### 26. underlines that automatic decision-making in healthcare applications may pose risks to patients’ well-being , although ai already outperforms doctors’ diagnoses in several instances , such as breast cancer21 ; finds that current liability frameworks do not provide sufficient legal certainty over who is accountable in the event of misdiagnosis through ai , for example; ### 26. underlines that automatic decision-making in healthcare applications may pose risks to patients’ well-being and fundamental rights , although ai already outperforms doctors’ diagnoses in several instances , such as breast cancer21; finds that current liability frameworks do not provide sufficient legal certainty over who is accountable in the event of misdiagnosis through ai , for example; notes that ai engineers or the companies employing them should remain accountable for the social , environmental and human health impacts that ai systems or robotics may impose on present and future generations;


### 26. underlines that automatic decision-making in healthcare applications may pose risks to patients’ well-being , although ai already outperforms doctors’ diagnoses in several instances , such as breast cancer21 ; finds that current liability frameworks do not provide sufficient legal certainty over who is accountable in the event of misdiagnosis through ai , for example; ### 26. underlines that automatic decision-making in healthcare applications may pose risks to patients’ well-being; notes that , despite several studies claiming ai is outperforming health professionals in diagnosis21 , there is still a need to confirm those results outside a controlled or a-posteriori test environment; finds that current liability frameworks do not provide sufficient legal certainty over who is accountable in the event of misdiagnosis through ai , for example;


### 26. underlines that automatic decision-making in healthcare applications may pose risks to patients’ well-being , although ai already outperforms doctors’ diagnoses in several instances , such as breast cancer21; finds that current liability frameworks do not provide sufficient legal certainty over who is accountable in the event of misdiagnosis through ai , for example; ### 26. underlines that automatic decision-making in healthcare applications may pose risks to patients’ well-being , but that the use of ai can speed up the processes that can help doctors reach their decisions; finds that current liability frameworks do not provide sufficient legal certainty over who is accountable in the event of misdiagnosis through ai , for example;


### 26. underlines that automatic decision-making in healthcare applications may pose risks to patients’ well-being , although ai already outperforms doctors’ diagnoses in several instances , such as breast cancer21 ; finds that current liability frameworks do not provide sufficient legal certainty over who is accountable in the event of misdiagnosis through ai , for example; ### 26. underlines that automated decision-making in healthcare applications may pose risks to patients’ well-being; finds that current liability frameworks do not provide sufficient legal certainty over who is accountable in the event of misdiagnosis through ai , for example; welcomes , in this regard , the upcoming legislative proposal on ai liability;


### 104. calls for the creation of an adequately resourced mechanism to supervise the uniform , eu-wide implementation and enforcement of the upcoming ai laws; prefers a european ai board over the creation of a costly new eu agency for ai; suggests , however , that this board should be made up of not only the national ai supervisory authorities and the european data protection board (edpb) , but also a broad range of relevant eu bodies , such as the eu agency for fundamental rights , the high-level expert group on ai , the eu agency for cybersecurity , the european consumer consultative group , and standardisation organisations the european committee for standardization , the european committee for electrotechnical standardization and the european telecommunications standards institute; ### 104. considers the creation of a european ai board that should be made up of not only the national ai supervisory authorities and the european data protection board (edpb) , but also a broad range of relevant eu bodies , such as the eu agency for fundamental rights , the high-level expert group on ai , the eu agency for cybersecurity , the european consumer consultative group , and standardisation organisations the european committee for standardization , the european committee for electrotechnical standardization and the european telecommunications standards institute;


### 104. calls for the creation of an adequately resourced mechanism to supervise the uniform , eu-wide implementation and enforcement of the upcoming ai laws; prefers a european ai board over the creation of a costly new eu agency for ai; suggests , however , that this board should be made up of not only the national ai supervisory authorities and the european data protection board (edpb) , but also a broad range of relevant eu bodies , such as the eu agency for fundamental rights , the high-level expert group on ai , the eu agency for cybersecurity , the european consumer consultative group , and standardisation organisations the european committee for standardization , the european committee for electrotechnical standardization and the european telecommunications standards institute; ### 104. calls for the creation of an adequately resourced mechanism to supervise the uniform , eu-wide implementation and enforcement of the upcoming ai-related legislation; suggests , however , that this body should be made up of not only the national ai supervisory authorities and the european data protection board (edpb) , but also a broad range of relevant eu bodies , such as the eu agency for fundamental rights , the high-level expert group on ai , the eu agency for cybersecurity , the european consumer consultative group , and standardisation organisations the european committee for standardization , the european committee for electrotechnical standardization and the european telecommunications standards institute;


### 104. calls for the creation of an adequately resourced mechanism to supervise the uniform , eu-wide implementation and enforcement of the upcoming ai laws; prefers a european ai board over the creation of a costly new eu agency for ai; suggests , however , that this board should be made up of not only the national ai supervisory authorities and the european data protection board (edpb) , but also a broad range of relevant eu bodies , such as the eu agency for fundamental rights , the high-level expert group on ai , the eu agency for cybersecurity , the european consumer consultative group , and standardisation organisations the european committee for standardization , the european committee for electrotechnical standardization and the european telecommunications standards institute; ### 104. calls for the creation of an adequately resourced mechanism to supervise the uniform , eu-wide implementation and enforcement of the upcoming ai laws; calls for the creation of an ai board , suggests , however , that this board should be made up of not only the national ai supervisory authorities and the european data protection board (edpb) , but also a broad range of relevant eu bodies , such as the eu agency for fundamental rights , the high-level expert group on ai , the eu agency for cybersecurity , the european consumer consultative group , and standardisation organisations the european committee for standardization , the european committee for electrotechnical standardization and the european telecommunications standards institute;


### 105. highlights that the underlying objective of the eu’s digital strategy , as well as that of the ai strategy is to create a ‘european way’ in a digitalised world; clarifies that this approach should be human-centred , value-oriented and based on the concept of the social market economy; underlines that the individual , with their respective dignity and individual freedoms , should always remain at the centre of all political considerations; ### 105. highlights that the underlying objective of the eu’s digital strategy , as well as that of the ai strategy is to create a ‘european way’ in a digitalised world; clarifies that this approach should be human-centred , value-oriented and based on a respect for fundamental rights and on the concept of the social market economy; underlines that the individual , with their respective dignity and individual freedoms , should always remain at the centre of all political considerations;


### 105. highlights that the underlying objective of the eu’s digital strategy , as well as that of the ai strategy is to create a ‘european way’ in a digitalised world; clarifies that this approach should be human-centred , value-oriented and based on the concept of the social market economy; underlines that the individual , with their respective dignity and individual freedoms , should always remain at the centre of all political considerations; ### 105. highlights that the underlying objective of the eu’s digital strategy , as well as that of the ai strategy is to create a ‘european way’ in a digitalised world; clarifies that this approach should be human-centric , value-oriented , trustworthy and based on the concept of the social market economy; underlines that citizens , with their fundamental rights and freedoms , should always remain at the centre of all political and legislative considerations;


### 106. agrees with the conclusion drawn by the commission in its 2020 white paper on artificial intelligence that there is a need to establish a risk-based legal framework for ai , covering high-level ethical standards combined with appropriate liability rules and sector-specific provisions , while at the same time providing the private sector with enough flexibility , practicability and legal certainty to develop new business models based on ai technologies; ### 106. agrees with the conclusion drawn by the commission in its 2020 white paper on artificial intelligence that there is a need to establish a risk-based legal framework for ai , covering high-level ethical standards and product safety provisions combined with appropriate liability rules and sector-specific provisions , while at the same time providing businesses with enough legal certainty and a level playing field to foster ai uptake and innovation based on eu values;


### 107. states that the co-legislators should aim to align the ai definition in future legislation with the concepts , terminologies and standards developed together with other like-minded democratic countries in the oecd44 ; stresses that doing so would give the eu an advantage in shaping a future international ai governance system; ### deleted


### 108. is convinced that it is not ai as a technology that should be regulated , but that the type , intensity and timing of regulatory intervention should solely depend on the type of risk incurred by the use of an ai system; underlines , in this regard , the importance of distinguishing between a minority of ‘high-risk’ and the vast majority of ‘low-risk’ ai use cases; concludes that while only the former category indeed demands legislative safeguards , businesses should self-regulate ‘low-risk’ technologies by choosing measures that deliver the best outcomes; ### deleted


### 108. is convinced that it is not ai as a technology that should be regulated , but that the type , intensity and timing of regulatory intervention should solely depend on the type of risk incurred by the use of an ai system; underlines , in this regard , the importance of distinguishing between a minority of ‘high-risk’ and the vast majority of ‘low-risk’ ai use cases; concludes that while only the former category indeed demands legislative safeguards , businesses should self-regulate ‘low-risk’ technologies by choosing measures that deliver the best outcomes; ### 108. is convinced that it is not ai as a technology that should be regulated , but that the type , intensity and timing of regulatory intervention should solely depend on the type of individual and/or societal risk incurred by the use of an ai system; underlines , in this regard , the importance of distinguishing between a gradually increasing number of ‘high-risk’ and the vast majority of ‘low-risk’ ai use cases; concludes that while only the former category indeed demands strict legislative safeguards , businesses should self-regulate ‘low-risk’ technologies by choosing measures that deliver the best outcomes and which should be monitored and audited if needed by public authorities. believes that artificial intelligence systems , especially those with built-in autonomy , including the capability to independently extract , collect , and share sensitive information with various stakeholders , and the possibility of self-learning or even evolving to self-modify , should be subject to robust conceptual laws and principles. stresses that ai systems must not keep or disclose personal confidential information without explicit approval from the source of that information;


### 109. specifies that the classification of technologies as ‘high-risk’ should be based on the concrete use and context , complexity and autonomy of the ai system , the probability and likelihood of the worst-case scenario , the severity of the harm and its irreversibility , the techniques used and the governance arrangements adopted; stresses that this classification should be introduced together with best practices and guidance for ai developers and should also recognise that ai technologies can significantly reduce certain risks; ### deleted


### 109. specifies that the classification of technologies as ‘high-risk’ should be based on the concrete use and context , complexity and autonomy of the ai system , the probability and likelihood of the worst-case scenario , the severity of the harm and its irreversibility , the techniques used and the governance arrangements adopted; stresses that this classification should be introduced together with best practices and guidance for ai developers and should also recognise that ai technologies can significantly reduce certain risks; ### 109. specifies that the classification of technologies as ‘high-risk’ should be based on the concrete use and context , complexity and autonomy of the ai system , the probability and likelihood of the worst-case scenario , the severity of the harm , the degree of moral hazard and its irreversibility , the techniques used and the governance arrangements adopted; stresses that this classification should be introduced together with best practices and guidance for ai developers and should also recognise that ai technologies can significantly reduce certain risks; stresses that the right to privacy must always be respected. an ai developer should guarantee that individuals are not personally identifiable , aside from exceptional circumstances and then only with clear , unambiguous informed consent. human informed consent should be pursued and obtained prior to any man-machine interaction. as such , ai designers have a responsibility to develop and follow procedures for valid consent , confidentiality , anonymity , fair treatment and due process. designers will comply with any requests that any related data be destroyed , and removed from any datasets;


### 110. notes that the requirements that ai systems need to fulfil differ significantly in a business-to-business (b2b) environment compared to a business-to-consumer (b2c) environment; points out that while consumer rights need to be legally protected through consumer protection legislation , companies can solve liability and other legal challenges more quickly and cost-effectively by contractual means with business partners directly; concludes that , in particular , smes and start-ups investing in ai technologies would benefit from a b2b exclusion as they are disproportionately affected by new legal obligations , which also harms their ability to attract investments; ### deleted


### 111. underlines the need to address open ethical questions raised by new technological possibilities , but clarifies that new ai ethical guidelines should not set up stricter rules than those already existing for human or automated actions; proposes that on these grounds the eu should introduce ethical guidelines that consist of three categories of core values and principles; ### deleted


### 111. underlines the need to address open ethical questions raised by new technological possibilities , but clarifies that new ai ethical guidelines should not set up stricter rules than those already existing for human or automated actions; proposes that on these grounds the eu should introduce ethical guidelines that consist of three categories of core values and principles; ### 111. underlines the need to address open ethical questions raised by new technological possibilities , but clarifies that new ai ethical guidelines should not set up stricter rules than those already existing for human or automated actions; proposes that on these grounds the eu should introduce ethical guidelines to be discussed and fleshed out in an interdisciplinary working group of scientists in the technological-humanistic field working closely with ai industry representatives and leading innovators;


### 112. explains that the first category could list fundamental , mandatory principles such as the non-maleficence principle , the principle of respecting human dignity or the protection of the democratic process; states that the second category could include good practices in ai development such as human-centric ai , responsible governance and the principles of transparency and explainability; concludes that the last category could include principles of sustainable ai that would be fully aligned with the un 2030 agenda for sustainable development; ### deleted


### 113. highlights , with regard to the third category , the gap in leadership on ai global governance , which gives the eu the chance to become the leading voice in aligning ai with the un sdgs and using ai technologies to push worldwide for their achievement; stresses , however , that not all ai technologies developed or applied in the eu should need to comply with all three categories; suggests , for example , that sustainable ai could only be mandated for ai implemented or procured by public tender or in specific sectors , while the majority of ai developers and companies would only be encouraged to align with the second and third categories through soft law; ### deleted


### 113. highlights , with regard to the third category , the gap in leadership on ai global governance , which gives the eu the chance to become the leading voice in aligning ai with the un sdgs and using ai technologies to push worldwide for their achievement; stresses , however , that not all ai technologies developed or applied in the eu should need to comply with all three categories; suggests , for example , that sustainable ai could only be mandated for ai implemented or procured by public tender or in specific sectors , while the majority of ai developers and companies would only be encouraged to align with the second and third categories through soft law; ### 113. highlights , with regard to the third category , the gap in leadership on ai global governance , which gives the eu the chance to become the leading voice in aligning ai with the un sdgs and the fundamental rights legal acquis , and using ai technologies to push worldwide for their achievement; stresses , however , that not all ai technologies developed or applied in the eu should need to comply with all three categories; suggests , for example , that sustainable ai could only be mandated for ai implemented or procured by public tender or in specific sectors , while the majority of ai developers and companies would only be encouraged to align with the second and third categories through soft law;


### 114. is convinced that efforts to completely ‘de-bias’ ai algorithms are frequently misguided , because this strategy wrongly suggests that bias-free data sets exist; notes that in this regard the requirement that data used to train ai systems is ‘complete and free of errors’ needs to be revisited; stresses , however , that the eu should at the same time cooperate very closely with ai developers to counterbalance structural biases in our societies and daily life; ### deleted


### 114. is convinced that efforts to completely ‘de-bias’ ai algorithms are frequently misguided , because this strategy wrongly suggests that bias-free data sets exist; notes that in this regard the requirement that data used to train ai systems is ‘complete and free of errors’ needs to be revisited; stresses , however , that the eu should at the same time cooperate very closely with ai developers to counterbalance structural biases in our societies and daily life; ### 114. is convinced that efforts to completely ‘de-bias’ ai algorithms are frequently misguided , because this strategy wrongly suggests that bias-free data sets exist; notes that in this regard the requirement that data used to train ai systems is ‘complete and free of errors’ needs to be balanced , as done in the upcoming draft for ai act44a; stresses , that the eu should cooperate very closely with ai developers to counterbalance structural biases in our societies and daily life;


### 115. elaborates that transparency or explainability obligations for ai systems , while helpful in certain cases , may not be possible to implement in every instance; notes that both concepts also need to be balanced against other factors , including the interests of businesses in maintaining trade secrets or the potential value of exposed data to potential competitors; stresses , however , that a mandatory self-identification of ai systems or accessible machine logs seem to be very useful for many ai use cases that interfere with the fundamental rights of individuals or affect consumers; ### deleted


### 116. states that the legislative framework on intellectual property must continue to incentivise and protect ai innovators by granting them patents as a reward for developing and publishing their creations; finds that existing laws are mostly future-proof , but proposes certain adjustments , including the integration of open source elements and new forms of patent licensing to ensure that tools are available to regions and initiatives that could not otherwise afford them; recognises that it will also be necessary to clarify whether ai will be able to hold intellectual property rights in itself; ### 116. states that the legislative framework on intellectual property must continue to incentivise and protect ai innovators by granting them patents as a reward for developing and publishing their creations; finds that existing laws are mostly future-proof , but proposes certain adjustments , including the integration of open source elements , the use of public procurement to encourage open source ai digital solutions in the public and private sector , and new forms of patent licensing to ensure that tools are available to regions and initiatives that could not otherwise afford them; recognises that it will also be necessary to clarify whether ai will be able to hold intellectual property rights in itself;


### 116. states that the legislative framework on intellectual property must continue to incentivise and protect ai innovators by granting them patents as a reward for developing and publishing their creations; finds that existing laws are mostly future-proof , but proposes certain adjustments , including the integration of open source elements and new forms of patent licensing to ensure that tools are available to regions and initiatives that could not otherwise afford them; recognises that it will also be necessary to clarify whether ai will be able to hold intellectual property rights in itself; ### 116. states that the legislative framework on intellectual property must continue to incentivise and protect ai innovators by granting them patents as a reward for developing and publishing their creations; finds that existing laws are mostly future-proof , but proposes certain adjustments , including the integration of open source elements and new forms of patent licensing to ensure that tools are available to regions and initiatives that could not otherwise afford them; is of the opinion that ai itself should not be entitled intellectual property rights for entirely ai-made creations , nor should their owners , in order to avoid market distortions to the expense of human creators;


### 117. elaborates that obligatory ex ante risk self-assessments , comparable with ce markings or data protection impact assessments , combined with market surveillance based on clear rules and standards , and complemented with ex post enforcement for high-risk ai systems , seem to be a sufficiently robust governance approach for ai; warns that overly burdensome conformity assessment obligations could create significant burdens that make the business models of ai developers and companies economically unviable; ### deleted


### 118. notes that in order to increase product safety and improve the identification of faults , the developers of high-risk ai should at least be obliged to ensure that accessible logs of algorithmic activity are maintained securely; considers that developers should also design high-risk ai systems with embedded mechanisms – ‘kill switches’ – for human intervention to immediately halt automated activities at any moment; ### deleted


### 118. notes that in order to increase product safety and improve the identification of faults , the developers of high-risk ai should at least be obliged to ensure that accessible logs of algorithmic activity are maintained securely; considers that developers should also design high-risk ai systems with embedded mechanisms – ‘kill switches’ – for human intervention to immediately halt automated activities at any moment; ### 118. notes that in order to increase product safety and improve the identification of faults , the developers of high-risk ai should at least be obliged to ensure that accessible logs of algorithmic activity are maintained securely; considers that developers should also design high-risk ai systems with embedded mechanisms – ‘kill switches’ – for human intervention to immediately halt automated activities at any moment and ensure a human-in-the-loop approach; considers that it should always be possible to reduce the ai system´s computations to a form comprehensible by humans; suggests that ai products be equipped with a ‘black box’ which records data on every transaction carried out by the ai-system , including the logic that contributed to each of its decisions;


### 119. is convinced that despite the legal challenges caused by ai systems , there is no need for a complete revision of the existing liability rules; stresses that the product liability directive and the national fault-based liability regimes can in principle remain the centrepiece legislation for countering most harm caused by ai; underlines that only in some cases could there be inappropriate outcomes , but warns that any revision should take the existing product safety legislation into account and should solely be based on clearly identified gaps; ### 119. is convinced that the intrinsic characteristics of ai and its ability to adapt call for a specific liability regime and looks forward in this regard to the presentation of the commission’s legislative proposal on ai liability;


### 120. notes that certain changes to the legal definitions of ‘product’ , including integrated software applications , digital services and inter-product dependency , and ‘producer’ , including backend operator , service provider and data supplier , do however seem necessary to ensure that compensation is available for harm caused by emerging technologies; stresses , however , that an overly broad approach to the definition of ‘product’ should be avoided , as this may make it difficult to differentiate between ai and other algorithms; ### deleted


### 121. points out that , due to the characteristics of ai systems , such as their autonomy and opacity , there could also be cases where neither an updated product liability directive nor national fault-based liability regimes apply and where persons who suffer harm or whose property is damaged would end up without compensation; suggests , therefore , the introduction of a limited new liability mechanism for legal claims against the operator , who controls the risks associated with the ai system and who also often is the cheapest cost avoider; specifies that while high-risk ai systems should fall under strict liability , combined with mandatory insurance cover , victims of low-risk ai systems should only benefit from a presumption of fault against the operator; ### deleted


### 122. agrees with the conclusion drawn by the commission in its 2020 communication entitled ‘a european strategy for data’ that the creation of a single european data space is key to ensuring the eu’s global competitiveness in ai , as well as its strategic sovereignty and economic prosperity; recalls the essential link between the availability of high-quality data and the development of ai; ### 122. agrees with the conclusions drawn by the commission in its 2020 communication entitled ‘a european strategy for data’ and by the european parliament on its resolution on the european strategy for data , that the creation of a single european data space is key to ensuring the eu’s global competitiveness in ai , as well as its strategic sovereignty and economic prosperity; recalls the essential link between the availability of high-quality data and the development of ai; and calls for the consistent and harmonized regulatory framework in european competition policy , data regulation and privacy rules for the use and access of data;


### 122. agrees with the conclusion drawn by the commission in its 2020 communication entitled ‘a european strategy for data’ that the creation of a single european data space is key to ensuring the eu’s global competitiveness in ai , as well as its strategic sovereignty and economic prosperity; recalls the essential link between the availability of high-quality data and the development of ai; ### 122. agrees with the conclusion drawn by the commission in its 2020 communication entitled ‘a european strategy for data’ that the creation of a single european data space is key to ensuring the eu’s global competitiveness in ai , as well as its strategic sovereignty and economic prosperity; recalls the essential link between the availability of high-quality data and the development of ai applications;


### 124. urges the commission to continue its work on removing key barriers for developers and companies in areas such as country-based discrimination , burdensome market access procedures and high regulatory costs , as well as to address the frequent use of derogations which results in diverging rules among different member state jurisdictions; ### 124. urges the commission to continue its work on removing key unjustified barriers preventing the full completion of the digital single market in areas such as country-based discrimination , incomplete mutual recognition of professional qualifications , unjustified burdensome market access procedures and high regulatory costs , as well as to address the frequent use of derogations which results in diverging rules among different member state jurisdictions;


### 125. is convinced that the current national and european competition and antitrust frameworks need to be reformed in order to better target abuses of market power and algorithmic collusion in the digital economy , as well as to better address the risks of new emerging monopolies without compromising innovation; ### 125. is convinced that the current national and european competition and antitrust frameworks need to be reformed in order to better target abuses of market power and algorithmic collusion in the digital economy , as well as to better address the risks of new emerging monopolies without compromising innovation; and calls for specific considerations of potential competition issues in the field of artificial intelligence , in line with the general review of commission’s competition rules to be fit for the digital age44b;


### 125. is convinced that the current national and european competition and antitrust frameworks need to be reformed in order to better target abuses of market power and algorithmic collusion in the digital economy , as well as to better address the risks of new emerging monopolies without compromising innovation; ### 125. is convinced that the current national and european competition and antitrust frameworks need to be reformed in order to better target abuses of market power and algorithmic collusion in the digital economy , as well as to better address the risks of new emerging monopolies without compromising innovation; welcomes in this regard the upcoming approval of the digital markets act;


### 125. is convinced that the current national and european competition and antitrust frameworks need to be reformed in order to better target abuses of market power and algorithmic collusion in the digital economy , as well as to better address the risks of new emerging monopolies without compromising innovation; ### 125. is convinced that the current national and european competition and antitrust frameworks need to be reformed in order to better target abuses of market power and algorithmic collusion in the digital economy , such as related to data accumulation , as well as to better address the risks of new emerging monopolies without compromising innovation;


### 127. stresses that the shift in the volume and processing of data for ai requires the development and deployment of new data processing technologies encompassing the edge , thereby moving away from centralised cloud-based infrastructure models towards increasing decentralisation of data processing capacities; urges the strengthening of european intense-computing ai architectures as a key strategic priority to maximise investment and research , including distributed clusters , the deployment of edge nodes , digital microcontroller initiatives , and the capacity to enable faster data collection and processing in all aspects of society; ### 127. stresses that the shift in the volume and processing of data for ai requires the development and deployment of new data processing technologies encompassing the edge , thereby moving away from centralised cloud-based infrastructure models towards increasing decentralisation of data processing capacities; urges the strengthening of european intense-computing ai-enabling architectures as a key strategic priority to maximise investment and research , including distributed clusters , the deployment of edge nodes , digital microcontroller initiatives;


### 128. stresses that ai requires powerful hardware to make sophisticated algorithms useable , including high-performance and quantum computing and the iot; urges the maximisation of funding and research for such ai-enabled emerging technologies; finds that , similarly , nano-technologies and chips are essential to enabling ai to be embedded in , for example , medical devices , which also requires priority funding; ### 128. stresses that ai requires powerful hardware to make sophisticated algorithms useable , including high-performance and quantum computing and the iot; urges the maximisation of funding and research for such ai-enabled emerging technologies; finds that , similarly , nano-technologies and chips are essential to enabling ai to be embedded in , for example , medical devices; is concerned about the global crisis of microprocessors and welcomes in this regard the commission’s proposal for a “chips act” to shorten supply chains and reduce eu’s current total dependence on external suppliers;


### 129. highlights that a functioning and fast infrastructure for ai must be based on a fair , safe and high-quality foundation by avoiding gaps in digital high-speed connectivity , which requires 5g roll-out in all urban areas by 2030 , as well as ultra-fast broadband networks and spectrum policy with licence conditions that do not distort competition; urges member states to continue to implement the 5g toolbox , specifically enabling legislation related to the risk assessment of suppliers and service providers; calls for the broadband cost reduction directive to be put into practice to facilitate network deployment; ### 129. highlights that a functioning and fast infrastructure for ai must be based on a fair , safe and high-quality foundation by avoiding gaps in digital high-speed connectivity , which requires 5g roll-out in all urban areas by 2030 , as well as ultra-fast broadband networks and spectrum policy; urges member states to continue to implement the 5g toolbox , specifically enabling legislation related to the risk assessment of suppliers and service providers; calls for the broadband cost reduction directive to be put into practice to facilitate network deployment;


### 130. calls on the commission to establish timetables and financial incentives for member states , cities , regions and industry , and to accelerate the administrative approval processes for 5g; supports the incentivisation of private investment in 5g roll-out; requests that in regions where roll-out is not carried out by the private sector , more funds are made available; calls for funding for broadband and connectivity projects under the multiannual financial framework , with easier access for local authorities to avoid the underutilisation of public funds; ### 130. calls on the commission to establish timetables and financial incentives for member states , cities , regions and industry , and to accelerate the administrative approval processes for 5g;


### 131. calls on the commission to establish a precise strategy with a clear timetable for 6g roll-out to better prepare for the next wave of digital infrastructure , enabling europe to take the lead; ### deleted


### 132. finds that it will not be possible to achieve the necessary deployment of dense edge-node connectivity for 5g in rural areas , where half of european households are not even connected through fibre; calls for a clear strategy on fibre-optic network deployment and broadband roll-out in rural areas , which is also key for data intensive technologies such as ai; recommends that european investment bank support for connectivity projects in rural areas be enhanced; ### 132. calls for a clear strategy on fibre-optic network deployment and broadband roll-out in rural areas , which is also key for data intensive technologies such as ai; calls in this regard for increased support by the european investment bank for connectivity projects in rural areas;


### 133. stresses that the significant investment required for network deployment , coupled with the ambitious expectations of public authorities and consumers regarding roll-out timing and coverage , will be impossible to achieve without infrastructure-sharing agreements , which are also key to promoting sustainability and reducing energy consumption; ### 133. stresses that the significant investment required for network deployment , and the swift rollout that would be needed to achieve the ambitious targets set by the digital compass will be impossible to achieve without infrastructure-sharing agreements , which are also key to promoting sustainability and reducing energy consumption;


### 134. urges the eu to take the lead in making green digital infrastructure climate neutral and energy efficient by 2030; calls for coordinated global multilateral action to use ai in the fight against climate change and environmental degradation; ### 134. urges the eu to take the lead in making green digital infrastructure climate neutral and energy efficient by 2030; underlines that the ai transformation should be integrated with the european green deal policy program; calls for coordinated global multilateral action to use ai in the fight against climate change and environmental degradation;


### 134. urges the eu to take the lead in making green digital infrastructure climate neutral and energy efficient by 2030; calls for coordinated global multilateral action to use ai in the fight against climate change and environmental degradation; ### 134. urges the eu to take the lead in making green digital infrastructure climate neutral and energy efficient by 2030;


### 135. calls on the commission to create an ai competence framework for individuals that builds on the digital competence framework for citizens , which helps individuals and smes to find relevant ai training and learning opportunities and to improve the sharing of knowledge , best practices , digital skills initiatives and funding between organisations and companies , at both eu and national level; recommends the establishment of a central body for the european ai skills data space to coordinate european skills training on sectoral and regional levels in all member states; urges the commission and the member states to support free online courses that enhance digital literacy such as basic training in ai; ### 135. calls on the commission to create an ai competence framework for individuals that builds on the digital competence framework for citizens , which helps organisations , managers , employees , individuals and smes to find relevant ai training and learning opportunities and to improve the sharing of knowledge , best practices , digital skills initiatives and funding between organisations and companies , at both eu and national level; advises the commission to build the competence framework quickly by using existing ai education schemes that are already widely available and accessible; recommends the establishment of a central body for the european ai skills data space to coordinate european skills training on sectoral and regional levels in all member states; urges the commission and the member states to support free online courses that enhance digital literacy such as basic training in ai;


### 135. calls on the commission to create an ai competence framework for individuals that builds on the digital competence framework for citizens , which helps individuals and smes to find relevant ai training and learning opportunities and to improve the sharing of knowledge , best practices , digital skills initiatives and funding between organisations and companies , at both eu and national level; recommends the establishment of a central body for the european ai skills data space to coordinate european skills training on sectoral and regional levels in all member states; urges the commission and the member states to support free online courses that enhance digital literacy such as basic training in ai; ### 135. calls on the commission to create an ai skills framework for individuals , building on the digital competence framework for citizens , providing citizens and smes with relevant ai training and learning opportunities and to improve the sharing of knowledge , best practices , digital skills initiatives and funding between organisations and companies , at both eu and national level; recommends to monitor the creation of quality jobs linked to ai in the eu; urges the commission and the member states to support the establishment and promotion of free online courses that enhance digital literacy such as basic training in ai;


### 136. calls for the eu to increase investment in research into key technologies such as ai , robotics , quantum computing , microelectronics , batteries , the internet of things , nano-technology , distributed ledger technology and 3d printing; calls on the commission to develop and maintain a european strategic research roadmap for ai which includes major interdisciplinary challenges where ai can be a part of the solution; ### 136. calls for the eu to increase investment in research into key technologies such as ai , robotics , quantum computing , microelectronics , batteries , the internet of things , nano-technology , distributed ledger technology and 3d printing; calls on the commission to develop and maintain a european strategic research roadmap for ai which includes major interdisciplinary challenges where ai can be a part of the solution; underlines that especially public investment efforts should be directed to use cases that are likely to increase sustainable solutions in society , increase wellbeing and inclusion in society’;


### 136. calls for the eu to increase investment in research into key technologies such as ai , robotics , quantum computing , microelectronics , batteries , the internet of things , nano-technology , distributed ledger technology and 3d printing; calls on the commission to develop and maintain a european strategic research roadmap for ai which includes major interdisciplinary challenges where ai can be a part of the solution; ### 136. calls for the eu to increase investment in research into key technologies such as ai , robotics , quantum computing , microelectronics , the internet of things and nano-technology; calls on the commission to develop and maintain a european strategic research roadmap for ai which includes major interdisciplinary challenges where it can be a part of the solution;


### 137. encourages all member states to spend a significant proportion of their gdp on research into digital technologies , and for annual combined public and private investments in the eu to reach at least eur 20-25 billion; urges the continued strengthening of the horizon europe programme , notably its ai , data and robotics partnership and the european innovation council , and to expand the digital europe programme , whose allocated funding of eur 7.6 billion46 is insufficient to remain competitive; ### 137. encourages all member states to spend a higher proportion of their gdp on research on digital technologies , and for annual combined public and private investments in the eu to reach at least eur 20-25 billion; urges the continued strengthening of the horizon europe programme , notably its ai , data and robotics partnership and the european innovation council , and to expand the digital europe programme , whose allocated funding of eur 7.6 billion46 is insufficient to remain competitive;


### 138. calls on the commission to simplify and streamline the structure of research funding instruments by reducing the effort and time needed to obtain decisions when applying for grants; stresses the need to improve the quality and consistency of proposal reviews and to increase the predictability of funding instruments and their timing to support long-term planning , using the european ai research roadmap; ### 138. calls on the commission to streamline the structure of research funding instruments by streamlining grant application requirements and processes; stresses the need to improve the quality and consistency of proposal reviews and to increase the predictability of funding instruments and their timing to support long-term planning , using the european ai research roadmap;


### 139. encourages the creation of more chairs on ai at european universities as well as competitive salaries for ai research and the provision of more funding in order to properly train and retain the next generation of researchers and entrepreneurs and prevent brain drain to locations outside the eu; stresses the need to reduce the bureaucratic burden for university researchers in accessing funds and calls on the commission to provide tools to increase digital interconnectivity between universities; urges the development of cross-cutting networks for ai across european universities and research institutions; ### 139. encourages the increase of specific ai curricula at european universities and to support ai research , also considering the need to properly train and retain the next generation of researchers and talent and prevent brain drain to locations outside the eu; stresses the need to reduce the bureaucratic burden for university researchers in accessing funds and calls on the commission to provide tools to increase digital interconnectivity between universities; urges the development of cross-cutting networks for ai across european universities and research institutions;


### 27. highlights that ai applications can bring environmental and economic benefits and strengthen predictive capabilities that contribute to the fight against climate change , to meeting the sustainable development goals (sdgs) and to achieving our target of becoming the first climate-neutral continent; finds that the use of ai has the potential to reduce global greenhouse gas emissions by up to 4 % by 203022 ; underlines that ai systems themselves need to be designed sustainably to reduce resource usage and energy consumption , thereby limiting the risks to the environment; finds that it has been estimated that ict technologies are capable of reducing 10 times more greenhouse gas emissions than their own footprint23 ; ### 27. highlights that ai applications can bring environmental and economic benefits and strengthen predictive capabilities that can contribute to the fight against climate change , and to achieving the eu’s target of becoming the first climate-neutral continent by2050; finds that the use of ai has the potential to reduce global green house gas emissions by up to 4 % by 2030; underlines that ai systems themselves need to be designed sustainably to reduce resource usage and energy consumption , thereby limiting the risks to the environment; finds that according to some estimates , ict technologies are capable of reducing 10times more greenhouse gas emissions than their own footprint; warns , at the same time , that opposing estimates exist , showing that the increasing energy consumption by data storage for the large datasets needed to train ai systems can also have a negative effect that currently overrides the potentially beneficial impact of ai on the environment; adds that the intensive use of raw materials to build microprocessors and high-tech devices using ai can also add to this negative impact;


### 27. highlights that ai applications can bring environmental and economic benefits and strengthen predictive capabilities that contribute to the fight against climate change , to meeting the sustainable development goals (sdgs) and to achieving our target of becoming the first climate-neutral continent; finds that the use of ai has the potential to reduce global greenhouse gas emissions by up to 4 % by 203022 ; underlines that ai systems themselves need to be designed sustainably to reduce resource usage and energy consumption , thereby limiting the risks to the environment; finds that it has been estimated that ict technologies are capable of reducing 10 times more greenhouse gas emissions than their own footprint23 ; ### 27. highlights that ai applications can bring environmental and economic benefits and strengthen predictive capabilities that contribute to the fight against climate change , to meeting the sustainable development goals (sdgs) and to achieving our target of becoming the first climate-neutral continent; finds that the use of ai has the potential to reduce global greenhouse gas emissions by up to 4 % by 203022 ; underlines that in order to guarantee the ‘large handprint but small footprint’ of ai on the environment and climate , ai systems themselves need to be designed sustainably to reduce resource usage and energy consumption , thereby limiting the damage to the environment; finds that it has been estimated that ict technologies may reduce 10 times more greenhouse gas emissions than their own footprint but recognizes that this requires conscious design choices and regulative actions23;


### 28. is concerned that only six member states have included a strong focus on ai applications in their efforts to meet the green deal objectives; finds that ai will produce information relevant to environmental planning , decision-making and the management and monitoring of the progress of environmental policies , for instance for cleaner air , where ai applications can monitor pollution and warn of hazards; highlights that ai and digital solutions have the potential to scale up resource-efficient solutions that would otherwise only be implemented in one company or sector; ### 28. is concerned that only six member states have included a strong focus on ai applications in their efforts to meet the green deal objectives; finds that ai can produce information relevant to environmental planning , decision-making and the management and monitoring of the progress of environmental policies , for instance for cleaner air , where ai applications can monitor pollution and warn of hazards; highlights that ai and digital solutions have the potential to scale up resource-efficient solutions that would otherwise only be implemented in one company or sector;


### 29. emphasises the importance of ai in developing smart cities and smart villages to improve the technological resilience of infrastructures , building on local strengths and opportunities , including public transport , emergency assistance , waste management , urban planning , smart energy and resource optimisation; stresses that ai-based solutions can further assist in optimising architecture , construction and engineering processes to reduce emissions , construction time , costs and waste; finds that this is already a reality in countries such as china and malaysia , where large-scale urban ai systems manage the transport , energy and safety systems of several cities; ### 29. emphasises the importance of ai in developing smart cities and smart villages to improve the technological resilience of infrastructures , building on local strengths and opportunities , including public transport , traffic prediction and reduction , emergency assistance , waste management , urban planning , smart energy and resource optimisation , as is already the case in several cities and municipalities across the eu; stresses that ai-based solutions can further assist in optimising architecture , construction and engineering processes to reduce emissions , construction time , costs and waste;


### 30. stresses that the energy transition will not take place without digitalisation , which will be achieved to a significant extent through ai; underlines that ai can monitor , optimise and reduce energy consumption and production , as well as support the integration of renewable energies into existing electricity grids; ### 30. stresses that the energy transition will not take place without digitalisation , which will be achieved to a significant extent through ai , which can also have a negative impact , given its very high energy consumption;


### 31. highlights that the growing complexity of an energy transition system , with increased volatile renewable generation and changes in load management , makes increasing automated control necessary for energy supply security; stresses that ai benefits for supply security , especially in the operation , monitoring , maintenance and control of water , gas and electricity networks , must be taken into account in the regulation of these networks; ### 31. highlights that the growing complexity of an energy transition system , with increased volatile renewable generation and changes in load management , makes increasing automated control necessary for energy supply security; stresses that ai benefits for security of supply , especially in the operation , monitoring , maintenance and control of water , gas and electricity networks , must be taken into account in the regulation of these networks; stresses however that the use of ai and digital tools to manage critical infrastructures enhances their vulnerabilities without appropriate cybersecurity provisions;


### 32. finds that ai and other digital solutions for mobility and transport have the potential to reduce traffic flows and enhance road safety , by greatly increasing the efficiency of access to transport systems through , for example , autonomous vehicles and optimised public transport planning , thus reducing the environmental footprint of the transport sector , travel times and costs; ### 32. finds that ai and other digital solutions for mobility and transport have the potential to reduce traffic flows and enhance road safety , by greatly increasing the efficiency of transport systems through , for example , optimised public transport planning , thus reducing the environmental footprint of the transport sector , travel times and costs;


### 33. believes that ai can have a transformative role in the agricultural sector when it comes to tackling food security issues , enabling the emergence of new harvesting methods and harvest prediction , novel approaches to food processing and retail , agricultural resource management and input efficiency , as well as improved land management and the optimisation of food supply chains; stresses that agriculture is a key sector in which ai can help to cut emissions and the use of pesticides , fertilisers , chemicals and water; further stresses that ai can contribute to the restoration of biodiversity and prevent deforestation by monitoring endangered species and tracking deforestation activities through smart forests; ### 33. believes that ai can have a transformative role in the agricultural sector when it comes to tackling food security issues , enabling the emergence of new harvesting methods and harvest prediction , novel approaches to food processing and retail , agricultural resource management and input efficiency , as well as improved land management and the optimisation of food supply chains; stresses that agriculture is a key sector in which ai can help to cut emissions and the use of pesticides , fertilisers , chemicals and water; further stresses that ai can contribute to the restoration of biodiversity and prevent deforestation by monitoring endangered species and tracking deforestation activities through smart forests; highlights the need for developing deployment guidelines and standardised assessment methodologies to support ‘green ai’ in areas such as smart grids , precision farming , and smart and sustainable cities as well as communities; is of the opinion that ai in the form of precision farming holds the potential to disrupt on-farm production of food as well as broader land management by improving land use planning , predicting land use change and monitoring crop health whilst having the potential to transform the prediction of extreme weather events;


### 33. believes that ai can have a transformative role in the agricultural sector when it comes to tackling food security issues , enabling the emergence of new harvesting methods and harvest prediction , novel approaches to food processing and retail , agricultural resource management and input efficiency , as well as improved land management and the optimisation of food supply chains; stresses that agriculture is a key sector in which ai can help to cut emissions and the use of pesticides , fertilisers , chemicals and water; further stresses that ai can contribute to the restoration of biodiversity and prevent deforestation by monitoring endangered species and tracking deforestation activities through smart forests; ### 33. believes that ai can have a transformative role in the agricultural sector , namely on food security , enabling the emergence of new harvesting methods and harvest prediction , agricultural resource management and input efficiency , as well as improved land management and the optimisation of food supply chains; stresses that agriculture is a key sector in which ai can help cut emissions and the use of pesticides , fertilisers , chemicals and water by optimizing their use to the exact amount and in a narrower area; further stresses that ai can contribute to the restoration of biodiversity by monitoring endangered species and tracking deforestation activities;


### 34. stresses that ai contributes to a circular economy through increased production output and quality , reduced maintenance costs , better use and the ethical sourcing of raw materials , and reduced waste; highlights that ai has the potential to automatically provide businesses with detailed insight into their emissions , including value chains , and forecast future emissions , thus helping to adjust and achieve individual emission targets; underlines that digital tools help businesses to implement the necessary steps towards more sustainable conduct , especially small and medium-sized enterprises (smes) which do not otherwise have the resources to do so; ### 34. stresses that ai can contribute to the circular economy through increased production output and quality , reduced maintenance costs , better use and the ethical sourcing of raw materials , and reduced waste; highlights that ai has the potential to automatically provide businesses with detailed insight into their emissions , including value chains , and forecast future emissions , thus helping adjust and achieve individual emission targets; underlines that digital tools help businesses implement the necessary steps towards more sustainable conduct , especially small and medium-sized enterprises (smes) which do not otherwise have the resources to do so;


### 35. stresses that more environmental data is needed in order to gain more insight and induce more progress through ai solutions; underlines that using ai to systematically connect data on co2 emissions with data on production patterns , consumer behaviour , supply chains and logistics routes could ensure that activities that have a positive or negative impact are detected; ### 35. stresses that more environmental data is needed in order to gain more insight and induce more progress through ai solutions; underlines that using ai to systematically connect data on co2 emissions with data on production and consumption patterns , supply chains and logistics routes could ensure that activities that have a positive or negative impact are detected;


### c) external policy and the security dimension of ai ### c) the international dimension of ai


### 36. is concerned that the global community does not seem likely to reach an agreement on minimum standards for the responsible use of ai , as the stakes , in particular for the most powerful nations , are too high; believes , however , as a matter of principle , in the potential of democratic nations to jointly shape the international debate , to work together towards certain minimum standards , and thereby to promote multilateralism , interoperability and data sharing on the international stage; ### 36. is concerned by the lack of progress in reaching a global agreement on minimum standards for the responsible use of ai , as the stakes are very high for all countries , including smaller ones which have to wake up to these threats; believes , however , as a matter of principle , in the potential of democratic nations to jointly shape the international debate , to work together towards certain minimum norms , standards and responsible state behaviour guidelines , and thereby to promote multilateralism , interoperability and data sharing on the international stage; thereby support the work of the un open-ended working group on ict and international security; underlines that confidence-building measures are essential to increase the level of dialogue and trust , therefore calls for more transparency in the use of ai , so as to ensure better accountability;


### 36. is concerned that the global community does not seem likely to reach an agreement on minimum standards for the responsible use of ai , as the stakes , in particular for the most powerful nations , are too high; believes , however , as a matter of principle , in the potential of democratic nations to jointly shape the international debate , to work together towards certain minimum standards , and thereby to promote multilateralism , interoperability and data sharing on the international stage; ### 36. is concerned that , the global community has not reached reach an agreement on minimum standards for the responsible use of ai although positive steps are being taken; believes , however , as a matter of principle , in the potential of democratic nations to jointly shape the international debate , to work together towards certain minimum standards , and thereby to promote sustainable development , multilateralism , interoperability , and data sharing on the international stage , for example within the organs of united nations system;


### 36. is concerned that the global community does not seem likely to reach an agreement on minimum standards for the responsible use of ai , as the stakes , in particular for the most powerful nations , are too high; believes , however , as a matter of principle , in the potential of democratic nations to jointly shape the international debate , to work together towards certain minimum standards , and thereby to promote multilateralism , interoperability and data sharing on the international stage; ### 36. is concerned that the global community has not yet reached an agreement on minimum standards for the responsible use of ai , as the stakes , in particular for the most powerful nations , are too high; believes , however , as a matter of principle , in the potential of democratic nations to jointly shape the international debate on an ai framework that is respectful of human rights and the rule of law , to work together towards certain minimum technical and ethical standards , and thereby to promote multilateralism , interoperability and data sharing on the international stage;


### 36. is concerned that the global community does not seem likely to reach an agreement on minimum standards for the responsible use of ai , as the stakes , in particular for the most powerful nations , are too high; believes , however , as a matter of principle , in the potential of democratic nations to jointly shape the international debate , to work together towards certain minimum standards , and thereby to promote multilateralism , interoperability and data sharing on the international stage; ### 36. considers of paramount importance for the international community to reach an agreement on minimum standards for the responsible use of ai; highlights the key role the eu can play in setting the global example , as the first bloc in the world to introduce legislation on ai , starting from its current work within the trade and technology council (ttc); welcomes the fact that like-minded democracies are working together to jointly shape the international debate , and to agree on common principles and standards on ai; welcomes the ongoing work at the international level on ai standards and the progress made with the iso standards on governance implications of ai;


### 36. is concerned that the global community does not seem likely to reach an agreement on minimum standards for the responsible use of ai , as the stakes , in particular for the most powerful nations , are too high; believes , however , as a matter of principle , in the potential of democratic nations to jointly shape the international debate , to work together towards certain minimum standards , and thereby to promote multilateralism , interoperability and data sharing on the international stage; ### 36. is concerned that the global community does not seem likely to reach an agreement on minimum standards for the responsible use of ai , as the stakes , in particular for the most powerful nations , are too high; believes , however , as a matter of principle , in the potential of democratic nations to jointly shape the international debate , to work together towards certain minimum standards especially under the umbrella of intergovernmental organisations such as the un and oecd , and thereby to promote multilateralism , interoperability and data sharing on the international stage;


### 36. is concerned that the global community does not seem likely to reach an agreement on minimum standards for the responsible use of ai , as the stakes , in particular for the most powerful nations , are too high; believes , however , as a matter of principle , in the potential of democratic nations to jointly shape the international debate , to work together towards certain minimum standards , and thereby to promote multilateralism , interoperability and data sharing on the international stage; ### 36. welcomes all the efforts of the global community to reach an agreement on minimum ethical standards for the responsible development and use of ai , interoperability and data sharing; believes that the union and its member states must , as a matter of principle , support and participate in the works at international or regional level , towards the conclusion of a legal framework and recommendations establishing ai ethical standards based on democracy , human rights and the rule of law and thereby to promote multilateralism;


### 37. observes that chinese nationals have assumed leadership positions in the international organization for standardization , the international electrotechnical commission and the international telecommunication union , the three largest and best-established standard-setting organisations in the world , while the chinese government has also signed standards and cooperation agreements with 52 other countries through its belt and road initiative; warns that since several of their promoted standards , including on ai technologies and in particular in relation to government surveillance and individual liberties , are not in line with eu values , the chinese standard offensive poses a crucial geopolitical challenge for the eu , while also giving china a first-mover advantage in economic terms; ### deleted


### 38. stresses that ai technologies , used in military command centres or in missile launch facilities , could escalate an automated reciprocal conflict before humans have the chance to detect what is happening , understand the causes and intervene; agrees with studies that warn that the impact of ai technologies on warfare could rival that of nuclear weapons24 ; ### deleted


### 38. stresses that ai technologies , used in military command centres or in missile launch facilities , could escalate an automated reciprocal conflict before humans have the chance to detect what is happening , understand the causes and intervene; agrees with studies that warn that the impact of ai technologies on warfare could rival that of nuclear weapons24 ; ### 38. stresses that ai technologies , used in military command centres or in missile launch facilities , could escalate an automated reciprocal conflict before humans have the chance to detect what is happening , understand the causes and intervene; agrees with studies that warn that the impact of ai technologies on warfare could rival that of nuclear weapons24 ; emphasises the need for an embedded option to reduce an ai-enabled system’s computations to a form comprehensible by humans throughout a given system’s lifecycle; considers that ai-enabled systems , products and technology purposed for military use should be equipped with a ‘black box’ to record every data transaction carried out by the machine , including the logic that contributed to its decisions , as well as with a “switch-off’ button which would instantly enable humans to deactivate the ai-enabled system; underlines the need to establish clear and traceable authorisation and accountability frameworks for the deployment of smart weapons and other ai-enabled systems in order to enable deployment exclusively by authorised personnel;


### 39. notes that the use of ai systems in defence-related developments is considered a game changer in military operations; states that the key advantage lies in the potential to engage in armed conflicts with a reduced risk of physical harm to one’s own military personnel and as a means to reduce military response time; ### 39. notes that the use of ai systems in defence-related developments is considered a game changer in military operations offering benefits such as the collection of higher quality data , greater situational awareness and the potential to engage in armed conflicts with a reduced risk of physical harm to one’s own military personnel and as a means to reduce military response time; underlines however that this could lead to lowering the threshold for the use of force , and therefore to more conflicts;


### 40. is concerned about military research and technological developments relating to lethal offensive weapon systems without human oversight that are pursued in countries such as russia and china with little regard for the risk to humanity; observes that such lethal offensive weapon systems are already used in military conflicts; warns that even non-state armed groups could soon equip drones with ai software for navigation and facial recognition and thus turn them into cheap lethal offensive weapons capable of acting entirely without human oversight; ### 40. is concerned about military research and technological developments relating to lethal offensive weapon systems without human oversight that are pursued in countries such as russia and china with little regard for the risk to humanity; observes that such lethal offensive weapon systems are already used in military conflicts; warns that even non-state armed groups could soon equip drones with ai software for navigation and facial recognition and thus turn them into cheap lethal offensive weapons capable of acting entirely without human oversight; is of the opinion that the eu should lead the way in establishing global agreements that regulate the production and use of autonomous weapons and weaponised ai systems utilized in warfare , similar to already established treaties regulating the use of chemical and biological weapons such as the biological and toxin weapons convention (btwc);


### 40. is concerned about military research and technological developments relating to lethal offensive weapon systems without human oversight that are pursued in countries such as russia and china with little regard for the risk to humanity; observes that such lethal offensive weapon systems are already used in military conflicts; warns that even non-state armed groups could soon equip drones with ai software for navigation and facial recognition and thus turn them into cheap lethal offensive weapons capable of acting entirely without human oversight; ### 40. is concerned about military research and technological developments relating to lethal offensive weapon systems without human oversight that are pursued in countries such as russia and china with little regard for the risk to humanity; observes that such lethal offensive weapon systems are already used in military conflicts; warns that even non-state armed groups could soon equip drones with ai software for navigation and facial recognition and thus turn them into cheap lethal offensive weapons capable of acting entirely without human oversight; calls on the council to adopt a joint position on autonomous weapons systems that ensures meaningful human control over their critical function; insist on the launch of international negotiations on a legally binding instrument that would prohibit fully autonomous weapons systems;


### 40. is concerned about military research and technological developments relating to lethal offensive weapon systems without human oversight that are pursued in countries such as russia and china with little regard for the risk to humanity; observes that such lethal offensive weapon systems are already used in military conflicts; warns that even non-state armed groups could soon equip drones with ai software for navigation and facial recognition and thus turn them into cheap lethal offensive weapons capable of acting entirely without human oversight; ### 40. is concerned about military research and technological developments relating to lethal autonomous weapon systems without meaningful human oversight; observes that such lethal offensive weapon systems are already used in military conflicts; is concerned about the risk of non-state groups coming in possession of such weapons as well as of drones with ai software for navigation and biometric recognition;


### 41. notes that ai technology can also be used as a means for various forms of hybrid warfare; specifies that it could for instance be mobilised to trigger information warfare , by using fake social media accounts , to weaponise interdependence , by gathering valuable information or denying network access to adversaries , or to create disturbances in the economic and financial systems of other countries; ### 41. notes that ai technology can also be used as a means for various forms of hybrid warfare; specifies that it could for instance be mobilised to trigger information warfare , by using fake social media accounts , or by taking advantage of the large amounts of personal data collected about end users to micro-target them with false information or selected political opinions based on ai-driven algorithmic content recommendation , to weaponise interdependence , by gathering valuable information or denying network access to adversaries , or to create disturbances in the economic and financial systems of other countries;


### 41. notes that ai technology can also be used as a means for various forms of hybrid warfare; specifies that it could for instance be mobilised to trigger information warfare , by using fake social media accounts , to weaponise interdependence , by gathering valuable information or denying network access to adversaries , or to create disturbances in the economic and financial systems of other countries; ### 41. notes that ai technology can also be used as a means for various forms of hybrid warfare; specifies that it could for instance be mobilised to trigger information warfare , by using fake social media accounts , to weaponise interdependence , by gathering valuable information or denying network access to adversaries , or to create disturbances in the economic and financial systems of other countries; calls on the eu to step up its resilience to hybrid threats;


### 41. notes that ai technology can also be used as a means for various forms of hybrid warfare; specifies that it could for instance be mobilised to trigger information warfare , by using fake social media accounts , to weaponise interdependence , by gathering valuable information or denying network access to adversaries , or to create disturbances in the economic and financial systems of other countries; ### 41. notes that ai technology can especially hold potential risks as a means for various forms of hybrid warfare and foreign interference; specifies that it could for instance be mobilised to trigger disinformation , by using bots or fake social media accounts , to pollute the political debate and favour extremist groups or manipulate elections to destabilize democracies;


### 42. illustrates that ai technologies could also help perpetrators by simplifying the use of very sophisticated cyberattacks , such as through ai-powered malware , identity theft using biometric data or adversarial ai that causes other ai systems to misinterpret input; points , in particular , to the rise in deepfakes , which already lead to doubts about the authenticity of all digital content , including genuinely authentic videos; warns that deepfakes could contribute to a broad climate of public mistrust in ai , as well as a deeper socio-political polarisation within our societies; ### 42. illustrates that ai technologies could also help perpetrators by simplifying the use of very sophisticated cyberattacks , such as through ai-powered malware , identity theft using biometric data or adversarial ai that causes other ai systems to misinterpret input; points , in particular , to the rise in deepfakes , which already lead to doubts about the authenticity of all digital content , including genuinely authentic videos; warns that deepfakes could contribute to a broad climate of public mistrust in ai , as well as a deeper socio-political polarisation within our societies; calls on the commission to ensure that whoever produces and disseminates deepfake material or synthetic videos or any other realistically made synthetic videos should be obliged by law to state explicitly that the content is not original and/or real;


### 42. illustrates that ai technologies could also help perpetrators by simplifying the use of very sophisticated cyberattacks , such as through ai-powered malware , identity theft using biometric data or adversarial ai that causes other ai systems to misinterpret input; points , in particular , to the rise in deepfakes , which already lead to doubts about the authenticity of all digital content , including genuinely authentic videos; warns that deepfakes could contribute to a broad climate of public mistrust in ai , as well as a deeper socio-political polarisation within our societies; ### 42. illustrates that ai technologies could also help perpetrators by simplifying the use of very sophisticated cyberattacks , such as through ai-powered malware , identity theft using biometric data or adversarial ai that causes other ai systems to misinterpret input; points , in particular , to the rise in deepfakes , which already lead to doubts about the authenticity of all digital content , including genuinely authentic videos; warns that deepfakes could contribute to a broad climate of public mistrust in ai , as well as a deeper socio-political polarisation within our societies; calls in this regard on the commission to include the investment in the development of ai systems that prevent , slow down , or complicate deepfake attacks as a focus area under horizon europe;


### 42. illustrates that ai technologies could also help perpetrators by simplifying the use of very sophisticated cyberattacks , such as through ai-powered malware , identity theft using biometric data or adversarial ai that causes other ai systems to misinterpret input; points , in particular , to the rise in deepfakes , which already lead to doubts about the authenticity of all digital content , including genuinely authentic videos; warns that deepfakes could contribute to a broad climate of public mistrust in ai , as well as a deeper socio-political polarisation within our societies; ### 42. illustrates that ai technologies could also help perpetrators by simplifying the use of very sophisticated cyberattacks , such as through ai-powered malware , identity theft , data poisoning or other adversarial machine learning that cause other ai systems to misinterpret input; points , in particular , to the rise in deepfakes , which are not necessarily “cyberattacks” but lead to doubts about the authenticity of all digital content , including videos , and therefore require particular attention in terms of transparency requirements; warns that deepfakes could contribute to a broad climate of public mistrust in ai , as well as a deeper socio-political polarisation within our societies;


### 43. elaborates that the internet of things , as well as the fact that ai systems nowadays run a significant amount of key critical infrastructure , such as energy grids , the food chain , the atm network and hospital logistics , has created a massive ai cybersecurity threat; predicts that states will focus more and more on protecting their it logistics and care delivery as a domestic asset , which could in turn create the temptation to invoke ‘ai autarchy’; ### 43. elaborates that with the internet of things , the fact that ai systems run a significant amount of key critical infrastructure , such as energy and transport grids , the food chain , banking and financial infrastructure and hospital facilities , has created new vulnerabilities that require robust cybersecurity measures to prevent threats; points out in this regard the importance of cooperation and information sharing and action both at the eu level as well as among member states;


### 43. elaborates that the internet of things , as well as the fact that ai systems nowadays run a significant amount of key critical infrastructure , such as energy grids , the food chain , the atm network and hospital logistics , has created a massive ai cybersecurity threat; predicts that states will focus more and more on protecting their it logistics and care delivery as a domestic asset , which could in turn create the temptation to invoke ‘ai autarchy’; ### 43. elaborates that the internet of things , as well as the fact that ai systems nowadays run a significant amount of key critical infrastructure , such as energy grids , the food chain , the atm network and hospital logistics , has created a massive ai cybersecurity threat; predicts that states will focus more and more on protecting their it logistics and care delivery as a domestic asset , which could in turn create the temptation to invoke ‘ai autarchy’; underlines the importance to foster the resilience of critical entities to hybrid threats;


### 43. elaborates that the internet of things , as well as the fact that ai systems nowadays run a significant amount of key critical infrastructure , such as energy grids , the food chain , the atm network and hospital logistics , has created a massive ai cybersecurity threat; predicts that states will focus more and more on protecting their it logistics and care delivery as a domestic asset , which could in turn create the temptation to invoke ‘ai autarchy’; ### 43. elaborates that the internet of things , as well as the fact that ai systems nowadays run a significant amount of key critical infrastructure , such as energy grids , the food chain , the atm network and hospital logistics , has created vulnerabilities and the potential for massive cybersecurity threats; predicts that states will focus more and more on protecting their it logistics and care delivery as a domestic asset , which could in turn create the temptation to invoke ‘ai autarchy’;


### 44. explains that the high level of accuracy that ai can achieve may pose security risks , as it can induce humans to place such confidence in ai as to trust it more than their own judgment; notes that experiments have shown that this can elevate the level of autonomy of ai beyond the supporting role for which it was originally designed and means that humans miss opportunities to gain experience and refine their skills and knowledge of ai systems; observes that this type of ai overuse has , for example , been cited as a major factor in several aircraft crashes25 ; ### deleted


### 45. highlights however that ai’s core characteristics also make the technology an ideal tool to enhance security; specifies that it can be used to synthesise large amounts of data , perform behavioural analysis of network activities and detect specific patterns; stresses that these elements would allow for better prediction and assessment of the threat level , faster decision-making processes , improved reactivity and the more effective securing of endpoint devices; ### 45. highlights however that ai’s core characteristics also make the technology an ideal tool to enhance security; specifies that it can be used to perform behavioural analysis of network activities , predict power failures and identify maintenance needs with great accuracy; stresses that these elements would allow for better prediction and assessment of the threat level , faster decision-making processes , improved reactivity and the more effective securing of endpoint devices;


### 45. highlights however that ai’s core characteristics also make the technology an ideal tool to enhance security; specifies that it can be used to synthesise large amounts of data , perform behavioural analysis of network activities and detect specific patterns; stresses that these elements would allow for better prediction and assessment of the threat level , faster decision-making processes , improved reactivity and the more effective securing of endpoint devices; ### 45. highlights however that ai’s core characteristics also make the technology a possible tool to enhance security; underlines that ai systems and applications intended to extract and synthesise data , and extrapolate results therefrom to inform decisions formatters relating to defence and national security , must be specific in scope and comply with the provisions set out in the current regulatory framework in terms of gathering and processing data;


### 46. underlines , in particular , the potential inherent in enabling law enforcement agencies to proactively assess and predict ai misuse , as well as to counter it effectively by using ai technologies themselves; underlines that such ai-supported law enforcement activities do , however , require clear transparency rules , highly skilled employees and access to large amounts of relevant data; ### deleted


### 46. underlines , in particular , the potential inherent in enabling law enforcement agencies to proactively assess and predict ai misuse , as well as to counter it effectively by using ai technologies themselves; underlines that such ai-supported law enforcement activities do , however , require clear transparency rules , highly skilled employees and access to large amounts of relevant data; ### 46. underlines , in particular , the potential inherent in enabling law enforcement agencies to proactively assess and predict ai misuse , as well as to counter it effectively by using ai technologies themselves , in full respect of data protection regulations and in an unbiased manner; underlines that such ai-supported law enforcement activities do , however , require clear transparency rules and highly skilled employees; stresses that ai applications designed to process data for intelligence purposes in defence should comply with data processing standards to avoid risks of unintended surveillance or infringement of individual rights; believes that for high-risk applications of ai-enabled technologies the union must ensure that their development and deployment is rightful , proportional and respects the rights of individuals; stresses the importance of monitoring competent national law enforcement authorities which develop and deploy ai-enabled systems and technologies to maintain public order so as to mitigate the disproportional risks of predictive policing;


### 46. underlines , in particular , the potential inherent in enabling law enforcement agencies to proactively assess and predict ai misuse , as well as to counter it effectively by using ai technologies themselves; underlines that such ai-supported law enforcement activities do , however , require clear transparency rules , highly skilled employees and access to large amounts of relevant data; ### 46. underlines , in particular , the potential inherent in enabling law enforcement agencies to proactively assess ai misuse , as well as to counter it effectively by using ai technologies themselves; underlines that such ai-supported law enforcement activities do , however , require clear transparency rules , respect for fundamental rights , highly skilled and trained employees;


### 63. acknowledges at the same time that the very same ai technologies used to address fundamental societal problems and achieve important public policy goals could also pose crucial ethical and legal questions; notes that there have already been documented instances which have led to serious wrongdoing within the eu; notes that in practice , member states rely heavily on the police to collect data , but also on private entities whose activities are often not supervised and who regularly sell the collected and highly sensitive data to other third parties; clarifies that this practice runs counter to european values and undermines the high level of fundamental rights in the eu , in particular the right to privacy; ### 63. acknowledges at the same time that the very same ai technologies used to address fundamental societal problems and achieve important public policy goals could also pose crucial ethical and legal questions; notes that there have already been documented instances which have led to serious wrongdoing within the eu; notes that in practice , member states rely heavily on the police to collect data , but also on private entities whose activities are often not supervised and who regularly sell the collected and highly sensitive data to other third parties; clarifies that this practice runs counter to european values and undermines the high level of fundamental rights in the eu , in particular the right to privacy; notes that in practice , member states rely heavily on the police to collect data , although contracts are awarded in some cases to private entities that do not provide the necessary guarantees regarding secure data collection and processing and data protection since they are often not properly supervised and , being commercial firms seeking to make a profit , they may sell this data on to third parties to ensure a bigger profit margin;


### 63. acknowledges at the same time that the very same ai technologies used to address fundamental societal problems and achieve important public policy goals could also pose crucial ethical and legal questions; notes that there have already been documented instances which have led to serious wrongdoing within the eu; notes that in practice , member states rely heavily on the police to collect data , but also on private entities whose activities are often not supervised and who regularly sell the collected and highly sensitive data to other third parties; clarifies that this practice runs counter to european values and undermines the high level of fundamental rights in the eu , in particular the right to privacy; ### 63. acknowledges that the very same ai technologies used to address fundamental societal problems and achieve important public policy goals could also pose crucial ethical and legal questions , if not appropriately regulated; notes that there have already been several documented instances of serious wrongdoing within the eu , for example in the field of welfare benefits or on law enforcement; notes that in practice , member states member states often outsource data collection activities to private entities , often without adequate supervision or regulation , and which regularly sell the collected and highly sensitive data to other third parties; clarifies that this practice runs counter to european values and undermines its fundamental rights , in particular the right to privacy;


### 64. stresses that many authoritarian regimes apply ai systems to control , spy on , monitor and rank their citizens; believes that any form of unrestricted normative citizen scoring on a large scale by public authorities , especially within the field of law enforcement and the judiciary , leads to the loss of autonomy and is not in line with european values; highlights past cases of eu companies having sold biometric systems which would be illegal to use within the eu to authoritarian regimes in non-eu countries; ### 64. stresses that many authoritarian regimes apply ai systems to control , exert mass surveillance , rank their citizens and restrict their freedom of movement; believes that any form of indiscriminate surveillance or unrestricted normative citizen scoring on a large scale by public authorities as well as private entities , especially within the field of law enforcement , border control and the judiciary , leads to the loss of autonomy , holds an enormous risk of discrimination and is not in line with european values; is concerned that the current eu dependence on third-country ai systems that might be trained with poor-quality data or easily hackable pose a huge risk of personal data breaches of eu citizens;


### 64. stresses that many authoritarian regimes apply ai systems to control , spy on , monitor and rank their citizens; believes that any form of unrestricted normative citizen scoring on a large scale by public authorities , especially within the field of law enforcement and the judiciary , leads to the loss of autonomy and is not in line with european values; highlights past cases of eu companies having sold biometric systems which would be illegal to use within the eu to authoritarian regimes in non-eu countries; ### 64. stresses that many authoritarian regimes apply ai systems to control , spy on , monitor and rank their citizens; believes that any form of unrestricted normative citizen scoring on a large scale by public authorities , especially within the field of law enforcement and the judiciary , as well as its use by private companies or individuals , leads to the loss of autonomy and privacy , and is not in line with european values; highlights past cases of eu companies having sold biometric systems which would be illegal to use within the eu to authoritarian regimes in non-eu countries , and calls for a ban on such sales;


### 65. notes that dominant tech platforms nowadays not only have significant control over access to information and its distribution , but they also use ai technologies to obtain more information on a person’s identity and knowledge of decisional history than is possessed by public authorities or close personal advisors such as doctors , lawyers or bankers; stresses that this development challenges the sovereignty of our nation states , the foundations of our democratic systems and the safeguarding of our fundamental rights; ### 65. notes that dominant tech platforms nowadays not only have significant control over access to information and its distribution , but they also use ai technologies to obtain more information on a person’s identity and knowledge of decisional history than is possessed by public authorities or close personal advisors such as doctors , lawyers or bankers; stresses that this development challenges the autonomy of citizens , the sovereignty of our nation states , the foundations of our democratic systems and the safeguarding of our fundamental rights;


### 65. notes that dominant tech platforms nowadays not only have significant control over access to information and its distribution , but they also use ai technologies to obtain more information on a person’s identity and knowledge of decisional history than is possessed by public authorities or close personal advisors such as doctors , lawyers or bankers; stresses that this development challenges the sovereignty of our nation states , the foundations of our democratic systems and the safeguarding of our fundamental rights; ### 65. notes that dominant tech platforms nowadays not only have significant control over access to information and its distribution , but they also use ai technologies to obtain and combine data on a person’s identity , behaviour and knowledge of decisional history than is possessed by public authorities with the intent of profiling and microtargeting; stresses that this development creates an enormous imbalance of power and poses systemic risks that can ultimately even affect democracy;