### 3. stresses that the cef is a key enabler for achieving the objectives of the trans-european transport network (ten-t) policy; points out that investment needs in the ten-t are estimated at eur 500 billion to complete the core network by 2030 and eur 1500 billion for the entire network by 2050; highlights the strategic value of the ten-t and cef for meeting new objectives as regards the eu sustainable and smart mobility strategy , enhanced military mobility in the eu and stronger connectivity with our strategic partners in non-eu countries; ### 3. stresses that the cef is a key enabler for achieving the objectives of the trans-european transport network (ten-t) policy; points out that investment needs in the ten-t are estimated at eur 500 billion to complete the core network by 2030 and eur 1500 billion for the entire network by 2050 and that measures introduced by the revision of regulation 1315/2013 on union guidelines for the development of the trans-european transport network could imply additional investments needs representing an increase of around 30% in the average annual investments; stresses also that the european climate , infrastructure and environment executive agency (cinea) plays a key role in implementing the cef through a centralised governance and direct management , which has proven to be an an efficient model of governance to progress in the completion the ten-t network , and calls therefore for an enhanced budget ensuring that it has the necessary means to meet our infrastructure deployment objectives; advocates for eu funds to replicate cef governance by promoting dedicated funds under direct management; highlights the strategic value of the ten-t and cef for meeting new objectives as regards the eu sustainable and smart mobility strategy , enhanced military mobility in the eu and stronger connectivity with our strategic partners in non-eu countries;


### 3. highlights that , in the short term , large-scale humanitarian aid in ukraine and financial support to member states receiving and helping to settle people fleeing the conflict are needed to address the impact of the war against ukraine; ### 3. highlights that , in the short term , large-scale humanitarian aid in ukraine and financial support to member states receiving and helping to settle people fleeing the conflict are needed to address the impact of the war against ukraine; welcomes the efforts made by member states hosting persons fleeing the war in ukraine in terms of offering infrastructure , education and work to refugees;


### 3. underlines the necessity of providing the regions with appropriate financial means in order to deal with the waves of migration caused by the russian aggression against ukraine and its multifaceted consequences; emphasises the need to address the grave difficulties that the current rise in energy costs is causing for the regions , and to identify suitable financial instruments to deal with them at a regional level; ### 3. underlines the necessity of providing the regions with appropriate financial means in order to deal with the waves of migration caused by the russian aggression against ukraine and its multifaceted consequences; recalls the pressing energy and food security concerns , and emphasises the need to address the grave difficulties that the current rise in energy costs is causing for people , and to identify suitable financial instruments directly accessible at a regional level; stresses the need to further strengthen the union’s solidarity capacities in times of crisis , and calls on the commission to put forward a legislative proposal establishing a ukrainian crisis adjustment reserve;


### 3. underlines the necessity of providing the regions with appropriate financial means in order to deal with the waves of migration caused by the russian aggression against ukraine and its multifaceted consequences; emphasises the need to address the grave difficulties that the current rise in energy costs is causing for the regions , and to identify suitable financial instruments to deal with them at a regional level; ### 3. underlines the necessity of providing the regions with appropriate financial means in order to deal with the waves of migration caused by the russian aggression against ukraine and its multifaceted consequences; emphasises the need to address the grave difficulties that the current rise in energy costs is causing for the regions;


### 3. recalls that under the interinstitutional agreement of 16 december 20201 , where a proposal for a new mff or for a substantial revision has been presented , the institutions have committed to seeking to determine specific arrangements for cooperation and dialogue between them throughout the procedure leading to its adoption; ### 3. recalls that under the interinstitutional agreement of 16 december 20201 , where a proposal for a new mff or for a substantial revision has been presented , the institutions have committed to seeking to determine specific arrangements for cooperation and dialogue between them throughout the procedure leading to its adoption; reaffirms its commitment to this agreement and expresses its readiness to engage with the other institutions to devise and implement ambitious and future-proof budget solutions;


### 3. underlines its undivided solidarity with the people of ukraine and recalls the need to mobilise all available eu budget instruments to provide the strongest possible economic and financial support to ukraine and to people fleeing the war; calls for work to start on a marshall-plan-like facility within the eu budget (ukraine solidarity trust fund) to rebuild ukraine after the war , and for a massive investment programme to be launched; ### 3. underlines its undivided solidarity with the people of ukraine and recalls the need to mobilise all available eu budget instruments to provide the strongest possible economic and financial support to ukraine and to people fleeing the war; welcomes the strengthening of cooperation between the eu and nato and calls for priority to be given to joint projects; calls for work to start on a marshall-plan-like facility within the eu budget (ukraine solidarity trust fund) to rebuild ukraine after the war , and for a massive investment programme to be launched;


### 3. underlines its undivided solidarity with the people of ukraine and recalls the need to mobilise all available eu budget instruments to provide the strongest possible economic and financial support to ukraine and to people fleeing the war; calls for work to start on a marshall-plan-like facility within the eu budget (ukraine solidarity trust fund) to rebuild ukraine after the war , and for a massive investment programme to be launched; ### 3. underlines its undivided solidarity with the people of ukraine and recalls the need to mobilise all available eu budget instruments to support the ukraine war effort and to provide the strongest possible economic and financial support to ukraine and to people fleeing the war; calls for work to start on a marshall-plan-like facility within the eu budget (ukraine solidarity trust fund) to rebuild ukraine after the war , and for a massive investment programme to be launched;


### 3. notes that the global humanitarian funding gap continues to grow; stresses that the humanitarian aid instrument must receive significantly more funding in the revised mff to match the eu’s ambition to be a leading humanitarian donor; ### 3. notes that the global humanitarian funding gap was the highest it has ever been in 2022 at usd 36.9 billion , and continues to grow; stresses that the humanitarian aid instrument must receive significantly more funding in the revised mff to match the eu’s ambition to be a leading humanitarian donor; recalls the “in-but-out” nature of humanitarian aid , and that providing life-saving humanitarian assistance should not come at the expense of other humanitarian programmes , nor should aid be diverted to other budget lines during the annual budgetary procedure unless the needs have decreased;


### 4. recommends further strengthening synergies between the cef and other programmes such as horizon europe and investeu , in order to support innovation , sustainability and safety in the transport sector and optimise the use of budgetary resources; ### 4. recommends further strengthening synergies between the cef and other programmes such as horizon europe , investeu and european structural and investment funds , in order to support innovation , sustainability and safety in the transport sector and optimise the use of budgetary resources; recommends , also , to further optimise the use of blending tools in order to attract private investors for financing transport infrastructures;


### 4. welcomes the decision to grant ukraine and moldova candidate country status; emphasises that this decision entails a long-term financial and budgetary commitment to supporting the necessary reforms specific to each country , as has been the case with other candidate countries , as well as to reconstruction and recovery; ### 4. welcomes the decision to grant ukraine and moldova candidate country status and a membership perspective to georgia; emphasises that this decision entails a long-term financial and budgetary commitment to supporting the necessary reforms specific to each country , as has been the case with other candidate countries;


### 4. calls for a significant increase in the european union solidarity fund (eusf) budget , which would help regions to anticipate and mitigate the effects of climate change , and for the scope of the eusf to be broadened , so that it can also support more climate-resilient restoration or construction of public and private infrastructure; ### 4. calls for a significant increase in the european union solidarity fund (eusf) budget , which would help regions to anticipate and mitigate the effects of climate change , and for the scope of the eusf to be broadened , so that it can also support more climate-resilient restoration or construction of public and private infrastructure; stresses the importance of the social dimension of the green transition and the need to provide targeted support to the regions , industries , workers and households facing the biggest challenges;


### 4. underlines the vital role played by the european parliament in the preparation , review and scrutiny of the mff; recalls that all elements of the mff package must be implemented in accordance with the principle of mutual sincere cooperation , as laid down in article 13(2) of the treaty on european union; ### 4. underlines the vital role played by the european parliament in the preparation , review and scrutiny of the mff; reiterates its view that any future decisions on the budgetary architecture of the union should safeguard the community method and ensure that the parliament is fully involved in the decision-making process; recalls that all elements of the mff package must be implemented in accordance with the principle of mutual sincere cooperation , as laid down in article 13(2) of the treaty on european union; regrets the use of instruments to advance legislation without european parliament’s consent or influence;


### 4. welcomes the commission’s upcoming proposal for a european defence investment programme (edip) , the aim of which would be to introduce joint procurement and life cycle management of military capabilities , in particular those necessary to harness eu defence over the decades to counter a military threat from russia; calls on all member states to complement eu funding with funding from their national defence budgets; invites the commission to open this programme to key strategic partners and allies; ### 4. welcomes the commission’s upcoming proposal for a european defence investment programme (edip) , the aim of which is to introduce joint procurement , stock replenishment and enhanced coordination of member states military capabilities; calls on the council and the commission to provide sufficient incentive by endowing this joint procurement mechanism with a relevant budget amount to achieve effective result , to make full use of the possibilities for funding from the union’s budget and to work on the mid-term review of the multiannual financial framework , to provide the necessary increase in funding for eu instruments and relevant eu initiatives in the area of defence , in particular to strengthen the edf and military mobility and increase the relevance of collaborative defence industry projects; calls on all member states to complement the european peace facility with funding from their national defence budgets;


### 4. highlights the need for flexibility mechanisms to have sufficient funding to respond to crises; is concerned by the uneven mobilisation of the solidarity and emergency aid reserve (sear); calls for more predictability in meeting internal and external emergency needs by separating the sear into a solidarity reserve for needs within the eu and an emergency aid reserve for external action , or by ring-fencing the share dedicated for external crises for the entire year; ### 4. highlights the need for flexibility mechanisms to have sufficient funding to respond to crises; is concerned by the uneven mobilisation of the solidarity and emergency aid reserve (sear); notes that a disproportionate amount of sear resources are used for internal purposes; calls for an overall increase of the resources allocated to sear; calls for more predictability in meeting internal and external emergency needs by separating the sear into a solidarity reserve for needs within the eu and an emergency aid reserve for external action , or by ring-fencing the share dedicated for external crises for the entire year; insists that the resources available under sear should not be time-bound , and should be allocated when they are required , on a strict needs basis;


### 5. points out that essential new policy initiatives put forward since the adoption of the current mff have come with proposals to shift money away from key eu policies and objectives; ### 5. underlines that the flexibility available under the current 2021-2027 multiannual financial framework (mff) is not sufficient to fully cover the financial needs generated by the war against ukraine and the covid pandemic; stresses that the current mff was neither designed nor conceived in terms of size to address the new challenges and future crisis situations while simultaneously maintain investments in the eu’s programmes and policies , including important priorities like the just , green and digital transitions; points out that essential new policy initiatives put forward since the adoption of the current mff have come with proposals to shift money away from key eu policies and objectives;


### 5. points out that essential new policy initiatives put forward since the adoption of the current mff have come with proposals to shift money away from key eu policies and objectives; ### 5. points out that essential new policy initiatives put forward since the adoption of the current mff have come with proposals to shift money away from key eu policies and objectives that actually pay for the collateral damages of the recent crises; considers that recurrent redeployments are not a viable way to finance union’s priorities;


### 5. invites the commission to propose new own resources ahead of the timeline envisaged in the legally binding roadmap for the current mff; ### 5. invites the commission to propose new own resources ahead of the timeline envisaged in the legally binding roadmap for the current mff by the end of 2023; points out that these new resources should generate sufficient income to ensure that the common debt can be effectively repaid;


### 5. stresses the serious risk that the amount of outstanding commitments (reste à liquider – ral) continues to rise; calls on the commission to closely monitor this issue and to make every effort to ensure that it remains under control; ### 5. stresses the serious risk that the amount of outstanding commitments (reste à liquider – ral) continues to rise; asks the commission to monitor the low absorption rate of members states; calls on the commission to closely monitor this issue by delivering a country-by-country analysis to the discharge authority , as well as the measures taken to optimize the situation and to prepare a detailed plan of actions in order to reduce the amount of outstanding commitments; calls on the commission to present that plan to the discharge authority;


### 5. calls for stronger defence cooperation with ukraine and moldova to be established , including by enhancing the financial capabilities of the european defence agency (eda) to help identify where ukraine should participate in eu defence capability development over the years to come. ### 5. calls for increased funding and the acceleration of military mobility ;


### 5. calls for stronger defence cooperation with ukraine and moldova to be established , including by enhancing the financial capabilities of the european defence agency (eda) to help identify where ukraine should participate in eu defence capability development over the years to come. ### 5. calls for stronger security and defence cooperation with ukraine and moldova to be established , including by enhancing the financial capabilities of the european defence agency (eda) to help identify where ukraine should participate in eu defence capability development over the years to come.


### 6. points to the extensive use made of the special instruments in the first two years of the mff; notes that the flexibility instrument was mobilised for heading 6 spending in 2022 and points to the proposal that it be mobilised for spending under both headings 6 and 7 in 2023; points out that , under the defence proposal of july 202218 , further appropriations are to be mobilised via special instruments in 2023 and 2024; ### 6. points to the extensive use made of the special instruments in the first two years of the mff; notes that the flexibility instrument was mobilised for heading 6 spending in 2022 and points to the commission’s proposal in the amending letter 1/2023 that it will be significantly mobilised for spending under headings 2b , 5 and 6 in 2023; points out that , under the defence proposal of july 202218 , further appropriations are to be mobilised via special instruments also in 2024;


### 6. recalls that the conference on the future of europe has proposed strengthening the union budget through new own resources2 and that the european parliament should decide on the union budget as it is the right of parliaments at national level3 ; calls in that regard for the european parliament to be more closely associated with the commission and the council in the process of adopting new own resources; ### 6. recalls that the conference on the future of europe has proposed strengthening the union budget through new own resources2 and that the european parliament should decide on the union budget as it is the right of parliaments at national level3 ; calls in that regard for the european parliament to be more closely associated with the commission and the council in the process of adopting new own resources; stresses that the conference provided additional momentum for a revision of the current mff;


### 6. notes that the mff revision should be accompanied by the necessary legislative changes to the ndici – global europe regulation. ### 6. notes that the mff revision should be accompanied by the necessary adjustments and flexibility to the ndici – global europe regulation.


### 7. highlights that the solidarity and emergency aid reserve (sear) was almost exhausted in 2021 and is projected to be fully exhausted in 2022 after having provided a combination of humanitarian aid and support to member states for tackling natural and man-made disasters; points out that the extension of the scope of the european union solidarity fund (eusf) to include public health emergencies , coupled with the increased scale and frequency of natural disasters , the humanitarian crisis in ukraine and the resulting arrival of large numbers of refugees in the eu , has placed the sear under extreme strain; expects , further , that the dramatic consequences of the unprecedented wildfires in the summer of 2022 will require significant financial support , including from the sear; ### 7. highlights that the solidarity and emergency aid reserve (sear) was almost exhausted in 2021 and is projected to be fully used in 2022 after having provided a combination of humanitarian aid and support to member states for tackling natural and man-made disasters; points out that the extension of the scope of the european union solidarity fund (eusf) to include public health emergencies , coupled with the increased scale and frequency of natural disasters , the humanitarian crisis in ukraine and the resulting arrival of large numbers of refugees in the eu , has placed the sear under extreme strain; expects , further , that the dramatic consequences of the unprecedented wildfires in the summer of 2022 will require significant financial support , including from the sear;


### d. whereas citizens rightly expect the eu budget to respond effectively to evolving needs and to support them in crises; ### d. whereas the crisis resulting from the covid-19 pandemic and the war against ukraine will have a serious impact on the social and economic situation in the eu , inter alia on the eu’s labour markets and living conditions and risks negatively impacting growth and employment; whereas people rightly expect the eu budget to respond effectively to evolving needs and to support them in crises , in particular when increasing inflation and rapid increases in food and energy prices across the eu are affecting the most vulnerable populations , further increasing inequalities , and aggravating poverty and energy poverty; whereas wages are not projected to increase as fast as inflation and therefore workers are losing purchasing power and might see their living conditions worsen in the next few months; whereas this will also exert greater pressure on social policy capacity , as well as on automatic stabilisers such as national unemployment schemes;


### d. whereas citizens rightly expect the eu budget to respond effectively to evolving needs and to support them in crises; ### d. whereas citizens rightly expect a bigger eu budget to respond effectively to evolving needs and to better support them in crises;


### e. whereas the combined effect of multiple crises and low mff ceilings has given rise to a ‘galaxy’ of ad hoc instruments beyond the eu budget , as well as greater use of external assigned revenue not subject to the budgetary procedure , most notably in the case of nextgenerationeu; whereas , as one arm of the budgetary authority , parliament should play a full role in this new budgetary environment in order to ensure democratic accountability and transparency; ### e. whereas the combined effect of multiple crises and low mff ceilings has given rise to a ‘galaxy’ of ad hoc instruments beyond the eu budget , as well as greater use of external assigned revenue not subject to the budgetary procedure , most notably in the case of nextgenerationeu (ngeu); whereas ngeu with the recovery and resilience facility (rrf) ensured an economically and socially sustainable , just , inclusive and non-discriminatory recovery; whereas , as one arm of the budgetary authority , parliament should play a full role in this new budgetary environment in order to ensure democratic accountability and transparency; whereas the european instrument for temporary support to mitigate unemployment risks in an emergency (sure) adopted by the commission was a success;


### e. whereas the combined effect of multiple crises and low mff ceilings has given rise to a ‘galaxy’ of ad hoc instruments beyond the eu budget , as well as greater use of external assigned revenue not subject to the budgetary procedure , most notably in the case of nextgenerationeu; whereas , as one arm of the budgetary authority , parliament should play a full role in this new budgetary environment in order to ensure democratic accountability and transparency; ### e. whereas the combined effect of multiple crises , low mff ceilings and cumbersome rules applying to any mff review or revision has given rise to a ‘galaxy’ of ad hoc instruments beyond the eu budget , as well as greater use of external assigned revenue not subject to the budgetary procedure , most notably in the case of nextgenerationeu; whereas , as one arm of the budgetary authority , parliament should play a full role in this new budgetary environment in order to ensure democratic accountability and transparency;


### f. whereas the iia sets out specific arrangements for cooperation and dialogue between parliament , the council and the commission on budgetary matters; whereas further steps should be taken to improve transparency and the availability of information on all spending in support of eu policy-making; ### f. whereas the iia sets out specific arrangements for cooperation and dialogue between parliament , the council and the commission on budgetary matters , including on climate and biodiversity spending; whereas further steps should be taken to improve transparency and the availability of information on all spending in support of eu policy-making;


### 1. underlines the central role that the eu budget plays in delivering on the union’s political priorities , including making a success of the green and digital transitions , fostering an inclusive and social recovery , promoting growth , strategic autonomy and energy independence , providing support for small and medium-sized enterprises , fostering sustainable development that leaves no one behind and ensures cohesion and upward convergence , ensuring a more robust european health union in the aftermath of the covid-19 crisis , promoting the rule of law , eu values and fundamental rights , contributing to greater opportunities for all , and ensuring a stronger union for its people and in the world; ### 1. underlines the central role that the eu budget plays in delivering on the union’s political priorities , including making a success of the green and digital transitions , not least by paying particular attention to remote areas and outermost regions , energy intense sectors and low-skilled workers with the objective of re- and up-skilling them , creating quality employment and decent working conditions , with adequate wages and social security protection , high occupational health and safety standards and gender-balanced opportunities , contributing to the eradication of poverty , reducing inequalities , fostering an inclusive and socially just , sustainable , and non-discriminatory recovery , based , inter alia , on robust national social protection systems , short-time work schemes to avoid the drastic consequences of redundancies and housing allowances for people in need promoting growth , strategic autonomy and energy independence , providing strong support particularly for the young generation , children , families , workers and small and medium-sized enterprises , fostering sustainable development that leaves no one behind and ensures cohesion and upward social convergence , while paying special attention to low-income and vulnerable groups , such as people in poverty or at risk of poverty and social exclusion , ensuring a more robust european health union in the aftermath of the covid-19 crisis , promoting the rule of law , eu values and fundamental rights , fostering greater and equal opportunities for all , and ensuring a stronger union for its people and in the world;


### 1. underlines the central role that the eu budget plays in delivering on the union’s political priorities , including making a success of the green and digital transitions , fostering an inclusive and social recovery , promoting growth , strategic autonomy and energy independence , providing support for small and medium-sized enterprises , fostering sustainable development that leaves no one behind and ensures cohesion and upward convergence , ensuring a more robust european health union in the aftermath of the covid-19 crisis , promoting the rule of law , eu values and fundamental rights , contributing to greater opportunities for all , and ensuring a stronger union for its people and in the world; ### 1. underlines the central role that the eu budget plays in delivering on the union’s political priorities , including making a success of the green and digital transitions , paving the way for climate neutrality by 2050 , fostering an inclusive and social recovery , promoting growth , strategic autonomy and energy independence , providing support for small and medium-sized enterprises , fostering sustainable development that leaves no one behind and ensures cohesion and upward convergence , ensuring a more robust european health union in the aftermath of the covid-19 crisis , promoting the rule of law , eu values and fundamental rights , contributing to greater opportunities for all , and ensuring a stronger union for its people and in the world;


### 1. underlines the central role that the eu budget plays in delivering on the union’s political priorities , including making a success of the green and digital transitions , fostering an inclusive and social recovery , promoting growth , strategic autonomy and energy independence , providing support for small and medium-sized enterprises , fostering sustainable development that leaves no one behind and ensures cohesion and upward convergence , ensuring a more robust european health union in the aftermath of the covid-19 crisis , promoting the rule of law , eu values and fundamental rights , contributing to greater opportunities for all , and ensuring a stronger union for its people and in the world; ### 1. underlines the central role that the eu budget must play in delivering on the union’s political priorities , including making a success of the green and digital transitions , fostering an inclusive and social recovery , promoting growth , strategic autonomy and energy independence , providing support for small and medium-sized enterprises , fostering sustainable development that leaves no one behind and ensures cohesion and upward convergence , ensuring a more robust european health union in the aftermath of the covid-19 crisis , promoting the rule of law , eu values and fundamental rights , contributing to greater opportunities for all , and ensuring a stronger union for its people and in the world;


### 1. reiterates its concern as regards the significant delay in the implementation of cohesion policy for the 2021-2027 period , as well as its call for the commission and the member states to speed up the adoption of the partnership agreements and programmes , without undermining their quality and while respecting the eu’s political priorities and the applicable principles; reiterates the need for special consideration to be given to less-developed regions and islands in this context; ### 1. reiterates its concern as regards the significant delay in the implementation of cohesion policy for the 2021-2027 period , as well as its call for the commission and the member states to speed up the adoption of the partnership agreements and programmes , without undermining their quality and while respecting the eu’s political priorities and the applicable principles; calls on the member states to ensure that local authorities are included in the design and implementation of all programmes; reiterates the need for special consideration to be given to less-developed regions , islands , outermost regions and rural , remote and depopulated areas in this context;


### 1. considers that the commission’s proposed revision of the mff should be aligned with the ‘fit for 55’ package and should take into consideration the main points of the versailles declaration , notably food security; ### 1. considers that the commission’s proposed revision of the mff should be aligned with the ‘fit for 55’ package and with the objectives set on paris agreement; should take into consideration the main points of the versailles declaration , notably food security;


### 8. emphasises , therefore , that the 2021-2027 mff is already being pushed to its limits less than two years after its adoption , a situation aggravated by the unforeseeable events of 2022; points out that it is simply not equipped , in terms of size , structure or rules , to respond to a multitude of crises of this scale , nor to adequately finance new shared eu policy ambitions and the swift implementation of the requisite eu-wide solutions; ### 8. points out that the economic and political context was different when the current mff was negotiated; emphasises , therefore , that the 2021-2027 mff is already being pushed to its limits less than two years after its adoption , a situation aggravated by the unforeseeable events of 2022; recalls that the current high inflation puts a great pressure on the ceilings in the mff leaving very limited margins available to tackle the biggest challenges and long-term eu goals; points out that it is simply not equipped , in terms of size , structure or rules , to respond swiftly to a multitude of crises of this scale , nor to adequately finance new shared eu policy ambitions and the swift implementation of the requisite eu-wide solutions;


### 8. emphasises , therefore , that the 2021-2027 mff is already being pushed to its limits less than two years after its adoption , a situation aggravated by the unforeseeable events of 2022; points out that it is simply not equipped , in terms of size , structure or rules , to respond to a multitude of crises of this scale , nor to adequately finance new shared eu policy ambitions and the swift implementation of the requisite eu-wide solutions; ### 8. emphasises , therefore , that the 2021-2027 mff is already being pushed to its limits less than two years after its adoption , a situation aggravated by the unforeseeable events of 2022; points out that it is simply not equipped , in terms of size , structure or rules , to respond to a multitude of crises of this scale , nor to adequately finance new shared eu policy ambitions and the swift implementation of the requisite eu-wide solutions; is very concerned , in this regard , about the ability from the european union to respond to any future unknown crises that might happen by 2027;


### 8. welcomes the application by the commission of the rule of law conditionality regulation5 laying down the rules necessary for the protection of the union budget in the case of breaches of the principles of the rule of law in the member states which affect or seriously risk affecting the sound financial management of the union budget or the protection of the financial interests of the union in a sufficiently direct way; ### 8. takes the view that the recovery and resilience facility has been an effective and critical tool in times of crisis , supporting economic convergence between member states and enabling the financing of strategic cross-border projects with european added value; takes note of the application by the commission of the rule of law conditionality regulation5 laying down the rules necessary for the protection of the union budget in the case of breaches of the principles of the rule of law in the member states which affect or seriously risk affecting the sound financial management of the union budget or the protection of the financial interests of the union in a sufficiently direct way; regrets the delay in the enforcement of the rule of law conditionality mechanism and calls on the commission to strengthen its oversight of the milestones and targets to be met by the member states; underlines that funds cannot be disbursed if member states do not uphold the rule of law and comply with all relevant ecj rulings;


### 9. recalls that the mff is increased annually on the basis of a 2 % deflator applied to 2018 prices; underlines that spiralling energy prices and extreme energy market volatility caused mainly by russia’s decision to cut gas supply have been feeding soaring inflation , with severe impacts on citizens , businesses and consumers; is deeply concerned that such unexpectedly high levels of inflation are placing the mff under severe strain and reducing its purchasing power further , in a context where its overall level is already lower than previous mffs; stresses that , in practice , this means that fewer union projects and actions can be funded , thereby negatively impacting beneficiaries; ### 9. recalls that the mff is increased annually on the basis of a 2 % deflator applied to 2018 prices; underlines that spiralling energy prices and extreme energy market volatility caused mainly by russia's decision to cut gas supply have been feeding soaring inflation , with severe impacts on citizens , businesses and consumers; is deeply concerned that such unexpectedly high levels of inflation are placing the mff under severe strain and reducing its purchasing power further , in a context where its overall level is already lower than previous mffs; stresses that , in practice , this means that fewer union projects and actions can be funded , thereby negatively impacting beneficiaries and the union's capacity to deliver on its political objectives;


### 9. recalls that the mff is increased annually on the basis of a 2 % deflator applied to 2018 prices; underlines that spiralling energy prices and extreme energy market volatility caused mainly by russia’s decision to cut gas supply have been feeding soaring inflation , with severe impacts on citizens , businesses and consumers; is deeply concerned that such unexpectedly high levels of inflation are placing the mff under severe strain and reducing its purchasing power further , in a context where its overall level is already lower than previous mffs; stresses that , in practice , this means that fewer union projects and actions can be funded , thereby negatively impacting beneficiaries; ### 9. recalls that the mff is increased annually on the basis of a 2 % deflator applied to 2018 prices; underlines that spiralling energy prices and extreme energy market volatility caused mainly by russia’s decision to cut gas supply have been feeding soaring inflation , with severe impacts on citizens , businesses and consumers; is deeply concerned that such unexpectedly high levels of inflation are placing the mff under severe strain and reducing its purchasing power further , in a context where its overall level is already lower than previous mffs in terms of share of the eu gdp; stresses that , in practice , this means that fewer union projects and actions can be funded , thereby negatively impacting beneficiaries;


### 10. recalls , further , that , despite parliament’s demands that the european union recovery instrument (euri) be placed over and above the ceilings , the refinancing costs are repaid from within the mff ceilings , exerting further pressure on the mff , especially in a context of rising interest rates; ### 10. recalls , further , that , despite parliament’s demands that the european union recovery instrument (euri) be placed over and above the ceilings , the refinancing costs are repaid from within the mff ceilings , exerting further pressure on the mff and requiring the use of special instruments in 2023 , in a context of rising interest rates and increasing ngeu borrowing costs;


### 10. reiterates its call for the activation of the passerelle clause provided for in article 312(2) tfeu so as to allow the council to adopt the mff regulation by qualified majority; recalls its proposals that the ordinary legislative procedure be applied for the adoption of the mff regulation; calls for article 311(3) tfeu to be amended so as to allow the european parliament to give its consent in the process of adopting new own resources. ### 10. reiterates its call for the activation of the passerelle clause provided for in article 312(2) tfeu so as to allow the adoption the mff regulation by qualified majority; recalls its proposals that the ordinary legislative procedure be applied for the adoption of the mff regulation; calls for article 311(3) tfeu to be amended so as to allow the european parliament to give its consent in the process of adopting new own resources.


### 11. observes the continuing demand for the eu budget to serve as a guarantee for additional macro-financial assistance (mfa); notes , however , that the higher risks of default and the large amount at stake entail significant contingent liabilities; ### 11. observes the continuing demand for the eu budget to serve as a guarantee for additional necessary macro-financial assistance (mfa) , especially for ukraine; welcomes the eu support in this regard; notes , however , that the higher risks of default and the large amount at stake entail significant contingent liabilities;


### 12. concludes that , in this context , the need for an urgent review and revision of the mff is beyond any doubt and that a ‘business as usual’ approach will not remotely suffice to tackle the array of challenges posed and could thereby undermine confidence in the union in the long term; ### 12. concludes that , in this context , the need for an urgent review and comprehensive , ambitious revision of the mff is beyond any doubt and that a ‘business as usual’ approach will fail unless additional measures are put in place to tackle the array of challenges posed , stimulate stagnant economies , rebuild europe’s industrial base and tackle the social and employment crisis , as well as the refugee and migration crises and could thereby undermine confidence in the union in the long term;


### 12. concludes that , in this context , the need for an urgent review and revision of the mff is beyond any doubt and that a ‘business as usual’ approach will not remotely suffice to tackle the array of challenges posed and could thereby undermine confidence in the union in the long term; ### 12. concludes that , in this context , the need for an urgent review and revision of the mff is beyond any doubt and that a ‘business as usual’ approach will not remotely suffice to tackle the array of challenges posed and could thereby undermine confidence in the union in the short , medium and long term;


### 13. calls on the commission , therefore , to conduct an in-depth review of the functioning of the current mff and proceed with a legislative proposal for a comprehensive mff revision as soon as possible and no later than the first quarter of 2023; ### 13. calls on the commission , therefore , to conduct an in-depth review of the functioning of the current mff and proceed with a legislative proposal for a comprehensive mff revision as soon as possible and no later than the first quarter of 2023; underlines the importance of union´s policies implementation and enforcement across all 27 member states and thus believes that an assessment of human resources needs of various directorates , which implement these policies , should be an integral part of the in-depth mff review;


### 13. calls on the commission , therefore , to conduct an in-depth review of the functioning of the current mff and proceed with a legislative proposal for a comprehensive mff revision as soon as possible and no later than the first quarter of 2023; ### 13. calls on the commission , therefore , to conduct an in-depth review of the functioning of the current mff and proceed with a legislative proposal for a comprehensive mff revision as soon as possible and no later than the first quarter of 2023 , in order to provide additional flexibility needed in the eu budget , respond to unforeseen and urgent needs and take into account the long-term implications of the covid-19 pandemic and the war against ukraine and the emergency measures taken;


### 14. underlines that the unanimity requirement for adoption of the mff regulation impedes the necessary decisions in the revision process; calls , in that regard , on the european council to activate the passerelle clause set out in article 312(2) tfeu to allow for adoption of the mff regulation by qualified majority; ### 14. underlines that the unanimity requirement for adoption of the mff regulation impedes the necessary decisions in the revision process; calls , in that regard , on the european council to activate the passerelle clause set out in article 312(2) tfeu to allow for adoption of the mff regulation by qualified majority; recalls its proposals that the ordinary legislative procedure be applied for the adoption of the mff regulation;


### 17. reaffirms its long-standing position that new political initiatives must be financed with additional fresh money and not to the detriment of well-established , pre-existing union programmes or policies; ### 17. reaffirms its long-standing position that new political initiatives must be financed with additional fresh money for new tasks , including those stemming from the european pillar of social rights (epsr) action plan and not to the detriment of well-established , pre-existing union programmes or policies; is concerned about the very limited margins available under the current mff and insists on the need to enhance spending to speed up the implementation of the action plan; reminds that programmes decided and their envelopes should be respected;


### 17. reaffirms its long-standing position that new political initiatives must be financed with additional fresh money and not to the detriment of well-established , pre-existing union programmes or policies; ### 17. reaffirms its long-standing position that new political initiatives must be financed with additional fresh money and not to the detriment of well-established , pre-existing union programmes or policies; strongly criticizes the systematic use of redeployments and the relabelling of existing programmes to finance new initiatives(“budgetwashing”);


### 18. highlights that many of the policy ambitions recently stated – notably in the fields of energy and strategic and industrial autonomy – and the new policy initiatives since january 2021 (chips act , secure connectivity , health emergency preparedness and response authority) imply spending under heading 1; opposes the use of agreed programme envelopes to finance new initiatives and believes that the margins are insufficient to accommodate the greater long-term needs; calls , therefore , for an increase in the ceiling of heading 1; ### 18. highlights that many of the policy ambitions recently stated – notably in the fields of energy and strategic and industrial autonomy – and the new policy initiatives since january 2021 (chips act , secure connectivity , health emergency preparedness and response authority) imply spending under heading 1; believes that the margins are insufficient to accommodate the greater long-term needs; calls , therefore , for an increase in the ceiling of heading 1;


### 19. regrets that , contrary to parliament’s position , it was decided that the costs of euri borrowing and the repayment of debt be included as a budget line under heading 2b , alongside flagship programmes such as erasmus+ , eu4health , and citizens , equality , rights and values; stresses that interest costs and debt repayment depend on market developments , are not discretionary spending , do not follow the logic of caps on spending and should never compete with programmes under the same ceiling; recalls that any activation of the emergency support instrument also depends on the availability of an unallocated margin under the ceiling of this heading; insists , therefore , that the status quo presents significant risks to programme spending and that the repayment line be removed from heading 2b and counted over and above the mff ceilings; ### 19. regrets that , contrary to parliament’s position , it was decided that the costs of euri borrowing and the repayment of debt be included as a budget line under heading 2b , alongside flagship programmes such as erasmus+ , eu4health , and citizens , equality , rights and values; stresses that interest costs and debt repayment depend on market developments , are not discretionary spending , do not follow the logic of caps on spending and should never compete with programmes under the same ceiling; recalls that any activation of the emergency support instrument also depends on the availability of an unallocated margin under the ceiling of this heading; insists , therefore , that the status quo presents significant risks to programme spending and that the repayment line be removed from heading 2b and counted over and above the mff ceilings; stresses the importance of european year of skills 2023 with concrete actions and policies to further develop employment and entrepreneurship measures and supported by adequate funding within the mff;


### 19. regrets that , contrary to parliament’s position , it was decided that the costs of euri borrowing and the repayment of debt be included as a budget line under heading 2b , alongside flagship programmes such as erasmus+ , eu4health , and citizens , equality , rights and values; stresses that interest costs and debt repayment depend on market developments , are not discretionary spending , do not follow the logic of caps on spending and should never compete with programmes under the same ceiling; recalls that any activation of the emergency support instrument also depends on the availability of an unallocated margin under the ceiling of this heading; insists , therefore , that the status quo presents significant risks to programme spending and that the repayment line be removed from heading 2b and counted over and above the mff ceilings; ### 19. recalls that the costs of euri borrowing and the repayment of debt are included as a budget line under heading 2b , alongside flagship programmes such as erasmus+ , eu4health , and citizens , equality , rights and values; stresses nevertheless that interest costs and debt repayment depend on market developments , are not discretionary spending , do not follow the logic of caps on spending and should never compete with programmes under the same ceiling; recalls that any activation of the emergency support instrument also depends on the availability of an unallocated margin under the ceiling of this heading; reminds that this decision was taken for the 2021-2027 period only , without prejudice to future negotiations; insists , therefore , that the status quo presents significant risks to programme spending and that the repayment line be removed from heading 2b and counted over and above the mff ceilings;


### 20. reiterates its position that the social climate fund must be fully incorporated into the eu budget and within the mff , without negatively impacting other programmes and funds under this heading , bearing in mind the importance of ensuring food security and delivering on the green deal; calls for the ceiling of heading 3 to be adjusted accordingly; ### 20. reiterates its position that the social climate fund must be fully incorporated into the eu budget and within the mff , without negatively impacting other programmes and funds under this heading , bearing in mind the importance of ensuring food security and delivering on the green deal; calls for the ceiling of heading 3 to be adjusted accordingly; calls on the council to move forward with the targeted mff revision as soon as possible to integrate the social climate fund into the mff; reminds the other arm of the budgetary authority its obligation to respect budget unity;


### 20. reiterates its position that the social climate fund must be fully incorporated into the eu budget and within the mff , without negatively impacting other programmes and funds under this heading , bearing in mind the importance of ensuring food security and delivering on the green deal; calls for the ceiling of heading 3 to be adjusted accordingly; ### 20. highlights the need to fully implement the just transition mechanism and the swift adoption of the social climate fund by focusing on social well-being and individuals’ needs; reiterates its position that the social climate fund must be fully incorporated into the eu budget and within the mff , without negatively impacting other programmes and funds under this heading , bearing in mind the importance of ensuring food security and delivering on the green deal; calls for the ceiling of heading 3 to be adjusted accordingly;


### 22. highlights that the necessary spending to enhance defence cooperation and investment cannot solely be covered within the ceiling of heading 5; calls for the ceiling to be increased in line with needs; ### 22. highlights that the necessary spending to enhance defence cooperation and investment cannot solely be covered within the ceiling of heading 5; welcomes the commission’s upcoming proposal for a european defence investment programme (edip) in view of introducing joint procurement and life cycle management of military capabilities; calls for the ceiling to be increased in line with needs; considers , in this regard , that savings could be made thanks to a mutualisation of defence spending between the member states at the eu level;


### 23. deplores the fact that , even prior to the war against ukraine , funds available under heading 6 were woefully inadequate and that pressure has since increased substantially; underlines that the continued funding for the needs of refugees from syria , iraq and other countries was not factored into the mff or ndici-global europe negotiations and should therefore have been financed by fresh appropriations with a corresponding increase in the ceiling of heading 6; highlights that , owing to the risk of default on mfa loans provided to ukraine , a far higher rate of provisioning than the standard 9 % is likely to be required as further loans are rolled out; underlines that additional needs in ukraine must not lead to money being diverted away from other geographic regions in need; insists , therefore , on an increase in the ceiling for heading 6 to fully cover the current and projected future needs of the union’s external action , which have dramatically increased both in neighbouring countries and worldwide as a result of the food , energy and economic crises; ### 23. deplores the fact that , even prior to the war against ukraine , funds available under heading 6 were woefully inadequate and that pressure has since increased substantially; underlines that the continued funding for the needs of refugees from syria , iraq and other countries was not factored into the mff or ndici-global europe negotiations and should therefore have been financed by fresh appropriations with a corresponding increase in the ceiling of heading 6 , rather than redeployments; highlights that a far higher rate of provisioning than the standard 9 % is required for mfa loans provided to ukraine as further loans are rolled out following the higher risk of default due to the war imposed by russia; underlines that additional needs in ukraine must not lead to money being diverted away from other geographic regions in need; insists , therefore , on an increase in the ceiling for heading 6 to fully cover the current and projected future needs of the union’s external action , which have dramatically increased both in neighbouring countries , especially in ukraine , and worldwide as a result of the food , energy and economic crises;


### 24. underlines that heading 7 spending must be set at a level that guarantees that the eu has an effective and efficient administration; calls for the swift adoption of the targeted revision of the financial regulation proposed by the commission in relation to the handling of default interest for the late repayment of cancelled or reduced competition fines , so as to avoid pressure on spending under heading 7; ### 24. underlines that heading 7 spending must be set at a level that guarantees that the eu has an effective and functional administration; calls on the commission to assign sufficient human resources for the implementation of the green deal and to commit to increase specifically the staffing level of the directorate general for environment; believes that a lack of action puts at danger several political priorities and citizens' requests; calls for the swift adoption of the targeted revision of the financial regulation proposed by the commission in relation to the handling of default interest for the late repayment of cancelled or reduced competition fines , so as to avoid pressure on spending under heading 7;


### 25. stresses that the mff revision must not lead to any downwards revision of the pre-allocated national envelopes; emphasises the fact that the late agreement on the mff for 2021-2027 and on the cohesion policy package , coupled with the covid-19 crisis , led to a slow start to the programming process , but not because of the policy itself; underlines that the delayed start does not in any way call into question the pivotal role and added value of cohesion policy as the essential union investment policy and convergence instrument; ### 25. stresses that the mff revision must not lead to any downwards revision of the pre-allocated national envelopes; emphasises the fact that the late agreement on the mff for 2021-2027 and on the cohesion policy package , coupled with the covid-19 crisis , led to a slow start to the programming process , but not because of the policy itself even though more administrative simplification is strongly needed; underlines that the delayed start does not in any way call into question the pivotal role and added value of cohesion policy as the essential union investment policy and convergence instrument;


### 26. recalls that payment appropriations flow directly from commitments and recalls , therefore , that any increase in the ceilings for commitments per heading will have to be accompanied by a corresponding increase in the ceiling for payments for the same or subsequent years; ### 26. recalls that payment appropriations flow directly from commitments and recalls , therefore , that any increase in the ceilings for commitments per heading will have to be accompanied by a correlative increase in the ceiling for payments for the same or subsequent years;


### 28. underlines that the temporary and short-term flexibility introduced into cohesion policy funds through the series of cohesion’s action for refugees in europe (care) proposals helped member states to deal quickly with the impact of the war against ukraine , following on from the model of the coronavirus response investment initiatives , crii and crii+ , which enabled eu action at the beginning of the covid-19 pandemic; ### 28. underlines that the temporary and short-term flexibility introduced into cohesion policy funds through the series of cohesion’s action for refugees in europe (care) proposals provided help to member states to deal quickly with the impact of the war against ukraine , albeit for some member states still insufficient for the scale of needs , following on from the model of the coronavirus response investment initiatives , crii and crii+ , which enabled eu action at the beginning of the covid-19 pandemic;


### 29. stresses that , while crisis response measures are necessary and useful , cohesion policy is not a crisis response tool; is concerned that cohesion policy is increasingly being used to reinforce other policies and to make up for shortcomings in budgetary flexibility or crisis response mechanisms in the mff; emphasises that cohesion policy is one of the priorities of the union , has long-term investment objectives linked to the eu’s strategic agenda , in particular the european green deal and the digital agenda , and should not be used to replenish funding for other policies; calls , therefore , for cohesion funding levels to be preserved in the budget; ### 29. stresses that , while crisis response measures are necessary and useful , cohesion policy is not a crisis response tool; considers , however , that it is essential to support regional development , sustainable growth and quality of life and employment; is concerned that cohesion policy is increasingly being used to reinforce other policies and to make up for shortcomings in budgetary flexibility or crisis response mechanisms in the mff; emphasises that cohesion policy is one of the priorities of the union , has long-term investment objectives linked to the eu’s strategic agenda , in particular the european green deal and the digital agenda , and should not be used to replenish funding for other policies; calls , therefore , for funding levels to be readjusted , in light of the sharp rise in energy prices that puts low income households in a difficult position , in order to invest in energy efficiency of the worst performing residential buildings to allow for timely , efficient and long-term response to the crisis;


### 29. stresses that , while crisis response measures are necessary and useful , cohesion policy is not a crisis response tool; is concerned that cohesion policy is increasingly being used to reinforce other policies and to make up for shortcomings in budgetary flexibility or crisis response mechanisms in the mff; emphasises that cohesion policy is one of the priorities of the union , has long-term investment objectives linked to the eu’s strategic agenda , in particular the european green deal and the digital agenda , and should not be used to replenish funding for other policies; calls , therefore , for cohesion funding levels to be preserved in the budget; ### 29. stresses that , while crisis response measures are necessary and useful , cohesion policy is not a crisis response tool; is concerned that cohesion policy is increasingly being used to reinforce other policies and to make up for shortcomings in budgetary flexibility or crisis response mechanisms in the mff; emphasises that cohesion policy is one of the priorities of the union , has long-term investment objectives linked to the eu’s strategic agenda , in particular the european green deal and the digital agenda , and should not be used to replenish funding for other policies; calls , therefore , for cohesion funding levels to be preserved in the budget along with common agricultural policy;


### 29. stresses that , while crisis response measures are necessary and useful , cohesion policy is not a crisis response tool; is concerned that cohesion policy is increasingly being used to reinforce other policies and to make up for shortcomings in budgetary flexibility or crisis response mechanisms in the mff; emphasises that cohesion policy is one of the priorities of the union , has long-term investment objectives linked to the eu’s strategic agenda , in particular the european green deal and the digital agenda , and should not be used to replenish funding for other policies; calls , therefore , for cohesion funding levels to be preserved in the budget; ### 29. stresses that , while crisis response measures are necessary and useful , cohesion policy is not a crisis response tool; is concerned that cohesion policy is increasingly being used to reinforce other policies and to make up for shortcomings in budgetary flexibility or crisis response mechanisms in the mff; emphasises that cohesion policy is one of the priorities of the union , has long-term investment objectives linked to the eu’s strategic agenda , in particular the european green deal and the digital agenda , and should not be used to replenish funding for other policies; calls , therefore , for cohesion and environmental funding levels to be preserved in the budget;


### 30. recalls that the special instruments sit outside the mff ceilings , therefore ensuring a degree of flexibility and the ability to respond to crises , and are only mobilised in the event of a budgetary authority decision; points to the extensive use made of the special instruments in the first two years of the mff; ### 30. recalls that the special instruments sit outside the mff ceilings , therefore ensuring a degree of flexibility and the ability to respond to crises , and are only mobilised in the event of a budgetary authority decision; points to the extensive use made of the special instruments in the first two years of the mff; insists that all existing shortcomings of the emergency measures need to be addressed and fully resolved , particularly in terms of adequacy and universality of coverage and access;


### 31. considers that the special instruments are constrained both by scarcity of resources and rigidity of design , hampering their ability to serve as effective crisis response tools; stresses , therefore , that the revision is imperative in broadening the potential of the existing flexibility provisions; criticises in particular the council’s decision , despite parliament’s warnings , to merge the emergency aid reserve (ear) and the eusf in the current mff , while reducing the overall funding available; ### 31. considers that the special instruments are constrained both by scarcity of resources and rigidity of design , hampering their ability to serve as effective crisis response tools; stresses , therefore , that the revision is imperative in broadening the potential of the existing flexibility provisions; considers that the merging of the emergency aid reserve (ear) and the eusf in the current mff has led to shortcomings , while reducing the overall funding available;


### 32. calls for annual appropriations for the flexibility instrument to be increased from eur 915 million to eur 2 billion; calls , in addition , for the sear to be split into two strands – the ear and the eusf – and for annual appropriations to be increased from eur 1.2 billion for the sear to eur 1 billion for each strand in 2018 prices; considers that this will provide vital additional resources to respond to current and emerging needs; ### 32. calls for annual appropriations for the flexibility instrument to be increased from eur 915 million to eur 2 billion; calls , in addition , for the sear to be split into two strands – the ear and the eusf – and for annual appropriations to be increased from eur 1.2 billion for the sear overall to eur 1 billion for each strand in 2018 prices; considers that this will provide vital additional resources to respond to current and emerging needs;


### 35. insists that , beyond a reinforcement of the existing special instruments , it is necessary to establish a permanent fiscal capacity and common crisis instrument as an additional special instrument over and above the mff ceilings so that the eu budget can better adapt and quickly react to crises and their social and economic effects; ### 35. insists that , beyond a reinforcement of the existing special instruments , it is necessary to establish a permanent fiscal capacity and common crisis instrument as an additional special instrument over and above the mff ceilings so that the eu budget can better adapt and quickly react to crises and their social and economic effects , thus mitigating the possible shocks on the eu's labour markets and consequences on living conditions , especially of those of the most vulnerable persons , as well as on small and medium-sized enterprises (smes);


### 35. insists that , beyond a reinforcement of the existing special instruments , it is necessary to establish a permanent fiscal capacity and common crisis instrument as an additional special instrument over and above the mff ceilings so that the eu budget can better adapt and quickly react to crises and their social and economic effects; ### 35. insists that , beyond a reinforcement of the existing special instruments , it is necessary to establish a permanent fiscal capacity for the euro area and common crisis instrument as an additional permanent special instrument over and above the mff ceilings so that the eu budget can better adapt and quickly react to crises and their social and economic effects;


### 36. insists that decommitted appropriations should remain in the budget so as to provide additional budgetary flexibility; underlines the need for corresponding changes to the financial regulation; ### 36. insists that decommitted appropriations , fines not used for eu programmes top-ups in 2021-2027 and penalties should accrue to the crisis instrument so as to provide additional budgetary flexibility; underlines the need for corresponding changes to the financial regulation;


### 37. underlines that many of the shortcomings and inadequacies in the current mff are inherent in its logic and design , where predictability of spending drives decisions on structure and amounts and curbs flexibility; ### 37. underlines that many of the shortcomings and inadequacies in the current mff are inherent in its logic and design , where predictability of spending drives decisions on structure and amounts and curbs flexibility; regrets the high tensions the mff negotiations trigger due to its nature;


### 38. points out that many of the recent spending needs , in areas such as economic and social recovery , climate change-related policy reform and funding linked to the ukraine crisis , do not follow the traditional logic of medium-term investment predictability; considers social climate fund , defence , crisis response and emergency intervention spending to be cases in point where there is a clear-cut rationale for eu action; expects this trend towards a more diversified expenditure landscape to continue as the scope and depth of eu cooperation progresses; underlines , therefore , the need for a properly constructed and adaptable mff so that the design of the eu budget does not prevent the eu from taking on new tasks and functions; ### 38. points out that many of the recent spending needs , in areas such as economic and social recovery , climate change-related policies and funding linked to the ukraine crisis , do not follow the traditional logic of medium-term investment predictability; considers social climate fund , defence , crisis response and emergency intervention spending to be cases in point where there is a clear-cut rationale for eu action; expects this trend towards a more diversified expenditure landscape to continue as the scope and depth of eu cooperation progresses; underlines , therefore , the need for a properly constructed and adaptable mff so that the design of the eu budget does not prevent the eu from taking on new tasks and functions;


### 39. deplores , however , the repeated use of off-budget instruments , in particular under article 122 tfeu , which runs counter to citizens’ interests , as this frustrates oversight and the transparency of public spending; considers , in that regard , than an annual plenary debate in parliament on all eu finances , including off-budget instruments , will be an important step towards enhancing transparency and accountability; ### 39. deplores , however , the repeated use of off-budget instruments , in particular under article 122 tfeu , which runs counter to citizens’ interests , as this frustrates oversight , accountability and the transparency of public spending;


### 40. stresses , in this context , that the trend towards increased use of external assigned revenue is not a satisfactory solution as it weakens the role of the budgetary authority (parliament and the council) , thereby negatively impacting democratic scrutiny and reducing the transparency of the eu’s finances; demands legally sound solutions that allow for targeted , one-off or needs-based top-ups that display the same advantages as earmarked revenue (i.e. not counted against the ceilings) , but that are at the same time subject to full control of the budgetary authority; ### 40. stresses , in this context , that the trend towards increased use of external assigned revenue is not a satisfactory solution as it weakens the role of the budgetary authority (parliament and the council) , thereby negatively impacting democratic scrutiny and reducing the transparency of the eu’s finances; demands legally sound solutions that allow for targeted , one-off or needs-based top-ups that display the same advantages as external assigned revenue (i.e. not counted against the ceilings) , but that are at the same time subject to full control of the budgetary authority; reminds its strong commitment to the universality principle;


### 42. calls on the commission , furthermore , to begin a longer-term reflection on the eu budget post-2027 in the light of evolving spending needs and building on the work of the conference on the future of europe with respect to own resources and the budget; insists that the successor to the current mff be equipped to deal fully and flexibly with a range of policy priorities and spending needs and to ensure resilience in the event of crises; ### 42. calls on the commission , furthermore , to begin a longer-term reflection on the eu budget post-2027 in the light of evolving spending needs and the interinstitutional commitment made towards the implementation of european pillar of social rights and the adoption of its action plan , which set , inter alia , the eu target of reducing the number of people at risk of poverty or social exclusion by at least 15 million by 2030 and building on the work of the conference on the future of europe with respect to own resources and the budget; insists that the successor to the current mff be equipped to deal fully and flexibly with a range of policy priorities and spending needs and to ensure resilience in the event of crises;


### 42. calls on the commission , furthermore , to begin a longer-term reflection on the eu budget post-2027 in the light of evolving spending needs and building on the work of the conference on the future of europe with respect to own resources and the budget; insists that the successor to the current mff be equipped to deal fully and flexibly with a range of policy priorities and spending needs and to ensure resilience in the event of crises; ### 42. calls on the commission , furthermore , to begin a longer-term reflection on the eu budget post-2027 in the light of evolving spending needs and building on the work of the conference on the future of europe with respect to own resources and the budget; insists that the successor to the current mff be equipped to deal fully and flexibly with a range of policy priorities and spending needs and to ensure resilience in the event of crises; asks the commission to review the whole architecture of the mff , including through an assessment of the suitability of a long-term programming framework for all eu programmes and of the duration of programming periods of seven years;


### (5) in order to implement those commitments as well as the union’s contributions under the paris agreement33 adopted under the unfccc , the union regulatory framework to achieve the greenhouse gas emission reduction target should be adapted. ### (5) in order to implement those commitments as well as the union’s contributions under the paris agreement33 adopted under the unfccc , the union regulatory framework to achieve the greenhouse gas emission reduction target should be adapted as well as the development strategies at national , regional and local level taking into account the importance of the domestic energy efficiency and independence. energy efficiency should be considered at the level of the energy system and in terms of reducing greenhouse gas emissions , and not through detailed sector-specific regulations. the different circumstances in the member states , cost-effectiveness , emissions trading and the work already done in the member states need to be better taken into account. in energy and climate work , it is important to involve private and public actors at regional and local level in the member states in order to ensure the effectiveness and acceptability of local measures. this should be done through national plans and strategies. local energy solutions should be considered as part of energy efficiency from the point of view of economic , social and ecological sustainability. fossil energy sources should be replaced where possible by locally produced sustainable energy sources that create positive effects on the regional economy.


### (7) while emissions trading will also apply to greenhouse gas emissions from road and maritime transport as well as buildings , the scope of regulation (eu) 2018/842 will be maintained. regulation (eu) 2018/842 will therefore continue applying to the greenhouse gas emissions from domestic navigation , but not to those from international navigation. greenhouse gas emissions of a member state within the scope of regulation (eu) 2018/842 to be taken into account for compliance checks will continue to be determined upon completion of inventory reviews in accordance with regulation (eu) 2018/1999 of the european parliament and the council34 . ### (7) regulation (eu) 2018/842 will continue applying to the greenhouse gas emissions from domestic navigation , but not to those from international navigation. greenhouse gas emissions of a member state within the scope of regulation (eu) 2018/842 to be taken into account for compliance checks will continue to be determined upon completion of inventory reviews in accordance with regulation (eu) 2018/1999 of the european parliament and the council34 .


### (13) the covid-19 pandemic has impacted the union’s economy and its level of emissions to a degree that cannot yet be fully quantified. on the other hand , the union is deploying its largest stimulus package ever , also having a potential impact on the level of emissions. due to those uncertainties , it is appropriate to review the emissions data in 2025 and , if necessary , readjust the annual emission allocations. ### (13) the covid-19 pandemic has impacted the union’s economy and its level of emissions to a degree that cannot yet be fully quantified. on the other hand , the union is deploying its largest stimulus package ever , also having a potential impact on the level of emissions. due to those uncertainties , it is appropriate to review the emissions data in 2025 and , if necessary , readjust the annual emission allocations in case the previous years’ allocations were too strict.


### (14) it is therefore appropriate to update in 2025 the annual emission allocations for the years 2026 to 2030. this should be based on a comprehensive review of the national inventory data carried out by the commission in order to determine the average of the greenhouse gas emissions of each member state during the years 2021 , 2022 and 2023. ### (14) it is therefore appropriate to update in 2025 the annual emission allocations for the years 2026 to 2030 in case the previous allocations are found to be too strict. this should be based on a comprehensive review of the national inventory data carried out by the commission in order to determine the average of the greenhouse gas emissions of each member state during the years 2021 , 2022 and 2023.


### (16) in addition to that flexibility , a limited quantity of net removals and net emissions from land use , land-use change and forestry (‘lulucf’) may be taken into account for member states’ compliance under regulation (eu) 2018/842 (‘the lulucf flexibility’). in order to ensure that sufficient mitigation efforts are deployed until 2030 , it is appropriate to limit the use of the lulucf flexibility by separating the use of such flexibility into two separate time periods , each capped by a limit corresponding to half of the maximum amount of total net removals set out in annex iii to regulation (eu) 2018/842. it is also appropriate to bring the title of annex iii in line with the amendment to regulation (eu) 2018/841 carried out by commission delegated regulation (eu) 2021/268 of 28 october 202037 . as a consequence , there is no longer a need for regulation (eu) 2018/842 to provide for a legal basis allowing the commission to adopt delegated acts to amend the title of its annex iii. article 7(2) of regulation (eu) 2018/842 should therefore be deleted. ### (16) in addition to that flexibility , a limited quantity of net removals and net emissions from land use , land-use change and forestry (‘lulucf’) may be taken into account for member states’ compliance under regulation (eu) 2018/842 (‘the lulucf flexibility’). in order to ensure that sufficient mitigation efforts are deployed until 2030 , it is appropriate to limit the use of the lulucf flexibility by separating the use of such flexibility into two separate time periods , first one capped at 75% of the maximum amount of total net removals set out in annex iii to regulation (eu) 2018/842 and the second one at half.


### for the years 2026 to 2030 , it shall determine the annual emission allocations based on the value for the 2005 greenhouse gas emissions of each member state indicated pursuant to the second subparagraph and on a comprehensive review of the most recent national inventory data for the years 2021 , 2022 and 2023 submitted by the member states pursuant to article 26 of regulation (eu) 2018/1999. ### for the years 2026 to 2030 , it shall determine the annual emission allocations based on the value for the 2005 greenhouse gas emissions of each member state indicated pursuant to the second subparagraph and on a comprehensive review of the most recent national inventory data for the years 2021 , 2022 and 2023 submitted by the member states pursuant to article 26 of regulation (eu) 2018/1999 , in case the previous years’ allocations were too strict.


### do not exceed , in the years 2023 , 2024 and 2025 , the limit defined by a linear trajectory starting in 2022 at the annual emission allocation for that member state , as set out pursuant to paragraph 3 of this article for that year , and ending in 2030 at the limit set for that member state in column 2 of annex i to this regulation; ### do not exceed , in the years 2023 to2030 , the limit defined by a linear trajectory starting in 2022 at the annual emission allocation for that member state , as set out pursuant to paragraph 3 of this article for that year , and ending in 2030 at the limit set for that member state in column 2 of annex i to this regulation;


### do not exceed , in the years 2026 to 2030 , the limit defined by a linear trajectory starting in 2024 , at the average of its greenhouse gas emissions during the years 2021 , 2022 and 2023 , as submitted by the member state pursuant to article 26 of regulation (eu) 2018/1999 , and ending in 2030 at the limit set for that member state in column 2 of annex i to this regulation. ### deleted


### for the years 2023 , 2024 and 2025 , it shall determine the annual emission allocations based on the value for the 2005 greenhouse gas emissions of each member state indicated pursuant to the second subparagraph and the reviewed values of the national inventory data for the years 2016 , 2017 and 2018 referred to in the second subparagraph. ### for the years 2023 to 2030 , it shall determine the annual emission allocations based on the value for the 2005greenhouse gas emissions of each member state indicated pursuant to the second subparagraph and the reviewed values of the national inventory data for the years 2016 , 2017 and 2018 referred to in the second subparagraph.


### for the years 2026 to 2030 , it shall determine the annual emission allocations based on the value for the 2005 greenhouse gas emissions of each member state indicated pursuant to the second subparagraph and on a comprehensive review of the most recent national inventory data for the years 2021 , 2022 and 2023 submitted by the member states pursuant to article 26 of regulation (eu) 2018/1999. ### deleted


### 3. notes that 2021 has seen the full commitment of the remaining budget appropriations related to the h2020 funded shift2rail programme for the operational activities. the undertaking’s annual budget for 2021 was eur 13.6 million in commitment appropriations and eur 68.4 million in payment appropriations; notes that the budget implementation rate was 100 % for the commitment appropriations and 85 % of the active funds for the payment appropriations; ### 3. notes that 2021 has seen the full commitment of the remaining budget appropriations related to the h2020 funded shift2rail programme for the operational activities. the undertaking’s annual budget for 2021 was eur 13.6 million in commitment appropriations and eur 68.4 million in payment appropriations; notes that the budget implementation rate was 100 % for the commitment appropriations and 85 % of the active funds for the payment appropriations; notes that the implementation rate for the undertaking’s 2021 operational payment budget available fell to 61 % , compared to 76% in 2020;


### (1) the purpose of this regulation is to improve the functioning of the internal market by laying down a uniform legal framework in particular for the development , marketing and use of artificial intelligence in conformity with union values. this regulation pursues a number of overriding reasons of public interest , such as a high level of protection of health , safety and fundamental rights , and it ensures the free movement of ai-based goods and services cross-border , thus preventing member states from imposing restrictions on the development , marketing and use of ai systems , unless explicitly authorised by this regulation. ### (1) the purpose of this regulation is to improve the functioning of the internal market by laying down a uniform legal framework in particular for the development , marketing and use of artificial intelligence in conformity with union values without hindering the innovation and the evolution of artificial intelligence and the beneficial contributions it can bring to the society. this regulation pursues a number of overriding reasons of public interest , such as a high level of protection of health , safety and fundamental rights , and it ensures the free movement of ai-based goods and services cross-border , thus preventing member states from imposing restrictions on the development , marketing and use of ai systems , unless explicitly authorised by this regulation.


### (5) a union legal framework laying down harmonised rules on artificial intelligence is therefore needed to foster the development , use and uptake of artificial intelligence in the internal market that at the same time meets a high level of protection of public interests , such as health and safety and the protection of fundamental rights , as recognised and protected by union law. to achieve that objective , rules regulating the placing on the market and putting into service of certain ai systems should be laid down , thus ensuring the smooth functioning of the internal market and allowing those systems to benefit from the principle of free movement of goods and services. by laying down those rules , this regulation supports the objective of the union of being a global leader in the development of secure , trustworthy and ethical artificial intelligence , as stated by the european council33 , and it ensures the protection of ethical principles , as specifically requested by the european parliament34 . ### (5) a union legal framework laying down harmonised rules on artificial intelligence is therefore needed to foster the development , use and uptake of artificial intelligence in the internal market that at the same time meets a high level of protection of public interests , such as health and safety and the protection of fundamental rights , as recognised and protected by union law. to achieve that objective , rules regulating the placing on the market and putting into service of certain ai systems should be laid down , thus ensuring the smooth functioning of the internal market and allowing those systems to benefit from the principle of free movement of goods and services. by laying down those rules as well as measures in support of innovation with a particular focus on smes and start-ups , this regulation supports the objective of the union of being a global leader in the development of secure , trustworthy and ethical artificial intelligence , as stated by the european council33 , and it ensures the protection of ethical principles , as specifically requested by the european parliament34 .


### (6) the notion of ai system should be clearly defined to ensure legal certainty , while providing the flexibility to accommodate future technological developments. the definition should be based on the key functional characteristics of the software , in particular the ability , for a given set of human-defined objectives , to generate outputs such as content , predictions , recommendations , or decisions which influence the environment with which the system interacts , be it in a physical or digital dimension. ai systems can be designed to operate with varying levels of autonomy and be used on a stand-alone basis or as a component of a product , irrespective of whether the system is physically integrated into the product (embedded) or serve the functionality of the product without being integrated therein (non-embedded). the definition of ai system should be complemented by a list of specific techniques and approaches used for its development , which should be kept up-to–date in the light of market and technological developments through the adoption of delegated acts by the commission to amend that list. ### (6) the notion of ai system should be clearly defined to ensure legal certainty , while providing the flexibility to accommodate future technological developments. therefore , the term ai system should be defined in line with internationally accepted definitions. the definition should be based on the key functional characteristics of ai systems , in particular the ability , for a given set of human-defined objectives , to generate outputs such as content , predictions , recommendations , or decisions which influence their physical or digital environment. ai systems can be designed to operate with varying levels of autonomy and be used on a stand-alone basis or as a component of a product , irrespective of whether the system is physically integrated into the product (embedded) or serve the functionality of the product without being integrated therein (non-embedded). the definition of ai system should be complemented by a list of specific techniques and approaches used for its development , which should be kept up-to–date in the light of market and technological developments through the adoption of delegated acts by the commission to amend that list. in order to ensure alignment of definitions on an international level , the european commission should engage in a dialogue with international organisations such as the organisation for economic cooperation and development (oecd) , should their definitions of the term ‘ai system’ be adjusted.


### (6) the notion of ai system should be clearly defined to ensure legal certainty , while providing the flexibility to accommodate future technological developments. the definition should be based on the key functional characteristics of the software , in particular the ability , for a given set of human-defined objectives , to generate outputs such as content , predictions , recommendations , or decisions which influence the environment with which the system interacts , be it in a physical or digital dimension. ai systems can be designed to operate with varying levels of autonomy and be used on a stand-alone basis or as a component of a product , irrespective of whether the system is physically integrated into the product (embedded) or serve the functionality of the product without being integrated therein (non-embedded). the definition of ai system should be complemented by a list of specific techniques and approaches used for its development , which should be kept up-to–date in the light of market and technological developments through the adoption of delegated acts by the commission to amend that list. ### (6) the notion of ai system should be clearly defined to ensure legal certainty , while providing the flexibility to accommodate future technological developments. the definition should be based on the key functional characteristics of the software , in particular the ability , for a given set of human-defined objectives , to generate outputs such as content , evaluation of status and quality , predictions , potential risks , recommendations , or decisions which influence the environment with which the system interacts , be it in a physical or digital dimension. ai systems can be designed to operate with varying levels of autonomy and be used on a stand-alone basis or as a component of a product , irrespective of whether the system is physically integrated into the product (embedded) or serve the functionality of the product without being integrated therein (non-embedded). the definition of ai system should be complemented by a list of specific techniques and approaches used for its development , which should be kept up-to–date in the light of market and technological developments through the adoption of delegated acts by the commission to amend that list.


### (19) the use of those systems for the purpose of law enforcement should therefore be prohibited , except in three exhaustively listed and narrowly defined situations , where the use is strictly necessary to achieve a substantial public interest , the importance of which outweighs the risks. those situations involve the search for potential victims of crime , including missing children; certain threats to the life or physical safety of natural persons or of a terrorist attack; and the detection , localisation , identification or prosecution of perpetrators or suspects of the criminal offences referred to in council framework decision 2002/584/jha38 if those criminal offences are punishable in the member state concerned by a custodial sentence or a detention order for a maximum period of at least three years and as they are defined in the law of that member state. such threshold for the custodial sentence or detention order in accordance with national law contributes to ensure that the offence should be serious enough to potentially justify the use of ‘real-time’ remote biometric identification systems. moreover , of the 32 criminal offences listed in the council framework decision 2002/584/jha , some are in practice likely to be more relevant than others , in that the recourse to ‘real-time’ remote biometric identification will foreseeably be necessary and proportionate to highly varying degrees for the practical pursuit of the detection , localisation , identification or prosecution of a perpetrator or suspect of the different criminal offences listed and having regard to the likely differences in the seriousness , probability and scale of the harm or possible negative consequences. ### (19) the use of those systems for the purpose of law enforcement should therefore be prohibited.


### (19) the use of those systems for the purpose of law enforcement should therefore be prohibited , except in three exhaustively listed and narrowly defined situations , where the use is strictly necessary to achieve a substantial public interest , the importance of which outweighs the risks. those situations involve the search for potential victims of crime , including missing children; certain threats to the life or physical safety of natural persons or of a terrorist attack; and the detection , localisation , identification or prosecution of perpetrators or suspects of the criminal offences referred to in council framework decision 2002/584/jha38 if those criminal offences are punishable in the member state concerned by a custodial sentence or a detention order for a maximum period of at least three years and as they are defined in the law of that member state. such threshold for the custodial sentence or detention order in accordance with national law contributes to ensure that the offence should be serious enough to potentially justify the use of ‘real-time’ remote biometric identification systems. moreover , of the 32 criminal offences listed in the council framework decision 2002/584/jha , some are in practice likely to be more relevant than others , in that the recourse to ‘real-time’ remote biometric identification will foreseeably be necessary and proportionate to highly varying degrees for the practical pursuit of the detection , localisation , identification or prosecution of a perpetrator or suspect of the different criminal offences listed and having regard to the likely differences in the seriousness , probability and scale of the harm or possible negative consequences. ### (19) the use of those systems for the purpose of law enforcement should therefore be prohibited , except in exhaustively listed and narrowly defined situations , where the use is strictly necessary to achieve a substantial public interest , the importance of which outweighs the risks. those situations involve the search for potential victims of crime , including missing children and certain threats to the life or physical safety of natural persons or of a terrorist attack.


### (33) technical inaccuracies of ai systems intended for the remote biometric identification of natural persons can lead to biased results and entail discriminatory effects. this is particularly relevant when it comes to age , ethnicity , sex or disabilities. therefore , ‘real-time’ and ‘post’ remote biometric identification systems should be classified as high-risk. in view of the risks that they pose , both types of remote biometric identification systems should be subject to specific requirements on logging capabilities and human oversight. ### (33) technical inaccuracies of ai systems intended for the remote biometric identification of natural persons can lead to biased results and entail discriminatory effects. this is particularly relevant when it comes to age , ethnicity , sex or disabilities. therefore , ‘ real-time’ and ‘post’ remote biometric identification systems should be classified as high-risk. in view of the risks that they pose , both types of remote biometric identification systems should be subject to specific requirements on logging capabilities and human oversight. the high risk of non-remote biometric identification systems intended to be used in publicly accessible spaces , workplaces and education and training institutions should be determined on a case-by-case basis considering the need for and logging-in capabilities and other elements that might interfere with the human rights.