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SCVIET LETAL. C.DITT:G, HUTE CGATI:: FOR VLAACITY AID FORCED CONFESSICH TFCHNT QUES

I. This title implies three Spviet activities snd objectives:

A. liental Conditioning

l. Of Conrunist agents and military personnel

2. Of prisoners in general

?. To facilitate interrogation to obtain inforrntion rather than false confessions

4. To obtain forced ccnfessions with conviction the objective

5. For propaganda purposes

B. Interrogation techniques for obtaining truthful infornation in instances in which confession is not the objective.

C. Techniques for canfessins iucluding, mental conditioning: interroration, and mental and physicel duress for obtaining true or false cnfessions.

ll. The Conmunists arear to be very realistic in mectins; their objcctives in

à. The solection of victims for specific purposes

I. Utilizing effective rethods and producin" rosults in accorronce . with differencos in susceptibility of the victimas

C. The tire f-ctor in producing, results

D. The selection of different methods accordi'lE to the desired objective, particularly the differentiation betuecn forced confession techniques and methods for obtaining information.

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11! lental conditicntin coverer':n this rovie: doo:; not include ass nsycholory usnd by the Russians in the control of nations, large eneral maszes of civilians, or psychological warfare.

A. Iental conitioning is nre-eminent in theory, concent and practice in Russia and has rermeated the entire jovict, sphere. It is in.consoñnnce with Favlov's phys:olorical. teaching, their most recent research work on conditioned reflexes, and Sovict. ideolory.

B. Althouch esycholory has been relegated to the field of medago, the eryhasis placr un lescarch in euroiyci,logy, psychophysiolofy, and neuropsychiatry indicates that ussia considcrs these fields of practical importance. They are adept in the applicatio of the results of their resnarch in these- fields to mental conditicning, 'ncluding the handlin" of prisoners.

C.  ental Conditioning of Communists

No details are available in this office on the mental. conditioning of Cormunist agents and military personncl. The routine rereated loyalty indoctrination of workers, liussian ideological teaching in all schools, rilitary including, loyalty traininr even in odical schools and constant lovalty, security and intense enery hatred training. in the arned servicns i dicate the importance attachod to rental coiditinin" by the Comrunists. Surcly, tussin is not this thoronrh rithout spccial security nd loyaliy teachin of Lheir -conts and inalructions in overy hiorn .ethod, device and trick to rpsist, eneny attempts to obtain infomation fron their agents.

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D. iental Conditioning of lrisonors

l. We have not received an analytical survey of thc reasons why thouçands of Chinese and iorth Korean troons want to return to their homelands or wiy thousands of others have no desiro to retur. Chinese ond. ussianenviromental conditions, other frctors and ental conditionin: are not the sac: thcrefore, an analrsis of Chinese prisoners would not show the sare results as in Russians.

2. The Communists have ha thousands of oriso.iers.and years of exnerienco :n the development of methors for the mertal conditioning of prisoners. These include: their owm colitical prisoners in cams: prisoners held for court. trials: Gernnn, Japanese and other soldiers: suspected and actua). spies of various nati-nalities: thouzands of Arerican and South horean military orisoncrs of war now in thcir hands, and árericans arrested for suspected espionaze. le do not laow how many ¿merican prisoners will be susceotible willingly or by force.

3. Cue of our rcquirehents not yet solved is the detcils of the Cormunist. landling of prisoners. Interrofation of Coramunists captured by the U. !. troops as revealod little inforiation, and the Colunists have not et relcased knouladgcable li.. prisoners.

4. There uere psycholorical reasons includiur, favorctle propacand? ayd cnre of the vounded carly in the loreun comtlict for the Chinese release of American prisoners to the l'. i. lines.

5. There. hav becn sone rerorts on Commnist nental conditioning of prisoners in general, such as the copr:on jractice of

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handling parphlets on Co: unisu to prisoners, folloued by the relivery of talks on the advantares of Comsunism. They sell Communism to many prisoners by daily repetition even three times a day.at rerular intervals.

6. They carelull select. their victins for specific purposes, such as thos? who.for sore reason decide to cooperate with ther afcinst their oum nations. The Corvunists select those who will male an impression for pronaganda purroses, such as tie Anerican nilot yho arnarently cooperated as a proparanda dupe in the production of the sound -icture to help the Coneaunists convince the world that their E. charfes were true. Frobably the reasons for the pilol's apparent cooperation will not be known until there is an opportunity to debrief him and the other persons directly involved.

7. Sone of their victins are easy pro, not by direct, threats and more cirastic duress, but by another approach such as tellinf then: they will be well treated and returned to their honeland in good rental and physical condition if they cooperate.

a. Sone urisoners are vell amre of the rast stories on handling of prisoners, such os subjection to exibition for ridicule, traumatism, and even death hy public mobs: rhysical duress: never roturnin· hore. and even behearinr, shooting or cther penalties by their captors.

c The fear comnlcx rroduces mny submiasive persons. They know open defiance of captors is not healthy and have not had aderuate training to savo themselves and protect security.

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D 9. Anerican Comunists such n

help in conversion and other crican Comaunists hclp convert anti-Conmunist prisoners.

l0. The time factor is important to the Communists as show by early release of rctured prisoners i:n Torea: tie timely producticn of the Di motien ricture: the use of drug atirulants and mental duress: exhaustion in rushin; through soue court, convictions: and the lonf-ter: montal conditionin; of prisoners, shcwn in the pro-Conrunist Japanese prisoners which wore Eeutally conditioned for years by the Russians. before they uere returned to Japan. I any tere never returned.

. ll. Because of the effect, on world opinion, we con expect that the Cortunists will use conventional psycholorical interrogation techmiques on : any prisonccs, and treat thom in accordaace with Goneva aproonents. This has and vill Le done with privoners they willingly retur.

12. They will use thcir educatioual techiques repeatedly to win over the eas" victins.

13. They may retum some of tho more resistant rrisoners which have beon subjected to a l:rited degree of iental. duress, low djcts and persistent ropcated interrogation under varicus conditions.

IV. I ental conditioninz to facilitate interrogatioi oi stronrl resistant. rrisoners includins aspionage auspects for ottainin! truthful infonation rather than false confessions presents a difficult problen.

A. There is no reason for not believing that the Communists can readily obtain confessions without, as they claim, "old-fzshioned torbure," or he use of crurs. llo doutt they have in aind rutilation

in Shurai

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and other anciant mcticos of "hscal torture, end. de not. consider that torture includes tetal duress, starvation diets and other rethods of exhausticn to the degree ol subnission.

B. There are sound runsons for believins that drugs vould to a cerlain derrec accelerate obtaininr confessions, but no reasons for believing that confessios cannot le ohtaincd easily without diws, ur that drugs are reliable in obtaining truthful inforiction. licyorts are quite conviucing that the Gerrans, lussians, and Satellites have used drugs experimentally many years,.but no aulhentic evidonce fron any country thnt, drurs of any lind are reliable in outnining truthful inforwatint. Reports of the use of drurs for soue confession, apparently have led pcople in various contries to lelieve drugs can be rolied upon for veracity of nrisoners' statements. There appears to have been consir'orablc coifusin in the methods used for roeting the objective in confessio for convicticns, and iuterrogatior for truth.

C. Couist, rental conditioning, covers all tethors, frorpersistent, education end milr persuasion to techiques for forcer Lransient softa tin or comlete breakrlowm of the mental faculties of the victim.

D. The open Sovi et literature funishes convincing evidence !hat. the mussinns are up-to-dste in the use of the neuropsrcliatric techniques usod in this country on patients, and that the efocts vary considorably.

L. Thero are muy docusents (referred to in past reports; which indcate that the Co: anists hav. caplored th: u.e of drugs (at least 25 different preparations) end other uethods sufficicutly to kno: their lizitations in cffectiveness in. the interrogation and convistisn of prisoners:

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F. Roports loa' us to believe that the Communi shs do not usn sti ulating drurs or narcotics routinei: as supplsments to interroralion: therefore, we asowne that. they have ccme tc the coiclusion that these preparations are unreliable and at times a detriient in obtaining truthful inforation fror nrisoners. A number of roports lend us to bolieve tlie have used drurs provious to sone court trials.

G. The usual technique afainst resistant prisoners appears to be clever convent:onal psychological interroratic folloued in sone casus b. methods of exhaustion, particularly of the nervous s"ateri, without the use of crurs.

H. Their vast. experiencc surely hns convined thea that scmewhere plong ths line of increasinuly drstic teasures that the resistance of agy ran will break, but not always tell ths truth. Also, that the lental rcsistaice, inclurinr. subconscious rosistance of cene Lan, is itror enou h to wi chholr secret infortztion. The trealin point in so.a men vould not be reachcd wtil thcir mental jaculties are ao abnormal that the inforaation they give may or ma, not be the truth. The Communists probably have been succcssful in oltrinin Lruthful inforration fro ny men ly their !ctlod's because moss ren ould toll the.truth !:ofor they reached the later staces of : ental duress.

1. Althcu h vo have ne ovidence that the Coruunists dencnd uron the use of n.: on drur er cainaiirn of producto or dvices rcutinely in interrogti ns, ther test treatnent of scie pri oners ive: u wrii q thret o cnn expret the1 to ure crura and other uncenventie ol products, devices and methods.under certain circwistances i espicnage and as hopeful supplenents in the handling: ol prisoners they have no intention of releasing.

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v. Communist techniques in espionage and suggestions for defense.

A. Among the Commnist activities we can expect them to use all kinds of trickery, drugs including toxic substances, electric and other applications to induce shock, the polygraph and hypnotism.

B. Primarily we can expect mental and physical duress, to break down resistance in interrogation of prisoners.  This method of breaking the will to resist can be practiced anywhere but the other measures to supplement. interrogation probably would be applied to prisoners at special centers only.

C. They may use drugs and other supplementary techniques, not that any one method assures veracity in ary one individual, but because any means of loosening tongues such as the effects of alcohol or other methods for inducing speech in subconscious states may give them true or false information from a mumber of persons. By an analysis of the combined statements from a number of prisoners they might be able to delete the false statements.

D. Before the Communists use nerve stimulant drugs, they probably would first try other methods to break down mental resistance, such as persistent repeated interrogations, bright lights, starvation diet, barbarous quarters, not allowing sleep and strained positions in standing or other postures. They are not likely to use the stimulants and interrogation only, because very resistant prisoners are not likely to tell the truth under this treatment.

E. They may use narcotics and other nerve depressants, highly toxic substances or electric shock to incapacitate or even liquidate an

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enemy victim before or after capture.

F. In subversive activities they are more likely to devise methods for tricking the victim to ingest drugs than by injection or inhaling. Administration to prisoners would be by ingestion or injection rather than inhalation. They may use narcotics to facilitate hypnotism, but hypnotism requires special training and even with a narcotic some persons cannot be hypnotized, and the most resistant would not reveal secret information if hypnotized.

G. Defense against all actions should primarily cover the selection of agents who have the greatest resistance before assignment, and then thorough conditioning to resist techniques without supplementary materials which they might carry.

H. Inasmuch as ingestion would be more widely used in the administration of drugs than by injection, agents could carry an emetic such as apomorphine for use against ingestion of too much alcohol or suspected enemy doses of other substances.

I. Other defenses against enemy actions should require more study including suggestions for concealment, such as the use of matched moulage patches, ingestion and recovery'of materials and offensive devices to prevent enemy actions before and after capture.

J. We cannot expect equal mental reactions to artificially induced .alterations of the mind, therefore for certain purposes we probably can spend time more profitably in utilizing techniques, devices and materials which are available than in the more remote and unrealistic approaches such as exploration of plant products in Mexico. Sufficient information

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is available to show that exploration of the Mexican products is not likely to produce the results desired.

K. Our main security defense should be mental conditioning of selected agents to resist enemy actions to obtain information.

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Chiel, Security Rosoarch Staff

OTR "Tirnin Waohing" Report, June 1955, Attached

A 1. Attached is tho report which was preparedl by the under in tho fralning Divioion. As far os I kow, most the actual work was done by who is a good scholar and I think a capabls young man.

2. As you know, tho Soçirity Office did not rocoivo, as far es I lmow, a cony of this report although we should have aince we have been active in brain washing problens for yoars and ere fully represented on the lilltog coaritteo and were prosant when this was brought up. I canot understand wiy we did not automatically receive this roport and I protested this mattor, whethor you wiah to do something about it or not is up to you.

3. In my opinion, this ia a vory good report and although does not cxtcnsively go into the matter it touches the highlights and covers the field vory well. The Training people should bo congratulated on this roport and thoir sugfestions I believe are worthnhile. Becauso it is good and fairly brief I em recormending it to you for your stuty and I en sugcating, that you offer it to

for thoir reading.

l. As you knoy wo wore aware some report was boing preparod but I do not believo Security waa consulted in the diatribution of this report. csked me mmorous questions about it and I (per your instructions) gave him information but I do not believe anyone in Cocurity had the orportunity of studying it before its diatribution. Since the ratcrial is important end some of it is quite hot I am somowhat conccrnodaout the distribution of the roport and I sucgest, if possiblc,Cocurity obtain fron list of all to whom it has beon diotributed. Tho report centains sevoral rentions of exporimonto and that is ono of the itens that docs not boar wido distributicn.

5. I en sotting, out below a series of random observations in connoction vith this roport which I think are portinont. hother or not wo dhculd surgest theso to the Trainirg livision or take thom up in any way is aimply a tntter for coneideration.

a. This report contains no reforonce or disaussion of the treatment, activity and problems encountorod with the Chicoms and liorth Koreen POw'a in our camps during the Korean Wiar. The wariter wonders whether we have learned

A/P I1.2,6

12 July 1955

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sy lecsons fron those fiascos or whothor etes, studisa, reporta vero nade of theso situations.

b. The writor has not yet poon and can find no raferenco to in this reportot reportfon the Pii activity of tho Turks, Lritish, Canadiano, ctc. while Po!'s in North Korsa. Theso stuliics should be important.

c. Tho writor often woniors whewher or not we aro attributing too ruch to the Clicons in their Pa; control. The writer woniers tother or not thoir handldbf PoWt wus daliberate and besed upon exceptional training or sorsthing olse again.

d. This is vory isportant end ahould bo onc of the highent priority itarn for the opcrations people. Evory afrort Should to pado to find out wiat instructions or training are Eivon (hicomo ao intorropators. Every detail should bo studicd. lo ahould meke positive efforts to pick up a Chicon interrogator eitler by snatchinc or cofecting. te mhould certainly bond evry effort to get inforontion on thoir training and their oral and writton inatruetions, éto.

e.Cofer botton of pau 65-Dlis intcrocting point has occirred to the writer rauy tines. Wy don't lavyera for the Puito who aro triod pload tegorary insmity? It seemo you could foul up any trial this vay since you cen got nony psychiatristo andpychologista who would aree on this to testify as axports. Also see pace 72a and 72b.

f. In the writer's opinion, som of tho training aids pet up on paçes O-ó right be lielpful or of absolute ansiotanco to people having hirh Iù lut the writer woncors whcther this would wcrk at the laver itellectual lcvels.

B+ The writer notos thit techniques (marry-gorouri techniqua) ighit bo a very uceful emerianco for poe. Sec page 06, Section (a nnd alro rote pago 07, Section C.

h. In adklition to Whe obviously scund training idoaa advencod in this report for dofcnsiv roosures, the writer would like to guccost perhaps sore of the folloaine rdrht well to conaidorod in training r people defensivaly to rosist braimmaiing, alicitation, ote.

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(1) llou to asaue tho appearence of stupidity.

(2) wuat can be done to make a peraon or high intelligonce appear modioore or unintoresting to enonyintorrogators?

(3) Closely rolsted to (1) and (2) atore would be certain minor tricks of ectin; or playing tho role of a otupid or dull type.

(4) Has anybody done a etudy of laughter, bunor or derision as a weapon?

(5) low to similate physical dofocta or protond to be deaf, ill, nausented or suffering fron very poor cyesighit?

(6) Hhat are counter harrasemont masuros?

(7) low boat can you annoy or frustrate Chinese or Corrunist interrogators without suffaring unxtue consequances?

(8) Can prnctioal jokos be worked out?

(9) mhe writer noted in lis briaf asociations with Mils that ocret societieg even KiK activity Mourished and vorkrd succcsafully as a norale booster ani actual weapon against the enemy. The writer beliovos arphatically a study chould be made of this type of activity.

(10) Cartainly land aotivity could be studicd and taught. Planning oscape in tho opinion of the writer vould bo a strong, moralc booster and a cdhcsive forćé in PQi activity (study British techiques, atc.).

(1l) The ever presant problem of the informer or "rat" should be very carefully and sciontifically studled not only to counter acrinst this evil but to dia cover vaye and means for trapping informrs, exponing inforrors and defootig their afforts. The writer knovs of no effort along thore lines.

(12) As a rule a penior officer takos conand in a POi carp. lut the Koroan liar clearly indicatod that ono of the main efforts of the Chicome ws to upset any leadorahip talonts displayed by individualo,

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to segregato ranks and roduce all. Po/'s to a standard lavel cxcept in certain instances. The writor is of the opiniou that any group who nay or my not fali into cnomy hands should have a pro-lotorrinod syata of leaderahip or cormond authority. Certainly this problon ahould be studied.

(13) Me Chinese or North Korean Nuü's cloarly doronstrated mass activity and rass protost. Dhiis phonornna appears to have beon rare in alliod PO camps. This shiould be very care-Lülly studiod and its value as a defanaive rechanian should be exained.