### 11. recalls parliament’s important role as a democratic , convening institution that can provide a unique public forum to promote multilateralism; considers that parliament should regularly invite high-level leaders from relevant international organisations to discuss shared interests and priorities; believes that to reinforce the parliamentary dimension of multilateral fora , parliament should host on its premises , on an annual basis , a conference of speakers from g7 and g20 countries; calls for the reinforcement of structured dialogue between parliament and the un system; stresses , in this regard , the importance of holding regular meetings to exchange views between the committee on foreign affairs and the heads of the eu delegations to the un in new york and geneva and between the committee and the heads of mission of the eu member states that are either permanent or rotating members of the un security council; highlights the positive contributions of the annual delegations from the committee on foreign affairs and its sub-committees to the un headquarters in new york; calls for the formalisation of some of the informal sessions between the eu and the un security council; encourages the setting up of a formal association between parliament and the un general assembly; ### 11. recalls parliament’s important role as a democratic , convening institution that can provide a unique public forum to promote multilateralism; considers that parliament should regularly invite high-level leaders from relevant international organisations to discuss shared interests and priorities; believes that to reinforce the parliamentary dimension of multilateral fora , parliament should host on its premises , on an annual basis , a conference of speakers from g7 and g20 countries; calls for the reinforcement of structured dialogue between parliament and the un system; stresses , in this regard , the importance of holding regular meetings to exchange views between the committee on foreign affairs and other relevant committees and the heads of the eu delegations to the un in new york and geneva and between the committee and the heads of mission of the eu member states that are either permanent or rotating members of the un security council; highlights the positive contributions of the annual delegations from the committee on foreign affairs and its sub-committees to the un headquarters in new york; calls for the formalisation of some of the informal sessions between the eu and the un security council; encourages the setting up of a formal association between parliament and the un general assembly;


### 12. highlights the crucial contribution of the multilateral system in addressing the climate emergency; calls for the further enhancement , reinforcement and institutionalisation of the existing multilateral frameworks that seek to combat climate change , such as the un climate change conferences and the paris agreement , which have almost universal membership , through the establishment of accountability mechanisms and concrete principles to ensure the effectiveness of their mandates; stresses the need to reinforce global action against climate change , as only through collective , immediate and ambitious global action may the world be able to limit the temperature increase to 1 ,5 degrees centigrade above pre-industrial levels; recalls the importance of focusing on the implementation at the national level by adopting and implementing nationally determined contributions (ndcs) , while at the same time ensuring that the international community is collectively on track to meet the goals of the paris agreement at the multilateral level; recalls the importance of working closely with major emitters , climate-vulnerable countries and transatlantic partners to deliver progress on the 2030 target at the 2022 un climate change conference; ### 12. highlights the crucial contribution of the multilateral system in addressing the climate emergency; calls for the further enhancement , reinforcement and institutionalisation of the existing multilateral frameworks that seek to combat climate change , such as the un climate change conferences and the paris agreement , which have almost universal membership , through the establishment of accountability mechanisms and concrete principles to ensure the effectiveness of their mandates; stresses the need to reinforce global action against climate change , as only through collective , immediate and ambitious global action may the world be able to limit the temperature increase to 1 ,5 degrees centigrade above pre-industrial levels; believes that in the fight against global warming industrialised countries should support developing countries in the shift from fossil fuels to green energy , by transferring not only funding but also expertise and technology; recalls the importance of focusing on the implementation at the national level by adopting and implementing nationally determined contributions (ndcs) , while at the same time ensuring that the international community is collectively on track to meet the goals of the paris agreement at the multilateral level; recalls the importance of working closely with major emitters , climate-vulnerable countries and transatlantic partners to deliver progress on the 2030 target at the 2022 un climate change conference;


### 12. highlights the crucial contribution of the multilateral system in addressing the climate emergency; calls for the further enhancement , reinforcement and institutionalisation of the existing multilateral frameworks that seek to combat climate change , such as the un climate change conferences and the paris agreement , which have almost universal membership , through the establishment of accountability mechanisms and concrete principles to ensure the effectiveness of their mandates; stresses the need to reinforce global action against climate change , as only through collective , immediate and ambitious global action may the world be able to limit the temperature increase to 1 ,5 degrees centigrade above pre-industrial levels; recalls the importance of focusing on the implementation at the national level by adopting and implementing nationally determined contributions (ndcs) , while at the same time ensuring that the international community is collectively on track to meet the goals of the paris agreement at the multilateral level; recalls the importance of working closely with major emitters , climate-vulnerable countries and transatlantic partners to deliver progress on the 2030 target at the 2022 un climate change conference; ### 12. highlights the crucial contribution of the multilateral system in addressing the climate emergency; calls for the further enhancement , reinforcement and institutionalisation of the existing multilateral frameworks that seek to combat climate change , such as the un climate change conferences and the paris agreement , which have almost universal membership , through the establishment of accountability mechanisms and concrete principles to ensure the effectiveness of their mandates; stresses the need to reinforce global action against climate change , as only through collective , immediate and ambitious global action may the world be able to limit the temperature increase to 1 ,5 degrees centigrade above pre-industrial levels; recalls the importance of focusing on the implementation at the national level by adopting and implementing nationally determined contributions (ndcs) , while at the same time ensuring that the international community is collectively on track to meet the goals of the paris agreement at the multilateral level; recalls the importance of working closely with major emitters , climate-vulnerable countries and transatlantic partners to deliver progress on the 2030 target at the 2022 un climate change conference; calls for continuing multilateral efforts to mobilise finance for the sdgs and climate , including dedicating 50% of climate finance to adaptation;


### 13. recalls the key role of multilateral fora in addressing the challenges of the covid-19 pandemic and highlights this as an example of their importance in promoting and protecting global public health; celebrates the development of the covax initiative , which constitutes an unprecedented exercise of international solidarity , and thanks its donors and contributors , while stressing the need to continue donating and increasing resources in order to make vaccines and treatments available for free to all countries; commends the work of the world health organization in combating the pandemic through its decisions based on scientific knowledge and evidence and stresses the need to enhance its mandate and executive capacity , especially with regard to data sharing and resource mobilisation , as well as reform the decision-making process of its emergency committee and establish enforcement mechanisms for its decisions and precepts; ### 13. recalls the key role of multilateral fora in addressing the challenges of the covid-19 pandemic and highlights this as an example of their importance in promoting and protecting global public health; celebrates the development of the covax initiative , which constitutes an unprecedented exercise of international solidarity , and thanks its donors and contributors , while stressing the need to continue donating and increasing resources in order to make vaccines and treatments available for free to all countries; commends the work of the world health organization in combating the pandemic through its decisions based on scientific knowledge and evidence and stresses the need to enhance its mandate and executive capacity , especially with regard to data sharing and resource mobilisation , as well as reform the decision-making process of its emergency committee and establish enforcement mechanisms for its decisions and precepts; welcomes the start of the works on a new international treaty on pandemics , following the adoption of a decision on may 31st 2021 by the totality of the 194 who members;


### 14. stresses the need for further multilateral action in economic governance , especially in regards to taxation; celebrates the direction set up by the g20 in their latest proposal for establishing a minimum corporate tax rate of 15 %; encourages the international community to further integration in this area in order to avoid disloyal practices and abuses; calls for the enlargement of international standards and norms in this policy area; recalls the key importance of the world trade organization in regulating and facilitating world trade; ### 14. stresses the need for further multilateral action in economic governance , especially in regards to taxation; celebrates the direction set up by the g20/inclusive framework in their latest proposal for establishing a minimum corporate tax rate of 15% and the future pillar allowing for a fairer reallocation of taxation rights; supports the commission’s intention to propose an own resource equivalent to 15% of the share of the residual profits of the largest and most profitable multinational enterprises that are reallocated to eu member states under this agreement; encourages the international community to further integration in this area in order to avoid disloyal practices and abuses; calls for the enlargement of international standards and norms in this policy area; welcomes the fact that more than 130 countries are members of the inclusive framework on base erosion and profit shifting , whose work is managed by the organisation for economic cooperation and development; reminds , however , that the un would be a more inclusive forum for discussions and negotiations on international taxation; recalls the key importance of the world trade organization in regulating and facilitating world trade;


### 15. calls for extending multilateralism to new challenges and realities such as biodiversity , cybersecurity , biotechnology and artificial intelligence , which need to be developed alongside experts and scientists who should be party to multilateral , multi-stakeholder arrangements; ### 15. calls for extending multilateralism to new challenges and realities such as biodiversity , cybersecurity , biotechnology and artificial intelligence , which need to be developed alongside experts and scientists who should be party to multilateral , multi-stakeholder arrangements; welcomes the efforts of the un secretary general to enhance and coordinate the digitalisation of the united nations , so that the internet serves the pillars of the un: peace and security , human rights and development;


### e. whereas multilateralism is in need of swift revitalisation to tackle this multidimensional crisis; whereas peace and security , climate change , global public health and the deepening of poverty and inequalities at the global level are some of the pressing challenges that the world is facing right now; whereas only through a reinforced multilateral order will the international community be able to find lasting and sustainable answers to these challenges; ### e. whereas multilateralism is in need of swift revitalisation to tackle this multidimensional crisis; whereas peace and security , climate change and environmental degradation , disaster risk management , global public health and the deepening of poverty and inequalities at the global level are some of the pressing challenges that the world is facing right now; whereas only through a reinforced multilateral order will the international community be able to find lasting and sustainable answers to these challenges;


### h. whereas the un secretary-general’s report entitled ‘our common agenda’ , which was presented to the un general assembly in september 2021 and drafted through a wide-ranging consultation process including un member states , thought leaders , young people , civil society , relevant stakeholders and citizens , as well as the un system and its many partners , attests to the need for a more effective , inclusive and networked multilateralism for the future; whereas this will be essential for the un system and other multilateral fora in order to continue being an effective venue for global consultation and decision-making; whereas , in this context , the eu is uniquely positioned to support the un and other relevant international organisations in pursuing a process of reform and in revitalising their delivery capacity and their ability to connect to relevant stakeholders , such as young people or the communities most impacted by climate change; whereas in doing so the eu should seize the opportunity to engage constructively and effectively with rival powers , while maintaining a firm stance on fundamental rights and pursuing closer cooperation with like-minded countries to reinforce the primacy of universal values and fundamental rights and to advance effective solutions to global challenges; whereas parliamentary diplomacy will be a key component of reinforcing rules-based , inclusive , networked and effective multilateralism; ### h. whereas the un secretary-general’s report entitled ‘our common agenda’ , which was presented to the un general assembly in september 2021 and drafted through a wide-ranging consultation process including un member states , thought leaders , young people , civil society , relevant stakeholders and citizens , as well as the un system and its many partners , attests to the need for a more effective , inclusive and networked multilateralism for the future; whereas this will be essential for the un system and other multilateral fora in order to continue being an effective venue for global consultation and decision-making; whereas , in this context , the eu is uniquely positioned to support the un and other relevant international organisations in pursuing a process of reform and in revitalising their delivery capacity and their ability to connect to relevant stakeholders , such as young people or the communities most impacted by climate change; whereas in doing so the eu should seize the opportunity to engage constructively and effectively with rival powers , while maintaining a firm stance on fundamental rights and pursuing closer cooperation with like-minded countries to reinforce the primacy of universal values and fundamental rights and to advance effective solutions to global challenges; whereas parliamentary diplomacy will be a key component of reinforcing rules-based , inclusive , networked and effective multilateralism; whereas the eu and the un continue to work closely in over 170 countries to improve the protection of human rights for all , reduce hunger and malnutrition , prevent and overcome crises , build democratic and inclusive societies , deliver essential services , promote green growth and decent jobs , and ensure the sustainable management of natural resources;


### h. whereas the un secretary-general’s report entitled ‘our common agenda’ , which was presented to the un general assembly in september 2021 and drafted through a wide-ranging consultation process including un member states , thought leaders , young people , civil society , relevant stakeholders and citizens , as well as the un system and its many partners , attests to the need for a more effective , inclusive and networked multilateralism for the future; whereas this will be essential for the un system and other multilateral fora in order to continue being an effective venue for global consultation and decision-making; whereas , in this context , the eu is uniquely positioned to support the un and other relevant international organisations in pursuing a process of reform and in revitalising their delivery capacity and their ability to connect to relevant stakeholders , such as young people or the communities most impacted by climate change; whereas in doing so the eu should seize the opportunity to engage constructively and effectively with rival powers , while maintaining a firm stance on fundamental rights and pursuing closer cooperation with like-minded countries to reinforce the primacy of universal values and fundamental rights and to advance effective solutions to global challenges; whereas parliamentary diplomacy will be a key component of reinforcing rules-based , inclusive , networked and effective multilateralism; ### h. whereas the un secretary-general’s report entitled ‘our common agenda’ , which was presented to the un general assembly in september 2021 and welcomed by the general assembly in november 2021 , and drafted through a wide-ranging consultation process including un member states , thought leaders , young people , civil society , relevant stakeholders and citizens , as well as the un system and its many partners , attests to the need for a more effective , inclusive and networked multilateralism for the future; whereas this will be essential for the un system and other multilateral fora in order to continue being an effective venue for global consultation and decision-making; whereas , in this context , the eu is uniquely positioned to support the un and other relevant international organisations in pursuing a process of reform and in revitalising their delivery capacity and their ability to connect to relevant stakeholders , such as young people or the communities most impacted by climate change; whereas in doing so the eu should seize the opportunity to engage constructively and effectively with rival powers , while maintaining a firm stance on fundamental rights and pursuing closer cooperation with like-minded countries to reinforce the primacy of universal values and fundamental rights and to advance effective solutions to global challenges; whereas parliamentary diplomacy will be a key component of reinforcing rules-based , inclusive , networked and effective multilateralism;


### i. whereas the new ‘global europe – neighbourhood , development and international cooperation instrument’ (global europe financial instrument) , combined with the ‘team europe’ approach confers on the eu and its member states an ability to pull resources together in a synergic way and to better coordinate assistance and create positive impact in the external action of the eu; whereas the new global europe financial instrument provides for high-level political dialogue between the commission , the european external action service (eeas) and parliament on programming priorities with the opportunity for parliament to reconnect this policy and programming dialogue to its political outreach and consultations with third countries , thus reinforcing , through its parliamentary diplomacy activities and outreach , the ability of the eu to assist and positively impact relevant third countries; ### i. whereas the new ‘global europe – neighbourhood , development and international cooperation instrument’ (global europe financial instrument) , combined with the ‘team europe’ approach confers on the eu and its member states an ability to pull resources together in a synergic way and to better coordinate assistance and create positive impact in the external action of the eu , including with a continued and strengthened cooperation with the un on the ground; whereas the new global europe financial instrument provides for high-level political dialogue between the commission , the european external action service (eeas) and parliament on programming priorities with the opportunity for parliament to reconnect this policy and programming dialogue to its political outreach and consultations with third countries , thus reinforcing , through its parliamentary diplomacy activities and outreach , the ability of the eu to assist and positively impact relevant third countries;


### 1. welcomes the joint communication by the commission and the vp/hr to parliament and the council on strengthening the eu’s contribution to rules-based multilateralism; considers that this communication contributes very directly to and further advances the reflection on the direction of the eu’s foreign policy from its important , but more general commitment to effective multilateralism as defined in the 2003 european security strategy to the realisation of the need to combine the value and objective of effective multilateralism with principled pragmatism and the need to promote and preserve the eu’s interests and values , as laid out in the 2016 global strategy for the eu’s foreign and security policy; concurs with the commission and the vp/hr on the need for the eu to be more assertive in pursuing its interests and in advancing the universal values in which it believes and , therefore , concurs on the need for the eu to defend and strengthen multilateralism as a means to ensuring a level playing field for the international community , providing a platform for inclusive policy dialogue , cooperation and convergence and achieving policy responses supported by the international community at large and which can truly deliver; points to the eu’s ability to devise very efficient and inclusive regulatory standards for its single market and takes the view that the eu should also seek to promote such standards in the framework of its external action as a paradigm and contribution to the discussion on effective global regulatory standards; ### 1. welcomes the joint communication by the commission and the vp/hr to parliament and the council on strengthening the eu’s contribution to rules-based multilateralism; considers that this communication contributes very directly to and further advances the reflection on the direction of the eu’s foreign policy from its important , but more general commitment to effective multilateralism as defined in the 2003 european security strategy to the realisation of the need to combine the value and objective of effective multilateralism with principled pragmatism and the need to promote and preserve the eu’s interests and values , as laid out in the 2016 global strategy for the eu’s foreign and security policy; concurs with the commission and the vp/hr on the need for the eu to be more assertive in pursuing its interests and in advancing the universal values in which it believes and , therefore , concurs on the need for the eu to defend and strengthen multilateralism as a means to ensuring a level playing field for the international community , providing a platform for inclusive policy dialogue , cooperation and convergence and achieving policy responses supported by the international community at large and which can truly deliver; highlights the paramount importance for the eu to strengthen its external action and diplomacy toolbox with its own autonomous instruments , increasing its capacity to be a global actor and “speak with one voice” in order to better defend multilateralism , including the creation of an european diplomatic academy as the european parliament has recently called for; reiterates its call to include the “new european bauhaus” as a new instrument in the eu’s external action toolbox and as a useful cultural and public diplomatic tool , which are fundamental to promote a values-based multilateral order and the strengthening of international partnerships; points to the eu’s ability to devise very efficient and inclusive regulatory standards for its single market and takes the view that the eu should also seek to promote such standards in the framework of its external action as a paradigm and contribution to the discussion on effective global regulatory standards;


### 2. reiterates its strongest support for the programme of reforms introduced by un secretary-general antónio guterres; stresses the importance of a un system that can continue to deliver effectively; points to the value of the ‘one un’ vision of the un secretary-general for the un system , where the various agencies and components of the un can truly be interlinked and function together on the basis of a single budgetary and managerial structure and can reinforce the attainment of the un’s objectives; points , in particular , to the enhanced role of the un resident coordinators provided for by the reform of the un development system and considers that these un resident coordinators should not only take the lead in coordinating the implementation of un programmes on the ground to reinforce the unity of un action , but should also liaise and consult closely with eu delegations in the relevant un member state to pursue synergies and mutual reinforcement with the eu’s thematic and geographic programmes for that country; recalls that the eu can greatly reinforce the outreach and impact of un programmes in third countries and can define its programming and assistance in synergic and reinforcing fashion in conjunction with the objectives of the un; stresses , therefore , the value of close eu-un consultation and cooperation and invites the un to regularly consult with the eu at un headquarters , but also on the ground in third countries; takes the view that the eu and the un should hold annual summits with the possibility for the un secretary-general to confer with council , commission , eeas and parliament; calls on the un to ensure a steady presence of high-level un interlocutors at the european parliament to further policy dialogue and give enhanced visibility to un efforts; ### 2. reiterates its strongest support for the programme of reforms introduced by un secretary-general antónio guterres; stresses the importance of a un system that can continue to deliver effectively; points to the value of the ‘one un’ vision of the un secretary-general for the un system , where the various agencies and components of the un can truly be interlinked and function together on the basis of a single budgetary and managerial structure and can reinforce the attainment of the un’s objectives; points , in particular , to the enhanced role of the un resident coordinators provided for by the reform of the un development system and considers that these un resident coordinators should not only take the lead in coordinating the implementation of un programmes on the ground to reinforce the unity of un action , but should also liaise and consult closely with eu delegations in the relevant un member state to pursue synergies and mutual reinforcement with the eu’s thematic and geographic programmes for that country; recalls that the eu can greatly reinforce the outreach and impact of un programmes in third countries and can define its programming and assistance in synergic and reinforcing fashion in conjunction with the objectives of the un; stresses , therefore , the value of close eu-un consultation and cooperation and invites the un to regularly consult with the eu at un headquarters , but also on the ground in third countries; takes the view that the eu and the un should hold annual summits with the possibility for the un secretary-general to confer with council , commission , eeas and parliament; calls on the un to ensure a steady presence of high-level un interlocutors at the european parliament to further policy dialogue and give enhanced visibility to un efforts; highlights the need to improve the political functioning of the un , calling for a stronger interface between un and regional organisations as underlined by united nations secretary-general guterres; highlights the need to strengthen the coordination of un agencies with international financial institutions through the un economic and social council (ecosoc); supports un secretary-general guterres’ proposals to give young people and civil society stronger voices within the un system;


### 2. reiterates its strongest support for the programme of reforms introduced by un secretary-general antónio guterres; stresses the importance of a un system that can continue to deliver effectively; points to the value of the ‘one un’ vision of the un secretary-general for the un system , where the various agencies and components of the un can truly be interlinked and function together on the basis of a single budgetary and managerial structure and can reinforce the attainment of the un’s objectives; points , in particular , to the enhanced role of the un resident coordinators provided for by the reform of the un development system and considers that these un resident coordinators should not only take the lead in coordinating the implementation of un programmes on the ground to reinforce the unity of un action , but should also liaise and consult closely with eu delegations in the relevant un member state to pursue synergies and mutual reinforcement with the eu’s thematic and geographic programmes for that country; recalls that the eu can greatly reinforce the outreach and impact of un programmes in third countries and can define its programming and assistance in synergic and reinforcing fashion in conjunction with the objectives of the un; stresses , therefore , the value of close eu-un consultation and cooperation and invites the un to regularly consult with the eu at un headquarters , but also on the ground in third countries; takes the view that the eu and the un should hold annual summits with the possibility for the un secretary-general to confer with council , commission , eeas and parliament; calls on the un to ensure a steady presence of high-level un interlocutors at the european parliament to further policy dialogue and give enhanced visibility to un efforts; ### 2. reiterates its strongest support for the programme of reforms introduced by un secretary-general antónio guterres; stresses the importance of a un system that can continue to deliver effectively; points to the value of the ‘one un’ vision of the un secretary-general for the un system , where the various agencies and components of the un can truly be interlinked and function together on the basis of a single budgetary and managerial structure and can reinforce the attainment of the un’s objectives; points , in particular , to the enhanced role of the un resident coordinators provided for by the reform of the un development system and considers that these un resident coordinators should not only take the lead in coordinating the implementation of un programmes on the ground to reinforce the unity of un action , but should also liaise and consult closely with eu delegations in the relevant un member state to pursue synergies and mutual reinforcement with the eu’s thematic and geographic programmes for that country; recalls that the eu can greatly reinforce the outreach and impact of un programmes in third countries and can define its programming and assistance in synergic and reinforcing fashion in conjunction with the objectives of the un; stresses , therefore , the value of close eu-un consultation and cooperation and invites the commission and the eeas as well as eu delegations in third countries to actively reach out and consult the un regarding eu policy and programmatic activities for 2021-2027 and beyond , and the un to regularly consult with the eu at un headquarters , but also on the ground in third countries; takes the view that the eu and the un should hold annual summits with the possibility for the un secretary-general to confer with council , commission , eeas and parliament; calls on the un to ensure a steady presence of high-level un interlocutors at the european parliament to further policy dialogue and give enhanced visibility to un efforts;


### 2. reiterates its strongest support for the programme of reforms introduced by un secretary-general antónio guterres; stresses the importance of a un system that can continue to deliver effectively; points to the value of the ‘one un’ vision of the un secretary-general for the un system , where the various agencies and components of the un can truly be interlinked and function together on the basis of a single budgetary and managerial structure and can reinforce the attainment of the un’s objectives; points , in particular , to the enhanced role of the un resident coordinators provided for by the reform of the un development system and considers that these un resident coordinators should not only take the lead in coordinating the implementation of un programmes on the ground to reinforce the unity of un action , but should also liaise and consult closely with eu delegations in the relevant un member state to pursue synergies and mutual reinforcement with the eu’s thematic and geographic programmes for that country; recalls that the eu can greatly reinforce the outreach and impact of un programmes in third countries and can define its programming and assistance in synergic and reinforcing fashion in conjunction with the objectives of the un; stresses , therefore , the value of close eu-un consultation and cooperation and invites the un to regularly consult with the eu at un headquarters , but also on the ground in third countries; takes the view that the eu and the un should hold annual summits with the possibility for the un secretary-general to confer with council , commission , eeas and parliament; calls on the un to ensure a steady presence of high-level un interlocutors at the european parliament to further policy dialogue and give enhanced visibility to un efforts; ### 2. reiterates its strongest support for the programme of reforms introduced by un secretary-general antónio guterres; stresses the importance of a un system that can continue to deliver effectively; points to the value of the ‘one un’ vision of the un secretary-general for the un system , where the various agencies and components of the un can truly be interlinked and function together on the basis of a single budgetary and managerial structure and can reinforce the attainment of the un’s objectives; points , in particular , to the enhanced role of the un resident coordinators provided for by the reform of the un development system and considers that these un resident coordinators should not only take the lead in coordinating the implementation of un programmes on the ground to reinforce the unity of un action , but should also liaise and consult closely with eu delegations in the relevant un member state to pursue synergies and mutual reinforcement with the eu’s thematic and geographic programmes for that country; reaffirms that the eu and the un should work closely at hq level and in the regions and countries to exchange analysis , and align policy and programmatic planning to maximise impact on the wellbeing of people and planet; recalls that the eu can greatly reinforce the outreach and impact of un programmes in third countries and can define its programming and assistance in synergic and reinforcing fashion in conjunction with the objectives of the un; stresses , therefore , the value of close eu-un consultation and cooperation and invites the un to regularly consult with the eu at un headquarters , but also on the ground in third countries; takes the view that the eu and the un should hold annual summits with the possibility for the un secretary-general to confer with council , commission , eeas and parliament; calls on the un to ensure a steady presence of high-level un interlocutors at the european parliament to further policy dialogue and give enhanced visibility to un efforts;


### 2. reiterates its strongest support for the programme of reforms introduced by un secretary-general antónio guterres; stresses the importance of a un system that can continue to deliver effectively; points to the value of the ‘one un’ vision of the un secretary-general for the un system , where the various agencies and components of the un can truly be interlinked and function together on the basis of a single budgetary and managerial structure and can reinforce the attainment of the un’s objectives; points , in particular , to the enhanced role of the un resident coordinators provided for by the reform of the un development system and considers that these un resident coordinators should not only take the lead in coordinating the implementation of un programmes on the ground to reinforce the unity of un action , but should also liaise and consult closely with eu delegations in the relevant un member state to pursue synergies and mutual reinforcement with the eu’s thematic and geographic programmes for that country; recalls that the eu can greatly reinforce the outreach and impact of un programmes in third countries and can define its programming and assistance in synergic and reinforcing fashion in conjunction with the objectives of the un; stresses , therefore , the value of close eu-un consultation and cooperation and invites the un to regularly consult with the eu at un headquarters , but also on the ground in third countries; takes the view that the eu and the un should hold annual summits with the possibility for the un secretary-general to confer with council , commission , eeas and parliament; calls on the un to ensure a steady presence of high-level un interlocutors at the european parliament to further policy dialogue and give enhanced visibility to un efforts; ### 2. reiterates its strongest support for the programme of reforms introduced by un secretary-general antónio guterres; stresses the importance of a un system that can continue to deliver effectively; points to the value of the ‘one un’ vision of the un secretary-general for the un system , where the various agencies and components of the un can truly be interlinked and function together on the basis of a single budgetary and managerial structure and can reinforce the attainment of the un’s objectives; points , in particular , to the enhanced role of the un resident coordinators , currently operating in more than 130 countries , provided for by the reform of the un development system and considers that these un resident coordinators should not only take the lead in coordinating the implementation of un programmes on the ground to reinforce the unity of un action , but should also liaise and consult closely with eu delegations in the relevant un member state to pursue synergies and mutual reinforcement with the eu’s thematic and geographic programmes for that country; recalls that the eu can greatly reinforce the outreach and impact of un programmes in third countries and can define its programming and assistance in synergic and reinforcing fashion in conjunction with the objectives of the un; stresses , therefore , the value of close eu-un consultation and cooperation and invites the un to regularly consult with the eu at un headquarters , but also on the ground in third countries; takes the view that the eu and the un should hold annual summits with the possibility for the un secretary-general to confer with council , commission , eeas and parliament; calls on the un to ensure a steady presence of high-level un interlocutors at the european parliament to further policy dialogue and give enhanced visibility to un efforts;


### — having regard to the action plan entitled ‘strategic compass for security and defence – for a european union that protects its citizens , values and interests and contributes to international peace and security’ , which was approved by the council on 21 march 2022 and endorsed by the european council on 25 march 2022 , ### — having regard to the ‘strategic compass for security and defence – for a european union that protects its citizens , values and interests and contributes to international peace and security’ , which was adopted by the council on 21 march 2022 and endorsed by the european council on 25 march 2022 ,


### — having regard to the response force of the north atlantic treaty organization (nato) , ### — having regard to the north atlantic treaty organization (nato) response force (nrf) ,


### a. whereas the european union has extensive experience in deploying multinational missions abroad in order to promote peace , security and progress in europe and in the world; whereas these common security and defence policy (csdp) missions regularly operate alongside and complement missions of the member states , united nations , international organisations and third countries; ### a. whereas the european union has extensive experience in deploying multinational missions abroad in order to promote peace , security and progress in europe and in the world; whereas these common security and defence policy (csdp) missions regularly operate alongside and complement missions of the member states , united nations , international organisations and third countries; whereas the simultaneous presence of various actors as well as missions and operations in one conflict area underlines the importance of coordination and division of labour with a view to improving coherence and effectiveness of efforts;


### a. whereas the european union has extensive experience in deploying multinational missions abroad in order to promote peace , security and progress in europe and in the world; whereas these common security and defence policy (csdp) missions regularly operate alongside and complement missions of the member states , united nations , international organisations and third countries; ### a. whereas the european union has extensive experience in deploying multinational missions abroad in order to promote peace , security and progress in europe and in the world; whereas these common security and defence policy (csdp) missions regularly operate alongside and complement missions of the member states , united nations , nato , international organisations and third countries;


### a. whereas the european union has extensive experience in deploying multinational missions abroad in order to promote peace , security and progress in europe and in the world; whereas these common security and defence policy (csdp) missions regularly operate alongside and complement missions of the member states , united nations , international organisations and third countries; ### a. whereas the european union has extensive experience in deploying missions and operations abroad in order to promote peace , security and progress in europe and in the world; whereas these common security and defence policy (csdp) missions regularly operate alongside and complement missions of the member states , united nations , international organisations and third countries;


### a. whereas the european union has extensive experience in deploying multinational missions abroad in order to promote peace , security and progress in europe and in the world; whereas these common security and defence policy (csdp) missions regularly operate alongside and complement missions of the member states , united nations , international organisations and third countries; ### a. whereas the european union has extensive experience in deploying multinational missions abroad to promote peace , security and progress in europe and in the world; whereas these common security and defence policy (csdp) missions regularly operate alongside and complement missions of the member states , united nations and other international organisations and third countries;


### b. whereas csdp missions regularly depend on the effective performance of third-party missions , reliable cooperation , timely information sharing and sincere host nation support; whereas the lack of any of these can jeopardise the implementation of a csdp mission’s mandate and could ultimately lead to the withdrawal of eu forces; ### b. whereas csdp missions regularly depend on the effective performance of third-party missions , reliable cooperation , timely information sharing and sincere host nation support and ownership; whereas the lack of any of these can jeopardise the implementation of a csdp mission’s mandate and could ultimately lead to the withdrawal of eu forces; whereas mandates should set clearly defined objectives for eu missions and operations , including a timetable for their attainment , as well as a comprehensive exit strategy;


### c. whereas the premature termination of csdp missions leaves populations unprotected and makes weak host nation authorities vulnerable , thereby opening up opportunities for state and non-state actors , including terrorists and extremists , and including those sponsored by our global competitors; ### c. whereas the premature termination of csdp missions leaves populations unprotected and makes weak host nation authorities vulnerable , thereby opening up opportunities for state and non-state actors , including terrorists and extremists , and including those sponsored by our global competitors; whereas consideration for controlled phasing out of missions and operations or for transfer to other eu instruments is therefore crucial for the achievement of sustainable and comprehensive results in host countries;


### d. whereas the european union and its member states should strive for autonomy when preparing , conducting and sustaining their csdp missions; whereas the union should be capable of rapidly deploying multidimensional forces , swiftly reinforcing them where needed and sustaining them as long as required and without depending on third-party support; ### d. whereas the european union and its member states should strive for autonomy when preparing , conducting and sustaining their csdp missions; whereas the union should be capable of rapidly deploying multidimensional and modular forces , swiftly reinforcing them where needed and sustaining them as long as required and without depending on third-party support;


### g. whereas building capabilities and adapting them to military needs requires solutions to be developed and combined in doctrine and concepts , the organisation and structure of forces , individual , collective and multinational training , defence materiel development , procurement and life-cycle management , military leadership development , staff recruitment and development , defence infrastructures , installations and facilities , interoperability and standardisation; ### g. whereas building capabilities and adapting them to military needs requires a common strategic culture and threat perception as well as solutions to be developed and combined in doctrine and concepts , the organisation and structure of forces , regular individual , collective and multinational training , defence materiel development , procurement and life-cycle management , military leadership development , staff recruitment and development , defence infrastructures , installations and facilities , interoperability and standardisation;


### h. whereas the strategic compass sets out eu-level action in many of these areas; whereas the european defence fund and the european peace facility are eu instruments which have already been deployed and that are designed to improve military capabilities and foster operational cooperation and burden-sharing abroad; ### h. whereas the strategic compass sets out eu-level action in many of these areas;


### i. whereas the battlegroup concept has helped develop multinational defence cooperation and interoperability , as well as transformation for rapid deployment and force modernisation; ### i. whereas the battlegroup concept has helped develop multinational defence cooperation and interoperability , as well as transformation for rapid deployment and force modernisation , yet , despite these benefits , the non-use of this asset over a period of 15 years has been politically embarrassing given the eu’s aspirations in this area , and raises questions over the justifiability of its costs;


### j. whereas in cases when eu battlegroups have not been used , individual eu member states have often acted outside the eu framework instead , either on their own or with other eu or non-eu states; ### j. whereas in cases when eu battlegroups have not been used , individual eu member states have often acted outside the eu framework instead , either on their own or with other eu or non-eu states , inevitably constraining , if not undermining , the eu’s stated aspiration for ‘integration’ across policy tools , institutions and actors in pursuit of common interests and values also in foreign policy , and also excluding both formal and informal democratic oversight and scrutiny through the european parliament;


### j. whereas in cases when eu battlegroups have not been used , individual eu member states have often acted outside the eu framework instead , either on their own or with other eu or non-eu states; ### j. whereas in cases when eu battlegroups have not been deployed , individual eu member states have occasionally acted outside the eu framework instead , either on their own or with other eu or non-eu states;


### k. whereas the integrated approach is also meant to prioritise prevention and promote the human security of local populations over narrow self-interests; ### k. whereas a comprehensive approach is a prerequisite for achieving sustainable results in enhancing security and stability in conflict areas; whereas the eu’s integrated approach provides for the coherent use of different instruments at various stages of conflicts; whereas the integrated approach is also meant to prioritise prevention and promote the human security of local populations over narrow self-interests;


### m. whereas the strategic compass sets out a clear roadmap for implementing eu-level actions , in particular for transforming the eu battlegroup system , establishing a rapid deployment capacity (rdc) and paving the way towards entrusting the implementation of specific tasks to a group of member states within the union framework in accordance with articles 42(5) and 44 of the teu; ### m. whereas the strategic compass sets out a clear roadmap for implementing eu-level actions , by establishing a rapid deployment capacity (rdc) building on substantially modified eu battlegroups and paving the way towards entrusting the implementation of specific csdp tasks to a group of member states within the union framework in accordance with articles 42(5) and 44 of the teu;


### n. whereas article 44 has never been used , and is ambiguous in terms of how it would work in practice in specific cases; ### n. whereas article 44 has never been used , and is ambiguous in terms of how it would work in practice in specific cases; whereas article 44 provides for possibilities to react within an eu framework in a more rapid and flexible manner to various crises with the aim of safeguarding the union’s values and interests;


### o. whereas the practical implementation of article 44 of the teu , as well as the establishment and operation of the rdc , should be considered the main aspects of the csdp on which the vice-president of the european commission / high representative of the european union for foreign affairs and security policy (vp/hr) needs to regularly consult parliament; ### o. whereas the possible implementation of article 44 of the teu , as well as the establishment and operation of the eu rdc , should be considered among the main aspects of the csdp on which the vice-president of the european commission / high representative of the european union for foreign affairs and security policy (vp/hr) needs to regularly consult parliament;


### p. whereas , in line with article 41 of the teu , the administrative and operating expenditure for the rdc should be charged to the union budget except for expenditure that is covered by the european peace facility , notwithstanding the possibility for participating member states to make free-of-charge contributions to the rdc; ### p. whereas financing of the battlegroups has contributed towards disincentivising their use; whereas the scope of common costs for the rapid deployment capacity should therefore be extended; whereas , in line with article 41 of the teu , the administrative and operating expenditure for the rdc should be charged to the union budget except for expenditure that is covered by the european peace facility , notwithstanding the possibility for participating member states to make free-of-charge contributions to the rdc;


### p. whereas , in line with article 41 of the teu , the administrative and operating expenditure for the rdc should be charged to the union budget except for expenditure that is covered by the european peace facility , notwithstanding the possibility for participating member states to make free-of-charge contributions to the rdc; ### p. whereas , in line with article 41 of the teu and previous practice building on the experience of the european security and defence college , the administrative and operating expenditure for the rdc should be charged to the union budget except for expenditure that is covered by the european peace facility , notwithstanding the possibility for participating member states to make free-of-charge contributions to the rdc;


### 1. welcomes the vp/hr’s proposal , enshrined in the strategic compass , to establish an rdc; stresses the importance of the eu having the necessary capabilities and structures to take action rapidly and decisively during crises in order to serve and protect the union’s citizens , interests and values across the world; ### 1. welcomes the vp/hr’s proposal , enshrined in the strategic compass , to establish an rdc; stresses the importance of the eu having the necessary capabilities and structures to take action rapidly and decisively during crises in order to serve and protect the union’s citizens , interests and values across the world; underlines , in this regard , the eu threat analysis as a starting point for shaping the rdc; calls for needs identified within the regularly updated threat analysis and developments in the operating environment to be taken into account in the rdc;


### 1. welcomes the vp/hr’s proposal , enshrined in the strategic compass , to establish an rdc; stresses the importance of the eu having the necessary capabilities and structures to take action rapidly and decisively during crises in order to serve and protect the union’s citizens , interests and values across the world; ### 1. welcomes the vp/hr’s proposal , enshrined in the strategic compass , to establish the eu rdc; stresses the importance of the eu having the necessary capabilities and structures to take action rapidly and decisively during crises in order to serve and protect the union’s citizens , interests and values across the world;


### 2. strongly encourages the vp/hr to propose a council decision on establishing an eu rdc to protect the union’s values and serve its interests along the following lines: ### 2. strongly encourages the vp/hr to propose the establishing an eu rdc to protect the union’s values and serve its interests along the following lines:


### the rdc’s tasks should include , but not be limited to , rescue and evacuation operations , initial entry and initial phase of stabilisation operations , temporary reinforcement of other missions , and acting as a reserve force to secure exit; the council could assign further tasks as referred to under article 44 of the teu , and the duration and scope of the assignments should be consistent with resources allocated to the rdc; ### the rdc’s tasks should include , but not be limited to , rescue and evacuation operations , initial entry and initial phase of stabilisation operations , temporary reinforcement of other missions , and acting as a reserve force to secure exit; the council could assign further tasks as referred to under article 44 of the teu , and the duration and scope of the assignments should be consistent with resources allocated to the rdc; notes that flexibility should be introduced in task and scenario planning in order to be prepared to address all possible crisis situations;


### the rdc’s tasks should include , but not be limited to , rescue and evacuation operations , initial entry and initial phase of stabilisation operations , temporary reinforcement of other missions , and acting as a reserve force to secure exit; the council could assign further tasks as referred to under article 44 of the teu , and the duration and scope of the assignments should be consistent with resources allocated to the rdc; ### the rdc’s tasks should reflect the needs identified in the eu threat analysis and should include , but not be limited to , rescue and evacuation operations , initial entry and initial phase of stabilisation operations , temporary reinforcement of other missions , and acting as a reserve force to secure exit; the council could assign further tasks as referred to under article 44 of the teu , and the duration and scope of the assignments should be consistent with resources allocated to the rdc;


### the rdc should number at least 5 000 troops , excluding strategic enablers such as air and sea lift personnel , intelligence assets , special operations forces and medical evacuation and care units; the target number for the rdc should be at least between 7 000 and 10 000 troops in total; ### the rdc should number at least 5 000 troops , excluding strategic enablers such as air and sea lift personnel , intelligence assets , special operations forces and medical evacuation and care units; the target number for the rdc should be at least between 7 000 and 10 000 troops in total; notes that an exact number of minimum troops can only be given after conceptual planners have analysed the potential scenarios;


### the rdc should frequently simulate scenarios and hold joint exercises following uniform training and certification standards such as those in nato; ### the rdc should frequently simulate scenarios and hold joint exercises following uniform training and certification standards such as those in nato; further notes that the term ‘non-permissive environment’ can refer to a terrorist or a conventional threat , but could also include all kinds of hybrid threats , such as cyber-attacks , information warfare or even weapons of mass destruction; notes that the rdc is not limited to use in such environment but also in so-called permissive environments if decided to;


### the rdc should frequently simulate scenarios and hold joint exercises following uniform training and certification standards such as those in nato; ### the rdc should frequently simulate scenarios and hold joint exercises following uniform training and certification standards such as those in nato; notes that the scenarios should cover , among others , two guidelines in the strategic compass: a) operations in a ‘non-permissive environment’ , and b) the suggested role division with nato and the related most likely geographical areas for the rdc to focus on;


### the rdc should frequently simulate scenarios and hold joint exercises following uniform training and certification standards such as those in nato; ### the rdc should frequently simulate scenarios and hold regular joint live exercises in an eu framework and coordinated by the military planning and conduct capability to increase readiness and interoperability , following uniform training and certification standards such as those in nato;


### the rdc should frequently simulate scenarios and hold joint exercises following uniform training and certification standards such as those in nato; ### the rdc should frequently simulate scenarios and hold joint exercises at the strategic , joint forces and tactical level , to be scheduled by the hr/vp , following uniform training and certification standards such as those in nato;


### similarly , its operating expenditure should be funded from the union budget with the exception of expenditure that is charged to the european peace facility; ### similarly , its operating expenditure should be funded from the union budget with the exception of expenditure that is charged to the european peace facility; notes that epf budget rules permit it , ‘if the council so decides’; encourages the council to decide positively in such cases;


### 3. calls on the member states to transform the eu battlegroup system to match the needs of the rdc; considers that the eu battlegroups should be funded from the union budget during their stand-up , stand-by and stand-down phases; ### deleted


### 3. calls on the member states to transform the eu battlegroup system to match the needs of the rdc; considers that the eu battlegroups should be funded from the union budget during their stand-up , stand-by and stand-down phases; ### 3. calls on the member states to transform the eu battlegroup system to match the needs of the rdc; calls for an extended scope of common costs for the rdc; considers that the eu battlegroups should be funded from the union budget during their stand-up , stand-by and stand-down phases;


### 5. points out that the rdc should have permanent operational headquarters under the military planning and conduct capability in order to ensure its effectiveness; ### 5. points out that the rdc should have permanent operational headquarters under the military planning and conduct capability (mpcc) , to ensure its effectiveness; stresses the need to bring the mpcc to full operational capacity and improve its capabilities through increasing the number of its permanent staff up to 350 , relocating it to larger premises jointly with other csdp-related structures such as the civilian planning and conduct capability , the eu intelligence and situation centre and the eums , and urgently develop a dedicated communication and information system for its needs; notes that is advisable to keep one or more national ‘high readiness’ ohqs as a fall-back option to anticipate a scenario in which multiple crises present themselves at the same time;


### 5. points out that the rdc should have permanent operational headquarters under the military planning and conduct capability in order to ensure its effectiveness; ### 5. points out that the rdc should have permanent operational headquarters under the military planning and conduct capability in order to ensure its effectiveness; calls , in this regard , for the development of the mpcc into a full command and control structure , capable of planning , controlling and commanding non-executive and executive tasks and operations , as well as joint live exercises;


### 6. calls for the eu rdc to have the possibility of being deployed and acting in emergencies , natural disasters such as floods or wildfires , or other significant civil-protection crises inside eu territory , at the proposal of the vp/hr and following the pertinent authorisation procedures; ### 6. calls for the eu rdc to have the possibility to be deployed and act in case of emergency , natural disasters such as floods or wildfires , or other significant civil protection crisis inside eu territory , where possible , at the proposal of the hr/vp , in close coordination with the eu civil protection mechanism and following the pertinent authorisation procedures;


### 7. calls on the member states participating in the rdc to agree to act in the name of the european union as mandated by the council under article 44 of the teu: ### 7. calls on the member states to agree to act in the name of the european union as mandated by the council under article 44 of the teu and to thereby use all the tools in the treaty to increase credibility , flexibility , and efficiency of the eu’s crisis management:


### 8. considers that the political and economic incentives need to change in order to improve the prospects for using article 44; ### 8. considers that the political and economic incentives need to change in order to improve the prospects for using article 44; calls for greater access to common funding for additional costs to member states utilising article 44 and greater flexibility concerning operational decisions and the drafting of the crisis management concept and operational plan; suggests the use of scenarios to simulate potential use of article 44 in advance and to clarify associated modalities;


### 9. highlights that the use of article 44 offers significant benefits compared to member states acting outside the eu framework; ### 9. highlights that the use of article 44 offers significant benefits compared to member states acting outside the eu framework in situations where troop deployment needs to be rapid to prevent further escalation and where the risks to combat troops are at the higher end;


### 9. highlights that the use of article 44 offers significant benefits compared to member states acting outside the eu framework; ### 9. highlights that the use of article 44 offers significant benefits such as speed , flexibility and freedom of action , whilst preserving joint eu action compared to member states acting outside the eu framework;


### — having regard to the negotiating framework for turkey of 3 october 2005 , ### — having regard to the negotiating framework for turkey of 3 october 2005 , and to the fact that , as it is the case for all candidate countries , turkey’s accession to the eu depends on full compliance with the copenhagen criteria , and to the need to normalize its relations with all eu member states , including the republic of cyprus ,


### — having regard to the statement of the members of the european council of 25 march 2021 on the eastern mediterranean , to the european council’s conclusions of 24 june 2021 and 1 october 2020 , and to all previous relevant council and european council conclusions , ### — having regard to the council conclusions of 26 june 2018 and 18 june 2019 on enlargement and stabilisation and association process , to the council conclusions of 15 july and 14 october 2019 on turkey’s illegal drilling activities in the eastern mediterranean , to the european council conclusions of 12 december 2019 , 1-2 and 15-16 october 2020 , to the statement of the eu foreign ministers of 15 may 2020 and the main results of their videoconference of 14 august 2020 on the situation in the eastern mediterranean , to the outcome of the informal meeting of eu foreign ministers in gymnich of 27-28 august 2020 , to the statement of the members of the european council of 25 march 2021 on the eastern mediterranean , to the european council’s conclusions of 24 june 2021 and 1 october 2020 , and to all previous relevant council and european council conclusions ,


### — having regard to the relevant resolutions by the committee of ministers of the council of europe , including the interim resolution of 2 december 2021 on the execution of the judgment of the european court of human rights in kavala against turkey , the interim resolution of 2 december 2021 on the execution of the judgment of the european court of human rights in selahattin demirtaş v turkey (no. 2) , and the interim resolution of 2 february 2022 on the execution of the judgment of the european court of human rights in kavala against turkey , ### — having regard to the relevant resolutions by the committee of ministers of the council of europe , including the interim resolution of 2 december 2021 on the execution of the judgment of the european court of human rights in kavala against turkey , the interim resolution of 2 december 2021 on the execution of the judgment of the european court of human rights in selahattin demirtaş v turkey (no. 2) , and the interim resolution of 2 february 2022 on the execution of the judgment of the european court of human rights in kavala against turkey , and the resolution of 17 october 2007 and the interim resolution of 9 march 2009 and the following 9 decisions on the execution of the judgment of the european court of human rights in ülke v. turkey;


### — having regard to the relevant resolutions by the committee of ministers of the council of europe , including the interim resolution of 2 december 2021 on the execution of the judgment of the european court of human rights in kavala against turkey , the interim resolution of 2 december 2021 on the execution of the judgment of the european court of human rights in selahattin demirtaş v turkey (no. 2) , and the interim resolution of 2 february 2022 on the execution of the judgment of the european court of human rights in kavala against turkey , ### — having regard to the relevant resolutions by the committee of ministers of the council of europe , including the interim resolution of 2 december 2021 on the execution of the judgment of the european court of human rights in kavala against turkey , the interim resolution of 2 december 2021 on the execution of the judgment of the european court of human rights in selahattin demirtaş v turkey (no. 2) , the interim resolution of 2 february 2022 on the execution of the judgment of the european court of human rights in kavala against turkey and the interim resolution of 16th september 2021 on the execution of the judgment of the european court of human rights in cyprus v. turkey ,


### — having regard to the relevant resolutions of the un security council on cyprus , including resolution 550(1984) of 11 may 1984 on secessionist actions in cyprus and resolution 789(1992) of 25 november 1992 urging all concerned in the cyprus question to commit themselves to the confidence-building measures set out in the resolution , ### — having regard to the relevant resolutions of the un security council on cyprus , including resolution 550 (1984) of 11 may 1984 on secessionist actions in cyprus and resolution 789 (1992) of 25 november 1992 which consider attempts to settle any part of varosha by people other than its inhabitants as inadmissible , and call for the transfer of that area to the administration of the united nations , urging all concerned in the cyprus question to commit themselves to the confidence-building measures set out in the resolution ,


### a. whereas turkey , besides being a candidate for eu accession , is a key partner in relation to the economy , trade and migration , as well as a strategic partner; ### a. whereas turkey , as candidate for eu accession is expected to respect and uphold the copenhagen criteria , to uphold the highest standards of democracy , respect of human rights and the rule of law , to comply with the international law and international conventions acceded to by the eu , to pursue and maintain good neighbourly relations with the eu and all its member states indiscriminately and to peacefully settle all disputes having resource , if necessary , to the international court of justice;


### b. whereas , in the aftermath of recent tensions between the eu and turkey , particularly in relation to the situation in the eastern mediterranean , the european council offered to nurture a more positive dynamic in eu-turkey relations by expressing readiness to engage with turkey in a phased , proportionate and reversible manner in a number of areas of common interest; ### b. whereas , in the aftermath of recent tensions between the eu and turkey , particularly following its provocative actions in the eastern mediterranean , the european council expressed readiness to engage with turkey in a phased , proportionate and reversible manner in a number of areas of common interest , provided a sustainable de-escalation , a constructive engagement in a dialogue based on international law and other conditionalities established in previous european council conclusions;


### c. whereas being a candidate country presumes a willingness to progressively approach in all aspects the values , interests , standards and policies of the eu; whereas an analysis of the eu’s reports in recent years reveal that turkey’s distance from the eu’s values and its normative framework is still considerable and is even growing in fundamental areas such as the rule of law and human rights; ### c. whereas being a candidate country presumes a willingness to progressively align in all aspects the values , interests , standards and policies of the eu; whereas an analysis of the eu’s reports in recent years reveal that turkey’s distance from the eu’s values and its normative framework is still considerable and is even growing in fundamental areas such as the rule of law , the respect of human rights and good neighbourly relations;


### d. whereas over the past year , eu-turkey relations have on average remained stable , as enhanced cooperation and dialogue on a number of issues have coexisted with regular conflicts; whereas this report reflects this situation by welcoming positive developments and pointing to further potential in the relationship , while signalling remaining problems , in particular as regards the rule of law and fundamental rights; ### d. whereas over the past year , eu-turkey relations have on average remained stable , as enhanced cooperation and dialogue on a number of issues have coexisted with regular conflicts; whereas this report reflects this situation by welcoming positive developments and pointing to further potential in the relationship , while signalling remaining problems , in particular as regards the rule of law and fundamental rights; whereas if this report is to assess turkey’s progress or lack of progress in terms of human rights and rule of law , as the core of the accession process , it is important to describe the concrete mechanisms of erosion of freedoms that , taken together , lead to this general backsliding with regard to european standards; whereas this approach means going beyond a long list of citizens and groups who are suffering as a result of these decisions to identifying the operators and bodies of the public authorities responsible of this worrying situation in their particular area of action; whereas generic criticism must be replaced by targeted criticism;


### 1. reiterates its concern about the persistent distance between the eu and turkey , despite it being a candidate country , in terms of values and standards , and the continuing lack of political will to carry out the necessary reforms to address , in particular , the serious concerns about the rule of law and fundamental rights that continue to negatively affect the accession process; considers that without clear progress in this field , parliament cannot envisage any resumption of accession negotiations with turkey , which have effectively been at a standstill since 2018; ### 1. reiterates its concern about the persistent distance between the eu and turkey , despite it being a candidate country , in terms of values and standards , and the continuing lack of political will to have good neighbourly relations with the eu member states and to carry out the necessary reforms to address , in particular , the serious concerns about the rule of law , fundamental rights that continue to negatively affect the accession process; considers that without clear progress in this field , parliament cannot envisage any resumption of accession negotiations with turkey , which have effectively been at a standstill since 2018; recalls that the accession process is and will remain a merit-based process fully dependent on the objective progress achieved by each country;


### 1. reiterates its concern about the persistent distance between the eu and turkey , despite it being a candidate country , in terms of values and standards , and the continuing lack of political will to carry out the necessary reforms to address , in particular , the serious concerns about the rule of law and fundamental rights that continue to negatively affect the accession process; considers that without clear progress in this field , parliament cannot envisage any resumption of accession negotiations with turkey , which have effectively been at a standstill since 2018; ### 1. reiterates its concern about the persistent distance between the eu and turkey , despite it being a candidate country , in terms of values and standards , and the continuing lack of political will to carry out the necessary reforms to address , in particular , the serious concerns about the rule of law and fundamental rights that continue to negatively affect the accession process; considers that without clear progress in this field , parliament cannot envisage any resumption of accession negotiations with turkey , which have effectively been at a standstill since 2018; notes that it does not find arguments at this stage to modify its conditional position concerning the formal suspension of the accession negotiations with turkey;


### 2. notes , however , that there has been a slight improvement over the past year in overall eu-turkey relations , which have on average remained stable , as enhanced cooperation and dialogue on a number of issues have coexisted with regular conflicts; expresses its hope that this pattern of ‘conflictual cooperation’ can be overcome and replaced with a more positive dynamic; ### 2. notes , however , that there has been a slight improvement over the past year in overall eu-turkey relations , which have on average remained stable , as enhanced cooperation and dialogue on a number of issues have coexisted with regular conflicts; expresses its hope that this pattern of ‘conflictual cooperation’ can be overcome and replaced with a more positive dynamic; welcomes the recent high-level dialogues between eu-turkey on climate change on 16 september 2021 , turkey formulating its own green deal and putting in place ambitious domestic climate policies as well as turkey ratifying the paris agreement on 6 october 2021; welcomes the high-level dialogue on migration and security on 12 october 2021 focused on strengthening cooperation on managing migration , combating human trafficking and organised crime , and preventing terrorist attacks; welcomes the high-level dialogue on public health of 1 december 2021 discussing enhanced cooperation on cross-border health threats , including in the short-term in the fight against the covid-19 pandemic; commends , in this context , the mutual recognition of covid-19 certificates in august 2021;


### 2. notes , however , that there has been a slight improvement over the past year in overall eu-turkey relations , which have on average remained stable , as enhanced cooperation and dialogue on a number of issues have coexisted with regular conflicts; expresses its hope that this pattern of ‘conflictual cooperation’ can be overcome and replaced with a more positive dynamic; ### 2. notes , that over the past year eu-turkey relations have not improved; notes that turkey relations with several member states , in particular with greece and cyprus have remained challenging with a rise in tensions in the aegean sea and the eastern mediterranean , undermining regional stability and security; expresses its hope that this pattern of ‘conflictual cooperation’ can be overcome and replaced with a more positive dynamic;


### 3. reiterates its firm conviction that turkey is a country of strategic relevance in political , economic and foreign policy terms , a partner that is key for the stability of the wider region , and an ally with which the eu wishes to pursue the best possible relations; welcomes , in this view , the recent statements expressed at the highest level by the turkish authorities about the recommitment of the turkish government to the eu path , but urges the turkish authorities to put their words into action and demonstrate this commitment with specific facts and decisions; ### 3. reiterates its firm conviction that turkey is a country of strategic relevance in political , economic and foreign policy terms , a partner that is key for the stability of the wider region , and an ally with which the eu wishes to pursue the best possible relations; welcomes , in this view , the recent statements expressed at the highest level by the turkish authorities about the recommitment of the turkish government to the eu path , but urges the turkish authorities to put their words into action and demonstrate this commitment with specific facts and decisions; believes that , if conditions allow , dialogue with turkish authorities and counterparts at all levels should be further reinforced as a means to contribute to the rebuilding of trust and diminish the possibilities of future confrontations , in line with the european council’s position to engage with turkey in a phased , proportionate and reversible manner; calls in this view on the council to unblock the suspended high level political dialogue , the high level sectoral dialogues on economy , energy and transport , as well as the eu-turkey association council while bearing in mind that further progress in any field should also be closely linked to improvements in the situation of fundamental freedoms and rule of law;


### 3. reiterates its firm conviction that turkey is a country of strategic relevance in political , economic and foreign policy terms , a partner that is key for the stability of the wider region , and an ally with which the eu wishes to pursue the best possible relations; welcomes , in this view , the recent statements expressed at the highest level by the turkish authorities about the recommitment of the turkish government to the eu path , but urges the turkish authorities to put their words into action and demonstrate this commitment with specific facts and decisions; ### 3. reiterates its firm conviction for the development of a mutually beneficial cooperative relationship with turkey , as it is a country of significant relevance in political , economic and foreign policy terms , an important partner for the stability of the wider region , with which the eu wishes to pursue the best possible relations; deplores the fact that turkey remains a source of instability; welcomes , the recent statements expressed at the highest level by the turkish authorities about the recommitment of the turkish government to the eu path , but urges the turkish authorities to put their words into action and demonstrate this commitment with specific facts and decisions; recalls the european council's position to engage with turkey in a phased , proportionate and reversible manner , under the condition that the latter would stop its provocations against eu and its member states and the there is tangible improvement in the area of fundamental freedoms and rule of law; it is of the position that these conditions have not been yet met;


### 4. expresses concern over the current economic situation in turkey , which through soaring inflation and a constantly rising cost of living is pushing a high and increasing number of people into hardship and poverty; ### 4. expresses concern over the current economic situation in turkey , which through soaring inflation and a constantly rising cost of living is pushing a high and increasing number of people into hardship and poverty; notes that while the current situation has been developing over a number of years , it turned into a currency crisis in december 2021 , exacerbating existing pandemic-related impacts in the economy; is concerned by the lack of confidence in purportedly independent bodies such as the central bank and the turkish statistical institute (tüik); notes in this regard that the operational independence of both institutions is a key criterion for eu accession; further highlights that the poor performance of turkey with regard to the respect to the rule of law has also a severe impact on the reputational image of the country and that the lack of legal certainty has the potential to seriously affect the ability of the country to attract foreign investments;


### 5. deplores the continued deterioration of the human rights situation in turkey , including backsliding on fundamental freedoms , democracy and the rule of law; considers that the current repressive form of rule , whose main pillars are abuse of the legal framework and a lack of independence of the judiciary , is a deliberate , relentless and systematic state policy developed to suppress any critical activities either-directly or through a chilling effect; is appalled by the fact that in order to pursue this policy , the turkish state authorities are ready to blatantly and persistently disregard their international and domestic legal obligations , such as those derived from turkey’s membership of the council of europe; ### 5. deplores the continued deterioration of the human rights situation in turkey , including backsliding on fundamental freedoms , democracy and the rule of law; considers that the current repressive form of rule , whose main pillars are abuse of the legal framework -particularly through the application of terrorism charges and by restriction of freedom of expression- and a lack of independence of the judiciary , is a deliberate , relentless and systematic state policy developed to suppress any critical activities either-directly or through a chilling effect; is appalled by the fact that in order to pursue this policy , the turkish state authorities are ready to blatantly and persistently disregard their international and domestic legal obligations , such as those derived from turkey’s membership of the council of europe;


### 6. insists that the crucial area of fundamental rights and freedoms , which is at the core of the accession process , cannot be disconnected and isolated from overall relations with the eu and stresses that for parliament , it remains the main obstacle to further progress on any positive agenda that could be offered to turkey; ### 6. insists that the crucial area of fundamental rights and freedoms , which is at the core of the accession process , cannot be disconnected and isolated from overall relations with the eu and stresses that for parliament , it remains the main obstacle to further progress on any positive agenda that could be offered to turkey; considers that the adoption on march 2021 of an action plan on human rights shows a willingness to improve the overall situation of fundamental rights in turkey; notes nevertheless that the commitment of the government will be measured by the extent of its implementation and the reforms undertaken to ensure its application to all citizens without discrimination;


### 6. insists that the crucial area of fundamental rights and freedoms , which is at the core of the accession process , cannot be disconnected and isolated from overall relations with the eu and stresses that for parliament , it remains the main obstacle to further progress on any positive agenda that could be offered to turkey; ### 6. insists that the crucial area of fundamental rights and freedoms , which is at the core of the accession process , cannot be disconnected and isolated from overall relations with the eu and stresses that for parliament , it remains the main obstacle together with the need to respect international law and good neighbourly relations to further progress on any positive agenda that could be offered to turkey;


### 6. insists that the crucial area of fundamental rights and freedoms , which is at the core of the accession process , cannot be disconnected and isolated from overall relations with the eu and stresses that for parliament , it remains the main obstacle to further progress on any positive agenda that could be offered to turkey; ### 6. insists that the crucial area of fundamental rights and freedoms , which is at the core of the accession process , cannot be disconnected and isolated from overall relations with the eu and stresses that for parliament , it remains one of the main obstacles to further progress on any positive agenda that could be offered to turkey;


### 7. reiterates its strong condemnation of turkey’s withdrawal , by presidential decree , from the council of europe convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence (the istanbul convention); ### 7. reiterates its strong condemnation of turkey’s withdrawal , by presidential decree , from the council of europe convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence (the istanbul convention); a decision that is particularly alarming against the background of continuing high number of femicides in the country and that represents a major setback to efforts to promote women’s rights in the country; reiterates its call on turkey’s government to reverse this incomprehensible decision and , in the meantime , to prevent and combat violence against all women and girls , support survivors , and hold abusers to account by fully implementing turkey’s own law no. 6284 and all measures identified in the relevant ecthr jurisprudence;


### 7. reiterates its strong condemnation of turkey’s withdrawal , by presidential decree , from the council of europe convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence (the istanbul convention); ### 7. reiterates its strong condemnation of turkey’s withdrawal , by presidential decree , from the council of europe convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence (the istanbul convention); reminds that this is in strong violation of fundamental european values and will be a part of the evaluation for turkey’s accession process;


### 8. notes the importance of upholding the freedom of assembly in turkey , which is enshrined in its constitution; ### 8. notes the importance of upholding the freedom of assembly in turkey , which is enshrined in its constitution; is deeply worried by the routine use and continued extension of bans on protests and demonstration by provincial governors , and particularly by the governor’s ban that has been in place for over five years in van province; deplores the targeting of journalists at public protests by turkish police forces including through the april 2021 directive by turkey’s security general directorate (egm) , instructing turkish police forces to prevent press recordings of protests and demonstrations that was subsequently suspended by the council of state citing a restriction of fundamental rights; regrets the recurrent use of excessive force to suppress peaceful demonstrations amidst an overall general impunity of law enforcement officials; deplores the ongoing trial against the cumartesi anneleri (saturday mothers) at the istanbul 21st criminal court of first instance in relation to the violent dispersal of their 700th vigil on 25 august 2018; reiterates its call on the authorities to drop charges against the students of boğaziçi university prosecuted for exercising their right to peaceful assembly , and highlights the relevance of ensuring academic freedom and the autonomy of universities; is concerned in this regard by the recent decision to remove three elected deans in boğaziçi university , whose current rector was appointed by presidential decree in august 2021;


### 8. notes the importance of upholding the freedom of assembly in turkey , which is enshrined in its constitution; ### 8. notes the importance of upholding the freedom of assembly in turkey , which is enshrined in its constitution and a positive obligation derived from its membership of the european convention of human rights;


### 9. reiterates its serious concern about the disproportionate and arbitrary measures curtailing freedom of expression; welcomes the further decrease in the number of journalists in prison in turkey; ### 9. reiterates its serious concern about the disproportionate and arbitrary measures curtailing freedom of expression; welcomes the further decrease in the number of journalists in prison in turkey and the increase in the number of acquittals in cases against journalists observed in the last period of 2021; welcomes the recent rulings of the council of state halting the execution of some articles of the press card regulations and the police circular that had banned audio-visual recordings at public demonstrations; notes however that the practice of investigating and prosecuting people on charges such as insulting the president or on broadly-worded and vague terrorism charges continues; is appalled by the gross abuse of article 299 of turkish penal code on insulting the president which can carry a jail sentence of between one and four years; finds completely disproportionate that since 2014 , the first year of president erdoğan’s term in office , more than 160 ,000 investigations have been launched , more than 35 ,500 cases were filed and there were more than12 ,800 convictions over insulting the president; calls on turkey’s authorities to apply the rulings by the european court on human rights and to follow the venice commission recommendations in order to bring turkish law on this matter in line with the convention; is particularly worried by the case of journalist sedef kabaş , who after being publicly targeted by senior government officials was arrested during a midnight raid on january 22nd , by the order of istanbul10th criminal court of peace judge , and is kept in pre-trial detention at the bakırköy women's prison in i̇stanbul for having allegedly insulted the president on a live broadcast on tele1 tv on 14 january 2022; is appalled by the fact that the istanbul 36th criminal court of first instance of the indictment has recently accepted the indictment prepared by the istanbul chief public prosecutor's office for which ms kabaş will face up to 12 years and 10 months in prison on the offenses charged; finds this case a clear example of the abusive use of article 299 with an aim of having a chilling effect on any journalist or citizen who could express criticism towards the president or government; expresses concerns about the presidential circular on "press and broadcasting activities" published on 28 january 2022 as it could imply unlawful restrictions to fundamental rights and freedoms;


### 9. reiterates its serious concern about the disproportionate and arbitrary measures curtailing freedom of expression; welcomes the further decrease in the number of journalists in prison in turkey; ### 9. reiterates its serious concern about the disproportionate and arbitrary measures curtailing freedom of expression; welcomes the further decrease in the number of journalists in prison in turkey; expresses at the same time serious concern about the continuation of arbitrary arrest of journalists;


### 9. reiterates its serious concern about the disproportionate and arbitrary measures curtailing freedom of expression; welcomes the further decrease in the number of journalists in prison in turkey; ### 9. reiterates its serious concern about the disproportionate and arbitrary measures curtailing freedom of expression; condemns the systematic use of terrorist offences to silence journalists , media and opposition; welcomes the further decrease in the number of journalists in prison in turkey;


### 10. asserts that the continued prosecution , censorship and harassment of journalists and independent media remains an issue of concern; ### 10. asserts that the continued prosecution , censorship and harassment of journalists and independent media remains an issue of concern; calls on the chair of the turkish radio and television supreme council (rtük) to discontinue the excessive imposition of fines and broadcasting bans restricting the legitimate freedom of expression of turkish journalists and broadcasters; is concerned by the rtük’s decision to expand government control over international press outlets by applying broadcasting requirements to deutsche welle , euronews and voice of america; calls on the chair of the press advertising agency (bik) to ensure that bans on public advertising do not serve to suppress independent media reporting; calls on the director of communications at the turkish presidency , to ensure the timely processing of press card applications and to discontinue the use of criminal complaints and belligerent rhetoric targeting journalists; calls on the turkish grand national assembly to follow-up on the turkish constitutional court’s judgement of january 2022 requesting to reformulate article 9 of the internet law to protect the freedoms of expression and the press;


### 11. takes note of the adoption of the fourth and fifth judicial packages in turkey during 2021; asserts , however , that the current problems stem not only from problematic legislation , but are often caused by a failure to implement existing adequate provisions; remains concerned about the erosion of the rule of law and judicial independence in turkey; ### 11. takes note of the adoption of the fourth and fifth judicial packages in turkey during 2021 which contain steps in the right direction although modest and not addressing the main concerns; asserts , however , that the current problems stem not only from problematic legislation , but are often caused by a failure to implement existing adequate provisions; remains concerned about the erosion of the rule of law and judicial independence in turkey; notes in this regard the appointment to the turkish constitutional court in january 2021 of a judge who had served just twenty days on the court of cassation and who had previously acted as istanbul chief public prosecutor , being involved in the controversial cases brought against osman kavala , the gezi park protestors , and journalists can dündar and erdem gül , among others; points out the council of judges and prosecutors (hsk) , as the main element of concern with regard to the lack of judicial independence; reiterates its call for the shortcomings in the structure and process for the selection of the members of this council to be addressed with a view to ensuring its independence and putting an end to its arbitrary decisions;