### 4. when the commission pursuant to article 3(6) designates as a gatekeeper a provider of core platform services that does not yet enjoy an entrenched and durable position in its operations , but it is foreseeable that it will enjoy such a position in the near future , it shall declare applicable to that gatekeeper only obligations laid down in article 5(b) and article 6(1) points (e) , (f) , (h) and (i) as specified in the designation decision. the commission shall only declare applicable those obligations that are appropriate and necessary to prevent that the gatekeeper concerned achieves by unfair means an entrenched and durable position in its operations. the commission shall review such a designation in accordance with the procedure laid down in article 4. ### 4. when the commission pursuant to article 3(6) designates as a gatekeeper a provider of core platform services that does not yet enjoy an entrenched and durable position in its operations , but it is foreseeable that it will enjoy such a position , it shall declare applicable to that gatekeeper specific obligations laid down in article 5 and article 6 as specified in the designation decision. the commission shall only declare applicable those obligations that are appropriate and necessary to prevent that the gatekeeper concerned achieves by unfair means an entrenched and durable position in its operations. the commission shall review such a designation in accordance with the procedure laid down in article 4.


### 1. where the market investigation shows that a gatekeeper has systematically infringed the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6 and has further strengthened or extended its gatekeeper position in relation to the characteristics under article 3(1) , the commission may by decision adopted in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in article 32(4) impose on such gatekeeper any behavioural or structural remedies which are proportionate to the infringement committed and necessary to ensure compliance with this regulation. the commission shall conclude its investigation by adopting a decision within twelve months from the opening of the market investigation. ### 1. the commission may conduct a market investigation for the purpose of examining whether a gatekeeper has engaged in systematic non-compliance. where the market investigation shows that a gatekeeper has systematically infringed the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6 and has further strengthened or extended its gatekeeper position in relation to the characteristics under article 3(1) , the commission may by decision adopted in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in article 32(4) impose on such gatekeeper any behavioural or structural remedies which are proportionate to the infringement committed and necessary to ensure compliance with this regulation. the commission shall , where appropriate , be entitled to require the remedies to be tested to optimise their effectiveness. the commission shall conclude its investigation by adopting a decision as soon as possible , and in any case no later than twelve months from the opening of the market investigation.


### 1. where the market investigation shows that a gatekeeper has systematically infringed the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6 and has further strengthened or extended its gatekeeper position in relation to the characteristics under article 3(1) , the commission may by decision adopted in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in article 32(4) impose on such gatekeeper any behavioural or structural remedies which are proportionate to the infringement committed and necessary to ensure compliance with this regulation. the commission shall conclude its investigation by adopting a decision within twelve months from the opening of the market investigation. ### 1. where the market investigation shows that a gatekeeper has systematically infringed the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6 , the commission may by decision adopted in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in article 32(4) impose on such gatekeeper any behavioural or structural remedies which are proportionate to the infringement committed and necessary to ensure compliance with this regulation. the commission shall conclude its investigation by adopting a decision within twelve months from the opening of the market investigation.


### 1. where the market investigation shows that a gatekeeper has systematically infringed the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6 and has further strengthened or extended its gatekeeper position in relation to the characteristics under article 3(1) , the commission may by decision adopted in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in article 32(4) impose on such gatekeeper any behavioural or structural remedies which are proportionate to the infringement committed and necessary to ensure compliance with this regulation. the commission shall conclude its investigation by adopting a decision within twelve months from the opening of the market investigation. ### 1. where the market investigation shows that a gatekeeper has systematically infringed any obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6 , the commission may by decision adopted in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in article 32(4) impose on such gatekeeper any behavioural or structural remedies which are proportionate to the infringement committed and necessary to ensure compliance with this regulation. the commission shall , where appropriate , be entitled to require the remedies to be tested to optimise their effectiveness. the commission shall conclude its investigation by adopting a decision within twelve months from the opening of the market investigation.


### 1. where the market investigation shows that a gatekeeper has systematically infringed the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6 and has further strengthened or extended its gatekeeper position in relation to the characteristics under article 3(1) , the commission may by decision adopted in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in article 32(4) impose on such gatekeeper any behavioural or structural remedies which are proportionate to the infringement committed and necessary to ensure compliance with this regulation. the commission shall conclude its investigation by adopting a decision within twelve months from the opening of the market investigation. ### 1. the commission may conduct a market investigation for the purpose of examining whether a gatekeeper has engaged in systematic non-compliance. where the market investigation shows that a gatekeeper has systematically infringed the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6 and has further strengthened or extended its gatekeeper position in relation to the characteristics under article 3(1) , the commission may by decision adopted in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in article 32(4) impose on such gatekeeper any behavioural or structural remedies which are proportionate to the infringement committed and necessary to ensure compliance with this regulation. the commission shall where appropriate , be entitled to require the remedies to be tested to optimise their effectiveness. the commission shall conclude its investigation by adopting a decision as soon as possible , and in any case no later than twelve months from the opening of the market investigation.


### (17) a very significant turnover in the union and the provision of a core platform service in at least three member states constitute compelling indications that the provider of a core platform service has a significant impact on the internal market. this is equally true where a provider of a core platform service in at least three member states has a very significant market capitalisation or equivalent fair market value. therefore , a provider of a core platform service should be presumed to have a significant impact on the internal market where it provides a core platform service in at least three member states and where either its group turnover realised in the eea is equal to or exceeds a specific , high threshold or the market capitalisation of the group is equal to or exceeds a certain high absolute value. for providers of core platform services that belong to undertakings that are not publicly listed , the equivalent fair market value above a certain high absolute value should be referred to. the commission should use its power to adopt delegated acts to develop an objective methodology to calculate that value. a high eea group turnover in conjunction with the threshold of users in the union of core platform services reflects a relatively strong ability to monetise these users. a high market capitalisation relative to the same threshold number of users in the union reflects a relatively significant potential to monetise these users in the near future. this monetisation potential in turn reflects in principle the gateway position of the undertakings concerned. both indicators are in addition reflective of their financial capacity , including their ability to leverage their access to financial markets to reinforce their position. this may for example happen where this superior access is used to acquire other undertakings , which ability has in turn been shown to have potential negative effects on innovation. market capitalisation can also be reflective of the expected future position and effect on the internal market of the providers concerned , notwithstanding a potentially relatively low current turnover. the market capitalisation value can be based on a level that reflects the average market capitalisation of the largest publicly listed undertakings in the union over an appropriate period. ### (17) a very significant turnover in the union and the provision of a core platform service in at least three member states constitute compelling indications that the provider of a core platform service has a significant impact on the internal market. this is equally true where a provider of a core platform service in at least three member states has a very significant market capitalisation or equivalent fair market value. therefore , a provider of a core platform service should be presumed to have a significant impact on the internal market where it provides a core platform service in at least three member states and where either its group turnover realised in the eea is equal to or exceeds a specific , high threshold or the market capitalisation of the group is equal to or exceeds a certain high absolute value. for providers of core platform services that are not publicly listed , the equivalent fair market value above a certain high absolute value should be referred to. the commission should use its power to adopt delegated acts to develop an objective methodology to calculate that value. a high eea group turnover in conjunction with the threshold of users in the union of core platform services reflects a relatively strong ability to monetise these users. a high market capitalisation relative to the same threshold number of users in the union reflects a relatively significant potential to monetise these users in the near future. this monetisation potential in turn reflects in principle the gateway position of the undertakings concerned. both indicators are in addition reflective of their financial capacity , including their ability to leverage their access to financial markets to reinforce their position. this may for example happen where this superior access is used to acquire other providers of core platform services , which ability has in turn been shown to have potential negative effects on innovation. market capitalisation can also be reflective of the expected future position and effect on the internal market of the providers concerned , notwithstanding a potentially relatively low current turnover. the market capitalisation value can be based on a level that reflects the average market capitalisation of the largest publicly listed core platform services in the union over an appropriate period.


### (20) a very high number of business users that depend on a core platform service to reach a very high number of monthly active end users allow the provider of that service to influence the operations of a substantial part of business users to its advantage and indicate in principle that the provider serves as an important gateway. the respective relevant levels for those numbers should be set representing a substantive percentage of the entire population of the union when it comes to end users and of the entire population of businesses using platforms to determine the threshold for business users. ### (20) a very high number of business users that depend on a core platform service to reach a very high number of monthly active end users allow the provider of that service to influence the operations of a substantial part of business users to its advantage and indicate in principle that the provider serves as an important gateway. the respective relevant levels for those numbers should be set representing a substantive percentage of the entire population of the union when it comes to end users and of the entire population of businesses using platforms to determine the threshold for business users. active end users as well as business users should be defined in a way that adequately represents the role and reach of the specific core platform service in question. in order to provide legal certainty for gatekeepers , elements of such definitions per core platform service should be set out in an annex to this regulation , which should be subject to possible amendment by the commission by means of delegated act to be able to keep it up to date in the light of technical or other developments.


### (25) such an assessment can only be done in light of a market investigation , while taking into account the quantitative thresholds. in its assessment the commission should pursue the objectives of preserving and fostering the level of innovation , the quality of digital products and services , the degree to which prices are fair and competitive , and the degree to which quality or choice for business users and for end users is or remains high. elements that are specific to the providers of core platform services concerned , such as extreme scale economies , very strong network effects , an ability to connect many business users with many end users through the multi-sidedness of these services , lock-in effects , a lack of multi-homing or vertical integration , can be taken into account. in addition , a very high market capitalisation , a very high ratio of equity value over profit or a very high turnover derived from end users of a single core platform service can point to the tipping of the market or leveraging potential of such providers. together with market capitalisation , high growth rates , or decelerating growth rates read together with profitability growth , are examples of dynamic parameters that are particularly relevant to identifying such providers of core platform services that are foreseen to become entrenched. the commission should be able to take a decision by drawing adverse inferences from facts available where the provider significantly obstructs the investigation by failing to comply with the investigative measures taken by the commission. ### (25) such an assessment can only be done in light of a market investigation , while taking into account the quantitative thresholds. in its assessment the commission should pursue the objectives of preserving and fostering the level of innovation , access to public information entailing the making available of information non-discriminatory to a potentially unlimited number of persons or users in general , the quality of digital products and services , the degree to which prices are fair and competitive , and the degree to which quality or choice for business users and for end users is or remains high. elements that are specific to the providers of core platform services concerned , such as extreme scale economies , very strong network effects , an ability to connect many business users with many end users through the multi-sidedness of these services , lock-in effects , a lack of multi-homing or vertical integration , can be taken into account. in addition , a very high market capitalisation , a very high ratio of equity value over profit or a very high turnover derived from end users of a single core platform service can point to the tipping of the market or leveraging potential of such providers. together with market capitalisation , high growth rates , or decelerating growth rates read together with profitability growth , are examples of dynamic parameters that are particularly relevant to identifying such providers of core platform services that are foreseen to become entrenched. the commission should be able to take a decision by drawing adverse inferences from facts available where the provider significantly obstructs the investigation by failing to comply with the investigative measures taken by the commission.


### (25) such an assessment can only be done in light of a market investigation , while taking into account the quantitative thresholds. in its assessment the commission should pursue the objectives of preserving and fostering the level of innovation , the quality of digital products and services , the degree to which prices are fair and competitive , and the degree to which quality or choice for business users and for end users is or remains high. elements that are specific to the providers of core platform services concerned , such as extreme scale economies , very strong network effects , an ability to connect many business users with many end users through the multi-sidedness of these services , lock-in effects , a lack of multi-homing or vertical integration , can be taken into account. in addition , a very high market capitalisation , a very high ratio of equity value over profit or a very high turnover derived from end users of a single core platform service can point to the tipping of the market or leveraging potential of such providers. together with market capitalisation , high growth rates , or decelerating growth rates read together with profitability growth , are examples of dynamic parameters that are particularly relevant to identifying such providers of core platform services that are foreseen to become entrenched. the commission should be able to take a decision by drawing adverse inferences from facts available where the provider significantly obstructs the investigation by failing to comply with the investigative measures taken by the commission. ### (25) such an assessment can only be done in light of a market investigation , while taking into account the quantitative thresholds. in its assessment the commission should pursue the objectives of preserving and fostering the level of innovation , the quality of digital products and services , the degree to which prices are fair and competitive , and the degree to which quality or choice for business users and for end users is or remains high. elements that are specific to the providers of core platform services concerned , such as extreme scale economies , very strong network effects , an ability to connect many business users with many end users through the multi-sidedness of these services , lock-in effects , a lack of multi-homing or vertical integration , can be taken into account. the potential negative and positive impacts of these elements for business users , especially for small and medium-sized enterprises , and consumers should be taken into consideration. in addition , a very high market capitalisation , a very high ratio of equity value over profit or a very high turnover derived from end users of a single core platform service can point to the tipping of the market or leveraging potential of such providers. together with market capitalisation , high growth rates , or decelerating growth rates read together with profitability growth , are examples of dynamic parameters that are particularly relevant to identifying such providers of core platform services that are foreseen to become entrenched. the commission should be able to take a decision by drawing adverse inferences from facts available where the provider significantly obstructs the investigation by failing to comply with the investigative measures taken by the commission.


### (26) a particular subset of rules should apply to those providers of core platform services that are foreseen to enjoy an entrenched and durable position in the near future. the same specific features of core platform services make them prone to tipping: once a service provider has obtained a certain advantage over rivals or potential challengers in terms of scale or intermediation power , its position may become unassailable and the situation may evolve to the point that it is likely to become durable and entrenched in the near future. undertakings can try to induce this tipping and emerge as gatekeeper by using some of the unfair conditions and practices regulated in this regulation. in such a situation , it appears appropriate to intervene before the market tips irreversibly. ### (26) a particular subset of rules should apply to those providers of core platform services that are foreseen to enjoy an entrenched and durable position in the near future. the same specific features of core platform services make them prone to tipping: once a service provider has obtained a certain advantage over rivals or potential challengers in terms of scale or intermediation power , its position may become unassailable and the situation may evolve to the point that it is likely to become durable and entrenched in the near future. providers of core platform services can try to induce this tipping and emerge as gatekeeper by using some of the unfair conditions and practices regulated in this regulation. in such a situation , it appears appropriate to intervene before the market tips irreversibly.


### (28) this should allow the commission to intervene in time and effectively , while fully respecting the proportionality of the considered measures. it should also reassure actual or potential market participants about the fairness and contestability of the services concerned. ### (28) this should allow the commission to intervene in time and effectively , while fully respecting the proportionality of the considered measures. it should also reassure actual or potential market participants about the fairness and contestability of the services concerned. in this regard , calls on the commission to undertake further steps by initiating a more comprehensive data sharing framework for online platforms dedicated to short-term rentals , following consultations with all relevant stakeholders , and to establish an obligation for platforms to hare their data accordingly , in full compliance with regulation (eu) 2016/679 , with eurostat and the national statistics office of the country where the service providers operate.


### (31) to ensure the effectiveness of the review of gatekeeper status as well as the possibility to adjust the list of core platform services provided by a gatekeeper , the gatekeepers should inform the commission of all of their intended and concluded acquisitions of other providers of core platform services or any other services provided within the digital sector. such information should not only serve the review process mentioned above , regarding the status of individual gatekeepers , but will also provide information that is crucial to monitoring broader contestability trends in the digital sector and can therefore be a useful factor for consideration in the context of the market investigations foreseen by this regulation. ### (31) to ensure the effectiveness of the review of gatekeeper status as well as the possibility to adjust the list of core platform services provided by a gatekeeper , the gatekeepers should inform the commission of all of their intended and concluded acquisitions prior to their application. such information should not only serve the review process mentioned above , regarding the status of individual gatekeepers , but will also provide information that is crucial to monitoring broader contestability trends in the markets where gatekeepers operate , in particular in the digital sector and can therefore be a useful factor for consideration in the context of the market investigations foreseen by this regulation.


### (33) the obligations laid down in this regulation are limited to what is necessary and justified to address the unfairness of the identified practices by gatekeepers and to ensure contestability in relation to core platform services provided by gatekeepers. therefore , the obligations should correspond to those practices that are considered unfair by taking into account the features of the digital sector and where experience gained , for example in the enforcement of the eu competition rules , shows that they have a particularly negative direct impact on the business users and end users. in addition , it is necessary to provide for the possibility of a regulatory dialogue with gatekeepers to tailor those obligations that are likely to require specific implementing measures in order to ensure their effectiveness and proportionality. the obligations should only be updated after a thorough investigation on the nature and impact of specific practices that may be newly identified , following an in-depth investigation , as unfair or limiting contestability in the same manner as the unfair practices laid down in this regulation while potentially escaping the scope of the current set of obligations. ### (33) the obligations laid down in this regulation are limited to what is necessary and justified to address the unfairness of the identified practices by gatekeepers and to ensure contestability in relation to core platform services provided by gatekeepers. therefore , the obligations should correspond to those practices that are considered unfair by taking into account the features of the digital sector and where experience gained , for example in the enforcement of the eu competition rules , shows that they have a particularly negative direct impact on the business users and end users. in addition , it is necessary to provide for the possibility of a brief regulatory dialogue with gatekeepers to tailor those obligations that are likely to require specific implementing measures in order to ensure their effectiveness and proportionality. the obligations should only be updated after a thorough investigation on the nature and impact of specific practices that may be newly identified , following an in-depth investigation , as unfair or limiting contestability in the same manner as the unfair practices laid down in this regulation while potentially escaping the scope of the current set of obligations.


### (33) the obligations laid down in this regulation are limited to what is necessary and justified to address the unfairness of the identified practices by gatekeepers and to ensure contestability in relation to core platform services provided by gatekeepers. therefore , the obligations should correspond to those practices that are considered unfair by taking into account the features of the digital sector and where experience gained , for example in the enforcement of the eu competition rules , shows that they have a particularly negative direct impact on the business users and end users. in addition , it is necessary to provide for the possibility of a regulatory dialogue with gatekeepers to tailor those obligations that are likely to require specific implementing measures in order to ensure their effectiveness and proportionality. the obligations should only be updated after a thorough investigation on the nature and impact of specific practices that may be newly identified , following an in-depth investigation , as unfair or limiting contestability in the same manner as the unfair practices laid down in this regulation while potentially escaping the scope of the current set of obligations. ### (33) the obligations laid down in this regulation are limited to what is necessary and justified to address the unfairness of the identified practices by gatekeepers and to ensure contestability in relation to core platform services provided by gatekeepers. therefore , the obligations should correspond to those practices that are considered unfair by taking into account the features of the digital sector and where experience gained , for example in the enforcement of the eu competition rules , shows that they have a particularly negative direct impact on the business users and end users. the obligations laid down in the regulation may specifically take into account the nature of the core platform services provided. in addition , it is necessary to provide for the possibility of a regulatory dialogue with gatekeepers to tailor those obligations that are likely to require specific implementing measures in order to ensure their effectiveness and proportionality. the obligations should only be updated after a thorough investigation on the nature and impact of specific practices that may be newly identified , following an in-depth investigation , as unfair or limiting contestability in the same manner as the unfair practices laid down in this regulation while potentially escaping the scope of the current set of obligations. in order to enhance the effectiveness of the updating process , the commission should also use the reporting mechanism involving competitors , business users , end-users and competent national authorities , that would inform the commission in the event of any of those detected practices.


### (33) the obligations laid down in this regulation are limited to what is necessary and justified to address the unfairness of the identified practices by gatekeepers and to ensure contestability in relation to core platform services provided by gatekeepers. therefore , the obligations should correspond to those practices that are considered unfair by taking into account the features of the digital sector and where experience gained , for example in the enforcement of the eu competition rules , shows that they have a particularly negative direct impact on the business users and end users. in addition , it is necessary to provide for the possibility of a regulatory dialogue with gatekeepers to tailor those obligations that are likely to require specific implementing measures in order to ensure their effectiveness and proportionality. the obligations should only be updated after a thorough investigation on the nature and impact of specific practices that may be newly identified , following an in-depth investigation , as unfair or limiting contestability in the same manner as the unfair practices laid down in this regulation while potentially escaping the scope of the current set of obligations. ### (33) the obligations laid down in this regulation are limited to what is necessary and justified to address the unfairness of the identified practices by gatekeepers and to ensure contestability in relation to core platform services provided by gatekeepers. therefore , the obligations should correspond to those practices that are considered unfair by taking into account the features of the digital sector and where experience gained , for example in the enforcement of the eu competition rules , shows that they have a particularly negative direct impact on the business users and end users. in addition , it is necessary to provide for the possibility of a regulatory dialogue with gatekeepers to tailor those obligations that are likely to require specific implementing measures in order to ensure their effectiveness and proportionality. the obligations should only be updated after a thorough investigation on the nature and impact of specific practices that may be newly identified , following an in-depth investigation , as unfair or limiting contestability in the same manner as the unfair practices laid down in this regulation while potentially escaping the scope of the current set of obligations. in order to enhance the effectiveness of the updating process , the commission should also use the reporting mechanism involving competitors , business users , end users and member states to inform the commission in the event of any of the identified practices.


### (33) the obligations laid down in this regulation are limited to what is necessary and justified to address the unfairness of the identified practices by gatekeepers and to ensure contestability in relation to core platform services provided by gatekeepers. therefore , the obligations should correspond to those practices that are considered unfair by taking into account the features of the digital sector and where experience gained , for example in the enforcement of the eu competition rules , shows that they have a particularly negative direct impact on the business users and end users. in addition , it is necessary to provide for the possibility of a regulatory dialogue with gatekeepers to tailor those obligations that are likely to require specific implementing measures in order to ensure their effectiveness and proportionality. the obligations should only be updated after a thorough investigation on the nature and impact of specific practices that may be newly identified , following an in-depth investigation , as unfair or limiting contestability in the same manner as the unfair practices laid down in this regulation while potentially escaping the scope of the current set of obligations. ### (33) the obligations laid down in this regulation are limited to what is necessary and justified to address the unfairness of the identified practices by gatekeepers and to ensure contestability in relation to core platform services provided by gatekeepers. therefore , the obligations should correspond to those practices that are considered unfair by taking into account the features of the digital sector and where experience gained , for example in the enforcement of the eu competition rules , shows that they have a particularly negative direct impact on the business users and end users. the obligations laid down in the regulation should specifically take into account the nature of the core platform services provided and the presence of different business models. in addition , it is necessary to provide for the possibility of a regulatory dialogue with gatekeepers to tailor those obligations that are likely to require specific implementing measures in order to ensure their effectiveness and proportionality. the obligations should only be updated after a thorough investigation on the nature and impact of specific practices that may be newly identified , following an in-depth investigation , as unfair or limiting contestability in the same manner as the unfair practices laid down in this regulation while potentially escaping the scope of the current set of obligations.


### (37) because of their position , gatekeepers might in certain cases restrict the ability of business users of their online intermediation services to offer their goods or services to end users under more favourable conditions , including price , through other online intermediation services. such restrictions have a significant deterrent effect on the business users of gatekeepers in terms of their use of alternative online intermediation services , limiting inter-platform contestability , which in turn limits choice of alternative online intermediation channels for end users. to ensure that business users of online intermediation services of gatekeepers can freely choose alternative online intermediation services and differentiate the conditions under which they offer their products or services to their end users , it should not be accepted that gatekeepers limit business users from choosing to differentiate commercial conditions , including price. such a restriction should apply to any measure with equivalent effect , such as for example increased commission rates or de-listing of the offers of business users. ### (37) because of their position , gatekeepers might in certain cases restrict the ability of business users of their online intermediation services to offer their goods or services to end users under more favourable conditions , including price , through other online intermediation services or alternative distribution channels. such restrictions have a significant deterrent effect on the business users of gatekeepers in terms of their use of alternative online intermediation services or alternative distribution channels , limiting inter-platform contestability , which in turn limits choice of alternative online intermediation or distribution channels for end users. to ensure that business users of online intermediation services of gatekeepers can freely choose among alternative online services and channels , and differentiate the conditions under which they offer their products or services to their end users , it should not be accepted that gatekeepers limit business users from choosing to differentiate commercial conditions , including price. such a restriction should apply to any measure with equivalent effect , such as for example increased commission rates or de-listing of the offers of business users.


### (37) because of their position , gatekeepers might in certain cases restrict the ability of business users of their online intermediation services to offer their goods or services to end users under more favourable conditions , including price , through other online intermediation services. such restrictions have a significant deterrent effect on the business users of gatekeepers in terms of their use of alternative online intermediation services , limiting inter-platform contestability , which in turn limits choice of alternative online intermediation channels for end users. to ensure that business users of online intermediation services of gatekeepers can freely choose alternative online intermediation services and differentiate the conditions under which they offer their products or services to their end users , it should not be accepted that gatekeepers limit business users from choosing to differentiate commercial conditions , including price. such a restriction should apply to any measure with equivalent effect , such as for example increased commission rates or de-listing of the offers of business users. ### (37) because of their position , gatekeepers might in certain cases restrict the ability of business users of their online intermediation services to offer their goods or services to end users under more favourable conditions , including price , through other online intermediation services , their own interface or direct channel. such restrictions have a significant deterrent effect on the business users of gatekeepers in terms of their use of alternative online intermediation services , limiting inter-platform contestability , which in turn limits choice of alternative distribution channels including alternative online intermediation channels for end users. to ensure that business users of online intermediation services of gatekeepers can freely choose alternative online intermediation services and differentiate the conditions under which they offer their products or services to their end users , it should not be accepted that gatekeepers limit business users from choosing to differentiate commercial conditions , including price. such a restriction should apply to any measure with equivalent effect , such as for example increased commission rates or de-listing of the offers of business users.


### (37) because of their position , gatekeepers might in certain cases restrict the ability of business users of their online intermediation services to offer their goods or services to end users under more favourable conditions , including price , through other online intermediation services. such restrictions have a significant deterrent effect on the business users of gatekeepers in terms of their use of alternative online intermediation services , limiting inter-platform contestability , which in turn limits choice of alternative online intermediation channels for end users. to ensure that business users of online intermediation services of gatekeepers can freely choose alternative online intermediation services and differentiate the conditions under which they offer their products or services to their end users , it should not be accepted that gatekeepers limit business users from choosing to differentiate commercial conditions , including price. such a restriction should apply to any measure with equivalent effect , such as for example increased commission rates or de-listing of the offers of business users. ### (37) because of their position , gatekeepers might in certain cases restrict the ability of business users of their online intermediation services to offer their goods or services to end users under more favourable conditions , including price , through other online intermediation services , their own interface or direct channel. such restrictions have a significant deterrent effect on the business users of gatekeepers in terms of their use of alternative online intermediation services , limiting inter-platform contestability , which in turn limits choice of alternative distributive channels including alternative online intermediation channels for end users. to ensure that business users of online intermediation services of gatekeepers can freely choose alternative online intermediation services and differentiate the conditions under which they offer their products or services to their end users , it should not be accepted that gatekeepers limit business users from choosing to differentiate commercial conditions , including price. such a restriction should apply to any measure with equivalent effect , such as for example increased commission rates , de-listing or less favourable ranking of the offers of business users.


### (39) to safeguard a fair commercial environment and protect the contestability of the digital sector it is important to safeguard the right of business users to raise concerns about unfair behaviour by gatekeepers with any relevant administrative or other public authorities. for example , business users may want to complain about different types of unfair practices , such as discriminatory access conditions , unjustified closing of business user accounts or unclear grounds for product de-listings. any practice that would in any way inhibit such a possibility of raising concerns or seeking available redress , for instance by means of confidentiality clauses in agreements or other written terms , should therefore be prohibited. this should be without prejudice to the right of business users and gatekeepers to lay down in their agreements the terms of use including the use of lawful complaints-handling mechanisms , including any use of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms or of the jurisdiction of specific courts in compliance with respective union and national law this should therefore also be without prejudice to the role gatekeepers play in the fight against illegal content online. ### (39) to safeguard a fair commercial environment and protect the contestability of the digital sector it is important to safeguard the right of business users to raise concerns about unfair behaviour by gatekeepers with any relevant administrative or other public authorities including national courts. for example , business users may want to complain about different types of unfair practices , such as discriminatory access conditions , unjustified closing of business user accounts or unclear grounds for product de-listings. any practice that would in any way inhibit such a possibility of raising concerns or seeking available redress , for instance by means of confidentiality clauses in agreements or other written terms , should therefore be prohibited. this should be without prejudice to the right of business users and gatekeepers to lay down in their agreements the terms of use including the use of lawful complaints-handling mechanisms , including any use of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms or of the jurisdiction of specific courts in compliance with respective union and national law this should therefore also be without prejudice to the role gatekeepers play in the fight against illegal content online.


### (40) identification services are crucial for business users to conduct their business , as these can allow them not only to optimise services , to the extent allowed under regulation (eu) 2016/679 and directive 2002/58/ec of the european parliament and of the council33 , but also to inject trust in online transactions , in compliance with union or national law. gatekeepers should therefore not use their position as provider of core platform services to require their dependent business users to include any identification services provided by the gatekeeper itself as part of the provision of services or products by these business users to their end users , where other identification services are available to such business users. ### (40) identification and ancillary services are crucial for the economic development of business users to conduct their business , as these can allow them not only to optimise services , to the extent allowed under regulation (eu) 2016/679 and directive 2002/58/ec of the european parliament and of the council33 , but also to inject trust in online transactions , in compliance with union or national law. gatekeepers should therefore not use their position as provider of core platform services to require their dependent business users to include any identification or ancillary services provided by the gatekeeper itself as part of the provision of services or products by these business users to their end users , where other identification services are available to such business users.


### (40) identification services are crucial for business users to conduct their business , as these can allow them not only to optimise services , to the extent allowed under regulation (eu) 2016/679 and directive 2002/58/ec of the european parliament and of the council33 , but also to inject trust in online transactions , in compliance with union or national law. gatekeepers should therefore not use their position as provider of core platform services to require their dependent business users to include any identification services provided by the gatekeeper itself as part of the provision of services or products by these business users to their end users , where other identification services are available to such business users. ### (40) identification and payment services are crucial for the economic development of business users to conduct their business , as these can allow them not only to optimise services , to the extent allowed under regulation (eu) 2016/679 and directive 2002/58/ec of the european parliament and of the council33 , but also to inject trust in online transactions , in compliance with union or national law. gatekeepers should therefore not use their position as provider of core platform services to require their dependent business users to include any payment and identification services provided by the gatekeeper itself as part of the provision of services or products by these business users to their end users , where other identification services are available to such business users.


### (41) gatekeepers should not restrict the free choice of end users by technically preventing switching between or subscription to different software applications and services. gatekeepers should therefore ensure a free choice irrespective of whether they are the manufacturer of any hardware by means of which such software applications or services are accessed and should not raise artificial technical barriers so as to make switching impossible or ineffective. the mere offering of a given product or service to end users , including by means of pre-installation , as well the improvement of end user offering , such as better prices or increased quality , would not in itself constitute a barrier to switching. ### (41) gatekeepers should not restrict the free choice of end users by technically preventing switching between or subscription to different software applications and services. gatekeepers should therefore ensure a free choice irrespective of whether they are the manufacturer of any hardware by means of which such software applications or services are accessed and should not raise artificial technical barriers so as to make switching more cumbersome or ineffective. the mere offering of a given product or service to end users , including by means of pre-installation , as well the improvement of end user offering , such as better prices or increased quality , would not in itself constitute a barrier to switching.


### (58) to ensure the effectiveness of the obligations laid down by this regulation , while also making certain that these obligations are limited to what is necessary to ensure contestability and tackling the harmful effects of the unfair behaviour by gatekeepers , it is important to clearly define and circumscribe them so as to allow the gatekeeper to immediately comply with them , in full respect of regulation (eu) 2016/679 and directive 2002/58/ec , consumer protection , cyber security and product safety. the gatekeepers should ensure the compliance with this regulation by design. the necessary measures should therefore be as much as possible and where relevant integrated into the technological design used by the gatekeepers. however , it may in certain cases be appropriate for the commission , following a dialogue with the gatekeeper concerned , to further specify some of the measures that the gatekeeper concerned should adopt in order to effectively comply with those obligations that are susceptible of being further specified. this possibility of a regulatory dialogue should facilitate compliance by gatekeepers and expedite the correct implementation of the regulation. ### (58) to ensure the effectiveness of the obligations laid down by this regulation , while also making certain that these obligations are limited to what is necessary to ensure contestability and tackling the harmful effects of the unfair behaviour by gatekeepers , it is important to clearly define and circumscribe them so as to allow the gatekeeper to immediately comply with them , in full respect of regulation (eu) 2016/679 and directive 2002/58/ec , consumer protection , cyber security and product safety. the gatekeepers should ensure the compliance with this regulation by design. the necessary measures should therefore be as much as possible and where relevant integrated into the technological design used by the gatekeepers. however , it may in certain cases be appropriate for the commission , following a dialogue with the gatekeeper concerned , to further specify some of the measures that the gatekeeper concerned should adopt in order to effectively comply with those obligations that are susceptible of being further specified.


### (58) to ensure the effectiveness of the obligations laid down by this regulation , while also making certain that these obligations are limited to what is necessary to ensure contestability and tackling the harmful effects of the unfair behaviour by gatekeepers , it is important to clearly define and circumscribe them so as to allow the gatekeeper to immediately comply with them , in full respect of regulation (eu) 2016/679 and directive 2002/58/ec , consumer protection , cyber security and product safety. the gatekeepers should ensure the compliance with this regulation by design. the necessary measures should therefore be as much as possible and where relevant integrated into the technological design used by the gatekeepers. however , it may in certain cases be appropriate for the commission , following a dialogue with the gatekeeper concerned , to further specify some of the measures that the gatekeeper concerned should adopt in order to effectively comply with those obligations that are susceptible of being further specified. this possibility of a regulatory dialogue should facilitate compliance by gatekeepers and expedite the correct implementation of the regulation. ### (58) this regulation should aim to ensure contestability and fairness of the digital economy , with a view to promoting innovation , high quality of digital products and services , fair and competitive prices , as well as a high quality and choice for end users in the digital sector. to ensure the effectiveness of the obligations laid down by this regulation , while also making certain that these obligations are limited to what is necessary and proportionate to ensure contestability and tackling the harmful effects of the unfair behaviour by gatekeepers , it is important to clearly define and circumscribe them so as to allow the gatekeeper to immediately comply with them , in full respect of regulation (eu) 2016/679 and directive 2002/58/ec , consumer protection , cyber security and product safety. the gatekeepers should ensure the compliance with this regulation by design. the necessary measures should therefore be as much as possible and where relevant integrated into the technological design used by the gatekeepers. in view of that , further specification should be possible where specific modalities of the implementation of an obligation set out in article 6 can be affected by differences in business models where the provision concerned applies to a broad range of core platform services. to this end , the gatekeeper should be granted the opportunity to engage in a regulatory dialogue whereby the commission may further specify some of the measures that the gatekeeper concerned should adopt in order to effectively comply with the objectives of those obligations that are susceptible of being further specified. this regulatory dialogue should be limited to the questions around ensuring effective compliance with the obligation in line with the protection of safety , security and privacy. during such regulatory dialogue , the commission should be able to consult with interested third parties in relation to the measures that the gatekeeper is expected to implement. the commission will nevertheless retain discretion in deciding when further specification should be provided. this would ensure that the regulatory dialogue is not used to circumvent the present regulation. furthermore , the regulatory dialogue is without prejudice to the powers of the commission to adopt a decision pursuant to articles 25 , 26 or 27. such decisions would be normally adopted when the gatekeeper acts in bad faith during the regulatory dialogue or in case of blatant non-compliance with an obligation. the possibility of a regulatory dialogue should facilitate compliance by gatekeepers and expedite the correct implementation of the regulation.


### (62) in order to ensure the full and lasting achievement of the objectives of this regulation , the commission should be able to assess whether a provider of core platform services should be designated as a gatekeeper without meeting the quantitative thresholds laid down in this regulation; whether systematic non-compliance by a gatekeeper warrants imposing additional remedies; and whether the list of obligations addressing unfair practices by gatekeepers should be reviewed and additional practices that are similarly unfair and limiting the contestability of digital markets should be identified. such assessment should be based on market investigations to be run in an appropriate timeframe , by using clear procedures and deadlines , in order to support the ex ante effect of this regulation on contestability and fairness in the digital sector , and to provide the requisite degree of legal certainty. ### (62) in order to ensure the full and lasting achievement of the objectives of this regulation , the commission should be able to assess whether a provider of core platform services should be designated as a gatekeeper without meeting the quantitative thresholds laid down in this regulation; whether systematic non-compliance by a gatekeeper warrants imposing additional remedies; and whether the list of obligations addressing unfair practices by gatekeepers should be reviewed and additional practices that are similarly unfair and limiting the contestability of digital markets should be identified. such assessment should be based on market investigations to be run in an appropriate timeframe , by using clear procedures and legally binding deadlines , in order to support the ex ante effect of this regulation on contestability and fairness in the digital sector , and to provide the requisite degree of legal certainty.


### (62) in order to ensure the full and lasting achievement of the objectives of this regulation , the commission should be able to assess whether a provider of core platform services should be designated as a gatekeeper without meeting the quantitative thresholds laid down in this regulation; whether systematic non-compliance by a gatekeeper warrants imposing additional remedies; and whether the list of obligations addressing unfair practices by gatekeepers should be reviewed and additional practices that are similarly unfair and limiting the contestability of digital markets should be identified. such assessment should be based on market investigations to be run in an appropriate timeframe , by using clear procedures and deadlines , in order to support the ex ante effect of this regulation on contestability and fairness in the digital sector , and to provide the requisite degree of legal certainty. ### (62) in order to ensure the full and lasting achievement of the objectives of this regulation , the commission should be able to assess whether a provider of core platform services should be designated as a gatekeeper without meeting the quantitative thresholds laid down in this regulation; whether systematic non-compliance by a gatekeeper warrants imposing additional remedies; and whether the list of obligations addressing unfair practices by gatekeepers should be reviewed and additional practices that are similarly unfair and limiting the contestability of digital markets should be identified; and whether the prior designation of gatekeepers or introduction of obligations has had a significant impact on business users , especially on small and medium-sized enterprises , or consumers. such assessment should be based on market investigations to be run in an appropriate timeframe , by using clear procedures and deadlines , in order to support the ex ante effect of this regulation on contestability and fairness in the digital sector , and to provide the requisite degree of legal certainty.


### (65) the services and practices in core platform services and markets in which these intervene can change quickly and to a significant extent. to ensure that this regulation remains up to date and constitutes an effective and holistic regulatory response to the problems posed by gatekeepers , it is important to provide for a regular review of the lists of core platform services as well as of the obligations provided for in this regulation. this is particularly important to ensure that behaviour that may limit the contestability of core platform services or is unfair is identified. while it is important to conduct a review on a regular basis , given the dynamically changing nature of the digital sector , in order to ensure legal certainty as to the regulatory conditions , any reviews should be conducted within a reasonable and appropriate time-frame. market investigations should also ensure that the commission has a solid evidentiary basis on which it can assess whether it should propose to amend this regulation in order to expand , or further detail , the lists of core platform services. they should equally ensure that the commission has a solid evidentiary basis on which it can assess whether it should propose to amend the obligations laid down in this regulation or whether it should adopt a delegated act updating such obligations. ### (65) the services and practices in core platform services and markets in which these intervene can change quickly and to a significant extent. the commission may soon need to assess whether new services such as voice-enabled services , should be added to the list of core platform services. to ensure that this regulation remains up to date and constitutes an effective and holistic regulatory response to the problems posed by gatekeepers , it is important to provide for a regular review of the lists of core platform services. while it is important to conduct a review on a regular basis , given the dynamically changing nature of the digital sector , in order to ensure legal certainty as to the regulatory conditions , any reviews should be conducted within a reasonable and appropriate time-frame. market investigations should also ensure that the commission has a solid evidentiary basis on which it can assess whether it should propose to amend this regulation in order to expand , or further detail , the lists of core platform services. they should equally ensure that the commission has a solid evidentiary basis on which it can assess whether it should propose to amend the obligations laid down in this regulation or whether it should adopt a delegated act updating such obligations.


### (72) the commission should be able to take the necessary actions to monitor the effective implementation and compliance with the obligations laid down in this regulation. such actions should include the ability of the commission to appoint independent external experts , such as and auditors to assist the commission in this process , including where applicable from competent independent authorities , such as data or consumer protection authorities. ### (72) the commission should be able to take the necessary actions to monitor the effective implementation and compliance with the obligations laid down in this regulation. such actions should include the ability of the commission to request the active cooperation of the european court of auditors , including where applicable from competent national authorities and independent authorities , such as data or consumer protection authorities.


### (72) the commission should be able to take the necessary actions to monitor the effective implementation and compliance with the obligations laid down in this regulation. such actions should include the ability of the commission to appoint independent external experts , such as and auditors to assist the commission in this process , including where applicable from competent independent authorities , such as data or consumer protection authorities. ### (72) the commission should be able to take the necessary actions to monitor the effective implementation and compliance with the obligations laid down in this regulation. such actions should include the ability of the commission to appoint independent external experts , such as auditors to assist the commission in this process , including where applicable from competent independent authorities , such as data or consumer protection authorities.


### (75) in the context of proceedings carried out under this regulation , the undertakings concerned should be accorded the right to be heard by the commission and the decisions taken should be widely publicised. while ensuring the rights to good administration and the rights of defence of the undertakings concerned , in particular , the right of access to the file and the right to be heard , it is essential that confidential information be protected. furthermore , while respecting the confidentiality of the information , the commission should ensure that any information relied on for the purpose of the decision is disclosed to an extent that allows the addressee of the decision to understand the facts and considerations that led up to the decision. finally , under certain conditions certain business records , such as communication between lawyers and their clients , may be considered confidential if the relevant conditions are met. ### (75) in the context of proceedings carried out under this regulation , the undertakings concerned should be accorded the right to be heard by the commission and the decisions taken should be widely publicised. while ensuring the rights to good administration and the rights of defence of the undertakings concerned , in particular , the right of access to the file and the right to be heard , it is essential that confidential and sensitive commercial information , which could affect the privacy of trade secrets , be protected. furthermore , while respecting the confidentiality of the information , the commission should ensure that any information relied on for the purpose of the decision is disclosed to an extent that allows the addressee of the decision to understand the facts and considerations that led up to the decision. finally , under certain conditions certain business records , such as communication between lawyers and their clients , may be considered confidential if the relevant conditions are met.


### (78) the commission should periodically evaluate this regulation and closely monitor its effects on the contestability and fairness of commercial relationships in the online platform economy , in particular with a view to determining the need for amendments in light of relevant technological or commercial developments. this evaluation should include the regular review of the list of core platform services and the obligations addressed to gatekeepers as well as enforcement of these , in view of ensuring that digital markets across the union are contestable and fair. in order to obtain a broad view of developments in the sector , the evaluation should take into account the experiences of member states and relevant stakeholders. the commission may in this regard also consider the opinions and reports presented to it by the observatory on the online platform economy that was first established by commission decision c(2018)2393 of 26 april 2018. following the evaluation , the commission should take appropriate measures. the commission should to maintain a high level of protection and respect for the common eu rights and values , particularly equality and non-discrimination , as an objective when conducting the assessments and reviews of the practices and obligations provided in this regulation. ### (78) the commission should periodically evaluate this regulation and closely monitor its effects on the contestability and fairness of commercial relationships in the online platform economy , in particular with a view to determining the need for amendments in light of relevant technological or commercial developments. this evaluation should include the regular review of the list of core platform services and the obligations addressed to gatekeepers as well as enforcement of these , in view of ensuring that digital markets across the union are contestable and fair. in order to obtain a broad view of developments in the sector , the evaluation should take into account the experiences of member states and relevant stakeholders. the commission may in this regard also consider the opinions and reports presented to it by the observatory on the online platform economy that was first established by commission decision c(2018)2393 of 26 april 2018 , by eurostat , and by the national statistics offices of the countries where the service providers operate. following the evaluation , the commission should take appropriate measures. the commission should to maintain a high level of protection and respect for the common eu rights and values , particularly equality and non-discrimination , as an objective when conducting the assessments and reviews of the practices and obligations provided in this regulation.


### (14) ‘ancillary service’ means services provided in the context of or together with core platform services , including payment services as defined in point 3 of article 4 and technical services which support the provision of payment services as defined in article 3(j) of directive (eu) 2015/2366 , fulfilment , identification or advertising services; ### (14) ‘ancillary service’ means services provided in the context of or together with core platform services , including payment services as defined in point 3 of article 4 and technical services which support the provision of payment services as defined in article 3(j) of directive (eu) 2015/2366 , fulfilment services , parcel delivery services , as defined in article 2(2) of regulation (eu) no 2018/644 , freight transport services and identification or advertising services;


### it operates a core platform service which serves as an important gateway for business users to reach end users; and ### it operates a core platform service which serves as an important gateway for business users to reach both active and end users; and


### it operates a core platform service which serves as an important gateway for business users to reach end users; and ### it operates a core platform service which serves as an important gateway for business users to reach end users or is able to lock the access to its own essential services; and


### it enjoys an entrenched and durable position in its operations or it is foreseeable that it will enjoy such a position in the near future. ### it enjoys an entrenched and durable position in its operations or it is foreseeable that it will enjoy such a position in the future.


### it enjoys an entrenched and durable position in its operations or it is foreseeable that it will enjoy such a position in the near future. ### it enjoys an entrenched and durable position in its operations or it is foreseeable that it will enjoy such a position.


### the requirement in paragraph 1 point (b) where it provides a core platform service that has more than 45 million monthly active end users established or located in the union and more than 10 000 yearly active business users established in the union in the last financial year; ### the requirement in paragraph 1 point (b) where it provides a core platform service that has more than 50 million monthly active users established or located in the union and more than 10 000 yearly active business users established in the union in the last financial year;


### 3. where a provider of core platform services meets all the thresholds in paragraph 2 , it shall notify the commission thereof within three months after those thresholds are satisfied and provide it with the relevant information identified in paragraph 2.. that notification shall include the relevant information identified in paragraph 2 for each of the core platform services of the provider that meets the thresholds in paragraph 2 point (b). the notification shall be updated whenever other core platform services individually meet the thresholds in paragraph 2 point (b). ### 3. where a provider of core platform services meets all the thresholds in paragraph 2 , it shall notify the commission thereof within three months after those thresholds are satisfied and provide it with the relevant information identified in paragraph 2.. that notification shall include the relevant information identified in paragraph 2 for each of the core platform services of the provider that meets the thresholds in paragraph 2 point (b). the notification shall be updated whenever other core platform services individually meet the thresholds in paragraph 2 point (b). following notification by a provider of core platform services , the commission shall take the decision to conduct a market investigation under article 15 within 60 days.


### 3. where a provider of core platform services meets all the thresholds in paragraph 2 , it shall notify the commission thereof within three months after those thresholds are satisfied and provide it with the relevant information identified in paragraph 2.. that notification shall include the relevant information identified in paragraph 2 for each of the core platform services of the provider that meets the thresholds in paragraph 2 point (b). the notification shall be updated whenever other core platform services individually meet the thresholds in paragraph 2 point (b). ### 3. where a provider of core platform services meets all the thresholds in paragraph 2 , it shall notify the commission thereof within one month after those thresholds are satisfied and provide it with the relevant information identified in paragraph 2.. that notification shall include the relevant information relating to the quantitative thresholds identified in paragraph 2 for each of the core platform services of the provider that meets the thresholds in paragraph 2 point (b). the notification shall be updated whenever other core platform services individually meet the thresholds in paragraph 2 point (b).


### a failure by a relevant provider of core platform services to notify the required information pursuant to this paragraph shall not prevent the commission from designating these providers as gatekeepers pursuant to paragraph 4 at any time. ### a failure by a relevant provider of core platform services to notify the required information pursuant to this paragraph shall not prevent the commission from designating these providers as gatekeepers pursuant to paragraph 4 at any time. the possibility for the commission to conduct a market investigation in the event of a failed notification by a provider of a core platform service shall not be subject to time limitation.


### a failure by a relevant provider of core platform services to notify the required information pursuant to this paragraph shall not prevent the commission from designating these providers as gatekeepers pursuant to paragraph 4 at any time. ### a failure by a relevant provider of core platform services to notify the required information pursuant to this paragraph shall not prevent the commission from designating these providers as gatekeepers pursuant to paragraph 4 at any time or adopting a decision pursuant to article 7(2).


### 6. the commission may identify as a gatekeeper , in accordance with the procedure laid down in article 15 , any provider of core platform services that meets each of the requirements of paragraph 1 , but does not satisfy each of the thresholds of paragraph 2 , or has presented sufficiently substantiated arguments in accordance with paragraph 4. ### 6. the commission shall identify as a gatekeeper , in accordance with the procedure laid down in article 15 , any provider of core platform services that meets each of the requirements of paragraph 1 , but does not satisfy each of the thresholds of paragraph 2 , or has not presented sufficiently substantiated arguments in accordance with paragraph 4.


### 6. the commission may identify as a gatekeeper , in accordance with the procedure laid down in article 15 , any provider of core platform services that meets each of the requirements of paragraph 1 , but does not satisfy each of the thresholds of paragraph 2 , or has presented sufficiently substantiated arguments in accordance with paragraph 4. ### 6. the commission may identify as a gatekeeper , in accordance with the procedure laid down in article 15 , any provider of core platform services that meets each of the requirements of paragraph 1 , but does not satisfy each of the thresholds of paragraph 2.


### other structural market characteristics. ### other structural market characteristics , such as the consistent growth of the platform’s core service market share in a given digital sector leading to a dominant market position over a three year timeframe.


### other structural market characteristics. ### other structural market characteristics such as the degree of multi-homing among business and end-users of the core platform services provided.


### other structural market characteristics. ### other relevant business or service characteristics , such as a corporate structure or vertical integration of the undertaking providing core platform services , for instance allowing cross subsidisation or combination of data from different sources or other structural market characteristics.


### where the provider of a core platform service that satisfies the quantitative thresholds of paragraph 2 fails to comply with the investigative measures ordered by the commission in a significant manner and the failure persists after the provider has been invited to comply within a reasonable time-limit and to submit observations , the commission shall be entitled to designate that provider as a gatekeeper. ### deleted


### where the provider of a core platform service that satisfies the quantitative thresholds of paragraph 2 fails to comply with the investigative measures ordered by the commission in a significant manner and the failure persists after the provider has been invited to comply within a reasonable time-limit and to submit observations , the commission shall be entitled to designate that provider as a gatekeeper. ### where the provider of a core platform service that satisfies the quantitative thresholds of paragraph 2 fails to comply with the investigative measures ordered by the commission pursuant to chapter v of this regulation in a significant manner and the failure persists after the provider has been invited to comply within a reasonable time-limit and to submit observations , the commission shall be entitled to designate that provider as a gatekeeper.


### where the provider of a core platform service that satisfies the quantitative thresholds of paragraph 2 fails to comply with the investigative measures ordered by the commission in a significant manner and the failure persists after the provider has been invited to comply within a reasonable time-limit and to submit observations , the commission shall be entitled to designate that provider as a gatekeeper. ### where the provider of a core platform service that satisfies the quantitative thresholds of paragraph 2 fails to comply with the investigative measures ordered by the commission in a significant manner within 2 months and the failure persists after the provider has been invited to comply within 3 months and to submit observations , the commission shall be entitled to designate that provider as a gatekeeper based on the facts available.


### where the provider of a core platform service that does not satisfy the quantitative thresholds of paragraph 2 fails to comply with the investigative measures ordered by the commission in a significant manner and the failure persists after the provider has been invited to comply within a reasonable time-limit and to submit observations , the commission shall be entitled to designate that provider as a gatekeeper based on facts available. ### deleted


### where the provider of a core platform service that does not satisfy the quantitative thresholds of paragraph 2 fails to comply with the investigative measures ordered by the commission in a significant manner and the failure persists after the provider has been invited to comply within a reasonable time-limit and to submit observations , the commission shall be entitled to designate that provider as a gatekeeper based on facts available. ### where the provider of a core platform service that does not satisfy the quantitative thresholds of paragraph 2 fails to comply with the investigative measures ordered by the commission pursuant to chapter v of this regulation in a significant manner and the failure persists after the provider has been invited to comply within a reasonable time-limit and to submit observations , the commission shall be entitled to designate that provider as a gatekeeper based on facts available.


### where the provider of a core platform service that does not satisfy the quantitative thresholds of paragraph 2 fails to comply with the investigative measures ordered by the commission in a significant manner and the failure persists after the provider has been invited to comply within a reasonable time-limit and to submit observations , the commission shall be entitled to designate that provider as a gatekeeper based on facts available. ### where the provider of a core platform service that does not satisfy the quantitative thresholds of paragraph 2 fails to comply with the investigative measures ordered by the commission in a significant manner and the failure persists after the provider has been invited to comply within 2 months and to submit observations , the commission shall be entitled to designate that provider as a gatekeeper based on facts available.


### refrain from requiring business users to use , offer or interoperate with an identification service of the gatekeeper in the context of services offered by the business users using the core platform services of that gatekeeper; ### refrain from requiring business users to use , offer or interoperate with an identification service , or any other ancillary service , of the gatekeeper itself or of third parties belonging to the same undertaking , in the context of services offered by the business users using the core platform services of that gatekeeper;


### refrain from requiring business users to use , offer or interoperate with an identification service of the gatekeeper in the context of services offered by the business users using the core platform services of that gatekeeper; ### refrain from requiring business users to use , offer or interoperate with any ancillary service as defined in points (14) and (15) of article 2 of the gatekeeper in the context of services offered by the business users using the core platform services of that gatekeeper;


### refrain from requiring business users to use , offer or interoperate with an identification service of the gatekeeper in the context of services offered by the business users using the core platform services of that gatekeeper; ### refrain from requiring business users to use , offer or interoperate with an identification service and a payment service , or a technical service supporting the provision of payment services of the gatekeeper in the context of services offered by the business users using the core platform services of that gatekeeper;


### 1. in respect of each of its core platform services identified pursuant to article 3(7) , a gatekeeper shall: ### 1. in respect of each of its core platform services identified pursuant to article 3(7) , and ancillary services , a gatekeeper shall:


### refrain from using , in competition with business users , any data not publicly available , which is generated through activities by those business users , including by the end users of these business users , of its core platform services or provided by those business users of its core platform services or by the end users of these business users; ### refrain from using , directly or through third parties belonging to the same undertaking , in competition with business users and with ancillary service providers , any data not publicly available , which is generated through activities by those business users , including by the end users of business users , of its core platform services or provided by the business users of its core platform services or by the end users of these business users;


### refrain from using , in competition with business users , any data not publicly available , which is generated through activities by those business users , including by the end users of these business users , of its core platform services or provided by those business users of its core platform services or by the end users of these business users; ### refrain from using , in competition with business users , any data exclusively in domain of core platform provider , which is generated through activities by those business users , including by the end users of these business users , of its core platform services or provided by those business users of its core platform services or by the end users of these business users;


### refrain from using , in competition with business users , any data not publicly available , which is generated through activities by those business users , including by the end users of these business users , of its core platform services or provided by those business users of its core platform services or by the end users of these business users; ### refrain from using , in competition with business users , any data not publicly available , which is generated through or in connection with activities by those business users , including by the end users of these business users , of its core platform services or of its ancillary services or which is provided by those business users of its core platform services or its ancillary services or by the end users of these business users;


### refrain from using , in competition with business users , any data not publicly available , which is generated through activities by those business users , including by the end users of these business users , of its core platform services or provided by those business users of its core platform services or by the end users of these business users; ### refrain from using , in competition with business users , any data not publicly available , which is generated through activities by those business users , including by the end users of these business users , of its core platform services or ancillary services provided by those business users of its core platform services or by the end users of these business users;


### refrain from treating more favourably in ranking services and products offered by the gatekeeper itself or by any third party belonging to the same undertaking compared to similar services or products of third party and apply fair and non-discriminatory conditions to such ranking; ### deleted


### refrain from treating more favourably in ranking services and products offered by the gatekeeper itself or by any third party belonging to the same undertaking compared to similar services or products of third party and apply fair and non-discriminatory conditions to such ranking; ### refrain from treating more favourably , including in ranking services - core platform and ancillary services - and products offered by the gatekeeper itself or by any third party belonging to the same undertaking compared to similar services or products of third party and apply fair and non-discriminatory conditions to such ranking;


### refrain from treating more favourably in ranking services and products offered by the gatekeeper itself or by any third party belonging to the same undertaking compared to similar services or products of third party and apply fair and non-discriminatory conditions to such ranking; ### refrain from user profiling and using exclusive data for treating more favourably in ranking services and products offered by the gatekeeper itself or by any third party belonging to the same undertaking compared to similar services or products of third party and apply fair and non-discriminatory conditions to such ranking; refrain from favouring it’s additional services or products offered by the gatekeeper or by an third party belonging to the same undertaking compared to similar services or products of third party and apply fair and non-discriminatory conditions to such offerings , and avoid the use of behavioural techniques and interface design with lack of transparency , inadequate information and lack of valid consent mechanisms in its ads personalisation tool;


### refrain from treating more favourably in ranking services and products offered by the gatekeeper itself or by any third party belonging to the same undertaking compared to similar services or products of third party and apply fair and non-discriminatory conditions to such ranking; ### refrain from treating differently or more favourably in ranking , display , installation , activation , or default settings , services and products offered by the gatekeeper itself or by any third party belonging to the same undertaking compared to similar services or products of third party and apply fair and non-discriminatory conditions to such ranking , display , installation , activation and default settings;


### refrain from treating more favourably in ranking services and products offered by the gatekeeper itself or by any third party belonging to the same undertaking compared to similar services or products of third party and apply fair and non-discriminatory conditions to such ranking; ### refrain from treating more favourably in ranking services and products offered by the gatekeeper itself or by any third party belonging to the same undertaking compared to similar services or products of third party and apply fair and non-discriminatory conditions to such ranking , including display;


### refrain from treating more favourably in ranking services and products offered by the gatekeeper itself or by any third party belonging to the same undertaking compared to similar services or products of third party and apply fair and non-discriminatory conditions to such ranking; ### refrain from embedding or treating more favourably in ranking services and products offered by the gatekeeper itself or by any third party compared to similar services or products of third party and apply fair and non-discriminatory conditions to such ranking;


### refrain from treating more favourably in ranking services and products offered by the gatekeeper itself or by any third party belonging to the same undertaking compared to similar services or products of third party and apply fair and non-discriminatory conditions to such ranking; ### refrain from treating differently or more favourably in ranking , display , installation , activation , or default settings , services and products offered by the gatekeeper itself or by any third party belonging to the same undertaking compared to similar services or products of third party and apply fair and non-discriminatory conditions to such ranking , display ,installation , activation and default settings;


### refrain from technically restricting the ability of end users to switch between and subscribe to different software applications and services to be accessed using the operating system of the gatekeeper , including as regards the choice of internet access provider for end users; ### refrain from technically restricting the ability of end users to install , effectively use , switch between and subscribe to different software applications and services from third parties to be accessed using the operating system of the gatekeeper , including as regards the choice of internet access provider for end users;


### refrain from technically restricting the ability of end users to switch between and subscribe to different software applications and services to be accessed using the operating system of the gatekeeper , including as regards the choice of internet access provider for end users; ### refrain from technically restricting the ability of end users to switch between and subscribe to different software applications and services to be accessed using the operating system or the cloud computing services of the gatekeeper , including as regards the choice of internet access provider for end users or using its virtual assistant;


### refrain from technically restricting the ability of end users to switch between and subscribe to different software applications and services to be accessed using the operating system of the gatekeeper , including as regards the choice of internet access provider for end users; ### refrain from technically restricting the ability of end users to switch between and subscribe to different software applications and services to be accessed using the operating system or the cloud computing services of the gatekeeper , including as regards the choice of internet access service provider for end users , or using its virtual assistant;


### allow business users and providers of ancillary services access to and interoperability with the same operating system , hardware or software features that are available or used in the provision by the gatekeeper of any ancillary services; ### allow business users , end users and providers of ancillary services access to and interoperability with the same operating system , hardware or software features , including near-field communication antennas or technology related to these antennas , that are available or used in the provision by the gatekeeper of any ancillary services or industry-standard features of its core platform services; in such cases , access and interoperability conditions shall be fair , reasonable and non-discriminatory;


### allow business users and providers of ancillary services access to and interoperability with the same operating system , hardware or software features that are available or used in the provision by the gatekeeper of any ancillary services; ### allow business users and providers of ancillary services equivalent access to and interoperability with the operating system , hardware features and related software features that are available or used in the provision by the gatekeeper of any ancillary services; such measures shall not jeopardise measures by the gatekeeper designed primarily to ensure user safety and data protection;


### allow business users and providers of ancillary services access to and interoperability with the same operating system , hardware or software features that are available or used in the provision by the gatekeeper of any ancillary services; ### provide business users and providers of ancillary services access under fair and equal conditions to and interoperability with the same operating system , hardware or software features that are available or used in the provision by the gatekeeper , directly or through a partnership agreement , of any ancillary services and any core platform service , where such access or interoperability is necessary to provide ancillary services to the core platform service of the gatekeeper;


### allow business users and providers of ancillary services access to and interoperability with the same operating system , hardware or software features that are available or used in the provision by the gatekeeper of any ancillary services; ### allow business users and providers of ancillary services access to and interoperability with the same operating system , hardware or software or other features , including near-field-communication antennas or technology related to those antennas , that are available or used in the provision of any ancillary services or industry-standard features of its core platform services; in such cases , access and interoperability conditions shall be fair , reasonable and non-discriminatory. the gatekeeper shall not be prevented from taking in dispensable measures to ensure that third party ancillary services do not endanger or compromise the integrity of the operating system , hardware or software features provided by the gatekeeper , provided that such indispensable measures are duly justified by the gatekeeper , while providing free of charge alternative access and interoperability to enable effective provision of ancillary services;


### provide business users , or third parties authorised by a business user , free of charge , with effective , high-quality , continuous and real-time access and use of aggregated or non-aggregated data , that is provided for or generated in the context of the use of the relevant core platform services by those business users and the end users engaging with the products or services provided by those business users; for personal data , provide access and use only where directly connected with the use effectuated by the end user in respect of the products or services offered by the relevant business user through the relevant core platform service , and when the end user opts in to such sharing with a consent in the sense of the regulation (eu) 2016/679; ; ### provide business users , or third parties authorised by a business user , free of charge , with effective , high-quality , continuous and real-time access and use of aggregated and non-aggregated data , that is provided for or generated in the context of the use of the relevant core platform services by those business users and the end users engaging with the products or services provided by those business users; for personal data , provide access and use only where directly connected with the use effectuated by the end user in respect of the products or services offered by the relevant business user through the relevant core platform service , and when the end user opts in to such sharing with a consent in the sense of the regulation (eu) 2016/679; ;


### provide business users , or third parties authorised by a business user , free of charge , with effective , high-quality , continuous and real-time access and use of aggregated or non-aggregated data , that is provided for or generated in the context of the use of the relevant core platform services by those business users and the end users engaging with the products or services provided by those business users; for personal data , provide access and use only where directly connected with the use effectuated by the end user in respect of the products or services offered by the relevant business user through the relevant core platform service , and when the end user opts in to such sharing with a consent in the sense of the regulation (eu) 2016/679; ; ### provide business users , or third parties authorised by a business user , free of charge , with effective , high-quality , continuous and real-time access and use of aggregated or non-aggregated data , that is provided for or generated in the context of the use of the relevant core platform services by those business users and the end users engaging with the products or services provided by those business users; for personal data , provide access and use only where directly connected with the use effectuated by the end user in respect of the products or services offered by the relevant business user through the relevant core platform service , and when the end user opts in to such sharing with a consent , presented in an explicit , user-friendly , clear and straightforward manner in the sense of the regulation (eu) 2016/679; shall ensure that the functionalities forgiving information and offering of the opportunity to grant consent are as user-friendly as possible;