### 3. highlights that , in the short term , large-scale humanitarian aid in ukraine and financial support to member states receiving and helping to settle people fleeing the conflict are needed to address the impact of the war against ukraine; ### 3. stresses that , in the short and medium term , large-scale humanitarian aid in ukraine and financial support to member states receiving and helping to settle people fleeing the conflict are needed to address the impact of the war against ukraine; reminds that the relevant programmes have not been budgeted with the resources this unprecedented situation requires;


### 3. underlines the necessity of providing the regions with appropriate financial means in order to deal with the waves of migration caused by the russian aggression against ukraine and its multifaceted consequences; emphasises the need to address the grave difficulties that the current rise in energy costs is causing for the regions , and to identify suitable financial instruments to deal with them at a regional level; ### 3. underlines the necessity of providing the regions with timely and appropriate financial means in order to deal with the waves of migration caused by the russian aggression against ukraine and its multifaceted consequences; emphasises the need to address the grave difficulties that the current rise in energy costs is causing for the regional and local authorities , for the citizens and the social and economic actors and to identify suitable financial instruments to deal with them at a regional and local level;


### 3. notes that the global humanitarian funding gap continues to grow; stresses that the humanitarian aid instrument must receive significantly more funding in the revised mff to match the eu’s ambition to be a leading humanitarian donor; ### 3. notes that the global humanitarian funding gap continues to grow while the unpredictability and the impacts of climate and human-induced disasters continue to arise; underlines that the numerous and consistent top-ups of the eu’s annual humanitarian budget over the past years of the current mff have proven the initially allocated funding to never be sufficient to cover the humanitarian needs for the entire year; stresses that the humanitarian aid instrument must receive significantly more funding in the revised mff to match the eu’s ambition to be a leading humanitarian donor and enable humanitarian partners and local responders to deliver timely and adapted responses to the increasing needs;


### 3. calls on the council to preserve an ambitious multiannual budget for heading 3 , bearing in mind the importance of food security; ### 3. calls on the council to preserve an ambitious multiannual budget for heading 3 , bearing in mind the importance of food security and environmental protection;


### 4. recommends further strengthening synergies between the cef and other programmes such as horizon europe and investeu , in order to support innovation , sustainability and safety in the transport sector and optimise the use of budgetary resources; ### 4. recommends further strengthening synergies between the cef and other programmes such as horizon europe and investeu , ensuring that the minimum thresholds on climate-related expenditure are fulfilled and prioritising investments in rail over other modes , in order to support innovation , sustainability and safety in the transport sector and optimise the use of budgetary resources;


### 4. welcomes the decision to grant ukraine and moldova candidate country status; emphasises that this decision entails a long-term financial and budgetary commitment to supporting the necessary reforms specific to each country , as has been the case with other candidate countries , as well as to reconstruction and recovery; ### 4. welcomes the decision to grant ukraine and moldova candidate country status; emphasises that this decision entails a long-term financial and budgetary commitment to supporting the necessary reforms specific to each country , as has been the case with other candidate countries , as well as to reconstruction and recovery; insists on policy cohesion across the two goals;


### 4. welcomes the decision to grant ukraine and moldova candidate country status; emphasises that this decision entails a long-term financial and budgetary commitment to supporting the necessary reforms specific to each country , as has been the case with other candidate countries , as well as to reconstruction and recovery; ### 4. welcomes the decision to grant ukraine and moldova candidate country status and a membership perspective to georgia; emphasises that this decision entails a long-term financial and budgetary commitment to supporting the necessary reforms specific to each country , as has been the case with other candidate countries;


### 4. welcomes the commission’s upcoming proposal for a european defence investment programme (edip) , the aim of which would be to introduce joint procurement and life cycle management of military capabilities , in particular those necessary to harness eu defence over the decades to counter a military threat from russia; calls on all member states to complement eu funding with funding from their national defence budgets; invites the commission to open this programme to key strategic partners and allies; ### 4. notes the commission’s intention to propose a european defence investment programme (edip) in the third quarter of this year , the aim of which would be to introduce joint procurement and life cycle management of military capabilities for the medium-term , in particular those necessary to harness eu defence over the decades to counter a military threat from russia; notes that as an immediate follow-up , the commission will in addition propose a short-term instrument to reinforce european defence industrial capacities through joint procurement between the member states in order to fill the most urgent and critical gaps , for which eur 500 million should be invested over two years between 2022 and 2024; calls on all member states to complement eu funding with funding from their national defence budgets; invites the commission to open this programme to key strategic partners and allies;


### 4. calls on the council and the commission to recognise that the capacity of farmers to withstand inflation pressure and increased input prices and to ensure food security is impacted by variation in cap payments; calls , therefore , for additional support to the member states with the lowest payments; ### 4. calls on the council and the commission to recognise that the capacity of farmers to withstand inflation pressure and increased input prices and to ensure food security is impacted by variation in cap payments; calls , therefore , for additional support to the member states with direct payments below the eu average;


### 5. points out that in the current geopolitical context , achieving the goals of the european green deal should be tackled together with the reduction of the eu’s energy dependency , which is critical for the transport sector; welcomes in this respect the commission’s initiative for a repowereu plan and calls on the commission to promptly adopt further measures to address rising transport and energy costs; ### 5. points out that in the current geopolitical context , achieving the goals of the european green deal should be tackled together with the reduction of the eu’s energy dependency , which is critical for the transport sector; points out that reducing speeds in roads is a clear contribution to this objective , as pointed out by the international energy agency; welcomes in this respect the commission’s initiative for a repowereu plan and calls on the commission to promptly adopt further measures to address rising transport and energy costs;


### 5. points out that essential new policy initiatives put forward since the adoption of the current mff have come with proposals to shift money away from key eu policies and objectives; ### 5. points out that essential new policy initiatives put forward since the adoption of the current mff have come with proposals to shift money away from key eu policies and objectives that actually pay for the collateral damages of the recent crises; considers that recurrent redeployments are not a viable way to finance union’s priorities;


### 5. points out that essential new policy initiatives put forward since the adoption of the current mff have come with proposals to shift money away from key eu policies and objectives; ### 5. points out that essential new policy initiatives put forward since the adoption of the current mff have come with proposals to shift money away from key eu policies and objectives and clearly deviate from the agreement reached by the two arms of the budgetary authority;


### 5. calls for stronger defence cooperation with ukraine and moldova to be established , including by enhancing the financial capabilities of the european defence agency (eda) to help identify where ukraine should participate in eu defence capability development over the years to come. ### 5. calls for stronger defence cooperation with ukraine and moldova to be established , including by enhancing the financial capabilities of the european defence agency (eda) by the member states and if a holistic assessment deems it necessary and calls for help to identify where ukraine should participate in eu defence capability development over the years to come.


### 5. calls for the mff revision to provide additional funds to the neighbourhood , development and international cooperation instrument (ndici) – global europe instrument , particularly to reinforce the budget lines most in demand recently and to meet the additional needs caused by the russian war against ukraine without diverting money from other geographic regions; ### 5. calls for the mff revision to provide additional funds to the neighbourhood , development and international cooperation instrument (ndici) – global europe instrument , particularly to reinforce the budget lines most in demand recently to counter the current food crisis and climate related disasters impacting developing countries , but also anticipate and prevent similar situations in the future , and to meet the additional needs caused by the russian war against ukraine without diverting money from other geographic regions;


### 5. calls on the council to modify article 4 of the mff regulation to allow for the technical adjustment of ceilings to take into account inflation of above 2 %. ### 5. calls on the council to modify article 4 of the mff regulation to allow for the technical adjustment of ceilings to take into account inflation of above 2 % and reflecting actual inflation.


### 6. stresses that the transition to a smart and sustainable mobility system has to be fair and inclusive and requires mitigating the risk of energy and mobility poverty and protecting the most vulnerable; considers that to ensure a successful transition , it is essential to invest in the upskilling and reskilling of workers; therefore insists on targeted measures within the ‘fit for 55’ package in that respect , in coordination with member states’ plans; ### 6. stresses that the transition to a smart and sustainable mobility system has to be fair and inclusive , geographically comprehensive adequately covering rural and remote areas , and requires mitigating the risk of energy and mobility poverty and protecting the most vulnerable , including persons with disabilities; considers that to ensure a successful transition , it is essential to invest in the upskilling and reskilling of workers; therefore insists on targeted measures within the ‘fit for 55’ package in that respect , in coordination with member states’ plans;


### 6. points to the extensive use made of the special instruments in the first two years of the mff; notes that the flexibility instrument was mobilised for heading 6 spending in 2022 and points to the proposal that it be mobilised for spending under both headings 6 and 7 in 2023; points out that , under the defence proposal of july 202218 , further appropriations are to be mobilised via special instruments in 2023 and 2024; ### 6. points to the extensive use made of the special instruments in the first two years of the mff; notes that the flexibility instrument was mobilised for heading 6 spending in 2022 and points to the commission’s proposal in the amending letter 1/2023 that it will be significantly mobilised for spending under headings 2b , 5 and 6 in 2023; points out that , under the defence proposal of july 202218 , further appropriations are to be mobilised via special instruments also in 2024;


### 6. notes that the mff revision should be accompanied by the necessary legislative changes to the ndici – global europe regulation. ### 6. notes that the comprehensive and ambitious mff revision should be accompanied by the necessary legislative changes to the ndici – global europe regulation including more clear programming cycles , enhanced transparency of funding decisions and reinforced engagement of civil society and local actors;


### 7. highlights that the solidarity and emergency aid reserve (sear) was almost exhausted in 2021 and is projected to be fully exhausted in 2022 after having provided a combination of humanitarian aid and support to member states for tackling natural and man-made disasters; points out that the extension of the scope of the european union solidarity fund (eusf) to include public health emergencies , coupled with the increased scale and frequency of natural disasters , the humanitarian crisis in ukraine and the resulting arrival of large numbers of refugees in the eu , has placed the sear under extreme strain; expects , further , that the dramatic consequences of the unprecedented wildfires in the summer of 2022 will require significant financial support , including from the sear; ### 7. highlights that the solidarity and emergency aid reserve (sear) was almost exhausted in 2021 and is projected to be fully exhausted in 2022 after having provided a combination of humanitarian aid and support to member states for tackling natural and man-made disasters; points out that the extension of the scope of the european union solidarity fund (eusf) to include public health emergencies , coupled with the increased scale and frequency of natural disasters , the humanitarian crisis in ukraine and the resulting arrival of large numbers of refugees in the eu , has placed the sear under extreme strain; expects , further , that the dramatic consequences of the unprecedented wildfires in the summer of 2022 that follow on to the major floods and wildfires from the summer of 2021 will require significant financial support , including from the sear;


### 7. highlights that the solidarity and emergency aid reserve (sear) was almost exhausted in 2021 and is projected to be fully exhausted in 2022 after having provided a combination of humanitarian aid and support to member states for tackling natural and man-made disasters; points out that the extension of the scope of the european union solidarity fund (eusf) to include public health emergencies , coupled with the increased scale and frequency of natural disasters , the humanitarian crisis in ukraine and the resulting arrival of large numbers of refugees in the eu , has placed the sear under extreme strain; expects , further , that the dramatic consequences of the unprecedented wildfires in the summer of 2022 will require significant financial support , including from the sear; ### 7. highlights that the solidarity and emergency aid reserve (sear) was almost exhausted in 2021 and is projected to be fully used in 2022 after having provided a combination of humanitarian aid and support to member states for tackling natural and man-made disasters; points out that the extension of the scope of the european union solidarity fund (eusf) to include public health emergencies , coupled with the increased scale and frequency of natural disasters , the humanitarian crisis in ukraine and the resulting arrival of large numbers of refugees in the eu , has placed the sear under extreme strain; expects , further , that the dramatic consequences of the unprecedented wildfires in the summer of 2022 will require significant financial support , including from the sear;


### a. whereas russia’s unprovoked and unjustified military aggression against ukraine has undermined food security; whereas the heads of state or government of the member states have emphasised the importance of food security and sovereignty; ### a. whereas russia’s unprovoked and unjustified military aggression against ukraine has undermined food security , notably in those middle east and northern africa countries which heavily rely on cereal imports; whereas the heads of state or government of the member states have emphasised the importance of global food security and food sovereignty;


### c. whereas russia’s unprovoked and unjustified invasion of ukraine has led to a major humanitarian crisis , and has triggered an economic and social shock of uncertain duration and magnitude worldwide; whereas the heads of state or government have described the war as a ‘tectonic shift in european history’ and the commission has stated that the ‘unforeseen needs created by war in europe are well beyond the means available in the current multiannual financial framework’ , necessitating new financing sources; ### c. whereas russia’s unprovoked and unjustified invasion of ukraine has led to a major humanitarian crisis , and has triggered an economic and social shock of uncertain duration and magnitude worldwide; whereas the heads of state or government have described the war as a ‘tectonic shift in european history’ and the commission has stated that the ‘unforeseen needs created by war in europe are well beyond the means available in the current multiannual financial framework’ , necessitating new financing sources in an urgent manner;


### d. whereas citizens rightly expect the eu budget to respond effectively to evolving needs and to support them in crises; ### d. whereas citizens rightly expect a bigger eu budget to respond effectively to evolving needs and to better support them in crises;


### e. whereas the combined effect of multiple crises and low mff ceilings has given rise to a ‘galaxy’ of ad hoc instruments beyond the eu budget , as well as greater use of external assigned revenue not subject to the budgetary procedure , most notably in the case of nextgenerationeu; whereas , as one arm of the budgetary authority , parliament should play a full role in this new budgetary environment in order to ensure democratic accountability and transparency; ### e. whereas the combined effect of multiple crises and low mff ceilings has given rise to a‘ galaxy’ of ad hoc instruments beyond the eu budget , as well as greater use of external assigned revenue not subject to the budgetary procedure , most notably in the case of nextgenerationeu; whereas , as both arms of the budgetary authority should have equal roles as set out in the treaties; whereas parliament should play a full role in this new budgetary environment in order to ensure democratic accountability and transparency;


### e. whereas the combined effect of multiple crises and low mff ceilings has given rise to a ‘galaxy’ of ad hoc instruments beyond the eu budget , as well as greater use of external assigned revenue not subject to the budgetary procedure , most notably in the case of nextgenerationeu; whereas , as one arm of the budgetary authority , parliament should play a full role in this new budgetary environment in order to ensure democratic accountability and transparency; ### e. whereas the combined effect of multiple crises , low mff ceilings and cumbersome rules applying to any mff review or revision has given rise to a ‘galaxy’ of ad hoc instruments beyond the eu budget , as well as greater use of external assigned revenue not subject to the budgetary procedure , most notably in the case of nextgenerationeu; whereas , as one arm of the budgetary authority , parliament should play a full role in this new budgetary environment in order to ensure democratic accountability and transparency;


### 1. underlines the central role that the eu budget plays in delivering on the union’s political priorities , including making a success of the green and digital transitions , fostering an inclusive and social recovery , promoting growth , strategic autonomy and energy independence , providing support for small and medium-sized enterprises , fostering sustainable development that leaves no one behind and ensures cohesion and upward convergence , ensuring a more robust european health union in the aftermath of the covid-19 crisis , promoting the rule of law , eu values and fundamental rights , contributing to greater opportunities for all , and ensuring a stronger union for its people and in the world; ### 1. recalls that the mff sets out union budgetary priorities for seven years and provides financial resources for the implementation of long term policy objectives; reminds that the subsequent crisis have shown that the lack of resilience and flexibility backed with democratic control is lacking in the current rigid structure; underlines the central role that the eu budget plays in delivering on the union’s political priorities , including making a success of the green and digital transitions for all , fostering an inclusive and social recovery , promoting growth , innovation , strategic autonomy and energy independence , providing support for small and medium-sized enterprises , fostering sustainable development that leaves no one behind and ensures cohesion and upward convergence , ensuring a more robust european health union in the aftermath of the covid-19 crisis , promoting the rule of law , eu values and fundamental rights within the eu and beyond , contributing to greater opportunities for all and to our shared global responsibilities , and ensuring a stronger union for its people and in the world;


### 1. underlines the central role that the eu budget plays in delivering on the union’s political priorities , including making a success of the green and digital transitions , fostering an inclusive and social recovery , promoting growth , strategic autonomy and energy independence , providing support for small and medium-sized enterprises , fostering sustainable development that leaves no one behind and ensures cohesion and upward convergence , ensuring a more robust european health union in the aftermath of the covid-19 crisis , promoting the rule of law , eu values and fundamental rights , contributing to greater opportunities for all , and ensuring a stronger union for its people and in the world; ### 1. underlines the central role that the eu budget must play in delivering on the union’s political priorities , including making a success of the green and digital transitions , fostering an inclusive and social recovery , promoting growth , strategic autonomy and energy independence , providing support for small and medium-sized enterprises , fostering sustainable development that leaves no one behind and ensures cohesion and upward convergence , ensuring a more robust european health union in the aftermath of the covid-19 crisis , promoting the rule of law , eu values and fundamental rights , contributing to greater opportunities for all , and ensuring a stronger union for its people and in the world;


### 1. reiterates its concern as regards the significant delay in the implementation of cohesion policy for the 2021-2027 period , as well as its call for the commission and the member states to speed up the adoption of the partnership agreements and programmes , without undermining their quality and while respecting the eu’s political priorities and the applicable principles; reiterates the need for special consideration to be given to less-developed regions and islands in this context; ### 1. reiterates its utter concern as regards the significant delay in the implementation of cohesion policy for the 2021-2027 period , as well as its call for the commission and the member states to speed up the adoption of the partnership agreements and programmes , without undermining their quality and while respecting the eu’s political priorities and the applicable principles; reiterates the need for special consideration to be given to less-developed regions and islands in this context;


### 1. reiterates that , from the very beginning of the new multiannual financial framework (mff) , the available margins under heading 6 have been limited and have been shrinking further , including through early depletion of the cushion; encourages the commission to propose an ambitious early revision of the mff in order to meet needs more effectively; ### 1. reiterates that , from the very beginning of the new multiannual financial framework (mff) , the available margins under heading 6 have been very limited and have become non-existent including through early depletion of the cushion and the need to use the single margin also to cover commitments under heading 6; is deeply concerned that the mff is already pushed to its limits and is not fit to continue addressing the multiple internal and external crises in a sustainable manner; calls , therefore , on the commission to conduct an in-depth review of the functioning of the current mff and proceed with a legislative proposal for a comprehensive revision of the mff as soon as possible and not later than the first quarter of 2023; calls on the commission to create an effective crisis response mechanism to tackle the new without jeopardising priorities established under co-decision in the relevant programmes , in particular as regards climate and development aid;


### 1. regrets that the 2021-2027 multiannual financial framework (mff) lacks a sufficiently endowed heading 6 and , therefore , the available margins have been limited and shrinking since the first year , including an early depletion of the cushion; highlights that the russian invasion of ukraine is generating unprecedented needs for eu external action , both in neighbouring countries and worldwide , as a result of the food , energy and economic crises , which are undermining progress towards the sustainable development goals; ### 1. regrets that the 2021-2027 multiannual financial framework (mff) lacks a sufficiently endowed heading 6 and , therefore , the available margins have been very limited and shrinking since the first year , including an early depletion of the cushion and the need to use the single margin also to cover commitments under heading 6; is deeply concerned that the mff is already pushed to its limits and it is not fit to continue addressing the multiple internal and external crises in a sustainable manner; highlights that the russian invasion of ukraine is generating unprecedented needs for eu external action , both in neighbouring countries and worldwide , as a result of the food , climate and energy and economic crises , which are undermining progress towards the sustainable development goals;


### 1. considers that the commission’s proposed revision of the mff should be aligned with the ‘fit for 55’ package and should take into consideration the main points of the versailles declaration , notably food security; ### 1. considers that the commission’s proposed revision of the mff should be aligned with the ‘fit for 55’ package and should take into consideration the main points of the versailles declaration , notably improving food security by reducing dependency on key imported agricultural products and inputs;


### 8. emphasises , therefore , that the 2021-2027 mff is already being pushed to its limits less than two years after its adoption , a situation aggravated by the unforeseeable events of 2022; points out that it is simply not equipped , in terms of size , structure or rules , to respond to a multitude of crises of this scale , nor to adequately finance new shared eu policy ambitions and the swift implementation of the requisite eu-wide solutions; ### 8. emphasises , therefore , that the 2021-2027 mff is already being pushed to its limits less than two years after its adoption , a situation aggravated by the unforeseeable events of 2022; points out that it is simply not equipped , in terms of size , structure or rules , to respond to a multitude of crises of this scale , nor to adequately finance new shared eu policy ambitions and the swift implementation of the requisite eu-wide solutions; is very concerned , in this regard , about the ability from the european union to respond to any future unknown crises that might happen by 2027;


### 8. emphasises , therefore , that the 2021-2027 mff is already being pushed to its limits less than two years after its adoption , a situation aggravated by the unforeseeable events of 2022; points out that it is simply not equipped , in terms of size , structure or rules , to respond to a multitude of crises of this scale , nor to adequately finance new shared eu policy ambitions and the swift implementation of the requisite eu-wide solutions; ### 8. emphasises , therefore , that the 2021-2027 mff has already been pushed to its limits less than two years after its adoption , a situation aggravated by the unforeseeable events of 2022;points out that it is simply not equipped , in terms of size , structure or rules , to respond to a multitude of crises of this scale , nor to adequately finance new shared eu policy ambitions and the swift implementation of the required eu-wide solutions;


### 9. recalls that the mff is increased annually on the basis of a 2 % deflator applied to 2018 prices; underlines that spiralling energy prices and extreme energy market volatility caused mainly by russia’s decision to cut gas supply have been feeding soaring inflation , with severe impacts on citizens , businesses and consumers; is deeply concerned that such unexpectedly high levels of inflation are placing the mff under severe strain and reducing its purchasing power further , in a context where its overall level is already lower than previous mffs; stresses that , in practice , this means that fewer union projects and actions can be funded , thereby negatively impacting beneficiaries; ### 9. recalls that the mff is increased annually on the basis of a 2 % deflator applied to 2018 prices; underlines that spiralling energy prices and extreme energy market volatility caused mainly by russia’s decision to cut gas supply have been feeding soaring inflation , with severe impacts on citizens , businesses and consumers; is deeply concerned that such unexpectedly high levels of inflation are placing the mff under severe strain and reducing its purchasing power further , in a context where its overall level is already lower than previous mffs in terms of share of the eu gdp; stresses that , in practice , this means that fewer union projects and actions can be funded , thereby negatively impacting beneficiaries;


### 9. recalls that the mff is increased annually on the basis of a 2 % deflator applied to 2018 prices; underlines that spiralling energy prices and extreme energy market volatility caused mainly by russia’s decision to cut gas supply have been feeding soaring inflation , with severe impacts on citizens , businesses and consumers; is deeply concerned that such unexpectedly high levels of inflation are placing the mff under severe strain and reducing its purchasing power further , in a context where its overall level is already lower than previous mffs; stresses that , in practice , this means that fewer union projects and actions can be funded , thereby negatively impacting beneficiaries; ### 9. recalls that the mff is increased annually on the basis of a 2 % deflator applied to 2018 prices; underlines that spiralling energy prices and extreme energy market volatility caused mainly by russia’s decision to cut gas supply have been feeding soaring inflation , with severe impacts on people , businesses and consumers; is deeply concerned that such unexpectedly high levels of inflation are placing the mff under severe strain and reducing its purchasing power further , in a context where its overall level is already lower than previous mffs; stresses that , in practice , this means that fewer union projects and actions can be funded , thereby negatively impacting the implementation of our shared policy goals;


### 10. recalls , further , that , despite parliament’s demands that the european union recovery instrument (euri) be placed over and above the ceilings , the refinancing costs are repaid from within the mff ceilings , exerting further pressure on the mff , especially in a context of rising interest rates; ### 10. recalls , further , that , despite parliament’s demands that the european union recovery instrument (euri) be placed over and above the ceilings , the refinancing costs are repaid from within the mff ceilings , exerting further pressure on the mff and requiring the use of special instruments in 2023 , in a context of rising interest rates and increasing ngeu borrowing costs;


### 11. observes the continuing demand for the eu budget to serve as a guarantee for additional macro-financial assistance (mfa); notes , however , that the higher risks of default and the large amount at stake entail significant contingent liabilities; ### 11. observes the continuing demand for the eu budget to serve as a guarantee for additional necessary macro-financial assistance (mfa) , especially for ukraine; welcomes the eu support in this regard; notes , however , that the higher risks of default and the large amount at stake entail significant contingent liabilities;


### 11. observes the continuing demand for the eu budget to serve as a guarantee for additional macro-financial assistance (mfa); notes , however , that the higher risks of default and the large amount at stake entail significant contingent liabilities; ### 11. observes the continuing demand for the eu budget to serve as a guarantee for additional macro-financial assistance (mfa); notes , however , that the higher risks of default and the large amount at stake entail significant and unpredictable contingent liabilities;


### 12. concludes that , in this context , the need for an urgent review and revision of the mff is beyond any doubt and that a ‘business as usual’ approach will not remotely suffice to tackle the array of challenges posed and could thereby undermine confidence in the union in the long term; ### 12. concludes that , in this context , the need for an urgent review and revision of the mff is beyond any doubt and that a ‘business as usual’ approach will not remotely suffice to tackle the array of challenges posed and could thereby undermine confidence in the union in the short , medium and long term;


### 12. concludes that , in this context , the need for an urgent review and revision of the mff is beyond any doubt and that a ‘business as usual’ approach will not remotely suffice to tackle the array of challenges posed and could thereby undermine confidence in the union in the long term; ### 12. concludes that , in this context , the need for an urgent revision of the mff is beyond any doubt and that a ‘business as usual’ approach will not remotely suffice to tackle the array of challenges posed and could thereby undermine confidence in the union in the long term;


### 14. underlines that the unanimity requirement for adoption of the mff regulation impedes the necessary decisions in the revision process; calls , in that regard , on the european council to activate the passerelle clause set out in article 312(2) tfeu to allow for adoption of the mff regulation by qualified majority; ### 14. underlines that the unanimity requirement for adoption of the mff regulation impedes the necessary decisions in the revision process; calls , in that regard , on the european council to activate the passerelle clause set out in article 312(2) tfeu to allow for adoption of the mff regulation by qualified majority; recalls its proposals that the ordinary legislative procedure be applied for the adoption of the mff regulation;


### 16. insists that the principle of unity , whereby all items of the union’s revenue and expenditure are shown in the budget , is both a treaty requirement and a basic precondition for accountability , democratic legitimacy and the transparency of the eu’s public finances; stresses the need for an upscaled mff to ensure a stronger and more agile eu budget which meets the highest standards of transparency and democratic accountability; requests , therefore , an increase in the mff ceilings , as well as an increase in and redesign of budgetary flexibility and significantly greater parliamentary control over all eu spending , including off-budget instruments , funds and common borrowing and lending programmes; ### 16. insists that the principle of unity , whereby all items of the union’s revenue and expenditure are shown in the budget , is both a treaty requirement and a basic precondition for accountability , democratic legitimacy and the transparency of the eu’s public finances; stresses the need for an upscaled mff to ensure a stronger and more agile eu budget which meets the highest standards of transparency and democratic accountability; requests , therefore , an increase in the mff ceilings , as well as an increase in and redesign of budgetary flexibility and significantly greater parliamentary control over all eu both the revenue and the expenditure side , meaning all financial activities below the own resources ceiling and , in particular off-budget instruments and funds and common borrowing and lending activities;


### 17. reaffirms its long-standing position that new political initiatives must be financed with additional fresh money and not to the detriment of well-established , pre-existing union programmes or policies; ### 17. reaffirms its long-standing position that new political initiatives must be financed with additional fresh money and not to the detriment of well-established , pre-existing union programmes or policies; strongly criticizes the systematic use of redeployments and the relabelling of existing programmes to finance new initiatives(“budgetwashing”);


### 17. reaffirms its long-standing position that new political initiatives must be financed with additional fresh money and not to the detriment of well-established , pre-existing union programmes or policies; ### 17. reaffirms its long-standing position that new political initiatives must be financed with additional fresh money and not to the detriment of well-established , pre-existing union programmes or policies that have been agreed by co-decision;


### 18. highlights that many of the policy ambitions recently stated – notably in the fields of energy and strategic and industrial autonomy – and the new policy initiatives since january 2021 (chips act , secure connectivity , health emergency preparedness and response authority) imply spending under heading 1; opposes the use of agreed programme envelopes to finance new initiatives and believes that the margins are insufficient to accommodate the greater long-term needs; calls , therefore , for an increase in the ceiling of heading 1; ### 18. highlights that many of the policy ambitions recently stated – notably in the fields of energy and strategic and industrial autonomy – and the new policy initiatives since january 2021 (chips act , secure connectivity , health emergency preparedness and response authority) imply spending under heading 1; recalls the key role horizon and cef play in the green transition , in particular by fostering innovation and implementing cross-border projects; opposes the use of agreed programme envelopes to finance new initiatives and believes that the margins are insufficient to accommodate the greater long-term needs; calls , therefore , for an increase in the ceiling of heading 1;


### 18. highlights that many of the policy ambitions recently stated – notably in the fields of energy and strategic and industrial autonomy – and the new policy initiatives since january 2021 (chips act , secure connectivity , health emergency preparedness and response authority) imply spending under heading 1; opposes the use of agreed programme envelopes to finance new initiatives and believes that the margins are insufficient to accommodate the greater long-term needs; calls , therefore , for an increase in the ceiling of heading 1; ### 18. highlights that many of the policy ambitions recently stated – notably in the fields of energy and strategic and industrial autonomy – and the new policy initiatives since january 2021 (chips act , secure connectivity , health emergency preparedness and response authority) imply spending under heading 1; believes that the margins are insufficient to accommodate the greater long-term needs; calls , therefore , for an increase in the ceiling of heading 1;


### 19. regrets that , contrary to parliament’s position , it was decided that the costs of euri borrowing and the repayment of debt be included as a budget line under heading 2b , alongside flagship programmes such as erasmus+ , eu4health , and citizens , equality , rights and values; stresses that interest costs and debt repayment depend on market developments , are not discretionary spending , do not follow the logic of caps on spending and should never compete with programmes under the same ceiling; recalls that any activation of the emergency support instrument also depends on the availability of an unallocated margin under the ceiling of this heading; insists , therefore , that the status quo presents significant risks to programme spending and that the repayment line be removed from heading 2b and counted over and above the mff ceilings; ### 19. recalls that the costs of euri borrowing and the repayment of debt are included as a budget line under heading 2b , alongside flagship programmes such as erasmus+ , eu4health , and citizens , equality , rights and values; stresses nevertheless that interest costs and debt repayment depend on market developments , are not discretionary spending , do not follow the logic of caps on spending and should never compete with programmes under the same ceiling; recalls that any activation of the emergency support instrument also depends on the availability of an unallocated margin under the ceiling of this heading; reminds that this decision was taken for the 2021-2027 period only , without prejudice to future negotiations; insists , therefore , that the status quo presents significant risks to programme spending and that the repayment line be removed from heading 2b and counted over and above the mff ceilings;


### 19. regrets that , contrary to parliament’s position , it was decided that the costs of euri borrowing and the repayment of debt be included as a budget line under heading 2b , alongside flagship programmes such as erasmus+ , eu4health , and citizens , equality , rights and values; stresses that interest costs and debt repayment depend on market developments , are not discretionary spending , do not follow the logic of caps on spending and should never compete with programmes under the same ceiling; recalls that any activation of the emergency support instrument also depends on the availability of an unallocated margin under the ceiling of this heading; insists , therefore , that the status quo presents significant risks to programme spending and that the repayment line be removed from heading 2b and counted over and above the mff ceilings; ### 19. regrets that , contrary to parliament’s position , it was decided that the costs of euri borrowing and the repayment of debt be included as a budget line under heading 2b , alongside flagship programmes such as erasmus+ , eu4health , and citizens , equality , rights and values; stresses that interest costs and debt repayment depend on market developments , are not discretionary spending , do not follow the logic of caps on spending and should never compete with programmes; recalls that any activation of the emergency support instrument also depends on the availability of an unallocated margin under the ceiling of this heading; insists , therefore , that the status quo presents significant risks to programme spending and that the repayment line must be counted over and above the mff ceilings;


### 20. reiterates its position that the social climate fund must be fully incorporated into the eu budget and within the mff , without negatively impacting other programmes and funds under this heading , bearing in mind the importance of ensuring food security and delivering on the green deal; calls for the ceiling of heading 3 to be adjusted accordingly; ### 20. reiterates its position that the social climate fund must be fully incorporated into the eu budget and within the mff , without negatively impacting other programmes and funds under this heading , bearing in mind the importance of ensuring food security and delivering on the green deal; calls for the ceiling of heading 3 to be adjusted accordingly; calls on the council to move forward with the targeted mff revision as soon as possible to integrate the social climate fund into the mff; reminds the other arm of the budgetary authority its obligation to respect budget unity;


### 21. emphasises that the war against ukraine has placed unexpected demands on the asylum , migration and integration fund , the border management and visa instrument (bmvi) and the decentralised agencies in heading 4; expresses further concern , furthermore , that successive commission proposals for agency mandate extensions are eroding the bmvi’s financial envelope; calls for the ceiling of heading 4 to be increased to reflect the real financing needs of the union’s migration and border management; ### 21. highlights that the war in ukraine has required the unexpected reinforcement and mobilisation of the asylum , migration and integration fund and of the border management and visa instrument (bmvi) , and called for additional responsibilities for the decentralised agencies in heading 4;expresses further concern , furthermore , that successive commission proposals for agency mandate extensions are eroding the bmvi’s financial envelope; calls for the ceiling of heading 4 to be increased to reflect the current reality and the real financing needs of the union’s policies in the area of migration and asylum , visa and border management; calls for an increase of the budget of amif , the implementation of the temporary protection directive and the solidarity and responsibility sharing under the common european asylum system , with targeted funds for inclusion and integration , as well as for resettlement and relocation;


### 22. highlights that the necessary spending to enhance defence cooperation and investment cannot solely be covered within the ceiling of heading 5; calls for the ceiling to be increased in line with needs; ### 22. highlights that the necessary spending to enhance defence cooperation and investment cannot solely be covered within the ceiling of heading 5; welcomes the commission’s upcoming proposal for a european defence investment programme (edip) in view of introducing joint procurement and life cycle management of military capabilities; calls for the ceiling to be increased in line with needs; considers , in this regard , that savings could be made thanks to a mutualisation of defence spending between the member states at the eu level;


### 23. deplores the fact that , even prior to the war against ukraine , funds available under heading 6 were woefully inadequate and that pressure has since increased substantially; underlines that the continued funding for the needs of refugees from syria , iraq and other countries was not factored into the mff or ndici-global europe negotiations and should therefore have been financed by fresh appropriations with a corresponding increase in the ceiling of heading 6; highlights that , owing to the risk of default on mfa loans provided to ukraine , a far higher rate of provisioning than the standard 9 % is likely to be required as further loans are rolled out; underlines that additional needs in ukraine must not lead to money being diverted away from other geographic regions in need; insists , therefore , on an increase in the ceiling for heading 6 to fully cover the current and projected future needs of the union’s external action , which have dramatically increased both in neighbouring countries and worldwide as a result of the food , energy and economic crises; ### 23. deplores the fact that , even prior to the war against ukraine , funds available under heading 6 were woefully inadequate and that pressure has since increased substantially; underlines that the continued funding for the needs of refugees from syria , iraq and other countries was not factored into the mff or ndici-global europe negotiations and should therefore have been financed by fresh appropriations with a corresponding increase in the ceiling of heading 6 , rather than redeployments; highlights that a far higher rate of provisioning than the standard 9 % is required for mfa loans provided to ukraine as further loans are rolled out following the higher risk of default due to the war imposed by russia; underlines that additional needs in ukraine must not lead to money being diverted away from other geographic regions in need; insists , therefore , on an increase in the ceiling for heading 6 to fully cover the current and projected future needs of the union’s external action , which have dramatically increased both in neighbouring countries , especially in ukraine , and worldwide as a result of the food , energy and economic crises;


### 23. deplores the fact that , even prior to the war against ukraine , funds available under heading 6 were woefully inadequate and that pressure has since increased substantially; underlines that the continued funding for the needs of refugees from syria , iraq and other countries was not factored into the mff or ndici-global europe negotiations and should therefore have been financed by fresh appropriations with a corresponding increase in the ceiling of heading 6; highlights that , owing to the risk of default on mfa loans provided to ukraine , a far higher rate of provisioning than the standard 9 % is likely to be required as further loans are rolled out; underlines that additional needs in ukraine must not lead to money being diverted away from other geographic regions in need; insists , therefore , on an increase in the ceiling for heading 6 to fully cover the current and projected future needs of the union’s external action , which have dramatically increased both in neighbouring countries and worldwide as a result of the food , energy and economic crises; ### 23. deplores the fact that , even prior to the war against ukraine , funds available under heading 6 were woefully inadequate and that pressure has since increased substantially; underlines that the continued funding for the needs of refugees from syria , iraq and other countries was not factored into the mff or ndici-global europe budgets and should therefore have been financed by fresh appropriations with a corresponding increase in the ceiling of heading 6; highlights that , owing to the risk of default on mfa loans provided to ukraine , a far higher rate of provisioning than the standard 9 % is likely to be required as further loans are rolled out; underlines that additional needs in ukraine must not lead to money being diverted away from other geographic regions in need neither thematic priorities; insists , therefore , on an increase in the ceiling for heading 6 to fully cover the current and projected future needs of the union’s external action , which have dramatically increased both in neighbouring countries and worldwide as a result of the food , energy and economic crises;


### 24. underlines that heading 7 spending must be set at a level that guarantees that the eu has an effective and efficient administration; calls for the swift adoption of the targeted revision of the financial regulation proposed by the commission in relation to the handling of default interest for the late repayment of cancelled or reduced competition fines , so as to avoid pressure on spending under heading 7; ### 24. underlines that heading 7 spending must be set at a level that guarantees that the eu has an effective and efficient administration; calls for the swift adoption of the targeted revision of the financial regulation in relation to the handling of default interest for the late repayment of cancelled or reduced competition fines , so as to avoid pressure on spending under heading 7;


### 25. stresses that the mff revision must not lead to any downwards revision of the pre-allocated national envelopes; emphasises the fact that the late agreement on the mff for 2021-2027 and on the cohesion policy package , coupled with the covid-19 crisis , led to a slow start to the programming process , but not because of the policy itself; underlines that the delayed start does not in any way call into question the pivotal role and added value of cohesion policy as the essential union investment policy and convergence instrument; ### 25. stresses that the mff revision must not lead to any downwards revision of programmes; emphasises the fact that the late agreement on the mff for 2021-2027 and on the cohesion policy package , coupled with the covid-19 crisis , led to a slow start to the programming process for cohesion policy , but not because of the policy itself; underlines that the delayed start does not in any way call into question the pivotal role and added value of cohesion policy as the essential union investment policy and convergence instrument;


### 25. stresses that the mff revision must not lead to any downwards revision of the pre-allocated national envelopes; emphasises the fact that the late agreement on the mff for 2021-2027 and on the cohesion policy package , coupled with the covid-19 crisis , led to a slow start to the programming process , but not because of the policy itself; underlines that the delayed start does not in any way call into question the pivotal role and added value of cohesion policy as the essential union investment policy and convergence instrument; ### 25. stresses that the mff revision must not lead to any downwards revision of the pre-allocated national envelopes; emphasises the fact that the late agreement on the mff for 2021-2027 and on the cohesion policy package , coupled with the covid-19 crisis , led to a slow start to the programming process , but not because of the policy itself even though more administrative simplification is strongly needed; underlines that the delayed start does not in any way call into question the pivotal role and added value of cohesion policy as the essential union investment policy and convergence instrument;


### 26. recalls that payment appropriations flow directly from commitments and recalls , therefore , that any increase in the ceilings for commitments per heading will have to be accompanied by a corresponding increase in the ceiling for payments for the same or subsequent years; ### 26. recalls that payment appropriations flow directly from commitments and recalls , therefore , that any increase in the ceilings for commitments per heading will have to be accompanied by a correlative increase in the ceiling for payments for the same or subsequent years;


### 27. points out that mff and own resources are interlinked; emphasises , in this context , the need for sustainable and resilient revenue for the eu budget; recalls that , in the iia , parliament , the council and the commission committed to introducing sufficient new own resources to at least cover the repayment of euri debt; ### 27. points out that mff and own resources are interlinked; emphasises , in this context , the need for sustainable and resilient revenue for the eu budget; recalls that , in the iia , parliament , the council and the commission committed to introducing sufficient new own resources to at least cover the repayment of euri debt and already made political commitments;


### 29. stresses that , while crisis response measures are necessary and useful , cohesion policy is not a crisis response tool; is concerned that cohesion policy is increasingly being used to reinforce other policies and to make up for shortcomings in budgetary flexibility or crisis response mechanisms in the mff; emphasises that cohesion policy is one of the priorities of the union , has long-term investment objectives linked to the eu’s strategic agenda , in particular the european green deal and the digital agenda , and should not be used to replenish funding for other policies; calls , therefore , for cohesion funding levels to be preserved in the budget; ### 29. stresses that , while crisis response measures are necessary and useful , cohesion policy is not a crisis response tool; is concerned that cohesion policy is increasingly being used to reinforce other policies and to make up for shortcomings in budgetary flexibility or crisis response mechanisms in the mff; emphasises that cohesion policy is one of the priorities of the union , has long-term investment objectives linked to the eu’s strategic agenda , in particular the european green deal and the digital agenda , and should not be used to replenish funding for other policies; calls , therefore , for funding levels to be readjusted , and in particular for additional funding for cohesion policy amount to around at least 30% of the investment gap for energy efficiency investments until 2030 for a spending targeted at enhancing energy efficiency of the worst performing residential buildings for upfront investments with a special attention on technical assistance to allow for the bundling of projects to ensure timely and efficient uptake in response to the sharp rise in energy prices putting low income households in a difficult position;


### 29. stresses that , while crisis response measures are necessary and useful , cohesion policy is not a crisis response tool; is concerned that cohesion policy is increasingly being used to reinforce other policies and to make up for shortcomings in budgetary flexibility or crisis response mechanisms in the mff; emphasises that cohesion policy is one of the priorities of the union , has long-term investment objectives linked to the eu’s strategic agenda , in particular the european green deal and the digital agenda , and should not be used to replenish funding for other policies; calls , therefore , for cohesion funding levels to be preserved in the budget; ### 29. stresses that , while crisis response measures are necessary and useful , cohesion policy is not a crisis response tool; is concerned that cohesion policy is increasingly being used to reinforce other policies and to make up for shortcomings in budgetary flexibility or crisis response mechanisms in the mff; emphasises that cohesion policy is one of the priorities of the union , has long-term investment objectives linked to the eu’s strategic agenda , in particular the european green deal and the digital agenda , and should not be used to replenish funding for other policies; calls , therefore , for cohesion funding levels to be preserved in the budget along with common agricultural policy;


### 31. considers that the special instruments are constrained both by scarcity of resources and rigidity of design , hampering their ability to serve as effective crisis response tools; stresses , therefore , that the revision is imperative in broadening the potential of the existing flexibility provisions; criticises in particular the council’s decision , despite parliament’s warnings , to merge the emergency aid reserve (ear) and the eusf in the current mff , while reducing the overall funding available; ### 31. considers that the special instruments are constrained both by scarcity of resources and rigidity of design , hampering their ability to serve as effective crisis response tools; stresses , therefore , that the revision is imperative in broadening the potential of the existing flexibility provisions; criticises in particular the council’s decision , despite parliament’s warnings , to merge the emergency aid reserve (ear) and the eusf in the current mff , while reducing the overall funding available by about half;


### 31. considers that the special instruments are constrained both by scarcity of resources and rigidity of design , hampering their ability to serve as effective crisis response tools; stresses , therefore , that the revision is imperative in broadening the potential of the existing flexibility provisions; criticises in particular the council’s decision , despite parliament’s warnings , to merge the emergency aid reserve (ear) and the eusf in the current mff , while reducing the overall funding available; ### 31. considers that the special instruments are constrained both by scarcity of resources and rigidity of design , hampering their ability to serve as effective crisis response tools; stresses , therefore , that the revision is imperative in broadening the potential of the existing flexibility provisions; considers that the merging of the emergency aid reserve (ear) and the eusf in the current mff has led to shortcomings , while reducing the overall funding available;


### 32. calls for annual appropriations for the flexibility instrument to be increased from eur 915 million to eur 2 billion; calls , in addition , for the sear to be split into two strands – the ear and the eusf – and for annual appropriations to be increased from eur 1.2 billion for the sear to eur 1 billion for each strand in 2018 prices; considers that this will provide vital additional resources to respond to current and emerging needs; ### 32. calls for annual appropriations for the flexibility instrument to be increased from eur 915 million to eur 2 billion; reminds the increasing need to tackle emergencies and crises related to natural disasters and extreme weather internally and externally to the eu and its associated costs; calls , in addition , for the sear to be split into two strands – the ear and the eusf – and for annual appropriations to be increased from eur 1.2 billion for the sear to eur 1 billion for each strand in 2018 prices; considers that this will provide vital additional resources to respond to current and emerging needs , in particular , the expected increase in unforeseen weather events linked to climate change; furthermore , for the eusf calls for an increase in the level of advanced payments to at least 50% and to at least half the average time for advanced payments and at the same time ensuring the protection of the eu budget;


### 32. calls for annual appropriations for the flexibility instrument to be increased from eur 915 million to eur 2 billion; calls , in addition , for the sear to be split into two strands – the ear and the eusf – and for annual appropriations to be increased from eur 1.2 billion for the sear to eur 1 billion for each strand in 2018 prices; considers that this will provide vital additional resources to respond to current and emerging needs; ### 32. calls for annual appropriations for the flexibility instrument to be increased from eur 915 million to eur 2 billion; calls , in addition , for the sear to be split into two strands – the ear and the eusf – and for annual appropriations to be increased from eur 1.2 billion for the sear overall to eur 1 billion for each strand in 2018 prices; considers that this will provide vital additional resources to respond to current and emerging needs;


### 34. emphasises further that the various special instruments are subject to different carry-over rules and calls for the harmonisation of these rules so that amounts may be used up to year n+3 for all special instruments , thereby creating additional flexibility; insists that lapsed amounts after year n+3 be made available once more under the flexibility instrument; ### 34. emphasises further that the various special instruments are subject to different carry-over rules and calls for the harmonisation of these rules so that amounts may be used up to year n+3 for all special instruments , thereby creating additional flexibility; insists that lapsed amounts after year n+3 be made available once more under the smi;


### 35. insists that , beyond a reinforcement of the existing special instruments , it is necessary to establish a permanent fiscal capacity and common crisis instrument as an additional special instrument over and above the mff ceilings so that the eu budget can better adapt and quickly react to crises and their social and economic effects; ### 35. insists that , beyond a reinforcement of flexibilities in the mff and the existing special instruments , it is necessary to establish a permanent fiscal capacity and common crisis instrument as an additional special instrument over and above the mff ceilings so that the eu budget can better adapt and quickly react to crises and their social and economic effects;


### 35. insists that , beyond a reinforcement of the existing special instruments , it is necessary to establish a permanent fiscal capacity and common crisis instrument as an additional special instrument over and above the mff ceilings so that the eu budget can better adapt and quickly react to crises and their social and economic effects; ### 35. insists that , beyond a reinforcement of the existing special instruments , it is necessary to establish a permanent fiscal capacity for the euro area and common crisis instrument as an additional permanent special instrument over and above the mff ceilings so that the eu budget can better adapt and quickly react to crises and their social and economic effects;


### 36. insists that decommitted appropriations should remain in the budget so as to provide additional budgetary flexibility; underlines the need for corresponding changes to the financial regulation; ### 36. insists that decommitted appropriations , fines not used for eu programmes top-ups in 2021-2027 and penalties should accrue to the crisis instrument so as to provide additional budgetary flexibility; underlines the need for corresponding changes to the financial regulation;


### 36. insists that decommitted appropriations should remain in the budget so as to provide additional budgetary flexibility; underlines the need for corresponding changes to the financial regulation; ### 36. insists that all decommitted appropriations should remain in the budget so as to provide additional budgetary flexibility; underlines the need for corresponding changes to the financial regulation;


### 37. underlines that many of the shortcomings and inadequacies in the current mff are inherent in its logic and design , where predictability of spending drives decisions on structure and amounts and curbs flexibility; ### 37. underlines that many of the shortcomings and inadequacies in the current mff are inherent in its logic and design , where predictability of spending drives decisions on structure and amounts and curbs flexibility; regrets the high tensions the mff negotiations trigger due to its nature;


### 38. points out that many of the recent spending needs , in areas such as economic and social recovery , climate change-related policy reform and funding linked to the ukraine crisis , do not follow the traditional logic of medium-term investment predictability; considers social climate fund , defence , crisis response and emergency intervention spending to be cases in point where there is a clear-cut rationale for eu action; expects this trend towards a more diversified expenditure landscape to continue as the scope and depth of eu cooperation progresses; underlines , therefore , the need for a properly constructed and adaptable mff so that the design of the eu budget does not prevent the eu from taking on new tasks and functions; ### 38. points out that many of the recent spending needs , in areas such as economic and social recovery , climate change-related policy reform and funding linked to the ukraine crisis , do not follow the traditional logic of medium-term investment predictability; considers social climate fund , defence , crisis response and emergency intervention spending to be cases in point where there is a clear-cut rationale for eu action; expects this trend towards a more diversified expenditure landscape to continue as the scope and depth of eu cooperation progresses; underlines , therefore , the need for a properly constructed and adaptable mff so that the design of the eu budget does not prevent the eu from taking on new tasks and functions during the forthcoming mffs and ensure that new priorities are not implemented to the detriment of already agreed programmes;


### 39. deplores , however , the repeated use of off-budget instruments , in particular under article 122 tfeu , which runs counter to citizens’ interests , as this frustrates oversight and the transparency of public spending; considers , in that regard , than an annual plenary debate in parliament on all eu finances , including off-budget instruments , will be an important step towards enhancing transparency and accountability; ### 39. expresses concern , however , the repeated use of off-budget instruments , in particular under article 122 tfeu , impeding proper oversight if the european parliament and the transparency of public spending; considers , in that regard , than an annual plenary debate in parliament on all eu finances , including off-budget instruments , will be an important step towards enhancing transparency and accountability; calls , therefore , for enhanced reporting on the “galaxy” , in particular the introduction of an annex attached to the eu budget with detailed estimates of the amounts of external assigned revenues used for particular budgetary lines , streamlined reporting on borrowing and lending activities linked to the annual budgetary cycle and regular reporting on the outstanding guarantees , and considers that a regular inter-institutional dialogue on off-budget instruments linked to the annual budgetary procedure is needed;


### 39. deplores , however , the repeated use of off-budget instruments , in particular under article 122 tfeu , which runs counter to citizens’ interests , as this frustrates oversight and the transparency of public spending; considers , in that regard , than an annual plenary debate in parliament on all eu finances , including off-budget instruments , will be an important step towards enhancing transparency and accountability; ### 39. deplores , however , the repeated use of off-budget instruments , in particular under article 122 tfeu , which runs counter to citizens’ interests , as this frustrates oversight , accountability and the transparency of public spending;


### 40. stresses , in this context , that the trend towards increased use of external assigned revenue is not a satisfactory solution as it weakens the role of the budgetary authority (parliament and the council) , thereby negatively impacting democratic scrutiny and reducing the transparency of the eu’s finances; demands legally sound solutions that allow for targeted , one-off or needs-based top-ups that display the same advantages as earmarked revenue (i.e. not counted against the ceilings) , but that are at the same time subject to full control of the budgetary authority; ### 40. stresses , in this context , that the trend towards increased use of external assigned revenue is not a satisfactory solution as it weakens the role of the budgetary authority (parliament and the council) , thereby negatively impacting democratic scrutiny and reducing the transparency of the eu’s finances; demands legally sound solutions that allow for targeted , one-off or needs-based top-ups that display the same advantages as earmarked revenue (i.e. not counted against the ceilings) , but that are at the same time subject to full control of the budgetary authority; calls , in this regard , on the commission to explore the use of hybrid instruments(funds with mix funding: budget and assigned revenue) beyond research and external action (combined financing from eu budget and externally assigned revenue(ears)s 6a as long as parliament’s role is secured and empower the budgetary authority to adopt annual commitments and payments when ears are used to supplement eu programmes with contributions from member states (article 21(2a) of the financial regulation) or when they come from joint eu borrowing , and making possible for member states to the use of voluntary ‘ad hoc’ contributions from member states to reinforce all types of union programmes;


### 40. stresses , in this context , that the trend towards increased use of external assigned revenue is not a satisfactory solution as it weakens the role of the budgetary authority (parliament and the council) , thereby negatively impacting democratic scrutiny and reducing the transparency of the eu’s finances; demands legally sound solutions that allow for targeted , one-off or needs-based top-ups that display the same advantages as earmarked revenue (i.e. not counted against the ceilings) , but that are at the same time subject to full control of the budgetary authority; ### 40. stresses , in this context , that the trend towards increased use of external assigned revenue is not a satisfactory solution as it weakens the role of the budgetary authority (parliament and the council) , thereby negatively impacting democratic scrutiny and reducing the transparency of the eu’s finances; demands legally sound solutions that allow for targeted , one-off or needs-based top-ups that display the same advantages as external assigned revenue (i.e. not counted against the ceilings) , but that are at the same time subject to full control of the budgetary authority; reminds its strong commitment to the universality principle;


### 42. calls on the commission , furthermore , to begin a longer-term reflection on the eu budget post-2027 in the light of evolving spending needs and building on the work of the conference on the future of europe with respect to own resources and the budget; insists that the successor to the current mff be equipped to deal fully and flexibly with a range of policy priorities and spending needs and to ensure resilience in the event of crises; ### 42. calls on the commission , furthermore , to begin a longer-term reflection on the eu budget post-2027 in the light of evolving spending needs and building on the work of the conference on the future of europe with respect to own resources and the budget; insists that the successor to the current mff be equipped to deal fully and flexibly with a range of policy priorities and spending needs and to ensure resilience in the event of crises; asks the commission to review the whole architecture of the mff , including through an assessment of the suitability of a long-term programming framework for all eu programmes and of the duration of programming periods of seven years;


### proposal for a ### proposal for a


### (4) in regulation (eu) 2021/1119 of the european parliament and of the council32 ( ‘european climate law’) , the union has enshrined into legislation the target of economy-wide climate neutrality by 2050. that regulation also establishes a binding union domestic reduction commitment of net greenhouse gas emissions (emissions after deduction of removals) of at least 55% below 1990 levels by 2030. ### (4) in regulation (eu) 2021/1119 of the european parliament and of the council32 ( ‘european climate law’) , the union has enshrined into legislation the target of economy-wide climate neutrality by 2050. that regulation also establishes a binding union domestic reduction commitment of net greenhouse gas emissions (emissions after deduction of removals) of at least 55% below 1990 levels by 2030. that regulation also lays down an obligation on the commission to make a legislative proposal , as appropriate , to introduce further intermediary targets , to ensure a swift and irreversible reduction of greenhouse gas emissions over time so as to reach the union climate neutrality objective by 2050 at the latest and negative emissions thereafter.


### (4) in regulation (eu) 2021/1119 of the european parliament and of the council32 ( ‘european climate law’) , the union has enshrined into legislation the target of economy-wide climate neutrality by 2050. that regulation also establishes a binding union domestic reduction commitment of net greenhouse gas emissions (emissions after deduction of removals) of at least 55% below 1990 levels by 2030. ### (4) in regulation (eu) 2021/1119 of the european parliament and of the council32 ( ‘european climate law’) , the union has enshrined into legislation the target of economy-wide climate neutrality by 2050. that regulation also establishes a binding union domestic reduction commitment of net greenhouse gas emissions (emissions after deduction of removals) of at least 55% below 1990 levels by 2030. that regulation also lays down an obligation on the commission to make a legislative proposal , as appropriate , to introduce further intermediary targets , to ensure a swift and irreversible reduction of greenhouse gas emissions over time so as to reach the eu climate neutrality objective by 2050 at the latest and negative emissions thereafter.


### (11) for that purpose , the greenhouse gas emission reduction target for 2030 needs to be revised for each member state. the revision of the greenhouse gas emission reduction target should use the same methodology that was followed when regulation (eu) 2018/842 was first adopted , where the national contributions were determined in consideration of the different capacities and cost-efficiency opportunities in member states so to ensure a fair and balanced distribution of the effort. the reduction of the maximum greenhouse gas emissions for each member state in 2030 should thus be determined in relation to the level of its 2005 reviewed greenhouse gas emissions covered by this regulation , excluding verified greenhouse gas emissions from installations that operated in 2005 and which were only included in the emission trading system of the union after 2005. ### (11) for that purpose , the greenhouse gas emission reduction target for 2030 needs to be revised for each member state. the revision of the greenhouse gas emission reduction target should use the same methodology that was followed when regulation (eu) 2018/842 was first adopted , where the national contributions were determined in consideration of the different capacities and cost-efficiency opportunities in member states so to ensure a fair and balanced distribution of the effort. however , cost-efficiency opportunities should be carefully measured against the urgency of climate action and the financial opportunities made available through the next generation eu recovery package , including the new eu budget , to make sure that member states are using all the instruments available to reduce their country emissions in the sectors outlined in article 2 of this regulation. the reduction of the maximum greenhouse gas emissions for each member state in 2030 should thus be determined in relation to the level of its 2005 reviewed greenhouse gas emissions covered by this regulation , excluding verified greenhouse gas emissions from installations that operated in 2005 and which were only included in the emission trading system of the union after 2005.


### (13) the covid-19 pandemic has impacted the union’s economy and its level of emissions to a degree that cannot yet be fully quantified. on the other hand , the union is deploying its largest stimulus package ever , also having a potential impact on the level of emissions. due to those uncertainties , it is appropriate to review the emissions data in 2025 and , if necessary , readjust the annual emission allocations. ### deleted


### (13) the covid-19 pandemic has impacted the union’s economy and its level of emissions to a degree that cannot yet be fully quantified. on the other hand , the union is deploying its largest stimulus package ever , also having a potential impact on the level of emissions. due to those uncertainties , it is appropriate to review the emissions data in 2025 and , if necessary , readjust the annual emission allocations. ### (13) the covid-19 pandemic has impacted the union’s economy and its level of emissions to a degree that cannot yet be fully quantified. on the other hand , the union is deploying its largest stimulus package ever , also having a potential impact on the level of emissions. due to those uncertainties , it is appropriate to review the emissions data in 2025 and , if necessary , readjust the annual emission allocations. however , such adjustments shall not undermine the level of the ambition of the union target in article 1 and the national targets in annex i of this regulation. the national targets shall be reviewed only upwards , i.e. aligning with the paris agreement clause of “no backsliding” (article 3) to make sure that the emissions reduction targets cannot be decreased over time.


### (13) the covid-19 pandemic has impacted the union’s economy and its level of emissions to a degree that cannot yet be fully quantified. on the other hand , the union is deploying its largest stimulus package ever , also having a potential impact on the level of emissions. due to those uncertainties , it is appropriate to review the emissions data in 2025 and , if necessary , readjust the annual emission allocations. ### (13) the covid-19 pandemic has impacted the union’s economy and its level of emissions to a degree that cannot yet be fully quantified. it should be ensured that , in the post-pandemic period , emissions do not bounce back to pre-covid-19 levels , so as not to jeopardise the achievement of the union's climate neutrality objective by 2050 at the latest.


### (14) it is therefore appropriate to update in 2025 the annual emission allocations for the years 2026 to 2030. this should be based on a comprehensive review of the national inventory data carried out by the commission in order to determine the average of the greenhouse gas emissions of each member state during the years 2021 , 2022 and 2023. ### deleted


### (15) under regulation (eu) 2018/842 , the cancellation of a limited quantity of emission allowances in the european union emission trading system may be taken into account for some member states’ compliance under regulation (eu) 2018/842. given the particular structure of malta’s economy , the national reduction target of that member state based on gross domestic product per capita is significantly above its cost-effective reduction potential , is is therefore appropriate to increase malta’s access to that flexibility , without compromising the 2030 target of the union on emission reductions. ### deleted


### (16) in addition to that flexibility , a limited quantity of net removals and net emissions from land use , land-use change and forestry (‘lulucf’) may be taken into account for member states’ compliance under regulation (eu) 2018/842 (‘the lulucf flexibility’). in order to ensure that sufficient mitigation efforts are deployed until 2030 , it is appropriate to limit the use of the lulucf flexibility by separating the use of such flexibility into two separate time periods , each capped by a limit corresponding to half of the maximum amount of total net removals set out in annex iii to regulation (eu) 2018/842. it is also appropriate to bring the title of annex iii in line with the amendment to regulation (eu) 2018/841 carried out by commission delegated regulation (eu) 2021/268 of 28 october 202037 . as a consequence , there is no longer a need for regulation (eu) 2018/842 to provide for a legal basis allowing the commission to adopt delegated acts to amend the title of its annex iii. article 7(2) of regulation (eu) 2018/842 should therefore be deleted. ### (16) in addition to that flexibility , a limited quantity of net removals and net emissions from land use , land-use change and forestry (‘lulucf’) may be taken into account for member states’ compliance under regulation (eu) 2018/842 (‘the lulucf flexibility’). in order to ensure that sufficient mitigation efforts are deployed until 2030 , it is appropriate to end the use of the lulucf flexibility from 2023 onward.


### (17) considering , the introduction of a strengthened compliance regime in regulation (eu) 2018/841 as of 2026 , it is appropriate to abolish the deduction of the greenhouse gas emissions generated by each member state in the period from 2026 to 2030 in the land sector in excess of its removals. article 9(2) should therefore be amended accordingly. ### (17) the provisions of regulation 2018/842 in relation to incompliance should be strengthened so as , on the one hand , to dissuade countries from exceeding their emissions allocations including with financial penalties , and , on the other hand , to increase transparency and effectiveness of corrective actions.


### (18) the setting of more ambitious targets under regulation (eu) 2018/841 will decrease the capacity of member states to generate net removals that can be used for compliance under regulation (eu) 2018/842. in addition , the split of the use of the lulucf flexibility into two separate time periods , will further limit the availability of net removals for the purpose of compliance with regulation (eu) 2018/842. as a result , some member states may face challenges in meeting their targets under regulation (eu) 2018/842 , while some member states , the same or other , may generate net removals that cannot be used for compliance with regulation (eu) 2018/842. as long as the union objectives as set out in article 3 of regulation (eu) 2021/1119 are met , in particular with regard to the maximum limit of the contribution of net removals , it is appropriate to create a new voluntary mechanism , in the form of an additional reserve , that will help adhering member states to comply with their obligations. ### deleted


### (1) in article 1 , “30%” is replaced by “40%”; ### (1) article 1 is replaced by the following:


### 2. subject to the flexibilities provided for in articles 5 , 6 and 7 of this regulation and the adjustment pursuant to its article 10(2) and taking into account any deduction resulting from the application of article 7 of decision no 406/2009/ec , each member state shall ensure that its greenhouse gas emissions: ### 2. subject to the flexibilities provided for in article 5 of this regulation and the adjustment pursuant to its article 10(2)and taking into account any deduction resulting from the application of article7 of decision no 406/2009/ec , each member state shall ensure that its greenhouse gas emissions


### do not exceed , in the years 2023 , 2024 and 2025 , the limit defined by a linear trajectory starting in 2022 at the annual emission allocation for that member state , as set out pursuant to paragraph 3 of this article for that year , and ending in 2030 at the limit set for that member state in column 2 of annex i to this regulation; ### do not exceed , in the years 2023 to2030 , the limit defined by a linear trajectory , starting on the average of its greenhouse gas emissions during 2018 , 2019 and 2020 , as set out pursuant to paragraph 3 of this article , and ending in 2030 at the limit set for that member state in column 2 of annex i to this regulation;


### do not exceed , in the years 2026 to 2030 , the limit defined by a linear trajectory starting in 2024 , at the average of its greenhouse gas emissions during the years 2021 , 2022 and 2023 , as submitted by the member state pursuant to article 26 of regulation (eu) 2018/1999 , and ending in 2030 at the limit set for that member state in column 2 of annex i to this regulation. ### deleted


### for the years 2021 and 2022 , it shall determine the annual emission allocations based on a comprehensive review of the most recent national inventory data for the years 2005 and 2016 to 2018 submitted by the member states pursuant to article 7 of regulation (eu) no 525/2013 and indicate the value for the 2005 greenhouse gas emissions of each member state used to determine those annual emission allocations. ### for the years 2021 and 2022 , it shall determine the annual emission allocations based on a comprehensive review of the most recent national inventory data for the years 2005 and 2016 to 2018 submitted by the member states pursuant to article 7 of regulation (eu) no 525/2013 and indicate the value for the 2005 greenhouse gas emissions of each member state used to determine those annual emission allocations.


### (4) in article 6 the following paragraph 3a is inserted: ### (4) article 6 is deleted.


### (5) article 7 is amended as follows: ### (5) article 7 is deleted.


### (5) article 7 is amended as follows: ### deleted


### 2. if the greenhouse gas emissions of a member state in the period from 2021 to 2025 referred to in article 4 of regulation (eu) 2018/841 exceeded its removals , as determined in accordance with article 12 of that regulation , the central administrator shall deduct from that member state’s annual emission allocations an amount equal to those excess greenhouse gas emissions in tonnes of co2 equivalent for the relevant years.. ### 2. if a member state exceeds its annual emissions allowance in two or more consecutive years it shall undertake a review of its national energy and climate plan and national long-term strategy. this review shall be completed within 12 months. the commission may issue recommendations identifying how the member state’s national energy and climate plan and national long-term strategy should be revised. the member state shall notify the revised plan to the commission together with a statement setting out how the proposed revisions will remedy non- compliance with the national aeas and how they have responded to the commission’s recommendations where relevant. if the national energy and climate plan or national long-term strategy remains substantially unaltered , the commission shall , if appropriate , open an infringement procedure.


### 2. if the greenhouse gas emissions of a member state in the period from 2021 to 2025 referred to in article 4 of regulation (eu) 2018/841 exceeded its removals , as determined in accordance with article 12 of that regulation , the central administrator shall deduct from that member state’s annual emission allocations an amount equal to those excess greenhouse gas emissions in tonnes of co2 equivalent for the relevant years.. ### 2. “if a member state exceeds its annual emissions allowance in two or more consecutive years it shall undertake a review of its national energy and climate plan and national long-term strategy. this review shall be completed within 12 months. the commission may issue recommendations identifying how the member state’s national energy and climate plan and national long-term strategy should be revised. the member state shall notify the revised plan to the commission together with a statement setting out how the proposed revisions will remedy non- compliance with the national aeas and how they have responded to the commission’s recommendations where relevant. if the national energy and climate plan or national long-term strategy remains substantially unaltered , the commission shall , if appropriate , open an infringement procedure.”


### article 11 ### (6 a) article 11 is deleted


### (7) the following article is inserted: ### deleted


### (9) in annex ii the entry for malta is replaced by the following: ### (9) annex ii is deleted.


### (9) in annex ii the entry for malta is replaced by the following: ### deleted


### (10) the title of annex iii is replaced by the following: ### deleted


### (10) the title of annex iii is replaced by the following: ### (10) annex iii is deleted.


### 7. welcomes the commitment of the undertaking to facilitate research and innovation activities to deliver an integrated european railway network by design , eliminating barriers to interoperability and delivering smart , sustainable , and resilient rail system to ensure a harmonised approach to the evolution of the single european rail area. ### 7. welcomes the commitment of the undertaking to facilitate research and innovation activities to deliver an integrated european railway network by design , eliminating barriers to interoperability and delivering smart , sustainable , and resilient rail system to ensure a harmonised approach to the evolution of the single european rail area; highlights the importance of supporting the undertaking given rail’s inherent advantages in terms of environmental performance , land use , energy consumption , and safety;


### (1) the purpose of this regulation is to improve the functioning of the internal market by laying down a uniform legal framework in particular for the development , marketing and use of artificial intelligence in conformity with union values. this regulation pursues a number of overriding reasons of public interest , such as a high level of protection of health , safety and fundamental rights , and it ensures the free movement of ai-based goods and services cross-border , thus preventing member states from imposing restrictions on the development , marketing and use of ai systems , unless explicitly authorised by this regulation. ### (1) the purpose of this regulation is to improve the functioning of the internal market by laying down a uniform legal framework in particular for the development , marketing and use of artificial intelligence in conformity with union values. this regulation pursues a number of overriding reasons of public interest , such as a high level of protection of health , safety , fundamental rights and the environment , and it ensures the free movement of ai-based goods and services cross-border , thus preventing member states from imposing restrictions on the development , marketing and use of ai systems , unless explicitly authorised by this regulation.


### (1) the purpose of this regulation is to improve the functioning of the internal market by laying down a uniform legal framework in particular for the development , marketing and use of artificial intelligence in conformity with union values. this regulation pursues a number of overriding reasons of public interest , such as a high level of protection of health , safety and fundamental rights , and it ensures the free movement of ai-based goods and services cross-border , thus preventing member states from imposing restrictions on the development , marketing and use of ai systems , unless explicitly authorised by this regulation. ### (1) the purpose of this regulation is to improve the functioning of the internal market by laying down a uniform minimum legal framework in particular for the development , marketing and use of artificial intelligence in conformity with union values. this regulation pursues a number of overriding reasons of public interest , such as a high level of protection of health , safety and fundamental rights , as well as the environment , society , rule of law and democracy , economic interests and consumer protection. it also ensures the free movement of ai-based goods and services cross-border , thus preventing member states from imposing restrictions on the development , marketing and use of ai systems , unless explicitly authorised by this regulation , or justified by the need to ensure the protection of the rights and freedoms of natural persons , or the ethical principles advocated by this regulation


### (1) the purpose of this regulation is to improve the functioning of the internal market by laying down a uniform legal framework in particular for the development , marketing and use of artificial intelligence in conformity with union values. this regulation pursues a number of overriding reasons of public interest , such as a high level of protection of health , safety and fundamental rights , and it ensures the free movement of ai-based goods and services cross-border , thus preventing member states from imposing restrictions on the development , marketing and use of ai systems , unless explicitly authorised by this regulation. ### (1) the purpose of this regulation is to improve the functioning of the internal market by laying down a uniform legal framework in particular for the development , marketing and use of artificial intelligence in conformity with union priorities and values. this regulation pursues a number of overriding reasons of public interest , such as a high level of protection of biodiversity , the climate and the environment , health , safety and fundamental rights , and it ensures the free movement of ai-based goods and services cross-border , thus preventing member states from imposing restrictions on the development , marketing and use of ai systems , unless explicitly authorised by this regulation.


### (1) the purpose of this regulation is to improve the functioning of the internal market by laying down a uniform legal framework in particular for the development , marketing and use of artificial intelligence in conformity with union values. this regulation pursues a number of overriding reasons of public interest , such as a high level of protection of health , safety and fundamental rights , and it ensures the free movement of ai-based goods and services cross-border , thus preventing member states from imposing restrictions on the development , marketing and use of ai systems , unless explicitly authorised by this regulation. ### (1) the purpose of this regulation is to improve the functioning of the internal market by laying down a uniform minimum legal framework in particular for the development , marketing and use of artificial intelligence in conformity with union values. this regulation pursues a number of overriding reasons of public interest , such as a high level of protection of health , safety and fundamental rights , and it ensures the free movement of ai-based goods and services cross-border , thus preventing member states from imposing restrictions on the development , marketing and use of ai systems , unless explicitly authorised by this regulation , or justified by the need to ensure the protection of the rights and freedoms of natural persons , or the ethical principles advocated by this regulation.