### (65) given the complexity of the functioning of the systems deployed and the systemic risks they present to society , very large online platforms should appoint compliance officers , which should have the necessary qualifications to operationalise measures and monitor the compliance with this regulation within the platform’s organisation. very large online platforms should ensure that the compliance officer is involved , properly and in a timely manner , in all issues which relate to this regulation. in view of the additional risks relating to their activities and their additional obligations under this regulation , the other transparency requirements set out in this regulation should be complemented by additional transparency requirements applicable specifically to very large online platforms , notably to report on the risk assessments performed and subsequent measures adopted as provided by this regulation. ### (65) given the complexity of the functioning of the systems deployed and the systemic risks they present to society and the economy , very large online platforms should appoint compliance officers , which should have the necessary qualifications to operationalise measures and monitor the compliance with this regulation within the platform’s organisation. very large online platforms should ensure that the compliance officer is involved , properly and in a timely manner , in all issues which relate to this regulation. in view of the additional risks relating to their activities and their additional obligations under this regulation , the other transparency requirements set out in this regulation should be complemented by additional transparency requirements applicable specifically to very large online platforms , notably to report on the risk assessments performed and subsequent measures adopted as provided by this regulation.


### (78) member states should set out in their national law , in accordance with union law and in particular this regulation and the charter , the detailed conditions and limits for the exercise of the investigatory and enforcement powers of their digital services coordinators , and other competent authorities where relevant , under this regulation. ### (78) member states should set out in their national law , in accordance with union law and in particular this regulation and the charter , the detailed conditions and limits for the exercise of the investigatory and enforcement powers of their digital services coordinators , and other competent authorities , and the repercussions in the event they are breached , where relevant , under this regulation.


### (87) in view of the particular challenges that may emerge in relation to assessing and ensuring a very large online platform’s compliance , for instance relating to the scale or complexity of a suspected infringement or the need for particular expertise or capabilities at union level , digital services coordinators should have the possibility to request , on a voluntary basis , the commission to intervene and exercise its investigatory and enforcement powers under this regulation. ### (87) in view of the particular challenges that may emerge in relation to assessing and ensuring a very large online platform’s compliance , for instance relating to the scale or complexity of a suspected infringement or the need for particular expertise or capabilities at union level , digital services coordinators should have the possibility to request , on a voluntary basis , assistance from the commission or otherwise ask the commission to intervene and exercise its investigatory and enforcement powers under this regulation.


### (94) given the importance of very large online platforms , in view of their reach and impact , their failure to comply with the specific obligations applicable to them may affect a substantial number of recipients of the services across different member states and may cause large societal harms , while such failures may also be particularly complex to identify and address. ### (94) given the importance of very large online platforms , in view of their reach and impact , their failure to comply with the specific obligations applicable to them may affect a substantial number of recipients of the services across different member states and may cause large societal and economic harms , while such failures may also be particularly complex to identify and address.


### (97) the commission should remain free to decide whether or not it wishes to intervene in any of the situations where it is empowered to do so under this regulation. once the commission initiated the proceedings , the digital services coordinators of establishment concerned should be precluded from exercising their investigatory and enforcement powers in respect of the relevant conduct of the very large online platform concerned , so as to avoid duplication , inconsistencies and risks from the viewpoint of the principle of ne bis in idem. however , in the interest of effectiveness , those digital services coordinators should not be precluded from exercising their powers either to assist the commission , at its request in the performance of its supervisory tasks , or in respect of other conduct , including conduct by the same very large online platform that is suspected to constitute a new infringement. those digital services coordinators , as well as the board and other digital services coordinators where relevant , should provide the commission with all necessary information and assistance to allow it to perform its tasks effectively , whilst conversely the commission should keep them informed on the exercise of its powers as appropriate. in that regard , the commission should , where appropriate , take account of any relevant assessments carried out by the board or by the digital services coordinators concerned and of any relevant evidence and information gathered by them , without prejudice to the commission’s powers and responsibility to carry out additional investigations as necessary. ### (97) the commission should , on the basis of this regulation and other relevant eu law , decide whether or not it intervenes in any of the situations where it is empowered to do so under this regulation. once the commission initiated the proceedings , the digital services coordinators of establishment concerned should be precluded from exercising their investigatory and enforcement powers in respect of the relevant conduct of the very large online platform concerned , so as to avoid duplication , inconsistencies and risks from the viewpoint of the principle of ne bis in idem. however , in the interest of effectiveness , those digital services coordinators should not be precluded from exercising their powers either to assist the commission , at its request in the performance of its supervisory tasks , or in respect of other conduct , including conduct by the same very large online platform that is suspected to constitute a new infringement. those digital services coordinators , as well as the board and other digital services coordinators where relevant , should provide the commission with all necessary information and assistance to allow it to perform its tasks effectively , whilst conversely the commission should keep them informed on the exercise of its powers as appropriate. in that regard , the commission should , where appropriate , take account of any relevant assessments carried out by the board or by the digital services coordinators concerned and of any relevant evidence and information gathered by them , without prejudice to the commission’s powers and responsibility to carry out additional investigations as necessary.


### 3. very large online platforms shall provide access to data pursuant to paragraphs 1 and 2 through online databases or application programming interfaces , as appropriate. ### 3. very large online platforms shall provide access to data pursuant to paragraphs 1 and 2 through online databases or application programming interfaces , as appropriate in an easily accessible and user-friendly format. this shall include personal data only where it is lawfully accessible by the public and without prejudice to regulation (eu) 2016/679.


### 3. paragraph 2 is without prejudice to the tasks of digital services coordinators within the system of supervision and enforcement provided for in this regulation and the cooperation with other competent authorities in accordance with article 38(2). paragraph 2 shall not prevent supervision of the authorities concerned in accordance with national constitutional law. ### 3. paragraph 2 is without prejudice to the tasks of digital services coordinators within the system of supervision and enforcement provided for in this regulation and the cooperation with other competent authorities in accordance with article 38(2). paragraph 2 shall not prevent supervision of the authorities concerned in accordance with national constitutional law or the allocation of additional powers under other applicable law.


### 6. the board shall adopt its rules of procedure , following the consent of the commission. ### deleted


### 2. the commission may by decision impose on the very large online platform concerned or other person referred to in article 52(1) fines not exceeding 1% of the total turnover in the preceding financial year , where they intentionally or negligently: ### 2. the commission may by decision impose on the very large online platform concerned or other person referred to in article 52(1) fines not exceeding 1% of the total global turnover in the preceding financial year , where they intentionally or negligently:


### 1. by five years after the entry into force of this regulation at the latest , and every five years thereafter , the commission shall evaluate this regulation and report to the european parliament , the council and the european economic and social committee. ### 1. by three years after the entry into force of this regulation at the latest , and every three years thereafter , the commission shall evaluate this regulation and report to the european parliament , the council and the european economic and social committee.


### contribute to the proper functioning of the internal market for intermediary services; ### contribute to the proper functioning of the internal market for intermediary services and impacted economic actors;


### the provider acts expeditiously to remove or to disable access to the information it has stored upon obtaining actual knowledge of the fact that the information at the initial source of the transmission has been removed from the network , or access to it has been disabled , or that a court or an administrative authority has ordered such removal or disablement. ### the provider acts expeditiously and in good faith to remove or to disable access to the information it has stored upon obtaining actual knowledge of the fact that the information at the initial source of the transmission has been removed from the network , or access to it has been disabled , or that a court or an administrative authority has ordered such removal or disablement.


### where the decision concerns allegedly illegal content , a reference to the legal ground relied on and explanations as to why the information is considered to be illegal content on that ground; ### where the decision concerns allegedly illegal content , a reference to the legal ground relied on and explanations as to why the information is considered to be illegal content on that ground including explanations in relation to the arguments submitted under article 14 paragraph 2a , where relevant;


### a self-certification by the trader committing to only offer products or services that comply with the applicable rules of union law. ### deleted


### 4. member states shall ensure that the maximum amount of a periodic penalty payment shall not exceed 5 % of the average daily turnover of the provider of intermediary services concerned in the preceding financial year per day , calculated from the date specified in the decision concerned. ### 4. member states shall ensure that the maximum amount of a periodic penalty payment shall not exceed 5 % of the average daily global turnover of the provider of intermediary services concerned in the preceding financial year per day , calculated from the date specified in the decision concerned.


### 1. in the decision pursuant to article 58 , the commission may impose on the very large online platform concerned fines not exceeding 6% of its total turnover in the preceding financial year where it finds that that platform , intentionally or negligently: ### 1. in the decision pursuant to article 58 , the commission may impose on the very large online platform concerned fines not exceeding 6% of its total global turnover in the preceding financial year where it finds that the platform , intentionally or negligently:


### (27) since 2000 , new technologies have emerged that improve the availability , efficiency , speed , reliability , capacity and security of systems for the transmission and storage of data online , leading to an increasingly complex online ecosystem. in this regard , it should be recalled that providers of services establishing and facilitating the underlying logical architecture and proper functioning of the internet , including technical auxiliary functions , can also benefit from the exemptions from liability set out in this regulation , to the extent that their services qualify as ‘mere conduits’ , ‘caching’ or hosting services. such services include , as the case may be , wireless local area networks , domain name system (dns) services , top–level domain name registries , certificate authorities that issue digital certificates , or content delivery networks , that enable or improve the functions of other providers of intermediary services. likewise , services used for communications purposes , and the technical means of their delivery , have also evolved considerably , giving rise to online services such as voice over ip , messaging services and web-based e-mail services , where the communication is delivered via an internet access service. those services , too , can benefit from the exemptions from liability , to the extent that they qualify as ‘mere conduit’ , ‘caching’ or hosting service. ### (27) since 2000 , new technologies have emerged that improve the availability , efficiency , speed , reliability , capacity and security of systems for the transmission and storage of data online , leading to an increasingly complex online ecosystem that makes it harder for both policymakers to manage , as well as for new entrants to penetrate the market. in this regard , it should be recalled that providers of services establishing and facilitating the underlying logical architecture and proper functioning of the internet , including technical auxiliary functions , can also benefit from the exemptions from liability set out in this regulation , to the extent that their services qualify as ‘mere conduits’ , ‘caching’ or hosting services. such services include , as the case may be , wireless local area networks , domain name system (dns) services , top–level domain name registries , certificate authorities that issue digital certificates , or content delivery networks , that enable or improve the functions of other providers of intermediary services. likewise , services used for communications purposes , and the technical means of their delivery , have also evolved considerably , giving rise to online services such as voice over ip , messaging services and web-based e-mail services , where the communication is delivered via an internet access service. those services , too , can benefit from the exemptions from liability , to the extent that they qualify as ‘mere conduit’ , ‘caching’ or hosting service.


### (31) the territorial scope of such orders to act against illegal content should be clearly set out on the basis of the applicable union or national law enabling the issuance of the order and should not exceed what is strictly necessary to achieve its objectives. in that regard , the national judicial or administrative authority issuing the order should balance the objective that the order seeks to achieve , in accordance with the legal basis enabling its issuance , with the rights and legitimate interests of all third parties that may be affected by the order , in particular their fundamental rights under the charter. in addition , where the order referring to the specific information may have effects beyond the territory of the member state of the authority concerned , the authority should assess whether the information at issue is likely to constitute illegal content in other member states concerned and , where relevant , take account of the relevant rules of union law or international law and the interests of international comity. ### (31) the territorial scope of such orders to act against illegal content should be clearly set out on the basis of the applicable union law and , where relevant , in accordance with the applicable national law enabling the issuance of the order and should not exceed what is strictly necessary to achieve its objectives. in that regard , the national judicial or administrative authority issuing the order should balance the objective that the order seeks to achieve , in accordance with the legal basis enabling its issuance , with the rights and legitimate interests of all third parties that may be affected by the order , in particular their fundamental rights under the charter. in addition , where the order referring to the specific information may have effects beyond the territory of the member state of the authority concerned , the authority should assess whether the information at issue is likely to constitute illegal content in other member states concerned and , where relevant , take account of the relevant rules of union law or international law and the interests of international comity.


### (35) in that regard , it is important that the due diligence obligations are adapted to the type and nature of the intermediary service concerned. this regulation therefore sets out basic obligations applicable to all providers of intermediary services , as well as additional obligations for providers of hosting services and , more specifically , online platforms and very large online platforms. to the extent that providers of intermediary services may fall within those different categories in view of the nature of their services and their size , they should comply with all of the corresponding obligations of this regulation. those harmonised due diligence obligations , which should be reasonable and non-arbitrary , are needed to achieve the identified public policy concerns , such as safeguarding the legitimate interests of the recipients of the service , addressing illegal practices and protecting fundamental rights online. ### (35) in that regard , it is important that the due diligence obligations are adapted to the type and nature of the intermediary service concerned. this regulation therefore sets out basic obligations applicable to all providers of intermediary services , as well as additional obligations for providers of hosting services and , more specifically , online platforms holding a dominant position in the market and very large online platforms. to the extent that providers of intermediary services may fall within those different categories in view of the nature of their services and their size , they should be obliged to comply with all of the corresponding obligations of this regulation. those harmonised due diligence obligations , which should be reasonable and non-arbitrary , are needed to achieve the identified public policy concerns , such as safeguarding the legitimate interests of the recipients of the service , addressing illegal practices , safeguarding the competitive nature of the sector by assuring the possibility for new entrants to penetrate the market , and protecting fundamental rights online.


### (54) very large online platforms may cause societal risks , different in scope and impact from those caused by smaller platforms. once the number of recipients of a platform reaches a significant share of the union population , the systemic risks the platform poses have a disproportionately negative impact in the union. such significant reach should be considered to exist where the number of recipients exceeds an operational threshold set at 45 million , that is , a number equivalent to 10% of the union population. the operational threshold should be kept up to date through amendments enacted by delegated acts , where necessary. such very large online platforms should therefore bear the highest standard of due diligence obligations , proportionate to their societal impact and means. ### (54) very large online platforms may cause societal risks , different in scope and impact from those caused by smaller platforms. once the number of recipients of a platform reaches a significant share of the union population , the systemic risks the platform poses have a disproportionately negative impact in the union. such significant reach should be considered to exist where the number of recipients exceeds an operational threshold set at 45 million , that is , a number equivalent to 10 % of the union population. the operational threshold should be kept up to date through amendments enacted by delegated acts , where necessary , and also take into account the operational threshold of each member state. such very large online platforms should therefore bear the highest standard of due diligence obligations , proportionate to their societal impact and means.


### (54) very large online platforms may cause societal risks , different in scope and impact from those caused by smaller platforms. once the number of recipients of a platform reaches a significant share of the union population , the systemic risks the platform poses have a disproportionately negative impact in the union. such significant reach should be considered to exist where the number of recipients exceeds an operational threshold set at 45 million , that is , a number equivalent to 10% of the union population. the operational threshold should be kept up to date through amendments enacted by delegated acts , where necessary. such very large online platforms should therefore bear the highest standard of due diligence obligations , proportionate to their societal impact and means. ### (54) very large online platforms may cause societal and economic risks , different in scope and impact from those caused by smaller platforms. once the number of recipients of a platform reaches a significant share of the union population , the systemic risks the platform poses have a disproportionately negative socioeconomic impact in the union. such significant reach should be considered to exist where the number of recipients exceeds an operational threshold set at 45 million , that is , a number equivalent to 10% of the union population. the operational threshold should be kept up to date through amendments enacted by delegated acts , where necessary. such very large online platforms should therefore bear the highest standard of due diligence obligations , proportionate to their societal impact and means.


### recommender systems ### recommender and reputation systems


### 7. for each gatekeeper identified pursuant to paragraph 4 or paragraph 6 , the commission shall identify the relevant undertaking to which it belongs and list the relevant core platform services that are provided within that same undertaking and which individually serve as an important gateway for business users to reach end users as referred to in paragraph 1(b). ### 7. for each gatekeeper identified pursuant to paragraph 4 or paragraph 6 , the commission shall , without undue delay and at the latest 60 days after receiving the complete information referred to in paragraph 3 , identify the relevant undertaking to which it belongs and list the relevant core platform services that are provided within that same undertaking and which individually serve as an important gateway for business users to reach end users as referred to in paragraph 1(b).


### 7. for each gatekeeper identified pursuant to paragraph 4 or paragraph 6 , the commission shall identify the relevant undertaking to which it belongs and list the relevant core platform services that are provided within that same undertaking and which individually serve as an important gateway for business users to reach end users as referred to in paragraph 1(b). ### 7. for each gatekeeper pursuant to paragraph 1 or identified pursuant to paragraph 6 , the commission shall identify the relevant undertaking to which it belongs and list the relevant core platform services that are provided within that same undertaking and which individually serve as an important gateway for business users to reach end users as referred to in paragraph 1(b).


### 7. for each gatekeeper identified pursuant to paragraph 4 or paragraph 6 , the commission shall identify the relevant undertaking to which it belongs and list the relevant core platform services that are provided within that same undertaking and which individually serve as an important gateway for business users to reach end users as referred to in paragraph 1(b). ### 7. for each gatekeeper identified pursuant to paragraph 4 or paragraph 6 , the commission shall , within 60 days , identify the relevant undertaking to which it belongs and list the relevant core platform services that are provided within that same undertaking and which individually serve as an important gateway for business users to reach end users as referred to in paragraph 1(b).


### 8. the gatekeeper shall comply with the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6 within six months after a core platform service has been included in the list pursuant to paragraph 7 of this article. ### 8. the gatekeeper shall comply with the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6 as soon as possible , and in any case no later than two months after a core platform service has been included in the list pursuant to paragraph 7 of this article. if a gatekeeper fails to comply with the obligations within these 2 months , articles 25 and 26 are applicable.


### 8. the gatekeeper shall comply with the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6 within six months after a core platform service has been included in the list pursuant to paragraph 7 of this article. ### 8. the gatekeeper shall comply with the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6 , and notify the commission of the terms of its compliance , within six months after a core platform service has been included in the list pursuant to paragraph 7 of this article.


### 8. the gatekeeper shall comply with the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6 within six months after a core platform service has been included in the list pursuant to paragraph 7 of this article. ### 8. the gatekeeper shall comply with the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6 as soon as possible , and in any case no later than two months after a core platform service has been included in the list pursuant to paragraph 7 of this article.


### 8. the gatekeeper shall comply with the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6 within six months after a core platform service has been included in the list pursuant to paragraph 7 of this article. ### 8. the gatekeeper shall comply with the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6 within two months after a core platform service has been included in the list pursuant to paragraph 7 of this article.


### 8. the gatekeeper shall comply with the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6 within six months after a core platform service has been included in the list pursuant to paragraph 7 of this article. ### 8. the gatekeeper shall comply with the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6 within three months after a core platform service has been included in the list pursuant to paragraph 7 of this article.


### 8. the gatekeeper shall comply with the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6 within six months after a core platform service has been included in the list pursuant to paragraph 7 of this article. ### 8. the gatekeeper shall comply with the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6 as soon as possible , and in any case no later than two months after a core platform service has been included in the list pursuant to paragraph 7 of this article. if a gatekeeper fails to comply with the obligations within these 2 months , article 25 and 26 are triggered.


### 2. the commission shall regularly , and at least every 2 years , review whether the designated gatekeepers continue to satisfy the requirements laid down in article 3(1) , or whether new providers of core platform services satisfy those requirements. the regular review shall also examine whether the list of affected core platform services of the gatekeeper needs to be adjusted. ### 2. the commission shall regularly , and at least every 2 years , review whether the designated gatekeepers continue to satisfy the requirements laid down in article 3(1). furthermore , the commission shall regularly , and at least every 12 months , examine whether new providers of core platform services , regardless of their country of establishment , satisfy those requirements. the regular review shall also examine whether the list of affected core platform services of the gatekeeper needs to be adjusted.


### 2. the commission shall regularly , and at least every 2 years , review whether the designated gatekeepers continue to satisfy the requirements laid down in article 3(1) , or whether new providers of core platform services satisfy those requirements. the regular review shall also examine whether the list of affected core platform services of the gatekeeper needs to be adjusted. ### 2. the commission shall regularly , and at least every 4 years , review whether the in line with article 3 (6) designated gatekeepers continue to satisfy the requirements laid down in article 3(1) , and at least every year whether new providers of core platform services satisfy those requirements. the regular review shall also examine whether the list of affected core platform services of the gatekeeper needs to be adjusted. the review shall not have any suspending effect on the obligations.


### 2. the commission shall regularly , and at least every 2 years , review whether the designated gatekeepers continue to satisfy the requirements laid down in article 3(1) , or whether new providers of core platform services satisfy those requirements. the regular review shall also examine whether the list of affected core platform services of the gatekeeper needs to be adjusted. ### 2. the commission shall regularly , and at least every 4 years , review whether the in line with article 3 (6) designated gatekeepers continue to satisfy the requirements laid down in article 3(1) , and at least every year or whether new providers of core platform services satisfy those requirements. the regular review shall also examine whether the list of affected core platform services of the gatekeeper needs to be adjusted. the review shall not have any suspending effect on the obligations.


### 3. the commission shall publish and update the list of gatekeepers and the list of the core platform services for which they need to comply with the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6 on an on-going basis. ### 3. the commission shall publish and update the list of gatekeepers and the list of the core platform services for which they need to comply with the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6 on an on-going basis. to this end , the commission should publish an annual report with findings of their monitoring activities and examinations , which is to be presented in front of and discussed with the european parliament and the union’s member states.


### 3. the commission shall publish and update the list of gatekeepers and the list of the core platform services for which they need to comply with the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6 on an on-going basis. ### 3. the commission shall publish and update the list of gatekeepers and the list of the core platform services for which they need to comply with the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6 on an on-going basis. the commission shall publish an annual report setting out the findings of its monitoring activities and present it to the european parliament and the council of the european union.


### refrain from combining personal data sourced from these core platform services with personal data from any other services offered by the gatekeeper or with personal data from third-party services , and from signing in end users to other services of the gatekeeper in order to combine personal data , unless the end user has been presented with the specific choice and provided consent in the sense of regulation (eu) 2016/679. ; ### not combine personal data sourced from these core platform services with personal data from the same core platform service and any other services offered by the gatekeeper or with personal data from third-party services , and not sign in end users to other services of the gatekeeper;


### refrain from combining personal data sourced from these core platform services with personal data from any other services offered by the gatekeeper or with personal data from third-party services , and from signing in end users to other services of the gatekeeper in order to combine personal data , unless the end user has been presented with the specific choice and provided consent in the sense of regulation (eu) 2016/679. ; ### refrain from combining personal data sourced from these core platform services with personal data from any other services offered by the gatekeeper or with personal data from third-party services , and from signing in end users to other services of the gatekeeper in order to combine personal data , unless the end user has been presented , in a user-friendly and clear manner , with the specific choice , and they have provided their consent. ;


### refrain from combining personal data sourced from these core platform services with personal data from any other services offered by the gatekeeper or with personal data from third-party services , and from signing in end users to other services of the gatekeeper in order to combine personal data , unless the end user has been presented with the specific choice and provided consent in the sense of regulation (eu) 2016/679. ; ### not combine personal data sourced from these core platform services with personal data from other core platform services , any other services offered by the gatekeeper or from third-party services , and not sign in business users and end users to other services of the gatekeeper;


### allow business users to offer the same products or services to end users through third party online intermediation services at prices or conditions that are different from those offered through the online intermediation services of the gatekeeper; ### allow business users to offer the same products or services to end users at prices or conditions that are different from those offered through the online intermediation services of the gatekeeper through any other online services or direct sales channels , with due respect for the business users’ freedom to manage and differentiate the products they offer.


### allow business users to offer the same products or services to end users through third party online intermediation services at prices or conditions that are different from those offered through the online intermediation services of the gatekeeper; ### allow business users to offer the same products or services to end users through third party online intermediation services or its own online services at prices or conditions that are different from those offered through the online intermediation services of the gatekeeper;


### allow business users to offer the same products or services to end users through third party online intermediation services at prices or conditions that are different from those offered through the online intermediation services of the gatekeeper; ### allow business users to offer the same products or services to end users themselves or through third party online intermediation services at prices or conditions that are different from those offered through the online intermediation services of the gatekeeper;


### allow business users to offer the same products or services to end users through third party online intermediation services at prices or conditions that are different from those offered through the online intermediation services of the gatekeeper; ### allow business users to offer the same products or services to end users through third party online intermediation services or through their own direct sales channels at prices or conditions that are different from those offered through the online intermediation services of the gatekeeper;


### allow business users to offer the same products or services to end users through third party online intermediation services at prices or conditions that are different from those offered through the online intermediation services of the gatekeeper; ### allow business users to offer the same products or services to end users through third party online intermediation services or through its own online services or distribution channels at prices or conditions that are different from those offered through the online intermediation services of the gatekeeper;


### allow business users to promote offers to end users acquired via the core platform service , and to conclude contracts with these end users regardless of whether for that purpose they use the core platform services of the gatekeeper or not , and allow end users to access and use , through the core platform services of the gatekeeper , content , subscriptions , features or other items by using the software application of a business user , where these items have been acquired by the end users from the relevant business user without using the core platform services of the gatekeeper; ### allow business users to promote offers to or communicate with end users acquired via the core platform service , and to conclude contracts with these end users regardless of whether for that purpose they use the core platform services of the gatekeeper or not , and allow end users to access and use , through the core platform services of the gatekeeper , content , subscriptions , features or other items by using the software application of a business user , where these items have been acquired by the end users from the relevant business user without using the core platform services of the gatekeeper;


### (1) digital services in general and online platforms in particular play an increasingly important role in the economy , in particular in the internal market , by providing new business opportunities in the union and facilitating cross-border trading. ### (1) digital services in general and online platforms in particular play an increasingly important role in the economy , in particular in the internal market , by providing new business opportunities in the union and facilitating cross-border trading. they serve as essential facilities for the digital economy by providing access to critical infrastructures.


### (1) digital services in general and online platforms in particular play an increasingly important role in the economy , in particular in the internal market , by providing new business opportunities in the union and facilitating cross-border trading. ### (1) digital services in general and online platforms in particular play an increasingly important role in the economy , in particular in the internal market , by providing new business opportunities in the union and facilitating cross-border trading. they serve as essential facilities for the digital economy by providing access to critical infrastructures. furthermore , they could play an important role in safeguarding the freedom and pluralism of the media , including by disseminating news and by facilitating public debate.


### (3) a small number of large providers of core platform services have emerged with considerable economic power. typically , they feature an ability to connect many business users with many end users through their services which , in turn , allows them to leverage their advantages , such as their access to large amounts of data , from one area of their activity to new ones. some of these providers exercise control over whole platform ecosystems in the digital economy and are structurally extremely difficult to challenge or contest by existing or new market operators , irrespective of how innovative and efficient these may be. contestability is particularly reduced due to the existence of very high barriers to entry or exit , including high investment costs , which cannot , or not easily , be recuperated in case of exit , and absence of (or reduced access to) some key inputs in the digital economy , such as data. as a result , the likelihood increases that the underlying markets do not function well – or will soon fail to function well. ### (3) a small number of large providers of core platform services have emerged with considerable economic power. typically , they feature an ability to connect many business users with many end users through their services which , in turn , allows them to leverage their advantages , such as their access to large amounts of data , from one area of their activity to new ones. some of these providers exercise control over whole platform ecosystems in the digital economy and are structurally extremely difficult to challenge or contest by existing or new market operators , irrespective of how innovative and efficient these may be. contestability is particularly reduced due to the existence of very high barriers to entry or exit , including high investment costs , which cannot , or not easily , be recuperated in case of exit , and absence of (or reduced access to) some key inputs in the digital economy , such as data. as a result , the likelihood increases that the underlying markets do not function well – or will soon fail to function well. in addition , there are unjustified advantages for digital platforms in the form of circumvention constructions in the payment of profit taxes and in the employment conditions of platform workers , which further distort competition.


### (4) the combination of those features of gatekeepers is likely to lead in many cases to serious imbalances in bargaining power and , consequently , to unfair practices and conditions for business users as well as end users of core platform services provided by gatekeepers , to the detriment of prices , quality , choice and innovation therein. ### (4) the combination of those features of gatekeepers is likely to lead in many cases to serious imbalances in bargaining power and , consequently , to unfair practices and conditions for business users as well as end users of core platform services provided by gatekeepers , to the detriment of prices , quality , privacy and security standards , choice and innovation therein.


### (4) the combination of those features of gatekeepers is likely to lead in many cases to serious imbalances in bargaining power and , consequently , to unfair practices and conditions for business users as well as end users of core platform services provided by gatekeepers , to the detriment of prices , quality , choice and innovation therein. ### (4) the combination of those features of gatekeepers is likely to lead in many cases to serious imbalances in bargaining power and , consequently , to unfair practices and conditions for business users as well as end users of core platform services provided by gatekeepers , to the detriment of pluralism , prices , quality , choice , fair competition and innovation therein.


### (4) the combination of those features of gatekeepers is likely to lead in many cases to serious imbalances in bargaining power and , consequently , to unfair practices and conditions for business users as well as end users of core platform services provided by gatekeepers , to the detriment of prices , quality , choice and innovation therein. ### (4) the combination of those features of gatekeepers is likely to lead in many cases to serious imbalances in bargaining power and , consequently , to unfair practices and conditions for business users as well as end users of core platform services provided by gatekeepers , to the detriment of prices , quality , privacy , security standards , funding of traditional publishers , choice and innovation therein.


### (6) gatekeepers have a significant impact on the internal market , providing gateways for a large number of business users , to reach end users , everywhere in the union and on different markets. the adverse impact of unfair practices on the internal market and particularly weak contestability of core platform services , including their negative societal and economic implications , have led national legislators and sectoral regulators to act. a number of national regulatory solutions have already been adopted or proposed to address unfair practices and the contestability of digital services or at least with regard to some of them. this has created a risk of divergent regulatory solutions and thereby fragmentation of the internal market , thus raising the risk of increased compliance costs due to different sets of national regulatory requirements. ### (6) gatekeepers have a significant impact on the internal market , providing gateways for a large number of business users , to reach end users , everywhere in the union and on different markets. the adverse impact of unfair practices on the internal market and particularly weak contestability of core platform services , including their negative societal and economic implications , have led national legislators and sectoral regulators to act. a number of regulatory solutions at national level have already been adopted or proposed to address unfair practices and the contestability of digital services or at least with regard to some of them. this has created a risk of divergent regulatory solutions and thereby fragmentation of the internal market , thus raising the risk of increased compliance costs due to different sets of national regulatory requirements.


### (7) therefore , business users and end-users of core platform services provided by gatekeepers should be afforded appropriate regulatory safeguards throughout the union against the unfair behaviour of gatekeepers in order to facilitate cross-border business within the union and thereby improve the proper functioning of the internal market and to address existing or likely emerging fragmentation in the specific areas covered by this regulation. moreover , while gatekeepers tend to adopt global or at least pan-european business models and algorithmic structures , they can adopt , and in some cases have adopted , different business conditions and practices in different member states , which is liable to create disparities between the competitive conditions for the users of core platform services provided by gatekeepers , to the detriment of integration within the internal market. ### (7) therefore , business users and end-users of core platform services provided by gatekeepers should be afforded appropriate regulatory safeguards throughout the union against the unfair behaviour of gatekeepers in order to facilitate cross-border business within the union and thereby improve the proper functioning of the internal market and to address existing or likely emerging fragmentation in the specific areas covered by this regulation , with the inclusion of a clause entitling users to compensation in situations where their rights are infringed. moreover , while gatekeepers tend to adopt global or at least pan-european business models and algorithmic structures , they can adopt , and in some cases have adopted , different business conditions and practices in different member states , which is liable to create disparities between the competitive conditions for the users of core platform services provided by gatekeepers , to the detriment of integration within the internal market.


### (7) therefore , business users and end-users of core platform services provided by gatekeepers should be afforded appropriate regulatory safeguards throughout the union against the unfair behaviour of gatekeepers in order to facilitate cross-border business within the union and thereby improve the proper functioning of the internal market and to address existing or likely emerging fragmentation in the specific areas covered by this regulation. moreover , while gatekeepers tend to adopt global or at least pan-european business models and algorithmic structures , they can adopt , and in some cases have adopted , different business conditions and practices in different member states , which is liable to create disparities between the competitive conditions for the users of core platform services provided by gatekeepers , to the detriment of integration within the internal market. ### (7) therefore , the objective of this regulation is to contribute to the proper functioning of the internal market by laying down rules to ensure contestability and fairness for the digital sector in general and for business users and end-users of core platform services provided by gatekeepers in particular. business users and end-users of core platform services provided by gatekeepers should be afforded appropriate regulatory safeguards throughout the union against the unfair behaviour of gatekeepers in order to facilitate cross-border business within the union and thereby improve the proper functioning of the internal market and to eliminate existing or likely emerging fragmentation in the specific areas covered by this regulation. moreover , while gatekeepers tend to adopt global or at least pan-european business models and algorithmic structures , they can adopt , and in some cases have adopted , different business conditions and practices in different member states , which is liable to create disparities between the competitive conditions for the users of core platform services provided by gatekeepers , to the detriment of integration within the internal market.


### (8) by approximating diverging national laws , obstacles to the freedom to provide and receive services , including retail services , within the internal market should be eliminated. a targeted set of harmonised mandatory rules should therefore be established at union level to ensure contestable and fair digital markets featuring the presence of gatekeepers within the internal market. ### (8) by approximating diverging national laws , obstacles to the freedom to provide and receive services , including retail services , within the internal market should be eliminated. a targeted set of harmonised mandatory rules should therefore be established at union level to ensure fair competition , contestable and fair digital markets featuring the presence of gatekeepers within the internal market.


### (8) by approximating diverging national laws , obstacles to the freedom to provide and receive services , including retail services , within the internal market should be eliminated. a targeted set of harmonised mandatory rules should therefore be established at union level to ensure contestable and fair digital markets featuring the presence of gatekeepers within the internal market. ### (8) by approximating diverging national laws , obstacles to the freedom to provide and receive services , including retail services , within the internal market should be eliminated. a targeted set of harmonised legal obligations should therefore be established at union level to ensure contestable and fair digital markets featuring the presence of gatekeepers within the internal market.


### (9) a fragmentation of the internal market can only be effectively averted if member states are prevented from applying national rules which are specific to the types of undertakings and services covered by this regulation. at the same time , since this regulation aims at complementing the enforcement of competition law , it should be specified that this regulation is without prejudice to articles 101 and 102 tfeu , to the corresponding national competition rules and to other national competition rules regarding unilateral behaviour that are based on an individualised assessment of market positions and behaviour , including its likely effects and the precise scope of the prohibited behaviour , and which provide for the possibility of undertakings to make efficiency and objective justification arguments for the behaviour in question. however , the application of the latter rules should not affect the obligations imposed on gatekeepers under this regulation and their uniform and effective application in the internal market. ### (9) this regulation does not override national competition laws or render them unlawful nor does it preclude member states from imposing identical , similar , stricter or different obligations on undertakings , in order to pursue legitimate public interests , in compliance with union law. those legitimate public interests are inter alia consumer protection , the fight against acts of unfair competition and the protection and fostering of media freedom and pluralism of media or opinion as well as diversity in cultures or in languages. in particular the right of the member states to impose obligations on the undertakings referred to as "gatekeepers" within the meaning of this regulation , but also on other undertakings , which serve to enforce legitimate public interests , remains unaffected , since this regulation aims at complementing the enforcement of competition law , it should be specified that this regulation is without prejudice to articles 101 and 102 tfeu , the corresponding provisions at national level as well as other provisions at national level regarding unilateral behaviour , based on an individualised assessment of market positions and behaviour , including its likely effects and the precise scope of the prohibited behaviour , and which provide for the possibility of undertakings to make efficiency and objective justification arguments for the behaviour in question.


### (9) a fragmentation of the internal market can only be effectively averted if member states are prevented from applying national rules which are specific to the types of undertakings and services covered by this regulation. at the same time , since this regulation aims at complementing the enforcement of competition law , it should be specified that this regulation is without prejudice to articles 101 and 102 tfeu , to the corresponding national competition rules and to other national competition rules regarding unilateral behaviour that are based on an individualised assessment of market positions and behaviour , including its likely effects and the precise scope of the prohibited behaviour , and which provide for the possibility of undertakings to make efficiency and objective justification arguments for the behaviour in question. however , the application of the latter rules should not affect the obligations imposed on gatekeepers under this regulation and their uniform and effective application in the internal market. ### (9) this regulation does not override national competition laws or render them unlawful as well as it does not preclude member states from imposing identical , similar , stricter or different obligations on undertakings , in order to pursue legitimate public interests , in compliance with union law. those legitimate public interests can be , among others , consumer protection , the fight against acts of unfair competition and the protection and fostering of media freedom and pluralism of media or opinion as well as diversity incultures or in languages. in particular the right of the member states to impose obligations on the undertakings referred to as" gatekeepers" within the meaning of this regulation , but also on other undertakings , which serve to enforce legitimate public interests , remains unaffected , since this regulation aims at complementing the enforcement of competition law , it should be specified that this regulation is without prejudice to articles 101 and 102 tfeu , the corresponding provisions at national level as well as other provisions at national level regarding unilateral behaviour , based on an individualised assessment of market positions and behaviour , including its likely effects and the precise scope of the prohibited behaviour , and which provide for the possibility of undertakings to make efficiency and objective justification arguments for the behaviour in question.


### (9) a fragmentation of the internal market can only be effectively averted if member states are prevented from applying national rules which are specific to the types of undertakings and services covered by this regulation. at the same time , since this regulation aims at complementing the enforcement of competition law , it should be specified that this regulation is without prejudice to articles 101 and 102 tfeu , to the corresponding national competition rules and to other national competition rules regarding unilateral behaviour that are based on an individualised assessment of market positions and behaviour , including its likely effects and the precise scope of the prohibited behaviour , and which provide for the possibility of undertakings to make efficiency and objective justification arguments for the behaviour in question. however , the application of the latter rules should not affect the obligations imposed on gatekeepers under this regulation and their uniform and effective application in the internal market. ### (9) a fragmentation of the internal market can only be effectively averted if member states are prevented from applying national rules which are specific to the types of undertakings and services covered by this regulation. at the same time , since this regulation aims at complementing the enforcement of competition law , it should be specified that this regulation is without prejudice to articles 101 and 102 tfeu , to the corresponding national competition rules and to other national competition rules regarding unilateral behaviour that are based on an individualised assessment of market positions and behaviour , including its likely effects and the precise scope of the prohibited behaviour , and which provide for the possibility of undertakings to make efficiency and objective justification arguments for the behaviour in question. however , the application of the latter rules should not affect the obligations and prohibitions imposed on gatekeepers under this regulation and their uniform and effective application in the internal market.


### (10) articles 101 and 102 tfeu and the corresponding national competition rules concerning anticompetitive multilateral and unilateral conduct as well as merger control have as their objective the protection of undistorted competition on the market. this regulation pursues an objective that is complementary to , but different from that of protecting undistorted competition on any given market , as defined in competition-law terms , which is to ensure that markets where gatekeepers are present are and remain contestable and fair , independently from the actual , likely or presumed effects of the conduct of a given gatekeeper covered by this regulation on competition on a given market. this regulation therefore aims at protecting a different legal interest from those rules and should be without prejudice to their application. ### (10) articles 101 and 102 tfeu and the corresponding national competition rules concerning anticompetitive multilateral and unilateral conduct as well as merger control have as their objective the protection of undistorted competition on the market. this regulation pursues an objective that is complementary to , but different from that of protecting undistorted competition on any given market , as defined in competition-law terms , which is to ensure that markets where gatekeepers are present are and remain contestable and fair , and to protect the respective rights of business users and end users , independently from the actual , likely or presumed effects of the conduct of a given gatekeeper covered by this regulation on competition on a given market. this regulation therefore aims at protecting a different legal interest from those rules and should be without prejudice to their application.


### (10) articles 101 and 102 tfeu and the corresponding national competition rules concerning anticompetitive multilateral and unilateral conduct as well as merger control have as their objective the protection of undistorted competition on the market. this regulation pursues an objective that is complementary to , but different from that of protecting undistorted competition on any given market , as defined in competition-law terms , which is to ensure that markets where gatekeepers are present are and remain contestable and fair , independently from the actual , likely or presumed effects of the conduct of a given gatekeeper covered by this regulation on competition on a given market. this regulation therefore aims at protecting a different legal interest from those rules and should be without prejudice to their application. ### (10) articles 101 and 102 tfeu and the corresponding national competition rules concerning anticompetitive multilateral and unilateral conduct as well as merger control have as their objective the protection of undistorted competition on the market. this regulation pursues an objective that is complementary to , but different from that of protecting undistorted competition on any given market , as defined in competition-law terms , which is to ensure that markets where gatekeepers are present are and remain contestable and fair , and the respective rights of business users and end users are protected , independently from the actual , likely or presumed effects of the conduct of a given gatekeeper covered by this regulation on competition on a given market. this regulation therefore aims at protecting a different legal interest from those rules and should be without prejudice to their application.


### (11) this regulation should also complement , without prejudice to their application , the rules resulting from other acts of union law regulating certain aspects of the provision of services covered by this regulation , in particular regulation (eu) 2019/1150 of the european parliament and of the council26 , regulation (eu) xx/xx/eu [dsa] of the european parliament and of the council27 , regulation (eu) 2016/679 of the european parliament and of the council28 , directive (eu) 2019/790 of the european parliament and of the council29 , directive (eu) 2015/2366 of the european parliament and of the council30 , and directive (eu) 2010/13 of the european parliament and of the council31 , as well as national rules aimed at enforcing or , as the case may be , implementing that union legislation. ### (11) this regulation should also complement , without prejudice to their application , the rules resulting from other acts of union law regulating certain aspects of the provision of services covered by this regulation , in particular regulation (eu) 2019/1150 of the european parliament and of the council26 , regulation (eu) xx/xx/eu [dsa] of the european parliament and of the council27 , regulation (eu) 2016/679 of the european parliament and of the council28 , directive (eu) 2019/790 of the european parliament and of the council29 , directive (eu) 2015/2366 of the european parliament and of the council30 , and directive (eu) 2010/13 of the european parliament and of the council31 , as well as rules at national level adopted in accordance with union legislation.


### (12) weak contestability and unfair practices in the digital sector are more frequent and pronounced for certain digital services than for others. this is the case in particular for widespread and commonly used digital services that mostly directly intermediate between business users and end users and where features such as extreme scale economies , very strong network effects , an ability to connect many business users with many end users through the multi-sidedness of these services , lock-in effects , a lack of multi-homing or vertical integration are the most prevalent. often , there is only one or very few large providers of those digital services. these providers of core platform services have emerged most frequently as gatekeepers for business users and end users with far-reaching impacts , gaining the ability to easily set commercial conditions and terms in a unilateral and detrimental manner for their business users and end users. accordingly , it is necessary to focus only on those digital services that are most broadly used by business users and end users and where , based on current market conditions , concerns about weak contestability and unfair practices by gatekeepers are more apparent and pressing from an internal market perspective. ### (12) weak contestability and unfair practices in the digital sector are more frequent and pronounced for certain digital services than for others. this is the case in particular for widespread and commonly used digital services that mostly directly intermediate between business users and end users and where features such as extreme scale economies , very strong network effects , an ability to connect many business users with many end users through the multi-sidedness of these services , lock-in effects , a lack of multi-homing or vertical integration are the most prevalent. often , there is only one or very few large providers of those digital services. these providers of core platform services have emerged most frequently as gatekeepers for business users and end users with far-reaching impacts , gaining the ability to easily set commercial conditions and terms in a unilateral and detrimental manner for their business users and end users. accordingly , it is necessary to focus only on those digital services that are most broadly used by business users and end users and where , concerns about weak contestability and unfair practices by gatekeepers are more apparent and pressing from an internal market perspective.


### (12) weak contestability and unfair practices in the digital sector are more frequent and pronounced for certain digital services than for others. this is the case in particular for widespread and commonly used digital services that mostly directly intermediate between business users and end users and where features such as extreme scale economies , very strong network effects , an ability to connect many business users with many end users through the multi-sidedness of these services , lock-in effects , a lack of multi-homing or vertical integration are the most prevalent. often , there is only one or very few large providers of those digital services. these providers of core platform services have emerged most frequently as gatekeepers for business users and end users with far-reaching impacts , gaining the ability to easily set commercial conditions and terms in a unilateral and detrimental manner for their business users and end users. accordingly , it is necessary to focus only on those digital services that are most broadly used by business users and end users and where , based on current market conditions , concerns about weak contestability and unfair practices by gatekeepers are more apparent and pressing from an internal market perspective. ### (12) weak contestability and unfair practices in the digital sector are more frequent and pronounced in certain digital services than others. this is the case in particular for widespread and commonly used digital services that mostly directly intermediate between business users and end users and where features such as extreme scale economies , very strong network effects , an ability to connect many business users with many end users through the multi-sidedness of these services , lock-in effects , a lack of multi-homing or vertical integration are the most prevalent. often , there is only one or very few large providers of those digital services. these providers of core platform services have emerged most frequently as gatekeepers for business users and end users with far-reaching impacts , gaining the ability to easily set commercial conditions and terms in a unilateral and detrimental manner for their business users and end users , especially in the banking and health sectors. accordingly , it is necessary to focus only on those digital services that are most broadly used by business users and end users and where , based on current market conditions , concerns about weak contestability and unfair practices by gatekeepers are more apparent and pressing from an internal market perspective.


### (13) in particular , online intermediation services , online search engines , operating systems , online social networking , video sharing platform services , number-independent interpersonal communication services , cloud computing services and online advertising services all have the capacity to affect a large number of end users and businesses alike , which entails a risk of unfair business practices. they therefore should be included in the definition of core platform services and fall into the scope of this regulation. online intermediation services may also be active in the field of financial services , and they may intermediate or be used to provide such services as listed non-exhaustively in annex ii to directive (eu) 2015/1535 of the european parliament and of the council32 . in certain circumstances , the notion of end users should encompass users that are traditionally considered business users , but in a given situation do not use the core platform services to provide goods or services to other end users , such as for example businesses relying on cloud computing services for their own purposes. ### (13) in particular , online intermediation services , online search engines , operating systems , (including , inter alia , smart tvs and iptvs) , digital voice assistants and platforms that use integrated voice assistant technologies , mobile payment services , web-browsers , online social networking , video sharing platform services , video and audio on demand services , number-independent interpersonal communication services , digital services which allow the creation of , processing of , accessing or storage of data in digital form , including software as a service such as cloud computing services , meaning an electronic platform or a cloud storage facility , that the consumer selects for receiving or storing the digital content or digital service and online advertising services all have the capacity to affect a large number of end users and businesses alike , which entails a risk of unfair business practices. they therefore should be stated as example of core platform services and fall into the scope of this regulation. this is without prejudice to the inclusion of other categories of digital services into the scope of the regulation. the fact that weak contestability and unfair practices in the digital sector are more frequent and pronounced in certain digital services than in others does not imply that other categories of services are exempt from it. the core platform services falling under the scope of this regulation should therefore not be limited to certain types of services. online intermediation services may also be active in the field of financial services , and they may intermediate or be used to provide such services as listed non-exhaustively in annex ii to directive (eu) 2015/1535 of the european parliament and of the council32 . in certain circumstances , the notion of end users should encompass users that are traditionally considered business users , but in a given situation do not use the core platform services to provide goods or services to other end users , such as for example businesses relying on cloud computing services for their own purposes.


### (13) in particular , online intermediation services , online search engines , operating systems , online social networking , video sharing platform services , number-independent interpersonal communication services , cloud computing services and online advertising services all have the capacity to affect a large number of end users and businesses alike , which entails a risk of unfair business practices. they therefore should be included in the definition of core platform services and fall into the scope of this regulation. online intermediation services may also be active in the field of financial services , and they may intermediate or be used to provide such services as listed non-exhaustively in annex ii to directive (eu) 2015/1535 of the european parliament and of the council32 . in certain circumstances , the notion of end users should encompass users that are traditionally considered business users , but in a given situation do not use the core platform services to provide goods or services to other end users , such as for example businesses relying on cloud computing services for their own purposes. ### (13) in particular , online intermediation services , online search engines , operating systems , online social networking , video sharing platform services , number-independent interpersonal communication services , cloud computing services , online advertising services , web browsers and virtual assistants all have the capacity to affect a large number of end users and businesses alike , which entails a risk of unfair business practices. they therefore should be included in the definition of core platform services and fall into the scope of this regulation. the fact that weak contestability and unfair practices in the digital sector are more frequent and pronounced in certain digital services than in others does not imply that other categories of services are exempt from it. the core platform services falling under the scope of this regulation should therefore not be limited to certain types of services. online intermediation services may also be active in the field of financial services , and they may intermediate or be used to provide such services as listed non-exhaustively in annex ii to directive (eu) 2015/1535 of the european parliament and of the council32 . in certain circumstances , the notion of end users should encompass users that are traditionally considered business users , but in a given situation do not use the core platform services to provide goods or services to other end users , such as for example businesses relying on cloud computing services for their own purposes.


### (13) in particular , online intermediation services , online search engines , operating systems , online social networking , video sharing platform services , number-independent interpersonal communication services , cloud computing services and online advertising services all have the capacity to affect a large number of end users and businesses alike , which entails a risk of unfair business practices. they therefore should be included in the definition of core platform services and fall into the scope of this regulation. online intermediation services may also be active in the field of financial services , and they may intermediate or be used to provide such services as listed non-exhaustively in annex ii to directive (eu) 2015/1535 of the european parliament and of the council32 . in certain circumstances , the notion of end users should encompass users that are traditionally considered business users , but in a given situation do not use the core platform services to provide goods or services to other end users , such as for example businesses relying on cloud computing services for their own purposes. ### (13) in particular , online intermediation services , online social networking , number-independent interpersonal communication services , online search engines , operating systems , web browsers , online advertising services , cloud computing services , mobile payment services , digital voice assistants , platforms using integrated voice assistant technologies , video sharing platform services and online on-demand audiovisual media services and audio media services all have the capacity to affect a large number of end users and businesses alike , which entails a risk of unfair business practices. they therefore should be included in the definition of core platform services and fall into the scope of this regulation. online intermediation services may also be active in the field of financial services , and they may intermediate or be used to provide such services as listed non-exhaustively in annex ii to directive (eu) 2015/1535 of the european parliament and of the council32 . in certain circumstances , the notion of end users should encompass users that are traditionally considered business users , but in a given situation do not use the core platform services to provide goods or services to other end users , such as for example businesses relying on cloud computing services for their own purposes.


### (14) a number of other ancillary services , such as identification or payment services and technical services which support the provision of payment services , may be provided by gatekeepers together with their core platform services. as gatekeepers frequently provide the portfolio of their services as part of an integrated ecosystem to which third-party providers of such ancillary services do not have access , at least not subject to equal conditions , and can link the access to the core platform service to take-up of one or more ancillary services , the gatekeepers are likely to have an increased ability and incentive to leverage their gatekeeper power from their core platform services to these ancillary services , to the detriment of choice and contestability of these services. ### (14) a number of other ancillary services , such as identification or payment services (which depending on their function can act either as core service or as ancillary service) and technical services which support the provision of payment services , may be provided by gatekeepers together with their core platform services. as gatekeepers frequently provide the portfolio of their services as part of an integrated ecosystem to which third-party providers of such ancillary services do not have access , at least not subject to equal conditions , and can link the access to the core platform service to take-up of one or more ancillary services , the gatekeepers are likely to have an increased ability and incentive to leverage their gatekeeper power from their core platform services to these ancillary services , to the detriment of choice and contestability of these services.


### (15) the fact that a digital service qualifies as a core platform service in light of its widespread and common use and its importance for connecting business users and end users does not as such give rise to sufficiently serious concerns of contestability and unfair practices. it is only when a core platform service constitutes an important gateway and is operated by a provider with a significant impact in the internal market and an entrenched and durable position , or by a provider that will foreseeably have such a position in the near future , that such concerns arise. accordingly , the targeted set of harmonised rules laid down in this regulation should apply only to undertakings designated on the basis of these three objective criteria , and they should only apply to those of their core platform services that individually constitute an important gateway for business users to reach end users. ### (15) the fact that a digital service qualifies as a core platform service in light of its widespread and common use and its importance for connecting business users and end users does not as such give rise to sufficiently serious concerns of contestability and unfair practices. it is only when a core platform service constitutes an important gateway and is operated by a provider with a significant impact in the internal market and an entrenched and durable position , or by a provider that will foreseeably have such a position in the near future , that such concerns arise. accordingly , the targeted set of harmonised rules laid down in this regulation should apply only to undertakings that fulfill these three objective criteria or are designated on the basis of those , and they should only apply to those of their core platform services that individually constitute an important gateway for business users to reach end users.


### (15) the fact that a digital service qualifies as a core platform service in light of its widespread and common use and its importance for connecting business users and end users does not as such give rise to sufficiently serious concerns of contestability and unfair practices. it is only when a core platform service constitutes an important gateway and is operated by a provider with a significant impact in the internal market and an entrenched and durable position , or by a provider that will foreseeably have such a position in the near future , that such concerns arise. accordingly , the targeted set of harmonised rules laid down in this regulation should apply only to undertakings designated on the basis of these three objective criteria , and they should only apply to those of their core platform services that individually constitute an important gateway for business users to reach end users. ### (15) the fact that a digital service qualifies as acore platform service in light of its widespread and common use or its importance for connecting business users and end users , does not , as such , give rise to sufficiently serious concerns of contestability and unfair practices. it is only when a core platform service constitutes an important gateway , is operated by a provider with a significant impact in the internal market and an entrenched and durable position , or by a provider that will foreseeably have such a position in the near future , that such concerns arise. accordingly , the targeted set of harmonised rules laid down in this regulation should only apply to undertakings designated on the basis of these three objective criteria , and to those of their core platform services that individually constitute an important gateway for business users to reach end users.


### (57) in particular gatekeepers which provide access to software application stores serve as an important gateway for business users that seek to reach end users. in view of the imbalance in bargaining power between those gatekeepers and business users of their software application stores , those gatekeepers should not be allowed to impose general conditions , including pricing conditions , that would be unfair or lead to unjustified differentiation. pricing or other general access conditions should be considered unfair if they lead to an imbalance of rights and obligations imposed on business users or confer an advantage on the gatekeeper which is disproportionate to the service provided by the gatekeeper to business users or lead to a disadvantage for business users in providing the same or similar services as the gatekeeper. the following benchmarks can serve as a yardstick to determine the fairness of general access conditions: prices charged or conditions imposed for the same or similar services by other providers of software application stores; prices charged or conditions imposed by the provider of the software application store for different related or similar services or to different types of end users; prices charged or conditions imposed by the provider of the software application store for the same service in different geographic regions; prices charged or conditions imposed by the provider of the software application store for the same service the gatekeeper offers to itself. this obligation should not establish an access right and it should be without prejudice to the ability of providers of software application stores to take the required responsibility in the fight against illegal and unwanted content as set out in regulation [digital services act]. ### (57) in particular gatekeepers which provide access to software application stores serve as an important gateway for business users that seek to reach end users. in view of the imbalance in bargaining power between those gatekeepers and business users of their software application stores , those gatekeepers should not be allowed to impose general conditions , including pricing conditions , that would be unfair or lead to unjustified differentiation. pricing or other general access or treatment conditions should be considered unfair if they lead to an imbalance of rights and obligations imposed on business users or confer an advantage on the gatekeeper which is disproportionate to the service provided by the gatekeeper to business users or lead to a disadvantage for business users in providing the same or similar services as the gatekeeper. the following benchmarks can serve as a yardstick to determine the fairness of general access conditions: prices charged or conditions imposed for the same or similar services by other providers of software application stores; prices charged or conditions imposed by the provider of the software application store for different related or similar services or to different types of end users; prices charged or conditions imposed by the provider of the software application store for the same service in different geographic regions; prices charged or conditions imposed by the provider of the software application store for the same service the gatekeeper offers to itself. this obligation should not establish an access right and it should be without prejudice to the ability of providers of software application stores to take the required responsibility in the fight against illegal and unwanted content as set out in regulation [digital services act].


### 7. a gatekeeper may request the opening of proceedings pursuant to article 18 for the commission to determine whether the measures that the gatekeeper intends to implement or has implemented under article 6 are effective in achieving the objective of the relevant obligation in the specific circumstances. a gatekeeper may , with its request , provide a reasoned submission to explain in particular why the measures that it intends to implement or has implemented are effective in achieving the objective of the relevant obligation in the specific circumstances. ### 7. a gatekeeper may request within the implementation deadline of article 3 paragraph 8the opening of proceedings pursuant to article 18 for the commission to determine whether the measures that the gatekeeper intends to implement or has implemented under article 6 are effective in achieving the objective of the relevant obligation in the specific circumstances. a gatekeeper may , with its request , provide a reasoned submission to explain in particular why the measures that it intends to implement or has implemented are effective in achieving the objective of the relevant obligation in the specific circumstances. the commission shall adopt its decision within six months from the opening of proceedings pursuant to article 18.


### 7. a gatekeeper may request the opening of proceedings pursuant to article 18 for the commission to determine whether the measures that the gatekeeper intends to implement or has implemented under article 6 are effective in achieving the objective of the relevant obligation in the specific circumstances. a gatekeeper may , with its request , provide a reasoned submission to explain in particular why the measures that it intends to implement or has implemented are effective in achieving the objective of the relevant obligation in the specific circumstances. ### 7. a gatekeeper may , prior to the expiration of the deadline in article 3(8) , request the opening of proceedings pursuant to article 18 for the commission to determine whether the measures that the gatekeeper intends to implement or has implemented under article 6 are effective in achieving the objective of the relevant obligation in the specific circumstances. a gatekeeper may , with its request , provide a reasoned submission to explain in particular why the measures that it intends to implement or has implemented are effective in achieving the objective of the relevant obligation in the specific circumstances. the commission shall adopt its decision within six months from the opening of proceedings pursuant to article 18.


### 7. a gatekeeper may request the opening of proceedings pursuant to article 18 for the commission to determine whether the measures that the gatekeeper intends to implement or has implemented under article 6 are effective in achieving the objective of the relevant obligation in the specific circumstances. a gatekeeper may , with its request , provide a reasoned submission to explain in particular why the measures that it intends to implement or has implemented are effective in achieving the objective of the relevant obligation in the specific circumstances. ### 7. a gatekeeper may , within the deadline set in article 3(8) , request the opening of proceedings pursuant to article 18 for the commission to determine whether the measures that the gatekeeper intends to implement or has implemented under article 6 are effective in achieving the objective of the relevant obligation in the specific circumstances. a gatekeeper may , with its request , provide a reasoned submission to explain in particular why the measures that it intends to implement or has implemented are effective in achieving the objective of the relevant obligation in the specific circumstances. the commission shall adopt its decision within six months from the opening of proceedings pursuant to article 18. if in its decision the commission finds the gatekeeper is non-compliant under article 25 and a decision under article 26 is taken , the non-compliance period is considered to have commenced from the implementation deadline in article 3(8).


### 7. a gatekeeper may request the opening of proceedings pursuant to article 18 for the commission to determine whether the measures that the gatekeeper intends to implement or has implemented under article 6 are effective in achieving the objective of the relevant obligation in the specific circumstances. a gatekeeper may , with its request , provide a reasoned submission to explain in particular why the measures that it intends to implement or has implemented are effective in achieving the objective of the relevant obligation in the specific circumstances. ### 7. a gatekeeper may request within the implementation deadline of article 3(8) the opening of proceedings pursuant to article 18 for the commission to determine whether the measures that the gatekeeper intends to implement or has implemented under article 6 are effective in achieving the objective of the relevant obligation in the specific circumstances. a gatekeeper may , with its request , provide a reasoned submission to explain in particular why the measures that it intends to implement or has implemented are effective in achieving the objective of the relevant obligation in the specific circumstances. the commission shall adopt its decision within six months from the opening of proceedings pursuant to article 18.


### 1. the commission may , on a reasoned request by the gatekeeper , exceptionally suspend , in whole or in part , a specific obligation laid down in articles 5 and 6 for a core platform service by decision adopted in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in article 32(4) , where the gatekeeper demonstrates that compliance with that specific obligation would endanger , due to exceptional circumstances beyond the control of the gatekeeper , the economic viability of the operation of the gatekeeper in the union , and only to the extent necessary to address such threat to its viability. the commission shall aim to adopt the suspension decision without delay and at the latest 3 months following receipt of a complete reasoned request. ### 1. the commission may , on a reasoned request by the gatekeeper , exceptionally suspend , in whole or in part , a specific obligation laid down in articles 5 and 6 for a core platform service by decision adopted in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in article 32(4) , where the gatekeeper demonstrates that compliance with that specific obligation would endanger , due to exceptional circumstances beyond the control of the gatekeeper , the economic viability of the operation of the gatekeeper in the union , and only to the extent necessary to address such threat to its viability. the commission shall aim to adopt the suspension decision without delay and at the latest 3 months following receipt of a complete reasoned request and accompany this by a reasoned statement explaining the grounds for the suspension.


### 1. the commission may , acting on a reasoned request by a gatekeeper or on its own initiative , by decision adopted in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in article 32(4) , exempt it , in whole or in part , from a specific obligation laid down in articles 5 and 6 in relation to an individual core platform service identified pursuant to article 3(7) , where such exemption is justified on the grounds set out in paragraph 2 of this article. the commission shall adopt the exemption decision at the latest 3 months after receiving a complete reasoned request. ### 1. the commission may , acting on a reasoned request by a gatekeeper or on its own initiative , by decision adopted in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in article 32(4) , exempt it , in whole or in part , from a specific obligation laid down in articles 5 and 6 in relation to an individual core platform service identified pursuant to article 3(7) , where such exemption is justified on the grounds set out in paragraph 2 of this article. the commission shall adopt the exemption decision at the latest 3 months after receiving a complete reasoned request and accompany by a reasoned statement explaining the grounds for the suspension.


### 1. the commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with article 34 to update the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6 where , based on a market investigation pursuant to article 17 , it has identified the need for new obligations addressing practices that limit the contestability of core platform services or are unfair in the same way as the practices addressed by the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6. ### 1. the commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with article 34 to update the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6 where , based on a market investigation pursuant to article 17 , it has identified the need for new additional obligations addressing practices that limit the contestability of core platform services or are unfair in the same way as the practices addressed by the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6. suchan update should only enable the commission to add new obligations or prohibitions to this regulation but not to eliminate current obligations or prohibitions.


### 1. the commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with article 34 to update the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6 where , based on a market investigation pursuant to article 17 , it has identified the need for new obligations addressing practices that limit the contestability of core platform services or are unfair in the same way as the practices addressed by the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6. ### 1. the commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with article 34 to update and strengthen the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6 where , based on a market investigation pursuant to article 17 , it has identified the need for new obligations addressing practices that limit the contestability of core platform services or are unfair in the same way as the practices addressed by the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6.


### there is an imbalance of rights and obligations on business users and the gatekeeper is obtaining an advantage from business users that is disproportionate to the service provided by the gatekeeper to business users; or ### there is an imbalance of rights and obligations on business users and the gatekeeper is obtaining an advantage from business users that is disproportionate to the service provided by the gatekeeper to business users or end users; or


### there is an imbalance of rights and obligations on business users and the gatekeeper is obtaining an advantage from business users that is disproportionate to the service provided by the gatekeeper to business users; or ### there is an imbalance of rights and obligations on end-users or business users and the gatekeeper is obtaining an advantage from end-users or business users that is disproportionate to the service provided by the gatekeeper to end-users or business users; or


### there is an imbalance of rights and obligations on business users and the gatekeeper is obtaining an advantage from business users that is disproportionate to the service provided by the gatekeeper to business users; or ### there is an imbalance of rights and obligations on business users or end users and the gatekeeper is obtaining an advantage from business users that is disproportionate to the service provided by the gatekeeper to business users or end users; or


### 1. a gatekeeper shall ensure that the obligations of articles 5 and 6 are fully and effectively complied with. while the obligations of articles 5 and 6 apply in respect of core platform services designated pursuant to article 3 , their implementation shall not be undermined by any behaviour of the undertaking to which the gatekeeper belongs , regardless of whether this behaviour is of a contractual , commercial , technical or any other nature. ### 1. a gatekeeper shall ensure that the obligations of articles 5 and 6 are fully and effectively complied with by the gatekeeper themselves as well as undertakings which they belong. while the obligations of articles 5 and 6 apply in respect of core platform services designated pursuant to article 3 , their implementation shall not be undermined by any behaviour of the undertaking to which the gatekeeper belongs , regardless of whether this behaviour is of a contractual , commercial , technical or any other nature.