Genre: Opinion/Argumentation

By Iain Martin One doesn't like to interrupt the new politics while it's still finding its feet, but the questions about the 55% rule won't go away. I posted on the subject yesterday . The new government has so far made only a few confused attempts to explain what it thinks it is doing with this measure. Perhaps its senior members know they have blundered but are still working out how to master the art of the swift and dignified U-turn. I repeat, in the coalition document it stipulates: "Legislation will be brought forward to make provision for fixed-term parliaments of five years. This legislation will also provide for dissolution if 55% or more of the House votes in favour." So far the government's defense of this piece of constitutional vandalism can be summarized as amounting to: "Er... we think it will ensure strong government? Um... I'm sure it will be debated in the House of Commons... er... Labour was much worse?" Various readers and contributors here have done a somewhat better job of making the case for it -- saying it strengthens the hand of Parliament against a prime minister. And an enthusiastic supporter of the government had the best argument. The idea, he says, is that it diminishes the PM's power to call a snap election, giving the Lib Dems a lock on such a decision because he would need their votes to get to 55% of the House. This, he says, is an erosion of executive power and A Good Thing. However, he claims (or presumes, because ministers have yet to decide or make it clear) that there seems to be nothing to stop the Lib Dems breaking the coalition at some point, and joining Labour and the other parties to vote down the Tories on an old-fashioned 50%-plus-one no-confidence vote. Not sure that's the case, as combined the other parties seem to have about 53% of votes in the Commons. Or is it being suggested that there will now be two types of no-confidence motion? One requiring 50% plus one if it's the PM's opponents are putting it down and another different kind requiring 55% if it's the PM trying for a dissolution? The beauty of the existing convention of 50% plus one in all eventualities is that it is simple, easily understood and was, until the coalition document, accepted by all sides. It has its origins in the no-confidence motion that brought down Lord North's administration in 1782. Then it was a daring innovation, but it became from then the accepted convention. As I said, it can be easily grasped as a concept which is why it has endured. A few questions and points to consider for the constitutional mastermind in government who is eventually landed with trying to introduce this mess of a policy (probably Nick Clegg, who apparently has the task of "reforming politics"): 1) Might a future strong PM or coalition partners decide that 55% is not enough and push it up higher? Perhaps in the name of stability and "strong government"? Start fiddling around with such a basic convention and who knows what some of your successors with suspect motives might try (citing your earlier manipulation of the constitution in their defense). Dangerous stuff. 2) What if a future prime minister needs to call an election before his or her five year term is up? I mean, really needs to have an election but can't. Several years down the line there is an economic crisis on, a PM's coalition partners have gone loopy and been hijacked by economic illiterates who fear tough action and don't want an election because they have no money and are unpopular. The PM needs to get through robust measures but he can't. In the interests of the nation he should go to the Queen and ask for an election to give him a mandate for the action required. But he can't, he doesn't have 55% of the votes in the House. What does he do? And how is this log-jam either democratic or good for the country? 3) Once a PM wanting an election has failed to dissolve Parliament by getting only 54% of the votes in the house, he resigns surely. Do his former partners and now opponents, let's call them the Lib Dems for the sake of argument, get to have another go with Labour, the Nats and the Greens without an election? How is this an improvement of our democratic arrangements? 4) People keep talking about a dissolution vote. What is this innovation? As it stands, the Queen grants a dissolution by proclamation after a PM asks for it. If he is defeated in a no-confidence vote then it leads, by convention, to a trip to the Palace and a dissolution. But a dissolution vote is new. This proposal merits proper free discussion by both houses of Britain's sovereign parliament, rather than being whipped through within days on the back of a hastily constructed coalition deal. 5) Anyway, what is so great about fixed term Parliaments in a parliamentary system? Various MPs have told me that it would be much more convenient, and so it would... convenient for MPs. But their convenience is immaterial, I'm afraid. A PM should have the right to go to the country -- in a crisis or after unforeseen developments, or simply because he thinks he can win and maximize support for the measures he judges the country needs. 6) The government wants to move quickly on this. Presumably it will need to pass through the existing House of Lords, (which won't be straightforward). Or is the plan to wait until the Lords can be stuffed with new appointed members hired to vote through this and then the introduction of PR leading to them being turfed out shortly after? (Incidentally, will there be a long queue of top-quality people willing to give up a year or so of their earning potential to do this work?) Or will the Parliament Act be used to force this through in the name of strong government? In essence there is nothing democratic about preventing a PM from asking the people for their verdict by calling an election. On the contrary, putting an obstacle in place is undemocratic. What is being proposed to replace the existing arrangements is a nonsense and a case study in how not to treat the constitution. Pull hastily at one constitutional thread, fixed term parliaments and the royal prerogative in this case, and other loose threads appear rapidly. It is what one gets when the constitution is redesigned at high speed in coalition negotiations on the back of secretive smoker Nick Clegg's cigarette packet. Comments (5 of 14) If people paid a bit more attention to what goes on INSIDE Westminster (ie David Howarth's attempt to get fixed term parliaments in the past) there would be more understanding of the issue and less hot air and anxiety. 12:32 pm May 16, 2010 Scary Biscuits wrote : MPs have got the wrong end of the stick again. Asked to reduce thier power and their too cosy relationship with the executive, they have instead got cosier with the executive and increased their power and the expense of voters and Crown. The 55% rule makes it harder for Crown, (it's still officially the Queen's job), to consult the people in the event of drastically changed circumstances. The new rule on five year fixed terms means that parliaments, which were previously only four years in length on average, will now all be five years long, a 25% increase in MPs' terms (and pensions) and a corresponding decrease in democratic accountability. How very convenient for them. 6:06 pm May 14, 2010 Shaun wrote : "Edward, What is a dissolution motion? Until now, there's been so such thing in the Commons. There are confidence motions, which if a government lost meant a trip to the palace and an election (as in 1979). But not now, it seems. The PM loses such a vote but carries on? Or someone else gets a shot until the fixed date in May 2015? " In Scotland I believe if the government falls due to resignation or a no-confidence vote 50%+1 the Parliament has 28 days for another government to be formed after which an election is called. To vote for a government to fall and for Parliament to be dissolved they need to get 66% of the vote. I imagine the Scottish model is what they're thinking in this given that David Laws was involved in the negotiation of the Lib-Lab pact that produced the Scottish rule. You're right, though, that 55% is arbitrary but then so's 66% in Scotland (and I believe, Wales) or the number of Senators required to break a filibuster, or requiring parties get at least 5% of the votes to be represented or whatever else. When you're choosing something other than a simple majority it's always arbitrary which is a weakness of those systems. But I don't think it significantly delegitimises Scotland , the US, or Germany. Also it seems that if Parliament's to be fixed term but able to decide for early elections when it wants that it makes sense to have a higher hurdle for those situations. Not just for situations like this but that so when we have majority, one-party government the government won't be able to dissolve Parliament whenever it wants. Shaun 6:02 pm May 14, 2010 FaustiesBlog wrote : The 55% rule is such a major constitutional change, that it will require primary legislation to pass into law. Since that is the case, and since constitutional changes have to be put to the people in a referendum, and since the 55% rule was not in his manifesto, by what right does he think he can ram this through parliament without offering us a referendum on it? He says it will have adequate time in parliament for debate, and won't be guillotined. That's what Obama said. And look what he's been doing since. It's not as if Cameron has kept many of his promises since he became the Leader of the Opposition. 4:47 pm May 14, 2010 FF wrote : I think you're still confusing the issues. To be clear, there is no change to the rules on confidence motions. MPs can vote down governments just as they do at present. What happens next is different. Before the PM could and normally would call an election. Now it's expected that Parliament would make a proposal for a new government using the existing collection of MPs. In exceptional circumstances, Parliament can vote for an early election. Generally parliaments will go to term, whereas before the PM could call a new election whenever it suits him. There are arguments for and against fixed terms but the arguments for are relatively stronger in hung parliament/coalition government situations. In these situations there is a bigger contention between parties after the election and therefore a greater temptation to try to boost your representation by holding another election. The 55% figure was chosen to deal with the specific distribution of seats that we have now and is a bit of a gerrymander. 50% or 66%, which are equally arbitrary figures, might be more acceptable simply because they are figures that have been used before.