### 1. this regulation lays down rules and procedures in order to ensure the effective protection of the interests of the union and its member states where a third country seeks , through measures affecting trade or investment , to coerce the union or a member state into adopting or refraining from adopting a particular act. this regulation provides a framework for the union to respond in such situations with the objective to deter , or have the third country desist from such actions , whilst permitting the union , in the last resort , to counteract such actions. ### 1. this regulation creates and establishes a european mechanism against foreign economic coercion with specific and defined rules and procedures in order to ensure the effective protection of the interests of the union and its member states where a third country seeks , through measures affecting trade or investment , to coerce the union or a member state into adopting or refraining from adopting a particular act. this regulation provides a framework for the union to respond in such situations with the objective to deter , or have the third country desist from such actions , whilst permitting the union , in the last resort , to counteract such actions.


### 1. this regulation lays down rules and procedures in order to ensure the effective protection of the interests of the union and its member states where a third country seeks , through measures affecting trade or investment , to coerce the union or a member state into adopting or refraining from adopting a particular act. this regulation provides a framework for the union to respond in such situations with the objective to deter , or have the third country desist from such actions , whilst permitting the union , in the last resort , to counteract such actions. ### 1. this regulation lays down rules and procedures in order to ensure the effective protection of the interests of the union and its member states where a third country seeks , through measures , failure to act or threat thereof affecting trade or investment , to coerce the union or a member state into adopting or refraining from adopting a particular act. this regulation provides a framework for the union to respond in such situations with the objective to deter , obtain the cessation and the reparation of the injury caused or have the third country desist from such actions , whilst permitting the union , in the last resort , to counteract such actions.


### (10) any action undertaken by the union on the basis of this regulation should comply with the union’s obligations under international law. international law allows , under certain conditions , such as proportionality and prior notice , the imposition of countermeasures , that is to say of measures that would otherwise be contrary to the international obligations of an injured party vis-à-vis the country responsible for a breach of international law , and that are aimed at obtaining the cessation of the breach or reparation for it.10 accordingly , response measures adopted under this regulation should take the form of either measures adhering to the union’s international obligations or measures constituting permitted countermeasures. under international law , and in accordance with the principle of proportionality , they should not exceed a level that is commensurate with the injury suffered by the union or a member state due to the third country’s measures of economic coercion , taking into account the gravity of the third country’s measures and the union’s rights and interests in question. in this respect , injury to the union or a member state is understood under international law to include injury to union economic operators. ### (10) any action undertaken by the union on the basis of this regulation should comply with the union’s obligations under international law. the union should continue to support the rules-based multilateral trading system , with the world trade organisation (wto) at its core. out of the wto's framework , international law allows , under certain conditions , such as proportionality and prior notice , the imposition of countermeasures , that is to say of measures that would otherwise be contrary to the international obligations of an injured party vis-à-vis the country responsible for a breach of international law , and that are aimed at obtaining the cessation of the breach or reparation for it.10 accordingly , response measures adopted under this regulation should take the form of either measures adhering to the union’s international obligations or measures constituting permitted countermeasures. under international law , and in accordance with the principle of proportionality , they should not exceed a level that is commensurate with the injury suffered by the union or a member state due to the third country’s measures of economic coercion , taking into account the gravity of the third country’s measures and the union’s rights and interests in question. in this respect , injury to the union or a member state is understood under international law to include injury to union economic operators.


### 1. this regulation applies where a third country: ### 1. this regulation applies in the event of economic coercion , where a third country:


### — interferes in the legitimate sovereign choices of the union or a member state by seeking to prevent or obtain the cessation , modification or adoption of a particular act by the union or a member state ### — interferes in the legitimate sovereign choices of the union or a member state by seeking to prevent or obtain the cessation , modification or adoption of a particular act by the union or a member state , including some extraterritorial effects of third countries' sanctions


### — by applying or threatening to apply measures affecting trade or investment. ### — by applying , failing to adopt or threatening to apply measures affecting trade or investment.


### for the purposes of this regulation , such third-country actions shall be referred to as measures of economic coercion. ### deleted


### the intensity , severity , frequency , duration , breadth and magnitude of the third country’s measure and the pressure arising from it; ### the intensity , severity , frequency , duration , breadth and magnitude of the third country’s measure , failure to act or threat thereof as well as and the pressure arising from it;


### the extent to which the third-country measure encroaches upon an area of the union’s or member states’ sovereignty; ### the extent to which the third-country measure , failure to act or threat thereof encroaches upon an area of the union’s or member states’ sovereignty;


### whether the third country is acting based on a legitimate concern that is internationally recognised; ### whether the third country is acting based on a legitimate concern that is well defined and recognised as legitimate by international law and conventions;


### 1. the commission may examine any measure of a third country in order to determine whether it meets the conditions set out in article 2(1). the commission shall act expeditiously. ### 1. the commission may examine any measure of a third country , failure to act and threat thereof in order to determine whether it meets the conditions set out in article 2(1). the commission shall act expeditiously.


### 2. the commission may carry out the examination referred to in paragraph 1 on its own initiative or following information received from any source. the commission shall ensure the protection of confidential information in line with article 12 , which may include the identity of the supplier of the information. ### 2. the commission shall carry out the examination referred to in paragraph 1 on its own initiative or following information received from any reliable source , notably a member state , the european parliament , economic operators or trade unions. the commission shall ensure the protection of confidential information in line with article 12 , which may include the identity of the supplier of the information.


### the commission may publish a notice in the official journal of the european union or through other suitable public communication means with an invitation to submit information within a specified time limit. in that event , the commission shall notify the third country concerned of the initiation of the examination. ### the commission shall duly and in a timely manner inform the european parliament and the council of any development in the examination of third country measures. it shall publish a notice in the official journal of the european union or through other suitable public communication means with an invitation to submit information within a specified time limit which shall not exceed 4 months. in that event , the commission shall notify the third country concerned of the initiation of the examination.


### prior to adopting its decision , the commission may invite the third country concerned to submit its observations. ### prior to adopting its decision , the commission may invite the third country concerned to submit its observations within a reasonable and specified time limit that shall not unduly delay the commission's decision.


### where the commission decides that the measure of the third country concerned meets the conditions set out in article 2(1) , it shall notify the third country concerned of its decision and request it to cease the economic coercion and , where appropriate , repair the injury suffered by the union or its member states. ### where the commission decides that the measure of the third country concerned meets the conditions set out in article 2(1) , it shall notify the third country concerned of its decision and request it to cease the economic coercion and , where appropriate , repair the injury suffered by the union or its member states within a reasonable and specified period of time.


### — submitting the matter to international adjudication. ### — submitting , in parallel , the matter to international adjudication , without implying any undue delay in the commission's decision.


### the commission shall seek to obtain the cessation of the economic coercion by also raising the matter in any relevant international forum. ### the commission shall seek to obtain the cessation of the economic coercion by raising , in addition to the commission's determination of the third country's measures , the matter in any relevant international forum.


### the commission shall keep the european parliament and the council informed of relevant developments. ### the commission shall keep the european parliament and the council fully , regularly and in timely manner informed of all developments.


### action pursuant to the articles 4 and 5 has not resulted in the cessation of the economic coercion and reparation of the injury it has caused to the union or a member state within a reasonable period of time; ### action pursuant to the articles 4 and 5 has not resulted in the cessation of the economic coercion and reparation of the injury it has caused to the union or a member state within the reasonable period of time set in the decision referred to in article 4;


### 2. the union response measures shall apply from a specified date after the adoption of the implementing act referred to in paragraph 1. the commission shall set this date of application , taking into account the circumstances , to allow for the notification of the third country concerned pursuant to paragraph 3 and for it to cease the economic coercion. ### 2. the union response measures shall apply from a specified date after the adoption of the implementing act referred to in paragraph 1. the commission shall set this date of application , taking into account the circumstances , to allow for the notification of the third country concerned pursuant to paragraph 3 and for it to cease the economic coercion and to repair the injury caused.


### 3. the commission shall , upon adoption of the implementing act , notify the third country concerned of the union response measures adopted pursuant to paragraph 1. in the notification , the commission shall , on behalf of the union , call on the third country concerned to promptly cease the economic coercion , offer to negotiate a solution , and inform the third country concerned that the union response measure will apply , unless the economic coercion ceases. ### 3. the commission shall , upon adoption of the implementing act , notify the third country concerned of the union response measures adopted pursuant to paragraph 1. in the notification , the commission shall , on behalf of the union , call on the third country concerned to promptly cease the economic coercion , offer to negotiate a solution and the reparation of the injury caused by it to the union and its member states , and inform the third country concerned that the union response measure will apply , unless the economic coercion ceases.


### 4. the implementing act referred to in paragraph 1 shall state that the application of the union response measures shall be deferred for a period specified in that implementing act , where the commission has credible information that the third country has ceased the economic coercion before the start of application of the adopted union response measures. in that event , the commission shall publish a notice in the official journal of the european union indicating that there is such information and the date from which the deferral shall apply. if the third country ceases the economic coercion before the union response measures start to apply , the commission shall terminate the union response measures in accordance with article 10. ### 4. the implementing act referred to in paragraph 1 shall state that the application of the union response measures shall be deferred for a period specified in that implementing act , where the commission has credible information that the third country has ceased the economic coercion before the start of application of the adopted union response measures. in that event , the commission shall publish a notice in the official journal of the european union indicating that there is such information and the date from which the deferral shall apply. if the third country ceases the economic coercion before the union response measures start to apply , the commission shall terminate the union response measures in accordance with article 10 making sure that the injury caused by the economic coercion to the union and its member states has been repaired.


### 6. on duly justified imperative grounds of urgency to avoid irreparable damage to the union or its member states by the measures of economic coercion the commission shall adopt immediately applicable implementing acts imposing union response measures , in accordance with the procedure referred to in article 15(3). the requirements set out in paragraphs 2 to 5 shall apply. those acts shall remain in force for a period not exceeding three months. ### 6. on duly justified imperative grounds of urgency to avoid irreparable damage to the union , its internal market or its member states by the measures of economic coercion the commission shall adopt immediately applicable implementing acts imposing union response measures , in accordance with the procedure referred to in article 15(3). the requirements set out in paragraphs 2 to 5 shall apply. those acts shall remain in force for a period not exceeding three months.


### 2. where the third country concerned suspends the economic coercion , or where it is necessary in the union’s interest , the commission may suspend the application of the respective union response measure for the duration of the third country’s suspension , or as long as necessary in light of the union’s interest. the commission shall suspend the union response measures if the third country concerned has offered , and the union has concluded , an agreement to submit the matter to binding international third-party adjudication and the third country is also suspending its measures of economic coercion. the commission shall , by means of an implementing act , decide to suspend the union response measure. these implementing acts shall be adopted in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in article 15(2). ### 2. where the third country concerned suspends the economic coercion and where the injury caused to the union and its member states has been repaired , or where it is necessary in the union’s interest , the commission may suspend the application of the respective union response measure for the duration of the third country’s suspension , or as long as necessary in light of the union’s interest. the commission shall suspend the union response measures if the third country concerned has offered , and the union has concluded , an agreement to submit the matter to binding international third-party adjudication and the third country is also suspending its measures of economic coercion as well as if the injury caused to the union and its member states by the economic coercion has been repaired. the commission shall , by means of an implementing act , decide to suspend the union response measure. these implementing acts shall be adopted in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in article 15(2).


### where the economic coercion has ceased; ### where the economic coercion has ceased and the injury caused has been repaired;


### 5. the commission shall take utmost account of the information gathered during the information gathering exercise. an analysis of the envisaged measures shall accompany the draft implementing act when submitted to the committee in the context of the examination procedure referred to in article 15(2). ### 5. the commission shall take utmost account of the information gathered during the information gathering exercise. an analysis of the envisaged measures and their potential impacts shall accompany the draft implementing act when submitted to the committee in the context of the examination procedure referred to in article 15(2).


### — having regard to the commission communication of 22 april 2008 on the protection of consumers , in particular minors , in respect of the use of video games (com(2008)0207) , ### — having regard to the commission communication of 22 april 2008 on the protection of consumers , in particular children , in respect of the use of video games (com(2008)0207) ,


### 3. emphasises that the provision of digital public services implies the use of personal data , and therefore calls on the commission and member states to pay special attention to the protection of citizens’ personal data; ### 3. emphasises that the provision of digital public services implies the use of personal data , and therefore calls on the commission and member states to pay special attention to the protection of citizens’ personal data and act in accordance with regulation (eu) 2016/679;


### 3. recalls that in-person help should be provided to eu citizens to help them access public services , especially persons with disabilities and elderly people , but also to mitigate low levels of digital literacy and poor internet coverage; ### 3. recalls that in-person help should be provided to eu citizens to help them access public services , especially persons with disabilities and elderly people , but also to mitigate low levels of digital literacy;


### 4. emphasises that broadband internet coverage , especially on islands and in rural areas , is of key importance for the development of egovernment; calls on the commission , therefore , to complete the necessary infrastructure for broadband internet access in cooperation with the member states; ### 4. emphasises that connectivity and stable broadband internet coverage , especially on islands and in rural areas , of key importance for the development of egovernment; calls on the commission , therefore , to complete the necessary infrastructure for broadband internet access , including via fibre-to-home , in cooperation with the member states; recalls the obligations of all member states under the universal service obligations (uso) section of the european electronic communications code to ensure broadband access to all households; encourages the member states to use the option to provide uso service via mobile internet providers as well as fixed providers;


### 4. takes note of the role of ai in egovernment; is concerned that ai risks reinforcing existing discrimination , inequalities and social exclusion and misidentifying or incorrectly classifying individuals belonging to certain groups; calls for effective remedies to be put in place including human checks , while preventing discrimination due to automation and improving the quality and design of datasets; ### 4. takes note of the role of ai in egovernment; is concerned that ai risks reinforcing existing discrimination , inequalities and social exclusion and misidentifying or incorrectly classifying individuals belonging to certain groups; calls for effective remedies to be put in place including human checks , while preventing discrimination due to automation and improving the quality and design of datasets; emphasizes that a greater diversity of coder profiles in the it professions will allow for greater inclusiveness and better representation of individuals in the coded algorithms; points out that only 12% of ai researchers in the world are women.


### 5. calls for egovernment services to be reliable and to have very high standards of security with human oversight in order to prevent data leaks , data security breaches , and unauthorised and unproportioned access to personal data; ### 5. calls for egovernment services to be reliable and to have very high standards of security with human oversight in order to prevent data leaks , data security breaches , and unauthorised and unproportioned access to personal data; stresses that the trust of citizens in egovernance will only work by ensuring the digital sovereignty of the european union to guarantee the security of data processing and storage.


### 7. believes that e-health has untapped potential , and therefore welcomes the commission’s intention to create a european health data space; emphasises , furthermore , that e-medical records are extremely useful for stimulating cross-border research and providing cross-border healthcare; ### 7. believes that e-health has untapped potential , and therefore welcomes the commission’s intention to create a european health data space; emphasises , furthermore , that e-medical records are extremely useful for stimulating cross-border research , providing cross-border healthcare and fulfilling the promise to european citizens that they should be able to access and exchange their health data across borders;


### 13. emphasises the role of egovernment in issuing building permits; believes that significant progress should be made in shortening the deadlines for issuing building permits; ### 13. emphasises the role of egovernment in issuing building permits; believes that significant progress should be made to make applying for a building permit simpler and in shortening the deadlines for issuing building permits;


### 25. underlines that digital public administration should be inclusive and easily accessible for people with different needs , such as elderly people and people with disabilities; ### 25. underlines that digital public administration should be inclusive and easily accessible for people with different needs , such as elderly people and people with disabilities; reminds member states of their obligations under the web accessibility act , while encouraging them to go beyond the minimums required by it; asks member states to increase the rate of active testing of services for accessibility by third parties and associations;


### 4. underlines that current merger control rules are not fit for dealing with so-called ‘killer acquisitions’ by dominant players in digital markets; stresses the fact that ‘killer acquisitions’ may also affect the contestability and fairness of the digital single market and therefore should be assessed by the commission in the framework of the dma , as set out in imco’s report; ### 4. underlines that merger control rules should take so-called ‘killer acquisitions’ by dominant players in the single market into account; stresses the fact that ‘killer acquisitions’ may also affect the contestability and fairness of the single market and therefore should be assessed by the commission;


### 5. notes that the consumer internet of things (iot) sector will expand significantly in the coming years but recognises that shortcomings still exist in this sector , such as the lack of interoperability between various iot products and/or services , which could reduce competition and consumer choice; welcomes the commission’s sector inquiry into the iot and calls on the commission to take further action regarding standards , data portability and access; ### 5. notes that the consumer internet of things (iot) sector will expand significantly in the coming years but recognises that shortcomings still exist in this sector , which could reduce competition and consumer choice; welcomes the commission’s sector inquiry into the iot and calls on the commission to take further action regarding standards , data portability and access;


### 6. notes that the vertical block exemption regulation1 and related vertical guidelines2 have been inadequately adapted for recent market developments , notably the growth of online sales and online platforms; highlights that there are outstanding concerns regarding the automobile sector , where manufacturers are competing directly with the distribution network by modifying the contractual terms of the vertical distribution relationship , thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage and driving small and medium-sized enterprises out of the market; ### 6. notes that the vertical block exemption regulation1 and related vertical guidelines2 have been inadequately adapted for recent market developments , notably the growth of online sales and online platforms; asks the commission to ensure that any future revision takes the abuse of selective distribution agreements , labelling and other measures to prevent the purchase , distribution and resale of goods across borders into account.


### b. whereas competition policy should aim to support the european green deal; ### b. whereas competition policy should aim to support the european green deal , digital compass goals and the resilience of the eu internal market ;


### 5. calls on the commission to safeguard the integrity of the internal market and is deeply concerned about the risk of increasing fragmentation within the internal market due to excessive use of subsidies in response to the us inflation reduction act; understands the need for additional public investments; considers the introduction of dedicated permanent , if necessary debt-financed , european investment funds to be a better policy response; ### 5. calls on the commission to safeguard the integrity of the internal market and a level playing field and is deeply concerned about the risk of increasing fragmentation within the internal market due to excessive use of subsidies in response to the us inflation reduction act; understands the need to give faster access to sufficient funding using private funding , state aid , eu funds and a new european sovereignty fund which could support the european industrial strategy;


### 8. calls for the quantitative jurisdictional thresholds in the ec merger regulation to be reviewed and lowered; calls for the introduction of a rebuttable presumption that effective competition is significantly impeded by any concentration leading to a dominant position in a relevant market or any concentration involving a very large market operator or a gatekeeper; calls for matters of public interest , such as climate protection , sustainability and the rule of law , to be taken into account when examining the impact of a concentration on the internal market; calls for the inclusion of review clauses in decisions approving a concentration with a view to introducing more stringent conditions; ### 8. calls for eu objectives , such as climate protection , sustainability , open strategic autonomy , industrial competitiveness , to be taken into account when examining the impact of a concentration on the internal market; calls on the commission to revise merger guidelines to adopt a more comprehensive assessment of efficiencies in merger control and cooperation; notes that the assessment of horizontal cooperation should also recognise the importance of collaboration in markets dominated by digital gatekeepers; recognises the need to foster cooperation among players in traditional as well as digital markets , by giving the right relevance to the positive effects , like efficiencies and benefits in the relevant antitrust analysis;


### 9. urges the commission to take decisive action , under article 22 of the ec merger regulation , against ‘killer acquisitions’ that must be reported to the commission under the digital markets act (‘dma’); ### 9. urges the commission to take decisive action , under article 22 of the ec merger regulation , against ‘killer acquisitions’ that must be reported to the commission under the digital markets act (‘dma’); welcomes the new guidance from the european commission on the use of article 22 of the ec merger regulation by member states to review a transaction; underlines the importance of the confirmation of this new application by the european court of justice to address effectively "killer acquisitions";


### 10. calls for the commission’s procedure for examining a concentration to be shortened by making full use of digitalisation; ### deleted


### 12. welcomes the evaluation of regulation (ec) no 1/2003 and regulation (ec) no 773/2004 initiated by the commission; considers a legislative review of these regulations necessary; calls for stronger use of structural remedies , and therefore for the primacy of behavioural remedies to be removed from regulation (ec) no 1/2003; ### 12. welcomes the evaluation of regulation (ec) no 1/2003 and regulation (ec) no 773/2004 initiated by the commission; considers a legislative review of these regulations necessary; calls the commission to speed up antitrust procedures and introduce time limit for antitrust proceedings to ensure the effectiveness of eu antitrust rules and the well-functioning of the internal market; calls for stronger use of structural remedies , and therefore for the primacy of behavioural remedies to be removed from regulation (ec) no 1/2003;


### 13. calls for the introduction of an explicit legal base for the unbundling of undertakings as a structural remedy for antitrust violations; considers unbundling to also be a structural remedy in situations where abuse of a dominant position on a relevant market cannot be ascertained , but conditions for competition would improve significantly if unbundling measures were applied; ### 13. calls for the unbundling of undertakings as a structural remedy in situations where abuse of a dominant position on a relevant market cannot be ascertained , but conditions for competition would improve significantly if unbundling measures were applied;


### 14. underlines the importance of adopting interim measures in the enforcement of competition law , particularly in relation to dynamic and fast-developing markets such as digital markets; therefore supports the commission in enhancing the use of interim measures under the existing regulation (ec) no 1/2003; calls for legislative action to lower the burden associated with the use of interim measures for the commission and for national competition authorities; ### 14. underlines the importance of adopting interim measures in the enforcement of competition law to stop any practice which would seriously harm competition , particularly in relation to dynamic and fast-developing markets such as digital markets; therefore supports the commission in enhancing the use of interim measures under the existing regulation (ec) no 1/2003; calls for legislative action to lower the burden associated with the use of interim measures for the commission and for national competition authorities;


### 16. welcomes the creation of a new commission directorate for the enforcement of the dma; deplores the member states’ unwillingness to make available additional financial resources to enable more data-science and technology staff to be hired for the commission; ### 16. welcomes the creation of a new commission directorate for the enforcement of the dma; deplores the member states’ unwillingness to make available additional financial resources to enable more behavioural economists , algorithms specialists , data-science and technology staff to be hired for the commission; underlines the need to ensure a swift cooperation with national competent authorities and build on their growing expertise to support the enforcement of the dma; stresses that the commission should prioritise resources to enforce provisions of the dma that can support previous antitrust rulings in cases where the remedies have not been successful;


### 17. stresses that competition law remains relevant to digital markets despite the entry into force of the dma; considers that violations of privacy rights can constitute abusive practices; ### 17. stresses that competition law remains relevant to digital markets despite the entry into force of the dma; considers that violations of privacy rights can constitute abusive practices; recalls that some undertakings likely to be designated as gatekeepers have been subject to previous antitrust rulings , which have not led to effective behavioural changes; recalls that the enforcement of the google shopping decision has still not led to a change self-preferencing behaviour and shall not serve as a precedent for the dma;


### 19. welcomes the presentation by the commission of draft guidelines for sustainability agreements; underlines the need for a broad understanding of consumer welfare , which should include not only price levels , but also sustainability considerations; considers that similar authorisations should be extended to agreements that improve animal welfare , prevent deforestation , or provide for living wages; ### 19. welcomes the presentation by the commission of draft guidelines for sustainability agreements; underlines the need for a broad understanding of consumer welfare , which should include not only price levels , but also sustainability considerations;


### 20. is of the opinion that sustainability is not only pursued by derogations from competition law provisions , but also by the application of competition law provisions in order to promote sustainability; calls for the presentation of draft guidelines on abusive practices , in particular with regard to achieving sustainability goals; ### 20. is of the opinion that competition law provisions can also contribute to promote sustainability; calls for the presentation of draft guidelines on abusive practices , in particular with regard to achieving sustainability goals;


### 22. stresses that parliament should be adequately involved in shaping competition policy; considers that more frequent use should be made of parliament’s right to intervene in judicial proceedings concerning competition law; calls on the commission to enter into negotiations for an interinstitutional agreement on competition policy; ### 22. stresses that parliament should play an active role in shaping competition policy; notes that parliament should be more involved in the activity of working parties and expert groups , such as the international competition network (icn) and the organisation for economic cooperation and development (oecd) as an observer to get a better knowledge of the matter and keep it updated on the developments in order to be more prepared for its role as co-legislator; calls on the commission to enter into negotiations for an interinstitutional agreement on competition policy;


### (3) responsible and diligent behaviour by providers of intermediary services is essential for a safe , predictable and trusted online environment and for allowing union citizens and other persons to exercise their fundamental rights guaranteed in the charter of fundamental rights of the european union (‘charter’) , in particular the freedom of expression and information and the freedom to conduct a business , and the right to non-discrimination. ### (3) responsible and diligent behaviour by providers of intermediary services is essential for a safe , predictable and trusted online environment and for allowing union citizens and other persons to exercise their fundamental rights guaranteed in the charter of fundamental rights of the european union (‘charter’) , in particular the freedom of expression and information and the freedom to conduct a business , and the right to non-discrimination. children have specific rights enshrined in article 24 of the charter of fundamental rights of the european union and in the united nations convention on the rights of the child. as such , the best interests of the child should be a primary consideration in all matters affecting them. the uncrc general comment no. 25 on children’s rights in relation to the digital environment formally sets out how these rights apply to the digital world.


### (3) responsible and diligent behaviour by providers of intermediary services is essential for a safe , predictable and trusted online environment and for allowing union citizens and other persons to exercise their fundamental rights guaranteed in the charter of fundamental rights of the european union (‘charter’) , in particular the freedom of expression and information and the freedom to conduct a business , and the right to non-discrimination. ### (3) responsible , transparent and diligent behaviour by providers of intermediary services is essential for a safe , predictable and trusted online environment , for ensuring legal certainty and for allowing union citizens and other persons to exercise their fundamental rights guaranteed in the charter of fundamental rights of the european union (‘charter’) , in particular the freedom of expression and information and the freedom to conduct a business , and the right to non-discrimination.


### (3) responsible and diligent behaviour by providers of intermediary services is essential for a safe , predictable and trusted online environment and for allowing union citizens and other persons to exercise their fundamental rights guaranteed in the charter of fundamental rights of the european union (‘charter’) , in particular the freedom of expression and information and the freedom to conduct a business , and the right to non-discrimination. ### (3) responsible and diligent behaviour by providers of intermediary services is essential for a safe , predictable and trusted online environment and for allowing union citizens and other persons to exercise their fundamental rights guaranteed in the charter of fundamental rights of the european union (‘charter’) , in particular the freedom of expression and information , fundamental rights to privacy and to the protection of personal data , freedom and pluralism of media , the freedom to conduct a business , and the right to non-discrimination.


### (3) responsible and diligent behaviour by providers of intermediary services is essential for a safe , predictable and trusted online environment and for allowing union citizens and other persons to exercise their fundamental rights guaranteed in the charter of fundamental rights of the european union (‘charter’) , in particular the freedom of expression and information and the freedom to conduct a business , and the right to non-discrimination. ### (3) responsible and diligent behaviour by providers of intermediary services is essential for a safe , predictable and trusted online environment and for allowing union citizens and other persons to exercise their fundamental rights guaranteed in the charter of fundamental rights of the european union (‘charter’) , in particular the freedom of expression and information and the freedom to conduct a business , and the right to non-discrimination. children have specific rights enshrined in article 24 of the charter and in the united nations convention on the rights of the child. the uncrc general comment no. 25 on children’s rights in relation to the digital environment formally sets out how these rights apply to the digital world.


### (3) responsible and diligent behaviour by providers of intermediary services is essential for a safe , predictable and trusted online environment and for allowing union citizens and other persons to exercise their fundamental rights guaranteed in the charter of fundamental rights of the european union (‘charter’) , in particular the freedom of expression and information and the freedom to conduct a business , and the right to non-discrimination. ### (3) responsible and diligent behaviour by providers of intermediary services is essential for a safe , predictable and trusted online environment and for allowing union citizens and other persons to exercise their fundamental rights guaranteed in the charter of fundamental rights of the european union (‘charter’) , in particular the freedom of expression and information and the freedom to conduct a business , and the right to gender equality and non-discrimination. children , especially girls , have specific rights enshrined in article 24 of the charter and in the united nations convention on the rights of the child. as such , the best interests of the child should be a primary consideration in all matters affecting them. the uncrc general comment no. 25 on children’s rights in relation to the digital environment formally sets out how these rights apply to the digital world.


### additional provisions applicable to providers of hosting services , including online platforms ### additional provisions applicable to providers of hosting services , including online platforms and to providers of live streaming platform services and of private messaging services


### 2 additional provisions applicable to providers of hosting services , including online platforms ### 2 additional provisions applicable to providers of hosting services , including online platforms and to providers of live streaming platform services and of private messaging services


### 1. providers of hosting services shall put mechanisms in place to allow any individual or entity to notify them of the presence on their service of specific items of information that the individual or entity considers to be illegal content. those mechanisms shall be easy to access , user-friendly , and allow for the submission of notices exclusively by electronic means. ### 1. providers of hosting services , providers of live streaming platform services and of private messaging services shall put mechanisms in place to allow any individual or entity to notify them of the presence on their service of specific items of information that the individual or entity considers to be illegal content , or content that is in breach with their terms and conditions. those mechanisms shall be easy to access , user-friendly , and allow for the submission of notices exclusively by electronic means and may include:


### 1. providers of hosting services shall put mechanisms in place to allow any individual or entity to notify them of the presence on their service of specific items of information that the individual or entity considers to be illegal content. those mechanisms shall be easy to access , user-friendly , and allow for the submission of notices exclusively by electronic means. ### 1. providers of hosting services shall put mechanisms in place to allow any individual or non-governmental entity to notify them of the presence on their service of specific items of information that the individual or entity considers to be illegal content. those mechanisms shall be easy to access , user-friendly , and allow for the submission of notices exclusively by electronic means and may include:


### 1. providers of hosting services shall put mechanisms in place to allow any individual or entity to notify them of the presence on their service of specific items of information that the individual or entity considers to be illegal content. those mechanisms shall be easy to access , user-friendly , and allow for the submission of notices exclusively by electronic means. ### 1. providers of hosting services shall put mechanisms in place to allow any individual or entity to notify them of the presence on their service of specific items of information that the individual or entity considers to be illegal content. those mechanisms shall be easy to access , clearly visible , user-friendly , located in close proximity to the content and allow for the submission of notices exclusively by electronic means.


### 1. providers of hosting services shall put mechanisms in place to allow any individual or entity to notify them of the presence on their service of specific items of information that the individual or entity considers to be illegal content. those mechanisms shall be easy to access , user-friendly , and allow for the submission of notices exclusively by electronic means. ### 1. providers of hosting services shall put mechanisms in place to allow any individual or entity to notify them of the presence on their service of specific items of information that the individual or entity considers to be illegal content , or content that is in breach with their terms and conditions. those mechanisms shall be easy to access , user-friendly , and allow for the submission of notices exclusively by electronic means and may include:


### (40) providers of hosting services play a particularly important role in tackling illegal content online , as they store information provided by and at the request of the recipients of the service and typically give other recipients access thereto , sometimes on a large scale. it is important that all providers of hosting services , regardless of their size , put in place user-friendly notice and action mechanisms that facilitate the notification of specific items of information that the notifying party considers to be illegal content to the provider of hosting services concerned ('notice') , pursuant to which that provider can decide whether or not it agrees with that assessment and wishes to remove or disable access to that content ('action'). provided the requirements on notices are met , it should be possible for individuals or entities to notify multiple specific items of allegedly illegal content through a single notice. the obligation to put in place notice and action mechanisms should apply , for instance , to file storage and sharing services , web hosting services , advertising servers and paste bins , in as far as they qualify as providers of hosting services covered by this regulation. ### (40) providers of hosting services play a particularly important role in tackling illegal content online , as they store information provided by and at the request of the recipients of the service and typically give other recipients access thereto , sometimes on a large scale. it is important that all providers of hosting services , regardless of their size , put in place user-friendly notice and action mechanisms that facilitate the notification of specific items of information that the notifying party considers to be illegal content to the provider of hosting services concerned ('notice') , pursuant to which that provider can decide whether or not it agrees with that assessment and wishes to remove or disable access to that content ('action'). provided the requirements on notices are met , it should be possible for individuals or entities to notify multiple specific items of allegedly illegal content through a single notice. the obligation to put in place notice and action mechanisms should apply , for instance , to file storage and sharing services , web hosting services , advertising servers and paste bins , in as far as they qualify as providers of hosting services covered by this regulation. furthermore , the notice and action mechanism should be complemented by ‘stay down’ provisions whereby providers of hosting services should demonstrate their best efforts in order to prevent from reappearing content which is identical to another piece of content that has already been identified and removed by them as illegal. the application of this requirement should not lead to any general monitoring obligation.


### (40) providers of hosting services play a particularly important role in tackling illegal content online , as they store information provided by and at the request of the recipients of the service and typically give other recipients access thereto , sometimes on a large scale. it is important that all providers of hosting services , regardless of their size , put in place user-friendly notice and action mechanisms that facilitate the notification of specific items of information that the notifying party considers to be illegal content to the provider of hosting services concerned ('notice') , pursuant to which that provider can decide whether or not it agrees with that assessment and wishes to remove or disable access to that content ('action'). provided the requirements on notices are met , it should be possible for individuals or entities to notify multiple specific items of allegedly illegal content through a single notice. the obligation to put in place notice and action mechanisms should apply , for instance , to file storage and sharing services , web hosting services , advertising servers and paste bins , in as far as they qualify as providers of hosting services covered by this regulation. ### (40) providers of hosting services play a particularly important role in tackling illegal content online , as they store information provided by and at the request of the recipients of the service and typically give other recipients access thereto , sometimes on a large scale. it is important that all providers of hosting services , regardless of their size , put in place user-friendly notice and action mechanisms that facilitate the notification of specific items of information that the notifying party considers to be illegal content to the provider of hosting services concerned ('notice') , pursuant to which that provider can decide whether or not it agrees with that assessment and wishes to remove or disable access to that content ('action'). provided the requirements on notices are met , it should be possible for individuals or entities to notify multiple specific items of allegedly illegal content through a single notice. the obligation to put in place notice and action mechanisms should apply , for instance , to file storage and sharing services , web hosting services , advertising servers and paste bins , in as far as they qualify as providers of hosting services covered by this regulation. moreover , the notification and action mechanism should be supplemented by 'stay down' provisions , under which providers of hosting services should do everything in their power to prevent the reappearance of content which is identical to other content which they have identified and withdrawn as illegal. the application of this requirement must not lead to a general monitoring obligation.


### (41) the rules on such notice and action mechanisms should be harmonised at union level , so as to provide for the timely , diligent and objective processing of notices on the basis of rules that are uniform , transparent and clear and that provide for robust safeguards to protect the right and legitimate interests of all affected parties , in particular their fundamental rights guaranteed by the charter , irrespective of the member state in which those parties are established or reside and of the field of law at issue. the fundamental rights include , as the case may be , the right to freedom of expression and information , the right to respect for private and family life , the right to protection of personal data , the right to non-discrimination and the right to an effective remedy of the recipients of the service; the freedom to conduct a business , including the freedom of contract , of service providers; as well as the right to human dignity , the rights of the child , the right to protection of property , including intellectual property , and the right to non-discrimination of parties affected by illegal content. ### (41) the rules on such notice and action mechanisms should be harmonised at union level , so as to provide for the timely , diligent and objective processing of notices on the basis of rules that are uniform , transparent and clear and that provide for robust safeguards to protect the right and legitimate interests of all affected parties , in particular their fundamental rights guaranteed by the charter , irrespective of the member state in which those parties are established or reside and of the field of law at issue. the fundamental rights include , as the case may be , the right to freedom of expression and information , the right to respect for private and family life , the right to protection of personal data , the right to non-discrimination , the right to gender equality and the right to an effective remedy of the recipients of the service; the freedom to conduct a business , including the freedom of contract , of service providers; as well as the right to human dignity , the rights of the child , the right to protection of property , including intellectual property , and the right to non-discrimination of parties affected by illegal content.


### (42) where a hosting service provider decides to remove or disable information provided by a recipient of the service , for instance following receipt of a notice or acting on its own initiative , including through the use of automated means , that provider should inform the recipient of its decision , the reasons for its decision and the available redress possibilities to contest the decision , in view of the negative consequences that such decisions may have for the recipient , including as regards the exercise of its fundamental right to freedom of expression. that obligation should apply irrespective of the reasons for the decision , in particular whether the action has been taken because the information notified is considered to be illegal content or incompatible with the applicable terms and conditions. available recourses to challenge the decision of the hosting service provider should always include judicial redress. ### (42) where a hosting service provider decides to remove or disable information provided by a recipient of the service , for instance following receipt of a notice or acting on its own initiative , including through the use of automated means , that have been proven to be efficient , proportionate and reliable , that provider should inform the recipient of its decision , the reasons for its decision and the available redress possibilities to contest the decision , in view of the negative consequences that such decisions may have for the recipient , including as regards the exercise of its fundamental right to freedom of expression. that obligation should apply irrespective of the reasons for the decision , in particular whether the action has been taken because the information notified is considered to be illegal content or incompatible with the applicable terms and conditions. available recourses to challenge the decision of the hosting service provider should always include judicial redress. such an statement , however , should not be required if it relates to spam , manifestly illegal content , removal of content similar or identical to content already removed from the same recipient who has already received a statement or where a provider of hosting service does not have the information necessary to inform the recipient by a durable medium.


### (42) where a hosting service provider decides to remove or disable information provided by a recipient of the service , for instance following receipt of a notice or acting on its own initiative , including through the use of automated means , that provider should inform the recipient of its decision , the reasons for its decision and the available redress possibilities to contest the decision , in view of the negative consequences that such decisions may have for the recipient , including as regards the exercise of its fundamental right to freedom of expression. that obligation should apply irrespective of the reasons for the decision , in particular whether the action has been taken because the information notified is considered to be illegal content or incompatible with the applicable terms and conditions. available recourses to challenge the decision of the hosting service provider should always include judicial redress. ### (42) where a hosting service provider decides to remove or disable information provided by a recipient of the service , for instance following receipt of a notice or acting on its own initiative , including through the use of automated means , that have been proven to be efficient , proportionate and reliable , that provider should inform the recipient of its decision , the reasons for its decision and the available redress possibilities to contest the decision , in view of the negative consequences that such decisions may have for the recipient , including as regards the exercise of its fundamental right to freedom of expression. that obligation should apply irrespective of the reasons for the decision , in particular whether the action has been taken because the information notified is considered to be illegal content or incompatible with the applicable terms and conditions. available recourses to challenge the decision of the hosting service provider should always include judicial redress.


### (42) where a hosting service provider decides to remove or disable information provided by a recipient of the service , for instance following receipt of a notice or acting on its own initiative , including through the use of automated means , that provider should inform the recipient of its decision , the reasons for its decision and the available redress possibilities to contest the decision , in view of the negative consequences that such decisions may have for the recipient , including as regards the exercise of its fundamental right to freedom of expression. that obligation should apply irrespective of the reasons for the decision , in particular whether the action has been taken because the information notified is considered to be illegal content or incompatible with the applicable terms and conditions. available recourses to challenge the decision of the hosting service provider should always include judicial redress. ### (42) where a hosting service provider decides to remove or disable information provided by a recipient of the service , for instance following receipt of a notice or acting on its own initiative , including through the use of efficient , proportionate and accurate automated means accompanied by human oversight , that provider should inform the recipient of its decision and possible notifier , the reasons for its decision and the available effective redress possibilities to rapidly contest the decision , in view of the negative consequences that such decisions may have for the recipient , including as regards the exercise of its fundamental right to freedom of expression. that obligation should apply irrespective of the reasons for the decision , in particular whether the action has been taken because the information notified is considered to be illegal content or incompatible with the applicable terms and conditions. available recourses to challenge the decision of the hosting service provider should always include judicial redress.


### (43) to avoid disproportionate burdens , the additional obligations imposed on online platforms under this regulation should not apply to micro or small enterprises as defined in recommendation 2003/361/ec of the commission ,41 unless their reach and impact is such that they meet the criteria to qualify as very large online platforms under this regulation. the consolidation rules laid down in that recommendation help ensure that any circumvention of those additional obligations is prevented. the exemption of micro- and small enterprises from those additional obligations should not be understood as affecting their ability to set up , on a voluntary basis , a system that complies with one or more of those obligations. ### (43) to avoid disproportionate burdens , the additional obligations imposed on online platforms under this regulation should not apply to micro or small enterprises as defined in recommendation 2003/361/ec of the commission ,41 unless their reach and impact is such that they meet the criteria to qualify as very large online platforms under this regulation. this regulation should highlights the importance of collaborative economy platforms in the transport and tourism sectors , on which services are provided by both individuals and professionals and avoid imposing disproportionate information obligations and unnecessary administrative burden on peer-to-peer providers of services. the consolidation rules laid down in that recommendation help ensure that any circumvention of those additional obligations is prevented. the exemption of micro- and small enterprises from those additional obligations should not be understood as affecting their ability to set up , on a voluntary basis , a system that complies with one or more of those obligations.


### (43) to avoid disproportionate burdens , the additional obligations imposed on online platforms under this regulation should not apply to micro or small enterprises as defined in recommendation 2003/361/ec of the commission ,41 unless their reach and impact is such that they meet the criteria to qualify as very large online platforms under this regulation. the consolidation rules laid down in that recommendation help ensure that any circumvention of those additional obligations is prevented. the exemption of micro- and small enterprises from those additional obligations should not be understood as affecting their ability to set up , on a voluntary basis , a system that complies with one or more of those obligations. ### (43) to avoid disproportionate burdens , the additional obligations imposed on online platforms under this regulation should not apply to micro or small enterprises as defined in recommendation 2003/361/ec of the commission ,41 unless their reach and impact is such that they meet the criteria to qualify as very large online platforms under this regulation. the consolidation rules laid down in that recommendation help ensure that any circumvention of those additional obligations is prevented. the exemption of micro- and small enterprises from those additional obligations should not be understood as affecting their ability to set up , on a voluntary basis , a system that complies with one or more of those obligations , and are encouraged to do so.


### (44) recipients of the service should be able to easily and effectively contest certain decisions of online platforms that negatively affect them. therefore , online platforms should be required to provide for internal complaint-handling systems , which meet certain conditions aimed at ensuring that the systems are easily accessible and lead to swift and fair outcomes. in addition , provision should be made for the possibility of out-of-court dispute settlement of disputes , including those that could not be resolved in satisfactory manner through the internal complaint-handling systems , by certified bodies that have the requisite independence , means and expertise to carry out their activities in a fair , swift and cost-effective manner. the possibilities to contest decisions of online platforms thus created should complement , yet leave unaffected in all respects , the possibility to seek judicial redress in accordance with the laws of the member state concerned. ### (44) recipients of the service should be able to easily and effectively contest certain decisions of online platforms that negatively affect them. therefore , online platforms should be required to provide for internal complaint-handling systems , which meet certain conditions aimed at ensuring that the systems are easily accessible and lead to swift and fair outcomes. in addition , provision should be made for the possibility of entering , in good faith , an out-of-court settlement of disputes , including those that could not be resolved in satisfactory manner through the internal complaint-handling systems , by certified bodies located in either the member state of the recipient or the provider and that have the requisite independence , means and expertise to carry out their activities in a fair , swift and cost-effective manner. the possibilities to contest decisions of online platforms thus created should complement , yet leave unaffected in all respects , the possibility to seek judicial redress in accordance with the laws of the member state concerned.


### (46) action against illegal content can be taken more quickly and reliably where online platforms take the necessary measures to ensure that notices submitted by trusted flaggers through the notice and action mechanisms required by this regulation are treated with priority , without prejudice to the requirement to process and decide upon all notices submitted under those mechanisms in a timely , diligent and objective manner. such trusted flagger status should only be awarded to entities , and not individuals , that have demonstrated , among other things , that they have particular expertise and competence in tackling illegal content , that they represent collective interests and that they work in a diligent and objective manner. such entities can be public in nature , such as , for terrorist content , internet referral units of national law enforcement authorities or of the european union agency for law enforcement cooperation (‘europol’) or they can be non-governmental organisations and semi-public bodies , such as the organisations part of the inhope network of hotlines for reporting child sexual abuse material and organisations committed to notifying illegal racist and xenophobic expressions online. for intellectual property rights , organisations of industry and of right-holders could be awarded trusted flagger status , where they have demonstrated that they meet the applicable conditions. the rules of this regulation on trusted flaggers should not be understood to prevent online platforms from giving similar treatment to notices submitted by entities or individuals that have not been awarded trusted flagger status under this regulation , from otherwise cooperating with other entities , in accordance with the applicable law , including this regulation and regulation (eu) 2016/794 of the european parliament and of the council.43 ### (46) action against illegal content can be taken more quickly and reliably where online platforms take the necessary measures to ensure that notices submitted by trusted flaggers through the notice and action mechanisms required by this regulation are treated with priority , without prejudice to the requirement to process and decide upon all notices submitted under those mechanisms in a timely , diligent and objective manner. such trusted flagger status should only be awarded to entities that have demonstrated , among other things , that they have particular expertise and competence in detecting , identifying and notifying illegal content , that they represent collective interests and that they work in a diligent and objective manner. such entities can be public in nature , or they can be non-governmental organisations and semi-public bodies , for intellectual property rights , organisations of industry and of right-holders could be awarded trusted flagger status , where they have demonstrated that they meet the applicable conditions , including their competence and objectivity. the rules of this regulation on trusted flaggers should not be understood to prevent online platforms from giving similar treatment to notices submitted by entities or individuals that have not been awarded trusted flagger status under this regulation , from otherwise cooperating with other entities , in accordance with the applicable law , including this regulation and regulation (eu) 2016/794 of the european parliament and of the council.43


### (63) advertising systems used by very large online platforms pose particular risks and require further public and regulatory supervision on account of their scale and ability to target and reach recipients of the service based on their behaviour within and outside that platform’s online interface. very large online platforms should ensure public access to repositories of advertisements displayed on their online interfaces to facilitate supervision and research into emerging risks brought about by the distribution of advertising online , for example in relation to illegal advertisements or manipulative techniques and disinformation with a real and foreseeable negative impact on public health , public security , civil discourse , political participation and equality. repositories should include the content of advertisements and related data on the advertiser and the delivery of the advertisement , in particular where targeted advertising is concerned. ### (63) advertising systems used by very large online platforms pose particular risks and require further public and regulatory supervision on account of their scale and ability to target and reach recipients of the service based on their behaviour within and outside that platform’s online interface. very large online platforms should ensure public access to repositories of advertisements displayed on their online interfaces to facilitate supervision and research into emerging risks brought about by the distribution of advertising online , for example in relation to illegal advertisements or manipulative techniques and disinformation with a real and foreseeable negative impact on public health , public security , civil discourse , political participation and equality. repositories should include the content of advertisements and related data on the advertiser and the delivery of the advertisement , in particular where targeted advertising is concerned. in addition , very large online platforms should label any known deep fake videos , audio or other files.


### (63) advertising systems used by very large online platforms pose particular risks and require further public and regulatory supervision on account of their scale and ability to target and reach recipients of the service based on their behaviour within and outside that platform’s online interface. very large online platforms should ensure public access to repositories of advertisements displayed on their online interfaces to facilitate supervision and research into emerging risks brought about by the distribution of advertising online , for example in relation to illegal advertisements or manipulative techniques and disinformation with a real and foreseeable negative impact on public health , public security , civil discourse , political participation and equality. repositories should include the content of advertisements and related data on the advertiser and the delivery of the advertisement , in particular where targeted advertising is concerned. ### (63) advertising systems used by very large online platforms pose particular risks and require further public and regulatory supervision on account of their scale and ability to target and reach recipients of the service based on their behaviour within and outside that platform’s online interface. very large online platforms should ensure public access to repositories of advertisements displayed on their online interfaces to facilitate supervision and research into emerging risks brought about by the distribution of advertising online , for example in relation to illegal advertisements or manipulative techniques and disinformation with negative impact on public health , public security , civil discourse , political participation and equality. repositories should include the content of advertisements and related data on the advertiser and the delivery of the advertisement.


### (64) in order to appropriately supervise the compliance of very large online platforms with the obligations laid down by this regulation , the digital services coordinator of establishment or the commission may require access to or reporting of specific data. such a requirement may include , for example , the data necessary to assess the risks and possible harms brought about by the platform’s systems , data on the accuracy , functioning and testing of algorithmic systems for content moderation , recommender systems or advertising systems , or data on processes and outputs of content moderation or of internal complaint-handling systems within the meaning of this regulation. investigations by researchers on the evolution and severity of online systemic risks are particularly important for bridging information asymmetries and establishing a resilient system of risk mitigation , informing online platforms , digital services coordinators , other competent authorities , the commission and the public. this regulation therefore provides a framework for compelling access to data from very large online platforms to vetted researchers. all requirements for access to data under that framework should be proportionate and appropriately protect the rights and legitimate interests , including trade secrets and other confidential information , of the platform and any other parties concerned , including the recipients of the service. ### (64) in order to appropriately supervise the compliance of very large online platforms with the obligations laid down by this regulation , the digital services coordinator of establishment or the commission may require access to or reporting of specific data. such a requirement may include , for example , the data necessary to assess the risks and possible harms , such as the dissemination of illegal and amplification of harmful content brought about by the platform’s systems , data on the accuracy , functioning and testing of algorithmic systems for content moderation , recommender systems or advertising systems , or data on processes and outputs of content moderation or of internal complaint-handling systems within the meaning of this regulation. investigations by researchers on the evolution and severity of online systemic risks are particularly important for bridging information asymmetries and establishing a resilient system of risk mitigation , informing online platforms , digital services coordinators , other competent authorities , the commission and the public. this regulation therefore provides a framework for compelling access to data from very large online platforms to vetted researchers. all requirements for access to data under that framework should be proportionate and appropriately protect the rights and legitimate interests , including trade secrets and other confidential information , of the platform and any other parties concerned , including the recipients of the service.


### (64) in order to appropriately supervise the compliance of very large online platforms with the obligations laid down by this regulation , the digital services coordinator of establishment or the commission may require access to or reporting of specific data. such a requirement may include , for example , the data necessary to assess the risks and possible harms brought about by the platform’s systems , data on the accuracy , functioning and testing of algorithmic systems for content moderation , recommender systems or advertising systems , or data on processes and outputs of content moderation or of internal complaint-handling systems within the meaning of this regulation. investigations by researchers on the evolution and severity of online systemic risks are particularly important for bridging information asymmetries and establishing a resilient system of risk mitigation , informing online platforms , digital services coordinators , other competent authorities , the commission and the public. this regulation therefore provides a framework for compelling access to data from very large online platforms to vetted researchers. all requirements for access to data under that framework should be proportionate and appropriately protect the rights and legitimate interests , including trade secrets and other confidential information , of the platform and any other parties concerned , including the recipients of the service. ### (64) in order to appropriately supervise the compliance of very large online platforms with the obligations laid down by this regulation , the digital services coordinator of establishment or the commission may require access to or reporting of specific data. such a requirement may include , for example , the data necessary to assess the risks and possible harms brought about by the platform’s systems , data on the accuracy , functioning and testing of algorithmic systems for content moderation , recommender systems or advertising systems , or data on processes and outputs of content moderation or of internal complaint-handling systems within the meaning of this regulation. investigations by researchers on the evolution and severity of online systemic risks are particularly important for bridging information asymmetries and establishing a resilient system of risk mitigation , informing online platforms , digital services coordinators , other competent authorities , the commission and the public. this regulation therefore provides a framework for compelling access to data from very large online platforms to vetted researchers , which mean the conditions set down in this regulation. all requirements for access to data under that framework should be proportionate and appropriately protect the rights and legitimate interests , including trade secrets and other confidential information , of the platform and any other parties concerned , including the recipients of the service.


### (64) in order to appropriately supervise the compliance of very large online platforms with the obligations laid down by this regulation , the digital services coordinator of establishment or the commission may require access to or reporting of specific data. such a requirement may include , for example , the data necessary to assess the risks and possible harms brought about by the platform’s systems , data on the accuracy , functioning and testing of algorithmic systems for content moderation , recommender systems or advertising systems , or data on processes and outputs of content moderation or of internal complaint-handling systems within the meaning of this regulation. investigations by researchers on the evolution and severity of online systemic risks are particularly important for bridging information asymmetries and establishing a resilient system of risk mitigation , informing online platforms , digital services coordinators , other competent authorities , the commission and the public. this regulation therefore provides a framework for compelling access to data from very large online platforms to vetted researchers. all requirements for access to data under that framework should be proportionate and appropriately protect the rights and legitimate interests , including trade secrets and other confidential information , of the platform and any other parties concerned , including the recipients of the service. ### (64) in order to appropriately supervise the compliance of very large online platforms with the obligations laid down by this regulation , the digital services coordinator of establishment or the commission may require access to or reporting of specific data. such a requirement may include , for example , the data necessary to assess the risks and possible harms brought about by the platform’s systems , data on the accuracy , functioning and testing of algorithmic systems for content moderation , recommender systems or advertising systems , or data on processes and outputs of content moderation or of internal complaint-handling systems within the meaning of this regulation. investigations by researchers on the evolution and severity of online systemic risks are particularly important for bridging information asymmetries and establishing a resilient system of risk mitigation , informing online platforms , digital services coordinators , other competent authorities , the commission and the public. this regulation therefore provides a framework for compelling access to data from very large online platforms to vetted researchers , which mean the conditions set out in this regulation. all requirements for access to data under that framework should be proportionate and appropriately protect the rights and legitimate interests , including trade secrets and other confidential information , of the platform and any other parties concerned , including the recipients of the service.


### (66) to facilitate the effective and consistent application of the obligations in this regulation that may require implementation through technological means , it is important to promote voluntary industry standards covering certain technical procedures , where the industry can help develop standardised means to comply with this regulation , such as allowing the submission of notices , including through application programming interfaces , or about the interoperability of advertisement repositories. such standards could in particular be useful for relatively small providers of intermediary services. the standards could distinguish between different types of illegal content or different types of intermediary services , as appropriate. ### (66) to facilitate the effective and consistent application of the obligations in this regulation that may require implementation through technological means , it is important to promote voluntary industry standards covering certain technical procedures , where the industry can help develop standardised means to comply with this regulation , such as allowing the submission of notices , including through application programming interfaces , or about the interoperability of advertisement repositories. such standards could in particular be useful for relatively small providers of intermediary services. the standards could distinguish between different types of illegal content or different types of intermediary services , as appropriate. however , where no voluntary industry standard is agreed and the commission finds that the application of this regulation by providers is significantly divergent , the commission should be empowered to adopt delegated acts where needed until a voluntary industry standard is agreed.


### (66) to facilitate the effective and consistent application of the obligations in this regulation that may require implementation through technological means , it is important to promote voluntary industry standards covering certain technical procedures , where the industry can help develop standardised means to comply with this regulation , such as allowing the submission of notices , including through application programming interfaces , or about the interoperability of advertisement repositories. such standards could in particular be useful for relatively small providers of intermediary services. the standards could distinguish between different types of illegal content or different types of intermediary services , as appropriate. ### (66) to facilitate the effective and consistent application of the obligations in this regulation that may require implementation through technological means , it is important to promote voluntary industry standards covering certain technical procedures , where the industry can help develop standardised means to comply with this regulation , such as standardised disclosure frames for advertising , as allowing the submission of notices , including through application programming interfaces , or about the interoperability of advertisement repositories. such standards could in particular be useful for relatively small providers of intermediary services. the standards could distinguish between different types of illegal content or different types of intermediary services , as appropriate.


### (67) the commission and the board should encourage the drawing-up of codes of conduct to contribute to the application of this regulation. while the implementation of codes of conduct should be measurable and subject to public oversight , this should not impair the voluntary nature of such codes and the freedom of interested parties to decide whether to participate. in certain circumstances , it is important that very large online platforms cooperate in the drawing-up and adhere to specific codes of conduct. nothing in this regulation prevents other service providers from adhering to the same standards of due diligence , adopting best practices and benefitting from the guidance provided by the commission and the board , by participating in the same codes of conduct. ### (67) the commission and the board should encourage the drawing-up of codes of conduct to contribute to the application of this regulation , as well as the compliance of online platforms with the provisions of these codes. while the implementation of codes of conduct should be measurable and subject to public oversight , this should not impair the voluntary nature of such codes and the freedom of interested parties to decide whether to participate. in certain circumstances , it is important that very large online platforms cooperate in the drawing-up and adhere to specific codes of conduct. nothing in this regulation prevents other service providers from adhering to the same standards of due diligence , adopting best practices and benefitting from the guidance provided by the commission and the board , by participating in the same codes of conduct.


### 5. where an online platform has information indicating that a trusted flagger submitted a significant number of insufficiently precise or inadequately substantiated notices through the mechanisms referred to in article 14 , including information gathered in connection to the processing of complaints through the internal complaint-handling systems referred to in article 17(3) , it shall communicate that information to the digital services coordinator that awarded the status of trusted flagger to the entity concerned , providing the necessary explanations and supporting documents. ### 5. where an online platform has information indicating that a trusted flagger submitted a significant number of insufficiently precise or inadequately substantiated notices through the mechanisms referred to in article 14 , including information gathered in connection to the processing of complaints through the internal complaint-handling systems referred to in article 17(3) , it shall communicate that information to the digital services coordinator that awarded the status of trusted flagger to the entity concerned , providing the necessary explanations and supporting documents. during this period of investigation by the digital services coordinator , the trusted flagger shall be treated as a non-trusted flagger when using the mechanisms referred to in article 14 , where not suspended under article 20.


### 5. where an online platform has information indicating that a trusted flagger submitted a significant number of insufficiently precise or inadequately substantiated notices through the mechanisms referred to in article 14 , including information gathered in connection to the processing of complaints through the internal complaint-handling systems referred to in article 17(3) , it shall communicate that information to the digital services coordinator that awarded the status of trusted flagger to the entity concerned , providing the necessary explanations and supporting documents. ### 5. where an online platform has information indicating that a trusted flagger submitted a significant number of insufficiently precise or inadequately substantiated notices through the mechanisms referred to in article 14 , including information gathered in connection to the processing of complaints through the internal complaint-handling systems referred to in article 17(3) , it shall communicate that information to the digital services coordinator that awarded the status of trusted flagger to the entity concerned , and inform the board and other digital services coordinators , providing the necessary explanations and supporting documents.


### 6. the digital services coordinator that awarded the status of trusted flagger to an entity shall revoke that status if it determines , following an investigation either on its own initiative or on the basis information received by third parties , including the information provided by an online platform pursuant to paragraph 5 , that the entity no longer meets the conditions set out in paragraph 2. before revoking that status , the digital services coordinator shall afford the entity an opportunity to react to the findings of its investigation and its intention to revoke the entity’s status as trusted flagger ### 6. the digital services coordinator that awarded the status of trusted flagger to an entity shall revoke that status if it determines , following an investigation either on its own initiative or on the basis information received from third parties , including the information provided by an online platform pursuant to paragraph 5 , that the entity no longer meets the conditions set out in paragraph 2. before revoking that status , the digital services coordinator shall afford the entity an opportunity to react to the findings of its investigation and its intention to revoke the entity’s status as trusted flagger


### 6. the digital services coordinator that awarded the status of trusted flagger to an entity shall revoke that status if it determines , following an investigation either on its own initiative or on the basis information received by third parties , including the information provided by an online platform pursuant to paragraph 5 , that the entity no longer meets the conditions set out in paragraph 2. before revoking that status , the digital services coordinator shall afford the entity an opportunity to react to the findings of its investigation and its intention to revoke the entity’s status as trusted flagger ### 6. the digital services coordinator that awarded the status of trusted flagger to an entity shall revoke that status if it determines , following an investigation either on its own initiative or on the basis information received by third parties , including the information provided by an online platform pursuant to paragraph 5 , that the entity no longer meets the conditions set out in paragraph 2. before revoking that status , the digital services coordinator shall afford the entity an opportunity to react to the findings of its investigation and its intention to revoke the entity’s status as trusted flagger. before revoking that status the digital services coordinator shall inform the board and other digital services coordinators of the decision made regarding revoking the status of trusted flagger.


### 7. the commission , after consulting the board , may issue guidance to assist online platforms and digital services coordinators in the application of paragraphs 5 and 6. ### 7. the commission , after consulting the board , shall issue guidance as to how to apply and demonstrate the conditions of paragraph 2 and may issue guidance to assist online platforms and digital services coordinators in the application of paragraphs 5 and 6.


### 7. the commission , after consulting the board , may issue guidance to assist online platforms and digital services coordinators in the application of paragraphs 5 and 6. ### 7. the commission , after consulting the board , shall issue guidance to assist online platforms and digital services coordinators in the application of paragraphs 2 , 4a , 5 and 6.


### 7. the commission , after consulting the board , may issue guidance to assist online platforms and digital services coordinators in the application of paragraphs 5 and 6. ### 7. the commission , after consulting the board , shall issue guidance to assist online platforms and digital services coordinators in the application of paragraphs 2 , 5 and 6.


### 1. online platforms shall suspend , for a reasonable period of time and after having issued a prior warning , the provision of their services to recipients of the service that frequently provide manifestly illegal content. ### 1. online platforms shall suspend , or otherwise restrict , for a reasonable period of time and after having issued a prior warning , the provision or some features of their services to recipients of the service that frequently provide manifestly illegal content.


### 1. online platforms shall suspend , for a reasonable period of time and after having issued a prior warning , the provision of their services to recipients of the service that frequently provide manifestly illegal content. ### 1. online platforms shall suspend , for a reasonable period of time and after having issued a prior warning , the provision of their services to recipients of the service that frequently provide manifestly illegal content , or content that is in breach with their terms and conditions.


### 1. online platforms shall suspend , for a reasonable period of time and after having issued a prior warning , the provision of their services to recipients of the service that frequently provide manifestly illegal content. ### 1. online platforms shall suspend , for a reasonable period of time and after having issued a prior warning , the provision of their services to recipients of the service that provide manifestly illegal content.


### 1. online platforms shall suspend , for a reasonable period of time and after having issued a prior warning , the provision of their services to recipients of the service that frequently provide manifestly illegal content. ### 1. online platforms shall suspend , for a reasonable period of time and where proportionate after having issued a prior warning , the provision of their services to recipients of the service that frequently provide manifestly illegal content.


### 5. the board shall regularly monitor and evaluate the achievement of the objectives of the codes of conduct , having regard to the key performance indicators that they may contain. ### 5. the board shall regularly monitor and evaluate the achievement of the objectives of the codes of conduct , having regard to the key performance indicators that they may contain. in case of systematic and repetitive failure to comply with the codes of conduct , the board shall as a measure of last resort take a decision to temporary suspend or definitely exclude platforms that do not meet their commitments as a signatory to the codes of conduct.


### article 36 ### deleted


### 1. the commission shall encourage and facilitate the drawing up of codes of conduct at union level between , online platforms and other relevant service providers , such as providers of online advertising intermediary services or organisations representing recipients of the service and civil society organisations or relevant authorities to contribute to further transparency in online advertising beyond the requirements of articles 24 and 30. ### 1. the commission shall encourage and facilitate the drawing up of codes of conduct at union level between , online platforms and other relevant service providers , such as providers of online advertising intermediary services or organisations representing recipients of the service and civil society organisations or relevant authorities to contribute to further transparency for all players in the online advertising value chain. beyond the requirements of articles 24 and 30


### 1. the commission shall encourage and facilitate the drawing up of codes of conduct at union level between , online platforms and other relevant service providers , such as providers of online advertising intermediary services or organisations representing recipients of the service and civil society organisations or relevant authorities to contribute to further transparency in online advertising beyond the requirements of articles 24 and 30. ### 1. the commission shall encourage and facilitate the drawing up of codes of conduct at union level between , online platforms and other relevant service providers , such as providers of online advertising intermediary services or organisations representing recipients of the service and civil society organisations or relevant authorities to contribute to further transparency for all actors in the online advertising value chain , beyond the requirements of articles 24 and 30


### 3. the commission shall encourage the development of the codes of conduct within one year following the date of application of this regulation and their application no later than six months after that date. ### 3. the commission shall encourage the development of the codes of conduct within one year following the date of application of this regulation and their application no later than six months after that date. the commission shall evaluate the application of those codes three years after the application of this regulation.


### 3. the commission shall encourage the development of the codes of conduct within one year following the date of application of this regulation and their application no later than six months after that date. ### 3. the commission shall encourage the development of the codes of conduct within one year following the date of application of this regulation and their application no later than six months after that date. the commission shall evaluate the application of those codes two years after the application of this regulation.