### k. whereas nominal corporate tax rates have decreased at eu level from an average of 32 % in 2000 to 21 ,7 % in 201919 , which represents a decrease of 32 %; whereas this decrease can have implications on the sustainability of tax systems and potential spill over effects on other countries; ### k. whereas nominal corporate tax rates have decreased at eu level from an average of 32 % in 2000 to 21 ,7 % in 201919 , which represents a decrease of 32 %; whereas this decrease can have implications on the sustainability of eu welfare states and potential spill over effects on other countries;


### m. whereas there has been a gradual shift from tangible production to intangible assets in the value chains of mnes , as reflected in the relative rates of growth over the last five years of royalties and licensing fee receipts (almost 5 % annually) compared with trade in goods and foreign direct investment (fdi) (less than 1 % annually); whereas mnes pay almost no taxes in some member states despite their significant digital presence and large revenues in those member states; ### m. whereas there has been a gradual shift from tangible production to intangible assets in the value chains of mnes , as reflected in the relative rates of growth over the last five years of royalties and licensing fee receipts (almost 5 % annually) compared with trade in goods and foreign direct investment (fdi) (less than 1 % annually); whereas some mnes pay almost no taxes in some member states despite their significant digital presence and large revenues in those member states;


### 5. deplores that eu member states were not able to agree on a joint approach regarding dst; ### 5. recognises that thus far eu member states have been unable to find a proportionate and fair approach regarding dst; regrets that the dst proposal would disproportionately impact small or export led economies;


### 9. highlights the specificities of the single market which provides for the free movement of goods and services and therefore considers that any international corporate tax reform should ensure a smooth running of the single market , notably by safeguarding a level playing field for all firms , including paying a fair share of where the actual substantive and genuine economic activity and value creation take place; ### 9. highlights the specificities of the single market which provides for the free movement of goods and services and therefore considers that any international corporate tax reform should ensure a smooth running of the single market , notably by safeguarding a level playing field for all firms , including paying a fair share of where the actual substantive and genuine economic activity and value creation take place; considers that the access to the single market , which provides for one the largest pool of consumers in the world , goes hand in hand with tax responsibility;


### 14. welcomes the idea to develop a new nexus that goes beyond the concept of having a physical presence in a country to include a taxpayer into a scope , considers that the nexus should be designed in order to include firms with an active engagement and interaction with customers and users , also by digital means; ### 14. welcomes the idea of developing a new nexus that goes beyond the concept of having a physical presence in a country to include a taxpayer into a scope , considers that the nexus should be designed in order to include firms with an active engagement and interaction with customers and users , also by digital means;


### 17. welcomes the idea to develop a new allocation of taxing rights that goes beyond the arm’s length principle (alp) and that will allocate new taxation rights to market jurisdictions; ### 17. welcomes the idea to develop a new allocation of taxing rights that builds upon the arm’s length principle (alp) and that will allocate new taxation rights to market jurisdictions;


### 19. would therefore rather invite member states to push for a solution that would favour fractional apportionment , based on factors representing the value creation , such as sales , employees , assets and users; in that regard , recalls therefore its position on the c(c)ctb and sdp proposals; ### deleted


### 28. calls upon the commission and member states to agree on a joint , ambitious eu position in the oecd negotiations , ensuring that the eu speaks with one voice and leads by example to ensure a fairer allocation of taxing rights and a minimum level of effective taxation; ### 28. calls upon the commission and member states to agree on a joint , ambitious eu position in the oecd negotiations , ensuring that the eu speaks with one voice and leads by example to ensure a fairer allocation of taxing rights;


### 30. strongly encourages the commission and the member states to achieve a deal at international level which would then be transposed at eu level through relevant eu and national legislations; likewise supports the commitment of the commission president-elect to propose an eu solution , should an international deal not be reached by the end of 2020; ### 30. strongly encourages the commission and the member states to achieve a deal at international level which would then be transposed at eu level through relevant eu and national legislations; raises concern that to pursue an eu solution without the support of the oecd could risk putting the eu at a competitive disadvantage as well as exacerbating current international trade tensions;


### 31. invites the council , with the support of the commission , to update the criteria of the eu list of non-cooperative jurisdictions for tax purposes once the international rules and/or the eu newly agreed reforms have been adopted , and notably the eu listing criteria on fair taxation; ### deleted


### — having regard to its resolution of 23 november 2016 on the finalisation of basel iii2 , ### — having regard to its resolution of 23 november 2016 on the finalisation of basel iii2 , and the conclusion of the ecofin council of 12 july 2016 noting that the reform package would not be expected to result in a significant increase of eu capital ,


### — having regard to the european banking authority (eba) report of december 2018 entitled ‘risk assessment of the european banking system’5 ; ### — having regard to the european banking authority (eba) report of november 2019 entitled ‘risk assessment of the european banking system5 ,


### b. whereas the banking union remains incomplete as long as it lacks a backstop for the single resolution fund (srf) and a european deposit insurance scheme (edis); ### b. whereas the banking union remains incomplete as long as it lacks a backstop for the single resolution fund (srf) and a european deposit insurance scheme (edis) as the third pillar of the banking union;


### c. whereas entrusting the ecb with the supervision of systemically important financial institutions has proven to be successful; ### c. whereas entrusting the ecb with the supervision of systemically important financial institutions has proven to be successful; whereas the ecb can exercise , where necessary , supervisory tasks in relation to all credit institutions authorised in , and branches established in , participating member states;


### 1. market data contributors shall , with regard to shares , etfs and bonds that are traded on a trading venue , and with regard to otc derivatives as defined in article 2(7) of regulation (eu) no 648/2012 that are subject to the clearing obligation as referred to in article 4 of that regulation , provide the ctp with all the market data as set out in article 22b(2) as needed for the ctp to be operational. those market data shall be provided in a harmonised format , through a high quality transmission protocol , and as close to real-time as is technically possible. ### 1. market data contributors shall , with regard to bonds provide the ctp with all the market data as set out in article 22b(2) as needed for the ctp to be operational. those market data shall be provided in a harmonised format , through a high quality transmission protocol , and as no later than one minute after the transaction by all trading venues.


### 1. the commission shall set up an expert stakeholder group by [op add 3 months as of entry into force] to provide advice on the quality and the substance of market data , the common interpretation of market data and the quality of the transmission protocol referred to in article 22a(1). the expert stakeholder group shall provide advice on a yearly basis. that advice shall be made public. ### 1. the commission shall set up an expert stakeholder group by [op add 3 months as of entry into force] to provide advice on the quality and the substance of market data , the common interpretation of market data and the quality of the transmission protocol referred to in article 22a(1). esma should work closely with the expert stakeholder group which shall provide advice on a yearly basis. that advice shall be made public.


### 2. the commission shall be empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with article 50 to specify the quality and the substance of the market data and the quality of the transmission protocol. ### 2. esma should develop draft regulatory standards.


### those delegated acts shall in particular specify all of the following: ### those regulatory technical standards shall in particular specify all of the following:


### 1. investment firms shall keep at the disposal of the competent authority , for five years , the relevant data relating to all orders and all transactions in financial instruments which they have carried out , whether on own account or on behalf of a client. in the case of transactions carried out on behalf of clients , the records shall contain all the information and details of the identity of the client , and the information required under directive 2005/60/ec of the european parliament and of the council (). esma may request access to that information in accordance with the procedure and under the conditions set out in article 35 of regulation (eu) no 1095/2010. ### (11 a) in article 25 , paragraph 1 is replaced by the following: ‘1. member states shall require investment firms to ensure and demonstrate to competent authorities on request that natural persons giving investment advice or information about financial instruments , investment services or ancillary services to clients on behalf of the investment firm possess the necessary knowledge and competence , including in the field of sustainability preferences of clients , to fulfil their obligations under article 24 and this article. member states shall publish the criteria to be used for assessing such knowledge and competence.


### article 27da ### article 27da


### 1. by [op insert date 3 months as of entry into force] , esma shall organise a selection procedure for the appointment of the ctp for a five year term. esma shall organise a separate selection procedure for each of the following asset classes: shares , exchange traded funds , bonds and derivatives (or relevant subclasses of derivatives). ### 1. by [op insert date 3 months as of entry into force] , esma shall organise a selection procedure for the appointment of the ctp for a term deemed appropriate keeping in mind the set-up costs which will be incurred by the ctp. esma should organise a separate selection procedure for bonds


### 2. for each of the asset classes referred to in paragraph 1 , esma shall assess the applications on the basis of the following criteria: ### 2. for bonds referred to in paragraph 1 , esma shall assess the applications on the basis of the following criteria:


### 3. the first selection procedure organised for shares shall only invite bids for the provision of a consolidated tape containing post trade data. prior to subsequent selection procedures , esma shall assess market demand and revenue impacts on regulated markets and based on that assessment , report to the commission on the opportunity of adding best bids and offers and corresponding volumes to the tape. based on that report and on the experience gained further to the first selection procedure , the commission is empowered to adopt a delegated act specifying the appropriate level of pre-trade data to be contributed to the ctp. ### 3. the first selection procedure organised shall only invite bids for the provision of a consolidated tape containing one minute delayed post trade data. prior to subsequent selection procedures , esma shall assess market demand and revenue impacts on regulated markets and based on that assessment , report to the commission on the opportunity of adding best bids and offers and corresponding volumes to the tape as well as on the possible improvement to the tape , including on the speed of publication. based on that report and on the experience gained further to the first selection procedure , the commission is empowered to adopt a delegated act specifying measures for improving the data tape.


### 4. the selection of the ctp for shares shall , in addition to the criteria in paragraph 2 , consider the revenue participation scheme , and in particular the formula , applicable to regulated markets that are market data contributors. esma shall , when considering the competing tenders , select the ctp for shares that offers the revenue participation scheme that provides regulated markets , in particular smaller regulated markets , with the highest amount of revenue that remains for distribution once deducted operating costs and a reasonable margin. this revenue shall be distributed in accordance with article 27h(1)(c) , and in a manner commensurate to the market data contributed according to article 22a. ### 4. the selection of the ctp for bonds shall , in addition to the criteria in paragraph 2 , consider the revenue participation scheme , and in particular the formula , applicable to regulated markets that are market data contributors. esma shall , when considering the competing tenders , select the ctp for bonds that offers the revenue participation scheme that provides regulated markets , in particular smaller regulated markets , with the highest amount of revenue that remains for distribution once deducted operating costs and a small incentivising margin which is deemed appropriate and reasonable. this revenue shall be distributed in accordance with article 27h(1)(c) , and in a manner commensurate to the market data contributed according to article 22a.


### 5. esma shall adopt a fully reasoned decision selecting and authorising the entities operating the consolidated tapes within 3 months as of initiation of the selection procedure referred to in paragraph 2. such reasoned decision shall specify the conditions under which the ctps shall operate , and in particular the level of fees referred to in paragraph 2 , point (g) and for shares the level of the participation referred to in paragraph 3 , in particular for smaller regulated markets. ### 5. esma should adopt a fully reasoned decision selecting and authorising the entities operating the consolidated tapes within 3 months as of initiation of the selection procedure referred to in paragraph 2. such reasoned decision shall specify the conditions under which the ctps shall operate , and in particular the level of fees referred to in paragraph 2 , point (g) and for bonds the level of the participation referred to in paragraph 3 , in particular for smaller regulated markets.


### in the case of market data concerning shares , redistribute part of their revenues for the purposes of covering the cost related to mandatory contribution and of ensuring a fair level of participation for regulated markets , and in particular smaller regulated markets , in the revenue generated by the consolidated tape , in accordance with article 27da(4); ### in the case of market data , redistribute part of their revenues for the purposes of covering the cost related to mandatory contribution and of ensuring a reasonable level of participation for regulated markets , and in particular smaller regulated markets , in the revenue generated by the consolidated tape , in accordance with article 27da(4);


### make consolidated core market data , for the provision of which the ctp is selected in accordance with article 27da , available in accordance with the data quality requirements set out in article 22b to users into a continuous electronic data stream on non-discriminatory terms as close to real time as technically possible; ### make consolidated core market data , for the provision of which the ctp is selected in accordance with article 27da , available in accordance with the data quality requirements set out in article 22b to users into a continuous electronic data stream on non-discriminatory terms no later than one minute after the transaction;


### for the purpose of establishing the participation in point (c) , the revenue of the ctp shall be allocated among regulated markets according to a formula that reflects the proportion of pre-trade transparent liquidity in shares displayed by a regulated market relative to the average daily turnover in these shares in the union. ### for the purpose of establishing the revenue redistribution in point (c) , the revenue of the ctp shall be allocated among regulated markets according to a formula that reflects the proportion of core market data provided while taking into account the ratio of market data revenue to the overall revenue within the legal group structure.


### 4. after 12 months of full operation of the ctp for shares , esma shall provide the commission with a motivated opinion on the effectiveness and fairness of the level of participation of regulated markets in the revenues generated by the ctp as set out in accordance with the second subparagraph of paragraph 1. the commission may request esma to provide further opinions , where necessary or appropriate. the commission shall be empowered to adopt a delegated act in accordance with article 50 to revise the allocation key for the revenue redistribution , where appropriate.; ### 4. after 12 months of full operation of the ctp for bonds , esma shall provide the commission with an evaluation on the effectiveness and fairness of the level of participation of regulated markets in the revenues generated by the ctp as set out in accordance with the second subparagraph of paragraph 1. the commission may request esma to provide further assessments , where necessary or appropriate. the commission shall be empowered to adopt a delegated act in accordance with article 50 to revise the allocation key for the revenue redistribution , where appropriate.;


### (26) the following article 39a is inserted: ### deleted


### proposal for a ### proposal for a


### (4) to date , however , no supervised entity has applied for authorisation to act as a ctp. esma has identified three main obstacles that have prevented supervised entities to apply for registration as a ctp33 . first , a lack of clarity as to how the ctp is to procure market data from the various execution venues or from the data reporting service providers concerned. second , insufficient quality in terms of harmonisation of the data reported by those execution venues to allow for a cost-efficient consolidation. third , a lack of commercial incentives to apply for authorisation as a ctp. it is therefore necessary to remove those obstacles. such removal requires , first , that all trading venues and systematic internalisers (‘sis’) provide ctps with market data (provision rule). it secondly requires an improvement of the data quality by harmonising the data reports that trading venues and sis should submit to the ctp. ### (4) to date , however , no supervised entity has applied for authorisation to act as a ctp. esma has identified three main obstacles that have prevented supervised entities to apply for registration as a ctp33 . first , a lack of clarity as to how the ctp is to procure market data from the various execution venues or from the data reporting service providers concerned. second , insufficient quality in terms of harmonisation of the data reported by those execution venues to allow for a cost-efficient consolidation. third , a lack of commercial incentives to apply for authorisation as a ctp. it is therefore necessary to remove those obstacles. such removal requires , first , that all trading venues and systematic internalisers (‘sis’) provide ctps with market data (provision rule). it secondly requires an improvement of the data quality by harmonising the data reports that trading venues and sis should submit to the ctp. it thirdly requires as close to real time as it is technically possible pre- and post trade information for shares , and as close to real time as it is technically possible post trade information for bonds.


### (6) article 4 of regulation (eu) no 600/2014 allows competent authorities to waive the pre-trade transparency requirements for market operators and investment firms operating a trading venue who determine their prices by reference to the midpoint price of the primary market or the most relevant market in terms of liquidity. as there is no justification for excluding the smallest orders from a transparent order book and in order to increase pre-trade transparency and thereby reinforce the price formation process , that waiver should be applicable to orders with a size greater than or equal to twice the standard market size. where the consolidated tape for shares and exchange-traded funds (etfs) will provide bid and offer prices from which a midpoint can be derived , the reference price waiver should also be available for systems deriving the midpoint price from the consolidated tape. ### (6) article 4 of regulation (eu) no 600/2014 allows competent authorities to waive the pre-trade transparency requirements for market operators and investment firms operating a trading venue who determine their prices by reference to the midpoint price of the primary market or the most relevant market in terms of liquidity. as there is no justification for excluding the smallest orders from a transparent order book and in order to increase pre-trade transparency and thereby reinforce the price formation process , that waiver should be applicable to orders with a size of a minimum at twice the standard market size. further clarifications should be provided by esma. where the consolidated tape for shares and exchange-traded funds (etfs) will provide bid and offer prices from which a midpoint can be derived , the reference price waiver should also be available for systems deriving the midpoint price from the consolidated tape.


### (7) dark trading is trading without pre-trade transparency , using the reference price waiver laid down in article 4(1) , point (a) of regulation (eu) no 600/2014 and the negotiated trade waiver laid down in article 4(a) point (a) , point (i) of that regulation. the use of both waivers is capped by the double volume cap (‘dvc’). the dvc is a mechanism that limits the level of dark trading to a certain proportion of total trading in an equity instrument. the amount of dark trading in an equity instrument on an individual venue may not exceed 4% of total trading in that instrument in the union. when this threshold is breached , dark trading in that instrument on that venue is suspended. secondly the amount of dark trading in an equity instrument in the union may not exceed 8% of total trading in that instrument in the union. when this threshold is breached all dark trading in that instrument is suspended. the venue specific threshold leaves room for continued use of those waivers on other platforms on which trading in that equity instrument is not yet suspended , until the union wide threshold is breached. this causes complexity in terms of monitoring the levels of dark trading and of enforcing the suspension. to simplify the double volume cap while keeping its effectiveness , the new single volume cap should rely solely on the eu-wide threshold. that threshold should be lowered to 7 % to compensate for a potential increase of trading under those waivers as a consequence of abolishing the venue specific threshold. ### (7) dark trading is trading without pre-trade transparency , using the reference price waiver laid down in article 4(1) , point (a) of regulation (eu) no 600/2014 and the negotiated trade waiver laid down in article 4(a) point (a) , point (i) of that regulation. the use of both waivers is capped by the double volume cap (‘dvc’). the dvc is a mechanism that limits the level of dark trading to a certain proportion of total trading in an equity instrument. the amount of dark trading in an equity instrument on an individual venue may not exceed 4% of total trading in that instrument in the union. when this threshold is breached , dark trading in that instrument on that venue is suspended. secondly the amount of dark trading in an equity instrument in the union may not exceed 8% of total trading in that instrument in the union. when this threshold is breached all dark trading in that instrument is suspended. the venue specific threshold leaves room for continued use of those waivers on other platforms on which trading in that equity instrument is not yet suspended , until the union wide threshold is breached. this causes complexity in terms of monitoring the levels of dark trading and of enforcing the suspension. to simplify the double volume cap while keeping its effectiveness , the new single volume cap should rely solely on the eu-wide threshold. that threshold should be lowered to 7 % to compensate for a potential increase of trading under those waivers as a consequence of abolishing the venue specific threshold. esma should be empowered to determine the dvc based on market conditions , the price formation process and liquidity available in the market.


### (9) to ensure an adequate level of transparency , the price of a non-equity transaction should be published as close to real time as possible and only be delayed until maximally the end of the trading day. however , in order not to expose liquidity providers in non-equity instruments to undue risk , it should be possible to mask volumes of transactions for a short period of time , which should not be longer than two weeks. the exact calibration of the various buckets corresponding to different time deferrals should be left to esma due to the technical expertise required to specify the calibration as well as due to the need to allow for the flexibility to amend the calibration. those deferrals should be based on the liquidity of the non-equity instrument , the size of the transaction and , for bonds , the credit rating and it should no longer include the size specific to the instrument concerned. ### (9) to ensure an adequate level of transparency , the price and the volume of a non-equity transaction should be published as close to real time as possible and only be delayed until maximally the end-of-second-day trading. however , in order not to expose liquidity providers in non-equity instruments to undue risk , it should be possible to mask volumes of transactions for a short period of time , which should not be longer than four weeks. the exact calibration of the various buckets corresponding to different time deferrals should be left to esma due to the technical expertise required to specify the calibration as well as due to the need to allow for the flexibility to amend the calibration. those deferrals should be based on the liquidity of the non-equity instrument , the size of the transaction and , for bonds , the credit rating and it should no longer include the size specific to the instrument concerned.


### (10) article 13 of regulation (eu) no 600/2014 requires market operators and investment firms operating a trading venue to make the pre-trade and post-trade information on transactions in financial instruments available to the public on a reasonable commercial basis (‘rcb’) , and to ensure non-discriminatory access to that information. that article has , however , not delivered on its objectives. the information provided by trading venues , apas and systematic internalisers on a reasonable commercial basis does not enable users to understand market data policies and how the price for market data is set. esma issued guidelines explaining how the concept of rcb should be applied. these guidelines should be converted to legal obligations. due to the high level of detail required to specify rcb and the required flexibility in amending the applicable rules based on the fast changing data landscape , esma should be empowered to develop draft regulatory technical standards specifying how rcb should be applied , thereby further strengthening the harmonised and consistent application of article 13 of regulation (eu) no 600/2014. ### (10) article 13 of regulation (eu) no 600/2014 requires market operators and investment firms operating a trading venue to make the pre-trade and post-trade information on transactions in financial instruments available to the public on a reasonable commercial basis (‘rcb’) , and to ensure non-discriminatory access to that information. that article has , however , not delivered on its objectives. the information provided by trading venues , apas and systematic internalisers on a reasonable commercial basis does not enable users to understand market data policies and how the price for market data is set. esma issued guidelines explaining how the concept of rcb should be applied. these guidelines should be converted to legal obligations. due to the high level of detail required to specify rcb and the required flexibility in amending the applicable rules based on the fast changing data landscape , esma should be empowered to develop draft regulatory technical standards specifying how rcb should be applied , thereby ensuring a harmonised and consistent application of article 13 of regulation (eu) no 600/2014. furthermore , the provision to provide market data on the basis of costs of producing and disseminating the market data (article 85 of cdr 2017/565 and article 7 of cdr 2017/567) is moved to the level 1 text. such move would allow to further specify the general principle via level 2 measures bearing in mind that the market data is a by-product of the trading activity. additionally , there is added a requirement in the level 1 text for trading venues , apas , sis and ctps to share information on the actual costs for producing and disseminating market data as well as on the margins included with cas and esma combined with an empowerment of esma to develop draft regulatory technical standards specifying the content , format and terminology of such information.


### (11) in order to reinforce the price formation process and to maintain a level playing field between trading venues and systematic internalisers , article 14 of regulation (eu) no 600/2014 requires systematic internalisers to make public all quotes in equity instruments placed by that systematic internaliser below the standard market size. systematic internalisers are free to decide which sizes they quote , as long as they quote at a minimum size of 10% of the standard market size. that possibility , however , has led to very low levels of pre-trade transparency provided by systematic internalisers in equity instruments , and has hampered the achievement of a level playing field. it is therefore necessary to require systematic internalisers to publish firm quotes relating to a minimum of twice the standard market size. ### (11) in order to reinforce the price formation process and to maintain a level playing field between trading venues and systematic internalisers , article 14 of regulation (eu) no 600/2014 requires systematic internalisers to make public all quotes in equity instruments placed by that systematic internaliser below the standard market size. systematic internalisers are free to decide which sizes they quote , as long as they quote at a minimum size of 10% of the standard market size. that possibility , however , has led to very low levels of pre-trade transparency provided by systematic internalisers in equity instruments , and has hampered the achievement of a level playing field. it is therefore necessary to require systematic internalisers to publish firm quotes relating to a minimum of twice the standard market size. esma should be empowered to determine the threshold in accordance with article 4(6) point f.


### (12) in order to create a level playing field , in addition to the obligation to publish firm quotes relating to a minimum of twice the standard market size , systematic internalisers should also no longer be allowed to match at midpoint below twice the standard market size. it should furthermore be clarified that systematic internalisers should be allowed to match at midpoint in so far as they comply with the tick-size rules in accordance with article 49 of directive 2014/65/eu when they trade above twice the standard market size but below the large in-scale threshold. when systematic internalisers trade above a large in-scale threshold , they should continue to be allowed to match at midpoint without complying with the tick-size regime. ### (12) in order to create a level playing field , in addition to the obligation to publish firm quotes relating to a minimum of twice the standard market size , systematic internalisers should not be allowed to match at midpoint below twice the standard market size. it should furthermore be clarified that systematic internalisers should be allowed to match at midpoint in so far as they comply with the tick-size rules in accordance with article 49 of directive 2014/65/eu when they trade above twice the standard market size but below the large in-scale threshold. when systematic internalisers trade above a large in-scale threshold , they should continue to be allowed to match at midpoint without complying with the tick-size regime. in order to clarify , esma should be empowered to determine the size appropriate for the market conditions.


### (13) market participants need core market data to be able to make informed investment decisions. pursuant to the current article 27h of regulation (eu) 600/2014 , sourcing core market data about certain financial instruments directly from trading venues and apas requires that consolidated tape providers enter into separate licensing agreements with all those data contributors. that process is burdensome , costly and time consuming. it has been one of the obstacles to consolidated tape providers emerging on a cross market basis. this obstacle should be removed in order to enable consolidated tape providers to obtain the market data and to overcome licencing issues. trading venues and apas , or investment firms and systematic internalisers without intervention of apas (‘market data contributors’) should be required to submit their market data to consolidated tape providers , and to use harmonised templates respecting high–quality data standards to do so. only ctps selected and authorised by esma should be able to collect harmonised market data from the individual data sources in accordance with the mandatory contribution rule. to make the market data useful for investors , market data contributors should be required to provide the ctp with market data as close as technically possible to real time. ### (13) market participants need core market data to be able to make informed investment decisions. pursuant to the current article 27h of regulation (eu) 600/2014 , sourcing core market data about certain financial instruments directly from trading venues and apas requires that consolidated tape providers enter into separate licensing agreements with all those data contributors. that process is burdensome , costly and time consuming. it has been one of the obstacles to consolidated tape providers emerging on a cross market basis. this obstacle should be removed in order to enable consolidated tape providers to obtain the market data and to overcome licencing issues. trading venues and apas , or investment firms and systematic internalisers without intervention of apas (‘market data contributors’) should be required to submit their market data to consolidated tape providers , and to use harmonised templates respecting high–quality data standards to do so. only ctps selected and authorised by esma should be able to collect harmonised market data from the individual data sources in accordance with the mandatory contribution rule. to make the market data useful for investors , market data contributors should be required to provide the ctp with market data no later than one minute after the transaction


### (14) title ii and iii of regulation (eu) 600/2014 require trading venues , apas , investment firms and systematic internalisers (‘market data contributors’) to publish pre-trade data on financial instruments , including bid and offer prices and post-trade data on transactions , including the price and volume at which a transaction in a specific instrument has been concluded. market participants are not obliged to use the consolidated core market data provided by the ctp. the requirement to publish those pre-trade and post-trade data should therefore remain applicable to enable market participants to access market data. however , to avoid undue burden on market data contributors , it is appropriate to align the requirement for market data contributors to publish data as much as possible with the requirement to contribute data to the ctp. ### (14) title ii and iii of regulation (eu) 600/2014 require trading venues , apas , investment firms and systematic internalisers (‘market data contributors’) to publish pre-trade data on financial instruments , including bid and offer prices and post-trade data on transactions , including the price and volume at which a transaction in a specific instrument has been concluded. market participants are not obliged to use the consolidated core market data provided by the ctp. the requirement to publish those pre-trade and post-trade data should therefore remain applicable to enable market participants to access market data. however , to avoid undue burden on market data contributors , it is appropriate to align the requirement for market data contributors to publish data as much as possible with the requirement to contribute data to the ctp , which will require only post-trade data.


### (20) competition among consolidated tape providers ensures that the consolidated tape is provided in the most efficient way and under the best conditions for users. however , no entity has , up until now , applied to act as a consolidated tape provider. it is therefore considered appropriate to empower esma to periodically organise a competitive selection procedure to select a single entity which is able to provide the consolidated tape for each specified asset class. taking into account the novelty of the proposed scheme , esma should only mandate the provision of post-trade transparency data for the first selection procedure that it runs in relation to shares. at least 18 months before the launch of the second selection procedure , esma should submit a report to the commission assessing whether there is market demand for extending the data contributed to the tape to pre-trade data. on the basis of such a report , the commission should be empowered , by way of a delegated act , to further specify the depth of pre-trade data to the tape. ### (20) competition among consolidated tape providers ensures that the consolidated tape is provided in the most efficient way and under the best conditions for users. however , no entity has , up until now , applied to act as a consolidated tape provider. it is therefore considered appropriate to empower esma to periodically organise a competitive selection procedure to select a single entity which is able to provide the consolidated tape for bonds , taking into account the set-up costs. esma should prioritise the selection and authorisation of a consolidated tape provider for bonds.


### (20) competition among consolidated tape providers ensures that the consolidated tape is provided in the most efficient way and under the best conditions for users. however , no entity has , up until now , applied to act as a consolidated tape provider. it is therefore considered appropriate to empower esma to periodically organise a competitive selection procedure to select a single entity which is able to provide the consolidated tape for each specified asset class. taking into account the novelty of the proposed scheme , esma should only mandate the provision of post-trade transparency data for the first selection procedure that it runs in relation to shares. at least 18 months before the launch of the second selection procedure , esma should submit a report to the commission assessing whether there is market demand for extending the data contributed to the tape to pre-trade data. on the basis of such a report , the commission should be empowered , by way of a delegated act , to further specify the depth of pre-trade data to the tape. ### (20) competition among consolidated tape providers ensures that the consolidated tape is provided in the most efficient way and under the best conditions for users. however , no entity has , up until now , applied to act as a consolidated tape provider. it is therefore considered appropriate to empower esma to periodically organise a competitive selection procedure to select a single entity which is able to provide the consolidated tape for each specified asset class. esma should prioritise the selection and authorization of a consolidated tape provider for shares and etfs , followed by bonds


### (20) competition among consolidated tape providers ensures that the consolidated tape is provided in the most efficient way and under the best conditions for users. however , no entity has , up until now , applied to act as a consolidated tape provider. it is therefore considered appropriate to empower esma to periodically organise a competitive selection procedure to select a single entity which is able to provide the consolidated tape for each specified asset class. taking into account the novelty of the proposed scheme , esma should only mandate the provision of post-trade transparency data for the first selection procedure that it runs in relation to shares. at least 18 months before the launch of the second selection procedure , esma should submit a report to the commission assessing whether there is market demand for extending the data contributed to the tape to pre-trade data. on the basis of such a report , the commission should be empowered , by way of a delegated act , to further specify the depth of pre-trade data to the tape. ### (20) competition among consolidated tape providers ensures that the consolidated tape is provided in the most efficient way and under the best conditions for users. however , no entity has , up until now , applied to act as a consolidated tape provider. it is therefore considered appropriate to empower esma to periodically organise a competitive procedure to select and authorize a single entity which is able to provide the consolidated tape per specified asset class. taking into account the novelty of the proposed scheme , esma should prioritize the selection and authorization of the provider for the consolidated tape for bonds. after 12 months of operation of the ctp for bonds , esma shall provide the commission with a motivated opinion on the effectiveness of the ctp for bond. based on this opinion , in case the ctp for bonds has satisfied the political objectives , esma shall start the selection and authorization procedures for the providers for the other relevant asset classes in the following order: shares , etfs and otc derivatives.


### (21) according to data presented in the impact assessment accompanying the proposal for this regulation , the expected revenue generation for the consolidated tape will vary depending on the precise features of the tape. the expected revenue of the ctp should significantly exceed the cost of its production and therefore help to build a solid revenue participation scheme whereby the ctp and the market data contributors share aligned commercial interests. this principle should not prevent ctps from making a necessary margin to maintain a viable business model and from using the core market data to offer further analytics or other services aimed to increase the revenue pool. ### (21) according to data presented in the impact assessment accompanying the proposal for this regulation , the expected revenue generation for the consolidated tape will vary depending on the precise features of the tape. the expected revenue of the ctp should exceed the cost of its production , and therefore help to build a solid revenue participation scheme whereby the ctp and the market data contributors share aligned commercial interests. this principle should not prevent ctps from making a necessary margin to maintain a viable business model.


### (22) there is an objective difference between a venue of primary admission and other trading venues that serve as secondary trading markets. a venue of primary admission admits companies to the public markets , playing a crucial role in the life of a share and for the share’s liquidity. this is particularly true in the case of shares listed on smaller regulated markets which remain typically traded mostly on the venue of primary admission. when the pre-trade transparent trading of a certain share takes place exclusively or predominantly on the venue of primary admission , such smaller venue plays a more important role in the price formation for that share. the core market data a smaller regulated market contributes to the consolidated tape therefore plays a more determining role in the price formation for the shares this venue admits to trading. a preferential treatment in the revenue participation scheme is therefore considered appropriate to allow these smaller exchanges to maintain their local admissions and safeguard a rich and vibrant ecosystem in line with the objectives of the capital markets union. ### (22) there is an objective difference between a venue of primary admission and other trading venues that serve as secondary trading markets. a venue of primary admission admits companies to the public markets , playing a crucial role in the life of a share and for the share’s liquidity. this is particularly true in the case of shares listed on smaller regulated markets which remain typically traded mostly on the venue of primary admission. when the pre-trade transparent trading of a certain share takes place exclusively or predominantly on the venue of primary admission , such smaller venue plays a more important role in the price formation for that share. on that note , the ct can offer more visibility to the smaller exchanges. therefore , it is important for all exchanges to contribute to the tape , which is , moreover , fully in line with the idea of the internal market.


### (23) small regulated markets are regulated markets which admit shares of issuers for which trading in the secondary market tends to be less liquid than the trading of shares admitted to trading on larger regulated markets. in order to avoid that lower trading volumes (or nominal values) penalise smaller exchanges in the revenue participation scheme designed for the consolidated tape for shares , data from trades in these less liquid shares should attract a higher remuneration than their notional trading value would indicate. whether a share is less liquid should be determined on the basis of the proportion of pre-trade transparent liquidity displayed by the regulated market that admits the less liquid share , relative to the average daily trading turnover in that share. ### (23) the desired outcome would be to provide end investors with a truly consolidated overview of the trading opportunities available in the union and to increase the overall domestic and international attractiveness of the union capital markets , in line with the objectives of the capital markets union , and to include small regulated markets in the picture created by the consolidated tape.


### (24) given the novelty of the consolidated tape in the context of the eu financial markets , esma should be entrusted with providing the european commission with an assessment of the revenue participation scheme designed for regulated markets in the context of the consolidated tape for shares. this report should be prepared on the basis of at least 12 months of operation of the ctp and subsequently at the request of the commission , where deemed necessary or appropriate. the assessment should focus in particular on whether the participation of small regulated markets in the revenue of the ctp is fair and effective in safeguarding the role that these markets play in their local financial ecosystem. the commission should be empowered to revise the mechanism of allocation by way of a delegated act , where necessary or appropriate. ### (24) given the novelty of the consolidated tape in the context of the eu financial markets , esma should be entrusted with providing the european commission with an assessment of the revenue participation scheme designed for regulated markets in the context of the consolidated tape. this report should be prepared on the basis of at least 12 months of operation of the ctp and subsequently at the request of the commission , where deemed necessary or appropriate. the assessment should focus in particular on whether the participation of small regulated markets in the revenue of the ctp is fair and effective in safeguarding the role that these markets play in their local financial ecosystem. the commission should be empowered to revise the mechanism of allocation by way of a delegated act , where necessary or appropriate.


### (32) financial intermediaries should strive to achieve the best possible price and the highest possible likelihood of execution for trades that they execute on behalf of their clients. to that end , financial intermediaries should select the trading venue or counterparty for executing their client trades solely on the basis of achieving best execution for their clients. it should be incompatible with that principle of best execution that a financial intermediary receives a payment from a trading counterpart in exchange for ensuring the execution of client trades. investment firms should be therefore be prohibited from receiving such payment. ### (32) financial intermediaries should strive to achieve the best possible price and the highest possible likelihood of execution for trades that they execute on behalf of their clients. to ensure that the best execution requirement described in article 27 of directive 2014/65/eu can be met financial intermediaries should select the trading venue or counterparty for executing their client trades solely on the basis of achieving best execution for their clients.


### (35) ‘consolidated tape provider’ or ‘ctp’ means a person authorised in accordance with title iva , chapter 1 of this regulation to provide the service of collecting market data for shares , etfs , bonds or derivatives , from market data contributors , and of consolidating those data into a continuous electronic live data stream providing core market data per share , etf , bond or derivatives and of providing them to user of market data;; ### (35) ‘consolidated tape provider’ or ‘ctp’ means a person authorised in accordance with title iva , chapter 1 of this regulation to provide the service of collecting market data from market data contributors , and of consolidating those data into a continuous electronic live data stream providing core market data and of providing them to user of market data;


### all of the following data on equities: ### deleted


### the best bids and offers with corresponding volumes; ### deleted


### (ii) the transaction price and volume executed at the stated price; ### deleted


### (iii) the intra-day auction information; ### deleted


### (iv) the end-of-day auction information; ### deleted


### the market identifier code identifying the execution venue; ### deleted


### (vi) the standardised instrument identifier that applies across venues; ### deleted


### (vii) the timestamp information on all of the following: ### deleted


### — the time of execution of the trade; ### deleted


### — the time of publication of the trade; ### deleted


### — the receipt of market data from the market data contributors; ### deleted


### — the receipt of market data by the consolidated tape provider; ### deleted


### — the dissemination of consolidated market data to subscribers; ### deleted


### (viii) the trading protocols and the applicable waivers or deferrals; ### deleted


### all of the following data on non-equities: ### all of the following data on bonds:


### paragraph 1 is amended as follows: ### deleted


### (iii) the consolidated tape for shares or etfs; ### deleted


### 1. trading venues shall suspend their use of the waivers referred to in article 4(1) , point (a) , and 4(1) , point (b)(i) where the percentage of volume traded in the union in a financial instrument carried out under those waivers exceeds 7% of the total volume traded in that financial instrument in the union. trading venues shall base their decision to suspend the use of those waivers on the data published by esma in accordance with paragraph 4 , and shall take such decision within two working days after this publication of those data and for a period of six months.; ### 1. trading venues shall suspend their use of the waivers referred to in article 4(1) , point (a) , and 4(1) , point (b)(i) where the percentage of volume traded in the union in a financial instrument carried out under those waivers exceeds 7% of the total volume traded in that financial instrument in the union as determined by esma according to article 5 (9) of this regulation. trading venues shall base their decision to suspend the use of those waivers on the data published by esma in accordance with paragraph 4 , and shall take such decision within two working days after this publication of those data and for a period of six months.;


### (6) article 11 is amended as follows: ### deleted


### 3. esma shall develop draft regulatory technical standards to specify the content , format and terminology of the reasonable commercial basis information that trading venues , apas , ctps and systematic internalisers have to make available to the public. ### 3. esma shall develop draft regulatory technical standards to


### 2. this article and articles 15 , 16 and 17 shall apply to systematic internalisers when they deal in sizes up to twice the standard market size. systematic internalisers shall not be subject to this article and articles 15 , 16 and 17 when they deal in sizes above twice the standard market size. ### 2. this article and articles 15 , 16 and 17 shall apply to systematic internalisers when they deal in sizes up to the threshold determined by esma in accordance with article 4(6)(f). systematic internalisers shall not be subject to this article and articles 15 , 16 and 17 when they deal in sizes above that threshold.


### 3. systematic internalisers are allowed to quote any size. the minimum quoting size shall be at least the equivalent of twice the standard market size of a share , depositary receipt , etf , certificate , or other financial instrument that is similar to those financial instruments and that is traded on a trading venue. for a particular share , depository receipt , etf , certificate or other financial instrument that is similar to those financial instruments and that is traded on a trading venue , each quote shall include a firm bid and offer price , or firm bid and offer prices for a size or sizes which could be up to twice the standard market size for the class of shares , depositary receipts , etfs , certificates or financial instruments that are similar to those financial instruments , to which the financial instrument belongs. the price or prices shall reflect the prevailing market conditions for that share , depositary receipt , etf , certificate or financial instrument that is similar to those financial instruments.; ### 3. systematic internalisers are allowed to quote any size. the minimum quoting size shall be at the minimum of twice the standard market size. for a particular share , depository receipt , etf , certificate or other financial instrument that is similar to those financial instruments and that is traded on a trading venue , each quote shall include a firm bid and offer price , or firm bid and offer prices for a size or sizes which could be up to the minimum of twice the standard market size. the price or prices shall reflect the prevailing market conditions for that share , depositary receipt , etf , certificate or financial instrument that is similar to those financial instruments.;


### 2. the application of the tick sizes set in accordance with article 49 of directive 2014/65/eu shall not prevent systematic internalisers from matching orders large in scale at mid-point within the current bid and offer prices. matching orders at mid-point within the current bid and offer prices below large in scale but above twice the standard market size shall be allowed in so far as those tick sizes are complied with.; ### 2. the application of the tick sizes set in accordance with article 49 of directive 2014/65/eu shall not prevent systematic internalisers from matching orders large in scale at mid-point within the current bid and offer prices. matching orders at mid-point within the current bid and offer prices below large in scale but above the threshold determined by esma in accordance with article 4(6)(f) shall be allowed in so far as those tick sizes are complied with.;


### (7) in the context of the indirect subscription of internal mrel eligible instruments by resolution entities pursuant to the revised union bank resolution framework , intermediate parents should be required to deduct from their own internal mrel eligible resources the full holding of own funds and eligible liabilities issued by their subsidiaries belonging to the same resolution group. this ensures the proper functioning of the internal loss-absorbing and recapitalisation mechanisms within a group and avoids the double-counting of the internal mrel eligible resources of the subsidiary for the purposes of compliance by the intermediate parent with its own internal mrel. additionally , without those deductions , the individual solvency ratios of intermediate parents would not reflect appropriately and prudently their actual loss-absorbing capacity , as those ratios would also include the loss-absorbing capacity of their subsidiaries. this could compromise the proper implementation of the chosen resolution strategy , as the intermediate parent could use up not only its own loss absorption capacity but also that of its subsidiary , before the intermediate parent or the subsidiary are no longer viable. the deductions should first be applied to the eligible liabilities items of the intermediate parents. in case the amount to be deducted would exceed the amount of the eligible liabilities items of the intermediate parents , the remaining amount should be deducted from their tier 2 items. to ensure that the deduction regime remains proportionate , that regime should not be applicable in the exceptional cases where internal mrel is applied on a consolidated basis only. ### (7) in the context of the indirect subscription of internal mrel eligible instruments by resolution entities pursuant to the revised union bank resolution framework , intermediate parents should be required to deduct from their own internal mrel eligible resources the full holding of own funds and eligible liabilities issued by their subsidiaries belonging to the same resolution group. this ensures the proper functioning of the internal loss-absorbing and recapitalisation mechanisms within a group and avoids the double-counting of the internal mrel eligible resources of the subsidiary for the purposes of compliance by the intermediate parent with its own internal mrel. additionally , without those deductions , the individual solvency ratios of intermediate parents would not reflect appropriately and prudently their actual loss-absorbing capacity , as those ratios would also include the loss-absorbing capacity of their subsidiaries. this could compromise the proper implementation of the chosen resolution strategy , as the intermediate parent could use up not only its own loss absorption capacity but also that of its subsidiary , before the intermediate parent or the subsidiary are no longer viable. deductions should first be applied to the eligible liabilities items of the intermediate entities. where the intermediate entity is required to comply with internal mrel pursuant to directive 2014/59/eu , the deductions should be applied to the liabilities meeting the conditions of article 45f(2) of that directive. in case the amount to be deducted would exceed the amount of the eligible liabilities items of the intermediate entities , the remaining amount should be deducted from their common equity tier 1 , additional tier 1 and tier 2 items , starting with tier 2 items in accordance with article 66 , point (e) , of regulation (eu) no 575/2013. in such a case , it is necessary that the deductions corresponding to the remaining amount are also applied when calculating own funds for the purposes of the requirements laid down in regulation (eu) no 575/2013 and directive 2013/36/eu. otherwise , the solvency ratios of intermediate entities that have issued own funds instruments , rather than eligible liabilities instruments , to fund the acquisition of ownership of internal mrel eligible resources may be overstated. additionally , by keeping the treatment of holdings of internal mrel eligible resources aligned for prudential and resolution purposes , an undue increase in complexity is avoided , as institutions would be able to continue to calculate , report and disclose one set of total risk exposure amount and total exposure measure for prudential and resolution purposes. article 49(2) of regulation (eu) no 575/2013 should thus be amended accordingly. to ensure that the deduction regime remains proportionate , that regime should not be applicable in the exceptional cases where , pursuant to articles 45f(1) , third subparagraph , and 45f(4) of directive 2014/59/eu , internal mrel is applied on a consolidated basis only , in what concerns the holdings of internal mrel eligible resources issued by entities included in the perimeter of consolidation. the same exception should apply when the requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities for material subsidiaries of non-eu g-siis laid down in article 92b of regulation (eu) no 575/2013 is complied with on a consolidated basis , pursuant to article 11(3a) of regulation(eu) no 575/2013.


### (10) to ensure that institutions have sufficient time to implement the dedicated treatment for the indirect subscription of instruments eligible for internal mrel , including the new deduction regime , the provisions laying down that treatment should become applicable six months after the entry into force of this regulation. ### (10) to ensure that institutions have sufficient time to implement the dedicated treatment for the indirect subscription of internal mrel eligible resources , including the new deduction regime , the provisions laying down that treatment should become applicable from 01 january 2024.


### for the purposes of this paragraph , the reference to eligible liabilities items shall also be understood as a reference to eligible liabilities referred to in article 45f(2) , point (a) , of directive 2014/59/eu. ### for the purposes of this paragraph , the reference to eligible liabilities items shall be limited to the intermediate entities holdings of eligible instruments of the lower subsidiaries up to the lower subsidiaries’ loss absorption amount and recapitalization amount as defined in article 45 (2) (a) and (b) of directive 2014/59/eu.


### however , article 1 , point (3) , point (5)(b) , and points (7) , (8) and (9) and article 2 shall apply from [op please insert the date = 6 months after date of entry into force]. ### however , article 1 , point (3) , point (5)(b) , and points (7) , (8) and (9) and article 2 shall apply from 1 january 2024. article 2 , points (1) and (3) , shall apply by the date referred to in the second paragraph , first subparagraph.


### (1) ensuring fair and effective taxation in the internal market and tackling tax avoidance and evasion remain high political priorities in the union. while recent years saw important progress in this area , especially with the adoption of council directive 2016/116410 concerning anti-tax avoidance and the expansion of scope of council directive 2011/16/eu11 on administrative cooperation , further measures are necessary to tackle specifically identified practices of tax avoidance and evasion , which are not fully captured by the existing legal framework of the union. in particular , multinational groups often create undertakings with no minimal substance , to lower their overall tax liability , including by shifting profits away from certain high-tax member states in which they carry out economic activity and create value for their business. this proposal complements the progress achieved in corporate transparency through requirements concerning beneficial ownership information introduced by the anti-money laundering framework , which address situations where undertakings are created to conceal true ownership , whether of the undertakings themselves or of the assets they manage and own , such as real estate or property of high value. ### (1) ensuring fair and effective taxation in the internal market and tackling tax avoidance and evasion remain high political priorities in the union. while recent years saw important progress in this area , especially with the adoption of council directive 2016/116410 concerning anti-tax avoidance and the expansion of scope of council directive 2011/16/eu11 on administrative cooperation in the field of taxation , further measures are necessary to tackle specifically identified practices of tax avoidance and evasion including through the misuse of shell entities , which are not fully captured by the existing legal framework of the union. in this regard , the pandora papers’ revelations reported on the creation of shell companies with the purpose of moving money between bank accounts , avoiding taxes and carrying out financial crimes , including money laundering , and circumventing eu sanctions for russian oligarchs. in particular , multinational groups often create undertakings with no minimal substance , to lower their overall tax liability , including by shifting profits away from certain high-tax member states in which they carry out economic activity and create value for their business. this proposal complements the progress achieved in corporate transparency through requirements concerning beneficial ownership information introduced by the anti-money laundering framework , which address situations where undertakings are created to conceal true ownership , whether of the undertakings themselves or of the assets they manage and own , such as real estate or property of high value.


### (15) directive 2011/16/eu should therefore be amended accordingly. ### (15) considering that the directive 2011/16/eu on administrative cooperation (dac) laid down the rules and procedures for cooperation between member states on the exchange of information between tax administrations of the member states , notably the automatic exchange of information on income and assets , this directive should therefore be amended accordingly allowing member states to automatically exchange the information received in the framework of this directive.


### in the preceding two tax years , the undertaking outsourced the administration of day-to-day operations and the decision-making on significant functions. ### in the preceding two tax years , the undertaking outsourced to a third party the administration of day-to-day operations and the decision-making on significant functions.


### regulated financial undertakings; ### deleted


### undertakings with at least five own full-time equivalent employees or members of staff exclusively carrying out the activities generating the relevant income; ### deleted


### member states shall ensure that those penalties include an administrative pecuniary sanction of at least 5% of the undertaking’s turnover in the relevant tax year , if the undertaking that is required to report pursuant to article 6 does not comply with such requirement for a tax year within the prescribed deadline or makes a false declaration in the tax return under article 7. ### member states shall ensure that those penalties include an administrative pecuniary sanction of at least 5% of the undertaking’s turnover or assets in the relevant tax year , if the undertaking that is required to report pursuant to article 6 does not comply with such requirement for a tax year within the prescribed deadline or makes a false declaration in the tax return under article 7.


### a. whereas the banking union (bu) currently consists of the single supervisory mechanism (ssm) and the single resolution mechanism (srm); ### a. whereas the banking union (bu) currently consists of the single supervisory mechanism (ssm) and the single resolution mechanism (srm); whereas the third pillar , the european deposit insurance scheme (edis) , is yet to be established;


### b. whereas the bu is open to all eu member states; ### b. whereas the banking union is open to all eu member states;


### c. whereas the problems of the banking sector may worsen after the temporary support measures introduced during the covid-19 crisis are lifted; ### c. whereas the crucial , decisive , timely and targeted support provided to europe’s banks during the covid-19 pandemic have ensured that banks have been able to continue lending to the economy , protecting jobs and businesses and contributing to economic growth;


### c. whereas the problems of the banking sector may worsen after the temporary support measures introduced during the covid-19 crisis are lifted; ### c. whereas the banking sector has remained resilient over the course of the pandemic , the lifting of the temporary support measures introduced during the covid-19 crisis may expose the sector to vulnerabilities that will need to be closely monitored and managed;


### d. whereas some financial institutions in the bu are heavily invested in the debt of their own home sovereign; ### d. whereas the sovereign to bank nexus continues to exist and the eu regulatory framework for the prudential treatment of sovereign debt should be consistent with international standards; whereas the level of sovereign exposures has been growing in a number of banks; whereas a number of national options and discretions persist within the prudential legislative framework , undermining the european dimension of the banking union;


### d. whereas some financial institutions in the bu are heavily invested in the debt of their own home sovereign; ### d. whereas some financial institutions in the banking union are heavily invested in the debt of their own home sovereign;


### e. whereas the role of the banking sector is crucial to the recovery and transition to a low-carbon economy; ### e. whereas the role of the banking sector is crucial to the recovery , especially to sme's , and transition to a low-carbon economy;


### e. whereas the role of the banking sector is crucial to the recovery and transition to a low-carbon economy; ### e. whereas the role of the banking sector is crucial to the recovery and transition to a carbon-neutral and digitalised economy;


### f. whereas there are numerous challenges to the digitalisation of finance; ### f. whereas there is great economic , environmental and social potential linked to the digitalisation of finance , as well as challenges which need to be addressed;


### g. whereas there is a need for effective anti-money laundering supervision; ### g. whereas the further strengthening and harmonisation of eu prudential and anti-money laundering supervision and enforcement , which are necessary to protect the integrity of the eu’s financial system , are a priority;


### g. whereas there is a need for effective anti-money laundering supervision; ### g. whereas there is a need for an effective and robust anti-money laundering supervisory framework throughout the european banking sector and weaknesses in the framework must be addressed;


### h. whereas consumers , investors and all depositors should be well protected; ### h. whereas consumer and investor protection is paramount to the deepening of the cmu , and strong eu consumer protection rules providing a strong minimum baseline are necessary; whereas national rules implementing european consumer protection requirements vary across the banking union , pointing to the need for harmonisation; whereas the banking union still lacks effective tools to tackle the problems consumers are facing , such as artificial complexity , unfair commercial practices , the exclusion of vulnerable groups from using basic services and the limited involvement of public authorities;


### 1. recalls that one goal of the bu is the security of the banking system and the prevention of bank bailouts by taxpayers; supports efforts to strengthen the bu; stresses that a solid bu will result in increased confidence in the banking sector; ### 1. recalls that the banking union is an essential element for completing economic and monetary union; recalls that significant progress has been made since the financial crisis of 2008 and as a result the european banking system is greatly reinforced , better equipped to deal with future crises and resolution mechanisms are in place to ensure that failing banks are wound up without the use of tax payers’ money; supports efforts to strengthen the banking union and underlines that progress in different areas must continue in parallel; stresses that the significant work undertaken to create a banking union has contributed to increased confidence in the european banking sector and that banks entered the covid-19 pandemic robust , better capitalised and able to play an essential role in ensuring access to finance during the pandemic;


### 1. recalls that one goal of the bu is the security of the banking system and the prevention of bank bailouts by taxpayers; supports efforts to strengthen the bu; stresses that a solid bu will result in increased confidence in the banking sector; ### 1. recalls that one goal of the banking union is the security of the banking system and the prevention of bank bailouts by taxpayers; supports efforts to strengthen the banking union; stresses that a solid banking union will result in increased confidence in the banking sector;


### 2. considers that the bu should be built in a friendly and attractive way , including for member states outside the euro area; ### 2. considers that the banking union should be completed as soon as possible , as a means to improve the stability of the euro area , to promote the international role of the euro , and to complement the capital markets union;


### 2. considers that the bu should be built in a friendly and attractive way , including for member states outside the euro area; ### 2. recalls that all euro area member states are part of banking union , and that non-euro area member states are also able to join;


### 2. considers that the bu should be built in a friendly and attractive way , including for member states outside the euro area; ### 2. considers that the bu should be built in a transparent and attractive way , including for member states outside the euro area;


### 3. stresses that the relatively good performance of banks during the covid-19 crisis is related to the policies implemented by the member states during the pandemic , as well as to temporary measures under regulation (eu) 575/2013 (capital requirements regulation); ### 3. notes that european banks entered the covid-19 crisis with strong capital positions as a result of the regulatory reforms adopted in the wake of the previous global financial crisis; stresses that the banking sector maintained relatively good performances during the covid-19 crisis as a result of the policies implemented by the member states , as well as temporary measures introduced under regulation (eu) 575/2013 (capital requirements regulation) , and additional capital space provided by the ecb;


### 3. stresses that the relatively good performance of banks during the covid-19 crisis is related to the policies implemented by the member states during the pandemic , as well as to temporary measures under regulation (eu) 575/2013 (capital requirements regulation); ### 3. stresses the importance of decisive , timely and targeted policies , such as the measures under regulation (eu) 575/2013 (capital requirements regulation) , which have played a crucial role in ensuring that banks have been able to continue lending throughout the pandemic;


### 3. stresses that the relatively good performance of banks during the covid-19 crisis is related to the policies implemented by the member states during the pandemic , as well as to temporary measures under regulation (eu) 575/2013 (capital requirements regulation); ### 3. notes that the relatively good performance of banks during the covid-19 crisis is related to the policies implemented by the member states during the pandemic , as well as to temporary measures under regulation (eu) 575/2013 (capital requirements regulation);


### 4. recalls the key role of the eu banking sector in financing the recovery of the european economy; ### 4. recalls the key role played by the eu banking sector in continuing to support the real economy during the pandemic and now in financing the recovery of the european economy and the transition to a digitalised and carbon-neutral economy;


### 4. recalls the key role of the eu banking sector in financing the recovery of the european economy; ### 4. underlines the key role of the eu banking sector in financing the recovery of the european economy and welcomes the effective reforms undertaken since the 2008 financial crisis;


### 4. recalls the key role of the eu banking sector in financing the recovery of the european economy; ### 4. recalls the key role of the eu banking sector in financing the recovery of the european economy , including sufficient funding for sme's;


### 5. notes that the eba , the ecb and the srb still see many problems in the banking system , such as high stocks of non-performing loans (npls) , exposures to sectors which are sensitive to the covid-19 crisis , deficiencies in risk management , and discrepancies in the implementation of international financial reporting standard 9 (ifrs 9); underlines with concern that these problems are likely to increase after the withdrawal of the emergency measures; ### 5. notes that the eba , the ecb and the srb still see many problems in the banking system , such as high stocks of non-performing loans (npls) , exposures to sectors which are sensitive to the covid-19 crisis , deficiencies in risk management , and discrepancies in the implementation of international financial reporting standard 9 (ifrs 9); underlines with concern that these problems may increase after the withdrawal of the emergency measures; welcomes in this regard , the 2022-2024 supervisory priorities of the ecb that fully acknowledge the potential risks posed to banks as the economy emerges from the pandemic and the focus of their supervisory activities on these vulnerabilities36c;


### 5. notes that the eba , the ecb and the srb still see many problems in the banking system , such as high stocks of non-performing loans (npls) , exposures to sectors which are sensitive to the covid-19 crisis , deficiencies in risk management , and discrepancies in the implementation of international financial reporting standard 9 (ifrs 9); underlines with concern that these problems are likely to increase after the withdrawal of the emergency measures; ### 5. notes that the eba , the ecb and the srb still see problems in the banking system , such as the continued fragmentation of the european banking market and the associated risks to europe’s economic sovereignty and strategic autonomy , exposures to sectors which are sensitive to the covid-19 crisis , a potential risk of an increasing number of non performing loans (npls) as public support is withdrawn , deficiencies in risk management , and discrepancies in the implementation of international financial reporting standard 9 (ifrs 9); underlines with concern that these problems could increase after the withdrawal of the emergency measures;


### 6. supports ongoing work on the implementation of the basel iii rules; ### 6. supports ongoing work on the implementation of the basel iii rules and stresses the importance of the specificities of the european banking sector being duly taken into account in order to ensure a global level playing field; reiterates that the reform must not hamper eu banks’ ability to finance the recovery , and the digital and environmental transition in europe; underlines that in order to uphold its economic sovereignty and strategic autonomy , the eu needs strong and competitive european banks to offer wholesale banking services to corporates of all sizes;


### 6. supports ongoing work on the implementation of the basel iii rules; ### 6. supports ongoing work on the implementation of the basel iii rules; stresses that the international standards must be implemented in the eu in a timely manner whilst ensuring that the eu banking sector remains competitive vis-à-vis its global competitors; highlights the persistent out-performing of eu banks by us banks , with recent figures showing that the median return on equity of us banks was over 5% higher than that of eu banks36d;


### 6. supports ongoing work on the implementation of the basel iii rules; ### 6. supports ongoing work on the implementation of the basel iii rules , that follows the proportionality principles given the specifications and diversity of the eu banking sector;


### 6. supports ongoing work on the implementation of the basel iii rules; ### 6. supports ongoing work on the implementation of the basel iii rules; welcomes the commission’s proposal to opt for a single-stack approach in the application of the output floor;


### 6. supports ongoing work on the implementation of the basel iii rules; ### 6. supports a reasonable and careful implementation of the basel iii rules , that respects the specifications and diversity of the eu banking markets and systems;


### 7. notes that the banking sector is adapting to the challenges of digitalisation; stresses the need for further investments , research and adequate regulations; appreciates the work on the digital finance package; considers that the priority should be customer safety , inclusiveness and technological neutrality; observes with interest the work on the digital euro; ### 7. notes that the banking sector is adapting to the challenges and opportunities of digitalisation; stresses the need for further investments , research and adequate regulations , based on the same services , same risk , same regulation approach; welcomes progress achieved on the digital finance package and calls on swift agreement on the digital operational resilience act and the markets in crypto-assets regulation; considers that the priority should be customer safety , inclusiveness and technological neutrality; observes with interest the work on the digital euro;


### 7. notes that the banking sector is adapting to the challenges of digitalisation; stresses the need for further investments , research and adequate regulations; appreciates the work on the digital finance package; considers that the priority should be customer safety , inclusiveness and technological neutrality; observes with interest the work on the digital euro; ### 7. notes that the banking sector is adapting to the challenges of digitalisation; stresses the need for further investments , research and adequate regulations; appreciates the work on the digital finance package; considers that the priorities should be customer safety , inclusiveness and technological neutrality; observes with interest the work on the digital euro;


### 9. notes that there is a prospect of gradually phasing out emergency measures and returning to pre-covid-19 capital requirements; ### deleted


### 9. notes that there is a prospect of gradually phasing out emergency measures and returning to pre-covid-19 capital requirements; ### 9. notes that there is a prospect of gradually phasing out emergency measures and returning to pre-covid-19 capital requirements; believes that support measures should be in place for as long as needed to support the recovery from the covid-19 pandemic and to drive the transformative changes making the economies greener , more digital and inclusive;


### 10. considers the reduction of npls should remain a priority; warns that their number is likely to increase rapidly after the withdrawal of emergency support measures; draws attention to the importance of prudential compliance , early identification and proactive management of npls; ### deleted


### 10. considers the reduction of npls should remain a priority; warns that their number is likely to increase rapidly after the withdrawal of emergency support measures; draws attention to the importance of prudential compliance , early identification and proactive management of npls; ### 10. considers the monitoring of npl levels should remain a priority; warns that their number is likely to increase rapidly after the withdrawal of emergency support measures; draws attention to the importance of prudential compliance , early identification and proactive management of npls; acknowledges that the eu directive on credit servicers and credit purchasers will foster a secondary market for npls;


### 11. is concerned about the rising level of sovereign debt on the balance sheets of banks in the bu; notes that government bonds are not risk-free assets and that risks are differentiated; emphasises that the issue of regulatory treatment of sovereign exposures requires an in-depth examination of the consequences of different approaches; ### 11. is concerned about the rising level of sovereign debt on the balance sheets of banks in the euro area; notes that government bonds are not risk-free assets and that risks are differentiated; emphasises that the issue of regulatory treatment of sovereign exposures requires an in-depth examination of the consequences of different approaches to ensure the prevention of the so-called 'doom-loop'; takes note of the work of the basel committee on banking supervision (bcbs) on sovereign risk in this regard , and stresses that the eu regulatory framework on prudential treatment of sovereign debt should be consistent with international standards; calls for further reflection and discussion on the creation of a european safe asset based on the experience of the issuance of recovery bonds;


### 11. is concerned about the rising level of sovereign debt on the balance sheets of banks in the bu; notes that government bonds are not risk-free assets and that risks are differentiated; emphasises that the issue of regulatory treatment of sovereign exposures requires an in-depth examination of the consequences of different approaches; ### 11. calls for progress to be undertaken to address the excessive domestic bias of bank's sovereign exposures , with risk reduction through the diversification of banks’ sovereign exposures , which will have multifaceted advantages , including greater financial stability throughout the banking union , while ensuring that this does not result in additional capital charges for europe’s banks;


### 11. is concerned about the rising level of sovereign debt on the balance sheets of banks in the bu; notes that government bonds are not risk-free assets and that risks are differentiated; emphasises that the issue of regulatory treatment of sovereign exposures requires an in-depth examination of the consequences of different approaches; ### 11. is concerned about the rising level of sovereign debt on the balance sheets of banks in the bu; notes that government bonds are not risk-free assets and that risks are differentiated; emphasises that the issue of regulatory treatment of sovereign exposures requires an in-depth examination of the consequences of different approaches; highlights that this is the key to break up the 'doom loop' between banks and sovereigns;


### 12. notes that the transition to a low-carbon economy presents new challenges and risks related to the preference for sustainable investments; stresses the need for an in-depth analysis of the economic efficiency of sustainable investments in order to avoid a future bubble of green assets; calls for clear guidelines for banks based on economic data; ### 12. notes that the transition to a low-carbon economy presents new challenges and risks related to the preference for sustainable investments; emphasises the importance of the banking sector , to complement public investment , in helping fund the crucial transition to a carbon-neutral economy; stresses the need for an in-depth analysis of the economic efficiency of sustainable investments in order to avoid a future bubble of green assets and welcomes the ecb’s commitment to carrying out climate-stress tests in 2022 as an important element to tackling climate-related risk; stresses the need for further improvements in the disclosure of climate-related and environmental risks by banks , as well as improvements in the disclosure of transition strategies by entities to facilitate banks’ and supervisors’ assessment of risk; ; calls for banks to take the double materiality perspective when assessing their climate risks; calls for clear guidelines for banks based on economic data;


### 12. notes that the transition to a low-carbon economy presents new challenges and risks related to the preference for sustainable investments; stresses the need for an in-depth analysis of the economic efficiency of sustainable investments in order to avoid a future bubble of green assets; calls for clear guidelines for banks based on economic data; ### 12. welcomes that the transition to a low-carbon economy presents great potential for urgent environmental progress and significant economic growth in a range of different sectors; underlines the importance of clear legislation to prevent greenwashing and to ensure that the eu is able to realise its essential environmental commitments;


### 13. recalls that the impact of special measures during the pandemic should be taken into account in the assessment of the current condition of banks; stresses that these measures distort the picture , as the decline in real economic activity does not fully translate into banks’ balance sheets; ### deleted


### 13. recalls that the impact of special measures during the pandemic should be taken into account in the assessment of the current condition of banks; stresses that these measures distort the picture , as the decline in real economic activity does not fully translate into banks’ balance sheets; ### 13. recalls the impact of special measures during the pandemic should be taken into account in the assessment of the current condition of banks;


### 14. draws attention to the dangers of a very loose monetary policy stimulating inflation; points out the need for the gradual tightening of monetary policy; ### 14. recalls the ecb governing council’s decision of 3 february 2022 to discontinue net asset purchases under the pandemic emergency purchase programme (pepp) at the end of march 2022; takes note of the current inflation rates while noting the ecb’s medium-term inflation forecast remains at target; recalls the ecb’s primary objective of price stability and calls on the ecb to continue to monitor the situation closely and to use its toolbox as appropriate;


### 14. draws attention to the dangers of a very loose monetary policy stimulating inflation; points out the need for the gradual tightening of monetary policy; ### 14. draws attention to the dangers of a very loose monetary policy stimulating inflation; points out the need for the gradual tightening of monetary policy , and welcomes the remarks made by president lagarde in the last monetary dialogue , where she stated that the ecb will use any tools and instruments needed in order to ensure that its monetary policy is transmitted;


### 14. draws attention to the dangers of a very loose monetary policy stimulating inflation; points out the need for the gradual tightening of monetary policy; ### 14. expresses its deep concern about the high and increasing level of inflation in the euro area; recognises that inflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon and urges the ecb to treat the current wave of inflation as such;


### 15. indicates that the trend towards consolidation in the banking sector is likely to increase as a result of the pandemic; recognises the challenges posed to banking supervision by large systemically important institutions , whose possible problems may affect financial stability in many jurisdictions; ### 15. stresses the benefits of banking consolidation , including across borders , in addressing the overcapacities and fragmentation of the banking sector and enabling european banks to remain competitive and to continue to serve europe’s customers; regrets therefore the recent reduction in cross-border transactions;


### 15. indicates that the trend towards consolidation in the banking sector is likely to increase as a result of the pandemic; recognises the challenges posed to banking supervision by large systemically important institutions , whose possible problems may affect financial stability in many jurisdictions; ### 15. indicates that the need for cross-border consolidation in the banking sector has become more pressing as a result of the pandemic; recognises the challenges posed to banking supervision by large systemically important institutions , whose possible problems may affect financial stability in many jurisdictions;


### 16. notes the problems and challenges related to home/host issues; points out that greater market integration requires credible safeguards in eu law for host member states; ### 16. notes that problems and challenges related to home/host issues persist; stresses that banks need to be able to operate across borders while managing their capital and liquidity at a consolidated level , in order to diversify their risks and address any lack of profitability; believes that this is essential to enable european banks to provide competitive services to european consumers and businesses and to ensure a dynamic and robust european banking sector; considers that gradual harmonisation is required in areas where national options and discretions apply; recalls that a range of measures have already been put in place to protect host member states , including internal mrel requirements at the subsidiary level , the srf;


### 16. notes the problems and challenges related to home/host issues; points out that greater market integration requires credible safeguards in eu law for host member states; ### 16. stresses the need for improvements in the cross-border provision of services to create a truly eu-wide banking sector and to improve the competitiveness of the sector and consumer choice; notes the problems and challenges related to home/host issues that have hindered the ability to offer cross-border services; points out that greater market integration requires credible safeguards in eu law for host member states;


### 17. stresses the need for effective anti-money laundering supervision; notes the commission’s adoption of the anti-money laundering (aml) package of proposals; ### 17. stresses the need for effective and greatly improved anti-money laundering supervision; welcomes the commission’s adoption of the anti-money laundering (aml) package of proposals; calls on the european institutions to be ambitious in their negotiations and to reach an agreement as quickly as possible , particularly on the creation of a new european aml authority with strong direct supervisory powers on the riskiest obliged financial entities and on clear rules on beneficial ownership transparency;


### 17. stresses the need for effective anti-money laundering supervision; notes the commission’s adoption of the anti-money laundering (aml) package of proposals; ### 17. stresses the need for effective anti-money laundering supervision; welcomes the commission’s adoption of the anti-money laundering (aml); highlights that the establishment of an anti-money laundering authority (amla) at eu level will significantly increase the quality of the supervision over eu banks and ensure consistent supervision across the eu;


### 18. underlines the need to protect consumers from abuses and harmful practices; ### 18. underlines that it should be borne in mind that the ultimate beneficiaries of a complete banking union should be the consumers and businesses of the real economy; highlights in this regard , that all measures taken towards the completion of the banking union should ensure that consumers are adequately protected from abuses and harmful practices;


### 19. welcomes the activities of the srb in 2021 , including the further completion of the single resolution fund; takes note of the srb’s work programme for the coming years , which includes making the effective resolution of all banks under the srb possible by 2023; ### 19. welcomes the activities of the srb in 2021 , including the further completion of the single resolution fund; takes note of the srb’s work programme for the coming years , which includes making the effective resolution of all banks under the srb possible by 2023; calls for the srb to be entrusted with coordination powers over national authorities;


### 20. supports the specification of the public interest assessment criteria so that the srm is applied in a more consistent and predictable manner; proposes that an alternative liquidation regime for small and medium-sized banks be considered; asks for a more proportionate setting of the minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities (mrel) level; ### 20. supports the specification of the public interest assessment criteria so that the srm is applied in a more consistent and predictable manner and relies on objective thresholds; calls for the public interest assessment to be positive for all banks supervised by the single supervision mechanism and cross-border groups; proposes that an alternative liquidation regime for small and medium-sized banks be considered; asks for a more proportionate setting of the minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities (mrel) level;