### 1. a gatekeeper shall ensure that the obligations of articles 5 and 6 are fully and effectively complied with. while the obligations of articles 5 and 6 apply in respect of core platform services designated pursuant to article 3 , their implementation shall not be undermined by any behaviour of the undertaking to which the gatekeeper belongs , regardless of whether this behaviour is of a contractual , commercial , technical or any other nature. ### 1. a gatekeeper shall ensure that the obligations of articles 5 and 6 are fully and effectively complied with. while the obligations of articles 5 and 6 apply in respect of core platform services designated pursuant to article 3 , their implementation shall not be undermined by any behaviour of the gatekeeper itself or of any third party belonging to the same undertaking , regardless of whether this behaviour is of a contractual , commercial , technical or any other nature.


### 1. a gatekeeper shall ensure that the obligations of articles 5 and 6 are fully and effectively complied with. while the obligations of articles 5 and 6 apply in respect of core platform services designated pursuant to article 3 , their implementation shall not be undermined by any behaviour of the undertaking to which the gatekeeper belongs , regardless of whether this behaviour is of a contractual , commercial , technical or any other nature. ### 1. a gatekeeper shall ensure that the obligations of articles 5 and 6 are fully and effectively complied with by the gatekeeper itself as well as by undertakings to which it belongs. while the obligations of articles 5 and 6 apply in respect of core platform services designated pursuant to article 3 , their implementation shall not be undermined by any behaviour of the undertaking to which the gatekeeper belongs , shall not engage in any behaviour regardless of whether this behaviour is of a contractual , commercial , technical or any other nature , which is able to have an equivalent object or effect to a behaviour prohibited pursuant to articles 5 and 6.


### 2. where consent for collecting and processing of personal data is required to ensure compliance with this regulation , a gatekeeper shall take the necessary steps to either enable business users to directly obtain the required consent to their processing , where required under regulation (eu) 2016/679 and directive 2002/58/ec , or to comply with union data protection and privacy rules and principles in other ways including by providing business users with duly anonymised data where appropriate. the gatekeeper shall not make the obtaining of this consent by the business user more burdensome than for its own services. ### 2. where consent for collecting and processing of personal data is required to ensure compliance with this regulation , a gatekeeper shall take the necessary steps to either enable business users to directly obtain the required consent to their processing , where required under regulation (eu) 2016/679 and directive 2002/58/ec , or to comply with union data protection and privacy rules and principles in other ways including by providing business users with duly anonymised data where appropriate. the gatekeeper shall not make the obtaining of this consent by the business user more burdensome than for its own services. where consent is directly expressed by the end-user at the level of the services or products offered by the business user through the relevant core platform service , it shall prevail over any consent provided at the gatekeeper level.


### 2. where consent for collecting and processing of personal data is required to ensure compliance with this regulation , a gatekeeper shall take the necessary steps to either enable business users to directly obtain the required consent to their processing , where required under regulation (eu) 2016/679 and directive 2002/58/ec , or to comply with union data protection and privacy rules and principles in other ways including by providing business users with duly anonymised data where appropriate. the gatekeeper shall not make the obtaining of this consent by the business user more burdensome than for its own services. ### 2. where consent for collecting and processing of personal data is required to ensure compliance with this regulation , a gatekeeper shall take the necessary steps to either enable business users to directly obtain at the level of their own services or products , the required consent to their processing , where required under regulation (eu) 2016/679 and directive 2002/58/ec , or to comply with union data protection and privacy rules and principles in other ways including by providing business users with duly anonymised data where appropriate. the gatekeeper shall not make the obtaining of this consent by the business user more burdensome than for its own services.


### 2. where consent for collecting and processing of personal data is required to ensure compliance with this regulation , a gatekeeper shall take the necessary steps to either enable business users to directly obtain the required consent to their processing , where required under regulation (eu) 2016/679 and directive 2002/58/ec , or to comply with union data protection and privacy rules and principles in other ways including by providing business users with duly anonymised data where appropriate. the gatekeeper shall not make the obtaining of this consent by the business user more burdensome than for its own services. ### 2. where consent for collecting and processing of personal data is required to ensure compliance with this regulation , a gatekeeper shall take the necessary steps to either enable business users to directly obtain the required consent to their processing , where required under regulation (eu) 2016/679 and directive 2002/58/ec , or , if the consent is not obtained , to comply with union data protection and privacy rules and principles in other ways including by providing business users with duly anonymised data. the gatekeeper shall not make the obtaining of this consent by the business user more burdensome than for its own services.


### 2. where consent for collecting and processing of personal data is required to ensure compliance with this regulation , a gatekeeper shall take the necessary steps to either enable business users to directly obtain the required consent to their processing , where required under regulation (eu) 2016/679 and directive 2002/58/ec , or to comply with union data protection and privacy rules and principles in other ways including by providing business users with duly anonymised data where appropriate. the gatekeeper shall not make the obtaining of this consent by the business user more burdensome than for its own services. ### 2. where consent for collecting , processing and sharing of personal data is required to ensure compliance with this regulation , a gatekeeper shall take the necessary steps to either enable business users to directly obtain the required consent to their processing , where required under regulation (eu) 2016/679 and directive 2002/58/ec , or to comply with union data protection and privacy rules and principles in other ways including by providing business users with duly anonymised data. the gatekeeper shall not make the obtaining of this consent by the business user more burdensome than for its own services.


### 2. where consent for collecting and processing of personal data is required to ensure compliance with this regulation , a gatekeeper shall take the necessary steps to either enable business users to directly obtain the required consent to their processing , where required under regulation (eu) 2016/679 and directive 2002/58/ec , or to comply with union data protection and privacy rules and principles in other ways including by providing business users with duly anonymised data where appropriate. the gatekeeper shall not make the obtaining of this consent by the business user more burdensome than for its own services. ### 2. where consent for collecting and processing of personal data is required to ensure compliance with this regulation , a gatekeeper shall take the necessary steps to either enable business users to directly obtain the required consent to their processing , where required under regulation (eu) 2016/679 and directive 2002/58/ec , and to comply with union data protection and privacy rules and principles in other ways including by providing business users with duly anonymised data where appropriate. the gatekeeper shall not make the obtaining of this consent by the business user more burdensome than for its own services.


### 2. where consent for collecting and processing of personal data is required to ensure compliance with this regulation , a gatekeeper shall take the necessary steps to either enable business users to directly obtain the required consent to their processing , where required under regulation (eu) 2016/679 and directive 2002/58/ec , or to comply with union data protection and privacy rules and principles in other ways including by providing business users with duly anonymised data where appropriate. the gatekeeper shall not make the obtaining of this consent by the business user more burdensome than for its own services. ### 2. where consent for collecting , processing and sharing of personal data is required to ensure compliance with this regulation , a gatekeeper shall take the necessary steps to either enable business users to directly obtain the required consent to their processing , where required under regulation (eu) 2016/679 and directive 2002/58/ec , or to comply with union data protection and privacy rules and principles in other ways including by providing business users with duly anonymised data. the gatekeeper shall not make the obtaining of this consent by the business user more burdensome than for its own services , and shall offer users a choice in a neutral way , safeguarding the autonomous decision-making of business users or end users via form , function or operation of the user interface.


### 2. where consent for collecting and processing of personal data is required to ensure compliance with this regulation , a gatekeeper shall take the necessary steps to either enable business users to directly obtain the required consent to their processing , where required under regulation (eu) 2016/679 and directive 2002/58/ec , or to comply with union data protection and privacy rules and principles in other ways including by providing business users with duly anonymised data where appropriate. the gatekeeper shall not make the obtaining of this consent by the business user more burdensome than for its own services. ### 2. where consent for collecting , processing or sharing of personal data is required to ensure compliance with this regulation , a gatekeeper shall take the necessary steps to either enable business users to directly obtain the required consent to their processing and retrieval , where required under regulation (eu) 2016/679 and directive 2002/58/ec , or , if such consent is not obtained , to comply with union data protection and privacy rules and principles in other ways including by providing business users with duly anonymised data. the gatekeeper shall not make the obtaining of this consent by the business user more burdensome than for its own services.


### 3. a gatekeeper shall not degrade the conditions or quality of any of the core platform services provided to business users or end users who avail themselves of the rights or choices laid down in articles 5 and 6 , or make the exercise of those rights or choices unduly difficult. ### 3. a gatekeeper shall not degrade the conditions or quality of any of the core platform services provided to business users or end users who avail themselves of the rights or choices laid down in articles 5 and 6 , or make the exercise of those rights or choices unduly difficult , including through the use of “dark patterns” or manipulative choice architecturs.


### 3. a gatekeeper shall not degrade the conditions or quality of any of the core platform services provided to business users or end users who avail themselves of the rights or choices laid down in articles 5 and 6 , or make the exercise of those rights or choices unduly difficult. ### 3. a gatekeeper shall not degrade the conditions or quality of any of the core platform services provided to business users or end users who avail themselves of the rights or choices laid down in articles 5 and 6 , or make the exercise of those rights or choices unduly difficult , including through the use of “dark patterns” or manipulative choice architectures.


### obligation to inform about concentrations ### concentrations


### 12 obligation to inform about concentrations ### 12 concentrations


### 1. a gatekeeper shall inform the commission of any intended concentration within the meaning of article 3 of regulation (ec) no 139/2004 involving another provider of core platform services or of any other services provided in the digital sector irrespective of whether it is notifiable to a union competition authority under regulation (ec) no 139/2004 or to a competent national competition authority under national merger rules. ### 1. a gatekeeper shall notify the commission of any intended concentration within the meaning of article 3 of regulation (ec) no 139/2004 irrespective of whether it is notifiable to a union competition authority under regulation (ec) no 139/2004 or to a competent national competition authority under national merger rules.


### 1. a gatekeeper shall inform the commission of any intended concentration within the meaning of article 3 of regulation (ec) no 139/2004 involving another provider of core platform services or of any other services provided in the digital sector irrespective of whether it is notifiable to a union competition authority under regulation (ec) no 139/2004 or to a competent national competition authority under national merger rules. ### 1. a gatekeeper shall notify to the commission any intended concentration within the meaning of article 3 of regulation (ec) no 139/2004 or any agreement or series of agreements having a substantially similar effect , irrespective of whether it is notifiable to a union competition authority under regulation (ec) no 139/2004 or to a competent national competition authority under national merger rules.


### a gatekeeper shall inform the commission of such a concentration prior to its implementation and following the conclusion of the agreement , the announcement of the public bid , or the acquisition of a controlling interest. ### a gatekeeper shall inform the commission of such a concentration prior to its implementation and following the conclusion of the agreement , the announcement of the public bid , or the acquisition of a controlling interest.


### a gatekeeper shall inform the commission of such a concentration prior to its implementation and following the conclusion of the agreement , the announcement of the public bid , or the acquisition of a controlling interest. ### a gatekeeper shall notify the commission of such a concentration prior to its implementation and following the conclusion of the agreement , the announcement of the public bid , or the acquisition of a controlling interest , in accordance with the procedure set out in regulation (ec) no 139/2004.


### a gatekeeper shall inform the commission of such a concentration prior to its implementation and following the conclusion of the agreement , the announcement of the public bid , or the acquisition of a controlling interest. ### a gatekeeper shall notify to the commission such a concentration prior to its implementation and following the conclusion of the agreement , the announcement of the public bid , or the acquisition of a controlling interest , in accordance with the procedure set out in regulation (ec) no 139/2004.


### 2. the notification pursuant to paragraph 1 shall at least describe for the acquisition targets their eea and worldwide annual turnover , for any relevant core platform services their respective eea annual turnover , their number of yearly active business users and the number of monthly active end users , as well as the rationale of the intended concentration. ### 2. the notification pursuant to paragraph 1 shall at least describe for the acquisition targets their eea and worldwide annual turnover , for any relevant core platform services their respective eea annual turnover , their number of yearly active business users and the number of monthly active end users , as well as the rationale of the intended concentration , and its potential impact on the rights and interests of business users and end users.


### within six months after its designation pursuant to article 3 , a gatekeeper shall submit to the commission an independently audited description of any techniques for profiling of consumers that the gatekeeper applies to or across its core platform services identified pursuant to article 3. this description shall be updated at least annually. ### within six months after its designation pursuant to article 3 , a gatekeeper shall submit to the commission an independently audited description of any techniques for profiling of consumers that the gatekeeper applies to or across its core platform services identified pursuant to article 3. this description shall be updated at least annually. the description shall also include information on whether users are shown different prices depending on individual (as defined in directive 2011/83/eu , art 6(1) ii) ea)) or target group-specific factors , in particular devices used and geographical locations. where applicable , the platform shall make reference to these factors in a clearly visible manner.


### within six months after its designation pursuant to article 3 , a gatekeeper shall submit to the commission an independently audited description of any techniques for profiling of consumers that the gatekeeper applies to or across its core platform services identified pursuant to article 3. this description shall be updated at least annually. ### within six months after its designation pursuant to article 3 , a gatekeeper shall submit to the commission and data protection authorities an independently audited description of any techniques for profiling of consumers that the gatekeeper applies to any platform services identified pursuant to article 3 and make them publicly available. this description shall be updated at least annually.


### within six months after its designation pursuant to article 3 , a gatekeeper shall submit to the commission an independently audited description of any techniques for profiling of consumers that the gatekeeper applies to or across its core platform services identified pursuant to article 3. this description shall be updated at least annually. ### within three months after its designation pursuant to article 3 , a gatekeeper shall submit to the commission an independently audited description of any techniques for profiling of consumers that the gatekeeper applies to or across its core platform services identified pursuant to article 3. this description shall be updated at least annually.


### within six months after its designation pursuant to article 3 , a gatekeeper shall submit to the commission an independently audited description of any techniques for profiling of consumers that the gatekeeper applies to or across its core platform services identified pursuant to article 3. this description shall be updated at least annually. ### within six months after its designation pursuant to article 3 , a gatekeeper shall submit to the commission an independently audited description of any techniques for profiling of consumers that the gatekeeper applies to or across its core platform services identified pursuant to article 3. this description shall be updated at least annually. the commission shall share the audited description , as well as all relevant materials collected in the context of supervising the gatekeepers , that relate to the processing of personal data , in particular profiling , with any competent supervisory authority , represented in the european data protection board , upon its request.


### within six months after its designation pursuant to article 3 , a gatekeeper shall submit to the commission an independently audited description of any techniques for profiling of consumers that the gatekeeper applies to or across its core platform services identified pursuant to article 3. this description shall be updated at least annually. ### within six months after its first qualification pursuant to article 3 , a gatekeeper shall submit to the commission and data protection authorities an independently audited description of any techniques for profiling of business users and end users and the personalisation of their service that the gatekeeper applies to any platform services identified pursuant to article 3 and make them publicly available. this description shall be updated at least annually.


### 1. the commission may conduct a market investigation for the purpose of examining whether a provider of core platform services should be designated as a gatekeeper pursuant to article 3(6) , or in order to identify core platform services for a gatekeeper pursuant to article 3(7). it shall endeavour to conclude its investigation by adopting a decision in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in article 32(4) within twelve months from the opening of the market investigation. ### 1. the commission , acting on a complaint or on its own initiative , may conduct a market investigation for the purpose of examining whether a provider of core platform services should be designated as a gatekeeper pursuant to article 3(6) , or in order to identify core platform services for a gatekeeper pursuant to article 3(7). it shall endeavour to conclude its investigation by adopting a decision in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in article 32(4) within twelve months from the opening of the market investigation.


### 1. the commission may conduct a market investigation for the purpose of examining whether a provider of core platform services should be designated as a gatekeeper pursuant to article 3(6) , or in order to identify core platform services for a gatekeeper pursuant to article 3(7). it shall endeavour to conclude its investigation by adopting a decision in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in article 32(4) within twelve months from the opening of the market investigation. ### 1. the commission shall conduct a market investigation for the purpose of examining whether a provider of core platform services should be designated as a gatekeeper pursuant to article 3(6) , or in order to identify core platform services for a gatekeeper pursuant to article 3(7). it shall conclude its investigation by adopting a decision in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in article 32(4) within twelve months from the opening of the market investigation.


### 1. the commission may conduct a market investigation for the purpose of examining whether a provider of core platform services should be designated as a gatekeeper pursuant to article 3(6) , or in order to identify core platform services for a gatekeeper pursuant to article 3(7). it shall endeavour to conclude its investigation by adopting a decision in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in article 32(4) within twelve months from the opening of the market investigation. ### 1. the commission may conduct a market investigation for the purpose of examining whether a provider of core platform services should be designated as a gatekeeper pursuant to article 3(6) , or in order to identify core platform services for a gatekeeper pursuant to article 3(7). it shall endeavour to conclude its investigation by adopting a decision in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in article 32(4) within six months from the opening of the market investigation.


### 2. in the course of a market investigation pursuant to paragraph 1 , the commission shall endeavour to communicate its preliminary findings to the provider of core platform services concerned within six months from the opening of the investigation. in the preliminary findings , the commission shall explain whether it considers , on a provisional basis , that the provider of core platform services should be designated as a gatekeeper pursuant to article 3(6). ### 2. in the course of a market investigation pursuant to paragraph 1 , the commission shall endeavour to communicate its preliminary findings to the provider of core platform services concerned within three months from the opening of the investigation. in the preliminary findings , the commission shall explain whether it considers , on a provisional basis , that the provider of core platform services should be designated as a gatekeeper pursuant to article 3(6).


### 2. in the course of a market investigation pursuant to paragraph 1 , the commission shall endeavour to communicate its preliminary findings to the provider of core platform services concerned within six months from the opening of the investigation. in the preliminary findings , the commission shall explain whether it considers , on a provisional basis , that the provider of core platform services should be designated as a gatekeeper pursuant to article 3(6). ### 2. in the course of a market investigation pursuant to paragraph 1 , the commission shall communicate its preliminary findings to the provider of core platform services concerned within six months from the opening of the investigation. in the preliminary findings , the commission shall explain whether it considers , on a provisional basis , that the provider of core platform services should be designated as a gatekeeper pursuant to article 3(6).


### 2. in the course of a market investigation pursuant to paragraph 1 , the commission shall endeavour to communicate its preliminary findings to the provider of core platform services concerned within six months from the opening of the investigation. in the preliminary findings , the commission shall explain whether it considers , on a provisional basis , that the provider of core platform services should be designated as a gatekeeper pursuant to article 3(6). ### 2. in the course of a market investigation pursuant to paragraph 1 , the commission shall endeavour to communicate its preliminary findings to the provider of core platform services concerned within four months from the opening of the investigation. in the preliminary findings , the commission shall explain whether it considers , on a provisional basis , that the provider of core platform services should be designated as a gatekeeper pursuant to article 3(6).


### 3. where the provider of core platform services satisfies the thresholds set out in article 3(2) , but has presented significantly substantiated arguments in accordance with article 3(4) , the commission shall endeavour to conclude the market investigation within five months from the opening of the market investigation by a decision pursuant to paragraph 1. in that case the commission shall endeavour to communicate its preliminary findings pursuant to paragraph 2 to the provider of core platform services within three months from the opening of the investigation. ### deleted


### 4. when the commission pursuant to article 3(6) designates as a gatekeeper a provider of core platform services that does not yet enjoy an entrenched and durable position in its operations , but it is foreseeable that it will enjoy such a position in the near future , it shall declare applicable to that gatekeeper only obligations laid down in article 5(b) and article 6(1) points (e) , (f) , (h) and (i) as specified in the designation decision. the commission shall only declare applicable those obligations that are appropriate and necessary to prevent that the gatekeeper concerned achieves by unfair means an entrenched and durable position in its operations. the commission shall review such a designation in accordance with the procedure laid down in article 4. ### 4. when the commission pursuant to article 3(6) designates as a gatekeeper a provider of core platform services that does not yet enjoy an entrenched and durable position in its operations , but it is foreseeable that it will enjoy such a position in the near future , it shall declare applicable to that gatekeeper the obligations laid down in article 5 and article 6 in the designation decision. the commission shall review such a designation in accordance with the procedure laid down in article 4.


### 4. when the commission pursuant to article 3(6) designates as a gatekeeper a provider of core platform services that does not yet enjoy an entrenched and durable position in its operations , but it is foreseeable that it will enjoy such a position in the near future , it shall declare applicable to that gatekeeper only obligations laid down in article 5(b) and article 6(1) points (e) , (f) , (h) and (i) as specified in the designation decision. the commission shall only declare applicable those obligations that are appropriate and necessary to prevent that the gatekeeper concerned achieves by unfair means an entrenched and durable position in its operations. the commission shall review such a designation in accordance with the procedure laid down in article 4. ### 4. when the commission pursuant to article 3(6) designates as a gatekeeper a provider of core platform services that does not yet enjoy an entrenched and durable position in its operations , but it is foreseeable that it will enjoy such a position in the near future , it shall declare applicable to that gatekeeper the obligations laid down in this regulation as specified in the designation decision. the commission shall only declare applicable those obligations that are appropriate and necessary to prevent that the gatekeeper concerned achieves by unfair means an entrenched and durable position in its operations. the commission shall review such a designation in accordance with the procedure laid down in article 4.


### 4. when the commission pursuant to article 3(6) designates as a gatekeeper a provider of core platform services that does not yet enjoy an entrenched and durable position in its operations , but it is foreseeable that it will enjoy such a position in the near future , it shall declare applicable to that gatekeeper only obligations laid down in article 5(b) and article 6(1) points (e) , (f) , (h) and (i) as specified in the designation decision. the commission shall only declare applicable those obligations that are appropriate and necessary to prevent that the gatekeeper concerned achieves by unfair means an entrenched and durable position in its operations. the commission shall review such a designation in accordance with the procedure laid down in article 4. ### 4. when the commission pursuant to article 3(6) designates as a gatekeeper a provider of core platform services that does not yet enjoy an entrenched and durable position in its operations , but it is foreseeable that it will enjoy such a position in the near future , it shall declare applicable to that gatekeeper at least the obligations laid down in article 5(b) and article 6(1) points (e) , (f) , (h) and (i) as specified in the designation decision. the commission shall only declare applicable those obligations that are appropriate and necessary to prevent that the gatekeeper concerned achieves by unfair means an entrenched and durable position in its operations. the commission shall review such a designation in accordance with the procedure laid down in article 4.


### 1. where the market investigation shows that a gatekeeper has systematically infringed the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6 and has further strengthened or extended its gatekeeper position in relation to the characteristics under article 3(1) , the commission may by decision adopted in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in article 32(4) impose on such gatekeeper any behavioural or structural remedies which are proportionate to the infringement committed and necessary to ensure compliance with this regulation. the commission shall conclude its investigation by adopting a decision within twelve months from the opening of the market investigation. ### 1. where the market investigation shows that a gatekeeper has systematically infringed the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6 , the commission shall by decision adopted in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in article 32(4) impose on such gatekeeper any behavioural or structural remedies which are proportionate to the infringement committed and necessary to ensure full compliance with this regulation. the commission shall conclude its investigation by adopting a decision within six months from the opening of the market investigation.


### 1. where the market investigation shows that a gatekeeper has systematically infringed the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6 and has further strengthened or extended its gatekeeper position in relation to the characteristics under article 3(1) , the commission may by decision adopted in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in article 32(4) impose on such gatekeeper any behavioural or structural remedies which are proportionate to the infringement committed and necessary to ensure compliance with this regulation. the commission shall conclude its investigation by adopting a decision within twelve months from the opening of the market investigation. ### 1. where the market investigation , initiated by the commission following a complaint or on its own initiative , shows that a gatekeeper has systematically infringed the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6 and has further strengthened or extended its gatekeeper position in relation to the characteristics under article 3(1) , the commission may by decision adopted in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in article 32(4) impose on such gatekeeper any behavioural or structural remedies which are proportionate to the infringement committed and necessary to ensure compliance with this regulation. the commission shall conclude its investigation by adopting a decision within twelve months from the opening of the market investigation.


### 1. where the market investigation shows that a gatekeeper has systematically infringed the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6 and has further strengthened or extended its gatekeeper position in relation to the characteristics under article 3(1) , the commission may by decision adopted in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in article 32(4) impose on such gatekeeper any behavioural or structural remedies which are proportionate to the infringement committed and necessary to ensure compliance with this regulation. the commission shall conclude its investigation by adopting a decision within twelve months from the opening of the market investigation. ### 1. where the market investigation shows that a gatekeeper has systematically infringed the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6 and has further strengthened or extended its gatekeeper position in relation to the characteristics under article 3(1) , the commission shall by decision adopted in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in article 32(4) impose on such gatekeeper any behavioural or structural remedies which are proportionate to the infringement committed and necessary to ensure full compliance with this regulation. the commission shall conclude its investigation by adopting a decision within twelve months from the opening of the market investigation.


### (17) a very significant turnover in the union and the provision of a core platform service in at least three member states constitute compelling indications that the provider of a core platform service has a significant impact on the internal market. this is equally true where a provider of a core platform service in at least three member states has a very significant market capitalisation or equivalent fair market value. therefore , a provider of a core platform service should be presumed to have a significant impact on the internal market where it provides a core platform service in at least three member states and where either its group turnover realised in the eea is equal to or exceeds a specific , high threshold or the market capitalisation of the group is equal to or exceeds a certain high absolute value. for providers of core platform services that belong to undertakings that are not publicly listed , the equivalent fair market value above a certain high absolute value should be referred to. the commission should use its power to adopt delegated acts to develop an objective methodology to calculate that value. a high eea group turnover in conjunction with the threshold of users in the union of core platform services reflects a relatively strong ability to monetise these users. a high market capitalisation relative to the same threshold number of users in the union reflects a relatively significant potential to monetise these users in the near future. this monetisation potential in turn reflects in principle the gateway position of the undertakings concerned. both indicators are in addition reflective of their financial capacity , including their ability to leverage their access to financial markets to reinforce their position. this may for example happen where this superior access is used to acquire other undertakings , which ability has in turn been shown to have potential negative effects on innovation. market capitalisation can also be reflective of the expected future position and effect on the internal market of the providers concerned , notwithstanding a potentially relatively low current turnover. the market capitalisation value can be based on a level that reflects the average market capitalisation of the largest publicly listed undertakings in the union over an appropriate period. ### (17) a very significant turnover in the union and the provision of a core platform service in at least one member state constitutes compelling indications that the provider of a core platform service has a significant impact on the internal market. this is equally true where a provider of a core platform service in at least one member state has a very significant market capitalisation or equivalent fair market value. therefore , a provider of a core platform service should be deemed to have a significant impact on the internal market where it provides a core platform service in at least one member state and where either its group turnover realised in the eea is equal to or exceeds a specific , high threshold or the market capitalisation of the group is equal to or exceeds a certain high absolute value. for providers of core platform services that belong to undertakings that are not publicly listed , the equivalent fair market value above a certain high absolute value should be referred to. the commission should use its power to adopt delegated acts to develop an objective methodology to calculate that value. a high eea group turnover in conjunction with the threshold of users in the union of core platform services reflects a relatively strong ability to monetise these users. a high market capitalisation relative to the same threshold number of users in the union reflects a relatively significant potential to monetise these users in the near future. this monetisation potential in turn reflects in principle the gateway position of the undertakings concerned. both indicators are in addition reflective of their financial capacity , including their ability to leverage their access to financial markets to reinforce their position. this may for example happen where this superior access is used to acquire other undertakings , which ability has in turn been shown to have potential negative effects on innovation. market capitalisation can also be reflective of the expected future position and effect on the internal market of the providers concerned , notwithstanding a potentially relatively low current turnover. the market capitalisation value can be based on a level that reflects the average market capitalisation of the largest publicly listed undertakings in the union over an appropriate period.


### (21) an entrenched and durable position in its operations or the foreseeability of achieving such a position future occurs notably where the contestability of the position of the provider of the core platform service is limited. this is likely to be the case where that provider has provided a core platform service in at least three member states to a very high number of business users and end users during at least three years. ### (21) an entrenched and durable position in its operations or the foreseeability of achieving such a position future occurs notably where the contestability of the position of the provider of the core platform service is limited. this is likely to be the case where that provider has provided a core platform service in at least one member state to a very high number of business users and end users during at least two years.


### (21) an entrenched and durable position in its operations or the foreseeability of achieving such a position future occurs notably where the contestability of the position of the provider of the core platform service is limited. this is likely to be the case where that provider has provided a core platform service in at least three member states to a very high number of business users and end users during at least three years. ### (21) an entrenched and durable position in its operations or the foreseeability of achieving such a position future occurs notably where the contestability of the position of the provider of the core platform service is limited. this is likely to be the case where that provider has provided a core platform service in more than one member state to a very high number of business users and end users during at least three years.


### (22) such thresholds can be impacted by market and technical developments. the commission should therefore be empowered to adopt delegated acts to specify the methodology for determining whether the quantitative thresholds are met , and to regularly adjust it to market and technological developments where necessary. this is particularly relevant in relation to the threshold referring to market capitalisation , which should be indexed in appropriate intervals. ### (22) such thresholds can be impacted by market and technical developments and innovations on the market. the commission should therefore be empowered to adopt delegated acts to specify the methodology for determining whether the quantitative thresholds are met , and to regularly adjust it to market and technological developments where necessary. this is particularly relevant in relation to the threshold referring to market capitalisation , which should be indexed in appropriate intervals.


### (22) such thresholds can be impacted by market and technical developments. the commission should therefore be empowered to adopt delegated acts to specify the methodology for determining whether the quantitative thresholds are met , and to regularly adjust it to market and technological developments where necessary. this is particularly relevant in relation to the threshold referring to market capitalisation , which should be indexed in appropriate intervals. ### (22) such thresholds can be impacted by market and technical developments. the commission should therefore be empowered to adopt delegated acts to specify the methodology for determining whether the quantitative thresholds are met , and to regularly adjust it to market and technological developments where necessary. this is particularly relevant in relation to the threshold referring to market capitalisation , which should be indexed in appropriate intervals. the accuracy of the reported numbers of business users and monthly active users can be technically verified through independent audience measurement.


### (25) such an assessment can only be done in light of a market investigation , while taking into account the quantitative thresholds. in its assessment the commission should pursue the objectives of preserving and fostering the level of innovation , the quality of digital products and services , the degree to which prices are fair and competitive , and the degree to which quality or choice for business users and for end users is or remains high. elements that are specific to the providers of core platform services concerned , such as extreme scale economies , very strong network effects , an ability to connect many business users with many end users through the multi-sidedness of these services , lock-in effects , a lack of multi-homing or vertical integration , can be taken into account. in addition , a very high market capitalisation , a very high ratio of equity value over profit or a very high turnover derived from end users of a single core platform service can point to the tipping of the market or leveraging potential of such providers. together with market capitalisation , high growth rates , or decelerating growth rates read together with profitability growth , are examples of dynamic parameters that are particularly relevant to identifying such providers of core platform services that are foreseen to become entrenched. the commission should be able to take a decision by drawing adverse inferences from facts available where the provider significantly obstructs the investigation by failing to comply with the investigative measures taken by the commission. ### (25) such an assessment can only be done in light of a market investigation , while taking into account the quantitative thresholds. in its assessment the commission should pursue the objectives of preserving and fostering the level of innovation , the quality of digital products and services , the degree to which prices are fair and competitive , and the degree to which quality or choice for business users and for end users is or remains high , and whether or not fair competition is ensured. elements that are specific to the providers of core platform services concerned , such as extreme scale economies , very strong network effects , an ability to connect many business users with many end users through the multi-sidedness of these services , lock-in effects , a lack of multi-homing or vertical integration , can be taken into account. in addition , a very high market capitalisation , a very high ratio of equity value over profit or a very high turnover derived from end users of a single core platform service can point to the tipping of the market or leveraging potential of such providers. together with market capitalisation , high growth rates , or decelerating growth rates read together with profitability growth , are examples of dynamic parameters that are particularly relevant to identifying such providers of core platform services that are foreseen to become entrenched. the commission should be able to take a decision by drawing adverse inferences from facts available where the provider significantly obstructs the investigation by failing to comply with the investigative measures taken by the commission.


### (26) a particular subset of rules should apply to those providers of core platform services that are foreseen to enjoy an entrenched and durable position in the near future. the same specific features of core platform services make them prone to tipping: once a service provider has obtained a certain advantage over rivals or potential challengers in terms of scale or intermediation power , its position may become unassailable and the situation may evolve to the point that it is likely to become durable and entrenched in the near future. undertakings can try to induce this tipping and emerge as gatekeeper by using some of the unfair conditions and practices regulated in this regulation. in such a situation , it appears appropriate to intervene before the market tips irreversibly. ### (26) a particular subset of rules should apply to those providers of core platform services that are foreseen to enjoy an entrenched and durable position in the near future. the same specific features of core platform services make them prone to tipping: once a service provider has obtained a certain advantage over rivals or potential challengers in terms of scale or intermediation power , its position may become unassailable and the situation may evolve to the point that it is likely to become durable and entrenched in the near future. undertakings can try to induce this tipping and emerge as gatekeeper by using some of the unfair conditions and practices regulated in this regulation. in such a situation , it would be appropriate for there to be predictability and to intervene before the market tips irreversibly.


### (28) this should allow the commission to intervene in time and effectively , while fully respecting the proportionality of the considered measures. it should also reassure actual or potential market participants about the fairness and contestability of the services concerned. ### (28) this should allow the commission to intervene in time and effectively , while fully respecting the proportionality of the considered measures. it should also reassure actual or potential market participants about the fairness , efficiency and contestability of the services concerned.


### (30) the very rapidly changing and complex technological nature of core platform services requires a regular review of the status of gatekeepers , including those that are foreseen to enjoy a durable and entrenched position in their operations in the near future. to provide all of the market participants , including the gatekeepers , with the required certainty as to the applicable legal obligations , a time limit for such regular reviews is necessary. it is also important to conduct such reviews on a regular basis and at least every two years. ### (30) the very rapidly changing and complex technological nature of core platform services requires a regular review of the status of gatekeepers , including those that are foreseen to enjoy a durable and entrenched position in their operations in the near future. to provide all of the market participants , including the gatekeepers , with the required certainty as to the applicable legal obligations , a time limit for such regular reviews is necessary. it is also important to conduct such reviews on a regular basis and at least every four years for designated gatekeepers to assess whether they continue to satisfy the requirements , and at least every year to assess whether new providers of core platform services satisfy those requirements.


### (31) to ensure the effectiveness of the review of gatekeeper status as well as the possibility to adjust the list of core platform services provided by a gatekeeper , the gatekeepers should inform the commission of all of their intended and concluded acquisitions of other providers of core platform services or any other services provided within the digital sector. such information should not only serve the review process mentioned above , regarding the status of individual gatekeepers , but will also provide information that is crucial to monitoring broader contestability trends in the digital sector and can therefore be a useful factor for consideration in the context of the market investigations foreseen by this regulation. ### (31) to ensure the effectiveness of the review of gatekeeper status as well as the possibility to adjust the list of core platform services provided by a gatekeeper , the gatekeepers should inform the commission of all of their intended and concluded concentrations within the meaning of article 3 of regulation (ec) no 139/2004 or any agreement or series of agreements having a substantially similar effect. such information should not only serve the review process mentioned above , regarding the status of individual gatekeepers , but will also provide information that is crucial to monitoring broader contestability trends in the digital sector and can therefore be a useful factor for consideration in the context of the market investigations foreseen by this regulation. to safeguard the fairness and contestability of core platform services provided by gatekeepers , any concentration by undertakings that have been considered as gatekeepers for more than two years should be forbidden by default , unless the specific concentration is indisputably not impeding contestable and fair markets in the digital sector. the burden of proof for this lies on the gatekeeper.


### (31) to ensure the effectiveness of the review of gatekeeper status as well as the possibility to adjust the list of core platform services provided by a gatekeeper , the gatekeepers should inform the commission of all of their intended and concluded acquisitions of other providers of core platform services or any other services provided within the digital sector. such information should not only serve the review process mentioned above , regarding the status of individual gatekeepers , but will also provide information that is crucial to monitoring broader contestability trends in the digital sector and can therefore be a useful factor for consideration in the context of the market investigations foreseen by this regulation. ### (31) to ensure the effectiveness of the review of gatekeeper status as well as the possibility to adjust the list of core platform services provided by a gatekeeper , the gatekeepers should inform the commission of all of their intended and concluded concentrations within the meaning of article 3 of regulation (ec) no 139/2004 or any agreement or series of agreements having a substantially similar effect. such information should not only serve the review process mentioned above , regarding the status of individual gatekeepers , but will also provide information that is crucial to monitoring broader contestability trends in the digital sector and can therefore be a useful factor for consideration in the context of the market investigations foreseen by this regulation. to safeguard the fairness and contestability of core platform services provided by gatekeepers , any concentration by undertakings that have been considered as gatekeepers for more than 2 years should be forbidden by default , unless the specific concentration is indisputably not impeding contestable and fair markets in the digital sector. the burden of proof for this lies on the gatekeeper.


### (32) to safeguard the fairness and contestability of core platform services provided by gatekeepers , it is necessary to provide in a clear and unambiguous manner for a set of harmonised obligations with regard to those services. such rules are needed to address the risk of harmful effects of unfair practices imposed by gatekeepers , to the benefit of the business environment in the services concerned , to the benefit of users and ultimately to the benefit of society as a whole. given the fast-moving and dynamic nature of digital markets , and the substantial economic power of gatekeepers , it is important that these obligations are effectively applied without being circumvented. to that end , the obligations in question should apply to any practices by a gatekeeper , irrespective of its form and irrespective of whether it is of a contractual , commercial , technical or any other nature , insofar as a practice corresponds to the type of practice that is the subject of one of the obligations of this regulation. ### (32) to safeguard the fairness and contestability of core platform services provided by gatekeepers , it is necessary to provide in a clear and unambiguous manner for a set of harmonised obligations with regard to those services. such rules are needed to address the risk of harmful effects of unfair practices imposed by gatekeepers , to the benefit of the business environment in the services concerned , to the benefit of users and ultimately to the benefit of society as a whole. given the fast-moving and dynamic nature of digital markets , and the substantial economic power of gatekeepers , it is important that these obligations are effectively applied without being circumvented. to that end , the obligations in question should apply to any practices by a gatekeeper , irrespective of its form , including through the use of dark patterns or manipulative choice architectures , and irrespective of whether it is of a contractual , commercial , technical or any other nature , insofar as a practice corresponds to the type of practice that is the subject of one of the obligations of this regulation.


### (37) because of their position , gatekeepers might in certain cases restrict the ability of business users of their online intermediation services to offer their goods or services to end users under more favourable conditions , including price , through other online intermediation services. such restrictions have a significant deterrent effect on the business users of gatekeepers in terms of their use of alternative online intermediation services , limiting inter-platform contestability , which in turn limits choice of alternative online intermediation channels for end users. to ensure that business users of online intermediation services of gatekeepers can freely choose alternative online intermediation services and differentiate the conditions under which they offer their products or services to their end users , it should not be accepted that gatekeepers limit business users from choosing to differentiate commercial conditions , including price. such a restriction should apply to any measure with equivalent effect , such as for example increased commission rates or de-listing of the offers of business users. ### (37) because of their position , gatekeepers might in certain cases restrict the ability of business users of their online intermediation services to offer their goods or services to end users under more favourable conditions , including price , through other online intermediation services or alternative distribution channels. such restrictions have a significant deterrent effect on the business users of gatekeepers in terms of their use of alternative online intermediation services or alternative distribution channels , limiting inter-platform contestability , which in turn limits choice of alternative online intermediation or distribution channels for end users. to ensure that business users of online intermediation services of gatekeepers can freely choose among alternative online services and channels , and differentiate the conditions under which they offer their products or services to their end users , it should not be accepted that gatekeepers limit business users from choosing to differentiate commercial conditions , including price. such a restriction should apply to any measure with equivalent effect , such as for example increased commission rates or de-listing of the offers of business users.


### (37) because of their position , gatekeepers might in certain cases restrict the ability of business users of their online intermediation services to offer their goods or services to end users under more favourable conditions , including price , through other online intermediation services. such restrictions have a significant deterrent effect on the business users of gatekeepers in terms of their use of alternative online intermediation services , limiting inter-platform contestability , which in turn limits choice of alternative online intermediation channels for end users. to ensure that business users of online intermediation services of gatekeepers can freely choose alternative online intermediation services and differentiate the conditions under which they offer their products or services to their end users , it should not be accepted that gatekeepers limit business users from choosing to differentiate commercial conditions , including price. such a restriction should apply to any measure with equivalent effect , such as for example increased commission rates or de-listing of the offers of business users. ### (37) because of their position , gatekeepers might in certain cases restrict the ability of business users of their online intermediation services to offer their goods or services to end users under more favourable conditions , including price or availability , through other distribution channels. such restrictions have a significant deterrent effect on the business users of gatekeepers in terms of their use of alternative distribution channels , limiting inter-platform contestability , which in turn limits choice of alternative distribution channels for end users. to ensure that business users of online intermediation services of gatekeepers can freely choose alternative online services and differentiate the conditions under which they offer their products or services to their end users , it should be prohibited that gatekeepers limit business users from choosing to differentiate commercial conditions , including price or availability. such a restriction should apply to any measure with equivalent effect , such as for example increased commission rates , de-listing or less favourable ranking of the offers of business users.


### (39) to safeguard a fair commercial environment and protect the contestability of the digital sector it is important to safeguard the right of business users to raise concerns about unfair behaviour by gatekeepers with any relevant administrative or other public authorities. for example , business users may want to complain about different types of unfair practices , such as discriminatory access conditions , unjustified closing of business user accounts or unclear grounds for product de-listings. any practice that would in any way inhibit such a possibility of raising concerns or seeking available redress , for instance by means of confidentiality clauses in agreements or other written terms , should therefore be prohibited. this should be without prejudice to the right of business users and gatekeepers to lay down in their agreements the terms of use including the use of lawful complaints-handling mechanisms , including any use of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms or of the jurisdiction of specific courts in compliance with respective union and national law this should therefore also be without prejudice to the role gatekeepers play in the fight against illegal content online. ### (39) to safeguard a fair commercial environment based on fair competition , and to protect the contestability of the digital sector , it is important to safeguard the right of business users to raise concerns about unfair behaviour by gatekeepers with any relevant administrative or other public authorities. for example , business users may want to complain about different types of unfair practices , such as discriminatory access conditions , unjustified closing of business user accounts or unclear grounds for product de-listings. any practice that would in any way inhibit such a possibility of raising concerns or seeking available redress , for instance by means of confidentiality clauses in agreements or other written terms , should therefore be prohibited. this should be without prejudice to the right of business users and gatekeepers to lay down in their agreements the terms of use including the use of lawful complaints-handling mechanisms , including any use of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms or of the jurisdiction of specific courts in compliance with respective union and national law this should therefore also be without prejudice to the role gatekeepers play in the fight against illegal content online.


### (39) to safeguard a fair commercial environment and protect the contestability of the digital sector it is important to safeguard the right of business users to raise concerns about unfair behaviour by gatekeepers with any relevant administrative or other public authorities. for example , business users may want to complain about different types of unfair practices , such as discriminatory access conditions , unjustified closing of business user accounts or unclear grounds for product de-listings. any practice that would in any way inhibit such a possibility of raising concerns or seeking available redress , for instance by means of confidentiality clauses in agreements or other written terms , should therefore be prohibited. this should be without prejudice to the right of business users and gatekeepers to lay down in their agreements the terms of use including the use of lawful complaints-handling mechanisms , including any use of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms or of the jurisdiction of specific courts in compliance with respective union and national law this should therefore also be without prejudice to the role gatekeepers play in the fight against illegal content online. ### (39) to safeguard a fair commercial environment and protect the contestability of the digital sector it is important to safeguard the right of business users to raise concerns about unfair behaviour by gatekeepers with any relevant administrative , judicial or other public authorities. for example , business users may want to complain about different types of unfair practices , such as discriminatory access conditions , unjustified closing of business user accounts or unclear grounds for product de-listings. any practice that would in any way inhibit such a possibility of raising concerns or seeking available redress , for instance by means of confidentiality clauses in agreements or other written terms , should therefore be prohibited. this should be without prejudice to the right of business users and gatekeepers to lay down in their agreements the terms of use including the use of lawful complaints-handling mechanisms , including any use of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms or of the jurisdiction of specific courts in compliance with respective union and national law this should therefore also be without prejudice to the role gatekeepers play in the fight against illegal content online.


### (40) identification services are crucial for business users to conduct their business , as these can allow them not only to optimise services , to the extent allowed under regulation (eu) 2016/679 and directive 2002/58/ec of the european parliament and of the council33 , but also to inject trust in online transactions , in compliance with union or national law. gatekeepers should therefore not use their position as provider of core platform services to require their dependent business users to include any identification services provided by the gatekeeper itself as part of the provision of services or products by these business users to their end users , where other identification services are available to such business users. ### (40) identification services are crucial for boosting the economic activities of all business users , as these can allow them not only to optimise services , to the extent allowed under regulation (eu) 2016/679 and directive 2002/58/ec of the european parliament and of the council33 , but also to inject trust in online transactions , in compliance with union or national law. the competent authorities should pay increased attention to payment identification services. gatekeepers should therefore not use their position as provider of core platform services to require their dependent business users to include any identification services provided by the gatekeeper itself as part of the provision of services or products by these business users to their end users , where other identification services are available to such business users.


### (41) gatekeepers should not restrict the free choice of end users by technically preventing switching between or subscription to different software applications and services. gatekeepers should therefore ensure a free choice irrespective of whether they are the manufacturer of any hardware by means of which such software applications or services are accessed and should not raise artificial technical barriers so as to make switching impossible or ineffective. the mere offering of a given product or service to end users , including by means of pre-installation , as well the improvement of end user offering , such as better prices or increased quality , would not in itself constitute a barrier to switching. ### (41) gatekeepers should not restrict the free choice of end users , who 'pay' with their personal data , by technically preventing switching between or subscription to different software applications and services. gatekeepers should therefore ensure a free choice irrespective of whether they are the manufacturer of any hardware by means of which such software applications or services are accessed and should not raise artificial technical barriers so as to make switching impossible or ineffective. the mere offering of a given product or service to end users , including by means of pre-installation , as well the improvement of end user offering , such as better prices or increased quality , would not in itself constitute a barrier to switching.


### (41) gatekeepers should not restrict the free choice of end users by technically preventing switching between or subscription to different software applications and services. gatekeepers should therefore ensure a free choice irrespective of whether they are the manufacturer of any hardware by means of which such software applications or services are accessed and should not raise artificial technical barriers so as to make switching impossible or ineffective. the mere offering of a given product or service to end users , including by means of pre-installation , as well the improvement of end user offering , such as better prices or increased quality , would not in itself constitute a barrier to switching. ### (41) gatekeepers should not restrict the free choice of end users by technically preventing switching between or subscription to different software applications and services or through product design. gatekeepers should therefore ensure a free choice irrespective of whether they are the manufacturer of any hardware by means of which such software applications or services are accessed and should not raise artificial technical barriers so as to make switching impossible or ineffective. the mere offering of a given product or service to end users , including by means of pre-installation , as well the improvement of end user offering , such as better prices or increased quality , would not in itself constitute a barrier to switching.


### (62) in order to ensure the full and lasting achievement of the objectives of this regulation , the commission should be able to assess whether a provider of core platform services should be designated as a gatekeeper without meeting the quantitative thresholds laid down in this regulation; whether systematic non-compliance by a gatekeeper warrants imposing additional remedies; and whether the list of obligations addressing unfair practices by gatekeepers should be reviewed and additional practices that are similarly unfair and limiting the contestability of digital markets should be identified. such assessment should be based on market investigations to be run in an appropriate timeframe , by using clear procedures and deadlines , in order to support the ex ante effect of this regulation on contestability and fairness in the digital sector , and to provide the requisite degree of legal certainty. ### (62) in order to ensure the full and lasting achievement of the objectives of this regulation , the commission should be able to assess whether a provider of core platform services should be designated as a gatekeeper without meeting the quantitative thresholds laid down in this regulation; whether systematic non-compliance by a gatekeeper warrants imposing additional remedies; and whether the list of obligations addressing unfair practices by gatekeepers should be reviewed and additional practices that are similarly unfair and limiting the contestability of digital markets should be identified. such assessment should be based on market investigations to be run in an appropriate timeframe , by using clear procedures and legally binding deadlines , in order to support the ex ante effect of this regulation on contestability and fairness in the digital sector , and to provide the requisite degree of legal certainty.


### (66) in the event that gatekeepers engage in behaviour that is unfair or that limits the contestability of the core platform services that are already designated under this regulation but without these behaviours being explicitly covered by the obligations , the commission should be able to update this regulation through delegated acts. such updates by way of delegated act should be subject to the same investigatory standard and therefore following a market investigation. the commission should also apply a predefined standard in identifying such behaviours. this legal standard should ensure that the type of obligations that gatekeepers may at any time face under this regulation are sufficiently predictable. ### (66) in the event that gatekeepers engage in behaviour that is unfair or that limits the contestability of the core platform services but without these behaviours being explicitly covered by the obligations , the commission should be able to update this regulation through delegated acts. such updates by way of delegated act should be subject to the same investigatory standard and therefore following a market investigation. the commission should also apply a predefined standard in identifying such behaviours. this legal standard should ensure that the type of obligations that gatekeepers may at any time face under this regulation are sufficiently predictable.


### (72) the commission should be able to take the necessary actions to monitor the effective implementation and compliance with the obligations laid down in this regulation. such actions should include the ability of the commission to appoint independent external experts , such as and auditors to assist the commission in this process , including where applicable from competent independent authorities , such as data or consumer protection authorities. ### (72) the commission should be able to take the necessary actions to monitor the effective implementation and compliance with the obligations laid down in this regulation. such actions should include the ability of the commission to appoint independent external experts , such as and auditors to assist the commission in this process , including where applicable from competent independent authorities , such as data or consumer protection authorities. the commission should set up rotating auditor teams with members from different organisations and with experience in the various sectors involved. the teams should rotate and be restructured on a regular basis. this should also apply to any external independent control authority. auditors or staff from the external independent control authority should also be subject to an appropriate cooling-off period.


### it operates a core platform service which serves as an important gateway for business users to reach end users; and ### it operates a core platform service which serves as an important gateway for business users to reach end users or end users to reach other end users or business users; and


### the requirement in paragraph 1 point (a) where the undertaking to which it belongs achieves an annual eea turnover equal to or above eur 6.5 billion in the last three financial years , or where the average market capitalisation or the equivalent fair market value of the undertaking to which it belongs amounted to at least eur 65 billion in the last financial year , and it provides a core platform service in at least three member states; ### the requirement in paragraph 1 point (a) where the undertaking to which it belongs achieves an annual eea turnover equal to or above eur 5 billion in the last three financial years , or where the average market capitalisation or the equivalent fair market value of the undertaking to which it belongs amounted to at least eur 65 billion in the last financial year , and it provides a core platform service in at least one member state;


### the requirement in paragraph 1 point (a) where the undertaking to which it belongs achieves an annual eea turnover equal to or above eur 6.5 billion in the last three financial years , or where the average market capitalisation or the equivalent fair market value of the undertaking to which it belongs amounted to at least eur 65 billion in the last financial year , and it provides a core platform service in at least three member states; ### the requirement in paragraph 1 point (a) where the undertaking to which it belongs achieves an annual eea turnover equal to or above eur 6.5 billion in the last three financial years , or where the average market capitalisation or the equivalent fair market value of the undertaking to which it belongs amounted to at least eur 65 billion in the last financial year , and it provides a core platform service in more than one member state;


### the requirement in paragraph 1 point (b) where it provides a core platform service that has more than 45 million monthly active end users established or located in the union and more than 10 000 yearly active business users established in the union in the last financial year; ### the requirement in paragraph 1 point (b) where it provides a core platform service that , has a demonstrable eu market share of more than 60% in a given digital sector or has more than 45 million monthly active end users established or located in the union and more than 10 000 yearly active business users established in the union in the last financial year;


### the requirement in paragraph 1 point (b) where it provides a core platform service that has more than 45 million monthly active end users established or located in the union and more than 10 000 yearly active business users established in the union in the last financial year; ### the requirement in paragraph 1 point (b) where it provides one or more core platform services combining more than 23 million monthly end users established or located in the union and more than 7 000 business users per year established in the union during the last financial year;


### 3. where a provider of core platform services meets all the thresholds in paragraph 2 , it shall notify the commission thereof within three months after those thresholds are satisfied and provide it with the relevant information identified in paragraph 2.. that notification shall include the relevant information identified in paragraph 2 for each of the core platform services of the provider that meets the thresholds in paragraph 2 point (b). the notification shall be updated whenever other core platform services individually meet the thresholds in paragraph 2 point (b). ### 3. where a provider of core platform services meets all the thresholds in paragraph 2 , it shall notify the commission thereof within three months after those thresholds are satisfied and provide it with the relevant information identified in paragraph 2.. that notification shall include the relevant information identified in paragraph 2 for each of the core platform services of the provider that meets the thresholds in paragraph 2 point (b). the notification shall be updated whenever other core platform services individually meet the thresholds in paragraph 2 point (b). following notification by a provider of core platform services , the commission shall take the decision to conduct a market investigation under article 15 within 60 days.


### 3. where a provider of core platform services meets all the thresholds in paragraph 2 , it shall notify the commission thereof within three months after those thresholds are satisfied and provide it with the relevant information identified in paragraph 2.. that notification shall include the relevant information identified in paragraph 2 for each of the core platform services of the provider that meets the thresholds in paragraph 2 point (b). the notification shall be updated whenever other core platform services individually meet the thresholds in paragraph 2 point (b). ### 3. where a provider of core platform services meets all the thresholds in paragraph 2 , it shall be considered as a gatekeeper and shall comply with all its obligations under the current regulation.


### a failure by a relevant provider of core platform services to notify the required information pursuant to this paragraph shall not prevent the commission from designating these providers as gatekeepers pursuant to paragraph 4 at any time. ### a failure by a relevant provider of core platform services to notify the required information pursuant to this paragraph shall not prevent the commission from designating these providers as gatekeepers pursuant to paragraph 4 at any time. the possibility for the commission to conduct a market investigation in the event of a failed notification by a provider of a core platform service shall not be subject to time limitation.


### a failure by a relevant provider of core platform services to notify the required information pursuant to this paragraph shall not prevent the commission from designating these providers as gatekeepers pursuant to paragraph 4 at any time. ### deleted


### 6. the commission may identify as a gatekeeper , in accordance with the procedure laid down in article 15 , any provider of core platform services that meets each of the requirements of paragraph 1 , but does not satisfy each of the thresholds of paragraph 2 , or has presented sufficiently substantiated arguments in accordance with paragraph 4. ### 6. the commission shall identify as a gatekeeper , in accordance with the procedure laid down in article 15 , any provider of core platform services that meets each of the requirements of paragraph 1 , but does not satisfy each of the thresholds of paragraph 2 , or has not presented sufficiently substantiated arguments in accordance with paragraph 4.


### 6. the commission may identify as a gatekeeper , in accordance with the procedure laid down in article 15 , any provider of core platform services that meets each of the requirements of paragraph 1 , but does not satisfy each of the thresholds of paragraph 2 , or has presented sufficiently substantiated arguments in accordance with paragraph 4. ### 6. the commission may identify as a gatekeeper , in accordance with the procedure laid down in article 15 , any provider of core platform services that meets each of the requirements of paragraph 1 , but does not satisfy each of the thresholds of paragraph 2.


### other structural market characteristics. ### other structural market characteristics , such as the consistent growth of the platform’s core service market share in a given digital sector leading to a dominant market position over a three year timeframe.


### where the provider of a core platform service that satisfies the quantitative thresholds of paragraph 2 fails to comply with the investigative measures ordered by the commission in a significant manner and the failure persists after the provider has been invited to comply within a reasonable time-limit and to submit observations , the commission shall be entitled to designate that provider as a gatekeeper. ### where the provider of a core platform service that satisfies the quantitative thresholds of paragraph 2 fails to comply with the investigative measures ordered by the commission in a significant manner and the failure persists after the provider has been invited to comply , within a time limit of 45 days , and to submit observations , the commission shall be entitled to designate that provider as a gatekeeper.


### where the provider of a core platform service that does not satisfy the quantitative thresholds of paragraph 2 fails to comply with the investigative measures ordered by the commission in a significant manner and the failure persists after the provider has been invited to comply within a reasonable time-limit and to submit observations , the commission shall be entitled to designate that provider as a gatekeeper based on facts available. ### where the provider of a core platform service that does not satisfy the quantitative thresholds of paragraph 2 fails to comply with the investigative measures ordered by the commission in a significant manner and the failure persists after the provider has been invited to comply within a time limit of 45 days and to submit observations , the commission shall be entitled to designate that provider as a gatekeeper based on facts available.


### refrain from requiring business users to use , offer or interoperate with an identification service of the gatekeeper in the context of services offered by the business users using the core platform services of that gatekeeper; ### refrain from requiring business users or end users to use , offer or interoperate with any service of the gatekeeper in the context of services offered by the business users using the core platform services of that gatekeeper;


### refrain from requiring business users to use , offer or interoperate with an identification service of the gatekeeper in the context of services offered by the business users using the core platform services of that gatekeeper; ### refrain from requiring end-users or business users to use , offer or interoperate with an identification service of the gatekeeper in the context of services offered by the business users using the core platform services of that gatekeeper;


### refrain from requiring business users to use , offer or interoperate with an identification service of the gatekeeper in the context of services offered by the business users using the core platform services of that gatekeeper; ### not require business users nor end users to use , offer or interoperate with any ancillary or identification service of the gatekeeper itself , or third parties belonging to the same undertaking , in the context of services offered by the business users using the core platform services of that gatekeeper;


### refrain from requiring business users to use , offer or interoperate with an identification service of the gatekeeper in the context of services offered by the business users using the core platform services of that gatekeeper; ### refrain from requiring business users to use , offer or interoperate with any ancillary identification service of the gatekeeper in the context of services offered by the business users using the core platform services of that gatekeeper;


### refrain from using , in competition with business users , any data not publicly available , which is generated through activities by those business users , including by the end users of these business users , of its core platform services or provided by those business users of its core platform services or by the end users of these business users; ### deleted


### refrain from treating more favourably in ranking services and products offered by the gatekeeper itself or by any third party belonging to the same undertaking compared to similar services or products of third party and apply fair and non-discriminatory conditions to such ranking; ### deleted


### refrain from treating more favourably in ranking services and products offered by the gatekeeper itself or by any third party belonging to the same undertaking compared to similar services or products of third party and apply fair and non-discriminatory conditions to such ranking; ### refrain from embedding or treating more favourably in ranking and other settings , as well as in access to and conditions for the use of services , functionalities or technical interfaces , services and products offered by the gatekeeper itself or by any third party compared to similar services or products of other parties and apply fair , reasonable and non-discriminatory conditions to such practices or settings;


### refrain from treating more favourably in ranking services and products offered by the gatekeeper itself or by any third party belonging to the same undertaking compared to similar services or products of third party and apply fair and non-discriminatory conditions to such ranking; ### refrain from treating more favourably in crawling , indexing , ranking or obtaining information regarding the criteria for such measures any services and products offered by the gatekeeper itself or by any party , with which it has entered into an agreement , compared to similar services or products of third parties and apply fair , reasonable and non-discriminatory conditions to such crawling , indexing and ranking;


### refrain from treating more favourably in ranking services and products offered by the gatekeeper itself or by any third party belonging to the same undertaking compared to similar services or products of third party and apply fair and non-discriminatory conditions to such ranking; ### (d) be banned from treating more favourably in ranking services and products offered by the gatekeeper itself or by any third party belonging to the same undertaking in any core platform service compared to similar services or products of third party in order to ensure the application of fair and non-discriminatory conditions to such ranking;


### refrain from technically restricting the ability of end users to switch between and subscribe to different software applications and services to be accessed using the operating system of the gatekeeper , including as regards the choice of internet access provider for end users; ### not technically restrict the ability of end users to switch between and subscribe to different software applications and services to be accessed using the operating system of the gatekeeper , including as regards the choice of internet access provider for end users;


### allow business users and providers of ancillary services access to and interoperability with the same operating system , hardware or software features that are available or used in the provision by the gatekeeper of any ancillary services; ### allow business users , end users and providers of services to have , to the fullest extent technically supported , access to and interoperability with the same operating system , hardware or software features that are available or used in the provision by the gatekeeper of any core and ancillary services by providing complete and accurate information , while guaranteeing a high level of security and personal data protection;


### allow business users and providers of ancillary services access to and interoperability with the same operating system , hardware or software features that are available or used in the provision by the gatekeeper of any ancillary services; ### allow business users and providers of ancillary services access under equal conditions to , and interoperability with the same operating system , hardware or software features that are available or used in the provision by the gatekeeper of any ancillary services by the gatekeeper;


### provide business users , or third parties authorised by a business user , free of charge , with effective , high-quality , continuous and real-time access and use of aggregated or non-aggregated data , that is provided for or generated in the context of the use of the relevant core platform services by those business users and the end users engaging with the products or services provided by those business users; for personal data , provide access and use only where directly connected with the use effectuated by the end user in respect of the products or services offered by the relevant business user through the relevant core platform service , and when the end user opts in to such sharing with a consent in the sense of the regulation (eu) 2016/679; ; ### provide business users , or third parties authorised by a business user , free of charge , with effective , high-quality , continuous and real-time access and use of aggregated and non-aggregated data , that is provided for or generated in the context of the use of the relevant core platform services by those business users and the end users engaging with the products or services provided by those business users; for personal data , provide access and use only where directly connected with the use effectuated by the end user in respect of the products or services offered by the relevant business user through the relevant core platform service , and when the end user opts in to such sharing with a consent in the sense of the regulation (eu) 2016/679; ;


### provide business users , or third parties authorised by a business user , free of charge , with effective , high-quality , continuous and real-time access and use of aggregated or non-aggregated data , that is provided for or generated in the context of the use of the relevant core platform services by those business users and the end users engaging with the products or services provided by those business users; for personal data , provide access and use only where directly connected with the use effectuated by the end user in respect of the products or services offered by the relevant business user through the relevant core platform service , and when the end user opts in to such sharing with a consent in the sense of the regulation (eu) 2016/679; ; ### provide business users , or third parties authorised by a business user , free of charge , with effective , high-quality , continuous and real-time access and use of aggregated or non-aggregated non-personal data , that is provided for or generated in the context of the use of the relevant core platform services by those business users and the end users engaging with the products or services provided by those business users; for personal data , provide for , in full compliance of regulation (eu) 2016/679 , the possibility to obtain consent , in a user-friendly and clear manner , from the end-users to allow the use of such personal data , only where directly connected with the use effectuated by the end user in respect of the products or services offered by the relevant business user through the relevant core platform service;


### provide business users , or third parties authorised by a business user , free of charge , with effective , high-quality , continuous and real-time access and use of aggregated or non-aggregated data , that is provided for or generated in the context of the use of the relevant core platform services by those business users and the end users engaging with the products or services provided by those business users; for personal data , provide access and use only where directly connected with the use effectuated by the end user in respect of the products or services offered by the relevant business user through the relevant core platform service , and when the end user opts in to such sharing with a consent in the sense of the regulation (eu) 2016/679; ; ### provide business users and end users , or third parties authorised by a business user or end user , free of charge , in a user-friendly manner with effective , high-quality , continuous and real-time access and use of aggregated and non-aggregated data , that is provided for or generated in the context of the use of the relevant core platform services by those business users and the end users engaging with the products or services provided by those business users; for personal data , provide , with the consent of the data subject , access and use to those data only where directly connected with the use effectuated by the end user in respect of the products or services offered by the relevant business user through the relevant core platform service in line with the principles of purpose limitation and data minimisation , and when the end user opts in to such sharing with a consent in the sense of the regulation (eu) 2016/679;


### provide business users , or third parties authorised by a business user , free of charge , with effective , high-quality , continuous and real-time access and use of aggregated or non-aggregated data , that is provided for or generated in the context of the use of the relevant core platform services by those business users and the end users engaging with the products or services provided by those business users; for personal data , provide access and use only where directly connected with the use effectuated by the end user in respect of the products or services offered by the relevant business user through the relevant core platform service , and when the end user opts in to such sharing with a consent in the sense of the regulation (eu) 2016/679; ; ### provide business users , or third parties authorised by a business user , free of charge , with effective , high-quality , continuous and real-time access and use of aggregated or non-aggregated data , that is provided for or generated in the context of the use of the relevant core platform services by those business users and the end users engaging with the products or services provided by those business users; for personal data , provide access and use where connected with the use effectuated by the end user in respect of the products or services offered by the relevant business user through the core platform services;