(ESTIMATED PUB DATE) DISCUSSIONS OF MKNAOMI WITH (DELETED)[12885070]

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75-12.

SUBJECT: Discussions of HKNAOMI withE

7. On. 25 June 1975 I met with at his apartment at ,to probe his recollections of the relationships between TSD and Ft. Detrick in the MKNAOMI project. was in TSDfrom 1952 until 1962, serving as Chief of the Division during the last two years of that period. of OGC and of ORD were also present and participatedin the discussions.eay was told that he need not become involved but he expressed a complete.willingness to provide whatever help he could.

2.It was explained that MKNAOiI had been discovered ouly recently as result of personal recollections by people not directly involved and that available records left large gaps in our ability to understand what had taken place. s stated that the Detrick project had been established and was used as a sourcc of specialized technical support in the areas of BH and CH. He agreed that its origins were in the early 1950's. Its establishment was a rather natural step in view of. OSS experience which had involved the development and use of two types of lethal tablets. and other exotic weapon devices.

3.wstressed that the relation with Detrick was an informal one\_and was never defined with any precision. He seemed to be unaware of the 1952.Memorandur of Understanding batween the CIA and the Army's Chief Chemical Officer which apparently was the charter for the association. Furthermore, he noted that well defined programs were not established but that work pursued lines considered tobe intriguing by Ft. Detrick or requested by the CIA. Funding was not tied to tasking and he. suggested that Agency money was not strictly accounted for in teras of effort expended strictly in our behalf. The arrangement worked because of close personal ties between involved personnel at Detrick and the Agency. MKNAOMI activities covered a broad spectrum and involved the development of materials useful for many different purposes. Insofar as affecting hunan behavior was concerned, interests ranged from very temporary minor disablement (such as inability to deliver a speech well) to more serious and longer incapacitation to death.

4. According to some well established guidelines for the menagement of work in this area existed. No written records were kept; verbal comunications, close assocations among the people involved, and human continuity kept the prograr together. Since there were swarms of requests of TSD to provide support of weird sorts wihich might involve this type of activity, it was agreed TSD would always respond to such requests negatively unless approval by the DD? (i.e., the Deputy Director) had been given prior to the contact. According to  this ruie was always followed. lormally, he was tipped off at the DDp staff meeting that soecne had a need for support in this area and then arrangements were made to put

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

E2 IMP DET CL Signer

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in contact with the Project Officer ne staed that in no case he could remesber had any direction or requests for support come from outside the Agency.

5. From gaccount, compartmentation was extreme. When contact was mace with DDP approval, it was done with the Chief of the Chemistry Branch day)and, after having set up the contact, would never learn anything more about the affair. Indeed, according to his account, he was never apprised in any detail as to the specific type of support involved in specific requests though he was aware in general terms as to the types of things involved. Others in TSD - apparently including all but those few officers personally involved in relations with Detrick -- were entirely excluded from any knowiledge of these matters.

6. In amplifying his statement about the number of requests for support in this area,vprovided a number of examples. These included suicide agents for the U-2 pilots, L-pills, means for incapacitating guards or guard dogs, material to anesthetize the inhabitants of.a building so as to allow its entry, material to dissolve the Berlin Wall, aphrodisiacs for operational use, etc. He gave the impression of TSD's being besieged with wild ideas for which they were to provicie the magic potion that would make them work. Few were seriously considered.

7. When asked directly about any knowLedge he may have about specific MKNAOMI support to assassination planning,stated that he- had none. He said that he was zware of a whole raft of schemes relating to Castro that were discussed before and. imediately after the Bay of Pigs but that he never knew which,if any, were taken seriously. He did indicate, however,'that some requests for support approved by the DDp had apparently. involved assassination. lle had no personal involvement in these or. knowledge of them.

8. When asked about personally targeted harrassment operations; e stated that he knew of none and that the use of harrassmcnt agents had focused on breaking up meetings, affecting crowds, etc.

9. It was clear that -- to some extent -- MKNAOMI was wrapped up with the drug activities of MKuLTRA in egarmind. He recalled ULTRA as a funding mechanism that was used to handle both drug research and the first because of its sensitivity and the second because of concere He.noted that the drug activity was characterized -- like MKNAOMI -- by a s&ris compartmentation policy and an avoidance of creating a written record. He spoke of nearly all the drug work as having been related to-interrogation uses and noted that TSD received numerous requests to find aids to the interrogation process.

11. When asked about the keeping of records of MKilAOiI materials stored in TSD, he stated that it was unlikely that any very elaborate or systematic scheme was

was uever, iu fact, Ceeh of tue Bowosy Branc shicis in tues penoc, was rispousisle Ror tue Pt. Defrick prolect. Tue Crevism Branu refernn is sucorrect for tus period. Cs. 75-12

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F eployed. The policy of avoiding written records would have acted against suchen approach and he doubted that any real records were maintained. ydid not find it surprising that unexpected things had been discovered in storage in OTs: it was the nature of the business that peculiar things were kept on hand. He related a story of finding six sticks of ancient -- hence particularly dangerous -- dynamite stored above the DCI's office in the Central Building.

12. In conclusion, the interview shed little new light on MKNAOMI but did put the activity and the way it was managed into somewhat better perspective. Though some of what he related was surprising, it was believable. The most notable point Rade was the unusual -- even by Agency standards -- compartmentation and security maintained with regard to the Detrick project.

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