### 13. highlights that a common union framework on crypto-assets should help increase consumer and investor protection , enhance know your customer (kyc) obligations and oversight of the underlying technology; ### 13. highlights that a common union framework on crypto-assets should help increase consumer and investor protection , fully enforce know your customer (kyc) obligations and oversight of the underlying technology;


### 14. points out that with the increasing digitalisation of financial services , as well as outsourcing to external it solution or maintenance providers , such as cloud providers , the exposure of financial institutions and markets to disruption caused by internal failures or external attacks is becoming more pronounced; ### 14. points out that with the increasing digitalisation of financial services , as well as outsourcing to external it solution or maintenance providers , such as cloud providers , the exposure of financial institutions and markets to disruption caused by internal failures or external attacks is becoming more pronounced and thereby that operational risks need to be thoroughly assessed in such evolving landscape to take into account and stress test plausible , but extreme scenarios;


### 15. calls on the commission to propose legislative changes in the area of ict and cyber security requirements for the union financial sector in order to address any inconsistencies , gaps and loopholes that are found to exist in relevant law; ### 15. calls on the commission to propose legislative changes in the area of ict and cyber security requirements for the union financial sector , taking into account international standards , in order to address any inconsistencies , gaps and loopholes that are found to exist in relevant law;


### 23. believes that the lack of accessible data and information regarding fintech activities can be a detriment to growth; advocates for increased transparency and enhanced reporting of fintech activity so as to reduce asymmetries and risks; ### 23. believes that the lack of accessible data and information regarding fintech and crypto-assets related activities can be a detriment to consumer protection , market integrity and financial stability as well as to the fight against money laundering and terrorism financing , tax evasion and tax avoidance; advocates for increased transparency and enhanced reporting requirements of fintech and crypto-assets activity so as to reduce asymmetries and risks; further calls for the adoption of specific rules on market transparency and integrity;


### 2. to ensure that digital finance can continue to be an innovative driver of growth and jobs across the single market; ### 2. to create a framework that allows digital finance is an innovative driver of growth and jobs across the single market in a safe and regulated environment with high standards for consumer/investor protection and market integrity;


### 3. to foster a common understanding of the key issues concerning digital finance and encourage the harmonisation of relevant provisions , which will lead to enhanced cross border activity; ### 3. to foster a common understanding of the key issues concerning digital finance and ensure the harmonisation of relevant provisions , which will lead to enhanced cross border activity;


### 4. to increase data sharing in accordance with union principles in order to stimulate innovation. the aim should be to facilitate access to public data across the union. this would not only benefit digital finance companies , but would also be to the benefit of a number of other union policy areas and increase market transparency; ### 4. to increase data sharing , data integrity and security in accordance with union principles in order to enhance consumer protection and market integrity . the aim should be to facilitate access to public data across the union , while ensuring compliance with data protection and data security standards. this would not only benefit digital finance companies , but would also be to the benefit of a number of other union policy areas and increase market transparency;


### 1. to put forward a legislative proposal for crypto-assets , which provides legal certainty for the treatment of crypto-assets while ensuring consumer and investor protection. such a framework should consider an open taxonomy and aim to legislate according to the principle of the same rules applying according to the same activity and risks; ### 1. to put forward a legislative proposal for crypto-assets , which provides legal certainty for the treatment of crypto-assets while ensuring high standards of consumer and investor protection , market integrity and financial stability. such a framework should consider a comprehensive and an open taxonomy , and aim to legislate according to the principle of the same rules applying according to the same activity and risks , both among crypto-assets as well as vis-à-vis traditional financial services. moreover , such framework should:


### 2. to make a legislative proposal on cyber resilience , which ensures consistent standards of ict security across the union financial sector. such a framework should be future-oriented and focus on modernising the current rules applicable concerning cyber resilience , while also closing any regulatory loopholes and gaps , which may put businesses , investors and consumers at risk; ### 2. to make a legislative proposal on cyber resilience , which ensures consistent standards of ict security across the union financial sector. such a framework should be future-oriented and focus on modernising the current rules applicable concerning cyber resilience , while also closing any regulatory loopholes and gaps , which may put businesses , investors and consumers at risk; crypto-assets trading platforms should be subject to robust governance arrangements , including risk-based requirements and adequate processes and controls against hacking or theft , due diligence requirements , assets segregation , adequate complaints handling and redress procedures to deter market abuses , as well as screening processes against the risk of fraud and manipulation;


### (8) evidence emerged in the context of the covid-19 pandemic has made apparent that the possibility to temporarily exclude certain central bank exposures from the calculation of an institution’s total exposure measure , as laid down in article 429a of regulation (eu) no 575/2013 as amended by regulation (eu) 2019/876 , could prove essential during a crisis situation. however , the effectiveness of this measure appears to be hampered by the reduced flexibility stemming from the offsetting mechanism attached to such temporary exclusions that would constrain the ability of institutions to increase central bank exposures in a crisis situation. this could ultimately result in forcing the institution to reduce the level of lending to households and businesses. in order to avoid any undesired consequences related to the offsetting mechanism and to ensure the effectiveness of that exclusion in the face of possible future shocks and crises , the offsetting mechanism should be modified before the leverage ratio requirement set out in point (d) of article 92(1) of regulation (eu) no 575/2013 becomes applicable in accordance with union law on 28 june 2021. pending the application of the amended provisions on the calculation of the leverage ratio as introduced by regulation (eu) 2019/876 , article 429a should continue to apply as introduced by the commission delegated regulation (eu) 2015/6218 . ### deleted


### (11) to mitigate the potential impact that a sudden increase in expected credit loss provisions may have on institutions’ capacity to lend to clients at times when it is most needed , the transitional arrangements should be extended by two years and institutions should be allowed to fully add-back to their common equity tier 1 capital any increase in new expected credit loss provisions that they recognise in 2020 and 2021 for their financial assets , which are not credit-impaired. this would bring additional relief to the impact of the covid-19 crisis on institutions’ possible rise in provisioning needs under ifrs 9 while maintaining the transitional arrangements for the expected credit loss amounts established before the pandemic of covid-19. ### (11) to mitigate the potential impact that a sudden increase in expected credit loss provisions may have on institutions’ capacity to lend to clients at times when it is most needed , the transitional arrangements should be extended by two years and institutions should be allowed to partially add-back to their common equity tier 1 capital any increase in new expected credit loss provisions that they recognise in 2020 and 2021 for their financial assets , which are not credit-impaired. this would bring additional relief to the impact of the covid-19 crisis on institutions’ possible rise in provisioning needs under ifrs 9 while maintaining the transitional arrangements for the expected credit loss amounts established before the pandemic of covid-19.


### (14) given the specific guarantees attached to loans granted by credit institutions to pensioners or employees with a permanent contract against the unconditional transfer of part of the borrower’s pension or salary to that credit institution , article 123 of regulation (eu) no 575/2013 was amended by regulation (eu) 2019/876 to allow for a more favourable treatment of such loans. the application of this treatment in the context of the covid-19 pandemic would incentivise institutions to increase lending to employees and pensioners. it is therefore necessary to advance the date of application of that provision so that it can be used by institutions already during the covid-19 pandemic. ### deleted


### (15) the provisions on the adjustment of risk-weighted non-defaulted sme exposures set out in article 501 of regulation (eu) no 575/2013 (the sme supporting factor) have been amended by regulation (eu) 2019/876. that regulation also introduced in article 501a of regulation (eu) no 575/2013 a new adjustment to own funds requirements for credit risk for exposures to entities that operate or finance physical structures or facilities , systems and networks that provide or support essential public services (the infrastructure supporting factors). as those supporting factors allow a more favourable treatment of certain exposures to smes and infrastructure , their application in the context of the covid-19 pandemic would incentivise institutions to increase much needed lending to those entities. it is therefore necessary to advance the date of application of the two supporting factors so that they can be used by institutions already during the covid-19 pandemic. ### deleted


### (16) the prudential treatment of certain software assets has been amended by regulation (eu) 2019/876 in order to further support the transition towards a more digitalised banking sector. in the context of the accelerated up-take of digital services as a consequences of public measures adopted to address the covid-19 pandemic , the application of these changes should be anticipated. ### deleted


### (18) for the extraordinary support measures adopted to alleviate the impact of the covid-19 pandemic to be fully effective with regard to keeping the banking sector more resilient and providing an incentive to the institutions to continue lending , it is necessary for the alleviating effect of those measures to be immediately reflected in the way in which regulatory capital requirements are determined. having regard to the urgency of those adjustments to the prudential framework , this regulation should enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the official journal of the european union. ### (18) for the extraordinary support measures adopted to alleviate the impact of the covid-19 pandemic to be fully effective with regard to keeping the banking sector more resilient and providing an incentive to the institutions to continue lending , it is necessary for the alleviating effect of those measures to be immediately reflected in the way in which regulatory capital requirements are determined. the impact of such relief measures should be taken explicitly into account in the context of the supervisory review and evaluation process referred to in article 97 of directive 2013/36/eu. moreover , in order to implement capital conservation measures , competent authorities should be empowered to apply temporary suspensions of variable remunerations , discretionary pension benefits , share buy-backs operations and distributions or interest payments by credit institution to shareholders , members or holders of additional tier 1 instruments where the prohibition does not constitute an event of default of the institution and when the commission determines in an implementing act that the single market experiences a serious economic disturbance. in such circumstances , competent authorities should require credit institutions to present an action plan within three months specifying internal measures to restore the soundness of an institution. the action plan should provide a roadmap and a strategy to restore compliance with supervisory requirements pursuant to directive 2013/36/eu and to regulation (eu) no 575/2013 and define a deadline for its implementation. competent authorities should review and approve such action plans. having regard to the urgency of those adjustments to the prudential framework , this regulation should enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the official journal of the european union.


### (1) article 429a , as amended by regulation (eu) 2019/876 , is amended as follows: ### deleted


### 1 during the period from 1 january 2020 to 31 december 2020; ### 0 ,9 during the period from 1 january 2020 to 31 december 2020;


### 1 during the period from 1 january 2021 to 31 december 2021; ### 0 ,9 during the period from 1 january 2021 to 31 december 2021;


### (3) the following article is inserted: ### deleted


### by way of derogation from paragraph 2 , the eligible providers of unfunded credit protection listed in point (g) of article 201(1) shall have been assigned a credit assessment by a recognised ecai which is credit quality step 3 or above.; ### by way of derogation from paragraph 2 , the eligible providers of unfunded credit protection listed in point (g) of article 201(1) shall have been assigned a credit assessment by a recognised ecai which is credit quality step 2 or above;


### 1. the risk weight for a position in an npe securitisation shall be calculated in accordance with article 254 , subject to a floor of 100%. ### 1. the risk weight for a position in an npe securitisation shall be calculated in accordance with article 254 , subject to a floor of 150 %.


### 2. by way of derogation from paragraph 1 , institutions shall assign a risk weight of 100% to the senior securitisation position in a traditional npe securitisation , provided the exposures in the pool backing the securitisation have been transferred to the sspe with a non-refundable price discount of at least 50% on the nominal amount of the exposures. ### 2. by way of derogation from paragraph 1 , institutions shall assign a risk weight of 150% to the senior securitisation position in a traditional npe securitisation , provided the exposures in the pool backing the securitisation have been transferred to the sspe with a non-refundable price discount of at least 50% on the nominal amount of the exposures.


### (3) article 270 is replaced by the following: ### deleted


### (4) product governance requirements can restrict the sale of corporate bonds. corporate bonds with a “make whole clause” are generally considered safe and simple products that are eligible for retail clients. such a “make whole clause” protects investors against losses in case an issuer opts for early repayment by ensuring that those investors are provided with a payment equal to the net present value of the coupons they would have received if the bond would not have been called. the product governance requirements should therefore no longer apply to corporate bonds with such “make-whole clauses”. ### (4) product governance requirements can restrict the sale of corporate bonds. corporate bonds with a “make whole clause” are generally considered safe and simple products that are eligible for retail clients. such a “make whole clause” protects investors against losses in case an issuer opts for early repayment by ensuring that those investors are provided with a payment equal to the net present value of the coupons they would have received if the bond would not have been called. some product governance requirements should therefore no longer apply to corporate bonds with such “make-whole clauses”.


### (5) the call for evidence , launched by the european securities and markets authority (esma) , on the impact of inducements and cost and charges disclosure requirements under directive 2014/65/eu and the public consultation of the commission both confirmed that professional clients and eligible counterparties do not need standardised and mandatory cost information as they already receive the necessary information when they negotiate with their service provider. that information is tailored to their needs and often more detailed. eligible counterparties and professional clients should therefore be exempted from those cost and charges disclosure requirements , except with regard to the services of investment advice and portfolio management because professional clients entering into portfolio management or investment advice relationships are do not necessarily have sufficient expertise or knowledge to be exempted from the costs and charges disclosures. ### (5) the call for evidence , launched by the european securities and markets authority (esma) , on the impact of inducements and cost and charges disclosure requirements under directive 2014/65/eu and the public consultation of the commission both confirmed that professional clients and eligible counterparties do not need standardised and mandatory cost information as they already receive the necessary information when they negotiate with their service provider. that information is tailored to their needs and often more detailed. eligible counterparties and professional clients should therefore be exempted from those cost and charges disclosure requirements , except with regard to the services of investment advice and portfolio management because professional clients entering into portfolio management or investment advice relationships do not necessarily have sufficient expertise or knowledge to be exempted from the costs and charges disclosures.


### (7) clients with an ongoing relationship with an investment firm receive mandatory service reports , either periodically or based on triggers. neither investment firms nor their professional clients find such service reports useful. those reports have proved in particular unhelpful for professional clients in extreme volatile markets , as those reports are provided in a high frequency and number. professional clients often react to those service reports either by not reading those reports , or by making fast investment decisions rather than continuing with a long-term investment strategy. eligible counterparties should therefore no longer receive such service reports , professional clients , however , should have the possibility to opt-in to those service reports. ### (7) clients with an ongoing relationship with an investment firm receive mandatory service reports , either periodically or based on triggers. neither investment firms nor their professional clients find such service reports useful. those reports may be unhelpful for professional clients in extreme volatile markets , as those reports are provided in a high frequency and number. eligible counterparties should therefore have the possibility to no longer receive such service reports , professional clients , however , should have the possibility to opt-in to those service reports.


### (9) in order to facilitate the communication between investment firms and their clients and thus the investment process itself , investment information should no longer be provided on paper but should , as a default option , be provided electronically. retail clients should however be able to request the continued provision of information on paper. ### (9) in order to facilitate the communication between investment firms and their clients and thus the investment process itself , investment information should no longer be provided on paper but should , as a default option , be provided electronically. retail clients should however be able to have the possibility of continuing to receive the information on paper unless they opt-in online for receiving the information in an electronic format.


### (10) directive 2014/65/eu allows persons that trade in commodity derivatives , emission allowances and derivatives on emission allowances on a professional basis to make use of an exemption from authorisation as an investment firm when their trading activity is ancillary to their main business. those persons applying for the ancillary activity test are required to notify the relevant competent authority annually that they make use of that possibility and provide the necessary elements to satisfy the two quantitative tests that determine whether its trading activity is ancillary to its main business. the first test compares the size of an entity's speculative trading activity to the total trading activity in the union on an asset class basis. the second test compares the size of the speculative trading activity , with all asset classes included , to the total trading activity in financial instruments by the entity at group level. there is an alternative form of the second test , which consists of comparing the estimated capital used for the speculative trading activity to the actual amount of capital used at group level for the main business. those quantitative tests are particularly complex and have not altered the status quo in terms of persons that are eligible for the exemption. therefore , the exemption should rely solely on qualitative elements. persons that are eligible for the exemption , including market makers , are dealing on own account or providing investment services other than dealing on own account , to customers or suppliers of their main business. the exemption is available for both cases individually and on an aggregate basis where this is an ancillary activity , when considered on a group basis. that exemption should not be available for persons who apply a high-frequency algorithmic trading technique or are part of a group the main business of which is the provision of investment services , or banking activities , or acting as a market maker in relation to commodity derivatives. all provisions regarding the quantitative elements should be deleted. ### deleted


### (11) competent authorities currently have to establish and apply position limits on the size of a net position which a person can hold at all times in commodity derivatives traded on trading venues and in economically equivalent over-the-counter (eeotc) contracts designated by the commission. as the position limit regime has proved to be unfavourable for the development of new commodity markets , nascent commodity markets should be excluded from the position limit regime. instead , the position limits should only apply to those commodity derivatives that are deemed significant or critical commodity derivatives and their eeotc contracts. significant or critical derivatives are energy commodity derivatives with an open interest of at least 300 000 lots over a one-year period. due to its critical importance for citizens , agricultural commodities that have an underlying that is for human consumption , and their eeotc contracts , will remain under the current position limit regime. esma should be mandated to develop draft regulatory standards to define agricultural commodities with an underlying for human consumption subject to position limits and critical or significant derivatives subject to position limits. for significant and critical derivatives , esma should take into account the 300 000 lots open interest over a one-year period , the number of market participants and the underlying commodity. ### deleted


### (12) directive 2014/65/eu does not allow hedging exemptions for any financial entities. several predominantly commercial groups who set up a financial entity for their trading purposes found themselves in a situation where their financial entity could not carry out all the trading for the group , as the financial entity was not eligible for the hedging exemption. therefore , a narrowly defined hedging exemption for financial counterparties should be introduced. that hedging exemption should be available where , within a predominantly commercial group , a person has been registered as an investment firm and trades on behalf of that commercial group. to limit this hedging exemption to only those financial entities that trade for the non-financial entities in the predominantly commercial group , that hedging exemption should apply to those positions held by that financial entity that are objectively measurable as reducing risks directly related to the commercial activities of the non-financial entities of the group. ### deleted


### (13) even in liquid contracts , only a limited number of market participants typically act as market makers in commodity markets. when those market participants have to apply position limits they are not in a positon to be as effective as market markers. therefore , an exemption from the position limit regime should be introduced for financial and non-financial counterparties for positions resulting from transactions undertaken to fulfil mandatory liquidity provisions. ### deleted


### (14) the current position limit regime does not recognise the unique characteristics of securitised derivatives. securitised derivatives should therefore be excluded from the position limit regime. ### deleted


### (15) since the entry into force of directive 2014/65/eu , no same commodity derivative contracts have been identified. due to the concept of “same contract” in that directive , the methodology for determining the other months’ limit is detrimental to the venue with the less liquid market when trading venues are competing on commodity derivatives based on the same underlying and sharing the same characteristics. therefore , the reference to “same contract” in directive 2014/65/eu should be deleted. competent authorities should be able to agree that the commodity derivatives traded on their respective trading venues are based on the same underlying and share the same characteristics , in which case the baseline for the other months’ limit on the most liquid market for that commodity derivative can be used as the baseline limit for setting the other months’ position limit for the competing contracts traded on the less liquid venues. ### deleted


### (16) significant dissimilarities exist in the way positions are managed by trading venues in the union. therefore , position management controls should be reinforced where necessary. ### deleted


### (17) in order to ensure the further development of euro denominated eu commodity markets , the power to adopt acts in accordance with article 290 of the treaty on the functioning of the european union should be delegated to the commission in respect of which agricultural commodity derivatives should be subject to position limits and which critical or significant derivatives should be subject to position limits , in respect of a procedure for which persons may apply for a hedging exemption for positions resulting from transactions undertaken to fulfil mandatory liquidity provisions , in respect of a procedure for which financial entities that are part of a predominantly commercial group may apply for a hedging exemption for positions held by that financial entity that are objectively measurable as reducing risks directly related to the commercial activities of the non-financial entities of the group , in respect of the clarification of the content of position management controls. it is of particular importance that the commission carries out appropriate consultations during its preparatory work , including at expert level , and that those consultations are conducted in accordance with the principles laid down in the interinstitutional agreement of 13 april 2016 on better law-making10 . in particular , to ensure equal participation in the preparation of delegated acts , the european parliament and the council receive all documents at the same time as member states' experts , and their experts systematically have access to meetings of commission expert groups dealing with the preparation of delegated acts. ### deleted


### in paragraph 1 , point (j) is replaced by the following: ### deleted


### paragraph 4 is deleted; ### deleted


### in paragraph 2 , the following subparagraph is added: ### deleted


### where the agreement to buy or sell a financial instrument is concluded using means of distance communication , the investment firm may provide the information on costs and charges in an electronic format without undue delay after the conclusion of the transaction , provided that all of the following conditions are met: ### “where the agreement to buy or sell a financial instrument is concluded using means of telephonic or other voice communication , the investment firm may provide the information on costs and charges without undue delay after the conclusion of the transaction , provided that all of the following conditions are met:


### 5a. investment firms shall provide all information required by this directive to clients or potential clients in electronic format , except where the client or potential client is a retail client or potential retail client who has requested receiving the information on paper , in which case that information shall be provided on paper and free of charge. ### 5a. investment firms shall provide all information required by this directive to clients or potential clients in electronic format , except where the client or potential client is a retail client or potential retail client in which case that information shall be provided by default on paper and free of charge.


### investment firms shall inform retails clients or potential retail clients that they have the option to receive the information on paper. ### investment firms shall inform retails clients or potential retail clients that they have the option to receive the information only in electronic format , if they request so online.


### investment firms shall inform existing retail clients that used to receive the information required by this directive on paper about the fact that they will receive that information in electronic form at least eight weeks before sending that information in electronic form. investment firms shall inform the existing retail clients that they have the choice to either continue receiving information on paper or to switch to information in electronic format. investment firms shall also inform existing retail clients that an automatic switch to the electronic format will follow where they do not request the continuation of the provision of the information on paper within that eight weeks period.; ### deleted


### [...] ### deleted


### (10) in article 58 , paragraph 2 is replaced by the following: ### deleted


### (24) ‘non-performing exposure (npe) securitisation’ means a securitisation backed by a pool of non-performing exposures that meet the conditions set out in article 47a(3) of regulation 575/2013 and the value of which makes up at least 90% of the pool’s value at the time of origination; ### (24) ‘non-performing exposure (npe) securitisation’ means a securitisation backed by a pool of non-performing exposures that meet the conditions set out in article 47a(3) of regulation (eu) no 575/2013 and the value of which makes up at least 90% of the pool’s value at the time when the securitisation is issued;


### in case of npe securitisations , the requirement of this paragraph may also be fulfilled by the servicer.; ### deleted


### 3a. by way of derogation from points (b) to (e) of paragraph 3 , in the case of npe securitisations , the retention of a material net economic interest for the purposes of those points shall not be less than 5% of the net value of the securitised exposures that qualify as non-performing exposures as referred to in article 47a(3) of regulation 575/2013. ### 3a. by way of derogation from points (b) to (e) of paragraph 3 , in the case of npe securitisations , the retention of a material net economic interest for the purposes of those points shall not be less than 25% of the net value of the securitised exposures that qualify as non-performing exposures as referred to in article 47a(3) of regulation 575/2013.


### 1. the originator shall make available data on static and dynamic historical default and loss performance such as delinquency and default data , for substantially similar exposures to those securitised , and the sources of those data and the basis for claiming similarity , to potential investors before pricing. those data shall cover a period of at least five years. ### 1. the originator shall make available data on static and dynamic historical default and loss performance such as delinquency and default data , for substantially similar exposures to those securitised , and the sources of those data and the basis for claiming similarity , to potential investors before pricing. those data shall cover a period of at least fifteen years.


### 4. in case of a securitisation where the underlying exposures are residential loans or auto loans or leases , the originator shall publish the available information related to the environmental performance of the assets financed by such residential loans , auto loans or leases , as part of the information disclosed pursuant to point (a) of the first subparagraph of article 7(1). ### 4. as part of the information disclosed pursuant to point (a) of the first subparagraph of article 7(1) , the originator shall publish the available information related to the adverse impacts on sustainability factors of the assets financed by the underlying exposures in a principal adverse impacts statement.


### (2) regulation (eu) 2017/1129 of the european parliament and of the council14 lays down requirements for the drawing up , approval and distribution of the prospectus to be published when securities are offered to the public or admitted to trading on a regulated market in the union. as part of the measures to help issuers to recover from the economic shock resulting from the covid-19 pandemic , targeted amendments to the prospectus regime are necessary. such amendments should enable issuers and financial intermediaries to reduce costs and free up resources for the recovery phase in the immediate aftermath of the crisis. ### (2) regulation (eu) 2017/1129 of the european parliament and of the council14 lays down requirements for the drawing up , approval and distribution of the prospectus to be published when securities are offered to the public or admitted to trading on a regulated market in the union. as part of the measures to help issuers to recover from the economic shock resulting from the covid-19 pandemic , targeted amendments to the prospectus regime are necessary. such amendments should enable issuers and financial intermediaries to reduce costs and free up resources for the recovery phase in the immediate aftermath of the crisis. the amendments should remain in line with the overarching objectives of regulation (eu) 2017/1129 to ensure consumer and investor protection and the proper functioning of the internal market.


### (4) in order to swiftly address the severe economic impact of the covid-19 pandemic , it is important to introduce measures to facilitate investments in the real economy , allow for a rapid recapitalisation of companies in the union and enable issuers to tap into public markets at an early stage in the recovery process. in order to achieve those objectives , it is appropriate to create a new short-form prospectus (‘eu recovery prospectus’) that is easy to produce for issuers , easy to understand for investors who want to finance them and easy to scrutinise and approve for competent authorities. ### (4) in order to swiftly address the severe economic impact of the covid-19 pandemic , it is important to introduce measures to facilitate sustainable investments in the real economy , allow for a rapid recapitalisation of companies in the union and enable issuers to tap into public markets at an early stage in the recovery process. in order to achieve those objectives , it is appropriate to create a new short-form prospectus (‘eu recovery prospectus’) that is easy to produce for issuers , easy to understand for investors who want to finance them and easy to scrutinise and approve for competent authorities.


### 1. without prejudice to articles 14(2) , 14a(2) and 18(1) , a prospectus shall contain the necessary information which is material to an investor for making an informed assessment of:; ### 1. without prejudice to articles 14(2) , 14a(2) and 18(1) , a prospectus shall contain the necessary financial and non-financial information which is material to an investor for making an informed assessment of;


### an introduction , containing warning as laid down in paragraph 5 of this article; ### an introduction , containing warnings and the date of approval of the prospectus as laid down in paragraph 5 of this article;


### (ii) key information on the issuer; ### (ii) key information on the issuer as laid down in paragraph 6 of this article;


### (iii) key information on the securities; ### (iii) key information on the shares , including their type , class , the rights attached to them and any limitations thereon , as well as the long-term past performance of the market price of the shares and dividend yields , if any;


### the prospects of the issuer and the significant changes in the financial position of the issuer that have occurred since the end of the last financial year , if any; ### the prospects and performance of the issuer and the significant changes in the financial position of the issuer that have occurred since the end of the last financial year , if any , as well as its long term business strategy and objectives , both financial and non-financial , in the context of the recovery and ecological transition;


### the essential information on the shares , the reasons for the issuance and its impact on the overall capital structure of the issuer , and the use of proceeds. ### the essential information on the shares , the rights attached to them , including any limitations of those rights , and procedure for the exercise of those rights , the reasons for the issuance and its impact on the overall capital structure of the issuer , the disclosure of capitalisation and indebtedness , a working capital statement and the use of proceeds;


### 6a. by way of derogation from paragraphs 2 and 4 , the time limits set out in the first subparagraph of paragraph 2 and in paragraph 4 shall be reduced to five working days for an eu recovery prospectus drawn up in accordance with article 14a. the issuer shall inform the competent authority at least five working days before the date envisaged for the submission of an application for approval.; ### 6a. by way of derogation from paragraphs 2 and 4 , the time limits set out in the first subparagraph of paragraph 2 and in paragraph 4 shall be reduced to five working days for an eu recovery prospectus drawn up in accordance with article 14a. the issuer shall inform the competent authority at least five working days before the date envisaged for the submission of an application for approval. the time limit set out in the first subparagraph can be extended by five additional working days where the competent authority notifies to the issuer and esma that more time is required;


### 5a. an eu recovery prospectus drawn up in accordance with article 14a shall be classified in the storage mechanism referred to in paragraph 6 of this article. the data used for the classification of prospectuses drawn up in accordance with article 14 may be used for the classification of eu recovery prospectuses drawn up in accordance with article 14a , provided that the two types of prospectuses are differentiated in that storage mechanism.; ### 5a. an eu recovery prospectus drawn up in accordance with article 14a shall be published in searchable electronic format in accordance with this article , where applicable , and classified in the storage mechanism referred to in paragraph 6 of this article. the data used for the classification of prospectuses drawn up in accordance with article 14 may be used for the classification of eu recovery prospectuses drawn up in accordance with article 14a , provided that the two types of prospectuses are differentiated in that storage mechanism.;


### the cost of preparing and having an eu recovery prospectus approved compared to the current costs for a prospectus , together with an indication of the overall financial savings achieved; ### the break down of costs of preparing and having an eu recovery prospectus approved compared to the costs for a regular prospectus , together with an indication of which costs may be reduced;


### an analysis of whether the eu recovery prospectuses strikes a proper balance between investor protection and the reduction of administrative burden for the persons entitled to use it.; ### an analysis of the impact of eu recovery prospectuses on investor protection and on the accessibility of essential information for investments;


### the purpose is to describe the most material risks that are specific to the issuer and the shares. ### the purpose is to describe the most material risks that are specific to the issuer and the shares. the description shall include risks that may have an adverse impact on factors , including environmental , social and governance factors , if any.


### financial statements (annual and half-yearly) are required to be published covering the period of 12 months prior to the approval of the eu recovery prospectus. where both annual and half-yearly financial statements have been published , only the annual statements shall be required where they postdate the half-yearly financial statements. ### the eu recovery prospectus shall include the financial statements (annual and half-yearly) covering the period of 12 months prior to the approval of the eu recovery prospectus. where both annual and half-yearly financial statements have been published , only the annual statements shall be required where they postdate the half-yearly financial statements.


### vii. where and when to subscribe the shares ### vii. essential information on the shares


### the purpose is to provide the international security identification number (‘isin’) and other essential information about the shares offered to the public and to provide information about where the shares can be subscribed as well as on the time period , including any possible amendments , during which the offer will be open and a description of the application process together with the issue date of new shares. ### the purpose is to provide essential information about the shares offered to the public:


### the purpose is to provide information as to whether the working capital is sufficient for the issuer’s present requirements or , if not , how the issuer proposes to provide the additional working capital needed. ### the purpose is to provide information on the issuer’s capitalisation and indebtedness (distinguishing between guaranteed and unguaranteed , secured and unsecured indebtedness) and information as to whether or not the working capital is sufficient for the issuer’s present requirements if there is insufficient capital , a clear description of how the issuer proposes to provide the additional working capital needed is required.


### the purpose is to provide information about any conflicts of interest related to the issuance. ### the purpose is to provide information about interest , including any conflicts of interest related to the issuance , detailing the natural and legal persons involved and the nature of the interest.


### xi. shareholding after the issuance ### xi. dilution and shareholding after the issuance


### the purpose is to provide information about the participation in share capital and voting rights after the capital increase resulting from the offer to the public.. ### the purpose is to provide information about the dilution in share capital and voting rights that existing shareholders of the issuer will experience after the capital increase as a result of the public offer.”.


### a. whereas all actions taken to create a capital markets union (cmu) should have improving the range of financing options offered to companies and citizens , as well as a greater range of more attractive investment offers , as their objective; ### a. whereas all actions taken to create a capital markets union (cmu) should aim to improve access to financing for those real economy businesses that have difficulties obtaining it , especially sustainable ones , or to offer better , i.e. simple and transparent , investment options to citizens in accordance with their risk tolerance;


### b. whereas the actions taken so far to achieve the cmu are moving in the right direction; whereas much work nevertheless remains to be done in terms of the precision , effectiveness and simplification of the measures adopted; ### b. whereas the actions taken so far to achieve the cmu have failed to channel more capital towards sustainable businesses and to provide investors with better investment opportunities in accordance with their risk tolerance; whereas much work remains to be done in terms of the precision and effectiveness of the measures adopted;


### 1. calls for the removal of barriers , including the simplification of legislation , to diversify funding sources for smes , in order to promote smes’ ability to access equity markets , and to reduce the existing debt bias; points out that the current situation makes smes more fragile and vulnerable; ### 1. emphasises that , due to their size , the overwhelming majority of smes will continue to rely on bank lending as their sole source of finance; supports , however , measures to diversify funding sources for start-ups and those smes that can access equity financing due to their relatively large size or high growth prospects;


### 2. takes the view that the efficiency of financial markets should be improved and that the listing of companies should be facilitated; encourages the creation and prioritisation of a large private pan-european fund , an initial public offering (ipo) fund , to support smes; ### 2. 2. calls on the commission to conduct a study and impact assessment of new ways of providing equity financing to those smes that are capable to benefit from it by virtue of their size or growth prospects; such a study should examine options like , among others , the creation of a public-private pan-european initial public offering (ipo) fund or the expansion of mezzanine financing;


### 3. calls for the acceleration of the development of eu venture capital (vc) and private equity markets by increasing the availability of funding for vc investments , developing larger late-stage vc funds , tax incentive schemes for vc and business angel investments , and active ipo markets for vc-backed companies; ### 3. calls for the acceleration of the development of eu venture capital (vc) and private equity markets by increasing the availability of funding for vc investments , developing larger late-stage vc funds , public programmes for vc and business angel investments , and active ipo markets for vc-backed companies;


### 4. requests the realignment of the treatment of cash and synthetic securitisations , of the treatment of regulatory capital and liquidity with that of covered bonds and loans , as well as with the disclosure and due diligence requirements for covered bonds and simple , transparent and standardised (sts) securitisation; ### 4. notes with concern the proposals put forward by the hlf on cmu for stimulating securitisation aim to circumvent the treatment of regulatory capital and liquidity , including the new basel iii framework , since it would endanger financial stability and amplify systemic risks , without any added value for the real economy; underlines that synthetic securitisations are highly complex , opaque and risky and that it would be misleading to include them under the definition of simple , transparent and standardised (sts)securitisation; further stresses that granting to synthetic securitisations a preferential treatment would not be justified from a prudential perspective;


### 5. calls for targeted measures within securities market legislation to expedite the recovery after the covid-19 crisis; supports changes in the prospectus regulation , the markets in financial instruments directive (mifid) , the securitisation regulation and the market abuse regulation to facilitate investments in the real economy , in particular in smes , and to allow newcomers and new products to enter the markets , preserving consumer protection and market integrity; ### 5. emphasises that a prime objective of securities market legislation is to safeguard transparency and market integrity to ensure a high degree of investor confidence and protection; stresses that the review of the markets in financial instruments directive (mifid) should not be used to promote financial deregulation;


### 6. asks the member states to amend their national tax frameworks , in order to reduce tax obstacles to cross-border investments , including withholding tax procedures , and to increase financing by investors to long-term investment opportunities thereby improving returns on long-term savings for eu citizens; ### 6. stresses that different national tax frameworks and harmful tax competition within the eu undermine the sustainability of the cmu and the level playing field and that they are one of the key obstacles to cross border investments; believes that an eu-wide withholding tax would be desirable; emphasises that the integration of eu capital markets increases the urgency of adopting a common consolidated corporate tax base (ccctb) and ensuring the level playing field for eu companies;


### 7. highlights the importance of increasing legal certainty for cross-border investments by making national insolvency proceedings more efficient and effective; ### 7. highlights the importance of increasing legal certainty for cross-border investments by harmonising national insolvency proceedings;


### 9. underlines the need to promote pension provision; welcomes the pan-european personal pension (pepp) product; reminds member states that pepps need to be subject to the same tax treatment as national pension products to become an option for savers; ### 9. welcomes the pan-european personal pension (pepp) product; reminds member states that pepps should be subject to the same tax treatment as national pension products where existing national tax relief policies have proven to be efficient and restricted to low income groups or groups with insufficient access to other collective retirement systems;


### 10. encourages the member states to promote multi-pillar pension systems , including occupational pension schemes , as a way to improve market dynamics and the incentives to invest; believes that private pensions should be revitalised and made more attractive; encourages the participation of investors in long-term products with tax reduction or exemption policies; ### 10. stresses the need to ensure that all european citizens can enjoy safe and adequate pensions , and that public and collective social security systems - play and shall continue to play a primary role in this , especially for low and middle-income segments of the population;; believes that the development of private pension products should ensure high consumer protection standards and transparency; encourages the participation of investors in long-term products;


### 11. recalls that the solvency 2 directive requires a review by the end of 2020 and that the european insurance and occupational pensions authority (eiopa) will provide technical advice to the commission after consultations with different stakeholders; requests the commission and eiopa to consider adjusting the capital requirements for investments in equity and private debt , in particular of smes; ### 11. recalls that the solvency 2 directive requires a review by the end of 2020 and that the european insurance and occupational pensions authority (eiopa) will provide technical advice to the commission after consultations with different stakeholders; stresses that this opportunity should be used to strengthen the financial stability of the insurance sector and the protection of policyholders;


### 12. stresses the need for european and national supervisory authorities to overcome their differences; calls for supervisory convergence to promote a common european model , guided by the european securities and market authority (esma) , to reduce the existing obstacles to cross-border financial operations; ### 12. stresses the need for european and national supervisory authorities to overcome their differences; calls for regulatory and supervisory convergence to promote a more effective a joint supervision model under the guidance of the european securities and market authority (esma) , to ensure adequate oversight of cross-border financial operations; believes that esma should be granted more far-reaching powers and resources , especially additional direct supervision powers of large financial market participants and further product intervention power in the area of cross-border financial activity; believes that esma's board of supervisors should include independent members to limit the risk of conflict of interest of national supervisory authorities and increase the effectiveness of supervision at the eu level;


### 13. observes that financial services regulation is a very complex undertaking , with regulation at international , european and national level; encourages all relevant actors to address this complexity to ensure the proportionality of financial regulation and to remove unnecessary administrative burdens; ### 13. observes that financial services regulation is a very complex undertaking , with regulation at international , european and national level; encourages all relevant actors to address this complexity to ensure the proportionality of financial regulation;


### 14. is concerned that retail investors’ engagement with financial markets remains low; calls for measures to promote retail investments in view of the demographic challenges faced by the eu by increasing the participation of retail investors in capital markets through more attractive and appropriate personal pension products; ### 14. believes that retail investors can play a major role in the shift towards long-term stable and sustainable capital markets inconsideration of their long-term investment horizon and sustainability preferences; is concerned that retail investors’ engagement with sustainable financial markets remains low due to lack of information and lack of financial advice on suitable sustainable investment products; calls for measures to stimulate the supply of simple and transparent sustainable investment and personal pension products , and for measures to ensure that financial advice is reliable and unbiased;


### 15. emphasises that access to financial markets should be possible for all enterprises under the ‘same business , same rules’ principle; ### 15. emphasises that the legislation on financial markets , including in the field of digital finance , should be based on the ‘same business , same rules’ principle , in order to minimise the potential for regulatory arbitrage and ensure a level playing field across financial services;


### 16. recalls the existence of different shortcomings in the legislation on packaged retail investment and insurance products (priips) that should be addressed in the next review; expects that level 2 priips legislation on the key investor document to respect level 1 , in particular in relation to the performance scenarios; regrets the delays in the adoption of level 2 priips legislation that will overlap with the first review of priips , and which increases legal uncertainty and costs for stakeholders; ### 16. recalls the existence of different shortcomings and inconsistencies in the legislation on packaged retail investment and insurance products (priips) that should be addressed in the next review in order to improve transparency , comparability and eliminate misleading information; expects that level 2 priips legislation on the key investor document to respect level 1 legislation , in particular in relation to the performance scenarios and the priips with specific environmental or social objectives; regrets the delays in the adoption of level 2 priips legislation that will overlap with the first review of priips , and which increases legal uncertainty and costs for stakeholders;


### 18. is of the opinion that the current reporting framework within mifid ii and the european market infrastructure regulation (emir) is very costly and complex , hindering the effectiveness of the system; believes that a simplification thereof is necessary; ### 18. is of the opinion that certain disclosure regimes within mifid ii and priips may be too complex and misleading and lack comparability , hindering the effectiveness of the disclosure and increasing the risk of mis-selling; believes that a simplification and further standardisation thereof is necessary in order to improve transparency and comparability of investment products; stresses , however , that this should not compromise the scope and quality of information;


### 19. calls for amendments to legislation to ensure access to independent advice by financial intermediaries while avoiding promotion of the institution’s own financial products and ensuring a fair marketing of financial products; ### 19. calls for amendments to legislation to ensure access to reliable independent advice for all investment products by retail clients while avoiding promotion of the institution’s own financial products and ensuring a fair marketing of suitable and affordable financial products from third party product providers in the clients’ best interests; believes that comparable investment products , such as insurance products , should be subject to the same inducement rules as under mifid ii; points out that there is little evidence that the current mifid ii disclosure regime on inducements has had a positive impact on client’s behaviour2a; calls for a eu-wide ban on inducements to avoid potential conflict of interests;


### 20. underlines that financial education is needed to overcome low retail investor engagement with financial markets , based on lack of knowledge , mistrust and risk aversion; ### 20. underlines that financial education can help empower individuals to make more conscious financial choices in line with their preferences , especially in light of the increasingly easy access to risky investment products provided by digitalisation; , considers that financial education should increase awareness of opportunities as well as risks and increase the ability to choose between and compare affordable and individually suitable long-term investment products , while also taking sustainability aspects into account; underlines that it should address the social and gender dimension and that there is no one-size-fits-all approach to handlings one's financial affairs because people of different incomes and wealth levels have different tolerance for risk;


### 21. emphasises that financial education is a medium-term tool , which enriches the financial system and which is a good step for engaging retail investors with financial markets; ### 21. emphasises , however , that financial education is a medium-term tool whose effects are limited due to inevitable cognitive biases , the speed of change in financial markets and their sheer complexity; stresses that financial education cannot replace access to reliable and impartial professional financial advice , and that it can therefore only play a supplementary role to strong financial regulation and supervision , enforceable codes of conduct for financial intermediaries , and rules that require the provision of relevant and understandable information about investment products;


### 22. urges the member states to include financial literacy programs in school curricula aimed at developing autonomy in financial matters; suggests the inclusion of this topic in the programme for international student assessment (pisa) study; ### 22. urges the member states to include financial literacy programs in school curricula aimed at developing autonomy in financial matters;


### 23. takes the view that the digitalisation of financial services can be a catalyst for the mobilisation of capital in the eu while reducing barriers and increasing supervisory efficiency; emphasises that an eu framework with high standards of cybersecurity would be conducive to the cmu; ### 23. takes the view that the digitalisation of financial services can be a catalyst for the mobilisation of capital in the eu while reducing barriers and costs and increasing competition and supervisory efficiency; emphasises that an eu framework with high standards of cybersecurity , market integrity and investor protection is essential for the further development of a sustainable and well-functioning cmu;


### 24. highlights that ‘sandboxes’ may be an adequate tool to enhance the innovation and competitiveness of the financial services sector; requests that the commission create a pan-european ‘sandbox’ for financial services; ### 24. highlights that the wirecard’s scandal is a warning that ‘sandboxes’ used as a tool to enhance the innovation and competitiveness of the financial services sector may pose significant risks to consumer and investor protection and enable financial fraud; requests that a pan-european ‘sandbox’ for start-ups in the area of fintech should seek to strike a balance between the objective of fostering innovation and financial stability and the protection of investors and consumers , while taking into account the size , systemic significance and cross-border activity of the firms;


### 25. points out that europe competes for capital in a global market , and that , as a result , deeper , more integrated and efficient european capital markets are critical to protecting europe’s economic sovereignty , the use of the euro in third countries , and to attracting foreign investors; ### 25. points out that integrated , well-regulated , stable and efficient european capital markets are critical to protecting europe’s economic sovereignty in a number of areas , including the use of the euro in third countries;


### 26. reiterates that eu legislation provides for the possibility of considering third-country rules as equivalent based on a proportional and risk-based analysis , and that such decisions should be taken through a delegated act; recalls that the eu can unilaterally withdraw any equivalence decision; ### 26. reiterates that eu legislation provides for the possibility of considering third-country rules as equivalent based on a proportional and risk-based analysis , and that such decisions should be taken through a delegated act; stresses that , in order to preserve financial stability , the level playing field and the protection of investors and consumers in the eu in the post-brexit context , the equivalence decisions with the eu regulatory framework should be comprehensive and coherent and be accompanied by enhanced supervisory powers over third countries financial entities; recalls that the eu can unilaterally withdraw any equivalence decision and that any divergence from the eu regulatory standards should be closely monitored;


### 27. calls for action towards strengthening the international role and the use of the euro , by completing economic and monetary union , the cmu and the banking union , supporting the development of euro-benchmarks for commodity markets , and reinforcing the role of the euro as a reference currency; ### 27. points out that completing and strengthening economic and monetary union , the cmu and the banking union could increase international use of the euro;


### (7) in accordance with regulation (eu) 2016/679 of the european parliament and of the council46 , it is important that the obligation on a payment service provider , to retain and provide information in relation to a cross-border payment transaction , should be proportionate and should only be what is necessary for member states to fight e-commerce vat fraud. furthermore , the only information relating to the payer that should be retained is where the payer is located. with regard to information relating to the payee and the payment transaction itself , payment service providers should only be required to retain and transmit to tax authorities information which is necessary for tax authorities to detect possible fraudsters and to carry out vat controls. therefore , payment service providers should only be required to retain records on cross-border payment transactions which are likely to indicate economic activities. the introduction of a ceiling based on the number of payments received by a payee over the course of a calendar quarter would give a reliable indication that those payments were received as part of an economic activity , thereby excluding payments for non-commercial reasons. where such a ceiling is reached , the accounting obligation of the payment service provider would be triggered. ### (7) in accordance with regulation (eu) 2016/679 of the european parliament and of the council46 , it is important that the obligation on a payment service provider , to retain and provide information in relation to a cross-border payment transaction , should be proportionate and should only be what is necessary for member states to fight e-commerce vat fraud. furthermore , the only information relating to the payer that should be retained is where the payer is located. with regard to information relating to the payee and the payment transaction itself , payment service providers should only be required to retain and transmit to tax authorities information which is necessary for tax authorities to detect possible fraudsters and to carry out vat controls. therefore , payment service providers should only be required to retain records on cross-border payment transactions which are likely to indicate economic activities. the introduction of a ceiling based either on the number of payments received by a payee over the course of a calendar quarter or on a minimum amount per payment would give a reliable indication that those payments were received as part of an economic activity , thereby excluding payments for non-commercial reasons. where such a ceiling is reached , the accounting obligation of the payment service provider would be triggered.


### (8) due to the significant volume of information and its sensitivity in terms of the protection of personal data , it is necessary and proportionate that payment service providers retain records of the information in relation to cross-border payment transactions for a two-year period in order to assist member states fight e-commerce vat fraud and detect fraudsters. this period constitutes the minimum necessary for member states to carry out controls effectively and to investigate suspected vat fraud or to detect vat fraud. ### (8) due to the significant volume of information and its sensitivity in terms of the protection of personal data , it is necessary and proportionate that payment service providers retain records of the information in relation to cross-border payment transactions for a three-year period in order to assist member states fight e-commerce vat fraud and detect fraudsters. this period constitutes the minimum necessary for member states to carry out controls effectively and to investigate suspected vat fraud or to detect vat fraud.


### in respect of the transfer of funds referred to in point (a) , where a payment service provider executes more than 25 payment transactions to the same payee in the course of a calendar quarter. ### in respect of the transfer of funds referred to in point (a) , where a payment service provider executes more than 25 payment transactions to the same payee in the course of a calendar quarter or executes transactions of a monetary value of minimum eur 2500 in one payment transaction.


### be kept by the payment service provider in electronic format for a period of two years from the end of the year during which the payment transaction was executed; ### be kept by the payment service provider in electronic format for a period of three years from the end of the year during which the payment transaction was executed;


### e. whereas the eba board of supervisors has taken a decision imposing restrictions on its executive director in order to address the conflict of interest arising from him accepting his new position at afme; whereas these restrictions address activities while in service at the eba and after leaving the eba; ### e. whereas the eba board of supervisors approved the new employment as ceo of afme; whereas the eba board of supervisors has taken a decision imposing restrictions on its executive director that according to the eba address the conflict of interest arising from him accepting his new position at afme; whereas these restrictions address activities while in service at the eba and after leaving the eba;


### h. whereas post-public employment and ’revolving door’ conflict of interest situations are recurring issues and have been assessed and analysed by international and eu bodies , in particular by the eu ombudsman and the european court of auditors; ### h. whereas post-public employment and ’revolving door’ conflict of interest situations are recurring concerns and have been assessed and analysed by international and eu bodies , in particular by the eu ombudsman and the european court of auditors;


### 2. is concerned about the conflict of interest that has arisen as a consequence of the appointment of the eba executive director as afme chief executive from 1 february 2020; notes that this post-public employment might constitute not only an risk to the reputation and independence of eba but to all union institutions; ### 2. is concerned about the conflict of interest that has arisen as a consequence of the appointment of the eba executive director as afme chief executive from 1 february 2020; notes that this post-public employment with no cooling off period constitutes not only a risk to the reputation and independence of eba but to all union institutions;


### 3. calls for an effective application of the eu staff regulations , in particular of article 16 , in order to prevent conflicts of interest; ### 3. calls for an effective application of the eu staff regulations , in particular of article 16 , in order to prevent conflicts of interest; underlines that article 16 allows for european institutions to turn down a request to take a specific job if restrictions do not suffice to protect the legitimate interests of the institutions; stresses that in the case of mr. farkas , a prohibition of a direct move to afme would have been a proportionate measure in that afme constitutes an ‘opposing party’ in the meaning of commission decision c(2018)4048 final , article 21 3(b);


### 8. calls on the commission to assess the current practice on post-public employment at european and national level; ### 8. calls on the commission to assess the current practice on post-public employment at european and national level and to develop stronger measures for the prevention of conflicts of interest that arise when senior officials of union bodies leave their posts to take up private sector employment or when individuals that come from the private sector are appointed to senior positions in a union body;


### 10. calls on the commission to define in this review of the post-public employment framework specific risk areas which might require strengthening , including expanding the opportunity to block professional moves and to consider possible lengthening of cooling-off periods of senior officials proportionate to the specific case to ensure equal treatment in line with article 15 of the charter of fundamental rights of the european union; ### 10. calls on the commission to define in this review of the post-public employment framework specific risk areas which might require strengthening , including expanding the opportunity to block professional moves and to consider extending possible lengthening of cooling-off periods of senior officials proportionate to the specific case to ensure equal treatment in line with article 15 of the charter of fundamental rights of the european union; stresses that the requirement of ex-ante disclosures of conflicts of interest in article 11 of the staff regulation should be implemented in a way that ensures that a candidate's potential conflicts of interest are revealed well before taking up employment in a union body; further stresses that all union bodies should publish their internal rules for dealing with conflicts of interest on their websites and heed the european ombudsman's 2017 recommendations concerning the publication of the annual information required by article 16(4) of the staff regulation;


### 11. points out that in case a stricter application of cooling-off periods for senior officials was considered , granting adequate compensation for the duration of the cooling-off period to the senior officials leaving the agency would have to be looked at as well; underlines that such temporary allowances should end if a new employment is taken up during the cooling-off period; ### 11. points out that , if longer cooling-off periods for senior officials who leave an agency are introduced , one might also consider granting them an appropriate temporary allowance; underlines that such temporary allowances should end if a new employment is taken up during the cooling-off period;


### 12. calls on the commission to assess , whether it is appropriate that the concerned eu agencies decide for themselves on the enforcement of the rules for the prevention of conflicts of interest , and whether the independent ethics body envisaged by president-elect of the european commission ursula von der leyen could function as body of appeal in that regard; ### 12. calls on the commission to assess , whether it is appropriate that the concerned eu agencies decide for themselves on the enforcement of the rules for the prevention of conflicts of interest; considers the independent ethics body envisaged by commission president ursula von der leyen to be the body that is best-suited to take decisions related to conflict of interest of eu staff members in the future;


### (8) a central electronic information system ‘cesop’ where member states transmit payment information they store at national level , would achieve the objective of fighting e-commerce vat fraud more effectively. this system should aggregate , in relation to individual payees , all vat relevant information regarding payment transactions transmitted by member states and should allow for a full overview of payments received by payees from payers located in the member states. furthermore , this information system should recognise multiple records from the same payment transactions , clean the information received from the member states (e.g. remove duplicates , correct error in data , etc.) and permit eurofisc liaison officials of member states to cross-check payment data with the vat information they dispose of and make enquiries for the purpose of an investigation into suspected vat fraud or to detect vat fraud. ### (8) a central electronic information system ‘cesop’ where member states transmit payment information they store at national level , would achieve the objective of fighting e-commerce vat fraud more effectively. this system should aggregate , in relation to individual payees , all vat relevant information regarding payment transactions transmitted by member states and should allow for a full overview of payments received by payees from payers located in the member states. furthermore , this information system should recognise multiple records from the same payment transactions , clean the information received from the member states (e.g. remove duplicates , correct error in data , etc.) and permit eurofisc liaison officials of member states to cross-check payment data with the vat information they dispose of and make enquiries for the purpose of an investigation into suspected vat fraud or to detect vat fraud. all member states should participate in all eurofisc working groups and appoint liaison officials accordingly.


### (13) it is necessary and proportionate that payment service providers retain records of the information in relation to payment transactions for a two-years period to assist member states fight e-commerce vat fraud and detect fraudsters. this period constitute the minimum necessary for member states to carry out controls effectively and investigate into suspected vat fraud or detect vat fraud , and it is proportionate considering the massive volume of the payment information and its sensitivity in terms of protection of personal data. ### (13) it is necessary and proportionate that payment service providers retain records of the information in relation to payment transactions for a three-year period to assist member states fight e-commerce vat fraud and detect fraudsters. this period constitute the minimum necessary for member states to carry out controls effectively and investigate into suspected vat fraud or detect vat fraud , and it is proportionate considering the massive volume of the payment information and its sensitivity in terms of protection of personal data.


### (14) each member states’ eurofisc liaison officials should be able to access and analyse the information in relation to the payment transactions for the purpose of fighting vat fraud. duly accredited persons of the commission should access the information only for the purpose of developing and maintaining the central electronic information system. both groups of users should be bound by the confidentiality rules laid down in this regulation. ### (14) each member states’ eurofisc liaison officials should be able to access and analyse the information in relation to the payment transactions for the purpose of fighting vat fraud. duly accredited persons of the commission should access the information for the purpose of developing and maintaining the central electronic information system and to ensure the proper implementation of this regulation. both groups of users should be bound by the confidentiality rules laid down in this regulation. in addition , it should be possible for the commission to conduct visits in member states to evaluate how the administrative cooperation arrangements work.


### 2. cesop shall retain the information referred to in points (a) and (b) of paragraph 1 for a maximum period of two years from the expiry of the year when the information was transferred into the system. ### 2. cesop shall retain the information referred to in points (a) and (b) of paragraph 1 for a maximum period of three years from the expiry of the year when the information was transferred into the system.


### the commission shall grant access to information stored in cesop to eurofisc liaison officials , who hold a user identifier for cesop , where the information is required for the purpose of investigations into suspected vat fraud or to detect vat fraud. ### the commission shall grant access to information stored in cesop to eurofisc liaison officials , who hold a user identifier for cesop , where the information is required for the purpose of investigations into suspected vat fraud or to detect vat fraud.


### the annual report shall at a minimum indicate in detail in relation to each member state the number of controls carried out and the additional vat assessed and collected as a result of the information processed pursuant to article 24d. ### the annual report shall at least indicate in detail in relation to each member state:


### 1. welcomes the role of the ecb in safeguarding euro stability and stresses that the ecb’s independence is a requisite for fulfilling its mandate; ### 1. welcomes the role of the ecb in safeguarding euro stability; notes ecb’s independence in fulfilling its mandate; stresses , however , that the measures taken by the ecb since 2008 raise serious questions whether its accountability framework is well adapted to these type of policies;


### 2. is concerned that after a short economic recovery , euro area growth momentum has slowed markedly to 1.2 % of gdp in the euro area and to 1.4 % of gdp for the eu-27; underlines , therefore , the need for monetary policy to remain accommodative for the foreseeable future; ### 2. is concerned that after a short economic recovery , euro area growth momentum has slowed markedly to 1.2 % of gdp in the euro area and to 1.4 % of gdp for the eu-27; underlines , therefore , that while monetary policy may need to remain accommodative for the foreseeable future , it is high time for fiscal policy to play its part where there is fiscal space;


### 3. stresses that fiscal policy is a necessary component for enhancing the impact of monetary policy and reducing possible side effects; ### deleted


### - the completion of the banking union , including a fully mutualised european deposit insurance scheme that would reduce risks , promote fair competition , facilitate the expansion of pan-european banking and reinforce the stability of the euro area as a whole; ### - the completion of the banking union , including a european deposit co-insurance scheme with full liquidity and loss coverage but depletion of national funds first that would preserve well-functioning national deposit insurance systems and reduce risks , promote fair competition , facilitate the expansion of pan-european banking and reinforce the stability of the euro area as a whole;


### - the completion of the banking union , including a fully mutualised european deposit insurance scheme that would reduce risks , promote fair competition , facilitate the expansion of pan-european banking and reinforce the stability of the euro area as a whole; ### - the completion of the banking union , including a european deposit insurance scheme that would reduce risks , promote fair competition , facilitate the expansion of pan-european banking and reinforce the stability of the euro area as a whole;


### other aspects ### fight against climate change


### 12. takes good note of christine lagarde’s declaration of 4 september , in which she welcomed the ecb’s collaboration in the network for greening the financial system (ngfs) and commitment to contribute to facing the challenges which climate change poses by implementing the ngfs’s recommendations and acting on them substantively wherever possible without undermining the ecb’s price stability mandate and other objectives; ### 12. notes with approval christine lagarde’s declaration of 4 september , in which she welcomed the ecb’s membership in the network of central banks and supervisors for greening the financial system (ngfs) and notably endorsed "a gradual transition to eliminate carbon assets" from the ecb's portfolio; stresses that the ecb should contribute actively to the work of the ngfs and implement the ngfs’s recommendations set out in its first comprehensive report of april 2019 , without undermining the ecb’s price stability mandate and other objectives;


### 14. is extremely worried about the risks due to the delay in setting up the banking union , and calls for the swift completion of the banking union with a fully mutualised european deposit guarantee scheme; ### 14. is extremely worried about the risks due to the delay in setting up the banking union , and calls for the swift completion of the banking union with a european deposit co-insurance scheme with full liquidity and loss coverage but depletion of national funds first to preserve well-functioning national deposit insurance systems;


### 16. calls on the ecb to increase its monitoring of the development of crypto-currencies and the increased risks in cyber-security; ### 16. calls on the ecb to monitor carefully the development of crypto-assets and the attendant risks to cyber-security which can have negative effects for the stability and safety of the financial sector; suggests to refrain from using the term 'crypto currencies' because , as pointed out in eba opinion 2014/08 , using the term 'currency' can be misleading for a variety of reasons;


### 20. recalls that the nominations of executive board members should be prepared carefully , with full transparency and together with parliament in line with the treaties; calls on the council to draw up a gender-balanced shortlist for all current and upcoming vacancies and to share it with parliament , thus allowing it to play a more meaningful advisory role in the appointment process; regrets that to date no satisfactory progress has been made; ### 20. recalls that the nominations of executive board members should be prepared carefully , with full transparency and together with parliament in line with the treaties; calls on the council to draw up gender-balanced shortlists for all current and upcoming vacancies and to share them with parliament , thus allowing it to play a more meaningful advisory role in the appointment process; recalls point 4 of the european parliament’s resolution 2019/2614(rsp) ,in which parliament commits itself not to take into account short-lists that do not respect the principle of gender balance; regrets that to date no satisfactory progress has been made


### a. whereas the current international corporate tax rules can be dysfunctional , date from the early 20th century and were not designed for the challenges of the digital economy; ### a. whereas the current international corporate tax rules are now dysfunctional and can be exploited for tax evasion and tax avoidance , date from the early 20th century and were not designed for the challenges of the digital economy , leading to countries taking unilateral measures to address these challenges;


### b. whereas following the financial crisis from 2008-09 and a series of revelations by journalists of practices of tax evasion , aggressive tax planning and tax avoidance , the g20 countries agreed to address these issues globally via the at oecd level through the base erosion and profit shifting (beps) project , leading to the beps action plan; ### b. whereas following the financial crisis from 2008-09 and a series of revelations by journalists of practices of tax evasion , tax avoidance and money laundering , the g20 countries agreed to address these issues globally including at oecd level through the base erosion and profit shifting (beps) project , leading to the beps action plan;


### c. whereas the beps action plan managed to find global consensus on many aspects to fight tax evasion , aggressive tax planning and tax avoidance; however there was no agreement on addressing the tax challenges of the digitalisation of the economy , which led to a separate 2015 beps action 1 report; ### c. whereas the beps action plan managed to find global consensus on several aspects to fight tax evasion and tax avoidance; however there was no agreement on addressing the tax challenges of the digitalisation of the economy , which led to a separate 2015 beps action 1 report and unresolved issues; whereas several actions of the beps action plan were included into eu law with the anti-tax avoidance directive (atad) but this directive in itself is not sufficient to end base erosion and profit shifting in the union;


### d. whereas the european parliament , in its taxe , tax2 , tax3 and pana resolutions , has repeatedly called for a reform of the international corporate tax system to tackle tax evasion , aggressive tax planning and tax avoidance and the challenges of taxing the digital economy , and called upon the commission and member states to agree on a joint european position at oecd/g20 level; ### d. whereas the european parliament , in its taxe , tax2 , tax3 and pana resolutions as well as in its common corporate tax base opinion , has repeatedly called for a reform of the international corporate tax system to tackle tax evasion and tax avoidance and the challenges of taxing the digital economy , and called upon the commission and member states to agree on a joint european position at oecd/g20 level or to act at the union level if an international agreement was not possible;


### e. whereas in 2018 , pending an international agreement , the european commission put forward two proposals addressing the taxation of the digital economy , which were supported by the european parliament , but not adopted in council: a short-term solution of introducing a digital services tax (dst) , and a long-term solution defining a significant digital presence (sdp) as a nexus for corporate taxation; ### e. whereas in 2018 , pending an international agreement , the european commission put forward two proposals18a addressing the taxation of the digital economy , which were supported by the european parliament , but rejected in council because a unanimous agreement could not be reached despite support by a large majority of member states;


### i. whereas on 8 october 2019 , the oecd secretariat launched a public consultation on the basis of oecd secretariat proposal for a “unified approach” aiming to find a consensus between the three alternatives set out in pillar one; whereas on 8 november 2019 , the oecd secretariat launched a public consultation on the globe proposal under pillar two; ### i. whereas on 9 october 2019 , the oecd secretariat launched a public consultation on the basis of oecd secretariat proposal for a “unified approach” aiming to find a consensus between the three alternatives set out in pillar one; whereas on 18 october 2019 , the g2018a welcomed the oecd secretariat’s efforts for the proposed unified approach under pillar 1 but did not formally endorsed the proposal; whereas on 8 november 2019 , the oecd secretariat launched a public consultation on the globe proposal under pillar two;


### j. whereas a fair and efficient taxation system is key to addressing inequality and ensures certainty and stability which are prerequisite for competitiveness; ### j. whereas a fair and efficient taxation system is key to addressing inequality and ensures a level playing field between companies , especially towards small and medium enterprises , which is a prerequisite for fair competition in the internal market;


### k. whereas nominal corporate tax rates have decreased at eu level from an average of 32 % in 2000 to 21 ,7 % in 201919 , which represents a decrease of 32 %; whereas this decrease can have implications on the sustainability of tax systems and potential spill over effects on other countries; ### k. whereas nominal corporate tax rates have decreased at eu level from an average of 32 % in 2000 to 21 ,7 % in 201919 , which represents a decrease of 32 %; whereas this decrease can have implications on the sustainability of tax systems and potential spill over effects on other countries; whereas 22 of the 38 countries surveyed in the tax policy reform 2018 report from the oecd19a now have combined statutory corporate income tax rates equal to or below 25 % , compared with only six in 2000;


### l. whereas criticisms have been raised by the european commission in some country reports against shortcoming in national tax systems that facilitate aggressive tax planning , arguing that they undermine the integrity of the european single market; ### l. whereas criticisms have been raised by the european commission in the country reports of cyprus , hungary , ireland , luxembourg , malta , the netherlands and the united kingdom19a against shortcoming in national tax systems that facilitate aggressive tax planning , arguing that they undermine the integrity of the european single market;


### 1. acknowledges the progress made by the beps action plan and its eu implementation through the anti-tax avoidance directive (atad) but recognizes that some challenges , notably linked with globalisation and digitalisation of the economy , are still not addressed; ### 1. acknowledges the progress made by the beps action plan and its eu implementation through the anti-tax avoidance directive (atad) but recognizes that some challenges , notably linked with globalisation and digitalisation of the economy , are still not addressed; recalls that one of the objectives of the work of the task force on the digital economy , in addition to ending corporate profit shifting , is to build a new tax system which rules are easily applicable in order to increase tax compliance and limit tax dispute resolution; is concerned that the ongoing if negotiations could lead in the end to a very complex system , which will be hard to implement;


### 2. points out that atad went further than the beps action plan , notably with the new eu controlled foreign company rules that enable profits parked in tax havens to be taxed in the eu country where a mne is headquartered; notes that these types of measures limit aggressive tax planning and tax avoidance; ### 2. points out that atad went further than the beps action plan , notably with the new eu controlled foreign company rules that enable profits parked in tax havens to be taxed in the eu country where a mne is headquartered; notes that these types of measures limit aggressive tax planning and tax avoidance; calls on the new commission to evaluate the implementation of atad and analyse new ways of circumventing this directive and to present new legislative proposals when necessary; calls on the council to resume work and progress on the revision of the interest & royalty directive;


### 3. recalls that the eu’s proposals for a c(c)ctb also go far beyond these oecd alternatives at eu level , notably by departing from the separate entity principle; ### 3. recalls that the eu’s proposal for a ccctb also goes far beyond these oecd alternatives at eu level , notably by departing from the separate entity principle; recalls the need for a single set of rules for calculating taxable profits of cross-border companies by treating corporate groups as a single entity for tax purposes , in order to eliminate many of the weaknesses in the current corporate tax framework enabling aggressive tax planning and tax avoidance; insists on the importance of consolidation to reduce administrative burden , compliance costs and tax obstacles for cross-border companies in the eu and to remove the need for complex transfer pricing arrangements; calls on the council to rapidly adopt the cctb and ccctb proposals;


### 3. recalls that the eu’s proposals for a c(c)ctb also go far beyond these oecd alternatives at eu level , notably by departing from the separate entity principle; ### 3. recalls that the eu’s proposals for a c(c)ctb also go far beyond these oecd alternatives at eu level , notably by departing from the separate entity principle; deplores that the proposals are still blocked and calls the member states to adopt them swiftly;


### 5. deplores that eu member states were not able to agree on a joint approach regarding dst; ### 5. deplores that eu member states were not able to agree on a joint approach regarding dst; recalls the difficulty with the unanimity rule in council to adopt certain tax proposals;


### 7. welcomes the participation on an equal footing of all countries involved in the inclusive framework , which brings together over 130 countries and jurisdictions to collaborate on the implementation of the oecd/g20 beps package and to negotiate joint solutions for tackling the remaining beps challenges; recalls , however , that over 100 developing countries were excluded from the negotiations on the 15 beps actions; ### 7. welcomes the participation on an equal footing of all countries involved in the inclusive framework , which brings together over 130 countries and jurisdictions to collaborate on the implementation of the oecd/g20 beps package and to negotiate joint solutions for tackling the remaining beps challenges; recalls , however , that developing countries were not involved in the beps process until an advanced stage of negotiations;


### 8. notes that the oecd preliminary findings of the impact assessment suggest that the combined effect of pillar one and pillar two would lead to a significant increase in global tax revenues as well as a redistribution on taxing rights to market jurisdictions; notes in particular that pillar two would yield a significant increase of corporate income tax revenue globally; understands the two pillars would not adversely affect the investment environment20; ### 8. notes that the oecd preliminary findings of the impact assessment suggest that the combined effect of pillar one and pillar two would lead to a significant increase in global tax revenues as well as a redistribution on taxing rights to market jurisdictions; notes in particular that pillar two would yield a significant increase of corporate income tax revenue globally; calls on the oecd to publish its impact assessments as soon as finished to provide greater clarity as to the impact of these proposed reforms on revenue collection; understands the two pillars would not adversely affect the investment environment20; calls on the commission to complete its own impact assessment on the effects of pillars one and two on revenue collection for the member states and to inform the council and parliament about its findings;


### 10. welcomes that all three alternatives under consideration in pillar one of the oecd oecd secretariat proposal ### 10. welcomes the proposal by the oecd secretariat to merge all three alternatives under consideration in pillar one as they share the same objectives: