### 8. the gatekeeper shall comply with the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6 within six months after a core platform service has been included in the list pursuant to paragraph 7 of this article. ### 8. the gatekeeper shall comply with the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6 as soon as possible , and in any case no later than two months after a core platform service has been included in the list pursuant to paragraph 7 of this article. if a gatekeeper fails to comply with the obligations within these 2 months , article 25 and 26 are triggered.


### 2. the commission shall regularly , and at least every 2 years , review whether the designated gatekeepers continue to satisfy the requirements laid down in article 3(1) , or whether new providers of core platform services satisfy those requirements. the regular review shall also examine whether the list of affected core platform services of the gatekeeper needs to be adjusted. ### 2. the commission shall regularly , and at least every 4 years , review whether the in line with article 3 (6) designated gatekeepers continue to satisfy the requirements laid down in article 3(1) , and at least every year or whether new providers of core platform services satisfy those requirements. the regular review shall also examine whether the list of affected core platform services of the gatekeeper needs to be adjusted. the review shall not have any suspending effect on the obligations.


### 3. the commission shall publish and update the list of gatekeepers and the list of the core platform services for which they need to comply with the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6 on an on-going basis. ### 3. the commission shall publish and update the list of gatekeepers and the list of the core platform services for which they need to comply with the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6 on an on-going basis. the commission shall publish an annual report setting out the findings of its monitoring activities and present it to the european parliament and the council of the european union.


### refrain from combining personal data sourced from these core platform services with personal data from any other services offered by the gatekeeper or with personal data from third-party services , and from signing in end users to other services of the gatekeeper in order to combine personal data , unless the end user has been presented with the specific choice and provided consent in the sense of regulation (eu) 2016/679. ; ### refrain from combining personal data sourced from these core platform services with personal data from any other services offered by the gatekeeper or with personal data from third-party services , and from signing in end users to other services of the gatekeeper in order to combine personal data , unless the end user has been presented with the specific choice and provided consent in the sense of regulation (eu) 2016/679 , such choice must include the offering of a less personalised alternative and must be proactively presented to the end user in an explicit , clear and straightforward manner;


### refrain from combining personal data sourced from these core platform services with personal data from any other services offered by the gatekeeper or with personal data from third-party services , and from signing in end users to other services of the gatekeeper in order to combine personal data , unless the end user has been presented with the specific choice and provided consent in the sense of regulation (eu) 2016/679. ; ### not combine personal data sourced from these core platform services with personal data from other core platform services , any other services offered by the gatekeeper or from third-party services , and not sign in business users and end users to other services of the gatekeeper;


### allow business users to offer the same products or services to end users through third party online intermediation services at prices or conditions that are different from those offered through the online intermediation services of the gatekeeper; ### allow business users to offer the same products or services to end users directly or through third party online intermediation services at prices or conditions that are different from those offered through the online intermediation services of the gatekeeper;


### allow business users to offer the same products or services to end users through third party online intermediation services at prices or conditions that are different from those offered through the online intermediation services of the gatekeeper; ### allow business users to offer the same products or services to end users through third party online intermediation services or through its own online services or distribution channels at prices or conditions that are different from those offered through the online intermediation services of the gatekeeper;


### (1) digital services in general and online platforms in particular play an increasingly important role in the economy , in particular in the internal market , by providing new business opportunities in the union and facilitating cross-border trading. ### (1) digital services in general and online platforms in particular play an increasingly important role in the economy , in particular in the internal market , by providing new business opportunities in the union and facilitating cross-border trading. they serve as essential facilities for the digital economy by providing access to critical infrastructures. furthermore , they could play an important role in safeguarding the freedom and pluralism of the media , including by disseminating news and by facilitating public debate.


### (3) a small number of large providers of core platform services have emerged with considerable economic power. typically , they feature an ability to connect many business users with many end users through their services which , in turn , allows them to leverage their advantages , such as their access to large amounts of data , from one area of their activity to new ones. some of these providers exercise control over whole platform ecosystems in the digital economy and are structurally extremely difficult to challenge or contest by existing or new market operators , irrespective of how innovative and efficient these may be. contestability is particularly reduced due to the existence of very high barriers to entry or exit , including high investment costs , which cannot , or not easily , be recuperated in case of exit , and absence of (or reduced access to) some key inputs in the digital economy , such as data. as a result , the likelihood increases that the underlying markets do not function well – or will soon fail to function well. ### (3) a small number of large providers of core platform services have emerged with considerable economic power. typically , they feature an ability to connect many business users with many end users through their services which , in turn , allows them to leverage their advantages , such as their access to large amounts of data , from one area of their activity to new ones. some of these providers exercise control over whole platform ecosystems in the digital economy and are structurally extremely difficult to challenge or contest by existing or new market operators , irrespective of how innovative and efficient these may be. contestability is particularly reduced due to the existence of very high barriers to entry or exit , including high investment costs , which cannot , or not easily , be recuperated in case of exit , and absence of (or reduced access to) some key inputs in the digital economy , such as data. as a result , the likelihood increases that the underlying markets do not function well – or will soon fail to function well. in addition , there are unjustified advantages for digital platforms in the form of circumvention constructions in the payment of profit taxes and in the employment conditions of platform workers , which further distort competition.


### (4) the combination of those features of gatekeepers is likely to lead in many cases to serious imbalances in bargaining power and , consequently , to unfair practices and conditions for business users as well as end users of core platform services provided by gatekeepers , to the detriment of prices , quality , choice and innovation therein. ### (4) the combination of those features of gatekeepers is likely to lead in many cases to serious imbalances in bargaining power and , consequently , to unfair practices and conditions for business users as well as end users of core platform services provided by gatekeepers , to the detriment of prices , quality , privacy , security standards , funding of traditional publishers , choice and innovation therein.


### (9) a fragmentation of the internal market can only be effectively averted if member states are prevented from applying national rules which are specific to the types of undertakings and services covered by this regulation. at the same time , since this regulation aims at complementing the enforcement of competition law , it should be specified that this regulation is without prejudice to articles 101 and 102 tfeu , to the corresponding national competition rules and to other national competition rules regarding unilateral behaviour that are based on an individualised assessment of market positions and behaviour , including its likely effects and the precise scope of the prohibited behaviour , and which provide for the possibility of undertakings to make efficiency and objective justification arguments for the behaviour in question. however , the application of the latter rules should not affect the obligations imposed on gatekeepers under this regulation and their uniform and effective application in the internal market. ### (9) a fragmentation of the internal market can only be effectively averted if member states are prevented from applying national rules which are specific to the types of undertakings and services covered by this regulation. at the same time , since this regulation aims at complementing the enforcement of competition law , it should be specified that this regulation is without prejudice to articles 101 and 102 tfeu , to the corresponding national competition rules and to other national competition rules regarding unilateral behaviour that are based on an individualised assessment of market positions and behaviour , including its likely effects and the precise scope of the prohibited behaviour , and which provide for the possibility of undertakings to make efficiency and objective justification arguments for the behaviour in question. however , the application of the latter rules should not affect the obligations and prohibitions imposed on gatekeepers under this regulation and their uniform and effective application in the internal market.


### (10) articles 101 and 102 tfeu and the corresponding national competition rules concerning anticompetitive multilateral and unilateral conduct as well as merger control have as their objective the protection of undistorted competition on the market. this regulation pursues an objective that is complementary to , but different from that of protecting undistorted competition on any given market , as defined in competition-law terms , which is to ensure that markets where gatekeepers are present are and remain contestable and fair , independently from the actual , likely or presumed effects of the conduct of a given gatekeeper covered by this regulation on competition on a given market. this regulation therefore aims at protecting a different legal interest from those rules and should be without prejudice to their application. ### (10) articles 101 and 102 tfeu and the corresponding national competition rules concerning anticompetitive multilateral and unilateral conduct as well as merger control have as their objective the protection of undistorted competition on the market. this regulation pursues an objective that is complementary to , but different from that of protecting undistorted competition on any given market , as defined in competition-law terms , which is to ensure that markets where gatekeepers are present are and remain contestable and fair , and the respective rights of business users and end users are protected , independently from the actual , likely or presumed effects of the conduct of a given gatekeeper covered by this regulation on competition on a given market. this regulation therefore aims at protecting a different legal interest from those rules and should be without prejudice to their application.


### (12) weak contestability and unfair practices in the digital sector are more frequent and pronounced for certain digital services than for others. this is the case in particular for widespread and commonly used digital services that mostly directly intermediate between business users and end users and where features such as extreme scale economies , very strong network effects , an ability to connect many business users with many end users through the multi-sidedness of these services , lock-in effects , a lack of multi-homing or vertical integration are the most prevalent. often , there is only one or very few large providers of those digital services. these providers of core platform services have emerged most frequently as gatekeepers for business users and end users with far-reaching impacts , gaining the ability to easily set commercial conditions and terms in a unilateral and detrimental manner for their business users and end users. accordingly , it is necessary to focus only on those digital services that are most broadly used by business users and end users and where , based on current market conditions , concerns about weak contestability and unfair practices by gatekeepers are more apparent and pressing from an internal market perspective. ### (12) weak contestability and unfair practices in the digital sector are more frequent and pronounced for certain digital services than for others. this is the case in particular for widespread and commonly used digital services that mostly directly intermediate between business users and end users and where features such as extreme scale economies , very strong network effects , an ability to connect many business users with many end users through the multi-sidedness of these services , lock-in effects , a lack of multi-homing or vertical integration are the most prevalent. often , there is only one or very few large providers of those digital services. this situation produces disruptions and restrictions , in particular on smes in the transport , tourism and hospitality sector , where intermediaries have a dominant market position. these providers of core platform services have emerged most frequently as gatekeepers for business users and end users with far-reaching impacts , gaining the ability to easily set commercial conditions and terms in a unilateral and detrimental manner for their business users and end users. accordingly , it is necessary to focus only on those digital services that are most broadly used by business users and end users and where , based on current market conditions , concerns about weak contestability and unfair practices by gatekeepers are more apparent and pressing from an internal market perspective.


### (15) the fact that a digital service qualifies as a core platform service in light of its widespread and common use and its importance for connecting business users and end users does not as such give rise to sufficiently serious concerns of contestability and unfair practices. it is only when a core platform service constitutes an important gateway and is operated by a provider with a significant impact in the internal market and an entrenched and durable position , or by a provider that will foreseeably have such a position in the near future , that such concerns arise. accordingly , the targeted set of harmonised rules laid down in this regulation should apply only to undertakings designated on the basis of these three objective criteria , and they should only apply to those of their core platform services that individually constitute an important gateway for business users to reach end users. ### (15) the fact that a digital service qualifies as a core platform service in light of its widespread and common use and its importance for connecting business users and end users does not as such give rise to sufficiently serious concerns of contestability and unfair practices. it is only when a core platform service constitutes an important gateway and is operated by a provider with a significant impact in the internal market and an entrenched and durable position , or by a provider that will foreseeably have such a position in the near future , that such concerns arise. accordingly , the targeted set of harmonised rules laid down in this regulation should apply only to undertakings that fulfill these three objective criteria or are designated on the basis of those , and they should only apply to those of their core platform services that individually constitute an important gateway for business users to reach end users.


### 6. for the purposes of specifying the obligations under article 6(1) points (j) and (k) , the commission shall also assess whether the intended or implemented measures ensure that there is no remaining imbalance of rights and obligations on business users and that the measures do not themselves confer an advantage on the gatekeeper which is disproportionate to the service provided by the gatekeeper to business users. ### 6. for the purposes of specifying the obligations under article 6(1) points (j) and (k) , the commission shall also assess whether the intended or implemented measures ensure that there is no remaining imbalance of rights and obligations on business users or end users and that the measures do not themselves confer an advantage on the gatekeeper which is disproportionate to the service provided by the gatekeeper to business users or end users.


### 7. a gatekeeper may request the opening of proceedings pursuant to article 18 for the commission to determine whether the measures that the gatekeeper intends to implement or has implemented under article 6 are effective in achieving the objective of the relevant obligation in the specific circumstances. a gatekeeper may , with its request , provide a reasoned submission to explain in particular why the measures that it intends to implement or has implemented are effective in achieving the objective of the relevant obligation in the specific circumstances. ### 7. a gatekeeper may request within the implementation deadline of article 3(8) the opening of proceedings pursuant to article 18 for the commission to determine whether the measures that the gatekeeper intends to implement or has implemented under article 6 are effective in achieving the objective of the relevant obligation in the specific circumstances. a gatekeeper may , with its request , provide a reasoned submission to explain in particular why the measures that it intends to implement or has implemented are effective in achieving the objective of the relevant obligation in the specific circumstances. the commission shall adopt its decision within six months from the opening of proceedings pursuant to article 18.


### 1. the commission may , on a reasoned request by the gatekeeper , exceptionally suspend , in whole or in part , a specific obligation laid down in articles 5 and 6 for a core platform service by decision adopted in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in article 32(4) , where the gatekeeper demonstrates that compliance with that specific obligation would endanger , due to exceptional circumstances beyond the control of the gatekeeper , the economic viability of the operation of the gatekeeper in the union , and only to the extent necessary to address such threat to its viability. the commission shall aim to adopt the suspension decision without delay and at the latest 3 months following receipt of a complete reasoned request. ### 1. the commission may , on a reasoned request by the gatekeeper , exceptionally suspend , in whole or in part , a specific obligation laid down in articles 5 and 6 for a core platform service by decision adopted in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in article 32(4) , where the gatekeeper demonstrates that compliance with that specific obligation would endanger , due to exceptional circumstances beyond the control of the gatekeeper , the economic viability of the operation of the gatekeeper in the union , and only to the extent necessary to address such threat to its viability. the commission shall aim to adopt the suspension decision without delay and at the latest 3 months following receipt of a complete reasoned request. a report stating the reasons and motivations for the suspension decision shall accompany the decision itself.


### 1. the commission may , on a reasoned request by the gatekeeper , exceptionally suspend , in whole or in part , a specific obligation laid down in articles 5 and 6 for a core platform service by decision adopted in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in article 32(4) , where the gatekeeper demonstrates that compliance with that specific obligation would endanger , due to exceptional circumstances beyond the control of the gatekeeper , the economic viability of the operation of the gatekeeper in the union , and only to the extent necessary to address such threat to its viability. the commission shall aim to adopt the suspension decision without delay and at the latest 3 months following receipt of a complete reasoned request. ### 1. the commission may , on a reasoned request by the gatekeeper , exceptionally suspend , in whole or in part , a specific obligation laid down in articles 5 and 6 for a core platform service by decision adopted in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in article 32(4) , where the gatekeeper demonstrates that compliance with that specific obligation would endanger , due to exceptional circumstances beyond the control of the gatekeeper , the economic viability of the operation of the gatekeeper in the union , and only to the extent necessary to address such threat to its viability. the commission shall aim to adopt the suspension decision without delay and at the latest 3 months following receipt of a complete reasoned request and accompany this by a reasoned statement explaining the grounds for the suspension.


### 1. the commission may , acting on a reasoned request by a gatekeeper or on its own initiative , by decision adopted in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in article 32(4) , exempt it , in whole or in part , from a specific obligation laid down in articles 5 and 6 in relation to an individual core platform service identified pursuant to article 3(7) , where such exemption is justified on the grounds set out in paragraph 2 of this article. the commission shall adopt the exemption decision at the latest 3 months after receiving a complete reasoned request. ### 1. the commission may , acting on a reasoned request by a gatekeeper or on its own initiative , by decision adopted in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in article 32(4) , exempt it , in whole or in part , from a specific obligation laid down in articles 5 and 6 in relation to an individual core platform service identified pursuant to article 3(7) , where such exemption is justified on the grounds set out in paragraph 2 of this article. the commission shall adopt the exemption decision at the latest 3 months after receiving a complete reasoned request. a report stating the reasons and motivations for the exemption decision shall accompany the decision itself.


### there is an imbalance of rights and obligations on business users and the gatekeeper is obtaining an advantage from business users that is disproportionate to the service provided by the gatekeeper to business users; or ### there is an imbalance of rights and obligations on business users or end users , and the gatekeeper is obtaining an advantage from business users or end users that is disproportionate to the service provided by the gatekeeper to business users or end users; or


### there is an imbalance of rights and obligations on business users and the gatekeeper is obtaining an advantage from business users that is disproportionate to the service provided by the gatekeeper to business users; or ### there is an imbalance of rights and obligations on business users or end users and the gatekeeper is obtaining an advantage from business users that is disproportionate to the service provided by the gatekeeper to business users or end users; or


### 1. a gatekeeper shall ensure that the obligations of articles 5 and 6 are fully and effectively complied with. while the obligations of articles 5 and 6 apply in respect of core platform services designated pursuant to article 3 , their implementation shall not be undermined by any behaviour of the undertaking to which the gatekeeper belongs , regardless of whether this behaviour is of a contractual , commercial , technical or any other nature. ### 1. a gatekeeper shall ensure that the obligations of articles 5 and 6 are fully and effectively complied with by the gatekeeper itself as well as by undertakings to which it belongs. while the obligations of articles 5 and 6 apply in respect of core platform services designated pursuant to article 3 , their implementation shall not be undermined by any behaviour of the undertaking to which the gatekeeper belongs , shall not engage in any behaviour regardless of whether this behaviour is of a contractual , commercial , technical or any other nature , which is able to have an equivalent object or effect to a behaviour prohibited pursuant to articles 5 and 6.


### 2. where consent for collecting and processing of personal data is required to ensure compliance with this regulation , a gatekeeper shall take the necessary steps to either enable business users to directly obtain the required consent to their processing , where required under regulation (eu) 2016/679 and directive 2002/58/ec , or to comply with union data protection and privacy rules and principles in other ways including by providing business users with duly anonymised data where appropriate. the gatekeeper shall not make the obtaining of this consent by the business user more burdensome than for its own services. ### 2. where consent for collecting , processing and sharing of personal data is required to ensure compliance with this regulation , a gatekeeper shall take the necessary steps to either enable business users to directly obtain the required consent to their processing , where required under regulation (eu) 2016/679 and directive 2002/58/ec , or to comply with union data protection and privacy rules and principles in other ways including by providing business users with duly anonymised data. the gatekeeper shall not make the obtaining of this consent by the business user more burdensome than for its own services , and shall offer users a choice in a neutral way , safeguarding the autonomous decision-making of business users or end users via form , function or operation of the user interface.


### 3. a gatekeeper shall not degrade the conditions or quality of any of the core platform services provided to business users or end users who avail themselves of the rights or choices laid down in articles 5 and 6 , or make the exercise of those rights or choices unduly difficult. ### 3. a gatekeeper shall not degrade the conditions or quality of any of the core platform services provided to business users or end users who avail themselves of the rights or choices laid down in articles 5 and 6 , or make the exercise of those rights or choices unduly difficult , in particular through the use of so called “dark patterns” , which present choices in a non-neutral manner or otherwise seek to subvert their decision making.


### 3. a gatekeeper shall not degrade the conditions or quality of any of the core platform services provided to business users or end users who avail themselves of the rights or choices laid down in articles 5 and 6 , or make the exercise of those rights or choices unduly difficult. ### 3. a gatekeeper shall not degrade the conditions or quality of any of the core platform services provided to business users or end users who avail themselves of the rights or choices laid down in articles 5 and 6 , or make the exercise of those rights or choices unduly difficult , including through the use of “dark patterns” or manipulative choice architectures.


### 12 obligation to inform about concentrations ### 12 concentrations


### 1. a gatekeeper shall inform the commission of any intended concentration within the meaning of article 3 of regulation (ec) no 139/2004 involving another provider of core platform services or of any other services provided in the digital sector irrespective of whether it is notifiable to a union competition authority under regulation (ec) no 139/2004 or to a competent national competition authority under national merger rules. ### 1. a gatekeeper shall notify to the commission any intended concentration within the meaning of article 3 of regulation (ec) no 139/2004 or any agreement or series of agreements having a substantially similar effect , irrespective of whether it is notifiable to a union competition authority under regulation (ec) no 139/2004 or to a competent national competition authority under national merger rules.


### a gatekeeper shall inform the commission of such a concentration prior to its implementation and following the conclusion of the agreement , the announcement of the public bid , or the acquisition of a controlling interest. ### a gatekeeper shall notify to the commission such a concentration prior to its implementation and following the conclusion of the agreement , the announcement of the public bid , or the acquisition of a controlling interest , in accordance with the procedure set out in regulation (ec) no 139/2004.


### 2. the notification pursuant to paragraph 1 shall at least describe for the acquisition targets their eea and worldwide annual turnover , for any relevant core platform services their respective eea annual turnover , their number of yearly active business users and the number of monthly active end users , as well as the rationale of the intended concentration. ### 2. the notification pursuant to paragraph 1 shall at least describe for the acquisition targets their eea and worldwide annual turnover , for any relevant core platform services their respective eea annual turnover , their number of yearly active business users and the number of monthly active end users , as well as the rationale of the intended concentration , and its potential impact on the rights and interests of business users and end users.


### within six months after its designation pursuant to article 3 , a gatekeeper shall submit to the commission an independently audited description of any techniques for profiling of consumers that the gatekeeper applies to or across its core platform services identified pursuant to article 3. this description shall be updated at least annually. ### within six months after its first qualification pursuant to article 3 , a gatekeeper shall submit to the commission and data protection authorities an independently audited description of any techniques for profiling of business users and end users and the personalisation of their service that the gatekeeper applies to any platform services identified pursuant to article 3 and make them publicly available. this description shall be updated at least annually.


### 2. in the course of a market investigation pursuant to paragraph 1 , the commission shall endeavour to communicate its preliminary findings to the provider of core platform services concerned within six months from the opening of the investigation. in the preliminary findings , the commission shall explain whether it considers , on a provisional basis , that the provider of core platform services should be designated as a gatekeeper pursuant to article 3(6). ### 2. in the course of a market investigation pursuant to paragraph 1 , the commission shall communicate its preliminary findings to the provider of core platform services concerned within six months from the opening of the investigation. in the preliminary findings , the commission shall explain whether it considers , on a provisional basis , that the provider of core platform services should be designated as a gatekeeper pursuant to article 3(6).


### 3. where the provider of core platform services satisfies the thresholds set out in article 3(2) , but has presented significantly substantiated arguments in accordance with article 3(4) , the commission shall endeavour to conclude the market investigation within five months from the opening of the market investigation by a decision pursuant to paragraph 1. in that case the commission shall endeavour to communicate its preliminary findings pursuant to paragraph 2 to the provider of core platform services within three months from the opening of the investigation. ### deleted


### 4. when the commission pursuant to article 3(6) designates as a gatekeeper a provider of core platform services that does not yet enjoy an entrenched and durable position in its operations , but it is foreseeable that it will enjoy such a position in the near future , it shall declare applicable to that gatekeeper only obligations laid down in article 5(b) and article 6(1) points (e) , (f) , (h) and (i) as specified in the designation decision. the commission shall only declare applicable those obligations that are appropriate and necessary to prevent that the gatekeeper concerned achieves by unfair means an entrenched and durable position in its operations. the commission shall review such a designation in accordance with the procedure laid down in article 4. ### 4. when the commission pursuant to article 3(6) designates as a gatekeeper a provider of core platform services that does not yet enjoy an entrenched and durable position in its operations , but it is foreseeable that it will enjoy such a position in the near future , it shall declare applicable to that gatekeeper the obligations laid down in this regulation as specified in the designation decision. the commission shall only declare applicable those obligations that are appropriate and necessary to prevent that the gatekeeper concerned achieves by unfair means an entrenched and durable position in its operations. the commission shall review such a designation in accordance with the procedure laid down in article 4.


### 1. where the market investigation shows that a gatekeeper has systematically infringed the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6 and has further strengthened or extended its gatekeeper position in relation to the characteristics under article 3(1) , the commission may by decision adopted in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in article 32(4) impose on such gatekeeper any behavioural or structural remedies which are proportionate to the infringement committed and necessary to ensure compliance with this regulation. the commission shall conclude its investigation by adopting a decision within twelve months from the opening of the market investigation. ### 1. where the market investigation shows that a gatekeeper has systematically infringed the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6 and has further strengthened or extended its gatekeeper position in relation to the characteristics under article 3(1) , the commission shall by decision adopted in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in article 32(4) impose on such gatekeeper any behavioural or structural remedies which are proportionate to the infringement committed and necessary to ensure full compliance with this regulation. the commission shall conclude its investigation by adopting a decision within twelve months from the opening of the market investigation.


### (30) the very rapidly changing and complex technological nature of core platform services requires a regular review of the status of gatekeepers , including those that are foreseen to enjoy a durable and entrenched position in their operations in the near future. to provide all of the market participants , including the gatekeepers , with the required certainty as to the applicable legal obligations , a time limit for such regular reviews is necessary. it is also important to conduct such reviews on a regular basis and at least every two years. ### (30) the very rapidly changing and complex technological nature of core platform services requires a regular review of the status of gatekeepers , including those that are foreseen to enjoy a durable and entrenched position in their operations in the near future. to provide all of the market participants , including the gatekeepers , with the required certainty as to the applicable legal obligations , a time limit for such regular reviews is necessary. it is also important to conduct such reviews on a regular basis and at least every four years for designated gatekeepers to assess whether they continue to satisfy the requirements , and at least every year to assess whether new providers of core platform services satisfy those requirements.


### (31) to ensure the effectiveness of the review of gatekeeper status as well as the possibility to adjust the list of core platform services provided by a gatekeeper , the gatekeepers should inform the commission of all of their intended and concluded acquisitions of other providers of core platform services or any other services provided within the digital sector. such information should not only serve the review process mentioned above , regarding the status of individual gatekeepers , but will also provide information that is crucial to monitoring broader contestability trends in the digital sector and can therefore be a useful factor for consideration in the context of the market investigations foreseen by this regulation. ### (31) data has a very relevant role on digital competition. in order to ensure that the competitiveness in the european single market is not disrupted , the effectiveness of the review of gatekeeper status as well as the possibility to adjust the list of core platform services provided by a gatekeeper , the gatekeepers should inform the commission of all of their intended acquisitions of other providers of core platform services or any other services provided within the digital sector. such market concentrations should not only be duly informed , but also cleared by the commission. the information on these concentrations should eventually be subject to the merger control procedure. finally , this information could serve the review process mentioned above , regarding the status of individual gatekeepers and provide information that is crucial to monitoring broader contestability trends in the digital sector and can therefore be a useful factor for consideration in the context of the market investigations foreseen by this regulation.


### (31) to ensure the effectiveness of the review of gatekeeper status as well as the possibility to adjust the list of core platform services provided by a gatekeeper , the gatekeepers should inform the commission of all of their intended and concluded acquisitions of other providers of core platform services or any other services provided within the digital sector. such information should not only serve the review process mentioned above , regarding the status of individual gatekeepers , but will also provide information that is crucial to monitoring broader contestability trends in the digital sector and can therefore be a useful factor for consideration in the context of the market investigations foreseen by this regulation. ### (31) to ensure the effectiveness of the review of gatekeeper status as well as the possibility to adjust the list of core platform services provided by a gatekeeper , the gatekeepers should inform the commission of all of their intended and concluded concentrations within the meaning of article 3 of regulation (ec) no 139/2004 or any agreement or series of agreements having a substantially similar effect. such information should not only serve the review process mentioned above , regarding the status of individual gatekeepers , but will also provide information that is crucial to monitoring broader contestability trends in the digital sector and can therefore be a useful factor for consideration in the context of the market investigations foreseen by this regulation. to safeguard the fairness and contestability of core platform services provided by gatekeepers , any concentration by undertakings that have been considered as gatekeepers for more than two years should be forbidden by default , unless the specific concentration is indisputably not impeding contestable and fair markets in the digital sector. the burden of proof for this lies on the gatekeeper.


### (31) to ensure the effectiveness of the review of gatekeeper status as well as the possibility to adjust the list of core platform services provided by a gatekeeper , the gatekeepers should inform the commission of all of their intended and concluded acquisitions of other providers of core platform services or any other services provided within the digital sector. such information should not only serve the review process mentioned above , regarding the status of individual gatekeepers , but will also provide information that is crucial to monitoring broader contestability trends in the digital sector and can therefore be a useful factor for consideration in the context of the market investigations foreseen by this regulation. ### (31) to ensure the effectiveness of the review of gatekeeper status as well as the possibility to adjust the list of core platform services provided by a gatekeeper , the gatekeepers should inform the commission of all of their intended and concluded concentrations within the meaning of article 3 of regulation (ec) no 139/2004 or any agreement or series of agreements having a substantially similar effect. such information should not only serve the review process mentioned above , regarding the status of individual gatekeepers , but will also provide information that is crucial to monitoring broader contestability trends in the digital sector and can therefore be a useful factor for consideration in the context of the market investigations foreseen by this regulation. to safeguard the fairness and contestability of core platform services provided by gatekeepers , any concentration by undertakings that have been considered as gatekeepers for more than 2 years should be forbidden by default , unless the specific concentration is indisputably not impeding contestable and fair markets in the digital sector. the burden of proof for this lies on the gatekeeper.


### (32) to safeguard the fairness and contestability of core platform services provided by gatekeepers , it is necessary to provide in a clear and unambiguous manner for a set of harmonised obligations with regard to those services. such rules are needed to address the risk of harmful effects of unfair practices imposed by gatekeepers , to the benefit of the business environment in the services concerned , to the benefit of users and ultimately to the benefit of society as a whole. given the fast-moving and dynamic nature of digital markets , and the substantial economic power of gatekeepers , it is important that these obligations are effectively applied without being circumvented. to that end , the obligations in question should apply to any practices by a gatekeeper , irrespective of its form and irrespective of whether it is of a contractual , commercial , technical or any other nature , insofar as a practice corresponds to the type of practice that is the subject of one of the obligations of this regulation. ### (32) to safeguard the fairness and contestability of core platform services provided by gatekeepers , it is necessary to provide in a clear and unambiguous manner for a set of harmonised obligations with regard to those services. such rules are needed to address the risk of harmful effects of unfair practices imposed by gatekeepers , to the benefit of the business environment in the services concerned , to the benefit of users and ultimately to the benefit of society as a whole. given the fast-moving and dynamic nature of digital markets , and the substantial economic power of gatekeepers , it is important that these obligations are effectively applied without being circumvented. to that end , the obligations in question should apply to any practices by a gatekeeper , irrespective of its form , including through the use of dark patterns or manipulative choice architectures , and irrespective of whether it is of a contractual , commercial , technical or any other nature , insofar as a practice corresponds to the type of practice that is the subject of one of the obligations of this regulation.


### (37) because of their position , gatekeepers might in certain cases restrict the ability of business users of their online intermediation services to offer their goods or services to end users under more favourable conditions , including price , through other online intermediation services. such restrictions have a significant deterrent effect on the business users of gatekeepers in terms of their use of alternative online intermediation services , limiting inter-platform contestability , which in turn limits choice of alternative online intermediation channels for end users. to ensure that business users of online intermediation services of gatekeepers can freely choose alternative online intermediation services and differentiate the conditions under which they offer their products or services to their end users , it should not be accepted that gatekeepers limit business users from choosing to differentiate commercial conditions , including price. such a restriction should apply to any measure with equivalent effect , such as for example increased commission rates or de-listing of the offers of business users. ### (37) because of their position , gatekeepers might in certain cases restrict the ability of business users of their online intermediation services to offer their goods or services to end users under more favourable conditions , including price or availability , through other distribution channels. such restrictions have a significant deterrent effect on the business users of gatekeepers in terms of their use of alternative distribution channels , limiting inter-platform contestability , which in turn limits choice of alternative distribution channels for end users. to ensure that business users of online intermediation services of gatekeepers can freely choose alternative online services and differentiate the conditions under which they offer their products or services to their end users , it should be prohibited that gatekeepers limit business users from choosing to differentiate commercial conditions , including price or availability. such a restriction should apply to any measure with equivalent effect , such as for example increased commission rates , de-listing or less favourable ranking of the offers of business users.


### (39) to safeguard a fair commercial environment and protect the contestability of the digital sector it is important to safeguard the right of business users to raise concerns about unfair behaviour by gatekeepers with any relevant administrative or other public authorities. for example , business users may want to complain about different types of unfair practices , such as discriminatory access conditions , unjustified closing of business user accounts or unclear grounds for product de-listings. any practice that would in any way inhibit such a possibility of raising concerns or seeking available redress , for instance by means of confidentiality clauses in agreements or other written terms , should therefore be prohibited. this should be without prejudice to the right of business users and gatekeepers to lay down in their agreements the terms of use including the use of lawful complaints-handling mechanisms , including any use of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms or of the jurisdiction of specific courts in compliance with respective union and national law this should therefore also be without prejudice to the role gatekeepers play in the fight against illegal content online. ### (39) to safeguard a fair commercial environment and protect the contestability of the digital sector it is important to safeguard the right of business users to raise concerns about unfair behaviour by gatekeepers with any relevant administrative or other public authorities. for example , business users may want to complain about different types of unfair practices , such as discriminatory access conditions , unjustified closing of business user accounts or unclear grounds for product de-listings. any practice that would in any way inhibit such a possibility of raising concerns or seeking available redress , for instance by means of confidentiality clauses in agreements or other written terms , should therefore be prohibited. this should be without prejudice to the right of business users and gatekeepers to lay down in their agreements the terms of use including the use of lawful complaints-handling mechanisms , including any use of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms or of the jurisdiction of specific courts in compliance with respective union and national law , and where applicable regional law. this should therefore also be without prejudice to the role gatekeepers play in the fight against illegal content online.


### (39) to safeguard a fair commercial environment and protect the contestability of the digital sector it is important to safeguard the right of business users to raise concerns about unfair behaviour by gatekeepers with any relevant administrative or other public authorities. for example , business users may want to complain about different types of unfair practices , such as discriminatory access conditions , unjustified closing of business user accounts or unclear grounds for product de-listings. any practice that would in any way inhibit such a possibility of raising concerns or seeking available redress , for instance by means of confidentiality clauses in agreements or other written terms , should therefore be prohibited. this should be without prejudice to the right of business users and gatekeepers to lay down in their agreements the terms of use including the use of lawful complaints-handling mechanisms , including any use of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms or of the jurisdiction of specific courts in compliance with respective union and national law this should therefore also be without prejudice to the role gatekeepers play in the fight against illegal content online. ### (39) to safeguard a fair commercial environment and protect the contestability of the digital sector it is important to safeguard the right of business users to raise concerns about unfair behaviour by gatekeepers with any relevant administrative , judicial or other public authorities. for example , business users may want to complain about different types of unfair practices , such as discriminatory access conditions , unjustified closing of business user accounts or unclear grounds for product de-listings. any practice that would in any way inhibit such a possibility of raising concerns or seeking available redress , for instance by means of confidentiality clauses in agreements or other written terms , should therefore be prohibited. this should be without prejudice to the right of business users and gatekeepers to lay down in their agreements the terms of use including the use of lawful complaints-handling mechanisms , including any use of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms or of the jurisdiction of specific courts in compliance with respective union and national law this should therefore also be without prejudice to the role gatekeepers play in the fight against illegal content online.


### (40) identification services are crucial for business users to conduct their business , as these can allow them not only to optimise services , to the extent allowed under regulation (eu) 2016/679 and directive 2002/58/ec of the european parliament and of the council33 , but also to inject trust in online transactions , in compliance with union or national law. gatekeepers should therefore not use their position as provider of core platform services to require their dependent business users to include any identification services provided by the gatekeeper itself as part of the provision of services or products by these business users to their end users , where other identification services are available to such business users. ### (40) identification services are crucial for business users to conduct their business , as these can allow them not only to optimise services , to the extent allowed under regulation (eu) 2016/679 and directive 2002/58/ec of the european parliament and of the council33 , but also to inject trust in online transactions , in compliance with union or national law , or where applicable regional law. gatekeepers should therefore not use their position as provider of core platform services to require their dependent business users to include any identification services provided by the gatekeeper itself as part of the provision of services or products by these business users to their end users , where other identification services are available to such business users.


### (41) gatekeepers should not restrict the free choice of end users by technically preventing switching between or subscription to different software applications and services. gatekeepers should therefore ensure a free choice irrespective of whether they are the manufacturer of any hardware by means of which such software applications or services are accessed and should not raise artificial technical barriers so as to make switching impossible or ineffective. the mere offering of a given product or service to end users , including by means of pre-installation , as well the improvement of end user offering , such as better prices or increased quality , would not in itself constitute a barrier to switching. ### (41) gatekeepers should not restrict the free choice of end users by technically preventing switching between or subscription to different software applications and services or through product design. gatekeepers should therefore ensure a free choice irrespective of whether they are the manufacturer of any hardware by means of which such software applications or services are accessed and should not raise artificial technical barriers so as to make switching impossible or ineffective. the mere offering of a given product or service to end users , including by means of pre-installation , as well the improvement of end user offering , such as better prices or increased quality , would not in itself constitute a barrier to switching.


### (58) to ensure the effectiveness of the obligations laid down by this regulation , while also making certain that these obligations are limited to what is necessary to ensure contestability and tackling the harmful effects of the unfair behaviour by gatekeepers , it is important to clearly define and circumscribe them so as to allow the gatekeeper to immediately comply with them , in full respect of regulation (eu) 2016/679 and directive 2002/58/ec , consumer protection , cyber security and product safety. the gatekeepers should ensure the compliance with this regulation by design. the necessary measures should therefore be as much as possible and where relevant integrated into the technological design used by the gatekeepers. however , it may in certain cases be appropriate for the commission , following a dialogue with the gatekeeper concerned , to further specify some of the measures that the gatekeeper concerned should adopt in order to effectively comply with those obligations that are susceptible of being further specified. this possibility of a regulatory dialogue should facilitate compliance by gatekeepers and expedite the correct implementation of the regulation. ### (58) to ensure the effectiveness of the obligations laid down by this regulation , while also making certain that these obligations are limited to what is necessary to ensure contestability and tackling the harmful effects of the unfair behaviour by gatekeepers , it is important to clearly define and circumscribe them so as to allow the gatekeeper to immediately comply with them , in full respect of regulation (eu) 2016/679 and directive 2002/58/ec , consumer protection , cyber security and product safety. moreover , when necessary , gatekeepers should assess whether it is relevant to use decentralised applications or distributed ledger technology to increase safety. the gatekeepers should ensure the compliance with this regulation by design. the necessary measures should therefore be as much as possible and where relevant integrated into the technological design used by the gatekeepers. however , it may in certain cases be appropriate for the commission , following a dialogue with the gatekeeper concerned , to further specify some of the measures that the gatekeeper concerned should adopt in order to effectively comply with those obligations that are susceptible of being further specified. this possibility of a regulatory dialogue should facilitate compliance by gatekeepers and expedite the correct implementation of the regulation.


### (66) in the event that gatekeepers engage in behaviour that is unfair or that limits the contestability of the core platform services that are already designated under this regulation but without these behaviours being explicitly covered by the obligations , the commission should be able to update this regulation through delegated acts. such updates by way of delegated act should be subject to the same investigatory standard and therefore following a market investigation. the commission should also apply a predefined standard in identifying such behaviours. this legal standard should ensure that the type of obligations that gatekeepers may at any time face under this regulation are sufficiently predictable. ### (66) in the event that gatekeepers engage in behaviour that is unfair or that limits the contestability of the core platform services but without these behaviours being explicitly covered by the obligations , the commission should be able to update this regulation through delegated acts. such updates by way of delegated act should be subject to the same investigatory standard and therefore following a market investigation. the commission should also apply a predefined standard in identifying such behaviours. this legal standard should ensure that the type of obligations that gatekeepers may at any time face under this regulation are sufficiently predictable.


### (77) the advisory committee established in accordance with regulation (eu) no 182//2011 should also deliver opinions on certain individual decisions of the commission issued under this regulation. in order to ensure contestable and fair markets in the digital sector across the union where gatekeepers are present , the power to adopt acts in accordance with article 290 of the treaty should be delegated to the commission to supplement this regulation. in particular , delegated acts should be adopted in respect of the methodology for determining the quantitative thresholds for designation of gatekeepers under this regulation and in respect of the update of the obligations laid down in this regulation where , based on a market investigation the commission has identified the need for updating the obligations addressing practices that limit the contestability of core platform services or are unfair. it is of particular importance that the commission carries out appropriate consultations and that those consultations be conducted in accordance with the principles laid down in the interinstitutional agreement on better law-making of 13 april 201636 . in particular , to ensure equal participation in the preparation of delegated acts , the european parliament and the council receive all documents at the same time as member states' experts , and their experts systematically have access to meetings of commission expert groups dealing with the preparation of delegated acts. ### (77) the advisory committee established in accordance with regulation (eu) no 182//2011 should also deliver opinions on certain individual decisions of the commission issued under this regulation. when composing the advisory committee , member states shall also consider including their regions , in case they have devolved digital competences , and the opinions of stakeholders such as small and medium-sized enterprises(smes) , consumer protection experts and associations. in order to ensure contestable and fair markets in the digital sector across the union where gatekeepers are present , the power to adopt acts in accordance with article 290 of the treaty should be delegated to the commission to supplement this regulation. in particular , delegated acts should be adopted in respect of the methodology for determining the quantitative thresholds for designation of gatekeepers under this regulation and in respect of the update of the obligations laid down in this regulation where , based on a market investigation the commission has identified the need for updating the obligations addressing practices that limit the contestability of core platform services or are unfair. it is of particular importance that the commission carries out appropriate consultations and that those consultations be conducted in accordance with the principles laid down in the interinstitutional agreement on better law-making of 13 april 201636 . in particular , to ensure equal participation in the preparation of delegated acts , the european parliament and the council receive all documents at the same time as member states' experts , and their experts systematically have access to meetings of commission expert groups dealing with the preparation of delegated acts.


### it operates a core platform service which serves as an important gateway for business users to reach end users; and ### it operates a core platform service which serves as an important gateway for business users to reach end users or end users to reach other end users or business users; and


### the requirement in paragraph 1 point (a) where the undertaking to which it belongs achieves an annual eea turnover equal to or above eur 6.5 billion in the last three financial years , or where the average market capitalisation or the equivalent fair market value of the undertaking to which it belongs amounted to at least eur 65 billion in the last financial year , and it provides a core platform service in at least three member states; ### the requirement in paragraph 1 point (a) where the undertaking to which it belongs achieves an annual eea turnover equal to or above eur 5 billion in the last three financial years , or where the average market capitalisation or the equivalent fair market value of the undertaking to which it belongs amounted to at least eur 65 billion in the last financial year , and it provides a core platform service in at least one member state;


### the requirement in paragraph 1 point (b) where it provides a core platform service that has more than 45 million monthly active end users established or located in the union and more than 10 000 yearly active business users established in the union in the last financial year; ### the requirement in paragraph 1 point (b) where it provides one or more core platform services combining more than 23 million monthly end users established or located in the union and more than 7 000 business users per year established in the union during the last financial year;


### 6. the commission may identify as a gatekeeper , in accordance with the procedure laid down in article 15 , any provider of core platform services that meets each of the requirements of paragraph 1 , but does not satisfy each of the thresholds of paragraph 2 , or has presented sufficiently substantiated arguments in accordance with paragraph 4. ### 6. the commission may identify as a gatekeeper , in accordance with the procedure laid down in article 15 , any provider of core platform services that meets each of the requirements of paragraph 1 , but does not satisfy each of the thresholds of paragraph 2.


### refrain from requiring business users to use , offer or interoperate with an identification service of the gatekeeper in the context of services offered by the business users using the core platform services of that gatekeeper; ### not require business users nor end users to use , offer or interoperate with any ancillary or identification service of the gatekeeper itself , or third parties belonging to the same undertaking , in the context of services offered by the business users using the core platform services of that gatekeeper;


### refrain from using , in competition with business users , any data not publicly available , which is generated through activities by those business users , including by the end users of these business users , of its core platform services or provided by those business users of its core platform services or by the end users of these business users; ### deleted


### refrain from treating more favourably in ranking services and products offered by the gatekeeper itself or by any third party belonging to the same undertaking compared to similar services or products of third party and apply fair and non-discriminatory conditions to such ranking; ### deleted


### refrain from technically restricting the ability of end users to switch between and subscribe to different software applications and services to be accessed using the operating system of the gatekeeper , including as regards the choice of internet access provider for end users; ### not technically restrict the ability of end users to switch between and subscribe to different software applications and services to be accessed using the operating system of the gatekeeper , including as regards the choice of internet access provider for end users;


### allow business users and providers of ancillary services access to and interoperability with the same operating system , hardware or software features that are available or used in the provision by the gatekeeper of any ancillary services; ### allow business users , end users and providers of services to have , to the fullest extent technically supported , access to and interoperability with the same operating system , hardware or software features that are available or used in the provision by the gatekeeper of any core and ancillary services by providing complete and accurate information , while guaranteeing a high level of security and personal data protection;


### provide business users , or third parties authorised by a business user , free of charge , with effective , high-quality , continuous and real-time access and use of aggregated or non-aggregated data , that is provided for or generated in the context of the use of the relevant core platform services by those business users and the end users engaging with the products or services provided by those business users; for personal data , provide access and use only where directly connected with the use effectuated by the end user in respect of the products or services offered by the relevant business user through the relevant core platform service , and when the end user opts in to such sharing with a consent in the sense of the regulation (eu) 2016/679; ; ### provide business users , or third parties authorised by a business user , free of charge , with effective , user-friendly , interoperable , high-quality , continuous and real-time access and use of aggregated or non-aggregated data , that is provided for or generated in the context of the use of the relevant core platform services by those business users and the end users engaging with the products or services provided by those business users; for personal data , provide access and use only where directly connected with the use effectuated by the end user in respect of the products or services offered by the relevant business user through the relevant core platform service , and when the end user opts in to such sharing with a consent in the sense of the regulation (eu) 2016/679;


### provide business users , or third parties authorised by a business user , free of charge , with effective , high-quality , continuous and real-time access and use of aggregated or non-aggregated data , that is provided for or generated in the context of the use of the relevant core platform services by those business users and the end users engaging with the products or services provided by those business users; for personal data , provide access and use only where directly connected with the use effectuated by the end user in respect of the products or services offered by the relevant business user through the relevant core platform service , and when the end user opts in to such sharing with a consent in the sense of the regulation (eu) 2016/679; ; ### provide business users and end users , or third parties authorised by a business user or end user , free of charge , in a user-friendly manner with effective , high-quality , continuous and real-time access and use of aggregated and non-aggregated data , that is provided for or generated in the context of the use of the relevant core platform services by those business users and the end users engaging with the products or services provided by those business users; for personal data , provide , with the consent of the data subject , access and use to those data only where directly connected with the use effectuated by the end user in respect of the products or services offered by the relevant business user through the relevant core platform service in line with the principles of purpose limitation and data minimisation , and when the end user opts in to such sharing with a consent in the sense of the regulation (eu) 2016/679;


### 1. the measures implemented by the gatekeeper to ensure compliance with the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6 shall be effective in achieving the objective of the relevant obligation. the gatekeeper shall ensure that these measures are implemented in compliance with regulation (eu) 2016/679 and directive 2002/58/ec , and with legislation on cyber security , consumer protection and product safety. ### 1. the measures implemented by the gatekeeper to ensure full compliance with the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6 shall be effective in achieving the objective of the relevant obligation. the gatekeeper shall be responsible for , and be able to demonstrate full compliance with these obligations (‘accountability’). the burden of proof regarding the efficiency lies on the gatekeeper. the gatekeeper shall demonstrate which measures have been taken to comply with these obligations. the gatekeeper shall ensure that these measures are implemented in compliance with regulation (eu) 2016/679 and directive 2002/58/ec , and with legislation on cyber security , consumer protection and product safety.


### 2. where the commission finds that the measures that the gatekeeper intends to implement pursuant to paragraph 1 , or has implemented , do not ensure effective compliance with the relevant obligations laid down in article 6 , it may by decision specify the measures that the gatekeeper concerned shall implement. the commission shall adopt such a decision within six months from the opening of proceedings pursuant to article 18. ### 2. where the commission finds that the measures that the gatekeeper intends to implement pursuant to paragraph 1 , or has implemented , do not ensure effective compliance with the relevant obligations laid down in article 6 , it may by decision specify the measures that the gatekeeper concerned shall implement. the commission shall adopt such a decision within three months from the opening of proceedings pursuant to article 18.


### the commission may conduct a market investigation with the purpose of examining whether one or more services within the digital sector should be added to the list of core platform services or to detect types of practices that may limit the contestability of core platform services or may be unfair and which are not effectively addressed by this regulation. it shall issue a public report at the latest within 24 months from the opening of the market investigation. ### the commission may conduct a market investigation with the purpose of examining whether one or more services within the digital sector should be added to the list of core platform services or to detect types of practices that may limit the contestability of core platform services or may be unfair and which are not effectively addressed by this regulation. it shall issue a public report at the latest within 18 months from the opening of the market investigation.


### 3. during on-site inspections the commission and auditors or experts appointed by it may require the undertaking or association of undertakings to provide access to and explanations on its organisation , functioning , it system , algorithms , data-handling and business conducts. the commission and auditors or experts appointed by it may address questions to key personnel. ### 3. during on-site inspections the commission and auditors or experts appointed by it may require the undertaking or association of undertakings to provide access to and explanations on its organisation , functioning , it system , algorithms , data-handling and business conducts. they shall run behavioural experiments to evaluate the algorithm and use of the data. the commission and auditors or experts appointed by it may address questions to key personnel.


### 1. the commission shall adopt a non-compliance decision in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in article 32(4) where it finds that a gatekeeper does not comply with one or more of the following: ### 1. the commission shall adopt a non-compliance decision in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in article 32(4) within a period of 6 months beginning from the moment of non-compliance where it finds that a gatekeeper does not comply with one or more of the following:


### 3. in the non-compliance decision adopted pursuant to paragraph 1 , the commission shall order the gatekeeper to cease and desist with the non-compliance within an appropriate deadline and to provide explanations on how it plans to comply with the decision. ### 3. in the non-compliance decision adopted pursuant to paragraph 1 , the commission shall order the gatekeeper to cease and desist with the non-compliance within an appropriate deadline and to provide explanations on how it plans to comply with the decision. the commission may by decision adopted in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in article 32(4) impose on such gatekeeper any behavioural remedies which are proportionate to the infringement committed and necessary to ensure compliance with this regulation.


### 1. in the decision pursuant to article 25 , the commission may impose on a gatekeeper fines not exceeding 10% of its total turnover in the preceding financial year where it finds that the gatekeeper , intentionally or negligently , fails to comply with: ### 1. in the decision pursuant to article 25 , the commission may impose on a gatekeeper fines not exceeding 30% of its total turnover in the preceding financial year where it finds that the gatekeeper , intentionally or negligently , fails to comply with:


### 2. the commission may by decision impose on undertakings and associations of undertakings fines not exceeding 1% of the total turnover in the preceding financial year where they intentionally or negligently: ### 2. the commission may by decision impose on undertakings and associations of undertakings fines not exceeding 5% of the total turnover in the preceding financial year where they intentionally or negligently:


### 1. the powers conferred on the commission by articles 26 and 27 shall be subject to a three year limitation period. ### 1. the powers conferred on the commission by articles 26 and 27 shall be subject to a five year limitation period.


### 1. before adopting a decision pursuant to article 7 , article 8(1) , article 9(1) , articles 15 , 16 , 22 , 23 , 25 and 26 and article 27(2) , the commission shall give the gatekeeper or undertaking or association of undertakings concerned the opportunity of being heard on: ### 1. before adopting a decision pursuant to article 7 , article 8(1) , article 9(1) , articles 15 , 16 , 22 , 23 , 25 and 26 and article 27(2) , the commission shall give the gatekeeper or undertaking or association of undertakings concerned and third parties with a legitimate interest the opportunity of being heard on:


### (36) the conduct of combining end user data from different sources or signing in users to different services of gatekeepers gives them potential advantages in terms of accumulation of data , thereby raising barriers to entry. to ensure that gatekeepers do not unfairly undermine the contestability of core platform services , they should enable their end users to freely choose to opt-in to such business practices by offering a less personalised alternative. the possibility should cover all possible sources of personal data , including own services of the gatekeeper as well as third party websites , and should be proactively presented to the end user in an explicit , clear and straightforward manner. ### (36) the conduct of combining end user data from different sources or signing in users to different services of gatekeepers gives them potential advantages in terms of accumulation of data , thereby raising barriers to entry. to ensure that gatekeepers do not unfairly undermine the contestability of core platform services , and in order to impede business models that are based on the collection of users’ personal data , combining personal data should be prohibited.


### (42) the conditions under which gatekeepers provide online advertising services to business users including both advertisers and publishers are often non-transparent and opaque. this opacity is partly linked to the practices of a few platforms , but is also due to the sheer complexity of modern day programmatic advertising. the sector is considered to have become more non-transparent after the introduction of new privacy legislation , and is expected to become even more opaque with the announced removal of third-party cookies. this often leads to a lack of information and knowledge for advertisers and publishers about the conditions of the advertising services they purchased and undermines their ability to switch to alternative providers of online advertising services. furthermore , the costs of online advertising are likely to be higher than they would be in a fairer , more transparent and contestable platform environment. these higher costs are likely to be reflected in the prices that end users pay for many daily products and services relying on the use of online advertising. transparency obligations should therefore require gatekeepers to provide advertisers and publishers to whom they supply online advertising services , when requested and to the extent possible , with information that allows both sides to understand the price paid for each of the different advertising services provided as part of the relevant advertising value chain. ### (42) the advertising revenues for many online advertising services , such as traditional publishers , have significantly declined , whereas the advertising revenues for gatekeepers have steadily increased1a. the conditions under which gatekeepers provide online advertising services to business users including both advertisers and publishers are very often non-transparent and opaque. this opacity is largely linked to the practices of a few platforms , but is also due to the sheer complexity of modern day programmatic advertising. the online advertising sector is considered to have become more non-transparent after the introduction of new privacy legislation , and is expected to become even more opaque with the announced removal of third-party cookies. this leads to a lack of trustworthy information and knowledge for advertisers and publishers about the conditions of the advertising services they purchased and undermines their ability to switch to alternative providers of online advertising services or build their own service. furthermore , the costs of online advertising are significantly higher than they would be in a fairer , more transparent and contestable platform environment. these higher costs are likely to be reflected in the prices that end users pay for many daily products and services relying on the use of online advertising. in addition , a few dominant platforms have gathered significant sets of data and data points , which erodes the exclusive trademarks of publishers and advertisers and extracts their client's data , creating unfair competition. transparency obligations should therefore require gatekeepers to provide advertisers and publishers to whom they supply online advertising services continuous , real-time and free of charge access to the performance measuring tools of the gatekeeper and provide for entire disclosure and transparency of the parameters and data used for with information that allows both sides to understand the price paid for each of the different advertising services provided as part of the relevant advertising value chain. a gatekeeper should further provide , free of charge , reliable , non-aggregated , granular and complete data necessary for advertisers and publishers to carry out their own independent high-quality and real-time evaluation of intermediation services , including verification of the ad inventory. moreover , a prohibition on combining data sets should prevent tracking of end users and thereby level the playing field for providers of online advertising services , strengthening funding of public media and restoring privacy of end users.


### (42) the conditions under which gatekeepers provide online advertising services to business users including both advertisers and publishers are often non-transparent and opaque. this opacity is partly linked to the practices of a few platforms , but is also due to the sheer complexity of modern day programmatic advertising. the sector is considered to have become more non-transparent after the introduction of new privacy legislation , and is expected to become even more opaque with the announced removal of third-party cookies. this often leads to a lack of information and knowledge for advertisers and publishers about the conditions of the advertising services they purchased and undermines their ability to switch to alternative providers of online advertising services. furthermore , the costs of online advertising are likely to be higher than they would be in a fairer , more transparent and contestable platform environment. these higher costs are likely to be reflected in the prices that end users pay for many daily products and services relying on the use of online advertising. transparency obligations should therefore require gatekeepers to provide advertisers and publishers to whom they supply online advertising services , when requested and to the extent possible , with information that allows both sides to understand the price paid for each of the different advertising services provided as part of the relevant advertising value chain. ### (42) the advertising revenues for many online advertising services , such as traditional publishers , have significantly declined , whereas the advertising revenues for gatekeepers have steadily increased. the conditions under which gatekeepers provide online advertising services to business users including both advertisers and publishers are very often non-transparent and opaque. this opacity is largely linked to the practices of a few platforms , but is also due to the sheer complexity of modern day programmatic advertising. the online advertising sector is considered to have become more non-transparent after the introduction of new privacy legislation , and is expected to become even more opaque with the announced removal of third-party cookies. this leads to a lack of trustworthy information and knowledge for advertisers and publishers about the conditions of the advertising services they purchased and undermines their ability to switch to alternative providers of online advertising services or build their own service. furthermore , the costs of online advertising are significantly higher than they would be in a fairer , more transparent and contestable platform environment. these higher costs are likely to be reflected in the prices that end users pay for many daily products and services relying on the use of online advertising. in addition , a few dominant platforms have gathered significant sets of data and data points , which erodes the exclusive trademarks of publishers and advertisers and extracts their client's data , creating unfair competition. transparency obligations should therefore require gatekeepers to provide advertisers and publishers to whom they supply online advertising services continuous , real-time and free of charge access to the performance measuring tools of the gatekeeper and provide for entire disclosure and transparency of the parameters and data used for with information that allows both sides to understand the price paid for each of the different advertising services provided as part of the relevant advertising value chain. a gatekeeper should further provide , free of charge , reliable , non-aggregated , granular and complete data necessary for advertisers and publishers to carry out their own independent high-quality and real-time evaluation of intermediation services , including verification of the ad inventory. moreover , a prohibition on combining data sets should prevent tracking of end users and thereby level the playing field for providers of online advertising services , strengthening funding of public media and restoring privacy of end-users.


### (46) a gatekeeper may use different means to favour its own services or products on its core platform service , to the detriment of the same or similar services that end users could obtain through third parties. this may for instance be the case where certain software applications or services are pre-installed by a gatekeeper. to enable end user choice , gatekeepers should not prevent end users from un-installing any pre-installed software applications on its core platform service and thereby favour their own software applications. ### (46) a gatekeeper may use different means to favour its own services or products on its core platform service , to the detriment of the same or similar services that end users could obtain through third parties. this may for instance be the case where certain software applications , software application stores or ancillary services are pre-installed by a gatekeeper. to enable end user choice , gatekeepers should not pre-install any software applications on its core platform service and thereby favour their own software applications , without prejudice to applications essential for the integrity of the service , operating system or the device and which cannot technically be offered on a standalone basis by third parties.


### (47) the rules that the gatekeepers set for the distribution of software applications may in certain circumstances restrict the ability of end users to install and effectively use third party software applications or software application stores on operating systems or hardware of the relevant gatekeeper and restrict the ability of end users to access these software applications or software application stores outside the core platform services of that gatekeeper. such restrictions may limit the ability of developers of software applications to use alternative distribution channels and the ability of end users to choose between different software applications from different distribution channels and should be prohibited as unfair and liable to weaken the contestability of core platform services. in order to ensure that third party software applications or software application stores do not endanger the integrity of the hardware or operating system provided by the gatekeeper the gatekeeper concerned may implement proportionate technical or contractual measures to achieve that goal if the gatekeeper demonstrates that such measures are necessary and justified and that there are no less restrictive means to safeguard the integrity of the hardware or operating system. ### (47) the rules that the gatekeepers set for the distribution of software applications may in certain circumstances restrict the ability of end users to install and effectively use third party software applications or software application stores on operating systems or hardware of the relevant gatekeeper and restrict the ability of end users to access these software applications or software application stores outside the core platform services of that gatekeeper. such restrictions may limit the ability of developers of software applications to use alternative distribution channels and the ability of end users to choose between different software applications from different distribution channels and should be prohibited as unfair and liable to weaken the contestability of core platform services. the end user should be required to decide which software application or software application store should become the default. in order to ensure that third party software applications or software application stores do not endanger the integrity of the hardware or operating system provided by the gatekeeper the gatekeeper concerned may implement proportionate technical or contractual measures to achieve that goal if the gatekeeper demonstrates that such measures are necessary and justified and that there are no less restrictive means to safeguard the integrity of the hardware or operating system.


### (48) gatekeepers are often vertically integrated and offer certain products or services to end users through their own core platform services , or through a business user over which they exercise control which frequently leads to conflicts of interest. this can include the situation whereby a gatekeeper offers its own online intermediation services through an online search engine. when offering those products or services on the core platform service , gatekeepers can reserve a better position to their own offering , in terms of ranking , as opposed to the products of third parties also operating on that core platform service. this can occur for instance with products or services , including other core platform services , which are ranked in the results communicated by online search engines , or which are partly or entirely embedded in online search engines results , groups of results specialised in a certain topic , displayed along with the results of an online search engine , which are considered or used by certain end users as a service distinct or additional to the online search engine. other instances are those of software applications which are distributed through software application stores , or products or services that are given prominence and display in the newsfeed of a social network , or products or services ranked in search results or displayed on an online marketplace. in those circumstances , the gatekeeper is in a dual-role position as intermediary for third party providers and as direct provider of products or services of the gatekeeper. consequently , these gatekeepers have the ability to undermine directly the contestability for those products or services on these core platform services , to the detriment of business users which are not controlled by the gatekeeper. ### (48) gatekeepers are often vertically integrated and offer certain products or services to end users through their own core platform services , or through a business user over which they exercise control or cooperate with which frequently leads to conflicts of interest. this can include the situation whereby a gatekeeper offers its own online intermediation services through an online search engine. when offering those products or services on the core platform service , gatekeepers can reserve a better position to their own offering , in terms of ranking , as opposed to the products of third parties also operating on that core platform service. this can occur for instance with products or services , including other core platform services , which are ranked in the results communicated by online search engines , or which are partly or entirely embedded in online search engines results , groups of results specialised in a certain topic , displayed along with the results of an online search engine , which are considered or used by certain end users as a service distinct or additional to the online search engine. such preferential or embedded display should constitute an inadmissible preference , irrespective of whether the information or results may also be provided by competing services and are as such ranked in a non-discriminatory way. inadmissible preferencing can also take place in other instances , such as software application stores , or products or services that are given prominence and display in the newsfeed of a social network , or products or services ranked in search results or displayed on an online marketplace , or products or services listed in core platform service settings , or the results provided by a virtual assistant. in those circumstances , the gatekeeper is in a dual-role position as intermediary for third party providers and as direct provider of products or services of the gatekeeper. consequently , these gatekeepers have the ability to undermine directly the contestability for those products or services on these core platform services , to the detriment of business users which are not controlled by the gatekeeper.


### (51) gatekeepers can hamper the ability of end users to access online content and services including software applications. therefore , rules should be established to ensure that the rights of end users to access an open internet are not compromised by the conduct of gatekeepers. gatekeepers can also technically limit the ability of end users to effectively switch between different internet access service providers , in particular through their control over operating systems or hardware. this distorts the level playing field for internet access services and ultimately harms end users. it should therefore be ensured that gatekeepers do not unduly restrict end users in choosing their internet access service provider. ### (51) gatekeepers can hamper the ability of end users to access online content and services including software applications. therefore , rules should be established to ensure that the rights of end users to access an open internet are not compromised by the conduct of gatekeepers. gatekeepers can also technically limit the ability of end users to effectively switch between different internet access service providers , in particular through their control over operating systems or hardware. this distorts the level playing field for internet access services and ultimately harms end users. it should therefore be ensured that gatekeepers do not restrict end users in choosing their internet access service provider.


### (53) the conditions under which gatekeepers provide online advertising services to business users including both advertisers and publishers are often non-transparent and opaque. this often leads to a lack of information for advertisers and publishers about the effect of a given ad. to further enhance fairness , transparency and contestability of online advertising services designated under this regulation as well as those that are fully integrated with other core platform services of the same provider , the designated gatekeepers should therefore provide advertisers and publishers , when requested , with free of charge access to the performance measuring tools of the gatekeeper and the information necessary for advertisers , advertising agencies acting on behalf of a company placing advertising , as well as for publishers to carry out their own independent verification of the provision of the relevant online advertising services. ### (53) the conditions under which gatekeepers provide online advertising services to business users including both advertisers and publishers are often non-transparent and opaque. this often leads to a lack of information for advertisers and publishers about the effect of a given ad. to further enhance fairness , transparency and contestability of online advertising services designated under this regulation as well as those that are fully integrated with other core platform services of the same provider , the designated gatekeepers should therefore provide advertisers and publishers a continuous , real-time and free of charge access to the performance measuring tools of the gatekeeper and provide for entire disclosure and transparency of the parameters and data used for decision making , execution and measurement of the intermediation services for advertisers , advertising agencies acting on behalf of a company placing advertising , as well as for publishers to carry out their own independent verification of the provision of the relevant online advertising services. a gatekeeper should further provide , free of charge , reliable , non-aggregated , granular and complete data necessary for advertisers and publishers to carry out their own independent high-quality and real-time evaluation of intermediation services , including verification of the ad inventory. this should include data relating to all parameters used by gatekeepers or services belonging to the same undertaking in the context of an advertising intermediation services in order to determine the outcome of such intermediation and corresponding prices for advertisements or charges for any intermediation service provided either on the buy-side or the sell-side.