### 5. where the digital services coordinator that sent the request , or , where appropriate , the board , did not receive a reply within the time period laid down in paragraph 4 or where it does not agree with the assessment of the digital services coordinator of establishment , it may refer the matter to the commission , providing all relevant information. that information shall include at least the request or recommendation sent to the digital services coordinator of establishment , any additional information provided pursuant to paragraph 3 and the communication referred to in paragraph 4. ### 5. where the digital services coordinator that sent the request , or , where appropriate , the board , did not receive a reply within the time period laid down in paragraph 4 or where it does not agree with the assessment of the digital services coordinator of establishment , it may refer the matter to the commission and the digital services coordinators , providing all relevant information. that information shall include at least the request sent to the digital services coordinator of establishment , any additional information provided pursuant to paragraph 3 and the communication referred to in paragraph 4.


### 6. the commission shall assess the matter within three months following the referral of the matter pursuant to paragraph 5 , after having consulted the digital services coordinator of establishment and , unless it referred the matter itself , the board. ### 6. the commission , in cooperation with the digital services coordinators shall assess the matter within three months following the referral of the matter pursuant to paragraph 5 , after having consulted the digital services coordinator of establishment and , unless it referred the matter itself , the board.


### 7. where , pursuant to paragraph 6 , the commission concludes that the assessment or the investigatory or enforcement measures taken or envisaged pursuant to paragraph 4 are incompatible with this regulation , it shall request the digital service coordinator of establishment to further assess the matter and take the necessary investigatory or enforcement measures to ensure compliance with this regulation , and to inform it about those measures taken within two months from that request. ### 7. 7. where , pursuant to paragraph6 , the commission in cooperation with the digital services coordinators concludes that the assessment or the investigatory or enforcement measures taken or envisaged pursuant to paragraph 4 are incompatible with this regulation , it shall request the digital service coordinator of establishment to take the necessary investigatory or enforcement measures to ensure compliance with this regulation , and to inform it about those measures taken within two months from that request.


### joint investigations and requests for commission intervention ### joint investigations , cooperation among digital services coordinators and requests for commission intervention


### ‘content moderation’ means the activities undertaken by providers of intermediary services aimed at detecting , identifying and addressing illegal content or information incompatible with their terms and conditions , provided by recipients of the service , including measures taken that affect the availability , visibility and accessibility of that illegal content or that information , such as demotion , disabling of access to , or removal thereof , or the recipients’ ability to provide that information , such as the termination or suspension of a recipient’s account; ### ‘content moderation’ means the activities , either through automated or manual means , undertaken by providers of intermediary services aimed at detecting , identifying and addressing illegal content or information incompatible with their terms and conditions , provided by recipients of the service , including measures taken that affect the availability , visibility , monetisation and accessibility of that illegal content or that information , such as demotion , disabling of access to , delisting , demonetisation or removal thereof , or the recipients’ ability to provide that information , such as the termination or suspension of a recipient’s account;


### 6. this article is without prejudice to directive 2013/11/eu and alternative dispute resolution procedures and entities for consumers established under that directive. ### 6. this article shall only take effect on providers other than very large online platforms from [24 months after the date of entry into force of this regulation].


### (54) very large online platforms may cause societal risks , different in scope and impact from those caused by smaller platforms. once the number of recipients of a platform reaches a significant share of the union population , the systemic risks the platform poses have a disproportionately negative impact in the union. such significant reach should be considered to exist where the number of recipients exceeds an operational threshold set at 45 million , that is , a number equivalent to 10% of the union population. the operational threshold should be kept up to date through amendments enacted by delegated acts , where necessary. such very large online platforms should therefore bear the highest standard of due diligence obligations , proportionate to their societal impact and means. ### (54) very large online platforms may cause societal risks , different in scope and impact from those caused by smaller platforms. once the number of recipients of a platform reaches a significant share of the union population , the systemic risks the platform poses have a disproportionately negative impact in the union. such significant reach should be considered to exist where the number of recipients exceeds an operational threshold set at 45 million , that is , a number equivalent to 10% of the union population. the determination of this operational threshold , therefore , should only take into account those recipients which are physical persons residing in the union or physical persons acting on behalf of a legal person established in the union. automated bots , fake accounts , indirect hyperlinking , ftp or other indirect downloading of content should not be included in the determination of this threshold being exceed. the operational threshold should be kept up to date through amendments enacted by delegated acts , where necessary. such very large online platforms should therefore bear the highest standard of due diligence obligations , proportionate to their societal impact and means.


### 7. for each gatekeeper identified pursuant to paragraph 4 or paragraph 6 , the commission shall identify the relevant undertaking to which it belongs and list the relevant core platform services that are provided within that same undertaking and which individually serve as an important gateway for business users to reach end users as referred to in paragraph 1(b). ### 7. for each gatekeeper identified pursuant to paragraph 4 or paragraph 6 , the commission shall , within 60 days , identify the relevant undertaking to which it belongs and list the relevant core platform services that are provided within that same undertaking and which individually serve as an important gateway for business users to reach end users as referred to in paragraph 1(b).


### 8. the gatekeeper shall comply with the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6 within six months after a core platform service has been included in the list pursuant to paragraph 7 of this article. ### 8. the gatekeeper shall comply with the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6 and shall notify the commission of the details of its compliance with those obligations as soon as possible , and in any case no later than six months after a core platform service has been included in the list pursuant to paragraph 7 of this article.


### 8. the gatekeeper shall comply with the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6 within six months after a core platform service has been included in the list pursuant to paragraph 7 of this article. ### 8. the gatekeeper shall comply with the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6 , and notify the commission of the terms of its compliance , within six months after a core platform service has been included in the list pursuant to paragraph 7 of this article.


### 8. the gatekeeper shall comply with the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6 within six months after a core platform service has been included in the list pursuant to paragraph 7 of this article. ### 8. the gatekeeper shall comply with the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6 within three months after a core platform service has been included in the list pursuant to paragraph 7 of this article.


### 8. the gatekeeper shall comply with the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6 within six months after a core platform service has been included in the list pursuant to paragraph 7 of this article. ### 8. the gatekeeper shall comply with the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6 within four months after a core platform service has been included in the list pursuant to paragraph 7 of this article.


### 8. the gatekeeper shall comply with the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6 within six months after a core platform service has been included in the list pursuant to paragraph 7 of this article. ### 8. the gatekeeper shall notify the commission of the measures that it intends to implement to ensure compliance with the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6 after a core platform service has been included in the list pursuant to paragraph 7 of this article and shall comply with the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6 within six months after a core platform service has been included in the list pursuant to paragraph 7 of this article.


### 8. the gatekeeper shall comply with the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6 within six months after a core platform service has been included in the list pursuant to paragraph 7 of this article. ### 8. the commission shall publish and update the list of gatekeepers and the list of the core platform services for which they need to comply with the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6 on an ongoing basis and send the lists , and each update thereof , to the european parliament.


### 2. the commission shall regularly , and at least every 2 years , review whether the designated gatekeepers continue to satisfy the requirements laid down in article 3(1) , or whether new providers of core platform services satisfy those requirements. the regular review shall also examine whether the list of affected core platform services of the gatekeeper needs to be adjusted. ### 2. the commission shall regularly , and at least every 2 years , review whether the designated gatekeepers continue to satisfy the requirements laid down in article 3(1) , or whether new providers of core platform services satisfy those requirements. the regular review shall also examine whether the list of affected core platform services of the gatekeeper needs to be adjusted and if any business users , especially small and medium-sized enterprises or consumers , have been negatively impacted by the designation of a core platform service as a gatekeeper.


### 3. the commission shall publish and update the list of gatekeepers and the list of the core platform services for which they need to comply with the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6 on an on-going basis. ### 3. the commission shall publish and update the list of gatekeepers and the list of the core platform services for which they need to comply with the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6 on an on-going basis and send it to the european parliament.


### in respect of each of its core platform services identified pursuant to article 3(7) , a gatekeeper shall: ### in respect of each of its core platform and ancillary services identified pursuant respectively to article 3(7) , and article 2(14) a gatekeeper shall:


### in respect of each of its core platform services identified pursuant to article 3(7) , a gatekeeper shall: ### in respect of each of its core platform services identified pursuant to article 3(7) , and ancillary services , a gatekeeper shall:


### refrain from combining personal data sourced from these core platform services with personal data from any other services offered by the gatekeeper or with personal data from third-party services , and from signing in end users to other services of the gatekeeper in order to combine personal data , unless the end user has been presented with the specific choice and provided consent in the sense of regulation (eu) 2016/679. ; ### refrain from combining personal data sourced from these core platform services with personal data from any other services offered by the gatekeeper or with personal data from third-party services , and from signing in end users to other services of the gatekeeper in order to combine personal data.


### refrain from combining personal data sourced from these core platform services with personal data from any other services offered by the gatekeeper or with personal data from third-party services , and from signing in end users to other services of the gatekeeper in order to combine personal data , unless the end user has been presented with the specific choice and provided consent in the sense of regulation (eu) 2016/679. ; ### refrain from combining and accumulating of personal data sourced from these core platform services with personal data from any other services offered by the gatekeeper or with personal data from third-party services , and from signing in end users to other services of the gatekeeper in order to combine and accumulate personal data , and present to the end user , including by offering a less personalised or non-personalised alternative in an explicit , user-friendly , clear and straight forward manner with the specific choice to opt-in to such practices and provide a user friendly consent management to the end user in the sense of regulation (eu) 2016/679;


### refrain from combining personal data sourced from these core platform services with personal data from any other services offered by the gatekeeper or with personal data from third-party services , and from signing in end users to other services of the gatekeeper in order to combine personal data , unless the end user has been presented with the specific choice and provided consent in the sense of regulation (eu) 2016/679; ### refrain from combining personal data sourced from these core platform services with personal data from any other services offered by the gatekeeper or with personal data from third-party services , and from signing in end users to other services of the gatekeeper in order to combine personal data unless the end user has been presented with the specific choice and provided consent in the sense of regulation (eu) 2016/679. in the event that the end user has been presented with the specific choice and has not provided consent , or has withdrawn consent , the gatekeeper shall refrain from offering different or degraded services compared to the services offered to an end user that provided consent , unless such consent is indispensable to ensure the same quality of service;


### refrain from combining personal data sourced from these core platform services with personal data from any other services offered by the gatekeeper or with personal data from third-party services , and from signing in end users to other services of the gatekeeper in order to combine personal data , unless the end user has been presented with the specific choice and provided consent in the sense of regulation (eu) 2016/679. ; ### refrain from combining personal data sourced from these core platform services with personal data from any other services offered by the gatekeeper or with personal data from third-party services , and from signing in end users to other services of the gatekeeper in order to combine personal data , unless the end user provided consent in the sense of regulation (eu) 2016/679 and in particular , has been presented with the effective possibility of selecting the specific purposes for which they consent to the processing of their personal data , including the sources of their personal data to be combined , without such selection affecting the degree of quality of their engagement with the core platform services;


### refrain from combining personal data sourced from these core platform services with personal data from any other services offered by the gatekeeper or with personal data from third-party services , and from signing in end users to other services of the gatekeeper in order to combine personal data , unless the end user has been presented with the specific choice and provided consent in the sense of regulation (eu) 2016/679. ; ### refrain from combining personal data sourced from these core platform services with personal data from any other services offered by the gatekeeper or with personal data from third-party services , and from signing in end users to other services of the gatekeeper in order to combine personal data;


### refrain from combining personal data sourced from these core platform services with personal data from any other services offered by the gatekeeper or with personal data from third-party services , and from signing in end users to other services of the gatekeeper in order to combine personal data , unless the end user has been presented with the specific choice and provided consent in the sense of regulation (eu) 2016/679. ; ### refrain from combining personal data sourced from these core platform services with personal data from any other services offered by the gatekeeper or with personal data from third-party services , and from signing in end users to other services of the gatekeeper in order to combine personal data , unless the end user has received a disclosure of the combination and provided consent in the sense of regulation (eu) 2016/679;


### refrain from combining personal data sourced from these core platform services with personal data from any other services offered by the gatekeeper or with personal data from third-party services , and from signing in end users to other services of the gatekeeper in order to combine personal data , unless the end user has been presented with the specific choice and provided consent in the sense of regulation (eu) 2016/679. ; ### refrain from combining personal data sourced from any of its core platform services with personal data from any other core platform service or other services offered by the gatekeeper or with personal data from third-party services , and from signing in end users to other services of the gatekeeper in order to combine personal data , unless the end user has been presented with the specific choice and provided consent in the sense of article 6(1)(a) of regulation (eu) 2016/679. the gatekeeper shall be entitled to rely on point (c) or point (d) of article 6(1) of regulation (eu) 2016/679 as a legal basis , where applicable.


### allow business users to offer the same products or services to end users through third party online intermediation services at prices or conditions that are different from those offered through the online intermediation services of the gatekeeper; ### allow business users to offer the same products or services to end users by any other means , including through third party online intermediation services and through the business users’ own direct online sales channels at prices or conditions that are different from those offered through the online intermediation services of the gatekeeper;


### allow business users to offer the same products or services to end users through third party online intermediation services at prices or conditions that are different from those offered through the online intermediation services of the gatekeeper; ### allow business users to offer the same products or services to end users through third party online intermediation services or a direct business channel of the business user at prices or conditions that are different from those offered through the online intermediation services of the gatekeeper;


### allow business users to offer the same products or services to end users through third party online intermediation services at prices or conditions that are different from those offered through the online intermediation services of the gatekeeper; ### allow business users to offer the same products or services to end users themselves or through third party online intermediation services at prices or conditions that are different from those offered through the online intermediation services of the gatekeeper;


### allow business users to offer the same products or services to end users through third party online intermediation services at prices or conditions that are different from those offered through the online intermediation services of the gatekeeper; ### allow business users to offer the same products or services to end users through third party online intermediation services or through their own direct sales channels at prices or conditions that are different from those offered through the online intermediation services of the gatekeeper;


### allow business users to offer the same products or services to end users through third party online intermediation services at prices or conditions that are different from those offered through the online intermediation services of the gatekeeper; ### allow business users to offer the same products or services to end users by any other means at prices or conditions that are different from those offered through the online intermediation services of the gatekeeper;


### allow business users to offer the same products or services to end users through third party online intermediation services at prices or conditions that are different from those offered through the online intermediation services of the gatekeeper; ### allow business users to offer end users , either directly or through third party online intermediation services and at different prices or conditions , the same products or services as those offered through the online intermediation services of the gatekeeper;


### allow business users to offer the same products or services to end users through third party online intermediation services at prices or conditions that are different from those offered through the online intermediation services of the gatekeeper; ### allow business users to offer the same products or services to end users by any other means , including through third party online intermediation services and through the business users’ own direct online sales channel sat prices or conditions that are different from those offered through the online intermediation services of the gate keeper;


### allow business users to promote offers to end users acquired via the core platform service , and to conclude contracts with these end users regardless of whether for that purpose they use the core platform services of the gatekeeper or not , and allow end users to access and use , through the core platform services of the gatekeeper , content , subscriptions , features or other items by using the software application of a business user , where these items have been acquired by the end users from the relevant business user without using the core platform services of the gatekeeper; ### allow business users to promote offers to or communicate with end users acquired via the core platform service , within or outside the core platform service , and to conclude contracts with these end users regardless of whether for that purpose they use the core platform services of the gatekeeper or not , and allow end users to access and use , through the core platform services of the gatekeeper , content , subscriptions , features or other items by using the software application of a business user , where these items have been acquired by the end users from the relevant business user without using the core platform services of the gatekeeper , unless the gatekeeper can demonstrate that such access bypasses the security measures of the gatekeeper's core platform service;


### allow business users to promote offers to end users acquired via the core platform service , and to conclude contracts with these end users regardless of whether for that purpose they use the core platform services of the gatekeeper or not , and allow end users to access and use , through the core platform services of the gatekeeper , content , subscriptions , features or other items by using the software application of a business user , where these items have been acquired by the end users from the relevant business user without using the core platform services of the gatekeeper; ### allow business users to promote offers or to otherwise communicate with end users within or outside the core platform service , and to conclude contracts with these end users or receive payments for services provided regardless of whether for that purpose they use the core platform services of the gatekeeper or not , and allow end users to access and use , through the core platform services of the gatekeeper , content , subscriptions , features or other items by using the software application of a business user , where these items have been acquired by the end users from the relevant business user without using the core platform services of the gatekeeper;


### allow business users to promote offers to end users acquired via the core platform service , and to conclude contracts with these end users regardless of whether for that purpose they use the core platform services of the gatekeeper or not , and allow end users to access and use , through the core platform services of the gatekeeper , content , subscriptions , features or other items by using the software application of a business user , where these items have been acquired by the end users from the relevant business user without using the core platform services of the gatekeeper; ### allow business users to promote offers to end users acquired via the core platform service , and to conclude contracts with these end users or receive payments for services provided regardless of whether for that purpose they use the core platform services of the gatekeeper or not , and allow end users to access and use , through the core platform services of the gatekeeper , content , subscriptions , features or other items by using the software application of a business user , where these items have been acquired by the end users from the relevant business user without using the core platform services of the gatekeeper;


### allow business users to promote offers to end users acquired via the core platform service , and to conclude contracts with these end users regardless of whether for that purpose they use the core platform services of the gatekeeper or not , and allow end users to access and use , through the core platform services of the gatekeeper , content , subscriptions , features or other items by using the software application of a business user , where these items have been acquired by the end users from the relevant business user without using the core platform services of the gatekeeper; ### allow business users to promote offers to end users acquired via the core platform service , and to conclude contracts with these end users regardless of whether for that purpose they use the core platform services of the gatekeeper or not , and allow end users to access and use , through the core platform services of the gatekeeper , content , subscriptions , features or other items by using the software application of a business user , where these items have been acquired by the end users from the relevant business user without using the core platform services of the gatekeeper , and does not jeopardise measures by the gatekeeper designed primarily to ensure user safety and data protection;


### allow business users to promote offers to end users acquired via the core platform service , and to conclude contracts with these end users regardless of whether for that purpose they use the core platform services of the gatekeeper or not , and allow end users to access and use , through the core platform services of the gatekeeper , content , subscriptions , features or other items by using the software application of a business user , where these items have been acquired by the end users from the relevant business user without using the core platform services of the gatekeeper; ### allow business users to promote offers or to otherwise communicate with end users within or outside the core platform service , or through other channels , and to conclude contracts with these end users regardless of whether for that purpose they use the core platform services of the gatekeeper or not , and allow end users to access and use , through the core platform services of the gatekeeper , content , subscriptions , features or other items by using the software application of a business user , where these items have been acquired by the end users from the relevant business user without using the core platform services of the gatekeeper , unless the gatekeeper can demonstrate that such access bypasses the security measures of the gatekeeper's core platform service;


### allow business users to promote offers to end users acquired via the core platform service , and to conclude contracts with these end users regardless of whether for that purpose they use the core platform services of the gatekeeper or not , and allow end users to access and use , through the core platform services of the gatekeeper , content , subscriptions , features or other items by using the software application of a business user , where these items have been acquired by the end users from the relevant business user without using the core platform services of the gatekeeper; ### allow business users to promote offers or to otherwise communicate with end users within or outside the core platform service , or through other channels , and to conclude contracts with these end users regardless of whether for that purpose they use the core platform services of the gatekeeper or not , and allow end users to access and use , through the core platform services of the gatekeeper , content , subscriptions , features or other items by using the software application of a business user , where these items have been acquired by the end users from the relevant business user without using the core platform services of the gatekeeper;


### (2) core platform services , at the same time , feature a number of characteristics that can be exploited by their providers. these characteristics of core platform services include among others extreme scale economies , which often result from nearly zero marginal costs to add business users or end users. other characteristics of core platform services are very strong network effects , an ability to connect many business users with many end users through the multi-sidedness of these services , a significant degree of dependence of both business users and end users , lock-in effects , a lack of multi-homing for the same purpose by end users , vertical integration , and data driven-advantages. all these characteristics combined with unfair conduct by providers of these services can have the effect of substantially undermining the contestability of the core platform services , as well as impacting the fairness of the commercial relationship between providers of such services and their business users and end users , leading to rapid and potentially far-reaching decreases in business users’ and end users’ choice in practice , and therefore can confer to the provider of those services the position of a so-called gatekeeper. ### (2) core platform services , at the same time , feature a number of characteristics that can be exploited by their providers. these characteristics of core platform services include among others extreme scale economies , which often result from nearly zero marginal costs to add business users , active users or end users. other characteristics of core platform services are very strong network effects , an ability to connect many business users with many active users and end users through the multi-sidedness of these services , a significant degree of dependence of both business users and end users , lock-in effects , a lack of multi-homing for the same purpose by end users , vertical integration , and data driven-advantages. all these characteristics combined with unfair conduct by providers of these services can have the effect of substantially undermining the contestability of the core platform services , as well as impacting the fairness of the commercial relationship between providers of such services and their business users and end users , leading to rapid and potentially far-reaching decreases in business users’ and end users’ choice in practice , and therefore can confer to the provider of those services the position of a so-called gatekeeper.


### (3) a small number of large providers of core platform services have emerged with considerable economic power. typically , they feature an ability to connect many business users with many end users through their services which , in turn , allows them to leverage their advantages , such as their access to large amounts of data , from one area of their activity to new ones. some of these providers exercise control over whole platform ecosystems in the digital economy and are structurally extremely difficult to challenge or contest by existing or new market operators , irrespective of how innovative and efficient these may be. contestability is particularly reduced due to the existence of very high barriers to entry or exit , including high investment costs , which cannot , or not easily , be recuperated in case of exit , and absence of (or reduced access to) some key inputs in the digital economy , such as data. as a result , the likelihood increases that the underlying markets do not function well – or will soon fail to function well. ### (3) a small number of large providers of core platform services have emerged with considerable economic power. typically , they feature an ability to connect many business users with many active users and end users through their services which , in turn , allows them to leverage their advantages , such as their access to large amounts of data , from one area of their activity to new ones. some of these providers exercise control over whole platform ecosystems in the digital economy and are structurally extremely difficult to challenge or contest by existing or new market operators , irrespective of how innovative and efficient these may be. contestability is particularly reduced due to the existence of very high barriers to entry or exit , including high investment costs , which cannot , or not easily , be recuperated in case of exit , and absence of (or reduced access to) some key inputs in the digital economy , such as data. as a result , the likelihood increases that the underlying markets do not function well – or will soon fail to function well.


### (4) the combination of those features of gatekeepers is likely to lead in many cases to serious imbalances in bargaining power and , consequently , to unfair practices and conditions for business users as well as end users of core platform services provided by gatekeepers , to the detriment of prices , quality , choice and innovation therein. ### (4) the combination of those features of gatekeepers is likely to lead in many cases to serious imbalances in bargaining power and , consequently , to unfair practices and conditions for business users as well as active and end users of core platform services provided by gatekeepers , to the detriment of prices , quality , choice and innovation therein.


### (6) gatekeepers have a significant impact on the internal market , providing gateways for a large number of business users , to reach end users , everywhere in the union and on different markets. the adverse impact of unfair practices on the internal market and particularly weak contestability of core platform services , including their negative societal and economic implications , have led national legislators and sectoral regulators to act. a number of national regulatory solutions have already been adopted or proposed to address unfair practices and the contestability of digital services or at least with regard to some of them. this has created a risk of divergent regulatory solutions and thereby fragmentation of the internal market , thus raising the risk of increased compliance costs due to different sets of national regulatory requirements. ### (6) gatekeepers have a significant impact on the internal market , providing gateways for a large number of business users , to reach active and end users , everywhere in the union and on different markets. the adverse impact of unfair practices on the internal market and particularly weak contestability of core platform services , including their negative societal and economic implications , have led national legislators and sectoral regulators to act. a number of national regulatory solutions have already been adopted or proposed to address unfair practices and the contestability of digital services or at least with regard to some of them. this has created a risk of divergent regulatory solutions and thereby fragmentation of the internal market , thus raising the risk of increased compliance costs due to different sets of national regulatory requirements.


### (7) therefore , business users and end-users of core platform services provided by gatekeepers should be afforded appropriate regulatory safeguards throughout the union against the unfair behaviour of gatekeepers in order to facilitate cross-border business within the union and thereby improve the proper functioning of the internal market and to address existing or likely emerging fragmentation in the specific areas covered by this regulation. moreover , while gatekeepers tend to adopt global or at least pan-european business models and algorithmic structures , they can adopt , and in some cases have adopted , different business conditions and practices in different member states , which is liable to create disparities between the competitive conditions for the users of core platform services provided by gatekeepers , to the detriment of integration within the internal market. ### (7) therefore , business users , active users and end-users of core platform services provided by gatekeepers should be afforded appropriate regulatory safeguards throughout the union against the unfair behaviour of gatekeepers in order to facilitate cross-border business within the union and thereby improve the proper functioning of the internal market and to address existing or likely emerging fragmentation in the specific areas covered by this regulation. in this regard , calls on the commission to clarify the liability of transport and tourism platforms , in order to promote responsible behaviour , transparency , legal certainty and thereby increase user confidence. moreover , while gatekeepers tend to adopt global or at least pan-european business models and algorithmic structures , they can adopt , and in some cases have adopted , different business conditions and practices in different member states , which is liable to create disparities between the competitive conditions for the users of core platform services provided by gatekeepers , to the detriment of integration within the internal market.


### (8) by approximating diverging national laws , obstacles to the freedom to provide and receive services , including retail services , within the internal market should be eliminated. a targeted set of harmonised mandatory rules should therefore be established at union level to ensure contestable and fair digital markets featuring the presence of gatekeepers within the internal market. ### (8) by approximating diverging national laws , obstacles to the freedom to provide and receive services , including retail services , within the internal market should be eliminated. a targeted set of harmonised mandatory rules should therefore be established at union level to ensure contestable and fair digital markets featuring the presence of gatekeepers within the internal market , and in order to create and maintain a safer environment and legal certainty for the users and public authorities.


### (9) a fragmentation of the internal market can only be effectively averted if member states are prevented from applying national rules which are specific to the types of undertakings and services covered by this regulation. at the same time , since this regulation aims at complementing the enforcement of competition law , it should be specified that this regulation is without prejudice to articles 101 and 102 tfeu , to the corresponding national competition rules and to other national competition rules regarding unilateral behaviour that are based on an individualised assessment of market positions and behaviour , including its likely effects and the precise scope of the prohibited behaviour , and which provide for the possibility of undertakings to make efficiency and objective justification arguments for the behaviour in question. however , the application of the latter rules should not affect the obligations imposed on gatekeepers under this regulation and their uniform and effective application in the internal market. ### (9) a fragmentation of the internal market can only be effectively averted if member states are prevented from applying national rules which are specific to the types of services and their providers covered by this regulation. at the same time , since this regulation aims at complementing the enforcement of competition law , it should be specified that this regulation is without prejudice to articles 101 and 102 tfeu , to the corresponding national competition rules and to other national competition rules regarding unilateral behaviour that are based on an individualised assessment of market positions and behaviour , including its likely effects and the precise scope of the prohibited behaviour , and which provide for the possibility of undertakings to make efficiency and objective justification arguments for the behaviour in question. however , the application of the latter rules should not affect the obligations imposed on gatekeepers under this regulation and their uniform and effective application in the internal market.


### (12) weak contestability and unfair practices in the digital sector are more frequent and pronounced for certain digital services than for others. this is the case in particular for widespread and commonly used digital services that mostly directly intermediate between business users and end users and where features such as extreme scale economies , very strong network effects , an ability to connect many business users with many end users through the multi-sidedness of these services , lock-in effects , a lack of multi-homing or vertical integration are the most prevalent. often , there is only one or very few large providers of those digital services. these providers of core platform services have emerged most frequently as gatekeepers for business users and end users with far-reaching impacts , gaining the ability to easily set commercial conditions and terms in a unilateral and detrimental manner for their business users and end users. accordingly , it is necessary to focus only on those digital services that are most broadly used by business users and end users and where , based on current market conditions , concerns about weak contestability and unfair practices by gatekeepers are more apparent and pressing from an internal market perspective. ### (12) weak contestability and unfair practices in the digital sector are more frequent and pronounced for certain digital services than for others. this is the case in particular for widespread and commonly used digital services that mostly directly intermediate between business users and end users and where features such as extreme scale economies , very strong network effects , an ability to connect many business users with many end users through the multi-sidedness of these services , lock-in effects , a lack of multi-homing or vertical integration are the most prevalent. often , there is only one or very few large providers of those digital services. these providers of core platform services have emerged most frequently as gatekeepers for business users and end users with far-reaching impacts , gaining the ability to easily set commercial conditions and terms in a unilateral and detrimental manner for their business users and end users. accordingly , it is necessary to focus only on those digital services that are most broadly used by business users and active or end users and where , based on current market conditions , concerns about weak contestability and unfair practices by gatekeepers are more apparent and pressing from an internal market perspective. in this regard , stresses the importance and the particularities of the transport and tourism online platform market , which require a sector-specific approach and special attention in this regard. highlights the importance of collaborative economy platforms in the transport and tourism sectors , on which services are provided by both individuals and professionals and stresses the importance of avoiding imposing disproportionate information requirements and administrative burdens on peer-to-peer providers of services.


### (13) in particular , online intermediation services , online search engines , operating systems , online social networking , video sharing platform services , number-independent interpersonal communication services , cloud computing services and online advertising services all have the capacity to affect a large number of end users and businesses alike , which entails a risk of unfair business practices. they therefore should be included in the definition of core platform services and fall into the scope of this regulation. online intermediation services may also be active in the field of financial services , and they may intermediate or be used to provide such services as listed non-exhaustively in annex ii to directive (eu) 2015/1535 of the european parliament and of the council32 . in certain circumstances , the notion of end users should encompass users that are traditionally considered business users , but in a given situation do not use the core platform services to provide goods or services to other end users , such as for example businesses relying on cloud computing services for their own purposes. ### (13) in particular , online intermediation services , online search engines , operating systems , online social networking , web browsers , video sharing platform services , number-independent interpersonal communication services , cloud computing services and online advertising services all have the capacity to affect a large number of end users and businesses alike , which entails a risk of unfair business practices. they therefore should be included in the definition of core platform services and fall into the scope of this regulation. online intermediation services should be considered irrespective of the technology used to provide such services. in this sense , virtual or voice activated assistants and other connected devices fall within the scope of this regulation whether their software is considered an operating system , an online intermediation service or a search engine. online intermediation services may also be active in the field of financial services , and they may intermediate or be used to provide such services as listed non-exhaustively in annex ii to directive (eu) 2015/1535 of the european parliament and of the council32 . in certain circumstances , the notion of end users should encompass users that are traditionally considered business users , but in a given situation do not use the core platform services to provide goods or services to other end users , such as for example businesses relying on cloud computing services for their own purposes.


### (13) in particular , online intermediation services , online search engines , operating systems , online social networking , video sharing platform services , number-independent interpersonal communication services , cloud computing services and online advertising services all have the capacity to affect a large number of end users and businesses alike , which entails a risk of unfair business practices. they therefore should be included in the definition of core platform services and fall into the scope of this regulation. online intermediation services may also be active in the field of financial services , and they may intermediate or be used to provide such services as listed non-exhaustively in annex ii to directive (eu) 2015/1535 of the european parliament and of the council32 . in certain circumstances , the notion of end users should encompass users that are traditionally considered business users , but in a given situation do not use the core platform services to provide goods or services to other end users , such as for example businesses relying on cloud computing services for their own purposes. ### (13) in particular , online intermediation services , online search engines , operating systems , online social networking , video sharing platform services , number-independent interpersonal communication services , cloud computing services , online advertising services and web browsers all have the capacity to affect a large number of end users and businesses alike , which entails a risk of unfair business practices. they therefore should be included in the definition of core platform services and fall into the scope of this regulation. online intermediation services may also be active in the field of financial services , and they may intermediate or be used to provide such services as listed non-exhaustively in annex ii to directive(eu) 2015/1535 of the european parliament and of the council32. in certain circumstances , the notion of end users should encompass users that are traditionally considered business users , but in a given situation do not use the core platform services to provide goods or services to other end users , such as for example businesses relying on cloud computing services for their own purposes.


### (13) in particular , online intermediation services , online search engines , operating systems , online social networking , video sharing platform services , number-independent interpersonal communication services , cloud computing services and online advertising services all have the capacity to affect a large number of end users and businesses alike , which entails a risk of unfair business practices. they therefore should be included in the definition of core platform services and fall into the scope of this regulation. online intermediation services may also be active in the field of financial services , and they may intermediate or be used to provide such services as listed non-exhaustively in annex ii to directive (eu) 2015/1535 of the european parliament and of the council32 . in certain circumstances , the notion of end users should encompass users that are traditionally considered business users , but in a given situation do not use the core platform services to provide goods or services to other end users , such as for example businesses relying on cloud computing services for their own purposes. ### (13) in particular , online intermediation services , online search engines , operating systems , online social networking , video sharing platform services , number-independent interpersonal communication services , cloud computing services , online advertising services and web browsers all have the capacity to affect a large number of end users and businesses alike , which entails a risk of unfair business practices. they therefore should be included in the definition of core platform services and fall into the scope of this regulation. online intermediation services may also be active in the field of financial services , and they may intermediate or be used to provide such services as listed non-exhaustively in annex ii to directive (eu) 2015/1535 of the european parliament and of the council32 . in certain circumstances , the notion of end users should encompass users that are traditionally considered business users , but in a given situation do not use the core platform services to provide goods or services to other end users , such as for example businesses relying on cloud computing services for their own purposes.


### (13) in particular , online intermediation services , online search engines , operating systems , online social networking , video sharing platform services , number-independent interpersonal communication services , cloud computing services and online advertising services all have the capacity to affect a large number of end users and businesses alike , which entails a risk of unfair business practices. they therefore should be included in the definition of core platform services and fall into the scope of this regulation. online intermediation services may also be active in the field of financial services , and they may intermediate or be used to provide such services as listed non-exhaustively in annex ii to directive (eu) 2015/1535 of the european parliament and of the council32 . in certain circumstances , the notion of end users should encompass users that are traditionally considered business users , but in a given situation do not use the core platform services to provide goods or services to other end users , such as for example businesses relying on cloud computing services for their own purposes. ### (13) in particular , online intermediation services , online search engines , web browsers , operating systems , online social networking , video sharing platform services , number-independent interpersonal communication services , cloud computing services and online advertising services all have the capacity to affect a large number of end users and businesses alike , which entails a risk of unfair business practices. they therefore should be included in the definition of core platform services and fall into the scope of this regulation. online intermediation services should be covered irrespective of the technology used to provide such services. in this regard , virtual or voice activated assistants and other connected devices should fall within the scope of this regulation irrespective of the software used as an operating system , an online intermediation service or a search engine. online intermediation services may also be active in the field of financial services , and they may intermediate or be used to provide such services as listed non-exhaustively in annex ii to directive (eu) 2015/1535 of the european parliament and of the council32 . in certain circumstances , the notion of end users should encompass users that are traditionally considered business users , but in a given situation do not use the core platform services to provide goods or services to other end users , such as for example businesses relying on cloud computing services for their own purposes.


### (13) in particular , online intermediation services , online search engines , operating systems , online social networking , video sharing platform services , number-independent interpersonal communication services , cloud computing services and online advertising services all have the capacity to affect a large number of end users and businesses alike , which entails a risk of unfair business practices. they therefore should be included in the definition of core platform services and fall into the scope of this regulation. online intermediation services may also be active in the field of financial services , and they may intermediate or be used to provide such services as listed non-exhaustively in annex ii to directive (eu) 2015/1535 of the european parliament and of the council32 . in certain circumstances , the notion of end users should encompass users that are traditionally considered business users , but in a given situation do not use the core platform services to provide goods or services to other end users , such as for example businesses relying on cloud computing services for their own purposes. ### (13) in particular , online intermediation services , online search engines , web browsers , operating systems , online social networking , video sharing platform services , number-independent interpersonal communication services , cloud computing services and online advertising services all have the capacity to affect a large number of end users and businesses alike , which entails a risk of unfair business practices. they therefore should be included in the definition of core platform services and fall into the scope of this regulation. online intermediation services should be included irrespective of the technology used to provide such services. for that reason , virtual or voice activated assistants and other connected devices should fall within the scope of this regulation whether their software is considered an operating system , an online intermediation service or a search engine. online intermediation services may also be active in the field of financial services , and they may intermediate or be used to provide such services as listed non-exhaustively in annex ii to directive (eu) 2015/1535 of the european parliament and of the council32 . in certain circumstances , the notion of end users should encompass users that are traditionally considered business users , but in a given situation do not use the core platform services to provide goods or services to other end users , such as for example businesses relying on cloud computing services for their own purposes.


### (15) the fact that a digital service qualifies as a core platform service in light of its widespread and common use and its importance for connecting business users and end users does not as such give rise to sufficiently serious concerns of contestability and unfair practices. it is only when a core platform service constitutes an important gateway and is operated by a provider with a significant impact in the internal market and an entrenched and durable position , or by a provider that will foreseeably have such a position in the near future , that such concerns arise. accordingly , the targeted set of harmonised rules laid down in this regulation should apply only to undertakings designated on the basis of these three objective criteria , and they should only apply to those of their core platform services that individually constitute an important gateway for business users to reach end users. ### (15) the fact that a digital service qualifies as a core platform service in light of its widespread and common use and its importance for connecting business users and end users does not as such give rise to sufficiently serious concerns of contestability and unfair practices. it is only when a core platform service constitutes an important gateway and is operated by a provider with a significant impact in the internal market and an entrenched and durable position , or by a provider that will foreseeably have such a position in the near future , that such concerns arise. accordingly , the targeted set of harmonised rules laid down in this regulation should apply only to providers of core platform services designated on the basis of these three objective criteria , and they should only apply to those of their core platform services that individually constitute an important gateway for business users to reach end users.


### (57) in particular gatekeepers which provide access to software application stores serve as an important gateway for business users that seek to reach end users. in view of the imbalance in bargaining power between those gatekeepers and business users of their software application stores , those gatekeepers should not be allowed to impose general conditions , including pricing conditions , that would be unfair or lead to unjustified differentiation. pricing or other general access conditions should be considered unfair if they lead to an imbalance of rights and obligations imposed on business users or confer an advantage on the gatekeeper which is disproportionate to the service provided by the gatekeeper to business users or lead to a disadvantage for business users in providing the same or similar services as the gatekeeper. the following benchmarks can serve as a yardstick to determine the fairness of general access conditions: prices charged or conditions imposed for the same or similar services by other providers of software application stores; prices charged or conditions imposed by the provider of the software application store for different related or similar services or to different types of end users; prices charged or conditions imposed by the provider of the software application store for the same service in different geographic regions; prices charged or conditions imposed by the provider of the software application store for the same service the gatekeeper offers to itself. this obligation should not establish an access right and it should be without prejudice to the ability of providers of software application stores to take the required responsibility in the fight against illegal and unwanted content as set out in regulation [digital services act]. ### (57) core platform services provided by gatekeepers , and in particular gatekeepers which provide access to software application stores , serve as an important gateway for business users that seek to reach end users. in view of the imbalance in bargaining power between those gatekeepers and business users of their core platform services , those gatekeepers should not be allowed to impose general conditions , including pricing conditions , data usage conditions or conditions related to the licensing of rights held by the business user that would be unfair or lead to unjustified differentiation. pricing or other general access or treatment conditions should be considered unfair if they lead to an imbalance of rights and obligations imposed on business users or confer an advantage on the gatekeeper which is disproportionate to the service provided by the gatekeeper to business users or lead to a disadvantage for business users in providing the same or similar services as the gatekeeper. the following benchmarks can serve as a yardstick to determine the fairness of general access conditions: prices charged or conditions imposed for the same or similar services by other providers of the relevant core platform service; prices charged or conditions imposed by the gatekeeper for different related or similar services or to different types of end users; prices charged or conditions imposed by the gatekeeper for the same service in different geographic regions; prices charged or conditions imposed by the provider of the software application store for the same service the gatekeeper offers to itself. this obligation should not establish an access right and it should be without prejudice to the ability of providers of core platform services to take the required responsibility in the fight against illegal and unwanted content as set out in regulation [digital services act].


### (57) in particular gatekeepers which provide access to software application stores serve as an important gateway for business users that seek to reach end users. in view of the imbalance in bargaining power between those gatekeepers and business users of their software application stores , those gatekeepers should not be allowed to impose general conditions , including pricing conditions , that would be unfair or lead to unjustified differentiation. pricing or other general access conditions should be considered unfair if they lead to an imbalance of rights and obligations imposed on business users or confer an advantage on the gatekeeper which is disproportionate to the service provided by the gatekeeper to business users or lead to a disadvantage for business users in providing the same or similar services as the gatekeeper. the following benchmarks can serve as a yardstick to determine the fairness of general access conditions: prices charged or conditions imposed for the same or similar services by other providers of software application stores; prices charged or conditions imposed by the provider of the software application store for different related or similar services or to different types of end users; prices charged or conditions imposed by the provider of the software application store for the same service in different geographic regions; prices charged or conditions imposed by the provider of the software application store for the same service the gatekeeper offers to itself. this obligation should not establish an access right and it should be without prejudice to the ability of providers of software application stores to take the required responsibility in the fight against illegal and unwanted content as set out in regulation [digital services act]. ### (57) gatekeepers which provide access to core platform services serve as an important gateway for business users that seek to reach end users. in view of the imbalance in bargaining power between those gatekeepers and business users of their core platform services , those gatekeepers should not be allowed to impose general conditions , including pricing conditions , that would be unfair or lead to unjustified differentiation. pricing or other general access conditions should be considered unfair if they lead to an imbalance of rights and obligations imposed on business users or confer an advantage on the gatekeeper which is disproportionate to the service provided by the gatekeeper to business users or lead to a disadvantage for business users in providing the same or similar services as the gatekeeper. the following benchmarks can serve as a yardstick to determine the fairness of general access conditions: prices charged or conditions imposed for the same or similar services by other providers of core platform services; prices charged or conditions imposed by the provider of the software application store for different related or similar services or to different types of end users; prices charged or conditions imposed by the provider of the core platform services for the same service in different geographic regions; prices charged or conditions imposed by the provider of the core platform services for the same service the gatekeeper offers to itself. this obligation should not establish an access right and it should be without prejudice to the ability of providers of core platform services to take the required responsibility in the fight against illegal and unwanted content as set out in regulation [digital services act].


### 7. a gatekeeper may request the opening of proceedings pursuant to article 18 for the commission to determine whether the measures that the gatekeeper intends to implement or has implemented under article 6 are effective in achieving the objective of the relevant obligation in the specific circumstances. a gatekeeper may , with its request , provide a reasoned submission to explain in particular why the measures that it intends to implement or has implemented are effective in achieving the objective of the relevant obligation in the specific circumstances. ### deleted


### 7. a gatekeeper may request the opening of proceedings pursuant to article 18 for the commission to determine whether the measures that the gatekeeper intends to implement or has implemented under article 6 are effective in achieving the objective of the relevant obligation in the specific circumstances. a gatekeeper may , with its request , provide a reasoned submission to explain in particular why the measures that it intends to implement or has implemented are effective in achieving the objective of the relevant obligation in the specific circumstances. ### 7. a gatekeeper may , within the deadline set in article 3(8) , request the opening of proceedings pursuant to article 18 for the commission to determine whether the measures that the gatekeeper intends to implement or has implemented under article 6 are effective in achieving the objective of the relevant obligation in the specific circumstances. a gatekeeper may , with its request , provide a reasoned submission to explain in particular why the measures that it intends to implement or has implemented are effective in achieving the objective of the relevant obligation in the specific circumstances. the commission shall adopt its decision within six months from the opening of proceedings pursuant to article 18. if in its decision the commission finds the gatekeeper is non-compliant under article 25 and a decision under article 26 is taken , the non-compliance period is considered to have commenced from the implementation deadline in article 3(8).


### 7. a gatekeeper may request the opening of proceedings pursuant to article 18 for the commission to determine whether the measures that the gatekeeper intends to implement or has implemented under article 6 are effective in achieving the objective of the relevant obligation in the specific circumstances. a gatekeeper may , with its request , provide a reasoned submission to explain in particular why the measures that it intends to implement or has implemented are effective in achieving the objective of the relevant obligation in the specific circumstances. ### 7. a gatekeeper may request the opening of proceedings pursuant to article 18 for the commission to determine whether the measures that the gatekeeper intends to implement or has implemented under article 6 are effective in achieving the objective of the relevant obligation in the specific circumstances. a gatekeeper shall , with its request , provide a reasoned submission to explain in particular why the measures that it intends to implement or has implemented are effective in achieving the objective of the relevant obligation in the specific circumstances.


### 7. a gatekeeper may request the opening of proceedings pursuant to article 18 for the commission to determine whether the measures that the gatekeeper intends to implement or has implemented under article 6 are effective in achieving the objective of the relevant obligation in the specific circumstances. a gatekeeper may , with its request , provide a reasoned submission to explain in particular why the measures that it intends to implement or has implemented are effective in achieving the objective of the relevant obligation in the specific circumstances. ### 7. a gatekeeper may request the opening of proceedings pursuant to article 18 for the commission to determine whether the measures that the gatekeeper intends to implement or has implemented under article 6 are effective in achieving the objective of the relevant obligation in the specific circumstances. a gatekeeper may , with its request , provide a reasoned submission to explain in particular why the measures that it intends to implement or has implemented are effective in achieving the objective of the relevant obligation in the specific circumstances. a gatekeeper shall continue to comply with all relevant obligations during the proceedings pursuant to article 18.


### 7. a gatekeeper may request the opening of proceedings pursuant to article 18 for the commission to determine whether the measures that the gatekeeper intends to implement or has implemented under article 6 are effective in achieving the objective of the relevant obligation in the specific circumstances. a gatekeeper may , with its request , provide a reasoned submission to explain in particular why the measures that it intends to implement or has implemented are effective in achieving the objective of the relevant obligation in the specific circumstances. ### 7. a gatekeeper may request the opening of proceedings pursuant to article 18 for the commission to determine whether the measures that the gatekeeper intends to implement or has implemented under article 6 are proportionate and effective in achieving the objective of the relevant obligation in the specific circumstances. a gatekeeper may , with its request , provide a reasoned submission to explain in particular why the measures that it intends to implement or has implemented are proportionate and effective in achieving the objective of the relevant obligation in the specific circumstances.


### 1. the commission may , on a reasoned request by the gatekeeper , exceptionally suspend , in whole or in part , a specific obligation laid down in articles 5 and 6 for a core platform service by decision adopted in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in article 32(4) , where the gatekeeper demonstrates that compliance with that specific obligation would endanger , due to exceptional circumstances beyond the control of the gatekeeper , the economic viability of the operation of the gatekeeper in the union , and only to the extent necessary to address such threat to its viability. the commission shall aim to adopt the suspension decision without delay and at the latest 3 months following receipt of a complete reasoned request. ### 1. the commission may , on a reasoned request by the gatekeeper , exceptionally suspend , in whole or in part , a specific obligation laid down in articles 5 and 6 for a core platform service by decision adopted in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in article 32(4) , where the gatekeeper demonstrates that compliance with that specific obligation would endanger , due to exceptional circumstances beyond the control of the gatekeeper , the economic viability of the operation of the gatekeeper in the union , and only to the extent necessary to address such threat to its viability. the commission shall aim to adopt the suspension decision without delay and at the latest 3 months following receipt of a complete reasoned request. the suspension decision shall be accompanied by a reasoned statement explaining the grounds for the suspension.


### 1. the commission may , on a reasoned request by the gatekeeper , exceptionally suspend , in whole or in part , a specific obligation laid down in articles 5 and 6 for a core platform service by decision adopted in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in article 32(4) , where the gatekeeper demonstrates that compliance with that specific obligation would endanger , due to exceptional circumstances beyond the control of the gatekeeper , the economic viability of the operation of the gatekeeper in the union , and only to the extent necessary to address such threat to its viability. the commission shall aim to adopt the suspension decision without delay and at the latest 3 months following receipt of a complete reasoned request. ### 1. the commission may , on a reasoned request by the gatekeeper , exceptionally suspend , in whole or in part , a specific obligation laid down in articles 5 and 6 for a core platform service by decision adopted in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in article 32(4) , where the gatekeeper demonstrates that compliance with that specific obligation:


### 2. where the suspension is granted pursuant to paragraph 1 , the commission shall review its suspension decision every year. following such a review the commission shall either lift the suspension or decide that the conditions of paragraph 1 continue to be met. ### 2. where the suspension is granted pursuant to paragraph 1 , the commission shall review its suspension decision every year. following such a review the commission shall either in whole or in part lift the suspension or decide that the conditions of paragraph 1 continue to be met.


### in assessing the request , the commission shall take into account , in particular , the impact of the compliance with the specific obligation on the economic viability of the operation of the gatekeeper in the union as well as on third parties. the suspension may be made subject to conditions and obligations to be defined by the commission in order to ensure a fair balance between these interests and the objectives of this regulation. such a request may be made and granted at any time pending the assessment of the commission pursuant to paragraph 1. ### in assessing the request , the commission shall take into account , in particular , the impact of the compliance with the specific obligation on the economic viability of the operation of the gatekeeper in the union as well as on third parties , in particular smaller business users and consumers. the suspension may be made subject to conditions and obligations to be defined by the commission in order to ensure a fair balance between these interests and the objectives of this regulation. such a request may be made and granted at any time pending the assessment of the commission pursuant to paragraph 1.


### in assessing the request , the commission shall take into account , in particular , the impact of the compliance with the specific obligation on the economic viability of the operation of the gatekeeper in the union as well as on third parties. the suspension may be made subject to conditions and obligations to be defined by the commission in order to ensure a fair balance between these interests and the objectives of this regulation. such a request may be made and granted at any time pending the assessment of the commission pursuant to paragraph 1. ### in assessing the request , the commission shall take into account the conditions listed in paragraph 1 of this article and the impact of the compliance with the specific obligation on third parties. the suspension may be made subject to conditions and obligations to be defined by the commission in order to ensure a fair balance between these interests and the objectives of this regulation. such a request may be made and granted at any time pending the assessment of the commission pursuant to paragraph 1.


### public morality; ### public policy;


### 1. the commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with article 34 to update the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6 where , based on a market investigation pursuant to article 17 , it has identified the need for new obligations addressing practices that limit the contestability of core platform services or are unfair in the same way as the practices addressed by the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6. ### 1. the commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with article 34 to update and strengthen the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6 where , based on a market investigation pursuant to article 17 , it has identified the need for new obligations addressing practices that limit the contestability of core platform services or are unfair in the same way as the practices addressed by the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6.


### 1. the commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with article 34 to update the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6 where , based on a market investigation pursuant to article 17 , it has identified the need for new obligations addressing practices that limit the contestability of core platform services or are unfair in the same way as the practices addressed by the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6. ### 1. the commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with article 37 to update the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6 where , based on a market investigation pursuant to article 17 , it has identified the need for new obligations addressing practices that limit the contestability of core platform services or are unfair in the same way as the practices addressed by the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6.


### there is an imbalance of rights and obligations on business users and the gatekeeper is obtaining an advantage from business users that is disproportionate to the service provided by the gatekeeper to business users; or ### there is an imbalance of rights and obligations on business users or the gatekeeper is obtaining an advantage from business users that is disproportionate to the service provided by the gatekeeper to business users; or


### 1. a gatekeeper shall ensure that the obligations of articles 5 and 6 are fully and effectively complied with. while the obligations of articles 5 and 6 apply in respect of core platform services designated pursuant to article 3 , their implementation shall not be undermined by any behaviour of the undertaking to which the gatekeeper belongs , regardless of whether this behaviour is of a contractual , commercial , technical or any other nature. ### 1. a gatekeeper shall ensure that the obligations of articles 5 and 6 are fully and effectively complied with. while the obligations of articles 5 and 6 apply in respect of core platform services designated pursuant to article 3 , their implementation shall not be undermined by any behaviour of the gatekeeper or any part of the undertaking to which the gatekeeper belongs , regardless of whether this behaviour is of a contractual , commercial , technical or any other nature , including through product design or by presenting end user choices in a non-neutral manner , or by otherwise subverting or impairing user autonomy , decision-making , or choice via the structure , function or manner of operation of a user interface or a part thereof.


### 1. a gatekeeper shall ensure that the obligations of articles 5 and 6 are fully and effectively complied with. while the obligations of articles 5 and 6 apply in respect of core platform services designated pursuant to article 3 , their implementation shall not be undermined by any behaviour of the undertaking to which the gatekeeper belongs , regardless of whether this behaviour is of a contractual , commercial , technical or any other nature. ### 1. a gatekeeper shall ensure that the obligations of articles 5 and 6 are fully and effectively complied with. while the obligations of articles 5 and 6 apply in respect of core and ancillary platform services , respectively pursuant to article 3 and article 2 (point 14) , their implementation shall not be undermined by any behaviour of the gatekeeper itself or of any third party belonging to the same undertaking to which the gatekeeper belongs , regardless of whether this behaviour is of a contractual , commercial , technical or any other nature.


### 1. a gatekeeper shall ensure that the obligations of articles 5 and 6 are fully and effectively complied with. while the obligations of articles 5 and 6 apply in respect of core platform services designated pursuant to article 3 , their implementation shall not be undermined by any behaviour of the undertaking to which the gatekeeper belongs , regardless of whether this behaviour is of a contractual , commercial , technical or any other nature. ### 1. a gatekeeper shall ensure that the obligations of articles 5 and 6 are fully and effectively complied with. while the obligations of articles 5 and 6 apply in respect of core platform services designated pursuant to article 3 , a gatekeeper , including any undertaking to which the gatekeeper belongs , shall not engage in any behaviour regardless of whether this behaviour is of a contractual , commercial , technical or any other nature that would undermine these obligations.


### 2. where consent for collecting and processing of personal data is required to ensure compliance with this regulation , a gatekeeper shall take the necessary steps to either enable business users to directly obtain the required consent to their processing , where required under regulation (eu) 2016/679 and directive 2002/58/ec , or to comply with union data protection and privacy rules and principles in other ways including by providing business users with duly anonymised data where appropriate. the gatekeeper shall not make the obtaining of this consent by the business user more burdensome than for its own services. ### 2. where consent for collecting and processing of personal data is required to ensure compliance with this regulation , a gatekeeper shall take the necessary steps to either enable business users to directly obtain the required consent to their processing , where required under regulation (eu) 2016/679 and directive 2002/58/ec , and comply with union data protection and privacy rules and principles in other ways including by providing business users with duly effectively anonymised data with every reasonable means and techniques available to prevent re-identification. the gatekeeper shall not make the obtaining of this consent by the business user more burdensome than for its own services.


### 3. a gatekeeper shall not degrade the conditions or quality of any of the core platform services provided to business users or end users who avail themselves of the rights or choices laid down in articles 5 and 6 , or make the exercise of those rights or choices unduly difficult. ### 3. a gatekeeper shall not degrade the conditions or quality of any of the core platform services provided to business users or end users who avail themselves of the rights or choices laid down in articles 5 and 6 , or make the exercise of those rights or choices unduly difficult , including by presenting end-user choices in a non-neutral manner , or by otherwise subverting or impairing user autonomy , decision-making , or choice via the structure , function or manner of operation of a user interface or a part thereof.


### 3. a gatekeeper shall not degrade the conditions or quality of any of the core platform services provided to business users or end users who avail themselves of the rights or choices laid down in articles 5 and 6 , or make the exercise of those rights or choices unduly difficult. ### 3. a gatekeeper shall not degrade the conditions or quality of any of the core platform services provided to business users or end users who avail themselves of the rights or choices laid down in articles 5 and 6 , or make the exercise of those rights or choices unduly difficult , including by offering choices to the end-user in a non-neutral manner , or by subverting user's autonomy , decision-making , or choice via the structure , function or manner of operation of a user interface or a part thereof.


### 3. a gatekeeper shall not degrade the conditions or quality of any of the core platform services provided to business users or end users who avail themselves of the rights or choices laid down in articles 5 and 6 , or make the exercise of those rights or choices unduly difficult. ### 3. a gatekeeper shall not degrade the conditions or quality of any of the core platform services provided to business users or end users who avail themselves of the rights and possibilities including consent of combining end user data or signing in users with offering a less personalised and non-personalised alternatives or choices laid down in articles 5 and 6 , or make the exercise of those rights or choices unduly difficult and avoid the use of behavioural techniques and interface design with lack of transparency , inadequate information and lack of valid consent to ads personalisation or consumer profiling;


### 3. a gatekeeper shall not degrade the conditions or quality of any of the core platform services provided to business users or end users who avail themselves of the rights or choices laid down in articles 5 and 6 , or make the exercise of those rights or choices unduly difficult. ### 3. a gatekeeper shall not degrade the conditions or quality of any of the core platform services provided to business users or end users who avail themselves of the rights or choices laid down in articles 5 and 6 , or make the exercise of those rights or choices unduly difficult including by offering choices to the end-user in a non-neutral manner , or by subverting user's autonomy , decision-making , or choice via the structure , function or manner of operation of a user interface or a part thereof.


### 1. a gatekeeper shall inform the commission of any intended concentration within the meaning of article 3 of regulation (ec) no 139/2004 involving another provider of core platform services or of any other services provided in the digital sector irrespective of whether it is notifiable to a union competition authority under regulation (ec) no 139/2004 or to a competent national competition authority under national merger rules. ### 1. a gatekeeper shall inform the commission of any intended concentration within the meaning of article 3 of regulation (ec) no 139/2004 irrespective of whether it is notifiable to a union competition authority under regulation (ec) no 139/2004 or to a competent national competition authority under national merger rules.


### a gatekeeper shall inform the commission of such a concentration prior to its implementation and following the conclusion of the agreement , the announcement of the public bid , or the acquisition of a controlling interest. ### a gatekeeper shall inform the commission of such a concentration at least 2 months prior to its implementation and following the conclusion of the agreement , the announcement of the public bid , or the acquisition of a controlling interest.


### a gatekeeper shall inform the commission of such a concentration prior to its implementation and following the conclusion of the agreement , the announcement of the public bid , or the acquisition of a controlling interest. ### a gatekeeper shall inform the commission of such a concentration within at least 2 months prior to its implementation and following the conclusion of the agreement , the announcement of the public bid , or the acquisition of a controlling interest. the commission shall make this information available to relevant national authorities.


### 2. the notification pursuant to paragraph 1 shall at least describe for the acquisition targets their eea and worldwide annual turnover , for any relevant core platform services their respective eea annual turnover , their number of yearly active business users and the number of monthly active end users , as well as the rationale of the intended concentration. ### 2. the notification of information pursuant to paragraph 1 shall at least describe for the acquisition targets their eea and worldwide annual turnover , for any relevant core platform services their respective eea annual turnover , their number of yearly active business users and the number of monthly active end users , as well as the rationale of the intended concentration.


### within six months after its designation pursuant to article 3 , a gatekeeper shall submit to the commission an independently audited description of any techniques for profiling of consumers that the gatekeeper applies to or across its core platform services identified pursuant to article 3. this description shall be updated at least annually. ### within six months after its designation pursuant to article 3 , a gatekeeper shall submit to the commission an independently audited description of any techniques for profiling of consumers that the gatekeeper applies to or across its core platform services identified pursuant to article 3. the gatekeeper shall make publicly available an overview of the audited description taking into account the limitations imposed by the requirements of business secrecy. this description and its publicly available overview shall be updated at least annually. this description shall be updated at least annually.


### within six months after its designation pursuant to article 3 , a gatekeeper shall submit to the commission an independently audited description of any techniques for profiling of consumers that the gatekeeper applies to or across its core platform services identified pursuant to article 3. this description shall be updated at least annually. ### within six months after its designation pursuant to article 3 , a gatekeeper shall submit to the commission an independently audited description of any techniques for profiling of consumers that the gatekeeper applies to or across its core platform services identified pursuant to article 3. without prejudice to trade secrets protection , the gatekeeper shall make an overview of the audited description of applied profiling techniques of consumers publicly available. this description and its publicly available overview shall be updated at least annually.


### 1. the commission may conduct a market investigation for the purpose of examining whether a provider of core platform services should be designated as a gatekeeper pursuant to article 3(6) , or in order to identify core platform services for a gatekeeper pursuant to article 3(7). it shall endeavour to conclude its investigation by adopting a decision in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in article 32(4) within twelve months from the opening of the market investigation. ### 1. the commission may conduct a market investigation for the purpose of examining whether a provider of core platform services should be designated as a gatekeeper pursuant to article 3(6) , or in order to identify core platform services for a gatekeeper pursuant to article 3(7). it shall endeavour to conclude its investigation by adopting a decision in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in article 32(4) within six months from the opening of the market investigation.


### 1. the commission may conduct a market investigation for the purpose of examining whether a provider of core platform services should be designated as a gatekeeper pursuant to article 3(6) , or in order to identify core platform services for a gatekeeper pursuant to article 3(7). it shall endeavour to conclude its investigation by adopting a decision in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in article 32(4) within twelve months from the opening of the market investigation. ### 1. the commission and national competition authorities may conduct a market investigation for the purpose of examining whether a provider of core platform services should be designated as a gatekeeper pursuant to article 3(6) , or in order to identify core platform services for a gatekeeper pursuant to article 3(7) and article 3 (8). it shall conclude its investigation by adopting a decision in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in article 32(4) within twelve months from the opening of the market investigation.


### 2. in the course of a market investigation pursuant to paragraph 1 , the commission shall endeavour to communicate its preliminary findings to the provider of core platform services concerned within six months from the opening of the investigation. in the preliminary findings , the commission shall explain whether it considers , on a provisional basis , that the provider of core platform services should be designated as a gatekeeper pursuant to article 3(6). ### 2. in the course of a market investigation pursuant to paragraph 1 , the commission shall endeavour to communicate its preliminary findings to the provider of core platform services concerned as soon as possible , and in any case no later than six months from the opening of the investigation. in the preliminary findings , the commission shall explain whether it considers , on a provisional basis , that the provider of core platform services should be designated as a gatekeeper pursuant to article 3(6).


### 2. in the course of a market investigation pursuant to paragraph 1 , the commission shall endeavour to communicate its preliminary findings to the provider of core platform services concerned within six months from the opening of the investigation. in the preliminary findings , the commission shall explain whether it considers , on a provisional basis , that the provider of core platform services should be designated as a gatekeeper pursuant to article 3(6). ### 2. in the course of a market investigation pursuant to paragraph 1 , the commission shall endeavour to communicate its preliminary findings to the provider of core platform services concerned within four months from the opening of the investigation. in the preliminary findings , the commission shall explain whether it considers , on a provisional basis , that the provider of core platform services should be designated as a gatekeeper pursuant to article 3(6).


### 3. where the provider of core platform services satisfies the thresholds set out in article 3(2) , but has presented significantly substantiated arguments in accordance with article 3(4) , the commission shall endeavour to conclude the market investigation within five months from the opening of the market investigation by a decision pursuant to paragraph 1. in that case the commission shall endeavour to communicate its preliminary findings pursuant to paragraph 2 to the provider of core platform services within three months from the opening of the investigation. ### 3. where the provider of core platform services satisfies the thresholds set out in article 3(2) , but has presented significantly substantiated arguments in accordance with article 3(4) , the commission shall endeavour to conclude the market investigation as soon as possible , and in any case no later than five months from the opening of the market investigation by a decision pursuant to paragraph 1. in that case the commission shall endeavour to communicate its preliminary findings pursuant to paragraph 2 to the provider of core platform services as soon as possible , and in any case no later than three months from the opening of the investigation.


### 3. where the provider of core platform services satisfies the thresholds set out in article 3(2) , but has presented significantly substantiated arguments in accordance with article 3(4) , the commission shall endeavour to conclude the market investigation within five months from the opening of the market investigation by a decision pursuant to paragraph 1. in that case the commission shall endeavour to communicate its preliminary findings pursuant to paragraph 2 to the provider of core platform services within three months from the opening of the investigation. ### 3. where the provider of core platform services satisfies the thresholds set out in article 3(2) , but has presented significantly substantiated arguments in accordance with article 3(4) , the commission shall endeavour to conclude the market investigation within five months from the opening of the market investigation by a decision pursuant to paragraph 1. in that case the commission shall communicate its preliminary findings pursuant to paragraph 2 to the provider of core platform services within three months from the opening of the investigation.