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that no damage was done to individuals who volunteer for the experiments."Overseas interrogations utilizing a combination of sodium pentothal and hypnosis after physical and psychiatric examinations of the subjects were also part of ARTICHOKE. m

The Office of Scientific Intelligence (OSI), which studied scientific advances by hostile powers, initially led BLUEBIRD/ARTICHOKE efforts. In 1952, overall responsibility for ARTICHOKE was transferred from OSI to the Inspection and Security Office (I&SO), predecessor to the present Office of Security. The ČIA's Technical Services and Medical Staffs were to be called upon as needed; OSI would retain liaison function with other government agencies. The change in leadership from an intelligence unit to an operating unit apparently reflected a change in emphasis; from the study of actions by hostile powers to the use, both for offensive and defensive purposes, of special interrogation techniques—primarily hypnosis and truth serums.

Representatives from each Agency unit involved in ARTICHOKE met almost monthly to discuss their progress. These discussions included the planning of overseas interrogations8 as well as further experimentation in the U.S.

Information about project ARTICHOKE after the fall of 1953 is scarce. The CIA maintains that the project ended in 1956, but evidence suggests that Office of Security and Office of Medical Services use of "special interrogation" techniques continued for several years thereafter.

3. MKNAOMI

MKNAOMI was another major CIA program in this area. In 1967, the CIA summarized the purposes of MKNAOMI:

(a) To provide for a covert support base to meet clandestine operational requirements.

(b) To stockpile severely incapacitating and lethai materials for the specific use of TSD [Technical Services Division].

(c) To maintain in operational readiness special and unique items for the dissemination of biological and chemical materials.

(d) To provide for the required surveillance, testing, upgrading, and evaluation of materials and items in order to assure absence of defects and complete predictability of results to be expected under operational conditions. T\_1

Under an agreement reached with the Army in 1952, the Special Operations Division (SOD) at Fort Detrick was to assist CIA in developing, testing, and maintaining biological agents and delivery systems. By this agreement, CIA acquired the knowledge, skill, and facilities of the Army to develop biological weapons suited for CIA use.

SOD developed darts coated with biological agents and pills containing several diferent biological agents which could remain potent for weeks or months. SOD also developed a special gun for firing darts coated with a chemical which could allow CIA agents to incapacitate a guard dog, enter an installation secretly, and return the dog to consciousness when leaving. SOD scientists were unable to develop a similar incapacitant for humans. SOD also physically transferred to CIA personnel biological agents in "bulk" form, and delivery devices, including some containing biological agents.

In addition to the CIA's interest in biological weapons for use against humans, it also asked SOD to study use of biological agents against crops and animals. In its 1967 memorandum, the ČIA stated:

Three methods and systems for carrying out a covert attack against crops and causing severe crop loss have been developed and evaluated under field conditions. This was accomplished in anticipation of a requirement which was later developed .but was subsequently scrubbed just prior to putting into action.

MKNAOMI was terminated in 1970. On November 25, 1969, President Nixon renounced the use of any form of biological weapons that kill or incapacitate and ordered the disposal of existing stocks of bacteriological weapons. On February 14, 1970, the President clarified the extent of his earlier order and indicated that toxins—chemicals that are not living organisms but are produced by living organisms—were considered biological weapons subject to his previous directive and were to be destroyed. Although instructed to relinquish control of material held for the CIA by SOD, a CIA scientist acquired approximately 11 grams of shellfish toxin from SOD personnel at Fort Detrick which were stored in a little-used CIA laboratory where it went undetected for five years.1º

4. MKULTRA

MKULTRA was the principal CIA program involving the research and development of chemical and biological agents. It was "concerned with the research and development of chemical, biological, and radiological materials capable of employment in clandestine operations to control human behavior." 11

In January 1973, MKULTRA records were destroyed by Technical Services Division personnel acting on the verbal orders of Dr. Sidney Gottlieb, Chief of TSD. Dr. Gottlieb has testified, and former Director Helms has confirmed, that in ordering the records destroyed, Dr. Gottlieb was carrying out the verbal order of then DCI Helms.

MKULTRA began with a proposal from the Assistant Deputy Director for Plans, Richard Helms, to the DCI, outlining a special

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'Memorandum from Robert Tavlor, O/DD/P to the Assistant Deputy (Inspection and Security) and Chief of the Medical Staff, 3/22/52.

•Memorandum from H. Marshall Chadwell. Assistant Director. Scientific Intelligence, to the Deputy Director/Plans (DDP) "Priect ARTICHOKE," 8/29/52. "Progress Report, Project ARTICHOKE." 1/12/53.

Memorandum from Chief, TSD/Biological Branch to Chief. TSD "MKNAOMI: Funding. Ohiectives. and Accomnliehmente." 10/18/67. p. 1. For a fuller description of MKNAOMI and the relationship between CIA and SOD. see p. 360 ff.

"Ibid. p. 2

Senate Select Committee, 9/16/75, Hearings, Vo. 1. 1   . .

"Memorandum from the CIA Inspector General to the Director, 7/26/63.

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tho nt oern  n in teer ins na  t  t   ing Sur        an dise n a  g     iai Mk      d ent. Dn i    a i i  int

ear  950. tha d           ts M     nen   C na ned des it        bo nse t     nt a o re Sov a        s t ere AMs   d  d ldls to

theh   .e tet     oa d  g hn n    n    annd o. thr t      h  t he rea ai  l     lie m t ol        or tes t t  a    s ting

Burr ha ehat Ae          the toe a s l n nt a n s ace  ad     e  s eace Tn  a f  ,      fder

Ceo      a    o, tn     s n  n ier Ths n      g tion Ir d          a am. Pro          io Is   o    n ie pha         min TJhh         t ie

viollonns. thhin s s s    og    ng In     ,  yas a   t   ex-MMan          n-On  a t  l      of bas         cts o    n  dn n n  h taxil  it a   oil  ral Th d  n t t  t t ns

CIAti  s  it n ion un    g   the zatit  c t t i o t a  ade

nos ae e  es ts s ses ne aet  a   n  ding

P2t.

oma    n  s. or   t t    ition Hur         snry teine fe s t e e   e e ma aee   f e ean fo    ng e a       r e na a, n  n   -  to

mn t  s  o    s opi     aa   ion ye        ie Pias s t  s ts s s s dy. e        ets

s nnity: sr g  g g ng     hnis at ad n f a t a aa t f tun.

Mt  s s   hng     hes Iinne p q od ms

ni es ae ecna wht    t e e e e n  c pots a        oe avo     og    cal bilaal       t  ar en pl    t  papre t e    ne  o an    d   ort on    t   a e es o it et t e it a  t ao

i a vg   ang  e: mnaa  e t     t  tt ad ts

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e       l  2 thei      ls, Td  n  d al      or o  d   a       o l        s: Ai  t        s.

acts  o ct., aa t l  t    t d   thte aia e           de not e   a e   se  s, a er r          on

AR  33 tv   , :  m, Mp        ka //    3.

ri   i   tes. n    d  the e n d   nd ti    ns      s aenr n g tn ig ia stan n   i     ad cal e s a t t tat  t t t sb-

ceu sn  t ns  ss  sa nmat ba       nat dt   a u t t  oto o t e e  a t  ne ane co    h      his i t  t t       be dur t   nd   ne ros       ceal Trhe t  e e  e e  er

t hen      g2: sve          e  ot thhe  ns n a o   s  len ple    t   o it ded Repd t   t   t   eo

har     sa ma     a id   nt ohhe         and oa e    e t e t t  tn tol r   s         e At  t       t   on Wwnn  n       wans not            a and For        or But e       and B        nd

Ha tt at ae  tt a t    s

.) eent e r  d        t o tne r ,  s         e or

s       te Bute  a  t       di. bee s  t   e e  a has a           n o ng i          ss nv p     r    pdy or  t   t     the du          a  o por          ved

be  t e  u ns   ud bed d,.s anni      c  ech aae         ical sured e    e  e fes o ad l          bio wa t a     e  aes cont tte  t   t  tes Repe t e  t     es ar

B NG DG DNG AMS

ess  o nd  r l   ed tests. CH  e  t       RD seot         the vo s        vho the

e  t  t   n   os. y ea  t  t   nty r e e  e    vo a t t t   te t t ted ani t  er  y     ry e       nn Gen         ctor rveng a       nal

creebi saliy sblt  t t     r  re a d  d  s      nnd

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73 363

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rns t         tng 1n/   55

t       i  .

add          or He          t tt , n hn t       t t tn u        ng won      r er t etn  t    t n nts t  d arl      , co n   n nn Ae o Aecone Cisia n si tl i tion Oppins Dvon. OPpvons von.

laa e e e     e al i         e  r ttl      e --: OIils  ath. le t.

ra d     er a n   n n n    eno the t   t      t n wo    t        tii n      t n n aht sis          hns t  ca ()

ninncoony nctons: i  vo e Icra D D  an. s       eeed

otr    l et tt  t t l  2. oDurirtty ty  y ct      y tcor ha  g         o mai  t   d   t  t   eas sod d    d    d nd or an  a t tt t      i tess  tn   t  t   i   ts. t       t    titn

rot       a tec tl   t   t     a  ath Aq    n     y Py  a         oid noiss   o  a a  aht Shon o n    t  oa-

CIist s h   S a a    a  and by      ot     ent he              te rec        a eau expnt n t t n t t nt gty oH   o        Ci dea  y          ied Tht t t    t   t t tt t ttthe

ofiis n 'zae cire  a cet a ee  eent wou n ot     tice that   t     t tties tii a    n t  de ro    o  s   o ace-Drett peon ot  not et  r caons

c a       t   g: dee te e    t tt  er Vole   t      vas Dl            i-The ss    a      en aspee oo  e n  en   es. The e t e ae s t  e ese sal

L2 1 onn na to ni  t i ior. Ae         ent andt tet err i  e  r  the ra  a  a    vate wo  e a e e  as  o

t ong   ing: tornl t     n n    sa Diny  t  s n y ns  e diyit tr i t   t  te AIln   C  e      n

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d. 1a 1 m .8. Sta    son

ro         s the d   d  d   a    ath rdpt  ,  tat   d ' t  th br  o  ,     a   hos thaet      y    em ls    t     t      ke hen [    n     t ame aa      t       hat Aits o  o   o  o

an e  t  t   t t t te te aer p  a, ey  e. Ae     a,    loy isi     l n    ner. e io  :     p    tion. fate e S     S Sae en ar     a   ons et       n  or

insi   Gtir tis s hat e  r r      n Ab o  r   n  red Lo    n n n  e  n th r      y    a Lask      k  k   an u  t  t       . cid     d      at vas            dein t t t   t t t t t t he thr  e  at     e vine cenn        the Ruw          sof

en    a  d i. D r r      a  r n           t by   k   a   eiy tvry  t td td t t  ty pra            ia At tt t at at  t t t aist

a t     n   sn. a      t      ork l on n  n nD    to Lask  a e ae    vet vassa d  d a  s  a Ro , tat   a   t tson

deseiaile.t Va    a  t   is vas

E  m .3. E   r

10/7) et     t   t  r t tor s         e  en w    d d     s had e    o      di vy e  e   e   ter. sevve t     t     anme s   b n  n     en po   ,      d ase t k           ked Cia   r     ras di        nr     as t   ,         out the  n           om a   t     a  and es        c ch wa   e        ch Ser           eal He             lr ea  r  t   o   riy

r      r    c n n s         imm s               the o , nn   n

cire,0 re   t ,  t lt t t a    be e  e e  ved n tt     rs rtnn t nt        nts e n  e  ne e   on. eos       tg  g on ooee te n e    nn n nt Drr e t to tt t t , tt t e

d y  t Ss. td  t     ar t t       tes Droep   l        did ot o   t      r sht oarr  r  a  a  da As  d A   a ,     n pe s   t   son parttd,.s Pot r r  t or  t sr  nor

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Dil       5. ea          rom ie          ..

Ilel         eet. tl  t t  t t  t t t  t tich ma              a ad       t    occ ne et   t e  e e t nus oe      /4.

as s     t    t s to oi t    t s   t ted e  t   t   t e Ss ist     t      port era     t       min mead ,         a as n        te Asrhn n, g       n ODn      n    nr nce

ins n  nt    gls diseg    at r a   a    ain thai  a  a t  a  ted ria     a a a ate wtvt a  t  t a t  ate-

ADirit   atat;: mat    H   s hen aoa  a i   ol nt l i, nt hav   e d    o Prit  o  t   t t ene

ol     cts. nift     r  ary in             eir Vol       ais rro    o n  on on ir   t  t  t  C  rtss Ait  t    i    t in sta  nt t t  tat    t in. asa    t      n t t s su Tist         n    me

oir r  r      tr t.

et     t t  t  e. ti  a    l      ent asdp   t  e   t  pa Tht      a em

nel g n ne    e -ror t t t n t  t  t son-Dir It   d I Ht  I  o tiret t  n  t  it t  uety Te a         a nd

Me      t e at d  t  t t n. ne     t   t   1 nin

C     .8. . 28

ott  s  ds s s  o s  s en i    at ti  ation ap   ,  t t   t  int nietn,   g    tng a t    t   i c t  ch baes    s a nd   snt ud          n  ing Std, g g  t ng   f or It  t  ca C    t t ies As   s nn  Dnn u t  o  nal

ala  ab      be aitta  e oe o     est ne       ned mi b        t   be prrun    ca   a bn cat a t t  a  a     tte eli  f  t   f    peth n   in i  ig not men  t  t tt      to o  t  t  e   t t ri-I a    t  a    e

t on  n t nl n a t tn: ioa it i it i   i i t  ia Ali i       i  a Ias   e  t      et. dah       t   tor dent  t e   e   the buts n i    s ns s  dhis asua  it t  t  h it ats n nt     ae kno t     s     son Pdoy  o    oe   a dnt Sho  o  o on  ot em-

chat a  aot  d ad oet bro        tk   t,  ter Abr t        saa     t t  o led aa C t    a   a dsk Cid    d   nd   at bro   d   d   b  kin Imia a   a a  at   ash-

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"observe the behavior of unwitting persons being questioned after having been given a drug." o There is no evidence that Subproject Number 3 was terminated even though these officers were unequivocally aware of the dangers of the surreptitious administration of LSD and the necessity of obtaining informed consent and providing medical safeguards. Subproject Number 3, in fact, used methods which showed even less concern than did the OLSON experiment for the safety and security of the participants. Yet the evidence indicates the project continued until 1963.1

In the project, the individual conducting the test might make initial contact with a prospective subject selected at random in a bar. He would then invite the person to a "safehouse" where the test drug was administered to the subject through drink or in food. CIA personnel might debrief the individual conducting the test, or observe the test by using a one-way mirror and tape recorder in an adjoining room.

Prior consent was obviously not obtained from any of the subjects. There was also, obviously, no medical prescreening. In addition, the tests were conducted by individuals who were not qualified scientific observers. There were no medical personnel on hand either to administer the drugs or to observe their effects, and no follow-up was conducted on the test subjects.

As the Inspector General noted in 1963:

A significant limitation on the effectiveness of such testing is the infeasibility of performing scientific observation of results. The [individuals conducting the test] are not qualified scientific observers. Their subjects are seldom accessible beyond the first hours of the test. The testing may be useful in perfecting delivery techniques, and in identifying surface characteristics of onset, reaction, attribution, and side-effect.2

This was particularly troublesome as in a

number of instances, . . . the test subject has become ill for hours or days, including hospitalization in at least one case, and the agent could only follow up by guarded inquiry after the test subject's return to normal life. Possible sickness and attendant economic loss are inherent contingent effects of the testing.8s

Paradoxically, greater care seems to have been taken for the safety of foreign nationals against whom LSD was used abroad. In several cases medical examinations were performed prior to the use of LSD.

Moreover, the administration abroad was marked by constant observation made possible because the material was being used against prisoners of foreign intelligence or security organizations. Finally, during certain of the LSD interrogations abroad, local physicians were on call, though these physicians had had no experience with LSD and would not be told that hallucinogens had been administered.ss

The CIA's project involving the surreptitious administration of LSD to unwitting human subjects in the United States was finally halted in 1963, as a result of its discovery during the course of an Inspector General survey of the Technical Services Division. When the Inspector General learned of the project, he spoke to the Deputy Director for Plans, who agreed that the Director should be briefed. The DDP made it clear that the DCI and his Deputy were generally familiar with MKULTRA. He indicated, however, that he was not sure it was necessary to brief the DDCI at that point.

On May 24, 1963, the DDP advised the Inspector General that he had briefed the Director on the MKULTRA program and in particular had covered the question of the surreptitious administration of LSD to unwitting human subjects. According to the Inspector General, the DDP said that "the Director indicated no disagreement and therefore the 'testing'will continue."

One copy of an "Eyes Only" draft report on MKULTRA was prepared by the Inspector General who recommended the termination of the surreptitious administration project. The project was suspended following the Inspector General's report.

On December 17, 1963, Deputy Director for Plans Helms wrote a memo to the DDCI, who with the Inspector General and the Executive Director-Comptroller had opposed the covert testing. He noted two aspects of the problem: (1) "for over a decade the Clandestine Services has had the mission of maintaining a capability for influencing human behavior;" and (2)"testing arrangements in furtherance of this mission should be as operationally realistic and yet as controllable as possible."Helms argued that the individuals must be "unwitting" as this was "the only realistic method of maintaining the capability, considering the intended operational use of materials to influence human behavior as the operational targets will certainly be unwitting. Should the subjects of the testing not be unwitting, the program would only be "pro forma" resulting in a "false sense of accomplishment and readiness." 7 Helms continued:

81

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400

401

Memorandum to Inspector General from Chief, Inspection and Review, on Subproject #3 of MKULTRA, 2/10/54.

" I bid., p. 12.

IG Report on MKULTRA, 1963.

"Ibid. According to the IG's survey in 1963, physicians associated with MKULTRA could be made available in an emergency.

"The Technical Services Division which was responsible for the operational use of LSD abroad took the position that "no physical examination of the subject is required prior to administration of [LSD] by TSS trained personnel. A physi-

cian need not be present, There is no danger medically in the use of this material as handled by TSS trained personnel." The Office of Medical Services had taken the position that LSD was "medically dangerous." Both the Office of Security and the Office of Medical Services argued that LSD "should not be administered unless preceded by a medical examination... and should be administered only by or in the presence of a physician who had studied it and its effect." (Memorandum from James Angleton, Chief, Counterintelligence Staff to Chief of Operations, 12/12/57, pp. 1–2.

Physicians might be called with the hope that they would make a diagnosis of mental breakdown which would be useful in discrediting the individual who was the subject of the CIA interest.

"Memorandum for the Record prepared by the Inspector General, 5/15/63, p. 1. " Ibid., p. 2.

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ruil     o t., o  r  e    t  rers S,    t     t t t   en,t

n    t d ut d  d as th ag   a ia     nd ni       ko    a shi o      o a oui     a    ion lr          or reti    n       a les a  a   a  t a    a a

Diirr r : DHit e An  An t  A n hen Thet   t t  e     en

the    y t   tor. lr  a      a   f trat        o  the a l nl        ii mt    t     t   st e an       anad ce    r        ct Wie t    (   t   )a) ahn  ot  n  cois

a n n n ci. Gennal   t a  at t t  tion revit t t    t t    tor thn     (( n   nal see   nl rao   t ( d) vit    a        our an           ts Tie   e l e rn  rng

Bol    iA

toay a ai on. a e         ect ma t  t  rt  t   ect ot n d tt   tt    b b   tat     t   t   re t        hed of d          ie whi t tt        t s ar           ting ls    s   ts eoop Vit       t   hat sh a a        a  ovoll d   a    ae derhg n     n oo  non r   s        e

id. 1 dd p1 . M/   t  mt t 33.

wass       est. e e    e   n  tion ng veo s ei   v  n ng ve  n     t tt    de He   t t       ni

nir   rar  r ,, a  n  a ral 1s.12 Het at   n ot t   t that r"'n a, tl a  t  t te   tnm Te  h g    t   i

1T oprt t e rt D t    rt a         s s ta t           ces ng         the e s     a   n Het t n o on nt  n t t tne

be  t       ce. ablee a e t t  t t  e  t  o ue nt  ,      ng Fig ns          e rs uen  t t  t t t   tner uo  e t t t t t t  e  or D  n Noe Tt    o t     had

sub     e oot  e t  a   e ten n  t       g  ia t   a      the ot t t  n       time n r  n o i   ar n une

dam    de ern a        s mat t t at a t a s het s a s      stnet t to t t  te  ton tn    a n a     nt es       t t t   sy Is in to mai  t a   t his

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82 402

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Ishe        n ons. Dirlct t lt    t   a r lcy mna   a d   ns    uuty t    t t   ttbe Irolt t l Dcl .          . 2,.

dest s  t   o  e e   he sht ta a t o t   ,    the w  o vr  s s    r  d ei thae t aat att stt tt  s lis. biolee t  te   t tt atect Detar r    ek t   and ia  G s    ot esirdi i aii  ns oi  iser ei aali a au b     auld ope oe e w t n  ger tros ss    i  t s  tive sen n on o  t on   on Spe o  t  e    t ahhiy siot   ma on   on t lis. su p s a t  p  s srd aes erthatn nd end n n a n f  t , ting for tt  t   t ti ts tt rote Wh n f    a  ta  ss

bonai a g yion. pr ot t oa     o o aba a   a a  a ng. mitlt a     t eithal at  t a   trthai  d i     ces dvia n   a e f rch ed   y a     a le   t n n     aud

sibl on in   sn    o on-Mt t   tid  ie Bra  a at  a t   tire res   t s   a ,  sen srt n t tn     ,, tne ia a     a   d unay    i   i    ther au  b     o     en sul    d   a      to Genh ra Ss     S t   re Tre t        ctor

405

hani n  t tnd t nts ap  s   g ded vwe            les inuot t t t ot t e   os s tion o  t   y  nts

I(I     23) cept t    t t t t t t t es, tiad             d rin. met t t  tt t  t  t t ta i      t    at-: eoet u nao miauao odsur amn s aaido mou

ven    t  o o    iar t       s   6.) enc           ver bec  a         re os   o ot       ed cers        a      ose. Pdat        a   by noct   ca   cd o e  e tan r            'r

G ts y      ed: Coma   t  t t e e t t tr. Ci    t    tecet e  e e ecet Clr t lttn  t10 an   n n  s. asat t tt t t t ds silt  ot t t t t    t t ted tio      ad      os deli y           and an  t      t   or Mia  s     nis Ri    .5.

not    o o   ta si st  t t i    s itiy th   t    t    nto be    t t t  ted exa  nl t  t n, ns, r       t t  e rno  t s t t  tt six ai          ans. ro   n     ere

them  M.,t l a          n prog  g  n  t  athe vd     t    t the ao  t     g t  ro aro g  g ra   ica fort   e t t t  t t t t the Tos       mo ibie n a t  a  a   r     er thit  tt ot  t tt  t t ttt tted mo t t t  t    o ot    t  t     les re   t a   n, :  or Asi s Da   A D D   n toet t  e, t eetde etd   ds Ta  a   n      a

W.s be  r a   nnt  you t  dt      t at  ot

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an t  e    o o  nner subt  tt   o s  t ties repr     r  an wie t  t t    t e r-Cut ait a t a a at ant at acies

Gor    l.. Naanan 4 o"n't  a a  a  a   ' thea           t  sed a     on  t     o  ie actt         l  ent i            n

Med  a    . Givt o dvind san bpre di  stie t tns

Ins   r 5g: prot  e        the ope  t at  t nt t t t t ap a   v       c it  n       t  t the cren   g      ons h    n      dis One  t e t    t hin

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40

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m  1//    1. the ncy. o  r    t r   te

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P       (   ) n   t     t    t  tre evi  t              ov s   t t        t  ong os n       e   ere snt  t t        ht o ,,

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16

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