### 8. welcomes the council’s response to the commission’s proposals , in particular its focus on the importance of vocational education and training (vet) and lifelong learning opportunities; ### 8. welcomes the council’s response to the commission’s proposals , in particular its focus on the importance of vocational education and training (vet) and lifelong learning opportunities; underlines , in this respect , the importance of creating different flexible and modular pathways to learning to enable learners to combine and build on different learning experiences and opportunities;


### 12. highlights inclusiveness as a central dimension of an eea and a prerequisite for achieving quality education for all , ensuring that no talent is left behind; ### 12. highlights inclusion as a central dimension of an eea and a prerequisite for achieving quality education for all , ensuring that no learner is left behind , irrespectively of geographical , financial , structural , socio-economic , or physical barriers , of neuro-typical or cognitive differences , ethnic background , or legal status;


### 13. supports the use of quantitative indicators and benchmarks to allow the continuous comparison and monitoring of member states’ progress towards common objectives and to incentivise further policy actions , while at the same time reiterating the need for supplementary qualitative indicators and benchmarks; ### 13. supports the use of quantitative indicators and benchmarks , especially by means of the european semester process , to allow the continuous comparison and monitoring of member states’ progress towards common objectives and to incentivise further policy actions , while at the same time reiterating the need for supplementary qualitative indicators and benchmarks;


### 14. calls for synergies between the eea , the european research area and the european higher education area to be exploited and for a further strengthening of the erasmus+ programme for the benefit of all teachers and learners; ### 14. calls for synergies between the eea , the european research area and the european higher education area to be created and exploited and for a further strengthening of the erasmus+ , horizon europe , european solidarity corps , digital europe , and citizens , equality , rights and values programmes for the benefit of all teachers and learners;


### 16. calls for a common framework on the development of digital competences and on learning about the eu throughout all appropriate levels and areas of education; ### 16. calls for a common framework on the development of digital competences and on learning about the eu throughout all appropriate levels and areas of education; stresses the need for better , more innovative unified system of recognition , validation and certification - and therefore portability - of digital skills , qualifications and credentials for students;


### 18. underlines the need for member states to take action to support the development of linguistic competences in primary and secondary education , to embrace the council of europe’s goal of ‘plurilingualism’ and to achieve the benchmark of all pupils having a sufficient knowledge of english at the end of lower secondary education; ### 18. underlines the need for member states to take action to support the development of linguistic competences in primary and secondary education , to embrace the council of europe’s goal of ‘plurilingualism’ and to achieve the benchmark of all pupils having a sufficient knowledge of english at the end of lower secondary education; calls upon the european union to finance schools providing rare european language skills especially the native languages of those europeans now living in other european countries;


### 20. calls on the commission and member states to facilitate the expansion of automatic mutual recognition of learning outcomes and study periods abroad , including in vet; ### 20. calls on the commission and member states to integrate automatic mutual recognition of learning outcomes and study periods abroad , including in vet and hvet in their educational systems;


### 21. calls on the commission and the member states to establish a concrete european education area strategic framework 2030 (eeasf 2030) by the end of 2022 with a comprehensive steering , monitoring and evaluation mechanism , in line with un sustainable development goal 4 to ‘ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all’; ### 21. calls on the commission and the member states to establish a concrete european education area strategic framework 2030 (eeasf 2030) by mid 2022 with a comprehensive steering , monitoring and evaluation mechanism , in line with the first principle of the european pillar of social rights and the un sustainable development goal 4 to ‘ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all’;


### 23. seeks clarity on the level of involvement expected from stakeholders , education sectors that have been underrepresented so far , and relevant civil society actors; ### 23. seeks clarity on the level of involvement expected from stakeholders , education sectors that have been underrepresented so far , and relevant civil society actors; supports the co-creation process of performant educational systems that involve strong partnerships between the educators , learners , local authorities , parents and the private sector;


### 25. underlines the need for a european dimension in education by strengthening a distinct european perspective in students’ curricula and teachers’ training , including with support from jean monnet actions and teacher academies; proposes that these teacher academies be called ‘comenius teacher academies’; ### 25. underlines the need for a european dimension in education by strengthening a distinct european perspective in students’ curricula and teachers’ training , including with support from jean monnet actions and teacher academies; proposes that these teacher academies be called ‘comenius teacher academies’; supports the creation of a framework for shaping and developing common qualifications for teachers across member states , especially in the field of digital education;


### 27. stresses the need to familiarise learners with the european integration process , the institutions and policies of the eu , the rights emerging from eu citizenship and how to actively participate in the eu’s democratic processes; ### 27. calls on the commission to develop a comprehensive european strategy on citizenship education in view of the risk posed to our democracies by national populism , online disinformation and the polarising social tensions in europe and abroad; believes that such a strategy should notably focus on shared eu democratic values and principles; believes that this strategy should enhance citizens’ understanding of the eu decision-making process and of eu policies and should raise awareness of the benefits , rights and obligations of eu citizenship;


### strengthening visibility , cooperation and mainstreaming in eu policies ### strengthening visibility , cooperation and mainstreaming sport in eu policies;


### 8. calls for a european sports model that recognises the need for a strong commitment to integrating the principles of solidarity , sustainability , inclusiveness , open competition and sporting merit; ### 8. calls for a european sports model that recognises the need for a strong commitment to integrating the principles of solidarity , sustainability , inclusiveness , open competition , sporting merit , fairness and accordingly strongly opposes breakaway competitions that undermine such principles and endanger the stability of the overall sports ecosystem;


### 10. highlights the need for increased solidarity and financial redistribution , especially between professional and grassroots sport; ### 10. highlights the need for increased solidarity and financial redistribution , especially between professional and grassroots sport; calls on member states and sports federations to implement a mandatory solidarity mechanism based on a fair and binding distribution key that ensures a redistribution of revenues in favour of the amateur and grassroots level;


### 10. highlights the need for increased solidarity and financial redistribution , especially between professional and grassroots sport; ### 10. highlights the need for more targeted and increased solidarity and financial redistribution , especially between professional and grassroots sport;


### 12. urges public authorities , sports federations and organisations to uphold values such as human rights , democracy and the rule of law when awarding host status for major sporting events; ### 12. urges public authorities , sports federations and organisations to uphold values such as human rights , democracy and the rule of law when awarding host status for major sporting events; insists that , as a matter of principle , major sporting events should no longer be awarded to countries where these fundamental rights and values are not even remotely respected;


### 16. calls for the eu institutions to promote the fundamental rights of athletes , including freedom of association , collective bargaining and non-discrimination; ### 16. calls for the eu institutions to promote the fundamental rights of athletes , including athlete representation in decision-making , freedom of association , collective bargaining and non-discrimination;


### 23. calls on the commission and the member states to ensure that sports policy and legislation support gender equality , with particular attention to media coverage , remuneration gaps , award disparities and harassment; ### 23. calls on the commission and the member states to ensure that sports policy and legislation support gender equality , with particular attention to gender based violence such as harassment and sexual assault , media coverage , wage disparities and premium pay disparities;


### 24. calls on the commission to recognise the importance and support the social inclusion of refugees , ethnic minorities and the lgbtqi+ community in sport; ### 24. calls on the commission to recognise the importance and support the social inclusion of refugees , ethnic minorities and the lgbtqi+ community in sport; underlines that the visibility of the lgtbqi+ collective in sport remains a task to be developed , given the significant social weight that elite sport has in society and the positive social impact that can be achieved through increased publicity;


### 26. calls on the member states to step up efforts towards the inclusion in sports activities and programmes of persons with disabilities; ### 26. calls on the member states to step up efforts towards the inclusion in sport activities and programmes of persons with mental and physical disabilities , and to increase visibility in the media of competitions involving athletes with disabilities;


### 28. calls on the member states and public authorities to develop sports infrastructure and to increase the amount of physical education and extracurricular physical activities in schools; ### 28. urges member states and public authorities to develop sports infrastructure and to comprehensively increase the amount of physical education and extracurricular physical activities in schools; underlines the need to include a daily sports lesson in the curricula of compulsory schools in all member states;


### 31. highlights the role of coaches and sport staff in developing the skills of and in educating young people; ### 31. highlights the role of coaches and sport staff in developing the skills of and in educating children and young people and stresses that the adequate training plays a key role in encouraging participation in sport and in ensuring a safe environment for all;


### 33. calls on the commission and the member states to create a system for the recognition of qualifications gained by volunteers; ### 33. recognises the valuable contributions that sports volunteers bring to a society and calls on the commission and the member states to create a system for the recognition of qualifications gained by volunteers , including coaches working as volunteers;


### 34. insists on the need for support mechanisms to get the sport sector back on track in the wake of covid-19; ### 34. insists on the need for support mechanisms to get the sport sector back on track in the wake of covid-19 , including through national support funds , the recovery and resilience facility and the structural funds;


### 35. stresses the need to further increase funding for sport; ### 35. stresses the need to further increase funding for sport , especially in grassroots sport , women’s sport , para-sport and the field of education;


### 36. welcomes the higher budget for sport under the new erasmus+ programme and supports further synergies between programmes and funds; ### 36. welcomes the higher budget for sport under the new erasmus+ programme and supports further synergies between programmes and funds and make a better use of this tool to support recovery in sport;


### 38. calls on national , regional and local authorities to recognise the key role of sport and physical activity in fields such as urban regeneration , tourism and territorial cohesion and to prioritise them in cohesion policy and investments under the recovery and resilience facility; ### 38. calls on national , regional and local authorities to recognise the key role of sport and physical activity in fields such as urban regeneration , tourism and territorial cohesion and to prioritise them in cohesion policy , specifically on european social fund plus and on european regional and development fund investments and under the recovery and resilience facility;


### 44. highlights the importance of innovation and cross-sectoral cooperation in sport , especially of developing digital tools to increase participation in physical activity; ### 44. highlights the importance of innovation and cross-sectoral cooperation in sport , especially of developing digital tools to increase participation in physical activity; underlines that in the current context new means of organising sport events should be envisaged , by making full use of the digital technologies available;


### 70. surveillance of a politician is highly unusual , and the greek constitution foresees special protection of politicians. the eyp denies any involvement in the surveillance with predator. the government initially floated suggestions about foreign powers that supposedly requested the wiretapping of androulakis , or they suggested that his membership of an ep committee in charge of relations with china might be the reason. none of these hypotheses were very credible. the surveillance occurred in a political context of upcoming elections. polls predicted that néa demokratía would lose its absolute majority. pasok would be the preferred coalition partner. in autumn 2021 , there were four candidates in the pasok leadership contest , each with different views on such a coalition. androulakis was said to be open to the idea , but not under the premiership of mitsotakis. another candidate , andreas loverdos , had served earlier as a minister in a néa demokratía - pasok coalition , and was thought to be more supportive. he was acquainted to dimitriadis. manolis othonas , the right hand of another candidate , was also said to be among those who had closer relations with néa demokratía and dimitriadis. the publication of the list of other alleged targets by documento , reinforces the suspicion of political reasons for the surveillance. there is no proof for any of these hypotheses , but it is essential that these avenues are investigated and eliminated where possible. ### 70. surveillance of a politician is highly unusual , and the greek constitution foresees special protection of politicians. the eyp denies any involvement in the surveillance with predator. the government initially floated suggestions about foreign powers that supposedly requested the wiretapping of androulakis , or they suggested that his membership of an ep committee in charge of relations with china might be the reason. none of these hypotheses were very credible. the surveillance occurred in a political context of upcoming elections. polls predicted that néa demokratía would lose its absolute majority. pasok would be the preferred coalition partner. in autumn 2021 , there were four candidates in the pasok leadership contest , each with different views on such a coalition. androulakis was said to be open to the idea , but not under the premiership of mitsotakis. the publication of the list of other alleged targets by documento , reinforces the suspicion of political reasons for the surveillance. there is no proof for any of these hypotheses , but it is essential that these avenues are investigated and eliminated where possible.


### 85. in cyprus , dilian got closely associated with abraham sahak avni. avni has formerly been involved in the israeli police special forces as special detective152 . in november 2015 , he acquired cypriot citizenship and a golden passport because of a 2.9 million euro investment in real estate153 . avni founded the cypriot ncis intelligence services ltd154 , a company that was reportedly involved with the most powerful technology-oriented companies in the world155 . ncis intelligence and security services provided security software to the police headquarters between 2014 and 2015 and instructed employees of the office of crime analysis and statistics between 2015 and 2016156 . government party disy (dimokratikós sinagermós) is also part of the company’s clientele. reportedly , avni had installed security equipment in the party’s offices157 . next to avni’s security equipment , dilian’s materials were also sold to the cyprus drug enforcement agency and the cypriot police158 . ### 85. in cyprus , dilian got closely associated with abraham sahak avni. avni has formerly been involved in the israeli police special forces as special detective152 . in november 2015 , he acquired cypriot citizenship and a golden passport because of a 2.9 million euro investment in real estate153 . avni founded the cypriot ncis intelligence services ltd154 , a company that was reportedly involved with the most powerful technology-oriented companies in the world155 . ncis intelligence and security services provided security software to the police headquarters between 2014 and 2015 and instructed employees of the office of crime analysis and statistics between 2015 and 2016156 . there were closer ties between avni and the president of disy , averof neofytou as evidenced by a specific email sent by the president of disy promoting avni's products in the netherlands to the secret service. government party disy (dimokratikós sinagermós) is also part of the company’s clientele. reportedly , avni had installed security equipment in the party’s offices157 . next to avni’s security equipment , dilian’s materials were also sold to the cyprus drug enforcement agency and the cypriot police158 .


### victim makarios drousiotis ### the case of makarios drousiotis


### 100. the july 2021 revelations by the pegasus project showed a large number of targets in spain. however , they seem to have been targeted by different actors and for different reasons. it is widely believed that the moroccan authorities targeted prime minister pedro sanchez , minister for defence margarita robles and minister of the interior fernando grande-marlaska , similarly to the case of the french president and government ministers185 . the targeting of a second group of victims is referred to as ‘catalangate’186 . it includes catalan parliamentarians , members of the european parliament , lawyers , civil society organisation members and some family and staff connected to those victims187 . the ‘catalangate’ surveillance scandal was first reported on in 2020 , but it was not until april 2022 that citizen lab completed their in-depth investigation that the scale of the scandal was revealed. the results of that probe showed that at least 65 persons were targeted188 . in may 2020 , the spanish authorities admitted to targeting 18 of those 65 victims with court authorisation189 . ### 100. the july 2021 revelations by the pegasus project showed a large number of targets in spain , potentially originated by different actors and for different reasons. the alleged targets include high-ranking members of the spanish government , as well as other political figures of the regional government of catalonia , members of the pro-catalan independence movement , lawyers and journalists.


### 101. the past purchase of various spyware products like sitel in 2001 and the spyware of hacking team in 2010 by the ministry of the interior , the spanish national intelligence centre (cni) and police has been widely publicised190 . it was also previously reported by citizenlab that spain was a suspected customer of finfisher191 . in 2020 , the spanish newspaper el pais reported that spain has done business with nso group and that the cni routinely uses pegasus192 . the spanish government allegedly purchased the spyware in the first half of the 2010s for an estimated amount of €6 million193 194 . in addition , a former employee of nso has further confirmed that spain has an account with the company despite the spanish authorities declining to comment or confirm195 . ### 101. in its efforts to contributing to ensuring a high-level of security in the european union , in late 2001 , the spanish ministry of the interior began the implementation of the integrated telecommunications interception system , providing the operation units of the state security forces and corps (fcse) with the necessary means for the reception and recording of electronic communications authorised by a court order190. with this aim , the spanish authorities acquired legal tools for the interception of telecommunications , like the systems for the lawful interception of telecommunications (sitel) in 2001 and hacking team's galileo in 2010191. since its acquisition , sitel has been used by the spanish authorities , among others , in anti-drug operations , to locate the members of the jihadist cell behind the attacks in madrid on 11 of march 2004 , and to fight cases of political corruption.192 ,193 . the spanish government allegedly purchased pegasus spyware in the first half of the 2010s.


### 102. the right to privacy is protected under article 18 of the spanish constitution of 1978 , including the right to secrecy in ‘postal , telegraphic and telephone communication’196 . the use of spyware such as pegasus and candiru is a violation of article 18; however , there is an exception to this right in the case of a court granting authorisation197 . the constitution also provides further exceptions to those rights in part i section 55 by stating that some freedoms are eligible to be suspended with ‘participation of the courts and proper parliamentary control’ in the case of individuals under investigation for activities relating to armed groups or terrorist organisations198 . ### 102. the right to privacy is protected under article 18 of the spanish constitution of 1978 , including the right to "secrecy of communication , especially of postal , telegraphic and telephone communication"196 , which is guaranteed. the constitution also provides further exceptions in part i section 55 by stating that some rights are eligible to "be suspended when the declaration of state of emergency or siege is agreed under the terms provided in the constitution" , and that "an organic law may determine the manner and cases in which individually and with the necessary judicial intervention and adequate parliamentary control" certain rights "can be suspended in the case of individuals under investigation for activities relating to armed groups or terrorist organisations"198 .


### 103. the spanish intelligence service is made up of three main agencies. firstly , the national intelligence service (cni) which is under the control of the ministry of defence. the director of the cni is nominated by the minister for defence and serves as the prime minister’s lead advisor on issues relating to intelligence and counter-intelligence199 . the second body is the domestic intelligence agency , the intelligence centre for counter-terrorism and organised crime (citco). the third and final body is the spanish armed forces intelligence centre (cifas). the cifas is also under the direct supervision of the ministry of defence200 201 . ### 103. the spanish intelligence service is made up of three main agencies. firstly , the national intelligence service (cni) which acts under the supervision and control of the executive , legislative and judicial powers and is attached to the ministry of defence.198b the director of the cni is nominated by the minister for defence and serves as the prime minister’s lead advisor on issues relating to intelligence and counter-intelligence199 . the second body is the domestic intelligence agency , the intelligence centre for counter-terrorism and organised crime (citco). the third and final body is the spanish armed forces intelligence centre (cifas). the cifas is also under the direct supervision of the ministry of defence200 201 .


### 104. much of the surveillance conducted in spain was carried out by the cni , a body that has been embroiled in a number of scandals relating to surveillance in the past202 . the cni was established under law 11/2002 may 6 and it authorises the cni to conduct ‘security investigations’203 . however , there is little clarification on the means or limitations of such activities204 . law 11/2002 also established parliamentary , executive and legislative oversight control over the cni205 parliamentary oversight is to be carried out by the official secrets committee of the spanish congress , which was established in 1995206 . the delegated committee for intelligence affairs is in executive control of the body , and co-ordinates the intelligence activities of the cni207 . lastly , the defence committee of the congress of deputies conducts legislative oversight over the cni208 . the annual intelligence directive dictates the intelligence priorities of the cni for the year209 . ### 104. the cni was established under law 11/2002 , of may 6 , with the mission to provide the spanish government with the information and intelligence necessary to prevent and avoid any risk or threat that affects the independence and integrity of the state , national interests and the stability of the rule of law and its institutions201a. law 11/2002 grants the cni powers to conduct ‘security investigations on persons or entities’ and to carry out such investigations , and the cni "may request the necessary collaboration from public and private organisations and institutions"203. the cni activities , as well as its organisation and internal structure , means and procedures , personnel , facilities , databases and data centres , sources of information and information or data that may lead to knowledge of the above matters , constitute classified information , with the degree of secrecy204. law 11/2002 also established parliamentary , executive and legislative oversight. parliamentary control over the cni is to be carried out by the committee on the use and control of credits allocated to secret funds (the so-called official secrets committee) of the spanish congress , which was established in 1995206 .


### 105. the laws establishing the cni also established the defence committee of the congress of deputies and it is responsible for allocating the confidential funds for the cni and producing an annual report on the cni. however , the spanish constitution does not stipulate that access will be granted to documents or information relating to the work of the intelligence services and the requirement is also notably absent in the legal framework of the law on transparency. therefore , much of the work of the cni is kept secret and lacks transparency210 . ### 105. the amounts assigned to secret funds are set in teh spanish general budget law for each financial year 209a. such amounts are subject to control by the committee on the us and control of credits allocated to secret funds of the spanish congress , which also exercises parliamentary oversight over the cni and allocates its funds. the government determines and approves annually the objectives of the cni through the intelligence directive , which is secret 209b. the director of the cni has exclusive competencies on determining the purpose and destination of the funds assigned , and periodically has to report on their use to the head of the govermnet. the committee on the use and control of credits allocated to secret funds is informed abour the intelligence objectives , has the prerogative to submit an annual report on the activities of the intelligence services209c , and has access to the annual report produced on a yearly basis by the director of the cni on the assessment of activities , status , and degree of fulfilment of the objectives.


### 106. the official secrets committee is required to submit an annual report on the activities of the intelligence services , however when it was convened as a result of the surveillance by the cni , it was the first meeting of the body in more than two years. head of the cni paz esteban appeared before the committee on 5 may 2022 to present the court authorisations for the 18 victims that the authorities have taken responsibility for targeting.211 the hearing was not public and those present were not allowed to enter with any electronic on them whatsoever212 . ### 106. the committee on the use and control of the credits allocated to secret funds was convened on 5 may 2022 , and the head of the cni at the time appeared before the committee to debrief the deputies and provide cni's account of the use of the pegasus spyware. in accordance to article 5.5 of law 11/2002 , this hearing was conducted in-camera. in this session , the head of the cni reportedly admitted to intercepting the communications of 18 individuals.


### 107. there has been a significant amount of public scrutiny on the ‘catalangate’ scandal since it came to light in april 2022. the spanish media and media outlets around the world have worked extensively in conjunction with civil society organisations to scrutinise the surveillance system in spain and advocate for the fundamental rights of the victims. inversely , some spanish politicians have tried to discredit citizenslab , suggesting their methods are unsound or that they are politically motivated. a collaborator of citizenslab , himself of catalan origin , was among the targets , along with his parents , who are not politically active at all213 . ### 107. there has been a significant amount of public scrutiny on the use of spyware against public authorities and civilians. the spanish media and media outlets around the world have worked extensively in conjunction with civil society organisations to scrutinise the surveillance system in spain and advocate for the fundamental rights of the victims.


### 25. in november 2021 , at the insistence of the opposition , two committees in the senate conducted hearings into the use of spyware in hungary and the alleged politically motivated targeting of citizens by the government in particular. it was subsequently reported that the government representatives insisted that all surveillance was authorised through appropriate channels , but refused to comment as to whether or not journalists or politicians were targeted. it is not possible to know exactly what was said however , as the ruling party have classified the minutes of the meeting until the year 2050. ### 25. in november 2021 , at the insistence of the opposition , two committees (national security committee and committee on defence and security) in the parliament conducted hearings into the use of spyware in hungary and the alleged politically motivated targeting of citizens by the government in particular. at the first meeting of the national security committee , the committee was inquorate because its mps from the fidesz party did not show up at the session. it was subsequently reported that the government representatives insisted that all surveillance was authorised through appropriate channels , but refused to comment as to whether or not journalists or politicians were targeted. it is not possible to know exactly what was said however , as the ruling party have classified the minutes of the meeting until the year 2050.


### 26. when the pegasus scandal erupted in hungary , it became clear that journalists were one of the groups most targeted by the government , though it refuses to either confirm or deny this. as a result , in early 2022 a group of six journalists and activists initiated legal proceedings in hungary against both the state and the naih. the hungarian civil liberties union (hclu) will represent journalists brigitta csikász , dávid dercsényi , dániel németh and szabolcs panyi in addition to adrien beauduin , a belgian-canadian phd student and activist. the sixth party has chosen to remain anonymous. the hclu is also working with eitay mack in israel to file a case with the attorney general in order to trigger an investigation into nso group65 . ### 26. when the pegasus scandal erupted in hungary , it became clear that journalists were one of the groups most targeted by the government , though it refuses to either confirm or deny this. as a result , in early 2022 a group of six journalists and activists initiated legal actions before the hungarian authorities , the european commission and the ecthr. the hungarian civil liberties union (hclu) will represent journalists brigitta csikász , dávid dercsényi , dániel németh and szabolcs panyi in addition to adrien beauduin , a belgian-canadian phd student and activist. the sixth party has chosen to remain anonymous. the hclu is also working with eitay mack in israel to file a case with the attorney general in order to trigger an investigation into nso group65 .


### 27. the political control over the use of surveillance in hungary is complete and total. the orbán-led fidesz regime has made it so that they can target lawyers , journalists , political opponents and civil society organisations with ease and without fear of recourse. in addition , their control over almost all hungarian media outlets allows them to continue pushing their own version of the truth , stopping much of the public scrutiny conducted by the media from reaching hungarian citizen. ### 27. the political control over the use of surveillance in hungary is complete and total. the orbán-led fidesz regime has made it so that they can target lawyers , journalists , political opponents and civil society organisations with ease and without fear of recourse. in addition , their control over almost all offline and broadcast hungarian media outlets allows them to continue pushing their own version of the truth , stopping much of the public scrutiny conducted by independent media from reaching hungarian citizen.


### 31. adrien beauduin appeared on the radar of the orbán regime in 2018 while completing a phd in gender studies at the central european university (ceu). the institution was founded by george soros and the government was trying to remove it from hungary at the time , along with the entire subject of gender studies68 . after attending a protest in budapest , beauduin was arrested in what is seen as a highly politically motivated move , and faced charges for assault of a police officer , which he vehemently denies69 . it was reported that there was essentially no evidence against beauduin , and the evidence that was submitted had been copied verbatim from the police testimony in another case70 . ### 31. adrien beauduin appeared on the radar of the orbán regime in 2018 while completing a phd in gender studies at the central european university (ceu). the institution was founded by george soros and the government was trying to remove it from hungary at the time , along with the entire subject of gender studies68 . after attending a protest in budapest , beauduin was arrested in what is seen as a highly politically motivated move , and faced charges for assault of a police officer , which he vehemently denies69 . it was reported that there was essentially no evidence against beauduin , and the evidence that was submitted had been copied verbatim from the police testimony in another case70 . in 2020 , the criminal proceeding aginst adrien beauduin , who was represented by hclu in the case , was terminated.


### 108. a legal case regarding the surveillance of prime minister sanchez and minister for defence robles was filed in madrid in the audienca nacional , the spanish national court (snc) , by the state solicitors’ office214 . judge jose luis calama , head of the central court of instruction number 4 , is responsible for this on-going case215 . on 13 october 2022 , judge calama delivered a questionnaire to both robles and grande-marlaska , which included a request , to be confirmed by legal sources , as to how the pegasus infections were identified. the prosecutors office and the office of the state attorney also sent questions to the ministers216 . ### 108. a legal case regarding the spyware surveillance of prime minister pedro sánchez and minister for defence margarita robles was filed by the state solicitors’ office in madrid's spanish national court (snc) , the audiencia nacional. the alleged facts fall within the jurisdiction of the snc , as established in article 65.1 a( of the organic law 6/1985 of the judiciary , as they affect high-ranking national bodies , such as the president of the government and the minister of defence.


### 109. in contrast to the fast-paced nature of the case taken by sanchez et al. in madrid , the cases that have been filed in barcelona by catalonian victims of spyware are moving at a slow pace217 218 . the first case in investigative court number 32 in barcelona was filed by two pegasus victims in 2020; former president of the catalonian parliament and current minister of business and work , roger torrent , and former minister of foreign action , institutional relations and transparency of catalonia and current erc president in barcelona city council , ernest maragall219 . andreu van den eynde is one of the lawyers representing torrent and maragall in this case , and is a victim of pegasus himself. van den eynde has criticised the courts consistently delaying proceedings and virtually ‘paralysing’ the case220 . omnium cultural and the popular unity candidacy party (cup) have also filed a case in the same court in barcelona. lawyer benet salellas , who is involved in both cases , is asserting that the spanish government is behind the targeting221 . ### 109. legal cases on spyware surveillance have been filed in investigative court in barcelona by individuals with direct or indirect ties to the pro-catalan independence movement , and investigations are ongoing.


### 110. as the snc has jurisdiction over cases concerning the most serious crimes in all territories , it is possible that the public prosecutor could request all pegasus cases to be unified222 . in other words , the cases of the victims from the spanish government and the ‘catalangate’ victims would all be heard in the snc in madrid. the lawyers representing the catalan victims assert that there is no link between the cases unless the perpetrator is proved to be the same in all instances of surveillance223 . ### deleted


### 111. there are a number of other pending legal cases linked to the 65 catalonian victims. one such case was filed by lawyer and pegasus victim gonzalo boye on behalf of at least 19 victims against nso , its three founders niv karmi , shalev hulio and omri lavie , q cyber technologies , and osy , a subsidiary company based in luxembourg224 225 . legal action is also underway in a number of other eu member states as a result of the surveillance carried out on those catalan separatists in exile , including france , belgium , switzerland , germany , and luxembourg226 . ### deleted


### 112. the targeting of catalan citizens with spyware reportedly began as early as 2015 , and has been carried out on a large scale since 2017227 . after initial media coverage in 2020 , the full scandal broke across europe in april 2022 with the publication of the university of toronto citizenlab report. given the significant passage of time since the beginning of the hacking and these revelations , a number of targets were unable to be identified or further investigated owing to various factors that occurred , including a number of targets who disposed of the phone in question228 . ### 112. allegations have been made that pro-catalan independence movement members and their entourage have been targeted with spyware. in this context , the april 2022 university of toronto citizenlab report claimed that at least 65 persons had been targeted with spyware between 2017 and 2020: 63 with pegasus , four with candiru and at least two people by both211a.


### 113. spanish prime minister pedro sánchez , minister for defence margarita robles and minister of the interior fernando grande-marlaska were targeted with pegasus between may and june 2021229 . there is little information available so far on details of this hacking , as they were announced by the government and were not the result of an investigation of citizenlab or any other such research service or investigative journalists. sánchez and robles are the heads of the two government branches that oversee the cni , the body responsible for conducting surveillance in spain. the infected devices of sánchez and robles were government-issued and were being scanned for spyware occasionally230 . grande-marlaska was infected on his personal device231 . minister for agriculture luis planas , who formerly served as a diplomat in morocco , was also targeted with spyware but there was no successful infection. it has been reported that the moroccan government could potentially be responsible for this targeting , however that information has not been confirmed232 . ### deleted


### 114. in total , 65 catalonians were confirmed to have been targeted with mercenary spyware , 63 with pegasus , four with candiru and at least two people were targeted by both233 . at least 51 individuals were successfully infected234 . the spanish government have refused to comment as to whether or not they were responsible for the surveillance any of the other victims outside of the 18 they admit to having targeted235 . the majority of those 18 persons were never charged with a crime , and yet were included on this list. minister for defence robles has relied heavily on the official secrets act rather than expand on what were the reasons for the surveillance of those specific targets236 . all 65 catalan targets have at some point in time been in contact with the catalan separatists living outside spain. ### deleted


### members of the european parliament ### deleted


### 115. one of the key groups revealed to have been targeted is the pro-independence catalan members of the european parliament. each of them were hacked with spyware either directly or indirectly through what citizenlab refer to as relational targeting237 : diana riba i giner , antoni comín i oliveres , jordi solé , carles puigdemont , and clara ponsati. ### deleted


### catalonian politicians ### deleted


### 116. former president of the catalonian parliament and current minister of business and work roger torrent was among the first persons to come forward as a victim of the 2019 whatsapp pegasus infections238 . shortly after , leader of the pro-independence republican left of catalonia party , ernest maragall and anna gabriel who was previously a regional member of parliament for the popular unity candidacy party also came forward as victims of pegasus239 . all of the presidents of catalonia since 2010 have been targeted with spyware either during or after their term in office240 . as many as 12 erc members were among the 65 targets , including the secretary general of the party marta rovira who was hacked at least twice in june 2020 according to citizenlab. it is highly significant that both gabriel and rovira were living in switzerland at the time of their surveillance following the fall out after the 2017 referendum. ### deleted


### civil society organisations ### civilian targets


### 117. jordi domingo was one of the first catalonian activists that was reported to be targeted in 2020. though a supporter of catalan independence , it was reported by the guardian that domingo believed himself to be a mistaken target. given that he did not play a major role in the events of 2017 , it is his belief that the intended target was a lawyer of the same name who contributed to the drafting of the constitution of catalonia241 . ### deleted


### lawyers ### deleted


### 118. gonzalo boye has represented many high profile catalan figures , including former presidents puigdemont and torras242 . over five months between january and may of 2020 , he was a victim of pegasus himself243 . boye was targeted as many as 18 times during that period via text messages that appeared as tweets from civil society organisations or prominent news outlets244 . citizenlab confirmed at least one successful infection on 30 october 2020. the infection came just 48 hours after the arrest of one of his clients245 . the targeting of boye has called in to question the legality of attacking the lawyer-client privilege. ### deleted


### 119. andreu van den eynde i adroer , was successfully infected with pegasus on 14 may 2020246 . the hacking occurred while he was acting as the lawyer of both raul romeva and oriol junqueras in their case before the supreme court. ### deleted


### 120. similarly , prominent lawyer jaume alonso-cuevillas was also infected while representing key catalan figures such as carles puigdemont. however , citizenlab were unable to determine the precise date of the successful infection. ### deleted


### 137. luxemburg hosts nine entities directly related to nso group , as was revealed by amnesty international in june 2021268 . the fact that foreign minister jean asselborn was initially only aware of two nso entities based in the country269 , and that the names of the nine companies (such as triangle holdings sa , square 2 sarl , and q cyber technologies sarl) do not immediately reveal the connection with nso group , show how opaque business structures in luxemburg allow companies to operate completely out of the public view. ### 137. luxemburg hosts nine entities directly related to nso group , as was revealed by amnesty international in june 2021 and later confirmed by the luxembourgish foreign affairs minister jean asselborn.


### 142. in bulgaria , export controls and export licenses for products that are categorized as ‘dual-use’ as outline in the eu dual use regulation are controlled by the ministry of economy , more particularly by the interministerial commission for export control and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction275 . the current minister of economy and industry is nikola stoyanov276 . up until today , the bulgarian authorities deny having granted export licenses to nso group277 . yet , former private equity owner of nso group novalpina capital emphasised that nso products are being exported from the eu from both cyprus and bulgaria278 279 280 . these two claims are contradictory. ### 142. in bulgaria , export controls and export licenses for products that are categorized as ‘dual-use’ as outlined in the eu dual use regulation are controlled by the ministry of economy , more particularly by the interministerial commission for export control and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction275 . the current minister of economy and industry is nikola stoyanov276 . up until today , the bulgarian authorities deny having granted export licenses to nso group277 . yet , former private equity owner of nso group novalpina capital emphasised that nso products are being exported from the eu from both cyprus and bulgaria278 279 280. furthermore , media publications claim that one of the servers of the network infrastructure over which pegasus attacks are conducted is located in a bulgarian datacentre , owned by a bulgarian company owned by nso group , circles , which has received export licences from the authorities. these two claims are contradictory.280a the sofia city prosecutor's office has started an investigation in february 2022 to establish whether state services have illegally used the pegasus spyware to target bulgarian citizens280b when it comes to the right of privacy , according to the charter of fundamental rights of the european union (article 7) and the european convention on human rights (article 8)280c , in ekimdzhiev and others v. bulgaria288f[1] , the ecthr found that the existing laws in bulgaria regarding the secret surveillance and the retention and accessing communications did not meet the quality-of-law requirement of the convention and asked the government to make the necessary changes to domestic law to end the violation.280d


### 151. without vulnerabilities in software , it would be impossible to install and deploy spyware. therefore , in order to regulate the use of spyware , the discovery , sharing and exploitation of vulnerabilities have to be regulated as well290 . despite the strengthening of the defence of digital systems required and encouraged by the nis2 directive and the proposal for the cyber resilience act , it is nearly impossible to develop systems without vulnerabilities. ### 151. without vulnerabilities in software , it would be impossible to install and deploy spyware. therefore , in order to regulate the use of spyware , the discovery , sharing and exploitation of vulnerabilities have to be regulated as well290 . despite the strengthening of the defence of digital systems required and encouraged by the nis2 directive and the proposal for the cyber resilience act , it is nearly impossible to develop systems without vulnerabilities. eu may however regulate the handling of vulnerabilities when it comes to the disclosure of information security research with a view of ending the practice of researchers to keep vulnerabilities secret and to sell them to private companies.


### 170. the eu does have several laws that might serve as regulatory tools with regard to spyware. in addition to laws protecting the rights of citizens , such as the laws on data protection and privacy of communications (gdpr , e-privacy) , there are laws on exports (dual use regulation) and procurement. however , enforcement by the commission is weak. it tends to limit itself to verifying if a member state has correctly transposed eu laws in national laws. however , that says very little about the actual situation on the ground. thus , the commission implementation report332 of the dual use regulation seems to conclude that implementation is well on track , whereas there is ample evidence to prove that in practice it is weak and patchy , and in some countries even deliberately so. despite the rules laid down in the dual use regulation , cyprus appears to have become an attractive export hub for spyware vendors. without proper and meaningful enforcement , eu laws are mere paper tigers that create ample space for the illegitimate use of spyware. ### 170. the eu does have several laws that might serve as regulatory tools with regard to spyware. however , the application of the union's law to the use of spyware for national security purposes is largely limited due to the exclusion of national security from the scope of gdpr and eprivacy directive. in addition to laws protecting the rights of citizens , there are laws on exports (dual use regulation) and procurement. however , enforcement by the commission is weak. it tends to limit itself to verifying if a member state has correctly transposed eu laws in national laws. however , that says very little about the actual situation on the ground. there is need to strenghten protection in order to guarantee that cyber survelliance items would not be exported to coutries that do not respect fundamental rights and equal attention should be paid to imports as well. thus , the commission implementation report332 of the dual use regulation seems to conclude that implementation is well on track , whereas there is ample evidence to prove that in practice it is weak and patchy , and in some countries even deliberately so. despite the rules laid down in the dual use regulation , cyprus appears to have become an attractive export hub for spyware vendors. without proper and meaningful enforcement that goes beyond blacklisting of spyware vendors , eu laws are mere paper tigers that create ample space for the illegitimate use of spyware.


### the explicit commitment to grant any request by europol pursuant to art 6(1a) of the europol regulation relating to investigations into allegations of illegitimate use of spyware; and ### the explicit commitment to involve europol pursuant to articles 4 and 5 of the europol regulation relating to investigations into allegations of illegitimate use of spyware; and


### repealing all export licences that are not fully in line with both the letter and the spirit of the dual-use regulation; ### repealing all export licences that are not fully in line with the dual-use regulation;


### a. whereas it has been revealed that government bodies in several countries , both member states and third countries , have used pegasus and other brands of surveillance spyware against journalists , politicians , law enforcement officials , diplomats , lawyers , business people , civil society actors and other actors , for political and even criminal purposes; whereas such practices are extremely alarming and underscore the risk of abuse of surveillance technologies to undermine human rights and democracy; ### a. whereas it has been revealed that government bodies in several countries , both member states and third countries , have used pegasus and other brands of surveillance spyware against journalists , politicians , law enforcement officials , diplomats , lawyers , business people , civil society actors and other actors , for political and even criminal purposes; whereas such practices are extremely alarming and underscore the risk of abuse of surveillance technologies to undermine fundamental human rights , electoral processes and democracy;


### a. whereas it has been revealed that government bodies in several countries , both member states and third countries , have used pegasus and other brands of surveillance spyware against journalists , politicians , law enforcement officials , diplomats , lawyers , business people , civil society actors and other actors , for political and even criminal purposes; whereas such practices are extremely alarming and underscore the risk of abuse of surveillance technologies to undermine human rights and democracy; ### a. whereas it has been revealed that government bodies in several countries , both member states and third countries , have used pegasus and equivalent surveillance spyware against journalists , politicians , law enforcement officials , diplomats , lawyers , business people , civil society actors and other actors , for political and even criminal purposes; whereas such practices are extremely alarming and underscore the risk of abuse of surveillance technologies to undermine human rights and democracy;


### e. whereas any spyware surveillance must be scrutinised by an independent ex post oversight authority , which must ensure that any authorised surveillance is carried out in compliance with fundamental rights and in accordance with the conditions set out by the court of justice of the european union (cjeu) , the european court of human rights (ecthr) and the venice commission and must be able to terminate the surveillance if it is not; ### e. whereas any spyware surveillance must be scrutinised by an independent ex post oversight authority , which must ensure that any authorised surveillance is carried out in compliance with fundamental rights and in accordance with the conditions set out by the court of justice of the european union (cjeu) , the european court of human rights (ecthr) and the venice commission; whereas such ex post oversight authority should order the termination of the surveillance when it is found to be incompatible with the above-mentioned right and conditions;


### f. whereas spyware surveillance failing to meet the requirements set out in union law and the jurisprudence of the cjeu and the ecthr would entail a violation of the values enshrined in article 2 teu and the fundamental rights enshrined in the charter and , in particular , articles 7 , 8 , 11 , 17 , 21 and 47 thereof that recognise the specific rights , freedoms and principles set out in it , such as respect for private and family life , the protection of personal data , freedom of expression and information , right to property , right to non-discrimination , as well as the right to effective remedy and fair trial; ### f. whereas spyware surveillance failing to meet the requirements set out in union law and the jurisprudence of the cjeu and the ecthr would entail a violation of the values enshrined in article 2 teu and the fundamental rights enshrined in the charter and , in particular , articles 7 , 8 , 11 , 17 , 21 and 47 thereof that recognise the specific rights , freedoms and principles set out in it , such as respect for private and family life , the protection of personal data , freedom of expression and information , right to property , right to non-discrimination , as well as the right to effective remedy and fair trial and right to presumption of innocence;


### h. whereas it results from the testimonies of victims that even if legal remedy and civil rights may exist on paper , they mostly become void in the face of obstruction by government bodies , the absence of implementation of the right to be informed for victims and the administrative burden to prove the status as victim; ### h. whereas it results from the testimonies of persons illegally targeted that even if legal remedy and civil rights may exist on paper , they mostly become void in the face of obstruction by government bodies , the absence or non-implementation of the right to be informed for persons illegally targeted and the administrative burden to prove the status as victim;


### i. whereas the polish government has weakened and eliminated institutional and legal safeguards including proper oversight and scrutiny procedures , effectively leaving victims without any meaningful remedy; whereas the pegasus surveillance spyware has been illegally deployed to spy on journalists , politicians , prosecutors and civil society actors for political purposes; ### i. whereas the polish government has weakened and eliminated institutional and legal safeguards including proper oversight and scrutiny procedures , effectively leaving persons illegally targeted without any meaningful remedy; whereas the pegasus surveillance spyware has been illegally deployed to spy on journalists , politicians , prosecutors and civil society actors for political purposes;


### j. whereas the hungarian government has weakened and eliminated institutional and legal safeguards including proper oversight and scrutiny procedures , effectively leaving victims without any meaningful remedy; whereas the pegasus surveillance spyware has been illegally deployed to spy on journalists , politicians , prosecutors and civil society actors for political purposes; ### j. whereas the hungarian government has weakened and eliminated institutional and legal safeguards including proper oversight and scrutiny procedures , effectively leaving persons illegally targeted without any meaningful remedy; whereas the pegasus surveillance spyware has been illegally deployed to spy on journalists , politicians , prosecutors and civil society actors for political purposes;


### k. whereas greek members of parliament , opposition as well as nea demokratia (nd) mps , nd party loyalists and journalists have been targeted with predator spyware , the use of which is illegal under greek law; whereas many of the persons targeted were also under official surveillance by the eyp greek secret service; whereas the greek government denies having purchased or used predator , but it is highly probable that predator has been used by or on behalf of persons very close to the prime minister’s office; whereas the greek government admitted it has granted export licences to intellexa for the sale of the predator spyware to repressive governments; whereas the government has responded to the scandal with legislative amendments that further reduce the rights of the target to be informed after surveillance has taken place; ### k. whereas greek members of parliament , opposition as well as government representatives , party activists and journalists have been targeted with predator spyware , the use of which is illegal under greek law; whereas many of the persons targeted were also under official surveillance by the eyp greek secret service; whereas the greek government denies having purchased or used predator , but it is highly probable that predator has been used by or on behalf of persons very close to the prime minister’s office; whereas the greek government admitted it has granted export licences to intellexa for the sale of the predator spyware to repressive governments; whereas the government has responded to the scandal with legislative amendments that further reduce the rights of the target to be informed after surveillance has taken place;


### l. whereas revelations showed two categories of spyware targets in spain; whereas the first includes the prime minister and the minister of defence that are believed to be spied upon by morocco; whereas the second concerns some 65 victims referred to as ‘catalangate’ including catalan parliamentarians , members of parliament , lawyers and civil society actors; whereas the spanish authorities admitted in may 2020 to targeting 18 of those 65 victims with court authorisation , however , they have refrained from providing further information , invoking national security; ### l. whereas revelations showed two categories of spyware targets in spain; whereas the first includes the prime minister and the minister of defence that are believed to be spied upon by morocco; whereas the second includes political figures of the regional government of catalonia , members of the pro-catalan independence movement , lawyers and journalists; whereas the spanish intelligence authority reportedly declared in may 2022 to targeting 18 persons with court authorisation , however , they have invoked national security when giving account , to the extent possible within their legal obligations , of the use of spyware surveillance in spain;


### o. whereas it can be safely assumed that all member states have purchased or used one or more spyware systems; whereas most governments will refrain from illegitimate use of spyware , but in the absence of a solid legal framework including safeguards and oversight , the risk of abuse is very high; ### o. whereas it is the prerogative of the member states to define their essential security interests and to adopt appropriate measures to ensure their internal security , including the right to equip themselves with the necessary surveillance tools to be deployed incompliance with the applicable legal framework; whereas member states may have purchased or used one or more surveillance spyware systems; whereas most governments will refrain from illegitimate use of surveillance spyware; whereas the absence of a solid legal framework including safeguards and oversight increases the risk of abuse on the use of surveillance spyware technologies;


### p. whereas the member state governments and member state parliaments have not provided parliament with meaningful information about the legal frameworks governing the use of spyware in their member states beyond what was already publicly known , despite an obligation to do so pursuant to article 3 , paragraph 4 of the decision of the european parliament , the council and the commission of 6 march 1995 on the detailed provisions governing the exercise of the european parliament’s right of inquiry; whereas it is difficult to assess the enforcement of union legislation and the safeguards , oversight , and means of redress which prevents the adequate protection of citizen’s fundamental rights; ### p. whereas parliament has exercised its right of inquiry pursuant to article 3 , paragraph 4 of the decision of the european parliament , the council and the commission of 6 march 1995; whereas a number of member state governments and member state parliaments within their capabilities have provided parliament with information about the legal frameworks governing the use of surveillance spyware in their member states;


### p. whereas the member state governments and member state parliaments have not provided parliament with meaningful information about the legal frameworks governing the use of spyware in their member states beyond what was already publicly known , despite an obligation to do so pursuant to article 3 , paragraph 4 of the decision of the european parliament , the council and the commission of 6 march 1995 on the detailed provisions governing the exercise of the european parliament’s right of inquiry; whereas it is difficult to assess the enforcement of union legislation and the safeguards , oversight , and means of redress which prevents the adequate protection of citizen’s fundamental rights; ### p. whereas most member state governments and member state parliaments have not provided parliament with meaningful information about the legal frameworks governing the use of spyware in their member states beyond what was already publicly known , despite an obligation to do so pursuant to article 3 , paragraph 4 of the decision of the european parliament , the council and the commission of 6 march 1995 on the detailed provisions governing the exercise of the european parliament’s right of inquiry; whereas it is difficult to assess the enforcement of union legislation and the safeguards , oversight , and means of redress which prevents the adequate protection of citizen’s fundamental rights;


### v. whereas spyware producers exporting to third countries establish themselves within the union to gain respectability while trading in spyware to totalitarian regimes; whereas exports from the union to totalitarian regimes or non-state actors are taking place , in violation of the eu export rules on surveillance technologies; ### v. whereas spyware producers exporting to third countries establish themselves within the union to gain respectability while trading in spyware to autocratic regimes; whereas exports from the union to autocratic regimes or non-state actors are taking place , in violation of the eu export rules on surveillance technologies;


### y. whereas member states claim that matters relating to national security fall outside of the treaties as article 4 (2) teu provides that national security remains the sole responsibility of the member states; ### y. whereas member states national security matters fall outside of the treaties as article 4 (2) teu provides that national security remains the sole responsibility of the member states;


### ah. whereas the infection of a device with spyware and the subsequent collection of data takes place through the servers of the mobile service provider , and as the free roaming within the union has resulted in persons more often having mobile contracts from other member states than the one in which they live , a legal base for the collection of data in the other member state through the use of spyware is currently absent in union law; ### ah. whereas the infection of a device with spyware and the subsequent collection of data takes place through the servers of the mobile service provider , and as the free roaming within the union has resulted in persons sometimes having mobile contracts from other member states than the one in which they live , a legal base for the collection of data in the other member state through the use of spyware is currently absent in union law;


### aj. whereas it has been reported that large financial institutions have tried to incite spyware producers to refrain from applying appropriate human rights standards and due diligence and continue selling spyware to totalitarian regimes; ### aj. whereas it has been reported that large financial institutions have tried to incite spyware producers to refrain from applying appropriate human rights standards and due diligence and continue selling spyware to autocratic regimes;


### ak. whereas israel participates in union research programmes since 2000; whereas funds have been made available to israeli military and security companies through these european programmes; ### ak. whereas israel participates in union research programmes since 2000;


### 3. strongly condemns the use of spyware by member state governments or members of government for the purpose of monitoring , blackmailing , intimidating , manipulating and discrediting opposition and critics , eliminating democratic scrutiny and free press , and manipulating elections; ### 3. strongly condemns the use of spyware by member state governments or members of government for the purpose of monitoring , blackmailing , intimidating , manipulating and discrediting opposition and critics , eliminating democratic scrutiny and free press , manipulating elections , the appropriation and exploitation of sensitive personal data of citizens and confidential information of law firms and banks , and the undermining of the rule of law by targeting judges , prosecutors and lawyers by spyware;


### 4. points out that this illegitimate use of spyware by national governments directly and indirectly affects the union institutions and the decision making process , thus undermining the integrity of european union democracy; ### 4. points out that this illegitimate use of spyware by national governments directly and indirectly affects the union institutions and the decision making process , thus undermining the integrity of european union democracy and fundamental values;


### 5. notes with grave concern the fundamental inadequacy of the current union governance structure to respond to attacks on democracy from within the union; ### 5. notes with grave concern the fundamental inadequacy of the current union governance to respond to attacks on democracy from within the union; notes that this state of affairs is due to the lack of action taken by many member states;


### 6. takes the firm position that the export of spyware from the union to dictatorships and oppressive regimes with poor human-right records where such tools are used against human rights activists , journalist and government critics is a severe violation of fundamental rights enshrined in the charter and a gross violation on union export rules; ### 6. takes the firm position that the export of spyware from the union to dictatorships and oppressive regimes with poor human-right records where such tools are used against human rights activists , journalist and government critics is a severe violation of fundamental rights enshrined in the charter and a gross violation on union export rules. outlines the necessity to pay equal attention to imports of cyber surveillance items as well;


### 6. takes the firm position that the export of spyware from the union to dictatorships and oppressive regimes with poor human-right records where such tools are used against human rights activists , journalist and government critics is a severe violation of fundamental rights enshrined in the charter and a gross violation on union export rules; ### 6. takes the firm position that the export of spyware from the union to dictatorships and autocratic regimes with poor human-right records where such tools are used against human rights activists , journalist and government critics is a severe violation of fundamental rights enshrined in the charter and a gross violation on union export rules;


### 7. is of the opinion that contraventions , or maladministration in the implementation of union law with regard to the use of , and trade in spyware , have taken place in poland , hungary , greece , spain and cyprus; ### 7. is of the opinion that the implementation of union law with regard to the use of , and trade in surveillance spyware , needs revision and improvement in all member states;


### (2) the commission proposed to link the cap to the delivery of performance (‘delivery model’). under the new legal framework , the union is to set the basic policy parameters , such as objectives of the cap and basic requirements , while member states are to bear greater responsibility as to how they meet the objectives and achieve targets. accordingly , member states are to draw up cap strategic plans , which are to be approved by the commission and implemented by member states. ### (2) the commission proposed to link the cap to the delivery of performance (‘delivery model’). under the new legal framework , the union is to set the policy parameters , such as objectives of the cap and basic requirements. a strong european framework is essential to ensure that the cap remains a common policy and to guarantee a level playing field. member states will also have greater responsibility on how they meet the objectives and achieve targets. accordingly , member states are to draw up cap strategic plans , based on an ex-ante analysis and an assessment of needs , which are to be approved by the commission and implemented by member states.


### (17) as regards the aid scheme in the olive oil and table olives sector , the existing work programmes drawn up for the period running from 1 april 2018 until 31 march 2021 should be extended until 31 december 2021. for aid schemes in the fruit and vegetables sector rules should be laid down regarding the modification or replacement of operational programmes. ### (17) as regards the aid scheme in the olive oil and table olives sector , the existing work programmes drawn up for the period running from 1 april 2018 until 31 march 2021 should be extended until 31 december 2021. for aid schemes in the fruit and vegetables sector rules should be laid down regarding the modification or replacement of operational programmes. the recognised producer organisations in the fruit and vegetables sector should also have the possibility to maintain the operational programme until it comes to the end.


### (18) with the view to ensuring continuity as regards the aid schemes in the wine sector and the apiculture sector , rules need to be laid down that allow those aid schemes to continue to be implemented until the end of their respective programming periods. for this period certain provisions of regulation (eu) no 1306/2013 should therefore continue to apply in relation to expenditure incurred and payments made for operations implemented pursuant to regulation (eu) no 1308/2013 after 31 december 2021 and until the end of those aid schemes. ### (18) with the view to ensuring continuity as regards the aid schemes in the fruit and vegetables sector , wine sector and the apiculture sector , rules need to be laid down that allow those aid schemes to continue to be implemented until the end of their respective programming periods. for this period certain provisions of regulation (eu) no 1306/2013 should therefore continue to apply in relation to expenditure incurred and payments made for operations implemented pursuant to regulation (eu) no 1308/2013 after 31 december 2021 and until the end of those aid schemes and of the operational programmes.


### (34) furthermore , the amendments to regulations (eu) no 228/2013 and (eu) no 229/2013 should apply from 1 january 2021 in line with regulation (eu) …/…[regulation laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027] , ### (34) the financial allocations provided in regulation (eu) no 228/2013 and in regulation (eu) no 229/2013 should apply from 1 january 2021 in line with regulation (eu) …/…[regulation laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027] ,


### member states that decide to make use of the possibility provided in the first subparagraph shall notify the commission of their decision within 10 days after the entry into force of this regulation. where member states have submitted a set of regional programmes in accordance with article 6 of regulation (eu) no 1305/2013 , that notification shall also contain information on which of the regional programmes are to be extended and on the corresponding budgetary allocation within the annual breakdown for the year 2021 as set out in annex i to regulation (eu) no 1305/2013. ### member states that decide to make use of the possibility provided in the first subparagraph shall notify the commission of their decision within 2 weeks after the entry into force of this regulation. where member states have submitted a set of regional programmes in accordance with article 6 of regulation (eu) no 1305/2013 , that notification shall also contain information on which of the regional programmes are to be extended and on the corresponding budgetary allocation within the annual breakdown for the year 2021 as set out in annex i to regulation (eu) no 1305/2013.


### where the commission considers that an extension of the period under the first subparagraph is not justified , it shall inform the member state thereof within 6 weeks after receipt of the notification referred to in the second subparagraph. ### where the commission considers that an extension of the period under the first subparagraph is not justified , it shall inform the member state thereof within 6 weeks after receipt of the notification referred to in the second subparagraph. the commission will base the evaluation of the request for extension on clear and objective criteria that shall be communicated to the member state.


### where a recognised producer organisation does not submit such request by 15 september 2021 , its operational programme approved under regulation (eu) no 1308/2013 shall end on 31 december 2021. ### where a recognised producer organisation does not submit such request , its operational programme approved under regulation (eu) no 1308/2013 shall continue to be governed by the concerned provisions of the same regulation until the programme comes to an end.


### 6. with regard to the aid schemes referred to in paragraphs 3 and 4 of this article , articles 7(3) , 9 , 21 , 43 , 51 , 52 , 54 , 59 , 67 , 68 , 70 to 75 , 77 , 91 to 97 , 99 , 100 , 102(2) , 110 and 111 of regulation (eu) no 1306/2013 and the relevant provisions of delegated and implementing acts related to those articles shall continue to apply after 31 december 2021 in relation to expenditure incurred and payments made for operations implemented pursuant to regulation (eu) no 1308/2013 after that date and until the end of the aid schemes referred to in paragraphs 3 and 4 of this article. ### 6. with regard to the aid schemes referred to in paragraphs 3 and 4 of this article , articles 7(3) , 9 , 21 , 43 , 51 , 52 , 54 , 59 , 67 , 68 , 70 to 75 , 77 , 91 to 97 , 99 , 100 , 102(2) , 110 and 111 of regulation (eu) no 1306/2013 and the relevant provisions of delegated and implementing acts related to those articles shall continue to apply after the transitional period in relation to expenditure incurred and payments made for operations implemented pursuant to regulation (eu) no 1308/2013 after that date and until the end of the aid schemes referred to in paragraphs 3 and 4 of this article and until the end of the operational programmes referred in paragraph 2 of this article , where applicable.


### for new commitments to be undertaken from 2021 , member states shall determine a shorter period of one to three years in their rural development programmes. if member states provide for an annual extension of commitments after the termination of the initial period in accordance with the first subparagraph , from 2021 the extension shall not go beyond one year. as from 2021 , for new commitments directly following a commitment performed in the initial period , member states shall determine a period of one year in their rural development programmes. ### for new commitments to be undertaken from 2021 member states may determine a shorter period of one to three years in their rural development programmes. if member states provide for an annual extension of commitments after the termination of the initial period in accordance with the first subparagraph , from 2021 the extension shall not go beyond one year. as from 2021 , for new commitments directly following a commitment performed in the initial period , member states shall determine a period of one year in their rural development programmes.


### for new commitments to be undertaken from 2021 member states shall determine a shorter period of one to three in their rural development programmes. if member states provide for an annual extension of commitments after the termination of the initial period in accordance with the first subparagraph , from 2021 the extension shall not go beyond one year. as from 2021 , for new commitments directly following a commitment performed in the initial period , member states shall determine a period of one year in their rural development programmes. ### for new commitments to be undertaken from 2021 member states shall determine a shorter period of one to five in their rural development programmes. if member states provide for an annual extension of commitments after the termination of the initial period in accordance with the first subparagraph , from 2021 the extension shall not go beyond one year. as from 2021 , for new commitments directly following a commitment performed in the initial period , member states shall determine a period of one year in their rural development programmes.


### for new commitments to be undertaken from 2021 member states shall determine a shorter period of one to three in their rural development programmes. if member states provide for an annual extension of commitments after the termination of the initial period in accordance with the first subparagraph , from 2021 the extension shall not go beyond one year. as from 2021 , for new commitments directly following a commitment performed in the initial period , member states shall determine a period of one year in their rural development programmes. ### for new commitments to be undertaken from 2021 member states shall determine a shorter period of one to seven in their rural development programmes. if member states provide for an annual extension of commitments after the termination of the initial period in accordance with the first subparagraph , from 2021 the extension shall not go beyond one year. as from 2021 , for new commitments directly following a commitment performed in the initial period , member states shall determine a period of one year in their rural development programmes.


### for new commitments to be undertaken from 2021 , member states shall determine a shorter period of one to three years in their rural development programmes. if member states provide for an annual extension for the maintenance of organic farming after the termination of the initial period in accordance with the first subparagraph , from 2021 the extension shall not go beyond one year. as from 2021 , for new commitments concerning maintenance that directly follow the commitment performed in the initial period , member states shall determine a period of one year in their rural development programmes. ### for new commitments to be undertaken from 2021 member states may determine a shorter period of one to three years in their rural development programmes. if member states provide for an annual extension for the maintenance of organic farming after the termination of the initial period in accordance with the first subparagraph , from 2021 the extension shall not go beyond one year. as from 2021 , for new commitments concerning maintenance that directly follow the commitment performed in the initial period , member states shall determine a period of one year in their rural development programmes.


### for new commitments to be undertaken from 2021 , member states shall determine a shorter period of one to three years in their rural development programmes. if member states provide for an annual extension for the maintenance of organic farming after the termination of the initial period in accordance with the first subparagraph , from 2021 the extension shall not go beyond one year. as from 2021 , for new commitments concerning maintenance that directly follow the commitment performed in the initial period , member states shall determine a period of one year in their rural development programmes. ### for new commitments to be undertaken from 2021 , member states shall determine a shorter period of one to five years in their rural development programmes. if member states provide for an annual extension for the maintenance of organic farming after the termination of the initial period in accordance with the first subparagraph , from 2021 the extension shall not go beyond one year. as from 2021 , for new commitments concerning maintenance that directly follow the commitment performed in the initial period , member states shall determine a period of one year in their rural development programmes.


### for new commitments to be undertaken from 2021 , member states shall determine a shorter period of one to three years in their rural development programmes. if member states provide for an annual extension for the maintenance of organic farming after the termination of the initial period in accordance with the first subparagraph , from 2021 the extension shall not go beyond one year. as from 2021 , for new commitments concerning maintenance that directly follow the commitment performed in the initial period , member states shall determine a period of one year in their rural development programmes. ### for new commitments to be undertaken from 2021 , member states shall determine a shorter period of one to seven years in their rural development programmes. if member states provide for an annual extension for the maintenance of organic farming after the termination of the initial period in accordance with the first subparagraph , from 2021 the extension shall not go beyond one year. as from 2021 , for new commitments concerning maintenance that directly follow the commitment performed in the initial period , member states shall determine a period of one year in their rural development programmes.


### for new commitments to be undertaken as from 2021 member states shall determine a shorter period of one to three years in their rural development programmes. if member states provide for an annual renewal of commitments after the termination of the initial period in accordance with the first subparagraph , as from 2021 the renewal shall not go beyond one year. ### for new commitments to be undertaken as from 2021 member states may determine a shorter period of one to three years in their rural development programmes. if member states provide for an annual renewal of commitments after the termination of the initial period in accordance with the first subparagraph , as from 2021 the renewal shall not go beyond one year.


### for new commitments to be undertaken as from 2021 member states shall determine a shorter period of one to three years in their rural development programmes. if member states provide for an annual renewal of commitments after the termination of the initial period in accordance with the first subparagraph , as from 2021 the renewal shall not go beyond one year. ### for new commitments to be undertaken as from 2021 member states shall determine a shorter period of one to seven years in their rural development programmes. if member states provide for an annual renewal of commitments after the termination of the initial period in accordance with the first subparagraph , as from 2021 the renewal shall not go beyond one year.


### without prejudice to paragraphs 5 , 6 and 7 , the total amount of union support for rural development under this regulation for the period from 1 january 2021 to 31 december 2021 shall be maximum eur 11 258 707 816 , in current prices , in accordance with the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027.; ### without prejudice to paragraphs 5 , 6 and 7 , the total amount of union support for rural development under this regulation for the transitional period shall be maximum eur x , in current prices , in accordance with the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027.;


### without prejudice to paragraphs 5 , 6 and 7 , the total amount of union support for rural development under this regulation for the period from 1 january 2021 to 31 december 2021 shall be maximum eur 11 258 707 816 , in current prices , in accordance with the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027. ### without prejudice to paragraphs 5 , 6 and 7 , the total amount of union support for rural development under this regulation for the transitional period shall be maximum eur x* , in current prices , in accordance with the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027.


### – bulgaria: eur 624 ,11 , ### – bulgaria: eur x ,


### – greece: eur 225 ,04 , ### – greece: eur x ,


### – spain: eur 348 ,03 , ### – spain: eur x ,


### – portugal: eur 219 ,09.; ### – portugal: eur x.;


### eur 10 660 000 for greece; ### eur x for greece;


### eur 554 000 for france; ### eur xxx for france;


### eur 34 590 000 for italy.; ### eur xxx for italy.;


### the union financing for the aid to producer organisations provided for in paragraph 1 shall be for 2021 eur 2 188 000 for germany.; ### the union financing for the aid to producer organisations provided for in paragraph 1 shall be for 2021 eur x for germany.;


### – in the french overseas departments: eur 267 580 000 , ### – in the french overseas departments: eur 278 410 000 ,


### – azores and madeira: eur 102 080 000 , ### – azores and madeira: eur 106 210 000 ,


### – canary islands: eur 257 970 000. ### – canary islands: eur 268 420 000.


### – in the french overseas departments: eur 25 900 000 , ### – in the french overseas departments: eur 35 000 000 ,


### – azores and madeira: eur 20 400 000 , ### – azores and madeira: eur 21 200 000 ,


### – canary islands: eur 69 900 000. ### – canary islands: eur 72 700 000.


### 2. the union shall finance the measures provided for in chapters iii and iv up to an amount of eur 23 000 000. ### 2. the union shall finance the measures provided for in chapters iii and iv up to an amount of eur 23 ,93 million.


### 3. the amount allocated to finance the specific supply arrangements referred to in chapter iii shall not exceed eur 6 830 000.' . ### 3. the amount allocated to finance the specific supply arrangements referred to in chapter iii shall not exceed eur 7 ,11 million.


### (current prices in eur) ### (current prices in eur)


### 2021 ### 2021


### 2021 onwards ### 2021 onwards


### — having regard to the european pillar of social rights and , in particular , to principles 2 and 9 thereof , ### — having regard to the european pillar of social rights and , in particular , to principles 2 , 3 and 9 thereof ,


### a. whereas equality between women and men is a core value of the eu enshrined in articles 8 and 19 of the treaty on the functioning of the european union; whereas gender mainstreaming is therefore an important tool in the horizontal integration of this principle into eu policies , measures and actions , including cohesion policy; ### a. whereas equality between women and men is a core value of the eu enshrined in articles 8 and 19 of the treaty on the functioning of the european union; whereas gender mainstreaming is therefore an important tool in the horizontal integration of this principle into eu policies , measures and actions , including cohesion policy; whereas article 7 of the common provisions regulation (eu) no 1303/2013 for 2014-2020 establishes that equality between men and women and the integration of gender perspective shall be taken into account and promoted throughout the preparation and implementation of programmes , including in relation to monitoring , reporting and evaluation;


### b. whereas cohesion policy is as an important policy tool to support gender equality; ### b. whereas the promotion of gender equality is a horizontal objective for all cohesion policy funds; the european structural and investments funds (esif) are a very important resource to support the member states to achieve progress in the gender equality field;


### b. whereas cohesion policy is as an important policy tool to support gender equality; ### b. whereas cohesion policy is as an important tool not only to support gender equality , but also to reduce disparities affecting groups still suffering from discrimination , including that linked to their sexual orientation;


### b. whereas cohesion policy addresses disparities between various regions and the backwardness of the least favoured regions with a view to achieving economic , social and territorial cohesion through the european regional development fund (erdf) , the european social fund (esf) , the cohesion fund , the european agricultural fund for rural development (eafrd) and the european maritime and fisheries fund (emff) , which are subject to the principles of non-discrimination and equality between women and men; ### b. whereas cohesion policy addresses disparities between various regions and the backwardness of the least favoured regions with a view to achieving economic , social and territorial cohesion , of which the achievement of gender equality is an essential part , through the european regional development fund (erdf) , the european social fund (esf) , the cohesion fund , the european agricultural fund for rural development (eafrd) and the european maritime and fisheries fund (emff) , just transition fund (jtf) , which are subject to the principles of non-discrimination and equality between women and men; whereas these funds should pay particular attention to women living in rural areas , areas affected by industrial transition , and regions which suffer from severe and permanent natural or demographic handicaps such as regions with very low population density and island , cross-border and mountain regions;


### c. whereas the full economic , employment and social consequences of the pandemic are still unknown; whereas preliminary studies suggest that the covid-19 pandemic has exacerbated existing inequalities , which cohesion policy should take into account; ### c. whereas the full economic , employment and social consequences of the pandemic are still unknown; whereas preliminary studies suggest that the covid-19 pandemic has exacerbated existing inequalities between men and women such as an increase in unpaid care work and an increase of gender-based violence , which cohesion policy should take into account; whereas there is a risk that the countries most affected by the covid-19 crisis will suffer from budgetary constraints , which can impact public expenditure in public policies aimed at reducing gender discrimination and gender violence and the allocation of funding of the public bodies responsible for the implementation of gender equality policies , such as public agencies , ngos and third-sector organisations promoting gender equality measures;


### d. whereas the involvement of local and regional authorities , gender equality institutions and non-governmental organisations in partnership agreements and monitoring committees is still insufficient; ### d. whereas the european court of auditors is currently assessing the gender mainstreaming in the european budget; whereas this audit report , due to be published in the first quarter of 2021 , will give useful insights on how to implement the gender dimension in the cohesion policy actions under the mff 2021-2027;


### d. whereas the provision of care is of the utmost importance in enabling women to remain active in the labour market; ### d. whereas the provision of accessible and affordable quality care facilities is of the utmost importance in enabling women to remain active in the labour market;


### e. whereas gender-disaggregated data and the adoption of appropriate selection procedures are considered useful for promoting gender equality; ### e. whereas the adoption of appropriate selection procedures is considered useful for promoting gender equality;


### h. whereas the eu recovery fund focuses on economic stimuli for sectors with a high share of male employment , which risks increasing gender inequalities in employment; ### h. whereas women and men do not have the same resources , needs and preferences and that many policies are not gender neutral , taking often into account the male perspective as the ‘norm’;


### 1. stresses the importance of cohesion policy in promoting gender equality and the eu gender equality strategy; recalls that all policy goals need appropriate resources dedicated to their implementation; ### 1. stresses the importance of cohesion policy , and of the esif , in promoting gender equality and the eu gender equality strategy; recalls that all policy goals need appropriate resources dedicated to their implementation;