### 2. welcomes the robustness of the labour market; highlights the stabilising effect of national short-time work schemes supported by the european instrument for temporary support to mitigate unemployment risks in an emergency (sure); welcomes the fact that the recovery and resilience facility is mitigating those consequences and contributing to the union’s competitive sustainability; stresses that its successful implementation requires the completion of milestones and targets , in particular compliance with the rule of law and the general regime of conditionality , to be monitored transparently and thoroughly; welcomes the commission’s proposal to include a repowereu chapter in the national recovery and resilience plans; insists that the financing of repowereu must not divert resources away from other eu priorities; ### 2. welcomes the robustness of the labour market; highlights the stabilising effect of national short-time work schemes supported by the european instrument for temporary support to mitigate unemployment risks in an emergency (sure); welcomes the fact that the recovery and resilience facility is mitigating those consequences and contributing to the union’s competitive sustainability; stresses that its successful implementation requires the completion of milestones and targets , to be monitored transparently and thoroughly; welcomes the commission’s proposal to include a repowereu chapter in the national recovery and resilience plans; insists that the financing of repowereu must not divert resources away from other eu priorities;


### 4. is concerned at the economic impact of the aforementioned crises on the union and on national budgets; stresses that crisis response has led member states to adopt extensive economic measures; highlights the long-term impact of these measures on economic sustainability , but considers that it should be possible to return to a state of economic discipline in the long run; is also concerned at the union’s increasing debt repayment obligations if not appropriately handled; stresses that union borrowing should not increase further as long as there are no new own resources to cater for debt repayment. ### 4. is concerned at the economic impact of the aforementioned crises on the union and on national budgets; stresses that crisis response has led member states to adopt extensive economic measures; highlights the long-term impact of these measures on economic sustainability , but considers that it should be possible to return to a state of economic discipline in the long run; is also concerned at the union’s increasing debt repayment obligations if not appropriately handled; stresses that no further union borrowing should be allowed.


### 7. underlines the two key features of the rrf which are intrinsically linked to its successful implementation: ### deleted


### 13. welcomes that lessons have been learned from the rrf process by promoting more ownership of ways of putting member states in charge of designing their own national plans combining fiscal , reform and investment commitments within a common eu framework; greatly regrets that , unlike the rrf , the european parliament is excluded from defining the overarching goals , guidance , criteria for the debt reduction path , investments , reforms and the underlying assumptions on which the comprehensive debt sustainability analysis is based; regrets that neither the involvement of national parliaments nor that of national stakeholders and civil society is mentioned under project design , implementation or subsequent scrutiny , which sets back ownership and democratic accountability; ### 13. welcomes that lessons have been learned from the rrf process by promoting more ownership of ways of putting member states in charge of designing their own national plans combining fiscal , reform and investment commitments within a common eu framework; regrets that neither the involvement of national parliaments nor that of national stakeholders and civil society is mentioned under project design , implementation or subsequent scrutiny , which sets back ownership and democratic accountability;


### (22) freezing measures should be without prejudice to the possibility for a specific property to be considered evidence throughout the proceedings , provided that it would ultimately be made available for effective execution of the confiscation order. in the context of criminal proceedings , property may also be frozen with a view to its possible subsequent restitution or in order to safeguard compensation for the damage caused by a criminal offence. ### (22) freezing measures should be without prejudice to the possibility for a specific property to be considered evidence throughout the proceedings , provided that it would ultimately be made available for effective execution of the confiscation order. in the context of criminal proceedings , property shall also be frozen with a view to its subsequent restitution and in order to safeguard victims’ rights to compensation and restitution for the damage caused by a criminal offence.


### 2. member states shall consider taking measures allowing confiscated property to be used for public interest or social purposes. ### 2. member states shall take the necessary measures allowing confiscated property to be used for public interest or social purposes.


### 1. member states shall take the necessary measures to enable the freezing of property necessary to ensure a possible confiscation of that property under article 12. ### 1. member states shall take the necessary measures to enable the freezing of property necessary to ensure a possible confiscation of that property under article 12 and ensure victims’ compensation under article 18. .


### immunity from prosecution of the suspected or accused person , as provided for under national law; ### immunity from prosecution of the suspected or accused person , as provided for under national and international law;


### where , as a result of a criminal offence , victims have claims against the person who is subject to a confiscation measure provided for under this directive , member states shall take the necessary measures to ensure that the confiscation measure does not affect victims’ rights to obtain compensation for their claims. ### where , as a result of a criminal offence , victims have claims against the person who is subject to a confiscation measure provided for under this directive , member states shall take the necessary measures to ensure that the confiscation measure does not affect victims’ rights to obtain compensation for their claims. the confiscated property or money obtained after selling such property are either restitute to the victim or used to compensate the victims.


### 1. considers that the european union needs a more sustainable growth model in order to respond to environmental , digital and demographic challenges; welcomes the european green deal as the new green growth strategy for europe with sustainability , citizen well-being and fairness at its core; ### 1. considers that the european union needs a more sustainable growth model in order to respond to environmental , digital and demographic challenges; welcomes the european green deal as the new green growth strategy for europe with sustainability , citizen well-being and fairness at its core; therefore calls on the commission urgently to start work on the creation of its own coordination mechanism in the eu to ensure that europe is able to become the first climate-neutral continent by 2050;


### 1. acknowledges that europe’s economy is showing signs of less dynamic growth; highlights that more must be done to support member states which are experiencing slower growth and high unemployment , particularly where young people are concerned; ### 1. acknowledges that europe’s economy is showing signs of less dynamic growth; highlights that more must be done to support member states which are experiencing slower growth and high unemployment , particularly where young people are concerned; underlines that a rating agency recently downgraded from “stable” to “negative” the annual outlook for sovereign creditworthiness in the euro area for 2020;


### 1. acknowledges that europe’s economy is showing signs of less dynamic growth; highlights that more must be done to support member states which are experiencing slower growth and high unemployment , particularly where young people are concerned; ### 1. acknowledges that europe’s economy is showing signs of less dynamic growth; highlights that more must be done to support member states which are experiencing slower growth and high unemployment , particularly where young people are concerned; emphasizes that investments are needed to facilitate the integration of young people and the long-term unemployed into the labour market;


### 1. notes that , in view of the climate change emergency , the eu’s annual growth survey (ags) has now been renamed the annual sustainable growth survey (asgs) , and considers that this implies a change in the positioning of the report and the implementation of ecological indicators; ### 1. notes that the eu’s annual growth survey (ags) has now been renamed the annual sustainable growth survey (asgs). considers that this cannot override the original purpose and function of the european semester , since it was established to provide a framework for the coordination of economic policies across the european union. promoting sustainable growth in a sustainable manner means to promote responsible fiscal policies , structural reforms and investment;


### 1. notes that , in view of the climate change emergency , the eu’s annual growth survey (ags) has now been renamed the annual sustainable growth survey (asgs) , and considers that this implies a change in the positioning of the report and the implementation of ecological indicators; ### 1. notes that , in view of the political prioritization of climate change , the eu’s annual growth survey (ags) has now been renamed the annual sustainable growth survey (asgs);


### 2. notes the role of the european green deal as the eu’s new strategy defining ecological issues and the wellbeing of citizens as principal goals for the union; notes , with regard to the scope of the european semester , the inclusion of the sdgs and of the principles of the european pillar of social rights (epsr) , which will require the adjustment of existing indicators and the creation of new ones to monitor the implementation of eu economic , environmental and social policies , as well as coherence between policy goals and budgetary means; notes the need to implement long-term planning to tackle climate change; ### 2. notes , with regard to the scope of the european semester , the inclusion of the sdgs and of the principles of the european pillar of social rights (epsr) , which will require the adjustment of existing indicators and the creation of new ones to monitor the implementation of eu economic , environmental and social policies , as well as coherence between policy goals and budgetary means;


### 3. considers achieving a fair transition to climate neutrality to be a major responsibility for the eu’s citizens and economy and its role in the world; calls for appropriate support and policies , with involvement for and of the public , the various sectors , regions and member states with a view to benefiting from this transformation and making it a success; calls on the commission to undertake an annual evaluation of the union’s ecological debt , carbon budget and imported emissions; ### 3. urges member states and citizens to take responsibility for future generations , and to ensure the sustainability of our economies , productivity , innovation and wealth creation; calls for appropriate support and policies , with involvement for and of the public , the various sectors , regions and member states with a view to benefiting from this transformation and making it a success; calls on the commission to undertake an annual evaluation of the union’s ecological debt , carbon budget and imported emissions; calls on the commission to closely monitor the transitioning costs;


### 4. notes that the euro area is going through a prolonged period of subdued growth (1.1 % in the euro area and 1.4% in the eu as a whole in 2019) , with growth in the euro area in 2020 and 2021 forecast at 1.2 % and for the eu in 2020 and 2021 forecast at 1.4 %; also notes that the inflation rate is forecast to further slow down , to 1.2 % in 2019 and 2020 , in a context of high uncertainty due to geopolitical tensions and brexit; is concerned at the high level of private debt; ### 4. notes that the euro area is going through a prolonged period of subdued growth (1.1 % in the euro area and 1.4% in the eu as a whole in 2019) , with growth in the euro area in 2020 and 2021 forecast at 1.2 % and for the eu in 2020 and 2021 forecast at 1.4 %; also notes that the inflation rate is forecast to further slow down , to 1.2 % in 2019 and 2020 , in a context of high uncertainty due to geopolitical tensions , brexit and ongoing accommodative interest rate policies pursued by the ecb; is concerned at the high level of public as well as private debt , which has been spurred and exacerbated by the accommodative monetary policy of the ecb;


### 4. notes that the euro area is going through a prolonged period of subdued growth (1.1 % in the euro area and 1.4% in the eu as a whole in 2019) , with growth in the euro area in 2020 and 2021 forecast at 1.2 % and for the eu in 2020 and 2021 forecast at 1.4 %; also notes that the inflation rate is forecast to further slow down , to 1.2 % in 2019 and 2020 , in a context of high uncertainty due to geopolitical tensions and brexit; is concerned at the high level of private debt; ### 4. notes that the euro area is going through a prolonged period of subdued growth (1.3% in the euro area and 1.5% in the eu as a whole in 2019) , with growth in the euro area in 2020 forecast at 1.6 % and for the eu in 2020 forecast at 1.8%; also notes that the euro area headline inflation rate is forecast to slow down , to 1.4 % in 2019 with gradual pick-up to 1.5% in 2020 , with 1.6% and 1.7% respectively in the eu 27;


### 5. is concerned that post-crisis investment has been on a downward path in the eu in spite of historically low interest rates , currently standing at 3.4 % , with overall infrastructure investment now at about 75 % of its pre-crisis level; whereas 80 % of the shortfall is the result of cutbacks in the public sector , which have occurred particularly in countries subject to adverse macroeconomic conditions and the more severe fiscal constraints imposed on disadvantaged regions already characterised by poor infrastructure quality and weak socio-economic outcomes , but also , and surprisingly , in countries with a large fiscal space; ### 5. is concerned that post-crisis investment has been on a downward path in the eu in spite of historically low interest rates set by the ecb , currently standing at 3.4 % , with overall infrastructure investment now at about 75 % of its pre-crisis level; calls on the ecb to normalise interest rates as soon as possible;


### 5. is concerned that post-crisis investment has been on a downward path in the eu in spite of historically low interest rates , currently standing at 3.4 % , with overall infrastructure investment now at about 75 % of its pre-crisis level; whereas 80 % of the shortfall is the result of cutbacks in the public sector , which have occurred particularly in countries subject to adverse macroeconomic conditions and the more severe fiscal constraints imposed on disadvantaged regions already characterised by poor infrastructure quality and weak socio-economic outcomes , but also , and surprisingly , in countries with a large fiscal space; ### 5. is concerned that post-crisis investment has been on a downward path in the eu in spite of historically low interest rates , currently standing at 3.4 % ,with overall infrastructure investment now at about 75 % of its pre-crisis level; in the same time notes that investment-to-gdp ratio is set to continue on a rising trend in the forecast horizon , driven by the steady increases of the investments in the private sector.


### 6. endorses the conclusion of the european fiscal board (efb) that the fiscal framework has not protected the quality of public expenditure , and welcomes the efb’s proposal for a ‘golden rule’ to protect public investment; calls , therefore , for the reform of the stability and growth pact and the introduction of a golden rule aimed at implementing sound fiscal policy on an equal footing with investment within the eu’s policy objectives; whereas this should cover the investment foreseen for the realisation of the green deal , the digital revolution , the sdgs and the epsr rights , including expenditure aimed at reducing poverty and inequality related to social protection , health services and long-term care , and education and training; ### 6. disagrees with the conclusion of the european fiscal board (efb) that the fiscal framework has not protected the quality of public expenditure , given persistently high public deficits in certain member states , and rejects the efb’s proposal for a ‘golden rule’ to protect public investment , as long as deficits remain high and the ecb´s monetary policy remains accommodative;


### — having regard to the commission communication of 21 november 2018 entitled ‘annual sustainable growth strategy 2020’ (com(2019)0650) , and to the commission’s alert mechanism report 2020 of 17 december 2019 (com(2019)0651) , ### — having regard to the commission communication of 17 december 2019 entitled ‘annual sustainable growth strategy 2020’ (com(2019)0650) , and to the commission’s alert mechanism report 2020 of 17 december 2019 (com(2019)0651) ,


### — having regard to the recommendation for a council recommendation of 17 december 2019 on the economic policy of the euro area (2019/c652) , ### — having regard to the commission’s recommendation for a council recommendation of 17 december 2019 on the economic policy of the euro area (2019/c652) ,


### — having regard to its resolution of 10 october 2019 on employment and social policies of the euro area10 , ### deleted


### — having regard to its resolution of 26 march 2019 on financial crimes , tax evasion and tax avoidance11 , ### deleted


### — having regard to its resolution of 18 december 2019 on ‘fair taxation in a digitalised and globalised economy: beps 2.0’12 , ### deleted


### — having regard to the opinions of the committee on budgets and the committee on regional development , ### deleted


### — having regard to the report of the committee on economic and monetary affairs (a9-0000/2019) , ### — having regard to the report of the committee on economic and monetary affairs , the opinions of the committee on budgets and the committee on regional development (a9-0000/2019) ,


### a. whereas the improvement in the economic situation and low interest rates provide an opportunity to implement ambitious reforms , in particular measures aimed at encouraging public investment to tackle climate change and its social consequences and create full-time jobs; ### a. whereas the negative effects on banks’ net interest income and the increase in banks' lending capacity and lower costs for provisions and losses , which rewards risky behaviour and spurs speculation , poses significant systemic threats in the banking sector and the real economy , including the possibility of asset bubbles , especially in the green economy;


### a. whereas the improvement in the economic situation and low interest rates provide an opportunity to implement ambitious reforms , in particular measures aimed at encouraging public investment to tackle climate change and its social consequences and create full-time jobs; ### a. whereas the improvement in the economic situation and low interest rates provide an opportunity to use these good times to implement ambitious reforms , in particular measures aimed at reducing budget deficits , government debt and non-performing loans and to be prepared for another eventual recession or economic crisis and create full-time jobs;


### b. whereas inequality of income in the euro area has increased since the beginning of the financial crisis; whereas there are between 50 and 100 million people affected by energy poverty in europe; ### b. whereas more needs to be done to further reduce inequality of income in the euro area


### c. having regard to the need for a european climate law with a legally binding goal of reaching net zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050 at the latest and an intermediate target of at least 65 % for 2030; ### deleted


### economic outlook ### economic outlook (based on winter economic outlook)


### 7. highlights the problem of too low a level of public investment; calls on the commission to assess the cost of not taking action in this area , in particular by evaluating the difference between the need for investment and the actual investments made; ### deleted


### 7. highlights the problem of too low a level of public investment; calls on the commission to assess the cost of not taking action in this area , in particular by evaluating the difference between the need for investment and the actual investments made; ### 7. notes that the public investment-to-gdp ratio in 2020 is set to remain below its pre-crisis average level in almost half the eu member states , while highlights that in terms of the quality of public spending , the aggregate public investment-to-gdp ratio in the euro area is projected to increase from 2.7% in 2018 to 2.9% in 2020-2021; calls on the commission to assess the situation in this area , in particular by evaluating the difference between the need for investment and the actual investments made;


### 8. calls for a european green industrial strategy; ### deleted


### 9. shares the concern expressed in others of the efb’s conclusions regarding the pro-cyclical elements in the eu fiscal rules , which forced member states to adjust their economies in a poor or difficult economic situation , failing to improve the quality of public finance and promote investment; welcomes the efb’s recommendation of a seven-year cycle mirroring the mff so as to better coordinate member states’ public accounts , and especially investment; ### 9. stresses efb’s conclusions regarding the pro-cyclical elements in the eu fiscal rules , which cannot easily disentangle what is due to the fiscal framework or to the economic and political context , the six-pack reform and subsequent reinterpretations of the rules have de facto neither reduced pro-cyclicality nor sufficiently encouraged counter-cyclicality; is concerned that pro-cyclical tightening during the crisis was particularly pronounced in countries with high debt that had not taken advantage of the good times preceding the crisis to create fiscal buffers;


### 10. notes that the debt levels of all the member states are above the pre-crisis level and are expected to exceed 60 % in 2021; further notes that in six member states the ratio will be higher than 90 %; highlights the fact that the fiscal rules have not contributed to bringing down the debt levels of highly indebted countries but have , rather , increased them; ### 10. is concerned that the debt levels of 11 member states are above the pre-crisis level and are expected to exceed 60 % in 2021; further notes that in 3 member states the ratio will be higher than 100 %; highlights the fact that the poor enforcement of the eu fiscal rules by the member states have not contributed to bringing down the debt levels of highly indebted countries and could not prevent their increase;


### 10. notes that the debt levels of all the member states are above the pre-crisis level and are expected to exceed 60 % in 2021; further notes that in six member states the ratio will be higher than 90 %; highlights the fact that the fiscal rules have not contributed to bringing down the debt levels of highly indebted countries but have , rather , increased them; ### 10. regrets that the debt levels of all the member states are above the pre-crisis level and are expected to exceed 60 % on average in 2021; further notes that in six member states the ratio will be higher than 90 %; regrets that these member states have not made use of the favorable interest rate policy of the ecb to reduce their debt;


### 11. supports flexibility in the implementation of the sgp as proposed by the commission in 2015; considers that much more flexibility should be introduced in order to boost investment and ecological transition in the eu; calls , therefore , for the reform of the sgp and the introduction of a euro area fiscal capacity; ### 11. takes note of the commission communication on making the best use of the flexibility within the existing rules of the stability and growth pact; notes that ms did not used provided flexibility to promote much needed investments via efsi; is concerned that without sustainable fiscal policy and a credible financial situation of member states any future financing model of the ecological transition is endangered;


### 11. supports flexibility in the implementation of the sgp as proposed by the commission in 2015; considers that much more flexibility should be introduced in order to boost investment and ecological transition in the eu; calls , therefore , for the reform of the sgp and the introduction of a euro area fiscal capacity; ### 11. considers that much more flexibility in the implementation of the sgp in order to boost investment and ecological transition in the eu will worsen the financial situation across all eu member states and will foster green asset bubbles; calls , therefore , for fiscal orthodoxy and strict adherence to the sgp;


### 12. reiterates its call for a european stabilisation function and a european unemployment benefit reinsurance scheme , with a view to protecting citizens and reducing pressure on public finances during external shocks so as to overcome social and economic imbalances; ### deleted


### 13. notes that the commission warranted in-depth reviews for 13 member states identified as having imbalances; supports the suggestion made in the alert mechanism report (amr) 2020 that a rebalancing of current account deficits and surpluses in the euro area is needed urgently and would be beneficial for all member states; ### 13. notes that the commission’s report identified 13 member states that may have macroeconomic imbalances and which should be subject to an in-depth review in 2020; notes the suggestion made in the alert mechanism report (amr) 2020 that are balancing of both current account deficits and surpluses in the euro area is needed urgently and would be beneficial for all member states;


### 14. is concerned about the accelerating rise in house prices; ### 14. is concerned that in some member states , developments in price or cost variables show potential signs of overheating , particularly as regards the housing market or the labour market;


### 14. is concerned about the accelerating rise in house prices; ### 14. is deeply concerned about the accelerating rise in house prices as a result of artificially cheap mortages due to the ultra-accommodative monetary policies of the ecb;


### 15. recalls the importance of the efficient regulation of the banking and financial sectors in order to prevent a new crisis; believes that such regulation must integrate the ecological situation; emphasises the importance of completing the banking union and the need to reform the european stability mechanism; ### 15. recalls the importance of the efficient regulation of the banking and financial sectors in order to prevent a new crisis; believes that such regulation must integrate the ecological situation; emphasises the importance of completing the banking union and the need to reform the european stability mechanism; with a credible european deposit insurance scheme , a package to reduce non-performing loans and a structural reform of the banking sector to prevent financial institutions from being “too big to fail” and separate essential banking services for citizens from trading activities and speculation;


### 15. recalls the importance of the efficient regulation of the banking and financial sectors in order to prevent a new crisis; believes that such regulation must integrate the ecological situation; emphasises the importance of completing the banking union and the need to reform the european stability mechanism; ### 15. recalls the importance of the efficient regulation of the banking and financial sectors in order to prevent a new crisis; emphasises the need to abolish the european stability mechanism in order to avoid moral hazard;


### 15. recalls the importance of the efficient regulation of the banking and financial sectors in order to prevent a new crisis; believes that such regulation must integrate the ecological situation; emphasises the importance of completing the banking union and the need to reform the european stability mechanism; ### 15. recalls the importance of the efficient regulation of the banking and financial sectors in order to prevent a new crisis; emphasises the importance of completing the banking union and the need to reform the european stability mechanism;


### 16. calls for qualified majority voting in council on tax matters; ### 16. recalls that qualified majority voting in council on tax matters would lead to a situation of taxation without representation in certain member states , which would only accelerate the disintegration of the european union;


### 16. calls for qualified majority voting in council on tax matters; ### 16. calls for respecting the provisions of the treaties concerning the decision making on tax matters;


### 17. calls for the systematic inclusion of tax matters in the country specific recommendations (csrs) , with the aim of ensuring economic coherence across eu member states as well as the fairness of eu tax systems; believes that the csrs could ensure a fair balance between sources of revenue and should also include innovative elements aiming at promoting the green deal; further believes that they should also support member states in tackling tax avoidance and aggressive tax planning; ### 17. recalls that tax matters are exclusive competences of the member states;


### 17. calls for the systematic inclusion of tax matters in the country specific recommendations (csrs) , with the aim of ensuring economic coherence across eu member states as well as the fairness of eu tax systems; believes that the csrs could ensure a fair balance between sources of revenue and should also include innovative elements aiming at promoting the green deal; further believes that they should also support member states in tackling tax avoidance and aggressive tax planning; ### 17. notes the inclusion of tax matters , when necessary , in the country specific recommendations (csrs) , with the aim of ensuring competitiveness and economic coherence across eu member states; believes that the csrs could ensure a fair balance between sources of revenue; invites the council to start considering innovative elements in taxation with the aim of reconciling competitiveness and the promotion of the green deal , meanwhile guaranteeing a level playing field for eu companies; further believes that they should also support member states in tackling tax avoidance;


### 18. notes that the eu-28 employment rate currently stands at 73.1 % - the highest annual average ever recorded - while unemployment stands at 7.6 % in the euro area and 6.3 % in the eu as a whole; ### 18. notes that the eu-28 employment rate currently stands at 73.1 % - the highest annual average ever recorded - while unemployment stands at 7.6 % in the euro area and 6.3 % in the eu as a whole , with downward trend in 2020 and 2021;


### 20. takes note of amr 2020’s finding that wage growth at euro area level remains below what would be expected at the current levels of unemployment on the basis of historical data , and that this affects the inflation rate; highlights that the currently low productivity and inflation together with structural reforms transferring collective bargaining to the enterprise level are detrimental to wage growth and are leading to greater income inequality and an increase in the numbers of working poor , with in-work poverty affecting almost one in ten workers in europe; accordingly advocates wage growth; ### deleted


### 20. takes note of amr 2020’s finding that wage growth at euro area level remains below what would be expected at the current levels of unemployment on the basis of historical data , and that this affects the inflation rate; highlights that the currently low productivity and inflation together with structural reforms transferring collective bargaining to the enterprise level are detrimental to wage growth and are leading to greater income inequality and an increase in the numbers of working poor , with in-work poverty affecting almost one in ten workers in europe; accordingly advocates wage growth; ### 20. takes note of amr 2020’s finding that the labour markets continued to improve and unemployment has fallen in all eu member states. welcomes that in many member states there were wage growth , but is concerned that the unit labour costs have been growing at a faster pace in many member states due to both wage acceleration and reduced productivity growth;


### 21. agrees that it is a matter of great concern that income inequality is above pre-crisis levels in some countries , being frequently linked to unequal opportunities in access to education , training and social protection; ### 21. agrees that it is a matter of great concern that income inequality is above pre-crisis levels in some countries , being frequently linked to unequal opportunities in access to education , training and social protection; calls on the commission and member states to drastically limit the import of cheap labour into the eu , which drives the price of labour downwards;


### 21. agrees that it is a matter of great concern that income inequality is above pre-crisis levels in some countries , being frequently linked to unequal opportunities in access to education , training and social protection; ### 21. stresses that equal opportunities in access to education , training and social protection are important elements to further reduce income inequalities;


### 22. underlines the fact that the number of people at risk of poverty or social exclusion stands , on 2017 figures , at 113 million , or 22.5 % of the population; ### 22. underlines the fact that the number of people at risk of poverty or social exclusion is declining in most member states , and is now 5 million below the 2012 peak;


### 23. stresses that equality between women and men , gender mainstreaming and gender budgeting must become key elements of the european semester , leading to action on gender pay , gender career development and the gender pension gap (which currently stands at 40 % in the eu); ### deleted


### 24. welcomes the asgs 2020’s proposals for fostering social and regional convergence towards better living and working conditions in the eu; ### 24. welcomes the asgs 2020’s offer to provide tailored incentives and support for reforms and investment via budgetary instrument for convergence and competitiveness and asks for the same in the framework of convergence and reform instrument for the non-eurozone member states;


### 25. highlights the time constraints on the current european semester process , which form an obstacle to full debate and the proper involvement in the process of civil society organisations , social partners , and even national parliaments and the ep , and contribute significantly to the lack of a sense of ownership and implementation; calls for the extension of the semester cycle to a biannual or triannual period , with the possibility of revision in case of major economic shocks; ### 25. highlights the time constraints on the current european semester process , which form an obstacle to full debate and the proper involvement in the process national parliaments and the ep;


### 26. looks forward to the stronger involvement of the ep and the national parliaments in the european semester process and to the creation of an institutionalised dialogue with the commission , the social partners , territories and civil society , at both eu and national level , in order to further boost the process’s democratic legitimacy; ### 26. looks forward to the stronger monitoring by the ep and the closer involvement of national parliaments in the european semester process and to continue the dialogue with the commission ,


### 26. looks forward to the stronger involvement of the ep and the national parliaments in the european semester process and to the creation of an institutionalised dialogue with the commission , the social partners , territories and civil society , at both eu and national level , in order to further boost the process’s democratic legitimacy; ### 26. looks forward to the better involvement of the ep and the national parliaments in the european semester process and to the creation of an institutionalised dialogue with the commission , and the social partners , at both eu and national level , in order to further boost the process’s democratic legitimacy;


### 28. instructs its president to forward this resolution to the council and the commission. ### deleted


### 28. instructs its president to forward this resolution to the council and the commission. ### 28. instructs its president not to forward this resolution to the council and the commission.


### 2. stresses the ‘policy first’ principle underpinning the european fund for sustainable development plus (efsd+) , which should enhance coherence and coordination among the eib , the commission and member states in identifying investment operations that can contribute to sustainable development; ### 2. stresses the ‘policy first’ principle underpinning the european fund for sustainable development plus (efsd+) , which should enhance coherence and coordination among the eib , the commission and member states in identifying investment operations that can contribute to sustainable development; is of the opinion that the eib should avoid excessive overreliance on projects implemented by transnational companies and financial intermediaries that do not prioritize development projects , such as private equity funds;


### 4. recalls the need for robust ex ante impact assessments to mitigate the risks of eib operations on human rights and on environmental , labour and social standards , and the need for meaningful consultations with stakeholders , including civil society organisations; stresses that the eib needs to deal with complaints in a transparent and effective manner; ### 4. recalls the need for robust ex ante impact assessments to mitigate the risks of eib operations on human rights and on environmental , labour and social standards , and the need for meaningful consultations with stakeholders , including civil society organisations; believes that ex ante impact assessments on human rights should be carried out for every project funded by the eib , especially when implemented by financial intermediaries , and that continuous monitoring of operations on the ground should be ensured; stresses that the eib needs to deal with complaints in a transparent and effective manner;


### 6. stresses the importance of avoiding further geographical imbalances in the eib’s lending activity so as to ensure a broader geographical and sectoral allocation of investments , reduce regional disparities and enhance convergence; welcomes the efforts already made by the eib in this regard; ### 6. takes note of the geographical distribution of eib’s lending activity and call for a fair allocation of investments , to reduce regional disparities and to enhance convergence; welcomes the efforts already made by the eib in this regard;


### 18. reiterates that supporting smes and mid-caps must remain a fundamental objective for the eib , notably to assist them with decarbonisation and access to ict tools; welcomes efforts made to provide online assistance and counselling to smes in accessing eib lending; ### 18. reiterates that supporting smes and mid-caps must remain a fundamental objective for the eib , notably to assist them with decarbonisation and access to ict tools; welcomes efforts made to provide online assistance and counselling to smes in accessing eib lending; reiterates , moreover , that the eib should further strengthen its support for micro-enterprises , especially in this time of economic crisis , including through cooperation with national support banks and local banking networks;


### 1. highlights the importance of the activities of the european investment bank (eib) to increase the current levels of investment in the eu , which are below historical averages and insufficient to fulfil the eu’s sustainability , social and innovation ambitions; stresses that in order to achieve these ambitions , more risk-taking by the eib may be necessary in parallel to increasing equity and the development of expertise in innovative funding instruments; calls for adequate capitalisation of the eib to allow for the use of innovative instruments in the financing of projects with substantial potential sustainability , social and innovation gains; ### 1. highlights the importance of the activities of the european investment bank (eib) to restoring investment activity in the eu , which is below historical averages; stresses that more risk-taking by the eib should be avoided , giving the fragile nature of the investment climate in the eu due to the ultra-accommodative interest policies of the ecb , which may have given rise to asset bubbles throughout european markets , and has contributed to the zombification of up to 10% of european undertakings , according to the 2018 economic activity report of the bank of international settlements; calls for adequate decapitalisation of the eib following brexit , taking into account that the uk accounts for 18% of the banks capital;


### 1. highlights the importance of the activities of the european investment bank (eib) to increase the current levels of investment in the eu , which are below historical averages and insufficient to fulfil the eu’s sustainability , social and innovation ambitions; stresses that in order to achieve these ambitions , more risk-taking by the eib may be necessary in parallel to increasing equity and the development of expertise in innovative funding instruments; calls for adequate capitalisation of the eib to allow for the use of innovative instruments in the financing of projects with substantial potential sustainability , social and innovation gains; ### 1. highlights the importance of the activities of the european investment bank (eib) to increase the current levels of investment in the eu , which are below historical averages and insufficient to fulfil the eu’s sustainability , social and innovation ambitions; stresses that in order to achieve these ambitions , more risk-taking by the eib may be necessary in parallel to increasing equity and the development of expertise in innovative funding instruments; calls for adequate capitalisation of the eib to allow for the use of innovative instruments in the financing of projects with substantial potential sustainability , social and innovation gains; calls on the eib to intervene when there are specific market failures , such as the financial crisis and difficulties in accessing finance for smes and innovators;


### 2. welcomes the commitment by the commission president-elect to turn sections of the eib into a climate bank , and the commitments from the eib president to increase the share of eib financing for climate action and environmental sustainability to at least 50 % by 2025 and to align all eib financing activities with the goals of the paris agreement by the end of 2020; calls on the commission to present an ambitious new european sustainable investment plan , including additional financial commitments , as soon as possible , and to fully support the eib in its sustainability ambitions; ### 2. rejects the commitment by the commission president to turn sections of the eib into a climate bank , and the commitments from the eib president to increase the share of eib financing for climate action and environmental sustainability to at least 50 % by 2025 and to align all eib financing activities with the goals of the paris agreement by the end of 2020 , since this will contribute to the emergence of green asset bubbles throughout the eu , which threatens the resilience and sustainability of european financial markets; calls on the commission to refrain from presenting an overly ambitious new european sustainable investment plan;


### 2. welcomes the commitment by the commission president-elect to turn sections of the eib into a climate bank , and the commitments from the eib president to increase the share of eib financing for climate action and environmental sustainability to at least 50 % by 2025 and to align all eib financing activities with the goals of the paris agreement by the end of 2020; calls on the commission to present an ambitious new european sustainable investment plan , including additional financial commitments , as soon as possible , and to fully support the eib in its sustainability ambitions; ### 2. welcomes the commitment by the commission president-elect to turn sections of the eib into a climate bank , and the commitments from the eib president to increase the share of eib financing for climate action and environmental sustainability to at least 50 % by 2025 and to align all eib financing activities with the goals of the paris agreement by the end of 2020; calls on the commission to present an ambitious new european sustainable investment plan , including additional financial commitments , as soon as possible , and to fully support the eib in its sustainability ambitions; calls on the commission to consider the different economic situation and capacity ofthe member states and work out some kind of preferential treatment or an extended transitional period for the cohesion countries , so that the transition to aclimate neutral economy does not result in an unbearable burden for them;


### 3. stresses that in order for the eib to become the eu’s climate bank , it should stop all financial support to fossil fuel projects by the end of 2020 , and align all its activities , including eif operations , with the paris agreement’s goals; calls on the eib to make decarbonisation commitments a condition for companies to receive eib support; calls on the eib to apply the eu taxonomy framework , once it has been formally adopted , as a benchmark for its climate and environmental investments; calls on the eib to develop a credible methodology to measure , disclose and achieve ‘paris alignment’ of its financing operations; ### deleted


### 3. stresses that in order for the eib to become the eu’s climate bank , it should stop all financial support to fossil fuel projects by the end of 2020 , and align all its activities , including eif operations , with the paris agreement’s goals; calls on the eib to make decarbonisation commitments a condition for companies to receive eib support; calls on the eib to apply the eu taxonomy framework , once it has been formally adopted , as a benchmark for its climate and environmental investments; calls on the eib to develop a credible methodology to measure , disclose and achieve ‘paris alignment’ of its financing operations; ### 3. stresses that in order for the eib to become the eu’s climate bank , it should stop all financial support to fossil fuel projects by the end of 2020 , and align all its activities , including eif operations , with the paris agreement’s goals; calls on the eib to make decarbonisation commitments a condition for companies to receive eib support; calls on the eib to apply the eu taxonomy framework , once it has been formally adopted , as a benchmark for its climate and environmental investments; calls on the eib to develop a credible methodology to measure , disclose and achieve ‘paris alignment’ of its financing operations; stresses the importance of the projects planned to be financed or cofinanced by the eib being compatible with the national climate targets linked to the implementation of cop21;


### 4. stresses that the key quantitative target of the european fund for strategic investments (efsi) of mobilising eur 500 billion of additional private and public investment should be replaced by measurable targets on sustainability and social impact in future investment strategies; calls on the eib to increase the share of efsi and investeu financing to projects that substantially contribute to the eu’s sustainability and social objectives; calls on the commission to ensure that investeu’s sustainability-proofing methodologies are fully consistent with the eu’s sustainability objectives; ### 4. stresses that the key quantitative target of the european fund for strategic investments (efsi) of mobilising eur 500 billion of additional private and public investment should be erased; recalls that the eib is the bank of the member states , which are its shareholders , and therefore not an eu institution , which means they should decide on investment decisions , without any interference by the commission or other eu institutions;


### 4. stresses that the key quantitative target of the european fund for strategic investments (efsi) of mobilising eur 500 billion of additional private and public investment should be replaced by measurable targets on sustainability and social impact in future investment strategies; calls on the eib to increase the share of efsi and investeu financing to projects that substantially contribute to the eu’s sustainability and social objectives; calls on the commission to ensure that investeu’s sustainability-proofing methodologies are fully consistent with the eu’s sustainability objectives; ### 4. stresses that the key quantitative target of the european fund for strategic investments (efsi) of mobilising eur 500 billion of additional private and public investment should be replaced by measurable targets on sustainability and social impact in future investment strategies; calls on the eib to increase the share of efsi and investeu financing to projects that substantially contribute to the eu’s sustainability and social objectives; calls on the commission to ensure that investeu’s sustainability-proofing methodologies are fully consistent with the eu’s sustainability objectives; points in this context to the importance of carrying out thorough ex-ante and ex-post assessments in order to ascertain that works are sustainable and will provide real added value in economic , social , and environmental terms;


### 5. calls on the eib group to be more transparent about its economic operations , its use of the eu budget guarantee , the additionality of eib operations and on possible future plans for a development subsidiary at the eib , and for the eib group to improve its accountability on these issues; calls for a memorandum of understanding between the eib and parliament to improve access to eib documents and data related to strategic orientation and financing policies in the future in order to strengthen the bank’s accountability. ### 5. calls on the eib group to be more transparent about its economic operations , its use of the eu budget guarantee , the additionality of eib operations and on possible future plans for a development subsidiary at the eib , and for the eib group to improve its accountability on these issues; calls for a memorandum of understanding between the eib and parliament to improve access to eib documents and data related to strategic orientation and financing policies in the future in order to strengthen the bank’s accountability; points out that the bank's only shareholders are the member states; stresses that the european parliament , the court of auditors and the european anti-fraud office should have more external oversight powers in order to strengthen the reporting of the bank's activities;


### 5. calls on the eib group to be more transparent about its economic operations , its use of the eu budget guarantee , the additionality of eib operations and on possible future plans for a development subsidiary at the eib , and for the eib group to improve its accountability on these issues; calls for a memorandum of understanding between the eib and parliament to improve access to eib documents and data related to strategic orientation and financing policies in the future in order to strengthen the bank’s accountability. ### 5. calls on the eib group to be more transparent about its economic operations , its use of the eu budget guarantee , the additionality of eib operations; calls for a memorandum of understanding between the eib and parliament to improve access to eib documents and data related to strategic orientation and financing policies in the future in order to strengthen the bank’s accountability.


### a. whereas the european union solidarity fund (eusf) , established by council regulation (ec) no 2012/2002 in order to provide financial assistance to member states and accession countries undergoing major disasters , represents true european added value and the materialisation of a will , that has sometimes been lacking , to provide mutual assistance at union level; ### deleted


### 1. is deeply concerned that currently none of the nationally determined contributions (ndcs) submitted , including those of the union and its member states , are in line with the objective of pursuing efforts to limit the global temperature increase to 1.5°c above pre-industrial levels; ### 1. is deeply concerned that currently none of the nationally determined contributions(ndcs) submitted , including those of the union and its member states , are in line with the objective of pursuing efforts to limit the global temperature increase to 1.5°c above pre-industrial levels; and notes that population relocations within the eu contribute to population growth in countries of origin and thus to global overpopulation , leading to environmental destruction;


### 1. welcomes the paris agreement , the green deal and the goal of achieving climate neutrality by 2050; notes the lack of international climate efforts; believes that an eu carbon border adjustment mechanism (‘the mechanism’) could incentivise international efforts to combat climate change; ### 1. welcomes the paris agreement , the green deal and the goal of achieving climate neutrality by 2050; notes the significant divergence of climate efforts between different countries; underlines that eu climate policy must go hand in hand with increased economic growth and competitiveness for the european industry based on the principles of free and fair competition; believes that an eu carbon border adjustment mechanism (‘the mechanism’) should serve to incentivise international efforts to combat climate change , therefore asks the commission to consider all available options while drawing up proposal for any such mechanism;


### — having regard to the commission communication of 11 december 2019 on ‘the european green deal’ (com(2019)0640) , ### deleted


### — having regard to its resolution of 15 january 2020 on the european green deal1 , ### deleted


### a. whereas the adverse impacts of climate change represent a direct threat to human livelihoods and ecosystems , as confirmed by the special report by the intergovernmental panel on climate change (ipcc) on global warming of 1.5°c; ### a. whereas the adverse impacts of climate change represent a direct threat to human livelihoods and ecosystems , as confirmed by the special report by the intergovernmental panel on climate change (ipcc) on global warming of 1.5°c; whereas carbon dioxide is a prerequisite for all growth and a natural , colourless , odourless and tasteless atmospheric gas; whereas the increasing carbon dioxide is accelerating growth and that a warm climate cycle can be a positive thing for much of northern europe;


### a. whereas the adverse impacts of climate change represent a direct threat to human livelihoods and ecosystems , as confirmed by the special report by the intergovernmental panel on climate change (ipcc) on global warming of 1.5°c; ### a. whereas the adverse impacts of climate change represent a direct threat to human livelihoods and ecosystems , as confirmed by the special report by the intergovernmental panel on climate change (ipcc) on global warming of 1.5°c; whereas these impacts show an uneven distribution , with most adverse effects on poorer countries and people;


### b. whereas the average global temperature has already risen by about 1.1°c above pre-industrial levels; ### b. whereas the average global temperature has already risen by about 1.1°c above pre-industrial levels , and estimated anthropogenic global warming is currently increasing at 0.2 ºc (likely between 0.1 ºc and 0.3ºc) per decade due to past and ongoing emissions;


### b. whereas the average global temperature has already risen by about 1.1°c above pre-industrial levels; ### b. whereas the average global temperature has already risen by about 1.1°c above pre-industrial levels; whereas the relationship between temperature variation and carbon dioxide has not been demonstrated;


### c. whereas the union and its member states are committed to delivering climate action on the basis of the latest available scientific evidence; ### c. whereas the union and its member states are committed to delivering climate action on the basis of the latest available scientific evidence; whereas many measures , such as the denial of nuclear power and stricter regulations than the eu's competitors , have increased the use of fossil energy worldwide;


### c. whereas the union and its member states are committed to delivering climate action on the basis of the latest available scientific evidence; ### c. whereas the union and its member states are committed to delivering climate action on the basis of the latest available scientific evidence and taking into account the existing inequalities between richer and poorer regions worldwide;


### d. whereas ensuring effective and meaningful carbon pricing , as part of a broader regulatory environment , can act as an economic incentive to spur investments in the decarbonisation of the union’s economy; ### d. whereas ensuring effective and meaningful fossil carbon dioxide pricing , as part of a broader regulatory environment , can act as an economic incentive to spur investments in the decarbonisation of the union’s economy;


### e. whereas existing carbon leakage provisions under union law have failed to demonstrate their effectiveness in delivering the necessary decarbonisation of the sectors concerned; ### e. whereas existing carbon leakage provisions under union law have proved to be inadequate in delivering the necessary carbon leakage protection to of the sectors concerned; whereas priority must be given to amending existing decisions which undermine the competitiveness of the internal market and , in addition , to imposing import duties;


### 2. strongly deplores the non-cooperative and disloyal behaviour of some of the union’s trade partners in international climate negotiations , as recently observed at cop25; considers that this behaviour hampers our collective global ability to reach the objectives of the paris agreement; ### 2. strongly deplores the non-cooperative and disloyal behaviour of some of the union’s trade partners in international climate negotiations , as recently observed at cop25; considers that this behaviour hampers our collective global ability to reach the objectives of the paris agreement; stresses that while co2-emissions in many 3rd countries have increased , the eu-27 emissions have decreased; notes that the eu must not compromise the competitiveness of its own industry by giving a competitive advantage to non-eu production;


### 2. underlines that international carbon pricing and fully competitive low-emission solutions would render the mechanism obsolete; stresses , therefore , that the eu needs to step up efforts in this respect; ### 2. underlines that international carbon pricing and fully competitive low-emission solutions would render the mechanism obsolete; stresses , therefore , that the eu needs to step up efforts in this respect; recalls that many technical solutions for mitigating co2 are still at the pilot stage and far from being economically feasible; underlines that the union’s increased climate ambition at the core of the green deal will increase the risk of carbon leakage in many industrial sectors;


### 3. stresses that the union has the responsibility and opportunity to assume a leading role in global climate action; ### 3. stresses that the union has the responsibility and opportunity to assume a leading role in global climate action but that it must not be to the detriment of the competitiveness of our own industry; stresses that the eu emits circa 8.5 % of the global emissions;


### 3. urges that the proposed cbam apply to all imports in order to avoid distortion in the internal market; ### 3. urges that the proposed cbam apply to all imports in order to avoid distortion in the internal market; stresses the need to address the inclusion of shipping emissions into these imports , additionally to the product-based ones;


### 3. emphasises that decentralised climate actions can lead to carbon leakage and a competitive disadvantage on international markets for the eu industry; urges the commission , therefore , to ensure full carbon-leakage protection and to consider the inclusion of export rebates in the mechanism; ### 3. emphasises that asymmetrical climate actions can lead to carbon leakage and a competitive disadvantage on international markets for the eu industry; urges the commission , therefore , to ensure full carbon-leakage protection and to include export rebates in the mechanism;


### 4. takes note of the commission’s proposal to set the union’s 2030 climate target to ‘at least 55 % net emissions reduction’ compared to 1990 levels; highlights , however , that this target does not represent the union’s highest possible ambition , nor does it reflect the principle of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities; ### 4. takes note of the commission’s unduly proposal to set the union’s 2030 climate target to ‘at least 55 % net emissions reduction’ compared to 1990 levels; highlights , however , that this target does not represent the union’s highest possible ambition , nor does it reflect the principle of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities;


### 4. recommends that a design be introduced that measures the carbon content of imports through their basic materials composition (as outlined in the proposal from the european economic and social committee); recalls that this feasible approximation would weigh each basic material covered by the eu ets and multiply it by its carbon intensity value – which ideally should be defined at country level; stresses , however , that importers who are more carbon efficient should be allowed to demonstrate the specific carbon intensity of their products; ### 4. recommends that a design be introduced that measures the carbon content of imports through their basic materials composition (as outlined in the proposal from the european economic and social committee); recalls that this feasible approximation would weigh each basic material covered by the eu ets and multiply it by its carbon intensity value – which ideally should be defined at eu level; stresses , however , that importers who are more carbon efficient should be allowed to demonstrate the specific carbon intensity of their products; this flexible system should be based on objective and harmonized parameters , such as with the establishment of a range of values multiplier rather than a fixed one;


### 4. suggests a progressive mechanism that first includes sectors with the highest risk of carbon leakage before being enlarged over time; stresses that this should not lead to internal market distortions; ### 4. highlights the role such a mechanism could play , if balanced and appropriately implemented , in energy intensive industries , such as steel , cement and aluminium , given the experienced trade exposure of those sectors and their participation in the ets; suggests a progressive mechanism that first includes sectors with the highest risk of carbon leakage before being enlarged over time if deemed appropriate; considers it necessary that the scope of the mechanism covers as a large part of the carbon footprint of a product as possible , i.e. through the inclusion of emissions from energy in production; stresses that this should be done considering their respective value chains and not lead to internal market distortions notably on downstream markets; recalls that determining the carbon footprint of a product includes several insecurities and that the mechanism should not contribute to an undue regulatory burden for importing companies especially smes;


### 5. notes that the union had reduced its domestic greenhouse gas (ghg) emissions by 23.2 % below 1990 levels in 2018 , while at the same time its ghg emissions embedded in international trade have been constantly rising , thereby undermining the union’s efforts to reduce its global footprint; underlines that the net imports of goods and services in the eu represent more than 20 % of the union’s domestic co2 emissions; ### 5. notes that the union had reduced its domestic greenhouse gas (ghg) emissions by 23.2 % below 1990 levels in 2018 , while at the same time its ghg emissions embedded in international trade have been constantly rising , thereby undermining the union’s efforts to reduce its global footprint; underlines that the net imports of goods and services in the eu represent more than 20 %of the union’s domestic co2 emissions; notes that incorrectly implemented co2 tariffs increase the competitiveness of third countries vis-à-vis intra-eu players.;


### 5. stresses the need to limit international retaliation measures against the eu caused by the mechanism; urges the commission to make the mechanism world trade organization-compatible and to take a multilateral approach to its design; ### 5. strongly emphasises that the success of european smes and hidden champions depends on access to global markets. therefore , calls on the commission to base any legislative proposal on a thorough impact assessment , which takes into consideration the impact of possible counter measures taken by affected third countries against european industries stresses the need to limit and possibly avoid international retaliation measures against the eu caused by the mechanism; urges the commission to make the mechanism compatible with the wto acquis and provisions in the union’s free trade agreements and to take a multilateral approach to its design; underlines the need to deduct costs incurred from carbon taxes , emissions rights under cap-and-trade schemes or equivalent climate mitigation measures , including those of a regulatory rather than a fiscal nature , in the country of production from payments at import under the mechanism and to avoid any discrimination based on origin;


### 6. supports the introduction of a carbon border adjustment mechanism (cbam) as a way to reduce global ghg emissions in the pursuit of the paris agreement objectives; states unequivocally that this mechanism should serve to better address ghg emissions embedded in international trade , thereby incentivising climate action both within the union and by our trading partners , and not as an instrument for protectionism; ### 6. supports the introduction of a carbon border adjustment mechanism (cbam) as a way to reduce eu consumption based and global ghg emissions in the pursuit of the paris agreement objectives; states unequivocally that this mechanism should serve to better address ghg emissions embedded in eu industry and in international trade , by preventing any potential undermining of eu climate policies by carbon leakage , thereby incentivising climate action both within the union and by our trading partners (while fully respecting the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities) , and not as an instrument for protectionism;


### 6. supports the introduction of a carbon border adjustment mechanism (cbam) as a way to reduce global ghg emissions in the pursuit of the paris agreement objectives; states unequivocally that this mechanism should serve to better address ghg emissions embedded in international trade , thereby incentivising climate action both within the union and by our trading partners , and not as an instrument for protectionism; ### 6. supports the introduction of a carbon border adjustment mechanism (cbam) as a way to reduce global ghg emissions in the pursuit of the paris agreement objectives; states unequivocally that this mechanism should serve to better address ghg emissions embedded in international trade , thereby incentivising climate action both within the union and by our trading partners , and not as an instrument for protectionism; notes that , as the most important climate action , each nation state must take care of population growth and its own population;


### 6. underlines that the resources incurred by the mechanism are to be considered eu own resources; is convinced that these resources must be used for climate measures; ### 6. underlines that resources incurred by the mechanism must not create distortions based on the member state of import but help level the global playing field between competing industries and for low carbon investment and industrial manufacturing transformation;


### 7. reiterates that the introduction of a cbam should be part of a broader union industrial policy that is both environmentally ambitious and socially fair , aiming at steering a decarbonised reindustrialisation of europe that will create local jobs and ensure the competitiveness of the european economy while fulfilling the union’s climate ambition; ### 7. reiterates that the introduction of a cbam should be complemented with a broader union industrial policy that is both environmentally ambitious and socially fair , aiming at steering a decarbonised reindustrialisation of europe , by 2050 at the latest , that will create local jobs and ensure the competitiveness of the european economy while fulfilling the union’s climate ambition within the european green deal;


### 7. calls on the commission to conduct an impact assessment of different mechanisms and designs to incentivise international climate action and prevent carbon leakage before presenting a legislative proposal. ### 7. calls on the commission to conduct an in-depth impact assessment of different mechanisms and alternatives before presenting a legislative proposal; including regulatory climate standards for imported products and the compatibility with eu ets’s free allocation of allowances , to incentivise international climate action and prevent carbon leakage.


### 8. considers that a cbam should cover all imports , but that as a starting point already by 2023 it should cover the power sector and energy-intensive industrial sectors like cement , steel , chemicals and fertilisers , which continue to receive substantial free allocations , and still represent 94 % of union industrial emissions; ### 8. considers that a cbam could theoretically cover all imports , but that as a starting point already by 2023 it should cover the power sector and energy-intensive industrial sectors like cement , steel , chemicals and fertilisers , which continue to receive substantial free allocations , and still represent 94 % of union industrial emissions; considers , however , that before introducing cbam on all imports , there should be a test phase of 3-5 years during which it should only cover the most energy-intensive products , such as steel and concrete , or aluminium; considers that the processing industry must receive a refund equivalent to that of its exports in order not to reduce its competitiveness on the international market;


### 8. considers that a cbam should cover all imports , but that as a starting point already by 2023 it should cover the power sector and energy-intensive industrial sectors like cement , steel , chemicals and fertilisers , which continue to receive substantial free allocations , and still represent 94 % of union industrial emissions; ### 8. considers that a cbam should cover all eu-ets emissions embedded in imports , but that as a starting point already by 2023 it should cover the power sector and energy and emissions -intensive industrial sectors like electricity , cement , steel , and certain chemicals and fertilisers , which continue to receive substantial free allocations , and still represent 94 % of union industrial emissions; considers that the cbam may also cover products containing large amounts of these energy-intensive commodities that may be particularly at risk of carbon leakage;


### 9. underlines that the ghg emissions content of imports concerned should be accounted for on the basis of transparent and reliable product-specific benchmarks representing the global average ghg emissions content of individual products; considers that the carbon pricing of imports should also take into account the country-specific carbon intensity of the electricity grid; ### 9. underlines that the ghg emissions content of imports concerned should be accounted for on the basis of transparent and reliable product-specific benchmarks representing the global average ghg emissions content of individual products; disaggregated by different production methods with varying emission intensities; considers that importers should have the option to prove , in accordance with eu standards for measurement , reporting and verification (mrv) , that the carbon content of their products is lower than the benchmark , and avail of a cbam price adapted accordingly; and stresses the need to address the inclusion of transport emissions into the cbam and not only product-based emissions;


### 9. underlines that the ghg emissions content of imports concerned should be accounted for on the basis of transparent and reliable product-specific benchmarks representing the global average ghg emissions content of individual products; considers that the carbon pricing of imports should also take into account the country-specific carbon intensity of the electricity grid; ### 9. underlines that the ghg emissions content of imports concerned should be accounted for on the basis of transparent and reliable product-specific benchmarks representing the content of individual products; considers that the carbon pricing of imports should also take into account the country-specific carbon intensity of the electricity grid;


### 10. stresses that carbon pricing under the cbam should mirror the dynamic evolution of the price of union allowances under the eu emissions trading system (eu ets); points out that the introduction of a rising carbon floor price under the eu ets could ensure predictability under the cbam while also ensuring a stronger price signal within the eu; ### 10. stresses that carbon pricing under the cbam should mirror the dynamic evolution of the price of union allowances under the eu emissions trading system (eu ets);


### 10. stresses that carbon pricing under the cbam should mirror the dynamic evolution of the price of union allowances under the eu emissions trading system (eu ets); points out that the introduction of a rising carbon floor price under the eu ets could ensure predictability under the cbam while also ensuring a stronger price signal within the eu; ### 10. stresses that the pricing of fossil coal used in the co2 tariff mechanism should reflect the dynamic evolution of the prices of union allowances under the eu ets; points out that the introduction of a rising base price for fossil coal in the eu ets could ensure the predictability of the carbon tariff mechanism as well as a stronger price signal within the eu; stresses that the cbam should be based on a non-discriminatory principle in order to be wto compatible;


### 10. stresses that carbon pricing under the cbam should mirror the dynamic evolution of the price of union allowances under the eu emissions trading system (eu ets); points out that the introduction of a rising carbon floor price under the eu ets could ensure predictability under the cbam while also ensuring a stronger price signal within the eu; ### 10. stresses that carbon pricing under the cbam should mirror the dynamic evolution of the price of union allowances under the eu emissions trading system (eu ets); points out that the introduction of a rising carbon floor price under the eu ets could ensure predictability under the cbam while also ensuring a stronger price signal within the eu; underlines that true free trade has to integrate carbon pricing;


### 11. points out that a cbam is not per se incompatible with wto rules , and highlights the necessity for any cbam to be designed with the highest environmental integrity in mind; ### 11. points out that a cbam is not per se incompatible with wto rules , and highlights the necessity for any cbam to be designed with the highest environmental integrity in mind and aiming at setting high standards of commitment and exemplarity at complying with the paris agreement and against global temperature increase; calls on the commission to take into account that a cbam can be implemented within the framework of wto in order to boost active policies in climate action;


### 11. points out that a cbam is not per se incompatible with wto rules , and highlights the necessity for any cbam to be designed with the highest environmental integrity in mind; ### 11. points out that a cbam is not per se incompatible with wto rules , and highlights the necessity for any cbam to be designed with the highest environmental integrity in mind; calls for an independent and scientific research before deciding how and when a possible cbam is introduced


### 12. underlines the principle of non-discrimination under gatt article iii; stresses that treating imports and domestic production in the same way is a key criterion for ensuring wto compatibility of any measure , and that , therefore , all existing measures on carbon leakage under union law should immediately cease to apply as soon as the cbam enters into force , as this mechanism would apply carbon pricing to imports similar to what is applied to eu installations under the eu ets; ### 12. underlines the principle of non-discrimination under gatt article iii; stresses that treating imports and domestic production in the same way is a key criterion for ensuring wto compatibility of any measure , as this mechanism would apply carbon pricing to imports similar to what is applied to eu installations under the eu ets; considers that for the importer there should be an obligation to purchase allowances from a specific pool outside the ets dedicated to imports , which would mirror the eu ets system (border ets); considers further that the price should mirror the ets price in order for this measure to be wto compatible and fair;


### 13. calls on the commission to address this concern during the upcoming reform of the eu ets , ensuring the eu ets delivers , through ambitious and meaningful carbon pricing , on the necessary ghg emissions reduction in line with the updated 2030 union climate target and the objective of reaching net zero ghg emissions within the union by 2050 at the latest , fully respecting the polluter pays principle; stresses that export rebates risk creating perverse climate effects , incentivising less efficient production methods for european exporting industries; urges the commission to refrain from including export rebates in its proposal; ### 13. calls on the commission to address this concern during the upcoming reform of the eu ets , ensuring the eu ets delivers , through ambitious and meaningful carbon pricing that ensures a minimum carbon price consistent with the paris agreement ambitious emission goals , on the necessary ghg emissions reduction in line with the updated 2030 union climate target and the objective of reaching net zero ghg emissions within the union by 2050 at the latest , fully respecting the polluter pays principle; stresses that export rebates risk creating perverse climate effects , incentivising less efficient production methods for european exporting industries; urges the commission to refrain from including export rebates in its proposal


### 13. calls on the commission to address this concern during the upcoming reform of the eu ets , ensuring the eu ets delivers , through ambitious and meaningful carbon pricing , on the necessary ghg emissions reduction in line with the updated 2030 union climate target and the objective of reaching net zero ghg emissions within the union by 2050 at the latest , fully respecting the polluter pays principle; stresses that export rebates risk creating perverse climate effects , incentivising less efficient production methods for european exporting industries; urges the commission to refrain from including export rebates in its proposal; ### 13. calls on the commission to address this concern during the upcoming reform of the eu ets , ensuring the eu ets delivers , through ambitious and meaningful fossil carbon pricing , on the necessary ghg emissions reduction in line with the updated 2030 union climate target and the objective of reaching net zero ghg emissions within the union by 2050 at the latest , fully respecting the polluter pays principle; stresses that export rebates risk creating perverse climate effects , incentivising less efficient production methods for european exporting industries; urges the commission to refrain from including export rebates in its proposal;


### 14. supports the commission’s intention to use revenues generated by the cbam as new own resources for the eu budget , and asks the commission to ensure full transparency about the use of those revenues; believes these revenues should be earmarked for supporting the just transition and decarbonisation of europe’s economy , and for stepping up the union’s contribution to international climate finance in favour of least developed countries and small island developing states , which are most vulnerable to climate change; ### 14. the revenues generated by the cbam should be treated as any duty collected by the customs authorities of a member state. the member states should be authorised to retain 20 % as collection costs;


### (12) european political parties and their affiliated european political foundations wishing to obtain recognition as such at union level by virtue of european legal status and to receive public funding from the general budget of the european union should respect certain principles and fulfil certain conditions. in particular , it is necessary for european political parties , their affiliated european political foundations and their respective members in the union to observe the values on which the union is founded , as expressed in article 2 teu. european political parties and their affiliated european political foundations should also ensure that their member parties and member organisations observe such values. ### (12) european political parties and their affiliated european political foundations wishing to obtain recognition as such at union level by virtue of european legal status and to receive public funding from the general budget of the european union should respect certain principles and fulfil certain conditions. in particular , it is necessary for european political parties and their affiliated european political foundations to observe the values on which the union is founded , as expressed in article 2 teu.


### (13) for the purpose of its decisions to register , in order to ascertain that a european political party or a european political foundation complies with its obligations to observe the values on which the union is founded , as expressed in article 2 teu , and that it ensures that its members observe such values , the authority should rely on a written declaration to be issued by the european political party or european political foundation by using a template attached to this regulation. the power of the authority , upon request from the european parliament , the council or the commission , to verify the compliance with such values should however not extend to possible breaches of those values by member parties or member organisations. ### (13) for the purpose of its decisions to register , in order to ascertain that a european political party or a european political foundation complies with its obligations to observe the values on which the union is founded , as expressed in article 2 teu , the authority should rely on a written declaration to be issued by the european political party or european political foundation by using a template attached to this regulation. the power of the authority , upon request from the european parliament , the council or the commission , to verify the compliance with such values should however not extend to possible breaches of those values by member parties or member organisations.


### (30) european political parties and their member parties should lead by example in closing the gender gap in the political domain. if they wish to benefit from eu funding , european political parties should have internal rules promoting gender balance and they should be transparent about the gender balance of their member parties. european political parties should provide evidence on their internal policy on gender balance and on their member parties’ gender representation as regards candidates to and member of the european parliament. the european political parties are also encouraged to provide information in relation to their member parties’ on inclusiveness and representation of minorities. ### deleted


### (34) the co-financing rate should be lowered to 0% in the year of the elections to the european parliament. eliminating the co-financing obligation in the year of the elections to the european parliament should help european political parties increase the number and intensity of their campaign activities and , therefore , also increase their visibility at national level. ### deleted


### (37) in order to enhance cooperation with long-standing members sharing eu values , contributions from member parties having their seat in a country outside the union but in the council of europe , should be allowed. however , such contributions should be subject to a cap in relation to total contribution , to limit the risk of foreign interference. ### deleted


### (39) in order to reach out to their members and constituencies across the union , european political parties should have the right to use their funding for cross-border political campaigns. the funding and limitation of election expenses for parties and candidates in those campaigns should be governed by the rules applicable in each member state. ### (39) european political parties should have the right to use their funding for political campaigns. the funding and limitation of election expenses for parties and candidates in those campaigns should be governed by the rules applicable in each member state.


### (41) european political parties should not fund , directly or indirectly , other political parties and , in particular , national parties or candidates. european political foundations should not fund , directly or indirectly , european or national political parties or candidates. the prohibition of indirect funding should however not prevent european political parties from publicly supporting and engaging with their member parties in the union on issues of relevance for the union , or to support political activities in the common interest , to be able to fulfil their mission under article 10(4) teu. moreover , european political parties and their affiliated european political foundations should only finance activities in the context of national referendum campaigns when they concern the implementation of the teu and the tfeu. these principles reflect declaration no 11 on article 191 of the treaty establishing the european community annexed to the final act of the treaty of nice. ### (41) european political parties should not fund , directly or indirectly , other political parties and , in particular , national parties or candidates. european political foundations should not fund , directly or indirectly , european or national political parties or candidates. moreover , european political parties and their affiliated european political foundations should not finance activities in the context of national referendum campaigns. these principles reflect declaration no 11 on article 191 of the treaty establishing the european community annexed to the final act of the treaty of nice.


### (49) european political parties often rely on external service providers , including advertising publishers , for the preparation , placement , publication and dissemination of their political advertisements. such service providers are bound by regulation 2022/xx of the european parliament and of the council on the transparency and targeting of political advertising28. where entering into a contractual relationship on the provision of services related to political advertisements , european political parties should ensure that the providers of political advertising services , including advertising publishers , comply with their obligations under regulation 2022/xx [on the transparency and targeting of political advertising]. they should ensure that the contractual arrangements specify how the relevant provisions of this regulation are taken into account. where appropriate , the political advertisement may include the european political party’s political logo. ### deleted


### (50) it is necessary to establish a common repository for the disclosures of european political parties. given its specific role in the implementation of this regulation , the authority should establish and manage such repository as a part of the registry for european political parties. the information contained in the repository should be transmitted by european political parties to the authority using a standard format and may be automated. european political parties should make available in the authority’s repository information to enable the wider context of the political advertisement and its aims to be understood. the information on the amount allocated to political advertising in the context of a specific campaign to be included in the repository may be based on an estimated allocation of funding. the amounts to be mentioned in the repository include donations for specific purposes or benefits in kind. ### deleted


### (61) in order to facilitating the monitoring of the implementation of this regulation , single points of contact in charge of coordination with the european level should be designated by each member sate. such contact points should be adequately resourced to be able to ensure effective coordination , including on issues related to the monitoring of political advertising. ### deleted


### it also ensures that its member parties having their seat in the union observe the values expressed in article 2 teu and that its member parties having their seat outside the union observe equivalent values. it provides a written declaration using the template in annex i; ### deleted


### it also ensures that its member organisations having their seat in the union observe the values expressed in article 2 teu and that its member organisations having their seat outside the union observe equivalent values. it provides a written declaration using the template in annex i; ### deleted


### its internal rules regarding gender balance. ### deleted


### the authority shall annually prepare and publish a report on the political advertising activity of european political parties. this report shall include the reports for the relevant reporting year published by european political parties according to article 5(4) , as well as any decisions of the national regulatory authorities designated under article 5(6) or of the supervisory authorities referred to in article 5(7) finding that a european political party has violated article 5 of this regulation. ### deleted


### 4. a european political party shall include in its application evidence demonstrating its compliance with article 4(1) , point (j) , and that its member parties have continuously published on their websites , during 12 months preceding the moment at which the application is made , information on the gender representation among the candidates at the last elections to the european parliament and on the evolution of gender representation among their members of the european parliament. ### deleted


### (4) a european political party shall include in its application evidence demonstrating its compliance with article 4(1) , point (j) , and that its member parties have continuously published on their websites , during 12 months preceding the moment at which the application is made , information on the gender representation among the candidates at the last elections to the european parliament and on the evolution of gender representation among their members of the european parliament. ### deleted


### 5. for all donations the value of which exceeds eur 3 000 , european political parties and european political foundations shall request donors to provide the necessary information for their proper identification. european political parties and european political foundations shall transmit the information received to the authority upon its request. ### 5. for all donations the value of which exceeds eur 1 500 , european political parties and european political foundations shall request donors to provide the necessary information for their proper identification. european political parties and european political foundations shall transmit the information received to the authority upon its request.


### (5) for all donations the value of which exceeds eur 3000 , european political parties and european political foundations shall request donors to provide the necessary information for their proper identification. european political parties and european political foundations shall transmit the information received to the authority upon its request. ### (5) for all donations the value of which exceeds eur 1500 , european political parties and european political foundations shall request donors to provide the necessary information for their proper identification. european political parties and european political foundations shall transmit the information received to the authority upon its request.


### (9) contributions from members of a european political party that have their seat in , or are citizens of , a member state or from member parties that have their seat in a country belonging to the council of europe shall be permitted. the total value of contributions from members shall not exceed 40 % of the annual budget of a european political party. the value of contributions from member parties that have their seat in a country outside the union shall not exceed 10% of the total contributions from members. ### (9) contributions to a european political party from its members shall be permitted. the total value of contributions from members shall not exceed 40 % of the annual budget of a european political party.


### (10) contributions from members of a european political foundation that have their seat in , or are citizens of , a member state or from member organisations that have their seat in a country belonging to the council of europe , and from the european political party with which it is affiliated , shall be permitted. the total value of contributions from members shall not exceed 40 % of the annual budget of a european political foundation and shall not derive from funds received by a european political party pursuant to this regulation from the general budget of the european union. the value of contributions from member organisations that have their seat in a country outside the union shall not exceed 10% of the total contributions from members. ### (10) contributions to a european political foundation from its members , and from the european political party with which it is affiliated , shall be permitted. the total value of contributions from members shall not exceed 40 % of the annual budget of a european political foundation and shall not derive from funds received by a european political party pursuant to this regulation from the general budget of the european union.


### 2. the funding of european political parties and european political foundations from the general budget of the european union or from any other source may be used to finance referendum campaigns when those campaigns concern the implementation of the treaties of the union. ### deleted


### (2) the funding of european political parties and european political foundations from the general budget of the european union or from any other source may be used to finance referendum campaigns when those campaigns concern the implementation of the treaties of the union. ### deleted


### 3. expenditure linked to the campaigns referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall be clearly identified as such by the european political parties in their annual financial statements. ### 3. expenditure linked to the campaigns referred to in paragraph 1 shall be clearly identified as such by the european political parties in their annual financial statements.


### (3) expenditure linked to the campaigns referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall be clearly identified as such by the european political parties in their annual financial statements. ### (3) expenditure linked to the campaigns referred to in paragraph 1 shall be clearly identified as such by the european political parties in their annual financial statements.


### (ii) in the event of non-compliance with the commitments entered into and the information provided by a european political party or european political foundation in accordance with article 4(1) , points (a) , (b) , (d) , (e) , (f) , (i) and (j) and with article 6(1) , points (a) , (b) , (d) and (e); ### (ii) in the event of non-compliance with the commitments entered into and the information provided by a european political party or european political foundation in accordance with article 4(1) , points (a) , (b) , (d) , (e) , (f) and (i) and with article 6(1) , points (a) , (b) , (d) and (e);


### (ix) in the event of failure to provide evidence on gender representation in accordance with article 21(4). ### deleted