### 2. without prejudice to the protection of undertakings’ business secrets , providers of proprietary audience measurement systems shall provide , without undue delay and free of costs , to media service providers and advertisers , as well as to third parties authorised by media service providers and advertisers , accurate , detailed , comprehensive , intelligible and up-to-date information on the methodology used by their audience measurement systems. this provision shall not affect the union’s data protection and privacy rules. ### 2. without prejudice to the protection of undertakings’ business secrets and intellectual property rights , providers of proprietary audience measurement systems developed without market governance or outside of industry standards agreed by the relevant self-regulatory bodies shall provide , without undue delay and free of costs , to media service providers and advertisers , right holders , as well as to third parties authorised by media service providers and advertisers , accurate , detailed , comprehensive , intelligible and up-to-date information on the methodology used and the data collected by their audience measurement systems. the information must be as granular as the information on methodologies published by self-regulatory bodies that govern the agreed industry standards on audience measurement. the methodology and its application shall be audited at least once a year by an independent body. this provision shall not affect the union’s data protection and privacy rules.


### 3. national regulatory authorities or bodies shall encourage the drawing up of codes of conduct by providers of audience measurement systems , together with media service providers , their representative organisations and any other interested parties , that are intended to contribute to compliance with the principles referred to in paragraph 1 , including by promoting independent and transparent audits. ### 3. national regulatory authorities or bodies shall encourage the drawing up of codes of conduct by providers of audience measurement systems , including very large online platforms , together with media service providers , their representative organisations and any other interested parties , that are intended to contribute to compliance with the principles referred to in paragraph 1 , including by promoting independent and transparent audits.


### 3. national regulatory authorities or bodies shall encourage the drawing up of codes of conduct by providers of audience measurement systems , together with media service providers , their representative organisations and any other interested parties , that are intended to contribute to compliance with the principles referred to in paragraph 1 , including by promoting independent and transparent audits. ### 3. national regulatory authorities or bodies shall encourage the drawing up of codes of conduct by providers of audience measurement systems , including online platforms , together with media service providers , their representative organisations and any other interested parties , that are intended to contribute to compliance with the principles referred to in paragraph 1 , including by promoting independent and transparent audits.


### 3. national regulatory authorities or bodies shall encourage the drawing up of codes of conduct by providers of audience measurement systems , together with media service providers , their representative organisations and any other interested parties , that are intended to contribute to compliance with the principles referred to in paragraph 1 , including by promoting independent and transparent audits. ### 3. providers of audience measurement systems , including online platforms , together with media service providers , their representative organisations and any other interested parties , shall draw up codes of conduct , with the support of national regulatory authorities or bodies , that are intended to contribute to compliance with the principles referred to in paragraph 1 , including by promoting independent and transparent audits.


### allocation of state advertising ### allocation of state funding


### 1. public funds or any other consideration or advantage granted by public authorities to media service providers for the purposes of advertising shall be awarded according to transparent , objective , proportionate and non-discriminatory criteria and through open , proportionate and non-discriminatory procedures. this article shall not affect public procurement rules. ### 1. public funds or any other consideration or advantage granted by public authorities to media service providers and providers of online platforms , including for the purposes of advertising , shall be awarded according to transparent , objective , proportionate and non-discriminatory criteria and through open , proportionate and non-discriminatory procedures. this article shall not affect public procurement rules.


### 1. public funds or any other consideration or advantage granted by public authorities to media service providers for the purposes of advertising shall be awarded according to transparent , objective , proportionate and non-discriminatory criteria and through open , proportionate and non-discriminatory procedures. this article shall not affect public procurement rules. ### 1. public funds or any other consideration or advantage granted by public authorities to media service providers and online platforms for the purposes of advertising shall be awarded according to transparent , objective , proportionate and non-discriminatory criteria and through open , proportionate and non-discriminatory procedures. this article shall not affect public procurement rules.


### 2. public authorities , including national , federal or regional governments , regulatory authorities or bodies , as well as state-owned enterprises or other state-controlled entities at the national or regional level , or local governments of territorial entities of more than 1 million inhabitants , shall make publicly available accurate , comprehensive , intelligible , detailed and yearly information about their advertising expenditure allocated to media service providers , which shall include at least the following details: ### 2. public authorities , including national , federal or regional governments , regulatory authorities or bodies , as well as state-owned enterprises or other state-controlled entities at the national or regional level , or local governments , shall make publicly available accurate , comprehensive , intelligible , detailed and yearly information about their advertising expenditure allocated to media service providers , which shall include at least the following details:


### 2. public authorities , including national , federal or regional governments , regulatory authorities or bodies , as well as state-owned enterprises or other state-controlled entities at the national or regional level , or local governments of territorial entities of more than 1 million inhabitants , shall make publicly available accurate , comprehensive , intelligible , detailed and yearly information about their advertising expenditure allocated to media service providers , which shall include at least the following details: ### 2. public authorities , including national , federal or regional governments , regulatory authorities or bodies , as well as state owned enterprises or other state controlled entities at the national or regional level , or local governments of territorial entities , shall make publicly available accurate , comprehensive , intelligible , detailed and yearly information about their expenditures allocated to media service providers and providers of online platforms , which shall include at least the following details:


### the legal names of media service providers from which advertising services were purchased; ### the legal names of media service providers;


### the total annual amount spent as well as the amounts spent per media service provider. ### the total annual amount spent as well as the amounts spent per media service provider or providers of online platforms..


### 3. national regulatory authorities or bodies shall monitor the allocation of state advertising in media markets. in order to assess the accuracy of the information on state advertising made available pursuant to paragraph 2 , national regulatory authorities or bodies may request from the entities referred to in paragraph 2 further information , including information on the application of criteria referred to in paragraph 1. ### 3. national regulatory authorities or bodies shall monitor the allocation of state funding in media markets and to providers of online platforms. in order to assess the accuracy of the information on state funding made available pursuant to paragraph 2 , national regulatory authorities or bodies may request from the entities referred to in paragraph 2 further information , including information on the application of criteria referred to in paragraph 1.


### 4. the allocation of state resources to media service providers for the purpose of purchasing goods or services from them other than state advertising shall be subject to the requirements set out in paragraph 1. this article shall not affect the application of the state aid rules. ### 4. the allocation of state resources to media service providers and providers of online platforms for the purpose of purchasing goods or services from them shall be subject to the requirements set out in paragraph 1. this article shall not affect the application of the state aid rules.


### (16) journalists and editors are the main actors in the production and provision of trustworthy media content , in particular by reporting on news or current affairs. it is essential therefore to protect journalists’ capability to collect , fact-check and analyse information , including information imparted confidentially. in particular , media service providers and journalists (including those operating in non-standard forms of employment , such as freelancers) should be able to rely on a robust protection of journalistic sources and communications , including against deployment of surveillance technologies , since without such protection sources may be deterred from assisting the media in informing the public on matters of public interest. as a result , journalists’ freedom to exercise their economic activity and fulfil their vital ‘public watchdog’ role may be undermined , thus affecting negatively access to quality media services. the protection of journalistic sources contributes to the protection of the fundamental right enshrined in article 11 of the charter. ### (16) journalists and editors are the main actors in the production and provision of trustworthy media content , in particular by reporting on news or current affairs. it is essential therefore to protect journalists’ capability to collect , fact-check and analyse information , including information imparted confidentially. in particular , media service providers and journalists (including those operating in non-standard forms of employment , such as freelancers) should be able to rely on a robust protection of journalistic sources and communications , including against deployment of surveillance and encryption deconstruction technologies , since without such protection sources may be deterred from assisting the media in informing the public on matters of public interest. as a result , journalists’ freedom to exercise their economic activity and fulfil their vital ‘public watchdog’ role may be undermined , thus affecting negatively access to quality media services. the protection of journalistic sources contributes to the protection of the fundamental right enshrined in article 11 of the charter.


### (18) public service media established by the member states play a particular role in the internal media market , by ensuring that citizens and businesses have access to quality information and impartial media coverage , as part of their mission. however , public service media can be particularly exposed to the risk of interference , given their institutional proximity to the state and the public funding they receive. this risk may be exacerbated by uneven safeguards related to independent governance and balanced coverage by public service media across the union. this situation may lead to biased or partial media coverage , distort competition in the internal media market and negatively affect access to independent and impartial media services. it is thus necessary , building on the international standards developed by the council of europe in this regard , to put in place legal safeguards for the independent functioning of public service media across the union. it is also necessary to guarantee that , without prejudice to the application of the union’s state aid rules , public service media providers benefit from sufficient and stable funding to fulfil their mission that enables predictability in their planning. preferably , such funding should be decided and appropriated on a multi-year basis , in line with the public service mission of public service media providers , to avoid potential for undue influence from yearly budget negotiations. the requirements laid down in this regulation do not affect the competence of member states to provide for the funding of public service media as enshrined in protocol 29 on the system of public broadcasting in the member states , annexed to the treaty on european union and to the treaty on the functioning of the european union. ### (18) public service media established by the member states play a particular role in the internal media market , by ensuring that citizens and businesses have access to universal and varied offers including quality information , and balanced and impartial media coverage , as part of their remit. however , public service media can be particularly exposed to the risk of interference , given their institutional proximity to the state and the public funding they receive. this risk may be exacerbated by uneven safeguards related to independent governance and balanced coverage by public service media across the union. it is thus necessary , building on the international standards developed by the council of europe in this regard , that member states put in place legal safeguards for the independent functioning of public service media across the union. it is also necessary to guarantee that , without prejudice to the application of the union’s state aid rules , public service media providers benefit from sufficient and stable funding to fulfil their remit that enables predictability in their planning. such funding should be decided and appropriated on a multi- year basis , in line with the public service remit of public service media providers , to avoid potential for undue influence from budget negotiations. the transparency requirements under this regulation for the appointment procedures for public service media’s heads of management and members of governing bodies do not require the disclosure of the candidates’ identity. the requirements laid down in this regulation do not affect the application of the state aid rules as applied on a case-by-case basis or the competence of member states to define a broad and dynamic remit , organise and provide for the funding of public service media as enshrined in protocol 29 on the system of public broadcasting in the member states , annexed to the treaty on european union and to the treaty on the functioning of the european union.


### (20) media integrity also requires a proactive approach to promote editorial independence by news media companies , in particular through internal safeguards. media service providers should adopt proportionate measures to guarantee , once the overall editorial line has been agreed between their owners and editors , the freedom of the editors to take individual decisions in the course of their professional activity. the objective to shield editors from undue interference in their decisions taken on specific pieces of content as part of their everyday work contributes to ensuring a level playing field in the internal market for media services and the quality of such services. that objective is also in conformity with the fundamental right to receive and impart information under article 11 of the charter. in view of these considerations , media service providers should also ensure transparency of actual or potential conflicts of interest to their service recipients. ### (20) media integrity also requires a proactive approach to promote editorial independence by news media companies , in particular through internal safeguards. media service providers should adopt proportionate measures to guarantee , in line with the media service providers' priorities and the overall editorial , the freedom of the editors-in-chief to take independent decisions in the course of their professional activity. the editor-in-chief oversees the editorial work and makes the editorial decisions. the publisher , owner , or other company management cannot interfere with the content by overriding the editor-in-chief. any attempt by the publisher , owner , or other company management to limit or control the decisions of the editor-in-chief regarding the editorial content is considered inappropriate interference from the owner of the media service provider , which undermines editorial independence and integrity. the objective to shield editors from undue interference in their decisions taken on specific pieces of content as part of their everyday work contributes to ensuring a level playing field in the internal market for media services and the quality of such services. that objective is also in conformity with the fundamental right to receive and impart information under article 11 of the charter. in view of these considerations , media service providers should also ensure transparency of conflicts of interest to their service recipients.


### (21) to mitigate regulatory burdens , micro enterprises within the meaning of article 3 of directive 2013/34/eu of the european parliament and of the council50 should be exempted from the requirements related to information and internal safeguards with a view to guaranteeing the independence of individual editorial decisions. moreover , media service providers should be free to tailor the internal safeguards to their needs , in particular if they are small and medium-sized enterprises within the meaning of that article. the recommendation that accompanies this regulation51 provides a catalogue of voluntary internal safeguards that can be adopted within media companies in this regard. the present regulation should not be construed to the effect of depriving the owners of private media service providers of their prerogative to set strategic or general goals and to foster the growth and financial viability of their undertakings. in this respect , this regulation recognises that the goal of fostering editorial independence needs to be reconciled with the legitimate rights and interests of private media owners. ### (21) media service providers should be free to tailor the internal safeguards to their needs , in particular if they are small and medium-sized enterprises. the recommendation that accompanies this regulation51 provides a catalogue of voluntary internal safeguards that can be adopted within media companies in this regard. the present regulation should not be construed to the effect of depriving the owners of private media service providers of their prerogative to set strategic or general goals and to foster the growth and financial viability of their undertakings. in this respect , this regulation recognises that the goal of fostering editorial independence needs to be reconciled with the legitimate rights and interests of private media owners.


### (22) independent national regulatory authorities or bodies are key for the proper application of media law across the union. national regulatory authorities or bodies referred to in article 30 of directive 2010/13/eu are best placed to ensure the correct application of the requirements related to regulatory cooperation and a well-functioning market for media services , envisaged in chapter iii of this regulation. in order to ensure a consistent application of this regulation and other union media law , it is necessary to set up an independent advisory body at union level gathering such authorities or bodies and coordinating their actions. the european regulators group for audiovisual media services (erga) , established by directive 2010/13/eu , has been essential in promoting the consistent implementation of that directive. the european board for media services (‘the board’) should therefore build on erga and replace it. this requires a targeted amendment of directive 2010/13/eu to delete its article 30b , which establishes erga , and to replace references to erga and its tasks as a consequence. the amendment of directive 2010/13/eu by this regulation is justified in this case as it is limited to a provision which does not need to be transposed by member states and is addressed to the institutions of the union. ### (22) independent national regulatory authorities or bodies are key for the proper application of media law across the union. while national regulatory authorities or bodies referred to in article 30 of directive 2010/13/eu often do not have competencies related to the press sector , they are best placed to ensure the correct application of the requirements related to regulatory cooperation and a well-functioning market for media services , envisaged in chapter iii of this regulation. in order to ensure a consistent application of this regulation and other union media law , it is necessary to set up an independent advisory body at union level gathering such authorities or bodies and coordinating their actions. in the performance of its tasks and the exercise of its powers , this body should neither seek nor take instructions from any government , institution and public or private person or body. the european regulators group for audiovisual media services (erga) , established by directive 2010/13/eu , has been essential in promoting the consistent implementation of that directive. the european board for media services (‘the board’) should therefore build on erga and replace it. this requires a targeted amendment of directive 2010/13/eu to delete its article 30b , which establishes erga , and to replace references to erga and its tasks as a consequence. the amendment of directive 2010/13/eu by this regulation is justified in this case as it is limited to a provision which does not need to be transposed by member states and is addressed to the institutions of the union.


### (23) the board should bring together senior representatives of the national regulatory authorities or bodies referred to in article 30 of directive 2010/13/eu , appointed by such authorities or bodies. in cases where member states have several relevant regulatory authorities or bodies , including at regional level , a joint representative should be chosen through appropriate procedures and the voting right should remain limited to one representative per member state. this should not affect the possibility for the other national regulatory authorities or bodies to participate , as appropriate , in the meetings of the board. the board should also have the possibility to invite to attend its meetings , in agreement with the commission , experts and observers , including in particular regulatory authorities or bodies from candidate countries , potential candidate countries , eea countries , or ad hoc delegates from other competent national authorities. due to the sensitivity of the media sector and following the practice of erga decisions in accordance with its rules of procedure , the board should adopt its decisions on the basis of a two-thirds majority of the votes. ### (23) the board should bring together senior representatives of the national regulatory authorities or bodies referred to in article 30 of directive 2010/13/eu , appointed by such authorities or bodies. in cases where member states have several relevant regulatory authorities or bodies , including at regional level , a joint representative should be chosen through appropriate procedures and the voting right should remain limited to one representative per member state. this should not affect the possibility for the other national regulatory authorities or bodies to participate , as appropriate , in the meetings of the board. the board should also have the possibility to invite , on a case-by-case basis , external experts to attend its meetings. the board , in consultation with the commission , should have the possibility to designate experts and observers , to attend its meetings , including in particular regulatory authorities or bodies from candidate countries , potential candidate countries , eea countries , or to invite ad hoc delegates from other competent national authorities. due to the sensitivity of the media sector and following the practice of erga decisions in accordance with its rules of procedure , the board should adopt its decisions on the basis of a two-thirds majority of the votes.


### (24) without prejudice to the powers granted to the commission by the treaties , it is essential that the commission and the board work and cooperate closely. in particular , the board should actively support the commission in its tasks of ensuring the consistent application of this regulation and of the national rules implementing directive 2010/13/eu. for that purpose , the board should in particular advise and assist the commission on regulatory , technical or practical aspects pertinent to the application of union law , promote cooperation and the effective exchange of information , experience and best practices and draw up opinions in agreement with the commission or upon its request in the cases envisaged by this regulation. in order to effectively fulfil its tasks , the board should be able to rely on the expertise and human resources of a secretariat provided by the commission. the commission secretariat should provide administrative and organisational support to the board , and help the board in carrying out its tasks. ### (24) without prejudice to the powers granted to the commission by the treaties , it is essential that the commission and the board work and cooperate closely. in particular , the board should actively support the commission in its tasks of ensuring the consistent application of this regulation and of the national rules implementing directive 2010/13/eu. for that purpose , the board should in particular advise and assist the commission on regulatory , technical or practical aspects pertinent to the application of union law , promote cooperation and the effective exchange of information , experience and best practices and may draw up opinions in the cases envisaged by this regulation. in order to effectively fulfil its tasks , the board should be able to rely on the expertise and human resources of an independent secretariat. the secretariat should provide administrative and organisational support to the board , and help the board in carrying out its tasks.


### (24) without prejudice to the powers granted to the commission by the treaties , it is essential that the commission and the board work and cooperate closely. in particular , the board should actively support the commission in its tasks of ensuring the consistent application of this regulation and of the national rules implementing directive 2010/13/eu. for that purpose , the board should in particular advise and assist the commission on regulatory , technical or practical aspects pertinent to the application of union law , promote cooperation and the effective exchange of information , experience and best practices and draw up opinions in agreement with the commission or upon its request in the cases envisaged by this regulation. in order to effectively fulfil its tasks , the board should be able to rely on the expertise and human resources of a secretariat provided by the commission. the commission secretariat should provide administrative and organisational support to the board , and help the board in carrying out its tasks. ### (24) without prejudice to the powers granted to the commission by the treaties , it is essential that the commission and the board work and cooperate closely. in particular , the board should actively support the commission in its tasks of ensuring the consistent application of this regulation and of the national measures implementing directive 2010/13/eu. for that purpose , the board should in particular advise and assist the commission on regulatory , technical or practical aspects pertinent to the application of union law , promote cooperation and the effective exchange of information , experience and best practices and draw up opinions on its own initiative or upon the commission's request in the cases envisaged by this regulation. in order to effectively and independently fulfil its tasks , the board should be able to rely on the expertise and human resources of a secretariat provided by the commission. the commission secretariat should provide administrative and organisational support to the board , and help the board in carrying out its tasks.


### (30) regulatory authorities or bodies referred to in article 30 of directive 2010/13/eu have specific practical expertise that allows them to effectively balance the interests of the providers and recipients of media services while ensuring the respect for the freedom of expression. this is key in particular when it comes to protecting the internal market from activities of media service providers established outside the union that target audiences in the union where , inter alia in view of the control that may be exercised by third countries over them , they may prejudice or pose risks of prejudice to public security and defence. in this regard , the coordination between national regulatory authorities or bodies to face together possible public security and defence threats stemming from such media services needs to be strengthened and given a legal framework to ensure the effectiveness and possible coordination of the national measures adopted in line with union media legislation. in order to ensure that media services suspended in certain member states under article 3(3) and 3(5) of directive 2010/13/eu do not continue to be provided via satellite or other means in those member states , a mechanism of accelerated mutual cooperation and assistance should also be available to guarantee the ‘effet utile’ of the relevant national measures , in compliance with union law. additionally , it is necessary to coordinate the national measures that may be adopted to counter public security and defence threats by media services established outside of the union and targeting audiences in the union , including the possibility for the board , in agreement with the commission , to issue opinions on such measures , as appropriate. in this regard , risks to public security and defence need to be assessed with a view to all relevant factual and legal elements , at national and european level. this is without prejudice to the competence of the union under article 215 of the treaty on the functioning of the european union. ### (30) regulatory authorities or bodies referred to in article 30 of directive 2010/13/eu have specific practical expertise that allows them to effectively balance the interests of the providers and recipients of media services while ensuring the respect for the freedom of expression. this is key in particular when it comes to protecting the internal market from activities of media service providers originating from outside the union (either established outside of the eu , established outside of the eu but under jurisdiction of an eu member state through the directive 2010/13/eu satellite criteria or established in the eu) , irrespective of the means of distribution or access , that target or reach audiences in the union where , inter alia in view of the control that may be exercised by third countries state authorities over them , they may prejudice or pose risks of prejudice to public security , including the safeguarding of national security and defence , public health , or where their programs include incitement to violence or hatred or public provocation to commit a terrorist offence. in this regard , the cooperation between national regulatory authorities or bodies to face together possible threats stemming from such media services needs to be strengthened and given a legal framework to ensure the effectiveness and possible coordination of the national measures adopted in line with union media legislation. media service providers must notify regulatory authorities or bodies in the member states where they target or reach audiences about their operations , including specific information on their ownership structure , financing sources , and editorial practices. this information should shall be made transparent and accessible to the public in order to promote accountability and confidence in the media industry. the board shall monitor compliance with these requirements and offer comments on the efforts made by member states to address threats to public security and defense presented by such media services in collaboration with regulatory authorities or bodies.


### (31) very large online platforms act for many users as a gateway for access to media services. media service providers who exercise editorial responsibility over their content play an important role in the distribution of information and in the exercise of freedom of information online. when exercising such editorial responsibility , they are expected to act diligently and provide information that is trustworthy and respectful of fundamental rights , in line with the regulatory or self-regulatory requirements they are subject to in the member states. therefore , also in view of users’ freedom of information , where providers of very large online platforms consider that content provided by such media service providers is incompatible with their terms and conditions , while it is not contributing to a systemic risk referred to in article 26 of regulation (eu) 2022/xxx [the digital services act] , they should duly consider freedom and pluralism of media , in accordance with regulation (eu) 2022/xxx [the digital services act] and provide , as early as possible , the necessary explanations to media service providers as their business users in the statement of reasons under regulation (eu) 2019/1150 of the european parliament and of the council54 . to minimise the impact of any restriction to that content on users’ freedom of information , very large online platforms should endeavour to submit the statement of reasons prior to the restriction taking effect without prejudice to their obligations under regulation (eu) 2022/xxx [the digital services act]. in particular , this regulation should not prevent a provider of a very large online platform to take expeditious measures either against illegal content disseminated through its service , or in order to mitigate systemic risks posed by dissemination of certain content through its service , in compliance with union law , in particular pursuant to regulation (eu) 2022/xxx [the digital services act]. ### (31) very large online platforms act for many users as a gateway for access to media services. media service providers who exercise editorial responsibility over their content play an important role in the distribution of information and in the exercise of freedom of information online. when exercising such editorial responsibility , they are expected to act diligently and provide information that is trustworthy and respectful of fundamental rights , in line with the regulatory or self-regulatory requirements they are subject to in the member states. therefore , also in view of users’ freedom of information , where providers of very large online platforms consider that content provided by such media service providers is incompatible with their terms and conditions , while it is not contributing to a systemic risk referred to in article 26 of regulation (eu) 2022/xxx [the digital services act] , they should duly consider freedom and pluralism of media , in accordance with regulation (eu) 2022/xxx [the digital services act] and provide , as early as possible , the necessary explanations to media service providers as their business users in the statement of reasons under regulation (eu) 2019/1150 of the european parliament and of the council54 . to minimise the impact of any restriction to that content on users’ freedom of information , very large online platforms should endeavour to submit the statement of reasons in accordance with article 4(1) of regulation (eu) 2019/1150 and article 17(3) of regulation (eu) 2022/xxx2065 [the digital services act] and grant the affected media service a right to reply to this statement of reasons prior to the suspension or restriction taking effect. in particular , this regulation should not prevent a provider of a very large online platform to take expeditious measures either against illegal content disseminated through its service , or in order to mitigate systemic risks posed by dissemination of certain content through its service , in compliance with union law , in particular pursuant to regulation (eu) 2022/2065 [the digital services act].


### (31) very large online platforms act for many users as a gateway for access to media services. media service providers who exercise editorial responsibility over their content play an important role in the distribution of information and in the exercise of freedom of information online. when exercising such editorial responsibility , they are expected to act diligently and provide information that is trustworthy and respectful of fundamental rights , in line with the regulatory or self-regulatory requirements they are subject to in the member states. therefore , also in view of users’ freedom of information , where providers of very large online platforms consider that content provided by such media service providers is incompatible with their terms and conditions , while it is not contributing to a systemic risk referred to in article 26 of regulation (eu) 2022/xxx [the digital services act] , they should duly consider freedom and pluralism of media , in accordance with regulation (eu) 2022/xxx [the digital services act] and provide , as early as possible , the necessary explanations to media service providers as their business users in the statement of reasons under regulation (eu) 2019/1150 of the european parliament and of the council54 . to minimise the impact of any restriction to that content on users’ freedom of information , very large online platforms should endeavour to submit the statement of reasons prior to the restriction taking effect without prejudice to their obligations under regulation (eu) 2022/xxx [the digital services act]. in particular , this regulation should not prevent a provider of a very large online platform to take expeditious measures either against illegal content disseminated through its service , or in order to mitigate systemic risks posed by dissemination of certain content through its service , in compliance with union law , in particular pursuant to regulation (eu) 2022/xxx [the digital services act]. ### (31) very large online platforms act for many users as a gateway for access to media services. media service providers who exercise editorial responsibility over their content play an important role in the distribution of information and in the exercise of freedom of information online. when exercising such editorial responsibility , they are expected to act diligently and provide information that is trustworthy and respectful of fundamental rights , in line with the regulatory or self-regulatory requirements they are subject to in the member states. therefore , also in view of users’ freedom of information , where providers of very large online platforms consider that content provided by such media service providers is incompatible with their terms and conditions , while it is not contributing to a systemic risk referred to in article 26 of regulation (eu) 2022/xxx [the digital services act] , they should duly consider freedom and pluralism of media , in accordance with regulation (eu) 2022/xxx [the digital services act] and provide , as early as possible , the necessary explanations to media service providers as their business users in the statement of reasons under regulation (eu) 2019/1150 of the european parliament and of the council54 . to minimise the impact of any restriction to that content on users’ freedom of information , very large online platforms should submit the statement of reasons prior to the restriction taking effect without prejudice to their obligations under regulation (eu) 2022/2065 [the digital services act] and grant the affected media service a right to reply to this statement of reasons prior to the suspension or restriction taking effect. in particular , this regulation should not prevent a provider of a very large online platform to take expeditious measures either against illegal content disseminated through its service , or in order to mitigate systemic risks posed by dissemination of certain content through its service , in compliance with union law , in particular pursuant to regulation (eu) 2022/2065[the digital services act].


### (31) very large online platforms act for many users as a gateway for access to media services. media service providers who exercise editorial responsibility over their content play an important role in the distribution of information and in the exercise of freedom of information online. when exercising such editorial responsibility , they are expected to act diligently and provide information that is trustworthy and respectful of fundamental rights , in line with the regulatory or self-regulatory requirements they are subject to in the member states. therefore , also in view of users’ freedom of information , where providers of very large online platforms consider that content provided by such media service providers is incompatible with their terms and conditions , while it is not contributing to a systemic risk referred to in article 26 of regulation (eu) 2022/xxx [the digital services act] , they should duly consider freedom and pluralism of media , in accordance with regulation (eu) 2022/xxx [the digital services act] and provide , as early as possible , the necessary explanations to media service providers as their business users in the statement of reasons under regulation (eu) 2019/1150 of the european parliament and of the council54 . to minimise the impact of any restriction to that content on users’ freedom of information , very large online platforms should endeavour to submit the statement of reasons prior to the restriction taking effect without prejudice to their obligations under regulation (eu) 2022/xxx [the digital services act]. in particular , this regulation should not prevent a provider of a very large online platform to take expeditious measures either against illegal content disseminated through its service , or in order to mitigate systemic risks posed by dissemination of certain content through its service , in compliance with union law , in particular pursuant to regulation (eu) 2022/xxx [the digital services act]. ### (31) very large online platforms act for many users as a gateway for access to media services. media service providers who exercise editorial responsibility over their content play an important role in the distribution of information and in the exercise of freedom of information online. when exercising such editorial responsibility , they are expected to act diligently and provide information that is trustworthy and respectful of fundamental rights , in line with the regulatory or self-regulatory requirements they are subject to in the member states. therefore , also in view of users’ freedom of information , and without prejudice to the obligations pursuant to articles 34 and 35 of regulation (eu) 2022/2065 , where providers of very large online platforms consider that content provided by such media service providers is incompatible with their terms and conditions , they should duly consider freedom and pluralism of media , in accordance with regulation (eu) 2022/2065 and provide , as early as possible , the necessary explanations to media service providers as their business users in the statement of reasons under regulation (eu) 2019/1150 of the european parliament and of the council and regulation (eu) 2022/2065. to minimise the impact of any restriction to that content on users’ freedom of information , very large online platforms should endeavour to submit the statement of reasons prior to the restriction taking effect without prejudice to their obligations under regulation (eu) 2022/2065. in particular , this regulation should not prevent a provider of a very large online platform to take expeditious measures either against illegal content disseminated through its service , or in order to mitigate systemic risks posed by dissemination of certain content through its service , in compliance with union law , in particular pursuant to regulation (eu) 2022/2065.


### (33) to this end , providers of very large online platforms should provide a functionality on their online interface to enable media service providers to declare that they meet certain requirements , while at the same time retaining the possibility not to accept such self-declaration where they consider that these conditions are not met. providers of very large online platforms may rely on information regarding adherence to these requirements , such as the machine-readable standard of the journalism trust initiative or other relevant codes of conduct. guidelines by the commission may be useful to facilitate an effective implementation of such functionality , including on modalities of involvement of relevant civil society organisations in the review of the declarations , on consultation of the regulator of the country of establishment , where relevant , and address any potential abuse of the functionality. ### (33) to this end , providers of very large online platforms should provide a functionality on their online interface to enable media service providers to declare that they meet certain requirements , while at the same time retaining the possibility not to accept such self-declaration where they consider that these conditions are not met. providers of very large online platforms shall verify the declarations submitted , notably regarding adherence to the requirements as mentioned above , with the supervising or monitoring entity. for audiovisual media services , the supervisory authority shall be the national authority or body in charge of media regulation pursuant to article 30 of directive 2010/13/eu. for other media outlets , the verification could be done with a press council , where relevant , or through the consultation of the machine-readable standard of the journalism trust initiative or other relevant codes of conduct. guidelines by the commission may be useful to facilitate an effective implementation of such functionality , including on modalities of involvement of relevant civil society organisations in the review of the declarations , on consultation of the regulator of the country of establishment , where relevant , and address any potential abuse of the functionality.


### (39) it is also key that the board is empowered to issue an opinion , on the commission’s request , where national measures are likely to affect the functioning of the internal market for media services. this is , for example , the case when a national administrative measure is addressed to a media service provider providing its services towards more than one member state , or when the concerned media service provider has a significant influence on the formation of public opinion in that member state. ### (39) it is also key that the board is empowered to issue opinions where national measures are likely to affect the functioning of the internal market for media services. this is , for example , the case when a national administrative measure is addressed to a media service provider providing its services towards more than one member state , when the concerned media service provider has a significant influence on the formation of public opinion in that member state or if it is preventing a media service provider established in one member state from providing services or starting operations in another member state. media service providers individually and directly affected by a measure and the commission , should be able to request that the board draw up opinions on such measures.


### (40) media play a decisive role in shaping public opinion and helping citizens participate in democratic processes. this is why member states should provide for rules and procedures in their legal systems to ensure assessment of media market concentrations that could have a significant impact on media pluralism or editorial independence. such rules and procedures can have an impact on the freedom to provide media services in the internal market and need to be properly framed and be transparent , objective , proportionate and non-discriminatory. media market concentrations subject to such rules should be understood as covering those which could result in a single entity controlling or having significant interests in media services which have substantial influence on the formation of public opinion in a given media market , within a media sub-sector or across different media sectors in one or more member states. an important criterion to be taken into account is the reduction of competing views within that market as a result of the concentration. ### (40) media play a decisive role in shaping public opinion and helping citizens participate in democratic processes. this is why member states should provide for rules and procedures in their legal systems to ensure assessment of media market concentrations that could have a significant impact on media pluralism or editorial independence. such rules should take into account sectoral specificities , including the economic sustainability of the sector as a whole. such rules and procedures can have an impact on the freedom to provide media services in the internal market and need to be properly framed and be transparent , objective , proportionate and non-discriminatory. media market concentrations subject to such rules should be understood as covering those which could result in a single entity controlling or having significant interests in media services which have substantial influence on the formation of public opinion or very large online platforms carrying content provided by media service providers and very large online search engines which control access and visibility to the content of media service providers , in a given media market , within a media sub-sector or across different media sectors in one or more member states. an important criterion to be taken into account is the reduction of competing views within that market as a result of the concentration.


### (44) with a view to ensuring pluralistic media markets , the national authorities or bodies and the board should take account of a set of criteria. in particular , impact on media pluralism should be considered , including notably the effect on the formation of public opinion , taking into account of the online environment. concurrently , it should be considered whether other media outlets , providing different and alternative content , would still coexist in the given market(s) after the media market concentration in question. assessment of safeguards for editorial independence should include the examination of potential risks of undue interference by the prospective owner , management or governance structure in the individual editorial decisions of the acquired or merged entity. the existing or envisaged internal safeguards aimed at preserving independence of the individual editorial decisions within the media undertakings involved should also be taken into account. in assessing the potential impacts , the effects of the concentration in question on the economic sustainability of the entity or entities subject to the concentration should also be considered and whether , in the absence of the concentration , they would be economically sustainable , in the sense that they would be able in the medium term to continue to provide and further develop financially viable , adequately resourced and technologically adapted quality media services in the market. ### (44) with a view to ensuring pluralistic media markets , the national authorities or bodies and the board should take account of a set of criteria. in particular , impact on media pluralism should be considered , including notably the effect on the formation of public opinion , taking into account of the online environment. concurrently , it should be considered whether other media outlets , providing different and alternative content , would still coexist in the given market(s) after the media market concentration in question. assessment of safeguards for editorial independence should include the examination of potential risks of undue interference by the prospective owner , management or governance structure in the individual editorial decisions of the acquired or merged entity. the existing or envisaged internal safeguards aimed at preserving independence of the individual editorial decisions within the media undertakings involved should also be taken into account. in assessing the potential impacts , the effects of the concentration in question on the economic sustainability of the entity or entities subject to the concentration should also be considered and whether , in the absence of the concentration , they would be economically sustainable , in the sense that they would be able in the medium term to continue to provide and further develop financially viable , adequately resourced and technologically adapted quality media services in the market. consideration should also be given to whether concentration would stimulate investments for a vital media market.


### (45) audience measurement has a direct impact on the allocation and the prices of advertising , which represents a key revenue source for the media sector. it is a crucial tool to evaluate the performance of media content and understand the preferences of audiences in order to plan the future production of content. accordingly , media market players , in particular media service providers and advertisers , should be able to rely on objective audience data stemming from transparent , unbiased and verifiable audience measurement solutions. however , certain new players that have emerged in the media ecosystem provide their own measurement services without making available information on their methodologies. this could result in information asymmetries among media market players and in potential market distortions , to the detriment of equality of opportunities for media service providers in the market. ### (45) audience measurement has a direct impact on the allocation and the prices of advertising , which represents a key revenue source for the media sector. it is a crucial tool to evaluate the performance of media content and understand the preferences of audiences in order to plan the future production of content. accordingly , media market players , in particular media service providers , rights holders and advertisers , should be able to rely on objective audience data stemming from transparent , unbiased and verifiable audience measurement solutions. however , certain new players that have emerged in the media ecosystem provide their own measurement services without making available information on their methodologies. this could result in information asymmetries and incomparable measurement systems among media market players and in potential market distortions , to the detriment of equality of opportunities for media service providers in the market. besides media market players , right holders and advertisers , all the parties involved in producing media content , and other relevant stakeholders , should have access to audience measurement data transparently and by request where necessary. such access will allow a more accurate understanding of audience preferences and behaviour and help inform future content production decisions. audience measurement data should be made available in a standardized and accessible format , considering the need for confidentiality and data protection.


### (46) in order to enhance the verifiability and reliability of audience measurement methodologies , in particular online , transparency obligations should be laid down for providers of audience measurement systems that do not abide by the industry benchmarks agreed within the relevant self-regulatory bodies. under these obligations , such actors , when requested and to the extent possible , should provide advertisers and media service providers or parties acting on their behalf , with information describing the methodologies employed for the measurement of the audience. such information could consist in providing elements , such as the size of the sample measured , the definition of the indicators that are measured , the metrics , the measurement methods and the margin of error as well as the measurement period. the obligations imposed under this regulation are without prejudice to any obligations that apply to providers of audience measurement services under regulation 2019/1150 or regulation (eu) 2022/xx [digital markets act] , including those concerning ranking or self-preferencing. ### (46) in order to enhance the verifiability and reliability of audience measurement methodologies , in particular online , transparency obligations should be laid down for providers of audience measurement systems that do not abide by the industry benchmarks agreed within the relevant self-regulatory bodies. under these obligations , such actors , when requested and to the extent possible , should provide advertisers and media service providers or parties acting on their behalf , with information describing the methodologies employed for the measurement of the audience. such information could consist in providing elements , such as the size of the sample measured , the definition of the indicators that are measured , the metrics , the measurement methods and the margin of error as well as the measurement period and the coverage of measurement. the obligations imposed under this regulation are without prejudice to any obligations that apply to providers of audience measurement services under regulation 2019/1150 or regulation (eu) 2022/1925 , including those concerning ranking or self-preferencing.


### (47) codes of conduct , drawn up either by the providers of audience measurement systems or by organisations or associations representing them , can contribute to the effective application of this regulation and should , therefore , be encouraged. self-regulation has already been used to foster high quality standards in the area of audience measurement. its further development could be seen as an effective tool for the industry to agree on the practical solutions needed for ensuring compliance of audience measurement systems and their methodologies with the principles of transparency , impartiality , inclusiveness , proportionality , non-discrimination and verifiability. when drawing up such codes of conduct , in consultation with all relevant stakeholders and notably media service providers , account could be taken in particular of the increasing digitalisation of the media sector and the objective of achieving a level playing field among media market players. ### (47) codes of conduct , drawn up either by the providers of audience measurement systems or by organisations or associations representing them , together with media service providers , their representative organisations and any other interested parties contribute to the effective application of this regulation. self-regulation has already been used to foster high quality standards in the area of audience measurement. its further development could be seen as an effective tool for the industry with the support of national regulatory authorities or bodies to agree on the practical solutions needed for ensuring compliance of audience measurement systems and their methodologies with the principles of transparency , impartiality , inclusiveness , proportionality , non-discrimination , comparability and verifiability. when drawing up such codes of conduct , in consultation with all relevant stakeholders and notably media service providers and independent third-party audience measurement providers , account could be taken in particular of the increasing digitalisation of the media sector and the objective of achieving a level playing field among media market players.


### (47) codes of conduct , drawn up either by the providers of audience measurement systems or by organisations or associations representing them , can contribute to the effective application of this regulation and should , therefore , be encouraged. self-regulation has already been used to foster high quality standards in the area of audience measurement. its further development could be seen as an effective tool for the industry to agree on the practical solutions needed for ensuring compliance of audience measurement systems and their methodologies with the principles of transparency , impartiality , inclusiveness , proportionality , non-discrimination and verifiability. when drawing up such codes of conduct , in consultation with all relevant stakeholders and notably media service providers , account could be taken in particular of the increasing digitalisation of the media sector and the objective of achieving a level playing field among media market players. ### (47) codes of conduct , drawn up either by the providers of audience measurement systems or by organisations or associations representing them , can contribute to the effective application of this regulation and should , therefore , be encouraged. self-regulation has already been used to foster high quality standards in the area of audience measurement. its further development could be seen as an effective tool for the industry to agree on the practical solutions needed for ensuring compliance of audience measurement systems and their methodologies with the principles of transparency , impartiality , inclusiveness , proportionality , non-discrimination , comparability and verifiability. when drawing up such codes of conduct , in consultation with all relevant stakeholders and notably media service providers and independent third-party audience measurement providers , account could be taken in particular of the increasing digitalisation of the media sector and the objective of achieving a level playing field among media market players.


### (48) state advertising is an important source of revenue for many media service providers , contributing to their economic sustainability. access to it must be granted in a non-discriminatory way to any media service provider from any member state which can adequately reach some or all of the relevant members of the public , in order to ensure equal opportunities in the internal market. moreover , state advertising may make media service providers vulnerable to undue state influence to the detriment of the freedom to provide services and fundamental rights. opaque and biased allocation of state advertising is therefore a powerful tool to exert influence or ‘capture’ media service providers. the distribution and transparency of state advertising are in some regards regulated through a fragmented framework of media-specific measures and general public procurement laws , which , however , may not cover all state advertising expenditure nor offer sufficient protection against preferential or biased distribution. in particular , directive 2014/24/eu of the european parliament and of the council56 does not apply to public service contracts for the acquisition , development , production or co-production of programme material intended for audiovisual media services or radio media services. media-specific rules on state advertising , where they exist , diverge significantly from one member state to another. ### (48) state funding , including state advertising , is an important source of revenue for many media service providers , contributing to their economic sustainability. access to it must be granted in a non-discriminatory way to any media service provider. moreover , state funding may make media service providers vulnerable to undue state influence to the detriment of the freedom to provide services and fundamental rights. opaque and biased allocation of state funding is therefore a powerful tool to exert influence or ‘capture’ media service providers. the distribution and transparency of state funding are in some regards regulated through a fragmented framework of media-specific measures and general public procurement laws , which , however , may not cover all state advertising expenditure nor offer sufficient protection against preferential or biased distribution. in particular , directive 2014/24/eu of the european parliament and of the council does not apply to public service contracts for the acquisition , development , production or co-production of programme material intended for audiovisual media services or radio media services. media-specific rules on state funding , where they exist , diverge significantly from one member state to another.


### 1. this regulation lays down common rules for the proper functioning of the internal market for media services , including the establishment of the european board for media services , while preserving the quality of media services. ### 1. this regulation lays down common rules for the proper functioning of the internal market for media services , including the establishment of the european board for media services , while preserving the quality of media services and ensuring the cultural and linguistic diversity and a high level of consumer protection.


### 3. this regulation shall not affect the possibility for member states to adopt more detailed rules in the fields covered by chapter ii and section 5 of chapter iii , provided that those rules comply with union law. ### 3. this regulation shall not affect the possibility for member states to adopt more detailed rules in the fields covered by chapter ii , section 5 of chapter iii and article 24 , provided that those rules comply with union law.


### (1) ‘media service’ means a service as defined by articles 56 and 57 of the treaty , where the principal purpose of the service or a dissociable section thereof consists in providing programmes or press publications to the general public , by any means , in order to inform , entertain or educate , under the editorial responsibility of a media service provider; ### (1) ‘media service’ means a service as defined by articles 56 and 57 of the treaty , where the principal purpose of the service or a dissociable section thereof consists in providing programmes or press publications to the general public , as defined in directive 2010/13/eu;


### (1) ‘media service’ means a service as defined by articles 56 and 57 of the treaty , where the principal purpose of the service or a dissociable section thereof consists in providing programmes or press publications to the general public , by any means , in order to inform , entertain or educate , under the editorial responsibility of a media service provider; ### (1) ‘media service’ means a service as defined by articles 56 and 57 of the treaty , where the principal purpose of the service or a dissociable section thereof consists in providing programmes or press publications to the general public , by any means , in order to inform , entertain or educate , under the editorial responsibility of a designated editor;


### (2) ‘media service provider’ means a natural or legal person whose professional activity is to provide a media service and who has editorial responsibility for the choice of the content of the media service and determines the manner in which it is organised; ### (2) ‘media service provider’ means a legal person whose professional activity is to provide a media service; such as press publications within the meaning of article 2(4) of directive (eu) 2019/790 , and audiovisual media services within the meaning of article 1(1) point (a) of directive 2010/13/eu.


### (2) ‘media service provider’ means a natural or legal person whose professional activity is to provide a media service and who has editorial responsibility for the choice of the content of the media service and determines the manner in which it is organised; ### (2) ‘media service provider’ means a natural or legal person whose professional activity is to provide a media service and who decides the overall editorial line of the content of the media service and determines the manner in which it is organised;


### (7) ‘editor’ means a natural person or a number of natural persons possibly grouped in a body , regardless of its legal form , status and composition , that takes or supervises editorial decisions within a media service provider; ### (7) ‘editor-in-chief’ means a natural person , who takes or supervises editorial decisions within a media service provider. the term 'editor-in-chief' includes any natural person who exercises editorial control over the content produced by the media service provider , regardless of their job title. any person who exercises editorial control over the content produced by the media service provider , regardless of their job title or role , shall be subject to the same obligations and responsibilities as an 'editor-in-chief' under this regulation. media service providers are restricted from creating new job titles or roles with similar functions to 'editor-in-chief' to circumvent this regulation's provisions.


### (7) ‘editor’ means a natural person or a number of natural persons possibly grouped in a body , regardless of its legal form , status and composition , that takes or supervises editorial decisions within a media service provider; ### (7) ‘editor’ means a natural person who takes or supervises editorial decisions within a media service;


### (9) ‘editorial responsibility’ means the exercise of effective control both over the selection of the programmes or press publications and over their organisation , for the purposes of the provision of a media service , regardless of the existence of liability under national law for the service provided; ### (9) ‘editorial responsibility’ means the exercise of effective control both over the selection of the programmes or the content of press publications and over their organisation , for the purposes of the provision of a media service , regardless of the existence of liability under national law for the service provided;


### (12) ‘national regulatory authority or body’ means the authority or body designated by member states pursuant to article 30 of directive 2010/13/eu; ### (12) ‘national regulatory authority or body’ means any authority or body designated by member states pursuant to article 30 of directive 2010/13/eu;


### (13) ‘media market concentration’ means a concentration as defined in article 3 of regulation (ec) no 139/2004 involving at least one media service provider; ### (13) ‘media market concentration significantly impacting media pluralism’ means a concentration as defined in article 3 of regulation (ec) no 139/2004 involving at least one media service provider , one provider of very large online platform or one provider of very large online search engine , and which has a significant impact on the structure of the media market.


### (13) ‘media market concentration’ means a concentration as defined in article 3 of regulation (ec) no 139/2004 involving at least one media service provider; ### (13) ‘media market concentration’ means a concentration as defined in article 3 of regulation (ec) no 139/2004 involving at least one media service provider , one provider of very large online platform or one provider of very large online search engine , and which has a significant impact on the structure of the media market.


### (14) ‘audience measurement’ means the activity of collecting , interpreting or otherwise processing data about the number and characteristics of users of media services for the purposes of decisions regarding advertising allocation or prices or the related planning , production or distribution of content; ### (14) ‘audience measurement’ means the activity of collecting , interpreting and otherwise processing data about the number and characteristics of users of media services and users of online platforms , to determine the audience size , reach and frequency for the purposes of decisions regarding advertising allocation or prices or the buying , planning , selling or distribution of content;


### (15) ‘state advertising’ means the placement , publication or dissemination , in any media service , of a promotional or self-promotional message , normally in return for payment or for any other consideration , by , for or on behalf of any national or regional public authority , such as national , federal or regional governments , regulatory authorities or bodies as well as state-owned enterprises or other state-controlled entities at the national or regional level , or any local government of a territorial entity of more than 1 million inhabitants; ### (15) ‘state advertising’ means the placement , publication or dissemination , in any media service , of a promotional or self-promotional message , normally in return for payment or for any other consideration , by , for or on behalf of any national or regional public authority , such as national , federal or regional governments , regulatory authorities or bodies as well as state-owned enterprises or other state-controlled entities at the national or regional level , or any local government;


### recipients of media services in the union shall have the right to receive a plurality of news and current affairs content , produced with respect for editorial freedom of media service providers , to the benefit of the public discourse. ### recipients of media services in the union shall have the right to receive a plurality of news and current affairs content in their own language and related to their own cultural references , produced with respect for editorial freedom of media service providers , to the benefit of the public discourse.


### 2. member states shall respect effective editorial freedom of media service providers. member states , including their national regulatory authorities and bodies , shall not: ### 2. member states shall guarantee effective editorial freedom of media service providers. member states , including their national regulatory authorities and bodies , shall not:


### detain , sanction , intercept , subject to surveillance or search and seizure , or inspect media service providers or , if applicable , their family members , their employees or their family members , or their corporate and private premises , on the ground that they refuse to disclose information on their sources , unless this is justified by an overriding requirement in the public interest , in accordance with article 52(1) of the charter and in compliance with other union law; ### order disclosure , detain , sanction , intercept , subject to surveillance or search and seizure , or inspect media service providers or , if applicable , their family members , their employees or their family members , or their corporate and private premises , where such actions might lead to access to journalists’ sources;


### deploy spyware in any device or machine used by media service providers or , if applicable , their family members , or their employees or their family members , unless the deployment is justified , on a case-by-case basis , on grounds of national security and is in compliance with article 52(1) of the charter and other union law or the deployment occurs in serious crimes investigations of one of the aforementioned persons , it is provided for under national law and is in compliance with article 52(1) of the charter and other union law , and measures adopted pursuant to sub-paragraph (b) would be inadequate and insufficient to obtain the information sought. ### deploy spyware in any device or machine used by media service providers or , if applicable , their family members , or their employees or their family members , where such action might lead to access to journalists’ sources;


### 1. public service media providers shall provide in an impartial manner a plurality of information and opinions to their audiences , in accordance with their public service mission. ### 1. member states shall ensure in their national legal framework and conduct that public service media providers provide independently and in an impartial manner a plurality of information and opinions to their audiences , in accordance with their public service remit.


### 1. public service media providers shall provide in an impartial manner a plurality of information and opinions to their audiences , in accordance with their public service mission. ### 1. public service media providers shall provide independently in an impartial manner a plurality of information and opinions to their audiences , in accordance with their public service mission.


### 3. member states shall ensure that public service media providers have adequate and stable financial resources for the fulfilment of their public service mission. those resources shall be such that editorial independence is safeguarded. ### 3. member states shall ensure that public service media providers have adequate and stable financial resources for the fulfilment of their public service remit and to meet the objectives therein. those resources and the process by which they are allocated shall be such that editorial independence is safeguarded.


### 3. member states shall ensure that public service media providers have adequate and stable financial resources for the fulfilment of their public service mission. those resources shall be such that editorial independence is safeguarded. ### 3. member states shall ensure that public service media providers have adequate and stable financial resources for the fulfilment of their public service mission. those resources and the process by which they are allocated shall be such that editorial independence is safeguarded.


### 2. without prejudice to national constitutional laws consistent with the charter , media service providers providing news and current affairs content shall take measures that they deem appropriate with a view to guaranteeing the independence of individual editorial decisions. in particular , such measures shall aim to: ### 2. without prejudice to national constitutional laws consistent with the charter , the editor-in-chief must , within the framework of the medium's fundamental principles and purpose set by the publisher , manage the editorial work and make decisions on editorial issues. the publisher , owner , or other company management must refrain from instructing or overruling the editor-in-chief on editorial matters , nor can they demand to see print , text , or pictures or demand to see or hear program material before it is made available to the public. media service providers providing news and current affairs content shall take measures that they deem appropriate with a view to guaranteeing the independence of individual editorial decisions. in particular , such measures shall aim to:


### 2. without prejudice to national constitutional laws consistent with the charter , media service providers providing news and current affairs content shall take measures that they deem appropriate with a view to guaranteeing the independence of individual editorial decisions. in particular , such measures shall aim to: ### 2. without prejudice to national constitutional laws consistent with the charter , media service providers providing news and current affairs content shall take measures that they deem appropriate with a view to guaranteeing the independence of editorial decisions.


### guarantee that editors are free to take individual editorial decisions in the exercise of their professional activity; and ### deleted


### ensure disclosure of any actual or potential conflict of interest by any party having a stake in media service providers that may affect the provision of news and current affairs content. ### deleted


### 3. the obligations under this article shall not apply to media service providers that are micro enterprises within the meaning of article 3 of directive 2013/34/eu. ### deleted


### 1. the national regulatory authorities or bodies referred to in article 30 of directive 2010/13/eu shall be responsible for the application of chapter iii of this regulation. ### 1. the national regulatory authorities or bodies as defined in article 2(12) shall be responsible for the application of chapter iii of this regulation.


### those powers shall include in particular the power to request such persons to provide , within a reasonable time period , information that is proportionate and necessary for carrying out the tasks under chapter iii; the request can also be addressed to any other person that , for purposes related to their trade , business or profession , may reasonably be in possession of the information needed. ### those powers shall include in particular the power to request such persons to provide , within a reasonable time period , information and data that is proportionate and necessary for carrying out the tasks under chapter iii; the request can also be addressed to any other person that , for purposes related to their trade , business or profession , may reasonably be in possession of the information needed.


### the board shall act in full independence when performing its tasks or exercising its powers. in particular , the board shall , in the performance of its tasks or the exercise of its powers , neither seek nor take instructions from any government , institution , person or body. this shall not affect the competences of the commission or the national regulatory authorities or bodies in conformity with this regulation. ### the board shall act in full independence when performing its tasks or exercising its powers. in particular , the board shall , in the performance of its tasks or the exercise of its powers , neither seek nor take instructions from any government , national or european institution , person or body. this shall not affect the competences of the commission or the national regulatory authorities or bodies in conformity with this regulation.


### 1. the board shall be composed of representatives of national regulatory authorities or bodies referred to in article 30 of directive 2010/13/eu. ### 1. the board shall be composed of representatives of national regulatory authorities or bodies as defined in article 2(12).


### 5. the commission shall designate a representative to the board. the representative of the commission shall participate in all activities and meetings of the board , without voting rights. the chair of the board shall keep the commission informed about the ongoing and planned activities of the board. the board shall consult the commission in preparation of its work programme and main deliverables. ### 5. the chair of the board shall keep the commission informed about the ongoing and planned activities of the board. the board shall consult the commission in preparation of its work programme and main deliverables.


### 5. the commission shall designate a representative to the board. the representative of the commission shall participate in all activities and meetings of the board , without voting rights. the chair of the board shall keep the commission informed about the ongoing and planned activities of the board. the board shall consult the commission in preparation of its work programme and main deliverables. ### 5. the commission shall designate a representative to the board. the representative of the commission shall participate in activities and meetings of the board , without voting rights. the chair of the board shall keep the commission informed about the ongoing and planned activities of the board. the board shall seek the views of the commission in preparation of its work programme and main deliverables. the board may seek the views of other interested parties.


### 6. the board , in agreement with the commission , may invite experts and observers to attend its meetings. ### 6. the board , on a case-by-case basis , may invite experts to attend its meetings.


### 6. the board , in agreement with the commission , may invite experts and observers to attend its meetings. ### 6. the board may invite the commission , experts and observers to attend its meetings.


### 8. the board shall adopt its rules of procedure by a two-thirds majority of its members with voting rights , in agreement with the commission. ### 8. the board shall adopt its rules of procedure by a two-thirds majority of its members with voting rights.


### (1) past crises , especially the early days of the covid-19 pandemic , have shown that the internal market (also referred to as the single market and its supply chains can be severely affected by such crises , and appropriate crisis management tools and coordination mechanisms are either lacking , do not cover all aspects of the single market or do not allow for a timely response to such impacts. ### (1) past crises , especially the early days of the covid-19 pandemic , have shown that the internal market (also referred to as the single market can be severely affected by such crises , and appropriate crisis management tools and coordination mechanisms are either lacking , do not cover all aspects of the single market or do not allow for a timely response to such impacts.


### (1) past crises , especially the early days of the covid-19 pandemic , have shown that the internal market (also referred to as the single market and its supply chains can be severely affected by such crises , and appropriate crisis management tools and coordination mechanisms are either lacking , do not cover all aspects of the single market or do not allow for a timely response to such impacts. ### (1) past crises , especially the early days of the covid-19 pandemic , have shown that the internal market (also referred to as the single market) can be severely affected by such crises , that the free movement of goods , services and people are not sufficiently safeguarded despite being laid down in treaties and that appropriate , harmonised crisis management tools and coordination mechanisms are either lacking , legally unclear , do not cover all aspects of the single market or do not allow for a timely response to such impacts which can further exacerbate such crises’ impacts.


### (2) the union was not sufficiently prepared to ensure efficient manufacturing , procurement and distribution of crisis-relevant non-medical goods such as personal protective equipment , especially in the early phase of the covid-19 pandemic and the ad-hoc measures taken by the commission in order to re-establish the functioning of the single market and to ensure the availability of crisis-relevant non-medical goods during the covid-19 pandemic were necessarily reactive the pandemic also revealed insufficient overview of manufacturing capacities across the union as well as vulnerabilities related to the global supply chains. ### (2) the union was not sufficiently prepared to ensure efficient manufacturing , procurement and distribution of crisis-relevant non-medical goods such as personal protective equipment , especially in the early phase of the covid-19 pandemic and the ad-hoc measures taken by the commission in order to re-establish the functioning of the single market and to ensure the availability of crisis-relevant non-medical goods during the covid-19 pandemic were necessarily reactive.


### (3) actions by the commission were delayed by several weeks due to the lack of any union wide contingency planning measures and ofclarity as to which part of the national administration to contact to find rapid solutions to the impact on the single market being cause by the crisis. in addition it became clear that uncoordinated restrictive actions taken by the member states would further aggravate the impacts of the crisis on the single market. it emerged that there is a need for arrangements between the member states and union authorities as regards contingency planning , technical level coordination and cooperation and information exchange. ### (3) actions by the commission were delayed by several weeks due to the lack of any union wide contingency planning measures and of clarity as to which part of the national administration to contact to find rapid solutions to the impact on the single market being cause by the crisis. in addition , it became clear that uncoordinated restrictive actions taken by the member states would further aggravate the impacts of the crisis on the single market. it emerged that there is a need for arrangements between the member states and union authorities as regards contingency planning , technical level coordination and cooperation and information exchange.


### (3) actions by the commission were delayed by several weeks due to the lack of any union wide contingency planning measures and ofclarity as to which part of the national administration to contact to find rapid solutions to the impact on the single market being cause by the crisis. in addition it became clear that uncoordinated restrictive actions taken by the member states would further aggravate the impacts of the crisis on the single market. it emerged that there is a need for arrangements between the member states and union authorities as regards contingency planning , technical level coordination and cooperation and information exchange. ### (3) actions by the commission were delayed by several weeks due to the lack of any union wide contingency planning measures and of clarity as to the relevant departments of the national administration to contact to find rapid solutions to crisis-related impacts on the single market. in addition it became clear that uncoordinated restrictive actions taken by the member states further aggravated the impacts of the crisis on the single market. it emerged that there is a need for arrangements between the member states and union authorities as regards contingency planning , technical level coordination and cooperation and information exchange.


### (4) representative organisations of economic operators have suggested that economic operators did not have sufficient information on the crisis response measures of the member states during the pandemics , partly due to not knowing where to obtain such information , partly due to language constraints and the administrative burden implied in making repeated inquiries in all the member states , especially in a constantly changing regulatory environment. this prevented them from making informed business decisions as to what extent they may rely on their free movement rights or continue cross-border business operations during the crisis. it is necessary to improve the availability of information on national and union level crisis response measures ### (4) representative organisations of economic operators , as well as social partners , have suggested that economic operators and workers did not have sufficient information on the crisis response measures of the member states during the pandemics , partly due to not knowing where to obtain such information , partly due to language constraints and the administrative burden implied in making repeated inquiries in all the member states , especially in a constantly changing regulatory environment. this prevented them from making informed business decisions as to what extent they may rely on their free movement rights and/or continue cross-border business operations during the crisis. it is necessary to improve the availability of information on national and union level crisis response measures , but most of all it is crucial that member states refrain from imposing restrictions on free movement at any time.


### the economic operators affected have not been able to provide a solution in a reasonable time to the particular aspects of the crisis on a voluntary basis. ### the economic operators affected by the disruption have not been able to provide a solution in a reasonable time to the particular aspects of the crisis on a voluntary basis.


### the geographic area that is and could be affected , including any cross-border impacts on the functioning of supply chains that are indispensable in the maintenance of vital societal or economic activities in the single market; ### the geographic area that is and could be affected , including any cross-border impacts on the provision of goods and services as well as on the functioning of systemic supply chains that are indispensable in the maintenance of vital societal or economic activities in the single market;


### the geographic area that is and could be affected , including any cross-border impacts on the functioning of supply chains that are indispensable in the maintenance of vital societal or economic activities in the single market; ### the geographic area that is and could be affected , including any cross-border impacts on free movement of goods , services or persons or the functioning of supply chains that are indispensable in the maintenance of vital societal or economic activities in the single market;


### the absence of substitute goods , inputs or services. ### the absence or shortages of substitutes for crisis-relevant goods or services.


### the absence of substitute goods , inputs or services. ### the absence or shortages of substitute goods , inputs or services.


### (5) these recent events have also highlighted the need for the union to be better prepared for possible future crises , especially as we consider the continuing effects of climate change and resulting natural disasters as well as global economic and geopolitical instabilities. given the fact that it is not known which kind of crises could come up next and produce severe impacts on the single market and its supply chains in the future , it is necessary to provide for an instrument that would apply with regards to impacts on the single market of a wide range of crises. ### (5) these recent events have also highlighted the need for the union to be better prepared for possible future crises , especially as we consider the continuing effects of climate change and resulting natural disasters as well as global economic and geopolitical instabilities. given the fact that it is not known which kind of crises could come up next and produce severe impacts on the single market in the future , it is necessary to provide for an instrument that would apply with regards to impacts disrupting the single market of a wide range of crises by safeguarding the free movement of goods , services and persons and which facilitates access to crisis-relevant goods and services in the single market.


### (7) since any specific aspects of future crises that would impact the single market and its supply chains are hard to predict , this regulation should provide for a general framework for anticipating , preparing for , mitigating and minimising the negative impacts which any crisis may cause on the single market and its supply chains. . ### (7) since any specific aspects of future crises that would impact the single market are hard to predict , this regulation should provide for a general framework for anticipating , preparing for , mitigating and minimising the negative impacts which any crisis may cause on the single market , while ensuring that any crisis related emergency response measures are in line with the rights of free movement as laid down in the treaties. in addition , such response should always respect fundamental rights.


### (8) the framework of measures set out under this regulation should be deployed in a coherent , transparent , efficient , proportionate and timely manner , having due regard to the need to maintain vital societal functions , meaning including public security , safety , public order , or public health respecting , the responsibility of the member states to safeguard national security and their power to safeguard other essential state functions , including ensuring the territorial integrity of the state and maintaining law and order. ### (8) the framework of measures set out under this regulation should be deployed in a coherent , transparent , efficient , proportionate and timely manner , having due regard to the need to maintain vital societal functions , meaning including public security , public safety , public order , or public health while respecting the responsibility of the member states to safeguard national security and their power to safeguard other essential state functions , including ensuring the territorial integrity of the state and maintaining law and order. in addition , the framework should recognize the important role played by social partners in supporting the member states’ contingency planning efforts , by ensuring inter alia full respect for collective bargaining rights and the autonomy of social partners.


### — the necessary means to ensure the continued functioning of the single market , the businesses that operate on the single market and its strategic supply chains , including the free circulation of goods , services and persons in times of crisis and the availability of crisis relevant goods and services to citizens , businesses and public authorities at the time of crisis; ### — the necessary means to ensure the continued functioning of the single market also in times of crisis , both for the businesses that operate on the single market and their strategic supply chains , including the free movement of goods , services and persons in times of crisis and the availability of crisis relevant goods and services to citizens , businesses and public authorities;


### — the means for the timely accessibility and availability of the information which is needed for a targeted response and adequate market behaviour by businesses and citizens during a crisis. ### — the means for the timely accessibility and availability of the information which is needed for a targeted response and adequate market behaviour by businesses , workers and citizens during a crisis.