### (15) the member states should maintain a list of authorised e-codex access points operated within their territory , and communicate them to eu-lisa in order to enable the interaction between them in the context of the relevant procedures. the commission should maintain a similar list of authorised e-codex access points operated by the union institutions , bodies and agencies for the same reason. the entities operating the access points at national level may be public authorities , organisations representing legal practitioners or private companies. bearing in mind the decentralised nature of the e-codex system , while eu-lisa should ensure the operational management of the e-codex system , the responsibility for setting up and operating the authorised e-codex access points should lie exclusively with the entities operating the relevant access points. the entities operating the authorised e-codex access point should bear the responsibility for any damage resulting from the operation of the authorised e-codex access point. ### (15) the member states should maintain a list of authorised e-codex access points operated within their territory , and communicate them to eu-lisa in order to enable the interaction between them in the context of the relevant procedures. the commission should maintain a similar list of authorised e-codex access points operated by the union institutions , bodies and agencies for the same reason. the entities operating the access points at national level may be public authorities or organisations representing legal practitioners. bearing in mind the decentralised nature of the e-codex system , while eu-lisa should ensure the operational management of the e-codex system , the responsibility for setting up and operating the authorised e-codex access points should lie exclusively with the entities operating the relevant access points. the entities operating the authorised e-codex access point should bear the responsibility for any damage resulting from the operation of the authorised e-codex access point.


### (22) this regulation should not provide any specific legal basis for processing personal data. any processing of personal data performed in the framework of this regulation should be in accordance with the applicable data protection rules. regulation (eu) 2016/679 of the european parliament and the council35 and directive (eu) 2016/680 of the european parliament and the council36 , apply to the processing of personal data carried out by e-codex access points , operated by authorised e-codex access points which are established within the territory of the member states according to this regulation. ### (22) this regulation should not provide any specific legal basis for processing personal data. any processing of personal data performed in the framework of this regulation should be in accordance with the applicable data protection rules. regulation (eu) 2016/679 of the european parliament and the council35 , directives (eu) 2016/68036 and 2002/58/ec of the european parliament and the council36aapply to the processing of personal data carried out by e-codex access points , operated by authorised e-codex access points which are established within the territory of the member states according to this regulation.


### this regulation shall apply to the electronic transmission of information in the context of cross-border civil and criminal proceedings by means of the e-codex system in accordance with the legal acts adopted in the area of judicial cooperation listed in annex i. ### this regulation shall apply to the electronic transmission of information in the context of cross-border civil and criminal proceedings by means of the e-codex system in accordance with the legal acts adopted in the area of judicial cooperation listed in annex i.


### 2. the commission may adopt implementing acts establishing detailed technical specifications on the digital procedural standards defined in article 4(3). ### 2. the commission shall adopt implementing acts establishing detailed technical specifications on the digital procedural standards defined in article 4(3).


### informing the general public through the internet about e-codex , by means of a set of large-scale communication channels , such as websites or social media platforms; ### informing the general public about e-codex , by means of a set of large-scale communication channels , including but not limited to , websites or social media platforms;


### 2. during not more than six months after the delivery of the handover document referred to in paragraph 1 a handover/takeover process shall take place between the entity managing the e-codex system and eu-lisa. during that period , the entity managing the e-codex system shall retain full responsibility for the e-codex system and shall ensure that only corrective maintenance activities are performed in the system , excluding any other types of changes to the system. it shall , in particular , not deliver any new release of the e-codex system. ### 2. during a period of not more than six months after the delivery of the handover document referred to in paragraph 1 a handover/takeover process shall take place between the entity managing the e-codex system and eu-lisa. during that period , the entity managing the e-codex system shall retain full responsibility for the e-codex system and shall ensure that only corrective maintenance activities are performed in the system , excluding any other types of changes to the system. it shall , in particular , not deliver any new release of the e-codex system.


### 3. the commission shall monitor the handover/takeover process in order to ensure that the detailed arrangements of the process are correctly implemented by the entity managing the e-codex system and eu-lisa , on the basis of the criteria referred to in paragraph 1. ### 3. the commission shall monitor the handover/takeover process in order to ensure that the detailed arrangements of the process are correctly implemented by the entity managing the e-codex system and eu-lisa , on the basis of the criteria referred to in paragraph 1. the commission shall update the european parliament and the council by 31 july 2023 on the handover/takeover process.


### 4. the e-codex advisory group shall involve in its work the professional organisations and other stakeholders , which participated in the management of the e-codex system at the time of its handover. ### 4. the e-codex advisory group shall involve in its work the professional organisations representing those involved in the administration of justice at member state level , and other stakeholders , which participated in the management of the e-codex system at the time of its handover.


### admission of experts to the meetings , including professional organisations and other stakeholders , participating in the management of the e-codex system at the moment of its handover; ### admission of experts to the meetings , including professional organisations representing those involved in the administration of justice at member state level , and other stakeholders , participating in the management of the e-codex system at the moment of its handover;


### 3. for the first time , three years after eu-lisa takes over responsibility for the e-codex system , and every four years thereafter , the commission shall produce an overall evaluation of the e-codex system. that overall evaluation shall include an assessment of the application of this regulation and an examination of results achieved against objectives , and may propose possible future actions. at the time of the first evaluation , the commission shall also reexamine the role of the programme management board and its continuation. the commission shall transmit the evaluation report to the european parliament and the council. ### 3. for the first time , three years after eu-lisa takes over responsibility for the e-codex system , and every three years thereafter , the commission shall produce an overall evaluation of the e-codex system. that overall evaluation shall include an assessment of the application of this regulation and an examination of results achieved against objectives , and may propose possible future actions. it shall also include an assessment of the effect of the use of e-codex on equality of arms in the context of cross-border criminal proceedings. in that regard , it shall assess the access enjoyed and use of e-codex by representatives of suspects and accused persons in criminal proceedings. at the time of the first evaluation , the commission shall also reexamine the role of the programme management board and its continuation. the commission shall transmit the evaluation report to the european parliament and the council.


### 3. for the first time , three years after eu-lisa takes over responsibility for the e-codex system , and every four years thereafter , the commission shall produce an overall evaluation of the e-codex system. that overall evaluation shall include an assessment of the application of this regulation and an examination of results achieved against objectives , and may propose possible future actions. at the time of the first evaluation , the commission shall also reexamine the role of the programme management board and its continuation. the commission shall transmit the evaluation report to the european parliament and the council. ### 3. for the first time , three years after eu-lisa takes over responsibility for the e-codex system , and every four years thereafter , the commission shall produce an overall evaluation of the e-codex system. that overall evaluation shall include an assessment of the application of this regulation and an examination of results achieved against objectives , and may propose possible future actions. at the time of the first evaluation , the commission shall also reexamine the role of the programme management board and its continuation on objective grounds and shall , as a first step , propose any necessary improvements. the commission shall transmit the evaluation report to the european parliament and the council.


### 1. the board shall have a secretariat , which shall be provided by the commission. ### 1. the board shall have an independent secretariat.


### advise the commission , where requested by it , on regulatory , technical or practical aspects pertinent to the consistent application of this regulation and implementation of directive 2010/13/eu as well as all on other matters related to media services within its competence. where the commission requests advice or opinions from the board , it may indicate a time limit , taking into account the urgency of the matter; ### advise the commission on regulatory , technical or practical aspects pertinent to the consistent application of this regulation and implementation of directive 2010/13/eu as well as all on other matters related to media services within its competence;


### when requested by the commission , provide opinions on the technical and factual issues that arise with regard to article 2(5c) , article 3(2) and (3) , article 4(4) , point (c) and article 28a(7) of directive 2010/13/eu; ### provide opinions on the technical and factual issues that arise with regard to article 2(5c) , article 3(2) and (3) , article 4(4) , point (c) and article 28a(7) of directive 2010/13/eu;


### in agreement with the commission , draw up opinions with respect to: ### draw up opinions with respect to:


### upon request of the commission , draw up opinions with respect to: ### draw up opinions with respect to:


### national measures which are likely to affect the functioning of the internal market for media services , in accordance with article 20(4) of this regulation; ### national measures with cross-border implications which are likely to affect the functioning of the internal market for media services , in accordance with article 20(4) of this regulation;


### (ii) media market concentrations which are likely to affect the functioning of the internal market for media services , in accordance with article 22(1) of this regulation; ### (ii) cross-border media market concentrations which are likely to affect the functioning of the internal market for media services , in accordance with article 22(1) of this regulation;


### draw up opinions on draft national opinions or decisions assessing the impact on media pluralism and editorial independence of a notifiable media market concentration where such a concentration may affect the functioning of the internal market , in accordance with article 21(5) of this regulation; ### draw up opinions or decisions assessing the impact on media pluralism and editorial independence of a notifiable cross-border media market concentration where such a concentration may affect the functioning of the internal market , in accordance with article 21(5) of this regulation;


### (iii) the application of articles 23(1) , (2) and (3) pursuant to article 23(4) of this regulation. ### (iii) the application of articles 23(1) , (2) and (3) pursuant to article 23(4) of this regulation in consultation with the relevant experts from research companies or organisations such as joint industry committees providing audience measurement for the market.


### foster the exchange of best practices related to the deployment of audience measurement systems , in accordance with article 23(5) of this regulation. ### foster the exchange of best practices related to the deployment of audience measurement systems , and encourage compliance with existing codes of conduct , in accordance with article 23(5) of this regulation.


### 7. where the requesting authority does not consider the measures taken by the requested authority to be sufficient to address and reply to its request , it shall inform the requested authority without undue delay , explaining the reasons for its position. if the requested authority does not agree with that position , or if the requested authority’s reaction is missing , either authority may refer the matter to the board. within 14 calendar days from the receipt of that referral , the board shall issue , in agreement with the commission , an opinion on the matter , including recommended actions. the requested authority shall do its outmost to take into account the opinion of the board. ### 7. where the requesting authority does not consider the measures taken by the requested authority to be sufficient to address and reply to its request , it shall inform the requested authority without undue delay , explaining the reasons for its position. if the requested authority does not agree with that position , or if the requested authority’s reaction is missing , either authority may refer the matter to the board. within 14 calendar days from the receipt of that referral , the board shall issue an opinion on the matter , including recommended actions. the requested authority shall do its outmost to take into account the opinion of the board.


### 4. if no amicable solution has been found following mediation by the board , the requesting national authority or body or the requested national authority or body may request the board to issue an opinion on the matter. in its opinion the board shall assess whether the requested authority or body has complied with a request referred to in paragraph 1. if the board considers that the requested authority has not complied with such a request , the board shall recommend actions to comply with the request. the board shall issue its opinion , in agreement with the commission , without undue delay. ### 4. if no amicable solution has been found following mediation by the board , the requesting national authority or body or the requested national authority or body may request the board to issue an opinion on the matter. in its opinion the board shall assess whether the requested authority or body has complied with a request referred to in paragraph 1. if the board considers that the requested authority has not complied with such a request , the board shall recommend actions to comply with the request. the board shall issue its opinion , without undue delay.


### 4. the board shall foster cooperation between media service providers , standardisation bodies or any other relevant stakeholders in order to facilitate the development of technical standards related to digital signals or design of devices or user interfaces controlling or managing access to and use of audiovisual media services. ### 4. the board shall foster cooperation between media service providers , standardisation bodies or any other relevant stakeholders in order to promote the development of european-wide harmonised technical standards related to digital signals or design of devices or user interfaces controlling or managing access to and use of audiovisual media services.


### 1. the board shall coordinate measures by national regulatory authorities or bodies related to the dissemination of or access to media services provided by media service providers established outside the union that target audiences in the union where , inter alia in view of the control that may be exercised by third countries over them , such media services prejudice or present a serious and grave risk of prejudice to public security and defence. ### 1. the board shall coordinate measures by national regulatory authorities or bodies related to the dissemination of or access to media services provided by media service providers established outside the union that target audiences in the union where , inter alia in view of the control that may be exercised by third countries over them , or their contribution to the propaganda for serious violation of human rights such media services prejudice or present a serious and grave risk of prejudice to public security and defence.


### 2. the board , in agreement with the commission , may issue opinions on appropriate national measures under paragraph 1. all competent national authorities , including the national regulatory authorities or bodies , shall do their utmost to take into account the opinions of the board. ### 2. the board , in agreement with the commission , or on its own initiative , may issue opinions on appropriate national measures under paragraph 1. all competent national authorities , including the national regulatory authorities or bodies , shall do their utmost to take into account the opinions of the board.


### 1. providers of very large online platforms shall provide a functionality allowing recipients of their services to declare that: ### 1. providers of very large online platforms shall ensure that their terms and conditions and moderation processes guarantee the freedom of expression and of information , including media freedom and pluralism of news and information of the media service providers within the meaning of article 2(2). to this end , providers of very large online platforms should act in non-arbitrary and non-discriminatory manner and ensure that their content moderation processes have adequate and sufficient personnel , including specific type of linguistic and cultural diversity training to deal with media content that is already a subject to editorial responsibility in one or more member states.


### it is a media service provider within the meaning of article 2(2); ### deleted


### it is editorially independent from member states and third countries; and ### deleted


### it is subject to regulatory requirements for the exercise of editorial responsibility in one or more member states , or adheres to a co-regulatory or self-regulatory mechanism governing editorial standards , widely recognised and accepted in the relevant media sector in one or more member states. ### deleted


### 2. where a provider of very large online platform decides to suspend the provision of its online intermediation services in relation to content provided by a media service provider that submitted a declaration pursuant to paragraph 1 of this article , on the grounds that such content is incompatible with its terms and conditions , without that content contributing to a systemic risk referred to in article 26 of the regulation (eu) 2022/xxx [digital services act] , it shall take all possible measures , to the extent consistent with their obligations under union law , including regulation (eu) 2022/xxx [digital services act] , to communicate to the media service provider concerned the statement of reasons accompanying that decision , as required by article 4(1) of regulation (eu) 2019/1150 , prior to the suspension taking effect. ### 2. where a provider of very large online platform decides to remove or otherwise restrict availability of and access to content provided by a media service provider within the meaning of article 2(2) or linking to content under its editorial control , on the grounds that such content is incompatible with its terms and conditions , without that content otherwise contributing to a systemic risk referred to in article 26 of the regulation (eu) 2022/2065 it shall take all reasonable measures , to the extent consistent with their obligations under union law , including regulation (eu) 2022/2065 , to communicate to the media service provider concerned the statement of reasons accompanying that decision , as required by article17 of regulation (eu) 2019/2065 and article 4(1) of regulation (eu) 2019/1150 , if possible prior to removal or restriction taking effect.


### 2. where a provider of very large online platform decides to suspend the provision of its online intermediation services in relation to content provided by a media service provider that submitted a declaration pursuant to paragraph 1 of this article , on the grounds that such content is incompatible with its terms and conditions , without that content contributing to a systemic risk referred to in article 26 of the regulation (eu) 2022/xxx [digital services act] , it shall take all possible measures , to the extent consistent with their obligations under union law , including regulation (eu) 2022/xxx [digital services act] , to communicate to the media service provider concerned the statement of reasons accompanying that decision , as required by article 4(1) of regulation (eu) 2019/1150 , prior to the suspension taking effect. ### 2. where a provider of very large online platform decides to suspend or restrict the provision of its online intermediation services in relation to content provided by a media service provider that submitted a declaration pursuant to paragraph 1 of this article , on the grounds that such content is incompatible with its terms and conditions , without that content contributing to a systemic risk referred to in article 26 of the regulation (eu) 2022/xxx [digital services act] , it shall take all possible measures , to the extent consistent with their obligations under union law , including regulation (eu) 2022/xxx [digital services act] , to communicate to the media service provider concerned the statement of reasons accompanying that decision , as required by article 4(1) of regulation (eu) 2019/1150 , prior to the suspension taking effect.


### 3. providers of very large online platforms shall take all the necessary technical and organisational measures to ensure that complaints under article 11 of regulation (eu) 2019/1150 by media service providers that submitted a declaration pursuant to paragraph 1 of this article are processed and decided upon with priority and without undue delay. ### 3. providers of very large online platforms shall take all the necessary technical and organisational measures to ensure that complaints under article 11 of regulation (eu) 2019/1150 by media service providers that submitted a declaration pursuant to paragraph 1 of this article are processed and decided upon with priority and within 24 hours. where the provider of a very large online platform fails to address the complaint within 24 hours on grounds of force majeure or for objectively justifiable reasons , it shall , without undue delay , inform the media service provider.


### 3. providers of very large online platforms shall take all the necessary technical and organisational measures to ensure that complaints under article 11 of regulation (eu) 2019/1150 by media service providers that submitted a declaration pursuant to paragraph 1 of this article are processed and decided upon with priority and without undue delay. ### 3. providers of very large online platforms shall take all the necessary technical and organisational measures to ensure that complaints under article 11 of regulation (eu) 2019/1150 and article 86 of regulation (eu)2022/2065 by representative bodies including those representing media service providers are processed and decided upon with priority and without undue delay.


### 4. where a media service provider that submitted a declaration pursuant to paragraph 1 considers that a provider of very large online platform frequently restricts or suspends the provision of its services in relation to content provided by the media service provider without sufficient grounds , the provider of very large online platform shall engage in a meaningful and effective dialogue with the media service provider , upon its request , in good faith with a view to finding an amicable solution for terminating unjustified restrictions or suspensions and avoiding them in the future. the media service provider may notify the outcome of such exchanges to the board. ### 4. where a provider of very large online platform frequently removes or otherwise restricts availability of and access to content provided by one or more the media service provider(s) without sufficient grounds and in a manner that undermines media freedom and pluralism , the provider of very large online platform shall engage in a meaningful and effective dialogue with the media service provider(s) , upon their request , in good faith with a view to finding an amicable solution for terminating unjustified restrictions or suspensions and avoiding them in the future. if no amicable solution is found , the media service provider(s) may lodge a complaint before a certified out-of-court dispute settlement body in accordance with article 21 of regulation 2022/2065 without prejudice and in addition to its right to effective judicial protection.


### the number of instances where they imposed any restriction or suspension on the grounds that the content provided by a media service provider that submitted a declaration in accordance with paragraph 1 of this article is incompatible with their terms and conditions; and ### the number of instances where they imposed any restriction or suspension on the grounds that the content provided by a media service provider is incompatible with their terms and conditions; and


### 6. with a view to facilitating the consistent and effective implementation of this article , the commission may issue guidelines to establish the form and details of the declaration set out in paragraph 1. ### deleted


### 1. the board shall regularly organise a structured dialogue between providers of very large online platforms , representatives of media service providers and representatives of civil society to discuss experience and best practices in the application of article 17 of this regulation , to foster access to diverse offers of independent media on very large online platforms and to monitor adherence to self-regulatory initiatives aimed at protecting society from harmful content , including disinformation and foreign information manipulation and interference. ### 1. the board shall regularly organise a structured dialogue between providers of very large online platforms , representatives of media service providers and representatives of civil society to discuss experience and best practices in the application of article 17 of this regulation , to foster access to diverse offers of independent media on very large online platforms stemming from the design or functioning of their service and its related systems , including algorithmic systems , or from the use made of their services and to monitor adherence to self-regulatory initiatives aimed at identifying , analysing and assessing any systemic risks and actual or foreseeable negative effects for the exercise of fundamental rights , as well as any actual or foreseeable negative effects on civic discourse and on media freedom and pluralism of news and information.


### 1. users shall have a right to easily change the default settings of any device or user interface controlling or managing access to and use of audiovisual media services in order to customise the audiovisual media offer according to their interests or preferences in compliance with the law. this provision shall not affect national measures implementing article 7a of directive 2010/13/eu. ### 1. users shall have a right to easily change the default settings and the arrangement of applications or content of audiovisual media services of any device or user interface controlling or managing access to and use of audiovisual media services in order to customise the audiovisual media offer according to their interests or preferences in compliance with the law. to this end , the identity of the media service provider shall be clearly visible and recognisable alongside the content and services offered and users , including persons with disabilities , shall be able to easily identify the media service provider on any device or user interface controlling or managing access to and use of media services. this provision shall not affect national measures implementing article 7a of directive 2010/13/eu.


### 1. any legislative , regulatory or administrative measure taken by a member state that is liable to affect the operation of media service providers in the internal market shall be duly justified and proportionate. such measures shall be reasoned , transparent , objective and non-discriminatory. ### 1. any legislative , regulatory or administrative measure taken by a member state , including , but not limited to , to implement directive 2010/13/eu , that is liable to affect the operation of media service providers in the internal market shall be duly justified , reasoned , efficient , proportionate , transparent , objective and non-discriminatory.


### 4. the board , upon request of the commission , shall draw up an opinion where a national legislative , regulatory or administrative measure is likely to affect the functioning of the internal market for media services. following the opinion of the board , and without prejudice to its powers under the treaties , the commission may issue its own opinion on the matter. opinions by the board and , where applicable , by the commission shall be made publicly available. ### 4. the board , upon request of the commission , shall draw up an opinion where a national legislative , regulatory or administrative measure is likely to affect the functioning of the internal market for media services. opinions by the board shall be made publicly available.


### 4. the board , upon request of the commission , shall draw up an opinion where a national legislative , regulatory or administrative measure is likely to affect the functioning of the internal market for media services. following the opinion of the board , and without prejudice to its powers under the treaties , the commission may issue its own opinion on the matter. opinions by the board and , where applicable , by the commission shall be made publicly available. ### 4. the board , upon request of the commission , shall draw up an opinion where a national legislative , regulatory or administrative measure referred to in paragraph 1 is likely to affect the functioning of the internal market for media services. following the opinion of the board , and without prejudice to its powers under the treaties , the commission may issue its own opinion on the matter. opinions by the board and , where applicable , by the commission shall be made publicly available.


### 5. where a national authority or body adopts a measure that affects individually and directly a media service provider and is likely to affect the functioning of the internal market for media services , it shall communicate , at the request of the board , and where applicable , of the commission , without undue delay and by electronic means , any relevant information , including the summary of the facts , its measure , the grounds on which the national authority or body has based its measure , and , where applicable , the views of other authorities concerned. ### 5. where a national authority or body adopts a measure referred to in paragraph 1 that affects individually and directly a media service provider and is likely to affect the functioning of the internal market for media services , it shall communicate , at the request of the board , and where applicable , of the commission , without undue delay and by electronic means , any relevant information , including the summary of the facts , its measure , the grounds on which the national authority or body has based its measure , and , where applicable , the views of other authorities concerned.


### designate the national regulatory authority or body as responsible for the assessment of the impact of a notifiable concentration on media pluralism and editorial independence or ensure the involvement of the national regulatory authority or body in such assessment; ### deleted


### the assessment referred to in this paragraph shall be distinct from the competition law assessments including those provided for under merger control rules. it shall be without prejudice to article 21(4) of regulation (ec) no 139/2004 , where applicable. ### the assessment referred to in this paragraph shall be part of the competition law assessments including those provided for under merger control rules. it shall be without prejudice to article 21(4) of regulation (ec) no 139/2004 , where applicable.


### the impact of the concentration on media pluralism , including its effects on the formation of public opinion and on the diversity of media players on the market , taking into account the online environment and the parties’ interests , links or activities in other media or non-media businesses; ### the impact of the concentration on media pluralism , including a risk assessment concerning media freedom and media pluralism as referred to in article 12(g a) , and its effects on the formation of public opinion and on the diversity of media players on the market , taking into account the online environment and the parties’ interests , links or activities in other media or non-media businesses;


### the impact of the concentration on media pluralism , including its effects on the formation of public opinion and on the diversity of media players on the market , taking into account the online environment and the parties’ interests , links or activities in other media or non-media businesses; ### the impact of the concentration on media pluralism , including its effects on the formation of public opinion and on the diversity of media players and services on the market , taking into account the online environment and the parties’ interests , links or activities in other media or non-media businesses;


### the safeguards for editorial independence , including the impact of the concentration on the functioning of the editorial teams and the existence of measures by media service providers taken with a view to guaranteeing the independence of individual editorial decisions; ### the safeguards for editorial independence , including the impact of the concentration on the functioning of the editorial teams and the existence of measures by media service providers taken with a view to guaranteeing the independence of individual editorial decisions , in line with national laws and self-regulation;


### whether , in the absence of the concentration , the acquiring and acquired entity would remain economically sustainable , and whether there are any possible alternatives to ensure its economic sustainability. ### whether , in the absence of the concentration , the acquiring and acquired entity would remain economically sustainable , in the short and medium term , and whether there are any possible alternatives to ensure its economic sustainability;


### 4. the national regulatory authority or body shall consult the board in advance on any opinion or decision it aims to adopt assessing the impact on media pluralism and editorial independence of a notifiable media market concentration where such concentrations may affect the functioning of the internal market. ### 4. the national regulatory authority or body may consult the board in advance on any opinion or decision it aims to adopt assessing the cross- border impact on media pluralism and editorial independence of a notifiable media market concentration where such concentrations may affect the functioning of the internal market. the national regulatory authority or body may also consult the board if the operation in question has cross-border dimension , but if only national companies are involved.


### 5. within 14 calendar days from the receipt of the consultation referred to in paragraph 4 , the board shall draw up an opinion on the draft national opinion or decision referred to it , taking account of the elements referred to in paragraph 2 and transmit that opinion to the consulting authority and the commission. ### 5. within 14 calendar days from the receipt of the request referred to in paragraph 4 , the board shall draw up an opinion on the draft national opinion or decision referred to it , taking account of the cross-border elements referred to in paragraph 2 and transmit that opinion to the consulting authority and the commission.


### 6. the national regulatory authority or body referred to in paragraph 4 shall take utmost account of the opinion referred to in paragraph 5. where that authority does not follow the opinion , fully or partially , it shall provide the board and the commission with a reasoned justification explaining its position within 30 calendar days from the receipt of that opinion. without prejudice to its powers under the treaties , the commission may issue its own opinion on the matter. ### 6. the national regulatory authority or body referred to in paragraph 4 may take utmost account of the opinion referred to in paragraph 5. where that authority does not follow the opinion , fully or partially , it shall provide the board and the commission with an explanation of its position within 30 calendar days from the receipt of that opinion. without prejudice to its powers under the treaties , the commission may issue its own opinion on the matter.


### 1. in the absence of an assessment or a consultation pursuant to article 21 , the board , upon request of the commission , shall draw up an opinion on the impact of a media market concentration on media pluralism and editorial independence , where a media market concentration is likely to affect the functioning of the internal market for media services. the board shall base its opinion on the elements set out in article 21(2). the board may bring media market concentrations likely to affect the functioning of the internal market for media services to the attention of the commission. ### 1. in the absence of an assessment or a consultation pursuant to article 21 , the board , may draw up an opinion on the impact of a cross-border media market concentration on media pluralism and editorial independence and on the proper functioning of the internal market , where a media market concentration is likely to affect negatively the functioning of the internal market for media services. the board shall base its opinion on the elements set out in article 21(2). the board may bring cross-border media market concentrations likely to affect the functioning of the internal market for media services to the attention of the commission.


### 1. audience measurement systems and methodologies shall comply with principles of transparency , impartiality , inclusiveness , proportionality , non-discrimination and verifiability. ### 1. audience measurement systems and methodologies shall comply with principles of transparency , impartiality , inclusiveness , proportionality , non-discrimination , comparability and verifiability. to secure impartiality in measurement , audience measurement systems shall be carried out by independent third parties or self-regulatory bodies.


### 2. without prejudice to the protection of undertakings’ business secrets , providers of proprietary audience measurement systems shall provide , without undue delay and free of costs , to media service providers and advertisers , as well as to third parties authorised by media service providers and advertisers , accurate , detailed , comprehensive , intelligible and up-to-date information on the methodology used by their audience measurement systems. this provision shall not affect the union’s data protection and privacy rules. ### 2. without prejudice to the protection of undertakings’ trade secrets , providers of proprietary audience measurement systems shall provide , without undue delay and free of costs , to media service providers and advertisers , as well as to third parties authorised by media service providers and advertisers , accurate , detailed , comprehensive , intelligible and up-to-date information on the methodology used by their audience measurement systems. this provision shall not affect the union’s data protection and privacy rules. the methodology and its application shall be audited at least once a year by an independent body. the information shared by providers must be comparable , as the information on methodologies published by self-regulatory bodies that govern the agreed industry standards on audience measurement , to ensure true market transparency.


### 3. national regulatory authorities or bodies shall encourage the drawing up of codes of conduct by providers of audience measurement systems , together with media service providers , their representative organisations and any other interested parties , that are intended to contribute to compliance with the principles referred to in paragraph 1 , including by promoting independent and transparent audits. ### 3. national regulatory authorities or bodies shall encourage and support the drawing up of codes of conduct or compliance with existing codes of conduct by providers of audience measurement systems , together with media service providers , online platforms , their representative organisations and any other interested parties , that are intended to contribute to compliance with the principles referred to in paragraph 1 , including by promoting independent and transparent audits. in the drawing up of codes of conduct , special consideration should be given to small media to ensure proper measurements of their audiences.


### 4. the commission , assisted by the board , may issue guidelines on the practical application of paragraphs 1 , 2 and 3 of this article. ### 4. the commission , assisted by the board , may issue guidelines on the practical application of paragraphs 1 , 2 and 3 of this article , whilst taking into the existing national codes of conduct.


### 5. the board shall foster the exchange of best practices related to the deployment of audience measurement systems through a regular dialogue between representatives of the national regulatory authorities or bodies , representatives of providers of audience measurement systems and other interested parties. ### 5. the board shall foster the exchange of best practices related to the deployment of audience measurement systems through a regular dialogue between representatives of the national regulatory authorities or bodies , representatives of providers of audience measurement systems , media service providers and other interested parties.


### 1. public funds or any other consideration or advantage granted by public authorities to media service providers for the purposes of advertising shall be awarded according to transparent , objective , proportionate and non-discriminatory criteria and through open , proportionate and non-discriminatory procedures. this article shall not affect public procurement rules. ### 1. public funds or any other consideration or advantage granted by public authorities to media service providers and providers of online platforms , for the purposes of advertising shall be awarded according to transparent , objective , proportionate and non-discriminatory criteria and through open , proportionate and non-discriminatory procedures. this article shall not affect public procurement rules.


### 2. public authorities , including national , federal or regional governments , regulatory authorities or bodies , as well as state-owned enterprises or other state-controlled entities at the national or regional level , or local governments of territorial entities of more than 1 million inhabitants , shall make publicly available accurate , comprehensive , intelligible , detailed and yearly information about their advertising expenditure allocated to media service providers , which shall include at least the following details: ### 2. public authorities , including european union bodies institutions and agencies , national , federal or regional governments , regulatory authorities or bodies , as well as state-owned enterprises or other state-controlled entities , where the state is involved in the everyday business and has influence or control over advertising strategies at the national or regional level , or local governments of territorial entities of more than 1 million inhabitants , shall make publicly available accurate , comprehensive , intelligible , detailed and yearly information about their advertising expenditure allocated to media service providers and providers of online platforms , which shall include at least the following details:


### the legal names of media service providers from which advertising services were purchased; ### the legal names of media service providers from which advertising services were purchased or providers of online platforms;


### the total annual amount spent as well as the amounts spent per media service provider. ### the total annual amount spent as well as the amounts spent per media service provider and to providers of online platforms.


### 3. national regulatory authorities or bodies shall monitor the allocation of state advertising in media markets. in order to assess the accuracy of the information on state advertising made available pursuant to paragraph 2 , national regulatory authorities or bodies may request from the entities referred to in paragraph 2 further information , including information on the application of criteria referred to in paragraph 1. ### 3. national regulatory authorities or bodies shall monitor the allocation of state advertising in media markets and providers of online platforms. in order to assess the accuracy of the information on state advertising made available pursuant to paragraph 2 , national regulatory authorities or bodies may request from the entities referred to in paragraph 2 further information , including information on the application of criteria referred to in paragraph 1.


### 4. the allocation of state resources to media service providers for the purpose of purchasing goods or services from them other than state advertising shall be subject to the requirements set out in paragraph 1. this article shall not affect the application of the state aid rules. ### 4. the allocation of state resources to media service providers and providers of online platforms , for the purpose of purchasing goods or services from them other than state advertising shall be subject to the requirements set out in paragraph 1. this article shall not affect the application of the state aid rules.


### (3) in the digital media space , citizens and businesses access and consume media content , immediately available on their personal devices , increasingly in a cross-border setting. global online platforms act as gateways to media content , with business models that tend to disintermediate access to media services and amplify polarising content and disinformation. these platforms are also essential providers of online advertising , which has diverted financial resources from the media sector , affecting its financial sustainability , and consequently the diversity of content on offer. as media services are knowledge- and capital-intensive , they require scale to remain competitive and to thrive in the internal market. to that effect , the possibility to offer services across borders and obtain investment including from or in other member states is particularly important. ### (3) in the digital media space , citizens and businesses access and consume media content , immediately available on their personal devices , increasingly in a cross-border setting. very large online platforms and very large online search engines act as gateways to media content , with business models that tend to disintermediate access to media services and can be used in a way that strongly influences the shaping of public opinion and discourse. the way they design their services is generally optimised to benefit their often advertising-driven business models that can cause societal concerns and can amplify polarising content and disinformation. these platforms are also essential providers of online advertising , which has diverted financial resources from the media sector , affecting its financial sustainability , and consequently the diversity of content on offer. as media services are knowledge- and capital-intensive , they require scale to remain competitive and to thrive in the internal market. to that effect , the possibility to offer services across borders and obtain investment including from or in other member states is particularly important.


### (4) however , the internal market for media services is insufficiently integrated. a number of national restrictions hamper free movement within the internal market. in particular , different national rules and approaches related to media pluralism and editorial independence , insufficient cooperation between national regulatory authorities or bodies as well as opaque and unfair allocation of public and private economic resources make it difficult for media market players to operate and expand across borders and lead to an uneven level playing field across the union. the integrity of the internal market for media services may also be challenged by providers that systematically engage in disinformation , including information manipulation and interference , and abuse the internal market freedoms , including by state-controlled media service providers financed by certain third countries. ### (4) however , the internal market for media services is insufficiently integrated. a number of unjustified national restrictions hamper free movement within the internal market. different national rules and approaches related for example to media pluralism and editorial independence , insufficient cooperation between national regulatory authorities or bodies as well as opaque and unfair allocation of public and private economic resources make it difficult for media market players to operate and expand across borders and lead to an uneven level playing field across the union. the integrity of the internal market for media services may also be challenged by providers that systematically engage in disinformation , including information manipulation and interference , and abuse the internal market freedoms , including by state-controlled media service providers financed by certain third countries.


### (8) in the digitalised media market , providers of video-sharing platforms or very large online platforms may fall under the definition of media service provider. in general , such providers play a key role in the content organisation , including by automated means or algorithms , but do not exercise editorial responsibility over the content to which they provide access. however , in the increasingly convergent media environment , some providers of video-sharing platforms or very large online platforms have started to exercise editorial control over a section or sections of their services. therefore , such an entity could be qualified both as a video-sharing platform provider or a very large online platform provider and as a media service provider. ### (8) in the digitalised media market , providers of video-sharing platforms or online platforms may fall under the definition of media service provider. in general , such providers play a key role in the content organisation , including by automated means or algorithms , but do not exercise editorial responsibility over the content to which they provide access. however , in the increasingly convergent media environment , some providers of video-sharing platforms or online platforms have started to produce their own content and to exercise editorial control over a section or sections of their services. therefore , such an entity could be qualified both as a video-sharing platform provider or an online platform provider and as a media service provider.


### (9) the definition of audience measurement should cover measurement systems developed as agreed by industry standards within self-regulatory organisations , like the joint industry committees , and measurement systems developed outside such self-regulatory approaches. the latter tend to be deployed by certain online players who self-measure or provide their proprietary audience measurement systems to the market , which do not necessarily abide by the commonly agreed industry standards. given the significant impact that such audience measurement systems have on the advertising and media markets , they should be covered by this regulation. ### (9) the definition of audience measurement should cover measurement systems developed as agreed by industry standards within self-regulatory organisations , like the joint industry committees , and measurement systems developed outside such self-regulatory approaches. the latter tend to be deployed by certain online players who self-measure or provide their proprietary audience measurement systems to the market , which do not necessarily abide by the commonly agreed industry standards. given the significant impact that such audience measurement systems have on the advertising and media markets , they should be covered by this regulation , this will ensure that all providers , including providers of proprietary audience measurement systems , are transparent about their audience measurement methodologies.


### (10) state advertising should be understood broadly as covering promotional or self-promotional activities undertaken by , for or on behalf of a wide range of public authorities or entities , including governments , regulatory authorities or bodies as well as state-owned enterprises or other state-controlled entities in different sectors , at national or regional level , or local governments of territorial entities of more than 1 million inhabitants. however , the definition of state advertising should not include emergency messages by public authorities which are necessary , for example , in cases of natural or sanitary disasters , accidents or other sudden incidents that can cause harm to individuals. ### (10) state advertising should be understood broadly as covering promotional or self-promotional activities undertaken by , for or on behalf of a wide range of public authorities or entities , including governments , regulatory authorities or bodies as well as state-owned enterprises or other state-controlled entities in different sectors , at national or regional level , or local governments of territorial entities of more than 1 million inhabitants in which the state is involved in the everyday business and has influence or control over advertising strategies. however , the definition of state advertising should not include emergency messages by public authorities which are necessary , for example , in cases of natural or sanitary disasters , accidents or other sudden incidents that can cause harm to individuals.


### (18) public service media established by the member states play a particular role in the internal media market , by ensuring that citizens and businesses have access to quality information and impartial media coverage , as part of their mission. however , public service media can be particularly exposed to the risk of interference , given their institutional proximity to the state and the public funding they receive. this risk may be exacerbated by uneven safeguards related to independent governance and balanced coverage by public service media across the union. this situation may lead to biased or partial media coverage , distort competition in the internal media market and negatively affect access to independent and impartial media services. it is thus necessary , building on the international standards developed by the council of europe in this regard , to put in place legal safeguards for the independent functioning of public service media across the union. it is also necessary to guarantee that , without prejudice to the application of the union’s state aid rules , public service media providers benefit from sufficient and stable funding to fulfil their mission that enables predictability in their planning. preferably , such funding should be decided and appropriated on a multi-year basis , in line with the public service mission of public service media providers , to avoid potential for undue influence from yearly budget negotiations. the requirements laid down in this regulation do not affect the competence of member states to provide for the funding of public service media as enshrined in protocol 29 on the system of public broadcasting in the member states , annexed to the treaty on european union and to the treaty on the functioning of the european union. ### (18) public service media established by the member states play a particular role in the internal media market , by ensuring that citizens and businesses have access universal and varied offers including to quality information as well as balanced and impartial media coverage , as part of their remit. however , public service media can be particularly exposed to the risk of interference , given their institutional proximity to the state and the public funding they receive. this risk may be exacerbated by uneven safeguards related to independent governance and balanced coverage by public service media across the union. it is thus necessary , building on the international standards developed by the council of europe in this regard , that member states put in place legal safeguards for the independent functioning of public service media across the union. it is also necessary to guarantee that , without prejudice to the application of the union’s state aid rules , public service media providers benefit from sufficient and stable funding to fulfil their remit that enables predictability in their planning. preferably , such funding should be decided and appropriated on a multi-year basis , in line with the public service remit of public service media providers , to avoid potential for undue influence from yearly budget negotiations. the transparency requirements under this regulation for the appointment procedures for public service media’s heads of management and members of governing bodies do not require the disclosure of the candidates’ identity. the requirements laid down in this regulation do not affect the application of the state aid rules as applied on a case-by-case basis or the competence of member states to define a broad and dynamic remit , organise and provide for the funding of public service media as enshrined in protocol 29 on the system of public broadcasting in the member states , annexed to the treaty on european union and to the treaty on the functioning of the european union.


### (18) public service media established by the member states play a particular role in the internal media market , by ensuring that citizens and businesses have access to quality information and impartial media coverage , as part of their mission. however , public service media can be particularly exposed to the risk of interference , given their institutional proximity to the state and the public funding they receive. this risk may be exacerbated by uneven safeguards related to independent governance and balanced coverage by public service media across the union. this situation may lead to biased or partial media coverage , distort competition in the internal media market and negatively affect access to independent and impartial media services. it is thus necessary , building on the international standards developed by the council of europe in this regard , to put in place legal safeguards for the independent functioning of public service media across the union. it is also necessary to guarantee that , without prejudice to the application of the union’s state aid rules , public service media providers benefit from sufficient and stable funding to fulfil their mission that enables predictability in their planning. preferably , such funding should be decided and appropriated on a multi-year basis , in line with the public service mission of public service media providers , to avoid potential for undue influence from yearly budget negotiations. the requirements laid down in this regulation do not affect the competence of member states to provide for the funding of public service media as enshrined in protocol 29 on the system of public broadcasting in the member states , annexed to the treaty on european union and to the treaty on the functioning of the european union. ### (18) public service media established by the member states play a particular role in the internal media market , by ensuring that citizens and businesses have universal access to quality information , services and impartial media coverage , as part of their role. however , public service media can be particularly exposed to the risk of interference , given their institutional proximity to the state and the public funding they receive. this risk may be exacerbated by uneven safeguards related to independent governance and balanced coverage by public service media across the union. this situation may lead to biased or partial media coverage , distort competition in the internal media market and negatively affect access to independent and impartial media services. it is thus necessary , building on the international standards developed by the council of europe in this regard , that member states put in place legal safeguards for the independent functioning of public service media across the union. it is also necessary to guarantee that , without prejudice to the application of the union’s state aid rules , public service media providers benefit from sufficient and stable funding to fulfil their role that enables predictability in their planning. preferably , such funding should be decided and appropriated on a multi-year basis , in line with the public service role of public service media providers , to avoid potential for undue influence from yearly budget negotiations. the requirements laid down in this regulation do not affect the application of the state aid rules as applied on a case-by-case basis or the competence of member states to provide for the funding of public service media as enshrined in protocol 29 on the system of public broadcasting in the member states , annexed to the treaty on european union and to the treaty on the functioning of the european union.


### (20) media integrity also requires a proactive approach to promote editorial independence by news media companies , in particular through internal safeguards. media service providers should adopt proportionate measures to guarantee , once the overall editorial line has been agreed between their owners and editors , the freedom of the editors to take individual decisions in the course of their professional activity. the objective to shield editors from undue interference in their decisions taken on specific pieces of content as part of their everyday work contributes to ensuring a level playing field in the internal market for media services and the quality of such services. that objective is also in conformity with the fundamental right to receive and impart information under article 11 of the charter. in view of these considerations , media service providers should also ensure transparency of actual or potential conflicts of interest to their service recipients. ### (20) media integrity also requires a proactive approach to promote editorial independence by news media companies , in particular through internal safeguards. media service providers should adopt proportionate measures to guarantee , in line with the media service providers’ identity and the overall editorial line agreed between owners and editors , the freedom of the editors to take individual independent decisions in the course of their professional activity. the objective to shield editors from undue interference in their decisions taken on specific pieces of content as part of their everyday work contributes to ensuring a level playing field in the internal market for media services and the quality of such services. that objective is also in conformity with the fundamental right to receive and impart information under article 11 of the charter. in view of these considerations , media service providers should also ensure transparency of actual or potential conflicts of interest to their service recipients. this is without prejudice to existing legal and self-regulatory frameworks of member states that govern liability rules applicable to the editorial content of media services , where the principal purpose of such decisions is to shield the media service provider or the editors from liability risks.


### (20) media integrity also requires a proactive approach to promote editorial independence by news media companies , in particular through internal safeguards. media service providers should adopt proportionate measures to guarantee , once the overall editorial line has been agreed between their owners and editors , the freedom of the editors to take individual decisions in the course of their professional activity. the objective to shield editors from undue interference in their decisions taken on specific pieces of content as part of their everyday work contributes to ensuring a level playing field in the internal market for media services and the quality of such services. that objective is also in conformity with the fundamental right to receive and impart information under article 11 of the charter. in view of these considerations , media service providers should also ensure transparency of actual or potential conflicts of interest to their service recipients. ### (20) media integrity also requires a proactive approach to promote editorial independence by news media companies , in particular through internal safeguards. media service providers should adopt proportionate measures to guarantee , in line with the media service providers’ identity and overall editorial line , the freedom of the editors to take independent decisions in the course of their professional activity. the objective to shield editors from undue interference is also in conformity with the fundamental right to receive and impart information under article 11 of the charter. in view of these considerations , media service providers should also ensure transparency of actual or potential conflicts of interest to their service recipients. this is without prejudice to existing legal and self-regulatory frameworks of member states that govern liability rules applicable to the editorial content of media services. therefore , editorial independence safeguards should not prevent or otherwise restrict managerial decisions where the principal purpose of such decisions is to shield the media service provider or the editors from liability risks.


### (21) to mitigate regulatory burdens , micro enterprises within the meaning of article 3 of directive 2013/34/eu of the european parliament and of the council50 should be exempted from the requirements related to information and internal safeguards with a view to guaranteeing the independence of individual editorial decisions. moreover , media service providers should be free to tailor the internal safeguards to their needs , in particular if they are small and medium-sized enterprises within the meaning of that article. the recommendation that accompanies this regulation51 provides a catalogue of voluntary internal safeguards that can be adopted within media companies in this regard. the present regulation should not be construed to the effect of depriving the owners of private media service providers of their prerogative to set strategic or general goals and to foster the growth and financial viability of their undertakings. in this respect , this regulation recognises that the goal of fostering editorial independence needs to be reconciled with the legitimate rights and interests of private media owners. ### (21) media service providers should be free to tailor the internal safeguards to their needs , in particular if they are small and medium-sized enterprises within the meaning of that article. the recommendation that accompanies this regulation51 provides a catalogue of voluntary internal safeguards that can be adopted within media companies in this regard. the present regulation should not be construed to the effect of depriving the owners of private media service providers of their prerogative to set strategic or general goals and to foster the growth and financial viability of their undertakings. in this respect , this regulation recognises that the goal of fostering editorial independence needs to be reconciled with the legitimate rights and interests of private media owners.


### (23) the board should bring together senior representatives of the national regulatory authorities or bodies referred to in article 30 of directive 2010/13/eu , appointed by such authorities or bodies. in cases where member states have several relevant regulatory authorities or bodies , including at regional level , a joint representative should be chosen through appropriate procedures and the voting right should remain limited to one representative per member state. this should not affect the possibility for the other national regulatory authorities or bodies to participate , as appropriate , in the meetings of the board. the board should also have the possibility to invite to attend its meetings , in agreement with the commission , experts and observers , including in particular regulatory authorities or bodies from candidate countries , potential candidate countries , eea countries , or ad hoc delegates from other competent national authorities. due to the sensitivity of the media sector and following the practice of erga decisions in accordance with its rules of procedure , the board should adopt its decisions on the basis of a two-thirds majority of the votes. ### (23) the board should bring together senior representatives of the national regulatory authorities or bodies referred to in article 30 of directive 2010/13/eu , appointed by such authorities or bodies. in cases where member states have several relevant regulatory authorities or bodies , including at regional level , a joint representative should be chosen through appropriate procedures and the voting right should remain limited to one representative per member state. this should not affect the possibility for the other national regulatory authorities or bodies to participate , as appropriate , in the meetings of the board. the board should also have the possibility to invite to attend its meetings experts and observers , including in particular regulatory authorities or bodies from candidate countries , potential candidate countries , eea countries , or ad hoc delegates from other competent national authorities. due to the sensitivity of the media sector and following the practice of erga decisions in accordance with its rules of procedure , the board should adopt its decisions on the basis of a two-thirds majority of the votes.


### (24) without prejudice to the powers granted to the commission by the treaties , it is essential that the commission and the board work and cooperate closely. in particular , the board should actively support the commission in its tasks of ensuring the consistent application of this regulation and of the national rules implementing directive 2010/13/eu. for that purpose , the board should in particular advise and assist the commission on regulatory , technical or practical aspects pertinent to the application of union law , promote cooperation and the effective exchange of information , experience and best practices and draw up opinions in agreement with the commission or upon its request in the cases envisaged by this regulation. in order to effectively fulfil its tasks , the board should be able to rely on the expertise and human resources of a secretariat provided by the commission. the commission secretariat should provide administrative and organisational support to the board , and help the board in carrying out its tasks. ### (24) without prejudice to the powers granted to the commission by the treaties , it is essential that the commission and the board cooperate closely. in particular , the board should support the commission in its tasks of ensuring the consistent application of this regulation and of the national rules implementing directive 2010/13/eu. for that purpose , the board should in particular advise and assist the commission on regulatory , technical or practical aspects pertinent to the application of union law , promote cooperation and the effective exchange of information , experience and best practices and may draw up opinions in the cases envisaged by this regulation. in order to effectively fulfil its tasks , the board should be able to rely on the expertise and human resources of an independent secretariat. the secretariat should provide administrative and organisational support to the board , and help the board in carrying out its tasks.


### (28) ensuring a consistent regulatory practice regarding this regulation and directive 2010/13/eu is essential. for this purpose , and to contribute to ensuring a convergent implementation of eu media law , the commission may issue guidelines on matters covered by both this regulation and directive 2010/13/eu when needed. when deciding to issue guidelines , the commission should consider in particular regulatory issues affecting a significant number of member states or those with a cross-border element. this is the case in particular for national measures taken under article 7a of directive 2010/13/eu on the appropriate prominence of audiovisual media services of general interest. in view of the abundance of information and the increasing use of digital means to access the media , it is important to ensure prominence for content of general interest , in order to help achieving a level playing field in the internal market and compliance with the fundamental right to receive information under article 11 of the charter of fundamental rights of the union. given the possible impact of the national measures taken under article 7a on the functioning of the internal media market , guidelines by the commission would be important to achieve legal certainty in this field. it would also be useful to provide guidance on national measures taken under article 5(2) of directive 2010/13/eu with a view to ensuring the public availability of accessible , accurate and up-to-date information related to media ownership. in the process of preparing its guidelines , the commission should be assisted by the board. the board should in particular share with the commission its regulatory , technical and practical expertise regarding the areas and topics covered by the respective guidelines. ### (28) ensuring an effective application and consistent regulatory practice regarding this regulation and directive 2010/13/eu is essential. for this purpose , and to contribute to ensuring a convergent implementation of eu media law , the commission may issue guidelines on matters covered by both this regulation and directive 2010/13/eu when needed. when deciding to issue guidelines , the commission should consider in particular regulatory issues affecting a significant number of member states or those with a cross-border element. this is the case in particular for national measures taken under article 7a of directive 2010/13/eu on the appropriate prominence of audiovisual media services of general interest. in view of the abundance of information and the increasing use of digital means to access the media , it is important to ensure prominence for content of general interest , in order to help achieving a level playing field in the internal market and compliance with the fundamental right to receive information under article 11 of the charter of fundamental rights of the union. given the possible impact of the national measures taken under article 7a on the functioning of the internal media market , guidelines by the commission would be important to achieve legal certainty and consistent implementation in this field. such guidelines should respect the member states’ competence in cultural matters with a view to promoting media pluralism , entertainment , information and education and be principle-based. it would also be useful to provide guidance on national measures taken under article 5(2) of directive 2010/13/eu with a view to ensuring the public availability of accessible , accurate and up-to-date information related to media ownership. in the process of preparing its guidelines , the commission should be assisted by the board. the board should in particular share with the commission its regulatory , technical and practical expertise regarding the areas and topics covered by the respective guidelines.


### (30) regulatory authorities or bodies referred to in article 30 of directive 2010/13/eu have specific practical expertise that allows them to effectively balance the interests of the providers and recipients of media services while ensuring the respect for the freedom of expression. this is key in particular when it comes to protecting the internal market from activities of media service providers established outside the union that target audiences in the union where , inter alia in view of the control that may be exercised by third countries over them , they may prejudice or pose risks of prejudice to public security and defence. in this regard , the coordination between national regulatory authorities or bodies to face together possible public security and defence threats stemming from such media services needs to be strengthened and given a legal framework to ensure the effectiveness and possible coordination of the national measures adopted in line with union media legislation. in order to ensure that media services suspended in certain member states under article 3(3) and 3(5) of directive 2010/13/eu do not continue to be provided via satellite or other means in those member states , a mechanism of accelerated mutual cooperation and assistance should also be available to guarantee the ‘effet utile’ of the relevant national measures , in compliance with union law. additionally , it is necessary to coordinate the national measures that may be adopted to counter public security and defence threats by media services established outside of the union and targeting audiences in the union , including the possibility for the board , in agreement with the commission , to issue opinions on such measures , as appropriate. in this regard , risks to public security and defence need to be assessed with a view to all relevant factual and legal elements , at national and european level. this is without prejudice to the competence of the union under article 215 of the treaty on the functioning of the european union. ### (30) regulatory authorities or bodies referred to in article 30 of directive 2010/13/eu have specific practical expertise that allows them to effectively balance the interests of the providers and recipients of media services while ensuring the respect for the freedom of expression. this is key in particular when it comes to protecting the internal market from activities of media service providers established outside the union that target audiences in the union where , inter alia in view of the control that may be exercised by third countries over them , they may prejudice or pose risks of prejudice to public security and defence. in this regard , the coordination between national regulatory authorities or bodies to face together possible public security and defence threats stemming from such media services needs to be strengthened and given a legal framework to ensure the effectiveness and possible coordination of the national measures adopted in line with union media legislation. in order to ensure that media services suspended in certain member states under article 3(3) and 3(5) of directive 2010/13/eu do not continue to be provided via satellite or other means in those member states , a mechanism of accelerated mutual cooperation and assistance should also be available to guarantee the ‘effet utile’ of the relevant national measures , in compliance with union law. additionally , it is necessary to coordinate the national measures that may be adopted to counter public security and defence threats by media services established outside of the union and targeting audiences in the union , including the possibility for the board to issue opinions on such measures , as appropriate. in this regard , risks to public security and defence need to be assessed with a view to all relevant factual and legal elements , at national and european level. this is without prejudice to the competence of the union under article 215 of the treaty on the functioning of the european union.


### (31) very large online platforms act for many users as a gateway for access to media services. media service providers who exercise editorial responsibility over their content play an important role in the distribution of information and in the exercise of freedom of information online. when exercising such editorial responsibility , they are expected to act diligently and provide information that is trustworthy and respectful of fundamental rights , in line with the regulatory or self-regulatory requirements they are subject to in the member states. therefore , also in view of users’ freedom of information , where providers of very large online platforms consider that content provided by such media service providers is incompatible with their terms and conditions , while it is not contributing to a systemic risk referred to in article 26 of regulation (eu) 2022/xxx [the digital services act] , they should duly consider freedom and pluralism of media , in accordance with regulation (eu) 2022/xxx [the digital services act] and provide , as early as possible , the necessary explanations to media service providers as their business users in the statement of reasons under regulation (eu) 2019/1150 of the european parliament and of the council54 . to minimise the impact of any restriction to that content on users’ freedom of information , very large online platforms should endeavour to submit the statement of reasons prior to the restriction taking effect without prejudice to their obligations under regulation (eu) 2022/xxx [the digital services act]. in particular , this regulation should not prevent a provider of a very large online platform to take expeditious measures either against illegal content disseminated through its service , or in order to mitigate systemic risks posed by dissemination of certain content through its service , in compliance with union law , in particular pursuant to regulation (eu) 2022/xxx [the digital services act]. ### (31) very large online platforms act for many users as a gateway for access to media services. media service providers who exercise editorial responsibility over their content play an important role in the distribution of information and in the exercise of freedom of information online. when exercising such editorial responsibility , they are expected to act diligently and provide information that is trustworthy and respectful of fundamental rights , in line with the regulatory or self-regulatory requirements they are subject to in the member states. therefore , also in view of users’ freedom of information , where providers of very large online platforms consider that content provided by such media service providers is incompatible with their terms and conditions , while it is not contributing to a systemic risk referred to in article 26 of regulation (eu) 2022/2065 , they should duly consider freedom and pluralism of media , in accordance with regulation (eu) 2022/2065 and provide , as early as possible , the necessary explanations to media service providers as their business users in the statement of reasons under regulation (eu) 2019/1150 of the european parliament and of the council and article17 of regulation (eu) 2022/2065. to minimise the impact of any restriction to that content on users’ freedom of information , very large online platforms , if possible , should endeavour to submit the statement of reasons prior to the removal or restriction taking effect without prejudice to their obligations under regulation (eu) 2022/2065. in particular , this regulation should not prevent a provider of a very large online platform to take expeditious measures either against illegal content disseminated through its service , or in order to mitigate systemic risks posed by dissemination of certain content through its service , in compliance with union law , in particular pursuant to regulation (eu) 2022/2065 .


### (33) to this end , providers of very large online platforms should provide a functionality on their online interface to enable media service providers to declare that they meet certain requirements , while at the same time retaining the possibility not to accept such self-declaration where they consider that these conditions are not met. providers of very large online platforms may rely on information regarding adherence to these requirements , such as the machine-readable standard of the journalism trust initiative or other relevant codes of conduct. guidelines by the commission may be useful to facilitate an effective implementation of such functionality , including on modalities of involvement of relevant civil society organisations in the review of the declarations , on consultation of the regulator of the country of establishment , where relevant , and address any potential abuse of the functionality. ### (33) to this end , providers of very large online platforms should ensure that their terms and conditions and moderation processes guarantee the freedom of expression and of information , including media freedom and pluralism of news and information of the media service providers within the meaning of article 2(2). to this end , providers of very large online platforms should act in non-arbitrary and non-discriminatory manner and ensure that their content moderation processes have adequate and sufficient personnel , including specific type of linguistic and cultural diversity training to deal with media content that is already a subject to editorial responsibility in one or more member states.


### (36) building on the useful role played by erga in monitoring compliance by the signatories of eu code of practice on disinformation , the board should , at least on a yearly basis , organise a structured dialogue between providers of very large online platforms , representatives of media service providers and representatives of civil society to foster access to diverse offers of independent media on very large online platforms , discuss experience and best practices related to the application of the relevant provisions of this regulation and to monitor adherence to self-regulatory initiatives aimed at protecting society from harmful content , including those aimed at countering disinformation. the commission may , where relevant , examine the reports on the results of such structured dialogues when assessing systemic and emerging issues across the union under regulation (eu) 2022/xxx [digital services act] and may ask the board to support it to this effect. ### (36) building on the useful role played by erga in monitoring compliance by the signatories of eu code of practice on disinformation , the board should , at least on a yearly basis , organise a structured dialogue between providers of very large online platforms , representatives of media service providers and representatives of civil society to foster access to diverse offers of independent media on very large online platforms , discuss experience and best practices related to the application of the relevant provisions of this regulation and to monitor adherence to self-regulatory initiatives aimed at protecting society from harmful content , including those aimed at countering disinformation. the commission may , where relevant , examine the reports on the results of such structured dialogues when assessing systemic and emerging issues across the union under regulation (eu) 2022/2065.


### (37) recipients of audiovisual media services should be able to effectively choose the audiovisual content they want to watch according to their preferences. their freedom in this area may however be constrained by commercial practices in the media sector , namely agreements for content prioritisation between manufacturers of devices or providers of user interfaces controlling or managing access to and use of audiovisual media services , such as connected televisions , and media service providers. prioritisation can be implemented , for example , on the home screen of a device , through hardware or software shortcuts , applications and search areas , which have implications on the recipients’ viewing behaviour , who may be unduly incentivised to choose certain audiovisual media offers over others. service recipients should have the possibility to change , in a simple and user-friendly manner , the default settings of a device or user interface controlling and managing access to , and use of , audiovisual media services , without prejudice to measures to ensure the appropriate prominence of audiovisual media services of general interest implementing article 7a of directive 2010/13/ec , taken in the pursuit of legitimate public policy considerations. ### (37) recipients of audiovisual media services should be able to effectively choose the audiovisual content they want to watch according to their preferences. their freedom in this area may however be constrained by commercial practices in the media sector , namely agreements for content prioritisation between manufacturers of devices or providers of user interfaces controlling or managing access to and use of audiovisual media services , such as connected televisions , and media service providers. prioritisation can be implemented , for example , on the home screen of a device , through hardware or software shortcuts , applications and search areas , which have implications on the recipients’ viewing behaviour , who may be unduly incentivised to choose certain audiovisual media offers over others. service recipients should have the possibility to change , in a simple and user-friendly manner , arrangement of applications or content of audiovisual media services and the default settings of a device or user interface controlling and managing access to , and use of , audiovisual media services , without prejudice to measures to ensure the appropriate prominence of audiovisual media services of general interest implementing article 7a of directive 2010/13/ec , taken in the pursuit of legitimate public policy considerations.


### (38) different legislative , regulatory or administrative measures can negatively affect the operation of media service providers in the internal market. they include , for example , rules to limit the ownership of media companies by other companies active in the media sector or non-media related sectors; they also include decisions related to licensing , authorisation or prior notification for media service providers. in order to mitigate their potential negative impact on the functioning of the internal market for media services and enhance legal certainty , it is important that such measures comply with the principles of objective justification , transparency , non-discrimination and proportionality. ### (38) disproportionate or distorted implementation at national level of the minimum requirements foreseen in the audiovisual media services directive and different legislative , regulatory or administrative measures can negatively affect the operation of media service providers and can create new barriers in the internal market. they include , for example , rules to limit the ownership of media companies by other companies active in the media sector or non-media related sectors; they also include decisions related to licensing , authorisation or prior notification for media service providers. in order to mitigate their potential negative impact on the functioning of the internal market for media services and enhance legal certainty , it is important that such measures comply with the principles of objective justification , efficiency , transparency , non-discrimination and proportionality.


### (39) it is also key that the board is empowered to issue an opinion , on the commission’s request , where national measures are likely to affect the functioning of the internal market for media services. this is , for example , the case when a national administrative measure is addressed to a media service provider providing its services towards more than one member state , or when the concerned media service provider has a significant influence on the formation of public opinion in that member state. ### (39) it is also key that the board is empowered to issue opinions , where national measures are likely to have cross-border affect on the functioning of the internal market for media services. this is , for example , the case when a national administrative measure is addressed to a media service provider providing its services towards more than one member state , or when the concerned media service provider has a significant influence on the formation of public opinion in that member state.


### (41) national regulatory authorities or bodies , who have specific expertise in the area of media pluralism , should be involved in the assessment of the impact of media market concentrations on media pluralism and editorial independence where they are not the designated authorities or bodies themselves. in order to foster legal certainty and ensure that the rules and procedures are genuinely geared at protecting media pluralism and editorial independence , it is essential that objective , non-discriminatory and proportionate criteria for notifying and assessing the impact of media market concentrations on media pluralism and editorial independence are set out in advance. ### (41) national regulatory authorities or bodies , who have specific expertise in the area of media pluralism , may be involved in the assessment of the impact of media market concentrations on media pluralism and editorial independence where they are not the designated authorities or bodies themselves. in order to foster legal certainty and ensure that the rules and procedures are genuinely geared at protecting media pluralism and editorial independence , it is essential that objective , non-discriminatory and proportionate criteria for notifying and assessing the impact of media market concentrations on media pluralism and editorial independence are set out in advance , where possible.


### (43) the board should be empowered to provide opinions on draft decisions or opinions by the designated or involved national regulatory authorities or bodies , where the notifiable concentrations may affect the functioning of the internal media market. this would be the case , for example , where such concentrations involve at least one undertaking established in another member state or operating in more than one member state or result in media service providers having a significant influence on formation of public opinion in a given media market. moreover , where the concentration has not been assessed for its impact on media pluralism and editorial independence by the relevant national authorities or bodies , or where the national regulatory authorities or bodies have not consulted the board regarding a given media market concentration , but that media market concentration is considered likely to affect the functioning of the internal market for media services , the board should be able to provide an opinion , upon request of the commission. in any event , the commission retains the possibility to issue its own opinions following the opinions drawn up by the board. ### (43) the board can provide opinions on draft decisions or opinions by the designated or involved national regulatory authorities or bodies , where the notifiable cross-border concentrations may affect the functioning of the internal media market. this would be the case , for example , where such concentrations involve at least one undertaking established in another member state or operating in more than one member state or result in media service providers having a significant influence on formation of public opinion in a given media market. moreover , where the concentration has not been assessed for its impact on media pluralism and editorial independence by the relevant national authorities or bodies , or where the national regulatory authorities or bodies have not consulted the board regarding a given media market concentration , but that media market concentration is considered likely to affect the functioning of the internal market for media services , the board should be able to provide an opinion ,. in any event , the commission retains the possibility to issue its own opinions following the opinions drawn up by the board.