### 10. recalls that for rules-based , effective , results-oriented and networked multilateralism to flourish , it is important to involve democratically elected parliaments to ensure broader access to a wide-range of stakeholders and expand dialogue and cooperation to non-state entities such as regional governments , municipalities and the economic sector; recalls that democratically elected parliaments can give visibility to and empower the voices supporting multilateralism as an avenue for effective policy responses for the benefit of all mankind and can further secure the necessary link between the international organisations and multilateral fora making decisions and the citizens; points to the synergic role that the european parliament can play in its regular political and policy outreach to the parliaments of the eu member states and third countries , as this outreach can reinforce and further expand the coalition and the ability of like-minded countries in international organisations and multilateral fora to make positive impacts; considers that parliament should reflect on the possibility of creating a delegation devoted to the un , with particular regard to the un general assembly and other parliamentary dimensions of international organisations and multilateral fora to reinforce the parliamentary link and dialogue with the un system and other relevant multilateral fora and ensure democratic dialogue and strategic considerations at the eu inter-institutional level; believes that parliament’s offices in cities with un bodies or international organisations that are relevant for the external action of the eu should reach out to and cover the activities of these bodies and organisations to establish a closer link with the efforts , commitments and visions related to multilateralism at eu and european parliament level; takes the view that parliament should carry out a reflection on how to maximise the synergies between inter-parliamentary delegations , committees and parliament’s services devoted to election observation and democracy support to further reinforce the external action of the eu through the activities of these parliamentary bodies; ### 10. recalls that for rules-based , effective , results-oriented and networked multilateralism to flourish , it is important to involve democratically elected parliaments to ensure broader access to a wide-range of stakeholders and expand dialogue and cooperation to non-state entities such as regional governments , municipalities , academia and the economic sector; recalls that democratically elected parliaments can give visibility to and empower the voices supporting multilateralism as an avenue for effective policy responses for the benefit of all humankind and can further secure the necessary link between the international organisations and multilateral fora making decisions and the citizens; points to the synergic role that the european parliament can play in its regular political and policy outreach to the parliaments of the eu member states and third countries , as this outreach can reinforce and further expand the coalition and the ability of like-minded countries in international organisations and multilateral fora to make positive impacts; considers that parliament should reflect on the possibility of creating a delegation devoted to the un , with particular regard to the un general assembly and other parliamentary dimensions of international organisations and multilateral fora to reinforce the parliamentary link and dialogue with the un system and other relevant multilateral fora and ensure democratic dialogue and strategic considerations at the eu inter-institutional level; believes that parliament’s offices in cities with un bodies or international organisations that are relevant for the external action of the eu should reach out to and cover the activities of these bodies and organisations to establish a closer link with the efforts , commitments and visions related to multilateralism at eu and european parliament level; takes the view that parliament should carry out a reflection on how to maximise the synergies between inter-parliamentary delegations , committees and parliament’s services devoted to election observation and democracy support to further reinforce the external action of the eu through the activities of these parliamentary bodies;


### 10. recalls that for rules-based , effective , results-oriented and networked multilateralism to flourish , it is important to involve democratically elected parliaments to ensure broader access to a wide-range of stakeholders and expand dialogue and cooperation to non-state entities such as regional governments , municipalities and the economic sector; recalls that democratically elected parliaments can give visibility to and empower the voices supporting multilateralism as an avenue for effective policy responses for the benefit of all mankind and can further secure the necessary link between the international organisations and multilateral fora making decisions and the citizens; points to the synergic role that the european parliament can play in its regular political and policy outreach to the parliaments of the eu member states and third countries , as this outreach can reinforce and further expand the coalition and the ability of like-minded countries in international organisations and multilateral fora to make positive impacts; considers that parliament should reflect on the possibility of creating a delegation devoted to the un , with particular regard to the un general assembly and other parliamentary dimensions of international organisations and multilateral fora to reinforce the parliamentary link and dialogue with the un system and other relevant multilateral fora and ensure democratic dialogue and strategic considerations at the eu inter-institutional level; believes that parliament’s offices in cities with un bodies or international organisations that are relevant for the external action of the eu should reach out to and cover the activities of these bodies and organisations to establish a closer link with the efforts , commitments and visions related to multilateralism at eu and european parliament level; takes the view that parliament should carry out a reflection on how to maximise the synergies between inter-parliamentary delegations , committees and parliament’s services devoted to election observation and democracy support to further reinforce the external action of the eu through the activities of these parliamentary bodies; ### 10. recalls that for rules-based , effective , results-oriented and networked multilateralism to flourish , it is important to involve democratically elected parliaments to ensure broader access to a wide-range of stakeholders and expand dialogue and cooperation to non-state entities such as regional governments , civil society , municipalities and the economic sector; recalls that democratically elected parliaments can give visibility to and empower the voices supporting multilateralism as an avenue for effective policy responses for the benefit of all mankind and can further secure the necessary link between the international organisations and multilateral fora making decisions and the citizens; points to the synergic role that the european parliament can play in its regular political and policy outreach to the parliaments of the eu member states and third countries , as this outreach can reinforce and further expand the coalition and the ability of like-minded countries in international organisations and multilateral fora to make positive impacts; considers that parliament should reflect on the possibility of creating a delegation devoted to international organisations and multilateral fora , with particular regard to the un general assembly , to reinforce the parliamentary link and dialogue with the un system and other relevant multilateral fora and ensure democratic dialogue and strategic considerations at the eu inter-institutional level; believes that parliament’s offices in cities with un bodies or international organisations that are relevant for the external action of the eu should reach out to and cover the activities of these bodies and organisations to establish a closer link with the efforts , commitments and visions related to multilateralism at eu and european parliament level; takes the view that parliament should carry out a reflection on how to maximise the synergies between inter-parliamentary delegations , committees and parliament’s services devoted to election observation and democracy support to further reinforce the external action of the eu through the activities of these parliamentary bodies;


### 11. recalls parliament’s important role as a democratic , convening institution that can provide a unique public forum to promote multilateralism; considers that parliament should regularly invite high-level leaders from relevant international organisations to discuss shared interests and priorities; believes that to reinforce the parliamentary dimension of multilateral fora , parliament should host on its premises , on an annual basis , a conference of speakers from g7 and g20 countries; calls for the reinforcement of structured dialogue between parliament and the un system; stresses , in this regard , the importance of holding regular meetings to exchange views between the committee on foreign affairs and the heads of the eu delegations to the un in new york and geneva and between the committee and the heads of mission of the eu member states that are either permanent or rotating members of the un security council; highlights the positive contributions of the annual delegations from the committee on foreign affairs and its sub-committees to the un headquarters in new york; calls for the formalisation of some of the informal sessions between the eu and the un security council; encourages the setting up of a formal association between parliament and the un general assembly; ### 11. recalls parliament’s important role as a democratic , convening institution that can provide a unique public forum to promote multilateralism; considers that parliament should regularly invite high-level leaders from relevant international organisations to discuss shared interests and priorities; believes that to reinforce the parliamentary dimension of multilateral fora , parliament should host on its premises , on an annual basis , a conference of speakers from g7 and g20 countries; calls for the reinforcement of structured dialogue between parliament and the un system; stresses , in this regard , the importance of holding regular meetings to exchange views between the committee on foreign affairs and the heads of the eu delegations to the un in new york and geneva and between the committee and the heads of mission of the eu member states that are either permanent or rotating members of the un security council; highlights the positive contributions of the annual delegations from the committee on foreign affairs and its sub-committees to the un headquarters in new york; calls for the formalisation of some of the informal sessions between the eu and the un security council;


### 12. highlights the crucial contribution of the multilateral system in addressing the climate emergency; calls for the further enhancement , reinforcement and institutionalisation of the existing multilateral frameworks that seek to combat climate change , such as the un climate change conferences and the paris agreement , which have almost universal membership , through the establishment of accountability mechanisms and concrete principles to ensure the effectiveness of their mandates; stresses the need to reinforce global action against climate change , as only through collective , immediate and ambitious global action may the world be able to limit the temperature increase to 1 ,5 degrees centigrade above pre-industrial levels; recalls the importance of focusing on the implementation at the national level by adopting and implementing nationally determined contributions (ndcs) , while at the same time ensuring that the international community is collectively on track to meet the goals of the paris agreement at the multilateral level; recalls the importance of working closely with major emitters , climate-vulnerable countries and transatlantic partners to deliver progress on the 2030 target at the 2022 un climate change conference; ### 12. highlights the crucial contribution of the multilateral system in addressing the climate emergency; calls for the further enhancement , reinforcement and institutionalisation of the existing multilateral frameworks that seek to combat climate change , such as the un climate change conferences and the paris agreement , which have almost universal membership , through the establishment of accountability mechanisms and concrete principles to ensure the effectiveness of their mandates; stresses the need to reinforce global action against climate change , as only through collective , immediate and ambitious global action may the world be able to limit the temperature increase to 1 ,5 degrees centigrade above pre-industrial levels; recalls the importance of focusing on the implementation at the national level by adopting and implementing nationally determined contributions (ndcs) , while at the same time ensuring that the international community is collectively on track to meet the goals of the paris agreement at the multilateral level; calls on governments to set ambitious ndcs , without which the 1 ,5 degree objective will not be met , and encourage each other to stay on track; recalls the importance of working closely with major emitters , climate-vulnerable countries and transatlantic partners to deliver progress on the 2030 target at the 2022 un climate change conference;


### 13. recalls the key role of multilateral fora in addressing the challenges of the covid-19 pandemic and highlights this as an example of their importance in promoting and protecting global public health; celebrates the development of the covax initiative , which constitutes an unprecedented exercise of international solidarity , and thanks its donors and contributors , while stressing the need to continue donating and increasing resources in order to make vaccines and treatments available for free to all countries; commends the work of the world health organization in combating the pandemic through its decisions based on scientific knowledge and evidence and stresses the need to enhance its mandate and executive capacity , especially with regard to data sharing and resource mobilisation , as well as reform the decision-making process of its emergency committee and establish enforcement mechanisms for its decisions and precepts; ### 13. recalls the key role of multilateral fora in addressing the challenges of the covid-19 pandemic and highlights this as an example of their importance in promoting and protecting global public health and universal health coverage; celebrates the development of the covax initiative , which constitutes an unprecedented exercise of international solidarity , and thanks its donors and contributors , while stressing the need to continue donating and increasing resources in order to make vaccines and treatments available for free to all countries; commends the work of the world health organization in combating the pandemic through its decisions based on scientific knowledge and evidence and stresses the need to enhance its mandate and executive capacity , especially with regard to data sharing and resource mobilisation , as well as reform the decision-making process of its emergency committee and establish enforcement mechanisms for its decisions and precepts; calls for strengthened legislative and regulatory frameworks and promotes policy coherence for the achievement of universal health coverage , including by enacting legislation and implementing policies that provide greater access to health services , products and vaccines , especially for the most underprivileged;


### 15. calls for extending multilateralism to new challenges and realities such as biodiversity , cybersecurity , biotechnology and artificial intelligence , which need to be developed alongside experts and scientists who should be party to multilateral , multi-stakeholder arrangements; ### 15. calls for extending multilateralism to new challenges and realities such as biodiversity , cybersecurity , biotechnology , artificial intelligence , and emerging threats such as the technology-enabled spread of fake news , fake science , and disinformation; argues that experts and scientists should be party to multilateral , multi-stakeholder arrangements;


### 15. calls for extending multilateralism to new challenges and realities such as biodiversity , cybersecurity , biotechnology and artificial intelligence , which need to be developed alongside experts and scientists who should be party to multilateral , multi-stakeholder arrangements; ### 15. calls for extending multilateralism to new challenges and realities such as biodiversity , digitalisation , cybersecurity , biotechnology and artificial intelligence , which need to be developed alongside experts , civil society , and scientists who should be party to multilateral , multi-stakeholder arrangements;


### 16. stresses the important role of parliament in closely monitoring and supporting the implementation process of the strategic development goals , including by looking not only to monitor progress , but equally to enhance resource allocation and suggest improvements or concrete proposals; ### 16. stresses the important role of parliament in closely monitoring and supporting the implementation process of the sustainable development goals , including by looking not only to monitor progress , but equally to enhance resource allocation and suggest improvements or concrete proposals;


### 17. calls on the council , the commission and the vp/hr to take due consideration of this report in defining the priorities of the eu for the 77th un general assembly; ### 17. calls on the council , the commission and the vp/hr to take due consideration of this report in defining the priorities of the eu for the 77th un general assembly , as well as in other international organisations and multilateral fora;


### a. whereas the global order is increasingly polarised and marred by competing agendas and policy stances and by the increasing risk of regulatory fragmentation and competition on regulatory standards; ### a. whereas the global order is increasingly polarised and marred by competing agendas and policy stances and by the increasing risk of regulatory fragmentation and competition on regulatory standards; whereas democracy , human rights , and the rule of law are coming under increasing threat in different regions of the world; whereas human rights defenders and civil society activists are facing increasing threats and risks for their legitimate work;


### b. whereas the world has entered a new era of ‘unpeace’ , characterised by great geopolitical competition involving ‘semi-conflicts’ , which happen away from the public eye , but have significant implications for eu and global security; ### b. whereas the world has entered a new era of ‘unpeace’ , characterised by great geopolitical competition involving non-traditional threats and conflicts , such as hybrid and cyber-attacks , which happen away from the public eye , but have significant implications for eu and global security and for which we do not have proper tools to counter and react to;


### c. whereas at the same time , the global order is increasingly confronted with policy issues and challenges that require effective global policy dialogue and convergence of positions in order to devise real solutions and common agreed upon standards that can deliver effectively in the interest of all; ### c. whereas at the same time , the global order is increasingly confronted with policy issues and challenges that require effective global policy dialogue and convergence of positions in order to devise real solutions and common agreed upon standards that can deliver effectively in the interest of all and are promoting human rights and the rule of law;


### c. whereas at the same time , the global order is increasingly confronted with policy issues and challenges that require effective global policy dialogue and convergence of positions in order to devise real solutions and common agreed upon standards that can deliver effectively in the interest of all; ### c. whereas at the same time , the global order is increasingly confronted with policy issues and challenges that require effective global policy dialogue , cooperation and convergence of positions in order to devise real solutions , coordinated action and common agreed upon standards that can deliver effectively in the interest of all;


### d. whereas multilateralism is in crisis , resulting in part from the emergence of new actors on the global stage , the tensions derived from the nature of multilateral institutions , the growing gap between public opinion and institutions , the decline of traditionally dominant geopolitical powers and the subsequent decline of global freedoms and democracy; whereas we are on the cusp of a new era that threatens to undermine more than seventy years of progress and relative peace and consolidate an era of strongman politics striving to undermine the rule of law , responsibility and diversity; whereas the combination of national populist impulses , divergent and changing objectives and a lack of application and accountability methods is forcing the multilateral system to face three connected crises: a crisis of power , of relevance and of legitimacy; ### d. whereas multilateralism is in crisis , resulting in part from the emergence of new non-state actors and authoritarian state networks on the global stage , the tensions derived from the nature of multilateral institutions , the growing gap between public opinion and institutions , the decline of the liberal democratic powers and the subsequent decline of global freedoms and democracy; whereas we are on the cusp of a new era that threatens to undermine more than seventy years of progress and relative peace and consolidate an era of strongman politics striving to undermine the rule of law , responsibility and diversity; whereas the combination of national populist impulses , divergent and changing objectives and a lack of application and accountability methods is forcing the multilateral system to face three connected crises: a crisis of power , of relevance and of legitimacy , which are a result of a lack of political will and coordination , mostly from the west;


### d. whereas multilateralism is in crisis , resulting in part from the emergence of new actors on the global stage , the tensions derived from the nature of multilateral institutions , the growing gap between public opinion and institutions , the decline of traditionally dominant geopolitical powers and the subsequent decline of global freedoms and democracy; whereas we are on the cusp of a new era that threatens to undermine more than seventy years of progress and relative peace and consolidate an era of strongman politics striving to undermine the rule of law , responsibility and diversity; whereas the combination of national populist impulses , divergent and changing objectives and a lack of application and accountability methods is forcing the multilateral system to face three connected crises: a crisis of power , of relevance and of legitimacy; ### d. whereas multilateralism is in crisis , resulting in part from the emergence of new actors on the global stage and the need to overhaul decades-old institutions , the resulting tensions derived from the nature of multilateral institutions , the growing gap between public opinion and institutions , the decline of traditionally dominant geopolitical powers and the attack on global freedoms and democracy; whereas we are on the cusp of a new era that threatens to undermine more than seventy years of progress and relative peace and consolidate an era of strongman politics striving to undermine the rule of law , responsibility and diversity; whereas the combination of national populist impulses , divergent and changing objectives and a lack of application and accountability methods is forcing the multilateral system to face three connected crises: a crisis of power , of relevance and of legitimacy;


### e. whereas multilateralism is in need of swift revitalisation to tackle this multidimensional crisis; whereas peace and security , climate change , global public health and the deepening of poverty and inequalities at the global level are some of the pressing challenges that the world is facing right now; whereas only through a reinforced multilateral order will the international community be able to find lasting and sustainable answers to these challenges; ### e. whereas multilateralism is in need of swift revitalisation to tackle this multidimensional crisis; whereas threats to peace and security , climate change , global public health challenges , disinformation , foreign interference , and the deepening of poverty and inequalities at the global level are some of the pressing challenges that the world is facing right now; whereas only through a reinforced multilateral order and political leadership will the international community be able to find lasting and sustainable answers to these challenges;


### e. whereas multilateralism is in need of swift revitalisation to tackle this multidimensional crisis; whereas peace and security , climate change , global public health and the deepening of poverty and inequalities at the global level are some of the pressing challenges that the world is facing right now; whereas only through a reinforced multilateral order will the international community be able to find lasting and sustainable answers to these challenges; ### e. whereas multilateralism is in need of swift revitalisation to tackle this multidimensional crisis; whereas peace and security , climate change , biodiversity loss , global public health , gender equality , sustainable development , and the deepening of poverty and inequalities at the global level are some of the pressing challenges that the world is facing right now; whereas only through a reinforced multilateral order will the international community be able to find lasting and sustainable answers to these challenges;


### f. whereas the climate emergency and the covid-19 pandemic have shown the importance and policy primacy of global public goods , such as , inter alia , access to health , clean air , education , technology and cyberspace in an inclusive fashion; whereas access to global public goods and policy responses seeking to standardise and expand such access across countries and communities requires global cooperation on objectives , minimum standards and active support for the most vulnerable countries and communities; whereas this requires an effective multilateral agenda focused on global public goods and governance structures that reinforce access to such goods; whereas effective policy dialogue , cooperation and delivery on access to global public goods cannot be decoupled from the promotion and protection of fundamental rights; ### f. whereas the climate emergency and the covid-19 pandemic have shown the importance and policy primacy of global public goods , such as , inter alia , access to universal health coverage , clean air and water , education , technology and cyberspace in an inclusive fashion; whereas access to global public goods and policy responses seeking to standardise and expand such access across countries and communities requires global cooperation on objectives , minimum standards and active support for the most vulnerable countries and communities; whereas this requires an effective multilateral agenda focused on global public goods and governance structures that reinforce access to such goods; whereas effective policy dialogue , cooperation and delivery on access to global public goods cannot be decoupled from the promotion and protection of fundamental rights and dignity , as well as the empowerment of all people , in particular the most vulnerable; whereas the covid-19 pandemic has demonstrated the importance of the work of the who while showing again its fragility regarding attempts of interfering and manipulation;


### g. whereas the increasing positions of strength by illiberal third countries in multilateral fora and international organisations , including through a strong presence as regards the management and decision-making processes of relevant international organisations and multilateral fora , can lead to asymmetric and less effective , if not biased , policy responses , absent the level playing field for all members of the international community , and to a much weaker commitment by the international community to the defence of universal values and universal rights; whereas individual agendas , unilateral actions and a lack of engagement and support for multilateral solutions can further undermine multilateralism as an essential organising principle to tackle transnational challenges; whereas , in this context , it is essential to reaffirm the value of rules-based governance , international cooperation , a commitment to fundamental rights and a true level playing field for all members of the international community; whereas relevant international organisations and multilateral fora will be key to achieving these objectives; whereas these objectives will not only allow a more effective positive policy impact on global challenges , but will also curb and prevent the risk of conflict; ### g. whereas the increasing positions of strength by illiberal third countries in multilateral fora and international organisations , including through a strong presence as regards the management and decision-making processes of relevant international organisations and multilateral fora , can lead to asymmetric , less effective , and biased , policy responses , absent the level playing field for all members of the international community , and to a much weaker commitment by the international community to the defence of universal values and universal rights; whereas individual agendas , unilateral actions and a lack of engagement and support for multilateral solutions can further undermine multilateralism as an essential organising principle to tackle transnational challenges; whereas , in this context , it is essential to reaffirm the value of rules-based governance , international cooperation , a commitment to fundamental rights and a true level playing field for all members of the international community; whereas relevant international organisations and multilateral fora will be key to achieving these objectives; whereas these objectives will not only allow a more effective positive policy impact on global challenges , but will also curb and prevent the risk of conflict;


### g. whereas the increasing positions of strength by illiberal third countries in multilateral fora and international organisations , including through a strong presence as regards the management and decision-making processes of relevant international organisations and multilateral fora , can lead to asymmetric and less effective , if not biased , policy responses , absent the level playing field for all members of the international community , and to a much weaker commitment by the international community to the defence of universal values and universal rights; whereas individual agendas , unilateral actions and a lack of engagement and support for multilateral solutions can further undermine multilateralism as an essential organising principle to tackle transnational challenges; whereas , in this context , it is essential to reaffirm the value of rules-based governance , international cooperation , a commitment to fundamental rights and a true level playing field for all members of the international community; whereas relevant international organisations and multilateral fora will be key to achieving these objectives; whereas these objectives will not only allow a more effective positive policy impact on global challenges , but will also curb and prevent the risk of conflict; ### g. whereas the increasing positions of strength by illiberal governments in multilateral fora and international organisations , including through a strong presence as regards the decision-making processes of relevant international organisations and multilateral fora , can lead to asymmetric and less effective , if not biased , policy responses , absent the level playing field for all members of the international community , and to a much weaker commitment by the international community to the defence of universal values and universal rights; whereas individual agendas , unilateral actions and a lack of engagement and support for multilateral solutions can further undermine multilateralism as an essential organising principle to tackle transnational challenges; whereas , in this context , it is essential to reaffirm the value of rules-based governance , international cooperation , a commitment to fundamental rights and a true level playing field for all members of the international community; whereas relevant international organisations and multilateral fora will be key to achieving these objectives; whereas these objectives will not only allow a more effective positive policy impact on global challenges , but will also curb and prevent the risk of conflict;


### h. whereas the un secretary-general’s report entitled ‘our common agenda’ , which was presented to the un general assembly in september 2021 and drafted through a wide-ranging consultation process including un member states , thought leaders , young people , civil society , relevant stakeholders and citizens , as well as the un system and its many partners , attests to the need for a more effective , inclusive and networked multilateralism for the future; whereas this will be essential for the un system and other multilateral fora in order to continue being an effective venue for global consultation and decision-making; whereas , in this context , the eu is uniquely positioned to support the un and other relevant international organisations in pursuing a process of reform and in revitalising their delivery capacity and their ability to connect to relevant stakeholders , such as young people or the communities most impacted by climate change; whereas in doing so the eu should seize the opportunity to engage constructively and effectively with rival powers , while maintaining a firm stance on fundamental rights and pursuing closer cooperation with like-minded countries to reinforce the primacy of universal values and fundamental rights and to advance effective solutions to global challenges; whereas parliamentary diplomacy will be a key component of reinforcing rules-based , inclusive , networked and effective multilateralism; ### h. whereas the un secretary-general’s report entitled ‘our common agenda’ , which was presented to the un general assembly in september 2021 and drafted through a wide-ranging consultation process including un member states , thought leaders , young people , civil society , relevant stakeholders and citizens , as well as the un system and its many partners , attests to the need for a more effective , inclusive rules-based , and networked multilateralism for the future; whereas this will be essential for the un system and other multilateral fora in order to continue being an effective venue for global consultation and decision-making; whereas , in this context , the eu is uniquely positioned to support the un and other relevant international organisations in pursuing a process of reform and in revitalising their delivery capacity and their ability to connect to relevant stakeholders , such as young people or the communities most impacted by climate change; whereas in doing so the eu should maintain a firm stance on fundamental rights and pursue closer cooperation and coordination with like-minded countries to reinforce the primacy of universal values and fundamental rights and to advance effective solutions to global challenges; whereas parliamentary diplomacy will be a key component of reinforcing rules-based , inclusive , networked and effective multilateralism;


### h. whereas the un secretary-general’s report entitled ‘our common agenda’ , which was presented to the un general assembly in september 2021 and drafted through a wide-ranging consultation process including un member states , thought leaders , young people , civil society , relevant stakeholders and citizens , as well as the un system and its many partners , attests to the need for a more effective , inclusive and networked multilateralism for the future; whereas this will be essential for the un system and other multilateral fora in order to continue being an effective venue for global consultation and decision-making; whereas , in this context , the eu is uniquely positioned to support the un and other relevant international organisations in pursuing a process of reform and in revitalising their delivery capacity and their ability to connect to relevant stakeholders , such as young people or the communities most impacted by climate change; whereas in doing so the eu should seize the opportunity to engage constructively and effectively with rival powers , while maintaining a firm stance on fundamental rights and pursuing closer cooperation with like-minded countries to reinforce the primacy of universal values and fundamental rights and to advance effective solutions to global challenges; whereas parliamentary diplomacy will be a key component of reinforcing rules-based , inclusive , networked and effective multilateralism; ### h. whereas the un secretary-general’s report entitled ‘our common agenda’ , which was presented to the un general assembly in september 2021 and drafted through a wide-ranging consultation process including un member states , thought leaders , young people , civil society , relevant stakeholders and citizens , as well as the un system and its many partners , attests to the need for a more effective , inclusive and networked multilateralism for the future; whereas this will be essential for the un system and other multilateral fora in order to continue being an effective venue for global consultation and decision-making; whereas , in this context , the eu is uniquely positioned to support the un and other relevant international organisations in pursuing a process of reform and in revitalising their delivery capacity and their ability to connect to relevant stakeholders , such as young people or local and regional communities most impacted by climate change; whereas in doing so the eu should seize the opportunity to engage constructively and effectively with rival powers , while maintaining a firm stance on fundamental rights and pursuing closer cooperation with like-minded countries to reinforce the primacy of universal values and fundamental rights and to advance effective solutions to global challenges; whereas parliamentary diplomacy will be a key component of reinforcing rules-based , inclusive , networked and effective multilateralism;


### 2. reiterates its strongest support for the programme of reforms introduced by un secretary-general antónio guterres; stresses the importance of a un system that can continue to deliver effectively; points to the value of the ‘one un’ vision of the un secretary-general for the un system , where the various agencies and components of the un can truly be interlinked and function together on the basis of a single budgetary and managerial structure and can reinforce the attainment of the un’s objectives; points , in particular , to the enhanced role of the un resident coordinators provided for by the reform of the un development system and considers that these un resident coordinators should not only take the lead in coordinating the implementation of un programmes on the ground to reinforce the unity of un action , but should also liaise and consult closely with eu delegations in the relevant un member state to pursue synergies and mutual reinforcement with the eu’s thematic and geographic programmes for that country; recalls that the eu can greatly reinforce the outreach and impact of un programmes in third countries and can define its programming and assistance in synergic and reinforcing fashion in conjunction with the objectives of the un; stresses , therefore , the value of close eu-un consultation and cooperation and invites the un to regularly consult with the eu at un headquarters , but also on the ground in third countries; takes the view that the eu and the un should hold annual summits with the possibility for the un secretary-general to confer with council , commission , eeas and parliament; calls on the un to ensure a steady presence of high-level un interlocutors at the european parliament to further policy dialogue and give enhanced visibility to un efforts; ### 2. reiterates its strongest support for the programme of reforms introduced by un secretary-general antónio guterres , and points to the need for further progress , especially regarding the inclusion of women , young people and persons in a vulnerable situation , as well as on raising awareness on intersectionality in the un structures; stresses the importance of a un system that can continue to deliver effectively; points to the value of the ‘one un’ vision of the un secretary-general for the un system , where the various agencies and components of the un can truly be interlinked and function together on the basis of a single budgetary and managerial structure and can reinforce the attainment of the un’s objectives; points , in particular , to the enhanced role of the un resident coordinators provided for by the reform of the un development system and considers that these un resident coordinators should not only take the lead in coordinating the implementation of un programmes on the ground to reinforce the unity of un action , but should also liaise and consult closely with eu delegations in the relevant un member state to pursue synergies and mutual reinforcement with the eu’s thematic and geographic programmes for that country; recalls that the eu can greatly reinforce the outreach and impact of un programmes in third countries and can define its programming and assistance in synergic and reinforcing fashion in conjunction with the objectives of the un; stresses , therefore , the value of close eu-un consultation and cooperation and invites the un to regularly consult with the eu at un headquarters , but also on the ground in third countries; takes the view that the eu and the un should hold annual summits with the possibility for the un secretary-general to confer with council , commission , eeas and parliament; calls on the un to ensure a steady presence of high-level un interlocutors at the european parliament to further policy dialogue and give enhanced visibility to un efforts;


### 2. reiterates its strongest support for the programme of reforms introduced by un secretary-general antónio guterres; stresses the importance of a un system that can continue to deliver effectively; points to the value of the ‘one un’ vision of the un secretary-general for the un system , where the various agencies and components of the un can truly be interlinked and function together on the basis of a single budgetary and managerial structure and can reinforce the attainment of the un’s objectives; points , in particular , to the enhanced role of the un resident coordinators provided for by the reform of the un development system and considers that these un resident coordinators should not only take the lead in coordinating the implementation of un programmes on the ground to reinforce the unity of un action , but should also liaise and consult closely with eu delegations in the relevant un member state to pursue synergies and mutual reinforcement with the eu’s thematic and geographic programmes for that country; recalls that the eu can greatly reinforce the outreach and impact of un programmes in third countries and can define its programming and assistance in synergic and reinforcing fashion in conjunction with the objectives of the un; stresses , therefore , the value of close eu-un consultation and cooperation and invites the un to regularly consult with the eu at un headquarters , but also on the ground in third countries; takes the view that the eu and the un should hold annual summits with the possibility for the un secretary-general to confer with council , commission , eeas and parliament; calls on the un to ensure a steady presence of high-level un interlocutors at the european parliament to further policy dialogue and give enhanced visibility to un efforts; ### 2. reiterates its strongest support for the programme of reforms introduced by un secretary-general antónio guterres; stresses the importance of a un system that can continue to deliver effectively; points to the value of the ‘one un’ vision of the un secretary-general for the un system , where the various agencies and components of the un can truly be interlinked and function together on the basis of a single budgetary and managerial structure and can reinforce the attainment of the un’s objectives; points , in particular , to the enhanced role of the un resident coordinators provided for by the reform of the un development system and considers that these un resident coordinators should not only take the lead in coordinating the implementation of un programmes on the ground to reinforce the unity of un action , but should also liaise and consult closely with eu delegations in the relevant un member state to pursue synergies and mutual reinforcement with the eu’s thematic and geographic programmes for that country; recalls that the eu can greatly reinforce the outreach and impact of un programmes in third countries and can define its programming and assistance in synergic and reinforcing fashion in conjunction with the objectives of the un; stresses , therefore , the value of close eu-un consultation and cooperation and invites the un to regularly consult with the eu at un headquarters , but also on the ground in third countries; takes the view that the eu and the un should hold annual summits with the possibility for the un secretary-general to confer with council , commission , eeas and parliament; calls on the un to ensure a steady presence of high-level un interlocutors at the european parliament to further structured and consistent policy dialogue and give enhanced visibility to un efforts;


### 3. takes the view that the eu should identify the un bodies and other multilateral organisations that are key to promoting policy dialogue , convergence and policy solutions to global challenges and standard setting and should define clear objectives and clear priorities for dialogue with and support , including budgetary support , to such bodies and organisations; recalls , in this regard , that the eu and its member states are already the leading donors to the un and many of its agencies and programmes , but that this commitment to and support for the un does not always translate into a stronger presence by the eu and its member states in key un agency positions; calls on the eu and its member states to further improve their coordination when it comes to establishing joint support for candidacies for leadership positions in multilateral fora; points to the positive potential of also enhancing this coordination with like-minded partners in other world regions and looking at the importance of the principle of the equitable geographical distribution of leadership positions; ### 3. takes the view that the eu should identify the un bodies and other multilateral organisations that are key to promoting policy dialogue , convergence and policy solutions to global challenges and standard setting and should define clear objectives and clear priorities for dialogue with and support , including budgetary support , to such bodies and organisations; recalls , in this regard , that the eu and its member states are already the leading donors to the un and many of its agencies and programmes , but that this commitment to and support for the un does not always translate into a stronger presence by the eu and its member states in key un agency positions; points to the increased geopolitical importance of standards , especially in technology , and urges the eu to act strategically to become a standard-setting superpower in multilateral fora; calls on the eu and its member states to further improve their coordination when it comes to establishing joint support for candidacies for leadership positions in multilateral fora; points to the need to coordinate with like-minded partners in other world regions and looking at the importance of the principle of the equitable geographical distribution of leadership positions , keeping a strong focus on democratic values;


### 4. praises the ability of the eu and its member states to work in a coherent and synergic fashion and to present unified positions in the un system , with particular regard to the un general assembly , un security council and un human rights council; praises , in this regard , the valuable coordination efforts by the eu delegations to the un in new york and geneva; believes that this unified , synergic approach should be replicated for every un body , agency or other international organisation , so that the eu can act and deliver as one across the board in multilateral fora; laments that the security council is not as reactive to crises like the ones in syria , ethiopia and sudan as it has been to other crises in the past and that this has had a negative impact on preventing , managing and resolving these crises; points to the fact that in 2022 , only two eu member states will be on the security council; considers that the eu should promote reflecting on the terms of a reform of the security council that can restore its ability to address crises in a timely and effective manner , thoroughly limit the right to veto and change the composition of the security council to reflect today’s world better; reiterates its view , in this regard , that the eu and its member states should find a broad consensus on reforming the security council , inter alia , through the provision of a permanent seat for the eu , in addition to the already existing seats held by eu member states; ### 4. praises the ability of the eu and its member states to work in a coherent and synergic fashion and to present unified positions in the un system , with particular regard to the un general assembly , un security council and un human rights council; praises , in this regard , the valuable coordination efforts by the eu delegations to the un in new york and geneva; believes that this unified , synergic approach should be replicated for every un body , agency or other international organisation , so that the eu can act and deliver as one across the board in multilateral fora; stresses the importance of cooperation and coordination of the eu csdp missions and operations in sahel , car , libya , somalia , bosnia-herzegovina , with , for example , minusma , minusca , minuk , eufor althea , and manusom; laments that the security council is not as reactive to crises like the ones in syria , ethiopia and sudan as it has been to other crises in the past and that this has had a negative impact on preventing , managing and resolving these crises; urges the un to appoint its special envoy to libya , as the position is vacant since november 2021 and as the democratic process in libya remains at a turning point; points to the fact that in 2022 , only two eu member states will be on the security council; considers that the eu should promote reflecting on the terms of a reform of the security council that can restore its ability to address crises in a timely and effective manner , thoroughly limit the right to veto and change the composition of the security council to reflect today’s world better; reiterates its view , in this regard , that the eu and its member states should find a broad consensus on reforming the security council;


### 4. praises the ability of the eu and its member states to work in a coherent and synergic fashion and to present unified positions in the un system , with particular regard to the un general assembly , un security council and un human rights council; praises , in this regard , the valuable coordination efforts by the eu delegations to the un in new york and geneva; believes that this unified , synergic approach should be replicated for every un body , agency or other international organisation , so that the eu can act and deliver as one across the board in multilateral fora; laments that the security council is not as reactive to crises like the ones in syria , ethiopia and sudan as it has been to other crises in the past and that this has had a negative impact on preventing , managing and resolving these crises; points to the fact that in 2022 , only two eu member states will be on the security council; considers that the eu should promote reflecting on the terms of a reform of the security council that can restore its ability to address crises in a timely and effective manner , thoroughly limit the right to veto and change the composition of the security council to reflect today’s world better; reiterates its view , in this regard , that the eu and its member states should find a broad consensus on reforming the security council , inter alia , through the provision of a permanent seat for the eu , in addition to the already existing seats held by eu member states; ### 4. welcomes the ability of the eu and its member states to work in a coherent and synergic fashion and to present unified positions in the un system , with particular regard to the un general assembly , un security council and un human rights council; praises , in this regard , the valuable coordination efforts by the eu delegations to the un in new york and geneva; believes that this unified , synergic approach should be replicated for every un body , agency or other international organisation , so that the eu can act and deliver as one across the board in multilateral fora; laments that the security council is consistently unable to take decisions and consequently not effective in responding to crises and that this has had a negative impact on preventing , managing and resolving these crises; points to the fact that in 2022 , only two eu member states will be on the security council; considers that the eu and the member states should be at the front of calling for a reform of the security council that can restore its ability to address crises in a timely and effective manner , thoroughly limit the right to veto and change the composition of the security council to reflect today’s world better; reiterates its view , in this regard , that the eu and its member states should find a broad consensus on reforming the un system , inter alia , through providing supranational regional organisations like the eu with full un membership;


### 5. calls on the eu and its member states to further their ability to share information , consult and coordinate , including in the governing bodies and boards of multilateral bodies where the eu is not represented; shares the view of the vp/hr and the commission that the eu should establish coordination mechanisms in all international financial institutions; believes that the same coordination ability should be expanded to the boards of all un bodies , such as , for example , the food and agriculture organization; ### 5. calls on the eu and its member states to further their ability to share information , consult and coordinate on strategies , policies , and positions including in the governing bodies and boards of multilateral bodies where the eu is not represented; shares the view of the vp/hr and the commission that the eu should establish coordination mechanisms in all international financial institutions; believes that the same coordination ability should be expanded to the boards of all un bodies , such as , for example , the food and agriculture organization;


### — having regard to the action plan entitled ‘strategic compass for security and defence – for a european union that protects its citizens , values and interests and contributes to international peace and security’ , which was approved by the council on 21 march 2022 and endorsed by the european council on 25 march 2022 , ### — having regard to the action plan entitled ‘strategic compass for security and defence – for a european union that protects its citizens , values and interests and contributes to international peace and security’ , which was adopted by the council on 21 march 2022 and endorsed by the european council on 25 march 2022 ,


### — having regard to the action plan entitled ‘strategic compass for security and defence – for a european union that protects its citizens , values and interests and contributes to international peace and security’ , which was approved by the council on 21 march 2022 and endorsed by the european council on 25 march 2022 , ### — having regard to the ‘strategic compass for security and defence – for a european union that protects its citizens , values and interests and contributes to international peace and security’ , which was adopted by the council on 21 march 2022 and endorsed by the european council on 25 march 2022 ,


### — having regard to the response force of the north atlantic treaty organization (nato) , ### — having regard to the north atlantic treaty organization (nato) response force (nrf) ,


### — having regard to the response force of the north atlantic treaty organization (nato) , ### — having regard to the north atlantic treaty organization's (nato) response force ,


### a. whereas the european union has extensive experience in deploying multinational missions abroad in order to promote peace , security and progress in europe and in the world; whereas these common security and defence policy (csdp) missions regularly operate alongside and complement missions of the member states , united nations , international organisations and third countries; ### a. whereas the european union has extensive experience in deploying multinational missions and operations abroad in order to promote peace , security and progress in europe and in the world; whereas these common security and defence policy (csdp) missions regularly operate alongside and complement missions of the member states , united nations , nato , international organisations and third countries;


### a. whereas the european union has extensive experience in deploying multinational missions abroad in order to promote peace , security and progress in europe and in the world; whereas these common security and defence policy (csdp) missions regularly operate alongside and complement missions of the member states , united nations , international organisations and third countries; ### a. whereas the european union has extensive experience in deploying missions and operations abroad in order to promote peace , security and progress in europe and in the world; whereas these common security and defence policy (csdp) missions regularly operate alongside and complement missions of the member states , united nations , nato , international organisations and third countries;


### b. whereas csdp missions regularly depend on the effective performance of third-party missions , reliable cooperation , timely information sharing and sincere host nation support; whereas the lack of any of these can jeopardise the implementation of a csdp mission’s mandate and could ultimately lead to the withdrawal of eu forces; ### b. whereas csdp missions regularly depend on the effective performance of international partners missions , reliable cooperation , timely information sharing and sincere host nation support; whereas the lack of any of these can jeopardise the implementation of a csdp mission’s mandate and could ultimately lead to the withdrawal of eu forces;


### h. whereas the strategic compass sets out eu-level action in many of these areas; whereas the european defence fund and the european peace facility are eu instruments which have already been deployed and that are designed to improve military capabilities and foster operational cooperation and burden-sharing abroad; ### h. whereas the strategic compass sets out eu-level action in many of these areas; whereas the european defence fund and the european peace facility are eu instruments which have already been established and are designed to improve military capabilities , in the case of the european defence fund; and foster operational support , cooperation and burden-sharing abroad , in the case of the european peace facility;


### h. whereas the strategic compass sets out eu-level action in many of these areas; whereas the european defence fund and the european peace facility are eu instruments which have already been deployed and that are designed to improve military capabilities and foster operational cooperation and burden-sharing abroad; ### h. whereas the strategic compass sets out eu-level action in many of these areas; whereas eu instruments have already been used and are designed to improve military capabilities , in the case of the european defence fund , and foster operational support , cooperation and burden-sharing abroad , in the case of the european peace facility;


### j. whereas in cases when eu battlegroups have not been used , individual eu member states have often acted outside the eu framework instead , either on their own or with other eu or non-eu states; ### j. whereas in cases when eu battlegroups have not been deployed , individual eu member states have occasionally acted outside the eu framework instead , either on their own or with other eu or non-eu states;


### m. whereas the strategic compass sets out a clear roadmap for implementing eu-level actions , in particular for transforming the eu battlegroup system , establishing a rapid deployment capacity (rdc) and paving the way towards entrusting the implementation of specific tasks to a group of member states within the union framework in accordance with articles 42(5) and 44 of the teu; ### m. whereas the strategic compass sets out a clear roadmap for implementing eu-level actions , in particular , by establishing a rapid deployment capacity (eu rdc) , building on substantially modified eu battlegroups and paving the way towards entrusting the implementation of specific csdp tasks to a group of member states within the union framework in accordance with articles 42(5) and 44 of the teu;


### m. whereas the strategic compass sets out a clear roadmap for implementing eu-level actions , in particular for transforming the eu battlegroup system , establishing a rapid deployment capacity (rdc) and paving the way towards entrusting the implementation of specific tasks to a group of member states within the union framework in accordance with articles 42(5) and 44 of the teu; ### m. whereas the strategic compass sets out a clear roadmap for implementing eu-level actions , in particular for transforming the eu battlegroup system , establishing a rapid deployment capacity (eu rdc) and paving the way towards entrusting the implementation of specific csdp tasks to a group of member states within the union framework in accordance with articles 42(5) and 44 of the teu;


### o. whereas the practical implementation of article 44 of the teu , as well as the establishment and operation of the rdc , should be considered the main aspects of the csdp on which the vice-president of the european commission / high representative of the european union for foreign affairs and security policy (vp/hr) needs to regularly consult parliament; ### o. whereas the practical implementation of article 44 of the teu , as well as the establishment and operation of the eu rdc , should be considered among the main aspects of the csdp on which the vice-president of the european commission / high representative of the european union for foreign affairs and security policy (vp/hr) needs to regularly consult parliament;


### o. whereas the practical implementation of article 44 of the teu , as well as the establishment and operation of the rdc , should be considered the main aspects of the csdp on which the vice-president of the european commission / high representative of the european union for foreign affairs and security policy (vp/hr) needs to regularly consult parliament; ### o. whereas the possible implementation of article 44 of the teu , as well as the establishment and operation of the eu rdc , should be considered among the main aspects of the csdp on which the vice-president of the european commission / high representative of the european union for foreign affairs and security policy (vp/hr) needs to regularly consult parliament;


### p. whereas , in line with article 41 of the teu , the administrative and operating expenditure for the rdc should be charged to the union budget except for expenditure that is covered by the european peace facility , notwithstanding the possibility for participating member states to make free-of-charge contributions to the rdc; ### p. whereas , article 41(2) of the treaty on european union (teu) prohibits ‘expenditure arising from operations having military or defence implications’ from being charged to the eu budget; whereas the csdp military missions and operations , in their common costs , are funded under the european peace facility;


### 1. welcomes the vp/hr’s proposal , enshrined in the strategic compass , to establish an rdc; stresses the importance of the eu having the necessary capabilities and structures to take action rapidly and decisively during crises in order to serve and protect the union’s citizens , interests and values across the world; ### 1. welcomes the vp/hr’s proposal , enshrined in the strategic compass , to establish the eu rdc , a modular capability that will be able to be used in different phases of an operation in a hostile environment , such as initial entry or reinforcement , or as a reserve force to secure an exit , where the development of this capability will be based on operational scenarios , initially focusing on rescue and evacuation operations , as well as the initial phase of stabilization operations; recalls that the capability will be composed of substantially modified eu battlegroups and pre-identified military forces and capabilities from member states , in accordance with the principle of the single set of forces; recalls the importance of the eu having the necessary capabilities and structures to take action rapidly and decisively during crises in order to serve and protect the union’s citizens , interests and values across the world;


### 2. strongly encourages the vp/hr to propose a council decision on establishing an eu rdc to protect the union’s values and serve its interests along the following lines: ### 2. asks the vp/hr to establish , as soon as 2025 , and with the strong engagement of the member states , an eu rdc to protect the union’s values and serve its interests along the following lines:


### 2. strongly encourages the vp/hr to propose a council decision on establishing an eu rdc to protect the union’s values and serve its interests along the following lines: ### 2. strongly encourages the vp/hr to establish an eu rdc to protect the union’s values and serve its interests along the following lines:


### the rdc should be established as a european union structure with its own legal and institutional identity; ### deleted


### the rdc’s tasks should include , but not be limited to , rescue and evacuation operations , initial entry and initial phase of stabilisation operations , temporary reinforcement of other missions , and acting as a reserve force to secure exit; the council could assign further tasks as referred to under article 44 of the teu , and the duration and scope of the assignments should be consistent with resources allocated to the rdc; ### the rdc’s tasks should include , but not be limited to , the tasks referred to in article 43 as well as acting as a reserve force to secure exit; the council could assign further tasks as referred to under article 44 of the teu , and the duration and scope of the assignments should be consistent with resources allocated to the rdc;


### the rdc should number at least 5 000 troops , excluding strategic enablers such as air and sea lift personnel , intelligence assets , special operations forces and medical evacuation and care units; the target number for the rdc should be at least between 7 000 and 10 000 troops in total; ### the rdc should number at least 5 000 troops , excluding strategic enablers such as air and sea lift personnel , intelligence assets , special operation forces and medical evacuation and care units; points out that the target number for the rdc 5 000 troops may be insufficient in some cases , thus the force limit should be increased to meet all eventual scenarios' requirements;


### the rdc should number at least 5 000 troops , excluding strategic enablers such as air and sea lift personnel , intelligence assets , special operations forces and medical evacuation and care units; the target number for the rdc should be at least between 7 000 and 10 000 troops in total; ### the rdc should number at least 5 000 troops , excluding strategic enablers such as air and sea lift personnel , intelligence assets , strategic transportation , satellite communication , special operations forces and medical evacuation and care units; the target number for the rdc should be at least between 7 000 and 10 000 troops in total;


### the rdc should number at least 5 000 troops , excluding strategic enablers such as air and sea lift personnel , intelligence assets , special operations forces and medical evacuation and care units; the target number for the rdc should be at least between 7 000 and 10 000 troops in total; ### the rdc should number an average 5 000 troops , excluding strategic enablers such as air and sea lift personnel , intelligence assets , special operations forces and medical evacuation and care units; the target number for the rdc should be adapted to the needs of the scenario-based concept;


### the rdc should frequently simulate scenarios and hold joint exercises following uniform training and certification standards such as those in nato; ### the eu rdc should be based , as stated in the strategic compass , on pre-defined operational scenarios and hold joint exercises following uniform training and certification standards and based on the single set of forces principle;


### the rdc should frequently simulate scenarios and hold joint exercises following uniform training and certification standards such as those in nato; ### the development of the eu rdc will be based on operational scenarios and on holding joint exercises following uniform training and certification standards such as those for eubg and in nato;


### all force elements of the rdc should be assigned exclusively to it and not to any other international high-readiness forces , notwithstanding the possibility for member states to call them up for national duty in the event of an emergency; ### all force elements of the rdc should be assigned exclusively to it and not to any other international high-readiness forces , notwithstanding the possibility for member states to call them up for national and nato duty in the event of an emergency. the eu should work together with nato to align the readiness categories of the rdc and the nato force model;


### all force elements of the rdc should be assigned exclusively to it and not to any other international high-readiness forces , notwithstanding the possibility for member states to call them up for national duty in the event of an emergency; ### all force elements of the eu rdc should be assigned exclusively to it and not to any other international high-readiness forces , notwithstanding the possibility for member states to call them up for national duty in the event of an emergency;


### in line with article 41 of the teu , the rdc’s administrative expenditure should be funded from the union budget; ### change the current arrangement to fund the rdc’s administrative expenditure , should be funded from under the union budget; evaluate the relevance of a amending article 41 teu;


### similarly , its operating expenditure should be funded from the union budget with the exception of expenditure that is charged to the european peace facility; ### similarly , its operating expenditure should be funded from the union budget via a change in the treaties with the exception of expenditure that is charged to the european peace facility; in this regard , a re-evaluation and adequate increase of the epf budget to ensure the proper and timely financing of the rdc under any conceivable scenario is absolutely vital;


### similarly , its operating expenditure should be funded from the union budget with the exception of expenditure that is charged to the european peace facility; ### similarly , its operating expenditure should be funded from the union budget via a change in the treaties , with the exception of expenditure that is charged to the european peace facility;


### 3. calls on the member states to transform the eu battlegroup system to match the needs of the rdc; considers that the eu battlegroups should be funded from the union budget during their stand-up , stand-by and stand-down phases; ### 3. calls on the member states to take action as soon as possible and not later than 2025 , and deliver the transformation of the eu battlegroup system to match the needs of the rdc , that will be composed of modules , as stated in the strategic compass; urges them to agree and plan scenarios , and conduct regular live exercises to improve readiness and interoperability of the rdc , starting from 2023 onwards;


### 3. calls on the member states to transform the eu battlegroup system to match the needs of the rdc; considers that the eu battlegroups should be funded from the union budget during their stand-up , stand-by and stand-down phases; ### 3. calls on the member states to transform the eu battlegroup system to match the financial and equipment needs of the eu rdc; considers that the eu battlegroups should be funded from the union budget during their stand-up , stand-by and stand-down phases as well as replacement of equipment lost or spent in action;


### 5. points out that the rdc should have permanent operational headquarters under the military planning and conduct capability in order to ensure its effectiveness; ### 5. insists that the rdc should have permanent operational headquarters under the military planning and conduct capability in order to ensure its effectiveness and organise training exercises , with sufficient office space , including a proper communication and information system as well as adapted facilities for secure meetings and for the use of intelligence services; suggests to keep one or more national ‘high readiness’ ohqs as a fall-back option , as long as the mpcc has not reached foc necessary resources and capabilities to reach foc status; therefore , calls for a fast implementation of the role of operational commander of the director of the mpcc; emphasises that a permanently activated headquarters requires 200 staff members , up to 300 in the case of executive operations , to be fully operational , and that this important staffing step requires a genuine political will and rapid action from the ms;


### 5. points out that the rdc should have permanent operational headquarters under the military planning and conduct capability in order to ensure its effectiveness; ### 5. points out that the rdc should have permanent operational headquarters under the military planning and conduct capability in order to ensure its effectiveness , provided that it can be upgraded from a small-scale centre to a full-fledged eu military operation headquarters with secure communication systems and sufficient military personnel in order to be ready for planning and directing the rdc employment when it reaches full operational status;


### 5. points out that the rdc should have permanent operational headquarters under the military planning and conduct capability in order to ensure its effectiveness; ### 5. points out that the eu rdc should have a permanent operational headquarter under the military planning and conduct capability , as well as immediate access to eu decision centres and connexion with nato in order to ensure its effectiveness;


### 6. calls for the eu rdc to have the possibility of being deployed and acting in emergencies , natural disasters such as floods or wildfires , or other significant civil-protection crises inside eu territory , at the proposal of the vp/hr and following the pertinent authorisation procedures; ### 6. calls for the eu rdc to have the possibility of being deployed and acting in emergencies , natural disasters such as floods or wildfires , or other significant civil-protection crises , at the proposal of the vp/hr and following the pertinent authorisation procedures;


### 7. calls on the member states participating in the rdc to agree to act in the name of the european union as mandated by the council under article 44 of the teu: ### 7. calls on the member states who agreed to act in the name of the european union as mandated by the council under article 44 of the teu , under the eu csdp , to do so solely upon a proposal by the vp/hr , who should ensure that the views of parliament are duly taken into consideration in their proposal;


### solely upon a proposal by the vp/hr , who should ensure that the views of parliament are duly taken into consideration in their proposal , and ### deleted


### acting by qualified majority after deliberation in the council; ### deleted


### acting by qualified majority after deliberation in the council; ### acting by qualified majority after deliberation in the council , demanding abstention from those member states that do not wish to contribute to the rdc;


### 9. highlights that the use of article 44 offers significant benefits compared to member states acting outside the eu framework; ### 9. highlights that the use of article 44 offers significant benefits , such as speed and flexibility , and represents a strong political symbol of joint eu action , compared to member states acting outside the eu framework;


### 9. highlights that the use of article 44 offers significant benefits compared to member states acting outside the eu framework; ### 9. highlights that the use of article 44 can offer significant benefits , such as speed , flexibility and freedom of action whilst preserving joint eu action compared to member states acting outside the eu framework;


### 10. calls on the commission to propose the appropriate changes to the eu’s financial and staff regulations , to the relevant interinstitutional agreement on budgetary matters , and to other union acts as necessary; ### deleted


### — having regard to the statement of the members of the european council of 25 march 2021 on the eastern mediterranean , to the european council’s conclusions of 24 june 2021 and 1 october 2020 , and to all previous relevant council and european council conclusions , ### — having regard to the council’s conclusions on enlargement and association and stabilisation process of 14 december 2021 , the statement of the members of the european council of 25 march 2021 on the eastern mediterranean , to the european council’s conclusions of 24 june 2021 and 1 october 2020 , and to all previous relevant council and european council conclusions ,


### — having regard to the relevant resolutions of the un security council on cyprus , including resolution 550(1984) of 11 may 1984 on secessionist actions in cyprus and resolution 789(1992) of 25 november 1992 urging all concerned in the cyprus question to commit themselves to the confidence-building measures set out in the resolution , ### — having regard to the relevant resolutions of the un security council on cyprus , including resolution 550(1984) of 11 may 1984 on secessionist actions in cyprus and resolution 789(1992) of 25 november 1992 which consider attempts to settle any part of varosha by people other than its inhabitants as inadmissible , and call for the transfer of that area to the administration of the united nations urging all concerned in the cyprus question to commit themselves to the confidence-building measures set out in the resolution ,


### a. whereas turkey , besides being a candidate for eu accession , is a key partner in relation to the economy , trade and migration , as well as a strategic partner; ### a. whereas turkey , besides being a candidate to eu accession , is a key partner in relation to the economy , trade , security and counter-terrorism , green transition and migration , as well as a strategic partner; whereas turkey is the eu’s sixth trading partner while the eu is turkey’s largest trading partner; whereas turkey is a key member in nato and plays an instrumental geostrategic role in the security architecture of the black sea and , in particular , in the security of ukraine , which is facing russian aggression;


### a. whereas turkey , besides being a candidate for eu accession , is a key partner in relation to the economy , trade and migration , as well as a strategic partner; ### a. whereas turkey , besides being a candidate for eu accession , is a key partner in essential areas of joint interest , such as migration , public health , climate , counter – terrorism and regional issues;


### a. whereas turkey , besides being a candidate for eu accession , is a key partner in relation to the economy , trade and migration , as well as a strategic partner; ### a. whereas turkey is a major neighbour and partner of the eu and is candidate to accession ;


### b. whereas , in the aftermath of recent tensions between the eu and turkey , particularly in relation to the situation in the eastern mediterranean , the european council offered to nurture a more positive dynamic in eu-turkey relations by expressing readiness to engage with turkey in a phased , proportionate and reversible manner in a number of areas of common interest; ### b. whereas , the european council offered to nurture a more positive dynamic in eu-turkey relations by expressing readiness to engage with turkey in a phased , proportionate and reversible manner in a number of areas of common interest , provided that the de-escalation of recent tensions between the eu and turkey , particularly in relation to the situation in the eastern mediterranean , is sustained and that turkey engages constructively and subject to the established conditionalities set out in previous european council conclusions;


### b. whereas , in the aftermath of recent tensions between the eu and turkey , particularly in relation to the situation in the eastern mediterranean , the european council offered to nurture a more positive dynamic in eu-turkey relations by expressing readiness to engage with turkey in a phased , proportionate and reversible manner in a number of areas of common interest; ### b. whereas , in the aftermath of recent tensions between the eu and turkey , particularly in relation to the situation in the eastern mediterranean , the european council offered to nurture a more positive dynamic in eu-turkey relations by expressing readiness to engage with turkey in a phased , proportionate and reversible manner in a number of areas of common interest on the condition of improvements in eu-turkey relations and the respect for democratic values and the rule of law by the turkish government;


### c. whereas being a candidate country presumes a willingness to progressively approach in all aspects the values , interests , standards and policies of the eu; whereas an analysis of the eu’s reports in recent years reveal that turkey’s distance from the eu’s values and its normative framework is still considerable and is even growing in fundamental areas such as the rule of law and human rights; ### c. whereas being a candidate country presumes a willingness to progressively approach in all aspects the values , interests , standards and policies of the eu and to respect and uphold the copenhagen criteria and to align itself with eu policies and objectives; whereas an analysis of the eu’s reports in recent years reveal that turkey’s distance from the eu’s values and its normative framework is still vast and is even growing in fundamental areas such as respect for international law , the rule of law and human rights; whereas the links between turkish civil society and pro-democratic forces and the eu remain strong , as the eu is deeply committed to provide support to turkish citizens and organisations that promote european norms and values;


### c. whereas being a candidate country presumes a willingness to progressively approach in all aspects the values , interests , standards and policies of the eu; whereas an analysis of the eu’s reports in recent years reveal that turkey’s distance from the eu’s values and its normative framework is still considerable and is even growing in fundamental areas such as the rule of law and human rights; ### c. whereas being a candidate country presumes a willingness to progressively approach in all aspects the values , interests , standards and policies of the eu; whereas an analysis of the eu’s reports in recent years reveal that turkey’s distance from the eu’s values and its normative framework is still considerable and is even growing in fundamental areas such as the rule of law and human rights as well as good neighbourly relations and regional cooperation;


### d. whereas over the past year , eu-turkey relations have on average remained stable , as enhanced cooperation and dialogue on a number of issues have coexisted with regular conflicts; whereas this report reflects this situation by welcoming positive developments and pointing to further potential in the relationship , while signalling remaining problems , in particular as regards the rule of law and fundamental rights; ### d. whereas over the past year , the council reiterated that turkey continues to move further away from the european union , and that turkey’s accession negotiations have effectively come to a standstill and no further chapters can be considered for opening or closing , while according to the commission , the underlying facts leading to this assessment still hold; nonetheless , dialogue and cooperation with turkey increased in 2021; whereas this report reflects this situation by pointing to further potential in the relationship , while signalling remaining problems , in particular as regards the rule of law and fundamental rights and good neighbourly relations and regional cooperation;


### d. whereas over the past year , eu-turkey relations have on average remained stable , as enhanced cooperation and dialogue on a number of issues have coexisted with regular conflicts; whereas this report reflects this situation by welcoming positive developments and pointing to further potential in the relationship , while signalling remaining problems , in particular as regards the rule of law and fundamental rights; ### d. whereas over the past year , despite enhanced cooperation and dialogue on a number of issues , eu-turkey relations have suffered regular conflicts; whereas this report reflects this situation by welcoming positive developments and pointing to further potential in the relationship , while signaling remaining significant problems , in particular as regards violations of international law , the rule of law and fundamental rights;


### 1. reiterates its concern about the persistent distance between the eu and turkey , despite it being a candidate country , in terms of values and standards , and the continuing lack of political will to carry out the necessary reforms to address , in particular , the serious concerns about the rule of law and fundamental rights that continue to negatively affect the accession process; considers that without clear progress in this field , parliament cannot envisage any resumption of accession negotiations with turkey , which have effectively been at a standstill since 2018; ### 1. reiterates its concern about the persistent distance between the eu and turkey , despite it being a candidate country , in terms of values and standards , and the continuing lack of political will to carry out the necessary reforms to address , in particular , the serious concerns about the rule of law and fundamental rights that continue to negatively affect the accession process; notes that , in addition to this , unilateral actions in breach of international law in the eastern mediterranean and the aegean sea as well as strong and provocative statements against the eu and its member states have deteriorated eu-turkey relations; considers that without clear progress in these fields , parliament cannot envisage any resumption of accession negotiations with turkey , which have effectively been at a standstill since 2018;


### 1. reiterates its concern about the persistent distance between the eu and turkey , despite it being a candidate country , in terms of values and standards , and the continuing lack of political will to carry out the necessary reforms to address , in particular , the serious concerns about the rule of law and fundamental rights that continue to negatively affect the accession process; considers that without clear progress in this field , parliament cannot envisage any resumption of accession negotiations with turkey , which have effectively been at a standstill since 2018; ### 1. reiterates its concern about the persistent and growing distance between turkey’s government and eu values and standards , despite it being a candidate country , in terms of values and standards , and the continuing lack of political will to carry out the necessary reforms to address , in particular , the serious concerns about the rule of law and fundamental rights that continue to negatively affect the accession process; considers that without clear and significant progress in this field , parliament firmly insists therefore that , in line with the negotiating framework from october 2005 , the commission should recommend formal suspension of accession negotiations with turkey , which have effectively been at a standstill since 2018;


### 2. notes , however , that there has been a slight improvement over the past year in overall eu-turkey relations , which have on average remained stable , as enhanced cooperation and dialogue on a number of issues have coexisted with regular conflicts; expresses its hope that this pattern of ‘conflictual cooperation’ can be overcome and replaced with a more positive dynamic; ### 2. notes that good neighbourly relations form an essential part of moving towards the eu; notes that bilateral relations remained challenging with neighbouring eu member states , particularly greece and cyprus; notes that tensions in the aegean sea and the eastern mediterranean were not conducive to good neighbourly relations and undermined regional stability and security; expresses its hope that this pattern of ‘conflictual cooperation’ can be overcome and replaced with a more positive dynamic;


### 2. notes , however , that there has been a slight improvement over the past year in overall eu-turkey relations , which have on average remained stable , as enhanced cooperation and dialogue on a number of issues have coexisted with regular conflicts; expresses its hope that this pattern of ‘conflictual cooperation’ can be overcome and replaced with a more positive dynamic; ### 2. notes , however , that there has been a slight improvement over the past year in overall eu-turkey relations , which have on average remained stable , with enhanced cooperation and dialogue through the high-level dialogues on a number of issues , while having coexisted with regular conflicts; expresses its hope that this pattern of ‘conflictual cooperation’ can be overcome and replaced with a more sustained and genuine positive dynamic;


### 2. notes , however , that there has been a slight improvement over the past year in overall eu-turkey relations , which have on average remained stable , as enhanced cooperation and dialogue on a number of issues have coexisted with regular conflicts; expresses its hope that this pattern of ‘conflictual cooperation’ can be overcome and replaced with a more positive dynamic; ### 2. notes that despite a slight improvement over the past year in overall eu-turkey relations , enhanced cooperation and dialogue on a number of issues have coexisted with regular conflicts; urges turkish authorities to act so that this pattern of ‘conflictual cooperation’ can be overcome and replaced with a more positive dynamic;


### 3. reiterates its firm conviction that turkey is a country of strategic relevance in political , economic and foreign policy terms , a partner that is key for the stability of the wider region , and an ally with which the eu wishes to pursue the best possible relations; welcomes , in this view , the recent statements expressed at the highest level by the turkish authorities about the recommitment of the turkish government to the eu path , but urges the turkish authorities to put their words into action and demonstrate this commitment with specific facts and decisions; ### 3. reiterates its firm conviction that turkey is a country of strategic relevance in political , economic and foreign policy terms , a partner that is key for the stability of the wider region , and an inescapable and vital ally with which the eu wishes to pursue the best possible relations , including within nato; is deeply concerned about turkey's current destabilising role in the wider region through its involvement in several conflicts; welcomes , in this view , the recent statements expressed at the highest level by the turkish authorities about the recommitment of the turkish government to the eu path , but urges the turkish authorities to put their words into action and demonstrate this commitment with specific facts and decisions;


### 3. reiterates its firm conviction that turkey is a country of strategic relevance in political , economic and foreign policy terms , a partner that is key for the stability of the wider region , and an ally with which the eu wishes to pursue the best possible relations; welcomes , in this view , the recent statements expressed at the highest level by the turkish authorities about the recommitment of the turkish government to the eu path , but urges the turkish authorities to put their words into action and demonstrate this commitment with specific facts and decisions; ### 3. reiterates its firm conviction that turkey is an important neighbour country in political , economic and foreign policy terms , a partner that should be actively involved in the stability of the wider region , and a nato ally; acknowledges the recent statements expressed at the highest level by the turkish authorities about the recommitment of the turkish government to the eu path , but urges the turkish authorities to put their words into action and demonstrate this commitment with specific facts and decisions;


### 3. reiterates its firm conviction that turkey is a country of strategic relevance in political , economic and foreign policy terms , a partner that is key for the stability of the wider region , and an ally with which the eu wishes to pursue the best possible relations; welcomes , in this view , the recent statements expressed at the highest level by the turkish authorities about the recommitment of the turkish government to the eu path , but urges the turkish authorities to put their words into action and demonstrate this commitment with specific facts and decisions; ### 3. reiterates the european union’s strategic interest in a stable and secure environment in the eastern mediterranean and in the development of a cooperative and mutually beneficial relationship with turkey; welcomes , in this view , the recent statements expressed at the highest level by the turkish authorities about the recommitment of the turkish government to the eu path , but urges the turkish authorities to put their words into action and demonstrate this commitment with specific facts and decisions;


### 4. expresses concern over the current economic situation in turkey , which through soaring inflation and a constantly rising cost of living is pushing a high and increasing number of people into hardship and poverty; ### 4. expresses its deep concern over the current economic situation in turkey , which through soaring inflation and a constantly rising cost of living is pushing a high and increasing number of people into hardship and poverty; expresses concern over the direct interference by the turkish president in turkish monetary policy; calls for financial institutions such as the ecb or the imf to provide technical support , if desired by the turkish authorities;


### 4. expresses concern over the current economic situation in turkey , which through soaring inflation and a constantly rising cost of living is pushing a high and increasing number of people into hardship and poverty; ### 4. expresses concern over the current economic situation in turkey , which through soaring inflation and a constantly rising cost of living is pushing a high and increasing number of people into hardship and poverty as reflected in the oecd 2021 report on turkey;


### 4. expresses concern over the current economic situation in turkey , which through soaring inflation and a constantly rising cost of living is pushing a high and increasing number of people into hardship and poverty; ### 4. expresses deep concern over the current economic situation in turkey , which through soaring inflation and a constantly rising cost of living is pushing a high and increasing number of people into hardship and poverty;


### 6. insists that the crucial area of fundamental rights and freedoms , which is at the core of the accession process , cannot be disconnected and isolated from overall relations with the eu and stresses that for parliament , it remains the main obstacle to further progress on any positive agenda that could be offered to turkey; ### 6. insists that the crucial area of fundamental rights and freedoms , which is at the core of the accession process , cannot be disconnected and isolated from overall relations with the eu and stresses that for parliament , it remains the main obstacle to further progress on any positive agenda that could be offered to turkey; considers that the adoption on march 2021 of an action plan on human rights shows a willingness to improve the overall situation of fundamental rights in turkey; notes nevertheless that the commitment of the government will be measured by the extent of its implementation and the reforms undertaken to ensure its application to all citizens without discrimination;