### (11) to mitigate the potential impact that a sudden increase in expected credit loss provisions may have on institutions’ capacity to lend to clients at times when it is most needed , the transitional arrangements should be extended by two years and institutions should be allowed to fully add-back to their common equity tier 1 capital any increase in new expected credit loss provisions that they recognise in 2020 and 2021 for their financial assets , which are not credit-impaired. this would bring additional relief to the impact of the covid-19 crisis on institutions’ possible rise in provisioning needs under ifrs 9 while maintaining the transitional arrangements for the expected credit loss amounts established before the pandemic of covid-19. ### (11) to mitigate the potential impact that a sudden increase in expected credit loss provisions and net unrealised losses on assets measured at fair value through oci may have on institutions’ capacity to lend to clients at times when it is most needed , the transitional arrangements should be extended by two years and institutions should be allowed to fully add-back to their common equity tier 1 capital any increase in new expected credit loss provisions and net unrealised losses on assets measured at fair value through oci that they recognise in 2020 and 2021 for their financial assets , which are not credit-impaired. this would bring additional relief to the impact of the covid-19 crisis on institutions’ possible rise in provisioning needs and unrealised losses under ifrs 9 while maintaining the transitional arrangements for the expected credit loss amounts established before the pandemic of covid-19.


### the sum of the 12-month expected credit losses determined in accordance with paragraph 5.5.5 of the annex relating to ifrs 9 and the amount of the loss allowance for lifetime expected credit losses determined in accordance with paragraph 5.5.3 of the annex relating to ifrs 9 excluding the loss allowance for lifetime expected credit losses for financial assets that are credit-impaired as defined in appendix a to the annex relating to ifrs 9 as of 1 january 2020 or on the date of initial application of ifrs 9 , whichever is later.; ### the sum of the 12-month expected credit losses determined in accordance with paragraph 5.5.5 of the annex relating to ifrs 9 and the amount of the loss allowance for lifetime expected credit losses determined in accordance with paragraph 5.5.3 of the annex relating to ifrs 9 excluding the loss allowance for lifetime expected credit losses for financial assets that are credit-impaired classified as such before 1 january 2020 as defined in appendix a to the annex relating to ifrs 9 as of 1 january 2020 or on the date of initial application of ifrs 9 , whichever is later.;


### 0 ,7 during the period from 1 january 2020 to 31 december 2020; ### 0 ,85 during the period from 1 january 2020 to 31 december 2021;


### 0 ,5 during the period from 1 january 2021 to 31 december 2021; ### 0 ,70 during the period from 1 january 2022 to 31 december 2022;


### 0 ,25 during the period from 1 january 2022 to 31 december 2022; ### 0 ,50 during the period from 1 january 2023 to 31 december 2024;


### 0 during the period from 1 january 2023 to 31 december 2024. ### 0 ,25 during the period from 1 january 2024 to 31 december 2024.


### (ii) the following subparagraph is inserted: ### deleted


### by way of derogation from article 47c(3) , until [date of entry into force of this amending regulation + 7 years] the factors set out in article 47c(4) shall also apply to the part of the non-performing exposure guaranteed by an eligible provider referred to in points (a) to (e) of article 201(1) , where , subject to compliance with union state aid rules , where applicable , the guarantee or counter-guarantee is provided as part of support measures to assist borrowers amid the covid-19 pandemic. ### by way of derogation from article 47c(3) , the factors set out in article 47c(4) shall also apply to the part of the non-performing exposure guaranteed by an eligible provider referred to in points (a) to (e) of article 201(1) , where , subject to compliance with union state aid rules , where applicable , the guarantee or counter-guarantee is provided as part of support measures to assist borrowers amid the covid-19 pandemic.


### (5) the final elements of the basel iii framework published on 7 december 2017 impose , in case of securitisation exposures , a minimum credit rating requirement only upon a limited set of protection providers , namely to entities that are not sovereign entities , public sector entities , institutions or other prudentially regulated financial institutions. it is therefore necessary to amend article 249(3) of regulation (eu) no 575/2013 to align it with the basel iii framework in order to enhance the effectiveness of national public guarantee schemes assisting institutions’ strategies to securitise non-performing exposures (npes) in the aftermath of the covid-19 pandemic. ### (5) the final elements of the basel iii framework published on 7 december 2017 impose , in case of securitisation exposures , a minimum credit rating requirement only upon a limited set of protection providers , namely to entities that are not sovereign entities , public sector entities , institutions or other prudentially regulated financial institutions. it is therefore necessary to amend article 249(3) of regulation (eu) no 575/2013 to align it with the basel iii framework in order to enhance the effectiveness of national public guarantee schemes assisting institutions’ strategies to securitise non-performing exposures (npes) in the aftermath of the covid-19 pandemic. an unregulated provider of unfunded credit protection is required to have credit quality step 3 or above.


### (7) as pointed out by the eba in its “report on sts framework for synthetic securitisation” of 6 may 2020 , it is necessary to introduce a specific framework for simple , transparent and standardised (sts) on-balance sheet securitisation. given the lower agency risk and modelling risk of a sts on-balance-sheet securitisation compared with a non-sts on-balance-sheet synthetic securitisation , a fitting risk-sensitive calibration for sts on-balance-sheet securitisations as recommended by the eba in its report should be introduced. the greater recourse to the sts on-balance-sheet securitisation promoted by the more risk sensitive treatment of the senior tranche of such securitisations will free up regulatory capital and ultimately further expand the lending capacity of institutions in a prudentially sound manner. ### (7) as pointed out by the eba in its “report on sts framework for synthetic securitisation” of 6 may 2020 , it is necessary to introduce a specific framework for simple , transparent and standardised (sts) on-balance sheet securitisation. given the lower agency risk and modelling risk of a sts on-balance-sheet securitisation compared with a non-sts on-balance-sheet synthetic securitisation , a fitting risk-sensitive calibration for sts on-balance-sheet securitisations as recommended by the eba in its report building on the current preferential regulatory treatment of senior tranches of sme portfolios should be introduced. the greater recourse to the sts on-balance-sheet securitisation promoted by the more risk sensitive treatment of the senior tranche of such securitisations will free up regulatory capital and ultimately further expand the lending capacity of institutions in a prudentially sound manner.


### 1. the risk weight for a position in an npe securitisation shall be calculated in accordance with article 254 , subject to a floor of 100%. ### 1. the risk weight for a position in an npe securitisation shall be calculated in accordance with article 254.


### 2. by way of derogation from paragraph 1 , institutions shall assign a risk weight of 100% to the senior securitisation position in a traditional npe securitisation , provided the exposures in the pool backing the securitisation have been transferred to the sspe with a non-refundable price discount of at least 50% on the nominal amount of the exposures. ### 2. institutions shall attribute to the senior tranche of an eligible traditional npe securitisation the following risk weights:


### 2. by way of derogation from paragraph 1 , institutions shall assign a risk weight of 100% to the senior securitisation position in a traditional npe securitisation , provided the exposures in the pool backing the securitisation have been transferred to the sspe with a non-refundable price discount of at least 50% on the nominal amount of the exposures. ### 2. institutions shall assign a maximum risk weight of 100% to the senior securitisation position in a traditional npe securitisation , provided the exposures in the pool backing the securitisation have been transferred to the sspe with a non-refundable price discount of at least 20% on the nominal amount of the exposures.


### (14) the current position limit regime does not recognise the unique characteristics of securitised derivatives. securitised derivatives should therefore be excluded from the position limit regime. ### (14) the current position limit regime does not recognise the unique characteristics of securitised derivatives. securitised derivatives are caught by the transferable securities definition under article 4(1)(44)(c). the commodity securitised derivatives market is characterised by a large number of different issuances , each one registered within the central securities depository for a specific size and any possible increase follows a specific procedure duly approved by the relevant competent authority. this contrasts with standard commodity derivatives where the amount of open interest , and thereby the size of a position , is potentially unlimited. at the time of issue , the issuer or the intermediary in charge of the distribution of the issuance holds 100% of the issue , which challenges the very application of a position limit regime. in addition , most of securitised derivatives are then ultimately held by a large number of retail investors , which does not raise the same risk of abusing a dominant position or to orderly pricing and settlement conditions as for ordinary commodity derivative contracts. moreover , the notion of spot month and other months , for which position limits are to be set under article 57(3) of mifid ii , is not applicable to securitised derivatives. securitised derivatives should therefore be excluded from the application of position limits regime and reporting requirements.


### the requirements laid down in the second to fifth subparagraphs of this paragraph shall not apply to corporate bonds with make-whole clauses.; ### the requirements laid down in the second to fifth subparagraphs of this paragraph shall not apply to corporate bonds with make-whole clauses , except in the case the corporate bonds are intended for retail clients;


### this paragraph shall not apply to corporate bonds with make-whole clauses.; ### this paragraph shall not apply to corporate bonds with make-whole clauses , except in the case the corporate bonds are intended for retail clients;


### the reporting requirement laid down in this paragraph shall however not apply until [date of entry into force of this amending directive + 2 years].; ### the reporting requirement laid down in this paragraph shall however not apply until [date of entry into force of this amending directive + 1 year].;


### (24) ‘non-performing exposure (npe) securitisation’ means a securitisation backed by a pool of non-performing exposures that meet the conditions set out in article 47a(3) of regulation 575/2013 and the value of which makes up at least 90% of the pool’s value at the time of origination; ### (24) ‘non-performing exposure (npe) securitisation’ means a securitisation backed by a pool of non-performing exposures that meet the conditions set out in article 47a(3) of regulation (eu) no 575/2013 and the nominal value of which makes up at least 90% of the pool’s nominal value at the time of origination;


### each underlying exposure complies , at the date it is included in the securitised portfolio , with the eligibility criteria and with all conditions , other than the occurrence of a credit event as referred to in article 26e , for a credit protection payment; ### each underlying exposure complies with the eligibility criteria and with all conditions , other than the occurrence of a credit event as referred to in article 26e , for a credit protection payment;


### collateral in the form of cash held with a third-party credit institution or in the form of cash on deposit with the originator , subject to a minimum credit quality step 2 as referred to in article 136 of regulation (eu) no 575/2013. ### collateral in the form of cash held with a third-party credit institution or in the form of cash on deposit with the originator , subject to a minimum credit quality step 3 as referred to in article 136 of regulation (eu) no 575/2013.


### for the purposes of point (b) , where the third-party credit institution or the originator no longer satisfy the minimum credit quality step 2 , the collateral shall be promptly transferred to a third-party credit institution with a credit quality step of 2 or higher or the collateral shall be invested in securities meeting the criteria laid down in point (a) of this paragraph. the requirements set out in this point (b) shall be deemed satisfied in the case of investments in credit linked notes issued by the originator , in accordance with article 218 of regulation (eu) no 575/2013. ### for the purposes of point (b) , where the third-party credit institution or the originator no longer satisfy the minimum credit quality step 3 , the collateral shall be promptly transferred to a third-party credit institution with a credit quality step of 3 or higher or the collateral shall be invested in securities meeting the criteria laid down in point (a) of this paragraph. the requirements set out in this point (b) shall be deemed satisfied in the case of investments in credit linked notes issued by the originator , in accordance with article 218 of regulation (eu) no 575/2013.


### 2. where the prospectus relates to an offer of securities to the public , investors who have already agreed to purchase or subscribe for the securities before the supplement is published shall have the right , exercisable within three working days after the publication of the supplement , to withdraw their acceptances , provided that the significant new factor , material mistake or material inaccuracy referred to in paragraph 1 arose or was noted before the closing of the offer period or the delivery of the securities , whichever occurs first. that period may be extended by the issuer or the offeror. the final date of the right of withdrawal shall be stated in the supplement.; ### 2. where the prospectus relates to an offer of securities to the public , investors who have already agreed to purchase or subscribe for the securities before the supplement is published shall have the right to withdraw their acceptances , provided that the significant new factor , material mistake or material inaccuracy referred to in paragraph 1 arose or was noted before the closing of the offer period or the delivery of the securities , whichever occurs first. the right to withdraw is exercisable within three working days after the publication of the supplement. that period may be extended by the issuer or the offeror. the final date of the right of withdrawal shall be stated in the supplement.;


### where the investors referred to in the first subparagraph of this paragraph have the right of withdrawal referred to in paragraph 2 , the financial intermediary shall contact those investors within one working day after the publication of the supplement.; ### where the investors referred to in the first subparagraph of this paragraph have the right of withdrawal referred to in paragraph 2 , the financial intermediary shall contact those investors within the business day following the one on which the supplement has been published.;


### where the investors referred to in the first subparagraph of this paragraph have the right of withdrawal referred to in paragraph 2 , the financial intermediary shall contact those investors within one working day after the publication of the supplement.; ### where the investors referred to in the first subparagraph of this paragraph have the right of withdrawal referred to in paragraph 2 , the financial intermediary shall contact those investors within the business day following the one on which the supplement was published.;


### 1. calls for the removal of barriers , including the simplification of legislation , to diversify funding sources for smes , in order to promote smes’ ability to access equity markets , and to reduce the existing debt bias; points out that the current situation makes smes more fragile and vulnerable; ### 1. calls for the removal of barriers , including the simplification of legislation when possible without undermining companies’ obligations with respect to transparency , accountability and data protection , to diversify funding sources for smes , in order to promote smes’ ability to access equity markets , and to reduce the existing debt bias; points out that the current situation makes smes more fragile and vulnerable;


### 3. calls for the acceleration of the development of eu venture capital (vc) and private equity markets by increasing the availability of funding for vc investments , developing larger late-stage vc funds , tax incentive schemes for vc and business angel investments , and active ipo markets for vc-backed companies; ### 3. calls for the acceleration of the development of eu venture capital (vc) and private equity markets by increasing the availability of funding for vc investments , developing larger late-stage vc funds , simplification of bureaucracy where possible for vc and business angel investments , and active ipo markets for vc-backed companies;


### 11. recalls that the solvency 2 directive requires a review by the end of 2020 and that the european insurance and occupational pensions authority (eiopa) will provide technical advice to the commission after consultations with different stakeholders; requests the commission and eiopa to consider adjusting the capital requirements for investments in equity and private debt , in particular of smes; ### 11. recalls that the solvency 2 directive requires a review by the end of 2020 and that the european insurance and occupational pensions authority (eiopa) will provide technical advice to the commission after consultations with different stakeholders; requests the commission and eiopa to consider adjusting the capital requirements for investments in equity and private debt , in particular of smes , also through the internal model approach;


### 15. emphasises that access to financial markets should be possible for all enterprises under the ‘same business , same rules’ principle; ### 15. emphasises that access to financial markets should be possible for all enterprises under the ‘same business , same rules’ principle; nonetheless , to achieve this objective , takes the view that it is important to simplify the criteria to consider professional investors upon request , which is also linked to quantitative requirements related to the size of the enterprises;


### 16. recalls the existence of different shortcomings in the legislation on packaged retail investment and insurance products (priips) that should be addressed in the next review; expects that level 2 priips legislation on the key investor document to respect level 1 , in particular in relation to the performance scenarios; regrets the delays in the adoption of level 2 priips legislation that will overlap with the first review of priips , and which increases legal uncertainty and costs for stakeholders; ### 16. recalls the existence of different shortcomings in the legislation on packaged retail investment and insurance products (priips) that should be addressed in the next review; expects that level 2 priips legislation on the key investor document to respect level 1 , in particular in order to improve the methodologies related to the performance scenarios and to ensure comparability among different investment products; regrets the delays in the adoption of level 2 priips legislation that will overlap with the first review of priips , and which increases legal uncertainty and costs for stakeholders;


### 17. urges the commission to make clear the differentiation between professional and retail investors on all levels of mifid , making it possible to tailor the treatment of clients according to their knowledge and experience on the markets; requests that the commission consider the introduction of a category of semi-professional investors to better respond to the reality of participation on the financial markets; ### 17. urges the commission to make clear the differentiation between professional and retail investors on all levels of mifid , making it possible to tailor the treatment of clients according to their knowledge and experience on the markets; requests that the commission consider the introduction of a category of semi-professional investors to better respond to the reality of participation on the financial markets; considers , however , that the application of this new category of clients should be left to the discretion of the investment firms , which should be free to include (or not) semi-professional clients in their own service model , and could involve taking certain appropriate measures;


### 19. calls for amendments to legislation to ensure access to independent advice by financial intermediaries while avoiding promotion of the institution’s own financial products and ensuring a fair marketing of financial products; ### deleted


### – having regard to the statute of the european system of central banks (escb) and of the ecb , in particular article 15 thereof , ### – having regard to the statute of the european system of central banks (escb) and of the ecb , in particular article 15 and article 21 thereof ,


### – having regard to article 284(3) of the treaty on the functioning of the european union , ### – having regard to article 123 , article 127(1) and (2) and article 284 (3) of the treaty on the functioning of the european union ,


### c. whereas according to the eurosystem staff macroeconomic projections of september 2019 , annual inflation for the euro area in the harmonised index of consumer prices (hicp) looks set to reach 1.2 % , 1.0 % and 1.5 % in 2019 , 2020 and 2021 , thus still falling short of the medium-term objective of 2 %; ### c. whereas according to the eurosystem staff macroeconomic projections of september 2019 , annual inflation for the euro area in the harmonised index of consumer prices (hicp) looks set to reach 1.2 % , 1.0 % and 1.5 % in 2019 , 2020 and 2021 , thus still falling short of the medium-term objective of 2 %; recalls however the large variance in inflation rates across the euro area;


### d. whereas at the end of 2018 the size of the eurosystem balance sheet had reached an all-time high of eur 4.7 trillion , an increase of 0.2 trillion compared with the end of 2017; ### d. whereas at the end of 2018 the size of the eurosystem balance sheet had reached an all-time high of eur 4.7 trillion , over 40% of euro area gdp , an increase of 0.2 trillion compared with the end of 2017; whereas concerns continue to exist that the balance sheet of the ecb contains rising levels of risk;


### f. whereas a stronger role of the euro , and its increased use as a reserve currency , would increase the eu’s ability to frame its policy stance independently vis-à-vis the us and the federal reserve and would ultimately provide protection from the risk of an uncooperative us approach; ### deleted


### h. whereas despite this positive trend , green bonds still account for only 1 % of the overall supply of euro-denominated bonds; ### h. whereas despite this trend , green bonds account for 1 % of the overall supply of euro-denominated bonds;


### 1. welcomes the role of the ecb in safeguarding euro stability and stresses that the ecb’s independence is a requisite for fulfilling its mandate; ### 1. stresses that the ecb’s independence is a requisite for fulfilling its mandate; insists that the objective of stability aims at safeguarding price stability and not the composition of the euro area , for which the ecb has no mandate;


### 2. is concerned that after a short economic recovery , euro area growth momentum has slowed markedly to 1.2 % of gdp in the euro area and to 1.4 % of gdp for the eu-27; underlines , therefore , the need for monetary policy to remain accommodative for the foreseeable future; ### 2. regrets that the heavy reliance on monetary policy to support the post-crisis recovery has also had unintended negative consequences


### 3. stresses that fiscal policy is a necessary component for enhancing the impact of monetary policy and reducing possible side effects; ### 3. warns that the ecb's monetary policy is currently dominated by the lack of sound fiscal policies in some member states;


### 5. underlines that strengthening the role of the euro requires the right structural conditions , among which: ### deleted


### - the completion of the banking union , including a fully mutualised european deposit insurance scheme that would reduce risks , promote fair competition , facilitate the expansion of pan-european banking and reinforce the stability of the euro area as a whole; ### - warns that there is no legal base for a european deposit insurance scheme. mutualisation does not create additional security , but rather stimulates risk-taking behaviour of banks;


### 6. underlines that the asset purchase programme (app) has provided a substantial contribution to economic recovery and the formation of households’ inflation expectations , has led to a substantial improvement in financing conditions via several transmission channels , and has compressed yields across a wide range of asset classes; stresses , in particular , that the app has directly improved credit conditions for the private non-financial sector with the asset-backed securities purchase programme (abspp) and the third covered bond purchase programme (cbpp3); ### 6. is concerned that certain european countries have profited in a disproportionate way from the pspp , since national central banks and the ecb have purchased certain government bonds whose volume exceeds these member states’ share in gdp , in two cases even by respectively 43 billion and 51 billion euros , well above the average of 14.4% of gdp for the entire eurozone; stresses that this strengthens the suspicion that the main goal of the pspp is fiscal stabilisation of over-indebted member states of the euro area , which falls outside the scope of the mandate of the ecb.


### 7. notes that on 12 september 2019 the ecb announced a broad stimulus package including an open-ended quantitative easing programme that will run at a monthly pace of eur 20 billion per month , a cut of 10 basis points in the deposit rate , a two-tier system for reserve remuneration , and easier terms for targeted longer-term refinancing operations (tltro-iii); ### 7. deplores that on 12 september 2019 the ecb announced a broad stimulus package including an open-ended quantitative easing programme that will run at a monthly pace of eur 20 billion per month , a cut of 10 basis points in the deposit rate , a two-tier system for reserve remuneration , and easier terms for targeted longer-term refinancing operations (tltro-iii); calls on the ecb to end its stimulus package as soon as possible , including phasing out tltro;


### 8. notes that the negative effects on banks’ net interest income have been counterbalanced so far by the benefits from more bank lending and lower costs for provisions and losses; ### 8. warns that the negative effects on banks’ net interest income and the increase in banks' lending capacity and lower costs for provisions and losses , which rewards risky behaviour and spurs speculation , poses significant systemic threats in the banking sector and the real economy;


### 9. underlines that very low or negative interest rates offer opportunities to consumers , workers and borrowers , who can benefit from stronger economic momentum , lower unemployment and lower borrowing costs; ### 9. emphasises that low interest rates have made issuing new debt cheaper; reiterates that debt levels in certain member state are still unsustainable; stresses that in 4 euro area member states debt levels are still well above 100% of gdp; reiterates that low interest rates are instrumental in the emergence of market bubbles , primarily , but certainly not only , in the real estate market;


### 10. supports the intention of the governing council of the ecb to continue reinvesting the principal payments from maturing securities for as long as necessary to maintain favourable liquidity conditions and an ample degree of monetary accommodation; ### 10. deplores the intention of the governing council of the ecb to continue reinvesting the principal payments from maturing securities for as long as necessary to maintain favourable liquidity conditions and an ample degree of monetary accommodation , since this policy falls outside the scope of the mandate of the ecb as enshrined in article 127 tfeu;


### 11. recalls that , as an eu institution , the ecb is bound by the paris agreement on climate change and that this should be reflected in its policies , with full respect for its mandate and its independence; ### 11. recalls that the ecb is an independent body with a strict and limited mandate enshrined in article 127 tfeu , namely to ensure price stability , which means the eu´s obligations under the paris agreement on climate change fall outside the scope of the ecb's mandate;


### 12. takes good note of christine lagarde’s declaration of 4 september , in which she welcomed the ecb’s collaboration in the network for greening the financial system (ngfs) and commitment to contribute to facing the challenges which climate change poses by implementing the ngfs’s recommendations and acting on them substantively wherever possible without undermining the ecb’s price stability mandate and other objectives; ### 12. regrets christine lagarde’s declaration of 4 september , in which she welcomed the ecb’s collaboration in the network for greening the financial system (ngfs) and commitment to contribute to facing the challenges which climate change poses by implementing the ngfs’s recommendations and acting on them substantively wherever possible , which undermines the ecb’s price stability mandate and its subservient objectives;


### 14. is extremely worried about the risks due to the delay in setting up the banking union , and calls for the swift completion of the banking union with a fully mutualised european deposit guarantee scheme; ### 14. takes note of the delay in setting up the banking union , and concludes that there is no political will for the swift completion of the banking union , including a fully mutualised european deposit guarantee scheme , which would only be in the interest of those member states at the receiving end of the benevolent solidarity of other member states; underlines that the lack of structural reforms , risk-reduction and debt-levels in aforementioned member states has created substantial distrust within the eu and between member states;


### 15. calls for the capital markets union (cmu) project to be accelerated in order to deepen financial integration , with a view to improving resilience to shocks and making the transmission of monetary policy across the monetary union more effective; ### deleted


### 16. calls on the ecb to increase its monitoring of the development of crypto-currencies and the increased risks in cyber-security; ### 16. welcomes the development of crypto-currencies as a market-driven emergent alternative to the euro; calls on national central banks and supervisory authorities to monitor its development and risks in the area of cyber-security;


### 18. agrees with christine lagarde that a review of the ecb’s monetary policy framework is timely and warranted in order to ensure that the ecb has the right tools to deliver on its price stability mandate in the future; calls on the ecb to organise a public consultation as part of this process in order to ensure that the review is open to input and feedback from a broad range of diverse civil society stakeholders; ### 18. disagrees with christine lagarde that a review of the ecb’s monetary policy framework is timely and warranted in order to ensure that the ecb has the "right tools" to deliver on its price stability mandate in the future; believes that the ecb has to radically moderate its ambitions and apply a strict reading of its own mandate;


### 19. welcomes the increase in accountability under the presidency of mario draghi , and looks forward to even greater accountability , dialogue and openness with the incoming president; ### 19. looks forward to greater accountability , dialogue and openness with the incoming president , and takes note of her promises made regarding accountability and transparency issues during her hearing before the econ committee on the 4th of september 2019;


### 20. recalls that the nominations of executive board members should be prepared carefully , with full transparency and together with parliament in line with the treaties; calls on the council to draw up a gender-balanced shortlist for all current and upcoming vacancies and to share it with parliament , thus allowing it to play a more meaningful advisory role in the appointment process; regrets that to date no satisfactory progress has been made; ### 20. recalls that the nominations of executive board members should be prepared carefully , with full transparency and together with parliament in line with the treaties;


### 3. recalls that the eu’s proposals for a c(c)ctb also go far beyond these oecd alternatives at eu level , notably by departing from the separate entity principle; ### 3. recalls that the eu’s proposals for a c(c)ctb also go far beyond these oecd alternatives at eu level , notably by departing from the separate entity principle; deplores that the proposals are still blocked and calls the member states to adopt them swiftly;


### 9. highlights the specificities of the single market which provides for the free movement of goods and services and therefore considers that any international corporate tax reform should ensure a smooth running of the single market , notably by safeguarding a level playing field for all firms , including paying a fair share of where the actual substantive and genuine economic activity and value creation take place.; ### 9. highlights the specificities of the single market which provides for the free movement of goods and services and therefore considers that any international corporate tax reform should ensure a smooth running of the single market , notably by safeguarding a level playing field for all firms , including paying a fair share of where the actual substantive and genuine economic activity and value creation take place and , in the meantime , maintains competitive tax systems , as they are a tool to increase the eu’s external competitiveness;


### 12. considers that the scope of the reform should cover all large firms having the possibility to engage in beps practices by exploiting legal loopholes; ### 12. considers that the scope of the reform should cover all large firms having the possibility to engage in beps practices by exploiting legal loopholes , avoiding to add further and unnecessary burdens to smes;


### 20. welcomes the willingness to ensure tax certainty and to limit dispute that could arise from the implementation of the new nexus and the new allocation of taxing rights; ### 20. welcomes the willingness to ensure tax certainty and to limit dispute that could arise from the implementation of the new nexus and the new allocation of taxing rights; calls therefore for simple and harmonized rules;


### 21. welcomes the globe proposal which aims at ensuring that a minimum level of taxes is paid where value is created and where economic activity is taking place; ### 21. takes note of the globe proposal which aims at ensuring that a minimum level of taxes is paid where value is created and where economic activity is taking place;


### 22. invites member states to ensure that the globe proposal provides for the simplest framework that would not lead to the development of new harmful tax schemes; ### 22. invites member states to examine whether the globe proposal provides for the simplest framework that would not lead to the development of new harmful tax schemes; to assess its impact , first we need a proper economic analysis;


### 24. considers that any discussion at oecd/g20 towards a minimum tax rate should focus on effective tax rates; considers that any minimum effective rate should be set at a fair and sufficient level to discourage profit shifting and prevent tax competition; ### 24. considers that any discussion at oecd/g20 towards a minimum tax rate should focus on effective tax rates and on the competitiveness of the eu and our businesses; considers that any minimum effective rate should be set at a fair and sufficient level to discourage profit shifting and prevent tax evasion;


### 25. considers that any discussion at oecd/g20 towards a minimum tax rate should focus on effective tax rates; considers that any minimum effective rate should be set at a fair and sufficient level to discourage profit shifting and prevent tax competition; ### 25. considers that any discussion at oecd/g20 towards a minimum tax rate should focus on effective tax rates; considers that any minimum effective rate should be set at a fair and sufficient level to discourage profit shifting and prevent tax competition; calls for a minimum effective rate of 20%;


### 26. reminds that setting a global level for minimum effective taxation raises the questions of blending across jurisdictions; considers therefore that , with respect to the income inclusion rule , the minimum effective level of taxation should be established for each jurisdiction where the mnes are located to limit possibilities to continue engaging in aggressive tax planning; ### 26. reminds that setting a global level for minimum effective taxation raises the questions of maintaining our competitive economy , and of blending across jurisdictions; considers it crucial , both economically and legally , that the minimum tax proposal shall not affect valid business activities; considers therefore that careful examination and negotiation are needed to determine whether it is useful to create a the minimum effective level of taxation should be established for each jurisdiction where the mnes are located to limit possibilities to continue engaging in aggressive tax planning;


### 28. calls upon the commission and member states to agree on a joint , ambitious eu position in the oecd negotiations , ensuring that the eu speaks with one voice and leads by example to ensure a fairer allocation of taxing rights and a minimum level of effective taxation; ### 28. calls upon the commission and member states to agree on a joint , ambitious eu position in the oecd negotiations , ensuring that the eu speaks with one voice and leads by example to ensure a fairer allocation of taxing rights;


### 29. invites the european commission to provide support in the elaboration of such eu position; ### 29. invites the european commission to provide support in the elaboration of such eu position; urges the commission to provide an impact assessment on revenues for every member states for both pillars;


### a. whereas the process of deepening the economic and monetary union requires a solid banking union as an indispensable building block to the euro area’s financial stability , as well as the creation of a mechanism of fiscal stabilisation for the euro area as a whole; ### a. whereas sound monetary policy which adheres strictly to its mandate of price stability as enshrined in article 127 (1) tfeu is an indispensable building block to the euro area’s financial stability;


### b. whereas the banking union remains incomplete as long as it lacks a backstop for the single resolution fund (srf) and a european deposit insurance scheme (edis); ### b. whereas the banking union will further disintegrate due to moral hazard and lead to a permanent transfer union if mechanisms such as the backstop for the single resolution fund (srf) and a european deposit insurance scheme (edis) are implemented; regrets that insufficient progress in risk reduction in some member states serves as an argument for mutualisation of deposit insurance schemes , creating incentives for some member states not to reduce risk , or even engage in even more excessive risk-taking; points out that the absence of a proper impact assessment of the edis proposal is fundamentally at odds with the principles of sound governance;


### c. whereas entrusting the ecb with the supervision of systemically important financial institutions has proven to be successful; ### c. whereas entrusting the ecb with the supervision of systemically important financial institutions has proven to be unsuccessful , according to the eba's risk dashboards , which clearly show that the 50% weakest banks in the euro area did not increase their solvency ratios since 2016 , and that the biggest banks are substantially worse of than smaller banks;


### d. whereas the development of the single resolution mechanism (srm) was efficient; ### d. whereas the single resolution mechanism (srm) has to be terminated;


### 1. recalls the progress made regarding the implementation of the banking union , namely on risk reduction; stresses , however , that further progress has to be made , particularly on risk sharing; ### 1. recalls the progress made regarding the implementation of the banking union , namely on risk reduction; stresses , however , that risk has only been marginally reduced , despite the favorable interest rate climate;


### a. whereas according to the commission’s forecasts , the gdp growth rate for 2019 stands at 1.2 % of gdp per capita in the euro area and 1.4 % in the eu28 , and is expected to rise to 1.4 % and 1.6 % respectively in 202010; ### a. whereas according to the commission’s forecasts , whose year-ahead projections has proved exceedingly inaccurate and unreliable over the last years , notably the forecasts of gdp , investment , inflation and the government budget balance9a , the gdp growth rate for 2019 stands at 1.2 % of gdp per capita in the euro area and 1.4 % in the eu28 , and is expected to rise to 1.4 % and 1.6 % respectively in 202010 , which is still far below the projected growth for the rest of the world; whereas private consumption has been the main driver of growth over the past years; whereas this casts doubt on the sustainability of recovery as well as future growth potential;


### b. whereas unemployment rates continue on a steady downward path , with an average rate of 7.5 % in the euro area and 6.3 % in the eu28 in may 2019 , the lowest since the start of the eu monthly unemployment series , and a further decrease is expected to 7.3 % and 6.2 % respectively in 2020; ### b. whereas unemployment rates continue on a steady downward path , with an average rate of 7.5 % in the euro area and 6.3 % in the eu28 in may 2019 , the lowest since the start of the eu monthly unemployment series , and a further decrease is expected to 7.3 % and 6.2 % respectively in 2020; whereas unemployment rates have for years been unacceptably high , at levels twice as high as those of the rest of the industrialized world;


### d. whereas some financial institutions in the bu are heavily invested in the debt of their own home sovereign; ### d. whereas the lack of a common safe asset in the euro area entails that some financial institutions in the bu are heavily invested in the debt of their own home sovereign;


### 1. recalls that one goal of the bu is the security of the banking system and the prevention of bank bailouts by taxpayers; supports efforts to strengthen the bu; stresses that a solid bu will result in increased confidence in the banking sector; ### 1. recalls that one goal of the bu is the security of the banking system and the prevention of bank bailouts by taxpayers; supports efforts to complete the bu with a european deposit insurance scheme (edis); stresses that a solid bu will result in increased confidence in the banking sector and greater levels of protection for savers;


### 1. recalls that one goal of the bu is the security of the banking system and the prevention of bank bailouts by taxpayers; supports efforts to strengthen the bu; stresses that a solid bu will result in increased confidence in the banking sector; ### 1. recalls that one goal of the bu is the security of the banking system , while ensuring that taxpayers are never made to bear the cost of bank bailouts; supports efforts to strengthen the bu; stresses that a solid bu will result in increased confidence in the banking sector;


### 3. stresses that the relatively good performance of banks during the covid-19 crisis is related to the policies implemented by the member states during the pandemic , as well as to temporary measures under regulation (eu) 575/2013 (capital requirements regulation); ### 3. stresses that the relatively good performance of banks during the covid-19 crisis is related to the policies implemented by the member states during the pandemic , as well as to temporary measures under regulation (eu) 575/2013 (capital requirements regulation); cautions against the structural changes in the banking sector that were triggered by the covid-19 crisis , which include the strengthening of non-bank payment service providers and the significant increase in the use of digital platforms by financial institutions;


### 5. notes that the eba , the ecb and the srb still see many problems in the banking system , such as high stocks of non-performing loans (npls) , exposures to sectors which are sensitive to the covid-19 crisis , deficiencies in risk management , and discrepancies in the implementation of international financial reporting standard 9 (ifrs 9); underlines with concern that these problems are likely to increase after the withdrawal of the emergency measures; ### 5. notes that the eba , the ecb and the srb still see many problems in the banking system , such as exposures to sectors which are sensitive to the covid-19crisis , deficiencies in risk management , and discrepancies in the implementation of international financial reporting standard 9 (ifrs 9); notes that the expected rise in non-performing loans (npls) has not materialised , and that the level of npls is the lowest on record in most member states; underlines with concern that these problems are likely to increase after the withdrawal of the emergency measures , which calls for a gradual phase-out of policy support;


### 7. notes that the banking sector is adapting to the challenges of digitalisation; stresses the need for further investments , research and adequate regulations; appreciates the work on the digital finance package; considers that the priority should be customer safety , inclusiveness and technological neutrality; observes with interest the work on the digital euro; ### 7. notes that the banking sector is adapting to the challenges of digitalisation; calls on the financial supervisors to adjust their priorities in order to face the related changes; stresses the need for further investments , training , research and adequate regulations; appreciates the work on the digital finance package; considers that the priority should be customer safety , inclusiveness and technological neutrality; observes with interest the work on the digital euro , which should be a universal and inclusive means of payment that can be used without the need for the latest technology;


### 9. notes that there is a prospect of gradually phasing out emergency measures and returning to pre-covid-19 capital requirements; ### 9. notes that it is still too early for a gradually phasing out emergency measures and returning to pre-covid-19 capital requirements;


### 10. considers the reduction of npls should remain a priority; warns that their number is likely to increase rapidly after the withdrawal of emergency support measures; draws attention to the importance of prudential compliance , early identification and proactive management of npls; ### 10. considers the reduction of npls and of complex and illiquid financial instruments classified as level 2 and level 3 should remain a priority; warns that their number is likely to increase rapidly after the withdrawal of emergency support measures; draws attention to the importance of prudential compliance , early identification and proactive management of the above-mentioned risks; cautions against the exposure of certain euro area-based financial institutions to the leveraged loan market;


### 11. is concerned about the rising level of sovereign debt on the balance sheets of banks in the bu; notes that government bonds are not risk-free assets and that risks are differentiated; emphasises that the issue of regulatory treatment of sovereign exposures requires an in-depth examination of the consequences of different approaches; ### deleted


### 11. is concerned about the rising level of sovereign debt on the balance sheets of banks in the bu; notes that government bonds are not risk-free assets and that risks are differentiated; emphasises that the issue of regulatory treatment of sovereign exposures requires an in-depth examination of the consequences of different approaches; ### 11. is concerned about the rising level of sovereign debt on the balance sheets of banks in the bu; notes that government bonds are not risk-free assets and that risks are differentiated; emphasises that any restrictions on the holding of government securities by financial institutions would make it impossible for indebted countries to borrow when needed.


### 12. notes that the transition to a low-carbon economy presents new challenges and risks related to the preference for sustainable investments; stresses the need for an in-depth analysis of the economic efficiency of sustainable investments in order to avoid a future bubble of green assets; calls for clear guidelines for banks based on economic data; ### 12. notes that the transition to a low-carbon economy presents new challenges and risks related to the preference for sustainable investments; stresses the need for an in-depth analysis of the economic efficiency of sustainable investments in order to avoid a future bubble of green assets; calls for clear guidelines for banks based on economic data; stresses that europe’s banks play an important role in limiting greenhouse gas emissions; deplores that , according to a 2021 report1a , the world’s biggest sixty banks have provided usd 3.8tn of financing for fossil fuel companies since the paris climate deal in 2015; calls on financial regulators to ensure that banks publish credible plans to transition their loan and investment portfolios to net zero by 2050;


### 14. draws attention to the dangers of a very loose monetary policy stimulating inflation; points out the need for the gradual tightening of monetary policy; ### 14. draws attention to the dangers of a very loose monetary policy stimulating inflation; points out that any premature tightening of monetary policy in the euro area will have dire consequences for the labour market and for the vulnerable economies of southern europe;


### 14. draws attention to the dangers of a very loose monetary policy stimulating inflation; points out the need for the gradual tightening of monetary policy; ### 14. draws attention to the dangers of a very loose monetary policy stimulating inflation , as well as to the risk of premature tightening choking off the recovery;


### 18. underlines the need to protect consumers from abuses and harmful practices; ### 18. underlines the need to protect consumers from abuses and harmful practices , especially in the midst of soaring energy costs and continuous price increases that are eroding household incomes;


### 19. welcomes the activities of the srb in 2021 , including the further completion of the single resolution fund; takes note of the srb’s work programme for the coming years , which includes making the effective resolution of all banks under the srb possible by 2023; ### 19. welcomes the activities of the srb in 2021 , including the further completion of the single resolution fund; takes note of the srb’s work programme for the coming years , which includes making the effective resolution of all banks under the srb possible by 2023 , while catering to the needs of local community banks as a place for small savers , on the basis of the proportionality principle;


### 23. notes the ongoing discussion of various concepts for the edis; ### 23. notes the ongoing discussion of various concepts for the edis; calls for the swift adoption of an ambitious and time-bound roadmap to complete the banking union;


### 24. considers that the main obstacles for edis are concerns about risks in some banking systems; stresses that the implementation of credible and effective risk reduction measures could enable an agreement on edis; ### deleted


### b. whereas tax authorities face many challenges nowadays regarding effective cross-border cooperation , given the acceleration of digital transactions , the increasing mobility of taxpayers , the number of cross-border transactions and the internationalisation of economic operations and business models; ### b. whereas tax authorities today face many challenges nowadays regarding effective cross-border cooperation , given the acceleration of digital transactions , the increasing mobility of taxpayers , the number of cross-border transactions and the internationalisation of economic operations and business models;


### e. whereas tax administrations across europe , within different degrees , are taking important steps towards the digitalisation of processes , making tax compliance easier , faster and more effective; whereas the use of new technologies is significantly different between member states; whereas national tax administrations , in general , need a further push to realise the potential in the field of technological and digital transformation; ### e. whereas several tax administrations across europe , within different degrees , are already taking important steps towards the digitalisation of processes , making tax compliance easier , faster and more effective; whereas the use of new technologies still varies considerably between member states; whereas national tax administrations , in general , demand more incentives and awareness-raising measures to realise the potential in the field of technological and digital transformation;


### f. whereas the increasing use of crypto-assets is forcing tax administrations to adapt current taxing practices within the single market; ### f. whereas the increasing use of crypto-assets is forcing member states to create custom national tax regimes to allow national tax administrations to tax crypto-asset transactions and/or holdings , providing for additional tax revenues , albeit fragmenting the tax landscape of the single market;


### g. whereas there is an international effort and commitment to better regulate the fair taxation of the digital economy; whereas , in this context , it is crucial that the eu take a leading role , namely on strong cooperation between member states to tax , in a fair and transparent way , crypto-assets; ### g. whereas there is an international effort and commitment to better regulate the fair taxation of the digital economy; whereas , in this context , it is crucial for the eu to take a leading role , in particular through close cooperation between member states on the fair , accountable and transparent taxation of crypto-assets;


### h. whereas the union has already taken important steps towards a clear definition of crypto-assets and this definition must facilitate the fair and simple taxation of these assets; and whereas definitions of such crypto-assets must be highly aligned with international standards , namely with the financial action task force; ### h. whereas the union has already taken important steps towards a clear definition of certain crypto-assets and these definitions must facilitate the fair and simple taxation of these assets; and whereas definitions of such crypto-assets must be highly aligned with international standards , namely those set by the financial action task force;


### i. whereas tax policy is a national competence , but strong cooperation between member states is essential to respond to the challenges posed to the integrity of the single market , namely by the increasing the use of crypto-assets; whereas a framework of 27 significantly different approaches to crypto-assets taxation could lead to significant obstacles for the fulfilment of the objectives of the european digital single market; ### i. whereas tax policy is a national competence , and as such an important part of state sovereignty but close cooperation between member states remains essential and necessary to respond to the challenges posed to the integrity of the single market , in particular bye increasing the use of crypto-assets; whereas a framework of 27 significantly different approaches to crypto-assets taxation could lead to significant obstacles for the fulfilment of the objectives of the european digital single market;


### j. whereas the european union and its single market must ensure an innovation-friendly environment for companies (namely small and medium-sized enterprises (smes) and start-ups) regarding new technologies in the area of financial services and crypto-assets; whereas this main goal requires a strong commitment from member states with policies , namely on taxation , that ensure a stable , clear and certain legal framework for businesses to thrive and contribute to economic growth; whereas , finally , this effort requires strong commitment to safeguard citizens’ rights , as taxpayers and consumers of financial services; ### j. whereas the european union and its single market must ensure an innovation-friendly environment for companies (in particular for small and medium-sized enterprises (smes) and start-ups) regarding new technologies in the area of financial services and crypto-assets; whereas this main goal requires a strong commitment from member states with policies ,namely on taxation , to ensure a stable , clear and secure regulatory framework for businesses to thrive and contribute to economic growth; whereas , finally , this effort requires strong commitment to safeguard citizens’ rights , as taxpayers and consumers of financial services;


### the potential of new technologies – such as blockchain – to better serve taxpayers , empower tax administrations and tackle tax fraud and evasion ### the potential of new technologies – such as blockchain – to better serve taxpayers , empower tax administrations , deter corruptive practices and tackle tax fraud and evasion


### 1. considers that national tax administrations should be better equipped with the adequate resources to better serve taxpayers and ensure compliance and that , in the context of digital transition , this means proper commitment from member states with investment in human resources training , digital infrastructures and specialised personnel and equipment; ### 1. considers that national tax administrations should be better equipped with the adequate resources to better serve taxpayers and ensure compliance and that , in the context of digital transition , this means sufficient commitment from member states with investment in human resources training , digital infrastructures and specialised personnel and equipment;


### 2. points out that adapting the it capacities of tax authorities through new emerging technologies , such as potential distributed ledger technologies like blockchain or artificial intelligence , promises to foster intelligent , effective and efficient tax and administrative procedures , facilitate tax compliance by citizens and businesses , and increase the traceability and identification of taxable transactions in a globalised environment where cross-border transactions have increased; ### 2. points out that adapting the it capacities of tax authorities through new emerging technologies , such as potential distributed ledger technologies like blockchain or artificial intelligence , promises to deter and limit corruption ,foster intelligent , effective and efficient tax and administrative procedures , facilitate tax compliance by citizens and businesses , and increase the traceability and identification of taxable transactions in a globalised environment where cross-border transactions have increased;


### 3. highlights the need to identify the best ways to use technology to strengthen the analytical capacity of tax administrations (through better data analysis) , to standardise data to reduce administrative burdens on smes , to ensure that taxation better reflects the business environment in the digital age and at the same time guarantees high levels of data protection; ### 3. highlights the need to identify the best ways to use technology to strengthen the analytical capacity of tax administrations (through better data analysis) , to standardise data to reduce administrative burdens on smes (through common reporting standards) , to ensure that taxation better reflects the business environment in the digital age and at the sometime to guarantee high levels of data protection;


### 9. notes that each country tends to use their own terminology when designing their national regulatory solutions to crypto-assets , which could cause legal uncertainty for citizens and companies , at the same time emerge as a threat to the integrity of the european single market; ### 9. notes that each country tends to use their own terminology when designing their national regulatory solutions to crypto-assets , which could cause legal uncertainty for citizens and companies , and at the same time emerge as a threat to the integrity of the european single market , as cross-border cooperation could be significantly impaired;


### 10. emphasises that the rapid growth of crypto-assets4 refers to the key question of the type of taxation to be applied , when a taxable event happens , and its valuation; ### 10. emphasises that the rapid growth of crypto-assets4 refers to the key question of the type of taxation to be applied , the definition of the “taxable event" , the timing when a taxable event occurs , and its valuation;


### 13. calls on the member states to consider the dimension of crypto-assets in their national tax reforms , and to consider implementing more effective systems that ensure less compliance costs and administrative burden , but that guarantee , at the same time , the fair , transparent and effective taxation of crypto-assets; underlines the role of tax incentives and exemptions in promoting technological innovation and development; ### 13. calls on the member states to consider the dimension of crypto-assets in their national tax reforms , and to consider implementing more effective systems that ensure less compliance costs and administrative burden , but that guarantee , at the same time , the fair , transparent and effective taxation of crypto-assets; underlines the role of tax incentives and exemptions in promoting technological innovation and development; highlights the key importance of common reporting standards for crypto-asset service providers as well as individuals and entities;


### 14. points out that the crypto-asset landscape is global and requires an international approach; understands , in this regard , the need to further negotiate international instruments on the matter; ### 14. points out that the crypto-asset landscape is global and requires an international approach; understands , in this regard , the need to further align definitions related to crypto-assets such as “taxable event” , “tax object” or other , e.g. airdrops and mining treatments , and negotiate international instruments on the matter;


### 18. encourages the commission to take account of existing digital solutions , legal provisions and administrative guidance used in member states in order to assess how to leverage blockchain technologies and to prevent tax fraud and avoidance; supports the development of a european blockchain services infrastructure; ### 18. encourages the commission to take account of existing digital solutions , legal provisions and administrative guidance used in member states in order to assess how to leverage blockchain technologies in addressing corruption and to prevent tax fraud and avoidance; supports the development of a european blockchain services infrastructure;


### (3) certain characteristics of the eltif market , including the low number of funds , the small net asset size , the low number of jurisdictions in which eltifs are domiciled , and a portfolio composition that is skewed towards certain eligible investment categories , demonstrate the concentrated nature of that market , both geographically and in terms of investment type. it is therefore necessary to review the functioning of the eltif legal framework to ensure that more investments are channelled to businesses in need of capital and to long-term investment projects. ### (3) certain characteristics of the eltif market , including the low number of funds , the small net asset size , the low number of jurisdictions in which eltifs are domiciled , and a portfolio composition that is skewed towards certain eligible investment categories , demonstrate the concentrated nature of that market , both geographically and in terms of investment type. it is therefore necessary to review the functioning of the eltif legal framework to ensure that more investments are channelled to businesses in need of capital and to long-term investment projects. eltifs have not captured investment flows also due to a lack of awareness and financial education , but most importantly an adequate level of trust and reliability in the finance industry. promoting independent financial literacy is fundamental to make eltifs more accessible and popular among individual investors.


### (7) investments in commercial property , in facilities or installations for education , research , sports or development , or in housing , including in senior residents or social housing , should also be deemed to be eligible assets due to the capacity of such assets to contribute to the objectives of smart , sustainable and inclusive growth. to enable real investment strategies in areas where direct investments in real assets are not possible or uneconomical , eligible investments in real assets should also comprise investments in water rights , forest rights , building rights and mineral rights. ### (7) investments in commercial property , in facilities or installations for education , research , sports or development , or in housing , including in senior residents or social housing , should also be deemed to be eligible assets due to the capacity of such assets to contribute to the objectives of smart , sustainable and inclusive growth , while taking into consideration the questions raised by the further privatisation of quasi-public goods.


### (13) due to concerns that fund-of-funds strategies can give rise to investments that would not fall within the scope of eligible investment assets , regulation (eu) 2015/760 currently contains restrictions on investments in other funds throughout the eltif’s life. fund-of-fund strategies are , however , a common and very effective way of obtaining rapid exposure to illiquid assets , in particular in respect of real estate and in the context of fully paid-in capital structures. it is therefore necessary to give eltifs the possibility to invest in other funds , because that would enable eltifs to ensure a faster deployment of capital. facilitating fund-of-fund investments by eltifs would also allow reinvestment of excess cash into funds as different investments with distinct maturities may lower the cash drag of the eltif. it is therefore necessary to expand the eligibility of funds-of-funds strategies for eltif managers beyond investments in european venture capital funds (euvecas) or european social entrepreneurship funds (eusefs). the scope of collective investment undertakings in which eltifs can invest should thus be broadened to undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities (ucits) and to eu alternative investment funds (eu aifs) managed by eu aif managers. however , in order to ensure effective investor protection , it is also necessary to set out that where an eltif invests in other eltifs , in european venture capital funds (euvecas) , in european social entrepreneurship funds (eusefs) , in ucits and eu aifs managed by eu aifms , those collective investment undertakings should also invest in eligible investments and have not themselves invested more than 10 % of their capital in any other collective investment undertaking. ### (13) due to concerns that fund-of-funds strategies can give rise to investments that would not fall within the scope of eligible investment assets , regulation (eu) 2015/760 currently contains restrictions on investments in other funds throughout the eltif’s life. fund-of-fund strategies are , however , a common and very effective way of obtaining rapid exposure to illiquid assets , in particular in respect of real estate and in the context of fully paid-in capital structures. it is therefore necessary to give eltifs the possibility to invest in other funds , because that would enable eltifs to ensure a faster deployment of capital. facilitating fund-of-fund investments by eltifs would also allow reinvestment of excess cash into funds as different investments with distinct maturities may lower the cash drag of the eltif. it is therefore necessary to expand the eligibility of funds-of-funds strategies for eltif managers beyond investments in european venture capital funds (euvecas) or european social entrepreneurship funds (eusefs). the scope of collective investment undertakings in which eltifs can invest should thus be broadened to undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities (ucits) and to eu alternative investment funds (eu aifs) managed by eu aif managers. however , in order to ensure effective investor protection , it is also necessary to set out that where an eltif invests in other eltifs , in european venture capital funds (euvecas) , in european social entrepreneurship funds (eusefs) , in ucits and eu aifs managed by eu aifms , those collective investment undertakings should also comply with the portfolio composition , diversification , concentration and investment restriction rules applying to eltifs , thereby offering a risk profile similar to that of eltifs.


### (19) article 30(3) of regulation (eu) 2015/760 currently requires , for potential retail investors whose financial instrument portfolio does not exceed eur 500 000 , an initial minimum investment in one or more eltifs of eur 10 000 , and requires that such investors do not invest an aggregate amount exceeding 10 % of that their financial instrument portfolio in eltifs. when applied together , the eur 10 000 minimum initial investment participation and the 10 % limitation on aggregate investment create a significant obstacle for the retail investor to invest in eltifs , which conflicts with the goal of an eltif to establish a retail alternative investment fund product. it is therefore necessary to remove that eur 10 000 initial minimum investment requirement and the 10 % limitation on aggregate investment. ### deleted


### (25) leverage is frequently used to enable the day-to-day operation of an eltif and to carry out a specific investment strategy. moderate amounts of leverage can amplify returns , and , where controlled adequately , without incurring or exacerbating excessive risks. in addition , leverage can frequently be used by a variety of collective investment undertakings to gain additional efficiencies or operational results. since the borrowing of cash threshold is currently limited to 30% of the capital of the eltif , eltif managers may be unable to successfully pursue certain investment strategies , including in the case of investments in real assets , where using higher levels of leverage is an industry norm or is otherwise required to achieve attractive risk-adjusted returns. it is therefore appropriate to increase the flexibility of managers of eltifs to raise further capital during the life of the eltif. in view of the possible risks that leverage can entail , eltifs marketed to retail investors should be permitted to borrow cash amounting to up to 50 % of the value of the capital of the eltif. the 50 % threshold is appropriate given the overall borrowing of cash limits common for funds investing in real assets with a similar liquidity and redemption profile. as for eltifs marketed to professional investors , however , a higher leverage threshold should be permitted , because professional investors have a higher risk-tolerance than retail investors. the borrowing of cash threshold for eltifs that are marketed to professional investors only should therefore be extended to 100 % of the eltif capital. ### (25) leverage is frequently used to enable the day-to-day operation of an eltif and to carry out a specific investment strategy. moderate amounts of leverage can amplify returns , and , where controlled adequately , without incurring or exacerbating excessive risks. in addition , leverage can frequently be used by a variety of collective investment undertakings to gain additional efficiencies or operational results. since the borrowing of cash threshold is currently limited to 30% of the capital of the eltif , eltif managers may be unable to successfully pursue certain investment strategies , including in the case of investments in real assets , where using higher levels of leverage is an industry norm or is otherwise required to achieve attractive risk-adjusted returns. it is therefore appropriate to increase the flexibility of managers of eltifs to raise further capital during the life of the eltif. in view of the possible risks that leverage can entail , eltifs marketed to retail investors should be permitted to borrow cash amounting to up to 50 % of the value of the capital of the eltif. the 50 % threshold is appropriate given the overall borrowing of cash limits common for funds investing in real assets with a similar liquidity and redemption profile. as for eltifs marketed to professional investors , however , a higher leverage threshold should be permitted , because professional investors have a higher risk-tolerance than retail investors. the borrowing of cash threshold for eltifs that are marketed to professional investors only should therefore be extended to 100 % of the eltif capital. at the same time , since cash borrowing is not the only way to get exposure to leverage , the increased thresholds for borrowing cash by eltifs should be accompanied by a mandatory cap on leverage.


### units or shares of one or several other eltifs , euvecas , eusefs , ucits and eu aifs managed by eu aifm provided that those eltifs , euvecas , eusefs¸ ucits and eu aifs invest in eligible investments as referred to in article 9(1) and (2) and have not themselves invested more than 10% of their assets in any other collective investment undertaking. ### units or shares of one or several other eltifs , euvecas , eusefs , ucits and eu aifs managed by eu aifm provided that those eltifs , euvecas , eusefs¸ ucits and eu aifs comply with the portfolio composition , diversification , concentration and investment restriction rules applying to eltifs , thereby offering a risk profile similar to that of eltifs;


### 1. the units or shares of an eltif may only be marketed to a retail investor where an assessment of suitability in accordance with article 25 , paragraphs 1 , 2 and 5 , article 25(6) , second and third subparagraph , and article 25(7) of directive 2014/65/eu has been carried out with respect to that investor. ### 1. the units or shares of an eltif may only be marketed to a retail investor where an assessment of suitability in accordance with article 25 , paragraphs 1 , 2 and 5 , article 25(6) , second and third subparagraph , and article 25(7) of directive 2014/65/eu has been carried out with respect to that investor. where the financial instrument portfolio of a potential retail investor does not exceed eur 500 000 , the manager of the eltif or any distributor , after having performed the suitability test referred to above and having provided appropriate investment advice , shall ensure , on the basis of the information submitted by the potential retail investor , that the potential retail investor does not invest an aggregate amount exceeding 10 % of that investor's financial instrument portfolio in eltifs and that the initial minimum amount invested in one or more eltifs is eur 10 000. the potential retail investor shall be responsible for providing the manager of the eltif or the distributor with accurate information on the potential retail investor's financial instrument portfolio and investments in eltifs as referred to in the first subparagraph. for the purpose of this paragraph , a financial instrument portfolio shall be understood to include cash deposits and financial instruments , but shall exclude any financial instruments that have been given as collateral.


### 1. this directive shall apply to constituent entities located in the union that are members of an mne group or a large-scale domestic group which has an annual revenue of eur 750 000 000 or more in its consolidated financial statements in at least two of the last four consecutive fiscal years. ### 1. this directive shall apply to constituent entities located in the union that are members of an mne group or a large-scale domestic group which has an annual revenue of eur 750 000 000 or more in its consolidated financial statements in at least two of the last four consecutive fiscal years. each member state may apply an income inclusion rule in accordance with this directive also to mne groups which have annual revenues above a nationally defined lower threshold if the ultimate parent entity is tax resident in this member state. the same threshold shall then apply to large-scale domestic groups of this member state.


### a stand-alone institution in the eu and , for the purposes of complying with the obligations of this regulation on the basis of its consolidated situation in accordance with part one , title ii , chapter 2 , an eu parent institution , an eu parent financial holding company and an eu parent mixed financial holding company shall calculate the total risk exposure amount as follows: ### institutions shall calculate the total risk exposure amount as follows:


### for the purposes set out in points (i) and (ii) , the total risk exposure amount shall be calculated in accordance with paragraph 6: ### deleted


### for the purposes of complying with the obligations of this regulation on an individual basis , the total risk exposure amount of an institution which is neither a stand-alone institution in the eu nor a stand-alone subsidiary institution in a member state shall be the un-floored total risk exposure amount calculated in accordance with paragraph 4. ### deleted


### 6. the total risk exposure amount of an entity ‘i’ for the purposes set out in paragraph 3 , point (b) , shall be calculated as follows: ### deleted


### 4. for contractual arrangements offered by an institution , but not yet accepted by the client , that would become commitments if accepted by the client , and contractual arrangements that would qualify as commitments but meet the conditions for not being treated as commitments , the percentage applicable to that type of contractual arrangement shall be that provided for in accordance with paragraph 2. ### deleted


### where the purpose of a specialised lending exposure is to provide for short-term financing of reserves , inventories or receivables of exchange-traded commodities , including crude oil , metals , or crops , and the income to be generated by those reserves , inventories or receivables is to be the proceeds from the sale of the commodity (‘commodities finance exposures’) , institutions shall apply a risk weight of 100 %; ### where the purpose of a specialised lending exposure is to provide for short-term financing of inventories or receivables of liquidly traded commodities , including crude oil , metals , or soft commodities , and the income to be generated by those inventories or receivables is to be the proceeds from the sale of the commodity (‘commodities finance exposures’) , institutions shall apply a risk weight of 100 %;


### 130 % where the project to which the exposure is related is in the pre-operational phase; ### 110 % where the project to which the exposure is related is in the pre-operational phase;


### — the obligor has sufficient reserve funds fully funded in cash , or other financial arrangements , with highly rated guarantors to cover the contingency funding and working capital requirements over the lifetime of the project being financed; ### — the obligor has sufficient reserve funds fully funded in cash , or other financial arrangements , with guarantors with an ecai rating with a credit quality step of at least 3 , or , if not externally rated , are assigned with a rating equivalent to a step 3 or higher with the bank validated internal rating model to cover the contingency funding and working capital requirements over the lifetime of the project being financed;


### — the source of repayment of the obligation depends on one main counterparty and that main counterparty is one of the following: ### — where the revenues of the obligor are not funded by payments from a large number of users , the source of repayment of the obligation depends on one main counterparty and that main counterparty is one of the following:


### — a public sector entity , provided that that entity is assigned a risk weight of 20 % or below in accordance with article 116 , or is assigned an ecai rating with a credit quality step of at least 3; ### — a public sector entity , provided that that entity is assigned a risk weight of 20 % or below in accordance with article 116 , or is assigned an ecai rating with a credit quality step of at least 3 , or , if not externally rated , are assigned with a rating equivalent to a step 3 or higher with the bank validated internal rating model;


### — a corporate entity which has been assigned an ecai rating with a credit quality step of at least 3. ### — a corporate entity which has been assigned an ecai rating with a credit quality step of at least 3 , or , if not externally rated , are assigned with a rating equivalent to a step 3 or higher with the bank validated internal rating model;


### — equity is pledged to the lending institution such that they are able to take control of the obligor entity upon default; ### — equity is pledged or assigned to the lending institution such that they are able to take control of the obligor entity upon default;


### member states shall ensure that the management body develops specific plans and quantifiable targets to monitor and address the risks arising in the short , medium and long-term from the misalignment of the business model and strategy of the institutions , with the relevant union policy objectives or broader transition trends towards a sustainable economy in relation to environmental , social and governance factors.; ### member states shall ensure that the management body develops specific plans and quantifiable targets to monitor and address the risks arising in the short , medium and long-term from the misalignment of the business model and strategy of the institutions , with the relevant union policy objectives or broader transition trends towards a sustainable economy in relation to environmental , social and governance factors. these plans shall outline the institution's pathway to reduce financed emissions by 55% in 2030 compared to 1990 levels and to have net 0 financed emissions by 2050. these plans shall also outline the institution's pathway to end financing of activities that do significant harm to environmental objectives as stipulated in article 17 of regulation (eu) 2019/852 , reducing the exposure to such activities by at least 50% by 2035 compared to current levels.


### 3. member states shall ensure that institutions draw up , maintain and update individual statements setting out the roles and duties of each member of the management body , senior management and key function holders and a mapping of duties , including details of the reporting lines and the lines of responsibility , and the persons who are part of the governance arrangements as referred to in article 74 (1) and their duties approved by the management body. ### 3. member states shall ensure that institutions draw up , maintain and update individual statements setting out the roles of key function holders , and the persons who are part of the governance arrangements as referred to in article 74 (1).


### member states shall ensure that the statements of duties and the mapping of the duties are made available and communicated in due time , upon request , to the competent authorities. ### member states shall ensure that the statements of roles are made available and communicated in due time , upon request , to the competent authorities.


### eba shall issue guidelines , in accordance with article 16 of regulation (eu) no 1093/2010 , ensuring the implementation of this paragraph and its consistent application. eba shall issue those guidelines by [op please insert the date = 12 months from date of entry into force of this amending directive]. ### deleted


### 2. the entities shall assess the suitability of members of the management body before those members take up their positions. where the entities conclude , based on the suitability assessment , that the member concerned does not fulfil the criteria and requirements set out in paragraph 1 , the entities shall ensure that the member concerned does not take up the position considered. ### 2. the timing of the suitability assessment is subject to national law and takes place before or after the members of the management body take up their positions. where the entities conclude , based on the suitability assessment , that the member concerned does not fulfil the criteria and requirements set out in paragraph 1 , the entities shall ensure that the member concerned does not take up the position considered.


### however , where it is strictly necessary to replace a member of the management body immediately , the entities may assess the suitability of such replacement members after they have taken up their positions. the entities shall be able to duly justify such immediate replacement. ### without prejudice to the timing provided for in national law , where it is strictly necessary to replace a member of the management body immediately , the entities may assess the suitability of such replacement members after they have taken up their positions. the entities shall be able to duly justify such immediate replacement.


### competent authorities shall complete the assessment referred to in paragraph 1 within 80 working days (‘assessment period’) as from the date of the written acknowledgement referred to in the first subparagraph of this paragraph. ### competent authorities shall complete the assessment referred to in paragraph 1 within 40 working days (‘assessment period’) as from the date of the written acknowledgement referred to in the first subparagraph of this paragraph.


### 4. competent authorities that request from the entities additional information or documentation , including interviews or hearings , may extend the assessment period for a maximum of 40 working days. however , the assessment period shall not exceed 120 working days. request for additional information or documentation shall be made in writing and shall be specific. the entities shall acknowledge receipt of request for additional information or documentation within two working days and provide the requested additional information or documentation within 10 working days as of the date of the written acknowledgement of the request from competent authorities. ### 4. competent authorities that request from the entities additional information or documentation , including interviews or hearings , may extend the assessment period for a maximum of 20 working days. however , the assessment period shall not exceed 60 working days. request for additional information or documentation shall be made in writing and shall be specific. the entities shall acknowledge receipt of request for additional information or documentation within two working days and provide the requested additional information or documentation within 10 working days as of the date of the written acknowledgement of the request from competent authorities.


### 8. in accordance with paragraphs 1 to 7 , competent authorities shall carry out the suitability assessment before members of the management body take up their positions in the following entities: ### deleted


### (3) some crypto-assets qualify as financial instruments as defined in article 4(1) , point (15) , of directive 2014/65/eu of the european parliament and of the council33. the majority of crypto-assets , however , fall outside of the scope of union legislation on financial services. there are no rules for services related to crypto-assets , including for the operation of trading platforms for crypto-assets , the service of exchanging crypto-assets against fiat currency or other crypto-assets , or the custody of crypto-assets. the lack of such rules leaves holders of crypto-assets exposed to risks , in particular in areas not covered by consumer protection rules. the lack of such rules can also lead to substantial risks to market integrity in the secondary market of crypto-assets , including market manipulation. to address those risks , some member states have put in place specific rules for all – or a subset of – crypto-assets that fall outside union legislation on financial services. other member states are considering to legislate in this area. ### (3) some crypto-assets qualify as financial instruments as defined in article 4(1) , point (15) , of directive 2014/65/eu of the european parliament and of the council33. because of the specific features linked to their innovative and technological aspects , however , it is necessary to clearly identify the requirements for classifying a crypto-asset as a financial instrument. for this purpose , the european securities and markets authority (esma) should be tasked by the european commission with publishing guidelines in order to reduce legal uncertainty and guarantee a level playing field for market operators. the majority of crypto-assets , however , fall outside of the scope of union legislation on financial services. there are no rules for services related to crypto-assets , including for the operation of trading platforms for crypto-assets , the service of exchanging crypto-assets against fiat currency or other crypto-assets , or the custody of crypto-assets. the lack of such rules leaves holders of crypto-assets exposed to risks , in particular in areas not covered by consumer protection rules. the lack of such rules can also lead to substantial risks to market integrity in the secondary market of crypto-assets , including market manipulation. to address those risks , some member states have put in place specific rules for all – or a subset of – crypto-assets that fall outside union legislation on financial services. other member states are considering to legislate in this area.


### (8) any legislation adopted in the field of crypto-assets should be specific , future-proof and be able to keep pace with innovation and technological developments. ‘crypto-assets’ and ‘distributed ledger technology’ should therefore be defined as widely as possible to capture all types of crypto-assets which currently fall outside the scope of union legislation on financial services. such legislation should also contribute to the objective of combating money laundering and the financing of terrorism. any definition of ‘crypto-assets’ should therefore correspond to the definition of ‘virtual assets’ set out in the recommendations of the financial action task force (fatf)34. for the same reason , any list of crypto-asset services should also encompass virtual asset services that are likely to raise money-laundering concerns and that are identified as such by the fatf. ### (8) any legislation adopted in the field of crypto-assets should be specific , future-proof and be able to keep pace with innovation and technological developments and be based on incentivising approaches in order to ensure a consistent national legal competence , as well as rapid development for the industry. ‘crypto-assets’ and ‘distributed ledger technology’ should therefore be defined as widely as possible to capture all types of crypto-assets which fall outside the scope of current union legislation on financial services. such legislation should also contribute to the objective of combating money laundering and the financing of terrorism. any definition of ‘crypto-assets’ should therefore correspond to the definition of ‘virtual assets’ set out in the recommendations of the financial action task force (fatf)34. in order to avoid damaging or infringing member states’ national competences in relation to control over their fiscal and monetary policies , any list of crypto-asset services should also encompass virtual asset services that are likely to raise money-laundering concerns and that are identified as such by the fatf.


### (9) a distinction should be made between three sub-categories of crypto-assets , which should be subject to more specific requirements. the first sub-category consists of a type of crypto-asset which is intended to provide digital access to a good or service , available on dlt , and that is only accepted by the issuer of that token (‘utility tokens’). such ‘utility tokens’ have non-financial purposes related to the operation of a digital platform and digital services and should be considered as a specific type of crypto-assets. a second sub-category of crypto-assets are ‘asset-referenced tokens’. such asset-referenced tokens aim at maintaining a stable value by referencing several currencies that are legal tender , one or several commodities , one or several crypto-assets , or a basket of such assets. by stabilising their value , those asset-referenced tokens often aim at being used by their holders as a means of payment to buy goods and services and as a store of value. a third sub-category of crypto-assets are crypto-assets that are intended primarily as a means of payment aim at stabilising their value by referencing only one fiat currency. the function of such crypto-assets is very similar to the function of electronic money , as defined in article 2 , point 2 , of directive 2009/110/ec of the european parliament and of the council35. like electronic money , such crypto-assets are electronic surrogates for coins and banknotes and are used for making payments. these crypto-assets are defined as ‘electronic money tokens’ or ‘e-money tokens’. ### (9) a distinction should be made between three sub-categories of crypto-assets , which should be subject to more specific requirements. the first sub-category consists of a type of crypto-asset which is intended to provide digital access to a good or service , available on dlt , and that is only accepted by the issuer of that token (‘utility tokens’). such ‘utility tokens’ have non-financial purposes related to the operation of a digital platform and digital services and should be considered as a specific type of crypto-assets. a second sub-category of crypto-assets are ‘asset-referenced tokens’. such asset-referenced tokens aim at maintaining a stable value by referencing several currencies that are legal tender , one or several commodities , one or several crypto-assets , or a basket of such assets. by stabilising their value , those asset-referenced tokens often aim at being used by their holders as a means of exchange to buy goods and services and as a store of value. a third sub-category of crypto-assets are crypto-assets that are intended primarily as a means of exchange aim at stabilising their value by referencing only one fiat currency. the function of such crypto-assets is very similar to the function of electronic money , as defined in in article 2 , point 2 , of directive 2009/110/ec of the european parliament and of the council35. like electronic money , such crypto-assets are electronic surrogates for coins and banknotes and are used for making payments. these crypto-assets are defined as ‘electronic money tokens’ or ‘e-money tokens’.