This one caught my eye because of 2 things. Some audio transmission clips from the lunar flights and a photograph that was presumed unseeable, but with todays modern advancements, they claim to make out a pyramid shape. This is the first time that I've personally heard or seen anything about these 2 items in my thread. I have alot of time in reading and video watching invested. Im sure a bit of you already know this info, The vid is from 2008. I have always questioned that NASA put 70 tons of aluminum on the moon with pretty stunning accuracy with pocket calculator computing power. And one conspiracy tugs at the other. If we didnt go to the moon then how are were ground level photos taken, unless its all one giant fraud. Here is a recently uploaded video from Finlands ex minister of health discussing a UFO conference in Russia where a case of abduction of a Russian farmer says he was in a UFO, flew over the back side of the moon and saw bases....Pretty good vid First of all, big problems can have small solutions when the solution is coupled with a good brain. Computing power wasn't the hurdle for the moon landing, knowledge of physics and obtaining accurate information for the basis of the calculations was the hard part. The moon landing can probably be calculated with an abicis combined with knowledge of geometry and algebra to be honest. Computers do not equal answer to all things. Secondly, I've been watching the moon for a while with my telescope. There are no visible structures on this side of it. Who knows what's on the other side. Would nightvision even work on the backside of the moon? This one caught my eye because of 2 things. Some audio transmission clips from the lunar flights and a photograph that was presumed unseeable, but with todays modern advancements, they claim to make out a pyramid shape. This is the first time that I've personally heard or seen anything about these 2 items in my thread. I have alot of time in reading and video watching invested. Im sure a bit of you already know this info, The vid is from 2008. I have always questioned that NASA put 70 tons of aluminum on the moon with pretty stunning accuracy with pocket calculator computing power. And one conspiracy tugs at the other. If we didnt go to the moon then how are were ground level photos taken, unless its all one giant fraud. Yes and the same with mars too! Thanks for sharing the videos! Very important videos for those seeking the truth. Whether your posts get one or tons of flags, still a very important thread. That even if repeated should be repeated for truths sake. Secondly, I've been watching the moon for a while with my telescope. There are no visible structures on this side of it. Who knows what's on the other side. Would nightvision even work on the backside of the moon?. Why is this a concern? The side of the moon that we never see from earth has the same amount of time in sunlight as the side that is visiable from earth. From a stationary postion on the surface of the moon one would have a fourteen day sunlight period followed by a fourteen day dark period. Secondly, I've been watching the moon for a while with my telescope. There are no visible structures on this side of it. Who knows what's on the other side. Would nightvision even work on the backside of the moon?. Why is this a concern? The side of the moon that we never see from earth has the same amount of time in sunlight as the side that is visiable from earth. From a stationary postion on the surface of the moon one would have a fourteen day sunlight period followed by a fourteen day dark period. Your telescope wouldn't pick up objects on the moon. Simply because it isn't designed for that purpose. And no night-vision won't work either. I dont think the dark side of the moon is actually dark, we just cant see it so it referred to as dark. If a extraterrestrial civilization were to build, what better spot. Its human instinct to question what we cant see or the unknown. Its personally one of my favorite subjects. If none of these topics were even real, I enjoy getting a cold drink and reading and filling my mind with fiction or non fiction, its a great way to spend a rainy evening. The first video at 3.30 is the zeeman crater they claim a castle is under the blur the crater is 184km in dia thats a big castle then Then at this post here you will see that Joe Escamilla who ranks with Hoagland and Icke as a bit of an idiot claimed it was an Alien repairing his ship obviously he hadn't checked the size of the objects in the picture. The Above Top Secret Web sites are a wholly owned social content community of The Above Network, LLC. This content community relies on user-generated content from our member contributors. The opinions of our members are not those of site ownership who maintains strict editorial agnosticism and simply provides a collaborative venue for free expression.


Good work sped - hopefully this works like your Crows one did last night PUDDINGS. __________________ Somebody who loves life and thinks that North Melbourne are grouse. A word of warning this is not have anything to do with porn or anything disgusting. So please refrain from posting up pornographic images and posting about it. Also no trolls allowed. __________________ Somebody who loves life and thinks that North Melbourne are grouse. A word of warning this is not have anything to do with porn or anything disgusting. So please refrain from posting up pornographic images and posting about it. Also no trolls allowed.


Rhona Mitra Cast as Female Lead in Michael Bay's 'The Last Ship' Rhona Mitra is a badass English actress with plenty of silver screen skills, starring in "Doomsday," "Shooter" and "Underworld: Rise of the Lycans." Her TV list is just as impressive: "Strike Back," "Nip/Tuck," "Boston Legal" and "The Practice." Now, Mitra can add one more show under her belt -- "The Last Ship." "The Last Ship" is based on the popular 1988 novel of the same name by William Brinkley. The show, set to debut sometime in 2013, will feature a post-apocalyptic world in which members from a naval destroyer find themselves as some of the last people on Earth. You can bet your bottom dollar this show will be the next big thing. Why am I so sure, you ask? Mega producer Michael Bay will be producing this TNT drama. Who's in Charge? Michael Bay will produce the show, who is most famously known for his Transformers series . The show is written by "Without a Trace" creator Hank Steinberg. Steven Kane -- who recently worked on "The Closer" -- will take the role of producer. According to Deadline.com, casting for the show has closed and all the major roles have been filled. And the Cast is... Rhona Mitra: Mitra will play Rachel Scott, the strong-willed and fearless paleomicrobioligist. Eric Dane: He will play Captain Tom Chandler, the captain of the USS Nathan James. Chandler gets word from his family that they are still alive, but militias everywhere, jeopardizing their lives. It is up to him to figure out how to save the last of humanity. Dane became a household sensation for playing Dr. Mark "McSteamy" Sloan on the medical drama television series "Grey's Anatomy." He was also in the films "Marley & Me," "Valentine's Day" and "Burlesque." Adam Baldwin: He will play the character of Mike Slattery, second in command to Captain Tom Chandler. Baldwin is most known for his role in "Independence Day" as well as several TV series including "Leverage," "Castle" and "Chuck." Charles Parnell: He will be playing the role of Commander Master Chief (CMC) Hugh Jeter aboard the USS Nathan James. CMC Jeter runs a tight ship and even threatens to shoot a sailor who attempts to leave the ship without permission, according to i09.com . Parnell is a television actor and has made appearances on "Bones," "Fringe," "CSI: Miami," "All My Children" and "Law & Order." Michaela McManus: Michaela McManus will be playing Lt. Jackie Makena, who runs the Combat Information Center and is in charge of missile deployment. She is dating Danny Green, the leader of a group of SEALS. McManus has experience in short film and television, making appearances in "Cosa Bella," "One Tree Hill," "The Vampire Diaries" and "CSI: Miami." Sam Spruell: He will play the character of Quincy Tophet, a paleomicrobiologist who is the assistant of Rachel Scott's assistant. He helps her dig for ice samples in the hopes to find a cure for the mutating virus. Spruell has been featured in British series "Spooks" and "P.O.W." and is most recently known for his role in "Snow White and the Huntsman."" A strong cast of veterans mixed with a quality production and writing team should blend well to make this a good watch. Bay creates cinematic wonder with his eye for special effects, bringing settings to life in a surreal way. As long as the acting is adequate, a good script will make this show a hit.


Campaign provides phone cards to soldiers SAVANNAH -- The Coastal Bank, a community bank serving coastal Georgia, launched its third annual initiative to raise money for the USO's Operation Phone Home, which provides prepaid phone cards to deployed military personnel, enabling them to call loved ones while away from their families this holiday season. The bank will lead the 2012 fundraising campaign for USO Operation Phone Home, which runs through Nov. 30. "This campaign is a small way for us to express our gratitude for their selfless sacrifice and service to our nation," said Jim LaHaise, acting bank president and CEO. "Our goal is to put at least one phone card in the hands of every soldier and service member in our area who is deployed during the holidays." The public is invited to join the bank and the USO in connecting deployed soldiers from the Coastal Empire and the Lowcountry to their loved ones. A $5 donation will provide a service member with a phone card. Cards will be given in December to deployed members of the U.S. Army, Army National Guard, Air National Guard, U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Marine Corps and U.S. Naval Reserve. Anyone donating $5 or more will be entered into a drawing to win one free Chick-fil-A sandwich per week for a year. Two winners will be announced at the conclusion of the campaign. The public can buy phone cards online at www.phonehomesav.com or visit a Coastal Bank branch to make a donation to the campaign. The Hinesville branch is at 101 W. Hendry St. "We are fortunate to live in such a generous community, where people are willing to support our local service men and women," said Mitchell Bush, president of USO of Georgia-Savannah. "This year, we hope to raise a record number of phone cards for service members serving overseas during the holiday season." SAVANNAH -- The Coastal Bank, a community bank serving coastal Georgia, launched its third annual initiative to raise money for the USO's Operation Phone Home, which provides prepaid phone cards to deployed military personnel, enabling them to call loved ones while away from their families this holiday season. The bank will lead the 2012 fundraising campaign for USO Operation Phone Home, which runs through Nov. 30. "This campaign is a small way for us to express our gratitude for their selfless sacrifice and service to our nation," said Jim LaHaise, acting bank president and CEO. "Our goal is to put at least one phone card in the hands of every soldier and service member in our area who is deployed during the holidays." The public is invited to join the bank and the USO in connecting deployed soldiers from the Coastal Empire and the Lowcountry to their loved ones. A $5 donation will provide a service member with a phone card. Cards will be given in December to deployed members of the U.S. Army, Army National Guard, Air National Guard, U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Marine Corps and U.S. Naval Reserve. Anyone donating $5 or more will be entered into a drawing to win one free Chick-fil-A sandwich per week for a year. Two winners will be announced at the conclusion of the campaign. The public can buy phone cards online at www.phonehomesav.com or visit a Coastal Bank branch to make a donation to the campaign. The Hinesville branch is at 101 W. Hendry St. "We are fortunate to live in such a generous community, where people are willing to support our local service men and women," said Mitchell Bush, president of USO of Georgia-Savannah. "This year, we hope to raise a record number of phone cards for service members serving overseas during the holiday season."


Now that the days of painfully straight-looking hair are over and more relaxed, voluminous-looking styles are in, it's time to put your flat iron on the backburner and brush up on your blow-drying skills. To find out more, we hit up hairdresser Phillip Gallo for some styling shortcuts. STEP ONE: KEEP IT REAL "Begin by detangling the hair using a wide-tooth comb before towel-drying the hair and applying a heat protection or volumising product," advises Gallo. To speed up the drying process, He recommends blow-drying your hair upside down, using your hands to create body and texture in at the roots as you dry off excess moisture. STEP TWO: DIVIDE AND CONQUER Once the hair feels close to dry, that's your cue to separate the hair into two sections from ear to ear. Then all you need to do is secure the first section into a hair clip before tackling the bottom section with a barrel brush. "As you grab each section, you want to pull the hair in an upward direction from the roots so that it feels like you're gently stretching the strands against the downward pressure of the hot air." STEP THREE: SEAL THE DEAL "Once you're satisfied with the amount of volume and movement in the hair, give each section a quick once over with the cold air button to seal the hair cuticle and add shine," Gallo says. And if you're thinking of adding a finishing product or hairspray to the routine, it's best to wait until the hair has cooled down as the heat will only cause the product to set looking stiff and crunchy. STEP FOUR: DON'T OVERDO IT "The biggest mistake most women make when it comes to at-home styling is overloading the hair with too much product," says Gallo. "The roots produce enough oil as it is, so aim to keep the product concentrated on the lengths and ends where you need the protection and shine the most." TOOL TIME Owning the right styling tools is half the battle when it comes to perfecting a professional blow-dry at home. When it comes to creating shiny, smooth-looking hair, you can't go past a thick-bristled, round brush. Unlike a flat paddle brush that slips through the hair, the thicker, the more concentrated the bristles, the more hair it means you can collect at once to cut down on styling time. Aside from boasting ionic and ceramic technology that's designed to minimise heat damage and frizz, salon-grade dryers are built to handle heavy-duty use. Plus, the powerful motor means you can get away with using the medium heat settings for the majority of your styling needs.


High School lives up to the title High School 3.0 stars TORONTO - What to do when your high school introduces mandatory drug testing? Make sure the entire student body is baked. And the teachers. That's the game plan in High School , a stoner comedy with Matt Bush as the nerdy Henry and Sean Marquette as his ne'er do well childhood friend, Travis Breaux. Breaux is always stoned. Henry is on his way to MIT and will be class valedictorian, but then he and Travis cross paths and Henry is convinced to smoke a joint. Trouble. The headmaster (Michael Chiklis, fairly demented here) suddenly decides to hold school-wide drug tests. Henry will fail, get kicked out and lose his future at MIT, so he and Breaux need to come up with a plan. They decide to get the entire student body stoned on brownies so that all the drug test results will be rendered useless. To get enough dope for all those brownies, they pay a visit to the local psycho drug dealer (Adrien Brody) and steal his stash of kief. Then they start baking. Everything that could go wrong does go wrong in High School , a cheerful if lightweight comedy about being young and footloose and not bowing to authority, and all that. The performances are decent. Bush and Marquette are entirely watchable as the high school schemers; Brody is out of control crazy as the dope specialist and --  pleasant surprise -- Colin Hanks and Yeardley Smith turn up in small roles. The action is frantic and funny, what with all the students and all the teachers getting stoned, but what it means in the end isn't clear. Silliness is what it means, probably. It's a fun ride, but entirely forgettable.


Carson, Calif.  Alvaro Saborio was back in the starting lineup for Real Salt Lake on Saturday night, as it prepared to take on Chivas USA in a crucial Major League Soccer game at the Home Depot Center. The team's leading scorer missed its game last weekend with a shoulder injury suffered in a CONCACAF Champions League game last week, even after lobbying coach Jason Kreis to play. But Saborio now will get a chance to add to his 14 goals this season against a team that hasn't won in two months. The last-place Goats are riding a nine-game winless streak since July 28. Led by former RSL assistant Robin Fraser, they are 7-15-7 and have lost their last five in a row by a combined 10-1 score, having not found the back of the net at all in their last three games. Beating them is crucial for RSL, which is 15-11-4 and fighting to stay in the top three in the MLS Western Conference to avoid a wild-card game in the playoffs. RSL, the Los Angeles Galaxy, and the Seattle Sounders all are within one point of each other in the battle for second and third place, with four regular-season games remaining (five for the Sounders). The Galaxy are playing at Colorado on Saturday, while the Sounders are at Vancouver. RSL also will start Luis Gil in place of midfielder Ned Grabavoy, who injured his right quadriceps during practice this week. The team has shown some hope for the stretch run by going 2-1-1 in league play since a three-game losing streak. Reader comments on sltrib.com are the opinions of the writer, not The Salt Lake Tribune. We will delete comments containing obscenities, personal attacks and inappropriate or offensive remarks. Flagrant or repeat violators will be banned. If you see an objectionable comment, click the red "Flag" link below it. See more about comments here.


Things to do after Mass Brothers and sisters - it has been a while since ive posted so excuse the long distance Just wanted to know things to do after Mass or things to talk about to invoke discussion with friends/bf after Holy Mass. Ive done the whole "So what did you understand from the Gospel, what did the homily mean to you, how do you think we can implement this in our life, did you like the priest, the mass the church etc". But i feel as though it is all rigid and straight forward responses. I want the discussion to open up so i can see their perspective and point of view. E.g. after Mass yesterday the radio got turned on - i wasnt happy with the station or songs so i turned it off. We sat in awkward silence and brouught up random convo material - when really i wanted to talk about what i just learnt and it helped/affirmed me to continue my spiritual journey.. I brouught up the usual churchey topics but nothing really extended. The only time things get interesting (religiously) is when were in a heated debate (fun but tiring lol). I just want a casual exchange but i dont know how to bring it on.


Fund-raising Appeal The Asia-Pacific Journal needs your financial support to take the next step in expanding our work and outreach and above all to placing the journal on a firm long-term trajectory. With some 200 articles on themes related to Japan's 3.11 triple disaster, we have become a major source of information on Japan and the Pacific. We are now launching an ambitious new venture: under Laura Hein's leadership we will post the first of a series of course readers that provide readers an outline, introduction and ten to twenty core texts on a major theme such as war and visual culture; women and Japan's political economy; environmental history, and war in Japanese popular culture. Available free to readers. As we approach our first decade of publication, we need to place the journal on a sustainable foundation. This will require hiring of a part-time managing editor. We rely on the support of 6,000 regular readers and many more who consult our work periodically. We ask those who value our work to go to the red sustainer button on our home page http://japanfocus.org and contribute generously. In addition to the many who become members at our basic rate of $25, we need the help of those who are able to support the journal at higher levels to become sustainers at the $100, $500 and more. Thanks in advance. The United States and East Asia: The decline of long-distance leadership? 1 Mark Beeson The election of Barrack Obama was a remarkable event in many ways. Not only was the election of a black, Democratic president a domestic milestone, but it was a potentially transformative moment for foreign policy, too. The administration of George W. Bush was responsible for some of the most divisive and counter-productive foreign policies of recent times. The standing and authority of the US had been steadily undermined as a consequence. It is clear that the election of Obama has already seen a dramatic improvement in sentiment toward the US around the world, something that bodes well for the US's 'soft power' and influence.  One might expect, therefore, that US policymakers will once again be able to assert themselves in East Asia, a region in which the US has had a powerful presence and influence since the Second World War. While the region is not unique in this regard -- the US as the world's sole remaining superpower has been a major factor in the development of every other region, too -- East Asia's post-war trajectory, both as the epicentre of international wars between 1945 and 1975, and as a rapidly advancing economic region throughout the era, has been especially marked by American influence. 2 Indeed, East Asia's recent development history, its intra-regional relations and its place in the overall international system might have been profoundly different were it not for its engagement with the United States. But will the US continue to exert such a powerful influence in the future? To understand why the US might loom so large in East Asia's recent past and how its influence might be changing, we need to historicise its relationship with the region. This involves saying something about the nature of American power and the way it has been theorized. Consequently, the article begins with a brief consideration of the nature of 'American leadership', distinguishing it from the sort of institutionalised 'structural' power that has been an enduring part of American power and influence. The key point that emerges from this discussion is that the effectiveness and coherence of American leadership in East Asia has fluctuated, and has not simply been a function of its underlying structural dominance. Indeed, while the contemporary international system has frequently being characterised as 'unipolar' and unparalleled, there are substantial grounds for thinking that the US capacity for exercising leadership is in decline. 3 This article explains how this situation has come about. After first sketching the US's historical influence over East Asia, I explain the steady erosion of its leadership. This has come about, I suggest, partly as a consequence of the rise of China and a growing interest in an exclusive form of East Asian regionalism that excludes the US, but primarily because of America's own political, economic and strategic problems. Bound to lead? Structure, agency and American power Writing nearly twenty years ago, Joseph Nye argued that the US was 'bound to lead' the international system as a consequence of its overwhelming material and ideological dominance. 4 In part, Nye was responding to Paul Kennedy's highly influential thesis, which claimed that American power was entering a period of inevitable and unstoppable decline brought about by 'imperial overstretch'. 5 Such debates are not just historical curiosities, however. Precisely the same sorts of debates continue between those who think that American power is unparalleled and enduring, 6 and those who argue that its authority and even its material dominance have been eroded, especially by the costly and ill-advised wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. 7 Before evaluating such ideas and their repercussions on US relations with East Asia, it is worth making some initial observations about the sources of American power. One way of understanding how American influence operates, I suggest, is to distinguish between the 'structural' and 'agential' aspects of American power. Although structure and agency are deeply connected, mutually constitutive forces, 8 it is useful to isolate the different properties associated with each to gain a clearer understanding of the nature of American power and influence. Only those countries that have enjoyed economic pre-eminence have been able to assert a concomitant influence over the international system, 9 so it is worth spelling out how these forces have worked and why they have had such an impact on East Asia. After the Second World War it was clear that the US had the world's largest and most dynamic economy and would play a major role in determining the shape of the emerging international economic order. One of the reasons that the US was able to exert such a profound influence on not only East Asia but also the rest of the world was this economic dominance. In 1953, the US alone accounted for around 45 percent of the world's manufacturing output, 10 a situation which stands in marked contrast with its current position of about 20 per cent, which China is expected to overtake by 2016. 11 Indeed, the rapid rise of China (and, to a lesser extent, India) as a global economic power has begun to undermine the primacy of the American economy, 12 something that has potentially major implications for its concomitant political influence. Initially, however, US dominance was entrenched in the Bretton Woods institutions, notably the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the United Nations, and was deeply reflective of American values and preferences. 13 When thinking about the sources of American power it is important to recognise the pervasive, enduring nature of its influence. This owes a great deal to the US ability to institutionalise an international order that reflected and enhanced its dominance, 14 or turn structural potential into political agency. The possible unravelling of this multilateral order and the shift to a more unilateral foreign policy stance on the part of the US is, as we shall see, one source of its declining leadership influence. 15 The links -- and possible contradictions -- between structural or material power on the one hand, and agential influence on the other, are also evident in US strategic dominance. Fifty years ago the US not only wielded formidable economic power through the activities of American multinationals and the centrality of its financial sector, but this was reinforced by what Chalmers Johnson described as a global 'empire of bases' or military outposts. 16 Of course, this is still the case, as those who emphasise the material elements of American primacy are quick to highlight. 17 But the world was a very different place in the late 1940s and '50s; the military stand-off with the Soviet Union, and its expression in the Korean and Indochinese Wars, gave the military a prominence and importance it no longer enjoys. One of the most widely noted features of the contemporary international order is the decline of inter-state warfare, 18 something that potentially robs the US of a good deal of influence and leverage. The fact that the financially-constrained Obama administration may be less enthusiastic about the military option than its predecessor may further diminish US strategic leverage that had already been undermined by the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and the maladroit conduct of the 'war on terror'. 19 This situation stands in marked contrast with the febrile atmosphere of the Cold War, when America's capacity to actively 'lead' and the willingness of other countries to follow -- in the capitalist world, at least -- was considerably enhanced. As Gaddis points out, much of the willingness of America's allies to go along with its leadership flowed from the perceived legitimacy of the cause compared to the Soviet alternative, 20 America's failings in Vietnam notwithstanding. The importance of this ideational or ideological aspect of the Cold War in particular and of American foreign policy more generally is also worth emphasising. While there is clearly an important structural aspect of recent US dominance of the international system, 21 it is equally apparent that it has made an enormous difference to the constitution of the inter-state system that it has been America (rather than some other potential hegemon) that has been in the ascendant. 22 This has been manifest in an ideological commitment to the promotion of liberalism and (to a significantly lesser extent) democracy, and to a particular view of itself as a force for enlightenment and good in world affairs. 23 Not only have such domestically rooted views about the unique historical role of the US given a distinctive cast to the nature of American foreign policy and influenced the way such policies have been pursued, 24 but they have made many American policymakers remarkably oblivious to the way America is perceived in the world. As Barry Buzan notes, the 'combination of a benign self-image as the carrier of universal values and domestically driven foreign policy insulates the US from the idea that people abroad oppose it, or even hate it, because of its foreign policies rather than because they oppose or hate its values'. 25 This matters more now because of the declining legitimacy and thus authority of American policy. The potential importance of this point becomes clearer if the contemporary situation is contrasted with earlier phases of American dominance. Historicising American hegemony reminds us that debates about the nature, impact and importance of American power are not new. Charles Kindleberger famously argued that the Great Depression was largely a consequence of a failure of American leadership to provide public goods, a stabilising influence, and an open economic system, 26 sparking a major debate about the nature and impact of American hegemony that continues to this day. 27 The fact that Kindleberger operated from a broadly realist position explains his state-centrism and emphasis on leadership rather than more encompassing, multi-dimensional notion of hegemony. 28 The key point to emphasise here is that American leadership matters today as it has throughout the post-war world, but its impact and content are powerfully mediated by contingent circumstances. At one level, as we have seen, this may reflect the bipolar structure of the post-war international order, and the size and importance of the US economy, especially for its capitalist allies. At another level, the content of American leadership -- its agential component, if you will -- is shaped by a combination of ideas, interests and institutional variables at both the international and national levels. Post-war American foreign policy has shown remarkable continuity. The structurally imposed constraints of the Cold War may have made such an outcome in recent history entirely predictable, but Andrew Bacevich has persuasively argued that a consistency of purpose has been a continuing characteristic of American foreign policy even in the post-Cold War period. Bacevich suggests that a commitment to 'openness' has been the continuing 'Big Idea' underlying recent American policy: the removal of barriers to the movement of goods, capital, people and ideas, thereby fostering an integrated international order conducive to American interests, governed by American norms, regulated by American power, and, above all, satisfying expectations of the American people for ever-greater abundance. 29 While it is possible to quibble about both the extent of America's support for the universal liberalization of population flows, and its commitment to reducing its own barriers to trade, nevertheless Bacevich highlights some important continuities in American policy. But it is one thing to have some consistency of purpose, it is quite another to see this supported and realized. For that to occur, policy -- especially that of another country -- must enjoy a degree of authority, legitimacy, or the promise of some instrumental pay-off that makes support or at least acquiescence worthwhile. The rest of this article looks at the evolution of American foreign policy in East Asia and argues that the sustaining confluence of structural and agential factors that sustained American hegemony for so long are beginning to unravel. History, hegemony and East Asia Hegemony differs from leadership, and both aspects of American power are evident in its relations with East Asia. America's military primacy was demonstrated vividly in its defeat and subsequent occupation of Japan, positioning the US to play a leading role in the construction of East Asia's bifurcated post-war international order. But hegemony means more than simply imposing foreign policy preferences on weaker or subordinate powers. For hegemony to be enduring it requires a degree of consent and support from less powerful states -- something both radical and liberal theorists of hegemony have highlighted. 30 What was striking about American hegemony in the post-war period was that for many of its allies it offered a number of potential long-term advantages, which generally outweighed possible disadvantages that came with American dominance. It is worth spelling out what these were, as the calculus of advantage has started to shift, despite the persistence of the earlier structures of dependency and domination. Two inter-connected, but distinct and differentially realized aspects of America's post-war relations with East Asia were vital in underpinning its overall dominance. On the one hand, the multilateral institutional order associated with the Bretton Woods regime, broadly understood as the World Bank, the IMF and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,  held out the prospect of integration into what would prove to be a highly effective and expansionary economic order, and which provided strong incentives to join the US side. The incentives included access to the world's largest market on favorable terms. On the other hand, a series of bilateral, 'hub and spokes' relationships in East Asia constituted an America-centric security architecture that profoundly influenced the trajectory of regional development. Indeed, while helping to prop up American allies, it effectively foreclosed the possibility of meaningful regional integration until the end of the Cold War. 31 Some observers suggest that the historical animosities that are such a prominent and endlessly invoked part of East Asian history 'virtually bid the United States to play the "hub"'. 32 The reality is more complex: not only did the US treat post-war Asia very differently from Western Europe, 33 but from the start the Americans played an interventionist role in directly shaping East Asia's post-war order. The logic and impact of American bilateralism was most obvious in the reconstitution of Japan as a pivotal, subordinate part of the region's strategic architecture. 34 That Japan has remained in a dependent and subordinate position that has effectively prevented it from exercising regional leadership despite its economic renaissance is testimony to the durability and importance of the relationships established in this period. 35 It might be objected that Japan is not a 'normal' country and its historical ties to the US are atypical. While there is something in this, 36 it is still the case that the US has effectively determined the shape of the region's security institutions and its intra-regional relations -- even for those countries that are not allies. The most obvious manifestation of this possibility, of course, was the US involvement in the region's two major wars in Korea and Vietnam. Somewhat surprisingly, participation in these bloody conflicts did little to undermine the idea that regional stability was dependent on the continuing strategic presence of the US in East Asia, despite stalemate in the first and US defeat in the second. Whatever the merit of this idea, (and it is not as widely or uncritically supported as it once was), 37 it is plain that it has influenced the evolution of the region's institutional architecture. The most enduring multilateral institution in the developing world -- ASEAN -- owes it existence, in large part, to the Cold War divisions that American grand strategy helped entrench, and to the prospect of America's strategic withdrawal from the region under the rubric of the Nixon Doctrine. 38 Similarly, two of ASEAN's most significant claims to fame -- the resolution of the conflict in Cambodia and the establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum -- have been dependent on an absence of American opposition. 39 Even what has arguably proved to be the pivotal moment in East Asia's post-war history -- the rapprochement between the US and China which ultimately opened the way for the latter's rise via its reintegration into the international system -- occurred more as a consequence of shifts in American rather than Chinese or East Asian policy. 40 The potential paradoxes of American policy were evident in the differences between, and impact of, America's economic and strategic goals as they became increasingly separate and disconnected over time. 41 The most obvious expression of American influence was strategic: its policies reinforced ideological divisions across the region and help explain the limited amount of regional political integration that occurred there as a result. At the economic level, however, the consequences of American policy have been less obvious and immediate, but may have greater long-term ramifications in an era where inter-state war is less common. Indeed, it is hard to overstate the importance of much of East Asia being revitalised within the framework of an America-centric, capitalist hegemony, especially given China's recent incorporation into the global economy. One of the key consequences of this period generally and the priority the US attached to capitalist consolidation in particular was, America's declaratory rhetoric notwithstanding, 42 frequently anti-democratic. The exigencies of the Cold War era actually helped consolidate the 'strong' states of Japan, South Korea and Taiwan and the patterns of US intervention that were their hallmark. 43 As far as America's hegemonic influence and its capacity to exercise decisive leadership were concerned, this period highlighted the limits and contradictions of its overall position. To be sure, the US was able to shape the overall structural configuration of the international system, especially during the Cold War, but it is equally clear that enthusiasm about, and support for, American economic practices was less than fulsome or universal. Indeed, the persistence of a degree of antipathy, if not outright hostility, toward the more doctrinaire aspects of the 'Washington consensus' is a surprisingly common feature of East Asia's integration into the international economic order the US did so much to constitute. 44 This was especially galling for the Americans given the otherwise unambiguous success of their overall engagement with the region. The 'East Asian miracle' may have owed much more to prosaic forms of state-led development than that label implies, but the net result, at least, was unambiguous: American aid and markets in combination with the efforts of East Asia's developmental states underpinned an historically unprecedented economic expansion across much of Northeast Asia. 45 The nurturing of successful capitalist economies may have fulfilled a crucial strategic objective in the struggle with communism, but it also created sources of relentless competition which would steadily undercut America's economic strength at home and abroad. 46 The emergence of first Japan and subsequently China as formidable economic competitors and -- paradoxically -- critical sources of capital, owes much to the creation of an 'open' international economic order generally and existence of seemingly insatiable American consumers in particular. Attempting to reconcile the different objectives of strategic and economic policy would become a major problem for the US as it also found itself having to rapidly adjust to the new post-Cold War international order that it had done so much to bring about. Life as a normal nation In the aftermath of Japan's decade-long recession, during which it became synonymous with policy inertia and economic under-achievement, it is easy to forget just how concerned American policymakers were with the possibility that Japan might overtake it economically. 47 Throughout much of the 1980s in particular, there was an influential literature that described a seemingly inexorable process of American decline and which depicted an international order 'after hegemony'. 48 We now know, of course, that such prognoses were at least premature. But before considering the current situation, and what I suggest is the continuing erosion of American leadership, it is worth reminding ourselves of why the US seemed to be in decline. Two points emerge from this period generally and from America's relationship with Japan in particular. First, despite the relentless application of bilateral pressure by the US on Japan's policymakers, it is debateable how much was achieved. Despite the seemingly interminable trade talks of the 1980s and early 1990s, the extent of Japanese trade liberalisation was modest, and most likely only where there was a domestic constituency in Japan that added additional leverage. 49 As far as wider structural reforms and the adoption of American norms and practices are concerned, the record has been even more ambiguous: market-oriented reform has again been partial and perhaps inadvertent. 50 This leads to the second point: where the greatest change has occurred as a consequence of American 'leadership', it has often come about as a consequence of longer-term, unintended consequences of very different initiatives. The greatest consequence of American leadership in this context was arguably the Plaza Accord which, while failing to do much about its ostensible target -- America's trade deficit with Japan -- had the effect of creating Japan's 'bubble economy', 51 which would ultimately have far-reaching impact on Japan's domestic political-economy in general and the governance of its financial sector in particular. 52 The point to emphasise again is the disjuncture between, and differential impact of, elements of American power. The fact that the US economy had been, and remained, of critical importance to Japan and its distinctive, politically embedded, export-dependent economy, 53 meant that it had potential leverage over Japanese policymakers. Such leverage was reinforced by Japan's strategic dependence and subordination, a position which has only recently shown signs of change. 54 As a consequence, many in Japan have felt compelled to cooperate with the Americans and, indeed, make concessions with tangible outcomes, at times. 55 However, there were plainly limits to what American pressure could achieve. While some observers consider America's 'penetrated hegemony' a source of strength that allows legitimacy-enhancing access by subordinate powers, 56 others fret about the way that American policy has been defined by the actions of powerful foreign and domestic lobbies. 57 But whatever the confluence of forces that shaped the discursively realised and protean content of American foreign policy, it was plain that it was not always motivated by Kindlebergian concerns about systemic stability. Notably in the presidency of George W. Bush, American policy was dedicated to the pursuit of a narrowly conceived, bilaterally pursued 'national interest'. Consequently, expectations about the potentially beneficial impact of American hegemony on the international economy were invariably unfulfilled as the US was frequently often a source of instability. 58 The decline of long-distance leadership Much has been written about the East Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s and its aftermath, 59 and there is no intention of adding to that literature here. However, the crisis proved to be something of a turning point for both intra- and inter-regional relations and it is worth spelling out why as this period had major implications for American leadership in the region. The first point to emphasise is that American actions in the aftermath of the crisis were frequently seen to be opportunistic, insensitive, and unhelpful. Consequently, they were widely resented across much of the region. 60 While it may have been the IMF that made the actual attempt to impose neoliberal reforms on Asian economies, (of a sort that had been resisted before the crisis), American dominance of the international financial institutions made it easy for Asian leaders to connect the dots. 61 The fact that the policies proposed by the IMF were widely viewed as inappropriate and counter-productive added to the generally negative perceptions of American conduct in the immediate post-crisis atmosphere. 62 In the longer term, the most enduring impact of the crisis may have been to transform much of the received wisdom in East Asia about the region itself, its relationship to the wider world, and what many continued to see as the inescapable necessity of American primacy. 63 Three factors were especially important in catalysing this change. First, the crisis made it painfully obvious to East Asian policymakers that there were potential costs as well as benefits from integration into a global economy, especially one characterised by rapid, massive movements of mobile capital. 64 Second, it was clear that, in the event of such a crisis, the region was heavily reliant on external assistance and vulnerable to the intrusive, reform agendas of actors from outside the region. Finally, it was equally apparent that the region had little indigenous capacity to deal with such crises, and hardly any effective leadership within the region itself. Paradoxically, therefore, East Asia's much discussed leadership failures 65 may yet provide the most important challenge to, and erosion of, America's long-distance, de facto, sometimes inadvertent, leadership of the region. Indeed, some believe that 'the American approach in Asia has created a leadership vacuum into which China can and has adroitly stepped'. 66 The rise of long-term leadership competition China was the only country to emerge from the East Asian crisis with its position unambiguously improved. 67 China's 'responsible' attitude, especially its willingness to maintain the value of its currency and not add to the region's downward economic spiral, was greatly appreciated in the region. More than that, China's constructive role contrasted with that of the US and of its key ally Japan: not only were Japan's own leadership aspirations initially snuffed out by the US, but it was seen by some observers as having been responsible for the genesis of the crisis itself as a result of the implosion of its economy in 1990. 68 Moreover, Japan's own attempts to play a constructive leadership role by underwriting a regionally based currency swap scheme were thwarted by the US and its own deference. 69 In such circumstances, China's position was significantly enhanced, not only because its high-speed growth continued through the crisis, but especially as its increasingly deft regional diplomacy reinforced its emerging structural power. It is worth briefly indicating just how much China's position in the region has changed, because it has direct implications for the US and helps to explain the erosion of American influence. Two aspects of the 'rise of China' are especially germane. First, and most tangibly, the remarkable expansion of China's economy -- a consequence of its incorporation into a capitalist international order shaped by American hegemony -- has transformed its relationship with its neighbours. 70 One of the key reasons that East Asia recovered so rapidly from the effects of the crisis was that China provided a major catalyst for regional growth. Not only has China become of central importance to the countries of East Asia, but America's position is less vital than it once was. 71 Indeed, the dependence on China and Japan for continuing inflows of capital to fund the US budget and trade deficits, making it possible to maintain its consumption pattern, marks a major shift in the balance of power between East Asia and North America, and a significant erosion of America's material dominance. 72 Even if this latent leverage is too risky for any other state to utilise without triggering a major economic and political crisis, it still marks a potentially major turning point in the relative standing of the US and China in the regional and global economic and financial order. 73 This profound, continuing reconfiguration of the underlying patterns of economic integration in the region is significant enough in itself but, in China's case, it is being reinforced by a surprisingly sophisticated and effective 'charm offensive' that is winning over formerly nervous, if not hostile neighbours. 74 Such realignments are bound to have an impact on the relative standing of the US, especially when its own actions stand in such sharp contrast, most notably in the Iraq and Afghan Wars. Thus, while China has become an enthusiastic participant in a range of multilateral forums including ASEAN +3 and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, 75 American foreign policy during the Bush-Cheney years would become increasingly unilateral and confrontational. 76 Throwing off the constraining influence of multilateral obligations has always had its attractions as far as the US is concerned, but during the George W Bush administration in particular, succumbing to the 'hegemonic temptation' and embracing unilateralism became the US's defining characteristic. 77 Given the influence of so-called neoconservative thinking within the Bush administration, 78 and the long-standing desire to exploit the strategic leverage that unipolarity seemed to confer, 79 the outcome was to weaken the US position internationally. What was less obvious was how this possibility would be reinforced by the increasing emphasis on security in the wake of September 11. US foreign policy was significantly reconfigured, undermining the foundations of the most distinctive and enduring aspects of American hegemony and leadership: its legitimacy-conferring, confidence-inducing, multilateral institutionalisation. 80 In this regard, it is striking how rapidly and extensively attitudes toward the US turned negative, and not just in the Middle East where its policies have had the most deleterious impact. 81 While the 'war on terror' may not have been solely responsible for this transformation in attitudes, the relentless American emphasis on security made life awkward for some of the states of Southeast Asia in particular, where governments must walk a fine line between support of US policies and often hostile national sentiment. 82 In this context, the development of a less intrusive, more 'pragmatic' and development-oriented 'Beijing consensus' has begun to assume a greater attraction for those primarily concerned with national rather than international security. 83 The Obama administration, of course, promises significant change from its predecessor, and great hopes are held about what this may mean for inter-regional relations. Certainly, the rhetoric has changed, and much greater importance is attached to multilateralism and cooperation. 84 Cynics might observe, that George W. Bush had come to office promising to make the US a 'humbler' nation, a pledge that would prove to be almost laughably at odds with reality. Whatever the foreign policy style and rhetoric of the Obama presidency, many prominent American observers continue to believe that the US remains an indispensable actor in East Asia and elsewhere, no matter who may be running the country. 85 And yet it is clear the US cannot get its way as easily as it once did, and the rise of new centres of power among the so-called BRICs are creating new challenges for American diplomacy. 86 The limits to US influence and its possible institutional marginalization are becoming clearer in East Asia. One of the most tangible manifestations of this possibility can be seen in the creation of new institutions in East Asia that self-consciously exclude the US. A number of points are worth emphasising about this development. First, for a region that is stereotypically seen as being 'ripe for rivalry', 87 eternally on the point of conflagration, and wracked by barely contained instability and animosity, the fact that any form of indigenous regionalisation is taking place is worthy of note. Not only has there not been a major war in the region since 1975, but China has been an increasingly integrated and important part of the regional economy since the Sino-US rapprochement of the early 1970s., Indeed, intra-regional relations have improved so much that there is possibly an excess of regional initiatives and suggestions for institutional development, which threaten to become too much of a good thing and suggest that a process of institutional shakeout may occur in the future. 88 Second, it is highly significant that the development of ASEAN+3, which seems poised to become the most important regional grouping, is coalescing around China. 89 While it remains to be seen quite how important this grouping will become, it is noteworthy that it has emerged at all, given that a similar Malaysian-sponsored initiative was effectively derailed in the mid 1990s by a combination of American opposition and a concomitant Japanese leadership failure. 90 For some observers, the re-emergence of China at the centre of East Asian affairs is something of a return to 'normal', and not something that American policymakers should necessarily become too exercised about. 91 Predictably, enough, however, it is something that many American observers are concerned about. 92 The fact that 'the United States' finds it so difficult to react to China's rise with any consistency tells us much about the constraints on and counterproductive nature of American leadership in the contemporary era. As Christensen points out, one of the paradoxical consequences of America's East Asia policy has been 'to improve [China's] relations with its neighbors diplomatically and economically at least in part as a hedge against US power and the fear of encirclement by a coalition led by the United States'. 93 Equally importantly, the dynamics embedded within the political economy of the US-China relationship mean that there are limits to what the US can now do: on the one hand, America is highly reliant on continuing inflows of capital, on the other, China's position in the international division of labour makes it a pivotal cog in global production (and consumption) processes, and one that many American business elites have a vested interest in preserving. 94 The Obama administration confronts a very different geopolitical and economic landscape in East Asia than did its predecessor. On the one hand, the legacy of the 'war on terror' may constrain the new administration in surprising ways: terrorism is not considered as pivotal an issue as it once was and while this may allow the US to improve its image in the region, it may also deprive it of some strategic leverage. The victory of the Democratic Party of Japan in the 2009 elections and the pledge by the new prime minister Yukio Hatoyama to make Japan's relationship with the US more independent is highly significant, as is Australia's decision to consider pulling out of Afghanistan. 95 That two such key allies would feel less obligated to the US is a telling indication of the shifting strategic calculus in the region. In Japan's case this rather belated pursuit of policy independence has been driven in part by the realisation that it is simply no longer part of the most important bilateral relationship that the US has in East Asia. 96 China is not only effectively bank rolling the US government and providing an increasingly important market for its neighbours, 97 but it is rapidly assuming a regional and international leadership position to match its economic importance. As a result, the US finds itself excluded from potentially important regional institutions like ASEAN+3 and the East Asian Summit; even familiar institutions are evolving or taking on new forms. The demise of the G7/8 in favour of the G20 is one example of the ways in which new players are being included in multilateral processes, which may undermine the influence and centrality of the US. 98 Even more tellingly, perhaps, the possible development of a so-called 'G2' between the US and China is a striking symbol of the new international order and the relative fortunes of its two key members. 99 In such circumstances, even a relative improvement in the reputational standing of the Obama administration may not be enough to offset the long-term decline in the material basis of the waning US hegemony. Concluding remarks When attempting to gauge the extent of American influence or leadership in East Asia, much depends on the time frame we adopt. When seen in the long sweep of history, the fact that there is no longer an ideological rival in the region, and that China is a capitalist country in all but name, are clearly developments of the utmost significance. The symbiotic economic relationship that has developed between the US and China is even more remarkable. China's successful incorporation into the global capitalist economy is largely a product of America's hegemonic influence and plainly of overall benefit to America's strategic position. Significantly, US policy during the Cold War -- the period in which this transformation was incubating -- was characterised by a high degree of integration in the agential and structural components of American power. Not only was the unambiguous ascendancy of the American economy of crucial importance to the rest of the world, but American policymakers were able to reinforce this material dominance in an institutional order that reflected its norms and furthered its broadly conceived national and strategic interests. The foundations of this earlier order look more fragile than they once did. True, the Bretton Woods institutions are still with us, but their authority is less assured. The recent crisis that had its origins in the US not only raised questions about the durability of Anglo-American capitalism, but also highlighted a more fundamental long-run problem: the material importance of the US economy to East Asia is simply not as great as it once was. On the contrary, of late it is the US that has become increasingly dependent on East Asia generally and China in particular to underwrite its budgetary position. Without the continuing willingness of countries such as China and Japan to continue buying American government debt, the policy options of the US government will be increasingly constrained. True, this is something of a two-way street that poses dangers for lenders as well as the borrowers, 100 but the net effect has surely been to diminish the relative attractiveness of the Anglo-American model. After all, unlike the first 'Asian crisis', this one was unambiguously made in the heartlands of neoliberal capitalism. While the structural dominance of American economic interests may be in decline, it is of course possible that effective policy might limit or even reverse some of the damage inflicted during the Bush years. The great hope for the US is that the Obama administration will prove more effective than its predecessor. At one level, it could hardly be otherwise. At the same time, though, the 'rise of China' places inevitable constraints on what the US can and cannot do, a possibility that is increasingly recognised by the Obama administration itself. 101 As far as East Asia is concerned therefore, not only is the material preponderance of the US being steadily eroded, but its ideational influence is not as great either -- especially as China's diplomacy and continuing economic growth begins to provide an alternative model of development. If China's growth and seemingly inexorable rise can be sustained, it seems inevitable that it will steadily undermine the US ability to provide long distance leadership. Indeed, it is no longer difficult to imagine East Asia generally and China in particular assuming a more independent and influential role on the world stage. 102


find an error in my paper that has been submitted I find an error in my paper that has been submitted to a journal and is currently under review. The error is more like a "typo". It is a short statement about the motivation of an important definition of the paper (just a two-sentence statement embedded in the text, it's neither a lemma nor a theorem). The statement is true under certain condition. But, in the paper submitted, I forgot to mention the condition. A careful reviewer may figure out that the statement holds only under that condition. However, I doubt that the reviewer is willing to spend some time to figure that out and may simply think the statement is wrong, and this may lead the reviewer to misunderstand the remaining part of the paper (although the remaining part of the paper is all correct and accurate).


The Beginning of your VIEW You wake up out of your every day routine life or what some people call society sleep and you pick up a copy of your View. After studying the beautiful cover of this Zine, you begin to read the words that begin on the very next page and by doing so you have now entered a new dimension or a place which can only be pictured inside the minds eye of the reader. The image of a big blue door now stands in front of you, inside a dream state where the only outstanding color to be focused upon is that damn door. Being stuck inside a blank space of time and the fact that this big ol' door smack in front of you has lured your curiosity almost like a magnet, you make your first step forward in your VIEW journey. Stepping towards the door on what you thought would be a solid floor you notice that things in this realm might not always be what they appear to be. Once your body became alive and interested in moving on to the next scene the blank space in which you became accustomed to had now been covered with a gooey substance some what like that of a heated marshmallow. Now it was time for you to show off your strength by fighting off this substance that you were beginning to sink into and make your way towards the door. Being covered with all this Goo you were feeling quite icky and disgusted that you were thrown into such a consequence. You wanted out so you struggled with all your might, ignoring this disgusting feeling you had and made it within reach of the door. You began to stick your hand out and turn the knob of this big blue looking door and all of a sudden that gooey crap you had exhausted yourself fighting with had all disappeared, not a trace was left. You were now confused as all hell but you wasted no time and swung the door open in which you felt a sort of magnetic force bring you forward as you heard a loud crashing sound. From this latest action you have now noticed that your eyes can only see what's in front of you and once you have left a scene their is no turning back. You were now placed inside a bare white room with one small school desk where a little girl was working. You immediately focus your eyes upon this girl who was wearing a fancy red dress and had the appearance of what your mind says to be the look of an elementary level girl. The girl finishes the sentence she was writing dotting her I"s and crossing her T's, shuts her book placing the yellow #2.pencil beside and begins to get up from the desk. Now this girls head is all that is in view and she is wearing a mask which contains a mouth but no eyes or ears. You begin to motion to this girl like your going to ask her something but before you can do so she begins to yell, "attention, attention, in order for you to pick up anything from this VIEW, in order for you to have any understanding, you must listen to what you read". Comments The writing is a litte clumsy in places, ubie, but given a polish you might have something worth pursuing here. Have you ever read anything about supposedly genuine out of the body experiences? This is what this piece reminds me of. sorry about the clumsiness of the writing but it was just an idea I had and went with. There was no editing happening here, I guess that's why I joined this site to find out if any of my ideas were worthy of any serious diving into. I have read parts of books that deal with out of body experience and have taken a few surrealism classes and have been simply inspired by anything that deals with the subconscious. Thanks for reading and taking the time to comment, it means a lot to get a little feedback.


Every winemaker, at one time or another, has had to deal with grapes having less than ideal pH and acid balances.  Whether the grapes come from California, a warm climate, or Oregon, Washington and the Okanagan, cool climates, the winemaker is faced with the problem: how to adjust the acid and pH. It may be necessary to adjust the grape acid level for different reasons: 1. The pH is too high and the acid too low; 2. The pH is too low and the acid is too high; or 3. Both the pH and the acid are too high, usually the result of excessive amounts of malic acid and potassium. Both 2 and 3 are phenomena common in cool climate grapes; although 3 occurs in warm climate grapes also. Before continuing, it must be pointed out that when Total Acidity (TA) is referred to it will be in grams per litre. Some books refer to acid as a percentage: ie - 0.7 percent.  To make the transition to grams per litre, move the decimal one space to the right; thus 0.7 becomes 7 grams per litre. All white and ros musts should be adjusted to a maximum of pH 3.3 and all reds should be adjusted to a maximum of pH 3.4 in order to achieve optimum flavour extraction and to minimize bacterial infection.  These adjustments should be made with tartaric acid .  Even if this procedure increases the TA above desired levels, the tartrates can be precipitated with cold stabilization.  The rule-of-thumb for tartaric acid addition is 1 g/l to reduce the pH by 0.1 .  However, there are some cautions: 1. Different grapes have different buffering capacities; 2. High pH drops, say from 3.6 to 3.3 may require about 4 g/l of tartaric acid instead of the rule-of-thumb 3g/l as the ratio is on a curve rather than being linear; 3. Adding acid can result in some precipitation of potassium hydrogen tartrate (KHT) which    may affect both pH and TA values.  Therefore, lab tests should be performed. The most convenient way of testing for the appropriate amount of tartaric acid to add is to prepare a 10% solution (10 grams in 100 ml of water) of tartaric acid in distilled water.  Dissolve the acid in a little water and add water to exactly 100ml.  Set up several glasses containing 100ml of juice and, using one as a control, to the other glasses add 1, 2, 3, etc. ml of the 10% solution and measure the pH changes.  The volumes of the 10% solution used are equivalent to the grams per litre of acid necessary to make the required adjustment.  That is, one ml of the solution equals one gram of acid.  The same process can be used if post-fermentation acid adjustments need to be made.  By using the 10% solution, results are instantaneous and less bothersome than dissolving the acid volumes one at a time. Be aware that all the acids - tartaric, malic and citric - will affect the TA values differently.  While a one-gram addition of tartaric acid will increase the TA by one gram per litre, malic acid will increase the TA by about 1.12 and citric acid by about 1.17.  They also affect the flavour differently.  So lab tests are essential. Whether the grapes are pressed immediately after crushing or let stand on the skins for flavour extraction before pressing, once the juice sample has settled and cleared, the acid and pH readings should be accurate.  The same cannot be said for red grapes, however.  Most winemakers take their samples immediately after crushing, but the readings are not accurate.  Doing a test twenty-four hours later will see an increase in pH of between 0.1 and 0.2 as the direct result of potassium extraction.  The TA change will be minimal.  A further increase in pH will be observed after pressing due to maceration during fermentation and greater extraction of skin constituents. Many grapes, particularly in climatically unfavourable years, may require the acid to be reduced prior to fermentation.  This can be achieved in several ways. Water Addition: Adding ten to fifteen percent water, particularly with the more floral grape varieties, will achieve the desired TA without making significant changes in the pH; however, sugar will have to be added as the result of dilution. Occasionally grapes from California, even the Okanagan, have high Brix ( or SG), high pH and high TA; and it may be desirable to add some water in order to decrease the potential alcohol of the high sugar.  While adding water will also reduce the acid, it will still be necessary to add acid in order to reduce the pH. Cold Stabilization: This procedure is usually performed after fermentation, when the weather is slightly below freezing.  Putting the wine into a refrigerator is an alternative.  In either case, it also helps to "seed" the wine with cream of tartar crystals in the amount of 2 - 6 g/l.  Do bench trials to determine the optimum amount to be used.  Cold stabilization will not work if the pH is too low, less than 3.2, because the malic acid content will be higher than the tartaric acid content; and malic acid does not precipitate its salts as does tartaric acid. As well as reducing acidity, cold stabilization reduces the probability of tartrate precipitation when the wine is chilled before serving.  Prior to cold stabilization, the pH should be below 3.65, otherwise any precipitation of potassium bitartrate will lead to a decrease in both the pH and the TA, possibly necessitating the addition of acid prior to bottling.  Conversely, if the pH is much above 3.65, the pH will increase. ACIDEX  : This so-called double salt of calcium carbonate , in theory, reduces both tartaric and malic acids equally.  Before fermentation a portion of the juice is treated wherein all the acid is removed and then added back to the rest of the juice. Do not use this procedure on wine, as the portion treated will have a pH close to 8.0 and the wine will oxidize irrespective of its SO 2 content. Do not be alarmed at the dark brown colour of the deacidified juice; fermentation will clear it up.  It is advisable not to use any SO 2 in the treated juice, otherwise the colour may become "fixed" or bound.  In order to use Acidex O effectively, it is necessary to consult the Desired Acidity table below. Unlike the following carbonates, the juice must be stirred into the Acidex O in order to reduce the malic acid as well as the tartaric acid.  In order to reduce the malic acid, the pH must be higher than 4.5 , preferably above 5.0 , during the entire process, so stir the juice in slowly.  (See Explanations for Acid Reduction p. 4)  Some winemakers have added Acidex O to the juice or the wine and observed an acid reduction, but only the tartaric acid has been reduced.  The same result could have been obtained by using one of the carbonates described below at a fraction of the cost. Calcium Carbonate (CaCO 3 ) or Chalk: Use at the rate of between 0.67 and 1.53 g/l to reduce TA by 1.0g/l.  Seeding with cream of tartar crystals and chilling hastens the process.  If the pH is too low, calcium carbonate will not work for the same reason that cold stabilization will not work.  If this procedure is used, do it well before bottling, at least three months, or a chalk haze or crystalline deposit could occur in the bottle.  I prefer to use calcium carbonate before filtering.  Calcium carbonate is not the preferred method of acid reduction by wineries because of the length of time it takes to complete the process, as well as the possibility of tartrate precipitation in the bottle.   They do, however, have metatartaric acid at their disposal.  This acid prevents tartrate precipitation for up to a year.  Metatartaric acid is temperature sensitive, and wines should be held below 20  C in order to retain the activity of the acid.  According to Peynaud ( Knowing and Making Wine), this acid should be used only in wines that are not going to be kept very long.  Since I have not used it, I cannot comment on its effectiveness. Potassium Carbonate (KCO 3 ): Use at the rate of about 1.0 g/l to reduce the TA by 1.0 g/l.  The wine should be chilled, although it will work at cellar temperature, and unlike calcium carbonate, potassium carbonate reacts immediately and does not leave a deposit. As with tartaric acid, for the purpose of testing for the proper additions of potassium carbonate, make a 5% solution.  Put one litre of wine into a refrigerator and chill to about -3 or -4  C.  Set up a few glasses with 100 ml of the chilled wine.  Using one as a control, add 1, 2, 3, etc, mls. of the solution which will be the equivalent of 0.5, 1.0, 1.5, etc, g/l.  Refrigerate for two hours or so stirring regularly - 7 or 8 times.  Let the samples warm up to cellar temperature and taste to determine the amount to add to the batch. It is necessary to taste the wine after the potassium carbonate has been added to the glasses in order to determine whether there is a resulting flabby taste.  I have found that some wines, particularly aromatic wines lose their crispness when potassium carbonate is used even in very small amounts. NOTE: The last two procedures are generally carried out on wine.  It is always best (safest) to do lab trials before treating the entire volume of wine. Potassium will increase the pH very quickly compared to calcium, so do not use it if the wine pH is already high, say above 3.5 or for large reductions.  Potassium carbonate is best used to "fine tune" the acid balance. When using either of the carbonates, put it into a small quantity of wine, mix well, add back to the larger volume and stir it well.  Always leave plenty of space in the larger container, as foaming can be violent unless the wine is very cold. Because both carbonates reduce only the tartrates, it is quite possible to notice that there may be little drop in TA if the malic acid is predominant despite the increase in pH. The rule of thumb is to use 1 g/l to reduce acidity by 1 g; however, this equation is not linear.  If it is necessary to reduce acidity by, say, 5g, it will require more than 1g/l. Malolactic Fermentation (MLF): Unlike the four procedures described previously which remove tartrates, malolactic fermentation removes malic acid.  It does so by converting malic acid into lactic acid.  One gram of malic acid is converted into 0.67 grams of lactic acid and the rest is given off as carbon dioxide .  This procedure is often used for two reasons: it is a natural means of reducing acidity; and as a stylistic tool: it changes the character of the wine by making it softer and slightly buttery.  It also influences microbial stability: if used in marginal to high pH's - between 3.5 to 4.0 - it can encourage growth of spoilage forms of lactic acid bacteria. Leuconostoc Oenos is normally the only lactic acid bacteria inducing MLF in lower pH wines (<3.5). Higher pH wines support the growth of Lactobacillus and Pediococcus , both spoilage bacteria. One of the most readily available MLF cultures was developed at Oregon State University.  It consists of two strains, Erla and Ey2d, now referred to as OSU1 and OSU2 , which were developed to tolerate both low temperature fermentation (about 15C  ) and low pH (about 2.9), similar conditions for winemaking in B.C. If you use this culture, make a starter.  It is in liquid form and the package states that it is good for 5 gallons, and at about $7.00 per package, that's expensive.  Buy some apple juice, which has the desired pH of about 4.0 (it also has lots of malic acid), and start the culture in this medium.  Gradually add white grape juice to sensitize the bacteria to the lower pH of the must and add directly to the ferment.  This starter can be used for both red and white grapes. Freeze-dried cultures have recently become available.  They are very easy to use and very effective - just sprinkle them into the wine after alcoholic fermentation has been completed.  The drawback is that they are very expensive. MLF is routinely carried out on red wines and a few white wines (Chardonnay, Pinot Blanc, Pinot Gris, Sauvignon Blanc).  Some winemakers like the taste; others don't.  It also has some important catches to it: l. Sulfite levels must be kept dangerously low - 30 ppm - during malolactic fermentation.  Malolactic bacteria are sensitive to sulfite; they may be stunned, but they are not killed.  If the MLF is not completed before bottling, when the free sulfite degrades, the bacteria can become active again; and the wine will undergo malolactic fermentation in the bottle. 2. Since home winemakers cannot test for either tartaric or malic acid levels, they don't really know how much TA drop to expect; and the only way to find out if the MLF is completed is to use color chromatography.  See Charles Plant's explanation of this procedure. Obviously getting involved with MLF is another dimension of winemaking that many people may not want to step up to, but it bears serious consideration. If MLF is not practiced and the sulfite levels are not high enough to inhibit the ML bacteria, there is the real danger that the wine, once it has been corked, will undergo MLF in the bottle.  So it is best to use the process for no other reason than to avoid the potential problem. Blending: Blending high acid wines with low acid wines is a method of balancing acid that many winemakers prefer.  It is safe, uses no chemicals and yields immediate results.  Many winemakers do an MLF on a portion of the wine and blend it with the non-MLF portion in order to balance the softer lactic characteristics with the more aromatic and fruitier characteristics of the grape resulting in a more complex wine.  It can be a lot of fun to experiment in this way, and the rewards can be considerable. All of the above-mentioned procedures are useful and safe; indeed, it is unlikely that many commercial wineries make their wines without using one or another - or a combination - of these methods of dealing with acid imbalances. Explanations for Acid Reduction All acids have an isoelectric point (also isoionic or dissociation point ), the pH at which 50% of the acid is in its free form and 50% is still in its bound form.  However, the isoelectric point pH's differ for each acid.  The two main acids, tartaric and malic , have isoelectric pH's of 2.96 and 3.41 respectively.  It is only after the isoelectric pH's have been attained that optimum acid reduction can occur. Once the isoelectric pH of tartaric acid is reached and continues to increase, the bound tartaric acid becomes free tartaric acid ( H 2 T- ) which changes into potassium bitartrate ( HT- ) which, in turn, changes into dipotassium tartrate ( T 2- ) both of which are salts.  While the free tartaric acid can be reduced with carbonates, the potassium bitartrate and the dipotassium tartrate can be reduced with a combination of cold stabilization and carbonates. The most frequently encountered problem, if it is a problem, is low pH and high TA.  It is not unusual, however, to encounter both high pH and high TA due to a higher concentration of malic acid and high potassium which results in high pH. Under normal growing conditions, some of the malic acid is metabolized into sugars and some disappears through transpiration. And the decrease in TA is directly parallel with the decrease in malic acid.  ( See graph )  Tartaric acid and its salts, on the other hand, remain fairly constant during the ripening process; and ultimately the level of malic acid is metabolized to the point where the dominant acid is tartaric. One method of dealing with the high pH/high acid phenomenon is the following: Since it is unlikely that few, if any, any home winemakers can determine both the tartaric and malic acid levels, it is best to consider the above procedure only in terms of the standard practice of reducing the pH to the desired level prior to fermentation. The problem can be dealt with in the same way with those white grape varieties that can be enhanced by malolactic fermentation.  However, white grape varieties that depend upon malic acid for their aromas and flavours do not respond well to malolactic fermentation and require other treatments, including the use of higher levels of SO 2 to prevent spontaneous malolactic fermentation after bottling. On the other hand, grapes from warm climates can also exhibit both high pH and high TA.  When this situation occurs, the high pH is due to high potassium, and the high TA is almost entirely tartaric.  Tartaric acid must be added to reduce the pH, and the necessary acid reduction must be accomplished by using procedures discussed previously.  It is unlikely, however, that malolactic fermentation will result in any significant reduction in TA due to very low levels of malic acid. Index of Acidity (IA) or Acid Taste Index Ultimately, acid balance is a matter of taste and there is no "rule of thumb" that will determine what the correct acid balance is.  However, research has been done that provides some general guidelines that can be helpful in determining whether the acid balance is within the "desired" range for the type and style of wine.  It is simply a matter of subtracting the pH from the TA.  For example: dry red wines should have an IA range of about 2 to 3, dry white wines about 2.7 to 3.7 and off-dry white wines about 3.8 to 4.8.  Too far below these levels and the wine will be flabby or soapy; too far above them and the wine will be sharp and acidic. Specialty wines such as dry Sherries, sparkling wines, dessert and after dinner wines are not as easy to assess using this method: Sherries because of their general low pH and low TA; sparkling wines because their low pH and high acid are mitigated somewhat by carbonation; dessert and after dinner wines in particular require a much higher pH-to-TA ratio because they usually have a lower pH with higher acids in order to balance the sweetness.  Icewines, for example, may have an IA as high as 12 or more.  Of significance in red wines is the level of astringency: high astringency will tend to make wines on the high side of the IA seem more acidic than they really are. While numbers may be useful tools and can be used as aids in striving for good pH/acid balance, the final arbiter of proper balance is the taste buds.


Hello All, I'm looking for some serious advice and guidance. I have a 4 month old Puppy GSD cross Malamute (three quarters GSD ). I've had her for just under two months. I'm an experienced dog owner having proudly owned a GSD cross called Jed for 10 years and more recently two English Bulldogs. I thought I had witnessed it all with that mixture, however I was wrong !! Lola was a very nervous pup, so much so that I got in a dog trainer for help. He was a great help to me. But now Lola has become quite confident bordering 'arsey' and seems to look on me and my family members as staff ! She prone to tantrums, which sound and look horrendous. She becomes quite aggressive and bounces around the living room barking and snapping (yet her tail is often wagging ?) I know it's a dominance thing, trying to become alpha bitch, but I really don't know how to handle her in these episodes. Her tantrums are very frustrating as I don't know what triggers them often. How should I deal with her ??????? I'd appreciate any help and pearls of wisdom, I'm getting quite desperate. Thank you in anticipation, Tray She prone to tantrums, which sound and look horrendous. She becomes quite aggressive and bounces around the living room barking and snapping (yet her tail is often wagging ?) I know it's a dominance thing, trying to become alpha bitch, but I really don't know how to handle her in these episodes. Her tantrums are very frustrating as I don't know what triggers them often. How should I deal with her ??????? I'd appreciate any help and pearls of wisdom, I'm getting quite desperate. Thank you in anticipation, Tray Hi, welcome to the forum. Firstly forget about her trying to become Alpha bitch - dogs really don't think like that, she is not plotting to take over leadership of the household. Sounds to me like she is trying to get you to play and is getting over excited/frustrated when she is not getting a reaction. When you say she becomes quite aggressive what do you mean? Is she trying to nip you? I would either turn my back on her and totally ignore her, or completely walk out of the room and only return when she has become quiet. The 'game' would end immediately. Pups usually have a 'puppy license' up until the age of around 16 weeks, this is where adult dogs will let them get away with anything. After 16 weeks they start to learn that they have to follow certain 'rules' in life and gradually they are taught to calm down. Some pups have a 'mad' period just before they crash out to sleep - it is what they would do when they are with the rest of the litter (play hard and sleep hard!). I would have to agree, she's not trying to take over your house hold and be top dog, you have to remember she is a baby, like all babies she will experience her world though her mouth, I know those pearly whites are sharp and hurt like hell, but she is simply checking out her new world, I also understand she has to learn. You have been given some great advice so far and really I can add nothing more, walk away from her, stop play until she settles, lots of praise when she is playing nicely, she will learn, if I keep my teeth to myself they will play and I get lots of cuddles. Dont worry, this time passes, looking forward to seeing some pictures. __________________ Sarah "A dog is the only thing on earth that loves you more than he loves himself." Firstly forget about her trying to become Alpha bitch - dogs really don't think like that, she is not plotting to take over leadership of the household. Sounds to me like she is trying to get you to play and is getting over excited/frustrated when she is not getting a reaction. When you say she becomes quite aggressive what do you mean? Is she trying to nip you? I would either turn my back on her and totally ignore her, or completely walk out of the room and only return when she has become quiet. The 'game' would end immediately. Pups usually have a 'puppy license' up until the age of around 16 weeks, this is where adult dogs will let them get away with anything. After 16 weeks they start to learn that they have to follow certain 'rules' in life and gradually they are taught to calm down. Some pups have a 'mad' period just before they crash out to sleep - it is what they would do when they are with the rest of the litter (play hard and sleep hard!). Firstly forget about her trying to become Alpha bitch - dogs really don't think like that, she is not plotting to take over leadership of the household. Sounds to me like she is trying to get you to play and is getting over excited/frustrated when she is not getting a reaction. When you say she becomes quite aggressive what do you mean? Is she trying to nip you? I would either turn my back on her and totally ignore her, or completely walk out of the room and only return when she has become quiet. The 'game' would end immediately. Pups usually have a 'puppy license' up until the age of around 16 weeks, this is where adult dogs will let them get away with anything. After 16 weeks they start to learn that they have to follow certain 'rules' in life and gradually they are taught to calm down. Some pups have a 'mad' period just before they crash out to sleep - it is what they would do when they are with the rest of the litter (play hard and sleep hard!). Thank you all so much for your quite responses and most excellent advice. Lola was a very nervous puppy when we got her home and it took us a month to get her to trust that nothing horrible was going to happen her when strangers etc came into the house. Now she's feeling her feet she has become boisterous and jumps up on friends etc when they come into the house. We're using the ignore the baby technique to overcome anti social behaviour but she is clinging onto the habit. Her play does become very rough and boisterous and does nip. She's started 'chopsing' and nipping at the air if she doesn't get her own way. I'm not sure is this is a baby's tantrum or the first signs of aggression. I know that being a baby she will push all my buttons to see what she can or can't get away with, but the bouncey tantrums are concerning me. They usually occur after she tries to engage me in boisterous play (nibbling involved) I try to tell her sternly no, and walk away and that is when she amps it up. Is this still her playing ?? To counter this I put her lead on her, make her get off the sofa and I make her sit on the floor until she's calmer. Often she lulls me into a false sense of security and kicks back off again. I admit I try to stay calm but I do get frustrated and end up raising my voice. Do you think she is just a gianormous baby that doesn't know her own strength etc. Even though I've always had dogs, she is out on her own !!!! I've never met a baby like her ! Thank you all so much for taking the time to respond, Tray


Writing for children can be a very enjoyable and rewarding activity, but it is not easy. If you are new to the publishing world and serious about writing, we suggest that you first do the following before submitting your manuscripts to Kube for consideration: Read a few books on the subject of writing for children and how to get published. We recommend ?Writing for Children and Getting Published? or ?Teach Yourself Writing for Children? by Pollinger and Jones, and the most recent ?Children?s Writers? and Artists? Yearbook? to get started. If you are able to do so, take a course on writing for children or join a writer?s group. Read the top five bestselling books for your intended genre and age range in the mainstream as well as Muslim markets. A children?s writer should generally be familiar with what children are reading at school and the popular literature available in bookshops and libraries, as well as British and American children?s classics and folktales. If you are writing non-fiction, research your subject well and make yourself familiar with what children of your intended age group are learning at school on the subject ? in particular, the English National Curriculum. Once you have written your first draft, ask several children who are not related to you to read it and give it their honest feedback before finalising your second draft. Now you are ready to send your work in to us! J How to submit a proposal to the Children?s Editor Please pay careful attention to these guidelines because the Editor will not read your unsolicited manuscript unless you first send in a complete submission. Send in your proposal in a Word document. It should include the following: (Page 1) A cover letter with your full name and contact details. (Page 2) A brief CV/resume. (Page 3) A one-page description of the proposal, including: A synopsis of the plot and description of the main characters; The intended age group and audience; A paragraph explaining what is unique or necessary about this book in comparison to similar titles that are currently available on the market or our publishing backlist (Islamic Foundation and Kube). What is distinctive or different about this book? Word length (actual or proposed) (Pages 4+/Attachment) If your manuscript is short, you may submit the entire manuscript; otherwise, in the case of chapter books, submit one or two sample chapters. Please make sure that your spelling and grammar are correct! British English is preferred, although North American English is acceptable. All manuscripts should be submitted as MS Word documents (.doc or .docx) by email attachment, as follows: The whole manuscript must be in a single document (not separate documents for different chapters); Set your manuscript in plain text, Calibri or Times New Roman font, 11 point, 1.5 spacing, left-margin justified with document margins of 2.5 cm on all sides. Do not send manuscripts in fancy or coloured fonts. Do not send in handwritten manuscripts by post. Do not send in artwork for your manuscript. If you have ideas for artwork or layout, you may submit these along with your text. If you are a professional artist and are writing and illustrating a picture book or comic book, please request our style sheet for artists before submitting your manuscript. Manuscripts longer than 25 A4 pages should also be sent in hard copy, to the address below. After considering a submission, the Editor will contact you to say if the Editorial team wish to see a complete manuscript for further consideration or not. This may take up to three months if we send your manuscript to be reviewed by external readers; otherwise we aim to give a response within six weeks.


you did such a great job with the boiler last time please can you mend my baby he hasn't moved for three weeks don't they use coffins when they are that small I don't want this poor thing in my house sir my chin has been getting rather hot lately so lick your chin stand on a tall building in the stiff breeze don't know what to do it's saturday night I seek good advice from who knows what's right why don't you ring friends and go for a few drinks and then go see a movie did you prescribe my daughter a pound of heroine I'm sorry, I can't see, I think I've blinded myself did you prescribe my daughter pound of heroine I'm sorry, I can't see, I think I've blinded myself it isn't a spot, it is a baby you're not a doctor, you're a wanker


I think this really needs to be said. I've seen this everywhere, including on a lot of fat/body positive blogs. This, in my opinion, is more rampant than the shaming of skinny women and might even equal the shaming of fat women. It's a bit tied in with skinny shaming though: THE SHAMING OF ANOREXIC WOMEN. Can we please stop? Don't call yourself body positive and then snark and about how ugly skin and bones are. It's all very well if you include a disclaimer that you don't mean naturally skinny women... So then who do you mean? Women with a legitimate mental disorder who desperately need help and acceptance rather than shaming? Seriously, it's very hypocritical. Let's all stop making disparaging comments about anorexic women. I never really understood what reviling the bodies of anorexic women was supposed to accomplish anyway. Body shaming is not the way to reach out to people with this illness. What's more is that once one starts talking about how revolting 'skin and bones' are, he or she starts down a slippery slope that can end in language that denigrates all thin women, equating all of them with those with eating disorders. I had a friend who struggled with an eating disorder, and when she overcame it, she was still a petite but much healthier-looking girl. However, it continues to be a struggle for her to accept her body, because of this kind of body shaming that continues in even some well-intentioned resources for body acceptance. You are pretty brave to bring up this issue on your blog. Keep up the good work. I totally agree! It's isn't fair and it's just as cruel. No one is better than anyone else because of how they look, the kind of body they have or don't have. I too am sick of it. "Real women have curves." is not only not (necessarily) true but degrading, just as degrading as some larger (any larger) is less of a person or less of a woman or not as worthy. I've noticed this a lot too with larger women trying to reclaim their confidence and thats ok what's not ok is treating someone or saying mean things and trying to lessen someone's worth because they aren't like you. A size 0 is just as ok as a 24 or a 4 or a 12 or a 16 or a 6. All women are beautiful. All shades all sizes. Absolutely. I, and the fat acceptance activists I surround myself with, certainly call people out when we see this. Body shaming in all its forms is terrible, but it's body shaming someone with an illness like anorexia is on a whole other level of bullshit.


Such is life Meaning An acceptance of the unpredictable fortunes of existence, often spoken with an air of weary resignation. Origin The early uses of this phrase date from the mid 18th century; for example, Joseph Baretti's A Grammar of the Italian Language , 1762, translates "Cosi va'l mondo!" as "Such is life" and continues: "Such is life, that whatever is proposed, it is much easier to find reasons for rejecting than embracing." 'Such is life', of course, mirrors the French 'C'est la vie', which equates to the English 'that's life', or 'life's like that'. Modern variants are 'that's the way it goes', 'that's the way the ball bounces', 'that's the way the cookie crumbles' etc.