### 35. stresses that more environmental data is needed in order to gain more insight and induce more progress through ai solutions; underlines that using ai to systematically connect data on co2 emissions with data on production patterns , consumer behaviour , supply chains and logistics routes could ensure that activities that have a positive or negative impact are detected; ### 35. stresses that more environmental data is needed in order to gain more insight and induce more progress through ai solutions; underlines that using ai to systematically connect data on co2 emissions with data on production and consumption patterns , supply chains and logistics routes could ensure that activities that have a positive or negative impact are detected;


### c) external policy and the security dimension of ai ### c) the international dimension of ai


### 36. is concerned that the global community does not seem likely to reach an agreement on minimum standards for the responsible use of ai , as the stakes , in particular for the most powerful nations , are too high; believes , however , as a matter of principle , in the potential of democratic nations to jointly shape the international debate , to work together towards certain minimum standards , and thereby to promote multilateralism , interoperability and data sharing on the international stage; ### 36. is concerned by the lack of progress in reaching a global agreement on minimum standards for the responsible use of ai , as the stakes are very high for all countries , including smaller ones which have to wake up to these threats; believes , however , as a matter of principle , in the potential of democratic nations to jointly shape the international debate , to work together towards certain minimum norms , standards and responsible state behaviour guidelines , and thereby to promote multilateralism , interoperability and data sharing on the international stage; thereby support the work of the un open-ended working group on ict and international security; underlines that confidence-building measures are essential to increase the level of dialogue and trust , therefore calls for more transparency in the use of ai , so as to ensure better accountability;


### 36. is concerned that the global community does not seem likely to reach an agreement on minimum standards for the responsible use of ai , as the stakes , in particular for the most powerful nations , are too high; believes , however , as a matter of principle , in the potential of democratic nations to jointly shape the international debate , to work together towards certain minimum standards , and thereby to promote multilateralism , interoperability and data sharing on the international stage; ### 36. is concerned that , the global community has not reached reach an agreement on minimum standards for the responsible use of ai although positive steps are being taken; believes , however , as a matter of principle , in the potential of democratic nations to jointly shape the international debate , to work together towards certain minimum standards , and thereby to promote sustainable development , multilateralism , interoperability , and data sharing on the international stage , for example within the organs of united nations system;


### 36. is concerned that the global community does not seem likely to reach an agreement on minimum standards for the responsible use of ai , as the stakes , in particular for the most powerful nations , are too high; believes , however , as a matter of principle , in the potential of democratic nations to jointly shape the international debate , to work together towards certain minimum standards , and thereby to promote multilateralism , interoperability and data sharing on the international stage; ### 36. is concerned that the global community has not yet reached an agreement on minimum standards for the responsible use of ai , as the stakes , in particular for the most powerful nations , are too high; believes , however , as a matter of principle , in the potential of democratic nations to jointly shape the international debate on an ai framework that is respectful of human rights and the rule of law , to work together towards certain minimum technical and ethical standards , and thereby to promote multilateralism , interoperability and data sharing on the international stage;


### 36. is concerned that the global community does not seem likely to reach an agreement on minimum standards for the responsible use of ai , as the stakes , in particular for the most powerful nations , are too high; believes , however , as a matter of principle , in the potential of democratic nations to jointly shape the international debate , to work together towards certain minimum standards , and thereby to promote multilateralism , interoperability and data sharing on the international stage; ### 36. considers of paramount importance for the international community to reach an agreement on minimum standards for the responsible use of ai; highlights the key role the eu can play in setting the global example , as the first bloc in the world to introduce legislation on ai , starting from its current work within the trade and technology council (ttc); welcomes the fact that like-minded democracies are working together to jointly shape the international debate , and to agree on common principles and standards on ai; welcomes the ongoing work at the international level on ai standards and the progress made with the iso standards on governance implications of ai;


### 36. is concerned that the global community does not seem likely to reach an agreement on minimum standards for the responsible use of ai , as the stakes , in particular for the most powerful nations , are too high; believes , however , as a matter of principle , in the potential of democratic nations to jointly shape the international debate , to work together towards certain minimum standards , and thereby to promote multilateralism , interoperability and data sharing on the international stage; ### 36. is concerned that the global community does not seem likely to reach an agreement on minimum standards for the responsible use of ai , as the stakes , in particular for the most powerful nations , are too high; believes , however , as a matter of principle , in the potential of democratic nations to jointly shape the international debate , to work together towards certain minimum standards especially under the umbrella of intergovernmental organisations such as the un and oecd , and thereby to promote multilateralism , interoperability and data sharing on the international stage;


### 36. is concerned that the global community does not seem likely to reach an agreement on minimum standards for the responsible use of ai , as the stakes , in particular for the most powerful nations , are too high; believes , however , as a matter of principle , in the potential of democratic nations to jointly shape the international debate , to work together towards certain minimum standards , and thereby to promote multilateralism , interoperability and data sharing on the international stage; ### 36. welcomes all the efforts of the global community to reach an agreement on minimum ethical standards for the responsible development and use of ai , interoperability and data sharing; believes that the union and its member states must , as a matter of principle , support and participate in the works at international or regional level , towards the conclusion of a legal framework and recommendations establishing ai ethical standards based on democracy , human rights and the rule of law and thereby to promote multilateralism;


### 37. observes that chinese nationals have assumed leadership positions in the international organization for standardization , the international electrotechnical commission and the international telecommunication union , the three largest and best-established standard-setting organisations in the world , while the chinese government has also signed standards and cooperation agreements with 52 other countries through its belt and road initiative; warns that since several of their promoted standards , including on ai technologies and in particular in relation to government surveillance and individual liberties , are not in line with eu values , the chinese standard offensive poses a crucial geopolitical challenge for the eu , while also giving china a first-mover advantage in economic terms; ### deleted


### 38. stresses that ai technologies , used in military command centres or in missile launch facilities , could escalate an automated reciprocal conflict before humans have the chance to detect what is happening , understand the causes and intervene; agrees with studies that warn that the impact of ai technologies on warfare could rival that of nuclear weapons24 ; ### deleted


### 38. stresses that ai technologies , used in military command centres or in missile launch facilities , could escalate an automated reciprocal conflict before humans have the chance to detect what is happening , understand the causes and intervene; agrees with studies that warn that the impact of ai technologies on warfare could rival that of nuclear weapons24 ; ### 38. stresses that ai technologies , used in military command centres or in missile launch facilities , could escalate an automated reciprocal conflict before humans have the chance to detect what is happening , understand the causes and intervene; agrees with studies that warn that the impact of ai technologies on warfare could rival that of nuclear weapons24 ; emphasises the need for an embedded option to reduce an ai-enabled system’s computations to a form comprehensible by humans throughout a given system’s lifecycle; considers that ai-enabled systems , products and technology purposed for military use should be equipped with a ‘black box’ to record every data transaction carried out by the machine , including the logic that contributed to its decisions , as well as with a “switch-off’ button which would instantly enable humans to deactivate the ai-enabled system; underlines the need to establish clear and traceable authorisation and accountability frameworks for the deployment of smart weapons and other ai-enabled systems in order to enable deployment exclusively by authorised personnel;


### 39. notes that the use of ai systems in defence-related developments is considered a game changer in military operations; states that the key advantage lies in the potential to engage in armed conflicts with a reduced risk of physical harm to one’s own military personnel and as a means to reduce military response time; ### 39. notes that the use of ai systems in defence-related developments is considered a game changer in military operations offering benefits such as the collection of higher quality data , greater situational awareness and the potential to engage in armed conflicts with a reduced risk of physical harm to one’s own military personnel and as a means to reduce military response time; underlines however that this could lead to lowering the threshold for the use of force , and therefore to more conflicts;


### 40. is concerned about military research and technological developments relating to lethal offensive weapon systems without human oversight that are pursued in countries such as russia and china with little regard for the risk to humanity; observes that such lethal offensive weapon systems are already used in military conflicts; warns that even non-state armed groups could soon equip drones with ai software for navigation and facial recognition and thus turn them into cheap lethal offensive weapons capable of acting entirely without human oversight; ### 40. is concerned about military research and technological developments relating to lethal offensive weapon systems without human oversight that are pursued in countries such as russia and china with little regard for the risk to humanity; observes that such lethal offensive weapon systems are already used in military conflicts; warns that even non-state armed groups could soon equip drones with ai software for navigation and facial recognition and thus turn them into cheap lethal offensive weapons capable of acting entirely without human oversight; is of the opinion that the eu should lead the way in establishing global agreements that regulate the production and use of autonomous weapons and weaponised ai systems utilized in warfare , similar to already established treaties regulating the use of chemical and biological weapons such as the biological and toxin weapons convention (btwc);


### 40. is concerned about military research and technological developments relating to lethal offensive weapon systems without human oversight that are pursued in countries such as russia and china with little regard for the risk to humanity; observes that such lethal offensive weapon systems are already used in military conflicts; warns that even non-state armed groups could soon equip drones with ai software for navigation and facial recognition and thus turn them into cheap lethal offensive weapons capable of acting entirely without human oversight; ### 40. is concerned about military research and technological developments relating to lethal offensive weapon systems without human oversight that are pursued in countries such as russia and china with little regard for the risk to humanity; observes that such lethal offensive weapon systems are already used in military conflicts; warns that even non-state armed groups could soon equip drones with ai software for navigation and facial recognition and thus turn them into cheap lethal offensive weapons capable of acting entirely without human oversight; calls on the council to adopt a joint position on autonomous weapons systems that ensures meaningful human control over their critical function; insist on the launch of international negotiations on a legally binding instrument that would prohibit fully autonomous weapons systems;


### 40. is concerned about military research and technological developments relating to lethal offensive weapon systems without human oversight that are pursued in countries such as russia and china with little regard for the risk to humanity; observes that such lethal offensive weapon systems are already used in military conflicts; warns that even non-state armed groups could soon equip drones with ai software for navigation and facial recognition and thus turn them into cheap lethal offensive weapons capable of acting entirely without human oversight; ### 40. is concerned about military research and technological developments relating to lethal autonomous weapon systems without meaningful human oversight; observes that such lethal offensive weapon systems are already used in military conflicts; is concerned about the risk of non-state groups coming in possession of such weapons as well as of drones with ai software for navigation and biometric recognition;


### 41. notes that ai technology can also be used as a means for various forms of hybrid warfare; specifies that it could for instance be mobilised to trigger information warfare , by using fake social media accounts , to weaponise interdependence , by gathering valuable information or denying network access to adversaries , or to create disturbances in the economic and financial systems of other countries; ### 41. notes that ai technology can also be used as a means for various forms of hybrid warfare; specifies that it could for instance be mobilised to trigger information warfare , by using fake social media accounts , or by taking advantage of the large amounts of personal data collected about end users to micro-target them with false information or selected political opinions based on ai-driven algorithmic content recommendation , to weaponise interdependence , by gathering valuable information or denying network access to adversaries , or to create disturbances in the economic and financial systems of other countries;


### 41. notes that ai technology can also be used as a means for various forms of hybrid warfare; specifies that it could for instance be mobilised to trigger information warfare , by using fake social media accounts , to weaponise interdependence , by gathering valuable information or denying network access to adversaries , or to create disturbances in the economic and financial systems of other countries; ### 41. notes that ai technology can also be used as a means for various forms of hybrid warfare; specifies that it could for instance be mobilised to trigger information warfare , by using fake social media accounts , to weaponise interdependence , by gathering valuable information or denying network access to adversaries , or to create disturbances in the economic and financial systems of other countries; calls on the eu to step up its resilience to hybrid threats;


### 41. notes that ai technology can also be used as a means for various forms of hybrid warfare; specifies that it could for instance be mobilised to trigger information warfare , by using fake social media accounts , to weaponise interdependence , by gathering valuable information or denying network access to adversaries , or to create disturbances in the economic and financial systems of other countries; ### 41. notes that ai technology can especially hold potential risks as a means for various forms of hybrid warfare and foreign interference; specifies that it could for instance be mobilised to trigger disinformation , by using bots or fake social media accounts , to pollute the political debate and favour extremist groups or manipulate elections to destabilize democracies;


### 42. illustrates that ai technologies could also help perpetrators by simplifying the use of very sophisticated cyberattacks , such as through ai-powered malware , identity theft using biometric data or adversarial ai that causes other ai systems to misinterpret input; points , in particular , to the rise in deepfakes , which already lead to doubts about the authenticity of all digital content , including genuinely authentic videos; warns that deepfakes could contribute to a broad climate of public mistrust in ai , as well as a deeper socio-political polarisation within our societies; ### 42. illustrates that ai technologies could also help perpetrators by simplifying the use of very sophisticated cyberattacks , such as through ai-powered malware , identity theft using biometric data or adversarial ai that causes other ai systems to misinterpret input; points , in particular , to the rise in deepfakes , which already lead to doubts about the authenticity of all digital content , including genuinely authentic videos; warns that deepfakes could contribute to a broad climate of public mistrust in ai , as well as a deeper socio-political polarisation within our societies; calls on the commission to ensure that whoever produces and disseminates deepfake material or synthetic videos or any other realistically made synthetic videos should be obliged by law to state explicitly that the content is not original and/or real;


### 42. illustrates that ai technologies could also help perpetrators by simplifying the use of very sophisticated cyberattacks , such as through ai-powered malware , identity theft using biometric data or adversarial ai that causes other ai systems to misinterpret input; points , in particular , to the rise in deepfakes , which already lead to doubts about the authenticity of all digital content , including genuinely authentic videos; warns that deepfakes could contribute to a broad climate of public mistrust in ai , as well as a deeper socio-political polarisation within our societies; ### 42. illustrates that ai technologies could also help perpetrators by simplifying the use of very sophisticated cyberattacks , such as through ai-powered malware , identity theft using biometric data or adversarial ai that causes other ai systems to misinterpret input; points , in particular , to the rise in deepfakes , which already lead to doubts about the authenticity of all digital content , including genuinely authentic videos; warns that deepfakes could contribute to a broad climate of public mistrust in ai , as well as a deeper socio-political polarisation within our societies; calls in this regard on the commission to include the investment in the development of ai systems that prevent , slow down , or complicate deepfake attacks as a focus area under horizon europe;


### 42. illustrates that ai technologies could also help perpetrators by simplifying the use of very sophisticated cyberattacks , such as through ai-powered malware , identity theft using biometric data or adversarial ai that causes other ai systems to misinterpret input; points , in particular , to the rise in deepfakes , which already lead to doubts about the authenticity of all digital content , including genuinely authentic videos; warns that deepfakes could contribute to a broad climate of public mistrust in ai , as well as a deeper socio-political polarisation within our societies; ### 42. illustrates that ai technologies could also help perpetrators by simplifying the use of very sophisticated cyberattacks , such as through ai-powered malware , identity theft , data poisoning or other adversarial machine learning that cause other ai systems to misinterpret input; points , in particular , to the rise in deepfakes , which are not necessarily “cyberattacks” but lead to doubts about the authenticity of all digital content , including videos , and therefore require particular attention in terms of transparency requirements; warns that deepfakes could contribute to a broad climate of public mistrust in ai , as well as a deeper socio-political polarisation within our societies;


### 43. elaborates that the internet of things , as well as the fact that ai systems nowadays run a significant amount of key critical infrastructure , such as energy grids , the food chain , the atm network and hospital logistics , has created a massive ai cybersecurity threat; predicts that states will focus more and more on protecting their it logistics and care delivery as a domestic asset , which could in turn create the temptation to invoke ‘ai autarchy’; ### 43. elaborates that with the internet of things , the fact that ai systems run a significant amount of key critical infrastructure , such as energy and transport grids , the food chain , banking and financial infrastructure and hospital facilities , has created new vulnerabilities that require robust cybersecurity measures to prevent threats; points out in this regard the importance of cooperation and information sharing and action both at the eu level as well as among member states;


### 43. elaborates that the internet of things , as well as the fact that ai systems nowadays run a significant amount of key critical infrastructure , such as energy grids , the food chain , the atm network and hospital logistics , has created a massive ai cybersecurity threat; predicts that states will focus more and more on protecting their it logistics and care delivery as a domestic asset , which could in turn create the temptation to invoke ‘ai autarchy’; ### 43. elaborates that the internet of things , as well as the fact that ai systems nowadays run a significant amount of key critical infrastructure , such as energy grids , the food chain , the atm network and hospital logistics , has created a massive ai cybersecurity threat; predicts that states will focus more and more on protecting their it logistics and care delivery as a domestic asset , which could in turn create the temptation to invoke ‘ai autarchy’; underlines the importance to foster the resilience of critical entities to hybrid threats;


### 43. elaborates that the internet of things , as well as the fact that ai systems nowadays run a significant amount of key critical infrastructure , such as energy grids , the food chain , the atm network and hospital logistics , has created a massive ai cybersecurity threat; predicts that states will focus more and more on protecting their it logistics and care delivery as a domestic asset , which could in turn create the temptation to invoke ‘ai autarchy’; ### 43. elaborates that the internet of things , as well as the fact that ai systems nowadays run a significant amount of key critical infrastructure , such as energy grids , the food chain , the atm network and hospital logistics , has created vulnerabilities and the potential for massive cybersecurity threats; predicts that states will focus more and more on protecting their it logistics and care delivery as a domestic asset , which could in turn create the temptation to invoke ‘ai autarchy’;


### 44. explains that the high level of accuracy that ai can achieve may pose security risks , as it can induce humans to place such confidence in ai as to trust it more than their own judgment; notes that experiments have shown that this can elevate the level of autonomy of ai beyond the supporting role for which it was originally designed and means that humans miss opportunities to gain experience and refine their skills and knowledge of ai systems; observes that this type of ai overuse has , for example , been cited as a major factor in several aircraft crashes25 ; ### deleted


### 45. highlights however that ai’s core characteristics also make the technology an ideal tool to enhance security; specifies that it can be used to synthesise large amounts of data , perform behavioural analysis of network activities and detect specific patterns; stresses that these elements would allow for better prediction and assessment of the threat level , faster decision-making processes , improved reactivity and the more effective securing of endpoint devices; ### 45. highlights however that ai’s core characteristics also make the technology an ideal tool to enhance security; specifies that it can be used to perform behavioural analysis of network activities , predict power failures and identify maintenance needs with great accuracy; stresses that these elements would allow for better prediction and assessment of the threat level , faster decision-making processes , improved reactivity and the more effective securing of endpoint devices;


### 45. highlights however that ai’s core characteristics also make the technology an ideal tool to enhance security; specifies that it can be used to synthesise large amounts of data , perform behavioural analysis of network activities and detect specific patterns; stresses that these elements would allow for better prediction and assessment of the threat level , faster decision-making processes , improved reactivity and the more effective securing of endpoint devices; ### 45. highlights however that ai’s core characteristics also make the technology a possible tool to enhance security; underlines that ai systems and applications intended to extract and synthesise data , and extrapolate results therefrom to inform decisions formatters relating to defence and national security , must be specific in scope and comply with the provisions set out in the current regulatory framework in terms of gathering and processing data;


### 46. underlines , in particular , the potential inherent in enabling law enforcement agencies to proactively assess and predict ai misuse , as well as to counter it effectively by using ai technologies themselves; underlines that such ai-supported law enforcement activities do , however , require clear transparency rules , highly skilled employees and access to large amounts of relevant data; ### deleted


### 46. underlines , in particular , the potential inherent in enabling law enforcement agencies to proactively assess and predict ai misuse , as well as to counter it effectively by using ai technologies themselves; underlines that such ai-supported law enforcement activities do , however , require clear transparency rules , highly skilled employees and access to large amounts of relevant data; ### 46. underlines , in particular , the potential inherent in enabling law enforcement agencies to proactively assess and predict ai misuse , as well as to counter it effectively by using ai technologies themselves , in full respect of data protection regulations and in an unbiased manner; underlines that such ai-supported law enforcement activities do , however , require clear transparency rules and highly skilled employees; stresses that ai applications designed to process data for intelligence purposes in defence should comply with data processing standards to avoid risks of unintended surveillance or infringement of individual rights; believes that for high-risk applications of ai-enabled technologies the union must ensure that their development and deployment is rightful , proportional and respects the rights of individuals; stresses the importance of monitoring competent national law enforcement authorities which develop and deploy ai-enabled systems and technologies to maintain public order so as to mitigate the disproportional risks of predictive policing;


### 46. underlines , in particular , the potential inherent in enabling law enforcement agencies to proactively assess and predict ai misuse , as well as to counter it effectively by using ai technologies themselves; underlines that such ai-supported law enforcement activities do , however , require clear transparency rules , highly skilled employees and access to large amounts of relevant data; ### 46. underlines , in particular , the potential inherent in enabling law enforcement agencies to proactively assess ai misuse , as well as to counter it effectively by using ai technologies themselves; underlines that such ai-supported law enforcement activities do , however , require clear transparency rules , respect for fundamental rights , highly skilled and trained employees;


### 63. acknowledges at the same time that the very same ai technologies used to address fundamental societal problems and achieve important public policy goals could also pose crucial ethical and legal questions; notes that there have already been documented instances which have led to serious wrongdoing within the eu; notes that in practice , member states rely heavily on the police to collect data , but also on private entities whose activities are often not supervised and who regularly sell the collected and highly sensitive data to other third parties; clarifies that this practice runs counter to european values and undermines the high level of fundamental rights in the eu , in particular the right to privacy; ### 63. acknowledges that the very same ai technologies used to address fundamental societal problems and achieve important public policy goals could also pose crucial ethical and legal questions , if not appropriately regulated; notes that there have already been several documented instances of serious wrongdoing within the eu , for example in the field of welfare benefits or on law enforcement; notes that in practice , member states member states often outsource data collection activities to private entities , often without adequate supervision or regulation , and which regularly sell the collected and highly sensitive data to other third parties; clarifies that this practice runs counter to european values and undermines its fundamental rights , in particular the right to privacy;


### 64. stresses that many authoritarian regimes apply ai systems to control , spy on , monitor and rank their citizens; believes that any form of unrestricted normative citizen scoring on a large scale by public authorities , especially within the field of law enforcement and the judiciary , leads to the loss of autonomy and is not in line with european values; highlights past cases of eu companies having sold biometric systems which would be illegal to use within the eu to authoritarian regimes in non-eu countries; ### 64. stresses that many authoritarian regimes apply ai systems to control , exert mass surveillance , rank their citizens and restrict their freedom of movement; believes that any form of indiscriminate surveillance or unrestricted normative citizen scoring on a large scale by public authorities as well as private entities , especially within the field of law enforcement , border control and the judiciary , leads to the loss of autonomy , holds an enormous risk of discrimination and is not in line with european values; is concerned that the current eu dependence on third-country ai systems that might be trained with poor-quality data or easily hackable pose a huge risk of personal data breaches of eu citizens;


### 64. stresses that many authoritarian regimes apply ai systems to control , spy on , monitor and rank their citizens; believes that any form of unrestricted normative citizen scoring on a large scale by public authorities , especially within the field of law enforcement and the judiciary , leads to the loss of autonomy and is not in line with european values; highlights past cases of eu companies having sold biometric systems which would be illegal to use within the eu to authoritarian regimes in non-eu countries; ### 64. stresses that many authoritarian regimes apply ai systems to control , spy on , monitor and rank their citizens; believes that any form of unrestricted normative citizen scoring on a large scale by public authorities , especially within the field of law enforcement and the judiciary , as well as its use by private companies or individuals , leads to the loss of autonomy and privacy , and is not in line with european values; highlights past cases of eu companies having sold biometric systems which would be illegal to use within the eu to authoritarian regimes in non-eu countries , and calls for a ban on such sales;


### 65. notes that dominant tech platforms nowadays not only have significant control over access to information and its distribution , but they also use ai technologies to obtain more information on a person’s identity and knowledge of decisional history than is possessed by public authorities or close personal advisors such as doctors , lawyers or bankers; stresses that this development challenges the sovereignty of our nation states , the foundations of our democratic systems and the safeguarding of our fundamental rights; ### 65. notes that dominant tech platforms nowadays not only have significant control over access to information and its distribution , but they also use ai technologies to obtain more information on a person’s identity and knowledge of decisional history than is possessed by public authorities or close personal advisors such as doctors , lawyers or bankers; stresses that this development challenges the autonomy of citizens , the sovereignty of our nation states , the foundations of our democratic systems and the safeguarding of our fundamental rights;


### 65. notes that dominant tech platforms nowadays not only have significant control over access to information and its distribution , but they also use ai technologies to obtain more information on a person’s identity and knowledge of decisional history than is possessed by public authorities or close personal advisors such as doctors , lawyers or bankers; stresses that this development challenges the sovereignty of our nation states , the foundations of our democratic systems and the safeguarding of our fundamental rights; ### 65. notes that dominant tech platforms nowadays not only have significant control over access to information and its distribution , but they also use ai technologies to obtain and combine data on a person’s identity , behaviour and knowledge of decisional history than is possessed by public authorities with the intent of profiling and microtargeting; stresses that this development creates an enormous imbalance of power and poses systemic risks that can ultimately even affect democracy;


### 66. points out that digital platforms are also used to spread disinformation , acting as networks for propaganda , trolling and harassment with the aim of undermining electoral processes; stresses that machine learning enables in particular the targeted use of personal data to create personalised and convincing messages for potential voters , who are often completely unaware that the content has been created or manipulated through the use of ai; ### 66. points out that digital platforms are also used to spread disinformation and deepfakes , acting as networks for propaganda , trolling and harassment with the aim of undermining electoral processes; stresses that machine learning enables in particular the targeted use of personal data to create personalised and convincing messages for potential voters , who are often completely unaware that the content has been created or manipulated through the use of ai; highlights in this respect the need to extend the european democracy action plan in order to mitigate that risk , while considering the complete ban of deepfakes technologies in political advertisements and communication;


### 66. points out that digital platforms are also used to spread disinformation , acting as networks for propaganda , trolling and harassment with the aim of undermining electoral processes; stresses that machine learning enables in particular the targeted use of personal data to create personalised and convincing messages for potential voters , who are often completely unaware that the content has been created or manipulated through the use of ai; ### 66. points out that digital platforms can also be used to spread disinformation and foreign interference in electoral processes; stresses that machine learning enables in particular the targeted use of personal data to manipulate unaware voters , by creating personalised and convincing messages;


### 67. underlines that ai could , however , also be used to reduce anti-democratic and unethical activities on platforms and as a means to stop the distribution of fake news; notes that the effective use of ai for this purpose has so far been prevented by strongly diverging definitions of hate speech among member states and the lack of consensus on how to harness ai to effectively filter out illegal and harmful content; explains that it is also problematic that divisive language leads to greater user engagement , which is why removal of such language would be in direct conflict with the platform’s business model , based on maximising user engagement; ### 67. underlines that ai could , however , also be used as a tool to reduce anti-democratic and unethical activities on platforms and as a means to stop the distribution of fake news , even though its abilities to understand context have shown so far very poor results; is concerned that divisive language leads to greater user engagement , which is why removal of such language would be in direct conflict with the platform’s business model , based on maximising user engagement , for example through click-baiting and content amplification;


### 68. stresses that bias in ai systems often occurs due to a lack of diverse and high-quality training data , for instance where data sets are used which do not sufficiently cover discriminated groups , or where the task definition or requirement setting themselves were biased; notes that bias can also arise due to a limited volume of training data , which can result from overly strict data protection provisions , or where a biased ai developer has compromised the algorithm; points out that some biases in the form of reasoned differentiation are , on the other hand , also intentionally created in order to improve the ai’s learning performance under certain circumstances; ### 68. stresses that bias in ai systems often occurs due to a lack of diverse and high-quality training data , for instance where data sets are used which do not sufficiently cover discriminated groups , or where the task definition or requirement setting themselves were biased; further notes that the categorisation of individuals according to some particular variables may be intrinsically biased , especially if it requires individuals to define with one of a narrow set of categories; notes that bias can also arise where a biased ai developer has compromised the algorithm; points out that some biases in the form of reasoned differentiation are , on the other hand , also intentionally created in order to improve the ai’s learning performance under certain circumstances;


### 68. stresses that bias in ai systems often occurs due to a lack of diverse and high-quality training data , for instance where data sets are used which do not sufficiently cover discriminated groups , or where the task definition or requirement setting themselves were biased; notes that bias can also arise due to a limited volume of training data , which can result from overly strict data protection provisions , or where a biased ai developer has compromised the algorithm; points out that some biases in the form of reasoned differentiation are , on the other hand , also intentionally created in order to improve the ai’s learning performance under certain circumstances; ### 68. stresses that bias in ai systems often occurs due to a lack of diverse , updated and high-quality training data , for instance where datasets are used which do not sufficiently cover discriminated or vulnerable groups , or where the task definition or requirement setting themselves were biased for their very design; notes that bias can also arise due to the lack of diversity in ai developers teams , reiterating intrinsic biases , or to a limited volume of training data , which can result from lack of access to non-personal data , especially for smes;


### 69. raises the question of whether certain biases can be resolved by using more diverse datasets , given the structural biases present in our society; specifies in this regard that algorithms learn to be as discriminatory as the society they observe and then suggest decisions that are inherently discriminatory , which again contributes to exacerbating discrimination within society; concludes that there is therefore no such thing as a completely impartial and objective algorithm; ### 69. notes that certain biases cannot be completely resolved by using more diverse datasets , given the structural biases present in our society; specifies in this regard that algorithms learn to be as discriminatory as the society they observe and then suggest decisions that are inherently discriminatory , which again contributes to exacerbating discrimination within society; calls hence for proper risk assessment on high-risk use cases and integrating bias-risk assessment to the full lifecycle of the ai system; and encourages new innovations and practices that seek to mitigate these biases and even aims to turn ai to an asset in fighting bias and discrimination in certain situations , and a force for equal rights and positive social change;


### 69. raises the question of whether certain biases can be resolved by using more diverse datasets , given the structural biases present in our society; specifies in this regard that algorithms learn to be as discriminatory as the society they observe and then suggest decisions that are inherently discriminatory , which again contributes to exacerbating discrimination within society; concludes that there is therefore no such thing as a completely impartial and objective algorithm; ### 69. raises the question of whether certain biases can be resolved by using more diverse datasets , given the structural biases present in our society; specifies in this regard that algorithms learn to be as discriminatory as the society they observe and then suggest decisions that are inherently discriminatory , which again contributes to exacerbating discrimination within society; concludes that it is therefore necessary to establish different control layers on ai systems software , algorithms and data used and produced by them , in order to minimise the risk;


### 69. raises the question of whether certain biases can be resolved by using more diverse datasets , given the structural biases present in our society; specifies in this regard that algorithms learn to be as discriminatory as the society they observe and then suggest decisions that are inherently discriminatory , which again contributes to exacerbating discrimination within society; concludes that there is therefore no such thing as a completely impartial and objective algorithm; ### 69. raises the question of whether certain biases can be resolved by using more diverse datasets , given the structural biases present in our society; specifies in this regard that algorithms learn to be as discriminatory as the society they observe and then suggest decisions that are inherently discriminatory , which again contributes to exacerbating discrimination within society; concludes that there is therefore no such thing as a completely impartial and objective algorithm , which begs the possibility that algorithms are not suited for certain tasks;


### 69. raises the question of whether certain biases can be resolved by using more diverse datasets , given the structural biases present in our society; specifies in this regard that algorithms learn to be as discriminatory as the society they observe and then suggest decisions that are inherently discriminatory , which again contributes to exacerbating discrimination within society; concludes that there is therefore no such thing as a completely impartial and objective algorithm; ### 69. raises the question of whether certain biases can be solved by using more diverse datasets , given the structural biases present in our society; is concerned in this regard that algorithms learn to be as discriminatory as the society they observe and then suggest decisions that are inherently discriminatory , which again contributes to exacerbating discrimination within society; states that this amplifies even more the sensitivity and the risks of using them to take decisions impacting people or society;


### 70. believes that that the adoption of ai , if combined with the necessary support infrastructure and training , can substantially increase productivity , innovation , growth and job creation , with expectations of labour productivity set to increase by 11-37 %26 by 2035; ### 70. underlines that the eu must promote a socially responsible use of ai fully respecting workers' rights and decent working conditions , a work-life balance with the right to disconnect and improving access to the labour market , while safeguarding the rights to privacy , health and safety , and prohibiting any discriminatory and illegal surveillance of workers;


### 71. stresses that although ai may replace some tasks , including mundane , labour-intensive or dangerous tasks , it will create new , higher value-added employment; stresses that ai is currently substituting or complementing humans in a subset of tasks but that it is not yet having detectable aggregate labour market consequences27 ; stresses , however , the potential for an increase in income inequality if ai is augmenting high-skill occupations and replacing low-skill occupations , and that such possible effects need to be prepared for; ### 71. stresses that although ai may replace some tasks , including mundane , labour-intensive or dangerous tasks , it will create new , higher value-added employment where ai is used to augment , not replace human capacities26b;stresses that ai is currently substituting or complementing humans in a subset of tasks but that it is not yet having detectable aggregate labour market consequences27;stresses , however , the potential for an increase in income inequality if ai is augmenting high-skill occupations and replacing low-skill occupations , and that such possible effects need to be prepared for; calls for efforts to balance the workforce developing ai through facilitating the entry of women and other underrepresented groups in the ai professions and initiatives to promote diversity in all phases of ai-system development;


### 71. stresses that although ai may replace some tasks , including mundane , labour-intensive or dangerous tasks , it will create new , higher value-added employment; stresses that ai is currently substituting or complementing humans in a subset of tasks but that it is not yet having detectable aggregate labour market consequences27 ; stresses , however , the potential for an increase in income inequality if ai is augmenting high-skill occupations and replacing low-skill occupations , and that such possible effects need to be prepared for; ### 71. stresses that although ai may replace some tasks , including mundane , repetitive , heavy , labour-intensive or dangerous ones , it can create new , higher quality employment , leaving more time for stimulating tasks and career development; stresses that ai is currently already substituting or complementing humans in a subset of tasks but that it is not yet having detectable significant aggregate labour market consequences; stresses , however , the potential for an increase in income inequality if ai increases high-skill occupations and replaces low-skill occupations , and that such possible effects need to be mitigated , by appropriate measures , such as possible universal income measures; adds on the other hand that jobs with a more human character , requiring empathy , such as care jobs , are likely to remain , as ai cannot fully replace humans in these tasks;


### 71. stresses that although ai may replace some tasks , including mundane , labour-intensive or dangerous tasks , it will create new , higher value-added employment; stresses that ai is currently substituting or complementing humans in a subset of tasks but that it is not yet having detectable aggregate labour market consequences27 ; stresses , however , the potential for an increase in income inequality if ai is augmenting high-skill occupations and replacing low-skill occupations , and that such possible effects need to be prepared for; ### 71. stresses that although ai may replace some tasks , including mundane , labour-intensive or dangerous tasks , it will create new , higher value-added employment; stresses that ai is currently substituting or complementing humans in a subset of tasks but that it is not yet having detectable aggregate labour market consequences27 ; stresses , however , the potential for an increase in income inequality if ai is augmenting high-skill occupations and replacing low-skill occupations , and that such possible effects need to be prepared for; is of the opinion that the creation of an "ai adjustment fund" could be beneficial for member states to cover the accustoming of their labour markets to new conditions arising from rapid mass introduction of ai systems which could affect specific job sectors;


### 71. stresses that although ai may replace some tasks , including mundane , labour-intensive or dangerous tasks , it will create new , higher value-added employment; stresses that ai is currently substituting or complementing humans in a subset of tasks but that it is not yet having detectable aggregate labour market consequences27 ; stresses , however , the potential for an increase in income inequality if ai is augmenting high-skill occupations and replacing low-skill occupations , and that such possible effects need to be prepared for; ### 71. stresses that although ai will replace some tasks , including mundane , labour-intensive or dangerous tasks , it will create new , higher value-added employment; stresses that ai is currently substituting or complementing humans in a subset of tasks but that it is not yet having detectable aggregate labour market consequences27 ; stresses , however , the potential for an increase in income inequality if ai is augmenting high-skill occupations and replacing low-skill occupations , and that such possible effects need to be prepared for by investing in reskilling and upskilling of the workforce with a focus on underrepresented groups such as women and minorities , which are likely to be most affected by this transition;


### 72. highlights that ai implementation also represents an opportunity for significant cultural change within organisations , including improved workplace safety , better work-life balance and more effective training and guidance; is of the opinion that human-empowering ai applications could also create new job opportunities , in particular for those who , because of natural restrictions such as disabilities or living circumstances , were initially bound to less qualified jobs; ### 72. highlights that ai uptake can also represent an opportunity for significant cultural change within organisations , including improved workplace safety , better work-life balance , the right to disconnect and more effective training opportunities and guidance; is of the opinion that human-empowering ai applications could also create new job opportunities , in particular for those who , because of natural restrictions such as disabilities or living circumstances , were initially bound to less qualified jobs;


### 73. is concerned about ai-fuelled surveillance in the workplace and teleworking environment , as well as in the school environment , in the light of the fundamental right to privacy , data protection and the human dignity of the worker , as well as the fundamental rights of children; ### 73. is concerned about the increased recourse to ai-fuelled surveillance in the workplace , particularly with the emergence of teleworking , often occurring without the workers’ knowledge , let alone their consent; sustains that this practice should not be allowed , as it is extremely abusive of the fundamental right to privacy , data protection and the human dignity of the worker , and has also negative effects on their mental health;


### 73. is concerned about ai-fuelled surveillance in the workplace and teleworking environment , as well as in the school environment , in the light of the fundamental right to privacy , data protection and the human dignity of the worker , as well as the fundamental rights of children; ### 73. is concerned about ai-fuelled surveillance in the workplace and teleworking environment , as well as in the school environment , in the light of the fundamental right to privacy , data protection and the human dignity of the worker , as well as the fundamental rights of children due to the degree of intrusion , its blanket or indiscriminate effect , or lack of safeguards for affected individuals;


### 73. is concerned about ai-fuelled surveillance in the workplace and teleworking environment , as well as in the school environment , in the light of the fundamental right to privacy , data protection and the human dignity of the worker , as well as the fundamental rights of children; ### 73. is concerned about ai-fuelled surveillance in the workplace and teleworking environment , in the light of the fundamental right to privacy , data protection and the human dignity of the worker;


### 74. considers that the adaptation of the workforce in terms of ai education and retraining is of vital importance , as 52 %28 of the current european workforce urgently requires retraining; highlights that current concepts of learning and working are still defined to too great an extent by the job market needs of a pre-digital world , which also contributes to a growing skills gap and a new digital divide for both citizens and businesses who do not have access to a secure digital space; stresses that enhancing digital literacy contributes to achieving the sdgs , in particular those on education , human capital and infrastructure; ### 74. considers that the adaptation of the workforce in terms of ai education , life-long learning and reskilling is of vital importance; highlights that current concepts of learning and working are still defined to too great an extent by the pre-digital world , which also contributes to a growing skills gap and a new digital divide for citizens who do not have access to a secure digital space; stresses that enhancing digital literacy contributes to achieving the sdgs , in particular those on education , human capital and infrastructure;


### 75. stresses that more than 70 % of businesses report a lack of staff with adequate digital and ai skills as an obstacle to investment; is concerned that as of 2019 , there were 7.8 million ict specialists in the eu , with a prior annual growth rate of 4.2 % , which is far short of the 20 million experts that are needed for key areas such as data analysis , as projected by the commission; is concerned about the extensive gender gap in this area , with only one in six ict specialists and one in three science , technology , engineering and mathematics (stem) graduates being female29 ; ### 75. stresses that more than 70 % of businesses report a lack of staff with adequate digital and ai skills as an obstacle to investment; is concerned that as of 2019 , there were 7.8 million ict specialists in the eu , with a prior annual growth rate of 4.2 % , which is far short of the 20 million experts that are needed for key areas such as data analysis , as projected by the commission; is concerned about the extensive gender gap in this area , with only one in six ict specialists and one in three science , technology , engineering and mathematics (stem) graduates being female29 ; stresses that this gap inevitably results in biased algorithms;


### g) three recurring findings in all six case studies ### g) recurring findings in all six case studies


### security and military deterrence ### security


### 76. notes that there are a number of transversal obstacles that the eu needs to overcome in order to achieve a widespread use of ai and to fully harness its benefits; states that in particular , legal uncertainty , insufficient digital infrastructure and a lack of ai skills can be observed as barriers to the successful application of ai in all fields analysed; ### 76. notes that there are a number of transversal obstacles that the eu needs to overcome in order to allow for the uptake of ai in accordance with eu principles , values and legislation and to fully harness its benefits; states that in particular , legal uncertainty , market fragmentation , insufficient digital infrastructure and a lack of ai skills can be observed as barriers to the successful application of ai in all fields analysed;


### 77. concludes from the case studies examined , furthermore , that it is not specific ai technologies themselves that are risky , but certain use cases; points in particular to dual-use ai systems such as drones , the uses of which can vary drastically from consumer recreation to warfare , with the worst-case scenario being swarms of inexpensive , armed microdrones used to kill specific human targets; ### 77. concludes that the risk from ai technologies is dependent on not only the technology itself , but also on how it can be used , including unintended , and how widely it is deployed; adds moreover the fundamental role of meaningful human oversight in ensuring appropriate use and useful outcomes;


### 77. concludes from the case studies examined , furthermore , that it is not specific ai technologies themselves that are risky , but certain use cases; points in particular to dual-use ai systems such as drones , the uses of which can vary drastically from consumer recreation to warfare , with the worst-case scenario being swarms of inexpensive , armed microdrones used to kill specific human targets; ### 77. concludes from the case studies examined , furthermore , that it is not specific ai technologies themselves that are risky , but certain use cases and areas of application; points in particular to dual-use ai systems such as drones , the uses of which can vary drastically from consumer recreation to warfare , with the worst-case scenario being swarms of inexpensive , armed microdrones used to kill specific human targets;


### 78. states that while it is important to examine and categorise potential risks posed by ai , the case studies illustrated that ai technologies also enable us to apply , in most cases , very effective counter measures that are able to mitigate or eliminate the very same risks; underlines that , as ai is still in its early stages of development within a wider context of emerging technologies , its real potential can still only be imagined; stresses that the promise and potential benefits of ai in economic and societal terms appear to be tremendous; ### deleted


### 78. states that while it is important to examine and categorise potential risks posed by ai , the case studies illustrated that ai technologies also enable us to apply , in most cases , very effective counter measures that are able to mitigate or eliminate the very same risks; underlines that , as ai is still in its early stages of development within a wider context of emerging technologies , its real potential can still only be imagined; stresses that the promise and potential benefits of ai in economic and societal terms appear to be tremendous; ### 78. underlines that , as ai is still in its early stages of development within a wider context of emerging technologies , its real potential as well as risks are not certain; stresses that the promise and potential benefits of ai in economic and societal terms appear to be tremendous;


### 78. states that while it is important to examine and categorise potential risks posed by ai , the case studies illustrated that ai technologies also enable us to apply , in most cases , very effective counter measures that are able to mitigate or eliminate the very same risks; underlines that , as ai is still in its early stages of development within a wider context of emerging technologies , its real potential can still only be imagined; stresses that the promise and potential benefits of ai in economic and societal terms appear to be tremendous; ### 78. states that while it is important to examine and categorise potential risks posed by ai , the case studies illustrated that ai technologies also enable us to apply , in most cases , very effective counter measures that are able to mitigate or eliminate the very same risks; underlines that , as ai is still in its early stages of development within a wider context of emerging technologies , its real potential can still only be imagined; stresses that the promise and potential benefits of ai in economic and societal terms appear to be tremendous both in europe and globally;


### 79. observes fierce ai competition that involves not only the two frontrunners , the us and china , but also countries such as canada , india , israel , japan , russia , south korea and the uk; underlines that the previous chapter has already indicated that the eu is so far struggling to meet its aspiration30 of becoming a global leader in ai; ### deleted


### 81. notes that the us refrains from introducing horizontal legislation in the digital field , while focusing instead on sector-specific laws and private sector innovation , in particular among its tech giants and leading universities; observes that the us approach on ai up to 2019 can therefore be summarised as providing legal guidance to businesses , investing in research projects and removing barriers to innovation; ### 81. notes that the us is also discussing on introducing horizontal legislation in the digital field , despite its traditional focus on litigation , sector-specific laws and private sector innovation , in particular among its tech giants and leading universities; observes that the us approach on ai up to 2019 can therefore be summarised as providing legal guidance to businesses , investing in research projects and removing barriers to innovation , but that recent developments show an increasingly active policy-making role;


### 82. stresses that the 2019 american ai initiative act ushered in a slight realignment , as besides redirecting funding , retraining workers and strengthening digital infrastructure , the us government announced the development of common standards for trustworthy ai; notes , however , that the resulting 10 principles were very broadly formulated in order to allow each government agency to create sector-specific regulations; expects that although the administration of president biden plans to bring forward a new bill of rights to limit ai harms in 2022 , the us approach will remain market-driven , aiming to avoid regulatory overreach; ### 82. stresses that the 2019 american ai initiative act ushered in a slight realignment , as besides redirecting funding , retraining workers and strengthening digital infrastructure , the us government announced the development of common standards for trustworthy ai; notes , however , that the resulting 10 principles were very broadly formulated in order to allow each government agency to create sector-specific regulations;


### 83. highlights that chinese president xi jinping underlined as early as 2013 the importance of technologies in geopolitics , the role of public policies in defining long-term objectives and the fact that ai offers an opportunity to overtake the us in terms of military supremacy; stresses further that the chinese government subsequently put forward the made in china 2025 plan in 2015 and the next generation ai development plan in 2017 , both of which had the clear targets of making china the global leader in ai by 2030; notes that the 2018 ai standardisation white paper further outlined how the socialist market economy can develop international standards and strategically engage in international standardisation organisations; ### 83. highlights that chinese president xi jinping underlined as early as 2013 the importance of technologies in geopolitics , the role of public policies in defining long-term objectives and the fact that ai offers an opportunity to overtake the us; stresses further that the chinese government subsequently put forward the made in china 2025 plan in 2015 and the next generation ai development plan in 2017 , both of which had the clear targets of making china the global leader in ai by 2030; notes that the 2018 ai standardisation white paper further outlined how the socialist market economy can develop international standards and strategically engage in international standardisation organisations; adds the recent activism of the chinese government in introducing rules on recommender systems as well as an ethics code on ai;


### 84. observes that on the global stage , china actively promotes international ai partnership as a way to export its own ai-based government surveillance practices , social scoring system and censorship strategies; emphasises that heavy investment abroad under the digital silk road initiative are also used as a means to spread chinese ai globally and to bring other countries under chinese influence; concludes that the chinese approach is therefore built upon deploying ai domestically as well as exporting ai technologies that follow predetermined standards that are in line with the ideology of the chinese communist party; ### 84. observes that on the global stage , china actively promotes international ai partnership as a way to export its own ai-based government surveillance practices , social scoring system and censorship strategies; emphasises that heavy investment abroad under the digital silk road initiative are also used as a means to spread chinese ai globally and to bring other countries under chinese influence; concludes that the chinese approach is therefore built upon deploying ai domestically as well as exporting ai technologies that follow predetermined standards that are in line with the ideology of the chinese communist party; and hence calls for european union to pursue regulatory leadership in setting the global rules and standards on ai;


### 84. observes that on the global stage , china actively promotes international ai partnership as a way to export its own ai-based government surveillance practices , social scoring system and censorship strategies; emphasises that heavy investment abroad under the digital silk road initiative are also used as a means to spread chinese ai globally and to bring other countries under chinese influence; concludes that the chinese approach is therefore built upon deploying ai domestically as well as exporting ai technologies that follow predetermined standards that are in line with the ideology of the chinese communist party; ### 84. observes that on the global stage , china actively promotes international ai partnership as a way to export its own ai-based government surveillance practices , social scoring system and censorship strategies; emphasises that heavy investment abroad under the digital silk road initiative are also used as a means to spread chinese ai globally and to bring other countries under chinese influence; concludes that the chinese approach is therefore built upon deploying ai domestically as well as exporting ai technologies based on standards that are in line with the ideology of the chinese government;


### 86. emphasises that central to the eu regulatory approach is a strong attention to ethical considerations in line with core human rights values and democratic principles; underlines that the commission thereby hopes to achieve another gdpr-like ‘brussels effect’ , meaning that the eu’s regulatory and market power leads to a competitive edge in ai; states that establishing the world’s first regulatory framework for ai could indeed leverage a first-mover advantage in setting international ai standards based on european values , as well as successfully exporting ‘trustworthy ai’ around the world; ### 86. emphasises that central to the eu regulatory approach is a strong attention to ethical considerations in line with core human rights , values and democratic principles , to integrate into classic but robust technical product safety provisions; underlines that the commission thereby aims to set a gold standard on ai to inspire other democracies and become a world leader on human-centric and trustworthy ai;


### 87. is aware that that the vast majority of the 100 leading ai companies globally are domiciled in the us , whereas only three chinese companies and four eu companies fall into this category34 ; notes that the us also leads in the total number of ai start-ups , hosting 40 % of all new ai companies , followed by the eu with 22 % and china with 11 %35 ; ### 87. is aware that that the vast majority of the leading ai companies globally are based in the us , whereas only a few are in the eu; notes that the us also leads in the total number of ai startups;


### 88. points out that in recent years , many of the eu’s most successful digital companies have been acquired by us tech giants; refers also to the ongoing debate about so-called ‘killer acquisitions’; notes that us firms , with 130 acquisitions in 2020 alone , acquired many more ai companies than eu and chinese firms combined , which made 30 and three comparable acquisitions respectively; ### 88. points out that in recent years , several successful european digital companies have been acquired by us tech giants; welcomes the upcoming approval of the digital markets act that will contribute to limit killer acquisitions;


### 89. stresses that while the us and china are trying to accelerate the use of ai technologies in the public and private sectors , the adoption of ai within the eu lags behind; states that only 7 % of all eu companies are currently using ai technologies , while just 30 % are planning to do so in the future36 ; states that there is also a clear gap in ai readiness between different business sectors as well as among member states , with southern and eastern europe lagging behind , while northern europe is , in general , very advanced , even by global standards; ### 89. stresses that while the us and china are trying to accelerate the use of ai technologies in the public and private sectors , the eu has also set very ambitious targets through the commission's communication on the digital compass;


### 90. underlines that while the us and china each have a unified digital market with a coherent set of rules , the eu’s digital single market is still fragmented and features many barriers; stresses that the development of ai products and services is further slowed down by the existence of 27 different national ai strategies and the fact that the eu’s ai assets such as talent , capital and research are spread widely across the continent; ### 90. is concerned that the eu’s digital single market is still not complete and fragmented and unjustified barriers remain to be addressed; stresses that the artificial intelligence act will establish a clear legal framework to enable the creation of a true and safe single market for ai , in conjunction with the coordinated plan on ai and other policy actions and funds put in place both at the eu and national level;


### 91. points also to the problem that inconsistencies in eu law , contradictions between eu and national laws , different legal interpretations and a lack of enforcement among member states is putting european companies in operational and financial jeopardy as they cannot determine whether their ai innovations are later likely to be assessed as non-compliant with eu law; ### 91. points also to the problem that inconsistencies in eu law , contradictions between eu and national laws , different legal interpretations and a lack of enforcement among member states create legal uncertainty and prevent the creation of a level playing field for businesses;


### 92. notes that the insufficient legal certainty for ai companies is further exacerbated by the fact that common standards and norms are missing in some sectors , while others are compromised by overregulation or the presence of legislative proposals that have been pending for long periods of time without being adopted; highlights as an example the fact that eu ai developers face a data challenge that neither their us nor chinese counterparts do; observes that they often do not have enough high-quality data to train their algorithms , struggle with strict data protection rules and are affected by a lack of sectoral data spaces and cross-sectoral interoperability , as well as constraints on cross-border data flows; ### 92. notes that the insufficient legal certainty for ai companies is further exacerbated by the fact that common standards and norms are missing in some sectors;


### 94. states that together with national initiatives , the estimated annual public investment of the eu in ai of eur 1 billion is also much lower than the eur 5.1 billion invested annually in the us and up to eur 6.8 billion in china38 ; states , however , that between 2017 and 2020 , eu public funding for ai research and innovation increased by 70 % compared to the previous period; acknowledges that the commission plans to increase investment further through the digital europe programme , horizon europe , the european structural and investment funds (esif) , the european investment fund (eif) , the recovery and resilience facility and various cohesion policy programmes39 ; ### deleted


### 95. stresses that ai companies within the eu have problems finding qualified employees as 42 % of the eu population lacks basic digital skills40 ; points out that the eu also struggles with ai-relevant university degrees , as the number of bachelor’s degrees awarded in ict is decreasing while the number of postgraduate degrees awarded is 50 % lower than in the us; underlines that the eu also faces a cybersecurity skills gap , with more than 350.000 experts needed; recognises that us and increasingly also chinese companies have a clear advantage in attracting and retaining ai talent from the rest of the world; ### 95. stresses that ai companies within the eu have problems finding qualified employees as 42 % of the eu population lacks basic digital skills40 ; points out that the eu also struggles with ai-relevant university degrees , as the number of bachelor’s degrees awarded in ict is decreasing while the number of postgraduate degrees awarded is 50 % lower than in the us; underlines that the eu also faces a cybersecurity skills gap , with more than 350.000 experts needed;


### 96. observes that although the eu still has an excellent community of researchers who are producing many ai research papers that are often cited and downloaded , the eu’s global impact is steadily declining , with a brain drain of top eu researchers to the us and china41 ; notes that the eu only spends 2 % of its gdp on research and development (r&d) , while the us spends 2.8 %; emphasises that the total r&d spending of us software and computer services firms in 2019 was eur 100 billion , which is much higher than comparative figures in china and the eu , where private r&d spending amounted to eur 20 billion and eur 12.5 billion respectively; ### 96. observes that although the eu has an excellent community of researchers on ai , the brain drain remains a serious problem; notes that the eu only spends 2 % of its gdp on research and development (r&d) , while the us spends 2.8 %;


### 97. notes that the eu’s digital infrastructure is underdeveloped , with just 25 % of people in the eu being able to connect to a 5g network , compared to 76 % of people in the us42 ; observes that the eu in general lacks high-performance digital infrastructure with interoperable data spaces , affordable energy supply , high transmission rates and volumes , reliability and short delays as well as a genuine ai ecosystem with excellence clusters such as can be found in the us or china43 ; ### deleted


### d) conclusion ### deleted


### 98. concludes that the us is still the overall leader in ai as it is ahead in almost every category , in particular when it comes to market power , investment , ai talent , research and infrastructure; highlights , however , that china , which five years ago was still significantly lagging behind the us in all indicators , is now quickly catching up in almost every category; notes that china could in fact achieve its goal of becoming the global leader in ai by 2030 or even earlier; recognises that both countries have the advantage of a unified single market , greater flexibility in digital governance and stronger political commitment to remaining a leader in ai; ### deleted


### 99. stresses that the eu is behind the us and china in virtually every category and that despite its current measures , it is losing further ground; notes that the eu is , however , ahead on regulatory approaches; points out that a viable eu strategy for becoming more competitive on ai would be to quadruple efforts to catch up when it comes to ai research and innovation , skills , infrastructure and investment , while at the same time trying to create a first-mover advantage by establishing a future-oriented and innovation-friendly regulatory framework for ai development and use; ### deleted


### 99. stresses that the eu is behind the us and china in virtually every category and that despite its current measures , it is losing further ground; notes that the eu is , however , ahead on regulatory approaches; points out that a viable eu strategy for becoming more competitive on ai would be to quadruple efforts to catch up when it comes to ai research and innovation , skills , infrastructure and investment , while at the same time trying to create a first-mover advantage by establishing a future-oriented and innovation-friendly regulatory framework for ai development and use; ### 99. stresses that the eu is behind the us and china in virtually every category and that despite its current measures , it is losing further ground; notes that the eu is , however , ahead on regulatory approaches; points out that a viable eu strategy for becoming more competitive on ai would be to quadruple efforts to catch up when it comes to ai research and innovation , skills , infrastructure and investment , while at the same time trying to create a first-mover advantage by establishing a future-oriented and innovation-friendly regulatory framework for ai development and use , while at the same time ensuring that fundamental rights of eu citizens and the rule of law are safeguarded;


### 100. underlines that the eu’s efforts to strengthen its global ai footprint were severely set back by brexit , as the uk was one of the leading eu countries in ai with london as one of the eu’s most important ai hubs , home to 1.000 ai companies , 35 tech hubs and reputed research centres such as the alan turing institute; ### deleted


### 101. concludes that the eu is currently on the losing side , far from fulfilling its aspiration of becoming a global leader in ai; maintains that there is still a small window of opportunity to change this situation , even though it will close very soon; states that the special committee therefore proposes to swiftly implement the following eu roadmap for ai; ### deleted


### 102. specifies that as the eu does not have the legislative power to address all the points listed in the eu roadmap for ai , the special committee recommends that a political process be launched with the aim of pulling all member states in the right direction and drastically improving the performance of those that are lagging furthest behind; refers in this regard to the eu 2000 lisbon agenda , which , despite the criticism , played a part in guiding the eu’s policy orientation over 20 years and in keeping up the pressure on member states to reform; ### deleted


### 103. calls on the commission to propose only legislative acts in the form of regulations for new digital laws in areas such as ai , as the digital single market needs to undergo a process of genuine harmonisation; is convinced that due to rapid technological development , digital legislation should always be swiftly adaptable , principle-based and future-proof , while adopting a risk-based approach; stresses , furthermore , the importance of legal certainty and , consequently , the need for robust , practical and unambiguous applicability criteria , definitions and obligations in all legal texts; ### 103. calls on the commission to propose only legislative acts in the form of regulations for new digital laws in areas such as ai , as the digital single market needs to undergo a process of genuine harmonisation; is convinced that due to rapid technological development , digital legislation should always be flexible , principle-based and future-proof; stresses , furthermore , the importance of legal certainty and , consequently , the need for robust , practical and unambiguous applicability criteria , definitions and obligations in all legal texts;


### 140. calls on the commission to improve knowledge transfer between ai research and the business world by setting up business networks , regulatory sandboxes and contact points with legal personnel and business consultants in universities; ### 140. calls on the commission to improve knowledge transfer between ai research and the business world by setting up business networks , regulatory sandboxes and contact points with legal personnel and business consultants in universities; calls on the commission to improve knowledge transfer between ai research and the society by setting up citizen panels , science and society platforms , and engaging the public in the framing of ai research agendas;


### 140. calls on the commission to improve knowledge transfer between ai research and the business world by setting up business networks , regulatory sandboxes and contact points with legal personnel and business consultants in universities; ### 140. calls on the commission to improve knowledge transfer between ai research and the business world by setting up business networks , regulatory sandboxes and contact points with legal personnel and business consultants in universities; underlines the importance of a smooth transition from academia to industry and the added value of proximity between the two for successful and dynamic ecosystems and industrial poles on ai;


### 141. stresses the need to accelerate knowledge transfer in the eu from research and science to ai applications in industry and the public sector; recommends the creation of a dedicated public-private partnership (ppp) on ai; calls on the commission to establish european ai data centres , jointly developed by government and industry and using strong encryption to protect the stored data in an appropriate manner; stresses the need to support the development of large-scale testing sites for ai; calls on the commission to provide financial incentives at eu level to launch pilot projects in member states; ### 141. stresses the need to accelerate knowledge transfer in the eu from research and science to ai applications in industry and the public sector; recommends the creation of a dedicated public-private partnership (ppp) on ai; calls on the commission to establish european ai data centres , jointly developed by government and industry and using strong encryption to protect the stored data in an appropriate manner; stresses the need to support the development of large-scale testing sites for ai;


### 142. supports strongly the establishment of an ai lighthouse under the horizon europe framework , which would be the continent’s pioneering centre of excellence for ai research and development; notes , however , that the eu and the member states should commit to a long-term and much more substantial investment plan in the region of eur 1 billion per year over the next 10 years; adds that the ai lighthouse would be an excellent place to create regulatory sandboxes , meaning time- and space-limited areas for experimenting with , testing and finessing specific ai applications that carry some risk but also have high potential for public good; ### 142. supports the establishment of an ai distributed lighthouse under the horizon europe framework , which would be the continent’s pioneering centre of excellence for ai research and development; notes , however , that the eu and the member states should commit to a long-term and more substantial investment plan; adds that the ai lighthouse would be an excellent place to create regulatory sandboxes;


### 142. supports strongly the establishment of an ai lighthouse under the horizon europe framework , which would be the continent’s pioneering centre of excellence for ai research and development; notes , however , that the eu and the member states should commit to a long-term and much more substantial investment plan in the region of eur 1 billion per year over the next 10 years; adds that the ai lighthouse would be an excellent place to create regulatory sandboxes , meaning time- and space-limited areas for experimenting with , testing and finessing specific ai applications that carry some risk but also have high potential for public good; ### 142. supports strongly the establishment of a distributed ai lighthouse supported by the horizon europe framework , building on the existing and future networks of regional ai excellence centres , with the aim to build an alliance of strong european research organisations that will share a common roadmap to support excellence in basic and applied research , to align national ai efforts , to foster innovation and investments , to attract and retain ai talent in europe , and to create synergies and economies of scale; notes , however , that the eu and the member states should commit to a long-term and much more substantial investment plan in the region of eur 1 billion per year over the next 10 years;


### 143. points out that the designation of european digital innovation hubs (edihs) under the digital europe programme is another important step in building up an ai ecosystem of excellence based on university-industry clusters; criticises , however , the fact that the hubs are dotted across the continent and that the interplay with other digital hubs designated by the european institute of innovation & technology (eit) and under the horizon europe framework remains unclear; suggests , consequently , that more coordination is needed , as is the establishment of a cooperating overall cluster of decentralised ai hubs based on an eu-wide framework for legal expertise , data , funding , and incentives; ### 143. points out that the designation of european digital innovation hubs (edihs) under the digital europe programme is another important step in building up an ai ecosystem of excellence based on university-industry clusters; welcomes the fact that the hubs are distributed across the continent and that the interplay with other digital hubs designated by the european institute of innovation & technology (eit) and under the horizon europe framework remains unclear; suggests , consequently , that more coordination is needed , as is the establishment of a cooperating overall cluster of decentralised ai hubs based on an eu-wide framework for legal expertise , data , funding , and incentives; welcomes the commission’s initiatives to establish startup networks across the eu and also beyond , such as startup europe and startup europe mediterranean in order to foster exchanges of ideas , business , and networking opportunities;


### 144. proposes to scale up and align existing mission such as ellis , platforms such as claire and flagship projects such as humane ai and ai4eu with the goal of promoting ambitious , collaborative and eu-wide research and development goals as well as projects; explains that a single ai mission with clear milestones and regular evaluation would attract the most talented researchers , bringing them together to address the biggest scientific questions in ai; ### 144. proposes to scale up and align existing mission such as ellis , platforms such as claire and flagship projects such as humane ai and ai4eu with the goal of promoting ambitious , collaborative and eu-wide research and development goals as well as projects;


### i. society and ai ### i. socially responsible ai


### 145. proposes that on top of the suggested ai training , the eu and its member states should create awareness raising campaigns , including public discussions at local level , as an additional means to reach , inform and empower citizens to understand better the capabilities , limitations and impacts of ai; ### 145. proposes that as part of its ai illustration , the eu and its member states should create awareness raising campaigns , including public discussions at local level , as an additional means to reach , inform and empower citizens to understand better the capabilities , limitations and the societal , legal , and ethical impact of ai to further contribute to ai trustworthiness and ai democratisation;


### 145. proposes that on top of the suggested ai training , the eu and its member states should create awareness raising campaigns , including public discussions at local level , as an additional means to reach , inform and empower citizens to understand better the capabilities , limitations and impacts of ai; ### 145. proposes that on top of the suggested ai training , the eu and its member states should create awareness raising campaigns , including public discussions at local level , as an additional means to reach , inform and empower citizens to understand better the opportunities opened by , limitations , risks and impacts of ai; is convinced that this , in parallel with the creation of a clear and sound legal framework on human-centric and trustworthy ai , would contribute to reducing citizens’ fears that are currently associated with a widespread adoption of ai in europe;


### 145. proposes that on top of the suggested ai training , the eu and its member states should create awareness raising campaigns , including public discussions at local level , as an additional means to reach , inform and empower citizens to understand better the capabilities , limitations and impacts of ai; ### 145. proposes that on top of the suggested ai training , the eu and its member states should create awareness raising campaigns , including public discussions at local level , as an additional means to reach , inform and empower citizens to understand better the capabilities , limitations , risks and impacts of ai;


### 146. calls on member states to deliver on the tallinn declaration on egovernment and put mechanisms in place to provide borderless , interoperable , personalised , user-friendly , and end-to-end digital public services based on ai to all individuals and businesses at all levels of public administration; is of the opinion that the objective should be to increase the number of people that use egovernment services , with a focus on ai , to up to 80 % of all eu citizens over the next five years; ### 146. calls on member states to deliver on the tallinn declaration on egovernment and put mechanisms in place to provide borderless , interoperable , personalised , user-friendly , and end-to-end digital public services based on ai to all citizens at all levels of public administration; is of the opinion that the objective should be to complete the provision of digitalized public services to citizens , which has already accelerated during the pandemic , over the next five years; recalls the rrf funds and the pnrrs will play a key role in this regard; welcomes the revision of the eidas regulation and its role in boosting the provision of digital public services , which in turn make digital literacy even more necessary;


### iii. ehealth ### iii. digital health


### 147. calls for human-centred design and an evidence-based approach to ai in health that focuses on patient-oriented and high-quality digital healthcare and that seeks consumer and user feedback throughout the development process; calls on the commission to set the global tone on cutting-edge healthcare and well-being , placing the benefits of ai at the centre of policy-making; urges the prioritisation of funding , the setting of strategic goals , the fostering of cooperation and the adoption of ai applications in healthcare as a critical sector; ### 147. calls for the development of human-centred and evidence-based applications of ai , acting on both the promotion of health and the prevention , diagnosis , treatment and recovery of disease , developed in close cooperation with health professionals and patients; urges the prioritisation of funding , the setting of strategic goals , the fostering of cooperation and the adoption of ai applications in healthcare as a critical sector whereby the opportunities offered by ai can bring enormous benefits to citizens’ health and well-being , if the inherent risks are appropriately managed;


### 147. calls for human-centred design and an evidence-based approach to ai in health that focuses on patient-oriented and high-quality digital healthcare and that seeks consumer and user feedback throughout the development process; calls on the commission to set the global tone on cutting-edge healthcare and well-being , placing the benefits of ai at the centre of policy-making; urges the prioritisation of funding , the setting of strategic goals , the fostering of cooperation and the adoption of ai applications in healthcare as a critical sector; ### 147. calls for human-centred design and an evidence-based approach to ai in health that focuses on personalized , patient-centred and high-quality digital healthcare urges the prioritisation of funding , the setting of strategic goals , the fostering of cooperation and the adoption of ai applications in healthcare as a critical sector whereby the opportunities offered by ai can bring enormous benefits to citizens’ health and well-being , if the inherent risks are appropriately managed;


### 148. is convinced that the eu should implement an ambitious digital industrial strategy with a focus on ai , that attempts to reduce the eu’s dependence on non-european hardware , software and services while establishing sound ethical , technological and security standards for those elements that are not produced in the eu or where the purchasing of imports makes more sense from an economic point of view; declares that this approach does not aim to make the eu protectionist , but to strengthen its role as a champion of international cooperation and trade; ### 148. is convinced that the eu should implement an ambitious digital industrial strategy with a focus on ai , while establishing sound legal , ethical , technological and security standards for all ai systems and components that are intended to be used in the eu single market or have impact on eu citizens;


### 149. proposes to offer an alternative to the buy-out vision of many ai start-ups by ensuring that government support is provided at all stages of their development; underlines in this regard that the eu should amplify its efforts at offering smes and start-ups development paths and services , especially by promoting the use of digital tools , developing ai transition plans and further expanding the exchange of best practices; urges the commission and the member states to provide better counselling and more concrete support through networks , digital hubs , ai trainers , business mentoring and site visits; ### 149. proposes to offer an alternative to the buy-out vision of many ai start-ups by ensuring that government support is provided at all stages of their development; underlines in this regard that the eu should amplify its efforts , and believes that this important task could be better achieved , increasing the leverage union-wide and helping to close the digital divide among countries and regions in the union , through a future european agency for ai , offering smes and start-ups development paths and services , especially by promoting the use of digital tools , developing ai transition plans and further expanding the exchange of best practices; urges the commission and the member states to provide better counselling and more concrete support through networks , digital hubs , ai trainers , business mentoring and site visits;