### 23. believes that , in the future , the eusf budget will have to be increased in order to make it a real tool for eu solidarity; ### 23. considers that , in the future , the eusf budget will have to be increased in order to meet what is required from a real tool for eu solidarity; believes that in the short run , the commission should prepare a proposal with more allocated resources for the eusf budget , as it is duly justified by the broadening of the scope , in order to guarantee that there is enough budget to deal immediately with major natural and public health disasters;


### 24. calls for the criteria for determining operations that are ‘eligible’ for assistance from the fund to take greater account of the latest risk prevention principles , so as to enable countries to improve the quality of their infrastructure during reconstruction and thus be better prepared to deal with disasters; ### 24. calls for the criteria for determining operations that are ‘eligible’ for assistance from the fund to take greater account of the latest risk prevention principles , in order to enable countries to improve the quality of their infrastructure during reconstruction and to better prepare themselves to avoid future disasters by securing preventive infrastructure;


### 25. takes the view that operations such as ‘framework loans’ , implemented with the eib , could also be used to finance the reconstruction of more expensive , but more resilient , safer and greener infrastructure; ### 25. takes the view that operations such as ‘framework loans’ , implemented with the eib , could also be used to finance the reconstruction of more resilient , safer and greener infrastructure;


### 26. calls on the commission to strengthen synergies between the eusf and cohesion funds , as well as with the ucpm , with a view to effective and structured risk management in the short , medium and long term , not only through the construction of sustainable , energy- and resource-efficient infrastructure , but also through the deployment of preventive measures; ### 26. calls on the commission to strengthen and simplify the synergies between the eusf and cohesion funds , as well as with the union civil protection mechanism , with a view to effective and structured risk management in the short , medium and long term , not only through the construction of sustainable , energy- and resource-efficient infrastructure , but also through the deployment of preventive measures;


### 28. takes the view that this broadening of the scope of the eusf requires a larger budget; ### 28. stresses the fact that the broadening of the scope of the eusf must always be accompanied by a reinforcement of its budget;


### 30. calls on the commission and the member states to improve the visibility of the fund’s assistance through ad hoc , targeted communication activities , and to make rapid response and delivery of aid a priority , in order specifically to highlight the union’s added value in the event of natural and health disasters and its ability to put genuine mutual assistance into practice by providing significant budgetary resources; ### 30. calls on the commission and the member states to improve the visibility of the fund’s assistance through ad hoc , targeted communication activities , in order specifically to highlight the union’s added value in the event of natural and health disasters and a concrete expression of eu solidarity and its ability to put genuine mutual assistance into practice by providing significant budgetary resources;


### 31. instructs its president to forward this resolution to the council and to the commission. ### 31. instructs its president to forward this resolution to the council , the commission and the member states.


### 1. believes that the main aim of the carbon border adjustment mechanism (cbam) should be to support the eu’s green objectives by fighting carbon leakage; ### 1. believes that the main aim of the carbon border adjustment mechanism (cbam) should be to support the eu’s green objectives by addressing carbon leakage , increasing demand for low carbon processes and products and reducing the carbon content of products; believes that an ultimate aim should be to work towards a global climate policy with a global carbon price;


### 1. believes that the main aim of the carbon border adjustment mechanism (cbam) should be to support the eu’s green objectives by fighting carbon leakage; ### 1. believes that the main aim of the carbon border adjustment mechanism (cbam) should be to support the eu’s green objectives by incentivising the reduction of imports greenhouse gas (ghg) emissions and investments in green and energy efficient technology at european and global levels ;


### 1. believes that the main aim of the carbon border adjustment mechanism (cbam) should be to support the eu’s green objectives by fighting carbon leakage; ### 1. welcomes the european goal of achieving a socially just transition to climate neutrality by 2050 as well as the 60%-goal for 2030; notes with concern the lack of ambition in climate efforts in eu economic policy as well as in many other policy spheres; calls for the paris agreement and its 1.5 percent goal to become the guiding principle of economic policy to which all initiatives must be adjusted; believes that the main aim of the carbon border adjustment mechanism (cbam) should be to support the eu’s green objectives by fighting carbon leakage; underlines that a universal system needs to be the final goal of the initiative since decentral climate protection measures will not have the desired effect and would only result in carbon leakage as well as have disadvantageous effects on european industries; thus suggests the externalisation of the eu emissions trading system (eu ets) as a possible cbam; expects the commission to initiate negotiations for a global approach within the framework of the wto or the g20;


### 1. welcomes the paris agreement , the green deal and the goal of achieving climate neutrality by 2050; notes the lack of international climate efforts; believes that an eu carbon border adjustment mechanism (‘the mechanism’) could incentivise international efforts to combat climate change; ### 1. welcomes the paris agreement as an international commitment to fight climate change and underlines the necessity to conduct a thorough evaluation of all international rulebooks regarding their compatibility with the climate goals; welcomes the european efforts in this regard like the green deal and the goal to achieve a cost-efficient , just , socially balanced and fair transition leading to climate neutrality by 2050 at the latest; notes with concern the lack of sufficient ambitious international climate efforts and measures , especially with regard to implementing the decisions made under the paris agreement , as well as the withdrawal of the usa from the agreement; believes that a eu carbon border adjustment mechanism (“the mechanism”) can incentivize low-emission imports to the eu , market creation of low-emission technologies and products in the eu , increased international efforts to combat climate change and be a first step towards international carbon pricing as decentralised climate protection measures are not sufficient to combat climate-change;


### d. whereas ensuring effective and meaningful carbon pricing , as part of a broader regulatory environment , can act as an economic incentive to spur investments in the decarbonisation of the union’s economy; ### d. whereas ensuring effective and meaningful carbon pricing , accompanied by suitable investment measures , as part of a broader regulatory environment , can act as an economic incentive to spur investments in the decarbonisation of the union’s economy;


### e. whereas existing carbon leakage provisions under union law have failed to demonstrate their effectiveness in delivering the necessary decarbonisation of the sectors concerned; ### deleted


### 2. proposes that the cbam be implemented as an extension of the eu emissions trading system (eu ets) , which would require importers to purchase allowances for the volume of carbon emissions incorporated in their products; notes that the mechanism should ensure a single carbon price , both for domestic producers and importers; ### 2. notes that a cbam implemented as an extension of the eu ets would require importers to purchase allowances for the volume of carbon emissions incorporated in their products; notes that such mechanism encompasses risks of foreign interference into the eu ets balance;


### 2. proposes that the cbam be implemented as an extension of the eu emissions trading system (eu ets) , which would require importers to purchase allowances for the volume of carbon emissions incorporated in their products; notes that the mechanism should ensure a single carbon price , both for domestic producers and importers; ### 2. proposes that the cbam be implemented as an extension of the eu emissions trading system (eu ets) through the creation of a dedicated pool of allowances for imports , which would require importers to purchase allowances for the volume of carbon emissions incorporated in their products; notes that the mechanism should ensure a single carbon price , both for domestic producers and importers;


### 2. underlines that international carbon pricing and fully competitive low-emission solutions would render the mechanism obsolete; stresses , therefore , that the eu needs to step up efforts in this respect; ### 2. underlines that the mechanism cannot help against indirect carbon-leakage; further underlines that sufficient international climate efforts , such as through an international carbon pricing and fully competitive low-emission technologies , products and production processes will render the mechanism obsolete; encourages the commission to design the mechanism as a transitional measure and to step up efforts in this respect by establishing a thorough framework to support industry and society in the low-carbon transition and by engaging in climate diplomacy.


### 3. stresses that the union has the responsibility and opportunity to assume a leading role in global climate action; ### 3. stresses that the union has the responsibility and opportunity to assume a leading role in global climate action by transitioning to an economy with net zero ghg emissions;


### 3. stresses that the union has the responsibility and opportunity to assume a leading role in global climate action; ### 3. stresses that the union has the opportunity to assume a leading role in global climate action;


### 3. urges that the proposed cbam apply to all imports in order to avoid distortion in the internal market; ### 3. invites the commission to assess the impact of a cbam applied to all imports , however urges to ensure at least all energy intensive sectors are included in an early phase of implementation in order to ensure the eu environmental objectives are rapidly reached;


### 3. urges that the proposed cbam apply to all imports in order to avoid distortion in the internal market; ### 3. urges that the proposed cbam be based on a thorough impact assessment , which assesses the impact of different options also at sector level; believes that the cbam should be applied gradually , first applying to select products related to carbon leakage sectors; urges that the proposed cbam avoid distortion in the internal market;


### 3. emphasises that decentralised climate actions can lead to carbon leakage and a competitive disadvantage on international markets for the eu industry; urges the commission , therefore , to ensure full carbon-leakage protection and to consider the inclusion of export rebates in the mechanism; ### 3. emphasises that decentralised climate actions can lead to carbon-leakage leading to an increase of global emissions and a competitive disadvantage on international markets for the eu industry and that they hence put at risk european jobs and value chains; stresses that the eu industry suffers increased economic pressure due to cheap imports from trading partners and the covid-19 crisis; thus urges the commission to ensure full and effective climate and carbon-leakage protection and to consider export rebates in the design of the mechanism;


### 3. emphasises that decentralised climate actions can lead to carbon leakage and a competitive disadvantage on international markets for the eu industry; urges the commission , therefore , to ensure full carbon-leakage protection and to consider the inclusion of export rebates in the mechanism; ### 3. emphasises that decentralised climate actions can lead to carbon leakage and a competitive disadvantage on international markets for the eu industry; urges the commission , therefore , to ensure full carbon-leakage protection by a design of a carbon border adjustment mechanism as an additional and complementing measure to the existing carbon leakage measures and to consider the inclusion of export rebates in the mechanism;


### 4. takes note of the commission’s proposal to set the union’s 2030 climate target to ‘at least 55 % net emissions reduction’ compared to 1990 levels; highlights , however , that this target does not represent the union’s highest possible ambition , nor does it reflect the principle of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities; ### 4. takes note of the commission’s proposal to set the union’s 2030 climate target to ‘at least 55 % net emissions reduction’ compared to 1990 levels; highlights , however , that this target does not represent the union’s highest possible ambition , nor does it reflect the principle of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities; underlines in this respect the european parliament’s position that calls for a revised 2030 climate target of 60% emissions reduction compared to 1990 levels;


### 4. recommends that a design be introduced that measures the carbon content of imports through their basic materials composition (as outlined in the proposal from the european economic and social committee); recalls that this feasible approximation would weigh each basic material covered by the eu ets and multiply it by its carbon intensity value – which ideally should be defined at country level; stresses , however , that importers who are more carbon efficient should be allowed to demonstrate the specific carbon intensity of their products; ### 4. calls for a calculation method for carbon contents that does not disadvantage european producers; calls for a calculation method that takes into account to the highest possible extent the real carbon content of the goods concerned; suggests that an independent agency should be responsible for the definition of the most realistic carbon content of goods as well as the determination of the respective good’s market entry price; calls for the inclusion of existing third country carbon pricing systems in the calculation; asks the commission to consider evaluating all products according to a worst-in-class approach , i.e. assume the most emission-rich production method and thus provide an incentive for producers to share information on their products carbon content in order to pay a lower carbon border adjustment;


### 4. recommends that a design be introduced that measures the carbon content of imports through their basic materials composition (as outlined in the proposal from the european economic and social committee); recalls that this feasible approximation would weigh each basic material covered by the eu ets and multiply it by its carbon intensity value – which ideally should be defined at country level; stresses , however , that importers who are more carbon efficient should be allowed to demonstrate the specific carbon intensity of their products; ### 4. recommends that a design be introduced that measures the carbon content of imports through their basic materials composition (as outlined in the proposal from the european economic and social committee); recalls that this feasible approximation would weigh each basic material covered by the eu ets and multiply it by its carbon intensity value – which ideally should be defined at country and sector levels; stresses , however , that importers who are more carbon efficient should be allowed to demonstrate the specific carbon intensity of their products; is of the opinion that a cbam would require a strong independent infrastructure to be administered , in particular as regard to the measurement of carbon content of imports , certifications , double taxation and/or the existence of an equivalent carbon pricing system in the country of imports origin;


### 4. recommends that a design be introduced that measures the carbon content of imports through their basic materials composition (as outlined in the proposal from the european economic and social committee); recalls that this feasible approximation would weigh each basic material covered by the eu ets and multiply it by its carbon intensity value – which ideally should be defined at country level; stresses , however , that importers who are more carbon efficient should be allowed to demonstrate the specific carbon intensity of their products; ### 4. recommends that a design be introduced that measures the carbon content of imports through their basic materials composition (as outlined in the proposal from the european economic and social committee); recalls that this feasible approximation would weigh each basic material covered by the eu ets and multiply it by its carbon intensity value – which ideally should be defined at country level; stresses , however , that importers who are more carbon efficient should be allowed to demonstrate the specific carbon intensity of their products , so as to encourage innovation and investments into greener technologies globally;


### 4. suggests a progressive mechanism that first includes sectors with the highest risk of carbon leakage before being enlarged over time; stresses that this should not lead to internal market distortions; ### 4. suggests a progressive mechanism that first includes sectors with the highest risk of carbon leakage before being enlarged overtime; stresses that this should not lead to internal market distortions and should cover imports from all countries not subject to astringent carbon trading scheme of equivalent co2 emission reduction targets and costs.


### 4. suggests a progressive mechanism that first includes sectors with the highest risk of carbon leakage before being enlarged over time; stresses that this should not lead to internal market distortions; ### 4. suggests a progressive mechanism that first includes sectors with the highest risk of carbon leakage before being enlarged over time; stresses that this should not lead to internal market distortions; underlines that consumers , especially those of member states heavily relying on imports from third countries , should be protected from possible higher product prices;


### 4. suggests a progressive mechanism that first includes sectors with the highest risk of carbon leakage before being enlarged over time; stresses that this should not lead to internal market distortions; ### 4. suggests a progressive mechanism , firstly including sectors with the highest risk of carbon-leakage and being enlarged over time; believes that such a design could reduce international retaliation and serve as a test phase for eu industry; stresses however that this should not lead to internal market distortions;


### 5. notes that the union had reduced its domestic greenhouse gas (ghg) emissions by 23.2% below 1990 levels in 2018 , while at the same time its ghg emissions embedded in international trade have been constantly rising , thereby undermining the union’s efforts to reduce its global footprint; underlines that the net imports of goods and services in the eu represent more than 20% of the union’s domestic co2 emissions; ### 5. notes that the union had reduced its domestic greenhouse gas (ghg) emissions by 23.2% below 1990 levels in 2018 , while at the same time its ghg emissions embedded in international trade have been constantly rising , thereby undermining the union’s efforts to reduce its global footprint; underlines that the net imports of goods and services in the eu represent more than 20% of the union’s domestic co2 emissions; believes that these imports should be monitored more closely in order to identify their potential gas emission impacts;


### 5. notes that the union had reduced its domestic greenhouse gas (ghg) emissions by 23.2 % below 1990 levels in 2018 , while at the same time its ghg emissions embedded in international trade have been constantly rising , thereby undermining the union’s efforts to reduce its global footprint; underlines that the net imports of goods and services in the eu represent more than 20 % of the union’s domestic co2 emissions; ### 5. notes that the union had reduced its domestic greenhouse gas (ghg) emissions by 23.2 % below 1990 levels in 2018 , while our economy grew by more than 60% , while at the same time its ghg emissions embedded in international trade have been constantly rising , thereby undermining the union’s efforts to reduce its global footprint; underlines that the net imports of goods and services in the eu represent more than 20 % of the union’s domestic co2 emissions;


### 5. notes that the union had reduced its domestic greenhouse gas (ghg) emissions by 23.2 % below 1990 levels in 2018 , while at the same time its ghg emissions embedded in international trade have been constantly rising , thereby undermining the union’s efforts to reduce its global footprint; underlines that the net imports of goods and services in the eu represent more than 20 % of the union’s domestic co2 emissions; ### 5. notes that the union had reduced its domestic greenhouse gas (ghg) emissions by 23.2 % below 1990 levels in 2018 , while at the same time its imported ghg emissions have been constantly rising , thereby undermining the union’s efforts to reduce its global footprint; underlines that the net imports of goods and services in the eu represent more than 20 % of the union’s domestic co2 emissions;


### 5. requests that the implementation of the cbam should lead to the progressive phasing out of the free allocation of allowances , following an appropriate transition period , since the mechanism ensures that eu producers and importers would have to deal with the same carbon costs in the eu market; notes that this phasing out should be coupled in parallel with the introduction of export rebates in order to maintain strong decarbonisation incentives , while ensuring a level playing field for eu exports; ### 5. believes in the principle that eu producers and importers should have to deal with the same carbon cost in the eu market and that eu exporters should face the same carbon cost as non-eu producers outside the eu market; requests , therefore that the implementation of an effective cbam in a specific sector should put an end to the free allocation of allowances in that sector and calls on the commission to assess and propose the introduction of support measures to exports that would remain wto compliant and in coherence with eu environmental objectives;


### 5. stresses the need to limit international retaliation measures against the eu caused by the mechanism; urges the commission to make the mechanism world trade organization-compatible and to take a multilateral approach to its design; ### 5. stresses the need to limit international retaliation measures against the eu caused by the mechanism in order to minimise negative effects on the european trade balance and the eu industry; encourages the commission to ensure a level-playing field in international trade paying due respect to the principles of a free and fair global market; thus urges the commission make the mechanism wto-compatible , preferably by using articles xx(b)and (g) that allow wto members to justify gatt-inconsistent measures if these are either necessary to protect human , animal or plant life or health and to have a multilateral approach to its design by involving international trading partners by making it part of the negotiations for multilateral environmental agreements while taking into consideration the european union's position as the world's largest trading block; underlines that the mechanism shall not be a prerogative for the eu to foster protectionism vis-a-vis third countries;


### 6. supports the introduction of a carbon border adjustment mechanism (cbam) as a way to reduce global ghg emissions in the pursuit of the paris agreement objectives; states unequivocally that this mechanism should serve to better address ghg emissions embedded in international trade , thereby incentivising climate action both within the union and by our trading partners , and not as an instrument for protectionism; ### 6. supports the introduction of a carbon border adjustment mechanism (cbam) as a way to reduce global ghg emissions in the pursuit of the paris agreement objectives , given that third countries would be forced to consider the cost of less restrictive environmental regulations and to adopt measures to reduce their carbon footprint; states unequivocally that this mechanism should serve to better address ghg emissions embedded in international trade , thereby incentivising climate action both within the union and by our trading partners , and not as an instrument for protectionism;


### 6. supports the introduction of a carbon border adjustment mechanism (cbam) as a way to reduce global ghg emissions in the pursuit of the paris agreement objectives; states unequivocally that this mechanism should serve to better address ghg emissions embedded in international trade , thereby incentivising climate action both within the union and by our trading partners , and not as an instrument for protectionism; ### 6. supports the introduction of a carbon border adjustment mechanism (cbam) as it would create an incentive for european industries and eu trade partners to decarbonize their industries , and therefore support both eu and global climate policies towards ghg neutrality in line with the paris agreement objectives; recalls that studies found little or no factual evidence of a competitiveness-driven operational carbon leakage due to the eu ets , and that the main objective of a cbam should be to incentivise global climate action rather than protectionism;


### 6. stresses that importers from third countries should not pay twice for the carbon content embodied in its products; ### 6. stresses that importers from third countries are prevented from being double charged for the carbon content embodied in its products;


### 6. underlines that the resources incurred by the mechanism are to be considered eu own resources; is convinced that these resources must be used for climate measures; ### 6. underlines that according to the european parliament resolution of 14 november 2018 on the multiannual financial framework 2021-2027 ,the resources incurred by the mechanism shall be considered european own resources; is convinced that these resources shall be solely used for measures to achieve climate-neutrality , for example carbon-neutral and sustainable industrial production processes , recycling and material efficiency or to finance administrative costs incurred by the mechanism;


### 7. reiterates that the introduction of a cbam should be part of a broader union industrial policy that is both environmentally ambitious and socially fair , aiming at steering a decarbonised reindustrialisation of europe that will create local jobs and ensure the competitiveness of the european economy while fulfilling the union’s climate ambition; ### 7. reiterates that the introduction of a cbam should be part of a broader union industrial policy that is both environmentally ambitious and socially fair , so as to ensure , where possible , the rapid modernisation and adaptation of existing industries to the new climate standards , and to ensure a new process aiming at steering a decarbonised reindustrialisation of europe that will create local jobs and ensure the competitiveness of the european economy while fulfilling the union’s climate ambition;


### 7. reiterates that the introduction of a cbam should be part of a broader union industrial policy that is both environmentally ambitious and socially fair , aiming at steering a decarbonised reindustrialisation of europe that will create local jobs and ensure the competitiveness of the european economy while fulfilling the union’s climate ambition; ### 7. reiterates that the introduction of a cbam should be part of a broader union industrial policy that is both environmentally ambitious and socially fair , aiming at steering a decarbonised reindustrialisation of europe that will create local jobs and ensure the competitiveness of the european economy while fulfilling the union’s climate ambition; stresses that this mechanism should also be a means of restoring fair competition at european and international level;


### 7. calls for the inclusion of cbam revenues into the eu budget; ### 7. supports the commission’s intention to include cbam revenues into the eu budget , acknowledges that additional revenues would be generated by both the cbam and the removing of eu ets free allowances , therefore also requests that those supplementary revenues would become new own resources , believes these revenues should be aimed at supporting the environmental and sustainable objectives of the eu;


### 7. calls for the inclusion of cbam revenues into the eu budget; ### 7. calls for the inclusion of cbam revenues into the eu budget and earmarked as for fighting climate change actions of the eu; calls for the resources generated by the cbam to be re-invested in the development of carbon neutral technologies and in the build-up of an independent agency responsible for the definition of carbon contents as well as market-entry prices;


### 7. calls for the inclusion of cbam revenues into the eu budget; ### 7. calls for the inclusion of cbam revenues into the eu budget; believes that such revenues should only fund climate related objectives;


### 7. calls on the commission to conduct an impact assessment of different mechanisms and designs to incentivise international climate action and prevent carbon leakage before presenting a legislative proposal. ### 7. calls on the commission to conduct a thorough impact assessment on different mechanisms and designs , including a carbon tax on consumption and carbon footprint requirements in public procurement , before presenting a legislative proposal in order to evaluate in how far they incentivize international climate action and prevent carbon-leakage; the assessment should also analyse the possibility to transitionally maintain free allowances under the ets and/or electricity price compensation while slowly phasing in the mechanism;


### 8. considers that a cbam should cover all imports , but that as a starting point already by 2023 it should cover the power sector and energy-intensive industrial sectors like cement , steel , chemicals and fertilisers , which continue to receive substantial free allocations , and still represent 94 % of union industrial emissions; ### 8. considers that a cbam should cover all imports , except for all the electric vehicles , appliances , and components needed for the production of green energy , but that as a starting point already by 2023 it should cover the power sector and energy-intensive industrial sectors like cement , steel , chemicals and fertilisers , which continue to receive substantial free allocations , and still represent 94 % of union industrial emissions;


### 8. considers that a cbam should cover all imports , but that as a starting point already by 2023 it should cover the power sector and energy-intensive industrial sectors like cement , steel , chemicals and fertilisers , which continue to receive substantial free allocations , and still represent 94 % of union industrial emissions; ### 8. considers that a cbam should cover all sectors covered by the eu ets , but that as a starting point already by 2023 it should cover the power sector and energy-intensive industrial sectors like cement , steel , chemicals and fertilisers , which continue to receive substantial free allocations , and still represent 94 % of union industrial emissions;


### 8. believes that the above proposal is compatible with world trade organization rules , since it does not discriminate between producers , is based on objective criteria and has a clear environmental objective. ### deleted


### 8. believes that the above proposal is compatible with world trade organization rules , since it does not discriminate between producers , is based on objective criteria and has a clear environmental objective. ### 8. believes that the mechanism should be designed in a way that does not impact international trade negatively and is compatible with world trade organization rules , not discriminating between producers , based on objective criteria and has a clear environmental objective.


### 8. believes that the above proposal is compatible with world trade organization rules , since it does not discriminate between producers , is based on objective criteria and has a clear environmental objective. ### 8. believes that the above proposal is compatible with world trade organization rules , since it does not discriminate between producers , is based on objective criteria and has a clear environmental objective; expects the commission to take urgent initiative for wto reform in order to achieve full compatibility with the climate objectives of the paris agreement;


### 9. underlines that the ghg emissions content of imports concerned should be accounted for on the basis of transparent and reliable product-specific benchmarks representing the global average ghg emissions content of individual products; considers that the carbon pricing of imports should also take into account the country-specific carbon intensity of the electricity grid; ### 9. underlines that the ghg emissions content of imports concerned should be accounted for on the basis of transparent , reliable up to date product-specific benchmarks representing the global average ghg emissions intensities of individual products , disaggregated by different production methods with varying emission intensities; considers that non eu producers should have the option to prove , in respect with eu standards for measurement , reporting and verification (mrv) , that the actual carbon intensity embodied in their products is below the average value estimated by the benchmark , and should therefore benefit from a cbam price adapted accordingly.


### 9. underlines that the ghg emissions content of imports concerned should be accounted for on the basis of transparent and reliable product-specific benchmarks representing the global average ghg emissions content of individual products; considers that the carbon pricing of imports should also take into account the country-specific carbon intensity of the electricity grid; ### 9. underlines that the ghg emissions content of imports concerned should be accounted for on the basis of transparent and reliable product-specific benchmarks representing the global average ghg emissions content of individual products; considers that the carbon pricing of imports should also take into account the country-specific carbon intensity of the electricity grid; stresses the need for the border adjustment mechanism to cover both direct and indirect carbon emissions;


### 9. underlines that the ghg emissions content of imports concerned should be accounted for on the basis of transparent and reliable product-specific benchmarks representing the global average ghg emissions content of individual products; considers that the carbon pricing of imports should also take into account the country-specific carbon intensity of the electricity grid; ### 9. underlines that the ghg emissions intensity of imports should be calculated for on the basis of product-specific union benchmarks; considers that the carbon pricing of imports should also take into account the country-specific carbon intensity of the electricity grid , if inclusion of indirect emissions can be done in a wto-compatible and non-discriminatory way;


### 10. stresses that carbon pricing under the cbam should mirror the dynamic evolution of the price of union allowances under the eu emissions trading system (eu ets); points out that the introduction of a rising carbon floor price under the eu ets could ensure predictability under the cbam while also ensuring a stronger price signal within the eu; ### 10. stresses that carbon pricing under the cbam should mirror the dynamic evolution of the price of union allowances under the eu emissions trading system (eu ets)


### 11. points out that a cbam is not per se incompatible with wto rules , and highlights the necessity for any cbam to be designed with the highest environmental integrity in mind; ### 11. points out that a cbam can be designed in a wto-compatible and non-discriminatory way highlights the necessity for any cbam to be designed with the environmental objective to reduce global emissions in mind;


### 11. points out that a cbam is not per se incompatible with wto rules , and highlights the necessity for any cbam to be designed with the highest environmental integrity in mind; ### 11. points out that a cbam is wto-compatible when designed with the highest environmental integrity in mind in relation to the exemptions in gatt article xx sub b and g;


### 12. underlines the principle of non-discrimination under gatt article iii; stresses that treating imports and domestic production in the same way is a key criterion for ensuring wto compatibility of any measure , and that , therefore , all existing measures on carbon leakage under union law should immediately cease to apply as soon as the cbam enters into force , as this mechanism would apply carbon pricing to imports similar to what is applied to eu installations under the eu ets; ### 12. underlines the principle of non-discrimination under gatt article iii; stresses that treating imports and domestic production in the same way is a key criterion for ensuring wto compatibility of any measure; calls on the commission to design the cbam to be eligible for the exemption referred to in the article xx of gatt , and to improve the effectiveness of all existing measures on carbon leakage under union law which are necessary to assist companies in the transition period to sustain the eu industry’s competitiveness on the export markets


### 13. calls on the commission to address this concern during the upcoming reform of the eu ets , ensuring the eu ets delivers , through ambitious and meaningful carbon pricing , on the necessary ghg emissions reduction in line with the updated 2030 union climate target and the objective of reaching net zero ghg emissions within the union by 2050 at the latest , fully respecting the polluter pays principle; stresses that export rebates risk creating perverse climate effects , incentivising less efficient production methods for european exporting industries; urges the commission to refrain from including export rebates in its proposal; ### 13. calls on the commission during the upcoming reform of the eu ets , to ensure that the eu ets delivers , through ambitious and meaningful carbon pricing , on the necessary ghg emissions reduction in line with the updated 2030 union climate target and the objective of reaching net zero ghg emissions within the union by 2050 at the latest , fully respecting the polluter pays principle; stresses that export rebates risk creating perverse climate effects , incentivising less efficient production methods for european exporting industries; urges the commission to refrain from including export rebates including export rebates in its proposal;


### 13. calls on the commission to address this concern during the upcoming reform of the eu ets , ensuring the eu ets delivers , through ambitious and meaningful carbon pricing , on the necessary ghg emissions reduction in line with the updated 2030 union climate target and the objective of reaching net zero ghg emissions within the union by 2050 at the latest , fully respecting the polluter pays principle; stresses that export rebates risk creating perverse climate effects , incentivising less efficient production methods for european exporting industries; urges the commission to refrain from including export rebates in its proposal; ### 13. calls on the commission to address this concern during the upcoming reform of the eu ets , ensuring the eu ets delivers , through ambitious and meaningful carbon pricing , on the necessary ghg emissions reduction in line with the updated 2030 union climate target and the objective of reaching net zero ghg emissions within the union by 2050 at the latest , fully respecting the polluter pays principle; calls on the commission to ensure that any proposed export rebates would not risk creating perverse climate effects by incentivising less efficient production methods for european exporting industries;


### 14. supports the commission’s intention to use revenues generated by the cbam as new own resources for the eu budget , and asks the commission to ensure full transparency about the use of those revenues; believes these revenues should be earmarked for supporting the just transition and decarbonisation of europe’s economy , and for stepping up the union’s contribution to international climate finance in favour of least developed countries and small island developing states , which are most vulnerable to climate change; ### 14. supports the commission’s intention to use revenues generated by the cbam as new own resources for the eu budget in a separate chapter so as to increase their visibility and enhance the credibility of eu measures , and asks the commission to ensure full transparency about the use of those revenues; believes these revenues should be earmarked for supporting the just transition and decarbonisation of europe’s economy , and for stepping up the union’s contribution to international climate finance in favour of least developed countries and small island developing states , which are most vulnerable to climate change;


### 14. supports the commission’s intention to use revenues generated by the cbam as new own resources for the eu budget , and asks the commission to ensure full transparency about the use of those revenues; believes these revenues should be earmarked for supporting the just transition and decarbonisation of europe’s economy , and for stepping up the union’s contribution to international climate finance in favour of least developed countries and small island developing states , which are most vulnerable to climate change; ### 14. supports the commission’s intention to use revenues generated by the cbam as new own resources for the eu budget , and asks the commission to ensure full transparency about the use of those revenues; believes these revenues should be earmarked for supporting the just transition and decarbonisation of europe’s economy , and for stepping up the union’s contribution to international climate finance in favour of least developed countries and small island developing states and member states with different starting points which are most vulnerable to climate change;


### 1. stresses that the mobilisation of the flexibility instrument shows , once more , the crucial need for the union budget to be more flexible; ### deleted


### 2. reiterates its long-standing view that the payments stemming from commitments previously mobilised through the flexibility instrument can only be counted over and above the ceilings; ### deleted


### 3. approves the decision annexed to this resolution; ### deleted


### 4. instructs its president to sign the decision with the president of the council and arrange for its publication in the official journal of the european union; ### deleted


### 5. instructs its president to forward this resolution , including its annex , to the council and the commission. ### 5. instructs its president to forward this resolution to the council and the commission.


### 1. takes note of the commission’s proposal; ### 1. takes note of the commission’s proposal; reiterates its position considering that the union budget is too small to respond to pressing needs and challenges it faces as well as its citizens;


### 3. approves the council position on draft amending budget no 4/2019; ### 3. considers that a draft amending budget should follow one purpose only; notes that draft amending budget no 4/2019 has two purposes , namely to release commitment and payment appropriations of budget lines for headings 1a - competitiveness for growth and jobs , 1b - economic , social and territorial cohesion , 3 - security and citizenship , 4 - global europe as well as for the european union solidarity fund , and to increase the budget 2019 of some institutions as a result of the postponement of the withdrawal of the united kingdom from the european union to 31 october 2019; notes that the most urgent purpose of draft amending budget no 4/2019 is to increase the budget 2019 of some institutions as a result of the postponement of the withdrawal of the united kingdom from the european union to 31 october 2019; approves , therefore , these adjustments but rejects the proposed release of commitment appropriations;


### 4. instructs its president to declare that amending budget no 4/2019 has been definitively adopted and arrange for its publication in the official journal of the european union; ### deleted


### 5. instructs its president to forward this resolution to the council , the commission and the national parliaments. ### 5. instructs its president to forward this resolution , together with parliament’s amendments , to the council , the commission , the other institutions and bodies concerned and the national parliaments.


### 6. notes that belgium argues that retail trade is going through a period of major change , due to globalisation (e-commerce , online shopping) , resulting in redundancies and that changing patterns in consumers' habits and digitalisation also have an impact on retail trade; underlines that these redundancies do not directly concern the food industry , but mostly pertain the e-commerce of goods , such as books and electronic devices; ### 6. acknowledges that retail trade is going through a period of major change , due to globalisation (e-commerce , online shopping) , resulting in redundancies and that changing patterns in consumers' habits and digitalisation also have an impact on retail trade; underlines that the redundancies in carrefour belgique sa do not directly concern the food industry , but mostly pertain the e-commerce of goods , such as books and electronic devices; notes that these kind of redundancies may further increase in the future due to digitalisation , which should be considered during the discussions on the future egf in the next multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027;


### 7. believes that globalisation represents a challenge for the union; considers , moreover , that tackling youth and other unemployment involves the creation of opportunities of re-skilling and up-skilling in the european companies; believes that carrefour belgium should ensure the necessary high-quality social dialogue with its workers during this process; ### 7. believes that globalisation represents a challenge for the union; considers , moreover , that tackling youth and other unemployment involves the creation of opportunities of re-skilling and up-skilling in the european companies; expects that carrefour belgium will ensure the necessary high-quality social dialogue with its workers during this process;


### (13) for the purpose of its decisions to register , in order to ascertain that a european political party or a european political foundation complies with its obligations to observe the values on which the union is founded , as expressed in article 2 teu , and that it ensures that its members observe such values , the authority should rely on a written declaration to be issued by the european political party or european political foundation by using a template attached to this regulation. the power of the authority , upon request from the european parliament , the council or the commission , to verify the compliance with such values should however not extend to possible breaches of those values by member parties or member organisations. ### (13) for the purpose of its decisions to register , in order to ascertain that a european political party or a european political foundation complies with its obligations to observe the values on which the union is founded , as expressed in article 2 teu , and that it ensures that its members observe such values , the authority should rely on a written declaration to be issued by the european political party or european political foundation by using a template attached to this regulation.


### (30) european political parties and their member parties should lead by example in closing the gender gap in the political domain. if they wish to benefit from eu funding , european political parties should have internal rules promoting gender balance and they should be transparent about the gender balance of their member parties. european political parties should provide evidence on their internal policy on gender balance and on their member parties’ gender representation as regards candidates to and member of the european parliament . the european political parties are also encouraged to provide information in relation to their member parties’ on inclusiveness and representation of minorities. ### (30) european political parties and their member parties should lead by example in closing the gender gap in the political domain. if they wish to benefit from eu funding , european political parties should have internal rules promoting gender equality and they should be transparent about the gender balance of their member parties. european political parties should provide evidence on their internal policy on gender balance and on their member parties’ gender representation as regards candidates to and member of the european parliament . the european political parties are also encouraged to provide information in relation to their member parties’ on inclusiveness and representation of minorities.


### (37) in order to enhance cooperation with long-standing members sharing eu values , contributions from member parties having their seat in a country outside the union but in the council of europe , should be allowed. however , such contributions should be subject to a cap in relation to total contribution , to limit the risk of foreign interference. ### deleted


### (37) in order to enhance cooperation with long-standing members sharing eu values , contributions from member parties having their seat in a country outside the union but in the council of europe , should be allowed. however , such contributions should be subject to a cap in relation to total contribution , to limit the risk of foreign interference. ### (37) in order to enhance cooperation with long-standing members sharing eu values , contributions from member parties having their seat in candidate countries for accession to the union , in countries from the european free trade association , from eu neighbourhood countries and from former member states , should be allowed. however , such contributions should be subject to a cap in relation to total contribution , to limit the risk of foreign interference.


### (39) in order to reach out to their members and constituencies across the union , european political parties should have the right to use their funding for cross-border political campaigns. the funding and limitation of election expenses for parties and candidates in those campaigns should be governed by the rules applicable in each member state. ### (39) in order to reach out to their members and constituencies across the union , european political parties should have the right to use their funding for cross-border political campaigns , conducted in the context of elections to the european parliament , including the setting up of union-wide lists and referendum campaigns. the funding and limitation of election expenses for parties and candidates in those campaigns should be governed by the rules applicable in each member state.


### (41) european political parties should not fund , directly or indirectly , other political parties and , in particular , national parties or candidates. european political foundations should not fund , directly or indirectly , european or national political parties or candidates. the prohibition of indirect funding should however not prevent european political parties from publicly supporting and engaging with their member parties in the union on issues of relevance for the union , or to support political activities in the common interest , to be able to fulfil their mission under article 10(4) teu. moreover , european political parties and their affiliated european political foundations should only finance activities in the context of national referendum campaigns when they concern the implementation of the teu and the tfeu . these principles reflect declaration no 11 on article 191 of the treaty establishing the european community annexed to the final act of the treaty of nice. ### (41) european political parties should not fund , directly or indirectly , other political parties and , in particular , national parties or candidates. european political foundations should not fund , directly or indirectly , european or national political parties or candidates. the prohibition of indirect funding should however not prevent european political parties or political foundations from publicly supporting and engaging with their member parties or member organisations in the union on issues of relevance for the union , from supporting political activities in the common interest , or from engaging in educational activities , in order to be able to fulfil their mission under article 10(4) teu. the prohibition of indirect funding should not prevent the participation of both representatives and staffers of political parties , nor of potentially politically active persons in events of european political foundations. moreover , european political parties and their affiliated european political foundations should only finance activities in the context of national referendum campaigns when they concern the implementation of the teu and the tfeu . these principles reflect declaration no 11 on article 191 of the treaty establishing the european community annexed to the final act of the treaty of nice.


### (41) european political parties should not fund , directly or indirectly , other political parties and , in particular , national parties or candidates. european political foundations should not fund , directly or indirectly , european or national political parties or candidates. the prohibition of indirect funding should however not prevent european political parties from publicly supporting and engaging with their member parties in the union on issues of relevance for the union , or to support political activities in the common interest , to be able to fulfil their mission under article 10(4) teu. moreover , european political parties and their affiliated european political foundations should only finance activities in the context of national referendum campaigns when they concern the implementation of the teu and the tfeu . these principles reflect declaration no 11 on article 191 of the treaty establishing the european community annexed to the final act of the treaty of nice. ### (41) european political parties should not fund , directly or indirectly , other political parties and , in particular , national parties or candidates. european political foundations should not fund , directly or indirectly , european or national political parties or candidates. the prohibition of indirect funding should however not prevent european political parties from publicly supporting and engaging with their member parties in the union on issues of relevance for the union , or to support political activities in the common interest , to be able to fulfil their mission under article 10(4) teu. moreover , european political parties and their affiliated european political foundations should only finance activities in the context of national referendum campaigns when they concern issues directly related to the european union. these principles reflect declaration no 11 on article 191 of the treaty establishing the european community annexed to the final act of the treaty of nice.


### (49) european political parties often rely on external service providers , including advertising publishers , for the preparation , placement , publication and dissemination of their political advertisements. such service providers are bound by regulation 2022/xx of the european parliament and of the council28 on the transparency and targeting of political advertising. where entering into a contractual relationship on the provision of services related to political advertisements , european political parties should ensure that the providers of political advertising services , including advertising publishers , comply with their obligations under regulation 2022/xx [on the transparency and targeting of political advertising]. they should ensure that the contractual arrangements specify how the relevant provisions of this regulation are taken into account. where appropriate , the political advertisement may include the european political party’s political logo. ### (49) european political parties often rely on external service providers , including advertising publishers , for the preparation , placement , publication and dissemination of their political advertisements. such service providers are bound by regulation 2022/xx of the european parliament and of the council28 on the transparency and targeting of political advertising. where entering into a contractual relationship on the provision of services related to political advertisements , european political parties should ensure that the providers of political advertising services , including advertising publishers , comply with their obligations under regulation 2022/xx [on the transparency and targeting of political advertising]. they should ensure that the contractual arrangements specify how the relevant provisions of this regulation are taken into account. the political advertisement should include the european political party’s political logo.


### 4. a european political party shall include in its application evidence demonstrating its compliance with article 4(1) , point (j) , and that its member parties have continuously published on their websites , during 12 months preceding the moment at which the application is made , information on the gender representation among the candidates at the last elections to the european parliament and on the evolution of gender representation among their members of the european parliament. ### 4. a european political party shall include in its application evidence demonstrating its compliance with article 4(1) , point (j) , and that its member parties apply gender equality and have continuously published on their websites , during 12 months preceding the moment at which the application is made , information on the gender representation among the candidates at the last elections to the european parliament and on the evolution of gender representation among their members of the european parliament.


### 9. contributions from members of a european political party that have their seat in , or are citizens of , a member state or from member parties that have their seat in a country belonging to the council of europe shall be permitted. the total value of contributions from members shall not exceed 40 % of the annual budget of a european political party. the value of contributions from member organisations that have their seat in a country outside the union shall not exceed 10 % of the total contributions from members. ### 9. contributions from members of a european political party that have their seat in a member state shall be permitted. the total value of contributions from members shall not exceed 40 % of the annual budget of a european political party.


### 9. contributions from members of a european political party that have their seat in , or are citizens of , a member state or from member parties that have their seat in a country belonging to the council of europe shall be permitted. the total value of contributions from members shall not exceed 40 % of the annual budget of a european political party. the value of contributions from member parties that have their seat in a country outside the union shall not exceed 10% of the total contributions from members. ### 9. contributions from members of a european political party that have their seat in , or are citizens of , a member state or from member parties that have their seat in candidate countries for accession to the union , in countries from the european free trade association , in eu neighbourhood countries and in former member states shall be permitted. the total value of contributions from members shall not exceed 40 % of the annual budget of a european political party. the value of contributions from member parties that have their seat in a country outside the union shall not exceed 10% of the total contributions from members.


### 10. contributions from members of a european political foundation that have their seat in , or are citizens of , a member state or from member organisations that have their seat in a country belonging to the council of europe , and from the european political party with which it is affiliated , shall be permitted. the total value of contributions from members shall not exceed 40 % of the annual budget of a european political foundation and shall not derive from funds received by a european political party pursuant to this regulation from the general budget of the european union. the value of contributions from member organisations that have their seat in a country outside the union shall not exceed 10% of the total contributions from members. ### 10. contributions from members of a european political foundation that have their seat in , or are citizens of , a member state shall be permitted. the total value of contributions from members shall not exceed 40 % of the annual budget of a european political foundation and shall not derive from funds received by a european political party pursuant to this regulation from the general budget of the european union.


### 10. contributions from members of a european political foundation that have their seat in , or are citizens of , a member state or from member organisations that have their seat in a country belonging to the council of europe , and from the european political party with which it is affiliated , shall be permitted. the total value of contributions from members shall not exceed 40 % of the annual budget of a european political foundation and shall not derive from funds received by a european political party pursuant to this regulation from the general budget of the european union. the value of contributions from member organisations that have their seat in a country outside the union shall not exceed 10% of the total contributions from members. ### 10. contributions from members of a european political foundation that have their seat in , or are citizens of , a member state or from member organisations that have their seat in a country belonging to candidate countries for accession to the union , countries from the european free trade association , eu neighbourhood countries and to former member states and from the european political party with which it is affiliated , shall be permitted. the total value of contributions from members shall not exceed 40 % of the annual budget of a european political foundation and shall not derive from funds received by a european political party pursuant to this regulation from the general budget of the european union. the value of contributions from member organisations that have their seat in a country outside the union shall not exceed 10% of the total contributions from members.


### 2. the funding of european political parties and european political foundations from the general budget of the european union or from any other source may be used to finance referendum campaigns when those campaigns concern the implementation of the treaties of the union. ### 2. the funding of european political parties and european political foundations from the general budget of the european union or from any other source may be used to finance referendum campaigns when those campaigns concern issues directly related to the european union.


### 1. notwithstanding article 24(1) , the funding of european political parties from the general budget of the european union or from any other source shall not be used for the direct or indirect funding of other political parties , and in particular national parties or candidates. those national political parties and candidates shall continue to be governed by national rules. ### 1. notwithstanding article 24(1) , the funding of european political parties from the general budget of the european union or from any other source shall not be used for the direct or indirect funding of other political parties , and in particular national parties or candidates except for political activities in the common interest of european and national parties and capacity building to support the formation of future political leadership in the union. those national political parties and candidates shall continue to be governed by national rules.


### (27) if a european political party or a european political foundation seriously fails to comply with relevant national law and if the matter relates to elements affecting respect of the values on which the union is founded , as expressed in article 2 teu , the authority should decide , upon request by the member state concerned , to apply the procedures laid down by this regulation. moreover , the authority should decide , upon request from the member state of the seat , to remove from the register a european political party or european political foundation which has seriously failed to comply with relevant national law on any other matter. ### (27) if a european political party or a european political foundation seriously fails to comply with relevant national law and if the matter relates to elements affecting respect of the values on which the union is founded , as expressed in article 2 teu , the authority should decide to apply the procedures laid down by this regulation. moreover , the authority should decide , upon request from the member state of the seat , to remove from the register a european political party or european political foundation which has seriously failed to comply with relevant national law on any other matter.


### serving as a framework for national political foundations , academics , and other relevant actors to work together at european level; ### serving as a framework for national political foundations , academics (including by different levels of affiliation and a category of research partners) , and other relevant actors to work together at european level;


### where the authority becomes aware of facts which may give rise to doubts concerning compliance by a specific european political party or european political foundation with the conditions laid down in article 3(1) , point (d) , and article 3(2) , point (c) , it shall inform the european parliament , the council and the commission with a view to allowing any of them to lodge a request for verification as referred to in the first subparagraph. without prejudice to the first subparagraph , the european parliament , the council and the commission shall indicate their intention within two months of receiving that information. ### where the authority becomes aware of facts which may give rise to doubts concerning compliance by a specific european political party or european political foundation with the conditions laid down in article 3(1) , point (d) , and article 3(2) , point (c) , it shall start the verification process and inform the european parliament , the council and the commission.


### 1. subject to the second subparagraph , the funding of european political parties from the general budget of the european union or from any other source may be used to finance campaigns conducted by the european political parties in the context of elections to the european parliament in which they or their members participate as required by article 3(1) , point (f). ### 1. subject to the second subparagraph , the funding of european political parties from the general budget of the european union or from any other source may be used to finance campaigns conducted by the european political parties in the context of elections to the european parliament in which they or their members participate as required by article 3(1) , point (f) including setting up union-wide lists.


### 8. european political parties and european political foundations , the member states and the independent bodies or experts authorised to audit accounts under this regulation shall be liable in accordance with applicable national law for any damage they cause in the processing of personal data pursuant to this regulation. the member states shall ensure that effective , proportionate and dissuasive sanctions are applied for infringements of this regulation , of regulation (eu) 2016/679 and of the national provisions adopted pursuant thereto , and in particular for the fraudulent use of personal data. ### 8. european political parties and european political foundations , the member states and the independent bodies or experts authorised to audit accounts under this regulation shall be liable in accordance with applicable national law for any damage they cause in the processing of personal data pursuant to this regulation. the member states shall , without prejudice to regulation (eu) 2016/679 , ensure that effective , proportionate and dissuasive sanctions are applied for infringements of this regulation.


### 1. stresses that ngeu is the first eu common borrowing programme which not only grants loans to member states , but also provides direct union budget expenditure embedded in genuine eu programmes and policies; underlines that common union debt managed by the commission boosts the size , impact and added value of the union budget , thereby supporting the post-covid-19 recovery and delivering on long-term eu priorities; ### 1. stresses that ngeu is the largest eu common borrowing programme which not only grants loans to member states , but also provides direct union budget expenditure embedded in genuine eu programmes and policies; underlines that common union debt managed by the commission boosts the size , impact and added value of the union budget , thereby supporting the post-covid-19 recovery and delivering on long-term eu priorities;


### 4. notes that the commission has developed and put in place a new and large funding programme and built up its debt management capacities swiftly and efficiently; welcomes the fact that first issuances took place at a steady pace in 2021 and were all heavily oversubscribed , revealing strong investor interest and enabling the commission to meet its funding targets; ### 4. notes that the commission has developed and put in place a new and large funding programme and built up its debt management capacities swiftly and efficiently; welcomes the fact that first issuances took place at a steady pace in 2021 and were all heavily oversubscribed , revealing strong investor interest and enabling the commission to meet its funding targets; notes that in 2021 loans were made at a lower price and calls for the freed amounts to be reallocated to other eu priorities;


### 5. supports the diversified funding strategy adopted by the commission , offering a wide range of products (bonds and bills) and maturities (from three months to 30 years) through various issuance methods (syndicated transactions and auctions) and on a regular schedule; ### 5. acknowledges the funding strategy adopted by the commission , offering a wide range of products (bonds and bills) and maturities (from three months to 30 years) through various issuance methods (syndicated transactions and auctions) and on a regular schedule;


### 8. highlights , in particular , that the union could set benchmarks for sustainable investment as the largest global issuer of green bonds , as well as by diversifying its investor base and securing lower borrowing costs; ### 8. highlights , in particular , that the union can be a benchmark-setter and role model for sustainable and green investment as the largest global issuer of green bonds , as well as diversifying its investor base and securing lower borrowing costs; stresses the important role of green bonds in financing assets needed for the low-carbon transition; welcomes that the green bond framework used by the commission observes high sustainability standards; urges the commission to ensure harmonisation of standards for green bonds issuance; at the same time , underlines the importance to prevent any kind of “greenwashing ” in the context of the issuance of green bonds and that the funds raised by green bonds should be fully allocated to projects which are entirely aligned with the eu taxonomy.


### 11. points out that the features of ngeu’s borrowing will have direct consequences on repayments from the union budget for decades; insists , therefore , on optimising the debt service and ensuring a smooth debt profile in order to spread out the future burden evenly; ### 11. points out that the features of ngeu’s borrowing will have direct consequences on repayments from the union budget for decades; insists , therefore , on optimising the debt service and ensuring a smooth debt profile in order to spread out the future burden evenly; insists that funds allocated to member states should not be included in the deficit targets;


### 12. insists on the need to involve the budgetary authority at all stages of this process; recalls that under the own resources decision , the commission is required to publish a regularly updated plan of expected principal and interest payments , to be discussed with parliament and council in the regular interinstitutional meetings on the topic of ngeu; ### 12. underlines that with ngeu the eu’s borrowing and lending capacity has expanded considerably; insists on the need to involve the budgetary authority at all stages of this process; recalls that under the own resources decision , the commission is required to publish a regularly updated plan of expected principal and interest payments , to be discussed with parliament and council in the regular interinstitutional meetings on ngeu; notes that insofar annual debt limits and existing debt levels are defined solely by the commission , side-lining the budgetary authorities; calls on the commission to consider integrating in each annual budgetary cycle clear debt limits and limits on issued debt and to bring greater democratic accountability and scrutiny into the process;


### 2. welcomes the decision as a tangible and visible form of the union’s solidarity with its citizens and the regions in the affected areas in germany , belgium , netherlands , austria , luxembourg , spain and greece; ### 2. notes the commission’s proposal;


### 4. stresses the urgent need to release financial assistance through the european union solidarity fund (eusf) to ensure that support can reach the affected regions in a timely manner; regrets at the same time that the maximum amount available for that eusf mobilisation is much lower than the potential aid amount that could be covered and comes more than a year after the events took place due to the inflexible mobilisation rules of the eusf; believes that the available resources for eusf should be increased and made available in a more timely manner as part of the ambitious multiannual financial framework revision; ### 4. deplores therefore that the maximum amount available for this eusf mobilisation is much lower than the potential aid amount that could be covered and comes more than a year after the events took place due to the inflexible mobilisation rules of the eusf; believes that the available resources for eusf should be substantially increased and made available in a more timely manner as part of the ambitious multiannual financial framework revision;


### 1. welcomes the annual sustainable growth strategy 2022 pledge to continue placing a sustainable , fair and green transition at the heart of the european semester (semester) process , enshrining environmental sustainability , climate neutrality , public health and the wellbeing of citizens as guiding principles for the eu’s recovery. ### 1. welcomes the annual sustainable growth strategy 2022 overall pledge to continue placing a sustainable , fair and green transition at the heart of the european semester (semester) process , while emphasising environmental sustainability , climate neutrality , public health and the wellbeing of citizens as guiding principles for the eu’s recovery; it is imperative that economic activity becomes aligned with the dimensions of competitive sustainability , i.e. environmental sustainability , productivity , fairness , and macroeconomic stability.


### 1. notes that the european economy is recovering faster than expected from the devastating impact of the global pandemic; underlines the crucial importance that timely policy interventions have played and will continue to play in mitigating the impact of the pandemic on the european economy; ### 1. notes that the european economy is recovering faster than expected from the devastating impact of the global pandemic; underlines the crucial importance that timely policy interventions have played and will continue to play in mitigating the impact of the pandemic on the european economy and society , in particular in the field of health and education;


### 1. notes that the european economy is recovering faster than expected from the devastating impact of the global pandemic; underlines the crucial importance that timely policy interventions have played and will continue to play in mitigating the impact of the pandemic on the european economy; ### 1. notes that the european economy is recovering faster than expected from the devastating impact of the ongoing global pandemic; underlines the crucial importance that timely policy interventions have played and will continue to play in mitigating the impact of the pandemic on the european economy;


### (new) ### 1 a. stresses for the need to highlight , in a specific analysis for each member state , the measures implemented and the budgetary resources allocated to deal with the covid-19 crisis and the share of eu funding in supporting those measures;


### 2. stresses that the recovery and resilience facility (rrf) requires that the european semester be reshaped to ensure the delivery of high-quality and ambitious national recovery and resilience plans (nrrps); considers that the nrrps are an opportunity for the member states to address identified structural challenges and to make their economies more shock-resistant , sustainable and inclusive in line with the european pillar of social rights and the sustainable development goals; ### 2. stresses that the recovery and resilience facility (rrf) requires that the european semester be reshaped to ensure the delivery of high-quality and ambitious national recovery and resilience plans (nrrps); considers that the nrrps are an opportunity for the member states to contribute significantly to the economic and social recovery of the union , to address identified structural challenges and to make their economies more shock-resistant , sustainable and inclusive in line with the european pillar of social rights and the sustainable development goals; deplores , however , that nrrps fail to tackle adequately aggressive tax planning schemes;


### 2. stresses the importance of accelerating the alignment of the semester process with the eu’s long-term climate and environmental objectives as set up under the european green deal and reinforced in the fit for 55 package; welcomes the insertion , at each european semester country report , of dedicated sections on the member state’s progress in the different sdg areas , as well as the set-up of additional indicators to monitor and guide member states’ performance in view of eu green deal policy goals; ### 2. stresses the importance of accelerating the alignment of the semester process with the eu’s short and long-term climate and environmental objectives as set up under the european green deal , enshrined into legislation through the european climate law and reinforced in the fit for 55 package; welcomes the insertion , at each european semester country report , of dedicated sections on the member state’s progress in the different sdg areas , as well as the set-up of additional indicators to monitor and guide member states’ performance in view of eu green deal policy goals and the paris agreement notably ahead of the next global stocktake;


### 2. is concerned about emerging new variants , localised pandemic lockdowns , increased energy prices , inflationary pressure , supply-side disruptions and emerging labour shortages; notes that these risks could hamper economic growth prospects in the coming months and delay the transition to a more sustainable and future-proof economy; ### 2. is concerned about emerging new variants , localised pandemic lockdowns , increased energy prices , inflationary pressures , supply-side disruptions and emerging labour shortages; notes that these risks create a significant level of uncertainty and could hamper economic growth prospects in the coming months and delay the transition to a more sustainable and future-proof economy;


### 2. is concerned about emerging new variants , localised pandemic lockdowns , increased energy prices , inflationary pressure , supply-side disruptions and emerging labour shortages; notes that these risks could hamper economic growth prospects in the coming months and delay the transition to a more sustainable and future-proof economy; ### 2. is concerned about emerging new variants , localised pandemic lockdowns , increased energy prices , education lockdowns , inflationary pressure , supply-side disruptions and emerging labour shortages; notes that these risks could hamper economic growth prospects in the coming months and delay the transition to a more sustainable and future-proof economy;


### (new) ### 2 a. calls for the inclusion and highlighting within the european semester exercise of the policies , activities and recommendations referring to employment , social care , education , culture , sports and media and details of how those issues have been addressed by the national recovery and resilience plans (nrrps);


### (new) ### 2 b. calls for a better correlation of the european semester with the digital economy and society index (desi); calls on member states to take the necessary measures to reinforce their digital infrastructure , connectivity and the methods used by schools and learning centres for digital education and learning in the context of the pandemic and reiterates the need to accelerate the reforms implementing the digital transformation ensuring that all europeans can take advantage of it;


### (new) ### 2 c. calls for monitoring to include the social objectives agreed upon in the social summits and in the european pillar for social rights; regrets that , in some nrrps , due to extensive politicisation , anti-social and anti-development measures have been included among the reforms , including to keep pensions and salaries under the poverty line;


### 3. welcomes the recovery and resilience scoreboard , which is designed to monitor progress on the implementation of the rrf; calls on the commission to develop tools to ensure the robust implementation of the nrrps and measure the attainment of targets and milestones as a prerequisite for the disbursement of rrf funds; ### 3. welcomes the recovery and resilience scoreboard , which is designed to monitor progress on the implementation of the rrf; calls on the commission to develop tools to ensure robust implementation of the nrrps and measure attainment of targets and milestones as a prerequisite for the disbursement of rrf funds; points to the need to streamline reporting requirements , reduce the administrative burden and ensure conditions for proper implementation;


### 3. notes that , meeting the eu’s ambitious green deal agenda will require significant investment and that , according to the commission , the private and public investment gap to cater for the green transition are estimated at nearly eur 520 billion per year , for the next decade; further notes that whereas a substantial share of the investment will be borne by the private sector , public investment will have to increase as well; ### 3. notes that , meeting the eu’s ambitious green deal agenda will require significant investment and that , according to the commission , the private and public investment gap to cater for the green transition are estimated at nearly eur 520 billion per year , for the next decade; further notes that whereas a substantial share of the investment will be borne by the private sector , public investment and policies steering private investment to sustainability will have to increase as well;


### 3. is alerted by the fact that the speed of the recovery varies across member states and regions , with significant differences and a disparity of between 2.7 % and 14.6 % between the member states in 2021 , according to the commission’s autumn economic forecast; ### 3. is alerted by the fact that the speed of the recovery varies across member states and regions , with significant differences and a disparity of between 2.7 % and 14.6 % between the member states in 2021 , according to the commission’s autumn economic forecast; urges the european commission to support the member states in their economic recovery process; calls on member states to step up their efforts in making sure the recovery is inclusive and no one is left behind;


### 3. is alerted by the fact that the speed of the recovery varies across member states and regions , with significant differences and a disparity of between 2.7 % and 14.6 % between the member states in 2021 , according to the commission’s autumn economic forecast; ### 3. is alerted by the fact that the speed of the recovery varies across member states and regions , with significant differences and a disparity of between 2.7 % and 14.6 % in gdp growth among the member states in 2021 , according to the commission’s autumn economic forecast;


### (new) ### 3 a. calls on the commission to monitor closely member states’ progress reports on the implementation of the nrrps within the european semester exercise in order to verify to what extent the objectives of the recovery and resilience facility (rrf) have been met; calls on the european commission to be open , transparent and available for the rapid correction of errors in nrrps or revisions of nrrps , especially if the reforms included risk generating negative social and development effects;


### 4. reiterates the need for member states to have the necessary control mechanisms in place to ensure respect for the rule of law and protect the eu’s financial interests; ### 4. reiterates the need for member states to have the necessary control mechanisms in place to ensure respect for the rule of law and protect the eu’s financial interests; especially to prevent fraud , corruption and conflicts of interest;


### 4. calls therefore on the commission to extend the current semester approach to deliver on its political commitment to make it a governance tool supporting the achievement of the european green deal and the sustainable development goals; underlines the need to further integrate , without weakening the monitoring process of this extended european semester , the union’s climate , environmental , including biodiversity and social objectives in a more comprehensive manner to provide member states with analysis and indicators beyond economic indicators only , thus better reflecting the current challenges faced by member states in reducing their ecological footprint and making the process a driver of change towards a sustainable wellbeing for all in europe; ### 4. calls therefore on the commission to extend the current semester approach to deliver on its political commitment to make it a governance tool supporting the achievement of the european green deal and the sustainable development goals; underlines the need to further integrate , without weakening the monitoring process of this extended european semester , the union’s climate , environmental , including biodiversity and social objectives in a more comprehensive manner to provide member states with analysis and indicators on an equal footing to economic indicators , thus better reflecting the current challenges faced by member states in reducing their ecological footprint and making the process a driver of change towards a sustainable wellbeing for all in europe in line with the just transition;


### 4. recognises that the crisis triggered by the covid-19 pandemic has been especially severe for enterprises , mostly small and medium-sized enterprises (smes) , in tourism , hospitality and culture; recognises the notion of european solidarity underpinning the establishment of the rrf; ### 4. recognises that the crisis triggered by the covid-19 pandemic has been especially severe for enterprises , mostly start-ups , small and medium-sized enterprises (smes) , in tourism , hospitality , education and learning , agriculture and culture; recognises the notion of european solidarity underpinning the establishment of the rrf;


### 4. recognises that the crisis triggered by the covid-19 pandemic has been especially severe for enterprises , mostly small and medium-sized enterprises (smes) , in tourism , hospitality and culture; recognises the notion of european solidarity underpinning the establishment of the rrf; ### 4. recognises that the crisis triggered by the covid-19 pandemic has been especially severe for enterprises , mostly small and medium-sized enterprises (smes) , in tourism , hospitality and culture , not least those based in eu island regions; recognises the notion of european solidarity underpinning the establishment of the rrf;


### 5. recalls that public funding is key to achieving the 2030 climate objectives and addressing other social and economic challenges; considers that all options to incentivise member state investments to tackle those challenges should be on the table , specifically the revision of the stability and growth pact to promote a future-oriented economy and the extension of lending and borrowing capacities at eu level , building on nextgenerationeu; ### 5. recalls that public funding is key to achieving the 2030 climate objectives and addressing other social , educational and economic challenges; underlines its concern about the gaps in europe on how access to education and lifelong learning is being dealt with during the pandemic and underlines the need to make sure everyone continues to get access to quality education and lifelong learning , knowing that this represents a key feature in the european pillar of social rights in achieving sustainable long-term development of the european union and member states; considers that all options to incentivise member state investments to tackle those challenges should be on the table , specifically the revision of the stability and growth pact to promote a future-oriented economy and the extension of lending and borrowing capacities at eu level , building on nextgenerationeu; calls for the amounts allocated to national recovery and resilience plans to be removed from the deficit targets;


### 5. stresses that the european semester should support the union’s effort to achieve climate neutrality by 2050 at the latest; calls therefore on the commission to assess the discrepancy between the structure of the member states’ budgets and a paris-aligned scenario for each of their national budgets; thus enabling the commission to provide recommendations on member states’ climate debt and climate-friendly investment gap associated to the union’s 2030 objective and the objective of climate neutrality by 2050 at the latest; ### 5. stresses that the european semester should support the union’s effort to achieve climate neutrality by 2050 at the latest; calls therefore on the commission to build upon the upcoming recommendations of the european scientific advisory board on climate change to assess the discrepancy between the structure of the member states’ budgets and a paris-aligned scenario for each of their national budgets as well as the appropriate use of earmarked revenues to climate and social purposes under the eu ets; thus enabling the commission to provide recommendations on member states’ climate debt and climate-friendly investment gap associated to the union’s 2030 objective , the trajectory over 2040 and the objective of climate neutrality by 2050 at the latest; as established in article 10a of regulation (eu) 2021/1119 of the european parliament and of the council of 30 june 2021 establishing the framework for achieving climate neutrality and amending regulations (ec) no 401/2009 and (eu) 2018/1999 (‘european climate law’)


### 5. points out that the successful roll-out of the rrf will help to make eu economies and societies more sustainable , inclusive , resilient and better prepared for the green and digital transitions; ### 5. points out that the successful roll-out of the rrf will help to make eu economies and societies more sustainable , inclusive , resilient and better prepared for the green and digital transitions; considers that , in light of the success of the rrf and the existing needs for massive investments in the ecological and social transition , the european commission should propose a new investment plan to continue the transformation of our societies towards a greener and more inclusive model;


### 5. points out that the successful roll-out of the rrf will help to make eu economies and societies more sustainable , inclusive , resilient and better prepared for the green and digital transitions; ### 5. points out that the successful roll-out of the rrf will help to make eu economies and societies more sustainable , inclusive , resilient and better prepared for the just , green and digital transitions; as well as to foster economic , social and territorial cohesion , bring convergence and help the member states to mitigate the economic and social impact of the crisis;


### 5. points out that the successful roll-out of the rrf will help to make eu economies and societies more sustainable , inclusive , resilient and better prepared for the green and digital transitions; ### 5. points out that the successful roll-out of the rrf should help to make eu economies and societies more sustainable , inclusive , resilient and better prepared for the green and digital transitions;


### 6. believes that rrf governance , notably the assessment and approval of the nrrps by the commission and the council , provides a solid foundation for discussions on how to allow sufficient public investment under the fiscal rules; ### 6. believes that rrf governance , notably the assessment and approval of the nrrps by the commission and the council , provides a solid foundation for discussions on how to allow sufficient public investment under the fiscal rules; recalls that the european parliament , social partners , civil society , academia and local authorities have to be actively involved in the governance and supervision of the implementation of the nrrps in each member state; regrets that , in some member states , as was the case of the previous government in romania , the authorities refused the active participation of social partners and of the parliament in the drafting of the nrrps;


### 6. recalling the importance of ensuring the semester is aligned with the recovery and resilience facility and the need to swiftly address the covid 19 pandemic impact on the european economy; highlights that the rrf presents an unprecedented and unique opportunity for all member states to address key structural challenges and investment needs and transform their economies to make them sustainable , more competitive and more resilient to future shocks; stresses the importance of implementing investment policies and sustainable reforms in line with the european priorities identified in the rrf; is of the view that the rrf should serve as an inspiration for the review of the framework for macroeconomic governance , notably in identifying common structural challenges and investment needs; further stresses that this review should design an enabling framework for member states to accelerate their green transition and close their climate and environment friendly investment gap; ### 6. recalling the importance of ensuring the semester is aligned with the recovery and resilience facility and the need to swiftly address the covid 19 pandemic impact on the european economy; highlights that the rrf presents an unprecedented and unique opportunity for all member states to address key structural challenges and investment needs and transform their economies to make them sustainable , more competitive and more resilient to future shocks; stresses the need to prevent new waves of infections in the current pandemic , possible future pandemics and health threats by strengthening public health capacities and preventative measures following the one health approach; stresses the importance of implementing investment policies and sustainable reforms in line with the european priorities identified in the rrf; is of the view that the rrf and the taxonomy regulation should serve as an inspiration for the review of the framework for macroeconomic governance , notably in identifying common structural challenges and investment needs; further stresses that this review should design an enabling framework for member states to accelerate their socially inclusive , gender-equal and just green transition and close their climate and environment friendly investment gap; calls on the commission to issue ambitious country- specific recommendations to promote national tax reforms and the swift phasing-out of fossil fuel subsidies in order to support the transition to a green economy;