### (7) in order to ensure , inter alia , that users can assert their rights they should be given an appropriate degree of influence over the curation of content made visible to them , including the possibility to opt out of any content curation altogether. in particular , users should not be subject to curation without specific consent. ### (7) in order to ensure , inter alia , that users can assert their rights they should be given an appropriate degree of influence over the curation of content made visible to them. in particular , users should not be subject to curation without specific consent.


### (9) this regulation should not contain provisions forcing content hosting platforms to employ any form of fully automated ex-ante control of content. ### (9) this regulation should contain provisions forcing content hosting platforms to employ automated ex-ante control of content which is effective and transparent.


### (15) in order to ensure that users and notifiers to make use of referral to independent dispute settlement bodies as a first step , it must be emphasised that such referral should not preclude any subsequent court action. given that content hosting platforms which enjoy a dominant position on the market can particularly gain from the introduction of independent dispute settlement bodies , it is appropriate that they take responsibility for the financing of such bodies. ### (15) in order to ensure that users and notifiers make use of referral to independent dispute settlement bodies as a first step , it must be emphasised that such referral should not preclude any subsequent court action. given that content hosting platforms which enjoy a dominant position on the market can particularly gain from the introduction of independent dispute settlement bodies , it is appropriate that they take responsibility for the financing of such bodies. these bodies shall be provided with adequate resources to ensure their competence and independence.


### (16) users should have the right to referral to a fair and independent dispute settlement body to contest a decision taken by a content hosting platform following a notice concerning content they uploaded. notifiers should have this right if they would have had legal standing in a civil procedure regarding the content in question. ### (16) users should have the right to referral to a fair and independent dispute settlement body , as an alternative dispute settlement mechanism , to contest a decision taken by a content hosting platform following a notice concerning content they uploaded. notifiers should have this right if they would have had legal standing in a civil procedure regarding the content in question.


### (17) as regards jurisdiction , the competent independent dispute settlement body should be that located in the member state in which the content forming the subject of the dispute has been uploaded. ### (17) as regards jurisdiction , the competent independent dispute settlement body should be that located in the member state in which the content forming the subject of the dispute has been uploaded. for natural persons , it should always be possible to bring complaints to the independent dispute body of their member states.


### (19) this regulation should include obligations to report on its implementation and to review it within a reasonable time. for this purpose , the independent dispute settlement bodies established pursuant to this regulation should submit reports on the number of referrals brought before them , including the number of referrals dealt with. ### (19) this regulation should include obligations to report on its implementation and to review it within a reasonable time. for this purpose , the independent dispute settlement bodies established pursuant to this regulation should submit reports on the number of referrals brought before them , the decisions taken – anonymising personal data as appropriate – including the number of referrals dealt with , data on systemic problems , trends and the identification of traders not complying with the decisions of the alternative dispute settlement body.


### (21) action at union level as set out in this regulation would be substantially enhanced with the establishment of a union agency tasked with monitoring and ensuring compliance by content hosting platforms with the provisions of this regulation. the agency should review compliance with the standards laid down for content management on the basis of transparency reports and an audit of algorithms employed by content hosting platforms for the purpose of content management ‒ ### (21) the application of this regulation should be closely monitored by an existing or new european agency , or european body tasked , in particular , to ensure compliance by content hosting platforms with the provisions of this regulation. the respective agency or european body should review compliance with the standards laid down for content management on the basis of transparency reports and an audit of algorithms employed by content hosting platforms for the purpose of content management ‒


### 4. content hosting platforms shall provide users with an appropriate degree of influence over the curation of content made visible to them , including the choice of opting out of content curation altogether. in particular , users shall not be subject to content curation without their specific consent. ### 4. content hosting platforms shall provide users with an appropriate degree of influence over the curation of content made visible to them , including the choice of opting out of content curation altogether. in particular , users shall not be subject to content curation without their specific prior consent.


### any natural or legal person or public body to which content is provided through a website or application shall have the right to issue a notice pursuant to this regulation. ### any natural or legal person or public body to which content is provided through a website , application , or another software , shall have the right to issue a notice pursuant to this regulation.


### a notice regarding content shall include at least the following information: ### a notice regarding content shall be made in writing and shall include at least the following information:


### a link to the content in question; ### a link to the content in question and , where appropriate , e.g. video , a timestamp;


### once a decision has been taken , content hosting platforms shall inform all parties involved in the notice procedure about the outcome of the decision , providing the following information: ### once a decision has been taken , content hosting platforms shall inform all parties involved in the notice procedure about the outcome of the decision , providing the following information in a clear and simple manner:


### whether the decision was made by a human or an algorithm; ### whether the decision was made by a human or an algorithm and in the latter case , whether a human review has taken place;


### information about the possibility for review as referred to in article 11 or judicial redress for either party. ### information about the possibility for review as referred to in article 11 and judicial redress for either party.


### where a content hosting platform has set up a review mechanism , the final decision of the review shall be undertaken by a human. ### dominant content hosting platforms must set up a review mechanism. in all cases , the final decision of the review shall be undertaken by a human.


### 1. member states shall establish independent dispute settlement bodies for the purpose of providing quick and efficient extra-judicial recourse when decisions on content moderation are appealed against. ### 1. member states shall establish independent dispute settlement bodies for the purpose of providing quick and efficient extra-judicial recourse when decisions on content moderation are appealed against. the independent dispute settlement bodies should as a minimum comply with the quality requirements for consumer adr bodies set down under directive 2013/11/eu.


### 3. the referral of a question regarding content moderation to an independent dispute settlement body shall not preclude a user from being able to have further recourse in the courts unless the dispute has been settled by agreement. ### 3. the referral of a question regarding content moderation to an independent dispute settlement body shall not preclude a user from being able to have further recourse in the courts unless the dispute has been settled by common agreement.


### 4. content hosting platforms that enjoy a dominant position on the market shall contribute financially to the operating costs of the independent dispute settlement bodies through a dedicated fund. ### 4. content hosting platforms that enjoy a dominant position on the market shall contribute financially to the operating costs of the independent dispute settlement bodies through a dedicated fund. member states shall ensure these bodies are provided with adequate resources.


### 1. the uploader shall have the right to refer a case of content moderation to the competent independent dispute settlement body where the content hosting platform has decided to remove or take down content or otherwise to act in a manner that is contrary to the action preferred by the uploader as expressed by the uploader. ### 1. the uploader shall have the right to refer a case of content moderation to the competent independent dispute settlement body where the content hosting platform has decided to remove , take down or make invisible content , or otherwise to act in a manner that is contrary to the action preferred by the uploader as expressed by the uploader.


### 3. as regards jurisdiction , the competent independent dispute settlement body shall be that located in the member state in which the content that is the subject of the dispute has been uploaded. ### 3. as regards jurisdiction , the competent independent dispute settlement body shall be that located in the member state in which the content that is the subject of the dispute has been uploaded. for natural persons , it should always be possible to bring complaints to the independent dispute body of their member states.


### 4. where the notifier has the right to refer a case of content moderation to an independent dispute settlement body in accordance with paragraph 2 , the notifier may refer the case to the independent dispute settlement body located in the member state of habitual residence of the notifier. ### 4. where the notifier has the right to refer a case of content moderation to an independent dispute settlement body in accordance with paragraph 2 , the notifier may refer the case to the independent dispute settlement body located in the member state of habitual residence of the notifier or the uploader , if the latter is using the service for non-commercial purposes.


### a. whereas an agreement with the uk must ensure a balance of rights and obligations , respect the full integrity of the eu’s internal market and customs union , and guarantee a level playing field; ### a. whereas an agreement with the uk must ensure a balance of rights and obligations , respect the full integrity and proper functioning of the eu’s internal market and customs union , and guarantee a level playing field for businesses as well as a high level of consumer protection;


### a. whereas cohesion policy is a key instrument that ensures solidarity between european regions in exchange for the opportunities afforded by the internal market; whereas if regions are to access the internal market , they must make a contribution to the cohesion funds – as is the case for european economic area (eea) countries; ### a. whereas cohesion policy is a key instrument that ensures solidarity between eu regions in exchange for the opportunities afforded by the internal market; whereas if regions are to access the internal market , they must make a contribution to the cohesion funds – as is the case for european economic area (eea) countries;


### 1. stresses that the envisaged partnership should provide continued connectivity for all modes of transport subject to reciprocity and should ensure a level playing field , in particular with regard to social , employment and environmental standards; ### 1. stresses that the envisaged partnership should provide continued connectivity for all modes of transport subject to reciprocity and should ensure a level playing field , in particular with regard to social , employment , safety , security , passengers’rights and environmental standards;


### 1. considers that the uk should be invited to contribute to the cohesion funds if it wishes to participate in the internal market , in accordance with the model for eea countries; ### 1. considers that , in the absence of full participation in the internal market , the united kingdom should not be able to benefit from cohesion funds , except for projects which are permitted under the regulations establishing those funds; adds that , should the united kingdom ultimately wish to participate in the internal market , it should contribute to cohesion funds for the 2021-2027 period in accordance with the model applied to eea countries;


### 2. believes that the new agreement should take into account the needs of the regions affected by brexit , especially those sharing a land or sea border with the uk , such as the border regions of ireland and the coastal regions along the channel and the north sea; ### 2. believes that the new agreement should take into account the needs of the regions affected by brexit , especially those sharing a land or sea border with the uk , such as the border regions of ireland and the coastal regions along the channel , the atlantic and the north sea;


### 2. stresses that the envisaged partnership must be based on the shared values and principles of democracy , the rule of law and respect for human rights , which should be expressed in binding political clauses; stresses that , while the eu will remain bound by the charter of fundamental rights of the european union , the agreement on the future relationship must incorporate the united kingdom’s continued commitment to respect the framework of the european convention on human rights (echr); ### 2. stresses that the envisaged partnership must be based on the shared values , mutual trust and principles of democracy , the rule of law and respect for human rights , which should be expressed in binding political clauses; stresses that , while the eu will remain bound by the charter of fundamental rights of the european union , the agreement on the future relationship must incorporate the united kingdom’s continued commitment to respect the framework of the european convention on human rights (echr);


### 2. stresses that the full implementation of the withdrawal agreement , including the protocol on northern ireland , is a prerequisite for and a basic component of a future partnership between the eu and the uk; expresses concern at the uk government’s statements demonstrating a lack of political will to fully comply with its commitments under the withdrawal agreement , namely regarding border controls in the irish sea; notes that no concrete reassurances were given on this matter during the first meeting of the joint committee; underlines that trust between the parties is essential in these negotiations; ### 2. stresses that the full implementation of the withdrawal agreement , including the protocol on northern ireland , is a prerequisite for and a basic component of a new partnership between the eu and the uk; expresses concern at the uk government’s statements demonstrating a lack of political will to fully comply with its commitments under the withdrawal agreement , namely regarding border controls in the irish sea; notes that no concrete reassurances were given on this matter during the first meeting of the joint committee; underlines that trust between the parties is essential in these negotiations;


### 3. recalls the importance of the commission being the sole eu negotiator during the negotiations and that member states shall not undertake any bilateral negotiations; ### 3. recalls the importance of the commission being the sole eu negotiator during the negotiations and that member states shall not undertake any bilateral negotiations; urges , however , the commission to fully protect and defend the interest and sovereignty of members states as well as their territorial integrity;


### 3. welcomes the fact that the commission has presented and published a comprehensive legal proposal for a future relationship , broadly in line with its negotiating mandate and the european parliament’s resolution , and deeply regrets the fact that the uk government has refused to accept a similar level of transparency; ### 3. welcomes the fact that the commission has presented and published a comprehensive legal proposal for a new partnership , broadly in line with its negotiating mandate and the european parliament’s resolution; urges the commission to continue its transparency towards the co-legislators , as well as the financial services industry and consumers , and deeply regrets the fact that the uk government has refused to accept a similar level of transparency; stresses that clarity and certainty are crucial to business continuity and a seamless provision of services to consumers , as well as to preventing market volatility;


### 6. considers that the envisaged partnership should include an ambitious comprehensive air transport agreement which ensures the eu’s strategic interests; ### 6. considers that the envisaged partnership should include an ambitious comprehensive air transport agreement which ensures the eu’s strategic interests , including market access and aviation investment as well as operational and commercial flexibility provisions (e.g.code sharing);


### 6. recalls , in the context of financial services , that passporting rights , which are based on mutual recognition and harmonised prudential rules in the internal market , will cease to apply between the eu and the uk at the end of the transitional period; underlines that , thereafter , access to the european financial market must be based on equivalence decisions made within the eu’s legal framework; ### 6. recalls , in the context of financial services , that passporting rights , which are based on mutual recognition and harmonised prudential rules in the internal market , will cease to apply between the eu and the uk at the end of the transitional period; underlines that , thereafter , access to the european financial market must be based on equivalence decisions made within the eu’s legal framework; notes that equivalence examinations are a technical process which should be based on clear and transparent criteria; recalls that equivalence decisions are unilaterally granted and withdrawn by the european commission , taking due account of the impact on the market and the need to preserve eu financial stability; recalls the importance of the eu maintaining its autonomy to adopt any measures for prudential reasons;


### 6. recalls , in the context of financial services , that passporting rights , which are based on mutual recognition and harmonised prudential rules in the internal market , will cease to apply between the eu and the uk at the end of the transitional period; underlines that , thereafter , access to the european financial market must be based on equivalence decisions made within the eu’s legal framework; ### 6. recalls , in the context of financial services , that passporting rights , which are based on mutual recognition and harmonised prudential rules in the internal market , will cease to apply between the eu and the uk at the end of the transitional period; underlines that , thereafter , access to the european financial market must be based on equivalence decisions made within the eu’s legal framework , but also highlights that this decision should be fact-based and not politicized;


### 7. considers that the envisaged partnership should include a level playing field in the areas of , in particular , state aid , passengers’ rights , social rights and environmental protection; ### 7. considers that the envisaged partnership should include a level playing field in the areas of , in particular , state aid , passengers’ rights , social rights , safety , security and environmental protection;


### 7. defends the need to extend the transition period in order to allow enough time to conclude the negotiations on a comprehensive future partnership , while safeguarding citizens’ rights , legal certainty and economic and financial stability. ### 7. in light of the impact of the covid-19 crisis on the societies , economies and politics of the parties , asks the european commission to prepare the scenario of a potential extension to the transition period in case requested by the uk.


### 7. defends the need to extend the transition period in order to allow enough time to conclude the negotiations on a comprehensive future partnership , while safeguarding citizens’ rights , legal certainty and economic and financial stability. ### 7. defends the need to extend the transition period , also due to the current covid-19 crisis , in order to allow enough time to conclude the negotiations on a comprehensive future partnership , while safeguarding citizens’ rights , legal certainty and economic and financial stability.


### 13. considers that the envisaged partnership should include a level playing field in the areas of , in particular , work and rest time , tachographs , weights and dimensions; ### 13. considers that the envisaged partnership should include a level playing field in the areas of , in particular , cabotage , work and rest time , posting of drivers , tachographs , weights and dimensions and combined transport;


### 15. stresses that the envisaged partnership should include the specific situation of the channel tunnel , especially with regard to the aspects of safety regime and authorisation; ### 15. stresses that the envisaged partnership should include the specific situation of the channel tunnel , especially with regard to the aspects of safety regime and authorisation and passengers’rights;


### 16. stresses that the envisaged partnership should ensure access for the international maritime transport sector with an appropriate level playing field. ### 16. stresses that the envisaged partnership should ensure free and equal market access for the international maritime transport sector , including but not limited to the offshore sector and domestic trade , without reservations and with an appropriate level playing field in the fiscal , safety , security , environmental and social areas; urges moreover that the fluidity of eu-uk maritime trade should be a priority as well as the regulatory alignment and reciprocal recognition of standards , inspections and controls to ensure the movement of goods , logistics and supply chains and ensure close cooperation between the eu and the uk with regard to the global policy framework of the imo , the oecd , the ilo and the wto;


### take the necessary action to ensure that the general principles , terms and conditions to be established as part of the envisaged partnership in relation to participation in union and euratom programmes include the requirement for the uk to make a fair and appropriate financial contribution to any programmes in which it takes part; ### take the necessary action to ensure that the general principles , terms and conditions to be established as part of the envisaged partnership in relation to participation in union and euratom programmes include the requirement for the uk to make a fair and appropriate financial contribution , both in terms of participation fee and operational contribution , to any programmes in which it takes part;


### 5. takes note of the discussions taking place in the eu-uk joint committee established under the withdrawal agreement and the upcoming meeting of the specialised committee on citizens’ rights; calls on the co-chairs of the joint committee to actively involve citizens and civil society organisations in this regard; requests that parliament be fully informed of all the discussions held and decisions taken by the joint committee; is concerned that , according to the latest eu settlement scheme statistics1 , published by the uk home office on 16 april 2020 , of the total number of 3.4 million (3 468 700) applications received up to 31 march 2020 , only 58 % were granted settled status and 41 % were granted pre-settled status; reiterates the parliament’s call2 , with regard to resident status schemes both in the uk and in the member states , that these schemes be non-discriminatory , user-friendly and transparent , and free of charge , that they have a declaratory nature and grant a physical document as proof of status; recalls that eu citizens holding pre-settled status should be treated equally with uk citizens under the withdrawal agreement , including with regard to access to benefits; calls on the joint committee and the commission to monitor relevant developments; notes that little progress has been achieved regarding parliament’s call to address issues with regard to the eu settlement scheme , notably in relation to the accessibility of the application , the independence of the monitoring authority , and the possible consequences for union citizens of not meeting the deadline , as well as the applicability of the uk’s eu settlement scheme in relation to eu-27 citizens in northern ireland who have not sought uk citizenship under the terms of the good friday agreement , and the need to fully respect the good friday agreement in all its parts as stated in the withdrawal agreement; urges the uk authorities to ensure that there is no diminution of rights for citizens in northern ireland; stresses that these issues would need to be fully addressed and evaluated by the end of the transition period as a pre-condition for a future agreement; ### 5. takes note of the discussions taking place in the eu-uk joint committee established under the withdrawal agreement and the upcoming meeting of the specialised committee on citizens’ rights; calls on the co-chairs of the joint committee to actively involve citizens and civil society organisations in this regard; requests that parliament be fully informed of all the discussions held and decisions taken by the joint committee; is concerned that , according to the latest eu settlement scheme statistics1 , published by the uk home office on 16 april 2020 , of the total number of 3.4 million (3 468 700) applications received up to 31 march 2020 , only 58 % were granted settled status and 41 % were granted pre-settled status; reiterates the parliament’s call2 , with regard to resident status schemes both in the uk and in the member states , that these schemes be non-discriminatory , user-friendly and transparent , and free of charge , that they have a declaratory nature and grant a physical document as proof of status; recalls that eu citizens holding pre-settled status should be treated equally with uk citizens under the withdrawal agreement , including with regard to access to benefits and the healthcare system; calls on the joint committee and the commission to monitor relevant developments; notes that little progress has been achieved regarding parliament’s call to address issues with regard to the eu settlement scheme , notably in relation to the accessibility of the application , the independence of the monitoring authority , and the possible consequences for union citizens of not meeting the deadline , as well as the applicability of the uk’s eu settlement scheme in relation to eu-27 citizens in northern ireland who have not sought uk citizenship under the terms of the good friday agreement , and the need to fully respect the good friday agreement in all its parts as stated in the withdrawal agreement; urges the uk authorities to ensure that there is no diminution of rights for citizens in northern ireland; stresses that these issues would need to be fully addressed and evaluated by the end of the transition period as a pre-condition for a future agreement;


### 5. believes it to be in both parties’ mutual interests to establish an ambitious future economic partnership covering a wide number of sectors; underlines that , in any case , a level playing field must be ensured and eu standards safeguarded in order to avoid a ‘race to the bottom’ and the acquisition of unfair competitive advantages through the undercutting of levels of protection or other regulatory divergences; considers that any future framework should safeguard fair competition , investor and consumer protection , and the integrity of the single market , while respecting the eu’s regulatory regime and decision-making autonomy; ### 5. believes it to be in both parties’ mutual interests to establish an ambitious new economic partnership covering a wide number of sectors; underlines that , in any case , a level playing field must be ensured and eu standards safeguarded in order to avoid a ‘race to the bottom’ and the acquisition of unfair competitive advantages through the undercutting of levels of protection or other regulatory divergences; considers that any new framework should safeguard eu financial stability , fair competition , investor and consumer protection , the integrity of the single market , and commitments to combat climate change , while respecting the eu’s regulatory regime and decision-making autonomy;


### b. whereas ai in transport is driving the evolution of the next generation of it systems and its application involves using many types of technologies such as autonomous vehicles and traffic management solutions; ### b. whereas ai in transport is driving the evolution of the next generation of it systems and its application involves using many types of technologies such as autonomous vehicles , unmanned aircraft systems (uas) and traffic management solutions;


### b. whereas any future-orientated liability framework has to strike a balance between efficiently protecting potential victims of harm or damage and at the same time , providing enough leeway to make the development of new technologies , products or services possible; whereas ultimately , the goal of any liability framework should be to provide legal certainty for all parties , whether it be the producer , the deployer , the affected person or any other third party; ### b. whereas any future-orientated liability framework has to strike a balance between efficiently protecting potential victims of harm or damage and at the same time , providing enough leeway to make the development of new technologies , products or services possible; whereas ultimately , the goal of any liability framework should be to provide legal certainty for all parties , whether it be the producer , the deployer , the developer , the affected person or any other third party;


### d. whereas union and national legislation should ensure high product safety both ex ante and throughout a product’s life cycle , while facilitating the compensation of victims ex post; ### d. whereas union and national legislation should ensure high product safety and a sound system management both ex ante and throughout a life cycle , while facilitating the compensation of victims ex post;


### 1. underlines that ai can be applied at different levels in vehicles and has an important impact on their autonomy and consequently on civil liability; ### 1. underlines that ai can be applied at different levels in transport infrastructure and in the transport modes and has an important impact on their autonomy and consequently on civil liability;


### 2. underlines that automated functionalities can bring significant safety improvements in the medium and long term; notes that ai could also be used for planning and guiding logistics chains , and for increasing efficiency , resilience , reliability and flexibility; ### 2. underlines that automated functionalities can bring significant safety improvements in the medium and long term as well as unintended consequences (e.g. cybersecurity , data privacy); notes that ai could also be used for planning and guiding logistics chains , and for increasing efficiency , resilience , reliability , sustainability and flexibility;


### 3. stresses the importance of defining a clear division of responsibilities between software developers , manufacturers of various components , service providers and operators and end users; ### 3. stresses the importance of defining a clear division of responsibilities between software developers , manufacturers , service and data providers and operators and end users;


### 4. underlines that for ai-related applications with a specific high-risk profile , there is a need for a risk-based approach depending on the levels of automation; ### 4. underlines that for ai-related applications in the transport sector with a specific high-risk profile , there is a need for a risk-based approach depending on the levels of automation and self-learning of the system;


### 5. believes that there is no need for a complete revision of the well-functioning liability regimes but that the complexity , connectivity , opacity , vulnerability and autonomy of ai-systems nevertheless represent a significant challenge; considers that specific adjustments are necessary to avoid a situation in which persons who suffer harm or whose property is damaged end up without compensation; ### 5. believes that there is no need for a complete revision of the well-functioning liability regimes but that the complexity , connectivity , opacity , vulnerability and autonomy of ai-systems , as well as the multitude of actors involved , nevertheless represent a significant challenge; considers that specific adjustments are necessary to avoid a situation in which persons who suffer harm or whose property is damaged end up without compensation;


### 6. notes that all physical or virtual activities , devices or processes that are driven by ai-systems may technically be the direct or indirect cause of harm or damage , yet are always the result of someone building , deploying or interfering with the systems; is of the opinion that the opacity and autonomy of ai-systems could make it in practice very difficult or even impossible to trace back specific harmful actions of the ai-systems to specific human input or to decisions in the design; recalls that , in accordance with widely-accepted liability concepts , one is nevertheless able to circumvent this obstacle by making the persons who create , maintain or control the risk associated with the ai-system , accountable; ### 6. notes that all physical or virtual activities , devices or processes that are driven by ai-systems may technically be the direct or indirect cause of harm or damage , yet are always the result of someone building , deploying or interfering with the systems; notes in this respect that it is not necessary to give legal personality to ai-systems; is of the opinion that the opacity and autonomy of ai-systems could make it in practice very difficult or even impossible to trace back specific harmful actions of the ai-systems to specific human input or to decisions in the design; recalls that , in accordance with widely-accepted liability concepts , one is nevertheless able to circumvent this obstacle by making the persons who create , maintain or control the risk associated with the ai-system , accountable;


### 7. stresses the importance of ensuring that drivers are always fully aware of a vehicle’s level of automation and their level of liability: drivers should be informed about their vehicles’ ai systems and related limitations of such systems such as activation , deactivation , failure; moreover , in-vehicle features should periodically remind the driver that he or she is in charge of monitoring the vehicle status; ### 7. stresses the importance of ensuring that drivers are always fully aware of a vehicle’s level of automation and their level of liability: drivers should be informed about their vehicles’ ai systems and related limitations of such systems such as activation , deactivation , failure; moreover , in-vehicle features should periodically remind the driver that he or she is in charge of monitoring the vehicle status and give clear warnings to the driver of the approaching limits of ai systems;


### 7. considers that the product liability directive (pld) has proven to be an effective means of getting compensation for harm triggered by a defective product; hence , notes that it should also be used with regard to civil liability claims against the producer of a defective ai-system , when the ai-system qualifies as a product under that directive; if legislative adjustments to the pld are necessary , they should be discussed during a review of that directive; is of the opinion that , for the purpose of legal certainty throughout the union , the ‘backend operator’ should fall under the same liability rules as the producer , manufacturer and developer; ### 7. considers that the product liability directive (pld) has proven to be an effective means of getting compensation for harm triggered by a defective product; hence , notes that it should also be used with regard to civil liability claims against the producer of a defective ai-system , when the ai-system qualifies as a product under that directive; legislative adjustments to the pld are necessary and they should be discussed during a review of that directive;


### 9. calls for further analysis of the need to adapt the european driving licence directive due to automated functionalities of vehicles; ### 9. calls for further analysis of the need to adapt the european driving licence directive due to automated functionalities of vehicles; urges moreover the commission to carry out a periodic assessment of transport european regulatory framework to ensure it can respond to the safety and liability challenges related to the integration of ai technologies;


### 9. considers it , therefore , appropriate for this report to focus on civil liability claims against the deployer of an ai-system; affirms that the deployer’s liability is justified by the fact that he or she is controlling a risk associated with the ai-system , comparable to an owner of a car or pet; considers that due to the ai-system’s complexity and connectivity , the deployer will be in many cases the first visible contact point for the affected person; ### 9. considers it , therefore , appropriate for this report to focus on civil liability claims against the operator of an ai-system; affirms that the operator’s liability is justified by the fact that he or she is controlling the risks associated with the ai-system , comparable to an owner of a car or pet;


### 10. underlines that liability schemes in the event of an accident or a violation of traffic legislation need to be carefully designed for each level of automation and communicated in a clear way to the users in order to ensure a smooth transition between full driver liability to full manufacturer and road operator liability; ### 10. underlines that liability schemes in the event of an accident or a violation of traffic legislation need to be carefully designed for each level of automation and ai integration and communicated in a clear way to the users in order to ensure a smooth transition between full driver liability to full manufacturer and operator liability;


### 10. opines that liability rules involving the deployer should in principle cover all operations of ai-systems , no matter where the operation takes place and whether it happens physically or virtually; remarks that operations in public spaces that expose many third persons to a risk constitute , however , cases that require further consideration; considers that the potential victims of harm or damage are often not aware of the operation and regularly do not have contractual liability claims against the deployer; notes that when harm or damage materialises , such third persons would then only have a fault-liability claim , and they might find it difficult to prove the fault of the deployer of the ai-system; ### 10. opines that liability rules involving the operator should in principle cover all operations of ai-systems , no matter where the operation takes place and whether it happens physically or virtually; remarks that operations in public spaces that expose many third persons to a risk constitute , however , cases that require further consideration; considers that the potential victims of harm or damage are often not aware of the operation and regularly do not have contractual liability claims against the operator; notes that when harm or damage materialises , such third persons would then only have a fault-liability claim , and they might find it difficult to prove the fault of the operator of the ai-system;


### 11. notes that automated vehicles deal with variable signals and conditions; calls as a result for a regular update of digital maps providing a compulsory minimum set of information about the road network; ### 11. notes that the successful integration of unmanned systems in the transport network , such as automated vehicles and unmanned aircraft systems (uas) into respectively the land infrastructure and airspace relies on many variable signals and conditions; calls as a result for a regular update of digital maps providing a compulsory minimum set of information about the road network and for the correct development and deployment of the u-space;


### 11. considers it appropriate to define the deployer as the person who decides on the use of the ai-system , who exercises control over the risk and who benefits from its operation; considers that exercising control means any action of the deployer that affects the manner of the operation from start to finish or that changes specific functions or processes within the ai-system; ### 11. considers it appropriate to define the operator as the person who exercises a degree of control over a risk connected with the operation and functioning of the ai-system and benefits from its operation; considers that exercising control means any action of the operator that influences the operation of the ai-system and thus the extent to which it exposes third parties to its potential risks; considers that these actions could impact the operation from start to finish by determining the input , output or results , or change specific functions or processes within the ai-system;


### 12. notes that there could be situations in which there is more than one deployer; considers that in that event , all deployers should be jointly and severally liable while having the right to recourse proportionally against each other; ### 12. notes that there could be situations in which there is more than one operator , for example a backend and frontend operator; considers that in that event , all operators should be jointly and severally liable while having the right to recourse proportionally against each other , reflecting the level of control each party has over the materialized risk;


### e. whereas artificial intelligence (ai)-systems present significant legal challenges for the existing liability framework and could lead to situations , in which their opacity could make it extremely expensive or even impossible to identify who was in control of the risk associated with the ai-system or which code or input has ultimately caused the harmful operation; ### e. whereas certain ai-systems present significant legal challenges for the existing liability framework and could lead to situations , in which their opacity could make it extremely expensive or even impossible to identify who was in control of the risk associated with the ai-system or which code or input has ultimately caused the harmful operation;


### liability of the deployer ### liability of the operator


### 13. recognises that the type of ai-system the deployer is exercising control over is a determining factor; notes that an ai-system that entails a high risk potentially endangers the general public to a much higher degree; considers that , based on the legal challenges that ai-systems pose to the existing liability regimes , it seems reasonable to set up a strict liability regime for those high-risk ai-systems; ### 13. recognises that the type of ai-system the operator is exercising control over is a determining factor; notes that an ai-system that entails a high risk potentially endangers the general public to a much higher degree; considers that , based on the legal challenges that ai-systems pose to the existing liability regimes , it seems reasonable to set up a strict liability regime for those high-risk ai-systems;


### 14. believes that an ai-system presents a high risk when its autonomous operation involves a significant potential to cause harm to one or more persons , in a manner that is random and impossible to predict in advance; considers that the significance of the potential depends on the interplay between the severity of possible harm , the likelihood that the risk materializes and the manner in which the ai-system is being used; ### 14. believes that an ai-system presents a high risk when its autonomous operation involves a significant potential to cause harm to one or more persons , in a manner that is random and goes beyond what can reasonably be expected from its intended use; considers that the significance of the potential depends on the interplay between the severity of possible harm , the likelihood that the risk materializes and the manner in which the ai-system is being used;


### 15. recommends that all high-risk ai-systems be listed in an annex to the proposed regulation; recognises that , given the rapid technological change and the required technical expertise , it should be up to the commission to review that annex every six months and if necessary , amend it through a delegated act; believes that the commission should closely cooperate with a newly formed standing committee similar to the existing standing committee on precursors or the technical committee on motor vehicles , which include national experts of the member states and stakeholders; considers that the balanced membership of the ‘high-level expert group on artificial intelligence’ could serve as an example for the formation of the group of stakeholders; ### 15. recommends that all high-risk ai-systems be listed in an annex to the proposed regulation; recognises that , given the rapid technological developments and the required technical expertise , it should be up to the commission to review that annex every six months and if necessary , amend it through a delegated act; believes that the commission should be informed by a newly formed standing committee similar to the existing standing committee on precursors or the technical committee on motor vehicles , which include national experts of the member states and stakeholders; considers that the balanced membership of the ‘high-level expert group on artificial intelligence’ could serve as an example for the formation of the group of stakeholders;


### 16. believes that in line with strict liability systems of the member states , the proposed regulation should only cover harm to the important legally protected rights such as life , health , physical integrity and property , and should set out the amounts and extent of compensation as well as the limitation period; ### 16. believes that the proposed regulation should cover harm to the important legally protected rights such as life , health , physical integrity , property and significant immaterial harm resulting in economic loss , and should set out the amounts and extent of compensation as well as the limitation period;


### 17. determines that all activities , devices or processes driven by ai-systems that cause harm or damage but are not listed in the annex to the proposed regulation should remain subject to fault-based liability; believes that the affected person should nevertheless benefit from a presumption of fault of the deployer; ### 17. determines that all activities , devices or processes driven by ai-systems that cause harm or damage but are not listed in the annex to the proposed regulation should remain subject to fault-based liability; believes that the affected person should nevertheless benefit from a presumption of fault of the operator;


### 19. is of the opinion that , based on the significant potential to cause harm and by taking directive 2009/103/ec7 into account , all deployers of high-risk ai-systems listed in the annex to the proposed regulation should hold liability insurance; considers that such a mandatory insurance regime for high-risk ai-systems should cover the amounts and the extent of compensation laid down by the proposed regulation; ### 19. is of the opinion that , based on the significant potential to cause harm and by taking directive 2009/103/ec7 into account , all operators of high-risk ai-systems listed in the annex to the proposed regulation should hold liability insurance; considers that such a mandatory insurance regime for high-risk ai-systems should cover the amounts and the extent of compensation laid down by the proposed regulation;


### 20. believes that a european compensation mechanism , funded with public money , is not the right way to fill potential insurance gaps; considers that bearing the good experience with regulatory sandboxes in the fintech sector in mind , it should be up to the insurance market to adjust existing products or create new insurance cover for the numerous sectors and various different technologies , products and services that involve ai-systems; ### 20. believes that a european compensation mechanism , funded with public money , is not the right way to fill potential insurance gaps; considers that a lack of data of the risks associated with ai-systems make it difficult for the insurance sector to come up with adapted or new insurance products; considers that leaving the development of a mandatory insurance entirely to the market is likely to result in a one size fits all approach with disproportionate high prices and the wrong incentives , stimulating operators to opt for the cheapest insurance rather than for the best coverage; considers that the commission should work closely with the insurance sector to see how data and innovative models can be used to create the insurances that offer adequate coverage for an affordable price.


### - new legal challenges posed by the deployment of artificial intelligence (ai)-systems have to be addressed by establishing maximal legal certainty for the producer , the deployer , the affected person and any other third party. ### - new legal challenges posed by the deployment of artificial intelligence (ai)-systems have to be addressed by establishing maximal legal certainty for the producer , the operator , the affected person and any other third party.


### (2) especially at the beginning of the life cycle of new products and services , there is a certain degree of risk for the user as well as for third persons that something does not function properly. this process of trial-and-error is at the same time a key enabler of technical progress without which most of our technologies would not exist. so far , the accompanying risks of new products and services have been properly mitigated by strong product safety legislation and liability rules. ### (2) especially at the beginning of the life cycle of new products and services , there is a certain degree of risk for the user as well as for third persons that something does not function properly. this process of trial-and-error is at the same time a key enabler of technical progress without which most of our technologies would not exist. so far , the accompanying risks of new products and services have been mitigated by strong product safety legislation and they need to continue to be properly implemented and reviewed where necessary.


### (3) the rise of artificial intelligence (ai) however presents a significant challenge for the existing liability frameworks. using ai-systems in our daily life will lead to situations in which their opacity (“black box” element) makes it extremely expensive or even impossible to identify who was in control of the risk of using the ai-system in question or which code or input has caused the harmful operation. this difficulty is even compounded by the connectivity between an ai-system and other ai-systems and non-ai-systems , by its dependency on external data , by its vulnerability to cybersecurity breaches as well as by the increasing autonomy of ai-systems triggered by machine-learning and deep-learning capabilities. besides these complex features and potential vulnerabilities , ai-systems could also be used to cause severe harm , such as compromising our values and freedoms by tracking individuals against their will , by introducing social credit systems or by constructing lethal autonomous weapon systems. ### (3) the rise of artificial intelligence (ai) however presents a significant challenge for the existing liability frameworks. using ai-systems in our daily life will lead to situations in which their opacity (“black box” element) and the multitude of actors who intervene in their life-cycle make it extremely expensive or even impossible to identify who was in control of the risk of using the ai-system in question or which code or input has caused the harmful operation. this difficulty is even compounded by the connectivity between an ai-system and other ai-systems and non-ai-systems , by its dependency on external data , by its vulnerability to cybersecurity breaches as well as by the increasing autonomy of ai-systems triggered by machine-learning and deep-learning capabilities. besides these complex features and potential vulnerabilities , ai-systems could also be used to cause severe harm , such as compromising our values and freedoms by tracking individuals against their will , by introducing social credit systems or by constructing lethal autonomous weapon systems.


### (5) any discussion about required changes in the existing legal framework should start with the clarification that ai-systems have neither legal personality nor human conscience , and that their sole task is to serve humanity. many ai-systems are also not so different from other technologies , which are sometimes based on even more complex software. ultimately , the large majority of ai-systems are used for handling trivial tasks without any risks for the society. there are however also ai-systems that are deployed in a critical manner and are based on neuronal networks and deep-learning processes. their opacity and autonomy could make it very difficult to trace back specific actions to specific human decisions in their design or in their operation. a deployer of such an ai-system might for instance argue that the physical or virtual activity , device or process causing the harm or damage was outside of his or her control because it was caused by an autonomous operation of his or her ai-system. the mere operation of an autonomous ai-system should at the same time not be a sufficient ground for admitting the liability claim. as a result , there might be liability cases in which a person who suffers harm or damage caused by an ai-system cannot prove the fault of the producer , of an interfering third party or of the deployer and ends up without compensation. ### (5) any discussion about required changes in the existing legal framework should start with the clarification that ai-systems have neither legal personality nor human conscience , and that their sole task is to serve humanity. many ai-systems are also not so different from other technologies , which are sometimes based on even more complex software. ultimately , the large majority of ai-systems are used for handling trivial tasks without any risks for the society. there are however also ai-systems that are developed and deployed in a critical manner and are based on neuronal networks and deep-learning processes. their opacity and autonomy could make it very difficult to trace back specific actions to specific human decisions in their design or in their operation. an operator of such an ai-system might for instance argue that the physical or virtual activity , device or process causing the harm or damage was outside of his or her control because it was caused by an autonomous operation of his or her ai-system. the mere operation of an autonomous ai-system should at the same time not be a sufficient ground for admitting the liability claim. as a result , there might be liability cases in which a person who suffers harm or damage caused by an ai-system cannot prove the fault of the producer , of an interfering third party or of the operator and ends up without compensation.


### (6) nevertheless , it should always be clear that whoever creates , maintains , controls or interferes with the ai-system , should be accountable for the harm or damage that the activity , device or process causes. this follows from general and widely accepted liability concepts of justice according to which the person that creates a risk for the public is accountable if that risk materializes. consequently , the rise of ai-systems does not pose a need for a complete revision of liability rules throughout the union. specific adjustments of the existing legislation and very few new provisions would be sufficient to accommodate the ai-related challenges. ### (6) nevertheless , it should always be clear that whoever creates , maintains , controls or interferes with the ai-system , should be accountable for the harm or damage that the activity , device or process causes. this follows from general and widely accepted liability concepts of justice according to which the person that creates a risk for the public is accountable if that risk materializes. consequently , the rise of ai-systems does not pose a need for a complete revision of liability rules throughout the union. specific adjustments of the existing legislation and well-assessed and targeted new provisions would be sufficient to accommodate the ai-related challenges.


### (7) council directive 85/374/eec3 (the product liability directive) has proven to be an effective means of getting compensation for damage triggered by a defective product. hence , it should also be used with regard to civil liability claims of a party who suffers harm or damage against the producer of a defective ai-system. in line with the better regulation principles of the union , any necessary legislative adjustments should be discussed during a review of that directive. the existing fault-based liability law of the member states also offers in most cases a sufficient level of protection for persons that suffer harm or damages caused by an interfering third person , as that interference regularly constitutes a fault-based action. consequently , this regulation should focus on claims against the deployer of an ai-system. ### (7) council directive 85/374/eec3 (the product liability directive) has proven to be an effective means of getting compensation for damage triggered by a defective product. hence , it should also be used with regard to civil liability claims of a party who suffers harm or damage against the producer of a defective ai-system. in line with the better regulation principles of the union , any necessary legislative adjustments should be discussed during the review of that directive. the existing fault-based liability law of the member states also offers in most cases a sufficient level of protection for persons that suffer harm or damages caused by an interfering third person , as that interference regularly constitutes a fault-based action. consequently , this regulation should focus on claims against the operator of an ai-system.


### (8) the liability of the deployer under this regulation is based on the fact that he or she controls a risk by operating an ai-system. comparable to an owner of a car or pet , the deployer is able to exercise a certain level of control over the risk that the item poses. exercising control thereby should be understood as meaning any action of the deployer that affects the manner of the operation from start to finish or that changes specific functions or processes within the ai-system. ### (8) the liability of the operator under this regulation is based on the fact that he or she exercises a degree of control over a risk connected to the operation of an ai-system , which is comparable to that of an owner of a car or pet. exercising control thereby should be understood meaning any action of the operator that influences the operation of the ai-system and thus the extent to which it exposes third parties to its potential risks. these actions could impact the operation from start to finish by determining the input , output or results , or change specific functions or processes within the ai-system;


### (9) if a user , namely the person that utilises the ai-system , is involved in the harmful event , he or she should only be liable under this regulation if the user also qualifies as a deployer. this regulation should not consider the backend operator , who is the person continuously defining the features of the relevant technology and providing essential and ongoing backend support , to be a deployer and thus , its provisions should not apply to him or her. for the purpose of legal certainty throughout the union , the backend operator should fall under the same liability rules as the producer , manufacturer and developer. ### (9) if a user , namely the person that utilises the ai-system , is involved in the harmful event , he or she should only be liable under this regulation if the user also qualifies as an operator. for the purpose of legal certainty throughout the union , if the backend operator is the producer or the manufacturer within the meaning of article 3 of the product liability directive , that directive should apply to him or her. if there is only one operator , who is also the producer , this regulation should prevail.


### (10) this regulation should cover in principle all ai-systems , no matter where they are operating and whether the operations take place physically or virtually. the majority of liability claims under this regulation should however address cases of third party liability , where an ai-system operates in a public space and exposes many third persons to a risk. in that situation , the affected persons will often not be aware of the operating ai-system and will not have any contractual or legal relationship towards the deployer. consequently , the operation of the ai-system puts them into a situation in which , in the event of harm or damage being caused , they only have fault-based liability claims against the deployer of the ai-system , while facing severe difficulties to prove fault on the part of the deployer. ### (10) this regulation should cover in principle all ai-systems , no matter where they are operating and whether the operations take place physically or virtually. the majority of liability claims under this regulation should however address cases of third party liability , where an ai-system operates in a public space and exposes many third persons to a risk. in that situation , the affected persons will often not be aware of the operating ai-system and will not have any contractual or legal relationship towards the operator. consequently , the operation of the ai-system puts them into a situation in which , in the event of harm or damage being caused , they only have fault-based liability claims against the operator of the ai-system , while facing severe difficulties to prove fault on the part of the operator.


### (11) the type of ai-system the deployer is exercising control over is a determining factor. an ai-system that entails a high risk potentially endangers the public to a much higher degree and in a manner that is random and impossible to predict in advance. this means that at the start of the autonomous operation of the ai-system , the majority of the potentially affected persons are unknown and not identifiable (e.g. persons on a public square or in a neighbouring house) , compared to the operation of an ai-system that involves specific persons , who have regularly consented to its deployment before (e.g. surgery in a hospital or sales demonstration in a small shop). determining how significant the potential to cause harm or damage by a high-risk ai-system should depend on the interplay between the manner in which the ai-system is being used , the severity of the potential harm or damage and the likelihood that the risk materialises. the degree of severity should be determined based on the extent of the potential harm resulting from the operation , the number of affected persons , the total value for the potential damage as well as the harm to society as a whole. the likelihood should be determined based on the role of the algorithmic calculations in the decision-making process , the complexity of the decision and the reversibility of the effects. ultimately , the manner of usage should depend , among other things , on the sector in which the ai-system operates , if it could have legal or factual effects on important legally protected rights of the affected person , and whether the effects can reasonably be avoided. ### (11) the type of ai-system the operator is exercising control over is a determining factor. an ai-system that entails a high risk potentially endangers the public to a much higher degree and in a manner that is random and goes beyond what can reasonably be expected from its intended use. this means that at the start of the autonomous operation of the ai-system , the majority of the potentially affected persons are unknown and not identifiable (e.g. persons on a public square or in a neighbouring house) , compared to the operation of an ai-system that involves specific persons , who have regularly consented to its deployment before (e.g. surgery in a hospital or sales demonstration in a small shop). determining how significant the potential to cause harm or damage by a high-risk ai-system is dependent on the interplay between the manner in which the ai-system is being used , the severity of the potential harm or damage and the likelihood that the risk materialises. the degree of severity should be determined based on the extent of the potential harm resulting from the operation , the number of affected persons , the total value for the potential damage as well as the harm to society as a whole. the likelihood should be determined based on the role of the algorithmic calculations in the decision-making process , the complexity of the decision and the reversibility of the effects. ultimately , the manner of usage should depend , among other things , on the sector in which the ai-system operates , if it could have legal or factual effects on important legally protected rights of the affected person , and whether the effects can reasonably be avoided.


### (12) all ai-systems with a high risk should be listed in an annex to this regulation. given the rapid technical and market developments as well as the technical expertise which is required for an adequate review of ai-systems , the power to adopt delegated acts in accordance with article 290 of the treaty on the functioning of the european union should be delegated to the commission to amend this regulation in respect of the types of ai-systems that pose a high risk and the critical sectors where they are used. based on the definitions and provisions laid down in this regulation , the commission should review the annex every six months and , if necessary , amend it by means of delegated acts. to give businesses enough planning and investment security , changes to the critical sectors should only be made every 12 months. developers are called upon to notify the commission if they are currently working on a new technology , product or service that falls under one of the existing critical sectors provided for in the annex and which later could qualify for a high risk ai-system. ### (12) all ai-systems with a high risk should be listed in an annex to this regulation. given the rapid technical and market developments as well as the technical expertise which is required for an adequate review of ai-systems , the power to adopt delegated acts in accordance with article 290 of the treaty on the functioning of the european union should be delegated to the commission to amend this regulation in respect of the types of ai-systems that pose a high risk and the critical sectors where they are used. based on the definitions and provisions laid down in this regulation , the commission should review the annex every six months and , if necessary , amend it by means of delegated acts. to give businesses enough planning and investment security , changes to the critical sectors should only be made every twelve months. operators are called upon to notify the commission if they are currently working on a new technology , product or service that falls under one of the existing critical sectors provided for in the annex and which later could qualify for a high risk ai-system.


### (14) in line with strict liability systems of the member states , this regulation should cover only harm or damage to life , health , physical integrity and property. for the same reason , it should determine the amount and extent of compensation , as well as the limitation period for bringing forward liability claims. in contrast to the product liability directive , this regulation should set out a significantly lower ceiling for compensation , as it only refers to a single operation of an ai-system , while the former refers to a number of products or even a product line with the same defect. ### (14) this regulation should cover harm or damage to life , health , physical integrity , property and significant immaterial damage. for immaterial damage to be considered significant , the person must have suffered noticeable disadvantage and it had to be an objectively comprehensible impairment of personal interests with a substantial economic loss. the regulation should also determine the amount and extent of compensation , as well as the limitation period for bringing forward liability claims. in contrast to the product liability directive , this regulation should set out a significantly lower ceiling for compensation , as it only refers to the damage of a single person resulting from a single operation of an ai-system , while the former refers to a number of products or even a product line with the same defect.


### (15) all physical or virtual activities , devices or processes driven by ai-systems that are not listed as a high-risk ai-system in the annex to this regulation should remain subject to fault-based liability. the national laws of the member states , including any relevant jurisprudence , with regard to the amount and extent of compensation as well as the limitation period should continue to apply. a person who suffers harm or damage caused by an ai-system should however benefit from the presumption of fault of the deployer. ### (15) all physical or virtual activities , devices or processes driven by ai-systems that are not listed as a high-risk ai-system in the annex to this regulation should remain subject to fault-based liability. the national laws of the member states , including any relevant jurisprudence , with regard to the amount and extent of compensation as well as the limitation period should continue to apply. a person who suffers harm or damage caused by an ai-system should however benefit from the presumption of fault of the operator.


### (16) the diligence which can be expected from a deployer should be commensurate with (i) the nature of the ai system , (ii) the legally protected right potentially affected , (iii) the potential harm or damage the ai-system could cause and (iv) the likelihood of such damage. thereby , it should be taken into account that the deployer might have limited knowledge of the algorithms and data used in the ai-system. it should be presumed that the deployer has observed due care in selecting a suitable ai-system , if the deployer has selected an ai-system which has been certified under [the voluntary certification scheme envisaged on p. 24 of com(2020) 65 final]. it should be presumed that the deployer has observed due care during the operation of the ai-system , if the deployer can prove to have actually and regularly monitored the ai-system during its operation and to have notified the manufacturer about potential irregularities during the operation. it should be presumed that the deployer has observed due care as regards maintaining the operational reliability , if the deployer installed all available updates provided by the producer of the ai-system. ### (16) the diligence which can be expected from an operator should be commensurate with (i) the nature of the ai system , (ii) the legally protected right potentially affected , (iii) the potential harm or damage the ai-system could cause and (iv) the likelihood of such damage. thereby , it should be taken into account that the operator might have limited knowledge of the algorithms and data used in the ai-system. it should be presumed that the operator has observed due care in selecting a suitable ai-system , if the operator has selected an ai-system which has been certified under [the voluntary certification scheme envisaged on p. 24 of com(2020) 65 final]. it should be presumed that the operator has observed due care during the operation of the ai-system , if the operator can prove to have actually and regularly monitored the ai-system during its operation and to have notified the manufacturer about potential irregularities during the operation. it should be presumed that the operator has observed due care as regards maintaining the operational reliability , if the operator installed all available updates provided by the producer of the ai-system.


### (17) in order to enable the deployer to prove that he or she was not at fault , the producers should have the duty to collaborate with the deployer. european as well as non-european producers should furthermore have the obligation to designate an ai-liability-representative within the union as a contact point for replying to all requests from deployers , taking similar provisions set out in article 37 gdpr (data protection officers) , articles 3(41) and 13(4) of regulation 2018/858 of the european parliament and of the council5 and articles 4(2) and 5 of regulation 2019/1020 of the european parliament and of the council6 (manufacturer's representative) into account. ### (17) in order to enable the operator to prove that he or she was not at fault , or the affected person to prove the existence of fault , the producers should have the duty to collaborate with both parties concerned. european as well as non-european producers should furthermore have the obligation to designate an ai-liability-representative within the union as a contact point for replying to all requests from operators , taking similar provisions set out in article 37 gdpr (data protection officers) , articles 3(41) and 13(4) of regulation 2018/858 of the european parliament and of the council5 and articles 4(2) and 5 of regulation 2019/1020 of the european parliament and of the council6 (manufacturer's representative) into account.


### (18) the legislator has to consider the liability risks connected to ai-systems during their whole lifecycle , from development to usage to end of life. the inclusion of ai-systems in a product or service represents a financial risk for businesses and consequently will have a heavy impact on the ability and options for small and medium-sized enterprises (sme) as well as for start-ups in relation to insuring and financing their projects based on new technologies. the purpose of liability is , therefore , not only to safeguard important legally protected rights of individuals but also a factor which determines whether businesses , especially smes and start-ups , are able to raise capital , innovate and ultimately offer new products and services , as well as whether the customers are willing to use such products and services despite the potential risks and legal claims being brought against them. ### (18) the legislator has to consider the liability risks connected to ai-systems during their whole lifecycle , from development to usage to end of life. the inclusion of ai-systems in a product or service represents a financial risk for businesses and consequently will have a heavy impact on the ability and options for smes as well as for start-ups in relation to insuring and financing their projects based on new technologies. the purpose of liability is , therefore , not only to safeguard important legally protected rights of individuals but also a factor which determines whether businesses , especially smes and start-ups , are able to raise capital , innovate and ultimately offer new products and services , as well as whether the customers are willing to use such products and services despite the potential risks and legal claims being brought against them.


### (20) despite missing historical claim data , there are already insurance products that are developed area-by-area and cover-by-cover as technology develops. many insurers specialise in certain market segments (e.g. smes) or in providing cover for certain product types (e.g. electrical goods) , which means that there will usually be an insurance product available for the insured. if a new type of insurance is needed , the insurance market will develop and offer a fitting solution and thus , will close the insurance gap. in exceptional cases , in which the compensation significantly exceeds the maximum amounts set out in this regulation , member states should be encouraged to set up a special compensation fund for a limited period of time that addresses the specific needs of those cases. ### (20) because historical claim data is missing , it should be investigated how and under which conditions liability is insurable. there are already insurance products that are developed area-by-area and cover-by-cover as technology develops. many insurers specialise in certain market segments (e.g. smes) or in providing cover for certain product types (e.g. electrical goods) , which means that there will usually be an insurance product available for the insured. however , a “one size fits all” solution is difficult to envisage and the insurance market will need time to adapt. the commission should work closely with the insurance market to develop innovative insurance products that could close the insurance gap. in exceptional cases , in which the compensation significantly exceeds the maximum amounts set out in this regulation , member states should be encouraged to set up a special compensation fund for a limited period of time that addresses the specific needs of those cases.


### (21) it is of utmost importance that any future changes to this text go hand in hand with a necessary review of the pld. the introduction of a new liability regime for the deployer of ai-systems requires that the provisions of this regulation and the review of the pld should be closely coordinated in terms of substance as well as approach so that they together constitute a consistent liability framework for ai-systems , balancing the interests of producer , deployer and the affected person , as regards the liability risk. adapting and streamlining the definitions of ai-system , deployer , producer , developer , defect , product and service throughout all pieces of legislation is therefore necessary. ### (21) it is of utmost importance that any future changes to this text go hand in hand with the necessary review of the pld. the introduction of a new liability regime for the operator of ai-systems requires that the provisions of this regulation and the review of the pld should be closely coordinated in terms of substance as well as approach so that they together constitute a consistent liability framework for ai-systems , balancing the interests of producer , operator and the affected person , as regards the liability risk. adapting and streamlining the definitions of ai-system , operator , producer , developer , defect , product and service throughout all pieces of legislation is therefore necessary and should be envisaged in parallel.


### this regulation sets out rules for the civil liability claims of natural and legal persons against the deployer of ai-systems. ### this regulation sets out rules for the civil liability claims of natural and legal persons against the operator of ai-systems.


### 1. this regulation applies on the territory of the union where a physical or virtual activity , device or process driven by an ai-system has caused harm or damage to the life , health , physical integrity or the property of a natural or legal person. ### 1. this regulation applies on the territory of the union where a physical or virtual activity , device or process driven by an ai-system has caused harm or damage to the life , health , physical integrity and property of a natural or legal person or has caused significant immaterial damage to a natural or legal person.


### 2. any agreement between a deployer of an ai-system and a natural or legal person who suffers harm or damage because of the ai-system , which circumvents or limits the rights and obligations set out in this regulation , whether concluded before or after the harm or damage has been caused , shall be deemed null and void. ### 2. any agreement between an operator of an ai-system and a natural or legal person who suffers harm or damage because of the ai-system , which circumvents or limits the rights and obligations set out in this regulation , whether concluded before or after the harm or damage has been caused , shall be deemed null and void.


### 3. this regulation is without prejudice to any additional liability claims resulting from contractual relationships between the deployer and the natural or legal person who suffered harm or damage because of the ai-system. ### 3. this regulation is without prejudice to any additional liability claims resulting from contractual relationships between the operator and the natural or legal person who suffered harm or damage because of the ai-system.


### ‘ai-system’ means a system that displays intelligent behaviour by analysing certain input and taking action , with some degree of autonomy , to achieve specific goals. ai-systems can be purely software-based , acting in the virtual world , or can be embedded in hardware devices; ### ‘ai-system’ means a system that displays intelligent behaviour by analysing their environment and taking action , with some degree of autonomy , to achieve specific goals. ai-systems can be purely software-based , acting in the virtual world , or can be embedded in hardware devices;


### ‘high risk’ means a significant potential in an autonomously operating ai-system to cause harm or damage to one or more persons in a manner that is random and impossible to predict in advance; the significance of the potential depends on the interplay between the severity of possible harm or damage , the likelihood that the risk materializes and the manner in which the ai-system is being used; ### ‘high risk’ means a significant potential in an autonomously operating ai-system to cause harm or damage to one or more persons in a manner that is random and goes beyond what can reasonably be expected from its intended use; the significance of the potential depends on the interplay between the severity of possible harm or damage , the likelihood that the risk materializes and the manner in which the ai-system is being used;


### ‘deployer’ means the person who decides on the use of the ai-system , exercises control over the associated risk and benefits from its operation; ### ‘operator’ means the person who exercises control over the associated risk and benefits from its operation;


### ‘affected person’ means any person who suffers harm or damage caused by a physical or virtual activity , device or process driven by an ai-system , and who is not its deployer; ### ‘affected person’ means any person who suffers harm or damage caused by a physical or virtual activity , device or process driven by an ai-system , and who is not its operator;


### ‘harm or damage’ means an adverse impact affecting the life , health , physical integrity or property of a natural or legal person , with the exception of non-material harm; ### ‘harm or damage’ means an adverse impact affecting the life , health , physical integrity , property of a natural or legal person , or causing significant immaterial damage.


### ‘producer’ means the developer or the backend operator of an ai-system , or the producer as defined in article 3 of council directive 85/374/eec7 . ### ‘producer’ means the producer as defined in article 3 of council directive 85/374/eec7 .


### 1. the deployer of a high-risk ai-system shall be strictly liable for any harm or damage that was caused by a physical or virtual activity , device or process driven by that ai-system. ### 1. the operator of a high-risk ai-system shall be strictly liable for any harm or damage that was caused by a physical or virtual activity , device or process driven by that ai-system.


### 3. the deployer of a high-risk ai-system shall not be able to exonerate himself or herself by arguing that he or she acted with due diligence or that the harm or damage was caused by an autonomous activity , device or process driven by his or her ai-system. the deployer shall not be held liable if the harm or damage was caused by force majeure. ### 3. the operator of a high-risk ai-system shall not be able to exonerate himself or herself by arguing that he or she acted with due diligence or that the harm or damage was caused by an autonomous activity , device or process driven by his or her ai-system. the operator shall not be held liable if the harm or damage was caused by force majeure.


### 4. the deployer of a high-risk ai-system shall ensure they have liability insurance cover that is adequate in relation to the amounts and extent of compensation provided for in article 5 and 6 of this regulation. if compulsory insurance regimes already in force pursuant to other union or national law are considered to cover the operation of the ai-system , the obligation to take out insurance for the ai-system pursuant to this regulation shall be deemed fulfilled , as long as the relevant existing compulsory insurance covers the amounts and the extent of compensation provided for in articles 5 and 6 of this regulation. ### 4. the operator of a high-risk ai-system shall ensure they have liability insurance cover that is adequate in relation to the amounts and extent of compensation provided for in article 5 and 6 of this regulation. if compulsory insurance regimes already in force pursuant to other union or national law are considered to cover the operation of the ai-system , the obligation to take out insurance for the ai-system pursuant to this regulation shall be deemed fulfilled , as long as the relevant existing compulsory insurance covers the amounts and the extent of compensation provided for in articles 5 and 6 of this regulation.


### 1. a deployer of a high-risk ai-system that has been held liable for harm or damage under this regulation shall compensate: ### 1. a operator of a high-risk ai-system that has been held liable for harm or damage under this regulation shall compensate:


### up to a maximum total amount of eur ten million in the event of death or of harm caused to the health or physical integrity of one or several persons as the result of the same operation of the same high-risk ai-system; ### up to a maximum total amount of eur two million in the event of death or of harm caused to the health or physical integrity of one person as the result of the single operation of a single high-risk ai-system;


### up to a maximum total amount of eur two million in the event of damage caused to property , including when several items of property of one or several persons were damaged as a result of the same operation of the same high-risk ai-system; where the affected person also holds a contractual liability claim against the deployer , no compensation shall be paid under this regulation if the total amount of the damage to property is of a value that falls below eur 500. ### up to a maximum total amount of eur one million in the event of damage caused to property , including when several items of property of one person were damaged as a result of a single operation of a single high-risk ai-system , or significant immaterial damage; where the affected person also holds a contractual liability claim against the operator , no compensation shall be paid under this regulation if the total amount of the damage to property is of a value that falls below eur 500.


### 2. where the combined compensation to be paid to several persons who suffer harm or damage caused by the same operation of the same high-risk ai-system exceeds the maximum total amounts provided for in paragraph 1 , the amounts to be paid to each person shall be reduced pro-rata so that the combined compensation does not exceed the maximum amounts set out in paragraph 1. ### deleted


### 1. within the amount set out in article 5(1)(a) , compensation to be paid by the deployer held liable in the event of physical harm followed by the death of the affected person , shall be calculated based on the costs of medical treatment that the affected person underwent prior to his or her death , and of the pecuniary prejudice sustained prior to death caused by the cessation or reduction of the earning capacity or the increase in his or her needs for the duration of the harm prior to death. the deployer held liable shall furthermore reimburse the funeral costs for the deceased affected person to the party who is responsible for defraying those expenses. ### 1. within the amount set out in article 5(1)(a) , compensation to be paid by the operator held liable in the event of physical harm followed by the death of the affected person , shall be calculated based on the costs of medical treatment that the affected person underwent prior to his or her death , and of the pecuniary prejudice sustained prior to death caused by the cessation or reduction of the earning capacity or the increase in his or her needs for the duration of the harm prior to death. the operator held liable shall furthermore reimburse the funeral costs for the deceased affected person to the party who is responsible for defraying those expenses.


### if at the time of the incident that caused the harm leading to his or her death , the affected person was in a relationship with a third party and had a legal obligation to support that third party , the deployer held liable shall indemnify the third party by paying maintenance to the extent to which the affected person would have been obliged to pay , for the period corresponding to an average life expectancy for a person of his or her age and general description. the deployer shall also indemnify the third party if , at the time of the incident that caused the death , the third party had been conceived but had not yet been born. ### if at the time of the incident that caused the harm leading to his or her death , the affected person was in a relationship with a third party and had a legal obligation to support that third party , the operator held liable shall indemnify the third party by paying maintenance to the extent to which the affected person would have been obliged to pay , for the period corresponding to an average life expectancy for a person of his or her age and general description. the operator shall also indemnify the third party if , at the time of the incident that caused the death , the third party had been conceived but had not yet been born.


### 2. within the amount set out in article 5(1)(b) , compensation to be paid by the deployer held liable in the event of harm to the health or the physical integrity of the affected person shall include the reimbursement of the costs of the related medical treatment as well as the payment for any pecuniary prejudice sustained by the affected person , as a result of the temporary suspension , reduction or permanent cessation of his or her earning capacity or the consequent , medically certified increase in his or her needs. ### 2. within the amount set out in article 5(1)(b) , compensation to be paid by the operator held liable in the event of harm to the health or the physical integrity of the affected person shall include the reimbursement of the costs of the related medical treatment as well as the payment for any pecuniary prejudice sustained by the affected person , as a result of the temporary suspension , reduction or permanent cessation of his or her earning capacity or the consequent , medically certified increase in his or her needs.


### 2. civil liability claims , brought in accordance with article 4(1) , concerning damage to property shall be subject to a special limitation period of: ### 2. civil liability claims , brought in accordance with article 4(1) , concerning damage to property or significant immaterial damage shall be subject to a special limitation period of:


### 30 years from the date on which the operation of the high-risk ai-system that subsequently caused the property damage took place. ### 30 years from the date on which the operation of the high-risk ai-system that subsequently caused the property or significant immaterial damage took place.


### 1. the deployer of an ai-system that is not defined as a high-risk ai-system , in accordance to article 3(c) and , as a result is not listed in the annex to this regulation , shall be subject to fault-based liability for any harm or damage that was caused by a physical or virtual activity , device or process driven by the ai-system. ### 1. the operator of an ai-system that is not defined as a high-risk ai-system , in accordance to article 4 and , as a result is not listed in the annex to this regulation , shall be subject to fault-based liability for any harm or damage that was caused by a physical or virtual activity , device or process driven by the ai-system.


### 2. the deployer shall not be liable if he or she can prove that the harm or damage was caused without his or her fault , relying on either of the following grounds’: ### 2. the operator shall not be liable if he or she can prove that the harm or damage was caused without his or her fault , relying on either of the following grounds’:


### due diligence was observed by selecting a suitable ai-system for the right task and skills , putting the ai-system duly into operation , monitoring the activities and maintaining the operational reliability by regularly installing all available updates. ### due diligence was strictly observed by selecting a suitable ai-system for the right task and skills , putting the ai-system duly into operation , monitoring the activities and maintaining the operational reliability by regularly installing all available updates.


### the deployer shall not be able to escape liability by arguing that the harm or damage was caused by an autonomous activity , device or process driven by his or her ai-system. the deployer shall not be liable if the harm or damage was caused by force majeure. ### the operator shall not be able to escape liability by arguing that the harm or damage was caused by an autonomous activity , device or process driven by his or her ai-system. the operator shall not be liable if the harm or damage was caused by force majeure.


### 3. where the harm or damage was caused by a third party that interfered with the ai-system by modifying its functioning , the deployer shall nonetheless be liable for the payment of compensation if such third party is untraceable or impecunious. ### 3. where the harm or damage was caused by a third party that interfered with the ai-system by modifying its functioning , the operator shall nonetheless be liable for the payment of compensation if such third party is untraceable or impecunious.


### 4. at the request of the deployer , the producer of an ai-system shall have the duty of collaborating with the deployer to the extent warranted by the significance of the claim in order to allow the deployer to prove that he or she acted without fault. ### 4. at the request of the operator or the affected person , the producer of an ai-system shall have the duty of collaborating with them to the extent warranted by the significance of the claim in order to allow for the identification of the liabilities.


### 1. if the harm or damage is caused both by a physical or virtual activity , device or process driven by an ai-system and by the actions of an affected person or of any person for whom the affected person is responsible , the deployer’s extent of liability under this regulation shall be reduced accordingly. the deployer shall not be liable if the affected person or the person for whom he or she is responsible is solely or predominantly accountable for the harm or damage caused. ### 1. if the harm or damage is caused both by a physical or virtual activity , device or process driven by an ai-system and by the actions of an affected person or of any person for whom the affected person is responsible , the operator’s extent of liability under this regulation shall be reduced accordingly. the operator shall not be liable if the affected person or the person for whom he or she is responsible is solely accountable for the harm or damage caused.


### 2. a deployer held liable may use the data generated by the ai-system to prove contributory negligence on the part of the affected person. ### 2. an operator held liable and the affected person may use the data generated by the ai-system to prove contributory negligence on the part of the affected person , without prejudice to regulation (eu) 2016/679.


### if there is more than one deployer of an ai-system , they shall be jointly and severally liable. if any of the deployers is also the producer of the ai-system , this regulation shall prevail over the product liability directive. ### if there is more than one operator of an ai-system , they shall be jointly and severally liable. if any of the operators is also the producer of the ai-system , this regulation shall prevail over the product liability directive.


### 1. the deployer shall not be entitled to pursue a recourse action unless the affected person , who is entitled to receive compensation under this regulation , has been paid in full. ### 1. the operator shall not be entitled to pursue a recourse action unless the affected person , who is entitled to receive compensation under this regulation , has been paid in full.