### from 1 january 2026 , for the purposes of making accessible on esap the information referred to in article 71(1) , article 32(2) first subparagraph , and article 52(2) , the collection body as defined in article 2 , point (2) , of regulation (eu) xx/xxxx [esap regulation] shall be the national competent authority. that information shall be prepared in a data extractable format as defined in article 2 , point (3) , of regulation (eu) xx/xxxx [esap regulation] , include the names and , where available , the legal entity identifier of the investment firm or market operator as specified pursuant to article 7(4) of that regulation , and the type of information as classified pursuant to article 7(4) of that regulation. ### from 1 january 2027 , for the purposes of making accessible on esap the information referred to in article 71(1) , article 32(2) first subparagraph , and article 52(2) , the collection body as defined in article 2 , point (2) , of regulation (eu) xx/xxxx [esap regulation] shall be the national competent authority. that information shall be prepared in a data extractable format as defined in article 2 , point (3) , of regulation (eu) xx/xxxx [esap regulation] , include the names and , where available , the legal entity identifier of the investment firm or market operator as specified pursuant to article 7(4) of that regulation , and the type of information as classified pursuant to article 7(4) of that regulation.


### from 1 january 2026 , for the purposes of making accessible on esap the information referred to in article 5(3) , article 18(10) fourth sentence , article 58(1) point (a) , and article 59(3) , the collection body as defined in article 2 , point (2) , of regulation (eu) xx/xxxx [esap regulation] shall be esma. that information shall be prepared in a data extractable format as defined in article 2 , point (3) , of regulation (eu) xx/xxxx [esap regulation] , include the names and , where available , the legal entity identifier of the investment firm or market operator as specified pursuant to article 7(4) of that regulation , and the type of information as classified pursuant to article 7(4) of that regulation. ### from 1 january 2027 , for the purposes of making accessible on esap the information referred to in article 5(3) , article 18(10) fourth sentence , article 58(1) point (a) , and article 59(3) , the collection body as defined in article 2 , point (2) , of regulation (eu) xx/xxxx [esap regulation] shall be esma. that information shall be prepared in a data extractable format as defined in article 2 , point (3) , of regulation (eu) xx/xxxx [esap regulation] , include the names and , where available , the legal entity identifier of the investment firm or market operator as specified pursuant to article 7(4) of that regulation , and the type of information as classified pursuant to article 7(4) of that regulation.


### from 1 january 2026 , for the purposes of making accessible on esap the information referred to in article 29(3) , the collection body as defined in article 2 (2) , of regulation (eu) xx/xxxx [esap regulation] shall be the public register. that information shall be prepared in a data extractable format as defined in article 2 , point (3) , of regulation (eu) xx/xxxx [esap regulation] , include the names and the legal entity identifier of the tied agent as specified pursuant to article 7(4) of that regulation , and the type of information as classified pursuant to article 7(4) of that regulation. ### from 1 january 2027 , for the purposes of making accessible on esap the information referred to in article 29(3) , the collection body as defined in article 2 (2) , of regulation (eu) xx/xxxx [esap regulation] shall be the public register. that information shall be prepared in a data extractable format as defined in article 2 , point (3) , of regulation (eu) xx/xxxx [esap regulation] , include the names and the legal entity identifier of the tied agent as specified pursuant to article 7(4) of that regulation , and the type of information as classified pursuant to article 7(4) of that regulation.


### from 1 january 2026 , for the purposes of making accessible on esap the information referred to in article 32(1) and article 32(2) of this directive , the collection body as defined in article 2 , point (2) , of regulation (eu) xx/xxxx [esap regulation] shall be the competent authority. that information shall be prepared in a data extractable format as defined in article 2 , point (3) , of regulation (eu) xx/xxxx [esap regulation] , include the name and - where available - the legal entity identifier of the entity as specified pursuant to article 7(4) of that regulation , and the type of information as classified pursuant to article 7(4) of that regulation. ### from 1 january 2027 , for the purposes of making accessible on esap the information referred to in article 32(1) and article 32(2) of this directive , the collection body as defined in article 2 , point (2) , of regulation (eu) xx/xxxx [esap regulation] shall be the competent authority. that information shall be prepared in a data extractable format as defined in article 2 , point (3) , of regulation (eu) xx/xxxx [esap regulation] , include the name and - where available - the legal entity identifier of the entity as specified pursuant to article 7(4) of that regulation , and the type of information as classified pursuant to article 7(4) of that regulation.


### 1. from 1 january 2026 , member states shall ensure that , when making public any information pursuant to article 23 (2) and article 29 of this directive , iorp submit at the same time that information to the relevant collection body referred to in paragraph 3 of this article for accessibility on esap established under regulation (eu) xx/xxxx[esap regulation] of the european parliament and of the council*. ### 1. from 1 january 2027 , member states shall ensure that , when making public any information pursuant to article 23 (2) and article 29 of this directive , iorp submit at the same time that information to the relevant collection body referred to in paragraph 3 of this article for accessibility on esap established under regulation (eu) xx/xxxx[esap regulation] of the european parliament and of the council*.


### 3. by 31 december 2025 , for the purposes of making accessible on esap the information referred to in paragraph 1 , member states shall designate one of the officially appointed mechanisms referred to in article 21 , point (2) of directive 2004/109/ec as the collection body defined in article 2 , point (2) , of regulation (eu) xx/xxxx [esap regulation] and notify esma thereof. ### 3. by 31 december 2026 , for the purposes of making accessible on esap the information referred to in paragraph 1 , member states shall designate a collection body as defined in article 2 , point (2) , of regulation (eu) xx/xxxx [esap regulation] and notify esma thereof.


### from 1 january 2026 , for the purposes of making accessible on esap the information referred to in article 30 and 48(4) , the collection body as defined in article 2 , point (2) , of regulation (eu) xx/xxxx [esap regulation] shall be the competent authority. that information shall be prepared in a data extractable format as defined in article 2 , point (3) , of regulation (eu) xx/xxxx [esap regulation] , include the names and the legal entity identifier of the investment firm as specified pursuant to article 7(4) of that regulation , and the type of information as classified pursuant to article 7(4) of that regulation. ### from 1 january 2027 , for the purposes of making accessible on esap the information referred to in article 30 and 48(4) , the collection body as defined in article 2 , point (2) , of regulation (eu) xx/xxxx [esap regulation] shall be the competent authority. that information shall be prepared in a data extractable format as defined in article 2 , point (3) , of regulation (eu) xx/xxxx [esap regulation] , include the names and the legal entity identifier of the investment firm as specified pursuant to article 7(4) of that regulation , and the type of information as classified pursuant to article 7(4) of that regulation.


### 1. from 1 january 2026 , member states shall ensure that , when making public any information pursuant to article 44 of this directive , investment firms submit that information at the same time to the relevant collection body referred to in paragraph 3 of this article for accessibility on esap established under regulation (eu) xx/xxxx[esap regulation] of the european parliament and of the council*. ### 1. from 1 january 2027 , member states shall ensure that , when making public any information pursuant to article 44 of this directive , investment firms submit that information at the same time to the relevant collection body referred to in paragraph 3 of this article for accessibility on esap established under regulation (eu) xx/xxxx[esap regulation] of the european parliament and of the council*.


### 3. by 31 december 2025 , for the purposes of making accessible on esap the information referred to in paragraph 1 , member states shall designate one of the officially appointed mechanisms referred to in article 21 , point (2) of directive 2004/109/ec as the collection body as defined in article 2 , point (2) , of regulation (eu) xx/xxxx [esap regulation] and notify esma thereof. ### 3. by 31 december 2026 , for the purposes of making accessible on esap the information referred to in paragraph 1 , member states shall designate a collection body as defined in article 2 , point (2) , of regulation (eu) xx/xxxx [esap regulation] and notify esma thereof.


### from 1 january 2026 , for the purposes of making accessible on esap the information referred to in article 20 , the collection body as defined in article 2 , point (2) , of regulation (eu) xx/xxxx [esap regulation] shall be eba. that information shall be prepared in a data extractable format as defined in article 2 , point (3) , of regulation (eu) xx/xxxx [esap regulation] , include the names and the legal entity identifier of the investment firm as specified pursuant to article 7(4) of that regulation , and the type of information as classified pursuant to article 7(4) of that regulation. ### from 1 january 2027 , for the purposes of making accessible on esap the information referred to in article 20 , the collection body as defined in article 2 , point (2) , of regulation (eu) xx/xxxx [esap regulation] shall be eba. that information shall be prepared in a data extractable format as defined in article 2 , point (3) , of regulation (eu) xx/xxxx [esap regulation] , include the names and the legal entity identifier of the investment firm as specified pursuant to article 7(4) of that regulation , and the type of information as classified pursuant to article 7(4) of that regulation.


### 1. from 1 january 2026 , member state shall ensure that , when making public any information pursuant to article 14 of this directive , credit institutions permitted to issue covered bonds submit that information at the same time to the relevant collection body referred to in paragraph 3 of this article for accessibility on esap established pursuant to regulation (eu) xx/xxxx[esap regulation] of the european parliament and of the council*. ### 1. from 1 january 2027 , member state shall ensure that , when making public any information pursuant to article 14 of this directive , credit institutions permitted to issue covered bonds submit that information at the same time to the relevant collection body referred to in paragraph 3 of this article for accessibility on esap established pursuant to regulation (eu) xx/xxxx[esap regulation] of the european parliament and of the council*.


### from 1 january 2026 , for the purposes of making accessible on esap the information referred to in articles 24 , article 26(1) , point (b) and article 26(1) , point (c) , the collection body as defined in article 2 , point (2) , of regulation (eu) xx/xxxx [esap regulation] shall be the competent authority. that information shall be prepared in a data extractable format as defined in article 2 , point (3) , of regulation (eu) xx/xxxx [esap regulation] , include the names and the legal entity identifier of the credit institution permitted to issue covered bonds as specified pursuant to article 7(4) of that regulation , and the type of information as classified pursuant to article 7(4) of that regulation. ### from 1 january 2027 , for the purposes of making accessible on esap the information referred to in articles 24 , article 26(1) , point (b) and article 26(1) , point (c) , the collection body as defined in article 2 , point (2) , of regulation (eu) xx/xxxx [esap regulation] shall be the competent authority. that information shall be prepared in a data extractable format as defined in article 2 , point (3) , of regulation (eu) xx/xxxx [esap regulation] , include the names and the legal entity identifier of the credit institution permitted to issue covered bonds as specified pursuant to article 7(4) of that regulation , and the type of information as classified pursuant to article 7(4) of that regulation.


### e. whereas , although tplf is widespread in australia , it has not had a positive impact on the administration of justice in that jurisdiction; whereas , empirical data6 show that litigation funders typically pick and choose between cases to find the best returns , and would not invest in cases they regard as too risky or not profitable enough; ### e. whereas , although tplf is widespread outside of europe , such as in australia and the usa , it has not had a positive impact on the administration of justice in those third-country jurisdictions; whereas , empirical data6show that litigation funders typically pick and choose between cases to find the best returns , and would not invest in cases they regard as too risky or not profitable enough;


### g. whereas the current regulatory vacuum enables litigation funders to operate in secrecy , with the result that courts can , on occasion , make awards to claimants without realising that a large majority of the award will subsequently be redirected to litigation funders; whereas the lack of transparency can also mean that even the potential beneficiaries have little or no knowledge about the distribution of awards or the funding agreements , in particular in members states with an opt-out system; ### g. whereas the current regulatory vacuum enables litigation funders to operate in secrecy , with the result that courts can , on occasion , make awards to claimants without realising that a large majority of the award will subsequently be redirected to litigation funders; whereas the lack of transparency can also mean that even the potential beneficiaries have little or no knowledge about the distribution of awards or the funding agreements , in particular in members states with an opt-out mechanism within collective redress systems;


### h. whereas directive (eu) 2020/1828 identifies certain safeguards relating to litigation funding , which are , however , limited to representative actions on behalf of consumers taken under that directive , and therefore exclude many other types of action or categories of claimants; whereas , effective safeguards should apply to all types of claims; ### h. whereas directive (eu) 2020/1828 lays down certain safeguards relating to litigation funding , which are , however , limited to representative actions on behalf of consumers within the remit of that directive , and therefore does not regulate other types of action or categories of claimants; whereas , effective safeguards should apply to all types of claims;


### 1. observes that third party litigation funding is a rapidly expanding commercial practice in the union , which has a significant impact on justice systems as well as on european citizens. notes that litigation funding is so far largely unregulated in the union; ### 1. observes that third party litigation funding is a rapidly expanding commercial practice in the union , which has a significant impact on justice systems and thereby on european citizens. notes that litigation funding is so far largely unregulated at union level;


### 2. firmly believes that in order to ensure that justice systems prioritise redress for victims of injustice , and not the interests of investors who may seek commercial opportunity from disputes , a regulatory regime addressing key issues relevant to litigation funding , including transparency , fairness , and proportionality , is necessary; ### 2. firmly believes that in order to ensure that justice systems prioritise redress for victims of injustice , and not the interests of private investors who may only seek commercial opportunities from legal disputes , it is necessary to establish a regulatory regime at union level , which addresses the key aspects relevant to tplf , including transparency , fairness , and proportionality;


### 4. recommends the establishment of a system of authorisation for litigation funders , permitting the introduction of corporate governance requirements and supervisory powers to protect claimants , and to ensure that funding is only provided by entities that are committed to complying with minimum standards in terms of transparency , governance and capital adequacy , and observing a fiduciary relationship vis-à-vis claimants and intended beneficiaries; ### 4. recommends the establishment of a system of authorisation for litigation funders , permitting the introduction of corporate governance requirements and supervisory powers to protect claimants , and to ensure that funding is only provided by entities that are committed to complying with minimum standards in terms of transparency , governance and capital adequacy , and observing a fiduciary relationship vis-à-vis claimants and intended beneficiaries in the context of representative actions;


### 5. recommends that litigation funders be obliged to respect a fiduciary duty of care requiring them to act in the best interests of a claimant. believes that litigation funders should be prevented from exercising control over the legal proceedings they fund , which should be the sole responsibility of the claimant and their legal representatives. points out that such control over the legal proceedings they fund can consist both of formal control , such as a contractual power to make decisions , and informal control , such as the threat to withdraw the funding; ### 5. recommends that litigation funders be obliged to respect a fiduciary duty of care requiring them to act in the best interests of a claimant. believes that litigation funders should be prevented from exercising control over the legal proceedings they fund , which should be the sole responsibility of the claimant and their legal representatives , whereby such control over funded legal proceedings can consist of both , formal control , such as through contractual arrangements , and informal control , such as through threats to withdraw the funding;


### 6. underlines that conflicts of interest may arise where there are relationships between litigation funders , qualified entities , law firms , aggregators , including claims-collection and award-distribution-platforms , and other actors who may be involved in claims. notes that there is a trend of an increasingly close cooperation , with , for example , litigation funders agreeing to finance law firms across a series of future cases (portfolio funding)7 . recommends that safeguards are adopted to prevent such conflicts , set out claimants’ rights and to require that details of relationships between litigation funders and the other involved parties are disclosed; ### 6. underlines that conflicts of interest may arise where litigation funders , qualified entities , law firms , aggregators , including claims-collection and award-distribution-platforms , and other actors are involved in legal proceedings , having an interest in the outcome of such court cases. notes that there is a trend of an increasingly close cooperation , with , for example , litigation funders agreeing to finance law firms across a series of future cases (portfolio funding)7. recommends that safeguards are adopted to prevent such potential conflicts , to lay down claimants’ rights and to require that details of relationships between litigation funders and other involved parties are disclosed;


### 7. believes that litigation funders should not be permitted to abandon funded parties in litigation , except in restricted and well-defined circumstances , leaving claimants solely responsible for all costs of the litigation , which may have only been pursued due to the involvement of the funder; ### 7. believes that litigation funders should not be permitted to abandon funded parties in litigation , except in restricted and well-defined circumstances , leaving claimants solely responsible for all costs of the litigation , which may have only been pursued due to the involvement of the funder; stresses therefore that contractual arrangements on the basis of conditional funding should be considered as void;


### 9. considers that legislation should impose limits on the proportion of the award that litigation funders are entitled to by virtue of a funding agreement. believes that only under exceptional circumstances arrangements between litigation funders and claimants should vary from the rule that a minimum of 60% of the gross settlement or damages is paid to the claimants; ### 9. considers that legislation should impose limits to the proportion of the award that litigation funders are entitled to receive in case of successful litigation and on the basis of a contractual arrangement. believes that only under exceptional circumstances arrangements between litigation funders and claimants should divert from the general rule that only a maximum of 40% of the gross settlement or damages can be claimed by the litigation funder;


### 10. considers that there should be transparency regarding the involvement of litigation funding in legal proceedings , including obligations for claimants and their lawyers to disclose funding agreements to courts and defendants. notes that , currently , courts or administrative authorities and defendants are often not aware that a claim is funded by a commercial actor. points out that this can also hinder a court or administrative authority in properly considering costs issues and in ensuring that awards compensate claimants adequately; ### 10. considers that there should be transparency regarding the involvement of litigation funding in legal proceedings , including obligations for claimants and their lawyers to disclose funding agreements to courts and defendants. notes that , currently , courts or administrative authorities and defendants are often not aware that a claim is funded by a commercial actor. points out that such lack of transparency can also have a negative impact on a court or administrative authority’s cost decision;


### 11. is of the opinion that supervisory authorities , and courts and administrative authorities were appropriate in accordance with national procedural law , should have the powers to facilitate the enforcement of legislation adopted to achieve the goals set out above; recommends the establishment of a complaints system. considers that supervisory authorities , and courts and administrative authorities where appropriate in accordance with national procedural law , should have the powers to address abusive practices by authorised litigation funders; ### 11. is of the opinion that supervisory authorities , courts and administrative authorities where appropriate in accordance with national procedural law , should have the power to facilitate the enforcement of legislation adopted to achieve the goals set out above; recommends the establishment of a complaints system. considers that supervisory authorities , courts and administrative authorities , where appropriate in accordance with national procedural law , should have the powers to address abusive practices by authorised litigation funders;


### 12. requests the commission to submit a proposal for a directive to regulate third party litigation funding , following the recommendations set out in the annex hereto; ### 12. requests the commission to submit a proposal for a directive to lay down harmonised rules for third party litigation funding , following the recommendations set out in the annex hereto;


### (22) the adequacy of supervision of litigation funders and third-party funding agreements cannot be ensured absent obligations on litigation funders to be transparent regarding their activities. this includes transparency vis-à-vis courts or administrative authorities , defendants and claimants , and therefore obligations should apply to disclose third party funding agreements in full to courts or administrative authorities and defendants , subject to appropriate limitations to protect any necessary confidentiality. ### (22) the adequacy of supervision of litigation funders and third-party funding agreements cannot be ensured in the absence of obligations on litigation funders to be transparent regarding their activities. this includes transparency vis-à-vis courts or administrative authorities , defendants and claimants , and therefore obligations should apply to disclose third party funding agreements in full to courts or administrative authorities and defendants , subject to appropriate limitations to protect any necessary confidentiality.


### this directive applies to third party litigation funders and to the third-party funding agreements that they are entitled to offer to claimants in the union. ### this directive applies to third party litigation funders and to third-party funding agreements.


### ‘litigation funder’ means any undertaking that enters into a third-party funding agreement in relation to proceedings , even though it is neither a party to those proceedings , a lawyer representing a party to such proceedings , or a provider of regulated insurance services to a party in such proceedings; ### ‘litigation funder’ means any undertaking that enters into a third-party funding agreement in relation to proceedings , even though it is neither a party to those proceedings , a legal representative of a party to such proceedings , or a provider of regulated insurance services to a party in such proceedings;


### ‘court or administrative authority’ means a competent court , administrative authority , arbitral body or other body tasked with adjudicating on proceedings; ### ‘court or administrative authority’ means a competent court , administrative authority , arbitral body or other body tasked with adjudicating on proceedings , according to national law;


### ‘intended beneficiary’ means a person who is entitled to share directly in the distribution of an award in proceedings and whose interests in the proceedings are represented by the funded claimant or a qualified entity bringing the action; ### ‘intended beneficiary’ means a person who is entitled to receive a share of an award in proceedings and whose legitimate interests in the proceedings are represented by the funded claimant or a qualified entity bringing the action on his behalf in the course of representative actions;


### ‘qualified entity’ means an organisation representing consumers’ interests and designated as qualified under directive (eu) 2020/1828; ### ‘qualified entity’ means an organisation representing consumers’ interests and designated as qualified entity under directive (eu) 2020/1828;


### ‘third-party funding agreement’ means an agreement in which a litigation funder agrees to fund of all or part of the costs of proceedings in exchange for receiving a share of the monetary amount awarded to the claimant or a success fee , so as to cover the reimbursement of its funding and , where applicable , remuneration for the service provided , based wholly or partially on the outcome of proceedings. this definition includes all agreements in which such a reward is agreed , whether offered as an ‘arm’s length’ service , or achieved through a purchase or assignment of the claim. ### ‘third-party funding agreement’ means an agreement in which a litigation funder agrees to fund all or part of the costs of proceedings in exchange for receiving a share of the monetary amount awarded to the claimant or a success fee , so as to cover the reimbursement of its funding and , where applicable , remuneration for the service provided , based wholly or partially on the outcome of proceedings. this definition includes all agreements in which such a reward is agreed , whether offered as an ‘arm’s length’ service , or achieved through a purchase or assignment of the claim.


### 1. member states may determine in accordance with national law whether third party funding agreements can be offered in relation to proceedings within their member state , or for the benefit of claimants or intended beneficiaries resident within their member state. ### deleted


### 2. where such activities are permitted , member states shall create a system for the authorisation of the activities of litigation funders within their member state. that system shall include designating an independent supervisory authority tasked with granting or withdrawing authorisations for litigation funders and supervising the activities of litigation funders. ### 2. member states shall create a system for the authorisation of the activities of litigation funders in relation to proceedings within their territory or for the benefit of claimants or intended beneficiaries resident within their member state. that system shall include designating an independent supervisory authority tasked with granting or withdrawing authorisations for litigation funders and supervising the activities of litigation funders.


### 1. member states shall ensure that supervisory authorities only grant or maintain authorisations , whether for domestic or cross-border litigation or other proceedings , to litigation funders who comply with the provisions of this directive , and who meet , in addition to any suitability or other criteria as may be set out in national law , at least the following criteria: ### 1. member states shall ensure that supervisory authorities only grant or maintain authorisations , whether for domestic or cross-border litigation , to litigation funders who comply with the provisions of this directive , and who meet at least one or all of the following criteria:


### they demonstrate to the satisfaction of the supervisory authority that they have procedures and governance structures in place to ensure their ongoing compliance with this directive , with the transparency requirements and fiduciary relationships this directive provides for , and with any additional national requirements relating to the conclusion of third-party funding agreements; ### they demonstrate to the satisfaction of the supervisory authority that they have procedures and governance structures in place to ensure their ongoing compliance with this directive , with the transparency requirements and fiduciary relationships this directive provides for , and they have established internal procedures to prevent a conflict of interest between itself and the defendant;


### 2. the system of authorisation established by this directive shall be without prejudice to the application of union law governing the provision of financial services , investment activity , or consumer protection as may apply to litigation funders. ### 2. the system of authorisation established by this directive shall be without prejudice to the application of union law governing the provision of financial services , investment activity , or consumer protection.


### cover aggregate funding liabilities under all of the third-party funding agreements they have entered into , for a period of 24 months. ### deleted


### 2. member states shall ensure that supervisory authorities are empowered to verify whether litigation funders would be able to maintain access at all times to the minimum liquidity required to pay in full all foreseeable adverse costs in all proceedings they have funded. members states shall ensure that their courts or administrative authorities can request litigation funders to provide security for costs in the forms admitted by national law , should a defendant so request based on reasoned specific concerns. ### 2. member states shall require that litigation funders , during the first stage of proceedings , make a financial deposit equivalent to the amount in dispute or the value in litigation with a public fiduciary.


### 1. member states shall ensure that supervisory authorities are empowered to verify that litigation funders have the governance and internal procedures in place to ensure that the third-party funding agreements they enter into are based on a fiduciary relationship and that they commit under those agreements to acting fairly , transparently and in the best interests of a claimant. ### deleted


### 2. where a claimant intends to take a claim on behalf of others in proceedings , such as where the claimant is a qualified entity representing consumers , the litigation funder shall also be required to owe a fiduciary duty to such intended beneficiaries. litigation funders shall be obliged to acting in a manner that is consistent with their fiduciary duty throughout the course of proceedings. in the event of a conflict between the interests of the litigation funder and those of claimants or intended beneficiaries , the litigation funder shall commit to placing the interests of the claimants or intended beneficiaries above its own interests. ### 2. where a claimant intends to take a claim on behalf of others in proceedings , such as where the claimant is a qualified entity representing consumers , the litigation funder shall be required to owe a fiduciary duty to such intended beneficiaries. litigation funders shall be obliged to acting in a manner that is consistent with their fiduciary duty throughout the course of proceedings. in the event of a conflict between the interests of the litigation funder and those of claimants or intended beneficiaries , the litigation funder shall commit to placing the interests of the claimants or intended beneficiaries above its own interests.


### 1. in the member states where third party funding agreements are permitted in accordance with article 4 , member states shall provide that an independent public supervisory authority is responsible for overseeing the authorisation of litigation funders established within its jurisdiction , offering third party funding agreements to claimants and intended beneficiaries within its jurisdiction , or in relation to proceedings within its jurisdiction. ### 1. member states shall provide that an independent public supervisory authority is responsible for overseeing the authorisation of litigation funders established within its jurisdiction , offering third party funding agreements to claimants and intended beneficiaries within its jurisdiction , or in relation to proceedings within its jurisdiction.


### 2. member states shall ensure that a complaints procedure before supervisory authorities is available for any natural or legal person who wishes to raise concerns regarding the compliance of a litigation funder with its obligations under this directive and the applicable national law. ### 2. member states shall ensure that a complaint procedure before supervisory authorities is available for any natural or legal person who wishes to raise concerns regarding the compliance of a litigation funder with its obligations under this directive and the applicable national law.


### decide on the suitability and fitness of a litigation funder including by reference to their experience , reputation , any conflicts of interest or knowledge; ### deleted


### 4. member states shall ensure that litigation funders are required to notify a supervisory authority without delay of any changes affecting compliance by a litigation funder with the capital adequacy requirements laid down in article 6 paragraphs 1 and 2. in addition , member states shall ensure that litigation funders certify , at regular intervals and at least once annually , that they remain in compliance with those paragraphs. such a certification shall contain the opinion of a recognised national or international audit firm that the litigation funder is in compliance. ### 4. member states shall ensure that litigation funders are required to notify a supervisory authority without undue delay of any changes affecting compliance by a litigation funder with the capital adequacy requirements laid down in article 6 paragraphs 1 and 2.


### 5. member states shall ensure that supervisory authorities oversee fiduciary relationships between litigation funders and claimants and intended beneficiaries in general , and are able to make directions and orders to ensure that claimants’ interests and those of intended beneficiaries are protected. ### 5. member states shall ensure that supervisory authorities oversee fiduciary relationships between litigation funders and claimants and intended beneficiaries in general.


### 1. member states shall ensure that a complaints system is in place that allows for the reception and investigation of complaints as referred to in article 8 , paragraph 2. ### 1. member states shall ensure that a complaint system is in place which allows for the reception and investigation of complaints as referred to in article 8 , paragraph 2.


### 2. under the complaints system referred to in paragraph 1 , member states shall ensure that supervisory authorities are empowered to assess whether a litigation funder is in compliance with any obligations or conditions associated with its authorisation , with the provisions of this directive and with any other applicable requirements under national law. ### 2. under the complaint system referred to in paragraph 1 , member states shall ensure that supervisory authorities are empowered to assess whether a litigation funder is in compliance with any obligations or conditions associated with its authorisation , with the provisions of this directive and with any other applicable requirements under national law.


### 3. member states shall ensure that , in exercising their oversight with litigation funders’ compliance with such obligations , supervisory authorities are empowered to: ### 3. member states shall ensure that , in exercising their oversight with litigation funders’ compliance with such obligations , supervisory authorities shall be empowered to


### (iv) initiate investigations following a recommendation from a court or administrative authority that has concerns regarding a litigation funder’s compliance with such obligations arising from any proceedings before such a court or administrative authority. ### (iv) initiate investigations following a recommendation from a court or administrative authority that has concerns regarding a litigation funder’s compliance with such obligations arising from any proceedings before such a court or administrative authority , prior to any court action or during the proceedings.


### 2. the commission shall oversee and coordinate the activities of the supervisory authorities in performing the functions set out in this directive , and shall convene and chair a network of supervisory authorities. the modalities for cooperation within the network shall be laid down and revised by the commission by means of delegated acts , in close cooperation with the supervisory authorities. ### 2. the commission shall coordinate the activities of the supervisory authorities in performing the functions set out in this directive , and shall establish a network of supervisory authorities.


### 3. the supervisory authorities may consult the commission on any matter involving the implementation of this directive. the commission may issue guidelines , recommendations , best practice notices and advisory opinions to supervisory authorities on the implementation of this directive , and in relation to any apparent inconsistency in this regard , or in relation to the supervision of any litigation funders. the commission may also set up a centre of competence to provide qualified expertise to court or administrative authorities seeking advice on how to assess litigation funders’ activities within the union. ### 3. the commission may issue guidelines on the implementation of this directive.


### 4. each supervisory authority shall communicate every quarter to the commission a list of the litigation funders it has authorised and make that list publicly available. supervisory authorities shall inform the commission each and every time there is a change to that list. ### 4. each supervisory authority shall communicate a list of authorised litigation funders.


### 5. each supervisory authority shall communicate every quarter to the commission and other supervisory authorities details of all decisions taken with regard to the supervision of litigation funders , including details of all decisions taken pursuant to article 8(2)(b). ### deleted


### 6. where a litigation funder has sought authorisation from a supervisory authority , and subsequently seeks authorisation from another , such supervisory authorities shall coordinate and share information to the extent appropriate , with a view to taking consistent decisions. ### deleted


### 7. where a litigation funder is authorised by a supervisory authority in a member state , but wishes to offer a third party funding agreement for the benefit of a claimant or other intended beneficiary in another member state , or for proceedings in another member state it shall notify the supervisory authority of the host member state , and present proof of authorisation from its home member state supervisory authority. ### deleted


### member states shall ensure that third party funding agreements are required to be written in one or more of the official languages of the member state in which the claimant(s) and intended beneficiaries are resident , and presented in clear and easily understood terms , in particular with regard to the following elements: ### member states shall ensure that third party funding agreements are required to be provided in writing in at least one of the official languages of the union , and presented in a clear and comprehensible manner , in particular with regard to the following elements:


### a. the share of any award or fees that will be paid to the litigation funder or any other third party , or any other financial costs borne by the claimants and /or intended beneficiaries directly or indirectly both in absolute terms , and also modelled on a range of realistic outcomes given the facts then known about the claim; ### a. the share of any award or fees that will be paid to the litigation funder;


### b. the risks that the claimants and/or intended beneficiaries are assuming , including: ### b. a declaration of absence of conflict of interest by the litigation funder.


### i. any restrictions on the claimants’ autonomy in issuing instructions to the claimant law firm or otherwise controlling the conduct of the litigation; ### deleted


### ii. the scope for escalating costs in the litigation , and how that impacts the financial interests of the claimants and/or beneficiaries; ### deleted


### iii. the circumstances in which the third party funding agreement can be terminated and the risks to claimants and/or beneficiaries in that scenario , and ### deleted


### iv. any potential risk of having to pay adverse costs , including circumstances in which adverse costs insurance or indemnities may not cover such exposure. ### deleted


### details of any other third-party funding agreements that the litigation funder has entered into which are related , relevant or similar to the claimant’s case , and ### deleted


### 1. member states shall ensure that third-party funding agreements concluded with persons who are not authorised to act as a litigation funder have no legal effect. ### 1. member states shall ensure that third-party funding agreements concluded with natural or legal persons who are not authorised to act as a litigation funder have no legal effect.


### 1. member states shall prohibit the termination of a third-party funding agreement by a litigation funder without the claimant’s informed consent , except where a court or administrative authority has granted the litigation funder permission to terminate the agreement , having considered whether the interests of the claimant and intended beneficiaries would be adequately protected despite the termination. ### 1. member states shall prohibit the unilateral termination of a third-party funding agreement by a litigation funder without the claimant’s informed consent , except where a court or administrative authority has granted the litigation funder permission to terminate the agreement , having considered whether the interests of the claimant and intended beneficiaries would be adequately protected despite the termination.


### 2. sufficient notice as provided for in national law shall be required to be given in order to terminate the third-party funding agreement. ### deleted


### 2. member states shall ensure that courts or administrative authorities are empowered , upon request by a party to the proceedings , where that party has justified doubts in respect of the compliance of such third party funding agreement with this directive and any other applicable national law in accordance with article 16. ### deleted


### 3. where paragraph 2 applies , in accordance with national procedural law , subject to the applicable union and national rules on confidentiality , member states shall ensure , if requested by the defendant , that the court or administrative authority is able to require the claimants or their representatives to provide the defendant with a copy of any third-party funding agreement used to support the proceedings. the court or administrative authority may permit certain information , which could confer a tactical advantage to a defendant to be redacted from the third-party funding agreement prior to disclosure to the defendant. ### deleted


### member states shall designate the competent court or administrative authority to perform the different judicial and administrative tasks under this directive. such designation shall in particular specify which court or administrative authority is to conduct controls on the impact of funding agreements on the cases before them , by exercising powers: ### member states shall designate the competent court or administrative authority to perform the different judicial and administrative tasks under this directive.


### to make orders or give directions that are binding on a litigation funder , such as requiring the litigation funder to provide the funding as agreed in the relevant third-party funding agreement or requiring the litigation funder to make changes in respect of the relevant funding and , if necessary , rejecting the legal standing of the funded claimant , in particular , when the action is brought by a qualified entity , in accordance with article 10 , paragraph 4 , of directive (eu) 2020/1828 of the european parliament and of the council; ### deleted


### to assess the compliance of each third-party funding agreement with the provisions laid down in this directive , particularly with the fiduciary duty owed to claimants and intended beneficiaries under article 7 , and , where that agreement is found not to be compliant , order the litigation funder to make the necessary changes , or declare the clause to be null and void in accordance with article 13; ### deleted


### to evaluate the suitability of each third-party funding agreement with respect to the transparency requirements under article 12 , taking in particular into account the level of clarity and transparency of the third-party funding agreement , and the degree to which any risks and benefits were presented to and knowingly undertaken by claimants or those intended beneficiaries represented by claimants; ### deleted


### to assess whether a third-party funding agreement entitles a litigation funder to an unfair , disproportionate or unreasonable share of any award , and to annul or adjust such agreements accordingly. member states shall specify that in making such an assessment , competent courts or administrative authorities may take into consideration the characteristics and circumstances of the intended or ongoing proceedings including , as appropriate: ### deleted


### the parties that are involved in the case , as well as the intended beneficiaries of the proceedings , and what they understood to be agreed as regards the amount the litigation funder would receive under the funding agreement , upon a successful outcome; ### deleted


### (ii) the likely value of any award; ### deleted


### (iii) the value of a litigation funder’s financial contribution and the proportion funded by the litigation funder of the claimant’s overall costs , and ### deleted


### (iv) the proportion of any award that the claimant and intended beneficiaries stand to receive; ### deleted


### to impose any penalty the court or administrative authority deems appropriate to ensure compliance with this directive; ### deleted


### to consult or seek expertise from persons with appropriate knowledge to assist in the performance of the court’s or administrative authority’s assessment powers , including from any suitably qualified expert or from supervisory authorities. ### deleted


### article 17 ### deleted


### 1. where the claimant party has insufficient resources to meet adverse costs , member states shall ensure that courts or administrative authorities are empowered to make cost orders against litigation funders , whether jointly or severally with claimants , following an unsuccessful outcome in proceedings. in such a case , courts or administrative authorities may require litigation funders to pay any appropriate adverse costs , having regard to: ### deleted


### the value and proportion of any award that the litigation funder would have received had the claim been successful; ### deleted


### the extent to which any costs that are not paid by a litigation funder would instead fall on a defendant , the claimant , or any other intended beneficiaries. ### deleted


### the conduct of the litigation funder throughout the proceedings and , in particular , its compliance with this directive and whether its conduct has contributed to the overall cost of the proceedings; and ### deleted


### the value of the litigation funder’s initial investment. ### deleted


### 2. member states shall provide the commission , for the first time by [ ] years after the date of application of this directive and annually thereafter , with the following information necessary for the preparation of the report referred to in paragraph 1: ### deleted


### the identity , number and type of entities that are recognised as authorised litigation funders; ### deleted


### any changes to that list and the reasons therefor; ### deleted


### the number and type of proceedings that are funded in whole or in part by a litigation funder; ### deleted


### the outcomes of those proceedings in terms of the amounts earned by litigation funders in comparison to the awards delivered to claimants and intended beneficiaries. ### deleted


### (8) a dlt multilateral trading facility should be a multilateral system , operated by an investment firm or a market operator authorised under directive 2014/65/eu , that has received a specific permission under regulation (eu) xx/20xx of the european parliament and of the council27 [proposal for a regulation on a pilot regime on dlt market infrastructure]. dlt multilateral trading facilities should be subject to all the requirements applicable to a multilateral trading facility under that directive , except if it were to be granted an exemption by its national competent authority in accordance with this directive. one potential regulatory barrier to the development of a multilateral trading facility for transferable securities issued on a dlt could be the obligation of intermediation set out in directive 2014/65/eu. a traditional multilateral trading facility can only admit as members and participants investment firms , credit institutions and other persons who have a sufficient level of trading ability and competence and who dispose of appropriate organisational arrangements and resources. a dlt multilateral trading facility should be allowed to request a derogation from such an obligation so that is can provide retail investors with easy access to the trading venue , provided that adequate safeguards are in place in terms of investor protection. ### (8) a dlt multilateral trading facility should be a multilateral system that has received a specific permission under regulation (eu) xx/20xx of the european parliament and of the council27 [proposal for a regulation on a pilot regime on dlt market infrastructure]. dlt multilateral trading facilities should be subject to all the requirements applicable to a multilateral trading facility under that directive , except if it were to be granted an exemption by its national competent authority in accordance with this directive. one potential regulatory barrier to the development of a multilateral trading facility for transferable securities issued on a dlt could be the obligation of intermediation set out in directive 2014/65/eu. a traditional multilateral trading facility can only admit as members and participants investment firms , credit institutions and other persons who have a sufficient level of trading ability and competence and who dispose of appropriate organisational arrangements and resources. a dlt multilateral trading facility should be allowed to request a derogation from such an obligation so that is can provide retail investors with easy access to the trading venue , provided that adequate safeguards are in place in terms of investor protection.


### (9) directive (eu) 2015/2366 on payment services sets out specific rules on ict security controls and mitigation elements for the purposes of authorisation to perform payment services. those authorisation rules should be amended in order to align them with to regulation (eu) 2021/xx [dora]. furthermore , the incident notification rules in that directive should not apply to ict-related incident notifications that regulation (eu) 2021/xx [dora] fully harmonises. ### (9) directive (eu) 2015/2366 on payment services sets out specific rules on ict security controls and mitigation elements for the purposes of authorisation to perform payment services. those authorisation rules should be amended in order to align them with to regulation (eu) 2021/xx [dora]. furthermore , the incident notification rules in that directive should not apply to ict-related incident notifications that regulation (eu) 2021/xx [dora] fully harmonises. directive (eu) 2015/2366 should also ensure that member states designate the competent authority responsible for carrying out the duties resulting from regulation (eu) 2021/xx [dora] for the supervision of payment systems.


### 3. however , where the investment firm or market operator operates a distributed ledger technology multilateral trading facility (“dlt multilateral trading facility”) as defined in article 2(3) of regulation xx/20xx [proposal for a regulation on a pilot regime for dlt market infrastructure] , the competent authority may permit that , under its rules governing access as referred to in article 18(3) and for a maximum of four years , the investment firm or market operator admits natural persons to the dlt multilateral trading facility as members or participants , provided that those persons fulfil the following requirements: ### 3. however , where an entity operates a distributed ledger technology multilateral trading facility (“dlt multilateral trading facility”) as defined in article 2(3) of regulation xx/20xx [proposal for a regulation on a pilot regime for dlt market infrastructure] , the competent authority may permit that , under its rules governing access as referred to in article 18(3) and for a maximum of four years , the entity operating a dlt multilateral trading facility admits natural persons to the dlt multilateral trading facility as members or participants , provided that those persons fulfil the following requirements:


### 5. eba shall promote cooperation , including the sharing of information , in the area of operational risks associated with payment services among the competent authorities , and between the competent authorities and the ecb.; ### 5. eba and its independent director in charge of digital operational resilience shall promote cooperation , including the sharing of information , in the area of operational risks associated with payment services among the competent authorities , and between the competent authorities and the ecb.;


### 23. calls on the member states to step up their efforts to early identify potential victims , in particular within migration flows and hotspots; calls on the member states to provide adequate resources for specialised facilities for unaccompanied minors and female victims of trafficking; ### 23. calls on the member states to step up their efforts to early identify potential victims , in particular within migration flows and hotspots; highlights that potential victims identified should be provided with protection and access to safe places where information could be provided; calls on the member states to provide adequate resources for specialised facilities for unaccompanied minors and female victims of trafficking and ensure sufficient places in shelters;


### 26. calls on the member states to focus on identifying child victims and helping them to avail themselves of their rights; emphasises the need for guardians , including temporary guardians as an emergency measure , to be appointed immediately for child victims; ### 26. calls on the member states to focus on identifying child victims and helping them to avail themselves of their rights; recalls the obligation of member states to pay special attention to child victims of trafficking and to provide special protection to children in criminal procedures , with the best interests of the child being considered paramount at all times; emphasises the need for guardians , including temporary guardians as an emergency measure , to be appointed immediately for child victims;


### 26. calls on the member states to focus on identifying child victims and helping them to avail themselves of their rights; emphasises the need for guardians , including temporary guardians as an emergency measure , to be appointed immediately for child victims; ### 26. calls on the member states to focus on identifying child victims and helping them to avail themselves of their rights; emphasises the need for well-trained and well-supported guardians , including temporary guardians as an emergency measure , to be appointed immediately for child victims; advises the member states to increase the number of guardians by organising awareness campaigns;


### 27. calls on the member states to fully implement directive 2011/93/eu on combating the sexual abuse and sexual exploitation of children and child pornography26 , and to reinforce police and judicial cooperation to prevent and combat sexual exploitation; ### 27. calls on the member states to fully implement directive 2011/93/eu on combating the sexual abuse and sexual exploitation of children and child pornography26 , and to reinforce police and judicial cooperation to prevent and combat sexual exploitation; urges the member states to cooperate with eu agencies , in particular with europol and its dedicated entities , to step up information exchange and to support cross border investigations;


### 28. notes that children in migration , and , in particular , unaccompanied migrant children , continue to be at higher risk of trafficking and exploitation along migration routes en route to and within the eu; ### 28. notes that children in migration , and , in particular , unaccompanied migrant children , continue to be at higher risk of trafficking and exploitation along migration routes en route to and within the eu; urges the member states to protect unaccompanied migrant children against those risks by assuring them the same rights as all other children and taking their best interests into account , to assign them a guardian upon arrival , and to provide them with proper and adapted living conditions; stresses that a coordinated european approach is necessary to find and protect unaccompanied migrant children when they go missing , including data exchange (e.g. through an integrated database which can only be accessed and used in the best interests of the child);


### 31. calls on the member states to adopt clear provisions on the non-prosecution or non-punishment of thb victims and on decoupling protection from cooperation with law enforcement agencies; ### 31. regrets that conditions for a victim to receive the official status of thb victim are often too rigid to fulfil , especially for minors and other vulnerable victims who are financially and emotionally dependent on their traffickers; calls on the member states to adopt clear provisions on the non-prosecution or non-punishment of thb victims and on decoupling protection from cooperation with law enforcement agencies , currently putting the complete burden on the victim; requests the member states to rather fulfil their needs on a more psycho-emotional level;


### 32. stresses the importance of financial investigation and ‘following the money’ as a key strategy for investigating and prosecuting the organised crime networks that profit from thb; calls on the commission to assess and promote the use of existing judicial and police cooperation , and the available tools; ### 32. stresses the importance of financial investigation and ‘following the money’ as a key strategy for investigating and prosecuting the organised crime networks that profit from thb; calls on the member states to launch financial investigations and work with money laundering specialists when starting a new trafficking investigation; calls on member states to strengthen cooperation in freezing and confiscating the assets of individuals involved in trafficking and providing compensation to victims; calls on the commission to assess and promote the use of existing judicial and police cooperation , and the available tools , such as mutual recognition of court judgments , joint investigation teams and the european investigation order;


### 33. recalls the role of eu agencies in the early identification of victims and the fight against thb; calls for more resources for the justice and home affairs (jha) agencies to enable their staff to be trained and capacity-building instruments to be developed in the area of detecting victims , including the appointment of gender-trained agency officers , especially in the member states faced with increased mixed migratory flows; calls on the commission to develop guidelines to mainstream gender expertise in the activities of law enforcement authorities across the eu; ### 33. recalls the role of eu agencies in the early identification of victims and the fight against thb; calls for more resources for the justice and home affairs (jha) agencies to enable their staff to be trained and capacity-building instruments to be developed in the area of detecting victims , including the appointment of gender-trained agency officers , especially in the member states faced with increased mixed migratory flows; calls on the commission to develop guidelines to mainstream gender expertise in the activities of law enforcement authorities across the eu , including by developing sustained programs of improving gender balance in decision-making processes and in the staff of the jha agencies relevant to trafficking;


### 1. points out the need for a coordinated and coherent framework at eu level that guarantees the protection of victims of thb , including through coordinated implementation with the rights conferred by the victims’ rights directive , the residence permit directive and the compensation directive15 ; ### 1. points out the need for a coordinated and coherent framework at eu level that guarantees the protection of victims of thb , including through coordinated implementation with the rights conferred by the victims’ rights directive , the residence permit directive , , the directive 93/2011/eu on combating the sexual abuse and sexual exploitation of children and child pornography , and the compensation directive15 ;


### 3. stresses the importance of the funding of the asylum , migration and integration fund (amif) and internal security fund (isf) programmes to continue to be used for projects tackling thb , as well as using other available instruments; ### 3. stresses the importance of the funding of the asylum , migration and integration fund (amif) , the daphne program and internal security fund (isf) programmes to continue to be used for projects tackling thb , as well as using other available instruments , such as the rights , equality and citizenship programme , empact actions , eu-un spotlight initiative , the eu trust fund for africa , glo.act initiative , the development cooperation instrument and the european development fund;


### 3. stresses the importance of the funding of the asylum , migration and integration fund (amif) and internal security fund (isf) programmes to continue to be used for projects tackling thb , as well as using other available instruments; ### 3. stresses the importance of the funding of the asylum , migration and integration fund (amif) , daphne fund and internal security fund (isf) programmes to continue to be used for projects tackling thb , as well as using other available instruments;


### 4. highlights that the lack of consistent and detailed data continues to hamper the adequate assessment of trends in thb; calls on the member states to collect more up-to-date data disaggregated by age and gender and including internally trafficked people , by compiling statistical information in cooperation with civil society; ### 4. highlights that the lack of consistent and detailed data continues to hamper the adequate assessment of trends in thb; calls on the member states to collect more up-to-date , centralised and comprehensive data disaggregated by age and gender and including internally trafficked people , by compiling statistical information in cooperation with civil society;


### 6. calls on the commission and the member states to monitor the use of digital technologies for thb as the predominant tools used to recruit trafficking victims; ### 6. calls on the commission and the member states to monitor the use of digital technologies , internet and social media for thb as the predominant tools used to recruit trafficking victims and to regulate third party responsibility for technology companies hosting exploitative materials;


### 6. calls on the commission and the member states to monitor the use of digital technologies for thb as the predominant tools used to recruit trafficking victims; ### 6. calls on the commission and the member states to monitor the use of digital technologies for thb as the predominant tools used to recruit , traffic and exploit victims and to increase support for building transnational expertise and capacity with technology-based solutions;


### 8. calls on all member states to effectively guarantee the rights of victims and to support them with a gender-sensitive approach while ensuring complementarity with the victims’ rights directive; notes that the anti-trafficking directive prohibits the criminalisation of victims of thb; ### 8. calls on all member states to effectively guarantee the rights of victims and to support them with a gender-sensitive approach while ensuring complementarity with the victims’ rights directive; notes that the anti-trafficking directive prohibits the criminalisation of victims of thb; calls on all member states to ensure that legal assistance is provided to potential victims of thb at the earliest possible moment;


### 8. calls on all member states to effectively guarantee the rights of victims and to support them with a gender-sensitive approach while ensuring complementarity with the victims’ rights directive; notes that the anti-trafficking directive prohibits the criminalisation of victims of thb; ### 8. calls on all member states to effectively guarantee the rights of victims and to support them with a gender-sensitive approach while ensuring complementarity with the victims’ rights directive; underscores that the anti-trafficking directive prohibits the criminalisation of victims of thb;


### 9. highlights that while the full impact of the covid-19 pandemic is not yet measureable , it is nevertheless clear that the crisis disproportionately affects the most vulnerable victims of thb , especially women and children; ### 9. highlights that while the full impact of the covid-19 pandemic is not yet measurable , it is nevertheless clear that the crisis disproportionately affects the most vulnerable victims of thb , especially women and children; stresses that due to the increased use of the internet , social media and online advertisements , a sharp increase in the number of victims of trafficking exploited online is expected; calls on the member states for more effective and coherent actions targeting online exploitation , with the support of relevant eu agencies , such as europol;


### 9. highlights that while the full impact of the covid-19 pandemic is not yet measureable , it is nevertheless clear that the crisis disproportionately affects the most vulnerable victims of thb , especially women and children; ### 9. highlights that while the full impact of the covid-19 pandemic is not yet measureable , it is nevertheless clear that the crisis disproportionately affects the most vulnerable victims of thb , especially women and children; calls on member states to ensure effective functioning of nrms and equivalent systems and that they should be updated to respond to emerging thb trends during the covid-19 pandemic;


### 10. points out the need for a coherent and coordinated national referral mechanism (nrm); underlines that good cooperation between the police and non-governmental organisations (ngos) cannot be a substitute for a fully fledged nrm defining the roles and responsibilities of all relevant actors16 ; ### 10. points out the need for a coherent and coordinated national referral mechanism (nrm); underlines that good cooperation between the police and non-governmental organisations (ngos) cannot be a substitute for a fully fledged nrm defining the roles and responsibilities of all relevant actors16 ; encourages member states to set up national centres specialised in the support and reception of victims of thb and to facilitate direct and efficient cross-border cooperation between those centres as well as between law enforcement agencies;


### 14. calls on the commission , in cooperation with the member states , to examine how the demand for sexual services drives trafficking , as traffickers tend to convey their victims to countries where prostitution is regulated and lawfully practiced , making it much easier for traffickers to use a legal environment in order to exploit their victims17 ; recalls that in some eu member states where prostitution is legal , suspects were able to exploit children alongside adult victims18 ; ### 14. calls on the commission , in cooperation with the member states , to examine how the demand for sexual services drives trafficking;


### 15. calls on the commission to prioritise the prevention of the crime of trafficking for sexual exploitation , including through adopting measures and programmes to discourage and reduce demand , and calls on the member states to include the use of the services of victims of trafficking as a criminal offence in their national statutes , as recommended by article 8 of the anti-trafficking directive and reiterated by the commission in 201819 ; ### 15. calls on the commission to prioritise the prevention of the crime of trafficking for sexual exploitation , including through adopting measures and programmes to discourage and reduce demand , and calls on the member states to include the use of the services of victims of trafficking as a criminal offence in their national statutes , as recommended by article 8 of the anti-trafficking directive and reiterated by the commission in 201819 and foreseen proportionate sanctions;


### 16. urges the member states to focus on the recurring and emerging patterns of thb for sexual exploitation , such as the increasing exploitation of children and the use of the ‘lover boy’ method as the most frequent means of recruiting victims by using online technologies; ### 16. urges the member states to focus on the recurring and emerging patterns of thb for sexual exploitation , such as the increasing exploitation of children and the use of the ‘lover boy’ method as the most frequent means of recruiting victims by using online technologies; notes that the increased use of online technologies by criminal networks engaged in thb has significantly transformed their traditional modus operandi;


### – having regard to its resolution of 21 january 2021 on the eu strategy for gender equality5 , ### – having regard to its resolution of 21 january 2021 on the eu strategy for gender equality5and to the european commission's gender equality strategy for 2020-2025 ,


### c. whereas gender-based violence is violence directed against women because they are women and it affects women disproportionately; whereas lgbti persons are also victims of gender-based violence because of their gender , gender identity , gender expression and sex characteristics; whereas gender-based violence is rooted in gender stereotypes , patriarchal structures and power asymmetries; ### c. whereas gender-based violence is violence directed against a person because of that person's gender or violence that affects persons of a particular gender disproportionately; whereas ‘violence against women’ means any act of gender-based violence that results in , or is likely to result in , physical , sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women , including threats of such acts , coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty , whether occurring in public or in private life; whereas lgbti persons are also victims of gender-based violence because of their gender , gender identity , gender expression and sex characteristics; whereas gender-based violence is rooted in gender stereotypes , patriarchal structures and power asymmetries;


### c. whereas gender-based violence is violence directed against women because they are women and it affects women disproportionately; whereas lgbti persons are also victims of gender-based violence because of their gender , gender identity , gender expression and sex characteristics; whereas gender-based violence is rooted in gender stereotypes , patriarchal structures and power asymmetries; ### c. whereas gender-based violence is a serious violation of human rights directed against women because they are women and it affects women disproportionately; whereas lgbti persons are also victims of gender-based violence because of their gender , gender identity , gender expression and sex characteristics; whereas gender-based violence is rooted in gender stereotypes , patriarchal structures and power asymmetries;


### d. whereas the european institute for gender equality defines femicide as the killing of women and girls because of their gender; ### d. whereas the european institute for gender equality defines femicide as the killing of women and girls because of their gender; whereas it can take different forms such as the murder of women as a result of intimate partner violence , killing of women and girls because of their gender , sexual orientation , gender identity , gender expression and sex characteristics , as well as female and intersex genital mutilations and so called "honour killings";


### 1. condemns all forms of violence against women and girls and other forms of gender-based violence , such as violence against lgbti persons , and deplores the fact that women and girls continue to be exposed to psychological , physical , sexual and economic violence , including sexual exploitation and trafficking in human beings , both online and offline; ### 1. condemns all forms of violence against women and girls in all their diversity and other forms of gender-based violence , such as violence against lgbti persons , and deplores the fact that women and girls continue to be exposed to psychological , physical , sexual and economic violence , including sexual exploitation and trafficking in human beings , both online and offline;


### 3. stresses that violence against women and other forms of gender-based violence are the result of the unequal distribution of power , patriarchal structures , and gender stereotypes , that have led to domination over and discrimination against women by men; underlines that this situation is aggravated by social and economic inequalities; ### 3. stresses that violence against women and other forms of gender-based violence are the result of the unequal distribution of power , patriarchal structures , and gender stereotypes , that have led to domination over and discrimination against women and lgbti persons by men; underlines that this situation is aggravated by social and economic inequalities;


### 4. underlines the wide range of psychological impacts that gender-based violence has on victims , including stress , concentration problems , anxiety , panic attacks , low self-esteem , depression , post-traumatic stress disorder , lack of trust and of sense of control; recalls that gender-based violence also has a social and economic impact; ### 4. underlines the wide range of psychological impacts that gender-based violence has on victims , including stress , concentration problems , anxiety , panic attacks , low self-esteem , low self-confidence , depression , post-traumatic stress disorder , which can force victims into committing suicide;


### 4. underlines the wide range of psychological impacts that gender-based violence has on victims , including stress , concentration problems , anxiety , panic attacks , low self-esteem , depression , post-traumatic stress disorder , lack of trust and of sense of control; recalls that gender-based violence also has a social and economic impact; ### 4. underlines the wide range of psychological impacts that gender-based violence has on victims , including stress , concentration problems , anxiety , panic attacks , social alienation , low self-esteem , depression , post-traumatic stress disorder , lack of trust and of sense of control that can lead to self-harm thoughts and actions; recalls that gender-based violence also has a social and economic impact;


### 4. underlines the wide range of psychological impacts that gender-based violence has on victims , including stress , concentration problems , anxiety , panic attacks , low self-esteem , depression , post-traumatic stress disorder , lack of trust and of sense of control; recalls that gender-based violence also has a social and economic impact; ### 4. underlines the wide range of psychological impacts that gender-based violence has on victims and witnesses , including feeling unsafe or vulnerable , stress , concentration problems , anxiety , panic attacks , low self-esteem , depression , post-traumatic stress disorder , lack of trust and of sense of control; recalls that gender-based violence also has a social and economic impact;


### 5. stresses that the council of europe convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence (the ‘istanbul convention’) remains the international standard and a key tool for the eradication of gender-based violence by following a holistic and coordinated approach that places the rights of the victim at the centre and addresses the issues from a wide range of perspectives; ### 5. stresses that the council of europe convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence (the ‘istanbul convention’) remains the international standard and a key tool for the eradication of gender-based violence by following a holistic and coordinated approach that places the rights of the victim at the centre and addresses the issues from a wide range of perspectives; reiterates its call to conclude the eu’s ratification of the istanbul convention on the basis of a broad accession , and to advocate its ratification by bulgaria , czech republic , hungary , latvia , lithuania and slovakia; calls on the member states to take into account the recommendations by grevio and to improve legislation to bring it more into line with the istanbul convention’s provisions in order to ensure proper implementation and enforcement;


### 6. denounces the fact that the combat against gender-based violence is negatively affected by the attack on women’s rights and gender equality; condemns the actions of anti-gender and anti-women movements in europe and worldwide that aim to overturn existing laws on women’s rights and lgbti+ rights; ### 6. denounces the fact that the combat against gender-based violence is negatively affected by the attack on women’s rights and gender equality; condemns the actions of anti-gender and anti-women movements in europe and worldwide that aim to overturn existing laws on women’s rights , especially sexual and reproductive health and rights , and lgbti+ rights;


### 7. insists on actions to prevent gender-based violence by addressing the underlying causes , including counteracting sexism , gender stereotypes and patriarchal values; underlines the need for gender equality to have a central place in education and the need for awareness-raising campaigns; ### 7. emphasizes the importance of the preventive measures in combating violence against women and girls; insists on actions to prevent gender-based violence by addressing the underlying causes , including counteracting sexism , gender stereotypes and patriarchal values; underlines the need for gender equality to have a central place in education and the need for awareness-raising campaigns; stresses the specific need to educate children and young people on gender-based violence , which would contribute to the prevention of crimes;


### 7. insists on actions to prevent gender-based violence by addressing the underlying causes , including counteracting sexism , gender stereotypes and patriarchal values; underlines the need for gender equality to have a central place in education and the need for awareness-raising campaigns; ### 7. insists on actions to prevent gender-based violence by addressing the underlying causes , including counteracting sexism , gender stereotypes and patriarchal values; underlines the need for gender equality to have a central place in education and the need for awareness-raising campaigns; recalls the commission’s proposal in the gender equality strategy for an eu-wide campaign on gender stereotypes and calls on member states to fully support and implement the initiative when launched;


### 7. insists on actions to prevent gender-based violence by addressing the underlying causes , including counteracting sexism , gender stereotypes and patriarchal values; underlines the need for gender equality to have a central place in education and the need for awareness-raising campaigns; ### 7. insists on actions to prevent gender-based violence by addressing the underlying causes , including counteracting sexism , gender stereotypes and patriarchal values; underlines the need for gender equality to have a central place in education and the need for awareness-raising campaigns; calls on the commission to work together with the member states to make sure that gender-based violence is effectively tackled throughout the national curricula;


### 8. calls on the commission and the member states to improve the regular availability and comparability of quality , disaggregated data on all forms of gender-based violence through cooperation with eurostat , the european union agency for fundamental rights and the european institute for gender equality; ### 8. calls on the commission and the member states to improve the regular availability and comparability of quality , disaggregated data on all forms of gender-based violence through cooperation with eurostat , the european union agency for fundamental rights and the european institute for gender equality; stresses the importance of promoting cooperation between the member states on the issue of gender-based violence , which also enables the member states with successful policies to share their experiences through exchange of best practices;


### 8. calls on the commission and the member states to improve the regular availability and comparability of quality , disaggregated data on all forms of gender-based violence through cooperation with eurostat , the european union agency for fundamental rights and the european institute for gender equality; ### 8. calls on the commission and the member states to improve the regular availability and comparability of quality , disaggregated data on all forms of gender-based violence through cooperation with eurostat , the european union agency for fundamental rights and the european institute for gender equality; welcomes the announcement of a new eu-wide survey by the fra on the prevalence and dynamics of all forms of violence against women;


### 9. highlights the need for targeted policies to address the situation of survivors who experience intersectional forms of discrimination , such as women refugees , asylum seekers and migrants , indigenous women , racialised women , women from religious and ethnic minorities , lesbian , bisexual and trans women , elderly women and women with disabilities; ### 9. highlights the need for targeted policies to address the situation of survivors who experience intersectional forms of discrimination , such as women refugees , asylum seekers and migrants , indigenous women , racialised women , women from religious and ethnic minorities , lesbian , bisexual , trans and intersex women , elderly women and women with disabilities , as well as non-binary persons;


### 9. highlights the need for targeted policies to address the situation of survivors who experience intersectional forms of discrimination , such as women refugees , asylum seekers and migrants , indigenous women , racialised women , women from religious and ethnic minorities , lesbian , bisexual and trans women , elderly women and women with disabilities; ### 9. highlights the need for targeted policies to address the situation of survivors who experience intersectional forms of discrimination , such as women refugees , asylum seekers and migrants , women from religious , racial and ethnic minorities , lesbian , bisexual and trans women , elderly women and women with disabilities;


### 10. recalls that violations of sexual and reproductive rights are a form of violence against women and girls; ### 10. recalls that violations of sexual and reproductive rights are a form of violence against women and girls; strongly condemns the backlash against women’s rights and gender equality in the eu , in particular the setback to women’s sexual and reproductive health and rights and the de facto ban to safe and legal abortion in poland;


### 10. recalls that violations of sexual and reproductive rights are a form of violence against women and girls; ### 10. recalls that violations of sexual and reproductive rights are a form of violence against women and girls , as well as transgender and non-binary persons , as reflected in the lgbtiq equality strategy;


### 12. calls on member states to take all necessary measures to promote the protection of women and girls in all their diversity and all survivors of gender-based violence against all forms of violence; ### 12. calls on member states to take all necessary measures to promote the protection of women and girls in all their diversity and all survivors of gender-based violence against all forms of violence , including by paying greater attention to the needs of survivors who experience intersectional forms of discrimination and violence;


### 13. underlines the obligation on member states to ensure that there is support and services for survivors of gender-based violence; recalls the importance , in that context , of support to independent civil society and women’s shelter organisations; ### 13. underlines the obligation on member states to ensure that there is adequate support and services for survivors of gender-based violence; recalls the importance , in that context , of providing support to independent civil society , women’s shelter organisations and to organisations providing legal advice and psychological support , as well as support , counselling , and training to victims with regards to access to employment;


### 13. underlines the obligation on member states to ensure that there is support and services for survivors of gender-based violence; recalls the importance , in that context , of support to independent civil society and women’s shelter organisations; ### 13. underlines the obligation on member states to ensure that there is support and services for survivors of gender-based violence; recalls the importance , in that context , of support to independent civil society and women’s shelter organisations; highlights the necessity to raise awareness amongst women and girls about available support for victims;


### 13. underlines the obligation on member states to ensure that there is support and services for survivors of gender-based violence; recalls the importance , in that context , of support to independent civil society and women’s shelter organisations; ### 13. underlines the obligation on member states to ensure that there is support and services for survivors of gender-based violence; recalls the importance , in that context , of support to independent civil society and women’s and specialised shelter organisations;


### 14. calls on the member states to step up their work in order to ensure that victims have access to justice , and to guarantee that the rights of the victim are placed at the centre in order to avoid discrimination , traumatisation or revictimisation during judicial , medical and police proceedings; ### 14. calls on the member states to step up their work in order to ensure that victims have access to justice , including restorative justice , and to guarantee that the rights of the victim are placed at the centre in order to avoid discrimination , traumatisation or revictimisation during judicial , medical and police proceedings; underlines with concern that most member states still have issues with complete/correct transposition and/or practical application of the victim’s rights directive , as reflected in the commission’s strategy on victim’s rights , and calls on their due diligence for its complete and correct transposition;


### 15. calls on the member states to improve the resources and training of practitioners , law enforcement officers and all professionals dealing with victims of gender-based violence; calls on members states to ensure that victims have the right to state-funded legal aid before and during legal proceedings; ### 15. calls on the member states to improve the resources and training of practitioners , law enforcement officers and all professionals dealing with victims of gender-based violence; points out the importance of making full use of the training possibilities available to member states through the various programmes and agencies of the european union dealing with the prevention of gender-based violence; calls on members states to ensure that victims have the right to state-funded legal aid before and during legal proceedings;


### 16. stresses that gender-based violence is a serious crime and a widespread violation of fundamental rights in the union which needs to be addressed with greater efficiency and determination on a common basis; stresses that gender-based violence is the result of a patriarchal society that has a cross-border dimension; points , in particular , at the growing anti-gender and anti-women movements , which are well organised and have a cross-border nature; ### 16. stresses that gender-based violence is a serious crime and a widespread violation of fundamental rights in the union which needs to be addressed with greater efficiency and determination on a common basis; stresses that gender-based violence is the result of a patriarchal society that has a cross-border dimension; points , in particular , at the growing anti-gender and anti-women movements , which are well organised and have a cross-border nature , and which therefore call for a coordinated eu response;


### 16. stresses that gender-based violence is a serious crime and a widespread violation of fundamental rights in the union which needs to be addressed with greater efficiency and determination on a common basis; stresses that gender-based violence is the result of a patriarchal society that has a cross-border dimension; points , in particular , at the growing anti-gender and anti-women movements , which are well organised and have a cross-border nature; ### 16. stresses that gender-based violence is a serious crime and a widespread violation of fundamental rights in the union which needs to be addressed with greater efficiency and determination on a common basis; stresses that gender-based violence is the result of a patriarchal society that has a cross-border dimension; points , in particular , at the growing anti-gender , anti-lgbtiq and anti-women movements , which are well organised and have a cross-border nature;


### 17. stresses that the special need to combat violence against women and girls and other forms of gender-based violence on a common basis also results from the need to establish minimum rules concerning the definition of criminal offences and sanctions; ### 17. stresses that the special need to combat violence against women and girls in all their diversity and other forms of gender-based violence on a common basis also results from the need to establish minimum rules concerning the definition of criminal offences and sanctions;


### 18. requests that the commission submit , on the basis of the third subparagraph of article 83(1) tfeu , a proposal for a council decision identifying gender-based violence as a new area of crime , following the recommendations set out in the annex hereto and requests the commission to use that new area of crime as a legal basis for a holistic directive to prevent and combat all forms of gender-based violence; ### 18. requests that the commission submit , on the basis of the third subparagraph of article 83(1) tfeu , a proposal for a council decision identifying gender-based violence as a new area of crime , following the recommendations set out in the annex hereto and requests the commission to use that new area of crime as a legal basis for a holistic and victim-centred eu directive to prevent and combat all forms of gender-based violence;


### 18. requests that the commission submit , on the basis of the third subparagraph of article 83(1) tfeu , a proposal for a council decision identifying gender-based violence as a new area of crime , following the recommendations set out in the annex hereto and requests the commission to use that new area of crime as a legal basis for a holistic directive to prevent and combat all forms of gender-based violence; ### 18. requests that the commission submit , on the basis of the third subparagraph of article 83(1) tfeu , a proposal for a council decision identifying gender-based violence , online and offline , as a new area of crime , following the recommendations set out in the annex hereto and requests the commission to use that new area of crime as a legal basis for a holistic directive to prevent and combat all forms of gender-based violence;


### 19. calls on the commission to propose a directive on gender-based violence that implements the standards of the istanbul convention and includes the following elements: prevention , including through gender-sensitive education programming directed at both girls and boys , and empowerment of women and girls; support services and protection measures for survivors; combating all forms of gender-based violence , including violations of women’s sexual and reproductive health and rights; and minimum standards for law enforcement; ### 19. calls on the commission to propose a legislative framework on gender-based violence that implements the standards of the istanbul convention and includes the following elements: prevention , including through gender-sensitive education programming directed at both girls and boys , and empowerment of women and girls; support services and protection measures for survivors such as financial assistance , psychological support , telephone helplines , shelters and access to social housing , specialists support for children; obligations for member states to address appropriately in their respective legislation amongst others custody and visitation rights of children , civil consequences of forced marriages , stalking , including cyberstalking , forced abortion and sterilization and denial of reproductive rights and denial of access to reproductive health care and minimum standards for law enforcement;


### 19. calls on the commission to propose a directive on gender-based violence that implements the standards of the istanbul convention and includes the following elements: prevention , including through gender-sensitive education programming directed at both girls and boys , and empowerment of women and girls; support services and protection measures for survivors; combating all forms of gender-based violence , including violations of women’s sexual and reproductive health and rights; and minimum standards for law enforcement; ### 19. calls on the commission to propose a directive on gender-based violence that implements the standards of the istanbul convention and includes the following elements: prevention , including through gender-sensitive education programming directed at both girls and boys in all their diversity , and empowerment of women and girls in all their diversity; support services and protection measures for survivors; combating all forms of gender-based violence , including violations of women’s , transgender's and non-binary persons' sexual and reproductive health and rights; and minimum standards for law enforcement;