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SUBJECT: Discussions with YWonNKNAOHI

1. On 27 June)I met with  in my office to discuss MKNACKI in the hopes-he-could shed additionai light on the tasking of that project and any operational support it possibly may have provided.  joined the Agoncy early in 1958 and served as Chief of the Biology Branch of TSD from Septeaber 196] until January l968 when he retired. He was personally deeply involved in the MKNAOMI project which was the responsibility of his branch.  of OGc, Tof ORD, andsof 0TS were also present during these discussions

3. I began the interview by giving a run-down on our understanding of the Ft. Detrick project and the image of that effort projected by the limited record of the MKNAoil file. I pointed out that one. of the clearly defined purposes of. the' project as stated in TSD documents was to maintain a. stockpile of lethal agents and disseminating systems in readiness for operational uso and that this in association with the current furor about assassinations had caused some obvious concern within the Agency about this program which had not been alleviated by available records. It was our hope that scould fill some gaps in our knowledge. He was told that whatever he could provide should be given on a complete voluntary basis and that he should feel free, not to say anything if he so chose.

4. sssresponded immediately by stating that it was essential we understand that while discussions were held and work done on things that might appear questionable, there was a clear understanding among all involved that they would never actually be used operationally because of inherent stops built into the Agency approval system that assured final approval for use would never be given. Thus, he characterized the whole NKHAOMI effort as a kind of Never-llever-Land invciving all sorts of unfettered discussion in isolation fron reality. He providec

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full. assurance that "the Company" had nothing to worry about: none of the lethal or incepacitating products of HKNAONI had ever been made available to anyone for operational use.

5. Some time was spent questioning eabout the requirements that shaped the NKNAOMI project. He,stated that these had all been generated internally within TSD. He recalled no requirements having been levied by anyone within the Agency but not a part of TSD. Later in the interview, however, he noted that he had had discussions relevant to this matter with , but with no one else. He recalled no case in which requirements or direction were received from outside the Agency. It was simply the view of TSD that such a capability as NAGMi could provide was a reasonable one for the Agency to possess. Horeover, he noted that the inherent unreliability of biclogical agents and processes basically limited.the utility of the NAOMI product. He nointed out that lots of work was done on incapacitants, none of which could be used because of an inability to find complete assurance that no serious lasting etfects might result from their use. He contended at scme length that the work done by Ft. Detrick was really defensive in nature. BK applications suitable for clandestine use were developcd and tested only in order to understand the offensive threat the Agency faced. In some contradiction to this, however, he indicated that systems for use against dogs or for incapacitating humans were actually. thought to be needed additions to the Agency's capabilities. In making his case for the defensive concerns of MKNAOMI he cited the vulnerability studies undertaken by Ft. Detrick.

6. confirmed that the responsibilities of the Special Operations Division centered on the development and testing of special applications of BW weapons. Our relaticns were fairly informal and relied upon liaison between Ft.'Detrick and TSD being conducted by a very limited number (several) of designated project officers. He also confiraed that virtually np written records on the proiect were maintained. Funding was provided by the Agency simply to support the overalì activity of SCD and apparently was not accounted for on a tasking basis: Creard averred that the arrangement was based on the premise that work done in response to special Army requirements would be of interest to the Agsncy. This was particularly true since the Army Special Forces were SOD's principal customer and the Agency faced many of the same problems as this element of the Army. He left the impression that rather than provide tasking to Ft. Detrick, TSD simply selected developments of interest from an internally generated program. Whenasked about maintaining records of material transferred to the Agency, mresponded that very little such material was-in fact given to TSD and that it was unlikely any records were kept.

7. A considerable amount of time was spent questioning  specifically about the provision of agents or delivery systems developed at Ft. Detrick to operatioral elements of the Agency. He stated flatly that he had never had occasion to do so. was shown a Ft. Detrick memo in the MKlAOMI-file covering a conference with the Agency at which he was present which indicated he reguested the Agency be provided with 5 staph. enterotoxin (food poisoning) tablets by 1 April 1962. He was asked the purpose of his request.pa responded by

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saying he was glad this specific question was asked since it enabled him to elerify what was obviously a source of some misunderstanding. It was his practice, he said, to levy such requests upon S0D with specific due dates simply to mask any possible future request which might be made for real operational purposes. Thus, periodic requests for material.and delivery systens were made so that a purposeful one would not stand out as unusual. He further stated that the enterotoxin development was one the Arny had been engaged in which we thought might be of use to us as a means for temporarily incapacitating guards. No mention was made of the obvious discrepancy between this view,and the contention that our interests were purely defensive in nature pwastold that one of the schomes suggested for use against Castro involved the treatment of the inside of a diving suite with Madura Foot, a non-specific fungal skin disease. At the same conference as noted above, considerable attention was given to the development of Hicrosporum Gypseun (a fungal agent producing severe skin disease) and direction was reportedly given by that it be prepared in a form suitable for dusting clothes, pillows, etc. He was asked if this direction was related to the.Castro gambit. He stated categorically that it was not and was not related to any identified operational use af the zgent. Rather, it was another example of the type of tasking he levied on Ft. Detrick.. lle claimed he had no knowledge of the diving suit affair or of any other plot to incapacitate or assassinate Castro -- or anyone else, for that-matter. lle did state later that tranyuilizinq materiais obtained elsewhorc but loaded into syringes at Ft. Detrick (because of the sterile facilities there) had been yiven to case officers for use in Eopac sae On no other occasion had Ft. Detrick material been provided to the DDP.

7. The MKULTRA drug -work came up a number of times. At the outset of the discussions, and repeatedly throughout them, he stated - though not asked -- thai he had no knowledge of any unwitting testing of drugs. Rather, aninal tests and ultimate testing with human volunteers had been all that was required. In these cases well ustablished test protocols had heen used. He stated that this activity had been his principal concern.

9.maatatrspent some time describingother activities apparently involving Ft. Detrick, though that was not always clear. These things included materials that would causo the rapid corrosion of metal products displayed at trade fairs, POL contaminants that would desiroy petroleum stocks, reagents that would cause structural failures in a number of different materials, crop contaminants that would prevent their passing customs controls (e.g., unacceptably high DDT levels), etc. He knew of no actual uses of harrassnent materials against targeted individuals as opposed to uses for crowd control or meeting disruption.

10. In sumnary, it must be said that the discussions withsas gzo were far frca satisfying. Many of his responses appeared to be less than forthcoming

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and were not altogather believable in the light of information available elsewhere. Since he appears to be the sole accessible participant in the MKNAOMI project who was deeply involved in it during its most provocative period, there seems to be rittle more that can be dore now in establishing the extent of support provided actual operations during the early 1950's.

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