### 40. recalls that eu funding is based on strict conditionality; ### 40. recalls that eu funding under the pre-accession instrument (ipa iii) and the economic and investment plan for the western balkans is based on strict conditionality; and should be modulated to address fundamental reform areas; underlines the need to improve visibility of the eu funding;


### 41. welcomes north macedonia’s updated climate pledges; recalls that additional efforts are needed to meet the targets for energy efficiency , renewable energy , security of supply and emission reductions; urges the authorities to align environment and climate change legislation with the eu acquis and to ensure its enforcement; ### 41. welcomes north macedonia’s updated climate pledges of a net 82% greenhouse gas emissions reduction by 2030; recalls that additional efforts are needed to meet the targets for energy efficiency , renewable energy , security of supply and emission reductions; urges the eu to intensify its support to counter the reversal of a sustainable transition from coal in the face of the global energy crunch; urges the authorities to align environment and climate change legislation with the eu acquis and to ensure its enforcement; acknowledges increasing alignment with the eu’s third energy package and urges to finalise unbundling of the gas transmission and to implement the energy efficiency legislation;


### 43. urges the country to step up efforts to upgrade transport and energy infrastructure and regional connectivity , including rail and road corridors and gas and electricity interconnectors; ### 43. urges the country to step up efforts to upgrade transport and energy infrastructure and regional connectivity , including rail and road corridors viii and x and gas and electricity interconnectors with neighbouring countries;


### 45. welcomes north macedonia’s continued commitment to euro-atlantic security; commends the country’s increasing alignment with the eu’s foreign , security and defence policy and invites it to align itself with the restrictive measures related to russia; welcomes its continued contributions to eu crisis management missions and operations; ### 45. welcomes north macedonia’s continued commitment to euro-atlantic security; commends the country’s increasing alignment with the eu’s foreign , security and defence policy; welcomes its continued contributions to eu crisis management missions and nato-led operations; commends a swift alignment to the sanctions against the russian aggression in ukraine , increasing its foreign policy alignment to 100% , including with moves to end broadcasting of russian state-owned and state-backed propaganda outlets , ban entry into its airspace;


### 46. welcomes the ongoing process of historical reconciliation with neighbouring countries; ### 46. welcomes the ongoing process of historical settlement with neighbouring countries , embodied by the prespa agreement with greece and the treaty on good neighbourly relations with bulgaria;


### 47. strongly welcomes the political impetus for a renewed dialogue between bulgaria and north macedonia and encourages the partners to accelerate engagement in good faith in order to reach an acceptable compromise , thereby bringing societies closer together by enabling a common future in the eu; ### 47. strongly welcomes the political impetus for a renewed dialogue between bulgaria and north macedonia leading to a settlement on a short name notified to the united nations; encourages the partners to accelerate engagement in good faith in order to kick-start accession negotiations by resolving pending bilateral issues contained in the so-called 4+1 measures , to be sufficiently covered and progressively addressed through the negotiating framework; urges the partners to strive sincerely to speedily reaching an acceptable compromise bringing societies closer together by enabling a common future in the eu;


### b. whereas the denial of the human right to water has repercussions on enjoyment of the right to health; considering that contaminated water , the inadequate management of urban , industrial and agricultural wastewater and poor sanitation are linked to the transmission of serious diseases and even death; ### b. whereas the denial of the human right to water has repercussions on enjoyment of the right to life and health; considering that contaminated water , the inadequate management of urban , industrial and agricultural wastewater and poor sanitation are linked to the transmission of serious diseases and even death;


### f. whereas the sixth united nations sustainable development goal (sdg) is to ensure that the entire world has universal and equitable access to safe drinking water by 2030; ### f. whereas the sixth united nations sustainable development goal (sdg) is to ensure that the entire world has universal and equitable access to safe drinking water and sanitation by 2030;


### g. whereas , according to the united nations , 785 million people have no access to basic water services , 2 billion people do not have safe and clean drinking water in their homes when they need it , 4.2 billion people live without safely managed sanitation and 673 million people still practise open defecation; ### g. whereas , according to the united nations , 785 million people have no access to basic water services , 2 billion people do not have safe and clean drinking water in their homes when they need it , 4.2 billion people live without safely managed sanitation and 673 million people still practise open defecation; whereas despite progress , significant challenges still remain for the achievement of the sustainable development goal 6 and in addressing great inequalities between and within countries in accessing basic water and sanitation services;


### i. whereas the ongoing climate crisis , with increasing droughts , floods and torrential rains , is exacerbating inequalities in distribution of water; whereas floods and other water-related disasters account for 70% of all deaths linked to natural disasters; ### i. whereas the ongoing climate crisis , with increasing droughts , floods and torrential rains , is exacerbating inequalities in distribution of water; whereas floods and other water-related disasters account for 70% of all deaths linked to natural disasters; whereas about 90% of all natural disasters are water-related; whereas , according to the oedc , nearly 20% of the world’s population will be at risk from floods in 2050 , while economic value of assets at risk is expected to be around us$45 trillion by 2050 , a growth of over 340% from 2010;


### k. whereas deforestation , land-grabbing and other industrial and natural resource exploitation and extraction activities , carried out by certain private or public ventures , contribute towards the drying-up of rivers , lakes and other water sources; ### k. whereas deforestation , land-grabbing and natural resource exploitation and extraction activities , carried out by certain private or public ventures , can contribute towards the drying-up of rivers , lakes and other water sources;


### o. whereas the extractive industries have contributed to the overexploitation of surface and groundwater resources , pollution and the destruction of glaciers , forests , wetlands , rivers and other vital water sources for human consumption; ### o. whereas certain extractive industries have contributed to the overexploitation of surface and groundwater resources , pollution and the destruction of glaciers , forests , wetlands , rivers and other vital water sources for human consumption;


### 1. reaffirms the right to safe drinking water and sanitation as a human right , which is in turn fundamental for the development of other rights , and as such must be guided by a logic grounded in the public interest and common good; ### 1. reaffirms the right to safe drinking water and sanitation as a human right , both rights being complementary , which is in turn fundamental for the development of other rights , and as such must be guided by a logic grounded in the public interest and common good;


### 1. reaffirms the right to safe drinking water and sanitation as a human right , which is in turn fundamental for the development of other rights , and as such must be guided by a logic grounded in the public interest and common good; ### 1. reaffirms the right to safe drinking water and sanitation as a human right , which is in turn fundamental for the development of other rights , and as such must be guided by a logic grounded in the public interest and common good; stresses that progressing towards the recognition of the right to a clean , healthy and sustainable environment , as laid out in resolution 48/13 of the un human rights council both internationally and at eu level , is an enabling condition to reach safe drinking water and sanitation for all;


### 1. reaffirms that access to water is a vital imperative and a fundamental right; ### 1. reaffirms that access to drinking water and sanitation are vital imperatives and fundamental rights;


### 2. calls on the european union to promote a rights-based approach to access to water and sanitation in its external action in accordance with the un-declared water action decade 2018-2028 , and in keeping with sustainable development goal 6; ### 2. calls on the european union to promote a rights-based approach to access to water and sanitation in its external action in accordance with the un-declared water action decade 2018-2028 , and in keeping with sustainable development goal 6 , particularly at the next world water forum , in dakar , and the high-level international conference on water in dushanbe in 2022 and the high-level un conference on the water action decade in new york in 2023;


### 3. recalls the responsibility of states to promote and safeguard all human rights; reiterates , therefore , that states must ensure universal access to safe drinking water in sufficient quantity and quality; ### 3. recalls the responsibility of states to promote and safeguard all human rights; reiterates , therefore , that states must ensure universal access to safe drinking water in sufficient quantity and quality , and access to improved sanitation;


### 3. is concerned that easy access to drinking water is severely restricted in developing countries (only one person in two enjoys such access) and extremely limited in sub-saharan africa (only one person in eight in rural areas); ### 3. is concerned that easy access to drinking water is severely restricted in developing countries (only one person in two enjoys such access) , as obstacles to water security are either physical scarcity or lack of sufficient infrastructure , and extremely limited in sub-saharan africa (only one person in eight in rural areas) , where population is regularly not provided with one of the most basic needs for human survival;


### 4. recalls that states that ratify a human rights treaty undertake to protect , respect and fulfil the commitments adopted in the international , regional and national framework for the protection of these rights; takes the view in this regard that the international community’s recognition of the right to water and sanitation must encompass protection and enforceability arrangements and , therefore , calls on the eu to promote protection mechanisms at international , regional and national level to ensure that upholding the right to water and sanitation is not optional for states but rather an enforceable right; ### 4. recalls that states that ratify a human rights treaty undertake to protect , respect and fulfil the commitments adopted in the international , regional and national framework for the protection of these rights; takes the view in this regard that the international community’s recognition of the right to water and sanitation must encompass protection and enforceability arrangements and , therefore , calls on the eu to promote protection mechanisms at international , regional and national level to ensure that upholding the right to water and sanitation is not optional for states but rather an enforceable right; calls on the eu to promote and support independent water regulatory bodies that can help enforce human rights standards;


### 4. calls urgently , following the covid-19 pandemic and given the increasing number of climate change-related natural disasters , for access to water and sanitation to be made a priority in developing countries , in particular in the least developed countries and small island developing states; ### 4. calls urgently , following the covid-19 pandemic and given the increasing number of climate change-related natural disasters , for access to water and sanitation to be made a priority in developing countries , in particular in the least developed countries and small island developing states; in this regard , stresses the importance to mobilise financial resources and technical assistance for facilitating capacity building to meet more urgent necessities in providing essential water and sanitation services during crisis , such as tackling challenges regarding reduced availabilities of vital elements for operations , as materials for water treatment or for the rehabilitation of damaged assets of the critical water-related infrastructure;


### 5. maintains that the full exercise of the right to water depends on the preservation of biodiversity , and therefore demands that water management should respond primarily to environmental and social interests and not to those of the various sectors of the economy; ### 5. maintains that the full exercise of the right to water depends on the preservation of biodiversity , and therefore demands that water management should respond primarily to environmental and social interests;


### 6. draws attention to the major geostrategic dimension of water , which can give rise to sudden conflict and forced displacement; calls on the commission to promote regional cooperation on the shared management of water resources around the 286 transboundary river basins; ### 6. draws attention to the major geostrategic dimension of water , which can give rise to sudden conflict and forced displacement; calls for local economic development to be fostered and for coastal communities dependent on marine resources to be strengthened; further calls on the commission to promote regional cooperation on the shared management of water resources around the 286 transboundary river basins;


### 6. draws attention to the major geostrategic dimension of water , which can give rise to sudden conflict and forced displacement; calls on the commission to promote regional cooperation on the shared management of water resources around the 286 transboundary river basins; ### 6. draws attention to the major geostrategic dimension of water , which can give rise to sudden conflict and forced displacement; calls on the commission to promote regional cooperation on the shared management of water resources around the 286 transboundary river basins , furthermore calls for the identification of policies , as well as for the development of operational programmes that practically address with long-term perspective specific problems about the respective transboundary basins , climate-change mitigation and preservation of ecosystems by adequate governance of both nature resources and the risk of watershed degradation , at domestic and transnational level , as a precondition to ensure a water secure future and to advance their water resilience agenda;


### 7. underlines that pollution and the excessive extraction of water resources by means of industrial activities or discharge are among the most commonly identified threats to the exercise of the human rights to water and sanitation; ### 7. underlines that pollution and the excessive extraction of water resources by means of excessive industrial activities or discharge are among the most commonly identified threats to the exercise of the human rights to water and sanitation;


### 7. calls for coordinated and coherent water management in developing countries with regard to its various uses (agriculture , energy production , industry , etc.) , and calls on the european union to provide better support to developing countries for sustainable water management; ### 7. recalls that agriculture accounts for 70% to 90% of water use in the world and that access to water is also an energy-use challenge (both in terms of production and extraction); calls , therefore , for coordinated and coherent water management in developing countries with regard to its various uses , and calls on the european union to provide better support to developing countries for sustainable water management; stresses the importance of fostering better energy management as well as reuse solutions for treated wastewater to limit freshwater consumption by means of wastewater treatment;


### 7. calls for coordinated and coherent water management in developing countries with regard to its various uses (agriculture , energy production , industry , etc.) , and calls on the european union to provide better support to developing countries for sustainable water management; ### 7. calls for coordinated and coherent water management in developing countries with regard to its various uses (agriculture , energy production , industry , etc.) , and calls on the european union to provide better support to developing countries for sustainable water management , points to the need to frame implementation plans at multiple levels for water source protection and to reconcile water usage with the application of emerging technologies for conservation , reduction of water pollution and recycling wastewater , in order to improve the way water is provided , treated and disposed;


### 8. calls on the commission to discourage the practices of water-grabbing and hydraulic fracturing and make them subject to environmental and human-rights impact assessments; ### 8. calls on the commission to discourage practices that are a threat to the right to safe and clean drinking water and sanitation and make those practices subject to environmental and human-rights impact assessments;


### 8. stresses the need to support small projects , including those in rural areas , and to pay particular attention to women and the most vulnerable communities as regards access to water and sanitation. ### 8. stresses the need to support small projects , that have direct impact on the access , allocation and storing of water; in this context , underlines the potential of private sector in water provision , and calls for the encouragement of partnership between the eu and developing countries , namely of enhanced collaboration with smes and locally-based businesses , which can apply valuable solutions and innovative approaches in designing , constructing or rehabilitating existing water services or in other water-related projects , including those in rural areas , and to pay particular attention to women and the most vulnerable communities as regards access to water and basic sanitation facilities , as it recognises the correlation between safe water , sanitation and bringing about lasting healthy changes to communities.


### 8. stresses the need to support small projects , including those in rural areas , and to pay particular attention to women and the most vulnerable communities as regards access to water and sanitation. ### 8. stresses the need to support small projects , including those in rural areas , and to pay particular attention to women , who in developing countries are often responsible for fetching water and are severely impacted by the economic and social consequences of climate change , as well as to the most vulnerable local communities as regards access to water and sanitation.


### 9. recognises the important work undertaken by environmental rights defenders , in particular those safeguarding the right to water , and roundly condemns the killings , abductions , torture , gender-based violence , threats , harassment , intimidation , smear campaigns , criminalisation , judicial harassment , forced evictions and displacements carried out by numerous perpetrators , including governments and multinational corporations; ### 9. recognises the important work undertaken by environmental rights defenders , in particular those safeguarding the right to water , and roundly condemns the killings , abductions , torture , sexual and gender-based violence , threats , harassment , intimidation , smear campaigns , criminalisation , judicial harassment , forced evictions and displacements;


### 9. recognises the important work undertaken by environmental rights defenders , in particular those safeguarding the right to water , and roundly condemns the killings , abductions , torture , gender-based violence , threats , harassment , intimidation , smear campaigns , criminalisation , judicial harassment , forced evictions and displacements carried out by numerous perpetrators , including governments and multinational corporations; ### 9. recognises the important work undertaken by environmental rights defenders , in particular those safeguarding the right to water , and roundly condemns the killings , abductions , torture , gender-based violence , threats , harassment , intimidation , smear campaigns , criminalisation , judicial harassment , forced evictions and displacements carried out by numerous perpetrators , including governments and multinational corporations; calls on the eu to support the crucial work done by environmental rights defenders; stresses that their safety and freedom to operate without violence and intimidation should be promoted;


### 9. recognises the important work undertaken by environmental rights defenders , in particular those safeguarding the right to water , and roundly condemns the killings , abductions , torture , gender-based violence , threats , harassment , intimidation , smear campaigns , criminalisation , judicial harassment , forced evictions and displacements carried out by numerous perpetrators , including governments and multinational corporations; ### 9. recognises the important work undertaken by environmental rights defenders , in particular those safeguarding the right to water , and roundly condemns the killings , abductions , torture , gender-based violence , threats , harassment , intimidation , smear campaigns , criminalisation , judicial harassment , forced evictions and displacements carried out by numerous perpetrators , including governments and multinational corporations; calls on the eu and its member states to increase protection and prevention mechanisms for environmental defenders;


### 12. notes with concern that the lack of access to water and adequate sanitation has a devastating effect on women’s rights , making it difficult for women and girls to lead safe and healthy lives; ### 12. notes with concern that the lack of access to water and adequate sanitation has a devastating effect on women’s rights , making it difficult for women and girls to lead safe and healthy lives; calls on the eu to ensure that a gender-based approach is applied to water resources management and water supply and sanitation programmes;


### 12. notes with concern that the lack of access to water and adequate sanitation has a devastating effect on women’s rights , making it difficult for women and girls to lead safe and healthy lives; ### 12. notes with concern that the lack of access to water and adequate sanitation has a devastating effect on women’s rights , making it difficult for women and girls to lead safe and healthy lives; calls on the commission and the eeas to apply a transformative and intersectional gender perspective to its policies on this area , in accordance with the action plan on gender equality and women's empowerment in external action 2021–2025 (gap iii);


### 14. stresses that companies worldwide must ensure that their activities do not encroach on the enjoyment of the human right of access to safe drinking water; demands support for the binding treaty being drafted at the united nations; ### 14. stresses that companies worldwide must ensure that their activities do not encroach on the enjoyment of the human right of access to safe drinking water in line with the un guiding principles on business and human rights; urges the eu and its member states to constructively participate in the work of the un intergovernmental working group on transnational corporations and other business enterprises with respect to human rights , with a view to establishing an international binding instrument to regulate , in international human rights law , the activities of transnational corporations and other companies;


### 16. calls on states to take legal measures as a matter of urgency to prevent water from being subject to financial speculation on futures markets and to promote democratic governance of water and sanitation services under a approach grounded in human rights and common goods; ### 16. calls on states to take legal measures as a matter of urgency to prevent water from being subject to financial speculation on futures markets and to promote democratic governance of water and sanitation services under a approach grounded in human rights and common goods; calls on the eu to support independent water regulatory bodies that can help enforce human rights standards;


### 17. recalls that , as the eu water framework directive recognises , water is not a commodity but a public good that is vital to human life and dignity; calls on the commission , given that these are services of general interest that fall , therefore , primarily in the public interest , to permanently exclude water and sanitation and wastewater treatment from the scope of any trade agreements and to check carefully that trade agreements and the activities of european companies do not undermine , whether by action or omission , the right to drinking water and sanitation; ### 17. recalls that , as the eu water framework directive recognises , water is not a commodity but a public good that is vital to human life and dignity; calls on the commission , given that these are services of general interest that fall , therefore , primarily in the public interest , to promote the human right to drinking water and sanitation as such;


### 19. stresses that public provision is the most appropriate model for the exercise of the human rights to water and sanitation; urges states in this regard to engage in a transparent and robust deprivatisation process to improve the effective enjoyment of the human rights to water and sanitation; calls on governments to increase public investments in sustainable water-related infrastructure and to safeguard water as an essential public good; ### 19. stresses that public provision is the most appropriate model for the exercise of the human rights to water and sanitation; urges states in this regard to engage in a transparent and robust process to improve the effective enjoyment of the human rights to water and sanitation; calls on governments to increase public investments in sustainable water-related infrastructure and to safeguard water as an essential public good; calls on governments to support the capacity of independent water regulatory bodies;


### 20. calls on the world bank and the imf to prohibit the imposition of conditions requiring governments to privatise water and sanitation services when providing grants , loans and technical assistance; stresses that the widespread privatisation of public goods in many societies is systematically dismantling human rights safeguards and further marginalising those living in the most abject poverty; ### deleted


### 21. demands that civil society organisations working to address breaches of the rights to water and sanitation have adequate resources and access to relevant information and the ability to participate meaningfully in water-related decision-making processes; ### 21. demands that civil society organisations , indigenous and local communities working to address breaches of the rights to water and sanitation have adequate resources and access to relevant information and the ability to participate meaningfully in water-related decision-making processes;


### 21. demands that civil society organisations working to address breaches of the rights to water and sanitation have adequate resources and access to relevant information and the ability to participate meaningfully in water-related decision-making processes; ### 21. demands that civil society organisations working to address breaches of the rights to water and sanitation have adequate resources and access to relevant information and the ability to participate meaningfully in water-related decision-making processes; highlights that women remain underrepresented in water resources management and calls for gender-sensitive and inclusion policies accompanied by concrete action plans and adequate funding;


### 22. stresses that inequalities in access to water and sanitation are often attributable to systemic inequalities or exclusion; calls on governments to guarantee the absence of discrimination in access to water and sanitation services , as a public good , ensuring the provision thereof for all , in particular by affording priority to access for marginalised groups with a view to remedying systemic discrimination; ### 22. stresses that inequalities in access to water and sanitation are often attributable to systemic inequalities or exclusion; calls on governments to guarantee the absence of discrimination in access to water and sanitation services , as a public good , ensuring the provision thereof for all , in particular by affording priority to access for vulnerable groups with a view to remedying systemic discrimination;


### 22. stresses that inequalities in access to water and sanitation are often attributable to systemic inequalities or exclusion; calls on governments to guarantee the absence of discrimination in access to water and sanitation services , as a public good , ensuring the provision thereof for all , in particular by affording priority to access for marginalised groups with a view to remedying systemic discrimination; ### 22. stresses that inequalities in access to water and sanitation are often attributable to systemic inequalities or exclusion; calls on governments to guarantee the absence of discrimination in access to water and sanitation services , as a public good , ensuring the provision thereof for all , in particular by affording priority to access for women , girls and marginalised groups with a view to remedying systemic exclusion and discrimination;


### — having regard to the council conclusions of 8 december 2009 on arctic issues , of 12 may 2014 on developing a european union policy towards the arctic region , of 20 june 2016 on the arctic and of 9 december 2019 on the eu arctic policy , ### — having regard to the council conclusions of 8 december 2009 on arctic issues , of 12 may 2014 on developing a european union policy towards the arctic region , of 20 june 2016 on the arctic , of 21 november 2019 on space solutions for a sustainable arctic and of 9 december 2019 on the eu arctic policy ,


### c. whereas conflicts can take place in all physical (land , air , sea and space) and virtual (cyber) domains , and may be amplified through elements of hybrid warfare , proxy wars , offensive and defensive use of cyber capabilities and strategic attacks to disrupt critical infrastructure; ### c. whereas in cyber space there is no clear division between civil and military realms , it is being militarized and weaponized , conflicts can take place in all physical (land , air , sea and space) and virtual (cyber) domains , and may be amplified through elements of hybrid warfare , proxy wars , offensive and defensive use of cyber capabilities and strategic attacks to disrupt critical infrastructure and cause considerable financial losses;


### 1. underlines that a common cyber defence policy and a substantial cyber defence capability are core elements for the development of the european defence union; stresses the urgent need to strengthen eu and the member state cyber defence capabilities; ### 1. underlines that a common approach on cyber defence and a substantial cyber defence capability are core elements for the development of the european defence union; stresses the urgent need to strengthen eu and the member state cyber defence capabilities;


### 4. calls on the eeas to further develop a coherent it security policy to strengthen cyber defence coordination; urges a cooperation strategy with the eu’s computer emergency response teams (cert-eu) to protect networks used by all eu institutions; calls on the european parliament to ensure its participation in cert-eu results to ensured a level of it security that will allow it to receive all the necessary classified and non-classified information to carry out its responsibilities under the treaties , including as a result of the current process to replace the 2002 inter-institutional agreement on access to information in the area of security and defence; ### 4. calls on the eeas to further develop a coherent it security policy to strengthen cyber defence coordination; urges to strengthen cooperation with the eu’s computer emergency response team (cert-eu) to protect networks used by all eu institutions; calls on the european parliament to ensure its participation in cert-eu results to ensured a level of it security that will allow it to receive all the necessary classified and non-classified information to carry out its responsibilities under the treaties , including as a result of the current process to replace the 2002 inter-institutional agreement on access to information in the area of security and defence;


### 5. notes the 2018 cdpf’s objective to setup an eu military cert-network; calls on member states to significantly increase classified information sharing , to develop a european rapid and secure network to counter cyber-attacks; ### 5. notes the 2018 cdpf’s objective to setup an eu military cert-network; calls on member states to significantly increase classified information sharing capacities in order to facilitate information sharing , when needed and useful , and to develop a european rapid and secure network to counter cyber-attacks;


### 5. notes the 2018 cdpf’s objective to setup an eu military cert-network; calls on member states to significantly increase classified information sharing , to develop a european rapid and secure network to counter cyber-attacks; ### 5. notes the 2018 cdpf’s objective to setup an eu military cert-network; calls on member states to significantly increase classified information sharing , to develop a european rapid and secure network to detect , asses and counter cyber-attacks;


### 8. notes that the european defence fund (edf) , will also support strengthening resilience , and improve preparedness , responsiveness and cooperation in the cyber domain; ### 8. welcomes the progress already made under the edidp with several relevant projects , and the fact that the european defence fund (edf) will also support strengthening resilience and improve preparedness , responsiveness and cooperation in the cyber domain;


### 9. welcomes the progress achieved by the permanent structured cooperation (pesco) cyber rapid response team; recalls that pesco offers excellent ways to speed up cyber security initiatives , such as through the cyber threats and incident response information sharing platform and cyber and information domain coordination centre; ### 9. welcomes the progress achieved by the permanent structured cooperation (pesco) cyber rapid response teams and mutual assistance in cyber security (crrts) project led by lithuania and encourages the active participation of all other eu member states; recalls that pesco offers excellent ways to speed up cyber security initiatives , such as through the cyber threats and incident response information sharing platform and cyber and information domain coordination centre;


### 9. welcomes the progress achieved by the permanent structured cooperation (pesco) cyber rapid response team; recalls that pesco offers excellent ways to speed up cyber security initiatives , such as through the cyber threats and incident response information sharing platform and cyber and information domain coordination centre; ### 9. welcomes the progress achieved by the permanent structured cooperation (pesco) cyber rapid response team; recalls that the edf as well as pesco offer excellent ways to speed up cyber security initiatives , such as through the cyber threats and incident response information sharing platform and cyber and information domain coordination centre;


### 11. welcomes the council’s june 2019 framework , which allows targeted restrictive measures to deter and respond to cyber-attacks that constitute a threat to the eu or its member states , including cyber-attacks against third countries or international organisations; welcomes the imposition of such restrictive measures in july 2020 and october 2020 as a credible step in strengthening the eu’s cyber diplomacy toolbox; ### 11. welcomes the council’s june 2019 framework , which allows targeted restrictive measures to deter and respond to cyber-attacks that constitute a threat to the eu or its member states , including cyber-attacks against third countries or international organisations; welcomes the imposition of such restrictive measures in july 2020 and october 2020 as a credible step in strengthening the eu’s cyber diplomacy toolbox; notes the prevailing lack of legal norms to contain cyber-attacks by state and non-state actors , and calls for further development and strict enforcement of a system of proportionate punishments;


### 13. notes that the strategic compass will enhance and guide the implementation of the eu’s level of ambition in security and defence , and translate that ambition into capability needs , including in cyber defence , thereby increasing the ability of the eu and member states to prevent , discourage , deter , respond to and recover from malicious cyber activities by strengthening its posture , situational awareness , tools , procedures and partnerships; ### 13. notes that the strategic compass will enhance and guide the implementation of the eu’s level of ambition in security and defence , and translate that ambition into capability needs , including in cyber defence , thereby increasing the ability of the eu and member states to detect , attribute , prevent , discourage , deter , respond to and recover from malicious cyber activities by strengthening its posture , situational awareness , legal and ethical framework , tools , procedures and partnerships;


### 15. stresses that fragmentation is accompanied by serious concerns over resources and staff at the eu level; urges the vp/hr and/or the member states to increase financial and personnel resources , in particular experts in cyberforensics; calls for further funding for cert-eu and the creation of an eu security operations centre; ### 15. stresses that fragmentation is accompanied by serious concerns over the lack of resources and staff at the eu level , thereby stresses the need to increase both; urges the vp/hr and/or the member states to increase financial and cyber defence personnel resources in decision and policy making , policy implementation , cyber incidents response and investigation areas , including the development of cyber skills; calls for further funding for cert-eu and the creation of an eu security operations centre;


### 15. stresses that fragmentation is accompanied by serious concerns over resources and staff at the eu level; urges the vp/hr and/or the member states to increase financial and personnel resources , in particular experts in cyberforensics; calls for further funding for cert-eu and the creation of an eu security operations centre; ### 15. stresses that fragmentation is accompanied by serious concerns over resources and staff at the eu level; notes that the eu lags far behind the us in investing in cyber-defence , which hinders the ambition of creating the most secure digital environment; urges the vp/hr and/or the member states to increase financial and personnel resources , in particular experts in cyberforensics; calls for further funding for cert-eu and the creation of an eu security operations centre;


### 15. stresses that fragmentation is accompanied by serious concerns over resources and staff at the eu level; urges the vp/hr and/or the member states to increase financial and personnel resources , in particular experts in cyberforensics; calls for further funding for cert-eu and the creation of an eu security operations centre; ### 15. stresses that fragmentation is accompanied by serious concerns over resources and staff at the eu level; urges the vp/hr and/or the member states to increase financial and personnel resources , in particular experts in cyberforensics to strengthen eu’s ability to characterize , attribute cyber attacks and hence provide the adequate response; calls for further funding for cert-eu and the creation of an eu security operations centre;


### 16. recalls that cyber defence has both military and civilian dimensions; calls on the vp/hr , therefore , to develop an integrated policy approach and close cooperation between the military cert-network and cert-eu; ### 16. recalls that cyber defence has both military and civilian dimensions; calls on the vp/hr , therefore , to develop an integrated policy approach and promote synergies between the military cert-network and the csirts network;


### 18. recalls that improving cyber defence capabilities also requires civilian network and information security expertise; welcomes the proposed revision of the directive on security of network and information systems (nis) and of current eu law , seeking to protect critical infrastructures , enhance supply chain security and the inclusion of regulated actors in the digital ecosystem; ### 18. recalls that improving cyber defence capabilities also requires civilian network and information security expertise; welcomes the proposed revision of the directive on security of network and information systems (nis) and of current eu law , seeking to protect critical infrastructures , enhance supply chain security and the inclusion of regulated actors in the digital ecosystem; recalls that the nis directive should respect member states competencies , in particular their responsibility regarding national security;


### 21. calls for enhanced mutual operational assistance between member states; strongly emphasises the importance of further exercises and scenario-based policy discussions on crisis management , including on the mutual assistance clause (article 42(7) of the teu) in a hypothetical cyber attack scenario; calls for increased coordination with nato in this matter through participation in cyber exercises and joint training , such as the parallel and coordinated exercises (pace); calls for such initiatives to strengthen the common understanding on the implementation procedures for mutual assistance and/or solidarity in line with article 42(7) of the teu and article 222 of the tfeu , including with a specific objective of operationalising these procedures for cyber-attacks on the eu institutions or member states; ### 21. calls to further integrate cybersecurity into eu crisis response mechanisms and link the existing initiatives , structures and procedures (such as the ipcr , the csirts network , the nis cooperation group , the cyclone) between various cyber communities for enhanced mutual assistance between member states; strongly emphasises the importance of further exercises and scenario-based policy discussions on crisis management , including on the stake of solidarity and mutual assistance clause (article 42(7) of the teu) in a cyber attack scenario; calls for such initiatives to strengthen the common understanding on the implementation procedures for mutual assistance and/or solidarity in line with article 42(7) of the teu and article 222 of the tfeu , including with a specific objective of operationalising these procedures for cyber-attacks on the eu institutions or member states; welcomes further discussions on the articulation between the eu cybersecurity crisis management framework and the cyber diplomacy toolbox;


### 21. calls for enhanced mutual operational assistance between member states; strongly emphasises the importance of further exercises and scenario-based policy discussions on crisis management , including on the mutual assistance clause (article 42(7) of the teu) in a hypothetical cyber attack scenario; calls for increased coordination with nato in this matter through participation in cyber exercises and joint training , such as the parallel and coordinated exercises (pace); calls for such initiatives to strengthen the common understanding on the implementation procedures for mutual assistance and/or solidarity in line with article 42(7) of the teu and article 222 of the tfeu , including with a specific objective of operationalising these procedures for cyber-attacks on the eu institutions or member states; ### 21. calls for enhanced mutual operational assistance between member states; strongly emphasises the importance of further exercises , but at a higher frequency , and scenario-based policy discussions on crisis management , including on the mutual assistance clause (article 42(7) of the teu) in a hypothetical cyber attack scenario; calls for increased coordination with nato in this matter through participation in cyber exercises and joint training , such as the parallel and coordinated exercises (pace); calls for such initiatives to strengthen the common understanding on the implementation procedures for mutual assistance and/or solidarity in line with article 42(7) of the teu and article 222 of the tfeu , including with a specific objective of operationalising these procedures for cyber-attacks on the eu institutions or member states;


### 21. calls for enhanced mutual operational assistance between member states; strongly emphasises the importance of further exercises and scenario-based policy discussions on crisis management , including on the mutual assistance clause (article 42(7) of the teu) in a hypothetical cyber attack scenario; calls for increased coordination with nato in this matter through participation in cyber exercises and joint training , such as the parallel and coordinated exercises (pace); calls for such initiatives to strengthen the common understanding on the implementation procedures for mutual assistance and/or solidarity in line with article 42(7) of the teu and article 222 of the tfeu , including with a specific objective of operationalising these procedures for cyber-attacks on the eu institutions or member states; ### 21. calls for enhanced mutual operational assistance between member states; strongly emphasises the importance of further exercises and scenario-based policy discussions on crisis management , including on the mutual assistance clause (article 42(7) of the teu) in a hypothetical cyber attack scenario; calls for increased coordination with nato in this matter through participation in cyber exercises and joint training , such as the parallel and coordinated exercises (pace); calls for such initiatives to strengthen the common understanding on the implementation procedures for mutual assistance and/or solidarity in line with article 42(7) of the teu and article 222 of the tfeu , including with a specific objective of operationalising these procedures for cyber-attacks on eu member states;


### 22. considers that eu-nato cyber cooperation is crucial , as it enables strong formal attribution and thus the imposition of restrictive sanctions; notes that functioning deterrence would be achieved if adversaries were aware of the catalogue of possible countermeasures (based on the severity , scale , and target of the cyber-attacks); ### 22. considers that eu-nato cyber cooperation is crucial , as it enables strong formal attribution and thus the imposition of restrictive sanctions; notes that functioning deterrence would be achieved if adversaries were aware of the catalogue of possible countermeasures (based on the severity , scale , and target of the cyber-attacks); calls for increased coordination with nato in this matter through participation in cyber exercises and joint training , such as the parallel and coordinated exercises (pace);


### 24. calls for further synchronisation of eu-nato cooperation , notably on cyber defence interoperability requirements , by looking for possible complementarities , avoiding duplication and acknowledging their respective responsibilities; ### 24. calls for further synchronisation of eu-nato cooperation , notably on cyber defence interoperability requirements , by looking for possible complementarities , pursuing the affiliation of relevant csdp structures to nato’s federated mission networking and avoiding duplication and acknowledging their respective responsibilities;


### 24. calls for further synchronisation of eu-nato cooperation , notably on cyber defence interoperability requirements , by looking for possible complementarities , avoiding duplication and acknowledging their respective responsibilities; ### 24. calls for further synchronisation of eu-nato cooperation , notably on cyber defence interoperability requirements , by looking for possible complementarities and mutually beneficial strengthening of capacities , and acknowledging their respective responsibilities;


### 25. calls for closer coordination on cyber defence between member states , the eu institutions , nato , the united states and other strategic partners; underlines the urgent need for implementing the widely-recognised international normative framework for responsible state behaviour in cyberspace; ### 25. calls for closer coordination on cyber defence between member states , the eu institutions , nato member states and other strategic partners like japan , australia , south korea , new zealand and others; underlines the urgent need to respect international law , including the un charter in its entirety , and adhere to the widely-recognised international normative framework for responsible state behaviour in cyberspace;


### 26. calls on all member states and the eu to show leadership during discussions and initiatives under the auspices of the un to help truly promote responsible state behaviour in cyber space , building on the consensus reports of the un gge endorsed by the un general assembly; calls for un peacekeeping missions to be reinforced with cyber defence capacities in line with the effective implementation of their mandates; ### 26. calls on all member states and the eu to show leadership during discussions and initiatives under the auspices of the un , including through the proposition of a programme of action , to help truly promote responsible state behaviour in cyber space , building on the consensus reports of the un gge endorsed by the un general assembly; welcomes the recommendations of the oewg final report , notably on the establishment of a programme of action; calls for un peacekeeping missions to be reinforced with cyber defence capacities in line with the effective implementation of their mandates;


### 26. calls on all member states and the eu to show leadership during discussions and initiatives under the auspices of the un to help truly promote responsible state behaviour in cyber space , building on the consensus reports of the un gge endorsed by the un general assembly; calls for un peacekeeping missions to be reinforced with cyber defence capacities in line with the effective implementation of their mandates; ### 26. calls on all member states and the eu to show leadership during discussions and initiatives under the auspices of the un to help truly promote responsible state behaviour in cyber space , building on the consensus reports of the un gge endorsed by the un general assembly , and more recently the oewg; calls for un peacekeeping missions to be reinforced with cyber defence capacities in line with the effective implementation of their mandates;


### a. whereas the eu defines the indo-pacific as a region spanning from the east coast of africa to the pacific island states; whereas the indo-pacific region , home to 60 % of the world’s population and seven g20 members , is a key shaper of the global international order and home to increasingly important political , trade and security partners for the eu; ### a. whereas the eu defines the indo-pacific as a region spanning from the east coast of africa to the pacific island states; whereas the indo-pacific region , home to 60 % of the world’s population and seven g20 members , is a key shaper of the global international order and home to increasingly important political , trade and security partners for the eu , but is also a source of potential global instability due to the lack of confidence-building mechanisms in the region;


### b. whereas the recently adopted eu strategy for cooperation in the indo-pacific , which is based on a principled engagement with a long-term perspective , reflects a deep evolution in the way the eu looks at its interests in the region and the potential role it can play; whereas building strong relations and security cooperation with indo-pacific regional organisations and countries is central to the strategy; ### b. whereas the recently adopted eu strategy for cooperation in the indo-pacific , which is based on a principled engagement with a long-term perspective , reflects the ambition of the eu to play a greater role in this region of growing geopolitical and economic importance; whereas promoting an open and rules-based regional security architecture and building strong relations and security cooperation with indo-pacific regional organisations and countries is central to the strategy;


### b. whereas the recently adopted eu strategy for cooperation in the indo-pacific , which is based on a principled engagement with a long-term perspective , reflects a deep evolution in the way the eu looks at its interests in the region and the potential role it can play; whereas building strong relations and security cooperation with indo-pacific regional organisations and countries is central to the strategy; ### b. whereas the recently adopted eu strategy for cooperation in the indo-pacific , which is based on a principled engagement with a long-term perspective , reflects a deep evolution in the way the eu looks at its interests , the opportunities , and challenges in the region and the potential role it can play; whereas building strong relations and security cooperation with indo-pacific regional organisations and countries is central to the strategy;


### b. whereas the recently adopted eu strategy for cooperation in the indo-pacific , which is based on a principled engagement with a long-term perspective , reflects a deep evolution in the way the eu looks at its interests in the region and the potential role it can play; whereas building strong relations and security cooperation with indo-pacific regional organisations and countries is central to the strategy; ### b. whereas the recently adopted eu strategy for cooperation in the indo-pacific , which is based on a principled engagement with a long-term perspective , reflects a deep and necessary evolution in the way the eu looks at its interests in the region and the potential role it can play; whereas building strong relations and security cooperation with indo-pacific regional organisations and countries is central to the strategy;


### c. whereas in recent years the dynamics in the region have given rise to intense geopolitical competition , mirrored in an increase in military spending and a more aggressive rhetoric , thereby calling into question the rules-based international order; whereas a new centre of global competition has therefore evolved in the indo-pacific region; whereas there is no overarching regional security order to mitigate the associated challenges; whereas such dynamics represent serious threats to stability and security in the region and beyond , impacting directly the eu’s strategic interests as a key political and economic partner of the countries in the region; whereas the eu is committed to security , peace and international law; ### c. whereas in recent years the dynamics in the region have given rise to intense geopolitical competition , mirrored in an increase in military spending , military build-up and a more aggressive rhetoric , thereby calling into question the rules-based international order; whereas a new centre of regional and global competition has therefore evolved in the indo-pacific region; whereas there is no overarching regional security order nor confidence-building mechanism to mitigate the associated challenges and tensions; whereas such dynamics represent serious threats to stability and security in the region and beyond , impacting directly the eu’s strategic interests as a key political and economic partner of the countries in the region; whereas the eu is committed to security , peace and international law;


### c. whereas in recent years the dynamics in the region have given rise to intense geopolitical competition , mirrored in an increase in military spending and a more aggressive rhetoric , thereby calling into question the rules-based international order; whereas a new centre of global competition has therefore evolved in the indo-pacific region; whereas there is no overarching regional security order to mitigate the associated challenges; whereas such dynamics represent serious threats to stability and security in the region and beyond , impacting directly the eu’s strategic interests as a key political and economic partner of the countries in the region; whereas the eu is committed to security , peace and international law; ### c. whereas in recent years the region has become a hotspot of intense geopolitical competition , mirrored by an increase in military spending and a more aggressive rhetoric , thereby calling into question the rules-based international order; whereas there is no overarching regional security order to mitigate the associated challenges; whereas such dynamics represent serious threats to stability and security in the region and beyond , impacting directly the eu’s strategic interests as a key political and economic partner of the countries in the region; whereas the eu is committed to security , peace and international law;


### c. whereas in recent years the dynamics in the region have given rise to intense geopolitical competition , mirrored in an increase in military spending and a more aggressive rhetoric , thereby calling into question the rules-based international order; whereas a new centre of global competition has therefore evolved in the indo-pacific region; whereas there is no overarching regional security order to mitigate the associated challenges; whereas such dynamics represent serious threats to stability and security in the region and beyond , impacting directly the eu’s strategic interests as a key political and economic partner of the countries in the region; whereas the eu is committed to security , peace and international law; ### c. whereas in recent years the dynamics in the region , and in particular those pursued by the people’s republic of china , have given rise to intense geopolitical competition , mirrored in an increase in military spending and a more aggressive rhetoric , thereby calling into question the rules-based international order; whereas a new centre of global competition has therefore evolved in the indo-pacific region; whereas there is no overarching regional security order to mitigate the associated challenges; whereas such dynamics represent serious threats to stability and security in the region and beyond , impacting directly the eu’s strategic interests as a key political and economic partner of the countries in the region; whereas the eu is committed to security , peace and international law;


### c. whereas in recent years the dynamics in the region have given rise to intense geopolitical competition , mirrored in an increase in military spending and a more aggressive rhetoric , thereby calling into question the rules-based international order; whereas a new centre of global competition has therefore evolved in the indo-pacific region; whereas there is no overarching regional security order to mitigate the associated challenges; whereas such dynamics represent serious threats to stability and security in the region and beyond , impacting directly the eu’s strategic interests as a key political and economic partner of the countries in the region; whereas the eu is committed to security , peace and international law; ### c. whereas in recent years the dynamics in the region have given rise to intense geopolitical tensions and competition , mirrored in an increase in military spending and a more aggressive rhetoric , thereby calling into question the rules-based international order; whereas a new centre of global competition has therefore evolved in the indo-pacific region; whereas there is no overarching regional security order to mitigate the associated challenges; whereas such dynamics represent serious threats to stability and security in the region and beyond , impacting directly the eu’s strategic interests as a key political and economic partner of the countries in the region; whereas the eu is committed to security , peace , international law , and human rights;


### d. whereas the eu is the number one foreign investor and development assistance provider; whereas the eu has already concluded and is in the process of negotiating free trade agreements with countries in the region; whereas the eu can already rely on a broad network of partnerships and agreements with a number of countries , such as japan , the republic of korea , australia , india , new zealand and singapore , and with regional organisations , such as the association of southeast asian nations (asean) and the organisation of african , caribbean and pacific states (oacps); whereas the eu is present in the region through its member state france , notably through the french overseas departments of la réunion and mayotte in the indian ocean , and in the pacific ocean through new caledonia , as well as through the french overseas collectivities of french polynesia and wallis and futuna; whereas these french regions are home to roughly 1.5 million eu citizens; whereas , consequently , the eu is a resident actor in the indo-pacific; ### d. whereas the eu is the number one foreign investor and development assistance provider; whereas the eu has already concluded and is in the process of negotiating free trade agreements with countries in the region; whereas the eu can already rely on a broad network of partnerships and agreements with a number of countries , such as japan , the republic of korea , australia , india , new zealand , vietnam and singapore , and with regional organisations , such as the association of southeast asian nations (asean) and the organisation of african , caribbean and pacific states (oacps); whereas the eu is present in the region through its member state france , notably through the french overseas departments of la réunion and mayotte , as well as the french southern and antarctic lands in the indian ocean , and in the pacific ocean through new caledonia , as well as through the french overseas collectivities of french polynesia and wallis and futuna; whereas these french regions are home to roughly 1.5 million eu citizens; whereas , consequently , the eu is a resident actor in the indo-pacific;


### d. whereas the eu is the number one foreign investor and development assistance provider; whereas the eu has already concluded and is in the process of negotiating free trade agreements with countries in the region; whereas the eu can already rely on a broad network of partnerships and agreements with a number of countries , such as japan , the republic of korea , australia , india , new zealand and singapore , and with regional organisations , such as the association of southeast asian nations (asean) and the organisation of african , caribbean and pacific states (oacps); whereas the eu is present in the region through its member state france , notably through the french overseas departments of la réunion and mayotte in the indian ocean , and in the pacific ocean through new caledonia , as well as through the french overseas collectivities of french polynesia and wallis and futuna; whereas these french regions are home to roughly 1.5 million eu citizens; whereas , consequently , the eu is a resident actor in the indo-pacific; ### d. whereas the eu is the number one foreign investor and development assistance provider in the indo-pacific; whereas the eu has already concluded and is in the process of negotiating free trade agreements with countries in the region; whereas the eu can already rely on a broad network of partnerships and agreements with a number of countries , such as japan , the republic of korea , australia , india , new zealand and singapore , and with regional organisations , such as the association of southeast asian nations (asean) and the organisation of african , caribbean and pacific states (oacps); whereas the eu is present in the region through its member state france , notably through the french overseas departments of la réunion and mayotte in the indian ocean , and in the pacific ocean through new caledonia , as well as through the french overseas collectivities of french polynesia and wallis and futuna; whereas these french regions are home to roughly 1.6 million eu citizens , including over 7000 military personnel; whereas , consequently , the eu is a resident actor in the indo-pacific;


### e. whereas china’s rapid military build-up , coupled with its increasingly assertive behaviour in the indo-pacific region and its military activities in the east and south china seas , as well as its deliberate and repetitive violations of taiwan’s air defence identification zone and its increasingly aggressive rhetoric and media campaigns , are leading to rising tensions in the indo-pacific; ### e. whereas china’s rapid military build-up , coupled with its increasingly assertive behaviour in the indo-pacific region and its military activities in the east and south china seas , executed through the creation and progressive expansion of two different bodies that complement the people’s liberation army navy (plan) , namely the chinese coast guard and the maritime militia , as well as its deliberate and repetitive violations of taiwan’s air defence identification zone and its increasingly aggressive rhetoric and media campaigns , are leading to rising tensions in the indo-pacific;


### e. whereas china’s rapid military build-up , coupled with its increasingly assertive behaviour in the indo-pacific region and its military activities in the east and south china seas , as well as its deliberate and repetitive violations of taiwan’s air defence identification zone and its increasingly aggressive rhetoric and media campaigns , are leading to rising tensions in the indo-pacific; ### e. whereas china’s rapid military build-up , coupled with its increasingly assertive behaviour in the indo-pacific region , its military activities and its intentions to interfere with the freedom of navigation in the east and south china seas , its military build-up on the indian-chinese border , as well as its deliberate and repetitive violations of taiwan’s air defence identification zone and its increasingly aggressive rhetoric and media campaigns , are leading to rising tensions in the indo-pacific;


### e. whereas china’s rapid military build-up , coupled with its increasingly assertive behaviour in the indo-pacific region and its military activities in the east and south china seas , as well as its deliberate and repetitive violations of taiwan’s air defence identification zone and its increasingly aggressive rhetoric and media campaigns , are leading to rising tensions in the indo-pacific; ### e. whereas china’s rapid military build-up , coupled with its increasingly assertive behaviour in the indo-pacific region and its military activities in the east and south china seas , as well as its deliberate and repetitive violations of taiwan’s air defence identification zone and its increasingly aggressive rhetoric and media campaigns , are leading to rising tensions in the indo-pacific , which calls for a scenario-based ready-to-act plan;


### e. whereas china’s rapid military build-up , coupled with its increasingly assertive behaviour in the indo-pacific region and its military activities in the east and south china seas , as well as its deliberate and repetitive violations of taiwan’s air defence identification zone and its increasingly aggressive rhetoric and media campaigns , are leading to rising tensions in the indo-pacific; ### e. whereas china’s rapid military build-up , coupled with its increasingly assertive behaviour in the indo-pacific region and its military activities in the east and south china seas , as well as its deliberate and repetitive violations of taiwan’s air defence identification zone , trampling of hong kong’s freedoms , and its increasingly aggressive rhetoric and media campaigns , are driving up tensions in the indo-pacific;


### 1. welcomes the recently adopted eu strategy for cooperation in the indo-pacific; recognises the added value of the strategy as the first foundation stone of the eu’s united approach to the region , and praises the inclusive and multifaceted nature of the strategy and the inclusion of security and defence as one of its seven priority areas; calls for the eu to use the strategy as a tool to effectively assert its presence and influence in the region through furthering strategic ties and deepening cooperation on security- and defence-related matters with regional countries and organisations; believes that increased eu engagement in the region would contribute to regional security , and help overcome regional tensions and create more balanced relations among regional players; recalls that the strategy is a team europe project; ### 1. welcomes the recently adopted eu strategy for cooperation in the indo-pacific; recognises the added value of the strategy as the first foundation stone of the eu’s united approach to the region , and praises the inclusive and multifaceted nature of the strategy and the inclusion of security and defence as one of its seven priority areas; calls for the eu to use the strategy as a tool to effectively assert its presence and influence in the region through furthering strategic ties and deepening cooperation on security- and defence-related matters with regional like-minded countries and organisations; believes that increased value-based eu engagement in the region would contribute to regional security , and help overcome regional tensions and create more balanced relations among regional players; recalls that the strategy is a team europe project and that bilateral arrangements between member states and indo-pacific countries that go against the team europe approach can harm the objectives of the shared strategy;


### 2. highlights the need to safeguard eu unity as a pre-condition to achieve the eu’s ambition of strategic sovereignty amid the increasing competition between the united states and china; recalls that the eu’s unified approach must be underpinned by a pragmatic and principled foreign and security policy; ### 2. highlights the need to safeguard eu unity as a pre-condition to achieve the eu’s ambition of open strategic autonomy amid the increasing competition between the united states and china; recalls that the eu’s unified approach must be underpinned by a pragmatic and principled foreign and security policy and more effective foreign-policy decision-making at the eu-level , specifically through a transition to qualified majority voting;


### 2. highlights the need to safeguard eu unity as a pre-condition to achieve the eu’s ambition of strategic sovereignty amid the increasing competition between the united states and china; recalls that the eu’s unified approach must be underpinned by a pragmatic and principled foreign and security policy; ### 2. highlights the need to safeguard eu unity as a pre-condition to achieve the eu’s ambition of strategic sovereignty amid the increasing competition between the united states and china; recalls that the eu’s unified approach must be underpinned by a pragmatic and principled foreign and security policy as well as credible foreign policy tools;


### 4. calls on the eu to make use of its reputation as a credible and reliable actor amid the growing geopolitical competition between global and regional powers in the indo-pacific; recalls that the added value of eu engagement in the indo-pacific lies in its comprehensive range of civilian and military assistance measures , including well developed non-military contributions; recalls that the eu has a vast network of diplomatic assets to facilitate dialogue on conflict-resolution , legal solutions and expertise in setting up confidence-building measures; ### 4. urges the eu to make use of its reputation as a credible and reliable actor amid the growing geopolitical competition between global and regional powers in the indo-pacific; recalls that the added value of eu engagement in the indo-pacific lies in its comprehensive range of civilian and military assistance measures , including well developed non-military contributions; recalls that the eu has a vast network of diplomatic assets to facilitate dialogue on conflict-resolution , legal solutions and expertise in setting up confidence-building measures; calls on the eu to closer link its contributions to countries in the region and its diplomacy efforts to its values and interests;


### 5. stresses its concern that the current tensions and disputes in the region , unless properly mediated and managed , pose a threat to free and open communication in the maritime , air , space and cyber areas , which are essential to maintain regional and global trading routes; ### 5. stresses its concern that the current tensions and disputes in the region , unless properly mediated and managed , pose a threat to global security and stability and to free and open communication in the maritime , air , space and cyber areas , which are essential to maintain regional and global trading routes;


### 5. stresses its concern that the current tensions and disputes in the region , unless properly mediated and managed , pose a threat to free and open communication in the maritime , air , space and cyber areas , which are essential to maintain regional and global trading routes; ### 5. stresses its concern that the current tensions and disputes in the region , unless properly mediated and managed , pose a threat to free and open communication in the maritime , air , space and cyber areas , which are essential to stability and peace and to maintain regional and global trading routes;


### 6. expresses deep concerns about china’s rapid military build-up , including its test of a hypersonic missile , and its increasingly assertive behaviour , which aims , among other things , to advance its territorial claims in the east and south china seas; highlights that security hotspots and unresolved issues , such as the democratic people’s republic of korea’s nuclear programme , the recent china-india border standoffs , the crackdown on democracy in hong kong , and threats posed by china to the territorial integrity of taiwan , exert further strain on regional security and stability; highlights that the eu’s approach towards china must be unified , pragmatic , multifaceted and principled , including cooperating on issues of shared interest , such as climate change , on the one hand , and competing when it comes to providing economic , political and strategic alternatives to third countries , and confronting china on matters where our respective views diverge substantially , on the other hand; ### 6. expresses deep concerns about china’s rapid military build-up , including its recently uncovered test of a hypersonic missile , and its increasingly assertive behaviour , which aims , among other things , to advance its territorial claims in the east and south china seas , as well as its growing strategic presence in the indian ocean and arabian sea , as evidenced by its activities and investments in the hambatonta (sri lanka) and djibouti ports , as well as the gwadar harbour , strategically connected with the chinese xinjiang uygur autonomous region through the karakoram highway;


### 6. expresses deep concerns about china’s rapid military build-up , including its test of a hypersonic missile , and its increasingly assertive behaviour , which aims , among other things , to advance its territorial claims in the east and south china seas; highlights that security hotspots and unresolved issues , such as the democratic people’s republic of korea’s nuclear programme , the recent china-india border standoffs , the crackdown on democracy in hong kong , and threats posed by china to the territorial integrity of taiwan , exert further strain on regional security and stability; highlights that the eu’s approach towards china must be unified , pragmatic , multifaceted and principled , including cooperating on issues of shared interest , such as climate change , on the one hand , and competing when it comes to providing economic , political and strategic alternatives to third countries , and confronting china on matters where our respective views diverge substantially , on the other hand; ### 6. highlights that security hotspots and unresolved issues , such as the democratic people’s republic of korea’s nuclear programme , the recent china-india border standoffs , the crackdown on democracy in hong kong , and threats posed by china to the territorial integrity of taiwan , materialised through military actions , exert further strain on regional security and stability; highlights that the eu’s approach towards china must be unified , pragmatic , multifaceted and principled , including cooperating on issues of shared interest , such as climate change , on the one hand , and competing when it comes to providing economic , political and strategic alternatives to third countries , and confronting china on matters where our respective views diverge substantially , such as respect for democracy and fundamental human rights , on the other hand;


### 6. expresses deep concerns about china’s rapid military build-up , including its test of a hypersonic missile , and its increasingly assertive behaviour , which aims , among other things , to advance its territorial claims in the east and south china seas; highlights that security hotspots and unresolved issues , such as the democratic people’s republic of korea’s nuclear programme , the recent china-india border standoffs , the crackdown on democracy in hong kong , and threats posed by china to the territorial integrity of taiwan , exert further strain on regional security and stability; highlights that the eu’s approach towards china must be unified , pragmatic , multifaceted and principled , including cooperating on issues of shared interest , such as climate change , on the one hand , and competing when it comes to providing economic , political and strategic alternatives to third countries , and confronting china on matters where our respective views diverge substantially , on the other hand; ### 6. condemns china’s rapid military build-up including its test of a hypersonic missile , and its increasingly assertive behaviour , which aims , among other things , to advance its territorial claims in the east and south china seas; equally condemns china’s diplomacy of intimidation towards the eu and eu member states; highlights that security hotspots and unresolved issues , such as the democratic people’s republic of korea’s nuclear programme , the recent china-india border standoffs , the crackdown on democracy in hong kong , and threats posed by china to the territorial integrity of taiwan , exert further strain on regional security and stability; highlights that the eu’s approach towards china must be unified , pragmatic , multifaceted and principled , including cooperating on issues of global impact , such as climate change , on the one hand , and competing when it comes to providing economic , political and strategic alternatives to third countries , and confronting and sanctioning china on matters where our respective views diverge substantially , on the other hand;


### 19. underscores the need to advance defence capability development in order to adequately respond to commonly identified threats; believes that eu member states , especially the 21 joint eu-nato members , need to act coherently and should consider identifying a clear ‘european level of ambition’ in quantitative and qualitative terms regarding capability development in nato; encourages stronger efforts by members of both organisations to achieve greater synergies and coordination between the eu’s capability development plan (cdp) , the eu’s coordinated annual review on defence (card) and nato’s defence planning process (ndpp); ### 19. underscores the need to advance defence capability development in order to adequately respond to commonly identified threats; believes that eu member states , especially the 21 joint eu-nato members , need to act coherently and should consider identifying a clear ‘european level of ambition’ in quantitative and qualitative terms regarding capability development in nato , in particular by increasing their investment in research and innovation; encourages stronger efforts by members of both organisations to achieve greater coherence between nato’s defence planning process (ndpp) and eu initiatives on capability development , in particular the high-impact capability goals (hicg) , the eu’s capability development plan (cdp) and the eu’s coordinated annual review on defence (card); calls the 21 common eu-nato members to declare the same pool of capabilities potentially available in both frameworks for planning purpose in application of the “single set of forces” principle;


### 19. underscores the need to advance defence capability development in order to adequately respond to commonly identified threats; believes that eu member states , especially the 21 joint eu-nato members , need to act coherently and should consider identifying a clear ‘european level of ambition’ in quantitative and qualitative terms regarding capability development in nato; encourages stronger efforts by members of both organisations to achieve greater synergies and coordination between the eu’s capability development plan (cdp) , the eu’s coordinated annual review on defence (card) and nato’s defence planning process (ndpp); ### 19. underscores the need to advance defence capability development in order to adequately respond to commonly identified threats; believes that eu member states , especially the 21 joint eu-nato members , need to act coherently and should encourage stronger efforts to achieve greater synergies and coordination between the eu’s capability development plan (cdp) , the eu’s coordinated annual review on defence (card) and with the nato’s defence planning process (ndpp);


### 19. underscores the need to advance defence capability development in order to adequately respond to commonly identified threats; believes that eu member states , especially the 21 joint eu-nato members , need to act coherently and should consider identifying a clear ‘european level of ambition’ in quantitative and qualitative terms regarding capability development in nato; encourages stronger efforts by members of both organisations to achieve greater synergies and coordination between the eu’s capability development plan (cdp) , the eu’s coordinated annual review on defence (card) and nato’s defence planning process (ndpp); ### 19. underscores the need to advance defence capability development in order to adequately respond to commonly identified threats; believes that eu member states , especially the 21 joint eu-nato members , need to act coherently and should consider identifying a clear ‘european level of ambition’ , without disregard for the transatlantic partnership , in quantitative and qualitative terms regarding capability development in nato; encourages stronger efforts by members of both organisations to achieve greater synergies and coordination between the eu’s capability development plan (cdp) , the eu’s coordinated annual review on defence (card) and nato’s defence planning process(ndpp);


### encourages the eu and member states to deepen cooperation with taiwan in confronting disinformation from malign third countries , including the sharing of best-practices; ### encourages the eu and member states to deepen cooperation with taiwan in confronting disinformation from malign third countries , including the sharing of best-practices and to deepen cooperation in matters regarding cybersecurity and cyber threats;


### a. whereas solid and comprehensive arms control , non-proliferation and disarmament architecture based on binding treaties and reinforced by a reliable and transparent verification mechanism is key to maintaining peace , stability , predictability , human security and sustainable development , de-escalating existing tensions between states and reducing the possibility of armed conflict with catastrophic consequences; ### a. whereas solid and comprehensive arms control , non-proliferation and disarmament architecture based on robust confidence building mechanisms and binding treaties and reinforced by a reliable and transparent verification mechanism is key to building and maintaining peace , stability , predictability , human security and sustainable development , de-escalating existing tensions between states and reducing the possibility of armed conflict with unpredictable and possibly catastrophic consequences;


### b. whereas in the current tense geopolitical context , key arms control treaties that came into force at the end of the cold war have recently been dismantled; ### b. whereas in the current tense european and global geopolitical context , key arms control treaties that came into force at the end of the cold war have recently been weakened and replaced by a new status quo based on the principle of balance of power; whereas this new status quo is not sustainable as it does not guarantee the necessary stability and predictability of the european and global security architecture , thereby endangering the eu strategic goal of establishing its own defence capabilities;


### b. whereas in the current tense geopolitical context , key arms control treaties that came into force at the end of the cold war have recently been dismantled; ### b. whereas in the current tense geopolitical context , key arms control treaties that came into force at the end of the cold war have recently been weakened;


### c. whereas the eu , through its strategy against proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (wmd) , is proactively contributing to the prevention of the use and proliferation of wmds; ### c. whereas the eu , through its strategy against proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (wmd) , is proactively contributing to the prevention of the use and proliferation of wmds; whereas the strategy should also be focused on new threats such as missile , drone , autonomous ai-based and energy-based weapons systems and technologies;


### d. whereas the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (npt) has proven to be a cornerstone of global nuclear arms control architecture and an effective tool to uphold international peace and security; ### d. whereas the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (npt) has proven to be and remains a cornerstone of global nuclear arms control architecture and an effective tool to uphold international peace and security;


### g. whereas the treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapons (tpnw) entered into force on 22 january 2021; whereas three eu member states are states parties to the tpnw; whereas no nato allies and no state possessing nuclear weapons are states parties to the tpnw; whereas no meaningful results in the global non-proliferation and disarmament efforts are possible without the involvement and active participation of the five nuclear-weapon states parties to the npt; ### g. whereas the treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapons (tpnw) entered into force on 22 january 2021; whereas three eu member states are states parties to the tpnw; whereas no nato allies and no state possessing nuclear weapons are states parties to the tpnw; whereas no meaningful results in the global non-proliferation and disarmament efforts are possible without the involvement and active participation of all states parties to the npt;


### h. whereas the joint comprehensive plan of action (jcpoa) was an achievement of multilateral diplomacy led by the eu; whereas the us and iran have begun indirect negotiations with a view to their return to the jcpoa; whereas iran has ceased the application of the additional protocol; ### h. whereas the joint comprehensive plan of action (jcpoa) was an achievement of multilateral diplomacy led by the eu; whereas participants to the 2015 nuclear deal and the us have begun indirect negotiations with a view to the mutual return of iran and the us to the implementation of the jcpoa; whereas iran has ceased the application of the additional protocol and the implementation of modified code 3.1 of the subsidiary arrangements to iran’s safeguards agreement;


### h. whereas the joint comprehensive plan of action (jcpoa) was an achievement of multilateral diplomacy led by the eu; whereas the us and iran have begun indirect negotiations with a view to their return to the jcpoa; whereas iran has ceased the application of the additional protocol; ### h. whereas the joint comprehensive plan of action (jcpoa) was an achievement of multilateral diplomacy led by the eu; whereas the us and iran have begun indirect negotiations with a view to their return to the jcpoa; whereas iran has ceased the application of the additional protocol and intensified its uranium enrichment programs towards weapons-grade level;


### k. whereas following the collapse of the intermediate-range nuclear forces (inf) treaty , the us and russia are now no longer prohibited from building and deploying this category of weapons and from engaging in a new arms race; ### k. whereas following the collapse of the intermediate-range nuclear forces (inf) treaty , the us and russia are now no longer prohibited from building and deploying this category of weapons and from engaging in a new arms race , especially in europe and asia;


### m. whereas in recent years , china has substantially stepped up the development of its conventional and nuclear capabilities , whereas china has shown reluctance to engage in talks on its potential participation in multilateral arms control instruments; ### m. whereas in recent years , china has substantially stepped up the development of its conventional and nuclear capabilities , whereas china has shown lack of transparency and reluctance to engage in talks on its potential participation in nuclear arms control instruments;


### m. whereas in recent years , china has substantially stepped up the development of its conventional and nuclear capabilities , whereas china has shown reluctance to engage in talks on its potential participation in multilateral arms control instruments; ### m. whereas in recent years , china has substantially stepped up the development of its conventional , missile and nuclear capabilities , whereas china has shown reluctance to engage in talks on its potential participation in multilateral arms control instruments;


### n. whereas since the withdrawal of the uk from the eu , france is now the only nuclear member state; ### n. whereas since the withdrawal of the uk from the eu , france is now the only nuclear member state within the eu;


### t. whereas the nuclear activities of the democratic people’s republic of korea (dprk) represent a serious threat to international peace and security , and to global disarmament and non-proliferation efforts; ### t. whereas the proliferation and export of missile , nuclear and other wmd-related technologies by the democratic people’s republic of korea (dprk) represent a serious threat to international peace and security , and to global disarmament and non-proliferation efforts;


### t. whereas the nuclear activities of the democratic people’s republic of korea (dprk) represent a serious threat to international peace and security , and to global disarmament and non-proliferation efforts; ### t. whereas the nuclear , wmd and ballistic missiles programmes of the democratic people’s republic of korea (dprk) represent a serious threat to international peace and security , and to global disarmament and non-proliferation efforts;


### u. whereas wmd disarmament and non-proliferation efforts can contribute to sustainable development; ### u. whereas wmd disarmament and non-proliferation efforts can contribute to sustainable development , global security predictability and long-term stability;


### v. whereas the covid-19 pandemic has shown the need to increase eu chemical , biological , radiological and nuclear defence (cbrn) preparedness; ### v. whereas the covid-19 pandemic has shown the need to increase eu chemical , biological , radiological and nuclear defence (cbrn) preparedness as well as investments in cbrn civil and military capabilities;


### 1. reiterates its full commitment to the preservation of effective international arms control , disarmament and non-proliferation regimes as a cornerstone of global and european security; recalls its commitment to pursuing policies designed to move forward the reduction and elimination of all nuclear arsenals and to achieve a world without nuclear weapons; calls for a renewed arms control multilateral order; ### 1. reiterates its full commitment to the preservation of effective international arms control , disarmament and non-proliferation regimes as a cornerstone of global and european security; recalls its willingness to pursuing policies designed to move forward the reduction and elimination of all nuclear arsenals and to create the conditions to achieve a world without nuclear weapons with undiminished security for all;


### 2. is alarmed by the ongoing erosion of the global non-proliferation , disarmament and arms control architecture , which is worsened by the rapid development of new systems; fears that withdrawal from , or the non-extension of , major arms control treaties would seriously damage the international arms control regimes that have provided decades of stability , and would undermine relationships between nuclear-armed states; underlines the urgent need to restore cross-border trust; ### 2. is alarmed by the ongoing erosion of the global non-proliferation , disarmament and arms control architecture , which is worsened by the rapid development of new systems such as ai- and energy-based weapons systems , hypersonic missile and drone technologies; fears that withdrawal from , or the non-extension of , major arms control treaties would seriously damage the international arms control regimes that have provided decades of stability , and would undermine relationships between nuclear-armed states; underlines the urgent need to restore cross-border trust;


### 2. is alarmed by the ongoing erosion of the global non-proliferation , disarmament and arms control architecture , which is worsened by the rapid development of new systems; fears that withdrawal from , or the non-extension of , major arms control treaties would seriously damage the international arms control regimes that have provided decades of stability , and would undermine relationships between nuclear-armed states; underlines the urgent need to restore cross-border trust; ### 2. is alarmed by the ongoing erosion of the global non-proliferation , disarmament and arms control architecture , which is worsened by the rapid development of new destabilising systems and the persistence of the proliferation crisis; fears that withdrawal from , or the non-extension of major arms control treaties would seriously damage the international arms control regimes that have provided decades of stability , and would undermine relationships between nuclear-weapon states; underlines the urgent need to restore cross-border trust;


### 3. reaffirms its full support to the npt; expects nuclear-weapon states to take steps to demonstrate their genuine commitment to nuclear disarmament; exhorts states parties to do their utmost to contribute to a successful and ambitious outcome of the upcoming 10th review conference; ### 3. reaffirms its full support to the npt; expects nuclear-weapon states to take steps to demonstrate their genuine commitment to nuclear disarmament; exhorts states parties to do their utmost to contribute to a successful and ambitious outcome of the upcoming 10th review conference; underlines the need to acknowledge the deficiencies of the existing treaty , which enabled the proliferation of nuclear technology for military use in the first place;


### 3. reaffirms its full support to the npt; expects nuclear-weapon states to take steps to demonstrate their genuine commitment to nuclear disarmament; exhorts states parties to do their utmost to contribute to a successful and ambitious outcome of the upcoming 10th review conference; ### 3. reaffirms its full support to the npt as the cornerstone of the international non-proliferation regime; expects nuclear-weapon states to take steps to demonstrate their genuine commitment to nuclear disarmament; exhorts states parties to do their utmost to contribute to a successful and ambitious outcome of the upcoming 10th review conference in all its pillars: disarmament , non-proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy;


### 4. insists on the need to ensure that the eu plays a strong and constructive role in developing and reinforcing the global rules-based non-proliferation efforts and arms control and disarmament architecture; ### 4. insists on the need to ensure that the eu plays a strong and constructive role in developing and reinforcing the global rules-based non-proliferation efforts and arms control and disarmament architecture; calls on the eu to step up its multilateral diplomacy efforts to promote confidence-building measures among all parties to the npt , with a view to defusing existing tensions and reducing distrust;


### 4. insists on the need to ensure that the eu plays a strong and constructive role in developing and reinforcing the global rules-based non-proliferation efforts and arms control and disarmament architecture; ### 4. insists on the need to ensure that the eu plays a strong and constructive role in developing and reinforcing the global non-proliferation efforts and arms control and disarmament architecture;