### 5. by way of derogation from articles 7 and 20 , subsystems or safety components , for which an authorisation has been granted in accordance with paragraph 1 of this article , shall not leave the territory of the member state which has issued the authorisation and shall not bear the ce marking. ### 5. by way of derogation from articles 7 and 20 , subsystems or safety components , for which an authorisation has been granted in accordance with paragraph 1 of this article , shall only leave the territory of the member state which has issued the authorisation if traceability has been ensured by the economic operator. the subsystems or safety components shall not bear the ce marking.


### article 43dpresumption of conformity based on national and international standards ### article 43d


### member states shall take all appropriate measures to ensure that , for the purposes of placing on the market , their competent authorities consider that subsystems and safety components , which comply with the relevant international standards or any national standards in force in the member state of manufacture , ensuring the safety level required by the essential requirements set out in annex ii , comply with those essential requirements in either of the following cases: ### member states shall take all appropriate measures to ensure that , for the purposes of placing on the market , their competent authorities consider that subsystems and safety components , which comply with the relevant national standards in force in the member state of manufacture , ensuring the safety level required by the essential requirements set out in annex ii , comply with those essential requirements in either of the following cases:


### a. whereas the functioning of the internal market is greatly facilitated by the market’s adoption and use of standards; whereas the adoption of european standards simplifies compliance for market participants and national authorities , replacing as many as 34 national standards with one european standard; ### a. whereas the functioning of the internal market is greatly facilitated by the market’s adoption and use of standards; whereas the adoption of european standards simplifies compliance for market participants and national authorities , replacing as many as 34 national standards with one european standard; european standards play a very important role in the single market for goods through the use of harmonised standards in the presumption of conformity of products to be made available on the market with the essential requirements relating to those products laid down in the relevant union harmonisation legislation.


### 1. welcomes the adoption of the standardisation strategy , which sets out five main areas for action for the commission; considers that the classification of priority areas for action closely aligns with the weaknesses of the current system identified during the stakeholder consultation; notes also the adoption of , and progress on , the 2022 annual work programme on standardisation; ### 1. welcomes the adoption of the standardisation strategy , which sets out five main areas for action for the commission; considers that the classification of priority areas for action closely aligns with the weaknesses of the current system identified during the stakeholder consultation; stresses , however , the insufficient focus of the strategy on the uptake and implementation of standards , especially among smes; notes also the adoption of , and progress on , the 2022 annual work programme on standardisation and looks forward to the 2023 and 2024 draft annual work programmes;


### 2. considers that the fundamental qualities of the standardisation system remain relevant and effective for the proper functioning of the internal market; recalls that standards are a voluntary , market-driven tool providing technical requirements and guidance , the use of which facilitates the compliance of goods and services with european legislation and supports the development of european policies in an accountable , transparent and inclusive way; stresses , however , that standards cannot be seen as eu law , since legislation and policies regarding the level of consumer , health , safety , environmental and data protection , and the level of social inclusion , are determined by the legislator; ### 2. considers that the fundamental qualities of the standardisation system remain relevant and effective for the proper functioning of the internal market; recalls that standards are a voluntary , market-driven tool providing technical requirements and guidance , the use of which facilitates the compliance of goods and services with european legislation , ensures fair competition in the market and supports the implementation of european policies in an accountable , transparent and inclusive way , ensuring that the needs and specificities of all relevant stakeholders , including smes and societal actors , are taken into account; stresses that according to regulation 1025/2012 , harmonised standards have the legal effect of providing presumption of conformity to legislation , but that the level of consumer , health , safety , environmental and data protection , and the level of social inclusion , are determined by the legislator; stresses , however , that standards cannot be used to address socio-economic issues , and in particular working conditions , health , safety at work , data protection , and workers’ protection and trade unions rights , as well as all issues falling under the competence of the legislator and/or social partners;


### 4. supports the launch of the high-level forum for standardisation and the desire to broaden the range of voices heard when identifying standardisation needs , planning future activities and coordinating approaches in standardisation bodies; underlines that this expert group should include a diverse range of stakeholders , without losing sight of the bottom-up , market-driven nature of standardisation activities; ### 4. supports the launch of the high-level forum for standardisation and the desire to broaden the range of voices heard when identifying standardisation needs , planning future activities and coordinating approaches in standardisation bodies; underlines that this expert group should include a diverse range of stakeholders , including smes and consumers , without losing sight of the bottom-up , market-driven nature of standardisation activities;


### 6. welcomes the creation of an eu excellence hub on standards and the appointment of a chief standardisation officer (cso) in the commission; believes that this position and the hub , as a resource , should lead to greater consistency across the commission in terms of standardisation requests and the preparation and adoption of standards and legislative provisions with relevance to standardisation; considers that the person holding this oversight function should be an important interlocutor for parliament , enabling the technical scrutiny of the commission’s standardisation activities; ### 6. welcomes the creation of an eu excellence hub on standards and the appointment of a chief standardisation officer (cso) in the commission; believes that this position and the hub , as a resource , should lead to greater consistency across the commission in terms of standardisation requests and the preparation and adoption of standards and legislative provisions with relevance to standardisation; considers that the person holding this oversight function should be an important interlocutor for parliament to inform the parliament on the standardisation activities of the commission , enabling the technical scrutiny of the commission’s standardisation activities;


### 7. believes that the commission should establish a clear set of key performance indicators on the aspects of standardisation within its remit; ### 7. believes that the commission should establish a clear set of key performance indicators on the aspects of standardisation within its remit , especially for standards linked to the objectives of the european green deal and the twin transitions;


### 9. notes that the commission wishes to accelerate the steps involved in developing standards; considers that the timely preparation of standards is necessary for the proper functioning of the internal market , in particular in the case of harmonised standards; ### 9. notes that the commission wishes to accelerate the steps involved in developing standards; considers that the timely preparation of robust standards meeting market and societal needs is necessary for the proper functioning of the internal market , in particular in the case of harmonised standards , but without affecting the quality of consultations with stakeholders; however , consensus building , inclusiveness and the proper verification that standards satisfy eu legal requirements , in particular in the case of harmonised standards , should prevail over speed;


### 11. stresses that there may be inherent limits to speeding up the standardisation process , as the preparation of standards , citation of harmonised standards and industry implementation of those standards all add time before market adoption; recognises that it may be easier to accelerate administrative tasks , such as citation in the official journal , but that the unduly rushed preparation or deployment of standards creates challenges for all stakeholders , including national authorities; encourages the commission , in conjunction with improvements to its own internal processes , to continue working with the esos on ways of achieving timely delivery , including consideration of the most suitable standardisation deliverable depending on the need; ### 11. stresses that there may be inherent limits to speeding up the standardisation process , as the preparation of standards , citation of harmonised standards and industry implementation of those standards all add time before market adoption; recognises that it may be easier to accelerate administrative tasks , such as citation in the official journal , but that the unduly rushed preparation or deployment of standards creates challenges for all stakeholders , including national authorities , as each enforced reduction in time risks the chance to achieve the broad and robust consensus of all interested parties; encourages the commission , in conjunction with improvements to its own internal processes , to continue working with the esos on ways of achieving timely delivery , including consideration of the most suitable standardisation deliverable depending on the need;


### 12. considers that an evaluation of regulation (eu) 1025/2012 may identify areas where reform is needed beyond the targeted amendment already introduced by the commission; considers that the role , participation and input of relevant stakeholders , including those representing , inter alia , smes and environmental , social and consumer interests , should be evaluated and strengthened where such reforms may be beneficial and complementary to work envisaged by the esos following the commission’s call for them to present proposals to reform their own internal governance; ### 12. considers that an evaluation of regulation (eu) 1025/2012 may identify areas where reform is needed beyond the targeted amendment already introduced by the commission; considers that the role , participation and input of relevant stakeholders , including those representing , inter alia , smes , trade unions and environmental , social and consumer interests , should be evaluated and strengthened where such reforms may be beneficial and complementary to work envisaged by the esos following the commission’s call for them to present proposals to reform their own internal governance; a reform should ensure that inclusiveness and effective participation of societal stakeholders is implemented in a harmonised manner beyond the simple obligation of efforts , as defined in articles 5 and 16 of the regulation , and also takes account of the actual results of the consensus-building process;


### 13. welcomes the focus on national-level involvement of wider stakeholders in standardisation activities; notes that not all organisations listed in annex iii have national counterparts in the member states; considers that the commission may direct funding or technical support to those organisations to ensure participation in national standardisation activities , including not only technical work on standards , but also the preparation of positions vis-à-vis standardisation requests at the european and international levels , thereby reinforcing the inclusivity of the process as a whole; ### 13. welcomes the focus on national-level involvement of wider stakeholders in standardisation activities; notes that not all organisations listed in annex iii have national counterparts in the member states; considers that the commission should increase funding or technical support to those organisations , in order to ensure a collective national stakeholder voice is heard at european level , including not only technical work on standards , but also the preparation of positions vis-à-vis standardisation requests at the european and international levels , thereby reinforcing the inclusivity of the process as a whole; stresses the importance to ensure that additional financial support for the participation of smes and sme associations is provided by member states at the national level;


### 14. recognises the need for a consistent approach towards technical or common specifications , in particular as different legislative processes may give rise to divergent provisions; considers , therefore , that this mechanism should only be used in exceptional circumstances and only while relevant standards do not exist; expresses concern about technical specifications concerning , among other things , respect for fundamental rights , where recourse to implementing acts affects the co-legislators’ powers of scrutiny; ### 14. recognises the need for a consistent approach towards technical or common specifications , in particular as different legislative processes may give rise to divergent provisions; considers , therefore , that this mechanism should only be used in exceptional circumstances and only while relevant standards do not exist and by ensuring the involvement of all relevant stakeholders; expresses concern about technical specifications concerning , among other things , respect for fundamental rights of consumers , where recourse to implementing acts affects the co-legislators’ powers of scrutiny;


### 17. emphasises that prioritising standardisation matters in cooperation with third countries in bi- , multi- and pluri-lateral settings is also important to ensure that like-minded , inclusive approaches towards standardisation can prevail at international level; encourages , in this regard , the commission and the cso to develop key performance indicators to monitor commitments on standardisation between the union and third countries; ### 17. emphasises that prioritising standardisation matters in cooperation with third countries in bi- , multi- and pluri-lateral settings is also important to ensure that like-minded , inclusive approaches towards standardisation can prevail at international level; encourages , in this regard , the commission and the cso to develop key performance indicators , which cover inclusiveness , to monitor commitments on standardisation between the union and third countries in eu trade agreements , which would lead to an improvement of competition in the internal market and an increase of consumer protection;


### 19. supports the development of awareness-raising and training programmes aimed at developing pathways towards standardisation activities for academics , future industry professionals and policymakers; ### 19. supports the development of awareness-raising and training programmes aimed at developing pathways towards standardisation activities for academics , future industry professionals and policymakers and civil society representatives; calls for training and mentorship programmes to be launched to promote awareness of standards and the benefits of standardisation , particularly aimed at smes and other underrepresented stakeholders in standardisation;


### ensure regular human oversight as necessary to ensure that the technologies operate in a sufficiently reliable manner and , where necessary , in particular when potential errors and potential solicitation of children are detected , human intervention; ### ensure regular human oversight as necessary to ensure that the technologies operate and , where necessary , in particular when potential errors and potential solicitation of children are detected , human intervention;


### 2. the provider shall execute the removal order as soon as possible and in any event within 24 hours of receipt thereof. ### 2. the provider shall execute the removal order as soon as possible and in any event within no more than 24 hours of receipt thereof.


### 1. providers of hosting services shall provide reasonable assistance , on request , to persons residing in the union that seek to have one or more specific items of known child sexual abuse material depicting them removed or to have access thereto disabled by the provider. ### 1. providers of hosting services shall provide reasonable assistance , on request , in a timely manner , to persons residing in the union that seek to have one or more specific items of known child sexual abuse material depicting them removed or to have access thereto disabled by the provider.


### 1. by [five years after the entry into force of this regulation] , and every five years thereafter , the commission shall evaluate this regulation and submit a report on its application to the european parliament and the council. ### 1. by [three years after the entry into force of this regulation] , and every five years thereafter , the commission shall evaluate this regulation and submit a report on its application to the european parliament and the council.


### (3) member states are increasingly introducing , or are considering introducing , national laws to prevent and combat online child sexual abuse , in particular by imposing requirements on providers of relevant information society services. in the light of the inherently cross-border nature of the internet and the service provision concerned , those national laws , which diverge , have a direct negative effect on the internal market. to increase legal certainty , eliminate the resulting obstacles to the provision of the services and ensure a level playing field in the internal market , the necessary harmonised requirements should be laid down at union level. ### (3) member states are increasingly introducing , or are considering introducing , national laws to prevent and combat online child sexual abuse , in particular by imposing requirements on providers of relevant information society services. in the light of the inherently cross-border nature of the internet and the service provision concerned , those national laws , which diverge , have a direct negative effect on the internal market and lead to a fragmentation in the union’s approach towards this phenomenon. to increase legal certainty , eliminate the resulting obstacles to the provision of the services and ensure a level playing field in the internal market , the necessary harmonised requirements should be laid down at union level.


### (4) therefore , this regulation should contribute to the proper functioning of the internal market by setting out clear , uniform and balanced rules to prevent and combat child sexual abuse in a manner that is effective and that respects the fundamental rights of all parties concerned. in view of the fast-changing nature of the services concerned and the technologies used to provide them , those rules should be laid down in technology-neutral and future-proof manner , so as not to hamper innovation. ### (4) therefore , this regulation should contribute to the proper functioning of the internal market by setting out clear , uniform and balanced rules to prevent and combat online child sexual abuse in a manner that is effective and that respects the fundamental rights of all parties concerned. in view of the fast-changing nature of the services concerned and the technologies used to provide them , those rules should be laid down in technology-neutral and future-proof manner , so as not to hamper innovation.


### (22) however , the finding of such a significant risk should in itself be insufficient to justify the issuance of a detection order , given that in such a case the order might lead to disproportionate negative consequences for the rights and legitimate interests of other affected parties , in particular for the exercise of users’ fundamental rights. therefore , it should be ensured that detection orders can be issued only after the coordinating authorities and the competent judicial authority or independent administrative authority having objectively and diligently assessed , identified and weighted , on a case-by-case basis , not only the likelihood and seriousness of the potential consequences of the service being misused for the type of online child sexual abuse at issue , but also the likelihood and seriousness of any potential negative consequences for other parties affected. with a view to avoiding the imposition of excessive burdens , the assessment should also take account of the financial and technological capabilities and size of the provider concerned. ### (22) however , the finding of such a significant risk should in itself be insufficient to justify the issuance of a detection order , given that in such a case the order might lead to disproportionate negative consequences for the rights and legitimate interests of other affected parties , in particular for the exercise of users’ fundamental rights. therefore , it should be ensured that detection orders can be issued only after the coordinating authorities and the competent judicial authority or independent administrative authority having objectively and diligently assessed , identified and weighted , on a case-by-case basis , not only the likelihood and seriousness of the potential consequences of the service being misused for the type of online child sexual abuse at issue , but also the likelihood and seriousness of any potential negative consequences for other parties affected. with a view to avoiding the imposition of excessive burdens , the assessment should also take account of the financial and technological capabilities and size of the provider concerned. in this regard , close cooperation is advisable so as to have a comprehensive view of all the information required in order to perform the assessment in a clear and detailed manner.


### (70) longstanding union support for both inhope and its member hotlines recognises that hotlines are in the frontline in the fight against online child sexual abuse. the eu centre should leverage the network of hotlines and encourage that they work together effectively with the coordinating authorities , providers of relevant information society services and law enforcement authorities of the member states. the hotlines’ expertise and experience is an invaluable source of information on the early identification of common threats and solutions , as well as on regional and national differences across the union. ### (70) longstanding union support for both inhope and its member hotlines recognises that hotlines are in the frontline in the fight against online child sexual abuse. the eu centre should leverage the network of hotlines and encourage that they work together effectively with the coordinating authorities , providers of relevant information society services and law enforcement authorities of the member states. the hotlines’ expertise and experience is an invaluable source of information on the early identification of common threats and solutions , as well as on regional and national differences across the union. furthermore , a special green line with a call centre assistance service will be constituted at eu level in order for victims and their families to receive support in a timely manner.


### this regulation lays down uniform rules to address the misuse of relevant information society services for online child sexual abuse in the internal market. ### this regulation lays down uniform rules to address the misuse of relevant information society services for online child sexual abuse in the eu member states.


### — measures taken to enforce such prohibitions and restrictions; ### — concrete measures taken to enforce such prohibitions and restrictions;


### the provider may request the eu centre to perform an analysis of representative , anonymized data samples to identify potential online child sexual abuse , to support the risk assessment. ### prior to preparing its risk assessment , the provider shall be advised upon the specific requirements in order to ensure that the risk assessment is thorough , accurate and detailed. the provider may request the eu centre to perform an analysis of representative , anonymized data samples to identify potential online child sexual abuse , to support the risk assessment.


### 1. providers of hosting services and providers of interpersonal communications services shall take reasonable mitigation measures , tailored to the risk identified pursuant to article 3 , to minimise that risk. such measures shall include some or all of the following: ### 1. providers of hosting services and providers of interpersonal communications services shall take concrete mitigation measures , tailored to the risk identified pursuant to article 3 , to minimise that risk. such measures shall include some or all of the following:


### effective in mitigating the identified risk; ### effective and efficient in mitigating the identified risk;


### 3. providers of interpersonal communications services that have identified , pursuant to the risk assessment conducted or updated in accordance with article 3 , a risk of use of their services for the purpose of the solicitation of children , shall take the necessary age verification and age assessment measures to reliably identify child users on their services , enabling them to take the mitigation measures. ### 3. providers of interpersonal communications services that have identified , pursuant to the risk assessment conducted or updated in accordance with article 3 , a risk of use of their services for the purpose of the solicitation of children , shall immediately take the necessary age verification and age assessment measures to reliably identify child users on their services , enabling them to take the mitigation measures.


### 1. providers of hosting services and providers of interpersonal communications services shall transmit , by three months from the date referred to in article 3(4) , to the coordinating authority of establishment a report specifying the following: ### 1. providers of hosting services and providers of interpersonal communications services shall transmit , within 30 days of the date referred to in article 3(4) , to the coordinating authority of establishment a report specifying the following:


### 2. within three months after receiving the report , the coordinating authority of establishment shall assess it and determine , on that basis and taking into account any other relevant information available to it , whether the risk assessment has been carried out or updated and the mitigation measures have been taken in accordance with the requirements of articles 3 and 4. ### 2. within 60 days after receiving the report , the coordinating authority of establishment shall assess it and determine , on that basis and taking into account any other relevant information available to it , whether the risk assessment has been carried out or updated and the mitigation measures have been taken in accordance with the requirements of articles 3 and 4.


### (36) given the impact on the rights of victims depicted in such known child sexual abuse material and the typical ability of providers of hosting services to limit that impact by helping ensure that the material is no longer available on their services , those providers should assist victims who request the removal or disabling of access of the material in question. that assistance should remain limited to what can reasonably be asked from the provider concerned under the given circumstances , having regard to factors such as the content and scope of the request , the steps needed to locate the items of known child sexual abuse material concerned and the means available to the provider. the assistance could consist , for example , of helping to locate the items , carrying out checks and removing or disabling access to the items. considering that carrying out the activities needed to obtain such removal or disabling of access can be painful or even traumatic as well as complex , victims should also have the right to be assisted by the eu centre in this regard , via the coordinating authorities. ### (36) given the impact on the rights of victims depicted in such known child sexual abuse material and the typical ability of providers of hosting services to limit that impact by helping ensure that the material is no longer available on their services , those providers should assist victims who request the removal or disabling of access of the material in question in a timely manner. that assistance should remain limited to what can reasonably be asked from the provider concerned under the given circumstances , having regard to factors such as the content and scope of the request , the steps needed to locate the items of known child sexual abuse material concerned and the means available to the provider. the assistance could consist , for example , of helping to locate the items , carrying out checks and removing or disabling access to the items. considering that carrying out the activities needed to obtain such removal or disabling of access can be painful or even traumatic as well as complex , victims should also have the right to be assisted by the eu centre in this regard , via the coordinating authorities. .


### (36) given the impact on the rights of victims depicted in such known child sexual abuse material and the typical ability of providers of hosting services to limit that impact by helping ensure that the material is no longer available on their services , those providers should assist victims who request the removal or disabling of access of the material in question. that assistance should remain limited to what can reasonably be asked from the provider concerned under the given circumstances , having regard to factors such as the content and scope of the request , the steps needed to locate the items of known child sexual abuse material concerned and the means available to the provider. the assistance could consist , for example , of helping to locate the items , carrying out checks and removing or disabling access to the items. considering that carrying out the activities needed to obtain such removal or disabling of access can be painful or even traumatic as well as complex , victims should also have the right to be assisted by the eu centre in this regard , via the coordinating authorities. ### (36) given the impact on the rights of victims depicted in such known child sexual abuse material and the typical ability of providers of hosting services to limit that impact by helping ensure that the material is no longer available on their services , those providers should assist victims who request the removal or disabling of access of the material in question in a timely manner. that assistance should remain limited to what can reasonably be asked from the provider concerned under the given circumstances , having regard to factors such as the content and scope of the request , the steps needed to locate the items of known child sexual abuse material concerned and the means available to the provider. the assistance could consist , for example , of helping to locate the items , carrying out checks and removing or disabling access to the items. considering that carrying out the activities needed to obtain such removal or disabling of access can be painful or even traumatic as well as complex , victims should also have the right to be assisted by the eu centre in this regard , via the coordinating authorities.


### (66) with a view to contributing to the effective application of this regulation and the protection of victims’ rights , the eu centre should be able , upon request , to support victims and to assist competent authorities by conducting searches of hosting services for the dissemination of known child sexual abuse material that is publicly accessible , using the corresponding indicators. where it identifies such material after having conducted such a search , the eu centre should also be able to request the provider of the hosting service concerned to remove or disable access to the item or items in question , given that the provider may not be aware of their presence and may be willing to do so on a voluntary basis. ### (66) with a view to contributing to the effective application of this regulation and the protection of victims’ rights , the eu centre should be able , upon request , to support victims and to assist competent authorities by conducting searches of hosting services for the dissemination of known child sexual abuse material that is publicly accessible , using the corresponding indicators. where it identifies such material after having conducted such a search , the eu centre should also be able to request the provider of the hosting service concerned to remove or disable access to the item or items in question , as soon as possible , given that the provider may not be aware of their presence and may be willing to do so on a voluntary basis.


### (67) given its central position resulting from the performance of its primary tasks under this regulation and the information and expertise it can gather in connection thereto , the eu centre should also contribute to the achievement of the objectives of this regulation by serving as a hub for knowledge , expertise and research on matters related to the prevention and combating of online child sexual abuse. in this connection , the eu centre should cooperate with relevant stakeholders from both within and outside the union and allow member states to benefit from the knowledge and expertise gathered , including best practices and lessons learned. ### (67) given its central position resulting from the performance of its primary tasks under this regulation and the information and expertise it can gather in connection thereto , the eu centre should also contribute to the achievement of the objectives of this regulation by serving as a hub for knowledge , expertise and research on matters related to the prevention and combating of online child sexual abuse. in this connection , the eu centre should cooperate with relevant stakeholders from both within and outside the union and allow member states to benefit from the knowledge and expertise gathered , including best practices and lessons learned. for this scope , the eu centre can also aid in the implementation of awareness campaigns and contribute to the establishment and improvement of specific guidelines and proposals for mitigation measures respectively , so as to ensure accuracy and up to date solutions in tackling online child sexual abuse.


### collecting , recording , analysing and providing information , providing analysis based on anonymised and non-personal data gathering , and providing expertise on matters regarding the prevention and combating of online child sexual abuse , in accordance with article 51; ### collecting , recording , analysing and providing information , providing analysis based on anonymised and non-personal data gathering , and providing expertise on matters regarding the prevention and combating of online child sexual abuse , in accordance with article 51 , including in view of updating guidelines on prevention and mitigation methods for combatting child sexual abuse , especially for the digital dimension as per new technological developments;


### (76) in the interest of good governance and drawing on the statistics and information gathered and transparency reporting mechanisms provided for in this regulation , the commission should carry out an evaluation of this regulation within five years of the date of its entry into force , and every five years thereafter. ### (76) in the interest of good governance and drawing on the statistics and information gathered and transparency reporting mechanisms provided for in this regulation , the commission should carry out an evaluation of this regulation within three years of the date of its entry into force , and every five years thereafter.


### that coordinating authority shall transmit the request to the eu centre through the system established in accordance with article 39(2) and shall communicate the results received from the eu centre to the person making the request. ### in this regard , a special green line with a call centre assistance service will be established , in order for victims and their families to receive support in a timely manner.


### 2. the eu centre shall contribute to the achievement of the objective of this regulation by supporting and facilitating the implementation of its provisions concerning the detection , reporting , removal or disabling of access to , and blocking of online child sexual abuse and gather and share information and expertise and facilitate cooperation between relevant public and private parties in connection to the prevention and combating of child sexual abuse , in particular online. ### 2. the eu centre shall contribute to the achievement of the objective of this regulation by supporting and facilitating the implementation of its provisions concerning the detection , reporting , removal or disabling of access to , and blocking of online child sexual abuse and gather and share information , good practices and expertise and facilitate cooperation between relevant public and private parties in connection to the prevention and combating of child sexual abuse , in particular online.


### 2. by [five years after the entry into force of this regulation] , and every five years thereafter , the commission shall ensure that an evaluation in accordance with commission guidelines of the eu centre’s performance in relation to its objectives , mandate , tasks and governance and location is carried out. the evaluation shall , in particular , address the possible need to modify the tasks of the eu centre , and the financial implications of any such modification. ### 2. by [three years after the entry into force of this regulation] , and every five years thereafter , the commission shall ensure that an evaluation in accordance with commission guidelines of the eu centre’s performance in relation to its objectives , mandate , tasks and governance and location is carried out. the evaluation shall , in particular , address the possible need to modify the tasks of the eu centre , and the financial implications of any such modification.


### (7) in order to address the fact that the progressive introduction of union sector specific legislation has led to significant overlaps of that legislation with directive 2002/65/ec and that digitalisation exacerbated some aspects that are not fully addressed by the directive , including how and when information should be provided to the consumer , it is necessary to revise the rules applicable to financial services contracts concluded between a consumer and a trader at a distance , while at the same time ensuring the application of the ‘safety net’ feature. ### (7) in order to address the fact that the progressive introduction of union sector specific legislation has led to significant overlaps of that legislation with directive 2002/65/ec and that digitalisation exacerbated some aspects that are not fully addressed by the directive , including how and when information should be provided to the consumer , the speed with and means through which contracts can be concluded , or the information asymmetry between providers and consumers , it is necessary to revise the rules applicable to financial services contracts concluded between a consumer and a trader at a distance , while at the same time ensuring the application of the ‘safety net’ feature for financial services which are not covered by union sector specific legislation and/or financial services excluded from the scope of union acts governing financial services.


### (9) extending the scope of directive 2011/83/eu to cover financial services concluded at a distance should ensure the necessary complementarity. however , due to the particular nature of consumer financial services , in particular by reason of their complexity , not all the provisions of directive 2011/83/eu should apply to consumer financial services contracts concluded at a distance. a dedicated chapter with rules applicable only to consumer financial services contracts concluded at a distance should ensure the necessary clarity and legal certainty. ### (9) extending the scope of directive 2011/83/eu to cover financial services concluded at a distance should ensure the necessary complementarity without reducing the level of consumer protection for all products or services. however , due to the particular nature of consumer financial services , in particular by reason of their complexity , not all the provisions of directive 2011/83/eu should apply to consumer financial services contracts concluded at a distance. additionally to the application of several of the provisions of directive 2011/83/eu , a dedicated chapter with rules applicable only to consumer financial services contracts concluded at a distance should ensure the necessary clarity and legal certainty.


### (11) a dedicated chapter in directive 2011/83/eu should contain the still relevant and necessary rules of directive 2002/65/ec , in particular concerning the right to pre-contractual information and the right to withdrawal , and rules ensuring online fairness when financial service contracts are concluded at a distance. ### (11) a dedicated chapter in directive 2011/83/eu should contain an updated version of the still relevant and necessary rules of directive 2002/65/ec , in particular concerning the right to pre-contractual information and the right to withdrawal , and rules ensuring online fairness when financial service contracts are concluded at a distance.


### (17) the use of means of distance communications should not lead to an unwarranted restriction on the information provided to the consumer. in the interests of transparency , requirements should be laid down with regard to when the information should be provided to the consumer prior to the conclusion of the distance contract and how that information should reach the consumer. in order to be able to make their decisions in full knowledge of the facts , consumers should receive the information at least one day prior to the conclusion of the distance contract. only in exceptional cases can the information be provided less than a day before the conclusion of the distance contract for financial service. in case the contract is concluded less than one day before , the trader , within the established timeframe , should be obliged to remind the consumer about the possibility to withdraw from the distance contract for financial service. ### (17) the use of means of distance communications should not lead to an unwarranted restriction on the information provided to the consumer. in the interests of transparency , requirements should be laid down with regard to when the information should be provided to the consumer prior to the conclusion of the distance contract and how that information should reach the consumer. in order to be able to make their decisions in full knowledge of the facts , consumers should receive the information in due time and in any case always prior to the conclusion of the distance contract. terms and conditions laid down in pre-contractual information should remain unchanged for at least one full working day after the provision of all pre-contractual information. due to its benefits documented in behavioural studies on the capacity of the consumer to understand its rights in full , the trader , within the established timeframe , should be obliged to remind the consumer about the possibility to withdraw from the distance contract for financial service.


### (18) the information requirements should be modernised and updated to include , for example , the email address of the trader and the information on the risk and reward related to certain consumer financial services. consumers should also be clearly informed when the price presented to them is personalised on the basis of automated processing. ### (18) the information requirements should be modernised and updated to include , for example , the email address of the trader and the information on the risk and reward related to certain consumer financial services. consumers should also be clearly informed when the price or other characteristics of the offer presented to them are personalised on the basis of automated processing.


### (19) when the consumer financial service concluded at a distance includes a risk-reward profile , it should contain such elements as a summary risk indicator , supplemented by a narrative explanation of that indicator , its main limitations and a narrative explanation of the risks which are materially relevant to the financial service and the possible maximum loss of capital , including information on whether all capital can be lost. ### (19) when the consumer financial service concluded at a distance includes a risk-reward profile , it should contain such elements as a summary risk indicator , supplemented by a narrative explanation of that indicator , its main limitations and a narrative explanation of the risks which are materially relevant to the financial service and the possible maximum loss of capital , including information on whether all capital can be lost. the use of a traffic light label for financial risk could also be adopted.


### (20) certain financial services might pursue an environmental or social objective such as contributing to the fight against climate change or contributing to the reduction of over-indebtedness. in order to be able to make an informed decision , the consumer should also be informed about the particular environmental or social objectives targeted by the financial service. ### (20) certain financial services might pursue an environmental or social objective such as contributing to the fight against climate change or contributing to the reduction of over-indebtedness. in order to be able to make an informed decision , the consumer should also be informed about the particular duly documented environmental or social objectives targeted by the financial service.


### (22) when providing pre-contractual information through electronic means , such information should be presented in a clear and comprehensible manner. in this regard , the information could be highlighted , framed and contextualised effectively within the display screen. the technique of layering has been tested and proved to be useful for certain financial services; its uses , namely the possibility to present detailed parts of the information through pop-ups or through links to accompanying layers , should be encouraged. a possible manner of providing pre-contractual information is through the ‘tables of contents’ approach using expandable headings. at the top level , consumers could find the main topics , each of which can be expanded by clicking on it , so that the consumers are directed to a more detailed presentation of the relevant information. in this way , the consumer has all the required information in one place , while retaining control over what to review and when. consumers should have the possibility to download all the pre-contractual information document and to save it as a stand-alone document. ### (22) when providing pre-contractual information through electronic means , such information should be presented in a clear and comprehensible manner. in this regard , the information could be highlighted , framed and contextualised effectively within the display screen. the technique of layering has been tested and proved to be useful for certain financial services; its uses , namely the possibility to present detailed parts of the information through pop-ups or through links to accompanying layers , should be encouraged. a possible manner of providing pre-contractual information is through the ‘tables of contents’ approach using expandable headings. at the top level , consumers could find the main topics , each of which can be expanded by clicking on it , so that the consumers are directed to a more detailed presentation of the relevant information. in this way , the consumer has all the required information in one place , while retaining control over what to review and when. on the other hand , overly lengthy and complex descriptions , small print , and extensive use of hyperlinks should be avoided , as these are methods that worsen the understanding of consumers. consumers should have the possibility to download all the pre-contractual information documents and to save it as a stand-alone document.


### (25) for distance contracts concluded by electronic means , the trader should provide the consumer with the possibility to use a withdrawal button. in order for ensure the effective use of the withdrawal button , the trader should ensure that it is visible and , when the consumer uses the button , the trader should adequately document its use. ### (25) where the trader offers the possibility of concluding distance contracts by means of an online interface (e.g. via web-site or application) , he should additionally be obliged to enable the consumer to withdraw from such a contract via a button on that same interface. this should ensure that consumers can withdraw from a contract just as easily as they can conclude it. to achieve this , the trade should provide a button on the online interface on which the contract is concluded that indicates the possibility of withdrawal. the consumer should be allowed to make the withdrawal statement and to provide certain information to identify the contract. the withdrawal statement shall be submitted by using a confirmation button. in order to ensure the effective use of the withdrawal button , the trader should ensure that it is visible and , when the consumer uses the button , the trader should adequately document its use. this obligation should be laid down not only for distance contracts for financial services , but also for distance contracts for goods and services to enhance the possibilities for consumers to get out of contracts by means of withdrawal.


### (26) consumers may need assistance in order to decide which financial service is the most appropriate for his or her needs and financial situation. therefore , member states should ensure that before the conclusion of a financial service contract at a distance , traders provide such assistance in relation to the financial services which they offer to the consumer , by providing adequate explanations about the relevant information , including the essential characteristics of the products proposed. the obligation of providing adequate explanations is particularly important when consumers intend to conclude a financial service contract at a distance and the trader provides explanations through online tools. in order to ensure that the consumer understands the effects that the contract may have on his or her economic situation , the consumer should always be able to obtain human intervention on behalf of the trader. ### (26) consumers may need assistance in order to decide which financial service is the most appropriate for his or her needs and financial situation. therefore , member states should ensure that before the conclusion of a financial service contract at a distance , traders provide such assistance in relation to the financial services which they offer to the consumer , by providing adequate explanations about the relevant information , including the essential characteristics of the products proposed. the obligation of providing adequate explanations is particularly important when consumers intend to conclude a financial service contract at a distance and the trader provides explanations through online tools. in order to ensure that the consumer understands the effects that the contract may have on his or her economic situation , the consumer should always be able to obtain human intervention on behalf of the trader , free of charge , during the business hours of the trader.


### (27) when concluding financial services contracts at a distance , traders should be prohibited to use the structure , design , function or manner of operation of their online interface in a way that could distort or impair consumers’ ability to make a free , autonomous and informed decision or choice. ### (27) dark patterns on online interfaces are practices that materially distort or impair , either on purpose or in effect , the ability of consumers to make autonomous and informed choices or decisions. those practices can be used to persuade the consumers to engage in unwanted behaviours or into undesired decisions which have negative consequences for them. when concluding financial services contracts at a distance , traders should therefore be prohibited from deceiving or nudging consumers and from distorting or impairing the autonomy , decision-making , or choice of the consumers via the structure , design , function or manner of operation of their online interface or a part thereof in a way that could distort or impair consumers’ ability to make a free , autonomous and informed decision or choice. this should include , but not be limited to , exploitative design choices to direct the consumer to actions that benefit the trader , but which may not be in the consumers’ interests , presenting choices in a non-neutral manner , such as giving more prominence to certain choices through visual , auditory , or other components , when asking the recipient of the service for a decision. it should also include repeatedly requesting a consumer to make a choice where such a choice has already been made , instilling a sense of urgency in consumers to speed up the conclusion of a contract; making the procedure of cancelling a service significantly more cumbersome than signing up to it , or making certain choices more difficult or time-consuming than others , making it unreasonably difficult to discontinue purchases and deceiving the recipients of the service by nudging them into decisions on transactions , or by default settings that are very difficult to change , and so unreasonably bias the decision making of the recipient of the service , in a way that distorts and impairs their autonomy , decision-making and choice. however , rules preventing dark patterns should not be understood as preventing providers to interact directly with recipients of the service and to offer new or additional services to them. legitimate practices , for example in advertising , that are in compliance with union law should not in themselves be regarded as constituting dark patterns.


### ‘articles 1 and 2 , article 3(2) , (5) and (6) , article 4 , articles 16a to 16e , article 19 , articles 21 to 23 , article 24(1) , (2) , (3) and (4) and articles 25 and 26 shall apply to distance contracts concluded between a trader and a consumer for the supply of financial services. ### ‘articles 1 and 2 , article 3(2) , (5) and (6) , article 4 , article 11a , article 15 , articles 16a to 16e , article 19 , articles 21 to 23 , article 24(1) , (2) , (3) and (4) and articles 25 and 26 shall apply to distance contracts concluded between a trader and a consumer for the supply of financial services.


### rules conerning financial services contracts concluded at a distance ### rules concerning financial services contracts concluded at a distance


### 1. before the consumer is bound by a distance contract , or any corresponding offer , the trader shall provide the consumer with the following information , in a clear and comprehensible manner: ### 1. member states shall require that before the consumer is bound by a distance contract , or any corresponding offer , the trader provides the consumer with the following information , in a clear and comprehensible manner:


### the geographical address at which the trader is established as well as the trader’s telephone number and email address; in addition , where the trader provides other means of online communication which guarantee that the consumer can keep any written correspondence , including the date and time of such correspondence , with the trader on a durable medium , the information shall also include details of those other means; all those means of communication provided by the trader shall enable the consumer to contact the trader quickly and communicate with him efficiently; where applicable , the trader shall also provide the geographical address and identity of the trader on whose behalf he is acting; ### the geographical address at which the trader is established as well as the trader’s telephone number and email address; in addition , where the trader provides other means of online communication which guarantee that the consumer can keep any written correspondence , including the date and time of such correspondence , with the trader on a durable medium , the information shall also include details of those other means; all those means of communication provided by the trader shall enable the consumer to contact the trader quickly and communicate with him efficiently; where applicable , the trader shall also provide the identity , geographical address , telephone number and email address of the trader on whose behalf he is acting;


### in the case of telephone communications , the identity of the trader and the commercial purpose of the call initiated by the trader shall be made explicitly clear at the beginning of any conversation with the consumer. ### in the case of telephone communications initiated by the consumer , by way of derogation from paragraph 1 , only the information referred to in points (a) , (f) , (g) , (ga) , (i) , (j) , (n) and (p) of that paragraph needs to be provided by the trader before the consumer is bound by the distance contract. the remainder information shall be provided immediately after the conclusion of the contract and on a durable medium. the trader shall inform the consumer of the nature and the availability of the other information referred to in paragraph 1.


### where the consumer explicitly agrees to continue the telephone communications , by way of derogation from paragraph 1 , only the information referred to in points (a) , (f) , (g) , and (p) of that paragraph needs to be provided. ### deleted


### the trader shall inform the consumer of the nature and the availability of the other information referred to in paragraph 1 and shall provide that information when fulfilling obligations under paragraph 3. ### deleted


### the trader shall provide the information referred to in paragraph 1 at least one day before the consumer is bound by any distance contract. ### deleted


### when the information referred to in paragraph 1 is provided less than one day before the consumer is bound by the distance contract , member states shall require that the trader sends a reminder , on a durable medium , to the consumer of the possibility to withdraw from the distance contract and of the procedure to follow for withdrawing , in accordance with article 16b. that reminder shall be provided to the consumer , at the latest , one day after the conclusion of the distance contract. ### member states shall require that the trader sends a reminder , on a durable medium , to the consumer of the possibility to withdraw from the distance contract and of the procedure to follow for withdrawing , in accordance with article 16b. that reminder shall be provided to the consumer , at the latest , seven calendar days after the conclusion of the distance contract.


### except for the information referred to in paragraph 1 , points (a) , (f) , (g) , and (p) , the trader shall be permitted to layer the information where it is provided by electronic means. ### except for the information referred to in paragraph 1 , points (a) , (f) , (g) , (ga) , (i) , (n) and (p) , the trader shall be permitted to layer the information where it is provided by electronic means.


### — crypto-assets as defined in [article 3(1)(2) of commission proposal for a regulation of the european parliament and of the council on markets in crypto-assets , and amending directive (eu) 2019/193 24.9.2020 com(2020) 593 final]. ### deleted


### 5. member states shall ensure that , for distance contracts concluded by electronic means , the trader provides a possibility to use a withdrawal button in order to facilitate the consumer’s exercise of the right of withdrawal. such button shall be clearly labelled with the words ‘withdraw from contract’ or a corresponding unambiguous formulation. ### deleted


### 1. member states shall ensure that traders are required to provide adequate explanations to the consumer on the proposed financial services contracts that make it possible for the consumer to assess whether the proposed contract and ancillary services are adapted to his or her needs and financial situation. the explanations shall include the following elements: ### 1. member states shall ensure that traders are required to provide adequate explanations to the consumer on the proposed financial services contracts that make it possible for the consumer to assess whether the proposed contract and ancillary services are adapted to his or her needs and financial situation. such explanations shall be given free of charge and in due time. the explanations shall include the following elements:


### 3. member states shall ensure that , in case the trader uses online tools , the consumer shall have a right to request and obtain human intervention. ### 3. member states shall ensure that , in case the trader uses online tools , the consumer shall have a right to request and obtain human intervention at every stage of the negotiation process and/or contractual relationship in the language used in the pre-contractual information provided according to article 16(a)(1).


### additional protection regarding online interfaces ### additional protection regarding financial services contracts concluded online


### without prejudice to directive 2005/29/ec of the european parliament and of the council24 and council directive 93/13/eec25 , member states shall adopt measures requiring that traders , when concluding financial services contracts at a distance , do not use the structure , design , function or manner of operation of their online interface in a way that could distort or impair consumers’ ability to make a free , autonomous and informed decision or choice. ### without prejudice to directive 2005/29/ec of the european parliament and of the council24 and council directive 93/13/eec25 , member states shall adopt measures requiring that traders , when concluding financial services contracts at a distance , do not use the structure , design , function or manner of operation of their online interface , as laid down in article 3(m) of regulation 2022/2065 , in a way that could distort or impair consumers’ ability to make a free , autonomous and informed decision or choice.


### member states shall adopt and publish by [24 months from adoption] at the latest , the laws , regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with this directive. they shall forthwith communicate to the commission the text of those provisions. ### member states shall adopt and publish by [12 months from adoption] at the latest , the laws , regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with this directive. they shall forthwith communicate to the commission the text of those provisions.


### they shall apply those provisions from [the date after 24 months from adoption]. ### they shall apply those provisions from [the date after 12 months from adoption].


### a. whereas digital technologies in general and artificial intelligence (ai) in particular bring with them extraordinary promise; whereas ai is one of the strategic technologies of the 21st century , generating substantial benefits in efficiency , accuracy , and convenience , and thus bringing positive change to the european economy; whereas ai should not be seen as an end in itself , but as a tool for serving people , with the ultimate aim of increasing human well-being; ### a. whereas digital technologies in general and artificial intelligence (ai) in particular bring with them extraordinary promise; whereas ai could be one of the strategic technologies of the 21st century , that may generate substantial benefits in efficiency , accuracy , and convenience , and thus bringing positive change to the european economy; whereas ai should not be seen as an end in itself , but as a tool for serving people , with the ultimate aim of increasing human well-being;


### a. whereas the right to fair trial is a fundamental right which also applies to enforcement of the law; ### a. whereas the right to fair trial is a fundamental and legally binding right enshrined in the charter of fundamental rights of the european union and the european convention on human rights for law enforcement purposes;


### 1. considers that ai used by police and judicial authorities has to be categorised as high-risk , given that the role of these authorities is to defend the public interest; considers that the eu should take the lead in laying down basic rules on the development and use of ai to ensure the same high level of consumer protection across the eu; ### 1. considers that ai used by police and judicial authorities has to be categorised as high-risk and treated with the utmost care and highest standards of data protection , given the role of these authorities in defending the public interest; considers that the eu should take the lead in laying down high standards , rules and principles based on fundamental rights in the development and use of ai to ensure the same high level of consumer protection across the eu;


### 1. considers that ai used by police and judicial authorities has to be categorised as high-risk , given that the role of these authorities is to defend the public interest; considers that the eu should take the lead in laying down basic rules on the development and use of ai to ensure the same high level of consumer protection across the eu; ### 1. considers that ai used by police and judicial authorities has to be categorised as high-risk , given that the role of these authorities is to defend the public interest; considers that the eu should take the lead in laying down basic rules on the development and use of ai to ensure the same high level of consumer protection across the eu , and to enable a better functioning of the internal market;


### 1. emphasises the importance of considering the ethical and operational implications of the use of ai and related technologies within criminal justice systems; ### 1. emphasises that the ethical and operational implications of the use of ai and related technologies within criminal justice systems must be closely linked to compliance with rigorous ethical principles , such as those laid down in the council of europe's 'european ethical charter on the use of artificial intelligence in judicial systems and their environment' , to which public and private entities responsible for the initial design and development of ai tools and services should adhere , so that all social stakeholders can have full information on the corporate structures of companies that produce ai programmes;


### 2. stresses that ai should help to ease the administrative burden on public authorities , without ever replacing human decisions , and that ai systems should rely on human oversight; ### 2. stresses that ai should help to ease the administrative burden on public authorities , without ever replacing human decisions and coordination , and that ai systems should rely on human oversight , collaboration and coordination;


### 2. stresses that ai should help to ease the administrative burden on public authorities , without ever replacing human decisions , and that ai systems should rely on human oversight; ### 2. stresses that ai should help to ease the administrative burden on public authorities; underlines that ai systems must under no circumstances replace human decisions and that ai systems always must rely on human oversight;


### 2. reaffirms that all ai solutions for law enforcement and the judiciary also need to fully respect the principles of non-discrimination , freedom of movement , the presumption of innocence and right of defence , freedom of expression and information , freedom of assembly and of association , equality before the law , and the right to an effective remedy and a fair trial; ### 2. reaffirms that all ai solutions for law enforcement and the judiciary also need to fully respect the principles of non-discrimination , freedom of movement , the presumption of innocence and right of defence , freedom of expression and information , freedom of assembly and of association , equality before the law , and the right to an effective remedy and a fair trial; any artificial intelligence , robotics and related technologies , shall be developed , deployed or used in a manner that prevents the possible identification of individuals from data that were previously processed based on anonymity or pseudonymity , and the generation of new , inferred , potentially sensitive data and forms of categorisation through automated means;


### 2. reaffirms that all ai solutions for law enforcement and the judiciary also need to fully respect the principles of non-discrimination , freedom of movement , the presumption of innocence and right of defence , freedom of expression and information , freedom of assembly and of association , equality before the law , and the right to an effective remedy and a fair trial; ### 2. reaffirms that all ai solutions for law enforcement and the judiciary also need to fully respect the principles of non-discrimination , human dignity , prevention of damage , transparency , impartiality and accuracy , fairness and explainability of the use of biometric recognition technologies , guarantee of the human control by the user , freedom of movement , the presumption of innocence and right of defence , freedom of expression and information , freedom of assembly and of association , equality before the law , and the right to an effective remedy and a fair trial;


### 2. underlines the importance of being able to access ai-produced or ai-assisted outputs for notification procedures and the role of ai and related technologies in criminal law enforcement and crime prevention; recalls the importance of questions related to governance , transparency and accountability; ### 2. underlines the right of the parties to access the data collection process and that relating to prognostic assessments useful for crime prevention police , to the cataloguing and evaluation of criminal evidence and to preventive assessments of whether a suspect might be a danger to society; underlines , in addition , the right of the parties to access ai-produced or ai-assisted outputs for notification procedures and the role of ai and related technologies in criminal law enforcement and crime prevention; recalls the importance of questions related to governance , accountability and transparency , in keeping with the parliament resolution on robotics of 2017 , which stressed that it should always be possible to supply the rationale behind any decision taken with the aid of ai that can have an impact on one or more persons’ lives; is of the view , therefore , that it is vital also to provide for a rule that regulates the principle of the independence of programmers , since it is they who prepare not only the selection of data and information to be processed and upon which to base the algorithms , but also the assessment criteria that inform and produce a decision;


### 3. considers , in this regard , that any ai tool either developed or used by law enforcement or judiciary should , as a minimum , be safe , secure and fit for purpose , respect the principles of fairness , accountability , transparency and explainability , with their deployment subject to a strict necessity and proportionality test; ### 3. considers , in this regard , that any ai tool either developed or used by law enforcement or judiciary should , as a minimum , be safe , secure and fit for purpose , respect the principles of data minimisation , fairness , accountability , transparency and explainability , with their development , deployment and use subject to a strict necessity and proportionality test;


### 3. welcomes the recommendations of the commission’s high-level expert group on ai for a proportionate use of biometric recognition technology and suggests that the application of such technology must be clearly warranted under existing laws and urges the commission to assess how to effectively incorporate these; ### 3. welcomes the recommendations of the commission’s high-level expert group on ai for a proportionate use of biometric recognition technology , regulated on the basis of the principles of human dignity , prevention of harm , fairness and explicability of use , as enshrined in the gdpr legislation on the protection of personal data; suggests that the application of such technology must be clearly warranted under existing laws and urges the commission to assess how to effectively incorporate these recommendations;


### 4. emphasises that data collection and the monitoring of individuals should be limited to criminal suspects; ### 4. emphasises that data collection and the monitoring of individuals should be limited to criminal suspects , taking into account the respect of private life and the presumption of innocence;


### 4. highlights the importance of preventing mass surveillance by means of ai technologies , and of banning applications that would result in it; ### 4. sees with great concern the potential of mass surveillance by means of ai technologies in the law enforcement sector; highlights the imperative need of preventing such mass surveillance by means of ai technologies , and of banning any application that would result in it;


### 4. highlights the importance of preventing mass surveillance by means of ai technologies , and of banning applications that would result in it; ### 4. highlights the importance of preventing mass surveillance by means of ai technologies , in particular face recognition , and of banning applications that would result in it;


### 4. considers it necessary to clarify whether law enforcement decisions can be delegated to ai and stresses the need to develop codes of conduct for the design and use of ai to help law enforcers and judicial authorities; refers to the ongoing work in the committee on legal affairs. ### 4. considers it necessary to clarify that law enforcement decisions cannot be delegated to ai and stresses the need to develop specific mandatory rules of conduct for public and private entities responsible for the design and use of ai , to ensure that they adhere to the principles of transparency and clarity relating to the processes for developing mathematical models and predictive algorithms , while complying with the requirement for independent verification of the quality and reliability of the results achieved , in terms of acquiring and assessing evidence - especially circumstantial evidence - beyond all reasonable doubt , in order to help law enforcers and judicial authorities; refers to the ongoing work in the committee on legal affairs.


### 5. insists that effective complaint and redress procedures , including judicial redress be made available to citizens; ### 5. insists that simple effective complaint and redress procedures , including judicial redress be made available to citizens in order to be able to defend their rights;


### 5. insists that effective complaint and redress procedures , including judicial redress be made available to citizens; ### 5. insists that effective and easily accessible complaint and redress procedures , including judicial redress be made available to citizens;


### 5. stresses the potential for bias and discrimination arising from the use of machine learning and ai applications; notes that biases can be inherent in underlying datasets , especially when historical data is being used , introduced by the developers of the algorithms , or generated when the systems are implemented in real world settings; ### 5. stresses the potential for bias and discrimination arising from the use of machine learning and ai applications; notes that biases can be inherent in underlying datasets , especially when historical data is being used , introduced by the developers of the algorithms , or generated when the systems are implemented in real world settings; underlines that any software , algorithm or data used or produced by artificial intelligence , robotics and related technologies developed , deployed or used in the union shall protect the human rights of individuals against violations by ai actors throughout ai systems’ entire lifecycle. a description of the way in which the training data was collected should be maintained by the builders of the algorithms , accompanied by an exploration of the potential biases induced by the human or algorithmic data gathering process;


### 6. recalls the high risk of abuse of certain types of ai , including facial recognition technologies in public spaces , automated behaviour detection and profiling to divide people into risk categories at borders , and calls on the commission to ban them; ### 6. recalls the high risk of abuse of certain types of ai , including facial recognition technologies in public spaces , automated behaviour detection and profiling to divide people into risk categories at borders; calls on the commission to regulate the use in order to eliminate the risk of abuse;


### — having regard to the charter of fundamental rights of the european union , ### — having regard to the charter of fundamental rights of the european union , in particular articles 7 and 8


### b. whereas technologies such as artificial intelligence (ai) and related technologies will contribute to the reducing of crime rates , the use of statistical data analytics in crime analysis and prevention , and the operation of criminal justice systems; ### b. whereas technologies such as artificial intelligence (ai) and related technologies may contribute to the prevention of certain types of crime and , therefore , to the reducing of crime rates; whereas their use , when applied to statistical data analytics in crime analysis and prevention may provide useful support to the investigative activities of police authorities , whilst ensuring compliance with procedural safeguards concerning the protection of privacy , as enshrined in the rule of law and legislation on the protection of personal data , pursuant to the gdpr and in particular to article 22 thereof , according to which everyone has the right not to be subject to a decision which produces legal effects concerning them , or significantly affects them , based solely on automated data processing designed to assess certain aspects of their personality; whereas , moreover , the use of such technologies may help improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the operation of criminal justice systems , though such algorithms - so-called automated decision systems - should not be used to replace human minds in final decisions , in order to avoid deterministic approaches and ensure that all decisions are based on the free judgment of those who must judge , and whose decisions must always be justifiable , responsible and free of prejudice;


### e. whereas ai applications offer great opportunities in the field of law enforcement , in particular in improving the working methods of law enforcement agencies and judicial authorities , and combating certain types of crime more efficiently , in particular financial crime , money laundering and terrorist financing , as well as certain types of cybercrime; ### e. whereas ai applications may offer opportunities in the field of law enforcement , in particular in improving the working methods of law enforcement agencies and judicial authorities , and combating certain types of crime more efficiently , in particular financial crime , money laundering and terrorist financing , as well as certain types of cybercrime; while at the same time entailing significant risks for the fundamental rights of people;


### g. whereas ai applications in use by law enforcement include applications such as facial recognition technologies , automated number plate recognition , speaker identification , speech identification , lip-reading technologies , aural surveillance (i.e. gunshot detection algorithms) , autonomous research and analysis of identified databases , forecasting (predictive policing and crime hotspot analytics) , behaviour detection tools , autonomous tools to identify financial fraud and terrorist financing , social media monitoring (scraping and data harvesting for mining connections) , international mobile subscriber identity (imsi) catchers , and automated surveillance systems incorporating different detection capabilities (such as heartbeat detection and thermal cameras); whereas the aforementioned applications have vastly varying degrees of reliability and accuracy; ### g. whereas ai applications in use by law enforcement include applications such as facial recognition technologies , automated number plate recognition , speaker identification , speech identification , lip-reading technologies , aural surveillance (i.e. gunshot detection algorithms) , autonomous research and analysis of identified databases , forecasting (predictive policing and crime hotspot analytics) , behaviour detection tools , autonomous tools to identify financial fraud and terrorist financing , social media monitoring (scraping and data harvesting for mining connections) , international mobile subscriber identity (imsi) catchers , and automated surveillance systems incorporating different detection capabilities (such as heartbeat detection and thermal cameras); whereas the aforementioned applications have vastly varying degrees of reliability and accuracy as well as potentially significant effects on the protection of fundamental rights;


### i. whereas use of ai in law enforcement entails a number of potential risks , such as opaque decision-making , different types of discrimination , and risks to the protection of privacy and personal data , the protection of freedom of expression and information , and the presumption of innocence; ### i. whereas use of ai in law enforcement entails a number of high risks for the protection of fundamental rights of individuals , such as opaque decision-making , different types of discrimination , and risks to the protection of privacy and personal data , the protection of freedom of expression and information , and the presumption of innocence;


### 7. highlights the power asymmetry between those who develop and employ ai technologies and those who interact and are subject to them; ### 7. highlights the power asymmetry between those who develop and employ ai technologies and those who interact and are subject to them; it is , therefore , essential also to provide for a rule that ensures the transparency of the corporate structures of companies that produce and manage ai systems and institutionalise the principle of independence of the programmers , since it is they who prepare not only the selection of data and information to be processed at the basis of the algorithms , but also the assessment criteria that inform and produce a decision;


### 9. considers it necessary to create a clear and fair regime for assigning legal responsibility for the potential adverse consequences produced by these advanced digital technologies; ### 9. considers it necessary to create a clear and fair regime for assigning legal responsibility for the potential adverse consequences produced by these advanced digital technologies; recognises the challenges to correctly locate the responsibility for potential harm , given the complexity of development and operation of ai systems;


### 10. underlines that in judicial and law enforcement contexts , the final decision always needs to be taken by a human , who can be held accountable for the decisions made , and include the possibility of a recourse for a remedy; ### 10. underlines that in judicial and law enforcement contexts , the final decision always needs to be taken by a human , who can be held accountable for the decisions made , and include the possibility of a recourse for a remedy; reminds that under eu law , automated individual decision making shall not be based on special categories of personal data (personal data revealing racial or ethnic origin , political opinions , religious or philosophical beliefs , or trade union membership , and the processing of genetic data , biometric data for the purpose of uniquely identifying a natural person , data concerning health or data concerning a natural person's sex life or sexual orientation) , unless suitable measures to safeguard the data subject's rights and freedoms and legitimate interests are in place; highlights that eu law prohibits profiling that results in discrimination against natural persons on the basis of special categories of personal data;


### 10. underlines that in judicial and law enforcement contexts , the final decision always needs to be taken by a human , who can be held accountable for the decisions made , and include the possibility of a recourse for a remedy; ### 10. underlines that in judicial and law enforcement contexts , the final decision always needs to be taken by a human , who can be held accountable for the decisions made , and include the possibility of a recourse for a remedy; it is necessary to prevent the use of algorithms – so-called automated decision systems – can replace human minds in final decisions , in order to avoid deterministic approaches and ensure the formation of the free judgment of judicial authorities , and whose decisions must always be justifiable , responsible and free of prejudices;


### 11. calls for algorithmic explainability and transparency in order to ensure that the development , deployment and use of ai systems for judiciary and law enforcement comply with fundamental rights , and are trusted by citizens , as well as in order to ensure that results generated by ai algorithms can be rendered intelligible to users and to those subject to these systems , and that there is transparency on the source data and how the system arrived at a certain conclusion; ### 11. calls for algorithmic explainability and transparency in order to ensure that the development , deployment and use of ai systems for judiciary and law enforcement comply with fundamental rights , and are trusted by citizens , as well as in order to ensure that results generated by ai algorithms can be rendered intelligible to users and to those subject to these systems , and that there is transparency on the source data and how the system arrived at a certain conclusion; on that note , it is necessary to develop specific mandatory rules of conduct for public and private entities responsible for the design and use of ai , to ensure that they adhere to the principles of transparency and clarity relating to the processes for developing mathematical models and predictive algorithms , while complying with the requirement for independent verification of the quality and reliability of the results achieved , in terms of acquiring and assessing evidence - especially circumstantial evidence - beyond all reasonable doubt;


### 13. calls for a compulsory fundamental rights impact assessment to be conducted prior to the implementation or deployment of any ai systems for law enforcement or judiciary , in order to assess any potential risks to fundamental rights; ### 13. reminds that eu law (directive (eu) 2016/680) already foresees a mandatory data protection impact assessment for any type of processing , in particular , using new technologies , that is likely to result in a high risk to the rights and freedoms of natural persons and is of the opinion that this is the case for all ai technologies in the area of law enforcement; calls in addition for a compulsory fundamental rights impact assessment to be conducted prior to the implementation or deployment of any ai systems for law enforcement or judiciary , in order to assess any potential risks to fundamental rights;


### 13. calls for a compulsory fundamental rights impact assessment to be conducted prior to the implementation or deployment of any ai systems for law enforcement or judiciary , in order to assess any potential risks to fundamental rights; ### 13. calls for a compulsory fundamental rights impact assessment to be conducted prior to the implementation or deployment of any ai systems for law enforcement or judiciary , in order to assess any potential risks to fundamental rights; underlines that this could oftentimes be built upon the mandatory data protection impact assessments;


### 15. calls for a moratorium on the deployment of facial recognition systems for law enforcement , until the technical standards can be considered fully fundamental rights compliant , results derived are non-discriminatory , and there is public trust in the necessity and proportionality for the deployment of such technologies; ### 15. calls for a permanent prohibition on the use of facial recognition systems in the public space and in premises meant for education and (health) care and a moratorium on the deployment of facial recognition systems for law enforcement in semi-public spaces , such as airports , until the technical standards can be considered fully fundamental rights compliant , results derived are non-discriminatory , and there is public trust in the necessity and proportionality for the deployment of such technologies;


### 15. calls for a moratorium on the deployment of facial recognition systems for law enforcement , until the technical standards can be considered fully fundamental rights compliant , results derived are non-discriminatory , and there is public trust in the necessity and proportionality for the deployment of such technologies; ### 15. calls for a moratorium on the deployment of facial recognition systems for specific law enforcement operations , until the technical standards can be considered fully fundamental rights compliant , results derived are non-discriminatory , and there is public trust in the necessity and proportionality for the deployment of such technologies; calls for a ban of the use of facial recognition in the public sphere where not used in specific law enforcement operations;


### 1. points out that fundamental rights constitute an objective system of values which ensures that fundamental communication freedoms are not alterable , including by private-law agreements or business terms and conditions; ### 1. points out that fundamental rights constitute an objective and comprehensive system of values and principles , such as the right to privacy of communications , freedom of expression and media freedom and pluralism , and recalls that these freedoms should be respected , including by private-law agreements or business terms and conditions;


### 1. stresses that illegal content online should be tackled with the same rigour as illegal content offline; ### 1. stresses that illegal content online is the same as illegal content offline; takes therefore the position that any legally mandated content moderation measure in the digital services act should concern only illegal content , as it is defined in european or national law , and the legislative text should not include any legally vague and undefined terms , such as “harmful content” , as targeting such content would put fundamental rights and freedom of speech at serious risk and put the service providers in a legally unclear position;


### 1. stresses that illegal content online should be tackled with the same rigour as illegal content offline; ### 1. stresses that illegal content and cyber-enabled crimes , such as child sexual exploitation online , should be tackled with the same rigour as illegal content and behaviour offline;


### — having regard to the charter of fundamental rights of the european union , in particular article 6 , article 7 , article 8 , article 11 , article 13 , article 22 and article 24 thereof , ### — having regard to the charter of fundamental rights of the european union , in particular article 6 , article 7 , article 8 , article 11 , article 13 , article 21 , article 22 , article 23 , article 24 , article 25 and article 26 thereof ,


### c. whereas the amount of user-generated content , including harmful and illegal content , shared via cloud services or online platforms has increased exponentially; ### c. whereas the amount of user-generated content , including harmful and illegal content , such as images depicting child sexual abuse material (csam) online , shared via cloud services or online platforms has increased exponentially at an unprecedented pace;


### c. whereas the amount of user-generated content , including harmful and illegal content , shared via cloud services or online platforms has increased exponentially; ### c. whereas the amount of all types of user-generated content , including illegal content , shared via cloud services or online platforms has increased exponentially;


### e. whereas the political approach to tackle harmful and illegal content online in the eu has mainly focused on voluntary cooperation thus far , but a growing number of member states are adopting national legislation to address illegal content; ### e. whereas the approach to tackle illegal content online in the eu is based on court order mandated takedowns , but a growing number of member states are adopting further national legislation to address illegal content;


### f. whereas some forms of harmful content may be legal , yet detrimental to society or democracy , with examples such as opaque political advertising and disinformation on covid-19 causes and remedies; ### f. whereas some harmful content may be detrimental to society or democracy , yet be legal , with examples such as opaque political advertising and disinformation on covid-19 causes and remedies;


### g. whereas a pure self-regulatory approach of platforms does not provide adequate transparency to public authorities , civil society and users on how platforms address illegal and harmful content; whereas such an approach does not guarantee compliance with fundamental rights; ### g. whereas a pure self-regulatory approach of platforms does not provide legitimacy or adequate transparency and proper information to public authorities , civil society and users on how platforms address illegal content and content that is deleted against violations of terms and conditions; whereas such an approach does not guarantee compliance with fundamental rights and creates a risk of excessive interference with the right of freedom of expression and creates a problematic situation where law enforcement responsibilities are handed over to private parties;


### h. whereas regulatory oversight and supervision of platforms lacks horizontal coordination between the different oversight bodies across the eu; ### h. whereas regulatory oversight and supervision is sector-specific in the eu; whereas further and more comprehensive coordination between the different oversight bodies across the eu would be beneficial;


### i. whereas the absence of uniform and transparent rules for procedural safeguards across the eu is a key obstacle for persons affected by illegal content online and content providers seeking to exercise their rights; ### deleted


### j. whereas the lack of robust public data on the prevalence and removal of illegal and harmful content online creates a deficit of accountability; ### j. whereas the lack of comparable , robust public data on the prevalence and both court mandated and self-regulatory removal of illegal and harmful content online creates a deficit of transparency and accountability;


### k. whereas child sexual exploitation online is shaped by technological developments; whereas the vast amount of child sexual abuse material circulating online poses serious challenges for detection , investigation and , most of all , victim identification efforts; ### k. whereas child sexual exploitation online is one of the forms of illegal content shaped by technological developments; whereas the vast amount of child sexual abuse material circulating online poses serious challenges for detection , investigation and , most of all , victim identification efforts;


### l. whereas according to the court of justice of the european union (cjeu) , jurisprudence host providers may have recourse to automated search tools and technologies to assess if content is equivalent to content previously declared unlawful , and should thus be removed following an order from a member state; ### l. whereas according to the court of justice of the european union (cjeu) , jurisprudence host providers may have recourse to automated search tools and technologies to assess if content is equivalent to content previously declared unlawful , as long as it does not result in monitoring generally the information which it stores , or in actively seeking facts or circumstances indicating illegal activity , as provided for in article 15(1) of directive 2000/31; whereas such content should be removed following a court order from a member state;


### 2. believes in the clear economic benefits of a functioning digital single market for the eu and its member states; stresses the important obligation to ensure a fair digital ecosystem in which fundamental rights and data protection are respected; calls for a minimum level of intervention based on the principles of necessity and proportionality; ### 2. emphasises that the rapid development of digital services requires a strong futureproof legislative framework to protect personal data and privacy; stresses therefore in this regard that all digital services need to fully respect union data protection law , namely regulation (eu) 2016/679 of the european parliament and of the council (gdpr)1a and directive (ec) 2002/58 of the european parliament and of the council (eprivacy1a currently under revision , the freedom of expression and non-discrimination;