Tenebrae/cvss31vectors huggingface dataset:
CVE-2024-56656
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

bnxt_en: Fix aggregation ID mask to prevent oops on 5760X chips

The 5760X (P7) chip's HW GRO/LRO interface is very similar to that of
the previous generation (5750X or P5).  However, the aggregation ID
fields in the completion structures on P7 have been redefined from
16 bits to 12 bits.  The freed up 4 bits are redefined for part of the
metadata such as the VLAN ID.  The aggregation ID mask was not modified
when adding support for P7 chips.  Including the extra 4 bits for the
aggregation ID can potentially cause the driver to store or fetch the
packet header of GRO/LRO packets in the wrong TPA buffer.  It may hit
the BUG() condition in __skb_pull() because the SKB contains no valid
packet header:

kernel BUG at include/linux/skbuff.h:2766!
Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 1 PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
CPU: 4 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/4 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G           OE      6.12.0-rc2+ #7
Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE
Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R760/0VRV9X, BIOS 1.0.1 12/27/2022
RIP: 0010:eth_type_trans+0xda/0x140
Code: 80 00 00 00 eb c1 8b 47 70 2b 47 74 48 8b 97 d0 00 00 00 83 f8 01 7e 1b 48 85 d2 74 06 66 83 3a ff 74 09 b8 00 04 00 00 eb a5 <0f> 0b b8 00 01 00 00 eb 9c 48 85 ff 74 eb 31 f6 b9 02 00 00 00 48
RSP: 0018:ff615003803fcc28 EFLAGS: 00010283
RAX: 00000000000022d2 RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: ff2e8c25da334040
RDX: 0000000000000040 RSI: ff2e8c25c1ce8000 RDI: ff2e8c25869f9000
RBP: ff2e8c258c31c000 R08: ff2e8c25da334000 R09: 0000000000000001
R10: ff2e8c25da3342c0 R11: ff2e8c25c1ce89c0 R12: ff2e8c258e0990b0
R13: ff2e8c25bb120000 R14: ff2e8c25c1ce89c0 R15: ff2e8c25869f9000
FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ff2e8c34be300000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 000055f05317e4c8 CR3: 000000108bac6006 CR4: 0000000000773ef0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe07f0 DR7: 0000000000000400
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
 <IRQ>
 ? die+0x33/0x90
 ? do_trap+0xd9/0x100
 ? eth_type_trans+0xda/0x140
 ? do_error_trap+0x65/0x80
 ? eth_type_trans+0xda/0x140
 ? exc_invalid_op+0x4e/0x70
 ? eth_type_trans+0xda/0x140
 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20
 ? eth_type_trans+0xda/0x140
 bnxt_tpa_end+0x10b/0x6b0 [bnxt_en]
 ? bnxt_tpa_start+0x195/0x320 [bnxt_en]
 bnxt_rx_pkt+0x902/0xd90 [bnxt_en]
 ? __bnxt_tx_int.constprop.0+0x89/0x300 [bnxt_en]
 ? kmem_cache_free+0x343/0x440
 ? __bnxt_tx_int.constprop.0+0x24f/0x300 [bnxt_en]
 __bnxt_poll_work+0x193/0x370 [bnxt_en]
 bnxt_poll_p5+0x9a/0x300 [bnxt_en]
 ? try_to_wake_up+0x209/0x670
 __napi_poll+0x29/0x1b0

Fix it by redefining the aggregation ID mask for P5_PLUS chips to be
12 bits.  This will work because the maximum aggregation ID is less
than 4096 on all P5_PLUS chips.
CVSS 3.1 vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
CVE-2024-50077
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

Bluetooth: ISO: Fix multiple init when debugfs is disabled

If bt_debugfs is not created successfully, which happens if either
CONFIG_DEBUG_FS or CONFIG_DEBUG_FS_ALLOW_ALL is unset, then iso_init()
returns early and does not set iso_inited to true. This means that a
subsequent call to iso_init() will result in duplicate calls to
proto_register(), bt_sock_register(), etc.

With CONFIG_LIST_HARDENED and CONFIG_BUG_ON_DATA_CORRUPTION enabled, the
duplicate call to proto_register() triggers this BUG():

  list_add double add: new=ffffffffc0b280d0, prev=ffffffffbab56250,
    next=ffffffffc0b280d0.
  ------------[ cut here ]------------
  kernel BUG at lib/list_debug.c:35!
  Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
  CPU: 2 PID: 887 Comm: bluetoothd Not tainted 6.10.11-1-ao-desktop #1
  RIP: 0010:__list_add_valid_or_report+0x9a/0xa0
  ...
    __list_add_valid_or_report+0x9a/0xa0
    proto_register+0x2b5/0x340
    iso_init+0x23/0x150 [bluetooth]
    set_iso_socket_func+0x68/0x1b0 [bluetooth]
    kmem_cache_free+0x308/0x330
    hci_sock_sendmsg+0x990/0x9e0 [bluetooth]
    __sock_sendmsg+0x7b/0x80
    sock_write_iter+0x9a/0x110
    do_iter_readv_writev+0x11d/0x220
    vfs_writev+0x180/0x3e0
    do_writev+0xca/0x100
  ...

This change removes the early return. The check for iso_debugfs being
NULL was unnecessary, it is always NULL when iso_inited is false.
CVSS 3.1 vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
CVE-2024-50079
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

io_uring/sqpoll: ensure task state is TASK_RUNNING when running task_work

When the sqpoll is exiting and cancels pending work items, it may need
to run task_work. If this happens from within io_uring_cancel_generic(),
then it may be under waiting for the io_uring_task waitqueue. This
results in the below splat from the scheduler, as the ring mutex may be
attempted grabbed while in a TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE state.

Ensure that the task state is set appropriately for that, just like what
is done for the other cases in io_run_task_work().

do not call blocking ops when !TASK_RUNNING; state=1 set at [<0000000029387fd2>] prepare_to_wait+0x88/0x2fc
WARNING: CPU: 6 PID: 59939 at kernel/sched/core.c:8561 __might_sleep+0xf4/0x140
Modules linked in:
CPU: 6 UID: 0 PID: 59939 Comm: iou-sqp-59938 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc3-00113-g8d020023b155 #7456
Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
pstate: 61400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO +DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : __might_sleep+0xf4/0x140
lr : __might_sleep+0xf4/0x140
sp : ffff80008c5e7830
x29: ffff80008c5e7830 x28: ffff0000d93088c0 x27: ffff60001c2d7230
x26: dfff800000000000 x25: ffff0000e16b9180 x24: ffff80008c5e7a50
x23: 1ffff000118bcf4a x22: ffff0000e16b9180 x21: ffff0000e16b9180
x20: 000000000000011b x19: ffff80008310fac0 x18: 1ffff000118bcd90
x17: 30303c5b20746120 x16: 74657320313d6574 x15: 0720072007200720
x14: 0720072007200720 x13: 0720072007200720 x12: ffff600036c64f0b
x11: 1fffe00036c64f0a x10: ffff600036c64f0a x9 : dfff800000000000
x8 : 00009fffc939b0f6 x7 : ffff0001b6327853 x6 : 0000000000000001
x5 : ffff0001b6327850 x4 : ffff600036c64f0b x3 : ffff8000803c35bc
x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffff0000e16b9180
Call trace:
 __might_sleep+0xf4/0x140
 mutex_lock+0x84/0x124
 io_handle_tw_list+0xf4/0x260
 tctx_task_work_run+0x94/0x340
 io_run_task_work+0x1ec/0x3c0
 io_uring_cancel_generic+0x364/0x524
 io_sq_thread+0x820/0x124c
 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
CVSS 3.1 vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
CVE-2024-39072
AMTT Hotel Broadband Operation System (HiBOS) v3.0.3.151204 is vulnerable to SQL injection via manager/conference/calendar_remind.php.
CVSS 3.1 vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L
CVE-2025-49641
A regular Zabbix user with no permission to the Monitoring -> Problems view is still able to call the problem.view.refresh action and therefore still retrieve a list of active problems.
CVSS 3.1 vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
CVE-2024-50140
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

sched/core: Disable page allocation in task_tick_mm_cid()

With KASAN and PREEMPT_RT enabled, calling task_work_add() in
task_tick_mm_cid() may cause the following splat.

[   63.696416] BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/spinlock_rt.c:48
[   63.696416] in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 1, non_block: 0, pid: 610, name: modprobe
[   63.696416] preempt_count: 10001, expected: 0
[   63.696416] RCU nest depth: 1, expected: 1

This problem is caused by the following call trace.

  sched_tick() [ acquire rq->__lock ]
   -> task_tick_mm_cid()
    -> task_work_add()
     -> __kasan_record_aux_stack()
      -> kasan_save_stack()
       -> stack_depot_save_flags()
        -> alloc_pages_mpol_noprof()
         -> __alloc_pages_noprof()
	  -> get_page_from_freelist()
	   -> rmqueue()
	    -> rmqueue_pcplist()
	     -> __rmqueue_pcplist()
	      -> rmqueue_bulk()
	       -> rt_spin_lock()

The rq lock is a raw_spinlock_t. We can't sleep while holding
it. IOW, we can't call alloc_pages() in stack_depot_save_flags().

The task_tick_mm_cid() function with its task_work_add() call was
introduced by commit 223baf9d17f2 ("sched: Fix performance regression
introduced by mm_cid") in v6.4 kernel.

Fortunately, there is a kasan_record_aux_stack_noalloc() variant that
calls stack_depot_save_flags() while not allowing it to allocate
new pages.  To allow task_tick_mm_cid() to use task_work without
page allocation, a new TWAF_NO_ALLOC flag is added to enable calling
kasan_record_aux_stack_noalloc() instead of kasan_record_aux_stack()
if set. The task_tick_mm_cid() function is modified to add this new flag.

The possible downside is the missing stack trace in a KASAN report due
to new page allocation required when task_work_add_noallloc() is called
which should be rare.
CVSS 3.1 vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
CVE-2024-50141
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ACPI: PRM: Find EFI_MEMORY_RUNTIME block for PRM handler and context

PRMT needs to find the correct type of block to translate the PA-VA
mapping for EFI runtime services.

The issue arises because the PRMT is finding a block of type
EFI_CONVENTIONAL_MEMORY, which is not appropriate for runtime services
as described in Section 2.2.2 (Runtime Services) of the UEFI
Specification [1]. Since the PRM handler is a type of runtime service,
this causes an exception when the PRM handler is called.

    [Firmware Bug]: Unable to handle paging request in EFI runtime service
    WARNING: CPU: 22 PID: 4330 at drivers/firmware/efi/runtime-wrappers.c:341
        __efi_queue_work+0x11c/0x170
    Call trace:

Let PRMT find a block with EFI_MEMORY_RUNTIME for PRM handler and PRM
context.

If no suitable block is found, a warning message will be printed, but
the procedure continues to manage the next PRM handler.

However, if the PRM handler is actually called without proper allocation,
it would result in a failure during error handling.

By using the correct memory types for runtime services, ensure that the
PRM handler and the context are properly mapped in the virtual address
space during runtime, preventing the paging request error.

The issue is really that only memory that has been remapped for runtime
by the firmware can be used by the PRM handler, and so the region needs
to have the EFI_MEMORY_RUNTIME attribute.

[ rjw: Subject and changelog edits ]
CVSS 3.1 vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
CVE-2024-50182
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

secretmem: disable memfd_secret() if arch cannot set direct map

Return -ENOSYS from memfd_secret() syscall if !can_set_direct_map().  This
is the case for example on some arm64 configurations, where marking 4k
PTEs in the direct map not present can only be done if the direct map is
set up at 4k granularity in the first place (as ARM's break-before-make
semantics do not easily allow breaking apart large/gigantic pages).

More precisely, on arm64 systems with !can_set_direct_map(),
set_direct_map_invalid_noflush() is a no-op, however it returns success
(0) instead of an error.  This means that memfd_secret will seemingly
"work" (e.g.  syscall succeeds, you can mmap the fd and fault in pages),
but it does not actually achieve its goal of removing its memory from the
direct map.

Note that with this patch, memfd_secret() will start erroring on systems
where can_set_direct_map() returns false (arm64 with
CONFIG_RODATA_FULL_DEFAULT_ENABLED=n, CONFIG_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC=n and
CONFIG_KFENCE=n), but that still seems better than the current silent
failure.  Since CONFIG_RODATA_FULL_DEFAULT_ENABLED defaults to 'y', most
arm64 systems actually have a working memfd_secret() and aren't be
affected.

From going through the iterations of the original memfd_secret patch
series, it seems that disabling the syscall in these scenarios was the
intended behavior [1] (preferred over having
set_direct_map_invalid_noflush return an error as that would result in
SIGBUSes at page-fault time), however the check for it got dropped between
v16 [2] and v17 [3], when secretmem moved away from CMA allocations.

[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20201124164930.GK8537@kernel.org/
[2]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210121122723.3446-11-rppt@kernel.org/#t
[3]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20201125092208.12544-10-rppt@kernel.org/
CVSS 3.1 vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
CVE-2024-50224
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

spi: spi-fsl-dspi: Fix crash when not using GPIO chip select

Add check for the return value of spi_get_csgpiod() to avoid passing a NULL
pointer to gpiod_direction_output(), preventing a crash when GPIO chip
select is not used.

Fix below crash:
[    4.251960] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000000
[    4.260762] Mem abort info:
[    4.263556]   ESR = 0x0000000096000004
[    4.267308]   EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[    4.272624]   SET = 0, FnV = 0
[    4.275681]   EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[    4.278822]   FSC = 0x04: level 0 translation fault
[    4.283704] Data abort info:
[    4.286583]   ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004, ISS2 = 0x00000000
[    4.292074]   CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0
[    4.297130]   GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0
[    4.302445] [0000000000000000] user address but active_mm is swapper
[    4.308805] Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000004 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
[    4.315072] Modules linked in:
[    4.318124] CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc4-next-20241023-00008-ga20ec42c5fc1 #359
[    4.328130] Hardware name: LS1046A QDS Board (DT)
[    4.332832] pstate: 40000005 (nZcv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
[    4.339794] pc : gpiod_direction_output+0x34/0x5c
[    4.344505] lr : gpiod_direction_output+0x18/0x5c
[    4.349208] sp : ffff80008003b8f0
[    4.352517] x29: ffff80008003b8f0 x28: 0000000000000000 x27: ffffc96bcc7e9068
[    4.359659] x26: ffffc96bcc6e00b0 x25: ffffc96bcc598398 x24: ffff447400132810
[    4.366800] x23: 0000000000000000 x22: 0000000011e1a300 x21: 0000000000020002
[    4.373940] x20: 0000000000000000 x19: 0000000000000000 x18: ffffffffffffffff
[    4.381081] x17: ffff44740016e600 x16: 0000000500000003 x15: 0000000000000007
[    4.388221] x14: 0000000000989680 x13: 0000000000020000 x12: 000000000000001e
[    4.395362] x11: 0044b82fa09b5a53 x10: 0000000000000019 x9 : 0000000000000008
[    4.402502] x8 : 0000000000000002 x7 : 0000000000000007 x6 : 0000000000000000
[    4.409641] x5 : 0000000000000200 x4 : 0000000002000000 x3 : 0000000000000000
[    4.416781] x2 : 0000000000022202 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : 0000000000000000
[    4.423921] Call trace:
[    4.426362]  gpiod_direction_output+0x34/0x5c (P)
[    4.431067]  gpiod_direction_output+0x18/0x5c (L)
[    4.435771]  dspi_setup+0x220/0x334
CVSS 3.1 vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
CVE-2024-50250
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

fsdax: dax_unshare_iter needs to copy entire blocks

The code that copies data from srcmap to iomap in dax_unshare_iter is
very very broken, which bfoster's recent fsx changes have exposed.

If the pos and len passed to dax_file_unshare are not aligned to an
fsblock boundary, the iter pos and length in the _iter function will
reflect this unalignment.

dax_iomap_direct_access always returns a pointer to the start of the
kmapped fsdax page, even if its pos argument is in the middle of that
page.  This is catastrophic for data integrity when iter->pos is not
aligned to a page, because daddr/saddr do not point to the same byte in
the file as iter->pos.  Hence we corrupt user data by copying it to the
wrong place.

If iter->pos + iomap_length() in the _iter function not aligned to a
page, then we fail to copy a full block, and only partially populate the
destination block.  This is catastrophic for data confidentiality
because we expose stale pmem contents.

Fix both of these issues by aligning copy_pos/copy_len to a page
boundary (remember, this is fsdax so 1 fsblock == 1 base page) so that
we always copy full blocks.

We're not done yet -- there's no call to invalidate_inode_pages2_range,
so programs that have the file range mmap'd will continue accessing the
old memory mapping after the file metadata updates have completed.

Be careful with the return value -- if the unshare succeeds, we still
need to return the number of bytes that the iomap iter thinks we're
operating on.
CVSS 3.1 vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
CVE-2024-50279
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

dm cache: fix out-of-bounds access to the dirty bitset when resizing

dm-cache checks the dirty bits of the cache blocks to be dropped when
shrinking the fast device, but an index bug in bitset iteration causes
out-of-bounds access.

Reproduce steps:

1. create a cache device of 1024 cache blocks (128 bytes dirty bitset)

dmsetup create cmeta --table "0 8192 linear /dev/sdc 0"
dmsetup create cdata --table "0 131072 linear /dev/sdc 8192"
dmsetup create corig --table "0 524288 linear /dev/sdc 262144"
dd if=/dev/zero of=/dev/mapper/cmeta bs=4k count=1 oflag=direct
dmsetup create cache --table "0 524288 cache /dev/mapper/cmeta \
/dev/mapper/cdata /dev/mapper/corig 128 2 metadata2 writethrough smq 0"

2. shrink the fast device to 512 cache blocks, triggering out-of-bounds
   access to the dirty bitset (offset 0x80)

dmsetup suspend cache
dmsetup reload cdata --table "0 65536 linear /dev/sdc 8192"
dmsetup resume cdata
dmsetup resume cache

KASAN reports:

  BUG: KASAN: vmalloc-out-of-bounds in cache_preresume+0x269/0x7b0
  Read of size 8 at addr ffffc900000f3080 by task dmsetup/131

  (...snip...)
  The buggy address belongs to the virtual mapping at
   [ffffc900000f3000, ffffc900000f5000) created by:
   cache_ctr+0x176a/0x35f0

  (...snip...)
  Memory state around the buggy address:
   ffffc900000f2f80: f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8
   ffffc900000f3000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  >ffffc900000f3080: f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8
                     ^
   ffffc900000f3100: f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8
   ffffc900000f3180: f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8

Fix by making the index post-incremented.
CVSS 3.1 vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H
CVE-2024-50303
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

resource,kexec: walk_system_ram_res_rev must retain resource flags

walk_system_ram_res_rev() erroneously discards resource flags when passing
the information to the callback.

This causes systems with IORESOURCE_SYSRAM_DRIVER_MANAGED memory to have
these resources selected during kexec to store kexec buffers if that
memory happens to be at placed above normal system ram.

This leads to undefined behavior after reboot.  If the kexec buffer is
never touched, nothing happens.  If the kexec buffer is touched, it could
lead to a crash (like below) or undefined behavior.

Tested on a system with CXL memory expanders with driver managed memory,
TPM enabled, and CONFIG_IMA_KEXEC=y.  Adding printk's showed the flags
were being discarded and as a result the check for
IORESOURCE_SYSRAM_DRIVER_MANAGED passes.

find_next_iomem_res: name(System RAM (kmem))
		     start(10000000000)
		     end(1034fffffff)
		     flags(83000200)

locate_mem_hole_top_down: start(10000000000) end(1034fffffff) flags(0)

[.] BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffff89834ffff000
[.] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
[.] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
[.] PGD c04c8bf067 P4D c04c8bf067 PUD c04c8be067 PMD 0
[.] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
[.] RIP: 0010:ima_restore_measurement_list+0x95/0x4b0
[.] RSP: 0018:ffffc900000d3a80 EFLAGS: 00010286
[.] RAX: 0000000000001000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffff89834ffff000
[.] RDX: 0000000000000018 RSI: ffff89834ffff000 RDI: ffff89834ffff018
[.] RBP: ffffc900000d3ba0 R08: 0000000000000020 R09: ffff888132b8a900
[.] R10: 4000000000000000 R11: 000000003a616d69 R12: 0000000000000000
[.] R13: ffffffff8404ac28 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff89834ffff000
[.] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff893d44640000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[.] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[.] ata5: SATA link down (SStatus 0 SControl 300)
[.] CR2: ffff89834ffff000 CR3: 000001034d00f001 CR4: 0000000000770ef0
[.] PKRU: 55555554
[.] Call Trace:
[.]  <TASK>
[.]  ? __die+0x78/0xc0
[.]  ? page_fault_oops+0x2a8/0x3a0
[.]  ? exc_page_fault+0x84/0x130
[.]  ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30
[.]  ? ima_restore_measurement_list+0x95/0x4b0
[.]  ? template_desc_init_fields+0x317/0x410
[.]  ? crypto_alloc_tfm_node+0x9c/0xc0
[.]  ? init_ima_lsm+0x30/0x30
[.]  ima_load_kexec_buffer+0x72/0xa0
[.]  ima_init+0x44/0xa0
[.]  __initstub__kmod_ima__373_1201_init_ima7+0x1e/0xb0
[.]  ? init_ima_lsm+0x30/0x30
[.]  do_one_initcall+0xad/0x200
[.]  ? idr_alloc_cyclic+0xaa/0x110
[.]  ? new_slab+0x12c/0x420
[.]  ? new_slab+0x12c/0x420
[.]  ? number+0x12a/0x430
[.]  ? sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0xa/0x80
[.]  ? asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x16/0x20
[.]  ? parse_args+0xd4/0x380
[.]  ? parse_args+0x14b/0x380
[.]  kernel_init_freeable+0x1c1/0x2b0
[.]  ? rest_init+0xb0/0xb0
[.]  kernel_init+0x16/0x1a0
[.]  ret_from_fork+0x2f/0x40
[.]  ? rest_init+0xb0/0xb0
[.]  ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20
[.]  </TASK>
CVSS 3.1 vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
CVE-2022-49692
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

net: phy: at803x: fix NULL pointer dereference on AR9331 PHY

Latest kernel will explode on the PHY interrupt config, since it depends
now on allocated priv. So, run probe to allocate priv to fix it.

 ar9331_switch ethernet.1:10 lan0 (uninitialized): PHY [!ahb!ethernet@1a000000!mdio!switch@10:00] driver [Qualcomm Atheros AR9331 built-in PHY] (irq=13)
 CPU 0 Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 0000000a, epc == 8050e8a8, ra == 80504b34
         ...
 Call Trace:
 [<8050e8a8>] at803x_config_intr+0x5c/0xd0
 [<80504b34>] phy_request_interrupt+0xa8/0xd0
 [<8050289c>] phylink_bringup_phy+0x2d8/0x3ac
 [<80502b68>] phylink_fwnode_phy_connect+0x118/0x130
 [<8074d8ec>] dsa_slave_create+0x270/0x420
 [<80743b04>] dsa_port_setup+0x12c/0x148
 [<8074580c>] dsa_register_switch+0xaf0/0xcc0
 [<80511344>] ar9331_sw_probe+0x370/0x388
 [<8050cb78>] mdio_probe+0x44/0x70
 [<804df300>] really_probe+0x200/0x424
 [<804df7b4>] __driver_probe_device+0x290/0x298
 [<804df810>] driver_probe_device+0x54/0xe4
 [<804dfd50>] __device_attach_driver+0xe4/0x130
 [<804dcb00>] bus_for_each_drv+0xb4/0xd8
 [<804dfac4>] __device_attach+0x104/0x1a4
 [<804ddd24>] bus_probe_device+0x48/0xc4
 [<804deb44>] deferred_probe_work_func+0xf0/0x10c
 [<800a0ffc>] process_one_work+0x314/0x4d4
 [<800a17fc>] worker_thread+0x2a4/0x354
 [<800a9a54>] kthread+0x134/0x13c
 [<8006306c>] ret_from_kernel_thread+0x14/0x1c

Same Issue would affect some other PHYs (QCA8081, QCA9561), so fix it
too.
CVSS 3.1 vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
CVE-2024-56663
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

wifi: nl80211: fix NL80211_ATTR_MLO_LINK_ID off-by-one

Since the netlink attribute range validation provides inclusive
checking, the *max* of attribute NL80211_ATTR_MLO_LINK_ID should be
IEEE80211_MLD_MAX_NUM_LINKS - 1 otherwise causing an off-by-one.

One crash stack for demonstration:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: wild-memory-access in ieee80211_tx_control_port+0x3b6/0xca0 net/mac80211/tx.c:5939
Read of size 6 at addr 001102080000000c by task fuzzer.386/9508

CPU: 1 PID: 9508 Comm: syz.1.386 Not tainted 6.1.70 #2
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
 dump_stack_lvl+0x177/0x231 lib/dump_stack.c:106
 print_report+0xe0/0x750 mm/kasan/report.c:398
 kasan_report+0x139/0x170 mm/kasan/report.c:495
 kasan_check_range+0x287/0x290 mm/kasan/generic.c:189
 memcpy+0x25/0x60 mm/kasan/shadow.c:65
 ieee80211_tx_control_port+0x3b6/0xca0 net/mac80211/tx.c:5939
 rdev_tx_control_port net/wireless/rdev-ops.h:761 [inline]
 nl80211_tx_control_port+0x7b3/0xc40 net/wireless/nl80211.c:15453
 genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x22e/0x320 net/netlink/genetlink.c:756
 genl_family_rcv_msg net/netlink/genetlink.c:833 [inline]
 genl_rcv_msg+0x539/0x740 net/netlink/genetlink.c:850
 netlink_rcv_skb+0x1de/0x420 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2508
 genl_rcv+0x24/0x40 net/netlink/genetlink.c:861
 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1326 [inline]
 netlink_unicast+0x74b/0x8c0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1352
 netlink_sendmsg+0x882/0xb90 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1874
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:716 [inline]
 __sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:728 [inline]
 ____sys_sendmsg+0x5cc/0x8f0 net/socket.c:2499
 ___sys_sendmsg+0x21c/0x290 net/socket.c:2553
 __sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2582 [inline]
 __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2591 [inline]
 __se_sys_sendmsg+0x19e/0x270 net/socket.c:2589
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:51 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x45/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:81
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd

Update the policy to ensure correct validation.
CVSS 3.1 vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H
CVE-2024-56717
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

net: mscc: ocelot: fix incorrect IFH SRC_PORT field in ocelot_ifh_set_basic()

Packets injected by the CPU should have a SRC_PORT field equal to the
CPU port module index in the Analyzer block (ocelot->num_phys_ports).

The blamed commit copied the ocelot_ifh_set_basic() call incorrectly
from ocelot_xmit_common() in net/dsa/tag_ocelot.c. Instead of calling
with "x", it calls with BIT_ULL(x), but the field is not a port mask,
but rather a single port index.

[ side note: this is the technical debt of code duplication :( ]

The error used to be silent and doesn't appear to have other
user-visible manifestations, but with new changes in the packing
library, it now fails loudly as follows:

------------[ cut here ]------------
Cannot store 0x40 inside bits 46-43 - will truncate
sja1105 spi2.0: xmit timed out
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 102 at lib/packing.c:98 __pack+0x90/0x198
sja1105 spi2.0: timed out polling for tstamp
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 102 Comm: felix_xmit
Tainted: G        W        N 6.13.0-rc1-00372-gf706b85d972d-dirty #2605
Call trace:
 __pack+0x90/0x198 (P)
 __pack+0x90/0x198 (L)
 packing+0x78/0x98
 ocelot_ifh_set_basic+0x260/0x368
 ocelot_port_inject_frame+0xa8/0x250
 felix_port_deferred_xmit+0x14c/0x258
 kthread_worker_fn+0x134/0x350
 kthread+0x114/0x138

The code path pertains to the ocelot switchdev driver and to the felix
secondary DSA tag protocol, ocelot-8021q. Here seen with ocelot-8021q.

The messenger (packing) is not really to blame, so fix the original
commit instead.
CVSS 3.1 vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
CVE-2024-56718
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

net/smc: protect link down work from execute after lgr freed

link down work may be scheduled before lgr freed but execute
after lgr freed, which may result in crash. So it is need to
hold a reference before shedule link down work, and put the
reference after work executed or canceled.

The relevant crash call stack as follows:
 list_del corruption. prev->next should be ffffb638c9c0fe20,
    but was 0000000000000000
 ------------[ cut here ]------------
 kernel BUG at lib/list_debug.c:51!
 invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
 CPU: 6 PID: 978112 Comm: kworker/6:119 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G #1
 Hardware name: Alibaba Cloud Alibaba Cloud ECS, BIOS 2221b89 04/01/2014
 Workqueue: events smc_link_down_work [smc]
 RIP: 0010:__list_del_entry_valid.cold+0x31/0x47
 RSP: 0018:ffffb638c9c0fdd8 EFLAGS: 00010086
 RAX: 0000000000000054 RBX: ffff942fb75e5128 RCX: 0000000000000000
 RDX: ffff943520930aa0 RSI: ffff94352091fc80 RDI: ffff94352091fc80
 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffb638c9c0fc38
 R10: ffffb638c9c0fc30 R11: ffffffffa015eb28 R12: 0000000000000002
 R13: ffffb638c9c0fe20 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: ffff942f9cd051c0
 FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff943520900000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
 CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
 CR2: 00007f4f25214000 CR3: 000000025fbae004 CR4: 00000000007706e0
 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
 PKRU: 55555554
 Call Trace:
  rwsem_down_write_slowpath+0x17e/0x470
  smc_link_down_work+0x3c/0x60 [smc]
  process_one_work+0x1ac/0x350
  worker_thread+0x49/0x2f0
  ? rescuer_thread+0x360/0x360
  kthread+0x118/0x140
  ? __kthread_bind_mask+0x60/0x60
  ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
CVSS 3.1 vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
CVE-2024-55916
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

Drivers: hv: util: Avoid accessing a ringbuffer not initialized yet

If the KVP (or VSS) daemon starts before the VMBus channel's ringbuffer is
fully initialized, we can hit the panic below:

hv_utils: Registering HyperV Utility Driver
hv_vmbus: registering driver hv_utils
...
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
CPU: 44 UID: 0 PID: 2552 Comm: hv_kvp_daemon Tainted: G E 6.11.0-rc3+ #1
RIP: 0010:hv_pkt_iter_first+0x12/0xd0
Call Trace:
...
 vmbus_recvpacket
 hv_kvp_onchannelcallback
 vmbus_on_event
 tasklet_action_common
 tasklet_action
 handle_softirqs
 irq_exit_rcu
 sysvec_hyperv_stimer0
 </IRQ>
 <TASK>
 asm_sysvec_hyperv_stimer0
...
 kvp_register_done
 hvt_op_read
 vfs_read
 ksys_read
 __x64_sys_read

This can happen because the KVP/VSS channel callback can be invoked
even before the channel is fully opened:
1) as soon as hv_kvp_init() -> hvutil_transport_init() creates
/dev/vmbus/hv_kvp, the kvp daemon can open the device file immediately and
register itself to the driver by writing a message KVP_OP_REGISTER1 to the
file (which is handled by kvp_on_msg() ->kvp_handle_handshake()) and
reading the file for the driver's response, which is handled by
hvt_op_read(), which calls hvt->on_read(), i.e. kvp_register_done().

2) the problem with kvp_register_done() is that it can cause the
channel callback to be called even before the channel is fully opened,
and when the channel callback is starting to run, util_probe()->
vmbus_open() may have not initialized the ringbuffer yet, so the
callback can hit the panic of NULL pointer dereference.

To reproduce the panic consistently, we can add a "ssleep(10)" for KVP in
__vmbus_open(), just before the first hv_ringbuffer_init(), and then we
unload and reload the driver hv_utils, and run the daemon manually within
the 10 seconds.

Fix the panic by reordering the steps in util_probe() so the char dev
entry used by the KVP or VSS daemon is not created until after
vmbus_open() has completed. This reordering prevents the race condition
from happening.
CVSS 3.1 vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
CVE-2024-57901
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

af_packet: fix vlan_get_protocol_dgram() vs MSG_PEEK

Blamed commit forgot MSG_PEEK case, allowing a crash [1] as found
by syzbot.

Rework vlan_get_protocol_dgram() to not touch skb at all,
so that it can be used from many cpus on the same skb.

Add a const qualifier to skb argument.

[1]
skbuff: skb_under_panic: text:ffffffff8a8ccd05 len:29 put:14 head:ffff88807fc8e400 data:ffff88807fc8e3f4 tail:0x11 end:0x140 dev:<NULL>
------------[ cut here ]------------
 kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:206 !
Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 5892 Comm: syz-executor883 Not tainted 6.13.0-rc4-syzkaller-00054-gd6ef8b40d075 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 09/13/2024
 RIP: 0010:skb_panic net/core/skbuff.c:206 [inline]
 RIP: 0010:skb_under_panic+0x14b/0x150 net/core/skbuff.c:216
Code: 0b 8d 48 c7 c6 86 d5 25 8e 48 8b 54 24 08 8b 0c 24 44 8b 44 24 04 4d 89 e9 50 41 54 41 57 41 56 e8 5a 69 79 f7 48 83 c4 20 90 <0f> 0b 0f 1f 00 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 f3
RSP: 0018:ffffc900038d7638 EFLAGS: 00010282
RAX: 0000000000000087 RBX: dffffc0000000000 RCX: 609ffd18ea660600
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000080000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: ffff88802483c8d0 R08: ffffffff817f0a8c R09: 1ffff9200071ae60
R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: fffff5200071ae61 R12: 0000000000000140
R13: ffff88807fc8e400 R14: ffff88807fc8e3f4 R15: 0000000000000011
FS:  00007fbac5e006c0(0000) GS:ffff8880b8700000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007fbac5e00d58 CR3: 000000001238e000 CR4: 00000000003526f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
  skb_push+0xe5/0x100 net/core/skbuff.c:2636
  vlan_get_protocol_dgram+0x165/0x290 net/packet/af_packet.c:585
  packet_recvmsg+0x948/0x1ef0 net/packet/af_packet.c:3552
  sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:1033 [inline]
  sock_recvmsg+0x22f/0x280 net/socket.c:1055
  ____sys_recvmsg+0x1c6/0x480 net/socket.c:2803
  ___sys_recvmsg net/socket.c:2845 [inline]
  do_recvmmsg+0x426/0xab0 net/socket.c:2940
  __sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:3014 [inline]
  __do_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:3037 [inline]
  __se_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:3030 [inline]
  __x64_sys_recvmmsg+0x199/0x250 net/socket.c:3030
  do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
  do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
CVSS 3.1 vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
CVE-2025-21682
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

eth: bnxt: always recalculate features after XDP clearing, fix null-deref

Recalculate features when XDP is detached.

Before:
  # ip li set dev eth0 xdp obj xdp_dummy.bpf.o sec xdp
  # ip li set dev eth0 xdp off
  # ethtool -k eth0 | grep gro
  rx-gro-hw: off [requested on]

After:
  # ip li set dev eth0 xdp obj xdp_dummy.bpf.o sec xdp
  # ip li set dev eth0 xdp off
  # ethtool -k eth0 | grep gro
  rx-gro-hw: on

The fact that HW-GRO doesn't get re-enabled automatically is just
a minor annoyance. The real issue is that the features will randomly
come back during another reconfiguration which just happens to invoke
netdev_update_features(). The driver doesn't handle reconfiguring
two things at a time very robustly.

Starting with commit 98ba1d931f61 ("bnxt_en: Fix RSS logic in
__bnxt_reserve_rings()") we only reconfigure the RSS hash table
if the "effective" number of Rx rings has changed. If HW-GRO is
enabled "effective" number of rings is 2x what user sees.
So if we are in the bad state, with HW-GRO re-enablement "pending"
after XDP off, and we lower the rings by / 2 - the HW-GRO rings
doing 2x and the ethtool -L doing / 2 may cancel each other out,
and the:

  if (old_rx_rings != bp->hw_resc.resv_rx_rings &&

condition in __bnxt_reserve_rings() will be false.
The RSS map won't get updated, and we'll crash with:

  BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000168
  RIP: 0010:__bnxt_hwrm_vnic_set_rss+0x13a/0x1a0
    bnxt_hwrm_vnic_rss_cfg_p5+0x47/0x180
    __bnxt_setup_vnic_p5+0x58/0x110
    bnxt_init_nic+0xb72/0xf50
    __bnxt_open_nic+0x40d/0xab0
    bnxt_open_nic+0x2b/0x60
    ethtool_set_channels+0x18c/0x1d0

As we try to access a freed ring.

The issue is present since XDP support was added, really, but
prior to commit 98ba1d931f61 ("bnxt_en: Fix RSS logic in
__bnxt_reserve_rings()") it wasn't causing major issues.
CVSS 3.1 vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
CVE-2021-47638
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ubifs: rename_whiteout: Fix double free for whiteout_ui->data

'whiteout_ui->data' will be freed twice if space budget fail for
rename whiteout operation as following process:

rename_whiteout
  dev = kmalloc
  whiteout_ui->data = dev
  kfree(whiteout_ui->data)  // Free first time
  iput(whiteout)
    ubifs_free_inode
      kfree(ui->data)	    // Double free!

KASAN reports:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: double-free or invalid-free in ubifs_free_inode+0x4f/0x70
Call Trace:
  kfree+0x117/0x490
  ubifs_free_inode+0x4f/0x70 [ubifs]
  i_callback+0x30/0x60
  rcu_do_batch+0x366/0xac0
  __do_softirq+0x133/0x57f

Allocated by task 1506:
  kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x3c2/0x7a0
  do_rename+0x9b7/0x1150 [ubifs]
  ubifs_rename+0x106/0x1f0 [ubifs]
  do_syscall_64+0x35/0x80

Freed by task 1506:
  kfree+0x117/0x490
  do_rename.cold+0x53/0x8a [ubifs]
  ubifs_rename+0x106/0x1f0 [ubifs]
  do_syscall_64+0x35/0x80

The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88810238bed8 which
belongs to the cache kmalloc-8 of size 8
==================================================================

Let ubifs_free_inode() free 'whiteout_ui->data'. BTW, delete unused
assignment 'whiteout_ui->data_len = 0', process 'ubifs_evict_inode()
-> ubifs_jnl_delete_inode() -> ubifs_jnl_write_inode()' doesn't need it
(because 'inc_nlink(whiteout)' won't be excuted by 'goto out_release',
 and the nlink of whiteout inode is 0).
CVSS 3.1 vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
CVE-2025-21737
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ceph: fix memory leak in ceph_mds_auth_match()

We now free the temporary target path substring allocation on every
possible branch, instead of omitting the default branch.  In some
cases, a memory leak occured, which could rapidly crash the system
(depending on how many file accesses were attempted).

This was detected in production because it caused a continuous memory
growth, eventually triggering kernel OOM and completely hard-locking
the kernel.

Relevant kmemleak stacktrace:

    unreferenced object 0xffff888131e69900 (size 128):
      comm "git", pid 66104, jiffies 4295435999
      hex dump (first 32 bytes):
        76 6f 6c 75 6d 65 73 2f 63 6f 6e 74 61 69 6e 65  volumes/containe
        72 73 2f 67 69 74 65 61 2f 67 69 74 65 61 2f 67  rs/gitea/gitea/g
      backtrace (crc 2f3bb450):
        [<ffffffffaa68fb49>] __kmalloc_noprof+0x359/0x510
        [<ffffffffc32bf1df>] ceph_mds_check_access+0x5bf/0x14e0 [ceph]
        [<ffffffffc3235722>] ceph_open+0x312/0xd80 [ceph]
        [<ffffffffaa7dd786>] do_dentry_open+0x456/0x1120
        [<ffffffffaa7e3729>] vfs_open+0x79/0x360
        [<ffffffffaa832875>] path_openat+0x1de5/0x4390
        [<ffffffffaa834fcc>] do_filp_open+0x19c/0x3c0
        [<ffffffffaa7e44a1>] do_sys_openat2+0x141/0x180
        [<ffffffffaa7e4945>] __x64_sys_open+0xe5/0x1a0
        [<ffffffffac2cc2f7>] do_syscall_64+0xb7/0x210
        [<ffffffffac400130>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

It can be triggered by mouting a subdirectory of a CephFS filesystem,
and then trying to access files on this subdirectory with an auth token
using a path-scoped capability:

    $ ceph auth get client.services
    [client.services]
            key = REDACTED
            caps mds = "allow rw fsname=cephfs path=/volumes/"
            caps mon = "allow r fsname=cephfs"
            caps osd = "allow rw tag cephfs data=cephfs"

    $ cat /proc/self/mounts
    services@[REDACTED].cephfs=/volumes/containers /ceph/containers ceph rw,noatime,name=services,secret=<hidden>,ms_mode=prefer-crc,mount_timeout=300,acl,mon_addr=[REDACTED]:3300,recover_session=clean 0 0

    $ seq 1 1000000 | xargs -P32 --replace={} touch /ceph/containers/file-{} && \
    seq 1 1000000 | xargs -P32 --replace={} cat /ceph/containers/file-{}

[ idryomov: combine if statements, rename rc to path_matched and make
            it a bool, formatting ]
CVSS 3.1 vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
CVE-2025-21792
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ax25: Fix refcount leak caused by setting SO_BINDTODEVICE sockopt

If an AX25 device is bound to a socket by setting the SO_BINDTODEVICE
socket option, a refcount leak will occur in ax25_release().

Commit 9fd75b66b8f6 ("ax25: Fix refcount leaks caused by ax25_cb_del()")
added decrement of device refcounts in ax25_release(). In order for that
to work correctly the refcounts must already be incremented when the
device is bound to the socket. An AX25 device can be bound to a socket
by either calling ax25_bind() or setting SO_BINDTODEVICE socket option.
In both cases the refcounts should be incremented, but in fact it is done
only in ax25_bind().

This bug leads to the following issue reported by Syzkaller:

================================================================
refcount_t: decrement hit 0; leaking memory.
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 5932 at lib/refcount.c:31 refcount_warn_saturate+0x1ed/0x210 lib/refcount.c:31
Modules linked in:
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 5932 Comm: syz-executor424 Not tainted 6.13.0-rc4-syzkaller-00110-g4099a71718b0 #0
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2~bpo12+1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0x1ed/0x210 lib/refcount.c:31
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 __refcount_dec include/linux/refcount.h:336 [inline]
 refcount_dec include/linux/refcount.h:351 [inline]
 ref_tracker_free+0x710/0x820 lib/ref_tracker.c:236
 netdev_tracker_free include/linux/netdevice.h:4156 [inline]
 netdev_put include/linux/netdevice.h:4173 [inline]
 netdev_put include/linux/netdevice.h:4169 [inline]
 ax25_release+0x33f/0xa10 net/ax25/af_ax25.c:1069
 __sock_release+0xb0/0x270 net/socket.c:640
 sock_close+0x1c/0x30 net/socket.c:1408
 ...
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0xcd/0x250 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
 ...
 </TASK>
================================================================

Fix the implementation of ax25_setsockopt() by adding increment of
refcounts for the new device bound, and decrement of refcounts for
the old unbound device.
CVSS 3.1 vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
CVE-2024-58088
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

bpf: Fix deadlock when freeing cgroup storage

The following commit
bc235cdb423a ("bpf: Prevent deadlock from recursive bpf_task_storage_[get|delete]")
first introduced deadlock prevention for fentry/fexit programs attaching
on bpf_task_storage helpers. That commit also employed the logic in map
free path in its v6 version.

Later bpf_cgrp_storage was first introduced in
c4bcfb38a95e ("bpf: Implement cgroup storage available to non-cgroup-attached bpf progs")
which faces the same issue as bpf_task_storage, instead of its busy
counter, NULL was passed to bpf_local_storage_map_free() which opened
a window to cause deadlock:

	<TASK>
		(acquiring local_storage->lock)
	_raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x3d/0x50
	bpf_local_storage_update+0xd1/0x460
	bpf_cgrp_storage_get+0x109/0x130
	bpf_prog_a4d4a370ba857314_cgrp_ptr+0x139/0x170
	? __bpf_prog_enter_recur+0x16/0x80
	bpf_trampoline_6442485186+0x43/0xa4
	cgroup_storage_ptr+0x9/0x20
		(holding local_storage->lock)
	bpf_selem_unlink_storage_nolock.constprop.0+0x135/0x160
	bpf_selem_unlink_storage+0x6f/0x110
	bpf_local_storage_map_free+0xa2/0x110
	bpf_map_free_deferred+0x5b/0x90
	process_one_work+0x17c/0x390
	worker_thread+0x251/0x360
	kthread+0xd2/0x100
	ret_from_fork+0x34/0x50
	ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
	</TASK>

Progs:
 - A: SEC("fentry/cgroup_storage_ptr")
   - cgid (BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH)
	Record the id of the cgroup the current task belonging
	to in this hash map, using the address of the cgroup
	as the map key.
   - cgrpa (BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGRP_STORAGE)
	If current task is a kworker, lookup the above hash
	map using function parameter @owner as the key to get
	its corresponding cgroup id which is then used to get
	a trusted pointer to the cgroup through
	bpf_cgroup_from_id(). This trusted pointer can then
	be passed to bpf_cgrp_storage_get() to finally trigger
	the deadlock issue.
 - B: SEC("tp_btf/sys_enter")
   - cgrpb (BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGRP_STORAGE)
	The only purpose of this prog is to fill Prog A's
	hash map by calling bpf_cgrp_storage_get() for as
	many userspace tasks as possible.

Steps to reproduce:
 - Run A;
 - while (true) { Run B; Destroy B; }

Fix this issue by passing its busy counter to the free procedure so
it can be properly incremented before storage/smap locking.
CVSS 3.1 vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
CVE-2022-49741
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

fbdev: smscufx: fix error handling code in ufx_usb_probe

The current error handling code in ufx_usb_probe have many unmatching
issues, e.g., missing ufx_free_usb_list, destroy_modedb label should
only include framebuffer_release, fb_dealloc_cmap only matches
fb_alloc_cmap.

My local syzkaller reports a memory leak bug:

memory leak in ufx_usb_probe

BUG: memory leak
unreferenced object 0xffff88802f879580 (size 128):
  comm "kworker/0:7", pid 17416, jiffies 4295067474 (age 46.710s)
  hex dump (first 32 bytes):
    80 21 7c 2e 80 88 ff ff 18 d0 d0 0c 80 88 ff ff  .!|.............
    00 d0 d0 0c 80 88 ff ff e0 ff ff ff 0f 00 00 00  ................
  backtrace:
    [<ffffffff814c99a0>] kmalloc_trace+0x20/0x90 mm/slab_common.c:1045
    [<ffffffff824d219c>] kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:553 [inline]
    [<ffffffff824d219c>] kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:689 [inline]
    [<ffffffff824d219c>] ufx_alloc_urb_list drivers/video/fbdev/smscufx.c:1873 [inline]
    [<ffffffff824d219c>] ufx_usb_probe+0x11c/0x15a0 drivers/video/fbdev/smscufx.c:1655
    [<ffffffff82d17927>] usb_probe_interface+0x177/0x370 drivers/usb/core/driver.c:396
    [<ffffffff82712f0d>] call_driver_probe drivers/base/dd.c:560 [inline]
    [<ffffffff82712f0d>] really_probe+0x12d/0x390 drivers/base/dd.c:639
    [<ffffffff8271322f>] __driver_probe_device+0xbf/0x140 drivers/base/dd.c:778
    [<ffffffff827132da>] driver_probe_device+0x2a/0x120 drivers/base/dd.c:808
    [<ffffffff82713c27>] __device_attach_driver+0xf7/0x150 drivers/base/dd.c:936
    [<ffffffff82710137>] bus_for_each_drv+0xb7/0x100 drivers/base/bus.c:427
    [<ffffffff827136b5>] __device_attach+0x105/0x2d0 drivers/base/dd.c:1008
    [<ffffffff82711d36>] bus_probe_device+0xc6/0xe0 drivers/base/bus.c:487
    [<ffffffff8270e242>] device_add+0x642/0xdc0 drivers/base/core.c:3517
    [<ffffffff82d14d5f>] usb_set_configuration+0x8ef/0xb80 drivers/usb/core/message.c:2170
    [<ffffffff82d2576c>] usb_generic_driver_probe+0x8c/0xc0 drivers/usb/core/generic.c:238
    [<ffffffff82d16ffc>] usb_probe_device+0x5c/0x140 drivers/usb/core/driver.c:293
    [<ffffffff82712f0d>] call_driver_probe drivers/base/dd.c:560 [inline]
    [<ffffffff82712f0d>] really_probe+0x12d/0x390 drivers/base/dd.c:639
    [<ffffffff8271322f>] __driver_probe_device+0xbf/0x140 drivers/base/dd.c:778

Fix this bug by rewriting the error handling code in ufx_usb_probe.
CVSS 3.1 vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H