### 8. calls on the commission to pay special attention to the implementation in member states of adequately funded legal aid schemes and to the quality of the legal assistance provided , and to assess any obstacles currently preventing citizens without resources from effectively accessing justice; ### 8. calls on the commission to pay special attention to the implementation in member states of adequately funded legal aid schemes and to the quality of the legal assistance provided , and to assess any obstacles currently preventing citizens without resources from effectively accessing justice; similarly , calls on the commission to look at the recoverability of legal fees as it too can be a deterrent when it comes to accessing justice; points to the conclusion of the 2020 eu justice scoreboard that legal aid has become less accessible in some member states over the years; stresses that the availability of legal aid and the level of court fees can have a major impact on access to justice , as well as an dissuasive effect for people in poverty;


### 9. reaffirms the role of parliament , in accordance with article 7 teu , in monitoring compliance with union values; reiterates the call for parliament to be present in article 7 hearings when it is parliament that initiated the procedure; believes that the mechanism , underpinned by an interinstitutional agreement , will provide the necessary framework for better coordination; ### 9. reaffirms the role of parliament , in accordance with article 7 teu , in monitoring compliance with union values; reiterates the call for parliament to be present in article 7 hearings in accordance with the principle of mutual sincere cooperation as enshrined in article 13(2) teu; believes that the mechanism , underpinned by an interinstitutional agreement , will provide the necessary framework for better coordination;


### 11. strongly believes that addressing the crisis of union values , including through the proposed mechanism , is a precondition for re-establishing mutual trust among member states , thus enabling the union as a whole to sustain and further all common policies; ### 11. strongly believes that addressing the breaches of union values , including through the proposed mechanism , is a precondition for re-establishing mutual trust among member states , thus enabling the union as a whole to sustain and further all common policies;


### 11. believes that addressing persisting gender and cultural gaps in in the composition and structure of member states’ judicial systems is necessary to enhance their quality , effectiveness and independence. ### 11. believes that addressing persisting gender and cultural gaps in in the composition and structure of member states’ judicial systems is necessary to enhance their quality , effectiveness and independence; points to the conclusion of the 2020 eu justice scoreboard that women still represent less than fifty percent of judges at the level of supreme courts in most member states.;


### (2) pursuant to article 49 teu , respect for and commitment to promoting union values is a fundamental condition of union membership. in accordance with article 7 teu , the existence of a serious and persistent breach by a member state of union values can lead to the suspension of voting rights of the representative of the government of that member state in the council. respect for union values forms the basis of a high level of confidence and mutual trust between member states. ### (2) pursuant to article 49 teu , respect for and commitment to promoting union values is a fundamental condition of union membership. in accordance with article 7 teu , the existence of a serious and persistent breach by a member state , based on reliable evidence , of union values can lead to the suspension of voting rights of the representative of the government of that member state in the council. respect for union values forms the basis of a high level of confidence and mutual trust between member states.


### (3) the european parliament , the council and the commission (‘the three institutions’) recognise the paramount importance of respect for union values. respect for union values is necessary for the good functioning of the union and the achievement of its objectives as set out in article 3 teu. the three institutions are committed to mutual sincere cooperation with the aim of promoting and ensuring respect for union values. ### (3) the european parliament , the council and the commission (‘the three institutions’) recognise the paramount importance of respect for union values. respect for union values is necessary for the good functioning of the union and the achievement of its objectives as set out in article 3 teu. the three institutions are committed to mutual sincere and active cooperation with the aim of promoting and ensuring respect for union values.


### (4) the three institutions recognise the need for streamlining and strengthening the effectiveness of existing tools designed to foster compliance with union values. a comprehensive interinstitutional mechanism should therefore be established in order to improve coordination between the three institutions and consolidate initiatives taken previously. in accordance with the conclusions of the justice and home affairs council of 6 and 7 june 2013 , such a mechanism should operate in 'a transparent manner , on the basis of evidence objectively compiled , compared and analysed and on the basis of equality of treatment as between all member states'. ### (4) the three institutions recognise the need for streamlining and strengthening the effectiveness of existing tools designed to foster compliance with union values. a comprehensive interinstitutional mechanism should therefore be established in order to improve coordination between the three institutions and consolidate initiatives taken previously. in accordance with the conclusions of the justice and home affairs council of 6 and 7 june 2013 , such a mechanism should operate in 'a transparent manner , on the basis of reliable evidence transparently obtained and objectively compiled , compared and analysed and on the basis of equality of treatment as between all member states'.


### (5) the three institutions agree that an annual monitoring cycle on union values is necessary to reinforce the promotion and respect for union values. the annual monitoring cycle should be comprehensive , objective , impartial , evidence-based and applied equally and fairly to all member states. the primary objective of the annual monitoring cycle should be to prevent violations of and non-compliance with union values , while providing a shared basis for other actions by the three institutions. the three institutions also agree to use this interinstitutional agreement to integrate existing instruments and initiatives relating to the promotion of and respect for union values , in particular the annual rule of law report , the council’s annual rule of law dialogue and the commission’s rule of law framework , in order to avoid duplication and strengthen overall effectiveness. ### (5) the three institutions agree that an annual monitoring cycle on union values is necessary to reinforce the promotion and respect for union values. the annual monitoring cycle should be comprehensive , objective , impartial , evidence-based and applied equally and fairly to all member states. the primary objective of the annual monitoring cycle should be to prevent violations of and non-compliance with union values and to identify positive actions by member states and national actors including civil society and national human rights institutions to be promoted and supported by the union , while providing a shared basis for other actions by the three institutions. the three institutions also agree to use this interinstitutional agreement to integrate existing instruments and initiatives relating to the promotion of and respect for union values , in particular the annual rule of law report , the council’s annual rule of law dialogue and the commission’s rule of law framework , in order to avoid duplication and strengthen overall effectiveness.


### (5) the three institutions agree that an annual monitoring cycle on union values is necessary to reinforce the promotion and respect for union values. the annual monitoring cycle should be comprehensive , objective , impartial , evidence-based and applied equally and fairly to all member states. the primary objective of the annual monitoring cycle should be to prevent violations of and non-compliance with union values , while providing a shared basis for other actions by the three institutions. the three institutions also agree to use this interinstitutional agreement to integrate existing instruments and initiatives relating to the promotion of and respect for union values , in particular the annual rule of law report , the council’s annual rule of law dialogue and the commission’s rule of law framework , in order to avoid duplication and strengthen overall effectiveness. ### (5) the three institutions agree that an annual monitoring cycle on union values is necessary to reinforce the promotion and respect for union values. the annual monitoring cycle should be comprehensive , objective , impartial , based on reliable evidence and applied equally and fairly to all member states. the primary objective of the annual monitoring cycle should be to prevent violations of and non-compliance with union values , while providing a shared basis for other actions by the three institutions. the three institutions also agree to use this interinstitutional agreement to integrate existing instruments and initiatives relating to the promotion of and respect for union values , in particular the annual rule of law report , the council’s annual rule of law dialogue and the commission’s rule of law framework , in order to avoid duplication and strengthen overall effectiveness.


### a. whereas , under the terms of article 319 of the treaty on the functioning of the european union (tfeu) , the european parliament shall give a discharge to the commission in respect of the implementation of the general budget of the european union; ### a. whereas , under the terms of article 319 of the treaty on the functioning of the european union (tfeu) , the european parliament shall give a discharge to the commission in respect of the implementation of the general budget of the european union; whereas the council’s budget is a section of the union budget;


### b. whereas the persistent difficulties in receiving answers from the council due to a lack of cooperation have resulted in parliament’s refusal to grant discharge to the council for the implementation of its section of the budget for more than 10 years; ### b. whereas the persistent difficulties in receiving answers from the council due to a lack of cooperation have resulted in parliament’s refusal to grant discharge to the council for the implementation of its section of the budget for more than 10 years; whereas this situation has an important impact on the functioning of the institutions and diminishes citizens' trust in the procedure for political scrutiny;


### 1. regrets that , despite the letter sent by parliament's committee on budgetary control on 25 may 2020 to the secretary-general of the council to inform that parliament's committee on budgetary control has been mandated by parliament's conference of presidents to reopen negotiations with the council on cooperation during the annual discharge procedure , those negotiations have not yet resumed; ### 1. stresses the need for a memorandum of understanding between the european parliament , the council and the commission on the provision of the information necessary for the european parliament to take an informed decision on discharge; regrets that negotiations with the council to that end have still not resumed and this despite the letter sent by parliament's committee on budgetary control on 25 may 2020 to the secretary-general of the council to inform that parliament's committee on budgetary control has been mandated by parliament's conference of presidents to reopen negotiations with the council on cooperation during the annual discharge procedure;


### 1. regrets that , despite the letter sent by parliament's committee on budgetary control on 25 may 2020 to the secretary-general of the council to inform that parliament's committee on budgetary control has been mandated by parliament's conference of presidents to reopen negotiations with the council on cooperation during the annual discharge procedure , those negotiations have not yet resumed; ### 1. regrets that , despite the letter sent by parliament's committee on budgetary control on 25 may 2020 to the secretary-general of the council to inform that parliament's committee on budgetary control has been mandated by parliament's conference of presidents to reopen negotiations with the council on cooperation during the annual discharge procedure , those negotiations have not yet resumed; recalls that a refusal by an institution to comply with this requirement , after being called upon to act , could be a breach of the principle of sincere cooperation;


### 1. notes that the court of auditors (the ‘court’) , in its annual report for 2019 , observed that no significant weaknesses had been identified in respect of the audited topics relating to human resources and procurement for the european council and council (the ‘council’); ### 1. welcomes that the court of auditors (the ‘court’) , in its annual report for 2019 , observed that no significant weaknesses had been identified in respect of the audited topics relating to human resources and procurement for the european council and council (the ‘council’);


### 3. believes that increased transparency , and a proactive approach to sharing information , on the side of the council would be conducive to a better-informed discharge procedure from the outset; ### 3. believes that increased transparency , and a proactive approach to sharing information , on the side of the council would be conducive to a better-informed discharge procedure from the outset; proposes , for this purpose new instruments such as a memorandum of understanding between parliament and council on the information necessary for the european parliament to take a decision on discharge;


### 3. notes the role of parliament and of other institutions in the discharge procedure , as provided for by tfeu , in particular article 319 thereof , and of the financial regulation , in particular articles 260 to 263 thereof; ### 3. notes the role of parliament and of other institutions in the discharge procedure , as provided for by tfeu , in particular article 319 thereof , and by the financial regulation , in particular articles 260 to 263 thereof; underlines that parliament's role is reinforced by a well-established and respected practice;


### 4. considers that the conference on the future of europe provides an opportunity to discuss proposals to enhance transparency and democratic accountability with regard to the protection of the union’s financial interests. ### 4. suggests that , while the current situation could be improved through better cooperation between the union institutions within the treaty framework , a revision of the treaties could ultimately be required , so as to offer more legal clarity with regard to the discharge procedure by giving the european parliament the explicit competence to grant discharge to all institutions and bodies individually; believes , in that regard , that the conference on the future of europe provides an opportunity to discuss such a proposal and explore possible ways to increase transparency and democratic accountability with regard to the protection of the union’s financial interests.


### 4. considers that the conference on the future of europe provides an opportunity to discuss proposals to enhance transparency and democratic accountability with regard to the protection of the union’s financial interests. ### 4. suggests that a revision of the treaties , could be required in order to render the discharge procedure clearer , so as to give parliament the explicit competence to grant discharge to all institutions and bodies individually; considers that the conference on the future of europe provides an opportunity to initiate this debate in order to discuss these proposals to enhance transparency and democratic accountability with regard to the protection of the union’s financial interests.


### 5. regrets that the council continues to be silent in relation to the remarks made by parliament in its discharge resolution of 28 april 20211 in relation to the trend from previous years; ### 5. regrets that the council continues to be silent in relation to the remarks made by parliament in its discharge resolution of 28 april 20211 in relation to the trend ongoing since 2009;


### 6. regrets that the budget of the european council and the council has not been divided into two separate budgets , as recommended by parliament in recent discharge resolutions , for reasons of transparency and to improve accountability for each institution; ### 6. regrets that the budget of the european council and the council has not been divided into two separate budgets , as recommended by parliament in recent discharge resolutions , for reasons of transparency and to improve both expenditure efficiency and accountability for each institution;


### 8. regrets that , in spite of the council’s improved financial management and performance system , tno report currently exists which provides a comprehensive summary of the major key performance indicators and results , thus preventing any measurement of achievements reached against objectives set; ### 8. notes the council’s improved financial management and performance system; regrets , however , that no report currently provides a comprehensive summary of the major key performance indicators and results , thus preventing any measurement of achievements reached against objectives set;


### 9. regrets the lack of information on the implementation of the council’s gender action plan and of the measures taken to ensure equal opportunities for persons with disabilities at the council (as a workplace); calls on the council to provide information on the proportion of persons working with disabilities , geographical and gender distribution , and measures taken in order to ensure equal opportunities , geographical balance and gender equality at the council; ### 9. regrets the lack of information on the implementation of the council’s gender action plan and of the measures taken to ensure equal opportunities for persons with disabilities at the council (as a workplace); calls on the council to provide parliament with detailed information on the proportion of persons working with disabilities and on geographical and gender distribution , particularly at senior management level; calls on the council to report on the measures taken in order to ensure equal opportunities , geographical balance , and gender equality at the council;


### 10. regrets the lack of information from the council on effective actions taken to tackle gender and geographical imbalances , including at management level , and in this regard recalls parliament's resolution of 17 december 2020 on the need for a dedicated council configuration on gender equality3 , requesting ministers and secretaries of state in charge of gender equality to have a dedicated institutional forum to ensure stronger integration of gender equality in union strategies and policy processes , the coordination of all related policies , as well as the harmonisation of the protection of women’s rights and gender equality in the union via an intersectional approach; underlines that this specific configuration would represent a key element in unblocking the negotiations on the main files related to gender equality; ### 10. recalls parliament's resolution of 17 december 2020 on the need for a dedicated council configuration on gender equality3 , requesting ministers and secretaries of state in charge of gender equality to have a dedicated institutional forum to ensure stronger integration of gender equality in union strategies and policy processes , the coordination of all related policies , as well as the harmonisation of the protection of women’s rights and gender equality in the union via an intersectional approach; underlines that this specific configuration would represent a key element in unblocking the negotiations on the main files related to gender equality;


### 11. regrets the lack of information concerning council’s actions aimed at enhancing ethical culture and points out that no initiative in this direction has been reported , such as specific training , code of conduct provisions or internal guidance on integrity and ethical values , a dedicated website or frequently-asked-questions (faqs) on ethical matters or procedures for the protection of whistleblowers; recalls the statement by the court of auditors in its special report no 13/2019 entitled ‘the ethical frameworks of the audited eu institutions: scope for improvement’ that ethical conduct “contributes to sounder financial management and increased public trust , which is indispensable if public policies are to succeed” and in particular , that “any unethical behaviour by staff and members of the european union (eu) institutions and bodies attracts high levels of public interest and reduces trust in the eu”; ### 11. regrets the lack of information concerning council’s actions aimed at enhancing ethical culture and points out that no initiative in this direction has been reported to parliament; underlines the importance of implementing good practices such as specific training , code of conduct provisions or internal guidance on integrity and ethical values , a dedicated website or frequently-asked-questions (faqs) on ethical matters or procedures for the protection of whistleblowers; recalls the statement by the court of auditors in its special report no 13/2019 entitled ‘the ethical frameworks of the audited eu institutions: scope for improvement’ that ethical conduct “contributes to sounder financial management and increased public trust , which is indispensable if public policies are to succeed” and in particular , that “any unethical behaviour by staff and members of the european union (eu) institutions and bodies attracts high levels of public interest and reduces trust in the eu”;


### 12. regrets the lack of attention paid to the need for an ethical framework , transparency and the prevention , identification and avoidance of conflicts of interest; reiterates its deep concern over the conflicts of interests of a number of member state representatives involved in policy and budget decision-making processes; repeats parliament’s strong call on the council to ensure that member state representatives who benefit directly from union subsidies through the businesses they own (directly or indirectly) do not participate in related policy or budgetary discussions and votes; requests the council to provide parliament with information on the necessary measures put in place to avoid any conflict of interests; ### 12. regrets the lack of attention paid to the need for an ethical framework , transparency and the prevention , identification and avoidance of conflicts of interest; reiterates its deep concern over the conflicts of interests of a number of member state representatives involved in policy and budget decision-making processes; reiterates that any actual or perceived conflict of interests jeopardises the reputation of the council and the union as a whole; repeats parliament’s strong call on the council to ensure that member state representatives who benefit directly from union subsidies through the businesses they own (directly or indirectly) do not participate in related policy or budgetary discussions and votes; requests the council to provide parliament with information on the necessary measures put in place to avoid any conflict of interests;


### 13. regrets the resort to corporate sponsorship to cover some of the expenses incurred by member states to finance their council presidencies; is highly concerned by the possible reputational damage that this practice might cause to the council and the union; urges the adoption of clear guidelines aimed at preventing situations of conflict of interest and the definition of transparent and binding rules on sponsorship; ### 13. regrets that some member states resort to corporate sponsorship to finance part of the activities of their council presidencies not covered by the council’s budget; reiterates its deep concerns about the possible reputational damage that this practice might cause to the council and the union; takes note of the final text of 30 june 2021 to be inserted into the council’s presidency handbook as guidance to council presidencies regarding the use of sponsorship; welcomes this positive step but regrets the lack of a common set of clear , transparent and concrete rules; calls on the council to further elaborate this guidance and to make it mandatory for the member states;


### 16. regrets the lack of action and initiatives on the part of the council to ensure a smooth and faster process for the appointment of the european prosecutors and in relation to the proposal for european delegated prosecutors made by member states; ### 16. regrets the lack of action and initiatives on the part of the council to ensure a sound , transparent and efficient process for the appointment of the european prosecutors and in relation to the proposal for european delegated prosecutors made by member states;


### 19. regrets that the council continues to fail to provide answers to parliament's questions; ### 19. regrets that the council continues to fail to provide answers to parliament's questions as well as to attend the hearings of the secretary-generals of the institutions;


### 21. considers that the lack of cooperation of the european council and the council with the discharge authority sends a negative signal to the citizens of the union; ### 21. considers that the lack of cooperation of the european council and the council with the discharge authority contravenes the principle of loyal cooperation among the institutions and sends a negative signal to the citizens of the union with regards to the transparency and democratic accountability of the union budget;


### 22. reiterates the need to improve cooperation between the institutions in the framework of the discharge procedure through a memorandum of understanding between parliament , the council and the commission in relation to the cooperation between parliament and the council during the annual discharge procedure; ### 22. reiterates the need to improve cooperation between the institutions in the framework of the discharge procedure through a memorandum of understanding between parliament , the council and the commission in relation to the cooperation between parliament and the council during the annual discharge procedure; calls on the council , to that end , to initiate interinstitutional negotiations without any further delay;


### 26. encourages the council to advise the presidencies properly in establishing clear and transparent rules on sponsorship; urges the council to make progress with respect to the guidelines without delay and reflect on the currently non-binding character of the guidance; ### 26. notes that the member states are expected to finance their own presidencies and regrets that they resort to corporate sponsorship to cover some of their expenses; is highly concerned about the possible reputational damage that this practice might cause to the council and the union; urges council presidencies to avoid resorting to corporate sponsorship to cover expenses; asks the council , in that regard , to envisage the budgetisation of the presidencies; calls on the council to reflect on the currently non-binding character of the guidance;


### 44. recalls the statements by vice-president věra jourová and commissioner johannes hahn in their hearings before parliament in 2019 that they are willing to engage in this matter so as to help achieve more transparency on the implementation of the council’s budget; considers that the negotiations could be extended to include the commission so as to ensure that parliament is provided with the necessary information on how the council is implementing its budget , either directly or via the commission. ### 44. recalls the statements by vice-president věra jourová and commissioner johannes hahn in their hearings before parliament in 2019 that they are willing to engage in this matter so as to help achieve more transparency on the implementation of the council’s budget; considers that the negotiations could be extended to include the commission so as to ensure that parliament is provided with the necessary information on how the council is implementing its budget.


### b. whereas a political agreement was reached on 10 november 2020 between representatives of the european parliament , the council and the commission on the mff for 2021-2027 and on a new interinstitutional agreement on budgetary discipline , on cooperation in budgetary matters and on sound financial management , as well as on new own resources , including a roadmap for the introduction of new own resources; ### b. whereas a political agreement was reached on 10 november 2020 between representatives of the european parliament , the council and the commission on the mff for 2021-2027 and on a new interinstitutional agreement on budgetary discipline , on cooperation in budgetary matters and on sound financial management , as well as on new own resources , including a roadmap for the introduction of new own resources , and additionally a conditionality mechanism to protect the rule of law in the union was agreed; whereas that agreement lays the foundation for a financial union;


### d. whereas the new agreement contains important new elements in particular a roadmap for the introduction of new own resources during the next seven years , provisions on enhanced budgetary scrutiny of the spending of next generation eu (ngeu) funding and arrangements to monitor spending on climate and biodiversity objectives and on gender equality and mainstreaming; ### d. whereas the new agreement contains important new elements in particular a roadmap for the introduction of new own resources during the next seven years that will be sufficient to cover the interests and repayment costs of the european union recovery instrument (next generation eu (ngeu)); whereas revenue from own resources in excess of the needs for repayment will continue to fund the union budget as general revenue in line with the principle of universality; whereas the new agreement also contains provisions on enhanced budgetary scrutiny of the spending of funds under the european union recovery instrument (ngeu) and arrangements to monitor spending on climate and biodiversity objectives and on gender equality and mainstreaming;


### g. whereas this agreement , furthermore , contains a commitment to seek arrangements for cooperation between the institutions for future mff negotiations , so as to strengthen dialogue and transparency of the whole negotiation process; ### g. whereas this agreement , furthermore , includes for the first time provisions relating to cooperation and dialogue on the part of the institutions during the negotiations on the mff , aimed at operationalising the treaty requirements , according to which the institutions are to take any measure necessary to facilitate the adoption of a mff and to promote consultation and the reconciliation of their positions on budgetary matters , so as to strengthen dialogue and transparency of the whole negotiation process;


### 2. stresses that the sanitary crisis caused by the covid-19 pandemic has revealed that its rules of procedure did not provide for all appropriate measures in order to facilitate the functioning of parliament in extraordinary circumstances; ### 2. stresses that the sanitary crisis caused by the covid-19 pandemic has revealed that its rules of procedure require more developed procedures in order to ensure the unlimited functioning of parliament in different types of extraordinary circumstances;


### 3. takes note of the temporary measures adopted by its president and its governing bodies in order to cope with such extraordinary circumstances; underlines that those measures were needed to guarantee the continuity of parliament’s business , allowing parliament to carry out its legislative , budgetary and political control functions during the crisis; ### 3. underlines the importance of the temporary measures adopted , in compliance with the rule of law , by its president and its governing bodies in the current sanitary crisis , in order to cope with such extraordinary circumstances; stresses that there were no alternatives to those measures in order to guarantee the continuity of parliament’s business as required by the treaties , and that they allowed parliament to carry out its legislative , budgetary and political control functions during the crisis in accordance with the procedures provided for by the treaties;


### 4. recognises that those temporary measures were fully justified and ensured the validity of all votes taken during their period of application; ### 4. stresses that those temporary measures were fully justified and that they ensured the validity of all votes taken during their period of application;


### a. whereas the 2019 european elections registered the highest turnout of the any elections to the european parliament in the last 20 years , with 50.2 % , ( an increase of eight percentage points compared to 2014) , sending a positive signal that european citizens believe that many of their concerns can be addressed at eu level; ### a. whereas the 2019 european elections registered the highest turnout of the any elections to the european parliament in the last 20 years , with 50.2 % , ( an increase of eight percentage points compared to 2014) , sending a positive signal that european citizens believe that many of their concerns can be addressed at eu level; whereas the 2019 turnout still remains low and more needs to be done to increase participation in eu elections;


### c. whereas the higher turnout was ultimately linked to gains by eurosceptics , which should be considered as a warning for european integration , especially in several founding member states where far-right extremists and anti-european forces won the elections; ### deleted


### e. whereas gender equality among members of the european parliament has improved (41 % women in 2019 , up from 37 % in 2014); ### e. whereas gender equality among members of the european parliament has improved (41 % women in 2019 , up from 37 % in 2014); whereas ursula von der leyen is the first female president of the european commission and her commission has historically the largest share of female commissioners , with 12 women commissioners;


### f. whereas 15 member states still restrict voting rights for people with disabilities , thus preventing the meaningful participation and representation of these citizens in democratic processes; ### f. whereas 15 member states still restrict voting rights for people with disabilities , thus preventing the meaningful participation and representation of these citizens in democratic processes; whereas , due to national rules , an estimated 800 000 eu citizens were not able to exercise their right to vote in the last european elections because of their disabilities or mental health problems;1a


### g. whereas the reform of the electoral act of 1976 , as adopted by the european parliament in its legislative resolution of 4 july 2018 on the draft council decision amending the act concerning the election of the members of the european parliament by direct universal suffrage , annexed to council decision 76/787/ecsc , eec , euratom of 20 september 197614 , is still not fully ratified owing to the unwillingness of germany , spain and cyprus to take the last necessary steps in their national legislation , and thereby blocking the evolution of the regulatory framework for european elections; ### g. whereas the reform of the electoral act of 1976 , as adopted by the european parliament in its legislative resolution of 4 july 2018 on the draft council decision amending the act concerning the election of the members of the european parliament by direct universal suffrage , annexed to council decision 76/787/ecsc , eec , euratom of 20 september 197614 , is still not fully ratified by three member states;


### h. whereas the amended electoral act , still pending ratification by some member states , already requires further improvements (i.e. regarding parental leave for meps); ### h. whereas the amended electoral act , still pending ratification by some member states , already requires further improvements;


### i. whereas the outcome of the 2019 european elections fragmented political representation in parliament , leading to increased complexity in the decision-making process; ### i. whereas the outcome of the 2019 european elections has led to the emergence of a new parliamentary majority composed of different political groups with a clear pro-european identity;


### j. whereas the 2019 elections failed to culminate in the choice of a commission president from among the various spitzenkandidaten , resulting in a backward step from the process which was established in 2014; ### j. whereas the 2019 elections failed to culminate in the choice of a commission president from among the various spitzenkandidaten , whereas the election of the commission president depends on securing the support of the majority of members of the european parliament;


### k. whereas the spitzenkandidaten process has yet to be fully developed; whereas it lacks , among other things , the possibility for spitzenkandidaten to stand as official candidates in all member states on transnational lists , allowing all european voters to choose and vote for their preferred spitzenkandidat; whereas parliament raised this issue in its decision of 7 february 2018 on the revision of the framework agreement on relations between the european parliament and the european commission15 ; ### k. whereas the spitzenkandidaten process has yet to be fully consolidated , in line with the provisions of the lisbon treaty; whereas parliament raised this issue in its decision of 7 february 2018 on the revision of the framework agreement on relations between the european parliament and the european commission15 ;


### l. whereas the spitzenkandidaten system needs to be improved and formalised in the eu’s primary law after an in-depth institutional reflection; whereas this reflection should also include the de facto political role of the commission and its president and any related changes to the decision-making process of the union; ### l. whereas the spitzenkandidaten system needs to be urgently improved and formalised in the eu’s primary law after an in-depth institutional reflection , by taking into account the proportional nature of the european electoral system , and to be ready to be applied at the next european elections in 2024; whereas this reflection should also include the de facto political role of the commission and its president and any related changes to the decision-making process of the union;


### m. whereas institutional improvements such as transnational lists , as acknowledged by parliament in its resolution of 7 february 2018 on the composition of the european parliament , or the transformation of the council into a second legislative chamber of the union , as proposed in its resolution of 16 february 2017 on possible evolutions of and adjustments to the current institutional set-up of the european union , would radically transform the european elections into one true european election , as opposed to the collection of 27 separate national elections that it is today; ### m. whereas institutional improvements such as the possible creation of transnational lists should be discussed in the conference on the future of europe;


### m. whereas institutional improvements such as transnational lists , as acknowledged by parliament in its resolution of 7 february 2018 on the composition of the european parliament , or the transformation of the council into a second legislative chamber of the union , as proposed in its resolution of 16 february 2017 on possible evolutions of and adjustments to the current institutional set-up of the european union , would radically transform the european elections into one true european election , as opposed to the collection of 27 separate national elections that it is today; ### m. whereas institutional improvements such as transnational lists , as acknowledged by parliament in its resolution of 7 february 2018 on the composition of the european parliament , or the transformation of the council into a second legislative chamber of the union , as proposed in its resolution of 16 february 2017 on possible evolutions of and adjustments to the current institutional set-up of the european union , would help to transform the european elections into a single european election , as opposed to the collection of 27 separate national elections that it is today;


### n. whereas the intensified political exchanges in parliament have also highlighted the shortcomings of several standing procedures such as the hearings of commissioners-designate , with particular regard to the conditions for the legal assessment of their applications (e.g. declarations of financial interests); ### n. whereas the process of examination of the declarations of interests and the hearings of the designated european commissioners by the european parliament was an important step in increasing the commission’s accountability to the european parliament and the public in general; whereas this process can and should be further improved in the future;


### o. whereas democratic processes at both member state and eu levels have been targeted by foreign powers in order to influence the outcome of elections and weaken the union; whereas the mechanisms put in place by the european institutions , such as the code of practice against disinformation and the rapid alert system for elections contributed to the mitigation of foreign interference during the election campaign; ### o. whereas democratic processes at both member state and eu levels have been targeted by foreign powers sometimes in connection with internal actors in order to influence the outcome of elections and weaken the union; whereas the mechanisms put in place by the european institutions , such as the code of practice against disinformation and the rapid alert system for elections contributed to the mitigation of foreign interference during the election campaign;


### p. whereas the commission’s requests to social media platforms ahead of the elections created confusion and had unintended consequences such as the ban on europe-wide political advertisements , which is the only way for european political parties to advertise during european election campaigns; whereas especially on that matter , the institutions should develop an interinstitutional approach in order to have a positive impact on the security and stability of the electoral process; ### p. whereas the commission’s requests to social media platforms ahead of the elections had unintended consequences such as the ban on europe-wide political advertisements , which is an important instrument that european political parties use to advertise during european election campaigns; whereas especially on that matter , the institutions should develop an interinstitutional approach in order to have a positive impact on the security and stability of the electoral process;


### 1. takes note of the higher turnout in the 2019 european elections; considers that this shows that an increasing proportion of citizens consider the eu to be the appropriate level at which to address the challenges of our time such as climate change and environmental concerns , social and gender inequalities , sustainable growth , and geopolitical concerns such as migration and foreign policy; urges all the european institutions , therefore , to take responsibility and to act upon the mandate they have been given , directly or indirectly , by the citizens; regrets both the lack of decisiveness by the council and the lack of clear intent to achieve solutions based on a common approach; ### 1. welcomes the higher turnout in the 2019 european elections , which demonstrates that the trend of decreasing voter turnout in europe can be reversed; recognizes the important role of campaigns led by the eu institutions and civil society organisations to increase the turnout , such as the ‘this time i’m voting’ campaign; considers that this higher turnout shows that an increasing proportion of citizens consider the eu to be the appropriate level at which to address the challenges of our time such as climate change and environmental concerns , social and gender inequalities , sustainable growth , and geopolitical concerns such as migration and foreign policy; underlines that the state of the economy and the environment were the two main priorities for voters clearly indicating that citizens who take part in european elections wish to have more action at the european level in these two policy fields of shared competence between the eu and the national level; urges all the european institutions , therefore , to take responsibility and to act upon the mandate they have been given , directly or indirectly , by the citizens; regrets both the lack of decisiveness by the council and the lack of clear intent to achieve solutions based on a common approach;


### 2. welcomes the substantial increase of youth participation in the elections; reiterates its call on the council and the commission to take into account their concerns , which are critical for the lives of the next generations; ### 2. welcomes the substantial increase of youth participation in the elections; however , expresses concern that only 42% of people aged 16/18 to 24 cast a ballot in the2019 european elections;1a recommends that member states should consider ways to harmonise the minimum age of voters at 16 , in order to further enhance the participation of young voters; reiterates its call on the council and the commission to take into account their concerns , which are critical for the lives of the next generations; expresses concern , however , that across the eu almost half of all eligible voters did not cast a vote; stresses that more actions need to be undertaken at a local , regional , national , and european level to incentivise voters to participate in european elections;


### 3. deplores the fact that the outcome of the elections did not lead to genuine gender balance in parliament; calls on the commission , in cooperation with parliament and other bodies such as the venice commission , to formulate recommendations to member states with a view to increasing the representation of women in the european parliament; ### 3. deplores the fact that the outcome of the elections did not lead to genuine gender balance in parliament; recognizes that there are substantial differences between member states , with some electing more than 50% of women and others which did not elect a single female member of the european parliament; calls on member states and the institutions of the union to take all necessary measures to promote the principle of equality between men and women throughout the whole electoral process; emphasises in this connection the importance of gender-balanced electoral lists; calls on the commission , in cooperation with parliament and other bodies such as the venice commission , to formulate recommendations to member states with a view to increasing the representation of women in the european parliament by , for example , encouraging national parties to present list of candidates with an equal number of male and female candidates;


### 4. notes that similar recommendations could be made concerning the exercise of passive and active voting rights of citizens with disabilities; recalls with great concern that in several member states citizens with disabilities were not able to vote in 2019 because of unsuitable electoral material or infrastructure at polling stations; ### 4. notes that similar recommendations could be made concerning the exercise of passive and active voting rights of citizens with disabilities; recalls with great concern that in several member states an estimated 800 000 citizens with disabilities were not able to vote in 2019 because of unsuitable electoral material or infrastructure at polling stations; calls on member states to guarantee that all those who have the right to vote , including eu citizens living outside their country of origin and prisoners who are granted such a right in accordance with national laws , are able to exercise this right;


### 5. is of the opinion that the reason why the spitzenkandidaten process failed to produce a president of the european commission after the 2019 elections is because no improvements were made to it following the experience of 2014; intends to strengthen the democratic process for choosing the commission president before the next european elections of 2024; ### 5. notes that the spitzenkandidaten process is an important tool to organize the european political debate during the electoral campaign; believes that further improvements and clarifications are needed to strengthen the democratic process for choosing the commission president before the next european elections of 2024; notes , however , that the election of the commission president always depends on securing the support of the majority of members of the european parliament so that the electoral results are fully taken into account , as foreseen in the lisbon treaty;


### 5. is of the opinion that the reason why the spitzenkandidaten process failed to produce a president of the european commission after the 2019 elections is because no improvements were made to it following the experience of 2014; intends to strengthen the democratic process for choosing the commission president before the next european elections of 2024; ### 5. is of the opinion that the reason why the spitzenkandidaten process failed to produce a president of the european commission after the 2019 elections is because no formally binding framework for the application of the spitzenkandidat principle has been adopted since 2014; intends to strengthen the democratic process for choosing the commission president before the next european elections of 2024;


### 6. welcomes the up-coming joint declaration of the three european institutions on the conference on the future of europe , recalls the commitment by the commission president to address the issue of transnational lists and the spitzenkandidaten process as the priority institutional issues during the conference; ### 6. welcomes the up-coming joint declaration of the three european institutions on the conference on the future of europe , recalls the commitment by the commission president to address the issue of transnational lists and the spitzenkandidaten process during the conference , in accordance with the decisions taken by the conference itself on the list of priorities to be addressed , and in order to be applicable at the next european election in 2024;


### 7. stresses that the election of the commission president depends on a majority of parliament’s members , which de facto requires the formation of a coalition; recommends that the election procedure be reversed so that parliament proposes and elects the president of the commission , after obtaining the consent of the european council; ### 7. stresses that the process of selection and election of the president of the european commission should be consolidated , in line with the lisbon treaty’s provisions and based on the parliament’s requests to appoint as president of the commission a candidate that can be backed by a majority of parliament’s members , which de facto requires the formation of a programmatic agreement;


### 8. considers that the outcome of the european elections has reinforced the political dimension of the election of the european commission , and therefore the need for more accurate and objective scrutiny of the declarations of interests of the commissioners-designate; calls for the creation of an independent body , endowed with the appropriate means , to have this scrutiny included in its responsibilities; ### 8. believes that the european parliament's examination of the declaration of interests and hearings of the commissioners-designate was a necessary exercise that increased the democratic accountability of the commission in front of the parliament; believes , however , that this process has highlighted the need for a technical and super partes evaluation of the declarations of interests of the commissioners-designate; calls , to this end , for the creation of an independent body , endowed with the appropriate means , to have the scrutiny of the declarations of interests of the commissioners-designate included in its responsibilities; underlines , however , that the approval or rejection of each commissioner-designate and of the college of commissioners should ultimately be a political exercise firmly in the hands of the european parliament;


### 8. considers that the outcome of the european elections has reinforced the political dimension of the election of the european commission , and therefore the need for more accurate and objective scrutiny of the declarations of interests of the commissioners-designate; calls for the creation of an independent body , endowed with the appropriate means , to have this scrutiny included in its responsibilities; ### 8. considers that the outcome of the european elections has reinforced the political dimension of the election of the european commission , and therefore the need for more accurate and objective scrutiny of the declarations of interests of the commissioners-designate; underlines the importance of giving the committee for legal affairs sufficient time for a thorough examination of the commissioners-designate; highlights that the examination of the committee for legal affairs should not be limited to the declarations made by the commissioners-designate but expanded to evidence that is available by other means , underlines that the examination of conflict of interests should not be limited to family members so that the same rules should be applied to spouses and to long-term partners of commissioners-designate


### 8. considers that the outcome of the european elections has reinforced the political dimension of the election of the european commission , and therefore the need for more accurate and objective scrutiny of the declarations of interests of the commissioners-designate; calls for the creation of an independent body , endowed with the appropriate means , to have this scrutiny included in its responsibilities; ### 8. considers that the outcome of the european elections has reinforced the political dimension of the election of the european commission , and therefore the need for more accurate and objective scrutiny of the declarations of interests of the commissioners-designate;


### 9. regrets that the attribution of portfolios in the commission follows solely a logic where national interests take priority over the european common interest; ### deleted


### 9. regrets that the attribution of portfolios in the commission follows solely a logic where national interests take priority over the european common interest; ### 9. regrets that the attribution of portfolios in the commission follows solely a logic where national interests take priority over the european common interest; recalls that article 17(5) teu provides for the limitation of the practice of having one commissioner per member state; calls on the council to enact the treaty provision under article 17(5) teu;


### 10. insists that all european voters should be allowed to vote for their preferred candidate for the president of the commission; reiterates , therefore , that the spitzenkandidaten should be able to stand as official candidates at the next elections in a joint european constituency across all member states; ### deleted


### 10. insists that all european voters should be allowed to vote for their preferred candidate for the president of the commission; reiterates , therefore , that the spitzenkandidaten should be able to stand as official candidates at the next elections in a joint european constituency across all member states; ### 10. insists that all european voters should be allowed to vote for their preferred candidate for the president of the commission; reiterates , therefore , that the spitzenkandidaten should be able to stand as official candidates at the next elections in a joint european constituency across all member states; stresses that , taking into account the proportional electoral system of the eu , the election of the president of the european commission should depend on his or her ability to be supported by a majority of members of the european parliament;


### 11. believes that granting european voters a second vote for transnational lists in a joint european constituency , drawn up by european political parties and movements , would elevate the european elections above purely national campaigns based on national interests , particularly if such lists were headed by the respective spitzenkandidaten; ### 11. believes that granting european voters a vote for transnational lists in a joint european constituency , drawn up by european political parties and movements , would contribute to elevate the european elections above purely national campaigns based on national interests , particularly if such lists were headed by the respective spitzenkandidaten; calls on the commission and council , together with the parliament and in line with the works of the conference on the future of europe , to analyse the possibility of introducing a pan-european constituency for the elections of the european parliament; stresses that the transnational lists should , if introduced , include rules that ensure gender equality and geographical balance;


### 11. believes that granting european voters a second vote for transnational lists in a joint european constituency , drawn up by european political parties and movements , would elevate the european elections above purely national campaigns based on national interests , particularly if such lists were headed by the respective spitzenkandidaten; ### 11. believes that the possible cration of transnational lists should be discussed in the conference on the future of europe;


### 13. acknowledges that despite the fact that the agreed reform of the electoral law has not yet been ratified by some member states , further improvements are required , such as provisions for remote voting operations in defined or exceptional circumstances , as well as on the elections in the joint european constituency; ### 13. acknowledges that despite the fact that the agreed reform of the electoral law has not yet been ratified by some member states , further improvements are required , such as provisions for remote voting operations in defined or exceptional circumstances , the possibility for temporary replacement of members to a period of absence in case of maternity , parental leave or severe illness , as well as on the elections in the joint european constituency;


### 13. acknowledges that despite the fact that the agreed reform of the electoral law has not yet been ratified by some member states , further improvements are required , such as provisions for remote voting operations in defined or exceptional circumstances , as well as on the elections in the joint european constituency; ### 13. acknowledges that despite the fact that the agreed reform of the electoral law has not yet been ratified by some member states , further improvements are required , such as provisions for alternative voting methods , including in defined or exceptional circumstances , in order to incentivise voter turnout , as well as on the elections in the joint european constituency;


### 14. takes note of the efforts by the commission and other institutions to tackle foreign interference during the electoral campaign; points out , nevertheless , that the financial and human resources needed to counter these attacks on european democracy , including at national level , are many times superior to the combined designated european resources; urges the commission and the member states to raise significantly the financing they make available for the fight against foreign interference; ### 14. expresses deep concern about the fact that evidence of interferences and disinformation campaigns is continuously coming to light , often with indications of foreign influence , in the run-up to the 2019 european elections; takes note of the efforts by the commission and other institutions to tackle foreign interference during the electoral campaign; points out , nevertheless , that the financial and human resources needed to counter these attacks on european democracy , including at national level , are many times superior to the combined designated european resources; urges the commission and the member states to raise significantly the financing for the fight against foreign interference;


### 15. urges the commission and the council to consider , in accordance with the work of parliament’s special committee on foreign interference and disinformation , the urgent creation of a european organisation dedicated to the fight against foreign interference; encourages the commission and the council to work much more closely with parliament on these matters , as the protection of our democratic institutions is a core competence of the european parliament; ### 15. encourages the commission and the council to work much more closely with parliament on the fight against foreign interference , as the protection of our democratic institutions is a core competence of the european parliament;


### 15. urges the commission and the council to consider , in accordance with the work of parliament’s special committee on foreign interference and disinformation , the urgent creation of a european organisation dedicated to the fight against foreign interference; encourages the commission and the council to work much more closely with parliament on these matters , as the protection of our democratic institutions is a core competence of the european parliament; ### 15. urges the commission and the council to take all necessary measures to combat foreign interference effectively , and to implement the recommendations made by the european parliament's special committee on foreign interference in all democratic processes in the european union , including disinformation , as soon as its conclusions are delivered and before the next european elections;


### 16. recognises the important role of european political parties and foundations in fostering a european political debate; points out , however , that owing to restrictive measures at european and national levels , european political parties cannot fully participate in european election campaigns; stresses , moreover , that they are not allowed to campaign in referendums that concern european matters , including international trade agreements or the uk’s 2016 referendum on eu membership; ### 16. recognises the important role of european political parties and foundations in fostering a european political debate; points out , however , that owing to restrictive measures at european and national levels , european political parties cannot fully participate in european election campaigns; stresses , moreover , that they are not allowed to campaign in referendums that concern european matters , including international trade agreements or the uk’s 2016 referendum on eu membership; calls for a further alignment of national and eu level legislation in order to level the playing field across the eu for the european elections; proposes that the visibility of european political parties be enhanced by placing their names and logos on the ballot papers , and recommends that the same should also appear on all materials used in european election campaigns;


### 18. considers that the outcome of the european elections is a clear signal for an in-depth institutional reflection that will allow citizens , civil society and their representatives to shape the future of the union; calls , therefore , on all institutional partners to assume their responsibility and deliver an ambitious conference on the future of europe; ### 18. considers that the outcome of the european elections is a clear signal for an in-depth institutional reflection that will allow citizens , civil society and their representatives to shape the future of the union; underlines that the outbreak of covid-19 increased the urgency of an institutional reform process on the european level; calls , therefore , on all institutional partners to assume their responsibility and deliver an ambitious framework for the conference on the future of europe , and to follow up on its conclusions in order to achieve significant and tangible changes in the policies and institutional architecture of the eu; considers that following the covid-19 crisis the conference on the future of europe will represent an opportunity for a deep reflection on the european recovery , notably on the need to readdress the european socio-economic model towards solidarity and cohesion;


### 1. stresses that the eu institutions have an obligation to implement article 15(3) of the treaty on the functioning of the european union (tfeu) and to adopt a legal instrument on access to documents in line with the democratic principles expressed in article 10(3) of the treaty on european union (teu) and with the rights of eu citizens enshrined in article 42 of the charter of fundamental rights; highlights that article 15(3) of the tfeu envisages enhanced institutional scope; ### 1. stresses that the eu institutions have an obligation to implement article 15(3) of the treaty on the functioning of the european union (tfeu) and to adopt a legal instrument on access to documents in line with the democratic principles expressed in article 10(3) of the treaty on european union (teu) and with the rights of eu citizens enshrined in article 42 of the charter of fundamental rights; highlights that article 15(3) of the tfeu envisages enhanced institutional scope; recalls that each institution , body , office or agency shall ensure that its proceedings are transparent and shall elaborate in its own rules of procedure specific provisions regarding access to its documents , in accordance with the regulations.


### 1. stresses that the eu institutions have an obligation to implement article 15(3) of the treaty on the functioning of the european union (tfeu) and to adopt a legal instrument on access to documents in line with the democratic principles expressed in article 10(3) of the treaty on european union (teu) and with the rights of eu citizens enshrined in article 42 of the charter of fundamental rights; highlights that article 15(3) of the tfeu envisages enhanced institutional scope; ### 1. stresses that the eu institutions have an obligation to implement article 15(3) of the treaty on the functioning of the european union (tfeu) and to adopt a legal instrument on access to documents in line with the democratic principles expressed in article 10(3) of the treaty on european union (teu) and with the rights of eu citizens enshrined in articles 41 and 42 of the charter of fundamental rights; highlights that article 15(3) of the tfeu envisages enhanced institutional scope;


### 1. is resolutely determined in its endeavour to bring citizens closer to its decision-making process; ### 1. is resolutely determined in its endeavour to bring citizens closer to its decision-making process in order to improve the quality and social legitimacy of its decisions , and create the right conditions for the information , consultation and participation of citizens in its decision-making process;


### 2. underlines the fact that article 10(3) of the teu grants eu citizens the right to participate in the democratic life of the union and stipulates that decisions must be taken as openly and closely as possible to the citizen; insists that all institutions must strive to implement these principles; ### 2. underlines the fact that article 10(3) of the teu grants eu citizens the right to participate in the democratic life of the union and stipulates that decisions must be taken as openly and closely as possible to the citizen; insists that all institutions must strive to implement these principles; recalls that in order to promote good governance and ensure the participation of civil society , the union’s institutions , bodies , offices and agencies shall conduct their work as transparent as possible;


### 2. underlines the fact that article 10(3) of the teu grants eu citizens the right to participate in the democratic life of the union and stipulates that decisions must be taken as openly and closely as possible to the citizen; insists that all institutions must strive to implement these principles; ### 2. underlines the fact that article 10(3) of the teu grants eu citizens the right to participate in the democratic life of the union and stipulates that decisions must be taken as openly , transparently and closely as possible to the citizen; insists that all institutions must strive to implement these principles in an objective and non-discriminatory manner;


### 2. notes with satisfaction the designation of a commissioner responsible for transparency with a mission to introduce greater transparency into the legislative process; ### 2. notes with satisfaction the designation of a commissioner responsible for transparency with a mission to introduce greater transparency into the legislative process in the european institutions and in the member states , for the benefit of eu citizens;


### 3. recalls that parliament represents the interests of european citizens in an open and transparent manner , as confirmed by the ombudsman , and takes note of the progress made by the commission in improving its transparency standards; regrets the fact that the council has not yet implemented comparable standards; ### 3. recalls that parliament represents the interests of european citizens in an open and transparent manner , with the aim of keeping them fully informed and with due regard for their needs and aspirations , as confirmed by the ombudsman; takes note of the progress made by the commission in improving its transparency standards; regrets the fact that the council has not yet implemented comparable standards;


### 4. points out that transparent law-making is of the utmost importance to citizens; welcomes the 2016 interinstitutional agreement (iia) on better law-making , and the commitment therein by the three institutions to ensure the transparency of legislative procedures on the basis of relevant legislation and case law , including an appropriate handling of trilateral negotiations; ### 4. points out that transparent law-making is of the utmost importance to citizens and the only way to ensure their active participation in the law-making process; welcomes the 2016 interinstitutional agreement (iia) on better law-making , and the commitment therein by the three institutions to ensure the transparency of legislative procedures on the basis of relevant legislation and case law , including an appropriate handling of trilateral negotiations;


### 5. calls on the institutions to continue discussions on moving towards the establishment of a dedicated joint database on the state of play of legislative files (joint legislative database) as agreed in the iia on better law-making; ### 5. calls on the institutions to continue discussions on moving towards the establishment of a dedicated joint database on the state of play of legislative files (joint legislative database) as agreed in the iia on better law-making and greater transparency;


### 10. recalls that the right of public access to documents of the institutions is inextricably linked with the democratic nature of the institutions; ### 10. recalls that the right of public access to documents of the institutions is inextricably linked with the democratic nature of the institutions and , because the institutions fall within the sphere of public service , they must serve the citizens’ best interests when carrying out their activities;


### 15. points out that , as a result of the entry into force of the teu and the tfeu , the right of access to documents pertains to all eu institutions , bodies , and agencies; believes that regulation (ec) no 1049/2001 should be amended and modernised to react to the developments that have taken place in this area , also in the light of the relevant case law of the cjeu and ecthr; ### 15. points out that , as a result of the entry into force of the teu and the tfeu , the right of access to documents pertains to all eu institutions , bodies , and agencies; this is stated in article 15 (3) tfeu. considers that regulation (ec) no 1049/2001 should be amended and modernised in order to bring it in line with the tfeu , the developments in this field , and in the light of the relevant case law of the cjeu and ecthr;


### 16. emphasises the importance of transparency and public access to documents; stresses that a high level of transparency in the legislative process is essential in terms of enabling citizens , the media and stakeholders to hold their elected officials and governments to account; acknowledges the valuable role played by the ombudsman in liaising and acting as a mediator between the eu institutions and citizens , and highlights the ombudsman’s work in making the eu legislative process more accountable to the public; ### 16. emphasises the importance of transparency , which is essential in enhancing public accountability and public access to documents; stresses that a high level of transparency in the legislative process is essential in terms of enabling citizens , the media and stakeholders to hold their elected officials and governments to account; acknowledges the valuable role played by the ombudsman in liaising and acting as a mediator between the eu institutions and citizens , and highlights the ombudsman’s work in making the eu legislative process more accountable to the public;


### 20. recalls that the court makes it clear that where a document originating in an eu institution is covered by an exception to the right to public access , the institution must clearly assess and explain why access to this document could specifically and effectively undermine the interest protected by the exception , notably why full access to the documents at issue would undermine , specifically and actually , the decision-making process , thus requiring that this risk must be reasonably foreseeable and not purely hypothetical; ### 20. recalls that the court makes it clear that where a document originating in an eu institution is covered by an exception to the right to public access , the institution must clearly assess , explain and justify why access to this document could specifically and effectively undermine the interest protected by the exception , notably why full access to the documents at issue would undermine , specifically and actually , the decision-making process , thus requiring that this risk must be reasonably foreseeable and not purely hypothetical;


### 21. stresses that privacy and the protection of personal data should be respected while ensuring transparency; ### 21. stresses that privacy and the protection of personal data should be respected while ensuring transparency and free movement of personal data;


### 24. emphasises that open democratic societies depend on the ability of citizens to access a variety of verifiable information sources so that they can form a view on different issues; ### 24. emphasises that open democratic societies depend on the ability of citizens to access a variety of verifiable information sources so that they can form a view on different issues; emphasises , too , that citizens’ access to information enhances accountability in decision-making and is , therefore , essential for the efficient functioning of democratic societies;


### 1. welcomes the interest of member states in permanent structured cooperation (pesco) following its establishment by council decision (cfsp) 2017/2315 of 11 december 2017 , as shown by the significant number of projects established so far by the council under pesco; encourages participating member states to advance this work and focus on the swift and effective implementation of these projects; ### 1. welcomes the interest of member states in permanent structured cooperation (pesco) following its establishment by council decision (cfsp) 2017/2315 of 11 december 2017 , as shown by the significant number of projects established so far by the council under pesco; encourages participating member states to advance this work and focus on the swift and effective implementation of these projects while ensuring the participation of all member states;


### 3. welcomes in this regard the political guidelines of the commission regarding defence policy , and in particular regarding the need for bold steps towards a genuine european defence union , and for an integrated and comprehensive approach to the eu’s security; hopes that the creation of a new commission directorate-general for defence industry and space will serve as a catalyst for enhanced coherence in the creation of defence capabilities; ### 3. welcomes in this regard the political guidelines of the commission regarding defence policy , and in particular regarding the need for bold steps towards a genuine european defence union , and for an integrated and comprehensive approach to the eu’s security; hopes that the creation of a new commission directorate-general for defence industry and space will serve as a catalyst for enhanced coherence , fair cooperation and integrated coordination in the creation of defence capabilities across eu member states;


### 3. welcomes in this regard the political guidelines of the commission regarding defence policy , and in particular regarding the need for bold steps towards a genuine european defence union , and for an integrated and comprehensive approach to the eu’s security; hopes that the creation of a new commission directorate-general for defence industry and space will serve as a catalyst for enhanced coherence in the creation of defence capabilities; ### 3. welcomes in this regard the political guidelines of the commission regarding defence policy , and in particular regarding the need for bold steps towards a genuine european defence union , and for an integrated and comprehensive approach to the eu’s security; hopes that the creation of a new commission directorate-general for defence industry and space will serve as a catalyst for enhanced coherence in the creation of defence capabilities and to strengthen our industry and internal market in this field;


### 4. considers it necessary to step up the actual contribution of pesco projects to the achievement of the eu’s ambitions in the area of security and defence , by effectively ensuring that the participating member states strengthen their collaboration in significant and ambitious capability development , and that there is coherence between the eu and nato in terms of priorities; ### 4. considers it necessary to step up the actual contribution of pesco projects to the achievement of the eu’s ambitions in the area of security and defence , by effectively ensuring that the participating member states strengthen their collaboration and coordination in significant and ambitious capability development , and that there is coherence between the eu and nato in terms of priorities;


### 4. considers it necessary to step up the actual contribution of pesco projects to the achievement of the eu’s ambitions in the area of security and defence , by effectively ensuring that the participating member states strengthen their collaboration in significant and ambitious capability development , and that there is coherence between the eu and nato in terms of priorities; ### 4. considers it necessary to step up the actual contribution of pesco projects to the achievement of the eu’s ambitions in the area of security and defence , by effectively ensuring that the participating member states strengthen their collaboration in significant and ambitious capability development , and that there is coherence between the eu and nato in terms of priorities and synergies;


### 5. calls on the participating member states to continue making resources available for pesco projects , while ensuring real ownership of and commitment to pesco coordinating and pooling processes; ### 5. calls on the participating member states to continue making resources available for pesco projects , while ensuring real ownership of and commitment to pesco coordinating and pooling processes; stresses , in the context of the mff negotiations , the need to ensure adequate resources to key programmes such as the european defence fund and the military mobility programme , which should receive a level of funding at least at the level proposed by the commission proposal of 2018; points to the necessity of developing a system of genuine union own resources as a means to enable the alignment of the strategic objectives of the union in the field of defence , in particular its own strategic autonomy , with the funding for programmes and operations on the ground , notably pesco project;


### a. whereas according to article 42(2) of the teu , the common security and defence policy (csdp) includes the progressive framing of a common eu defence policy , which could lead to common defence being put in place; ### a. whereas according to article 42(2) of the teu , the common security and defence policy (csdp) includes the progressive framing of a common eu defence policy , which could lead to a common defence being put in place; whereas pesco constitutes an important step towards achieving this objective;


### d. whereas the three-fold level of ambition under the eu global strategy in the field of security and defence covers securing external borders , countering hybrid threats and fighting against terrorism; whereas no member state can protect itself alone , since security and defence threats faced by the eu , and which are targeted against its citizens and territory , are a joint threat and cannot be addressed by one single member state on its own; whereas an effective eu system for addressing burden-sharing would be advantageous for the eu’s overall level of security and defence; ### d. whereas the level of ambition under the eu global strategy in the field of security and defence covers the protection of europe and its citizens , crisis management and capacity-building of partners; whereas no member state can protect itself alone , since security and defence threats faced by the eu , and which are targeted against its citizens , territories and infrastructures , are common multi-faceted threats and cannot be addressed by one single member state on its own; whereas an effective eu system for efficient , coherent and strategic used of resources would be advantageous for the eu’s overall level of security and defence and is more than ever necessary in a fast deteriorating security environment;


### d. whereas the three-fold level of ambition under the eu global strategy in the field of security and defence covers securing external borders , countering hybrid threats and fighting against terrorism; whereas no member state can protect itself alone , since security and defence threats faced by the eu , and which are targeted against its citizens and territory , are a joint threat and cannot be addressed by one single member state on its own; whereas an effective eu system for addressing burden-sharing would be advantageous for the eu’s overall level of security and defence; ### d. whereas the three-fold level of ambition under the eu global strategy in the field of security and defence covers securing external borders , countering hybrid threats and fighting against terrorism; whereas no member state can protect itself alone , since security and defence threats faced by the eu , and which are targeted against its citizens and territory , cannot be addressed by one single member state on its own; whereas an effective eu defence initiatives for addressing burden-sharing would be advantageous for the eu’s overall level of security and defence;


### e. whereas the main actors of pesco are the participating member states (pms) , which provide the capabilities for implementing csdp (article 42(1) and article 42(3) teu) , and which deploy them in missions abroad where the council tasks them to do so (article 42 (1) (4) , and(5) , article 43 and article 44 teu) , that develop their defence capabilities within the framework of the european defence agency (article 42(3) and article 45 teu); ### e. whereas the main actors of pesco are the participating member states (pms) , which provide the capabilities for implementing csdp (article 42(1) and article 42(3) teu) , and which deploy them in eu operations and missions where the council entrusts the execution of a task , within the union framework article 42 (1) (4) , and(5) , article 43 and article 44 teu) , that develop their defence capabilities when appropriate within the framework of the european defence agency (article 42(3) and article 45 teu);


### f. whereas pesco’s long-term vision is to achieve a coherent full-spectrum force package available to the member states; whereas pesco should enhance the eu’s capacity to act as an international security provider in order to protect eu citizens and maximise the effectiveness of defence spending; whereas the cost of non-europe in security and defence is estimated to be more than eur 100 billion per year; ### f. whereas pesco’s long-term vision is to provide the union with operational capacity drawing on civil and military assets in order for the union to perform its tasks referred to in article 43 teu; whereas pesco should enhance the eu’s capacity to act as a global actor and an international security provider and to protect eu citizens; whereas pesco would maximise the effectiveness of defence spending; whereas the cost of non-europe in security and defence is estimated to be more than eur 100 billion per year;


### g. whereas the covid-19 pandemic has shown the consequences of the eu not having enough competence when it comes to health care; whereas , by the same analogy , it would make sense to establish an eu common defence strategy in order to be able to respond to an attack on the eu’s borders and territories; whereas pesco constitutes an important step towards achieving the objective of a common defence; ### g. whereas the covid-19 pandemic has shown the consequences of the eu not having enough competence when it comes to health care and the need for a european health union;


### h. whereas according to council decision 2017/2315 , establishing pesco enhanced defence capabilities of the member states will also benefit nato , while strengthening the european pillar within the alliance and responding to repeated calls for stronger transatlantic burden-sharing; ### h. whereas according to council decision 2017/2315 , establishing pesco enhanced defence capabilities of the member states will also benefit nato , following the single set-of-forces principle , while strengthening the european pillar within the alliance and responding to repeated calls for stronger transatlantic burden-sharing;


### i. whereas pesco creates a binding framework between the pms , which committed themselves to jointly investing , planning , developing and operating defence capabilities within union framework in a permanent and structured manner by subscribing to 20 binding commitments in five areas set by the teu; whereas these commitments should constitute a move from mere defence cooperation towards the integration of member states’ defence forces; whereas despite these binding commitments , no effective compliance mechanism for pesco is in place; ### i. whereas pesco creates a binding framework between the pms , which committed themselves to jointly investing , planning , developing and operating defence capabilities within union framework in a permanent and structured manner by subscribing to 20 binding commitments in five areas set by the teu; whereas these commitments should constitute a move from mere defence cooperation towards the integration of member states’ defence forces; whereas despite these binding commitments , the effective compliance mechanism for pesco should be improved;


### j. whereas the pms do not pay enough attention to the 20 binding commitments to which they have subscribed , and not enough progress has been achieved with regard to significantly embedding pesco into national defence planning processes; ### j. whereas the pms must show full political engagement to the 20 binding commitments to which they have subscribed , and not enough progress has been achieved with regard to significantly embedding pesco into national defence planning processes;


### k. whereas pesco was originally conceived as an avant-garde , comprising the member states willing and able to upgrade their cooperation in defence to a new level of ambition; whereas the fact that there are 25 pms means that pesco is at risk of being constrained by the ‘lowest common denominator’ approach; ### k. whereas pesco was originally conceived as an avant-garde , comprising the member states willing and able to upgrade their cooperation in defence to a new level of ambition; whereas we welcome that 25 member states have decided to participate to pesco; whereas this high number of pms should not mean that pesco is constrained by the ‘lowest common denominator’ approach; whereas meaningful participation of smaller member states shall be ensured;


### l. whereas work on the first three waves of pesco projects has led to the pms proposing 47 projects; whereas the current list of projects lacks coherence , strategic ambition and does not adequately address priority shortfalls as identified by the pms; whereas one of these projects has been stopped in order to avoid unnecessary duplication; whereas other projects did not make sufficient progress or are at risk of being stopped , and around 30 projects are still in the ideation and preparatory phase; ### l. whereas work on the first three waves of pesco projects has led to the pms establishing 47 projects; whereas we consider that this high number of proposals shows that pesco was much needed; whereas pms shall now translate this initial enthusiasm into political will and ensure the swift and effective implementation of these projects; whereas the current list of projects could benefit from more mutual coherence , strategic ambition and does not adequately address priority shortfalls as identified by the pms; whereas one of these projects has been stopped in order to avoid unnecessary duplication; whereas other projects did not make sufficient progress or are at risk of being stopped , and around 30 projects are still in the ideation and preparatory phase;


### l. whereas work on the first three waves of pesco projects has led to the pms proposing 47 projects; whereas the current list of projects lacks coherence , strategic ambition and does not adequately address priority shortfalls as identified by the pms; whereas one of these projects has been stopped in order to avoid unnecessary duplication; whereas other projects did not make sufficient progress or are at risk of being stopped , and around 30 projects are still in the ideation and preparatory phase; ### l. whereas work on the first three waves of pesco projects has led to the pms proposing 47 projects; whereas one of these projects has been stopped in order to avoid unnecessary duplication; whereas only some projects made sufficient progress , whereas some are at risk of being stopped , and whereas around 30 projects are still in the ideation and preparatory phase;


### m. whereas only the most strategic pesco projects , such as eufor crisis response operation core (eufor croc) have the potential to decisively contribute to the creation of a coherent full spectrum force package; ### m. whereas pesco projects , such as eufor crisis response operation core (eufor croc) , military mobility , network of logistic hubs or cyber rapid response teams and mutual assistance in cyber security (crrts) have the potential to decisively contribute to the creation of a coherent full spectrum force package;


### m. whereas only the most strategic pesco projects , such as eufor crisis response operation core (eufor croc) have the potential to decisively contribute to the creation of a coherent full spectrum force package; ### m. whereas pesco projects , such as eufor crisis response operation core (eufor croc) have the potential to decisively contribute to the creation of a coherent full spectrum force package;


### n. whereas major european defence projects such as the future air combat system (fcas) and the main ground combat system (mgcs) currently remain outside the scope of pesco; whereas their integration within the remit of pesco would provide for sufficient strategic focus; ### n. whereas major european defence projects such as the future air combat system (fcas) and the main ground combat system (mgcs) currently remain outside the scope of pesco;


### p. whereas only some of the current pesco projects do sufficiently address the most obvious capability gaps or already sufficiently take into account high impact capacity goals (hicg) deriving from the capability development plan (cdp) , and should be considered as a priority; ### p. whereas only some of the current pesco projects do sufficiently address the capability shortcomings or already sufficiently take into account high impact capacity goals (hicg) deriving from the capability development plan (cdp) , and should be considered as a priority;


### q. whereas the consistency between pesco , card , national implementation plans (nips) and the cdp has to be further improved; ### q. whereas the consistency , coherence and mutual reinforcement between pesco , card , national implementation plans (nips) and the cdp has to be further improved;


### r. whereas the nato defence planning process (ndpp) drives defence national planning processes in most cases; ### r. whereas the nato defence planning process (ndpp) drives defence national planning processes in most cases in member states which are members of the north atlantic treaty organization;


### s. whereas interactions between member states’ national priorities , eu priorities and nato priorities should be synchronised at the earliest possible convenience; whereas pesco can be an effective tool in order to achieve eu and nato targets simultaneously; ### s. whereas interactions between member states’ national priorities , eu priorities and nato priorities should take place at the earliest possible convenience; whereas pesco can be an effective tool in order to address the capability development priorities identified in the eu and by nato;


### u. whereas currently , pesco projects are dependent on the 25 participating member states’ financial contributions; whereas it is expected that , as a result of the covid-19 pandemic , national defence budgets will suffer reductions; whereas paradoxically , several of the currently 47 pesco projects , if funded accordingly , could strengthen member states’ preparedness , should another massive public health crisis occur: military mobility – a flagship pesco project – , the european medical command and many other projects in areas related to logistics and transportation , health care , disaster relief and the fight against malicious cyber activities; whereas cutting funding for the strategic capabilities that the eu and its member states currently lack would also weaken their ability to jointly act against future pandemics; ### u. whereas currently , pesco projects are dependent on the 25 participating member states’ financial contributions; whereas it is expected that , as a result of the covid-19 pandemic , national defence budgets will suffer reductions; whereas paradoxically , several of the currently 47 pesco projects , if funded accordingly , could strengthen member states’ preparedness , should another massive public health crisis occur: military mobility – a flagship pesco project – , the european medical command and many other projects in areas related to logistics and transportation , health care , disaster relief cbrn preparedness and the fight against malicious cyber activities; whereas cutting funding for the strategic capabilities that the eu and its member states currently lack would also weaken their ability to jointly act against future pandemics;


### v. whereas the prospect of co-financing certain pesco projects via the future european defence fund (edf) has led pms to multiply their proposals , and despite the fact that this has encouraged exchanges and cooperation , not all proposals necessarily have the eu’s best strategic interest in mind; ### v. whereas the prospect of co-financing certain pesco projects via the future european defence fund (edf) has led pms to multiply their proposals , and has encouraged exchanges and cooperation , whereas all proposals shall necessarily have the eu’s best strategic interest in mind;


### w. whereas the participation of third countries in individual pesco projects might be in the strategic interest of the european union , particularly in case of the united kingdom; ### w. whereas the participation of third countries , which would meet an agreed set of political substantive and legal conditions , in individual pesco projects might be in the strategic interest of the european union , when it comes to providing technical expertise or additional capabilities , particularly in case of strategic partners such as the united kingdom , countries from the western balkans and the eastern partnership; whereas possible third country participation to pesco projects should not undermine the objective to foster the eu csdp;


### w. whereas the participation of third countries in individual pesco projects might be in the strategic interest of the european union , particularly in case of the united kingdom; ### w. whereas the participation of third countries in individual pesco projects might be in the strategic interest of the european union , particularly in case of the united kingdom , united states of america or other non-eu nato member states;