### 12. checks shall be carried out without prior warning of the operator or trader , except where prior notification of the operator or trader is necessary in order to ensure the effectiveness of the checks. ### 12. checks shall be carried out without prior warning of the operator or trader.


### any technical and scientific means adequate to determine the exact place where the relevant commodity or product was produced , including isotope testing; ### any technical and scientific means adequate to determine the exact place where the relevant commodity or product was produced including anatomical , chemical and dna analysis , among others;


### 1. competent authorities shall cooperate with each other , with authorities from other member states , with the commission , and if necessary , with administrative authorities of third countries in order to ensure compliance with this regulation. ### 1. competent authorities shall cooperate with each other , with authorities from other member states , with the commission and , if necessary , with administrative authorities of third countries in order to ensure compliance with this regulation , including as regards the implementation of field audits.


### 1. competent authorities shall cooperate with each other , with authorities from other member states , with the commission , and if necessary , with administrative authorities of third countries in order to ensure compliance with this regulation. ### 1. competent authorities shall cooperate with each other , with authorities from other member states , with the commission , civil society organisations and trade unions , and if necessary , with administrative authorities of third countries in order to ensure compliance with this regulation.


### 3. competent authorities shall exchange information necessary for the enforcement of this regulation. this shall include giving access to and exchange of data on operators and traders including due diligence statements with other member states’ competent authorities to facilitate the enforcement of this regulation. ### 3. competent authorities shall exchange information necessary for the enforcement of this regulation. this shall include giving access to and exchange of data on operators and traders including due diligence statements , the nature and results of the controls carried out and any sanctions imposed with other member states’ competent authorities to facilitate the enforcement of this regulation.


### 1. member states shall make available to the public and the commission , at the latest by 30 april of each year , information on the application of this regulation during the previous calendar year. this information shall include their plans for checks , the number and the results of the controls carried out on operators and traders , including the contents of these checks , the volume of relevant commodities and products checked in relation to the total quantity of relevant commodities and products placed on the market , the countries of origin and of production of relevant commodities and products as well as the measures taken in case of non-compliance and the costs of controls recovered. ### 1. member states shall make available to the public and the commission , at the latest by 30 april of each year , information on the application of this regulation during the previous calendar year. this information shall include their plans for checks , the number and the results of the controls carried out on operators and traders , including the contents of these checks , the volume of relevant commodities and products checked in relation to the total quantity of relevant commodities and products placed on the market , the countries of origin and of production of relevant commodities and products as well as the measures taken in case of non-compliance , including the sanctions imposed , and the costs of controls recovered.


### 1. member states shall make available to the public and the commission , at the latest by 30 april of each year , information on the application of this regulation during the previous calendar year. this information shall include their plans for checks , the number and the results of the controls carried out on operators and traders , including the contents of these checks , the volume of relevant commodities and products checked in relation to the total quantity of relevant commodities and products placed on the market , the countries of origin and of production of relevant commodities and products as well as the measures taken in case of non-compliance and the costs of controls recovered. ### 1. member states shall make available to the public and the commission , at the latest by 30 april of each year , information on the application of this regulation during the previous calendar year. this information shall include their plans for checks , the number and the results of the controls carried out on operators and traders , including the contents of these checks , the proportion/percentage of relevant commodities and products checked in relation to the total quantity of relevant commodities and products placed on the market , the countries of origin and of production of relevant commodities and products as well as the measures taken in case of non-compliance and the costs of controls recovered.


### 1. member states shall make available to the public and the commission , at the latest by 30 april of each year , information on the application of this regulation during the previous calendar year. this information shall include their plans for checks , the number and the results of the controls carried out on operators and traders , including the contents of these checks , the volume of relevant commodities and products checked in relation to the total quantity of relevant commodities and products placed on the market , the countries of origin and of production of relevant commodities and products as well as the measures taken in case of non-compliance and the costs of controls recovered. ### 1. member states shall make available to the public and the commission , at the latest by 30 april of each year , information on the application of this regulation during the previous calendar year. this information shall include their plans for checks and the risk criteria on which they are based , the number and the results of the checks carried out on operators and traders , including the results of these checks , the number and the result of the controls carried out on relevant commodities and products including the results of these controls , the volume of relevant commodities and products checked in relation to the total quantity of relevant commodities and products placed on the market , the countries of origin and of production of relevant commodities and products as well as the measures taken in case of non-compliance and the operators and traders against whom such measures were taken as well as the trading name of the non-compliant products , the costs of enforcement activities recovered in each instance , and operators and traders who failed to fulfil their obligations under this regulation and against whom an administrative authority or court has imposed penalties in line with article 23 which are final within the proceeding four years , including the trading name of the relevant non-compliant products.


### where relevant commodities or products were produced in a country or part thereof listed as high risk in accordance with article 27 , or there is a risk of relevant commodities or products produced in such countries or parts thereof entering the relevant supply chain , each member state shall ensure that the annual checks carried out by their competent authorities cover at least 15% of the operators placing , making available on or exporting from the union market each of the relevant commodities on their market as well as 15% of the quantity of each of the relevant commodities placed or made available on or exported from their market from high risk countries or parts thereof. ### where relevant commodities or products were produced in a country or part thereof listed as high risk in accordance with article 27 , or there is a risk of relevant commodities or products produced in such countries or parts thereof entering the relevant supply chain , each member state shall ensure that the annual checks carried out by their competent authorities cover at least 20% of the operators placing , making available on or exporting from the union market each of the relevant commodities on their market as well as 20% of the quantity of each of the relevant commodities placed or made available on or exported from their market from high risk countries or parts thereof.


### where relevant commodities or products were produced in a country or part thereof listed as high risk in accordance with article 27 , or there is a risk of relevant commodities or products produced in such countries or parts thereof entering the relevant supply chain , each member state shall ensure that the annual checks carried out by their competent authorities cover at least 15% of the operators placing , making available on or exporting from the union market each of the relevant commodities on their market as well as 15% of the quantity of each of the relevant commodities placed or made available on or exported from their market from high risk countries or parts thereof. ### where relevant commodities or products were produced in a country or part thereof listed as high risk in accordance with article 27 , or there is a risk of relevant commodities or products produced in such countries or parts thereof entering the relevant supply chain , each member state shall ensure that the annual checks carried out by their competent authorities cover at least 30% of the operators placing , making available on or exporting from the union market each of the relevant commodities and products on their market as well as 30% of the quantity of each of the relevant commodities and products placed or made available on or exported from their market from high risk countries or parts thereof. competent authorities shall ensure that the annual checks carried out on the basis of this article regularly include all of the elements listed in article 15.


### where , following the checks referred to in article 15 and 16 , possible serious shortcomings have been detected , or risks have been identified pursuant to article 14(6) , the competent authorities may take immediate interim measures , including seizure or suspension of the placing or making available on and exporting from the union market of the relevant commodities and products. ### where , following the checks referred to in article 15 and 16 , possible serious shortcomings have been detected , or risks have been identified pursuant to article 14(6) , the competent authorities may take immediate interim measures , including seizure or suspension of the placing or making available on and exporting from the union market of the relevant commodities and products. member states shall inform the commission and the competent authorities of other member states about such measures directly.


### where , following the checks referred to in article 15 and 16 , possible serious shortcomings have been detected , or risks have been identified pursuant to article 14(6) , the competent authorities may take immediate interim measures , including seizure or suspension of the placing or making available on and exporting from the union market of the relevant commodities and products. ### where , following the checks referred to in article 15 and 16 , possible serious shortcomings have been detected , or risks have been identified pursuant to article 14(6) , the competent authorities may take immediate additional interim measures , including seizure or suspension of the placing or making available on and exporting from the union market of the relevant commodities and products.


### where , following the checks referred to in article 15 and 16 , possible serious shortcomings have been detected , or risks have been identified pursuant to article 14(6) , the competent authorities may take immediate interim measures , including seizure or suspension of the placing or making available on and exporting from the union market of the relevant commodities and products. ### where , following the checks referred to in article 15 and 16 , possible serious shortcomings have been detected , or risks have been identified pursuant to article 14(6) , the competent authorities should take immediate interim measures , including seizure or suspension of the placing or making available on and exporting from the union market of the relevant commodities and products.


### 1. without prejudice to article 23 , where competent authorities establish that an operator or trader has not complied with its obligations under this regulation or that a relevant commodity or product is not compliant with this regulation , they shall without delay require the relevant operator or trader to take appropriate and proportionate corrective action to bring the non-compliance to an end. ### 1. without prejudice to article 23 , where competent authorities establish that an operator or trader has not complied with its obligations under this regulation or that a relevant commodity or product is not compliant with this regulation , they shall without delay require the relevant operator or trader to take appropriate and proportionate corrective action to bring the non-compliance to an end , both for the relevant commodities or products concerned and all others with the same risk profile.


### 1. without prejudice to article 23 , where competent authorities establish that an operator or trader has not complied with its obligations under this regulation or that a relevant commodity or product is not compliant with this regulation , they shall without delay require the relevant operator or trader to take appropriate and proportionate corrective action to bring the non-compliance to an end. ### 1. without prejudice to article 23 , where competent authorities establish that an operator or trader has not complied with its obligations under this regulation or that a relevant commodity or product is not compliant with this regulation , they shall without delay require the relevant operator or trader to take appropriate and proportionate corrective action to bring the non-compliance to an end as soon as possible.


### 1. without prejudice to article 23 , where competent authorities establish that an operator or trader has not complied with its obligations under this regulation or that a relevant commodity or product is not compliant with this regulation , they shall without delay require the relevant operator or trader to take appropriate and proportionate corrective action to bring the non-compliance to an end. ### 1. in addition to the imposition of penalties in line with article 23 , where competent authorities establish that an operator or trader has not complied with its obligations under this regulation or that a relevant commodity or product is not compliant with this regulation , they shall without delay require the relevant operator or trader to take corrective action to bring the non-compliance to an end within a specified and reasonable period of time.


### destroying the relevant commodity or product or donating it to charitable or public interest purposes. ### donating the relevant commodity or product to charitable or public interest purposes or if not possible , destroying it.


### destroying the relevant commodity or product or donating it to charitable or public interest purposes. ### donating it to charitable or public interest purposes or destroying the relevant commodity or product.


### destroying the relevant commodity or product or donating it to charitable or public interest purposes. ### donating the relevant commodity or product to charitable or public interest purposes.


### destroying the relevant commodity or product or donating it to charitable or public interest purposes. ### destroying the relevant commodity or product or donating it to charitable or public interest purposes if possible;


### 3. if the operator or trader fails to take corrective action referred to in paragraph 2 or where the non-compliance referred to in paragraph 1 persists , competent authorities shall ensure that the product is withdrawn or recalled , or that its being made available on or exported from the union market is prohibited or restricted. ### 3. if the operator or trader fails to complete the corrective action referred to in paragraph 2 within the period of time specified by the competent authority under paragraph 1 , or where the non-compliance referred to in paragraph 1 persists after that period of time ends , competent authorities shall ensure that the relevant commodity or product is withdrawn or recalled , or that its being made available on or exported from the union market is prohibited or restricted.


### fines proportionate to the environmental damage and the value of the relevant commodities or products concerned , calculating the level of such fines in such way as to make sure that they effectively deprive those responsible of the economic benefits derived from their infringements , and gradually increasing the level of such fines for repeated infringements; the maximum amount of such fines shall be at least 4 % of the operators or trader’s annual turnover in the member state or member states concerned; ### fines proportionate to the environmental damage or the human rights violations and the value of the relevant commodities or products concerned , calculating the level of such fines in such way as to make sure that they effectively deprive those responsible of the economic benefits derived from their infringements , and gradually increasing the level of such fines for repeated infringements; the maximum amount of such fines shall be at least 4 % of the operators or trader’s annual turnover in the member state or member states concerned;


### 10. customs authorities may destroy a non-compliant relevant commodity or product upon the request of the competent authorities or where they deem it necessary and proportionate. the cost of such measure shall be borne by the natural or legal person holding the relevant commodity or product. articles 197 and 198 of regulation (eu) no 952/2013 shall apply accordingly. upon request of competent authorities , non-compliant relevant commodities and products may alternatively be confiscated and placed by customs at the disposal of the competent authorities. ### 10. customs authorities may donate for charitable or public interest purposes or if not possible , destroy a non-compliant relevant commodity or product upon the request of the competent authorities or where they deem it necessary and proportionate. the cost of such measure shall be borne by the natural or legal person holding the relevant commodity or product. articles 197 and 198 of regulation (eu) no 952/2013 shall apply accordingly. upon request of competent authorities , non-compliant relevant commodities and products may alternatively be confiscated and placed by customs at the disposal of the competent authorities.


### 1. the commission shall develop an electronic interface based on the eu single window environment for customs to enable the transmission of data , in particular the notifications and requests referred to in article 24 , paragraphs 5 to 8 , between national customs systems and the information system referred to in article 31. this electronic interface shall be in place at the latest four years from the date of adoption of the relevant implementing act referred to in paragraph 3. ### 1. the commission shall develop an electronic interface based on the eu single window environment for customs to enable the transmission of data , in particular the notifications and requests referred to in article 24 , paragraphs 5 to 8 , between national customs systems and the information system referred to in article 31. this electronic interface shall be in place at the latest two years from the date of adoption of the relevant implementing act referred to in paragraph 3.


### 2. the commission may develop an electronic interface based on the eu single window environment for customs to enable: ### 2. the commission shall develop an electronic interface based on the eu single window environment for customs to enable:


### 1. this regulation establishes a three-tier system for the assessment of countries or parts thereof. unless identified in accordance with this article as presenting a low or high risk , countries shall be considered as presenting a standard risk. the commission may identify countries or parts thereof that present a low or high risk of producing relevant commodities or products that are not compliant with article 3 , point (a). the list of the countries or parts thereof that present a low or high risk shall be published by means of implementing act(s) to be adopted in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in article 34(2). that list shall be updated as necessary in light of new evidence. ### 1. this regulation establishes a system for the assessment of countries or parts thereof. unless identified in accordance with this article as presenting a high risk , countries shall be considered as presenting a standard risk. the commission may identify countries or parts thereof that present a high risk of producing relevant commodities or products that are not compliant with article 3 , point (a). the list of the countries or parts thereof that present a high risk shall be published by means of implementing act(s) to be adopted in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in article 34(2). that list shall be updated as necessary in light of new evidence.


### 2. the identification of low and high risk countries or parts thereof pursuant to paragraph 1 shall take into account information provided by the country concerned and be based on the following assessment criteria: ### 2. the identification of high risk countries or parts thereof pursuant to paragraph 1 shall follow a transparent assessment process which shall take into account information provided by the country concerned and by third parties , including indigenous peoples , local communities and civil society organisations and be based on the following assessment criteria:


### rate of deforestation and forest degradation , ### rate of deforestation and forest degradation and destruction of ecosystems ,


### agreements and other instruments concluded between the country concerned and the union that address deforestation or forest degradation and facilitates compliance of relevant commodities and products with the requirements of this regulation and their effective implementation; ### agreements and other instruments concluded between the country concerned and the union that address deforestation or forest degradation or ecosystem destruction and facilitates compliance of relevant commodities and products with the requirements of this regulation and their effective implementation;


### whether the country concerned has national or subnational laws in place , including in accordance with article 5 of the paris agreement , and takes effective enforcement measures to avoid and sanction activities leading to deforestation and forest degradation , and in particular whether sanctions of sufficient severity to deprive of the benefits accruing from deforestation or forest degradation are applied. ### whether the country concerned has national or subnational laws in place , including in accordance with article 5 of the paris agreement and relevant law in accordance with article 2 paragraph 1 point 28 of this regulation , and takes effective enforcement measures to ensure that those laws are implemented and to avoid and sanction activities leading to deforestation , ecosystem conversion and forest and ecosystem degradation , and in particular whether sanctions of sufficient severity to deprive of the benefits accruing from deforestation , ecosystem degradation or forest and ecosystem degradation or non-compliance with the rules applicable in the country of production described in article 2 paragraph 1 point 28 are applied;


### 3. the commission shall notify the countries concerned of its intent to assign a change to the existing risk category and invite them to provide any information deemed useful in this regard. the commission shall allow the countries adequate time to provide a response , which may include information on measures taken by the country to remedy the situation in case its status or the status of parts thereof might be changed to a higher risk category. ### 3. the commission shall notify the countries concerned of its intent to assign a change to the existing risk category and invite them to provide any information deemed useful in this regard. it shall also carry out a public consultation to gather information and views from all interested parties , including in particular indigenous peoples and local communities as well as civil society organisations , including trade unions. the commission shall allow the countries and other interested parties adequate time to provide a response , which may include information on measures taken by the country to remedy the situation in case its status or the status of parts thereof might be changed to a higher risk category.


### the consequences of its identification as a high or low risk country. ### the consequences of its identification as a high risk country.


### 1. the commission shall engage with producer countries concerned by this regulation to develop partnerships and cooperation to jointly address deforestation and forest degradation. such partnerships and cooperation mechanisms will focus on the conservation , restoration and sustainable use of forests , deforestation , forest degradation and the transition to sustainable commodity production , consumption processing and trade methods. partnerships and cooperation mechanisms may include structured dialogues , support programmes and actions , administrative arrangements and provisions in existing agreements or agreements that enable producer countries to make the transition to an agricultural production that facilitates the compliance of relevant commodities and products with the requirements of this regulation. such agreements and their effective implementation will be taken into account as part of the benchmarking under article 27 of this regulation. ### 1. the commission shall engage with producer countries concerned by this regulation to develop partnerships and cooperation to jointly address the root causes of deforestation , ecosystem conversion and forest and ecosystem degradation or destruction. such partnerships and cooperation mechanisms shall be supported with adequate resources and shall focus on the conservation , restoration and sustainable use of forests , on ending deforestation , ecosystem conversion , forest and ecosystem degradation , on human rights protection and the transition to sustainable commodity production , consumption processing and trade methods , good governance , as well as on protecting the rights and livelihoods and subsistence of forest dependent communities including indigenous peoples , local communities , other customary tenure rights holders and smallholders , especially women. partnerships and cooperation mechanisms may include structured dialogues , support programmes and actions , administrative arrangements and provisions in existing agreements or agreements that enable producer countries to make the transition to an agricultural production that facilitates the compliance of relevant commodities and products with the requirements of this regulation. they should be based on time bound milestones agreed with local stakeholders. such agreements and their effective implementation will be taken into account as part of the benchmarking under article 27 of this regulation.


### 2. partnerships and cooperation should allow the full participation of all stakeholders , including civil society , indigenous people , local communities and the private sector including , smes and smallholders. ### 2. partnerships and cooperation should allow the full participation of all stakeholders , including civil society , indigenous peoples , local communities and the private sector including , smes and smallholders.


### 2. partnerships and cooperation should allow the full participation of all stakeholders , including civil society , indigenous people , local communities and the private sector including , smes and smallholders. ### 2. partnerships and cooperation should allow and monitor the full participation of all stakeholders , especially women , including civil society , indigenous people , local communities and the private sector including , smes and smallholders. partnerships and cooperation should support or initiate inclusive and participatory dialogue toward national legal and governance reform processes to enhance forest governance and address domestic factors contributing to deforestation , natural ecosystem conversion and forest and ecosystem degradation or destruction.


### 3. partnerships and cooperation shall promote the development of integrated land use planning processes , relevant legislations , fiscal incentives and other pertinent tools to improve forest and biodiversity conservation , sustainable management and restoration of forests , tackle the conversion of forests and vulnerable ecosystems to other land uses , optimise gains for the landscape , tenure security , agriculture productivity and competitiveness , transparent supply chains , strengthen the rights of forest dependent communities including smallholders , indigenous peoples and local communities , and ensure public access to forest management documents and other relevant information. ### 3. partnerships and cooperation shall promote the development of integrated land use planning processes , relevant legislations , fiscal incentives and other pertinent tools to improve forest and biodiversity conservation , sustainable management and restoration of forests , tackle the conversion of forests and vulnerable ecosystems to other land uses , optimise gains for the landscape , tenure security , agriculture productivity and competitiveness , transparent supply chains and traceability , protect the rights of ownership , tenure and access to land , including rights of tree tenure for local and indigenous communities , an the right to give or withhold free , prior and informed consent , strengthen the rights of forest dependent communities including smallholders , women , indigenous peoples and local communities , strengthen national systems of governance and law enforcement , ensure public access to forest management documents and other relevant information and support smallholders in third countries to comply with the requirements of this regulation and facilitate their access to the eu market.


### 4. the commission shall engage in international bilateral and multilateral discussion on policies and actions to halt deforestation and forest degradation , including in multilateral fora such as convention on biological diversity , food and agriculture organization of the united nations , united nations convention to combat desertification , united nations environment assembly , united nations forum on forests , united nations framework convention on climate change , world trade organisation , g7 and g20. such engagement shall include the promotion of the transition to sustainable agricultural production and sustainable forest management as well as the development of transparent and sustainable supply chains as well as continue efforts towards identifying and agreeing robust standards and definitions that ensure a high level of protection of forest ecosystems. ### 4. the commission shall engage in international bilateral and multilateral discussion on policies and actions to halt deforestation and forest degradation , including in multilateral fora such as convention on biological diversity , food and agriculture organization of the united nations , united nations convention to combat desertification , united nations environment assembly , united nations forum on forests , united nations framework convention on climate change , world trade organisation , g7 and g20. such engagement shall include the promotion of the transition to sustainable agricultural production and sustainable forest management as well as the development of transparent and sustainable supply chains as well as continue efforts towards identifying and agreeing robust standards and definitions that ensure a high level of protection of forests and other natural ecosystems and related human rights.


### 1. no later than two years after the entry into force , the commission shall carry out a first review of this regulation , and shall present a report to the european parliament and the council accompanied , if appropriate , by a legislative proposal. the report shall focus in particular on an evaluation of the need and the feasibility of extending the scope of this regulation to other ecosystems , including land with high carbon stocks and land with a high biodiversity value such as grasslands , peatlands and wetlands and further commodities. ### 1. no later than two years after the entry into force , the commission shall carry out a first review of this regulation , and shall present a report to the european parliament and the council accompanied , if appropriate , by a legislative proposal. the report shall focus in particular on an evaluation of additional measures to strengthen the protection of forests , natural ecosystems and human rights and on extending the scope of this regulation to financial institutions operating in the union that provide financial services to natural or legal persons whose economic activities consist , or are linked to , the production , supply , placing on or export from the eu market of relevant commodities and products.


### 3. without prejudice to the general review under paragraph 1 , a first review of annex i shall be carried out by the commission no later than two years after the entry into force of this regulation , and thereafter at regular intervals in order to assess whether it is appropriate to amend or extend the relevant products listed in annex i in order to ensure that all products that contain , have been fed with or have been made using relevant commodities are included in that list , unless the demand for those products has a negligible effect on deforestation. the reviews shall be based on an assessment of the effect of the relevant commodities and products on deforestation and forest degradation , and take into account changes in consumption , as indicated by scientific evidence. ### 3. without prejudice to the general review under paragraph 1 , a first review of annex i shall be carried out by the commission no later than two years after the entry into force of this regulation , and thereafter at regular intervals in order to assess whether it is appropriate to amend or extend the relevant commodities listed in annex i in order to ensure the broadest application to commodities linked to deforestation , ecosystem conversion and forest and ecosystem degradation , including fossil fuel and minerals extraction. the reviews shall be based on an assessment of the effect of the relevant commodities on deforestation , ecosystem conversion and forest and ecosystem degradation and destruction , and take into account changes in consumption , as indicated by scientific evidence.


### 4. following a review as set out in paragraph 3 , the commission may adopt delegated acts in accordance with article 33 to amend annex i to include relevant products that contain or have been made using relevant commodities. ### 4. following a review as set out in paragraph 3 , the commission may adopt delegated acts in accordance with article 33 to amend annex i to include additional relevant commodities.


### goods as classified in the combined nomenclature set out in annex i to council regulation (eec) no 2658/87 , referred to in article 1 of this regulation68 . ### goods as classified in the combined nomenclature set out in annex i to council regulation (eec) no 2658/87 , referred to as "relevant commodities" in article 1 of this regulation68 bovine , cocoa , coffee , maize , natural rubber , palm oil , poultry , soy , sheep and goats , swine , wood. in accordance with article 1 , the regulation shall apply to all goods that contain , have been fed with or have been made using “relevant commodities” or products deriving from them , and are therein referred to as “relevant products”. an indicative list of these products is provided in the table included in this annex.


### 3. country of production and all plots of land of production , including geo-localisation coordinates , latitude and longitude. where a product or commodity contains materials , ingredients or components produced in different plots of land , the geo-location coordinates of all different plots of land shall be included; ### 3. country of production and all plots of land of production , including geo-localisation coordinates , latitude and longitude or polygon , and date or time range of production. where a product or commodity contains materials , ingredients or components produced in different plots of land , the geo-location coordinates of all different plots of land shall be included;


### reducing the european union’s contribution to greenhouse gas emissions and global biodiversity loss. ### reducing the european union’s contribution to greenhouse gas emissions and global biodiversity loss caused by deforestation.


### 2. by [three months after the date of entry into force of this regulation] , member states shall notify the commission of the names , addresses and contact details of the competent authorities designated pursuant to paragraph 1. member states shall inform the commission without undue delay of any changes to this information. ### 2. by [six months after the date of entry into force of this regulation] , member states shall notify the commission of the names , addresses and contact details of the competent authorities designated pursuant to paragraph 1. member states shall inform the commission without undue delay of any changes to this information.


### 4. in order to implement the risk-based plans of checks established under paragraph 3 , the competent authorities shall carry out risk analysis of the information contained in the due diligence statements made available to them according to article 4(2). the risk analysis shall use the risk criteria included in the plans established under paragraph 3 , and shall be carried out by means of electronic data-processing techniques integrated in the information system set out in article 31. ### 4. in order to implement the risk-based check plans established under paragraph 3 , competent authorities shall carry out a risk analysis of the object of control on the basis of the information contained in the due diligence declarations made available in accordance with article 4(2). the risk analysis shall use the risk criteria included in the plans established under paragraph 3 , and shall be carried out by means of electronic data-processing techniques integrated in the information system set out in article 31.


### 7. the suspensions referred to in paragraph 6 shall end within 3 working days unless the competent authorities , based on the result of the checks conducted within that period , conclude that they require additional time to establish whether the relevant commodities and products comply with the requirements of this regulation. in such case , the competent authorities shall extend the period of suspension by means of additional interim measures taken under article 21 or , in the case of relevant commodities or products entering or leaving the union market , by notifying the customs authorities of the need to maintain the suspension under article 24(6). ### 7. the suspensions referred to in paragraph 6 shall end within 3 working days , starting from the date of check when a high risk of non-conformity in the commodities or product is identified in the register , unless the competent authorities , based on the outcome of the checks carried out within that period , conclude that they need more time to determine whether the relevant commodities and derived products comply with the requirements of this regulation. in such case , the competent authorities shall extend the period of suspension by means of additional interim measures taken under article 21 or , in the case of relevant commodities or products entering or leaving the union market , by notifying the customs authorities of the need to maintain the suspension under article 24(6).


### 8. competent authorities shall exchange information on and coordinate the development and application of the risk criteria referred to in paragraph 3 with competent authorities of other member states and with the commission , in order to improve the effectiveness of the enforcement of this regulation. ### 8. competent authorities shall exchange information on and coordinate the development and application of the risk criteria referred to in paragraph 3 with competent authorities of other member states , with the commission and with customs authorities , in order to improve the effectiveness of the enforcement of this regulation.


### 13. the competent authorities shall keep records of the checks indicating in particular their nature and results , as well as on the measures taken in case of non-compliance. records of all checks shall be kept for at least 5 years. ### 13. the competent authorities shall keep records of the checks indicating in particular their nature and results , as well as on the measures taken in case of non-compliance , including administrative or criminal offences and penalties related to compliance with this regulation. records of all checks shall be kept for at least 5 years.


### 13. the competent authorities shall keep records of the checks indicating in particular their nature and results , as well as on the measures taken in case of non-compliance. records of all checks shall be kept for at least 5 years. ### 13. the competent authorities shall keep records of the checks indicating in particular their nature and results , as well as on the measures taken in case of non-compliance. records of all checks shall be kept for at least 10 years.


### examination of the due diligence system , including risk assessment and risk mitigation procedures; ### examination of the due diligence system , including risk assessment and risk mitigation procedures , except when article 12 applies;


### any technical and scientific means adequate to determine whether the relevant commodity or product are deforestation-free , including earth observation data such as from copernicus programme and tools , and ### deleted


### examination of documentation and records that demonstrate the compliance with article 6(2); ### examination of documentation and records that demonstrate the compliance with article 6(2) , (3) and (4).


### 1. member states may authorise their competent authorities to reclaim from the operators or traders the totality of the costs of their activities with respect to instances of non-compliance. ### 1. member states may authorise their competent authorities to reclaim from the operators or traders the totality of the costs of their activities with respect to instances of infringements.


### 5. at the request of a competent authority , member states shall provide to it the necessary information to ensure compliance with this regulation. ### 5. at the request of a competent authority , member states shall provide to it , without undue delay , the necessary information to ensure compliance with this regulation.


### 2. the commission services shall make publicly available , on an annual basis , a union-wide overview of the application of this regulation based on the data submitted by the member states under paragraph 1. ### 2. the commission services shall make publicly available , on an annual basis , a union-wide overview of the application of this regulation based on the data submitted by the member states under paragraph 1. where appropriate , and in order to promote the effective implementation of this regulation , the commission shall make recommendations with a view to encouraging the harmonisation of sanctions between member states.


### 2. the commission services shall make publicly available , on an annual basis , a union-wide overview of the application of this regulation based on the data submitted by the member states under paragraph 1. ### 2. the commission services shall make publicly available , at the latest by 30 june of each year , a union-wide overview of the application of this regulation based on the data submitted by the member states under paragraph 1.


### 2. the commission services shall make publicly available , on an annual basis , a union-wide overview of the application of this regulation based on the data submitted by the member states under paragraph 1. ### 2. the commission services shall make publicly available , on an annual basis , a union-wide overview of the application of this regulation based on the data submitted by the member states under paragraph 1. based on this overview , the commission shall issue recommendations to competent authorities to ensure the uniform application of this regulation.


### enhanced scrutiny ### increased controls


### 2. for the purposes of paragraph 1 , the corrective action required to be taken by the operator or trader shall include at least one or more of the following: ### 2. for the purposes of paragraph 1 , the corrective action required to be taken by the operator or trader shall include at least one of the following:


### proposal for a ### proposal for a


### cattle ### ex 0102 live cattle ex 0201 meat of cattle , fresh or chilled ex 0202 meat of cattle , frozen ex 0206 10 edible offal of cattle , fresh or chilled ex 0206 22 edible cattle livers , frozen ex 0206 29 edible cattle offal (excluding tongues and livers) , frozen ex 4101 raw hides and skins of cattle (fresh , or salted , dried , limed , pickled or otherwise preserved , but not tanned , parchment-dressed or further prepared) , whether or not dehaired or split ex 4104 tanned or crust hides and skins of cattle , without hair on , whether or not split , but not further prepared ex 4107 leather of cattle , further prepared after tanning or crusting , including parchment-dressed leather , without hair on , whether or not split


### 2. harmonised system code , free-text description , and quantity70 of the relevant commodity or product that is intended to be placed on the union market by the operator; ### 2. harmonised system code , free-text description , and quantity70 of the relevant commodity or product that is intended to be placed on the union market by the operator; for wood products where the species is a critical piece of information , the scientific name of the species or species that make up the product shall be incorporated.


### 2. harmonised system code , free-text description , and quantity70 of the relevant commodity or product that is intended to be placed on the union market by the operator; ### 2. harmonised system code , free-text description , including the trade name as well as , where applicable , the full scientific name , and quantity70 of the relevant commodity or product that is intended to be placed on or exported from the union market by the operator;


### (11) the european parliament highlighted that ongoing destruction of the world’s forests is linked , to a large extent , to the expansion of agricultural production — in particular by converting forests to agricultural land dedicated to producing a number of high-demand products and commodities. the parliament adopted on 22 october 2020 a resolution32 in accordance with article 225 of the treaty on the functioning of the european union (tfeu) requesting the commission to submit , on the basis of article 192(1) tfeu , a proposal for an “eu legal framework to halt and reverse eu-driven global deforestation”. ### (11) the european parliament highlighted that ongoing destruction and degradation of the world’s forests and natural ecosystems , as well as human rights violations , are linked , to a large extent , to the expansion of agricultural production — in particular by converting forests to agricultural land dedicated to producing a number of high-demand products and commodities. the parliament adopted on 22 october 2020 a resolution32 in accordance with article 225 of the treaty on the functioning of the european union (tfeu) requesting the commission to submit , on the basis of article 192(1) tfeu , a proposal for an “eu legal framework to halt and reverse eu-driven global deforestation” based on mandatory due diligence.


### (37) in order to foster transparency and facilitate enforcement , operators which are not smes should , on an annual basis , publicly report on their due diligence system , including on the steps taken to implement their obligations. ### (37) in order to foster transparency and facilitate enforcement , operators which are not micro enterprises should , on an annual basis , publicly report on their due diligence system , including on the steps taken to implement their obligations.


### (46) the risk of non-compliant commodities and products being placed on the union market varies depending on the commodity and product as well as on its country of origin and production. operators sourcing commodities and products from countries or parts thereof that present a low risk of growing , harvesting or producing relevant commodities in violation of this regulation should be subject to fewer obligations , thereby reducing compliance costs and administrative burden. commodities and products from high-risk countries or parts thereof should be subject to enhanced scrutiny by the competent authorities. ### (46) the risk of non-compliant commodities and products being placed on the union market can vary depending on the commodity and product as well as on its country of origin and production thereof. commodities and products from high-risk countries or parts thereof should be subject to enhanced scrutiny by the competent authorities.


### (52) in order to ensure implementation and effective enforcement of this regulation , member states should have the power to withdraw and recall non-compliant relevant commodities and products and take appropriate corrective actions. they should also ensure that infringements of this regulation by operators and traders are sanctioned by effective , proportionate and dissuasive penalties. ### (52) in order to ensure implementation and effective enforcement of this regulation , member states should have the power to withdraw and recall non-compliant relevant commodities and products and take appropriate corrective actions. they should also ensure that infringements of this regulation by operators and traders are sanctioned by effective , proportionate and dissuasive penalties and that operators failing to comply with the duties of this regulation are liable and obliged to compensate for the harm that the exercise of due diligence would have avoided.


### 4. except where the analysis undertaken in accordance with paragraph 1 allows the operator to ascertain that there is no or negligible risk that the relevant commodities or products are not compliant with the requirements of this regulation , the operator shall adopt prior to placing the relevant commodities and products on the union market or to their export risk mitigation procedures and measures that are adequate to reach no or negligible risk. this may include requiring additional information , data or documents , undertaking independent surveys or audits or other measures pertaining to information requirements set out in article 9. ### 4. except where the analysis undertaken in accordance with paragraph 1 allows the operator to ascertain that there is no or negligible risk that the relevant commodities or products are not compliant with the requirements of this regulation , the operator shall adopt prior to placing the relevant commodities and products on the union market or to their export risk mitigation procedures and measures that are adequate to reach no or negligible risk. this may include requiring additional information , data or documents , undertaking independent surveys or audits , capacity-building and financial investments for smallholders or other measures pertaining to information requirements set out in article 9.


### 2. unless otherwise provided by other eu legislative instruments that lay down requirements regarding sustainability value chain due diligence , operators which are not smes shall , on an annual basis , publicly report as widely as possible , including on the internet , on their due diligence system including on the steps taken by them to implement their obligations as set out in article 8. operators falling also within the scope of other eu legislative instruments that lay down requirements regarding value chain due diligence may fulfil their reporting obligations under this paragraph by including the required information when reporting in the context of other eu legislative instruments. ### 2. operators shall , on an annual basis , publicly report as widely as possible , including on the internet , on their due diligence system including on the steps taken by them to implement their obligations as set out in article 8 , 9 and 10 , as well as the implementation and outcomes of their due diligence , and measures they have taken to support the compliance of smallholders , including through investments and capacity building. operators falling also within the scope of other eu legislative instruments that lay down requirements regarding value chain due diligence may fulfil their reporting obligations under this paragraph by including the required information when reporting in the context of other eu legislative instruments.


### 4. the commission shall provide access to that information system to customs authorities , competent authorities , operators and traders in accordance with their respective obligations under this regulation. ### 4. the commission shall provide access to that information system to customs authorities , competent authorities , operators and traders in accordance with their respective obligations under this regulation. producers , including smallholders , should be granted access to all information which concern them.


### (6) those objectives remain relevant in the current global context and they are consistent with the analysis and perspective of the recent commission communication trade policy review “an open , sustainable and assertive trade policy”16 (‘tpr’). according to the tpr , the union has a “strategic interest to support the enhanced integration into the world economy of vulnerable developing countries” and it “must fully use the strength provided by its openness and the attractiveness of its single market” to support multilateralism and to ensure adherence to universal values. for gsp specifically , the tpr notes its important role in “promoting respect for core human and labour rights” and sets the objective for the gsp “to further increase trading opportunities for developing countries to reduce poverty and create jobs based on international values and principles”. moreover , the scheme should assist beneficiaries in recovering from the covid-19 impact and in re-building their economies in a sustainable manner , including with respect to international human rights , labour , environmental and good governance standards. coherence should be ensured between the gsp and its objectives and the assistance provided to beneficiary countries , in line with union’s policy coherence for development (pcd) , which constitutes a key pillar of union’s efforts to enhance the positive impact and increase effectiveness of development cooperation17 . ### (6) those objectives remain relevant in the current global context and they are consistent with the analysis and perspective of the recent commission communication trade policy review “an open , sustainable and assertive trade policy”16 (‘tpr’). according to the tpr , the union has a “strategic interest to support the enhanced integration into the world economy of vulnerable developing countries” and it “must fully use the strength provided by its openness and the attractiveness of its single market” to support multilateralism and to ensure adherence to universal values. for gsp specifically , the tpr notes its important role in “promoting respect for core human and labour rights” and sets the objective for the gsp “to further increase trading opportunities for developing countries to reduce poverty and create jobs based on international values and principles”. moreover , the scheme should assist beneficiaries in recovering from the covid-19 impact , reinforcing their capacity building and in re-building their economies in a sustainable manner , including with respect to international human rights , labour , environmental and good governance standards. coherence should be ensured between the gsp and its objectives and the assistance provided to beneficiary countries , in line with union’s policy coherence for development (pcd) , which constitutes a key pillar of union’s efforts to enhance the positive impact and increase effectiveness of development cooperation17 .


### (9) the standard gsp arrangement should be granted to all those developing countries which share a common development need and are in a similar stage of economic development. there is no definition of ‘developing country’ at the level of the wto , and it is left to preference granting countries to determine the list of gsp-eligible developing countries. countries which have successfully completed their transition from centralised to market economies , and are today powerful economies with a strong position in international trade , such as china , hong kong , macao and russia , should not be considered as developing countries in the context of the gsp , and should , therefore , be removed from the list of eligible countries. countries which are classified by the world bank as high-income or upper-middle income countries have per capita income levels allowing them to attain higher levels of diversification without the scheme's tariff preferences. they are at a different stage of economic development and do not , therefore , share the same development , trade and financial needs as lower income or more vulnerable developing countries. in order to prevent unjustified discrimination , they need to be treated differently; therefore , they do not benefit from the standard gsp arrangement. furthermore , the use of tariff preferences provided under the scheme by high-income or upper-middle income countries would increase the competitive pressure on exports from poorer , more vulnerable countries and , therefore , could impose unjustifiable burdens on those more vulnerable developing countries. the standard gsp arrangement should take account of the fact that the development , trade and financial needs are subject to change and ensure that the arrangement remains open if the situation of a country changes. ### (9) the standard gsp arrangement should be granted to all those developing countries which share a common development need and are in a similar stage of economic development and which have signed and ratified the international conventions of annex vi. countries should have a transitional period of 5 years from the date of entry into force of that decision to compliance with ratifications. there is no definition of ‘developing country’ at the level of the wto , and it is left to preference granting countries to determine the list of gsp-eligible developing countries. countries which have successfully completed their transition from centralised to market economies , and are today powerful economies with a strong position in international trade , such as china , hong kong , macao and russia , should not be considered as developing countries in the context of the gsp , and should , therefore , be removed from the list of eligible countries. countries which are classified by the world bank as high-income or upper-middle income countries have per capita income levels allowing them to attain higher levels of diversification without the scheme's tariff preferences. they are at a different stage of economic development and do not , therefore , share the same development , trade and financial needs as lower income or more vulnerable developing countries. in order to prevent unjustified discrimination , they need to be treated differently; therefore , they do not benefit from the standard gsp arrangement. furthermore , the use of tariff preferences provided under the scheme by high-income or upper-middle income countries would increase the competitive pressure on exports from poorer , more vulnerable countries and , therefore , could impose unjustifiable burdens on those more vulnerable developing countries. the standard gsp arrangement should take account of the fact that the development , trade and financial needs are subject to change and ensure that the arrangement remains open if the situation of a country changes.


### (11) the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance (gsp+) is based on the integral concept of sustainable development , as recognised by international conventions and instruments such as the 1986 un declaration on the right to development , the 1992 rio declaration on environment and development , the 1998 international labour organisation (ilo) declaration on fundamental principles and rights at work , the 2000 un millennium declaration , the 2002 johannesburg declaration on sustainable development , the ilo centenary declaration for the future of work of 2019 , the outcome document of the un summit on sustainable development of 2015 "transforming our world: the 2030 agenda for sustainable development" , the un guiding principles on business and human rights , and the paris agreement on climate change under the un framework convention on climate change. consequently , the additional tariff preferences provided for under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance should be granted to those developing countries which , due to a lack of diversification , are economically vulnerable , have ratified core international conventions on human and labour rights , climate and environmental protection and good governance , and commit to ensuring the effective implementation thereof. the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance should help those countries to assume the additional responsibilities resulting from the ratification and effective implementation of these conventions. the list of conventions relevant for gsp should be updated to better reflect the evolution of core international instruments and standards and take a proactive approach to sustainable development in keeping with the sustainable development goals and agenda 203018 . in this regard , the following conventions are added: the paris agreement on climate change (2015) – replacing the kyoto protocol; the convention on the rights of persons with disabilities (crpd); the optional protocol to the convention on the rights of the child on the involvement of children in armed conflict (op-crc-ac); ilo convention no 81 on labour inspection; ilo convention no 144 on tripartite consultation; and the un convention against transnational organized crime. ### (11) the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance (gsp+) is based on the integral concept of sustainable development , as recognised by international conventions and instruments such as the 1986 un declaration on the right to development , the 1992 rio declaration on environment and development , the 1998 international labour organisation (ilo) declaration on fundamental principles and rights at work , the 2000 un millennium declaration , the 2002 johannesburg declaration on sustainable development , the ilo centenary declaration for the future of work of 2019 , the outcome document of the un summit on sustainable development of 2015 "transforming our world: the 2030 agenda for sustainable development" , the un guiding principles on business and human rights , and the paris agreement on climate change under the un framework convention on climate change. consequently , the additional tariff preferences provided for under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance should be granted to those developing countries which , due to a lack of diversification , are economically vulnerable , have ratified , and are implementing , core international conventions on human and labour rights , climate and environmental protection and good governance , and commit to ensuring the effective implementation thereof. the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance should help those countries to assume the additional responsibilities resulting from the ratification and effective implementation of these conventions. the list of conventions relevant for gsp should be updated to better reflect the evolution of core international instruments and standards and take a proactive approach to sustainable development in keeping with the sustainable development goals and agenda 203018 . in this regard , the following conventions are added: the paris agreement on climate change (2015) – replacing the kyoto protocol; the convention on the rights of persons with disabilities (crpd); the optional protocol to the convention on the rights of the child on the involvement of children in armed conflict (op-crc-ac); ilo convention no 81 on labour inspection; ilo convention no 144 on tripartite consultation; and the un convention against transnational organized crime.


### (16) the commission and where appropriate the european external action service should monitor the status of ratification of the international conventions on human and labour rights , environmental protection and good governance and their effective implementation , by examining the relevant information , in particular where available the conclusions and recommendations of the relevant monitoring bodies established under those conventions. every three years , the commission should present to the european parliament and the council a report on the status of ratification of the respective conventions , the compliance of the beneficiary countries with any reporting obligations under those conventions , and the status of the implementation of the conventions in practice. ### (16) the commission and where appropriate the european external action service should monitor the status of ratification of the international conventions on human and labour rights , environmental protection and good governance and their effective implementation , by examining the relevant information , in particular where available the conclusions and recommendations of the relevant monitoring bodies established under those conventions. every two years , the commission should present to the european parliament and the council a report on the status of ratification of the respective conventions , the compliance of the beneficiary countries with any reporting obligations under those conventions , and the status of the implementation of the conventions in practice.


### (26) orderly international migration can bring important benefits to the countries of origin and destination of migrants and contribute to their sustainable development needs. increasing coherence between trade , development and migration policies is key to ensure that the benefits of migration accrue mutually to both the origin and destination countries. in this respect , it is essential for both origin and destination countries to address common challenges , such as , stepping up cooperation on readmission of own nationals and their sustainable reintegration in the country of origin , in particular in order to avoid a constant drain in active population in the countries of origin , with the ensuing long-term consequences on development , and to ensure that migrants are treated with dignity. ### deleted


### (27) return , readmission and reintegration are a common challenge for the union and its partners. in particular , every state has the obligation to readmit its own nationals under international customary law , and multilateral international conventions such as the convention on international civil aviation signed in chicago on 7 december 1944. improving sustainable reintegration and capacity building would significantly strengthen the local development in the partner countries. ### deleted


### it has ratified all the conventions listed in annex vi (the 'relevant conventions') and the commission has not identified , based on available information , in particular the most recent available conclusions of the monitoring bodies under those conventions , a serious failure to effectively implement any of those conventions; ### it has ratified , and is implementing , all the conventions listed in annex vi (the 'relevant conventions') and the commission has not identified , based on available information , in particular the most recent available conclusions of the monitoring bodies under those conventions , a serious failure to effectively implement any of those conventions;


### 2. the requesting country shall submit its request to the commission in writing. the request shall provide comprehensive information concerning the ratification of the relevant conventions and shall include the binding undertakings referred to in article 9 , pointes (d) , (e) , and (f). ### 2. the requesting country shall submit its request to the commission in writing. the request shall provide comprehensive information concerning the ratification and the implementation of the relevant conventions and shall include the binding undertakings referred to in article 9 , pointes (d) , (e) , and (f).


### 1. the common customs tariff ad valorem duties on all products listed in annex iii and annex vii , which originate in a gsp+ beneficiary country , shall be suspended. ### 1. the common customs tariff ad valorem duties on all products listed in annex iii and annex vii , which originate in a gsp+ beneficiary country , shall be suspended according to the tariff suspension schedule referred to in article 9(2).


### 1. by 1 january 2027 , and every three years thereafter , the commission shall present to the european parliament and to the council a report on the status of ratification of the relevant conventions , the compliance of the gsp+ beneficiary countries with any reporting obligations under those conventions and the status of the effective implementation thereof. ### 1. by 1 january 2027 , and every two years thereafter , the commission shall present to the european parliament and to the council a report on the status of ratification of the relevant conventions , the compliance of the gsp+ beneficiary countries with any reporting obligations under those conventions and the status of the effective implementation thereof.


### 1. by 1 january 2027 , and every three years thereafter , the commission shall present to the european parliament and to the council a report on the status of ratification of the relevant conventions , the compliance of the gsp+ beneficiary countries with any reporting obligations under those conventions and the status of the effective implementation thereof. ### 1. by 1 january 2026 , and every two years thereafter , the commission shall present to the european parliament and to the council a report on the status of ratification of the relevant conventions , the compliance of the gsp+ beneficiary countries with any reporting obligations under those conventions and the status of the effective implementation thereof.


### the report may include any information from any source the commission considers appropriate. ### the report may include any information from any source the commission considers appropriate , in particular in cooperation with civil society organizations.


### 3. in drawing their conclusions concerning effective implementation of the relevant conventions , the commission and where appropriate the european external action service shall assess the conclusions and recommendations of the relevant monitoring bodies , as well as , without prejudice to other sources , information submitted by the european parliament or the council as well as third parties , including governments and international organisations , civil society , and social partners. ### 3. in drawing their conclusions concerning effective implementation of the relevant conventions , the commission and where appropriate the european external action service shall assess the conclusions and recommendations of the relevant monitoring bodies , as well as , without prejudice to other sources , information submitted by the european parliament or the council as well as third parties , including governments and international organisations , civil society , human rights organizations and social partners.


### 3. where , either on the basis of the conclusions of the report referred to in article 14 or on the basis of the evidence available , including evidence submitted through a complaint , the commission has a reasonable doubt that a particular gsp+ beneficiary country does not respect its binding undertakings as referred to in article 9 , points (d) , (e) and (f) , or has formulated a reservation which is prohibited by any of the relevant conventions or which is incompatible with the object and purpose of that convention as established in article 9 , point (c) , it shall , in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in article 39(2) , adopt an implementing act to initiate the procedure for the temporary withdrawal of the tariff preferences provided under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance. the commission shall inform the european parliament and the council thereof. ### 3. at the request of the european parliament or where , either on the basis of the conclusions of the report referred to in article 14 or on the basis of the evidence available , including evidence submitted through a complaint , the commission has a reasonable doubt that a particular gsp+ beneficiary country does not respect its binding undertakings as referred to in article 9 , points (d) , (e) and (f) , or has formulated a reservation which is prohibited by any of the relevant conventions or which is incompatible with the object and purpose of that convention as established in article 9 , point (c) , it shall , in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in article 39(2) , adopt an implementing act to initiate the procedure for the temporary withdrawal of the tariff preferences provided under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance. the commission shall inform the european parliament and the council thereof.


### 1. the preferential arrangements referred to in article 1(2) may be withdrawn temporarily , in respect of all or of certain products originating in a beneficiary country , for any of the following reasons: ### 1. 1. the preferential arrangements referred to in article 1(2) may be withdrawn temporarily , fully or partially , in respect of all or of certain products , or of economic sectors , originating in a beneficiary country , for any of the following reasons:


### serious shortcomings in customs controls on the export or transit of drugs (illicit substances or precursors) , or related to the obligation to readmit the beneficiary country’s own nationals or serious failure to comply with international conventions on antiterrorism or anti-money laundering; ### serious shortcomings in customs controls on the export or transit of drugs (illicit substances or precursors) , or serious failure to comply with international conventions on antiterrorism or anti-money laundering;


### 3. where the commission , acting upon a complaint or on its own initiative , considers that there are sufficient grounds justifying temporary withdrawal of the tariff preferences provided under any preferential arrangement referred to in article 1(2) on the basis of the reasons referred to in paragraph 1 of this article it shall adopt an implementing act to initiate the procedure for temporary withdrawal in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in article 39(2). the commission shall inform the european parliament and the council of the adoption of that implementing act. ### 3. at the request of the european parliament or where the commission , acting upon a complaint or on its own initiative , considers that there may be sufficient grounds justifying temporary withdrawal of the tariff preferences provided under any preferential arrangement referred to in article 1(2) on the basis of the reasons referred to in paragraph 1 of this article it shall adopt an implementing act to initiate the procedure for temporary withdrawal in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in article 39(2). the commission shall inform the european parliament and the council of the adoption of that implementing act.


### 10. where the commission considers that the findings justify temporary withdrawal for the reasons referred to in paragraph 1 of this article , it is empowered to adopt delegated acts , in accordance with article 36 , to amend annex i and annex ii , in order to temporarily withdraw the tariff preferences provided under the preferential arrangements referred to in article 1(2). in adopting the delegated act the commission may , where appropriate , consider the socio-economic effect of the temporary withdrawal of tariff preferences in the beneficiary country. ### 10. where the commission considers that the findings justify temporary withdrawal for the reasons referred to in paragraph 1 of this article , it is empowered to adopt delegated acts , in accordance with article 36 , to amend annex i and annex ii , in order to temporarily withdraw the tariff preferences provided under the preferential arrangements referred to in article 1(2).


### by 1 january 2027 and every three years thereafter , the commission shall submit to the european parliament and to the council a report on the effects of the scheme covering the most recent three-year period and all of the preferential arrangements referred to in article 1(2). ### by 1 january 2027 and every two years thereafter , the commission shall submit to the european parliament and to the council a report on the effects of the scheme covering the most recent two-year period and all of the preferential arrangements referred to in article 1(2).


### (17) for the purposes of monitoring of implementation and , where applicable , withdrawal of tariff preferences , reports from relevant monitoring bodies are essential. however , such reports may be supplemented by other information available to the commission , including information obtained under bilateral or multilateral technical assistance programmes , and through other sources of information , provided they are accurate and reliable. this could include information from the european parliament and the council , governments , international organisations , civil society , social partners , or complaints received through the sep provided they satisfy the relevant requirements. shortcomings identified during the monitoring process may inform the commission’s future programming of development assistance in a more targeted manner. ### (17) for the purposes of monitoring of implementation and , where applicable , withdrawal of tariff preferences , reports from relevant monitoring bodies are essential. however , such reports may be supplemented by other information available to the commission , including information obtained under bilateral or multilateral technical assistance programmes , and through other sources of information , provided they are accurate and reliable. this could include information from the european parliament and the council , governments , international organisations , civil society , human rights organizations , social partners , or complaints received through the sep provided they satisfy the relevant requirements. shortcomings identified during the monitoring process may inform the commission’s future programming of development assistance in a more targeted manner.


### (18) in july 2020 , the commission appointed the chief trade enforcement officer with the role of enforcing trade rules. in this connection , in november 2020 , the commission launched a new complaints mechanism , the single entry point (‘sep’) , as part of its increased efforts to strengthen the enforcement and implementation of trade commitments. through the sep , the commission receives complaints on various matters related to trade policy , including breaches of the gsp commitments. such new system of complaints should be integrated within the framework of this regulation. ### (18) in july 2020 , the commission appointed the chief trade enforcement officer with the role of enforcing trade rules. in this connection , in november 2020 , the commission launched a new complaints mechanism , the single entry point (‘sep’) , as part of its increased efforts to strengthen the enforcement and implementation of trade commitments. through the sep , the commission receives complaints on various matters related to trade policy , including breaches of the gsp commitments. such new system of complaints should be integrated within the framework of this regulation and should be accessible to civil society organisations.


### 2. an investigation shall be initiated upon request by a member state , by any legal person or any association not having legal personality , acting on behalf of union producers , or on the commission's own initiative if it is apparent to the commission that there is sufficient prima facie evidence , as determined on the basis of factors referred to in article 23 , to justify such initiation. the request to initiate an investigation shall contain evidence that the conditions for imposing the safeguard measure set out in article 22(1) are met. the request shall be submitted to the commission. the commission shall , as far as possible , examine the accuracy and adequacy of the evidence provided in the request , to determine whether there is sufficient prima facie evidence to justify the initiation of an investigation. ### 2. an investigation shall be initiated upon request by a member state , by the european parliament , by any legal person or any association not having legal personality , acting on behalf of union producers , or on the commission's own initiative if it is apparent to the commission that there is sufficient prima facie evidence , as determined on the basis of factors referred to in article 23 , to justify such initiation. the request to initiate an investigation shall contain evidence that the conditions for imposing the safeguard measure set out in article 22(1) are met. the request shall be submitted to the commission. the commission shall , as far as possible , examine the accuracy and adequacy of the evidence provided in the request , to determine whether there is sufficient prima facie evidence to justify the initiation of an investigation.


### (1) a strong , open and competitive internal market enables both european and foreign undertakings to compete on merits. the union benefits from a sophisticated and effective system of state aid control , aiming at ensuring fair conditions for all undertakings engaging in an economic activity in the internal market. this state aid control system prevents member states from granting state aid that unduly distorts competition in the internal market. ### (1) a strong , open and competitive internal market enables all undertakings active in the union to compete on merits. the union benefits from a sophisticated and effective system of state aid control , aiming at ensuring fair conditions for all undertakings engaging in an economic activity in the internal market. this state aid control system aims at preventing member states from granting state aid that unduly distorts competition in the internal market.


### (2) at the same time , undertakings might receive subsidies from third countries , that provide public funds which are then used , for instance , to finance economic activities in the internal market in any sector of the economy , such as participation in public procurement tenders , or acquisitions of undertakings , including those with strategic assets such as critical infrastructure and innovative technologies. such subsidies are currently not subject to union state aid rules. ### (2) at the same time , undertakings might receive subsidies from third countries which could be used to finance economic activities in the internal market , such as participation in public procurement tenders , or acquisitions of undertakings , including those with strategic assets such as critical infrastructure and innovative technologies. such subsidies are currently not subject to union state aid rules.


### (3) foreign subsidies can distort the internal market and undermine the level playing field for various economic activities in the union. this could in particular occur in the context of concentrations entailing a change of control over union undertakings , where such concentrations are fully or partially financed through foreign subsidies , or if undertakings benefiting from foreign subsidies are awarded public contracts in the union. ### (3) foreign subsidies can distort the internal market and undermine the level playing field for various economic activities in the union. this could in particular occur in the context of concentrations entailing a change of control over union undertakings , where such concentrations are fully or partially financed through foreign subsidies , or if undertakings benefiting from foreign subsidies are awarded public contracts in the union. apart from distorting competition , foreign subsidies may also lead to the delocalisation of companies active in the internal market when production facilities are relocated to a third country following an acquisition. this can have adverse consequences to labour markets such as job losses and a decline of aggregate consumer demand and real wages.


### (4) no existing union instruments address distortions caused by foreign subsidies. trade defence instruments enable the commission to act when subsidised goods are imported into the union , but not when foreign subsidies take the form of subsidised investments , or when services and financial flows are concerned. under the wto agreement on subsidies and countervailing measures , the union has the possibility to initiate state-to-state dispute settlement against certain foreign subsidies granted by wto members and limited to goods. ### (4) union instruments do not properly address distortions caused by foreign subsidies. trade defence instruments enable the commission to act when subsidised goods are imported into the union , but not when foreign subsidies take the form of subsidised investments , or when services and financial flows are concerned. under the wto agreement on subsidies and countervailing measures , the union has the possibility to initiate state-to-state dispute settlement against certain foreign subsidies granted by wto members and limited to goods.


### (5) it is therefore necessary to complement existing union instruments with a new tool to effectively deal with distortions in the internal market caused by foreign subsidies and ensure a level playing field. in particular , the new tool complements union state aid rules which deal with distortions in the internal market caused by member state subsidies. ### (5) it is therefore necessary to have in place an international structure that deals with the area of subsidies from different jurisdictions. in its absence , a new tool to effectively deal with distortions in the internal market caused by foreign subsidies and to ensure a level playing field will be created. the new tool complements union state aid rules which deal with distortions in the internal market caused by member state subsidies.


### (7) to ensure a level playing field throughout the internal market and consistency in the application of this regulation , the commission should be the sole authority competent to apply this regulation. the commission should have the power to examine any foreign subsidy to the extent it is in the scope of this regulation in any sector of the economy on its own initiative relying on information from all available sources. to ensure effective control , in the specific case of large concentrations (mergers and acquisitions) and public procurement procedures above certain thresholds , the commission should have the power to review foreign subsidies based on a prior notification by the undertaking to the commission. ### (7) to ensure a level playing field throughout the internal market and consistency in the application of this regulation , the commission should have a pivotal role when applying this regulation. the commission in conjunction with national competition authorities should have the power to examine any foreign subsidy to the extent it is in the scope of this regulation in any sector of the economy on its own initiative relying on information from all available sources in order to establish a union dimension to the impact such subsidy could have. to ensure effective control , in the specific case of large concentrations (mergers and acquisitions) and public procurement procedures above certain thresholds , the commission should have the power to review foreign subsidies based on a prior notification by the undertaking to the commission.


### (9) there should be a financial contribution provided , directly or indirectly , by the public authorities of a third country. the financial contribution may be granted through public or private entities. whether a public entity provides a financial contribution should be determined on a case-by-case basis with due regard to elements such as the characteristics of the relevant entity and the legal and economic environment prevailing in the country in which the entity operates including the government’s role in the economy. financial contributions may also be granted through a private entity if its actions can be attributed to the third country. ### (9) there should be a financial contribution provided , directly or indirectly , by the public authorities of a third country. the financial contribution may be granted through public or private entities. whether a public entity provides a financial contribution should be determined on a case-by-case basis with due regard to elements such as the characteristics of the relevant entity and the legal and economic environment prevailing in the country in which the entity operates including the government’s role in the economy. financial contributions in the form of a foreign subsidy may also be granted through a private entity if its actions can be attributed to the third country.


### (12) once the existence of a foreign subsidy is established , the commission should assess whether the foreign subsidy distorts the internal market. unlike state aid granted by a member state , foreign subsidies are not generally prohibited. subsidies in the form of export financing may be a cause of particular concern because of their distortive effects. this is not the case if such financing is provided in line with the oecd arrangement on officially supported export credits. the commission should assess on a case-by-case basis whether a foreign subsidy distorts the internal market. ### (12) once the existence of a foreign subsidy is established , the commission should assess whether the foreign subsidy distorts the internal market. unlike state aid granted by a member state , foreign subsidies are not generally prohibited. subsidies in the form of export financing may be a cause of particular concern because of their distortive effects. this is not the case if such financing is provided in line with the oecd arrangement on officially supported export credits. the commission should assess on a case-by-case basis whether a foreign subsidy distorts the internal market. if the threshold for notification is not met , the case can be referred by the commission to the national competition authorities of the relevant member states.


### (16) the commission should take into account the positive effects of the foreign subsidy on the development of the relevant subsidised economic activity. the commission should weigh these positive effects against the negative effects of a foreign subsidy in terms of distortion on the internal market in order to determine , if applicable , the appropriate redressive measure or accept commitments. the balancing may also lead to the conclusion that no redressive measures should be imposed. categories of foreign subsidies that are deemed most likely to distort the internal market are less likely to have more positive than negative effects. ### (16) the investigative authority should take into account the positive effects of the foreign subsidy on the development of the relevant subsidised economic activity. the commission should weigh these positive effects against the negative effects of a foreign subsidy in terms of distortion on the internal market in order to determine , if applicable , the appropriate redressive measure or accept commitments. the balancing should also take into account the contribution of a foreign subsidy to overarching goals based on international agreements such as the paris agreement and the sustainable development goals (sdgs). the balancing may also lead to the conclusion that no redressive measures should be imposed. categories of foreign subsidies that are deemed most likely to distort the internal market are less likely to have more positive than negative effects. to this effect , the commission should adopt a delegated act with guidance on the procedure adopted to balance the effects of foreign subsidies.


### (16) the commission should take into account the positive effects of the foreign subsidy on the development of the relevant subsidised economic activity. the commission should weigh these positive effects against the negative effects of a foreign subsidy in terms of distortion on the internal market in order to determine , if applicable , the appropriate redressive measure or accept commitments. the balancing may also lead to the conclusion that no redressive measures should be imposed. categories of foreign subsidies that are deemed most likely to distort the internal market are less likely to have more positive than negative effects. ### (16) the commission should take into account the positive effects of the foreign subsidy on the development of the relevant subsidised economic activity. the commission should weigh these positive effects against the negative effects of a foreign subsidy in terms of distortion on the internal market in order to determine , if applicable , the appropriate redressive measure or accept commitments. the balancing may also lead to the conclusion that no redressive measures should be imposed. categories of foreign subsidies that are deemed most likely to distort the internal market are less likely to have more positive than negative effects. the commission should develop guidelines on the application of the balancing test.


### (21) the commission should have the power , on its own initiative , to examine any information on foreign subsidies. to this end , it is necessary to establish a procedure consisting of two steps , namely a preliminary review and an in-depth investigation. ### (21) the investigative authority should have the power to examine any relevant information on foreign subsidies. to this end , it is necessary to establish a procedure consisting of two steps , namely a preliminary review and an in-depth investigation.


### (21) the commission should have the power , on its own initiative , to examine any information on foreign subsidies. to this end , it is necessary to establish a procedure consisting of two steps , namely a preliminary review and an in-depth investigation. ### (21) the commission should have the power , on its own initiative , to examine any information on foreign subsidies. to this end , it is necessary to establish a procedure consisting of two steps , namely a preliminary review and an in-depth investigation. the commission should publish guidance on the criteria to open such a procedure.


### (23) furthermore , where necessary to restore competition in the internal market immediately and to prevent irreparable harm , the commission should have the power to adopt interim measures. ### (23) furthermore , where necessary to restore competition in the internal market immediately and to prevent irreparable harm , the investigative authority should have the power to adopt interim measures.


### (24) in all cases where , as a result of the preliminary review , the commission has sufficient indications of the existence of a foreign subsidy distorting the internal market , the commission should have the power to launch an in-depth investigation to gather additional relevant information to assess the foreign subsidy , and to allow the interested parties to exercise their rights of defence. ### (24) in all cases where , as a result of the preliminary review , the investigative authority has sufficient indications of the existence of a foreign subsidy distorting the internal market , the investigative authority should have the power to launch an in-depth investigation to gather additional relevant information to assess the foreign subsidy , and to allow the interested parties to exercise their rights of defence.


### (26) the commission should have appropriate instruments to ensure the effectiveness of commitments and redressive measures. if the undertaking concerned does not comply with a decision with commitments , a decision imposing redressive measures , or a decision ordering interim measures , the commission should have the power to impose fines and periodic penalty payments. ### (26) the investigative authority should have appropriate instruments to ensure the effectiveness of commitments and redressive measures. if the undertaking concerned does not comply with a decision with commitments , a decision imposing redressive measures , or a decision ordering interim measures , the investigative authority should have the power to impose fines and periodic penalty payments.