### 4. notes the geopolitical competition and tensions following the covid-19 outbreak , and recognises that the european union still has to position itself in the new world order in which , alongside the eu , the us , china and russia play a leading role; ### 4. notes the geopolitical competition and tensions already present further accelerated following the covid-19 outbreak , and recognises that the european union still has to position itself in the new world order in which , alongside the eu , the us , china and russia play a leading role;


### 4. notes the geopolitical competition and tensions following the covid-19 outbreak , and recognises that the european union still has to position itself in the new world order in which , alongside the eu , the us , china and russia play a leading role; ### 4. notes the geopolitical competition and tensions following the covid-19 outbreak and stresses the marginal role of the eu in the new world order in which us , china and russia play a leading role;


### 5. is concerned about the lack of leadership the united states has shown in fighting covid-19; believes that the false information in president trump’s tweets and during his press conferences have been very unhelpful in the joint fight against the virus; ### deleted


### 5. is concerned about the lack of leadership the united states has shown in fighting covid-19; believes that the false information in president trump’s tweets and during his press conferences have been very unhelpful in the joint fight against the virus; ### 5. is concerned that the united states has not played a commensurate role in fighting covid-19;


### 6. is worried about the decision of the us to withdraw funding from the world health organization (who) and the general tendency of its president to withdraw the us from the multilateral organisations that were created to establish a rules-based world order; ### deleted


### 6. is worried about the decision of the us to withdraw funding from the world health organization (who) and the general tendency of its president to withdraw the us from the multilateral organisations that were created to establish a rules-based world order; ### 6. is worried about the declined of us engagement globally , the spike in its rivalry with china , the decision of the us to withdraw funding from the world health organization (who) and the general tendency of its president to withdraw the us from the multilateral organisations that were created to establish a rules-based world order;


### 6. is worried about the decision of the us to withdraw funding from the world health organization (who) and the general tendency of its president to withdraw the us from the multilateral organisations that were created to establish a rules-based world order; ### 6. notes the decision of the us to withdraw funding from the world health organization (who) and the general tendency of its president to withdraw the us from multilateral organisations;


### 8. notes the strengthening of the people’s republic of china’s worldwide diplomatic efforts following the covid-19 outbreak , seeking to position itself as the dominant global player; ### 8. notes the strengthening of the people’s republic of china’s worldwide diplomatic efforts following the covid-19 outbreak , seeking to fill the political vacuum in the multilateral system left by a more isolationist usa and trying to position itself as the dominant global player;


### 12. urges the chinese regime to fully cooperate with an independent investigation into the origins of covid-19 , and calls on the member states to present a united front towards a rising china , which is leading a crackdown on the pro-democracy movement in hong kong and has threatened to annex taiwan; calls on the member states to advocate taiwan’s membership of the who; ### 12. urges the chinese regime to fully cooperate with an independent investigation into the origins of covid-19:


### 12. urges the chinese regime to fully cooperate with an independent investigation into the origins of covid-19 , and calls on the member states to present a united front towards a rising china , which is leading a crackdown on the pro-democracy movement in hong kong and has threatened to annex taiwan; calls on the member states to advocate taiwan’s membership of the who; ### 12. urges the chinese regime to fully cooperate with an independent investigation into the origins of covid-19 , and calls on the member states to present a united front towards a rising china , which is leading a crackdown on the pro-democracy movement in hong kong , has threatened to annex taiwan and has increased its activities in tibet , xinjiang and the south china sea; calls on the member states to advocate taiwan’s membership of the who;


### 12. urges the chinese regime to fully cooperate with an independent investigation into the origins of covid-19 , and calls on the member states to present a united front towards a rising china , which is leading a crackdown on the pro-democracy movement in hong kong and has threatened to annex taiwan; calls on the member states to advocate taiwan’s membership of the who; ### 12. urges the chinese regime to fully cooperate with an independent investigation into the origins of covid-19 , and calls on the member states to present a united front towards a rising china , which is leading a crackdown on the pro-democracy movement in hong kong and has threatened to annex taiwan;


### 14. expresses concern over the structural attempts of the russian federation to undermine eu unity by the intensification of disinformation campaigns; ### deleted


### 14. expresses concern over the structural attempts of the russian federation to undermine eu unity by the intensification of disinformation campaigns; ### 14. stresses that russia is an important partner in the fight against the covid 19 crisis; demands , in view of a possible economic and health crisis and in order to calm the geopolitical tensions between russia and the eu , that further sanctions to be avoided;


### a more assertive eu foreign policy to defend europe’s interests , its values and the multilateral world order ### the foreign policy decisions of the member states in the context of the covid-19 crisis and a shift of competences at national level


### 16. stresses that the multilateral rules-based world order is vital for global peace , the rule of law and democracy; believes that a geopolitical eu must play a firmer role in defending it and seek ways to de-escalate tensions between powers; ### 16. stresses that the multilateral rules-based world order is vital for global peace , the rule of law and democracy;


### 17. stresses that only a more united eu , backed up by sufficient and credible military capacities , will be able to conduct a strong foreign policy , and believes that the vp/hr should receive a stronger mandate in speaking on behalf of the eu; ### 17. stresses that only a more united eu , backed up by sufficient and credible military capacities , will be able to conduct a strong foreign policy;


### 17. stresses that only a more united eu , backed up by sufficient and credible military capacities , will be able to conduct a strong foreign policy , and believes that the vp/hr should receive a stronger mandate in speaking on behalf of the eu; ### 17. stresses that only sovereign member states , backed up by sufficient and credible military capacities , will be able to conduct a strong foreign policy;


### 17. stresses that only a more united eu , backed up by sufficient and credible military capacities , will be able to conduct a strong foreign policy , and believes that the vp/hr should receive a stronger mandate in speaking on behalf of the eu; ### 17. stresses that only a more united eu , which has improved its strategic autonomy and is backed up by sufficient and credible military capacities , will be able to conduct a strong foreign policy , and believes that the vp/hr should receive a stronger mandate in speaking on behalf of the eu;


### 18. believes that the end of the unanimity rule on foreign policy would help the eu to conduct a foreign policy that is more effective and more proactive; ### deleted


### 18. believes that the end of the unanimity rule on foreign policy would help the eu to conduct a foreign policy that is more effective and more proactive; ### 18. is convinced that the end of the unanimity rule on foreign policy would irreparably weaken the sovereignty of member states and would have as well far-reaching consequences for the external action of member states; stresses that unanimity on foreign policy issues must have remained in place;


### 18. believes that the end of the unanimity rule on foreign policy would help the eu to conduct a foreign policy that is more effective and more proactive; ### 18. states that the unanimity rule should remain mandatory for any decision concerning foreign policy;


### 19. underlines the important role of the armed forces during the covid-19 pandemic and believes that a more in-depth joint operation and coordination of member states’ armed forces within existing frameworks - such as the european medical command - or within new frameworks - such as military hospital trains - could lead to greater efficiency and contribute to the eu’s preparedness to fight pandemics; recognises the need to review the eu’s security and defence strategies to develop strategic autonomy , to become better prepared and more resilient to the new and hybrid threats and technologies that have made the nature of warfare less conventional and challenge the traditional role of the military , as well as for a future in which russia and china are becoming more assertive; stresses that the future strategic compass on security and defence should reflect these developments and take account of the broader geopolitical implications of covid-19; believes that , given the new political balance and a potential worsening of the international security environment following covid-19 , the eu defence budgets must not be cut; ### 19. underlines the important role of member states' armed forces during the covid 19 pandemic and believes that joint operations and effective coordination of member states' armed forces could lead to greater efficiency and help ensure that the eu is prepared to fight pandemics; stresses that member states' armed forces should take into account the wider geopolitical implications of covid-19; is convinced that member states' defence spending must not be reduced in the face of a potentially deteriorating international security environment as a result of covid-19;


### 19. underlines the important role of the armed forces during the covid-19 pandemic and believes that a more in-depth joint operation and coordination of member states’ armed forces within existing frameworks - such as the european medical command - or within new frameworks - such as military hospital trains - could lead to greater efficiency and contribute to the eu’s preparedness to fight pandemics; recognises the need to review the eu’s security and defence strategies to develop strategic autonomy , to become better prepared and more resilient to the new and hybrid threats and technologies that have made the nature of warfare less conventional and challenge the traditional role of the military , as well as for a future in which russia and china are becoming more assertive; stresses that the future strategic compass on security and defence should reflect these developments and take account of the broader geopolitical implications of covid-19; believes that , given the new political balance and a potential worsening of the international security environment following covid-19 , the eu defence budgets must not be cut; ### 19. underlines the important role of the armed forces during the covid-19 pandemic and believes that a more in-depth joint operation and coordination of member states’ armed forces within existing frameworks - such as the european medical command - or within new frameworks - such as military hospital trains - could lead to greater efficiency and contribute to the eu’s preparedness to fight pandemics; stresses that the future strategic compass on security and defence should reflect these developments and take account of the broader geopolitical implications of covid-19; believes that , given the new political balance and a potential worsening of the international security environment following covid-19 , the eu defence budgets must not be cut;


### 19. underlines the important role of the armed forces during the covid-19 pandemic and believes that a more in-depth joint operation and coordination of member states’ armed forces within existing frameworks - such as the european medical command - or within new frameworks - such as military hospital trains - could lead to greater efficiency and contribute to the eu’s preparedness to fight pandemics; recognises the need to review the eu’s security and defence strategies to develop strategic autonomy , to become better prepared and more resilient to the new and hybrid threats and technologies that have made the nature of warfare less conventional and challenge the traditional role of the military , as well as for a future in which russia and china are becoming more assertive; stresses that the future strategic compass on security and defence should reflect these developments and take account of the broader geopolitical implications of covid-19; believes that , given the new political balance and a potential worsening of the international security environment following covid-19 , the eu defence budgets must not be cut; ### 19. underlines the important role of the armed forces during the covid-19 pandemic and believes that a more in-depth joint operation and coordination of member states’ armed forces within existing frameworks - such as the european medical command - or within new frameworks - such as military hospital trains - could lead to greater efficiency and contribute to the eu’s preparedness to fight pandemics; recognises the need to review the eu’s security and defence strategies to develop strategic autonomy , to become better prepared and more resilient to the new and hybrid threats and technologies that have made the nature of warfare less conventional and challenge the traditional role of the military;


### 19. underlines the important role of the armed forces during the covid-19 pandemic and believes that a more in-depth joint operation and coordination of member states’ armed forces within existing frameworks - such as the european medical command - or within new frameworks - such as military hospital trains - could lead to greater efficiency and contribute to the eu’s preparedness to fight pandemics; recognises the need to review the eu’s security and defence strategies to develop strategic autonomy , to become better prepared and more resilient to the new and hybrid threats and technologies that have made the nature of warfare less conventional and challenge the traditional role of the military , as well as for a future in which russia and china are becoming more assertive; stresses that the future strategic compass on security and defence should reflect these developments and take account of the broader geopolitical implications of covid-19; believes that , given the new political balance and a potential worsening of the international security environment following covid-19 , the eu defence budgets must not be cut; ### 19. underlines the important role of the armed forces during the covid-19 pandemic and believes that a more in-depth joint operation and coordination of member states’ armed forces within existing frameworks - such as the european medical command - or within new frameworks - such as military hospital trains - could lead to greater efficiency and contribute to the eu’s preparedness to fight pandemics; notes that effective external border protection plays a crucial role in maintaining the free movement of persons and goods within the eu; recognises the need to review the eu’s security and defence strategies to develop strategic autonomy , to become better prepared and more resilient to the new and hybrid threats and technologies that have made the nature of warfare less conventional and challenge the traditional role of the military , as well as for a future in which russia and china are becoming more assertive; stresses that the future strategic compass on security and defence should reflect these developments and take account of the broader geopolitical implications of covid-19; believes that , given the new political balance and a potential worsening of the international security environment following covid-19 , the eu defence budgets must not be cut;


### 20. calls for the expansion and modernisation of eu communication strategies so that eu action is sufficiently visible both within and beyond the eu; urges the european external action service (eeas) to further strengthen its capacities to counter disinformation , including the creation of a dedicated far-east stratcom task force focused on the disinformation emanating from china , and imposing costs on countries that deliberately spread disinformation to divide and harm the eu and its member states; ### deleted


### 21. stresses that its biggest global consumer market of almost 500 million people gives the eu leverage on the world stage , and believes that a geopolitical commission should use this leverage when other countries are not prepared to comply with the rule of law or international treaties; ### 21. stresses that its biggest global consumer market of almost 500 million people gives the eu member states leverage on the world stage , and believes this leverage should be utilised in trade negotiations; urges the eu and its member states to make aid granted to developing countries conditional upon agreements on the effective readmission of all illegal immigrants present in the eu eligible for return;


### 22. notes that the covid-19 pandemic has shown the need to reduce dependency on third countries in certain strategic and existential sectors and might prompt diversification of its most critical supply chains; ### 22. notes that the covid-19 pandemic has shown the need to reduce dependency on third countries in certain strategic and existential sectors and might prompt diversification of its most critical supply chains; emphasises the fact that relocating the production of most medicines to within the member states must be a top priority;


### 23. recalls its request for a strong global sanctions regime to address serious human rights violations , which would be the eu equivalent of the so-called magnitsky act; ### deleted


### 24. underlines the strategic importance of eu engagement and support in its neighbourhood , both in the east and in the south; stresses that the eu must give western balkan countries that are not yet part of the eu a fair chance to join the eu , and that the eu must continue its efforts to invest in the region; ### 24. calls for a rigorous monitoring and control of how eu aid is used by countries that receive it;


### 24. underlines the strategic importance of eu engagement and support in its neighbourhood , both in the east and in the south; stresses that the eu must give western balkan countries that are not yet part of the eu a fair chance to join the eu , and that the eu must continue its efforts to invest in the region; ### 24. underlines the strategic importance of eu engagement and support in its neighbourhood , both in the east and in the south by helping its neighbours in their combat against the covid-19 pandemic , stresses that the eu should speed up the accession negotiations with those western balkan countries that are not yet part of the eu , and that the eu must step up its efforts to invest in the region;


### 24. underlines the strategic importance of eu engagement and support in its neighbourhood , both in the east and in the south; stresses that the eu must give western balkan countries that are not yet part of the eu a fair chance to join the eu , and that the eu must continue its efforts to invest in the region; ### 24. underlines the covid-19 pandemic does not provide the excuse for the eu to expand still further , and under no circumstances should the eu admit new members; stresses that turkey has taken advantage of the pandemic situation to continue its destabilising policies in the eastern mediterranean and all accession talks should be discontinued on a permanent basis;


### 24. underlines the strategic importance of eu engagement and support in its neighbourhood , both in the east and in the south; stresses that the eu must give western balkan countries that are not yet part of the eu a fair chance to join the eu , and that the eu must continue its efforts to invest in the region; ### 24. underlines the strategic importance of eu engagement and support in its neighbourhood , both in the east and in the south; welcomes the mobilization of support packages in the wake of the covid crisis; recognizes nevertheless that the pandemic will have a long-term economic and social impact on our neighbours;


### 25. stresses that the covid-19 crisis could destabilise countries in africa which often have a fragile health infrastructure and high debts; calls for the eu presence in africa to be strengthened , for financial assistance and recovery plans to be fostered and for an alternative to chinese investments to be provided; ### 25. stresses that the covid-19 crisis could destabilise countries in africa which often have a fragile health infrastructure and high debts;


### 1. welcomes the clear strategic orientation and commitment of albania to european integration , manifesting itself in good neighbourly relations and the continued implementation of the accession-related reforms; ### 1. takes the view that there is no place for albania in the european union , and that the possible accession of albania , a state which is characterised by endemic organised crime , which is dealing with a massive influx of illegal migrants , and which is one of the countries from which the largest numbers of people seeking asylum in france originate , would have harmful consequences for the peoples of europe;


### 2. supports the convening of the first intergovernmental conference without further delay , following the adoption of the negotiating framework by the council; ### 2. condemns the decision taken by the council in march 2020 to open accession negotiations with albania , which is , moreover , in the midst of a health crisis;


### 8. underlines the importance of implementing the electoral reform measures codified in july 2020 , which are in line with the osce office for democratic institutions and human rights (osce/odihr) recommendations; welcomes the commitment to implement the forthcoming venice commission opinion regarding the amendments to the electoral code adopted in october 2020; ### 8. underlines the importance of implementing the electoral reform measures codified in july 2020 , which are in line with the osce office for democratic institutions and human rights (osce/odihr) recommendations and to fully implement those still outstanding; welcomes the commitment to implement the forthcoming venice commission opinion regarding the amendments to the electoral code adopted in october 2020;


### 11. encourages albania to complete the relevant steps towards re-establishing the constitutional court’s ability to function fully and efficiently , and urges all involved to swiftly conclude the appointment process; ### 11. encourages albania to complete the relevant steps towards re-establishing the constitutional court’s ability to function fully and efficiently , and urges all involved to swiftly conclude the appointment process; welcomes in this regard the appointment of the new members of the court and the reaching of the minimum quorum to adjudicate on the admissibility of cases;


### 16. welcomes the steps taken to improve the legislation and mechanisms for tackling money laundering and terrorism financing , and calls for further measures aimed at swiftly implementing the financial action task force action plan , in particular on reducing the size of the informal economy; ### 16. questions the steps taken to improve the legislation and mechanisms for tackling money laundering and terrorism financing , and calls for further measures aimed at swiftly implementing the financial action task force action plan , in particular on reducing the size of the informal economy; notes , however , that since 2 march 2020 albania has been included on the fatf grey list , and regards the decision to open accession negotiations despite that listing as a serious error on the part of the council;


### 17. calls for the efforts to dismantle local and international criminal networks , and to eliminate drug production and trafficking , to be intensified further , building on the significant efforts of recent years; welcomes the increased cooperation with europol and the law enforcement institutions of eu member states , and encourages the albanian authorities to swiftly finalise the posting of an albanian liaison prosecutor to the european union agency for criminal justice cooperation (eurojust); ### 17. calls for the efforts to dismantle local and international criminal networks , and to eliminate drug production and trafficking , to be intensified further , building on the significant efforts of recent years; welcomes the increased cooperation with europol and the law enforcement institutions of eu member states , that led to a number of successful large-scale law enforcement operations , and encourages the albanian authorities to swiftly finalise the posting of an albanian liaison prosecutor to the european union agency for criminal justice cooperation (eurojust); underlines the joint investigation team between the albanian and italian authorities represents a model of cooperation between enlargement countries and eu judicial authorities;


### 20. welcomes the update on the anti-discrimination legislation and urges the authorities to ensure the effective prevention and prosecution of hate speech and hate crimes; ### 20. welcomes the update on the anti-discrimination legislation and calls on the authorities to step up efforts to establish solid anti-discrimination case-law; urges the authorities to ensure the effective prevention and prosecution of hate speech and hate crimes;


### 24. reminds albania of its calls for further improvements to be made in the education and health , and the employment rates and living conditions of roma and other ethnic minorities; ### 24 reminds albania of its calls for further improvements to be made in the education and health , and the employment rates and living conditions of roma , egyptian and other ethnic minorities; calls for the swift adoption of the remaining bye-laws to ensure full implementation of the legislation related to the 2017 framework law on the protection of national minorities and other ethnic minorities;


### 27. recalls the authorities’ obligation to ensure due process for asylum seekers in compliance with albania’s international obligations , and to properly address the needs of refugees , asylum seekers and migrants; calls for increased capacities to process asylum requests and investigations into the reported cases of breaches of the return procedures; ### 27. stresses that albania is a weak link in the fight against illegal immigration; emphasises that the massive influx of illegal migrants into its territory poses a permanent challenge and threat to eu member states; stresses that the moves to bring albania more closely into line with the requirements of the schengen area , including visa liberalisation for its citizens , constitute a serious error which will give rise to significant security risks for the eu member states;


### 28. stresses that border protection and the prevention of cross-border crime , including in cooperation with the european border and coast guard agency (frontex) , must be conducted in full respect for fundamental rights; ### 28. stresses that border protection and the prevention of cross-border crime , including in cooperation with the european border and coast guard agency (frontex) , must focus on the expulsion of illegal migrants and their systematic return to their country of origin or the place from which they set off with the aim of entering an eu member state;


### 35. expresses grave concern about the proposed measures under the draft media law and welcomes the commitment to adopt amendments only if they are assessed as being fully in line with the venice commission’s recommendations; ### 35. expresses grave concern about the proposed measures under the draft media law , in particular regarding the so called anti-defamation laws , and urges the government to adopt amendments only if they are fully in line with the venice commission’s recommendations;


### 49. welcomes albania’s ongoing full alignment with the common foreign and security policy decisions and declarations since 2012 and its active contribution to the eu crisis management missions and operations; ### 49. takes the view that aligning albania’s foreign and strategic policy with the cfsp and csdp , and above all its accession to nato , can only widen the strategic divides and exacerbate the antagonisms affecting europe as a whole;


### — having regard to its resolutions on the humanitarian situation in yemen of 25 february 201620 , 15 june 201721 and 30 november 201722 , ### — having regard to its resolutions on the humanitarian situation in yemen of 25 february 201620 , 15 june 201721 and 30 november 201722 , on the killing of journalist jamal khashoggi in the saudi consulate in istanbul of 25 october 2018; on egypt of 24 october 2019 , on the uae , notably the situation of human rights defender ahmed mansoor of 4 october 2018 ,


### 1. welcomes the publication of the 20th and 21st annual reports; deplores the late publication of information about exports during 2017 and 2018; ### deleted


### 2. notes that ten member states made full submissions to the 20th annual report , and eleven to the 21st; deplores the fact that two of the main exporting countries – germany and the uk – did not make full submissions; ### 2. notes that ten member states made full submissions to the 20th annual report , and eleven to the 21st;


### 3. deplores the fact that member states use very different information in order to generate data on the value of licences , which renders the annual report considerably less usable as a comparative data set and serves to diminish its transparency and accountability before citizens and parliaments; urges france , in particular , to refrain from submitting data on the value of licences at pre-contract stage and broad values for global licences , which undermines the comparability of the report; ### 3. stresses that research , development , production , distribution and arms export policies must remain the discretion of the member states as it is a strictly national prerogative; calls on the commission , the high representative for foreign affairs and security policy and the european external action service to consider arms policy from the point of view of exports in particular and acknowledge that defence , in all its aspects , is exclusively the remit of the member states;


### 4. notes that the countries of the middle east and north africa , a region of several armed conflicts , remain the foremost regional destination for exports according to the last two annual reports; is concerned that this regional focus undermines the common foreign and security policy (cfsp) and specific eu action aimed at regional peace and stability; ### 4. notes that the countries of the middle east and north africa , a region of several armed conflicts , an extreme volatility of the political landscape and a great permeability of national borders , remain the foremost regional destination for exports according to the last two annual reports; is concerned that this regional focus undermines the common foreign and security policy (cfsp) and specific eu action aimed at regional peace and stability;


### 6. welcomes the council’s intention to increase convergence and transparency – the main objectives of its last review of the common position; ### deleted


### 8. notes with concern the growing divergences between the arms export policies and practices of the member states and the failure to introduce new instruments to promote convergence towards the strict application of eu rules in this area; ### deleted


### 9. supports the council’s decision to introduce a clear reporting deadline for national submissions; welcomes the steps taken towards the online approach and encourages the further development of the latter; ### deleted


### 10. notes that since the adoption of the legally binding common position in 2008 , an increasing number of weapon systems produced in europe are made up of components from multiple countries and involve bi- or multilateral cooperation for technological , industrial and political reasons; ### deleted


### 13. observes a trend whereby the diverging export policies of the member states are increasingly considered as obstacles to cooperation projects , which is giving rise to a multitude of bilateral and specific agreements on weapon systems that allow for exports to third countries based on the least restrictive standards , rather than a joint , eu-wide approach; ### 13. affirms its preference for bilateral or multilateral cooperation between eu member states for the programming of research , development and production in the arms sector; regrets that the cooperation projects proposed by the commission exclude bilateral agreements on principle;


### 14. stresses that bilateral and multilateral agreements may further reduce convergence at eu level and that the failure to regulate exports uniformly between the member states and the lack of convergence in export decisions to third countries have a negative impact on human rights and international law , generate market distortions , and hinder industrial strategic planning , economies of scale and a level playing field; ### deleted


### 14. stresses that bilateral and multilateral agreements may further reduce convergence at eu level and that the failure to regulate exports uniformly between the member states and the lack of convergence in export decisions to third countries have a negative impact on human rights and international law , generate market distortions , and hinder industrial strategic planning , economies of scale and a level playing field; ### 14. stresses that bilateral and multilateral agreements may further reduce convergence at eu level and that the failure to regulate exports uniformly between the member states and the lack of convergence in export decisions to third countries have a negative impact on the ability of the eu to speak with one voice and be influential in the international arena , human rights and international law , generate market distortions , and hinder industrial strategic planning , economies of scale and a level playing field;


### 15. notes that eu funds such as the preparatory action on defence research (padr) , the european defence industrial development programme (edidp) and the european defence fund (edf) , initiatives such as the permanent structured cooperation (pesco) , the coordinated annual review on defence (card) and the european peace facility (epf) , legislation such as the intra-community transfers and defence procurement directives of 2009 , and the creation of administrative capacities such as the commission directorate-general for defence industry and space (dg defis) are heralding an increasing europeanisation of arms production and capability development; ### 15. notes and deplores the fact that eu funds such as the preparatory action on defence research (padr) , the european defence industrial development programme (edidp) and the european defence fund (edf) , initiatives such as the permanent structured cooperation (pesco) , the coordinated annual review on defence (card) and the european peace facility (epf) , legislation such as the intra-community transfers and defence procurement directives of 2009 , and the creation of administrative capacities such as the commission directorate-general for defence industry and space (dg defis) are heralding an increasing europeanisation of arms production and capability development;


### 16. underlines the fact that the interinstitutional agreement on the establishment of the edf authorises the commission to assess whether the transfer of ownership or the granting of an exclusive licence of edf-co-funded military technology contravenes the security and defence interests of the eu and its member states or the objectives of the fund as set out in article 3 of the proposed regulation; notes that this new legislation establishes a specific type of control function for the commission with regard to a specific category of exports of military technology to third countries; ### 16. underlines the fact that the interinstitutional agreement on the establishment of the edf authorises the commission to assess whether the transfer of ownership or the granting of an exclusive licence of edf-co-funded military technology contravenes the security and defence interests of the eu and its member states or the objectives of the fund as set out in article 3 of the proposed regulation; notes that this new legislation establishes a specific type of control function for the commission with regard to a specific category of exports of military technology to third countries; suggests that the export of these edf-co-funded technologies should also be closely monitored vis a vis the common position;


### 17. notes that under the epf , member states and the european external action service (eeas) will work on creating an eu-level system for arms transfers to third countries; ### 17. deplores moves by the member states and the european external action service (eeas) under the epf to create an eu-level system for arms transfers to third countries;


### 18. notes that the lack of convergence of national arms export policies and decision-making is becoming increasingly untenable in the context of the prevailing europeanisation of arms production and the stated ambitions and plans to increase this further; ### 18. calls for the continued development of cooperative projects between european countries on a bilateral or multilateral basis , independently of any supranational entity;


### 19. believes that the europeanisation of arms production needs to go hand in hand with increased transparency; believes that there is still room for improvement in this area , particularly as regards the quality and uniformity of the data submitted by member states; calls on the working party on conventional arms exports (coarm): ### deleted


### 20. welcomes the decision to transform the annual report into an interactive and searchable online database and expects it to be up and running before publication of the export data for 2019; calls on the eeas to inform parliament about the precise date on which this database will go online; urges coarm to chose a solution that enables data to be exported in a structured format; ### deleted


### 20. welcomes the decision to transform the annual report into an interactive and searchable online database and expects it to be up and running before publication of the export data for 2019; calls on the eeas to inform parliament about the precise date on which this database will go online; urges coarm to chose a solution that enables data to be exported in a structured format; ### 20. welcomes the decision to transform the annual report into an interactive and searchable online database and expects it to be up and running before publication of the export data for 2019; calls on the eeas to inform parliament about the precise date on which this database will go online; urges coarm to choose a solution that is user-friendly and easily accessible by european citizens and civil society and that enables data to be exported in a structured format;


### 21. calls on coarm to work towards amending article 7 of the common position , by calling for an improved exchange of ‘relevant information , including information on denial notifications and arms export policies’ and other ‘measures to further increase convergence’; stresses the need , to this end: ### 21. calls on coarm to work towards amending article 7 of the common position , by calling for an improved exchange of ‘relevant information , including information on denial notifications and arms export policies’ and other ‘measures to further increase convergence’;


### a) to systematically discuss individual licence requests within coarm , where the receiving destination or recipient has been identified as a risk by one or several member states or the eeas; calls on member states to provide a justification if they decide to grant exports to such destinations; ### deleted


### c) to undertake a joint assessment of country situations or potential export recipients in the light of the principles and criteria of the common position within the framework of the cfsp and in consultation with external stakeholders , including parliament; ### deleted


### 22. believes that the eu institutions should organise peer reviews with a view to encouraging authorities to share best practices on the collection and processing of data , fostering a better understanding of different national approaches , identifying differences as regards the interpretation of the eight criteria , and discussing ways to improve harmonisation; ### deleted


### 22. believes that the eu institutions should organise peer reviews with a view to encouraging authorities to share best practices on the collection and processing of data , fostering a better understanding of different national approaches , identifying differences as regards the interpretation of the eight criteria , and discussing ways to improve harmonisation; ### 22. believes that the eu institutions should organise peer reviews with a view to encouraging national authorities to share best practices on the collection and processing of data , fostering a better understanding of different national approaches , identifying differences as regards the interpretation of the eight criteria , and discussing ways to improve harmonisation;


### 23. strongly believes that a much higher level of convergence as regards the strict application of the criteria will strengthen human rights , international law and the cfsp , and bolster the eu’s strategic security interests and strategic autonomy; ### deleted


### 24. stresses that effective end-use controls are crucial for a responsible export policy and for lowering the risk of diversion in particular; calls on the council , the member states , the eeas and the commission to set up a large-scale training and capacity-building programme for national and eu officials on arms export controls; stresses the need to use eu funding to ensure that sufficient staff resources are available at national and eu levels and at delegations and embassies in importing countries for the purposes of implementing viable end-use controls; calls on the eeas and coarm to report on itrace any identified diversion of eu-origin goods as part of the annual report; ### deleted


### 24. stresses that effective end-use controls are crucial for a responsible export policy and for lowering the risk of diversion in particular; calls on the council , the member states , the eeas and the commission to set up a large-scale training and capacity-building programme for national and eu officials on arms export controls; stresses the need to use eu funding to ensure that sufficient staff resources are available at national and eu levels and at delegations and embassies in importing countries for the purposes of implementing viable end-use controls; calls on the eeas and coarm to report on itrace any identified diversion of eu-origin goods as part of the annual report; ### 24. stresses that effective end-use controls are crucial for a responsible export policy and for lowering the risk of diversion in particular; calls on the council , the member states , the eeas and the commission to set up a large-scale training and capacity-building programme for national and eu officials on arms export controls; encourages member states governments to take steps in order to ensure better compliance with its end-use regulations , including the implementation of the practice of post-shipment controls , particularly for small arms and light weapons; stresses the need to use eu funding to ensure that sufficient staff resources are available at national and eu levels and at delegations and embassies in importing countries for the purposes of implementing viable end-use controls; calls on the eeas and coarm to report on itrace any identified diversion of eu-origin goods as part of the annual report;


### 25. believes that the increasing europeanisation of arms production , the recent council conclusions on convergence in arms exports and the establishment of the epf should be complemented by a mechanism for eu-level monitoring and control based on strict compliance with the eight criteria; ### deleted


### 25. believes that the increasing europeanisation of arms production , the recent council conclusions on convergence in arms exports and the establishment of the epf should be complemented by a mechanism for eu-level monitoring and control based on strict compliance with the eight criteria; ### 25. believes that the increasing europeanisation of arms production , the recent council conclusions on convergence in arms exports and the establishment of the epf should be complemented by a mechanism for eu-level monitoring and control based on strict compliance with the eight criteria; regrets the lack of provisions on sanctions to be imposed on member states that fail to check compliance with the eight criteria in advance of granting licences;


### 25. believes that the increasing europeanisation of arms production , the recent council conclusions on convergence in arms exports and the establishment of the epf should be complemented by a mechanism for eu-level monitoring and control based on strict compliance with the eight criteria; ### 25. believes that the increasing europeanisation of arms production , the recent council conclusions on convergence in arms exports and the establishment of the epf should be complemented by a mechanism for eu-level monitoring and control based on strict compliance with the eight criteria; calls on steps to be taken for the setting-up of an eu mechanism of sanctions for member states infringing the common position;


### 26. considers that regular consultations with national parliaments , arms export control authorities , industry associations and civil society are central to meaningful transparency; calls on coarm to enhance dialogue with civil society and consultations with parliament and arms export control authorities; encourages civil society and academia to exercise independent scrutiny of the arms trade and calls on the member states and the eeas to support such activities , including by financial means; ### deleted


### 26. considers that regular consultations with national parliaments , arms export control authorities , industry associations and civil society are central to meaningful transparency; calls on coarm to enhance dialogue with civil society and consultations with parliament and arms export control authorities; encourages civil society and academia to exercise independent scrutiny of the arms trade and calls on the member states and the eeas to support such activities , including by financial means; ### 26. considers that regular consultations with the european parliament , national parliaments , arms export control authorities , industry associations and civil society are central to meaningful transparency; calls on national parliaments to exchange best reporting and oversight practices in order to enhance the scrutinising role of all national parliaments in the decisions on arms control exports; calls on coarm to enhance dialogue with civil society and consultations with parliament and arms export control authorities; encourages civil society and academia to exercise independent scrutiny of the arms trade and calls on the member states and the eeas to support such activities , including by financial means;


### a. whereas parliament has a duty and responsibility to exercise its democratic oversight over the common foreign and security policy (cfsp) and common security and defence policy (csdp) and should get the necessary and effective means to fulfil this role; ### a. whereas parliament has a duty and responsibility to exercise its democratic oversight over the common foreign and security policy (cfsp) and common security and defence policy (csdp) and should get the necessary information in a transparent and timely manner as well as the effective means to fully fulfil this role ,;


### b. whereas in the context of the covid-19 pandemic , democracy , human rights and fundamental freedoms have deteriorated in many parts of the world , disinformation campaigns and cyberattacks have increased , and isolationist trends and rivalry – rather than multilateral cooperation; ### b. whereas in the context of the covid-19 pandemic , democracy , human rights , the rule of law and fundamental freedoms have deteriorated in many parts of the world , disinformation campaigns and cyberattacks have increased , and isolationist trends and rivalry – rather than multilateral cooperation;


### c. whereas challenges such as the resurgence of populism and authoritarianism , the attacks against liberal democracy and multilateralism , combined with competition between the great powers , which has transformed into rivalry , especially between us and china , pose a real threat to the eu’s interests and influence; ### deleted


### l. whereas the 2020 review conference will take place in a particularly challenging international security context , owing to the lack of progress in the denuclearisation of the korean peninsula as well as the us withdrawal from the joint comprehensive plan of action (jcpoa) with iran; whereas the current degree of disagreement and division between the 191 npt nuclear-armed and non-armed state parties over the best approach to reducing and eliminating nuclear weapons will add a further challenge to the debate; ### l. whereas the 2020 review conference will take place in a particularly challenging international security context , owing to the lack of progress in the denuclearisation of the korean peninsula , the us withdrawal from the joint comprehensive plan of action (jcpoa) with iran and from the inf with russia as well as the stalemate in negotiations for the extension of the start between russia and the usa; whereas the current degree of disagreement and division between the 191 npt nuclear-armed and non-armed state parties over the best approach to reducing and eliminating nuclear weapons will add a further challenge to the debate;


### n. whereas the worsening of the global security environment is further exacerbated by growing mistrust among states and nations , and the modernisation of arsenals has been advanced by new technologies that increase global security risks , in particular in relation with possible cyberattacks against nuclear weapons , their command , control and early warning systems , as well as by an increasing role of nuclear weapons in national policies , strategies and doctrines; whereas some states are pursuing nuclear weapons that allow for battlefield use; ### deleted


### u. whereas the ‘stepping stone’ approach , presented by sweden , introduces incremental , more easily achievable steps in four main areas aimed at building habits of cooperation , reducing the salience of nuclear weapons , enhancing transparency and reducing nuclear risks , which would allow for the existing disarmament objectives to be fulfilled; ### deleted


### uphold the ‘stepping-stone approach’ proposal put forward by sweden with the aim of building political support for pragmatic , short-term , achievable commitments to the global disarmament regime , the overall goal of which is to rebuild trust and confidence; support measures focused on reducing the salience of nuclear weapons; enhance habits of cooperation among states; reduce nuclear risks; and enhance transparency , as intermediate steps towards facilitating the fulfilment of existing obligations by state parties; ### deleted


### (aa) reaffirm the eu’s continuing commitment to the jcpoa as the best possible means for obtaining assurances of an exclusively peaceful use of nuclear energy by iran , and as a vital tool for enhancing stability and security in the middle east; reiterate the eu’s regret over the withdrawal by the us from the jcpoa and the re-impositions of sanctions; call on iran to return to full compliance with its nuclear-related commitments under the jcpoa and the npt; ### (aa) reaffirm the eu’s continuing commitment to the jcpoa as the best possible means for obtaining assurances of an exclusively peaceful use of nuclear energy by iran , and as a vital tool for enhancing stability and security in the middle east; reiterate the eu’s regret over the withdrawal by the us from the jcpoa and the re-impositions of sanctions; call on iran to return to full compliance with its nuclear-related commitments under the jcpoa and the npt; call upon the united states to reconsider its position on the joint comprehensive plan of action (jcpoa) relating to iran’s nuclear programme , resume its role as a party to the jcpoa and work together with the five other partners to fully implement the vienna agreement;


### c. whereas kosovo continues to struggle with political instability , in particular since the early legislative elections of 6 october 2019; ### c. whereas kosovo has been permanently struggling with political instability , not only since the early legislative elections of 6 october 2019;


### 1. welcomes kosovo’s continued commitment to advancing on its european path , as well as the strong support for european integration among kosovo’s population; ### 1. notes that kosovo , the existence of which is still not recognised by five eu member states , is not eligible to become a member of the european union , given its unstable and criminal nature;


### 5. welcomes the commission’s statement of 26 august 2020 confirming its assessment of kosovo’s ability to benefit from the visa liberalisation regime , and calls on the council to urgently proceed with the adoption of a visa-free regime for the citizens of kosovo; ### deleted


### 5. welcomes the commission’s statement of 26 august 2020 confirming its assessment of kosovo’s ability to benefit from the visa liberalisation regime , and calls on the council to urgently proceed with the adoption of a visa-free regime for the citizens of kosovo; ### 5. opposes strongly , in the light of the worrying criteria put forward by kosovo , any form of visa liberalisation with a view to facilitating entry and residence in the eu for kosovo nationals;


### 10. stresses the need to intensify the fight against corruption , and expresses its serious concern about the abolition of the special anti-corruption department within the kosovo police (kp); ### 10. regrets the lack of substantial results over the last year in the fight against corruption; points out that the government decision to dismantle the anti-corruption task force within the kosovo police undermines the effectiveness of this fight; calls on the kosovo authorities to show determination in combatting corruption at all levels;


### 13. reiterates its support for the work of the specialist chambers and the specialist prosecutor’s office; stresses the importance of the specialist chambers being able to continue their work independently , without any outside interference; ### 13. reiterates its full support for the work of the specialist chambers and the specialist prosecutor’s office; stresses the importance of the specialist chambers being able to continue their work independently , without any outside interference; calls on the kosovo authorities to provide assistance and cooperation in good faith to the specialist prosecutor's office when requested;


### 14. reiterates that selections and appointments for high-level decision-making positions in the civil service and publicly owned enterprises remain of great concern; ### 14. reiterates that selections and appointments for high-level decision-making positions in the civil service and publicly owned enterprises remain of great concern , as the interests of organised crime , which has its origins back in the times of the civil war in kosovo , are often promoted;


### 16. notes that kosovo’s legal and institutional framework broadly guarantees the protection of human and fundamental rights; underlines that challenges remain in its implementation , in particular as regards language rights; ### 16. underlines that challenges remain in the implementation of human and fundamental rights , in particular as regards language rights; expresses great concern at the regular acts of aggression undermining the safety of the populations of the kosovo serb enclaves; calls for measures to be taken to ensure their safety without any direct or indirect involvement of the kosovo police and armed forces;


### 24. welcomes kosovo’s efforts in maintaining constructive neighbourly relations throughout the region and in proactively aligning with the eu’s common foreign and security policy (cfsp); ### 24. notes that kosovo’s efforts in maintaining constructive neighbourly relations throughout the region are insufficient and only marginally contribute to stability and security in the context of coexistence among the balkan states;


### 25. stresses that normalisation of relations between serbia and kosovo is a priority and a precondition for eu accession; calls for active and constructive engagement in the eu-facilitated dialogue led by the eu special representative , seeking a comprehensive and legally binding agreement in accordance with international law; reiterates its call to move forward with the full implementation , in good faith and in a timely manner , of all the agreements already reached; ### 25. declares that the mandatory recognition of kosovo by serbia cannot be constantly used by the eu authorities as a means of bringing pressure to bear on the serbian government; recognises that kosovo is the historical heart of the serbian nation and that links between the serbian people and the territory of kosovo must accordingly be maintained , inter alia through a binding international agreement;


### 25. stresses that normalisation of relations between serbia and kosovo is a priority and a precondition for eu accession; calls for active and constructive engagement in the eu-facilitated dialogue led by the eu special representative , seeking a comprehensive and legally binding agreement in accordance with international law; reiterates its call to move forward with the full implementation , in good faith and in a timely manner , of all the agreements already reached; ### 25. stresses that normalisation of relations between serbia and kosovo is a priority and a precondition for eu accession; calls for active and constructive engagement in the eu-facilitated dialogue led by the eu special representative , seeking a comprehensive and legally binding agreement in accordance with international law; reiterates its call to move forward with the full implementation , in good faith and in a timely manner , of all the agreements already reached; calls on the eeas to set up a mechanism to monitor and verify the implementation of all the agreements so far reached and to report periodically to the european parliament about the state of play;


### 26. notes that five member states have not yet recognised kosovo , and reiterates its call for them to do so; stresses that recognition would be beneficial to the normalisation of relations between kosovo and serbia; ### deleted


### 26. notes that five member states have not yet recognised kosovo , and reiterates its call for them to do so; stresses that recognition would be beneficial to the normalisation of relations between kosovo and serbia; ### 26. stresses that the recognition of kosovo must remain at the discretion of the member state diplomatic services and that the european union is not to empowered to interfere in matters such as this that fall within their sovereign remit;


### 26. notes that five member states have not yet recognised kosovo , and reiterates its call for them to do so; stresses that recognition would be beneficial to the normalisation of relations between kosovo and serbia; ### 26. stresses that the independence of kosovo is irreversible; notes that five member states have not yet recognised kosovo , and reiterates its call for them to do so; stresses that recognition would be beneficial to the normalisation of relations between kosovo and serbia;


### 28. reiterates its support for the initiative to establish the regional commission for the establishment of facts about war crimes and other gross human rights violations on the territory of the former yugoslavia (recom); ### 28. reiterates its support for the initiative to establish the regional commission for the establishment of facts about war crimes and other gross human rights violations on the territory of the former yugoslavia (recom); calls on the eu to place the kla on the list of organisations supporting terrorism;


### 35. is deeply concerned that the overwhelming majority of energy in kosovo derives from coal power; urges kosovo to increase the sustainability of its energy sector by diversifying its sources , decentralising production and moving towards renewables; ### 35. is deeply concerned that the overwhelming majority of energy in kosovo derives from coal power; urges kosovo to increase the sustainability of its energy sector by diversifying its sources , decentralising production and moving towards renewables; calls on the kosovo authorities to stick to their commitment to shutting down and decommissioning kosovo a power plant , which is the largest source of air pollution in the country; welcomes the willingness of the european commission to assist the kosovo government in this process both financially and technically;


### 36. expresses serious concern about the continuing high rate of premature deaths due to polluted air; urges the kosovo authorities to tackle air pollution immediately and phase out coal; ### 36. expresses serious concern about the continuing high rate of premature deaths due to polluted air; regrets the lack of any serious public intervention to tackle air pollution; urges the kosovo authorities to take immediately effective steps in this regard and to develop a credible plan to phase out coal;


### a. whereas north macedonia has made consistent progress on its path towards the eu; ### a. whereas north macedonia’s accession to the european union is not desirable , because of both the characteristics of the country and the key objectives of the european union;


### 1. welcomes north macedonia’s clear strategic orientation and commitment to european integration , as manifested by continued implementation of accession-related reforms; ### 1. considers that the decision to open accession negotiations with north macedonia will be highly disadvantageous to all european nations;


### 2. urges the authorities to sustain consensual efforts to strengthen democratic consolidation and the transformation process , fight against corruption , and restore the rule of law , while improving the climate for media and civil society; ### 2. urges the north macedonian authorities to sustain consensual efforts to strengthen democratic consolidation and the transformation process , fight against corruption , and restore the rule of law , while improving the climate for media freedom and transparency and civil society participation;


### 5. acknowledges the adoption of legislation on the prevention of corruption and conflicts of interest , lobbying , access to information , whistle-blower protection , the public prosecutor office , and calls for their effective implementation; ### 5. acknowledges the adoption of legislation on the prevention of corruption and conflicts of interest , lobbying , access to information , whistle-blower protection , the public prosecutor office , and calls for their effective and steady implementation;


### 6. considers the creation of the post of deputy prime minister for anti-corruption and crime , sustainable development and human resources a sign of a clear political commitment to addressing these issues as a matter of priority; ### 6. welcomes the creation of the post of deputy prime minister for anti-corruption and crime , sustainable development and human resources as a sign of a clear political commitment to addressing these issues as a matter of priority;


### 9. calls for continued efforts to tackle organised crime and corruption through effective dissuasion , prevention , detection , financial investigation and sanctions for money laundering , financial crimes and terrorism finance , along with operations aimed at dismantling criminal networks; ### 9. calls for continued efforts to tackle organised crime and corruption through effective dissuasion , prevention , detection , financial investigation and sanctions for money laundering , financial crimes and terrorism finance , along with operations aimed at dismantling criminal networks; calls for more robust measures to be taken against mafia-style criminal organisations such as the uck , which has been particularly active in north macedonia;


### 10. welcomes the positive engagement of the country’s main political forces , enabling adoption of key legislation and a smooth electoral process; ### 10. welcomes the positive and constructive engagement of the country’s main political forces , enabling adoption of key legislation and a smooth electoral process;


### 17. expresses its support for the efforts to ensure inclusive policies to protect the fundamental freedoms and rights of all citizens , with special attention to women , youth , persons with disabilities , non-majority ethnic groups , lgbtqi+ persons , and the low-skilled unemployed; ### 17. expresses its support for the efforts to ensure inclusive policies to protect the fundamental freedoms and rights of all citizens , with special attention to women , youth , persons with disabilities , national minorities , non-majority ethnic groups , lgbtqi+ persons , and the low-skilled unemployed;


### 22. welcomes the country’s efforts in improving cooperation on managing migration and addressing the needs of refugees , asylum seekers and migrants; recalls the need to establish a viable mechanism for managing irregular migratory flows , ensuring international protection and combating people smuggling networks; ### 22. welcomes the country’s efforts in improving cooperation on countering illegal migration and addressing the needs of refugees , asylum seekers and illegal migrants; recalls the need to combat people smuggling networks;


### 41. welcomes north macedonia’s continued commitment to regional initiatives , and calls for the steady implementation of obligations within various regional frameworks that advance the common regional market; ### 41. is concerned at the growing influence of albania in north macedonia by means of intermediary organisations and political parties and underlines the major risk , in the event of north macedonia , albania and kosovo joining the european union together , of the de facto establishment of a ‘greater albania’ , which would seriously increase the likelihood of crime , trafficking , terrorism and floods of migrants throughout the member states;


### 42. invites north macedonia to continue contributing to the eu crisis management operations and increasing its alignment with the common foreign and security policy; ### 42. finds that north macedonia’s recent accession to nato will encourage destabilisation , simmering conflicts and tensions at eu level;


### 42. invites north macedonia to continue contributing to the eu crisis management operations and increasing its alignment with the common foreign and security policy; ### 42. commends the north macedonian participation in common security and defence policy missions and operations; invites north macedonia to maintain its commitment to csdp activities and to seek further involvement in the future , as well as to increase its alignment with the common foreign and security policy;


### – having regard to the council of europe convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence (hereinafter ‘the istanbul convention’) of 11 may 2011 , ### – having regard to the council of europe convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence (hereinafter ‘the istanbul convention’) of 11 may 2011 , but also bearing in mind that not all member states ratified the text ,


### – having regard to the un convention on the rights of the child of 20 november 1989 , ### – having regard to the un convention on the rights of the child of 20 november 1989 and in particular article 7(1) ,


### – having regard to the un convention on the rights of the child of 20 november 1989 , ### – having regard to the un convention on the rights of the child of 20 november 1989 , and its two optional protocols ,


### – having regard to the global compact for safe , orderly and regular migration adopted by the un general assembly on 10 and 11 december 2018 , ### deleted


### – having regard to the global compact for safe , orderly and regular migration adopted by the un general assembly on 10 and 11 december 2018 , ### – having regard to the global compact for safe , orderly and regular migration adopted by the majority of the un general assembly on 10 and 11 december 2018 , but also bearing in mind that not all member states accepted the text in the general assembly ,


### – having regard to the global compact on refugees , affirmed by the un general assembly on 17 december 2018 , ### deleted


### – having regard to the global compact on refugees , affirmed by the un general assembly on 17 december 2018 , ### – having regard to the global compact on refugees , affirmed by the majority of the un general assembly on 17 december 2018 , but also bearing in mind that not all member states accepted the text in the general assembly ,


### 16. calls for the eu and the member states to continue to closely monitor developments that negatively affect governance and civil society space worldwide , and to systematically respond , using all appropriate means , to policies and legislative changes led by authoritarian governments , that are aimed at undermining governance based on fundamental democratic principles and at shrinking civil society space; is of the opinion that synergy between the commission , the eeas and parliament should be strengthened in relation to this matter; ### 16. calls for the eu and the member states to continue to closely monitor developments that negatively affect governance and civil society space worldwide , and to systematically respond , using all appropriate means , to policies and legislative changes led by authoritarian governments , that are aimed at undermining governance based on fundamental democratic principles and at shrinking civil society space;


### 17. stresses the link between the increase in human rights violations and widespread impunity and the lack of accountability in regions and countries devastated by conflicts or marked by politically motivated intimidation , discrimination , harassment and assault , abduction , violent policing , arbitrary arrests and cases of torture; ### 17. stresses the link between the increase in human rights violations and widespread impunity and the lack of accountability in regions and countries devastated by conflicts or marked by politically motivated intimidation , discrimination , harassment and assault , arbitrary arrests , cases of torture and killings; calls to support actions aimed at combating impunity and promote accountability especially in those regions where the dynamics of impunity reward those who bear the greatest responsibility and disempower victims;


### 17. stresses the link between the increase in human rights violations and widespread impunity and the lack of accountability in regions and countries devastated by conflicts or marked by politically motivated intimidation , discrimination , harassment and assault , abduction , violent policing , arbitrary arrests and cases of torture; ### 17. stresses the link between the increase in human rights violations and widespread impunity and the lack of accountability in regions and countries devastated by conflicts or marked by politically motivated intimidation , discrimination , harassment and assault , abduction , violent policing , arbitrary arrests and cases of torture and killings; calls to support actions aimed at combating impunity and promote accountability especially in those regions where the dynamics of impunity reward those who bear the greatest responsibility and disempower victims;


### 17. stresses the link between the increase in human rights violations and widespread impunity and the lack of accountability in regions and countries devastated by conflicts or marked by politically motivated intimidation , discrimination , harassment and assault , abduction , violent policing , arbitrary arrests and cases of torture; ### 17. stresses the link between the increase in human rights violations and widespread impunity and the lack of accountability in regions and countries devastated by conflicts or marked by politically motivated intimidation , discrimination , harassment and assault , abduction , violent policing , arbitrary arrests and cases of torture , in particular , against members of ethnic , racial , religious , political , or cultural minorities;


### 17. stresses the link between the increase in human rights violations and widespread impunity and the lack of accountability in regions and countries devastated by conflicts or marked by politically motivated intimidation , discrimination , harassment and assault , abduction , violent policing , arbitrary arrests and cases of torture; ### 17. stresses the link between the increase in human rights violations and widespread impunity and the lack of accountability in regions and countries devastated by conflicts or marked by politically motivated intimidation , discrimination , harassment and assault , abduction , violent policing , arbitrary arrests and cases of torture; stresses also that in conflicts , minorities and marginalised groups are often particularly severely impacted;


### 18. welcomes the eu’s efforts to promote the universality of the rome statute in 2018 , during which the 20th anniversary of its adoption was celebrated , and reaffirms its unwavering support of the international criminal court; calls on the commission and the eeas to explore ways and present new tools to help the victims of violations of international human rights law and of international humanitarian law to access international justice and obtain remedy and reparation; ### 18. welcomes the eu’s efforts to promote the universality of the rome statute in 2018 , during which the 20th anniversary of its adoption was celebrated , and reaffirms its unwavering support of the international criminal court; calls on the commission and the eeas to explore ways and present new tools to help the victims of violations of international human rights law and of international humanitarian law to access international justice and obtain remedy and reparation; notes that international law is currently under serious pressure and is concerned that , because of its wide jurisdiction , of the 193 un member states , only 122 are members of the icc and only 38 have ratified the kampala amendment which gives the icc powers to prosecute the crime of aggression;


### 19. welcomes the initial discussions within the council regarding the establishment of an eu human rights sanctions mechanism , the so-called ‘magnitsky list’ , allowing for targeted sanctions against individuals complicit in serious human rights violations; ### deleted


### 19. welcomes the initial discussions within the council regarding the establishment of an eu human rights sanctions mechanism , the so-called ‘magnitsky list’ , allowing for targeted sanctions against individuals complicit in serious human rights violations; ### 19. takes note of the initial exploratory discussions within the council regarding the establishment of a possible global eu human rights sanctions mechanism , allowing for targeted sanctions against individuals complicit in serious human rights violations , while noting that no political decision has been made on this issue;


### 19. welcomes the initial discussions within the council regarding the establishment of an eu human rights sanctions mechanism , the so-called ‘magnitsky list’ , allowing for targeted sanctions against individuals complicit in serious human rights violations; ### 19. welcomes the initial discussions within the council regarding the establishment of an eu human rights sanctions mechanism allowing for targeted sanctions against individuals complicit in serious human rights violations; stresses the importance for this system to comply with eu mechanism of judicial review;


### 19. welcomes the initial discussions within the council regarding the establishment of an eu human rights sanctions mechanism , the so-called ‘magnitsky list’ , allowing for targeted sanctions against individuals complicit in serious human rights violations; ### 19. welcomes the initial discussions within the council regarding the establishment of an eu human rights sanctions mechanism , allowing for targeted sanctions against individuals complicit in serious human rights violations;


### a. whereas parliament has a duty and responsibility to exercise its democratic oversight of the common foreign and security policy (cfsp) and common security and defence policy (csdp) and should have the means to fulfil this role; ### a. whereas parliament and the national parliaments have a duty and responsibility to exercise their democratic oversight of the common foreign and security policy (cfsp) and common security and defence policy (csdp) and should have the means to fulfil this role;


### f. whereas new political forces are pushing for their own global and regional ambitions with unpredictable consequences for global security; ### f. whereas network of terroristic groups are pushing for their own global and regional ambitions with unpredictable consequences for global security;


### — having regard to the council conclusions of 10 may 2021 entitled ‘the horn of africa: a geo-strategic priority for the eu’ , ### — having regard to the council conclusions of 10 may 2021 entitled ‘the horn of africa: a geo-strategic priority for the eu’ , and particularly to action 28 regarding access to and respect for sexual and reproductive health and rights ,


### — having regard to resolution 376 of the african commission on human and peoples’ rights , adopted in may 2017 , ### — having regard to resolutions 275 (lv) 2014 on protection against violence and other human rights violations against persons on the basis of their real or imputed sexual orientation or gender identity and 376 (lx) 2017 on the situation of human rights defenders in africa of the african commission on human and peoples’ rights ,


### coordinate eu initiatives and support with african counterparts by favouring african ownership of the programmes whenever possible , thus helping to find african solutions to african problems; adopt , in this regard , a conditionality approach based on the more for more and less for less principle; ### coordinate eu initiatives and support with african counterparts by favouring african ownership of the programmes whenever possible , thus helping to find african solutions to african problems; adopt , in this regard , a conditionality approach based on the more for more and less for less principle; emphasise , enable and facilitate the strengthening of a context-based and bottom-up approach , where local communities and csos can work to build their own capacity , prepare , coordinate and organise better to become more resilient , in line with the eu’s humanitarian-development-peace nexus approach;


### coordinate efforts in the region with the african union and its regional components , as well as with the un and other like-minded partners; ### coordinate efforts in the region with the african union and its regional components , most notably the east african community (eac) and the intergovernmental authority on development (igad) , as well as with the united nations and other like minded international organisations and individual countries , such as the us , the uk , norway , canada , australia , and new zealand both in the framework of multilateral fora and at a bilateral level;


### contribute to regional security and stability both through conflict resolution and mediation activities and by addressing the root causes of conflicts; ### recognise that increased instability in the horn of africa represents a serious threat to the whole of africa economic and social prospects , as well as to the union’s security interests; contribute to the regional security and stability both through conflict resolution , mediation , and reconciliation activities , supporting african owned processes within the au , the igad and the eac , and addressing the root causes of conflicts such as , inter alia , extreme poverty and inequality , the consequences of climate change , longstanding border disputes , extremism and radicalization;


### support all diplomatic efforts devoted to ending the ongoing conflict within ethiopia , both at national level and in the forums provided by the african union , in order to agree on a permanent ceasefire and facilitate internal reconciliation; ### support all diplomatic efforts devoted to ending the ongoing conflict within ethiopia , both at national level and in the forums provided by the african union , in order to agree on a permanent ceasefire and to facilitate the internal reconciliation; coordinate support between relevant national and international institutions and the ethiopian government in the resumption of health , education and other public facilities and services , including relief services to idps and conflict affected populations;


### provide the countries affected by conflicts and natural disasters with prompt and adequate humanitarian assistance , in coordination with like-minded partners; ### coordinate with like-minded partners and international organisations to keep providing the countries affected by conflicts and natural disasters with prompt and adequate humanitarian assistance; recognise the linkages between the climate crisis , peace and conflicts , and the need for peace building and climate adaptation and mitigation efforts to address them; pay special attention to the specific human security implications of climate change , especially for marginalised groups;


### acknowledge the positive impacts of operation atlanta in guaranteeing maritime security , and take note of the non-extension of its mandate within the unsc; call on the member states to show adequate commitment to the eu training mission in somalia both in terms of personnel and means , in order to empower the somali armed forces to guarantee security in the country; ### acknowledge the positive impacts of eunavfor atalanta in guaranteeing maritime security , and regret the non-extension of its mandate within the unsc; commend the positive results already achieved by eucap somalia in the civilian law-enforcement domain , and ensure that the mission has sufficient means and personnel for being effective; call on the member states to show adequate commitment to eutm somalia both in terms of personnel and means , in order to empower somali armed forces to guarantee security in the country;


### take note of the growing activity of terrorist groups in the whole region , and provide tailored and effective assistance to the affected countries in countering both the immediate effects of this expansion and the root causes of extremism and radicalisation; ### take note of the growing activity of terrorist groups in the whole region , most notably al-shabab , al-qaeda , and daesh , and provide tailored and effective assistance to the affected countries in countering both the immediate effects of this expansion and the root causes that lead to extremism and radicalisation; recognise that the relevance and capability to operate of terrorist organisations in the region are further strengthened by the permeability of national borders , and support national and regional efforts to increase border security; work in cooperation with individual countries and regional organisations (most notably eca , igad and the eastern african standby force - easf) in order to adopt a regional approach in fighting terrorism and addressing its root causes;


### ensure that assistance channelled through the european peace facility abides by european fundamental values and helps in building a transparent , accountable and reliable security sector; ### provide tailored and request-driven support to the au , its regional components and individual countries in their efforts to build up conditions for security and stability , most notably through the operationalisation of the african peace and security architecture , the african standby force and its regional components , and the continental early warning mechanism; ensure that assistance channelled through the european peace facility abides by european fundamental values and helps in building a transparent , accountable and reliable security sector; fully exploit the potential of the epf in this regard and ensure continuity with the former apf in terms of quality and quantity of funding of african-led initiatives; ensure that all epf financing commitments made with the hoa before the russian criminal invasion of ukraine are fulfilled;


### fully support democratic transitions , the rule of law and state-building processes and promote an open political space; deploy , whenever possible , election observation missions; ### fully support democratic transitions , the rule of law and state-building processes and promote an open political space; mobilise , whenever possible , pre-electoral and electoral eu missions to accompany electoral processes; support strategies for fostering inclusive reconciliation processes with the aim to establish credible and representative institutions that foresee the participation of the various ethnic and religious communities; engage particularly with somalia , ethiopia , and sudan to scale-up efforts to include under-represented communities in high-level politics and governing bodies and assist partner countries in addressing disaffection and distrust towards national authorities through confidence building measures;


### mainstream transitional justice into its conflict management approach in the region and support the fight against impunity; ### mainstream transitional justice into its conflict management approach in the region; prioritise , in our support to transitional justice efforts , locally and nationally driven processes as well as local and regional experts; step up our engagement with partner countries and with international and regional organisations to support fight against impunity and promote truth , justice , reparations and guarantees of non-recurrence;


### take note of the region’s demographic development and recognise the role of young people in achieving economic sustainable development; strengthen eu support for access to education and vocational training , and the upskilling and reskilling of the workforce , according to the needs of the labour market; ### take note of the region’s demographic development and recognise the role of young people in achieving economic sustainable development; strengthen eu support in the field of access to education and vocational training , and the upskilling and reskilling of the workforce , according to the needs of the labour market; insist that empowering and giving real prospect to the young generations could bear multiple benefits for the whole region;


### scale up common actions in the fight against climate change , in particular in mitigation , adaptation , resilience and disaster risk management; share the benefits of the european green deal with our partners and support them in adopting their own climate transition agendas by sharing best practices and aligning , when possible , eu initiatives in this field with existing african initiatives; pay special attention to the human security implications of climate change; ### recognise that climate change seriously affects the horn of africa , with far-reaching consequences for the stability of the region; scale up common actions in the area of mitigation , adaptation , resilience and disaster risk management; share the benefits of the european green deal with our partners and support them in adopting their own climate transition agendas by sharing best green and sustainable practices and aligning , when possible , eu initiatives in this field with existing african initiatives;


### devote particular attention to widespread , locally-owned projects that are more effective in improving people’s lives , i.e. off-grid solar power systems , in particular in the most remote areas; ### recognise that the eu is most relevant when it adopts models of support , assistance , and cooperation that put communities at the centre; devote particular attention to widespread , locally-owned projects , especially in the most remote areas , that are less invasive from an environmental point of view but more effective in improving people's lives , i.e. off-grid solar power systems , irrigation systems , water purification and sanitation systems;


### adopt a holistic , conflict-sensitive approach to cooperation on migration , in line with the khartoum process , taking into account the different drivers of migration in the region and the persistent vulnerability of migrants , respecting the rights of migrants and refugees , and recognising the benefits of circular migration and regional mobility; ### adopt a holistic , conflict-sensitive approach to cooperation on migration , in line with the khartoum process , taking into account the different drivers of migration in the region and the persistent vulnerability of migrants , respecting the rights of migrants and refugees , and recognising the benefits of circular migration and regional mobility; work with our partners to resume the khartoum process activities and to reconfigure it in a way that reflects the current realities and the several limitations linked to travel possibilities;


### provide assistance and support to the countries hosting and assisting refugees; facilitate the relocation of displaced persons and internally displaced persons; ### provide immediate assistance and long-term support to the countries hosting and assisting refugees in order to secure their protection; facilitate the relocation of displaced persons and idps fleeing conflict , famine and other major drivers of forced displacement; coordinate diplomatic efforts to call on the governments of countries in the region involved in ongoing conflicts to halt indiscriminate attacks against civilians and civilian infrastructures , and to protect the civilian population , including taking all steps to ensure that refugees and idps are protected and given full access to humanitarian aid , including food , water and shelter;


### adopt a team europe approach in the region , working with a wide spectrum of actors , including from the private sector , in supporting african-owned initiatives; ### adopt a team europe approach in the region , working with a wide spectrum of partners and actors , including from the private sector , in supporting african-owned initiatives; keep monitoring and supporting the horn of africa initiative , to which the eu is a strategic partner , and its objective of crowding in capital to support connectivity and unlock opportunities in the region , creating jobs , mitigating emerging risks , strengthening resilience and paving the way to improved neighbourly relations;


### acknowledge that efficient infrastructures are key to consistent , sustainable and fair development in the region; fully exploit the potential of new eu-sponsored initiatives aiming at enhancing regional integration and connectivity; increase consultation and coordination with african counterparts in the definition of specific projects to be developed in the global gateway framework; ### acknowledge that efficient infrastructures are key to consistent , sustainable and fair development in the region; fully exploit the potential of new eu-sponsored initiatives aiming at enhancing regional integration and connectivity , most notably the global gateway initiative; increase consultation and coordination with african counterparts in the definition of specific projects to be developed in the global gateway framework , building on the positive outcomes of the 6th eu-au summit;


### take note of the growing , multifaceted influence of third parties in the region; recognise that the increasing presence of actors that do not share the union`s values , interests and objectives could undermine the eu’s role as a privileged partner; ### take note of the growing , multifaceted influence of third parties in the region , which is often reinforced through propaganda and disinformation campaigns aiming at magnifying the role played by these actors in the region , while also undermining the actions set in place by their competitors , including the eu , thus fuelling an anti-western narrative; recognise that the increasing presence of actors that do not share the union`s values , interests and objectives could undermine the eu’s role as a privileged partner;


### reinforce strategic communication through effective and fact-based campaigns about eu actions and eu sponsored initiatives in the region , underlining their added value for local communities , sustainable development and inclusive growth , while also countering disinformation and false narratives from third parties; ### reinforce strategic communication through effective and fact-based campaigns in order to be more present also at the local level and inform about eu actions and eu sponsored initiatives in the region , underlining their added value for local communities , sustainable development , and inclusive growth , while also countering disinformation and false narratives from third parties;


### b. whereas the southern neighbourhood should not be seen in a vacuum , but in close correlation with the eastern neighbourhood and an overall reflection on how to pursue closer relations between the eu and its neighbours; whereas both the eu’s southern and eastern neighbourhoods are strategic for the eu in that they can ensure shorter and , therefore , more secure and more effective supply lines; whereas the eu should pursue a common regulatory space that includes its southern and eastern neighbourhoods , and therefore ensures access for its neighbouring countries to the highest policy standards , which are multipliers of economic investment and economic growth; ### b. whereas the southern neighbourhood should not be seen in a vacuum , but in close correlation with the eastern neighbourhood and an overall strategic reflection on how to pursue closer and mutually beneficial relations between the eu and its neighbours; whereas both the eu’s southern and eastern neighbourhoods are strategic for the eu in that they can ensure shorter and , therefore , more secure and more effective supply lines; whereas the eu should pursue a common regulatory space that includes its southern and eastern neighbourhoods , and therefore ensures access for its neighbouring countries to the highest policy standards , which are multipliers of economic investment and fair and sustainable economic growth;


### c. whereas the war in ukraine has underlined the threat posed by third countries that seek political and economic hegemony in the eu’s neighbourhood to the detriment of the democratic aspirations and territorial integrity of target countries; whereas russia , china and iran are all seeking to increase their capacity to exercise political and/or economic hegemony in certain southern neighbourhood countries and , therefore , the eu’s capacity-building for fighting disinformation and promoting freedom of the press is crucial; whereas the eu should reaffirm its role as the primary political , economic and democratic anchor for the countries of the southern neighbourhood; ### c. whereas the war in ukraine has underlined the threat posed by third countries that seek political and economic hegemony in the eu’s neighbourhood to the detriment of the democratic aspirations and territorial integrity of target countries; whereas russia , china and iran , among others , are all seeking to increase their capacity to exercise political and/or economic hegemony in certain southern neighbourhood countries and , therefore , the eu’s capacity-building for fighting disinformation and promoting freedom of the press is crucial and needs to be scaled-up; whereas the eu should reaffirm its role as the primary political , economic and democratic anchor for the countries of the southern neighbourhood;