techniqut were devises ta indcte brain soncussion vithout riving tither advance vaming or ceusing exterai physical traua, the person upor resovety wsiid be unstie to resali wrat had happened ta his. Under these acrdatiant the sare teshcique of proising the concussior could be re-used many tines witnaut disclosure of its cature.

10.3 First, considerinc the possibilitie: of direct i-pest to the head pr bdy. it s se porsate Cran the finding: o this research prcgrar ts detemine the fciloving:

à. Opttaur desazn of inpacting devizes.

b. Op points af inpact or sci or body for the specific effects desired.

e. Intensity of the bios for the eftezt desired.

10.4 In regart to the potenttal irpacting deviers, there are certain desigr raqusitesathat are apparent at tris time:

a. The irgaet should be deliveres vitnout advance warring.

b. The area of ispact and foree distribution shculd be such that surface traua does not oeeur,

o. The iatensity of the inpecting forre and its duratien shsuid be such as to sbtain the desired effert.

d. The devize shouiz be as srall and as silent as possitie.

10.5 The spesific inpasting deviees migtt take the for of ary of the rollcwing:

a. a paneake type dlack-jack gáving a higt prak sepatt force vits a iow unit surface pressure.

b. Conzezled or earoufazed spring-lsaded inpartinz devires that triscer upen centact vith the heaa.

(origina: and sele cepy :ags)

[PAGE 169]
168

DJ

d. An axplosive pad detoratad in contsct vith the bead or the body.

10.6 Lat us now consider the possibilities of ezciting the resonance cavitation directly vithout iapact. There is considerable svidence that reaonance cavitation can be induced directly in the following ways: a, à blast vave propagated in sir. (Blast Coneussion) -—rstad in sir. (Blast Coneussian)

b. Phyaical exeitation with e methanical driver or hor, tuned to the rescran: frequency of the head.

10.? A single blast pressure wave propegated in air must have consiseratle intensity in order to prxuse brazn consussisn, hovever, there is considerable evadence (Carver & Dinsley) that modiftcation. of the pressure uave can produce profound effesta.

1c.8 Excitation of the Nesonanee cavitation by using  tuned diver at this time appears to be well vithin the rele of pessatziity. The neurotic-like manifestatiens nemally essociated with tlast concussion cosld possibly be ánduced by thás methad. Use of thas metnod, sovever, would requare actual physical cotast zi the dr.vers.

to.9 Lcitation of the resonance cavitation by tuned sound vaves also aprears to be s reascnahle pessibility. Consentration ef the seurdfield at sere rencte peint could be effeeted with scsoustacal lenses and raflectcrs. the biast duration wouis be in the order of a tenth of a seeond. Mesking of a noise of this duratinn shoild not be too dificuit.

11.0 It would possibly be advantageous to establiah the effestivness of both of the above -ethads as a tool in brain-wash therapy. à rull kaowieage cf the nethoe and the ręruiting segzela shouid be of aid to any person forced to subrat to such treateent.

12.0 Possinly the nost sigificant petential aspest of this study would be in the deveisprent of prasticel means ef giving s person imnaty, even thoagt te-pcrary. to train conmussion. Ce techrique that appears to have potertsalities involves the introduction of a small quantity of cas, approxarately 1 ec. into the srinsl eord. This gas bubtle would then noraily nigrale to the ve-tricles located at the centmn of the srain. The ataiity of tnis burble to sxpand wrder dynanie loadiny vouls be mcst effective in proventing resonance cavitation fron Decuring.

(original ard sole eory :agg)

96-4C8 196×

[PAGE 170]
MATERIAL FOR THE RECORD

MKSEARCH. OFTENACHICKWIT

MKSFAReH was thee nane given 1o the continuation of te MKtLTRA program. Funting ronmenred in FY 196. and endel in FY 1r2. 1ts pure was to deveboq, test, und evahuate cajabilities in tla- rovert use of biologicat. ehendical. and radioactive materiat systeis anl 1etuiques for jraheing uredictadle hutuan tehavioral annl or phyiojogital rhange» in suppur of highly susitive oetatiotal reptitelents.

OFTEN/CHICKWIT

In luit the Dfiee of Rescard und Develoganent toRlt and the Edgeweod Arsenal Researeà Jabratorios uadrrtook  prograu for dolng resenrel on the ideutitiratiou and cbaraterizatinn of drugs that rould infuene lumau behavior. Edgrwoul laal the fatrilities for tha full range of laloratory and clinical testing. À plased progran was envisionel that woul ronsist of aouuisition of drugs aud eheuizl cupounds Ilived 1 luve efets o the blavior of humans, and testiug ant evaluating thes: materinßs through lalsratory proselures and toxicologial studies. conjsund llieved romising as a resal of tt» on anímnls were then to l evattated rliniraliy with hunnn sntjeets at Edgewosd. Substances of jutential ns would thn l- analyzed strneturally ae a lasis fur identifying and synthasizitg assible nen derivatives of greater utitity.

The prograto was dividel into twa projets. P'rojert ofTEN was to deal with testing the tovicolugical. traastnisivity and bebaviural eftects of drugs tn animnts and. ultimately. huaus. Projet tHli'KWlT was ronorned-with sepuiring intormntion tb new drag development» in Ettroje anad the Orieut, au with acjuiring sumples.

There is a diserepaney between the testitnony of luo] aad lA regarting the testinag at Edlgewonl Arsenal in June 1973. Wbile there is agrement that humat testing tavurred at that place and tine, there is disagreetuent as to who was resjuosille fur tuaming and »ponsrsbil. (Ner heating lufore the Subwonuáttee on Health and Seiontitie Research of the Seuate Hunan Resourets C’ommtttee, Septeutst 21. 1077.1

(169)

[PAGE 171]
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINCTO O C 0S09

Oll.ce of leginlative Counsel

23 December 1977

Honorable Daniel K. Inouye, Chairman Selcct Committee on Intelligence United States Senate hashington, D.C.20\$10

Dear Mr. Chairman:

During Admiral Turner's 3 August lg7 ieslimony before your Committee and the Senate Human Resources Subcommittee on Health and Scientific Research, you asked whether any Agency employees had been terminated because of their participation in MKULTRA Subproject 3. Admiral Turner indicated he did not believe any employee had been terminated, but would have Agency records searched on this question. Our records have been searched and the results confirm the Director's testimony that no such actions were taken.

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QKHILL.TOP' was a eryptonn assignedl inu 194 to a project to study Chínese Commuuist hrainwasbing teehniques aul 1o develop fnterrogation techniques. Most of the early studies are belleved tu have bevn couducted by the Cornell U'niversity Medical Schtol Hnpan Feology Study Irograns. The effort was absorhed inio the MKILTHA progran: aml the QKHIlLTOP cryptonym beeame olsolete. The Sixiety for the investigation of Humnan Ecology. later the Human Eoology Fund. wes an outgrowth of the QKHlLlTOl.

QKHILLTOP DEFINITION