### provide business users , or third parties authorised by a business user , free of charge , with effective , high-quality , continuous and real-time access and use of aggregated or non-aggregated data , that is provided for or generated in the context of the use of the relevant core platform services by those business users and the end users engaging with the products or services provided by those business users; for personal data , provide access and use only where directly connected with the use effectuated by the end user in respect of the products or services offered by the relevant business user through the relevant core platform service , and when the end user opts in to such sharing with a consent in the sense of the regulation (eu) 2016/679; ; ### provide business users and end users , or third parties authorised by a business user or end user , free of charge , in a user friendly manner with effective , high-quality , continuous and real-time access and use of aggregated and non-aggregated data , based on the preference requested by the business users , or third parties authorised by a business user or several business users , that is provided for or generated in the context of the use of the relevant core platform services by those business users and the end users engaging with the products or services provided by those business users; for personal data , provide access and use , in full compliance with regulation (eu) 2016/679 (gdpr) , only where directly connected with the use effectuated by the end user in respect of the products or services offered by the relevant business user through the relevant core platform service in line with the principles of purpose limitation and data minimisation , and when the end user opts in to such sharing with a consent in the sense of the regulation (eu) 2016/679 or when access to such data is lawful under lex specialis exemptions;


### 1. the measures implemented by the gatekeeper to ensure compliance with the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6 shall be effective in achieving the objective of the relevant obligation. the gatekeeper shall ensure that these measures are implemented in compliance with regulation (eu) 2016/679 and directive 2002/58/ec , and with legislation on cyber security , consumer protection and product safety. ### 1. the measures implemented by the gatekeeper to ensure compliance with the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6 shall be effective in achieving the objective of the relevant obligation. the gatekeeper shall ensure that these measures are implemented in compliance with regulation (eu) 2016/679 and directive 2002/58/ec , and with legislation on cyber security , consumer protection and product safety , and shall ensure that fair competition is maintained on the internal market.


### 1. the measures implemented by the gatekeeper to ensure compliance with the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6 shall be effective in achieving the objective of the relevant obligation. the gatekeeper shall ensure that these measures are implemented in compliance with regulation (eu) 2016/679 and directive 2002/58/ec , and with legislation on cyber security , consumer protection and product safety. ### 1. the measures implemented by the gatekeeper to ensure full compliance with the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6 shall be effective in achieving the objective of the relevant obligation. the gatekeeper shall be responsible for , and be able to demonstrate full compliance with these obligations (‘accountability’). the burden of proof regarding the efficiency lies on the gatekeeper. the gatekeeper shall demonstrate which measures have been taken to comply with these obligations. the gatekeeper shall ensure that these measures are implemented in compliance with regulation (eu) 2016/679 and directive 2002/58/ec , and with legislation on cyber security , consumer protection and product safety.


### 2. where the commission finds that the measures that the gatekeeper intends to implement pursuant to paragraph 1 , or has implemented , do not ensure effective compliance with the relevant obligations laid down in article 6 , it may by decision specify the measures that the gatekeeper concerned shall implement. the commission shall adopt such a decision within six months from the opening of proceedings pursuant to article 18. ### 2. where the commission finds that the measures that the gatekeeper intends to implement pursuant to paragraph 1 , or has implemented , do not ensure effective compliance with the relevant obligations laid down in article 6 , it may by decision specify the measures that the gatekeeper concerned shall implement. the commission shall adopt such a decision within three months from the opening of proceedings pursuant to article 18.


### 3. paragraph 2 of this article is without prejudice to the powers of the commission under articles 25 , 26 and 27. ### 3. paragraph 2 of this article is without prejudice to the powers of the commission under articles 25 , 26 and 27. following a decision under paragraph 2 of this article , if the commission finds the gatekeeper in non-compliance under article 25 and a decision under article 26 is taken , the non-compliance period is considered to have commenced from the implementation deadline in article 3(8).


### the purpose of the investigation. ### the purpose of the investigation and the specific aim sought to be achieved.


### 3. a gatekeeper shall be deemed to have engaged in a systematic non-compliance with the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6 , where the commission has issued at least three non-compliance or fining decisions pursuant to articles 25 and 26 respectively against a gatekeeper in relation to any of its core platform services within a period of five years prior to the adoption of the decision opening a market investigation in view of the possible adoption of a decision pursuant to this article. ### 3. a gatekeeper shall be deemed to have engaged in a systematic non-compliance with the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6 , where the commission has issued at least two non-compliance or fining decisions pursuant to articles 25 and 26 respectively against a gatekeeper in relation to any of its core platform services within a period of five years prior to the adoption of the decision opening a market investigation in view of the possible adoption of a decision pursuant to this article.


### 3. a gatekeeper shall be deemed to have engaged in a systematic non-compliance with the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6 , where the commission has issued at least three non-compliance or fining decisions pursuant to articles 25 and 26 respectively against a gatekeeper in relation to any of its core platform services within a period of five years prior to the adoption of the decision opening a market investigation in view of the possible adoption of a decision pursuant to this article. ### 3. a gatekeeper shall be deemed to have engaged in a systematic non-compliance with the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6 , where the commission has issued at least two non-compliance or fining decisions pursuant to articles 25 and 26 respectively against a gatekeeper in relation to any of its core platform services prior to the adoption of the decision opening a market investigation in view of the possible adoption of a decision pursuant to this article.


### the commission may conduct a market investigation with the purpose of examining whether one or more services within the digital sector should be added to the list of core platform services or to detect types of practices that may limit the contestability of core platform services or may be unfair and which are not effectively addressed by this regulation. it shall issue a public report at the latest within 24 months from the opening of the market investigation. ### the commission may conduct a market investigation with the purpose of examining whether one or more services within the digital sector should be added to the list of core platform services or to detect types of practices that may limit the contestability of core platform services or prima facie unfair and which are not effectively addressed by this regulation. it shall issue a public report at the latest within 24 months from the opening of the market investigation.


### the commission may conduct a market investigation with the purpose of examining whether one or more services within the digital sector should be added to the list of core platform services or to detect types of practices that may limit the contestability of core platform services or may be unfair and which are not effectively addressed by this regulation. it shall issue a public report at the latest within 24 months from the opening of the market investigation. ### the commission may conduct a market investigation with the purpose of examining whether one or more services within the digital sector should be added to the list of core platform services or to detect types of practices that may limit the contestability of core platform services or may be unfair and which are not effectively addressed by this regulation. it shall issue a public report at the latest within 18 months from the opening of the market investigation.


### 3. during on-site inspections the commission and auditors or experts appointed by it may require the undertaking or association of undertakings to provide access to and explanations on its organisation , functioning , it system , algorithms , data-handling and business conducts. the commission and auditors or experts appointed by it may address questions to key personnel. ### 3. during on-site inspections the commission and auditors or experts appointed by it may require the undertaking or association of undertakings to provide access to and explanations on its organisation , functioning , it system , algorithms , data-handling and business conducts. they shall run behavioural experiments to evaluate the algorithm and use of the data. the commission and auditors or experts appointed by it may address questions to key personnel.


### 3. during on-site inspections the commission and auditors or experts appointed by it may require the undertaking or association of undertakings to provide access to and explanations on its organisation , functioning , it system , algorithms , data-handling and business conducts. the commission and auditors or experts appointed by it may address questions to key personnel. ### 3. during on-site inspections the commission and auditors or experts appointed by it may require the undertaking or association of undertakings to provide access to and explanations on its organisation , functioning , it system , algorithms , data-handling and business conducts. the commission shall appoint rotating auditor or expert teams within the platform with the aim of having continuous access to the data and algorithms. they should run behavioural experiments to evaluate the algorithm and use of the data. the commission and auditors or experts appointed by it may address questions to key personnel.


### 1. the commission may take the necessary actions to monitor the effective implementation and compliance with the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6 and the decisions taken pursuant to articles 7 , 16 , 22 and 23. ### 1. the commission shall take the necessary actions to monitor the effective implementation and compliance with the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6 and the decisions taken pursuant to articles 7 , 16 , 22 and 23.


### 1. the commission shall adopt a non-compliance decision in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in article 32(4) where it finds that a gatekeeper does not comply with one or more of the following: ### 1. the commission shall endeavour to adopt , within six months from the opening of the proceedings under article 18 , a non-compliance decision in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in article 32(4) where it finds that a gatekeeper does not comply with one or more of the following:


### 1. the commission shall adopt a non-compliance decision in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in article 32(4) where it finds that a gatekeeper does not comply with one or more of the following: ### 1. the commission shall adopt a non-compliance decision in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in article 32(4) within a period of 6 months beginning from the moment of non-compliance where it finds that a gatekeeper does not comply with one or more of the following:


### 3. in the non-compliance decision adopted pursuant to paragraph 1 , the commission shall order the gatekeeper to cease and desist with the non-compliance within an appropriate deadline and to provide explanations on how it plans to comply with the decision. ### 3. in the non-compliance decision adopted pursuant to paragraph 1 , the commission shall order the gatekeeper to cease and desist with the non-compliance within an appropriate deadline and specify mandatory corrective measures a non-compliant gatekeeper shall implement to comply with the obligations in articles 5 and 6. the gatekeeper shall also present its own plan on how it intends to comply with the decision and the corrective measures.


### 3. in the non-compliance decision adopted pursuant to paragraph 1 , the commission shall order the gatekeeper to cease and desist with the non-compliance within an appropriate deadline and to provide explanations on how it plans to comply with the decision. ### 3. in the non-compliance decision adopted pursuant to paragraph 1 , the commission shall order the gatekeeper to cease and desist with the non-compliance within an appropriate deadline and to provide explanations on how it plans to comply with the decision. the commission may by decision adopted in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in article 32(4) impose on such gatekeeper any behavioural remedies which are proportionate to the infringement committed and necessary to ensure compliance with this regulation.


### 1. in the decision pursuant to article 25 , the commission may impose on a gatekeeper fines not exceeding 10% of its total turnover in the preceding financial year where it finds that the gatekeeper , intentionally or negligently , fails to comply with: ### 1. in the decision pursuant to article 25 , the commission may impose on a gatekeeper fines not exceeding 30% of its total turnover in the preceding financial year where it finds that the gatekeeper , intentionally or negligently , fails to comply with:


### 2. the commission may by decision impose on undertakings and associations of undertakings fines not exceeding 1% of the total turnover in the preceding financial year where they intentionally or negligently: ### 2. the commission may by decision impose on undertakings and associations of undertakings fines not exceeding 5% of the total turnover in the preceding financial year where they intentionally or negligently:


### 1. the powers conferred on the commission by articles 26 and 27 shall be subject to a three year limitation period. ### 1. the powers conferred on the commission by articles 26 and 27 shall be subject to a five year limitation period.


### 1. before adopting a decision pursuant to article 7 , article 8(1) , article 9(1) , articles 15 , 16 , 22 , 23 , 25 and 26 and article 27(2) , the commission shall give the gatekeeper or undertaking or association of undertakings concerned the opportunity of being heard on: ### 1. before adopting a decision pursuant to article 7 , article 8(1) , article 9(1) , articles 15 , 16 , 22 , 23 , 25 and 26 and article 27(2) , the commission shall give the gatekeeper or undertaking or association of undertakings , together with other relevant stakeholders , including consumer organisations and business users , concerned the opportunity of being heard on:


### 1. before adopting a decision pursuant to article 7 , article 8(1) , article 9(1) , articles 15 , 16 , 22 , 23 , 25 and 26 and article 27(2) , the commission shall give the gatekeeper or undertaking or association of undertakings concerned the opportunity of being heard on: ### 1. before adopting a decision pursuant to article 7 , article 8(1) , article 9(1) , articles 15 , 16 , 22 , 23 , 25 and 26 and article 27(2) , the commission shall give the gatekeeper or undertaking or association of undertakings concerned and third parties with a legitimate interest the opportunity of being heard on:


### 1. the commission shall be assisted by the digital markets advisory committee. that committee shall be a committee within the meaning of regulation (eu) no 182/2011. ### 1. the commission shall be assisted by the digital markets advisory committee. that committee shall be a committee within the meaning of regulation (eu) no 182/2011. the digital markets advisory committee shall consist of representatives of the european data protection board and representatives of the national competent authorities responsible for electronic communications , audio-visual services , competition and consumer protection.


### 1. when three or more member states request the commission to open an investigation pursuant to article 15 because they consider that there are reasonable grounds to suspect that a provider of core platform services should be designated as a gatekeeper , the commission shall within four months examine whether there are reasonable grounds to open such an investigation. ### 1. when three or more member states request the commission to open an investigation pursuant to article 15 because they consider that there are reasonable grounds to suspect that a provider of core platform services should be designated as a gatekeeper , the commission shall within four months examine whether there are reasonable grounds to open such an investigation. the result of any such investigation shall be made publicly available.


### 1. when three or more member states request the commission to open an investigation pursuant to article 15 because they consider that there are reasonable grounds to suspect that a provider of core platform services should be designated as a gatekeeper , the commission shall within four months examine whether there are reasonable grounds to open such an investigation. ### 1. when one or more designated authorities of the member states request the commission to open an investigation pursuant to article 15 , 16 or 17 because they consider that there are reasonable grounds to suspect that a provider of core platform services should be designated as a gatekeeper that there are new core platform services and practices to be added , or that a gatekeeper is violating their obligations under articles 5 and 6 , or that there is a situation of (systemic) non-compliance , the commission shall within three months examine whether there are reasonable grounds to open such an investigation. if the commission decides not to open an investigation , the commission shall publish the respective reasons.


### 1. when three or more member states request the commission to open an investigation pursuant to article 15 because they consider that there are reasonable grounds to suspect that a provider of core platform services should be designated as a gatekeeper , the commission shall within four months examine whether there are reasonable grounds to open such an investigation. ### 1. when one or more member states request the commission to open an investigation pursuant to article 15 because they consider that there are reasonable grounds to suspect that a provider of core platform services should be designated as a gatekeeper , or that a gatekeeper is violating their obligations under articles 5 and 6 , or because they have information according to which there are reasonable grounds to add new services and new practices. on that basis , the commission shall within four months examine whether there are reasonable grounds to open such an investigation.


### 1. when three or more member states request the commission to open an investigation pursuant to article 15 because they consider that there are reasonable grounds to suspect that a provider of core platform services should be designated as a gatekeeper , the commission shall within four months examine whether there are reasonable grounds to open such an investigation. ### 1. when one or more designated authorities of the member states request the commission to open an investigation pursuant to articles 15 , 16 and 17 because they consider that there are reasonable grounds to suspect that a provider of core platform services should be designated as a gatekeeper , that there is a new core platform service , or that there is a situation of systemic non-compliance , the commission shall within three months examine whether there are reasonable grounds to open such an investigation. if the commission decides not to open an investigation , the commission shall publish the respective reasons.


### (36) the conduct of combining end user data from different sources or signing in users to different services of gatekeepers gives them potential advantages in terms of accumulation of data , thereby raising barriers to entry. to ensure that gatekeepers do not unfairly undermine the contestability of core platform services , they should enable their end users to freely choose to opt-in to such business practices by offering a less personalised alternative. the possibility should cover all possible sources of personal data , including own services of the gatekeeper as well as third party websites , and should be proactively presented to the end user in an explicit , clear and straightforward manner. ### (36) the conduct of combining end user data from different sources or signing in users to different services of gatekeepers gives them potential advantages in terms of accumulation of data , thereby raising barriers to entry. to ensure that gatekeepers do not unfairly undermine the contestability of core platform services , and in order to impede business models that are based on the collection of users’ personal data , combining personal data should be prohibited.


### (42) the conditions under which gatekeepers provide online advertising services to business users including both advertisers and publishers are often non-transparent and opaque. this opacity is partly linked to the practices of a few platforms , but is also due to the sheer complexity of modern day programmatic advertising. the sector is considered to have become more non-transparent after the introduction of new privacy legislation , and is expected to become even more opaque with the announced removal of third-party cookies. this often leads to a lack of information and knowledge for advertisers and publishers about the conditions of the advertising services they purchased and undermines their ability to switch to alternative providers of online advertising services. furthermore , the costs of online advertising are likely to be higher than they would be in a fairer , more transparent and contestable platform environment. these higher costs are likely to be reflected in the prices that end users pay for many daily products and services relying on the use of online advertising. transparency obligations should therefore require gatekeepers to provide advertisers and publishers to whom they supply online advertising services , when requested and to the extent possible , with information that allows both sides to understand the price paid for each of the different advertising services provided as part of the relevant advertising value chain. ### (42) the advertising revenues for many online advertising services , such as traditional publishers , have significantly declined , whereas the advertising revenues for gatekeepers have steadily increased1a. the conditions under which gatekeepers provide online advertising services to business users including both advertisers and publishers are very often non-transparent and opaque. this opacity is largely linked to the practices of a few platforms , but is also due to the sheer complexity of modern day programmatic advertising. the online advertising sector is considered to have become more non-transparent after the introduction of new privacy legislation , and is expected to become even more opaque with the announced removal of third-party cookies. this leads to a lack of trustworthy information and knowledge for advertisers and publishers about the conditions of the advertising services they purchased and undermines their ability to switch to alternative providers of online advertising services or build their own service. furthermore , the costs of online advertising are significantly higher than they would be in a fairer , more transparent and contestable platform environment. these higher costs are likely to be reflected in the prices that end users pay for many daily products and services relying on the use of online advertising. in addition , a few dominant platforms have gathered significant sets of data and data points , which erodes the exclusive trademarks of publishers and advertisers and extracts their client's data , creating unfair competition. transparency obligations should therefore require gatekeepers to provide advertisers and publishers to whom they supply online advertising services continuous , real-time and free of charge access to the performance measuring tools of the gatekeeper and provide for entire disclosure and transparency of the parameters and data used for with information that allows both sides to understand the price paid for each of the different advertising services provided as part of the relevant advertising value chain. a gatekeeper should further provide , free of charge , reliable , non-aggregated , granular and complete data necessary for advertisers and publishers to carry out their own independent high-quality and real-time evaluation of intermediation services , including verification of the ad inventory. moreover , a prohibition on combining data sets should prevent tracking of end users and thereby level the playing field for providers of online advertising services , strengthening funding of public media and restoring privacy of end users.


### (42) the conditions under which gatekeepers provide online advertising services to business users including both advertisers and publishers are often non-transparent and opaque. this opacity is partly linked to the practices of a few platforms , but is also due to the sheer complexity of modern day programmatic advertising. the sector is considered to have become more non-transparent after the introduction of new privacy legislation , and is expected to become even more opaque with the announced removal of third-party cookies. this often leads to a lack of information and knowledge for advertisers and publishers about the conditions of the advertising services they purchased and undermines their ability to switch to alternative providers of online advertising services. furthermore , the costs of online advertising are likely to be higher than they would be in a fairer , more transparent and contestable platform environment. these higher costs are likely to be reflected in the prices that end users pay for many daily products and services relying on the use of online advertising. transparency obligations should therefore require gatekeepers to provide advertisers and publishers to whom they supply online advertising services , when requested and to the extent possible , with information that allows both sides to understand the price paid for each of the different advertising services provided as part of the relevant advertising value chain. ### (42) the conditions under which gatekeepers provide online advertising services to business users including both advertisers and publishers are often non-transparent and opaque. this opacity is partly linked to the practices of a few platforms , but is also due to the sheer complexity of modern day programmatic advertising. the sector is considered to have become more non-transparent after the introduction of new privacy legislation , and is expected to become even more opaque with the announced removal of third-party cookies. this often leads to a lack of information and knowledge for advertisers and publishers about the conditions of the advertising services they purchased and undermines their ability to switch to alternative providers of online advertising services. furthermore , the costs of online advertising are likely to be higher than they would be in a fairer , more transparent and contestable platform environment. these higher costs are likely to be reflected in the prices that business and end users pay for many daily products and services relying on the use of online advertising. transparency obligations should therefore require gatekeepers to provide advertisers and publishers to whom they supply online advertising services , when requested and to the extent possible , with information that allows both sides to understand the price paid for each of the different advertising services provided as part of the relevant advertising value chain. this should include comprehensive information regarding the methodology for calculating any prices and fees and its application in relation to the respective bids submitted by an advertiser or publisher for each of the advertising intermediation services provided. furthermore , the gatekeeper shall subject the auction-based matching of advertising demand and supply to regular independent audits to ascertain that the outcome of such auctions corresponds with the bids made and the fees charged reflect the pricing information provided by the gatekeeper.


### (42) the conditions under which gatekeepers provide online advertising services to business users including both advertisers and publishers are often non-transparent and opaque. this opacity is partly linked to the practices of a few platforms , but is also due to the sheer complexity of modern day programmatic advertising. the sector is considered to have become more non-transparent after the introduction of new privacy legislation , and is expected to become even more opaque with the announced removal of third-party cookies. this often leads to a lack of information and knowledge for advertisers and publishers about the conditions of the advertising services they purchased and undermines their ability to switch to alternative providers of online advertising services. furthermore , the costs of online advertising are likely to be higher than they would be in a fairer , more transparent and contestable platform environment. these higher costs are likely to be reflected in the prices that end users pay for many daily products and services relying on the use of online advertising. transparency obligations should therefore require gatekeepers to provide advertisers and publishers to whom they supply online advertising services , when requested and to the extent possible , with information that allows both sides to understand the price paid for each of the different advertising services provided as part of the relevant advertising value chain. ### (42) the conditions under which gatekeepers provide online advertising services to business users including both advertisers and publishers are often non-transparent and opaque. this opacity is partly linked to the practices of a few platforms , but is also due to the sheer complexity of modern day programmatic advertising. the sector is considered to have become more non-transparent after the introduction of new data privacy legislation , and is expected to become even more opaque with the announced removal of third-party cookies. this often leads to a lack of information and knowledge for advertisers and publishers about the conditions of the advertising services they purchased and undermines their ability to switch to alternative providers of online advertising services. furthermore , the costs of online advertising are likely to be higher than they would be in a fairer , more transparent and contestable platform environment. these higher costs are likely to be reflected in the prices that end users pay for many daily products and services relying on the use of online advertising. transparency obligations should therefore require gatekeepers to provide advertisers and publishers to whom they supply online advertising services , when requested and to the extent possible , with information that allows both sides to understand the price paid for each of the different advertising services provided as part of the relevant advertising value chain.


### (42) the conditions under which gatekeepers provide online advertising services to business users including both advertisers and publishers are often non-transparent and opaque. this opacity is partly linked to the practices of a few platforms , but is also due to the sheer complexity of modern day programmatic advertising. the sector is considered to have become more non-transparent after the introduction of new privacy legislation , and is expected to become even more opaque with the announced removal of third-party cookies. this often leads to a lack of information and knowledge for advertisers and publishers about the conditions of the advertising services they purchased and undermines their ability to switch to alternative providers of online advertising services. furthermore , the costs of online advertising are likely to be higher than they would be in a fairer , more transparent and contestable platform environment. these higher costs are likely to be reflected in the prices that end users pay for many daily products and services relying on the use of online advertising. transparency obligations should therefore require gatekeepers to provide advertisers and publishers to whom they supply online advertising services , when requested and to the extent possible , with information that allows both sides to understand the price paid for each of the different advertising services provided as part of the relevant advertising value chain. ### (42) the advertising revenues for many online advertising services , such as traditional publishers , have significantly declined , whereas the advertising revenues for gatekeepers have steadily increased. the conditions under which gatekeepers provide online advertising services to business users including both advertisers and publishers are very often non-transparent and opaque. this opacity is largely linked to the practices of a few platforms , but is also due to the sheer complexity of modern day programmatic advertising. the online advertising sector is considered to have become more non-transparent after the introduction of new privacy legislation , and is expected to become even more opaque with the announced removal of third-party cookies. this leads to a lack of trustworthy information and knowledge for advertisers and publishers about the conditions of the advertising services they purchased and undermines their ability to switch to alternative providers of online advertising services or build their own service. furthermore , the costs of online advertising are significantly higher than they would be in a fairer , more transparent and contestable platform environment. these higher costs are likely to be reflected in the prices that end users pay for many daily products and services relying on the use of online advertising. in addition , a few dominant platforms have gathered significant sets of data and data points , which erodes the exclusive trademarks of publishers and advertisers and extracts their client's data , creating unfair competition. transparency obligations should therefore require gatekeepers to provide advertisers and publishers to whom they supply online advertising services continuous , real-time and free of charge access to the performance measuring tools of the gatekeeper and provide for entire disclosure and transparency of the parameters and data used for with information that allows both sides to understand the price paid for each of the different advertising services provided as part of the relevant advertising value chain. a gatekeeper should further provide , free of charge , reliable , non-aggregated , granular and complete data necessary for advertisers and publishers to carry out their own independent high-quality and real-time evaluation of intermediation services , including verification of the ad inventory. moreover , a prohibition on combining data sets should prevent tracking of end users and thereby level the playing field for providers of online advertising services , strengthening funding of public media and restoring privacy of end-users.


### (43) a gatekeeper may in certain circumstances have a dual role as a provider of core platform services whereby it provides a core platform service to its business users , while also competing with those same business users in the provision of the same or similar services or products to the same end users. in these circumstances , a gatekeeper may take advantage of its dual role to use data , generated from transactions by its business users on the core platform , for the purpose of its own services that offer similar services to that of its business users. this may be the case , for instance , where a gatekeeper provides an online marketplace or app store to business users , and at the same time offer services as an online retailer or provider of application software against those business users. to prevent gatekeepers from unfairly benefitting from their dual role , it should be ensured that they refrain from using any aggregated or non-aggregated data , which may include anonymised and personal data that is not publicly available to offer similar services to those of their business users. this obligation should apply to the gatekeeper as a whole , including but not limited to its business unit that competes with the business users of a core platform service. ### (43) a gatekeeper may in certain circumstances have a dual role as a provider of core platform services whereby it provides a core platform service to its business users , while also competing with those same business users in the provision of the same or similar services or products to the same end users. in these circumstances , a gatekeeper may take advantage of its dual role to use data generated from transactions by its business users on the core platform , especially in the case of banking and health services , for the purpose of its own services that offer similar services to that of its business users. this may be the case , for instance , where a gatekeeper provides an online marketplace or app store to business users , and at the same time offer services as an online retailer or provider of application software against those business users. to prevent gatekeepers from unfairly benefitting from their dual role , it should be ensured that they refrain from using any aggregated or non-aggregated data , which may include anonymised and personal data that is not publicly available to offer similar services to those of their business users. this obligation should apply to the gatekeeper as a whole , including but not limited to its business unit that competes with the business users of a core platform service.


### (46) a gatekeeper may use different means to favour its own services or products on its core platform service , to the detriment of the same or similar services that end users could obtain through third parties. this may for instance be the case where certain software applications or services are pre-installed by a gatekeeper. to enable end user choice , gatekeepers should not prevent end users from un-installing any pre-installed software applications on its core platform service and thereby favour their own software applications. ### (46) a gatekeeper may use different means to favour its own services or products on its core platform service , to the detriment of the same or similar services that end users could obtain through third parties. this may for instance be the case where certain software applications , software application stores or ancillary services are pre-installed by a gatekeeper. to enable end user choice , gatekeepers should not pre-install any software applications on its core platform service and thereby favour their own software applications , without prejudice to applications essential for the integrity of the service , operating system or the device and which cannot technically be offered on a standalone basis by third parties.


### (46) a gatekeeper may use different means to favour its own services or products on its core platform service , to the detriment of the same or similar services that end users could obtain through third parties. this may for instance be the case where certain software applications or services are pre-installed by a gatekeeper. to enable end user choice , gatekeepers should not prevent end users from un-installing any pre-installed software applications on its core platform service and thereby favour their own software applications. ### (46) a gatekeeper can use different means to favour its own or third party services or products on an operating system it provides or effectively controls , to the detriment of the same or similar services that end users could obtain through third parties. this may for instance be the case where certain software applications or services are pre-installed by a gatekeeper. to enable end user choice , gatekeepers should not prevent end users from un-installing any pre-installed software applications on an operating system they provide or effectively control its core platform service and thereby favour their own or third party software applications. .


### (47) the rules that the gatekeepers set for the distribution of software applications may in certain circumstances restrict the ability of end users to install and effectively use third party software applications or software application stores on operating systems or hardware of the relevant gatekeeper and restrict the ability of end users to access these software applications or software application stores outside the core platform services of that gatekeeper. such restrictions may limit the ability of developers of software applications to use alternative distribution channels and the ability of end users to choose between different software applications from different distribution channels and should be prohibited as unfair and liable to weaken the contestability of core platform services. in order to ensure that third party software applications or software application stores do not endanger the integrity of the hardware or operating system provided by the gatekeeper the gatekeeper concerned may implement proportionate technical or contractual measures to achieve that goal if the gatekeeper demonstrates that such measures are necessary and justified and that there are no less restrictive means to safeguard the integrity of the hardware or operating system. ### (47) the rules that the gatekeepers set for the distribution of software applications may in certain circumstances restrict the ability of end users to install and effectively use third party software applications or software application stores on operating systems or hardware of the relevant gatekeeper and restrict the ability of end users to access these software applications or software application stores outside the core platform services of that gatekeeper. such restrictions may limit the ability of developers of software applications to use alternative distribution channels and the ability of end users to choose between different software applications from different distribution channels and should be prohibited as unfair and liable to weaken the contestability of core platform services. the end user should be required to decide which software application or software application store should become the default. in order to ensure that third party software applications or software application stores do not endanger the integrity of the hardware or operating system provided by the gatekeeper the gatekeeper concerned may implement proportionate technical or contractual measures to achieve that goal if the gatekeeper demonstrates that such measures are necessary and justified and that there are no less restrictive means to safeguard the integrity of the hardware or operating system.


### (48) gatekeepers are often vertically integrated and offer certain products or services to end users through their own core platform services , or through a business user over which they exercise control which frequently leads to conflicts of interest. this can include the situation whereby a gatekeeper offers its own online intermediation services through an online search engine. when offering those products or services on the core platform service , gatekeepers can reserve a better position to their own offering , in terms of ranking , as opposed to the products of third parties also operating on that core platform service. this can occur for instance with products or services , including other core platform services , which are ranked in the results communicated by online search engines , or which are partly or entirely embedded in online search engines results , groups of results specialised in a certain topic , displayed along with the results of an online search engine , which are considered or used by certain end users as a service distinct or additional to the online search engine. other instances are those of software applications which are distributed through software application stores , or products or services that are given prominence and display in the newsfeed of a social network , or products or services ranked in search results or displayed on an online marketplace. in those circumstances , the gatekeeper is in a dual-role position as intermediary for third party providers and as direct provider of products or services of the gatekeeper. consequently , these gatekeepers have the ability to undermine directly the contestability for those products or services on these core platform services , to the detriment of business users which are not controlled by the gatekeeper. ### (48) gatekeepers are often vertically integrated and offer certain products or services to end users through their own core platform services , or through business users with which they cooperate or with which they have entered into particular cooperation agreements or which they prefer due to other reasons unrelated to their service’s actual relevance , which frequently leads to conflicts of interest. this can include the situation whereby a gatekeeper offers its own online intermediation services through an online search engine. when offering those products or services on the core platform service , gatekeepers can reserve a better position to their own offering , in terms of ranking , as opposed to the products of third parties also intermediated via that core platform service. this can occur for instance with products or services , including other core platform services , which are ranked within or along the results communicated by online search engines , or which are partly or entirely embedded in the search results of online search engines , groups of results specialised in a certain topic , displayed along with the results of an online search engine , which may be considered or used by certain end users as a service distinct or additional to the online search engine. such preferential or embedded display of a separate online intermediation service shall constitute a favouring irrespective of whether the information or results within the favoured groups of specialised results may also be provided by competing services and are as such ranked in a non-discriminatory way. inadmissible preferencing is also taking place in software applications which are distributed through software application stores , or products or services that are given prominence and display in the newsfeed of a social network , or products or services ranked in search results or displayed on an online marketplace , or products or services to which users are directed following a voice request by an end user to a digital voice assistant. in those circumstances , the gatekeeper is in a dual-role position as intermediary for third party providers and as direct provider of products or services of the gatekeeper. consequently , these gatekeepers have the ability to undermine directly the contestability for those products or services on these core platform services , to the detriment of business users which are not controlled by the gatekeeper.


### (48) gatekeepers are often vertically integrated and offer certain products or services to end users through their own core platform services , or through a business user over which they exercise control which frequently leads to conflicts of interest. this can include the situation whereby a gatekeeper offers its own online intermediation services through an online search engine. when offering those products or services on the core platform service , gatekeepers can reserve a better position to their own offering , in terms of ranking , as opposed to the products of third parties also operating on that core platform service. this can occur for instance with products or services , including other core platform services , which are ranked in the results communicated by online search engines , or which are partly or entirely embedded in online search engines results , groups of results specialised in a certain topic , displayed along with the results of an online search engine , which are considered or used by certain end users as a service distinct or additional to the online search engine. other instances are those of software applications which are distributed through software application stores , or products or services that are given prominence and display in the newsfeed of a social network , or products or services ranked in search results or displayed on an online marketplace. in those circumstances , the gatekeeper is in a dual-role position as intermediary for third party providers and as direct provider of products or services of the gatekeeper. consequently , these gatekeepers have the ability to undermine directly the contestability for those products or services on these core platform services , to the detriment of business users which are not controlled by the gatekeeper. ### (48) gatekeepers are often vertically integrated and offer certain products or services to end users through their own core platform services , or through a business user over which they exercise control or cooperate with which frequently leads to conflicts of interest. this can include the situation whereby a gatekeeper offers its own online intermediation services through an online search engine. when offering those products or services on the core platform service , gatekeepers can reserve a better position to their own offering , in terms of ranking , as opposed to the products of third parties also operating on that core platform service. this can occur for instance with products or services , including other core platform services , which are ranked in the results communicated by online search engines , or which are partly or entirely embedded in online search engines results , groups of results specialised in a certain topic , displayed along with the results of an online search engine , which are considered or used by certain end users as a service distinct or additional to the online search engine. such preferential or embedded display should constitute an inadmissible preference , irrespective of whether the information or results may also be provided by competing services and are as such ranked in a non-discriminatory way. inadmissible preferencing can also take place in other instances , such as software application stores , or products or services that are given prominence and display in the newsfeed of a social network , or products or services ranked in search results or displayed on an online marketplace , or products or services listed in core platform service settings , or the results provided by a virtual assistant. in those circumstances , the gatekeeper is in a dual-role position as intermediary for third party providers and as direct provider of products or services of the gatekeeper. consequently , these gatekeepers have the ability to undermine directly the contestability for those products or services on these core platform services , to the detriment of business users which are not controlled by the gatekeeper.


### (48) gatekeepers are often vertically integrated and offer certain products or services to end users through their own core platform services , or through a business user over which they exercise control which frequently leads to conflicts of interest. this can include the situation whereby a gatekeeper offers its own online intermediation services through an online search engine. when offering those products or services on the core platform service , gatekeepers can reserve a better position to their own offering , in terms of ranking , as opposed to the products of third parties also operating on that core platform service. this can occur for instance with products or services , including other core platform services , which are ranked in the results communicated by online search engines , or which are partly or entirely embedded in online search engines results , groups of results specialised in a certain topic , displayed along with the results of an online search engine , which are considered or used by certain end users as a service distinct or additional to the online search engine. other instances are those of software applications which are distributed through software application stores , or products or services that are given prominence and display in the newsfeed of a social network , or products or services ranked in search results or displayed on an online marketplace. in those circumstances , the gatekeeper is in a dual-role position as intermediary for third party providers and as direct provider of products or services of the gatekeeper. consequently , these gatekeepers have the ability to undermine directly the contestability for those products or services on these core platform services , to the detriment of business users which are not controlled by the gatekeeper. ### (48) gatekeepers are often vertically integrated and offer certain products or services to end users through their own core platform services , or through a business user over which they exercise control which frequently leads to conflicts of interest. this can include the situation whereby a gatekeeper offers its own online intermediation services through an online search engine. when offering those products or services on the core platform service , gatekeepers can reserve a better position , differential treatment or preferential treatment for their own offering , in terms of ranking , as opposed to the products of third parties also operating on that core platform service. this can occur for instance with products or services , including other core platform services , which are ranked in the results communicated by online search engines , or which are partly or entirely embedded in online search engines results , groups of results specialised in a certain topic , displayed along with the results of an online search engine , which are considered or used by certain end users as a service distinct or additional to the online search engine. other instances are those of software applications which are distributed through software application stores , or products or services that are given prominence and display in the benefitting of a social network , or products or services ranked in search results or displayed on an online marketplace. in those circumstances , the gatekeeper is in a dual-role position as intermediary for third party providers and as direct provider of products or services of the gatekeeper. consequently , these gatekeepers have the ability to undermine directly the contestability for those products or services on these core platform services , to the detriment of business users which are not controlled by the gatekeeper.


### (49) in such situations , the gatekeeper should not engage in any form of differentiated or preferential treatment in ranking on the core platform service , whether through legal , commercial or technical means , in favour of products or services it offers itself or through a business user which it controls. to ensure that this obligation is effective , it should also be ensured that the conditions that apply to such ranking are also generally fair. ranking should in this context cover all forms of relative prominence , including display , rating , linking or voice results. to ensure that this obligation is effective and cannot be circumvented it should also apply to any measure that may have an equivalent effect to the differentiated or preferential treatment in ranking. the guidelines adopted pursuant to article 5 of regulation (eu) 2019/1150 should also facilitate the implementation and enforcement of this obligation.34 ### (49) in such situations of a conflict of interest , the gatekeeper should not partly or entirely embed such distinct product or service in online search engines results or groups of results. however , it may rank its products or services , provided that it doesn’t engage in any form of differentiated or preferential treatment in ranking on the core platform service , whether through legal , commercial or technical means , in favour of products or services it offers itself or through a business user which it either controls or cooperates with or prefers for any other reason. in particular , where a gatekeeper’s online search engine results page includes the ranking of separate products or services , third parties shall be afforded equal opportunity to rank their product or service in the same format and on the same terms and conditions. should this take place in exchange for remuneration , to avoid any conflict of interest , the gatekeeper’s separate product or service shall be treated as a separate commercial entity and shall be commercially viable as a stand-alone service , offered outside of the gatekeeper’s core platform service. to ensure that this obligation is effective , it should also be ensured that the conditions that apply to such ranking are also generally fair , as well as that business users do have the same access as the gatekeeper to any information resulting from the ranking or any other competition-relevant aspects related to their respective products or services. ranking should in this context cover all forms of relative prominence , including among others order , graphic display , rating , linking or voice results. in particular , and with regard to digital voice assistants , it should be ensured that the ranking of products and services and thus the , typically single , response to a user’s voice request , should accurately and impartially reflect that request. to ensure that this obligation is effective and cannot be circumvented it should also apply to any measure that may have an equivalent effect to the differentiated or preferential treatment in ranking. such an equivalent effect can for instance be achieved by ad formats that are used by users in a similar manner to the gatekeeper's or third parties' online intermediation services , or that benefit the gatekeeper in a similar manner to the preferential treatment in ranking itself (e.g. , in terms of financial gains , user access / traffic or data access).the guidelines adopted pursuant to article 5 of regulation (eu) 2019/1150 should also facilitate the implementation and enforcement of this obligation.34


### (49) in such situations , the gatekeeper should not engage in any form of differentiated or preferential treatment in ranking on the core platform service , whether through legal , commercial or technical means , in favour of products or services it offers itself or through a business user which it controls. to ensure that this obligation is effective , it should also be ensured that the conditions that apply to such ranking are also generally fair. ranking should in this context cover all forms of relative prominence , including display , rating , linking or voice results. to ensure that this obligation is effective and cannot be circumvented it should also apply to any measure that may have an equivalent effect to the differentiated or preferential treatment in ranking. the guidelines adopted pursuant to article 5 of regulation (eu) 2019/1150 should also facilitate the implementation and enforcement of this obligation.34 . ### (49) in such situations , the gatekeeper should not engage in any form of differentiated or preferential treatment in ranking on the core platform service , whether through legal , commercial or technical means , in favour of products or services it offers itself or through a business user which it controls. to ensure that this obligation is effective , it should also be ensured that the conditions that apply to such ranking are also generally fair and should not apply , encourage , instigate , contribute to or consent to or facilitate any form of discrimination. ranking should in this context cover all forms of relative prominence , including display , rating , linking or voice results. to ensure that this obligation is effective and cannot be circumvented it should also apply to any measure that may have an equivalent effect to the differentiated or preferential treatment in ranking. the guidelines adopted pursuant to article 5 of regulation (eu) 2019/1150 should also facilitate the implementation and enforcement of this obligation34 .


### (51) gatekeepers can hamper the ability of end users to access online content and services including software applications. therefore , rules should be established to ensure that the rights of end users to access an open internet are not compromised by the conduct of gatekeepers. gatekeepers can also technically limit the ability of end users to effectively switch between different internet access service providers , in particular through their control over operating systems or hardware. this distorts the level playing field for internet access services and ultimately harms end users. it should therefore be ensured that gatekeepers do not unduly restrict end users in choosing their internet access service provider. ### (51) gatekeepers can hamper the ability of end users to access online content and services including software applications. therefore , rules should be established to ensure that the rights of end users to access an open internet are not compromised by the conduct of gatekeepers. gatekeepers can also technically limit the ability of end users to effectively switch between different internet access service providers , in particular through their control over operating systems or hardware. this distorts the level playing field for internet access services and ultimately harms end users. it should therefore be ensured that gatekeepers do not restrict end users in choosing their internet access service provider.


### (53) the conditions under which gatekeepers provide online advertising services to business users including both advertisers and publishers are often non-transparent and opaque. this often leads to a lack of information for advertisers and publishers about the effect of a given ad. to further enhance fairness , transparency and contestability of online advertising services designated under this regulation as well as those that are fully integrated with other core platform services of the same provider , the designated gatekeepers should therefore provide advertisers and publishers , when requested , with free of charge access to the performance measuring tools of the gatekeeper and the information necessary for advertisers , advertising agencies acting on behalf of a company placing advertising , as well as for publishers to carry out their own independent verification of the provision of the relevant online advertising services. ### (53) the conditions under which gatekeepers provide online advertising services to business users including both advertisers and publishers are often non-transparent and opaque. this often leads to a lack of information for advertisers and publishers about the effect of a given ad. to further enhance fairness , transparency and contestability of online advertising services designated under this regulation as well as those that are fully integrated with other core platform services of the same provider , the designated gatekeepers should therefore provide advertisers and publishers a continuous , real-time and free of charge access to the performance measuring tools of the gatekeeper and provide for entire disclosure and transparency of the parameters and data used for decision making , execution and measurement of the intermediation services for advertisers , advertising agencies acting on behalf of a company placing advertising , as well as for publishers to carry out their own independent verification of the provision of the relevant online advertising services. a gatekeeper should further provide , free of charge , reliable , non-aggregated , granular and complete data necessary for advertisers and publishers to carry out their own independent high-quality and real-time evaluation of intermediation services , including verification of the ad inventory. this should include data relating to all parameters used by gatekeepers or services belonging to the same undertaking in the context of an advertising intermediation services in order to determine the outcome of such intermediation and corresponding prices for advertisements or charges for any intermediation service provided either on the buy-side or the sell-side.


### (53) the conditions under which gatekeepers provide online advertising services to business users including both advertisers and publishers are often non-transparent and opaque. this often leads to a lack of information for advertisers and publishers about the effect of a given ad. to further enhance fairness , transparency and contestability of online advertising services designated under this regulation as well as those that are fully integrated with other core platform services of the same provider , the designated gatekeepers should therefore provide advertisers and publishers , when requested , with free of charge access to the performance measuring tools of the gatekeeper and the information necessary for advertisers , advertising agencies acting on behalf of a company placing advertising , as well as for publishers to carry out their own independent verification of the provision of the relevant online advertising services. ### (53) the conditions under which gatekeepers provide online advertising services to business users including both advertisers and publishers are often non-transparent and opaque. this often leads to a lack of information for advertisers and publishers about the effect of a given ad. to further enhance fairness , transparency and contestability of online advertising services designated under this regulation as well as those that are fully integrated with other core platform services of the same provider , the designated gatekeepers should therefore provide advertisers and publishers , when requested , with free of charge access to the performance measuring tools of the gatekeeper and the information necessary for advertisers , advertising agencies acting on behalf of a company placing advertising , as well as for publishers to carry out their own independent verification of the provision of the relevant online advertising services. this shall include data relating to all parameters used by the gatekeeper or services belonging to the same undertaking in the context of advertising intermediation services to determine the outcome of such intermediation and corresponding prices for ads or charges for any intermediation service provided either on the buy-side or the sell-side.


### (53) the conditions under which gatekeepers provide online advertising services to business users including both advertisers and publishers are often non-transparent and opaque. this often leads to a lack of information for advertisers and publishers about the effect of a given ad. to further enhance fairness , transparency and contestability of online advertising services designated under this regulation as well as those that are fully integrated with other core platform services of the same provider , the designated gatekeepers should therefore provide advertisers and publishers , when requested , with free of charge access to the performance measuring tools of the gatekeeper and the information necessary for advertisers , advertising agencies acting on behalf of a company placing advertising , as well as for publishers to carry out their own independent verification of the provision of the relevant online advertising services. ### (53) the conditions under which gatekeepers provide online advertising services to business users including both advertisers and publishers are often non-transparent and opaque. this often leads to a lack of information for advertisers and publishers about the effect of a given ad. to further enhance fairness , transparency and contestability of online advertising services designated under this regulation as well as those that are fully integrated with other core platform services of the same provider , the designated gatekeepers should therefore provide advertisers and publishers , when requested , with free of charge access to the performance measuring tools of the gatekeeper and the information necessary , including non-aggregated data , for advertisers , advertising agencies acting on behalf of a company placing advertising , as well as for publishers , or third parties authorised by publishers and advertisers to carry out their own independent verification of the provision of the relevant online advertising services.


### (54) gatekeepers benefit from access to vast amounts of data that they collect while providing the core platform services as well as other digital services. to ensure that gatekeepers do not undermine the contestability of core platform services as well as the innovation potential of the dynamic digital sector by restricting the ability of business users to effectively port their data , business users and end users should be granted effective and immediate access to the data they provided or generated in the context of their use of the relevant core platform services of the gatekeeper , in a structured , commonly used and machine-readable format. this should apply also to any other data at different levels of aggregation that may be necessary to effectively enable such portability. it should also be ensured that business users and end users can port that data in real time effectively , such as for example through high quality application programming interfaces. facilitating switching or multi-homing should lead , in turn , to an increased choice for business users and end users and an incentive for gatekeepers and business users to innovate. ### (54) gatekeepers benefit from access to vast amounts of data that they collect while providing the core platform services as well as other digital services. to ensure that gatekeepers do not undermine the contestability of core platform services as well as the innovation potential of the dynamic digital sector by restricting the ability of business users to effectively port their data , business users and end users should be granted effective and immediate access to the data they provided or generated in the context of their use of the relevant core platform services of the gatekeeper , in a structured , commonly used and machine-readable format. this should apply also to any other data at different levels of aggregation that may be necessary to effectively enable such portability. it should also be ensured that business users and end users can port that data in real time effectively , such as for example through high quality application programming interfaces. facilitating switching or multi-homing should lead , in turn , to an increased choice for business users and end users and an incentive for gatekeepers and business users to innovate. these portability rights will provide users with the right to access and transfer their data from the platforms that hold it.


### (54) gatekeepers benefit from access to vast amounts of data that they collect while providing the core platform services as well as other digital services. to ensure that gatekeepers do not undermine the contestability of core platform services as well as the innovation potential of the dynamic digital sector by restricting the ability of business users to effectively port their data , business users and end users should be granted effective and immediate access to the data they provided or generated in the context of their use of the relevant core platform services of the gatekeeper , in a structured , commonly used and machine-readable format. this should apply also to any other data at different levels of aggregation that may be necessary to effectively enable such portability. it should also be ensured that business users and end users can port that data in real time effectively , such as for example through high quality application programming interfaces. facilitating switching or multi-homing should lead , in turn , to an increased choice for business users and end users and an incentive for gatekeepers and business users to innovate. ### (54) gatekeepers benefit from access to vast amounts of data that they collect while providing the core platform services as well as other digital services. to ensure that gatekeepers do not undermine the contestability of core platform services as well as the innovation potential of the dynamic digital sector by restricting the ability of business users to effectively port their data , business users and end users should be granted effective and immediate access to the data they provided or generated in the context of their use of the relevant core platform services of the gatekeeper , in a structured , commonly used and machine-readable format. this should apply also to any other data at different levels of aggregation that may be necessary to effectively enable such portability. it should also be ensured that business users and end users can port that data in real time effectively , such as for example through high quality application programming interfaces. facilitating switching or multi-homing should lead , in turn , to an increased choice for business users and end users and an incentive for gatekeepers and business users to innovate. these portability rights would afford users the possibility of accessing and anonymise their data to different platforms.


### (55) business users that use large core platform services provided by gatekeepers and end users of such business users provide and generate a vast amount of data , including data inferred from such use. in order to ensure that business users have access to the relevant data thus generated , the gatekeeper should , upon their request , allow unhindered access , free of charge , to such data. such access should also be given to third parties contracted by the business user , who are acting as processors of this data for the business user. data provided or generated by the same business users and the same end users of these business users in the context of other services provided by the same gatekeeper may be concerned where this is inextricably linked to the relevant request. to this end , a gatekeeper should not use any contractual or other restrictions to prevent business users from accessing relevant data and should enable business users to obtain consent of their end users for such data access and retrieval , where such consent is required under regulation (eu) 2016/679 and directive 2002/58/ec. gatekeepers should also facilitate access to these data in real time by means of appropriate technical measures , such as for example putting in place high quality application programming interfaces. ### (55) business users that use large core platform services provided by gatekeepers and end users of such business users provide and generate a vast amount of data , including data inferred from such use. in order to ensure that business users have access to the relevant data thus generated , the gatekeeper should , upon their request , allow unhindered access , free of charge , to such data. such access should also be given to third parties contracted by the business user , who are acting as processors of this data for the business user. data provided or generated by the same business users and the same end users of these business users in the context of other services provided by the same gatekeeper may be concerned where this is inextricably linked to the relevant request. to this end , a gatekeeper should not use any contractual or other restrictions to prevent business users from accessing relevant data and should enable business users to obtain consent of their end users for such data access and retrieval under regulation (eu) 2016/679 and directive 2002/58/ec. gatekeepers should also facilitate access to these data in real time by means of appropriate technical measures , such as for example putting in place high quality application programming interfaces.


### (55) business users that use large core platform services provided by gatekeepers and end users of such business users provide and generate a vast amount of data , including data inferred from such use. in order to ensure that business users have access to the relevant data thus generated , the gatekeeper should , upon their request , allow unhindered access , free of charge , to such data. such access should also be given to third parties contracted by the business user , who are acting as processors of this data for the business user. data provided or generated by the same business users and the same end users of these business users in the context of other services provided by the same gatekeeper may be concerned where this is inextricably linked to the relevant request. to this end , a gatekeeper should not use any contractual or other restrictions to prevent business users from accessing relevant data and should enable business users to obtain consent of their end users for such data access and retrieval , where such consent is required under regulation (eu) 2016/679 and directive 2002/58/ec. gatekeepers should also facilitate access to these data in real time by means of appropriate technical measures , such as for example putting in place high quality application programming interfaces. ### (55) business users that use large core platform services provided by gatekeepers and end users of such business users provide and generate a vast amount of data , including data inferred from such use. in order to ensure that business users have access to the relevant data thus generated , the gatekeeper should , upon their request , allow unhindered access , free of charge , to such data. such access should also be given to third parties contracted by the business user , who are acting as processors or co-controllers of this data for the business user. for example , such parties can include providers of audience measurement metrics for the purpose of providing the market with impartial benchmarks on the use , effectiveness and reach of content viewed on gatekeepers' platforms. data provided or generated by the same business users and the same end users of these business users in the context of other services provided by the same gatekeeper may be concerned where this is inextricably linked to the relevant request. to this end , a gatekeeper should not use any contractual or other restrictions to prevent business users or authorised third parties from accessing relevant data and should enable business users to obtain consent of their end users for such data access and retrieval , where such consent is required under regulation (eu) 2016/679 and directive 2002/58/ec or if lawful under special exemptions , such as access to end-user’s data for audience measurement purposes. gatekeepers should also facilitate access to these data in real time by means of appropriate technical measures , such as for example putting in place high quality application programming interfaces


### (56) the value of online search engines to their respective business users and end users increases as the total number of such users increases. providers of online search engines collect and store aggregated datasets containing information about what users searched for , and how they interacted with , the results that they were served. providers of online search engine services collect these data from searches undertaken on their own online search engine service and , where applicable , searches undertaken on the platforms of their downstream commercial partners. access by gatekeepers to such ranking , query , click and view data constitutes an important barrier to entry and expansion , which undermines the contestability of online search engine services. gatekeepers should therefore be obliged to provide access , on fair , reasonable and non-discriminatory terms , to these ranking , query , click and view data in relation to free and paid search generated by consumers on online search engine services to other providers of such services , so that these third-party providers can optimise their services and contest the relevant core platform services. such access should also be given to third parties contracted by a search engine provider , who are acting as processors of this data for that search engine. when providing access to its search data , a gatekeeper should ensure the protection of the personal data of end users by appropriate means , without substantially degrading the quality or usefulness of the data. ### (56) the value of online search engines to their respective business users and end users increases as the total number of such users increases. providers of online search engines collect and store aggregated and anonymised datasets containing information about what users searched for , and how they interacted with , the results that they were served. providers of online search engine services collect these data from searches undertaken on their own online search engine service and , where applicable , searches undertaken on the platforms of their downstream commercial partners. access by gatekeepers to such ranking , query , click and view data constitutes an important barrier to entry and expansion , which undermines the contestability of online search engine services. gatekeepers should therefore be obliged to provide access and technical cooperation , on fair , reasonable and non-discriminatory terms , to these ranking , query , click and view data in relation to free and paid search generated by consumers on online search engine services to other providers of such services , so that these third-party providers can optimise their services and contest the relevant core platform services. such access should also be given to third parties contracted by a search engine provider , who are acting as processors of this data for that search engine. when providing access to its search data , a gatekeeper should ensure the protection of the personal data of end users by appropriate means , without substantially degrading the quality or usefulness of the data. furthermore , gatekeepers should ensure organic search results are given an equal ranking as sponsored and paid-for results.


### (56) the value of online search engines to their respective business users and end users increases as the total number of such users increases. providers of online search engines collect and store aggregated datasets containing information about what users searched for , and how they interacted with , the results that they were served. providers of online search engine services collect these data from searches undertaken on their own online search engine service and , where applicable , searches undertaken on the platforms of their downstream commercial partners. access by gatekeepers to such ranking , query , click and view data constitutes an important barrier to entry and expansion , which undermines the contestability of online search engine services. gatekeepers should therefore be obliged to provide access , on fair , reasonable and non-discriminatory terms , to these ranking , query , click and view data in relation to free and paid search generated by consumers on online search engine services to other providers of such services , so that these third-party providers can optimise their services and contest the relevant core platform services. such access should also be given to third parties contracted by a search engine provider , who are acting as processors of this data for that search engine. when providing access to its search data , a gatekeeper should ensure the protection of the personal data of end users by appropriate means , without substantially degrading the quality or usefulness of the data. ### (56) the value of online search engines to their respective business users and end users increases as the total number of such users increases. providers of online search engines collect and store aggregated datasets containing information about what users searched for , and how they interacted with , the results that they were served. providers of online search engine services collect these data from searches undertaken on their own online search engine service and , where applicable , searches undertaken on the platforms of their downstream commercial partners. access by gatekeepers to such ranking , query , click and view data constitutes an important barrier to entry and expansion , which undermines the contestability of online search engine services. gatekeepers should therefore be obliged to provide access , on fair , reasonable and non-discriminatory terms , to these ranking , query , click and view data in relation to free and paid search generated by consumers on online search engine services to other providers of such services , so that these third-party providers can optimise their services and contest the relevant core platform services. such access should also be given to third parties contracted by a search engine provider , who are acting as processors of this data for that search engine. when providing access to its search data , a gatekeeper needs to ensure the protection of the personal data of end users by appropriate means , without substantially degrading the quality or usefulness of the data.


### (61) the data protection and privacy interests of end users are relevant to any assessment of potential negative effects of the observed practice of gatekeepers to collect and accumulate large amounts of data from end users. ensuring an adequate level of transparency of profiling practices employed by gatekeepers facilitates contestability of core platform services , by putting external pressure on gatekeepers to prevent making deep consumer profiling the industry standard , given that potential entrants or start-up providers cannot access data to the same extent and depth , and at a similar scale. enhanced transparency should allow other providers of core platform services to differentiate themselves better through the use of superior privacy guaranteeing facilities. to ensure a minimum level of effectiveness of this transparency obligation , gatekeepers should at least provide a description of the basis upon which profiling is performed , including whether personal data and data derived from user activity is relied on , the processing applied , the purpose for which the profile is prepared and eventually used , the impact of such profiling on the gatekeeper’s services , and the steps taken to enable end users to be aware of the relevant use of such profiling , as well as to seek their consent. ### (61) the data protection and privacy interests of end users are relevant to any assessment of potential negative effects of the observed practice of gatekeepers to collect and accumulate large amounts of data from end users. ensuring an adequate level of transparency of profiling practices employed by gatekeepers facilitates contestability of core platform services , by putting external pressure on gatekeepers to prevent making deep consumer profiling the industry standard , given that potential entrants or start-up providers cannot access data to the same extent and depth , and at a similar scale. enhanced transparency should allow other providers of core platform services to differentiate themselves better through the use of superior privacy guaranteeing facilities. to ensure a minimum level of effectiveness of this transparency obligation , gatekeepers should at least provide a description of the basis upon which profiling is performed , including whether personal data and data derived from user activity is relied on , the processing applied , the purpose for which the profile is prepared and eventually used , the impact of such profiling on the gatekeeper’s services , and the steps taken to enable end users to be aware of the relevant use of such profiling , as well as to seek their consent. if such a consent procedure will not be envisaged the users should be protected from targeted advertising practices as well as commercial tracking and profiling.


### (61) the data protection and privacy interests of end users are relevant to any assessment of potential negative effects of the observed practice of gatekeepers to collect and accumulate large amounts of data from end users. ensuring an adequate level of transparency of profiling practices employed by gatekeepers facilitates contestability of core platform services , by putting external pressure on gatekeepers to prevent making deep consumer profiling the industry standard , given that potential entrants or start-up providers cannot access data to the same extent and depth , and at a similar scale. enhanced transparency should allow other providers of core platform services to differentiate themselves better through the use of superior privacy guaranteeing facilities. to ensure a minimum level of effectiveness of this transparency obligation , gatekeepers should at least provide a description of the basis upon which profiling is performed , including whether personal data and data derived from user activity is relied on , the processing applied , the purpose for which the profile is prepared and eventually used , the impact of such profiling on the gatekeeper’s services , and the steps taken to enable end users to be aware of the relevant use of such profiling , as well as to seek their consent. ### (61) the data protection and privacy interests of end users are relevant to any assessment of potential negative effects of the observed practice of gatekeepers to collect and accumulate large amounts of data from end users. ensuring an adequate level of transparency of profiling practices employed by gatekeepers facilitates contestability of core platform services , by putting external pressure on gatekeepers to prevent making deep consumer profiling the industry standard , given that potential entrants or start-up providers cannot access data to the same extent and depth , and at a similar scale. enhanced transparency should allow other providers of core platform services to differentiate themselves better through the use of superior privacy guaranteeing facilities. to ensure a minimum level of effectiveness of this transparency obligation , gatekeepers should at least provide a description of the basis upon which profiling is performed , including whether personal data and data derived from user activity is relied on , the processing applied , the purpose for which the profile is prepared and eventually used , the impact of such profiling on the gatekeeper’s services , and the steps taken to enable end users to be aware of the relevant use of such profiling , as well as to seek their consent. in cases where no such consent procedure is envisaged , users should be protected against targeted advertising practices as well as commercial tracking and profiling.


### (61) the data protection and privacy interests of end users are relevant to any assessment of potential negative effects of the observed practice of gatekeepers to collect and accumulate large amounts of data from end users. ensuring an adequate level of transparency of profiling practices employed by gatekeepers facilitates contestability of core platform services , by putting external pressure on gatekeepers to prevent making deep consumer profiling the industry standard , given that potential entrants or start-up providers cannot access data to the same extent and depth , and at a similar scale. enhanced transparency should allow other providers of core platform services to differentiate themselves better through the use of superior privacy guaranteeing facilities. to ensure a minimum level of effectiveness of this transparency obligation , gatekeepers should at least provide a description of the basis upon which profiling is performed , including whether personal data and data derived from user activity is relied on , the processing applied , the purpose for which the profile is prepared and eventually used , the impact of such profiling on the gatekeeper’s services , and the steps taken to enable end users to be aware of the relevant use of such profiling , as well as to seek their consent. ### (61) the data protection and privacy interests of end users are relevant to any assessment of potential negative effects of the observed practice of gatekeepers to collect and accumulate large amounts of data from end users. in order to ensure an adequate level of data and consumer protection , external pressure should be put on gatekeepers to prevent making deep consumer profiling the industry standard , in particular given that potential entrants or start-up providers cannot access data to the same extent and depth , and at a similar scale. providers of core platform services should commit to superior privacy guaranteeing facilities. business models that are based on the commercial tracking and profiling of consumers should be proscribed. to that end the mixing of data from different services should be prohibited. gatekeepers should provide a description of the basis upon which profiling is performed , including whether personal data and data derived from user activity is relied on , the processing applied , the purpose for which the profile is prepared and eventually used , the impact of such profiling on the gatekeeper’s services , and the steps taken to enable end users to be aware of the relevant use of such profiling , as well as to seek their consent. such information should be shared with other relevant enforcement authorities , in particular data protection authorities.


### 1. this regulation lays down harmonised rules ensuring contestable and fair markets in the digital sector across the union where gatekeepers are present. ### 1. this regulation lays down harmonised rules ensuring contestable and fair markets in the digital sector and plurality of media across the union where gatekeepers are present.


### 6. this regulation is without prejudice to the application of articles 101 and 102 tfeu. it is also without prejudice to the application of: national rules prohibiting anticompetitive agreements , decisions by associations of undertakings , concerted practices and abuses of dominant positions; national competition rules prohibiting other forms of unilateral conduct insofar as they are applied to undertakings other than gatekeepers or amount to imposing additional obligations on gatekeepers; council regulation (ec) no 139/200438 and national rules concerning merger control; regulation (eu) 2019/1150 and regulation (eu) …./.. of the european parliament and of the council39 . ### 6. this regulation is without prejudice to the application of articles 101 and 102 tfeu. it is also without prejudice to the application of: national rules prohibiting anticompetitive agreements , decisions by associations of undertakings , concerted practices and abuses of dominant positions; national competition rules prohibiting other forms of unilateral conduct insofar as they are applied to undertakings other than gatekeepers or amount to imposing additional obligations on gatekeepers; council regulation (ec) no 139/200438 and national rules concerning merger control; regulation (eu) 2019/1150 and regulation (eu) …./.. of the european parliament and of the council39. it is as well without prejudice to regulation (eu) 2019/1150; regulation (eu) 2016/679; directive 2002/58/ec and directive 2005/29/ec of the european parliament and of the council and council directive 93/13/eec.


### (18) ‘ranking’ means the relative prominence given to goods or services offered through online intermediation services or online social networking services , or the relevance given to search results by online search engines , as presented , organised or communicated by the providers of online intermediation services or of online social networking services or by providers of online search engines , respectively , whatever the technological means used for such presentation , organisation or communication; ### (18) ‘ranking’ means the relative prominence given to goods or services offered or provided through online intermediation services , online social networking services , video-sharing platform services , operating systems , web browsers , or the relevance given to search results by online search engines , as presented , organised or communicated by the providers of such services , respectively , whatever the technological means used for such presentation , organisation or communication;


### refrain from preventing or restricting business users from raising issues with any relevant public authority relating to any practice of gatekeepers; ### not directly or indirectly prevent or restrict business users and end users from raising issues with any relevant public authority or judicial authority relating to any practice of gatekeepers;


### refrain from preventing or restricting business users from raising issues with any relevant public authority relating to any practice of gatekeepers; ### refrain from preventing or restricting business users and end users from raising issues with any relevant public authority relating to any practice of gatekeepers;