INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
REGIONAL
ECONOMIC
OUTLOOK
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
A New Shock and Little Room
to Maneuver
2022
APR
W o r l d E c o n o m i c a n d F i n a n c i a l S u r v e y s
Regional Economic Outlook
22
I N T E R N A T I O N A L M O N E T A R Y F U N D
RPA
Sub-Saharan Africa
A New Shock and Little Room to Maneuver
©2022 Cataloging-in-Publication Data
IMF Library
Names: International Monetary Fund, publisher.
Title: Regional economic outlook. Sub-Saharan Africa : a new shock and little room to maneuver.
Other titles: Sub-Saharan Africa : a new shock and little room to maneuver. | World economic and financial
surveys.
Description: Washington, DC : International Monetary Fund, 2022. | World economic and financial surveys. |
Apr. 2022. | Includes bibliographical references.
Identifiers: ISBN 9798400208294 (English Paper)
9798400208430 (ePub)
9798400208454 (Web PDF)
Subjects: LCSH: Africa, Sub-Saharan -- Economic conditions. | Economic forecasting -- Africa, Sub-Saharan. |
Economic development -- Africa, Sub-Saharan. | Africa, Sub-Saharan -- Economic policy.
Classification: LCC HC800.R445 2022
The Regional Economic Outlook: Sub-Saharan Africa is published twice a year, in the
spring and fall, to review developments in sub-Saharan Africa. Both projections and
policy considerations are those of the IMF staff and do not necessarily represent the
views of the IMF, its Executive Board, or IMF Management.
Publication orders may be placed online, by fax, or through the mail:
International Monetary Fund, Publication Services
P.O. Box 92780, Washington, DC 20090 (USA)
Tel.: (202) 623-7430 Fax: (202) 623-7201
Email: publications@imf.org
www.imf.org
www.elibrary.imf.org
See all published Regional Economic Outlook: Sub-Saharan Africa:
https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/REO/SSA
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Contents
Acknowledgments � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � v
Executive Summary � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �vi
A New Shock and Little Room to Maneuver � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 1
Yet Another Shock � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �1
An Uncertain and Insufficient Economic Recovery � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �3
Risks are Tilted to the Downside � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �6
Complex Choices with Fewer Options � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �7
Beyond the Crisis: Enhancing Resilience and Lifting Potential Growth Will Be Key � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �15
References � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 24
Statistical Appendix � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 25
Boxes
Special Focus: Spillovers from the War in Ukraine � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �2
Box 1� One Year On: Vaccine Rollout In Sub-Saharan Africa � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �19
Box 2� Sub-Saharan Africa’s Vulnerability To External Shocks � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �20
Box 3� Economic Consequences Of Conflicts In Sub-Saharan Africa � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �22
Box 4� Central Bank Digital Currencies In Sub-Saharan Africa � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �23
Figures
Figure 1� Commodity Prices, 2005–22 � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �1
Figure 2� Sub-Saharan Africa: Sovereign Yields, 2019–22 � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �1
Focus Figure 1� Global Food Prices, 2021–22 � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �2
Focus Figure 2� Sub-Saharan Africa: Top 8 Wheat Importers � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �2
Focus Figure 3� Sub-Saharan Africa: Dependence on Food Imports, Top 10, 2019 � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �2
Figure 3� Sub-Saharan Africa: COVID-19 Cases and Deaths � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �3
Figure 4� Selected Economies: Fully Vaccinated Persons � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �3
Figure 5� Sub-Saharan Africa: Coups, 1990–2022 � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �3
Figure 6� Sub-Saharan Africa: Real GDP Growth � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �4
Figure 7� Sub-Saharan Africa: Revisions to Real GDP Growth for 2021 and 2022 � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �4
Figure 8� Sub-Saharan Africa: Revisions to Fiscal Projections for 2022 � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �4
Figure 9� Selected Regions: Real GDP Per Capita, 2019–26 � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �5
Figure 10� Sub-Saharan Africa: Human Capital Divergence � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �6
Figure 11� Selected Regions: Extreme Disasters since 1990 � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �7
Figure 12� Sub-Saharan Africa: Inflation Rates, 2005–22 � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �7
Figure 13� Sub-Saharan Africa: Median CPI Inflation � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �8
Figure 14� Sub-Saharan Africa: CPI Inflation � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �8
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Figure 15� Sub-Saharan Africa: Output Loss and Inflation � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �8
Figure 16� Sub-Saharan Africa: Composition of Public Debt, 2010 and 2020 � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �9
Figure 17� Sub-Saharan Africa: Debt Risk Status for PRGT Eligible Low-Income Developing Countries, 2015–21 � �9
Figure 18� Sub-Saharan Africa: Banks’ Holdings of Government Debt, 2015–21 � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �10
Figure 19� Sub-Saharan Africa: External Debt Service, 2010–21 � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �10
Figure 20� Sub-Saharan Africa: Tax Revenues, 2018–25 � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �11
Figure 21� Sub-Saharan Africa: Exchange Rates, 2019–22 � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �13
Figure 22� Sub-Saharan Africa: International Reserves, 2021 � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �13
Figure 23� Sub-Saharan Africa: Exchange-Rate Regime, 1980–2018 � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �14
Figure 24� Selected Countries: Exchange Rate Overvaluation, 2017–20 � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �14
Figure 25� Sub-Saharan Africa: Commodity Exports and Tax Revenues � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �15
Figure 26� Sub-Saharan Africa: Real GDP Per Capita, 2010–26 � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �15
Figure 27� Selected Regions: Share of Infrastructure Projects Receiving Government Support � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �17
Statistical Appendix Tables
SA1� Real GDP Growth and Consumer Prices, Average � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �27
SA2� Overall Fiscal Balance, Including Grants and Government Debt � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �28
SA3� Broad Money and External Current Account, Including Grants � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �29
SA4� External Debt, Official Debt, Debtor Based and Reserves � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �30
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Acknowledgments
The April 2022 issue of the Regional Economic Outlook: Sub-Saharan Africa (REO) was prepared by a
team led by Peter Kovacs under the supervision of Papa N’Diaye, Catherine Pattillo, and Damiano Sandri.
The team included Hany Abdel-Latif, Aqib Aslam, Marijn Bolhuis, Habtamu Fuje, Cleary Haines,
Shushanik Hakobyan, Franck Ouattara, Saad Quayyum, Henry Rawlings, Ivanova Reyes, and Andrew Tiffin.
Charlotte Vazquez was responsible for document production, with assistance from Erick Trejo Guevara.
The editing and production were overseen by Cheryl Toksoz of the Communications Department.
The following conventions are used in this publication:
• In tables, a blank cell indicates “not applicable,” ellipsis points (. . .) indicate “not available,” and
0 or 0.0 indicates “zero” or “negligible.” Minor discrepancies between sums of constituent figures
and totals are due to rounding.
• An en dash (–) between years or months (for example, 2019–20 or January–June) indicates the
years or months covered, including the beginning and ending years or months; a slash or virgule
(/) between years or months (for example, 2005/06) indicates a fiscal or financial year, as does
the abbreviation FY (for example, FY2006).
• “Billion” means a thousand million; “trillion” means a thousand billion.
• “Basis points” refer to hundredths of 1 percentage point (for example, 25 basis points are
equivalent to ¼ of 1 percentage point).
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Executive Summary
An already-stretched region faces yet further—potentially leading to food crises in some
another shock… countries—boost risk premiums, and weaken global
demand. Sub-Saharan Africa is also vulnerable to a
The economic recovery in sub-Saharan Africa surprised sharper-than-expected tightening in global monetary
on the upside in the second half of 2021, prompting conditions and a slowdown of growth in China
a significant upward revision in last year’s estimated and Europe. Locally, the slow vaccine rollout has
growth, from 3.7 to 4.5 percent. This year, however, left many countries vulnerable to new COVID-19
that progress has been jeopardized. waves and could favor the emergence of new variants.
Ongoing security risks and conflicts may weigh on
The Russian invasion of Ukraine has triggered a global economic growth. And the region remains highly
economic shock that is hitting the region at a time exposed to increasingly frequent—and increasingly
when countries’ policy space to respond is minimal severe—climate-related shocks.
to nonexistent. Most notably, surging oil and food
prices are straining the external and fiscal balances of Three immediate priorities for a constrained
commodity-importing countries and have increased and increasingly complex policy outlook
food security concerns in many countries. High food
prices will disproportionately harm the most vulnerable Besides accelerating the vaccination campaign to protect
segments of the population, especially in urban areas. the region from new COVID-19 waves, policymakers
face three policy priorities.
Moreover, the shock threatens to compound some of
the region’s most pressing policy challenges, including I. Balancing inflation versus growth.
the COVID-19 pandemic’s social and economic legacy, The increase in commodity prices due to the war
climate change, heightened security risks in the Sahel, in Ukraine, especially for food and energy, has
and the ongoing tightening of monetary policy in the compounded recent inflationary pressures in many
United States. countries. Since output levels remain well below
pre-pandemic trends in most countries, central banks
Because of this, the growth momentum for the region are facing a difficult balancing act between curbing
has weakened. Economic activity this year is expected inflation and supporting growth. To navigate this
to expand by 3.8 percent, held down by weaker growth trade-off, central banks will need to monitor price
prospects in oil-importing countries. developments carefully, stand ready to increase rates
if inflation expectations drift up, guard against the
The economic recovery is expected to accelerate in financial stability risks posed by higher interest
2023, with growth trending at about 4 percent over the rates, and maintain a credible policy framework
medium term. But this pace of growth is not enough to underpinned by strong central bank independence and
make up for lost ground from the pandemic and renders clear communication. Some have started to increase
the region’s Sustainable Development Goals significantly interest rates already, and more tightening may be
more difficult to achieve. The pandemic has also left needed in many cases.
deep social scars, illustrated starkly by the increase in the
number of people living in extreme poverty. Prolonged II. Addressing the economic impact of the war in
school closures have also imposed severe costs on Ukraine without adding to debt vulnerabilities.
students, curtailing their education, undermining their The fallout from the war in Ukraine is hitting the
lifetime productivity, and weighing on sub-Saharan region at a time when fiscal space is extremely limited.
Africa’s medium-term prospects. Public debt ratios are now at their highest levels since
the beginning of the century, and many low-income
… and a more uncertain outlook� countries are either in debt distress or close to it.
Therefore, the fiscal policy response needs to be carefully
Looking ahead, policymakers will need to navigate calibrated and targeted at protecting the most vulnerable
exceptional uncertainty with fewer policy options households from rising food and energy prices without
and little room for error. Internationally, a prolonged adding to debt vulnerabilities.
war in Ukraine may increase commodity prices
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In commodity-importing countries, especially those may be needed in some countries to support exchange
facing tighter fiscal constraints, finding resources to rates, even in the face of weak economic activity.
protect the vulnerable will require a significant reprioriti-
zation of spending, for example, by eliminating wasteful Beyond the crisis: toward strong, inclusive,
subsidies to state-owned enterprises. In commodity- and sustainable growth
exporting countries, higher commodity prices can
generate sizable fiscal windfalls but only if governments Looking beyond the pandemic and current geopolitical
contain expenditures on energy subsidies. Most of these tensions, creating jobs and meeting the Sustainable
gains should, in turn, be used to rebuild policy buffers, Development Goals will require strong, inclusive, and
especially in countries with elevated fiscal vulnerabilities. sustainable growth in sub-Saharan Africa. To this end,
decisive policy action is needed to enhance economic
Looking beyond immediate needs, most countries diversification, unleash the private sector’s potential,
will need to pursue fiscal consolidation to reduce and address the challenges posed by climate change.
debt vulnerabilities and lay the ground for stronger
and more sustainable medium-term growth. This will Many countries in the region continue to remain highly
require improving revenue mobilization and increasing dependent on commodity exports, experiencing as a
the efficiency of public spending in the context of consequence more volatile output and lower economic
credible medium-term fiscal frameworks. Importantly, growth. Thus, greater economic diversification is
fiscal consolidation measures should protect the essential. To this end, commodity exporters should take
weaker segments of the population and prioritize advantage of rising commodity prices to strengthen the
development needs. credibility of their macroeconomic frameworks, improve
the investment climate, and consider using targeted
Navigating this complex path will be difficult and sectoral interventions in case of market failures.
many countries will require international support. The
allocation of $23 billion of IMF special drawing rights Lifting potential growth also requires leveraging the
(SDRs) in 2021 to the region has provided critical help full potential of the private sector. For example, a
to strengthen external positions and finance urgent successful implementation of the African Continental
expenditures during the pandemic. The Group of Free Trade Area would greatly boost regional growth
Twenty’s pledge to channel $100 billion in SDRs to and competitiveness. Public authorities should also
vulnerable countries is another important step. But the explore new financing channels to boost private
international community should go further, for example, investment, for example by providing transparent and
by removing obstacles to the implementation of the well-designed infrastructure incentives in collaboration
Common Framework and allowing for swift and efficient with international development finance institutions.
debt restructurings where needed. Digitalization also provides important opportunities
coupled with new challenges and risks. For example,
III. Managing exchange rate adjustment. many countries are exploring the possible adoption
Monetary tightening in the United States and rising of central bank digital currencies to enhance financial
risk premiums associated with the war in Ukraine, have inclusion, lower the cost of remittances, and offer
placed downward pressure on exchange rates across the an alternative to private cryptocurrencies that could
region. For pegged currencies, authorities should find otherwise weaken monetary transmission.
the right balance between monetary and fiscal policy
to maintain the credibility of the peg. For countries Finally, climate change poses extreme challenges for
with more flexible arrangements, depreciation may help the region given its exposure to weather-related disasters
buffer the effects of global tightening. But even for these and the reliance on rain-fed agriculture. Investment in
latter countries, difficult decisions may lie ahead. For adaptation is thus of paramount importance. But the
many, there are clear limits to the near-term benefits green transition also provides new opportunities for
of exchange rate depreciation, given sizable currency sub-Saharan Africa given its potential for renewable
mismatches and pass-through to inflation. A targeted energy. International financial support will be critical to
use of foreign exchange intervention may help to lean help the region finance the cost of adaptation, seize the
against excessive exchange rate movements but the scope opportunities offered by the green transition, and ensure
for intervention is often constrained by low levels of fair and affordable access to energy.
international reserves. Therefore, monetary tightening
vI INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND | APRIL 2022 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND | APRIL 2022 vII
A New Shock and Little Room to Maneuver
YET ANOTHER SHOCK …and clouded the global economic outlook�
Since the publication of the Regional Economic Even before the war in Ukraine, inflationary pressures
Outlook: Sub-Saharan Africa in October 2021, in major advanced economies proved stronger and
sub-Saharan Africa has experienced a series of adverse more persistent than expected. With the added
shocks. The Russian invasion of Ukraine has shaken momentum of rising commodity prices, monetary
global commodity markets, added to geopolitical tightening in advanced economies is proceeding at a
tensions, and compounded the region’s already- faster rate than anticipated a few months ago and is
difficult policy outlook—which included the ongoing leading to a considerable increase in sovereign yields
monetary tightening in advanced economies, the (Figure 2). Rising yields also reflect increased risk
vulnerability to new waves of COVID-19 infections premiums from worsening geopolitical tensions, which
because of low vaccination rates, and political have combined to reduce portfolio inflows into the
instability and security risks in many countries. region and put downward pressure on most exchange
rates.
The Russian invasion of Ukraine has destabilized
global commodity markets��� Sub-Saharan Africa also faces headwinds from lower
demand from key trading partners because of the
The war has prompted a surge in commodity prices global activity slowdown. Economic growth in the
by disrupting energy and food exports from Russia United States is expected to be 1.5 percent lower in
and Ukraine (Figure 1). Although this may result in 2022 relative to the October 2021 forecast because of
a windfall gain for some large commodity exporters, less fiscal stimulus and tighter monetary conditions.
rising commodity prices are undermining fiscal and The economic outlook has deteriorated also in the
external balances in commodity-importing countries, euro area and in China, with downward revisions to
while also threatening food security and energy 2022 growth of about 1.5 and 1.2 percentage points,
affordability for their most vulnerable populations. In respectively.
this context, several countries are highly dependent
on wheat imports with a few of them sourcing a large Domestically, a slow vaccination rollout has left the
proportion of these imports directly from Ukraine region exposed���
and Russia (see Special Focus, page 2). In addition,
higher fertilizer and oil prices will increase the costs for The Omicron variant drove a fourth pandemic
harvesting, transporting, and processing food, putting wave that hit sub-Saharan Africa at the end of 2021
further upward pressure on food prices. (Figure 3). Confirmed cases rose very rapidly, reaching
the highest level since the beginning of the pandemic.
(Percent)
Figure 1� Commodity Prices, 2005–22 Figure 2� Sub-Saharan Africa: Sovereign Yields, 2019–22
(Percent)
(Index, 2016= 100) (US$ per barrel)
14
200 150
SSA Average
12
150 340bps
10
100
8
100
6 250bps
50
50 4 EMBIG
Food price index (left scale)
WTI oil price (right scale) 2
0 0 Jan-19 Jul-19 Jan-20 Jul-20 Jan-21 Jul-21 Jan-22
Jan-05 Jan-10 Jan-15 Jan-20
Sources: Bloomberg Finance L.P.; and IMF staff calculations.
Source: IMF, Primary Commodity Price System. Notes: EMBIG = J.P. Morgan Emerging Market Bond Index Global,
Note: WTI = West Texas Intermediate. SSA = sub-Saharan Africa.
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND | APRIL 2022 1
REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
SPECIAL FOCUS: SPILLOVERS FROM THE WAR IN UKRAINE
The war has increased the global prices of key commodities. Sub-Saharan Focus Figure 1� Global Food Prices, 2021–22
Africa’s direct links with Russia and Ukraine are relatively modest, making (Index, February 22, 2022 = 100)
up less than 2½ percent of the region’s total trade with the outside world.
175
The war will nonetheless affect the region through its effect on global
commodity prices. For the region’s 8 net oil exporters, higher energy prices
will represent a windfall gain. And exporters of other key commodities 150 Wheat
(copper, gold, diamonds, palladium) may also benefit from higher prices
and increased sales. But for the region’s remaining 37 non-oil-exporting 125
countries, higher oil and gas prices will result in a significant negative
terms-of-trade shock—which will worsen trade balances, increase transport
100
and living costs, and deteriorate fiscal balances, particularly for those Rice
with fuel subsidies. For oil importers, the crisis is expected to increase Maize
the region’s import bill by almost $19 billion. In addition, oil importing 75
Sep-21 Dec-21 Feb-22
fragile countries are expected to experience a 0.8 percent deterioration
of their fiscal balances (compared to the October 2021 forecast), twice Sources: Bloomberg Finance L.P.; and IMF staff
calculations.
the average of all oil importing countries.
A protracted conflict could further drive up global food prices (Focus Figure Focus Figure 2� Sub-Saharan Africa: Top 8 Wheat Importers
1). This is a particular concern—sub-Saharan Africa imports about 85 (Millions of US dollars, Numbers in parenthesis = percent from Russia/
Ukraine, data from 2020 or latest available.)
percent of its wheat and some countries source a large proportion of their
Tanzania (70)
imports directly from either Russia or Ukraine, making them particularly 3,000
Côte d’Ivoire (18)
vulnerable to disruptions in supply (Focus Figure 2). Foodstuffs comprise
40 percent of the region’s consumption basket, and imports represent Senegal (51)
a key hedge against local harvest shortfalls. In this context, the direct Mozambique (30)
pass-through of global food prices to domestic food prices is relatively 2,000
Angola (6)
high, at over 30 percent. Moreover, the indirect pass-through of global oil Other
prices to domestic food prices can also be sizable, especially for countries
Ethiopia (31)
(Ethiopia, Kenya) where imports of staples are significant. Further, Russia
is a key producer of fertilizers and natural gas (a key input to fertilizer 1,000
production), so an extended conflict will likely lift overall agricultural costs. Kenya (33)
Russia
Higher food inflation will add to food insecurity and social tensions.
South Africa (28)
Almost two-thirds of the region’s calories come from cereals (maize, rice, 0 Ukraine
and wheat) and starchy roots (cassava, yams, and sweet potatoes), so rising
Sources: United Nations COMTRADE; and IMF staff
wheat prices are especially concerning—even before the war in Ukraine, calculations.
the number of undernourished people had more than doubled in 2021
to almost one-quarter of the population in the wake of the COVID-19
Focus Figure 3� Sub-Saharan Africa: Dependence on Food
pandemic. Further food price increases will hurt the most vulnerable and Imports, Top 10, 2019
may add to social tensions, particularly in fragile and conflict-affected (Percent of daily calories consumed, red = fragile and conflict-
affected state, data from 2020 or latest available)
states (Focus Figure 3). Food security is already a critical issue across
Botswana
the Sahel, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Madagascar.
Eswatini
The war may affect global financial conditions beyond commodity prices.
Lesotho
Rising uncertainty could disrupt capital flows at a time they are needed
Mauritius
most. And a risk-off shock could trigger capital outflows—markets would
Cabo Verde
likely differentiate according to existing vulnerabilities, but most would
São Tomé & Príncipe
face increased borrowing costs and exchange rate pressures.
Seychelles
Wheat
Some countries may, however, benefit over the medium-term from
The Gambia Rice
European energy diversification efforts. For example, Nigeria, Senegal,
Senegal Maize
Mozambique, and Tanzania have the largest proven natural gas reserves in
Benin
the region. These countries may face stronger export demand from Europe,
especially given the EU’s recent decision to classify gas as sustainable. 0 20 40 60
Sources: Food and Agriculture Organization; and IMF
Sources: Food and AgricultureOrganization; and IMF staff calculations.
staff calculations.
2 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND | APRIL 2022
Figure 3.Sub-Saharan Africa: COVID-19 Cases and Deaths A NEW SHOCK AND LITTLE ROOM TO MANEUVER
(Seven-day moving average) Figure 5. Sub-Saharan Africa: Coups, 1990–2022
(Number of attempted and successful coups per year, by decade)
Figure 3� Sub-Saharan Africa: COVID-19 Cases and Deaths Figure 5� Sub-Saharan Africa: Coups, 1990–2022
(Seven-day moving average) (Number of attempted and successful coups per year, by decade)
50,000 800 4
New cases
(left scale)
40,000
New deaths 600 3
(right scale)
30,000
400 2
20,000
10,000 200 1
0 0 0
Jan-00 Jul-00 Feb-01 Aug-01 Mar-02 1990–99 2000–09 2010–19 2020–22
Sources: Coups d’état, 1950 to Present (Jonathan Powell and Clayton
Sources: Our World in Data; and IMF staff calculations.
Thyne); and IMF staff calculations.
However, the variant proved to be relatively less severe, than 45 percent of their populations, underscoring the
resulting in fewer deaths than in previous waves and ongoing disparity in global vaccination levels.
requiring less stringent lockdown measures.
���while several countries face security threats�
The vaccination campaign has accelerated in recent
months because of an increased vaccine supply and The region has experienced an increase in the
progress with distribution (Box 1). For example, five prevalence of political instability and military coups
countries (Botswana, Cabo Verde, Mauritius, Rwanda, in recent years (Figure 5). Since August 2020,
Seychelles) reached the IMF-proposed 40 percent military forces have assumed control in four countries
vaccination rate for 2021 by drawing on diversified (Burkina Faso, Chad, Guinea, Mali), and coups
vaccine sources, well-trained health staff, and have been attempted in two others (Guinea-Bissau,
coordinated efforts among health officials, government Niger). Regional and international sanctions have
officials, and the private sector. been imposed on several of these countries, which
could constrain their access to finance and curtail their
However, vaccination rates remain inadequate in growth prospects.
most countries. As of early April, only 12 percent of
the population is fully vaccinated across the region The region is also confronting several armed conflicts
(Figure 4). This falls well short of the 70 percent and terrorist threats, including in Burkina Faso, the
vaccination target for mid-2022 set in the IMF Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic
proposal (Agarwal and Gopinath 2021). Furthermore, of the Congo, Ethiopia, Mali, Niger, and Nigeria.
the pace of vaccination is still much slower than In Ethiopia, hostilities escalated in November. The
Figure 4. Selected Economies:Fully Vaccinated
in the rest of the world. For example, advanced intensity of the fighting has since declined, but
Persons
economies have already provided boosters to more prospects for a peace agreement are still uncertain.
(Percent of population)
Figure 4� Selected Economies: Fully Vaccinated Persons
(Percent of population) AN UNCERTAIN AND INSUFFICIENT
80 AEs ECONOMIC RECOVERY
AEs boosters
Non-SSA EMDEs
60
SSA
After Gaining Momentum in 2021, the
40 Recovery Is at Risk
20 GDP outturns for the third quarter of 2021 were
generally stronger than expected. High-frequency
0 indicators suggest that economic activity moderated
Jan-21 Apr-21 Jul-21 Oct-21 Jan-22 Apr-22
in the fourth quarter of 2021 but was largely resilient
Sources: Our World in Data; and IMF staff calculations. to the spread of the Omicron variant (Figure 6).
Note: AEs = Advanced Economies, Non-SSA EMDEs = non-sub-
Therefore, projected real GDP growth in sub-Saharan
Saharan African emerging market and developing economies,
SSA = sub-Saharan Africa. Africa for 2021 has been revised upward significantly
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND | APRIL 2022 3
REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
Figure 6� Sub-Saharan Africa: Real GDP Growth
downward revisions of about 0.4 percentage point.
(Rolling quarterly growth, year-on-year, percent)
Among the oil importers, downgrades are more
10
pronounced for fragile states, with 2022 growth being
marked down by 0.5 percentage point.
5
The commodity price shock is also having highly
0 asymmetric effects on government revenues and fiscal
balances across the region (Figure 8). In oil-exporting
–5 countries, 2022 fiscal revenues have been revised up
Actual by 2.1 percentage points of GDP. Exporters of other
Nowcast commodities are also expected to receive revenue gains,
–10
Dec-18 Jun-19 Dec-19 Jun-20 Dec-20 Jun-21 Dec-21 though more modest. But the impact of these gains on
fiscal balances is much more muted, because of higher
Sources: Haver Analytics; IMF internal databases; and IMF staff
calculations. expenditures on energy subsidies. Non-resource-
relative to the October 2021 forecast, from 3.7 to intensive countries will instead see their fiscal balances
4.5 percent (Figure 7). Looking at different country deteriorate considerably.
groups, Ethiopia is driving the large upward revision
for non-resource-intensive countries—its economy Looking at the region’s largest economies and country
fared better than expected despite multiple shocks groups:
(pandemic, conflict, and locust infestation). In
tourism-dependent countries, however, 2021 growth • South Africa’s growth slowed in the second half
was revised downward because the pandemic has of 2021 after a relatively strong performance in
continued to weigh on their economic recovery. the first half of the year. The third COVID-19
wave and the July unrest weighed on growth in
The commodity price shock following the Russian the third quarter and were only partially offset by
invasion of Ukraine has stalled the positive a rebound in the fourth quarter. After the 2021
momentum in the region’s economic recovery, rebound associated with the lifting of lockdowns,
with aggregate growth for 2022 expected to soften growth is expected to slow down to a modest
to 3.8 percent. Aggregate numbers mask strong 1.9 percent in 2022, held down by structural
heterogeneity across the region (Figure 7). Growth constraints (including in the electricity sector)
for oil exporters in 2022 has been revised up by and tighter global financial conditions. Without
0.8 percentage point (compared to the October fiscal adjustment, public debt is projected to grow
2021 forecast), although security challenges and steadily in the coming years, reaching 83.7 percent
aging infrastructure constrain oil supply. But growth of GDP by 2026. Increasing potential growth
prospects for oil importers have deteriorated, with and maintaining debt sustainability hinges on the
Figure 7� Sub-Saharan Africa: Revisions to Real GDP Growth Figure 8� Sub-Saharan Africa: Revisions to Fiscal Projections
for 2021 and 2022 for 2022
(Percent, difference from October 2021 forecast) (Percent of GDP, difference from October 2021 forecast)
2021. From 3.7 to 4.5
Revenue Excluding Grants
Non-resource-intensive countries Revenue Excluding Grants
Other resource-intensive countries
Other resource-intensive countries
Other resource-intensive countries
Oil exporters
Sub-Saharan Africa
Oil exporters
Tourism-dependent countries Non-resource-intensive countries
Non-resource-intensive countries
Oil exporters 10 15 20
Overall Balance Excluding Grants 10 15 20
2 3 4 5 6 7 Overall Balance Excluding Grants
2022. From 3.8 to 3.8 Other resource-intensive countries
Tourism-dependent countries Other resource-intensi O ve il e co xp u o n r tr te ie r s s
Non-resource-intensive countries Oil exporters
Non-resource-intensive countries
Sub-Saharan Africa Non-resource-intensive countries
−6 −5 −4
Oil exporters
−6 −5 −4
Other resource-intensive countries
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook database.
2 3 4 5 6 7
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook database.
4 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND | APRIL 2022
A NEW SHOCK AND LITTLE ROOM TO MANEUVER
timely implementation of credible fiscal policies High food and commodity prices and elevated
and structural reforms, including on the product debt risks also cloud the outlook. The country is
market regulatory framework, labor market highly dependent on wheat imports from Russia
flexibility, management of state-owned enterprises and Ukraine, adding pressure on food prices.
(SOEs), and acceleration of the energy transition. Although medium-term growth prospects are
better, uncertainty is very high because of internal
• Nigeria’s growth outlook has improved through conflict and global geopolitical tensions.
higher oil prices and a stronger-than-anticipated
recovery of manufacturing and agriculture. • Tourism-dependent countries face a particularly
Growth is expected to reach 3.4 percent in challenging recovery. International travel faces
2022, falling back to 2.9 percent from 2024 a longer recovery path than other sectors. Many
onwards. The outlook is subject to high tourism-dependent countries experienced a
uncertainty associated with oil prices and financial short-term setback in their recovery with the
conditions. Moreover, low vaccination rates, emergence of the Omicron variant. Some
rising security risks, and elevated price pressures countries have fared better because of significant
weigh negatively on the medium-term growth remittance inflows (Comoros, The Gambia) or
outlook. Diversification away from oil will be rapid vaccination rollout (Seychelles). Still, others
critical to raise growth potential sustainably and face persistent income losses as large as 15 percent
reduce volatility. of GDP (Cabo Verde, Mauritius).
• Angola grew 0.7 percent in 2021, reversing a • Fragile economies’ economic growth is expected
five-year long recession streak. The country to accelerate marginally from 4.6 percent in 2021
could not take full advantage of high oil prices to 4.8 percent in 2022—a much more modest
because of recurring technical problems and low acceleration than expected in October 2021.
investment affecting oil production. Growth is Furthermore, the outlook has significant downside
expected to accelerate to 3 percent in 2022, with risks. Many countries—particularly in the Sahel—
non-oil sectors (agriculture, construction, and face ongoing security challenges and political
transportation) as the main drivers of growth. In instability, coupled with regional and international
the medium-term, growth could gradually reach sanctions. Food security concerns have increased
4 percent because of high oil prices and the strong greatly because of the rapid rise of food prices,
performance of non-oil sectors. Key risks to this which exacerbates risks of social unrest. In
outlook include high inflation (especially food) addition, rising inflation and limited fiscal space
and continued oil production problems. constrain policy options further.
• Ethiopia’s growth is expected to slow down from Looking beyond 2022, sub-Saharan Africa is expected
6.3 percent in FY2021 to 3.8 percent in FY2022 to grow slightly above 4 percent (or 1.8 percent in
because of the intensified military conflict in the per capita terms). This is far short of the pace needed
first half of the fiscal year, the lingering effects for the region to recoup the output losses from the
of the pandemic amid low vaccination rates, pandemic (Figure 9). Indeed, per capita incomes
and the spillovers from the war in Ukraine. are expected to remain more than 4 percent below
Figure 9� Selected Regions: Real GDP Per Capita, 2019–26
(2019 = 100, dashed lines indicate pre-pandemic projections)
20
110 110 20
1 S 1 u 0 b-Saha S ra u n b - A S f a ri h c a a ran Africa 1 A 1 d 0 vanced A e d c v o a n n o c m ed ie e s conomies 21 21
22
22
105 105 23
105 105 23
24
24
25
100 100 100 100 26 25
26
95 95 95 95
2019 2019 21 21 23 23 25 25 2019 2019 21 21 23 23 25 25
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook database.
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND | APRIL 2022 5
REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
pre-pandemic projections. Further, with output in poorer households that spend a much larger fraction
advanced economies expected to reach their pre-pan- of their income on food. This is prompting growing
demic trend in the near term, the gap between the concerns about food insecurity in several countries
region and advanced economies that was opened by (Chad, Eritrea, Democratic Republic of the Congo,
the COVID-19 crisis is likely to persist. Madagascar, South Sudan). In some countries, food
insecurity is combining with slow and uneven job
The Pandemic Has Left Deep Social Scars prospects to undermine political stability.
Sub-Saharan Africa was struggling to create job
opportunities for its growing workforce even before RISKS ARE TILTED TO THE DOWNSIDE
the pandemic. But COVID-19 has undermined
labor markets further, especially in contact-intensive A continuation of the war in Ukraine and prolonged
sectors, which employ relatively more vulnerable restrictions on exports from Russia could place
groups, including women and low-skilled workers additional upward pressure on food and energy prices.
(Aslam and others 2021). Consequently, the long-term This would weigh heavily on the region’s commodity-
trend of decreasing poverty that had previously taken importing countries, exacerbating food insecurity,
hold in the region has reversed, and 39 million more fueling social tensions, and placing the heaviest
people fell into extreme poverty in 2020 and 2021 burden on vulnerable populations. An escalation in
(Lakner and others 2020; World Bank 2022). In geopolitical tensions between Russia and Western
parallel, inequality worsened across income groups countries could also increase global risk aversion and
and subnational regions, increasing the risk of social raise borrowing costs, especially for countries with
tension and political instability. The sharp increase in more precarious fiscal positions.
food prices due to the war in Ukraine has the potential
to further dramatically increase poverty and inequality Sub-Saharan Africa is also vulnerable to an
across the region. acceleration in the pace of monetary tightening in
advanced economies. For example, an unexpected
The pandemic has also harmed much-needed human 25-basis-points increase in the US 10-year rate could
capital accumulation because of prolonged school lower regionwide growth by about 0.25 percentage
closures. Schools in sub-Saharan Africa closed for point, through higher borrowing costs and weaker
128 days, on average, between February 2020 and external demand (Box 2). No country would be
October 2021—much longer than in advanced immune to such a shock, but frontier economies and
economies, where closures lasted about 84 days resource-intensive countries are particularly exposed.
(Figure 10). Longer school closures in Africa will The region is also vulnerable to a slowdown in
continue to widen the gap in learning outcomes and China, which accounts for more than 20 percent of
weigh on medium-term growth. sub-Saharan Africa’s exports.
Rapidly rising global food prices—reaching the On the domestic front, low vaccination rates continue
highest levels in more than a decade—have aggravated to expose sub-Saharan Africa to the risk of new
social tensions. The impact is particularly acute on COVID-19 waves. Additionally, the continued
existence of a large pool of unvaccinated people
Figure 10� Sub-Saharan Africa: Human Capital Divergence
increases the risk of new variants, threatening lives and
600 livelihoods in the region and beyond.
500 Downside risks may also materialize if sub-Saharan
Africa’s security situation continues to deteriorate. The
400 baseline projections assume a gradual de-escalation of
political and military tensions across the region. But if
300 political instability and security risks persist or worsen,
the economic outlook could deteriorate significantly.
200 For example, active conflicts tend to reduce economic
0 100 200 300 400 500 activity in affected countries by about 2.5 percent on
average and can trigger significant negative spillovers
on neighboring countries (Box 3).
Sources: Angrist and others, 2021; and United Nations Educational,
Scientific and Cultural Organization.
6 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND | APRIL 2022
gninrael
dezinomrah
cimednap-erP
71–0002
,)OLH(
semoctuo
Figure 10. Sub-Saharan Africa:Human Capital Divergence
Advanced economies
Sub-Saharan Africa
Number of fully closed school days,
February 2020–October 2021
Sources: Angrist et al, 2021; and United Nations Educational, Scientific and
Cultural Organization.
A NEW SHOCK AND LITTLE ROOM TO MANEUVER
Figure 11� Selected Regions: Extreme Disasters since 1990
Sub-Saharan Africa is also highly exposed to
(Average percentage of population affected in a year)
climate-related shocks, including droughts, storms,
2.0
and floods (Figure 11). These are becoming more
frequent and more severe and have a particular 1.6 Droughts Storms Floods
impact on the region’s growth prospects, given its
reliance on agriculture and limited resources for 1.2
post-disaster relief.
0.8
0.4
COMPLEX CHOICES WITH FEWER
OPTIONS 0.0
SSA EMDEs AEs
Sources: EM-DAT, the International Disaster Database; and IMF staff
Accelerating the vaccination campaign to reduce the calculations.
Note: A disaster is considered extreme if the total number of deaths plus
risk of new COVID-19 waves and the emergence
30 percent of the total affected population make up at least 1 percent
of new variants remains critical and will require of the entire population of the country. SSA = sub-Saharan Africa,
EMDEs = emerging market and developing economies, AEs = advanced
both domestic and global efforts. On the domestic
economies.
front, countries should continue to address logistical
challenges and undertake communication campaigns staple in a number of countries, including Ethiopia,
to counter vaccine hesitancy. Furthermore, several Kenya, Mozambique, Senegal, and Tanzania.
countries are poised to invest in vaccine manufacturing
facilities (Georgieva 2022). The international But the experience across the region has been far
community should ensure steady and predictable from uniform, suggesting an important role for local
vaccine donations and help the poorest countries factors. Although bumper crops in some countries
finance the purchase of additional doses. Beyond have helped to keep food prices moderate, drought
increasing vaccination rates, investing in therapeutics, in the Horn of Africa (Ethiopia and parts of Kenya)
testing, and epidemiological surveillance is key to and conflicts (particularly in the Sahel) have affected
bolstering the resilience of local health systems. food production and prices adversely. Countries with
greater reliance on food imports are facing more
Besides controlling the pandemic, the region faces price pressures because of higher global food prices.
three pressing policy priorities: containing ongoing Inflationary pressures have also been stronger in
inflationary pressures without unduly undermining those countries that experienced larger depreciations.
growth, protecting vulnerable groups in the population Buoyed oil prices have helped ease exchange rate
from the surge in energy and food prices without pressures and associated inflation in oil exporters while
adding to debt vulnerabilities, and managing exchange pushing up energy prices and inflation in oil importers
rate adjustments in response to tightening global (Figure 13). Although inflation has been better
monetary conditions. anchored and more subdued historically in countries
with pegged exchange rate regimes, price pressures
I� Balancing Inflation Versus Growth have also picked up but remain modest (Côte d’Ivoire,
Guinea-Bissau, Togo).
Inflation has increased considerably, influenced by both
Figure 12� Sub-Saharan Africa: Inflation Rates, 2005–22
international and domestic factors.
(Percent, year-on-year)
25 Interquartile range for CPI inflation
Most countries in the region have seen significant
Food inflation
inflationary pressures over the past year, affecting 20 CPI inflation
Non-food inflation
both food items—about 40 percent of the region’s
consumption basket—and non-food items (Figure 12). 15
Global factors have contributed strongly, for example,
via high commodity prices, droughts and export 10
restrictions in major food exporters, and global supply
5
shortages (Choi 2021). The war in Ukraine has
exacerbated these pressures through even higher oil
0
and food prices, particularly of wheat—an important 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019 2021
Sources: Haver Analytics; and IMF staff calculations.
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND | APRIL 2022 7
REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
Figure 13� Sub-Saharan Africa: Median CPI Inflation
pressures that would fuel inflation in sub-Saharan
(Percent, year-on-year)
Africa. Persistent supply bottlenecks could also increase
20
Median international prices of food and manufactured goods,
16 Interquartilerange affecting countries with a high reliance on imports
12 (Seychelles, South Sudan). Given shrinking fiscal space
8 and large spending needs, central banks in the region
4 may also face political pressure to monetize some of
0 the debt or keep a looser monetary stance for longer,
Dec-20 Feb-22 Dec-20 Feb-22 Dec-20 Feb-22 Dec-20 Feb-22 which would result in higher inflation relative to
Oil exporters Oil importers Countries Countries with current projections.
without exchange rate
exchange rate pegs
Trading off inflation and growth.
pegs
Sources: IMF, Information Notice System; and IMF, World Economic Economic activity in most countries remains well
Outlook database.
below the pre-pandemic trend. Therefore, inflationary
Inflation is expected to gradually decline but risks pressures pose a difficult trade-off for central banks
remain. looking to restrain inflation without compromising
the recovery. Several central banks (Angola, Ghana,
Inflation for the region is expected to remain elevated Rwanda, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Zambia) have
in 2022 at 12.2 percent and then gradually come started to increase rates because of inflationary
down to 9.6 percent in 2023—revised up by 3.6 pressures, and monetary policy for the CEMAC
and 2.5 percentage points, respectively, from the region has also been tightened to support the external
October 2021 forecasts (Figure 14). However, there position amid falling reserves (Figure 15).
is significant heterogeneity across the region. For
example, inflation is expected to be below 4 percent Central banks should continue to monitor inflationary
in the Central African Economic and Monetary pressures carefully and guard against the risk that
Community (CEMAC) region in 2022. The decline current increases in food and energy prices may
in inflation next year is projected to be broad-based, de-anchor inflation expectations. To fend off these
reflecting an expected easing of global and local supply risks, additional tightening might be needed in
challenges, and the likely responses of the region’s countries facing rising inflation, even if output
central banks in the event that inflationary pressures remains below potential. Rate hikes may also need to
strengthen even more. be coupled with tightening in financial regulations
that may have been relaxed during the pandemic. In
But there are significant risks to the inflation outlook. countries where inflationary pressures are more muted
An escalation of the war in Ukraine can push oil or less persistent, monetary policy can continue to
and food prices even higher. Faster-than-anticipated remain accommodative. In all cases, it will be critical
monetary policy normalization in the United States to preserve the credibility of the monetary frameworks
and Europe could lead to stronger exchange rate
Figure 15� Sub-Saharan Africa: Output Loss and Inflation
Figure 14� Sub-Saharan Africa: CPI Inflation
(Percent, red dots indicate monetary tightening since June 2021)
(Percent, annual average)
70
13 ZWE
60
12
50
11
40 LSO 10 ETH –
30 AGO
9 RWA SLE NGA
20 ZMB
8 Oct. 2021 WEO MWI GHA CEMAC
MUS NAM BWA GIN BDI
Current WEO 10 BFA COD 7
0 SSD ZAF SWZ
6 –20 –15 –10 –5 0 5 10
2019 20 21 22 23
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook database.
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook database.
Note: WEO = World Economic Outlook.
Note: See page 27 for a list of country acronyms.
8 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND | APRIL 2022
1202
,doirep-fo-dne,noitalfni
IPC
Median inflation
Real GDP as percent of pre-COVID-19 projection for 2022
A NEW SHOCK AND LITTLE ROOM TO MANEUVER
and maintain clear communication. These are essential placing severe strains on debt sustainability in many
elements to enhance monetary transmission and thus countries. Moreover, the pandemic has worsened
reduce the need for aggressive monetary tightening. most countries’ fiscal position, pushing public debt
to its highest level since the beginning of the century.
As borrowing rates rise, central banks should also One-half of low-income countries in the region are in
be careful about emerging financial sector risk from debt distress or at high risk of distress (Figure 17), and
leveraged financial institutions, firms, and households. many have been left with little or no fiscal space at a
Similarly, banks’ exposure to government bonds needs time of elevated spending needs.
to be monitored carefully, given the potential for
adverse feedback loops between sovereign and bank The composition of creditors has also changed
distress, especially considering the recent deterioration markedly. Bilateral debt has shifted from Paris Club
in bank capitalization in several countries. members to non-Paris Club creditors, making debt
renegotiations more complicated. Furthermore, a
During this delicate period for monetary policy, it is growing pool of private creditors has largely financed
also important to buttress central bank independence the increase in public debt, reflecting the region’s
and capacity. Central banks’ objectives need to be deepening financial markets and improved access to
defined clearly within a context of forward-looking international markets. Domestic government debt
policy. Governments should avoid pressuring has increased from 15 percent of GDP in 2010 to
central banks to monetize fiscal spending or keep a 30 percent in 2020. Over the same period, external
more accommodative policy stance than otherwise public debt held by private entities has increased from
warranted by inflation pressures.1 An inappropriate 4 percent of GDP to 11 percent.
policy stance can undermine confidence in the
local currency, leading to runaway inflation and For policymakers in the region, access to domestic and
macroeconomic instability, and undermining short- foreign private markets presents both opportunities
and medium-term growth prospects. and challenges.
II� Addressing the Economic Impact of the • The ability to borrow domestically proved
War in Ukraine without Adding to Debt particularly helpful at the beginning of the
Vulnerabilities pandemic when many sub-Saharan African
countries lost access to international financial
Public debt has increased considerably, mostly financed markets. Domestic borrowing also provides
by private creditors. opportunities to limit the issuance of foreign
currency debt. But with a few notable exceptions
Figure 17. Sub-Saharan Africa: DebtRisk Status for
Sub-Saharan Africa’s public debt has increased steadily (Benin, Botswana, Ghana, Namibia, Nigeria,
PRGT Eligible Low-Income Developing Countries,
for more than a decade (Figure 16). This has helped South Africa), domestic maturities are relatively
2015–21
fund the region’s development needs but is now short and interest rates are high. Domestic
Figure 16� Sub-Saharan Africa: Composition of Public Debt, Figure 17� Sub-Saharan Africa: Debt Risk Status for PRGT
2010 and 2020 Eligible Low-Income Developing Countries, 2015–21
(Percent of GDP) (Number of countries)
60 Domestic 6 2 3 6 7 7 5 6
External bonds 7
Multilateral 9 9 9 12
40 Bilateral 14
Other
21 19
15 14 15
16
20 15
6 6 5 5 4 2
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
0
Low Moderate High Distress
2010 2020
Source: IMF, Debt Sustainability Analysis Low-Income Developing
Sources: World Bank, International Debt Statistics; IMF, World
Countries database.
Economic Outlook database; and IMF staff calculations.
Note: PRGT = poverty reduction and growth trust.
1 Hooley and others (2021) documents the adverse impact of central bank lending to government on the exchange rate and inflation
Source:IMF, Debt Sustainability Analysis Low-Income Developing
in sub-Saharan Africa.
Countries database.
Note: Debt risk ratings for Cabo Verde begins in in 2014, and South
Sudan in 2015. PRGT = poveINrtTyER rNeAdTIuONcAtiLo MnO NaEnTAdR Yg FrUoNwD t| hAP tRrILu 2s0t2.2 9
REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
borrowing has also increased bank holdings of most desirable response. Where this is not feasible,
sovereign bonds, in line with patterns seen in other countries may use targeted tax reductions or price
emerging markets (April 2022 Global Financial subsidies with clear sunset clauses to contain the rise
Stability Report). Sovereign bonds now amount in domestic food and energy prices. This could be
to almost 20 percent of bank assets and reach as justified in countries with weak social safety nets and
high as 40 percent in some countries (Figure 18). limited ability to scale up targeted cash transfers. If
At such levels, the sovereign’s fiscal health and well-designed and temporary, targeted tax reductions
the banking sector’s financial health are closely and price subsidies could protect households from
intertwined, giving rise to a tight sovereign-bank high price volatility, providing time for a more gradual
nexus whereby sovereign risk can severely impair adjustment. Measures such as price controls and
banks’ balance sheets, especially in countries with export restrictions should instead be avoided as they
weakly capitalized banks. lead to market distortions and could exacerbate supply
constraints domestically and internationally.
• Greater access to international capital markets has
also proved to be a mixed blessing. On the positive The policy response should consider the persistent
side, countries have been able to draw on much- nature of the commodity price shock, calling for a
needed financial resources at a time of declining careful use of limited fiscal resources and implying
official development assistance flows. However, that excessive shielding of domestic prices will
the substitution of low-cost, long-term multilateral eventually require a large adjustment. Furthermore, it
flows with higher-cost private funds has resulted should differentiate between countries, depending on
in a steep rise in external debt-service costs and economic and social conditions and on whether they
higher rollover risks (Figure 19). Furthermore, are commodity importers or exporters.
the reliance on foreign funds has prompted a
large increase in foreign-currency debt. Therefore, Net commodity importers will face strong pressures
the region is highly vulnerable to a tightening on fiscal balances. To support the vulnerable via
in global financial conditions and exchange rate targeted transfers and subsidies, countries will need
depreciations. to reprioritize spending, for example, by cutting
non-essential expenditure such as wasteful subsidies to
Cushioning the economy from the war in Ukraine SOEs. The fiscal adjustment will need to be stronger
without increasing debt vulnerabilities. in countries facing tighter financial constraints.
The war in Ukraine is thus hitting the region at a Net commodity exporters can receive fiscal windfalls
time when most countries have little to nonexistent only if they contain subsidy expenditures. For
fiscal space to buffer the shock. Consequently, fiscal example, some oil exporters provide expensive
policy needs to react in a targeted manner, aiming and generalized energy subsidies to the domestic
at protecting vulnerable segments of the population population which could lead to a deterioration in fiscal
from the increase in energy and food prices without balances despite the revenue increase associated with
adding to debt vulnerabilities. In this context, targeted higher export prices (Nigeria). Therefore, removing
and direct transfers to vulnerable households are the generalized subsidies is crucial to ensure that the rise
Figure 18� Sub-Saharan Africa: Banks’ Holdings of Figure 19� Sub-Saharan Africa: External Debt Service, 2010–21
Government Debt, 2015–21 (Percent of exports of goods and services)
2010
(Percent of total assets)
25 11
20
12
20 13
15 Interquartilerange 14
15
15
10
Median 16
10
17
5 5 18
19
0 0 20
2015 2019 2021 2010 12 14 16 18 20 21
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics. Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook database.
10 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND | APRIL 2022
A NEW SHOCK AND LITTLE ROOM TO MANEUVER
in commodity prices generates fiscal savings. It is Figure 20� Sub-Saharan Africa: Tax Revenues, 2018–25
then essential that these savings are directed largely (Simple average, percent of GDP, dashed lines = pre-COVID-19
projections.)
to strengthening fiscal sustainability supported by
2018
strong governance frameworks, given the precarious
Non-resource-intensivecountries
19
conditions faced by many countries. 18
20
Over the medium term, most countries will need to 21
continue fiscal consolidation in order to reduce debt 16 22
vulnerabilities and boost resilience while protecting 23
development spending. To this end, revenue 14 24
mobilization is a key priority. The pandemic has 25
derailed revenue mobilization efforts, especially in Resource-intensivecountries
12
resource-intensive countries (Figure 20). Authorities
2018 20 22 24
should now renew their tax reform efforts, aiming
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook database.
to lift revenues at least back to pre-pandemic levels.
As authorities consider the best way forward, • Monitor fiscal risks to avoid negative surprises.
they should look for innovative approaches to old Many countries should focus especially on the
problems, for example, by leveraging the potential transparency and management reform of SOEs
from digitalization to broaden tax bases, enhance tax (Kenya, South Africa).
fairness and taxpayer compliance, and improve tax
administration. Countries should also adopt credible medium-term
fiscal frameworks to ensure that sufficient resources
Revenue mobilization efforts should be complemented are available to meet debt-service obligations and
with measures to increase the efficiency of public broader spending needs. By raising trust in fiscal
spending and strengthen accountability. For example: sustainability, credible budget plans can reduce
borrowing costs by as much as 40 basis points
• Improve the targeting of public expenditure. (October 2021 Fiscal Monitor). Even countries
Digital delivery mechanisms, such as mobile without market access benefit from fiscal credibility
money or smart cards, could be used effectively for by attracting more private investment and fostering
this purpose, as demonstrated in Togo during the macroeconomic stability.
pandemic. Furthermore, many countries should
strengthen social safety nets to respond to future Strengthening debt management capacity is also an
shocks in a more targeted and transparent manner. important priority. Debt vulnerabilities can be reduced
effectively via credible medium-term debt strategies
• Enhance public investment management. During and proactive liability management, and by improving
the last two years, many countries postponed debt reporting, transparency, and communication. For
investments to prioritize health and social instance, public debt data in many countries continue
spending. As investment programs resume, to be incompletely reported or hidden through
countries will need to use their limited resources confidentiality clauses, limiting the effectiveness of
carefully and effectively to support green and debt management and complicating potential debt
resilient infrastructure investment, which is restructurings. Despite significant improvements in
found to be up to 12 times more cost-effective debt management in recent years, a recent report from
than frequent disaster relief (April 2020 Regional the World Bank found that 40 percent of low-income
Economic Outlook: Sub-Saharan Africa, Chapter 2). countries have not published sovereign debt data for
Given large investment needs, it is critical that more than two years (World Bank 2021).
investment projects are managed effectively
and transparently, with careful identification, Domestic consolidation needs to be accompanied by
preparation, prioritization, risk management, international support...
and integration into medium-term strategies and
financing frameworks. In addition, steps taken Local fiscal efforts are not sufficient to simultaneously
during the pandemic to increase transparency restore sustainable fiscal positions and meet essential
in procurement (including beneficial ownership spending and investment needs, given the size of the
information) should continue in order to mitigate shocks associated with the prolonged pandemic and
the risk of corruption. now with the war in Ukraine. To offset further scarring
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND | APRIL 2022 11
REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
(especially in human capital) and make renewed the official creditor composition of low-income
progress toward the Sustainable Development Goals countries is much more diverse than in the past, and
(SDGs), international support for the region remains that an effective debt treatment requires bringing all
essential. major official creditors to the table. The importance
of comparability of treatment among all creditors,
Sub-Saharan African countries received $23 billion including private creditors, remains a prerequisite
of IMF special drawing rights (SDRs) in 2021 for fair debt resolutions and a requirement of debt
which have helped strengthen external positions and treatments under the Common Framework.
support urgent spending needs. For example, several
countries have used part of their SDR allocation for However, the Common Framework has faced
essential social spending on pandemic-related needs significant implementation challenges. So far, progress
and education programs (Chad, The Gambia, Niger, has been slow for the three countries that have applied
Rwanda, and Sierra Leone). The region’s poorest for debt treatment under the Common Framework
and most vulnerable countries also received two (Chad, Ethiopia, Zambia), and they have experienced
years of debt-service relief through the Catastrophe delays in reaching tangible results. This calls for urgent
Containment and Relief Trust, ending in April 2022. improvements along several dimensions:
Looking ahead, the G20 has committed to channel
$100 billion of their SDR holdings to vulnerable • First, the Common Framework needs greater
countries, especially in Africa. This would be a major clarity on the steps, conditions, and timeline for
contribution to the region’s short-term liquidity needs effective debt relief. This is important to increase
and longer-term development. The SDRs could be the predictability of the process and improve
channeled through the IMF’s Poverty Reduction and coordination among stakeholders to avoid
Growth Trust or the newly created Resilience and protracted negotiations. There is also a need to
Sustainability Trust. To ensure that both domestic and strengthen the involvement of debtor countries
international funds are well spent, countries should and their interactions with creditors.
further increase transparency and accountability of
their public finances. Many have made efforts to • Second, to encourage faster resolution and broader
enhance reporting and audits on COVID-19-related participation, debt service payments should be
expenditure. This reform momentum should be suspended from the time an IMF-supported
maintained, including the use of digital innovations in program consistent with the Common Framework
public finance management. debt treatment is agreed to with IMF staff. This
would provide an incentive for debtor countries
For countries with the most pressing debt to request debt treatment and for creditors to be
vulnerabilities and particularly for fragile states, constructive during negotiations.
direct budget support through grant financing will
be critical. The IMF has recently published a new, • Finally, more work is needed on securing
comprehensive strategy to better support fragile and comparability of treatment among various
conflict-affected states (FCS). The strategy recognizes creditors. Coordinating many bondholders,
the risk that FCS may fall further behind other navigating contractual clauses, and dealing
countries in their post-pandemic recovery and fail to with non-cooperative creditors can be complex,
achieve the SDGs, unless their efforts to exit fragility especially for low-income countries with weaker
are supported by coordinated actions of development debt management capacity.
partners, including the IMF (IMF 2022a).
III� Managing Exchange Rate Adjustment
.. and a predictable and effective framework to reduce
The pandemic and the recent global financial
debt burdens where needed.
tightening have weighed on exchange rates in
sub-Saharan Africa…
For some countries, restoring debt sustainability will
require debt re-profiling or an outright restructuring
of their public debt. Recognizing that a timely and The COVID-19 crisis has generally weakened the
orderly debt resolution is in the interest of both region’s exchange rates. During the first year and a
debtors and creditors, the G20 has taken an important half of the pandemic, exchange rates depreciated on
step to facilitate the restructuring of official external average by about 10 percent against the US dollar
debt. The Common Framework acknowledges that (Figure 21), in line with elevated risk aversion and
12 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND | APRIL 2022
Figure 21. Sub-Saharan Africa: ExchangeRates,
A NEW SHOCK AND LITTLE ROOM TO MANEUVER
2019–22
(Versus US dollar, nominal index, end-2019 = 100)
Figure 21� Sub-Saharan Africa: Exchange Rates, 2019–22 Tightening global financial conditions and limited
(Versus US dollar, nominal index, end-2019 = 100) reserves will complicate policy trade-offs for countries
with both pegged and flexible exchange rate regimes.
110
WAEMU/CEMAC
105 Exchange rate regimes in the region vary greatly and
have evolved over time (Figure 23), consistent with
100
Otherresource-intensive a general result that there is no single regime that is
countries
95 preferred for all countries at all times. For sub-Saharan
Africa, half of the region’s economies maintain a
90 Depreciation Oil exporters pegged exchange-rate arrangement, and the other half
85 maintain more flexible arrangements. Intervention is
Non-resource-intensivecountries relatively common in the latter countries, with a trend
80 toward more managed frameworks in the years since
Dec-19 Jun-20 Dec-20 Jun-21 Dec-21
the global financial crisis.
Sources: Bloomberg Finance L.P.; IMF, World Economic Outlook
database; and IMF staff calculations.
In countries with a peg, exchange-rate policy will need
Sources:Bloomberg Finance L.P.; IMF, World Economic
volatile commodity prices and capital flows. However, to remain centered on finding the right policy mix
Outlook database; and IMF staff calculations.
exchange rate movements have differed widely from (including monetary and fiscal policy) consistent with
country to country and displayed considerable maintaining the credibility of the peg. This may entail
volatility. The South African rand, for example, taking steps to offset a sustained erosion of reserves, for
depreciated sharply at the onset of the crisis, but example, by tightening macroeconomic policy, despite
recovered most of that loss over the following year. a still-weak economic outlook.
Countries with firm pegs to the strengthening euro
(Cabo Verde, Comoros, CEMAC, São Tomé and In countries with more flexible arrangements, some
Príncipe, WAEMU) are also a notable exception, additional depreciation may help buffer the effects
given that their exchange rates appreciated against the of global financial tightening. But the benefits of
US dollar. flexibility are often circumscribed, particularly during
periods of global turmoil. For example, balance-sheet
The tightening of global financial conditions in mismatches, shallow financial markets, and limited
recent months has intensified exchange rate pressures hedging opportunities may increase the potential
for most countries. Oil exporters are an important impact of exchange-rate volatility on financial
exception. For example, in the final quarter of 2021, stability. Additionally, when the exchange-rate-pass-
Angola’s currency registered its strongest gain since through to domestic prices is high, imported inflation
1999, supported by rising oil prices, a credit-rating represents an added challenge for monetary policy
upgrade, and a significant tightening of monetary because it risks de-anchoring inflationary expectations
policy. For countries pegged to the euro, the previous and undermining the credibility of the authorities’
year’s appreciation against the US dollar has been monetary framework.
largely unwound.
Figure 22� Sub-Saharan Africa: International Reserves, 2021
(Months of imports)
… and left most countries with limited reserve buffers.
Efforts to offset exchange rate pressures in 2021 have 9
led to a drop in reserves in several countries. In this
context, the 2021 SDR allocation was most timely 3–5 months
by strengthening countries’ external positions besides 6
providing resources for urgent spending programs.
However, for a large portion of sub-Saharan Africa,
reserve levels remain far from comfortable (Figure 22). 3
For example, many countries are still short of the
standard import-cover benchmark—there is no unique
framework for assessing reserve adequacy, but import 0
cover is often the prime motive for maintaining Before SDR After SDR
reserves in the region and 3 to 5 months is a common Sources: IMF, World Economic Outlook database; and IMF staff
calculations.
standard (Shanz 2019; Jeanne and Sandri 2020). Note: SDR = special drawing rights
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND | APRIL 2022 13
REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
Figure 23� Sub-Saharan Africa: Exchange-Rate Regime, Figure 24� Selected Countries: Exchange Rate Overvaluation,
1980–2018 2017–20
(De facto classification, percent of countries) (Percent)
100
75 Sub-Saharan
Africa
50
25
Emerging
Markets
0
1980 1990 2000 2010 2018
Independent Managed Crawl
– 20 0 20 40 60
Basket Conventional Peg Hard Peg
Sources: IMF staff reports; and IMF staff calculations
Sources: Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Note: Based on IMF staff assessments of real effective exchange rates,
Restrictions database; and IMF staff calculations. excluding pegged currencies.
Therefore, even for countries with flexible arrange- Indeed, for most countries, the case for or against
ments, reserves will still be an integral part of the intervention is seldom straightforward (IMF 2022).
authorities’ policy tool kit because they provide policy
space to maintain internal price and financial stability On the one hand, shallow markets, often-weak
in the face of large exchange-rate swings. But with less monetary policy credibility, and high foreign-exchange
room to maneuver, many policymakers will need to liabilities are common features throughout the
use their resources carefully as shocks unfold. region, implying that large exchange rate movements
might risk de-anchoring inflation expectations and
For countries with limited reserves, authorities have undermining financial stability. In such circumstances,
sometimes offered favorable rates, including to specific foreign-exchange flexibility may act as a shock
sectors. But the resulting parallel market for foreign amplifier rather than a shock absorber. Moreover,
exchange (Nigeria, Zimbabwe) can weigh on growth— dominant foreign currency pricing—in which both
distorting investment, encouraging rent seeking, exports and imports are priced in a foreign currency—
and adding to uncertainty. The decision to return implies that the shock-absorber role is weakened in
to a more unified framework is often difficult, but many cases, as exchange-rate movements induce less
experience suggests that the shift to a market-clearing expenditure switching, although the quantitative
official rate is not in itself likely to lead to a sharp relevance of this aspect is still under examination.
increase in inflation, as prices in the real economy Intervention to smooth undue exchange rate volatility
tend to reflect the less-favorable parallel exchange could, therefore, be a helpful addition to the policy
rate; and removing exchange-market distortions can toolkit subject to the availability of reserves.
give a substantial boost to development, by reducing
uncertainty and strengthening competitiveness On the other hand, the region is relatively exposed
(Gray 2021). In this regard, the exchange reform to persistent real shocks, suggesting that intervention
implemented in South Sudan last year prompted a might not always be the appropriate policy response.
significant appreciation of the parallel market rate, Also, with currencies being overvalued in many
helping to reduce inflation and insulating the country countries (Figure 24), sustained efforts to resist
from rising global food prices. downward pressure risk supporting unsustainable
policies and weak external positions.
What role for foreign exchange intervention?
Finally, in some countries the scope for intervention to
IMF staff analysis suggests that intervention may have lean against excessive movements in the exchange rate
a role to play in the policy toolkit for sub-Saharan is limited by low reserves. In these cases, authorities
African countries, but this must be weighed carefully, may have no option but to tighten monetary policy.
given the region’s complicated policy backdrop.
14 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND | APRIL 2022
A NEW SHOCK AND LITTLE ROOM TO MANEUVER
BEYOND THE CRISIS: ENHANCING But so far, most oil exporters have been unable to
RESILIENCE AND LIFTING POTENTIAL boost production, because of security concerns and
years of underinvestment that have translated into a
GROWTH WILL BE KEY
secular decline in market shares.
Looking beyond the immediate policy priorities, In addition to greater macroeconomic volatility,
strengthening resilience and lifting potential growth resource-intensive countries suffer from significantly
requires an ambitious reform agenda to promote weaker economic growth. For example, their average
economic diversification, unleash the private sector’s growth in the decade before to the pandemic was
potential—for example, via regional trade integration, about 3.1 percent, considerably lower than the
innovative financing channels, and digitalization—and 5.9 percent experienced by non-resource-intensive
confront the challenges posed by climate change. countries. This divergence is expected to continue
(Figure 26), widening regional inequality even more.
Promoting Diversification
Promoting diversification and developing new
Many countries in the region remain highly dependent industrial capabilities is therefore a key priority for
on commodity exports (Figure 25). For example, in commodity exporters (Cherif and others forthcoming).
some countries, oil exports reach more than 40 percent A broad range of policy actions is needed to achieve
of GDP (Equatorial Guinea, Republic of the Congo, these goals.
South Sudan). Beyond oil, 15 countries are large
exporters of other commodities, such as iron ore and • Credible macroeconomic policies and a favorable
copper. Oil exporters and other resource-intensive investment climate are essential ingredients to
countries combined represent more than 70 percent ensure that the private sector can take advantage of
of the region’s GDP. Besides accounting for a large new opportunities.
share of countries’ GDP, commodities contribute
very significantly to fiscal revenues. For example, • Targeted sectoral interventions may be helpful to
commodities provide more than 50 percent of total encourage the reallocation of resources to the most
fiscal revenues in several oil-exporting countries. promising activities. These interventions should
focus on addressing both policy failures, which
The reliance on commodity exports makes countries may include a burdensome regulatory framework,
highly susceptible to fluctuations in commodity high tariffs on critical inputs, an overvalued
prices. Commodity-dependent countries were among exchange rate, inadequate infrastructure, or an
the hardest hit at the start of the pandemic when insufficiently skilled workforce; and market
oil prices tumbled to record lows. The recent strong failures, which generally entail a sector-specific
rebound in commodity prices may provide temporary bottleneck or externality, where firms do not
relief for resource-intensive countries, by increasing fully internalize the possible benefits of potential
fiscal revenues and strengthening growth prospects. actions. From experience, targeted infrastructure,
research and development subsidies, and support
Figure 25� Sub-Saharan Africa: Commodity Exports and Tax
for start-up incubators have often proved effective.
Revenues
100
80 SSD GNQ
AGO 60
COG
BFA NGA
40 TCD GAB
CMR MLI BWA 20 GIN ZMB
GHA
NER SLE 0
0 20 40 60 80
Sources: United Nations, COMTRADE database; Bank of Sierra Leone;
IMF, World Economic Outlook database; and IMF staff calculations.
Note: See page 27 for a list of country acronyms.
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND | APRIL 2022 15
fo
tnecrep
,seunever
xat
ytidommoC
12–5102
egareva
,eunever
latot
Figure 26� Sub-Saharan Africa: Real GDP Per Capita, 2010–26 Other resource-intensive countries
(Index, 2010 = 100)
Oil exporters 180
2010
150 Non-resource-intensive countries 11
12
13
120 Resource-intensive countries 14
15
Commodity net exports, percent of GDP,
90 16
average 2000–20
2010 15 20 25 17
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook database.
REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
But, trade-related measures, strategic investments the continent. The system could substantially reduce
by SOEs, and directed lending have often the risks associated with relying on third-party
proved risky and have sometimes encouraged currencies, and make intraregional payments easier,
rent-seeking. Thus, targeted interventions are faster, and less expensive.
more likely to succeed where governance and
administrative capacity is strong, and when Trade integration will greatly benefit the region but
complemented by broader economy-wide reforms. benefits and costs will not be distributed evenly across
and within countries. For example, countries that are
• Cross-country experience shows that successful less integrated into regional and global value chains
targeted interventions are generally accompanied could see fewer benefits (October 2021 Regional
by enhanced accountability, including through Economic Outlook: Asia and Pacific). To harness the
specific performance targets, the promotion of AfCFTA’s full potential and ensure inclusive growth,
competition, and a focus on export orientation. policymakers must be prepared to provide adequate
safety nets and retraining opportunities for workers in
Several success stories in sub-Saharan Africa can inspire sectors that could be adversely affected.
efforts to enhance economic diversification (October
2017 Regional Economic Outlook: Sub-Saharan Encouraging More Innovative Financing
Africa, Chapter 3). For example, in the last 30 years, Channels to Boost Investment
Mauritius has managed to evolve from a mono-crop
economy to a competitive upper-middle income Sub-Saharan African countries need significant
country. Rwanda has embarked on an ambitious financing to close the infrastructure gap and meet
program of investment in infrastructure and education the SDGs. Catalyzing private finance will be essential
and has seen the region’s fastest movement of labor given high debt levels and low revenue mobilization.
from agriculture to higher-value-added activity. The continent holds immense opportunities for
private investors. It has a young and growing
Stronger Regional Trade Integration population, abundant natural resources, large markets,
and great potential for digital transformation. Still,
The recent launch of the African Continental Free risk-adjusted returns of projects in sub-Saharan Africa
Trade Area (AfCFTA) marks a milestone toward are often perceived to be less attractive than elsewhere.
deeper regional integration. This agreement has the
potential to eliminate tariffs on 90 percent of existing To mobilize private finance, governments should
intraregional trade flows (with an estimated increase deliver sustained improvements in the investment
in intraregional trade by about 15–25 percent over climate and macroeconomic stability, including
the medium term) and, critically, to reduce non-tariff predictable access to foreign exchange reserves.
barriers that are continuing to undermine regional Furthermore, they should explore innovative solutions
competitiveness (April 2019 Regional Economic to improve risk-return profiles, for example, by
Outlook: Sub-Saharan Africa, Chapter 3). Deeper providing public incentives to finance infrastructure
integration would boost incomes, create jobs, projects (Eyraud and others 2021). Up to 80–90
catalyze foreign direct investment, and facilitate percent of infrastructure projects receive government
the development of regional supply chains. The support in some regions, but this happens less often
AfCFTA will need to be implemented swiftly and in sub-Saharan Africa (Figure 27). Middle-income
complemented by an enabling macroeconomic countries with relatively strong state capacity and
environment and a range of structural reforms to institutions and with market access (Ghana, Kenya,
deliver its full potential. Senegal) are particularly well positioned to attract
private finance. Their pipeline of bankable projects
Regional integration would also benefit from the is often sufficiently developed, and many projects
digitalization of trade processes, the promotion of have a critical size that makes them appealing to
paperless trading systems, and the alignment of investors. Appropriate institutional, governance, and
multiple and overlapping regional trade frameworks legal frameworks are crucial to safeguard public sector
via regulatory standardization and enforcement. balance sheets from risks related to project financing.
The recently launched Pan-African Payment and
Settlement System is also an important step in Multilateral development banks (MDBs), development
operationalizing the AfCFTA because it facilitates finance institutions, and other development partners
transactions among more than 40 currencies across could play a key role in helping attract private
16 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND | APRIL 2022
Figure27. SelectedRegions: Share of Infrastructure Projects Receiving
Government Support A NEW SHOCK AND LITTLE ROOM TO MANEUVER
(Percent)
Figure 27� Selected Regions: Share of Infrastructure Projects
very little to rising global temperatures but that
Receiving Government Support
will bear the greatest burden given its exposure to
(Percent)
weather-related disasters and dependence on rain-fed
East Asia and Pacific
agriculture. Therefore, investment in adaptation
Middle East and North Africa is of critical importance. For example, investment
in climate-resilient infrastructure, better irrigation,
Europe and Central Asia
improved seed varieties, and strengthened health
South Asia
systems can deliver large gains.
Sub-Saharan Africa
Yet global mitigation efforts are also critical for
Latin America and the Caribbean
the region. The green transition offers important
0 20 40 60 80 100 opportunities for diversification and job creation.
Source: World Bank, Private Participation in Infrastructure (PPI) Sub-Saharan Africa has unrivalled potential for
Projects database.
renewable energy and an abundance of minerals
Soinuvrcees:t mwoernldt .B Iannskt,r uPmriveantet sP saurtcichi paast ibonle innd Inedfr afsintruanctcuere a (nPdP I) Projecktesyd afotarb tahsee .transition.
guarantees could leverage additional private funds. But
support should be targeted, temporary, and granted Financing adaptation and seizing the opportunities
on the basis of proven market failures. It should also presented by the green transition will require
be transparent, leave sufficient risk to private parties, significant investment, thus support from the
and display additionality, meaning that incentives international community will be essential. At the
should make worthy projects happen that would not 2021 United Nations Climate Change Conference
happen otherwise. MDBs and other development (COP26), the African Group of Negotiators indicated
partners could also deploy more equity financing, local that, beginning in 2025, a minimum $100 billion
currency financing and other risk-sharing instruments per year over the next decade and a half would be
in order to reduce the dominance of senior, foreign needed for infrastructure investment to boost resilience
currency debt financing. and to curb emissions. IMF estimates suggest that
climate change adaptation alone will cost up to
Digital Innovation Can Enhance Financial $50 billion every year, equivalent to about 3 percent
Inclusion and Reduce Costs of regional GDP.
Several countries in the region are exploring the Policy efforts should also be directed at ensuring
possibility of adopting a central bank digital currency that the green transition is also a just transition,
(CBDC). Nigeria has already moved forward by for example, by ensuring that carbon taxes and
launching the eNaira. CBDCs can offer several the removal of fossil-fuel subsidies do not pose
benefits, for example, by enhancing financial affordability challenges for the most vulnerable
inclusion, lowering the cost of remittances, and segments of the population. The transition of workers
reducing the reliance on private crypto currencies that to green sectors will also require investment in new
may hinder monetary transmission and facilitate illicit skills and adequate social protection. To this end, a
flows (Box 4). Yet CBDCs also present new challenges recent innovative partnership between South Africa
and risks. To harness the benefits of CBDCs, countries and a group of advanced economies, announced
should invest in digital infrastructure, build expertise at COP26, aims at accelerating decarbonization,
within central banks, and confront cybersecurity while supporting vulnerable groups.2 In addition,
risks. This is a complex and evolving area, where because a large share of the population still has no
the balance between benefits and risks depends on access to electricity, a continued increase in access to
country characteristics. affordable and sustainable energy should accompany
the transition. Closing the access gap in sub-Saharan
Investing in Climate Change Adaptation and African countries will require an estimated annual
Supporting the Green Transition are Key investment of $28 billion by 2030, according to the
International Energy Agency.
Climate change is posing major challenges for
sub-Saharan Africa—a region that has contributed
2 For more information, see the Political Declaration on the Just Energy Transition in South Africa:
https://ukcop26.org/political-declaration-on-the-just-energy-transition-in-south-africa/.
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND | APRIL 2022 17
REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
BOX 1� ONE YEAR ON: VACCINE ROLLOUT IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
COVID-19 vaccinations remain low in sub-Saharan countries with successful vaccination campaigns relied on
Africa, driven initially by limited supply and later by a more diversified vaccine portfolio sourced from multiple
logistical challenges. As of early April, only 12.2 percent suppliers (vaccine manufacturers, COVAX, the African
of the population in sub-Saharan Africa has been fully Vaccine Acquisition Trust, and bilateral donors) which
immunized, compared with 64 percent in emerging markets helped them mitigate the supply risks during the earlier
and developing economies and 74 percent in advanced days of vaccine production and distribution.
economies. Only five countries in the region (Botswana,
Cabo Verde, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles) reached Regional vaccine manufacturing initiatives are underway
the IMF-proposed target of 40 percent coverage by the and could help reduce Africa’s exposure to future health
end of 2021. The problems with limited vaccine supply shocks. Licensing and technology transfer agreements have
have eased, since India began exporting vaccines again in offered a short-term solution to mitigate vaccine supply
October 2021,1 and advanced economies have accelerated shortages over 2021. For instance, Aspen Pharmacare
the pace of dose donations bilaterally and through the in South Africa started supplying Johnson & Johnson’s
COVID-19 Vaccines Global Access (COVAX) (Figure 1.1). vaccine in July 2021. But a longer-term solution involves
Nevertheless, several supply-side challenges could linger establishing a sustainable ecosystem for local vaccine
well into 2022, including delays in vaccine manufacturing production that would require specialized equipment, a
in developing countries because of ongoing intellectual highly trained workforce, a conducive investment climate,
property rights waiver negotiations at the World Trade and a predictable and stable demand for vaccines from
Organization, shortages of medical supplies (for example, African countries. A handful of COVID-19 vaccine
syringes), and dose donations with a short shelf-life. In production facilities are set up or in the pipeline across
countries where the supply constraints are not binding, four sub-Saharan African countries (Ghana, Rwanda,
the focus has shifted toward meeting the health-system Senegal, and South Africa). For example, a new vaccine
infrastructure needs (for example, transportation, cold- manufacturing facility is being constructed (with financial
chain storage, vaccination sites, trained medical staff, and assistance from the US, EU, and other partners) at the
ancillary medical equipment such as syringes and personal Institut Pasteur de Dakar in Senegal, which will be one of
protective equipment), and launching communication the first start-to-finish factories on the continent.
campaigns to maximize the vaccine absorption. This
is particularly challenging in countries with large rural Figure 1�1 Sub-Saharan Africa: Vaccine Deliveries, 2021–22
populations and limited rural health infrastructure. (Million doses, as of March 31, 2022)
240 230
Successful vaccination campaigns in the region have been
marked by effective preparedness and coordination, and
Bilaterals/AVAT
diversified vaccine sources. By the time vaccines started 180
COVAX
arriving in March 2021, countries with the current high Donations via COVAX 135
vaccination rates had completed 38 percent of the vaccine 120 Bilateral donations
readiness pillar components, as assessed by the World Bank, 78
compared with 24 percent in other countries. For example, 60
Ghana became the first sub-Saharan African country to
20 15
receive a COVAX delivery in February 2021 and was able
0
to administer half of that initial supply within 10 days 2021:Q1 21:Q2 21:Q3 21:Q4 22:Q1
because of staff training and simulation exercises ahead of
Sources: Airfinity; and IMF staff calculations.
the rollout. Continued collaboration among health officials, Note: Bilaterals refers to doses received directly from vaccine
government officials, and the private sector to adapt and manufacturers. Donations via COVAX refers to doses donated by
advanced economies and channeled through COVAX.
meet challenges was also crucial for the rollout success
AVAT = African Vaccine Acquisition Trust, COVAX = COVID-19
(for example, Botswana, Cabo Verde, and Rwanda). Finally, Vaccines Global Access.
This box was prepared by Shushanik Hakobyan.
1 Export restrictions on the Serum Institute of India, a major supplier of the COVAX facility, derailed the delivery of vaccines from April through
June of 2021 and plunged the vaccination campaigns of countries relying primarily on COVAX into chaos.
18 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND | APRIL 2022
A NEW SHOCK AND LITTLE ROOM TO MANEUVER
BOX 2� SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA’S VULNERABILITY TO EXTERNAL SHOCKS
Recent international shocks are likely to have significant are particularly vulnerable to international conditions
implications for the macroeconomic outlook in sub-Saharan since they are more integrated via financial links and have
Africa. Notably, the ongoing US monetary policy tightening lower-than-average policy buffers to weather adverse shocks.
is worsening external financing conditions. Furthermore,
the war in Ukraine and the reduction of oil exports from A multi-country global vector autoregressive (GVAR)
Russia are stoking inflationary pressures across the globe model was used to quantify the impact of different external
because of their impact on energy and food prices. shocks on GDP growth in sub-Saharan Africa. This model
incorporated (1) domestic variables (real GDP, inflation
Sub-Saharan African countries vary in their exposure to rate, interest rate, exchange rate), (2) country-specific
external shocks. Three factors shape the extent to which foreign variables, which are cross-sectional weighted
countries are vulnerable to shocks: the strength of trade averages of domestic variables in other countries, and
ties with the global economy; the degree of integration (3) global variable (US 10-year rate, oil price).1 Average
with international financial markets; and the availability bilateral trade (2016–18) was used to create the weight
of policy buffers to respond to shocks, such as accumulated matrix required to construct the foreign variables. Using
international reserves. Considering different country annual data (1980–2021) for 71 countries, including
groups within sub-Saharan Africa, oil exporters are highly most sub-Saharan African countries, two shocks were
susceptible to external shocks because of a strong trade simulated (1) a positive shock to the US interest rate,
channel (Figure 2.1). Other resource-intensive countries reflecting the ongoing US monetary tightening, and (2)
tend to be less exposed to external shocks because of low a positive oil price shock as experienced in recent months.
financial integration. Non-resource-intensive countries Sign restrictions were used for identification, assuming a
also are relatively insulated from external shocks because slower pace for global economic activity because of the US
of lower trade integration. Frontier market economies monetary policy tightening and higher inflation fueled by
oil price increases.
Figure 2�1 Sub-Saharan Africa: Vulnerability to External Shocks by Channels and Buffers
(Percentile score minus sub-Saharan Africa average)
12
Trade Financial Policy space
8
4
0
–4
–8
Oil exporters Other resource-intensive Non-resource-intensive Frontier market
countries countries economies
Sources: Haver Analytics; and IMF staff estimations.
Note: Variables used to define channels: trade includes (i) exports as share of GDP, (ii) imports as share of GDP;
financial includes (i) private gross capital inflows as share of GDP, (ii) external debt as share of GDP, (iii) short-term
external debt as share of total external debt, and (iv) non-FDI as share of private capital inflows; policy space includes
(i) reserves as share of GDP (inverted), (ii) gross government debt as share of GDP, and (iii) inflation. Data are for 2019
or most recent year. All scores are percentiles over all other emerging market and developing economies normalized
as deviations from the average for sub-Saharan Africa. Bars represent unweighted mean for country groups, excluding
South Sudan.
This box was prepared by Hany Abdel-Latif and Marijn Bolhuis.
1 Estimates are based on annual data for most sub-Saharan African countries. When estimated with quarterly data for a smaller number of
sub-Saharan African countries, the results do not change significantly.
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND | APRIL 2022 19
REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
Continued Box 2
A tightening of US monetary policy and an increase in in trading partners (Figure 2.2). A 10-percentage point
energy prices can affect economic growth severely in sub- increase in oil prices will lead to an average decline in
Saharan Africa. An unexpected 25 basis points increase in regional growth by 0.5 percentage point (Figure 2.3). The
the US 10-year rate is associated with an average decline impact also varies by country sub-groups—a positive oil
inF irgeugrioen2a.l2 r.e Salu Gb-DSaPh oafr aabno Autf r0ic.2a5: GpeDrPce nRteasgpe opnosinet tion price shock affects oil importers the most.
tUheS f Mirsot nyeetaar,r ya sP hoilgihceyr Triagtehst elonwinegr growth and demand
Figure2.3. Sub-Saharan Africa: GDP Response to Oil
(25 bps US rate increase, weighted average growth
responses) Increase
Figure 2�2 Sub-Saharan Africa: GDP Response to US Monetary Figure 2�3 Sub-Saharan Africa: GDP Response to Oil Price Increase
Policy Tightening (10 percentage points oil price increase, weighted-average growth
(25bps US rate increase, weighted-average growth responses) responses)
0.10 4
0.00 3 Oil exporters
2 Oil Importers
–0.10
1
–0.20
0
–0.30
–1
–0.40 –2
–0.50 –3
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 0 2 4 6 8 10
Sources: Haver Analytics and IMF staff estimations. Sources: Haver Analytics and IMF staff estimations.
Note: Dots show average estimates with the range denoting 95 Note: Dots show average estimates with the range denoting 95
peSrcoeuntr cceonsf:i dHeancvee rin Atenrvaallyst.ics; and IMF staff estimates. percent confidence intervals.
Sources: Haver Analytics and IMF staff estimates.
Note: Dots show average estimates with the range
Note: Dots show average estimates with the range
denoting 95 percent confidence intervals.
denoting 95 percent confidence intervals.
20 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND | APRIL 2022
A NEW SHOCK AND LITTLE ROOM TO MANEUVER
BOX 3� ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF CONFLICTS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
Sub-Saharan Africa has seen a sharp increase in the Conflicts also have a clear, direct negative impact on
incidence of conflicts in recent years. Most recently, violence development goals such as poverty and hunger, educational
has picked up in the Sahel and the Central African Republic, attainment, child mortality, and access to essential services.
and political dissatisfaction and worsening insecurity have Furthermore, conflict can leave long-lasting social scars.
contributed to an uptick of military coups (Burkina Faso, For example, exposure to conflict in childhood leads to
Mali, and Guinea) (Figure 3.1) These developments stem poorer lifetime health outcomes for both the affected
from a combination of common factors (weak political generation and for future generations. Human capital losses
systems, inter-community tensions, poor governance, poor from conflict also lower people’s lifetime productivity and
service delivery) and country-specific triggers (electoral reduce socioeconomic mobility, and the reintegration of
tensions, security challenges). As a result, increased security demobilized combatants is often a prolonged challenge
spending is straining public finances, while disrupted trade and an ongoing source of potential instability.
routes, damaged infrastructures, displaced people, weakened
institutions, crippled tourism, and a less-hospitable business Conflicts also generate negative spillovers. Worldwide,
environment are all weighing on economic activity. estimates suggest that neighbors bear almost one-fifth of all
output losses of global conflict (de Groot and others 2022).
Conflicts impose large social and economic costs. For The onset of a conflict has, on average, resulted in a
sub-Saharan Africa, IMF staff estimates suggest that active cumulative drop in imports of almost 25 percent over five
conflicts tend to depress annual growth by 2.5 percentage years. But perhaps more importantly, prolonged conflicts
points per year in directly affected countries (April 2019 tend to increase security risks for neighboring countries and
Regional Economic Outlook: Sub-Saharan Africa, Chapter 2). generate refugee flows, which may exhaust host countries’
In the last three decades, this has translated into a already-stretched social infrastructure, while also adding
regionwide loss of about 3/4 percent of GDP each year to social tensions. In sub-Saharan Africa, the onset of a
(Figure 3.2). With the recent increase in the incidence of conflict has historically been followed by sizable refugee
conflicts, however, this estimated lost output has increased flows into neighboring countries, often amounting to
to almost 1.5 percent. Moreover, reduced tax revenue, 2 percent of the origin country’s population over a five-year
rising public debt, and increased military spending, all period (Figure 3.3).
further complicate the policy environment faced by local
Figure 3.2. Sub-Saharan Africa: Incidence and Cost of
authorities, undermining macroeconomic stability and
longer-term growth.
Figure 3�1 Sub-Saharan Africa: Deaths from Conflict, 2001–21 Figure 3�2� Sub-Saharan Africa: Incidence and Cost of Conflict,
(Thousands) 1990s–2020s
(Percent of region (Percentage points
80 Eastern Africa in conflict) of GDP)
Central Africa 40 1.6
60 Sahel
Western Africa 30 Incidence 1.2
(Left scale)
40
20 0.8
20 GDP loss due to conflict
10 (Right scale) 0.4
0 0 0.0
2001–05 2006–10 2011–15 2016–21 1990's 2000's 2010's 2020's
Sources: Uppsala Conflict database, ACLED; and IMF staff Sources: Uppsala Conflict database, ACLED; and IMF staff
calculations. calculations.
Sources: Uppsala Conflict Dataset; ACLED; Penn
This box was prepared by Marijn Bolhuis and Andrew Tiffin. World Tables; and IMF staff calculations.
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND | APRIL 2022 21
REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
Continued Box 3
Figure 3�3� Sub-Saharan Africa: Main Sources of Refugee Inflows
to the Region, 2020
(Thousands) SOM SSD
RWA
NGA
ERI
COD
CAF SDN
BDI
TCD TZA
KEN CMR
NER
ETH UGA
Sources: United Nations Human Rights Council; and IMF staff
calculations.
BOX 4� CENTRAL BANK DIGITAL CURRENCIES IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
Many central banks across the world—including 13 in Figure 4�1� Sub-Saharan Africa: Central Bank Digital Currencies
sub-Saharan Africa—are currently exploring the option Status, 2022
of using a Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC) to
Zambia
enhance their electronic payment system (Figure 4.1). A Kenya
CBDC is a digital version of cash that can be stored and Tanzania
transferred electronically and is fully backed by the issuing Mauritius
Madagascar
central bank. In October 2021, Nigeria became the first
Eswatini
country in Africa and the second in the world after the
Zimbabwe
Bahamas to issue a CBDC—the eNaira. Namibia South Africa
Rwanda Ghana Nigeria
Potential benefits and challenges
Research Pilot Launched
Source: Central Bank Digital Currencies Tracker.
CBDC entails various possible advantages.
Note: Tanzania and the East African Community were not in the
CBDC Tracker. Their initiatives are at an early stage of exploration.
• Fostering financial inclusion. In sub-Saharan Africa,
CBDCs could bring financial services to previously and cheaper by shortening payment chains and creating
unbanked or underbanked people, allowing digital more competition among remittance service providers.
transactions in remote places without internet access at Faster clearance of cross-border payments can help
minimal or no cost.1 promote trade integration within the region and with
the rest of the world.2
• Facilitating cross-border transfers and payments. The
average cost of sending remittances to sub-Saharan • Providing an alternative to cryptocurrencies. The
Africa was 8 percent of the transfer amount in 2020. spread of private cryptocurrencies poses the risk that
CBDCs could make sending remittances easier, faster, citizens may move their money to these assets either
This box was prepared by Habtamu Fuje, Saad Quayyum, and Franck Ouattara.
1 Allowing the unbanked and underbanked to participate in digital payment systems might also support reducing informality, which in turn can
expand the tax base and boost revenue for the government.
2 South Africa, for example, is participating in Project Dunbar with the central banks of Australia, Malaysia, and Singapore to test the use of
CBDC for international settlements. The East African Community is also exploring the development of a regional CBDC to upgrade the East
African Payment System.
22 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND | APRIL 2022
A NEW SHOCK AND LITTLE ROOM TO MANEUVER
Continued Box 4
for ease of transaction or if they lose confidence in the to be done. Development, deployment, and oversight
local currency. This may undermine monetary policy of CBDCs also require substantial technical capacity in
transmission. Moreover, cryptocurrencies could be a central banks.
conduit for illicit financial flows. CBDCs could minimize
these risks by offering a reliable and regulated alternative Therefore, before pursuing CBDCs, central banks in the
to cryptocurrencies. region would need to carefully evaluate the benefits and
weigh them against the challenges and risks, considering
• Enabling timely and targeted welfare disbursement. If the local context and internal capacity. For CBDCs to be
CBDCs are broadly used by population, including by successful they also need to be accompanied by sound
low-income households, targeted welfare support could macroeconomic and regulatory policies that buttress
be provided directly through CBDCs, especially during confidence in the local currency. In addition, how CBDCs
sudden crises such as those triggered by the COVID-19 could affect the thriving private industry for digital payment
pandemic or natural disasters. services should be carefully thought through and managed
as some operators can have systemic importance.
The design and adoption of CBDCs should address the
following challenges and risks: The eNaira
• Data integrity. It is essential that the CBDC is The Central Bank of Nigeria’s eNaira provides a useful
trustworthy and protects consumers’ privacy. Consumers example of how CBDCs could work in practice. It has a
will have to entrust the central bank with a large amount two-tiered architecture whereby the Central Bank of Nigeria
of personal transaction data and need to be confident (CBN) issues the eNaira and financial institutions directly
that this information will be safe and not misused. engage with users for distribution, payment facilitation,
dispute resolution, and other roles. At present, all users
• Cyber risk and disruptions. Like other forms of digital need to open and maintain wallets in the eNaira platform
money, CBDCs are exposed to the risk of cyber attacks. and link their bank accounts with their wallets. Transfers
Therefore, central banks need to invest in cybersecurity can be made from bank accounts to eNaira wallets up to a
programs (PwC 2021; Mancini-Griffoli and others daily maximum and a cumulative limit. The limits are set
2018). While this can be expensive, some of the cost can to prevent a sudden surge of transfers from the banking
be offset by lower costs of managing and distributing system to the eNaira platform, which could destabilize the
cash given that CBDCs are expected to reduce cash use. banking system. To open a wallet, users need to download
the eNaira app and provide their bank verification number.
• Financial integrity risk. Central banks would have The bank verification number helps to identify end users
to put in place appropriate measures to ensure AML/ and makes it possible to comply with financial integrity
CFT regulations are followed. This will require in many regulations. As of end January, over 700,000 wallets have
countries strengthening national identification systems been downloaded and a total of 9 million transfers and
so that Know-Your-Customer requirements can be more payments have been made using eNaira.
easily enforced without undermining financial inclusions.
The CBN is planning to allow users without a bank
• Financial/banking sector instability. Central banks account to open an eNaira wallet with only the national
need to be careful that CBDCs do not disrupt the identification number to make it more accessible to the
banking system through significant transfers of funds unbanked. Users without bank accounts will have lower
from commercial banks to CBDC wallets, which reduces transaction limits to minimize financial integrity risks. The
bank funding and lending capacity. CBN also plans to allow the Nigerian diaspora to send
remittances through the eNaira platform. For this plan to
• Digital infrastructure and knowledge. Broad adoption be successful, it is important to strengthen confidence in
and effective utilization of CBDCs hinge on the the local currency and support a unified market clearing
accessibility of digital infrastructure such as phone and exchange rate. Finally, the CBN plans to make it possible
internet connectivity. While sub-Saharan Africa has to pay taxes through the eNaira platform which could
made significant strides with digitalization, much needs potentially improve revenue collection.
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND | APRIL 2022 23
REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
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24 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND | APRIL 2022
Statistical Appendix
Unless otherwise noted, data and projections presented The low-income countries had average per capita gross
in this Regional Economic Outlook are IMF staff national income in the years 2018–20 equal to or lower
estimates as of April 8, 2022, consistent with the than $1,045.00 (World Bank, Atlas method).
projections underlying the April 2022 World Economic
Outlook. The countries in fragile situations had average Country
Policy and Institutional Assessment scores of 3.2 or
The data and projections cover 45 sub-Saharan African less in the years 2016–18 and/or had the presence of a
countries in the IMF’s African Department. Data peacekeeping or peace-building mission within the last
definitions follow established international statistical three years.
methodologies to the extent possible. However, in
some cases, data limitations limit comparability across The membership of sub-Saharan African countries
countries. in the major regional cooperation bodies is shown
on page 26: CFA franc zone, comprising the West
Country Groupings African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU)
and CEMAC; the Common Market for Eastern
Countries are aggregated into three (nonoverlapping) and Southern Africa (COMESA); the East Africa
groups: oil exporters, other resource-intensive Community (EAC-5); the Economic Community of
countries, and non-resource-intensive countries West African States (ECOWAS); the Southern African
(see table on page 26 for the country groupings). Development Community (SADC); and the Southern
African Customs Union (SACU). EAC-5 aggregates
The oil exporters are countries where net oil exports include data for Rwanda and Burundi, which joined
make up 30 percent or more of total exports. the group only in 2007.
The other resource-intensive countries are those where Methods of Aggregation
nonrenewable natural resources represent 25 percent or
more of total exports. In Tables SA1 and SA3, country group composites for
real GDP growth and broad money are calculated as
The non-resource-intensive countries refer to those the arithmetic average of data for individual countries,
that are not classified as either oil exporters or other weighted by GDP valued at purchasing power parity as
resource-intensive countries. a share of total group GDP. The source of purchasing
power parity weights is the World Economic Outlook
Countries are also aggregated into four (overlapping) (WEO) database.
groups: oil exporters, middle-income, low-income, and
countries in fragile situations (see table on page 26 for In Table SA1, country group composites for consumer
the country groupings). prices are calculated as the geometric average of data
for individual countries, weighted by GDP valued at
The membership of these groups reflects the most purchasing power parity as a share of total group GDP.
recent data on per capita gross national income The source of purchasing power parity weights is the
(averaged over three years) and the World Bank, WEO database.
Country Policy and Institutional Assessment score
(averaged over three years). In Tables SA2–SA4, country group composites, except
for broad money, are calculated as the arithmetic
The middle-income countries had per capita gross average of data for individual countries, weighted by
national income in the years 2018–20 of more than GDP in US dollars at market exchange rates as a share
$1,045.00 (World Bank, using the Atlas method). of total group GDP.
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND | APRIL 2022 25
REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
Sub-Saharan Africa: Member Countries of Groupings
Oil Exporters Other Resource- Non-Resource- Middle-Income Low-Income Countries in Fragile
Intensive Countries Intensive Countries Countries Countries Situations
Angola Botswana Benin Angola Burkina Faso Burundi
Cameroon Burkina Faso Burundi Benin Burundi Central African Republic
Chad Central African Republic Cabo Verde Botswana Central African Chad
Congo, Republic of Congo, Democratic Comoros Cabo Verde Republic Comoros
Equatorial Guinea Republic of the Côte d’Ivoire Cameroon Chad Congo, Democratic
Gabon Ghana Eritrea Comoros Congo, Democratic Republic of the
Nigeria Guinea Eswatini Congo, Republic of Republic of the Congo, Republic of
South Sudan Liberia Ethiopia Côte d’Ivoire Eritrea Côte d’Ivoire
Mali Gambia, The Equatorial Guinea Ethiopia Eritrea
Namibia Guinea-Bissau Eswatini Gambia, The Gambia, The
Niger Kenya Gabon Guinea Guinea
Sierra Leone Lesotho Ghana Guinea-Bissau Guinea-Bissau
South Africa Madagascar Kenya Liberia Liberia
Tanzania Malawi Lesotho Madagascar Madagascar
Zambia Mauritius Mauritius Malawi Malawi
Zimbabwe Mozambique Namibia Mali Mali
Rwanda Nigeria Mozambique São Tomé and Príncipe
São Tomé and Príncipe São Tomé and Príncipe Niger Sierra Leone
Senegal Senegal Rwanda South Sudan
Seychelles Seychelles Sierra Leone Togo
Togo South Africa South Sudan Zimbabwe
Tanzania
Uganda Zambia
Togo
Uganda
Zimbabwe
Sub-Saharan Africa: Member Countries of Regional Groupings
The West African Economic and Common Market East African Southern African Southern Economic
Economic and Monetary Community for Eastern and Community Development African Community of West
Monetary Union of Central African Southern Africa (*EAC-5) Community Customs Union African States
(WAEMU) States (CEMAC) (COMESA) (SADC) (SACU) (ECOWAS)
Benin Cameroon Burundi *Burundi Angola Botswana Benin
Burkina Faso Central African Republic Comoros *Kenya Botswana Eswatini Burkina Faso
Côte d’Ivoire Chad Congo, Democratic *Rwanda Comoros Lesotho Cabo Verde
Guinea-Bissau Congo, Republic of Republic of the South Sudan Congo, Democratic Namibia Côte d’Ivoire
Mali Equatorial Guinea Eritrea *Tanzania Republic of the South Africa Gambia, The
Niger Gabon Eswatini *Uganda Eswatini Ghana
Senegal Ethiopia Lesotho Guinea
Togo Kenya Madagascar Guinea-Bissau
Madagascar Malawi Liberia
Malawi Mauritius Mali
Mauritius Mozambique Niger
Rwanda Namibia Nigeria
Seychelles Seychelles Senegal
Uganda South Africa Sierra Leone
Zambia Tanzania Togo
Zimbabwe Zambia
Zimbabwe
26 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND | APRIL 2022
STATISTICAL APPENDIX
Sub-Saharan Africa Country Abbreviations
AGO Angola CPV Cabo Verde LSO Lesotho SLE Sierra Leone
BDI Burundi ERI Eritrea MDG Madagascar SSD South Sudan
BEN Benin ETH Ethiopia MLI Mali STP São Tomé and Príncipe
BFA Burkina Faso GAB Gabon MOZ Mozambique SWZ Eswatini
BWA Botswana GHA Ghana MUS Mauritius SYC Seychelles
CAF Central African Republic GIN Guinea MWI Malawi TCD Chad
CIV Côte d’Ivoire GMB Gambia, The NAM Namibia TGO Togo
CMR Cameroon GNB Guinea-Bissau NER Niger TZA Tanzania
COD Congo, Democratic Republic of the GNQ Equatorial Guinea NGA Nigeria UGA Uganda
COG Congo, Republic of KEN Kenya RWA Rwanda ZAF South Africa
COM Comoros LBR Liberia SEN Senegal ZMB Zambia
ZWE Zimbabwe
Statistical Appendix Tables
SA1� Real GDP Growth and Consumer Prices, Average �����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������28
SA2� Overall Fiscal Balance, Including Grants and Government Debt ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������29
SA3� Broad Money and External Current Account, Including Grants ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������30
SA4� External Debt, Official Debt, Debtor Based and Reserves �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������31
List of Sources and Footnotes for Statistical Appendix Tables
Tables SA1�,SA2�,SA3� Table SA4�
Sources: IMF, Common Surveillance database; and IMF, World Sources: IMF, Common Surveillance database; and IMF, World
Economic Outlook database, April 2022� Economic Outlook database, April 2022�
1 Fiscal year data� 1 As a member of the West African Economic and Monetary Union
2 For Zambia, government debt projections for 2022–23 are omitted (WAEMU), see WAEMU aggregate for reserves data�
due to ongoing debt restructuring� 2 As a member of the Central African Economic and Monetary
3 In 2019 Zimbabwe authorities introduced the real-time gross Community (CEMAC), see CEMAC aggregate for reserves data�
settlement (RTGS) dollar, later renamed the Zimbabwe dollar, 3 Fiscal year data�
and are in the process of redenominating their national accounts 4 For Zambia, external debt projections for 2022–23 are omitted due
statistics� Current data are subject to revision� The Zimbabwe to ongoing debt restructuring�
dollar previously ceased circulating in 2009, and between 2009–19,
5 In 2019 Zimbabwe authorities introduced the real-time gross
Zimbabwe operated under a multicurrency regime with the US dollar
settlement (RTGS) dollar, later renamed the Zimbabwe dollar,
as the unit of account�
and are in the process of redenominating their national accounts
Note: “���” denotes data not available� statistics� Current data are subject to revision� The Zimbabwe
dollar previously ceased circulating in 2009, and between 2009–19,
Zimbabwe operated under a multicurrency regime with the US dollar
as the unit of account�
Note: “���” denotes data not available�
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND | APRIL 2022 27
REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
SA1� Real GDP Growth and Consumer Prices, Average
Table SA1. Real GDP Growth and Consumer Prices
Real GDP Consumer Prices, Annual Average
(Annual percent change) (Annual percent change)
2010–18 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2010–18 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
Angola 2.5 –0.7 –5.6 0.7 3.0 3.3 16.0 17.1 22.3 25.8 23.9 13.2
Benin 4.5 6.9 3.8 6.6 5.9 6.1 1.5 –0.9 3.0 1.7 4.6 1.8
Botswana 4.9 3.0 –8.7 12.5 4.3 4.2 5.1 2.7 1.9 6.7 8.9 4.5
Burkina Faso 6.1 5.7 1.9 6.9 4.7 5.0 1.3 –3.2 1.9 3.9 6.0 2.0
Burundi 2.3 1.8 0.3 2.4 3.6 4.6 6.1 –0.7 7.3 8.3 9.2 6.5
Cabo Verde 2.4 5.7 –14.8 6.9 5.2 5.8 1.2 1.1 0.6 1.9 2.3 2.0
Cameroon 4.4 3.5 0.5 3.5 4.3 4.9 1.8 2.5 2.5 2.3 2.9 2.3
Central African Republic –0.6 3.0 1.0 1.0 3.5 3.7 4.7 2.8 0.9 4.3 4.0 3.6
Chad 3.5 3.4 –2.2 –1.1 3.3 3.5 1.7 –1.0 4.5 –0.8 4.1 3.1
Comoros 3.4 1.8 –0.3 2.2 3.5 3.7 1.8 3.7 0.8 1.5 5.0 1.5
Congo, Democratic Republic of the 6.4 4.4 1.7 5.7 6.4 6.9 12.3 4.7 11.4 9.0 6.4 6.1
Congo, Republic of 0.5 –0.4 –8.1 –0.2 2.4 2.7 2.3 0.4 1.4 2.0 2.7 3.0
Côte d'Ivoire 6.3 6.2 2.0 6.5 6.0 6.7 1.6 0.8 2.4 4.2 5.5 2.3
Equatorial Guinea –3.1 –6.0 –4.9 –3.5 6.1 –2.9 2.9 1.2 4.8 –0.1 4.0 3.9
Eritrea 5.4 3.8 –0.6 2.9 4.7 3.6 3.6 –16.4 4.8 4.5 6.2 3.5
Eswatini 2.7 2.6 –1.9 3.1 2.1 1.8 6.1 2.6 3.9 3.7 4.8 4.2
Ethiopia1 9.7 9.0 6.1 6.3 3.8 5.7 13.5 15.8 20.4 26.8 34.5 30.5
Gabon 4.0 3.9 –1.9 0.9 2.7 3.4 2.2 2.0 1.3 1.1 2.9 2.6
The Gambia 2.5 6.2 –0.2 5.6 5.6 6.2 6.1 7.1 5.9 7.4 8.0 8.0
Ghana 6.7 6.5 0.4 4.2 5.2 5.1 11.7 7.1 9.9 10.0 16.3 13.0
Guinea 6.1 5.6 6.4 4.2 4.8 5.8 12.1 9.5 10.6 12.6 12.7 12.3
Guinea-Bissau 4.0 4.5 1.5 3.8 3.8 4.5 1.4 0.3 1.5 3.3 4.0 3.0
Kenya 5.0 5.0 –0.3 7.2 5.7 5.3 7.3 5.2 5.3 6.1 7.2 7.1
Lesotho 2.4 0.0 –6.0 2.1 3.1 1.6 4.9 5.2 5.0 6.0 6.1 5.6
Liberia 3.8 –2.5 –3.0 4.2 4.5 5.5 10.3 27.0 17.0 7.8 8.2 6.9
Madagascar 2.8 4.4 –7.1 3.5 5.1 5.2 7.4 5.6 4.2 5.8 8.8 6.8
Malawi 4.2 5.4 0.9 2.2 2.7 4.3 17.0 9.4 8.6 9.3 10.7 7.1
Mali 4.4 4.8 –1.2 3.1 2.0 5.3 1.5 –2.9 0.5 4.0 8.0 3.0
Mauritius 3.8 3.0 –14.9 3.9 6.1 5.6 3.3 0.5 2.5 4.0 8.4 5.7
Mozambique 5.9 2.3 –1.2 2.2 3.8 5.0 8.1 2.8 3.1 5.7 8.5 7.7
Namibia 3.6 –0.9 –8.5 0.9 2.8 3.7 5.3 3.7 2.2 3.6 5.5 4.6
Niger 6.2 5.9 3.6 1.3 6.9 7.2 1.1 –2.5 2.9 3.8 5.0 3.0
Nigeria 4.0 2.2 –1.8 3.6 3.4 3.1 11.8 11.4 13.2 17.0 16.1 13.1
Rwanda 6.9 9.5 –3.4 10.2 6.4 7.4 3.9 2.4 7.7 0.8 8.0 7.0
São Tomé & Príncipe 4.5 2.2 3.0 1.8 1.6 2.8 8.7 7.7 9.8 8.1 14.5 9.2
Senegal 4.9 4.6 1.3 6.1 5.0 9.2 1.0 1.0 2.5 2.2 3.0 2.2
Seychelles 5.1 3.1 –7.7 8.0 4.6 5.6 2.5 1.8 1.2 9.8 5.6 1.6
Sierra Leone 5.0 5.3 –2.0 3.2 3.4 4.3 9.2 14.8 13.4 11.9 17.3 14.5
South Africa 1.9 0.1 –6.4 4.9 1.9 1.4 5.3 4.1 3.3 4.5 5.7 4.6
South Sudan –5.9 0.9 –6.6 5.3 6.5 5.6 107.2 51.2 24.0 5.3 16.0 15.0
Tanzania 6.6 7.0 4.8 4.9 4.8 5.2 7.7 3.4 3.3 3.7 4.4 5.4
Togo 5.7 5.5 1.8 5.1 5.6 6.2 1.3 0.7 1.8 4.3 4.6 2.0
Uganda 5.3 7.7 –1.4 5.1 4.9 6.5 7.1 2.3 2.8 2.2 6.1 4.1
Zambia 5.3 1.4 –2.8 4.3 3.1 3.6 8.9 9.2 15.7 20.5 15.7 9.2
Zimbabwe2 7.4 –6.1 –5.3 6.3 3.5 3.0 2.1 255.3 557.2 98.5 86.7 46.5
Sub-Saharan Africa 4.2 3.1 –1.7 4.5 3.8 4.0 8.3 8.1 10.2 11.0 12.2 9.6
Median 4.6 3.8 –1.2 3.9 4.3 5.0 4.6 2.8 3.9 4.5 6.2 4.6
Excluding Nigeria and South Africa 5.2 4.6 0.0 4.8 4.6 5.2 7.9 8.1 11.2 10.6 12.6 9.7
Oil-exporting countries 3.5 1.7 –2.3 2.9 3.5 3.2 11.4 11.0 13.0 15.8 15.3 11.6
Excluding Nigeria 2.4 0.6 –3.7 1.1 3.6 3.4 10.3 10.2 12.4 12.8 13.2 8.0
Oil-importing countries 4.5 3.9 –1.3 5.4 4.0 4.5 6.5 6.5 8.7 8.5 10.5 8.5
Excluding South Africa 6.0 5.6 0.9 5.5 4.9 5.6 7.3 7.6 11.0 10.2 12.5 10.0
Middle-income countries 3.6 2.1 –3.0 4.3 3.6 3.4 8.3 7.3 8.5 10.5 11.1 8.5
Excluding Nigeria and South Africa 4.4 3.4 –1.7 4.5 4.7 4.9 7.4 6.0 7.9 9.0 10.3 7.1
Low-income countries 6.2 6.0 2.0 5.0 4.6 5.6 8.5 10.6 15.0 12.4 15.3 12.6
Excluding low-income countries in 6.9 7.3 2.8 5.4 4.6 5.7 8.3 7.1 9.5 11.8 16.0 14.0
fragile situations
Countries in fragile situations 5.1 3.9 0.4 4.6 4.8 5.7 6.7 12.6 19.0 10.4 11.0 7.2
CFA franc zone 4.4 4.4 0.6 4.2 4.8 5.6 1.7 0.2 2.4 2.8 4.5 2.4
CEMAC 2.6 2.0 –1.6 1.4 3.9 3.4 2.2 1.6 2.7 1.5 3.2 2.7
WAEMU 5.6 5.7 1.8 5.6 5.3 6.7 1.4 –0.6 2.2 3.5 5.3 2.3
COMESA (SSA members) 6.2 5.7 0.5 5.9 4.8 5.5 8.8 12.2 17.3 14.6 17.0 13.9
EAC-5 5.6 6.3 0.9 6.2 5.3 5.6 7.2 3.9 4.4 4.4 6.2 6.0
ECOWAS 4.7 3.5 –0.6 4.2 4.1 4.3 9.6 8.2 10.2 12.7 13.3 10.3
SACU 2.1 0.2 –6.5 5.1 2.1 1.6 5.3 4.0 3.2 4.6 5.9 4.6
SADC 3.1 1.2 –4.4 4.4 3.1 3.0 7.5 8.6 10.8 9.5 9.9 7.0
See page 27 for sources and footnotes
28 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND | APRIL 2022
STATISTICAL APPENDIX
SA2� Overall Fiscal Balance, Including Grants and Government Debt
Table SA2. Overall Fiscal Balance, Including Grants and Government Debt
Overall Fiscal Balance, Including Grants Government Debt
(Percent of GDP) (Percent of GDP)
2010–18 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2010–18 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
Angola –0.2 0.8 –1.9 2.8 3.1 1.6 51.3 113.6 136.8 86.3 57.9 54.6
Benin –2.4 –0.5 –4.7 –5.8 –4.5 -3.5 27.9 42.5 46.1 50.6 49.3 48.7
Botswana –0.9 –8.5 –11.0 –4.7 –3.1 1.0 18.0 16.5 19.0 21.3 23.2 22.9
Burkina Faso –3.4 –3.4 –5.7 –5.6 –6.1 -5.0 29.6 42.0 46.5 50.7 53.4 53.1
Burundi –4.8 –6.4 –6.6 –3.9 –7.4 -7.5 43.6 60.0 66.0 68.6 69.2 69.6
Cabo Verde –6.5 –1.8 –9.1 –8.5 –7.1 -5.1 107.6 124.9 158.8 154.1 159.2 152.7
Cameroon –3.3 –3.2 –3.2 –3.2 –1.2 0.7 24.5 41.6 44.9 47.1 45.2 41.0
Central African Republic –1.6 1.4 –3.4 –6.0 –2.5 -2.0 44.3 47.2 43.4 47.6 46.3 44.7
Chad –1.3 –0.2 2.1 –0.8 5.9 8.3 38.7 51.1 52.1 58.2 46.5 39.8
Comoros 1.4 –4.3 –0.5 –2.4 –5.6 -5.3 18.9 19.5 22.3 25.2 30.4 34.5
Congo, Democratic Republic of the 0.2 –2.0 –1.4 –0.0 –3.3 -2.4 20.4 15.0 15.6 12.7 10.6 8.7
Congo, Republic of –0.9 4.7 –1.2 2.0 11.3 7.7 57.9 81.7 110.1 85.8 64.0 62.4
Côte d'Ivoire –2.3 –2.3 –5.6 –5.6 –4.7 -3.8 33.5 38.4 47.0 51.4 51.8 51.4
Equatorial Guinea –5.7 1.8 –1.7 1.7 3.5 4.4 21.2 43.0 48.8 39.9 27.8 30.4
Eritrea –4.9 0.6 –4.4 –4.0 –1.0 0.1 174.9 187.1 182.2 170.8 151.9 140.1
Eswatini –4.8 –7.0 –5.4 –5.7 –5.8 -2.6 19.6 39.6 42.1 42.8 45.6 44.3
Ethiopia1 –2.1 –2.5 –2.8 –2.8 –4.0 -3.3 47.5 54.7 53.7 52.9 48.3 42.7
Gabon 0.6 2.1 –2.2 –1.5 1.6 3.5 40.2 59.8 77.3 69.5 57.4 57.2
The Gambia –4.4 –2.5 –2.2 –4.4 –4.4 -2.3 65.8 83.0 85.0 83.0 80.4 75.5
Ghana –6.6 –7.3 –15.6 –11.6 –8.7 -7.8 47.0 62.7 78.3 81.8 84.6 84.8
Guinea –3.4 –0.5 –2.9 –1.5 –4.4 -4.2 43.5 38.4 44.0 39.3 39.1 37.5
Guinea-Bissau –2.5 –4.0 –10.0 –5.9 –4.1 -4.0 53.7 66.5 79.4 80.7 79.7 77.7
Kenya –5.8 –7.4 –8.1 –8.1 –6.9 -5.3 44.2 58.6 67.6 68.1 70.3 69.4
Lesotho –2.8 –7.5 0.3 –6.9 –7.8 -6.1 40.9 50.5 54.2 54.7 52.5 50.3
Liberia –3.2 –4.8 –3.8 –2.9 –2.9 -2.7 26.2 48.9 58.3 52.9 51.6 51.6
Madagascar –2.0 –1.4 –4.0 –6.3 –6.3 -4.1 36.9 38.5 49.0 53.4 57.9 56.7
Malawi –3.2 –4.5 –8.2 –8.5 –7.8 -7.5 32.6 45.3 54.8 63.5 66.9 71.2
Mali –2.8 –1.7 –5.4 –4.9 –4.5 -3.5 29.8 40.7 47.3 52.1 53.4 52.1
Mauritius –2.7 –8.4 –10.9 –7.2 –4.9 -5.2 60.5 84.6 99.2 100.7 98.9 96.1
Mozambique –4.8 –0.1 –5.1 –3.6 –3.0 -3.8 70.7 96.1 119.0 102.3 102.0 94.8
Namibia –6.0 –5.5 –8.2 –8.9 –7.8 -5.0 33.8 59.5 66.7 70.2 69.6 68.2
Niger –3.4 –3.6 –5.3 –5.9 –5.4 -4.2 25.1 39.8 45.0 52.9 53.8 53.1
Nigeria –3.0 –4.7 –5.7 –6.0 –6.4 -5.9 19.7 29.2 34.5 37.0 37.4 38.8
Rwanda –2.1 –5.1 –9.4 –6.9 –6.8 -6.3 29.6 49.8 64.6 68.6 72.0 73.6
São Tomé & Príncipe –6.0 –0.1 5.9 0.9 1.2 0.4 82.2 71.6 81.4 61.3 63.1 60.0
Senegal –3.9 –3.9 –6.4 –6.3 –4.7 -3.7 43.3 63.6 69.2 75.7 75.3 71.3
Seychelles 1.4 0.9 –17.4 –5.8 –6.7 -0.8 70.1 54.2 89.1 72.5 76.7 73.0
Sierra Leone –5.3 –3.1 –5.8 –6.9 –3.9 -3.2 48.6 72.4 76.3 76.2 75.0 73.1
South Africa –4.0 –4.7 –9.7 –6.4 –5.8 -6.1 42.2 56.3 69.4 69.1 70.2 73.4
South Sudan –7.0 0.1 6.7 10.0 8.9 3.9 41.8 28.1 37.2 58.2 50.5 21.2
Tanzania –3.0 –2.0 –2.5 –3.3 –3.3 -3.0 35.0 39.0 40.5 40.8 39.8 38.9
Togo –4.2 1.6 –6.9 –6.5 –4.9 -4.0 46.8 52.4 60.3 63.8 63.6 62.3
Uganda –3.0 –4.8 –7.5 –7.8 –5.6 -4.1 25.6 37.6 46.4 51.6 53.1 52.4
Zambia2 –5.6 –9.4 –13.8 –8.7 –9.0 -6.8 44.7 99.7 140.2 123.2 … …
Zimbabwe3 –3.3 –1.0 0.8 –2.0 –2.6 -2.7 47.7 93.2 102.6 67.6 67.2 61.7
Sub-Saharan Africa –3.2 –3.9 –6.4 –5.3 –4.7 -4.2 35.0 50.0 57.4 56.9 55.1 54.3
Median –3.2 –2.5 –5.3 –5.6 –4.5 -3.7 39.0 51.1 58.3 61.3 57.9 56.7
Excluding Nigeria and South Africa –3.0 –3.2 –5.5 –4.5 –3.4 -2.7 39.9 57.5 63.9 60.6 57.3 54.7
Oil-exporting countries –2.5 –3.3 –4.6 –4.1 –3.4 -3.3 27.2 43.8 48.5 46.3 42.5 42.0
Excluding Nigeria –1.5 0.3 –1.6 0.7 3.0 2.6 42.8 79.9 88.2 68.9 53.1 49.2
Oil-importing countries –3.8 –4.3 –7.3 –5.9 –5.4 -4.8 40.5 53.5 62.2 62.2 62.3 61.7
Excluding South Africa –3.6 –4.1 –6.3 –5.6 –5.2 -4.2 39.3 52.0 59.0 58.7 58.5 56.2
Middle-income countries –3.4 –4.4 –7.4 –5.9 –4.9 -4.6 34.4 50.9 59.5 59.1 57.1 57.3
Excluding Nigeria and South Africa –3.2 –4.0 –7.3 –5.3 –3.1 -2.4 41.5 65.9 75.2 69.5 64.4 62.7
Low-income countries –2.7 –2.3 –3.4 –3.5 –3.8 -3.1 37.7 47.2 51.4 50.3 48.7 45.3
Excluding low-income countries in –2.9 –2.7 –4.1 –4.4 –4.4 -3.7 38.7 48.8 52.6 53.4
fragile situations 52.3 49.5
Countries in fragile situations –2.2 –1.4 –3.1 –2.9 –2.6 -2.1 37.0 45.4 51.9 49.3 46.8 43.4
CFA franc zone –2.6 –1.5 –4.4 –4.1 –2.0 -1.2 33.1 47.2 54.0 56.2 53.2 51.8
CEMAC –2.4 –0.1 –2.0 –1.4 2.5 3.4 33.3 51.7 59.2 56.4 47.9 45.5
WAEMU –2.9 –2.4 –5.7 –5.7 –4.9 -3.9 33.6 44.4 51.1 56.1 56.5 55.4
COMESA (SSA members) –3.3 –4.6 –5.5 –5.1 –5.3 -4.1 40.1 54.4 61.0 58.5 58.0 54.8
EAC-5 –4.2 –5.3 –6.4 –6.5 –5.6 -4.4 37.0 48.9 55.7 57.1 57.9 56.8
ECOWAS –3.3 –4.3 –6.6 –6.4 –6.2 -5.5 25.6 36.7 43.8 47.2 46.9 47.2
SACU –3.9 –4.9 –9.6 –6.4 –5.7 -5.8 40.8 54.6 66.9 66.9 68.0 70.8
SADC –3.1 –3.7 –7.1 –4.6 –4.0 -4.0 42.0 61.1 71.2 64.8 62.1 62.0
See page 27 for sources and footnotes
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND | APRIL 2022 29
REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
SA3� Broad Money and External Current Account, Including Grants
Table SA3. Broad Money and External Current Account, Including Grants
Broad Money External Current Account, Including Grants
(Percent of GDP) (Percent of GDP)
2010–18 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2010–18 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
Angola 34.8 33.1 37.7 24.5 22.7 22.3 3.3 6.1 1.5 11.3 11.0 4.9
Benin 27.8 27.8 30.5 30.5 30.5 30.5 –5.0 –4.0 –1.7 –4.5 –5.8 –5.5
Botswana 45.0 47.2 52.5 50.6 49.8 49.7 2.1 –7.0 –10.8 –0.5 0.5 2.8
Burkina Faso 30.5 40.7 45.0 48.7 51.8 54.5 –4.9 –3.3 –0.1 –3.1 –5.7 –5.3
Burundi 25.7 39.6 46.3 50.9 52.7 54.4 –14.1 –11.6 –10.2 –13.5 –18.6 –15.7
Cabo Verde 92.4 102.0 125.3 116.2 112.7 109.2 –8.4 –0.4 –15.9 –12.5 –11.5 –8.6
Cameroon 21.3 24.0 26.6 29.3 31.2 32.1 –3.2 –4.3 –3.7 –3.3 –1.6 –2.9
Central African Republic 22.7 28.0 30.3 33.3 31.7 30.5 –7.6 –4.9 –8.5 –10.6 –11.0 –8.4
Chad 13.9 17.0 20.8 22.3 21.7 21.2 –8.1 –4.4 –7.6 –4.5 1.3 –2.3
Comoros 24.2 28.1 31.2 36.5 36.5 36.5 –2.7 –3.3 –1.6 –3.4 –8.3 –8.2
Congo, Democratic Republic of the 11.4 15.1 20.2 22.1 26.2 30.6 –5.4 –3.2 –2.2 –1.0 –0.3 –0.3
Congo, Republic of 27.2 24.4 36.4 31.8 28.8 32.2 –5.4 0.4 –0.1 15.4 26.0 14.7
Côte d'Ivoire 11.0 11.7 13.8 15.5 13.6 13.2 0.1 –2.3 –3.2 –3.7 –4.8 –4.4
Equatorial Guinea 15.2 16.0 17.3 14.3 11.9 7.3 –9.7 –0.9 –4.2 –3.4 –1.6 –2.0
Eritrea 199.0 241.5 235.3 226.6 211.5 202.6 12.1 13.0 11.4 13.5 13.5 13.3
Eswatini 26.5 28.3 32.4 30.7 33.9 33.9 4.6 4.3 6.7 0.5 –2.1 –0.2
Ethiopia1 28.5 33.0 30.8 31.1 26.5 24.2 –7.0 –5.3 –4.6 –3.2 –4.5 –4.4
Gabon 23.3 23.3 27.9 24.6 22.4 26.1 4.9 –0.9 –6.0 –6.9 1.7 –0.1
The Gambia 36.7 47.2 55.5 59.8 56.7 53.2 –8.0 –6.1 –3.2 –9.5 –14.9 –11.8
Ghana 23.6 26.1 31.4 30.6 30.6 30.4 –6.1 –2.7 –3.1 –3.0 –3.6 –3.5
Guinea 24.3 24.5 25.6 23.6 23.8 23.8 –15.6 –11.5 –13.7 –4.0 –9.6 –8.5
Guinea-Bissau 36.7 43.4 47.1 48.8 46.7 45.2 –2.3 –8.8 –2.6 –3.1 –5.6 –4.8
Kenya 36.9 34.4 37.1 35.2 34.3 33.8 –6.9 –5.3 –4.7 –5.4 –5.8 –5.3
Lesotho 34.6 35.4 41.8 40.6 39.1 38.4 –6.5 –2.1 –2.0 –9.3 –15.6 –8.9
Liberia 20.2 20.9 25.5 24.8 24.9 25.0 –17.8 –19.6 –16.3 –17.8 –16.1 –15.9
Madagascar 23.0 24.8 28.7 31.1 32.3 31.8 –3.4 –2.3 –5.4 –5.5 –6.5 –6.2
Malawi 17.1 16.0 17.5 17.5 17.5 17.5 –9.3 –12.6 –13.8 –14.5 –17.3 –15.4
Mali 26.5 29.6 36.5 40.3 40.3 40.3 –5.6 –7.5 –2.3 –4.5 –5.3 –4.9
Mauritius 104.3 120.8 163.7 165.8 153.0 143.6 –6.5 –5.4 –12.5 –11.1 –14.0 –8.0
Mozambique 31.9 36.9 43.3 42.7 43.2 43.4 –30.7 –19.1 –27.6 –22.4 –44.9 –39.0
Namibia 58.3 63.9 71.3 71.2 71.2 71.2 –8.3 –1.8 3.0 –7.3 –6.9 –4.4
Niger 17.1 17.1 19.2 21.3 23.2 23.8 –12.9 –12.2 –13.4 –15.8 –15.8 –13.8
Nigeria 22.1 23.9 25.0 24.9 25.3 26.2 1.9 –3.3 –4.0 –0.8 –1.1 –1.1
Rwanda 21.4 25.7 28.9 30.2 29.9 30.6 –9.9 –11.9 –11.9 –10.5 –11.4 –10.3
São Tomé & Príncipe 37.4 31.8 32.4 30.0 30.0 30.0 –16.8 –12.1 –10.3 –9.7 –12.1 –8.7
Senegal 33.2 41.5 45.3 48.2 50.5 50.0 –6.7 –7.9 –10.9 –11.8 –13.0 –8.4
Seychelles 64.7 82.5 119.0 107.7 84.0 80.6 –19.1 –16.2 –23.0 –20.3 –30.0 –23.6
Sierra Leone 22.0 23.2 29.5 31.7 31.4 31.1 –22.9 –14.3 –6.8 –13.0 –17.2 –13.7
South Africa 66.5 67.1 74.6 70.5 70.4 71.1 –3.4 –2.6 2.0 3.7 1.3 –1.0
South Sudan 18.1 13.6 14.6 16.3 15.5 10.1 3.5 1.5 –15.6 –7.6 9.5 1.1
Tanzania 22.6 20.4 21.3 21.5 21.5 21.4 –7.5 –2.6 –1.8 –3.3 –4.3 –3.6
Togo 36.2 42.0 45.4 46.9 47.1 47.2 –5.4 –0.8 –1.5 –3.3 –5.9 –6.4
Uganda 17.2 19.4 22.5 25.1 23.5 23.4 –5.7 –6.2 –9.3 –7.9 –7.0 –9.8
Zambia 20.1 23.6 31.3 35.4 34.8 34.2 1.1 0.6 12.0 6.7 4.4 4.3
Zimbabwe2 24.3 18.7 17.1 16.4 18.5 21.7 –9.9 4.0 4.7 3.6 2.5 1.5
Sub-Saharan Africa 34.8 35.5 38.6 37.5 37.0 37.0 –2.5 –3.2 –3.0 –1.1 –1.7 –2.5
Median 25.8 28.0 31.3 31.1 31.4 31.8 –5.7 –4.0 –4.2 –4.5 –5.8 –5.3
Excluding Nigeria and South Africa 27.8 29.5 32.7 32.0 31.1 30.9 –4.5 –3.5 –4.3 –3.2 –3.1 –3.6
Oil-exporting countries 23.7 24.9 26.9 24.9 24.9 25.7 1.4 –1.9 –3.6 0.4 1.7 0.0
Excluding Nigeria 27.4 27.4 31.4 25.1 24.2 24.3 0.3 1.6 –2.5 3.5 7.4 2.7
Oil-importing countries 41.8 41.4 45.2 44.3 43.4 43.1 –5.2 –4.0 –2.6 –1.9 –3.6 –4.0
Excluding South Africa 27.9 30.0 33.0 33.5 32.6 32.3 –6.5 –4.7 –4.7 –4.7 –6.0 –5.4
Middle-income countries 37.8 38.4 42.2 40.2 39.8 40.0 –1.2 –2.6 –2.0 0.2 –0.2 –1.3
Excluding Nigeria and South Africa 30.6 31.7 36.2 34.0 33.0 32.7 –2.0 –2.0 –3.1 –1.7 –0.5 –1.6
Low-income countries 24.2 27.0 28.8 29.8 29.1 28.9 –8.3 –5.4 –5.6 –4.9 –6.3 –6.1
Excluding low-income countries in
24.3 27.3 28.4 29.4 27.8 27.1 –9.3 –6.1 –6.3 –6.1
fragile situations –8.3 –7.9
Countries in fragile situations 20.8 22.1 25.6 26.5 26.5 27.3 –5.1 –3.7 –4.0 –2.4 –2.1 –2.8
CFA franc zone 21.6 24.5 28.0 29.6 29.6 30.0 –3.7 –4.0 –4.5 –4.5 –3.3 –3.9
CEMAC 20.4 22.2 26.0 26.4 26.2 27.1 –3.6 –2.6 –4.3 –2.0 2.9 –0.0
WAEMU 22.4 25.7 29.1 31.3 31.3 31.5 –4.1 –4.9 –4.6 –6.1 –7.3 –6.2
COMESA (SSA members) 29.7 32.0 34.6 35.0 33.4 32.8 –5.9 –4.4 –4.1 –3.7 –4.3 –4.2
EAC-5 27.3 27.0 29.3 29.2 28.5 28.3 –7.1 –5.1 –5.1 –5.6 –6.0 –6.0
ECOWAS 22.5 24.8 27.0 27.3 27.6 28.2 –0.5 –3.9 –4.3 –2.6 –3.2 –2.8
SACU 64.8 65.6 72.9 68.9 68.8 69.5 –3.3 –2.7 1.5 3.1 0.9 –1.0
SADC 50.0 49.4 55.0 51.6 51.3 51.5 –3.3 –1.9 –0.1 1.9 0.4 –1.3
See page 27 for sources and footnotes
30 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND | APRIL 2022
STATISTICAL APPENDIX
SA4� External Debt, Official Debt, Debtor Based and Reserves
Table SA4. External Debt, Official Debt, Debtor Based and Reserves
External Debt, Official Debt, Debtor Based Reserves
(Percent of GDP) (Months of imports of goods and services)
2010–18 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2010–18 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
Angola 29.2 59.5 89.1 72.7 44.8 43.6 8.3 13.6 10.2 6.2 6.6 6.6
Benin1 14.2 25.1 30.3 36.2 36.6 35.6 … ... ... ... ... ...
Botswana 15.8 11.8 11.8 9.8 11.3 11.0 11.6 10.0 6.5 6.2 6.3 7.1
Burkina Faso1 21.1 23.2 25.4 23.6 23.2 22.1 ... ... ... ... ... ...
Burundi 20.0 18.0 17.5 20.0 19.6 18.4 2.8 1.3 1.0 2.1 1.6 1.2
Cabo Verde 81.3 107.3 142.8 124.6 135.6 129.5 5.1 8.9 6.9 7.4 6.4 5.7
Cameroon2 16.1 29.2 32.5 32.3 33.7 32.7 ... ... ... ... ... ...
Central African Republic2 26.1 35.8 36.3 32.8 32.9 30.8 ... ... ... ... ... ...
Chad2 24.1 24.2 27.3 26.2 23.2 21.6 ... ... ... ... ... ...
Comoros 17.7 19.6 24.1 23.3 29.8 33.9 7.0 7.0 8.0 8.2 7.1 6.8
Congo, Democratic Republic of the 15.7 12.8 12.9 11.3 9.4 7.7 1.1 0.8 0.6 0.8 1.1 1.4
Congo, Republic of 2 23.8 31.0 34.2 29.3 25.0 26.2 ... ... ... ... ... ...
Côte d'Ivoire1 24.4 30.0 34.1 33.1 33.8 32.7 ... ... ... ... ... ...
Equatorial Guinea2 8.1 13.9 16.4 12.0 9.7 12.0 ... ... ... ... ... ...
Eritrea 63.4 61.7 58.1 53.7 47.6 44.0 3.7 2.5 2.2 2.2 2.8 3.4
Eswatini 8.2 12.7 15.3 15.9 18.0 18.3 3.8 3.2 3.1 3.0 3.0 3.0
Ethiopia3 24.5 28.2 28.8 29.0 27.0 24.3 2.0 2.2 2.0 1.6 0.8 0.8
Gabon2 27.4 38.9 49.0 38.1 33.7 34.8 ... ... ... ... ... ...
The Gambia 35.1 46.4 48.9 46.5 45.1 43.5 3.7 4.0 5.1 5.8 4.7 4.3
Ghana 23.6 29.6 36.0 36.0 36.9 34.6 2.7 3.2 3.2 3.1 2.7 2.3
Guinea 26.8 19.7 25.1 26.0 26.6 27.8 2.2 1.5 2.0 2.2 1.8 2.1
Guinea-Bissau1 29.4 37.8 44.9 40.1 41.7 38.9 ... ... ... ... ... ...
Kenya 22.2 30.5 32.8 33.3 35.0 36.4 4.3 6.1 4.5 4.4 3.9 4.2
Lesotho 34.9 38.8 48.2 42.5 43.9 45.2 4.8 3.9 4.3 4.3 3.9 3.4
Liberia 15.3 35.2 40.9 37.6 37.8 37.5 2.1 2.2 2.1 4.0 4.0 4.1
Madagascar 23.2 26.9 36.4 40.1 43.3 45.0 3.1 5.3 4.9 5.2 5.0 4.8
Malawi 17.3 28.0 31.8 31.7 37.0 39.3 2.3 3.1 2.0 0.5 0.3 0.7
Mali1 22.2 26.5 31.8 29.3 28.8 26.8 ... ... ... ... ... ...
Mauritius 13.7 10.9 21.1 22.4 30.1 28.5 6.9 16.9 15.0 14.7 11.4 10.0
Mozambique 58.8 80.8 91.6 82.1 76.1 76.2 3.2 5.3 4.6 2.5 2.3 2.2
Namibia 10.8 20.3 23.9 17.7 17.5 16.0 3.2 5.4 4.2 5.1 4.1 4.3
Niger1 17.0 25.4 33.0 33.0 34.4 33.0 ... ... ... ... ... ...
Nigeria 3.1 6.7 8.0 9.1 8.8 8.7 5.9 6.3 6.6 5.9 6.5 7.0
Rwanda 24.7 43.2 53.9 55.8 59.3 60.9 3.7 4.6 5.4 4.6 4.0 3.7
São Tomé & Príncipe 76.6 65.4 64.9 61.3 63.1 60.0 3.8 3.3 5.0 4.4 5.2 5.1
Senegal1 30.1 47.4 48.9 45.8 45.9 42.3 ... ... ... ... ... ...
Seychelles 37.9 26.3 40.7 39.3 36.4 40.0 3.4 5.7 4.6 4.6 3.8 3.6
Sierra Leone 30.4 41.4 48.3 47.9 48.3 48.0 2.9 4.5 4.6 5.4 4.3 4.0
South Africa 13.7 20.2 23.6 18.7 19.6 20.1 5.4 8.4 6.4 5.1 4.7 4.3
South Sudan ... ... ... ... ... ... 1.8 0.4 0.1 0.5 1.0 0.8
Tanzania 24.9 28.1 28.9 28.5 26.7 25.0 4.6 5.8 5.6 4.9 4.6 4.3
Togo1 12.8 17.6 28.7 25.8 28.0 27.4 ... ... ... ... ... ...
Uganda 15.6 25.3 31.5 32.9 33.8 34.0 4.6 3.7 4.4 4.0 3.8 3.6
Zambia4 21.8 48.7 66.6 57.6 … … 2.8 2.6 1.2 2.6 2.8 3.5
Zimbabwe5 33.6 31.2 30.8 21.8 19.5 20.4 0.5 0.3 0.1 1.2 0.8 0.8
Sub-Saharan Africa 15.4 22.9 26.6 25.1 24.0 23.4 4.9 6.0 5.1 4.5 4.5 4.6
Median 22.3 28.2 32.6 32.9 33.8 33.4 3.7 4.0 4.5 4.4 3.9 3.7
Excluding Nigeria and South Africa 23.3 32.0 36.7 34.7 32.6 31.7 4.2 4.9 3.9 3.6 3.5 3.6
Oil-exporting countries 9.9 17.1 20.0 20.2 17.7 17.1 6.0 6.9 6.4 5.4 6.0 6.5
Excluding Nigeria 24.6 43.5 55.5 47.9 36.7 36.4 6.3 8.3 5.9 4.3 5.2 5.6
Oil-importing countries 19.2 26.2 30.1 27.5 27.6 27.1 4.2 5.6 4.4 4.0 3.6 3.5
Excluding South Africa 23.0 29.3 33.0 31.9 31.5 30.5 3.4 4.0 3.5 3.4 3.1 3.1
Middle-income countries 13.4 21.4 25.1 23.6 22.5 22.1 5.5 7.0 5.8 5.1 5.2 5.4
Excluding Nigeria and South Africa 22.9 35.2 41.8 39.1 35.9 35.3 5.2 6.4 4.8 4.4 4.5 4.7
Low-income countries 24.0 28.0 30.8 29.6 28.5 27.4 2.7 3.0 2.9 2.7 2.3 2.3
Excluding low-income countries in 25.0 31.1 34.1 34.1 3.4 3.9 3.7 3.4 2.9 2.7
fragile situations 33.2 31.7
Countries in fragile situations 23.0 25.3 28.3 25.9 25.0 24.3 2.5 2.1 2.0 2.2 2.4 2.5
CFA franc zone 20.8 29.7 34.1 32.2 31.8 31.0 4.7 4.8 4.7 4.7 4.7 4.8
CEMAC 19.1 28.9 33.2 29.8 27.9 28.3 4.2 3.6 3.2 2.7 3.6 4.4
WAEMU 22.4 30.2 34.6 33.7 34.2 32.6 5.0 5.6 5.5 5.8 5.3 5.0
COMESA (SSA members) 21.4 27.6 30.8 29.9 29.2 28.6 3.1 3.9 3.1 3.0 2.6 2.7
EAC-5 21.8 29.4 32.2 32.7 33.2 33.3 4.4 5.5 4.8 4.5 4.1 4.1
ECOWAS 9.3 15.1 18.2 19.2 18.4 17.6 5.0 5.3 5.3 4.9 5.3 5.6
SACU 13.7 19.9 23.1 18.4 19.3 19.7 5.5 8.3 6.3 5.1 4.7 4.4
SADC 18.8 27.4 32.5 27.3 25.7 25.5 5.4 7.7 5.8 4.7 4.4 4.3
See page 27 for sources and footnotes
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND | APRIL 2022 31