### 3. where , on the basis of the programme of operation , the eba is of the opinion that the e-money tokens do not meet the criteria referred to in article 39(1) , as specified in accordance with article 39(6) , the eba shall prepare a draft decision to that effect and notify that draft decision to the issuer or applicant issuer and the competent authority of the issuer or applicant issuer’s home member state. ### 3. where , on the basis of the programme of operation , the eba after consultation of the ecb and the relevant central banks of member states whose currency is not the euro is of the opinion that the e-money tokens do not meet the criteria referred to in article 39(1) , as specified in accordance with article 39(6) , the eba shall prepare a draft decision to that effect and notify that draft decision to the issuer or applicant issuer and the competent authority of the issuer or applicant issuer’s home member state.


### 4. the eba shall take its final decision on whether an e-money token is a significant e-money token within three months after the notification referred to in paragraph 1 and immediately notify the issuers or applicant issuer of such e-money tokens and their competent authorities thereof. the decision shall be immediately notified to the issuer or applicant issuer of e-money tokens and to the competent authority of its home member state. ### 4. 4. the eba , after consultation of the ecb and the relevant central banks of member states whose currency is not the euro , shall take its final decision on whether an e-money token is a significant e-money token within three months after the notification referred to in paragraph 1 and immediately notify the issuers or applicant issuer of such e-money tokens and their competent authorities thereof.


### 1. crypto-asset services shall only be provided by legal persons that have a registered office in a member state of the union and that have been authorised as crypto-asset service providers in accordance with article 55 ### 1. crypto-asset services shall only be provided by legal persons that have a registered office in a member state of the union and that have an authorisation which allows them to provide those services in accordance with article 53a.


### 1. crypto-asset services shall only be provided by legal persons that have a registered office in a member state of the union and that have been authorised as crypto-asset service providers in accordance with article 55 ### 1. crypto-asset services shall only be provided by crypto asset service providers as defined in art 3 par 1 point 8. these providers will have a registered office in a member state of the union and does not have a parent undertaking , or a subsidiary , that is established in


### crypto-asset service providers shall , at all times , meet the conditions for their authorisation. ### crypto-asset service providers shall , at all times , meet the conditions for their authorisation. such authorisation shall be granted by the competent authority of the home member state ,.


### 2. competent authorities that grant an authorisation under article 55 shall ensure that such authorisation specifies the crypto-asset services that crypto-asset service providers are authorised to provide. ### deleted


### crypto-asset service providers that provide crypto-asset services on a cross-border basis shall not be required to have a physical presence in the territory of a host member state. ### deleted


### 4. crypto-asset service providers seeking to add crypto-asset services to their authorisation shall request the competent authorities that granted the authorisation for an extension of their authorisation by complementing and updating the information referred to in article 54. the request for extension shall be processed in accordance with article 55. ### 4. crypto-asset service providers seeking to add crypto-asset services to their authorisation shall request the competent authorities that granted the authorisation for an extension of their authorisation by complementing and updating the information referred to in article 54.


### 1. legal persons that intend to provide crypto-asset services shall apply for authorisation as a crypto-asset service provider to the competent authority of the member state where they have their registered office. ### deleted


### 1. legal persons that intend to provide crypto-asset services shall apply for authorisation as a crypto-asset service provider to the competent authority of the member state where they have their registered office. ### 1. in order to be able to provide crypto asset services , crypto-asset service providers as defined in art 3 par 1 point 8 will apply for authorisation to the competent authority of the member state where they have their registered office.


### the name , including the legal name and any other commercial name to be used , the legal entity identifier of the applicant crypto-asset service provider , the website operated by that provider , and its physical address; ### deleted


### the name , including the legal name and any other commercial name to be used , the legal entity identifier of the applicant crypto-asset service provider , the website operated by that provider , and its physical address; ### the name , including the legal name and any other commercial name to be used , the legal entity identifier of the applicant crypto-asset service provider , the website operated by that provider , a contact email address , a contact telephone number and its physical address;


### the legal status of the applicant crypto-asset service provider; ### deleted


### the articles of association of the applicant crypto-asset service provider; ### deleted


### a programme of operations setting out the types of crypto-asset services that the applicant crypto-asset service provider wishes to provide , including where and how these services are to be marketed; ### deleted


### a description of the applicant crypto-asset service provider’s governance arrangements; ### deleted


### for all natural persons involved in the management body of the applicant crypto-asset service provider , and for all natural persons who , directly or indirectly , hold 20% or more of the share capital or voting rights , proof of the absence of a criminal record in respect of infringements of national rules in the fields of commercial law , insolvency law , financial services law , anti-money laundering law , counter-terrorism legislation , and professional liability obligations; ### deleted


### for all natural persons involved in the management body of the applicant crypto-asset service provider , and for all natural persons who , directly or indirectly , hold 20% or more of the share capital or voting rights , proof of the absence of a criminal record in respect of infringements of national rules in the fields of commercial law , insolvency law , financial services law , anti-money laundering law , counter-terrorism legislation , and professional liability obligations; ### for all natural persons involved in the management body of the applicant crypto-asset service provider , and for all natural persons who , directly or indirectly , hold 5% or more of the share capital or voting rights , proof of the absence of a criminal record in respect of infringements of national rules in the fields of commercial law , insolvency law , financial services law , anti-money laundering law , counter-terrorism legislation , and professional liability obligations;


### proof that the natural persons involved in the management body of the applicant crypto-asset service provider collectively possess sufficient knowledge , skills and experience to manage that provider and that those natural persons are required to commit sufficient time to the performance of their duties; ### deleted


### a description of the applicant crypto-asset service provider’s internal control mechanism , procedure for risk assessment and business continuity plan; ### deleted


### descriptions both in technical and non-technical language of applicant crypto-asset service provider’s it systems and security arrangements; ### deleted


### proof that the applicant crypto-asset service provider meets the prudential safeguards in accordance with article 60; ### deleted


### a description of the applicant crypto-asset service provider’s procedures to handle complaints from clients; ### deleted


### a description of the procedure for the segregation of client’s crypto-assets and funds; ### deleted


### a description of the procedure and system to detect market abuse. ### deleted


### where the applicant crypto-asset service provider intends to ensure the custody and administration of crypto-assets on behalf of third parties , a description of the custody policy; ### deleted


### where the applicant crypto-asset service provider intends to operate a trading platform for crypto-assets , a description of the operating rules of the trading platform; ### deleted


### where the applicant crypto-asset service provider intends to exchange crypto-assets for fiat currency or crypto-assets for other crypto-assets , a description of the non-discriminatory commercial policy; ### deleted


### where the applicant crypto-asset service provider intends to exchange crypto-assets for fiat currency or crypto-assets for other crypto-assets , a description of the non-discriminatory commercial policy; ### where the applicant crypto-asset service provider intends to exchange crypto-assets for fiat currency or crypto-assets for other crypto-assets , a description of the non-discriminatory commercial policy governing the relationship with clients as well as a description of the methodology for determining the price of the crypto assets they propose for exchange against funds or other crypto assets;


### where the applicant crypto-asset service provider intends to execute orders for crypto-assets on behalf of third parties , a description of the execution policy; ### deleted


### where the applicant intends to receive and transmit orders for crypto-assets on behalf of third parties , proof that the natural persons giving advice on behalf of the applicant crypto-asset service provider have the necessary knowledge and expertise to fulfil their obligations. ### deleted


### 3. competent authorities shall not require an applicant crypto-asset service provider to provide any information they have already received pursuant to directive 2009/110/ec , directive 2014/65/eu , directive 2015/2366/eu or national law applicable to crypto-asset services prior to the entry into force of this regulation , provided that such information or documents are still up-to-date and are accessible to the competent authorities. ### deleted


### 1. competent authorities shall , within 25 working days of receipt of the application referred to in article 54(1) , assess whether that application is complete by checking that the information listed in article 54(2) has been submitted. where the application is not complete , the authorities shall set a deadline by which the applicant crypto-asset service providers are to provide the missing information. ### deleted


### 1. competent authorities shall , within 25 working days of receipt of the application referred to in article 54(1) , assess whether that application is complete by checking that the information listed in article 54(2) has been submitted. where the application is not complete , the authorities shall set a deadline by which the applicant crypto-asset service providers are to provide the missing information. ### 1. competent authorities shall , within 25 working days of receipt of the application referred to in article 54(1) , assess whether that application is complete by checking that the information listed in article 54(2) has been submitted. where the application is not complete , the applicant crypto-asset service providers will have a maximum of 10 working days to provide the missing information.


### 2. competent authorities may refuse to review applications where such applications remain incomplete after the deadline referred to in paragraph 1. ### deleted


### 2. competent authorities may refuse to review applications where such applications remain incomplete after the deadline referred to in paragraph 1. ### 2. competent authorities shall refuse to review applications where such applications remain incomplete after the deadline referred to in paragraph 1.


### 3. competent authorities shall immediately notify applicant crypto-asset service providers of the fact that an application is complete. ### deleted


### 4. before granting or refusing to an authorisation as a crypto-asset service provider , competent authorities shall consult the competent authorities of another member state in any of the following cases: ### deleted


### the applicant crypto-asset service provider is a subsidiary of a crypto-asset service provider authorised in that other member state; ### deleted


### the applicant crypto-asset service provider is a subsidiary of the parent undertaking of a crypto-asset service provider authorised in that other member state; ### deleted


### 5. competent authorities shall , within three months from the date of receipt of a complete application , assess whether the applicant crypto-asset service provider complies with the requirements of this title and shall adopt a fully reasoned decision granting or refusing an authorisation as a crypto-asset service provider. that assessment shall take into account the nature , scale and complexity of the crypto-asset services that the applicant crypto-asset service provider intends to provide. ### deleted


### 6. competent authorities shall inform esma of all authorisations granted under this article. esma shall add all the information submitted in successful applications to the register of authorised crypto-asset service providers provided for in article57. esma may request information in order to ensure that competent authorities grant authorisations under this article in a consistent manner. ### deleted


### 7. competent authorities shall notify applicant crypto-asset service providers of their decisions to grant or to refuse authorisation within three working days of the date of that decision. ### deleted


### 1. competent authorities shall withdraw the authorisations in any of the following situations the crypto-asset service provider: ### deleted


### 2. competent authorities shall also have the power to withdraw authorisations in any of the following situations: ### deleted


### 3. where a competent authority withdraws an authorisation , the competent authority designated as a single point of contact in that member state in accordance with article 81 shall notify esma and the competent authorities of the host member states thereof without undue delay. esma shall register the information on the withdrawal of the authorisation in the register referred to in article 57. ### deleted


### 4. competent authorities may limit the withdrawal of authorisation to a particular service. ### deleted


### 5. before withdrawing an the authorisation , competent authorities shall consult the competent authority of another member state where the crypto-asset service provider concerned is: ### deleted


### 6. the eba , esma and any competent authority of a host member state may at any time request that the competent authority of the home member state examines whether the crypto-asset service provider still complies with the conditions under which the authorisation was granted. ### deleted


### 7. crypto-asset service providers shall establish , implement and maintain adequate procedures ensuring the timely and orderly transfer of the clients’ crypto-assets and funds to another crypto-asset service provider when an authorisation is withdrawn. ### deleted


### the commercial name , physical address and website of the crypto-asset service provider or the trading platform for crypto-assets operated by the crypto-asset service provider; ### the commercial name , physical address , email address and telephone number of the crypto-asset service provider and website of the crypto-asset service provider or the trading platform for crypto-assets operated by the crypto-asset service provider;


### the name and address of the competent authority which granted authorisation and its contact details; ### the name and address of the competent authority which granted authorisation and its contact details , including an email address as well as telephone number towards the single point of contact in charge of questions and problems around crypto asset service providers;


### 3. crypto-asset service providers shall warn clients of risks associated with purchasing crypto-assets. ### 3. crypto-asset service providers shall warn clients of risks associated with purchasing crypto-assets , in particular the significant price volatility of crypto-assets , combined with the inherent difficulties of valuing crypto-assets reliably. they should further warn clients explicitly that by investing in these types of product , they should be prepared to lose all their money.


### 1. crypto-asset service providers shall , at all times , have in place prudential safeguards equal to an amount of at least the higher of the following: ### 1. crypto-asset service providers shall , at all times , meet , at least , the requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities , as applicable:


### 2. the prudential safeguards referred to in paragraph 1 shall take any of the following forms: ### deleted


### own funds , consisting of common equity tier 1 items referred to in articles 26 to 30 of regulation (eu) no 575/2013 after the deductions in full , pursuant to article 36 of that regulation , without the application of threshold exemptions pursuant to articles 46 and 48 of that regulation; ### for credit institutions authorised to provide crypto-asset services in accordance with para. 1 of article 53a the requirements for own funds and eligible liabilities in accordance with regulation (eu) 575/2013 and directive 2013/36/eu;


### an insurance policy covering the territories of the union where crypto-asset services are actively provided or a comparable guarantee. ### for investment firms authorised to provide crypto-asset services in accordance with para. 2 , 4 or 5 of article 53a the requirements for initial capital and own funds in accordance with regulation (eu) 2019/2033 and directive 2019/2034/eu;


### 3. crypto-asset service providers that have not been in business for one year from the date on which they started providing services shall use , for the calculation referred to in paragraph 1 , point (b) , the projected fixed overheads included in their projections for the first 12 months’ of service provision , as submitted with their application for authorisation. ### deleted


### 4. the insurance policy referred to in paragraph 2 shall have at least all of the following characteristics: ### deleted


### 4. the insurance policy referred to in paragraph 2 shall have at least all of the following characteristics: ### 4. the insurance policy referred to in paragraph 2 shall be disclosed to the public through the crypto asset service provider's website and shall have at least all of the following characteristics:


### it is provided by a third-party entity. ### it is provided by a third-party entity without any corporate link with the crypto asset service provider.


### 5. the insurance policy referred to in paragraph 2 , point (b) shall include , coverage against the risk of: ### deleted


### 6. for the purposes of paragraph 1 point (b) , crypto-asset service providers shall calculate their fixed overheads for the preceding year , using figures resulting from the applicable accounting framework , by subtracting the following items from the total expenses after distribution of profits to shareholders in their most recently audited annual financial statements or , where audited statements are not available , in annual financial statements validated by national supervisors: ### deleted


### 2. natural persons who either own , directly or indirectly , more than 20% of the crypto-asset service provider's share capital or voting rights , or who exercise , by any other means , a power of control over the said crypto-asset service provider shall provide evidence that they have the necessary good repute and competence. ### 2. natural persons who either own , directly or indirectly , more than 5% of the crypto-asset service provider's share capital or voting rights , or who exercise , by any other means , a power of control over the said crypto-asset service provider shall provide evidence that they have the necessary good repute and competence.


### 7. crypto-asset service providers shall have internal control mechanisms and effective procedures for risk assessment , including effective control and safeguard arrangements for managing ict systems in accordance with regulation (eu) 2021/xx of the european parliament and of the council.65 they shall monitor and , on a regular basis , evaluate the adequacy and effectiveness of internal control mechanisms and procedures for risk assessment and take appropriate measures to address any deficiencies. ### 7. crypto-asset service providers shall have internal control mechanisms and effective procedures for risk assessment , including effective control and safeguard arrangements for managing ict systems in accordance with regulation (eu) 2021/xx of the european parliament and of the council as well as effective procedures to comply with the obligations in relation to money laundering and terrorist financing under directive (eu) 2015/849 of the european parliament and of the council. they shall monitor and , on a regular basis , evaluate the adequacy and effectiveness of internal control mechanisms and procedures for risk assessment and take appropriate measures to address any deficiencies.


### crypto-asset service providers shall notify their competent authority of any changes to their management body and shall provide their competent authority with all the necessary information to assess compliance with article 61. ### crypto-asset service providers shall notify , with a period of maximum 5 working days , their competent authority of any changes to their management body and shall provide their competent authority with all the necessary information to assess compliance with article 61.


### 3. crypto-asset service providers shall , promptly place any client’s funds , with a central bank or a credit institution. ### 3. crypto-asset service providers shall , promptly place any client’s funds , with a credit institution or , where the relevant eligibility criteria and conditions for opening an account are met , a central bank.


### 4. crypto-assets service providers shall investigate all complaints in a timely and fair manner , and communicate the outcome of such investigations to their clients within a reasonable period of time. ### 4. crypto-assets service providers shall investigate all complaints in a fair manner and within 3 working days after reception of the complaint. the crypto asset service provider will notify a reference number of the complaint to the client and communicate the outcome of such investigations to their clients within a period of time not going beyond 25 working days.


### 2. crypto-asset service providers shall disclose to their clients and potential clients the general nature and sources of conflicts of interest and the steps taken to mitigate them. ### 2. crypto-asset service providers shall disclose to their clients , potential clients and the competent authority the specific nature and sources of conflicts of interest and the steps taken to mitigate them.


### 4. crypto-asset service providers shall assess and at least annually review , their policy on conflicts of interest and take all appropriate measures to address any deficiencies. ### 4. crypto-asset service providers shall assess and at least annually review , their policy on conflicts of interest and take all appropriate measures to address any deficiencies and communicate them to the competent authority.


### crypto-asset service providers retain the expertise and resources necessary for evaluating the quality of the services provided , for supervising the outsourced services effectively and for managing the risks associated with the outsourcing on an ongoing basis; ### crypto-asset service providers retain the expertise and resources necessary for evaluating the quality of the services provided , for supervising the outsourced services effectively and for managing the risks associated with the outsourcing on an ongoing basis and shall provide proof of this expertise and resource to the competent authority before the outsourcing starts.;


### 3. crypto-asset service providers shall enter into a written agreement with any third parties involved in outsourcing. that written agreement shall specify the rights and obligations of both the crypto-asset service providers and of the third parties concerned , and shall allow the crypto-asset service providers concerned to terminate that agreement. ### 3. crypto-asset service providers shall enter into a written agreement with any third parties involved in outsourcing. that written agreement , a copy of which will be transferred to the competent authority of the crypto asset service providers at the beginning of the outsourcing relation , shall specify the rights and obligations of both the crypto-asset service providers and of the third parties concerned , and shall allow the crypto-asset service providers concerned to terminate that agreement.


### 4. crypto-asset service providers and third parties shall , upon request , make available to the competent authorities and the relevant authorities all information necessary to enable those authorities to assess compliance of the outsourced activities with the requirements of this title. ### 4. crypto-asset service providers and third parties shall make available to the competent authorities and the relevant authorities all information necessary to enable those authorities to assess compliance of the outsourced activities with the requirements of this title.


### 1. crypto-asset service providers that are authorised for the operation of a trading platform for crypto-assets shall lay down operating rules for the trading platform. these operating rules shall at least: ### 1. crypto-asset service providers will be authorised for the operation of a trading platform for crypto-assets provided they have set up a partnership with a credit institution which has opened real-name bank accounts for their customers.


### for the purposes of point (a) , the operating rules shall clearly state that a crypto-asset shall not be admitted to trading on the trading platform , where a crypto-asset white paper has been published , unless such a crypto-asset benefits from the exemption set out in articles 4(2). ### for the purposes of point (a) , the operating rules shall clearly state that a crypto-asset shall not be admitted to trading on the trading platform , where a crypto-asset white paper has not been published or where the crypto asset provider is not connected to an open real-name bank account


### the operating rules of the trading platform for crypto-assets shall prevent the admission to trading of crypto-assets which have inbuilt anonymisation function unless the holders of the crypto-assets and their transaction history can be identified by the crypto-asset service providers that are authorised for the operation of a trading platform for crypto-assets or by competent authorities. ### the operating rules of the trading platform for crypto-assets shall prevent the admission to trading of crypto-assets which have inbuilt anonymisation function.


### 2. these operating rules referred to in paragraph 1 shall be drafted in one of the official languages of the home member states or in another language that is customary in the sphere of finance. those operating rules shall be made public on the website of the crypto-asset service provider concerned. ### 2. these operating rules referred to in paragraph 1 shall be drafted in one of the official languages of the home member states and in another language that is customary in the sphere of finance. those operating rules shall be made public on the website of the crypto-asset service provider concerned.


### 1. crypto-asset service providers that are authorised to execute orders for crypto-assets on behalf of third parties shall take all necessary steps to obtain , when executing orders , the best possible result for their clients taking into account the best execution factors of price , costs , speed , likelihood of execution and settlement , size , nature or any other consideration relevant to the execution of the order , unless the crypto-asset service provider concerned executes orders for crypto-assets following specific instructions given by its clients. ### 1. crypto-asset service providers that are authorised to execute orders for crypto-assets on behalf of third parties shall take all necessary steps to obtain , when executing orders , the best possible result for their clients taking into account the best execution factors of price , costs , speed , likelihood of execution and settlement , size , nature or any other consideration relevant to the execution of the order , unless the crypto-asset service provider concerned executes orders for crypto-assets following specific instructions given by its clients.


### 1. crypto-asset service providers that are authorised to execute orders for crypto-assets on behalf of third parties shall take all necessary steps to obtain , when executing orders , the best possible result for their clients taking into account the best execution factors of price , costs , speed , likelihood of execution and settlement , size , nature or any other consideration relevant to the execution of the order , unless the crypto-asset service provider concerned executes orders for crypto-assets following specific instructions given by its clients. ### 1. crypto-asset service providers that are authorised to execute orders for crypto-assets on behalf of third parties shall take all necessary steps to obtain , when executing orders , the best possible result for their clients taking into account the best execution factors of price , costs , speed , likelihood of execution and settlement , size , nature or any other consideration relevant to the execution of the order , unless the crypto-asset service provider concerned executes orders for crypto-assets following specific instructions given by its clients. where a crypto-asset service provider executes an order on behalf of a retail client , the best possible result shall be determined in terms of the total consideration , representing the price of the crypto-assets and the costs relating to execution , which shall include all expenses incurred by the client which are directly relating to the execution of the order , including execution venue fees , clearing and settlement fees and any other fees paid to third parties involved in the execution of the order.


### 3. crypto-asset service providers that are authorised to execute orders for crypto-assets on behalf of third parties shall provide appropriate and clear information to their clients on their order execution policy and any significant change to it. ### 3. crypto-asset service providers that are authorised to execute orders for crypto-assets on behalf of third parties shall ask the client or potential client to provide information regarding that person’s knowledge and experience in crypto-assets , the client’s objectives , risk tolerance , financial situation including the ability to bear losses , and basic understanding of risks involved in purchasing crypto-assets so as to enable the crypto-asset service provider to assess whether the crypto-asset envisaged is appropriate for the client. where the crypto-asset service provider considers , on the basis of the information received under the first subparagraph , that the crypto-asset is not appropriate to the client or potential client , it shall warn the client or potential client


### 1. crypto-asset service providers that are authorised to provide advice on crypto-assets shall assess the compatibility of such crypto-assets with the needs of the clients and recommend them only when this is in the interest of the clients. ### 1. crypto-asset service providers that are authorised to provide advice on crypto-assets shall assess whether crypto-asset services or crypto-assets are suitable for the clients , considering the clients’ knowledge and experience in crypto-assets , objectives and ability to bear losses.


### 1. crypto-asset service providers that are authorised to provide advice on crypto-assets shall assess the compatibility of such crypto-assets with the needs of the clients and recommend them only when this is in the interest of the clients. ### 1. crypto-asset service providers that are authorised to provide advice on crypto-assets shall assess the compatibility of such crypto-assets with the requirements and preferences of the client or potential client and recommend them only when they are suitable for the client or potential client and , in particular , are in accordance with his or her risk tolerance and ability to bear losses.


### 3. for the purposes of the assessment referred to in paragraph 1 , crypto-asset service providers that are authorised to provide advice on crypto-assets shall request information about the client or prospective client’s knowledge of , and experience in crypto-assets , objectives , financial situation including the ability to bear losses and a basic understanding of risks involved in purchasing crypto-assets. ### 3. for the purposes of the assessment referred to in paragraph 1 , crypto-asset service providers that are authorised to provide advice on crypto-assets shall request information about the client or potential client’s knowledge of , and experience in crypto-assets , the clients' objectives , financial situation including risk tolerance , financial situation including the ability to bear losses , and basic understanding of risks involved in purchasing crypto-assets. crypto-asset service providers that are authorised to provide advice on crypto-assets shall warn clients that , due to their nature ,


### 4. crypto-asset service providers that are authorised to provide advice on crypto-assets shall establish , maintain and implement policies and procedures to enable them to collect and assess all information necessary to conduct this assessment for each client. they shall take reasonable steps to ensure that the information collected about their clients or prospective clients is reliable. ### 4. crypto-asset service providers that are authorised to provide advice on crypto-assets shall establish , maintain and implement policies and procedures to enable them to collect and assess all information necessary to conduct this assessment for each client. they shall take reasonable steps to ensure that the information collected about their clients or potential clients is reliable.


### 5. where clients do not provide the information required pursuant to paragraph 4 , or where crypto-asset service providers that are authorised to provide advice on crypto-assets consider , on the basis of the information received under paragraph 4 , that the prospective clients or clients have insufficient knowledge , crypto-asset service providers that are authorised to provide advice on crypto-assets shall inform those clients or prospective clients that the crypto-assets or crypto-asset services may be inappropriate for them and issue them a warning on the risks associated with crypto-assets. that risk warning shall clearly state the risk of losing the entirety of the money invested or converted into crypto-assets. clients shall expressly acknowledge that they have received and understood the warning issued by the crypto-asset service provider concerned. ### 5. where clients do not provide the information required pursuant to paragraph 4 , or where crypto-asset service providers that are authorised to provide advice on crypto-assets consider , on the basis of the information received under paragraph 4 , that the potential clients or clients have insufficient knowledge , crypto-asset service providers that are authorised to provide advice on crypto-assets shall inform those clients or potential clients that the crypto-assets or crypto-asset services may not be suitable for them and issue them a warning on the risks associated with crypto-assets. that risk warning shall clearly state the risk of losing the entirety of the money invested or converted into crypto-assets. clients shall expressly acknowledge that they have received and understood the warning issued by the crypto-asset service provider concerned.


### specify the clients’ demands and needs; ### specify the clients’ requirements and preferences;


### 2. issuers of crypto-assets may , on their own responsibility , delay disclosure to the public of inside information provided that all of the following conditions are met: ### deleted


### 2. where , despite the measures taken by the competent authority of the home member state , the crypto-asset service provider or the issuer of crypto-assets persists in infringing this regulation , the competent authority of the host member state , after informing the competent authority of the home member state , esma and where appropriate the eba , shall take all appropriate measures in order to protect consumers and shall inform the commission , esma and where appropriate the eba , thereof without undue delay. ### 2. where , despite the measures taken by the competent authority of the home member state , the crypto-asset service provider or the issuer of crypto-assets persists in infringing this regulation , the competent authority of the host member state , after informing the competent authority of the home member state , esma and where appropriate the eba , shall take all appropriate measures in order to protect clients of crypto assets service providers and holders of crypto assets in particular retail holders. this includes the possibility to prevent crypto asset service providers and issuers or offerors seeking admission to trading , to continue to conduct their activities. the commission , esma and where appropriate the eba , will be informed thereof without undue delay.


### infringements of articles 17 and 21 , articles 23 to 36 and article 42; ### infringements of articles 15 to 17 and 21 , articles 23 to 37 and article 42;


### infringements of article 56 and articles 58 to 73; ### infringements of article 53 , 56 and articles 58 to 74;


### maximum administrative pecuniary sanctions of at least twice the amount of the profits gained or losses avoided because of the infringement where those can be determined; ### maximum administrative pecuniary fines of at least twice the amount of the profits gained or losses avoided because of the infringement where those can be determined;


### in the case of a legal person , maximum administrative pecuniary sanctions of at least 15% of the total annual turnover of that legal person according to the last available financial statements approved by the management body; ### in the case of a legal person , maximum administrative fines of at least 25% of the total annual turnover of that legal person according to the last available financial statements approved by the management body;


### in the case of a legal person , maximum administrative pecuniary sanctions of at least 15% of the total annual turnover of that legal person according to the last available financial statements approved by the management body; ### in the case of a legal person , maximum administrative pecuniary sanctions of at least 25% of the total annual turnover of that legal person according to the last available financial statements approved by the management body;


### in the event of repeated infringements of articles 78 , 79 or 80 , a permanent ban of any member of the management body of a crypto-asset service provider or any other natural person who is held responsible for the infringement , from exercising management functions in the crypto-asset service provider; ### in the event of repeated infringements of articles 78 , 79 or 80 , a permanent ban of any member of the management body of a crypto-asset service provider or any other natural person who is held responsible for the infringement , from exercising functions in the sector of crypto-asset service providers;


### 99 colleges for issuers of significant asset-referenced tokens ### 99 colleges for issuers of significant asset-referenced tokens and significant e-money tokens


### a description of developments in business models and technologies in the crypto-asset market; ### a description of developments in business models and technologies in the crypto-asset market with a particular focus on the environmental impact of new technologies;


### the costs of complying with this regulation for issuers of crypto-assets , other than asset-referenced tokens and e-money tokens as a percentage of the amount raised through crypto-asset issuances; ### the costs of complying with this regulation for issuers of crypto-assets , other than asset-referenced tokens and e-money tokens as a percentage of the amount raised through crypto-asset issuances , as well as the turn over and the total profits generated by issuers through these issuances in the period covered.


### the costs for crypto-asset service providers to comply with this regulation as a percentage of their operational costs; ### the costs for crypto-asset service providers to comply with this regulation as a percentage of their operational costs , as well as the turn over and the total profits generated by these service providers , generated via these services in the period covered.


### the costs for issuers of issuers of asset-referenced tokens and issuers of e-money tokens to comply with this regulation as a percentage of their operational costs; ### the costs for issuers of issuers of asset-referenced tokens and issuers of e-money tokens to comply with this regulation as a percentage of their operational costs; as well as the turn over and the total profits generated by these issuers through the issuances in the period covered.


### article 123 ### deleted


### 2. this regulation shall apply from [please insert date 18 months after the date of entry into force]. ### 2. this regulation shall apply from [please insert date 6 months after the date of entry into force].


### 3. however , the provisions laid down in title iii and title iv shall apply from [please insert the date of the entry into force]. ### deleted


### 2. except for issuers of asset-referenced tokens that are exempted from authorisation in accordance with article 15(3) , details about the authorisation as an issuer of asset-referenced tokens and name of the competent authority which granted such an authorisation. ### 2. details about the authorisation as an issuer of asset-referenced tokens and name of the competent authority which granted such an authorisation.


### 12. the issuer infringes article 26(2) by not disclosing as soon as possible and/or in a clear , accurate and transparent manner on their website the outcome of the audit of the reserve assets referred to in article 32. ### 12. the issuer infringes article 26(2) by not disclosing , not later than 10 working days of the completing of the audit in a clear , accurate and transparent manner on their website the outcome of the audit of the reserve assets referred to in article 32.


### 18. the issuer infringes article 28(1) , by not maintaining and implementing effective policies and procedures to prevent , identify , manage and disclose conflicts of interest between the issuer itself and its shareholders , the members of its management body , its employees , any natural persons who either own , directly or indirectly , more than 20% of the issuer's share capital or voting rights , or who exercise , by any other means , a power of control over the said issuer , the holders of significant asset-referenced tokens , any third party providing one of the functions as referred in article 30(5) , point (h) , or any natural or legal person granted with a direct claim or a redemption right in accordance with article 35(3). ### 18. the issuer infringes article 28(1) , by not maintaining and implementing effective policies and procedures to prevent , identify , manage and disclose conflicts of interest between the issuer itself and its shareholders , the members of its management body , its employees , any natural persons who either own , directly or indirectly , more than 5% of the issuer's share capital or voting rights , or who exercise , by any other means , a power of control over the said issuer , the holders of significant asset-referenced tokens , any third party providing one of the functions as referred in article 30(5) , point (h) , or any natural or legal person granted with a direct claim or a redemption right in accordance with article 35(3).


### 29. unless it has been permitted to hold a lower amount of own funds in accordance with article 31(3) , the issuer infringes article 31(1) point (a) or 41(4) by not abiding , at all times , to the own funds requirement. ### 29. the issuer infringes article 31(1) point (a) or 41(4) by not abiding , at all times , to the own funds requirement.


### 53. where the issuer do not grant rights as referred to in article 35(1) to all the holders of significant asset-referenced tokens , such an issuer infringes article 35(3) by not establishing a policy specifying the natural or legal persons that are provided with such rights , or by not specifying the conditions for exercising such rights , or the obligations imposed on those persons. ### deleted


### 55. where the issuer do not grant rights as referred to in article 35(1) to all the holders of significant asset-referenced tokens , such an issuer infringes article 35(4) by not putting in place a mechanism to ensure the liquidity of the significant asset-referenced tokens. ### deleted


### 63. the issuer infringes article 41(3) by not establishing , maintaining or implementing a liquidity management policy and procedures or by not having policy and procedures that ensure that the reserve assets have a resilient liquidity profile that enables the issuer of significant asset-referenced tokens to continue operating normally , including under liquidity stressed scenarios. ### 63. the issuer infringes article 41(3) by not establishing , maintaining or implementing a liquidity management policy and procedures or by not having policy and procedures that ensure that the reserve assets have a resilient liquidity profile that enables the issuer of significant asset-referenced tokens to continue operating normally , including under liquidity stressed scenarios , or by not conducting liquidity stress testing , on a regular basis , or by not complying with the decision following up on the outcome of the liquidity stress testing


### 17. unless it has been permitted to hold a lower amount of own funds in accordance with article 31(3) , the issuer infringes article 41(4) by not abiding , at all times , to the own funds requirement. ### 17. the issuer infringes article 41(4) by not abiding , at all times , to the own funds requirement.


### financial instruments as defined in article 4(1) , point (15) , of directive 2014/65/eu; ### investment tokens as defined in article 4(1) , point (15) , of directive 2014/65/eu;


### 5. where providing one or more crypto-asset services , credit institutions authorised under directive 2013/36/eu shall not be subject to the provisions of chapter i of title v , except articles 57 and 58. ### deleted


### 6. investment firms authorised under directive 2014/65/eu shall not be subject to the provisions of chapter i of title v , except articles 57 , 58 , 60 and 61 , where they only provide one or several crypto-asset services equivalent to the investment services and activities for which they are authorised under directive 2014/65/eu. for that purpose: ### deleted


### (2) ‘crypto-asset’ means a digital representation of value or rights which may be transferred and stored electronically , using distributed ledger technology or similar technology; ### (2) ‘crypto-asset’ means a fungible digital representation of value or rights which may be transferred and stored electronically , using distributed ledger technology or similar technology;


### (3) ‘asset-referenced token’ means a type of crypto-asset that purports to maintain a stable value by referring to the value of several fiat currencies that are legal tender , one or several commodities or one or several crypto-assets , or a combination of such assets; ### (3) ‘asset-referenced token’ means a type of crypto-asset that purports to maintain a stable value by referring to the value of several official currencies or one or several commodities or a combination of such assets;


### (4) ‘electronic money token’ or ‘e-money token’ means a type of crypto-asset the main purpose of which is to be used as a means of exchange and that purports to maintain a stable value by referring to the value of a fiat currency that is legal tender; ### (4) ‘electronic money token’ or ‘e-money token’ means a crypto-asset as defined in article 2(2a) of directive 2009/110/ec;


### (4) ‘electronic money token’ or ‘e-money token’ means a type of crypto-asset the main purpose of which is to be used as a means of exchange and that purports to maintain a stable value by referring to the value of a fiat currency that is legal tender; ### (4) ‘electronic money token’ or ‘e-money token’ means a type of crypto-asset the main purpose of which is to be used as a means of exchange and that purports to maintain a stable value by referring to the value of an official currency;


### (6) ‘issuer of crypto-assets’ means a legal person who offers to the public any type of crypto-assets or seeks the admission of such crypto-assets to a trading platform for crypto-assets; ### (6) ‘issuer of crypto-assets’ means any natural or legal person who issues crypto-assets;


### (6) ‘issuer of crypto-assets’ means a legal person who offers to the public any type of crypto-assets or seeks the admission of such crypto-assets to a trading platform for crypto-assets; ### (6) ‘issuer of crypto-assets’ means a legal person who offers to the public any type of crypto-assets or a person or entity with direct or indirect control over such crypto assets seeks the admission of such crypto-assets to a trading platform for crypto-assets;


### (7) ‘offer to the public’ means an offer to third parties to acquire a crypto-asset in exchange for fiat currency or other crypto-assets; ### (7) offer to the public’ means a communication to persons in any form and by any means , presenting sufficient information on the terms of the offer and the crypto-assets to be offered , so as to enable potential holders to decide to purchase those crypto-assets;


### (8) ‘crypto-asset service provider’ means any person whose occupation or business is the provision of one or more crypto-asset services to third parties on a professional basis; ### (8) crypto-asset service provider’ means any person or entity who has been authorised to provide one or more crypto-asset services in accordance with art.53 to third parties on a professional basis.


### (8) ‘crypto-asset service provider’ means any person whose occupation or business is the provision of one or more crypto-asset services to third parties on a professional basis; ### (8) ‘crypto-asset service provider’ means any person who has been authorised to provide one or more crypto-asset services in accordance with art.53;


### (21) ‘reserve assets’ means the basket of fiat currencies that are legal tender , commodities or crypto-assets , backing the value of an asset-referenced tokens , or the investment of such assets; ### (21) ‘reserve assets’ means the basket of official currencies of countries or commodities , backing the value of an asset-referenced tokens , or the investment of such assets;


### the crypto-assets are offered for free; ### deleted


### the crypto-assets are automatically created through mining as a reward for the maintenance of the dlt or the validation of transactions; ### deleted


### the crypto-assets are unique and not fungible with other crypto-assets; ### deleted


### the crypto-assets are offered to fewer than 150 natural or legal persons per member state where such persons are acting on their own account; ### deleted


### over a period of 12 months , the total consideration of an offer to the public of crypto-assets in the union does not exceed eur 1 000 000 , or the equivalent amount in another currency or in crypto-assets; ### deleted


### the offer to the public of the crypto-assets is solely addressed to qualified investors and the crypto-assets can only be held by such qualified investors. ### deleted


### 3. where the offer to the public of crypto-assets , other than asset-referenced tokens or e-money tokens , concerns utility tokens for a service that is not yet in operation , the duration of the public offer as described in the crypto-asset white paper shall not exceed 12 months. ### 3. where the offer to the public of crypto-assets , other than asset-referenced tokens or e-money tokens , concerns utility tokens for goods or services that is not yet in operation , the duration of the public offer as described in the crypto-asset white paper shall not exceed 12 months.


### information on the underlying technology and standards applied by the issuer of the crypto-assets allowing for the holding , storing and transfer of those crypto-assets; ### information on the underlying technology , which can not be based on a proof of work mechanism , and standards applied by the issuer of the crypto-assets allowing for the holding , storing and transfer of those crypto-assets;


### 3. the crypto-asset white paper shall contain the following statement: “the issuer of the crypto-assets is solely responsible for the content of this crypto-asset white paper. this crypto-asset white paper has not been reviewed or approved by any competent authority in any member state of the european union”. ### deleted


### 4. the crypto-asset white paper shall not contain any assertions on the future value of the crypto-assets , other than the statement referred to in paragraph 5 , unless the issuer of those crypto-assets can guarantee such future value. ### 4. the crypto-asset white paper shall not contain any assertions on the future value of the crypto-assets , other than the statement referred to in paragraph 5.


### 9. the crypto-asset white paper shall be drawn up in at least one of the official languages of the home member state or in a language customary in the sphere of international finance. ### 9. the crypto-asset white paper shall be drawn up in at least one of the official languages of the home member state and in a language customary in the sphere of international finance.


### the information in the marketing communications shall be fair , clear and not misleading; ### the information in the marketing communications shall be fair , clear and not misleading , and shall describe the risks and rewards of purchasing crypto-assets in an equally prominent manner;


### the marketing communications shall clearly state that a crypto-asset white paper has been published and indicate the address of the website of the issuer of the crypto-assets concerned. ### the marketing communications shall clearly state that a crypto-asset white paper has been published and indicate the address of the website of the issuer of the crypto-assets concerned as well as a contact number and email address of the issuer.


### 1. competent authorities shall not require an ex ante approval of a crypto-asset white paper , nor of any marketing communications relating to it before their publication. ### 1. competent authorities shall approve a crypto-asset white paper , and of any marketing communications relating to it before their publication. the approval or refusal shall be given not later than 20 working days after the notification.


### 1. issuers of crypto-assets , other than asset-referenced tokens or e-money tokens , shall publish their crypto-asset white paper , and , where applicable , their marketing communications , on their website , which shall be publicly accessible , by no later than the starting date of the offer to the public of those crypto-assets or the admission of those crypto-assets to trading on a trading platform for crypto-assets. the crypto-asset white paper , and , where applicable , the marketing communications , shall remain available on the issuer’s website for as long as the crypto-assets are held by the public. ### 1. issuers of crypto-assets , other than asset-referenced tokens or e-money tokens , shall , after the approval of the competent authority , publish their crypto-asset white paper , and , where applicable , their marketing communications , on their website , which shall be publicly accessible , by no later than the starting date of the offer to the public of those crypto-assets or the admission of those crypto-assets to trading on a trading platform for crypto-assets. the crypto-asset white paper , and , where applicable , the marketing communications , shall remain available on the issuer’s website for as long as the crypto-assets are held by the public.


### 2. the published crypto-asset white paper , and , where applicable , the marketing communications , shall be identical to the version notified to the relevant competent authority in accordance with article 7 , or , where applicable , modified in accordance with article 11. ### 2. the published crypto-asset white paper , and , where applicable , the marketing communications , shall be identical to the version approved by the relevant competent authority in accordance with article 7 , or , where applicable , modified in accordance with article 11.


### 1. after publication of the crypto-asset white paper in accordance with article 8 , and , where applicable , article 11 , issuers of crypto-assets may offer their crypto-assets , other than asset-referenced tokens or e-money tokens , throughout the union and seek admission to trading of such crypto-assets on a trading platform for crypto-assets. ### 1. after publication of the approved crypto-asset white paper in accordance with article 8 , and , where applicable , article 11 , issuers of crypto-assets may offer their crypto-assets , other than asset-referenced tokens or e-money tokens , throughout the union and seek admission to trading of such crypto-assets on a trading platform for crypto-assets.


### 1. issuers of crypto-assets , other than asset-referenced tokens or e-money tokens , shall modify their published crypto-asset white paper , and , where applicable , published marketing communications , to describe any change or new fact that is likely to have a significant influence on the purchase decision of any potential purchaser of such crypto-assets , or on the decision of holders of such crypto-assets to sell or exchange such crypto-assets. ### 1. issuers of crypto-assets , other than asset-referenced tokens or e-money tokens , shall modify their published crypto-asset white paper , and , where applicable , published marketing communications , to describe any change or new fact that is likely to have a significant influence on the purchase decision of any potential purchaser of such crypto-assets , or on the decision of holders of such crypto-assets to sell or exchange such crypto-assets. this modified crypto asset white paper shall be approved by the competent authority before publication.


### consumers shall have a period of 14 calendar days to withdraw their agreement to purchase those crypto-assets without incurring any cost and without giving reasons. the period of withdrawal shall begin from the day of the consumers’ agreement to purchase those crypto-assets. ### consumers shall have a period of 14 calendar days to withdraw their agreement to purchase those crypto-assets without incurring any cost and without giving reasons. the period of withdrawal shall begin from the day of the consumers’ agreement to purchase those crypto-assets and will restart every time a modification is made to the white paper and this until the end of the subscription period.


### maintain all of their systems and security access protocols to appropriate union standards. ### maintain all of their systems and security access protocols to appropriate union standards and refrain from issuing crypto-assets on a protocol that uses a proof-of-work mechanism.


### 3. where an offer to the public of crypto-assets , other than asset-referenced tokens or e-money tokens , is cancelled for any reason , issuers of such crypto-assets shall ensure that any funds collected from purchasers or potential purchasers are duly returned to them as soon as possible. ### 3. where an offer to the public of crypto-assets , other than asset-referenced tokens or e-money tokens , is cancelled for any reason , issuers of such crypto-assets shall ensure that any funds collected from purchasers or potential purchasers are duly returned to them as soon as possible and not later than 20 working days.


### over a period of 12 months , calculated at the end of each calendar day , the average outstanding amount of asset-referenced tokens does not exceed eur 5 000 000 , or the equivalent amount in another currency; ### over a period of 12 months , calculated at the end of each calendar day , the average outstanding amount of asset-referenced tokens does not exceed eur 1 000 000 , or the equivalent amount in another currency;


### the offer to the public of the asset-referenced tokens is solely addressed to qualified investors and the asset-referenced tokens can only be held by such qualified investors. ### deleted


### 4. paragraph 1 shall not apply where the issuers of asset-referenced tokens are authorised as a credit institution in accordance with article 8 of directive 2013/36/eu. ### deleted


### where applicable , proof that natural persons who either own , directly or indirectly , more than 20% of the applicant issuer's share capital or voting rights , or who exercise , by any other means , control over the said applicant issuer , have good repute and competence; ### where applicable , proof that natural persons who either own , directly or indirectly , more than 5% of the applicant issuer's share capital or voting rights , or who exercise , by any other means , control over the said applicant issuer , have good repute and competence;


### detailed information on the nature and enforceability of rights , including any direct redemption right or any claims , that holders of asset-referenced tokens and any legal or natural person as referred in article 35(3) , may have on the reserve assets or against the issuer , including how such rights may be treated in insolvency procedures. ### detailed information on the nature and enforceability of the rights of holders , including


### where the issuer does not offer a direct right on the reserve assets , detailed information on the mechanisms referred to in article 35(4) to ensure the liquidity of the asset-referenced tokens; ### deleted


### where the issuer does not offer a direct right on the reserve assets , detailed information on the mechanisms referred to in article 35(4) to ensure the liquidity of the asset-referenced tokens; ### detailed information on the stabilisation mechanisms referred to in article 35(4) , including , where applicable , any proposed arrangements to ensure the liquidity of the asset-referenced tokens;


### for the purposes of point (e) , where no direct claim or redemption right has been granted to all the holders of asset-referenced tokens , the crypto-asset white paper shall contain a clear and unambiguous statement that all the holders of the crypto-assets do not have a claim on the reserve assets , or cannot redeem those reserve assets with the issuer at any time. ### deleted


### 4. the crypto-asset white paper shall be drawn up in at least one of the official languages of the home member state or in a language customary in the sphere of international finance. ### 4. the crypto-asset white paper shall be drawn up in at least one of the official languages of the home member state and in a language customary in the sphere of international finance.


### 4. the eba , esma , the ecb and , where applicable , a central bank as referred to in paragraph 3 shall , within 2 months after having received the draft decision and the application file , issue a non-binding opinion on the application and transmit their non-binding opinions to the competent authority concerned. that competent authority shall duly consider those non-binding opinions and the observations and comments of the applicant issuer. ### 4. the eba , esma , the ecb and , where applicable , a central bank as referred to in paragraph 3 shall , within 2 months after having received the draft decision and the application file , issue a non- binding opinion on the application and transmit their opinions to the competent authority concerned , except that such opinions issued by the ecb and the national central banks shall be binding as regards the conduct of monetary policy , and the promotion of the smooth operation of payment systems. that competent authority shall duly consider those opinions and the observations and comments of the applicant issuer.


### 1. competent authorities shall , within one month after having received the non-binding opinion referred to in article 18(4) , take a fully reasoned decision granting or refusing authorisation to the applicant issuer and , and , within 5 working days , notify that decision to applicant issuers. where an applicant issuer is authorised , its crypto-asset white paper shall be deemed to be approved. ### 1. competent authorities shall , within one month after having received the opinions referred to in article 18(4) , take a fully reasoned decision granting or refusing authorisation to the applicant issuer and , within 5 working days , notify that decision to applicant issuers. where an applicant issuer is authorised , its crypto-asset white paper shall be deemed to be approved.


### the applicant issuer’s business model may pose a serious threat to financial stability , monetary policy transmission or monetary sovereignty. ### the applicant issuer’s business model may pose a serious threat to financial stability , monetary policy transmission or monetary sovereignty provided , however , that the competent authority shall act in accordance with the opinion of the ecb or the national central bank of issue of the relevant union currency as regards the conduct of monetary policy and the promotion of the smooth operation of payment systems.


### take any appropriate corrective measures to ensure financial stability. ### take any appropriate corrective measures to ensure financial stability and the proper conduct of monetary policy and the promotion of the smooth operation of payment systems , after having requested and obtained a binding opinion from the ecb and/or the relevant central banks of member states the currency of which is not the euro , provided , however , that the competent authorities shall act in accordance with such opinions as regards the conduct of monetary policy and the promotion of the smooth operation of payment systems.’


### the marketing communications shall clearly state that a crypto-asset white paper has been published and indicate the address of the website of the issuer of the crypto-assets. ### the marketing communications shall clearly state that a crypto-asset white paper has been published and indicate the address of the website of the issuer of the crypto-assets , as well as an email address and a telephone number of the issuer.


### 2. where no direct claim or redemption right has been granted to all the holders of asset-referenced tokens , the marketing communications shall contain a clear and unambiguous statement that all the holders of the asset-referenced tokens do not have a claim on the reserve assets or cannot redeem those reserve assets with the issuer at any time. ### deleted


### 2. issuers of asset-referenced tokens shall as soon as possible and in a clear , accurate and transparent manner disclose on their website the outcome of the audit of the reserve assets referred to in article 32. ### 2. issuers of asset-referenced tokens shall not later than 10 working days of the completing of the audit in a clear , accurate and transparent manner disclose on their website the outcome of the audit of the reserve assets referred to in article 32.


### any natural persons who either own , directly or indirectly , more than 20% of the asset-backed crypto-asset issuer's share capital or voting rights , or who exercise , by any other means , a power of control over the said issuer; ### any natural persons who either own , directly or indirectly , more than 5% of the asset-backed crypto-asset issuer's share capital or voting rights , or who exercise , by any other means , a power of control over the said issuer;


### 2. issuers of asset-referenced tokens shall disclose to the holders of their asset-referenced tokens the general nature and sources of conflicts of interest and the steps taken to mitigate them. ### 2. issuers of asset-referenced tokens shall disclose to the holders of their asset-referenced tokens and to the competent authority the general nature and sources of conflicts of interest and the steps taken to mitigate them.


### 3. natural persons who either own , directly or indirectly , more than 20% of the share capital or voting rights of issuers of asset-referenced tokens , or who exercise , by any other means , a power of control over such issuers shall have the necessary good repute and competence. ### 3. natural persons who either own , directly or indirectly , more than 5% of the share capital or voting rights of issuers of asset-referenced tokens , or who exercise , by any other means , a power of control over such issuers shall have the necessary good repute and competence.


### the rights or the absence of rights granted to the holders of asset-referenced tokens , as specified in article 35; ### the rights granted to the holders of asset-referenced tokens , as specified in article 35;


### 12. the eba , in close cooperation with esma , shall develop draft regulatory technical standards specifying the minimum content of the governance arrangements on: ### 12. the eba , in close cooperation with esma and the escb , shall develop draft regulatory technical standards specifying the minimum content of the governance arrangements on:


### 3. competent authorities of the home member states may require issuers of asset-referenced tokens to hold an amount of own funds which is up to 20 % higher than the amount resulting from the application of paragraph 1 , point (b) , or permit such issuers to hold an amount of own funds which is up to 20 % lower than the amount resulting from the application of paragraph 1 , point (b) , where an assessment of the following indicates a higher or a lower degree of risk: ### 3. competent authorities of the home member states may require issuers of asset-referenced tokens to hold an amount of own funds which is up to 20 % higher than the amount resulting from the application of paragraph 1 , point (b) , where an assessment of the following indicates a higher degree of risk:


### the criteria for requiring higher own funds or for allowing lower own funds , as set out in paragraph 3. ### the criteria for requiring higher own funds , as set out in paragraph 3.


### a. whereas the issue of harmful tax practices is debated in the report of its committee on economic and monetary affairs of 21 july 2021 on reforming the eu policy on harmful tax practices (including the reform of the code of conduct group); ### a. whereas the issue of harmful tax practices was debated in the parliament's resolution on reforming the eu policy on harmful tax practices (including the reform of the code of conduct group);


### b. whereas although tax policy largely remains a member state responsibility , the single market requires a minimum degree of coordination in setting tax policy1 ; ### b. whereas although tax policy largely remains a member state responsibility , the single market requires coordination in setting tax policy1 whereas national measures impact tax collection of other member states and can have a distortive effect on both fair competition and investments;


### c. whereas tax policy fragmentation creates various obstacles for companies and citizens in the single market , including legal uncertainty , red tape , the risk of double taxation and difficulties claiming tax refunds; whereas these obstacles discourage cross-border economic activity in the single market; whereas policy fragmentation also creates risks for tax authorities such as double non-taxation and arbitrage possibilities (such as tax planning); ### c. whereas tax policy fragmentation creates various obstacles for companies and citizens in the single market , including legal uncertainty , red tape , the risk of double taxation and difficulties claiming tax refunds; whereas these obstacles discourage cross-border economic activity in the single market; whereas policy fragmentation also creates risks for tax authorities such as double non-taxation and arbitrage possibilities (such as aggressive tax planning); whereas some tax loopholes between member states legislations , or between member states and third countries , have been exploited as tax avoidance schemes;


### d. whereas within the eu’s social market economy , adequate tax levels and simple and clear tax laws should not distort economic actors’ decision-making; whereas sound tax policies should support the creation of jobs and economic growth and improve the competitiveness of the eu and its member states; ### d. whereas within the eu’s social market economy , adequate tax levels and simple and clear tax laws should not distort economic actors’ decision-making; whereas sound tax policies should support the fulfilment of policy objectives stated in art. 3 of the teu , including full employment , sustainable growth , social progress and improve the competitiveness of the eu and its member states;


### e. whereas the overall level of taxation differs considerably between member states , as demonstrated by the fact that the tax-to-gdp ratio varied between 22.1 % in ireland and 46.1 % in denmark in 20192 ; whereas on aggregate , the tax burden in the eu (40.1 %) is high even when compared to other advanced economies (the organisation for economic co-operation and development (oecd) average was 34.3 % in 2018); ### e. whereas the overall level of taxation (understood as taxes and compulsory actual social contributions) differs considerably between member states , as demonstrated by the fact that the tax-to-gdp ratio varied between 22.1 % in ireland and 46.1 % in denmark in 20192 ; whereas on aggregate , the tax burden in the eu (40.1 %) is higher than some other advanced economies (the organisation for economic co-operation and development (oecd) average was 34.3 % in 2018);


### 1. recalls that member states are free to decide on their own economic policies and in particular their own tax policies; recalls , however , that member states must exercise this competence consistently with union law; ### 1. recalls that member states are free to decide on their own economic policies and in particular their own tax policies; recalls , however , that member states must exercise this competence consistently with union law; reminds about the existence of the art. 116 tfeu;


### 3. highlights that differences in national tax regimes present obstacles to smes trying to operate across borders; stresses that compared to multinational enterprises , smes have fewer resources to spend on tax compliance and tax optimisation; points out that the share of expenditure used for tax compliance purposes is higher for smes than for multinational enterprises; ### 3. highlights that differences in national tax regimes present obstacles to smes trying to operate across borders; stresses that compared to multinational enterprises , smes have fewer resources to spend on tax compliance while mnes can engage into aggressive tax planning; points out that the share of expenditure used for tax compliance purposes is higher for smes than for multinational enterprises; recalls that some member states has developed schemes that would tax profits made in an international context at a lower rate than the national nominal rate , thus putting smes at a competitive disadvantage3a;


### 7. highlights that the ideal level for tax policy coordination is on the international stage through the g20/oecd; notes that eu tax proposals based on international agreements have historically been more likely to be adopted by the council; ### 7. highlights that the ideal level for tax policy coordination is on the international stage through the g20/oecd; notes that eu tax proposals based on international agreements have historically been more likely to be adopted by the council; urges the commission and member states to work together and ensure the transposition into eu law of the inclusive framework agreement on the two pillars as announced by the president of the commission in its state of the union letter of intent 2021; recognises that the economic integration of the eu requires more coordination than other economic areas; notes that when translating the beps 15 action of the base erosion and profit shifting project from oecd/g20 , the eu went further in adding controlled foreign company rules into the anti-tax avoidance directive;


### 7. highlights that the ideal level for tax policy coordination is on the international stage through the g20/oecd; notes that eu tax proposals based on international agreements have historically been more likely to be adopted by the council; ### 7. highlights that the ideal level for tax policy coordination is on the international stage through the g20/oecd; notes that eu tax proposals based on international agreements have historically been more likely to be adopted by the council; encourages , in that regard , member states to push for similar international agreements that address the race to the bottom environment in capital gains taxes and personal income taxes for highly mobile individuals;


### 7. highlights that the ideal level for tax policy coordination is on the international stage through the g20/oecd; notes that eu tax proposals based on international agreements have historically been more likely to be adopted by the council; ### 7. highlights that tax policy coordination on the international stage managed to achieve significant results in recent years; notes that eu tax proposals based on international agreements have historically been more likely to be adopted by the council;


### 9. notes that digitalisation and a heavy reliance on intangible assets that pose challenges to the current tax system warrant a high degree of policy coordination; deplores the fact that some member states have pressed ahead with the introduction of national digital taxes despite ongoing negotiations at eu and oecd levels; stresses that these national measures should be phased out following the implementation of an effective international solution; ### 9. notes that digitalisation and a heavy reliance on intangible assets that pose challenges to the current tax system warrant a high degree of policy coordination; notes the fact that some member states have pressed ahead with the introduction of national digital taxes despite ongoing negotiations at eu and oecd levels; stresses that these national measures should be phased out following the implementation of an effective international solution; reminds that the eu agreed to a digital levy as part of the own resources to finance the next generation eu recovery instrument and urges the commission to come forward with alternative proposals that will be compatible with the international commitment;


### 10. deplores the debt equity bias in corporate taxation that allows for generous tax deductions on interest payments , while equity financing costs cannot be deducted in a similar manner; highlights the structural disadvantage facing companies that rely on equity financing , which are often young and small companies with poor access to credit; ### 10. deplores the debt equity bias in corporate taxation that allows for generous tax deductions on interest payments , while equity financing costs cannot be deducted in a similar manner; highlights the structural disadvantage facing companies that rely on equity financing , especially if they are young and small companies with poor access to credit;


### 11. notes that debt equity bias varies considerably between the member states; welcomes the fact that some member states have introduced allowances for corporate equity to address this issue; stresses that a common european approach would be preferable in order to avoid distortions in the single market; ### 11. notes that debt equity bias varies considerably between the member states; notes the fact that some member states have introduced allowances for corporate equity to address this issue; recalls that part of such allowances for corporate equity have proven to be exploited as tax loopholes allowing mnes to artificially deduct national interests; stresses that a common european approach would be preferable in order to avoid distortions in the single market; reminds that such bias can be tackled by either allowing for new deduction of costs related to equity financing or by reducing the interest deduction possibilities; recalls the parliament’s proposal to limit the deduction of exceeding borrowing costs to up to 20 % of the taxpayer's earnings before interest , tax , depreciation and amortisation (ebitda) while the council adopted a higher threshold of up to 30%1a; recalls that , according to the oecd , a ratio of 30 % may be too high to be effective in preventing base erosion and profit shifting1b;


### 12. looks forward to the commission’s proposal for a debt equity bias reduction allowance5 ; ### 12. looks forward to the commission’s proposal for a debt equity bias reduction allowance5; urges the commission to incorporate strong anti-avoidance provisions to avoid any allowance on equity to be used as a new tool for base erosion;


### 13. notes that the effective marginal tax rate (emtr) is often a decisive factor for corporations making investment decisions; notes that there is considerable variation in the emtr across member states; invites the commission to look into whether some member states are distorting competition by artificially lowering their emtr , e.g. through accelerated depreciation schedules or adjusting the tax deductibility of certain items; ### 13. notes that the effective marginal tax rate (emtr) can be a factor for corporations making investment decisions , together with the quality of infrastructure , the availability of an educated , healthy workforce , and stability13a; notes that there is considerable variation in the emtr across member states; invites the commission to look into whether some member states are distorting competition by artificially lowering their emtr , e.g. through accelerated depreciation schedules or adjusting the tax deductibility of certain items , and to communicate its results to the parliament;


### 13. notes that the effective marginal tax rate (emtr) is often a decisive factor for corporations making investment decisions; notes that there is considerable variation in the emtr across member states; invites the commission to look into whether some member states are distorting competition by artificially lowering their emtr , e.g. through accelerated depreciation schedules or adjusting the tax deductibility of certain items; ### 13. notes that the effective marginal tax rate (emtr) is often a decisive factor for corporations making investment decisions; notes that there is considerable variation in the emtr across member states; invites the commission to look into whether some member states are distorting competition by artificially lowering their emtr , e.g. through accelerated depreciation schedules or adjusting the tax deductibility of certain items; highlights that , under art. 116 tfeu , market distortions caused by national legal provisions can be eliminated through an ordinary legislative procedure;


### 14. highlights that tax incentives for private research and development (e.g. via tax credits , enhanced allowances or adjusted depreciation schedules) can help to lift an economy’s overall spending towards research and development , which often comes with positive externalities; is concerned , however , that certain types of tax incentives such as patent box / intellectual property box regimes do little to increase research and development spending and may actually distort the single market; ### 14. highlights that tax incentives for private research and development (e.g. via tax credits , enhanced allowances or adjusted depreciation schedules) can help to lift an economy’s overall spending towards research and development , which often comes with positive externalities; is concerned , however , that certain types of tax incentives such as patent box / intellectual property box regimes do little to increase research and development spending and may actually distort the single market; recommends incentives that target input of innovation rather than output , meaning incentives that are costs-based and not profit-based;


### 15. stresses that further harmonisation regarding tax incentives for research and development spending may be warranted; notes that that this was part of the commission’s initial common corporate tax base proposal; deplores the fact that the topic was not addressed in the recent communication on business taxation for the 21st century; ### 15. stresses that further harmonisation regarding tax incentives for research and development spending may be warranted; notes that that this was part of the commission’s initial common corporate tax base proposal; deplores the fact that the topic was not addressed in the recent communication on business taxation for the 21st century; demands the commission to propose guidelines on tax incentives that are not distortive for the single market , notably by favouring incentives that are cost-based , limited in time , regularly assessed , and repealed in case of no positive impact , limited in geographical scope and rather partial than full exemptions;


### 16. takes note of the commission’s ongoing work on an eu taxation scoreboard and calls on the commission to inform parliament about its political intentions and the possible financial implications of this system; ### 16. welcomes the commission’s ongoing work on an eu taxation scoreboard and calls on the commission to inform parliament about its political intentions; recommends the recourse to economic indicators that will allow for the identifications of distortion of the single market , such as the levels of fdi , royalties and interests payments; suggests that such work allows for the establishment of enhanced country specific recommendations to member states that would help ensure well coordinated tax policies across the eu;


### 16. takes note of the commission’s ongoing work on an eu taxation scoreboard and calls on the commission to inform parliament about its political intentions and the possible financial implications of this system; ### 16. takes note of the commission’s ongoing work on an eu taxation scoreboard; highlights that such tool must contribute to the fight against tax competition; urges the commission to duly take into account the massive public revenue losses imposed by national tax policies that are facilitating tax avoidance;


### a. whereas the fiscal system must be reformed if the state is to continue establishing the preconditions for inclusive and sustainable well-being; ### a. whereas the fiscal system must be reformed by shifting the tax mix , making the tax system fairer and adjusting our redistributive mechanisms if the state is to continue establishing the preconditions for inclusive and sustainable well-being;


### c. whereas tax morale is generally higher in countries that tax more heavily , which is evidence for the willingness of citizens to pay tax in return for effective public services9 ; ### c. whereas tax morale is generally higher in countries that tax more heavily , which is evidence for the willingness of citizens to pay tax in return for effective public services and a social safety net9 ;


### e. whereas small and medium-sized enterprises (smes) are particularly affected by the complexities of the tax system and tax compliance , disproportionately so compared to multinational enterprises (mnes); ### e. whereas small and medium-sized enterprises (smes) are particularly affected by the complexities of the tax system and tax compliance , disproportionately so compared to multinational enterprises (mnes); reiterates the importance of a smart financial system giving value to local small and medium sized enterprises (smes);


### 3. underlines that taxation and tax collection have shifted the tax incidence from wealth to income , from capital to labour income and consumption , from mnes to smes , and from the financial sector to the real economy; observes with concern this shift in the tax burden from more mobile to less mobile taxpayers , resulting in a lower average tax burden for the very income-rich11 ; ### 3. underlines that taxation and tax collection have shifted the tax incidence from wealth to income , from capital to labour income and consumption , from mnes to smes , and from the financial sector to the real economy; observes with concern this shift in the tax burden from more mobile to less mobile taxpayers , resulting in a lower average tax burden for the very income-rich11 ; notes that this further intensifies the race to the bottom in corporate as well as wealth taxation between member states;


### 3. underlines that taxation and tax collection have shifted the tax incidence from wealth to income , from capital to labour income and consumption , from mnes to smes , and from the financial sector to the real economy; observes with concern this shift in the tax burden from more mobile to less mobile taxpayers , resulting in a lower average tax burden for the very income-rich11 ; ### 3. underlines that taxation and tax collection have shifted the tax incidence from wealth to income , from capital to labour income and consumption , from mnes to smes , and from the financial sector to the real economy , thus becoming more regressive; observes with concern this shift in the tax burden from more mobile to less mobile taxpayers , resulting in a lower average tax burden for the very income-rich11 ;


### 4. points out that technological progress and economic integration are making the taxpayers and tax bases of all types of tax increasingly mobile12 ; notes that this could reinforce the tendency to rely on immobile tax bases; ### 4. points out that technological progress and economic integration are making the taxpayers and tax bases of all types of tax increasingly mobile12 ; notes that this could reinforce the tendency to rely on immobile tax bases; highlights that under these circumstances , particularly when considering the freedom of capital and freedom of movement within the european union , it is paramount to establish harmonised rules that provide more tax certainty and contribute to a level playing field;


### 5. observes that in spite of the numerous calls for shifting taxation from labour to pollution , revenues from taxes on pollution and resources in particular have remained very low , and yet they offer a potential source for increasing revenue through the application of the ‘polluter pays’ principle and are difficult to evade owing to the character of the tax base; ### 5. observes that in spite of the numerous calls for shifting taxation from labour to pollution , revenues from taxes on pollution and resources in particular have remained very low , and yet they offer a potential source for increasing revenue through the application of the ‘polluter pays’ principle and are difficult to evade owing to the character of the tax base; notes that currently in the eu almost 50% percent of taxation come from labour whereas only 6% is related to all uses of natural resources , including fuels , metals , minerals , pollution of water , air and soil , and emissions of co2 and other greenhouse gases11a


### 5. observes that in spite of the numerous calls for shifting taxation from labour to pollution , revenues from taxes on pollution and resources in particular have remained very low , and yet they offer a potential source for increasing revenue through the application of the ‘polluter pays’ principle and are difficult to evade owing to the character of the tax base; ### 5. regrets that in spite of the numerous calls for shifting taxation from labour to pollution , revenues from taxes on pollution and resources in particular have remained very low , accounting for a mere 0.2% of the total tax revenue in the eu12a; highlights the potential of increasing revenue through the application of the ‘polluter pays’ principle and that such taxes are difficult to evade owing to the character of the tax base;


### 8. notes with concern that the impact of the covid-19 pandemic is highly regressive , with the poorest households being the most severely hit14 ; regrets that large companies that realise excess profits , such as e-commerce businesses and wealthy individuals who realise significant capital gains through speculation , are often undertaxed; ### 8. notes with concern that the impact of the covid-19 pandemic is highly regressive , with the poorest households being the most severely hit14 ; reminds that an inclusive and sustainable economic recovery is a priority; regrets that large companies that realise excess profits , such as e-commerce businesses and wealthy individuals who realise significant capital gains through speculation , are often undertaxed; notes the growing discussion regarding how taxation can mitigate the negative impacts of the extreme accumulation of wealth and profits;


### 9. highlights that environmental taxes have the potential to cover the need for additional revenue while supporting a resilient , competitive , sustainable and carbon-free economy; calls on member states to consider expanding the tax base for environmental taxes through inter alia natural resource taxes , distance-based charges in the transport sector , fuel prices , and the taxation of deforestation , landfill , incineration , pesticides and fertilizers; ### 9. highlights that environmental taxes have the potential to cover the need for additional revenue while supporting a resilient , competitive , sustainable and carbon-free economy; calls on member states to consider expanding the tax base for environmental taxes through inter alia natural resource taxes , distance-based charges in the transport sector , fuel prices , and the taxation of deforestation , landfill , incineration , pesticides and fertilizers; stresses that the member states should ensure a just transition and continue to fight actively against any new forms of poverty;


### 9. highlights that environmental taxes have the potential to cover the need for additional revenue while supporting a resilient , competitive , sustainable and carbon-free economy; calls on member states to consider expanding the tax base for environmental taxes through inter alia natural resource taxes , distance-based charges in the transport sector , fuel prices , and the taxation of deforestation , landfill , incineration , pesticides and fertilizers; ### 9. highlights that environmental taxes have the potential to cover the need for additional revenue while supporting a resilient , competitive , sustainable and carbon-free economy; calls on member states to consider expanding the tax base for environmental taxes through inter alia natural resource taxes , distance-based charges in the transport sector , fuel prices , and the taxation of deforestation , landfill , incineration , pesticides and fertilizers; urges all member states to prevent a 'race to the bottom' in environmental taxation;


### 10. underlines that environmental taxation should be accompanied by a general tax shift , such as to lower labour income taxes and social security contributions , to protect low-income households from regressive effects and to build more resilient , economically efficient and fairer tax systems15 ; notes that the specific tax design is at least as important as the tax type; ### 10. stresses that a successful climate transition requires a socially sustainable approach; underlines that environmental taxation should be accompanied by a general tax shift , namely by lowering labour income taxes and social security contributions , to protect low-income households from regressive effects and to build more resilient , economically efficient and fairer tax systems15 ; notes that the specific tax design is at least as important as the tax type;


### 11. warns that national budgets cannot rely on environmental taxes alone , as some of these revenues will fall as environmental harm decreases over time; calls on member states to develop holistic tax reforms , shifting taxation from labour to not only pollution but also capital and wealth16 ; ### 11. warns that national budgets cannot rely on environmental taxes alone , as some of these revenues will fall as environmental harm decreases over time; calls on member states to develop holistic tax reforms that safeguard long-term fiscal sustainability , shifting taxation from labour to not only pollution but also capital and wealth16 ; highlights that such options would dramatically benefit from a coordinated approach that prevents capital flight and the erosion of each country's tax base;


### 12. calls on member states to revise tax expenditure in all tax areas; calls on member states to perform annual , detailed and public cost-benefit analyses of each tax provision; ### 12. calls on member states to revise tax expenditure in all tax areas; calls on member states to perform annual , detailed and public cost-benefit analyses of each tax provision; encourages the removal of tax expenditures which are at odds with the european union’s political priorities , namely the european green deal;