### 8. calls for the commission and the member states to foster a more diverse cultural sector by removing barriers to participation in culture for racialised communities through funding from all the relevant programmes; encourages the creation of support networks and outreach activities , especially for those in rural and outermost regions; ### 8. calls for the commission and the member states to foster a more diverse cultural sector by removing barriers to participation in culture for ethnic and racialised communities in particular through funding from all the relevant programmes; encourages the creation of support networks and outreach activities , especially for those in rural and outermost regions;


### 9. calls on the commission and the member states to improve monitoring and evaluation , including by testing and sharing participatory tools , which can demonstrate the effects of promoting inclusion and non-discrimination and combating racism through culture and help to create more inclusive policies; ### 9. calls on the commission and the member states to improve the sharing of best practices , monitoring and evaluation , including by testing and sharing participatory tools , which can demonstrate the effects of promoting inclusion and non-discrimination and combating racism through culture and help to create more inclusive policies;


### 9. calls on the commission and the member states to improve monitoring and evaluation , including by testing and sharing participatory tools , which can demonstrate the effects of promoting inclusion and non-discrimination and combating racism through culture and help to create more inclusive policies; ### 9. calls on the commission and the member states to improve monitoring , evaluation and exchange of best-practices , including by testing and sharing participatory tools , which can demonstrate the effects of promoting inclusion and non-discrimination and combating racism through culture and help to create more inclusive policies;


### 10. welcomes the recent report by the open method of cooperation (omc) working group of member states’ experts on gender equality in the cultural and creative sectors; calls on the omc working group to produce a study on the role that culture plays in promoting racial equality within the cultural and creative sectors; ### 10. welcomes the recent report by the open method of cooperation (omc) working group of member states’ experts on gender equality in the cultural and creative sectors; calls on the omc working group to produce a study on the role that culture and the creative sector play in promoting racial equality within the cultural and creative sectors;


### 10. welcomes the recent report by the open method of cooperation (omc) working group of member states’ experts on gender equality in the cultural and creative sectors; calls on the omc working group to produce a study on the role that culture plays in promoting racial equality within the cultural and creative sectors; ### 10. welcomes the work of the open method of cooperation (omc) working group of member states’ experts on gender equality in the cultural and creative sectors; calls on the member states to include in the next work plan for culture an omc working group of member states’ experts on combatting racism through arts and culture;


### 12. underlines the lasting negative impact of european colonialism on today’s society , including in the development of educational curricula; ### 12. underlines the lasting negative impact of particular elements of european history including colonialism , slavery and genocide on today’s society , including in the development of educational curricula;


### 13. calls on the member states to foster the development of diverse educational curricula to ensure that authors , historians , scientists and artists among other figures from diverse racial and ethnic backgrounds are included in key materials; ### 13. calls on the member states to foster the development of educational curricula to ensure that authors , historians , scientists , artists and other prominent figures from diverse racial and ethnic backgrounds are included in them as well as in other key materials;


### 13. calls on the member states to foster the development of diverse educational curricula to ensure that authors , historians , scientists and artists among other figures from diverse racial and ethnic backgrounds are included in key materials; ### 13. calls on the member states to foster the development of diverse and inclusive educational curricula to ensure that authors , historians , scientists and artists among other figures from diverse racial and ethnic backgrounds are included in key materials;


### 14. calls for the history of all racial and ethnic communities living in europe to be included in all history curricula in order to encourage a broader perspective on world history centred on the interactions between different continents before and after european colonisation; ### 14. calls for the history of all racial and ethnic communities living in europe to be included in history curricula in order to encourage a broader and more factual perspective on european and world history centred on the interactions between different continents before and after european colonisation;


### 14. calls for the history of all racial and ethnic communities living in europe to be included in all history curricula in order to encourage a broader perspective on world history centred on the interactions between different continents before and after european colonisation; ### 14. calls for the history of racial and ethnic communities living in europe to be included in all history curricula in order to encourage a broader perspective on world history centred on the interactions between different continents before , during and after european colonisation;


### 15. deplores the practice of segregation in schools; calls on all member states to introduce policies to prevent children from minority groups from being placed in separate schools or classes , whether intentionally or not; ### 15. deplores the practice of segregation in schools; calls on all member states to introduce policies to prevent children from minority groups from being placed in separate schools or classes , whether intentionally or not; emphasizes that such practices often stem from misdiagnosing children from certain minority groups with intellectual disabilities based on their social or personal circumstances , resulting in their placement in special schools with reduced curricula and , consequently , limiting possibilities for their further education. calls , therefore , on the member states to ensure that their educational systems embrace the concept of adjustment to different needs of different children instead of retaining the concept of a child that does not meet the demands of the system and needs to be separated;


### 15. deplores the practice of segregation in schools; calls on all member states to introduce policies to prevent children from minority groups from being placed in separate schools or classes , whether intentionally or not; ### 15. strongly condemns the practice of racial and ethnic segregation in schools , which is still in existence in europe; warns that such practices lead to marginalisation , early dropout , low enrolment rate , the creation of parallel social spaces , perpetuates structural discrimination and hampers equal access to quality life; calls on all member states to introduce policies to prevent students , from preschool to higher education , belonging to minority groups from being placed in separate schools , education institutions or classes , whether intentionally or not;


### 15. deplores the practice of segregation in schools; calls on all member states to introduce policies to prevent children from minority groups from being placed in separate schools or classes , whether intentionally or not; ### 15. deplores the practice of segregation in education; calls on all member states to introduce or reinforce inclusive policies to prevent children from marginalised groups from being placed in separate schools or classes , whether intentionally or not;


### 16. calls on the member states to ensure that teaching staff from minority groups are recruited at all levels and are protected from racial discrimination in the school system; ### 16. calls on the member states to ensure that teaching staff from racial and ethnic minority groups are recruited at all levels of education and that measures are put in place to ensure that both educators and learners are protected from racial discrimination in the school system;


### 16. calls on the member states to ensure that teaching staff from minority groups are recruited at all levels and are protected from racial discrimination in the school system; ### 16. calls on the member states to ensure that teaching staff from minority groups have equal access to teaching and education jobs at all levels and are protected from racial discrimination in the school system;


### 18. underlines the importance of representation and diversity in the development of inclusive societies; calls on the relevant stakeholders to address diversity and representation within their organisations; regrets the lack of racial and ethnic diversity in the media; ### 18. underlines the importance of representation and diversity in the development of inclusive societies; reminds the responsibility of media in reflecting societies in all their diversity , and regrets the lack of racial and ethnic diversity in many media; calls on the relevant stakeholders to address diversity and representation within their organisations including by creating a responsible figure for diversity;


### 19. welcomes the commission’s commitment to launching a communication campaign to foster diversity in the audiovisual sector; calls for this campaign to be centred on the diversity and history of racialised communities and on how achieving racial justice can contribute to a more democratic europe; ### 19. welcomes the commission’s commitment to launching a communication campaign to foster off-and on-screen , off-and on-air diversity in the audiovisual sector; calls for this campaign to be centred on the diversity and history of racialised communities and on how achieving racial justice can contribute to a more cohesive , peaceful and democratic europe;


### 19. welcomes the commission’s commitment to launching a communication campaign to foster diversity in the audiovisual sector; calls for this campaign to be centred on the diversity and history of racialised communities and on how achieving racial justice can contribute to a more democratic europe; ### 19. welcomes the commission’s communication campaign to foster diversity in the audiovisual sector; calls for this campaign to include the diversity and history of racialised communities , as well as other marginalised communities , and to highlight how achieving racial justice can contribute to a more democratic europe for all;


### 19. welcomes the commission’s commitment to launching a communication campaign to foster diversity in the audiovisual sector; calls for this campaign to be centred on the diversity and history of racialised communities and on how achieving racial justice can contribute to a more democratic europe; ### 19. welcomes the commission’s commitment to launching a communication and awareness-raising campaign to foster diversity in the audiovisual sector; calls for this campaign to be centred on the diversity and history of racialised communities and on how achieving racial justice can contribute to a more democratic europe;


### 21. notes that some member states have audiovisual regulatory bodies with the power to issue sanctions following programmes that show discriminatory or racist content; encourages the member states to empower their regulatory agencies in this sense; calls for the european regulators group for audiovisual media services to be given a greater role in coordinating the national agencies and collecting and sharing data; ### 21. notes that some member states have audiovisual regulatory bodies with the power to issue sanctions following programmes that show discriminatory or racist content; encourages the member states to empower their regulatory agencies in this sense; calls for the european regulators group for audiovisual media services to access resources to properly coordinate the national agencies in collecting and sharing quality data , as well as in monitoring such task;


### 21. notes that some member states have audiovisual regulatory bodies with the power to issue sanctions following programmes that show discriminatory or racist content; encourages the member states to empower their regulatory agencies in this sense; calls for the european regulators group for audiovisual media services to be given a greater role in coordinating the national agencies and collecting and sharing data; ### 21. notes that some member states have audiovisual regulatory bodies with the power to issue sanctions following programmes that promote discriminatory or racist content; encourages the member states to empower their regulatory agencies in this sense; calls for the european regulators group for audiovisual media services to be given a greater role in coordinating the national agencies and collecting and sharing data;


### 23. calls on the commission to open a specific call for funding for grassroots sports initiatives focused on inclusion and the fight against racism; calls on the commission , furthermore , to systematically monitor the number and type of sports projects whose main focus is the fight against racism , and the amount of funding allocated to them; ### 23. notes that racism is mentioned under the sector-specific priorities in key action 2 partnerships for sport and that grassroots sports initiatives focusing on inclusion and the fight against racism can be funded under the new the small scale partnerships scheme; calls on the commission to systematically monitor the number and type of sports projects whose main focus is the fight against racism , and the amount of funding allocated to them;


### 24. urges the commission to develop an eu code of ethics in sport in order to combat racism in sporting organisations and foster inclusion and respect at all levels of sport; invites sporting organisations at all levels to subscribe to such an eu code and to incorporate it within their statutes; encourages organisations to raise awareness of such a code and its content among their members and their families , and the wider public; ### 24. urges the commission to develop an eu code of ethics in sport in order to combat racism in sporting organisations and foster inclusion and respect , including for those that need specific clothing , at all levels of sport; invites sporting organisations at all levels to subscribe to such an eu code and to incorporate it within their statutes; encourages organisations to raise awareness of such a code and its content among their members and their families , and the wider public;


### 24. urges the commission to develop an eu code of ethics in sport in order to combat racism in sporting organisations and foster inclusion and respect at all levels of sport; invites sporting organisations at all levels to subscribe to such an eu code and to incorporate it within their statutes; encourages organisations to raise awareness of such a code and its content among their members and their families , and the wider public; ### 24. urges the commission to develop an eu code of ethics in sport in order to combat racism in sporting organisations and foster inclusion and respect at all levels of sport; invites sporting organisations at all levels to actively contribute to such code making , to subscribe to it and to incorporate it within their statutes; encourages organisations to raise awareness of such a code and its content among their members and their families , and the wider public;


### a. whereas the eu single market and other eu policies have contributed to the natural development of a european educational space , historically underpinned by the traditions of european humanism; ### a. whereas the eu single market and other eu policies have contributed to the natural development of a european educational space , historically underpinned by the traditions of european humanism , fundamental rights and values;


### b. whereas the ultimate goal is building a bottom-up european education area with common european policy objectives , requiring existing obstacles to be removed , european tools to be utilised and supporting policies at national and european levels to be developed; ### b. whereas the ultimate goal is building a bottom-up european education area with common european vision and policy objectives , guaranteeing quality , inclusive and accessible education , reinforcing the exchange of good practices , ensuring an effective framework for european mobility , requiring existing obstacles to be removed , european tools to be utilised and supporting policies at national and european levels to be developed;


### c. whereas education needs to be conceptualised broadly as ‘lifelong learning’ , ranging from pre-primary to tertiary education , including non-formal and informal modes , and being aimed at acquiring transversal skills; ### c. whereas the fundamental right to education needs to be conceptualised broadly as ‘lifelong learning’ , ranging from pre-primary to tertiary education , including vocational education and training as well as non-formal and informal modes of education , and being aimed at acquiring transversal skills;


### d. whereas the challenges the eu and its member states are faced with today , including climate change , various forms of extremism and populism , and the covid-19 pandemic , require appropriate educational answers and concerted european action; ### d. whereas the challenges the eu and its member states are faced with today , including climate change , various forms of extremism and populism , disinformation and conspiracy , the undermining of evidence-based education and the covid-19 pandemic , require appropriate educational answers and concerted european action;


### f. whereas parliament has called on member states to prioritise investments in education and training , valuing education spending as an investment in our common future; ### f. whereas the european parliament has called on member states to prioritise investments in education and training , valuing education spending as an investment in our common future rather than an expense; whereas the european parliament has called investment in education and training to be a substantial part of member states’ recovery plans and the european commission’s next generation eu instrument; ;


### g. whereas progress has been made in building a european higher education area , arising from the long-term efforts of the bologna process; ### g. whereas progress has been made in building a european higher education area , arising from the long-term efforts of the bologna process; whereas european universities need support with their transformative agendas and alliances; whereas they play a central role in creating synergies between education , research and innovation , and substantially contribute to european excellence and its geopolitical power;


### 2. stresses the role of the eea in fostering a sense of european belonging and in providing economic opportunities by addressing existing educational challenges; ### 2. stresses the role of the eea in allowing a greater and better flow of learners , teachers and knowledge across the union , fostering the european sense of belonging and identity , while guaranteeing our rights , freedoms and values , and leading to the emergence of an educational culture and vision that draws from the richness of our diversity and exchange of practices on common challenges , enshrining europe as a true educational power;


### 3. considers education a driver for european economic and social prosperity , and for ensuring that the eu is a globally competitive player and leading the green and digital transitions; ### 3. considers education a driver for european economic and social prosperity , and for ensuring that the eu is a globally competitive and resilient player and leading the green and digital transitions; insists therefore on the eea to rely on the new european strategies for youth and skills;


### 5. takes note of the variety of visions of , and approaches to , an eea , which express a common wish to provide a new impetus for the ‘european project’; ### 5. takes note of the variety of visions of , and approaches to , an eea , which express a common wish to provide a new impetus for common standards in education across the union and for the ‘european project’ itself;


### 9. emphasises the urgent need to develop a common implementation strategy and roadmap that includes the european institutions , member states and all relevant stakeholders , and defines their respective responsibilities; ### 9. emphasises the urgent need to develop a common implementation strategy and roadmap that includes the european institutions , member states and all relevant stakeholders , at local , regional , national and european levels , and defines their respective responsibilities and opportunities; insists that the eea should be readable , clear and accessible , and echo , at all levels of governance; recalls the role of the european semester for successful implementation of eu policies in the field of education;


### 12. highlights inclusiveness as a central dimension of an eea and a prerequisite for achieving quality education for all , ensuring that no talent is left behind; ### 12. highlights inclusiveness as a central dimension of an eea and a prerequisite for achieving quality education for all , ensuring that no one is left behind;


### 15. aims to foster media literacy and critical thinking at all stages of learning as a central means to empower responsible european citizens; ### 15. urges member states to develop media literacy and critical thinking initiatives at all stages of learning as an absolute priority and a central means to empower responsible european citizens; calls on member states to see the eea as embodying a commitment towards the development of basic skills in reading , writing , and mathematics and a culture of tolerance , solidarity and respect for others;


### 16. calls for a common framework on the development of digital competences and on learning about the eu throughout all appropriate levels and areas of education; ### 16. calls for common standards on the development of digital competences and on learning about the eu throughout all appropriate levels and areas of education;


### 17. stresses the importance of enhancing competences and motivation in the education profession , especially supported through the improved recognition of educators’ value to society and by bolstering pedagogical autonomy; ### 17. stresses the importance of enhancing the promotion , competences and motivation in the education profession , especially supported through the improved recognition of educators’ value to society and by bolstering pedagogical autonomy; urges member states , in cooperation with the european commission , to invest in the initial education of teachers and trainers , especially on including a european dimension and transnational mobility in their curricula; welcomes the european commission’s plans on the european teachers award and guidance for national career frameworks; stresses the need for increased mentoring support or induction at the beginning of careers; calls for a further strengthening of eu programmes such as erasmus+ and the teachers academies as support and funding schemes for teachers' pedagogical competence and transnational mobility; calls for the further development of the e-twinning and school education gateway initiatives;


### 18. underlines the need for member states to take action to support the development of linguistic competences in primary and secondary education , to embrace the council of europe’s goal of ‘plurilingualism’ and to achieve the benchmark of all pupils having a sufficient knowledge of english at the end of lower secondary education; ### 18. underlines the need for member states to take action to support the development of linguistic competences in primary and secondary education , to embrace the council of europe’s goal of ‘plurilingualism’ and to achieve the benchmark of all pupils having a sufficient knowledge of at least one other official language of the european union at the end of lower secondary education;


### 20. calls on the commission and member states to facilitate the expansion of automatic mutual recognition of learning outcomes and study periods abroad , including in vet; ### 20. urges the eea to be the final milestone in the recognition of diplomas and qualifications across the union; calls on the commission and member states to ensure the expansion of automatic mutual recognition of learning outcomes and study periods abroad , including in vet;


### 22. urges the commission and the member states to clarify the type of participation required from member states and other levels of government , including local and regional authorities , and to devise effective multi-level governance arrangements that respect subsidiarity while aiming to generate european added value; ### 22. urges the commission and the member states to clarify the type of participation required from the european commission , member states , the european parliament and other levels of government , including local and regional authorities , and to devise effective multi-level governance arrangements that respect subsidiarity while aiming to generate european added value;


### 25. underlines the need for a european dimension in education by strengthening a distinct european perspective in students’ curricula and teachers’ training , including with support from jean monnet actions and teacher academies; proposes that these teacher academies be called ‘comenius teacher academies’; ### 25. underlines the need for a european dimension in education by strengthening a distinct european perspective in students’ curricula and teachers’ training , including with support from jean monnet actions and teacher academies;


### 26. emphasises the need to provide learners with knowledge about european history and cultural heritage , both tangible and intangible , and to foster a critical european memory and historical consciousness; ### 26. emphasises the need to provide learners with knowledge about european history and cultural heritage , both tangible and intangible , and to foster a critical european memory and historical consciousness; calls on the european commission , member states and the council of europe to work towards the inclusion of european history and cultural heritage in curricula across the union;


### 27. stresses the need to familiarise learners with the european integration process , the institutions and policies of the eu , the rights emerging from eu citizenship and how to actively participate in the eu’s democratic processes; ### 27. stresses the need to familiarise learners with the european integration process , the institutions and policies of the eu , the rights emerging from eu citizenship and how to actively participate in the eu’s democratic processes; calls on member states , in cooperation with the european commission , to create a taskforce to establish common standards that can be implemented in curricula across the union;


### c. whereas sport is a growing economic sector contributing to growth and jobs in the eu and therefore to its prosperity; ### c. whereas sport is a growing economic sector contributing to growth and jobs in the eu and therefore to its prosperity as well as to its international influence;


### f. whereas eu sports policy must support both elite and grassroots sports; ### f. whereas eu sports policy must support both elite and grassroots sports as well as active leisures;


### 3. calls on the commission to set up regular high-level structured cooperation with all sports stakeholders and other institutions to deliver more targeted and accountable recommendations for action on the challenges facing the sport sector; ### 3. calls on the commission to set up regular high-level structured cooperation with all sports stakeholders , particularly the federations , and other institutions to deliver more targeted and accountable recommendations for action on the challenges facing the sport sector;


### 7. acknowledges the diversity of models and approaches across sports and countries while considering that the common foundation of european sport needs to be further enhanced and protected; ### 7. acknowledges the diversity of models and approaches across sports and countries while considering that the common foundation of european sport needs to be further enhanced and protected , and in particular the links between grassroots sports and elite sports , both of which are closely linked;


### 10. highlights the need for increased solidarity and financial redistribution , especially between professional and grassroots sport; ### 10. highlights the need for increased solidarity and financial redistribution , as well as exchanges in skills and know-how , especially between professional and grassroots sport;


### 12. urges public authorities , sports federations and organisations to uphold values such as human rights , democracy and the rule of law when awarding host status for major sporting events; ### 12. urges public authorities , sports federations and organisations to uphold values such as human rights , democracy and the rule of law when awarding host status for major sporting events , as well as in the choice of sponsors; calls for particular attention to be paid to the working conditions of sports infrastructure construction staff and to the environmental impact of major events;


### 13. considers that a renewed commitment to good governance is needed in order to rebalance the social and economic elements in sport and to ensure that stakeholder representation in decision-making bodies is respected; ### 13. considers that a renewed commitment to good governance is needed in order to rebalance the social and economic elements in sport and to ensure that stakeholder representation , particularly the athletes , in decision-making bodies is respected;


### 15. urges sports governing bodies to implement measures on diversity and inclusion , in particular to address the low numbers of women and ethnic minorities in leadership positions; ### 15. urges sports governing bodies to implement measures on diversity and inclusion , in particular to address the low numbers of women and minorities in leadership positions;


### 20. insists that fighting corruption in sport requires transnational cooperation among all stakeholders and authorities; ### 20. insists that fighting corruption in sport requires transnational cooperation among all stakeholders and authorities , and needs to be linked to policies to combat money laundering and organised crime;


### 23. calls on the commission and the member states to ensure that sports policy and legislation support gender equality , with particular attention to media coverage , remuneration gaps , award disparities and harassment; ### 23. calls on the commission and the member states to ensure that sports policy and legislation support gender equality , with particular attention to media coverage , remuneration gaps , award disparities and harassment , but also by fighting against gender stereotypes that are still present , by involving political authorities , federations and broadcasters;


### 28. calls on the member states and public authorities to develop sports infrastructure and to increase the amount of physical education and extracurricular physical activities in schools; ### 28. calls on the member states and public authorities to develop sports infrastructure and to increase the amount of physical education and extracurricular physical activities in schools , while instigating a change of mentality in the recognition of the importance of sport as a school discipline;


### 29. welcomes initiatives and campaigns to encourage physical activity such as the european week of sport , #beactive and healthylifestyle4all; ### 29. welcomes initiatives and campaigns to encourage physical activity such as the european week of sport , #beactive and healthylifestyle4all , and encourages the commission to intensify communication about these events in the member states , particularly targeted towards schools;


### 30. calls for the eu guidelines on dual careers of athletes to be extended to all sport staff engaged in structured sport and for specific retraining initiatives; ### 30. calls for the eu guidelines on dual careers of athletes to be implemented and promoted in each member state , and extended to all sport staff engaged in structured sport and for specific retraining initiatives;


### 31. highlights the role of coaches and sport staff in developing the skills of and in educating young people; ### 31. highlights the role of coaches and sport staff in developing the skills of and in educating young people; notes with satisfaction the inclusion of sport staff mobility in the erasmus + 2021-2027 programme , and calls on the commission , the national agencies and the federations to raise awareness about this new opportunity;


### 33. calls on the commission and the member states to create a system for the recognition of qualifications gained by volunteers; ### 33. calls on the commission and the member states to create a system for the recognition of qualifications gained by volunteers , in line with the eu skills strategy , and building on the already existing ects and ecvet systems;


### 34. insists on the need for support mechanisms to get the sport sector back on track in the wake of covid-19; ### 34. insists on the need for support mechanisms to get the sport sector back on track in the wake of covid-19 , including all sports; calls on the european commission to allow react-eu funding for projects related to sports infrastructures , provided that they are sustainable and participate to the economic and tourist attractiveness of a territory;


### 35. stresses the need to further increase funding for sport; ### 35. stresses the need to further increase funding for sport , beyond erasmus +;


### 36. welcomes the higher budget for sport under the new erasmus+ programme and supports further synergies between programmes and funds; ### 36. welcomes the higher budget for sport under the new erasmus+ programme and supports further synergies between programmes and funds , particularly the life programme;


### 38. calls on national , regional and local authorities to recognise the key role of sport and physical activity in fields such as urban regeneration , tourism and territorial cohesion and to prioritise them in cohesion policy and investments under the recovery and resilience facility; ### 38. calls on national , regional and local authorities to recognise the key role of sport and physical activity in fields such as urban regeneration , tourism and territorial cohesion and to prioritise them in cohesion policy and investments under the recovery and resilience facility; draws the attention of the commission and the managing authorities to the lack of human and material resources available to small sports clubs and associations in order to access european funding and asks that they be given targeted support;


### 41. underlines the need to ensure environmental sustainability when promoting the development of sport and the organisation of sporting events; ### 41. underlines the need to ensure environmental sustainability when promoting the development of sport and the organisation of sporting events; notes the important efforts already undertaken by clubs and federations;


### 46. calls for the eu institutions to launch a debate on the future of e-sport and to present a study on its social and economic impact; ### 46. calls for the eu institutions to work on the future of e-sport and to present a study on its social and economic impact; stresses the need to recognise and access this flourishing sector , driven by european flagships , but for which there is still little regulation in terms of player training and the competitions themselves;


### 4. welcomes the centre’s continued efforts in 2020 to assure the quality of translations produced by its external language service providers; in that regard , welcomes the setting up , by august 2020 , of a fully revised client feedback system; ### 4. welcomes the centre’s continued efforts in 2020 to assure the quality of translations produced by its external language service providers , as well as the stringent measures taken against several contractors whose documents were judged to be repeatedly unsatisfactory; in that regard , welcomes the setting up , by august 2020 , of a fully revised client feedback system , shifting the focus from measuring client satisfaction via satisfaction forms to the provision of updated versions;


### 5. notes the successful implementation of the centre’s 2019-2020 transformation plan; encourages the centre to continue on the path of technological transformation , with the aim of continuously adapting to clients’ needs and making full use of available new technologies; in that regard , encourages the centre to continue investing in staff training; ### 5. notes the successful implementation of the centre’s 2019-2020 transformation plan and the programme initiation document (pid) that were undertaken to bring about the centre’s structural changes; encourages the centre to continue on the path of technological transformation , with the aim of continuously adapting to clients’ needs and making full use of available new technologies; in that regard , encourages the centre to continue investing in staff training;


### 6. welcomes the fact that the centre is currently studying the possibility of starting the procedure for obtaining an iso 14001 or emas certificate in the near future. ### 6. welcomes the fact that the centre is currently studying the possibility of starting the procedure for obtaining an iso 14001 or emas certificate in the near future , in order to enhance its environmental performance; in this spirit , welcomes the centre’s preparation of its initial environmental review in 2020.


### 7. notes that the implementation of e-tendering and e-submission , to complement the introduction of e-invoicing , has been postponed due to the covid-19 crisis; calls on the centre to implement e-tendering and e-submission; welcomes the fact that the centre , in the wake of the covid-19 crisis , requested its language service providers to send all their invoices in electronic format; ### 7. notes that the implementation of e-tendering and e-submission , to complement the introduction of e-invoicing , has been postponed due to the covid-19 crisis; calls on the centre to implement e-tendering and e-submission; welcomes the fact that the centre , in the wake of the covid-19 crisis , requested its language service providers to send all their invoices in electronic format; welcomes the fact the centre has fully adopted e-procurement procedures in 2021 and e-submission for the first time;


### 72. on 15 november 2021 , former minister of infrastructure and lawmaker for the syriza party christos spirtzis was targeted with the predator spyware on his mobile phone133 . ### 72. on 15 november 2021 , former minister of infrastructure and lawmaker for the syriza party christos spirtzis was targeted with the predator spyware on his mobile phone133. spirtzis had submitted critical parliamentary questions to the government on the surveillance tasks of the eyp on 15 november 2021. that same day he received a similar message as the one nikos androulakis had received. on 19 november , a second message was sent to christos spirtzis containing a link to an article of efimerida ton syntakton133a. on 9 september 2022 , citizen lab informed christos spirtzis of the attempted hacking , after which he lodged a complaint to the prosecutor of the supreme court133b. spirtzis is a confidante of party leader tsipras , and present during high-level meetings of the party leadership.


### 73. tasos telloglou and eliza triantafylou have allegedly been spied upon during their investigative work for the inside story. ### 73. tasos telloglou and eliza triantafylou have allegedly been spied upon during their investigative work for the inside story. in an article for the heinrich-böll-stiftung on 24 october 2022 , telloglou shared his surveillance and intimidation experiences whilst investigating the surveillance scandals in greece. according to these experiences , he believes to have been monitored between may and august 20221a.


### 76. cyprus is an important european export hub for the surveillance industry. on paper , there is a robust legal framework , including eu rules , but in practice , cyprus is an attractive place for companies selling surveillance technologies. recent scandals have damaged the reputation of the country though and a set of new legislative initiatives tightening the legal framework for exports and improving compliance is expected to be finalised in 2023. ### 76. cyprus is an important european export hub for the surveillance industry and serves as the foothold in the trade of israeli spyware within the eu as well as the export of spyware to third countries. on paper , there is a robust legal framework , including eu rules , but in practice , cyprus is an attractive place for companies selling surveillance technologies. recent scandals have damaged the reputation of the country though and a set of new legislative initiatives tightening the legal framework for exports and improving compliance is expected to be finalised in 2023.


### 79. compared to its legal framework in place , cyprus is reportedly rather lenient in providing spyware companies with export licenses137 . companies use tricks to circumvent the rules. that is , the physical hardware of the product is sent to a recipient country without the software loaded on it138 . after that , the activation software (also referred to as the ‘license key’) is sent separately by means of an usb-memory stick to the destination country139 . another way is to state that the product is exported for demonstration purposes only , although a detailed description of the product is added140 . ### 79. in practice , cyprus is reportedly rather lenient in providing spyware companies with export licenses137 . companies use tricks to circumvent the rules. that is , the physical hardware of the product is sent to a recipient country without the software loaded on it138 . after that , the activation software (also referred to as the ‘license key’) is sent separately by means of an usb-memory stick to the destination country139 . another way is to state that the product is exported for demonstration purposes only , although a detailed description of the product is added140 .


### 80. many israeli companies come to cyprus to start off their european activity141 . different sources reported furthermore that the country is home to approximately 29 israeli companies142 . the trade in spyware and diplomatic relations are closely connected. in return for the facilitation of licenses for israeli companies , cyprus has allegedly received some of the products these companies develop and export , like the pegasus spyware from nso143 as well as spyware materials from wispear144 . ### 80. many israeli companies come to cyprus to start off their european activity141 . different sources reported furthermore that the country is home to approximately 29 israeli companies142 . the trade in spyware and diplomatic relations are closely connected. in return for the facilitation of licenses for israeli companies , cyprus has allegedly received some of the products these companies develop and export , like the pegasus spyware from nso143 as well as spyware materials from wispear144 . in light of the activities described above , it becomes clear that israel outsources their export of spyware to cyprus. more particularly , cyprus serves as the foothold in the trade of israeli spyware within the eu’s internal market as well as the export of spyware to third countries.


### 81. the law on the protection of the confidentiality of private communications 92(i)/1996 stipulates that the application for authorisation to monitor private communication must be submitted to the court145 . ### 81. the law on the protection of the confidentiality of private communications 92(i)/1996 stipulates that the attorney general may submit an application to the court for the issuance of a judicial warrant that authorises or extends the interception of private communications by an authorised person. this application by the attorney general to the court happens upon a written request by the chief of police , the commander of the cyprus intelligence service or an investigative judge. provisions on the authorization or approval can however be overruled in cases where the interception of private communication is in the security interests of cyprus , or to prevent , inquire or prosecute offences1a.


### 82. on paper , violating the protection of private communications is a de jure criminal offense. de facto , this illegality is often hidden behind the invocation of national security146 . there is no legislature covering how the police or other intelligence services use the interception devices , who regulates the procedures of interception and how the protection of constitutions rights of citizens is guaranteed. the relevant regulations and protocols are currently pending in the house of representatives for discussion and approval. for the time being , these provisions remain unchecked147 . ### 82. on paper , violating the protection of private communications is a de jure criminal offense. de facto , this illegality is often hidden behind the invocation of national security146 . there is no legislation covering how the police or other intelligence services use the interception devices , who regulates the procedures of interception and how the protection of constitutions rights of citizens is guaranteed. the relevant regulations and protocols are currently pending in the house of representatives for discussion and approval. for the time being , these provisions remain unchecked147 .


### 83. the president of cyprus has a significant say in the formation of the committee that is capable of starting critical inquiries in the actions of the kyp. in addition , the annual reports with the committee’s findings are first sent out to the president148 . ### 83. the president of cyprus has a significant say in the formation of the committee that is capable of starting critical inquiries in the actions of the kyp. in addition , the annual reports with the committee’s findings are first sent out to the president148. at the time of writing , there is no information on the exact composition of the committee , its work and the scrutiny it performs148a.


### 85. in cyprus , dilian got closely associated with abraham sahak avni. avni has formerly been involved in the israeli police special forces as special detective152 . in november 2015 , he acquired cypriot citizenship and a golden passport because of a 2.9 million euro investment in real estate153 . avni founded the cypriot ncis intelligence services ltd154 , a company that was reportedly involved with the most powerful technology-oriented companies in the world155 . ncis intelligence and security services provided security software to the police headquarters between 2014 and 2015 and instructed employees of the office of crime analysis and statistics between 2015 and 2016156 . government party disy (dimokratikós sinagermós) is also part of the company’s clientele. reportedly , avni had installed security equipment in the party’s offices157 . next to avni’s security equipment , dilian’s materials were also sold to the cyprus drug enforcement agency and the cypriot police158 . ### 85. in cyprus , dilian got closely associated with abraham sahak avni. avni has formerly been involved in the israeli police special forces as special detective152 . in november 2015 , he acquired cypriot citizenship and a golden passport because of a 2.9 million euro investment in real estate153 . avni founded the cypriot ncis intelligence services ltd154 , a company that was reportedly involved with the most powerful technology-oriented companies in the world155 . ncis intelligence and security services provided security software to the police headquarters between 2014 and 2015 and instructed employees of the office of crime analysis and statistics between 2015 and 2016156 . government party disy (dimokratikós sinagermós) is also part of the company’s clientele. reportedly , avni had installed security equipment in the party’s offices157 . next to avni’s security equipment , dilian’s materials were also sold to the cyprus drug enforcement agency and the cypriot police158 .


### 88. following the complaints against dilian , it became clear that the israeli go networks was reportedly associated with intellexa by way of shared corporate ownership in ireland. former senior representatives were allegedly provided with top functions at intellexa164 . in addition , the police investigations found that export licenses had been granted to wispear for ‘interception equipment designed for the extraction of voice or data , transmitted over the air interface’165 166 . ### 88. following the complaints against dilian , it became clear that the israeli go networks was reportedly associated with intellexa by way of shared corporate ownership in ireland. former senior representatives of israeli go networks were allegedly provided with top positions at intellexa164 . in addition , the police investigations found that export licenses had been granted to wispear for ‘interception equipment designed for the extraction of voice or data , transmitted over the air interface’165 166 . recall that , as mentioned above , dilian’s companies , as stated by the chamber of commerce , have not received any export licenses in the last two years. at time of writing , it remains unclear who authorised these export licenses166a.


### 89. in 2011 avni founded a company with michael angelides , the brother of the former minister and current deputy attorney general savvas angelides. their company s9s was registered with the registrar of companies on 10 november 2011167 and was registered with the assistance of the former law firm of savvas angelides168 . their partnership however dissolved in 2012. nevertheless , savvas angelides was the person in charge of controlling avni and dillian in the case of the surveillance van169 . ### 89. in 2011 avni founded a company with michael angelides , the brother of the former minister and current deputy attorney general savvas angelides. their company s9s was registered with the registrar of companies on 10 november 2011167 and was registered with the assistance of the former law firm of savvas angelides168 . their partnership was however dissolved in 2012. nevertheless , savvas angelides was the person in charge of investigating avni and dillian in the case of the surveillance van169. in a press release on 10 august 2022 , the deputy attorney general distanced himself from the contact between “a relative of mine intended to do business with mr. shahak avni.” he declared that he nor his family has any connection with tal dilian and that if there were evidence of surveillance or interception in the case of dilians’ van , then the criteria for determining the course of the case would have been different169a.


### 91. following the episode of the van and the lawsuit , dilian moved intellexa’s operations to greece , although he never left cyprus and is still a resident. indirect links between several natural and legal persons as registered in cyprus and greece expose the facilitation of dilian’s businesses to athens173 . ### 91. following the episode of the van and the lawsuit , dilian moved intellexa’s operations to greece. although he never left cyprus , he is reportedly planning his return to tel aviv1a. indirect links between several natural and legal persons as registered in cyprus and greece expose the facilitation of dilian’s businesses to athens173. what follows are some of the names that are part of the cyprus-greece connections , although the main role of intellexa sa in greece is further explained in the chapter on greece.


### 92. according to recent testimonies in light of the judicial investigations in the van case , lawyer aleksandros sinka has had significant influence in the move to greece. sinka - who formerly played a key role in the centre-right disy party - apparently had good relations with both dilian and avni174 . it appears that sinka was also an acquaintance of former general secretary of the greek government dimitriadis. both men held positions in the bureau of the european democrat students (eds) , the student organisation of the european people’s party (epp). between 2003 and 2004 , sinka served as chairman and dimitriadis as vice-chairman175 . dimitriadis allegedly introduced his friend and greek businessperson felix bitzios to sinka , in view of bitzios’ long-standing dispute in the cypriot court. sinka in turn recommended lawyer harris kyriakidis to help bitzios in his dispute. kyriakidis equally had good relations with the disy176 . ### 92. according to recent testimonies in light of the judicial investigations in the van case , lawyer alexandros sinka has had significant influence in the move to greece. sinka - who formerly played a key role in the centre-right disy party - apparently had good relations with both dilian and avni174 . sinka was also an acquaintance of former general secretary of the greek government dimitriadis. both men held positions in the bureau of the european democrat students (eds) , the student organisation of the european people’s party (epp). between 2003 and 2004 , sinka served as chairman and dimitriadis as vice-chairman175 . dimitriadis allegedly introduced his friend and greek businessperson felix bitzios to sinka , in view of bitzios’ long-standing dispute in the cypriot court. sinka in turn recommended lawyer harris kyriakidis to help bitzios in his dispute. kyriakidis equally had good relations with the disy176 . through a letter of his lawyer176a , mr sinka declares that he does not know tal dilian and has never had any contact with him. furthermore , mr sinka disputes the account of events as published in the article of to vima.


### 95. reportedly , nso group also had an active company in cyprus that allegedly hosted a customer service center. in 2017 , a meeting with nso officials and saudi arabian customers took place in the four seasons hotel in limassol to present to them the latest capabilities of the pegasus 3 version spyware. this version had the novel zero-click capability that could infect a device without the necessity of clicking on a link , for example through a missed whatsapp call. the saudi arabian clients immediately purchased the technology for an amount of €55 million181 182 . it should be noted here that a year later , on 2 october 2018 , the saudi regime killed jamal khashoggi in the saudi consulate in turkey , after surveiling him and his near ones with pegasus. ### 95. reportedly , nso group also had an active company in cyprus that allegedly hosted a customer service center. in 2017 , a meeting with nso officials and saudi arabian customers took place in the four seasons hotel in limassol to present to them the latest capabilities of the pegasus 3 version spyware. this version had the novel zero-click capability that could infect a device without the necessity of clicking on a link , for example through a missed whatsapp call. the saudi arabian clients immediately purchased the technology for an amount of €55 million181 182 . it should be noted here that a year later , on 2 october 2018 , the saudi regime killed jamal khashoggi in the saudi consulate in turkey , after surveilling his near ones with pegasus.


### 96. black cube is a company employing former officers of israeli intelligence agencies , like mossad. the company uses operatives with fake identities. according to the new yorker , former ceo of nso group shalev hulio hired black cube after three lawyers - mazen masri , alaa mahajna and christiana markou - sued nso and an affiliated subsidiary in israel and cyprus183 . ### 96. black cube is a company employing former officers of israeli intelligence agencies , like mossad. the company uses operatives with fake identities. according to the new yorker , former ceo of nso group shalev hulio hired black cube after three lawyers - mazen masri , alaa mahajna and christiana markou - sued nso and an affiliated subsidiary in israel and cyprus183. in 2018 , the three lawyers received several messages from so-called acquaintances of certain firms and individuals , proposing meetings in london. hulio stated , “for the lawsuit in cyprus , there was one involvement of black cube” since the lawsuit “came from nowhere and i want to understand”183a. black cube was also exposed in spying scandals in hungary and romania.


### 100. the july 2021 revelations by the pegasus project showed a large number of targets in spain. however , they seem to have been targeted by different actors and for different reasons. it is widely believed that the moroccan authorities targeted prime minister pedro sanchez , minister for defence margarita robles and minister of the interior fernando grande-marlaska , similarly to the case of the french president and government ministers185. the targeting of a second group of victims is referred to as ‘catalangate’186. it includes catalan parliamentarians , members of the european parliament , lawyers , civil society organisation members and some family and staff connected to those victims187. the ‘catalangate’ surveillance scandal was first reported on in 2020 , but it was not until april 2022 that citizen lab completed their in-depth investigation that the scale of the scandal was revealed. the results of that probe showed that at least 65 persons were targeted188. in may 2020 , the spanish authorities admitted to targeting 18 of those 65 victims with court authorisation189. ### 100. the july 2021 revelations by the pegasus project showed a large number of alleged targets in spain. however , it seems that these alleged targets were targeted by different actors and for different reasons.


### 101. the past purchase of various spyware products like sitel in 2001 and the spyware of hacking team in 2010 by the ministry of the interior , the spanish national intelligence centre (cni) and police has been widely publicised190. it was also previously reported by citizenlab that spain was a suspected customer of finfisher191. in 2020 , the spanish newspaper el pais reported that spain has done business with nso group and that the cni routinely uses pegasus192. the spanish government allegedly purchased the spyware in the first half of the 2010s for an estimated amount of €6 million193 194. in addition , a former employee of nso has further confirmed that spain has an account with the company despite the spanish authorities declining to comment or confirm195. ### 101. the past purchase of various spyware products like sitel in 2001 and the spyware of hacking team in 2010 by the ministry of the interior , the spanish national intelligence centre (cni) and police has been widely publicised190. it was also previously reported by citizenlab that spain was a suspected customer of finfisher191. in 2016 a number of publications revealed the catalan government’s intention to buy spyware from an israeli company191 b.


### 102. the right to privacy is protected under article 18 of the spanish constitution of 1978 , including the right to secrecy in ‘postal , telegraphic and telephone communication’196. the use of spyware such as pegasus and candiru is a violation of article 18; however , there is an exception to this right in the case of a court granting authorisation197. the constitution also provides further exceptions to those rights in part i section 55 by stating that some freedoms are eligible to be suspended with ‘participation of the courts and proper parliamentary control’ in the case of individuals under investigation for activities relating to armed groups or terrorist organisations198. ### 102. the right to privacy is protected under article 18 of the spanish constitution of 1978 , including the right to secrecy in ‘postal , telegraphic and telephone communication’196. the use of spyware such as pegasus and candiru would be a violation of article 18 if no judicial authorisation has been granted , but this possibility is provided for under spanish law197. the constitution also provides further exceptions to those rights in part i section 55 by stating that some freedoms are eligible to be suspended with ‘participation of the courts and proper parliamentary control’ in the case of individuals under investigation for activities relating to armed groups or terrorist organisations198. furthermore , article 55 includes democratic safeguards to ensure that ‘unjustified use or misuse’ of those powers will give rise to criminal liability.


### 103. the spanish intelligence service is made up of three main agencies. firstly , the national intelligence service (cni) which is under the control of the ministry of defence. the director of the cni is nominated by the minister for defence and serves as the prime minister’s lead advisor on issues relating to intelligence and counter-intelligence199. the second body is the domestic intelligence agency , the intelligence centre for counter-terrorism and organised crime (citco). the third and final body is the spanish armed forces intelligence centre (cifas). the cifas is also under the direct supervision of the ministry of defence200 201. ### 103. the spanish intelligence service is made up of three main agencies. firstly , the national intelligence service (cni) which is under the control of the ministry of defence. the director of the cni is nominated by the minister for defence and serves as the prime minister’s lead advisor on issues relating to intelligence and counter-intelligence199. the second body is the domestic intelligence agency , the intelligence centre for counter-terrorism and organised crime (citco). the third and final body is the spanish armed forces intelligence centre (cifas). the cifas is also under the direct supervision of the ministry of defence200 201. the cni was established under law no 11/2002 of 6 may 2002 , pursuant to which it is authorised to conduct ‘security investigations’.202 a


### 104. much of the surveillance conducted in spain was carried out by the cni , a body that has been embroiled in a number of scandals relating to surveillance in the past202. the cni was established under law 11/2002 may 6 and it authorises the cni to conduct ‘security investigations’203. however , there is little clarification on the means or limitations of such activities204. law 11/2002 also established parliamentary , executive and legislative oversight control over the cni205parliamentary oversight is to be carried out by the official secrets committee of the spanish congress , which was established in 1995206. the delegated committee for intelligence affairs is in executive control of the body , and co-ordinates the intelligence activities of the cni207. lastly , the defence committee of the congress of deputies conducts legislative oversight over the cni208. the annual intelligence directive dictates the intelligence priorities of the cni for the year209. ### 104. much of the surveillance conducted in spain was carried out by the cni , a body established under law no 11/2002 of may 6 2002 , which authorises the cni to conduct ‘security investigations’203. law 11/2002 also established parliamentary , executive and legislative oversight control over the cni205. parliamentary oversight is to be carried out by the official secrets committee of the spanish congress , which was established in 1995206. the delegated committee for intelligence affairs is in executive control of the body , and coordinates the intelligence activities of the cni207. lastly , the defence committee of the congress of deputies conducts legislative oversight over the cni208.


### 105. the laws establishing the cni also established the defence committee of the congress of deputies and it is responsible for allocating the confidential funds for the cni and producing an annual report on the cni. however , the spanish constitution does not stipulate that access will be granted to documents or information relating to the work of the intelligence services and the requirement is also notably absent in the legal framework of the law on transparency. therefore , much of the work of the cni is kept secret and lacks transparency210. ### 105. the laws establishing the cni also established the defence committee of the congress of deputies and it is responsible for allocating the confidential funds for the cni and producing an annual report on the cni. spanish legislation does not stipulate that public access will be granted to documents or information relating to the work of the intelligence services therefore , and in line with the legislation , much of the work of the cni , being an intelligence service , is kept secret210.


### 106. the official secrets committee is required to submit an annual report on the activities of the intelligence services , however when it was convened as a result of the surveillance by the cni , it was the first meeting of the body in more than two years. head of the cni paz esteban appeared before the committee on 5 may 2022 to present the court authorisations for the 18 victims that the authorities have taken responsibility for targeting.211 the hearing was not public and those present were not allowed to enter with any electronic on them whatsoever212 . ### 106. the official secrets committee is required to submit an annual report on the activities of the intelligence services , however when it was convened as a result of the surveillance by the cni , it was the first meeting of the body in more than two years. head of the cni paz esteban appeared before the committee on 5 may 2022 to present the court authorisations for the 18 victims that the authorities have taken responsibility for targeting.211 the hearing was not public and those present were not allowed to enter with any electronic on them whatsoever212. according to the spokespersons present at the hearing , it was almost solely focused on the catalan victims and not on pedro sanchez or margarita robles and the alleged 3gb of data that was taken from their devices by mercenary spyware212a. robles has repeatedly insisted that the targeting of the 18 catalans was valid owing to the ‘situations of violence against people’ following the supreme court sentencing nine key pro-independence figures to jail212b.


### 106. the official secrets committee is required to submit an annual report on the activities of the intelligence services , however when it was convened as a result of the surveillance by the cni , it was the first meeting of the body in more than two years. head of the cni paz esteban appeared before the committee on 5 may 2022 to present the court authorisations for the 18 victims that the authorities have taken responsibility for targeting.211the hearing was not public and those present were not allowed to enter with any electronic on them whatsoever212. ### 106. the committee responsible for monitoring appropriations for reserved expenditure is required to submit an annual report on the activities of the intelligence services; however , when it was convened in the wake of reports published across a number of media outlets about alleged espionage being carried out against more than 60 catalan separatist leaders , that was the first meeting of the body in more than three years. at that meeting held in camera on 5 may 2022 , cni director paz esteban admitted that surveillance had been carried out on 18 separatists. she also supplied evidence that all operations on mobile phones had been carried out with judicial authorisation. given that it was confidential , the hearing was not public and those present were not allowed to enter with any electronics on them whatsoever , which is normal practice in confidential meetings .


### 107. there has been a significant amount of public scrutiny on the ‘catalangate’ scandal since it came to light in april 2022. the spanish media and media outlets around the world have worked extensively in conjunction with civil society organisations to scrutinise the surveillance system in spain and advocate for the fundamental rights of the victims. inversely , some spanish politicians have tried to discredit citizenslab , suggesting their methods are unsound or that they are politically motivated. a collaborator of citizenslab , himself of catalan origin , was among the targets , along with his parents , who are not politically active at all213. ### 107. there has been interest in the ‘catalangate’ case on the part of media outlets in spain and in other countries since it came to light in april 2022.


### 107. there has been a significant amount of public scrutiny on the ‘catalangate’ scandal since it came to light in april 2022. the spanish media and media outlets around the world have worked extensively in conjunction with civil society organisations to scrutinise the surveillance system in spain and advocate for the fundamental rights of the victims. inversely , some spanish politicians have tried to discredit citizenslab , suggesting their methods are unsound or that they are politically motivated. a collaborator of citizenslab , himself of catalan origin , was among the targets , along with his parents , who are not politically active at all213 . ### 107. there has been a significant amount of public scrutiny on the ‘catalangate’ scandal since it came to light in april 2022. the spanish media and media outlets around the world have worked extensively in conjunction with civil society organisations to scrutinise the surveillance system in spain and advocate for the fundamental rights of the victims. inversely , some spanish politicians have tried to discredit citizen lab , suggesting their methods are unsound or that they are politically motivated. a collaborator of citizen lab , himself of catalan origin , was among the targets , along with his parents , who are not politically active at all213 .


### 25. in november 2021 , at the insistence of the opposition , two committees in the senate conducted hearings into the use of spyware in hungary and the alleged politically motivated targeting of citizens by the government in particular. it was subsequently reported that the government representatives insisted that all surveillance was authorised through appropriate channels , but refused to comment as to whether or not journalists or politicians were targeted. it is not possible to know exactly what was said however , as the ruling party have classified the minutes of the meeting until the year 2050. ### 25. in november 2021 , at the insistence of the opposition , two committees in the national assembly conducted hearings into the use of spyware in hungary and the alleged politically motivated targeting of citizens by the government in particular. the governmental party , fidesz and its mps prevented any meaningful and democratic scrutiny about the use of pegasus and the government representatives insisted that all surveillance was authorised through appropriate channels , but refused to comment as to whether or not journalists or politicians were targeted. they also refused to comment on the fact that the authorisations were delegated by the minister of justice to the secretary of state , pál völner , who is under investigation based on the charges of corruption and abuse of power. it is not possible to know exactly what was said however , as the ruling party have classified the minutes of the meeting until the year 2050.


### 28. it has been very clear that the government’s actions were politically motivated from the moment that the spyware scandal broke in hungary. it was reported that the phone numbers of over 300 persons were included in the findings of the pegasus project66 . among those were at least five journalists , ten lawyers and an opposition politician as well as activists and high profile business owners67 . while the appearance of phone numbers on this list does not necessarily mean that hacking of those phones took place , it is a revealing insight into the methodical and systematic actions and attitude of orbán’s government towards fundamental rights and media freedom. since that time in 2021 , a number of targets have been confirmed as having been successfully hacked with spyware. ### 28. it has been very clear that the government’s actions were politically motivated from the moment that the spyware scandal broke in hungary. it was reported that the phone numbers of over 300 persons were included in the findings of the pegasus project66 . among those were at least five journalists , ten lawyers , the opposition mayor of gödöllő , employee of the opposition party as well as activists and high profile business owners67. however , none of them were a target of any criminal investigations or accused of anything. while the appearance of phone numbers on this list does not necessarily mean that hacking of those phones took place , it is a revealing insight into the methodical and systematic actions and attitude of orbán’s government towards fundamental rights and media freedom. since that time in 2021 , a number of targets have been confirmed as having been successfully hacked with spyware.


### 109. in contrast to the fast-paced nature of the case taken by sanchez et al. in madrid , the cases that have been filed in barcelona by catalonian victims of spyware are moving at a slow pace217218. the first case in investigative court number 32 in barcelona was filed by two pegasus victims in 2020; former president of the catalonian parliament and current minister of business and work , roger torrent , and former minister of foreign action , institutional relations and transparency of catalonia and current erc president in barcelona city council , ernest maragall219. andreu van den eynde is one of the lawyers representing torrent and maragall in this case , and is a victim of pegasus himself. van den eynde has criticised the courts consistently delaying proceedings and virtually ‘paralysing’ the case220. omnium cultural and the popular unity candidacy party (cup) have also filed a case in the same court in barcelona. lawyer benet salellas , who is involved in both cases , is asserting that the spanish government is behind the targeting221. ### deleted


### 110. as the snc has jurisdiction over cases concerning the most serious crimes in all territories , it is possible that the public prosecutor could request all pegasus cases to be unified222. in other words , the cases of the victims from the spanish government and the ‘catalangate’ victims would all be heard in the snc in madrid. the lawyers representing the catalan victims assert that there is no link between the cases unless the perpetrator is proved to be the same in all instances of surveillance223. ### 110. the cases of those affected from the spanish government and the ‘catalangate’ individuals could be heard in the snc in madrid. the lawyers representing the individuals with links to separatism who were allegedly spied upon assert that there is no link between the cases unless the perpetrator is proved to be the same in all instances of surveillance223.


### 111. there are a number of other pending legal cases linked to the 65 catalonian victims. one such case was filed by lawyer and pegasus victim gonzalo boye on behalf of at least 19 victims against nso , its three founders niv karmi , shalev hulio and omri lavie , q cyber technologies , and osy , a subsidiary company based in luxembourg224225. legal action is also underway in a number of other eu member states as a result of the surveillance carried out on those catalan separatists in exile , including france , belgium , switzerland , germany , and luxembourg226. ### deleted


### targets ### those affected


### 112. the targeting of catalan citizens with spyware reportedly began as early as 2015 , and has been carried out on a large scale since 2017227. after initial media coverage in 2020 , the full scandal broke across europe in april 2022 with the publication of the university of toronto citizenlab report. given the significant passage of time since the beginning of the hacking and these revelations , a number of targets were unable to be identified or further investigated owing to various factors that occurred , including a number of targets who disposed of the phone in question228. ### deleted


### 113. spanish prime minister pedro sánchez , minister for defence margarita robles and minister of the interior fernando grande-marlaska were targeted with pegasus between may and june 2021229. there is little information available so far on details of this hacking , as they were announced by the government and were not the result of an investigation of citizenlab or any other such research service or investigative journalists. sánchez and robles are the heads of the two government branches that oversee the cni , the body responsible for conducting surveillance in spain. the infected devices of sánchez and robles were government-issued and were being scanned for spyware occasionally230. grande-marlaska was infected on his personal device231. minister for agriculture luis planas , who formerly served as a diplomat in morocco , was also targeted with spyware but there was no successful infection. it has been reported that the moroccan government could potentially be responsible for this targeting , however that information has not been confirmed232. ### 113. spanish prime minister pedro sánchez , minister for defence margarita robles and minister of the interior fernando grande-marlaska were targeted with pegasus between may and june 2021229 . sánchez and robles are the heads of the two government branches that oversee the cni , the body responsible for conducting surveillance in spain. the infected devices of sánchez and robles were issued by the authorities and were being scanned for spyware occasionally230 . grande-marlaska was subjected to an infection on his personal device231 . minister for agriculture luis planas , who formerly served as a diplomat in morocco , was also targeted with spyware but there was no successful infection. it has been reported that the moroccan government could potentially be responsible for this targeting , however that information has not been confirmed232 .


### 114. in total , 65 catalonians were confirmed to have been targeted with mercenary spyware , 63 with pegasus , four with candiru and at least two people were targeted by both233 . at least 51 individuals were successfully infected234 . the spanish government have refused to comment as to whether or not they were responsible for the surveillance any of the other victims outside of the 18 they admit to having targeted235 . the majority of those 18 persons were never charged with a crime , and yet were included on this list. minister for defence robles has relied heavily on the official secrets act rather than expand on what were the reasons for the surveillance of those specific targets236 . all 65 catalan targets have at some point in time been in contact with the catalan separatists living outside spain. ### 114. in total , 65 catalonians were confirmed to have been targeted with mercenary spyware , 63 with pegasus , four with candiru and at least two people were targeted by both233. at least 51 individuals were successfully infected234. the director of the cni , paz esteban , has previously acknowledged to the official secrets committee that 18 of those 65 persons were hacked by the spanish authorities with the required judicial authorisation from the supreme court234a. the spanish government have refused to comment on the remaining victims as to whether or not they were responsible for their their targeting234b. included among the 18 alleged legal targets is the current president of catalonia , pere aragones , former president and current mep carles puigdemont and other pro-independence politicians and their associates234c. the majority of those 18 persons were never charged with a crime , such as civil society organisation members , journalists and lawyers , and yet were included on this list. minister for defence robles has relied heavily on the official secrets act rather than expand on what were the reasons for the surveillance of those specific targets234d. all 65 catalan targets have at some point in time been in contact with the catalan separatists living outside spain.


### 114. in total , 65 catalonians were confirmed to have been targeted with mercenary spyware , 63 with pegasus , four with candiru and at least two people were targeted by both233. at least 51 individuals were successfully infected234. the spanish government have refused to comment as to whether or not they were responsible for the surveillance any of the other victims outside of the 18 they admit to having targeted235. the majority of those 18 persons were never charged with a crime , and yet were included on this list. minister for defence robles has relied heavily on the official secrets act rather than expand on what were the reasons for the surveillance of those specific targets236. all 65 catalan targets have at some point in time been in contact with the catalan separatists living outside spain. ### 114. according to the citizen lab report , of the 65 people linked to catalan separatism who were allegedly targeted with mercenary spyware , 63 were with pegasus , four with candiru and at least two people were targeted by both233. at least 51 individuals were successfully infected234. the spanish government have refused to comment as to whether or not they were responsible for the surveillance of any other affected persons , aside from the 18 people it admits to having monitored235.


### members of the european parliament ### deleted


### 115. one of the key groups revealed to have been targeted is the pro-independence catalan members of the european parliament. each of them were hacked with spyware either directly or indirectly through what citizenlab refer to as relational targeting237: diana riba i giner , antoni comín i oliveres , jordi solé , carles puigdemont , and clara ponsati. ### 115. one of the key groups reported in the citizen lab report to have been infected by pegasus is the separatist catalan members of the european parliament. some of them were supposedly hacked with spyware either directly or indirectly through what citizenlab refer to as relational targeting237 : diana riba i giner , jordi solé , carles puigdemont and clara ponsatí.


### 115. one of the key groups revealed to have been targeted is the pro-independence catalan members of the european parliament. each of them were hacked with spyware either directly or indirectly through what citizenlab refer to as relational targeting237 : diana riba i giner , antoni comín i oliveres , jordi solé , carles puigdemont , and clara ponsati. ### 115. one of the key groups revealed to have been targeted is the pro-independence catalan members of the european parliament. each of them were hacked with spyware either directly or indirectly through what citizenlab refer to as relational targeting237. two meps were directly infected , while three others were spied upon through family and staff.


### catalonian politicians ### deleted


### 116. former president of the catalonian parliament and current minister of business and work roger torrent was among the first persons to come forward as a victim of the 2019 whatsapp pegasus infections238. shortly after , leader of the pro-independence republican left of catalonia party , ernest maragall and anna gabriel who was previously a regional member of parliament for the popular unity candidacy party also came forward as victims of pegasus239. all of the presidents of catalonia since 2010 have been targeted with spyware either during or after their term in office240. as many as 12 erc members were among the 65 targets , including the secretary general of the party marta rovira who was hacked at least twice in june 2020 according to citizenlab. it is highly significant that both gabriel and rovira were living in switzerland at the time of their surveillance following the fall out after the 2017 referendum. ### 116. former president of the catalonian parliament and current minister of business and work roger torrent was among the first persons to come forward as a victim of the 2019 whatsapp pegasus intrusions238. shortly after , leader of the separatist republican left of catalonia party , ernest maragall and anna gabriel who was previously a regional member of parliament for the popular unity candidacy party also came forward as victims of pegasus239. all of the presidents of catalonia since 2010 have been , according to citizen lab , supposedly targeted with spyware either during or after their term in office240.


### civil society organisations ### deleted


### 117. jordi domingo was one of the first catalonian activists that was reported to be targeted in 2020. though a supporter of catalan independence , it was reported by the guardian that domingo believed himself to be a mistaken target. given that he did not play a major role in the events of 2017 , it is his belief that the intended target was a lawyer of the same name who contributed to the drafting of the constitution of catalonia241. ### deleted


### lawyers ### deleted


### 118. gonzalo boye has represented many high profile catalan figures , including former presidents puigdemont and torras242. over five months between january and may of 2020 , he was a victim of pegasus himself243. boye was targeted as many as 18 times during that period via text messages that appeared as tweets from civil society organisations or prominent news outlets244. citizenlab confirmed at least one successful infection on 30 october 2020. the infection came just 48 hours after the arrest of one of his clients245. the targeting of boye has called in to question the legality of attacking the lawyer-client privilege. ### 118. gonzalo boye is the lawyer of ex-presidents puigdemont and torras242 and was found guilty of collaboration with the terrorist organisation eta , as the cni states in its submissions.242 b boye is accused by the spanish national court of money laundering and falsification of documents on behalf of a drug trafficking organisation. boye was , for five months , between january and may 2020 , allegedly the object of an intrusion by pegasus243 .


### 119. andreu van den eynde i adroer , was successfully infected with pegasus on 14 may 2020246. the hacking occurred while he was acting as the lawyer of both raul romeva and oriol junqueras in their case before the supreme court. ### 119. andreu van den eynde i adroer , was supposedly the object of an intrusion by pegasus on 14 may 2020246 . the hacking occurred while he was acting as the lawyer of both raul romeva and oriol junqueras in their case before the supreme court.


### 120. similarly , prominent lawyer jaume alonso-cuevillas was also infected while representing key catalan figures such as carles puigdemont. however , citizenlab were unable to determine the precise date of the successful infection. ### 120. similarly , prominent lawyer jaume alonso-cuevillas was also purportedly affected while representing catalan figures such as carles puigdemont. however , citizenlab were unable to determine the precise date of the successful infection.


### 121. national authorities have so far shared very little official information about the acquisition and use of spyware in their countries , nor about the budgetary aspects or legal framework governing it. vendors and countries issuing export licenses (in particular israel) share no information about the customers. only austria , poland , cyprus have responded to the questionnaire sent by pega on 15 july 2022 , but mostly in a very general , even evasive way. ### 121. national authorities have so far shared very little official information about the acquisition and use of spyware in their countries , nor about the budgetary aspects or legal framework governing it. vendors and countries issuing export licenses (in particular israel) share no information about the customers. member state governments and member state parliaments have not provided the european parliament with meaningful information about the legal frameworks governing the use of spyware in their member states beyond what was already publicly known.


### 129. on 4 october 2022 , it was revealed that in november 2019 the dutch ministry of defence was about to sign an agreement with wispear , the company owned by tal dilian , which had earlier acquired cytrox , the manufacturer of predator spyware251 . it is not clear whether or not the contract was signed and any spyware was provided to the dutch defence ministry. ### 129. on 4 october 2022 , it was revealed that in november 2019 the dutch ministry of defence was about to sign an agreement with wispear , the company owned by tal dilian , which had earlier acquired cytrox , the manufacturer of predator spyware251 . wispear had won a tender of the dutch ministry. it does not become clear from the mail exchange if it concerns predator or another product. from disclosed emails exchanged between the cypriot ministry of energy , commerce and industry and wispear , it becomes clear that a representative of the dutch ministry of defence had contacted the cypriot ministry of commerce to obtain assurances about wispear on 13-15 november 2019 , only days before the “spy van” story of dilian broke. dilian informed the representative of the cypriot commerce ministry that he appreciates her immediate assistance in the matter as the expiry of the timetable for contract signatures is approaching”251a. it is not clear whether or not the contract was signed and any spyware was provided to the dutch defence ministry.


### use of finfisher ### use of spyware


### 132. in 2012 and 2013 , both the german federal police bka and berlin police lka independently purchased finfisher spyware (more about this spyware in chapter on the spyware industry). also here , just like in the case of pegasus , the bka told the company to develop the finfisher spyware in such a way that it could not access all data on a device , but only live communications , for it to be compliant with german law. ### 132. in 2012 and 2013 , both the german federal police bka and berlin police lka independently purchased finspy from finfisher (more about this spyware in chapter on the spyware industry). also here , just like in the case of pegasus , the bka told the company to develop the finfisher spyware in such a way that it could not access all data on a device , but only live communications , for it to be compliant with german law.


### 133. several key figures from the spyware trade , have registered a business on malta or they have obtained maltese passports , but it seems they do not actually reside there , nor do their companies seem to be active. a few key personalities from the spyware trade have been identified so far: tal dilian , anatoly hurgin , felix bitzios , stanislaw szymon pelczar , peter thiel. ### 133. several key figures from the spyware trade , have registered a business on malta or they have obtained maltese passports , but it seems they do not actually reside there , nor do their companies seem to be active. a few key personalities from the spyware trade have been identified so far:


### 134. in the summer of 2021 , the pegasus project revealed several cases of attempted hacks by the pegasus spyware in france260 . this leaked dataset included the telephone number of president emmanuel macron , as well as the phone numbers of 14 members of his cabinet261 262 . findings of forensic analyses have confirmed that the telephones of several ministers were infected with the pegasus spyware263 . ### 134. in the summer of 2021 , the pegasus project revealed a list of phone numbers that could have been targeted or were potentially about to be targeted with the pegasus spyware , although a lot is still unclear about the purpose of this list1a. the pegasus project did however identify the telephone numbers of several french officials included in this list1b. this leaked dataset included the telephone number of president emmanuel macron , as well as the phone numbers of 14 members of his cabinet261 262 . findings of forensic analyses have confirmed that the telephones of minister of education jean-michel blanquer , minister of territorial cohesion jacqueline gourault , minister of agriculture julien denormandie , minister of housing emmanuelle wargon and minister of overseas sebastien lecornu were infected with the pegasus spyware263 .


### 135. france is also home to the spyware industry. nexa technologies , part of tal dilian’s intellexa alliance , is a french cyber defence and intelligence company , established in 2000264 . nexa technologies is run by former managers of amesys. amesys was founded in 1979265 and is known for the sale of a program called cerebro , capable of tracking electronic communications of its victims , like email addresses and phone numbers266 . ### 135. as portrayed in the iss vendors and technology integrators attendees list , france is home to different spyware companies , of which the most eminent are nexa technologies and amesys. nexa technologies , part of tal dilian’s intellexa alliance , is a french cyber defence and intelligence company , established in 2000264 . nexa technologies is run by former managers of amesys. amesys was founded in 1979265 and is known for the sale of a program called cerebro , capable of tracking electronic communications of its victims , like email addresses and phone numbers266 .


### 138. so far , there have not been any reports on possible purchase of spyware by the italian authorities. apart from former prime minister and commission president romano prodi , who was spied upon with pegasus by the moroccan secret services , no high-level cases of spying have been reported270 . as former un special envoy for the sahel , he could have been an interesting target for morocco , considering his possible network with high-level figures in the western sahara or algeria. ### 138. so far , there have not been any reports on possible purchase of spyware by the italian authorities. no high-level cases of spying have been reported , although the telephone number of former prime minister and commission president romano prodi was found in the list published by the pegasus project 270 . as former un special envoy for the sahel , he could have been an interesting target for morocco , considering his possible network with high-level figures in the western sahara or algeria.


### 145. in its interaction with the pega committee , the commission repeatedly explained that the hack of commissioner reynders’s device with pegasus software did not succeed , seemingly downplaying the gravity of a commissioner being targeted. however , any attempted hack - successful or not - of (a member of) the commission is a very grave political fact that affects the integrity of the democratic decision-making process. ### 145. in its interaction with the pega committee , the commission repeatedly explained that the hack of commissioner reynders’s device with pegasus software did not succeed , seemingly downplaying the gravity of a commissioner being targeted. however , any attempted hack - successful or not - of (a member of) the commission is a very grave political fact that affects the integrity of the democratic decision-making process. the fact that the commission did not wish to comment any further on the attempted hack of commissioner reynders's device and the potential hack of commission staff , neither in in camera sessions of the pega committee , is regrettable.


### 146. following the attempted hack of commissioner reynders’s phone and the indicators of compromise on several devices of commission staff , the commission deployed a mobile ‘endpoint detection and response’ (edr) solution on all corporate phones in september 2021. ### 146. following the attempted hack of commissioner reynders’s phone and the indicators of compromise on several devices of commission staff , the commission deployed a mobile ‘endpoint detection and response’ (edr) solution on all corporate phones in september 2021. this solution would help the commission’s services to “identify potentially infected corporate mobile devices. whenever there are indications of infections , a security review of the device is organised.” the commission says to cooperate continuously with cert-eu , the computer emergency response team of the union’s institutions , bodies , and agencies , and to issue recommendations and guidance to cert-eu’s constituents1a.


### 161. poltrex was launched in october 2018 and the sole shareholder of the company was intellexa ltd as registered in the british virgin islands. israeli shahak avni - founder of the cypriot ncis intelligence services ltd315 and associate of tal dilian - was registered as the director of poltrex in september 2019. in october 2019 , both avni and dilian became co-directors and the name of poltrex was changed to alchemycorp ltd. notwithstanding the renaming of poltrex , the company was still hosted in the novel tower - the same location as the address of wispear316 . ### 161. poltrex was launched in october 2018 and the sole shareholder of the company was intellexa ltd as registered in the british virgin islands. israeli shahak avni - founder of the cypriot ncis intelligence services ltd315 and associate of tal dilian - was registered as the director of poltrex in september 2019. in october 2019 , both avni and dilian became co-directors and the name of poltrex was changed to alchemycorp ltd. notwithstanding the renaming of poltrex , the company was still hosted in the novel tower - the same location as the address of wispear316 .