### e. whereas existing carbon leakage provisions under union law have failed to demonstrate their effectiveness in delivering the necessary decarbonisation of the sectors concerned; ### e. whereas existing carbon leakage provisions under union law have failed to demonstrate their effectiveness in delivering the necessary decarbonisation of the sectors concerned and have , on the other hand , led to unjustified windfall profits for the beneficiary companies as highlighted by the european court of auditors1a;


### 2. strongly deplores the non-cooperative and disloyal behaviour of some of the union’s trade partners in international climate negotiations , as recently observed at cop25; considers that this behaviour hampers our collective global ability to reach the objectives of the paris agreement; ### 2. strongly deplores the non-cooperative behaviour of some of the union’s trade partners in international climate negotiations over the past years , as recently observed at cop25;


### 2. proposes that the cbam be implemented as an extension of the eu emissions trading system (eu ets) , which would require importers to purchase allowances for the volume of carbon emissions incorporated in their products; notes that the mechanism should ensure a single carbon price , both for domestic producers and importers; ### 2. calls on the commission to assess all different options for the introduction of a carbon border adjustment mechanism , including , among others , an extension of the eu emissions trading system (eu ets) which would require importers to purchase allowances for the volume of carbon emissions incorporated in their products; notes that the mechanism should ensure a single carbon price , both for domestic producers and importers;


### 2. underlines that international carbon pricing and fully competitive low-emission solutions would render the mechanism obsolete; stresses , therefore , that the eu needs to step up efforts in this respect; ### 2. underlines that international carbon pricing and fully competitive zero-to-low-emission solutions would render the mechanism obsolete , as the creation of a carbon border adjustment mechanism will not necessarily ensure the further decarbonisation of affected sectors and materials in europe and therefore requires additional measures; stresses , therefore , that the eu needs to step up efforts in this respect by adopting more ambitious and effective norms , quotas and standards that would stimulate the development of lead markets for more sustainable industrial materials and products , in particular those with high capex requirements; calls on the commission to design this mechanism as part of a comprehensive and long-term oriented policy package that is consistent with achieving a highly energy and resource efficient , fully renewable-based , net-zero ghg economy by 2050 at the latest;


### 2. underlines that international carbon pricing and fully competitive low-emission solutions would render the mechanism obsolete; stresses , therefore , that the eu needs to step up efforts in this respect; ### 2. underlines that widespread , robust and consistent international carbon pricing and fully competitive low-emission solutions could render the mechanism obsolete over time; stresses , therefore , that the eu needs to step up efforts in this respect;


### 3. stresses that the union has the responsibility and opportunity to assume a leading role in global climate action; ### 3. stresses that the union has the responsibility and opportunity to assume a leading role in global climate action; strongly encourages the commission to intensify its climate diplomacy ahead and after the adoption of its legislative proposal for a cbam , and ensure in particular continuous dialogue with trade partners , to incentivise global climate action;


### 3. urges that the proposed cbam apply to all imports in order to avoid distortion in the internal market; ### 3. urges that the proposed cbam first includes sectors with the highest share of carbon emissions before being enlarged over time; stresses that this should not lead to internal market distortions and should be conditional on immediate ending of free allowances and state aid for indirect cost compensation to these sectors;


### 3. emphasises that decentralised climate actions can lead to carbon leakage and a competitive disadvantage on international markets for the eu industry; urges the commission , therefore , to ensure full carbon-leakage protection and to consider the inclusion of export rebates in the mechanism; ### 3. notes that while in theory decentralised climate actions can lead to carbon leakage , in reality such effects did not occur in the eu1a; urges the commission , therefore , to ensure a more targeted carbon-leakage protection and to apply the carbon border adjustment mechanism as an alternative to the current measures against carbon leakage under the eu ets; opposes any introduction of export rebates , which would undermine the incentives for exporting industries to reduce their climate impact;


### 3. emphasises that decentralised climate actions can lead to carbon leakage and a competitive disadvantage on international markets for the eu industry; urges the commission , therefore , to ensure full carbon-leakage protection and to consider the inclusion of export rebates in the mechanism; ### 3. emphasises that decentralised climate actions can lead to carbon leakage and a competitive disadvantage on international markets for the eu industry; urges the commission , therefore , to ensure effective carbon-leakage protection;


### 4. takes note of the commission’s proposal to set the union’s 2030 climate target to ‘at least 55 % net emissions reduction’ compared to 1990 levels; highlights , however , that this target does not represent the union’s highest possible ambition , nor does it reflect the principle of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities; ### 4. takes note of the commission’s proposal to set the union’s 2030 climate target to ‘at least 55 % net emissions reduction’ compared to 1990 levels; highlights , however , that this target is insufficient to effectively tackle global warming and does not represent the union’s highest possible ambition , nor does it reflect the principle of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities;


### 4. takes note of the commission’s proposal to set the union’s 2030 climate target to ‘at least 55 % net emissions reduction’ compared to 1990 levels; highlights , however , that this target does not represent the union’s highest possible ambition , nor does it reflect the principle of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities; ### 4. takes note the commission’s proposal to set the union’s 2030 climate target to ‘at least 55 % net emissions reduction’ compared to 1990 levels; highlights however that the european parliament set out a higher 2030 target of 60% emission reductions compared to 1990;


### 4. recommends that a design be introduced that measures the carbon content of imports through their basic materials composition (as outlined in the proposal from the european economic and social committee); recalls that this feasible approximation would weigh each basic material covered by the eu ets and multiply it by its carbon intensity value – which ideally should be defined at country level; stresses , however , that importers who are more carbon efficient should be allowed to demonstrate the specific carbon intensity of their products; ### 4. recommends that a design be introduced that measures as objectively and precisely as possible the carbon content of imports including the whole value-chain of products; stresses that importers who consider to be more carbon efficient than what is assessed should be allowed to demonstrate the specific carbon intensity of their products;


### 4. suggests a progressive mechanism that first includes sectors with the highest risk of carbon leakage before being enlarged over time; stresses that this should not lead to internal market distortions; ### 4. suggests a progressive mechanism that first includes sectors with the highest share of carbon emissions before being enlarged over time; stresses that this should not lead to internal market distortions and should be conditional on phasing out free allowances and state aid for indirect cost compensation to these sectors 2a;


### 4. suggests a progressive mechanism that first includes sectors with the highest risk of carbon leakage before being enlarged over time; stresses that this should not lead to internal market distortions; ### 4. suggests a progressive and sector-specific mechanism that first includes sectors with the highest risk of carbon leakage before being enlarged over time; stresses that this should not lead to internal market distortions;


### 5. requests that the implementation of the cbam should lead to the progressive phasing out of the free allocation of allowances , following an appropriate transition period , since the mechanism ensures that eu producers and importers would have to deal with the same carbon costs in the eu market; notes that this phasing out should be coupled in parallel with the introduction of export rebates in order to maintain strong decarbonisation incentives , while ensuring a level playing field for eu exports; ### 5. insists that the implementation of the cbam should lead to the immediate phasing out of the free allocation of allowances , since the mechanism ensures that eu producers and importers would have to deal with the same carbon costs in the eu market; opposes any introduction of export rebates , which would undermine the core objective of the mechanism , by reducing incentives for exporting industries to decrease their climate impact;


### 6. supports the introduction of a carbon border adjustment mechanism (cbam) as a way to reduce global ghg emissions in the pursuit of the paris agreement objectives; states unequivocally that this mechanism should serve to better address ghg emissions embedded in international trade , thereby incentivising climate action both within the union and by our trading partners , and not as an instrument for protectionism; ### 6. supports the introduction of a carbon border adjustment mechanism (cbam) as a way to reduce eu and global ghg emissions in the pursuit of the paris agreement objectives; states unequivocally that this mechanism should serve to better address ghg emissions embedded in eu industry and in international trade , thereby incentivising climate action both within the union and by our trading partners , and not as an instrument for protectionism;


### 6. underlines that the resources incurred by the mechanism are to be considered eu own resources; is convinced that these resources must be used for climate measures; ### 6. underlines that the resources incurred by the mechanism are to be considered eu own resources; is convinced that these resources must be used for climate measures both within and outside the eu; suggests that these resources could partly feed into the eu's contribution to the adaptation fund for developing countries created by the paris agreement;


### 7. calls for the inclusion of cbam revenues into the eu budget; ### 7. calls for the inclusion of cbam revenues into the eu budget; considers that these resources must be used for climate action both within and outside the eu; recommends that these resources could partly feed into the eu's contribution to the adaptation fund for developing countries created by the paris agreement in order to support the environmental transition in developing countries; underlines that such revenues should not be considered as permanent revenues because , if successful , the cbam will not generate revenues anymore over time , as other countries will also price their carbon emissions in an equivalent way;


### 7. calls on the commission to conduct an impact assessment of different mechanisms and designs to incentivise international climate action and prevent carbon leakage before presenting a legislative proposal. ### 7. calls on the commission to conduct an impact assessment of different mechanisms and designs , including a charge on added emissions or similar carbon charges , to incentivise international climate action and prevent carbon leakage before presenting a legislative proposal; stresses that this study should carefully assess the cross-border effects of the mechanism and its potential burden on neighbouring countries and international partners , especially developing countries; calls on the commission to come forward with initiatives for minimising the burden on international partners through information and cooperation , thus reinforcing eu leadership in the global fight against climate change;


### 7. calls on the commission to conduct an impact assessment of different mechanisms and designs to incentivise international climate action and prevent carbon leakage before presenting a legislative proposal. ### 7. calls on the commission to conduct an in-depth impact assessment on the environmental impacts of the different forms of possible mechanism; advises the commission to take the environmental criterion as the leading factor in the choice of the form of the mechanism; calls on the commission to make the results of the impact assessment publicly available as soon as it is possible , and before the publication of its legislative proposal;


### 8. considers that a cbam should cover all imports , but that as a starting point already by 2023 it should cover the power sector and energy-intensive industrial sectors like cement , steel , chemicals and fertilisers , which continue to receive substantial free allocations , and still represent 94 % of union industrial emissions; ### 8. considers that a cbam should cover all imports in sectors covered by the eu ets and avoid distortions in the eu internal market; as a starting point already by 2023 it should cover the power sector and energy-intensive industrial sectors exposed the most to carbon leakage , like cement , steel , chemicals and fertilisers , which still represent 94 % of union industrial emissions; in order to avoid carbon leakage , a cbam should covered imports of commodities and processed products;


### 8. considers that a cbam should cover all imports , but that as a starting point already by 2023 it should cover the power sector and energy-intensive industrial sectors like cement , steel , chemicals and fertilisers , which continue to receive substantial free allocations , and still represent 94 % of union industrial emissions; ### 8. considers that a cbam should cover all products and by 2023 it should already cover at least the power sector and energy-intensive industrial sectors like cement , steel , chemicals and fertilisers , which continue to receive substantial free allocations , and still represent 94 % of union industrial emissions;


### 8. believes that the above proposal is compatible with world trade organization rules , since it does not discriminate between producers , is based on objective criteria and has a clear environmental objective. ### 8. believes that a cbam is compatible with world trade organization rules , as long as it does not discriminate between producers , is based on objective criteria and fulfils its primary objective of protecting the environment and health;


### 9. underlines that the ghg emissions content of imports concerned should be accounted for on the basis of transparent and reliable product-specific benchmarks representing the global average ghg emissions content of individual products; considers that the carbon pricing of imports should also take into account the country-specific carbon intensity of the electricity grid; ### 9. underlines that the ghg emissions content of imports concerned should be accounted for on the basis of transparent and reliable product-specific benchmarks at the level of the installations in third countries but , by default , if data is not made available by the importer , the global average ghg emissions content of individual products should be accounted for; notes in that perspective that carbon intensity of imported products may be evaluated through their raw materials composition and that this approximation would weigh each basic material covered by the eu ets and multiply it by its carbon intensity value; stresses that importers should be allowed to individually demonstrate the specific carbon intensity of their product; considers that the carbon pricing of imports should also take into account the country-specific carbon intensity of the electricity grid or if data is made available by the importer the carbon intensity of the energy consumption at the installation level;


### 9. underlines that the ghg emissions content of imports concerned should be accounted for on the basis of transparent and reliable product-specific benchmarks representing the global average ghg emissions content of individual products; considers that the carbon pricing of imports should also take into account the country-specific carbon intensity of the electricity grid; ### 9. underlines that the ghg emissions content of products concerned should be accounted for as close to reality as possible or , where not feasible , on the basis of transparent and reliable product-specific benchmarks representing the global average ghg emissions content of individual products , disaggregated by different production methods with varying emission intensities; considers that a cbam should also take into account the country-specific carbon intensity of the electricity grid and the emissions related to transportation; considers that producers should have the option to prove that the carbon content of their products is lower than the benchmark , and avail of a carbon charge adjusted accordingly;


### 9. underlines that the ghg emissions content of imports concerned should be accounted for on the basis of transparent and reliable product-specific benchmarks representing the global average ghg emissions content of individual products; considers that the carbon pricing of imports should also take into account the country-specific carbon intensity of the electricity grid; ### 9. underlines that the ghg emissions content of imports concerned should be accounted for on the basis of transparent and reliable product-specific benchmarks representing the global average ghg emissions content of individual products while taking into account different production methods with varying emission intensities; considers that the carbon pricing of imports should also take into account the country-specific carbon intensity of the electricity grid;


### 10. stresses that carbon pricing under the cbam should mirror the dynamic evolution of the price of union allowances under the eu emissions trading system (eu ets); points out that the introduction of a rising carbon floor price under the eu ets could ensure predictability under the cbam while also ensuring a stronger price signal within the eu; ### 10. calls on the commission to consider and assess different policy options for the implementation of the cbam as well as alternative solutions such as the introduction of a consumption charge , or charge on emissions , which would apply on both imported and domestic products by adjusting their vat rate proportionally to their embedded ghg emissions;


### 10. stresses that carbon pricing under the cbam should mirror the dynamic evolution of the price of union allowances under the eu emissions trading system (eu ets); points out that the introduction of a rising carbon floor price under the eu ets could ensure predictability under the cbam while also ensuring a stronger price signal within the eu; ### 10. stresses that carbon pricing under the cbam should mirror the dynamic evolution of the price of union allowances under the eu emissions trading system (eu ets); is of the opinion that importers should buy allowances from a separate pool of allowances to the eu ets , whose carbon price corresponds to the carbon price of the day of the transaction in the eu ets; points out that the introduction of a rising carbon price floor under the eu ets could ensure predictability under the cbam while also ensuring a stronger price signal within the eu;


### 11. points out that a cbam is not per se incompatible with wto rules , and highlights the necessity for any cbam to be designed with the highest environmental integrity in mind; ### 11. points out that a cbam is not per se incompatible with wto rules , and highlights the necessity for any cbam to be designed with the highest environmental integrity in mind; calls on the commission to pursue multilateral wto reforms that bring international trade law in line with the goals of the paris agreement;


### 11. points out that a cbam is not per se incompatible with wto rules , and highlights the necessity for any cbam to be designed with the highest environmental integrity in mind; ### 11. points out that a cbam is not per se incompatible with wto rules , and highlights the necessity for any cbam to be designed with the highest environmental integrity in mind; urges the commission to pursue multilateral wto reforms that bring international trade law in line with the goals of the paris agreement;


### 11. points out that a cbam is not per se incompatible with wto rules , and highlights the necessity for any cbam to be designed with the highest environmental integrity in mind; ### 11. points out that a cbam is compatible with wto rules if it is designed with a clear environmental objective; highlights therefore the necessity for any cbam to be designed with the highest environmental integrity and purpose in mind;


### 12. underlines the principle of non-discrimination under gatt article iii; stresses that treating imports and domestic production in the same way is a key criterion for ensuring wto compatibility of any measure , and that , therefore , all existing measures on carbon leakage under union law should immediately cease to apply as soon as the cbam enters into force , as this mechanism would apply carbon pricing to imports similar to what is applied to eu installations under the eu ets; ### 12. underlines the principle of non-discrimination under gatt article iii; stresses that treating imports and domestic production in the same way is a key criterion for ensuring wto compatibility of any measure , and that , therefore , measures on carbon leakage under union law should be phased out , in parallel with the implementation of the eu ets carbon price on imports , as soon as the cbam enters into force , as this mechanism would apply carbon pricing to imports similar to what is applied to eu installations under the eu ets; stresses however that this should not lead to double advantages for eu installations;


### 12. underlines the principle of non-discrimination under gatt article iii; stresses that treating imports and domestic production in the same way is a key criterion for ensuring wto compatibility of any measure , and that , therefore , all existing measures on carbon leakage under union law should immediately cease to apply as soon as the cbam enters into force , as this mechanism would apply carbon pricing to imports similar to what is applied to eu installations under the eu ets; ### 12. underlines the principle of non-discrimination under gatt article iii; stresses that treating imports and domestic production in the same way is a key criterion for ensuring wto compatibility of any measure , and that , therefore , all existing measures on carbon leakage under union law should immediately cease to apply as soon as the cbam enters into force , as this mechanism would create a level playing field between eu domestic and foreign producers by applying a charge on the embodied carbon emissions of all goods , regardless of their origin;


### 13. calls on the commission to address this concern during the upcoming reform of the eu ets , ensuring the eu ets delivers , through ambitious and meaningful carbon pricing , on the necessary ghg emissions reduction in line with the updated 2030 union climate target and the objective of reaching net zero ghg emissions within the union by 2050 at the latest , fully respecting the polluter pays principle; stresses that export rebates risk creating perverse climate effects , incentivising less efficient production methods for european exporting industries; urges the commission to refrain from including export rebates in its proposal; ### 13. calls on the commission to address this concern during the upcoming reform of the eu ets , ensuring the eu ets delivers , through ambitious and meaningful carbon pricing , on the necessary ghg emissions reduction in line with the updated 2030 union climate target and the objective of reaching net zero ghg emissions within the union by 2050 at the latest , fully respecting the polluter pays principle; is of the opinion that the phasing out of free allowances should be considered with the introduction of export rebates in order to ensure a level-playing field within and outside the eu for european companies; these rebates should be designed to incorporate free allowances in their calculation , based on benchmarks reflecting the most efficient installations , and therefore to maintain ghg reduction incentives for eu exporting companies; export rebates should not lead to any kind of competitive advantages for eu exporting industries in third countries; stresses that the commission should carry out a proper analysis regarding the wto-compatibility of export rebates as well as mechanism to avoid market distortions for sectors covered by a carbon border adjustment mechanism;


### 13. calls on the commission to address this concern during the upcoming reform of the eu ets , ensuring the eu ets delivers , through ambitious and meaningful carbon pricing , on the necessary ghg emissions reduction in line with the updated 2030 union climate target and the objective of reaching net zero ghg emissions within the union by 2050 at the latest , fully respecting the polluter pays principle; stresses that export rebates risk creating perverse climate effects , incentivising less efficient production methods for european exporting industries; urges the commission to refrain from including export rebates in its proposal; ### 13. calls on the commission to address this concern during the upcoming reform of the eu ets , ensuring the eu ets delivers , through the introduction of a rising carbon price floor , a rebasing of the cap and adjustment of the linear reduction factor resulting in ambitious and meaningful carbon pricing , on the necessary ghg emissions reduction in line with the updated 2030 union climate target and the objective of reaching net zero ghg emissions within the union by 2050 at the latest , fully respecting the polluter pays principle; stresses that export rebates risk creating perverse climate effects , incentivising less efficient production methods for european exporting industries; urges the commission to refrain from including export rebates in its proposal;


### 14. supports the commission’s intention to use revenues generated by the cbam as new own resources for the eu budget , and asks the commission to ensure full transparency about the use of those revenues; believes these revenues should be earmarked for supporting the just transition and decarbonisation of europe’s economy , and for stepping up the union’s contribution to international climate finance in favour of least developed countries and small island developing states , which are most vulnerable to climate change; ### 14. supports the commission’s intention to use revenues generated by the cbam as new own resources for the eu budget , and asks the commission to ensure full transparency about the use of those revenues; stresses that a part of those revenues should flow back to least developed countries when their exports are covered by a cbam in the form of a contribution to international climate finance in favour of least developed countries and small island developing states; believes that a significant part of these revenues should be earmarked for supporting the just transition and decarbonisation of europe’s economy;


### (13) for the purpose of its decisions to register , in order to ascertain that a european political party or a european political foundation complies with its obligations to observe the values on which the union is founded , as expressed in article 2 teu , and that it ensures that its members observe such values , the authority should rely on a written declaration to be issued by the european political party or european political foundation by using a template attached to this regulation. the power of the authority , upon request from the european parliament , the council or the commission , to verify the compliance with such values should however not extend to possible breaches of those values by member parties or member organisations. ### (13) for the purpose of its decisions to register , in order to ascertain that a european political party or a european political foundation complies with its obligations to observe the values on which the union is founded , as expressed in article 2 teu , and that it ensures that its members observe such values , the authority should rely on a written declaration to be issued by the european political party or european political foundation by using a template attached to this regulation.


### (30) european political parties and their member parties should lead by example in closing the gender gap in the political domain. if they wish to benefit from eu funding , european political parties should have internal rules promoting gender balance and they should be transparent about the gender balance of their member parties. european political parties should provide evidence on their internal policy on gender balance and on their member parties’ gender representation as regards candidates to and member of the european parliament . the european political parties are also encouraged to provide information in relation to their member parties’ on inclusiveness and representation of minorities. ### (30) european political parties , their member parties and european political foundations should lead by example in closing the gender gap in the political domain. if they wish to benefit from eu funding , european political parties and european political foundations should have internal rules promoting gender equality , including a gender equality plan and a protocol to prevent , detect and combat sexual harassment and harassment on the grounds of gender. in addition , european political parties should be transparent about the gender balance of their member parties and should provide evidence on their member parties’ gender representation as regards candidates to and member of the european parliament. european political parties and european political foundations should also provide evidence on their internal policy on gender equality by means of an annual report. the european political parties are also encouraged to provide information in relation to their member parties’ on inclusiveness and representation of minorities.


### (34) the co-financing rate should be lowered to 0% in the year of the elections to the european parliament. eliminating the co-financing obligation in the year of the elections to the european parliament should help european political parties increase the number and intensity of their campaign activities and , therefore , also increase their visibility at national level. ### (34) the co-financing rate for european political parties and european political foundations should be lowered to 0% in the year of the elections to the european parliament. eliminating the co-financing obligation in the year of the elections to the european parliament should help european political parties increase the number and intensity of their campaign activities and , therefore , also increase their visibility at national level.


### (37) in order to enhance cooperation with long-standing members sharing eu values , contributions from member parties having their seat in a country outside the union but in the council of europe , should be allowed. however , such contributions should be subject to a cap in relation to total contribution , to limit the risk of foreign interference. ### (37) in order to enhance cooperation with long-standing members sharing eu values , contributions from member parties having their seat in a country outside the union but in the council of europe , should be allowed. however , such contributions should be subject to a cap in relation to total contribution , to limit the risk of foreign interference. the above contributions should be subject to monitoring and control of the purpose of these donations and proving an absence of politically motivated interference , including indirect interference , of non-democratic third countries.


### (37) in order to enhance cooperation with long-standing members sharing eu values , contributions from member parties having their seat in a country outside the union but in the council of europe , should be allowed. however , such contributions should be subject to a cap in relation to total contribution , to limit the risk of foreign interference. ### (37) in order to enhance cooperation with long-standing members sharing eu values , member parties and member organisations having their seat in a country outside the union but in the council of europe , in candidate countries or potential candidates for eu membership , should be allowed , as well as their contributions. however , such contributions should be subject to a cap in relation to total contribution , to limit the risk of foreign interference.


### (38) regulation (eu , euratom) no 1141/2014 acknowledges only two categories of revenues for european political parties and foundations apart from contributions from the budget of the european union , namely contributions from members and donations. a number of revenue sources generated from own economic activities (such as sales of publications or conference fees) fall outside the scope of these two categories , creating accounting and transparency problems. a third category of revenues (‘own resources’) should therefore be created. the proportion of own resources in the total budget of a european political party or foundations should be capped at 5% to avoid that it becomes overdimensioned in relation to the overall budget of these entities. ### (38) regulation (eu , euratom) no 1141/2014 acknowledges only two categories of revenues for european political parties and foundations apart from contributions from the budget of the european union , namely contributions from members and donations. a number of revenue sources generated from own economic activities (such as sales of publications or conference or workshop fees) fall outside the scope of these two categories , creating accounting and transparency problems. a third category of revenues (‘ancillary own resources’) should therefore be created. the proportion of own resources in the total budget of a european political party or foundations should be capped at 5% to avoid that it becomes overdimensioned in relation to the overall budget of these entities.


### (39) in order to reach out to their members and constituencies across the union , european political parties should have the right to use their funding for cross-border political campaigns. the funding and limitation of election expenses for parties and candidates in those campaigns should be governed by the rules applicable in each member state. ### (39) in order to reach out to their members and constituencies across the union , european political parties should have the right to use their funding for cross-border political campaigns , conducted in the context of elections to the european parliament , including the setting up of union-wide lists and referendum campaigns. the funding and limitation of election expenses for parties and candidates in those campaigns should be governed by the rules applicable in each member state.


### (41) european political parties should not fund , directly or indirectly , other political parties and , in particular , national parties or candidates. european political foundations should not fund , directly or indirectly , european or national political parties or candidates. the prohibition of indirect funding should however not prevent european political parties from publicly supporting and engaging with their member parties in the union on issues of relevance for the union , or to support political activities in the common interest , to be able to fulfil their mission under article 10(4) teu. moreover , european political parties and their affiliated european political foundations should only finance activities in the context of national referendum campaigns when they concern the implementation of the teu and the tfeu . these principles reflect declaration no 11 on article 191 of the treaty establishing the european community annexed to the final act of the treaty of nice. ### (41) european political parties and foundations should not use the funding received from the general budget of the union for the sole benefit , directly or indirectly , of other political parties and , in particular , national , parties or candidates. the prohibition of indirect funding should however not prevent european political parties or political foundations from publicly supporting and engaging with their member parties or member organisations in the union on issues of relevance for the union , from supporting political activities in the common interest , or from engaging in educational activities , in order to be able to fulfil their mission under article 10(4) teu and act to reinforce the existence of the european demos. the prohibition of indirect funding should not prevent the participation of either representatives and staffers of political parties , nor of potentially politically active persons in events of european political foundations. moreover , european political parties and their affiliated european political foundations should only finance activities in the context of national referendum campaigns when they concern issues directly related to the union. these principles reflect declaration no 11 on article 191 of the treaty establishing the european community annexed to the final act of the treaty of nice.


### (41) european political parties should not fund , directly or indirectly , other political parties and , in particular , national parties or candidates. european political foundations should not fund , directly or indirectly , european or national political parties or candidates. the prohibition of indirect funding should however not prevent european political parties from publicly supporting and engaging with their member parties in the union on issues of relevance for the union , or to support political activities in the common interest , to be able to fulfil their mission under article 10(4) teu. moreover , european political parties and their affiliated european political foundations should only finance activities in the context of national referendum campaigns when they concern the implementation of the teu and the tfeu . these principles reflect declaration no 11 on article 191 of the treaty establishing the european community annexed to the final act of the treaty of nice. ### (41) european political parties should not fund , directly or indirectly , other political parties and , in particular , national parties or candidates. european political foundations should not fund , directly or indirectly , european or national political parties or candidates. the prohibition of indirect funding should however not prevent european political parties from publicly supporting and engaging with their member parties in the union on issues of relevance for the union , or to support political activities in the common interest , to be able to fulfil their mission under article 10(4) teu. moreover , european political parties and their affiliated european political foundations should only finance activities in the context of national referendum campaigns when they concern issues directly related to the union within the limits and in accordance with eu values . these principles reflect declaration no 11 on article 191 of the treaty establishing the european community annexed to the final act of the treaty of nice.


### (41) european political parties should not fund , directly or indirectly , other political parties and , in particular , national parties or candidates. european political foundations should not fund , directly or indirectly , european or national political parties or candidates. the prohibition of indirect funding should however not prevent european political parties from publicly supporting and engaging with their member parties in the union on issues of relevance for the union , or to support political activities in the common interest , to be able to fulfil their mission under article 10(4) teu. moreover , european political parties and their affiliated european political foundations should only finance activities in the context of national referendum campaigns when they concern the implementation of the teu and the tfeu . these principles reflect declaration no 11 on article 191 of the treaty establishing the european community annexed to the final act of the treaty of nice. ### (41) european political parties should not fund , directly or indirectly , other political parties and , in particular , national parties or candidates. european political foundations should not fund , directly or indirectly , european or national political parties or candidates. the prohibition of indirect funding should however not prevent european political parties or european political foundations from publicly supporting and engaging with their member parties or member organisations in the union on issues of relevance for the union , or to support political activities in the common interest , to be able to fulfil their mission under article 10(4) teu and act to reinforce the existence of the european demos. the prohibition of indirect funding should not prevent the participation of either representatives and staffers of political parties , nor of potentially politically active persons in events of european political foundations. moreover , european political parties should only finance activities in the context of national referendum campaigns when they concern the implementation of the teu and the tfeu. european political foundations should also be allowed to organise activities financed from the general budget of the european union to support these campaigns. these principles reflect declaration no 11 on article 191 of the treaty establishing the european community annexed to the final act of the treaty of nice.


### (50) it is necessary to establish a common repository for the disclosures of european political parties. given its specific role in the implementation of this regulation , the authority should establish and manage such repository as a part of the registry for european political parties. the information contained in the repository should be transmitted by european political parties to the authority using a standard format and may be automated. european political parties should make available in the authority’s repository information to enable the wider context of the political advertisement and its aims to be understood. the information on the amount allocated to political advertising in the context of a specific campaign to be included in the repository may be based on an estimated allocation of funding. the amounts to be mentioned in the repository include donations for specific purposes or benefits in kind. ### (50) it is necessary to establish a common repository for the disclosures of european political parties. given its specific role in the implementation of this regulation , the authority should establish and manage such repository as a part of the registry for european political parties. the information contained in the repository should be transmitted by european political parties to the authority using a standard format and may be automated. european political parties should make available in the authority’s repository information to enable the wider context and objectives of the political advertisement. the information on the amount allocated to political advertising in the context of a specific campaign to be included in the repository may be based on a realistic estimation of funding and the actual amounts , once known. the amounts to be mentioned in the repository regarding information on political advertising , include donations for specific purposes , benefits in kind , contributions and their own resources.


### (9) ‘own resources’ means income generated by own economic activities , such as conference fees and sales of publications; ### (9) ‘ancillary own resources’ means income generated by own economic activities , such as conference or workshop fees , sales of publications;


### (10) ‘indirect funding’ means funding from which the member party derives a financial advantage , even where no funds are directly transferred; this should include cases which allow the member party to avoid expenditure which it would otherwise have had to incur for activities , other than political activities in the common interest , organised for its own and sole benefit; ### (10) ‘indirect funding’ means funding from which the member party derives a financial advantage , even where no funds are directly transferred; this should include cases which allow the member party to avoid expenditure which it would otherwise have had to incur for activities , other than activities organised to promote european values and awareness , organised for its own and sole benefit;


### (10) ‘indirect funding’ means funding from which the member party derives a financial advantage , even where no funds are directly transferred; this should include cases which allow the member party to avoid expenditure which it would otherwise have had to incur for activities , other than political activities in the common interest , organised for its own and sole benefit; ### (10) ‘indirect funding’ means funding from which the member party derives a financial advantage , even where no funds are directly transferred; this should include cases which allow the member party to avoid expenditure which it would otherwise have had to incur for activities , other than political activities in the common interest , organised for its own and sole benefit; this shall also include trainings and seminars for individual members which in case of being elected or appointed to a public position do not have to partially or fully compensate retrospectively for the training received previously; this shall also apply to individual members who after having been elected or appointed to a public position do not have the obligation in front of their member party to pay a regular salary share related to their election or appointment , as well as any membership tax or any other way that might come as a compensation for the individual member's election or nomination in a public function on behalf of the party;


### it also ensures that its member parties having their seat in the union observe the values expressed in article 2 teu and that its member parties having their seat outside the union observe equivalent values. it provides a written declaration using the template in annex i; ### it also ensures that its member parties having their seat in the union observe the values expressed in article 2 teu and that its member parties having their seat outside the union observe equivalent values. it provides a yearly written declaration using the template in annex i;


### it also ensures that its member organisations having their seat in the union observe the values expressed in article 2 teu and that its member organisations having their seat outside the union observe equivalent values. it provides a written declaration using the template in annex i; ### it also ensures that its member organisations having their seat in the union observe the values expressed in article 2 teu and that its member organisations having their seat outside the union observe equivalent values. it provides a yearly written declaration using the template in annex i;


### its internal rules regarding gender balance. ### its internal rules regarding gender equality.


### 2. each european political party shall transmit within five working days of the first dissemination to the authority information concerning each political advertisement that it sponsors or publishes directly to enable the wider context of the political advertisement and its aims to be understood by citizens. that information shall include at least the information listed in point 1 of annex ii. ### 2. each european political party shall transmit within fifteen working days of the first dissemination to the authority information concerning each political advertisement that it sponsors or publishes directly to enable the wider context of the political advertisement and its aims to be understood by citizens. that information shall include at least the information listed in point 1 of annex ii. the authority shall , once relevant legislation obliges platforms to publish online registers containing the before mentioned information , provide for automatic forwarding of information while requiring european political parties to take or decline responsibility for listed advertisements.


### 4. a european political party shall include in its application evidence demonstrating its compliance with article 4(1) , point (j) , and that its member parties have continuously published on their websites , during 12 months preceding the moment at which the application is made , information on the gender representation among the candidates at the last elections to the european parliament and on the evolution of gender representation among their members of the european parliament. ### 4. a european political party shall include in its application evidence demonstrating that it has continuously published on its website , during 12 months preceding the moment at which the application is made , information on the gender representation among the candidates at the last elections to the european parliament and on the evolution of gender representation among their members of the european parliament.


### 2. european political parties and european political foundations shall , at the time of the submission of their annual financial statements in accordance with article 26 , also transmit a list of all donors with their corresponding donations , indicating both the nature and the value of the individual donations. this paragraph shall also apply to contributions made by member parties of european political parties and member organisations of european political foundations. ### 2. european political parties and european political foundations shall , at the time of the submission of their annual financial statements in accordance with article 26 , also transmit a list of all donors with their corresponding donations , indicating both the nature and the value of the individual donations. this paragraph shall also apply to contributions made by members of european political parties and member organisations of european political foundations.


### 5. for all donations the value of which exceeds eur 3000 , european political parties and european political foundations shall request donors to provide the necessary information for their proper identification. european political parties and european political foundations shall transmit the information received to the authority upon its request. ### 5. for all donations the value of which exceeds eur 1500 , european political parties and european political foundations shall request donors to provide the necessary information for their proper identification. european political parties and european political foundations shall transmit the information received to the authority upon its request.


### 5. for all donations the value of which exceeds eur 3000 , european political parties and european political foundations shall request donors to provide the necessary information for their proper identification. european political parties and european political foundations shall transmit the information received to the authority upon its request. ### 5. for all non-recurring donations exceeding eur 3000 and all recurring donations during a timeframe of 12 consecutive months exceeding eur 3000 , european political parties and european political foundations shall request donors to provide the necessary information for their proper identification. this identification shall give information about the personal and business environment of the donor in order to avoid the absence of control over donations executed by members belonging to the same personal or professional sphere , such as donations coming from the same family or the same work organisation.


### 5. for all donations the value of which exceeds eur 3000 , european political parties and european political foundations shall request donors to provide the necessary information for their proper identification. european political parties and european political foundations shall transmit the information received to the authority upon its request. ### 5. for all donations , european political parties and european political foundations shall request donors to provide the necessary information for their proper identification. european political parties and european political foundations shall transmit the information received to the authority upon its request.


### 9. contributions from members of a european political party that have their seat in , or are citizens of , a member state or from member parties that have their seat in a country belonging to the council of europe shall be permitted. the total value of contributions from members shall not exceed 40 % of the annual budget of a european political party. the value of contributions from member parties that have their seat in a country outside the union shall not exceed 10% of the total contributions from members. ### 9. contributions from members of a european political party that have their seat in , or are citizens or permanent residents of , a member state or from member parties that have their seat in a country belonging to the council of europe , in candidate countries or potential candidates for eu membership shall be permitted. the total value of contributions from members shall not exceed 40 % of the annual budget of a european political party. the value of contributions from member parties that have their seat in a country outside the union shall not exceed 20% of the total contributions from members.


### 10. contributions from members of a european political foundation that have their seat in , or are citizens of , a member state or from member organisations that have their seat in a country belonging to the council of europe , and from the european political party with which it is affiliated , shall be permitted. the total value of contributions from members shall not exceed 40 % of the annual budget of a european political foundation and shall not derive from funds received by a european political party pursuant to this regulation from the general budget of the european union. the value of contributions from member organisations that have their seat in a country outside the union shall not exceed 10% of the total contributions from members. ### 10. contributions from members of a european political foundation that have their seat in , or are citizens or permanent residents of , a member state or from member organisations that have their seat in a country belonging to the council of europe , in candidate countries or potential candidates for eu membership , and from the european political party with which it is affiliated , shall be permitted. the total value of contributions from members shall not exceed 40 % of the annual budget of a european political foundation and shall not derive from funds received by a european political party pursuant to this regulation from the general budget of the european union. the value of contributions from member organisations that have their seat in a country outside the union shall not exceed 20% of the total contributions from members.


### 13. the value of own resources of a european political party or of a european political foundation generated from own economic activities shall not exceed 5% of the annual budget of that european political party or european political foundation. ### 13. the value of ancillary own resources of a european political party or of a european political foundation generated from own economic activities shall not exceed 5% of the annual budget of that european political party or european political foundation.


### 2. the funding of european political parties and european political foundations from the general budget of the european union or from any other source may be used to finance referendum campaigns when those campaigns concern the implementation of the treaties of the union. ### 2. the funding of european political parties and european political foundations from the general budget of the european union or from any other source may be used to finance referendum campaigns when those campaigns concern issues directly related to the european union , and within the limits and in accordance with eu values.


### 2. the funding of european political parties and european political foundations from the general budget of the european union or from any other source may be used to finance referendum campaigns when those campaigns concern the implementation of the treaties of the union. ### 2. the funding of european political parties from the general budget of the european union or from any other source may be used to finance referendum campaigns when those campaigns concern the implementation of the treaties of the union. european political foundations shall be allowed to organise activities financed from the general budget of the european union to support these campaigns.


### 2. the funding of european political foundations from the general budget of the european union or from any other source shall not be used for any other purpose than for financing their tasks as listed in article 2 , point (4) , and to meet expenditure directly linked to the objectives set out in their statutes in accordance with article 6. it shall in particular not be used for the direct or indirect funding of elections , political parties , or candidates or other foundations. ### 2. the funding of european political foundations from the general budget of the european union or from any other source shall not be used for any other purpose than for financing their tasks as listed in article 2 , point (4) , and to meet expenditure directly linked to the objectives set out in their statutes in accordance with article 6. it shall in particular not be used for the direct or indirect funding of elections , political parties , or candidates or other foundations , other than political activities in the common interest of european and national parties and capacity building to support the formation of future political leadership in the union.


### (14) decisions to de-register a european political party or a european political foundation on the ground of non-compliance with the values on which the union is founded , as expressed in article 2 teu , should be taken only in the event of a manifest and serious breach of those values. when taking a decision to de-register , the authority should fully respect the charter. ### (14) decisions to de-register a european political party or a european political foundation should be taken in the event of a breach of the values on which the union is founded , as expressed in article 2 teu. when taking a decision to de-register , the authority should fully respect the charter.


### (18) the independence and transparency of the committee of independent eminent persons should be guaranteed. ### (18) the independence and transparency of the committee of independent eminent persons should be guaranteed by ensuring , inter alia , that their members do not have a political affiliation.


### (23) the european legal status granted to european political parties and their affiliated foundations should provide them with legal capacity and recognition in all the member states. such legal capacity and recognition do not entitle them to nominate candidates in national elections or elections to the european parliament . any such or similar entitlement remains under the competence of member states. ### (23) the european legal status granted to european political parties and their affiliated foundations should provide them with legal capacity and recognition in all the member states. such legal capacity and recognition do not entitle them to nominate candidates in national elections or in national or regional constituencies in the elections to the european parliament . any such or similar entitlement remains under the competence of member states.


### (33) in order to address the difficulties that european political parties , in particular small ones , face in achieving the 10% co-financing rate required by regulation (eu , euratom) no 1141/2014 , the co-financing rate for european political parties should be reduced to 5% , in line with the rate for european political foundations. ### (33) in order to address the difficulties that european political parties , in particular small ones , face in achieving the 10% co-financing rate required by regulation (eu , euratom) no 1141/2014 , the co-financing rate for european political parties should be reduced to 5% , in line with the rate for european political foundations. european political foundations , like european political parties , should be able to use any unused part of the union contribution awarded to cover reimbursable expenditure within the financial year following its award.


### (36) a due diligence mechanism should be introduced to improve the transparency of large donations and to minimise the risk of foreign interference from this source. to that end , european political parties and european political foundations should request detailed identification information from their donors. the authority should be empowered to request additional information from donors where it has grounds to believe that a donation has been granted in breach of this regulation. ### (36) a due diligence mechanism should be introduced to improve the transparency of donations and to minimise the risk of foreign interference from this source. to that end , european political parties and european political foundations should request detailed identification information from their donors. the authority should be empowered to request additional information from donors where it has grounds to believe that a donation has been granted in breach of this regulation.


### (56) in compliance with the principle of proportionality , the obligation to publish the identity of donors who are natural persons should not apply to donations equal to or below eur 1500 per year and per donor. furthermore , such obligation should not apply to donations the annual value of which exceeds eur 1500 and is below or equal to eur 3000 unless the donor has given prior written consent to the publication. these thresholds strike an appropriate balance between , on the one hand , the fundamental right to the protection of personal data and , on the other hand , the legitimate public interest in transparency regarding the funding of european political parties and foundations , as reflected in international recommendations to avoid corruption in relation to the funding of political parties and foundations. the disclosure of donations exceeding eur 3000 per year and per donor should allow effective public scrutiny and control over the relations between donors and european political parties. also in compliance with the principle of proportionality , information on donations should be published annually , except during election campaigns to the european parliament or for donations exceeding eur 12000 , in respect of which publication should take place expeditiously. ### (56) the disclosure of donations should allow effective public scrutiny and control over the relations between donors and european political parties. also in compliance with the principle of proportionality , information on donations should be published annually , except during election campaigns to the european parliament or for donations exceeding eur 1000 , in respect of which publication should take place expeditiously.


### it is either recognised by , or established in accordance with , the legal order of at least one member state; ### it is either recognised by , or established in accordance with , the legal order of at least one member state , a country belonging to the council of europe , a candidate country or a potential candidate for eu membership;


### it observes , in particular in its programme and in its activities , the values on which the union is founded , as expressed in article 2 teu , namely respect for human dignity , freedom , democracy , equality , the rule of law and respect for human rights , including the rights of persons belonging to minorities . it provides a written declaration using the template in annex i ; ### it observes , in particular in its programme and in its activities , the values on which the union is founded , as expressed in article 2 teu , namely respect for human dignity , freedom , democracy , equality , the rule of law and respect for human rights , including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. it provides a yearly written declaration using the template in annex i ;


### 3. the authority shall immediately publish the information referred to in paragraph 2 in the repository provided for in article 8. the information shall be presented in a form which is easily accessible , clearly visible and user friendly , and using plain language. ### 3. the authority shall immediately , and in any case no later than five working days from receiving it , publish the information referred to in paragraph 2 in the repository provided for in article 8. the information shall be presented in a machine-readable format as well as in a form which is easily accessible , clearly visible and user friendly , and using plain language.


### 6. member states shall designate one or more national regulatory authorities competent to supervise compliance with paragraphs 1 , 2 and 4 and notify the authority thereof. such national regulatory authorities or bodies shall exercise their powers impartially and transparently and be legally distinct from the government and functionally independent of their respective governments and of any other public or private body. the authority shall publish on its website and keep updated a list of member states’ national regulatory authorities. decisions of national regulatory authorities shall be subject to effective legal remedies. member states shall ensure that upon request of any interested party appropriate redress can be sought requiring the european political party to put an end to any violation of the obligations laid down in paragraphs 1 , 2 or 4. ### 6. member states shall designate one or more national regulatory authorities competent to supervise compliance with paragraphs 1 , 2 and 4 and notify the authority thereof. such national regulatory authorities or bodies shall exercise their powers impartially and transparently and be legally distinct from the government and functionally independent of their respective governments and of any other public or private body. the authority shall publish on its website and keep updated a list of member states’ national regulatory authorities. decisions of national regulatory authorities shall be subject to effective legal remedies. member states shall ensure that upon request of any interested party appropriate redress can be sought requiring the european political party to put an end to any violation of the obligations laid down in paragraphs 1 , 2 or 4. the supervision and enforcement of any rules and obligations related to the processing of personal data , including for targeting political advertising , shall remain the competence of the supervisory authorities established pursuant to regulation (eu) 2016/679.


### 2. if the authority finds that any of the conditions for registration or governance provisions referred to in paragraph 1 , with the exception of the conditions in article 3(1) , point (d) , and article 3(2) , point (c) , are no longer complied with , it shall notify the european political party or foundation concerned. ### 2. if following a verification conducted under paragraph 1 , the authority considers that one of the de-registration grounds under article 19(1) , point (a) , points (i) or (ii) , might apply to a european political party or a european political foundation , or the authority has knowledge of circumstances indicating that one of the deregistration grounds under article 19(1) , point (a) , points (iii) or (iv) , or under article 19(2) might apply to a european political party or to a european political foundation , the authority shall inform the party or foundation concerned without undue delay of those deregistration grounds , and invite the party or foundation concerned to submit observations within one month.


### a decision of the authority to de-register on grounds of non-compliance with the conditions set out in article 3(1) , point (d) , or article 3(2) , point (c) , may only be adopted in the event of manifest and serious breach of those conditions. it shall be subject to the procedure set out in paragraph 4. ### a decision of the authority to de-register on grounds of non-compliance with the conditions set out in article 3(1) , points (d) or (e) , or article 3(2) , points (c) or (e) , shall only be adopted in the event of breach of those conditions. it shall be subject to the procedure set out in paragraph 4.


### 4. a decision of the authority to de-register a european political party or foundation on the ground of a manifest and serious breach as regards compliance with the conditions set out in article 3(1) , point (d) , or article 3(2) , point (c) , shall be communicated to the european parliament and the council. the decision shall enter into force only if no objection is expressed by the european parliament and the council within a period of three months of the communication of the decision to the european parliament and the council or if , before the expiry of that period , the european parliament and the council have both informed the authority that they will not object. in the event of an objection by the european parliament and by the council , the european political party or foundation shall remain registered. ### 4. a decision of the authority to de-register a european political party or foundation on the ground of a breach as regards compliance with the conditions set out in article 3(1) , points (d) or (e) , or article 3(2) , points (c) or (d) , shall be communicated to the european parliament and the council. the decision shall enter into force only if no objection is expressed by the european parliament and the council within a period of three months of the communication of the decision to them or if , before the expiry of that period , the european parliament and the council have both informed the authority that they will not object. in the event of an objection by the european parliament and by the council , the european political party or foundation shall remain registered.


### 1. the committee of independent eminent persons established by regulation (eu , euratom) no 1141/2014 shall consist of six members , with the european parliament , the council and the commission each appointing two members. the members of the committee shall be selected on the basis of their personal and professional qualities. they shall neither be members of the european parliament , the council or the commission , nor hold any electoral mandate , be officials or other servants of the european union or be current or former employees of a european political party or a european political foundation. ### 1. the committee of independent eminent persons established by regulation (eu , euratom) no 1141/2014 shall consist of six members , with the european parliament , the council and the commission each appointing two members of which at least one shall be a woman. the members of the committee shall be selected on the basis of their personal and professional qualities. they shall neither be members or former members of the european parliament , the council or the commission , nor hold any electoral mandate , belong to a national or regional party in the european union , be officials or other servants of the european union or be current or former employees of a european political party or a european political foundation.


### any possible manifest and serious breach of the values on which the union is founded , as referred to in article 3(1) , point (d) , and article 3(2) , point (c) , by a european political party or a european political foundation; ### any possible breach of the values on which the union is founded , as referred to in article 3(1) , points (d) and (e) , and article 3(2) , points (c) and (d) , by a european political party or a european political foundation;


### 1. a european political party or a european political foundation shall lose its european legal personality upon the notification of a decision pursuant to article 11(5) . ### 1. a european political party or a european political foundation shall lose its european legal personality upon removal from the register by a decision of the authority:


### 3. if a european political party or a european political foundation has seriously failed to fulfil relevant obligations under national law applicable by virtue of the first subparagraph of article 17(2) , the member state of the seat may address to the authority a duly reasoned request for de-registration which shall identify precisely and exhaustively the illegal actions and the specific national requirements that have not been complied with. in such cases , the authority shall: ### 3. if a european political party or a european political foundation has failed to fulfil relevant obligations under national law applicable by virtue of article 17(2) , and if , in the light of the fundamental right of freedom of association enshrined in article 12 eu charter of fundamental rights and the need to ensure pluralism of political parties in europe , that failure is serious enough to justify its de-registration , the member state of the seat may address to the authority a request for de-registration. this request shall be duly reasoned. in particular , it shall identify precisely and exhaustively the illegal actions and the specific national requirements that have not been complied with.


### for any other matter , and when the reasoned request of the member state concerned confirms that all national remedies have been exhausted , decide to remove the european political party or european political foundation concerned from the register. ### for any other matter , where , in its request pursuant to paragraph 1 , the member state confirms that all national remedies concerning such a request have been exhausted , the authority shall , after hearing the representative of the european political party or european political foundation concerned , assess whether the de-registration ground under article 19(1) , point (d) , applies to the european political party or european political foundation concerned


### in all cases , the authority shall act without undue delay. the authority shall inform the member state concerned and the european political party or european political foundation concerned of the follow-up given to the reasoned request for de-registration. ### in all cases , the authority shall act without undue delay and , in any case not later than two months. the authority shall inform the member state concerned and the european political party or european political foundation concerned of how the reasoned request for de-registration has been followed-up.


### 4. financial contributions or grants from the general budget of the european union shall not exceed 95 % of the annual reimbursable expenditure indicated in the budget of a european political party and of the eligible costs incurred by a european political foundation. european political parties may use any unused part of the union contribution awarded to cover reimbursable expenditure within the financial year following its award. amounts unused after that financial year shall be recovered in accordance with regulation (eu , euratom) 2018/1046 . financial contributions in the year of elections to the european parliament may cover 100% of the reimbursable expenditure incurred by a european political party. ### 4. financial contributions or grants from the general budget of the european union shall not exceed 95 % of the annual reimbursable expenditure indicated in the budget of a european political party and of the eligible costs incurred by a european political foundation. european political parties and european political foundations may use any unused part of the union contribution awarded to cover reimbursable expenditure within the financial year following its award. amounts unused after that financial year shall be recovered in accordance with regulation (eu , euratom) 2018/1046 . financial contributions in the year of elections to the european parliament may cover 100% of the reimbursable expenditure incurred by a european political party or a european political foundation.


### 2. the european political party and the european political foundation shall , at the time of its application , comply with the obligations listed in article 26 from the date of its application until the end of the financial year or of the action covered by the contribution or grant , it shall remain registered in the register and shall not be the subject of any of the sanctions provided for in article 30(1) and in article 30(2) , points (a) (v) to (ix) . ### 2. the european political party and the european political foundation shall , at the time of its application , comply with the obligations listed in article 26 from the date of its application until the end of the financial year or of the action covered by the contribution or grant , it shall remain registered in the register and shall not be the subject of any of the sanctions provided for in article 30(2) , points (a) (v) to (ix) .


### 1. european political parties and european political foundations may accept donations from natural or legal persons of up to a value of eur 18000 per year and per donor. ### 1. european political parties and european political foundations may accept donations from natural persons or non-profit organisations of up to a value of eur 18000 per year and per donor.


### for donations from natural persons the value of which exceeds eur 1500 and is below or equal to eur 3000 , the european political party or european political foundation concerned shall indicate whether the corresponding donors have given their prior written consent to publication in accordance with article 36(1) , point (e). ### deleted


### 3. donations received by european political parties and european political foundations and expenditure funded from those donations within six months prior to elections to the european parliament shall be reported on a weekly basis to the authority in writing and in accordance with paragraph 2. ### 3. donations received by european political parties and european political foundations within six months prior to elections to the european parliament shall be reported on a weekly basis to the authority in writing and in accordance with paragraph 2.


### 4. single donations the value of which exceeds eur 12000 that have been accepted by european political parties and european political foundations shall be immediately reported to the authority in writing and in accordance with paragraph 2. ### 4. single donations the value of which exceeds eur 1000 that have been accepted by european political parties and european political foundations shall be immediately reported to the authority in writing and in accordance with paragraph 2 and no later than five working days.


### donations from any private entities based in a third country or from individuals from a third country who are not entitled to vote in elections to the european parliament. ### donations from any private entities based in a third country or from non-eu citizens resident in a third country.


### 1. subject to the second subparagraph , the funding of european political parties from the general budget of the european union or from any other source may be used to finance campaigns conducted by the european political parties in the context of elections to the european parliament in which they or their members participate as required by article 3(1) , point (f). ### 1. subject to the second subparagraph , the funding of european political parties from the general budget of the european union or from any other source may be used to finance campaigns conducted by the european political parties in the context of elections to the european parliament in which they or their members participate as required by article 3(1) , point (f) including setting up union-wide lists.


### 2. the authority shall control compliance by european political parties and european political foundations with their obligations under this regulation , in particular in relation to article 3 , article 4(1) , points (a) , (b) , (d) , (e) and (f) , of article 6(1) , points (a) to (e) and (g) , article 10(5) and (6) , and articles 23 , 24 and 25. ### 2. the authority shall control compliance by european political parties and european political foundations with their obligations under this regulation , in particular in relation to article 3 , article 4(1) , points (a) , (b) , (d) , (e) , (f) and (j) , of article 6(1) , points (a) to (e) , (g) and (ia) , article 10(5) and (6) , and articles 23 , 24 and 25.


### 1. with a view to fully comply with the obligations referred to in article 38 , before the authority’s final decision relating to any of the sanctions referred to in article 30 , the authority or the authorising officer of the european parliament shall give the european political party or the european political foundation concerned an opportunity to introduce the measures required to remedy the situation within a reasonable period of time , which shall not normally exceed one month. in particular , the authority or the authorising officer of the european parliament shall allow the possibility of correcting clerical and arithmetical errors , providing additional documents or information where necessary or correcting minor mistakes. ### 1. with a view to fully comply with the obligations referred to in article 38 , before the authority’s final decision relating to any of the sanctions referred to in article 30(2) , points (a)(i) to (iv) , (viii) and (ix) , the authority or the authorising officer of the european parliament shall give the european political party or the european political foundation concerned an opportunity to introduce the measures required to remedy the situation within a reasonable period of time , which shall not normally exceed one month. in particular , the authority or the authorising officer of the european parliament shall allow the possibility of correcting clerical and arithmetical errors , providing additional documents or information where necessary or correcting minor mistakes.


### 1. the european parliament , under the authority of its authorising officer or under that of the authority , shall make public the following on a website created for that purpose , in an open , machine readable format : ### 1. the european parliament , under the authority of its authorising officer , or the authority shall , in accordance with their respective responsibilities , make public the following on a website created for that purpose , in an open , machine readable format:


### the names of donors and their corresponding donations reported by european political parties and european political foundations in accordance with article 23(2) , (3) and (4) , with the exception of donations from natural persons the value of which does not exceed eur 1500 per year and per donor , which shall be reported as 'minor donations'. donations from natural persons the annual value of which exceeds eur 1500 and is below or equal to eur 3000 shall not be published without the corresponding donor's prior written consent to their publication. if no such prior consent has been given , such donations shall be reported as 'minor donations'. the total amount of minor donations and the number of donors per calendar year shall also be published; ### the names of donors and their corresponding donations reported by european political parties and european political foundations in accordance with article 23(2) , (3) and (4);


### the contributions referred to in article 23(9) and (10) and reported by european political parties and european political foundations in accordance with article 23(2) , including the identity of the member parties or organisations which made those contributions; ### the contributions referred to in article 23(9) and (10) and reported by european political parties and european political foundations in accordance with article 23(2) , including the identity of the members or member organisations which made those contributions;


### the european parliament shall , after consulting the authority , publish by [one year after the elections to the european parliament] a report on the application of this regulation and on the activities funded. the report shall indicate , where appropriate , possible amendments to be made to the statute and funding systems. ### the european parliament shall , after consulting the authority , adopt by [one year after the elections to the european parliament] a report on the application of this regulation and on the activities funded. the report shall indicate , where appropriate , possible amendments to be made to the statute and funding systems.


### – provisional statement of the amounts spent or allocated by the european political party for the preparation , placement , publication and dissemination of the political advertisement as well as the actual amounts once known; ### – provisional statement of the amounts spent or allocated by the european political party for the placement , publication and dissemination of the political advertisement as well as the actual amounts once known;


### – the source of the funds being used for the specific advertisement campaign including for the preparation , placement , publication and dissemination of a political advertisement. ### deleted


### – in case targeting techniques are used , meaningful information on the techniques used , including the points provided under annex ii to regulation 2022/xx [on the transparency and targeting of political advertising]. ### – in case targeting techniques are used , meaningful information on the techniques used , including the points provided under annex ii to regulation 2022/xx [on the transparency and targeting of political advertising]. this is without prejudice to the information and documentation obligations pursuant to regulation (eu) 2016/679.


### 1. stresses that ngeu is the first eu common borrowing programme which not only grants loans to member states , but also provides direct union budget expenditure embedded in genuine eu programmes and policies; underlines that common union debt managed by the commission boosts the size , impact and added value of the union budget , thereby supporting the post-covid-19 recovery and delivering on long-term eu priorities; ### 1. stresses that ngeu is the first eu common borrowing programme which not only grants loans to member states , but also provides direct union budget expenditure embedded in genuine eu programmes and policies; underlines that common union debt managed by the commission boosts the size , impact and added value of the union budget , thereby supporting the post-covid-19 recovery and delivering on long-term eu priorities in particular the european green deal and the green and digital transitions;


### 3. underlines that the success of the borrowing strategy will be judged by its ability to raise the funds necessary for the implementation of ngeu on the capital markets in a timely and relatively low-cost manner , and to repay the debt by 2058 smoothly and predictably; stresses that that the union’s issuance should not upset borrowing conditions for other european issuers and should even play a positive role on capital markets , notably by meeting investors’ demand for euro-denominated assets and for new products such as green bonds; ### 3. underlines that the success of the borrowing strategy will be judged by its ability to raise the funds necessary for the implementation of ngeu on the capital markets in a timely and relatively low-cost manner , and to repay the debt by 2058 smoothly and predictably and without crowding out expenditures in the current mff and endangering future eu action; stresses that that the union’s issuance should not upset borrowing conditions for other european issuers and should even play a positive role on capital markets , notably by meeting investors’ demand for euro-denominated assets and for new products such as green bonds while ensuring the highest standards as regards greens bonds issuance , including in proceeds reporting , to ensure the products are fit for purpose;


### 4. notes that the commission has developed and put in place a new and large funding programme and built up its debt management capacities swiftly and efficiently; welcomes the fact that first issuances took place at a steady pace in 2021 and were all heavily oversubscribed , revealing strong investor interest and enabling the commission to meet its funding targets; ### 4. notes that the commission has developed and put in place a new and large funding programme and built up its debt management capacities swiftly and efficiently; welcomes the fact that issuances took place at a steady pace since the first issuance in 2021 and were all heavily oversubscribed , revealing strong investor interest and enabling the commission to meet its funding targets;


### 7. believes that by making the union one of largest bond issuers in europe , ngeu can have a positive impact on the stability and liquidity of eu capital markets and can strengthen the international role of the euro; notes , however , that ngeu is legally limited in size and in time; ### 7. believes that by making the union one of largest bond issuers in europe , ngeu can have a positive impact on the stability and liquidity of eu capital markets and can strengthen the international role of the euro; notes , however , that ngeu is legally limited in size and in time and that the collateral framework of the european central bank (ecb) does not treat ngeu bonds as the european safe asset; calls , therefore , on the ecb to apply the same haircuts to ngeu bonds as to national sovereign bonds with the aim to exploit the entire stabilising potential of euro-denominated supranational bonds; calls on the commission to reflect about potential ways for maintaining the outstanding volume of ngeu bonds beyond 2027 in order to prevent the liquidity to decline shortly after reaching its peak at the end of the ngeu spending phase;


### 8. highlights , in particular , that the union could set benchmarks for sustainable investment as the largest global issuer of green bonds , as well as by diversifying its investor base and securing lower borrowing costs; ### 8. highlights , in particular , that the union could set benchmarks for sustainable investment as the largest global issuer of green bonds , as well as by diversifying its investor base and securing lower borrowing costs; warns that any greenwashing will put into risk the green premium; underlines that the credibility of the implementation of the rrf and the prevention of any kinds of green washing is key for the success of eu bonds , and the green bonds in particular; welcomes the interactive webpage reporting to investors on the investments financed from the bonds 1a and expects the commission to fully live up to its commitments relating excluding any and all problematic projects from being financed by the green bonds as soon as genuine concerns are noted; welcomes the inclusion of the do-no-significant-harm (dnsh) principle as the yardstick for any expenditure financed under ngeu; believes that the exclusion of environmentally harmful projects from eu funding is crucial to gain investor acceptance and to meet the union’s climate and environmental commitments; is , therefore , highly concerned that under repowereu , the commission has proposed to waive the dnsh principle for measures improving energy infrastructure and facilities to meet immediate security of supply needs for oil and gas;


### 9. believes that in contrast to the negative image associated with initiatives taken during the euro crisis of the early 2010s , the response to ngeu shows the merits of a more ambitious , collective and democratic crisis response at eu level; calls on all eu institutions , therefore , to ensure that the political signal given by ngeu lives on , by demonstrating that the eu delivers on its promises and by offering a longer-term political vision; ### 9. believes that in contrast to the negative image associated with initiatives taken during the euro crisis of the early 2010s , the response to ngeu shows the merits of a more ambitious , collective and democratic crisis response at eu level; notes that the substantial crisis support funded by joint debt issuance has strengthened the confidence in the resilience of the eu and its member states and that financial market participants widely acknowledge the improved robustness of the european financial architecture; calls on all eu institutions , therefore , to ensure that the political signal given by ngeu lives on , by demonstrating that the eu delivers on its promises and by offering a longer-term political vision minimising the risk of increased risk premia on certain national sovereign bonds in times of economic stress;


### 10. underlines that further investments in eu policies will be necessary to strengthen eu competitiveness and strategic autonomy , in particular regarding industry and climate action; considers , in this regard , that ngeu is a good example of a viable architecture for funding above the mff ceilings; ### 10. underlines that further investments in eu policies will be necessary to strengthen eu competitiveness , resilience and strategic autonomy , in particular regarding industry and climate action; considers , in this regard , that ngeu is a good example of a viable architecture for funding above the mff ceilings; calls , therefore , on the commission and on member states to give – in line with recommendations of the conference on the future of europe - further consideration to common borrowing at eu level , with a view to creating more favourable borrowing conditions , while maintaining responsible fiscal policies at member state level in particular to bridge the investment gap of the green transition;


### 13. firmly believes that the success of ngeu , and in particular the credibility and sustainability of its financing , will also be assessed against the union’s ability to repay the common debt with new own resources in the environmental and corporate sector , rather than with increased gross national income-based contributions from the member states; ### 13. firmly believes that the success of ngeu , and in particular the credibility and sustainability of its financing , will also be assessed against the union’s ability to repay the common debt with new own resources in the environmental and corporate sector , inter alia , rather than with increased gross national income-based contributions from the member states; highlights that own resources are a key enabler for the union to implement its policy priorities also and given the increased investment needs to address the climate emergency as well as energy independence and to help mitigate the social impact of the war in ukraine and sanctions and in order to speed up the green energy transition;


### 14. stresses that the introduction of such new own resources would avoid cuts to union programmes in the future , which would undermine the very purpose and long-term benefits of the recovery plan; believes that introducing new own resources would achieve lasting benefits , not only in the delivery of union policies , but also in ensuring the union’s standing as a credible and smart debt issuer; calls , therefore , on the member states to move as swiftly as possible in the current negotiations to establish own resources based on the eu emissions trading system , the carbon border adjustment mechanism and pillar i of the oecd; ### 14. stresses that the introduction of such new own resources would avoid cuts to union programmes in the future , cuts which would undermine the very purpose and long-term benefits of the recovery plan; believes that introducing new own resources as agreed in the legally binding inter institutional agreement would achieve lasting benefits , not only in the delivery of union policies , but also in ensuring the union’s standing as a credible and smart debt issuer; calls , therefore , on the member states to move as swiftly as possible and speed up the negotiations of the first basket of the so called new generation of eu own resources based on the eu emissions trading system , the carbon border adjustment mechanism and pillar i of the oecd presented by the commission on 22nd december 2021;


### 1. underlines that the swift and decisive mobilisation of significant eu budgetary resources was instrumental in cushioning the impact of the covid-19 crisis; ### 1. underlines that the swift and decisive mobilisation of significant eu budgetary resources was instrumental in cushioning the impact of the covid-19 crisis; recalls that member states have taken sizeable fiscal measures in response to the pandemic and in support of the recovery (5.2% of gdp in 2021 and 2.8% of gdp in 2022) , an increasing share of which is financed via the recovery and resilience facility (rrf) , which will fund 24% of total recovery support measures in 2022 ; highlights the stabilising effect of ngeu for member states at a time of great economic uncertainty , thereby allowing governments to maintain investment levels and keep down borrowing costs despite immense demands on national budgets;