### 18. considers that the outcome of the european elections is a clear signal for an in-depth institutional reflection that will allow citizens , civil society and their representatives to shape the future of the union; calls , therefore , on all institutional partners to assume their responsibility and deliver an ambitious conference on the future of europe; ### 18. considers that the outcome of the european elections is a clear signal for an in-depth institutional reflection that will allow states , citizens and their representatives to shape the future of the union; calls , therefore , on all institutional partners to assume their responsibility and deliver an ambitious conference on the future of europe;


### 1. is resolutely determined in its endeavour to bring citizens closer to its decision-making process; ### 1. is resolutely determined in its endeavour to bring citizens closer to its decision-making process , for example by making widespread use of impact assessments , ensuring transparency in the negotiations on international agreements , respecting the national parliaments and refraining from rejecting initiatives by european citizens for ideological reasons;


### 1. is resolutely determined in its endeavour to bring citizens closer to its decision-making process; ### 1. undertakes to bring citizens closer to its decision-making process;


### 2. underlines the fact that article 10(3) of the teu grants eu citizens the right to participate in the democratic life of the union and stipulates that decisions must be taken as openly and closely as possible to the citizen; insists that all institutions must strive to implement these principles; ### 2. underlines the fact that article 10(3) of the teu grants eu citizens the right to participate in the democratic life of the union and stipulates that decisions must be taken as openly and closely as possible to the citizen; insists that all institutions must strive to implement these principles , ensuring that the democratic political system remains accountable and legitimate while respecting the rule of law;


### 2. notes with satisfaction the designation of a commissioner responsible for transparency with a mission to introduce greater transparency into the legislative process; ### 2. notes the designation of a commissioner responsible for transparency with a mission to introduce greater transparency into the legislative process;


### b. whereas article 15 of the tfeu states that ‘in order to promote good governance and ensure the participation of civil society , the union’s institutions , bodies , offices and agencies shall conduct their work as openly as possible’ and that ‘any citizen of the union , and any natural or legal person residing or having its registered office in a member state , shall have a right of access to documents of the union’s institutions , bodies , offices and agencies’; ### b. whereas article 15 of the tfeu states that ‘in order to promote good governance and ensure the participation of civil society , the union’s institutions , bodies , offices and agencies shall conduct their work as openly as possible’ and that ‘any citizen of the union , and any natural or legal person residing or having its registered office in a member state , shall have a right of access to documents of the union’s institutions , bodies , offices and agencies , subject to the principles and the conditions defined in the eu secondary legislation’;


### d. whereas the ombudsman’s strategic inquiry oi/2/2017/te found that the council’s lack of transparency regarding public access to its legislative documents and its current practices in its decision-making process constitute maladministration; whereas on 16 may 2018 , following the council’s reluctance to implement her recommendations , the ombudsman submitted special report oi/2/2017/te on the transparency of the council legislative process to parliament; whereas in its resolution of 17 january 2019 on the ombudsman’s strategic inquiry , parliament endorsed the ombudsman’s recommendations; ### deleted


### 6. recognises the new code of conduct for the commission’s members which entered into force in february 2018 , and which increases transparency primarily in relation to the meetings held between the commissioners and interest representatives , as well as to the costs of the business travel of individual commissioners; ### 6. recognises the new code of conduct for the commission’s members which entered into force in february 2018 , and which increases transparency primarily in relation to the meetings held between the commissioners and interest representatives , as well as to the costs of the business travel of individual commissioners; underlines that under article 15 of the tfeu all citizens of the european union have a right of access to the documents and information arising from the activity of the european commission , covering details of meetings , agendas and even minutes; calls on the commission to fulfil this obligation especially in situations where the statement of the other participating party is contrary to the own allegations of the commission;


### 10. recalls that the right of public access to documents of the institutions is inextricably linked with the democratic nature of the institutions; ### 10. recalls that the right of public access to documents of the institutions in all of the eu’s official languages is inextricably linked with the democratic nature of the institutions;


### 16. emphasises the importance of transparency and public access to documents; stresses that a high level of transparency in the legislative process is essential in terms of enabling citizens , the media and stakeholders to hold their elected officials and governments to account; acknowledges the valuable role played by the ombudsman in liaising and acting as a mediator between the eu institutions and citizens , and highlights the ombudsman’s work in making the eu legislative process more accountable to the public; ### 16. emphasises the importance of transparency and public access to documents in all of the eu’s official languages; stresses that a high level of transparency in the legislative process is essential in terms of enabling citizens , the media and stakeholders to hold their elected officials and governments to account; acknowledges the valuable role played by the ombudsman in liaising and acting as a mediator between the eu institutions and citizens , and highlights the ombudsman’s work in making the eu legislative process more accountable to the public;


### 24. emphasises that open democratic societies depend on the ability of citizens to access a variety of verifiable information sources so that they can form a view on different issues; ### 24. is concerned about the european commission’s desire to censure social networks , which are spaces for freedom of expression where the eu is often criticised;


### 24. emphasises that open democratic societies depend on the ability of citizens to access a variety of verifiable information sources so that they can form a view on different issues; ### 24. emphasises that open democratic societies depend on the ability of citizens to access a variety of verifiable information sources in their own official language so that they can form a view on different issues;


### 1. welcomes the interest of member states in permanent structured cooperation (pesco) following its establishment by council decision (cfsp) 2017/2315 of 11 december 2017 , as shown by the significant number of projects established so far by the council under pesco; encourages participating member states to advance this work and focus on the swift and effective implementation of these projects; ### 1. notes the participation of member states in permanent structured cooperation (pesco) following its establishment by council decision (cfsp) 2017/2315 of 11 december 2017 , as shown by the projects established so far by the council under pesco;


### 1. welcomes the interest of member states in permanent structured cooperation (pesco) following its establishment by council decision (cfsp) 2017/2315 of 11 december 2017 , as shown by the significant number of projects established so far by the council under pesco; encourages participating member states to advance this work and focus on the swift and effective implementation of these projects; ### 1. welcomes the interest of member states in permanent structured cooperation (pesco) following its establishment by council decision (cfsp) 2017/2315 of 11 december 2017 , as shown by the significant number of projects established so far by the council under pesco; encourages participating member states to advance this work and focus on the swift and effective implementation of these projects; reminds nevertheless that pesco also entails 20 binding commitments that have received far less attention;


### 2. calls on the council and the member states to continue reinforcing coherence between all instruments and initiatives within the framework of common security and defence policy (csdp) in order to achieve the required level of effectiveness in ensuring strategic autonomy , and of ambition in the progressive framing of a common union defence policy in line with the treaty on european union; ### deleted


### 2. calls on the council and the member states to continue reinforcing coherence between all instruments and initiatives within the framework of common security and defence policy (csdp) in order to achieve the required level of effectiveness in ensuring strategic autonomy , and of ambition in the progressive framing of a common union defence policy in line with the treaty on european union; ### 2. calls on the council and the member states to continue reinforcing coherence between all instruments and initiatives within the framework of common security and defence policy (csdp) in order to achieve the required level of effectiveness in ensuring strategic autonomy , and of ambition in the progressive framing of a common union defence policy in line with the treaty on european union; underlines in this regard the importance of maintaining an adequate level of financing of edf and military mobility;


### 3. welcomes in this regard the political guidelines of the commission regarding defence policy , and in particular regarding the need for bold steps towards a genuine european defence union , and for an integrated and comprehensive approach to the eu’s security; hopes that the creation of a new commission directorate-general for defence industry and space will serve as a catalyst for enhanced coherence in the creation of defence capabilities; ### 3. condemns the political guidelines of the commission regarding defence policy , and in particular regarding the utopian dreaming of a genuine european defence union , and for an integrated and comprehensive approach to the eu’s security; further condemns the creation of a new commission directorate-general for defence industry and space , which demands resources urgently needed by the member states in tackling economic and social impacts of the covid-19 crisis;


### 4. considers it necessary to step up the actual contribution of pesco projects to the achievement of the eu’s ambitions in the area of security and defence , by effectively ensuring that the participating member states strengthen their collaboration in significant and ambitious capability development , and that there is coherence between the eu and nato in terms of priorities; ### 4. considers it necessary to implement the pesco projects according to national interests of the member states , bearing in mind their sovereignty and that security and defence policy in the european union is a competence of the member states;


### 4. considers it necessary to step up the actual contribution of pesco projects to the achievement of the eu’s ambitions in the area of security and defence , by effectively ensuring that the participating member states strengthen their collaboration in significant and ambitious capability development , and that there is coherence between the eu and nato in terms of priorities; ### 4. considers it necessary to step up the actual contribution of pesco projects to the achievement of the eu’s ambitions in the area of security and defence , by effectively ensuring that the participating member states strengthen their collaboration in significant and ambitious capability development , and that there is coherence between the eu and nato in terms of priorities as well as enhanced interoperability;


### 5. calls on the participating member states to continue making resources available for pesco projects , while ensuring real ownership of and commitment to pesco coordinating and pooling processes; ### 5. calls on the participating member states to continue the participation in the pesco projects as long as it furthers their national interests , without any pressure from the eu institutions or other member states;


### 5. calls on the participating member states to continue making resources available for pesco projects , while ensuring real ownership of and commitment to pesco coordinating and pooling processes; ### 5. calls on the participating member states to continue making resources available for pesco projects , while ensuring real ownership of and commitment to pesco coordinating and pooling processes; underlines that pesco should provide a framework to go beyond bilateral cooperation and foster a truly european effort through the meaningful participation of multiple member states to common projects;


### 6. calls on the council to define strict conditions for the participation of third states in pesco projects , in accordance with article 9 of council decision (cfsp) 2017/2315; considers that any such participation should not deviate pesco from its fundamental objectives as an instrument of the eu csdp , while respecting the obligations under the north atlantic treaty; ### 6. calls on the council to define as soon as possible the conditions for the participation of third states in pesco projects , in accordance with article 9 of council decision (cfsp) 2017/2315 and to involve the parliament in the discussion; considers that any such participation should not deviate pesco from its fundamental objectives as an instrument of the eu csdp , while respecting the obligations under the north atlantic treaty;


### 7. reiterates that parliament should play a prominent role in the scrutiny and supervision of the implementation and evaluation of the csdp; expects in this regard that parliament will be fully informed and consulted by the vice-president of the commission / high representative of the union for foreign affairs and security policy in the context of the current strategic review of the first pesco phase , which ends in 2020. ### deleted


### d. whereas the three-fold level of ambition under the eu global strategy in the field of security and defence covers securing external borders , countering hybrid threats and fighting against terrorism; whereas no member state can protect itself alone , since security and defence threats faced by the eu , and which are targeted against its citizens and territory , are a joint threat and cannot be addressed by one single member state on its own; whereas an effective eu system for addressing burden-sharing would be advantageous for the eu’s overall level of security and defence; ### d. whereas the three-fold level of ambition under the eu global strategy in the field of security and defence covers securing external borders , countering hybrid threats and fighting against terrorism; whereas closer cooperation between member states which safeguards their individual sovereignty could prove more effective against the challenges posed by common threats;


### f. whereas pesco’s long-term vision is to achieve a coherent full-spectrum force package available to the member states; whereas pesco should enhance the eu’s capacity to act as an international security provider in order to protect eu citizens and maximise the effectiveness of defence spending; whereas the cost of non-europe in security and defence is estimated to be more than eur 100 billion per year; ### f. whereas pesco’s long-term vision is to achieve a coherent full-spectrum force package available to the member states; whereas pesco should enhance the eu’s capacity to act as an international security provider in order to protect eu citizens , maximise the effectiveness of defence spending , reduce duplications , and get better value for taxpayer’s money; whereas the cost of non-europe in security and defence is estimated to be more than eur 100 billion per year;


### f. whereas pesco’s long-term vision is to achieve a coherent full-spectrum force package available to the member states; whereas pesco should enhance the eu’s capacity to act as an international security provider in order to protect eu citizens and maximise the effectiveness of defence spending; whereas the cost of non-europe in security and defence is estimated to be more than eur 100 billion per year; ### f. whereas pesco , in its current configuration , is too rigid a framework to foster cooperation between states; whereas the fact that it makes planning bilateral cooperation projects impossible is at odds with the experience of and successes achieved by the member states in this area; whereas it seems particularly arbitrary , not to say absurd , to set the hypothetical ‘cost of non-europe in this area’ at such a level;


### g. whereas the covid-19 pandemic has shown the consequences of the eu not having enough competence when it comes to health care; whereas , by the same analogy , it would make sense to establish an eu common defence strategy in order to be able to respond to an attack on the eu’s borders and territories; whereas pesco constitutes an important step towards achieving the objective of a common defence; ### g. whereas pesco constitutes an important step towards achieving the objective of a common defence;


### g. whereas the covid-19 pandemic has shown the consequences of the eu not having enough competence when it comes to health care; whereas , by the same analogy , it would make sense to establish an eu common defence strategy in order to be able to respond to an attack on the eu’s borders and territories; whereas pesco constitutes an important step towards achieving the objective of a common defence; ### g. whereas the covid-19 pandemic has shown the consequences of the eu’s ineffectiveness in its current form;


### i. whereas pesco creates a binding framework between the pms , which committed themselves to jointly investing , planning , developing and operating defence capabilities within union framework in a permanent and structured manner by subscribing to 20 binding commitments in five areas set by the teu; whereas these commitments should constitute a move from mere defence cooperation towards the integration of member states’ defence forces; whereas despite these binding commitments , no effective compliance mechanism for pesco is in place; ### i. whereas pesco creates a binding framework between the pms , which committed themselves to jointly investing , planning , developing and operating defence capabilities within union framework in a permanent and structured manner by subscribing to 20 binding commitments in five areas set by the teu; whereas in reality , many member states refuse to respect this framework;


### j. whereas the pms do not pay enough attention to the 20 binding commitments to which they have subscribed , and not enough progress has been achieved with regard to significantly embedding pesco into national defence planning processes; ### deleted


### n. whereas major european defence projects such as the future air combat system (fcas) and the main ground combat system (mgcs) currently remain outside the scope of pesco; whereas their integration within the remit of pesco would provide for sufficient strategic focus; ### n. whereas major european defence projects such as the future air combat system (fcas) and the main ground combat system (mgcs) currently remain outside the scope of pesco and are mainly based on a bilateral cooperation between germany and france; whereas their integration within the remit of pesco and the meaningful participation of more members states would provide for sufficient strategic focus and a truly european effort in fostering future cooperation and integration in defence;


### n. whereas major european defence projects such as the future air combat system (fcas) and the main ground combat system (mgcs) currently remain outside the scope of pesco; whereas their integration within the remit of pesco would provide for sufficient strategic focus; ### n. whereas major european defence projects such as the future air combat system (fcas) and the main ground combat system (mgcs) currently remain outside the scope of pesco; whereas their integration within the remit of pesco is not a requirement and does not guarantee greater effectiveness;


### q. whereas the consistency between pesco , card , national implementation plans (nips) and the cdp has to be further improved; ### deleted


### r. whereas the nato defence planning process (ndpp) drives defence national planning processes in most cases; ### r. whereas the nato defence planning process (ndpp) drives defence national planning processes in most cases; whereas this raises questions about the real diplomatic and military sovereignty of the eu member states and , by extension , of the eu itself;


### s. whereas interactions between member states’ national priorities , eu priorities and nato priorities should be synchronised at the earliest possible convenience; whereas pesco can be an effective tool in order to achieve eu and nato targets simultaneously; ### s. whereas it makes no sense to claim that europe has strategic autonomy while making it dependent as a matter of principle on nato;


### y. whereas the governance of pesco is led by pms , and therefore eventually leads to the insufficient coordination and overall consistency of the projects; whereas this should constitute grounds for the extension of the mandate of the pesco secretariat; ### y. whereas the governance of pesco is led by pms , as a legitimate consequence of their respective military investments;


### y. whereas the governance of pesco is led by pms , and therefore eventually leads to the insufficient coordination and overall consistency of the projects; whereas this should constitute grounds for the extension of the mandate of the pesco secretariat; ### y. whereas the governance of pesco is led by pms possibly leading to the insufficient coordination and overall consistency of the projects; whereas an extension of the mandate of the pesco secretariat could improve coordination;


### z. whereas deepening defence cooperation among member states at eu level should go hand in hand with the strengthening of parliament’s power of scrutiny; ### z. whereas deepening defence cooperation among member states at eu level should go hand in hand with the strengthening of member states parliaments and european parliament’s power of scrutiny;


### aa. whereas parliament should , jointly with the council , exercise legislative and budgetary functions , as well as functions of political control and consultation as laid down in the treaties; ### aa. whereas the national parliaments should be systematically involved and should approve all programmes set up under pesco;


### encourage the pms to switch from a strictly national focus on defence to a european one and to undertake structured efforts to increase the use of european collaborative approach as a priority , as no individual pms alone has the potential to address identified capacity shortfalls; ### encourage the pms to switch from a strictly national focus on defence to a european one and to undertake structured efforts to increase the use of european collaborative approach as a priority , as no individual pms alone has the potential to address identified capacity shortfalls and , on the contrary , insisting on bilateral initiatives that exclude eu member states willing to contribute has the potential to create tensions among member states thus jeopardizing future defence integration;


### encourage the pms to switch from a strictly national focus on defence to a european one and to undertake structured efforts to increase the use of european collaborative approach as a priority , as no individual pms alone has the potential to address identified capacity shortfalls; ### preserve states’ sovereignty in matters of defence , and ensure that on no account , particularly through the extension of qualified majority voting , is a ‘european’ approach taken in the form of exclusive competence in this area;


### maintain the eu’s budgetary ambition for the strengthening of defence capabilities , notably thought the sufficient financing of edf in the upcoming mff; ### maintain the eu’s budgetary ambition for the strengthening of defence and strategic capabilities , notably thought the sufficient financing of edf and military mobility in the upcoming mff;


### ensure that pesco is effectively used as an instrument to reach eu defence integration as a common goal , in line with the ambition for greater eu strategic autonomy; ### ensure that pesco is effectively used as an instrument to reach eu defence integration and overcome shortfalls as a common goal , in line with the ambition for greater eu strategic autonomy , and not only to further national objectives;


### ensure that pesco is effectively used as an instrument to reach eu defence integration as a common goal , in line with the ambition for greater eu strategic autonomy; ### ensure that pesco is effectively used as an instrument to improve member states’ security and strategic independence;


### ensure that pesco is treated as a union institutions sui generis , as is the case with the european external action service (eeas) , which would require amending the financial regulation8 in order to include pesco , with a specific section in the union budget; recognise that parliament , jointly with the council , exercises legislative and budgetary functions , as well as functions of political control and consultation as laid down in the treaties; ### deleted


### ensure that future key land , sea , air and other platforms for the armed forces of the member states are brought under pesco or are at least closely connected to it; ### ensure that future key land , sea , air and other platforms for the armed forces of the member states are brought under pesco , with the participation to such strategic projects open to all members states willing to cooperate;


### ensure that future key land , sea , air and other platforms for the armed forces of the member states are brought under pesco or are at least closely connected to it; ### ensure that future key land , sea , air and other platforms for the armed forces of the member states are explicitly under the sovereignty of those states;


### consider giving cdp a more binding character; ### consider giving cdp an optional , non-binding character;


### clarify the role of the political and security committee in the pesco process , which is not provided for by the teu , and ensure , in this context , the central role played by the european union military committee (eumc) in the provision of ad hoc military advice to the vice-president of the commission / high representative of the union for foreign affairs and security policy; ### clarify the role of the political and security committee in the pesco process , which is not provided for by the teu;


### establish an eu council on defence based on the existing eda ministerial steering board and the pesco format of eu defence ministers , in order to guarantee the prioritisation of resources , and the effective cooperation and integration among the member states; ### not accept any decision-making authority on defence that does proceed from the council; require all decisions on defence to be made unanimously;


### clarify the rules governing third-party participation in pesco , taking into consideration the importance of eu decision-making autonomy and full reciprocity , with a case-by-case approach considered to be most beneficial for the eu; ### clarify the rules governing third-party participation in pesco , taking into consideration the unanimous agreement of member states as to the inclusion of any cooperation programme in pesco;


### 1. underlines the need for a memorandum of understanding between the european parliament , council and the commission on the provision of the information necessary for parliament to take an informed decision on discharge; considers that the negotiations with the council to this end should be resumed and extended to the commission , so as to ensure that parliament is provided with the necessary information on how the council is implementing its budget , either directly or via the commission; ### 1. underlines the need for a continuing dialogue between the european parliament , council and the commission on the provision of the information necessary for parliament to take an informed decision on discharge; considers that the negotiations with the council to this end should be resumed;


### 1. highlights that in the current global security environment , an integral part of the eu’s strategic autonomy should be the independent capacity to guarantee the security of its own citizens; ### 1. highlights that in the current global security environment , the member states remain the main guarantors of the security of their own citizens;


### 2. highlights that the support of eu citizens is crucial to underpinning the political ambition of eu defence policy; underlines the fact that according to the latest public opinion surveys , three quarters of eu citizens are in favour of a common defence and security policy for the member states , a proportion that has remained above 70 % since 2004; ### 2. stresses that security and defence policy remain in the core of the sovereignty of the member states; reminds that it is impossible to determine a common foreign and security policy line for the eu due to diversity of historical backgrounds , geographical positions and geostrategic interests of the members states; urges the european parliament to bear in mind lessons of history for limits of european integration drawn by failures of projects even between six founding members of the european integration project , e.g. the collapse of the fouchet plan in the 1960s;


### 41. welcomes the commission’s proposal of june 2017 to create a european defence fund (edf) , which would foster cooperation between member states and support the european defence industry; notes that this proposal is the first initiative for which community funds are to be used in direct support of defence projects; recognises that this is a major step forward for european defence , from both a political and an industrial perspective; notes that the edf could finance structural projects such as the future european aircraft or tank or a european anti-missile defence capability; notes that the 2019 work programme for the preparatory action will focus on electromagnetic spectrum dominance and future disruptive defence technologies , two key areas for maintaining europe’s technological independence in the long term; welcomes , also , the adoption by the commission in march 2019 of the first european defence industrial development programme (edidp) and the publication of nine calls for proposals for 2019 , including for the eurodrone , which is a key capability for europe’s strategic autonomy; points out that 12 further calls for proposals will follow in 2020 , covering priority areas in all domains (air , land , sea , cyber and space); notes the link between the procurement decisions taken today by the member states and the prospects for industrial and technological cooperation under the edf; ### deleted


### 41. welcomes the commission’s proposal of june 2017 to create a european defence fund (edf) , which would foster cooperation between member states and support the european defence industry; notes that this proposal is the first initiative for which community funds are to be used in direct support of defence projects; recognises that this is a major step forward for european defence , from both a political and an industrial perspective; notes that the edf could finance structural projects such as the future european aircraft or tank or a european anti-missile defence capability; notes that the 2019 work programme for the preparatory action will focus on electromagnetic spectrum dominance and future disruptive defence technologies , two key areas for maintaining europe’s technological independence in the long term; welcomes , also , the adoption by the commission in march 2019 of the first european defence industrial development programme (edidp) and the publication of nine calls for proposals for 2019 , including for the eurodrone , which is a key capability for europe’s strategic autonomy; points out that 12 further calls for proposals will follow in 2020 , covering priority areas in all domains (air , land , sea , cyber and space); notes the link between the procurement decisions taken today by the member states and the prospects for industrial and technological cooperation under the edf; ### 41. welcomes the commission’s proposal of june 2017 to create a european defence fund (edf) , which would foster cooperation between member states and support the european defence industry; notes that this proposal is the first initiative for which community funds are to be used in direct support of defence projects; recognises that this is a major step forward for european defence , from both a political and an industrial perspective; stresses the need to implement this budget in a transparent and inclusive manner , not to support bilateral cooperation but to facilitate genuine industrial cooperation at european level; notes that the edf could finance structural projects such as the future european aircraft or tank or a european anti-missile defence capability; notes that the 2019 work programme for the preparatory action will focus on electromagnetic spectrum dominance and future disruptive defence technologies , two key areas for maintaining europe’s technological independence in the long term; welcomes , also , the adoption by the commission in march 2019 of the first european defence industrial development programme (edidp) and the publication of nine calls for proposals for 2019 , including for the eurodrone , which is a key capability for europe’s strategic autonomy; points out that 12 further calls for proposals will follow in 2020 , covering priority areas in all domains (air , land , sea , cyber and space); notes the link between the procurement decisions taken today by the member states and the prospects for industrial and technological cooperation under the edf;


### 42. welcomes the effective implementation of permanent structured cooperation (pesco) as an important step towards closer cooperation in security and defence among member states; stresses that this provision , introduced in the 2009 lisbon treaty (article 46 of the treaty on the functioning of the european union) , is legally binding and includes a set of ambitious commitments to enable european countries wishing to do so to move ahead faster on common defence projects; recognises the role that pesco can play in structuring european demand; notes that a significant number of edidp-eligible projects are being developed within the pesco framework and may also benefit from higher rates of subsidy; supports full consistency between pesco projects and the edf; ### deleted


### 1. within three years of the entry into force of this directive and every four years thereafter , the member states shall report to the commission on the application of this directive in their territory , including on the application of article 5(3) and (4). the report shall contain statistical data on the participation in municipal elections of voters and candidates pursuant to article 3 and a summary of measures taken in that regard. ### 1. within three years of the entry into force of this directive and every four years thereafter , the member states shall report to the commission on the application of this directive in their territory , including on the application of article 5(3) and (4). the report may contain statistical data on the participation in municipal elections of voters and candidates pursuant to article 3 and a summary of measures taken in that regard.


### 13. expresses deep concern about developments in the sahel region and the recent coups d’état in the region; condemns the increasing presence of the kremlin-backed wagner group in the sahel; firmly believes that the latter’s involvement in west africa runs counter to the objective of bringing peace , security and stability to the region; acknowledges that the various international missions have not yet achieved their primary goal of lasting peace in the region and that a reflection process on the mandates and roles of international missions and policies is therefore needed; expresses similar concern over the increased presence and activity of islamist terrorist groups , in particular al-qaeda , daesh and al-shabaab in the middle east and africa; ### 13. expresses deep concern about developments in the sahel region and the recent coups d’état in the region; condemns the increasing presence of the kremlin-backed wagner group in the sahel and other parts of the african continent; firmly believes that the latter’s involvement in west africa runs counter to the objective of bringing peace , security and stability to the region; acknowledges that the various international missions have not yet achieved their primary goal of creating the preconditions for lasting peace in the region and that a reflection process on the mandates and roles of international missions and policies is therefore needed; expresses similar concern over the increased presence and activity of islamist terrorist groups , in particular al-qaeda , daesh and al-shabaab in the middle east and africa;


### (2) while progress has been made towards more consistent rules for the protection of european union classified information (‘euci’) and non-classified information , the interoperability of the relevant systems remains limited , preventing a seamless transfer of information between the different union institutions and bodies. further efforts should therefore be made to enable an interinstitutional approach to the sharing of euci and sensitive non-classified information , with common categories of information and common key handling principles. a baseline should also be envisaged to simplify procedures for sharing euci and sensitive non-classified information between union institutions and bodies and with member states. ### (2) while progress has been made towards more consistent rules for the protection of european union classified information (‘euci’) and non-classified information , the interoperability of the relevant systems remains limited , preventing a seamless transfer of information between the different union institutions and bodies. further efforts should therefore be made to enable an interinstitutional approach to the sharing of euci and sensitive non-classified information , with common categories of information , common key handling principles , and where appropriate , common information system infrastructure on which information is handled , stored and transmitted by union institutions , bodies , offices and agencies. a baseline should also be envisaged to simplify procedures for sharing euci and sensitive non-classified information between union institutions and bodies and with member states.


### (14) with the purpose of adjusting to the new teleworking practices , the networks used for connecting to the union institution’s or body’s remote access services should be protected by adequate security measures. ### (14) with the purpose of adjusting to the new teleworking practices , the networks , information systems , digital infrastructure and terminal devices used for connecting to the union institution’s or body’s remote access services should be protected by adequate security measures.


### 2. the sub-group on euci sharing and exchange of classified information shall be composed of representatives from the commission , the council and the european external action service and shall work by consensus. ### 2. the sub-group on euci sharing and exchange of classified information shall be composed of representatives from the commission , the european parliament , the council and the european external action service and shall work by consensus.


### (1) union institutions and bodies currently have their own information security rules , based on their rules of procedure or their founding act , or do not have such rules at all. in that context , each union institution and body invests significant efforts in adopting different approaches , leading to a situation where exchange of information is not always reliable. the lack of a common approach hinders the deployment of common tools building on an agreed set of rules depending on the security needs of the information to be protected. ### (1) union institutions , bodies , offices and agencies currently have their own information security rules , based on their rules of procedure or their founding act , or do not have such rules at all. in that context , each union institution and body invests significant efforts in adopting different approaches , leading to a situation where exchange of information is not always reliable. the lack of a common approach hinders the deployment of common tools building on an agreed set of rules depending on the security needs of the information to be protected.


### (6) this regulation is without prejudice to regulation (euratom) no 3/195817 , regulation no 31 (eec) , 11 (eaec) , laying down the staff regulations of officials and the conditions of employment of other servants of the european economic community and the european atomic energy community18 , regulation (ec) 1049/2001 of the european parliament and of the council19 , regulation (eu) 2018/1725 of the european parliament and of the council20 , council regulation (eec , euratom) no 354/8321 , regulation (eu , euratom) 2018/1046 of the european parliament and of the council22 , regulation (eu) 2021/697 of the european parliament and of the council23 , regulation (eu) [...] of the european parliament and of the council24 laying down measures for a high common level of cybersecurity at the institutions , bodies , offices and agencies of the union. ### (6) this regulation is without prejudice to regulation (euratom) no 3/195817 , regulation no 31 (eec) , 11 (eaec) , laying down the staff regulations of officials and the conditions of employment of other servants of the european economic community and the european atomic energy community18 , regulation (ec) 1049/2001 of the european parliament and of the council19 , regulation (eu) 2018/1725 of the european parliament and of the council20 , including the rules on international transfers , council regulation (eec , euratom) no 354/8321 , regulation (eu , euratom) 2018/1046 of the european parliament and of the council22 , regulation (eu) 2021/697 of the european parliament and of the council23 , regulation (eu) [...] of the european parliament and of the council24 laying down measures for a high common level of cybersecurity at the institutions , bodies , offices and agencies of the union.


### (15) since union institutions and bodies frequently make use of contractors and outsourcing , it is important to establish common provisions relating to contractors’ personnel carrying out tasks related to information security. ### (15) since union institutions and bodies frequently make use of contractors and outsourcing , it is important to establish common provisions relating to contractors’ personnel carrying out tasks related to information security. union institutions , bodies , offices and agencies should establish formal procedures underpinning the tendering process for contractors and outsourcing partners , taking into account the specificities of their operational technology environments and the complexities of their supply chains.


### (21) union institutions and bodies have been traditionally developed their communication and information systems autonomously , with insufficient attention to their interoperability across all union institutions and bodies. it is therefore necessary to establish minimum security requirements concerning the communication and information systems (ciss) handling and storing both euci and non-classified information with the aim to guarantee a seamless exchange of information with the relevant stakeholders. ### (21) union institutions and bodies have been traditionally developed their communication and information systems autonomously , with insufficient attention to their interoperability across all union institutions and bodies. it is therefore necessary to establish minimum security requirements concerning the communication and information systems (ciss) handling , storing and transmitting both euci and non-classified information with the aim to guarantee a seamless exchange of information with the relevant stakeholders.


### (24) the close cooperation between union institutions and bodies as well as the multitude of synergies developed among them involve the sharing of a large amount of information. for the sake of the classified information security , the trustworthiness of a union institution or body should be assessed before they handle and store a specified level of euci. ### (24) the close cooperation between union institutions and bodies as well as the multitude of synergies developed among them involve the sharing of a large amount of information. for the sake of the classified information security , the trustworthiness of a union institution or body should be assessed before they handle and store a specified level of euci. such synergies and cooperation is relevant , when dealing with activities such as applying data protection by design and by default to information security measures , selecting security measures that involve personal data , integrated risk management , and integrated security incident handling.


### (24) the close cooperation between union institutions and bodies as well as the multitude of synergies developed among them involve the sharing of a large amount of information. for the sake of the classified information security , the trustworthiness of a union institution or body should be assessed before they handle and store a specified level of euci. ### (24) the close cooperation between union institutions and bodies as well as the multitude of synergies developed among them involve the sharing of a large amount of information. for the sake of the classified information security , the capabilities of a union institution , body , office or agency to handle , store and transmit euci should be assessed before they handle and store a specified level of euci.


### 1. this regulation lays down information security rules for all union institutions and bodies. ### 1. this regulation lays down information security rules for all union institutions , bodies , offices and agencies.


### union institutions and bodies handling and storing euci shall organise mandatory training at least once every 5 years for all individuals authorised to access euci. the union institutions and bodies concerned shall organise specific training for the specific functions entrusted with information security tasks. ### union institutions , bodies , offices and agencies handling and storing euci shall organise mandatory training at least once every 3 years for all individuals authorised to access euci. the union institutions and bodies concerned shall organise specific training for the specific functions entrusted with information security tasks. union institutions , bodies , offices and agencies shall design and implement effective and appropriate trainings commensurate to the risks identified in accordance with article 5 of this regulation for all individuals authorised to access euci no later than 6 months after the entry into force of this regulation.


### business continuity and disaster recovery; ### business continuity , such as back up management and disaster recovery , and crisis management;


### 19. stresses that eu sovereignty in the field of security and defence means the development , coordination and deployment of strategic capabilities , an efficient division of labour between the member states and the eu’s ability to decide and act autonomously , in line with its own interests , principles and values; stresses that this approach reinforces cooperation with partners , in particular within the framework of nato; welcomes in this regard the commission president’s announcement that the eu and nato will present a joint declaration on cooperation by the end of 2021; welcomes the discussion on an ‘initial entry force’ as presented by the vp/hr; ### 19. stresses that the framework of nato is an impediment to state sovereignty and undermines any credible european defence project serving the inherent interests of european countries;


### a. whereas parliament has a duty and responsibility to exercise its democratic oversight over the common foreign and security policy (cfsp) and the common security and defence policy and should have the necessary and effective means to fulfil this role; ### a. whereas parliament has a duty and responsibility to exercise its democratic oversight over the common foreign and security policy (cfsp) and the common security and defence policy and should get the necessary information in a transparent and timely manner as well as the effective means to properly fulfil this role;


### b. whereas recent international developments and challenges , including the covid-19 pandemic and the recent rapid collapse of the state structures of afghanistan , have accelerated existing trends affecting key aspects of the eu’s cfsp; ### b. whereas recent international developments and challenges , including the covid-19 pandemic and the recent rapid collapse of the state structures of afghanistan , have accelerated existing trends affecting key aspects of the eu’s cfsp , highlighting the need for a more strategic and unified eu action in the world stage;


### 3. notes the union’s committed relationship with nato , which remains fundamental to eu security policy; welcomes , in this regard , the ongoing preparation of the new eu-nato joint declaration , which will be presented before the end of the year; ### 3. notes the union’s committed relationship with nato , which remains fundamental to eu security policy; welcomes , in this regard , the ongoing preparation of the new eu-nato joint declaration , which will be presented before the end of the year; calls for a very tangible development in the eu-nato partnership starting from enhanced consultation at the political level;


### 4. calls for increased efforts to fight foreign interference in the union’s security and defence , which often takes the form of cyber threats or other types of hybrid warfare; supports , in this regard , the development of the european cyber defence policy , as announced by the president of the commission in the state of the union address; ### 4. calls for increased efforts to fight foreign interference in the union’s security and defence , which often takes the form of cyber threats or other types of hybrid warfare; supports , in this regard , the development of the european cyber defence policy , as announced by the president of the commission in the state of the union address; to better address cyber threats the eu must increase its resilience , strategic autonomy , and digital and technological sovereignty;


### 5. reiterates that parliament should play a prominent role in scrutinising and supervising the implementation and evaluation of the csdp , including monitoring the implementation of the permanent structured cooperation. ### 5. reiterates that parliament should play a prominent role in scrutinising and supervising the implementation and evaluation of the csdp , including monitoring the implementation of the permanent structured cooperation; the parliament should be consulted on csdp missions and that its recommendations and remarks should be duly taken into consideration;


### 24. calls on the union to build on and develop its csdp naval operations in order to provide a strong platform to further develop a more permanent operational commitment at international level; calls for consideration to be given to the possibility of organising regular naval exercises to enhance interoperability; ### 24. calls on the union to build on and develop its csdp naval operations in order to provide a strong platform to further develop a more permanent operational commitment at international level; calls for consideration to be given to the possibility of organising regular naval exercises that should combine manned and unmanned assets whenever possible to enhance interoperability;


### 26. condemns the malicious acts committed against member states; insists that the union and the member states react firmly and in coordination against any new malicious , illegal or destabilising activity; calls on the union to work towards the creation of a legal instrument to respond to hybrid threats and to develop a comprehensive cyber capacity; calls for a revision of the cyber-defence policy framework in order to increase the prevention and deterrence capacity of the union and its member states; ### 26. condemns the malicious acts committed against member states; insists that the union and the member states react firmly and in coordination against any new malicious , illegal or destabilising activity; calls on the union to make full use and further strengthen the eu’s cyber diplomacy toolbox , to work towards the creation of a legal instrument to respond to hybrid threats and to develop a comprehensive cyber capacity; calls for a revision of the cyber-defence policy framework in order to increase coordination and cooperation as well as the prevention and deterrence capacity of the union and its member states;


### 3. calls urgently on the commission to closely integrate the european pillar of social rights into the economic governance of the union; ### 3. recalls that social policies are the competence and responsibility of member states;


### 5. stresses that the suspension of the famous convergence criteria which prohibited having government debt above 60% of gdp and a general government deficit above 3% of gdp made possible the essential public investment for responding to the health , social and economic crisis; welcomes the speed with which it was possible to apply the general escape clause; ### 5. stresses that the suspension of the famous convergence criteria which prohibited having government debt above 60% of gdp and a general government deficit above 3% of gdp made possible the essential public investment for responding to the health , social and economic crisis; welcomes the speed with which it was possible to apply the general escape clause; considers it necessary , moreover , to introduce a golden rule that would allow productive investment aimed at strengthening the social pillar , the green transition and the research and innovation sector to be excluded from the debt calculated for the purposes of these criteria;


### 7. considers that the establishment of an economic and monetary union (emu) is inseparable from consolidation of the rule of law; welcomes the agreement on a regulation for a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the union budget; ### 7. considers that the establishment of an economic and monetary union (emu) is inseparable from consolidation of the rule of law; welcomes the agreement on a regulation for a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the union budget; takes the view , lastly , that the economic and monetary union should be accompanied by a tax union;


### 8. stresses the importance of an economic governance debate as part of the conference on the future of europe; calls for the conclusions of that conference to be properly taken into account , even if they mean amending the treaties. ### 8. stresses the importance of an economic governance debate as part of the conference on the future of europe.


### c. whereas article 50 of the teu is silent on several aspects of the procedure that arose during the withdrawal of the uk from the union; ### c. whereas a member state should be considered a third country as soon as it notifies the eu about its decision to withdraw from the union , meaning that the withdrawal procedure should follow the respective rules of the vienna convention on the law of treaties;


### g. whereas under the teu , citizens are directly represented at union level in the european parliament; ### g. whereas article 10.2 teu states that citizens are directly represented at union level in the european parliament;


### h. whereas parliament has engaged actively and decisively in the withdrawal process since the very beginning , and has committed to protecting the interests of eu citizens and to safeguarding the integrity of the european union throughout the whole process; ### h. whereas , in the procedure provided for in article 50 of the teu and as in all cases of international agreements negotiated using the procedure laid down in article 218(3) of the tfeu , parliament plays a marginal role that is limited to approving a possible withdrawal agreement; whereas , despite these limitations , parliament has engaged actively in the withdrawal process since the very beginning , and has committed to protecting the interests of eu citizens and to safeguarding the integrity of the european union throughout the whole process;


### i. whereas the withdrawal process has led to unpredictability and has constituted a challenge not only for the eu and the withdrawing member state , but also and even more so for the citizens and entities most directly affected; ### i. whereas the withdrawal process of the united kingdom was unprecedented and presented procedural challenges for both the eu , the withdrawing member state , the citizens and entities most directly affected;


### 2. recognises but nevertheless considers regrettable the withdrawal of the uk from the european union; ### 2. recognises the withdrawal of the uk from the european union;


### 3. regrets that the legally non-binding nature of the political declaration gave the uk legal grounds not to engage with crucial parts of its content , in particular those relating to foreign and security policy , which therefore formed no part of the negotiations; ### 3. considers it perfectly legitimate for the united kingdom , as a sovereign state , not to have envisaged concluding an agreement binding it structurally with the european union regarding foreign and defence policy issues;


### 4. believes that article 50 of the teu has met its objectives of preserving the sovereign right of a member state to withdraw from the european union and of ensuring the orderly withdrawal of the uk from the union , while allowing for the subsequent building of an enhanced relationship between the eu and the uk as a third country; ### 4. believes that the procedure provided for under article 50 of the teu has too many loopholes and does not ensure the orderly withdrawal of a member state from the union , but exposes the union and its member states for an excessively long time to the uncertainty arising from the risk of withdrawal without an agreement; believes that these procedural loopholes have exposed the eu’s institutions to the placing of excessive weight on the primary objective of preserving the sovereign right of a member state to withdraw from the european union;


### 5. considers that the aims of article 50 of the teu and the withdrawal negotiations with the uk of ensuring disentanglement from the union , providing legal stability and minimising disruption , and providing a clear vision of the future for citizens and legal entities , by ensuring an orderly withdrawal , while protecting the integrity and interests of the european union , its citizens and its member states , were generally achieved; ### 5. believes that the withdrawal negotiations and agreement with the uk have made it possible to ensure disentanglement from the union in an orderly fashion , providing legal stability and protecting the integrity and interests of the european union , its citizens and its member states; believes , however , that the agreement does not take sufficient account of the possible negative repercussions regarding , in particular , the position of northern ireland and respect for the good friday agreement;


### 5. considers that the aims of article 50 of the teu and the withdrawal negotiations with the uk of ensuring disentanglement from the union , providing legal stability and minimising disruption , and providing a clear vision of the future for citizens and legal entities , by ensuring an orderly withdrawal , while protecting the integrity and interests of the european union , its citizens and its member states , were generally achieved; ### 5. considers that the aims of article 50 of the teu and the withdrawal negotiations with the uk of ensuring disentanglement from the union , providing legal stability and minimising disruption , and providing a clear vision of the future for citizens and legal entities , by ensuring an orderly withdrawal , while protecting the integrity and interests of the european union , its citizens and its member states , were generally achieved thanks to the skilful negotiation of both the eu and uk negotiation teams;


### 6. considers that the swift and firm identification of the priorities in the context of the withdrawal of the uk from the union , and in particular , the protection of the rights of the millions of eu citizens in the uk and uk nationals in the eu affected by the withdrawal , the special circumstances confronting the island of ireland and a single financial settlement were key in structuring the process and stabilising its impact in the union; ### 6. considers that the swift and firm identification of the priorities in the context of the withdrawal of the uk from the union , and in particular , the protection of the rights of the millions of eu citizens in the uk and uk nationals in the eu affected by the withdrawal , the special circumstances confronting the island of ireland and a single financial settlement were key in structuring the process and stabilising its impact in the union; considers , however , that there should have been more clarity during the negotiations regarding the resolution of any disputes that might arise from the application of the withdrawal agreement , particularly in regard to the role of the court of justice;


### 8. believes , nevertheless , that the withdrawal process was characterised by hesitancy on the part of the uk , leading to protracted uncertainty from the outset , reflected in the time gap between the referendum and the withdrawal notification under article 50 of the teu , and until the end of the negotiations , due to the spectre of a no-deal withdrawal; ### deleted


### 9. considers , in this regard , that the political and economic consequences of the decision to leave the union are significant; believes that these were not genuinely and fully assessed by the uk prior to its decision to withdraw , resulting in a lack of preparation for the procedure; ### deleted


### 9. considers , in this regard , that the political and economic consequences of the decision to leave the union are significant; believes that these were not genuinely and fully assessed by the uk prior to its decision to withdraw , resulting in a lack of preparation for the procedure; ### 9. considers that the political and economic consequences of the decision to leave the union are difficult precisely to estimate at the time of the decision to withdraw; believes that this uncertainty warrants ample leniency in the procedure.


### 9. considers , in this regard , that the political and economic consequences of the decision to leave the union are significant; believes that these were not genuinely and fully assessed by the uk prior to its decision to withdraw , resulting in a lack of preparation for the procedure; ### 9. considers , in this regard , that the political and economic consequences of the decision to leave the union are significant and that these were not fully considered because of british citizens’ scant knowledge about the european union; calls on member states to do more to ensure that citizens are involved in the eu’s decision-making processes , with a view to increasing understanding and knowledge of the union and strengthening its democratic legitimacy;


### 10. believes that although the withdrawal is not conditional upon an agreement between the withdrawing member state and the union , the process of the withdrawal of the uk shows the importance of concluding an agreement on the withdrawal arrangements; considers that the eu institutions did their utmost and accomplished their obligation to ensure the conclusion of an agreement; commends the efforts made to avoid a no-deal scenario; ### 10. believes that although the withdrawal is not conditional upon an agreement between the withdrawing member state and the union , the process of the withdrawal of the uk shows the importance of concluding an agreement on the withdrawal arrangements; considers that the eu institutions' unreasonable demands , especially with regards to the role of the court of justice of the eu , almost lead to a no-deal scenario;


### 10. believes that although the withdrawal is not conditional upon an agreement between the withdrawing member state and the union , the process of the withdrawal of the uk shows the importance of concluding an agreement on the withdrawal arrangements; considers that the eu institutions did their utmost and accomplished their obligation to ensure the conclusion of an agreement; commends the efforts made to avoid a no-deal scenario; ### 10. deplores the fact that the withdrawal is not conditional upon an agreement between the withdrawing member state and the union; emphasises that the process of the withdrawal of the uk shows the importance of concluding an agreement on the withdrawal arrangements , particularly with a view to protecting the rights and legitimate expectations of the citizens involved; considers that the eu institutions did their utmost and accomplished their obligation to ensure the conclusion of an agreement; commends the efforts made to avoid a no-deal scenario;


### 11. considers that article 50 of the teu strikes a balance between ensuring a withdrawal process and safeguarding the flexibility necessary for adaptation to the specific circumstances; believes , however , that , in the framework of a future reform of the treaty , the opportunity of remedying some of the loopholes identified in article 50 of the teu could be assessed , with particular regard to the following: ### 11. considers that article 50 of the teu strikes a balance between ensuring a withdrawal process and safeguarding the flexibility necessary for adaptation to the specific circumstances; believes that the vienna convention on the law of treaties comprises the necessary rules to remedy some of the challenges identified in the exercise of article 50 of the eu;


### - delimited requirements for the extension of the period of two years set out under article 50(3) of the teu , ### deleted


### - a legal basis and strict conditions for transitional arrangements , ### deleted


### - explicit conditions for the revocation of the notification of the intention to leave , ### deleted


### - explicit conditions for the revocation of the notification of the intention to leave , ### - explicit conditions for the revocation of the notification of the intention to leave , clearly setting out that in the event of notification being revoked the withdrawal procedure lapses without any consequences for the member state that initiated the article 50 procedure ,


### - clarification of the application of the provisions of article 218 of the tfeu , notably on the role of the court of justice of the european union in the procedure; ### deleted


### 12. believes , furthermore , that the withdrawal provisions of the treaty should , as much as possible , ensure legal certainty for the eu citizens affected by the withdrawal , setting out minimum standards for the protection of their rights; ### 12. believes , furthermore , that the withdrawal provisions of the treaty should always ensure legal certainty for the eu citizens affected by the withdrawal , fully safeguarding their rights and protecting them against any discriminatory treatment;


### 12. believes , furthermore , that the withdrawal provisions of the treaty should , as much as possible , ensure legal certainty for the eu citizens affected by the withdrawal , setting out minimum standards for the protection of their rights; ### 12. believes , furthermore , that the withdrawal procedures should , as much as possible , ensure legal certainty for the eu citizens affected by the withdrawal , setting out minimum standards for the protection of their rights;


### 13. believes that the eu institutions and the member states have collectively been responsive and have followed a coherent and unified approach , providing for a timely , clear and well-structured definition of the aspects of the withdrawal process , including those which are not explicitly specified in article 50 of the teu , in particular the objectives and general principles of the negotiations , the eu’s competences for issues related to the withdrawal , the sequencing of negotiations , the scope of the withdrawal agreement , the transitional arrangements , and the framework of the future relationship; ### 13. considers that the eu institutions and the member states have collectively been responsible for acting in bad faith in the withdrawal process by not allowing negotiations about the future relationship to take place before the notification of article 50; is therefore of the view that in potential future withdrawal cases the eu should abandon its policy of no negotiation before notification of article 50 in order to emphasise bona fide and to demonstrate that the eu is a voluntary union of independent and sovereign nation states;


### 15. reiterates that , until a withdrawal agreement enters into force or , failing that , the two-year period mentioned in article 50(3) of the teu has elapsed , the withdrawing state remains a member state , and enjoys all the rights and is under all the obligations deriving from the treaties without exception , including the principle of sincere cooperation laid down in article 4(3) of the teu , as well as the obligation to hold elections to the european parliament; ### 15. believes that a member state should be considered a third country from the date of entry into force of the withdrawal agreement or , failing that , two years after the notification referred to in paragraph 2 , unless the european council , in agreement with the member state concerned , unanimously decides to extend this period , in accordance with article 50 (3) teu;


### 17. considers , in this context , that the role of the parliament is essential in safeguarding the parliamentary and democratic dimension of a procedure with such a constitutional and institutional impact on the union; considers that its role must be enhanced in any future treaty reform , in all aspects of the process from the negotiations to the implementation of a withdrawal agreement , including for major decisions such as extensions in accordance with article 50(3) of the teu; ### 17. considers , in this context , that the role of the parliament is essential in safeguarding the parliamentary and democratic dimension of a procedure of major constitutional and institutional impact on the union;


### 19. reiterates its call for an in-depth reflection on the withdrawal of the uk from the european union , and on its impact on the future of the eu; believes that such a reflection should ensure an open and broadened dialogue on the reforms that the union needs in order to reinforce democracy and the capacity to deliver on citizens needs and expectations; ### 19. reiterates its call for an in-depth reflection on the withdrawal of the uk from the european union , and on its impact on the future of the eu; believes that such a reflection should ensure an open and broadened dialogue on the reforms that the union needs in order to reinforce democracy and the capacity to deliver on citizens needs and expectations; believes that a smaller union , with less , but more committed member states , might be better suited in the future;


### 20. believes that it is the responsibility and role of the union and its member states to prevent the repetition of a withdrawal from the eu; calls on member states to consistently provide wide-reaching information to eu citizens on the functioning of the european union , its areas of action and its decision-making processes; considers that for this purpose the conference on the future of europe offers an opportunity for enhanced dialogue with citizens and civil society on the european union and how it should evolve; ### 20. believes that it is the responsibility and role of the union to repatriate powers to member states , and to loosen the currently prevalent character of the eu as a centrally led political union on the path to become a superstate , in order to prevent the repetition of withdrawals from the eu;


### 20. believes that it is the responsibility and role of the union and its member states to prevent the repetition of a withdrawal from the eu; calls on member states to consistently provide wide-reaching information to eu citizens on the functioning of the european union , its areas of action and its decision-making processes; considers that for this purpose the conference on the future of europe offers an opportunity for enhanced dialogue with citizens and civil society on the european union and how it should evolve; ### 20. considers that the conference on the future of europe offers an opportunity for enhanced dialogue with citizens and civil society on the european union and how it should evolve; regrets that of the 27 citizens´ representatives who took the floor at the inaugural plenary of the conference on the future of europe , 15 (55.6%) were representing non-profit organisations or organisations close to government , such as pro-integrationist think tanks , national or international youth organisations , youth parliaments or similar organisations , including 2 jean monnet chairs , a ceo of a government agency , a former mep who was shortlisted in 2011 for the prize of the best member of the european parliament , and only 4 citizens employed in the private sector; also regrets that 4 out of 6 representatives from civil society organisations were affiliated to the same organisation , the very pro-integrationist european movement international; fears that this undermines the credibility of the conference to establish a real dialogue , and risks to degrade the conference to an echo-chamber of integrationist ideas;


### 8. expresses its concern about the increasing role of the european council on the legislative files in spite of the fact that this institution has neither a legislative nor an executive function and is not being held accountable because it does not apply the same transparency standards as the council; regrets the fact that the transparency register applies to the member states’ permanent representatives only under voluntary schemes and insists that all permanent representations should take an active part in it during and after their member state’s council presidency; believes that the existing ethics rules on conflicts of interest , revolving doors and lobby transparency should be strengthened and harmonised; ### 8. expresses its concern about the increasing role of the european council on the legislative files in spite of the fact that this institution has neither a legislative nor an executive function and is not being held accountable because it does not apply the same transparency standards as the council; regrets the fact that the transparency register applies to the member states’ permanent representatives only under voluntary schemes and insists that all permanent representations should take an active part in it during and after their member state’s council presidency; believes that the existing ethics rules on conflicts of interest , revolving doors and lobby transparency should be strengthened and harmonised; encourages the council to join the transparency register scheme and calls on the council to refuse to meet with unregistered lobbyists;


### 8. notes an increase in the carry-over of appropriations from 2020 to 2021 (12 ,6 % in comparison to 9 ,8 % , from 2019 to 2020); reminds the council that carry-overs are exceptions to the principle of annuality of the union budget and could be an indicator of budget over-estimations; ### 8. notes an increase in the carry-over of appropriations from 2020 to 2021 (12 ,6 % in comparison to 9 ,8 % , from 2019 to 2020); reminds the council that carry-overs are exceptions to the principle of annuality of the union budget and could be an indicator of budget over-estimations and calls on the council to step up its efforts to prevent budget overestimates;


### 12. recalls that under article 319 of the tfeu parliament has the sole responsibility of granting discharge in respect of the implementation of the general budget of the union , and that the budget of the european council and of the council is a section of the union budget; ### 12. recalls that under article 319 of the tfeu parliament exercises its prerogatives in the discharge procedures and has the sole responsibility of granting discharge in respect of the implementation of the general budget of the union , and that the budget of the european council and of the council is a section of the union budget;


### 6. understands that the council’s budget is mostly administrative with a large part of it being used for expenditure in relation to staff , buildings (including furniture and equipment) and miscellaneous running costs; reiterates its call for separate budgets for the european council and the council in order to improve transparency , accountability and expenditure efficiency for both institutions; ### 6. understands that the council’s budget is mostly administrative with a large part of it being used for expenditure in relation to staff , buildings (including furniture and equipment) and miscellaneous running costs; reiterates its call , made in previous resolutions on the budget , for separate budgets for the european council and the council in order to improve transparency , accountability and expenditure efficiency for both institutions;


### 32. shares the court’s concern about the absence of a common union ethical framework governing the work of member states’ representatives in the council , expressed in the court’s special report no 13/2019; recalls the council’s obligation to deal with high-level conflicts of interest , revolving doors and lobby transparency rules; ### 32. shares the court’s concern about the absence of a common union ethical framework governing the work of member states’ representatives in the council , expressed in the court’s special report no 13/2019; recalls the council’s obligation to deal with and resolve high-level conflicts of interest and revolving doors and to extend the existing mandatory lobby transparency rules;


### a. whereas since 1976 , when the european electoral act paved the way for the election of the representatives of the european parliament by direct universal suffrage for the first time , the ep has continuously requested the reform of eu electoral law and moves towards a more a genuine , uniform and european electoral procedure; ### a. whereas since 1976 , when the european electoral act paved the way for the election of the representatives of the european parliament by direct universal suffrage for the first time , the ep has continuously requested the reform of eu electoral law and moves towards a more a genuine , uniform and european electoral procedure; whereas electoral law falls within the competence of the member states;


### d. whereas the procedure for the 2014 elections set a precedent for the role of the parliament in the selection of the ec president; whereas it was not possible for that procedure to become part of an overall reform of eu electoral law , which contributed to creating the political background for the unexpected disapplication of the lead candidate principle following the european elections of 2019 , which resulted from the lack of a common indication from the european political parties and parliamentary groups in support of one of the lead candidates and the european council’s lack of agreement on nominating any of the lead candidates; ### deleted


### f. whereas , despite some steps forward in defining common standards of electoral procedures for the european parliament , today eu elections are still mostly governed by national laws and therefore more improvements are needed to establish a genuinely uniform procedure for european elections; ### f. whereas today eu elections are still mostly governed by national laws and are a collection of national elections and they should stay as such in the future;


### g. whereas the turnout registered in the 2019 european elections was the highest of any elections to the european parliament in the last 20 years; whereas increased turnout is a positive signal shows that citizens of the union are taking an increasing interest in the development of the european integration , as indicated also by the results of the special eurobarometer of 9 march 2021; ### g. whereas the turnout registered in the 2019 european elections was the highest of any elections to the european parliament in the last 20 years; whereas increased turnout is a positive signal shows that citizens of the union are taking an increasing interest in the development of a new european union , as indicated also by the results of the special eurobarometer of 9 march 2021;


### l. whereas an appropriate approach to reforming the european electoral law should be based on respect for the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality and the introduction of common minimum standards ; ### l. whereas an appropriate approach to reforming the european electoral law should be based on respect for the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality and the introduction of recommendations for common minimum standards , based on the european best practices;


### m. whereas the reform of the european parliament's electoral procedure should aim to enhance the democratic and transnational dimension of the european elections and the democratic legitimacy of the union decision-making process , reinforce the concept of citizenship of the union , improve the functioning of the european parliament and the governance of the union , make the work of the european parliament more legitimate , strengthen the principles of electoral equality and equal opportunities , enhance the effectiveness of the system for conducting european elections , and bring members of the european parliament closer to their voters , and in particular the youngest amongst them; ### m. whereas the reform of the european parliament's electoral procedure should aim to enhance the democratic dimension of the european elections and the democratic legitimacy of the union decision-making process , reinforce the concept of citizenship of the union , improve the functioning of the european parliament and the governance of the union , make the work of the european parliament more legitimate , strengthen the principles of electoral equality and equal opportunities , enhance the effectiveness of the system for conducting european elections , and bring members of the european parliament closer to their voters , and in particular the youngest amongst them , while preserving the national character of electoral matters;


### p. whereas european political parties are best placed to "contribute to forming european political awareness" and should therefore play a stronger role in the campaigns for parliament elections in order to improve their visibility and to make clear the link between a vote for a particular national party and the impact it has on the size of a european political group in the european parliament; ### p. whereas european political parties and movements are best placed to "contribute to forming european political awareness" and should therefore play a stronger role in the campaigns for parliament elections in order to improve their visibility and to make clear the link between a vote for a particular national party and the impact it has on the size of a european political group in the european parliament;


### t. whereas the establishment of a joint constituency in which lists are headed by each political family’s candidate for the post of president of the commission would greatly strengthen european democracy and further legitimise the election of the president of the commission; ### deleted


### t. whereas the establishment of a joint constituency in which lists are headed by each political family’s candidate for the post of president of the commission would greatly strengthen european democracy and further legitimise the election of the president of the commission; ### t. whereas the establishment of a joint constituency in which lists are headed by each political family’s candidate for the post of president of the commission would greatly strengthen european democracy and further legitimise the election of the president of the commission; this would make the elections for the european parliament truly based on european issues and not on issues of exclusively national interest;


### v. whereas any barriers to the right to vote for persons with disabilities , especially legal barriers for adults with intellectual disabilities declared legally incapacitated should be removed , guaranteeing physical and sensory accessibility in polling stations as well as alternative participation systems to exercise the right to vote , in particular through postal voting; ### v. whereas any barriers to the right to vote for persons with disabilities , especially legal barriers for adults with intellectual disabilities declared legally incapacitated should be removed , accessibility throughout the elections process should be ensured , including by providing alternative participation systems to exercise the right to vote , in particular through electronic voting procedures and postal voting and through appropriate voting arrangements for persons with disabilities to facilitate their voting rights on an equal basis with others;


### w. whereas an electoral authority , acting as a network of member states' single contact authorities , should be set up at union level , as this would facilitate access to information on the rules governing the european elections , as well as streamlining the process , managing the joint constituency and enhancing the european character of those elections; ### w. whereas a network and synergies among member states' electoral authorities should be developed at union level , as this would facilitate access to information on the rules governing the european elections , as well as streamlining the process and enhancing the european character of those elections;


### x. whereas postal , electronic and internet voting could make the conduct of european elections more efficient and more appealing for voters , whilst ensuring the highest possible standards of data protection; ### x. whereas the voting system in each member state should be efficient and should ensure the highest possible standards of data protection;


### x. whereas postal , electronic and internet voting could make the conduct of european elections more efficient and more appealing for voters , whilst ensuring the highest possible standards of data protection; ### x. whereas postal , electronic and internet voting could make the conduct of european elections more efficient and more appealing for voters , whilst ensuring that this process is supported by a common regulatory framework and procedure in which the highest standards of data protection , maximum transparency and security of the entire electoral process are guaranteed;


### 1. suggests the reform of its electoral procedure with the goal of shaping in a concrete way a european public sphere , by suggesting common minimum standards and legislative changes ahead of the 2024 european elections; ### 1. suggests the reform of its electoral procedure with the goal of shaping in a concrete way a european public sphere , by suggesting recommendations for common minimum standards based on the european best practices ahead of the 2024 european elections;


### 2. considers it essential to improve the transparency and democratic accountability of the parliament , by strengthening the european dimension of the elections , notably by shifting the debate in election campaigns away from national topics towards genuinely european issues; in addition , considers it essential to transform the european elections into a single european election , as opposed to the collection of 27 separate national elections , which is the way that european elections are mainly perceived today; ### 2. considers it essential to improve the transparency and democratic accountability of the parliament; in addition , considers it essential to provide national electoral authorities with support from the eu level;


### 4. observes that diverging electoral cultures have resulted in a range of different electoral systems; considers therefore that common minimum standards are needed , in order to ensure approximation towards a unified european electoral law and equality of the vote for citizens of the union , including as regards: the right to register a party and to stand for elections; access to ballots; the fielding of candidates; accessibility of voting; or what happens on the day of the elections; ### 4. observes that diverging electoral cultures have resulted in a range of different electoral systems; considers therefore that recommendations for common standards , based on the european best practices , are needed , including as regards: the right to register a party and to stand for elections; access to ballots; the fielding of candidates; accessibility of voting; or what happens on the day of the elections;


### 4. observes that diverging electoral cultures have resulted in a range of different electoral systems; considers therefore that common minimum standards are needed , in order to ensure approximation towards a unified european electoral law and equality of the vote for citizens of the union , including as regards: the right to register a party and to stand for elections; access to ballots; the fielding of candidates; accessibility of voting; or what happens on the day of the elections; ### 4. observes that diverging electoral cultures have resulted in a range of different electoral systems; considers therefore that common minimum standards are needed , in order to ensure approximation towards a unified european electoral law and equality of the vote for citizens of the union , including as regards: the right to register a party and to stand for elections; access to ballots; the fielding of candidates; accessibility of voting for persons with disabilities; or what happens on the day of the elections;


### 5. calls for the establishment of a common framework , with benchmarks and minimum standards for election rules across the eu , and suggests focusing on a strong coordination with national measures for implementing the core of its proposals; ### 5. calls for the establishment of a common framework of recommendations , with benchmarks and minimum standards for election rules across the eu , and suggests focusing on a strong coordination with national measures for implementing the core of its proposals , without prejudice to the member states' authority in the field of electoral law;


### 8. considers gender equality to be a key horizontal element for improving the quality of eu democracy and enhancing a european public space; calls on member states to apply this principle and the provisions contained in the parliament’s proposal in the attached legislative act in a comprehensive way , in accordance with their own competences; calls for the introduction of lists of candidates with an equal number of male and female candidates for the electable places , for example through the use of zipped lists or other equivalent methods , since , in many member states , there is no legislation that ensures political gender parity in elections; ### 8. considers gender equality to be a key horizontal element for improving the quality of eu democracy and enhancing a european public space; calls on member states to apply this principle and the provisions contained in the parliament’s proposal in the attached legislative act in a comprehensive way , in accordance with their own competences; further calls on member states to increase efforts to ensure gender equality and equal opportunities in the european electoral process;


### 10. believes that all european voters should be allowed to indicate their preferred candidate for the president of the commission , and that leading candidates should be able to stand in all member states , nominated by a european political party , by a movement or by a coalition of european parties , putting forward a common electoral programme; ### deleted


### 11. calls on european political parties and movements to nominate their candidates for the position of president of the commission - or common candidates of a coalition of european parties and movements - at least 12 weeks before the start of the electoral period; considers that binding democratic procedures and transparency in the selection should be ensured; expects candidates to be placed in the first position of the corresponding list of the joint constituency; ### 11. encourages political parties and movements to indicate their candidates for the position of president of the commission before the start of the electoral period , in order to ensure the democratic scrutiny and a fully informed choice of eu citizens when voting in the european elections;


### 12. calls for enhancing the visibility of european parties and movements through media campaigns and on ballot papers and all electoral materials; determines that national parties shall indicate their affiliation to the european political parties and to the corresponding lead candidate during the electoral campaign; ### 12. calls for enhancing the visibility of european parties and movements through media campaigns and on ballot papers and all electoral materials; determines that national parties can indicate their affiliation to the european political parties;


### 12. calls for enhancing the visibility of european parties and movements through media campaigns and on ballot papers and all electoral materials; determines that national parties shall indicate their affiliation to the european political parties and to the corresponding lead candidate during the electoral campaign; ### 12. calls for enhancing the visibility of european parties and movements through media campaigns and on ballot papers and all electoral materials; determines that national parties shall indicate their affiliation to the european political parties and movements and to the corresponding lead candidate during the electoral campaign;


### 15. considers that the introduction of a joint constituency from which forty-six members of the european parliament shall be elected and in which lists are headed by each political family’s candidate for the post of president of the commission could offer an opportunity to enhance the democratic and transnational dimension of the european elections; believes that the goal of establishing a joint constituency is achievable only if geographical , demographic and gender balance is ensured , by guaranteeing that smaller member states are not put at a competitive disadvantage compared to the larger member states; suggests in this respect introducing binding demographic representation in the lists for the joint constituency , such as maximum thresholds for candidates residing in the same member state and a minimum obligatory representation of nationals of different member states; encourages european parties and movements to appoint candidates in the joint lists coming from all member states; ### deleted


### (3) ‘european coalition of national political parties and/or national political movements’ means an electoral alliance by a number of national political parties and/or national political movements equal to one quarter of the member states , where necessary rounded up to the nearest whole number , that tables a candidacy to , and campaigns for the union-wide constituency; ### (3) ‘european coalition of national political parties and/or national political movements’ means an electoral alliance by a number of national political parties and/or national political movements declaring their affiliation of a same european political party;


### (6) ‘european electoral coalition’ means an electoral alliance by two or more european political parties and/or european political movements that fields a list of candidates for and campaigns in the union-wide constituency. national political parties and/or national political movements can also join such an electoral alliance provided that they are not affiliated to a european political party and there is no other affiliated national political party to any of the european political parties of the electoral alliance; ### (6) ‘european electoral coalition’ means an electoral and political alliance by two or more european political parties or movements and/or national parties or movements from different member states;


### (8) ´transnational list´ means the candidacy/list of candidates fielded in the union-wide constituency; ### deleted