### 18. welcomes the commission’s recent adoption of the 2021-2027 framework of measures aimed at increasing diversity and inclusion in the current erasmus+ and european solidarity corps programmes , but nevertheless calls on the commission to closely monitor the future national implementation of this framework; ### 18. welcomes the commission’s recent adoption of the 2021-2027 framework of measures aimed at increasing diversity and inclusion in the current erasmus+ and european solidarity corps programmes , but nevertheless calls on the commission to closely monitor the future national implementation of this framework and to inform the parliament on annual basis; highlights that the full implementation of a dedicated framework of inclusion measures can serve as a useful experience and reference for other eu programmes that have a direct impact on citizens’ life such as creative europe and cerv;


### 1. welcomes the commission’s first ever rule of law report as a positive addition to the eu’s toolbox to prevent and address rule of law issues in member states; ### 1. welcomes the commission’s first ever rule of law report as a meaningful and positive addition to the eu’s toolbox to prevent and address rule of law issues in member states; notes commission´s central role in addressing the rule of law issues and developing the tools further; yearly reporting allows for strengthening of the commission´s work and also enables the communication of best practices between member states;


### 1. welcomes the commission’s first ever rule of law report as a positive addition to the eu’s toolbox to prevent and address rule of law issues in member states; ### 1. welcomes the commission’s first ever rule of law report as a positive addition to the eu’s toolbox to monitor , prevent and address rule of law issues in member states;


### 1. highlights that the rule of law is an essential precondition for compliance with the principle of sound financial management and for the protection of the union’s financial interests , which can only be ensured if public authorities act in accordance with the law , if cases of fraud , corruption , conflicts of interest or other breaches of the law are pursued effectively by investigative and prosecution services , if national courts are independent , and if the decisions of the court of justice of the european union are respected; ### 1. highlights that the rule of law is an essential precondition for compliance with the principle of sound financial management and for the protection of the union’s financial interests , which can only be ensured if public authorities act in accordance with the law , if cases of fraud , corruption , conflicts of interest or other breaches of the law are pursued effectively by investigative and prosecution services , if national courts are independent and the decisions of the court of justice of the european union are respected , and if the public scrutiny is maintained by free , independent and pluralistic media;


### 2. underlines the importance of the commission’s first rule of law report as a basis on which to build the new cycle of the rule of law mechanism; welcomes the inclusion among its pillars of the justice system , the anti-corruption framework and other institutional checks and balances , as these are particularly relevant for monitoring the protection of the eu budget; ### 2. underlines the importance of the commission’s rule of law report as the reflection of the european rule of law mechanism , which is designed as a yearly cycle of dialogue and assessment in order to promote this principle and to prevent problems from emerging or deepening in the member states; welcomes the inclusion among its pillars of the justice system , the anti-corruption framework , and other institutional checks and balances , as these are particularly relevant for monitoring the protection of the eu budget;


### — having regard to the european convention for the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms , the european social charter , the case law of the european court of human rights and the european committee of social rights , and the conventions , recommendations , resolutions , opinions and reports of the parliamentary assembly , the committee of ministers , the human rights commissioner , the european commission against racism and intolerance , the steering committee on anti-discrimination , diversity and inclusion , the venice commission and other bodies of the council of europe , ### — having regard to the european convention for the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms , the european social charter , the case law of the european court of human rights and the european committee of social rights , the council of europe framework convention for the protection of national minorities (fcnm) and the european charter for regional or minority languages (ecrml) and the conventions , recommendations , resolutions , opinions and reports of the parliamentary assembly , the committee of ministers , the human rights commissioner , the european commission against racism and intolerance , the steering committee on anti-discrimination , diversity and inclusion , the venice commission , the advisory committee on the fcnm , the committee of experts of the ecrml and other bodies of the council of europe ,


### a. whereas the union is founded on the values set out in article 2 of the treaty on european union (teu); whereas democracy , the rule of law and fundamental rights are mutually reinforcing values which , when undermined , may pose a systemic threat to the union; ### a. whereas the union is founded on the values set out in article 2 of the treaty on european union (teu); whereas democracy , the rule of law and fundamental rights are mutually reinforcing values which , when undermined , may pose a systemic threat to the union; whereas respect of the rule of law binds the union as a whole , its member states and their subnational entities;


### e. whereas without effective follow-up under an annual monitoring cycle , the 2020 report may fail to address systemic challenges and backsliding on the rule of law as witnessed in several eu member states in recent years; ### e. whereas without effective and informed follow-up with the same assessment criteria for all eu member states under an annual monitoring cycle , the 2020 report may fail to address systemic challenges and backsliding on the rule of law as witnessed in several eu member states in recent years;


### f. whereas backsliding on the rule of law and fundamental rights in some countries is seriously affecting mutual trust in the functioning of the area of freedom , security and justice and threatening the union objectives as enshrined in article 3 of the teu; ### f. whereas backsliding on the rule of law and fundamental rights in some countries is seriously affecting mutual trust in the functioning of the area of freedom , security and justice and threatening the union objectives as enshrined in article 3 of the teu , as illustrated by several cases where the european arrest warrant was put under a strain due to profound doubts about the independence of the judiciary;


### 3. asks the commission to provide information in its future reports about the way member states respect the rule of law and effectively protect the union’s financial interests , for both eu budget revenue and expenditure , and to highlight serious risks to the union budget; insists that the reports should provide specific assessments and recommendations to the member states; ### 3. asks the commission to provide information in its future reports about the way member states respect the rule of law and effectively protect the union’s financial interests , for both eu budget revenue and expenditure , as well as to put emphasis on cases where breaches of the principles of the rule of law in a particular member state could affect or seriously risk affecting the union's financial interests in a sufficiently direct way; emphasises that the reports should provide specific assessments and recommendations to the member states in order to strengthen their preventive role;


### 3. asks the commission to provide information in its future reports about the way member states respect the rule of law and effectively protect the union’s financial interests , for both eu budget revenue and expenditure , and to highlight serious risks to the union budget; insists that the reports should provide specific assessments and recommendations to the member states; ### 3. asks the commission to provide information in its future reports about the way member states respect the rule of law and effectively protect the union’s financial interests , for both eu budget revenue and expenditure , and to highlight serious risks to the union budget , taking into account the additional risks due to covid-19 and the related union funds available to member states under the recovery and resilience facility; insists that the reports should provide specific assessments and recommendations to the member states;


### 3. asks the commission to provide information in its future reports about the way member states respect the rule of law and effectively protect the union’s financial interests , for both eu budget revenue and expenditure , and to highlight serious risks to the union budget; insists that the reports should provide specific assessments and recommendations to the member states; ### 3. asks the commission to provide information in its future reports about the way member states respect the rule of law and effectively protect the union’s financial interests , for both eu budget revenue and expenditure , and to highlight serious risks to the union budget; highlights the need for more attention to fraud related to public procurement in this regard; insists that the reports should provide specific assessments and recommendations to the member states;


### 4. calls on the commission to assess the effectiveness of the national anti-corruption strategies and to use that knowledge to update and enhance the union’s anti-corruption framework; ### 4. calls on the commission to assess not only the existence but also the effectiveness of the national anti-corruption strategies , and to use that knowledge to update and enhance the union’s anti-corruption framework; underlines that anti-corruption frameworks shall cover areas such as , inter alia , ethical rules , awareness-raising measures , rules on asset disclosures , incompatibilities and conflicts of interest , public procurement , internal control mechanisms , rules on lobbying , and revolving doors; highlights likewise that national strategies shall incorporate tools to prevent , detect risk , halt and sanction cases of corruption and fraud , as well as mechanisms to recover the profit from those cases;


### 5. stresses that transparency , access to public information , the protection of whistleblowers and an overall culture of integrity in public life are key factors that enable corruption to be identified and prevented; underlines the importance of harmonising definitions and methodologies to obtain comparative data across the eu; ### 5. stresses that transparency , access to public information , protection of whistleblowers and an overall culture of integrity in public life are indispensable to identify and to prevented corruption;


### 6. highlights the importance of supporting and strengthening cooperation between the eu institutions , the member states and , in particular , the european anti-fraud office (olaf) and the european public prosecutor’s office (eppo) in the fight against corruption; ### 6. highlights the importance of supporting and strengthening cooperation between the eu institutions , the member states and , in particular , the european anti-fraud office (olaf) and the european public prosecutor’s office (eppo) in the fight against corruption; calls on the commission to propose the provision of adequate budget , resources and or any kind of support necessary for the aforementioned institutions and bodies;


### 7. reiterates that regulation (eu , euratom) 2020/2092 has been in force since 1 january 2021 and is not subject to the adoption of any guidelines or judicial interpretation. ### 7. believes that the situation as regards the respect of the principles of the rule of law in some member states is extremely worrying and seriously risks affecting the sound financial management of the union budget; reiterates that the general regime of conditionality as defined in the regulation 2020/2092 is in force since 1 january 2021 and is not subjected to the adoption of any guidelines or judicial interpretation; calls on the commission for an immediate action under the aforementioned regulation , using the existing investigation tools , without any further delay; insists in the role and competences of the parliament , in particular the right to be duly informed by the commission , in the procedures of the rule of law instruments;


### 7. reiterates that regulation (eu , euratom) 2020/2092 has been in force since 1 january 2021 and is not subject to the adoption of any guidelines or judicial interpretation. ### 7. reiterates that regulation (eu , euratom) 2020/2092 has been in force since 1 january 2021 and is not subject to the adoption of any guidelines or judicial interpretation; urges the commission to strengthen the link between the regulation and the rule of law reports , since the latter could serve as an additional source of information to identify and act on breaches of the regulation.


### 6. recalls that the authorities of the member states must ensure that a child is given the genuine and effective opportunity to express their own views freely during proceedings and that due weight is given to the child’s views in accordance with their age and maturity; ### 6. recalls that the authorities of the member states must ensure that a child is given the genuine and effective opportunity to express their own views freely during proceedings , that due weight is given to the child’s views in accordance with their age and maturity , and for their views to be taken seriously;


### 1. believes that a single independent eu ethics body is necessary to ensure the consistent and full implementation of ethics standards across the eu institutions; proposes the conclusion of an interinstitutional agreement (iia) to set up an eu ethics body for parliament and the commission open to the participation of all eu institutions , agencies and bodies; recommends that the iia contain the following provisions: ### 1. believes that a single independent eu ethics body is necessary to ensure the consistent and full implementation of ethics standards across the eu institutions; proposes the conclusion of an interinstitutional agreement (iia) to set up an eu ethics body for parliament and the commission open to the participation of all eu institutions , agencies and bodies , and also provide them training and active guidance; recommends that the iia contain the following provisions:


### 1. stresses that transparency , accountability and integrity are key components in promoting ethics principles within the eu , and are essential to protect the eu budget from fraud and corruption and to maintain democratic legitimacy; recalls that corruption has serious financial consequences and constitutes a serious threat to democracy , the rule of law and public investment; recalls that conflicts of interest can significantly damage the eu’s financial interests and decision-making processes , and should therefore be prevented and condemned; ### 1. stresses that transparency , accountability and integrity are key components in promoting ethics principles within the eu , are essential to protect the eu budget from fraud and corruption , and to maintain democratic legitimacy; recalls that unethical behaviours have negative financial consequences , may result in reputational damage to the image of the eu and its institutions , and constitute a serious threat to democracy , the rule of law and the public interest; remarks that the organisation for economic cooperation and development defines public integrity as the alignment of , and adherence to , shared ethical values , principles and norms for upholding and prioritising the public interest over private interests in the public sector;


### 1. stresses that transparency , accountability and integrity are key components in promoting ethics principles within the eu , and are essential to protect the eu budget from fraud and corruption and to maintain democratic legitimacy; recalls that corruption has serious financial consequences and constitutes a serious threat to democracy , the rule of law and public investment; recalls that conflicts of interest can significantly damage the eu’s financial interests and decision-making processes , and should therefore be prevented and condemned; ### 1. stresses that transparency , accountability professionalism and integrity are key components in promoting ethics principles within the eu , and are essential to protect the eu budget from fraud and corruption and to maintain democratic legitimacy; recalls that corruption has serious financial consequences and constitutes a serious threat to democracy , the rule of law and public investment; recalls that conflicts of interest can significantly damage the eu’s financial interests and decision-making processes , and should therefore be prevented , investigated and condemned;


### 1. notes that within the eu institutions different legislative measures aimed at preventing conflicts of interest contain varying definitions of the term ‘conflict of interest’; believes therefore that the term should be understood to mean a conflict between the public duty and private interests of a public official , in which the public official has private-capacity interests which could improperly influence the performance of their official duties and responsibilities; notes , however , that a definition of this kind has an evolving nature and that full transparency does not necessarily guarantee the absence of any conflict of interest , nor does it guarantee public trust; ### 1. notes that within the eu institutions different legislative measures aimed at preventing conflicts of interest contain varying definitions of the term ‘conflict of interest’; believes therefore that the term should be understood to mean a conflict between the public duty and private interests of a public official , in which the public official has private-capacity interests which could improperly influence the performance of their official duties and responsibilities , or in which the performance of official duties is prompted by private-capacity interests; notes , however , that a definition of this kind has a contextual and evolving nature and that full transparency does not necessarily guarantee the absence of any conflict of interest , nor does it guarantee public trust;


### 1. recalls its resolution of 16 january 2020 on institutions and bodies of the economic and monetary union: preventing post-public employment conflicts of interest1 ; ### 1. recalls its resolution of 16 january 2020 on institutions and bodies of the economic and monetary union: preventing post-public employment conflicts of interest1; recalls this resolution supported the proposal of the president of the commission to create an eu independent ethics body common to all eu institutions to taking decisions related to conflicts of interests;


### — having regard to the recommendations of transparency international , the council of europe’s group of states against corruption (greco) , and the organisation for economic co-operation and development (oecd) , ### — having regard to the recommendations of the council of europe’s group of states against corruption (greco) , and the organisation for economic co-operation and development (oecd) ,


### a. whereas the teu stipulates that ‘the union shall observe the principle of the equality of its citizens , who shall receive equal attention from its institutions , bodies and agencies’; whereas this implies that public decisions are taken in the interest of the common good and not according to the financial power of individual actors; ### a. whereas the teu stipulates that ‘the union shall observe the principle of the equality of its citizens , who shall receive equal attention from its institutions , bodies and agencies’; whereas this implies that public decisions are taken in the interest of the common good;


### c. whereas the shortcomings of the current eu ethics framework derive largely from the fact that it relies on a self-regulatory approach and lacks adequate human and financial resources and competences to verify information; ### c. whereas the shortcomings of the current eu ethics framework derive largely from the fact that it relies on a self-regulatory approach , due to the absence of eu criminal law , and insufficient resources and competences to verify information;


### g. whereas all lead candidates in the 2019 european elections committed to the creation of an independent ethics body common to all eu institutions; whereas the president of the commission committed to it in her political guidelines and whereas parliament has already supported this view; ### g. whereas some lead candidates in the 2019 european elections supported the creation of an independent ethics body common to all eu institutions; whereas the president of the commission supports it in her political guidelines and whereas parliament has already supported this view;


### 2. considers that the new eu ethics body should be delegated a list of competences to implement ethics rules for members and staff; takes the view that this list should include by way of a minimum the competences provided for in: ### 2. considers that the new eu ethics body should have an agreed list of competences to implement ethics rules for members and staff which should be foreseen in the necessary changes to the existing legislation; takes the view that this list should include by way of a minimum the competences provided for in:


### 2. considers that the new eu ethics body should be delegated a list of competences to implement ethics rules for members and staff; takes the view that this list should include by way of a minimum the competences provided for in: ### 2. considers that the new eu ethics body should be delegated a list of competences to implement ethics rules for commissioners , members and staff; takes the view that this list should include by way of a minimum the competences provided for in:


### 2. considers that the new eu ethics body should be delegated a list of competences to implement ethics rules for members and staff; takes the view that this list should include by way of a minimum the competences provided for in: ### 2. considers that the new eu ethics body should be delegated a list of competences to propose and advise on ethics rules for members and staff; takes the view that this list should include by way of a minimum the competences provided for in:


### - parliament’s rules of procedure: rules 2 , 10 and 11 , 176(1) , annex i , articles 1 to 3 , 4(6) , 5 and 6 and annex ii , ### - parliament’s rules of procedure: rules 2 , 10(5 , 6 and 7) and 11 , 176(1) , annex i , articles 1 to 3 , 4(6) , 5 and 6 and annex ii ,


### - the commission’s rules of procedure: article 9 , its code of conduct , article 2 and articles 5-11 , and annex ii , and its decision of 25 november 2014 on the publication of information on meetings held between members of the commission and organisations or self-employed individuals , and the same decision for directors-general , ### - the commission’s rules of procedure: article 9 , its code of conduct , article 2 and articles 5-11 , and annex ii , and its decision of 25 november 2014 on the publication of information on meetings held between members of the commission and organisations or self-employed individuals ,


### - the staff regulation’s articles 11 , 11(a) , 12 , 12(a) , 12(b) , 13 , 15 , 16 , 17 , 19 , 21(a) , 22(a) , 22(c) , 24 , 27 and 40 , ### - the staff regulation’s articles 11 , 11(a) , 12 , 12(a) , 12(b) , 13 , 15 , 16 , 17 , 19 , 21(a) , 22(a) , 22(c) , 24 , 27 and 40 , applying mutatis mutandis to all personnel employed by the agencies if signatories of the iia


### 3. believes that the members and staff of the participating institutions should be covered by the agreement before , during and after the term of office or service in line with the applicable rules; considers that this should apply to members of parliament , commissioners and all eu staff falling under the scope of the staff regulation; ### 3. believes that the members and staff of the participating institutions should be covered by the agreement before , during and in some cases after the term of office or service in line with the applicable rules; considers that this should apply to members of parliament , commissioners and all eu staff falling under the scope of the staff regulation;


### 3. emphasises that the high level of fragmentation in the ethics legal framework and the lack of oversight have prevented the proper implementation of codes of conduct in eu institutions; believes that the current self-regulatory approach is not fit for purpose and cannot guarantee integrity; underlines the need to enhance the integrity of the eu institutions and restore public trust; ### 3. emphasises that the eca identified many areas where is advisable to have harmonised approaches to handling ethical issues; recalls that the eca stated that the ethical frameworks are appropriately supported by investigative and sanction mechanisms; believes , however , that the current self-regulatory approach should be reviewed in the interest of a greater effectiveness; recalls that the eca states that the ethical frameworks cannot be effective without appropriate control systems as well as that the level of control should reflect the level of risks and take into account the administrative burden created by such controls; underlines the need to enhance the integrity of the eu institutions and restore public trust;


### 3. emphasises that the high level of fragmentation in the ethics legal framework and the lack of oversight have prevented the proper implementation of codes of conduct in eu institutions; believes that the current self-regulatory approach is not fit for purpose and cannot guarantee integrity; underlines the need to enhance the integrity of the eu institutions and restore public trust; ### 3. emphasises that the high level of fragmentation in the ethics legal framework and regarding sanctions and the lack of oversight have prevented the proper implementation of codes of conduct in eu institutions; believes that the current self-regulatory approach is not fit for purpose and cannot guarantee integrity; underlines the need to enhance the integrity of the eu institutions and restore public trust;


### 3. is also of the opinion that for this examination to be complete and accurate , and for the possibility of a conflict of interest to be excluded , information and documents beyond the declaration of financial interests of commissioner-designates are often essential; ### 3. is also of the opinion that for this examination to be complete and accurate , and for the possibility of a conflict of interest to be excluded , information and documents beyond the declaration of financial interests of commissioner-designates in its current form are often essential and that it should be possible to systematically verify whether information is complete , accurate and up-to-date;


### 3. points out that the inherent complexities in financial regulatory policies and the information asymmetries between financial market players and public officials may make the financial sector particularly susceptible to regulatory capture; ### 3. points out that the inherent complexities in financial regulatory policies and the information asymmetries between financial market players and public officials makes supervisors and regulators particularly susceptible to regulatory capture by the financial sector;


### 4. insists that the iia should be open to the participation of all eu institutions and bodies; believes that the iia should allow the ethics body to conclude agreements with national authorities with a view to ensuring the exchange of information necessary for the performance of its tasks; ### 4. insists that the iia should be open to the participation of all eu institutions and bodies; believes that the iia should allow the ethics body to conclude agreements with national authorities with a view to ensuring the exchange of information necessary for the performance of its tasks as well as to explore best practices and peer to peer reviews;


### 4. insists that the iia should be open to the participation of all eu institutions and bodies; believes that the iia should allow the ethics body to conclude agreements with national authorities with a view to ensuring the exchange of information necessary for the performance of its tasks; ### 4. insists that the iia should be open to the participation of all eu institutions and bodies; believes that the iia should allow the ethics body to conclude agreements with national authorities with a view to ensuring the exchange of information and best practices necessary for the performance of its tasks;


### 4. insists that the iia should be open to the participation of all eu institutions and bodies; believes that the iia should allow the ethics body to conclude agreements with national authorities with a view to ensuring the exchange of information necessary for the performance of its tasks; ### 4. insists that the iia should be open to the participation of all eu institutions and bodies; believes that the iia should allow the ethics body to exchange information with national authorities that are necessary for the performance of its tasks;


### 4. encourages the creation of an independent ethics body (ieb) common to all eu institutions; welcomes the fact that the commission has made it a priority , and is committed to supporting the ieb’s effort to establish a common ethical framework at eu level; ### 4. reflects on the creation of an independent ethics body (ieb) common to all eu institutions; acknowledges the fact that the commission has made it a priority , and is committed to supporting the effort to establish a common ethical framework at eu level; remarks that improving and harmonising the existing ethic frameworks and their effective implementation don’t rely exclusively upon the creation of the ieb; considers it to be of utmost importance , prior to the elaboration of a legislative proposal to create an ieb , to perform a thorough cost-benefit analysis and an impact assessment , including different scenarios competence-wise; highlights that the objective is to protect the eu budget from unethical behaviours while maintaining the highest standards of ethics and integrity among a diverse and large number of eu institutions and bodies , and contemplates a range of options to reach this objective;


### 4. believes therefore that the committee on legal affairs should be given sufficient time to evaluate possible conflicts of interest; further believes that it should be provided with sufficient resources , tools and skills to cross-check and locate necessary information; ### 4. believes therefore that the committee on legal affairs should be given sufficient time to evaluate possible conflicts of interest; further believes that it should be provided with sufficient resources , tools and skills to cross-check and locate necessary information as well as ask for complementary information where necessary;


### 4. calls for a strengthening of the existing regulatory and enforcement framework for both pre-public and post-public employment conflicts of interest , in order to establish appropriate boundaries between the public sector and the private and non-profit sectors; welcomes in this regard the work done by the organisation for economic co-operation and development , the european court of auditors and the european ombudsman; ### 4. calls for a strengthening of the existing regulatory and enforcement framework for both pre-public and post-public employment conflicts of interest , in order to establish appropriate boundaries between the public and the private sectors; welcomes in this regard the work done by the organisation for economic co-operation and development , the european court of auditors , the council of europe's group of states against corruption and the european ombudsman;


### 4. calls for a strengthening of the existing regulatory and enforcement framework for both pre-public and post-public employment conflicts of interest , in order to establish appropriate boundaries between the public sector and the private and non-profit sectors; welcomes in this regard the work done by the organisation for economic co-operation and development , the european court of auditors and the european ombudsman; ### 4. calls for a strengthening of the existing regulatory and enforcement framework for both pre-public and post-public employment conflicts of interest , in order to establish appropriate boundaries between the public sector and the private and non-profit sectors; welcomes in this regard the work done by the organisation for economic co-operation and development , the european court of auditors and the european ombudsman; points out the lack of alignment of the eu ethics rules with the oecd guidelines for managing conflict of interest in the public service; notes the oecd guidelines recommended the creation of a central function responsible for the development and maintenance of the conflict-of-interest policy and procedure , that could take the form of an independent agency; underlines the european ombudsman has been handling conflicts-of-interest complains in the absence of a mechanism dedicated to this task on top of its other missions , and without having the proper means and power to enforce its decisions;


### 5. considers that the participating institutions should entrust the eu ethics body with monitoring powers over ethics standards , as well as advisory , investigative and enforcement powers; ### 5. considers that the participating institutions should entrust the eu ethics body with monitoring powers over ethics standards , as well as advisory , investigative and enforcement powers; stresses that to monitor integrity a framework should be set up , that clearly defines integrity with a set of well-defined objectives and performance indicators;


### 5. considers that the participating institutions should entrust the eu ethics body with monitoring powers over ethics standards , as well as advisory , investigative and enforcement powers; ### 5. considers that the participating institutions should entrust the eu ethics body with monitoring powers over ethics standards , as well as advisory , investigative and the capacity to propose sanctions , if appropriate;


### 5. sees high potential for the eu institutions to transfer administrative decision-making competences to the ieb based on a new harmonised ethics framework that it will establish , which should include common rules on the publication of declarations of interests , avoidance of conflicts of interest and revolving doors , acceptance of gifts and entertainment , protection of whistle-blowers and victims of harassment , transparency of lobby meetings , public procurement and meeting calendars of senior staff , and use of transparent bank accounts for public funds; ### 5. sees high potential but also important risks for the eu institutions to transfer administrative decision-making competences to the ieb based on a new harmonised ethics framework , which nevertheless should include common rules on the publication of declarations of interests , avoidance of conflicts of interest and revolving doors , acceptance of gifts and entertainment , protection of whistle-blowers and victims of harassment , transparency of lobby meetings , public procurement and meeting calendars of senior staff , and use of transparent bank accounts for public funds , while taking into consideration the different work performed by the institutions as well as the risks inherent to their members’ specific duties;


### 5. considers that , given the sophisticated and complex nature of this responsibility , the establishment of a possible conflict of interest should be de-politicised and performed in an independent and systematic way with the assistance of a body with the relevant expertise and experience; ### 5. considers that , given the sophisticated and complex nature of this responsibility , the examination of and the establishment of a possible conflict of interest of commissioner-designates should be technical and performed in an independent and systematic way with the assistance of a body with the relevant expertise and experience;


### 5. recommends empowering the european anti-fraud office or the european ombudsman with the responsibility to carry out oversight of conflicts of interest , revolving doors and lobby transparency for eu institutions and agencies; ### 5. recommends , therefore , the creation of an eu independent ethics body with a broad mandate to carry out oversight , and decision regarding of conflicts of interest , revolving doors and lobby transparency for eu institutions and agencies;


### 5. recommends empowering the european anti-fraud office or the european ombudsman with the responsibility to carry out oversight of conflicts of interest , revolving doors and lobby transparency for eu institutions and agencies; ### 5. recommends that the european anti-fraud office or the european ombudsman have a secondary role to the new eu ethics body in the oversight of conflicts of interest , revolving doors and lobby transparency for eu institutions and agencies; highlights the need to establish a clear division of responsibilities between these institutions;


### 5. recommends empowering the european anti-fraud office or the european ombudsman with the responsibility to carry out oversight of conflicts of interest , revolving doors and lobby transparency for eu institutions and agencies; ### 5. recommends empowering the european anti-fraud office or the european ombudsman with the responsibility to carry out oversight of conflicts of interest , revolving doors and lobby transparency for eu institutions and agencies; stresses , especially in the cases of elected members , the necessity to adequately inform the broad public of relevant past and prospected (over a reasonable time frame) personal and financial commitments in order to meet transparency and accountability criteria to the benefit of european citizens;


### 6. considers that this monitoring capacity should include the verification of the veracity of the declaration of financial interests , the handling of conflicts of interest , checks on transparency obligations and the verification of compliance with revolving doors rules; ### 6. considers that this monitoring capacity should include the verification of the veracity of the declaration of financial interests , the handling of conflicts of interest , checks on transparency obligations , verification of compliance with revolving doors rules , and the verification and improvement of transparency in the eu’s ordinary legislative procedure and eu lobbying;


### 6. believes that empowering the ieb with the current internal ethics functions of the eu institutions will concentrate expertise , create synergies and hence improve the implementation of ethics rules; is confident that this transfer of competence will represent considerable savings for the eu budget; ### 6. believes that empowering the ieb with the current internal ethics functions of the eu institutions will concentrate expertise , create synergies and hence improve the implementation of ethics rules , requiring public officials always to act for the good of society through the sound management of public funds and legal , fair and transparent decision making; is confident that this transfer of competence will represent considerable savings for the eu budget;


### 6. believes that empowering the ieb with the current internal ethics functions of the eu institutions will concentrate expertise , create synergies and hence improve the implementation of ethics rules; is confident that this transfer of competence will represent considerable savings for the eu budget; ### 6. believes that the ieb could concentrate expertise , create synergies and hence improve the implementation of ethics rules without requiring a transfer of competences;


### 6. considers that for proper expertise to be acquired , the future ethics body should have a permanent , independent and collegiate structure , and that its composition could be based either on specific institutional positions , such as that of the president of the court of justice , or on the nomination of experts by each eu institution; ### 6. considers that for proper expertise to be acquired , the future ethics body should have a permanent , independent and collegiate structure , and that its composition could be based either on specific institutional positions , such as that of the president of the court of justice , or on the nomination of experts by each eu institution; considers that the members of the college must offer guarantees in terms of independence , impartiality , integrity , probity and experience;


### 6. considers that for proper expertise to be acquired , the future ethics body should have a permanent , independent and collegiate structure , and that its composition could be based either on specific institutional positions , such as that of the president of the court of justice , or on the nomination of experts by each eu institution; ### 6. considers that for proper expertise to be acquired , the future ethics body should have a permanent , independent and collegiate structure , and that its composition could be based either on specific institutional positions , such as that of the president of the court of justice , or on the nomination or election of experts by each eu institution;


### 6. recognises the need to strike a delicate balance between regulating conflicts of interest , respecting the individual right to economic freedom , and maintaining a dynamic labour market with mobility between the public sector and the private and non-profit sectors; ### 6. recognises the need to implement strong norms regulating conflicts of interest , while introducing measures which mitigate limitations to the individual right to economic freedom , such as posting information to job applicants about the conflict of interest regime and any future employment restrictions;


### 7. takes the view that the eu ethics body could also be given authority over the obligations imposed by the transparency register; ### 7. takes the view that the eu ethics body could also begiven authority over the obligations imposed by the transparency register , and should envisage a better protection of whistle-blowers , better management of conflict of interests for corruption and fraud cases;


### 7. underlines that the ieb should be in charge of prevention , monitoring , investigation and enforcement of the ethical framework for the protection of the eu’s financial interests; highlights that the ieb should be able to take disciplinary measures and impose financial sanctions in order to avoid abuse of the eu budget linked to unethical behaviour; ### 7. underlines that the ieb could provide knowledge and guidance about prevention , monitoring , investigation and enforcement of the ethical framework for the protection of the eu’s financial interests; contemplates the possibility that the ieb would be able to recommend disciplinary measures and financial sanctions in order to avoid abuse of the eu budget linked to unethical behaviour; calls for the ieb , as the case may be , to assess the implementation and compliance of ethics rules by the eu institutions and publish an annual report on its findings;


### 7. underlines that the ieb should be in charge of prevention , monitoring , investigation and enforcement of the ethical framework for the protection of the eu’s financial interests; highlights that the ieb should be able to take disciplinary measures and impose financial sanctions in order to avoid abuse of the eu budget linked to unethical behaviour; ### 7. underlines that the ieb should be in charge of prevention , monitoring , investigation and enforcement of the ethical framework for the protection of the eu’s financial interests; highlights that the ieb should be able to take disciplinary measures and impose sanctions in order to avoid abuse of the eu budget linked to unethical behaviour; stresses that the ieb must heighten staff awareness of the ethical framework provisions and the ethical culture in the eu institutions so as to prevent fraud and corruption;


### 7. recommends therefore that , while fully keeping its competence on the matter , the committee on legal affairs decide on the existence of a conflict of interest after having received a non-binding recommendation by such an independent expert advisory body; ### 7. recommends therefore that , while fully keeping its competence on the matter , the committee on legal affairs decide on the existence of a conflict of interest of commissioner-designates after having received a non-binding recommendation by such an independent expert advisory body; insists that the body should also have the investigative powers to detect relevant conflicts of interests prior to , during and after public office or employment of all union institutions , bodies ,offices , and agencies; suggests the eu ethics body to be competent on declarations of interest , declarations of assets , conflicts of interest , gifts and lobby transparency rules;


### 7. recommends therefore that , while fully keeping its competence on the matter , the committee on legal affairs decide on the existence of a conflict of interest after having received a non-binding recommendation by such an independent expert advisory body; ### 7. recommends therefore that , while fully keeping its competence on the matter , the committee on legal affairs decide on the existence of a conflict of interest after having received a non-binding recommendation by such an independent expert advisory body , which would have the effect of strengthening its action;


### 7. is of the view that any prohibition of a professional move should be justified on a case-by-case basis , and might , where appropriate , require a temporary allowance to be granted during a cooling-off period , until the new job is taken up. ### 7. is of the view that the eu independent ethics body should also be mandated to control conditions and lobby bans imposed on eu staff; stressed the eu ethics rules need to be revised to extend both the notification and cooling off-periods;


### 7. is of the view that any prohibition of a professional move should be justified on a case-by-case basis , and might , where appropriate , require a temporary allowance to be granted during a cooling-off period , until the new job is taken up. ### 7. is of the view that “cooling-off” periods are justified legal measures for certain professions in the public sphere in order to protect the public interest and integrity of public bodies; temporary allowances can bridge the time before finding an appropriate job;


### 7. is of the view that any prohibition of a professional move should be justified on a case-by-case basis , and might , where appropriate , require a temporary allowance to be granted during a cooling-off period , until the new job is taken up. ### 7. is of the view that any prohibition of a professional move should be justified on the basis of an objective procedure with clear criteria , and might , where appropriate , require a temporary allowance to be granted during a cooling-off period , until the new job is taken up.


### 8. highlights that tasks transferred to the ieb can go beyond those currently exercised by the institutions; calls for the ieb to assess the implementation of ethics rules by the eu institutions and publish an annual report on its findings; ### 8. warns that transfering tasks to the ieb beyond those currently exercised by the institutions could create a serious breach of the treaties;


### 8. highlights that tasks transferred to the ieb can go beyond those currently exercised by the institutions; calls for the ieb to assess the implementation of ethics rules by the eu institutions and publish an annual report on its findings; ### 8. highlights that tasks transferred to the ieb can go beyond those currently exercised by the institutions; calls for the ieb to assess the implementation of ethics rules by the eu institutions , publish an annual report on its findings and recommendations and present it to parliament;


### 8. believes furthermore that this future advisory body could also be entrusted with the broader task of examining conflicts of interest within the eu institutions and agencies in general , playing , in a complementary and balanced way , a preventive role via awareness raising and ethical guidance powers on the one hand , and a compliance role on the other. ### 8. believes furthermore that this future advisory body could also be entrusted with power to enforce attenuation measures , as well as bans and sanctions while exercising its task of examining conflicts of interest within the eu institutions and agencies in general , playing , in a complementary and balanced way , a preventive role via awareness raising and ethical guidance powers on the one hand , and a compliance and enforcement role on the other; suggests the new eu ethics body could replace existing ethics committees within eu institutions , to support a coherent implementation of the respective rules aiming for the strongest ethical standards;


### 8. believes furthermore that this future advisory body could also be entrusted with the broader task of examining conflicts of interest within the eu institutions and agencies in general , playing , in a complementary and balanced way , a preventive role via awareness raising and ethical guidance powers on the one hand , and a compliance role on the other. ### 8. believes furthermore that this future advisory body could also be entrusted with a broader support role in order to examine conflicts of interest within the eu institutions and agencies in general , including for members of the european parliament and senior officials , playing , in a complementary and balanced way , a preventive role via awareness raising and ethical guidance powers on the one hand , and a compliance role on the other.


### 9. believes that in relation to its enforcement powers , the body could take over from the appointing authority in dealing with staff ethics obligations , and that in relation to members of parliament or commissioners , the body could be granted enforcement powers within the limits of the provisions contained in the treaties , and without prejudice to any additional mechanisms provided for in parliament’s rules of procedure , in particular concerning termination of office; ### 9. believes that in relation to its enforcement powers , the body should issue recommandations to the responsible authorities of the respective participative institutions and without prejudice to any additional mechanisms;


### 9. believes that in relation to its enforcement powers , the body could take over from the appointing authority in dealing with staff ethics obligations , and that in relation to members of parliament or commissioners , the body could be granted enforcement powers within the limits of the provisions contained in the treaties , and without prejudice to any additional mechanisms provided for in parliament’s rules of procedure , in particular concerning termination of office; ### 9. considers that in case the eu ethics body should be given enforcement powers within the limits of the provisions contained in the treaties , bilateral agreements for good cooperation should be set up with each eu institution on the procedure envisaged to deal with the ethical obligations of commissioners , meps and staff;


### 9. calls for the ieb to lead by example on transparency by publishing all decisions and spending in a machine-readable open data format available to all citizens; strongly recommends that any software developed for upholding the ethical standards in eu public administration should be made available under a free and open-source software licence and should be shared with any institution in europe wishing to use it; ### 9. calls for the ieb to lead by example on transparency by publishing all recommendations , annual reports and spending in a machine-readable open data format available to all citizens; strongly recommends that any software developed for upholding the ethical standards in eu public administration should be made available under a free and open-source software licence and should be shared with any institution in europe wishing to use it; calls for a close cooperation with the european data protection supervisor on this regard;


### 10. considers that the eu ethics body should be entrusted with advisory tasks in order to provide advice to any individual covered by its scope who wishes to request interpretation of an ethical standard in relation to appropriate conduct in a specific case; ### 10. considers that the eu ethics body should promote integrity , and should be entrusted with advisory tasks in order to provide advice to any individual covered by its scope who wishes to request interpretation of an ethical standard in relation to appropriate conduct in a specific case;


### 10. considers that the eu ethics body should be entrusted with advisory tasks in order to provide advice to any individual covered by its scope who wishes to request interpretation of an ethical standard in relation to appropriate conduct in a specific case; ### 10. considers that the eu ethics body should be entrusted with advisory tasks in order to provide advice to any individual and/or institution covered by its scope who wishes to request interpretation of an ethical standard in relation to appropriate conduct in a specific case;


### 10. welcomes the signing of an interinstitutional agreement (iia) between eu institutions to set up the ieb; emphasises the importance of the council , including the member states’ representatives working in the council , joining the iia in view of the eca’s and european ombudsman’s repeated requests to enhance the institution’s working ethics and transparency; recalls the obligation of the council to deal with high-level conflicts of interest , revolving doors and lobby transparency rules; ### 10. considers that the creation of the ieb , as the case may be , should be accompanied by the signing of an interinstitutional agreement (iia) between eu institutions to set up the ieb; emphasises the importance of the council , including the member states’ representatives working in the council , joining the iia in view of the eca’s and european ombudsman’s repeated requests to enhance the institution’s working ethics and transparency; recalls the obligation of the council to deal with high-level conflicts of interest , revolving doors and lobby transparency rules;


### 10. welcomes the signing of an interinstitutional agreement (iia) between eu institutions to set up the ieb; emphasises the importance of the council , including the member states’ representatives working in the council , joining the iia in view of the eca’s and european ombudsman’s repeated requests to enhance the institution’s working ethics and transparency; recalls the obligation of the council to deal with high-level conflicts of interest , revolving doors and lobby transparency rules; ### 10. welcomes the signing of an interinstitutional agreement (iia) between eu institutions to set up the ieb; emphasises the importance of the council , including the member states’ representatives working in the council , joining the iia in view of the eca’s and european ombudsman’s repeated requests to enhance the institution’s working ethics and transparency for the benefit of eu citizens; recalls the obligation of the council to deal with high-level conflicts of interest , revolving doors and lobby transparency rules;


### 11. stresses the importance of enhanced mutual cooperation between the ieb and eu bodies such as the european anti-fraud office (olaf) , the european public prosecutor’s office (eppo) , the european ombudsman , the european court of auditors (eca) and others within their respective mandates , and of such cooperation generating a steady information exchange. ### 11. stresses the importance of having a clear division of tasks and a close cooperation between eu bodies such as the european anti-fraud office (olaf) , the european public prosecutor’s office (eppo) , the european ombudsman , the european court of auditors (eca) , the ieb if applicable and others within their respective mandates , and of such cooperation generating a steady information exchange; warns that the public trust cannot afford adding the ieb to the eu institutions and bodies without giving full reassurance in terms of opportunity and efficacy;


### 14. suggests that each institution choose these members in particular from among former judges of the cjeu , former or current members of highest courts of member states , former members of the european parliament , former staff of the participating institutions and bodies , former eu ombudsmen , and members of the ethics authorities in member states; suggests further that the body elect a president and two vice-presidents from among its members; ### 14. suggests that each institution choose these members in particular from among former judges of the cjeu , former or current members of highest courts of member states , former eu ombudsmen , and members of the ethics authorities in member states; suggests further that the body elect a president and two vice-presidents from among its members;


### 16. proposes a two-step approach whereby , in the event that the eu ethics body becomes aware of a breach or possible breach of ethics rules , it first recommends actions to put an end to the breach; considers that this first preventive step should ensure confidentiality and the right of the person to be heard; suggests that in the event that the individual concerned refuses to take the appropriate actions , the eu ethics body should make relevant information about the case publicly available and decide , if appropriate , on sanctions; considers that this two-step approach should apply provided that there are no reasonable grounds to believe that the individual acted in bad faith and recommends that intentional breach , gross negligence , the concealment of evidence and non-compliance with the obligation to cooperate should be , as such , subject to sanctions , even when the breach itself has ceased; ### 16. proposes a two-step approach whereby , in the event that the eu ethics body becomes aware of a breach or possible breach of ethics rules , it first recommends actions to put an end to the breach; considers that this first preventive step should ensure confidentiality and secrecy and the right of the person to be heard and present allegations to the accusations; suggests that in the event that the individual concerned refuses to take the appropriate actions , the eu ethics body should make relevant information about the case publicly available and decide , if appropriate , on sanctions; considers that this two-step approach should apply provided that there are no reasonable grounds to believe that the individual acted in bad faith and recommends that intentional breach , gross negligence , the concealment of evidence and non-compliance with the obligation to cooperate should be , as such , subject to sanctions , even when the breach itself has ceased;


### 16. proposes a two-step approach whereby , in the event that the eu ethics body becomes aware of a breach or possible breach of ethics rules , it first recommends actions to put an end to the breach; considers that this first preventive step should ensure confidentiality and the right of the person to be heard; suggests that in the event that the individual concerned refuses to take the appropriate actions , the eu ethics body should make relevant information about the case publicly available and decide , if appropriate , on sanctions; considers that this two-step approach should apply provided that there are no reasonable grounds to believe that the individual acted in bad faith and recommends that intentional breach , gross negligence , the concealment of evidence and non-compliance with the obligation to cooperate should be , as such , subject to sanctions , even when the breach itself has ceased; ### 16. proposes a two-step approach whereby , in the event that the eu ethics body becomes aware of a breach or possible breach of ethics rules , it first recommends actions to put an end to the breach; considers that this first preventive step should ensure confidentiality and the right of the person to be heard; suggests that in the event that the individual concerned refuses to take the appropriate actions , the eu ethics body should make relevant information , without prejudice to the gdpr , about the case publicly available and recommend , if appropriate , on sanctions; considers that this two-step approach should apply provided that there are no reasonable grounds to believe that the individual acted in bad faith and recommends that intentional breach , gross negligence , the concealment of evidence and non-compliance with the obligation to cooperate should be , as such , subject to sanctions , even when the breach itself has ceased;


### 17. is of the opinion that the eu ethics body should publish an annual report containing both information about the fulfilment of its tasks and , where appropriate , recommendations for improving ethics standards; ### 17. is of the opinion that one year after its establishment , the eu ethics body shall adopt a general assessment of its activities , including analysis of the functioning of the rules and procedures and the experience acquired in applying them (review clause).


### 18. insists that the decisions of the eu ethics body should be legally binding , reviewable before the cjeu and subject to possible complaints to the eu ombudsman; ### 18. insists that the decisions of the eu ethics body should be legally binding , without prejudice of the parliament's competences refer to in paragraph 11 , reviewable before the cjeu and subject to possible complaints to the eu ombudsman;


### 2. recalls that the european court of auditors (eca) identified serious weaknesses in this regard in its 2019 audit on the ethical frameworks of the eu institutions , which concludes that improvements need to be made through harmonisation , awareness raising and strengthening of eu ethics rules; shares the eca’s concern about the absence of a common eu ethical framework governing the work of member states’ representatives in the council; ### 2. recalls that the european court of auditors (eca) assessed the ethical frameworks of the parliament , the council and the commission and published its findings in the special report 13/2019; notes that the eca concluded that the audited institutions had established adequate ethical frameworks; notes with concern that the eca also identified some weaknesses in this regard and recommends improvements that could be made in terms of harmonisation , awareness raising and strengthening of eu ethics rules; shares the eca’s concern about the absence of a common eu ethical framework governing the work of member states’ representatives in the council;


### 2. is of the opinion that the examination of commissioner-designates’ declarations with a view to inferring a conflict of interest is of fundamental institutional and democratic importance and should be undertaken with the utmost attention , commitment and sense of responsibility; ### 2. is of the opinion that the examination of commissioner-designates’ declarations with a view to inferring a conflict of interest is of fundamental institutional and democratic importance and should be undertaken with the utmost attention , commitment and sense of responsibility; insists that the declaration of the president-elect of the european commission should also be examined;


### 2. highlights that post-public employment and ‘revolving door’ conflict of interest situations are recurring concerns that , if unaddressed , could jeopardise the enforcement of high ethical standards in the eu institutions and agencies , thus compromising their integrity and damaging citizens’ trust in them; ### 2. highlights that post-public employment and ‘revolving door’ conflict of interest situations are recurring concerns and a problem common to all institutions , bodies , offices , and agencies across the eu; notes however the multiplication of recent cases specifically within the institutions of the economic and monetary union; recalls that both the european ombudsman and the european court of auditors repeatedly warned several eu institutions about major failures in their prevention of conflict of interest policies; stresses that unaddressed conflict-of-interest situation jeopardise the enforcement of high ethical standards in the eu institutions and agencies , thus compromising their integrity and damaging citizens’ trust in them;


### b. whereas the petitions received request that full details of the covid-19 vaccine contracts concluded between the commission , the member states and the pharmaceutical industry , as well as patient-level clinical trial data will be published as soon as possible and that the patent law will be temporarily suspended in order to enable rapid , equitable and universal access to vaccines in all parts of the world; ### b. whereas the petitions received request that full details of the covid-19 vaccine contracts concluded between the commission , the member states and the pharmaceutical industry , as well as patient-level clinical trial data will be published as soon as possible and that the trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights (trips) will be temporarily suspended in order to enable rapid , equitable and universal access to vaccines in all parts of the world;


### c. whereas transparency in the research and development of covid-19 vaccines is the prerequisite for public trust in vaccines , and any lack of transparency leads to uncertainty and disinformation and thus undermines rapid and effective action against the pandemic; ### c. whereas transparency in the research and development of covid-19 vaccines is the prerequisite for public trust in vaccines , and any lack of transparency can lead to uncertainty and disinformation thus undermining rapid and effective action against the pandemic;


### g. whereas the commission and the member states have only published redacted versions of the advance purchase agreements and the purchase agreement with key information blacked out or missing; ### g. whereas the commission and the member states have only published redacted versions of the advance purchase agreements and the purchase agreement with key information blacked out or missing causing unnecessary lack of transparency and trust in society;


### h. whereas the european union has funded much of the research and development of the vaccines , has facilitated the pharmaceutical companies with a de-risking investment upfront , has granted emergency authorisation and has purchased vaccines with taxpayers' money; ### h. whereas the european union has funded much of the research and development of the vaccines , has facilitated the pharmaceutical companies with a de-risking investment upfront , has granted conditional marketing authorisation and has purchased vaccines with taxpayers' money;


### 2. expresses its deepest concern on the lack of transparency by the commission and member states in the development , purchase and distribution of covid-19 vaccines; ### 2. expresses its deepest concern on the lack of transparency by the commission and member states in the development , purchase and distribution of covid-19 vaccines , especially in context of continuous breaches of the signed contracts;


### 3. calls on the commission to improve its communication of the eu strategy for covid-19 vaccines to the public; ### 3. calls on the commission to improve its communication of the eu strategy for covid-19 vaccines to the public ,including the criteria by which some vaccines are selected over the rest;


### 4. calls on the commission to disclose the names of experts or at the very least the list of seven member states represented in the negotiating team involved in negotiating advance purchase agreements and purchase agreements with pharmaceutical companies for the purchase of a covid-19 vaccine; ### 4. calls on the commission to disclose the members in the negotiating team involved in negotiating advance purchase agreements and purchase agreements with pharmaceutical companies for the purchase of a covid-19 vaccine;


### 5. calls on the commission to publish non-redacted versions of the advance purchase agreements and the purchase agreement and in particular to disclose the following details: the advance payments by the commission , the cost sharing between public and private investments in the vaccines , the number of doses given to each country and to be delivered per quarter , the prices per dose , the number and locations of available production sites , the liability and compensation regimes for any harm that might be caused by the vaccines , the sanctions in case of breach of contract and information on the possible sharing of intellectual property rights; ### 5. calls on the commission to publish non-redacted versions of the advance purchase agreements and the purchase agreement and in particular to disclose the following details: the amount of public investment on the development of the vaccines , the advance payments by the commission , the cost sharing between public and private investments in the vaccines , the number of doses given to each country and to be delivered per quarter , the prices per dose , the number and locations of available production sites , the liability and compensation regimes for any harm that might be caused by the vaccines , the sanctions in case of breach of contract and information on the possible sharing of intellectual property rights -especially if the commission conserves any influence over the intellectual property rights due to the initial investments in the vaccine development process-;


### 8. calls on the commission to ensure that the contracted companies make the clinical trial results and protocols of potential covid-19 vaccine research available for evaluation by independent scientific experts , including statistical analysis plans , clinical study reports , patient-level data , and copies of the correspondence with regulators and other key stakeholders; ### 8. calls on the commission to ensure that the contracted companies make the clinical trial results and protocols of potential covid-19 vaccine research available for evaluation , as soon as possible , by independent scientific experts , beyond experts at ema , including statistical analysis plans , clinical study reports , patient-level data , and copies of the correspondence with regulators and other key stakeholders; points out that in case of detection of severe and/or frequent side effects during these clinical trials , the communication of these events should be immediate;


### 12. calls on the commission to ensure that the pharmaceutical companies share their knowledge and data through the world health organization covid-19 technology access pool (c-tap); ### 12. calls on the commission to ensure that the pharmaceutical companies share their knowledge and data through the world health organization covid-19 technology access pool (c-tap) , and that they use all the available options for increasing the production and distribution worldwide , including associations with other companies for development and distribution processes;


### 1. highlights that successfully opening , conducting and concluding accession talks with the western balkan countries is one of the eu’s core priorities in the region; ### 1. highlights that supporting eu-related reforms in the areas of democracy , rule of law , social market economy , economic cooperation and trade as well as good neighbourly relations and successfully opening , conducting and concluding accession talks with the western balkan countries is one of the eu's core priorities in the region;


### 3. believes that the eu’s enlargement policy is a two-way street on which both sides must uphold their commitments; ### 3. takes into account the new methodology for the accession negotiations adopted by the european commission , which envisions the eu’s enlargement policy as a two-way street on which both sides must uphold their commitments and supports the commission in rewarding negotiation progress as well as in reopening negotiations when expected reforms are not delivered;


### 5. demands strong integration efforts in order to support western balkan countries in promoting improvement of the rule of law , democracy and human rights so as to enhance economic competitiveness , budgetary balance and structural reform; ### 5. demands strong integration efforts in order to support western balkan countries in promoting improvement of the rule of law , democracy and human rights so as to enhance economic competitiveness , prosperity and social wellbeing , budgetary balance and structural reform;


### 6. reminds the western balkan countries of the importance of regional economic cooperation and good neighbourly relations; ### 6. reminds the western balkan countries of the importance of regional economic cooperation and good neighbourly relations and recalls the importance of the regional integration efforts coordinated within the framework of the berlin process , economic cooperation within cefta , continued work on the connectivity agenda and further engagement in the creation of the regional trade area;


### 8. requests that the commission provide further technical support to the western balkans to improve the external investment framework , in particular in the areas of predictability and investor protection; ### 8. requests that the commission provide further technical support to the western balkans to improve the external investment framework , in particular in the areas of predictability and investor protection also by the means of increased financing of technical assistance through the instrument for pre-accession assistance;


### – having regard to the final agreement for the settlement of the differences as described in the un security council resolutions 817 (1993) and 845 (1993) , the termination of the interim accord of 1995 and the establishment of a strategic partnership on 17 june 2018 between greece and the former yugoslav republic of macedonia , also known as the prespa agreement , ### – having regard to the final agreement for the settlement of the differences as described in the un security council resolutions 817 (1993) and 845 (1993) , the termination of the interim accord of 1995 and the establishment of a strategic partnership on 17 june 2018 between greece and north macedonia , also known as the prespa agreement ,


### – having regard to the presidency conclusions of the thessaloniki european council of 19 and 20 june 2003 concerning the prospect of the western balkan countries joining the european union , ### – having regard to the presidency conclusions of the thessaloniki european council of 19 and 20 june 2003 and the eu - western balkans summit declaration of thessaloniki of 21 june 2003 , concerning the prospect of the western balkan countries joining the european union ,


### – having regard to the berlin process , launched on 28 august 2014 , ### – having regard to the berlin process , launched on 28 august 2014 , in particular the declaration of the western balkans foreign ministers on regional cooperation and bilateral disputes of 27 august 2015 , and the establishment of the regional youth cooperation office (ryco) ,


### 1. reiterates that global value chains are the key feature of the global economy and that trade policy must contribute to a transparent production process throughout the value chain and demonstrate compliance with environmental , social and safety standards; ### 1. reiterates that global value chains are the key feature of the global economy and that trade policy must contribute to a transparent production process throughout the value chain , including subcontracting chains , and demonstrate compliance with environmental , human rights , social and safety standards;


### 2. emphasises that sustainable corporate governance can help the eu to build a more resilient and sustainable economy , improve the level playing field and protect eu businesses and citizens , and is therefore hugely beneficial to eu trade policy; ### 2. emphasises that sustainable corporate governance constitutes an important pillar for the eu in order to achieve a more resilient and sustainable economy , will improve the level playing field and protect eu businesses and citizens , and is therefore hugely beneficial to eu trade policy;


### 2. emphasises that sustainable corporate governance can help the eu to build a more resilient and sustainable economy , improve the level playing field and protect eu businesses and citizens , and is therefore hugely beneficial to eu trade policy; ### 2. emphasises that sustainable corporate governance can help the eu to build a more resilient and sustainable economy , improve the level playing field and protect eu businesses and workers , and is therefore hugely beneficial to eu trade policy;


### 2. reiterates its call for an enlargement of the scope of the nrfd to cover all listed and non-listed large undertakings established in the union territory , as defined in article 3(4) of the accounting directive; invites the commission to identify high-risk sectors of economic activity with a significant impact on sustainability matters that could justify the inclusion of small and medium enterprises (smes) in those sectors , within the scope of the nfrd; ### 2. reiterates its call for an enlargement of the scope of the nfrd to cover all listed and non-listed large undertakings established or operating in the union territory , as defined in article 3(4) of the accounting directive; invites the commission to identify high-risk sectors of economic activity with a significant impact on sustainability matters that could justify the inclusion of small and medium enterprises (smes) in those sectors , within the scope of the nfrd; stresses that a review of the nfrd is also needed to give financial market participants access to relevant data in order to carry out the obligations of the disclosure regulation.


### 2. reiterates its call for an enlargement of the scope of the nrfd to cover all listed and non-listed large undertakings established in the union territory , as defined in article 3(4) of the accounting directive; invites the commission to identify high-risk sectors of economic activity with a significant impact on sustainability matters that could justify the inclusion of small and medium enterprises (smes) in those sectors , within the scope of the nfrd; ### 2. reiterates its call for an enlargement of the scope of the nfrd to cover all listed and non-listed large undertakings established in the union territory , as defined in article 3(4) of the accounting directive; stresses that , in order to provide a level playing field , it should also apply to all non-eu companies which operate in the internal market selling goods or providing services; invites the commission to identify high-risk sectors of economic activity with a significant impact on sustainability matters that could justify the inclusion of small and medium enterprises (smes) in those sectors , within the scope of the nfrd;


### 3. notes that the covid-19 crisis has exposed the vulnerabilities of unregulated global supply chains , and that businesses with better environmental , social and governance practices and risk mitigation processes weather the crisis better; ### 3. notes that the covid-19 pandemic has exposed the vulnerabilities of unregulated global supply chains , which showed that the voluntarily rules are insufficient; especially in the garment sector where production was disrupted during the crisis with negative effects throughout the supply chain; notes that businesses with better environmental , social and governance practices and risk mitigation processes weather crisises better;


### 3. notes that the covid-19 crisis has exposed the vulnerabilities of unregulated global supply chains , and that businesses with better environmental , social and governance practices and risk mitigation processes weather the crisis better; ### 3. notes that the crisis caused by the covid-19 pandemic has exposed the vulnerabilities of unregulated global supply chains , and that businesses with better defined environmental , social and governance practices and risk mitigation processes weather the crisis better;


### 3. considers that the concept of environmental matters in the nfrd should be interpreted in line with the taxonomy regulation; considers it equally important to define with precision the other sustainability matters to which the directive refers , such as the concepts of social and employee matters , respect for human rights and anti-corruption and bribery; ### 3. notes that the taxonomy regulation establishes a list of environmental objectives , namely climate change , use and protection of water and marine resources , transition to a circular economy , pollution prevention and control , and biodiversity and ecosystems; considers that the concept of environmental matters in the nfrd should be interpreted in line with this regulation; considers it equally important to define with precision the other sustainability matters to which the directive refers , such as the concepts of social and employee matters , respect for human rights and anti-corruption and bribery;


### 3. considers that the concept of environmental matters in the nfrd should be interpreted in line with the taxonomy regulation; considers it equally important to define with precision the other sustainability matters to which the directive refers , such as the concepts of social and employee matters , respect for human rights and anti-corruption and bribery; ### 3. considers that the concept of environmental matters in the nfrd should be interpreted in line with the taxonomy regulation; stresses that the recommendations of the task force on climate-related financial disclosures should be applied; considers it equally important to define with precision the other sustainability matters to which the directive refers , such as the concepts of social and employee matters , respect for human rights and anti-corruption and bribery;


### 4. notes with concern that less than 1 % of companies publicly list their suppliers , even in high-risk sectors; ### 4. notes with concern that less than 1 % of companies publicly list their suppliers , even in high-risk sectors; emphasizes the importance of more transparency in the supply chain to oversee binding environmental , social , and human rights standards; stresses the need for the review of the non-financial reporting directive (nfrd) to greatly increase corporate transparency in the supply chain;


### 4. notes with concern that less than 1 % of companies publicly list their suppliers , even in high-risk sectors; ### 4. notes with concern that less than 1 % of companies publicly list their suppliers , even in high-risk sectors; stresses the importance of reviewing the non-financial reporting directive (nfrd) for a higher transparency;


### 4. considers that the definition of materiality should include the issues that affect long-term value creation and matters beyond the purely financial performance of companies; ### 4. considers that the definition of materiality should urgently be revised to include any relevant environmental , human rights and governance impacts to society as a whole , beyond value creation and the purely financial performance of companies; considers that the assessment of materiality should be carried out through a robust multi-stakeholder involvement process;


### 5. stresses that directors’ duties should encompass an obligation to develop , disclose and implement a corporate sustainability strategy for all aspects of the company’s operations , including its supply chains; ### 5. stresses that directors’ duties should encompass an obligation to develop , disclose and implement a corporate sustainability strategy for all aspects of the company’s operations , including its supply chains; based on international social , environmental and human rights standards; underlines that consultation with local communities is important;


### 5. stresses that directors’ duties should encompass an obligation to develop , disclose and implement a corporate sustainability strategy for all aspects of the company’s operations , including its supply chains; ### 5. stresses that directors’ duties should encompass an obligation to develop , disclose and implement a corporate sustainability strategy for all aspects of the company’s operations , including its supply chains , taking into account environmental , social and safety standards.


### 5. observes that the nfrd gives companies within its scope significant flexibility to disclose relevant information in the way they consider most useful; notes that companies may currently rely , at their discretion , on a number of different frameworks; considers it necessary to set up a comprehensive eu framework covering the full set of sustainability issues relevant for a comprehensive non-financial reporting; highlights , in this regard , that the eu framework should ensure that the disclosures are clear , balanced , understandable , comparable among companies within a sector , verifiable and objective; stresses that this framework should include , where relevant , mandatory sector-specific standards; welcomes , in this regard , the commission’s commitment to supporting a process to develop eu non-financial reporting standards18 ; ### 5. observes that the nfrd gives companies within its scope significant flexibility to disclose relevant information in the way they consider most useful; notes that companies may currently rely , at their discretion , on a number of different frameworks; considers it necessary to set up a comprehensive eu legislative framework covering the full set of sustainability issues relevant for a comprehensive non-financial reporting; highlights , in this regard , that the eu legislative framework should ensure that the disclosures are clear , balanced , understandable , comparable among companies within a sector , verifiable and objective; stresses that the legislation should include , where relevant , mandatory sector-specific standards; welcomes , in this regard , the commission’s commitment to supporting a process to develop eu non-financial reporting standards; stresses that specific mandatory reporting obligations and standards should be set in the nfrd review , with appropriate democratic overview and representation of public interests , including trade unions and civil society organisations;


### 5. observes that the nfrd gives companies within its scope significant flexibility to disclose relevant information in the way they consider most useful; notes that companies may currently rely , at their discretion , on a number of different frameworks; considers it necessary to set up a comprehensive eu framework covering the full set of sustainability issues relevant for a comprehensive non-financial reporting; highlights , in this regard , that the eu framework should ensure that the disclosures are clear , balanced , understandable , comparable among companies within a sector , verifiable and objective; stresses that this framework should include , where relevant , mandatory sector-specific standards; welcomes , in this regard , the commission’s commitment to supporting a process to develop eu non-financial reporting standards18 ; ### 5. observes that the nfrd gives companies within its scope significant flexibility to disclose relevant information in the way they consider most useful; notes that companies may currently rely , at their discretion , on a number of different frameworks; observes that companies are still uncertain about how to comply best with their disclosure obligations; considers it necessary to set up a comprehensive eu framework covering the full set of sustainability issues relevant for a comprehensive non-financial reporting; highlights , in this regard , that the eu framework should ensure that the disclosures are clear , balanced , understandable , comparable among companies within a sector , verifiable and objective; stresses that this framework should include , where relevant , mandatory sector-specific standards; welcomes , in this regard , the commission’s commitment to supporting a process to develop eu non-financial reporting standards18 ;


### 6. stresses that the requirement to disclose information on how sustainability issues affect the company and how the company affects society and the environment should include the sharing of all relevant information on all actors throughout the entire supply chain; ### 6. stresses that the requirement to disclose information on how sustainability issues affect the company and how the company affects society and the environment should include the sharing of all relevant information on all actors throughout the entire supply chain; notes that sharing this information is based on the reporting system non-financial reporting directive (‘nfrd’)


### 6. considers that the location of the non-financial statement should be harmonised; calls on the commission to establish a publicly accessible eu-wide digital platform that is free of charge , on which companies should publish their non-financial information; ### 6. considers that the location of the non-financial statement should be harmonised; welcomes the commission’s commitment in the capital markets union action plan (com/2020/590) to put forward a legislative proposal by q3 2021 to establish a publicly accessible eu-wide digital platform that provides free of charge access to both the financial and non-financial information reported by companies;


### 7. notes that sustainable corporate governance cannot reach its full potential without due diligence legislation that requires companies to identify , prevent , mitigate and account for human rights abuses and environmental damage in their global value chains. ### 7. notes that sustainable corporate governance cannot reach its full potential without due diligence legislation that requires companies to identify , prevent , mitigate and account for human rights abuses and environmental damage in their global value chains; underlines that sustainable corporate governance should not be limited by the present or lack of proper due diligence legislation; asks the commission to add the sustainable corporate governance and corporate due diligence into the ongoing trade policy review.


### 7. notes that the nfrd excludes non-financial statements from the requirement of content assurance to which financial statements of companies are otherwise subject; considers that non-financial statements should be subject to a mandatory audit , depending on the size and field of activity of the company concerned; considers that the assurance service provider , subject to requirements of objectivity and independence , should conduct their audit in accordance with the future eu framework; ### 7. notes that the nfrd excludes non-financial statements from the requirement of content assurance to which financial statements of companies are otherwise subject; considers that non-financial statements should be subject to a mandatory audit , depending on the size and field of activity of the company concerned; considers that the assurance service provider , subject to requirements of objectivity and independence , should conduct their audit in accordance with the future eu framework; stresses in this light the need to address the inherent wrong incentives in statutory auditing via a review of the statutory audit directive; upholds that this is also an opportunity to address the quasi monopoly of the ‘big four’ accountancy companies that audit the largest listed companies;


### a. whereas in a corporate context , a sustainability approach implies that the interest of different stakeholders in the company , including general societal and environmental concerns , are duly taken into consideration; ### a. whereas in a corporate context , a sustainability approach implies that the interest of different stakeholders in the company , including trade unions and workers representatives are duly taken into consideration , as well as the risks a company is exposed to , including general societal and environmental concerns;


### b. whereas the multiple international initiatives promoting sustainable corporate governance remain soft law only; ### b. whereas the multiple international initiatives promoting sustainable corporate governance remain soft law only; whereas the study commissioned by the commission on director’s duties and sustainable corporate governance highlights the problems associated with short-termism as well as the fact that the eu is not on track to meet its own sustainability commitments if companies do not incorporate long-term interests; underlines that the study clearly points towards the need for eu legislation in this regard.


### d. whereas the non-financial reporting directive (‘nfrd’) presents shortcomings that need to be addressed; ### d. whereas the non-financial reporting directive (‘nfrd’) has been a significant step forward to promote non-financial reporting in the union; whereas it presents nonetheless shortcomings that need to be addressed;


### e. whereas according to its adjusted work programme for 2020 , the commission intends to put forward a proposal reviewing the nfrd in the first trimester of 2021; ### e. whereas according to the commission european green deal , companies and financial institutions need to increase their disclosure on climate and environmental data so that investors are fully informed about the sustainability of their investments; whereas to this end the commission committed to reviewing the non-financial reporting directive; whereas according to its adjusted work programme for 2020 , the commission intends to put forward a proposal reviewing the nfrd in the first trimester of 2021;


### f. whereas stakeholders have often expressed that the non-financial information provided by companies pursuant to the nfrd is insufficient , unreliable and not comparable; whereas disclosure of more complete and reliable information is necessary so that companies can be held accountable for their potential adverse impacts on the environment and society; ### f. whereas stakeholders have often expressed that the non-financial information provided by companies pursuant to the nfrd is insufficient , unreliable and not comparable; whereas disclosure of more complete and reliable information is necessary so that companies can be held accountable for their potential adverse impacts on the environment and society; whereas improvements in non-financial reporting could increase companies’ accountability and enhance trust in companies;


### f. whereas stakeholders have often expressed that the non-financial information provided by companies pursuant to the nfrd is insufficient , unreliable and not comparable; whereas disclosure of more complete and reliable information is necessary so that companies can be held accountable for their potential adverse impacts on the environment and society; ### f. whereas stakeholders have often expressed that the non-financial information provided by companies pursuant to the nfrd is insufficient , unreliable and not comparable; whereas disclosure of more complete and reliable information is necessary so that companies can be held accountable for their potential adverse impacts on climate , the environment and society;


### g. whereas companies’ directors have the legal and statutory duty to act in the interest of the company; whereas an excessive focus on short-term profit maximisation has an adverse impact on companies’ long-term performances and on sustainability , and therefore may be to the detriment of shareholders’ interest; ### g. whereas companies’ directors have the legal and statutory duty to act in the interest of the company; notes that this duty has been subject to different interpretations in different jurisdictions , and that what is considered to be “the interest” of a company should incorporate the interests of stakeholders as well as wider societal interests; whereas a narrow interpretation of this duty wit with an excessive focus on short-term profit maximisation has an adverse impact on companies’ long-term performances and on sustainability , and therefore may be to the detriment of shareholders’ interest;


### g. whereas companies’ directors have the legal and statutory duty to act in the interest of the company; whereas an excessive focus on short-term profit maximisation has an adverse impact on companies’ long-term performances and on sustainability , and therefore may be to the detriment of shareholders’ interest; ### g. whereas companies’ directors have the legal and statutory duty to act in the interest of the company; whereas companies’ interest has been traditionally equated with the interest of its shareholders; whereas an excessive focus on short-term profit maximisation has an adverse impact on companies’ long-term performances and on sustainability , and therefore may be to the detriment of shareholders’ interest;