### 3. a member state or any party affected or benefitted by the situations described in paragraph 2 may notify the commission if it is confronted , over a two-month period compared with the same period in the preceding year with a significant decrease in the volume of imported goods included in the scope of this regulation and an increase of volume of imports of slightly modified products , which are not included in the list of goods in annex i. the commission shall continually monitor any significant change of pattern of trade of goods and slightly modified products at union level. ### 3. following a complaint from an interested party or on its own initiative , the commission may decide , following an investigation , to extend obligations laid down in this regulation , in whatever way is necessary to prevent future circumvention of the mechanism , when circumvention of the measures in force is taking place.


### 4. the notification referred to in paragraph 3 shall state the reasons on which it is based and shall include relevant data and statistics regarding the goods and products referred to in paragraph 2. ### 4. decisions referred to in the third paragraph shall be subject to the appeal procedure as set out in article 30.


### 5. where the commission , taking into account the relevant data , reports and statistics , including when provided by the customs authorities of member states , has sufficient reasons to believe that the circumstances referred to in paragraph 3 are occurring in one or more member states , it is empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with article 28 to supplement the scope of this regulation in order to include slightly modified products for anti-circumvention purposes. ### 5. investigations shall be initiated pursuant to this article on the initiative of the commission or at the request of a member state or of any interested party on the basis of sufficient evidence regarding the factors set out in the second paragraph. initiations shall be made by means of a commission regulation which shall also instruct customs authorities of member states to subject imports to registration. the commission shall provide information to the member states once an interested party or a member state has submitted a request justifying the initiation of an investigation and the commission has completed its analysis thereof , or where the commission has itself determined that there is a need to initiate an investigation.


### 2. the power to adopt delegated acts referred to in articles 2(10) , 2(11) , 18(3) and 27(5) shall be conferred on the commission for an indeterminate period of time. ### 2. the power to adopt delegated acts referred to in articles 2(10) , 2(11) , 2(12a) , 18(3) , 27(5) and 27a(4) shall be conferred on the commission for an indeterminate period of time.


### 2. the power to adopt delegated acts referred to in articles 2(10) , 2(11) , 18(3) and 27(5) shall be conferred on the commission for an indeterminate period of time. ### 2. the power to adopt delegated acts referred to in articles 2(10) , 2(14) , 18(3) and 27(5) shall be conferred on the commission for an indeterminate period of time.


### 3. the delegation of power referred to in articles 2(10) , 2(11) , 18(3) and 27(5) may be revoked at any time by the european parliament or by the council. ### 3. the delegation of power referred to in articles 2(10) , 2(11) , 2(12a) , 18(3) , 27(5) and 27a(4) may be revoked at any time by the european parliament or by the council.


### 3. the delegation of power referred to in articles 2(10) , 2(11) , 18(3) and 27(5) may be revoked at any time by the european parliament or by the council. ### 3. the delegation of power referred to in articles 2(10) , 2(11) , 18(3) and 27(5 and 6) may be revoked at any time by the european parliament or by the council.


### 3. the delegation of power referred to in articles 2(10) , 2(11) , 18(3) and 27(5) may be revoked at any time by the european parliament or by the council. ### 3. the delegation of power referred to in articles 2(10) , 2(14) , 18(3) and 27(5) may be revoked at any time by the european parliament or by the council.


### 7. a delegated act adopted pursuant to articles 2(10) , 2(11) , 18(3) and 27(5) shall enter into force only if no objection has been expressed either by the european parliament or by the council within a period of two months of notification of that act to the european parliament and to the council or if , before the expiry of that period , the european parliament and the council have both informed the commission that they will not object. that period shall be extended by two months at the initiative of the european parliament or of the council. ### 7. a delegated act adopted pursuant to articles 2(10) , 2(11) , 2(12a) , 18(3) , 27(5) and 27a(4) shall enter into force only if no objection has been expressed either by the european parliament or by the council within a period of two months of notification of that act to the european parliament and to the council or if , before the expiry of that period , the european parliament and the council have both informed the commission that they will not object. that period shall be extended by two months at the initiative of the european parliament or of the council.


### 7. a delegated act adopted pursuant to articles 2(10) , 2(11) , 18(3) and 27(5) shall enter into force only if no objection has been expressed either by the european parliament or by the council within a period of two months of notification of that act to the european parliament and to the council or if , before the expiry of that period , the european parliament and the council have both informed the commission that they will not object. that period shall be extended by two months at the initiative of the european parliament or of the council. ### 7. a delegated act adopted pursuant to articles 2(10) , 2(14) , 18(3) and 27(5) shall enter into force only if no objection has been expressed either by the european parliament or by the council within a period of two months of notification of that act to the european parliament and to the council or if , before the expiry of that period , the european parliament and the council have both informed the commission that they will not object. that period shall be extended by two months at the initiative of the european parliament or of the council.


### 3. the report by the commission shall , if appropriate , be accompanied by a legislative proposal. ### 3. the report by the commission shall be accompanied by a legislative proposal to address in particular the risk of carbon leakage on export markets. this proposal shall consider wto-compatible solutions such as export adjustment mechanisms that would equalise carbon costs , taking into account the carbon pricing schemes developed by third countries. such export mechanisms shall be emission performance-based in order to preserve an incentive for ghg emission reduction.


### 3. the customs authorities shall , by means of the surveillance mechanism established pursuant to article 56(5) of regulation (eu) no 952/2013 , communicate to the competent authority of the member state of importation information on imported goods , including processed products resulting from the outward processing procedure. such information shall include the eori number of the declarant , the 8-digit cn code , the quantity , the country of origin and the declarant of the goods , the date of declaration and the customs procedure. ### 3. the customs authorities shall , by means of the surveillance mechanism established pursuant to article 56(5) of regulation (eu) no 952/2013 , communicate to the cbam authority information on imported goods , including processed products resulting from the outward processing procedure. such information shall include the eori number of the declarant , the 8-digit cn code , the quantity , the country of origin and the declarant of the goods , the date of declaration and the customs procedure.


### 1. each declarant shall , for each quarter of a calendar year , submit a report (‘cbam report’) containing information on the goods imported during that quarter , to the competent authority of the member state of importation or , if goods have been imported to more than one member state , to the competent authority of the member state at the declarant’s choice , no later than one month after the end of each quarter. ### 1. each declarant shall , for each quarter of a calendar year , submit a report (‘cbam report’) containing information on the goods imported during that quarter , to the cbam authority , no later than one month after the end of each quarter.


### 3. the competent authority shall communicate the information referred to in paragraph 2 to the commission at the latest two months after the end of the quarter covered by a report. ### 3. the cbam authority shall communicate the information referred to in paragraph 2 to the commission at the latest two months after the end of the quarter covered by a report.


### 4. the competent authority shall impose a proportionate and dissuasive penalty on declarants who fail to submit a cbam report. ### 4. the cbam authority shall impose a proportionate and dissuasive penalty on declarants who fail to submit a cbam report.


### 5. if the competent authority determines that a declarant has failed to comply with the obligation to submit a cbam report as specified in paragraph 1 , the competent authority shall impose the penalty and notify the declarant: ### 5. if the cbam authority determines that a declarant has failed to comply with the obligation to submit a cbam report as specified in paragraph 1 , the cbam authority shall impose the penalty and notify the declarant:


### that the competent authority has concluded that the declarant fails to comply with the obligation of submitting a report for a given quarter; ### that the cbam authority has concluded that the declarant fails to comply with the obligation of submitting a report for a given quarter;


### of the action the competent authority considers the declarant should take to comply with its obligation under point (a) depending on the facts and circumstances of the case; and ### of the action the cbam authority considers the declarant should take to comply with its obligation under point (a) depending on the facts and circumstances of the case; and


### of the right of the declarant or to appeal under national rules. ### of the right of the declarant or to appeal.


### the unique identifier assigned by the competent national authority; ### the unique identifier assigned by the cbam authority;


### for parameters for which no such thresholds are defined , the verifier shall use expert judgement to whether misstatements , individually or when aggregated with other misstatements , justified by their size and nature , have to be considered material , i.e. and could affect the use of the report by the intended users , in particular the competent national authorities. ### for parameters for which no such thresholds are defined , the verifier shall use expert judgement to whether misstatements , individually or when aggregated with other misstatements , justified by their size and nature , have to be considered material , i.e. and could affect the use of the report by the intended users , in particular the cbam authority.


### (19) however , while the eu ets sets an absolute cap on the ghg emissions from the activities under its scope and allows tradability of allowances (so called ‘cap and trade system’) , the cbam should not establish quantitative limits to import , so as to ensure that trade flows are not restricted. moreover , while the eu ets applies to installations based in the union , the cbam should be applied to certain goods imported into the customs territory of the union. ### (19) however , while the eu ets sets an absolute cap on the ghg emissions from the activities under its scope and allows tradability of allowances (so called ‘cap and trade system’) , the cbam should not establish quantitative limits to import , so as to ensure that trade flows are not restricted. moreover , while the eu ets applies to installations based in the union , the cbam should be applied to certain goods imported into the customs territory of the union and should either not be applied to exported goods or should incorporate wto-compatible solutions such as export adjustments mechanisms to avoid carbon leakage on european exports. such mechanisms for exports shall only apply to the most ghg emission-efficient products in order to avoid carbon transfer abroad.


### (20) the cbam system has some specific features compared with the eu ets , including on the calculation of the price of cbam certificates , on the possibilities to trade certificates and on their validity over time. these are due to the need to preserve the effectiveness of the cbam as a measure preventing carbon leakage over time and to ensure that the management of the system is not excessively burdensome in terms of obligations imposed on the operators and of resources for the administration , while at the same time preserving an equivalent level of flexibility available to operators under the eu ets. ### (20) the cbam system has some specific features compared with the eu ets , including on the calculation of the price of cbam certificates , on the possibilities to trade certificates and on their validity over time. these are due to the need to preserve the effectiveness of the cbam as a measure preventing carbon leakage over time and to ensure that the management of the system is not excessively burdensome , in particular for smes , in terms of obligations imposed on the operators and of resources for the administration , while at the same time preserving an equivalent level of flexibility available to operators under the eu ets.


### (24) in terms of sanctions , member states should apply penalties to infringements of this regulation and ensure that they are implemented. the amount of those penalties should be identical to penalties currently applied within the union in case of infringement of eu ets according to article 16(3) and (4) of directive 2003/87/ec. ### (24) in terms of sanctions , cbam authority should apply penalties to infringements of this regulation and ensure that they are implemented. the amount of those penalties should be identical to penalties currently applied within the union in case of infringement of eu ets according to article 16(3) and (4) of directive 2003/87/ec.


### (24) in terms of sanctions , member states should apply penalties to infringements of this regulation and ensure that they are implemented. the amount of those penalties should be identical to penalties currently applied within the union in case of infringement of eu ets according to article 16(3) and (4) of directive 2003/87/ec. ### (24) in terms of sanctions , member states should apply penalties to infringements of this regulation and competent national authorities should ensure that they are implemented. the amount of those penalties should be identical to penalties currently applied within the union in case of infringement of eu ets according to article 16(3) and (4) of directive 2003/87/ec. however , in case of circumvention practices or in case or repeated infringements of the provisions of this regulation , stronger penalties should apply to avoid undermining the effectiveness of the cbam regime.


### (34) however , aluminium products should be included in the cbam as they are highly exposed to carbon leakage. moreover , in several industrial applications they are in direct competition with steel products because of characteristics closely resembling those of steel products. inclusion of aluminium is also relevant as the scope of the cbam may be extended to cover also indirect emissions in the future. ### (34) however , aluminium products should be included in the cbam as they are highly exposed to carbon leakage. moreover , in several industrial applications they are in direct competition with steel products because of characteristics closely resembling those of steel products. inclusion of aluminium is also relevant as the scope of the cbam also covers indirect emissions.


### (34) however , aluminium products should be included in the cbam as they are highly exposed to carbon leakage. moreover , in several industrial applications they are in direct competition with steel products because of characteristics closely resembling those of steel products. inclusion of aluminium is also relevant as the scope of the cbam may be extended to cover also indirect emissions in the future. ### (34) however , aluminium products should be included in the cbam as they are highly exposed to carbon leakage. moreover , in several industrial applications they are in direct competition with steel products because of characteristics closely resembling those of steel products. inclusion of aluminium is also relevant as the scope of the cbam , after thorough data collection and analysis of its impact on the industries concerned , may be extended to cover also indirect emissions in the future.


### (38) as importers of goods covered by this regulation should not have to fulfil their cbam obligations under this regulation at the time of importation , specific administrative measures should be applied to ensure that the obligations are fulfilled at a later stage. therefore , importers should only be entitled to import cbam goods after they have been granted an authorisation by competent authorities responsible for the application of this regulation. ### (38) as importers of goods covered by this regulation should not have to fulfil their cbam obligations under this regulation at the time of importation , specific administrative measures should be applied to ensure that the obligations are fulfilled at a later stage. therefore , importers should only be entitled to import cbam goods after they have been granted an authorisation by the cbam authority.


### (44) in order to give the authorised declarants flexibility in complying with their cbam obligations and allow them to benefit from fluctuations in the price of eu ets allowances , the cbam certificates should be valid for a period of two years from the date of purchase. the authorised declarant should be allowed to re-sell to the national authority a portion of the certificates bought in excess. the authorised declarant should build up during the year the amount of certificates required at the time of surrendering , with thresholds set at the end of each quarter. ### (44) in order to give the authorised declarants flexibility in complying with their cbam obligations and allow them to benefit from fluctuations in the price of eu ets allowances , the cbam certificates should be valid for a period of two years from the date of purchase. the authorised declarant should be allowed to re-sell to the cbam authority a portion of the certificates bought in excess. the authorised declarant should build up during the year the amount of certificates required at the time of surrendering , with thresholds set at the end of each quarter.


### (49) once third countries will be closely integrated into the union electricity market via market coupling , technical solutions should be found to ensure the application of the cbam to electricity exported from such countries into the customs territory of the union. if technical solutions cannot be found , third countries that are market coupled should benefit from a time limited exemption from the cbam until at the latest 2030 with regard solely to the export of electricity , provided that certain conditions are satisfied. however , those third countries should develop a roadmap and commit to implement a carbon pricing mechanism providing for an equivalent price as the eu ets , and should commit to achieving carbon neutrality by 2050 [as well as?] to align with union legislation in the areas of environment , climate , competition and energy. that exemption should be withdrawn at any time if there are reasons to believe that the country in question does not fulfil its commitments or it has not adopted by 2030 an ets equivalent to the eu ets. ### (49) once third countries will be closely integrated into the union electricity market via market coupling , technical solutions should be found to ensure the application of the cbam to electricity exported from such countries into the customs territory of the union. if technical solutions cannot be found , third countries that are market coupled should benefit from a time limited exemption from the cbam until at the latest 2030 with regard solely to the export of electricity , provided that certain conditions are satisfied. however , those third countries should develop a roadmap and commit to implement a carbon pricing mechanism providing for an equivalent price as the eu ets , and should commit to achieving carbon neutrality by 2050 [as well as?] to align with union legislation in the areas of environment , climate , competition and energy. that exemption should be withdrawn at any time if there are reasons to believe that the country in question does not fulfil its commitments or it has not adopted by 2030 an ets equivalent to the eu ets or it is importing electricity from high-emission third parties to circumvent the cbam regulation.


### (53) in light of the above , a dialogue with third countries should continue and there should be space for cooperation and solutions that could inform the specific choices that will be made on the details of the design of the measure during the implementation , in particular during the transitional period. ### (53) in light of the above , a dialogue with third countries should continue and there should be space for cooperation and solutions that could inform the specific choices that will be made on the details of the design of the measure during the implementation , in particular during the pilot phase.


### (54) the commission should strive to engage in an even handed manner and in line with the international obligations of the eu , with the third countries whose trade to the eu is affected by this regulation , to explore possibilities for dialogue and cooperation with regard to the implementation of specific elements of the mechanism set out this regulation and related implementing acts. it should also explore possibilities for concluding agreements to take into account their carbon pricing mechanism. ### (54) the commission should strive to engage in an even handed manner and in line with the international obligations of the eu , with the third countries whose trade to the eu is affected by this regulation , to explore possibilities for dialogue and cooperation with regard to the implementation of specific elements of the mechanism set out this regulation and related implementing acts. it should also explore possibilities for concluding agreements to take into account their carbon pricing mechanism , provided that they deliver equivalent ghg emissions reductions and carbon costs constraints.


### 1. this regulation establishes a carbon border adjustment mechanism (the ‘cbam’) for addressing greenhouse gas emissions embedded in the goods referred to in annex i , upon their importation into the customs territory of the union , in order to prevent the risk of carbon leakage. ### 1. this regulation establishes a carbon border adjustment mechanism (the ‘cbam’) for addressing greenhouse gas emissions embedded in the goods referred to in annex i , upon their importation into the customs territory of the union , in order to prevent the risk of carbon leakage and encourage external trade partners to pursue more ambitious climate goals on a global scale and not only in bilateral trade with the eu.


### 1. this regulation establishes a carbon border adjustment mechanism (the ‘cbam’) for addressing greenhouse gas emissions embedded in the goods referred to in annex i , upon their importation into the customs territory of the union , in order to prevent the risk of carbon leakage. ### 1. this regulation establishes a carbon border adjustment mechanism (the ‘cbam’) for addressing greenhouse gas emissions embedded in the goods referred to in annex i , upon their importation into the customs territory of the union , in order to prevent the risk of carbon leakage. it contributes to union climate action by incentivising and supporting the reduction of emissions in third countries , while not harming or hindering the socioeconomic progress of least developed countries. in this regard , the need for an effective diplomatic language , including with climate vulnerable countries , needs to be taken into account to avoid a shift in significant political energy from other aspects of international climate policy.


### 1. this regulation establishes a carbon border adjustment mechanism (the ‘cbam’) for addressing greenhouse gas emissions embedded in the goods referred to in annex i , upon their importation into the customs territory of the union , in order to prevent the risk of carbon leakage. ### 1. this regulation establishes a carbon border adjustment mechanism (the ‘cbam’) for addressing greenhouse gas emissions embedded in the goods referred to in annex i , upon their importation into the customs territory of the union , in order to prevent the risk of carbon leakage and encourage carbon pricing worldwide.


### 3. the mechanism will progressively become an alternative to the mechanisms established under directive 2003/87/ec to prevent the risk of carbon leakage , notably the allocation of allowances free of charge in accordance with article 10a of that directive. ### deleted


### 1. this regulation applies to goods as listed in annex i , originating in a third country , when those goods , or processed products from those goods as resulting from the inward processing procedure referred to in article 256 of regulation (eu) no 952/2013 of the european parliament and of the council53 , are imported into the customs territory of the union. ### 1. this regulation applies to goods as listed in the extended annex i including other carbon intensive industries such as hydrogen and plastics originating in a third country , when those goods , or processed products from those goods as resulting from the inward processing procedure referred to in article 256 of regulation (eu) no 952/2013 of the european parliament and of the council53 , are imported into the customs territory of the union.


### 12. the union , may conclude agreements with third countries with a view to take account of carbon pricing mechanisms in these countries in the application of article 9. ### 12. a third country satisfying the conditions set out in paragraph 11 , points (a) to (f) , shall be listed in annex ii , section c , of this regulation , and shall submit two reports on the fulfilment of the conditions pursuant to paragraph 7 , points (a) to (f) , one before 1 july 2025 and another before 1 july 2029. by 31 december2025 and by 31 december 2029 , the commission shall assess , notably on the basis of the roadmap pursuant to paragraph 11 , point (c) , and the reports received from the third country , whether that third country continues to respect the conditions set out in paragraph 11.


### 12. the union , may conclude agreements with third countries with a view to take account of carbon pricing mechanisms in these countries in the application of article 9. ### 12. the union shall make it a priority to conclude agreements with third countries with a view to take account of carbon pricing mechanisms in these countries in the application of article 9.


### (11) ‘competent authority’ means the authority , designated by each member state in accordance with article 11 of this regulation; ### (11) ‘cbam authority’ means the authority , appointed by the commission in accordance with article 11 of this regulation;


### (11) ‘competent authority’ means the authority , designated by each member state in accordance with article 11 of this regulation; ### (11) ‘competent authority’ means the cbam authority established at eu level and the national authority designated by each member state in accordance with article 11 of this regulation;


### (16) ‘embedded emissions’ mean direct emissions released during the production of goods , calculated pursuant to the methods set out in annex iii; ### (16) ‘embedded emissions’ mean direct emissions released during the production of goods , calculated pursuant to the methods set out in annex iii , and indirect emissions pursuant to the methods to be defined by the commission in accordance with article 7(6);


### goods shall only be imported into the customs territory of the union by a declarant that is authorised by the competent authority in accordance with article 17 (‘authorised declarant’). ### goods shall only be imported into the customs territory of the union by a declarant that is authorised by the cbam authority in accordance with article 17 (‘authorised declarant’).


### 2. by way of derogation from paragraph 1 , where transmission capacity for the import of electricity is allocated via explicit capacity allocation , the person to which capacity has been allocated for import and which nominates this capacity for import shall , for the purposes of this regulation , be regarded as an authorised declarant in the member state where the person declares the import of electricity. imports are to be measured per border for time periods not longer than one hour and no deduction of export or transit in the same hour is possible. ### 2. by way of derogation from paragraph 1 , where transmission capacity for the import of electricity is allocated via explicit capacity allocation , the person to which capacity has been allocated for import and which nominates this capacity for import shall , for the purposes of this regulation , be regarded as an authorised declarant. imports are to be measured per border for time periods not longer than one hour and no deduction of export or transit in the same hour is possible.


### information necessary to demonstrate the declarant’s financial and operational capacity to fulfil its obligations under this regulation and , if decided by the competent authority on the basis of a risk assessment , supporting documents confirming that information , such as the profit and loss account and the balance sheet for up to the three last financial years for which the accounts were closed; ### information necessary to demonstrate the declarant’s financial and operational capacity to fulfil its obligations under this regulation and , if decided by the cbam authority on the basis of a risk assessment , supporting documents confirming that information , such as the profit and loss account and the balance sheet for up to the three last financial years for which the accounts were closed;


### 5. the authorised declarant shall inform the competent authority without delay of any changes of the information provided under paragraph 3 , arising after the decision was taken , which may influence the decision taken pursuant to article 17 or content of the authorisation in accordance with article 17. ### 5. the authorised declarant shall inform the cbam authority without delay of any changes of the information provided under paragraph 3 , arising after the decision was taken , which may influence the decision taken pursuant to article 17 or content of the authorisation in accordance with article 17.


### 6. the commission is empowered to adopt implementing acts , concerning the standard format of the application and the delays and procedure to be followed by the competent authority when processing applications for authorisation in accordance with paragraph 1 and the rules for identification by the competent authority of the declarants for the importation of electricity. those implementing acts shall be adopted in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in article 29(2). ### 6. the commission is empowered to adopt implementing acts , concerning the standard format of the application and the delays and procedure to be followed by the cbam authority when processing applications for authorisation in accordance with paragraph 1 and the rules for identification by the cbam authority of the declarants for the importation of electricity. those implementing acts shall be adopted in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in article 29(2).


### 1. by 31 may of each year , each authorised declarant shall submit a declaration (‘cbam declaration’) , for the calendar year preceding the declaration , to the competent authority. ### 1. by 31 may of each year , each authorised declarant shall submit a declaration (‘cbam declaration’) , for the calendar year preceding the declaration , to the cbam authority.


### 1. embedded emissions in goods shall be calculated pursuant to the methods set out in annex iii. ### 1. embedded emissions in goods shall be calculated pursuant to the methods set out in annex iii and implementing acts adopted in accordance with paragraph 6.


### 2. embedded emissions in goods other than electricity shall be determined based on the actual emissions in accordance with the methods set out in annex iii , points 2 and 3. when actual emissions cannot be adequately determined , the embedded emissions shall be determined by reference to default values in accordance with the methods set out in annex iii , point 4.1. ### 2. direct embedded emissions in goods other than electricity shall be determined based on the actual emissions in accordance with the methods set out in annex iii , points 2 and 3. when actual emissions cannot be adequately determined , the embedded emissions shall be determined by reference to default values in accordance with the methods set out in annex iii , point 4.1.


### 3. embedded emissions in imported electricity shall be determined by reference to default values in accordance with the method set out in annex iii , point 4.2 , unless the authorised declarant chooses to determine the embedded emissions based on the actual emissions in accordance with that annex , point 5. ### 3. direct embedded emissions in imported electricity shall be determined by reference to default values in accordance with the method set out in annex iii , point 4.2 , unless the authorised declarant chooses to determine the embedded emissions based on the actual emissions in accordance with that annex , point 5.


### 4. the authorised declarant shall keep records of the information required to calculate the embedded emissions in accordance with the requirements laid down in annex iv. those records shall be sufficiently detailed to enable verifiers accredited pursuant to article 18 to verify the embedded emissions in accordance with article 8 and annex v and to enable the competent authority to review the cbam declaration in accordance with article 19(1). ### 4. the authorised declarant shall keep records of the information required to calculate the embedded emissions in accordance with the requirements laid down in annex iv. those records shall be sufficiently detailed to enable verifiers accredited pursuant to article 18 to verify the embedded emissions in accordance with article 8 and annex v and to enable the cbam authority to review the cbam declaration in accordance with article 19(1).


### 2. the authorised declarant shall keep records of the documentation , certified by an independent person , required to demonstrate that the declared embedded emissions were subject to a carbon price in the country of origin of the goods and keep evidence of the proof of the actual payment for that carbon price which should not have been subject to an export rebate or any other form of compensation on exportation. ### 2. the authorised declarant shall keep records of the documentation , certified by a verifier accredited pursuant to article 18 and in line with the competences established in article 8(1) concerning the verification of embedded emissions. the accredited verifier is required to demonstrate that the declared embedded emissions were subject to a carbon price in the country of origin of the goods and keep evidence of the proof of the actual payment for that carbon price which should not have been subject to an export rebate or any other form of compensation on exportation.


### 1. the commission shall , upon request by an operator of an installation located in a third country , register the information on that operator and on its installation in a central database referred to in article 14(4). ### 1. the commission shall register the information on operators of installations located in third countries and on those installation in a central database referred to in article 14(4).


### 6. the records referred to in paragraph 5 , point (c) , shall be sufficiently detailed to enable the verification in accordance with paragraph 5 , point (b) , and to enable any competent authority to review , in accordance with article 19(1) , the cbam declaration made by an authorised declarant to whom the relevant information was disclosed in accordance with paragraph 8. ### 6. the records referred to in paragraph 5 , point (c) , shall be sufficiently detailed to enable the verification in accordance with paragraph 5 , point (b) , and to enable the cbam authority to review , in accordance with article 19(1) , the cbam declaration made by an authorised declarant to whom the relevant information was disclosed in accordance with paragraph 8.


### 8. the operator may , at any time , ask to be deregistered from the database. ### 8. the operator may , after 10 years , ask to be deregistered from the database.


### 1. each member state shall designate the competent authority to carry out the obligations under this regulation and inform the commission thereof. ### 1. the commission shall appoint the cbam authority to carry out the obligations under this regulation and inform the commission thereof.


### 1. each member state shall designate the competent authority to carry out the obligations under this regulation and inform the commission thereof. ### 1. a central cbam authority at eu level is established for the purpose of implementing and managing this regulation.


### the commission shall make available to the member states a list of all competent authorities and publish this information in the official journal of the european union. ### deleted


### article 12 ### deleted


### all information acquired by the competent authority in the course of performing its duty which is by its nature confidential or which is provided on a confidential basis shall be covered by an obligation of professional secrecy. such information shall not be disclosed by the competent authority without the express permission of the person or authority that provided it. it may be shared with customs authorities , the commission and the european public prosecutors office and shall be treated in accordance with council regulation (ec) no 515/97. ### all information acquired by the cbam authority in the course of performing its duty which is by its nature confidential or which is provided on a confidential basis shall be covered by an obligation of professional secrecy. such information shall not be disclosed by the cbam authority without the express permission of the person or authority that provided it. it may be shared with customs authorities , the commission and the european public prosecutors office and shall be treated in accordance with council regulation (ec) no 515/97.


### 14 national registries and central database ### 14 cbam registry and database


### 1. the competent authority of each member state shall establish a national registry of declarants authorised in that member state in the form of a standardised electronic database containing the data regarding the cbam certificates of those declarants , and to provide for confidentiality in accordance with the conditions set out in article 13. ### 1. the cbam authority shall establish a cbam registry of authorised declarants in the form of a standardised electronic database containing the data regarding the cbam certificates of those declarants , and to provide for confidentiality in accordance with the conditions set out in article 13.


### the number , the price of sale , the date of purchase , the date of surrender , or the date of re-purchase , or that of the cancellation by the competent authority , of cbam certificates for each authorised declarant. ### the number , the price of sale , the date of purchase , the date of surrender , or the date of re-purchase , or that of the cancellation by the cbam authority , of cbam certificates for each authorised declarant.


### 3. the information in the database referred to in paragraph 2 shall be confidential. ### 3. the information in the database referred to in paragraph 2 shall be made available to the public , unless it is deemed as business confidential. information equivalent to the one made publicly available for eu producers under the eu ets central database shall be made public.


### 4. the commission shall establish a central database accessible to the public containing the names , addresses and contact details of the operators and the location of installations in third countries in accordance with article 10(2). an operator may choose not to have its name , address and contact details accessible to the public. ### 4. the cbam authority shall establish a database accessible to the public containing the names , addresses and contact details of the operators and the location of installations in third countries in accordance with article 10(2). an operator may choose not to have its name , address and contact details accessible to the public.


### 4. the commission shall establish a central database accessible to the public containing the names , addresses and contact details of the operators and the location of installations in third countries in accordance with article 10(2). an operator may choose not to have its name , address and contact details accessible to the public. ### 4. the eu cbam authority shall establish a central database at eu level accessible to the public containing the names , addresses and contact details of the operators and the location of installations in third countries in accordance with article 10(2). an operator may choose not to have its name , address and contact details accessible to the public.


### article 15 ### deleted


### 1. the commission shall act as central administrator to maintain an independent transaction log recording the purchase of cbam certificates , their holding , surrender , re-purchase and cancellation and ensure coordination of national registries. ### 1. the eu cbam authority shall act as central administrator to maintain an independent transaction log recording the purchase of cbam certificates , their holding , surrender , re-purchase and cancellation and ensure coordination of national registries.


### during the transitional period of this regulation , the cbam mechanism shall apply as a reporting obligation as set out in articles 33 to 35. ### during the pilot phase of this regulation , the cbam mechanism shall apply as a reporting obligation as set out in articles 33 to 35.


### (30) the use of the first criterion allows listing the following industrial sector in terms of cumulated emissions: iron and steel , refineries , cement , organic basic chemicals , and fertilisers. ### (30) the use of the first criterion allows listing the following industrial sector in terms of cumulated emissions: iron and steel , refineries , cement , organic basic chemicals , fertilisers , plastics and hydrogen. before widening the scope of the cbam to new sectors , including downstream products using goods covered by the cbam , a prior assessment should be carried out by the commission in consultation with the affected industries and stakeholders in order to verify its practicability and effectiveness. any further extension of the scope to additional industrial sectors should be based on a predictable , clear and binding timetable.


### (32) in particular , organic chemicals are not included in the scope of this regulation due to technical limitations that do not allow to clearly define the embedded emissions of imported goods. for these goods the applicable benchmark under the eu ets is a basic parameter , which does not allow for an unambiguous allocation of emissions embedded in individual imported goods. a more targeted allocation to organic chemicals will require more data and analysis. ### (32) in particular , organic chemicals are not included in the scope of this regulation due to technical limitations that do not allow to clearly define the embedded emissions of imported goods. for these goods the applicable and clearly defined benchmark under the eu ets is a basic parameter , which does not allow for an unambiguous allocation of emissions embedded in individual imported goods. a more targeted allocation to organic chemicals will require more data and analysis , which should be carried out before the phase-in of the cbam or during the transition period;


### (40) an authorised declarant should be allowed to claim a reduction in the number of cbam certificates to be surrendered corresponding to the carbon price already paid for those emissions in other jurisdictions. ### (40) an authorised declarant should be allowed to claim a reduction in the number of cbam certificates to be surrendered corresponding to the carbon price already paid for those emissions in other jurisdictions , upon proving that no circumvention methods were used in the production of the declared goods;


### (47) contracting parties to the treaty establishing the energy community45 or parties to association agreements including deep and comprehensive free trade areas are committed to decarbonisation processes that should eventually result in the adoption of carbon pricing mechanisms similar or equivalent to the eu ets or in their participation in the eu ets. ### (47) contracting parties to the treaty establishing the energy community45 or parties to association agreements including deep and comprehensive free trade areas are committed to decarbonisation processes that should eventually result in the adoption of carbon pricing mechanisms similar to the eu ets should benefit from cbam exemption with regard to the goods originating in those countries provided that certain conditions are satisfied.


### the third country or territory has submitted a roadmap to the commission , containing a timetable for the adoption of measures to implement the conditions set out in points (d) and (e); ### the third country or territory has submitted a public and verifiable roadmap to the commission , containing a timetable for the adoption of measures to implement the conditions set out in points (d) and (e);


### the third country or territory has committed to climate neutrality by 2050 and has accordingly formally formulated and communicated , where applicable , to the united nations framework convention on climate change a mid-century , long-term low greenhouse gas emissions development strategy aligned with that objective , and has implemented that obligation in its domestic legislation; ### the third country or territory has committed to climate neutrality by 2050 and has accordingly formally formulated and communicated , where applicable , to the united nations framework convention on climate change a mid-century , long-term low greenhouse gas emissions development strategy aligned with that objective , and has credibly and effectively implemented that obligation in its domestic legislation;


### the third country or territory has put in place an effective systems to prevent indirect import of electricity in the union from other third countries not meeting the requirements set out in points (a) to (e). ### the third country or territory has put in place an effective systems to prevent indirect import of electricity in the union from other third countries not meeting the requirements set out in points (a) to (ea).


### if the commission has reasons to consider that the country or territory has not shown sufficient progress to comply with one of the requirements listed in paragraph 7 , points (a) to (f) , or if the country or territory has taken action incompatible with the objectives set out in the union climate and environmental legislation; ### if the commission has reasons to consider that the country or territory has not proved sufficient progress to comply with one of the requirements listed in paragraph 7 , points (a) to (f) , or if the country or territory has taken any kind of action incompatible with the objectives set out in the union climate and environmental legislation;


### 1. the authorised declarant shall ensure that the total embedded emissions declared in the cbam declaration submitted pursuant to article 6 are verified by a verifier accredited pursuant to article 18 , based on the verification principles set out in annex v. ### 1. the authorised declarant shall ensure that the total embedded emissions declared in the cbam declaration submitted pursuant to article 6 are verified by a verifier accredited pursuant to article 18 , based on the verification principles set out in annex v. the competent authority is authorised to verify the accuracy of the information in the cbam declaration.


### (37) import of electricity should be included in the scope of this regulation , as this sector is responsible for 30 per cent of the total ghg emissions in the union. the enhanced union climate ambition would increase the gap in carbon costs between electricity production in the union and abroad. that increase combined with the progress in connecting the union electricity grid to that of its neighbours would increase the risk of carbon leakage due to increased imports of electricity , a significant part of which is produced by coal-fired power plants. ### (37) import of electricity should be included in the scope of this regulation , as this sector is responsible for 30 per cent of the total ghg emissions in the union. the enhanced union climate ambition would increase the gap in carbon costs between electricity production in the union and abroad. that increase combined with the progress in connecting the union electricity grid to that of its neighbours would increase the risk of carbon leakage due to increased imports of electricity , a significant part of which is produced by coal-fired power plants. given that the coal-to-biomass conversion is one of the envisaged scenarios of the transition and this could have significant consequences for land use sector and depending on the type of biomass use could result in negative carbon savings , carbon embedded in the process of combustion of biomass is newly included in the eu ets. respective values of emission intensity of eu energy mix comprising bioenergy plants burning wood , including in form of pellets , are used as default values to determine the reference value for embedded emissions. in case an authorised declarant chooses to determine the embedded emissions based on the actual emissions , the carbon embedded in the process of combustion of woody biomass should be included.


### 1. recalls that the new industrial strategy was updated to reflect the lessons learned from covid-19 , and that this strategy will be key to enhancing eu competitiveness and overcoming future challenges; recalls that a strong governance system and market surveillance are essential in order to relaunch the single market; calls on the commission to focus on ensuring that the industrial strategy helps remove single market barriers and avoid further fragmentation; ### 1. recalls that the new industrial strategy was updated to reflect the lessons learned from covid-19 , and that this strategy will be key to enhancing eu competitiveness and overcoming future challenges; underlines that the crisis clearly demonstrated that the single market needs to be better equipped to face possible future crisis; welcomes , in this respect , the announcement of the commission to present a single market emergency instrument to strengthen its resilience and ask the commission to improve the effectiveness of already existing governance tools; asks for a strong governance system and a digitalised market surveillance system making full use of new technologies , such as ai , as they are essential in order to relaunch and ensure a well-functioning single market; calls on the commission to focus on ensuring that the industrial strategy helps remove single market barriers and avoid further fragmentation;


### 1. welcomes the update of the industrial strategy; stresses that for the green deal to be a true growth strategy , reduce dependencies and maintain a level playing field for european industry during the transition , it needs to be accompanied by ambitious industrial policy; ### 1. welcomes the update of the industrial strategy; stresses that for the green deal to be a true growth strategy , reduce dependencies and maintain a level playing field for european industry during the transition , it needs to be accompanied by ambitious industrial policy and an ambitious r&;d policy , including a robust technology transfer policy in the framework of an eu-wide sme friendly business ecosystem;


### a. whereas it is crucial to enable industry to implement the energy and digital transitions while preserving jobs , competitiveness and its ability to develop and produce clean products; ### a. whereas it is crucial to enable industry to implement the green transition , including the energy and digital transitions while preserving jobs , competitiveness and its ability to actively participate in an economy of free trade and fair competition and to develop and produce clean products;


### b. whereas in a changing geopolitical world , reducing eu dependencies on critical materials , products and technologies is vital; ### b. whereas in a changing geopolitical world , addressing eu dependencies by diversifying industrial supply chains is vital; considers that strategic autonomy and the resilience of the union is achieved by strengthening and developing europe’s industrial and technological capacities by means of investments in key technologies while ensuring an active free trade agenda , a well-functioning single market and a regulatory environment where companies are competitive;


### b. whereas in a changing geopolitical world , reducing eu dependencies on critical materials , products and technologies is vital; ### b. whereas in a changing geopolitical world , strengthening strategic autonomy and reducing eu dependencies on critical materials - through the application of circular economy principles wherever it is possible and economically feasible - , products and technologies is vital , while fostering open trade and strengthening the resilience of global supply chains;


### b. whereas in a changing geopolitical world , reducing eu dependencies on critical materials , products and technologies is vital; ### b. whereas in a changing geopolitical world , reducing eu dependencies on critical materials , products and technologies and arms is vital;


### 2. underlines that the eu cannot be dependent on non-eu countries for products and technologies that are essential to our economy and for our society of the future; stresses that the eu needs to regain a strong position in crucial global value chains and secure the supply of critical materials in times of crisis; ### 2. underlines that the eu cannot be dependent on non-eu countries for products and technologies that are essential to our economy and for our society of the future; stresses that the eu needs to regain a strong position in crucial global value chains and secure the supply of critical materials in times of crisis; notes that european champions are best placed to secure these positions and calls for this to be taken into account in eu competition law;


### 2. underlines that the eu cannot be dependent on non-eu countries for products and technologies that are essential to our economy and for our society of the future; stresses that the eu needs to regain a strong position in crucial global value chains and secure the supply of critical materials in times of crisis; ### 2. underlines the need for the eu to further analyse its dependencies on non-eu countries for products and technologies that are essential to our economy and for our society of the future and address these through market diversification and by maintaining an ambitious free trade agenda with global partners; stresses that the eu needs to regain a strong position in crucial global value chains and secure the supply of critical materials in times of crisis by promoting an open and rule-based trade with the rest of the world;


### 2. underlines that the eu cannot be dependent on non-eu countries for products and technologies that are essential to our economy and for our society of the future; stresses that the eu needs to regain a strong position in crucial global value chains and secure the supply of critical materials in times of crisis; ### 2. underlines that the eu cannot be dependent on non-eu countries for products and technologies that are essential to our economy and for our society of the future; stresses that the eu needs to regain a strong position in crucial global value chains and secure the supply of critical materials in times of crisis , also through the increased use of circular economy principles in modern business models;


### 3. calls on the commission to support smes and micro-businesses (including artisans) in the tourism sector , by fostering innovative initiatives , simplifying bureaucracy and encouraging education and training (mainly on new digital skills) , to stimulate new tourism offerings in terms of destinations and experiences; ### 3. calls on the commission to support smes and micro-businesses (including artisans) in the tourism sector , by fostering innovative initiatives , simplifying bureaucracy and encouraging education and training (mainly on new digital skills) , to stimulate new tourism offerings in terms of destinations and experiences. emphasises the need to lower significantly the administrative burden on smes and to make the eu regulatory framework better adapted to this end; invites the commission and the member states to further include and support measures enhancing the digitalisation;


### 3. calls on the commission to present clear transition pathways for the industrial ecosystem as soon as possible , including by identifying the needs for a successful transition in terms of infrastructure , technologies and skills; calls on the commission to ensure consistency and coordination across all initiatives , objectives , funding and regulatory instruments that will support industry through the transitions; calls for annual monitoring and reporting on the competitiveness and resilience of our industrial ecosystems and on the progress made on the transition pathways , so that instruments can be adapted swiftly when needed; ### 3. calls on the commission to present clear climate goals-based transition pathways for the industrial ecosystem as soon as possible , including by identifying the needs for a successful transition in terms of infrastructure , technologies and skills and identifying the steps needed to foster the connection between the industrial ecosystem , r&i and the educational system; calls on the commission to ensure consistency and coordination across all initiatives , objectives , funding and regulatory instruments that will support industry through the transitions; calls for annual monitoring and reporting on the competitiveness , technological progress and resilience of our industrial ecosystems and on the progress made on the transition pathways , so that instruments can be adapted swiftly when needed;


### 4. notes that the eu is outperformed by other economic powers in research and development (r&d) expenditures as a percentage of gdp; reiterates the importance of an ambitious level of investment in r&d regrets that the target of 3 % of gdp investments in r&d has still not been achieved in the vast majority of member states; ### 4. notes that the eu is outperformed by other economic powers in research and development (r&d) expenditures as a percentage of gdp; reiterates the importance of an ambitious level of investment in r&d regrets that the target of 3 % of gdp investments in r&d has still not been achieved in the vast majority of member states; calls on the commission to coordinate member states' efforts in further committing to increased r&d investment targets at national level , in particular for national public and private funding for industrial innovation and research;


### 5. calls on the commission to facilitate multimodal journey planning and ticketing through digital services while better regulating the activity of online booking platforms and booking platform intermediaries; calls for the eu framework for short-term rentals to be strengthened and for new policies to be implemented with a view to enhancing transparency; ### 5. calls on the commission to facilitate multimodal journey planning and simplify ticketing procedures through digital services while better regulating the activity of online booking platforms and booking platform intermediaries; calls for the eu framework for short-term rentals to be strengthened and for new policies to be implemented with a view to enhancing transparency;


### 5. calls on the commission to close the investment gap with global competitors for key enabling technologies; welcomes , in this regard , the commission’s proposal for a european chips act10 and the establishment of the european alliance for industrial data , edge and cloud; calls on the commission to extend these initiatives to key enabling technologies , such as photonics and quantum; ### 5. calls on the commission to close the investment gap with global competitors for key enabling technologies like batteries and ai; welcomes , in this regard , the commission’s proposal for a european chips act10 and the establishment of the european alliance for industrial data , edge and cloud; calls on the commission to swiftly kick off the delayed work of the european industrial alliance for processors and semiconductor technologies; calls on the commission to extend these initiatives to key enabling technologies , such as photonics and quantum; welcomes the commission's efforts to develop european competences in chip and system design , as well as increased local production capacity and manufacturing sites for advanced chip technology;


### 5. calls on the commission to close the investment gap with global competitors for key enabling technologies; welcomes , in this regard , the commission’s proposal for a european chips act10 and the establishment of the european alliance for industrial data , edge and cloud; calls on the commission to extend these initiatives to key enabling technologies , such as photonics and quantum; ### 5. calls on the commission to stimulate increased investments in r&d and test beds in key enabling technologies; welcomes , in this regard , the r&d ambitions in the commission’s proposal for a european chips act10 and the establishment of the european alliance for industrial data , edge and cloud; calls on the commission to evaluate these initiatives in a transparent manner before considering to extend these to other key enabling technologies;


### 6. stresses the need to strengthen ‘made in eu’ and accelerate the adoption of industry 4.0 technologies , particularly by small and medium-sized enterprises (smes); calls on the commission to embed the ‘made in europe’ partnership strongly in the horizon europe programme; ### 6. stresses the need for the commission to safeguard effective competition rules while upholding vigilant supervision that limits a few actors from gaining excessive market power; welcomes the work on increasing contestability in digital markets and increased support for smes through the digital markets act; calls on the commission to consider when current temporary reliefs in state aid rules can be repealed in order to reduce long term market distortions;


### 7. welcomes the commission’s announcement issuing guidance on public procurement; stresses that public procurement is an essential instrument for national and economic security and for supporting the uptake of and demand for clean products; calls , in this regard , on the commission to review public procurement and competition rules where needed; ### 7. welcomes the commission’s announcement issuing guidance on public procurement; stresses that public procurement is an essential instrument for national and economic security and for supporting the uptake of and demand for clean products; underlines that public procurement mechanisms should further support the transformation of europe's industry by fostering the production of eco-innovative , cost-effective and sustainable goods and services and increasing the demand for secondary raw materials stemming from the deployment of circular production processes; calls , in this regard , on the commission to review public procurement and competition rules where needed;


### 7. welcomes the commission’s announcement issuing guidance on public procurement; stresses that public procurement is an essential instrument for national and economic security and for supporting the uptake of and demand for clean products; calls , in this regard , on the commission to review public procurement and competition rules where needed; ### 7. welcomes the commission’s announcement issuing guidance on public procurement and its efforts to promote reciprocity in access to public procurement markets; stresses that public procurement is an essential instrument for national and economic security and for supporting the uptake of and demand for clean products; calls , in this regard , on the commission to review public procurement and competition rules where needed;


### 8. highlights the importance of including education , upskilling and reskilling in the transition pathways; calls on the commission to develop a strategy for vocational education and business-education partnerships within regional industrial clusters to boost skills and enhance the uptake of ready-for-market innovations by smes; ### 8. highlights the importance of including education , upskilling and reskilling in the transition pathways as important tools in the transformation of eu industry and in the effort to achieve higher productivity; calls on the commission to develop a strategy for vocational education and business-education partnerships within regional industrial clusters to boost skills and enhance the uptake of ready-for-market innovations by smes; highlights the need to strengthen cooperation between r&d and industry , especially in the form of technology transfers to smes;


### 9. underlines that smes and start-ups are playing a central role in the digitalisation of the eu and are a critical source of innovation; stresses the need to improve their access to financing; ### 9. underlines that smes and start-ups are playing a central role in the eu industrial ecosystem and especially in the digitalisation of the eu and are a critical source of innovation; stresses the need to improve their access to financing; highlights the need to address existing barriers in the single market that are hindering the growth of smes and start-ups in europe , as well as the need for an improved legal and regulatory framework;


### 10. stresses the need for regulatory stability and predictability; calls on the commission to include roadmaps in the transition pathways to reduce administrative burdens for european businesses , especially smes , by at least 30 %; stresses the ‘one in , one out’ principle; ### 10. stresses the need to modernize and future-proof the regulatory framework to ensure regulatory stability and predictability; underlines the need to reduce unnecessary administrative burdens for companies and especially for smes , while maintaining adequate social , labour and environmental standards; calls on the commission to include roadmaps in the transition pathways to reduce administrative burdens for european businesses , especially smes , by at least 30 %; stresses the ‘one in , one out’ principle;


### 11. underlines the regional dimension of industrial policy and the role of regional smart specialisation strategies; calls on the commission to include instruments to increase the use of ‘made in eu’ at a regional level; ### 11. underlines the regional dimension of industrial policy and the role of regional smart specialisation strategies; calls in this regard for an analysis of the achievements of smart specialisation strategies as a platform for future measures at regional level; calls on the commission to include instruments to increase the use of ‘made in eu’ at a regional level; calls on the commission to recognise the potential of innovative circular technologies that shorten value chains , reduce emissions and increase resource autonomy;


### 12. calls on the commission to stimulate the production of affordable and abundant renewable and low-carbon energy; calls on the commission to increase the coordination of the planning and financing for needed electricity , energy , hydrogen , co2 and heating/cooling infrastructure; ### 12. calls on the commission to stimulate the production of affordable and abundant renewable and low-carbon energy; calls on the commission to increase its efforts in the potential of the circular bioeconomy where sustainable and renewable resources are used in order to promote competitive and resilient industries in the long term; while increasing the coordination of the planning and financing for needed electricity , energy , hydrogen , co2 and heating/cooling infrastructure;


### 12. calls on the commission to stimulate the production of affordable and abundant renewable and low-carbon energy; calls on the commission to increase the coordination of the planning and financing for needed electricity , energy , hydrogen , co2 and heating/cooling infrastructure; ### 12. calls on the commission to stimulate and support the transition to affordable , secure and sufficient energy production from renewable and transitional low-carbon sources; calls on the commission to ensure an appropriate legal framework and increase the coordination of the planning and financing destined to projects of electricity , smart grid , energy , hydrogen , co2 , heating/cooling and recycling infrastructure needed for eu industry and households;


### 12. calls on the commission to stimulate the production of affordable and abundant renewable and low-carbon energy; calls on the commission to increase the coordination of the planning and financing for needed electricity , energy , hydrogen , co2 and heating/cooling infrastructure; ### 12. calls on the commission to stimulate the production of affordable and abundant renewable and low-carbon energy; calls on the commission to support the development of energy sources that allow the increasing electricity needs to be met and to increase the coordination of the planning and financing for needed electricity , energy , hydrogen , co2 and heating/cooling infrastructure;


### 13. calls on the commission and the member states to bring down the time needed to issue permits substantially and create fast-track permitting procedures for infrastructure that supports industry in the energy transition; ### 13. calls on the commission and the member states to bring down the time needed to issue permits substantially and create fast-track permitting procedures for infrastructure that supports industry in its transition to a carbon neutral circular economy , without prejudice to the transparency , legitimacy and legality of the procedures;


### 14. calls on the member states and the commission to accelerate the implementation of instruments , including important projects of common european interest , and industrial alliances that develop innovative breakthrough technologies needed for the energy transition , such as clean steel , clean aviation , e-fuels , clean fertilisers , e-cracking and small modular reactors; ### 14. calls on the member states and the commission to accelerate the implementation of instruments , including important projects of common european interest , and industrial alliances that develop innovative breakthrough technologies needed for the energy transition , such as clean steel , clean aviation , e-fuels , clean fertilisers , e-cracking and small modular reactors; stresses that a swift assessment of ipcei applications by the commission is crucial for the resilience of european industry;


### 14. calls on the member states and the commission to accelerate the implementation of instruments , including important projects of common european interest , and industrial alliances that develop innovative breakthrough technologies needed for the energy transition , such as clean steel , clean aviation , e-fuels , clean fertilisers , e-cracking and small modular reactors; ### 14. calls on the member states and the commission to use appropriate instruments , including important projects of common and industrial alliances that develop innovative breakthrough technologies; underlines that ipcei is a tool to overcome proven market failure which should be used with care and based on strict criteria so as not to distort competition on the single market;


### 14. calls on the member states and the commission to accelerate the implementation of instruments , including important projects of common european interest , and industrial alliances that develop innovative breakthrough technologies needed for the energy transition , such as clean steel , clean aviation , e-fuels , clean fertilisers , e-cracking and small modular reactors; ### 14. calls on the member states and the commission to accelerate the implementation of instruments , including important projects of common european interest , and industrial alliances that develop innovative breakthrough technologies needed for the environmental , digital and energy transitions , such as clean steel , clean aviation , e-fuels , clean fertilisers , e-cracking and small modular reactors;


### 15. welcomes the commission analysis on strategic dependencies and capacities; calls on the commission to finalise the analyses and technology roadmaps as soon as possible and propose actions to reduce dependence on the identified critical products and supplies; highlights the necessity of a strategy based on further in-depth analysis of mutual dependencies to strengthen the eu’s capacity in critical value chains; ### 15. welcomes the commission analysis on strategic dependencies and capacities in line with the aim of strategic autonomy; calls on the commission to finalise the analyses and technology roadmaps as soon as possible and propose actions to reduce dependence on the identified critical products and supplies; highlights the necessity of a strategy based on further in-depth analysis of mutual dependencies to strengthen the eu’s capacity in critical value chains , while remaining committed to multilateralism and free trade; calls on the commission to adopt a holistic value chain approach when analysing strategic dependencies across the fourteen critical industrial ecosystems it has identified in its 2021 annual single market report;


### 17. is strongly concerned about unfair competition , investments and takeovers by non-eu state-financed companies on the single market , especially in strategic sectors; calls on the commission to analyse and prevent this interference; ### 17. welcomes the commission initiatives to address unfair competition , investments and takeovers by companies from third countries on the single market; highlights that , when an increased number of markets are concentrated around few actors , customer benefit , innovation and efficiency can be undermined; urges the commission to continue competition monitoring and supervision of strategic sectors in order to secure functional and open markets that stimulates investments;


### 17. is strongly concerned about unfair competition , investments and takeovers by non-eu state-financed companies on the single market , especially in strategic sectors; calls on the commission to analyse and prevent this interference; ### 17. is strongly concerned about unfair competition , investments and takeovers by non-eu state-financed companies on the single market , especially in strategic sectors; calls on the commission to analyse and develop suitable and legally sound measures to prevent this interference;


### 18. calls on the commission to broaden the framework for foreign direct investment to address the effect of foreign subsidies on economic security in the eu and of technology transfers by eu companies in non-eu countries in strategic sectors; ### 18. calls on the commission to broaden the scope and definitions of the framework for foreign direct investment to address the effect of foreign subsidies on economic security in the eu and of technology transfers by eu companies in non-eu countries in strategic sectors;


### 19. is concerned about the increasing dependence on non-eu producers for security equipment in vital and sensitive parts of our society , such as (border) security; stresses the need to earmark security technology and equipment as a strategic sector; calls for an action plan to boost this eu industry , including through adapted public procurement rules; ### 19. is concerned about the increasing dependence on non-eu producers for security equipment in vital and sensitive parts of our society , such as (border , cyber , defence) security; stresses the need to earmark security technology and equipment as a strategic sector; calls for an action plan to boost this eu industry , including through adapted but not protectionist public procurement rules;


### 20. highlights the conclusions of the european court of auditors -report on delays in implementing 5g networks and the risks associated with non-eu vendors11 ; calls on the commission to stimulate a coordinated 5g roll-out in the eu and reduce dependencies and interference risks in 5g and next generation communication technology; ### 20. highlights the conclusions of the european court of auditors -report on delays in implementing 5g networks and the risks associated with non-eu vendors11 ; calls on the commission to stimulate a coordinated 5g roll-out in the eu and reduce dependencies and interference risks in 5g and next generation communication technology; calls on the commission to ensure an adequate level of competitiveness in the field of 5g technologies while guaranteeing the security of 5g networks;


### (6) whilst always acting within the framework of international law , it is essential that the union possess an appropriate instrument to deter and counteract economic coercion by third countries in order to safeguard its rights and interests and those of its member states. this is particularly the case where third countries take measures affecting trade or investment that interfere in the legitimate sovereign choices of the union or a member state by seeking to prevent or obtain the cessation , modification or adoption of a particular act by the union or a member state. such measures affecting trade or investment may include not only actions taken on , and having effects within , the territory of the third country , but also actions taken by the third country , including through entities controlled or directed by the third country and present in the union , that cause harm to economic activities in the union. ### (6) whilst always acting within the framework of international law , it is essential that the union possess an appropriate instrument to deter and counteract economic coercion by third countries in order to safeguard its rights and interests and those of its member states. this is particularly the case where third countries take or threaten to take measures affecting trade or investment that interfere in the legitimate sovereign choices of the union or a member state by seeking to prevent or obtain the cessation , modification or adoption of a particular act by the union or a member state. such measures affecting trade or investment or threat thereof may include not only actions taken or actions threaten to be taken on and having effects within , the territory of the third country , but also actions taken or threatened to be taken by the third country , including through entities controlled or directed by the third country and present in the union , that cause harm to economic activities in the union , such as , among others , some extraterritorial effects of third county sanctions.


### (7) this regulation aims to ensure an effective , efficient and swift union response to economic coercion , including deterrence of economic coercion of the union or a member state and , in the last resort , countermeasures. ### (7) this regulation aims to ensure an effective , efficient and swift union response to economic coercion , including deterrence of economic coercion of the union or a member state and , in the last resort , countermeasures. this regulation shall be complementary to other existing union instruments and relations such as the regulation (eu) 2021/167 of the european parliament and of the council1a and the review of the blocking statute 1b


### (8) the objectives of this regulation , in particular counteracting third countries’ economic coercion of the union or a member state , cannot be sufficiently achieved by member states acting on their own. this is because member states as distinct actors under international law may not be entitled under international law to respond to economic coercion directed against the union. additionally , because of the exclusive competence conferred on the union by article 207 of the treaty on the functioning of the european union , member states are prevented from taking common commercial policy measures as a response to economic coercion. therefore , those objectives can be achieved with greater effectiveness at union level. ### (8) the objectives of this regulation , in particular counteracting third countries’ economic coercion of the union or a member state , cannot be sufficiently achieved by member states acting on their own , especially in the context of the union internal market. this is because member states as distinct actors under international law may not be entitled under international law to respond to economic coercion directed against the union. additionally , because of the exclusive competence conferred on the union by article 207 of the treaty on the functioning of the european union , member states are prevented from taking common commercial policy measures as a response to economic coercion. therefore , those objectives can be achieved with greater effectiveness at union level.


### (10) any action undertaken by the union on the basis of this regulation should comply with the union’s obligations under international law. international law allows , under certain conditions , such as proportionality and prior notice , the imposition of countermeasures , that is to say of measures that would otherwise be contrary to the international obligations of an injured party vis-à-vis the country responsible for a breach of international law , and that are aimed at obtaining the cessation of the breach or reparation for it.10 accordingly , response measures adopted under this regulation should take the form of either measures adhering to the union’s international obligations or measures constituting permitted countermeasures. under international law , and in accordance with the principle of proportionality , they should not exceed a level that is commensurate with the injury suffered by the union or a member state due to the third country’s measures of economic coercion , taking into account the gravity of the third country’s measures and the union’s rights and interests in question. in this respect , injury to the union or a member state is understood under international law to include injury to union economic operators. ### (10) any action undertaken by the union on the basis of this regulation should comply with the union’s obligations under international law. the union should continue to support the rules-based multilateral trading system , with the world trade organisation (wto) at its core. out of the wto's framework , international law allows , under certain conditions , such as proportionality and prior notice , the imposition of countermeasures , that is to say of measures that would otherwise be contrary to the international obligations of an injured party vis-à-vis the country responsible for a breach of international law , and that are aimed at obtaining the cessation of the breach or reparation for it.10 accordingly , response measures adopted under this regulation should take the form of either measures adhering to the union’s international obligations or measures constituting permitted countermeasures. under international law , and in accordance with the principle of proportionality , they should not exceed a level that is commensurate with the injury suffered by the union or a member state due to the third country’s measures of economic coercion , taking into account the gravity of the third country’s measures and the union’s rights and interests in question. in this respect , injury to the union or a member state is understood under international law to include injury to union economic operators.


### (13) the commission should examine whether third-country measures are coercive , on its own initiative or following information received from any source , including legal and natural persons or a member state. following this examination , the commission should determine in a decision whether the third-country measure is coercive. the commission should communicate any affirmative determination to the third country concerned , together with a request that the economic coercion cease and a request , where appropriate , that any injury be repaired. ### (13) the commission should examine whether third-country measures are coercive , on its own initiative or following information received from any source , including legal and natural persons , the european parliament or a member state. following this examination , the commission should determine in a decision whether the third-country measure is coercive. the commission should communicate any affirmative determination to the third country concerned , together with a request that the economic coercion cease and a request that any injury be repaired.


### (16) union response measures adopted in accordance with this regulation should be selected and designed on the basis of objective criteria , including: the effectiveness of the measures in inducing the cessation of coercion by the third country; their potential to provide relief to economic operators within the union affected by the third-country measures of economic coercion; the aim of avoiding or minimising negative economic and other effects on the union; and the avoidance of disproportionate administrative complexity and costs. it is also essential that the selection and design of union response measures take account of the union’s interest. union response measures should be selected from a wide array of options in order to allow the adoption of the most suitable measures in any given case. ### (16) union response measures adopted in accordance with this regulation should be selected and designed on the basis of objective criteria , including: the effectiveness of the measures in inducing the cessation of coercion by the third country; the effectiveness of the measures in repairing the injury caused by the economic coercion; their potential to provide relief to economic operators within the union affected by the third-country measures of economic coercion; the aim of avoiding or minimising negative economic and other effects on the union; and the avoidance of disproportionate administrative complexity and costs. it is also essential that the selection and design of union response measures take account of the union’s interest. union response measures should be selected from a wide array of options in order to allow the adoption of the most suitable measures in any given case.


### (18) in pursuing the objective of obtaining the cessation of the measure of economic coercion , union response measures consisting of restrictions on foreign direct investment or on trade in services should only apply with regard to services supplied , or direct investments made , within the union by one or more legal persons established in the union which are owned or controlled by persons of the third country concerned where necessary to ensure the effectiveness of union response measures and in particular to prevent their avoidance. the decision to impose any such restrictions will be duly justified in implementing acts adopted pursuant to this regulation in the light of the criteria specified in this regulation. ### (18) in pursuing the objective of obtaining the cessation of the measure of economic coercion and the reparation of the injury caused , union response measures consisting of restrictions on foreign direct investment or on trade in services should only apply with regard to services supplied , or direct investments made , within the union by one or more legal persons established in the union which are owned or controlled by persons of the third country concerned where necessary to ensure the effectiveness of union response measures and in particular to prevent their avoidance. the decision to impose any such restrictions will be duly justified in implementing acts adopted pursuant to this regulation in the light of the criteria specified in this regulation.


### (21) it is important to ensure an effective communication and exchange of views and information between the commission on the one hand and the european parliament and the council on the other , in particular on efforts to engage with the third country concerned to explore options with a view to obtaining the cessation of the economic coercion and on matters that may lead to the adoption of union response measures under this regulation. ### (21) it is important to ensure an effective communication and exchange of views and information between the commission on the one hand and the european parliament and the council on the other , in particular on efforts to engage with the third country concerned to explore options with a view to obtaining the cessation of the economic coercion and the reparation of the injury caused and on matters that may lead to the adoption of union response measures under this regulation.


### 1. this regulation lays down rules and procedures in order to ensure the effective protection of the interests of the union and its member states where a third country seeks , through measures affecting trade or investment , to coerce the union or a member state into adopting or refraining from adopting a particular act. this regulation provides a framework for the union to respond in such situations with the objective to deter , or have the third country desist from such actions , whilst permitting the union , in the last resort , to counteract such actions. ### 1. this regulation lays down rules and procedures in order to ensure the effective protection of the interests of the union and its member states where a third country seeks , through measures , failure to act or threat thereof affecting trade or investment , to coerce the union or a member state into adopting or refraining from adopting a particular act. this regulation provides a framework for the union to respond in such situations with the objective to deter , obtain the cessation and the reparation of the injury caused or have the third country desist from such actions , whilst permitting the union , in the last resort , to counteract such actions.


### 1. this regulation applies where a third country: ### 1. this regulation applies in the event of economic coercion , where a third country:


### — interferes in the legitimate sovereign choices of the union or a member state by seeking to prevent or obtain the cessation , modification or adoption of a particular act by the union or a member state ### — interferes in the legitimate sovereign choices of the union or a member state by seeking to prevent or obtain the cessation , modification or adoption of a particular act by the union or a member state , including some extraterritorial effects of third countries' sanctions;


### — by applying or threatening to apply measures affecting trade or investment. ### — by applying , failing to adopt or threatening to apply measures affecting trade or investment.


### for the purposes of this regulation , such third-country actions shall be referred to as measures of economic coercion. ### deleted


### 2. in determining whether the conditions set out in paragraph 1 are met , the following shall be taken into account: ### 2. in determining economic coercion and whether the conditions set out in paragraph 1 are met , the commission shall take into account the following:


### the intensity , severity , frequency , duration , breadth and magnitude of the third country’s measure and the pressure arising from it; ### the intensity , severity , frequency , duration , breadth and magnitude of the third country’s measure , failure to act or threat thereof as well as the pressure arising from it;


### the extent to which the third-country measure encroaches upon an area of the union’s or member states’ sovereignty; ### the extent to which the third-country measure , failure to act or threat thereof encroaches upon an area of the union’s or member states’ sovereignty;


### whether the third country is acting based on a legitimate concern that is internationally recognised; ### whether the third country is acting based on a concern that is well defined and recognised as legitimate by international law and conventions ;


### 1. the commission may examine any measure of a third country in order to determine whether it meets the conditions set out in article 2(1). the commission shall act expeditiously. ### 1. the commission may examine any measure of a third country , failure to act and threat thereof in order to determine whether it meets the conditions set out in article 2(1). the commission shall act expeditiously.


### 2. the commission may carry out the examination referred to in paragraph 1 on its own initiative or following information received from any source. the commission shall ensure the protection of confidential information in line with article 12 , which may include the identity of the supplier of the information. ### 2. the commission shall carry out the examination referred to in paragraph 1 on its own initiative or following information received from any reliable source , notably a member state , the european parliament , economic operators or trade unions. the commission shall ensure the protection of confidential information in line with article 12 , which may include the identity of the supplier of the information.


### the commission may publish a notice in the official journal of the european union or through other suitable public communication means with an invitation to submit information within a specified time limit. in that event , the commission shall notify the third country concerned of the initiation of the examination. ### the commission shall duly and in a timely manner inform the european parliament and the council of any development in the examination of third country measures. it shall publish a notice in the official journal of the european union or through other suitable public communication means with an invitation to submit information within a specified time limit which shall not exceed 4 months. in that event , the commission shall notify the third country concerned of the initiation of the examination.


### prior to adopting its decision , the commission may invite the third country concerned to submit its observations. ### prior to adopting its decision , the commission may invite the third country concerned to submit its observations within a reasonable and specified time limit that shall not unduly delay the commission's decision.


### where the commission decides that the measure of the third country concerned meets the conditions set out in article 2(1) , it shall notify the third country concerned of its decision and request it to cease the economic coercion and , where appropriate , repair the injury suffered by the union or its member states. ### where the commission decides that the measure of the third country concerned meets the conditions set out in article 2(1) , it shall notify the third country concerned of its decision and request it to cease the economic coercion and , where appropriate , repair the injury suffered by the union or its member states within a reasonable and specified period of time.


### — submitting the matter to international adjudication. ### — submitting , in parallel , the matter to international adjudication , without implying any undue delay in the commission's decision.


### the commission shall seek to obtain the cessation of the economic coercion by also raising the matter in any relevant international forum. ### the commission shall seek to obtain the cessation of the economic coercion by raising , in addition to the commission's determination of the third country's measures , the matter in any relevant international forum.


### the commission shall keep the european parliament and the council informed of relevant developments. ### the commission shall keep the european parliament and the council fully , regularly and in timely manner informed of all the developments.


### 1. the commission shall adopt an implementing act determining that it shall take a union response measure where: ### 1. the commission shall adopt an implementing act taking a union response measure where:


### action pursuant to the articles 4 and 5 has not resulted in the cessation of the economic coercion and reparation of the injury it has caused to the union or a member state within a reasonable period of time; ### action pursuant to the articles 4 and 5 has not resulted in the cessation of the economic coercion and reparation of the injury it has caused to the union or a member state within the reasonable period of time set in the decision referred to in article 4;