### provide business users , or third parties authorised by a business user , free of charge , with effective , high-quality , continuous and real-time access and use of aggregated or non-aggregated data , that is provided for or generated in the context of the use of the relevant core platform services by those business users and the end users engaging with the products or services provided by those business users; for personal data , provide access and use only where directly connected with the use effectuated by the end user in respect of the products or services offered by the relevant business user through the relevant core platform service , and when the end user opts in to such sharing with a consent in the sense of the regulation (eu) 2016/679; ### provide business users , or third parties authorised by a business user , free of charge , with effective , high-quality , continuous and real-time access and use of aggregated or non-aggregated data , that is provided for or generated in the context of the use of the relevant core platform services or of ancillary services offered by the gatekeeper by those business users and the end users engaging with the products or services provided by those business users; for personal data , provide access and use only where directly connected with the use effectuated by the end user in respect of the products or services offered by the relevant business user through the relevant core platform service , and when the end user opts in to such sharing with a consent in the sense of the regulation (eu) 2016/679;


### provide business users , or third parties authorised by a business user , free of charge , with effective , high-quality , continuous and real-time access and use of aggregated or non-aggregated data , that is provided for or generated in the context of the use of the relevant core platform services by those business users and the end users engaging with the products or services provided by those business users; for personal data , provide access and use only where directly connected with the use effectuated by the end user in respect of the products or services offered by the relevant business user through the relevant core platform service , and when the end user opts in to such sharing with a consent in the sense of the regulation (eu) 2016/679; ; ### provide effective portability of data generated through the activity of a business user or end user and shall , in particular , provide tools for end users to facilitate the exercise of data portability of personal data , in line with and building on regulation eu 2016/679 , and of non-personal data including by the provision of continuous and real-time access. the commission shall determine by means of implementing acts the technical means acceptable to ensure an easy , secure , continuous and real-time access;


### provide business users , or third parties authorised by a business user , free of charge , with effective , high-quality , continuous and real-time access and use of aggregated or non-aggregated data , that is provided for or generated in the context of the use of the relevant core platform services by those business users and the end users engaging with the products or services provided by those business users; for personal data , provide access and use only where directly connected with the use effectuated by the end user in respect of the products or services offered by the relevant business user through the relevant core platform service , and when the end user opts in to such sharing with a consent in the sense of the regulation (eu) 2016/679; ; ### provide business users , or third parties authorised by a business user , free of charge , with effective , high-quality , continuous and real-time access and use of aggregated or non-aggregated data , including personal data , that is provided for or generated in the context of the use of the relevant core platform services or of ancillary services offered by the gatekeeper by those business users and the end users engaging with the products or services provided by those business users; for personal data , provide access and use only where that data is directly connected with the use effectuated by the end user in respect of the products or services offered by the relevant business user through the relevant core platform service , and when the end user opts in to such sharing with a consent in the sense of the regulation (eu) 2016/679;


### 1. the measures implemented by the gatekeeper to ensure compliance with the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6 shall be effective in achieving the objective of the relevant obligation. the gatekeeper shall ensure that these measures are implemented in compliance with regulation (eu) 2016/679 and directive 2002/58/ec , and with legislation on cyber security , consumer protection and product safety. ### 1. the measures implemented by the gatekeeper to ensure compliance with the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6 shall be proportionate and effective in achieving the objective of the relevant obligation. the gatekeeper shall ensure that these measures are implemented in compliance with regulation (eu) 2016/679 , directive 2002/58/ec and regulation xx on a single market for digital services , and with legislation on cyber security , consumer protection and product safety.


### 2. where the commission finds that the measures that the gatekeeper intends to implement pursuant to paragraph 1 , or has implemented , do not ensure effective compliance with the relevant obligations laid down in article 6 , it may by decision specify the measures that the gatekeeper concerned shall implement. the commission shall adopt such a decision within six months from the opening of proceedings pursuant to article 18. ### 2. where the commission finds that the measures that the gatekeeper intends to implement pursuant to paragraph 1 , or has implemented , do not ensure effective compliance with the relevant obligations laid down in article 6 , it may by decision specify the measures that the gatekeeper concerned shall implement in order to comply with the obligations laid down in article 6. in view of adopting the decision , the commission shall take into account the information provided by all relevant stakeholders , such as interested third parties , governments or national authorities. the commission shall adopt such a decision within six months from the opening of proceedings pursuant to article 18.


### 2. where the commission finds that the measures that the gatekeeper intends to implement pursuant to paragraph 1 , or has implemented , do not ensure effective compliance with the relevant obligations laid down in article 6 , it may by decision specify the measures that the gatekeeper concerned shall implement. the commission shall adopt such a decision within six months from the opening of proceedings pursuant to article 18. ### 2. where the commission finds that the measures that the gatekeeper intends to implement pursuant to paragraph 1 , or has implemented , do not ensure effective compliance with the relevant obligations laid down in article 6 , it shall by decision specify the measures that the gatekeeper concerned shall implement , following a regulatory dialogue on the matter with the gatekeeper. the commission shall adopt such a decision within six months from the opening of proceedings pursuant to article 18.


### 2. where the commission finds that the measures that the gatekeeper intends to implement pursuant to paragraph 1 , or has implemented , do not ensure effective compliance with the relevant obligations laid down in article 6 , it may by decision specify the measures that the gatekeeper concerned shall implement. the commission shall adopt such a decision within six months from the opening of proceedings pursuant to article 18. ### 2. where the commission finds that the measures that the gatekeeper intends to implement pursuant to paragraph 1 , or has implemented , do not ensure effective compliance with the relevant obligations laid down in article 6 , it may act on its own initiative and may by decision specify the measures that the gatekeeper concerned shall implement. the commission shall adopt such a decision as soon as possible , and in any case no later than six months from the opening of proceedings pursuant to article 18.


### 3. paragraph 2 of this article is without prejudice to the powers of the commission under articles 25 , 26 and 27. ### 3. paragraph 2 of this article is without prejudice to the powers of the commission under articles 25 , 26 and 27. following a decision under paragraph 2 of this article , if the commission finds the gatekeeper in non-compliance under article 25 and a decision under article 26 is taken , the non-compliance period is considered to have commenced from the implementation deadline in article 3(8).


### the purpose of the investigation. ### the purpose of the investigation and the specific aim sought to be achieved.


### 3. a gatekeeper shall be deemed to have engaged in a systematic non-compliance with the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6 , where the commission has issued at least three non-compliance or fining decisions pursuant to articles 25 and 26 respectively against a gatekeeper in relation to any of its core platform services within a period of five years prior to the adoption of the decision opening a market investigation in view of the possible adoption of a decision pursuant to this article. ### 3. a gatekeeper shall be deemed to have engaged in a systematic non-compliance with the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6 , where the commission has issued at least two non-compliance or fining decisions pursuant to articles 25 and 26 respectively against a gatekeeper in relation to any of its core platform services within a period of five years prior to the adoption of the decision opening a market investigation in view of the possible adoption of a decision pursuant to this article.


### the commission may conduct a market investigation with the purpose of examining whether one or more services within the digital sector should be added to the list of core platform services or to detect types of practices that may limit the contestability of core platform services or may be unfair and which are not effectively addressed by this regulation. it shall issue a public report at the latest within 24 months from the opening of the market investigation. ### the commission may conduct a market investigation with the purpose of examining whether one or more services within the digital sector should be added to the list of core platform services or to detect types of practices that may limit the contestability of core platform services or prima facie unfair and which are not effectively addressed by this regulation. it shall issue a public report at the latest within 24 months from the opening of the market investigation.


### the commission may conduct a market investigation with the purpose of examining whether one or more services within the digital sector should be added to the list of core platform services or to detect types of practices that may limit the contestability of core platform services or may be unfair and which are not effectively addressed by this regulation. it shall issue a public report at the latest within 24 months from the opening of the market investigation. ### the commission and competent national authorities may conduct a market investigation with the purpose of examining whether one or more services within the digital sector should be added to the list of core platform services or to detect types of practices that may limit the contestability of core platform services or may be unfair and which are not effectively addressed by this regulation. it shall issue a public report at the latest within 24 months from the opening of the market investigation.


### the commission may conduct a market investigation with the purpose of examining whether one or more services within the digital sector should be added to the list of core platform services or to detect types of practices that may limit the contestability of core platform services or may be unfair and which are not effectively addressed by this regulation. it shall issue a public report at the latest within 24 months from the opening of the market investigation. ### the commission may conduct a market investigation with the purpose of examining whether one or more services within the digital sector should be added to the list of core platform services or to detect types of practices that may limit the contestability of core platform services or may be unfair and which are not effectively addressed by this regulation. it shall issue a public report at the latest within 12 months from the opening of the market investigation.


### 1. the commission may conduct on-site inspections at the premises of an undertaking or association of undertakings. ### 1. the commission , upon a prior notice , may conduct on-site inspections at the premises of an undertaking or association of undertakings.


### 1. the commission shall adopt a non-compliance decision in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in article 32(4) where it finds that a gatekeeper does not comply with one or more of the following: ### 1. the commission shall endeavour to adopt , within six months from the opening of the proceedings under article 18 , a non-compliance decision in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in article 32(4) where it finds that a gatekeeper does not comply with one or more of the following:


### 3. in the non-compliance decision adopted pursuant to paragraph 1 , the commission shall order the gatekeeper to cease and desist with the non-compliance within an appropriate deadline and to provide explanations on how it plans to comply with the decision. ### 3. in the non-compliance decision adopted pursuant to paragraph 1 , the commission shall order the gatekeeper to cease and desist with the non-compliance within an appropriate deadline and specify mandatory corrective measures a non-compliant gatekeeper shall implement to comply with the obligations in articles 5 and 6. the gatekeeper shall also present its own plan on how it intends to comply with the decision and the corrective measures.


### 3. in the non-compliance decision adopted pursuant to paragraph 1 , the commission shall order the gatekeeper to cease and desist with the non-compliance within an appropriate deadline and to provide explanations on how it plans to comply with the decision. ### 3. in the non-compliance decision adopted pursuant to paragraph 1 , the commission shall order the gatekeeper to cease and desist with the non-compliance within an appropriate deadline and impose behavioural or structural remedies as necessary and proportionate to the infringement.


### 2. the commission may by decision impose on undertakings and associations of undertakings fines not exceeding 1% of the total turnover in the preceding financial year where they intentionally or negligently: ### 2. the commission may by decision impose on undertakings and associations of undertakings fines not exceeding 1% of the total turnover of the undertakings or association of undertakings concerned in the preceding financial year where they intentionally or negligently:


### 1. the powers conferred on the commission by articles 26 and 27 shall be subject to a three year limitation period. ### 1. the powers conferred on the commission by articles 26 and 27 shall be subject to a five year limitation period.


### 1. before adopting a decision pursuant to article 7 , article 8(1) , article 9(1) , articles 15 , 16 , 22 , 23 , 25 and 26 and article 27(2) , the commission shall give the gatekeeper or undertaking or association of undertakings concerned the opportunity of being heard on: ### 1. before adopting a decision pursuant to article 7 , article 8(1) , article 9(1) , articles 15 , 16 , 22 , 23 , 25 and 26 and article 27(2) , the commission shall give the gatekeeper or undertaking or association of undertakings , together with other relevant stakeholders , including consumer organisations and business users , concerned the opportunity of being heard on:


### 1. the commission shall be assisted by the digital markets advisory committee. that committee shall be a committee within the meaning of regulation (eu) no 182/2011. ### 1. the commission shall be assisted by the digital markets advisory committee. that committee shall be a committee within the meaning of regulation (eu) no 182/2011. each member state shall appoint two representatives to the committee. if the appointed representatives are unable to attend , other representatives may replace them. at least one of the representatives of a member state shall be competent in matters of restrictive practices , abuses of dominant positions and other forms of unilateral conduct. member states shall take all necessary measures to ensure the protection of confidential information by their representatives.


### 1. when three or more member states request the commission to open an investigation pursuant to article 15 because they consider that there are reasonable grounds to suspect that a provider of core platform services should be designated as a gatekeeper , the commission shall within four months examine whether there are reasonable grounds to open such an investigation. ### 1. when three or more member states request the commission to open an investigation pursuant to article 15 because they consider that there are reasonable grounds to suspect that a provider of core platform services should be designated as a gatekeeper , the commission shall within four months examine whether there are reasonable grounds to open such an investigation. the result of any such investigation shall be made publicly available.


### 1. when three or more member states request the commission to open an investigation pursuant to article 15 because they consider that there are reasonable grounds to suspect that a provider of core platform services should be designated as a gatekeeper , the commission shall within four months examine whether there are reasonable grounds to open such an investigation. ### 1. when three or more member states request the commission to open an investigation pursuant to articles 15 , 16 and 17 or to institute proceedings in respect of possible non-compliance pursuant to article 25 because they consider that there are reasonable grounds to suspect that a provider of core platform services should be designated as a gatekeeper , that new services or practices should be included within the scope of this regulation or that a gatekeeper is not complying with its obligations , the commission shall within four months examine whether there are reasonable grounds to open such an investigation.


### 1. when three or more member states request the commission to open an investigation pursuant to article 15 because they consider that there are reasonable grounds to suspect that a provider of core platform services should be designated as a gatekeeper , the commission shall within four months examine whether there are reasonable grounds to open such an investigation. ### 1. when three or more member states request the commission to open an investigation pursuant to articles 15 , 16 and 17 or institute proceedings in respect of possible non-compliance pursuant to article 25 because they consider that there are reasonable grounds to suspect that a provider of core platform services should be designated as a gatekeeper , that a gatekeeper is not complying with its obligations as laid down in articles 5 and 6 , that one or more services within the digital sector should be added to the list of core platform services pursuant to point (2) of article 2 or that there are reasonable grounds to suspect that one or several types of practices are not effectively addressed by this regulation and can limit the contestability of core platform services or can be unfair , the commission shall as soon as possible , and in any case no later than four months examine whether there are reasonable grounds to open such an investigation.


### 2. the power to adopt delegated acts referred to in articles 3(6) and 9(1) shall be conferred on the commission for a period of five years from dd/mm/yyyy. the commission shall draw up a report in respect of the delegation of power not later than nine months before the end of the five-year period. the delegation of power shall be tacitly extended for periods of an identical duration , unless the european parliament or the council opposes such extension not later than three months before the end of each period. ### 2. the power to adopt delegated acts referred to in articles 3(5) and 10(1) shall be conferred on the commission for a period of five years from dd/mm/yyyy. the commission shall draw up a report in respect of the delegation of power not later than nine months before the end of the five-year period. the delegation of power shall be tacitly extended for periods of an identical duration , unless the european parliament or the council opposes such extension not later than three months before the end of each period.


### 3. the delegation of power referred to in articles 3(6) and 9(1) may be revoked at any time by the european parliament or by the council. a decision to revoke shall put an end to the delegation of the power specified in that decision. it shall take effect the day following the publication of the decision in the official journal of the european union or at a later date specified therein. it shall not affect the validity of any delegated acts already in force. ### 3. the delegation of power referred to in articles 3(5) and 10(1) may be revoked at any time by the european parliament or by the council. a decision to revoke shall put an end to the delegation of the power specified in that decision. it shall take effect the day following the publication of the decision in the official journal of the european union or at a later date specified therein. it shall not affect the validity of any delegated acts already in force.


### 6. a delegated act adopted pursuant to articles 3(6) and 9(1) shall enter into force only if no objection has been expressed either by the european parliament or by the council within a period of two months of notification of that act to the european parliament and to the council or if , before the expiry of that period , the european parliament and the council have both informed the commission that they will not object. that period shall be extended by two months at the initiative of the european parliament or of the council. ### 6. a delegated act adopted pursuant to articles 3(6) and 9(1) shall enter into force only if no objection has been expressed either by the european parliament or by the council within a period of three months of notification of that act to the european parliament and to the council or if , before the expiry of that period , the european parliament and the council have both informed the commission that they will not object. that period shall be extended by three months at the initiative of the european parliament or of the council.


### (36) the conduct of combining end user data from different sources or signing in users to different services of gatekeepers gives them potential advantages in terms of accumulation of data , thereby raising barriers to entry. to ensure that gatekeepers do not unfairly undermine the contestability of core platform services , they should enable their end users to freely choose to opt-in to such business practices by offering a less personalised alternative. the possibility should cover all possible sources of personal data , including own services of the gatekeeper as well as third party websites , and should be proactively presented to the end user in an explicit , clear and straightforward manner. ### (36) the conduct of combining end user data from different sources or signing in users to different services of gatekeepers gives them potential advantages in terms of accumulation of data , thereby raising barriers to entry. to ensure that gatekeepers do not unfairly undermine the contestability of core platform services , they should offer their end users an option to opt-in to such business practices by offering both less personalised and non-personalised alternative. the possibility should cover all possible sources of personal data , including own services of the gatekeeper as well as third party websites , and should be proactively presented to the end user in an explicit , user-friendly , clear and straightforward manner.


### (36) the conduct of combining end user data from different sources or signing in users to different services of gatekeepers gives them potential advantages in terms of accumulation of data , thereby raising barriers to entry. to ensure that gatekeepers do not unfairly undermine the contestability of core platform services , they should enable their end users to freely choose to opt-in to such business practices by offering a less personalised alternative. the possibility should cover all possible sources of personal data , including own services of the gatekeeper as well as third party websites , and should be proactively presented to the end user in an explicit , clear and straightforward manner. ### (36) the conduct of combining end user data from different sources or signing in users to different services of gatekeepers gives them potential advantages in terms of accumulation of data , thereby raising barriers to entry. to ensure that gatekeepers do not unfairly undermine the contestability of core platform services , they should enable their end users to freely choose to opt-in to such business practices by offering a less personalised but equivalent alternative , and without making the core platform service or certain functionalities thereof conditional upon the end user’s consent in the sense of article 6(1)(a) of regulation (eu) 2016/679. the less personalized alternative should not be different or of degraded quality compared to the service offered to the end users who provide consent to the combining of their personal data. the possibility of data combination should cover all possible sources of personal data , including own core platform services and other services offered by the gatekeeper as well as third party services (where data is obtained , for example , via cookies or like buttons included on third party websites). when the gatekeeper requests consent , it should proactively present a user-friendly solution to end users to provide , modify or revoke consent in an explicit , clear and straightforward manner. consent should be given in a clear , informed and specific way by the end user who should be informed that a refusal may lead to a less personalised offer but the quality and functionalities of the core platform service will remain unchanged.


### (36) the conduct of combining end user data from different sources or signing in users to different services of gatekeepers gives them potential advantages in terms of accumulation of data , thereby raising barriers to entry. to ensure that gatekeepers do not unfairly undermine the contestability of core platform services , they should enable their end users to freely choose to opt-in to such business practices by offering a less personalised alternative. the possibility should cover all possible sources of personal data , including own services of the gatekeeper as well as third party websites , and should be proactively presented to the end user in an explicit , clear and straightforward manner. ### (36) the conduct of combining end user data from different sources or signing in users to different services of gatekeepers gives them potential advantages in terms of accumulation of data , thereby raising barriers to entry. to ensure that gatekeepers do not unfairly undermine the contestability of core platform services , they should enable their end users to freely choose to opt-in to such business practices by offering a less personalised alternative. the possibility should cover all possible sources of personal data , including own services of the gatekeeper as well as third party websites , and should be proactively presented to the end user in an explicit , clear and straightforward manner. this should be amended without prejudice without other provisions governing the storage , processing and use of data , such as the regulation (eu) 2016/679 or the proposed data governance act.


### (36) the conduct of combining end user data from different sources or signing in users to different services of gatekeepers gives them potential advantages in terms of accumulation of data , thereby raising barriers to entry. to ensure that gatekeepers do not unfairly undermine the contestability of core platform services , they should enable their end users to freely choose to opt-in to such business practices by offering a less personalised alternative. the possibility should cover all possible sources of personal data , including own services of the gatekeeper as well as third party websites , and should be proactively presented to the end user in an explicit , clear and straightforward manner. ### (36) the conduct of combining end user data from different sources or signing in users to different services of gatekeepers gives them potential advantages in terms of accumulation of data , thereby raising barriers to entry. to ensure that gatekeepers do not unfairly undermine the contestability of core platform services , they should enable their end users to freely choose to opt-in to such business practices by offering a less personalised but equivalent alternative , and without making the core platform service or certain functionalities thereof conditional upon the end user’s consent in the meaning of article 6(1)(a) of regulation (eu) 2016/679. the less personalised alternative should not be different or of inferior quality compared to the service offered to the end users who consent to the combining of their personal data. the possibility of data combination should cover all possible sources of personal data , including own core platform services and other services offered by the gatekeeper as well as third party services (where data is obtained , for example , via cookies or ‘like’ buttons included on third party websites). when the gatekeeper requests consent , it should proactively present a user-friendly solution to end users to provide , modify or revoke consent in an explicit , clear and straightforward manner. consent should be given in a clear , informed and specific way by the end user who should be informed that a refusal could lead to a less personalised offer but that the quality and functionalities of the core platform service will remain unchanged.


### (38) to prevent further reinforcing their dependence on the core platform services of gatekeepers , the business users of these gatekeepers should be free in promoting and choosing the distribution channel they consider most appropriate to interact with any end users that these business users have already acquired through core platform services provided by the gatekeeper. conversely , end users should also be free to choose offers of such business users and to enter into contracts with them either through core platform services of the gatekeeper , if applicable , or from a direct distribution channel of the business user or another indirect distribution channel such business user may use. this should apply to the promotion of offers and conclusion of contracts between business users and end users. moreover , the ability of end users to freely acquire content , subscriptions , features or other items outside the core platform services of the gatekeeper should not be undermined or restricted. in particular , it should be avoided that gatekeepers restrict end users from access to and use of such services via a software application running on their core platform service. for example , subscribers to online content purchased outside a software application download or purchased from a software application store should not be prevented from accessing such online content on a software application on the gatekeeper’s core platform service simply because it was purchased outside such software application or software application store. ### (38) to prevent further reinforcing their dependence on the core platform services of gatekeepers , the business users of these gatekeepers should be free in promoting and choosing the distribution channel they consider most appropriate to interact with any end users that these business users have already acquired through core platform services provided by the gatekeeper. conversely , end users should also be free to choose offers of such business users and to enter into contracts with them either through core platform services of the gatekeeper , if applicable , or from a direct distribution channel of the business user or another indirect distribution channel such business user may use. this should apply to the promotion of offers and conclusion of contracts between business users and end users. moreover , the ability of end users to freely acquire content , subscriptions , features or other services or items outside the core platform services of the gatekeeper should not be undermined or restricted notably through the use of technical restrictions. in particular , it should be avoided that gatekeepers restrict end users from access to and use of such legally acquired digital content and services via hardware or a software application running on their core platform service. for example , subscribers to online content purchased outside a software application download or purchased from a software application store should not be prevented from accessing such online content on a software application on the gatekeeper’s core platform service simply because it was purchased outside such software application or software application store.


### (38) to prevent further reinforcing their dependence on the core platform services of gatekeepers , the business users of these gatekeepers should be free in promoting and choosing the distribution channel they consider most appropriate to interact with any end users that these business users have already acquired through core platform services provided by the gatekeeper. conversely , end users should also be free to choose offers of such business users and to enter into contracts with them either through core platform services of the gatekeeper , if applicable , or from a direct distribution channel of the business user or another indirect distribution channel such business user may use. this should apply to the promotion of offers and conclusion of contracts between business users and end users. moreover , the ability of end users to freely acquire content , subscriptions , features or other items outside the core platform services of the gatekeeper should not be undermined or restricted. in particular , it should be avoided that gatekeepers restrict end users from access to and use of such services via a software application running on their core platform service. for example , subscribers to online content purchased outside a software application download or purchased from a software application store should not be prevented from accessing such online content on a software application on the gatekeeper’s core platform service simply because it was purchased outside such software application or software application store. ### (38) to prevent further reinforcing their dependence on the core platform services of gatekeepers , the business users of these gatekeepers should be free in promoting and choosing the distribution channel they consider most appropriate to interact with any end users that these business users have already acquired through core platform services provided by the gatekeeper. conversely , end users should also be free to choose offers of such business users and to enter into contracts with them either through core platform services of the gatekeeper , if applicable , or from a direct distribution channel of the business user or another indirect distribution channel such a business user may use. this should apply to the promotion of offers , any communications and conclusion of contracts between business users and end users. moreover , the ability of end users to freely acquire content , subscriptions , features or other items outside the core platform services of the gatekeeper should not be undermined or restricted. in particular , it should be avoided that gatekeepers restrict end users from access to and use of such services via a software application running on their core platform service. for example , subscribers to online content purchased outside a software application download or purchased from a software application store should not be prevented from accessing such online content on a software application on the gatekeeper’s core platform service simply because it was purchased outside such software application or software application store.


### (42) the conditions under which gatekeepers provide online advertising services to business users including both advertisers and publishers are often non-transparent and opaque. this opacity is partly linked to the practices of a few platforms , but is also due to the sheer complexity of modern day programmatic advertising. the sector is considered to have become more non-transparent after the introduction of new privacy legislation , and is expected to become even more opaque with the announced removal of third-party cookies. this often leads to a lack of information and knowledge for advertisers and publishers about the conditions of the advertising services they purchased and undermines their ability to switch to alternative providers of online advertising services. furthermore , the costs of online advertising are likely to be higher than they would be in a fairer , more transparent and contestable platform environment. these higher costs are likely to be reflected in the prices that end users pay for many daily products and services relying on the use of online advertising. transparency obligations should therefore require gatekeepers to provide advertisers and publishers to whom they supply online advertising services , when requested and to the extent possible , with information that allows both sides to understand the price paid for each of the different advertising services provided as part of the relevant advertising value chain. ### (42) the conditions under which gatekeepers provide online advertising services to business users including both advertisers and publishers are often non-transparent and opaque. this opacity is partly linked to the practices of a few platforms , but is also due to the sheer complexity of modern day programmatic advertising. the sector is considered to have become more non-transparent after the introduction of new privacy legislation , and is expected to become even more opaque with the announced removal of third-party cookies. this often leads to a lack of information and knowledge for advertisers and publishers about the conditions of the advertising services they purchased and undermines their ability to switch to alternative providers of online advertising services. furthermore , the costs of online advertising are likely to be higher than they would be in a fairer , more transparent and contestable platform environment. these higher costs are likely to be reflected in the prices that end users pay for many daily products and services relying on the use of online advertising. transparency obligations should therefore require gatekeepers to provide advertisers and publishers to whom they supply online advertising services , when requested and to the extent possible , with information that allows both sides to understand the price paid for each of the different advertising services provided as part of the relevant advertising value chain. such information sharing should include necessary safeguards in order to protect users’ fundamental rights as enshrined in the eu charter of fundamental rights and enable users to make use of their rights as data subjects.


### (42) the conditions under which gatekeepers provide online advertising services to business users including both advertisers and publishers are often non-transparent and opaque. this opacity is partly linked to the practices of a few platforms , but is also due to the sheer complexity of modern day programmatic advertising. the sector is considered to have become more non-transparent after the introduction of new privacy legislation , and is expected to become even more opaque with the announced removal of third-party cookies. this often leads to a lack of information and knowledge for advertisers and publishers about the conditions of the advertising services they purchased and undermines their ability to switch to alternative providers of online advertising services. furthermore , the costs of online advertising are likely to be higher than they would be in a fairer , more transparent and contestable platform environment. these higher costs are likely to be reflected in the prices that end users pay for many daily products and services relying on the use of online advertising. transparency obligations should therefore require gatekeepers to provide advertisers and publishers to whom they supply online advertising services , when requested and to the extent possible , with information that allows both sides to understand the price paid for each of the different advertising services provided as part of the relevant advertising value chain. ### (42) the conditions under which gatekeepers provide online advertising services to business users including both advertisers and publishers are often non-transparent and opaque. this opacity is partly linked to the practices of a few platforms , but is also due to the sheer complexity of modern day programmatic advertising. the sector is considered to have become more non-transparent after the introduction of new privacy legislation , and is expected to become even more opaque with the announced removal of third-party cookies. this often leads to a lack of information and knowledge for advertisers and publishers about the conditions of the advertising services they purchased and undermines their ability to switch to alternative providers of online advertising services. furthermore , the costs of online advertising are likely to be higher than they would be in a fairer , more transparent and contestable platform environment. these higher costs are likely to be reflected in the prices that end users pay for many daily products and services relying on the use of online advertising. transparency obligations should therefore require gatekeepers to provide advertisers and publishers to whom they supply online advertising services , when requested and to the extent possible , with easily accessible and real-time information that allows both sides to understand the price paid for each of the different advertising services provided as part of the relevant advertising value chain.


### (43) a gatekeeper may in certain circumstances have a dual role as a provider of core platform services whereby it provides a core platform service to its business users , while also competing with those same business users in the provision of the same or similar services or products to the same end users. in these circumstances , a gatekeeper may take advantage of its dual role to use data , generated from transactions by its business users on the core platform , for the purpose of its own services that offer similar services to that of its business users. this may be the case , for instance , where a gatekeeper provides an online marketplace or app store to business users , and at the same time offer services as an online retailer or provider of application software against those business users. to prevent gatekeepers from unfairly benefitting from their dual role , it should be ensured that they refrain from using any aggregated or non-aggregated data , which may include anonymised and personal data that is not publicly available to offer similar services to those of their business users. this obligation should apply to the gatekeeper as a whole , including but not limited to its business unit that competes with the business users of a core platform service. ### (43) a gatekeeper may in certain circumstances have a dual role as a provider of core platform services whereby it provides a core platform service to its business users , while also competing with those same business users in the provision of the same or similar services or products to the same end users. in these circumstances , a gatekeeper may take advantage of its dual role to use data , generated from transactions by its business users on the core platform , for the purpose of its own services that offer similar services to that of its business users. this may be the case , for instance , where a gatekeeper provides an online marketplace or app store to business users , and at the same time offer services as an online retailer or provider of application software against those business users. to prevent gatekeepers from unfairly benefitting from their dual role , it should be ensured that they refrain from using any aggregated or non-aggregated data , which may include anonymised and personal data exclusively in domain of core platform providers to offer similar services to those of their business users. this obligation should apply to the gatekeeper as a whole , including but not limited to its business unit that competes with the business users of a core platform service.


### (46) a gatekeeper may use different means to favour its own services or products on its core platform service , to the detriment of the same or similar services that end users could obtain through third parties. this may for instance be the case where certain software applications or services are pre-installed by a gatekeeper. to enable end user choice , gatekeepers should not prevent end users from un-installing any pre-installed software applications on its core platform service and thereby favour their own software applications. ### (46) a gatekeeper may use different means to favour its own services or products on its core platform service , to the detriment of the same or similar services that end users could obtain through third parties. this may for instance be the case where certain software applications or services are pre-installed by a gatekeeper. to enable end user choice , gatekeepers should not prevent end users from un-installing any pre-installed software applications on its core platform service and thereby favour their own software applications , and should offer end users the opportunity to choose the software applications on its core platforms including an option to settings without any pre-installed software that is not required for the basic functionality of their platform.


### (46) a gatekeeper may use different means to favour its own services or products on its core platform service , to the detriment of the same or similar services that end users could obtain through third parties. this may for instance be the case where certain software applications or services are pre-installed by a gatekeeper. to enable end user choice , gatekeepers should not prevent end users from un-installing any pre-installed software applications on its core platform service and thereby favour their own software applications. ### (46) a gatekeeper may use different means to favour its own services or products on its core platform service , to the detriment of the same or similar services that end users could obtain through third parties. this may for instance be the case where certain software applications or ancillary services are pre-installed by a gatekeeper. to enable end user choice , gatekeepers should not prevent end users from un-installing any pre-installed software applications on its core platform service and thereby favour their own software applications.


### (46) a gatekeeper may use different means to favour its own services or products on its core platform service , to the detriment of the same or similar services that end users could obtain through third parties. this may for instance be the case where certain software applications or services are pre-installed by a gatekeeper. to enable end user choice , gatekeepers should not prevent end users from un-installing any pre-installed software applications on its core platform service and thereby favour their own software applications. ### (46) a gatekeeper may use different means to favour its own services or products on its core platform service , to the detriment of the same or similar services that end users could obtain through third parties. this may for instance be the case where certain software applications or services are pre-installed by a gatekeeper. to enable end user choice , gatekeepers should not prevent end users from un-installing any pre-installed software applications on its core platform service and thereby favour their own software applications. the gatekeeper can restrict such un-installation when such applications are essential to the functioning of the operating system or the device.


### (47) the rules that the gatekeepers set for the distribution of software applications may in certain circumstances restrict the ability of end users to install and effectively use third party software applications or software application stores on operating systems or hardware of the relevant gatekeeper and restrict the ability of end users to access these software applications or software application stores outside the core platform services of that gatekeeper. such restrictions may limit the ability of developers of software applications to use alternative distribution channels and the ability of end users to choose between different software applications from different distribution channels and should be prohibited as unfair and liable to weaken the contestability of core platform services. in order to ensure that third party software applications or software application stores do not endanger the integrity of the hardware or operating system provided by the gatekeeper the gatekeeper concerned may implement proportionate technical or contractual measures to achieve that goal if the gatekeeper demonstrates that such measures are necessary and justified and that there are no less restrictive means to safeguard the integrity of the hardware or operating system. ### (47) the rules that the gatekeepers set for the distribution of software applications may in certain circumstances restrict the ability of end users to install and effectively use third party software applications or software application stores on operating systems or hardware of the relevant gatekeeper and restrict the ability of end users to access these software applications or software application stores outside the core platform services of that gatekeeper. such restrictions may limit the ability of developers of software applications to use alternative distribution channels and the ability of end users to choose for different reasons between different software applications to run on platforms from different distribution channels and should be prohibited as unfair and liable to weaken the contestability of core platform services. in order to ensure that third party software applications or software application stores do not endanger the integrity of the hardware or operating system provided by the gatekeeper the gatekeeper concerned may implement proportionate technical or contractual measures to achieve that goal if the gatekeeper demonstrates that such measures are necessary and justified and that there are no less restrictive means to safeguard the integrity of the hardware or operating system.


### (48) gatekeepers are often vertically integrated and offer certain products or services to end users through their own core platform services , or through a business user over which they exercise control which frequently leads to conflicts of interest. this can include the situation whereby a gatekeeper offers its own online intermediation services through an online search engine. when offering those products or services on the core platform service , gatekeepers can reserve a better position to their own offering , in terms of ranking , as opposed to the products of third parties also operating on that core platform service. this can occur for instance with products or services , including other core platform services , which are ranked in the results communicated by online search engines , or which are partly or entirely embedded in online search engines results , groups of results specialised in a certain topic , displayed along with the results of an online search engine , which are considered or used by certain end users as a service distinct or additional to the online search engine. other instances are those of software applications which are distributed through software application stores , or products or services that are given prominence and display in the newsfeed of a social network , or products or services ranked in search results or displayed on an online marketplace. in those circumstances , the gatekeeper is in a dual-role position as intermediary for third party providers and as direct provider of products or services of the gatekeeper. consequently , these gatekeepers have the ability to undermine directly the contestability for those products or services on these core platform services , to the detriment of business users which are not controlled by the gatekeeper. ### (48) gatekeepers are often vertically integrated and offer certain products or services to end users through their own core platform services , or through a business user over which they exercise control or with which they have entered into particular cooperation agreements or which they prefer due to other reasons unrelated to their service´s actual relevance , which frequently leads to conflicts of interest. this can include the situation whereby a gatekeeper offers its own online intermediation services through an online search engine. when offering those products or services on the core platform service , gatekeepers can reserve a better position to their own offering , in terms of ranking , as opposed to the products of third parties also intermediated via that core platform service. this can occur for instance with products or services , including other core platform services , which are ranked in the results communicated by online search engines , or which are partly or entirely embedded in online search engines results , groups of results specialised in a certain topic , displayed along with the results of an online search engine , which are considered or used by certain end users as a service distinct or additional to the online search engine. other instances are those of software applications which are distributed through software application stores , or products or services that are given prominence and display in the newsfeed of a social network , or products or services ranked in search results or displayed on an online marketplace. in those circumstances , the gatekeeper is in a dual-role position as intermediary for third party providers and as direct provider of products or services of the gatekeeper. consequently , these gatekeepers have the ability to undermine directly the contestability for those products or services on these core platform services , to the detriment of business users which are not controlled by the gatekeeper.


### (48) gatekeepers are often vertically integrated and offer certain products or services to end users through their own core platform services , or through a business user over which they exercise control which frequently leads to conflicts of interest. this can include the situation whereby a gatekeeper offers its own online intermediation services through an online search engine. when offering those products or services on the core platform service , gatekeepers can reserve a better position to their own offering , in terms of ranking , as opposed to the products of third parties also operating on that core platform service. this can occur for instance with products or services , including other core platform services , which are ranked in the results communicated by online search engines , or which are partly or entirely embedded in online search engines results , groups of results specialised in a certain topic , displayed along with the results of an online search engine , which are considered or used by certain end users as a service distinct or additional to the online search engine. other instances are those of software applications which are distributed through software application stores , or products or services that are given prominence and display in the newsfeed of a social network , or products or services ranked in search results or displayed on an online marketplace. in those circumstances , the gatekeeper is in a dual-role position as intermediary for third party providers and as direct provider of products or services of the gatekeeper. consequently , these gatekeepers have the ability to undermine directly the contestability for those products or services on these core platform services , to the detriment of business users which are not controlled by the gatekeeper. ### (48) gatekeepers are often vertically integrated and offer certain products or services to end users through their own core platform services , or through a business user over which they exercise control which frequently leads to conflicts of interest. this can include the situation whereby a gatekeeper offers its own online intermediation services through an online search engine. when offering those products or services on the core platform service , gatekeepers can reserve a better position or a differentiated treatment to their own offering , in terms of ranking , as opposed to the products of third parties also operating on that core platform service. this can occur for instance with products or services , including other core platform services , which are ranked in the results communicated by online search engines , or which are partly or entirely embedded in online search engines results , groups of results specialised in a certain topic , displayed along with the results of an online search engine , which are considered or used by certain end users as a service distinct or additional to the online search engine. other instances are those of software applications which are distributed through software application stores , or products or services that are given prominence and display in the newsfeed of a social network , or products or services ranked in search results or displayed on an online marketplace. in those circumstances , the gatekeeper is in a dual-role position as intermediary for third party providers and as direct provider of products or services of the gatekeeper. consequently , these gatekeepers have the ability to undermine directly the contestability for those products or services on these core platform services , to the detriment of business users which are not controlled by the gatekeeper.


### (48) gatekeepers are often vertically integrated and offer certain products or services to end users through their own core platform services , or through a business user over which they exercise control which frequently leads to conflicts of interest. this can include the situation whereby a gatekeeper offers its own online intermediation services through an online search engine. when offering those products or services on the core platform service , gatekeepers can reserve a better position to their own offering , in terms of ranking , as opposed to the products of third parties also operating on that core platform service. this can occur for instance with products or services , including other core platform services , which are ranked in the results communicated by online search engines , or which are partly or entirely embedded in online search engines results , groups of results specialised in a certain topic , displayed along with the results of an online search engine , which are considered or used by certain end users as a service distinct or additional to the online search engine. other instances are those of software applications which are distributed through software application stores , or products or services that are given prominence and display in the newsfeed of a social network , or products or services ranked in search results or displayed on an online marketplace. in those circumstances , the gatekeeper is in a dual-role position as intermediary for third party providers and as direct provider of products or services of the gatekeeper. consequently , these gatekeepers have the ability to undermine directly the contestability for those products or services on these core platform services , to the detriment of business users which are not controlled by the gatekeeper. ### (48) gatekeepers are often vertically integrated and offer certain products or services to end users through their own core platform services , or through a business user over which they exercise control which frequently leads to conflicts of interest. this can include the situation whereby a gatekeeper offers its own online intermediation services through an online search engine. when offering those products or services on the core platform service , gatekeepers can reserve a better position or differentiated treatment to their own offering , in terms of ranking , as opposed to the products of third parties also operating on that core platform service. this can occur for instance with products or services , including other core platform services , which are ranked in the results communicated by online search engines , or which are partly or entirely embedded in online search engines results , groups of results specialised in a certain topic , displayed along with the results of an online search engine , which are considered or used by certain end users as a service distinct or additional to the online search engine. other instances are those of software applications which are distributed through software application stores , or products or services that are given prominence and display in the newsfeed of a social network , or products or services ranked in search results or displayed on an online marketplace. in those circumstances , the gatekeeper is in a dual-role position as intermediary for third party providers and as direct provider of products or services of the gatekeeper. consequently , these gatekeepers have the ability to undermine directly the contestability for those products or services on these core platform services , to the detriment of business users which are not controlled by the gatekeeper.


### (49) in such situations , the gatekeeper should not engage in any form of differentiated or preferential treatment in ranking on the core platform service , whether through legal , commercial or technical means , in favour of products or services it offers itself or through a business user which it controls. to ensure that this obligation is effective , it should also be ensured that the conditions that apply to such ranking are also generally fair. ranking should in this context cover all forms of relative prominence , including display , rating , linking or voice results. to ensure that this obligation is effective and cannot be circumvented it should also apply to any measure that may have an equivalent effect to the differentiated or preferential treatment in ranking. the guidelines adopted pursuant to article 5 of regulation (eu) 2019/1150 should also facilitate the implementation and enforcement of this obligation.34 ### (49) in such situations , the gatekeeper should not engage in any form of differentiated or preferential treatment in ranking , display , or making embedded results on the core platform service , whether through legal , commercial or technical means , in favour of products or services it offers itself or through a business user which it controls. the gatekeeper should refrain from imposing mechanisms or conditions that make the gathering and the combination of relevant data from end users or the obtaining of consent for the use of such data by a business user for the purpose of serving interest-based advertising within a core platform service more burdensome or difficult where the business user complies with all statutory requirements for such advertising , in particular under regulation(eu) 2016/679. provide for entire disclosure and transparency of the parameters and data used for decision making , execution and measurement of the performance measuring tools , in particular with regard to ad inventory and services owned by the gatekeeper in relation to ad inventory and intermediation services owned by other publishers or service providers connected with the gatekeeper´s platform; to ensure that this obligation is effective , it should also be ensured that the conditions that apply to such ranking , display or embedded results are fair. ranking should in this context cover all forms of relative prominence , including rating , linking or voice results. to ensure that this obligation is effective and cannot be circumvented it should also apply to any measure that may have an equivalent effect to the differentiated or preferential treatment in ranking. the guidelines adopted pursuant to article 5 of regulation (eu) 2019/1150 should also facilitate the implementation and enforcement of this obligation.34


### (49) in such situations , the gatekeeper should not engage in any form of differentiated or preferential treatment in ranking on the core platform service , whether through legal , commercial or technical means , in favour of products or services it offers itself or through a business user which it controls. to ensure that this obligation is effective , it should also be ensured that the conditions that apply to such ranking are also generally fair. ranking should in this context cover all forms of relative prominence , including display , rating , linking or voice results. to ensure that this obligation is effective and cannot be circumvented it should also apply to any measure that may have an equivalent effect to the differentiated or preferential treatment in ranking. the guidelines adopted pursuant to article 5 of regulation (eu) 2019/1150 should also facilitate the implementation and enforcement of this obligation.34 ### (49) while in such situations of a conflict of interest , the gatekeeper should not partly or entirely embed such distinct product or service in online search engine results or groups of results. gatekeeper may rank its products or services , provided that it does not engage in any form of differentiated or preferential treatment in ranking on the core platform service , whether through legal , commercial or technical means , in favour of products or services it offers itself or through a business user which it controls or cooperates with or prefers any other reason unrelated to the relevance of the product or service. in particular , where a gatekeeper´s online search engine results page includes ranking of separate products or services in the same format and on the same terms and conditions. should this take place in exchange for remuneration , to avoid any conflict of interest , the gatekeeper´s separate product or service shall be treated as a separate commercial entity and shall be commercially viable as a stand-alone service , offered outside of the gatekeeper´s core platform service.


### (49) in such situations , the gatekeeper should not engage in any form of differentiated or preferential treatment in ranking on the core platform service , whether through legal , commercial or technical means , in favour of products or services it offers itself or through a business user which it controls. to ensure that this obligation is effective , it should also be ensured that the conditions that apply to such ranking are also generally fair. ranking should in this context cover all forms of relative prominence , including display , rating , linking or voice results. to ensure that this obligation is effective and cannot be circumvented it should also apply to any measure that may have an equivalent effect to the differentiated or preferential treatment in ranking. the guidelines adopted pursuant to article 5 of regulation (eu) 2019/1150 should also facilitate the implementation and enforcement of this obligation.34 ### (49) in such situations , the gatekeeper should not engage in any form of differentiated or preferential treatment in ranking on the core platform service , whether through legal , commercial or technical means , in favour of products or services it offers itself or through a business user which it cooperates with. to ensure that this obligation is effective , it should also be ensured that the conditions that apply to such ranking are also generally fair and do not allow the gatekeeper’s own services or products to benefit from competition-relevant information about competing products or services. ranking should in this context cover all forms of relative prominence , including among others display , rating , order , linking or voice results. to ensure that this obligation is effective and cannot be circumvented it should also apply to any measure that may have an equivalent effect to the differentiated or preferential treatment in ranking. the guidelines adopted pursuant to article 5 of regulation (eu) 2019/1150 should also facilitate the implementation and enforcement of this obligation.34


### (50) gatekeepers should not restrict or prevent the free choice of end users by technically preventing switching between or subscription to different software applications and services. this would allow more providers to offer their services , thereby ultimately providing greater choice to the end user. gatekeepers should ensure a free choice irrespective of whether they are the manufacturer of any hardware by means of which such software applications or services are accessed and shall not raise artificial technical barriers so as to make switching impossible or ineffective. the mere offering of a given product or service to consumers , including by means of pre-installation , as well as the improvement of the offering to end users , such as price reductions or increased quality , should not be construed as constituting a prohibited barrier to switching. ### (50) gatekeepers should not restrict or prevent the free choice of end users by technically preventing switching between , installment , effective use or subscription to different , including third party software applications and services. this would allow more providers to offer their services , thereby ultimately providing greater choice to the end user. gatekeepers should ensure a free choice irrespective of whether they are the manufacturer of any hardware by means of which such software applications or services are accessed and shall not raise artificial technical barriers so as to make switching , installing or using impossible or ineffective.


### (51) gatekeepers can hamper the ability of end users to access online content and services including software applications. therefore , rules should be established to ensure that the rights of end users to access an open internet are not compromised by the conduct of gatekeepers. gatekeepers can also technically limit the ability of end users to effectively switch between different internet access service providers , in particular through their control over operating systems or hardware. this distorts the level playing field for internet access services and ultimately harms end users. it should therefore be ensured that gatekeepers do not unduly restrict end users in choosing their internet access service provider. ### (51) gatekeepers can hamper the ability of end users to access online content and services including software applications. therefore , rules should be established to ensure that the rights of end users to access an open internet are not compromised by the conduct of gatekeepers. gatekeepers can also technically limit the ability of end users to effectively switch between different internet access service providers , in particular through their control over operating systems or hardware. this distorts the level playing field for internet access services and ultimately harms end users. it should therefore be ensured that gatekeepers do not unduly restrict end users in choosing their internet access service provider or discriminate against using additional software by the end users , such as , for example , establishing virtual private network to hide or change their internet protocol.


### (53) the conditions under which gatekeepers provide online advertising services to business users including both advertisers and publishers are often non-transparent and opaque. this often leads to a lack of information for advertisers and publishers about the effect of a given ad. to further enhance fairness , transparency and contestability of online advertising services designated under this regulation as well as those that are fully integrated with other core platform services of the same provider , the designated gatekeepers should therefore provide advertisers and publishers , when requested , with free of charge access to the performance measuring tools of the gatekeeper and the information necessary for advertisers , advertising agencies acting on behalf of a company placing advertising , as well as for publishers to carry out their own independent verification of the provision of the relevant online advertising services. ### (53) the conditions under which gatekeepers provide online advertising services to business users including both advertisers and publishers are often non-transparent and opaque. this often leads to a lack of information for advertisers and publishers about the effect of a given ad. to further enhance fairness , transparency and contestability of online advertising services designated under this regulation as well as those that are fully integrated with other core platform services of the same provider , the designated gatekeepers should therefore provide advertisers and publishers , when requested , with free of charge access to the performance measuring tools of the gatekeeper and the information necessary , including criteria used by the ad-tech platform services such as pricing mechanisms , advertising auctions and their weighting , and fees charged by ad exchanges , for advertisers , advertising agencies acting on behalf of a company placing advertising , as well as for publishers to carry out their own independent verification of the provision of the relevant online advertising services.


### (53) the conditions under which gatekeepers provide online advertising services to business users including both advertisers and publishers are often non-transparent and opaque. this often leads to a lack of information for advertisers and publishers about the effect of a given ad. to further enhance fairness , transparency and contestability of online advertising services designated under this regulation as well as those that are fully integrated with other core platform services of the same provider , the designated gatekeepers should therefore provide advertisers and publishers , when requested , with free of charge access to the performance measuring tools of the gatekeeper and the information necessary for advertisers , advertising agencies acting on behalf of a company placing advertising , as well as for publishers to carry out their own independent verification of the provision of the relevant online advertising services. ### (53) the conditions under which gatekeepers provide online advertising services to business users including both advertisers and publishers are often non-transparent and opaque. this often leads to a lack of information for advertisers and publishers about the effect of a given ad. to further enhance fairness , transparency and contestability of online advertising services designated under this regulation as well as those that are fully integrated with other core platform services of the same provider , the designated gatekeepers should therefore provide advertisers , publishers , or third parties authorised by advertisers and publishers , when requested , with free of charge , continuous , detailed , comprehensive , accessible and real-time access to the performance measuring tools of the gatekeeper and the information necessary , including aggregated data and performance data , for advertisers , advertising agencies acting on behalf of a company placing advertising , as well as for publishers to carry out their own independent verification of the provision of the relevant online advertising services.


### (56) the value of online search engines to their respective business users and end users increases as the total number of such users increases. providers of online search engines collect and store aggregated datasets containing information about what users searched for , and how they interacted with , the results that they were served. providers of online search engine services collect these data from searches undertaken on their own online search engine service and , where applicable , searches undertaken on the platforms of their downstream commercial partners. access by gatekeepers to such ranking , query , click and view data constitutes an important barrier to entry and expansion , which undermines the contestability of online search engine services. gatekeepers should therefore be obliged to provide access , on fair , reasonable and non-discriminatory terms , to these ranking , query , click and view data in relation to free and paid search generated by consumers on online search engine services to other providers of such services , so that these third-party providers can optimise their services and contest the relevant core platform services. such access should also be given to third parties contracted by a search engine provider , who are acting as processors of this data for that search engine. when providing access to its search data , a gatekeeper should ensure the protection of the personal data of end users by appropriate means , without substantially degrading the quality or usefulness of the data. ### (56) the value of online search engines to their respective business users and end users increases as the total number of such users increases. providers of online search engines collect and store aggregated datasets containing information about what users searched for , and how they interacted with , the results that they were served. providers of online search engine services collect these data from searches undertaken on their own online search engine service and , where applicable , searches undertaken on the platforms of their downstream commercial partners. access by gatekeepers to such ranking , query , click and view data constitutes an important barrier to entry and expansion , which undermines the contestability of online search engine services. gatekeepers should therefore be obliged to provide access , on fair , reasonable and non-discriminatory terms , to these ranking , query , click and view data in relation to free and paid search generated by consumers on online search engine services to other providers of such services , so that these third-party providers can optimise their services and contest the relevant core platform services. such access should also be given to third parties contracted by a search engine provider , who are acting as processors of this data for that search engine. when providing access to its search data , a gatekeeper should ensure the protection of the personal data of end users by appropriate means , without substantially degrading the quality or usefulness of the data. the gatekeeper should be able to demonstrate that anonymised query , click and view data have been adequately tested against possible re-identification risks.


### (60) in exceptional circumstances justified on the limited grounds of public morality , public health or public security , the commission should be able to decide that the obligation concerned does not apply to a specific core platform service. affecting these public interests can indicate that the cost to society as a whole of enforcing a certain obligation would in a certain exceptional case be too high and thus disproportionate. the regulatory dialogue to facilitate compliance with limited suspension and exemption possibilities should ensure the proportionality of the obligations in this regulation without undermining the intended ex ante effects on fairness and contestability. ### (60) in exceptional circumstances justified on the limited grounds of public policy , public health or public security , the commission should be able to decide that the obligation concerned does not apply to a specific core platform service. affecting these public interests can indicate that the cost to society as a whole of enforcing a certain obligation would in a certain exceptional case be too high and thus disproportionate. the regulatory dialogue to facilitate compliance with limited suspension and exemption possibilities should ensure the proportionality of the obligations in this regulation without undermining the intended ex ante effects on fairness and contestability.


### (60) in exceptional circumstances justified on the limited grounds of public morality , public health or public security , the commission should be able to decide that the obligation concerned does not apply to a specific core platform service. affecting these public interests can indicate that the cost to society as a whole of enforcing a certain obligation would in a certain exceptional case be too high and thus disproportionate. the regulatory dialogue to facilitate compliance with limited suspension and exemption possibilities should ensure the proportionality of the obligations in this regulation without undermining the intended ex ante effects on fairness and contestability. ### (60) in exceptional circumstances justified on the limited grounds of public morality , public health or public security , the commission should be able to decide that the obligation concerned does not apply to a specific core platform service. affecting these public interests can indicate that the cost to society as a whole of enforcing a certain obligation would in a certain exceptional case be too high and thus disproportionate. the regulatory dialogue to facilitate compliance with limited suspension and exemption possibilities should ensure the proportionality of the obligations in this regulation without undermining the intended ex ante effects on fairness and contestability. the participants , agenda and results of regulatory dialogue should be made public. the regulatory dialogue itself should not take longer than 6 months.


### (61) the data protection and privacy interests of end users are relevant to any assessment of potential negative effects of the observed practice of gatekeepers to collect and accumulate large amounts of data from end users. ensuring an adequate level of transparency of profiling practices employed by gatekeepers facilitates contestability of core platform services , by putting external pressure on gatekeepers to prevent making deep consumer profiling the industry standard , given that potential entrants or start-up providers cannot access data to the same extent and depth , and at a similar scale. enhanced transparency should allow other providers of core platform services to differentiate themselves better through the use of superior privacy guaranteeing facilities. to ensure a minimum level of effectiveness of this transparency obligation , gatekeepers should at least provide a description of the basis upon which profiling is performed , including whether personal data and data derived from user activity is relied on , the processing applied , the purpose for which the profile is prepared and eventually used , the impact of such profiling on the gatekeeper’s services , and the steps taken to enable end users to be aware of the relevant use of such profiling , as well as to seek their consent. ### (61) the data protection and privacy interests of end users are relevant to any assessment of potential negative effects of the observed practice of gatekeepers to collect and accumulate large amounts of data from end users. ensuring an adequate level of transparency of profiling practices employed by gatekeepers facilitates contestability of core platform services , by putting external pressure on gatekeepers to prevent making consumer profiling , tracking or accumulation of personal data from third parties the industry standard , given that potential entrants or start-up providers cannot access data to the same extent and depth , and at a similar scale. enhanced transparency should allow other providers of core platform services to differentiate themselves better through the use of superior privacy guaranteeing facilities. to ensure a minimum level of effectiveness of this transparency obligation , gatekeepers should provide a comprehensive report of the basis upon which profiling , tracking and the use of data from third parties is performed , including whether personal data and data derived from user activity is relied on , the processing applied , the purpose for which the profile is prepared and eventually used , the impact of such profiling on the gatekeeper’s services and users’ privacy , and the steps taken to enable end users to be aware of the use of such profiling , as well as to seek their consent.


### 1. this regulation lays down harmonised rules ensuring contestable and fair markets in the digital sector across the union where gatekeepers are present. ### 1. the purpose of this regulation is to contribute to the proper functioning of the internal market by laying down harmonised rules ensuring contestable and fair markets in the digital sector across the union where gatekeepers are present.


### 5. member states shall not impose on gatekeepers further obligations by way of laws , regulations or administrative action for the purpose of ensuring contestable and fair markets. this is without prejudice to rules pursuing other legitimate public interests , in compliance with union law. in particular , nothing in this regulation precludes member states from imposing obligations , which are compatible with union law , on undertakings , including providers of core platform services where these obligations are unrelated to the relevant undertakings having a status of gatekeeper within the meaning of this regulation in order to protect consumers or to fight against acts of unfair competition. ### 5. in order to avoid the fragmentation of the internal market , member states shall not impose on gatekeepers further obligations by way of laws , regulations or administrative action for the purpose of ensuring contestable and fair markets. this is without prejudice to rules pursuing other legitimate public interests , in compliance with union law. in particular , nothing in this regulation precludes member states from imposing obligations , which are compatible with union law , on undertakings , including providers of core platform services where these obligations are unrelated to the relevant undertakings having a status of gatekeeper within the meaning of this regulation in order to protect consumers or to fight against acts of unfair competition.


### 5. member states shall not impose on gatekeepers further obligations by way of laws , regulations or administrative action for the purpose of ensuring contestable and fair markets. this is without prejudice to rules pursuing other legitimate public interests , in compliance with union law. in particular , nothing in this regulation precludes member states from imposing obligations , which are compatible with union law , on undertakings , including providers of core platform services where these obligations are unrelated to the relevant undertakings having a status of gatekeeper within the meaning of this regulation in order to protect consumers or to fight against acts of unfair competition. ### 5. member states shall not impose on gatekeepers further obligations by way of laws , regulations or administrative action for the purpose of ensuring contestable and fair markets. this is without prejudice to rules pursuing other legitimate public interests , in compliance with union law. in particular , nothing in this regulation precludes member states from imposing obligations , which are compatible with union law , on undertakings , including providers of core platform services where these obligations are unrelated to the relevant undertakings having a status of gatekeeper within the meaning of this regulation in order to protect consumers or to fight against acts of unfair competition and unfair trading practices in business-to-business relationships.


### 5. member states shall not impose on gatekeepers further obligations by way of laws , regulations or administrative action for the purpose of ensuring contestable and fair markets. this is without prejudice to rules pursuing other legitimate public interests , in compliance with union law. in particular , nothing in this regulation precludes member states from imposing obligations , which are compatible with union law , on undertakings , including providers of core platform services where these obligations are unrelated to the relevant undertakings having a status of gatekeeper within the meaning of this regulation in order to protect consumers or to fight against acts of unfair competition. ### 5. member states shall not impose on gatekeepers further obligations by way of laws , regulations or administrative action for the purpose of ensuring contestable and fair markets.


### 5. member states shall not impose on gatekeepers further obligations by way of laws , regulations or administrative action for the purpose of ensuring contestable and fair markets. this is without prejudice to rules pursuing other legitimate public interests , in compliance with union law. in particular , nothing in this regulation precludes member states from imposing obligations , which are compatible with union law , on undertakings , including providers of core platform services where these obligations are unrelated to the relevant undertakings having a status of gatekeeper within the meaning of this regulation in order to protect consumers or to fight against acts of unfair competition. ### 5. in order to ensure the frictionless and coherent application of this regulation throughout the internal market and to guarantee a fully harmonized approach , the european commission shall be the sole enforcer and decision maker on the correct application of the rules and obligations set out in this regulation. member states shall not impose on gatekeepers further obligations by way of laws , regulations or administrative action for the purpose of ensuring contestable and fair markets. this is without prejudice to rules pursuing other legitimate public interests , in compliance with union law. in particular , nothing in this regulation precludes member states from imposing obligations , which are compatible with union law , on undertakings , including providers of core platform services where these obligations are unrelated to the relevant undertakings having a status of gatekeeper within the meaning of this regulation in order to protect consumers or to fight against acts of unfair competition.


### 6. this regulation is without prejudice to the application of articles 101 and 102 tfeu. it is also without prejudice to the application of: national rules prohibiting anticompetitive agreements , decisions by associations of undertakings , concerted practices and abuses of dominant positions; national competition rules prohibiting other forms of unilateral conduct insofar as they are applied to undertakings other than gatekeepers or amount to imposing additional obligations on gatekeepers; council regulation (ec) no 139/200438 and national rules concerning merger control; regulation (eu) 2019/1150 and regulation (eu) …./.. of the european parliament and of the council39 . ### 6. this regulation is without prejudice to the application of articles 101 and 102 tfeu. it is also without prejudice to the application of: national rules prohibiting anticompetitive agreements , decisions by associations of undertakings , concerted practices and abuses of dominant positions; national competition rules prohibiting other forms of unilateral conduct insofar as they are applied to undertakings other than gatekeepers or amount to imposing additional obligations on gatekeepers; council regulation (ec) no 139/200438 and national rules concerning merger control; regulation (eu) 2019/1150 , regulation (eu) …./.. of the european parliament and of the council39 , directive 2005/29/ec on unfair commercial practices , council directive 93/13/eec on unfair terms in consumer contracts and directive 2010/13/eu on the provision of audiovisual media services 1a.


### (18) ‘ranking’ means the relative prominence given to goods or services offered through online intermediation services or online social networking services , or the relevance given to search results by online search engines , as presented , organised or communicated by the providers of online intermediation services or of online social networking services or by providers of online search engines , respectively , whatever the technological means used for such presentation , organisation or communication; ### (18) ‘ranking’ means the relative prominence given to goods or services offered through online intermediation services , video sharing platforms , search engines , web browsers or online social networking services , or the relevance given to search results by online search engines , as presented , organised or communicated by the providers of online intermediation services or of online social networking services or by providers of online search engines , respectively , whatever the technological means used for such presentation , organisation or communication;


### (18) ‘ranking’ means the relative prominence given to goods or services offered through online intermediation services or online social networking services , or the relevance given to search results by online search engines , as presented , organised or communicated by the providers of online intermediation services or of online social networking services or by providers of online search engines , respectively , whatever the technological means used for such presentation , organisation or communication; ### (18) ‘ranking’ means the relative prominence given to goods or services offered through online intermediation services including software application stores and virtual assistants or online social networking services , or the relevance given to search results by online search engines , as presented , organised or communicated by the providers of online intermediation services including software application stores and virtual assistants or of online social networking services or by providers of online search engines , respectively , whatever the technological means used for such presentation , organisation or communication;


### (18) ‘ranking’ means the relative prominence given to goods or services offered through online intermediation services or online social networking services , or the relevance given to search results by online search engines , as presented , organised or communicated by the providers of online intermediation services or of online social networking services or by providers of online search engines , respectively , whatever the technological means used for such presentation , organisation or communication; ### (18) ‘ranking’ means the relative prominence given to goods or services offered through online intermediation services including software application stores and virtual assistants , or online social networking services , or the relevance given to search results by online search engines , as presented , organised or communicated by the providers of online intermediation services including software application stores and virtual assistants , or of online social networking services or by providers of online search engines , respectively , whatever the technological means used for such presentation , organisation or communication;


### refrain from preventing or restricting business users from raising issues with any relevant public authority relating to any practice of gatekeepers; ### refrain from preventing or restricting business users and end-users from raising issues with any relevant public authority relating to any practice of gatekeepers including through the reporting mechanism for business users and end-users pursuant to article 21a;


### refrain from preventing or restricting business users from raising issues with any relevant public authority relating to any practice of gatekeepers; ### refrain from preventing or restricting business users from raising issues with any relevant public authority relating to any practice of gatekeepers , including by means of contractual conditions;


### refrain from requiring business users or end users to subscribe to or register with any other core platform services identified pursuant to article 3 or which meets the thresholds in article 3(2)(b) as a condition to access , sign up or register to any of their core platform services identified pursuant to that article; ### refrain from requiring business users or end users to subscribe to or register with any other core platform services as defined in article 2 or any ancillary services provided by the gatekeeper as a condition to use , access , sign up or register to any of their core platform services identified pursuant to that article;