### 9. considers it , therefore , appropriate for this report to focus on civil liability claims against the deployer of an ai-system; affirms that the deployer’s liability is justified by the fact that he or she is controlling a risk associated with the ai-system , comparable to an owner of a car or pet; considers that due to the ai-system’s complexity and connectivity , the deployer will be in many cases the first visible contact point for the affected person; ### 9. considers it , therefore , appropriate for this report to focus on civil liability claims against the frontend operator and backend operator of an ai-system; affirms that the frontend operator's liability is justified by the fact that he or she is benefitting from the use of the ai-system , comparable to an owner of a car or pet; considers that due to the ai-system’s complexity and connectivity , the frontend operator will be in many cases the first visible contact point for the affected person; conversely , believes that the liability of the backend operator under this regulation is based on the fact that he or she is the person continuously defining the features of the relevant technology and providing essential and ongoing backend support , therefore holding the actual control over the risks of the operation;


### 10. opines that liability rules involving the deployer should in principle cover all operations of ai-systems , no matter where the operation takes place and whether it happens physically or virtually; remarks that operations in public spaces that expose many third persons to a risk constitute , however , cases that require further consideration; considers that the potential victims of harm or damage are often not aware of the operation and regularly do not have contractual liability claims against the deployer; notes that when harm or damage materialises , such third persons would then only have a fault-liability claim , and they might find it difficult to prove the fault of the deployer of the ai-system; ### 10. opines that liability rules involving the frontend and backend operator should in principle cover all operations of ai-systems , no matter where the operation takes place and whether it happens physically or virtually; considers that the potential victims of harm or damage are often not aware of the operation and regularly do not have contractual liability claims against the frontend and backend operators; notes that when harm or damage materialises , such third persons would then only have a fault-liability claim , and they might find it difficult to prove the fault of the frontend or backend operator of the ai-system;


### 11. notes that automated vehicles deal with variable signals and conditions; calls as a result for a regular update of digital maps providing a compulsory minimum set of information about the road network; ### 11. notes that automated vehicles deal with variable signals and conditions; calls as a result for a regular update of digital maps providing a compulsory minimum set of information about the road network and any hazards or obstacles that might be encountered;


### 11. notes that automated vehicles deal with variable signals and conditions; calls as a result for a regular update of digital maps providing a compulsory minimum set of information about the road network; ### 11. notes that automated vehicles deal with variable signals and conditions; calls as a result for a regular update of digital maps , traffic management systems and data sharing rules providing a compulsory minimum set of information about the road network;


### 11. considers it appropriate to define the deployer as the person who decides on the use of the ai-system , who exercises control over the risk and who benefits from its operation; considers that exercising control means any action of the deployer that affects the manner of the operation from start to finish or that changes specific functions or processes within the ai-system; ### 11. considers it appropriate to define the frontend operator as the person who benefits from the use of the ai-system , who enjoys its features and functions; considers that the backend operator is defined as the person continuously defining the features of the relevant technology and providing essential and ongoing backend support , therefore holding the actual control over the risks of the operation;


### 12. asks the commission to present guidelines to avoid fragmented regulatory approaches at national level , taking into consideration the product liability directive and national liability regimes. ### 12. asks the commission to present guidelines to avoid fragmented regulatory approaches at national level , taking into consideration the product liability directive and existing national liability regimes; emphasizes how the aforementioned fragmentation will be extremely damaging for the development of such technologies and for the competitiveness of eu businesses and smes.


### 12. asks the commission to present guidelines to avoid fragmented regulatory approaches at national level , taking into consideration the product liability directive and national liability regimes. ### 12. asks the commission to present guidelines to avoid fragmented regulatory approaches at national level , taking into consideration the product liability directive and national liability regimes; stresses the need for a uniform european policy to be adopted by all member states.


### 12. notes that there could be situations in which there is more than one deployer; considers that in that event , all deployers should be jointly and severally liable while having the right to recourse proportionally against each other; ### 12. notes that there could be situations in which there are several frontend and backend operators; considers that in that event , all of them should be jointly and severally liable while having the right to recourse proportionally against each other;


### e. whereas artificial intelligence (ai)-systems present significant legal challenges for the existing liability framework and could lead to situations , in which their opacity could make it extremely expensive or even impossible to identify who was in control of the risk associated with the ai-system or which code or input has ultimately caused the harmful operation; ### e. whereas artificial intelligence (ai)-systems and other emerging digital technologies , such as the internet of things or distributed ledger technologies present significant legal challenges for the existing liability framework and could lead to situations , in which their opacity , complexity , modification through updates or self-learning during operation , limited predictability , and vulnerability to cybersecurity threats make it extremely difficult or even impossible to identify who was in control of the risk associated with the ai-system or which code or input has ultimately caused the harmful operation;


### g. whereas sound ethical standards for ai-systems combined with solid and fair compensation procedures can help to address those legal challenges; whereas fair liability procedures means that each person who suffers harm caused by ai-systems or whose property damage is caused by ai-systems should have the same level of protection compared to cases without involvement of an ai-system. ### g. whereas ai-systems need to comply with current applicable laws and , additionally , union and national liability regimes need to be adjusted , where necessary , in order to guarantee solid and fair compensation for affected persons; whereas fair liability procedures means that each person who suffers harm caused by ai-systems or whose property damage is caused by ai-systems should have the same level of protection compared to cases without involvement of an ai-system.


### liability of the deployer ### liability of the frontend and backend operator


### different liability rules for different risks ### no risk-based approach in the liability phase


### 13. recognises that the type of ai-system the deployer is exercising control over is a determining factor; notes that an ai-system that entails a high risk potentially endangers the general public to a much higher degree; considers that , based on the legal challenges that ai-systems pose to the existing liability regimes , it seems reasonable to set up a strict liability regime for those high-risk ai-systems; ### 13. recalls that in the liability stage , a risk-based approach to ai is not appropriate , since the damage has occurred and the product has proven to be a risk product; notes that so called low-risk applications may equally cause severe harm or damage;


### 14. believes that an ai-system presents a high risk when its autonomous operation involves a significant potential to cause harm to one or more persons , in a manner that is random and impossible to predict in advance; considers that the significance of the potential depends on the interplay between the severity of possible harm , the likelihood that the risk materializes and the manner in which the ai-system is being used; ### 14. stresses that the liability model for products containing ai systems has to be approached in a two-step process: firstly providing a fault based liability of the frontend operator against which the affected person should have the right to bring the claim for damages , with the possibility for the frontend operator to prove his lack of fault by complying with the duty of care consisting in the regular installation of all available updates; if this obligation is fulfilled , due diligence is presumed; secondly , in the event where no fault of the frontend operator can be established , the backend operator should be held strictly liable; notes that such a two-step process is essential in order to ensure that victims are effectively compensated for damages caused by ai driven systems;


### 15. recommends that all high-risk ai-systems be listed in an annex to the proposed regulation; recognises that , given the rapid technological change and the required technical expertise , it should be up to the commission to review that annex every six months and if necessary , amend it through a delegated act; believes that the commission should closely cooperate with a newly formed standing committee similar to the existing standing committee on precursors or the technical committee on motor vehicles , which include national experts of the member states and stakeholders; considers that the balanced membership of the ‘high-level expert group on artificial intelligence’ could serve as an example for the formation of the group of stakeholders; ### 15. points out that a risk-based approach to ai within the existing liability framework might create unnecessary fragmentation across the eu creating legal uncertainty , interpretative issues and confusion amongst users who would face different levels of protection depending on whether the ai-systems is classified as high-or low- risk , which is something users cannot assess on their own; considers that , once the damage has occurred , it is irrelevant whether an ai system has been classified as high- or low-risks , and that what matters is that affected persons can obtain full compensation for the harm regardless of the risk category;


### 16. believes that in line with strict liability systems of the member states , the proposed regulation should only cover harm to the important legally protected rights such as life , health , physical integrity and property , and should set out the amounts and extent of compensation as well as the limitation period; ### 16. believes that due to the special characteristics of ai-systems , the proposed regulation should cover material as well as non-material harm , including damage to intangible property and data , such as loss or leak of data , and should ensure that damage is always fully compensated , in compliance with the fundamental right of redress for damage suffered;


### 17. determines that all activities , devices or processes driven by ai-systems that cause harm or damage but are not listed in the annex to the proposed regulation should remain subject to fault-based liability; believes that the affected person should nevertheless benefit from a presumption of fault of the deployer; ### deleted


### 18. considers the liability risk to be one of the key factors that defines the success of new technologies , products and services; observes that proper risk coverage is also essential for assuring the public that it can trust the new technology despite the potential for suffering harm or for facing legal claims by affected persons; ### 18. considers the liability coverage to be one of the key factors that defines the success of new technologies , products and services; observes that proper liability coverage is also essential for assuring the public that it can trust the new technology despite the potential for suffering harm or for facing legal claims by affected persons;


### 19. is of the opinion that , based on the significant potential to cause harm and by taking directive 2009/103/ec7 into account , all deployers of high-risk ai-systems listed in the annex to the proposed regulation should hold liability insurance; considers that such a mandatory insurance regime for high-risk ai-systems should cover the amounts and the extent of compensation laid down by the proposed regulation; ### 19. is of the opinion that , a mandatory insurance regime for all ai systems is not the right approach;


### 20. believes that a european compensation mechanism , funded with public money , is not the right way to fill potential insurance gaps; considers that bearing the good experience with regulatory sandboxes in the fintech sector in mind , it should be up to the insurance market to adjust existing products or create new insurance cover for the numerous sectors and various different technologies , products and services that involve ai-systems; ### deleted


### 20. believes that a european compensation mechanism , funded with public money , is not the right way to fill potential insurance gaps; considers that bearing the good experience with regulatory sandboxes in the fintech sector in mind , it should be up to the insurance market to adjust existing products or create new insurance cover for the numerous sectors and various different technologies , products and services that involve ai-systems; ### 20. underlines that the sole grounds that harm or damage is caused by a non-human agent should not limit the extent of the damages which may be recovered , nor should it limit the forms of compensation which may be offered to the party suffering said harm or damage;


### - new legal challenges posed by the deployment of artificial intelligence (ai)-systems have to be addressed by establishing maximal legal certainty for the producer , the deployer , the affected person and any other third party. ### - new legal challenges posed by the deployment of artificial intelligence (ai)-systems have to be addressed by establishing maximal legal certainty for the producer , the frontend operator , the backend operator , the affected person and any other third party.


### - instead of replacing the well-functioning existing liability regimes , we should make a few specific adjustments by introducing new and future-orientated ideas. ### - instead of replacing the well-functioning existing liability regimes , we should make some necessary adjustments by introducing new and future-orientated ideas.


### (1) the concept of ‘liability’ plays an important double role in our daily life: on the one hand , it ensures that a person who has suffered harm or damage is entitled to claim compensation from the party proven to be liable for that harm or damage , and on the other hand , it provides the economic incentives for persons to avoid causing harm or damage in the first place. any liability framework should strive to strike a balance between efficiently protecting potential victims of damage and at the same time , providing enough leeway to make the development of new technologies , products or services possible. ### (1) the concept of ‘liability’ plays an important double role in our daily life: on the one hand , it ensures that a person who has suffered harm or damage is entitled to claim compensation from the party proven to be liable for that harm or damage , and on the other hand , it provides the incentives for persons to avoid causing harm or damage in the first place. any liability framework should protect potential victims of damage , ensuring that victims are able to a claim for compensation in all cases where this seems justified.


### (2) especially at the beginning of the life cycle of new products and services , there is a certain degree of risk for the user as well as for third persons that something does not function properly. this process of trial-and-error is at the same time a key enabler of technical progress without which most of our technologies would not exist. so far , the accompanying risks of new products and services have been properly mitigated by strong product safety legislation and liability rules. ### (2) not only at the beginning of the life cycle of new products and services , but also at later stages , due to modifications through updates , there is a certain degree of risk for the user as well as for third persons that something does not function properly. so far , the accompanying risks of new products and services have been properly mitigated by strong product safety legislation and liability rules.


### (3) the rise of artificial intelligence (ai) however presents a significant challenge for the existing liability frameworks. using ai-systems in our daily life will lead to situations in which their opacity (“black box” element) makes it extremely expensive or even impossible to identify who was in control of the risk of using the ai-system in question or which code or input has caused the harmful operation. this difficulty is even compounded by the connectivity between an ai-system and other ai-systems and non-ai-systems , by its dependency on external data , by its vulnerability to cybersecurity breaches as well as by the increasing autonomy of ai-systems triggered by machine-learning and deep-learning capabilities. besides these complex features and potential vulnerabilities , ai-systems could also be used to cause severe harm , such as compromising our values and freedoms by tracking individuals against their will , by introducing social credit systems or by constructing lethal autonomous weapon systems. ### (3) the rise of artificial intelligence (ai) and other emerging digital technologies , such as the internet of things or distributed ledger technologies however presents a significant challenge for the existing liability frameworks. using ai-systems in our daily life will lead to situations in which their opacity (“black box” element) , complexity , modification through updates or self-learning during operation , limited predictability , and vulnerability to cybersecurity threats makes it extremely difficult or even impossible to identify who was in control of the risk of using the ai-system in question or which code or input has caused the harmful operation. this difficulty is even compounded by the connectivity between an ai-system and other ai-systems and non-ai-systems , by its dependency on external data , by its vulnerability to cybersecurity breaches as well as by the increasing autonomy of ai-systems triggered by machine-learning and deep-learning capabilities. besides these complex features and potential vulnerabilities , ai-systems could also be used to cause severe harm , such as compromising our values and freedoms by tracking individuals against their will , by introducing social credit systems or by constructing lethal autonomous weapon systems.


### (4) at this point , it is important to point out that the advantages of deploying ai-systems will by far outweigh the disadvantages. they will help to fight climate change more effectively , to improve medical examinations , to better integrate disabled persons into the society and to provide tailor-made education courses to all types of students. to exploit the various technological opportunities and to boost people’s trust in the use of ai-systems , while at the same time preventing harmful scenarios , sound ethical standards combined with solid and fair compensation is the best way forward. ### (4) at this point , it is important to point out that to ensure that the advantages of deploying ai-systems outweigh the disadvantages , certain adjustments need to be made to the union law. they will help to fight climate change more effectively , to improve medical examinations , to better integrate disabled persons into the society and to provide tailor-made education courses to all types of students. to exploit the various technological opportunities and to boost people’s trust in the use of ai-systems , while at the same time preventing harmful scenarios , it is essential to ensure that ai-systems comply with applicable laws and adjust union and national liability regimes in order to guarantee solid and fair compensation for affected persons.


### (5) any discussion about required changes in the existing legal framework should start with the clarification that ai-systems have neither legal personality nor human conscience , and that their sole task is to serve humanity. many ai-systems are also not so different from other technologies , which are sometimes based on even more complex software. ultimately , the large majority of ai-systems are used for handling trivial tasks without any risks for the society. there are however also ai-systems that are deployed in a critical manner and are based on neuronal networks and deep-learning processes. their opacity and autonomy could make it very difficult to trace back specific actions to specific human decisions in their design or in their operation. a deployer of such an ai-system might for instance argue that the physical or virtual activity , device or process causing the harm or damage was outside of his or her control because it was caused by an autonomous operation of his or her ai-system. the mere operation of an autonomous ai-system should at the same time not be a sufficient ground for admitting the liability claim. as a result , there might be liability cases in which a person who suffers harm or damage caused by an ai-system cannot prove the fault of the producer , of an interfering third party or of the deployer and ends up without compensation. ### (5) any discussion about required changes in the existing legal framework should start with the clarification that ai-systems have neither legal personality nor human conscience , and that their sole task is to serve humanity. many ai-systems are also not so different from other technologies , which are sometimes based on even more complex software. ultimately , the large majority of ai-systems are used for handling trivial tasks without any risks for the society. there are however also ai-systems that are deployed in a critical manner and are based on neuronal networks and deep-learning processes. their opacity and autonomy could make it very difficult to trace back specific actions to specific human decisions in their design or in their operation. a frontend operator of such an ai-system might for instance argue that the physical or virtual activity , device or process causing the harm or damage was outside of his or her control because it was caused by an autonomous operation of his or her ai-system. the mere operation of an autonomous ai-system should at the same time not be a sufficient ground for admitting the liability claim. as a result , there might be liability cases in which a person who suffers harm or damage caused by an ai-system cannot prove the fault of the producer , the backend operator of an interfering third party or of the frontend operator and ends up without compensation. furthermore , the allocation of liability could be unfair or inefficient. to prevent such scenarios , certain adjustments need to be made to union and national liability regimes.


### (5) any discussion about required changes in the existing legal framework should start with the clarification that ai-systems have neither legal personality nor human conscience , and that their sole task is to serve humanity. many ai-systems are also not so different from other technologies , which are sometimes based on even more complex software. ultimately , the large majority of ai-systems are used for handling trivial tasks without any risks for the society. there are however also ai-systems that are deployed in a critical manner and are based on neuronal networks and deep-learning processes. their opacity and autonomy could make it very difficult to trace back specific actions to specific human decisions in their design or in their operation. a deployer of such an ai-system might for instance argue that the physical or virtual activity , device or process causing the harm or damage was outside of his or her control because it was caused by an autonomous operation of his or her ai-system. the mere operation of an autonomous ai-system should at the same time not be a sufficient ground for admitting the liability claim. as a result , there might be liability cases in which a person who suffers harm or damage caused by an ai-system cannot prove the fault of the producer , of an interfering third party or of the deployer and ends up without compensation. ### (5) as a result of major technological advances of the last years , ai-systems have become able to perform activities which used to be exclusively human , but the development of certain autonomous and cognitive features , like the ability to learn from data and experience and take decisions , has made them more and more similar to agents that interact with their environment and are able to alter it significantly. in such a context , the legal responsibility arising through a robot’s harmful action becomes a crucial issue. this , in turn , puts into question the current rules on liability , making it necessary for new principles and rules to provide clarity on the legal liability of various actors concerning responsibility for the acts and omissions of ai-systems , as their opacity and autonomy could make it very difficult to trace back specifications to specific human decisions in their design or in their operation and to assess whether their acts or omissions causing harm or damage could have been avoided. a deployer of such an ai-system might for instance argue that the physical or virtual activity , device or process causing the harm or damage was outside of his or her control because it was caused by an autonomous operation of his or her ai-system. as a result , there might be liability cases in which a person who suffers harm or damage caused by an ai-system cannot prove the fault of the producer , of an interfering third party or of the deployer and ends up without compensation.


### (6) nevertheless , it should always be clear that whoever creates , maintains , controls or interferes with the ai-system , should be accountable for the harm or damage that the activity , device or process causes. this follows from general and widely accepted liability concepts of justice according to which the person that creates a risk for the public is accountable if that risk materializes. consequently , the rise of ai-systems does not pose a need for a complete revision of liability rules throughout the union. specific adjustments of the existing legislation and very few new provisions would be sufficient to accommodate the ai-related challenges. ### (6) thus , it should always be clear that whoever creates , maintains , controls or interferes with the ai-system , should be accountable for the harm or damage that the activity , device or process causes. additionally , strict liability should lie with the person that has more control over the risks of the operation. this follows from general and widely accepted liability concepts of justice according to which the person that creates a risk for the public is accountable if that risk materializes. consequently , the rise of ai-systems does not pose a need for a complete revision of liability rules throughout the union. specific adjustments of the existing legislation and the necessary new provisions would be sufficient to accommodate the ai-related challenges.


### (6) nevertheless , it should always be clear that whoever creates , maintains , controls or interferes with the ai-system , should be accountable for the harm or damage that the activity , device or process causes. this follows from general and widely accepted liability concepts of justice according to which the person that creates a risk for the public is accountable if that risk materializes. consequently , the rise of ai-systems does not pose a need for a complete revision of liability rules throughout the union. specific adjustments of the existing legislation and very few new provisions would be sufficient to accommodate the ai-related challenges. ### (6) nevertheless , it should always be clear that whoever creates , maintains , controls or interferes with the ai-system , should be accountable for the harm or damage that the activity , device or process causes. this follows from general and widely accepted liability concepts of justice according to which the person that creates a risk for the public is accountable if that risk materializes. consequently , the rise of ai-systems poses a need for a revision of liability rules throughout the union. adjustments of the existing legislation and new provisions would be necessary to adapt it to ai-related challenges.


### (7) council directive 85/374/eec3 (the product liability directive) has proven to be an effective means of getting compensation for damage triggered by a defective product. hence , it should also be used with regard to civil liability claims of a party who suffers harm or damage against the producer of a defective ai-system. in line with the better regulation principles of the union , any necessary legislative adjustments should be discussed during a review of that directive. the existing fault-based liability law of the member states also offers in most cases a sufficient level of protection for persons that suffer harm or damages caused by an interfering third person , as that interference regularly constitutes a fault-based action. consequently , this regulation should focus on claims against the deployer of an ai-system. ### (7) council directive 85/374/eec3 (the product liability directive) has , for over 30 years , provided a valuable safety net to protect consumers from harm caused by defective products and needs to be updated to take account of civil liability claims of a party who suffers harm or damage against the producer of a defective ai-system. all necessary legislative adjustments should be discussed during a review of that directive. the existing fault-based liability law of the member states offers in most cases a sufficient level of protection for persons that suffer harm or damages caused by an interfering third person , but does not necessarily take account of technological developments. consequently , this regulation should focus on claims against the frontend operator and backend operator of an ai-system.


### (8) the liability of the deployer under this regulation is based on the fact that he or she controls a risk by operating an ai-system. comparable to an owner of a car or pet , the deployer is able to exercise a certain level of control over the risk that the item poses. exercising control thereby should be understood as meaning any action of the deployer that affects the manner of the operation from start to finish or that changes specific functions or processes within the ai-system. ### (8) the liability of the frontend operator under this regulation is based on the fact that he or she is the person primarily deciding on and benefitting from the use of the relevant technology. benefitting from the use thereby should be understood as meaning enjoying the features and functions of the ai-system. conversely , the liability of the backend operator under this regulation is based on the fact that he or she is the person continuously defining the features of the relevant technology and providing essential and ongoing backend support , therefore holding the actual control over the risks of the operation.


### (9) if a user , namely the person that utilises the ai-system , is involved in the harmful event , he or she should only be liable under this regulation if the user also qualifies as a deployer. this regulation should not consider the backend operator , who is the person continuously defining the features of the relevant technology and providing essential and ongoing backend support , to be a deployer and thus , its provisions should not apply to him or her. for the purpose of legal certainty throughout the union , the backend operator should fall under the same liability rules as the producer , manufacturer and developer. ### (9) if a user , namely the person that utilises the ai-system , is involved in the harmful event , he or she should only be liable under this regulation if the user also qualifies as a frontend operator. it is appropriate to note that the backend operator , who is the person continuously defining the features of the relevant technology and providing essential and ongoing backend support , does not necessarily coincide with the producer , as it could also inter alia be the developer or the programmer.


### (10) this regulation should cover in principle all ai-systems , no matter where they are operating and whether the operations take place physically or virtually. the majority of liability claims under this regulation should however address cases of third party liability , where an ai-system operates in a public space and exposes many third persons to a risk. in that situation , the affected persons will often not be aware of the operating ai-system and will not have any contractual or legal relationship towards the deployer. consequently , the operation of the ai-system puts them into a situation in which , in the event of harm or damage being caused , they only have fault-based liability claims against the deployer of the ai-system , while facing severe difficulties to prove fault on the part of the deployer. ### (10) this regulation should cover in principle all ai-systems , no matter where they are operating and whether the operations take place physically or virtually. this regulation should also but not exclusively address cases of third party liability , where an ai-system operates in a public space and exposes many third persons to a risk. in that situation , the affected persons will often not be aware of the operating ai-system and will not have any contractual or legal relationship towards the frontend operator. consequently , the operation of the ai-system puts them into a situation in which , in the event of harm or damage being caused , they face severe difficulties to prove fault on the part of the frontend operator.


### (11) the type of ai-system the deployer is exercising control over is a determining factor. an ai-system that entails a high risk potentially endangers the public to a much higher degree and in a manner that is random and impossible to predict in advance. this means that at the start of the autonomous operation of the ai-system , the majority of the potentially affected persons are unknown and not identifiable (e.g. persons on a public square or in a neighbouring house) , compared to the operation of an ai-system that involves specific persons , who have regularly consented to its deployment before (e.g. surgery in a hospital or sales demonstration in a small shop). determining how significant the potential to cause harm or damage by a high-risk ai-system should depend on the interplay between the manner in which the ai-system is being used , the severity of the potential harm or damage and the likelihood that the risk materialises. the degree of severity should be determined based on the extent of the potential harm resulting from the operation , the number of affected persons , the total value for the potential damage as well as the harm to society as a whole. the likelihood should be determined based on the role of the algorithmic calculations in the decision-making process , the complexity of the decision and the reversibility of the effects. ultimately , the manner of usage should depend , among other things , on the sector in which the ai-system operates , if it could have legal or factual effects on important legally protected rights of the affected person , and whether the effects can reasonably be avoided. ### (11) in the liability stage , a risk-based approach to ai is not appropriate , since the damage has occurred and the product has proven to be a risk product. it should be noted that so called low-risk applications may very well cause severe harm or damage. thus , the liability model for products containing ai applications has to be approached in a two-step process: firstly providing a fault based liability of the frontend operator against which the affected person should have the right to bring the claim for damages , with the possibility for the frontend operator to prove his lack of fault by complying with the duty of care consisting in the regular installation of all available updates. if this obligation is fulfilled , due diligence is presumed. secondly , in the event where no fault of the frontend operator can be established , the backend operator should be held strictly liable. a two-step process is essential in order to ensure that victims are effectively compensated for damages caused by ai driven systems;


### (12) all ai-systems with a high risk should be listed in an annex to this regulation. given the rapid technical and market developments as well as the technical expertise which is required for an adequate review of ai-systems , the power to adopt delegated acts in accordance with article 290 of the treaty on the functioning of the european union should be delegated to the commission to amend this regulation in respect of the types of ai-systems that pose a high risk and the critical sectors where they are used. based on the definitions and provisions laid down in this regulation , the commission should review the annex every six months and , if necessary , amend it by means of delegated acts. to give businesses enough planning and investment security , changes to the critical sectors should only be made every 12 months. developers are called upon to notify the commission if they are currently working on a new technology , product or service that falls under one of the existing critical sectors provided for in the annex and which later could qualify for a high risk ai-system. ### (12) a risk-based approach to ai within the existing liability framework might create unnecessary fragmentation across the union creating legal uncertainty , interpretative issues and confusion amongst users who would face different levels of protection depending on whether the ai-systems is classified as high- or low- risk , which is something users cannot assess on their own. once the damage has occurred it is irrelevant whether an ai system has been classified as high- or low-risks , what matters is that affected persons can obtain full compensation for the harm regardless of the risk category.


### (13) it is of particular importance that the commission carry out appropriate consultations during its preparatory work , including at expert level , and that those consultations be conducted in accordance with the principles laid down in the interinstitutional agreement of 13 april 2016 on better law-making4 . a standing committee called 'technical committee – high-risk ai-systems' (tcrai) should support the commission in its review under this regulation. that standing committee should comprise representatives of the member states as well as a balanced selection of stakeholders , including consumer organisation , businesses representatives from different sectors and sizes , as well as researchers and scientists. in particular , to ensure equal participation in the preparation of delegated acts , the european parliament and the council receive all documents at the same time as member states' experts , and their experts systematically have access to meetings of commission expert groups as well as the standing tcrai-committee , when dealing with the preparation of delegated acts. ### deleted


### (14) in line with strict liability systems of the member states , this regulation should cover only harm or damage to life , health , physical integrity and property. for the same reason , it should determine the amount and extent of compensation , as well as the limitation period for bringing forward liability claims. in contrast to the product liability directive , this regulation should set out a significantly lower ceiling for compensation , as it only refers to a single operation of an ai-system , while the former refers to a number of products or even a product line with the same defect. ### (14) due to the special characteristics of ai-systems , the proposed regulation should cover material as well as non-material harm , including damage to intangible property , and data , such as loss or leak of data and should ensure that damage is fully compensated in compliance with the fundamental right of redress for damage suffered.


### (15) all physical or virtual activities , devices or processes driven by ai-systems that are not listed as a high-risk ai-system in the annex to this regulation should remain subject to fault-based liability. the national laws of the member states , including any relevant jurisprudence , with regard to the amount and extent of compensation as well as the limitation period should continue to apply. a person who suffers harm or damage caused by an ai-system should however benefit from the presumption of fault of the deployer. ### deleted


### (16) the diligence which can be expected from a deployer should be commensurate with (i) the nature of the ai system , (ii) the legally protected right potentially affected , (iii) the potential harm or damage the ai-system could cause and (iv) the likelihood of such damage. thereby , it should be taken into account that the deployer might have limited knowledge of the algorithms and data used in the ai-system. it should be presumed that the deployer has observed due care in selecting a suitable ai-system , if the deployer has selected an ai-system which has been certified under [the voluntary certification scheme envisaged on p. 24 of com(2020) 65 final]. it should be presumed that the deployer has observed due care during the operation of the ai-system , if the deployer can prove to have actually and regularly monitored the ai-system during its operation and to have notified the manufacturer about potential irregularities during the operation. it should be presumed that the deployer has observed due care as regards maintaining the operational reliability , if the deployer installed all available updates provided by the producer of the ai-system. ### (16) the diligence which can be expected from an operator should be commensurate with (i) the nature of the ai system , (ii) the information on the nature of the ai system provided to the operator and to the public , (iii) the legally protected right potentially affected , (iv) the potential harm or damage the ai-system could cause and (v) the likelihood of such damage. thereby , it should be taken into account that the operator might have limited knowledge of the algorithms and data used in the ai-system , even though a sufficient level of information should be ensured , providing for the relevant documentation on the use and design instructions , including the source code and the data used by the ai system , made easily accessible through a mandatory legal deposit. it should be presumed that the operator has observed due care in selecting a suitable ai-system , if the operator has selected an ai-system which has been certified under [the voluntary certification scheme envisaged on p. 24 of com(2020) 65 final]. it should be presumed that the operator has observed due care during the operation of the ai-system , if the operator can prove to have actually and regularly monitored the ai-system during its operation and to have notified the manufacturer about potential irregularities during the operation. it should be presumed that the operator has observed due care as regards maintaining the operational reliability , if the operator installed all available updates provided by the producer of the ai-system according to the conditions laid down in directive (eu) 2019/770. due account should be given to the possibility for the largely volunteer-based free software community to produce software for the general public to use which can be integrated , in whole or in part , into ai systems , without automatically becoming subject to obligations designed for businesses providing digital content in a professional capacity.


### (16) the diligence which can be expected from a deployer should be commensurate with (i) the nature of the ai system , (ii) the legally protected right potentially affected , (iii) the potential harm or damage the ai-system could cause and (iv) the likelihood of such damage. thereby , it should be taken into account that the deployer might have limited knowledge of the algorithms and data used in the ai-system. it should be presumed that the deployer has observed due care in selecting a suitable ai-system , if the deployer has selected an ai-system which has been certified under [the voluntary certification scheme envisaged on p. 24 of com(2020) 65 final]. it should be presumed that the deployer has observed due care during the operation of the ai-system , if the deployer can prove to have actually and regularly monitored the ai-system during its operation and to have notified the manufacturer about potential irregularities during the operation. it should be presumed that the deployer has observed due care as regards maintaining the operational reliability , if the deployer installed all available updates provided by the producer of the ai-system. ### (16) the diligence which can be expected from a frontend operator should be commensurate with (i) the nature of the ai system , (ii) the legally protected right potentially affected , (iii) the potential harm or damage the ai-system could cause and (iv) the likelihood of such damage. thereby , it should be taken into account that the frontend operator might have limited knowledge of the algorithms and data used in the ai-system. it should be presumed that the frontend operator has observed due care in selecting a suitable ai-system , if the frontend operator has selected an ai-system which has been certified under [the voluntary certification scheme envisaged on p. 24 of com(2020) 65 final]. it should be presumed that the frontend operator has observed due care during the operation of the ai-system , if the frontend operator can prove to have actually and regularly monitored the ai-system during its operation and to have notified the backend operator about potential irregularities during the operation. it should be presumed that the frontend operator has observed due care as regards maintaining the operational reliability , if the frontend operator installed all available updates provided by the backend operator of the ai-system.


### (17) in order to enable the deployer to prove that he or she was not at fault , the producers should have the duty to collaborate with the deployer. european as well as non-european producers should furthermore have the obligation to designate an ai-liability-representative within the union as a contact point for replying to all requests from deployers , taking similar provisions set out in article 37 gdpr (data protection officers) , articles 3(41) and 13(4) of regulation 2018/858 of the european parliament and of the council5 and articles 4(2) and 5 of regulation 2019/1020 of the european parliament and of the council6 (manufacturer's representative) into account. ### (17) in order to enable the frontend operator to prove that he or she was not at fault , the backend operators should have the duty to collaborate with the frontend operator. european as well as non-european producers should furthermore have the obligation to designate an ai-liability-representative within the union as a contact point for replying to all requests from frontend operators , taking similar provisions set out in article 37 gdpr (data protection officers) , articles 3(41) and 13(4) of regulation 2018/858 of the european parliament and of the council5 and articles 4(2) and 5 of regulation 2019/1020 of the european parliament and of the council6 (manufacturer's representative) into account.


### (18) the legislator has to consider the liability risks connected to ai-systems during their whole lifecycle , from development to usage to end of life. the inclusion of ai-systems in a product or service represents a financial risk for businesses and consequently will have a heavy impact on the ability and options for small and medium-sized enterprises (sme) as well as for start-ups in relation to insuring and financing their projects based on new technologies. the purpose of liability is , therefore , not only to safeguard important legally protected rights of individuals but also a factor which determines whether businesses , especially smes and start-ups , are able to raise capital , innovate and ultimately offer new products and services , as well as whether the customers are willing to use such products and services despite the potential risks and legal claims being brought against them. ### (18) the legislator has to consider the liability risks connected to ai-systems during their whole lifecycle , from development to usage to end of life. the inclusion of ai-systems in a product or service represents a financial risk for businesses and consequently will have a heavy impact on the ability and options for small and medium-sized enterprises (sme) as well as for start-ups in relation to insuring and financing their projects based on new technologies. the purpose of liability is , therefore , not only to safeguard legally protected rights of individuals but also a factor which determines whether businesses , especially smes and start-ups , are able to raise capital , innovate and ultimately offer new products and services , as well as whether the customers are willing to use such products and services despite the potential risks and legal claims being brought against them.


### (19) insurance can help to ensure that victims can receive effective compensation as well as to pool the risks of all insured persons. one of the factors on which insurance companies base their offer of insurance products and services is risk assessment based on access to sufficient historical claim data. a lack of access to , or an insufficient quantity of high quality data could be a reason why creating insurance products for new and emerging technologies is difficult at the beginning. however , greater access to and optimising the use of data generated by new technologies will enhance insurers’ ability to model emerging risk and to foster the development of more innovative cover . ### deleted


### (20) despite missing historical claim data , there are already insurance products that are developed area-by-area and cover-by-cover as technology develops. many insurers specialise in certain market segments (e.g. smes) or in providing cover for certain product types (e.g. electrical goods) , which means that there will usually be an insurance product available for the insured. if a new type of insurance is needed , the insurance market will develop and offer a fitting solution and thus , will close the insurance gap. in exceptional cases , in which the compensation significantly exceeds the maximum amounts set out in this regulation , member states should be encouraged to set up a special compensation fund for a limited period of time that addresses the specific needs of those cases. ### deleted


### (21) it is of utmost importance that any future changes to this text go hand in hand with a necessary review of the pld. the introduction of a new liability regime for the deployer of ai-systems requires that the provisions of this regulation and the review of the pld should be closely coordinated in terms of substance as well as approach so that they together constitute a consistent liability framework for ai-systems , balancing the interests of producer , deployer and the affected person , as regards the liability risk. adapting and streamlining the definitions of ai-system , deployer , producer , developer , defect , product and service throughout all pieces of legislation is therefore necessary. ### (21) it is of utmost importance that any future changes to this text go hand in hand with a necessary review of the pld. the introduction of a new liability regime for the frontend operator and backend operator of ai-systems requires that the provisions of this regulation and the review of the pld should be closely coordinated in terms of substance as well as approach so that they together constitute a consistent liability framework for ai-systems.


### this regulation sets out rules for the civil liability claims of natural and legal persons against the deployer of ai-systems. ### this regulation sets out rules for the civil liability claims of natural and legal persons against the frontend operator and against the backend operator of ai-systems.


### 1. this regulation applies on the territory of the union where a physical or virtual activity , device or process driven by an ai-system has caused harm or damage to the life , health , physical integrity or the property of a natural or legal person. ### 1. this regulation applies on the territory of the union where a connected and self-learning device , digital content , digital good and/or service has caused a typical harm or damage to a natural or legal person.


### 2. any agreement between a deployer of an ai-system and a natural or legal person who suffers harm or damage because of the ai-system , which circumvents or limits the rights and obligations set out in this regulation , whether concluded before or after the harm or damage has been caused , shall be deemed null and void. ### 2. any agreement between a frontend or backend operator of an ai-system and a natural or legal person who suffers harm or damage because of the ai-system , which circumvents or limits the rights and obligations set out in this regulation , whether concluded before or after the harm or damage has been caused , shall be deemed null and void.


### ‘high risk’ means a significant potential in an autonomously operating ai-system to cause harm or damage to one or more persons in a manner that is random and impossible to predict in advance; the significance of the potential depends on the interplay between the severity of possible harm or damage , the likelihood that the risk materializes and the manner in which the ai-system is being used; ### deleted


### ‘deployer’ means the person who decides on the use of the ai-system , exercises control over the associated risk and benefits from its operation; ### ‘frontend operator’ means the person primarily deciding on and benefitting from the use of the relevant technology;


### ‘affected person’ means any person who suffers harm or damage caused by a physical or virtual activity , device or process driven by an ai-system , and who is not its deployer; ### ‘affected person’ means any person who suffers harm or damage caused by a physical or virtual activity , device or process driven by an ai-system , and who is not its frontend operator;


### ‘harm or damage’ means an adverse impact affecting the life , health , physical integrity or property of a natural or legal person , with the exception of non-material harm; ### ‘harm or damage’ means any material or non-material typical harm or damage , meaning those where the special risk of ai-systems or connected devices materialises;


### ‘producer’ means the developer or the backend operator of an ai-system , or the producer as defined in article 3 of council directive 85/374/eec7 . ### deleted


### high-risk ai-systems ### liability regimes


### strict liability for high-risk ai-systems ### fault liability and strict liability for ai-systems


### 1. the deployer of a high-risk ai-system shall be strictly liable for any harm or damage that was caused by a physical or virtual activity , device or process driven by that ai-system. ### 1. the frontend operator of an ai-system shall be liable at fault for any harm or damage that was caused by a physical or virtual activity , device or process driven by that ai-system. the frontend operator has to comply with the duty of care consisting in the regular installation of all available updates. if that obligation is fulfilled , due diligence shall be presumed.


### 2. the high-risk ai-systems as well as the critical sectors where they are used shall be listed in the annex to this regulation. the commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with article 13 , to amend the exhaustive list in the annex , by: ### 2. in the event where no fault of the frontend operator can be established , the backend operator should be held strictly liable.


### including new types of high-risk ai-systems and critical sectors in which they are deployed; ### deleted


### deleting types of ai-systems that can no longer be considered to pose a high risk; and/or ### deleted


### changing the critical sectors for existing high-risk ai-systems. ### deleted


### any delegated act amending the annex shall come into force six months after its adoption. when determining new critical sectors and/or high-risk ai-systems to be inserted by means of delegated acts in the annex , the commission shall take full account of the criteria set out in this regulation , in particular those set out in article 3(c). ### deleted


### 3. the deployer of a high-risk ai-system shall not be able to exonerate himself or herself by arguing that he or she acted with due diligence or that the harm or damage was caused by an autonomous activity , device or process driven by his or her ai-system. the deployer shall not be held liable if the harm or damage was caused by force majeure. ### deleted


### 4. the deployer of a high-risk ai-system shall ensure they have liability insurance cover that is adequate in relation to the amounts and extent of compensation provided for in article 5 and 6 of this regulation. if compulsory insurance regimes already in force pursuant to other union or national law are considered to cover the operation of the ai-system , the obligation to take out insurance for the ai-system pursuant to this regulation shall be deemed fulfilled , as long as the relevant existing compulsory insurance covers the amounts and the extent of compensation provided for in articles 5 and 6 of this regulation. ### deleted


### 5. this regulation shall prevail over national liability regimes in the event of conflicting strict liability classification of ai-systems. ### deleted


### amount of compensation ### full compensation for damages


### 1. a deployer of a high-risk ai-system that has been held liable for harm or damage under this regulation shall compensate: ### 1. a frontend or backend operator of an ai-system that has been held liable for harm or damage under this regulation shall fully compensate for any harm or damage.


### up to a maximum total amount of eur ten million in the event of death or of harm caused to the health or physical integrity of one or several persons as the result of the same operation of the same high-risk ai-system; ### deleted


### up to a maximum total amount of eur two million in the event of damage caused to property , including when several items of property of one or several persons were damaged as a result of the same operation of the same high-risk ai-system; where the affected person also holds a contractual liability claim against the deployer , no compensation shall be paid under this regulation if the total amount of the damage to property is of a value that falls below eur 500. ### deleted


### 2. where the combined compensation to be paid to several persons who suffer harm or damage caused by the same operation of the same high-risk ai-system exceeds the maximum total amounts provided for in paragraph 1 , the amounts to be paid to each person shall be reduced pro-rata so that the combined compensation does not exceed the maximum amounts set out in paragraph 1. ### deleted


### 1. within the amount set out in article 5(1)(a) , compensation to be paid by the deployer held liable in the event of physical harm followed by the death of the affected person , shall be calculated based on the costs of medical treatment that the affected person underwent prior to his or her death , and of the pecuniary prejudice sustained prior to death caused by the cessation or reduction of the earning capacity or the increase in his or her needs for the duration of the harm prior to death. the deployer held liable shall furthermore reimburse the funeral costs for the deceased affected person to the party who is responsible for defraying those expenses. ### 1. within the amount set out in article 5(1)(a) , compensation to be paid by party held liable in the event of physical harm followed by the death of the affected person , shall be calculated based on the costs of medical treatment that the affected person underwent prior to his or her death , and of the pecuniary prejudice sustained prior to death caused by the cessation or reduction of the earning capacity or the increase in his or her needs for the duration of the harm prior to death. the operator held liable shall furthermore reimburse the funeral costs for the deceased affected person to the party who is responsible for defraying those expenses.


### if at the time of the incident that caused the harm leading to his or her death , the affected person was in a relationship with a third party and had a legal obligation to support that third party , the deployer held liable shall indemnify the third party by paying maintenance to the extent to which the affected person would have been obliged to pay , for the period corresponding to an average life expectancy for a person of his or her age and general description. the deployer shall also indemnify the third party if , at the time of the incident that caused the death , the third party had been conceived but had not yet been born. ### if at the time of the incident that caused the harm leading to his or her death , the affected person was in a relationship with a third party and had a legal obligation to support that third party , the operator held liable shall indemnify the third party by paying maintenance to the extent to which the affected person would have been obliged to pay , for the period corresponding to an average life expectancy for a person of his or her age and general description. the operator shall also indemnify the third party if , at the time of the incident that caused the death , the third party had been conceived but had not yet been born.


### 2. within the amount set out in article 5(1)(b) , compensation to be paid by the deployer held liable in the event of harm to the health or the physical integrity of the affected person shall include the reimbursement of the costs of the related medical treatment as well as the payment for any pecuniary prejudice sustained by the affected person , as a result of the temporary suspension , reduction or permanent cessation of his or her earning capacity or the consequent , medically certified increase in his or her needs. ### 2. within the amount set out in article 5(1)(b) , compensation to be paid by the operator held liable in the event of harm to the health or the physical integrity of the affected person shall include the reimbursement of the costs of the related medical treatment as well as the payment for any pecuniary prejudice sustained by the affected person , as a result of the temporary suspension , reduction or permanent cessation of his or her earning capacity or the consequent , medically certified increase in his or her needs.


### 1. civil liability claims , brought in accordance with article 4(1) , concerning harm to life , health or physical integrity , shall be subject to a special limitation period of 30 years from the date on which the harm occurred. ### 1. civil liability claims , brought in accordance with article 4(1) , shall be subject to a special limitation period of 30 years from the date on which the harm occurred.


### 2. civil liability claims , brought in accordance with article 4(1) , concerning damage to property shall be subject to a special limitation period of: ### deleted


### other ai-systems ### duty of care


### fault-based liability for other ai-systems ### duties of care of the frontend operator


### 1. the deployer of an ai-system that is not defined as a high-risk ai-system , in accordance to article 3(c) and , as a result is not listed in the annex to this regulation , shall be subject to fault-based liability for any harm or damage that was caused by a physical or virtual activity , device or process driven by the ai-system. ### 1. the frontend operator of an ai-system shall be subject to fault-based liability for any harm or damage that was caused by a physical or virtual activity , device or process driven by the ai-system.


### 2. the deployer shall not be liable if he or she can prove that the harm or damage was caused without his or her fault , relying on either of the following grounds’: ### 2. the frontend operator shall not be liable if he or she can prove that the harm or damage was caused without his or her fault , relying on either of the following grounds’:


### the deployer shall not be able to escape liability by arguing that the harm or damage was caused by an autonomous activity , device or process driven by his or her ai-system. the deployer shall not be liable if the harm or damage was caused by force majeure. ### the frontend operator shall not be able to escape liability by arguing that the harm or damage was caused by an autonomous activity , device or process driven by his or her ai-system.


### 3. where the harm or damage was caused by a third party that interfered with the ai-system by modifying its functioning , the deployer shall nonetheless be liable for the payment of compensation if such third party is untraceable or impecunious. ### 3. where the harm or damage was caused by a third party that interfered with the ai-system by modifying its functioning , the frontend operator if at fault shall nonetheless be liable for the payment of compensation if such third party is untraceable or impecunious.


### 4. at the request of the deployer , the producer of an ai-system shall have the duty of collaborating with the deployer to the extent warranted by the significance of the claim in order to allow the deployer to prove that he or she acted without fault. ### 4. the backend operator of an ai-system shall have the duty of collaborating with the frontend operator or the affected person to the extent warranted by the significance of the claim in order to allow the frontend operator or the affected person to prove that he or she acted without fault.


### article 9 ### deleted


### 1. if the harm or damage is caused both by a physical or virtual activity , device or process driven by an ai-system and by the actions of an affected person or of any person for whom the affected person is responsible , the deployer’s extent of liability under this regulation shall be reduced accordingly. the deployer shall not be liable if the affected person or the person for whom he or she is responsible is solely or predominantly accountable for the harm or damage caused. ### 1. if the harm or damage is caused both by a physical or virtual activity , device or process driven by an ai-system and by the actions of an affected person or of any person for whom the affected person is responsible , the frontend operator’s extent of liability under this regulation shall be reduced accordingly. the frontend operator shall not be liable if the affected person or the person for whom he or she is responsible is solely or predominantly accountable for the harm or damage caused.


### 2. a deployer held liable may use the data generated by the ai-system to prove contributory negligence on the part of the affected person. ### 2. a frontend operator held liable may use the data generated by the ai-system to prove contributory negligence on the part of the affected person. the same right shall apply for the affected person. the use of such data shall comply with the data protection legislation.


### if there is more than one deployer of an ai-system , they shall be jointly and severally liable. if any of the deployers is also the producer of the ai-system , this regulation shall prevail over the product liability directive. ### if there is more than one frontend and backend operator of an ai-system , they shall be jointly and severally liable.


### 1. the deployer shall not be entitled to pursue a recourse action unless the affected person , who is entitled to receive compensation under this regulation , has been paid in full. ### 1. the frontend operator and the backend operator shall not be entitled to pursue a recourse action unless the affected person , who is entitled to receive compensation under this regulation , has been paid in full.


### 2. in the event that the deployer is held jointly and severally liable with other deployers in respect of an affected person and has fully compensated that affected person , in accordance with article 4(1) or 8(1) , that deployer may recover part of the compensation from the other deployers , in proportion to his or her liability. deployers , that are jointly and severally liable , shall be obliged in equal proportions in relation to one another , unless otherwise determined. if the contribution attributable to a jointly and severally liable deployer cannot be obtained from him or her , the shortfall shall be borne by the other deployers. to the extent that a jointly and severally liable deployer compensates the affected person and demands adjustment of advancements from the other liable deployers , the claim of the affected person against the other deployers shall be subrogated to him or her. the subrogation of claims shall not be asserted to the disadvantage of the original claim. ### 2. in the event that the frontend operator and the backend operator are held jointly and severally liable with other operators in respect of an affected person and have fully compensated that affected person , in accordance with article 4(1) or 8(1) , that operator may recover part of the compensation from the other operators , in proportion to his or her liability. operators , that are jointly and severally liable , shall be obliged in equal proportions in relation to one another , unless otherwise determined. if the contribution attributable to a jointly and severally liable operators cannot be obtained from him or her , the shortfall shall be borne by the other operators. to the extent that a jointly and severally liable operators compensate the affected person and demands adjustment of advancements from the other liable operators , the claim of the affected person against the other operators shall be subrogated to him or her. the subrogation of claims shall not be asserted to the disadvantage of the original claim.


### 3. in the event that the deployer of a defective ai-system fully indemnifies the affected person for harm or damages in accordance with article 4(1) or 8(1) , he or she may take action for redress against the producer of the defective ai-system according to directive 85/374/eec and to national provisions concerning liability for defective products. ### 3. in the event that the frontend operator of a defective ai-system fully indemnifies the affected person for harm or damages in accordance with article 4(1) or 8(1) , he or she may take action for redress against the backend operator of the defective ai-system according to directive 85/374/eec and to national provisions concerning liability for defective products.


### 4. in the event that the insurer of the deployer indemnifies the affected person for harm or damage in accordance with article 4(1) or 8(1) , any civil liability claim of the affected person against another person for the same damage shall be subrogated to the insurer of the deployer to the amount the insurer of the deployer has compensated the affected person. ### 4. in the event that the insurer of the operator indemnifies the affected person for harm or damage in accordance with article 4(1) or 8(1) , any civil liability claim of the affected person against another person for the same damage shall be subrogated to the insurer of the operator to the amount the insurer of the operator has compensated the affected person.


### article 13 ### deleted


### exhaustive list of ai-systems that pose a high risk as well as of critical sectors where the ai-systems are being deployed1 ### deleted


### 2. stresses that the internal market remains one of the union’s greatest and most tangible achievements , bringing benefits to businesses , consumers and citizens across europe; further deepening the single market and developing the digital single market should be prioritised in the 2020 budget; ### 2. stresses that the internal market remains one of the union’s greatest and most tangible achievements , bringing benefits to businesses , consumers and citizens across europe; further deepening the internal market should be prioritised in the 2020 budget and particular attention should be paid to the completion of the digital single market , for the continued competitiveness of eu business and the protection of consumers throughout the union;


### 3. underlines the importance of a robust consumer policy that gives protection and predictability to consumers both offline and online , and confidence to businesses to provide their goods and services across the internal market; ### 3. underlines that household consumption accounts for 54.4% of eu gdp (in 2017) , hence the importance of a robust consumer policy that gives protection and predictability to consumers both offline and online , and confidence to businesses to provide their goods and services across the internal market; stresses that consumer challenges remain , both in the digital and physical spheres , and therefore it is of utmost importance to increase the education and awareness of consumers and citizens;


### 3. underlines the importance of a robust consumer policy that gives protection and predictability to consumers both offline and online , and confidence to businesses to provide their goods and services across the internal market; ### 3. underlines the importance of a robust consumer policy that gives real protection and predictability to consumers both offline and online , and confidence to businesses to provide their goods and services across the internal market;


### 3. emphasises the need to continue efforts to fight fake news and disinformation with proper levels of financing for these activities. ### 3. emphasises the need to continue efforts to fight fake news and disinformation with proper and independent levels of financing for these activities.


### 3. calls for adequate resources for the european supervisory authorities (esas) in view of their new tasks; underlines that the esas should continue to increase their efficiency without compromising on the quality of their work with a focus on continuous re-assessment of working methods and of effective use of human and financial resources; emphasises that the esas must stick to the tasks and to the mandate assigned to them by the european legislator; ### 3. calls for adequate resources for the european supervisory authorities (esas) in view of their new tasks; underlines the importance of the esas in tackling the emerging financial vulnerabilities brought about by financing outside the banking system;


### 3. calls for adequate resources for the european supervisory authorities (esas) in view of their new tasks; underlines that the esas should continue to increase their efficiency without compromising on the quality of their work with a focus on continuous re-assessment of working methods and of effective use of human and financial resources; emphasises that the esas must stick to the tasks and to the mandate assigned to them by the european legislator; ### 3. calls for adequately increased resources for the european supervisory authorities (esas) in view of their new tasks deriving from the adoption of the revision of the regulation establishing eass 2017/0230(cod) ; underlines that the esas should continue to increase their efficiency via assessments of working methods and of effective use of human and financial resources; notes however that this will not be sufficient to cover the new tasks assigned by the revision of the regulation establishing eass 2017/0230(cod); emphasises that the esas must stick to the tasks and to the mandate assigned to them by the european legislator , including playing a central role in coordinating national competent authorities;


### 4. stresses the importance of appropriately financing the transition to a fully automated customs operation , in the interests of greater efficiency for european companies and streamlined protection for consumers; ### 4. stresses the importance of appropriately financing the transition to a fully automated customs operation , in the interests of greater efficiency for european companies , of a fair competition and streamlined protection for consumers;


### 4. welcomes the proposed increases of 3 ,1% in commitment appropriations , but regrets the decrease of 3 ,8% in payment appropriations for the ‘europe for citizens’ programme; condemns the council for its position to reduce by 4 ,4% the commitments appropriations for that aim. welcomes the 5 ,3% increase in commitment appropriations and 21 ,3% in payment appropriations for the “rights , equality and citizenship” programme but regrets the council position to reduce by 3 ,5% the commitment appropriations. welcomes the fact that a dedicated amount is allocated for the budgetary line of the european citizens initiative (eci). ### 4. welcomes the proposed increases of 3 ,1% in commitment appropriations , but regrets the decrease of 3 ,8% in payment appropriations for the ‘europe for citizens’ programme; condemns the council for its position to reduce by 4 ,4% the commitments appropriations for that aim considering that it was one of the key institutional demands of the parliament. welcomes the 5 ,3% increase in commitment appropriations and 21 ,3% in payment appropriations for the “rights , equality and citizenship” programme but regrets the council position to reduce by 3 ,5% the commitment appropriations. welcomes the fact that a dedicated amount is allocated for the budgetary line of the european citizens initiative (eci).


### 4. recalls that aquaculture is becoming an important element in the objective to cope with increasing consumption of fisheries products in the union. ### 4. recalls that aquaculture is becoming an important element in the objective to cope with increasing consumption of fisheries products in the union , and that its further development can provide a sustainable alternative to fishing , as aquaculture already employs 85.000 people throughout the european union.


### 4. emphasises that funding to accounting entities and tax authorities should continue; ### 4. emphasises that funding to accounting entities and tax authorities should continue , underlines the need to ensure adequate resources to support the union action to fight aggressive tax planning , tax fraud and tax evasion; therefore worries about the council’s proposal to reduce staff expenditure in the european directorate general dedicated to taxation , while the implementation of recently adopted legislation is to be monitored and while a new international tax reform is on-going at both g20 and inclusive framework levels;


### 6. welcomes the fact that in its draft budget the commission has allocated an appropriate budget to most of imco’s main priorities and invites the council to confirm these appropriations; ### 6. welcomes the fact that in its draft budget the commission has allocated an appropriate budget to most of imco’s main priorities , including the internal market for goods and services , support to smes , consumer protection and competitiveness , and invites the council and the parliament to agree these appropriations in the 2020 budget;


### 6. reiterates the importance of coastal and small artisanal fleet emphasises that sector represents nearly 75 % of all fishing vessels registered in the union and nearly half of all employment in the fisheries sector; notes that operators from small-scale coastal fisheries are dependent on healthy fish stocks for their main source of income. ### 6. reiterates the importance of coastal and small artisanal fleet; emphasises that sector represents nearly 75 % of all fishing vessels registered in the union and nearly half of all employment in the fisheries sector meaning that it is an important factor not only economically , but also socially , in many coastal communities; notes that operators from small-scale coastal fisheries are dependent on healthy fish stocks for their main source of income;


### 7. welcomes the increase in appropriations for “operation and development of the internal market of goods and services” (budget line 02 03 01) , as well as for “improving access to finance for smes” (budget line 02 02 02) , and for “support expenditure for cosme” (budget line 02 01 04 01) , as those three actions are crucial for boosting economic growth in the union; ### 7. welcomes the increase in appropriations for “operation and development of the internal market of goods and services” (budget line 02 03 01) , for the purpose of market surveillance and the establishment of the eu product compliance network , as well as for “improving access to finance for smes” (budget line 02 02 02) , and for “support expenditure for cosme” (budget line 02 01 04 01) ,as these three actions are crucial for boosting economic growth in the union; strongly regrets the council’s reduction in budget lines 02 03 01 and 02 02 02;


### 7. calls on the commission and member states to help communities that depend on fisheries to diversify their economies into other maritime activities such as tourism , and help them to add more value to their fishing activities. ### 7. calls on the commission and member states to help communities that depend on fisheries to diversify their economies into other maritime activities such as tourism , marine conservation , data collection and research , and help them to add more value to their fishing activities.


### 9. reminds that the commission and the member states have already accumulated delays in the scheduled implementation of the union customs code , and consequently strongly regrets the reduction in the budget appropriations for “supporting the functioning and modernisation of the customs union” (budget line 14 02 01) , which could lead to further delays; ### 9. reminds that the commission and the member states have already accumulated delays in the scheduled implementation of the union customs code , and consequently strongly regrets the reduction in the budget appropriations for “supporting the functioning and modernisation of the customs union” (budget line 14 02 01) , which could lead to further delays , and hamper the functioning of the internal market; recalls that the full and uniform implementation of the code is essential to better protect citizens and the financial interests of the union and e-customs constitutes a priority policy for the better functioning of the internal market;


### 10. draws attention to the decision of the united kingdom to leave the union which will have an impact on the implementation of the 2014-2020 emff; points out that “brexit” means that the utmost importance needs to be given to the establishment of a new financial budgetary framework for the period 2021-2027; considers that a higher degree of additional flexibility of the union budget is necessary to cope with the new situation. ### 10. draws attention to the current intention of the united kingdom to leave the union which will have an impact on the implementation of the 2014-2020 emff; points out that “brexit” would mean that the utmost importance needs to be given to the establishment of a new financial budgetary framework for the period 2021-2027; considers that a higher degree of additional flexibility of the union budget is necessary to cope with such a situation.


### 1. underlines that 21 ,0 % of the total commitments in the draft budget for 2020 (2020 db) are climate-related; regrets that the union budget trend would deliver only 19 ,7 % for the current multiannual financial framework (mff) period; stresses that every effort should be made to ensure that the overall eu budget target will be reached by the end of 2020; reiterates its call to have more ambitious climate mainstreaming in the next mff period and to its alignment with the paris agreement; ### 1. underlines that 21 ,0 % of the total commitments in the draft budget for 2020 (2020 db) are climate-related; regrets that the union budget trend would deliver only 19 ,7 % for the current multiannual financial framework period; stresses that every effort should be made to ensure that the overall eu budget target will be reached by the end of 2020; reiterates its call to have more ambitious climate mainstreaming in the next mff period whereby parliament urged for 30 % in its november 2018 resolution and to its alignment with the paris agreement;


### 1. calls for the 2020 budget to contribute to the fulfilment of the priorities outlined in the european semester , namely to deliver high-quality investment and reforms that increase productivity growth , continuing to ensure macro-financial stability and sound public finances , and deepening the single market , as well as the completion of the economic and monetary union (emu); ### 1. calls for the 2020 budget to contribute to the fulfilment of the priorities outlined in the european semester , namely to deliver high-quality investment and reforms that increase productivity as well as sustainable and inclusive growth , continuing to ensure sound public finance macro-financial stability while safeguarding flexibility in the implementation of the stability and growth pact , and deepening the single market , as well as the completion of the economic and monetary union (emu);


### 1. calls for the 2020 budget to contribute to the fulfilment of the priorities outlined in the european semester , namely to deliver high-quality investment and reforms that increase productivity growth , continuing to ensure macro-financial stability and sound public finances , and deepening the single market , as well as the completion of the economic and monetary union (emu); ### 1. calls for the 2020 budget to contribute to focusing on productive public investments in order to achieve the goals set by the paris agreements , continuing to ensure macro-financial stability and sound public finances , and deepening the single market , as well as the completion of the economic and monetary union (emu);


### 11. calls on the commission , for management and reporting purposes , to establish a way of recording union budgetary expenditure that will make it possible to report on all funding related to the refugee and migration crisis , as well as for the future union policy on management of migration flows and integration; ### 11. calls on the commission , for management and reporting purposes , to establish a way of recording union budgetary expenditure that will make it possible to report on all funding related to the refugee and migration issues , as well as for the future union policy on management of migration flows and integration;


### migration ### migration and border protection


### migration ### migration and human rights


### 12. reiterates its call to have a separate budget line for the daphne-specific objective in order to show the commitment of the union which is aimed at combating violence against women and girls; calls for increased resources in this budget line and to reverse the decrease of funds dedicated to daphne during the 2014-2020 period; calls on an steady effort to raise the awareness of the grants included in the daphne-specific objective along with measures to make its related administrative procedures more user friendly; ### 12. reiterates its call to have a separate budget line for the daphne-specific objective , which is part of the rights , equality and citizenship programme , in order to show the commitment of the union which is aimed at combating violence against women and girls; calls for increased resources in this budget line and to reverse the decrease of funds dedicated to daphne objective during the 2014-2020 period; suggests that in the next mff the budget for the new justice , rights and values fund which will include as well the rights , equality and citizenship programme to be increased; calls on an steady effort to raise the awareness of the grants included in the daphne-specific objective along with measures to make its related administrative procedures more user friendly;


### (7) on 13 december 2018 , the general court delivered judgment in joined cases t-339/16 , t-352/16 and t-391/1622 concerning an action for annulment of regulation (eu) 2016/646. the general court annulled the part of regulation (eu) 2016/646 which established the conformity factors used to assess compliance of rde test results with the emission limits laid down in regulation (ec) no 715/2007. the court found that only the legislator could introduce those conformity factors as they touched upon an essential element of regulation (ec) no 715/2007. ### (7) on 13 december 2018 , the general court delivered judgment in joined cases t-339/16 , t-352/16 and t-391/1622 concerning an action for annulment of regulation (eu) 2016/646. the general court annulled the part of regulation (eu) 2016/646 which established the conformity factors used to assess compliance of rde test results with the emission limits laid down in regulation (ec) no 715/2007. the court found that only the legislator could introduce those conformity factors as they modified an essential element of regulation (ec) no 715/2007 by de facto amending the limits on emissions of oxides of nitrogen laid down for the euro 6 standard referred to therein.


### (8) the general court did not question the technical justification of the conformity factors. therefore , and given that at the current stage of technological development there is still a discrepancy between emissions measured in real driving and those measured in a laboratory , it is appropriate to introduce the conformity factors into regulation (ec) no 715/2007. ### (8) the general court questioned the technical justification of the conformity factors in its ruling , in particular as regards the temporary conformity factor of 2 ,1 and its margin of statistical uncertainty. the court stated that “statistical uncertainties (the risk that results may be unrepresentative as compared with overall reality) are corrected by work to ensure the representativeness of the sample or of the testing (representativeness of the test) or by the volume of testing (the number of tests) , and not by stating the results may be subject to a margin of error of 60%”1a. moreover , the court went on to say that “rde tests have ‘matured’ over a long period of time , since the work on those tests began in january 2011 and the commission had the time to clarify and standardise the rde sufficiently so that they are representative of real driving conditions on the road in order to prevent in that regard a 60% degree of uncertainty as to their results”1b. in addition , the main focus of regulation (eu) 2016/427 , which inserted annex iii a into regulation (ec) no 692/2008 , and in particular of point 4 of that annex and its 11 appendices , is to describe in very specific detail the components of an rde test and how it is to be conducted.


### (9) in order to allow manufacturers to comply with the euro 6 emission limits in the context of rde test procedure , the compliance criteria for rde should be introduced in two steps. during the first step , upon the request of the manufacturer , a temporary conformity factor should apply , while as a second step only the final conformity factor should be used. the commission should keep under review the final conformity factors in light of technical progress. ### (9) in order to allow manufacturers to comply with the euro 6 emission limits in the context of rde test procedure , the compliance criteria for rde will only apply the final conformity factor. the commission should keep under review the final conformity factors in light of technical progress. the commission should adjust downwards the margin of error used to calculate the final conformity factor every year as a result of the improved accuracy of the measuring procedure or technical progress of pems equipment.


### (9) in order to allow manufacturers to comply with the euro 6 emission limits in the context of rde test procedure , the compliance criteria for rde should be introduced in two steps. during the first step , upon the request of the manufacturer , a temporary conformity factor should apply , while as a second step only the final conformity factor should be used. the commission should keep under review the final conformity factors in light of technical progress. ### (9) in order to allow manufacturers to comply with the euro 6 emission limits in the context of rde test procedure , a conformity factor could be introduced to temporarily address the technical uncertainty for the pems equipment. the commission should keep under annual review the temporary conformity factors in light of technical progress until its complete phase-out by 31 december 2021.


### (9) in order to allow manufacturers to comply with the euro 6 emission limits in the context of rde test procedure , the compliance criteria for rde should be introduced in two steps. during the first step , upon the request of the manufacturer , a temporary conformity factor should apply , while as a second step only the final conformity factor should be used. the commission should keep under review the final conformity factors in light of technical progress. ### (9) in order to allow manufacturers to comply with the euro 6 emission limits in the context of rde test procedure , the compliance criteria for rde will apply the final conformity. the commission should adjust downwards the margin of error used to calculate the final conformity factor every year as a result of the improved accuracy of the measuring procedure or technical progress of pems equipment.


### (11) in order to contribute to the achievement of the union’s air quality objectives and to reduce vehicle emissions , the power to adopt acts in accordance with article 290 of the treaty on the functioning of the european union (tfue) should be delegated to the commission in respect of the detailed rules on the specific procedures , tests and requirements for type approval. that delegation should include supplementing regulation (ec) no 715/2007 by such revised rules as well as the test cycles used to measure emissions; the requirements for the implementation of the prohibition on the use of defeat devices that reduce the effectiveness of emission control systems; the measures necessary for the implementation of the obligation of a manufacturer to provide unrestricted and standardised access to vehicle repair and maintenance information; the adoption of a revised measurement procedure for particulates. the delegation should further include amending regulation (ec) no 715/2007 for the purposes of revising the final conformity factors downwards to reflect technical progress in pems and recalibrating the particulate mass based limit values and introducing particle number based limit values. it is of particular importance that the commission carry out appropriate consultations during its preparatory work , including at expert level , and that those consultations are conducted in accordance with the principles laid down in the interinstitutional agreement on better law-making of 13 april 2016. in particular , to ensure equal participation in the preparation of delegated acts , the european parliament and the council should receive all documents at the same time as member states’ experts , and their experts systematically should have access to meetings of commission expert groups dealing with the preparation of delegated acts. ### (11) in order to contribute to the achievement of the union’s air quality objectives and to reduce vehicle emissions , the power to adopt acts in accordance with article 290 of the treaty on the functioning of the european union (tfue) should be delegated to the commission in respect of the detailed rules on the specific procedures , tests and requirements for type approval. that delegation should include supplementing regulation (ec) no 715/2007 by such revised rules as well as the test cycles used to measure emissions; the requirements for the implementation of the prohibition on the use of defeat devices that reduce the effectiveness of emission control systems; the measures necessary for the implementation of the obligation of a manufacturer to provide unrestricted and standardised access to vehicle repair and maintenance information; the adoption of a revised measurement procedure for particulates. the delegation should further include amending regulation (ec) no 715/2007 for the purposes of revising the final conformity factors downwards to reflect technical progress in pems and recalibrating the particulate mass based limit values and introducing particle number based limit values. it is of particular importance that the commission carry out appropriate consultations during its preparatory work , including at expert level , and that those consultations are conducted in accordance with the principles laid down in the interinstitutional agreement on better law-making of 13 april 2016. in particular , to ensure equal participation in the preparation of delegated acts , the european parliament , the council and the member state experts should receive promptly all the documents and information necessary , and their experts systematically should have access to meetings of commission expert groups dealing with the preparation of delegated acts.