### the first subparagraph shall not apply if the person has already been granted international protection by the responsible member state. ### the first subparagraph shall not apply if the person has already been granted international protection by the responsible member state , provided that the beneficiary does not claim before a judge that in the member state primarily designated as responsible there are substantial grounds for believing that he or she would be in danger of being subjected to torture or inhuman or degrading treatments and punishments , in contrast with article 4 of the eu charter of fundamental rights , pursuant to article 8 (3).


### 1. if a member state where an application for international protection has been registered considers that another member state is responsible for examining the application , it shall , without delay and in any event within two months of the date on which the application was registered , request that other member state to take charge of the applicant. ### 1. if a member state where an application for international protection has been registered considers that another member state is responsible for examining the application , it shall , without delay and in any event within three months of the date on which the application was registered , request that other member state to take charge of the applicant.


### notwithstanding the first subparagraph , in the case of a eurodac hit with data recorded pursuant to articles 13 and 14a of regulation (eu) xxx/xxx [eurodac regulation] or of a vis hit with data recorded pursuant to article 21 of regulation (ec) no 767/2008 , the request to take charge shall be sent within one month of receiving that hit. ### notwithstanding the first subparagraph , in the case of a eurodac hit with data recorded pursuant to articles 13 and 14a of regulation (eu) xxx/xxx [eurodac regulation] or of a vis hit with data recorded pursuant to article 21 of regulation (ec) no 767/2008 , the request to take charge shall be sent within two months of receiving that hit.


### where the applicant is an unaccompanied minor , the determining member state may , where it considers that it is in the best interest of the minor , continue the procedure for determining the member state responsible and request another member state to take charge of the applicant despite the expiry of the time limits laid down in the first and second subparagraphs. ### where the applicant is an unaccompanied minor or the request is based on article 16 or 17 , the determining member state may , continue the procedure for determining the member state responsible and request another member state to take charge of the applicant despite the expiry of the time limits laid down in the first and second subparagraphs.


### submitting a take back notification ### submitting a take back request


### 1. in a situation referred to in article 26(1) , point (b) , (c) or (d) the member state where the person is present shall make a take back notification without delay and in any event within two weeks after receiving the eurodac hit. ### 1. in a situation referred to in article 26(1) , point (b) , the member state where the person is present shall make a take back request without delay and in any event within two weeks after receiving the eurodac hit. where the take back request is not made within the established time limit , the responsibility for examining the application for international protection shall lie with the member state where the applicant is present.


### 3. the notified member state shall confirm receipt of the notification to the member state which made the notification within one week , unless the notified member state can demonstrate within that time limit that its responsibility has ceased pursuant to article 27. ### 3. the requested member state shall accept the request of the member state which made the request within four weeks , unless the requested member state can demonstrate within that time limit that it is not responsible pursuant to article 27.


### 4. failure to act within the one-week period set out in paragraph 3 shall be tantamount to confirming the receipt of the notification. ### 4. failure to act within the four-weeks period set out in paragraph 3 shall be tantamount to confirming the receipt of the request.


### 5. the commission shall , by means of implementing acts , adopt uniform conditions for the preparation and submission of take back notifications. those implementing acts shall be adopted in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in article 67(2). ### 5. the commission shall , by means of implementing acts , adopt uniform conditions for the preparation and submission of take back requests. those implementing acts shall be adopted in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in article 67(2).


### 1. the determining member state whose take charge request as regards the applicant referred to in article 26(1) , point (a) was accepted or who made a take back notification as regards persons referred to in article 26(1) , point (b) , (c) and (d) shall take a transfer decision at the latest within one week of the acceptance or notification. ### 1. the determining member state whose take charge request as regards the applicant referred to in article 26(1) , point (a) was accepted or who made a take back notification as regards persons referred to in article 26(1) , point (b) , shall take a transfer decision at the latest within one week of the acceptance or notification.


### 2. where the requested member state accepts to take charge of an applicant or to take back a person referred to in article 26(1) , point (b) , (c) or (d) , the requesting or the notifying member state shall notify the person concerned in writing without delay of the decision to transfer him or her to the member state responsible and , where applicable , of the fact that it will not examine his or her application for international protection. ### 2. where the requested member state accepts to take charge of an applicant or to take back a person referred to in article 26(1) , point (b) , the requesting or the notifying member state shall notify the person concerned in writing within one week of the decision to transfer him or her to the member state responsible and , where applicable , of the fact that it will not examine his or her application for international protection.


### 4. the decision referred to in paragraph 1 shall contain information on the legal remedies available , including on the right to apply for suspensive effect , and on the time limits applicable for seeking such remedies and for carrying out the transfer , and shall , if necessary , contain information on the place where , and the date on which , the person concerned is required to appear , if that person is travelling to the member state responsible by his or her own means. ### 4. the decision referred to in paragraph 1 shall be written in a language understandable to the applicant and contain information on the legal remedies available , including on the right to apply for suspensive effect , and on the time limits applicable for seeking such remedies and for carrying out the transfer , and shall , if necessary , contain information on the place where , and the date on which , the person concerned is required to appear , if that person is travelling to the member state responsible by his or her own means.


### 1. the applicant or another person as referred to in article 26(1) , point (b) , (c) and (d) shall have the right to an effective remedy , in the form of an appeal or a review , in fact and in law , against a transfer decision , before a court or tribunal. ### 1. the applicant or another person as referred to in article 26(1) , point (b) , shall have the right to an effective remedy with automatic suspensive effect , in the form of an appeal or a review , in fact and in law , against a transfer decision , before a court or tribunal.


### the scope of the remedy shall be limited to an assessment of: ### deleted


### 3. the person concerned shall have the right to request , within a reasonable period of time from the notification of the transfer decision , a court or tribunal to suspend the implementation of the transfer decision pending the outcome of his or her appeal or review. member states shall ensure that an effective remedy is in place by suspending the transfer until the decision on the first suspension request is taken. any decision on whether to suspend the implementation of the transfer decision shall be taken within one month of the date when that request reached the competent court or tribunal. ### 3. member states shall ensure that an effective remedy shall confer on the person concerned the right to remain in the member state concerned pending the outcome of the appeal or review , the transfer shall be automatically suspended until the decision on the first suspension request is taken. any decision to suspend the implementation of the transfer decision shall be taken within one month of the date when that request reached the competent court or tribunal.


### where the person concerned has not exercised his or her right to request suspensive effect , the appeal against , or review of , the transfer decision shall not suspend the implementation of a transfer decision. ### deleted


### 5. member states shall ensure that legal assistance is granted on request free of charge where the person concerned cannot afford the costs involved. member states may provide that , as regards fees and other costs , the treatment of persons subject to this regulation shall not be more favourable than the treatment generally accorded to their nationals in matters pertaining to legal assistance. ### 5. member states shall ensure that legal assistance is granted free of charge , at all stages of the procedure , where the person concerned cannot afford the costs involved , according to article 11a of this regulation. member states may provide that , as regards fees and other costs , the treatment of persons subject to this regulation shall not be more favourable than the treatment generally accorded to their nationals in matters pertaining to legal assistance.


### without arbitrarily restricting access to legal assistance , member states may provide that free legal assistance and representation is not to be granted where the appeal or review is considered by the competent authority or a court or tribunal to have no tangible prospect of success. ### deleted


### where a decision not to grant free legal assistance and representation pursuant to the second subparagraph is taken by an authority other than a court or tribunal , member states shall provide the right to an effective remedy before a court or tribunal to challenge that decision. where the decision is challenged , that remedy shall be an integral part of the remedy referred to in paragraph 1. ### deleted


### in complying with the requirements set out in this paragraph , member states shall ensure that legal assistance and representation is not arbitrarily restricted and that effective access to justice for the person concerned is not hindered. ### deleted


### legal assistance shall include at least the preparation of the required procedural documents and representation before a court or tribunal and may be restricted to legal advisors or counsellors specifically designated by national law to provide assistance and representation. ### legal assistance shall be in line with article 11a.


### procedures for access to legal assistance shall be laid down in national law. ### deleted


### 1. member states shall not hold a person in detention for the sole reason that he or she is subject to the procedure established by this regulation. ### 1. member states shall not hold a person in detention for the sole reason that he or she is subject to the procedure established by this regulation. detention shall , in any case , be a measure of last resort when alternatives are not available.


### 2. where there is a risk of absconding , member states may detain the person concerned in order to secure transfer procedures in accordance with this regulation , on the basis of an individual assessment and only in so far as detention is proportional and other less coercive alternative measures cannot be applied effectively , based on an individual assessment of the person’s circumstances. ### 2. where there is a proven risk of absconding , member states , as measure of last resort , may detain the person concerned in order to secure a transfer after a final transfer decision has been taken and notified in accordance with this regulation , on the basis of an individual assessment and only in so far as detention is proportional and other less coercive alternative measures cannot be applied effectively , based on an individual assessment of the person’s circumstances.


### 3. detention shall be for as short a period as possible and shall be for no longer than the time reasonably necessary to fulfil the required administrative procedures with due diligence until the transfer under this regulation is carried out. ### 3. detention shall be for as short a period as possible and shall be for no longer than the time reasonably necessary to fulfil the required administrative procedures with due diligence until the transfer under this regulation is carried out , and in any case shall not exceed three months.


### where an applicant or another person referred to in article 26(1) , point (b) , (c) or (d) is detained pursuant to this article , the period for submitting a take charge request or a take back notification shall not exceed two weeks from the registration of the application. where a person is detained at a later stage than the registration of the application , the period for submitting a take charge request or a take back notification shall not exceed one week from the date on which the person was placed in detention. the member state carrying out the procedure in accordance with this regulation shall ask for an urgent reply on a take charge request. such reply shall be given within one week of receipt of the take charge request. failure to reply within the one-week period shall be tantamount to accepting the take charge request and shall entail the obligation to take charge of the person , including the obligation to provide for proper arrangements for arrival. ### where an applicant or another person referred to in article 26(1) , point (b) , is detained pursuant to this article , the period for submitting a take charge request or a take back request shall not exceed two weeks from the registration of the application. where a person is detained at a later stage than the registration of the application , the period for submitting a take charge request or a take back notification shall not exceed one week from the date on which the person was placed in detention. the member state carrying out the procedure in accordance with this regulation shall ask for an urgent reply on a take charge request. such reply shall be given within one week of receipt of the take charge request. failure to reply within the one-week period shall be tantamount to accepting the take charge request and shall entail the obligation to take charge of the person , including the obligation to provide for proper arrangements for arrival.


### 4. where a person is detained pursuant to this article , the detention shall be ordered in writing by judicial authorities. the detention order shall state the reasons in fact and in law on which it is based. ### 4. where a person is detained pursuant to this article , the detention shall be ordered in writing by judicial authorities. the detention order shall state the reasons in fact and in law on which it is based and shall contain a reference to the consideration of the available alternatives and the reasons as to way they could not be applied effectively.


### 5. as regards the detention conditions and the guarantees applicable to applicants detained , in order to secure the transfer procedures to the member state responsible , articles 9 , 10 and 11 of directive xxx/xxx/eu [reception conditions directive] shall apply. ### 5. as regards the detention conditions , which shall fully respect the person's fundamental rights and the guarantees applicable to applicants detained , in order to secure the transfer procedures to the member state responsible , articles 9 , 10 and 11 of directive xxx/xxx/eu [reception conditions directive] shall apply.


### 1. the transfer of an applicant or of another person as referred to in article 26(1) , point (b) , (c) and (d) , from the requesting or notifying member state to the member state responsible shall be carried out in accordance with the national law of the requesting or notifying member state , after consultation between the member states concerned , as soon as practically possible , and at the latest within six months of the acceptance of the take charge request or of the confirmation of the take back notification by another member state or of the final decision on an appeal or review of a transfer decision where there is a suspensive effect in accordance with article 33(3). that time limit may be extended up to a maximum of one year if the transfer cannot be carried out due to imprisonment of the person concerned. ### 1. the transfer of an applicant or of another person as referred to in article 26(1) , point (b) , from the requesting or notifying member state to the member state responsible shall be carried out in accordance with the national law of the requesting or notifying member state , after consultation between the member states concerned , as soon as practically possible , and at the latest within six months of the acceptance of the take charge request or of the confirmation of the take back request by another member state or of the final decision on an appeal or review of a transfer decision where there is a suspensive effect in accordance with article 33(3). that time limit may be extended up to a maximum of one year if the transfer cannot be carried out due to imprisonment of the person concerned for criminal purposes.


### notwithstanding the first subparagraph , where the person concerned absconds and the requesting or notifying member state informs the member state responsible before the expiry of the time limits set out in paragraph 1 , first subparagraph , that the person concerned has absconded , the transferring member state shall retain the right to carry out the transfer within the remaining time at a later stage , should the person become available to the authorities again , unless another member state has carried out the procedures in accordance with this regulation and transferred the person to the responsible member state after the person absconded. ### deleted


### 1. in accordance with article 17 of regulation (eu) xxx/xxx [asylum and migration fund] , a contribution shall be paid to the member state carrying out the transfer for the transfer of an applicant or another person as referred to in article 26(1) , point (b) , (c) or (d) , pursuant to article 35. ### 1. the costs necessary to transfer an applicant or another person to the member state responsible shall be met by the general budget of the union.


### 1. the member state carrying out the transfer of an applicant or of another person as referred to in article 26(1) , point (b) , (c) or (d) , shall communicate to the member state responsible such personal data concerning the person to be transferred as is adequate , relevant and limited to what is necessary for the sole purposes of ensuring that the competent authorities , in accordance with national law in the member state responsible , are in a position to provide that person with adequate assistance , including the provision of immediate health care required in order to protect his or her vital interests , to ensure continuity in the protection and rights afforded by this regulation and by other applicable asylum legal instruments. those data shall be communicated to the member state responsible within a reasonable period of time before a transfer is carried out , in order to ensure that its competent authorities in under national law have sufficient time to take the necessary measures. ### 1. the member state carrying out the transfer of an applicant or of another person as referred to in article 26(1) , point (b) , shall communicate to the member state responsible such personal data concerning the person to be transferred as is adequate , relevant and limited to what is necessary for the sole purposes of ensuring that the competent authorities , in accordance with national law in the member state responsible , are in a position to provide that person with adequate assistance , including the provision of immediate health care required in order to protect his or her vital interests , to ensure continuity in the protection and rights afforded by this regulation and by other applicable asylum legal instruments. those data shall be communicated to the member state responsible within a reasonable period of time before a transfer is carried out , in order to ensure that its competent authorities in under national law have sufficient time to take the necessary measures.


### 3. provided it is necessary for the examination of the application for international protection , the member state responsible may request another member state to let it know on what grounds the applicant bases his or her application and , where applicable , the grounds for any decisions taken concerning the applicant. the other member state may refuse to respond to the request submitted to it , if the communication of such information is likely to harm its essential interests or the protection of the liberties and fundamental rights of the person concerned or of others. in any event , communication of the information requested shall be subject to the written approval of the applicant for international protection , obtained by the requesting member state. in that case , the applicant must know for what specific information he or she is giving his or her approval. ### 3. provided it is necessary for the examination of the application for international protection , the member state responsible may request another member state to let it know on what grounds the applicant bases his or her application and , where applicable , the grounds for any decisions taken concerning the applicant. the other member state may refuse to respond to the request submitted to it , if the communication of such information is likely to harm the protection of the liberties and fundamental rights of the person concerned or of others. in any event , communication of the information requested shall be subject to the written approval of the applicant for international protection , obtained by the requesting member state. in that case , the applicant must know for what specific information he or she is giving his or her approval.


### 3. before concluding or amending any arrangement as referred to in paragraph 1 , point (b) , the member states concerned shall consult the commission as to the compatibility of the arrangement with this regulation. ### 3. before concluding or amending any arrangement as referred to in paragraph 1 , point (b) , the member states concerned shall consult the commission as to the compatibility of the arrangement with this regulation and with other relevant provisions of eu law , including the charter of fundamental rights.


### 4. if the commission considers the arrangements referred to in paragraph 1 , point (b) , to be incompatible with this regulation , it shall , within a reasonable period , notify the member states concerned. the member states shall take all appropriate steps to amend the arrangement concerned within a reasonable time in such a way as to eliminate any incompatibilities observed. ### 4. if the commission considers the arrangements referred to in paragraph 1 , point (b) , to be incompatible with this regulation , and with any other relevant provisions of eu law including the charter of fundamental rights , it shall , within a reasonable period , notify the member states concerned. the member states shall take all appropriate steps to amend the arrangement concerned within a reasonable time in such a way as to eliminate any incompatibilities observed.


### b. whereas setting up trust funds and going beyond the eu’s budgetary rules undermines the principle of a single budget and creates a number of issues in terms of transparency and accountability; ### b. whereas setting up trust funds and going beyond the eu’s budgetary rules undermines the principle of a single budget and creates a number of issues in terms of sound financial management , transparency and accountability; whereas it increases the complexity of existing financial structures , which may lead to operational inefficiencies;


### 1. reiterates that these should be considered exceptional or emergency-led instruments whose added value and effects on the ground should be well justified and monitored; ### 1. notes that union trust funds are set up to react swiftly to challenging circumstances and to increase the flexibility of funding; reiterates however that these should be considered exceptional or emergency-led instruments whose added value and effects on the ground should be well justified and monitored; stresses the need to ensure that union trust funds bring clear political visibility for the union and that the objectives of union trust funds are aligned with the objectives of the union.


### 3. insists on the need to ensure that the objectives of the frt are consistent with the eu’s general principles , policies and objectives , including democracy , the rule of law and human rights; ### 3. insists on the need to ensure that the implementation of the frt and union trust funds is consistent with the eu’s general principles , policies and objectives , including democracy , the rule of law and human rights;


### 3. notes that committee chairs and relevant members have been granted observer status in meetings of the strategic boards of the trust funds and in the frt steering committee; notes further that this status has not been formally reflected in the constitutive agreements of the trust funds; ### 3. notes that committee chairs and relevant members have been granted observer status in meetings of the strategic boards of the trust funds and in the frt steering committee; notes further that this status has not been formally reflected in the constitutive agreements of the trust funds; regrets that its call to allow parliament to monitor the activities of the operational committee has not been answered and recalls its request to ensure that the parliament is represented at these meetings;


### c. whereas the facility for refugees in turkey (frt) differs from the other eu trust funds , mainly because it remains embedded within the budget of the eu; ### c. whereas the facility for refugees in turkey (frt) differs from the eu trust funds , mainly because it remains embedded within the budget of the eu;


### c. whereas parliament issued positive opinions in 2020 on the requests to extend the eutfs until the end of 2021; ### c. whereas parliament issued overall positive opinions in 2020 on the requests to extend the eutfs until the end of 2021 , while expressing concerns about the lack of transparency over the implementation of projects , with specific regard to the ones related to border and migration management , and under the condition , in the case of the africa trust fund , of providing mandatory guarantees on the respect of fundamental human rights in all funded projects;


### 4. calls on the commission to better address refugees’ needs for municipal infrastructure and socio-economic support , in order to improve the streamlining and complementarity of the assistance provided to them; ### 4. calls on the commission to better address refugees’ needs for municipal infrastructure and socio-economic support , as well as to ensure access to education , health , protection and other basic needs in order to improve the streamlining and complementarity of the assistance provided to them;


### 4. continues to expresses concerns over the limited role of parliament in the supervision and scrutiny of the union contributions to the eutfs; recalls parliament’s request to monitor the activities of the operational committee , and calls on the commission to provide in good time detailed information on the decisions taken in that committee and to ensure that parliament is represented at its meetings; ### 4. deeply regrets the limited role of parliament in the supervision and scrutiny of the union contributions to the eutfs; considers that the parliament should be able to monitor the activities of the operational committee , and calls on the commission to provide in good time detailed information on the decisions taken in that committee and to ensure that parliament is represented at its meetings;


### 5. calls on the commission to address the need to improve the operating environment for civil society organisations and the turkish authorities; ### 5. stresses the challenging working environment that non-governmental organisations face in the course of the implementation of the frt; invites the commission to address the need to improve the operating environment for civil society organisations , including through continuing the dialogue with the turkish authorities on issues involving registration and permits;


### 5. welcomes the commission’s efforts to closely monitor and evaluate interventions , and to generate knowledge about the activities of the eutfs and of the frt , through a dedicated set of reports; hails these efforts to achieve greater transparency by publishing relevant data on the web pages of the eutfs and the frt; ### 5. welcomes the commission’s efforts to closely monitor and evaluate interventions , and to generate knowledge about the activities of the eutfs and of the frt , through a dedicated set of reports; hails these efforts to achieve greater transparency by publishing relevant data on the web pages of the eutfs and the frt; considers , nevertheless , that the level of detail provided by the commission with regard to projects related to migration and border management has not always been sufficient for the parliament to adequately assess the implementation of these instruments;


### 6. underlines the need to make sure strict monitoring exercises and audits are carried out to ensure compliance with the financial regulation; invites the commission to scale up reporting on the frt and asks it to ensure that these funds specifically target refugee projects and are not used for any other purposes; ### 6. welcomes the monitoring reports provided through the facility results framework; underlines the need to make sure strict monitoring exercises and audits are carried out based on clear procedures to ensure compliance with the financial regulation; invites the commission to scale up reporting on the frt and provide all information necessary for the european parliament to exercise its right of scrutiny and control; asks it to ensure that these funds specifically target intended projects and are not used for any other purposes; in this context recalls the importance of accessibility of primary data on beneficiaries and traceability of eu funding and invites the commission to present the planned strategic mid-term evaluation of the frt;


### 6. regrets the late evaluations of some of the trust funds , which did not allow parliament to arrive at full and precise conclusions in a timely manner in the case of the trust fund for africa; ### 6. regrets the late notice from the commission on its intention to extend the duration of the eutfs and the late evaluations of some of the trust funds , which did not allow parliament to arrive at full and precise conclusions in a timely manner in the case of the trust fund for africa;


### 10. notes with appreciation the efforts and measures taken by the eu and its member states to support refugees in turkey; regrets , however , the general public’s lack of knowledge about these actions. ### 10. notes with appreciation the efforts and measures taken by the eu and its member states to support refugees in turkey; calls on the commission to improve its communication strategy and intensify its contact with the general public to communicate the efforts made by eu to support refugees and host communities in turkey.


### d. whereas the establishment of both the eutfs and the facility for refugees in turkey (frt) have been justified by the need for a flexible and swift reaction not possible under the classical institutional framework; whereas the extra-budgetary instruments such as the eutfs , as well as extraordinary tools such as the frt , pose challenges with respect to democratic accountability , including the role of the european parliament and also the integrity of the eu budget; ### d. whereas the establishment of both the eutfs and the facility for refugees in turkey (frt) have been justified by the need for a flexible , ad hoc and swift reaction not possible under the classical institutional framework and the limited resources and flexibility available in the eu budget; whereas the lisbon treaty reinforced the role of the european parliament to bring more coherence and democratic accountability and whereas the extra-budgetary instruments such as the eutfs , as well as extraordinary tools such as the frt pose challenges with respect to democratic accountability , including the role of the european parliament and also the integrity and unity of the eu budget;


### e. whereas parliament , while acknowledging their value-added , has repeatedly voiced the need for enhanced parliamentary scrutiny of the eutfs and the frt; ### e. whereas parliament , while acknowledging their value-added , has repeatedly voiced the need for enhanced parliamentary scrutiny of the eutfs and the frt and for stronger involvement in the preparation and negotiation of future eutfs and of the extension of existing eutfs and other financial instruments in the domain of eu external action; whereas , following the adoption of the 2021-27 mff and the inclusion of the european development fund in the eu budget , parliament’s demands have gained further relevance and legitimacy , taking into account that the biggest share of contributions to the eutfs are now coming from the eu budget itself , while contributions from member states represent a very limited share of the total eutfs’ budget;


### 7. considers that the bêkou trust fund has proven its value as an important tool to address the post-conflict situation in the central african republic (car); notes that the eutf made a major contribution to the nexus approach of development and humanitarian needs in the car; ### 7. considers that the bêkou trust fund has contributed to address the post-conflict situation in the central african republic (car); notes that the eutf made a major contribution to the nexus approach of development and humanitarian needs in the car;


### 13. considers that the trust fund for africa represents an important tool to provide a swift , flexible and targeted response to emerging challenges and underlines that common , global challenges , such as migration and forced displacement , the impact of climate change and economic crises in the context of the ongoing covid-19 pandemic , make this flexibility and rapidity more necessary than ever; ### 13. considers that the trust fund for africa should have represented , under the current circumstances , a tool to provide a swift , flexible and targeted response to emerging challenges and underlines that common , global challenges , such as migration and forced displacement , the impact of climate change and economic crises in the context of the ongoing covid-19 pandemic , make this flexibility and rapidity more necessary than ever; stresses , however , that flexibility needs to be always combined with full transparency and accountability of the decision-making process and underlines that focusing priorities on stopping migration flows has led to dangerous perverse effects and a substantial shift away from the original objectives of reducing poverty and tackling the root causes of migration;


### 14. welcomes the fact that the eutf for africa has contributed to the triple humanitarian-development-peace nexus approach , which was not possible with the eu financial instruments under the previous mff; ### 14. welcomes the fact that the eutf for africa has identified the goal of the triple humanitarian-development-peace nexus approach , which was not possible with the eu financial instruments under the previous mff; notes however that this nexus has often been contradicted and overcome by partnership agreements with actors allegedly responsible for violations of human rights , including training of armed forces and border guards and provision of equipment;


### 15. welcomes the generally strong degree of local ownership , the involvement of local authorities and civil society organisations (csos) in projects supported by the eutf for africa; ### deleted


### 16. notes that the eutf for africa made a major contribution to strengthening resilience and implementing the humanitarian-development nexus in fragile contexts; notes further that it also fostered cooperation between different stakeholders , and allowed contributions from non-eu donors , which in the post-brexit context have acquired particular importance , and increased the visibility of the issue of migration and forced displacement and the eu’s response to it; ### 16. notes that the eutf for africa made a contribution to strengthening resilience and implementing the humanitarian-development nexus in fragile contexts; notes further that it also fostered cooperation between different stakeholders , and allowed contributions from non-eu donors , which in the post-brexit context have acquired particular importance , and increased the visibility of the issue of migration and forced displacement and the eu’s response to it; regrets at the same time that the monitoring of the implementation of this fund has not been adequate and requests to include s.m.a.r.t. (specific , measurable , achievable , realistic and timely) objectives in the project long frames , as well as establish quantifiable targets for evaluating projects;


### 22. reiterates its request that turkey respect the principle of non-refoulement , in particular on the syrian border , and that it not use the flows of refugees against the eu; ### 22. expresses its concern about the legal status of syrian refugees in turkey , stresses the urgency to ensure that the human rights of migrants and refugees as guaranteed by the 1951 refugee convention are fully respected and reiterates its request that turkey respect the principle of non-refoulement , in particular on the syrian border. calls the turkish authorities to lift turkey’s geographical limitation to the 1951 refugee convention so that syrians can be recognised as refugees;


### 22. reiterates its request that turkey respect the principle of non-refoulement , in particular on the syrian border , and that it not use the flows of refugees against the eu; ### 22. reiterates its request that turkey respect the principle of non-refoulement , in particular on the syrian border , and that it not use the flows of refugees against the eu; expects turkey to implement in full and in a non-discriminatory manner the eu-turkey statement of march 2016 and the eu-turkey readmission agreement;


### 23. underlines the necessity of better addressing the funding needs in situations of protracted crisis and with a view to the coordination and transition between humanitarian relief , reconstruction and development in a flexible and interconnected manner; ### 23. underlines the necessity of better addressing the funding needs in situations of humanitarian and protracted crisis and with a view to the coordination and transition between humanitarian relief , reconstruction and development in a flexible and interconnected manner;


### 27. is confident that the ndici-global europe will allow for increased flexibility and responsiveness , allowing it to continue the activities of the existing trust funds and thereby safeguard the unity of the union budget; ### 27. is confident that the ndici-global europe will allow sufficient flexibility and responsiveness , allowing to evaluate , with the full involvement of the parliament , which activities of the existing trust funds should continue and which ones should be replaced and thereby safeguard the unity and democratic accountability of the union budget;


### 28. in the event of greater needs in the mff 2021-2027 , advocates increasing the ndici-global europe envelope through a revision of the mff and the ndici-global europe regulations , or a strengthening of the relevant ndici-global europe budget lines with contributions in the form of external assigned revenue; stresses that , should a need for a duly justified new trust fund nevertheless arise , it insists that parliament must be fully involved from the very outset; ### 28. in the event of greater needs in the mff 2021-2027 , advocates that the first and main solution to be explored should be through the eu programmes by increasing the ndici-global europe envelope through a revision of the mff and the ndici-global europe regulations , or as a secondary option and under the condition that the parliament is fully involved in the decision-making process and endowed with the proper scrutiny power , a strengthening of the relevant ndici-global europe budget lines with contributions in the form of external assigned revenue; stresses that , should a need for a duly justified new trust fund nevertheless arise , it insists that parliament must be fully involved from the very outset;


### 31. acknowledges that cooperation with representatives of local communities , including local religious leaders , in settings affected by conflict is crucial to foster reconciliation , dialogue and peace; ### 31. acknowledges that cooperation with local communities and stakeholders , including local government bodies , civil society organisations , ngos , trade unions and religious leaders , in settings affected by conflict is crucial to foster reconciliation , dialogue and peace;


### 3. is concerned about public statements by the uk prime minister declaring that uk will seek to diverge from eu data protection rules and establish its own ‘sovereign’ controls in this field; considers that the 2020 uk national data strategy represents a shift from the protection of personal data towards a wider use and sharing of data that is incompatible with the principles of fairness , data minimisation and purpose limitation under the gdpr; ### 3. is concerned about public statements by the uk prime minister declaring that uk will seek to diverge from eu data protection rules and establish its own ‘sovereign’ controls in this field; considers that the 2020 uk national data strategy represents a shift from the protection of personal data towards a wider use and sharing of data that is incompatible with the principles of fairness , data minimisation and purpose limitation under the gdpr; notes that the edpb highlights that this might lead to possible risks in the protection provided to personal data transferred from the eu;


### 18. notes the uk’s cross-border data access agreement with the us21 , under the us cloud act , which facilitates transfers for law enforcement purposes; is concerned that this will allow undue access to the personal data of eu citizens and residents by us authorities; ### 18. notes the uk’s cross-border data access agreement with the us21 , under the us cloud act , which facilitates transfers for law enforcement purposes; is concerned that this will allow undue access to the personal data of eu citizens and residents by us authorities; notes that the edpb has strong concerns in relation to the agreement which , once it enters into force , could substantially affect the level of protection of data transferred to the uk;


### 26. welcomes the fact that the adequacy decision will be reviewed every four years and will include a sunset clause , and calls on the commission to keep monitoring the level of data protection in the uk in law and practice in the meantime; ### 26. welcomes the fact that the adequacy decision will be reviewed every four years and will include a sunset clause , and calls on the commission to keep monitoring the level of data protection in the uk in law and practice in the meantime , and , if necessary , to take actions including by amending and/or suspending the decision;


### 10. notes the agency’s existing measures and ongoing efforts to secure transparency , prevention and management of conflicts of interest , whistleblower protection and the fight against harassment; notes that two cases of alleged psychological harassment and related inappropriate behaviour were reported and subsequently investigated by means of a formal administrative inquiry in 2019 and a decision on the outcome was to be taken in 2020; notes that the cvs and declarations of interest of some of the members of the agency’s management board have not been published on the agency’s website; ### 10. notes the agency’s existing measures and ongoing efforts to secure transparency , prevention and management of conflicts of interest and whistleblower protection; notes that the cvs and declarations of interest of some of the members of the agency’s management board have not been published on the agency’s website; calls on the agency to publish the cvs and declarations of interest of all the members of the management board and to report to the discharge authority on the measures taken in this regard;


### 17. acknowledges the agency’s existing measures and ongoing efforts to secure transparency , prevention and management of conflicts of interest , and whistleblowing; notes that the agency has in place rules on the prevention and management of conflicts of interest for staff members; notes that in 2019 , 106 declarations of interest were submitted by staff members appointed as an agent or verifier in the operational and financial circuits and by newcomers of which 21 declared an interest and that for one staff member it was advised to not participate in several actions to comply with the rules preventing conflicts of interest; notes that the management board in june 2020 was expected to adopt new rules on conflicts of interest that would apply to all staff members of the agency , including its senior management; calls on the agency to report to the discharge authority by june 2021 with regard to progress made; ### 17. acknowledges the agency’s existing measures and ongoing efforts to secure transparency , prevention and management of conflicts of interest , and whistleblowing; notes that the agency has in place rules on the prevention and management of conflicts of interest for staff members; notes that in 2019 the agency organised one session on ethics and integrity with a focus on whistleblowing and fraud delivered by a representative of olaf , two sessions on ethics and the code of conduct covering the prevention of harassment and whistleblowing with the involvement of the agency´s confidential counsellors , and three sessions on conflict of interest; notes that in 2019 , 106 declarations of interest were submitted by staff members appointed as an agent or verifier in the operational and financial circuits and by newcomers of which 21 declared an interest and that for one staff member it was advised to not participate in several actions to comply with the rules preventing conflicts of interest; notes that the management board in june 2020 was expected to adopt new rules on conflicts of interest that would apply to all staff members of the agency , including its senior management; calls on the agency to report to the discharge authority by june 2021 with regard to progress made;


### (4) given the increasingly global nature of serious crime and terrorism brought about by growing mobility , the information that third countries and international organisations , such as the international criminal police organization and the international criminal court , obtain about criminals and terrorists is increasingly relevant for the union‘s security. such information should contribute to the comprehensive efforts to ensure internal security in the european union. some of this information is only shared with europol. while europol holds valuable information received from external partners on serious criminals and terrorists , it cannot issue alerts in sis. member states are also not always able to issue alerts in sis on the basis of such information. ### (4) given the increasingly global nature of serious crime and terrorism brought about by growing mobility , the information that third countries obtain about criminals and terrorists is increasingly relevant for the union‘s security. such information could contribute to the comprehensive efforts to ensure internal security in the european union. some of this information is only shared with europol. while europol holds valuable information received from external partners on serious criminals and terrorists , it cannot issue alerts in sis. member states are also not always able to issue alerts in sis on the basis of such information.


### (8) in order to assess whether a concrete case is adequate , relevant and important enough to warrant the entry of an alert in sis , and in order to confirm the reliability of the source of information and the accuracy of the information on the person concerned , europol should carry out a detailed individual assessment of each case including further consultations with the third country or international organisation that shared the data on the person concerned , as well as further analysis of the case , in particular by cross checking it against information it already holds in its databases , to confirm the accuracy of the information and complement it with other data on the basis of its own databases. the detailed individual assessment should include the analysis of whether there are sufficient grounds for considering that the person has committed or taken part in , or will commit a criminal offence in respect of which europol is competent. ### (8) in order to assess whether a concrete case is adequate , relevant and important enough to warrant the entry of an alert in sis , and in order to confirm the reliability of the source of information and the accuracy of the information on the person concerned , that the information was not obtained in breach of fundamental rights of the person , that it was not communicated to europol for unlawful purposes or motivated by political reasons , europol should carry out a detailed individual assessment of each case , including further consultations with the third country that shared the data on the person concerned , as well as further analysis of the case , in particular by cross checking it against information it already holds in its databases , to confirm the accuracy of the information and complement it with other data on the basis of its own databases. the detailed individual assessment should include the analysis of whether there are sufficient grounds for considering that the person has committed or taken part in , or will commit a criminal offence in respect of which europol is competent.


### (9) europol should only be able to enter an alert in sis if the person concerned is not already subject to a sis alert issued by a member state. a further precondition for the creation of such an alert should be that member states do not object to the alert being issued in sis. therefore , it is necessary to establish rules on the obligations of europol prior to entering data in sis , in particular the obligation to consult the member states in line with regulation (eu) 2016/794. it should also be possible for member states to request the deletion of an alert by europol , in particular if they obtain new information about the person who is the subject of the alert , if their national security requires so or when it is likely that the alert would represent a risk for official or legal inquiries , investigations or procedures. ### (9) europol should only be able to enter an alert in sis if the person concerned is not already subject to a sis alert issued by a member state. a further precondition for the creation of such an alert should be that member states do not object to the alert being issued in sis. therefore , it is necessary to establish rules on the obligations for europol prior to entering data in sis , in particular the obligation to consult the member states in line with regulation (eu) 2016/794. it should also be possible for member states to request the deletion of an alert by europol , in particular where they have reasonable grounds to believe that the information in the alert is inaccurate , or they obtain new information about the person who is the subject of the alert , if their national security requires so or when it is likely that the alert would represent a risk for official or legal inquiries , investigations or procedures.


### (11) it is necessary to establish rules concerning the deletion of alerts entered in sis by europol. an alert should be kept only for the time required to achieve the purpose for which it was entered. it is therefore appropriate to set out detailed criteria to determine when the alert should be deleted. an alert entered by europol in sis should be deleted in particular if a member state objects , another alert is entered in sis by a member state , or if europol becomes aware that the information received from the third country or international organisation was incorrect or was communicated to europol for unlawful purposes , for example if sharing the information on the person was motivated by political reasons. ### (11) it is necessary to establish rules concerning the deletion of alerts entered in sis by europol. an alert should be kept only for the time required to achieve the purpose for which it was entered. it is therefore appropriate to set out detailed criteria to determine when the alert should be deleted. an alert entered by europol in sis should be deleted after the expiry of the alert , where a member state objects to an alert , where another alert is entered in sis by a member state , or if europol becomes aware , based on new information , that the information received from the third country was incorrect , the person is no longer suspected to be involved in a criminal activity , or the information was communicated to europol for unlawful purposes , for example if sharing the information on the person was motivated by political reasons.


### 2. europol may only enter an alert in sis on persons who are third-country nationals on the basis of information received from a third country or an international organisation in accordance with article 17(1)(b) of regulation (eu) 2016/794 , where the information relates to one of the following: ### 2. europol may only enter an alert in sis on persons who are third-country nationals on the basis of information received from a third country in accordance with article 17(1)(b) of regulation (eu) 2016/794 , where it has assessed that the information relates to one of the following:


### europol shall exchange supplementary information in accordance with the provisions of the sirene manual. to that end , europol shall ensure availability to supplementary information related to its own alerts 24 hours a day , 7 days a week. ### europol may also exchange and further request supplementary information in accordance with the provisions of the sirene manual. to that end , europol shall ensure availability to supplementary information related to its own alerts 24 hours a day , 7 days a week.


### 8. member states and europol shall keep statistics on the number of alerts on persons the retention periods of which have been extended in accordance with paragraph 6 of this article and transmit them , upon request , to the supervisory authorities referred to in article 69. ### 8. member states and europol shall keep statistics on the number of alerts on persons the retention periods of which have been extended in accordance with paragraph 6 of this article and transmit them , upon request , to the supervisory authorities referred to in article 69 , and , in case of europol , to the edps.


### (4) member states and europol shall report annually to the european data protection board on: ### (4) member states shall report annually to the european data protection board and europol to the edps on:


### 7. the commission shall adopt a decision setting the date on which europol shall start entering , updating and deleting data in sis pursuant to this regulation as amended by regulation [xxx] , after verification that the following conditions have been met: ### 7. the commission shall adopt a decision setting the date on which europol may start entering , updating and deleting alerts in sis , pursuant to this regulation , as amended by regulation [xxx] , after verification that the following conditions have been met:


### 1. acknowledges that the need to respond swiftly and effectively to a crisis often has a direct impact on the balance between the different powers of the state and recognises that governments and local authorities may be forced to adopt emergency measures with less public consultation than would generally be expected; calls attention to the great importance of upholding an effective system of checks and balances for all actions taken in response to an emergency; ### 1. acknowledges that the need to respond swiftly and effectively to a crisis often has a direct impact on the balance between the different powers of the state and recognises that governments and local authorities may be forced to adopt emergency measures with less public consultation than would generally be expected;


### 2. is of the opinion that the response to the current covid-19 crisis may have increased the risk and instances of corruption; believes that the response to the covid-19 crisis is also a reminder that openness , transparency , accountability and law enforcement are essential components of democratic governance; ### 2. is of the opinion that the response to the current covid-19 crisis increased the risk and instances of corruption; believes that the response to the covid-19 crisis is also a reminder that openness , transparency , accountability and law enforcement are essential components of rule of law based democratic governance;


### 2. is of the opinion that such crises provide an opportunity and a need to strengthen anti-corruption and integrity policies , and therefore improve overall governance; believes , in this respect , that the covid-19 crisis will sharpen our focus on governance in the years ahead as a result of the increased efforts to tackle the pandemic’s devastating effects and costs for people and economies; ### 2. is of the opinion that such crises provide an opportunity and a need to strengthen anti-corruption and integrity policies , as well as the bodies than enforce them , and therefore improve overall governance; believes , in this respect , that the covid-19 crisis will sharpen our focus on governance in the years ahead as a result of the increased efforts to tackle the pandemic’s devastating effects and costs for people and economies;


### 3. calls on the member states and the commission to carefully review the policies they enacted during the covid-19 crisis and to define new mechanisms and protocols for any future emergency spending; ### 3. calls on the member states and the commission to carefully review the policies they enacted during the covid-19 crisis , to correct cases of executive overreach and to define new mechanisms and protocols for any future emergency spending; notes that the commission can exercise ex-ante and ex-post control over eu funds; regrets , in this respect , that the commission is reluctant to use the means at its disposal; deeply regrets that the commission has not used the rule-of-law conditionality regulation since it entered into force on1 january 2021;


### 4. points out that corruption in general undermines the functioning of the state and public authorities at all levels and is one of the key enablers of organised crime; emphasises that effective anti-corruption frameworks and transparency and integrity in the exercise of state power can strengthen legal systems and trust in public authorities and democratic processes; ### 4. points out that corruption in general undermines the functioning of the state and public authorities at all levels and is one of the key enablers of organised crime and even more so in a crisis; emphasises that independent institutions , such as independent judiciary and prosecution , effective anti-corruption frameworks and transparency and integrity in the exercise of state power strengthen legal systems and trust in public authorities and democratic processes;


### 5. expresses its concern , however , that transparency , control and anti-corruption reforms have met a certain resistance in some member states , which has been explained by the fact that they affect the personal interests of the law-makers and government officials in charge of enforcing them; ### 5. expresses its concern , however , that transparency , control and anti-corruption reforms have met a certain resistance in some member states; believes that any actual or potential conflict of interest affecting law-makers and government officials must be prevented;


### 6. recalls that governments need efficient and transparent reporting , independent ex post audits and accountability procedures , and open channels of communication with civil society and the private sector to ensure that the funds and measures are helping the people who need it most; ### 6. recalls that public authorities need solid ex ante controls , efficient and transparent reporting , independent ex post audits and accountability procedures , and open channels of communication with civil society and the private sector to ensure that the funds and measures are helping the people who need it most;


### 7. is of the opinion that ex post controls and evaluations should be strengthened wherever ex ante controls and evaluations are not feasible; ### 7. is of the opinion that more effort needs to be put into ex ante controls to know beforehand exactly how the emergency funds are going to be used and to guarantee their traceability; believes that ex post controls and evaluations should be strengthened specially when ex ante controls and evaluations have been carried out under exceptional measures;


### 8. believes that it is important to keep citizens engaged in the fight against corruption and fully protected from negative personal consequences; calls on the commission to provide the right platforms for engagement; ### 8. believes that it is important to keep citizens both informed and engaged in the fight against corruption as well as fully protected from negative personal or professional consequences in case of whistleblowing; calls on the commission to provide the right platforms for that purpose;


### a. whereas financial and economic crime includes corruption , fraud , coercion , collusion , obstruction , money laundering and financing of terrorism; ### a. whereas financial and economic crime refers to illegal acts committed by an individual or a group of individuals to obtain economic or professional gain and includes , inter alia , corruption , fraud , coercion , collusion , obstruction , money laundering and financing of terrorism;


### b. whereas the public health crisis caused by the covid-19 pandemic , coupled with the subsequent economic emergency and social turmoil , has pushed the eu and the member states’ governments to provide for extra funding and substantially and swiftly increase spending; ### b. whereas the public health crisis caused by the covid-19 pandemic , coupled with the subsequent economic emergency and social turmoil , has pushed the eu and the public authorities in member states to provide for or to be involved in the management of extra funding and substantially and swiftly increase spending;


### f. whereas because of the pressing nature of the crisis , procurement procedures and means of control have been relaxed in many places in order to expedite implementation; ### f. whereas because of the pressing nature of the crisis , procurement procedures and means of control have been made more flexible in many places in order to expedite implementation;


### g. whereas response plans do not give enough consideration to governance and problems of corruption; ### g. whereas response plans do not give enough consideration to governance and problems of illegal acts , like corruption and fraud , and measures to avoid non-fraudulent irregularities;


### h. whereas crisis creates opportunities for numerous violations of integrity and could intensify fraud and corruption , particularly in public procurement , economic stimulus packages and public organisations; ### h. whereas crisis creates opportunities for numerous violations of integrity and could intensify fraud and corruption , as well as non-fraudulent irregularities , particularly in public procurement , economic stimulus packages and public organisations;


### j. whereas corruption is a major threat in the private and public sphere and has a disproportionate impact on the poor and most vulnerable , increasing costs and reducing access to services; ### j. whereas corruption is a major threat in the private and public spheres as it causes a reduction of the resources , which damages the social protection and an equitable access to public services , and has a disproportionate impact on the poor and most vulnerable groups , ultimately increasing social inequalities;


### k. whereas a rising number of organised crime groups are active in the eu , often with cross-border reach; ### k. whereas a rising number of serious and organised crime groups are active in the eu , often with cross-border reach and almost in all cases taking advantage of new technologies which makes it possible to act from anywhere in the world and at any time;


### o. whereas curbing corruption requires government ownership of reforms , international cooperation , and a joint effort with civil society and the private sector; ### o. whereas curbing corruption requires government ownership of reforms , public support , political commitment , international cooperation , and a joint effort with civil society and the private sector;


### p. whereas in a situation of high expectation , severe pressure and unprecedented spending volumes , public officials could be unfit to keep up with the increased professional standards needed , or not at ease with doing so; whereas , furthermore , officials may not necessarily become promptly aware of conflict-of-interest situations; ### p. whereas in a situation of high expectation , severe pressure and unprecedented spending volumes , the responsibility for meeting this challenge rests with public officials who need appropriate support to deal with both the increased professional standards and new difficulties to fulfil their mission; whereas , furthermore , officials may not necessarily become promptly aware of conflict-of-interest situations;


### r. whereas the lisbon treaty took the direction of reinforcing the role of the european parliament , to bring about more coherence and democratic accountability; ### r. whereas the lisbon treaty took the direction of reinforcing the role of the european parliament , to bring about more coherence , parliamentary scrutiny and democratic accountability;


### 9. notes that in the midst of an economic , security or health-related crisis , governments have a tendency to relax contracting procedures; stresses the fact that the eu public procurement directive already allows for much quicker and less administratively burdensome procedures and that member states’ governments should not manage these procedures outside of the legal requirements; ### 9. notes that in the midst of an economic , security or health-related crisis , governments have a tendency to make contracting procedures more flexible in order to promptly respond to the crisis; stresses the fact that the eu public procurement directive already allows for much quicker and less administratively burdensome procedures and that member states’ governments should not manage these procedures outside of the legal requirements;


### 10. insists , however , that in order to curb the potential negative effects of these policies in terms of graft , top-down accountability tools such as audits should by default accompany any relaxation of contracting rules , as flexibility and reactivity should not come at the expense of public accountability and performance; ### 10. insists , however , that in order to curb the potential negative effects of these policies in terms of graft , top-down accountability tools such as specific guidance and audits should by default accompany any flexibility measure on contracting rules in order not to harm public accountability and performance; welcomes in that regard the commission’s timely ‘guidance on using the public procurement framework in the emergency situation related to the covid-19 crisis’ published on 1 april 2020;


### 12. notes that the recovery and resilience facility (rrf)20 , the key instrument at the heart of nextgenerationeu , makes it possible to offer member states grants (of up to eur 312 billion) and loans (of up to eur 360 billion)21 for public investments and reforms aimed at addressing structural weaknesses and making member states’ economies more resilient; ### 12. notes that the recovery and resilience facility (rrf)20 , the key instrument at the heart of nextgenerationeu , makes it possible to offer member states grants (of up to eur 312 billion) and loans (of up to eur 360 billion)21 for public investments and reforms aimed at addressing structural weaknesses and making member states’ economies more resilient while focusing on sustainable transition , digital transformation , economic , social and territorial cohesion , institutional resilience and the pillar of social rights ;


### 13. believes that sound financial management should be pursued and that absorption should not be prioritised over value for money considerations; ### 13. believes that sound financial management should be pursued and that absorption , while remaining an important objective , should not be prioritised over performance and value for money considerations;


### 15. is of the opinion that more transparency , coupled with technology and data science , could also help to identify and reduce corruption; in this sense , calls on the commission and the member states to make full use of the available tools , such as the early detection and exclusion system (edes) , arachne and the irregularities management system (ims) to effectively and efficiently identify the problematic economic operators and the private individuals (or natural persons) linked to them in both direct and indirect management; encourages member states to exchange information both among themselves and with the commission and to cooperate more closely with a view to improving data collection and enhancing the effectiveness of controls; ### 15. is of the opinion that more transparency , coupled with technology and data science , are instrumental in order to prevent and reduce corruption; in this sense , calls strongly on the commission and the member states to make full use of the available tools , such as the early detection and exclusion system (edes) , arachne and the irregularities management system (ims) to effectively and efficiently identify the problematic economic operators and the private individuals (or natural persons) linked to them in both direct and indirect management; urges member states to exchange information both among themselves , with the commission and with the eu relevant bodies (eca , olaf , eppo and europol) to cooperate more closely with a view to improving data collection , enhancing the effectiveness of controls and securing the recovery of the misused funds;


### 17. regrets the fact that olaf does not have full access to the arachne risk scoring tool; ### 17. regrets the fact that olaf does not have full access to the arachne risk scoring tool; is of the opinion that integrating arachne in national management and control systems should be mandatory for all the managing authorities;


### 18. calls on the commission to evaluate the response to the covid-19 pandemic , to look at how corruption affected the outcome and whether integrity was upheld or undermined , and to report back to parliament on the main findings; ### 18. calls on the commission to evaluate the response to the covid-19 pandemic , in particular the preventive anti-corruption measures , to look at how corruption affected the outcome and whether integrity was upheld or undermined , and to report back to parliament on the main findings;


### 19. finds it lamentable that the commission makes extensive use of the redaction tool to cover parts of the apa contracts; insists , notwithstanding the sensitivity of the information , that such details are important in improving accountability and the global response to the virus; notes that the commission applies article 38(3)(d) of the financial regulation , referring to the case where disclosure of data risks harming the commercial interests of the recipients , and calls for proportionality of effective scrutiny and full accountability of the use of the resources with the public interest; ### 19. finds it lamentable that the commission makes extensive use of the redaction tool to cover parts of the apa contracts; insists , notwithstanding the sensitivity of the information , that such details are important in improving accountability and the global response to the virus as increased transparency boosts public trust , empowers the public debate and promotes eu standards; notes that the commission applies article 38(3)(d) of the financial regulation , referring to the case where disclosure of data risks harming the commercial interests of the recipients , and calls for proportionality of effective scrutiny and full accountability of the use of the resources with the public interest; believes , in that regard , that the second generation contracts should be published in full transparency since all vaccines have received some form of public support;


### 23. urges the commission to put in place a solid and transparent eu public procurement framework , when funds from the eu budget are fully or partially involved , that would allow for full and unlimited scrutiny by parliament , especially concerning major economic , security or health crisis-related spending areas; ### 23. urges the commission to put in place a solid and transparent eu public procurement framework , when funds from the eu budget are fully or partially involved , that would allow for full and unlimited scrutiny by parliament , especially concerning major economic , security or health crisis-related spending areas; calls on the commission to assess the successful joint procurement agreement and the resceu stockpile of medical equipment in order to establish good practises for future crisis;


### 24. calls on the commission and the member states to work together towards the adoption of robust national anti-fraud strategies (nas) , that offer the benefit of coordinating the actions of several entities and guaranteeing optimisation of resources and coverage of all the areas of interest (expenditures under indirect and shared management , national funds , etc.); ### 24. calls on the commission and the member states to work together towards the adoption of robust national anti-fraud strategies (nas) , that offer the benefit of coordinating the actions of several entities and guaranteeing optimisation of resources and coverage of all the areas of interest (expenditures under indirect and shared management , national funds , etc.); reiterates that the commission shall use its annual rule of law report to assess not only the existence but also the effectiveness of the nas (including relevant legislation and policies) , outline best practices , identify areas particularly sensitive to corruption and come up with country-specific recommendations for improvement , and to use that knowledge as well to update and enhance the union’s anti-corruption framework;


### 25. insists on the need for collaborative work among the european public prosecutor’s office (eppo) and other eu bodies such as eurojust , europol and the european anti-fraud office (olaf) to carry out criminal investigations and prosecutions within the respective mandate/remit; ### 25. insists on the need for collaborative work among the european public prosecutor’s office (eppo) and other eu bodies such as eurojust , europol and the european anti-fraud office (olaf) to carry out criminal investigations and prosecutions within the respective mandate/remit; emphasises the crucial role of the aforementioned institutions and bodies during emergency situations and crisis to fight those who unscrupulously take advantage of eu funds while ensuring their own business continuity; reiterates that fighting corruption and fraud requires a strong mandate coupled with an adequate budget , resources and any kind of support necessary to implement it from both the eu and the member states; calls on the commission to thoroughly secure the necessary support in the frame of the budgetary process;


### 26. calls for increased effective international cooperation on taking of evidence , mutual recognition , service of documents , and confiscation and freezing of assets , with a view to giving the competent authorities the means to trace , freeze , manage and confiscate the proceeds of crime; ### 26. calls for increased effective international cooperation on taking of evidence , mutual recognition , service of documents , and confiscation and freezing of assets , with a view to giving the competent authorities the means to trace , freeze , manage and confiscate the proceeds of crime; calls , therefore , on the commission to support and to promote the union-wide harmonisation of definitions of corruption offenses , as well as a better use of the existing data sets and the methodology to develop new ones in order to obtain comparative data across the eu on the treatment of corruption cases;


### 29. takes the view that a centralised procurement administration to which contractors and contracting authorities are obliged to systematically report highly detailed project data and progress (in a standardised format) should be created , in order to facilitate data collection and treatment on an eu level; ### 29. takes the view that a centralised procurement system in which contractors and contracting authorities are obliged to duly report fundamental project data , progress milestones and the beneficial owners (in a standardised format) should be created , in order to facilitate interoperability , data collection and treatment on an eu level;


### 31. believes in the benefits of professionalisation and adequate wages in public procurement , namely that having specialised , well trained and well paid public procurement staff who share their expertise , knowledge and (market) intelligence , also across member states’ borders , is a positive practice; ### 31. believes in the benefits of professionalisation and adequate wages in public procurement , namely that having specialised , well trained and well paid public procurement staff who share their expertise , knowledge and (market) intelligence , also across member states’ borders , is a positive practice to be implemented together among other corruption prevention techniques;


### 1. refuses to give its consent to the conclusion of the agreement; ### 1. gives its consent to the conclusion of the agreement;


### 1. notes the appointment of a new executive director on 16 june 2019; welcomes the detailed follow-up report by the office on the observations of parliament for the financial year 2019 , in particular the steps made in the area of procurement with the successful conclusion of the framework contract for temporary agency workers in italy that was awarded in 2019 and its full compliance with union procurement rules; ### 1. notes the appointment of a new executive director on 16 june 2019; welcomes the detailed follow-up report by the office on the observations of parliament for the financial year 2019 , in particular the steps made in the area of procurement with the successful conclusion of the framework contract for temporary agency workers in italy that was awarded in 2019 and its full compliance with union procurement rules; notes the corrective measures introduced in order to improve the governance structure and to restore transparency and the reputation of the office;


### 8. notes the office’s reply to the discharge authority on the declaration of interests , which stated that all staff sign a declaration of interests upon entry into service; notes that the declaration of interests of the executive director has been published on the office’s website; calls on the office to publish the declarations of interests of the other senior management members on its website; ### 8. notes the office’s reply to the discharge authority on the declaration of interests , which stated that all staff sign a declaration of interests upon entry into service; notes that the declaration of interests and cvs of all members of the management board and the executive director have been published on the office’s website; calls on the office to publish the declarations of interests and cvs of the other senior management members on its website and to report to the discharge authority on the measures taken in this regard;


### 13. notes the adoption of a new organigram by the office’s management board on 26 november 2019; acknowledges the reinforcement of the office’s governance structures , including the responsibilities of the executive office; stresses the importance to further strengthen the procurement function , in the light of the court’s ongoing findings regarding irregular procedures and associated payments; ### 13. notes the adoption of a new organigram by the office’s management board on 26 november 2019; acknowledges the reinforcement of the office’s governance structures , including the responsibilities of the executive office; stresses the importance to further strengthen the procurement function , in the light of the court’s ongoing findings regarding irregular procedures and associated payments; notes the office’s reply to the court’s finding and the measures taken by the office to prevent a recurrence of these failures;


### 2. notes that in its annual report for 2019 , the court observed no serious weaknesses in respect of the audited topics related to the supervisor’s human resources and procurement activities; ### 2. notes with satisfaction that in its annual report for 2019 , the court observed no serious weaknesses in respect of the audited topics related to the supervisor’s human resources and procurement activities;


### 8. observes that the supervisor staff consists of 19 union nationalities and has a gender representation of 39 % male staff and 61 % female staff in 2019; notes that the most important actions supporting gender equality were the nominations at middle management level (one male and three female heads of unit); notes further the introduction of greater flexibility as concerns remote working; appreciates an equal opportunity clause , included both in the recruitment materials and vacancy notice , stating that the supervisor is an equal opportunities employer and welcomes applications from those with disabilities; ### 8. observes that the supervisor staff consists of 19 union nationalities and has a gender representation of 39 % male staff and 61 % female staff in 2019; notes that the most important actions supporting gender equality were the nominations at middle management level (one male and three female heads of unit); notes further the introduction of greater flexibility as concerns remote working; calls attention to the fact that women use the flexible working arrangement much more often than men; appreciates an equal opportunity clause , included both in the recruitment materials and vacancy notice , stating that the supervisor is an equal opportunities employer and welcomes applications from those with disabilities;


### 12. commends the supervisor for having put all guidelines and procedures related to the ethical framework on the intranet immediately after their adoption; notes the revised decision on external activities which was adopted on 13 september 2019 , and the fact that the related presentations with real life examples had to be postponed due to the pandemic; ### 12. commends the supervisor for having put all guidelines and procedures related to the ethical framework on the intranet immediately after their adoption; calls on the supervisor to organise raise-awareness activities for the staff , also other than newcomers , regarding the applicable ethical framework and to adopt a proactive system to avoid conflicts in the workplace; notes the revised decision on external activities which was adopted on 13 september 2019 , and the fact that the related presentations with real life examples had to be postponed due to the pandemic;


### 13. notes that due to the original plans the supervisor would occupy the whole mts building as of september 2019; notes , however , that due to external factors , mainly to the united kingdom’s decision to withdraw from the european union , the move of the ombudsman was delayed; ### 13. notes that due to the original plans the supervisor would occupy the whole mts building as of september 2019; notes , however , that due to external factors the move of the ombudsman was delayed and consequently the expansion didn’t happen , which affected the execution under title 2 of the supervisor’s budget;


### 15. encourages the supervisor to explore the possibility of joining the transparency registry on the basis of a sla; acknowledges the inter-institutional cooperation through sla between the supervisor and other union institutions and bodies; is interested to see if any cost benefit analysis takes place before entering in any agreement; ### 15. encourages the supervisor to explore the possibility of joining the transparency registry on the basis of a sla; acknowledges the inter-institutional cooperation through sla between the supervisor and other union institutions and bodies; calls on the supervisor to carry out comprehensive and realistic cost benefit analysis before entering in any agreement;


### 26. is aware that the commission’s internal auditor (ia) is the internal auditor of the supervisor; notes that during 2019 , the ia did not perform any audit , but rather issued its annual internal audit report for 2019 with only two statements and there are no open recommendations; ### 26. is aware that the commission’s internal auditor (ia) is the internal auditor of the supervisor; regrets that during 2019 , the ia did not perform any audit , but rather issued its annual internal audit report for 2019 with only two statements and there are no open recommendations;


### 32. appreciates that the supervisor is closely following the emas initiatives and has started to convert human resources processes (selections , appraisal) and financial and administrative processes (payments , mips) into paperless procedures; agrees to the supervisor’s strategy in providing more flexible ways of working for its staff (occasional and structural teleworking) which helps to reduce energy as well as to use office space in a more optimal way; ### 32. appreciates that the supervisor is closely following the emas initiatives and has started to convert human resources processes (selections , appraisal) and financial and administrative processes (payments , mips) into paperless procedures; acknowledges the initiatives carried out by the supervisor to reduce the use of plastic bottles by its staff; agrees to the supervisor’s strategy in providing more flexible ways of working for its staff (occasional and structural teleworking); notes that those flexible working arrangements help to reduce energy for the supervisor as well as its use office space in a more optimal way;


### 5. notes that the covid-19 pandemic has had a negative impact on budget implementation (73 % in 2020 , compared to 91.97 % in 2019); observes that this impact is visible , in particular , on the missions and training budgets (execution of less than 17 %) and on the organisation of meetings , including experts’ reimbursement and catering (execution of less than 15 %); ### 5. notes that the covid-19 pandemic has had a negative impact on budget implementation (73 % in 2020 , compared to 91.97 % in 2019); observes that this impact is visible , in particular , on the missions and training budgets (execution of less than 17 %) and on the organisation of meetings , including experts’ reimbursement and catering (execution of less than 15 %); notes that the resulting savings amount to eur 2 183 000 , which represents 11 % of the overall budget consumption;


### 6. notes that the resulting savings amount to eur 2 183 000 , which represents 11 % of the overall budget consumption; notes that the covid-19 pandemic had an indirect impact on other parts of the budget that can not be quantified precisely , such as the building budget line , which was impacted by delays in the full occupation of the building , still shared with the european ombudsman; ### 6. notes that , in addition , the covid-19 pandemic had an indirect impact on other parts of the budget that can not be quantified precisely , such as the salaries budget lines due to delays in the recruitments planned for 2020 and the building budget line , which was impacted by delays in the full occupation of the building , still shared with the european ombudsman;


### 35. acknowledges the role of the supervisor in the global debate on digital ethics in particular having regard to the development of artificial intelligence and facial recognition technology; ### 35. acknowledges the role of the supervisor in the global debate on digital ethics in particular having regard to the development of artificial intelligence and facial recognition technology; highlights that the supervisor co-chairs the working group on ethics and data protection in artificial intelligence of the global privacy assembly , the international meeting of the data protection and privacy authorities around the world , on the issue of artificial intelligence and digital ethics;


### 59. notes that the supervisor has concluded in 2020 new and revised interinstitutional sla and administrative agreements with pmo and hr services of the commission , with dg eac and cert-eu; ### 59. notes that the supervisor has concluded or amended in 2020 both interinstitutional service level agreements and administrative agreements with pmo , dg hr , dg eac , dg budg and dg cert-eu of the commission , as well as a new administrative agreement with three directorate generals of parliament (dg inlo , dg safe and dg pers) concerning buildings , logistics and security services;


### 67. encourages the supervisor to fully integrate in the internal management strategy the lessons learned from the covid-19 pandemic , in terms of business continuity and crisis management approaches , it responsiveness , resilience of the organisation , effectiveness of communication and flexibility of working processes; ### 67. encourages the supervisor to fully integrate in the internal management strategy the lessons learned from the covid-19 pandemic , in terms of business continuity and crisis management approaches , it responsiveness , resilience of the organisation , duty of care towards its staff , effectiveness of internal communication and flexibility of working processes;


### 1. notes that the 'new pact on migration and asylum' is a holistic attempt to address europe's migration challenges; stresses however that these challenges originate outside europe and urges that the root causes and drivers of migration be effectively addressed; ### 1. notes that the 'new pact on migration and asylum' aims to address europe's migration challenges and retains that it should reflect a new approach based on the principles of solidarity and shared responsibility; stresses however that the proposed measures are focusing mainly on reducing the arrival of migrants in europe and on facilitating returns to their countries of origin , while it is fundamental to strengthen and to define safe and legal channels for migration;


### 2. requests that the commission submit , by 31 january 2022 , on the basis of article 79(2) , in particular points (a) and (b) , of the treaty on the functioning of the european union , a proposal for an act that would serve as a package of proposals to facilitate and promote entry into and mobility within the union for legally migrating third-country nationals applying for work and to reduce bureaucracy and promote equal treatment , following the recommendations set out in the annex hereto; ### 2. requests that the commission submit , by 31 january 2022 , on the basis of article 79(2) , in particular points (a) and (b) , of the treaty on the functioning of the european union , a proposal for an act that would serve as a package of proposals to facilitate , harmonise and promote entry into and mobility within the union for third-country nationals applying for work by aligning provisions across the existing legal migration directives to reduce bureaucracy , promote equal treatment and prevent labour exploitation , following the recommendations set out in the annex hereto;


### 2. requests that the commission submit , by 31 january 2022 , on the basis of article 79(2) , in particular points (a) and (b) , of the treaty on the functioning of the european union , a proposal for an act that would serve as a package of proposals to facilitate and promote entry into and mobility within the union for legally migrating third-country nationals applying for work and to reduce bureaucracy and promote equal treatment , following the recommendations set out in the annex hereto; ### 2. requests that the commission submit , by 31 january 2022 , on the basis of article 79(2) , in particular points (a) and (b) , of the treaty on the functioning of the european union , a proposal for an act that would serve as a package of proposals to facilitate and promote entry into and mobility within the union for third-country nationals applying for work and to reduce bureaucracy , enhance harmonisation and promote equal treatment , following the recommendations set out in the annex hereto;


### 2. recalls member states’ right to determine their own migration policies; underlines that facilitating labour migration at union level undermines member states’ unique and diverse labour market policies; considers that increasing regular migration channels will not reduce illegal migration or human trafficking; ### 2. considers that increasing regular migration channels represent the main tool in order to reduce irregular migration or human trafficking; underlines that strict border controls without legal alternative pathways for migration shift the routes , introducing different steps of the journey and new transit countries , thus increasing the precariousness of the journey and the exposure of migrants to smuggling networks , extortion and violence;


### 3. considers that the creation of a union-wide talent pool for third-country nationals who wish to apply for work with a view to migrating legally to a member state , as well as for employers to search for potential employees in third countries , would be an essential tool for achieving the purpose of the proposed act and calls on the commission to include the creation of such a talent pool in its proposal; ### 3. considers that the creation of a union-wide talent pool for third-country nationals who wish to apply for work with a view to migrating legally to a member state , as well as for employers to search for potential employees in third countries , would be an essential tool for achieving the purpose of the proposed act and calls on the commission to include the creation of such a talent pool in its proposal and create a framework for the validation and recognition of skills and qualifications , based on objective and uniform criteria;


### 3. considers that the creation of a union-wide talent pool for third-country nationals who wish to apply for work with a view to migrating legally to a member state , as well as for employers to search for potential employees in third countries , would be an essential tool for achieving the purpose of the proposed act and calls on the commission to include the creation of such a talent pool in its proposal; ### 3. considers that the creation of a union-wide talent pool for third-country nationals who wish to apply for work in a member state , as well as for employers to search for potential employees in third countries , would be an essential tool for achieving the purpose of the proposed act and calls on the commission to include the creation of such a talent pool in its proposal;


### 3. points out that external borders must be secured and that migrants who lack the right to stay or enter the member states must be swiftly returned; supports proposals for an accelerated border procedure to apply to persons whose asylum applications have been rejected; ### 3. regrets the prevalence of an excessive focus on deterrence of migration to the union and considers that this did not produce adequate level of management of the migration phenomenon and of respect of fundamental rights; stresses that a short-term approach based on measures to strengthen border controls and reduce migrant arrivals in europe has led to a drastic reduction in legal migration opportunities , pushing migrants towards more dangerous routes , in several cases in serious violation of human rights;


### 4. supports the commission’s statement in its communication of 23 september 2020 on a new pact on migration and asylum regarding the enhancement of short-term mobility as a complement to legal pathways , especially for the purposes of research or study in order to improve upstream cooperation with third countries , for example to stem irregular migratory flows , and asks the commission to explore this direction further; ### 4. supports the commission’s statement in its communication of 23 september 2020 on a new pact on migration and asylum regarding the enhancement of pathways , especially for the purposes of research or study in order to improve cooperation with third countries and asks the commission to explore this direction further;