INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
REGIONAL
ECONOMIC
OUTLOOK
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
Living on the Edge
2022
OC T
W o r l d E c o n o m i c a n d F i n a n c i a l S u r v e y s
Regional Economic Outlook
22
I N T E R N A T I O N A L M O N E T A R Y F U N D
TCO
Sub-Saharan Africa
Living on the Edge
©2022 Cataloging-in-Publication Data
IMF Library
Names: International Monetary Fund, publisher.
Title: Regional economic outlook. Sub-Saharan Africa : living on the edge.
Other titles: Sub-Saharan Africa : living on the edge. | World economic and financial surveys.
Description: Washington, DC : International Monetary Fund, 2022. | World economic and financial surveys. |
Oct. 2022. | Includes bibliographical references.
Identifiers:
9798400221910 (paper)
9798400221941 (ePub)
9798400221989 (Web PDF)
Subjects: LCSH: Africa, Sub-Saharan -- Economic conditions. | Economic forecasting -- Africa, Sub-Saharan. |
Economic development -- Africa, Sub-Saharan. | Africa, Sub-Saharan -- Economic policy.
Classification: LCC HC800.R4456 2022
The Regional Economic Outlook: Sub-Saharan Africa is published twice a year, in the
spring and fall, to review developments in sub-Saharan Africa. Both projections and
policy considerations are those of the IMF staff and do not necessarily represent the
views of the IMF, its Executive Board, or IMF Management.
Publication orders may be placed online, by fax, or through the mail:
International Monetary Fund, Publication Services
P.O. Box 92780, Washington, DC 20090 (USA)
Tel.: (202) 623-7430 Fax: (202) 623-7201
Email: publications@imf.org
www.imf.org
www.elibrary.imf.org
See all published Regional Economic Outlook: Sub-Saharan Africa:
https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/REO/SSA
ii INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND | OCTOBER 2022 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND | OCTOBER 2022 iii
Contents
Acknowledgments � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �iv
Executive Summary � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � v
Living on the Edge � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 1
Recent Developments and Outlook: Another Challenging Year � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �1
Policymaking at the Edge � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �4
Four Policy Priorities � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �5
International Solidarity Remains Essential � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �9
Infographic: Living on the Edge � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 11
References � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 12
Statistical Appendix � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 13
Figures
Figure 1� Sub-Saharan Africa: Portfolio Flows � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �1
Figure 2� World: Global Commodity Prices � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �1
Figure 3� Sub-Saharan Africa: Composition of Public Debt, 2000–20 � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �2
Figure 4� Sub-Saharan Africa: CPI Inflation, 2010–22 � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �2
Figure 5� Sub-Saharan Africa: GDP Growth 2022 � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �3
Figure 6� Sub-Saharan Africa: Inflation � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �3
Figure 7� Emerging and Frontier Market Economies: Exchange Rates, National Currency per US Dollar � � � � � � � � �6
Figure 8� Sub-Saharan Africa: Increase in Policy Rates � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �7
Figure 9� Sub-Saharan Africa: Change in Interest to Revenue Ratio, 2019–25 � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �7
Figure 10� Sub-Saharan Africa: Fiscal Adjustment Needed to Stabilize Debt Below 70% of GDP � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �8
Statistical Appendix Tables
SA1� Real GDP Growth and Consumer Prices, Average � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �16
SA2� Overall Fiscal Balance, Including Grants and Government Debt � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �17
SA3� Broad Money and External Current Account, Including Grants � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �18
SA4� External Debt, Official Debt, Debtor Based and Reserves � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �19
ii INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND | OCTOBER 2022 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND | OCTOBER 2022 iii
Acknowledgments
The October 2022 issue of the Regional Economic Outlook: Sub-Saharan Africa (REO) was prepared by a
team led by Andrew Tiffin under the supervision of Aqib Aslam, Luc Eyraud, and Catherine Pattillo.
The team included Hany Abdel-Latif, Marijn Bolhuis, Wenjie Chen, Habtamu Fuje, Cleary Haines, Shushanik
Hakobyan, Peter Kovacs, Saad Quayyum, Henry Rawlings, Ivanova Reyes, and Qianqian Zhang.
Charlotte Vazquez was responsible for document production, with assistance from Erick Trejo Guevara.
The editing and production were overseen by Cheryl Toksoz of the Communications Department.
The following conventions are used in this publication:
• In tables, a blank cell indicates “not applicable,” ellipsis points (. . .) indicate “not available,” and 0 or
0.0 indicates “zero” or “negligible.” Minor discrepancies between sums of constituent figures and totals
are due to rounding.
• An en dash (–) between years or months (for example, 2019–20 or January–June) indicates the years
or months covered, including the beginning and ending years or months; a slash or virgule (/) between
years or months (for example, 2005/06) indicates a fiscal or financial year, as does
the abbreviation FY (for example, FY2006).
• “Billion” means a thousand million; “trillion” means a thousand billion.
• “Basis points” refer to hundredths of 1 percentage point (for example, 25 basis points are equivalent to
¼ of 1 percentage point).
iv INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND | OCTOBER 2022 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND | OCTOBER 2022 v
Executive Summary
Sub-Saharan Africa’s recovery has been abruptly • Consolidating public finances amid tighter financial
interrupted. Last year, activity finally bounced back, conditions. Regional debt is approaching levels last
lifting GDP growth in 2021 to 4.7 percent. But seen in the early 2000s before the impact of the
growth this year is expected to slow sharply by more Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative. And
than 1 percentage point to 3.6 percent, as a worldwide in the context of rising global interest rates, access
slowdown, tighter global financial conditions, and a to funding will likely become much less forgiving.
dramatic pickup in global inflation spill into a region To build resilience and absorb the cost of a higher
already wearied by an ongoing series of shocks. Rising interest bill, authorities will need to continue
food and energy prices are striking at the region’s most consolidation. Further, credible medium-term
vulnerable, and public debt and inflation are at levels fiscal frameworks—including effective debt
not seen in decades. Against this backdrop, and with management—can reduce exposure to shifts in risk
limited options, many countries find themselves pushed sentiment and can lower borrowing costs. For some
closer to the edge. countries, debt reprofiling or restructuring may be
needed, requiring improved implementation of the
The near-term outlook is extremely uncertain. G20 Common Framework.
Concretely, the region’s prospects are tied firmly to
• Setting the stage for sustainable and greener growth.
developments in the global economy, while locally, the
High-quality growth has long been a priority, but
sociopolitical and security situation for many countries
the context for reform is changing dramatically
remains particularly difficult.
in the context of accelerating climate change.
Investment in resilient, green infrastructure is
In this regard, policymakers face the most challenging
increasingly important. And capitalizing on the
environment in years. They will need to deal with
region’s sizable endowment of renewable energy
immediate socioeconomic crises as they emerge (fighting
sources—and potentially leapfrogging fossil-fu-
fires), while also reducing vulnerabilities to future
el-based models—will require both innovating
shocks as best they can (building resilience). Ultimately,
private finance and energy sector reforms.
however, the region’s safety and prosperity will require
high-quality growth, so policies must also set the stage Regional Economic Outlook Analytical Notes
for a sustainable recovery (moving away from the edge).
As background to the findings and recommendations
With these goals in mind, sub-Saharan Africa faces of the October 2022 Regional Economic Outlook:
four key policy priorities: Sub-Saharan Africa, a separate series of notes are
provided on select topics of current interest. “Building
• Addressing food insecurity. With 123 million
a More Food-Secure Sub-Saharan Africa” outlines
acutely food-insecure people across the region,
the region’s response to the food security crisis and
rising food and energy prices mean that lives are
recommends policies for improving resilience in the
at risk. Tackling this issue is a clear priority, but
context of climate change. “Tackling Rising Inflation
the ability to rapidly expand social safety nets is
in Sub-Saharan Africa” analyzes the main drivers of
constrained in many cases, so some countries have
inflation across the region and discusses elements of an
turned to expensive and poorly targeted support
appropriate monetary policy response. “Managing Oil
measures. While these measures, especially food
Price Uncertainty and the Energy Transition” addresses
support, may be necessary in the current emergency,
the response to volatile export prices and examines
they should eventually be phased out and replaced
policies for oil exporters considering a global transition
with better-targeted alternatives, ensuring that
away from fossil fuels. “Digital Currency Innovations
scarce resources go to those who need them most.
in Sub-Saharan Africa” outlines recent developments
• Managing the shift in monetary policies. With in this fast-moving space and discusses the costs and
increased inflation and rising global interest rates, benefits of various instruments currently contemplated
most authorities have started to tighten monetary by the region’s policymakers (mobile money, central
policy. But in a context of fiscal consolidation and bank digital currencies, and cryptocurrencies).
a fragile recovery, authorities face a difficult balance.
They should increase policy rates gradually and
cautiously, keeping a close eye on inflation expecta-
tions and the level of foreign exchange reserves.
iv INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND | OCTOBER 2022 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND | OCTOBER 2022 v
Living on the Edge
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND gains have been scaled back since April, and significant
OUTLOOK: ANOTHER CHALLENGING heterogeneity persists—oil exporters can expect an
improvement of about 16 percent in their terms of
YEAR
trade this year, while non-resource-intensive countries
face a drop of about 4½ percent. For commodity
Sub-Saharan Africa’s recovery has been sharply exporters and importers alike, however, external prices
interrupted. Last year, activity in sub-Saharan Africa are now increasingly uncertain.
finally bounced back, bringing GDP growth in 2021
up to 4.7 percent. Unfortunately, growth is expected Macroeconomic Imbalances Have Returned…
to slow this year by more than 1 percentage point to
3.6 percent, as a worldwide slowdown and a dramatic Policy space to confront the latest challenges
pickup in global inflation spill into a region already remains thin as the region endures its third year of
wearied by an ongoing series of shocks. Rising food crisis. Over the past few years, as authorities have
and energy prices are striking at the region’s most struggled to protect lives and livelihoods throughout
vulnerable, and macroeconomic imbalances are the COVID-19 pandemic, fiscal positions have
approaching levels not seen in decades. deteriorated, increasing regional public debt to about
60 percent of GDP. And with global supply chain
A Shifting and Tumultuous Global Environment
Figure 1� Sub-Saharan Africa: Portfolio Flows
Three major global developments are reshaping (Billions of US dollars)
sub-Saharan Africa’s outlook: the slowdown in 6
advanced economies and emerging markets, tightening
4
global financial conditions, and volatile commodity
2
prices.
0
In the months since April, growth projections have Equity
-2
been scaled back worldwide. Global growth in 2022
Bonds
has been revised down by almost ½ percentage point, -4
driven in large part by a drop for both advanced -6
economies and China of about 1 percentage point. 2015 16 17 18 19 20 21 2022 :
H1
Sources: EPFR; and IMF staff calculations.
With the rapid pickup in global inflation, monetary
Note: EPFR data covers flows to portfolio investment funds.
policy normalization in advanced economies has (Index, February 21, 2022 = 100)
sped up. In this context, capital flows have remained Figure 2� World: Global Commodity Prices
precarious (Figure 1). For the first half of the year, (Index, February 21, 2022 = 100)
outflows from sub-Saharan Africa rivaled those 180
associated with the onset of the COVID-19 crisis or
160
the 2015 commodity price shock, adding to pressure
on exchange rates, with the largest depreciations 140
observed in Ghana, Malawi, and Sierra LeoneS.S1A REO
120
Wheat
Copper
Global commodity prices have been particularly 100
turbulent. Wheat, for example, almost doubled at the
80 Invasion
onset of the Russian invasion of Ukraine but has since Oil of Ukraine
returned to prewar levels (Figure 2). More broadly, 60
sub-Saharan Africa’s terms of trade are still expected to Sep-21 Dec-21 Mar-22 Jun-22 Sep-22
improve in 2022, compared with last yeaArp,r ibl ut some Source: Bloomberg Finance L.P.
1 Although most currencies weakened against the US dollar in the first half of 2022, real effective exchange rates actually appreciated
in more than half of sub-Saharan African countries, in part due to high inflation.
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND | OCTOBER 2022 1
REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
disruptions adding to the fallout from the war in traditionally been robust predictors of social unrest
Ukraine, double-digit inflation is now present in and have contributed to growing protests across the
about 40 percent of the region’s economies. region this year (Ghana, Guinea, Mozambique, Sierra
Leone). However, looking beyond food and fuel prices,
On public debt, regional indebtedness is now regional core inflation remains muted at this stage.
approaching levels last seen in the early 2000s before
the impact of the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries …Clouding the Economic Outlook…
Initiative, though with a different composition
(Figure 3). The substitution of low-cost, long-term The current upheaval comes at a most unfortunate
multilateral debt with higher-cost private funds has time, as many countries are still dealing with the
resulted in rising debt-service costs and higher rollover fallout from a pandemic that is far from over.
risks. Nineteen of the region’s 35 low-income countries Vaccination rates in sub-Saharan Africa are still only
are in debt distress or at high risk of distress.2 Out of a fraction of those in other regions (21 percent of the
the other ten countries of the region, three have faced population fully vaccinated), leaving many countries
spreads of more than 1,000 basis points at some point exposed to further illness and the possible emergence
over the past six months (Angola, Gabon, Nigeria). of new variants.
On inflation, rising prices have mirrored worldwide Nonetheless, as underscored in the April 2022 Regional
trends, where inflation has increased more rapidly and Economic Outlook: sub-Saharan Africa, the region
more persistently than expected, and where incomes enjoyed a surprisingly strong recovery toward the end
have been squeezed by hikes in the cost of living. of 2021. With final GDP data for more countries,
Recent inflation increases may appear less striking the growth figure for 2021 has been revised upward
relative to historical averages for sub-Saharan Africa further to 4.7 percent.
(Figure 4), especially for countries with fixed exchange
rates, but much of the recent movement has been However, the recent global turmoil has interrupted this
driven by essential food and energy items, which are progress. Regionwide, growth is expected to slow to
imported in many countries and average 50 percent of 3.6 percent in 2022 and 3.7 percent in 2023 because
the region’s consumption basket. of muted investment and an overall worsening balance
of trade (in volume terms). Oil exporters will grow
As a result, poverty, food insecurity, and malnutrition by 3.3 percent in 2022, and other resource-intensive
have been exacerbated, particularly in urban areas, countries by 3.1 percent. Even with a drop in their
with consequences not only for confidence and terms of trade, diversified non-resource-intensive
economic growth but also for social and political countries will continue to be among the region’s
stability. Rising food and energy prices have more dynamic and resilient economies, growing by
4.6 percent (Figure 5).
Figure 3� Sub-Saharan Africa: Composition of Public Debt,
2000–20 Figure 4� Sub-Saharan Africa: CPI Inflation, 2010–22
(Total, percent of GDP) (Percent, year-on-year, dashed line = pre-COVID-19 average)
60
9.0
Sub-Saharan Africa(median)
40 7.0
20 5.0
3.0 Global
0 composite
2000 05 10 15 20
1.0
Domestic External Bonds Multilateral Jan-10 Jan-12 Jan-14 Jan-16 Jan-18 Jan-20 Jan-22
Bilateral Other
Sources: World Bank, International Debt Statistics; and IMF, World Sources: Haver Analytics; country authorities; and IMF staff calculations.
Economic Outlook database. Note: Global composite by Haver Analytics.
2 These are the 35 sub-Saharan African economies covered by the Joint World Bank–IMF Debt Sustainability Framework for
Low-Income Countries.
2 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND | OCTOBER 2022
LIVING ON THE EDGE
Figure 5� Sub-Saharan Africa: GDP Growth, 2022
(Percent, red = Countries in fragile and conflict-affected situations)
Sub-Saharan Africa weighted average: 3.6 Non Resource
NGA
Oil Exporter
BFA GNB
Other Resource
GAB COM MOZ MDG SEN
ERI ZWE LBR BWA GIN BEN MUS
MLI NAM GHA CPV TZA CIV COD
CAF LSO SLE ZMB TCD CMR UGA TGO RWA NER
MWI STP ZAF SWZ AGO BDI ETH COG GMB KEN GNQ SSD SYC
0.0 2.5 5.0 7.5 10.0 12.5
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook database.
Note: See page 15 for country abbreviations list.
For 2022, the new growth projection for sub-Saharan …Amid Significant Downside Risks�
Africa represents a relatively modest downgrade of
−0.2 percent, compared with the April 2022 Regional Looking ahead, the outlook for 2022 and 2023 is
Economic Outlook: sub-Saharan Africa—substantially extremely uncertain. Sub-Saharan Africa’s prospects
less than the −0.9 percent revision for advanced are tied firmly to developments in the global economy,
economies. But the modest revision masks some and three key factors will shape the near-term path:
regional heterogeneity. South Africa’s 2022 growth (1) the monetary policy response of the world’s
projection, for example, was revised up as a robust largest economies to elevated inflation, (2) the war in
recovery in services activity, amid lower COVID-19 Ukraine, and (3) the ongoing impact of COVID-19-
cases, more than offset the adverse impacts of flooding, related lockdowns and supply chain disruptions.
power cuts, and strikes. Elsewhere, 33 of the remaining
44 countries have revised their projections downward Currently, the baseline projection for sub-Saharan
in light of a less-benign global outlook and cost-of- Africa assumes that global monetary tightening does
living pressures on domestic activity. not prompt a widespread recession or a disorderly shift
in global financial conditions. Further, it assumes that
Revisions to projected inflation have been more the conflict in Ukraine does not worsen, and that there
significant—the median for the region (year over are no additional pandemic-related disruptions to
year) has increased by almost 2 percentage points, global activity.
bringing the end-2022 forecast to 8.7 percent. Again,
expectations differ across countries (Figure 6). The Clearly, all these global factors are subject to sizable
projected median for those with pegged exchange downside risks.
rates is 6 percent (up 2.0), but it reaches 12.6 percent
(up 3.6) for those with more flexible arrangements. • Perhaps most important, monetary authorities
Angola is a notable exception: 2022 inflation has across the globe face the most challenging policy
been marked down by more than 3 percentage points environment in many years. If global inflation
because of the rapid appreciation of the Kwanza were to persist, faster and larger tightening in
associated with higher oil prices. advanced economies could slow global demand
and further increase borrowing costs in sub-
Figure 6� Sub-Saharan Africa: Inflation
(Percent, year-on-year, as of July 2022) Saharan Africa, undermining debt sustainability
and constraining local authorities’ ability to
ETH
GHA shield their most vulnerable. A global slowdown
30
SLE MWI and tighter financial conditions might also
further reduce the supply of official development
20 AGO assistance to the region. In addition, added
STP exchange rate pressures from a strengthening
ERI US dollar may increase imported inflation for the
10
region while draining reserves and undermining
financial stability in countries with balance sheet
0 vulnerabilities. At the extreme, sudden capital
outflows may cause distress in economies with
Flexible Pegged
Arrangement Exchange Rate large external financing needs.
Sources: Country authorities; and IMF staff calculations.
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND | OCTOBER 2022 3
REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
• An intensification of the war in Ukraine or POLICYMAKING AT THE EDGE
prolonged restrictions on Russian exports could
add to the turmoil seen over the past year, putting For many policymakers in sub-Saharan Africa, the
additional upward pressure on food and energy road ahead is daunting. With growing social needs,
prices in sub-Saharan Africa, exacerbating food rising imbalances, and elevated risks, the recent crisis
affordability problems for the most vulnerable has pushed many of them even closer to the edge.
populations, and fueling social tensions. Depleted buffers and shrinking policy space leaves
Furthermore, an escalation in geopolitical strains little room for error, and decisions must often strike
between Russia and Western countries could also a difficult balance across competing demands, most
increase global risk aversion and raise borrowing notably:
costs for the region, especially for countries with
• Fighting fires. First and foremost, precedence
more fragile fiscal positions.
should be given to saving lives. Throughout the
COVID-19 crisis, the region was focused appro-
Domestically, the sociopolitical context for many
priately on immediate measures to protect the
countries is challenging. Seven countries will hold
health and livelihoods of those at greatest risk.
presidential and parliamentary elections over the
Now, a cost-of-living crisis is adding to an already
next 12 months, and many others face rising popular
fragile food security situation, requiring a similarly
dissatisfaction. In such circumstances, responding
urgent response.
quickly to new shocks or pursuing long-needed reform
may be more difficult. Several countries also continue • Building resilience. Faced with an uncertain and
to face elevated security concerns (Burkina Faso, volatile outlook, authorities must reduce vulnera-
Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Ethiopia, bility to future shocks as best they can. In the first
Mali, Mozambique). Current projections assume a instance, this may require rebuilding buffers and
gradual de-escalation of political and military tensions. insuring economies against larger tail risks
But if security risks persist or worsen, the economic (Analytical Note “Managing Rising Oil Price
outlook for these countries and their neighbors could Uncertainty and the Energy Transition”). In
deteriorate significantly. addition, countries can build resilience by
strengthening their policy frameworks. Although
Any quantification of such risks should be treated current imbalances in sub-Saharan Africa may
with caution. The impact of yet another shock to recall the 1990s, the region has made significant
the region can be particularly hard to predict, given progress since then, particularly in improved
limited buffers and elevated poverty, food insecurity, budget frameworks, monetary credibility, and
and social tensions. Still, under a downside scenario governance. These achievements have helped
that abstracts from local security and political cushion some of the recent turmoil but will need
difficulties and considers only global factors (with to be safeguarded and strengthened.
tighter sanctions and reduced oil exports from
• Moving away from the edge. Ultimately, pro-
Russia, a significant downturn in China’s real estate
gressing beyond the current situation will require
sector, persistent labor-market disruptions in major
high-quality growth over the medium term,
economies, and tighter global financial conditions),
suggesting that the premium on upfront structural
worldwide growth would slow by an additional
reform is higher than ever. Strong growth is
1½ percentage points each year over the next two years
perhaps the most essential remedy available for the
(October 2022 World Economic Outlook). This would
elimination of imbalances, as a growing economy
be historically exceptional and would be accompanied
means a growing tax base and more policy space—
by markedly higher oil and gas prices. On top of an
for an average African country, an additional
already downbeat baseline projection, the cumulative
1 percentage point of annual GDP growth over
cost to sub-Saharan Africa would amount to a loss of
a decade could reduce the debt ratio by close to
−0.7 percent of GDP over 2023–24, though with
15 percentage points.
a somewhat different impact on oil exporters (gain
+1.1 percent) versus other resource-intensive countries
(lose −1.8 percent) and non-resource-intensive
countries (lose −1.4 percent).
4 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND | OCTOBER 2022
LIVING ON THE EDGE
FOUR POLICY PRIORITIES support at the scale or pace needed—even countries
that had been innovative in leveraging new digital
With these objectives in mind, each country must technologies during the COVID-19 crisis (Togo) have
tailor its policy mix to its own circumstances. But for had less success adopting the same approach in current
the region more broadly, the considerations described circumstances.
earlier suggest four pressing priorities.
Instead, many countries have turned to immediately
Addressing Food Insecurity available short-term support measures, addressing
both fuel and food price pressures in the context of
By the end of 2022, 123 million people or 12 percent an overall cost-of-living squeeze. From a recent survey
of sub-Saharan Africa’s population are expected to face of IMF country teams, these short-term measures
acute food insecurity (two-thirds of the worldwide implemented this year are mostly untargeted and
total), one-third of which have become acutely food are split evenly between those aimed at food security
insecure since the start of the pandemic. And of these, directly and those addressing higher fuel prices
a large proportion are children in circumstances in (Analytical Note “Building a More Food-Secure
which chronic hunger can permanently curtail future Sub-Saharan Africa”). Some countries have cut taxes
health and prospects. The rapid increase in food on food or fuel (Malawi, Niger, Senegal, Zimbabwe),
insecurity over the past two years is mainly due to and others have introduced new subsidies (Kenya,
(1) the fallout from the pandemic and the recent war Senegal, Zambia). A number have introduced price
in Ukraine, (2) a worsening security situation in some controls (Benin, Côte d’Ivoire), allocated credit to key
parts of the region, (3) a four-season drought in the importers or agricultural firms (Sierra Leone), made
Horn of Africa, and (4) other climate shocks (Angola, direct government arrangements to import critical
Madagascar). Areas of particular concern include the staples (Ethiopia), and introduced export restrictions
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Nigeria, (Côte d’Ivoire). The Nigerian authorities have
South Sudan, some parts of Kenya, and countries in suspended long-touted plans to scrap gas subsidies.
the Sahel. The World Food Programme has identified Only a few countries have introduced targeted cash or
the drought in the Horn of Africa as the world’s worst in-kind transfers.
food emergency in 2022.
In the current emergency, some of these measures
In addition to local factors (such as climate events may be a necessary expedient, but they should also be
or local conflicts), food security is shaped strongly phased out eventually. Many programs, like subsidies,
by global food prices. Food accounts for almost are often expensive and poorly targeted, funneling
40 percent of sub-Saharan Africa’s consumption public funds to those with the greatest consumption
basket, and many countries are net importers of key rather than the greatest need, and at the expense of
staples (corn, rice, wheat). For some of these items, other critical priorities such as public investment. For
international prices have doubled since early 2020, example, fuel subsidies—which seem less critical than
while fuel and fertilizer prices have reached as much food assistance measures at the current juncture—are
as triple, adding to transport costs and weighing often extremely costly, regressive, and ultimately
on harvests. Moreover, climate-related events are unsustainable. Similarly, price caps and export
worsening, which will further undermine food security restrictions can generate significant distortions, with
regionwide (Baptista and others 2022). increasingly adverse consequences for food insecurity,
growth, and poverty reduction.
As a policy response, global prices should ideally be
allowed to pass through into domestic prices, while The transition away from emergency measures will
authorities protect the most vulnerable through vary from country to country, depending on the gap
targeted cash transfers or an expansion of local social between domestic and international prices, the amount
safety nets (Amaglobeli and others 2022). of fiscal space, and the availability of mitigating social
support options (IMF 2020). For food subsidies, prices
In much of sub-Saharan Africa, however, such an could be adjusted gradually, and authorities might
approach is simply not viable. Given the size of the consider targeting specific items, such as basic staples,
problem, few countries have the infrastructure or that can better avoid leakage to higher-income groups.
administrative capacity to expand their targeted
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND | OCTOBER 2022 5
REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
Figure 7� Emerging and Frontier Market Economies:
Managing the Shift in Monetary Policies
Exchange Rates, National Currency per US Dollar
(Percent, change between December 2021 and July 2022)
Inflation in many advanced economies has reached
its highest level in more than four decades, but the Angola
Brazil
pickup has been less dramatic in sub-Saharan Africa.
Mexico
Median inflation is currently at about 9 percent,
Mozambique
compared with a pre-COVID-19 level of a little more
Rwanda
than 5 percent.
Namibia
Mauritius
Moreover, as authorities consider the appropriate South Africa
policy mix to fight inflation, it is notable that the Indonesia
drivers of inflation in many sub-Saharan African Kenya
economies are different from those seen elsewhere. China
Ethiopia
For example, one clear factor behind the recent
Malaysia
global surge was the unprecedented policy stimulus
India
employed by many of the largest economies, all aimed
CEMAC/WAEMU
at supporting their economies during the pandemic. Poland
This level of support was not an option for most of Hungary
sub-Saharan Africa, where limited policy space has Argentina
instead muted the regional recovery. Similarly, analysis Pakistan
of the components of inflation in sub-Saharan Africa Türkiye
suggests that much of the recent increase has been due -30.0 -20.0 -10.0 0.0 10.0 20.0 30.0
to external factors such as food and energy or swings
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics.
in the exchange rate (Figure 7). The elements most
Note: Red labels denote sub-Saharan African countries.
reflective of demand pressures, such as nontradable CEMAC = Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa;
core inflation, have remained relatively stable to WAEMU = West African Economic and Monetary Union.
date (Analytical Note “Tackling Rising Inflation in boosting resilience. Although many countries
Sub-Saharan Africa”). have made significant progress in strengthening
the transparency, credibility, and independence of
So, compared with many of their advanced market their monetary frameworks, these frameworks are
counterparts, many sub-Saharan African authorities now being tested.
face a more delicate challenge. • A tailored approach. In some instances, authori-
ties may need to adjust policies more aggressively.
• A gradual path. Most countries need to raise
For example, a rapid tightening may be needed
their policy rates to address rising inflation and
in countries with very high inflation (Zimbabwe)
exchange rate pressures. But current interest rate
or acute domestic demand pressures (Ghana). For
hikes are taking place in the context of a still-
countries with pegged exchange rates, the amount
fragile recovery and elevated social needs. So far,
of tightening needed will vary, but both monetary
the rise in inflation has been mostly driven by
and fiscal policy should be consistent with
external factors and, looking ahead, demand is
supporting reserves and maintaining the credibility
expected to remain relatively soft, including as a
of the peg. Finally, for countries with more flexible
result of fiscal consolidation. Therefore, countries
arrangements, a sudden surge in capital outflows
should tighten cautiously, while also keeping
presents authorities with a choice between
a close eye on inflation developments and the
tightening monetary policy, letting the exchange
emergence of second round effects.
rate depreciate, or intervening directly to support
• Cautious but not complacent. Authorities need the currency. Intervention to smooth exchange
to be wary of moving too slowly, particularly in rate volatility is a helpful part of the policy toolkit,
countries with less-well-anchored inflation expec- but it is constrained in many cases by low foreign
tations or weaker policy credibility. In this regard, exchange reserves. Most countries have external
maintaining monetary credibility is also a key goal positions that are weaker than justified by funda-
because it anchors expectations more strongly mentals and so could benefit from a depreciation.
against future shocks, reducing the tightening In these countries, a mix of tightening and
needed to keep inflation under control and so nominal depreciation might be preferable.
6 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND | OCTOBER 2022
LIVING ON THE EDGE
Figure 8� Sub-Saharan Africa: Increase in Policy Rates
around 55 percent of GDP. Approximately one-third
(Percent, between December 2021 and September 2022)
of the region’s economies now have debt levels above
WAEMU 2.50 (+0.50) 70 percent of GDP.
Botswana 2.65 (+1.51)
Global financial conditions are set to become
Mauritius 3.00 (+1.15) less forgiving. Much of the current debt has been
contracted during a period of historically low interest
CEMAC 4.50 (+1.00)
rates. Looking ahead, as global policy rates normalize,
Tanzania 5.00 (+0.00) financial conditions will continue to tighten,
Namibia 5.50 (+1.75) adding to external borrowing costs and weighing on
sub-Sahara Africa’s debt dynamics. Over the next few
Rwanda 6.00 (+1.50)
years, already-high interest payments are projected
South Africa 6.25 (+2.50) to increase as a proportion of revenue, exceeding
50 percent in some cases and far surpassing the
Lesotho 6.25 (+2.50)
burdens seen in other regions (Figure 9).
Kenya 8.25 (+1.25)
Furthermore, as global conditions tighten, borrowing
Zambia 9.00 (+0.00)
costs may also become more volatile. As with other
Uganda 9.00 (+2.50) emerging markets, sub-Saharan African borrowers
Nigeria 15.50 (+4.00) are subject to sudden changes in market sentiment,
particularly those perceived at greater risk. During
Mozambique 17.25 (+4.00)
the most recent turmoil, for example, sovereign
Angola 19.50 (-0.50) spreads fluctuated widely, disrupting the plans of
some countries that had aimed to issue during the
Ghana 22.00 (+7.50)
year. In this context, countries with reduced access to
1 5 10 20 30 global markets will need to rely more on often-shallow
Sources: Haver Analytics; and IMF, International Financial Statistics. domestic markets, potentially crowding out local
Note: CEMAC = Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa; borrowers. Higher borrowing costs are also a concern
WAEMU = West African Economic and Monetary Union.
for countries without market access, as inflationary
So far, monetary authorities throughout the region pressures have promoted a general tightening of
have indeed moved cautiously (Figure 8). Over monetary policy across the region, with direct
two-thirds have started increasing policy rates to consequences for domestic interest rates and public
ensure that inflation and inflation expectations remain borrowing costs.
in check, but rate hikes have not kept pace with the
pickup in headline inflation. This caution is likely To preserve fiscal sustainability, build greater resilience,
appropriate, given the supply side origins of recent and absorb the cost of a higher interest bill, authorities
inflation and muted demand pressures. But authorities will need to continue fiscal consolidation. Rising
should still keep a close eye on possible second-round borrowing costs, muted growth, and elevated debt
effects, as the costs of fighting inflation are typically stocks have undermined debt dynamics for many
much higher once inflation expectations become countries so that even stabilizing debt at an elevated
entrenched.
Figure 9� Sub-Saharan Africa: Change in Interest to Revenue
Ratio, 2019–25
Consolidating Public Finances amid Tighter
(Percent of revenue excluding grants)
Financing Conditions
Sub-Saharan Africa
Public debt has increased steadily in sub-Saharan
Africa for more than a decade, rising sharply in Non-sub-Saharan
African Emerging and
recent years owing to increased spending and falling
Developing Economies
revenues in the wake of the COVID-19 crisis. About
half of the countries are expected to undertake some Advanced Economies
consolidation this year—regionwide deficits are
0 10 20
projected to narrow by about ½ percent of GDP
after a larger consolidation of about 1¼ percent in Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook database.
Note: Regional averages weighted by GDP at purchasing power parity
2021, bringing average debt at end-2022 down to
exchange rates.
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND | OCTOBER 2022 7
REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
Figure 10� Sub-Saharan Africa: Fiscal Adjustment Needed
(2) boost investor confidence by improving
to Stabilize Debt Below 70% of GDP
communication with the market and outlining
(Percent of GDP, number of countries)
plans for foreign and domestic debt issuance; and
(3) better anticipate debt rollover needs and risks.
Fiscal Adjustment
space needs For some countries, tightening global financial
conditions may aggravate debt vulnerabilities
significantly, requiring some reprofiling or
restructuring. In this context, a well-functioning
debt-resolution mechanism is vital. The G20
Common Framework is an important step forward
as it recognizes that effective debt treatment requires
all major official creditors to be at the table. Recent
-10 -5 0 5 10 15 progress in Zambia is most welcome, but more is
Sources: Country authorities; and IMF staff calculations. needed—the framework should be improved to allow
Note: The 70 percent threshold represents top one-third of countries.
swift and fair resolution for distressed debt, covering
For countries below this threshhold, adjustment stabilizes debt ratio
at end-2021 level. For those above, adjustment brings debt to a broader set of countries, allowing for a standstill
70 percent over the forecast horizon.
of payments during negotiations, and encouraging
level will require significant effort (Figure 10). For creditor committees to meet and formulate agreements
most, successful consolidation will require accelerating quickly and transparently (Chabert, Cerisola, and
efforts to boost revenue mobilization, prioritizing Hakura 2022).
spending where possible, and increasing the efficiency
of public spending, as discussed in previous reports. In Setting the Stage for Sustainable and Greener
commodity-exporting countries, higher commodity Growth
prices can generate sizable windfalls but only if
expenditures on energy subsidies are contained. Most Ultimately, sub-Saharan Africa’s future prosperity and
of these windfalls should be used to rebuild policy resilience will require high-quality growth, especially
buffers, especially in countries with elevated fiscal because the region’s population is expected to double
vulnerabilities (Bellon and Massetti 2022a). over the next three decades. Within 10 to 15 years,
more than half of the world’s job market entrants will
Beyond this general strategy, however, authorities come from sub-Saharan Africa.
can also take steps aimed specifically at a less-benign
borrowing environment: For countries with limited fiscal space, providing
these job entrants with new opportunities will require
• A credible and clearly articulated medium- a pivot from government-led growth toward private
term fiscal framework can raise trust in fiscal sector innovation and activity. Most of these reforms
sustainability, reduce exposure to shifts in risk are long-standing priorities that predate the recent
sentiment, and lower borrowing costs. This crisis, including enhancing competition, removing key
framework should be supported by strong budget bottlenecks to doing business, improving governance,
institutions, transparent reporting practices, and fostering trade integration, and broadening financial
sound management of fiscal risks. Countries inclusion (April 2021 Regional Economic Outlook:
without market access can benefit from fiscal Sub-Saharan Africa; and 2022 Analytical Note “Digital
credibility, through more private investment, Currency Innovations in Sub-Saharan Africa”).
improved macroeconomic stability, and lower
domestic borrowing costs. But the context for growth-enhancing reform is
shifting dramatically. If the world is to cap global
• Volatile borrowing conditions place an added warming at 1.5°C, it must also cap the total
premium on effective and transparent public cumulative amount of greenhouse gases released into
debt management. Medium-term strategies the atmosphere, implying that the global economy
implemented by efficient and qualified debt now faces a binding “carbon budget.” Considering
management offices will be critical to (1) diversify the emissions over 1850–2020, estimates suggest that
financing sources to fill shortfalls in external only 15 percent of this total carbon budget remains
financing, including by developing domestic (IPCC 2021, Table SPM.2). So going forward, global
bond markets and broadening the investor base; economic activity will need to become significantly
8 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND | OCTOBER 2022
LIVING ON THE EDGE
less carbon intensive. Given the approaching • On policies, subsidy reform can help strengthen
demographic pressures on sub-Saharan Africa, this price signals and rebalance incentives away from
suggests that any durable global solution to climate the use of traditional carbon-intensive fossil fuels.
change must take the region’s interests and constraints Similarly, improved electricity sector governance
into account. (with tariff reform and reduced regulatory barriers)
may encourage the introduction and uptake of
In addition, sub-Saharan Africa stands out dispropor-
new technologies by providing a more conducive
tionately as the most climate-vulnerable region in the
and competitive investment environment.
world, plagued by increasingly intense and frequent
natural disasters. For authorities, mainstreaming
adaptation into government policy will be key
INTERNATIONAL SOLIDARITY REMAINS
(Aligishiev, Massetti, and Bellon 2022, and Bellon
ESSENTIAL
and Massetti 2022a, 2022b). But more broadly,
wide-ranging investment in resilient, green infrastruc-
ture will also be critical. This has implications for
As they pull themselves back from the edge, many
almost all aspects of development, and with limited
sub-Saharan African countries will struggle to meet the
resources, it may require exploring areas in which
basic needs of their populations without significant
the private sector is able to implement adaptation
additional financial assistance.
and mitigation measures more efficiently than the
public sector.
On Climate
For example, energy is a fundamental bottleneck
to growth in sub-Saharan Africa—about half of the Securing a fair energy transition should not be the
region’s population does not have a reliable supply of responsibility of sub-Saharan African authorities
electricity, limiting, for example, their ability to start alone. Having contributed little to global emissions,
and run a business. Globally, of course, growth and the region is disproportionately affected by climate
industrialization have historically been associated with change. And while a low-carbon and climate-resilient
rising energy needs. So, for sub-Saharan Africa, a fair growth path offers the region an opportunity to
and clean energy transition will be a critical part of the leapfrog forward in a way that delivers on the region’s
region’s development. And expanded access represents development and climate goals simultaneously,
a key opportunity for authorities to unlock sustainable sub-Saharan Africa will not be able to finance the
growth—with new and better jobs for all, improved investment needed without a dramatic step-up in
health, and increased resilience. international support, including through the provision
of incentives for private sector participation (Mitra and
In this regard, capitalizing on the region’s sizable others. Forthcoming).
endowment of renewable energy sources and
potentially leapfrogging fossil-fuel-based models will For the official sector, in the context of their
need both private finance and policy reform: commitments from the Copenhagen Accord, the Paris
Agreement, and the Glasgow Climate Pact, advanced
• On funding, accessing the region’s renewable economies promised $100 billion per year in climate
energy resources will require sizable upfront assistance for developing countries. Over 2016–19,
investment in flexible generation, new storage an average of $73 billion was disbursed each year, but
technologies, regional interconnectivity, and only one-quarter went to sub-Saharan Africa, with part
off-grid energy systems. But the expense of this of this replacing previously committed development
new infrastructure will likely be beyond the financing. More is needed. In this context, the
reach of most governments, so together with forthcoming UN Climate Change Conference in
development partners, they will need to explore Egypt (COP-27) will be a welcome opportunity for
innovative solutions that improve the risk-return the global community to reaffirm its commitment to
profile of private funding for clean energy projects. effective climate action and a just transition.
Potential measures include blended finance,
guarantees, and credit enhancements, along with For the region, more concessional climate finance—in
other actions to prepare bankable projects and addition to existing commitments—will be critical
lower entry costs for potential investors. to supporting conservation and climate adaptation.
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND | OCTOBER 2022 9
REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
In this regard, the IMF is helping catalyze new capital climate issues. It recently established the Resilience
inflows by boosting local capacity on climate strategy and Sustainability Trust, which will complement
issues, including through the Climate Macroeconomic the existing lending toolkit by providing affordable
Assessment Program and Climate Public Investment financing to address longer-term structural challenges,
Management Assessment pilots. including climate change. And responding to the most
recent food security challenge, the IMF has launched a
On Broader Development Needs new food shock window under its emergency lending
facilities, which would help qualifying members
International assistance is also critical to respond to facing an urgent balance-of-payments need associated
the region’s emergency food security, vaccination, with the current shock mitigate its impact. Finally,
and pandemic needs and to help countries maintain for fragile and conflict-affected states, the IMF is
economic stability as they negotiate their way away working closely with the region to customize support
from the edge. It should be emphasized that budget and enhance collaboration with other development
support to sub-Saharan Africa is in decline—as a partners, including the World Bank and the United
fraction of recipient GDP, official development aid Nations.
(ODA) disbursements from the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development have To support these efforts, and considering the region’s
dropped from about 4½ percent in the 1990s to below growing need for concessional financing, it will
3 percent more recently.3 And humanitarian assistance be essential to secure additional pledges from the
has also been compressed, despite pressing food international community to strengthen the IMF’s
security needs. Poverty Reduction Growth Trust, Catastrophe
Containment and Relief Trust, and Resilience and
As always, the IMF stands ready to help. In addition Sustainability Trust.
to technical assistance, the IMF has arrangements
with 23 countries in the region and has provided In sum, following yet another shock, sub-Saharan
$27 billion in assistance in the form of emergency African authorities are once again carefully navigating
financing, programs, and debt relief since the onset their way forward, weighing various competing
of the COVID-19 crisis. In addition, last year’s demands in a context of shrinking resources. The road
$23 billion special drawing rights allocation to the will not be easy. But the region’s ultimate potential
region also helped strengthen external positions remains undimmed. With help, sub-Saharan Africa
and provide budget financing, including to support will be poised to finally fulfill the promise of the
social spending at a most critical time. The IMF is African century, contributing to a more prosperous,
also expanding its lending facilities to better address greener future for the region and for the world.
3 ODA increased significantly in 2020 (to 3.8 percent of SSA GDP), reflecting emergency financing during the COVID-19 crisis,
but preliminary data suggest that aid returned to pre-pandemic levels in 2021.
10 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND | OCTOBER 2022
(cid:31)(cid:30)(cid:29)(cid:28)(cid:27)(cid:26)(cid:25)(cid:24)(cid:23)(cid:30)(cid:22)(cid:27)(cid:26)(cid:27)(cid:21)(cid:28)(cid:22)(cid:23)(cid:27)(cid:20)(cid:19)(cid:24)(cid:27)(cid:27)(cid:18)(cid:23)(cid:26)(cid:27)(cid:19)(cid:30) L L I I V V I I N N G G O O N N T T H H E E E E D D G G E E
Infographic: Living on the Edge
Infographic: Living on the Edge
LIVING ON THE EDGE
A more turbulent global environment and a more daunting outlook....
Infl ation has almost doubled Social tensions are rising
Commodity prices
Recovery has been interrupted
are volatile
123 million people are
Borrowing costs are rising
food insecure
...places further strains on policymakers
Fiscal Adjustment Needed to Stabilize Debt
Below 70% of GDP
(percent of GDP, no. of countries)
4.7
Fiscal space Adjustment needs
Sub-Saharan
3.6
Africa Growth
2021–22
–5 0 5 10
Source: Country authorities; and IMF staff calculations
Addressing food Consolidating public
FOUR insecurity fi nances amid tighter
fi nancial conditions
POLICY
Managing the Setting the stage
PRIORITIES shift in monetary for sustainable and
policies greener growth
(cid:14) (cid:28)(cid:26)(cid:19)(cid:30)(cid:31)(cid:26)(cid:25)(cid:19)(cid:28)(cid:27)(cid:26)(cid:25)(cid:24)(cid:23)(cid:21)(cid:27)(cid:26)(cid:30)(cid:19)(cid:25)(cid:31)(cid:17)(cid:23)(cid:16)(cid:20)(cid:26)(cid:15) | OCTOBER 2022
I I N N T T E E R R N N A A T T I I O O N N A A L L M M O O N N E E T T A A R R Y Y F F U U N N D D | | O O C C T T O O B B E E R R 2 2 0 0 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1
REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
References
Aligishiev, Zamid, Emanuele Massetti, and Matthieu Bellon, Mattieu and Emanuele Massetti, 2022a.
Bellon. 2022. “Macro-Fiscal Implications of “Economic Principles for Integrating Adaptation to
Adaptation to Climate Change.” IMF Climate Climate Change into Fiscal Policy.” IMF Climate
Note 2022/02, International Monetary Fund, Note 2022/01, International Monetary Fund,
Washington, DC. Washington, DC.
Amaglobeli, David, Emine Hanedar, Gee Hee Hong, Bellon, Mattieu and Emanuele Massetti. 2022b.
and Céline Thévenot. 2022. “Fiscal Policy for “Planning and Mainstreaming Adaptation to
Mitigating the Social Impact of High Energy and Climate Change in Fiscal Policy.” IMF Climate
Food Prices.” IMF Note 22/001, International Note 2022/03, International Monetary Fund,
Monetary Fund, Washington, DC. Washington, DC.
Baptista, Diogo, Mai Farid, Dominique Fayad, Chabert, Guillaume, Martin Cerisola, and Dalia
Laurent Kemoe, Loic Lanci, Pritha Mitra, Hakura. 2022. “Restructuring Debt of Poorer
Tara Muehlschlegel, Cedric Okou, John Spray, Nations Requires More Efficient Coordination.”
Kevin Tuitoek, and Filiz Unsal. Forthcoming. IMF Blog, April 7. Washington, DC.
“Climate Change and Chronic Food Insecurity
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
in Sub-Saharan Africa.” IMF Departmental
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12 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND | OCTOBER 2022
Statistical Appendix
Unless otherwise noted, data and projections presented The low-income countries had average per capita gross
in this Regional Economic Outlook are IMF staff national income in the years 2019–21 equal to or lower
estimates as of September 30, 2022, consistent with than $1,085.00 (World Bank, Atlas method).
the projections underlying the October 2022 World
Economic Outlook. The countries in fragile and conflict-affected situations
are classified based on the World Bank, Classification of
The data and projections cover 45 sub-Saharan African Fragile and Conflict-Affected Situations, FY2023.
countries in the IMF’s African Department. Data
definitions follow established international statistical The membership of sub-Saharan African countries
methodologies to the extent possible. However, in in the major regional cooperation bodies is shown
some cases, data limitations limit comparability across on page 14: CFA franc zone, comprising the West
countries. African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU)
and CEMAC; the Common Market for Eastern
Country Groupings and Southern Africa (COMESA); the East Africa
Community (EAC-5); the Economic Community of
Countries are aggregated into three (nonoverlapping) West African States (ECOWAS); the Southern African
groups: oil exporters, other resource-intensive Development Community (SADC); and the Southern
countries, and non-resource-intensive countries African Customs Union (SACU). EAC-5 aggregates
(see table on page 14 for the country groupings). include data for Rwanda and Burundi, which joined
the group only in 2007.
The oil exporters are countries where net oil exports
make up 30 percent or more of total exports. Methods of Aggregation
The other resource-intensive countries are those where In Tables SA1 and SA3, country group composites for
nonrenewable natural resources represent 25 percent or real GDP growth and broad money are calculated as
more of total exports. the arithmetic average of data for individual countries,
weighted by GDP valued at purchasing power parity as
The non-resource-intensive countries refer to those a share of total group GDP. The source of purchasing
that are not classified as either oil exporters or other power parity weights is the World Economic Outlook
resource-intensive countries. (WEO) database.
Countries are also aggregated into four (overlapping) In Table SA1, country group composites for consumer
groups: oil exporters, middle-income, low-income, and prices are calculated as the geometric average of data
countries in fragile and conflict-affected situations. for individual countries, weighted by GDP valued at
(see table on page 14 for the country groupings). purchasing power parity as a share of total group GDP.
The source of purchasing power parity weights is the
The membership of these groups reflects the most WEO database.
recent data on per capita gross national income
(averaged over three years) and the World Bank, In Tables SA2–SA4, country group composites, except
Classification of Fragile and Conflict-Affected for broad money, are calculated as the arithmetic
Situations. average of data for individual countries, weighted by
GDP in US dollars at market exchange rates as a share
The middle-income countries had per capita gross of total group GDP.
national income in the years 2019–21 of more than
$1,085.00 (World Bank, using the Atlas method).
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND | OCTOBER 2022 13
REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
Sub-Saharan Africa: Member Countries of Groupings
Oil Exporters Other Resource- Non-Resource- Middle-Income Low-Income Countries in Fragile
Intensive Countries Intensive Countries Countries Countries and Conflict-Affected
Situations1
Angola Botswana Benin Angola Burkina Faso Burkina Faso
Cameroon Burkina Faso Burundi Benin Burundi Burundi
Chad Central African Cabo Verde Botswana Central African Cameroon
Congo, Republic Republic Comoros Cabo Verde Republic Central African
of Congo, Democratic Côte d’Ivoire Cameroon Chad Republic
Equatorial Guinea Republic of the Eritrea Comoros Congo, Democratic Chad
Gabon Ghana Eswatini Congo, Republic of Republic of the Comoros
Nigeria Guinea Ethiopia Côte d’Ivoire Eritrea Congo, Democratic
South Sudan Liberia Gambia, The Equatorial Guinea Ethiopia Republic of the
Mali Gambia, The Congo, Republic of
Guinea-Bissau Eswatini
Namibia Guinea Eritrea
Kenya Gabon
Niger Guinea-Bissau Ethiopia
Lesotho Ghana
Sierra Leone Liberia Guinea-Bissau
Madagascar Kenya
South Africa Madagascar Mali
Malawi Lesotho
Tanzania Malawi Mozambique
Mauritius Mauritius
Zambia Mali Niger
Mozambique Namibia
Zimbabwe Mozambique Nigeria
Rwanda Nigeria
Niger South Sudan
São Tomé and São Tomé and
Príncipe Príncipe Rwanda Zimbabwe
Senegal Senegal Sierra Leone
Seychelles Seychelles South Sudan
Togo South Africa Tanzania
Uganda Zambia Togo
Uganda
Zimbabwe
1 Fragile and conflict-affected situations as classified by the World Bank, Classification of Fragile and Conflict-Affected Situations, FY2023.
Sub-Saharan Africa: Member Countries of Regional Groupings
The West African Economic and Common Market East African Southern African Southern Economic
Economic and Monetary Community for Eastern and Community Development African Community of West
Monetary Union of Central African Southern Africa (*EAC-5) Community Customs Union African States
(WAEMU) States (CEMAC) (COMESA) (SADC) (SACU) (ECOWAS)
Benin Cameroon Burundi *Burundi Angola Botswana Benin
Burkina Faso Central African Comoros *Kenya Botswana Eswatini Burkina Faso
Côte d’Ivoire Republic Congo, Democratic *Rwanda Comoros Lesotho Cabo Verde
Guinea-Bissau Chad Republic of the South Sudan Congo, Democratic Namibia Côte d’Ivoire
Mali Congo, Republic of Eritrea *Tanzania Republic of the South Africa Gambia, The
Niger Equatorial Guinea Eswatini *Uganda Eswatini Ghana
Senegal Gabon Ethiopia Lesotho Guinea
Togo Kenya Madagascar Guinea-Bissau
Madagascar Malawi Liberia
Malawi Mauritius Mali
Mauritius Mozambique Niger
Rwanda Namibia Nigeria
Seychelles Seychelles Senegal
Uganda South Africa Sierra Leone
Zambia Tanzania Togo
Zimbabwe Zambia
Zimbabwe
14 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND | OCTOBER 2022
STATISTICAL APPENDIX
Sub-Saharan Africa Country Abbreviations
AGO Angola CPV Cabo Verde LSO Lesotho SLE Sierra Leone
BDI Burundi ERI Eritrea MDG Madagascar SSD South Sudan
BEN Benin ETH Ethiopia MLI Mali STP São Tomé and Príncipe
BFA Burkina Faso GAB Gabon MOZ Mozambique SWZ Eswatini
BWA Botswana GHA Ghana MUS Mauritius SYC Seychelles
CAF Central African Republic GIN Guinea MWI Malawi TCD Chad
CIV Côte d’Ivoire GMB Gambia, The NAM Namibia TGO Togo
CMR Cameroon GNB Guinea-Bissau NER Niger TZA Tanzania
COD Congo, Democratic Republic of the GNQ Equatorial Guinea NGA Nigeria UGA Uganda
COG Congo, Republic of KEN Kenya RWA Rwanda ZAF South Africa
COM Comoros LBR Liberia SEN Senegal ZMB Zambia
ZWE Zimbabwe
Statistical Appendix Tables
SA1� Real GDP Growth and Consumer Prices, Average �����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������16
SA2� Overall Fiscal Balance, Including Grants and Government Debt ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������17
SA3� Broad Money and External Current Account, Including Grants ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������18
SA4� External Debt, Official Debt, Debtor Based and Reserves �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������19
List of Sources and Footnotes for Statistical Appendix Tables
Tables SA1�,SA3� Table SA4�
Sources: IMF, Common Surveillance database; and IMF, World Sources: IMF, Common Surveillance database; and IMF, World
Economic Outlook database, October 2022� Economic Outlook database, October 2022�
1 Fiscal year data� 1 As a member of the West African Economic and Monetary Union
2 In 2019 Zimbabwe authorities introduced the real-time gross (WAEMU), see WAEMU aggregate for reserves data�
settlement (RTGS) dollar, later renamed the Zimbabwe dollar,
2 As a member of the Central African Economic and Monetary
and are in the process of redenominating their national accounts
Community (CEMAC), see CEMAC aggregate for reserves data�
statistics� Current data are subject to revision� The Zimbabwe
dollar previously ceased circulating in 2009, and between 2009–19, 3 Fiscal year data�
Zimbabwe operated under a multicurrency regime with the US dollar 4 For Zambia, external debt projections for 2022–23 are omitted due
as the unit of account�
to ongoing debt restructuring�
Note: “���” denotes data not available� 5 In 2019 Zimbabwe authorities introduced the real-time gross
settlement (RTGS) dollar, later renamed the Zimbabwe dollar,
Table SA2�
and are in the process of redenominating their national accounts
Sources: IMF, Common Surveillance database; and IMF, World
statistics� Current data are subject to revision� The Zimbabwe
Economic Outlook database, October 2022�
dollar previously ceased circulating in 2009, and between 2009–19,
1 Fiscal year data�
Zimbabwe operated under a multicurrency regime with the US dollar
2 For Zambia, government debt projections for 2022–23 are omitted
due to ongoing debt restructuring� as the unit of account�
3 In 2019 Zimbabwe authorities introduced the real-time gross Note: “���” denotes data not available�
settlement (RTGS) dollar, later renamed the Zimbabwe dollar,
and are in the process of redenominating their national accounts
statistics� Current data are subject to revision� The Zimbabwe
dollar previously ceased circulating in 2009, and between 2009–19,
Zimbabwe operated under a multicurrency regime with the US dollar
as the unit of account�
Note: “���” denotes data not available�
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND | OCTOBER 2022 15
REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
SA1� Real GDP Growth and Consumer Prices, Average
Table SA1. Real GDP Growth and Consumer Prices
Real GDP Consumer Prices, Annual Average
(Annual percent change) (Annual percent change)
2010–18 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2010–18 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
Angola 2.6 –0.7 –5.8 0.8 2.9 3.4 16.0 17.1 22.3 25.8 21.7 11.8
Benin 4.5 6.9 3.8 7.2 5.7 6.2 1.6 –0.9 3.0 1.7 5.0 1.8
Botswana 4.9 3.0 –8.7 11.4 4.1 4.0 5.1 2.7 1.9 6.7 11.2 5.8
Burkina Faso 6.1 5.7 1.9 6.9 3.6 4.8 1.3 –3.2 1.9 3.9 14.2 1.5
Burundi 2.3 1.8 0.3 3.1 3.3 4.1 7.9 –0.7 7.3 8.3 17.3 8.5
Cabo Verde 3.5 5.7 –14.8 7.0 4.0 4.8 1.2 1.1 0.6 1.9 6.5 3.5
Cameroon 4.4 3.4 0.5 3.6 3.8 4.6 1.8 2.5 2.5 2.3 4.6 2.8
Central African Republic –0.6 3.0 1.0 1.0 1.5 3.0 4.7 2.8 0.9 4.3 6.5 6.3
Chad 3.5 3.4 –2.2 –1.1 3.3 3.4 1.7 –1.0 4.5 –0.8 4.9 3.1
Comoros 3.4 1.8 –0.3 2.2 3.0 3.4 1.8 3.7 0.8 –0.2 11.4 8.4
Congo, Democratic Republic of the 6.4 4.4 1.7 6.2 6.1 6.7 12.3 4.7 11.4 9.0 8.4 9.8
Congo, Republic of 0.5 –0.4 –8.1 –0.6 4.3 4.6 2.3 0.4 1.4 2.0 3.5 3.2
Côte d'Ivoire 6.3 6.2 2.0 7.0 5.5 6.5 1.6 0.8 2.4 4.2 5.5 4.0
Equatorial Guinea –3.1 –5.5 –4.2 –3.2 5.8 –3.1 2.9 1.2 4.8 –0.1 5.1 5.7
Eritrea 5.4 3.8 –0.5 2.9 2.6 2.8 3.6 1.3 5.6 6.6 7.4 6.4
Eswatini 2.7 2.7 –1.6 7.9 2.4 1.8 6.1 2.6 3.9 3.7 4.9 4.2
Ethiopia1 9.7 9.0 6.1 6.3 3.8 5.3 13.5 15.8 20.4 26.8 33.6 28.6
Gabon 4.0 3.9 –1.9 1.5 2.7 3.7 2.2 2.0 1.3 1.1 3.5 3.2
The Gambia 2.5 6.2 0.6 4.3 5.0 6.0 6.1 7.1 5.9 7.4 11.3 11.1
Ghana 6.7 6.5 0.5 5.4 3.6 2.8 11.7 7.1 9.9 10.0 27.2 20.9
Guinea 6.1 5.6 4.9 3.8 4.6 5.1 12.1 9.5 10.6 12.6 12.7 12.2
Guinea-Bissau 4.0 4.5 1.5 5.0 3.8 4.5 1.4 0.3 1.5 3.3 5.5 4.0
Kenya 5.0 5.1 –0.3 7.5 5.3 5.1 7.3 5.2 5.3 6.1 7.4 6.6
Lesotho 2.4 0.0 –6.0 2.1 2.1 1.6 4.9 5.2 5.0 6.0 8.1 6.2
Liberia 3.8 –2.5 –3.0 5.0 3.7 4.2 10.3 27.0 17.0 7.8 6.9 8.7
Madagascar 2.8 4.4 –7.1 4.3 4.2 5.2 7.4 5.6 4.2 5.8 9.8 8.0
Malawi 4.2 5.4 0.9 2.2 0.9 2.5 17.0 9.4 8.6 9.3 18.4 16.5
Mali 4.4 4.8 –1.2 3.1 2.5 5.3 1.5 –3.0 0.5 3.8 8.0 3.0
Mauritius 3.8 3.0 –14.9 4.0 6.1 5.4 3.3 0.5 2.5 4.0 10.2 6.1
Mozambique 5.9 2.3 –1.2 2.3 3.7 4.9 8.1 2.8 3.1 5.7 11.3 8.6
Namibia 3.6 –0.8 –8.0 2.7 3.0 3.2 5.3 3.7 2.2 3.6 6.4 4.9
Niger 6.2 5.9 3.6 1.3 6.7 7.3 1.1 –2.5 2.9 3.8 4.5 3.0
Nigeria 4.0 2.2 –1.8 3.6 3.2 3.0 11.8 11.4 13.2 17.0 18.9 17.3
Rwanda 6.9 9.5 –3.4 10.9 6.0 6.7 3.9 2.4 7.7 0.8 9.5 8.0
São Tomé & Príncipe 4.5 2.2 3.0 1.9 1.4 2.6 8.7 7.7 9.8 8.1 15.0 11.2
Senegal 4.9 4.6 1.3 6.1 4.7 8.1 1.0 1.0 2.5 2.2 7.5 3.1
Seychelles 5.1 3.1 –7.7 7.9 10.9 5.2 2.5 1.8 1.2 9.8 4.1 3.3
Sierra Leone 5.0 5.3 –2.0 4.1 2.4 3.3 9.2 14.8 13.4 11.9 25.9 26.8
South Africa 1.9 0.3 –6.3 4.9 2.1 1.1 5.3 4.1 3.3 4.6 6.7 5.1
South Sudan –6.1 0.9 –6.5 5.3 6.5 5.6 102.7 49.3 24.0 30.2 17.6 21.7
Tanzania 6.6 7.0 4.8 4.9 4.5 5.2 7.7 3.4 3.3 3.7 4.0 5.3
Togo 5.7 5.5 1.8 5.3 5.4 6.2 1.3 0.7 1.8 4.3 5.6 2.1
Uganda 5.3 7.8 –1.4 6.7 4.4 5.9 7.0 2.1 2.8 2.2 6.4 6.4
Zambia 5.3 1.4 –2.8 4.6 2.9 4.0 9.0 9.2 15.7 22.0 12.5 9.5
Zimbabwe2 7.4 –6.1 –5.2 7.2 3.0 2.8 2.1 255.3 557.2 98.5 284.9 204.6
Sub-Saharan Africa 4.2 3.2 –1.6 4.7 3.6 3.7 8.3 8.2 10.2 11.1 14.4 11.9
Median 4.6 3.8 –1.2 4.3 3.8 4.6 4.7 2.8 3.9 4.6 8.0 6.3
Excluding Nigeria and South Africa 5.2 4.7 0.0 5.1 4.3 4.9 7.9 8.2 11.2 10.8 15.1 11.8
Oil-exporting countries 3.5 1.7 –2.4 3.0 3.3 3.1 11.4 11.0 13.0 15.9 17.2 14.5
Excluding Nigeria 2.4 0.6 –3.8 1.3 3.5 3.5 10.3 10.2 12.4 13.4 12.9 7.8
Oil-importing countries 4.5 4.0 –1.3 5.6 3.8 4.0 6.5 6.6 8.6 8.5 13.0 10.5
Excluding South Africa 6.0 5.6 0.9 5.9 4.4 5.1 7.3 7.7 11.0 10.2 15.6 12.6
Middle-income countries 3.6 2.2 –2.9 4.5 3.3 3.1 8.3 7.3 8.5 10.5 12.9 10.5
Excluding Nigeria and South Africa 4.4 3.5 –1.7 4.9 4.3 4.5 7.4 6.0 7.9 9.1 11.9 8.2
Low-income countries 6.2 6.1 2.0 5.3 4.2 5.3 8.6 10.7 15.0 12.7 18.8 15.8
Excluding low-income countries in fragile and
conflict-affected situations 5.5 6.6 1.0 5.4 4.3 5.3 8.0 4.7 4.9 4.7 7.8 7.7
Countries in fragile and conflict-affected
situations 4.8 3.4 –0.2 4.2 3.6 3.9 10.3 12.0 15.7 16.5 20.8 17.9
CFA franc zone 4.4 4.4 0.6 4.4 4.5 5.4 1.7 0.2 2.4 2.8 6.1 3.1
CEMAC 2.6 2.0 –1.5 1.5 3.8 3.4 2.2 1.6 2.7 1.5 4.5 3.3
WAEMU 5.6 5.7 1.8 5.9 4.9 6.4 1.4 –0.6 2.2 3.5 7.0 3.1
COMESA (SSA members) 6.2 5.7 0.5 6.4 4.5 5.2 8.8 12.3 17.3 14.7 20.1 17.2
EAC-5 5.6 6.4 0.9 6.7 4.9 5.3 7.3 3.9 4.4 4.4 6.4 6.3
ECOWAS 4.7 3.5 –0.6 4.4 3.7 3.9 9.6 8.1 10.2 12.7 16.6 13.9
SACU 2.1 0.4 –6.4 5.2 2.2 1.3 5.3 4.0 3.2 4.6 6.9 5.2
SADC 3.1 1.3 –4.3 4.5 3.0 2.8 7.5 8.6 10.8 9.6 12.1 9.3
See page 15 for sources and footnotes
16 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND | OCTOBER 2022
STATISTICAL APPENDIX
SA2� Overall Fiscal Balance, Including Grants and Government Debt
Table SA2. Overall Fiscal Balance, Including Grants and Government Debt
Overall Fiscal Balance, Including Grants Government Debt
(Percent of GDP) (Percent of GDP)
2010–18 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2010–18 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
Angola –0.2 0.8 –1.9 3.8 2.7 0.0 51.3 113.6 136.5 86.4 56.6 52.5
Benin –2.4 –0.5 –4.7 –5.7 –5.5 -4.3 27.9 41.2 46.1 49.9 54.8 55.6
Botswana –0.9 –8.5 –11.1 –2.6 –1.5 1.1 18.0 16.5 19.0 19.5 21.3 19.6
Burkina Faso –3.4 –3.4 –5.7 –6.4 –6.1 -5.3 28.6 42.5 46.4 52.4 59.6 59.3
Burundi –4.8 –6.4 –6.6 –4.2 –7.3 -7.6 43.6 60.0 66.0 66.6 66.4 67.6
Cabo Verde –6.5 –1.7 –9.1 –7.3 –6.4 -5.6 106.4 114.0 145.1 142.3 154.5 149.0
Cameroon –3.3 –3.2 –3.2 –2.4 –2.0 -0.2 24.5 41.6 44.9 45.5 46.8 43.7
Central African Republic –1.6 1.4 –3.4 –6.0 –4.8 -0.1 44.3 47.1 43.4 47.6 52.1 47.6
Chad –1.3 –0.2 2.1 –1.8 5.4 7.8 38.7 52.3 54.2 56.0 44.7 38.3
Comoros 1.4 –4.3 –0.5 –2.7 –6.5 -5.5 19.0 21.7 24.0 26.0 34.5 38.2
Congo, Democratic Republic of the 0.2 –2.0 –1.4 –1.0 –3.6 -2.8 20.4 15.0 16.5 16.1 14.7 10.8
Congo, Republic of –0.9 4.7 –1.2 1.7 9.0 6.4 57.9 84.8 114.0 103.6 82.0 73.9
Côte d'Ivoire –2.3 –2.3 –5.6 –5.0 –5.3 -4.0 33.5 38.4 47.6 52.1 56.0 55.1
Equatorial Guinea –5.7 1.8 –1.7 2.6 3.7 4.1 21.2 43.2 48.4 42.8 27.1 26.5
Eritrea –4.9 0.6 –4.4 –4.1 –1.3 -0.1 174.9 187.1 179.7 176.2 164.7 149.6
Eswatini –4.8 –6.7 –4.5 –4.6 –6.4 -2.6 19.6 39.5 41.4 45.0 45.8 44.1
Ethiopia1 –2.1 –2.5 –2.8 –2.8 –3.1 -3.0 47.5 54.7 53.7 52.9 46.4 40.4
Gabon 0.6 2.1 –2.2 –1.9 1.2 3.0 40.2 59.8 78.3 65.8 54.0 52.4
The Gambia –4.4 –2.5 –2.2 –4.6 –4.4 -2.7 65.8 83.0 85.9 83.8 80.6 73.1
Ghana –6.6 –7.3 –15.3 –11.4 –9.2 -8.6 47.0 62.7 79.1 82.1 90.7 87.8
Guinea –0.4 –0.3 –3.1 –1.7 –1.9 -2.8 43.5 38.6 47.5 42.5 39.0 37.2
Guinea-Bissau –2.5 –3.9 –9.6 –5.7 –4.4 -4.0 53.5 64.0 76.5 78.5 82.0 80.3
Kenya –5.8 –7.4 –8.1 –8.0 –7.0 -5.3 44.2 59.1 68.0 67.8 69.4 67.5
Lesotho –2.8 –7.5 0.2 –4.4 –6.6 -5.9 40.9 50.5 54.2 53.5 50.7 48.0
Liberia –3.2 –4.8 –3.8 –2.4 –5.0 -3.6 26.2 48.5 58.7 53.2 55.1 56.2
Madagascar –2.0 –1.4 –4.0 –2.9 –6.5 -4.8 37.1 40.6 50.8 53.1 53.8 53.1
Malawi –3.2 –4.5 –8.2 –8.9 –7.1 -8.0 32.6 45.3 54.8 63.9 73.3 74.5
Mali –2.8 –1.7 –5.4 –5.0 –5.0 -4.7 29.8 40.7 47.3 51.9 55.9 55.8
Mauritius –2.7 –8.4 –10.9 –6.1 –6.0 -5.9 60.5 84.6 99.2 93.5 90.9 90.0
Mozambique –4.8 0.1 –5.4 –3.7 –3.4 -4.3 72.3 99.0 120.0 106.4 102.4 102.6
Namibia –6.0 –5.5 –8.1 –9.1 –8.1 -6.1 33.8 59.4 66.6 72.0 71.8 71.7
Niger –3.4 –3.6 –5.3 –5.9 –6.6 -4.7 25.4 39.8 45.0 51.2 57.1 57.0
Nigeria –3.0 –4.7 –5.6 –6.0 –6.2 -5.8 19.7 29.2 34.5 36.6 37.3 38.6
Rwanda –2.1 –5.1 –9.5 –7.0 –6.4 -5.7 29.6 49.8 65.6 66.6 68.1 68.6
São Tomé & Príncipe –6.0 –0.1 5.9 1.5 1.4 0.8 82.2 71.6 81.4 72.4 64.0 63.1
Senegal –3.9 –3.9 –6.4 –6.3 –6.2 -4.5 44.0 63.6 69.2 73.2 77.3 74.3
Seychelles 1.4 0.9 –16.5 –5.8 –2.9 0.9 70.1 54.2 84.8 72.9 64.9 61.7
Sierra Leone –5.3 –3.1 –5.8 –7.3 –3.8 -2.6 48.6 72.4 76.3 79.3 81.8 78.1
South Africa –4.0 –4.7 –9.7 –6.0 –4.9 -5.4 42.2 56.2 69.0 69.0 68.0 70.7
South Sudan –7.0 0.0 2.9 4.3 3.0 2.5 41.8 28.1 36.4 64.7 52.3 29.7
Tanzania –3.0 –2.0 –2.5 –3.1 –3.1 -3.3 35.0 39.0 40.5 40.7 39.5 38.1
Togo –4.3 1.6 –6.9 –6.0 –6.1 -4.6 46.8 52.4 60.3 63.7 66.1 65.4
Uganda –3.0 –4.8 –7.5 –7.7 –5.5 -4.7 25.6 37.6 46.3 51.8 52.2 51.3
Zambia2 –5.6 –9.4 –13.8 –8.4 –9.5 -9.1 44.7 99.7 140.2 119.1 … …
Zimbabwe3 –3.3 –1.0 0.8 –2.3 –1.5 -1.5 47.7 93.2 102.5 66.9 92.6 64.9
Sub-Saharan Africa –3.2 –3.9 –6.4 –5.1 –4.5 -4.3 35.0 50.1 57.6 57.0 55.5 53.7
Median –3.2 –2.5 –5.3 –4.6 –5.0 -4.0 39.1 52.3 58.7 63.9 57.1 57.0
Excluding Nigeria and South Africa –2.9 –3.2 –5.5 –4.3 –3.6 -3.1 39.9 57.6 64.3 60.9 59.1 55.0
Oil-exporting countries –2.5 –3.3 –4.6 –4.0 –3.5 -3.6 27.2 43.9 48.6 46.3 42.5 41.8
Excluding Nigeria –1.5 0.3 –1.7 1.1 2.3 1.3 42.8 80.2 88.5 69.7 53.3 49.0
Oil-importing countries –3.8 –4.3 –7.3 –5.7 –5.1 -4.7 40.5 53.5 62.4 62.3 63.0 61.1
Excluding South Africa –3.6 –4.1 –6.3 –5.5 –5.2 -4.4 39.4 52.1 59.4 59.0 60.7 56.7
Middle-income countries –3.4 –4.4 –7.3 –5.6 –4.8 -4.6 34.4 50.9 59.5 59.0 57.0 56.4
Excluding Nigeria and South Africa –3.2 –4.0 –7.3 –4.9 –3.6 -3.1 41.6 66.0 75.5 69.5 65.8 63.1
Low-income countries –2.7 –2.3 –3.5 –3.7 –3.6 -3.2 37.7 47.4 51.8 51.0 51.2 45.9
Excluding low-income countries in fragile and
conflict-affected situations –2.8 –2.7 –4.9 –4.9 –4.4 -4.1 34.0 42.0 48.3 50.1 49.9 48.5
Countries in fragile and conflict-affected
situations –2.8 –3.6 –4.3 –4.6 –4.6 -4.2 26.4 38.0 43.0 43.6 43.8 41.3
CFA franc zone –2.6 –1.5 –4.4 –3.9 –2.8 -1.7 33.1 47.4 54.4 56.4 56.2 54.6
CEMAC –2.4 –0.1 –2.0 –1.2 1.7 2.8 33.3 52.3 60.0 57.3 49.6 46.2
WAEMU –2.9 –2.4 –5.7 –5.5 –5.7 -4.4 33.6 44.3 51.3 55.9 60.4 59.6
COMESA (SSA members) –3.3 –4.6 –5.5 –5.1 –5.0 -4.2 40.1 54.6 61.3 58.6 59.4 53.8
EAC-5 –4.2 –5.3 –6.4 –6.4 –5.5 -4.6 37.0 49.1 55.9 56.8 57.1 55.3
ECOWAS –3.3 –4.3 –6.5 –6.4 –6.3 -5.6 25.6 36.7 44.0 47.2 48.4 47.7
SACU –3.9 –4.9 –9.6 –6.0 –4.9 -5.1 40.8 54.5 66.5 66.8 65.9 68.3
SADC –3.1 –3.7 –7.1 –4.2 –3.5 -3.9 42.0 61.1 71.0 64.9 62.0 60.5
See page 15 for sources and footnotes
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND | OCTOBER 2022 17
REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
SA3� Broad Money and External Current Account, Including Grants
Table SA3. Broad Money and External Current Account, Including Grants
Broad Money External Current Account, Including Grants
(Percent of GDP) (Percent of GDP)
2010–18 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2010–18 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
Angola 34.8 33.1 37.8 24.3 18.1 18.6 3.3 6.1 1.5 11.2 11.3 5.4
Benin 27.8 27.8 30.5 32.6 32.6 32.6 –5.0 –4.0 –1.7 –4.4 –6.0 –5.6
Botswana 45.0 47.2 52.5 48.3 45.3 47.5 2.1 –7.0 –10.8 –0.5 2.0 2.5
Burkina Faso 30.5 40.7 45.0 50.6 53.9 56.8 –4.9 –3.3 4.3 0.2 –3.5 –3.4
Burundi 25.7 39.6 46.3 50.6 52.6 54.4 –14.1 –11.6 –10.2 –13.4 –14.9 –14.1
Cabo Verde 91.4 93.1 114.3 107.1 100.4 100.7 –8.3 0.2 –15.0 –11.2 –14.0 –6.2
Cameroon 21.3 24.0 26.6 29.1 30.9 31.8 –3.2 –4.3 –3.7 –4.0 –2.3 –2.8
Central African Republic 22.7 28.0 30.3 33.3 31.3 29.7 –7.6 –5.1 –8.6 –10.8 –14.1 –7.5
Chad 13.9 17.0 20.8 23.3 20.1 20.2 –8.1 –4.4 –7.6 –4.5 0.8 –2.4
Comoros 24.2 28.1 31.2 36.8 36.1 33.4 –2.7 –3.9 –3.0 –2.4 –10.5 –9.1
Congo, Democratic Republic of the 11.4 15.1 20.2 21.9 26.2 29.7 –5.4 –3.2 –2.2 –0.9 0.0 0.0
Congo, Republic of 27.2 24.4 36.4 32.6 30.3 34.2 –5.4 0.4 –0.1 12.6 19.1 11.1
Côte d'Ivoire 11.0 11.7 13.8 15.4 13.6 13.0 0.1 –2.3 –3.2 –3.8 –5.2 –5.0
Equatorial Guinea 15.2 16.1 17.1 14.7 10.4 10.4 –9.7 –0.9 –4.2 –3.4 –1.6 –2.1
Eritrea 198.9 241.5 232.1 232.1 232.1 232.1 12.2 13.1 14.6 13.5 12.2 10.8
Eswatini 26.5 28.3 32.3 30.3 33.9 33.9 4.6 3.8 6.7 2.5 –0.8 0.1
Ethiopia1 28.5 33.0 30.8 31.1 29.0 26.9 –7.0 –5.3 –4.6 –3.2 –4.3 –4.4
Gabon 23.3 23.3 27.9 23.1 20.9 24.4 4.6 –5.0 –6.9 –5.7 –1.4 –2.9
The Gambia 36.7 47.2 56.0 59.5 55.5 50.9 –8.0 –6.2 –2.9 –8.1 –13.7 –11.7
Ghana 23.6 26.1 30.8 29.5 29.2 29.9 –6.1 –2.7 –3.0 –3.2 –5.2 –4.4
Guinea 24.3 24.6 27.6 25.8 24.9 25.4 –15.6 –11.5 –13.6 –1.3 –7.0 –8.0
Guinea-Bissau 36.5 42.0 45.6 45.5 43.9 42.6 –2.3 –8.5 –2.7 –3.2 –6.5 –4.7
Kenya 36.9 34.4 37.2 35.0 34.6 34.9 –6.9 –5.2 –4.7 –5.2 –5.9 –5.6
Lesotho 34.6 35.4 41.8 38.5 36.7 36.0 –7.0 –1.7 –1.6 –5.0 –8.5 –8.7
Liberia 20.2 20.9 25.5 24.6 24.8 24.9 –17.8 –19.6 –16.4 –17.7 –16.3 –16.5
Madagascar 23.0 24.8 28.7 29.1 33.9 33.6 –3.4 –2.3 –5.4 –4.9 –5.4 –5.1
Malawi 17.1 16.0 17.5 20.9 20.9 20.9 –9.5 –12.6 –13.8 –12.2 –12.1 –12.9
Mali 26.5 29.6 36.5 40.4 40.4 40.4 –5.6 –7.5 –2.2 –10.0 –7.9 –7.1
Mauritius 104.3 120.8 163.7 164.6 151.9 142.6 –6.5 –5.1 –9.2 –13.6 –13.0 –8.1
Mozambique 31.9 36.9 42.9 43.6 42.8 43.0 –30.7 –19.1 –27.3 –22.9 –45.9 –39.6
Namibia 58.3 63.6 71.6 71.4 70.3 69.4 –8.3 –1.7 2.6 –9.1 –8.0 –4.2
Niger 17.1 17.1 19.2 19.9 21.7 22.3 –12.9 –12.2 –13.5 –13.8 –15.6 –13.9
Nigeria 22.1 23.9 25.2 24.9 25.6 26.5 1.9 –3.3 –4.0 –0.4 –0.2 –0.6
Rwanda 21.4 25.7 29.4 30.4 30.4 29.9 –9.9 –11.9 –12.1 –10.9 –12.6 –11.7
São Tomé & Príncipe 37.4 31.8 32.4 30.2 30.2 30.2 –16.8 –12.1 –11.0 –11.3 –13.9 –11.0
Senegal 33.2 41.5 45.3 48.2 49.0 49.1 –6.7 –7.9 –10.9 –13.2 –13.0 –9.5
Seychelles 64.7 82.5 113.3 108.2 100.7 99.5 –17.5 –3.2 –13.7 –10.5 –6.6 –7.7
Sierra Leone 22.0 23.2 29.5 32.4 30.7 29.9 –22.9 –14.3 –6.8 –14.9 –8.5 –7.7
South Africa 66.5 67.0 74.1 70.3 69.6 70.3 –3.4 –2.6 2.0 3.7 1.2 –1.0
South Sudan 18.1 13.6 14.6 17.1 14.7 7.7 3.5 1.5 –13.8 –2.7 8.6 2.1
Tanzania 22.6 20.4 21.3 21.4 21.5 21.4 –7.5 –2.6 –1.8 –3.3 –4.4 –3.9
Togo 36.2 42.0 45.4 47.5 47.6 47.7 –5.4 –0.8 –0.3 –1.9 –4.8 –5.7
Uganda 17.2 19.4 22.4 21.8 21.6 21.6 –5.7 –6.6 –9.5 –8.3 –8.0 –10.2
Zambia 20.1 23.6 31.3 25.2 25.0 25.0 1.1 1.4 12.0 7.6 –1.8 –3.7
Zimbabwe2 24.3 18.7 17.1 16.3 13.8 12.0 –9.9 4.0 2.9 1.1 0.6 0.3
Sub-Saharan Africa 34.8 35.5 38.6 37.2 36.6 36.8 –2.5 –3.3 –2.9 –1.1 –1.7 –2.5
Median 25.8 28.0 31.2 31.1 30.9 31.8 –5.8 –4.0 –4.2 –4.4 –5.9 –5.1
Excluding Nigeria and South Africa 27.8 29.5 32.7 31.5 30.6 30.6 –4.5 –3.5 –4.2 –3.3 –3.4 –4.0
Oil-exporting countries 23.7 24.9 27.0 24.9 24.5 25.3 1.4 –2.0 –3.6 0.7 2.0 0.3
Excluding Nigeria 27.4 27.4 31.5 25.0 21.6 22.4 0.3 1.2 –2.5 3.2 6.6 2.6
Oil-importing countries 41.8 41.4 45.0 43.8 43.1 42.9 –5.2 –4.0 –2.5 –1.9 –3.8 –4.3
Excluding South Africa 27.9 30.0 32.9 32.9 32.5 32.3 –6.5 –4.7 –4.5 –4.7 –6.2 –5.8
Middle-income countries 37.8 38.4 42.1 39.9 39.1 39.6 –1.2 –2.6 –2.0 0.2 –0.2 –1.3
Excluding Nigeria and South Africa 30.6 31.7 36.1 33.1 31.4 31.7 –2.0 –2.0 –3.1 –1.9 –1.2 –2.1
Low-income countries 24.2 27.0 28.8 29.7 29.6 29.4 –8.3 –5.4 –5.5 –4.9 –6.1 –6.1
Excluding low-income countries in fragile
and conflict-affected situations 21.6 22.3 24.7 25.0 25.3 25.1 –8.1 –6.1 –6.6 –6.0 –7.0 –7.3
Countries in fragile and conflict-affected
situations 23.3 26.1 27.7 28.1 28.5 29.0 –1.3 –3.8 –4.2 –1.8 –1.9 –2.2
CFA franc zone 21.6 24.5 28.0 29.7 29.5 30.1 –3.8 –4.3 –4.2 –4.9 –4.2 –4.5
CEMAC 20.4 22.2 26.0 26.2 25.6 27.1 –3.7 –3.4 –4.5 –2.5 0.8 –1.0
WAEMU 22.4 25.7 29.1 31.6 31.4 31.6 –4.1 –4.9 –4.1 –6.3 –7.5 –6.6
COMESA (SSA members) 29.7 32.0 34.6 33.9 33.5 33.0 –5.9 –4.3 –4.1 –3.8 –4.6 –4.8
EAC-5 27.3 27.0 29.3 28.5 28.3 28.4 –7.1 –5.1 –5.1 –5.6 –6.3 –6.4
ECOWAS 22.5 24.8 27.1 27.3 27.7 28.3 –0.5 –3.9 –4.2 –2.4 –2.7 –2.6
SACU 64.8 65.5 72.4 68.7 67.9 68.6 –3.3 –2.6 1.5 3.1 0.9 –1.0
SADC 50.0 49.4 54.8 51.1 49.9 50.0 –3.3 –1.9 –0.1 1.9 0.3 –1.4
See page 15 for sources and footnotes
18 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND | OCTOBER 2022
STATISTICAL APPENDIX
SA4� External Debt, Official Debt, Debtor Based and Reserves
Table SA4. External Debt, Official Debt, Debtor Based and Reserves
External Debt, Official Debt, Debtor Based Reserves
(Percent of GDP) (Months of imports of goods and services)
2010–18 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2010–18 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
Angola 29.2 59.5 89.3 68.6 45.2 42.2 8.3 13.6 9.5 7.4 7.1 6.7
Benin1 14.2 25.1 30.3 34.8 39.4 41.3 … ... ... ... ... ...
Botswana 15.7 12.6 12.5 10.1 10.6 10.3 11.6 10.0 6.5 5.8 6.2 6.2
Burkina Faso1 20.2 23.7 25.2 25.2 28.1 27.9 ... ... ... ... ... ...
Burundi 20.0 18.0 17.5 19.9 18.4 17.1 2.8 1.3 1.0 2.2 1.6 1.4
Cabo Verde 80.2 97.9 130.3 114.9 127.6 126.1 5.1 8.9 6.9 7.0 5.1 5.0
Cameroon2 16.1 29.2 32.5 30.2 32.8 33.1 ... ... ... ... ... ...
Central African Republic2 26.1 35.8 36.3 32.8 33.7 31.1 ... ... ... ... ... ...
Chad2 24.1 25.5 28.2 24.4 21.6 20.2 ... ... ... ... ... ...
Comoros 18.0 20.9 23.2 24.0 32.6 37.6 7.0 6.9 8.2 8.5 7.3 6.5
Congo, Democratic Republic of the 15.7 12.8 13.7 14.6 13.2 9.9 1.1 0.8 0.6 0.8 1.1 1.4
Congo, Republic of 2 23.8 31.0 32.4 26.3 22.8 23.0 ... ... ... ... ... ...
Côte d'Ivoire1 20.4 28.2 34.4 31.5 34.5 34.5 ... ... ... ... ... ...
Equatorial Guinea2 8.1 14.0 16.3 12.4 8.5 9.1 ... ... ... ... ... ...
Eritrea 63.4 61.7 57.3 55.4 51.5 46.8 4.6 5.0 4.2 4.1 4.6 4.5
Eswatini 8.2 12.7 15.2 15.5 17.2 16.9 3.8 3.2 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.1
Ethiopia3 24.5 28.2 28.8 29.0 25.5 22.4 2.0 2.2 2.0 1.5 0.7 0.6
Gabon2 27.4 38.9 49.0 36.1 30.9 31.9 ... ... ... ... ... ...
The Gambia 35.1 46.4 49.4 47.5 45.2 43.7 3.7 4.0 5.3 6.0 4.4 4.1
Ghana 23.6 29.6 35.0 34.4 39.5 47.5 3.2 4.1 4.0 3.8 3.3 3.3
Guinea 26.8 19.9 27.0 28.3 26.9 26.7 2.2 1.5 1.9 2.2 2.2 2.4
Guinea-Bissau1 29.3 36.2 43.1 38.3 42.3 41.6 ... ... ... ... ... ...
Kenya 22.2 29.8 32.1 32.3 33.3 34.8 4.3 6.2 4.5 4.4 3.9 4.2
Lesotho 34.9 38.8 48.2 42.4 44.3 47.2 4.8 3.9 4.2 4.7 3.7 3.3
Liberia 15.3 34.9 41.1 37.2 39.1 40.9 2.1 2.2 2.2 4.3 4.1 4.3
Madagascar 23.2 26.9 36.4 38.0 40.3 41.6 3.1 5.3 4.8 5.1 4.9 4.5
Malawi 17.3 28.0 31.8 31.6 34.3 38.7 2.3 3.0 0.9 0.3 0.3 1.1
Mali1 22.2 26.5 31.8 27.9 28.3 28.1 ... ... ... ... ... ...
Mauritius 13.7 10.9 21.1 22.2 30.5 29.7 7.0 16.9 14.4 15.1 11.7 10.6
Mozambique 58.8 80.8 90.7 84.9 77.9 76.6 3.2 5.3 4.6 2.5 2.3 2.4
Namibia 10.8 20.2 21.3 16.6 17.7 16.8 3.2 5.3 4.3 5.0 4.1 4.3
Niger1 17.0 25.4 33.0 31.5 35.2 35.1 ... ... ... ... ... ...
Nigeria 3.1 6.7 8.0 9.1 9.1 9.1 5.9 6.3 6.6 6.3 6.5 6.7
Rwanda 24.6 43.2 54.7 53.4 55.6 56.3 3.7 4.6 5.4 4.5 4.2 4.0
São Tomé & Príncipe 76.6 65.4 64.9 60.0 64.0 63.0 3.8 3.4 4.5 3.8 4.6 4.6
Senegal1 30.1 47.4 48.9 45.8 47.4 45.6 ... ... ... ... ... ...
Seychelles 37.9 26.3 38.8 39.5 32.9 34.2 3.3 5.2 3.7 3.7 3.5 3.7
Sierra Leone 30.4 41.4 48.3 48.3 50.3 51.1 2.9 4.5 4.4 6.1 4.9 4.0
South Africa 13.7 20.2 23.4 18.6 20.0 20.7 5.4 8.4 6.4 5.2 4.8 4.5
South Sudan ... ... ... ... ... ... 1.8 0.4 0.1 0.8 0.6 0.8
Tanzania 24.9 28.1 28.9 28.4 27.0 25.4 4.6 5.8 5.6 4.7 4.4 4.3
Togo1 12.8 17.6 28.3 25.4 27.7 26.7 ... ... ... ... ... ...
Uganda 15.5 22.9 29.8 27.7 27.8 28.3 4.6 3.7 4.3 4.0 3.4 3.4
Zambia4 21.8 48.7 66.6 56.0 … … 2.8 2.6 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.8
Zimbabwe5 33.6 31.2 30.8 21.6 18.5 19.0 0.5 0.3 0.1 1.5 1.2 1.1
Sub-Saharan Africa 15.3 22.8 26.5 24.6 24.1 23.8 5.0 6.1 5.1 4.7 4.5 4.5
Median 21.9 28.2 32.3 31.5 32.8 33.7 3.7 4.5 4.3 4.3 4.1 4.0
Excluding Nigeria and South Africa 23.0 31.7 36.5 33.8 32.4 32.0 4.2 5.0 3.9 3.7 3.4 3.4
Oil-exporting countries 9.9 17.1 20.0 19.5 17.8 17.0 6.0 6.9 6.3 5.8 6.1 6.3
Excluding Nigeria 24.6 43.6 55.5 45.2 36.2 35.2 6.3 8.3 5.5 4.7 5.2 5.3
Oil-importing countries 19.0 25.9 29.9 27.1 27.7 27.9 4.2 5.6 4.4 4.1 3.5 3.4
Excluding South Africa 22.7 28.9 32.8 31.4 31.4 31.1 3.4 4.1 3.5 3.5 2.9 2.9
Middle-income countries 13.3 21.3 25.0 23.0 22.8 22.7 5.5 7.0 5.8 5.3 5.2 5.3
Excluding Nigeria and South Africa 22.6 34.9 41.5 37.5 36.0 36.5 5.3 6.5 4.8 4.6 4.4 4.5
Low-income countries 24.0 27.8 30.9 29.5 28.1 26.8 2.8 3.0 2.8 2.7 2.3 2.2
Excluding low-income countries in fragile and
conflict-affected situations 21.5 27.3 32.2 31.4 31.2 30.9 3.8 4.3 4.3 4.0 3.6 3.6
Countries in fragile and conflict-affected
situations 10.2 15.5 17.3 17.5 16.5 15.6 4.7 4.9 4.8 4.6 4.6 4.7
CFA franc zone 19.9 29.4 34.1 31.1 31.9 32.1 4.7 4.8 4.6 4.7 4.3 4.3
CEMAC 19.1 29.1 33.1 28.2 26.3 26.7 4.2 3.6 3.1 2.7 3.1 3.8
WAEMU 20.8 29.5 34.6 32.8 35.5 35.3 5.0 5.6 5.4 5.8 5.0 4.6
COMESA (SSA members) 21.4 27.1 30.5 29.4 27.9 27.0 3.1 3.9 3.1 3.0 2.5 2.5
EAC-5 21.8 28.6 31.6 31.1 31.2 31.4 4.4 5.5 4.8 4.4 4.0 4.0
ECOWAS 9.0 15.0 18.2 18.9 19.1 19.0 5.0 5.4 5.4 5.3 5.3 5.5
SACU 13.7 19.9 23.0 18.3 19.7 20.3 5.5 8.3 6.3 5.2 4.8 4.5
SADC 18.8 27.4 32.4 27.1 26.3 25.9 5.4 7.7 5.6 4.8 4.5 4.3
See page 15 for sources and footnotes
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND | OCTOBER 2022 19