INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
REGIONAL
ECONOMIC
OUTLOOK
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
Light on the Horizon?
2023
OC T
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
REGIONAL
ECONOMIC
OUTLOOK
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
Light on the Horizon?
2023
OCT
Copyright ©2023 International Monetary Fund
Cataloging-in-Publication Data
IMF Library
Names: International Monetary Fund, publisher.
Title: Regional economic outlook. Sub-Saharan Africa : light on the horizon?
Other titles: Sub-Saharan Africa : light on the horizon? | Light on the horizon? | World economic and financial
surveys. | Regional economic outlook: Sub-Saharan Africa.
Description: Washington, DC : International Monetary Fund, 2023. | World economic and financial surveys. |
Oct. 2023. | Includes bibliographical references.
Identifiers: ISBN 9798400253508 (English Paper)
9798400253560 (ePub)
9798400253546 (Web PDF)
Subjects: LCSH: Africa, Sub-Saharan—Economic conditions. | Economic forecasting—Africa, Sub-Saharan. |
Economic development—Africa, Sub-Saharan. | Africa, Sub-Saharan—Economic policy.
Classification: LCC HC800.R44 2023
The Regional Economic Outlook: Sub-Saharan Africa is published twice a year, in the spring and fall, to review
developments in sub-Saharan Africa. Both projections and policy considerations are those of the IMF staff
and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF, its Executive Board, or IMF Management.
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Find all published Regional Economic Outlook: Sub-Saharan Africa
https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/REO/SSA
LIGHT ON THE HORIZON? iii
Contents
Acknowledgments ....................................................................................................... v
Country Groupings. ..................................................................................................... vi
Assumptions and Conventions. ........................................................................................ vii
Executive Summary ...................................................................................................... 1
Light on the Horizon? .................................................................................................... 2
Recent developments and outlook: a distant glimpse of sunshine ................................................ 3
Looking to the horizon: four priority policies ........................................................................ 9
References .............................................................................................................. 15
Statistical Appendix. ................................................................................................... 18
OCTOBER 2023 • INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
iv REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK—Sub-Saharan Africa
FIGURES
Figure 1. Sub-Saharan Africa: GDP Growth, 2021–24 .................................................................. 3
Figure 2. Sub-Saharan Africa: Contributions to Change in GDP Growth. ............................................. 3
Figure 3. Sub-Saharan Africa: GDP Growth 2005–28. .................................................................. 4
Figure 4. Sub-Saharan Africa: Real Per Capita GDP, 2019–24 .......................................................... 4
Figure 5. Global Inflation during the Crisis. ............................................................................. 5
Figure 6. Sub-Saharan Africa: Food Inflation, 2002–23 ................................................................. 6
Figure 7. Sub-Saharan Africa: Government Deficit, (excluding grants), 2015–24 ..................................... 6
Figure 8. Sub-Saharan Africa: Public Debt, 2000–24 ................................................................... 6
Figure 9. Sub-Saharan Africa: time to Double Per Capita Income ..................................................... 7
Figure 10. Sub-Saharan Africa: Coups per Year 1960–2023 ........................................................... 7
Figure 11. Sub-Saharan Africa: Policy Rates versus Expected Inflation .............................................. 10
Figure 12. Sub-Saharan Africa: Reserve Cover, 2022. ................................................................ 10
Figure 13. Nigerian Naira Versus US Dollar, 2020–23 ................................................................ 11
Figure 14. Sub-Saharan Africa: Fiscal Adjustment Needed to Stabilize Debt Below 70 Percent of GDP, 2023 . .. 12
TABLES
Sub-Saharan Africa: Member Countries of Groupings ................................................................ vi
Sub-Saharan Africa: Member Countries of Regional Groupings ..................................................... vi
Sub-Saharan Africa: Country Abbreviations ........................................................................... vii
STATISTICAL APPENDIX TABLES
SA1. Real GDP Growth and Consumer Prices, Average .............................................................. 18
SA2. Overall Fiscal Balance, Including Grants and Government Debt .............................................. 19
SA3. Broad Money and External Current Account, Including Grants. ............................................... 20
SA4. External Debt, Official Debt, Debtor Based and Reserves. ..................................................... 21
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND • OCTOBER 2023
LIGHT ON THE HORIZON? v
Acknowledgments
The October 2023 issue of the Regional Economic Outlook: Sub-Saharan Africa was prepared by a
team led by Saad Quayyum and under the supervision of Andrew Tiffin, Luc Eyraud, and Catherine Pattillo.
The team included Hany Abdel-Latif, Wenjie Chen, Michele Fornino, Cleary Haines, Irena Jankulov Suljagic,
Thibault Lemaire, Hamza Mighri, Francine Nyankiye, Alvaro Piris, Henry Rawlings, Arthur Sode.
Charlotte Vazquez was responsible for document production, with assistance from Yao Nourdine Ouattara.
The editing and production were overseen by Cheryl Toksoz of the Communications Department.
OCTOBER 2023 • INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
vi REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK—Sub-Saharan Africa
Country Groupings
Sub-Saharan Africa: Member Countries of Groupings
Oil Exporters Other Resource- Non-Resource- Middle-Income Low-Income Countries in Fragile
Intensive Intensive Countries Countries and Conflict-Affected
Countries Countries Situations1
Angola Botswana Benin Angola Burkina Faso Burkina Faso
Cameroon Burkina Faso Burundi Benin Burundi Burundi
Chad Central Cabo Verde Botswana Central Cameroon
Congo, Republic of African Republic Comoros Cabo Verde African Republic Central African Republic
Equatorial Guinea Congo, Democratic Côte d’Ivoire Cameroon Chad Chad
Gabon Republic of the Eswatini Comoros Congo, Comoros
Nigeria Eritrea Ethiopia Congo, Republic of Democratic Congo, Democratic
South Sudan Ghana Gambia, The Côte d’Ivoire Republic of the Republic of the
Guinea Guinea-Bissau Equatorial Guinea Eritrea Congo, Republic of
Liberia Kenya Eswatini Ethiopia Eritrea
Mali Lesotho Gabon Gambia, The Ethiopia
Namibia Madagascar Ghana Guinea Guinea-Bissau
Niger Malawi Kenya Guinea-Bissau Mali
Sierra Leone Mauritius Lesotho Liberia Mozambique
South Africa Mozambique Mauritius Madagascar Niger
Tanzania Rwanda Namibia Malawi Nigeria
Zambia São Tomé Nigeria Mali São Tomé and Príncipe
Zimbabwe and Príncipe São Tomé Mozambique South Sudan
Senegal and Príncipe Niger Zimbabwe
Seychelles Senegal Rwanda
Togo Seychelles Sierra Leone
Uganda South Africa South Sudan
Zambia Tanzania
Togo
Uganda
Zimbabwe
1 Fragile and conflict-affected situations as classified by the World Bank, Classification of Fragile and Conflict-Affected Situations, FY2024
Sub-Saharan Africa: Member Countries of Regional Groupings
The West Economic Common East African Southern African Southern Economic
African and Monetary Market for Community Development African Community of
Economic and Community of Eastern and Community Customs West African
Monetary Union Central African Southern Africa Union States
(WAEMU) States (SADC)
(CEMAC) (COMESA) (*EAC-5) (SACU) (ECOWAS)
Benin Cameroon Burundi *Burundi Angola Botswana Benin
Burkina Faso Central Comoros *Kenya Botswana Eswatini Burkina Faso
Côte d’Ivoire African Republic Congo, *Rwanda Comoros Lesotho Cabo Verde
Guinea-Bissau Chad Democratic South Sudan Congo, Namibia Côte d’Ivoire
Mali Congo, Republic of Republic of the *Tanzania Democratic South Africa Gambia, The
Niger Equatorial Guinea Eritrea *Uganda Republic of the Ghana
Senegal Gabon Eswatini Eswatini Guinea
Togo Ethiopia Lesotho Guinea-Bissau
Kenya Madagascar Liberia
Madagascar Malawi Mali
Malawi Mauritius Niger
Mauritius Mozambique Nigeria
Rwanda Namibia Senegal
Seychelles Seychelles Sierra Leone
Uganda South Africa Togo
Zambia Tanzania
Zimbabwe Zambia
Zimbabwe
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND • OCTOBER 2023
LIGHT ON THE HORIZON? vii
Assumptions and Conventions
The following conventions are used in this publication:
In tables, ellipsis points (. . .) indicate “not available,” and 0 or 0.0 indicates “zero” or “negligible.” Minor
discrepancies between sums of constituent figures and totals are due to rounding.
An en dash (–) between years or months (for example, 2011–12 or January–June) indicates the years or
months covered, including the beginning and ending years or months; a slash or virgule (/) between
years or months (for example, 2011/12) indicates a fiscal or financial year, as does the abbreviation FY
(for example, FY 2012).
“Billion” means a thousand million; “trillion” means a thousand billion.
“Basis points (bps)” refer to hundredths of 1 percentage point (for example, 25 basis points are equivalent to
¼ of 1 percentage point).
As used in this publication, the term “country” does not in all cases refer to a territorial entity that is a state as
understood by international law and practice. As used here, the term also covers some territorial entities that
are not states but for which statistical data are maintained on a separate and independent basis.
The boundaries, colors, denominations, and any other information shown on the maps do not imply, on the
part of the International Monetary Fund, any judgment on the legal status of any territory or any endorsement
or acceptance of such boundaries.
Sub-Saharan Africa: Country Abbreviations
AGO Angola CPV Cabo Verde LSO Lesotho SLE Sierra Leone
BDI Burundi ERI Eritrea MDG Madagascar SSD South Sudan
BEN Benin ETH Ethiopia MLI Mali STP São Tomé and Príncipe
BFA Burkina Faso GAB Gabon MOZ Mozambique SWZ Eswatini
BWA Botswana GHA Ghana MUS Mauritius SYC Seychelles
CAF Central African Republic GIN Guinea MWI Malawi TCD Chad
CIV Côte d’Ivoire GMB Gambia, The NAM Namibia TGO Togo
CMR Cameroon GNB Guinea-Bissau NER Niger TZA Tanzania
COD Congo, Democratic Republic of the GNQ Equatorial Guinea NGA Nigeria UGA Uganda
COG Congo, Republic of KEN Kenya RWA Rwanda ZAF South Africa
COM Comoros LBR Liberia SEN Senegal ZMB Zambia
ZWE Zimbabwe
OCTOBER 2023 • INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
LIGHT ON THE HORIZON? 1
Executive Summary
2023 has been a difficult year for activity in sub-Saharan African economies. The inflationary shock following
Russia’s war in Ukraine has prompted higher interest rates worldwide, which has meant slowing international
demand, elevated spreads, and ongoing exchange rate pressures. As a result, growth in 2023 is expected to fall
for the second year in a row to 3.3 percent from 4.0 percent last year.
The region is expected to rebound next year, with growth increasing to 4.0 percent in 2024, picking up in four-
fifths of the sub-Saharan Africa’s countries, and with strong performances in non-resource intensive countries.
Macroeconomic imbalances are also improving—inflation is falling for most of the region, and public finances are
gradually being put on a more sustainable footing.
But the rebound is not guaranteed. A slowdown in reform efforts, a rise in political instability within the region, or
external downside risks (including from China slowing down) could undermine growth. Moreover, four clouds are
on the horizon which require determined policy action in the face of difficult tradeoffs:
 First, inflation is still too high. It is in double digits in 14 countries. And it remains above target in most countries
with explicit targets.
 Second, the region continues to face significant exchange rate pressures.
 Third, debt vulnerabilities are elevated. The funding squeeze is not over, as borrowing rates are still high,
and rolling over debt is a challenge. And half of the low-income countries in the region are at high risk or in
debt distress.
 Finally, while the recovery is underway, economic divergences within the region are widening—in particular,
per capita incomes in resource intensive economies remain subdued.
Against this background the policy priorities are as follows:
 Addressing inflation: For countries where inflation is high but falling, a “pause” may be warranted, with rates
held at existing elevated levels until inflation is firmly on the path to target. In countries with still rising inflation,
further monetary tightening may be required until there are clear signs that inflation is cooling.
 Managing exchange rate pressures: For pegged countries, monetary policy needs to be aligned with the anchor
country to preserve external stability and prevent further losses of reserves. In countries with floating exchange
rates, currencies should be allowed to adjust as much as possible, since efforts to resist fundamentals-based
movements come at a significant cost. The adjustment should be accompanied by other policy measures—
tighter monetary policy to keep inflation in check, targeted support for the poor, structural reforms to strengthen
the export sector, and fiscal consolidation where the fiscal deficit is adding to exchange rate pressures.
 Managing debt obligations while creating space for development spending: For much of the region, fiscal
policy must adapt to a tighter financing envelope and elevated debt vulnerabilities. This involves better mobi-
lizing domestic revenue, a strategic approach to spending, borrowing prudently, and anchoring fiscal policy
through a credible medium-term framework. In the few countries where debt is unsustainable, debt restruc-
turing may also be needed. With large development needs and limited fiscal space, most countries need
greater financial support from donors.
 Improving living standards and potential growth, particularly in resource intensive countries: Boosting income
per capita will require wide-ranging structural reforms, including investment in education, better natural
resource management, improved business climate and digitalization, and a commitment to trade integration.
Regional Economic Outlook Notes. In parallel, a series of analytical notes explore topics of current interest.
“At a Crossroads: Sub-Saharan Africa’s Economic Relations with China” explores the Africa-China relationship
and the implications of a slowdown in China. “Debt Dilemmas in Sub-Saharan Africa: Some Principles and Trade-
Offs in Debt Restructuring” discusses debt developments and how to approach sovereign debt restructuring.
“The Long Squeeze: Funding Development in an Age of Austerity” discusses trends in development finance and
their policy implications.
OCTOBER 2023 • INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
2 REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK—Sub-Saharan Africa
Light on the Horizon?
Still emerging from the COVID-19 pandemic, countries have been hit by a sluggish global economy,
worldwide inflation, high borrowing costs, and a cost-of-living crisis. As a result, growth in 2023 is expected
to fall for the second year in a row to 3.3 percent from 4.0 percent last year. But a long-awaited rebound
is on the horizon. Inflation is falling, public finances are stabilizing, and growth is poised to increase to 4.0
percent next year. Still, even though the outlook is less ominous, it is too early to celebrate. In many cases,
inflation is still too high, borrowing costs are still elevated, exchange-rate pressures persist, and political
instability is an ongoing concern. To ensure that the coming rebound is more than just a transitory glimpse
of sunshine, it is important for authorities to guard against a premature relaxation of stabilization policies,
while also focusing on reforms to both claw back lost ground from the four-year crisis and also to create new
space to address the region’s pressing development needs.
Light on the Horizon?
2023 has been a difficult year
Slowing international activity, higher global interest rates, elevated
spreads, and renewed exchange rate pressures have all combined to
create an acute funding squeeze.
A long-awaited growth rebound next year
2023: 2024:
fell for the set to
second year recover
3.3% 4 %
The recovery is not guaranteed: four policy priorities
Persistent Exchange-rate Fiscal Divergent
inflation pressures sustainability recoveries
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND • OCTOBER 2023
LIGHT ON THE HORIZON? 3
Recent developments and outlook: a distant glimpse of sunshine
Emerging from a difficult year in 2023, activity in the region is expected to
rebound next year…
FIGURE 1
2023 has been another challenging year. The inflationary
Figure 1. Sub-Saharan Africa: GDP Growth,
shock following Russia’s war in Ukraine prompted higher 2021–24
interest rates worldwide, with a significant impact this year. (Percent)
For sub-Saharan Africa, this has meant slowing international
4.8
demand, higher global interest rates, elevated spreads, and Projections
ongoing exchange rate pressures that have all combined to
create an acute funding squeeze—yet another shock for a 4.4
region still emerging from the COVID-19 pandemic. As a
result, growth in 2023 is expected to fall for the second year
in a row to 3.3 percent from 4.0 percent last year. 4.0
But growth in sub-Saharan Africa is set to rebound to
4.0 percent in 2024. (Figure 1.) Model estimates suggest 3.6
the region’s recovery may already have started. GDP data
for most countries are still only available for Q1 2023. But
2021 22 23 24
high frequency indicators show that aggregate activity for
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook database.
the region improved in the second quarter.1 Important
for the region, disruptive power shortages in South Africa
picked up significantly in 2022 and have weighed on that country’s growth in 2023—but even here outturns for
the first half of the year have been better than anticipated, owing to the lower-than-projected impact of power
shortages and the ongoing strength of the services sector. Looking ahead, the relative size of South Africa
(19½ percent of regional GDP) means that average regional growth in 2024 will largely reflect South Africa’s
coming recovery (Figure 2), which in turn will be driven by that country’s efforts to address pressing issues in the
power sector. But the region’s recovery extends beyond South Africa. Indeed, in stark contrast to 2023, growth will
improve in around four-fifths of the region’s economies.
figure 2 figure 2 Figure 2. Sub-Saharan Africa: Contributions to Change in GDP Growth
(Percent contributions, from 4.0 to 3.3) (Percent contributions, from 3.3 to 4.0)
2022 to 20220322 to 2023 2023 to 20220423 to 2024
Burkina FaBsourkina Faso South AfricSaouth Africa
MozambiquMeozambique Angola Angola
Equatorial EGquuinaetoarial Guinea Senegal Senegal
Uganda Uganda Ghana Ghana
Congo, De Cmo. nRgeop, .Dem. Rep. Niger Niger
Niger Niger Nigeria Nigeria
Ghana Ghana Tanzania Tanzania
Angola Angola Uganda Uganda
Nigeria Nigeria Burkina FaBsourkina Faso
South AfricSaouth Africa Congo, DeCmo. nRgeop, .Dem. Rep.
Others Others Others Others
3.5 3.35.7 3.73.9 3.9 3.4 3.43.6 3.63.8 3.84.0 4.0
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook database.
1 Barhoumi and others 2022.
OCTOBER 2023 • INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
4 REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK—Sub-Saharan Africa
…with faster growth in the region’s more diversified economies
Still, there is significant heterogeneity across the region—in particular, the divergence between resource-intensive
and non-resource-intensive countries is expected to persist. Both groups of economies will recover next year,
but at different paces. Subdued commodity prices will continue to weigh on exports for most resource-intensive
economies, but overall growth will improve nonetheless from 2.6 percent in 2023 to 3.2 percent in 2024, buoyed
mainly by private consumption and in some cases, a number of new (or repaired) hydrocarbon projects coming
on stream (Niger, Senegal), and mining projects starting production (Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia,
Mali, Sierra Leone). Growth in non-resource intensive countries, on the other hand, will be supported by both
consumption and investment and is expected to improve from 5.3 percent to an impressive 5.9 percent (Figure 3).
This two-speed recovery is a long-standing pattern, becoming particularly pronounced following the commod-
ity-price shock of 2015 (see “Recovery Amid Elevated Uncertainty,” Chapter 1 in Regional Economic Outlook:
Sub-Saharan Africa, April 2019). Since that episode, the divergence between these two types of economies has
become more entrenched. Neither group of countries is expected to completely recover lost ground from the
crisis, but non-resource countries have nonetheless proven more resilient, supported by their more diversified
economies. For resource-intensive economies, on the other hand, a less diversified structure along with greater
exposure to external shocks has weighed on investor confidence and activity—weakening prospects in the short
term and undermining potential growth in the long run (Figure 4).
External conditions are improving
Although the global environment remains difficult, some improvements have been observed since the April 2023,
Regional Economic Outlook: Sub-Saharan Africa:
 First, after three long years the World Health Organization has declared that the pandemic is over.
 Second, consumption has proven unexpectedly resilient across numerous large economies, so that (still
downbeat) projections for global growth in 2023 have been revised upwards since April.
 Third, global inflation is slowly falling (Figure 5). Policy-rate hikes in many large economies are now on pause
and international financial conditions are easing—which has helped reduce sovereign spreads for sub-Saharan
African countries, taking some pressure off the funding squeeze.2
Figure 3
Figure 4. Sub-Saharan Africa: Real Per Capita GDP,
Figure 3. Sub-Saharan Africa: GDP Growth 2005–28
2019–24
(Percent, dashed line = weighted average)
(Index 2019 = 100, dashed line = pre-crisis projections)
7.5
Projections
120 Non-resource-intensive
countries
5.0 Non-resource-intensive
countries
110
2.5
Resource-intensive
Resource-intensive
countries
countries
0.0
100
–2.5
2005 10 15 20 25 2019 20 21 22 23 24
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook database. Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook database.
Note: See country groupings on page vi. Note: See country groupings on page vi.
2 Spreads on Eurobonds have come down by 150 bps between March and end-September 2023.
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND • OCTOBER 2023
LIGHT ON THE HORIZON? 5
 Finally, global supply chains have normalized, and food and energy prices have fallen. International food
prices have dropped by over 20 percent over the past 18 months. With food being close to 40 percent of
sub-Saharan Africa’s consumption basket, this is good news for a region grappling with an acute cost-of-living
crisis and an already-troubling incidence of poverty—about a third of the population in sub-Saharan Africa is
estimated to live under $2.15 a day.
Macroeconomic imbalances are declining
Inflation is coming down in sub-Saharan Africa. Having peaked in March 2023 at almost 10 percent (y/y), median
inflation in sub-Saharan Africa has dropped by 3 percentage points, bringing the latest estimate to 7 percent as
of July, 2023.
As with growth, there is significant heterogeneity across countries. Countries with flexible exchange rates
on average have higher inflation rates than those with more fixed arrangements, and nearly one-third of the
region still had double-digit inflation as of July, 2023. Nonetheless, using latest available data, over 40 percent
of countries have had inflation fall consistently for at least two months. And most other countries are expected
to peak soon, with only five countries (Angola, Burkina Faso, Equatorial Guinea, Niger, Seychelles) projecting
inflation to increase over the course of 2024. Some countries with elevated inflation are relatively large economies
(Ghana, Ethiopia, Nigeria) so the weighted average rate for the region is also elevated. But looking at the median
country, the impact of the crisis on sub-Saharan Africa, as well as the region’s projected disinflation path, is broadly
in line with trends elsewhere (Figure 5).
Figure 5
Figure 5. Global Inflation during the Crisis
(Percentage point difference to end of 2019 pre-pandemic level)
Weighted Average Median
AEs AEs
Non-SSA EMs Non-SSA EMs
5.0 Non-SSA LICs 5.0 Non-SSA LICs
SSA SSA
2.5 2.5
0.0 0.0
2019 20 21 22 23 24 2019 20 21 22 23 24
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook database.
Note: AEs = Advanced economies; Non-SSA EMs = Non-sub-Saharan African emerging markets; Non-SSA LICs = Non-sub-Saharan African
Low-income countries; SSA = Sub-Saharan Africa.
Of critical importance to the region’s food security, domestic food price inflation has also fallen, driven largely
by a general drop in global food prices. Typically, as international food prices fall, domestic food inflation follows
with a lag of 6-to-12 months and with an almost complete pass-through for imported staples. Although median
food price inflation is still too high at over 10 percent, this is down from a peak of almost 16 percent in October
2022 (Figure 6). The recent trend is a welcome development for the region, as sub-Saharan Africa is the most food
insecure region in the world. Projections for 2023 suggest that 142 million people are acutely insecure, up by
10 million from last year and representing 12 percent the population.
Turning to the region’s fiscal situation, public finances are gradually being put on a more sustainable footing.
In 2020 the median fiscal deficit (excluding grants) expanded sharply to 8.2 percent of GDP, owing to the impact
of the pandemic on revenues and the need to protect the most vulnerable (Figure 7). Consequently, median
OCTOBER 2023 • INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
6 REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK—Sub-Saharan Africa
Figure 6
public debt also increased sharply, from around Figure 6. Sub-Saharan Africa: Food Inflation,
51½ percent in 2019 to almost 59 percent in 2020 2002–23
(Figure 8). But few countries entered the crisis with the (Percent, year over year, median, as of July 2023)
fiscal space to sustain such an effort, and most authori- 2007–08 Russian
ties have since started to consolidate. The median deficit Global invasion
food price of Ukraine
(excluding grants) narrowed to 6.1 percent of GDP in
15 crisis
2022 and is expected to moderate further to 5.3 percent
in 2023. As a result, debt levels have largely stabilized
at around 60 percent starting from 2021 and are 10
projected to ease gently starting 2024—halting an almost
decade-long upward trend. The fiscal adjustment so far
reflects an almost equal mix of spending restraint and 5
increased revenues (as a percent of GDP).
Beyond general consolidation, some countries (Angola,
Dec. 2002 Dec. 07 Dec. 12 Dec. 17 Dec. 22
The Gambia, Nigeria, Zambia) have started to implement
Sources: Haver Analytics; country authorities; and IMF staff
significant energy subsidy reforms to create space for
calculations.
development spending. In Nigeria, for example, in June
2023 the authorities removed fuel subsidies that cost about $10 billion last year—four times the amount spent
on health. Most of these subsidies were poorly targeted and tended to benefit affluent segments of the popula-
tion. Moreover, a significant amount of fuel was being smuggled out of the country, rewarding the rent-seeking
behavior of a small number of individuals and effectively subsidizing consumers (or distributors) in neighboring
states. Similarly, Angola has announced plans for a phased removal of energy subsidies worth almost $4 billion.
Still, some storm clouds remain…
The recovery next year is most welcome but is not guaranteed:
 First, the funding squeeze is not over. Debt levels have stabilized regionwide, but are still elevated in many
cases—over half the region’s low-income countries are either at high risk of debt distress or already in distress.
And with a trend shift toward market financing, which is more costly than loans from official creditors, debt
service obligations have ballooned. Further, although sovereign spreads have eased from their peak earlier
in the year, borrowing costs remain elevated. For non-distressed countries, the average yield on outstanding
Figure 8
Eurobonds is over 12 percent, compared to 7 percent prior to the pandemic. Although global interest rates
Figure 7
Figure 7. Sub-Saharan Africa: Government Deficit, Figure 8. Sub-Saharan Africa: Public Debt,
(excluding grants), 2015–24 2000–24
(Percent of GDP, median, dashed line = pre-crisis level) (Percent of GDP)
Projections 120 25th and 75th Projections
8 quartiles
90
7
6 60
Median
5
30
2016 18 20 22 24 2000 06 12 18 24
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook database. Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook database.
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND • OCTOBER 2023
LIGHT ON THE HORIZON? 7
should eventually fall in line with declining inflation, longer-term global rates are not expected to return to
pre-crisis levels anytime soon. At current yields, no Eurobond has been issued since April 2022 and some
countries may struggle to roll over near-term liabilities—indeed, aggregate upcoming Eurobond repayments
of around $6 billion in both 2024 and 2025 are of particular concern.
 Second, inflation is still too high. Although inflation is trending down for more than 40 percent of the region,
rates are still above pre-pandemic levels. For countries where expectations are not well anchored, the longer
elevated inflation persists the greater the prospect of spiraling second-round effects—ultimately requiring
monetary authorities to tighten even more aggressively, and potentially adding an extra hurdle for fiscal author-
ities who may face added public wage demands.
 Third, exchange-rate pressures continue. As a further consequence of the funding squeeze, rising global
interest rates and softening commodity prices have placed pressure on most sub-Saharan African currencies,
complicating the choices facing policymakers—especially in the fight against inflation. For those with flexible
arrangements, and particularly those with competitiveness concerns or low reserves, efforts to resist currency
movements may ultimately undermine growth and make the funding squeeze even worse (see below).
 Fourth, longer-term prosperity remains fragile, especially for less diversified economies. Sub-Saharan Africa
is endowed with enviable natural resources and a rapidly growing population. But incomes for many of the
region’s inhabitants have stagnated—indeed, income per capita growth has long been significantly softer within
resource-dependent economies, which host nearly two-thirds of the population. In more diversified countries,
income per capita is now growing at a respectable 3½ percent, suggesting that living standards can double in
as little as 20 years. But for less-diversified resource-intensive countries, continued low output growth and rapid
demographic change suggest that this doubling may take generations, if ever. (Figure 9). So, a fundamental
challenge for policy makers in these countries is to improve resource management and accelerate the process
of diversification, helping reduce the divergence in living standards across the region.
 Fifth, recent examples of political instability have underscored the implications of persistent fragility. Forty
percent of sub-Saharan Africa is classified as either fragile or in conflict affected areas. And there have been
11 coups or attempted coups in the region since 2020; representing a marked increase over the relative
tranquility of the previous 20 years (Figure 10). The economic and humanitarian costs of political instability
are not new but rising geo-economic fragmentation is adding to political and social tensions in some fragile
countries, including in the Sahel. In addition, fragile and conflict affected states are particularly exposed to
Figure 10
exogenous events, such as climate shocks. Evidence suggests that, following extreme weather events, cumula-
tive output losses can reach about 4 percent in fragile states compared to around 1 percent in other countries
Figure 9
Figure 9. Sub-Saharan Africa: time to Double Figure 10. Sub-Saharan Africa: Coups per Year
Per Capita Income 1960–2023
(Years, one block represents one country) (Average number of episodes per year)
4 Unsuccessful
Non-resource intensive countries Successful
Oil exporters
3
Other resources
2
1
0
1960– 1970– 1980– 1990– 2000– 2010– 2020–
20 30 40 >50 69 79 89 99 09 19 23
Sources: IMF, World Economic Outlook database; and IMF staff
Sources: Jonathan Powell, University of Central Florida; and
calculations.
Clayton Thyne, University of Kentucky.
Note: See country groupings on page vi.
OCTOBER 2023 • INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
8 REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK—Sub-Saharan Africa
(Jaramillo and others 2023). These losses, in turn, limit countries’ ability to protect themselves against future
shocks, with consequences spilling over to other groups of countries, often over multiple generations.
…and the road ahead will be turbulent, with easing global risks but rising
local risks
Globally, risks have eased since the April 2023 Regional Economic Outlook: Sub-Saharan Africa. Certainly, coming
out of a four-year crisis, and with limited fiscal and reserve buffers, the ability of most countries in sub-Saharan
Africa to absorb further shocks is still limited. But external risks are now much more balanced. Activity in major
economies has been more resilient than expected and inflation is falling, often surprising on the downside. Further,
swift action taken to contain banking-sector turbulence has reduced the immediate risks of financial stress. So
overall, the risk of a global hard landing has receded. Nevertheless, the global environment is still challenging
and key downside risks remain:
 Importantly for sub-Saharan Africa, growth in China—the region’s largest trading partner—is already slowing and
may be lower than expected. This could not only impact sub-Saharan Africa’s exports but might also shrink
inward foreign direct investment and lending from the world’s second largest economy (see analytical note
“At a Crossroads: Sub-Saharan Africa’s Economic Relations with China”). A downside scenario with a deep-
er-than-expected contraction in China’s real-estate market and weaker consumer confidence would slow
global activity and also tighten financial conditions for emerging markets and developing economies (EMDEs)
borrowers, leading to a –1¼ percent cumulative drop in sub-Saharan African output over 2024–26.
 Financial markets may tighten unexpectedly, inhibiting borrowing in international markets for sub-Saharan
African economies. This remains a concern as market expectations of policy rates in advanced economies still
differ from announced intentions, raising the prospect of a sudden repricing of risks. Persistent price pressures,
or significantly higher global energy prices, may also necessitate tighter-than-expected monetary policy in
advanced economies, resulting in higher international borrowing rates.
 Rising geopolitical tensions can weigh on global trade and growth and might also add to commodity-price
volatility. Food prices, for example, are already exposed to adverse weather patterns from El-Niño but might be
rocked even more violently if the war in Ukraine were to escalate. More generally, trade restrictions are rising.
Almost 3,000 restrictions were imposed globally just last year—nearly 3 times the number imposed in 2019.
And looking ahead, the region is highly exposed if large economies prioritize national interest over the global
common good, particularly when it comes to issues such as: technology transfers to low-income countries, trade
restrictions, and climate change. Moreover, countries in sub-Saharan Africa may be forced to choose between
competing political blocs, undermining their efforts at trade integration and diversification, and so constraining
potential growth (see analytical note “Geoeconomic Fragmentation: Sub-Saharan Africa Caught Between the
Fault Lines” in Regional Economic Outlook: Sub-Saharan Africa—The Big Funding Squeeze, April, 2023).
Still, the global economy is also subject to a range of upside risks. These include: further downside surprises on
core inflation; stronger consumer demand, including from policy support in China; and a better-than-expected
investment response to current policy incentives. In addition, recent breakthroughs in artificial intelligence and
green technologies could also usher in a new period of strong productivity growth, boosting investment and
potential output. A global upside scenario with faster disinflation, higher commodity prices, and a strong recovery
in investment in advanced economies could lift cumulative output in resource-intensive sub-Saharan Africa by
almost ½ percent of GDP over 2024–26.
While global risks have eased, region-specific risks have increased across sub-Saharan Africa:
 In particular, the risk of conflict has increased significantly, owing to mounting geopolitical tensions, weak
institutions, and a cost-of-living crisis that has left many behind. The military takeover in Niger has raised the
possibility of a regional military conflict in the Sahel, while in Ethiopia, social tensions and the prospect of
further violence remain despite a peace deal. The security situation also remains challenging in a number of
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND • OCTOBER 2023
LIGHT ON THE HORIZON? 9
other countries including Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mozambique, and Nigeria. Finally, there is risk that the
worsening conflict in Sudan can add to economic and humanitarian strains in neighboring countries.
 In the face of rising social tension, there is also risk that reform momentum may slow, undercutting the region’s
newly improved prospects for macroeconomic stability and growth.
Looking to the horizon: four priority policies
Authorities in sub-Saharan Africa face some of the most daunting policy challenges in the world: maintaining
macroeconomic stability amid limited resources, urgent development and humanitarian needs (including food
insecurity), frequent shocks, and political instability and fragility. Currently, with the pandemic officially over (for
now), inflation coming down, and growth looking to pick up, the outlook is finally starting to look less ominous.
But it is too early to celebrate. To ensure that the coming rebound is more than just a transitory glimpse of sunshine,
it is important for authorities to maintain momentum—guarding against a premature relaxation of stabilization
policies, while also focusing on reforms to both claw back lost ground from the four-year crisis and also to create
new space to address the region’s development needs. In this context, policy makers will need to focus on four
inter-related priorities: addressing inflation, allowing for greater exchange rate flexibility, managing high debt
obligations while creating space for development spending, and boosting the prospects for broad-based growth
to ensure prosperity for all.
How to address still-elevated inflation?
As noted above, headline inflation is falling in many sub-Saharan African countries. This has been helped by a
drop in external food and oil prices compared to 2022, but available data suggests core inflation is also trending
downward, in part resulting from a delicate process of monetary tightening over the past 2 years. Since end-2021,
the median country has increased policy rates by 350 bps—broadly in line with a median emerging-market hike
of 400 bps. Amplifying this effort, many countries have also taken extra steps to mop up excess liquidity, bringing
effective interbank rates closer to the main policy rate (Angola, Tanzania, CEMAC, WAEMU), and introduced limits
on credit growth (Ethiopia). A further part of the story, however, reflects less-orthodox measures put in place to
address abrupt swings in the cost of living. These include administered prices and subsidies which helped limit
inflation in Botswana, Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon, Guinea, Malawi, Rwanda and Togo.
But inflation is still too high. Inflation at end 2023 is projected to stay in double digits in 14 countries, including
some of the region’s larger economies, such as Ethiopia, Ghana, Nigeria. And among countries with an explicit
inflation target range, inflation remains above target in two-thirds of cases. In addition, many countries will likely
face an extra inflationary impulse as fuel subsidies and other emergency measures are unwound (Angola, Nigeria,
Senegal, Tanzania), or in response to persistent volatility in global oil prices. So, policy will continue to reflect a
delicate balance—including an assessment on when it is finally appropriate to start easing the monetary stance.
Gauging the appropriate stance is difficult. Although policy rates have increased in almost all countries, they may
not have always kept pace with anticipated inflation, and so may not have increased the real cost of borrowing
(Figure 11). For example, with only modest increases in the policy rate in Nigeria, the monetary stance remains
loose, owing in large part to the financing of the fiscal deficit by the central bank, but also the impact on inflation
of depreciation and the relaxation of fuel subsidies.
Finally, a key consideration is the need to preserve the credibility of the region’s monetary authorities. Regionwide,
the ability of the authorities to contain inflation amid global shocks owes much to improvements in their policy
frameworks over the last two decades. Advances in central bank independence, inflation targeting frameworks,
exchange rate flexibility, and macroprudential regulation have all played critical roles. That credibility is now being
tested. Care must be taken to safeguard and strengthen this effort, as a more credible policy framework anchors
expectations against future shocks, reducing the tightening needed to keep inflation under control.
OCTOBER 2023 • INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
Last year, the direction of policy across sub-Saharan Africa was Figure 11. Sub-Saharan Africa: Policy Rates
relatively unambiguous for most countries—with rapidly rising versus Expected Inflation
inflation, policy rates needed to be tighter. Looking ahead, (1-year ahead)
as inflation continues to ease, decisions are likely to be more
10
Tighter stance
complicated and changes in the monetary policy stance will
likely be less synchronous:
 Currently, in select economies with still elevated and 5
GHA
persistent inflation, further monetary tightening remains KEN
appropriate until there are clear signs that inflation is ZMB NGA
MOZ
cooling and on track to meet the authorities’ inflation target. 0 NAM
UGA MUS
This is critical to safeguard credibility and keep long-term TZA
AGO
inflation expectations anchored.
Looser stance
 For countries with high but falling inflation, a “pause” may -5
-5 0 5 10
be warranted, with rates held at existing elevated levels
Change in expected inflation since Dec. 2022 (percent)
(‘higher for longer’) until inflation is firmly on the path to
target. Loosening prematurely could risk a sharp resurgence
in inflation once activity rebounds. And amid ongoing
uncertainty—including, in some cases, the prospect of an
impulse from the easing of emergency measures—policy makers should err on the side of caution.
More generally, monetary policy needs to remain data-dependent going forward and coordinated with other
policies. For countries where inflation has closed on target and expectations are well anchored, authorities
might consider gradually easing to a more neutral policy stance. For example, Uganda in August 2023 cut policy
rates amid its relatively benign inflation outlook. In any event, a strong commitment to price stability will still be
essential and policy makers should be watchful of inflationary pressures re-emerging. Similarly, policies should be
accompanied by clear forward-looking communications, outlining country circumstances and international devel-
opments, as well as the motivation for the current policy stance. Strengthening central bank communication can
help anchor inflation expectations and enhance monetary policy credibility.
Are exchange rates sufficiently flexible?
Figure 12
As noted above, the ongoing funding squeeze means that most sub-Saharan African countries continue to face
exchange rate pressures. And since few countries have comfortable reserve buffers, this requires a delicate policy
response (Figure 12).
Figure 12. Sub-Saharan Africa: Reserve
For pegged countries, stability requires authorities to adjust Cover, 2022
the policy mix to sustain the peg—this will entail matching the (Months of imports)
monetary policy stance of the anchor country but may also
demand added (and coordinated) fiscal consolidation to rein
in external imbalances.
9 Comfortable
For countries with more flexible arrangements, this added
CEMAC
flexibility is no guarantee of a less-difficult policy challenge. WAEMU
6
Recently, for example, policy makers in most non-pegged
regimes have allowed exchange rates to weaken. But
Adequate
evidence suggests that many have refrained from allowing 3
the exchange rate to adjust in full—in some cases this can
Low
be seen in large spreads between rates in the official and
0
parallel market (Burundi, Ethiopia, Zimbabwe, Malawi), and
in a few, a further deterioration in reserves. The temptation to Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook database.
)tnecrep(
2202
.ceD
ecnis
etar
ycilop
ni
egnahC
10 REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK—Sub-Saharan Africa
Figure 11
Sources: Haver Analytics; IMF, World Economic Outlook
database; and IMF staff calculations.
Note: See countries abbreviation on page vii.
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND • OCTOBER 2023
LIGHT ON THE HORIZON? 11
resist exchange rate pressures is understandable. Policy makers legitimately worry that depreciation can lead
to inflation, adding to cost-of-living pressures and fueling social unrest. But efforts to resist fundamentals-based
movements also come at a significant cost. The exchange rate is an essential signal through which economies
adjust to external shocks. Resisting this adjustment does not make the shock go away, but may instead add to the
burden of adjustment down the road.
In countries with limited reserves, for example, resisting depreciation often entails distortive foreign exchange
rationing or price controls. Rationing can starve businesses of much needed imports and disrupt production
(Ethiopia, Malawi, São Tomé and Príncipe). Similarly, rationing can discourage capital inflows, owing to investor
concerns about their ability to repatriate their returns. Even without rationing, an artificially elevated exchange
rate may still deter foreign investors, who may hold off until an anticipated adjustment takes place. So rather
than avoiding the costs of adjustment, efforts to resist depreciation may instead undermine growth and actually
make the funding squeeze worse. Moreover, inflationary pressures can still arise even in the face of resistance, as
prices often reflect currency movements in the parallel informal market rather than the official market (Ethiopia).
Therefore, for all these reasons, it seems best to let the exchange rate adjust amid strong fundamentals-based
exchange rate pressures, particularly in countries with low reserves (see analytical note “Managing Exchange Rate
Pressures in Sub-Saharan Africa—Adapting to New Realities” in Regional Economic Outlook: Sub-Saharan Africa—
Figure 13
The Big Funding Squeeze, April, 2023).
Adjustment, however, needs coordinated policy Figure 13. Nigerian Naira Versus US Dollar,
support. This may include tighter monetary policy to 2020–23
keep inflation in check and ensure expectations remain (Index, Feb. 29, 2020 = 100; dashed line = parallel rate)
anchored. Fiscal consolidation may also be warranted
100
if a lax fiscal position is driving the exchange rate
pressure (for example through monetary financing of
the deficit). Nigeria is a case in point. The unification of
75
the Naira has been a bold and necessary move but is
not sufficient in itself. Follow-up support from monetary
and fiscal policy is needed to avoid the reemergence
50
of an inflation-depreciation spiral (Figure 13). Beyond
stabilization policies, targeted social support should
be put in place to protect the most vulnerable. And
25
to speed the realignment of economic activity toward
more competitive sectors, structural reforms that Jun. 2020 Jun. 21 Jun. 22 Jun. 23
remove obstacles for the tradeable sector can maximize Source: Bloomberg Finance L.P.
benefits of exchange rate depreciation. Note: Final data point as of end-September, 2023.
How to manage high debt obligations while still creating space for development
spending?
As outlined above, debt levels are high and the funding squeeze is far from over. Moreover, with countries
relying increasingly on market financing, interest payments have ballooned, crowding out space for develop-
ment spending—the median ratio of interest to revenue is around 10½ percent in sub-Saharan Africa, over three
times that of advanced economies. With rising needs and fewer options, fiscal policy must center around ways to
adapt in the face of a tighter funding envelope (Figure 14).
Mobilizing revenue. Amid high external borrowing costs, authorities will ultimately need to rely more on domestic
resources. In this context, sub-Saharan Africa has some of the lowest revenue-to-GDP ratios in the world. While
median revenues (excluding grants) have increased by about 1 percent of GDP between 2019 and 2023 they
are nonetheless projected to remain steady next year at only 17.0 percent of GDP, significantly below 40 percent
in advanced markets and 27 percent in other EMDEs. This suggest stronger efforts will be needed to increase
OCTOBER 2023 • INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
12 REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK—Sub-Saharan Africa
Figure 14. Sub-Saharan Africa: Fiscal Adjustment
Needed to Stabilize Debt Below 70% of GDP, 2023.
revenues, including by expanding the tax base through Fi(gpeurrcee n1t4 o.f SGuDbP-,S naoh.a orfa cno uAnftrriiceas): Fiscal Adjustment
reduced (distortive) tax expenditures and improved Needed to Stabilize Debt Below 70 Percent of
tax design.3 The region has often relied on value GDP, 2023
added taxes (VAT), but as activity shifts to the formal (Percent of GDP, number of countries)
sector, consideration should also be given to more
progressive sources, such as income and property
taxes in addition to VAT (see Gaspar and Selassie
2017). More broadly, a critical precondition for tax
policy reform is effective tax administration, an area
where the increased use of digitalization promises to
significantly improve efficiency in collection.
Spending smart. With limited revenues and large
development needs, countries need to make the
-5 0 5 10
most of the resources they have. Investment projects
Sources: Country authorities; and IMF staff calculations.
should be selected carefully to ensure high economic No S t o e u : r S c e e v : e N n a t t y i o p n e a r l c a e u n t t h t o h r r i e ti s e h s o , l a d n r d e I p M re F s e st n a t f s f t c o a p lc o u n la e ti - o th n i s rd
Note: 70-percent threshold represents top one-third of countries. For
and social returns, while efficiency of spending needs ofc coouunntrtireies s.b Feolor wco uthnitsri etsh breeslhoowl dth, isa tdhjuresstmhoelndt, asdtajubsitlimzeesn t debt at
staebndili-z2e0s2 d1e bletv aetl .t hFeo ern dth oosf e2 0a2b2o lveev,e l.a Fdojur stthmoesen ta bborivneg,s debt to 70
to be improved. For many countries, phasing out adpjeursctemnet nt obvreinrg s tdhee bt ftoor e7c0a pste rcheonrti zoof nth.e forecast horizon.
fuel subsidies and ensuring that these subsidies do
not re-emerge will be a vital part of the effort to keep expenditures in check. For countries where sustainability
requires a large adjustment effort, difficult choices will need to be made and some spending rationalization may
be inevitable. However, these should protect growth enhancing expenditures (such as on education, health,
critical infrastructure) as well as social assistance to the vulnerable (see Amaglobeli 2022).
Borrowing prudently. Effective debt management can help strike the balance between funding the government’s
needs and ensuring that debt remains sustainable. When countries need to borrow, they should rely more
on concessional financing where possible or choose official creditors with lower interest rates. Extending the
maturity of loans and ensuring repayments are not bunched together can help reduce refinancing risks, while
strengthening debt management frameworks can be key in expanding the range of viable options. In a difficult
funding environment, for example, debt management efforts need to be agile and proactive—if international costs
remain prohibitive for countries looking to rollover Eurobonds, an efficient debt management office may help
secure alternate funding channels, for example through syndicated loans or from domestic capital markets (see
IMF 2021).
Medium-term credibility. Having a strong medium-term fiscal framework can improve lender confidence and
lower risk premia. Most countries in sub-Saharan Africa have de jure frameworks but the ability of these to steer
policy has often been limited, with frequent breaches of fiscal rules. There is scope to greatly improve the design
and effectiveness of these frameworks by: ensuring that the deficit path is anchored by a viable debt target;
strengthening key budget processes (including expenditure controls and fiscal risk management tools); and
better communicating with the public to overcome resistance to difficult reforms—underscoring the long-term
benefits of reform and the (often mounting) costs of doing nothing (David and others 2023).
For most countries in sub-Saharan Africa, many of the efforts listed above are already underway and should be
sufficient to maintain fiscal sustainability. But for some, implementing the measures in full may still not be enough.
Such cases are atypical and are prompted by widely different country circumstances. But where debt is not
sustainable, it is in everyone’s interest to ensure that this debt is resolved swiftly. In this regard, some authorities
have engaged with creditors to restructure their debt through the G-20 Common Framework for Debt Treatment
3 In 2022, the median tax revenue-to-GDP ratio was 13 percent. A ratio of 15 percent is typically associated with accelerated growth
and development (Gaspar et al., 2016) and 27 countries in sub-Saharan Africa were below this threshold in 2022.
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND • OCTOBER 2023
LIGHT ON THE HORIZON? 13
(Chad, Ethiopia, Ghana, and Zambia). These recent cases will provide valuable experience and a clearer roadmap
of what creditors and debtors can expect from each other going forward in undertaking debt restructuring (see
analytical note “Debt Dilemmas in Sub-Saharan Africa: Some Principles and Trade-Offs in Debt Restructuring”).
How to reduce divergence in income per capita and improve living standards
more fairly?
Sluggish income per capita growth, particularly among resource-intensive countries, can undermine the region’s
near-term recovery and is a major long-term obstacle for shared prosperity. Structural reforms can help to ensure
broad-based and durable improvements in living standards, reducing divergence in sub-Saharan Africa and
reducing inequality more generally.
Invest in people not just natural resources. Sub-Saharan Africa is significantly behind many other regions in terms
of human capital accumulation—enrollment rates in the region’s secondary schools (54 percent) fall far below
the rates seen in EMDEs in other regions (89 percent). Greater focus on education and training can help boost
productivity for the millions of workers now entering the workforce, ensuring they are better able to participate in
the global economy. Investing in girls’ education, in particular, can have multifaceted returns—adding to produc-
tivity gains, boosting savings, improving health outcomes, and ensuring that the opportunities and benefits of
economic growth are passed on to future generations. As a priority, therefore, authorities should both widen
the access and improve the quality of education. For example, abolishing school fees (recently implemented in
Zambia) and providing school lunches and stipends can help attract and retain students, while hiring and training
new teachers is critical to ensure that quality standards do not slip as the school population grows.
Improve natural resource management. Sub-Saharan Africa has abundant natural resources. Some, such as oil,
may become less important as the world transitions to cleaner energy, while others (for example, lithium) may
become more important. In either case, the key challenge is to ensure that the region’s natural wealth translates
into improved living standards for all. This not only requires good governance and transparency, it also demands
sound fiscal management. As above, credible medium-term fiscal frameworks are essential for macroeconomic
stability. But they are particularly important for many resource-intensive countries, where frameworks need to be
resilient against volatile commodity prices—avoiding boom-bust cycles in public investment that can undermine
long-term growth, and also ensuring public wages do not greatly exceed private-sector wages, which can
undermine competitiveness.
Accelerate diversification and private sector participation. Expanding beyond the resource sector requires an
environment where business and innovation can thrive. As a first step, continued macroeconomic stability and
credible policies can support investor confidence. In addition, removing red tape, reducing regulatory barriers,
and ensuring adequate access to key public services (transport, electricity, water, and sanitation) are all essential
to ensure that investment projects in new sectors remain viable. Digitalization and widening internet access can
also create new and larger markets and help unlock the region’s underlying dynamism and creativity. Evidence
suggests that many development projects may simply not take place without the addition of public incentives
(Eyraud, Pattillo and Selassie 2021), particularly for resource-intensive countries seeking to expand activity further
up the value chain. But the associated fiscal risks must be managed carefully, and policies should be aimed at
addressing specific market failures—ultimately business investment should be self-sustaining rather than reliant on
continued public support (see Cherif and others 2022).
Foster trade integration. Growth and diversification requires access to new opportunities and markets. The African
Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) is the world’s largest free trade area by population covering 1.3 billion
people with a combined GDP of $3 trillion. AfCFTA is aimed at lowering tariffs and non-tariff measures, and if
implemented with additional reforms—such as improving transport, customs and border processing, and access
to trade financing—it has the potential to boost income levels and support the expansion of cross-border value
chains. Median merchandise trade among African countries, and between Africa and the rest of the world, could
OCTOBER 2023 • INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
14 REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK—Sub-Saharan Africa
increase by as much as 53 percent and 15 percent, respectively. This in turn could raise the real per capita income
of the median African country by more than 10 percent (ElGanainy and others 2023). Signatories have agreed
to eliminate tariffs on 90 percent of non-sensitive products by end-2025, and 7 percent of tariff lines on sensitive
goods by 2030. The challenge now is implementation. Priority should be given to ensuring that these deadlines
are met.
A helping hand from the international community is needed
With large development needs and limited fiscal space, most countries need greater donor support. The four-year
crisis, and the ongoing funding squeeze, has highlighted the need for both concessional official development
assistance (ODA) and increased countercyclical flows to offset the procyclical nature of private capital flows
(see analytical note “The Long Squeeze: Funding Development in an Age of Austerity”).
But ODA to sub-Saharan Africa has been trending downward. For official donors, if increased aid to the region is
not feasible in the short run, then one option is to ensure more progressivity in the flows that remain, ensuring that
scarce resources are channeled to sub-Saharan Africa’s poorest and more fragile countries.
On countercyclical flows, the IMF is an essential component of the region’s global safety net, particularly for
countries with limited reserve buffers. Demand for assistance has increased dramatically since the start of the
pandemic, with the IMF providing policy guidance and financing of $55 billion, much at highly concessional
terms. Twenty-six countries have IMF financing arrangements, with about $4 billion disbursed so far in 2023. Five
countries (Kenya, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal and Seychelles) have had arrangements approved under the newly
launched Resilience and Sustainability Facility since December 2022, helping them better prepare for climate-
related shocks. And Burkina Faso, Guinea, Malawi and South Sudan have received $358 million from the new
Food Shock Window, supporting their ability to weather the global food crisis. But the IMF’s ability to continue
lending at high levels will depend upon the availability of concessional resources. This is a challenge that the IMF
is working to address, including via pledges from the IMF’s members for both loan and subsidy resources for the
Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust.
In a difficult and more costly funding environment, sub-Saharan African countries may have to rely more on their
own efforts. But funding and reforms need to go together. Without reform, external development funding is less
effective. But without funding, reform is more difficult. Emerging from a long crisis, and with some signs of light on
the horizon, now is the time for the region and the international community to come together—the more we help
the region make progress now, the more resilient the global economy will be for all.
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND • OCTOBER 2023
LIGHT ON THE HORIZON? 15
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OCTOBER 2023 • INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
16 REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK—Sub-Saharan Africa
Statistical Appendix
Unless otherwise noted, data and projections presented in this Regional Economic Outlook are IMF
staff estimates as of September 30, 2023, consistent with the projections underlying the October 2023,
IMF, World Economic Outlook.
The data and projections cover 45 sub-Saharan African countries in the IMF’s African Department.
Data definitions follow established international statistical methodologies to the extent possible.
However, in some cases, data limitations limit comparability across countries.
Country Groupings
 Countries are aggregated into three (nonoverlapping) groups: oil exporters, other resource-intensive
countries, and non-resource-intensive countries (see table on page vi for the country groupings).
 The oil exporters are countries where net oil exports make up 30 percent or more of total exports.
 The other resource-intensive countries are those where nonrenewable natural resources represent
25 percent or more of total exports.
 The non-resource-intensive countries refer to those that are not classified as either oil exporters or other
resource-intensive countries.
 Countries are also aggregated into four (overlapping) groups: oil exporters, middle-income, low-income,
and countries in fragile and conflict-affected situations. (see table on page vi for the country groupings).
 The membership of these groups reflects the most recent data on per capita gross national income
(averaged over three years) and the World Bank, Classification of Fragile and Conflict-Affected Situations.
 The middle-income countries had per capita gross national income in the years 2020–22 of more than
$1,135.00 (World Bank, using the Atlas method).
 The low-income countries had average per capita gross national income in the years 2020–22 equal to or
lower than $1,135.00 (World Bank, Atlas method).
 The countries in fragile and conflict-affected situations are classified based on the World Bank, Classification
of Fragile and Conflict-Affected Situations, FY2024.
 The membership of sub-Saharan African countries in the major regional cooperation bodies is shown
on page vi: CFA franc zone, comprising the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) and
CEMAC; the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA); the East Africa Community
(EAC-5); the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS); the Southern African Development
Community (SADC); and the Southern African Customs Union (SACU). EAC-5 aggregates include data for
Rwanda and Burundi, which joined the group only in 2007.
Methods of Aggregation
 In Tables SA1 and SA3, country group composites for real GDP growth and broad money are calculated
as the arithmetic average of data for individual countries, weighted by GDP valued at purchasing power
parity as a share of total group GDP. The source of purchasing power parity weights is the World Economic
Outlook (WEO) database.
 In Table SA1, country group composites for consumer prices are calculated as the geometric average of
data for individual countries, weighted by GDP valued at purchasing power parity as a share of total group
GDP. The source of purchasing power parity weights is the WEO database.
 In Tables SA2–SA4, country group composites, except for broad money, are calculated as the arithmetic
average of data for individual countries, weighted by GDP in US dollars at market exchange rates as a
share of total group GDP.
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND • OCTOBER 2023
LIGHT ON THE HORIZON? 17
List of Sources and Footnotes for Statistical Appendix Tables SA1-SA4
Tables SA1.,SA3.
Sources: IMF, Common Surveillance database; and October 2023, IMF, World Economic Outlook database.
1 Data and projections for 2020–28 are excluded from the database due to constraints in data reporting.
2 In 2019 Zimbabwe authorities introduced the real-time gross settlement (RTGS) dollar, later renamed the
Zimbabwe dollar, and are in the process of redenominating their national accounts statistics. Current data are
subject to revision. The Zimbabwe dollar previously ceased circulating in 2009, and between 2009–19, Zimbabwe
operated under a multicurrency regime with the US dollar as the unit of account.
Note: “...” denotes data not available.
Table SA2.
Sources: IMF, Common Surveillance database; and October 2023, IMF, World Economic Outlook database.
1 Data and projections for 2020–28 are excluded from the database due to constraints in data reporting.
2 For Zambia, government debt projections for 2022–24 are omitted due to ongoing debt restructuring.
3 In 2019 Zimbabwe authorities introduced the real-time gross settlement (RTGS) dollar, later renamed the
Zimbabwe dollar, and are in the process of redenominating their national accounts statistics. Current data are
subject to revision. The Zimbabwe dollar previously ceased circulating in 2009, and between 2009–19, Zimbabwe
operated under a multicurrency regime with the US dollar as the unit of account.
Note: “...” denotes data not available.
Table SA4.
Sources: IMF, Common Surveillance database; and October 2023, IMF, World Economic Outlook database.
1 As a member of the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU), see WAEMU aggregate for
reserves data.
2 As a member of the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC), see CEMAC aggregate for
reserves data.
3 Data and projections for 2020–28 are excluded from the database due to constraints in data reporting.
4 Official Reserves include foreign assets held by Ghana Petroleum and Stabilization Fund and exclude
encumbered assets.
5 For Zambia, government debt projections for 2022–24 are omitted due to ongoing debt restructuring.
6 In 2019 Zimbabwe authorities introduced the real-time gross settlement (RTGS) dollar, later renamed the
Zimbabwe dollar, and are in the process of redenominating their national accounts statistics. Current data are
subject to revision. The Zimbabwe dollar previously ceased circulating in 2009, and between 2009–19, Zimbabwe
operated under a multicurrency regime with the US dollar as the unit of account.
OCTOBER 2023 • INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
18 REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK—Sub-Saharan Africa
Table SA1. Real GDP Growth and Consumer Prices
Real GDP Consumer Prices, Annual Average
(Annual percent change) (Annual percent change)
2011–19 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2011–19 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024
Angola 2.0 –5.6 1.2 3.0 1.3 3.3 16.3 22.3 25.8 21.4 13.1 22.3
Benin 5.1 3.8 7.2 6.3 5.5 6.3 1.2 3.0 1.7 1.4 5.0 2.5
Botswana 4.1 –8.7 11.9 5.8 3.8 4.1 4.6 1.9 6.7 12.2 5.9 4.7
Burkina Faso 5.7 1.9 6.9 1.5 4.4 6.4 1.0 1.9 3.9 14.1 1.4 3.0
Burundi 1.9 0.3 3.1 1.8 3.3 6.0 7.1 7.3 8.3 18.9 20.1 16.1
Cabo Verde 3.0 –19.6 6.4 17.0 4.4 4.5 1.1 0.6 1.9 7.9 5.2 2.0
Cameroon 4.4 0.5 3.6 3.8 4.0 4.2 1.9 2.5 2.3 6.3 7.2 4.8
Central African Republic –0.7 1.0 1.0 0.5 1.0 2.5 4.9 0.9 4.3 5.8 6.5 3.2
Chad 2.4 –2.1 –1.2 3.4 4.0 3.7 1.9 4.5 –0.8 5.8 7.0 3.5
Comoros 3.1 –0.2 2.1 2.6 3.0 3.5 1.8 0.8 –0.0 12.4 11.1 1.2
Congo, Democratic Republic of the 5.9 1.7 6.2 8.9 6.7 4.7 10.2 11.4 9.0 9.3 19.1 10.6
Congo, Republic of 0.3 –6.3 1.1 1.7 4.0 4.4 2.3 1.4 2.0 3.0 3.5 3.2
Côte d'Ivoire 6.5 1.7 7.0 6.7 6.2 6.6 1.5 2.4 4.2 5.2 4.3 2.3
Equatorial Guinea –2.7 –4.8 –0.4 3.2 –6.2 –5.5 2.5 4.8 –0.1 4.9 2.4 4.0
Eritrea1 4.6 … … … … … 2.6 … … … … …
Eswatini 2.5 –1.6 7.9 3.6 3.1 3.3 5.9 3.9 3.7 4.8 5.5 5.0
Ethiopia 9.5 6.1 6.3 6.4 6.1 6.2 14.4 20.4 26.8 33.9 29.1 20.7
Gabon 3.7 –1.8 1.5 3.0 2.8 2.6 2.3 1.7 1.1 4.3 3.8 2.5
The Gambia 2.5 0.6 5.3 4.9 5.6 6.2 6.3 5.9 7.4 11.5 17.0 12.3
Ghana 6.5 0.5 5.1 3.1 1.2 2.7 11.8 9.9 10.0 31.9 42.2 23.2
Guinea 6.2 4.7 5.0 4.3 5.9 5.6 11.4 10.6 12.6 10.5 8.3 7.9
Guinea-Bissau 3.9 1.5 6.4 4.2 4.5 5.0 1.3 1.5 3.3 7.9 7.0 3.0
Kenya 4.7 –0.3 7.6 4.8 5.0 5.3 7.4 5.3 6.1 7.6 7.7 6.6
Lesotho 1.5 –3.9 1.8 2.1 2.1 2.3 5.1 5.0 6.0 8.2 6.9 5.6
Liberia 2.8 –3.0 5.0 4.8 4.6 5.3 12.5 17.0 7.8 7.6 10.6 8.0
Madagascar 3.2 –7.1 5.7 4.0 4.0 4.8 7.0 4.2 5.8 8.2 10.5 8.8
Malawi 4.1 0.9 4.6 0.8 1.7 3.3 17.2 8.6 9.3 20.8 27.7 19.8
Mali 4.3 –1.2 3.1 3.7 4.5 4.8 1.1 0.5 3.8 9.7 5.0 2.8
Mauritius 3.7 –14.6 3.4 8.7 5.1 3.8 3.0 2.5 4.0 10.8 7.8 6.5
Mozambique 5.5 –1.2 2.4 4.2 7.0 5.0 7.0 3.1 5.7 9.8 7.4 6.5
Namibia 2.8 –8.1 3.5 4.6 2.8 2.7 5.2 2.2 3.6 6.1 6.0 4.9
Niger 5.9 3.5 1.4 11.9 4.1 11.1 0.7 2.9 3.8 4.2 4.6 6.6
Nigeria 3.0 –1.8 3.6 3.3 2.9 3.1 11.6 13.2 17.0 18.8 25.1 23.0
Rwanda 7.1 –3.4 10.9 8.2 6.2 7.0 3.9 7.7 0.8 13.9 14.5 6.0
São Tomé & Príncipe 3.6 2.6 1.9 0.1 0.5 2.4 8.1 9.8 8.1 18.0 20.8 11.9
Senegal 5.0 1.3 6.5 4.0 4.1 8.8 1.0 2.5 2.2 9.7 6.1 3.3
Seychelles 6.8 –8.5 2.5 8.9 4.2 3.9 3.0 1.2 9.8 2.6 -0.8 2.0
Sierra Leone 5.0 –2.0 4.1 4.0 2.7 4.7 10.0 13.4 11.9 27.2 42.9 29.8
South Africa 1.6 –6.0 4.7 1.9 0.9 1.8 5.3 3.3 4.6 6.9 5.8 4.8
South Sudan –5.3 –6.5 5.3 0.5 3.5 4.2 98.6 24.0 30.2 –3.2 16.3 13.6
Tanzania 6.7 4.8 4.9 4.7 5.2 6.1 7.3 3.3 3.7 4.4 4.0 4.0
Togo 5.4 2.0 6.0 5.8 5.4 5.3 1.4 1.8 4.5 7.6 5.0 2.8
Uganda 5.3 –1.2 5.7 6.4 4.6 5.7 6.8 2.8 2.2 7.2 5.8 4.7
Zambia 4.3 –2.8 4.6 4.7 3.6 4.3 9.0 15.7 22.0 11.0 10.6 9.6
Zimbabwe2 4.6 –7.8 8.4 6.2 4.1 3.6 30.2 557.2 98.5 193.4 314.5 222.4
Sub-Saharan Africa 3.8 –1.6 4.7 4.0 3.3 4.0 8.3 10.1 11.0 14.5 15.8 13.1
Median 4.3 –1.2 4.8 4.1 4.1 4.5 4.5 3.6 4.6 8.2 7.1 5.3
Excluding Nigeria and South Africa 5.0 –0.0 5.2 5.0 4.3 5.0 8.0 11.1 10.7 15.2 15.1 11.8
Oil-exporting countries 2.7 –2.3 3.1 3.2 2.6 3.1 11.2 13.0 15.9 17.1 20.5 20.0
Excluding Nigeria 2.1 –3.6 1.6 3.2 2.0 3.1 10.2 12.3 13.2 12.8 9.4 12.7
Oil-importing countries 4.4 –1.2 5.6 4.4 3.7 4.5 6.7 8.6 8.5 13.1 13.3 9.7
Excluding South Africa 5.8 0.8 6.0 5.4 4.8 5.4 7.5 10.9 10.2 15.7 16.3 11.6
Middle-income countries 3.1 –2.8 4.5 3.4 2.6 3.3 8.2 8.5 10.5 13.1 14.6 12.8
Excluding Nigeria and South Africa 4.2 –1.7 5.1 4.4 3.4 4.4 7.4 7.9 9.1 12.5 11.9 9.8
Low-income countries 6.0 1.9 5.4 5.6 5.3 5.7 8.8 14.8 12.5 18.2 18.8 13.9
Excluding low-income countries in fragile and
conflict-affected situations 5.6 1.0 5.6 5.0 4.8 5.7 7.8 4.9 4.8 8.3 8.7 6.7
Countries in fragile and conflict-affected
situations 4.1 –0.2 4.2 4.3 3.9 4.1 10.3 15.6 16.4 20.3 24.2 20.2
CFA franc zone 4.4 0.6 4.6 4.8 4.3 5.7 1.6 2.4 2.8 6.5 4.9 3.3
CEMAC 2.5 –1.5 1.9 3.3 2.7 2.9 2.2 2.7 1.5 5.4 5.7 4.0
WAEMU 5.7 1.7 6.0 5.6 5.2 7.0 1.2 2.2 3.5 7.0 4.5 3.0
COMESA (SSA members) 5.9 0.5 6.4 5.9 5.2 5.3 9.4 17.1 14.6 19.5 20.8 15.4
EAC-5 5.5 0.9 6.6 5.2 5.0 5.7 7.1 4.4 4.4 7.1 6.8 5.6
ECOWAS 4.0 –0.6 4.4 3.9 3.3 4.1 9.3 10.2 12.7 17.0 20.9 17.2
SACU 1.7 –6.1 5.0 2.2 1.2 2.0 5.2 3.2 4.6 7.1 5.9 4.8
SADC 2.8 –4.2 4.6 3.4 2.5 3.2 7.7 10.7 9.6 11.6 11.5 10.5
See sources on page 16.
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND • OCTOBER 2023
LIGHT ON THE HORIZON? 19
Table SA2. Overall Fiscal Balance, Including Grants and Government Debt
Overall Fiscal Balance, Including Grants Government Debt
(Percent of GDP) (Percent of GDP)
2011–19 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2011–19 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024
Angola –0.5 –1.9 3.8 0.7 -1.9 1.0 59.8 138.9 86.8 66.7 84.9 77.1
Benin –2.4 –4.7 –5.7 –5.6 -4.3 -3.7 30.1 46.1 50.3 54.2 53.0 52.4
Botswana –0.9 –10.9 –2.4 0.0 -1.9 -1.1 17.6 18.7 18.7 18.0 18.7 18.1
Burkina Faso –3.3 –5.1 –7.4 –10.7 -6.6 -5.6 31.0 43.3 55.4 58.3 61.2 61.2
Burundi –5.1 –6.3 –5.2 –12.1 -5.0 -2.8 45.1 66.0 66.6 68.4 72.7 65.8
Cabo Verde –5.0 –9.1 –7.5 –4.1 -4.5 -3.2 102.1 144.6 147.6 127.3 113.1 109.7
Cameroon –3.5 –3.2 –3.0 –1.1 -0.8 -0.6 27.6 44.9 46.8 45.5 41.9 39.6
Central African Republic –1.3 –3.4 –6.0 –5.3 -3.5 -2.8 47.4 43.4 47.6 51.8 50.1 49.6
Chad –0.9 1.6 –2.0 5.1 8.3 0.8 40.8 55.9 57.4 48.8 43.2 38.7
Comoros 0.5 –0.5 –2.8 –3.9 -4.9 -4.5 18.0 24.0 25.5 27.9 33.3 36.9
Congo, Democratic Republic of the –0.1 –3.3 –2.0 –0.8 -2.0 -2.0 18.0 16.5 15.9 14.5 13.3 11.1
Congo, Republic of –2.1 –1.1 1.6 8.9 4.1 5.0 59.7 102.5 97.8 92.5 97.8 91.0
Côte d'Ivoire –2.4 –5.4 –4.9 –6.8 -5.2 -4.1 32.4 46.3 50.9 56.8 56.8 57.0
Equatorial Guinea –5.0 –1.8 2.6 13.6 3.8 0.4 25.2 49.4 42.1 34.6 38.3 33.7
Eritrea1 –2.3 … … … … … 235.6 … … … … …
Eswatini –4.5 –4.5 –4.5 –4.5 -0.3 -2.3 22.5 41.2 40.8 42.0 42.4 41.9
Ethiopia –2.3 –2.8 –2.8 –4.2 -2.7 -2.0 49.5 53.9 53.8 46.4 37.9 31.2
Gabon 0.5 –2.2 –1.9 1.9 -0.4 -1.1 44.5 78.3 65.8 57.7 64.9 64.5
The Gambia –4.3 –2.2 –4.6 –4.8 -2.7 -2.5 70.2 85.9 83.1 82.8 72.3 65.5
Ghana –6.6 –17.4 –12.0 –11.2 -4.6 -4.1 49.6 72.3 79.2 92.4 84.9 81.5
Guinea 0.6 –3.1 –1.8 –0.7 -2.3 -2.4 40.2 47.8 41.5 33.1 31.6 31.5
Guinea-Bissau –2.9 –9.6 –5.9 –5.9 -3.5 -3.2 55.0 77.7 78.8 80.3 73.9 71.4
Kenya –6.2 –8.1 –7.2 –5.8 -4.7 -4.1 46.7 68.0 68.2 68.4 70.2 68.3
Lesotho –3.1 –0.0 –5.1 –7.7 1.0 -0.4 43.5 53.6 55.7 59.9 61.3 60.4
Liberia –3.9 –4.0 –2.5 –5.3 -2.8 -3.3 28.7 58.7 53.3 53.9 52.3 52.7
Madagascar –2.1 –3.9 –2.6 –6.4 -3.9 -3.4 38.1 52.2 52.0 55.1 54.0 53.5
Malawi –3.8 –8.2 –8.6 –9.3 -6.8 -8.0 35.5 54.8 61.5 75.2 78.6 77.4
Mali –2.7 –5.4 –4.8 –4.8 -4.8 -4.4 31.5 46.9 50.4 51.7 51.8 52.6
Mauritius –3.3 –10.4 –4.0 –3.2 -5.0 -5.7 62.2 94.6 88.4 83.1 79.7 78.9
Mozambique –4.2 –5.4 –3.6 –5.0 -2.8 -2.2 78.9 120.0 104.9 95.5 89.7 92.4
Namibia –6.1 –8.1 –8.7 –6.5 -4.2 -4.0 38.2 64.3 70.4 69.8 67.6 66.8
Niger –3.7 –4.8 –5.9 –6.8 -4.9 -4.1 27.8 45.0 51.3 50.3 48.7 46.3
Nigeria –3.1 –5.6 –6.0 –5.6 -5.4 -4.5 21.9 34.5 36.5 39.6 38.8 41.3
Rwanda –2.6 –9.5 –7.0 –5.8 -5.0 -7.3 33.0 65.6 66.7 61.1 63.3 72.1
São Tomé & Príncipe –5.2 2.9 –1.5 –2.2 0.2 0.1 94.6 86.7 76.7 77.7 58.5 54.4
Senegal –3.9 –6.4 –6.3 –6.6 -5.0 -3.9 47.2 69.2 73.3 76.6 81.0 72.1
Seychelles 1.5 –14.9 –5.4 –1.2 -1.1 -1.3 65.0 77.6 70.7 61.5 60.8 59.0
Sierra Leone –5.1 –5.8 –7.3 –10.6 -5.4 -2.9 51.5 76.3 79.3 95.8 88.9 82.6
South Africa –4.0 –9.6 –5.5 –4.7 -6.4 -6.5 44.9 68.9 68.8 71.1 73.7 75.8
South Sudan –5.7 –5.6 –9.4 5.1 8.4 4.3 53.0 49.9 52.5 37.8 60.4 50.9
Tanzania –2.7 –2.5 –3.4 –3.7 -3.3 -2.6 36.3 39.8 42.1 42.3 42.6 41.8
Togo –3.8 –7.0 –4.7 –8.3 -6.6 -4.7 48.3 61.8 64.6 66.3 67.2 67.6
Uganda –3.0 –7.5 –7.5 –5.8 -4.2 -2.7 27.8 46.4 50.6 48.4 48.3 47.7
Zambia2 –6.3 –13.8 –8.1 –7.7 -6.0 -4.6 50.9 140.2 110.8 98.5 … …
Zimbabwe3 –3.4 0.8 –2.2 –2.0 -4.1 -3.2 51.7 84.4 59.8 98.4 95.4 56.9
Sub-Saharan Africa –3.3 –6.5 –5.0 –4.4 -4.2 -3.7 37.7 57.1 56.6 57.1 57.7 55.8
Median –3.1 –5.2 –4.9 –4.9 -4.0 -3.0 41.3 57.3 58.6 59.1 60.8 57.0
Excluding Nigeria and South Africa –3.1 –5.8 –4.4 –3.9 -3.2 -2.6 42.7 63.4 60.3 59.4 58.8 54.0
Oil-exporting countries –2.6 –4.7 –4.1 –3.1 -3.5 -2.7 30.3 48.8 46.2 46.3 48.9 48.6
Excluding Nigeria –1.7 –2.1 0.5 2.0 0.1 0.8 48.6 89.5 69.4 59.8 68.1 62.2
Oil-importing countries –3.8 –7.5 –5.5 –5.2 -4.6 -4.1 42.8 61.5 61.8 63.0 61.5 58.8
Excluding South Africa –3.6 –6.5 –5.5 –5.4 -3.9 -3.3 41.4 58.2 58.3 59.3 56.8 52.4
Middle-income countries –3.5 –7.4 –5.4 –4.6 -4.7 -4.2 37.2 59.0 58.6 59.5 62.0 61.9
Excluding Nigeria and South Africa –3.4 –7.6 –4.8 –3.8 -3.3 -2.5 45.0 74.1 68.4 67.3 69.7 66.0
Low-income countries –2.6 –3.8 –3.9 –4.0 -3.1 -2.7 39.7 51.6 50.9 50.4 47.6 42.8
Excluding low-income countries in fragile and
conflict-affected situations –2.7 –4.9 –4.9 –5.0 -3.9 -3.3 35.5 48.2 50.1 49.6 49.3 48.7
Countries in fragile and conflict-affected
situations –2.8 –4.5 –4.7 –4.3 -3.7 -3.1 29.0 42.9 43.6 45.0 43.5 41.3
CFA franc zone –2.7 –4.3 –4.1 –3.2 -2.9 -2.7 35.2 53.7 56.3 57.1 57.8 55.8
CEMAC –2.5 –2.0 –1.5 3.1 1.4 0.3 36.6 59.6 57.5 53.5 53.5 50.5
WAEMU –3.0 –5.5 –5.5 –6.9 -5.2 -4.3 34.7 50.4 55.6 59.3 60.1 58.6
COMESA (SSA members) –3.5 –5.6 –4.8 –4.6 -3.6 -3.1 42.4 60.8 57.9 57.5 54.2 47.6
EAC-5 –4.3 –6.4 –6.1 –5.3 -4.2 -3.5 39.1 55.6 57.2 56.4 56.9 55.9
ECOWAS –3.3 –6.7 –6.5 –6.3 -5.1 -4.3 27.7 43.2 46.8 49.9 50.4 51.0
SACU –4.0 –9.5 –5.5 –4.6 -6.0 -6.1 43.5 66.3 66.4 68.3 70.4 72.2
SADC –3.2 –7.1 –4.0 –3.5 -4.6 -4.2 45.1 70.3 64.1 64.2 66.7 64.4
See sources on page 16.
OCTOBER 2023 • INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
20 REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK—Sub-Saharan Africa
Table SA3. Broad Money and External Current Account, Including Grants
Broad Money External Current Account, Including Grants
(Percent of GDP) (Percent of GDP)
2011–19 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2011–19 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024
Angola 34.6 38.4 24.4 20.0 20.0 19.6 3.0 1.5 11.2 9.6 3.1 3.7
Benin 28.1 30.5 32.7 33.4 33.4 33.4 –4.9 –1.7 –4.2 –5.6 –6.0 –5.7
Botswana 44.7 52.5 45.4 41.9 42.9 42.7 2.0 –10.3 –1.3 3.0 0.8 1.5
Burkina Faso 32.3 43.6 49.0 46.0 47.9 48.4 –5.1 4.1 0.4 –6.2 –5.1 –5.2
Burundi 27.0 46.3 50.6 56.0 54.7 53.6 –14.1 –10.3 –12.4 –15.6 –18.7 –20.7
Cabo Verde 85.5 114.3 110.7 93.3 92.8 92.2 –6.3 –15.0 –11.8 –3.6 –5.8 –5.0
Cameroon 21.7 26.6 29.1 29.6 30.1 30.3 –3.3 –3.7 –4.0 –1.8 –2.6 –2.4
Central African Republic 24.0 30.3 33.3 31.9 30.6 29.7 –7.1 –8.2 –11.1 –12.7 –8.8 –7.8
Chad 14.6 20.8 23.3 25.5 23.9 27.0 –7.6 –7.4 –3.4 6.2 0.2 –3.3
Comoros 25.1 31.2 36.7 36.7 37.8 38.7 –3.1 –1.9 –0.5 –2.4 –5.6 –5.8
Congo, Democratic Republic of the 11.5 20.2 21.9 19.5 21.4 21.8 –4.4 –2.2 –1.0 –5.2 –6.0 –5.3
Congo, Republic of 26.6 32.7 30.8 27.5 30.5 32.3 –3.0 12.3 14.2 19.4 4.0 2.1
Côte d'Ivoire 10.9 13.5 15.2 14.5 13.3 13.1 –0.3 –3.1 –4.0 –6.5 –4.7 –3.8
Equatorial Guinea 13.2 17.5 14.7 16.4 19.9 24.8 –8.4 –0.8 5.4 9.6 –2.6 –3.0
Eritrea1 207.6 … … … … … 14.9 … … … … …
Eswatini 26.8 32.3 30.3 30.3 30.4 30.4 6.0 7.1 2.7 –0.7 6.3 3.2
Ethiopia 29.2 30.8 31.1 27.9 25.3 22.6 –7.1 –4.6 –3.2 –4.3 –2.4 –2.0
Gabon 23.7 27.9 23.1 22.8 26.5 27.6 2.4 –6.9 –4.5 1.6 –0.8 –2.1
The Gambia 38.6 56.0 59.2 54.6 52.0 50.6 –7.6 –3.0 –0.1 –5.9 –5.0 –5.2
Ghana 24.1 30.8 29.4 29.5 27.8 26.9 –5.6 –2.5 –2.7 –2.1 –2.5 –2.8
Guinea 24.2 27.8 26.2 28.1 28.4 29.0 –16.3 –16.2 –2.1 –8.2 –8.9 –8.8
Guinea-Bissau 38.5 45.6 50.6 46.6 44.6 44.0 –2.4 –2.6 –0.8 –9.6 –7.1 –4.5
Kenya 36.8 37.2 35.2 33.9 32.6 31.9 –6.9 –4.7 –5.2 –5.1 –4.9 –4.9
Lesotho 34.2 40.3 37.3 40.3 38.4 37.4 –6.1 –1.0 –4.4 –7.9 –3.1 –4.7
Liberia 20.2 25.5 24.6 25.0 25.0 25.2 –20.1 –16.4 –17.9 –19.6 –22.9 –23.1
Madagascar 23.4 28.7 28.6 29.2 30.9 31.7 –2.7 –5.4 –4.9 –5.4 –3.9 –4.8
Malawi 17.2 17.5 20.1 23.6 23.6 23.6 –10.2 –13.8 –13.3 –3.4 –5.9 –8.5
Mali 27.1 36.1 39.1 40.2 40.2 40.2 –5.2 –2.2 –7.5 –6.9 –6.5 –5.7
Mauritius 104.3 156.8 160.1 141.5 129.6 131.3 –5.8 –8.8 –13.0 –11.5 –6.2 –4.1
Mozambique 33.5 43.3 42.8 40.9 37.5 36.3 –31.3 –27.6 –22.4 –32.9 –16.0 –39.3
Namibia 58.3 71.5 70.6 63.0 63.3 63.7 –8.1 2.6 –9.9 –12.7 –7.1 –6.4
Niger 17.5 19.2 20.1 19.4 19.4 19.4 –12.6 –13.2 –14.1 –15.6 –12.5 –3.9
Nigeria 24.3 25.2 25.2 25.8 27.0 28.3 1.2 –3.7 –0.7 0.2 0.7 0.6
Rwanda 22.4 29.0 29.9 29.2 26.8 27.3 –10.5 –12.1 –11.2 –9.8 –12.7 –11.3
São Tomé & Príncipe 41.1 32.5 29.5 28.1 26.3 26.3 –17.4 –11.2 –12.1 –13.3 –14.9 –10.0
Senegal 34.6 45.3 47.9 51.9 56.4 59.9 –7.2 –10.1 –11.2 –19.9 –14.6 –7.9
Seychelles 64.4 101.9 92.7 86.3 88.9 88.2 –15.3 –12.3 –10.1 –7.1 –6.9 –8.5
Sierra Leone 22.2 29.5 32.4 36.2 30.2 27.7 –23.0 –7.9 –8.6 –8.8 –6.8 –7.0
South Africa 66.4 74.0 70.1 71.1 71.5 72.3 –3.5 1.9 3.7 –0.5 –2.5 –2.8
South Sudan 20.7 18.4 14.9 8.8 12.8 12.0 4.5 –19.2 –9.5 9.8 2.3 2.0
Tanzania 22.1 20.9 21.3 21.8 22.4 22.4 –7.0 –1.9 –3.4 –5.4 –5.1 –4.2
Togo 37.2 46.6 48.0 50.4 50.4 51.0 –4.9 –0.3 –0.9 –3.2 –3.1 –2.7
Uganda 17.4 22.5 21.8 20.1 20.5 20.4 –5.6 –9.4 –8.3 –8.2 –7.1 –8.2
Zambia 21.0 31.3 24.3 26.6 26.8 26.3 0.3 10.6 9.7 3.6 3.8 7.1
Zimbabwe2 24.1 14.8 14.9 19.0 15.8 15.1 –7.9 2.5 1.0 1.0 0.9 –0.7
Sub-Saharan Africa 35.3 38.6 37.1 36.6 36.6 36.7 –2.8 –2.7 –1.0 –1.9 –2.7 –2.8
Median 26.4 31.0 30.6 29.6 30.3 30.0 –5.6 –4.2 –4.1 –5.4 –5.1 –4.7
Excluding Nigeria and South Africa 28.0 32.6 31.3 30.1 29.6 29.3 –4.5 –4.0 –3.0 –3.3 –3.9 –3.9
Oil-exporting countries 25.3 27.1 25.2 25.0 26.1 27.1 0.9 –3.1 0.6 2.5 0.8 0.6
Excluding Nigeria 27.4 31.9 25.0 22.9 23.7 24.3 0.2 –1.5 4.0 7.1 0.9 0.7
Oil-importing countries 41.5 44.9 43.6 42.9 42.1 41.6 –5.2 –2.5 –1.8 –4.3 –4.3 –4.2
Excluding South Africa 28.2 32.8 32.6 31.6 30.8 30.3 –6.4 –4.5 –4.5 –6.1 –4.9 –4.8
Middle-income countries 38.4 42.1 39.9 39.6 39.9 40.3 –1.5 –1.7 0.3 –0.4 –1.6 –1.5
Excluding Nigeria and South Africa 30.7 36.0 32.9 31.6 31.2 31.3 –2.2 –2.6 –1.4 –0.9 –2.6 –2.0
Low-income countries 24.6 28.7 29.5 28.5 27.8 27.1 –8.0 –5.5 –4.8 –6.2 –5.3 –5.6
Excluding low-income countries in fragile and
conflict-affected situations 21.6 24.6 24.9 25.2 25.3 25.4 –7.9 –6.8 –5.9 –6.8 –6.7 –6.7
Countries in fragile and conflict-affected
situations 25.1 27.6 28.2 27.8 28.2 28.5 –1.7 –3.8 –1.9 –1.9 –1.7 –2.3
CFA franc zone 22.0 27.7 29.4 29.5 30.2 31.1 –3.8 –3.4 –3.9 –4.4 –5.1 –4.0
CEMAC 20.4 25.8 26.1 26.4 27.8 29.2 –3.4 –2.5 –0.8 3.6 –1.2 –2.0
WAEMU 23.0 28.8 31.2 31.1 31.4 32.0 –4.3 –3.9 –5.7 –9.2 –7.2 –4.9
COMESA (SSA members) 30.1 34.4 33.7 32.0 30.7 29.8 –5.7 –4.1 –3.7 –4.5 –3.8 –3.5
EAC-5 27.4 29.2 28.5 27.8 27.3 26.9 –7.0 –5.1 –5.6 –6.2 –6.0 –5.9
ECOWAS 24.2 27.0 27.5 27.8 28.5 29.3 –1.0 –4.0 –2.4 –2.6 –2.4 –2.0
SACU 64.6 72.3 68.4 68.9 69.2 69.9 –3.4 1.5 3.0 –0.7 –2.4 –2.6
SADC 49.6 54.7 50.7 50.0 49.8 49.9 –3.4 –0.1 1.8 –0.8 –2.5 –3.0
See sources on page 16.
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND • OCTOBER 2023
LIGHT ON THE HORIZON? 21
Table SA4. External Debt, Official Debt, Debtor Based and Reserves
External Debt, Official Debt, Debtor Based Reserves
(Percent of GDP) (Months of imports of goods and services)
2011–19 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2011–19 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024
Angola 33.6 90.9 68.9 43.1 56.0 54.7 9.3 9.5 6.5 7.3 7.0 7.0
Benin1 15.6 30.3 35.2 37.8 39.6 39.3 … ... ... ... ... ...
Botswana 15.4 12.5 10.1 9.3 9.3 8.3 11.4 6.4 6.6 5.7 6.0 6.1
Burkina Faso1 21.0 22.8 24.4 26.1 24.9 24.2 ... ... ... ... ... ...
Burundi 19.5 17.5 19.9 19.6 27.9 30.8 2.5 1.0 2.3 1.3 1.9 2.3
Cabo Verde 78.4 129.6 119.3 106.9 96.2 91.6 5.7 7.6 6.7 5.6 6.0 5.9
Cameroon2 18.4 32.5 30.3 31.1 29.7 28.4 ... ... ... ... ... ...
Central African Republic2 29.2 36.3 32.8 34.4 31.4 30.4 ... ... ... ... ... ...
Chad2 24.2 28.2 24.3 22.4 20.9 20.8 ... ... ... ... ... ...
Comoros 17.0 23.2 24.7 27.1 32.9 36.2 7.1 7.9 9.0 6.5 7.5 7.9
Congo, Democratic Republic of the 14.1 13.7 14.5 13.2 12.1 10.4 0.6 0.4 1.1 1.7 2.0 2.1
Congo, Republic of 2 24.4 29.2 23.7 25.1 25.5 23.2 ... ... ... ... ... ...
Côte d'Ivoire1 19.6 33.5 30.7 36.0 35.7 34.4 ... ... ... ... ... ...
Equatorial Guinea2 8.8 15.4 12.2 10.0 9.0 6.1 ... ... ... ... ... ...
Eritrea3 62.2 … … … … … 2.8 … … … … …
Eswatini 8.8 15.2 15.2 17.2 20.2 21.5 3.7 3.1 3.1 2.5 3.3 3.4
Ethiopia 25.4 28.8 29.1 23.0 17.9 14.8 2.0 2.0 1.5 0.8 … …
Gabon2 29.8 49.0 36.1 34.8 39.0 39.2 ... ... ... ... ... ...
The Gambia 37.5 49.4 47.2 47.6 43.2 39.1 3.6 5.8 7.1 5.3 5.0 5.0
Ghana4 26.3 39.3 38.1 43.2 41.5 41.9 3.0 3.7 4.0 1.2 1.4 2.1
Guinea 23.2 27.2 25.2 21.5 21.0 21.8 2.2 1.9 2.6 2.6 2.4 2.2
Guinea-Bissau1 30.0 43.9 38.5 39.4 34.6 32.2 ... ... ... ... ... ...
Kenya 22.8 30.6 31.1 31.2 33.6 34.9 4.6 4.6 4.7 3.9 3.3 3.7
Lesotho 35.3 46.6 41.1 41.4 45.8 44.7 4.8 4.1 4.9 3.8 3.9 4.0
Liberia 18.4 41.1 37.2 35.3 35.4 36.5 2.1 2.2 3.9 3.1 3.1 3.1
Madagascar 23.5 35.9 33.2 33.7 36.3 37.0 3.4 4.8 4.5 4.1 4.0 3.9
Malawi 19.4 31.8 30.9 31.5 27.2 32.1 2.5 0.8 0.5 0.6 2.3 3.3
Mali1 22.8 31.5 27.1 26.6 24.6 23.9 ... ... ... ... ... ...
Mauritius 13.3 20.2 23.3 19.4 19.7 17.6 8.4 14.4 12.8 11.8 9.2 8.8
Mozambique 63.8 90.7 83.3 71.0 64.9 66.6 3.5 4.7 2.6 2.8 1.9 1.9
Namibia 12.2 18.8 14.5 16.7 17.2 16.4 3.4 4.1 4.5 4.7 4.8 5.0
Niger1 18.4 33.0 31.5 32.5 29.7 29.0 ... ... ... ... ... ...
Nigeria 3.7 8.0 9.1 9.4 11.2 13.3 6.1 6.5 6.3 6.5 5.8 5.7
Rwanda 28.0 54.8 53.5 46.8 52.1 62.3 3.9 5.3 4.6 3.7 3.6 4.3
São Tomé & Príncipe 84.3 65.1 59.5 59.2 51.0 47.9 3.7 4.4 3.6 2.5 2.0 2.5
Senegal1 32.9 48.9 45.9 47.0 43.6 39.7 ... ... ... ... ... ...
Seychelles 34.4 35.4 38.3 29.4 30.6 33.3 3.6 3.7 3.7 3.4 3.5 3.5
Sierra Leone 31.6 48.3 48.3 48.9 56.2 53.4 3.2 4.6 5.6 4.2 3.6 3.3
South Africa 15.0 23.4 18.6 18.8 21.0 21.0 5.8 6.4 5.5 5.4 5.0 4.6
South Sudan 50.0 50.6 50.3 40.6 61.1 51.3 1.7 0.1 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.9
Tanzania 25.9 28.4 28.8 27.3 26.4 26.9 4.8 5.3 4.0 3.7 4.0 4.1
Togo1 13.3 29.0 25.7 26.1 25.4 26.1 ... ... ... ... ... ...
Uganda 16.6 29.4 27.9 26.0 25.8 26.2 4.6 4.3 4.7 3.1 3.1 3.4
Zambia5 26.4 66.6 53.9 36.8 … … 2.7 1.3 2.8 3.2 3.1 3.8
Zimbabwe6 31.7 26.5 19.8 22.5 21.8 14.9 0.5 0.1 1.3 0.2 0.0 0.0
Sub-Saharan Africa 16.5 26.4 24.6 23.6 25.2 24.8 5.2 5.0 4.7 4.4 3.9 3.8
Median 22.8 31.6 30.8 31.1 29.7 30.8 3.6 4.3 4.3 3.5 3.5 3.7
Excluding Nigeria and South Africa 24.3 36.3 33.7 31.4 31.2 29.5 4.3 3.9 3.7 3.2 3.0 3.0
Oil-exporting countries 11.2 20.3 19.8 18.2 21.7 22.6 6.3 6.2 5.7 6.3 5.7 5.7
Excluding Nigeria 27.6 55.2 45.2 36.2 41.7 39.8 6.7 5.6 4.5 5.7 5.7 5.8
Oil-importing countries 20.2 29.7 27.0 26.6 26.7 25.7 4.4 4.4 4.1 3.5 3.1 3.0
Excluding South Africa 23.5 32.6 31.1 30.1 28.9 27.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 2.6 2.4 2.5
Middle-income countries 14.6 25.0 23.0 22.5 25.3 25.5 5.8 5.8 5.3 5.3 4.8 4.7
Excluding Nigeria and South Africa 24.4 41.5 37.5 35.3 37.2 36.1 5.4 4.7 4.5 4.2 4.1 4.2
Low-income countries 24.5 30.6 29.2 26.9 25.0 23.4 2.7 2.9 2.7 2.0 1.9 1.9
Excluding low-income countries in fragile and
conflict-affected situations 22.4 31.9 30.9 29.2 28.8 30.0 3.9 4.2 3.9 3.2 3.4 3.5
Countries in fragile and conflict-affected
situations 11.1 17.4 17.6 16.8 17.7 17.6 4.8 4.8 4.6 4.4 3.6 3.4
CFA franc zone 21.0 33.5 30.7 32.4 31.9 30.7 4.6 4.7 4.4 4.1 4.2 4.1
CEMAC 20.8 32.6 27.9 27.8 27.9 26.8 4.2 3.3 3.0 4.1 4.6 4.8
WAEMU 21.4 34.0 32.3 35.1 34.0 32.7 4.9 5.5 5.2 4.1 3.9 3.8
COMESA (SSA members) 22.0 29.7 28.6 26.0 24.7 22.7 3.1 3.1 3.1 2.5 2.3 2.3
EAC-5 22.7 30.7 30.7 29.7 30.7 31.9 4.6 4.7 4.4 3.7 3.5 3.8
ECOWAS 9.9 18.6 19.2 19.7 22.1 23.2 5.1 5.3 5.2 4.8 4.0 4.0
SACU 14.9 22.8 18.2 18.4 20.4 20.4 5.9 6.2 5.5 5.4 5.0 4.7
SADC 20.4 32.1 26.8 25.0 26.9 25.8 5.7 5.6 4.8 4.9 4.6 4.3
See sources on page 16.
OCTOBER 2023 • INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND