### 66. points out that digital platforms are also used to spread disinformation , acting as networks for propaganda , trolling and harassment with the aim of undermining electoral processes; stresses that machine learning enables in particular the targeted use of personal data to create personalised and convincing messages for potential voters , who are often completely unaware that the content has been created or manipulated through the use of ai; ### 66. points out that digital platforms are also used to spread disinformation and deepfakes , acting as networks for propaganda , trolling and harassment with the aim of undermining electoral processes; stresses that machine learning enables in particular the targeted use of personal data to create personalised and convincing messages for potential voters , who are often completely unaware that the content has been created or manipulated through the use of ai; highlights in this respect the need to extend the european democracy action plan in order to mitigate that risk , while considering the complete ban of deepfakes technologies in political advertisements and communication;


### 66. points out that digital platforms are also used to spread disinformation , acting as networks for propaganda , trolling and harassment with the aim of undermining electoral processes; stresses that machine learning enables in particular the targeted use of personal data to create personalised and convincing messages for potential voters , who are often completely unaware that the content has been created or manipulated through the use of ai; ### 66. points out that digital platforms can also be used to spread disinformation and foreign interference in electoral processes; stresses that machine learning enables in particular the targeted use of personal data to manipulate unaware voters , by creating personalised and convincing messages;


### 67. underlines that ai could , however , also be used to reduce anti-democratic and unethical activities on platforms and as a means to stop the distribution of fake news; notes that the effective use of ai for this purpose has so far been prevented by strongly diverging definitions of hate speech among member states and the lack of consensus on how to harness ai to effectively filter out illegal and harmful content; explains that it is also problematic that divisive language leads to greater user engagement , which is why removal of such language would be in direct conflict with the platform’s business model , based on maximising user engagement; ### 67. underlines that ai could , however , also be used as a tool to reduce anti-democratic and unethical activities on platforms and as a means to stop the distribution of fake news , even though its abilities to understand context have shown so far very poor results; is concerned that divisive language leads to greater user engagement , which is why removal of such language would be in direct conflict with the platform’s business model , based on maximising user engagement , for example through click-baiting and content amplification;


### 68. stresses that bias in ai systems often occurs due to a lack of diverse and high-quality training data , for instance where data sets are used which do not sufficiently cover discriminated groups , or where the task definition or requirement setting themselves were biased; notes that bias can also arise due to a limited volume of training data , which can result from overly strict data protection provisions , or where a biased ai developer has compromised the algorithm; points out that some biases in the form of reasoned differentiation are , on the other hand , also intentionally created in order to improve the ai’s learning performance under certain circumstances; ### 68. stresses that bias in ai systems often occurs due to a lack of diverse and high-quality training data , for instance where data sets are used which do not sufficiently cover discriminated groups , or where the task definition or requirement setting themselves were biased; further notes that the categorisation of individuals according to some particular variables may be intrinsically biased , especially if it requires individuals to define with one of a narrow set of categories; notes that bias can also arise where a biased ai developer has compromised the algorithm; points out that some biases in the form of reasoned differentiation are , on the other hand , also intentionally created in order to improve the ai’s learning performance under certain circumstances;


### 68. stresses that bias in ai systems often occurs due to a lack of diverse and high-quality training data , for instance where data sets are used which do not sufficiently cover discriminated groups , or where the task definition or requirement setting themselves were biased; notes that bias can also arise due to a limited volume of training data , which can result from overly strict data protection provisions , or where a biased ai developer has compromised the algorithm; points out that some biases in the form of reasoned differentiation are , on the other hand , also intentionally created in order to improve the ai’s learning performance under certain circumstances; ### 68. stresses that bias in ai systems often occurs due to a lack of diverse , updated and high-quality training data , for instance where datasets are used which do not sufficiently cover discriminated or vulnerable groups , or where the task definition or requirement setting themselves were biased for their very design; notes that bias can also arise due to the lack of diversity in ai developers teams , reiterating intrinsic biases , or to a limited volume of training data , which can result from lack of access to non-personal data , especially for smes;


### 69. raises the question of whether certain biases can be resolved by using more diverse datasets , given the structural biases present in our society; specifies in this regard that algorithms learn to be as discriminatory as the society they observe and then suggest decisions that are inherently discriminatory , which again contributes to exacerbating discrimination within society; concludes that there is therefore no such thing as a completely impartial and objective algorithm; ### 69. notes that certain biases cannot be completely resolved by using more diverse datasets , given the structural biases present in our society; specifies in this regard that algorithms learn to be as discriminatory as the society they observe and then suggest decisions that are inherently discriminatory , which again contributes to exacerbating discrimination within society; calls hence for proper risk assessment on high-risk use cases and integrating bias-risk assessment to the full lifecycle of the ai system; and encourages new innovations and practices that seek to mitigate these biases and even aims to turn ai to an asset in fighting bias and discrimination in certain situations , and a force for equal rights and positive social change;


### 69. raises the question of whether certain biases can be resolved by using more diverse datasets , given the structural biases present in our society; specifies in this regard that algorithms learn to be as discriminatory as the society they observe and then suggest decisions that are inherently discriminatory , which again contributes to exacerbating discrimination within society; concludes that there is therefore no such thing as a completely impartial and objective algorithm; ### 69. raises the question of whether certain biases can be resolved by using more diverse datasets , given the structural biases present in our society; specifies in this regard that algorithms learn to be discriminatory through the data used to train them and then suggest decisions that are inherently discriminatory , which again contributes to exacerbating discrimination within society; concludes that there is therefore no such thing as a completely impartial and objective algorithm; stresses , furthermore , that there are methodologies that try to reduce the likelihood of obtaining models that encode discriminatory decisions internally;


### 69. raises the question of whether certain biases can be resolved by using more diverse datasets , given the structural biases present in our society; specifies in this regard that algorithms learn to be as discriminatory as the society they observe and then suggest decisions that are inherently discriminatory , which again contributes to exacerbating discrimination within society; concludes that there is therefore no such thing as a completely impartial and objective algorithm; ### 69. raises the question of whether certain biases can be resolved by using more diverse datasets , given the structural biases present in our society; specifies in this regard that algorithms learn to be as discriminatory as the society they observe and then suggest decisions that are inherently discriminatory , which again contributes to exacerbating discrimination within society; concludes that it is therefore necessary to establish different control layers on ai systems software , algorithms and data used and produced by them , in order to minimise the risk;


### 69. raises the question of whether certain biases can be resolved by using more diverse datasets , given the structural biases present in our society; specifies in this regard that algorithms learn to be as discriminatory as the society they observe and then suggest decisions that are inherently discriminatory , which again contributes to exacerbating discrimination within society; concludes that there is therefore no such thing as a completely impartial and objective algorithm; ### 69. raises the question of whether certain biases can be resolved by using more diverse datasets , given the structural biases present in our society; specifies in this regard that algorithms learn to be as discriminatory as the society they observe and then suggest decisions that are inherently discriminatory , which again contributes to exacerbating discrimination within society; concludes that there is therefore no such thing as a completely impartial and objective algorithm , which begs the possibility that algorithms are not suited for certain tasks;


### 69. raises the question of whether certain biases can be resolved by using more diverse datasets , given the structural biases present in our society; specifies in this regard that algorithms learn to be as discriminatory as the society they observe and then suggest decisions that are inherently discriminatory , which again contributes to exacerbating discrimination within society; concludes that there is therefore no such thing as a completely impartial and objective algorithm; ### 69. raises the question of whether certain biases can be solved by using more diverse datasets , given the structural biases present in our society; is concerned in this regard that algorithms learn to be as discriminatory as the society they observe and then suggest decisions that are inherently discriminatory , which again contributes to exacerbating discrimination within society; states that this amplifies even more the sensitivity and the risks of using them to take decisions impacting people or society;


### 70. believes that that the adoption of ai , if combined with the necessary support infrastructure and training , can substantially increase productivity , innovation , growth and job creation , with expectations of labour productivity set to increase by 11-37 %26 by 2035; ### 70. underlines that the eu must promote a socially responsible use of ai fully respecting workers' rights and decent working conditions , a work-life balance with the right to disconnect and improving access to the labour market , while safeguarding the rights to privacy , health and safety , and prohibiting any discriminatory and illegal surveillance of workers;


### 71. stresses that although ai may replace some tasks , including mundane , labour-intensive or dangerous tasks , it will create new , higher value-added employment; stresses that ai is currently substituting or complementing humans in a subset of tasks but that it is not yet having detectable aggregate labour market consequences27 ; stresses , however , the potential for an increase in income inequality if ai is augmenting high-skill occupations and replacing low-skill occupations , and that such possible effects need to be prepared for; ### 71. stresses that although ai may replace some tasks , including mundane , labour-intensive or dangerous tasks , it will create new , higher value-added employment where ai is used to augment , not replace human capacities26b;stresses that ai is currently substituting or complementing humans in a subset of tasks but that it is not yet having detectable aggregate labour market consequences27;stresses , however , the potential for an increase in income inequality if ai is augmenting high-skill occupations and replacing low-skill occupations , and that such possible effects need to be prepared for; calls for efforts to balance the workforce developing ai through facilitating the entry of women and other underrepresented groups in the ai professions and initiatives to promote diversity in all phases of ai-system development;


### 71. stresses that although ai may replace some tasks , including mundane , labour-intensive or dangerous tasks , it will create new , higher value-added employment; stresses that ai is currently substituting or complementing humans in a subset of tasks but that it is not yet having detectable aggregate labour market consequences27 ; stresses , however , the potential for an increase in income inequality if ai is augmenting high-skill occupations and replacing low-skill occupations , and that such possible effects need to be prepared for; ### 71. stresses that although ai may replace some tasks , including mundane , repetitive , heavy , labour-intensive or dangerous ones , it can create new , higher quality employment , leaving more time for stimulating tasks and career development; stresses that ai is currently already substituting or complementing humans in a subset of tasks but that it is not yet having detectable significant aggregate labour market consequences; stresses , however , the potential for an increase in income inequality if ai increases high-skill occupations and replaces low-skill occupations , and that such possible effects need to be mitigated , by appropriate measures , such as possible universal income measures; adds on the other hand that jobs with a more human character , requiring empathy , such as care jobs , are likely to remain , as ai cannot fully replace humans in these tasks;


### 71. stresses that although ai may replace some tasks , including mundane , labour-intensive or dangerous tasks , it will create new , higher value-added employment; stresses that ai is currently substituting or complementing humans in a subset of tasks but that it is not yet having detectable aggregate labour market consequences27 ; stresses , however , the potential for an increase in income inequality if ai is augmenting high-skill occupations and replacing low-skill occupations , and that such possible effects need to be prepared for; ### 71. stresses that although ai may replace some tasks , including mundane , labour-intensive or dangerous tasks , it will create new , higher value-added employment; stresses that ai is currently substituting or complementing humans in a subset of tasks but that it is not yet having detectable aggregate labour market consequences27 ; stresses , however , the potential for an increase in income inequality if ai is augmenting high-skill occupations and replacing low-skill occupations , and that such possible effects need to be prepared for; is of the opinion that the creation of an "ai adjustment fund" could be beneficial for member states to cover the accustoming of their labour markets to new conditions arising from rapid mass introduction of ai systems which could affect specific job sectors;


### 71. stresses that although ai may replace some tasks , including mundane , labour-intensive or dangerous tasks , it will create new , higher value-added employment; stresses that ai is currently substituting or complementing humans in a subset of tasks but that it is not yet having detectable aggregate labour market consequences27 ; stresses , however , the potential for an increase in income inequality if ai is augmenting high-skill occupations and replacing low-skill occupations , and that such possible effects need to be prepared for; ### 71. stresses that although ai will replace some tasks , including mundane , labour-intensive or dangerous tasks , it will create new , higher value-added employment; stresses that ai is currently substituting or complementing humans in a subset of tasks but that it is not yet having detectable aggregate labour market consequences27 ; stresses , however , the potential for an increase in income inequality if ai is augmenting high-skill occupations and replacing low-skill occupations , and that such possible effects need to be prepared for by investing in reskilling and upskilling of the workforce with a focus on underrepresented groups such as women and minorities , which are likely to be most affected by this transition;


### 72. highlights that ai implementation also represents an opportunity for significant cultural change within organisations , including improved workplace safety , better work-life balance and more effective training and guidance; is of the opinion that human-empowering ai applications could also create new job opportunities , in particular for those who , because of natural restrictions such as disabilities or living circumstances , were initially bound to less qualified jobs; ### 72. highlights that ai uptake can also represent an opportunity for significant cultural change within organisations , including improved workplace safety , better work-life balance , the right to disconnect and more effective training opportunities and guidance; is of the opinion that human-empowering ai applications could also create new job opportunities , in particular for those who , because of natural restrictions such as disabilities or living circumstances , were initially bound to less qualified jobs;


### 73. is concerned about ai-fuelled surveillance in the workplace and teleworking environment , as well as in the school environment , in the light of the fundamental right to privacy , data protection and the human dignity of the worker , as well as the fundamental rights of children; ### 73. is concerned about the increased recourse to ai-fuelled surveillance in the workplace , particularly with the emergence of teleworking , often occurring without the workers’ knowledge , let alone their consent; sustains that this practice should not be allowed , as it is extremely abusive of the fundamental right to privacy , data protection and the human dignity of the worker , and has also negative effects on their mental health;


### 73. is concerned about ai-fuelled surveillance in the workplace and teleworking environment , as well as in the school environment , in the light of the fundamental right to privacy , data protection and the human dignity of the worker , as well as the fundamental rights of children; ### 73. is concerned about ai-fuelled surveillance in the workplace and teleworking environment , as well as in the school environment , in the light of the fundamental right to privacy , data protection and the human dignity of the worker , as well as the fundamental rights of children due to the degree of intrusion , its blanket or indiscriminate effect , or lack of safeguards for affected individuals;


### 74. considers that the adaptation of the workforce in terms of ai education and retraining is of vital importance , as 52 %28 of the current european workforce urgently requires retraining; highlights that current concepts of learning and working are still defined to too great an extent by the job market needs of a pre-digital world , which also contributes to a growing skills gap and a new digital divide for both citizens and businesses who do not have access to a secure digital space; stresses that enhancing digital literacy contributes to achieving the sdgs , in particular those on education , human capital and infrastructure; ### 74. considers that the adaptation of the workforce in terms of ai education , life-long learning and reskilling is of vital importance; highlights that current concepts of learning and working are still defined to too great an extent by the pre-digital world , which also contributes to a growing skills gap and a new digital divide for citizens who do not have access to a secure digital space; stresses that enhancing digital literacy contributes to achieving the sdgs , in particular those on education , human capital and infrastructure;


### 75. stresses that more than 70 % of businesses report a lack of staff with adequate digital and ai skills as an obstacle to investment; is concerned that as of 2019 , there were 7.8 million ict specialists in the eu , with a prior annual growth rate of 4.2 % , which is far short of the 20 million experts that are needed for key areas such as data analysis , as projected by the commission; is concerned about the extensive gender gap in this area , with only one in six ict specialists and one in three science , technology , engineering and mathematics (stem) graduates being female29 ; ### 75. stresses that more than 70 % of businesses report a lack of staff with adequate digital and ai skills as an obstacle to investment; is concerned that as of 2019 , there were 7.8 million ict specialists in the eu , with a prior annual growth rate of 4.2 % , which is far short of the 20 million experts that are needed for key areas such as data analysis , as projected by the commission; is concerned about the extensive gender gap in this area , with only one in six ict specialists and one in three science , technology , engineering and mathematics (stem) graduates being female29 ; stresses that this gap inevitably results in biased algorithms;


### g) three recurring findings in all six case studies ### g) recurring findings in all six case studies


### security and military deterrence ### security


### 76. notes that there are a number of transversal obstacles that the eu needs to overcome in order to achieve a widespread use of ai and to fully harness its benefits; states that in particular , legal uncertainty , insufficient digital infrastructure and a lack of ai skills can be observed as barriers to the successful application of ai in all fields analysed; ### 76. notes that there are a number of transversal obstacles that the eu needs to overcome in order to achieve a widespread use of ai and to fully harness its benefits; states that in particular , legal uncertainty , insufficient digital infrastructure and a lack of ai skills can be observed as barriers to the successful application of ai in all fields analysed; stresses that initiatives such as ellis reveal that european researchers are responsible for a significant proportion of research into ai , in particular modern research based on machine learning; emphasises that while europe appears therefore to be highly competitive , the danger is that other states are investing more and this could in the long term shift the balance in this field away from europe;


### 76. notes that there are a number of transversal obstacles that the eu needs to overcome in order to achieve a widespread use of ai and to fully harness its benefits; states that in particular , legal uncertainty , insufficient digital infrastructure and a lack of ai skills can be observed as barriers to the successful application of ai in all fields analysed; ### 76. notes that there are a number of transversal obstacles that the eu needs to overcome in order to allow for the uptake of ai in accordance with eu principles , values and legislation and to fully harness its benefits; states that in particular , legal uncertainty , market fragmentation , insufficient digital infrastructure and a lack of ai skills can be observed as barriers to the successful application of ai in all fields analysed;


### 77. concludes from the case studies examined , furthermore , that it is not specific ai technologies themselves that are risky , but certain use cases; points in particular to dual-use ai systems such as drones , the uses of which can vary drastically from consumer recreation to warfare , with the worst-case scenario being swarms of inexpensive , armed microdrones used to kill specific human targets; ### 77. concludes that the risk from ai technologies is dependent on not only the technology itself , but also on how it can be used , including unintended , and how widely it is deployed; adds moreover the fundamental role of meaningful human oversight in ensuring appropriate use and useful outcomes;


### 77. concludes from the case studies examined , furthermore , that it is not specific ai technologies themselves that are risky , but certain use cases; points in particular to dual-use ai systems such as drones , the uses of which can vary drastically from consumer recreation to warfare , with the worst-case scenario being swarms of inexpensive , armed microdrones used to kill specific human targets; ### 77. concludes from the case studies examined , furthermore , that it is not specific ai technologies themselves that are risky , but certain use cases and areas of application; points in particular to dual-use ai systems such as drones , the uses of which can vary drastically from consumer recreation to warfare , with the worst-case scenario being swarms of inexpensive , armed microdrones used to kill specific human targets;


### 78. states that while it is important to examine and categorise potential risks posed by ai , the case studies illustrated that ai technologies also enable us to apply , in most cases , very effective counter measures that are able to mitigate or eliminate the very same risks; underlines that , as ai is still in its early stages of development within a wider context of emerging technologies , its real potential can still only be imagined; stresses that the promise and potential benefits of ai in economic and societal terms appear to be tremendous; ### deleted


### 78. states that while it is important to examine and categorise potential risks posed by ai , the case studies illustrated that ai technologies also enable us to apply , in most cases , very effective counter measures that are able to mitigate or eliminate the very same risks; underlines that , as ai is still in its early stages of development within a wider context of emerging technologies , its real potential can still only be imagined; stresses that the promise and potential benefits of ai in economic and societal terms appear to be tremendous; ### 78. underlines that , as ai is still in its early stages of development within a wider context of emerging technologies , its real potential as well as risks are not certain; stresses that the promise and potential benefits of ai in economic and societal terms appear to be tremendous;


### 78. states that while it is important to examine and categorise potential risks posed by ai , the case studies illustrated that ai technologies also enable us to apply , in most cases , very effective counter measures that are able to mitigate or eliminate the very same risks; underlines that , as ai is still in its early stages of development within a wider context of emerging technologies , its real potential can still only be imagined; stresses that the promise and potential benefits of ai in economic and societal terms appear to be tremendous; ### 78. states that while it is important to examine and categorise potential risks posed by ai , the case studies illustrated that ai technologies also enable us to apply , in most cases , very effective counter measures that are able to mitigate or eliminate the very same risks; underlines that , as ai is still in its early stages of development within a wider context of emerging technologies , its real potential can still only be imagined; stresses that the promise and potential benefits of ai in economic and societal terms appear to be tremendous both in europe and globally;


### 79. observes fierce ai competition that involves not only the two frontrunners , the us and china , but also countries such as canada , india , israel , japan , russia , south korea and the uk; underlines that the previous chapter has already indicated that the eu is so far struggling to meet its aspiration30 of becoming a global leader in ai; ### deleted


### 81. notes that the us refrains from introducing horizontal legislation in the digital field , while focusing instead on sector-specific laws and private sector innovation , in particular among its tech giants and leading universities; observes that the us approach on ai up to 2019 can therefore be summarised as providing legal guidance to businesses , investing in research projects and removing barriers to innovation; ### 81. notes that the us is also discussing on introducing horizontal legislation in the digital field , despite its traditional focus on litigation , sector-specific laws and private sector innovation , in particular among its tech giants and leading universities; observes that the us approach on ai up to 2019 can therefore be summarised as providing legal guidance to businesses , investing in research projects and removing barriers to innovation , but that recent developments show an increasingly active policy-making role;


### 82. stresses that the 2019 american ai initiative act ushered in a slight realignment , as besides redirecting funding , retraining workers and strengthening digital infrastructure , the us government announced the development of common standards for trustworthy ai; notes , however , that the resulting 10 principles were very broadly formulated in order to allow each government agency to create sector-specific regulations; expects that although the administration of president biden plans to bring forward a new bill of rights to limit ai harms in 2022 , the us approach will remain market-driven , aiming to avoid regulatory overreach; ### 82. stresses that the 2019 american ai initiative act ushered in a slight realignment , as besides redirecting funding , retraining workers and strengthening digital infrastructure , the us government announced the development of common standards for trustworthy ai; notes , however , that the resulting 10 principles were very broadly formulated in order to allow each government agency to create sector-specific regulations;


### 83. highlights that chinese president xi jinping underlined as early as 2013 the importance of technologies in geopolitics , the role of public policies in defining long-term objectives and the fact that ai offers an opportunity to overtake the us in terms of military supremacy; stresses further that the chinese government subsequently put forward the made in china 2025 plan in 2015 and the next generation ai development plan in 2017 , both of which had the clear targets of making china the global leader in ai by 2030; notes that the 2018 ai standardisation white paper further outlined how the socialist market economy can develop international standards and strategically engage in international standardisation organisations; ### 83. highlights that chinese president xi jinping underlined as early as 2013 the importance of technologies in geopolitics , the role of public policies in defining long-term objectives and the fact that ai offers an opportunity to overtake the us; stresses further that the chinese government subsequently put forward the made in china 2025 plan in 2015 and the next generation ai development plan in 2017 , both of which had the clear targets of making china the global leader in ai by 2030; notes that the 2018 ai standardisation white paper further outlined how the socialist market economy can develop international standards and strategically engage in international standardisation organisations; adds the recent activism of the chinese government in introducing rules on recommender systems as well as an ethics code on ai;


### 84. observes that on the global stage , china actively promotes international ai partnership as a way to export its own ai-based government surveillance practices , social scoring system and censorship strategies; emphasises that heavy investment abroad under the digital silk road initiative are also used as a means to spread chinese ai globally and to bring other countries under chinese influence; concludes that the chinese approach is therefore built upon deploying ai domestically as well as exporting ai technologies that follow predetermined standards that are in line with the ideology of the chinese communist party; ### 84. observes that on the global stage , china actively promotes international ai partnership as a way to export its own ai-based government surveillance practices , social scoring system and censorship strategies; emphasises that heavy investment abroad under the digital silk road initiative are also used as a means to spread chinese ai globally and to bring other countries under chinese influence; concludes that the chinese approach is therefore built upon deploying ai domestically as well as exporting ai technologies that follow predetermined standards that are in line with the ideology of the chinese communist party; and hence calls for european union to pursue regulatory leadership in setting the global rules and standards on ai;


### 84. observes that on the global stage , china actively promotes international ai partnership as a way to export its own ai-based government surveillance practices , social scoring system and censorship strategies; emphasises that heavy investment abroad under the digital silk road initiative are also used as a means to spread chinese ai globally and to bring other countries under chinese influence; concludes that the chinese approach is therefore built upon deploying ai domestically as well as exporting ai technologies that follow predetermined standards that are in line with the ideology of the chinese communist party; ### 84. observes that on the global stage , china actively promotes international ai partnership as a way to export its own ai-based government surveillance practices , social scoring system and censorship strategies; emphasises that heavy investment abroad under the digital silk road initiative are also used as a means to spread chinese ai globally and to bring other countries under chinese influence; concludes that the chinese approach is therefore built upon deploying ai domestically as well as exporting ai technologies based on standards that are in line with the ideology of the chinese government;


### 86. emphasises that central to the eu regulatory approach is a strong attention to ethical considerations in line with core human rights values and democratic principles; underlines that the commission thereby hopes to achieve another gdpr-like ‘brussels effect’ , meaning that the eu’s regulatory and market power leads to a competitive edge in ai; states that establishing the world’s first regulatory framework for ai could indeed leverage a first-mover advantage in setting international ai standards based on european values , as well as successfully exporting ‘trustworthy ai’ around the world; ### 86. emphasises that central to the eu regulatory approach is a strong attention to ethical considerations in line with core human rights , values and democratic principles , to integrate into classic but robust technical product safety provisions; underlines that the commission thereby aims to set a gold standard on ai to inspire other democracies and become a world leader on human-centric and trustworthy ai;


### 87. is aware that that the vast majority of the 100 leading ai companies globally are domiciled in the us , whereas only three chinese companies and four eu companies fall into this category34; notes that the us also leads in the total number of ai start-ups , hosting 40 % of all new ai companies , followed by the eu with 22 % and china with 11 %35; ### 87. is aware that that the vast majority of the 100 leading ai companies globally are domiciled in the us , whereas only three chinese companies and four eu companies fall into this category34; notes that the us also leads in the total number of ai start-ups , hosting 40 % of all new ai companies , followed by the eu with 22 % and china with 11 %35; stresses that a considerable number of researchers in these companies are european; it is to be hoped , therefore , that a considerable number of researchers could be brought back to europe but a joint strategy is needed;


### 87. is aware that that the vast majority of the 100 leading ai companies globally are domiciled in the us , whereas only three chinese companies and four eu companies fall into this category34 ; notes that the us also leads in the total number of ai start-ups , hosting 40 % of all new ai companies , followed by the eu with 22 % and china with 11 %35 ; ### 87. is aware that that the vast majority of the leading ai companies globally are based in the us , whereas only a few are in the eu; notes that the us also leads in the total number of ai startups;


### 88. points out that in recent years , many of the eu’s most successful digital companies have been acquired by us tech giants; refers also to the ongoing debate about so-called ‘killer acquisitions’; notes that us firms , with 130 acquisitions in 2020 alone , acquired many more ai companies than eu and chinese firms combined , which made 30 and three comparable acquisitions respectively; ### 88. points out that in recent years , several successful european digital companies have been acquired by us tech giants; welcomes the upcoming approval of the digital markets act that will contribute to limit killer acquisitions;


### 89. stresses that while the us and china are trying to accelerate the use of ai technologies in the public and private sectors , the adoption of ai within the eu lags behind; states that only 7 % of all eu companies are currently using ai technologies , while just 30 % are planning to do so in the future36 ; states that there is also a clear gap in ai readiness between different business sectors as well as among member states , with southern and eastern europe lagging behind , while northern europe is , in general , very advanced , even by global standards; ### 89. stresses that while the us and china are trying to accelerate the use of ai technologies in the public and private sectors , the eu has also set very ambitious targets through the commission's communication on the digital compass;


### 90. underlines that while the us and china each have a unified digital market with a coherent set of rules , the eu’s digital single market is still fragmented and features many barriers; stresses that the development of ai products and services is further slowed down by the existence of 27 different national ai strategies and the fact that the eu’s ai assets such as talent , capital and research are spread widely across the continent; ### 90. is concerned that the eu’s digital single market is still not complete and fragmented and unjustified barriers remain to be addressed; stresses that the artificial intelligence act will establish a clear legal framework to enable the creation of a true and safe single market for ai , in conjunction with the coordinated plan on ai and other policy actions and funds put in place both at the eu and national level;


### 91. points also to the problem that inconsistencies in eu law , contradictions between eu and national laws , different legal interpretations and a lack of enforcement among member states is putting european companies in operational and financial jeopardy as they cannot determine whether their ai innovations are later likely to be assessed as non-compliant with eu law; ### 91. points also to the problem that inconsistencies in eu law , contradictions between eu and national laws , different legal interpretations and a lack of enforcement among member states create legal uncertainty and prevent the creation of a level playing field for businesses;


### 92. notes that the insufficient legal certainty for ai companies is further exacerbated by the fact that common standards and norms are missing in some sectors , while others are compromised by overregulation or the presence of legislative proposals that have been pending for long periods of time without being adopted; highlights as an example the fact that eu ai developers face a data challenge that neither their us nor chinese counterparts do; observes that they often do not have enough high-quality data to train their algorithms , struggle with strict data protection rules and are affected by a lack of sectoral data spaces and cross-sectoral interoperability , as well as constraints on cross-border data flows; ### 92. notes that the insufficient legal certainty for ai companies is further exacerbated by the fact that common standards and norms are missing in some sectors;


### 94. states that together with national initiatives , the estimated annual public investment of the eu in ai of eur 1 billion is also much lower than the eur 5.1 billion invested annually in the us and up to eur 6.8 billion in china38 ; states , however , that between 2017 and 2020 , eu public funding for ai research and innovation increased by 70 % compared to the previous period; acknowledges that the commission plans to increase investment further through the digital europe programme , horizon europe , the european structural and investment funds (esif) , the european investment fund (eif) , the recovery and resilience facility and various cohesion policy programmes39 ; ### deleted


### 95. stresses that ai companies within the eu have problems finding qualified employees as 42 % of the eu population lacks basic digital skills40 ; points out that the eu also struggles with ai-relevant university degrees , as the number of bachelor’s degrees awarded in ict is decreasing while the number of postgraduate degrees awarded is 50 % lower than in the us; underlines that the eu also faces a cybersecurity skills gap , with more than 350.000 experts needed; recognises that us and increasingly also chinese companies have a clear advantage in attracting and retaining ai talent from the rest of the world; ### 95. stresses that ai companies within the eu have problems finding qualified employees as 42 % of the eu population lacks basic digital skills40 ; points out that the eu also struggles with ai-relevant university degrees , as the number of bachelor’s degrees awarded in ict is decreasing while the number of postgraduate degrees awarded is 50 % lower than in the us; underlines that the eu also faces a cybersecurity skills gap , with more than 350.000 experts needed;


### 96. observes that although the eu still has an excellent community of researchers who are producing many ai research papers that are often cited and downloaded , the eu’s global impact is steadily declining , with a brain drain of top eu researchers to the us and china41 ; notes that the eu only spends 2 % of its gdp on research and development (r&d) , while the us spends 2.8 %; emphasises that the total r&d spending of us software and computer services firms in 2019 was eur 100 billion , which is much higher than comparative figures in china and the eu , where private r&d spending amounted to eur 20 billion and eur 12.5 billion respectively; ### 96. observes that although the eu has an excellent community of researchers on ai , the brain drain remains a serious problem; notes that the eu only spends 2 % of its gdp on research and development (r&d) , while the us spends 2.8 %;


### 97. notes that the eu’s digital infrastructure is underdeveloped , with just 25 % of people in the eu being able to connect to a 5g network , compared to 76 % of people in the us42 ; observes that the eu in general lacks high-performance digital infrastructure with interoperable data spaces , affordable energy supply , high transmission rates and volumes , reliability and short delays as well as a genuine ai ecosystem with excellence clusters such as can be found in the us or china43 ; ### deleted


### d) conclusion ### deleted


### 98. concludes that the us is still the overall leader in ai as it is ahead in almost every category , in particular when it comes to market power , investment , ai talent , research and infrastructure; highlights , however , that china , which five years ago was still significantly lagging behind the us in all indicators , is now quickly catching up in almost every category; notes that china could in fact achieve its goal of becoming the global leader in ai by 2030 or even earlier; recognises that both countries have the advantage of a unified single market , greater flexibility in digital governance and stronger political commitment to remaining a leader in ai; ### deleted


### 99. stresses that the eu is behind the us and china in virtually every category and that despite its current measures , it is losing further ground; notes that the eu is , however , ahead on regulatory approaches; points out that a viable eu strategy for becoming more competitive on ai would be to quadruple efforts to catch up when it comes to ai research and innovation , skills , infrastructure and investment , while at the same time trying to create a first-mover advantage by establishing a future-oriented and innovation-friendly regulatory framework for ai development and use; ### deleted


### 99. stresses that the eu is behind the us and china in virtually every category and that despite its current measures , it is losing further ground; notes that the eu is , however , ahead on regulatory approaches; points out that a viable eu strategy for becoming more competitive on ai would be to quadruple efforts to catch up when it comes to ai research and innovation , skills , infrastructure and investment , while at the same time trying to create a first-mover advantage by establishing a future-oriented and innovation-friendly regulatory framework for ai development and use; ### 99. stresses that the eu is behind the us and china in virtually every category and that despite its current measures , it is losing further ground; notes that the eu is , however , ahead on regulatory approaches; points out that a viable eu strategy for becoming more competitive on ai would be to quadruple efforts to catch up when it comes to ai research and innovation , skills , infrastructure and investment , while at the same time trying to create a first-mover advantage by establishing a future-oriented and innovation-friendly regulatory framework for ai development and use , while at the same time ensuring that fundamental rights of eu citizens and the rule of law are safeguarded;


### 100. underlines that the eu’s efforts to strengthen its global ai footprint were severely set back by brexit , as the uk was one of the leading eu countries in ai with london as one of the eu’s most important ai hubs , home to 1.000 ai companies , 35 tech hubs and reputed research centres such as the alan turing institute; ### deleted


### 101. concludes that the eu is currently on the losing side , far from fulfilling its aspiration of becoming a global leader in ai; maintains that there is still a small window of opportunity to change this situation , even though it will close very soon; states that the special committee therefore proposes to swiftly implement the following eu roadmap for ai; ### deleted


### 102. specifies that as the eu does not have the legislative power to address all the points listed in the eu roadmap for ai , the special committee recommends that a political process be launched with the aim of pulling all member states in the right direction and drastically improving the performance of those that are lagging furthest behind; refers in this regard to the eu 2000 lisbon agenda , which , despite the criticism , played a part in guiding the eu’s policy orientation over 20 years and in keeping up the pressure on member states to reform; ### deleted


### 103. calls on the commission to propose only legislative acts in the form of regulations for new digital laws in areas such as ai , as the digital single market needs to undergo a process of genuine harmonisation; is convinced that due to rapid technological development , digital legislation should always be swiftly adaptable , principle-based and future-proof , while adopting a risk-based approach; stresses , furthermore , the importance of legal certainty and , consequently , the need for robust , practical and unambiguous applicability criteria , definitions and obligations in all legal texts; ### 103. calls on the commission to propose only legislative acts in the form of regulations for new digital laws in areas such as ai , as the digital single market needs to undergo a process of genuine harmonisation; is convinced that due to rapid technological development , digital legislation should always be flexible , principle-based and future-proof; stresses , furthermore , the importance of legal certainty and , consequently , the need for robust , practical and unambiguous applicability criteria , definitions and obligations in all legal texts;


### 140. calls on the commission to improve knowledge transfer between ai research and the business world by setting up business networks , regulatory sandboxes and contact points with legal personnel and business consultants in universities; ### 140. calls on the commission to improve knowledge transfer between ai research and the business world by setting up business networks , regulatory sandboxes and contact points with legal personnel and business consultants in universities; calls on the commission to improve knowledge transfer between ai research and the society by setting up citizen panels , science and society platforms , and engaging the public in the framing of ai research agendas;


### 140. calls on the commission to improve knowledge transfer between ai research and the business world by setting up business networks , regulatory sandboxes and contact points with legal personnel and business consultants in universities; ### 140. calls on the commission to improve knowledge transfer between ai research and the business world by setting up business networks , regulatory sandboxes and contact points with legal personnel and business consultants in universities; underlines the importance of a smooth transition from academia to industry and the added value of proximity between the two for successful and dynamic ecosystems and industrial poles on ai;


### 141. stresses the need to accelerate knowledge transfer in the eu from research and science to ai applications in industry and the public sector; recommends the creation of a dedicated public-private partnership (ppp) on ai; calls on the commission to establish european ai data centres , jointly developed by government and industry and using strong encryption to protect the stored data in an appropriate manner; stresses the need to support the development of large-scale testing sites for ai; calls on the commission to provide financial incentives at eu level to launch pilot projects in member states; ### 141. stresses the need to accelerate knowledge transfer in the eu from research and science to ai applications in industry and the public sector; recommends the creation of a dedicated public-private partnership (ppp) on ai; calls on the commission to establish european ai data centres , jointly developed by government and industry and using strong encryption to protect the stored data in an appropriate manner; stresses the need to support the development of large-scale testing sites for ai;


### 142. supports strongly the establishment of an ai lighthouse under the horizon europe framework , which would be the continent’s pioneering centre of excellence for ai research and development; notes , however , that the eu and the member states should commit to a long-term and much more substantial investment plan in the region of eur 1 billion per year over the next 10 years; adds that the ai lighthouse would be an excellent place to create regulatory sandboxes , meaning time- and space-limited areas for experimenting with , testing and finessing specific ai applications that carry some risk but also have high potential for public good; ### 142. supports the establishment of an ai distributed lighthouse under the horizon europe framework , which would be the continent’s pioneering centre of excellence for ai research and development; notes , however , that the eu and the member states should commit to a long-term and more substantial investment plan; adds that the ai lighthouse would be an excellent place to create regulatory sandboxes;


### 142. supports strongly the establishment of an ai lighthouse under the horizon europe framework , which would be the continent’s pioneering centre of excellence for ai research and development; notes , however , that the eu and the member states should commit to a long-term and much more substantial investment plan in the region of eur 1 billion per year over the next 10 years; adds that the ai lighthouse would be an excellent place to create regulatory sandboxes , meaning time- and space-limited areas for experimenting with , testing and finessing specific ai applications that carry some risk but also have high potential for public good; ### 142. supports strongly the establishment of a distributed ai lighthouse supported by the horizon europe framework , building on the existing and future networks of regional ai excellence centres , with the aim to build an alliance of strong european research organisations that will share a common roadmap to support excellence in basic and applied research , to align national ai efforts , to foster innovation and investments , to attract and retain ai talent in europe , and to create synergies and economies of scale; notes , however , that the eu and the member states should commit to a long-term and much more substantial investment plan in the region of eur 1 billion per year over the next 10 years;


### 143. points out that the designation of european digital innovation hubs (edihs) under the digital europe programme is another important step in building up an ai ecosystem of excellence based on university-industry clusters; criticises , however , the fact that the hubs are dotted across the continent and that the interplay with other digital hubs designated by the european institute of innovation & technology (eit) and under the horizon europe framework remains unclear; suggests , consequently , that more coordination is needed , as is the establishment of a cooperating overall cluster of decentralised ai hubs based on an eu-wide framework for legal expertise , data , funding , and incentives; ### 143. points out that the designation of european digital innovation hubs (edihs) under the digital europe programme is another important step in building up an ai ecosystem of excellence based on university-industry clusters; welcomes the fact that the hubs are distributed across the continent and that the interplay with other digital hubs designated by the european institute of innovation & technology (eit) and under the horizon europe framework remains unclear; suggests , consequently , that more coordination is needed , as is the establishment of a cooperating overall cluster of decentralised ai hubs based on an eu-wide framework for legal expertise , data , funding , and incentives; welcomes the commission’s initiatives to establish startup networks across the eu and also beyond , such as startup europe and startup europe mediterranean in order to foster exchanges of ideas , business , and networking opportunities;


### 144. proposes to scale up and align existing mission such as ellis , platforms such as claire and flagship projects such as humane ai and ai4eu with the goal of promoting ambitious , collaborative and eu-wide research and development goals as well as projects; explains that a single ai mission with clear milestones and regular evaluation would attract the most talented researchers , bringing them together to address the biggest scientific questions in ai; ### 144. proposes to scale up and align existing mission such as ellis , platforms such as claire and flagship projects such as humane ai and ai4eu with the goal of promoting ambitious , collaborative and eu-wide research and development goals as well as projects;


### 145. proposes that on top of the suggested ai training , the eu and its member states should create awareness raising campaigns , including public discussions at local level , as an additional means to reach , inform and empower citizens to understand better the capabilities , limitations and impacts of ai; ### 145. proposes that on top of the suggested ai training , the eu and its member states should create awareness raising campaigns , including public discussions at local level , as an additional means to reach , inform and empower citizens to understand better the opportunities opened by , limitations , risks and impacts of ai; is convinced that this , in parallel with the creation of a clear and sound legal framework on human-centric and trustworthy ai , would contribute to reducing citizens’ fears that are currently associated with a widespread adoption of ai in europe;


### 145. proposes that on top of the suggested ai training , the eu and its member states should create awareness raising campaigns , including public discussions at local level , as an additional means to reach , inform and empower citizens to understand better the capabilities , limitations and impacts of ai; ### 145. proposes that on top of the suggested ai training , the eu and its member states should create awareness raising campaigns , including public discussions at local level , as an additional means to reach , inform and empower citizens to understand better the capabilities , limitations , risks and impacts of ai;


### 146. calls on member states to deliver on the tallinn declaration on egovernment and put mechanisms in place to provide borderless , interoperable , personalised , user-friendly , and end-to-end digital public services based on ai to all individuals and businesses at all levels of public administration; is of the opinion that the objective should be to increase the number of people that use egovernment services , with a focus on ai , to up to 80 % of all eu citizens over the next five years; ### 146. calls on member states to deliver on the tallinn declaration on egovernment and put mechanisms in place to provide borderless , interoperable , personalised , user-friendly , and end-to-end digital public services based on ai to all citizens at all levels of public administration; is of the opinion that the objective should be to complete the provision of digitalized public services to citizens , which has already accelerated during the pandemic , over the next five years; recalls the rrf funds and the pnrrs will play a key role in this regard; welcomes the revision of the eidas regulation and its role in boosting the provision of digital public services , which in turn make digital literacy even more necessary;


### iii. ehealth ### iii. digital health


### 147. calls for human-centred design and an evidence-based approach to ai in health that focuses on patient-oriented and high-quality digital healthcare and that seeks consumer and user feedback throughout the development process; calls on the commission to set the global tone on cutting-edge healthcare and well-being , placing the benefits of ai at the centre of policy-making; urges the prioritisation of funding , the setting of strategic goals , the fostering of cooperation and the adoption of ai applications in healthcare as a critical sector; ### 147. calls for the development of human-centred and evidence-based applications of ai , acting on both the promotion of health and the prevention , diagnosis , treatment and recovery of disease , developed in close cooperation with health professionals and patients; urges the prioritisation of funding , the setting of strategic goals , the fostering of cooperation and the adoption of ai applications in healthcare as a critical sector whereby the opportunities offered by ai can bring enormous benefits to citizens’ health and well-being , if the inherent risks are appropriately managed;


### 147. calls for human-centred design and an evidence-based approach to ai in health that focuses on patient-oriented and high-quality digital healthcare and that seeks consumer and user feedback throughout the development process; calls on the commission to set the global tone on cutting-edge healthcare and well-being , placing the benefits of ai at the centre of policy-making; urges the prioritisation of funding , the setting of strategic goals , the fostering of cooperation and the adoption of ai applications in healthcare as a critical sector; ### 147. calls for human-centred design and an evidence-based approach to ai in health that focuses on personalized , patient-centred and high-quality digital healthcare urges the prioritisation of funding , the setting of strategic goals , the fostering of cooperation and the adoption of ai applications in healthcare as a critical sector whereby the opportunities offered by ai can bring enormous benefits to citizens’ health and well-being , if the inherent risks are appropriately managed;


### 148. is convinced that the eu should implement an ambitious digital industrial strategy with a focus on ai , that attempts to reduce the eu’s dependence on non-european hardware , software and services while establishing sound ethical , technological and security standards for those elements that are not produced in the eu or where the purchasing of imports makes more sense from an economic point of view; declares that this approach does not aim to make the eu protectionist , but to strengthen its role as a champion of international cooperation and trade; ### 148. is convinced that the eu should implement an ambitious digital industrial strategy with a focus on ai , while establishing sound legal , ethical , technological and security standards for all ai systems and components that are intended to be used in the eu single market or have impact on eu citizens;


### 149. proposes to offer an alternative to the buy-out vision of many ai start-ups by ensuring that government support is provided at all stages of their development; underlines in this regard that the eu should amplify its efforts at offering smes and start-ups development paths and services , especially by promoting the use of digital tools , developing ai transition plans and further expanding the exchange of best practices; urges the commission and the member states to provide better counselling and more concrete support through networks , digital hubs , ai trainers , business mentoring and site visits; ### 149. proposes to offer an alternative to the buy-out vision of many ai start-ups by ensuring that government support is provided at all stages of their development; underlines in this regard that the eu should amplify its efforts at offering smes and start-ups development paths and services , especially by promoting the use of digital tools , developing ai transition plans and further expanding the exchange of best practices; urges the commission and the member states to provide better counselling and more concrete support through networks , digital hubs , ai trainers , business mentoring and site visits; underlined the importance of people-to-people exchange programmes such as erasmus for young entrepreneurs , that should be further developed and encouraged;


### 149. proposes to offer an alternative to the buy-out vision of many ai start-ups by ensuring that government support is provided at all stages of their development; underlines in this regard that the eu should amplify its efforts at offering smes and start-ups development paths and services , especially by promoting the use of digital tools , developing ai transition plans and further expanding the exchange of best practices; urges the commission and the member states to provide better counselling and more concrete support through networks , digital hubs , ai trainers , business mentoring and site visits; ### 149. proposes to offer an alternative to the buy-out vision of many ai start-ups by ensuring that both eu and government level support is provided at all stages of their development; underlines in this regard that the eu should amplify its efforts at offering smes and start-ups development paths and services , especially by promoting the use of digital tools , developing ai transition plans and further expanding the exchange of best practices; urges the commission and the member states to provide better counselling and more concrete support through networks , digital hubs , ai trainers , business mentoring and site visits;


### 150. points out that the eu should forge a strong international core value-based technology alliance , working together with like-minded partners in order to overcome regulatory divergence in the fields of privacy rights , data flows or competition rules and to remedy strategic vulnerabilities by building on each other’s assets and pooling resources in areas where it is mutually beneficial to do so; ### 150. points out that the eu should forge a strong international core value-based technology alliance , working together with like-minded partners in order to overcome regulatory divergence in the fields of privacy rights , data flows or competition rules and to remedy strategic vulnerabilities by building on each other’s assets and pooling resources in areas where it is mutually beneficial to do so; underlines that the eu should also actively support strengthened international cooperation on ethical , trustworthy and human centric ai in relevant multilateral fora , for example within the united nations system;


### 150. points out that the eu should forge a strong international core value-based technology alliance , working together with like-minded partners in order to overcome regulatory divergence in the fields of privacy rights , data flows or competition rules and to remedy strategic vulnerabilities by building on each other’s assets and pooling resources in areas where it is mutually beneficial to do so; ### 150. points out that the eu should promote a strong international value-based technology alliance , working together with like-minded partners in order to establish common and high regulatory standards in the field of ai and engage in enhanced cooperation in all relevant multilateral as well as bilateral fora , from the un to oecd to the ttc , to the council of europe;


### 151. considers it to be of paramount importance for the safety and security of citizens that law enforcement agencies are well advanced in ai development , making full use of the potential of digital technologies to prevent and investigate serious crimes through real-time facial recognition in select locations; underlines that diligently developed algorithms for crime prevention and investigation , based on highly qualitative data , may provide a higher level of efficiency , neutrality and legal certainty than human law enforcement agents , and should thus be promoted; ### deleted


### 151. considers it to be of paramount importance for the safety and security of citizens that law enforcement agencies are well advanced in ai development , making full use of the potential of digital technologies to prevent and investigate serious crimes through real-time facial recognition in select locations; underlines that diligently developed algorithms for crime prevention and investigation , based on highly qualitative data , may provide a higher level of efficiency , neutrality and legal certainty than human law enforcement agents , and should thus be promoted; ### 151. considers it to be of paramount importance for the safety and security of citizens that law enforcement agencies are well advanced in ai development , making full use of the potential of digital technologies to prevent and investigate serious crimes; underlines that diligently developed algorithms for crime prevention and investigation , based on highly qualitative data , may provide a higher level of efficiency , neutrality and legal certainty than human law enforcement agents , and should thus be promoted;


### 151. considers it to be of paramount importance for the safety and security of citizens that law enforcement agencies are well advanced in ai development , making full use of the potential of digital technologies to prevent and investigate serious crimes through real-time facial recognition in select locations; underlines that diligently developed algorithms for crime prevention and investigation , based on highly qualitative data , may provide a higher level of efficiency , neutrality and legal certainty than human law enforcement agents , and should thus be promoted; ### 151. considers it to be of paramount importance for the safety and security of citizens that law enforcement agencies are well advanced in development , making full use of the potential of digital technologies to prevent and investigate serious crimes including through real-time facial recognition in select locations; underlines that diligently developed algorithms for crime prevention and investigation , based on highly qualitative data , may provide a high level of efficiency which supplements and makes work by human law enforcement agents more efficient , and should thus be promoted;


### 152. asks member states to confer competences in the field of cybersecurity to the european level in order to enable the eu to better pool resources , more efficiently coordinate and streamline national cybersecurity policies , further increase cybersecurity capacity building and awareness raising , and swiftly provide cybersecurity knowledge and technical assistance to smes as well as to other more traditional sectors; ### 152. asks member states to confer competences in the field of cybersecurity to the european level in order to enable the eu to better pool resources , more efficiently coordinate and streamline national cybersecurity policies , further increase cybersecurity capacity building and awareness raising , and swiftly provide cybersecurity knowledge and technical assistance to smes as well as to other more traditional sectors; considers that member states should make cybersecurity in public administrations one of their top priorities , making systems mutually trustworthy;


### 153. urges member states to pursue an active policy of european cyber diplomacy by denouncing and attributing foreign-supported ai-powered cyberattacks , while leveraging the full toolbox of eu diplomacy; advises that this should include diplomatic responses , the termination of financial aid and sanctions against those countries or proxies that engage in malicious cyber activities or that sponsor cybercrimes; believes that the eu , in close cooperation with nato , should consider using ai to execute cyber counter-strikes against repeat offenders; ### 153. urges member states to pursue an active policy of european cyber diplomacy by enhancing dialogue with competing powers and sharing intelligence and cooperating at the eu level to prevent ai-powered cyberattacks; advises that this should include diplomatic responses , including the termination of financial aid and sanctions against those countries or proxies that engage in malicious cyber activities or that sponsor cybercrimes;


### 153. urges member states to pursue an active policy of european cyber diplomacy by denouncing and attributing foreign-supported ai-powered cyberattacks , while leveraging the full toolbox of eu diplomacy; advises that this should include diplomatic responses , the termination of financial aid and sanctions against those countries or proxies that engage in malicious cyber activities or that sponsor cybercrimes; believes that the eu , in close cooperation with nato , should consider using ai to execute cyber counter-strikes against repeat offenders; ### 153. urges member states to pursue an active policy of european cyber diplomacy by denouncing and attributing foreign-supported ai-powered cyberattacks , while leveraging the full toolbox of eu diplomacy; advises that this should include diplomatic responses , the termination of financial aid and sanctions against those countries or proxies that engage in malicious cyber activities , that sponsor cybercrimes or that are not sufficiently rigorous in prosecuting these crimes; believes that the eu , in close cooperation with nato , should consider using ai to execute cyber counter-strikes against repeat offenders;


### 153. urges member states to pursue an active policy of european cyber diplomacy by denouncing and attributing foreign-supported ai-powered cyberattacks , while leveraging the full toolbox of eu diplomacy; advises that this should include diplomatic responses , the termination of financial aid and sanctions against those countries or proxies that engage in malicious cyber activities or that sponsor cybercrimes; believes that the eu , in close cooperation with nato , should consider using ai to execute cyber counter-strikes against repeat offenders; ### 153. urges member states to pursue an active policy of european cyber diplomacy by identifying , collectively attributing and sanctioning the perpetrators of foreign-supported ai-powered cyberattacks , while leveraging the full toolbox of eu diplomacy; welcomes that the eu cyber toolbox includes sanctions against those countries or proxies that engage in malicious cyber activities or that sponsor cybercrimes; calls for closer cooperation with nato in the cyber defence field , notably on the exchanges of concepts and doctrines , on cross participation in cyber exercises and on cross-briefings;


### iv. military use of ai ### deleted


### 154. notes that exclusive military and national security uses of ai should be exempt from civilian ai legislation , since overregulation in the field of security and defence could pre-emptively restrict the eu’s capacity to innovate and deploy ai technologies , placing it at a disadvantage to its adversaries that do not have such constraints; ### deleted


### 154. notes that exclusive military and national security uses of ai should be exempt from civilian ai legislation , since overregulation in the field of security and defence could pre-emptively restrict the eu’s capacity to innovate and deploy ai technologies , placing it at a disadvantage to its adversaries that do not have such constraints; ### 154. underlines that the european court of auditors pointed to capability gaps in the eu in the area of ict technologies , cyber warfare and ai; welcomes that the edf call for project comprises a grant for frugal learning for rapid adaptation of ai systems; welcomes the fact that the edidp and the edf do not make eligible research on defence products and technologies that are specifically designed to carry out lethal strikes without and human control over the engagement decisions;


### 5. conclusion: an urgent call for action! ### 5. conclusions


### 155. believes that the ongoing digital transformation , where ai plays the key role , has triggered a global tech race that will determine the future political and economic power status of the european union; urgently stresses that the eu is so far falling further and further behind in this race with the result that current technological standards are being actively developed and determined outside of europe , presenting an existential threat to our democracy and prosperity; concludes that in order to remain both competitive and a global power , the eu needs to become a global leader in ai; ### 155. believes that the eu needs to become a global leader in ai standard-setting;


### 156. highlights that ai , while often portrayed as an unpredictable threat , is in reality a powerful digital tool that is already a game changer in core fields that bring benefits for the good of society , including in our aspirations to combat climate change , provide innovate healthcare , revolutionise employment , strengthen our security and democratic systems and boost our competitiveness on a global scale; stresses that these benefits should guide and inform regulation and public communication on ai; ### 156. highlights that ai , despite the current fears due to its opacity and unpredictability , is in reality a powerful digital tool and can be a game changer in core fields and brings benefits for the good of society , including in combating climate change , preventing and tackling pandemics and providing cutting-edge healthcare , and improving working conditions; stresses that these benefits as well as the inherent risks , should guide and inform regulation and public communication on ai;


### 157. highlights further that the eu , with its regulatory and market powers , has the potential to shape the international debate on ai and to push for common standards for the ethics-driven , sustainable and trustworthy development and use of this technology , fully in line with european principles and values; highlights , however , that the window of opportunity for consolidating such a distinctive european approach to ai on the international stage is closing fast , which is why the eu needs to join forces and agree on a joint ai strategy , including a balanced regulatory framework , very soon; ### 157. highlights further that the eu , with its regulatory and market powers , has the potential to shape the international debate on ai and to push for common high standards for the ethics-driven , sustainable and trustworthy development and use of this technology , in line with european principles and values;


### 157. highlights further that the eu , with its regulatory and market powers , has the potential to shape the international debate on ai and to push for common standards for the ethics-driven , sustainable and trustworthy development and use of this technology , fully in line with european principles and values; highlights , however , that the window of opportunity for consolidating such a distinctive european approach to ai on the international stage is closing fast , which is why the eu needs to join forces and agree on a joint ai strategy , including a balanced regulatory framework , very soon; ### 157. highlights further that the eu , with its regulatory and market powers , has the potential to shape the international debate on ai and to push for common standards for the ethics-driven , sustainable and trustworthy development and use of this technology globally , fully in line with european principles and values; highlights , however , that the window of opportunity for consolidating such a distinctive european approach to ai on the international stage is closing fast , which is why the eu needs to join forces and agree on a joint ai strategy , including a balanced regulatory framework , very soon;


### 158. stresses that currently , the eu does not meet any of the preconditions that would allow us to fully capture the potential of ai , especially compared to the ai frontrunners china and the us; finds that a lack of legal certainty , access to and sharing of high-quality data , harmonised rules and standards , funding , research , skills and infrastructure for core technologies , as well as high regulatory burdens , have led to a situation in which the eu’s competitiveness is constantly decreasing; is convinced that only by executing a bold and comprehensive eu roadmap for ai will the eu manage to catch up; states that parliament needs an ad hoc digital committee with legislative powers in order to be able to respond effectively to these horizontal challenges , ; notes that as long as this committee is not established , clear competences among existing committees need to be defined in order to enable them to follow up effectively on all specific parts of this roadmap; ### 158. stresses that currently , the eu still lags behind in several areas , preventing it to fully exploit ai opportunities and become a true leader in ai especially compared to china and the us; finds that a lack of legal certainty , access to and sharing of high-quality data , harmonised rules and standards , funding , research , skills and infrastructure need to be addressed to improve eu’s capacity for innovation and for its competitiveness on ai; is convinced that in order to do so , europe needs a bold and comprehensive roadmap for ai;


### 159. concludes that it is the eu’s responsibility to quickly set up a favourable regulatory environment for ai that provides for swift digital law-making , effective governance and balanced ethical standards , while at the same time preventing overregulation and giving enough leeway for innovation; urges that the adequate development and training of ai will require better access to high-quality data , common standards and incentives for voluntary data sharing; calls on its committees on legal affairs (juri) , internal market and consumer protection (imco) , industry , research and energy (itre) , civil liberties , justice and home affairs (libe) , and constitutional affairs (afco) to ensure that these goals are met; ### 159. concludes that it is the eu’s responsibility to set up a favourable regulatory environment for ai that provides for clear rules and requirements , effective governance and balanced ethical standards enabling positive innovation; underlines that the adequate development and training of ai will require better access to high-quality data , common standards and incentives for voluntary data sharing;


### 160. concludes that our digital ambitions in fields such as ai can only be achieved through a fully integrated and fully harmonised digital single market that promotes cross-border exchange and that guarantees that the same rules and standards apply to all ai researchers and companies across the eu; stresses in this regard that the eu also needs to target abuses of market power in order to level the playing field; calls on the economic and monetary affairs (econ) , imco and juri committees to guarantee this; ### 160. concludes that our digital ambitions in fields such as ai can only be achieved through a fully integrated and fully harmonised digital single market that promotes cross-border exchange and that guarantees that the same rules and standards apply to all ai researchers and companies across the eu; stresses in this regard that the eu also needs to target abuses of market power in order to level the playing field;


### 161. concludes that ai systems require robust infrastructure and connectivity; stresses that digital green infrastructure which is in line with the green deal will target all sectors , including agriculture , electricity , housing , transport , businesses , value chains and the circular economy; stresses that ai will not , however , be functional without strong deployment of broadband , fibre , edge nodes and 5g , or if key emerging technologies such as quantum computing are not made a priority; calls on the environment , public health and food safety (envi) , agriculture and rural development (agri) , regional development (regi) , transport and tourism (tran) , itre , econ and imco committees to follow up on these points; ### 161. concludes that ai systems require robust infrastructure and connectivity capacities; stresses that digital infrastructure in line with the green deal will target all sectors , including agriculture , energy , housing , transport , industry , value chains and the circular economy; stresses that ai will not , however , be functional without the adequate deployment of broadband , fibre , edge nodes and 5g , or if key emerging technologies such as quantum computing are not made a priority;


### 162. concludes that in order to promote innovation in ai , it is necessary to provide eu citizens with the means to acquire digital skills; stresses that in order to increase digital literacy and resilience and to combat the digital divide among citizens in the digital age , digital and ai education needs to start at an early stage and remain available at all levels of employment; finds that initiatives to establish ai ecosystems of excellence , to increase the pool of ai talent in the eu and to combat brain drain are of vital importance; calls on the culture and education (cult) , employment and social affairs (empl) and itre committee to focus their resources on these fields; ### 162. concludes that in order to promote innovation in ai , it is necessary to provide eu citizens with the means to acquire both basic and more advanced digital skills; stresses that in order to increase digital literacy and resilience , to empower citizens to take active role in digital societies and to combat the digital divide among citizens in the digital age , digital and ai education needs to start at an early stage and from basic level and remain available at all levels of employment; finds that initiatives to establish ai ecosystems of excellence , to increase the pool of ai talent in the eu and to combat brain drain are of vital importance; calls on the culture and education (cult) , employment and social affairs (empl) and itre committee to focus their resources on these fields;


### 162. concludes that in order to promote innovation in ai , it is necessary to provide eu citizens with the means to acquire digital skills; stresses that in order to increase digital literacy and resilience and to combat the digital divide among citizens in the digital age , digital and ai education needs to start at an early stage and remain available at all levels of employment; finds that initiatives to establish ai ecosystems of excellence , to increase the pool of ai talent in the eu and to combat brain drain are of vital importance; calls on the culture and education (cult) , employment and social affairs (empl) and itre committee to focus their resources on these fields; ### 162. concludes that in order to promote innovation in ai and to avoid leaving anyone behind , it is necessary to provide all eu citizens with the means to acquire at least basic digital skills; stresses that in order to increase digital literacy and resilience and to combat the digital divide , digital and ai education needs to start at an early stage and remain accessible at all stages of life; finds that initiatives to establish ai ecosystems of excellence , to increase the pool of ai talent in the eu and to combat brain drain are of vital importance;


### 163. concludes that in order to build trust in ai among citizens , public services and their administrative structures need to lead by example; stresses that the eu needs to accelerate the uptake of ai in egovernance in order to facilitate the secure use of ai in public administrations and to strengthen democratic structures as well as the eu’s core ethical principles; stresses furthermore that ai in the healthcare sector , if provided with the means to securely access patients’ data , will revolutionise healthcare systems; calls on the envi , itre , juri and libe committees to monitor and accelerate these developments; ### 163. concludes that in order to build trust in ai among citizens , public services and their administrative structures need to lead by example; stresses that the eu needs to accelerate the uptake of ai in egovernance in order to facilitate the secure use of ai in public administrations and to strengthen democratic structures as well as the eu’s core ethical principles; stresses furthermore that ai in the healthcare sector , if provided with the means to securely access patients’ data , and with the adequate training and up-skilling of healthcare professionals , will revolutionise healthcare systems; calls on the envi , itre , juri and libe committees to monitor and accelerate these developments;


### 163. concludes that in order to build trust in ai among citizens , public services and their administrative structures need to lead by example; stresses that the eu needs to accelerate the uptake of ai in egovernance in order to facilitate the secure use of ai in public administrations and to strengthen democratic structures as well as the eu’s core ethical principles; stresses furthermore that ai in the healthcare sector , if provided with the means to securely access patients’ data , will revolutionise healthcare systems; calls on the envi , itre , juri and libe committees to monitor and accelerate these developments; ### 163. concludes that in order to build trust in ai among citizens , public services and their administrative structures need to lead by example; stresses that the eu needs to accelerate the uptake of ai in egovernance in order to facilitate the secure use of ai in public administrations in line with the eu’s fundamental values and principles; stresses furthermore that ai in the healthcare sector , if the inherent risks are appropriately managed , can revolutionise healthcare systems;


### 164. concludes that the eu’s ai strategy should not overlook military and security considerations that arise with the global deployment of ai technologies; stresses that international cooperation with like-minded partners needs to be increased in order to safeguard our ethical principles and values but also to protect our continent against new technological threats; finds that our entire security system is affected by the digital transformation; urges the eu , therefore , to come up with new policy responses and tactics; calls on the foreign affairs (afet) , international trade (inta) and libe committees , and the subcommittee on security and defence (sede) to develop effective responses; ### 164. concludes that the eu’s ai strategy should not overlook geopolitical and geostrategic considerations that arise with the global deployment of ai technologies; stresses that international cooperation with like-minded partners needs to be increased in order to uphold our core values and at the same time to cooperate to minimise new technological threats;


### 164. concludes that the eu’s ai strategy should not overlook military and security considerations that arise with the global deployment of ai technologies; stresses that international cooperation with like-minded partners needs to be increased in order to safeguard our ethical principles and values but also to protect our continent against new technological threats; finds that our entire security system is affected by the digital transformation; urges the eu , therefore , to come up with new policy responses and tactics; calls on the foreign affairs (afet) , international trade (inta) and libe committees , and the subcommittee on security and defence (sede) to develop effective responses; ### 164. concludes that the eu’s ai strategy should not overlook military and security considerations that arise with the global deployment of ai technologies; stresses that international cooperation with democratic like-minded partners needs to be increased in order to safeguard our ethical principles and values but also to protect our continent against new technological threats; finds that our entire security system is affected by the digital transformation; urges the eu , therefore , to come up with new policy responses and tactics; calls on the foreign affairs (afet) , international trade (inta) and libe committees , and the subcommittee on security and defence (sede) to contribute to developing effective responses;


### 21. highlights that , in view of the 2019 european elections , the communication campaign was successfully launched; points out the increased participation of citizens in the 2019 european elections; ### 21. highlights that , in view of the 2019 european elections , the communication campaign was launched; points out the increased participation of citizens in the 2019 european elections;


### 27. is of the opinion that the protection of whistleblowers is a key element of democracy; recalls that , among others , accredited parliamentary assistants (apa) may find themselves in a particular situation due to their contract of employment; calls on secretary-general to take that specificity into account when apas act as whistleblowers , and to extend the contract protection options granted by parliament for apas victim of harassment to apas who act as whistleblowers; ### 27. is of the opinion that the protection of whistleblowers is an integral element of democracy; recalls that , among others , accredited parliamentary assistants (apa) may find themselves in a particular situation due to their contract of employment; calls on secretary-general to take that specificity into account when apas act as whistleblowers ,


### 30. welcomes the decision of the bureau on 2 may 2018 regarding staff with united kingdom nationality , namely that no official will be dismissed on the grounds of their united kingdom nationality; understands that the case-by-case assessments that had been conducted by the date initially foreseen for the withdrawal of the united kingdom with regard to the contractual and temporary staff of united kingdom nationality , resulted in no cases of contract termination; acknowledges that political groups conduct their own case-by-case assessments for their staff; ### 30. welcomes the decision of the bureau on 2 may 2018 regarding staff with united kingdom nationality , namely that no official will be dismissed on the grounds of their united kingdom nationality; understands that the case-by-case assessments that had been conducted by the date initially foreseen for the withdrawal of the united kingdom with regard to the contractual and temporary staff of united kingdom nationality , resulted in no cases of contract termination;


### 34. is convinced that the attractiveness of parliament is a key component of its success; draws attention to the difficulties encountered in recruiting some nationalities; calls on the secretary-general to do his utmost in order to reach a geographical balance , both on the total number by country and on the number of management positions; recognises the very positive steps taken in order to reach a gender balance; presses for gender balance at all levels , including directors-general level; ### 34. is convinced that the attractiveness of the parliament as a workplace is a key component of its success; draws attention to the difficulties encountered in recruiting some nationalities; calls on the secretary-general to insist on the need for real geographical balance in terms of equal representations of all mss at all levels , including top management levels. recognises the very positive steps taken in order to reach a gender balance; presses for gender balance at all levels , including directors-general level;


### 37. highlights the total of all costs related to the 12 missions to strasbourg amounts to eur 27 211 000; ### deleted


### 38. notes that the costs linked to parliament’s 12 journeys for members per year to strasbourg amounts to eur 21 266 689; notes that the annual travel costs amount to eur 3 631 082 for parliament staff and eur 2 097 250 for apas; ### deleted


### 39. notes that the cost of the thalys charter train was eur 3 739 680 in 2018 (compared to eur 3 668 532 in 2017); ### deleted


### 40. notes that this additional expenditure goes against the principle of sound financial management and against the principle of budgetary discipline; acknowledges that a single seat can only be achieved by a unanimous treaty change; stresses that moving parliament’s official vehicles to strasbourg could be more efficient by transporting accredited parliamentary assistants (apas); ### 40. notes that this additional expenditure goes against the principle of sound financial management and against the principle of budgetary discipline; acknowledges that a single seat can only be achieved by a unanimous treaty change;


### 42. welcomes the full implementation of the budget in 2018 as a testimony to the fact that a maximum effort was made to fully use all resources available to dg comm to reach a maximum number of citizens , which was of particular importance in this pre-election year; notes with satisfaction that in 2018 , it actively contributed to the development and setting-up of the european elections campaign strategy; ### 42. welcomes the full implementation of the budget in 2018 as a testimony to the fact that efforts have been made to fully use all resources available to dg comm to reach a maximum number of citizens , which was of particular importance in this pre-election year; notes with satisfaction that in 2018 , it actively contributed to the development and setting-up of the european elections campaign strategy;


### 43. notes that dg comm’s lead indicator , since 2017 , is the number of hours of attention that parliament receives across all communication channels; notes with satisfaction that , beyond a focus on attention levels , dg comm is developing a methodology for measuring the economy , efficiency and effectiveness of its activities across all communication channels; approves of the focus placed on parliament’s visibility; ### 43. notes that dg comm despite being the focus of much is developing a methodology for measuring the economy , efficiency and effectiveness of its activities across all communication channels; approves of the focus placed on parliament’s visibility; calls for more efforts to be made to that end;


### 44. calls on dg comm to continue its efforts to improve parliament’s public website , in particular with regard to search engine optimization , and increase its visibility; urges dg comm to create an easy-to-browse website , easily accessible from all devices i.e. from smartphones to desktop computers; ### 44. calls on dg comm to continue its efforts to improve parliament’s public website , in particular with regard to search engine optimization , and increase its visibility; urges dg comm to create an easy-to-browse website , easily accessible from all devices i.e. smartphones , tablets and desktop computers , with a particular emphasis on a simplified mobile version of the website;


### 47. notes that , in 2018 , 285 press seminars were organised in the member states with more than 3629 journalists attending; welcomes that , additionally , 1905 journalists were invited to take part in plenary sessions , and 1191 journalists were invited to take part in centrally organised press seminars; commends dg comm for using all possible media channels for dissemination of parliament’s work and achievements; invites the directorate-general to pay adequate attention to the importance of social media and its significant and ever-growing potential for reaching citizens; ### deleted