PROJECT MKULTRA, THE CIAS[12885086]

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JOINT HEARING BEFORE THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON HEALTH AND SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH OF THE COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RESOURCES UNITED STATES SENATE NINETY-FIFTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION

AUGUST 3, 1977

Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Intelligence and Committer on Human Resources

96–406い)

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE WASHINGTON : 1977

For sale by the Superintendent of Docuunents. U.s Goverument P'rinting Omce Washfugton. 0C. 20402 Stock N. 052 070-04357-1

PROJECT MKULTRA, THE CIA'S PROGRAM OF RESEARCH IN BEHAVIORAL MODIFICATION

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SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

(Estnblisheł hy S. Res. 40o. 941h Cong. 2d sess.)

DANHN. K. INOIYE. Hawa!, Chairma» BARRY GuLlWATER. Arizona. Vicr Chnirmnn

BIRCHI BAYH. Indtana
ADLE STEYENSON, D
WILALAM 1 HATHNWAY. Mait
WAITER 1. HUDDI.ESTDN. KOnDky
JosIP R. BtN. JR. Iulawar
ROBRT MORGAN. Nort CaroDna
GARYRART,CEd
JANIELIATRICK MONHHAN. NOW YOrK

CLIPFORD P. CASE. New JerSey JAKE CARN. Utah CHARLIS MCC. MATHLAS. JR.. Maryland JAMLS E. PEARSON. Kanas JOHN H CRAFEI. Rhob, Isand BIHAH G. LIGAR. Indíana MALCOLMWALLOP. Wyoming

RoBRT C. RYRL We! VIrgtria. 1r Omci" Mombe HWSD1 BAKIR J, Tpnss, L2 Ocio Mmbo

WULILAM G MILLER. Staf PrCCtOr FAE D ElsFsHowER. Moorit, NtO DireCto

COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RESOURCES

HARRISONA. WILAIAMSJR, N.WJr. Choimnn

HNNINoS RANI"LPR Wet Virgitia ELWAMKFNNUTM8aChs GAYLONILSON. Wmn THOMASFL.AGLJ.(ON. MEri ALANCEAAST…NCa11 WlLLAM111ATUAWAY. Mate 1NNALI W. RlEGLI. JR. Mi!tgan

JUCOE K JAVITS New York LHAR S. SOHWEKER. Pennsyvania RORERT T STAFFORI. Vermont ORRN G HATCH Tah JOnN UCHAFEE. Rhode Island . I. HAAKAWA. Califonía

Stiru J Puevisr. Genr' Cawne! and stan Director MARMDM WHUTTAEER. CL'ClCk D A ZMrRM. Mirorit Connse

SI BCOMMITILI ON HEATH AND SCHENTIFIC RESEARCH

EDWARI: M. KENNEIY, MassachusettS. Chairman

GAYIALNELSON.W0HL WILLLAMDHATHAWA Mn HARRISON A WILLLAMS. JE. NEW JerSy (ex oficio)

RICHADS SOHWEKER. PennsyHvania JACOE K JAVITS. New York JOHN H CHAIIE, Rhode Island

LswRF\Ci. HloRouITz, P'roteesional Staf Member DAvI WiNSToN. Minoritk CounsCl

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CONTENTS

Statements of: Page
Admiral Stansfield Turner. Director, Central Intelligence Agency: ac
companied by: Frank Laubinger, Ofice of Technical Services, Cen
tral lntelligence Ageney: Al Brody. Office of Inspertor General.
Central Intelligence Ageney; Ernest Mayerfeld, Offce of General
Counsel, Central Intelligence Ageney. and George Cary, Legislative
Counsel. Central Intelligenee Ageney.
Philip Goldmuan. former enployee. Central Intelligence Ageney 50
John Gittiuger. foruner employee. Central Iutelligence Ageney. 51
Aplendix A.-XVII. Testing and U'se of Chemical and Biological Agents
by the Intelligence Community- G.5
Appendix R.-Iocuments Referring to Discavery of Additional MKUI.TRA
Material 103
Aplendix C.-Documents Referring to Subprojects\_- 109
Material Snhmitted for the Record: .
Psychological Assessments--- 17
"Truth" Iorugs in Interrogation 25
Coustruetion of Gorman Annex 34
Subproject 41
Drug Testing in Foreign (ountries. 43
MKSEARCH. OFTENCHICKWIT 169
Emplogees Terninated Because of Their Participation in MKULTRA
Subprojert 3.. 170
QKHILLTOP Definition\_ 171

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PROJECT MKULTRA. THE CIA'S PROGRAM OF RESEARCH IN BEHAVIORAL MODIFICATION

WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 3, 1977

U.S. SENATE. SELECT COMMITIEE ON INTELLIGENCE. AND SUBCOMMITTEE ON HEALTH AND SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH OF THE COMMITIEE ON HUMAN RESOUROES. W'ashington, D.C.

The committees met, pursuant to notice, at 9:07 a.m. in room 1202. Dirksen Senate Oflice Buihding, Senator Daniel K. Inouye (chairman of the Select Committee on Intelligence) presiding.

Present: Senators Inouye (presiding), Kennedy, Goldwater, Bayh. Hathaway, Huddleston, Hart, Schweiker, Case, Garn, Chafee, Lugar and Wallop.

Also present : William G. Miller, staff director, Select Committee on Intelligence: Dr. Lawrenee Horowitz. staft director. Subcommittee on Health and Scientific Research: and professional staff members of both committees.

Senator Ixorrr. The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence is meeting today and is joined by the Subcommittee on Health and Scientifie Research chaired by Senator Edward Kennedyof Massachusetts and Senator Richard Schweiker of Pennsylvania. Senator Hathaway and Senator Chafee are members of loth committees.We are to hear testimony from the Director of Central Intelligence. Adm. Stansfield Turner. and from other Ageney witnesses on issues concerning new documents supplied to the committee in the last week on drug testing conducted by the Central Intelligence Agency.

It should be made clear from the outset that in general, we are focusing on events that happened over 12 or as long as 25 years ago. It should be emphasized that the programs that are of greatest concern have stopped and that we are reviewing these past events in order to better understand what statutes and other guidelines might be necessary to prevent the recurrence of such abuses in the future. We also need to know and understand what is now being done by the CIA in the field of behavioral research to be certain that no current abuses are occurring.

I want to commend Admiral Turner for his full cooperation with this committee and with the Subcommittee on Health in recognizing that this issue needed our attention. The CIA has assisted our committees and staffs in their investigative efforts and in arriving at remedies which will serve the best interests of our country.

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The reappearance of reports of the abuses of the drug testing program and reports of other previously unknown drug programs and project- for behavioral control underline the necessity for effective oversight procedures loth in the executive branch and in the Congress. The Select Committee on hntelligence has been working very closely with President Carter. the Vice President. and Admiral Turner and his associates in developing basic concepts for statutory guidelines which will govern all activities of the intelligence agencies of the United States.

In fart. it is my expectation that the President will soon announce his decisions on how he has decided the intelligence agencies of the United State- shall he organized. Thi- committee will be working closely with the President and Admiral Turner in placing this new strueture under the law and to develop effective oversight procedures.

It i- clear that effective oversight require- that information must be full and fortheoming. Full and timely information is obviously necessary if the committee and the public is to be confident that any transgressions can be dealt with quickly and foreefully. uimsgncss ……11

One purpose of thi- hearing is to give the committee and the publie an understanding of what new informnation has been discovered that add- to the knowledge already available from previous Church and Kennedy inquiries, and to hear the reasons why these documents were no: available to the Church and Kennedy committees. It is also the purpose of this hearing to adhress the issues raised by any additional illegal or improper activities that have emerged from the files and to develop remedie- to prevent such improper activitics from occurring again. agan.

Finally, there is an obligation on the part of both this committee and the CIA to make every effort to hehp these indlividual- or institutions that may have been harmned by any of these improper or illegal activities. I an certain that Admiral Turner will work with this committee to see that this will be done. unnee mosee unanun

I would now like to weleonme the most distinguished Senator from Massachusett-. the chairman of the Health Subeommittee, Senator Kennedy. Kenneay.

Senator Kenseny. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman. We are delighted to join together in thi- very important area of publie inquiry and publie interest. qunry auna pumne mmueis

Some 2 years ago. the Senate Health Subeommittee heard chilling testimony abont the human exjerimnentation activities of the Central Intelligence Ageney. The Deputy Director of the CIA revealed that over 3o universities and institntions were involved in an "extensive testing and experimentation" progran which inehuded covert drug test- on unwitting citizens "at all sowcial level. high and low. native Americans and foreign." Several of these test- involed the admninistration of Lsh to "unwitting subjects in social situations. Uinuon 01 11

At least one death. that of Dr. Olsen. resulted from these activities. The Aceney itself acknowledged that these test- made little scientifie sense. The agents doing the monitoring were not qualified scientifie ohservers. The test subjects were seldom accezsible bevond the first hours of the test. In a mumber of instanees, the test subjeet became ill for hour- or days, and effective followup wa- imposible.

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Other experiments were equally offensive. For example, heroin addiets were enticed into participating in LSI experiments in order to get a reward-heroin.

Perhaps most disturbing of all was the fact that the extent of experimentation on human subjects was unknown. The records of all these activities were destroyed in Jamuary 1973, at the instruction of then CIA Direetor Richard Helms. In spite of persistent inquiries by both the Iealth Subwommittee and the Intelligence Committee. no additional records or information were fortheoming. And no one no single individual-could be found who remembered the details, not the Director of the CIA. who ordered the documents destroyed, not the official responsible for the program. nor any of his associates.

We believed that the record. incomplete as it was, was as complete as it wa- going to be. Thun one individual. through a Freedom of Information request, accomplished what two U.S. Senatecommittees could not. He spurred the ageney into finding additional records pertaining to the CIA's program of experimentation with human subjects. These new records were discovered by the ageney in March. Their existence was not made known to the Congress until July.

The records reveal a far more extensive series of experiments than had previously been thought. Eighty-six universities or institutions were involved. New instances of unethical behavior were revealed.

The intelligence community of this Nation, which requires a shroud of secreey in ordler to operate. has a very sacred trust from the American people, The CIA's program of human experimentation of the fifties and sixtie- violated that trust, It was violated again on the day the bulk of the ageney's records were destroved in 1973. It is violated each time a responsible official refuses to recollect the details of the program. The best safeguard against abuses in the future is a complete publie accounting of the abuses of the past.

I think this is illustrated. as Chairman Inoive pointed out. These are issues, are questions that happened in the fifties and sixties, and go back some 15, 20 years ago. but they are front page news today, as we see in the major newspapers and on the television and in the media of this country; and the reason they are. I think. is because it just continuously begins to trickle out, sort of, month after month. and the best way to put this period behind us, obviously. is to have the full information, and I think that is the desire of Admiral Turner and of the members of this committee.

The Central Intelligence Ageney drugged American citizens without their knowledge or consent. It used university facilities and personnel without their knowledge. It funded leading researchers, often without their kuowledge.

These institutes, these individuals. have a right to know who they are and how and when they were used. As of today, the Ageney itself refuses to declassify the names of those institutions and individuals. quite appropriately, I might say, with regard to the individuals under the Privacy Act. It seems to me to be a fundamental responsibility to notify those individuals or institutions, rather. I think many of them were canght up in an unwitting manner to do researeh for the Ageney. Many researehers. distingnished researehers. some of our most outstanding members of our scientifie community, involved in

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this network, now really do not kuow whether they were involved or not. and it seems to me that the whole health and climate in terms of our university and our scientifie and health facilities are entitled to that respomse. that response. A e to at tho very

So. I intend to do all I can to persnade the Ageney to, at the very least, officially inform those in-titutions and individuals involved. least, omciany mniorm umuzr m vealdIintroduced

Two years ago, when these abuses were first revealed. I introduced legislation, with Senator Sehweiker and Senator Javits, designed to minimize the potential for any similar ahmuses in the future. That legislation expanded the jurisliction of the National Commission on Human Subjeets of Biomedical and Behavioral Research to cover all federally funded research involving human subjects. The rescarch initially was just direeted toward HEW activities, but this legi-lation covered DOD as well as the CLA. covered DOD as weu as ue  1. maos-ab cenability

This Nation has a biomedical and behavioral research capability second to none. It has had for subjeets of HEW funded researeh for the past 3 years a system for the protection of human subjects of biomedical and behavioral rescarch second to none, and the Human Experimentation Commission ha- proven its vahe. Today hearings and the record already established underscore the need to expand its iurisdiction. jurisdietion. d the Somate

The CIA supported that legi-lation in 1975, and it passed the Senate unahimously last year. 1 believe it is needed in order to assure all our people that they will have the degree of protection in human experimentation that they deserve and have every right to expect. perimentaton ua uney ursere am m. … wo will proceed with

Senator IxotyE. Thank you very much. Now we will proceed with the hearing. Admiral Turner? re hearmngs. Aommnra mm :1 T follw]

[The prepared statement of Admiral Turner follows:]

P'REPARED STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL. STANSFIELD TURNER, DIRECTOR OF CENTBAL INTEL1IGENCE

Mr. Chairman: In my letter to you of July 15. 197τ. I reported our recent discovery of seven hoxes of documents related to Project MKULTRA. a closely held CIA projet condncted from 1953-194. As yon may recall. MKULTRA was an "umbrella project" under which certain sensitive subprojeets were funded. involving among other things research on drugs and hehavioral modification. During the Rockefeller Commission and Chureh Committee investigations in 1975. the eryptonym beeame publicly knowu when details of the drug-related death of Dr. Frank Obson were publicized. In 1953 1r. Olson. a civilian employee of the Army at Fort Detrick. leaped to his death from a hotel room window in New York City about a weeh after having unwittingly consumed Lsh administered to him as an experiment at a meeting of Lsh researchers called by (lA. bim as an experiment at a meenuz u ir involvement with behavioral

Most of what was known about the Ageney's involvement with behavioral drugs during the investigations in 19t5 was contained in a report on Projeet MKULTRA preparel by the Inspwctor General's office in 163. As a result of that report's recommendations. unwitting testing of drugs on U.s. citizens was sutsrquently discontinued. The MKIITRA-related rejort was made available to the Chnrch Committet investigators and to the staff of Senator Kennedy's Subcommittee on Health. Until the rerent discovery. it was lwlieved that all of the MKllTRA tiles dealing with behavioral modifcation had been destroyed in 1973 on the orders of the then retiring Chief of the Ofice of Techical Service. with the authorization of the then bel. as has ben previoushy reported. Almost all of the pwople who had had any comertion with the aspects of the projeet which interested Senate investigators in 1975 were no longer with the Ageney at that time. Thus, there was little detailed knowledge of the MKILTRA subprojects available to Cl during the Church Committee investigations. This lack of available details. woreover, was probably not wholly attributable to the

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destruction of MKULTRA files in 1973: the 1963 report on MKULTRA by the Iuspector General notes on page 14: "Present practice is to maintain no records of th plauning and approval of test prograius." of th plauning and approvai o ws pv mr staf had not yet had an

When I rejworted to you last on this matter. my staf had not yet had an opportunity to review the newly located material in depth. This has now been acconuplished. and I am in a position to give you a deseription of the contents of the recovered material. 1 believe you will be most interested in the following asuects of the recent discovery : ts of the recent discovery : h t was not nreviously found;

How the material was discovered and why it was not previously found; The nature of ths recenuy rocateu ma ethis rerntly located material:

How much new information there is in the material which may not have been prevjously known and reported to Senate investigators; and been prevjously known anu rejrtru of this find to be.

What we believe the most signnncan asj  . wue t most signiticant aspets of this tind to be.

To begin. as to how we diseovered these materials. The material had been sent to our Retired Records Center outsid. of Washington and was discovered there as a result of the exteusive search efforts of an enployee charged with responsibility for maintaining our holdings on behavioral drugs and for resjwonding to Fredonn of Information Act requests on this subject. During the Church Committee investigation in 1975, searches for MKI'ITRA-related material were made hy examining both the active and retired reords of all branches of ClA considered at all likely to have had association with MkUlTRA documents. The retired rerords of the Budget and Fiscal Section of the Branch respnsible for such work were not searched. however. This was berause financial papers associated with sensitive projects such as MKULTRA were normally maintained by the Branch itself under the project file, not by the Bndget and Fiscal Section. In the case at hand. however. the newly located material was sent to the Retired Records Center in 197o by the Budget and Fiscal Section as part of its own retired holdings. The reason for this departure fron hormal procedure is not known. As a result of it. however. the material escapd retrieval and destruction in p9ī3 by the then-retiring lirector of the Ofticr as well as discovery in 1975 by CIA officials responding to Senate investigators. by CIA oficials responding to Nenaue mvecuaa … ai. s hv leaving no stone unturned

The employer who located this material did so by leaving no stone unturned in his efforts to respond to FolA requests. Hb. reviewed all listings of material of this Branch stored at the Retired Records Ceuter. inchuding those of the Budget and Fiscal Setion and. thus. discovered the MKULTRA-related doennents which had beeu missed in the previous searches. In sum. the Ageney failed to nucover these particular documents in 1973 in the process of attempting to destroy them : it similarly failed to loate them iu 1975 in response to the Church Conmittee hearings. I am convinced that there was Bo attempt to conceal this material during the earlier searches. material during the earher serenes. d material. it is important to

Next. as to the nature of the recently located material. it is important to realize that the recovered folders are tinance folders. The bulk of the material in them consists of approvals for advanre of funds. vouehers, accountings. and the like-most of which are not very informatise as to the nature of the aetivities that were undertaken. Oecasional projeet proposals or memoranda commenting ou sone aspeet of a subprojeet are scattered throughout this material. In general. however. the recoverei material does not inchnde status rejorts or other documents relating tu ojerational considerations or progress in the various subprojects. though some elaboration of the activities contemplated does appear. The recovered documents fall roughly into three categories: recovered documents fall roughty muio tnree sas f which ampear to have

Firs. there are 149 MKtLTkA subprojerts. many of which appear to have some connertion with rescarch into behavioral moditicatiou. drug acquisition and testing or administering drugs surreptitiously. and testing or administering urugs surrepumu, WkI1 TRA navers. including

Second. there are two boxes of misellaneous MKILTRA papers. including andit relorts and tinancial statements fronn "eut-ont" (i.e.. intermediary) funding mechanisms used to conceal ClAs sponsorship of various research projects. projects. …in cortain intelligence

Finally. there are 33 additional subprojeets concerning certain intelligence activities previonsly funded under MKI'L.TRA which have nothiug to do either with behavioral modification, drugs. and toxins or with any other related matters. lated matters. ohproiects into

We have attempted to gronp the activities cuvered by the 149 subprojects into categories under deseriptive headings. In broad outline. at least. this presents the contents of these files. The activities are placed in the following 15 categories:

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1. Researrh into the effects of behavioral drugs and/or alcohol :

17 subprojects probably not involving human testing:

14 subnroiects definitely involving tests on human volunteers: 19 suuqnurs ucmmo m

19 subprojects probably including tests on human voluuteers. Whbile not known. some of these subprojects may have included tests on unwitting subjeets as well:

6 subprojeets involving tests on nuwitting subjects.

2. Researeh on hypnosis: S subprojert, including 2 involving bypnosis and drugs in combination.

3. Acouisition of chemicals or drugs: 7 subprojects.

4 Aspets of magicians art useful in eovert oerations: eg.. surreptitions delivery of drng-related materials: 4 suhprojects.

∴. Studies of human hehavior. sleep research. and behavioral changes during psychotherapy : 9 subprojects.

6. Library searches and attendanve at seminars and international conferences on behavioral modification: G subprojects.

7. Motivational studies. studies of defectors. assessment. and training techniques: 23 subprojeets.

8. Polygraph research : 3 subprojects. S. roiygrapn reseancn . o smepmoso

9. Funding mechanisms for MKI'lTRA external research activities: 3 subprojects sunpnu1s

10. Research on drugs. toxins. and biologicals in human tissue: provision of exotic pathogens and the capability to ineorporate them in effective delivery systems- 6 subprojeets.

1. Activities whose objectives camnot be determined from available documentation: 3 subprojects.

12 Subprujects involving funding support for unspecified activities connected with the Aruy's Special Operations Division at Ft. Detrick. Md. This activity is outline in Book 1of the Church Committee Report. pp. 3s3sa. (See Appendix A. pp. 6-69. Under CIA's Projeet MKNAOMI. the Army Assisted CIA in developing. testing. and maintaining biological agents and delivery systens for use against humans as well as against animals and crops. The objectives of these subprojects camnot lwe identified from the recovered material beyond the fact tha! the motey was to be uset where bormal fundiug channels would require more written or oral justitication than appeared desirable for security reasons or where operational cousiderations dictated short lead tinrs for purchases. About 811o was involeł during thseriod 13-1a:3 subprojets.

13. Single subproiets in such areas as effects of electroshock. harassment techniques for offensive use. analysis of extrasensory purception. gas propelled sprays and aerosols. and four subproject- involving erop and material sabotage.

14. One or two sabprojeetson each of the following:

"Blood Grouping" researeh. controlling the activity of animals, energy storage and transfer in organic systems: and

stimula- and response in biological systems.

15. Three subprojts cancelled before any work was done on then having to do with laburatory drug sereening. research on brain concussion. and research on biologically active materials tobe tested through the skin on human volunteers.

Now, as to how much new the recovered material adds to what has prevjousty bern rejorted to the Church Committee and to Senator Kennedy's Subcommittee on Heaith on these topies, the answer is additional detail. for the most part : e.g.. the names of previously unidentified researchers and institutions associated on either a witting or unwitting basis with MKULTRA activities. and the names of CIA officials who approved or mouitored the various subprojects. Some new substantive material is also present: eg. details concerning propuosals for exjerimentation and clinical testing associated with varions research projects. and R possibly improper contrilution by CIA to a private institution. However. the principal types of activities inchuded have. for the most part. either been outlined to some extent or generally deseribed in what was previously available to CIA in the way of documentation and was supudied by CIA to Senate investigators. For example : ror esamnp

Financial disbuursement records for the perioì 196o-1964 for T6 of the 149 numubered MKILTRA subprojeets had been recovered from the Office of Finance by CIA and were made available to the Church Commnittee investigators in August or September 1975. or sepuemotr to.

The 1963 Inspwector Goneral report on MKILTR.A made a sailable to both the Church Comnittee and Senator Kennedy's Subcommittee mentions electroshock

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and harassment substances (pp. 4. 16) : (overt testing on unwitting U.S. citizens (pp. 7. 10-12) : the search for new materials through arrangements with specialists in universities. pharmaceutical houses. hospitals. state and federal institutions. and private research organizations (pp. 7. 9) : and the fact that the Technical Service Division of CIA had initiated 14 subprojects related to the control of human behavior between 193-1963 (p. 21).

The relevant section of a 195 Inspector General report on the Technical Service Division was also made availahle to the (hurch Commmittee staff. That report discusses techniques for human assessment and unorthodox methods of communication(p. 20]): diserediting and disabling materials which can be covertly administered (pp 201-20): studie、 on magicians arts as applied to covert operations (p. 202t: specifie funding merhanisms for research jerformed outside of CIA (pp. 202-203. 205) ; research being done on "K" (knockout) material, alcohol tolerance. and hypnotism (p. 203) : research on Ls1) (p. 204) ; anti-personnel harassment and assassination delivery systens including aerosol generators and other spray devices (pp. 206-20s, : the role of Fort Detrick in support of CIA's Biological'Chemical Warfare capability (p. 2os, : and material sabotage research (p. 209). Much of this material is reflected in the Church Committee Report, Book 1. p. 3-422. (See Appendix A. Pp. (5-102).

The most significant new data discovered are. frst. the names of researchers and institutions who participated in the MKl'LTRA project and. secondly, a possilly improper contribution by ClA to a private iustitution. We are now in possession of the names of 185 non-government researchers and assistants who are identitied in the recovered material dealing with the 149 subprojects. The names of s0 institutions where work was done or with which these people were affiliated are also mentioned.

The institutions include 44 colleges or universities. 15 research foundations or chemical or pharmaceutical compmnies and the like. 12 hospitals or clinics (in addition to those associated with universities), and 3 penal institutions. While the identities of some of these people and institutions were known previously, the discovery of the new identities adds to our knowledge of MKULTRA.

The faets as they pertain to the possibly improper contribution are as follows: One project involves a contribution of 375,o0 to a building fund of a private medical institution. The fact that a contribution was made was previously known; indeed it was mentioned in a 1957 Iuspector General report on the Technical Service Division of (lA. pertinent portions of which had been re viewed by the Church Conmittee staff. The newly discovered material, bowever, makes it clear that this contribution was made through an intermediary, which made it appear to be a private donation. As a private donation, the contribution was then matched by federal funds. The institution was not made aware of the true source of the gift. This project was approved by the then DCI, and concurred in by (lA's top management at the time. including the then General Counsel who wrote an opinion supporting the legality of the contribution.

The recently discovered documents give a greater insight into the scope of the unwitting drug testing but contribute little more than that. We now have collaborating information that some of the unwitting drug testing was carried on in safehouses in San Francisco and New York City. and we have identified that three individuals were involved in this undertaking as opquosed to the previously rejorted one person. We also kuow now that some unwitting testing took place on criminal sexual psychopaths confined at a State hospital and that, additionally. research was done on a knock-out or "K" drug in parallel with research to develop pain killers for cancer patients. n: of the

These. then are the principal findings identified to date in our review of the recovered material. As noted earlier. we believe the detail on the identities of researchers and institutious involved in ClA's sponsorship of drngs and behavioral moditication is a new element and one which poses a considerable prohlem. Most of the people and institutions involved are not aware of Ageney spousorship. We should certainly assume that the researehers and institutions which cooperated with CIA on a witting basis acted in good faith and in the belief that ther were aiding their government iu a legitimate and proper purpose. I bwlieve we all have a moral obligation to these rescarchers and institutions to proteet them from any unjustified embarrassment or damage to their reputations which revelation of their identities might bring. In addition. I have a legal obligation uuder the Privaey Act not to publicly disclose the names of the individual researciers without their consent. This is especially true, of course, for

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those researchers and institutions which were unwitting participants in CIAsiousored activities.

Nevertheless. recognizing the right and the need of both the Senate Select Committer on Intelligence and the Senate Subommittee on Health to investigate the circumstances of these activities in whatever detail they consider necessary. I am providing your Committee with all of the names on a classified basis. 1 hog: that this will facilitate your investigation while protectiag the individuals and institutions involved. Let me emphasize that the MktLTRA events are 12 to 25 years in the past. I assure you theat the (IA is in no way engagel in either witting or unwitting testing of drugs today.

Finally. 1 am working closely with the Attorney General and with the Seere tary of Health. Education and Welfare on this matter. We are making available to the Attorney General whatever materials he may deem necessary to any investigation he may elect to undertake. We are working with hoth the Attorney General and the Serretary of Health. Education and Welfare to determine whether it is practicable from this nen evideuce to attempt to identify any of the pwrsons to whom drugs may have leen administered unwittingly No such names are psrt of these records. but we are workiug to determine if there are adequate ches to lead to their identification : and if so. how to go about fulfilling the Goverument's responsibilities in the matter.

TESTIMONY OF ADM. STANSFIELD TURNER. DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE. ACCOMPANIED BY FRANK LAUBINGER. OFFICE OF TECHNICAL SERVICES: AL BRODY. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL: ERNEST MAYERFIELD. OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL: AND GEORGE L. CARY, LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL

Admiral TurNER. Thank you. Mr. Chairman. I would like to begin by thanking you and Senator Kennedy for having a joint hearing this morning. I hope this will expedite and facilitate our getting all the information that both of your committee: need into the record quickly.

I would like also to thank you both for prefacing the remarks today by reminding us all that the events about which we are here to talk are 12- to 24-vears old. They in no way represent the current activities or policies of the Central Intellirence Ageney.

What we are here to do is to give you alt the information that we now have and which we did not previously have on a subjeet known as Project MKULTRA. a project which took place from 1953 to 1964. It was an umbrella projeet under which there were namerous subprojects for researeh, among other things, on drugs and behavioral modification. What the new material that we offer today is a supplement to the considerable material that was made available in 1975, during the Church commuittee hearings, and also to the Senate Subcommittee on Hcalth and Scientifie Research.

At that time, the CIA offered up all of the information and documents it believed it had available. The principal one available at that time that gave the greatest amount of information on this subject was a report of the CIA'- Inspeetor General written in 1963, and which led direetly to the termination of this activity in 1964. 13 years ago.

The information available in 1975 to the various investigating groups was indeed sparse. first because of the destruetion of material that took place in 1973, as detailed by Senator Kennedy a minute ago. with the coneurrence of the then Director of Central Intelligence and under the supervision of the Direetor of the Of … of Technical Services that supervised Projeet MKULTRA.

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The material in 1975 was also sparse because most of the CLA people who had been involved in 1953 to 1964 in this activity had retired from the Ageney. I would further add that I think the material was sparse in part because it was the practice at that time not to keep detailed records in this category.

For in-tance, the 1963 report of the Inspector General notes:

Present practice is to maintain no records of the plamning and approval of test programs.

In brief. there were few records to begin with and less after the destruction of 1973.

What I would like to do now, though, is to proceed and let you know what the new material adds to our knowledge of this topie, and I will start by deseribing how the material was discovered and why it was not previously discovered. The material in question. somne seven boxes, had been sent to our Retired Records Center outside of the Washington area. It was discovered there as the result of an extensive search by an employee charged with the responsibility foi maintaining our holdings on behavioral drugs and for responding to Freedom of Information Aet requests on this subject.

During the Church committee investigation of 1975, searches for MKULTRA-related material were made by examining both the active and the retired records of all of the branches of CIA considered likely to have had an association with MKULTRA documents. The retired records of the Budget and Fiscal Section of the branch that was responsible for such work were not searched. however. This was because the finaneial paper associated with sensitive projects such as MKULTRA were normally maintained by the branch itself under the projeet title. MKULTRA, not by the Budget and Fiscal Section under a special budget file.

In the case at hand. however. this newly located material had been sent to the Retired Records Center in 197o by the Budget and Fiscal Section of this branch as part of its own retired holdings. In short, what should have been filed by the braneh itself was filed by the Budget and Fiscal Section, and what should have been filed under the project title, MKI'LTRA. was filed under budget and fiseal matters. The reason for this departure from the normal procedure of that time is simply hot known, and as a result of it. however. the material escaped retrieval and destruction in 1973, as well as discovery in 1975.

The emplovee who located this material did so by leaving no stone unturned in his efforts to respond to a Freedom of Information Act reqnest, or several of them. in fact. He reviewed all of the listings of material of this branch. stored at the Retired Records Center. ineluding those of the Budget and Fiseal Section. and thus diseovered the MKULTRA-related documents, which had been missed in the previous searches.

In sum, the ageney failed to uncover these particular documents in 1973. in the process of attempting to destroy them. It similarly failed to loeate them in 1973, in response to the Church committee hearings. I an personally persuaded that there is no evidence of any attempt to conceal this material during the carlier searehes. Moreover, as we will disruss as we proceed. I do not believe the material itself is such that

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there would be a motive on the part of the CIA to withhold this, having disclosed what it did in 1975.

Next, let me move to the nature of this recently located material. It is important to remember what I have just noted. that these folders that were discovered are finance folders. The bulk of the material in them consists of approvals for the advance of funds. vouchers, and aecountings and such, most of which are not very informative as to the nature of the activities that they were supporting. Oecasional project proposals or memoranda comnienting on some aspect of a subproject are seattered throughont this material. In general. however. the recovered material does not inchude overall status reports or other doeuments relating to operational considerations, or to the progress on various subprojects. though some elaboration of the activities contemplated does appear from timne to time.

There are roughly three categories of projeets. First. there are 149 MKILTRA subprojects, many of which appear to have some conneetion with rescarch into behavioral modification. drug acquisition and testing, or administering drug- surreptitioushy. Second. there are two boxe of miscellaneous MKULTRA papers. including audit reports and financial statements from intermediary funding mechanisms used to conceal CIA sponsorship of various rescarch projects.

Finally, there are 33 additional subprojects concerning certain intelligenee activities previously funded under MKULTRA but which have nothing to do either with behavioral modifications, drugs and toxins, or any closely related matter.

We have attempied to group the activities covered by the 149 subprojects into categories under deseriptive headings. In broad outline. at least. this presents the contents of these files. The following 15 categories are the ones we have divided these into.

First, research into the effects of behavioral drugs and 'or alcohol. Within this. there are 17 projects probably not involving human testing. There are 14 subprojests definitely involving testing on human voluuteers. There are 19 subprojects probably ineluding tests on human vohnteers and 6 suhprojeets involving tests on unwitting human heings.

Second. there is researeh on hypnosis, eight subprojects, inchuding two involving hypnosis and drugs in conbination.

Third. there are seven projeet- on the acquisition of chemicals or drugs.

Fourth. four subproject- on the aspects of the magician's art. useful in covert operations. for instance, the surreptitious delivery of drugrelated materials.

Fifth, there are nine projects on studies of human behavior, sleep research, and behavioral change during psychotherapy.

Sixth. there are projeets on library searehes and attendants at seminars and international conferences on behavioral modifieations.

Seventh, there are 23 projcets on motivational studies, studies of defectors, asses-ments of behavior and training techniques.

Eighth. there are three subprojeets on polygraph research.

Ninth. there are three subproject- on funding mechanisms for MKULTRA'sexternal research activities.

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Tenth, there are six subprojects on research on drugs, toxins, and biologicals in human tissue. provision of exotic pathogens. and the capability to incorporate them in effective delivery systems. capabinty to mncorpura iinc whose nature

Eleventh. there are three subprojects on activities whose nature simply cannot be determined. simply cannot te aetermmmmvu. f...lin\~ sunnort for un-

Twelfth. there are subprojects involving funding support for unspecified activities conducted with the Army Special Operations Division at Fort Detrich, Md. This activity is outlined in Book I of the Church committee report. pages 388 to 389. (See Appendix A, pp. 68–69). 68–69). -iatod the CIA in

Under CIA's Project MKNAOMI. the Army assisted the CIA in developing. testing. and maintaining biological agents and delivery systenis for use against humans as well as against animals and crops. …iccts in such areas as the effects Thirteenth, there are single subprojecis in suen areas as ue of electroshock. harassment techniques for offensive use, analysis of extrasensory perception. gas propelled sprays and aerosols, and four subprojects involving crop and material sabotage. subprojects involving crop ana mas -thfolloring:blood

Fourteenth. one or two subprojects on each of the following: blood grouping research: controlling the activities of animals; energy storage and transfer in organic systems; and stimulus and response in biological systems. biological systems. lal bofom eny rork

Finally. 15th, there are three subprojects canceled before any work was done on them having to do with laboratory drug sereening, research on brain concussion. and research on biologically active materials. materlals. diard meterial adds

Now. let me address how much this newly discovered material adds to what has previously been reported to the Church committee and to Senator Kennedy's Subcommittee on Health. The answer is basically additional detail. The principal types of activities included in these documents have for the most part been outlined or to some extent generally described in what was previously available in the way of documentation and which was supplied by the CIA to the Senate investigators. Senate investigators. - fa-tho meriod of 1960

For example, financial dishursement records for the period of 1960 to 1964 for 76 of these 149 subprojects had been recovered by the Office of Finance at CIA and were made available to the Church committee investigators. For example, the 1963 Inspector General report onMKULTR.A made available to both the Church committee and the Subcommittee on Health mentions electroshock and harassment substances. covert testing on unwitting U.S. citizens, the search for new materials through arrangements with specialists in hospitals and universities, and the fact that the Technical Service Division of CIA had initiated 144 subprojects related to the control of human behavior. behavior. 1057 Insnector General

For instance also, the relevant section of a 1957 Inspector General report was also made available to the Church committee staff. and that report discusses the techniques for human assessment and unorthodox methods of comnmunication, discrediting and disabling materials which can be covertly administered, studies on magicians' arts as applied to covert operations. and other similar topies. as applied to covert operauons. amu von . b discovered are. first.

The most signifeant new data that has been discovered are, first, the names of researchers and institutions who participated in

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MKULTRA projerts. and second. a possibly improper contribution by the CIA to a private institution. We are now in the possession of the naoes of 1s: nongovermment rescarehers and assistants who are identified in the recovered material dealing with these 149 subprojerts.

There are also names of so institutions where work was done or with whieh theze people were afliliated. The institutions inchude 44 colleges or universities, 15 research foundation or chenúcal or pharmacentical companies or the like. 12 hospitals or clinics. in addition to those associated with the universities. and 3 penal institutions.

While the identities of sone of these people and institutions were known previonsly. the discovery of the new identities adds to our knowledge of MKULTRA.

The fact- a- they pertain to the possibly improper contribution are as follows. One project involves a contribution of S3t5,ooo to a building fund of a private medical institution. The faet that that contribaution was made was previonshy known. Indeed, it was mentioned in the 1957 report of the In-pector General on the Technical Service Division of CIA that supervised MKULTRA, and pertinent portions of this had been reviewedl by the Church committee staff.

The newly disrovered material. however, makes it clear that this contributioi was made through an intermediary, which made it appear to bw a private donation. A- a private donation, the contribtion wa- then matehed by Federal funds. The institution was not made aware of the true souree of the gift. This project was approved hu the then Director of Central Intelligenee and concurred in by CIA's top management ineluding the then General Counsel. who wrote an opinion supporting the legality of the contrihution.

The recently discovered documents also give greater insight into the scope of the unwitting nature of the drug testing. but contribute liutle more than that. We now do have corroborating information that some of the unwitting drng testing was earried out in what is known in the intelligence trade as safe honses in San Franciseo and in New York City. and we have identifed that three individuals were involved in this undertaking. whereas we previously reported there was only one person.

We also know now that some unwitting testing took place on criminal sexual psyehopaths confined at a State hospital. and that additionally research was done on a knockout or K drug in parallel with researrh to develop painkillers for cancer patients.

These, then. are the principal finding- identifedl to date in our review of thi- recovered material. As noted carlier, we believe the detail on the identities of researechers and institutions involved in CIA sponsorship of drug and behavioral modifieation research is a new element and one which poses a cousiderable problem. Most of the people and institutions involved were not aware of CIA sponsorship. We shonld certainly asume that the researehers and institutions which cooperated with ClA on a witting hasis acted in good faith and in the belef that they were aiding their Govermment in a legitimate and proper purpose.

I believe that we all have a moral olligation to these researchers and institutions to proteet them from any unjustifed embarrassment

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or damage to their reputations which revelation of their identities might bring. In addition. 1 have a legal obligation under the Privaey Act not to publicly disclose the nanes of the individual researchers withont their consent. wnunonnumenoonnm.

This is especially true, of course. for those researchers and institution- which were unwitting participants in ClA sponsored activities.

Nonetheless. Mr. Chairman. I certainly recognize the right and the need of both the Senate Select Comnmittee on Intelligence and the Senate Subcommittee on Health and Scientific Research to investigate the circumstances of these activities in whatever detail you consider necessary. I an providing your committee with all of the documentation, inchuding all of the names. on a classified basis. I hope that this will facilitate your investigation while still protecting the individuals and the institutions involed. annue msununo

Let me emphasize again that the MKILTRA events are 12 to 24 years in the past, and I assure you that (IA is in no way engaged in either witting or unwitting testing of drugs today. 2

Finally. I am working closcly with the Attorney General on this matter. We are making available to the Attorney General whatever materials he may deem necessary to any investigations that he may eleet to undertake. Beyond that. we are also working with the Attorney General to determine whether it is practicable from this new evidence to identify any of the persons to whom drugs may have been administered unwittingly. No such nanes are part of these records. We have not identified the individuals to whom drngs were administered, but we are trying now to determine if there are adequate clues to lead to their identification, andl if so how best to go about fulfilling the Govermment's responsibilities in this matter.

Mr. Chairman, as we procced with that process of attempting to identify the individuals and then determining what is our proper responsibility to them. I will keep both of these committees fully advized. I thank you. sir.

Senator Ixouyr. Thank you very much. Admiral Turner. Your spirit of cooperation is mneh appreciated. I would like to announce to the committee that in order to give every member an opportunity to participate in this hearing. that we would set a time limit of 10 minutes per Senator.

Admiral Turner. please give this committee the genesis of MKUL TRA. Who or what conmittee or commission or ageney was responsible for dreaming up this grandiose and sinister project, and why was it necessary? What is the rationale or justification for such a project and wa- the President of the United States aware of this?

Admiral Tursen. Mr. Chairman, I am going to ask Mr. Brody on my right. who is a long-time member of the CIA to address that in more detail. I believe everything that we know about the genesis was turned over to the Chureh committee and is contained in that material. Basically. it was a CIA-initiated project. It started out of a concern of our being taken advantage of by other powers who would use drugs against our personnel. and it was approved in the Ageney. I have asked the question vou just asked me, and have been assured that there is no evidence within the Ageney of any involvement at higher echelons. the White House. for instance, or specifie approval. That does not say there was not. but we have no such evidence.

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Mr. Brody, would you amplify on my comment- there, please?

Mr. Bropy. Mr. Chairman, 1 really have very little to add to that. To mny knowledge, there was no Presidential knowledge of this projeet at the time. lt was a ClA project, and as the admiral said, it was a projeet designed to attempt to counteraet what was then thought to be a serious threat by our enemies of using drugs against us. Most of what clse we know about it is in the Senate Church commmittee report. Senator Ixou rE. Were the authorized members of the Congress made aware of thús project through the budgetary process?

Mr. Bropy. We have no knowledge of that. sir.

Senator Ixouye. Are you suggesting that it was intentionally kept away from the Congress and the President of the Umited States?

Admiral Ti kNER. No, sir. We are only saving that we have no evidenee one way or the other as to whether the Congress was informed of this particular project. There are no records to indicate.

Senator IsouyE. Admiral Turner. are vou personally satisfied by actual investigation that this newly discovered information was not intentionally kept away from the Senate of the United States?

Admiral TurNer. I have no way to prove that. sir. That is my conviction from everything I have seen of it.

Senator Isot yE. Now. we have been advised that these documents were initially discovered in March of this year. and you were notified jn Juhy of this vear, or June of this vear, and the committee was notified in July. Can vou tell us why the Director of Central Intelligence wa- notified 3 months after its initial discovery. why the delay?

Admiral TurNEr. Yes, sir. All this started with several Freedom of Information Aet requests, and Mr. Laubinger on my left was the individual who took it upon himself to pursue these requests with great diligence, and got permission to go to the Retired Records Center, and then made the decision to look not only under what would be the expectedl subjeet files. but through every file with which the branch that conducted this type of activity had any conccivable connection.

Very late in March. he diseovered these seven boxes. He arranged to have them shipped from the Retired Records Center to Washington, to our headquarters. They arrived in early April. He advised his appropriate superiors. who asked him how long he thought it would take him to go through these and sereen them appropriately, clear them for Freedom of Information Aet release.

There are, we originally estimated, 5,ooo pages here. We now think that waz an underestimation, and it may be closer to ooo pages. He estimated it would take about 45 days or into the middle of May to do that. He was told to proceed. and as he did so there was nothing uncovered in the beginning of these 149 cases that appeared particularly startling or particularly additive to the knowledge that had alrealy been given to the Chureh committee. some details. but no major revelations.

Hle and his assoiates proceeded with deliberateness, but not a great sense of urgeney. There were other interfering activities that came and demanded his tine also. Hle was not able to put 100 percent of his time on it. and there did not appear to be cause for a great rush here. We were trving to be responsive to the Freedom of Information Aet request within the limits of our manpower and our priorities.

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In early June. however. he discovered two projects, the one related to K drng- and the one related to the funding at the institution, and realized immediately that he had substantial new information, and he immeliately reported this to his superiors.

Two actions were taken. One was to notify the lawyers of the principal Freedon of Information Aet requestor that we would have substantal new material and that it would be forthcoming as rapidly as possible, and the second was to start a memorandum up the chain that indicatedl his belief that we should notify the Senate Seleet Committee on lntelligence of this discovery because of the character at least of these two douments.

As that proceeded up from the 13th of June, at each echelon we had to go through the legal oflice, the legislative liaison ofice and at each ehelon about the same question was asked of him: Have you gone throngh all of this, so that when we notify the Senate Select Committee we do not notify half of the important relevations and not the other half? The last thing I want. Mr. Chairman. is in any way to be on any topie. give the appearance on any topie of being recalcitrant. reluetant, or having to have you drag things out of me, and my subordinates. mneh to my pleasure, had each asked, have you really gone through these ooo pages enough to know that we are not going to uncover a bonbshell down at the bottom?

By late June. about the 2th. this process reached my deputy. He notified me after his review of it on the Tth of July. which is the first I knew of it. 1 began reading into it. I asked the same probing question directly. 1 then notified my superiors, and on the 15th delivered to vou my letter letting you know that we had this. and we have been working, many people. many hours since then. to be sure that what we are telling vou today does include all the relevant material.

Senator IsoryE. I would like to commend Mr. Laubinger for his diligence and expertise. but was this diligence the result of the Freedon of hnformation Aet or could thi- diligence have been exercised during the Chureh hearings? Why was it not exereised?

Admiral Tursre. There is no question that theoretically this diligence coull have been exercised at any time. and it may well be that the Freedom of Information Aet has made us more aware of this. Wonld yon speak for yourself. pleaze.

Mr. LsuüixcEr. I really don't attribute it. Senator. to diligence so mnch as thoroughness. 1f you can imagine the pressures under an organization trying to respond. which I think the CIA did at the time of the Chureh committee hearing. the hallways of the floor I am on were full of boxes from our records center. Every box that anyone thought could possibly contain anything was called up for seareh. It was one of a frantic eflort to comply.

When the pre-sure of that situation cool- down, and you can start looking at thing- systematically. you are apt to find things that you woulin't under the heat of a crash progran, and that is what happened here.

Senator IsouYE. Thank vou very much. Senator Kennedy?

Senator KEN Npy. Admiral Turner. this is an enormously distress ing report that you give to the Anerican Congress and to the Ameriean people today. Granted, it happened many years ago, but what we are

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basically talking about is an activity which took place in the country that involved the perversion and the corruption of many of our outstanding rescarch centers in thi- country. with CIA funds. where some of our top researchers were unwittingly involved in research sponsored by the Ageney in which they had no knowledge of the backgrounnd or the support for.

Much of it was done with American citizens who were completely unknowing in terms of taking various drugs. and there are perhaps any nutaler of Americans who are walking around today on the east coast or west coast who were given drugs, with all the kinds of physical and psychological damage that can be caused. We have gone over that in very careful detail. and it is significant and severe indeed.

I do not know what coukd be done in a less democratie country that would be more alien to our own traditions than was really done in this narrow area, and as you give this report to the committee, I would like to get some sense of your own concern about this type of activity. and how you reaet, havinig assumned this important responsibility with the confidence of President Carter and the overwhelming support. obviously, of the, Congress. umnder this set of circumstances.

I did not get much of a feeling in reviewing your statement here this morning of the kind of abhorrence to this type of past activity which I think the American people would certainly deplore and which I believe that you do. but could yon conment upon that question, and also perhap- give us what ideas you have to insure that it cannot happen again?

Admiral TuRxER. Senator Kemnedy, it is totally abhorrent to me to think of using a human being as a guinea pig and in any way jeopardizing hi- life and his health. no matter how great the cause. I am not here to pass judgnnent on mny predecessors. but I can assure you that thi- is totally beyond the prale of my contemplation of activities that the CIA or any other of our intelligence agencies shonld undertake.

I an taking and have taken what 1 believe are adequate steps to insure that such things are mot continningtoday.

Senator KeN Nrpy, Could you tell us a hiutle bit about that?

Adniral TursEr. 1 have a-ked for a special report assuring me that there are no drug activities extant. that is. drug activities that involve experinentation. Ohviousky. we colleet intelligence about drugs and drug use in other countries. but there are no esperimentations being conducted hy the Central Intelligence Ageney, and 1 have had a special chieek made because of another ineident that wa- uueovered some years ago abont the unanthorized retention of somne toxie materials at the ClA. I have bad an actual inspeetion made of the storage places and the certification from the people in charge of thoze that there are no sueh chenuical biological niaterial- present in our keeping, and I have issued express orders that that shall not be the case.

Beyond that. I have to rely in large measure on my sense of command and direetion of the people and their knowledge of the attitude Ihave jnst exprezsedto you in thi- regard.

Senator KEN NEny. 1 think that is very commendahle.

Admiral TURNER. Thank you, sir.

Senator KEs xEby. I think it is important that the American people understand that.

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You know, mnch of the research which is our area of interest that was being done hy the Ageney and the whole involved sequence of activities done by the Ageney, I am convinced could have been done in a legitimate way through the research programs of the Nationa) Institutes of Mental Health, other sponsored activities. I mean, that is some cther question, but I think you went to an awful lot of trouble, where these things could have been.

Let me ask you specifically. on the followup of MKULTRA. are there now-1 think you have answered. but I want to get a complete answer about any experimentations that are being done on human beingz. whether it is drugs or behavioral alteration- or patterns or any support, either direetly or indireetly, being provided by the Ageney in terms of any esperimentation on human beings.

AdmiralTursEr. There is no experimentation with drug- on human beings, witting or nnwittng, being condueted in any way.

Senator KeNNEpY. All right. Or being supported indirectly? I mean, are voucontracted ont?

Admiral TurNER. Orbeing in any way supported.

Senator KeNNEpy. All right. How abont the mondrng experimentation our Committee has seen-peychosurgery, for example, or psychological research?

Admiral TurNer. We are continually involved in what we call asses-ment of behavior. For instance. we are trying to continually improve our polygraph procedures to. you know. assezs whether a person is lying or not. This does not involve any tampering with the individual body. This involves studying records of people's behavior under different cireunstances. and so on. but it is not an experimental thing. Have I deseribed that aceurately, Al?

Mr. Bropy. Yes.

Senator KeN Nepy. Well. it is limitedtothose areas?

Admiral TursEr. Yes: it does not involve attempting to modify behavior. It only involves studying behavior conditions. but not trying to aetively modify it. as was one of the objectives of MKULTRA.

Senator Kesnipy. Well, we are scarce on time. but I am interested in the other areas besides polygraph where you are doing it. Maybe you ean either respond now or submnit it for the record. if you would do that. Would you provide that for the record?

Admiral TURNER. Yes.

[The material on psychological assessments follows:]

Isychological assessments are prformed as a service to ofcers in the operations directorate who recruit and or handle agents. Except for people involved in training conrses. the snbjerts of the assessments are foreign nationals. The assessmnents are generally done to determine the most successful tactic to persuade the suhjeet to accept covert employment by the (IA. and to make an appraisal of his reliability and truthfulness.

A majority of the work is done by a staff of trained psychologists, some of whom are stationcd overseas. The assessuents they do may be either direet or indirect. birect assessments involve a prsonal interview of the subjeet by the psychologist. When possible the subjeet is asked to comnphete a formal "intelligenre test" which is actually a disgnised psychological test. Individuals being assessed are mot given drngs. nor are they subjeeted to physicał harassment or torture. When operating conditious are such that a face-to-face interview is not possibke. the psyehologist may do an ídirest assessment. using as source materials deseriptious of :he subject by others, interviews with people who know him, specimens of his writings. ete.

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The other psychological assessments involve handwriting analysis or graphological assessment. The worh is done by a pair of trained graphologists, assisted by a small mumber of measurenieut technicians. They generaily require at least a page of handwritten script by the sulject. Measurements are made of about 3o diflerent writing characteristies, and these are charted aud furnished to the graphologist for assessments.

The psychologists also give courses in psychological assessment to group of operations officers, to sharpen their own capabilities to size up people. As part of the tramming course, the iustructor does a psychological asstssment of each studeut. The students are witting participants, and results are discussed with them.

It is important to reiterate that psychological assessments are only a service to the operations otticers. In the mual analysis, it is the respousibility of the ojerations otficer to decide how a potential agent should b approached, or to make a judgement as to whether any agent is telling the truth.

Admiral TurNER. The kind of thing we are interested in is, what will motivate a man to become an agent of the U'nited States in a difficult situation. We have to be familiar with that kind of attitudinal response that we can expeet from people we approach to for one reason or another become our spies, but I will be happy to submit a very specific listing of these.

Senator KENNEnY. Would you do that for the committee?

In the followup, in the MKSEARCH, in the OFTEN, and the CHlICKWIT, could you give us also a report on those particular programs!

Admiral TuRNER. Yes, sir.

Senator KeNNEpy. Did they involve experimentation, human experimentation!

Admiral TuRNER. No, sir.

Senator KENNEpY. None of them?

Admiral TURNER. Let me say this, that CHICKWIT program is the code name for the (IA participation in what was basically a Department of Defense program. This program was summarized and reported to the Church committee, to the Congress, and I have since they have been rementioned in the press in the last 2 days here, I have not had time to go through and personally review them. I have ascertained that all of the files that we had and made available before are intact, and I have put a special order out that nobody will enter those files or in any way touch them without my permission at this point, but they are in the Retired Records Center outside of Washington, and they are available.

I am not prepared to give you full details on it. because I simply haven't read into that part of our history, but in addition I would sug gest when we want to get into that we should get the Department of Defense in with us. 111

Senator KesNepy. Well. you will supply that information to the Intelligence Committee, the relevant. I mean, the health aspects, obviously, and the research we are interested in?

Adhmiral TurNER. Yes, sir.

Senator Kensepy. Will you let us know. Admiral Turner?

Admiral TuRNER. I will be happy to.

[See p. 169 for the material referred to.] hoee p. me mn os

Senator KENxEpy. Thank you. I am running out of time. Do you support the extension of the protection of human subjeets legislation to inelude the CIA and the DOD? You commented fa orably on that

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before, and I an hopeful we can get that on the calendar early in September, and that is our strong interest.

Admiral TurNer. The CIA certainly has no objection to that proposed legislation, sir. It is not my role in the administration to be the supporter of it or the endorser of it.

Senator KeNNeny. As a personal matter. since you have reviewed these subjects. would you comment?I know it is maybe unusual, but you can understand what we are attempting to do.

Admiral TuRNeR. Yes. sir.

Senator KenNenr. From your own experience in the agency, you can understand the value of it.

Just finally, in your own testimony now with this additional information. it seems quite apparent to me that vou can reconstruct in very careful detail this whole project in ternis of the responsible CIA officials for the program. You have so indicated in your testimony. Now with the additional information, and the people, that have been revealed in the examination of the documents, it seems to be pretty clear that you can track that whole program in very careful detail. and I would hope. you know. that you would want to get to the bottom of it, as the Congress does as well. I will cone back to that in my next round. Thank you very much.

Senator INotrE. Senator Goldwater?

Senator GoldwAater. I have no questions.

Senator INourE. Senator Schweiker?

Senator SchwEikER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral Turner, I would like to go back to your testimony on page 12. where you discuss the contribution to the building fund of a private medical institution. You state. "Indeed, it was mentioned in a 1957 Inspector General report on the Technical Service Division of CIA. pertinent portions of whieh had been reviewed by the Church committee staff." I would like to have you consider this question very carefully. I served as a member of the original Church committee. My staffer did a lot of the work that you are referring to here. He made notes on the IG's report. My question to you is, are you saying that the section that specifically delineates an improper contribution was in fact given to the Church committee staff to see?

Admiral TuRNER. The answer to your question is "Yes." The information that a contribution had been made was made available, to the best of my knowledge.

Senator ScuweikER. Only certain sections of the report were made available. The report had to be reviewed out at Langley; it was not reviewed here, and copies were not given to us here. I just want you to carefully consider what you are saying. because the only record we have are the notes that the staff' took on anything that was of significance.

Admiral TurNer. My understanding was that Mr. Maxwell was shown the relevant portion of this report that disclosed that the contribution had been made.

Senator Scíweiker. To follow this up further, I'd like to say that I think there was a serious flaw in the way that the 1G report was handled and the Church committee was limited. I am not making any accusations, but because of limited access to the report, we have a situ-

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ation where it. is not even clear whether we actually saw that material or not, simply because we could not keep a copy of the report under the procedures we had to follow. We were limited by notetaking, and so it is rather ambiguous as to just what was seen and what was not seen. I certainly hope that the new Intelligence Committee will not be bound by procedures that so restrict its ability to exercise effective oversight. oversight. Admiral that we used

I have a second question. Does it concern you, Admiral, that we used a subterfuge which resulted in the use of Federal construc:ion grant funds to finance facilities for these sorts of experinents on our own people! Becanse as I understand what you are saying. while the CIA mayboe only put up ș375,ooo, this triggered a response on the part of the Federal Government to provide on a good faith basis matching hospital funds at the same level. We put up more than \$1 million of matching fundds, sone based on an allegedly private donation which was really CIA money. as realy (1A money. :41.+l.n+2

Isn't thiere somethinig basically wrong with that? Isn't there somethmg pasicany wroug

Admiral 'TursER. I certainly believe there is. As I stated, the General Counsel of the CIA at that time rendered a legal opinion that this was a legal undertaking, and again I an hesitant to go back and revisit the atuosphere. the laws. the attitudes at that time, so whether the counsel was on good legal ground or not, I ann not enough of a lawyer to be sure, but it certainly would occur to me if it happened today as a very quesuonamne a on.: today as a very questionable aetivity. …b worked on and

Senator Sciweiken. Well. I think those of us who worked on and anended the Hill-Burton Act and other hospital construction assistance laws over the years. would have a rather different opinion on the legal intent or object of Congress in passing laws to provide hospital construction project money. These funds weren't intended for this. ths. : …biakturnod

It reminds me a little bit of the shellfish toxin situation which turned up when I was on the Church committee. The Publie Health Service was used to produce a deadly poison with Publie Health money. Here we are using general hospital construetion money to carry on a series of drug experiments. drug expermnents. 1 :…1 hink ac-

Admiral TukxEn. Excuse me, sir. If I could just be. I think. aecurate. I don't think any of this 37ã000 or the matehing funds were used to conduct drug experiments. They were used to build the hospital. Now, the CIA then put more money into a foundation that was condueting rescarch on the CIA's behalf supposedly in that hospital, so the intent was certainly there, but the money was not used for experimentation. expernunentation. ra-briale and

Senator Scuweiker. Well, I understand it was used for bricks and mortar, but the bricks were used to build the facility where the experiments were carried on: were they not! ments were carrieu on, weie o, m ↓hov waro

Admiral TuRsEr. We do not have positive evidence that they were. It certainly would seem that that was the intent. but I do not want to draw inferences here: draw mterences nere: -… a mener for

Senator ScuwEakEr. Well, why else would they give this money for the building fund if the building was not used for a purpose that benefited the CIA program? benetitedt the ( 1A prograum: 111h、CTA

Adiuiral TuuNrk. 1 certainly draw the inference that the CIA expected to benfit from it, and some of the wording says the General

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Counsels opinion was that this was legal only if the CLA was going to derive adequate benefit from it. but, sir. there is no evidence of what benefit wa- derived. benefit was derived. …1mo uretty good benefits

Senator ScmwEnkEr. There must have been some pretty good benefits at stake. The Atomie Energy Commnission was to bear a share of the cost. and when they backed out for some reason or another, the CIA picked up part of their tab. So, at two different points there were indications that CIA decisionmakers thought there was great benefit to be derived from whatever happened within the brick and mortar walls of that facility. walls of that facihty. I am only taking the

Admiral TurNEk. You are absolutely right. I am only taking the position that I cannot substantiate that there was benefit derived. position that I cannot sunstanuane Jomts say that the CIA

Senator ScuwEnkEr. The agreement documents say that the CIA wonld have access to one-sixth of the space involved in the construetion of the wing. so how would you enter into an agreemnent that specifically says that you will have access to and use of one-sixth of the space and not perform something in that space! I cannot believe it was enp!y. ll but loth of us

Admiral Turxer. Sir, I am not disputing you at all, but both ot uare saying that the inference is that one-sixth of the space was dsed, that experimentation was done. and so on, but there is no factual evidence of what went on a- a result of that payment or what went on in that hospital. It i- just missing. It is not that it didn't happen.

Senator ScnwEkER. Admiral Turner. one other Senator ScHWEnk. Auma

Senator KENNEpy. Would the Senator yield on that point? Sentor RENMtPI."

Sena'or ScuweikEr. I understand that in the ageney's documents on the agreemnent it was explicitly stated that one-sixth of the facility would le designated for CIA use and made available for CIA research. Are you familiar-- searcn. Are you taummmna

Mr. Bropy. Senator. as I recall. you are right in that there is a mention of one-sixth, but any mention at all has todo with planning. There are no subsequent reports as to what happened after the construetion took place. tοk pace. Val. Tivee

Senator ScnwEikEr. Adniral Turner, I read in the New York Times that part of this series of MKULTRA experiments involved an arrangement with the Federal Bureau of Narcoties to test LSD surreptitiously on umwitting patrons in bars in New York and San Francisco. Somne of the subjeets became violently ill and were hospitalized. I wonder if you would just briefly deseribe what we were doing there and how it was carried ont? I assume it was through a safe house operation. I don't believe your statement went into much detail.

Admiral TursER. 1 did mention the safe house operation in my statement. sir. and that is how these were carried out. What we have learned from the new documentation is the location and the da'es at which the safe houses were run by the CLA and the identification of three individuals who were associated with running those safe houses. We know something abont the construetion work that was done in them because there were contraets for this. Beyond that. we are pretty much drawing inferences as to the thing that went on as to what you are saving here.

Senator ScuwenkEr. Well, the subjects were unwitting. You can infer that muuch. right?

Admiral TunNER. Right.

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Senator Scnwkikrr. If you happened to be at the wrong bar at the wrong place and time, you got it.

Mr. Bropr. Senator, that would be-contacts were made, as we understand it, in bars, et cetera, and then the people may have been invited to these safe houses. There really isn't any indication as to the fact that this took place in the bars.

Admiral Turyen. We are trying to be very precise with you, sir, and not draw an inference here. 'There are 6 cases of these 149 where we have enough evidence in this new documentation to substantiate that there was unwitting testing and some of that involves these safe houses. There are other cases where it is ambiguous as to whether the testing was witting or voluntary. There are others where it was clearly voluntary.

Senator Scnwenker. Of course, after a few drinks, it is questionable whether informed consent means anything to a person in a bar anyway.

Aduiral Tukser. Well, we don't have any indication that all these cases where it is ambiguous involved drinking of any kind. There are cases in penal institutions where it is not clear whether the prisoner was given a choice or not. I don't know that he wasn't given a choice. but I don't positively know that he was, and I classify that as an ambiguous incident.

Senator INoUYE. Your time is up, Senator.

Senator Huddleston?

Senator HupplEstoN. Thank you. Mr. Chairman.

Admiral Turner, you stated in your testimony that you are convinced there was no attempt to conceal this recently discovered documentation during the earlier searches. Did you question the individuals connected with the carlier search before you made that judgment?

Admiral Tursen. Yes: I haven't, I don't think, questioned everybody who looked in the files or is still on our payroll who looked in the files back in 1975, but Mr. Laubinger on my left is the best authority on this, and I have gone over it with him in some detail.

Senator Hippuleston. But you have inquired, you think. sufficiently to assure yourself that there was no intent on the part of any person to conceal these records from the previous committee?

Admiral TurNEr. I am persuaded of that both by my questioning of people and by the circumstances and the way in which these documents were filed. by the fact which I did not and should have mentioned in my testimony, that these were not the official files. The ones that we have received or retrieved were copies of fles that were working files that somebody had used, and therefore were slipped into a different location. and again I say to you. sir. I can't imagine their deliberately concealing these particular files and revealing the other thing that they did reveal in 1975. I don't see the motive for that, because these are not that damning compared with the overall material that was provided.

Senator Hupplestos. Is this the kind of operation that if it were continuing now or if there were anvthing similar to it. that you would feel compelled to report to the Seleet Committee on Intelligence?

Admiral Tursen. Yes, sir. You mean. if I discovered that something like this were going on without my knowledge? Yes. I would feel ahsohutely the reqmirement to

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Senator HupplestoN. But if it were going on with your knowledge, would you report it to the committee? I assume you would.

Admiral TuRNER. Yes. Well, it would not be going on with my knowledge, but theoretically the answer is yes, sir.

Senator Hrpplestos. Well, then, what suggestions would you have as we devise charters for the various intelligence agencies? What provision would you suggest to prohibit this kind of activity from taking place? Would you suggest that it ought to be specifically outlined in a statutory charter setting out the parameters of the permissible operation of the various agencies?

Admiral TtrNeR. I think that certainly is something we must consider as we look at the legislation for charters. I am not on the face of it opposed to it. I think we would have to look at the particular wording as we are going to have to deal with the whole charter issue as to exactly how precise you want to be in delineating restraints and curbs on the intelligence activities.

Senator Huppleston. In the case of sensitive type operations, which this ertainly was, which might be going on today. is the oversight activity of the agency more intensive now than it was at that time?

Admiral TurNEr. Much more so. I mean. I have briefed you, sir. and the committee on our sensitive operations. We have the Intelligence Oversight Board. We have a procedure in the National Security Council for approval of very sensitive operations. I think the amount of spotlight focused on these activities is many, manyfold what it was in these 12 to 24 years ago.

Senator HuppLestoN. How about the record keeping?

Admiral TurNER. Yes; I can't imagine anyone having the gall to think that he can just blithely destroy records today with all of the attention that has come to this, and certainly we are emphasizing that that is mot the case.

Senator Hubplestus. Admiral,. I was particularly interested in the activity that took place at the U.S. Public Health Service Hospital at Lexington. Ky., in which a Dr. Harris Isbell conducted experiments on people who were presumably patients there. There was a narcoties institution, I take it. and Dr. Isbell was, according to the New York Times story, carrving on a secret series of correspondence with an individual at the agency by the name of Ray. Have you identified who that person is?

Admiral Turyer. Sir, I find myself in a difficult position here at a public hearing to confirn or deny these names in view of my legal responsibilities under the Privacy Act not to disclose the names of individuals here.

Senator Hupplestos. I am just asking you if you have identified the person referred to in that article as Ray. I am not asking you who he was. I just want to know if you know who he is. "o,

Admiral TuRNER. No. I am sorry. was this W-r-a-y or R-a-y?

Senator HuppLestox. It is listed in the news article as R-a-y, in quotations. una

Admiral TurNER. No, sir, we have not identified him.

SenatorHuppLestoy. So you have no knowledge of whether or not he is still a member of vour staff or conneeted with the Ageney in any way. Have you attempted to identify him?

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[Pause.]

Admiral TurNer. Senator. we have a former employee whose first name is Ray who may have had some counection with fhese activities C w qon wnu uese acuviues.

Senator HuppLestos. You suspeet that but you have not verified that at this time, or at least you are not in a position to indicate that you have verified it?

Admiral TuRNER. That is correct.

Senator HUppLEstoN. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator INoUvE. Senator Wallop?

Senator WaLlor. Thank you. Mr. Chairman.

Admiral Turner. not all of the-and in no way trying to excuse you of the hideous nature of some of these projects, but not all of the projects under MKILTRA are of a sinister or even a moral nature. Is that a fair statement?

Admiral TURNER. That is correct.

Senator WaLlor. Looking down through some of these 17 projects not involving human testing, aspeets of the magician's art. it doesn't seem as though there is anything very sinister about that. Studies of human behavior and sleep research, library searches. Now. those things in their way are still of interest. are they not. to the process of intelligonce gathering?

Admiral TuRseR. Yes. sir. I have not tried to indicate that we either are not doing or would not do any of the things that were involved in MKULTRA. but when it comes to the witting or unwitting testing of people with drugs. that is certainly verboten, but there are other things.

Senator WuLlor. Even with volunteer patients? I mean. I am not trying to put you on the spot to say whether it is going on. but I mean. it is not an unconmon thing. is it, in the prisons of the United States for the Public Health Service to condnet various kinds of experiments with vaccines and. say. sunburn ereams? I know in Arizona they have done so.

Admiral Trnyen.My understanding is. lots of that is authorized. but I am not of the opinion that this is not the CIA's business. and that if we need some information in that category. I would prefer to go to the other appropriate anthorities of the Government and ask them to get it for us rather than to in any way

Senator WsLior, Well. you know, vou have library searches and attendants at the national seminars. This is why I wanted to ask vou if the bulk of these projects were in any way the kinds of things that the Ageney might not do now. A President would uot have been horrifnd by the list of the legitimate types of things. Isn't that probahly the case?

Admiral TrRNER. Yes, sir.

Senator Waulor. And if it did in faet apprar in the IG report. is there any reason to suppose that the President did not know of this projeet? Yon said there wa- no reason to suppose that he did. but let me reverse that. Is there any reason to suppose that they did not?

Admiral TURNER. No.

Senator Wsjor. Well. vou know. I just cannot imagine you or literally anybody undertaking projects of the magnitude of dollars here and just not knowing about it. not informing your superior that

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these were going on, especially when certain itemns of it appear in the Inspector General's report on budget matters. Inspector (eneral s report on puug a l …l it is that far back to

Admiral TurNeR. Well. I find it diflicult when it is that far back to hypothesize what the proeedures that the Direetor was using in terms of informing his superiors were. It is quite a different climate from today. and 1 think we do a lot more informing today than they did back then, but I find it very difficult to guess what the level of knowledge was. edge was. ccond-quess it. but

Senator WaLlor. I am really not asking you to second-guess it, but it just seems to me that, while the past is past, and thank goodness we are operating under different sets of circumnstances. I think it is naive for us to suppose that these things were conducted entirely without the knowledge of the Presidents of the United States during those times. It is just the kinds of research information that was being sought was vital to the United States. not the means. but the information that they were trving to find. were trying to nna. hi vitel? Did

Admiral TurNEr. I am sorry. Your question is, was this vital? Did we view it as vital? we view lt as vital! -1 lLa\~inninα wo that

Senator WaLior. Well. your implication at the beginning was that it was a respon-e to the kinds of behavior that were seen in Cardinal Mindszenty's trial and other things. I mean, somebody must have thought that this was an important defensive reaction, if nothing else. on the part of the United States. on the part ot the t mitcu cuars. -i I iust don't

Admiral TurNer. Yes, sir, I am sure they did, but again I just don't know how high that permeated the executive braneh. know now mign uat punmnrau« still important

Senator Walior. But the kinds of information are still important to you. I mean. I an not suggesting that anyone go back and do that kind of thing again, but lmn certain it would be of use to you to know whatwas going to happen to one of your agents assuming someone had put one of these things into his bloodstream, or tried to modify his behavior. memavior. con

Admiral TurNer. Absolutely, and you know, we would be very concerned if we thought there were things like truth serums or other things that our agents or others coull be subjected to by use or improper use of drugs hy other powers against our people or agents. pruper use on muge. but are

Senator Wallor. Are there? I don't ask you to name them, but are there such serums? unere sucn serums : L-ould bave to

Admiral TrrNer. I don't know of them if there are. I would have to answer that for the record, sir.

Senator Wallor. I would appreciate that.

[The material referred to follows:]

"TRUTH" DRUGS IN INTERROGATION

The search for effective aids to interrogation is probably as old as man's need to obtain information fron an uncoozerative source and as persistent as his impatience to shorteut any tortuous path. In the annals of police investigation. physical coercion has at times been substituted for painstaking and timeconsuming inquiry in the lulief that direet methods produce quick results. Sir James Stephens. writing in 1ss3. rationalizes a grishy example of "third degree" prae tices by the police of India : "It is far pleasanter to sit comfortably in the shade rubbing red pepper in a poor devils eyes than to go about in the sun hunting up evidence." evinence. sa- asciet.

More recently. police officials in some countries have turued to drugs for assistance in extracting confessions from accused persons. drugs which are esumed

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to rlay the individnals defouses to the point that he unknowingly reveals truths he has been trying to conceal. This investigative technine. however hmmanitarian as an alteruative to physical torture. still raises serious questions of individual rights and libertirs. In this country. where drugs have gained only marginal acceptance in policr work. their nse has provoked cries of "psychological third degree" and has precipitated medico-legal controversies that after a quarter of a century still oceasionally fare into the ojen.

The use of socalled "trnth" drugs in polire work is similar to the accepted psyehiatrie practiov of narco-analysis: the difference in the two procedures lies in their different objectives. The poliee investigator is concerned with empirical truth that may be used against the suspurt. and therefore almost solely with probatire truth: the usefulness of the suspwct's revelations deqends nltinately on their acceptance in evidence by a court of law. The psyehiatist. on the other hand. using the sane "truth" drugs in diagnosis and treatment of the mentaliy ill. is primarily concerned with pspchological truth or psychological reality rather than empirical fact. A patient's aberrations are reality for hin at the time they occur. and an accurate aerount of these fantasies and dehusions. rather than reliable recollection of past events. can be the key to recovery.

The notion of drugs capable of illuminating hidden recesses of the mind. helling to heal the mentally ill and preventing or reversing the miscarriage of justice. has provided an exceedingly duratde thene for the pres and propailar literature. While acknowledging that "truth serun" is a misuonmer twice over-the drugs are not sera and they do pot necessarily bring forth prohative truth-journalistic accouuts contimue to exploit the appual of the term. The formnla is to play up a few spectacnlar "truih" drug successess and to imply that the drugs are more maligned than need be and more widely emuloyed in criminal investigation than can officially be admitted.

Any technique that promises an increment of success in extracting information fron an unconliant source is ipso facto of interest in intelligeuce operations. If the ethical consideration- which in Western rountries inhibit the use of narcointerrogation in police work are felt also in intelligotuce, the Western services must at least bue prejared against its possible employment by the adversary. An understanding of "truth" drugs. their chararteristic actions, and their potentialities. jwsitive and negative. for eliciting useful informatiou is fundameutal to an adequate defense against them.

This discussion. meant to help toward sueh an understanding. draws primarily upon opuuly putlishedl materials. It has the limitatious of projecting fron criminal investigative practices and fron the permissive atmosphere of drug psychotherpy.

SUOPCLAMINE AS "TRUTR SERUM"

Early in this oentury physicians began to employ scomolamine. along with morphine and chloroforn. to induce a state of "twilight sleep" during childbirth. A constituent of heubane. scopwlamine was kuown to proluce sedation aud drowsiness. confusion and disorientation. incoordination, and amnesia for events experienced during intoxication. Yet physicians noted that women in twilight sleep answered questions acenrately and often volunteered exceedingly candid remarks.

In 1922 it occurred to Robert House, a Dallas. Texas obstetrician, that a similar technique might l employed in the interrogation of susjwcted crininals. and he arranged t interview under scopolamine two prisoners in the Dallas county jail whose guilt seemed clearly contirmed. U'nder the drug, both men denied the charges on which they were held: and both. ujon trial. were found not guilly. Enthusiastie at this snccess. House concluded that a patient under the inftuence of scop lamite "cannot create a lie . . . and there is no power to think or reason." [14] His exjperiment and this (onclusion attractel wide attention. and the idea of a "truth" drug was thus lamnched upon the pullie consciomusness.

The phrase "truth serum" is believed to have appeared first in a news report of House's expweriment in the Los Angols Record. sometime in 19zz. House resjsted the term for a while bant eventually came to employ it regularly himiself. He puhlished some eleven artieles on scojolamine in the years 1921-1ir9. with a noticeable inerease in polemical zeal as tine went on. What had begun as something of a scientife statement turned finally into a dedicated erusade by the "father of truth serun" on hehalf of his ofspring. wherein he was "grossly indulgent of its wayward lehavior and stublornly proud of its minor achievements."{11]

一

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Only a handful of cases in which scopolamine was used for police interrogation came to publie notice. though there is evidence suggesting that some police forces may have used it extensively. [2. 16] One police writer claims that the threat of scopolamine interrogation bas been effective iu extracting confessions from criminal suspects, whu are told ther will first be rendered unconscious by chloral hydrate placed covertly in their coffee or drinking water. [16] chtorat nyoraie paceu cosrru m soouvlenine was shortlr dis-

Because of a number of undesirable side effects, scojolamine was shortly disqualified as a "truth" drug. Among the most disabling of the side effects are hallucinations. disturbed perception. somnolence. and pbysiologicalphenomena such as headache. rapid heart. and blurred vision. which distract the subject from the central purjse of the interview. Furthermore, the physical action is long. far outlasting the psychological effects. Scopolamine continues. in some cases. to make anesthesia and surgery safer by drying the mouth and throat and reducing secretions that might obstruet the air passages. But the fantastically, almost painfully. dry "desert" monuth brought on by the drug is hardly conducive to free talking. even in a tractalle subject.

THE BARBITURATES

The frst suggestion that drugs might facilitate communication with emotionally disturbed patieut- came quite by accident in 1916. Arthur S. Iovenhart and his assiates at the University of Wisconsin, experimenting with respiratory stimulants. were surprised when. after an mnjection of sodiuni cyanide. a catatonie patient who had long heen mute and rigid suddenly relaxed. opened bis eyes, and even answered a few questions. By the early 193o's a number of psychiatrists were experimeuting with drugs as an adjunct to established nethods of therapy. eeililitr that drugs

At about this time police officials. still attracted by Ine possunuy tat urugs migh help in the interrogation of suspects and witnesses. turned tu a class of depressant drug、 known as the barbiturates. By 1935 Clarence W. Muehlberger. head of the Michigan Crine Detection Laboratory at East Lansing. was using barbiturates on reluctant suspects. though police work continued to be hampered by the couris' rejection of drug-induced confessions except in a few carefully circumserihed instances.

The barhiturates. first synthesized in 1903. are among the oldest of modern drugs and the most versatile of all depressants. In this half-century some 2.500 have been prepared. and about two dozen of these have won an important plare in medicine. An estimated three to four billion doses of barbiturates are preseribed by physicians in the Iuited States each year. and they have come to be known hy a variety of commercial names and colorful slang expressions: "goofbalis." Luminal. Nembutal. "red devils." "yellow jackets." "pink ladies." etc. Three of them which are nsed in nareoanalysis and have seen service as "truth" drugs are sodinm amçtal tamobarbitalt. pentothal sodium (thiopental), and to a lesser exient seconal tsecobarbital.

A、 one pharmacologist explains it. a subjeet coming under the infuence of a barbiturate injeeted intravenously goes through all the stages of progressive drunkentess. but the time scale is on the order of minutes instead of bours. Outwardly the sedation effect is dramatic, especially if the subject is a psychiatric patient in tension. His features lacken. his bwody relaxes. Some people are momentarily excited: a few lewme silly and giggly. This usually passes. and most suhjects fall asleep. emerging later in disorieuted semi-wakefulness.

The deseent into narcosis and beyond with progressively larger doses can be divided as follows:

1. Sedative stage.

II. Unconsciousuess. with exaggerated reflexes (hyperactive stage).

J1. I'nconsciousness. without refex even to painful stimuli.

IV. Death.

Whether all these stages can be distinguished in any given subject depends largely on the dose aud the rapidity with which the drug is induced. In anesthesia. stages I and Il may last only two or three seconds.

The frst or sedative stage can lw further divided:

Plane 1. No evident effert. or slight sedative effect.

Plane 2. Cloudiness. calmness. amnesia. (Upon recovery. the subject will not remember what hapwmed at this or "lower" planes or stages.)

Plane 3. Shurred speech. old thought patterns disrupted. inability to integrate or learn new patterns. Poor courdination. Subject lecomes unaware of paniful stimuli.

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Plane 3 is the psrchiatric "work" stage. It may last only a few minutes, but it can be extended by further slow injection of drug. The usual practice is to bring the subject quickly to Stage Il and to conduct the interview as he passes back into the sedative stage on tbe way to full consciousuess.

CLINICAL AND EXPERIMENTAL BTUDIES

The general abhorrence in Western countries for the use of chemical agents "to make people do things against their will" bas precluded serious systematic study (at least as published openly) of the potentialities of drugs for interrogatlon. Louis A. Gottscbalk. surveying their use in information-seeking inter. views.[13] cites 136 references: but only two touch upon the extraction of futelligeuce informatiun, and oue of these coucludes merely that Russian techniques in interrogation and indoctrination are derived fron age-oldpolice methiods and do not depend on the use of drugs. On the validity of confessions obtained with drugs, Gottschalk found only three published exjerimental studies that he deemed worth reporting.

One of these reported experiments by D. P. Morris in which intravenous sodium anytal was helpful in detecting malingerers.[12] The subjects. soldiers, were at first sullen. negativistie, and non-productive under amytal. hut as the interriew proceeded they revealed the fact of and causes for their malingering. U'sually the interviews turued up a neurotic or psychotic basis for the deception.

The other two confession studies, being more relevant to the highly specialized. untouched area of drugs in intelligence interrogation, deserve more detailed review.

Gerson and Victoroff{12] conducted amytal interviews with 1ī neuropsychiatric patients. soldiers who had charges against then. at Tilton General Hospital. Fort Dix. First they were interviewed without amytal hy a psychiatrist. who. neither iguoring nor stressing their situatiou as prisoners or suspects under serutiny, urged each of them to discuss his social and family background. bis army career. and his version of the charges pending against him.

The patieuts were told only a few mtnutes in advance that narcoanalysis would be perfurmed. The doctor was considerate. but positive and forthright. He indicated that thes had no choice but to submit to the procedure. Their attitudes varied from unguestioning compliance to doworight refusal.

Each patient was brought to complete narcosis and permitied to sleep. As he became semiconscious and could le stimulated to speak, he was held in this stage with additional amstal while the questioning proceeded. He was questioned frst about inuocuous matters fron his background that he had discussed before receiving the drug. Whenever possible. he was manipulated into bringing up himself the charges pending against hin before being questioned alunt them. If he did this in: a tou fully conscious state. it proved more effeetive to ask him to "talk about that later" and to interpose a topic that would diminish suspicion. delaying the interrogation on his eriminal activity until he was hack in the projer stage of narcosis.

The proxedure differed from therajeutic narcoanalysis in several ways: the setting. the type of patients. and the kind of "truth" sought. Also. the subjects were kept in twilight consciousness longer than usual. This state proved richest in yield of admissions prejudicial to the subject. In it his spwech was thick. mitmbling. and disconnected. but his discretion was markediy reduced. This valuable interrogation period. lasting only five to ten minutes at a time. could be reindueed by injecting more amytal and putting the patient back to sleep.

The interrogation technique varied from case to case acrording to background information about the patient. the serionsuess of the charges. the patient's attitude under narcosis and his rapiort with the dowetor. Sometimes it was useful to pretend. as the patient grew more fully conscions, that he had already confessed during the amnestie period of the interrogatjon, and to urge him. while bis memory and sense of self-protection were still limited. to continue to elaborate the details of what he had "already descrilwed." When it was obvions that a subjeet was withholding the truth. his denials were quickly passed over and ignored. and the key questions would he reworded in a new approach.

Several patients revealed fantasies, fears. and delusions approaching delirium. much of which could readily be distinguished from reality. Rut sometimes there was no way for the examinor to distinguish truth from fantasy exeept by refer. euce to other sources. One subjeet claimed to have a child that did not exist,

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anotber threatened to kill on sight a stepfather who had lwen dead a year, and yet another confessed to participating in a robbery when in fact he had only purchased gods fron the particijsants. Testimony concerning dates and specife plares was uutrustworthy and often contradictory because of the patient's loss of time-sense. Hlis veracity in citing names and events proved questionable. Because of his confusion about actual events and what he thought or feared had happeued. the patient at times managed to conval the truth unintentionally

As the subiect revived. he would becone awarr that he was being questioned about his secrets and. depending upon his personality, his fear of discovery, or the degrer of his disillusioument with the dotor. grow negativistic. hostile, or physically aggressive. Oecasionally patients had to bu forcibly restrained during this period to prevent injury to themselves or others as the doctor continued to interrugate. Some patieuts, moved by ferce aud diffuse anger. the assumption that the) had already been tricked into confessing. and a still limited sense of diseretion. detiantiy acknowledged their guilt and challeuged the observer to "do sonething about it." As the exeitement passed. some fell back on their original stories and others veritied the confessed material. During the follow-up interview nine of the 1T admitted the validity of their confessions; eight repudiated their confessions and reafirmed their earlier accounts.

With resptet to the reliability of the results of such interrogation, Gerson and Victoroff conclude that persistent. careful questioning can reduce ambiguities in drug interrogation, but cantot eliminate thea altogether.

At least one experiment has shown that suljerts are cajable of maintaining a lie while under the intuence of a harbiturate. Redlich and his associates at Yalel25] administered sodiunu anuytal to nine volunteers. students and professionals. who had previously. for purjoses of the exleriment. revealed shameful and guilt-producing episodes of their past and then invented false self-protective sturies to cover them. In nearhy every case the cover story retained some elements of the guilt inherent in the true story.

I'nder the influence of the drug. the subjects were crossexamined on their cover stories by a second investigator. The results, though not definitive. showed that normal individuals who had good defenses and no overt pathological traits could stick to their invented stories and refuse confession. Neurotic individuals with strong uncouscious self-punitive teudencies. on the other band. both confessed more easily and were inclined to substitute fantasy for the truth. confessing to offeuses never actually committed.

In recent years drug therapy has made some use of stimulants. most notably amphetamine (Benzedrine: and its relative methamphetamine (Methedrine). These drugs. used either alone or following intravenous barbiturates. produce an ontpouring of ideas. enotions. and memories which has been of help in diagnosing mentai disorders. The potential of stimulants in interrogation has received little attention. unless in unpublished work. In one study of their psychiatric use Brussel ct al. [7] maintain that methedrine gives the liar no time to think or to organize his deceptjons. Onee the drug takes hold. they say, an insurmonutable urge to pour out spech traps the malingerer. Gottschalk. on the other hand. says that this clain is extravagant. asserting without elaboration that the study lacked projer controls.f13{ It is evident that the combined use of barbiturates and stimulants. perhaps along with ataraxies (tranquilizers), should be further explored.

OBSERUATIONS FROM PRACTICE

J. M. MacDonald. who as a psychiatrist for the District Courts of Denver has had extensive experience with narcoanalysis. says that drug interrogation is of doubtful value in obtaining confessions to crimes. Criminal suspeets under the influence of barbiturates may delibwerately withhold information. persist in giving untruthful answers. or falsely confess to crimes they did not commit. The psychopathie personality. in particular. appears to resist successfully the infnenre of drugs.

MacDonald tells of a crininal psychopath who. having agreed to narco-interrogation. received 1.5 grams of sodium amytal over a period of five hours. This man feigned amnesia and gave a false arconnt of a murder. "He displayed little or no remorse as he (falsely) deseribed the crime. ineluding burial of the twdy. Indeed he was very self-possessed and he apqeared almost tu enjoy the examination. Fron time to time he wonld request that more amytal be injeeted."[21}

Maebonald concludes that a person w ho gives felse information prior to re-

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ceiving drugs is likely to give fals information also under narcosis, that the drugs are of lintle valur for reveajing doceptions. and thnt they are more efective in reheasing unconsciously repressed material than in evoking consciously suppress d information.

Another psychiatrist known for his worh with criminals. L. Z. Freedman. gave soíinnn amytal to men arused of varios civil and military antisocial acts. The subieets were mentally uustable. their conditious ranging fron character disorders to neuroses and psychoses. The drug intervicws proved psychiatrically beneticial to the patients. but Freedman fond that his view of objective reality was seldom improved by thcir revelatious. He was unable to say on the basis of the nareuinterrogation whether a given aet had or had not oeeurred. Like Mae-Itolatd. he found that psyehopathie individuals can deny to (he point of unconsciunstrss crimes that every objectiv… sign indicates they hase committed.[10]

F. G. Inbau. Irofessor of Law at Northwestern University. who has had considerabde experienet observing and participating in "truth" drug tests. claims tha: they are owcasionally effeetive on pwrsons who would have disckosed the truth auyway had they heeu projerly interrogated. bt that a pwerso determined to lie will usually bw able to continue the deception under drugs.

The two military psyrhiasrists who made the most estensive use of nareoanalysiz during 1he war years. Roy R. Grinker and John C. Spiegel. conchuded that in almost all cases thes could obtain from their paticuts essentially the same matorial and give thrn the same emotional release by theraly withont the use o1 drugs. provided they had sutirient tite

The essence of thes comments fronu professionals of long experience is that drug proside rapid aecess to information that is psychiatrically useful but of doubfful validity as ennirical truth. The saue psychological iformation and a less adulterated empirical truth can be obtained fron fully conscious subjeets through ton-drug prychotherans and skilfut poliee interrogation

APPLICATION TO CI INTERROATION

The ahuost total absenet of controlled exrimental studies of "truth" drugs and ih sj!ty and aneciotal nature of jsychiatrie and police evidenre require that extrapnlations to ittelligcuce ojurations te made with care. Still. enough is knowu alut th drugs action to suggest certain considerations affecting the pustilities fot thcir use in interrogations.

Jt shonlì lu char fronn th foregoing that at best a drug can only serve as an aid to an interrogator who has a sure understanding of the psychology and techniues of norunal interrogation. ln somne respeets, indeed. the demands on his skill will bu inereased by she bafing mixture of truth and fuutasy in drug-induced ontant. Aud the tendeey agaiust which he must guard in the interrogate to give the responses that srem to be wanted withont regard for facts will be heighteued by drügs: the literature ahuunds with warniugs that a suhjeet in nareosis is extremehy suggestibe.

It seens possible that this suggostibility and the lowered guard of the narcotic stale migh be pont to advantage in the case of a subjeet feigning ignorance of a langnage or some other skill that had lwome automatic with him. Láipton{20] fond sonluun amytal helufut in determining whether a foreign subjeet was merely pretending not to uderstand Euglish By extension. one can guess that a drugged interrogatee might hase ditficulty maintaining the pretense that he did not couprohond sh ition of a profesion be was trying to hide

There is the furiher problem of hostility in the interrogator's relationship to a resistance souree. The acrumnlated knowhrdege atoni "truth" drug reaction has co largely from patient-physician relatiouships of trust nnd confidene. The subiect in uareonanahysis is usually motivated a pritri to coperate with the psyehiatrist. either to obtain relief frum mental sufering or to contribte to a scientitic study. Even in jwlice work. where au atuospdhere of anxiety and threat may l dominans. a relationship of trust frequently asserts itself: the drug is aduinistere hs a mdical man bound bs a striet code of ethics: the suspect agreeing to mmdergo uarroauaysis in a desprate bidł for corroboration of his testimony trusts both drug and psychiatrist. however apprehensively : and finally. as Frertmah and Machronakd have indicated. the police psyehiatrist frequently deal with » "sick" eriminal. and sone order of patient-physician relatiouship necessarily evolves.

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Rarely has a drug interrugation involved "normal" individuals in a bostile or genuinely threatening milieu. It was fron a non-threatening experimental setting that Eric Lindemann could say that his "normal" subjects "reported a goneral stnse of euphoria. ease and confidence. and they exhibited a marked increase in talkativeness and conmunicability."[1s] Gerson and Victoroff list poor doctor-patient rapport as one factor interferiug with the completeness and authenticity of confessions by the Fort Dix soldiers. caught as they were in a command performance and told they had no choice but to submit to narcointerrogation. interrogation. Froll all indications, subject-interrogator rapport is usually crucial to obtain- -annort is usually crucial to obtaining the psychological release which may lead to unguarded disclosures. Role-playing on the part of the interrogator might be a possible solution to the problen of establishing rapport with a drugged subject. In therapy. the British narcoaualyst William Sargent recommends that the therapist deliberately distort the facts of the patient's life-experience to achieve heightened emotional response and abrraction.[27] In the drunken state of narcoanalysis patients are prone to accept the therapist's false constructions. There is reason to expect that a drugged subject would commnnicate freely with an interrogator playing the role of relative. colleague. physician. immediate supwrior. or any other person to whom his hackground indicated he would be responsive. background indicated he woutd pe response. amains one facet of drug action

Even when rapport is poor. however. ther. remains one facet of drug action eminently exploitable in interrogation-the fact that subjerts emerge fron narcosis feeling they have revealed a great deal. even when they have not. As Gerson and Victoroff demonstrated at Fort Dix. this psychological set provides a major opening for obtaining genuine confessions.

POSSIBLE VARIATIONS

In studies by Beecher and his associates.[3-6] one-third to one-half the individuals tested proved to be placelo reactors. suljects who respond with symptomuatic relief to the administration of any syringe. pill. or capsule, regardless of what it contains. Although no studies are known to have been made of the placebo phenomenon as applied to narco-interrogation. it seems reasonable that when a subject's sense of guilt interferes with productive interrogation. a placebo for pseudo-narcosis could have the effect of absolving him of the responsibility for his acts and thus clear the way for free communication. It is notable that placebos are most likely to te effective in situations of stress. The individuals most likely to react to placebos are the more anxious, more self-centered, more dependent on outside stimulation. those who express their needs more freely soxially. talkers who drain off anxiety by conversing with others. The nonreactors are those clinically more rigid and with better than average emotional control. No sex or I.Q. differeuces between reactors and non-reactors have been found. found. arngs with hvpnotic trance

Another possibility might be the combined use of drugs with hypnotic trance and post-hypuotic suggestion: hypuosis could presumatly prevent any recollection of the drug exprience. Whether a subjeet can be brought to trance against his will or unaware, however. is a matter of some disagreement. Orne, in a survey of the potential uses of hypuosis in interrogation.[23] asserts that it is doubtful. despite many apparent indications to the contrary. that trance can be induced in resistant subjects. It may bw possible. he adds, to hypuotize a subject unaware. but thi、 would require a positive relatiouship with the hypnotist not likely to bue found in the interroganon serng. hw. found in the interrogation setting. emnloved when only light

In medical hypnosis. pentothal sodium is sometimes employed when only light tranee has bwen induced and deeper narcosis is desired. This procedure is a possibility for interrogation. but if a satisfactory level of narcosis could be achieved through hypuotie trance there would appear to be no need for drugs.

DEFENSIVE MEASURES

There is no known way of building tolerance for a "truth" drug without creating a disabling addiction, or of arresting the action of a barbiturate once induced. The only full safeguard against nareo-interrogation is to prevent the administration of the drug. Short of this. the twst defense is to make use of the same knowledge that suggests drugs for offensive operations: if a subjeet knows that on energing from narcosis he will have an exaggerated notion of how mech be has revealed he can better resolve to deny he has said anything.

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The disadvantages and shortcomiugs of drugs in offensive operations become positive features of the defenst posture. A subject in narco-interrogation is intoxicated. wavering between deep sleep and seni-wakefulness. His speech is garbled and irrational. the amount of ontput drastically diminished. Drugs disrupt established thought patterns. including the will to resist. but they do so indiscriminately and thus also interfere with the patterns of substantive information the interrogator seeks. Even under the conditions most favorable for the interrogator, output will be contaminated by fantasy, distortion, and untrutb.

Possibly the most effective way to arm oneself against narco-interrogation would be to undergo a "dry ruu." A trial drug interrogation with output taped for playback would familiarize an individual with his own reactions to "truth" drugs. and this familiarity wonld help to reduce the effects of harassment by the interrogator before and after the drug has been administered. From the viewpoint of the intelligene service. the trial expsure of a particnlar operative to drugs might provide a rough benchmark for assessing the kind and amount of information he would divulge in nareosis.

There may be conrern over the pwossibility of drng addiction intentionally or accidentally induceì by an adversary service. Most drugs will cause addiction with prolouged use. and the barhiturates are no exception. In recent studies at the U.s. Public Hoalth Service Rospital for addicts in Lexington. Ky., subjects received hrge doses of bariitura:. over a period of months. Uon removal of the drug. they experiemred arute withadrawal symptoms and behaved in every respct like chronie alcoholies.

Becausr their action is extremely short. however. and because there is little likelihod that they would be administerel regularly over a prolonged period. barhiturate "truth" drugs present slight risk of operational addiction. If the adversary servicr were intent on ereating addietion in order to exploit withdrawal. it wonld have other. more rapid means of producing states as unpleasant as withdrawal symptons

The hallucinatory snd psychotomimetic drugs such as mescaline. marihuana. Lsh 5. and mirrotine are sometimes mistakenly associated with narcoanalytic interrogation. These drugs distort the perceptiont aud interpretation of the sensory inpun to the central nervons system and afeet vision. auditiou. smell. the sensation of the size of buly parts and their position in space. ete. Mescaline and Lslt-25 have len used 1o create experimental "psychotic states." and in a minor way as aids in psychotherapy.

Since infornation obtaied fromn a prson in a psychotie drug state would be uurealistic. bizarre, aud extremely difficult to assess. the self-administration of Lsht-25, which is effective in ninute dosages, might in spwcial circumstances offer an operative temporary protection against iuterrogation. Conceivably. on the other hand. an adversary service could use such drugs to proínce anxiety or terror in nedically uusopdisticated subjects uuale to distinguish drug-induced psychosis from artual insanity. An enlighteted operative could not be thus frighteued. however. kuowing that the effeet of these ballucinogenic agents is transient in normal indivíduals.

Most broadly. there is evidence that drugs have least effect on well-adjusted individuals with got defenses and god enotional control. and that anyone who can withstand the stress of conpwtent interrogation in the waking state can do so in nareosis. The essential resourses for resistanee thus apiear to lie within the individual.

CONULUSIONS

The salient points that emerge fron this discussion are the following. No such magic brew as the pqmlar notion of truth serum exists. The barbiturates. by disrupting defensive patterus, may sometitues be helpful in interrogation, but even under the best conditions they will elicit an ontput contaminated hy deception. fantasy. garbleł sprh. ete. A major vuherability they produce in the subjeet is a tendeney to believe he has revealed more than he has. lt is possible. however. for both nortuat individuals aud psychogaths to resist drug interrogation: it seems likely that any indisiduat who can withstand ordinary intensive interrogation can hold oní in narcosis. The best aid to a defense agaiust narco-interrogation is foreknowledge of the process and its limitations. There is an acute nerd for coutrolled exserinental studies of drug reaction. not onky to depressants but also to stinulants and to comnbiuations of depressants, stimulants. and ataraxies.

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REFERENCES

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Admiral Turner. I appreciate that these tawdry activities were taking place long before your watch, and I think you have correctly labeled them as abhorrent, but not only were they abhorrent, it seems to me they were rather bungled. amateurish experinents that don't seem to have been handled in a very seientifie way, at least from the scanty evidence we have.

It seems to me that there were the minimum of reports and the Ageney didn't have the ability to call it quits. It went on for sone 12 years, as you mentioned. What I would like to get to is, are you convineed now in yon Ageney that those scientifie experiments. legitimate ones that you were conducting with polygraph and so forth, were being condueted in a scientifie manner and that you are handling it in a correet mamner to get the best information that you are seeking in the end?

Admiral Turser. Yes, I am, and I also have a sense of confidence that we are limiting ourselves to the areas where we need to be involved as opposed to areas where we can rely on others.

Senator CnaFer. I am convinced of that from your report. I just do hope that you have people who are trained in not only handling this type of experiment, but in preparing the proper reports and drawing the proper data from the reports. You are convineed that you have this type of people?

Admiral TuRNER. Yes, sir.

Senator Cuarer. The second point I am interested in was the final lines in your testimony here. which I believe are very important, and that is that the Agency is doing all it can in cooperation with other branches of the Governiment to go about tracking down the identity of those who were in sone way adversely affected. and see what can be done to fulfill the government's responsibilities in that respect. I might add that I comunend you in that, and I hope you will pursue it vigorously.

A hospital in my State was involved in these proceedings, and it is unclear exactly what did take place. so I have both a parochial interest in this and a national interest as well, and 1 do hope you will press on with it. It involves not only you, I apprciate, but also HEW and perhaps the Attorney General.

Admiral TuRNER. Thank you, sir. We will

Senator CnareE. Thank you. Thank you. Mr. Chairman.

Senator Isouyr. Thank you very much.

Admiral Turner. MKULTRA subproject 3 was a project involving the surreptitious adminisuration of Lsh on unwiuting persons, was it not?

Admiral TuRNER. Yes, sir.

Senator Ixorye. In February 1934, and this was in the very early stages of MkULTRA, the Director of Central htelligence wrote to the teehnical services staff officials criticizing their judgment because they had participated in an experiment involving the administration of lsh on an unwitting basi- to Dr. Frank Olson, who later committed snicide. Now. the individuaks criticized were the same individuals who were pesponsible for this subproject 3. involving exaethy the same praetices, Even though these individuals were clearly aware of the dangers of smrreptitious administration and had been eriticized by the Director

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of Central Intelligence, subproject 3 was not terminated immediately after Dr. Olson's death.

In faet. according to documents. it continned for a number of years. Can you provide this committee with any explanation of how such testing could have continued under these circumstances?

Admiral TurNER. No. sir. I really can't.

Senator IxotyE. Are the individuals in the technical services who carried on subproject 3 still on the (lA payroll?

Admiral TuRNER. I am sorry. Are you asking. are they today?

Senator INouYE. Yes.

Admiral TuRNER. No, sir.

Senator Isouye. What would you do if you criticized officials of the technical services staff and they continued to carry on experimentation for a mumber of years?

Admiral TurNeR. I would do two things, sir. One is. I would be sure at the beginning that 1 was explicit enough that they knew that I didn't want that to be continnedl anywhere else. and two. if 1 found it being continued. I would roll sonme heads.

Senator Ixorye. Could you provide this committee with information as to whether the individuals involved had their heads rolled?

Admiral TurseR. I don't believe there is any evidence they did, but I will double check that.

[See p. 170 for material referred to.]

Senator IxotyE. As you know. Senator Huddleston and his subcommittee are deeply involved in the drafting of charters and guidelines for the intelligence community. We will be meeting with the President tomorrow. Our concern is. I think, a basie one. (Can anything like this occur again?

Admiral TurNeR. I think it would be very, very unlikely, first, because we are all mueh more conscious of these issues than we were back in the fifties. second. lecause we have such thorough oversight procedures. I cannot imagine that this kind of activity could take place today without some member of the CIA itself bypassing me, if I were authorizing this, and writing to the lntelligenee Oversight Board, and blowing the whistle on this kind of aetivity.

I am also doing my very best, sir. to encourage an openness with myself and a free communication in the Agency. so that I am the one who finds these things if they should happen. The fact is that we must keep you and your committee and now the new committee in the House informned of our sensitive activities. 1 think all of these add up to a degree of serutiny such that this kind of extensive and fagrant activity coukl not happen today without it coming to the attention of the proper authorities to stop it.

Senator INouYE. A sad aspect of the MKULTRA project was that it naturally involved the people who unwittingly or wittingly got involved in experinentation. I would appreciate it if you would report back to this committee in 3 months on what the Ageney has done to notify these individuals and these institutions, and furthermore, to notify us as to what step- have been taken to identify victims, and if identified. what you have done to assist them, monetarily or otherwise.

Admiral TrrsER. All right, sir. 1 will be happy to.

Senator GoipwaTEr. Will the Senator yield!

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Senator INouYE. Yes. sir.

Senator GolpwatEr. I wonder if he could inchude in that report for our information only a complete listing of the individhuals and the experinnents done on then, and whetherthey were witting or unwitting. volunteer or nonvolunteer, and what has been the result in each case. I think that would be interesting.

Admiral TurNEr. Fine. Yes, sir.

Senator INorYE. Senator Kennedy?

Seuator KeNNEpy. Thank you. lt is your intention to notify the individuals who have been the subjects of the research, is that right.

Admiral Turner? Do you intend to notify those individuals?

Admiral TuRNER. Yes.

Senator KesNeby. If you can identify them. you intend to notify them?

Admiral TURNER. Yes.

Senator KenNepy. And yon intend to notify the universities or research centers as well!

Admuiral TrrNEn. Senator. I ann torn on that. I understand your opening statement. I put myself in the position of the president of one of those universities, let's say. If he were witting-if his university had been witting of this activity with us. he has access to all that information today. If he were not witting. I wonder if the process of informing hin might put his institution's reputation in more jeopardy than letting them go on the way they are today. not knowing. I really don't know the equities here.

Senator Kesxépy. Well. the problem is, all you have to do is pick up the newspapers and you see these universities mentioned. In many instances. I think you are putting the mniversity people at an extraordinary disadvantage. where there is a complete change of administration, and they mnay for one reason or another not have information that they are umnder suspicion. There is innuendo: there is rumor. I cannot help but lelieve that it will just get smeared all over the newspapers in spite of all the security steps that have been taken.

Ît seems to me that those universities should be entitled to that information, so that the ones with other adhuinistrations can adapt procedures to protecet those universities. The importance of preserving the indejendence of our rescarch areas and the communities seems to me to be a very fundamental kind of question about the protection of the integrity of our universities and our research centers.

Admiral TursEr. You are saving that you feel that if we identify them privately to themselves, we can beneft them in an adequate way to cover the risk that this will lead to a more publie diselosure? There are lots of the so who have not been identified publiely at this point.

Senator KEs NEpy. I think the universities themselves should be notifed. I think then the universities can take whatever steps in terms of their setting up the procedures to proteet their own kinds of integrity in teruns of the future. I would certainly hope that they would feel that they could make a publie comment or a publie statement on it. I think it is of general publie interest. particularly for the people that are involved in those universities, to have some kind of awareness of whether they were used or were not used and how they were used.

I think they are entitled to it, and quite frankly. if there is a publie official or an oflicial of the university that you notify and he wants

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for his own particular reasons not to have it publie, I don't see why those in a lesser echelon or lower echelon who have been effectively used by it should not have the information as well. Dy 1 snou no nave u 14hon

So. I would hope that you would notify the universities and then also indicate to the public. I can't conceive that this information will not be put out in the newspapers. and it puts the university people at an extraordinary disadvantage, and of course some of it is wrong, which is the fact of the matter, and I think some university official saying, well, it isn't so, is a lot different than if they know it is confirmed or it is not confimed in terms of the Ageney itself. 1 think that there is a responsibility there. unere is a respomnemonn, are savino

Admiral TurNEr. 1 have great sympathy with what you are saying. I have already notified one institutioni because the involvement was so extensive that I thought they really needed to protect themselves, and I am most anxious to do this in whatever way will help all of the people who were perhaps unwitting participants in this, and the difficulty I will have is. I can't quite do. I think, what you suggested, in that I may not be able to tell an institution of the extent and nature of its participation. uts parucipauon. of vour in-

Senator KeNNEpr. Well. you can tell them to the best of your information. and it seens to me that just because the university or an individual is going to be embarrassed is not a reason for classifying the information. So, I would hope-I mean, I obviously speak as an individual Senator, but 1 feel that that is an ineredible disservice to the innocent individuals and. I think. a disservice to the integrity of the universities unless they are notified. to be able to develop procedures you are developing with regards to your own institution and we are trving to in teris of the Congress. Certainly the universities are entitled to the same. e entted to ue sauné.

Admiral Turser. Yes. Not all of these, of course, were unwitting.

Senator KEN NEpY. That's right. Senator RENNLDY. LHat DEm.

Admiral TurNER. Many of then were witting, and therefore they can take all those precautionary steps on their own, but I am perfectly open to doing this. I am only interested in doing it in a way that when identifying a university it will not lead to the publie disclosure of the individuals, whom I an not allowed to disclose, and so on.

Senator KENNEpy. That could be done. it seems to me. Senator RENNEpY. AanSOn

Admiral Turser. So. we will see if we can devise a way of notifving these institutions on a private basis so that they can then make their own decision whether their equitie- are best served by their announeing it publiely or their attempting to maintain it- ing it punnieiy or uen anemm ask vou

Senätor Kis NEpy. Or you. I wonder. What if they were to ask you to announce or indicate? to announce or macae : -11-n ithot T

Admiral TurNER. My personal conscience. sir, at this time. is that I wonld be doing a disserve to these universities if 1 notifed the publie. iversity ofcials

Senator KessEny. Would yon meet with some umversity omeiais and ask what their views are or whether they feel that the preservation of the integrity of the universities would be better served or not? I think that would be useful to find out from small, large, private, and publie universities' oflicials how they view the integrity pubne universuues omcians m… . masidents

Admiral TuRNER. Fine. I will phone several university presidents today who are my friends and who are not invobved in this, and ask them what they think the equities would be.

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Senator KeNNepy. All right. Yon let us know. too.

Admiral Trryer. But I am not sure that I see that there is any great ha m fit in my notifying the publie as opposed to the university notifying then. Let him have his choice whether he wantseach institution wantstohave it nade public.

Senator KENNEny. Yes. The faet would remain that the institution's credibility would be better served if the institution's president were to deny it and the university indcated that it did not participate in that program than if the university were to deny it and the Ageney says nothing. It seems to me that that would be the strongest. and the only way that that is going to be credible. l would vahe it if you would get some inpt from universities as to what they believe is the fairest way in terms of the preservation of the integrity of the universities.

Let me. if 1 could. ask on the question of the uzes of these safe honses. az I understand from information that was provided to us in the course of our last committee. the testing of various drugs on individuals happened at all social levels. high and low. it happened on native Americans and also on foreign nationals. That is what I understand was the nature of the projeet itself.

Now. I an just wondering whether those tests were conducted at the two locations on the east coast and the west coast which were known as safe houses. To your knowledge. is that correet?

Admiral TURNER. Ye-.

Senator KesNeby. In terms of the research in this particular progran. it did not go beyond the safe houses loeated on the east coast and the west eoast?I believe I am correct on that.

Ahmiral TurNir. 'That type of unwitting testing of sort of randomly selected indivihnal. yes.

Senator Kes NEpy. It was just located in those two places?

Admiral TursER. To the best of our knowledge. there were only two locations.

Senator KeNsEby. Well. how do we interpret randomly seleeted? Admiral TrrsEr. Well, as opposed to prisoners in a prison who were somehow seleeted.

Senator KENNeny. All right. Do you know from this information how many people were reeruited during this period?

Admiral' Trêste. No idea.

Senatou KrNsuny. Do vou know approximately?

Admniral Turxer. I asked that question the other day, and we just don't have-apparently we are very-well, cither there were no records kept of the actual numbers and types of pople tested or they were destroved.

Senator INouYr. Senator Schweiker.

Senator ScuwenkEn. Thank yon. Mr. Chairman.

Admiral Turner. I would like to come back to the experiments which may have been condueted at the hospital research facilities which the CIA hehped to finanee. It wasn't clear to me from your previous answers what kind of work was done there. I gather yon are unclear on that. too. frot your remarks, yet 1 fiud in the CIA doeumentatior which yon have supplied us, a list describing some of the advantages the Ageney hoped to gain. It say»:

(a) One sixth of the total space in the new hospital wing will le available to the Chemical Division of Tss • • • : (b) Ageney squnsorship of sensitive research

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projects will be completely deniahle: (c) Full professional cover will be provided for up to three biothemical ruployees of the Chemical Division : (d) Human patients and volunteers for experimental us will le available under controlled clinical conditions with the full sujervision of

and there is a blank, something has been deleted.

It seems pretty clear to me what they intended to do in that particular wing. Doesn't it to you? Why would you go to such elaborate preparations, to buy part of the wing, bring three of your own personnel there. give them a cover. and give them access to patients? Why would you go to such trouble and expense to arrange all that, if you weren't plamning to experiment on people in the hospital?

Admiral TuRNEr. 1 agree with you 1o0 percent. sir. Those were clearly the intentions. I have no evidence that it was carried out in that way. I ann not trying to be defensive. Senator. I am only trying to be absolutely precise here.

Senator SciwElker. Well, then, as to the nature of what was done there, the last paragraph on the same page of the document says, "The facilities of the hospital and the ability to conduct controlled experimentations under safe clinical conditions using materials with which any agency comnection must be completely deniable will aug ment and complement other programs recently taken over by TSS. such as." and then there's another deletion.

Now. the words following "such as" have been deleted. That is still classified. or at least it was removed when this document was sanitized and releazed. It seens to be that whatever was deleted right there would give you a pretty good chue as to what they were doing, since it says that the activities wonld "augment and complement other programs undertaken by TSS. So. I have trouble understanding why yon don't know what was contemplated. Just the faet that similar programs are referred to in the document. though what they are is still deleted. should enable you to check it out.

You could look at what went on in the similar programs mentioned following the "such as" in the classitied version of this document.

Admiral TuksEk, Senator. I have not said that we don't know what was contemplated being done there. We do not know what was done there.

Senator SonwEikEr. Why did you delete that reference? Why is that stiil classified. that partieular projeet of whatever it is?

Admiral Turxer. 1 don't know this particular ease. We will get you the exact answer to that one and inform you about it, but it is quite probable that that other case is unrelated to this in the-well. not unrelated. but that that was a project that still deserves to be classified.

[The material referred to follows:]

Construetion of the Gorman Annex was begun in 1957 and the Annex was dedicated in March 1a5. of the srveral MKlLTRA projects conducted at Georgetown only one involving human testing covered a time span subsequent 1o Mareh 195a. Subprojtt 15 ran from 19 to 13, thus it is ssible that the finai four years (1959 13: of the subprojeet could have been spent in the Gorman Amnex. However, there is no reference to the Gorman Annex or a "newAnnex"in Subproject 45jsujers. neither is there any mention of the sule projeet moving to a new loation in 1959 or later years.

Anthorization to contiibute CIA funds toward construction of the Gorman Anex is comntained in Sutproject 35 of MkIlTRA. Receutly discovered material indicated that Dr. Geschickter continued his researeh for sleej- and amnesiaproducing drugs nnder 1eujeet MKsEARoHl throngh July 19ot at Georgetown U'niversity Huspital. But it is imjuossible to determine if tbe facilities of the Goruan Annex were involved.

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Senator ScnweikER. I think that would give us a pretty good clue as to what was going to be done in the wing the (lA helped to finance.

Was there any indication at all in the peeords you found that the projeet ultimately used cancer patients or terminally ill patients in conneetion with this facility?

Admiral TurNEr. I'm sorry. 1 missed your question because I was urying to get the data on the last one. I will read you the blank.

Senator ScHwEIkER. Go ahead.

Admirat TURNEE. QKHILLTOP. It doesn't help you. but

Senator SchwEkEn. C'an you tell us what that is. or is it still chassitied!

Admiral TunsEr. I don't kmow, and I assune fron the fact that we deleted it. it is still claszitiedl. but I will get yon that an-wer. sir.

Senator Scnwenker. Thank you. I'd like to see that information. [See p. 171 for material referred to. ]

Now my next question wa-: I- there any indicatiou. Admiral. that projects imn that partieular center involved experinnentation on terminally ill cancer patients?

Admiral Tuuser. I missed the first part of your question, sir. I am very sorry.

Senator ScuweikEr. Do you have any indication that some experiments in the farility used terminally ill cancer patients as subjects? You do acknowledge in your statenent and it is clar from oiher documents that these kind- of experiments were at sone point heing done somewhere. My question i-, is there any indication that cancer patients or terminally ill patient- were experimented with in thi- wing?

Admiral Tursér. Yes, it does appear there is a connection here, sir. Senator ScnwEnkrR. The other question 1 had relates to the development of something which has been ealled the perfeet concussion. A series of experinents toward that end were deseribed in the ClA docunents. I wonder if you would just tell us what your understanding of perfect concussion is.

Admiral TirsER. Is that in my testimony, sir. or in some other doeument?

Senator ScuwEikER. Subprojeet 54. MKULTRA. which involved examination of techniques to cause brain concuzsions and ammesia by using weapons or sound waves to strike individuals without giving warning and withont leaving any clear physical marks. Someone dubbed it “perfeet coneussion“—maybe that was poetie license on the part of our staff rather than your poets over there. I wonder if you could just tell us what brain conenssion experiments were abont?

Aduiral TurNEn. This project. No. 54, was canceled. and never carried out.

Senator ScuweikER. Well. I do believe the first year of the project in 195 was carried out by the Ofice of Naval Researeh. aecording to the information that you supplied us. The CIA seems to have been participating in some way at that point, because the reeords go on to say that the experimenter at ONR found out abont CIA's role, discovered that it was a cover. and then the projeet was transferred to MKULTRA in 1956. Again. this is all from the backup material you have given us. So, it was canceled at some time. I an not dizagreeing

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with that, but apparently for at least a year or two. somebody was investigatingthe prohction of brain concussions with special blackjacks. sound waves, and other methods as detailed in the backup material.

Adnuiral TurNER. The data available to me is that this project was never funded by the (IA. but I will d uble-cheek that and furnish the information for the record for you as to whether there was ever any connection here and if so. what the nature of the work was.

{The material referred to follows:]

Mr. Laubinger corrected his testimony regarding Suhpmject 54 during the Septemuler 21. 1977 hearings before the Subcommittee on Health and Scientitic Resoarch of the Human Resources Committee. The relevant portion is reproduced below:

Mr. LatBiNtER. On projeet 54. it has got a rather sensational proposal in there. in terins of the work that they projose to do, aud you asked about the proposal and I said. in faet. it was never funded uuder MKlLTRA. Now, I overlooked--at least. my memory did not serve me correctly when I went through that file folder to ste one memorandum dated January 10, 1956, which makes it quite clear, as a matter of fact. that that proposal was based on prior work that was funded by the Agency.

Senator SchwEiker. By what?

Mr. LatBINGER. By the CIA. So. that information was in their fle folder. It didl not bapen to be in my head when I testified.

Senator SHwelkeR. I think I might have read you that, and that is why I argued at the tiue with you. because I think I had in front of me. as I recall, soune indication that it was funded there. I did read that to you. So, you did sumply it to us: there is no argument atout that information.

Mir. Lstbixgek. Perhans I am sort of headstrong. myself, and in my own view. I an reading under the I'LTRA projeet. that if it had been funded under ULTR\. it would have had a projeet number and identifed as such. The thing that threw me was that it was fuuded. apparently. outside of any MKllTRA activity and it was under the normal contracting process. so that it was not inelnded in MKUL,TRA as any work done under that funding umbrella.

The file folder that you have and I have. right here. makes it quite clear. however. thal a year's work was done throngh nayy funding-a nayy funding mechanism-on which the projosal was based that ultimately came into the MKULTRA program. That second prousal was never funded. So. there was conflirt and I. personally. I think, introducel a little bit of confusion in that in my testimony.

Senator Sonwelker. Well. do you agree or not agree with DoD's statement here that even though the initial funding was navy. it was really a conduit for the (IA?

Mr. LarBINGER. I think that is correct.

Senator ScuwelkEr. Yes: I would appreciate that. I would like to know how it went from ONR to (IA after a year. Somebody made a decision to make that transfer, and to make this an MkULTRA subjeet. There had to be some sort of review that led to a decision to continue that kind of concussion-total tlackout, uaximnun amnesia, and whatever ele it was you were interested in-study and testing.

Mr. LauBiNcER. Senator. if I nay try to say a few words on that. the files that were available to us for inspection, which are limited, indicated that there was a projeet being carried on by the Navy having to do with the effects of brain coneussion. The CIA developed an interest in that. and considered funding it. but actually never did. and as the admiral testified. the MKULTRA is merely a funding mechanism. a place they go for money to do such things. but there is no evidence that I know of that that projeet was ever funded.

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Senator ScuwrtkEn. Well. I am confused. becanse here again is another quote from a document that we have seen. which you have released and supplied to us:

Following is the technical progress made under the current [deleted] contract : (a) Siucialized instrumentation and numerous testing techniques have been develoqed to obtain the desired dynamic data : (b) considerable data has now been obtained suplorting the resonance-cavilation theory of brain concussion: and te) preliminary acceleration threshold data has been obtained for a fuid-filled glass simulatedl skull.

It goes on to talk about a blast range and a 2,50o-square-foot laboratory. The document notes that "Three blast test series have been run to date." It deseribes a special blackjack device, "a pancake-type blackjack giving a high peak impaet force with a low unit surface pressure. jaeh gumg a mgn pan m. 1. of fhi. worl

I agree the records are inconchusive as to the results of this work. but it certainly seems that some testing was done. position

Mr. LauBiNcrR. Senator, you are putting us in the same position I think you were stating that you were in earlier in referring to documents not before us. but I believe you are quoting from a proposal that someone sent to the Ageney to fund this work, and he is referring to past work. 'The past work would have encompassed a lot of things like that. but CIA was not involved with that. nke Ual. pu1 was m m e of vour

Senator Scnwelker. What do you mean. Admiral, on page 6 of your testimony when you mention projects using magician's art? How do magicians get into the spook business! magicrans get mnto une spoon puzmnvse to alin the mickey

Adlmiral TursEr. I have interpreted this as to how to slip the mickey into the finn. but I would like to ask my adviser» here to comment. io une mm. esto1t i- surrentitious

Mr. Bropy. I think that is essentially it, Senator. It is surreptitious administration of material to someone. deceptive practices, how to distraet someone's attention while you are doing something else, as I understand it. It wa- also some type of a covert communication projeet involved with the study of how magicians and their assistants perhaps comnmunicate information to one another without having other people know it. This is the type of thing that was involved. sir. pop m….… Senator ScnwEtEi. Thank you. Mr. Chairman. Thnk von Mr. Chairman.

na

Senator INouyE. Senator Hhüúddleston?

Somator HupplEstos. Thank you. Mr. Chairman. Senator HUppLEsToN. 1nans Muu. n.

Admiral, in your checking these newhy discovered documents and interviewing mnembers of the CIA staff, did you find information that would confirm the contention deseribed by the reporters for the New York Times that this type of experimentation was legun out of a fear at the Ageney that foreign powers might have had drugs which would allow them to alter the behavior of Anerican citizens or agents or menbers of the Armed Forees who were taken into eustody, and which would have resulted in false confessions and the like? Is my question clear! question clear! ersonally read the documen-

Admiral TurNEr. Yes. sir. I haven't personally read the documentation on that. In my diseussions with the people who are well informed in this area at the Ageney. I am told that that is the case. formed in this area at the Ageney . 1 aumn on donce or any indication that

Senator Huppiistos. Was there any evidence or any indication that there were other motives that the Ageney might also le looking for drugs that could be applied for other purposes, such as debilitating an individual or even killing anoiher person? Was this part of this kind of experimentation?

[PAGE 46]
Admiral TurNEr. Yes: I think there is. I have not seen in this series of docunentation evidence of desire to kill, but 1 think the project turned its character from a defensive to an offensive one as it went along. and there certainly was an intention here to develop drugs that could be of use.

Senator HuppiEstoN. The project continued for some time after it was learned that. in fact. foreign powers did not have such a drug as was at first feared, didn't it?

Admiral Tunsen. That is my understanding. Yes. sir.

Senator HunpLeston. Is there any indication that knowledge gained as a result of these experiments has been useful or is being applied in any way to present operations?

Mr. Bropy. Senator. I am not sure if there is any body of knowledge. A great deal of what there was. I gather. was destroyed in 1973. I would like to defer to Frank here. Do you know of any?

Mr. Lußisger. I know of no drugs or anything like that developed under this program that ever reached operational use or are in use today.

Senator HrpplestoN. So apparently any information that was gathered was apparently useless and not worth continuing, not worth further development on the part of the Ageney.

Mr. LauBixGeR. I am having dificulty hearing your questions.

Senator Huppieston. I can hardly hear myself.

Admiral TurNer. I think the answer to your question is that we have no evidence of great usefulness on this. and yet I think we should remember

Senator Hlrppuestos. Well. is it accurate to say that this experimentation produced few useful results or had little application at all to the operations of the Ageney or anybody else as far as we know?

Admiral TuryEk. I think that is basically correct. At the same time. I would point out that we had two CIA prisoners in China and one in the Soviet Union at this time, and we were concerned as to what kinds of things might be done to then. but I am notsaying that-

Senator Huppieston. Have you detected any sign that any other nation is continuing or has in the past conducted experiments similar to this or with a similar ohjective?

Admiral TurNer. I am not prepared to answer that one off the top of my head. sir. but I will get it to you.

[The material referred to follows:]

We maintain no fles of up-to-date information on the testing of drugs in forvigu countries. Some years ag» we occasionally would review foreign research on atibiotics and pharmaceuticals in connection with publie health and civil defense assesments. For a few years teginning in 19? we assessed foreign research on Lsl, under Projeet ARTICHOKE because of concern that such drugs might be employed gainst Agency and other l.s. personnel. Information relative to this work has already been provided to relevant Committees. In this early work we also occasionally looked at foreign human experimentation; we long ago eliminated our holdings on this sutjeet and no collection requirements are any longer served. As consumer interest in this area has dropped off and higher priority areas need attention. we have virtually no present coverage with the possi!le exception of an oecasional scamning of the literature for a spwcifie progran. To the best of our knowledge no other uuit in the Intelligence Community is tracking this subject now.

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Senator Humplestos. Yon don't know whether any of your agents anywhere in the world have been subjeeted to any kind of procedure like this?

Admiral Ttryer. We certainly know of other powers conducting research in these areas. yes.

Senator HrmplEston. Do you know how they go about that research? Admiral TurNER. It is pretty sketchy. the information we have.

Senator HrboiEstox. Do you know of any other organization in this country or any institution that has conducted extensive research on unwitting indlividuals and through unwitting institutions?

Admiral TrrxEr. Well, I have read something in the newspapers about this. but I have not familiarized myself with it in specifies.

Senator Htpplestos. It is not a normal mode of operation for human researeh, is it?

Admiral TurNER. No. sir.

Senator HumplEstoN. Thank you. Mr. Chairman.

Senator Isouye. Senator Wallop?

Senator Walior. Mr. Chairman. I only have one to follow up on Senator Huddleston's questions and my earlier ones. You are not really saying, are yon. Admiral Turner. that there are no mind-altering drugs or behavior modification procedures which have been used by forvign powers?

Admiral TrRNEn. No, sir. I am not.

Senator WaLior. I drew that inference partly in answer to my question that yon knew of no truth serum. Maybe that is a misnomer, but surely there are relaxants that make tongues looser than they would otherwise be. Isn't that true?

Admiral TURNER. Yes.

Senator Wallor. So I think it is fair to say, too, that the experience of many American prisoners of war in the Korean conflict would indicate that there are behavior modification procedures in use by foreign powers of a fairly advanced degree of sophistication.

Admiral Turyer. Yes, sir.

Senator WaLlor. Again, I will just go back and say I think this must have been part of the motivation. I don't think you would have mentioned Cardinal Mindszenty had you thought his behavior was normal at the time or had anybody else. So. I would just again say I think it is a little bit scapegoating. I don't think the object of this hearing is in any way to lay blame on those passed or those dead or otherwise. but I think it is a little bit scapegoating to say that it stopped with the directors of the CIA or the DCI's of the time. Also I think it is a little bit scapegoating to say they didn't even know it. but that it was some lower echelon acting alone.

I think this was a behavior pattern that was prevalent in those years, and I think the object leson is that we have discovered. we think and we hope. through vour assurances and other activities of the Congress, means of avoiding future incidents of that kind. I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator IxouyE. Senator Chafee?

Senator CuaFEE. No questions.

Senator Isouye. Senator Kennedy. I think you have another question.

[PAGE 48]
Senator KENNEpy. Just talking about the two safe houses on the east and west coast a- beng the sonrces for the unwitting trials, now, the innportanee of this and the magnitde of it. I think. is of significance. because we have seen from your records that these were used over a period ofs or 9 years. and the mumlers could have been considerable. You are unalhle to determine. at least in your own research, what the munbers wonld he and what the drugs were. how many people were involved. but it could have been considerable during this period oftime.

It would certainly appear to ue in examining the documents and the flow charts of cash ships that were expemdled in these areas that it was considerable, but that is a judgmental factor on it. but I think it is important to try and find ont what the Ageney is attempting to do to get to the botton of it.

Now, the prineipal agent that was involved as I understand it is deceased and has been deceased for 2 years. The overall agent. Mr. Gottlieb. has indicated a fnzzy memory about this whole area. He has testified lefore the Intelligence Coimnittee. Yet he was responsibhe for the whole program. Then. the Director had indicated the destruction of the various materials and unfamiliarity with the projeet.

Now, you have indicated in your testimony today that there are two ahditional agents on page 9 of your testimnony. vou indicated there are two additional agents which you have uncovered at the bottom of it. and yon say. the nanes of (IA officials who approved or monitored the various projects. You talk about the two additional agents in your testimony.

Now. i an just wondering if you intend to interview those agents to finl ont exartly what is being done. I suppose. first of all, shouldn't the projeet tanager know what wasbeingdone?

Admiral TueNEn. Our first problem. Senator. is that we have been unable to associate an individual with those names at this point. We are still burrowing to finl ont who these people are. We haven't identified them as having been CLA employees, and we don't know whether these were false names.

Senator KEx xEny. You are tracking that down, as I understand it? Admiral TueNEE. Yes. sir.

Senator Kesseny. You are tracking that down, and you have every intention of interviewing those people to find out whatever you can about the program and project!

Admiral TurNER. My only hesitation here is whether I will do this orthe Justice Departmient.

Senator KexsenY. It will be pursued. though, I understand? Admiral TURNER. Yes. sir.

Senator KeNsepy. Either through the Ageney or through the Justice Department!

Admiral TuRNER. [Nods in the afirmative.]

Senator KexsEpy. Is it plausible that the director of the program would not understand or know about the details of the program? Is it plausible that Dr. Gottlich would not understand the full range of activities in those particular safe houses?

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Admiral TuRNER. Iet me say it is wnlikely. 1 don't know Mr. Gottlieb. neb. 1M

Senator KrssEpy. Has anybody in the Ageney talked with Mr. Gottlieb to find out about this?

Admiral TursER. Not since thi- revelation has come out. Aau 1N.  s 1-

Senator Kessepy. Not since thi- revelation? Well, why not?

Armirat HuRsER. ne nasienom smj A rmiral TraxEk. He has left our employ. Senator.

Senator KENNEpy. Does that mean that anybody who leaves is, you know. covered for lifetime!

Admiral TuRNER. No. sir. Admiral 1URNER. No. S1r.

Senator KENNEpy. Why wouldn't you talk with hin and find out? You have new information about this progran. It has been a matter of considerable interest both to our committee and to the Intelligence Committee. Why wouldn't you talk to Mr. Gottlieb? Conmttee. Wny wount you taun 1hs

Admiral TuRNER. Well. again, I think the issue is whether this shonld he done by the Justice Department or ourselves. should be done py ue rusuee rpau …

Senator KEsNEpy. Well, are we wrestling around because you and Attorney General Bell can't agree

Admiral TuRNER. No, sir. Admral TURNER. No,S.

Sonator Krxseny [continuing]. On who ought to do it? Senator RENNEDY– [ComumonE 1•

Admiral TuRNER. We are proceeding together in complete agreement as to how to go. I have. in connection with trying to find all of these Americans or others who were unwittingly tested. I have some considerable concern alout the CIA running around this country interviewing and interrogating people, because I don't want to give any impression that we are doing domestie intelligence. impression uat we aue uomug : thi case That

Senator KeNxepy. I am just talking about one, in this case. That was the man who was responsible for the whole program, and to find out whether anyone within the Ageney since you have had this new material has talked to Gottlieb since 1975, and if the answer is no. I want to know why not. no, I want lo know wn . d i» conpoction

Admiral TursER. The reason he was not interviewed in connection with the 1975 hearings was that he had left the employ of the CIA and there was a concern on the part of the Ageney that it would appear to the investigators that the CIA was in some way trying to infuence hin and influence his testimony before the committee. If these committees have no objection. we would be happy to contact Dr. Gottlieb and see if he can augment anything here in this new information, though 1 don't think there is much in this new information that he can add to as opposeu uu » that he can add to as opposed to what was available in 1975. ou come to the

Senator KessEpy. Well, you see, Admiral Turner, you come to the two committees this morning and indicate that now at last we have the information. We don't have to be concerned about anything in the future on it. Now, I don't know how you can give those assurances to the members of these committees as well as to the American people when you haven't since 1975 even talked to the principal person that was in charge of the progran. and the records were destroved. He is the fellow that was running the program. and the Ageney has not talked to him since the development of this new material. talked to him sinee the aeveiopuem un ue m " … ieties involved.

Admiral TursEn. Our only concern here is the proprieties involved, and we will dig into this and work with the Justice Department on

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who, if cither of us, should get into discussions with Dr. Gottlieb so as not to prejudice any legal rights that may be involved here, or to appear in any way to be improper.

SenatorKeNNeny. Well. do I understand you have not contacted the Justice Department about this particular case since the development of this new material about Gottlieh?

Adlmiral TunNen. Not about Gottlieb specifically. We have contacted him.

Senator KeNxenr. Well, it is amazing to me. I mean. can you understand the difieulty that any of us might have in terms of comprehending that when youdevelop a whole new series of materials that are on the front page of every newspaper in the country and are on every television. I mean. that means something, but it does not mean nearly as much as the interest that we have in the fact about the testing of unwitting Americans, and every single document that the staff reviews has Mr. Gottlieb's name on it and yon come up to tell us that we don't have to worry any more, we have these other final facts, and Mr. Gottlieb has not been talked to?

Admiral TurNen. Sir. I an not saying that these are in any way the final facts. I an saying these are all the facts we have available.

Senator KenNedy. And you have not talked to the person who was in charge of the progran, so what kind of value or what kind of weight can we give it?

Admiral Turser. We are happy to talk to him. I think the issue here again is one of propriety and how to go about this. We have not, I believe. enongh new informiation about Gottlieb's participation here to signal that his interview would be that much more revealing than what was revealed in 1975.

Senator KENNeny. The importance of it. I think. from our point of view. is. he would know the drugs that were administered. the volume of drug. how it was administered, and in terms of your ability to follow up to proteet these people and their health. to the extent that it can le done, that opportunity is being lost.

I want to get on to some others. but will you give us the assurance that you will get ahold of Gottlieb or that you will talk to Attorney General Bell and talk with Gottlieb?

Admiral TuRNER. Yes, sir.

Senator KeNNEoy. And let us know as to the extent of it. I don't see how we can fufill our responsibility in this area on the drug testing without our hearing fron Gottlieb as well. but I think it is importantthat you do so. particularly since all of the materials have been destroyed.

These ot her t wo agentz. have they talked to them?

Admiral TukNER. We don't know who they are. sir. We are trying to track down and see whether these names can be releated to anybody. Senator KEN NEry. That is under active investigation by the Ageney? Admiral TuRNER. Yes, sir.

Senator KENsEny. And yon have the intention of talking to those people when you locate them. Is that correct?

Admiral TurNEr. Yes, sir. under the same cireumstances as Gottlieb. Senator KeN NEny. And you have people working on it?

Admiral TURNER. Yes. sir.

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Senator Kes NEpy. With regards to the activities that took place in these safe honses, as I understand fromn the records, two-way mirrors were used. Isthat vour understanding!

Admiral TursER. Yes, sir. We have records that construction was done to put in two-way mirrors.

Senator KENsEpy. And they were placed in the bedroom. as I understand.

[Pause.]

Senator KEN NEpy. Well, we have document

Admiral TuRNER. I believe that was in the Church record, but I don't have the details.

Senator KussEpy. And rather elaborate decorations were added, as I understand, at least. to the one in San Franeisco. in the bedroom, which are French can-can dancers. floral pictures, drapery, inchuding installation of bedroom mirrors. three framed Toulouse Lautree posters with black silk mats, and a number of other-red bedroom curtains and recording equipment. and then a series of documents which were provided to the committee which indicate a wide proliferation of different cash for \$100, generally in the \$100 range over any period of time on the particular checks. Even the names are blocked out, as to the person who is receiving it. Cash for undercover agents. operating expenses, drinks, entertainment while administering, and then it is dashed out. and then the other doeuments, that would suggest, at least with the signature of your prineipal agent out there, that "called to the operation. midnight, and climax.

What can you tell us that it might suggest to you about what techniques were being used by the Ageney in terms of reaching that sort of broad-based group of American- that were being evidently enticed for testing in terms of drugs and others? Do you draw any kind of conclusion about what might have been going on out there in these safe honses?

Admiral TuRNER. No, sir.

[General langhter.]

Senator Krsseny. There is a light side to it. but there is also an enormously serious side. And that is that at least the techmniques which are used or were used in terns of testing, and trying to find out exactly the range of drugs used and the numbers of people involved and exaetly what that operation wa- about. as well as the constant reiteration of the use of small sums of cash at irregular intervals. A variety of different techniques were employed but there is an awful lot of doenmentation putting these matters together.

When you look at the fact that it is a broad range population that has been tested, tested in these two areas. with the kind of cash slips that were used in this. payment mechanisms and decorations and all of the rest, we are not able to put a bottom line on it but one thing is for sure, and that is. Gottlieh knows. That is one thing for sure, because his name appears on just abont every one of these documents. and it is. I think. very important to find out what his understanding is of the nature of that. So, we will hear more about that.

Admiral TursrR. I believe Gottlieb has been interviewed by the Congress.

Senator KeN NEny. That's right. he has, and in reviewing the record. it is not very satisfaetory. and it just seems with the new information

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and the new doumentation and the new memoranda-and he did not have the checks at that timne-and with the wide variety of different memoranda with his mate on it. his memory could be stimulated on that.

Thank you.

Senator IsotyE. I would like to thank the admiral and his staff for participating in this hearing. 1 believe the record should show that this hearing was held at the reqest of the Ageney and the admiral. It was not held because we insisted upon it. It was a volunteer effort on the part of the Ageney. I think the record should also indicate that Admiral Turner has forwarded to this committee a classified file including all of the names of the institutions and the persons involved as the experimentors.

i should also indicate that this hearing is just one step involved in the committee's investigation of drug abuse. Just as you have had much work in going over the oot pages, the staff of this committee has had equal problen. but 1 would like the record to show that you have made these papers and documnents available to the committee. I thank you for that.

As part of the ongoing investigation, we had intended to call upon many dozen- of others. experimentors, or those officials in charge. and one of those will he Dr. Gottlich.

In thanking you, I would like to say this to the American people. that what we have experieneed this morning in this committee room is mot heing duplicated in any other committee room in any other part of the world. 1 doubt that very much. Our Ageney and our intelligence community has been umder mueh criticisu and has been subjected to much abuse. in many cases justified. but this is the most open society that I can think of. For example. in Great Britain there are about six people who are aware of the identity of the man in charge of intelligenre. In other countriez, similar conditions exist. Here in the United States we not only know Admiral Turner, we have hadopen hearings with hin. such as this. The confirrzation hearings were all open.

In a few week-, the Senate of the United States will debate à resolution to decide upon whether we should disclose the amounts and funds being used for counterintelligence and national intelligenee. I would hope that in presenting this issue to the public, the media will take note that the Ageney has cooperated and will continue to. The abuse that we have learned abont this morning is one I hope will never happen again. hut without constant oversight on the part ef the Executive Ofier. on the part of the Congress. it could happen again. It is important therefore that we continue in this oversight activity.

So. once again, Admiral. I thank you very much for helping us. We willcontinne to call upon you for your assistance. We would like to submit to you several questions that the members and staf have prepared. We hope you will look then over carefully and prepare responses for the record, sir.

Senator KENNEpY. Mr. Chairman?

Senator IxoryE. Yes, sir?

Senator KeyNEpy. I. too, want to thank Admiral Turner for his responsiveness. I have had meeting- with him in the committees and also conversations. telephone conversations. and private meetings, and

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I have found hin personally to be extremely responsive. and it is a very, diflirnlt challenge which he has accepted in heading this Ageney. I want you to know. personally. 1. too, would like to see this put behind us. 1 dot't think we are quite there yet in terms of this particular area that we are interested in. I think the Intelligence Committee has special responsibilities in this area of the testing, so we look forward to working with you in expediting the time that we can put it behind, but it does seem to me that we have to dig in and finish the chapter. So. I want to perzonally express my appreciation to you, Admiral Turner, and thank you for your cooperation and your help, and I look forward to working with you.

Admiral TuiNER. Thank you. Admmtrat TURNER. Dnann sou.

Senator Huppiestox. Mr. Chairman, I am not sure you emphasized this enongh. but I think the record ought to show that Admiral Turner informed the Select Committee on his own initiative when the new docunnentation was found. The documnentation has been made available to us yoluntarily, in a spirit of cooperation. able to us xomumuarny, ma epnn mntinn thot

I think thi- show- a vast difference from the mode of operation that existed prior to the formation at least of the Church committee, and a difference that is very helpful. a díerence un is very mep. much

Senator Isouyr. Thank you very much. Thank you very much, Admiral. Admira. a11 -1J0hn

We would now like to call upon Mr. Philip Goldman and Mr. John Gittinger. Giittmger. a…l talo the

Mr. Goldian and Mr. Gittinger, will you please rise and take the oath. oath. lout to mivo is

Do you solemly swear that the testimony you are about to give is the truth. the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you, God?

Mr. GoLDMyN. I do.

Mr. GrrrINGER. 1 do.

Semator INot YE. Thank you, sir. Semator INotuYE. Hank you, Sur.

Mr. Goldman. will you identify yourself, and after that, Mr. (unger. Gittinger. 1--1:nd witnossMr

Senator KrN NEpy. Before we start in. we had a third witness. Mr. Chairnnan. Mr. Pasternac, who planned to testify. traveled to Washington -he lives in Washington, and was contacted recently-with the intention of testifying thi- morning. And something-he called us late thi- morning and indicated that he wanted to get a counsel before he would wish to testify.

Senator IxoryE. Mr. Goldman.

Mr. Goldman, will you identify yourself, sir.

TESTIMONY OF PHILIP GOLDMAN. FORMER EMPLOYEE. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Mr. Gorpmss. 1 am rnip oonumnan. Mr. Gotpu ys. I am Philip Goldman.

Seuator Ixouyr. And you are a former emplovee of the Central Intelligence Ageney?

Mr. Golpm yN. Oer 10 years ago. Mr. Giotpm AN. Over Iu years ago,

Senator IsoryE. And you were employed at the time when MKULTRA was in operation? Mkt L1RA was in opetaoon. an at the

Mr. GolomAN. There were some MKULTRA's in operation at the time I was there.

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Senator INotre. And Mr. John Gittinger, are you a former employee of the Central Intelligence Agency?

TESTIMONY OF JOHN GITTINGER, FORMER EMPLOYEE, CENTRALINTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Mr. GItTiNGer. I am. Mr. GITTINGEk. 1 am.

Senator INotrE. Are you still an employee? No

Mr. GITTINGER. No. Senator INoure. Were you a member of the Agency at the time MKULTRA was in operation?

Mr. GITTINGER. Yes.
Senator INouYe. Thank you. Senator nenneuy. Thank vou. Senator Kennedy.

Senator KeNNedr. I want to welcome both of you to the committee. If we could start with Mr. Goldman. Were you the project engineer for the safe houses in either San Francisco or New York? or the sate nouses m emoe …

Mr GornmaN. I know of no safe house in San Francisco. Mr. GoldMAN. 1 Know oi no sai

Senator KeNNeny. How about in New 1orn: v-nv How about in New York?

Mr. GolpmaN. I knew of one facility that was established there, but 1 didn't know anything o1 ns operaton. anvthin of its operation.

Senator KenNenr. Were you a nionitor on any testing of drugs on in parsons in San Francisco?

Mr. GoldMAN. No. Senator KeNNeny. Well. we have a classified document here that was provided by the Agency that lists your name as a monitor of the proif von wonld look

gram and I would appreciate n n you wouru Mr. Golpman. I think the misunderstanding arises because Iwas
proiect officer.

project omser. Senator KeNNepy. Well, would you take a look at that! [Mr. Goldman inspected the document.] Mr. GoldmaN. This document as it states is correct. However,

mv-Senator KeNNenY. That document is correct? Mr. GolpMaN. As far as I see on the first page, the project. But

my- Keerny. Well. could I get it back. please. Senator KeNNEnY. nel. couiu 1 get va.

mi -.ld inlicate that vou were a monitor of the program. That would indicate tnat you neir a mo

Mr. GolnmaN. I was in charge of disbursing the moneys to Morgan Hall Hall.

Savator KrysEpy. To whom was that ? Senator KeNNEpy. To whom was unat :

Mr. GolnmaN. To the individual whose name was listed at the top

of that document. Senator KeNNepr. And you knew that he was running the project
:-Ca-Fronoisco?
in San Francisco! Mr. GolpMaN. I knew he was the person who was in charge out
there mere.

Senator KENNEDY. All right. Senator KeNNEDY. All right.

Mr. GolnmaN. But I had no knowledge nor did I seek knowledge of actually what he was doing. because there would be other things involved.

I did receive 1 a'a rvn

Senator KENNEDY. What were you doing?

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Mr. GolpmN. I was collecting-I had to be sure that all the receipts that ever were turned in balanced with the moneys that were paid out to see that everything was run all right. There was no illegal use of funds as far as we could determine by the receipts and cash. use oí lunus as rat as ndicetes

Senator KENNEpy. So even though the Ageney document indicates that you were a monitor for the program, one of the few monitors of that particular program which you mentioned for San Francisco and Mill Valley, (alif.. you described your responsibility only as a carrier of money. is that correct? oI money,uas secing

Mr. GolomAN. I would say as a disburser or carrying out-seeing that the moneys were handled properly. There was within that-I don't know what's done or what he did do in conjunction with other people. people. 11fl dilrcemont of

Senator KeNsEby. Were you responsible for the disbursement of all the funds? Hue Junas: t ahacl to him

Mr. GolnmaN. I was responsible for turning over the check to him. Senator KeNNepy. And what did yon know of the progran itself? 8. what ho

Mr. GotpmaN. The only thing I knew of the progran was what ne furnished us in terms of receipts and that sort of thing. 1 didn't indulge or concern myself in that. auige or concern mysen m onat t1 …… amine it

Senator KeNNEiy. You still wrote. and I'll let you examine it it's a cla-sified document-but you wrote a rather substantive review of the progran in May of 1963, talking about the experiments, the fatual data that had been collected, covert and realistie feld trials. about the necessity of those particular-and talked about the effectiveness of the various programs. the efficiency of various delivery systems. That doesn't sound to me like someone who is only- systehs, Inat doesn t soumnu to me nne if I could

Mr. GolpmaN. Well. if you would refresh my memory. if I could read this I woull certainly agree with whatever is said there. if it was wrltten. written. -l was You've

Senator KeN NEpy. I am trying to gather what your role was. You've indicated first of all that you didn't know about-you knew about a safe house in New York: now we find out that you're the carrier for the resourees as well and the agent in San Francisco. We find out now that the CIA put you a: a monitor. You're testifying that you only were the courier, and here we have just one document, and there are many other- that talk about the substance of that program with your name on it and I an just trying to find out exaetly what role you were plaving. playmngé. 1. thi: an] T am

Mr. Goupuy. The only thing I can tell you about this and I am drawing completely on my memory is that this individual who was in charge out there condueted these things and reported them baek to the Aeney. I didn't participate in any of them. All I know was that he furnished me with receipts for thing- that were done and told of the work that they had done. work tat uey nal qone. rocoints

Senator Kissruy. Well. that document covers more than receipts. Mr. Golpmas. Yes. it tells of what-they had condueted work out there. nere. womamnb9

Senator KrNNEpy. It describes, does it not? Read the paragraph 2 Mr GoupmAN. “A number of covert"- Mr. GotDMAN, A nTO

Senator Krysrpy. Well, von can't read it. it's a classified document. and 1 don't know why. quite frankly, but it relates to the substance

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[PAGE 56]
of those prograns and your name is signed to the memorandums on it. I am not interested in you trving to review for us now what is in the document. but I think it would be unfortunate if we were left with the opinion that all you were was a courier of resources when we see a document with your name on it, signed. that talks about the substance of the program. And what were interested in is the substance of the programn. We have the recent documents that were provided by the Ageney, which do indicate that you were at least involved in the substance, and I'm just trying to find out whether youre willing to tell us about that. tell us about that. l  everthing that

Mr. (olpmas. I am perfectly willing to tell you everything that I can remember. I can rememver. r anvthing

c.t Kvenv But vou can't remember anything. Senator KENNEpY. But you can t remrmm «

Mr. Goupmax. 1 can't remenber the substantive parts of these things. I really can't. things. I really can't. aking pleco

e Keverny Of the program that was taking place. Senator KeNNEpY. Uf Une programn ta a- .

Do you have any greater familiarity with what was happening in New York?

Mr. GoLdMaN. No, no. Senator KENNEpy. And you have the same function with regards to New York? Mr. GolpmaN. The same function with regard to New York. Senator KeNNepy. Did you ever go to San Francisco?

Mr. GOLDMAN. Yes. Mr. GOLDMAN. Yes.

Senator KeNNEpy. Did you meet with the agent in charge?

Mr. GOLDMAN. 1 PS. eon Krxrny And why did you meet with him? Senator KENNEDy. Ana wny uu

Mr. Golpmas. To discuss some of the receipts and things that were there to find out if these were indeed true expenditures and to find out if everything was going along all right for the work that was being dono one. 0

Senator Keyyeny. What work was being done? Senator KENNEDY. Wnat wor as

Mr. Goupmys. No. the reports of these things and whatever was being done. I don't know who he reported to but he did report to somebody. somebody. £d out about the work

Senator KeyNepy. You travel out there to find out about the work that's being done. and what does he tell you, that the work is being done well and done well and thar wore doina was

Mr. Golpmas. He told me that the work that they were doing was going along, progressing satisfactorily. but to be very frank with you Sonator Keyxeny. But he didn't tell you what the work was? Senator KENNEdY. But ne qan tn

Mr. Golpmax. To be very frank with you. Senator, I cannot remember the things that happened back in those days. I've been away from the company-from the Agency for over 10 years. and that is even farther back than that, and that was just about the time when I first engaged in this, so it was my first- first engaged in this, so n was my mus mins of s100 checks. to

Senator KexNEny. Did they disburse a series of \$100 checks. to vour recollection? your recollection? k. :f vou have it there. then

Mr. Golpmas. I don't recollect it. but if you have it there. then they did. ney dia. C-411.9

Senator KeNNepy. Did you know Dr. Gottlieb?

Mr. GoLpMAN. Yes.

一州

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[PAGE 57]
Senator KeNneny. How did you know Dr. Gottlieb?

Mr. GoLpmaN. He had been head of the division when I was recruited. cruneu.

Senator KenNnepr. Did you talk to him about these programs? Did vou have anything to do with him during this period of time? you nase ansummne

Mr. GoomaN. I didn't have anything to do with him until I would say probably in the sixties. Sa pnonanymu

Senator KenNedr. And can you tell us what you had to do with him then?

Mr. Golpmay. Just what you see there on the papers. M. UOLPMAN. OuSn

Senator KeNNenr. Well, that is the request for the money and he approves it. a

Mr. GolpmaN. That is the request for money and he approves it. and I am quite sure that I probably discussed with him whether the work was going along all right, whether his reports were being turned in. and whether he was satisfied with the way things were going and did he have any complaints about the way other people were requesting him, but I did not engage myself in anything he was doing.

Senator KeNNepr. Well, did you get the impression that Gottlieb knew what was going on?

Mr. GoupmaN. I didn't ask.

Senator KeNNepy. But you told him that your impression that what was going on even though you didn't know what was going on, was going on well, I guess? [Laughter.] mg un wen.

Mr. Golpmas. I told Gottlieb what you saw in there was that the things appeared to be going along all right. I was repeating and parroting back the words that were given to me while I was there.

Senator KeNNzdr. What was the money being spent for, do you know?

Mr. GolpmaN. No: I can't recall that, sir. M, UM. ,

Senator KeNNenr. Would you remember if we told you it was red curtains and can-can pictures

Mr. GoldmaN. No. sir.

Senator KeNNFnr. Floral pictures and the rest.

Mr. GolpmaN. No, sir.

Senator KeNNEDY. Recorders.

Mr. GolpmaN. No, sir.

Senator KenNeny. Recorders and two-way mirrors.

Mr. GolnmaN. Wait, hold on. You're slipping a word in there now. Senator KenNepr. But you would have authorized those funds. would you not, since you were the

Mr. Golpman. Did you say two-way mirrors?

Senator KENNEDY. Yes.

Mr. GolDMaN. Where?

Senator KeNNepy. In the safe houses

Mr. GolDMAN. Where?

Senator KENNEDY. San Francisco.

Mr. GolDmaN. No.

Senator KENNEny. How about New York?

Mr. GolpmaN. Yes. M.LAN.

Senator KeNNeny. You remember now that you approved expenditures for New York?

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55

Mr. Golnman. Yes. Mr. GOiDMAN. 1es.

Sonator KrNNEnY. What were those expenditures for? Senator KENNEDY. W nat were unos cap

Mr. GoLpMaN. That was a transfer of money over for the use in an apartment in New York by the Bureau of Narcotics. It was for their use. their use. 1.1- -f what wes moing

Senator KenNenr. Do you have any knowledge of what was going on in the apartment? on in tne aparuent : :had hean used ar-

Mr. Golpmax. No, sir, other than I know that it had been used, according to the information that I have been given, it was used by the Bureau of Narcotics to make meetings with individuals who they were interested in with regard to pushing dope—not pushing dope, but selling narcoties and that sort of thing. ing narçoties ana uat sort ui onng. ensibilities and

Senator KeNNepy. Well. I am sure you had many responsibilities and it's a long time ago. but the Agency does indicate that you were project monitor for that particular program.

Mr. GolpMAN. That's correct. Mr. (OlDMAN. 1 nat S CorTect.

Senator KenNeny. Your own testimony indicates you went out to review the expenditures of funds to find out whether they were being wisely used, that you came back and talked to the project director, Mr. Gottlieb, to give him a progress report about what was going on out there. rere.

Mr. GoldmaN. Yes, sir, I did. Mr. GoldmAN. 1 es, sir, 1 uiu.

Senator KenNeny. All those things are true, and yet you draw a complete blank in terms of what was the project itself. That's where the record is now. the record is now. - the proiects nor did

Mr. Golumas. I did not go out there to review the projects nor did I come back and talk with Mr. Gottlieb and review what I had observed in terms of any projects that they—that is, other parts of the Agency might have in operation there. I simply reported back those things which were told to me by the individual out there who—and I carried them back and they are contained in the report that you have in front of vou. word for word. just as it was given to me. of you, word or woru. juzt as e suhsten-

Senator KeNNepy. The report that you examined here is a substantive report on the particular program and project. And I don't think anvone who wasn't familiar with the project-this is a personal evaluation—could write a report on the substance of it without knowing about it. Now, that's mine. Maybe you can't remember and recollect, and that's and that's in thinrs thet T

Mr. GolpmaN. No; everything I put down in there is things that I was told while I was out there. and if there was any ancillary information involved in there I can tell you I just don't remember that. I really don't. don't. . time lot of time has

At the time—that was some years ago. At the time—a lot of time has passed since then and I have made quite sure that if I could recollect it at all. I would do it. If you have some papers and you want me to certify whether yes. this is so or that is so, I can do that, but I can't recall it mentally. it mentally. in! Thare ere others

Senator KeNNepr. You just certified the principal. There are others up here.

I would like to go to Dr. Gittinger.

Mr. GittiNgeR. It's Mr. Gittinger. Mr. GiTTiNgER. IU'S Mr. Untunget.

Senator KeNNeny. How long did you serve with the Agency?

[PAGE 59]
Mr. GitTiNGER. Twenty-six years

Senator KeNNEDY. Excuse me?

Mr. GitriNGER Twenty-six years.

Senator KENNEbY. Twenty-six years.

And at some point you moved into the operational support side, is that correct?

Mr. (ilTTINGER. Yes.

Senator Kensepy. And did you know Sidney Gottlieb?

Mr. GITrINGER. Yes, sir.

Senator KeNNEny. And did he inforn you about the research projeets involving LSD?

Mr. GrrriNGER. Yes, sir.

Senator Kexsepr. lt is my understanding that you were also aware of sone of the drug testing projeçts conducted on unwitting subjects on the west coast using the Bureau of Narcotics people in the operation. Is that true!

Mr. GITTINGER. I was.

Senator Ixoure. Excuse me. Would you speak into the microphone? I cannot hear you.

Mr. GIrTINGER. Sorry.

Senator KENNepr. 1o you know which drugs were involved in those lests?

Mr. (rrtisGER. LSD. And I can't remember for sure much of the others. What is the substance of marihuana. cannabis. is that right. that can be delivered by other than smoking?

Senator KENNEpY. Cannabis?

Mr. GirttinGER. There had been some discussion of that ; yes.

Senator KeNNEpy. And was heroin also used?

Mr. GitTiNGER. Heroin used by CIA?

Senator KENNEpy. No. In the west coast operation.

Mr. GirtiNgER. Absolutely not.

Senator KenNepy. Now, to your knowledge, how were the drugs administered to the unwitting subjects?

Mr. GirtixcEr. Hhave no direet knowledge.

Senator KeNNepy. Why did you go to the safe houses?

Mr. Girriscen. It's a very complicated story. Just in justification of myself, this came up just day before yesterday. I have not really had enough tine to get it all straightened in my mind. so I ramble.

Senator KesNEby. Well, you take your time and tell us in your own words. We've got sone time here.

Mr. GrrriscEr. My responsibilities which would involve any of the period of time that you wer talking about really was not direetly related to drugs at ali. 1 was a psyehologist charged with the responsibility of trying to develop as muich information as I could on various cultures. overseas cultures. anthropological type data. if you follow what I mean. I was also engaged in trying to work out ways and means of assessing people and understanding people.

I originally beeame involved in this through working on Chinese culture. and over a series of time I was introduced to the problem of brainwashing. which is the thing that really was the most compelling thing in relationship to this. and became charged with the responsibility of trying to find out a little bit about interrogation techniques.

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And among other things. we decided or I decided that one of the best sources of interrogation techniques would be trying to locate and interview and become involved with experienced pofice interrogators in the country and experienced people who had real practical knowledge of interrogation. The reason for this is that we had become pretty well convinced after the experience of the brainwashing problems coming out of (hina, that it was the techniques of the interrogators that were causing the individuals to make confessions and so forth in relationship to this. rather than any kind of drugging and so forh. So we were very much interested in interrogation tochniques, and this led to me being introduced to the agent in the west coast. and I began to talk to him in connection with these interrogation techniques.

Senator KeNNenr. OK. Now. that is the agent that ran the tests on the west coast on the unwitting people. That's where you come in, correct?

Mr. GirtinGer. If I understand-would you say that again?

Senator KeyNrpy. The name Morgan Hall has been-that is the name that has been used.

Mr. GITTINGER. Yes.

Senator KeNNeny. And that is the agent that you met with.

Mr. GiTTiNGER. That is right.

Senator KeNNEpy. And yon met at the safe house.

Mr. GirTiNcEn. Yes. sir.

Senator KrN NEby. Whom did you meet with in the safe house?

Mr. Grrtinuen. This is the part that is hard for me to say, and I am sorry that I have to. In conneetion with sone work that we were doing, we needed to have some information on sexual habits, Morgan Halì provided informants for me to talk to in connection with the sex habits that I was interested in trying to find information. During one period of time the safe house. as far as I was concerned. was used for just these particular type of interviews. And I didn't see the red curtains.

Senator KeN NEpy. Those were prostitutes, were they?

Mr. GitriNGER. Yes. sir.

Senator KrsNEpy. How many different times were you there that you had similar

Mr. Girtiscen. 1 couldn't possihly say with any certainty on that. Four or five times.

Senator KEN NEny. Four or five times

Mr. GirriNüen. Over-you remember now. the period that I'm talking abonut when 1 would have any involvement in this is from about 1956 to 1961. So it's about a 4- or 5-year period which is the only time that I know anything about what you are talking about here today.

Senator Krssuny. Did Morgan Hall make the arrangements for the prostitutes to meet with you?

Mr. GirTiNGER. Yes, sir.

Senator KrsNepy. Did the interviews that you had have anything to do with drugs?

Mr. Grrriscen. Well. as I tried to explain earlier when this was being discussed a little bit beforehand. again I think it is pretty hard for nost people now to recognize how little there was known about drugs at the period of time that we are talking about, because the

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drug age or the drug culture comes later on. Consequently, those of us who had any responsibility in this area were interested in trving to get as much information as we could on the subeulture, the subeulture drug group. and obviously the Burean of Narcoties represented a mean- of doing thiz. Conseqnently. other types of things that were involved in diseussion- at that tine would have to do with the underground use of drugs. When l am talking abont this I am talking about the folk ways in terms of unwitting use of drugs. Did these people that I wa- talking to have any information abont this and on rare instances they were able to tell me about their use, and in most cases this would largely turn out to he a Mickey Finn or something of that sort rather than anything esoteric.

1 also was very much interested because we had relatively little inforuation. heliete it or not. at that time. in terms of the various reactions that people were having to drugs. Therefore. these people were very informative in terms of they knew a great deal of information about reactions.

Senator KEx NEpy. At least you gathered-or am I correet in assuming that you gathered the imprezsion that the prostitutes that you had talked to were able to ship the drugs to people as I understand it. Did you form any impression on that!

Mr. Grrrixeer. I certainly did not form the impression that they did thi- as a rule or-

Senator KEN NEny. But they had the knowledge.

Mr. GirriNüER. They had the knowledge or some of them had had knowledge of this being done. But again, as it turned out, it was largely in this area of knockout drops.

Senator KexNEpy. Looking back now did you form any impression about how the Ageney was actually testing the broad speetrum of social classes in these safe houses? With the large disbursal of cash in small quantities. Sloo bill- and the kinds of elaborate decorations and two-way mirror- in the bedroons and all the rest, is there any question in your own mind what was going on in the safe houses, or the techniqnes that were being used to ahinister these drugs?

Mr. GrrrisGEr. I find it very difficuht to answer that question. sir. I had absolutely no direet knowledge there was a large number of this. I had no knowledge that anyone oiher than-than Morgan Hall was in any way involved in the unwitting administration of drugs

Senator KENNEpy. But Gottlieb would know. would he not?

Mr. GrrriNGEe. 1 believe so, ves, sir.

Senator KENNEpy. Could we go into the Hhuman Eeology Foundation and talk about that and how it was used as an instrumnent in terms of the support of research?

Mr. GirTINGER. Yes. sir.

Senator KeNNEpy. Could von deseribe it to us? Could vou deseribe the Hhumnan Ecology Foundaton. how it funetioned anl how it worked?

Mr. GirrixgEr. May I tell something about how it evohved, which I think i- important!

Senator KENNEDY. Sure.

Mr. GrrrisgEk. The Society for the Investigation of Human Ecology. so-called, was ac:ually a-l am confused here now as to whether I should name you names.

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Senator KeNNEDr. Well. we're not interested in names or institutions, so we prefer that you do not. That has to be worked out in arrangements between Admiral Turner and the individuals and the institutions.

But were interested in what the Foundation really was and how it functioned and what its purpose was.

Mr. (ittixgei. Well, it was established to undertake research in the general area of the behavioral sciences. It definitely had almost no focus or interest in, say. drug-related type of activities except in a very minor way, because it was largely set up to attempt to gain a certain amount of information and to fund projeets which were psychological, sociological. anthropological in character. It was established in the sense of a period of time that a lot of u- who are in it wish we could do it over again. but we were interestel in trying to get together a panel of the most representative high-level behavioral scientists we could to oversee and help in terms of developing the Society for the Investigation of Human Ecology type of program.

The Agency in effect provided the money. They did not direct the projects. Now, the fact of the matter is. there are a lot of innocent people who received the Society for the Investigation of Human Ecology money which I know for a fact they were never asked to do anything for the CIA but they did get through this indirectly. They had no knowledge that they were getting CIÀ money.

Senator KenNepr. Over what period of tinie did this take place?

Mr. Girtinger. As far as I was concerned. it was the period of time ending in 1961. I believe the Human Ecology fund finally phased out in 1965. but I was not involved in this phasing out.

Senator KeNNenr. Can you give the range of the different sort of individual projects of the universities in which it was active?

Mr. Gittinger. Well. it would have as many as-I am very fuzzy on my memory on the number of projects. It is over 10. 20. 30.

Senator KeNNeny. After it made the grants. what was the relationship of the Agency with the results of the studies? The Foundation acquired the money to make the grants from the Agency, and then it made the grants to these various research programs.

Mr. GITTINGER. Yes. sir.

Senator Kenneny. And that included eight universities as well as individual researchers?

Mr. GITTINcER. Yes. sir.

Senator KeNNepy. Then what follow-up was there to that, sir!

Mr. GirriNgEn. Well. in every sense of the word. the organization was run exactly like any other foundation. and it carried with it the same thing in terms of making certain that the people that they had given money to used it for the purpose for which it had been granted, that they had access to any of the reports that they had put out. but there were no strings attached to anybody. There wasn't any reason they couldn't publish anything that they put out.

Senator KeNNenr. What sort of budget are we talking about here? Mr. Grrriyger. I honestly do not remember. I would muess we are talking in the realm of about \$150.000 a year, but don't hold me to that. because I don't know.

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Senator Kennedr. What is your view about such funding as a professional person, in terms of compromising the integrity of a university. sir?

Mr. Girringer. Well. obviously, sir. insofar as today there is no question about it. I will have to say at the time that we were doing this there was quite an entirely different kind of an attitude. and I do know for a fact that we moved to start towards phasing out the Society for the Investigation of Human Ecology and the Human Ecology Fund for the very reason that we were beginning to recognize that it was moving into an area but this would be compromised.

Senator Kesnepy. Well. that is commendable, both your attitude and the reasons for it, but during that period of time it still was involved in behavior rescarch programs, as I understand it.

Mr. Girrisger. Yes. sir. On its own. in connection with this. it participated again, and these again were not CIA-directed projects. but these were all things which would theoretically contribute to the general knowledge at the time where the things like the study of the Hungarian refugees-obviously. the study of the Hungarian refugees who came to this country after the Hungarian revolt was a very useful exercise to try to get information about the personality characteristics of the Communists and so forth.

Senator Kensepr. Were there other foundations that were doing similar kinds of work?

Mr. GirriNGER. Not to my knowledge, sir.

Senator KENNEDy. You believe

Mr. GitriNGER. You mean. CIA. other CIA?

Senator KENNEDY. Right.

Mr. Girringer. Well. my answer is in the sense that I know of no other CIA foundations, no. Thore were. of course. other foundations doing similar kinds of work in the United States.

Senator KrnNeny. Have you heard of the Psychological Assessments Foundation?

Mr. GirriNGER. I certainly have.

Senator KeyNEpy. What was that? What function did that have?

Mr. Girriyger. Now, this was bringing us up to a different era. I believe the functions of that organization have nothing whatsoever to do with the things that are being talked about here while I was associated with it.

Senator KesNeny. Rather than getting into the work. it was another foundation. was it not? It was another foundation supported by the Agoncy?

Mr. GirriyGER. What. the Psychological Assessment?

Senator KENNEny. Yes.

Mr. GittiygER. No. sir. it was not.

Senator Keysepy. It did not get any support at all from the Ageney?

Mr. Girrisger. Oh, yes, sir. It did get support. but it was a business firm.

Senator KeNNEpy. It was a business but it got support from the Agency?

Mr. Girrixger. It got money from it. but it definitely was not in MKULTRA or in any way associated with this.

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Senator KexNepy. All right. I want to thank you for your helpful testimony. Mr. Gittinger. It is not easy to go back into the past. I think you have been very fair in your characterizations, and I think it is quite appropriately indicated that there are different standards now from what they were 25 years ago. and I think you have responded very fairly and completely to the inquiries. and I think with a good deal of feeling about it.

You are a person who is obviously attempting to serve the country's interest. so I want to thank you very much for your statement and for your helpful timeliness.

Mr. GiTTiNGER. Thank you. sir.

Senator Isorre. Senator Case?

Senator Case. Thank you. Mr. Chairman. I am sorry that I had another committee that I had to complete the hearing with this morning before I got here.

I shall read the testimony with very great interest, and I appreciate your testimony as I have heard it. I would like to comment just on one point, and that is. it relates to a story in the press yesterday about part of this program involving the funding of a grant at aforeign university. I would like to elicit from you a comment as to the additional sensitivity and difficulty that that practice involves from your standpoint as a scientist, as well as a citizen. if you will.

Mr. GirriNGER. I will say it was after the fact thinking. It was utter stupidity the way things worked out to have used some of this money outside the l'nited States when it was CIA money. I can categorically state to my knowledge and I don't claim a complete knowledge all the way across of the human ecology funetions. but to my knowledge, and this is unfortunate, those people did not know that they were getting money from CIA, and they were not asked to contribute anything to CIA as such.

Senator Case. It would be interesting to try to examine this by turning the thing around and thinking what we would think if this happened fronn a foreign oflicial ageney to our own university. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator IyotYE. Senator Schweiker.

Senator ScnweikER. Thank you. Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Goldman. I wonder if you would tell us what your training and educational background is?

Dr. Golpmax. I have already given a biography for the record.

Senator ScnwElkER. I have not seen it. Who has it? Is it classified? We may have it for the record. but may I ask you to briefly deseribe your training and background for us now? I hope it is no secret.

Dr. Goupmax. Well. I was told if I was asked this to say that. I was told that by your staff people, but I have no objection to telling you. I am a resident from Pennsylvania. southwest Pennsylvania, Lancaster County. I went to Penn State. and I am in nutrition.

Senator ScHWEIKER. In what?

Dr. GolpMAN. Nutrition.

Senator ScuweikeR. Were you in charge of a section or segment of the CLA in your past capacity?

Dr. Golpmax. During the time I was with that organization. I was in charge of one small section of it, one small segment of it ; yes.

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Senator Schweiker. What was the function or purpose of that section that you headed!

Dr. Goipmaxs. To provide support for the other parts of the division. Senator SciweikeR. Where in the chain of command woukd that put you in relation to Dr. (ottlieb?

Dr. GolpMaN. P'retty far down the line.

Senator ScnwelkeR. Mr. Gittinger. I would just like to ask you a few questions. We appreciate your frankness and candor with the committee. and we realize this is a very difficuht area to go into. I am not quite clear on two matters that were raised earlier. First, were the safe houses we were talking about here used on occasion by the prostitutes you referred to?

Mr. GirrisgER. I really have not the slightest idea.

Senator SemwenkEr. Were the prostitutes used in any way to slip the eustomers drugs for observation purposes?

Mr. GirriNGER. Not to ny direet knowledge.

Senator ScnwElkrR. Would you have been in a position to know the answer to cither of these questions?

Mr. Grrrincer. May I say. probably not, and may I make an aside to explain a little bit of this. please. sir?

Senator ScuweikrR. Mr. Gittinger. a moment ago you mentioned brainwashing techniques. as one area that you had. I guess. done some work in. How would you characterize the state of the art of brainwashing today? Who has the most expertise in this field. and who is or is not doing it in terms of other governments?

During the Korean war there was a lot of serious discussion about brainwa-hing techniques being used by the North Koreans, and I an interested in finding ont what the state of the art is today. as you see it.

Mr. Grrriscek. Well, of course. there has been a great deal of work on this. and there is still a great deal of controversy. I can tell you that as far as I knew, by 196]. 1962. it was at leastproven to my satisfaction that brainwashing, so called. is some kind of an esoterie device where drngs or mind-altering kinds of conditions and so forth were used. did not exist even though "The Manchurian Candidate"as a movie really set us back a long tine, beeause it made something impossible look plausible. Do vou follow what I mean? But by 1962 and 1963, the general idea that we were able to come up with is that brainwa-hing was largely a proeess of isolating a human being. keeping him out of contaet, putting hin under long stress in relationship to interviewing and interrogation, and that they could produce any change that way withont having to resort to any kind of esoteric means.

Senator ScnweikEr. Are there ways that we can ascertain this from a distance when we see a captive prisoner either go on television, in a photograph. or at a press conference? In other words, are there certain signsthat you have learned to recognize from your technical background. to tell when brainwashing has occurred? Or is that very difficult to do?

Mr. Grrriygrr. It is difieult to do. I think it is posible now in terms of looking at a pieture of somebody who has been in enemy hands for a long period of time. We can get some pretty good ideas of what kind of circumstances he has been under, if that is what you mean.

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Senator SchweikeR. That is all I have, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
Senator INouyE. Thank you very much.

Before adljourning the hearings. I would like to have the record show that Ir. Goldman and Mr. Gittinger have voluntarily cooperated with the committee in staff interviews, that they appear this morning voluntarily, and they are not under subpena.

Gentlenien. I realize that this experience may have been an unhappy one and possibly a painful one. Therefore. we thank you very much for participating this morning. We also realize that the circumstances of that tine differed very much from this day, and possibly the national attitude, the national political attitude condoñed this type of activity. So. we have not asked you to come here as persons who have committed crimes. but rather in hope that you can assist us in studying this problem so that it will not oceur once again. In that spirit we thank you for your participation. and we look forward to working with you further in this case.

Thank you very much.

Senator KeNNepy. Mr. Chairman. I would like also to thank the witnesses. These are dificult matters. and I think all of us are very grateful.

Senator Scuweiker. I think the witnesses should know that though it may not always seem that way. what we are trying to do is to probe the past and look at the policies of the past to affect the future. I think our emphasis really is on the future. not the past. but it is important that we learn from the past as we formulate policies and legislation for the future. I hope that all of the witnesses who did come before us voluntarily this morning. ineluding Admiral Turner respect the fact that we are questioning the past to learn about the future. I think it should be looked at in that light.

Senator KeNNepy. I think that is the spirit in which we have had these hearings. It seems to me that from both these witnesses and others. Gottlieb knows the information and can best respond, and we are going to make every effort in the Senate Health Committee to get Mr. Gottlieh to appear, and we obviously look forward to cooperating with Senator Inouye and the other members of the committee in getting the final chapter written on this. but we want to thank you very much for your appearance here.

Senator IxorrE. The hearing will stand in recess, subjeet to the call of the Chair.

[Whereupon. at 12:12 p.m., the hearing was recessed. subject to the call of the Chair.]

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APPENDIX A

XVII. TESTING AND USE OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGI-CAL AGENTS BY THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

Under its mandate ' the Select Committee has studied the testing and use of chemical and biological agents by intelligence agencies. Detailed deseriptions of the prograns conducted by intelligence agencies involving chenical and biological agents will be included in a separately published appendix to the Senate Select Committee's report. 'This section of the report will discuss the rationale for the programs, their monitoring and control, and what the Committee's investigation has revealed about the relationships among the intelligence agencies and about their relations with other governmnent agencies and private institutions and individuals.? stitutions ana mnaiviuuais. rould vse chemi-

Fears that countries hostile to the United States would use chemical and biological agents against Americans or America's allies led to the development of a defensive program designed to discover techniques for American intelligence agencies to detect and counteract chemical and biological agents. The defensive orientation soon became secondary as the possible use of these agents to obtain information fron, or gain control over, enemy agents became apparent. from, or gain comtrui over, tnvm, “ l -hich could

Research and developmnent programs to find materials which could be used to alter human behavior were initiated in the late 194os and early 1950s. These experinental programs originally included testing of drugs involving witting humnan subjects. and culminated in tests using unwitting, nonvolunteer human subjects. These tests were designed to determine the potential effects of chemical or biological agents when used operationally against individuals unaware that they had received a drug. had receivea a urug. snsitive br the in-

The testing programs were considered highly sensitive by the intelligence agencies administering them. Few people. even within the agencies, knew of the programs and there is no evidence that either the executive branch or Congress were ever informed of them. The highly compartmented nature of these programs may be explained in part by an observation made by the CIA Inspector General that, "the knowledge that the Agency is engaging in unethical and illicit activi-

Senate Resolution 21 directs the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities to investigate a number of issues: Activities to investigate a numper or issues: munite conducted illegal

"(a) Whetber agencies within the intelligence community conducted illegal domestic activities (Section 2(1) and (2)) : domestic activities (section (1) adu(). -:-uiaonce communit cooner-

"(b The extent to which agencies within the intelligence community cooperate (Section 2(4) and (8)) ; ate (Section 2(4) and (8)) ; cienal osersight of intel-

"(c) The adequacy of executive branch and congressional oversight of intelligence activities (Section 2(7) and (11)); ligence activities (Section )ana n ishte of American citi-

"(d) The adequacy of existing laws to safeguard the rigbts of American citizens (Section 2(13))." zens (Section 2(13)). The nrograms vere higbly

The details of these programs may never be known. The programs were bighly compartmented. Few records were kept. What little documentation existed for the CIA's principal program was destroyed early in 1973.

(65)

(385)

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386

ties would have serious repercussions in political and diplomatic circles andwould be detrimental to the accomplishment of its missions."

The research and development program, and particularly the covert testing programs, resulted in massive abridgments of the rights of American citizens, sometimes with tr.iric consequences. The deaths of two Americans " can be attributed to these prograns; other participants in the testing programns may still suffer from the residual effects. While sone controlled testing of these substances might be defended, the nature of the tests, their scale, and the fact that they were continued for years after the danger of surreptitious administration of LsD to unwitting individuals was known, demonstrate a fundainental disregard for the value of human life.

The Select Committee's investigation of the testing and use of chemical and biological agents also raise serious questions about the adequacy of command and control procedures within the Central Intelligence Agency and military intelligence, and about the relationships among the intelligence agencies, othergovernmental agencies, and private institutions and individuals. The CIA's normal administrative controls were waived for programs involving chemical and biological agents to protect. their security. According to the head of the Audit Branch  the (IA. thesewaivers produced "gross administrative failures." They pr.nted the CIA's internal review mechanisms (the Oflice of General Consel. the Inspector General. and the Audit Staff) from adequately supervising the programs. In general. the waivers had the paradoxical eflect of providing less restrictive administrative controls and less effective internal revie for controversial and highly sensitite projects than those governing normal Ageney activities.

The security of the programs was protected not only by waivers of normal administrative controls. but also hy a high degree of compartmentation within the CIA. This compartmentation excluded the CIA's Medical Staff from the principal research and testing program employing chemical and biological agents.

It also may have led to agency policymakers receiving differing and inconsistent responses when they posed questions to the CIA component involved.

Jurisdictional uncertainty within the CIA was matched by jurisdictional conflict among the various intelligence agencies. A spirit of cooperation and reciprocal exchanges of information which initially characterized the programs disappeared. Military testers withheld injormation from the CIA. ignoring suggestions for coordination from their superiors. The CIA similarly failed to provide information to the military on the CIA's testing program. This failure to cooperate was conspicuously manifested in an attempt by the Army to conceal

66

CIA Inspector General's Survey of TSD. 195T, p. 217.

"On January S. 1953 Mr Harold Blaver died of circulatory collapse ard heart failure following an intravenous injection of a srnthetic mescaline derivatire while a subject of tests conducted by New York State Psrchiatric Institute under a contract let hs the U'.S. Arms Chemical Corps. The Committee's investigatinn into drug testing br U'.S. intelligence agencies focused on the testing of LsD, however. the committee did rereive a copy of the U.s. Arbir Inspector General's Report. issued on October 1975, on the events and circumstances of Mr. Blauer's death. Hi» death was directly atributable to the administration of the syntbetic mescaline derivative.

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their overseas testing program, which included surreptitious administration of LSD. from the CIA. Learning of the Army's program, the Agency surreptitiously attempted to obtain details of it.

The-lecision to institute one of the Army's LSD field testing projects had been based, at least in part, on the finding that no long-term residual effects had ever resulted from the drug's administration. The CIA's failure to inform the Army of a death which resulted from the surreptitious administration of LSD to unwitting Americans, may well have resulted in the institution of an unnecessary and potentially lethal program.

The development, testing, and use of ch ical and biological agents by intelligence agencies raises serious questions about the relationship between the intelligence community and foreign governments, other agencies of the Federal Government, and other institutions and individuals. The questions raised range from the legitimacy of American complicity in actions abroadwhich violate American and foreign laws to the possible compromise of the integrity of public and private institutions used as cover by intelligence agencies.

A. THE PROGRAMS INVESTIGATED

1. Project CHATTER

Project CHATTER was a Navy program that began in the fall of 1947. Responding to reports of "amazing results" achieved by the Soviets in using "truth drugs." the program focused on the identification and testing of. such drugs for use in interrogations and in the recruitmel:-of agents. The research included laboratory esperiments on animals and hun:subjects involving Anabasis aphylla, scopolamine. and mescaline it. order to determine their speech-inducing qualities. Overseas experiments were conducted as part of the project.

The project expanded substantially during the Korean War, and ended shortly after the war, in 1953.

2. Project BLUEBIRD/ARTICHOKE

The earliest of the CIA's major programs involving the use of chemical and biological agents. Project BLUEBIRD, was approved by the Director in 1950. Its objectives were:

(a) discovering means of conditioning personnel to prevent unauthorized extraction of information from them by known means. (b) investigating the possibility of control of an individual by application of special interrogation techniques, (c) memory enhancement. and (d) establishing defensive means for preventing hostile control of Agency personnel.

As a result of interrogations conducted overseas during the project. arother goal was added-the evaluation of offensive uses of unconventional interrogation techniques, including hypnosis and drugs. In August 1951, the project was renamed ARTICIIOKE. Project ARTI-CHOKE included in-house experiments on interrogation techniques, conducted "under medical and security controls which would ensure

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387

'CIA memorandum to the Select Committee, "Bebavioral Drugs and Testing." 2/11/75.

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388

that no damage was done to individuals who volunteer for the experiments."Overseas interrogations utilizing a combination of sodium pentothal and hypnosis after physical and psychiatric examinations of the subjects were also part of ARTICHOKE.

The Öfice of Scientific Intelligence (OSI). which studied scientific advances by hostile powers. initially led BLUEBIRD/ARTICHOKE efforts. In 1952.overall responsibility for ARTICHOKE was transferred from OsI to the Inspection and Security Office (I&SO), predecessor to the present Office of Security. The CIA's Technical Services and Modical Staffs were to be called upon as needed: OSI would retain liaison function with other government agencies. The change in leadership, from an intelligence unit to an operating unit apparently reflected a change in emphasis; from the study of actions by hostile powers to the use, both for offensive and defensive purposes, ofspialinterrogation techniques-primarilyhypnosisandtruth serums.

Representatives from each Agency unit involved in ARTICHOKE met almost monthly to discuss their progress. These discussions inchudrl the planning of overseas interrogations\* as well as further experimentation in the U.S.

Information about project ARTICHOKE after the fall of 1953 is scarce. The ClA maintains that the project enied in 1956, but evidence suggest- that Office of Security and Office of Medical Services use of "special interrogation" techniques continued for several years thereafter.

3. MKNAOMI

MKNAOMIwas another major CIA program in this area.In 1967, theCIA summarized the purposes of MKNAOMI:

(a) To provide for a covert support base to meet clandestine opcrational requirements.

(b) To stockpile severely incapacitating and lethal materials for the specifie use of TSD [Technical Services Division].

(c) To maintain in operational readiness special and unique itens for the dissemination of biological and chemical materials.

(d) To provide for the required surveillance. testing. upgrading, and evaluation of materials and items in order to assure absence of defects and complete predictability of results to be expected under operational conditions.

U'nder an agreement reached with the Army in 1952. the Special Operations Division (SOD) at Fort Detrick was to assist CIA in developing, testing, and maintaining biologicalagents and delivery

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Memorandum from Rohert Tavlor. O/DD.T to the Assistant Deputs (Inspection and Security} and Chief of the Medical Staf, 3.22/52.

Memorandun from H. Marshal Chadnott. Assistant Director. Scientifc Intelligence, to the Deputs Dimmr/Plans DnP "Pmiect ARTICHOKE,"8/29/52. "Progress Report, Project ARTICHOKE."1/12/53.

Memorandum from Chief. TSD/Binlogical Branch to Chief. TSD "MKNAOMI: Funding. Obiectives, and Accomnlishments" 10/iß/6i. p. 1. For a fuller descrip tion of MKNAOMI and the relationship betweenCIA and SOD. see p. S60 ff.

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systems. By this agreement, CIA acquired the knowledge, skill, and facilities of the Army to develop biological weapons suited for CIA use.

SOD developed darts coated with biological agents and pills containing several ditrrent biological agents which could remain potent for weeks or montis. SOD also developed a special gun for firing darts coated with a chemical which could allow CIA agents to incapacitate a guard dog, enter an installation secretly, and return the dog to consciousness when leaving. SOD scientists were unable to develop a similar incapacitantfor humans. SOD) also physically transferred toCIA personnel biological agents in "bulk" form, and delivery devices. including some containing biological agents.

In addition to the CIA's interest in biological weapons for use against humans, it also asked SOI) to study use of biological agents against crops and animals. In its 1967 nemorandum. the CIA stated:

Three methods and systems for carrying out a covert attack against crops and causing severe crop loss have been developed and evaluated under field conditions. This was accomplished in anticipation of a requirement which was later developed but was subsequently scrubbed just prior to putting into action.

MKNAOMI was terminated in 1970. On November 25. 1969, President Nixon renounced the use of any form of biological weapons that kill or incapacitate and ordlered the disposal of existing stocks of bacteriological weapons. On February 14. 1970, the President clarified the extent of his earlier order and indicated that toxins-chemicals that are not living organisms but are produced by living organisms-were considered biological weapons subject to his previous directive and were to be destroved. Although instructed to relinquish control of material held for the CIA by SOD. a CIA scientist acquired approximately 11 grams of shellfish toxin from SOD personnel at Fort Detrick which were stored in a little-used CIA laboratory where it went undetected for five years.1º

4. MKULTRA

MKULTRA was the principal CIA program involving the research and development of chemical and biological agents. It was "concerned with the researeh and development of chemical, biological,:and radiological materials capable of employment in clandestine operations to control human behavior." 1

In January 1973, MKULTR.A records were destroyed by Technical Services Division personnel acting on the verbal orders of Dr. Sidney Gottlieb. Chief of TSD. Dr. Gottlieb has testified, and former Director Helms has confirmed. that in ordering the records destroved. Dr. Gottlieh was carrying out the verbal order of then DCI Helms.

MKULTR.A began with a proposal from the Assistant Deputy Direetor for Plans. Richard Helnis. to the DCI. outlining a special

∴.

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389

Ibid. p. 2.

Senate Select Committee, 9/16/75, Hearings, Vo. 1.

" Memorandum from the ClA Inspector General to the Director, 7/26/63.

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fu:. ling mechanism for highly sensitive CIA rescarch and development projects that studied the use of biological and chemical materials in altering human behavior. The projects involved:

Research to develop a capability in the covert use of biological and chemieal materials. This a:ca involves the production of various physiological conditions which could support present or future clandestine operations. Aside from the offensive potential, the development of a comprehensive capability in this feld of covert chemical and biological warfare gives us a thorough knowledge of the enemy's theoretical potential. thus enabling us to defend ourselves against a foe who might not be as restrained in the use of these techniques as we are.12

MKULTRA was approved by the DCI on April 13, 1953 along the lines proposed by AbbP Helms.

Pait of the rationale for the establishment of this special funding mechanism was its extreme sensitivity. The Inspector General's survey of MKILTR.A in 1963 noted the following reasons for this sensitivity:

a. leareh n: the manipulation of human behavior is considerl by ma:. . authorities in medicine and related fields to lprofessio!. iy unethical. therefore the reputation of professional participants in the MKULTRA.program are on occasion in jeopardy.

b. Some MKtLTRA activities raise questions of legality implicit in the original charter.

c. A final phase of the testing of MKILTRA products places the rights and interests of U.S. citizens in jeopardy.

d. Publie disclosure of some aspects of MKULTRA activity could induce serious adverse reaction in U.S. public opinion. as well as stimulate offensive and defensive action in this field on the part of foreign intelligence services.1ª

Over the ten-year life of the program, many "additional avenues to the control of human behavior" were designated as appropriate for investigation under the MKILTRA charter. These include "radiation. electroshoek. various fields of psvchology. psychiatry, sociology. and anthropolory. graphology. harassment substances, and paramilitary device- and materials.""

The meseareh and development of materials to be used for altering hunan behavior consisted of three phases: first. the search for materials suitable for study: second. laboratory testing on voluntary human subieets in various types of institutions: third, the application of MKULTRA materials in normal life settings.

The scarch for snitable materials was conducted through standing arrangement、 with speialists in universities. pharmaceutical houses. hospitals. state and federal institutions. and private research organi-

70

390

-1 Roport on MKULTRA, 19G3, pp. 1-2. νICD "Ihid n

" Momorandum from ADDP Holms to DCI Dulles, 4/3/53, Tab A. pp. 1-2.

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391

zations. The annual grants of funds to these specialists were made under ostensible rescarch foundation auspices, thereby concealing the CIA's interest from the specialist's institution.

The next phase of the MKULTRA program involved physicians, toxicologists, and other specialists in mental, narcotics, and general hospitals. and in prisons. Utilizing the products and findings of the basic research phase, they conducted intensive tests on human subiects.

One of the first studies was conducted by the National Institute of Mental Hlealth. This study was intended to tes: various drugs. including hallucinogenics, at the NIMII Addiction Research Center in Lexington. Kentucky. The "Lexington Rehabilitation Center," as it. was then calledl, was a prison for drug addiets serving sentences for drug violations.

The test subjects were volunteer prisoners who, after taking a brief physical examination and signing a general consent form, were administered hallucinogenic drugs. As a reward for participation in the program. the addiets were provided with the drug of their addiction.

LSI) was one of the materials tested in the MKULTRA program. The final phase of LSI) testing involved surreptitious administration to unwitting nonvolunteer subjects in normal life settings by undercover officers of the Bureau of Narcoties acting for the CIA.

The rationale for such testing was "that testing of materials under accepted scientife procedures fails to disclose the full pattern of reactions and attributions that may occur in operational situations."s

According to the CIA. the advantage of the relationship with the Bureau was that

test subjects could be sought and cultivated within the setting of nareoties control. Some subjects have been informers or members of suspeet criminal elements from whom the [Bureau of Narcoties] has obtained results of onerational value through the tests. On the other hand, the effectironess of the substiuces on indiriduals at all social lerels, high and low natire Amorican and forcigu, is of great siguificauce and testing has beo" porformed on a raricty of individuals writhin these cat goris. [Emphasis added.] 16

A special procelure, designated MKDELTA. was esablished to govern the use of MKULTRA materials abroud. Snch materials were used on a munber of occasions. Because MKULTRA records were dostroved. it is impossible to reconstruet the operational use of MKULTRA materials by the CIA overseas: it has been determined that the use of these materials abroad began in 1953, and possibly as early as 1950.

Drngs were used primarily as an aid to interrogations. but MKULTRA 'MKbELTA materials were also used for harassment. diserediting, or disabling purposes. Aecording to an Inspeetor General Survey of the Technical Services Division of the CIA in 1957-an inspection which did not discover the MKULTR A projeet involving the surreptitious adninistration of Lsh to unwitting, nonvolunteer

71

Ihid. p. 21.

Ibid, pp. 11–12.

[PAGE 74]
subjects—the CIA had developed six drugs for operational use and they had been used in sis different operations on a total of thirty-three subjects."By 1963 the number of operations and subjects had increased substantially.

In the spring of 1963, during a wide-ranging Inspector General survey of the Technical Services Division, a member of the Inspector General's staff, John Vance, learned about MKULTRA and about the project involving the surreptitious administration of LSD to unwitting. nonvoluntaryhumansubjects. As a result of the discovery and the Inspector General's subsequent report, this testing was halted and much tighter administrative controls were imposed on the progran. According to the CIA, the project was decreased significantly each budgetyear until its complete termination in the late 1960s.

5. The Testing of LSD by the Army

There were three major phases in the Army's testing of LSD. In the first. LSD was administered to more than 1,0o0 American soldiers who volunteered to be subjects in chemical warfare experiments. In the second phase, Material Testing Program EA 1729, 95 volunteers received LSI) in clinical experiments designed to evaluate potential intelligence uses of the drug. In the third phase, Projects THIRD CHANCE and DERBY HAT. 16 unwitting nonvolunteer subjects were interrogated after receiving LSI) as partof operationalfeld tests.

B. CIA DRUG TESTING PROGRAMS

1. The Rationalc for the Testing Programs

The late 1940s and early 1950s were marked by concernover the thrcat posed by the activities of the Soviet Union. the People's Republic of China, and other Communist bloc countries. United States concern over the use of cheiical and biological agents by these powers was acute. The belief that hostile powers had used chemical and biological agents in interrogations. brainwashing, and in attacks designed to harass, disable, or kill Allied personnel created considerable pressure for a "defensive" program to investigate chemical and biological agents so that the intelligence community could understand the mechanisms by which these substances worked and how their effects could be defeated.""

Of particular concern was the drug LSD. TheCIA had received reports that the Soviet Union was engaged in intensive efforts to produce ISD); and that the Soviet U'nion had attempted to purchase the world's supply of the chemical. As one CIA officer who was deeply involved in work with this drug described the climate of the times: "[It] is awfully hard in this day and age to reproduce how frightening all of this was to us at the time. particularly after the drug scene has become as widespread and as knowledgeable in this country as it did. But we were literally terrified, because this was the one material that we

72

"Ibid, 1957, p. 201. 1, 1, y. s.

"Thns an offier in the Ofice of Security of the CIA stressl the "urgency of the discovery of techniques and method that would permit our personnel, in the event of their capture hy the enemy. to resist or defeat enemy interrogation." (Minutes of the ARTICHOKE conference of 10/22/53.)

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393

had ever been able to locate that really had potential fantastic possibilities if used wrongly." 19

But the defensive orientation soon became secondary. Chemical and biological agents were to be studied in order "to perfect techniques . . . for the abstraction of information from individuals whether willing or not" and in order to "develop neans for the control of the activities and mental capacities of individuals whether willing or not."20One Agency official noted that drugs would be useful in order to "gain control of bodies whether they were willing or not" in the process of removing personnel from Europe in the event of a Soviet attack."In other programs, the CI.A began to develop, produce, stockpile, and maintain in operational readines materials which could be used to harass. disable, or kill specific targets."

Reports of research and development in the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of C'hina, and the CommnunistBloc countries provided the basis for the transmutation of American programs from a defensive to an offensive orientation. As the Chief of the Medical Staff of the Central Intelligence Agency wrote in 1952:

There is ample evidence in the reports of innumerable interrogations that the Communists were utilizing drugs, physical duress. electric shock. and possibly hypnosis against their enemies. With such evidence it is diflicult not to keep from becoming rabid about our apparent laxity. We are forced by this mounting evidence to assume a more aggressive role in the developnient of these techniques, but must be cautious to maintain strict inviolable control because of the havoc that coull be wrought by such techniques in unserupulous hands."

In order to meet the perceived threat to the national security, substantial prograns for the testing and use of chemical and biological agents-including projeets involving the surreptitious administration of LsI) to unwitting nonvolunteer subjects "at all social levels, high and low. native American and foreign"-were conceived, and implemented. These programs resulted in substantial violations of the rights of individuals within the U'nited States.

73

" Testimony of CIA officer, 11 21 75. p. 33. 011.. I'. w

\*Meinorandum froln the Director of Security to ARTiCHOKE representatives. Subject : "ARTICHoKE Restatement of Program." mcstareunen

nARTICHOKE memorandum. 7/30 53 2 r1.. 1)

The Inspector General's Report of 1957 on the Technical Services Division noted that "Six specitic produets have been developwd and are available for operational use. Three of then are discrediting and disatling materials which can be administered unwittingly and qwrmit the exercise of a measure of control over the actions of the subject." A memoraudom

A memoraudum for the Chief. TsD. Biological Braneh to the Chief. TSD. 10/1S67. describwd two of the objectives of the CIA's Project MKNAOMI as: "to stockpile severely incapacitating and lethal materials for the specife use of TSD" and "to maintain in operational readiness special and unique items for the dissemination of biological and chemical materals." cnemcat materls."

"Memorandum frou the Chief of the Medica Staf, 1/25/52.

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394

Although the CIA recognized these effects of LSI) to unwitting individuals within the United States, the project continued." As the Deputy Director for Plans, Richard Helms, wrote the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence during discussions which led to the cessation of unwitting testing:

While I share your uneasiness and distaste for any program which tends to intrude upon an individual's private and legal prerogatives, 1 believe it is necessary that the Ageney maintain a central role in this activity, keep current on enemy capabilities the manipulation of human behavior, and maintain an offensive capability.

There were no attempts to secure approval for the most controversial aspect of these programs from the executive branch or Congress. The nature and extent of the programs were closely held secrets; even 1'l McCone was not briefed on all the details of the program involving the surreptitious administration of LSD untili963. It was decmed imperative that these programs be concealed from the American people. As the CIA's Inspeetor General wrote in 1957:

Precautions must be taken not only to protect operations fron exposure to enemy forces but also to conceal these activities from the Ameriean public in general. The knowledge that the Ageney is engaging in unethical and illicit activities would have serious repercussions in political and diplomatic circles and would be detrimental to the aecomplishment of its mission.²°

2. The Dcath of Dr. Frank Olson

The most tragie result of the testing of LSD by the CIA was the death of Dr. Frank Olson, a civilian employee of the Army, who died on November 27. 1953. Hi- death followed his participation in a CIA experiment with IsD. As part of this experiment, Olson unwittingly received approximately To mierograms of LsD in a glass of Cointreau he drank on November 19, 1953. The drug had been placed in the bottle by a (lA oflicer, lr. Rolert Lashbrook, as part of an experiment he and Dr. Sidney Gottlieb performed at a neeting of Army and CIAscientists.

Shortly after this experiment. Olson exhibited symptoms of paranoia and schizophrenia. Aceompanied by Dr. Lashbrook. Olson sought psychiatrie assistance in New York City from a physician, Dr. Harold Abramson. whose research on Ls had been funded indireetly by the (IA. While in New York for treatment. Olson fell to his death from a tenth story window in the Statler Hotel.

74

Fven during the discussions which led to the termination of the unnitting testing. the Dbp turned down the option of halting sneh tests within the U.s. and continuing them abroad despite the fact that the Technical Services Division had condncted numerous operations abroad making use of Lsb. The DDP made this decision on the basis of security noting that the psist efforts overseas had resnited in "meaking an inordimate number of foreign nationals witting of our role in the very sensitive activity " tMemorandum for the Deputy Director of Central Intelhigence from the Peputy Purector for Plans. 12 1i.f3, p. 2.) 1id.23

1 (. sarvey of Ts1, 195. p. 217.

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75

395

a. Background.—Olson, an expert in aerobiology who was assigned to the Special Operations Division (SOD) of the U.S. Army Biological Center at Canp Detrick, Maryland. This Division had three primary functions:

(1) assessing the vulnerability of American installations to biological attack;

(2) developing techniques for offensive use of biological weapons; and

(3) biological research for the CIA.2

Professionally, Olson was well respected by his colleagues in both the Army and the CIA. Colonel Vincent Ruwet, Olson's immediate superior at the time of his death, was in almost daily contact with Olson. According to Colonel Ruwet : "As a professional man . . . his ability . . . was outstanding."" Colonel Ruwet stated that "during the period prior to the experiment . . . I noticed nothing which would lead me to believe that he was of unsound mind."»Dr. Lashbrook, who had monthly contacts with Olson from early 1952until the time of his death, stated publiely that before Olson received LSD, "as far as I know, he was perfectly normal." 30 This assessment is in direct contradiction to certain statenients evaluating Olson's emotional stability nade in CIA internal memoranda written after Olson's death.

b. Thc Esperiment.—On November 18, 1953. a group of ten scientists from the CIA and Camp Detrick attended a semi-annual review and analysis conference at a cabin located at Deep Creek Lake, Maryland. Three of the participants were from the CIA's Technical Services Staff. The Detrick representatives were all from the Special Operations Division.

According to one CIA official, the Special Operations Division participants “agreed that an unwitting experiment would be desirable."a1This account directly contradictsVincent Ruwet's recollection. Ruwet recalls no such disoussion. and has asserted that he would remember any such discussion because the SOD) participants would have strenuously objected to testing on unwitting subjects."

In May, 1953, Richard Helms. Assistant DDP, held a staff meeting which the Chief of Technical Services Staff attended. At this meeting Helms "indicated that the drug [LSI] was dynamite and that he shouldl be advised at all times when it was intended to use it." In addition, the then DIP, Frank Wisner, sent a memorandum to TSS stating the requirement that the DIP personally approve the use of LSD. Gottlieb went ahead with the experiment,"securing the ap-

"Staff summary of Vincent Ruwet Interview, 8/13/75. p. 3.

"Memorandum of Col. Vincent Ruwet, To Whom It Mar Concern. no date. p. 2.

Ruwet Memorandum, p. 3.

"Joseph B. Treaster, Neu York Times, 7/19/75, p. 1.

Memorandum for the Record from Lyman Kirkpatrick. 12/1/53. P. 1.

Ruwet (staff sunmary). S/13/75. p. 6.

Inspector General Diary, 12/2/53.

"Ihid. Dr. Gottlrib has testified that he does not remember either the meeting with Helns nor the Wisner memorandum. (Gottlieb, 10.'1s/75, p. 16.)

[PAGE 78]
396

proval of his immediate supervisor. Neither the Chief of TSS nor the DDPspecifically authorized the experiment in which Dr. Olson participated.3s

According to Gottlieb.³ a "very small dose" of LSI) was placed in a bottle of Cointreau which was served after dinner on Thursday, Novenber 19. The drug was placed in the liqueur by Robert Lashbrook. All but two of the SOI) participants received LSD. One did not drink; the other had a heart condition.³: About twenty minutes after they finished their Cointreau. Gottlieb informed the other partieipants that they had received ID.

Dr. Gottlieb stated that "up to the time of the experiment," he observed nothing unusual in Olson's behavior.• Once the experinent was underway, Gottlieb recalled that "the drug had a definite effect on the group to the point that they were boisterous and laughing and they could not continue the mceting or engage in sensible conversation." The meeting continued until about 1:00 a.n., when the participants retired for the evening. Gottlieb recalled that Olson, among others, complained of "wakefulness" during the night." According to Gottlieb on Friday morning "aside from some evidence of fatigue, I observed nothing unusual in [Olson's] actions, conversation, or general behavior."3 Ruwet recalls that Olson "appeared to be agitated" at breakfast. but that he "did not consider this to be abnornal under the circumstances."40

c. ThT'rcatm,nt.-The followingMonday. November 23. Olson was waiting for Ruwet when he came in to work at 7:30 a.m. For the next two davs Olson's friends and fanily attempted to reassure him and help him "snap out" of what appeared to be a serious depression. On Tuesday, Olson again came to Ruwet and, after an hour long con-

?

76

Dr. Gottlieb testifed that "given the information we knew up to this time, and based on a lot of our own self-administration. we thought it was a fairly benign substance in terms of potential harm." This is in confict mot only with Mr. Helms' statement but also with material w bich had been suppliri to the Technical Services Staff. In one long menorandum on current research with LsD which was supplied to Tsl, Henry Beecher descrited the dangers involved with such research in a prophetic manner. "The second reason to doubt Professor Rothland came when I raised the question as to any accidents which had arisen from the use of Lsl-25 He said in a very positive way. 'none.' As it turned out this answer could be called overly positive. for later on in the evening I was discussing the matter with Dr. W. A. Stohl. Jr.. a psychiatrist in Bleulera's Clinic in Zurich where I had gone at Rothland's insistence. Stohl. when asked the same question. replied. 'yes.' and added spontaneously. 'there is a case Professor Rothland knows about. In Geneva a woman physician who had been subject to depression to some extent took Lsp-25 in an experiment and became severely and suddenly depressed and committed suicide three weeks later. While the connection is not detinite. comnon knowledge of this could hardly have allowed the positive statement Rothland permitted himself. This case is a warning to us to avoid engaging subjects who are depressel. or who have been subjrct to depression.'" Dr Gottlieb testified that he had no recollection of either the retort or that particular section of it. (Sidney Gottliet testimony. 10/19/75.p.78.)

Memorandum of Sheffield Edwards for the record. 11,28/53, p. 2.

Lashbrook (staf summary). 7/19. 5, p. 3.

Gottlieb Memorandum, 12/7/53. p. 2.

Edwards memorandum. 11/25 53. p. 3.

Gottlieb memorandum. 12/7./53. p. 3.

" Ruwet memorandum. p. 3.

[PAGE 79]
versation. it was decided that medical assistance for Dr. Olson was desirable."

Ruwet then called Lashbrook and informed him that "Dr. Olson was in serious trouble and needed immediate professional attention."2 Lashbrook agreed to make appropriate arrangements and told Ruwet to bring Olson to Washington, D.C. Ruwet and Olson proceeded to Washington to meet with Lashbrook, and the three left for New York at about 2: 30 p.m. to meet with Dr. Harold Abramson.

At that time Dr. Abramson was an allergist and immunologist practicing medicine in New York City. He held no degree in psychiatry. but was aszociated with rescarch projects supported indirectly by the CIA. Gottlieb and Dr. Lashbrook both followed his work closely in the early 195os.Since Olson needed medical help. they turned to Dr. Abramson as the doctor closest to Washington who was experienced with LSD and cleared by the CIA.

Ruwet. Lashbrook, and Olson remained in New York for two days of consultations with Abranson. On Thursday, November 26, 1953, the three flew back to Washington so that Olson could spend Thanksgiving with his family. En route from the airport Olson told Ruwet that he was afraid to face his fanily. After a lengthy discussion. it was decided that Olson and Lashbrook would return to New York. and that Ruwet would go to Frederick to explain these events to Mrz. Olson."

Lashhrook and Olson flew back to New York the same day, again for consultations with Abramson. They spent Thursday night in a Long Island hotel and the next morning returned to the city with Abramnson. In further discussions with Abramson, it was agreed that Olson should be placed under regular psychiatric care at an institution closer to his home."

d. The Ieath.—Because they could not obtain air transportation for a return trip on Friday night. Lashbrook and Olson made reservations for Saturday morning and checked into the Statler Hotel. Between the time they cherked in and 10:00 p.m.; they watched television. visited the cocktail lounge, where each had two martinis, and dinner. According to Lashbrook. Olson "was cheerful and appeared to enjoy the entertainment." He "appeared no longer particulary depressed, and almost the Ir. Olson I knew prior to the experiment."

After dinner Lashbrook and Olson watched television for about an hour, and at 11 :00. Ol on suggested that they go to bed. saying that "he felt more relaxed and contented than he had since [they] came to New York."" Olson then left a call with the hotel operator to wake then in the morning. At approximately 2:30 a.m. Saturday. November 2s. Lashbrook was awakened by a loud "erash of glass." In his report on the incident, he stated only that Olson "had crashed through the closed window blind and the closed window and he fell to his death from the window of our room on the 10th floor."8

397

77

" Ibid.. p. 4.

"Lashbrook memorandum. 12/7.53. p. 1.

" Staf sunimary of Dr. Harold Abraimson interview, 7/29/75, p. 2.

"Lashbrook memorandum, 12/7 53. p. 3.

Abr mson memorandum, 12/4/53.

"Lashorook memorandum. 12/7/53. p. 3.

" I bid.. p. 4.

Ibid.

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Immediately after finding that Olson had leapt to his death, Lashbrook telephoned Gottlieb at his home and informed him of the incident." Gottlieb called Ruwet and informed him of Olson's death at approximately 2:45 a.m.s0Lashbrook then called the hotel desk and reported the incident to the operator there. Lashbrook called Abranison and informed hin of the occurrence. Abramson told Iashbrook he "wanted to be kept out of the thing completely." but later changed his mind and agreed to assist Lashbrook.s1

Shortly thereafter. uniformed police officers and some hotel emplovees came to Lashbrook's room. Lashbrook toll the police he didn't know why Olson had committed suicide, but he did know that Olson "suffered from ulcers." s2

e. Th Aftermnath.-Following Dr. Olson's death. theCIA made a substantial effort to ensure that his family received death benefits, but did not notify the Olsons of the circumstances surrounding his demise.The Agency also made considerable efforts to prevent the death being connected with the CI.. and supplied complete cover for Lashbrook so that his association with the CIA would remain a secret.

After Dr. Olsom's death the CIA conducted an internal investigation of the incident. As part of his responsibilities in this investigation. the General Counsel wrote the Inspector General, stating:

I'm not happy with what seems to be a very casual attitude on the part of Tss representatives to the way this experimentwas condlneted and the remarks that this is just one of the risks running with scientific experimentation. I do not eliminate the need for taking risks, but I do believe, especially when human health or life is at stake. that at least the prudent. reasonable measures which can be taken to minimize the risk must be taken and failure to do so was culpable negligence. The actions of the various individuals concerned after effects of the experimenton Dr. Olson became manifest also revealed the failure to observe normal and reasonable precautions.3

As a result of the investigation DCI Allen Dulles sent a personal letter to the Chief of Technical Operations of the Technical Services Staff who had approved the experiment criticizing him for "poor judgunent ... in authorizing the use of this drug on such an unwitting basis andwithout proximate medical safeguards."Dulles also sent a letter to Dr. Gottlieb, Chief of the Chemical Division of the Technical Services Staff. criticizing him for recommending the "unwitting application of the drug" in that the proposal "did not give suffcient emphasis for medical collaboration and for the proper consideration of the rights of the individual to whon it was being administered." ss

一

78

CIA Field Office Report. 12 '3/53. p. 3.

Memorandum from PClto Sidney Gottlieb, 2/12 '54.

Memorandum from DCI Chief. Technical Operations, TSs. 2/12/54.

Ibid.

" Memorandum from the Goneral Counsel to the Inmpector General, 1/4/54.

Ruwet Memorandun. p. 11.

CIA Field Office Report. 12/3/53. p. 3.

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The letters were hand carriedl to the individuals to be read and returned. Although the letters were critical. a note from theDeputy Director of Central Intelligence to Mr. Helms instructed him to inform the individuals that : "These are not reprinmands and no personnel file notation are being made." s6

Thus, although the Rockefeller Commission has characterized them as such, these notes were explicitly not reprimands. Nor did participation in the events which led to Dr. Olson's death have any apparent effeet on the advaneement within the CIA of the individuals involved.

3. The Surreptitious Administration of LSI) to Unuitting Non-V'olunteer Human Subjcets by the CIA After the Death of Dr. Olson

The death of Dr. Olson could be viewed. as some argued at the time. as a tragic accident, one of the risks inherent in the testing of new substances. It might be argued that LSh was thought tobe benign. After the death of Dr. Olson the dangers of the surreptitious administration of ISD were clear. vet the CIA continued or initiateda project involving the surreptitious administration of LSD to nonvolunteer human subjects. This progran exposed numerous individuals in the United States to the risk of death or serious injury without their informed consent, without medical supervision, and without necessary follow-up to determine any long-term effects.

Prior to the Olson experiment, the Direetor of Central Intelligence had approved MKILTRA. a researeh progran designed to develop a "capability in the covert use of biological and chemical agent materials."In the proposal describing MKULTRA Mr. Helms. then ADDP, wrote the Director that :

we intend to investigate the development of a chemical material which causes a reversible non-toxic aberrant mental state. the specife nature of which can be reasonably well predicted for each individual. This material could potentially aid in discrediting individuals, eliciting information, and implanting suggestions and other forms of mental control.s

On February 12, 1954. the Director of the Central Intelligence Ageney wrote TSs officials criticizing then for "poor judgnent" in administering LsI) on "an unwitting basis and without proximate medical safeguards" to Dr. Olson and for the lack of "proper considcration of the rights of the individual to whom it was being administered."s On the same day. the Inspeetor General reviewed a report on Subprojeet Numnber 3 of MKIITRA, in which the same TSS officers who had just received letters from the Director were quoted as stating that one of the purposes of Subproject Number 3 was to

79

•Note from DDCI to Richanl Relms. 2/13/54.

"The 1963 IG Report, which described the project involving the surreptitious administration of LSD. placed the projoet leginning in 1955. Otber CIA documents reveal that it was in existence as early as February 194. The CIa bas told the Committee that the project beg n in 195 and tbat the experiment which led to Dr. Olson's death was part of the project.

Memorandum from Abbp items to 11 Dulles. 4/3/53. tab A. p. 2.

Memorandum from 11 to Sidhey Gottlieb, 2/12 '54; and menorandum from DCI to Chief of Operations, TSS, 2/12/54.

[PAGE 82]
"observe the behavior of unwitting persons being questioned after having been given a drug." eo There is no evidence that Subproject Number 3 was terminated even though these officers were unequivocally aware of the dangers of the surreptitious administration of LSD and the necessity of obtaining informed consent and providing medical safeguards. Subproject Number 3, in fact, used methiods which showed even less concern thian did the OLSON experiment for the safety and security of the participants. Yet the evidence indicates the project continued until 1963.61 continuea untl 1voo. tho tost might make

In the project. the individual conducting the test might make initial contact with a prospective subject selected at random in a bar. He would then invite the person to a "safehouse" where the test drug was administered to the subject through drink or in food. CIA personnel might debrief the individual conducting the test, or observe the test by using a one-way mirror and tape recorder in an adjoining room. room. »of the subiects.

Prior consent was obviously not obtained fron any of the subjects. There was also, obviously, no medical prescreening. In adlition; the tests were conducted by individuals who were not qualified scientific observers. There were no medical personnel on hand either to administer the drugs or to observe their effects, and no follow-up was conducted on the test subjects.

As the Inspector General noted in 1963:

A significant limitation on the effectiveness of such testing is the infeasibility of performing scientific observation of results. The [individuals conducting the test] are not qualified scientific observers. Their subjects are seldon accessible beyond the first hours of the test. The testing may be useful in perfecting delivery techniques, and in identifying surface characteristics of onset, reaction, attribution, and side-effect.62

This was particularly troublesome as in a number of instances, . . . the test subject has become ill for hours or days, including hospitalization in at least one case. and the agent could only follow up by guarded inquiry after the test subjeet's retuirn to normal life. Possible sickness and attendant economic loss are inherent contingent eflects of the testing.63

Paradoxically. greater care seenms to have been taken for the safety of forvign nationals against whom LsI) was used abroad. In several cases medical examinations were performed prior to the use of LsD.

80

400

Memorandum to Inspector General from Chief, Inspection and Review, on Subprojeet #3 of MKULTRA. 2/10,54.

1G Report on MKULTRA, 13.

1 bid.. p. 12. 1bid. According to the IG's survey in 193, physicians associated with MKI'I.TRA could be nade available in an emergency. MKIITRA could be nade avalaoe  a msihle for the oneratioual

"The Technical Services Division which was responsible for the operatioual use of LsI) abroad took the position that "no pbysical examination of the subject is required prior to administration of [LSD] by TSS trained personnel. A pbysi-

[PAGE 83]
Moreover, the administration abroad was marked by constant observation made possible because the material was being used against prisoners of foreign intelligence or security organizations. Finally, during certain of the LSD) interrogations abroad, local physicians were on call, though these physicians had had no experience with LSD and would not be told that hallucinogens had been administered.s nf

The CIA's project involving the surreptitious administration or LSD to unwitting human subjects in the United States was finally halted in 1963, as a result of its discovery during the course of an Inspector General survey of the Technical Services Division. When the Inspector General learnel of the project, he spoke to the Deputy Director for Plans, who agreed that the Director should be briefed. The DDP made it clear that the DCI and his Deputy were generally familiar with MKI'LTR.A. He indicated. however, that he was not sure it was necessary to brief the DDCI at that point. sure n was nrcrssay .

On May 24. 1963, the 1IP advised the Inspector General that he had briefed the Director on the MKILTRA program and in particular had covered the question of the surreptitious administration of LSD to unwitting human subjects. According to the Inspector General, the DDP said that "the Director indicated no disagreement and therefore the 'testing' will continue."ss ue tesunng wntomomma

One copy of an "Eyes Only" draft report on MKULTRA was prepared by the Inspector General who recommended the termination of the surreptitious administration project. The project was suspended following the Inspector General's report.

On December i7, 1963, Deputy Director for Plans Helms wrote a memo to the DDCI, who with the Inspector General and the Executive Direetor-Comptroller had opposed the covert testing. He noted two aspects of the problem: (1) "for over a decade the Clandestine Services has had the mission of maintaining a capability for infuencing human behavior:" and (2) "testing arrangements in furtherance of this mission should be as operationally realistic and yet as controllable as possible." Helms argued that the individuals must be "unwitting" as this was "the only realistic method of maintaining the capability, considering the intended operational use of materials to influence human behavior as the operational targets will certainly be unwitting. Should the subjects of the testing not le unwitting, the program would only le "pro forma" resulting in a "false sense of accomplishment and readliness."Helms continued:

81

cian nerd not be present. There is no danger medically in the use of tbis material as handled by Tss trained personnel." The Offier of Medical Services had taken the psition that LSp was "medically dangerous." Both the Offce of Security aud the Ofice of Medical Services argued that LsD "sbould not be administered unless prrceded by a melical examination .. . and should be administered only hy or in the presence of a physician who had studied it and its effect." (Memorandum from James Angleton. Chief, Counterintelligence Staff to Chief of Operations, 12/12 57. Pp. 1-2. a0ons. 12.12 . pp. 1-. sbo a dieanosis

Physicians might te called with the bope that they would make a diagnosis of mental breakdown which would be useful in discrediting the individual who was the subject of the ClA interest. vas the subjeet or tnet 1 mnterrs. ---1 K/15/82n1

"Memorandum for the Record prepared by the Insptor General, 5/15/63, p. 1. Ibid., p. 2.

[PAGE 84]
402

If one grants the validity of the mission of maintaining this unusual capability and the necessity for unwitting testing, there is only then the question of how best to do it. Obviously, the testing should be conducted in such a manner as to permit the opportunity to observe the results of the administration on the target. It also goes without saying that whatever testing arrangement we adopt must afford maximum safeguards for the protection of the Ageney's role in this activity, as well as minimizing the possibility of physical or emotional daunage to the individual tested.ss

In another memo to the Director of Central Intelligence in June, 1964. Hlelms again raised the issue of unwitting testing. At that time General Carter. then acting DCI. approved several changes in the MKUL,'TR.A program proposed by Mr. Helms as a result of negotiations bet ween the Inspector General and the DIP. In a handwritten note. however. Director Carter added that "unwitting testing will be subject to a separate decision." 69

No specific decision was made then or soon after. The testing had been halted and, according to Walter Elder, Executive Assistant to DCI MCone. the DCI was not inclined to take the positive step of authorizing a resumption of the testing. At least through the summer, the DDP did not press the issue. On November 9, 1964. the DDP raised the issue again in a memo to the DCI, calling the Director's attention to what he described as "several other indications during the past year of an apparent Soviet aggressiveness in the field of covertly administered chemicals which are, to say the least, inexplicable and disturbing."7

Helmns noted that because of the suspension of covert testing. the Agency's "positive operational capability to use drugs is diminishing, owing to a lack of realistic testing. With increasing knowledge of the state of the art, we are less capable of staying up with Soviet advances in this feld. This in turn results in a waning capability on our part to restrain others in the intelligence community (such as the Department of Defense) from pursuing operations in this area."

Helms attributed the cessation of the unwitting testing to the high risk of embarrassment to the Agency as well as the "moral problem." He noted that no better covert situation had been devised than that which had been used, and that "we have no answer to the moral issue. :2

Helms asked for either resumption of the testing project or its definitive cancellation. He argued that the status quo of a research and developnent program without a realistie testing progran was causing the Ageney to live "with the illusion of a capability which is becoming minimal and furthermore is expensive." ' Once again no formal action was taken in response to the Helms request.

一

82

Memorandun from DDP Helns to DDCI Carter. 12/17/63.

• Memorandum from DDP Helms to DC1, 6/9, 64, p. 3.

1bid., 11,9/64, p. 1.

n Jbid. pp. 1–2.

" Ibid, p. 2.

I bid.

[PAGE 85]
From its beginning in the early 1950's until its termination in 1963, the program of surreptitious administration of LSI) to unwitting nonvolunteer human subjects demonstrates a failure of the CIA's leadership to pay adequate attention to the rights of individuals and to provide effective guidance to CIA employees. Though it was known that the testing was dangerous, the lives of subjects were placed in jeopardy and their rights were ignored during the ten years of testing which followed Dr. Olson's death. Although it was clear that the laws of the United States were being violated. the testing continued. While the individuals involved in the Olson experiment were admonished by the Director, at the same time they were also told that they were not being reprimanded and that their "bad judgment" would not be made part of their personnel records. When the covert testing project was terminated in 1963, none of the individuals involved were subject to any disciplinary action.

4. Monitoring and Control of the Testing and I'se of Chemical and Biological Agents by thc CI.A

The Select Committee found numerous failures in the monitoring and control of the testing and use of chemical and 'biological agents within the (IA." An analysis of the failures can be divided into four sections: (a) the waiver of normal regulations or requirements; (b) the problems in authorization procedures: (c) the failure of internal review mechanisms such as the Ofice of General Counsel, the Inspector General. and the Audit Staff: and (d) the effeet of compartmentation and competition within the CIA.

a. The Waicer of Administratire Controls.—The internal controls within any agency rest on: (1) clear and coherent regulations; (2) clear lines of authority: and (3) clear rewards for those who conduct themselves in accord with ageney regulations and understandable and immediate sanctions against those who do not. In the case of the testing and use of chemical and biological agents. normal CIA administrative controls were waived.The destruction of the documents on the largest CIA program in this area constituted a prominent example of the waiver of normal Ageney procedures by the Director.

These documents were destroyed in early 1973 at the order of then DCI Richard Helms. According to Helms. Dr. Sidney Gottlieb, then Director of TSD:

• . . came to me and said that he was retiring and that I was retiring and he thought it would be a goot idea if these files were destroyed. And I also believe part of the reason for our thinking this was advisable was there had been relationships with outsiders in government agencies and other organizations and that thes would be sensitive in this kind of a thing but that since the program was over and finished and done with, we thought we would just get rid of the files as

83

403

"Section 2(9) of S. Res. 21 instructs the Committee to examine: the "extent to which U'nited States intelligence agencies are goverued by Executive Orders, rules, or regulations either publisbed or secret."

[PAGE 86]
well, so that anybody who assisted us in the past would not be subject to follow-up or questions, embarrassment, if you will."s

The destruction was based on a waiver of an internal CIA regulation. CSI 70-10, which regulated the "retirement of inactive records." As Thomas Karamessines, then Deputy Director of Plans, wrote in regulation CSI-70-10: "Retirement is not a matter of convenience or of storage but of conscious judgment in the application of the rules modified by knowledge of individual component needs. The heart of this judgnent is to ensure that the complete story can be reconstructed in later years and by people who may be unfamiliar with the events " e mmmar win tne events.

The destruction of the MKULTRA documents made it impossible for the Select Committee to determine the full range and extent of the largest CIA research program invoiving chenical and biological agents. The destruction also prevented the CIA fron locating and providing medical assistance to the individuals who were subjects in the progran. Finally, it prevented the Committee from determining the full extent of the operations which made use of materials developed in the MKULTRA program."

Fron the incepition of MKULTRA normal Agency procedures were waived. In 1953, Mr. Helms, then Assistant Deputy Director for Plans, proposed the establishment of MKU'LTRA. Under the proposal six pereent of the rescarch and development budget of TSD would be expended "without the establishment of formal contractual relations" because contracts would reveal government interest. Helms also voted that qualified individuals in the field "are most reluctant to enter into signed agreements of any sort which connect them with this activity since such a connection would jeopardize their professional reputa-

84

"Richard Helms testimony. 9/11/75, p. 5.

Many Agencs documents recording confdential relationships with individuals and organizations are retained without public disclosure. Moreover. in the case of MKULTRA the (IA had spent millions of dollars developing both materials and delivery systems wbich could be used by the (landestine Services: the reconstruetion of the resrarch and development progran would be dificult if not impossible, without the documents, and at least one assistant to Dr. Gottlieb protested against the document destruction on those grounds.

"Clandestine Services Institution (Cs1) 70-10. When asked by the Select Committre abuont the regularity of the prorrdure by which he authorized Dr. Gottlieb to destroy the MKULTRA record-. Helms respnded :

"Well. that's hard to say whether it would be part of the regular procedure or not. bcause the recvrd destruction progran is condueted according to a certain pattern. There's a regular record destruction pattern in the Ageney monitored by certain pwople and done a certain way. So that anything outside of that, I suppose. would have lun unusual. In other words, there were doxuments being destroyed because somelwody had raised this specife issue rather than because they were encompassedt in the regular records destruction prograin. So I think the answer to your question is probably yes." (Helms testimony. 9/11/75. p. 6.) , y v.

"Even prior to the destruction of dowumnents, the MKU'LTRA records were far from complete. As the Inspector General noted in 193:

"Files are notably incomplete. juorly organized. and lacking in evaluative statements that might give purspective to management policies over time. A substantial portioa of the MkUITRs record appwars to rest in the memories of the principal othcers and is therefore almost certain to be lost with their departures." (IG Report on MKULTRA. p. 23.)

[PAGE 87]
tions".'s Other Agency procedures. i.e., the forwarding of documents in support of invoices and the provision for regular audit procedures. were also to be waived. On April 13, 1953, then DCI Allen Dulles approved MKULTRA, noting that security considerations precluded handling the project through usual contractual agreements.

Ten years later investigations of MKULTRA by both the Inspector General and the Audit Staff noted substantial deficiencies which resulted from the waivers. Because TSI) had not reserved the right to audit the books of contractors in MKI'LTRA, the CIA had been unable to verify the use of Agency grants by a contractor. Another firm had failed to establish controls and safeguards which would assure "proper accountability" in use of government funds with the result that "funds have been used for purposes not contemplated by grants or allowable under usual contract relationship."w The entire MKIITRA arrangement was condemned for having administrative lines which were unclear, overly permissive controls, and irresponsible supervision.

The head of the Audit Branch noted that inspections and audits: led us to see MKILTRA as frequently having provided a device to escape normal administrative controls for research that is not especially sensitive, as having allowed practices that produce gross administrative failures. as having permitted the establishment of special relationships with unreliable organizations on an unacceptable basis. and as having produred. on at least one occasion. a cavalier treatment of a bona fide contracting organization.

While admitting that there may be a need for special mechanisms for handling sensitive projects. the Chief of the Audit Branch wrote that "both the terms of reference and the ground rules for handling such special projects should be spelled out in advance so that diversion from normal channels does not mean abandonment of controls.

Special procedures may be necessary to ensure the security of highly sensitive operations. To prevent the erosion of normal internal control mechanisns. such waivers should not be extended to less sensitive operations. Moreover. only those regulations which would endanger security should be waived: to waive regulations generally would result in highly sensitive and controversial projects having looser rather than stricter administrative controls. MKNAOMI, the Fort Detrick CIA project for research and development of chemical and biological agents. provides another exaimnple where efforts to protect the security of agency activties overwhelmed administrative controls. No written records of the transfer of agents such as anthrax or shellfish toxin were kept. "because of the sensitivity of the area and the desire to keep any possible use of materials like this recordless." siThe

405

85

" Memorandum from ADDP Helms to DCI Dulles, 4/3.53. Tab. A. p. 2.

"Memorandun from IG to Chief, TSI). 11/8/63., as quoied in memorandum from Chief. Audit Branch.

"The memorandum suggested that administrative exclusions, because of the importance of such decisions. should require the personal approval of the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence on an individual case basis. Present CIA policy is that only the DCI can authorize certain exemptions from regulations.

" Sidney Gottlieb testinony, 10,18/75, Hearings, Vol. 1, p. 51.

[PAGE 88]
result was that the Ageney had no way of determining what materiaks were on hand, and could not be certain whether dehivery systems such as dart guns, or deadly substances such as cobra venom had been issued to the field.

b. Aathorization.—The destruction of the documents regarding MKt'LTRA made it diflicult to determine at what level specifie projeets in the program were authorized. This problem is not solely a result of the document destruction. however. Even at the height of MKILTRA the 1Gi noted that. at least with re-pect to the surreptitious administration of Lsb, the "present practice is to maintain no record of the planning and approval of test programs.

While it is clear that Allen Dulles authorized MKULTRA. the reeord is unhear as to who authorized spcifie projects such as that involing th surreptitious administration of LsI) to unwitting nonvohunteer human subjects. Even given the sensitive and controversial nature of the projeet, there is no evidence that when John MeCone replared Allen Dulles as the Director of the Central Intelligence Ageney he wa- briefed on the details of this projeet and asked whether it should b continued." Even during the 196 discu-sions on the propriety of unwitting testing, the DbP questioned whether it was "nécessary to brief Gcteral Carter," the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence and the bireetor'- "alter ago," becanse ClA officers feht it necessary to keep details of the projeet restrieted to an absohute minimum mudnberof people."

hn May of ias. DP Helms told the Inspeetor General that the covert testing program was authorized heaise he had gone to the Director, hriefed hun on it and "the Direetor indicated no disagreement and therefore the testing will continne." Such authorization even for noncontroversial matters is clearly lez desirable than explicit authorization: in areas such as the surreptitious administration of drugs. it is particularly undesirable. Yet according to testimony

86i

406

10 Reot on MKUITRA. 1963. P. 14. 2

"Aerording to an assistait to Dr. Gottlieb, there were anmual brietings of the DeI and the DbP mn MKU1TRA by the Chef of TsD or bs deputy. However. a May 15, Hw3 Memorandum for the Roeord fron the Inzpeetor General noted that Mr Meone had mot buen briefed in detail abont the progr.m. Mr. Mecone's Exeeutise otcer, Walter Elder. testited that it was "prfeethy aliarent to me" that neither Mr. MeCone nor General Carter. thon the DleI. was aware of the surreptitins alministration project "or if they had lurt briefed theß had not understd it." (Elder. 12. 1 T5, p. 13.) Mr. MeConr testitied tha' he "did not know" whrther he talked to anyone about the projeet but that no one had told him about it in a way thai "would hse turned on all the hghts" lohn Mecone testimony. 2 3 76. 1. 101

"Arcording to. Eler's testimony. "ho Deputy Director. to my knowledge. has ever been briefed or was it ever thought neessiry to brief them to the extent to which you wonld brief the Direcetor."

10 Memorandnm for the Rosord. 5 15 63

On the questot of authorization of the covert testitg pr gram. Elder testitied as fodlows: …1.

"Bu! my reasonable judgment is that this was considere to be in te area of contitning appruval. having oner been apptosedby thae birector."

The thcory of authorizattot carrymhg over fron ote administration to the next sem partenlarly inapropriate for less vistble. highly stsitive opurations whach. unlss broncit l. nis attention by sabordinates, wouli hot cits to the atntinufthDiretor.

[PAGE 89]
before the Committee, authorization through lack of agreement is even more prevalent in sensitive situations.

The unauthorized retention of shellfish toxin by Dr. Nathan Gordon and his subordinates. in violation of a Presidential Directive, may have resulted from the failure of the Director to issue written instructions to Agency officials. The retention was not authorized by senior officials in the Agencv. The Director, Mr. Helms, haù instructed Mr. Karamessines, the Deputy Director of Plans, and Dr. (ottlieb, the Chief of Technical Services Division, to relinquish control to the Army of any chemical or biological agents being retained for the CIA at Fort Detrick. Dr. Gottlieb passed this instruetion on to Dr. Gordlon. While orders may be disregarded in any organization, one of the reasons that Dr. Gordon used to defend the retention was the fact that he had not received written instructions forbidding it."

In some situations the existence of written instructions did not prevent unauthorized actions. According to an investigation by the CIA's Inspector General TsD officers had been informedorallythat Mr. Hems was to be "advised at all times" when LSD was to be used. In addition TSI) had received a memo advising the staff thatLSD was not to be used without the permnission of the DDP, Frank Wisner. The experinent involving Ir. Olson went ahead without notification of either Mr. Wisner or Mr. Helms. The absence of clear and immediate punishment for that act must undercut the force of other internal instructions and regulations.

One last issue must l raised about authorization procedures within the Agency. Chemieal agents were used abroad until 1959 for discrediting or disabling operations, or for the purpose of interrogations with the approval of the Chief of Operations of the DDP. Later the approval of the DeputyDirector for Plans was required for such operations. Althongh the medical staff sought to be part of the approval process for these operations, they were excluded because, as the Inspector General wrote in 1957 :

Operational determinations are the responsibility of the DD) P and it is he who should advise the DCI in these respects, just as it is he who is responsible for the results. It is completely unrealistic to consider assigning to the Chief, Medical Staff, (what, in effect, would be authority over clandestine operations.)"

Given the expertise and training of physicians, participation of the Medical Staff might well have been useful.

Questions about authorization also exist in regard to those agencies which assisted the CIA. For instance, the project involving the surreptitious administration of LSI) to unwitting non-volunteer human subjects was conducted in coordination with the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs. Thereis sone question as to the Commissioner of Narcotics' knowledge about the project.

407

87

Mr. Elder was asked whether the process of bringing forward a description of actious br the Ageney in getting approval through the absence of disagreement was a common one. He responded. "It was not uncommon. . .. The more sensitive the project the more likely it would lean toward being a common practice, based on the need to keep the written rerord to a minimum."

"Nathan Gordan testimony, 9/16/75, Hearings, Vol. 1.

1957 IG Report.

[PAGE 90]
In 1963, the Inspector General noted that the head of the BNDD had been briefed alout the project, but the IG's report did not indicate the level of detail provided to him. Dr. Gottlieb testified that"I remember meeting Mr. Anslinger and had the general feeling that he was aware."Another CIA officer did not recall any discussion of testing on unwitting subjects when he and Dr. Gottlieb met with Commissioner Anslinger.

In a memorandumfor the record in 1967 Dr. Gottlieb stated that Harry Giordano, who replaced Mr. Anslinger, told Dr. Gottlieb that when he became Commissioner he was "only generally briefed on the arrangements, gave it his general blessing, and said he didn't want to know the details." The same memorandun states, however, that there were several comments which indicated to Dr. Gottlieb that Mr. Giordano was aware of the substance of the project. It is possible that the Commissioner provided a general authorization for the arrangement without understanding what it entailed or considering its propriety. A reluctance to seek detailed information from the CIA, and the CI.A's hesitancy to volunteer it, has been found in a number of instances during the Select Committee's investigations. This problem isnotconfined to the executive branch but has also marked congressional relationships with the Agency.

c. Internal lieview.—The waiver of regulations and the absence of docunentation make it difficult to determine now who authorized which activities. More importantly, they made internal Ageney review mechanisms much less efective.Controversial and highly sensitive projects which should have been subject to the most rigorous inspeetion lacked effective internal review.

Given the role of the General Counsel and his reaction to the surreptitious administration of LsD to Dr. Olson, it would have seened likely that he would be asked about the legality or propriety of any subsequent projects involving such administration. This was not done. He did not learn about this testing until the 197o's. Nor was the General Counsel's opinion sought on other MKULTRA projects, though these had been characterized by the Inspector General in the 1957 Report on TSI) as"unethical and illicit."

There is no mention in the report of the 1957 Inspeetor General's survey of TSI) of the project involving the surreptitious administration of LSI. That project was apparently not brought to the attention of the survey team. The Inspeetor who discovered it during the IG's 1963 survey of TSD recalls coming upon evidence of it inadvertently,

88

•Gottlieb, 10/18/75, p. 28.

The IG's report on MKU'LTRA in 1963 stated :

"The original charter dwcuments specified that TSD maintain exacting control of MKU'LTRA activities. In so doing. however. TSI) bas pursued a philosophy of minimum documentation in keeping with the high sensitivity of some of the projects. Some files were found to present a reasonably complete record. including most sensitive matters, while others with parallel objectives contained little or no data at all. The lack of consistent records precluded use of routive inspwction procedures and raised a variety of questions concerning management and fscal controls."

nCIA, Inspector General's report on TSD, 1957. p. 217.

[PAGE 91]
409

rather than its having been called to his attention as an especially sensitive project.92 sensiive projete. -1 tho nin

Thus both the General Counsel and the Inspector General, the principal internal mechanisms for the control of possibly improper actions, were excluded from regular reviews of the project. Whien the project was discovered the Executive Director-Comptroller voiced strong opposition to it: it is possible that the project would have been terminated in 1957 if it had been called to his attention when he then served as Inspector General. as mmspectoi uemerar funotion

The Audit Staff, which also serves an internal review function through the examination of Agency expenditures, also encountered substantial difliculty with MKULTRA. When MKULTRA was first proposed the Audit Staf was to be excluded from any function. This was soon changed. However, the waiver of normal "contractual procedures" in MKULTRA increased the likelihood of "irregularities" as well as the difhculty in detecting them. The head of the Audit Branch characterized the MKULTRA procedures as "having allowed practices that produced gross administrative failures," including a lack of controls within outside contractors which would "assure proper accountability in use of government funds." It also diminished the CIA's capacity to verify the accountings provided by outside firms. ClAsCapan, ↓2

d. Comnpartmentation and Jurisdictional Conflict Within the Agency.-As has been noted. the testing and use of chemical and biological agents was treated as a highly sensitive activity within the CIA. This resulted in a high degree of compartmentation. At the same tine substantial jurisdictional conflict existed within the Ageney between the Technical Services Division, and the Office of Medical Seryices and the Office of Security. ices ana ue omce or vtunn …llheve

This compartmentation and jurisdietional conflict may well have led to duplication of effort within the CIA and to Agency policymakers being deprived of useful information. maners uemng ue -2+han

During the early 195o's first the BLUEBIRD Committee and then the ARTICHOKÈ Committee were instituted to bring together representatives of the Ageney components which had a legitimnate interest in the area of the alteration of human behavior. By 1957 both these committees had fallen into disuse. No information went to the Technical Services Division (a component supposedly represented on the ARTICHOKEComnittee) about ARTI(CHOKE operations being conducted by the Oflice of Security and the Office of Medical Services. The Technical Services Division which was providing support to the Clandestine Services in the use of chenmical and biological agents, but provided little or no information to either the Office of Security or the Office of Medical Services. As one TS1) officer involved in these prograns testified: "Although we were acquainted, we certainly didn't share experiences." 03

89

"Even after tbe Inspector came upon it the IG did not perform a complete investigation of it. It was discovered at the end of an extensive survey of TSD and th.Inspctor was in the process of being transferred to another post within the Ageney. 15

Testimiony of CIA officer, 11/21,/75. p. 14.

[PAGE 92]
QKHILl,TOP, anot her group designed to coordinate research in this area also had little success. The group met infrequently-only tw ice a year—and little specifie infornmation was exchanged." Concern e catnnngru.

Concern over security obviously played sone role in the failure to share information," but this appears not to be the only reason. A TSD oflicer stated that the Oflice of Medical Services simply wasn't "particularly interested in what we were doing" and never sought such information." On the other hand, a representative of the Office of Medical Services consistently sought to have medical personnel participate in the use of chemical and biological agents suggested that Tsì) did not inform the Office of Medical Services in order to prevent their involvement.

Jurisdictional conflict was constant in this area. The Office of Security, which had been assigned responsibility for direction of ARTI(IOKE, consistently sought to bring TSI) operations involving psychochemicals under the ARTICHOKE umbrella. The Office of Medical Services sought to have OMs physicians advise and participate in the operational use of drugs. As the Inspector General described it in 1957, "the basic issue is concerned with the extent of authority that should be exercised by the Chief, Medical Staff, over the activities of TSl) which eneroach upon or enter into the medical field." and which are conducted by Tsi) "without seeking the prior approval of the Chief, Medical Staff, and often without informing him of their nature and extent."

As was noted previously, because the projeets and programs of TS1) stemined directly from operational needs controlled by the DbP. the 1G recommended no further supervision of these activities by the Medical Staff :

It is completely unrealistic to consider assigning to the Chief, Medical Staf, what. in effect, would be authority over clandestine operations. Futhermor, some of the actirities of Chcmiral Dirision are not ouly unorthodor but unethical and xometimes illegal. The PIl is in a better position to craluat the justipication jor such oprations than the Chief, Medical Staff." [Emphasis added.]

Because the advice of the Director of Security was needed for "evaluating the risks involved" in the programs and because the knowledge that the CIA was "engaging in unethical and illicit aetivities would have serious repercussions in political and diplomatie circles." the IG recommended that the Direetor of Security be fully advised of TSD's activities in these areas.

Even after the Inspector General's Report of 1957. the compartmentation and jurisdictional conflict continued. 'They may have had a sub-

90

"The oue set of minutes from a QKHlLL.ToP meeting indicated that individuals in the oflice of Medical Services stressed the need for more contact. more romnact.

When asked why information on the surreptitions administration of Lsh was not presented to the ARTIcHokE committee. Dr. Gottliet: responded: "I inagine the only reason wuuld have bwen a coneern for broadening the awaremess of its existence."

"CIA uther. 11 21 75. 1 1

1G Survey of Ts1. 1957. p 217.

"1 bid.

[PAGE 93]
stantial negative impact on policymaking in the Ageney. As the Deputy Chief of the Counterintelligence Staff noted in 195s. due to the different positions taken by TSS. the Office of Security, and the Office of Medical Services on the use of chemical or biological agents, it was possible that the individual who authorized the use of a chemical or biological agent could be presented with "incomplete facts upon which to make a decision relevant to its use." Even a committee set up by the DIP in 195s to attempt to rationalize Agency policy did not have access to records of testing and use. This was due, in part. to excessive compartmentation, and jurisdictional confiet.

C. COVERT TESTING ON HUMAN SUBIECTS BY MILITARY INTELLIGENCE GROUPS: MATERLAL TESTING PRORAM EA 1729, PROJECT THIRD CHANGE. AND PROJECT DERBY HAT

EA 1729 is the designator used in the Arniy drug testing program for lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD). Interest in LSD) was originally aroused at the Army's Chemical Warfare Laboratories by open literature on the unusual efects of the compound." The positive intelligence and counterintelligence potential envisioned for compounds like LsD, and suspected Soviet interest in such materials.1 supported the development of an American military capability and resulted in experinents conducted jointly by the U.S. Army Intelligence Board and the Chemical Warfare Laboratories.

These experiments. designed to evaluate potential intelligence uses of LSD, were known colleetively as "Material Testing Progran EA 1729." Two projeets of particular interest conducted as part of these exleriments. "THIRI (HANCE" and "DERBY HAT", involved the administration of LsI) to unwitting subjects in Europe and the Far East.

In many respects. the Army's testing programs duplicated research which had already been condueted by the CIA. They certainly involved the risks inherent in the early phases of drug testing. In the Army's tests, as with those of the CiA, individual rights were also subordinated to national security considerations; informed consent and followup examinations of subjeets were neglected in efforts to maintain the seerecy of the tests. Finally, the command and control problems which were apparent in the ClA's programs are paralleled by a lack of clear anthorization and supervision in the Army's programs.

91

"USAINTC staff study. "Material Testing Program. EA 1729." 10,'15'59, p. 4. This same U'SAINTC study cited "A 1952 (several years prior to initial U'.S. interest in LSD-25) report that the Soviets purehased a large quantity of LSD-25 from the Sandoz Company in 1951. reputed to be sufficient for 50 million doses." (bid. p. 16)

Generally accepted Soviet methods and counterintelligence concerns were also strong motivating faetors in the initiation of this research:

"A primars justifcation for feld experimentation in intelligenee with EA 1729 is the connter-intelligence or defense implication. We know that the enemy philosophy ccndones any kind of coercion or violence for intelligence purposes. There is proof that his intelligence service has used drugs in the past There is strong evidence of keen interest in EA 1729 by him. 'f for no other purpose than to know what to expuet from enemy intelligonce use of the material and to, thus, be prepared to counter it. field experimentation is justified." (bid. p. 34)

[PAGE 94]
1. Scope of Testing

Between 1955 and 1958 research was initiated by the Army Chemical Corps to evaluate the potential for LSD as a chemical warfare incapacitating agent. In the course of this research, LSD was administered to more than 1,000) American volunteers who then participated in a series of tests designed to ascertain the effects of the drug on their ability to function as soldiers. With the exception of one set of tests at Fort Bragg. these and subsequent laboratory experiments to evaluate chemical warfare potential were conducted at the Army Chemical Warfare Laboratories. Edgewood, Maryland.

In 195s a new series of laboratory tests were initiated at Edgewood. These experiments were conducted as the initial phase of Material Testing Program EA 1729 to evaluate the intelligence potential of LSI), and included LSI) tests on 95 volunteers.11 As part of these tests, three structured exjerinents were conducted:

1. LSD was administered surreptitiously at a simulated social receptionto volunteer subjects who were unaware of the purpose or nature of the tests in which they were participating;

2. LSI) was administered to volunteers who were subsequently polygraphed; and

3. LSì)was administered to volunteers who were then confined to "isolation chambers".

These structured experiments were designed to evaluate the validity of the traditional security training all subjects had undergone in the face of unconventional, drug enhanced, interrogations.

At the conclusion of the laboratory test phase of Material Testing Program EA 1729 in 1960. the Army Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (ACSI) authorized operational field testing of LSD. The first feld tests were conducted in Europe by an Army Special Purpose Team (SPT) during the period from May to August of 1961. These tests were known as Project THIRD CHANCE and involved eleven separate interrogations of ten subjects. None of the subjects were volunteers and none were aware that they were to receive LSD. All but one subject. a U.S. soldier implicated in the theft of classified documents. were alleged to be foreign intelligence sources or agents. While interrogations of these individnals were only moderately successful, at least one subject (the U.S. soldier) exhibited symptons of severe paranoia while under the infuence of the drug.

The second series of field tests, Project DERBY HAT, were conducted by an Army SPT in the Far East during the period from August to November of 1962. Seven subjects were interrogated under DERBY HAT. all of whom were foreign nationals either suspected of dealing in narcoties or implicated in foreign intelligence operations. The purpose of this second set of experiments was to colleet additional data on the utility of LsD in field interrogations, and to evaluate any diflerent eflects the drug might have on "Orientals.

92

412

"Inspertor General of the Army Report. "I'se of Volunteers ín Chemical Agent Research." 3/10 76, p. 135

[PAGE 95]
2. Inadequate Coordination Among Intelligence Agencies

On October 15, 1959, the U.S. Army Intelligence Center prepared lengthy staff study on Material Testing Program EA 1729. The stated purpose of the staff study was: "to determine the desirability of EA 1729 on non-U'S subjects in selected actual operations under controlled conditions.12It was on the basis of this study that operational field tests were later conducted.

After noting that the Chemical Warfare Laboratories began experiments with LSD on humans in 1955 and had administered the drug to over 1.000 volunteers, the "background" section of the study concluded:

There has not been a single case of residual ill effect. Study of the prolific scientific literature on LSD-25 and personal comnunication between US Army Chemical Corps personnel and other researchers in this field have failed to disclose an authenticated instance of irreversible change being produced in normal humans by the drug.13

This conclusion was reached despite an awareness that there were inherent medical dangers in such experimentation. In the body of this same study it is noted that :

The view has been expressed that EA 1729 is a potentially dangerous drug, whose pharmaceutical actions are not fully understood and there has been cited the possibility of the continuance of a chemically induced psychosis in chronic form. particularly if a latent schizophrenic were a subject, with consequent claim or representation against the U.S. Government.104

An attempt was made to minimize potential medical hazards by careful selection of subjects prior to field tests. Rejecting evidence that the drug might be hazardous, the study continued:

The claim of possible permanent damage caused by EA 1729 is an unproven hvpothesis based on the characteristic effect of the material. While the added stress of a real situation may increase the probability of permanent adverse effect, the resulting risk is deemed to be slight by the medical research personnel of the Chemical Warfarc Laboratories. To prevent even such a slight risk. the proposed plan for field experimentation calls for overt, if possible, or contrivedthrough-ruse. if necessary. phvsical and mental examination of any real situation subject prior to employment of the subject.10s

This conclusion was drawn six years after one death had occurred which could be attributed. at least in part, to the effects of the very drug the Army was proposing to feld test. The USAINTC staff, however. was apparently unaware of the circumstances surrounding Dr. Olson's death. This lack of knowledge is indicative of the

413

93

USAINTC staff study. "Material Testing Program FEA 1729." 10/15/59, p. 4. 2hid. p. 4.

Thid.. p. 25.

Ibid.

96-408 Ω.77.:

[PAGE 96]
general lack of interageney communication on drug related research. As the Octoler 1939 study noted. there has been no coordination with other intelligenee agencies up to the present." 106

On December 7. 1959, the Army Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligenee (ACSI. apparently a General Willems) was briefed on the proposed operational use of LSD by USAINTC Project Oficer Jacobson. in preparation for Projeet THIRD CHANCE. General Willems expressed coneern that the projeet had not been coordinated with the FBl and the CIA. He is quoted as saying "that if this projeet is going to be worth anvthing it [Lsh] should be used on higher types of non-I'.S. subject-" in other word- "staffers." He indicated this could be aceomplished if the CI.A were brought in. The summary of the briefing prepared by a Major Mehovsky continues: "Of particular note is that ACS1 did not direet coordination with CIA and the FBI but only mentioned it for consideration by the planners." 10:

After the briefing. four colonels. two lieutenant colonels and Major Mehovsky met to discuss interageney cooperation with CIA and FBI. The group consensus was to postpone efforts toward coordination:

Lt. Col. Jacobson commented that before we coordinate with CIA we should have more factual findings from feld experimentation with counterintelligence eases that will strengthen our position and proposal for cooperation. This approach was agreed to hy the conferees.10s

Had sueh coorlination been achieved, the safety of these experiments might have been viewed differently and the tests themselves might have been seen as umnnecessary.

3. Subordimation oi Indiridual Rights to National Security Considcrations

Just as many of these experiments may have been umnecessary. the nature of ths operational tests (polvgraph-assisted interrogations of drngged suspects) reflects a basie disregard for the fundamental human rightsof the subjects. The interrogation of an American sollier as part of the THIRD CHANCE 1961 tests is an example of this disregard.

The "trip report"for Project THIRD CHIANCE. dated September 6, 1961. recounts the cireumstances surrounding and the results of the tests as follows:

[The subjeet] was a U.S. soldier who had confessed to theft of classified documents. Conventional methods had failed to ascertain whether espionage intent was involved. A significant new adlmission by subjeet that he told a fellow soldier of the theft while he still had the doeuments in his possession was obtained during the EA 1729 interrogation along with other variations of Subjeet's previous account. The interrogation results were deemed by the local operational authority satisfaetory evidlence of Subject's claim of innocence in regard to espionage intent.109

94

Ihid.. p 6.

Mehovsky Fact Sheet. 12/9/60. p. 1.

Iie. p. 2.

SPT Trip Report. Operation THIRD CHANCE. 9/6/61. p. 5.

[PAGE 97]
415

The subject apparently reacted very strongly to the drug, and the interrogation, while productive, was difficult. The trip report concluded:

(1) This case demonstrated the ability to interrogate a subject profitably throughout a highly sustained and almnost incapacitating reaction to EA 1729.

(2) The apparent value of bringing a subject into the EA 1729 situation in a highly stressed state was indicated.

(3) The usefulness of employing as a duress factor the device of inviting the subject's attention to his EA 1729. influenced state and threatening to extend this state indefinitely even to a permanent condition of insanity, or to bring it to an end at the discretion of the interrogators was shown to be effective.

(4) The need for preplanned precautions against extreme paranoiac reaction to EA 1729 was indicated.

(5) It was brought to attention by this case that where subject has undergone extended intensive interrogation prior to the EA 1729 episode and has persisted in a version repeatedly during conventional interrogation, adherence to the same version while under EA 1729 influence, however extreme the reaction, may not necessarily be evidence of truth but merely the ability to adhere to a well rehearsed story.u

This strong reaction to the drug and the accompanying discomfort this individual suffered were exploited by the use of traditional interrogation techniques. While there is no evidence that physical violence or torture were eunployed in connection with this interrogation, physical and psychological techniques were used in the THIRD CHANCE experiments to exploit the subjects' altered mental state, and to maximize the stress situation. Jacobson described these methods in his trip report :

Stressing techniques employed included silent treatmnent before or after EA 1729 administration, sustained conventional interrogation prior to EA 1729 interrogation, deprivation of food. drink, sleep or bodily evacuation, sustained isolation prior to EA 1729 administration, hot-cold switches in approach, duress "pitches", verbal degradation and bodily discomfort. or dramnatized threats to subject's life or mental health.111

Another gross violation of an individual's fundamental rights occurred in September 1962 as part of the Army's DERBY HAT tests in the Far East. A suspected Asian espionage agent was given 6 mierograms of LsD per kilogram of bodyweight. The administration of the drug was completed at 1035 that morning:

At 1120, sweating became evident, his pulse became thready. He was placed in a supine position. He began groaning with expiration and becane semicomatose.u2

1e 1bid., pp. 17-1S.

Ibid p. 13.

DERiY HAT" Medical and Pharmacological Report: Case #1. 9/20/62. p. D102.

[PAGE 98]
416

For the next 28 minutes, the subject remained semicomatose.

At 1148, responses to painful stimuli were slightly improved.
At 1155, he was helped to a sitting position.

At 1200, he became shocky again and was returned to supine position.

At 1212. he was more alert and able to sit up with help.

At 1220, Subject was assisted to the interrogation table.

At 1230. he began moaning he wanted to die and usually ignored questions. Rarely he stated "he didn't know."

At 1250, his phasic alertness persisted. He frequently refocused his eyes with eyelid assistance. He frequently threw his head back with eves closed.

At 1330, he was slightly more alert. He was forced-walked for 5 minutes. He physically would cooperate until he became shocky again (sweating, thready pulse, pale).us

For the next three hours the subject remained in about the same condition. Continued attempts at interrogation yielded no relevant answers. Six hours after receiving the drug, the subject began giving relevant answers to questions. Eight and one-half hours after the initial dosage. the subject was polygraphed. The interrogation continued for seventeen and one-half hours after the drug was administered.

There was some psychological and medical screening of the individuals tested within the U'nited States. in Enrope, and in Asia. The proposal for the field experimentation in fact called for such examinations. The fact of presereening did not eliminate the risk of injury; the availability of medical staff did. however, limit injury and may well have prevented the death of one or more of the subjects. A、 the medical corps member of the team which surreptitiously administered the LSD) noted. "one subject ... did collapse after the interrogation and the presence of the medical officer was not only of value to the subject but to the interrogation team who were thus assured that an unnecessary untoward result would not occur." us

In the October 15, 1959, USAINTC staff study, moral and legal ramifications of covert administration of LsD in feld conditions were considered.

It was always a tenet of Army Intelligence that the basic American principle of the dignity and welfare of the individual will not be violated. . . . A more meticulous regard for the prohibition against violence or duress is taken in praetice when the suspect is a US citizen or ally as against an actual or potential enemy. in peace as against war, and in respect to the nature of the crime. . . . In intelligence, the stakes involved and the interests of national security may permit a more tolerant interpretation of moral-ethical values, but not legal limits. through necessity. . . . Any claim

Ibid.. p. D10-3.

" SPT Trip Rejort, Opration THIRD CHANYE. 7/25/61. P. 1.

[PAGE 99]
against the US Government for alleged injury due to EA 1729 must be legally shown to have been due to the material. Proper security and appropriate operational techniques can protect the fact of employment of EA 1729.u\*

On the basis of this evaluation, the st :ly concluded that in view of "the stakes involved and the interests of national security," the proposed plan for field testing should be approved.

The surreptitious administration of drugs to unwitting subjects by the Army raises serious constitutional and legal issues. The consideration given these issues by the Army was wholly insufficient. The character of the Armny's volunteer testing program and the possibility that drugs were simply substituted for other forms of violence or duress in field interrogations raises serious doubts as to whether national security imperatives were properly interpreted. The "consent"forms which each American volunteer signed prior to the administration of LSI) are a case in point. These forms contained no mention of the medical and psychological risks inherent in such testing, nor do they mention the nature of the psychotrophic drug to be administered:

The general nature of the experiments in which I have vol:nteered. have been explained to me from the standpoint of jüssible hiazards to my health. It is my understanding that the experin : are sodesigned, based on the results of aniñals and vious human experimentation, thot the anticipated results will justify the performance of the experimont. I understand further that experiments will be so conducted as to avoid all unnecessary physical and medical suffering and injury, and that Iwrill be àt liberty to request that the cxperimints be terminated at any time if in my opinion I have reached the physical or mental state where continnation of the experiments becomes undesirable.

I recoguize that in the pursuit of certain experiments transitory discomfort may occur. I recognize, also, that under these circumstances, I must rely upon the skill and wisdom of the physician superrising the erperiment to institute whatever medical or surgical measures are indicated. [Emphasis added.] n

The exclusion of any specific discussion of the nature of LSD in these forms raises serious doubts as to their validity. An "understanding . . . that the anticipated results will justify the performance of the experiment" without full knowledge of the nature of the experiment is an incomplete "understanding." Similarly. the nature of the experiment limited the ability of both the subject to request its request its termination and the experimenter to implement such a request. Finally. the euphemistic characterization of "transitory discomfort" and the agreement to "rely on the skill and wisdom of the physician" combine to conceal inherent risks in the experimentation and may be viewed as disolving the experimenter of personal responsibility for damaging aftereffects. In summary, a "volunteer" program in which subjects are not fully informed ofpotential hazards to their persons is "volunteer" in name only.

417

∴

97

USAINTC staf study, "Material Testing Program EA 1729," 10/15/59, p. 26. u Sample volunteer consent form.

[PAGE 100]
This problem was compounded by the security statements signed by each volunteer before he participated in the testing. As partof this statement, potential subjects agreed that they would:

not divulge or make available any information related to U.S. Army Intelligence Center interest or participation in the Department of the Army Medical Research Volunteer Programto anyindividual, nation, organization, business, association, or other group or entity, not officially authorized to receive such information.

I understand that any action contrary to the provisions of this statement will render me liable to punishment under the provisions of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.u

Under these provisions, a volunteer experiencing aftereffects of the test might have been unable to seek immediate medical assistance.

This disregard for the well-being of subjects drug testing is inexcusable. Further, the absence of any comprehensive long-term medicalassistance for the subjects of thiese experiments is not only unscientific; it is also unprofessional.

4. Lack of Normal Authorization and Supervision

It is apparent from documents supplied to the Committee that the Army's testing programs often operated under informal and nonroutine authorization. Potentially dangerous operations such as these testing programs are the very projects which ought to be subject to the closest internal scrutiny at the highest levels of the mnilitary command structure. There are numerous examples of inadequate review, partial consideration, and incomplete approvalin the administration of these programs.

When the first Army program to use LSD on American soldiers in "field stations"was authorized in May 1955, the Army violatedits own procedures in obtaining approval. Under Army Chief of Staff Memorandumn 385, such proposals were to be personally approved by the Secretary of the Army. Although the plan was submitted to him on April 26, 1956, the Secretary issued no written authorization for the project, and there is no evidence that he either reviewed or approvedthe plan. Less than a month later, the Army Chief of Staff issued a memorandum authorizing the tests.

Subsequent testing of LSD) under Material Testing Program EA 1729 operated generally under this authorization. When the plans for this testing were originally discussed in early 195s by officials of the Army Intelligence Center at Fort Holabird and representatives of the (hemical Warfare Center at Edgewood Arsenal, an informal proposal was formulated. This proposal was submitted to the Medical Research Directorate at Edgewood by the President of the Army Intelligence Board on June 3, 195s. There is no evidence that the plan was approved at any level higher than the President of the Intelligence Board or the Commanding General of Edgewood. The approval at Edgewood appears to have been issued by the Conumnander's Adjutant. The Medical Researeh Laboratories did not submit the plan to the Surgeon General for approval (a standard procedure) because

418

∴.

98

"Sample Volunteer Security Statement.

Inspwetur General of the Army Report. "Use of Volunteers in Chemical Agent Research." 3/10 76. p. 100.

[PAGE 101]
the new program was ostensibly covered by the authorizations granted in May1956.121

The two projects involving the operational use of LSD (THIRD CHANCE and DERBY HAT) were apparently approved by the Army Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (General Willems) on December 7, 1960.1This verbal approval came in the course of a briefing on previous drug programs and on the planned field experimentation. There is no record of written approval being issued by the ACSI to authorize these specific projects until January 1961, and there is no record of any specific knowledge or approval by the Secretary of the Army.

Ön February"4, 1963, Major General C. F. Leonard, ArmyACSI, forwarded a copy of the THIRI) CHANCE Trip Report to Army Chief of Staff, GeneralEarl Wheeler.1Wheeler had apparently requested a copy on February 2. The report was routed through a Gencral Hamlett. While this report included background on the origins of the LSD tests, it appears that General Wheeler may only have read the conclusion andrecommendations.1 The ofice memorandum accompanying the Trip Report bears Wheeler's initials.'s

5. Termination of Testing

On April 10, 1963, a briefing was held in the ACSI's office on the results of Projects THIRD ČHANCE and DERBY HAT. Both SPT's concluded that more field testing was required before LSD could be utilized as an integral aid to counterintelligence interrogations. During the presentation of the DERBY HAT results, General Leonard (Deputy ACSI) directed that no further field testing be undertaken.126After this meeting the ACSI sent a letter to the Commanding General of the Army Combat Developments Command (CDC) requesting that he review THIRD CHANCE and DERBY HAT and "make a net evaluation concerning the adoption of EA 1729 for future use as an effective and profitable aid in counterintelligence interrogations." 12On the same day the ACSI requested that the CDC Cominander revise regulation FM 30-17 to read in part:

. . . in no instance will drugs be used as an aid to interrogations in counterintelligence or security operations without prior permission of the Department of the Army. Requests to use drugs as an investigative aid will be forwarded through intelligence channels to the OACSI, DA, for approval. ...

Medical research has established that information obtained through the use of these drugs is unreliable and invalid. ...

It is considered that DA [Army] approval must be a prerequisite for use of such drugs because of the moral, legal, medical and political problems inherent in their use for intelligence purposes.1

11bid. 1212:.1

a.

99

1 bid., pp. 135. 137, 138.

Mehovsky Fact Sheet. 12/9/60.

Memorandum froni Ieonard to Wheeler. 2/4/63.

" SGS memorandum to Wheeler through Hamlett. 2/5/63. 11hid

Maj. F. Barnett, memorandum for the record. S/12/63.

"Yanaki memorandui for the record. 7/16/63.

[PAGE 102]
The subsequent aloption of this regulation marked the effective termination of field testing of LSD) by the Army.

The official termination date of these testing programs is rather unclear, but a later ACSI memo indicates that it may have occurred in September of 1963. On the 19th of that month a meeting was held between D)r. Van Sims (Edgewood Arsenal), Major Clovis(Chemical Research Laboratory), and ACSI representatives (General Ieholni and Colonel Schmidt). "As a result of this conference a determination was made to suspend the program and any further activity pending a more profitable and suitable use." 120

D. COOPERATION AND COMPETITION AMONG THE INTELLIGENCE COM-MUNITY AGENCIES AND BETWEEN THESE AGENCIES AND OTHERINDIVIDUALS AND INSTITUTIONS

cummunuy Relationships amongintelligence community agencies in this area varied considerably over timne, ranging fron full cooperation to intense and wasteful competition. The early period was marked by a high degree of cooperation among the agencies of the intelligence community. Although the military dominated research involving chemical and biological agents, the infornmation developed was shared with the FBI and the (IA. But the spirit of cooperation did not continue. The failure by the military to share information apparently breached the spirit, if not the letter, of conmands from above.

As noted above, the Army AssistantChief of Staf for Intelligence was briefed on the proposed operational testing of LsI) under Project THIRI) CHAN(E, and expressed concern that the project had not been coordinated with FBI and CIA. Despite this request. no coordination was achieved between the Army and either of these agencies. Had such cooperation been forthcoming, this projeet may have been evalnated in a diferent light.

The competition between the agencies in this area reached bizarre levels. A military officer told a (IA representative in confidence about the military's field testing of LSD) in Europe under Project THIRD CHANCE, and the CIA promptly attempted to learn surreptitiously the nature and extent of the program. At roughly the same time Mr. Helms argued to the DbCl that the unwitting testing program should be continued, as it contributed to the CIA's capability in the area and thus allowed the CIA "to restrain others in the intelligence community (such as the Department of Iefense) from pursuing operations." ise

The MKNAOMI program was also marked by a failure to share information. The Army Special Forces (the principal customer of the Special Operations Division at Fort Dietrick) and the CIA rather than attempting to coordinate their efforts promulgated different requirements which varied only slightly. This apparently resulted in some duplication of effort. In order to insure the security of CIA operations, the Ageney would request materials from SOD) for operational use without fully or accurately describing the operational requirements. This resulted in limitations on SOD's ability to assist the CIA.

100

420

Undatel ASCI memorandum. p. 2.

Memorandum from the DbP to the DeI, 11/9 64. p. 2.

[PAGE 103]
2. Relationships Between the Intelligence Community Agencies and Forcign Liaison Serrices

The subjects of the CIA's operational testing of chemical and biological agents abroad were generally being held for interrogation by foreign intelligence or security organizations. Although information about the use of drugs was generally withheld from these organizations. cooperation with them necessarily jeopardized the security of CI.A interest in these materials. Cooperation also placed the American Government in a position of complicity in actions which violated the rights of the subjects, and which may have violated the laws of the country in which the experiments took place.

Cooperation between the intelligence agencies and organizations in foreign countries was not limited to relationships with the intelligence or internal security organizations. Some MKULTR.A researchwas conducted abroad. While this is, in itself. not a questionable practice, it is important that such research abroad not be undertaken to evade American laws. That this was a possibility is suggested by an ARTI-CHOKE memorandum in which it is noted that working with the scientists of a foreign country "might be very advantageous" since that government “permitted certain activities which were not permitted by the United States government (i.e., experiments on anthrax, etc.)."131

3. Th Relationships Bctureen the Intelligence Community Agencies and Other Agencies of the l'.S. Government

Certain U.S. government agencies actively assisted the efforts of intelligence agencies in this area. One form of assistance was to provide "cover" for research contracts let by intelligence agencies, in order to disguise intelligence community interest in chemical and biological agents.

Other forms of assistance raise more serious questions. Although the CIA's project involving the surreptitious administration of LSD was condlucted by Bureau of Narcoties personnel, there was no open conneetion between the Bureau personnel and the Agency. The Bureau was serving as a "cut-out" in order to make it difficult to trace Agency participation. The cut-out arrangement, however, reduced the CIA's ability to control the program. The Ageney could not control the process by which subjects were seleeted and cultivated. and could not regulate follow-up after the testing. Moreover, as the CIA's Inspector General noted: "the handling of test subjects in the last analysis rests with the {Bureau of Narcoties] agent working alone. Suppression of knowledge of critical results from the top CIA management is an inherent risk in these operations." 132 The arrangement also made it impossible for the Agency to be certain that the decision to end the surreptitious administration of LsI) would be honored by the Bureau personnel.

The arrangement with the Bureau of Narcoties was described as "informal." is The informality of the arrangement compounded the problem is aggravated by the fact that the 40 Committee has had vir-

101

421

ARTIChiOKE Memorandum. 6'13/52.

10 Rejort on MK11TRA. 1963. p. 14.

Ibid. This was taken by one Ageney official to mean that there would be no written contract and no formal mechanism for payment. (Elder, 12/18/75, p. 31.)

[PAGE 104]
apparent unwillingness on the part of the Bureau's leadership to ask for details, and the Cl.A's hesitation in volunteering information. These problems raise serious questions of command and control within the Bureau.

4. Relationships Betwrcen thc Intelligence Community Agencies and Other Institutions and Individuals, Public and Private

The Inspector General's 1963 Survey of MKULTRA noted that "the research and development" phase was conducted through standing arrangements with "specialists in universities, pharmaceutical houses, hospitals. state and federal institutions, and private researeh organizations" in a manner which concealed "from the institution the interests of the CIA." Only a few "key individuals" in each institution were "made witting of Agency sponsorship." The research and development phase was succeeded by a phase involving "physicians. toxicologists, and other specialists in mental. narcoties, and general hospitals and prisons. who are provided the products and findings of the basie research projects and proceed with intensive testing on human subjects." 3

According to the Inspector General, the MKULTRA testing programs were "conducted under accepted scientific procedures . . where health permits. test subjects are voluntary participants in the programs." iss'This was clearly not true in the project involving the surreptitious administration of LSD. which was marked by a complete lack of screening. medical supervision, opportunity to observe, or medical or psychological follow-up..

The intelligence agencies allowed individual researchers to design their project. Experiments sponsored by these researchers (which included one where nareoties addlicts were sent to Lexington, Kentucky, who were rewarded with the drug of their addietion in return for participation in experiments with LsD) call into question the decision by the agencies not to fix guidelines for the experiments.

The MKILTRA research and development program raises other questions, as well. It is not clear whether individuals in prisons, mental. narcoties and general hospitals can provide “informied consent". to participation in esperiments such as these. There is doubt as to whether institutions should be unwitting of the ultimate sponsor of research being done in their facilities. The nature of the arrangements also madle it impossible for the individuals who were not aware of the sponsor of the research to exercise any choiee about their participation based on the sponsoring organization.

Although greater precautions are now being taken in research conducted on bebalf of the intelligence community agencies, the dilemma of classification remains. These agencies obviously wished to conceal their interest in certain forms of research in order to avoid stimulating interest in the same areas by hostile governments. In some cases today contractors or researchers wish to conccal their connection with these agencies. Yet the fact of classification prevents open discussion and debate upon which scholarly work depends.

422

102

Ibid. p. 9.

1bid.p. 10.

[PAGE 105]
APPENDIX B DOCUMENTS REFERRING TO DISCOVERY OF ADDI-TIONAL MKULTRA MATERIAL

22 June 1977

MENORANDUMI FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence THROUGH Deputy Director for Science and Technolog: SUBJECT Request for Guidance on Handling Recently Located NKULIRA Naterial

1. (U/AIUO) This nenorandun is to advisc you that additional NkULTRA documents have been discovered and to obtain your approval for follow-on sctions required. Paragraph 7 contains a reconnended course of action.

, 2. (U/AIUO) As a result of John Marks FOIA request (F-76-374), al1 of the MKL'LTRA matcrial in OTS possession was reviewed for possible release to him. Following that review, the CTs naterial in the Retired Records Cente: was searched. It was durins that latter search that the subproject files were located among the retired records of the OTS Budget and Fiscal Section. These files were not discovered earlier as the earlier searches were linited to the exanination of the active and retired records of those branches considered most likely to have generated or have had access tp MKULTRA documents. Those branches included: Chemistry, Biological, Behavioral Activities, and Contracts Management. Because Dr. Gottlieb retrieved and destroyed all the MKULTRa documents he vas able to locate, it is not surprising that the earlier search for NKULTRa documents. directed at areas where they were most likely to be found, was unsuccessful. The purpose of establishing the MKllLTRA mechanism was to limit knokledge of the sensitive work beins performed to those with an absolutc noed to know.. If those precepts had been followed, the recently found. B&F files should have containcd only financial and administrative docunents. (ln rcirospect, I realize that

02:9 29 JUL 1977

103

[PAGE 107]
105

SuJiCt: Rcquest for Guidance on Handling Recently Lecated, NKUlTRA Naterial

The centributicn could be controvetsizl in that it was madc thrcup & mechenis making it appear to be a private densticn. Frivate donations qualified for, ande s receivee, an ecual ancunt of Federal matchins funds. A iette: iro the Office cf Gcncral Counsel dated 21 Februsr lsi: attesting to the legality of this fundins is in the fiie.

6. -(e) The Legislative Counsel has been made awars ci the existcnce of these adciticnal MKUlTRA docunents wich are still under review and sanitization. The MaRks case is in litigation ané te are committed to edvise Sr. Narks ci the existence ci these files shortly. and to deive: the relcassbie msterial tc his attorneys by 31 Jv ¿etter fro the Inforaticn and Privacy Staff te ks' attcrneys iniermins them of the existence is taterial is in the ccctcination process and is sckeiue to be maiiei on 2 June.

(Ce) There are new tko actions that should be tzken:

a. Riense arpropriately sanitized material to Nr. Srks attorners as required by FOla litigation.

t. Ioier= the Senate Ssicct Committee of the existecs ci the reccntly lccsted records prior tc infcrzing Mr. Narks' attorneys.

Ii is recc-enied that you approve of both of these scticns.

S (/iUe) If additional details on the contents of this zterial are desired, the OTS officers most fazilia: with it are pepsred to brief you at your convenience.

D S. l

David S. Brandwcin Ditcctor Ofiicc of Technical Service

[PAGE 108]
Wshingon D C 20505

The Honorable Dantel K. Inouye, Chairman

Select Committee on Intelligence

United States Senate

Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

During the course of 1975 when the Senate Committee, chaired by Senator Church, was investigating intelligence activities, the CIA was asked to produce documentation on a program of experimentation with the effect of drugs. Under this project conducted from 1953 to 1964 and knowm as "MK-ULTRA." tests were conducted on American citizens in some cases without their knowledge. The CIA, after searching for such documentation, reported that most of the documents on this matter have been destroyed. I find it my duty to report toyou now that our continuing search for drug related, as well as other documents, has uncovered certain papers which bear on this matter. Let me hasten to add that I am persuaded that there was no previous attempt to conceal this material in the original 1975 exploration." The material recently discovered was in the retired archives filed under financial accounts and only uncovered by using extraordinary and extensive search efforts. In this connection, incidentally, I have personally commended the employee whose diligence produced this find.

Because the new material now on hand is primarily of a financial nature, it does not present a complete picture of the field of drug experimentation activity but it does provide more detail than was previously available to us. For example, the following types of activities were undertaken:

a. Possible additional cases of drugs being tested on American citizens, without their knowledge.

b. Research was undertaken on surreptitious methods of administering drugs.

c. Some of the persons chosen for experimentation were drug addicts or alcoholics.

d. Research into the development of a knockout or "K" drug was performed in conjunction with being done to develop pain killers for advanced cancer patients, and tests on such patients were carried out.

106

The Director of Central Intelligence

[PAGE 109]
e. There is a possibility of an improper payment to a private institution.

The drug related activities described in this newly located material began almost 25 years ago. I assure you they were discontinued over 10 years ago and do not take place today.

In keeping with the President's commitment to disclose any errors of the Intelligence Community which are uncovered, I would like to volunteer to testify before your Committee on the full details of this unfortunate series of events. I am in the process of reading the fairly voluminous material involved and do want to be certain that I have a complete picture when I talk with the Committee. I will be in touch with you next week to discuss when hearings might be scheduled at the earliest opportunity.

I regret having to bring this issue to your attention, but I know that it is essential to your oversight procedures that you be kept fully informed in a timely manner.

STANSFIELD TURNER

∴

107

2

[PAGE 110]
APPENDIX C DOCUMENTS REFERRINGTO SUBPROJECTS

DRAFT 1 May 1953

MEMORANDUM POR TEE RECORD

SULLECT: Project MULTRA, Subproject 2

1. Subproject 2 is beizs set up to provide s secure ad efficient means to exploit to the MULRA pog.

C 2. s  precticin psyeistst and a faculey serer of the rat 25 positiccs have ineluded Chie? Neuropsycniatrist et β 1 sief of the Psychiatric Section at sacrse and Oss experience during Wcrld War I. Ee bas been of vaise  the general MzA field as an overall advisor and ( cossultart, be has bees of value in contacting irdividuals in the rn ares and in setting up projects there, and be has dcze verk hisel vtich has cortributed to the Mza fielć. is prcessicnal actities and kowm connections vith the —B C\_

3. Subproject 2 vouli include:

a. Miscellazeous research and testing services in the general fieid of MLRA.

b. Serices as a contact and cut-out for pro'ects Ln tke MRLA field, prizrily those located in a ares.

e. Monitorins of selected prc'ects in the MeuiRA field, vhen located Ln the centraiaree.

d. Services as s general consultant and edviser is the MXILTRA field.

h. The total cost of this project is not to exceed \$4,650.00 for s period of one year.

C5.  clecred throush TOP ET ona contact basis.

109

96-40 Ω-77- 8

[PAGE 111]
110

[PAGE 112]
PROPOSAL.

Objective: To study the possible syoergistic action of drugs vhich mey be sppropriate for use in abolishing consciousness.

Situation: There is resson to believe that two or more drugs, used in combination, are more effective than single drugs. The ≈mbined effect of some drugs, suct as ccmbizatiocs of barbiturstes, arekcve. With otber coabirations,. the degree of sycergism is not kovn. If consideratle synergism is found to exist, tvo possibilities must be coasidered: (1) tbst a particularly useful coabinstion my be found, and (2) ttat a particular cxmbinatiou my be hazardous becsuse of its effect on respiration or some other vital function. To minimize bazards, eniml experiments should precede buras experiments.

Propcsal: Allocation of \$looo for animal experizents, to be dravu on ss needed. That experizents be conducted inforzally

Bat vithout  specific grant, and vitt appropriate cover.

[PAGE 113]
FROPCSAL

Objective: To study methods for the administration of drugs vithout the kovledge of the patient. Preparation of a mnual.

Method: A survey of methods vhich have been used by criminals for surreptitious adninistration of drugs. Anslysis of the psycbodynamics of situations of ttis nature.

Proposal: That \$l000 be allocated for this purpose, furds to te requested as needed.

cate

112

[PAGE 114]
daloJUN= LAT 1955

MIDHORAOUM POR: THE RBOORD

,

i Subprojeot 2 is being ipitiated to proride scre and afficiant mans of eploiting —C vith regad to the M og.

2. s a practicing paychiatrist in and a facuity mber of Ee bas been of valne in the gel M ject, ing  n vior and consltant, contacting indiridmals in the , nd n out s

3. Seboject  vod jacde te folloring

(a) Meoallaneous research and testing serrioss in te l ald of .

(e) Monitoring of seleoted projeots in the MEULIR field, vhen Located in the oentral C

(d) Serices as a goel nltent nd atrisr in the MUL fiald.

(e) Be vould aot as medical advisor and consaltant C to d ertablisb-

C vill be reimbursed for his services and xpenses upon receipt of an invoice at iegular intarrals. When travel eperses are incurred through use of a commn oarriar, they vill be docanted and reinbursed in the usual manner; that is, consistant vith standard Governssnt allovances.

113

[PAGE 115]
MEMCRANDUM FOR TEE RECOFD

SUBJECT: Project MKULTRA, Subproject 16

1. Subproject 16 is s continuation of Subproject 3, vhich isvolved the establishment and maintenance of facilities for the realistic testing of certain research and developzent items of interest to CD/TSS and APD/TSS. The facilities vere set up under Sutproject 3, and Subproject 16 is intended to provide for the continued maintenance of the facilities..

2. Subproject 3 vas originally intended to provide funds for the maintenance of the facilities for one year; but it turns out that the costs of alterations, equipment, and initial supplies vere underestinated in Subproject 3; hence the necessity to establish Subproject 16 at this time.

3. Subproject 16vill be conducted byeC , Certain support activities will be provided by CD/TSs and APD/TSS.

k. The estimated cost for a period of one year is \$7,740.∞0.

FROGRAM APPROVED AND RECCMMENDED:

APPROVED FOR OELIGATION OF FUIDS:

Date: 13 Ccl-.1453.

Original Only.

114

[PAGE 116]
Nay 26. 1953 er our teloboe conversation
and opezed  acco checisizg 1n the  .
ueizs the nace occwred to zo'tbat for sake sety enthing sboia rappea to 12 vciid mede this a joiat accout betvee ren,in cace of y abseace, fllzess or death joa couid reccver the
J01nt fds vitiout ay legal dificulties or onbey busizess. The bank was a little eticby alout openias
acconat in the absences of " references" frcs asotber bark,
alao fourd it bard to understand hes s got by all these Hovaver, I.cffered to provide an zcellent in a gover official and the zonez-lenders and be ircedietaly vrote a refcieace c cz official also kindly said be ws, well 2C wloted and as plessed to aer er bi Ifyou think s go0d "icec, the Jot Accct Aement and the thee sigatue crds closed and retua thes to me And nov that the sccout Ls opened I sugst
you bave fonds deposited Tia Cashier's ckeck C ctle wa seens easiest- oct 8 ceeont/ C I oriered checks pinted vi erecn and bave also cdered stationery baariz . cossidered this might socilitate peyment of biils, etc., by mail. Wat vith suepicious banks; Lenloda; uti anies., eté., you vill udersterd that de peraonality in tbe fo of is takdig a little See you Monder, the 8th.

115

[PAGE 117]
..en: Prpes

SUBECT: Project 1LA, Subproject 23

1. The scope of this project is interied/to encxpass all thcse ecti-ities now engaged in by tze At tue preses: tize the varicus Tojects at this facility( and  are being concluded and it is ieezed desirasle frca the stasipoirt of security and efficienc: to replase these projects vith s sinsle proect core geceral i its npproak CT

2. The sttacted propcsal rc Dr. Tdicates the extest of the investigations that his facilities will allos hin to carry out on the zaterials developed is the three proects referred to in parraph 1, as vell as certais otber terials o intsrest to clso serves as a gezeral cozsultant to this Ca/TSS. Dr. diision aniprovides cover and cut-out facilities to the Acensy.

3. (C) The total cost of this pojact for a periol of cue pess vill zct exceed2,700.00.

4. Dr. s been nted a Top Secret Clearce by the Aeney eni is ful capable of protectias the security of the Goterect's Lnterest Ln such ntters as this.

APPRO.ED:

AFPRCIE CR ORLIESIC 07 TTD3:

MEMORAIDUN POR TZ ECCRD

116

[PAGE 118]
117

1 - It is proposed to stoty a variety of kov drugs in this phermacological cass that are in present day use and to syuthesise nev chemical agemts er to modiy ristn ones as occaicn y dnd.

2 - The rerioes cheicel agets rorestigsted or syathesised vll be tested an anisals to detarxise their scute and chronic taricity. heir phamacalogical affects vill be stadied by a variety of assay tecinics, such as blood pressure detersinations, brouchial dilatation recordings, endocrine effects, etc. Ceplete anisal facilitiss vill be miatained for this purpose and patbologic study vill be carried out on the affected organs vhan the animls are sacrificed.

3- Prelininary clinical iovestigation vll be oarried out  the sore proising chenical agents, and appropriate Laboratory procedures vill be performed, such as blood counts, winalysia, etc. to determine the affectiveess and the side reactias of the drags undar iavestigation.

4 - Adequate reports vill be submitted of the findings at quarterly interrals.

5 - Proposed budgot:

Total salaries for persomal

\$30,700.00

other renditures

Animals, animal minteance & facilities 4,000.00
Chica& Laboratory spplies, pdable 4,000.00
Mscelne peent qit 2,000.00
Trarel, medical metings, etc. 2,000.0

Total ether ecpenditures

12,000.00

?

[PAGE 119]
BOtbEr 1954

MEMORANDOM FOR THE RECOFD

SUBCT:. Increase in the Scope of Subproject 23, Project MULRA

(e)

1. Due to aconsiderable incresse in the scope of the vork undertaken by st the direetion of TSS/CD umder Subproject 23, Project MRA, the \$42,700.00 sn or1ginally obligated for this work is insufricient to cover the year's costs. It is therefore proposed to add \$15,000.00 to that already obligated umder this Subproject.

2. The total cost of this Subproject for the period 28 Jauary 1954 to 28 January 1955 v1ll thus mount to \$57,700.00.

3. The increase in scope responsible for this proposal consists of the development and partial financing of tvo nev sources of biologically actire compouds of izterest in the progr TSs/cD is carrying cut.

Cheaical Division, TSS

APPROVED POR OELICATION OF FURDS:

APPROVED:

Date: 0t 101

ig y.

Ta e   n si qi iy oi s

.

118

[PAGE 120]
SUBJECT:

Authorization for Payment of Certain Bxpenses Under Project MKULTRA, Subproject 23

1. In order to cary on the work of the above Subproject, it vas necessary to test the effects of certain chemicai substances vhen adniristered to kuman œeings. Certain of the anticipated effects involved mental functions vhich precluded the use of mental defectives for this particular study.

2. In view of these circumstances the project engineer: vith versal approval from bis chief, authorized the contractor to pey the hospitals expenses of certain persons suffering from incurable cancer for the privilege of studying the effects of these chemicals during their terminal illnesses. The total funds expended in this fashion amounted to \$658.05 and fll value vas received.

3. It is requested that the Chief, TSS indicate his kovledge and approval of this particular expenditure for audit purposes.

ISS/Chemical Division

APPRCVED:

APPROVED:

Dist:1bution: Ay31-1955. Orig. - TSS/CD

Chief, TSS Chemical Division

119

25 August 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE RECCRD

[PAGE 121]
KECRADM FCR: Director of Central Istelligence

SUBJECT : Project :ULA, Subproject 35

1. While the Directer's statutory authority to expend funds for confidentiel purposes is not lizited by lew, we believe thet a gift of Goverrsent funds as such vould exceed the intent of the Cozgress in srenting that pover. Ecvever, where s Eift is made for the express purpose of producirg sozething cf value to this Asency vhicii cannct cthcrwise be obtainei end there is a reasonable expectetion that the value may be received, the sift may in effect be an expenditure for proper official purposes.

2. In Subproject 35, 1t is stated that the donation in question would achieve certain ends desired by TSs. There seens to be no question that those ends would be adventageous, so the main questicns arpear to be whether they couid zot be ettained by ore direct, norzal methods, and, ir not, whether the return is necessary and reasonable in relaticn to the donation.

3. We ere in no position to review the requirezents of TSS cr to eppraise the advantages thet would result from this project. We do not cc=ent, thererore, on the value received if the project results is the benefits foreseen. We feel ve should corzent on fectors arfectirg the probsbility of achieving those ends. In s legal sense, there is little cr no ccntrol. Once the furds are dorated, the iniividuel, his fouiation, or the hospital cculd conceivaoly refuse to work for us or allow us the use of the facilities.

4. Practically, the contrcl seeus to be established es well as circstances perzit. Certainly, as lons as the individual is alive and in bis present position, we have every reason to expect kis cozplete cooperaticn in the future as in the past, unless through sc.ie ast or fsult of our owm he is alienated. Even in the event o his death or incspacity, there appears to be a reasonable

Dounsraded to: Dours

dy cutzer11y 0f: 187475

cate: J 1977

27:3T:CL BY 137475

Copy " 1 of 1 copy

120

21 December 1954

[PAGE 122]
121

cnenee es continvira tho jeet. i these protatilities erpenr surricicns so chtain un aucqute retu fer te expeniitue, teore can be ro legal cbection to this aspuct o the project.

5. It shoulá be roted that thers ere two eircuestances viich recuire consideration in e fizal detcrinaticn. As stated in Secticn V, cur contribution, by appearins to be fres a private source, wouls increase the zstchins Goverrzent contributien by a siziiar asout whica would not be the case ir it were knou thet this vas in fect a Coverzont cortributicn ciso. Seccnily, it is the statcd pciisy of the hossital to chares the Govermens end csnercial organisatices SC per cest cverhend on rosearch contracts, whereas ncnprofit fouiaticns pay orly dircct cests but se overhead. Because of the ostensibie source, our projects vill not be chareed overheed. This could te construed es zoraliy wrengl to the bespital, as norally we vculd pey the So per cent overhesd chess for projects perioei directiy for us, but I Sniicve this can be ofsset, at lesst to the aoust of ou donstior, end perheps by the futher aount by which the other Governzent ccztributiors are incrensed by our dsnsticn. In tny case, if ths projcst is s proper ozs ani cuct be perfored in this zanner, security dictctes these circustances end they, thereicrs, do not present a \_egal cbstacie as such.

6. We raised the auestion whether finds for the bospital construstion could not be cbtained fres otcer norl cheritabie sources. It aspzared thet thcre was a stroro rossibility thst the individuol concerned could raise adequsze funds fres rivate resources, but it was the positicn of TSs that if this were the case ve would not obtain thecomitsent fros the individul and the deres of contrcl vhich this projeet is cesigned to ecbieve.

LAIRECE A. HCUSTON Generai Coussel

Dornpradel te: y auther : cats: J

E2 1

Copy # l of l copy

[PAGE 123]
8 Apr11 1055

ME:ORDU FOR: ChiST, DD/P/TSS SIEJDOT : Anendzent to Subpréject 35 of Project :nITA

Wa heve noted yeur mezcranius ef 6 April 1955 to the

Direster requestins an inerease c? \$250,0c0 for the TEs

FeD budcet for this Frojeet. This request does not affect

\- in any vay the cornents in y memcrani't of 21 Decenber 1954.

aded to: by suthority of: l67475 cote: J:e 1977

E2 IPDET: CL BY 1S7475

122

-H

Copy " l of l copy

[PAGE 124]
LRAFT 1-.A

5 May 1555

A porticn ef the Rosserch ead Develocat Prcgr of TSs/Cical Divicicn is dovoted to the iscovery cr the folluing zavaricls cud atheds:

1. Suostances which vill promota illozicel thinking end ilsivesss to a pot varo te rccipit voul be disreited in public.

2. Subetances which increase the efficicncy of mentation ard parcepticn.

3. I'starials hich vill provzt or ccteract ths intaicntis cffest cr alcool.

4 liaterials uhich willrcotethe intolcatisa-Seot of cobol.

5. Matoricls waich vill oiues the sis  t of recossd casos in 8 reversibls vayo that th be ussi ior maliugerins, otc.

ó. lateriais which vill render the induotion  byaosis eaais or otkarwiso canence its uefilaess.

7. Substansos vhich will enhasce tho ability of iri-Tiduis to witbsted pritvioa, tere and coercioa curins intercitica i so-callc"ainashing".

8. Naterials ai phycal athods vhich vill procuce amesia fcr ovants prossiirg ani cirirg thuir uso.

9. Faysieal potbods of preusins chock aad ecnsica over atencel paricùs of tis and capable of septitious usa.

10. Substicss rhich proluce physical disablezert such as paraljois of the lezs, ecute snezia, etc.

123

[PAGE 125]
124

1l. Substancos Lhich villprohice "pre" cupheria vith no cubsoqueat let-ácun.

12. Subatszces vhich alter porocnality structure in suob a vav that ths tasdsrsy cr tto recipiest to beccze deponceat up eotber parses is cnnced,

13. A rateril vich uill cause etal cozsics of such a type that the inivicual er iss Llucnce vill ini it difficult to mintain a farricatien uader questioning.

14. Subetancos vhich vill louer tho enbitica and gansral veridrs efsicicncy of cen vàan administared in udetcotcble arounts.

15. Substancss vhich prcots vesikess or diotortion of ths eyecisht or hezriag fcculties, priferably withcut perzarsat effects.

1ć. à kcekeut pill vhich can surreptiticusly be aninistored in rinks, feod, oigarettes, es an cercsol, etc., vbich wll ba szo to use, proride a rarimm of cmssia, ced be suitarls fer tos by egent types cn en ad hoo basis.

17. & mztarial uhich can be surroptiticusly adainiatored by the atose routea aad vhich in very llerts vill ke it ipessibie fer & n to perfo ay physical activity vhstover.

The dovalopzant of caterieis of this tyes follous tha stansd practice of such ethiel ug houses as oR It is a pelatiroly routino pcscuo to derop a cug to the point ef lmaa tosting. Criirarily, tha drug bevsss iepend uscn tho services ci privsto phrcicians fcr the fizal clinieal testiuz. Tas physicisrs cro villias to assazo the rotonsibility of sush tcsts in crésr to eirezce tho seiczce ef msdiaine, It isdissialt cd cenetinss irpossibla for TSs/CD to offer guch rn ircucczcat with rospact to its preévots. In fractice, it hes been porsibls to uss out-ide clcared contractors fos tho prelizissry phacso e this verk. Hovovor, that part which iavolves hn tostizg at eifsotive doss levels presents socurity problees which aannot bo herdisd by the ordicary centecter.

[PAGE 126]
The proposed acilityors a unique opertmity for the are balli c se cniel testing  sitioa to the zay cirstagos cutlined in tho Froject prepoeal. Tho security preblc ssnticnei above cra elinintod by the fict that ths ropoasibility for tho tostin; idll rest ecsietoly upoa te rysicic i the hoitel. te s vy ccaly to ke  tt c toss concictel accoriizg to ths reccjised practices cand cboiy auequte eafoguerda.

125

96-408 () - 77 .。

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126

10 May 1955

SUBPROUECT 35 OF PROJECT MKULTRA

1., Subproject 35 as approved by the DCI on 15 Januarv 1055 contemplated a :-B
financial contribution of \$125, 000 to the
participate in the construction of a new research win to cost S, , 000
exclusive of furnishings and equipment. Agency funds will be transmitted as cut-out which -. B
throuch the
will result in one-sxn o: e space in the new researc. wing being made
available for Agency-sponsored research involving covert biological and
chemucal techniques of warfare.

2. At that time (15 January 195)with CIA encouragement indicated a willingness to contributs Sséc, CCc to the construction fund. The buiiding fund was to have been raised as foliows:

\$1,000, 000- Contributed by B 250. 000 - Donaton fro wche…aledhvこ:

1,250, 000 - Matching funds under Pubic Law 221 equal to the amc.nt cf :he two above contributons

500,000-B

\$3,000,000 - TOTAL

3. Sincs it now appears that the expected contribution b,will not be forthcoming, permission is requested to increase lie Agency's contribution by \$250, 000 winch w:ll result iu a financial situation as follows:

\- B \$1, 000, 000 - Contributed by 500, 000- Doration fro cludingB €375. 000 suspliec : CLA

1, 500, 000 - Matchin; funds under Public Law 221 equal to the amount of the two above contributions

\$3,000, 300 - TOTAL

4. The Agency's contribution would thus total \$375, Oc0. Thus investment,
together with the equal sum resulting from matched funds, is fullv ustified C
in  onion of TSS for rcasons which will be explzncd b
Cinef, TSS, and Dr. S:dney Gottlieb, Chief, TSS/Chemicai Division.
Tic scope of subpruject 35 has not cianged since the Director originally
approved a request by TSS for permission to spend \$125, 000 of available 1

[PAGE 128]
127

. ra  ts urpose through the controls and procedures established !. i:LRA. At the time subproject 35 was set up within the scope of 1.Sh kLD ro;ram, security considerations and cover arrangements urrr raret ally reviewed and the Office of General Counsel sssisted in legal rininations. With the exception of funding arranzements, no changes in : : ,:rogram have since been made. H

;, Finds to cover she previously approved sum of Si25, 000 are available wit in the TSS oudget for FY 55 and have ogen set aside. The TSS !d! ct, however, lacks funds with which to cover the supplemental sum of S), 000, and it is requested that the TSS .dget be increased by this amnunt, Supplementary funds available for sutpro ect 35 can definitely be obligated by the end of FY 55.

12 1 Y.: CL BY 18705

[PAGE 129]
AMENDMENT TO SUBPROJECT SS, PROJECT MKULTRA

For the Purpose of Establishing a Cover Organization for Highly Sensitive Projects in the Field of Biological, Chemical and Radiological Warfare

I. Background of Subproject 35.

In January 1955 approval was given by the DCI to Subproject 35 of Project MKULTRA. The documents wbich lead to this approval (including comments of the OGC) are attached herewith as Tabs 2, A and 3.

Project MKULTRA is the framework of procedures and controls under which research projects in certain highiy sensitive fields are carzied out by TSS. A descr:ption of the background of Project MKULTRA may be found on page 1 of Tab A.

Subproject 35 establishes cover under which the Chemical Division of DD:P/TSS would conduct certain sensitive projects in the f:elds of binlogical and chemical warfare and consists of a proposed arrarreen: whereby the AgruCoof th funcss to be made through he -B as cut-out so that the ot remain -1 unwitting of Agency participation in the su.cin pre ram. Projects would later be carried out by the Cbemical Division using the facilities of the new research wing, and Agency employees would be able to participate in the work without the University or the Hospitai authorities be:ng aware of Agency interest. Sutproject 35 contemplated the contribution of Agency funds to assist in the construct:on of fac:li:ies. Future research work wouid be carried out through the 2s cut-out znd would be - B separately funded under existing procedures and controls.

and the backround of6 tae descrised or page 2 of Tab A. C the sar paze tacre .. be found a further descr:plion of the -B

II. Buiiding Fund.

The University will require \$3,OCC, 000 for the six-story addit:on to the hospital exclusive of the cost of land, heating and power supply which are being provided by the University. Undtr Putlc iaw 22l, Subappropriation

128

[PAGE 130]
663, dated 26 August l954, funds are available to match funds raised for this purpose by the University.

When Susnroject 35 was first prepared, it was hoped and expected that the funds rcquired would be provided as follows: The University has allocated \$), c00, o to this project and will assume upkeep and staffing obiigations,

Cem agreed that if the Agency would provide -B ..tn a grant of S125, 000, the Fund would match this amount and make a total donation of \$250, 000 to the Universitv Building Fund. At that time, discussions withasrB ndicaed tha rould contr:bute \$5OC, 000 to the suilding project on the basis that radidiogical research would be conducted in the new wing and that the construttion of the new facilities was of interest to that Agency. In summary, the financial situation was to have been as follows: B

\$1,000,000.-B 250, 000-Donation from -e of which-\$125, 000 was supplied by CLA)

1, 250, 000 - Matched Funds under Public Law 221

It was recognized that the Federal contribution gf S1, 250, 000 under Public Law 22l would be seeminglv inated bv reason of the inclusion af the ClA contribution in that of It was felt that the value to the Agency was such that this inflation of the Federal contribution was more than justified by the importance of the over-all project and that furthermore, the inclusion of the CiA contribution in that of was the best means of maintaining security. B

111. -B

C B The original informal commitment on the par: of was first obtained through verbal discussions with which were fcllowed up by an exchange of correspondence betweer. the DC: and c Unlortunatcly at that time as fully occupied with the cortroverss concerning the and cont:nued contact with -C ordinates resulted in a decision that :ould not or wouldl not contribute to the Building Fund, but would Se uN:ng to aupport an annual research program amountiag to \$50, 000 to 575, 00I: is not i B

1

Copy l of l copy

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130

known whether this change in policy was suggested t or C whether it originated with him. Be that as it may, when the change in policy became apparent, it was evident that additional funds wouid be required to complete the hospital construction,

IV. Sugzcsted Funding.

It is now sugzested that the \$3, 000, 000 required for the hospital wing be provided as followe:

The donation from would thus consist of the original \$125, 000 to be supplied by CLA plus the sum of \$125, 000 to be provided ay the Fund and a supplemental CLA contribution of \$250, 000. Originally Subproject 35 requested permission to make a contribution of \$125, 000 to the building fund and approval was given. This approval is enclosed herewith as Tab 2. The purpose of this amendment to Subproject 35 is to requcst permission to contribute an add:tional S250, 000 to the building construction fund through It should be noted that -0 the total Government contribution to the hospital fund still remains unchanged at \$i, 875, 000. The increase in the size of the contribution by the Fund is not out of keeping with other operations of and will - not arouse undue comment because of its magnuitude. The originally approved contribution has not as yet been transmitted toand ne:ther the B original contribution nor the supplement would be paid to until-B funds adequate to complete the project are made available. Tais ccndition wae specilied by the DCi in approving the original contribut:on.

V. Source of CIA Funds.

Funds to cover the initially approved sum of \$125, 000 are available and have been segregated for this yurpose within the TSS FY 1955 Eudget for Research and Develoyment. Insufficient funds remain in the TSS budget to cover the sup;,lemintary sum of \$230, 000, and it is therefore requested that the TSS budget be increased by this amount and that the increase be made available to Subproject 35 of Project MKULTRA.

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VI. Comments by the Office of General Counsel.

Tab 3 is a memorandum from the General Counsel to the DCI dated 21 Deccmber 1954, commenting on Subproject 35, and stating in part that there are no fundamental legal objections if the probable benefits are considered a fair return for this expenditure. The amendment to the Subproject contemplates only an increase in funds and in no way changes any other aspcct of the project. The project has beea referred back to the OGC ever though no change in its structure is contemplated, and Tab 4 contains his, comments.

VII. Just:fication.

The advantages and benefits accruing to the Agency outlined in Tab A are felt by TSS to pronde adequate and complete justification for the expenditure of the additional sum herein requested which brings the total CLA contribution to \$375, 000. The most important of these advantages and benefits may be summarized as follows: (Fuller explanations may be found in Tab A).

a. One-sixth of the total space in the new hospital @ing will be available to the Chemical Division of TSS, thereby providing laboratory and office space, technical assistants, equipment and experimestal animals.

b. Agency sponsorship of sensitive research projects will be completely deniable.

c. Full professional cover will be provided for up to three biochemical employees of the Chemical Division.

d. Human patients and volunteers for experimental use will be available under controlled clinica! cord:t:ors within the full supervon o

Subproject 35 was originally conceived in October and November of l954, and the cnsuing six months have indicated that increasing emphasis and importance are being placed on the Chemical Division's work in this field. The facilitics of the hospital and the ability to conduct controlled experimerte under safe clinical conditions using materials with which any Agency conneetion must be completely deniable will augmcnt and complement other programs recently taken over by TSS, such as

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It was originally thought that at least l8 months would elapse after the building furds had been raised before the facilities would be finished and couid be oc:uried bv TSS. This lengthv delay has net resr overcome. WB ds ra.sea tne ., Cou wnicn his Fund wli ostensiciy contribute, he wiii tnen be allowed to use existing space in the present hospitai in order that he may build up the organization which will later occupy the new wing. This means that TSS will be able to begin to take advantaze of this cover situation within a matter of months instead of waiting for a year and a ha.

VII. Seeirity.

Security matters and details are being co-ordinated with the TSS Liaisor. and Security Oificer. Security of transmittal of the funds and cover arrangemenis are described in Tab A and remain unchanged.

IX. Areement wiL

The agreemcrt withs described in Tab A, and he exten: of his co-operation and the contro: over his actions remain unchanged.

X. Resultan: Financial Saving.

The total contribution of \$375, 000 by CIA will result in an addit:onal \$375, 000 in matching funds provided under Public Law 221. It is felt that the expenditure of thpse total funds is justified by the importance of the programs which will be pursued at the new facility. Even though the Cla contribut:on is increased under this amended project, the totai of Federal funds rema.ns unchanged. The use of this facility will allow work to procced under conditions of cover and security which would be impossible to obi\_in clsewhere without an expenditure of equivalent or greater funds. In adltion. bv funding individual projects for this facility through the

an chare wll be ncurred for overhead expense. 1f rescarn projectsare openly sponsored by the U. S. Covernment, it.s cusiomur to pay an ovethead rate equ:vi'en to  of salaries. However, if a non-proft fund, such as - sponsors research, the funds granted for the work are customarily usid oniy to pay for salaries, equipment and supplies, but nol ovcrhead. The A cney thus buys considerably more research throug i would be the case ii no cut-out were used.

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Perovih the fle on a, Subproject 35, with o ceents on the loal asrects. hile there is no leal ccntrol cni there are certain incidental coasideraticns, there is no findomental lezel cojoction if tns probable bensfite are considered a fair retu for this expendisure.

General Counsel

(DATE)

FORM MO. 10.10I JAN 1952

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SUBPROJECT 35 - PROJECT MKULTRA
For the purpose of establishing a cover organization for highly
sensitive projects in the field of covert Biological, Chemical and Radiological Warfare

I. Background of Project MKULTRA.

In 1953 the DCI spproved Project MKULTRA which established procedures and controls under which research projects in certain highly sensitive fields could be carried out by TSS without the necessity of s:gning the usual contracts. The approved procedures applv -H over-all Research and Development budget, and no add.ticna. iuncs are required. Controls established in the Project Review Committee approval of the Research and Development program (other than the signing of a contract) remain unchanged, and special provisions for audit are included. All files are retained by TSS.

These procedures and controls were approved since it is highly undesirable from a policy and security point of view that contracts be signed indicating Agency or Government interest in this field of endeavor. In a great many instances the work must be conducted by individuals who are not and should not be aware of Agency interest. In other cases the individuzls involved are unwilling to have their narmes on a contract which remains out of their control in our files. Experience has shown that qualified, competent individuals in the field of physiological, psychiatric and other biological sciences are very reluctant to enter into signed agreements of any sort which would connect them with this activity since such connection might seriously jeopardize their professional reputations.

When Project MKULTRA was approved, it was not contemplated that it would be used for the establishment of cover. Over forty individual research and development projects have been established under this framework and have been carried out extremely successfully, both fiom technical and administrative points of view. The experience gained in handling these projects has emphasized that establishment of better cover both for the projects and for associated Agency scientists is of utmost importance. Subproject 35 would establish such cover.

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II. Background of the

Thwasincorporated nB has Board of Directo of six members, one of wnom. ho acts as Executive C Director of the Fund. : has solicited funds from various - B individuals to finance a program of basic research in the chemotherapy of cancer, asthma, hypertension, psychosomatic disorders and other chronic diseases. Since 195: -co-operated with.the. -8 Chemical Division of TSS and acteu smouthiy atd effic:ently, both as a cut-out for dealing with contractors in the fields of covert chemical and biological warfare, and as a prime contracter for certain areas of biological research. Projects prcsently being handled for the Agency by the Fund are administered under the contro!s and procedures previously approved for MKULTRA.

Il. Background o-

internationa!lv known as s in the fieid c: esearch and is In th- past he re: .e: asscc:a:ed in a reseàh capac:ty with both the B Du-ing the war served as C in the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery tn the Navy. Since then he has maintained a consulting relationship to the Navy medical research program. is TCP SECRET cleared and witting of Agency - C sponsorship of tre programs carried out by the Fund as are two other members of the Fund's Board of Directors.

V. nd.-B

es in a canpaiin to ra:se tuncs of ererting  reu clinical research wing on the existing The research wing will consist of a buiid.ng »ix stcries nigh, 320 leet lung and 50 feet wide. Two-thirds of the space will be research laboratories and officcs while l00 resrarch beds wiil occupy the remainder. partici--C patios: in the fund-raising rampaign outlined beion w.:i resu.i in his having control of one-sixth of the total space in addition to the base-

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ment and general out-patient facilities. In this effort, -C has secured the enthusiastic support of the medical faculty and ine officers of the University who have carried the preliminary arrangements forward to the maximum extent of their resources.

V. Financial Situation.

The University will require abcut \$3,000, 00C for thc story addition. This sum is exclusive of the cost of land and the heating and power supply, which are already availatle nt the site. At the present time under Public Law 22l, funds are available to match funds raised by the University. The University has allocated \$1, 00c, 000 to th:s project and will assume upheep and staffing cbligations. mas agreed tha:if CIA -C will provde yyrant of Si25,000,will -B match this amo.ni ans nenc  .o.a: donation of \$250, 000 to the University Building Fund. This Agency's contribution will be made under the condit:on that it wili be refunded if construction does not take place.

TSS has discussed this situation withpas Sand has encourasecdone 3 \$,e te :ne  ang project on the bas:s tha: will be conducted in the new wing. though aware of our interest in the building, is unwitting of our spec.fic fields of research .-and individual projects. Ia summary, the financial situation would be as follows:

\$1,000,000. -乃 250,000-Denaton1ro8AM (5125, 000 supp::ec  C1A) 1, 250, 000 - Matched fu-ds (rom Pubiic Law 221 500.CC0- -B
\$3,000,C00-TOTAL

Although it is recognized that the Federal contribution of Si, 250, 000 under P. L. 22l is seeming! inf.ated bv reason of the inclusion of the CLA contribution in that ofoda actually the value to the Cla is 一 \$250, 000 and not just \$125, 000, the amount of CIA's contr:bution; furthermcre the inclusion of the ClA contribution in that of - 1 .s the best method of maintaining security.

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VI. Difficulties Faced by TSS.

It has been generally recognized for some time that the external research activities of the Chemica: Division of TSS in the field of covert biological, chemical and radiological warfare are sorely in need of proper cover. Although Project MKULTRA provides excellent administrative and financial cover for projects, it does not afford cover for scientific or technical personnel. MKULTRA has been used for dircctly with ind:viduals oxprivate companies. The use of-: the future will be increasingly limted due to

(a)' The increasing number of people who, albeit properly cieared, are aware of the Agency connection with

(bj The feeling by that the Agency C empiovees contactisis him (Drs. Gottlieb, etc. have no cover of any sort and-C consequently expose him to unnecessary end highly undesirable personai risk; and

(c) The widespread intra-Agency awareness of the nature of the relaticnship between the Fund and the Agency.

Another serious problem faced by TSS/CD as a result of lack of suitable cover is the difficulty in planning careers for technical and scientific personnel in the biological field. A long-range career concept of activities in this fieid inevitably includes proper cover for the individua: cencerned. The availability of research facilities to soive many of the above probiems, and :s wiliing -C and able to make any reasonable arrangements to suit our needs. Up to three Chemical Division employees can be integrated into-C ogram for work in the new hospital wing on the Agency's research projects. Although career planning was not a consideration when plarning the procedures and controls established by Project MKULTRA, nevertheless this particular sutproject, in addition to its primary objective, will be of very great secondary help

Esraraded to: C t sutror1t7 o5: 1S7675 :  77

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in simplifying and eliminating many of the very swkward and dangerous conditions facing certain Chemical Division employees.

Vll.Advantages and Benefits Accruing to TSS.

The contemplated arrangements will result in many advantages and benefits, including the following:

(a) One-sixth of the total space in the new research wiag is to te available to in turn, will be available to the Chemical Division of TSS. This ill provide laboratory and office space, technical assistants, equipment and experimental animals for use of Chemical Division personnel in connection with specific future projects.

(b) The cost of Chemical Division projects which are to be carried out under this cover will be covered by funds made available through Project MKULTRA, and projects will be subject to the procedures and controls established for MKULTRA. The funds will be passed through -B as has been done in the pis:. in turn will either pay expenses directly or transfer the money to the University for this purpose. Each project will be individually funded based on its particular budget, and there will be no other continuing or recurring charges for items such as space, facilities, etc.

(c) The Agency's sponsorship of sensitive research projects wouid be completely deniable sizce no connection would exist between the University and the Agency.

(d) Excellent professional cover would be provided for up to three bio-chemical employees of the Chemical Divisien of TSS. This would allow open - attendance at scientific meetings, the advancement of personal standing in the scientific worid, and as such, would constitute a major efficiency and

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morale booster.

(e) Human patients and volunteers for experimental use will be available under excellent clinical conditions with the full supervision of - RTESCROA

(f) There ould be available the equivalent of a hospital safehouse.

(g) It is expected that the output of useful results of the Chemical Division in the bio-chemical field will be greatly improved through the more efficient use of technical personnel who would be able to spend more of their tuime on actual laboratory work,

(h)

(i) Excellent facilities would be provided fer recruiting new scientific personnel since members of the Chemical Division working under this cover will be in daily contact with members of the Graduate School of the University.

() The regular University library and reprint service will be available as a source of techmical information.

VIII. Funding.

It is proposed that \$125, 000 be granted to  If-1 approval is granted, TSS will arrange for payment to be made under the procedures and controls of MKULTRA. These furds would come out of the presently approved TSS Research and Development budget for FY l955 and no new funds are irveived. The funds would be transferred agrant tcin tur:ned

ili match these funds with an equal amount and donate a tota! of S250, Oc0 to the University as outlined in paragraph V. The sum of \$i25, 000 would be entirely in the nature of a grant and would in due

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course be merged with the entire \$3, 000, 000 raised for the construction of the wing. The Agency would retain no residual interest in the building or title to any equipment or facilities purchased with this money.

This single grant will constitute the Agency's entire participation in
the new hospital wing, and there will be no recurring obligations in
the for of annual support of the hospital or additional grants. Transwill be made B
missior cf Agency funds to
throu: previously established coverchannels set up by the
:r similar transmittals in the past. The donation or- -B ks wili be shown as having been received from.

. In the future when TSS sponsors sensitive research projects which are ch project- B to be carried out ie as it has will be individually financed tnroug been in the past in accordance with previously established procedures and controls using allotted portions of the annual Research and Development budget. The University will be totally unwitting of Agency sponsorih:p, and the projects to every outward appearance will be ponsored by-C

In the event of death, will continue in being and any activities under this project wiil be continued through  -6 ird will be unaffected by his death.

IX. Memorandum of Agreement.

-C A memorandum of agreement will be signed with outi.ning to the greatest extunt possible the arrangcments under which the hospitai space under his control wili be made available to Chemical Division personne! and the manner in which cover will be provided and other benefits ottained. No contract will be signed since would be unable to reflect any of the Agency's cor:ractual tims in his arrangements with the University whenSakes th- B denation in question. The memorandum ol agreement wii be retained in TSS.

X. Securitv.

All security ma'ters and dctails are being cosordinated with the TSS/ Lia:sen and Srece.

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XI. Resultant Firancial Saving.

The S125, 000 to be contributed by CLA plus the S125, 000 in matching funds provided under P. L. 221 to the Building Fund will be more than offset in a few years by the savings which wil resuit frc use of this non-profit fund. Ifa research project at ossve: other educa--B tionai non-profit institution is sponsores by ine C. S. Government, it is customary for the Goverament to pay for salaries, ecuisTent. -4 supples, etc, and for overhead as well. In the case of Essesr athe overhead amounts to 80%e cf salaries. Howcver, l: à non- B pre: ioncaton such asksponsors research at a non-profit instituton, the iunds granted for the work are customar:ly used to pay for salaries, equipment and supplies but not for overhead. The Gover-ment dollar thus buys considerabiy more research through -B Skcrr rt :han would be the case if no cut-out were used.

Xil. Lesa: Matters.

This ater has been discussed withetstra the Cffice -A of Generali Counsel, and he is fully aware of ali cetaiis s\_rrounding this grant.

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LEMCRANDUMI FOR: THE RSCORD

SUSJICT

1. The urose of this trs. wcs to make arraagenents íor closia out tho.cenvaplerevious notics ttat cus e incly to be the isseat oí tho vasit, an\_ be prepireu bumseli accorcinly.

2. It was explaied toct it would nut be posuitla to carry over furcs beyoau ts cnd of the curret fiscal year. Tuereicre all eorl: would have to Se completed aad all paymeats made rrior to 35 Sine. This d\_acline apeared accs taoie to bia, aad it was aeroed t i woulc ais y ii visit thre to receive reports and ate:d to finl cetails on ib juro..d aot havo a currec: Linaacial report, but he astmates tha: fusas curreutly ca bana wouid be about sucient for remaining expcnditures. le ajrsed to send tae jociay v.ihin the ncxl l0 ccys a inore exact statement cí currunt balance and estinatea rema expenciiurss. I tried to imnpress on him strongly thet transfer oi aciitioaal iunds and/ or retura of ussxpendea fiads must be complsted vell csíare the eud of the Lscal year.

3. Cf the 30 cases called fo: in the oricinal desi,/o 13 bave been conpleted (dut only 4 have tesn traascrised from the tapee). In adciaon there are 8 czses in pro\_rcss (of wbict two are alrcauy in icterviow and 6 are wortsd up to the point oí hiving the Lists of quastions prepared). It was agrsri taat ta meet tue ccajinne we woulu tave to Liait the dceiga to thuse 26 cases.

4. It lo apparest tha:s eo iuvoived ia the acministrative problems of the project that he is iut fayuag aay amentiou to the reaults. Since to cate oaiy  cases have beea transcribed taere ls no way of seliu.3 wist is conlg out of it. l assune tere vero no crasauc reactoss, because tae atrv.ewers eolc tave let nm ko atsut the b. they caered. It is pocsitls, towever, :t our owa asalyais nf the data ay dredge up sometang of valle, altiuc I an cubious on thus poiat.

5. ave me his ueual lcsg invcivec talk oa tho üsulties be bad sacounterrc hicn ascount ior tse delays. lis aleo talned at scnie

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length about bía "experlmsnta" with bypnosla, soine sepects ef whiet are mulily ur-raisg.  aally he mace quite a pitch ser costiauiag sorae sucb project as this noxt year, "wii realisiic, spuciflc deadliaes." Itold bum ve would jiscuse posaitllities aiter toe prrsunt project was corapieted and we bad a chaico to closely cxamine taa tais.

143

[PAGE 145]
July 18, 1958

The·experiment designed to test the effectiveness of eertain zedication in causing indiviiuals to reiease guarded inforation bas been cczp.etei in accorzance with the orig-nal experizentai desisn, wit L.t ettepsion that 25 instead of 3C cases of Juiy 15. Abstracts on ali 25 cases, transoriptions or the interviews, Vechsler-Bellevue Intelligence Tests siven at re bespital and previcusiy sivez as tis ciinis, post-experimental rarkings and evaluation szeets, and a schedle coverins the drug ad-inistration have ali been submitted to you under separate cover.

Enclosed is a finansial statemezt which repr sents the final ascoutin of the fuds allocated by you for use Ln is project. If, for your purpose, you require a more detaiies summary of what specifis professisnai services were pe-fozed or more detail vits reference to travel expenses or any otner item, kindiy let me know. 1

vas This was occasisned by the fact tha: r en: pose. It vas froz the cases seiected by bis taat the sutjects used in the experizent were ficaliy chosen.

I have been instructed to urite a check to the Society for the baiance in the account as o:' today. I vould like to

144

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M:.

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Pace To

neisy tnis matter for a few days. Several chesks have been written during recen: iays, and I wouls like to be sure they cleared the tank  before clcsing out the accouns. You will receive a cnesk in the asourt of Si35b.25 early next veek.

If there is any additional inforeation required, I will be happy to cooperate.

[PAGE 147]
15
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at te prosens sie thero sre ene buured cd fcrty-tuo () nsa
pathotiss elassiied a cridral-sel poyenepss. cre  few - t a   te peno  sc ers  d .  sper
Lel er ohra e iu s und ts esi
meeeitive erery of ts Seaté ertrene ef enal Halth aty  ca e is sy eved b he sor ceh - C le  teto s out thair vestisien.

boted d d () invesisn ineiupei erers,ic,tc ic      tho

1
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sujto vins en   s s  thre ci  inn lvls d sis.

To seller ren cre sustcd for tho resuach se

-C em, a pychclcist o heo Lad esire eerice  i ih etnsive ca pehepatide seul devistiane ie an autherity on pelyph and intoation neod.

g-C , sent his ? in  tt ef  c i t and t fat l- psyo.

C pactice. At Ue psen tirs ho is exelusimly eototins lis tie to pihis. Ho l had eesive cericace i . s v pat  b exiensive e in-C Lhe field e carte cltures, Oricmal pty, lsnin, ce. e h so d  tarrocation th eirdale a has encacod in aarcosnaluía and ealis.

Dod to: y 7 e: 10745 ese: J: 1277 2:C 57 157475

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EE-1 ai p l bk  went-ve u, in

C-4T: cfer the  nveC
H in iatei.esdos   pti, ie so ivstopgel

d cfe  C s a o is inre d hs u Ln te trea r  pes  us l petisnts. o rescre: acistnts ha not tesn celeeted so yt t rt  l lo e nees no b

See t ef tua ier prscanicrl a cach bo soleeted. 107415

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149

E2 1:: CL 8: 13745 tetreil acetae ivatim. ino tn wori an ceter jcts   st inteatio, L vit Lneotiea ad a tstnurcennatinel acstito derivative and interroatien. Later the thid tea  her p f .a l se sht Laer catio  a cobision uf L and a ttrigtrocanabinal acotate deriti.

A i of ll   of o re pt s e bed to e     lo  l Lade gud so f Ln the uso of thaco dugs.

Inciotirc Jope f etjects fer erirencica, the fallsin obfesves vill to scughe:

1) Chjos sll to slesed o ve died aca of vios ns tht can o clocd or str sund on te basis ef prericusly ostarlcod receris.

2)/ posit, the  rescrch  ns d vill not  o of t  he s iisteri d plcct terrsed  d aitatia.

3) Precutics l le taka to nutraliso , imtelle, pysical eion, sudand ou contrellatle fastar is velcctiac Teups. Adistrtica e? s will te dae both epenly and twteptitioucly.

L)  rscords uill Lo :de o the ieetia en o oed  r ea.

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MEMORANDUH FOR TEE RECORD

SUBJECT: Project MOKULTRA, Subproject 42

1. Subproject k2 is to be conticued for the same purposes as vhen originslly established: to suppor:ap covert2 and realistic field trials of certais research and develcpzent itens of interest to TSD, and to maintain the physical facilities required fer these trials.

2. In the past year a oumber of covert and realistic field trials have been successfully carried out. The results of these experinests have provided factual data essential to estsblisting protocols for  quaber of coztezplated operatioos. A continuntion of covert and realistic field trials ere necessitated by the proiuction of nev aterials in TSD programs, particularly in areas requiring detailed knosledge of the effectiveness pnd efficiency of delivety systems. Additioral trials are also zecessitated by the need for better controlled "field-type" experiments. 一

3. The estizated cost of the project is \$5,00.00 for a period of six months. Charges should be mde against Allotzent ll25-l390-3902.

k.Accounting for funds and equipment under this subprojeet bas been establisted on s detailed basis with the auditor and vill ccotizue ss in the pest. :

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5. is eporoved for TOP SECRET by the Agency and operates under cover for purposes cf this subproject.

APFRO.ED FOR OBLIGATION OF FUIDS:

Dist-isution: Orizinal only.

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MEHCRANDUM FOR THE RECRD

SLEJECT: Project MKULTRi, Subproject 42

1. Subproject 42 is bein- ertatlished to provide fcr the continued suppcrt of theacilities, and as such, is a ccntinuation of Sut-- s These faciles, in tne new locaticn, will continue to frv\_ce a means for the realistic testing of certain R and D itens of interest to CD/TSS and APD/TSS. C

2. Subproject 42 will be concucted by . a seanan. Certcin suppcrt activitics will be previcec Dy CD/TSS and AFD/TSS.

3. The estirzted cost for a period of one year is \$e,3Cc.∞0, startirs 1 March 1955.

TSS/Chemical Division

ALPRCVED FLR OBLIGATICN CF FLES:

Dere: 27 jan 105

Uriginal Only.

APPROVED FOR ADDITIOIAL OBLIGACICN QF FUDS: (\$2,089.34)

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[PAGE 155]
STE.ECT :Project-OLA, Subproject 65

1. The scope of this project is intesded to ensoess those activities now engaged n by the saren . i its ow feces cer the drection ef TSs, Chezca Divisien. These astivities vill take the for of three lines of biocheaical investigation; mazely, the curare-like effect of certain. thiols, the preparation of hydrogenated quizolines and iedole aikaloids, and the costinued study of iphencie ccpounds. In adtion to the above inrestigations, the presest biologisai tasting and assaying techaiques vill be eiatcrated and trcadened to include cardiovassuar and anticarciaogesic effects of conpounds resiting froz the above progas.

2. The atcached preposel fros dicates the extent of the investigations that his fasiities v lou his to cary out on the aterials developed is the three lines mteris of isterert to TSs/. ass sees of research referred to Ln paragraph i, as wel as certas other C as general const: to tis Division and provides cover d cut-out facilities to the Agency.

3. The totai cost of this project for a period of oze jeer vill zot exceed \$10,C0c.00. At the present tize, the  of \$ic,00c.00 is beng cozitted, the baasse of the total to be cozicced at a later date.

C L.  bee ? S clee by the Ageney, asi is y capable of protecting the security of the Goveest's izteres: in this ter.

A TSS, Chezzca. Divisicn

APFROTED FCR CBLIGATION CF FEOS:

APFRCIED:

TSS,Vn Feses rectcr 24 ma 51 APE PR DCN LC Date: 27,00: Attactsents: Propesai Researe Directer Criginal Only. Dater 2.157.

MEMORIDON FOR: DHE RESCAD

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21 eron

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MEIDRULOTIH FOR: TE KECORD

SUBJECT: Projeet L, Subproject 45

3) under the direction of TSS/CD. These activities take tne for of three lines of biochezical investigation, namely, the Curare-like effect of certain thiols, the preparation of bydrogenated quinolines and indole alkaloids and a prograa of iovestigation of toxic cerebral states, This last Lovestigation vill include bio-essay and chezical. analysis of various body fluids of anizals in vhich ceretral tozenias bave been produced. It is the ais of this progr to endeavor to understand the mechanisa of such states as toric deliriun, urezic
(B) (B) establisbed "cover" actirities of tseand  make availatle establisbed "cover actirities of teand  make availatle a cons, and cerebral toxicity fros poifsonizg. In order to contisue the c,  re pool of sub'ects for testing purposes,  paarar pool of subects for testing purposes, e po

6) egects of corpouds rosulting froa the above progres vill be evuated.

(c) 2. The attached proposal fra SLadicates the extant of the iovestigations that his faclities vill allou his to carty out on the materials developed in the three lines of research
: referred to in parsgrapt one, sa veli as certain otber mteriais of
(c) to this Division and provides cover and cat-out fesilitiss o the interest toTSS/. ro seves as general conntant

3. The total cost of this project for & period of one year vill not exceed \$10,00. Charges should be made against lotzent 6-25C2-10-001.

ing or  cop of tnual eudit report be made available for (B the sponscr's inspectios. Also, it has been requested that aay uzexpended fuds shall be returned to the Agency.

Title to aby peraseat equipsect purebased by funds granted B Werte Lieu of aher overhead rtes. (C)

\* other than its activities as a cut-out

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90 Jamry 1996

圓

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(6) 6. It vas mitually agreed that docestatisa and accsuti for travel expesses vhich are noraly reisbursable by tbelbi
(6) shall confora vi the accepted practices of th (B) 7.eed to coapy vith the requreess of the Mar of gzat.

ISS, CbenSL Divisios LPFD:

APPRE FOR OBLION C FJDS:

Chief, TSS/Chezica Divisie

Attachpest: Proposa

Distributioa:

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1960

157

Ihe research to de undertcken during the twelve month pertod for uhich financtel support ts requested wtll be depoted to the continued cnalysis of the neurcl and endocrine meshantsm of stress and the chemtcal agents that inpluence tt. Ihe screening procedures are based largely upon c further enclyets of phases of stress cnd the in/luences of this physiologic behaotor compiex upon both body cnd skin temperstures ce detsiled in the cccompanying report.

The chemics: synthests o. nes compounds utll be continued

Cos ese chemtocl ccens wil: be screened for thetr ccpctty to proucke stress or to sufpress the stress reactton in its acute or chronic prases. Animal testing wiil tnelude phamacologic screerin: and preper toztetty studies.of these compounds as. heretcore.

Chemicsl cgents that hase been found setive and utthin a suttabie tcztetty range uill be subjected to eliniccl sereening on appropriate pttents, the intitcl sereening tetns carried out on adxnced ssneer pttents. The ameln: of noney detoted to chezical syntrests, hosever, res bes: irther reiuced. Chestcel coapcunds auiictie fre. ticicgic sources cs vell es thcse synttestsed in tr projess uill be screened, particuiariy those trat are active in elther ratsing or lovering dody temperatire.

As heretopore any cgerts utish prose to be of interest ncan hath nn transtlant

26.40k0.77-11

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enimal tuzors and on concer pattènts. Ints cancer phase' os the eaimal tuzors ne u he maior objecttoe,

project u which wtll be directed to the problem of stress.

project uill be constdgred a by-product of the major objecttoe,\_

WARNING NOTICE SESSIBVE LTECCIGESCE SOURCES"AND METAODS INVOLVED

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17 t/ of:13/479 i

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MEMOFANDUM FOR: THE RECORD SUBJECT : Continuation of MYULTPA, Subprojeet Ne. s

. I. The scope of this subproject iacludes ali those activities B
now engaged io by
under the direction of TSSCD with the exception of those cutout
functions specifically menticaed in connection witt other MKULTRA
subprejects. In geaera:, the research effor: under this subprcjec:
ili continue along the lises laid dowe in previous years. These
involve the syothesis and ptartacologica: aad clinica! evalcation
of ccpouads of those cheical failies known to have application
in the psycbécbemical and "K" fields. During the past year importas:
prcgress bas been made in the area related to stressor compounds
and the relationship of these materials to the physiclogica! pathways
threugh which toth stress and the reactioe to it are mediated in
buzn beings. 11 As is indicated in the attached proposal, the work
of the past year has progressed to the point where more defizitive
experimests os tte stress reaction cas be carried out. Primarily this was brough: about by the characterizatios of several new materials which produce stress reaction in humane and the application of same new clinical metaeds of reasuring the extent of the d:stirbance produced. During tne next year preportionally more effort wil: be expesded on the proble= of the develcpment of pew

[PAGE 161]
is desirabie in tbis direction and because a new approach to the problem bas bees worked out. C.

the Agency, provides services ofa sensitive nature on an ad hoc basis, and serves as a cut-out in procurement problems.

3. The total cost of this project for a period of one year will oot exceed \$71, 500.00. Charges should be ade against

Allctment 0525-1009-4902.

C 4. a bas been requested to submit a sumary accounting or a copy of tte Fund's apoual sudit report for the sponsor's inspection. Also, it bas been reqeested that any unexpended funds shall be returned to the Agency.

5. Title to any permanent equipment purchased by funds B C granted onicck shall be retained by mrerser, in lieu of highe: ove:bead rater 6. It was mutually agreed that documentation and açcounting B for travel expeases which are norzally reimbursable by Q pcsbali conform with the sccepted practices of the Fuad.

Coades to: CCNDETIAL 7 1t7 0: 16475 Cate:1977

E2 1CET: CL BY 197675

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一
NDHORABDUN POR: TEE RECORD
: Custio  , Sbect .-

1. e scópe of this subpreject iacludes a those activities under the directi f / vi  ceptl of thoe cutout fumctions specifically meaticoed in comectioa v.tb other MecLRA subprojects. In penerl, the research effart mder this subproject rill contiue along the Lines laid dove in previous years. ese volre the yatbess d pheceloc and cic evlutio o coponds of those cheical felies ovs to bave applicstio in the peycbocbeaical and T" fielés. During the cosins year it is planned to cocerate sr iec  the me pactic pects of e "mockout" probles. Enough sev potent substaaces have become svalleble Lately to mke ruch a change Ln ephesis vartbvtiie. in consctica vith this change it abould be aoted tha: certan odiags mde in project at vt:ch cannot e fuher exploited at that facilty vill prsued at . Neuc it my be seceseary to suppiemeat the finiaga of this subproject Sros time to tim during the yers dus to incresses of scope.

C2. cth Agecy, poies serices ofa sesitive e  n ad boc basis, and servesu cutout n procuvmst probiess.

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3.  se ss os is pejot rer prios   yar vil mot exceed \$ho,0.. Charges abouid be mde againat Alotent 2125-1390-3902.

C.  he ben requested to subelt  uy accounting or a copy of the Pund's anual sudit report for the sposor's inspecticn. Also, it has bees requeeted that sny unezpended funds shall de retuued to the Agency.

5. Title to ny perment equipeat purchased by unds grnted Clund ye3 Tin Leu f gher overted ate.

6. It vas mutually agreed that documeatation and sccounting for travel epeuses vich ae pormaly niabursable by oe ahali coafore vith the accepted practices af the Pund.

APPROVED FOR OBLIGATON OF FUSDS:

\_Besearca Director

Attachent: Proposal and Buget

Distribution: Original oly

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24 January 1964

MEMORANDUN FOR : THE RECORD

SUBJECT : KULRA, Subproject 149

1. This subproject is being established for the purpose ふ 1
of supporting realistic tests of certzin developrent i:ems and
delivery systezs of interest to TSD.'BB. lin/

2. During the course of developzent it is sometimes found that certain very necessary experimerts or tests are not suited to ordinary laboratory facilities. At the same time, it would be difficult if not impossible to conduct such tests as operatiqnal field tests. This project is designed to provide a capability and facilities to fill this intermediate requirenent.

3. The activities under this subproject ill be conducted by r. . an individual in the import and C exportbusiness,ic.holdsTOP : SECRET Treasury Department clearince and a SECRET Agency approval. He is cozpletely witting of the aims and goals of his activities.

4. Nrossesses unique facilities and personal abilities which makes him invaluatle in this kind of testing operation.Lrbccnuse ofhis peculiar.talees and

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capabilities as vell, as his excellent connections vith all of the local lav enforcement agencies, vill provide a unique and essential capability. Because Mr.:s no longer re-C sident of the area, it is necessary that a suitable replacement be provided in order that s capability for continuance of our activities be maintained.

5. The estimated cost of the project 1s \$10,000.00 for s period of one year. Charges should be made against Allotment Number 4125-l390-3902. Reizbursement will be made 1or services rendered.

6. Accounting for funds advanced and any equipment under this subproject will be in accordance eith accounting proce

7. A memorandum of agreement along lines establishec by previous audit recommendations in like situations vill be executed.

164

Distribution: Original only

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su3.E: Request for Support of Research on the Mechanism of Brain Concussion

1. This is a request for financial suppert for research on the mechanis of brain concussion for the period 1 Feb 1956 to 1 Fet 1957.

2. The resonance-cavitation theory upon which this research is tc be based B has beer presented in the proposal subitted to the dated 27 March 1954.

3. The program as origiselly subritted estinated the duration of the progran to be fror three to five years requesting & total of \$72,109 for the initial year.

4. At the request of the icioas reduced budget was subritted.

5. a-unting to \$24,925, was then awarded to the to suppor this progra fro 1 Fet 1955 pes 1950.

6. The crcgress rade to date under the above contract can be surarised as fellows:

A. RESEARCH FACTLITIES

The following rescarch facilities have been established for the investigation of the very diverse aspects of Lhe protlers deing stud:ed:

Ate: of- Sare feet of laboratory and office space ecuipped with much of the diversifzed michinery and apparatus necessary for rescarch in this field.

b. Blast Range U. DiSOV

BGB A blast range  heen estatlished sttipGpit located apprexinately Ssear. the min acrery. Tis area is owmed by tne earand is closed to the public. Thrce blast test-series have been run to date.

4BB A:: :cr use of their hu-n ccaavers. A tert area has been assigned for this

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B. PERSONNEL

Both full-time techrical personnel and part-time professional research personnel have been acquired and indoctrinated relative to their specific function. i

C. TECHNICAL PROGRESS

Following is the technical progress made under the current B contract:

8. Specialized instrumentation and numerous testing techriques have been developed to obtain the desired dynamic data.

b. Considerable data has now been obtained supporting the resonance-cavitation theory of brain concussion.

e. Preli-ina:y acceleration thresbold data has been obtained for a fluid-filled glass simulated skull.

d. Data bas been obtsined on the nature and tbe magnitude of pressure fluctuztions within a glass simulated skull subject to either impsct or sound waves propagated in air.

Initial studies have been made on the simulated glass skull attempting to estatlish the cavitation patterns for varous types of impact.

7. The preposed rethod and progras plan remain the same as stated in the original proposal, except fcr the temporary deletion af the imrersion blast study.

8. The current level of activity on this project can be indicated by the most recent billing to the s for the month of November, which anounted to \$4,034.61.

9. In the interest of efficiency and econory it is requested that at least this level of activity be maintained for the coming year.

WARNING NOTIN STAC LLLGECE ETHODS VOLVEO

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transient state due to head irjury wnach is of instantanious onset, manifests widespread syrpto-s of purely paralytic kind, does not as sush corprise any evidense of strictural cerebral injury, ant is aluzy fo ed by area for the astua: mcnert of the acciser:."

10.2 The i-plication of the underlinei pcrtion of the abeve statcrent is that is a techniqus were devises to inclse brain concussion withou: giving either advance vaming or ceusing extemal physical traura, the person upon ressvery wouid be unstie to resali wat had happened to hir. Under these ccnditicns the same teshsique of proiusing the concussion could be re-used many tines witnout disclosure of its nature.

10.3 First, considering the possibilities of direct impast te the head or bedy, it sheuis be possitie Sron the findingt of this research pregras to deteine the fcilosing:

a. Optinur desizn of inpacting devises.

b. Optn points of inpast or. skiii or body for the specific effests desired.

e. Intensity of the biou for the effest desired.

10.4 In regart to the potential irpacting devices, there are certain design requsitesothat sre apparent at this time:

a. The irpact should be delivered without advance warring.

b. The area of impact and forse distribution shculd be such that surface traura does not occur.

e. The intensity of the inpacting forse and its duration sheui be such ss to obtain the desired effest.

d. The devize shouis be as srall and as silent as possitie.

10.5 The spesific irpasting devices might take the for of any of the follcwing:

a. A paneake type black-jack giving a high peak irpast force with a low unit surfase pressure.

b. Cencealed or carsufiaged spring-lsaded inpastinz devises that trigcer upcn centast uith the heaa.

(Origina: and sele cefy :ass)

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.

d. An explosive pad detorated in contact with the head or the body. :

10.6 Let us now consider the possibilities of exciting the resonance cavitation directly without inpact. There is considerabie evidence that resonance cavitation can be induced directly in the following ways: a. A blast wave propsgated in sir. (Blast Concussion) —nassted in sir. (Blast Concussion)

b. Physical excitation with a mechanical driver or hor, tuned to the rescrant frequency of the head.

10.? A single blast pressure wave propagated in air must have considerable intensity in order to produse brain consussisn, hosever, there is considerable evidence (Carver & Dinsley) that modification of the pressure vave can. produce profound effects.

10.8 Excitation of the resonance cavitation by using a tuned driver at this time appears to be well within the relm of pessibility. The neurotic-like manifestations nomslly associated vith blast concussion could possibly be induced by this method. Use of this metnod,bowever, would require actual physicai ccntact with the drivers.

10.9 Excitation of the resonance cavitation by tuned sound waves also aprears to be a reascnatle pessibility. Consentraticn ef the soundfield at scme renote paint could be effested with accoustical lenses and reflectors. The blast duration would be in the order of a tenth of a sesond. Masking of a noise of this duration should not be too dificult.

11.0 It would possitly be advantageous to establish the effectivmess of both of the atove methods as a tool in brain-wash therapy. A full kowiezge of the rethod and the resuiting sequela should be of aid to any person forced to submit to such treatment.

12.0 Possibly the nost significant potential sspect of this study would be in the deveioprent of prastical means of giving a person immunity. even though te-pcrary. to train cancussion. One technique that appears to have potentialities involves the introduction of a small quantity of cas, apprexirately 1 ec, into the spinal cord. This gas bubble would then noraily migrate to the ventricles located at the centmm of the hrain. The abaiity of this buttle to expand under dynanic loadin; would be mest effective in proventing resonanse cavitation fron occuring.

(Original and sole cory :agh)

96-4C8 196×

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MATERIAL FOR THE RECORD

MKSEARCH. OFTEN/ACHICKWIT

MKSEARCH was the nane given to the continuation of the MKI'LTRA program. Funding commenred in FY 196. and ended in FY 1972. 1ts purpos was to develop. test. and evaluate capsabilities in the covert use of biological. chemical. and radioactive material systens and tehuiques for prolucing predictable human behavioral and or physiologiral changes in support of highly snsitive operational requirements.

OFTEN/CHICKWIT

In 1it the Ofice of Researh and levelopuent (oRl) and the Edgewood Arsenal Research Latoratories undertook a progran for doing research on the identitication and chararterization of drugs that could influence human behavior. Edgewood had the facilities for the full range of latoratory and clinical testing. A phased progran was envisioned that would consist of aepuisition of drugs and chemical compounds buelieved to have efferts on the behavior of humans, and testing and evaluating thes. materials through latworatory procelures and toxicological studies. comjsomnds believed promising as a result of tests on animals were then to le evaluated clinically with human snbjerts at Edgewod. Substances of puotentinl use wouid then bue analyzed strueturally as a basis for identifying and synthesizing pwossible new derivatives of greater utility.

The program was divided into two projects. P'rojeet OrTEN was to deal with testing the tovicological. transmisivity and behavioral effects of drugs in animals and. ultimately. humans. Projet CHlckWIT was roneerned-with aequiring information on new drug development» in Euroje and the Orient, and with acquiring samples.

There is a diserepatney between the testimony of luop and ClA regarding the testing at Edgewond Arsenal in June 1973. While there is agreement that humah testing ocurred at that place and time. there is disagreetuent as to who was respunsible for inancing and sponsorship. (Ser hearings before the Subcommittee on Health and Srieutitic Research of the Senate Hunan Resources Committee. September 21. 1977.1

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON D C 20505

Office of legisiative Counsel

23 December 1977

Honorable Daniel K. Inouye, Chairman Select Committee on Intelligence United States Senate hashington, D.C.20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

During Admiral Turner's 3 August ig-7 ieslimuny before your Committee and the Senate Human Resources Subcommittee on Health and Scientific Research, you asked whether any Agency employees had heen terminated because of their participation in MKULTRA Subproject 3. Admiral Turner indicated he did not believe any employee had been terminated, but would have Agency records searched on this question. Our records have been searched and the results confirm the Director's testimony that no such actions were taken.

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QkHIll.TOI' was a cryptonym assigned in 19t to a project to study Chínese Communist brainwashing techniques aud to develop interrogation technigues. Most of the early studies are believed to have been couducted by the Cornell University Medical School Hunnan Ecology Study Programs. The effort was absorbed into the MKULTRA program and the QKHILLTOP cryptonym became obsolete. The Society for the investigation of Humnan Ecology. later the Human Ecology Fund. was an outgrowth of the QKHlLLTOl.

171

QKHILLTOP DEFINITION