### where the delegated acts adopted pursuant to articles 10(3) , 11(3) , 12(2) , 13(2) , 14(2) or 15(2) of regulation (eu) 2020/852 are amended following the issuance of the bond , the issuer shall allocate bond proceeds to the uses referred to in the first subparagraph by applying the amended delegated acts within five years after their entry into application. ### where the delegated acts adopted pursuant to articles 10(3) , 11(3) , 12(2) , 13(2) , 14(2) or 15(2) of regulation (eu) 2020/852 are amended following the issuance of the bond , the issuer shall allocate bond proceeds to the uses referred to in the first subparagraph by applying the amended delegated acts within five years after their entry into application. five years after the entry into application of the amended delegated acts , the bond cannot retain its designation as a european green bond if the funds have not been fully allocated in line with the amended delegated acts.


### where the delegated acts adopted pursuant to articles 10(3) , 11(3) , 12(2) , 13(2) , 14(2) or 15(2) of regulation (eu) 2020/852 are amended following the issuance of the bond , the issuer shall allocate bond proceeds to the uses referred to in the first subparagraph by applying the amended delegated acts within five years after their entry into application. ### where the delegated acts adopted pursuant to articles 10(3) , 11(3) , 12(2) , 13(2) , 14(2) or 15(2) of regulation (eu) 2020/852 are amended following the issuance of the bond , the issuer shall allocate bond proceeds to the uses referred to in the first subparagraph by applying the amended delegated acts within five years after their entry into application. in cases where , five years after the entry into application of the amended delegated acts , bond proceeds are not fully allocated in accordance with those delegated acts , the bond shall not retain its designation as a european green bond.


### where the delegated acts adopted pursuant to articles 10(3) , 11(3) , 12(2) , 13(2) , 14(2) or 15(2) of regulation (eu) 2020/852 are amended following the creation of the debt referred to in the first subparagraph , the issuer shall allocate bond proceeds to the debt referred to in the first subparagraph by applying the amended delegated acts within five years after their entry into application. ### where the delegated acts adopted pursuant to articles 10(3) , 11(3) , 12(2) , 13(2) , 14(2) or 15(2) of regulation (eu) 2020/852 are amended following the creation of the debt referred to in the first subparagraph , the issuer shall allocate bond proceeds to the debt referred to in the first subparagraph by applying the amended delegated acts within five years after their entry into application. five years after the entry into application of the amended delegated acts , the bond cannot retain its designation as a european green bond if the funds have not been fully allocated in line with the amended delegated acts.


### where the delegated acts adopted pursuant to articles 10(3) , 11(3) , 12(2) , 13(2) , 14(2) or 15(2) of regulation (eu) 2020/852 are amended following the creation of the debt referred to in the first subparagraph , the issuer shall allocate bond proceeds to the debt referred to in the first subparagraph by applying the amended delegated acts within five years after their entry into application. ### where the delegated acts adopted pursuant to articles 10(3) , 11(3) , 12(2) , 13(2) , 14(2) or 15(2) of regulation (eu) 2020/852 are amended following the creation of the debt referred to in the first subparagraph , the issuer shall allocate bond proceeds to the debt referred to in the first subparagraph by applying the amended delegated acts within five years after their entry into application. in cases where , five years after the entry into application of the amended delegated acts , bond proceeds are not fully allocated in accordance with those delegated acts , the bond shall not retain its designation as a european green bond.


### 1. prior to issuing a european green bond , issuers shall: ### 1. prior to issuing a european green bond or other bonds marketed as environmentally sustainable , issuers shall:


### 2. a european green bond factsheet may relate to one or several european green bond issuances. ### 2. a european green bond factsheet may relate to one or several issuances of european green bonds or other bonds marketed as environmentally sustainable.


### 1. every year and until the full allocation of the proceeds of the european green bond concerned , issuers of european green bonds shall draw up a european green bond allocation report by using the template laid down in annex ii , demonstrating that the proceeds of any european green bonds concerned from their issuance date and until the end of the year the report refers to have been allocated in accordance with articles 4 to 7. ### 1. every year and until the full allocation of the proceeds of the european green bond or other bonds marketed as environmentally sustainable concerned , issuers of european green bonds or other bonds marketed as environmentally sustainable shall draw up a european green bond allocation report by using the template laid down in annex ii , demonstrating that the proceeds of any european green bonds or other bonds marketed as environmentally sustainable concerned from their issuance date and until the end of the year the report refers to have been allocated in accordance with articles 4 to 7.


### 2. a european green bond allocation report may relate to one or several issuances of european green bonds. ### 2. a european green bond allocation report may relate to one or several issuances of european green bonds or other bonds marketed as environmentally sustainable.


### 3. issuers of european green bonds shall obtain a post-issuance review by an external reviewer of the allocation report drawn up after the full allocation of the proceeds of the european green bond in accordance with articles 4 to 7. ### 3. issuers of european green bonds or other bonds marketed as environmentally sustainable shall obtain a post-issuance review by an external reviewer of the allocation report drawn up after the full allocation of the proceeds of the european green bond or other bonds marketed as environmentally sustainable in accordance with articles 4 to 7.


### 4. where , following the publication of the allocation report in accordance with article 13(1) , point (c) , the allocation of proceeds is corrected , issuers of the european green bonds concerned shall amend the allocation report and obtain a post-issuance review by an external reviewer of that amended allocation report. ### 4. where , following the publication of the allocation report in accordance with article 13(1) , point (c) , the allocation of proceeds is corrected , issuers of the european green bonds or other bonds marketed as environmentally sustainable concerned shall amend the allocation report and obtain a post-issuance review by an external reviewer of that amended allocation report.


### 6. issuers of european green bonds shall provide the allocation reports referred to in paragraph 3 , 4 , and 5 to an external reviewer within 30 days following the end of the year to which the allocation reports refer. the post-issuance review must be made public within 90 days following the receipt of the allocation report. ### 6. issuers of european green bonds or other bonds marketed as environmentally sustainable shall provide the allocation reports referred to in paragraph 3 , 4 , and 5 to an external reviewer within 30 days following the end of the year to which the allocation reports refer. the post-issuance review must be made public within 90 days following the receipt of the allocation report.


### 8. where bond proceeds are allocated to tax relief as referred to in article 4(2) , point (c) or subsidies as referred to in article 4(2) , point (d) , the post-issuance review shall only assess compliance with articles 4 to 7 of the terms and conditions under which those expenditures or transfers have been disbursed. ### deleted


### 8. where bond proceeds are allocated to tax relief as referred to in article 4(2) , point (c) or subsidies as referred to in article 4(2) , point (d) , the post-issuance review shall only assess compliance with articles 4 to 7 of the terms and conditions under which those expenditures or transfers have been disbursed. ### 8. where bond proceeds are allocated to subsidies as referred to in article 4(2) , point (d) , the post-issuance review shall only assess compliance with articles 4 to 7 of the terms and conditions under which those expenditures or transfers have been disbursed.


### 1. issuers of european green bonds shall , after the full allocation of the proceeds of such bonds and at least once during the lifetime of the bond , draw up a european green bond impact report on the environmental impact of the use of the bond proceeds by using the template laid down in annex iii. ### 1. issuers of european green bonds or other bonds marketed as environmentally sustainable shall , after the full allocation of the proceeds of such bonds and at least every five years until the bond reaches maturity , draw up a european green bond impact report on the environmental impact of the use of the bond proceeds by using the template laid down in annex iii.


### 1. issuers of european green bonds shall , after the full allocation of the proceeds of such bonds and at least once during the lifetime of the bond , draw up a european green bond impact report on the environmental impact of the use of the bond proceeds by using the template laid down in annex iii. ### 1. issuers of european green bonds shall , after the full allocation of the proceeds of such bonds and at least every five years until the bond reaches maturity , draw up a european green bond impact report on the environmental impact of the use of the bond proceeds by using the template laid down in annex iii.


### an issuer that is a sovereign may obtain pre-issuance and post-issuance reviews from an external reviewer , or from a state auditor or any other public entity that is mandated by the sovereign to assess compliance with this regulation. ### an issuer of european green bonds or other bonds marketed as environmentally sustainable that is a sovereign may obtain pre-issuance and post-issuance reviews from an external reviewer , or from a state auditor or any other public entity that is mandated by the sovereign to assess compliance with this regulation. for non-union sovereign issuers , the state auditor or other public entity shall be required to receive pre-approval from esma in line with title iii chapter 1.


### 1. where a prospectus is to be published pursuant to regulation (eu) 2017/1129 , that prospectus shall clearly state , where required to provide information on the use of proceeds , that the european green bond is issued in accordance with this regulation. ### 1. where a prospectus is to be published pursuant to regulation (eu) 2017/1129 , that prospectus shall clearly state , where required to provide information on the use of proceeds , that the european green bond or other bond marketed as environmentally sustainable is issued in accordance with this regulation.


### 1. issuers of european green bonds shall publish on their website , in a distinct section titled ‘european green bonds’ and make available free of charge until at least the maturity of the bonds concerned , all of the following: ### 1. issuers of european green bonds or other bond marketed as environmentally sustainable shall publish on their website , in a distinct section titled ‘european green bonds’ and make available free of charge until at least the maturity of the bonds concerned , all of the following:


### conditions for taking up activities as external reviewer for european green bonds ### conditions for taking up activities as external reviewer for european green bonds or bonds marketed as environmentally sustainable


### conditions for taking up activities as external reviewer for european green bonds ### conditions for taking up activities as external reviewer for european green bonds and bonds marketed as environmentally sustainable


### 1. external reviewers for european green bonds shall , before taking up their activities , register with esma. ### 1. external reviewers for european green bonds or bonds marketed as environmentally sustainable shall , before taking up their activities , register with esma.


### the policies or procedures implemented by the applicant to identify , manage and disclose any conflicts of interests as referred to in article 27; ### the policies or procedures implemented by the applicant to identify , manage and disclose in a transparent manner any actual or potential conflicts of interests as referred to in article 27;


### esma may extend the period referred to in the first subparagraph by 15 working days where the applicant intends to use outsourcing to perform its activities as an external reviewer. ### esma may extend the period referred to in the first subparagraph by 15 working days where the applicant intends to use outsourcing to perform some of its activities as an external reviewer.


### that conflicts of interest are properly identified , managed and disclosed; ### that any actual or potential conflicts of interest are properly identified , managed and disclosed;


### 2. esma shall develop draft regulatory technical standards specifying the criteria to assess the sound and prudent management of the external reviewer referred to in paragraph 1 , point (a). ### 2. esma shall develop draft regulatory technical standards specifying the criteria to assess the sound and prudent management of the external reviewer referred to in paragraph 1 , point (a) and (c).


### esma shall develop draft regulatory technical standards specifying the criteria to assess the sound and prudent management of the external reviewer referred to in paragraph 1 , point (a). ### esma shall develop draft regulatory technical standards specifying the criteria to assess the sound and prudent management of the external reviewer referred to in paragraph 1 , point (a) and (c).


### 2. external reviewers shall not outsource their compliance function. ### 2. external reviewers shall give reasons for a decision to outsource part of their assessment activities. external reviewers shall not outsource all of their assessment activities , or compliance function.


### 2. external reviewers shall not outsource their compliance function. ### 2. external reviewers shall duly motivate a decision to outsource a part of their assessment activities. external reviewers shall not outsource all of their assessment activities or their compliance function.


### 3. external reviewers shall notify esma about those of its assessment activities which are to be outsourced , including a specification of the level of human and technical resources needed to carry out each of those activities. ### 3. external reviewers shall notify esma about those of its assessment activities which are to be outsourced , including a specification of the level of human and technical resources needed to carry out each of those activities. esma shall , within 30 days after the date of receipt of that notification , approve or reject the outsourcing arrangements. esma shall reject the outsourcing arrangements if it considers that the external reviewer does not adhere to the requirements of paragraph 1 , 2 and 4.


### 3. external reviewers shall notify esma about those of its assessment activities which are to be outsourced , including a specification of the level of human and technical resources needed to carry out each of those activities. ### 3. external reviewers shall notify esma about those of its assessment activities which are to be outsourced , including a specification of the level of human and technical resources needed to carry out each of those activities. esma shall , within 30 days of the date of receipt of that notification , approve or reject the outsourcing arrangements. esma shall reject the outsourcing arrangements if it considers that the external reviewer does not comply with paragraphs 1 , 2 and 4.


### 2. fees charged by external reviewers for assessment services shall not depend on the result of the pre-issuance or post-issuance review , or on any other result or outcome of the work performed. ### 2. fees charged by external reviewers for assessment services shall be agreed by the reviewer and the issuer prior to the review and shall not depend on the result of the pre-issuance or post-issuance review , or on any other result or outcome of the work performed.


### 1. a third-country external reviewer may provide its services in accordance with this regulation to issuers that issue european green bonds where that third-country external reviewer is registered in the register of third-country external reviewers kept by esma in accordance with article 59. ### 1. a third-country external reviewer may provide its services in accordance with this regulation to issuers that issue european green bonds or bonds marketed as environmentally sustainable where that third-country external reviewer is registered in the register of third-country external reviewers kept by esma in accordance with article 59.


### to suspend an offer of european green bonds for a maximum of 10 consecutive working days on any single occasion where there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that articles 8 to 13 of this regulation have been infringed; ### to suspend an offer of european green bonds or bonds marketed as environmentally sustainable for as long as necessary on any single occasion where there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that articles 8 to 13 of this regulation have been infringed;


### to prohibit or suspend advertisements or require issuers of european green bonds or financial intermediaries concerned to cease or suspend advertisements for a maximum of 10 consecutive working days on any single occasion where there are reasonable grounds for believing that articles 8 to 13 of this regulation have been infringed; ### to prohibit or suspend advertisements or require issuers of european green bonds or financial intermediaries concerned to cease or suspend advertisements for as long as necessary on any single occasion where there are reasonable grounds for believing that articles 7a to 13 of this regulation have been infringed;


### to make public the fact that an issuer of european green bonds is failing to comply with its obligations under articles 8 to 13 of this regulation; ### to make public the fact that an issuer of european green bonds or bonds marketed as environmentally sustainable is failing to comply with its obligations under articles 7a to 13 of this regulation and to require the issuer to publish that information on its website and inform investors in the sustainable bond of the failure to comply;


### (ii) the proportionality of the publication of such decisions with regard to measures which are deemed to be of a minor nature. ### deleted


### 3. environmental strategy and rationale ### 3. sustainability strategy and rationale


### 3.environmental strategy and rationale ### 3. sustainability strategy and rationale


### – for assets that are concerned by a taxonomy alignment plan: the progress in the implementation of the plan during the reporting period , and the estimated date of completion; ### – for assets that are concerned by a taxonomy alignment plan: the progress in the implementation of the plan during the reporting period , as well the remaining steps and estimated date of their completion;


### 2. environmental strategy and rationale ### 2. sustainability strategy and rationale


### application for registration as an external reviewer for european green bonds ### application for registration as an external reviewer for european green bonds and bonds marketed as environmentally sustainable


### 1. an application for registration as an external reviewer for european green bonds shall contain all of the following information: ### 1. an application for registration as an external reviewer for european green bonds and bonds marketed as environmentally sustainable shall contain all of the following information:


### to suspend an offer of european green bonds for a maximum of 10 consecutive working days on any single occasion where there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that articles 8 to 13 of this regulation have been infringed; ### to suspend an offer european green bonds or bonds marketed as environmentally sustainable for as long as necessary on any single occasion where there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that articles 6 to 13 of this regulation have been infringed;


### to prohibit or suspend advertisements or require issuers of european green bonds or financial intermediaries concerned to cease or suspend advertisements for a maximum of 10 consecutive working days on any single occasion where there are reasonable grounds for believing that articles 8 to 13 of this regulation have been infringed; ### to prohibit or suspend advertisements or require issuers of european green bonds or bonds marketed as environmentally sustainable or financial intermediaries concerned to cease or suspend advertisements for a maximum of as long as necessary on any single occasion where there are reasonable grounds for believing that articles 6 to 13 of this regulation have been infringed;


### to make public the fact that an issuer of european green bonds is failing to comply with its obligations under articles 8 to 13 of this regulation; ### to make public the fact that an issuer of european green bonds or bonds marketed as environmentally sustainable is failing to comply with its obligations under articles 6 to 13 of this regulation;


### issuers shall allocate bond proceeds to the uses set out in article 4(1) points (a) , (b) and (c) , article 4(2) , or the equity referred to in article 5(1) , point (b) by applying the delegated acts adopted pursuant to articles 10(3) , 11(3) , 12(2) , 13(2) , 14(2) or 15(2) of regulation (eu) 2020/852 applicable at the point in time when the bond was issued. ### issuers shall allocate bond proceeds to the uses set out in article 4(1) points (a) , (b) and (c) , article 4(2) , or the equity referred to in article 5(1) , point (b) by applying paragraph 2a of this article and the delegated acts adopted pursuant to articles 10(3) , 11(3) , 12(2) , 13(2) , 14(2) or 15(2) of regulation (eu) 2020/852 applicable at the point in time when the bond was issued.


### external reviewers for european green bonds ### external reviewers for european green bonds and bonds marketed as environmentally sustainable


### 1. external reviewers that outsource their assessment activities to third party service providers shall ensure that any such third party service provider has the ability and the capacity to perform those assessment activities reliably and professionally. those external reviewers shall also ensure that the outsourcing does not materially impair the quality of their internal control and the ability of esma to supervise the compliance of those external reviewers with this regulation. ### 1. external reviewers that outsource part of their assessment activities to third party service providers shall ensure that any such third party service provider has the ability and the capacity to perform those assessment activities reliably and professionally. those external reviewers shall also ensure that the outsourcing does not materially impair the quality of their internal control and the ability of esma to supervise the compliance of those external reviewers with this regulation.


### (6) combining both direct and indirect supervisory competences over obliged entities , and also functioning as a support and cooperation mechanism for fius , is the most appropriate means of bringing about supervision and cooperation between fius at union level. this should be achieved by creating an authority which should combine independence and a high level of technical expertise and which should be established in line with the joint statement and common approach of the european parliament , the council of the european union and the european commission on decentralised agencies32 . ### (6) combining both direct and indirect supervisory competences over obliged entities , and also functioning as a support and cooperation mechanism for fius , is the most appropriate means of bringing about supervision and cooperation between fius at union level. however , achieving the objectives of the mandate given to the authority depends on the cooperation and the adequate funding and equipment of the fius in the member states. this should be achieved by creating an authority which should combine independence and a high level of technical expertise and which should be established in line with the joint statement and common approach of the european parliament , the council of the european union and the european commission on decentralised agencies32 .


### (7) a seat agreement should be established between the authority and the host member state , stipulating the conditions of establishment of the seat and advantages conferred by the member state on the authority and its staff. ### (7) a seat agreement should be established between the authority and the host member state , stipulating the conditions of establishment of the seat and advantages conferred by the member state on the authority and its staff. the location of the newly created authority should take into account the equal geographic coverage of existing decentralised agencies in the union.


### (39) for a smooth decision making process , the tasks should be clearly divided: the general board in fiu composition should decide on the relevant measures for fius , the general board in supervisory composition should decide on delegated acts , guidelines and similar measures for obliged entities. the general board in supervisory composition should also be able to provide its opinion and advice to the executive board on all draft decisions towards individual selected obliged entities proposed by the joint supervisory teams. in absence of such opinion or advice , the decisions should be taken by the executive board. whenever the executive board deviates from the advice provided by the general board in supervisory composition in the final decision , it should explain the reasons thereof in writing. ### (39) for a smooth decision-making process , the tasks should be clearly divided: the general board in fiu composition should decide on the relevant measures for fius , while the general board in supervisory composition should decide on delegated acts , guidelines and similar measures for obliged entities. the general board in supervisory composition should also be able to provide its opinion and advice to the executive board before it adopts decisions addressed to individual selected obliged entities proposed by the joint supervisory teams. in absence of such opinion or advice , the decisions should be taken by the executive board. whenever the executive board deviates from the advice provided by the general board in supervisory composition in the final decision , it should explain the reasons thereof in writing.


### (40) for the purposes of voting and taking decisions , each member state should have one voting representative. therefore , the heads of public authorities should appoint a permanent representative as the voting member of the general board in supervisory composition. alternatively , depending on the subject-matter of the decision or agenda of a given general board meeting , public authorities of a member state may decide on an ad-hoc representative. the practical arrangements related to decision-making and voting by the general board members in supervisory composition should be laid down in the rules of procedure of the general board , to be developed by the authority. ### (40) for the purposes of voting and taking decisions , each member state should have one voting representative. therefore , the heads of public authorities should either appoint a permanent representative as the voting member of the general board in supervisory composition or decide on an ad-hoc representative depending on the subject-matter of the decision or agenda of a given general board meeting. they should take into account the principle of gender balance in their appointments and particularly regarding the composition of the board as a body. the practical arrangements related to decision-making and voting by the general board members in supervisory composition should be laid down in the rules of procedure of the general board , to be developed by the authority.


### (40) for the purposes of voting and taking decisions , each member state should have one voting representative. therefore , the heads of public authorities should appoint a permanent representative as the voting member of the general board in supervisory composition. alternatively , depending on the subject-matter of the decision or agenda of a given general board meeting , public authorities of a member state may decide on an ad-hoc representative. the practical arrangements related to decision-making and voting by the general board members in supervisory composition should be laid down in the rules of procedure of the general board , to be developed by the authority. ### (40) for the purposes of voting and taking decisions , each member state should have one voting representative. therefore , the heads of public authorities should appoint a permanent representative as the voting member of the general board in supervisory composition. alternatively , depending on the subject-matter of the decision or agenda of a given general board meeting , public authorities of a member state may decide on an ad-hoc representative. in their appointments to the general board , the public authorities of member states shall ensure gender balance , in particular with regard to the composition of the board as a body. the practical arrangements related to decision-making and voting by the general board members in supervisory composition should be laid down in the rules of procedure of the general board , to be developed by the authority.


### (42) the governing body of the authority should be the executive board composed of the chair of the authority and of five full time members , appointed by the general board based on the shortlist by the commission. with the aim of ensuring a speedy and efficient decision making process , the executive board should be in charge of planning and execution of all the tasks of the authority except where specific decisions are explicitly allocated to the general board. in order to ensure objectivity and appropriate rapidity of the decision-making process in the area of direct supervision of the selected obliged entities , the executive board should take all binding decisions addressed to selected obliged entities. in addition , together with a representative of the commission the executive board should be collectively responsible for the administrative and budgetary decisions of the authority. the consent of the commission should be required when the executive board is taking decisions related to the budget administration , procurement , recruitment , and audit of the authority , given that a portion of funding of the authority will be provided from union budget. ### (42) the governing body of the authority should be the executive board composed of the chair of the authority and of five full time members , appointed by the general board based on the shortlist by the commission. with the aim of ensuring a speedy and efficient decision making process , the executive board should be in charge of planning and execution of all the tasks of the authority except where specific decisions are explicitly allocated to the general board. in order to ensure objectivity and appropriate rapidity of the decision-making process in the area of direct supervision of the selected obliged entities , the executive board should take all binding decisions addressed to selected obliged entities. in addition , together with a representative of the commission the executive board should be collectively responsible for the administrative and budgetary decisions of the authority.


### (42) the governing body of the authority should be the executive board composed of the chair of the authority and of five full time members , appointed by the general board based on the shortlist by the commission. with the aim of ensuring a speedy and efficient decision making process , the executive board should be in charge of planning and execution of all the tasks of the authority except where specific decisions are explicitly allocated to the general board. in order to ensure objectivity and appropriate rapidity of the decision-making process in the area of direct supervision of the selected obliged entities , the executive board should take all binding decisions addressed to selected obliged entities. in addition , together with a representative of the commission the executive board should be collectively responsible for the administrative and budgetary decisions of the authority. the consent of the commission should be required when the executive board is taking decisions related to the budget administration , procurement , recruitment , and audit of the authority , given that a portion of funding of the authority will be provided from union budget. ### (42) the governing body of the authority should be the executive board composed of the chair of the authority and of five full-time members , appointed by the general board based on a shortlist drawn up by the commission , after the approval of the european parliament. with the aim of ensuring a speedy and efficient decision-making process , the executive board should be in charge of planning and execution of all the tasks of the authority except where specific decisions are explicitly allocated to the general board. in order to ensure that the decision-making process in the area of direct supervision of the selected obliged entities is objective and swift , the executive board should take all binding decisions addressed to selected obliged entities. in addition , together with a representative of the commission , the executive board should be collectively responsible for the administrative and budgetary decisions of the authority.


### (42) the governing body of the authority should be the executive board composed of the chair of the authority and of five full time members , appointed by the general board based on the shortlist by the commission. with the aim of ensuring a speedy and efficient decision making process , the executive board should be in charge of planning and execution of all the tasks of the authority except where specific decisions are explicitly allocated to the general board. in order to ensure objectivity and appropriate rapidity of the decision-making process in the area of direct supervision of the selected obliged entities , the executive board should take all binding decisions addressed to selected obliged entities. in addition , together with a representative of the commission the executive board should be collectively responsible for the administrative and budgetary decisions of the authority. the consent of the commission should be required when the executive board is taking decisions related to the budget administration , procurement , recruitment , and audit of the authority , given that a portion of funding of the authority will be provided from union budget. ### (42) the governing body of the authority should be the executive board composed of the chair and the vice-chair of the authority and of five full time members , appointed by the general board based on the gender-balanced shortlist by the commission , after having received the approval of the european parliament. with the aim of ensuring a speedy and efficient decision making process , the executive board should be in charge of planning and execution of all the tasks of the authority except where specific decisions are explicitly allocated to the general board. in order to ensure objectivity and appropriate rapidity of the decision-making process in the area of direct supervision of the selected obliged entities , the executive board should take all binding decisions addressed to selected obliged entities. in addition , together with a representative of the commission the executive board should be collectively responsible for the administrative and budgetary decisions of the authority. the consent of the commission should be required when the executive board is taking decisions related to the budget administration , procurement , recruitment , and audit of the authority , given that a portion of funding of the authority will be provided from union budget.


### (42) the governing body of the authority should be the executive board composed of the chair of the authority and of five full time members , appointed by the general board based on the shortlist by the commission. with the aim of ensuring a speedy and efficient decision making process , the executive board should be in charge of planning and execution of all the tasks of the authority except where specific decisions are explicitly allocated to the general board. in order to ensure objectivity and appropriate rapidity of the decision-making process in the area of direct supervision of the selected obliged entities , the executive board should take all binding decisions addressed to selected obliged entities. in addition , together with a representative of the commission the executive board should be collectively responsible for the administrative and budgetary decisions of the authority. the consent of the commission should be required when the executive board is taking decisions related to the budget administration , procurement , recruitment , and audit of the authority , given that a portion of funding of the authority will be provided from union budget. ### (42) the governing body of the authority should be the executive board composed of the chair of the authority and of five full time members , appointed by the general board based on the shortlist by the commission , after having received the binding approval of the european parliament. with the aim of ensuring a speedy and efficient decision making process , the executive board should be in charge of planning and execution of all the tasks of the authority except where specific decisions are explicitly allocated to the general board. in order to ensure objectivity and appropriate rapidity of the decision-making process in the area of direct supervision of the selected obliged entities , the executive board should take all binding decisions addressed to selected obliged entities. in addition , together with a representative of the commission the executive board should be collectively responsible for the administrative and budgetary decisions of the authority. the consent of the commission should be required when the executive board is taking decisions related to the budget administration , procurement , recruitment , and audit of the authority , given that a portion of funding of the authority will be provided from union budget.


### (43) to allow for swift decisions , all decisions of the executive board , including the decision where the commission has a right to vote , should be taken by simple majority , with the chair holding a casting vote in case of a tied vote. to ensure sound financial management of the authority , the commission’s consent should be required for decisions related to budget , administration and recruitment. the voting members of the executive board other than the chair should be selected by the general board , based on a short-list established by the commission. ### (43) to allow for swift decisions , all decisions of the executive board , including the decisions where the commission has a right to vote , should be taken by simple majority , with the chair holding a casting vote in case of a tied vote. the members of the executive board other than the chair should be selected by the general board , based on a shortlist established by the commission , after the approval of the european parliament. in case the parliament consider the selected candidates do not meet the qualification criteria , the procedure should recommence.


### (43) to allow for swift decisions , all decisions of the executive board , including the decision where the commission has a right to vote , should be taken by simple majority , with the chair holding a casting vote in case of a tied vote. to ensure sound financial management of the authority , the commission’s consent should be required for decisions related to budget , administration and recruitment. the voting members of the executive board other than the chair should be selected by the general board , based on a short-list established by the commission. ### (43) to allow for swift decisions , all decisions of the executive board , including the decision where the commission has a right to vote , should be taken by simple majority , with the chair holding a casting vote in case of a tied vote. the voting members of the executive board other than the chair should be selected by the general board , based on a short-list established by the commission.


### (43) to allow for swift decisions , all decisions of the executive board , including the decision where the commission has a right to vote , should be taken by simple majority , with the chair holding a casting vote in case of a tied vote. to ensure sound financial management of the authority , the commission’s consent should be required for decisions related to budget , administration and recruitment. the voting members of the executive board other than the chair should be selected by the general board , based on a short-list established by the commission. ### (43) to allow for swift decisions , all decisions of the executive board , including the decision where the commission has a right to vote , should be taken by simple majority , with the chair holding a casting vote in case of a tied vote. to ensure sound financial management of the authority , the commission’s consent should be required for decisions related to budget , administration and recruitment. the voting members of the executive board other than the chair or the vice-chair should be selected by the general board , based on a short-list established by the commission , after having received approval of the european parliament. should the parliament consider that the selected candidates do not meet the relevant qualification criteria , the selection procedure should recommence.


### (43) to allow for swift decisions , all decisions of the executive board , including the decision where the commission has a right to vote , should be taken by simple majority , with the chair holding a casting vote in case of a tied vote. to ensure sound financial management of the authority , the commission’s consent should be required for decisions related to budget , administration and recruitment. the voting members of the executive board other than the chair should be selected by the general board , based on a short-list established by the commission. ### (43) to allow for swift decisions , all decisions of the executive board , including the decision where the commission has a right to vote , should be taken by simple majority , with the chair holding a casting vote in case of a tied vote. to ensure sound financial management of the authority , the commission’s consent should be required for decisions related to budget , administration and recruitment. the voting members of the executive board other than the chair should be selected by the general board , based on a short-list established by the commission , after having received the binding approval of the european parliament.


### (44) to ensure the independent functioning of the authority the five members of the executive board and the chair of the authority should act independently and in the interest of the union as a whole. they should behave , both during and after their term of office , with integrity and discretion as regards the acceptance of certain appointments or benefits. to avoid giving any impression that a member of the executive board might use its position as a member of the executive board of the authority to get a high-ranking appointment in the private sector after his term of office and to prevent any post-public employment conflicts of interests , a cooling-off period for the five members of the executive board , including the chair of the authority , should be introduced. ### (44) to ensure the independent functioning of the authority the five members of the executive board and the chair of the authority should act independently and in the interest of the union as a whole. they should behave , both during and after their term of office , with integrity and discretion as regards the acceptance of certain appointments or benefits. to avoid giving any impression that a member of the executive board might use its position as a member of the executive board of the authority to get a high-ranking appointment in the private sector after his term of office and to prevent any post-public employment conflicts of interests , a cooling-off period for the five members of the executive board , including the chair of the authority , should be introduced. further internal mechanisms should be proposed to ensure that all the senior staff would not be able to undermine the integrity of the authority after their term in charge. amla should take into consideration the recommendations of the ombudsman in this matter.


### (44) to ensure the independent functioning of the authority the five members of the executive board and the chair of the authority should act independently and in the interest of the union as a whole. they should behave , both during and after their term of office , with integrity and discretion as regards the acceptance of certain appointments or benefits. to avoid giving any impression that a member of the executive board might use its position as a member of the executive board of the authority to get a high-ranking appointment in the private sector after his term of office and to prevent any post-public employment conflicts of interests , a cooling-off period for the five members of the executive board , including the chair of the authority , should be introduced. ### (44) to ensure the independent functioning of the authority the five members of the executive board and the chair of the authority should act independently and in the interest of the union as a whole. they should behave , both during and after their term of office , with integrity and discretion as regards the acceptance of certain appointments or benefits. in order to avoid a member of the executive board potentially using his or her position to get a high-ranking appointment in the private sector after his term of office and to prevent any post-public employment conflicts of interests , a cooling-off period for the five members of the executive board , including the chair of the authority , should be introduced in a way that they do not acquire any role in an obliged entity that that may give rise to any conflict of interests or situations which may objectively be perceived as a conflict of interests.


### (44) to ensure the independent functioning of the authority the five members of the executive board and the chair of the authority should act independently and in the interest of the union as a whole. they should behave , both during and after their term of office , with integrity and discretion as regards the acceptance of certain appointments or benefits. to avoid giving any impression that a member of the executive board might use its position as a member of the executive board of the authority to get a high-ranking appointment in the private sector after his term of office and to prevent any post-public employment conflicts of interests , a cooling-off period for the five members of the executive board , including the chair of the authority , should be introduced. ### (44) to ensure the independent functioning of the authority the five members of the executive board and the chair and the vice-chair of the authority should act independently and in the interest of the union as a whole. they should behave , both during and after their term of office , with integrity and discretion as regards the acceptance of certain appointments or benefits. to avoid giving any impression that a member of the executive board might use its position as a member of the executive board of the authority to get a high-ranking appointment in the private sector after his term of office and to prevent any post-public employment conflicts of interests , a cooling-off period for the five members of the executive board , including the chair and the vice-chair of the authority , should be introduced.


### (44) to ensure the independent functioning of the authority the five members of the executive board and the chair of the authority should act independently and in the interest of the union as a whole. they should behave , both during and after their term of office , with integrity and discretion as regards the acceptance of certain appointments or benefits. to avoid giving any impression that a member of the executive board might use its position as a member of the executive board of the authority to get a high-ranking appointment in the private sector after his term of office and to prevent any post-public employment conflicts of interests , a cooling-off period for the five members of the executive board , including the chair of the authority , should be introduced. ### (44) to ensure the independent functioning of the authority the five members of the executive board and the chair of the authority should act independently and in the interest of the union as a whole. they should behave , both during and after their term of office , with integrity and discretion as regards the acceptance of certain appointments or benefits. to avoid that a member of the executive board might use its position as a member of the executive board of the authority to get a high-ranking appointment in the private sector after his term of office and to prevent any post-public employment conflicts of interests , a cooling-off period of two years for the five members of the executive board , including the chair of the authority , should be introduced; during the cooling-off period the persons concerned should be prohibited from acquiring any role in an obliged entity that may give rise to conflicts of interest or to situations which may objectively be perceived as a conflict of interest.


### (46) the executive director of the authority should be appointed by the executive board based on a shortlist from the commission. the executive director of the authority should be a senior administrative official of the authority , in charge of the day-to-day management of the authority , and responsible for budget administration , procurement , and recruitment and staffing. ### (46) the executive director of the authority should be appointed by the executive board based on a gender-balanced shortlist from the commission and after the consent of the european parliament. the executive director of the authority should be a senior administrative official of the authority , in charge of the day-to-day management of the authority , and responsible for budget administration , procurement , and recruitment and staffing.


### (46) the executive director of the authority should be appointed by the executive board based on a shortlist from the commission. the executive director of the authority should be a senior administrative official of the authority , in charge of the day-to-day management of the authority , and responsible for budget administration , procurement , and recruitment and staffing. ### (46) the executive director of the authority should be appointed by the executive board based on a shortlist from the commission , after being approved by the european parliament. the executive director of the authority should be a senior administrative official of the authority , in charge of the day-to-day management of the authority , and responsible for budget administration , procurement , and recruitment and staffing.


### (46) the executive director of the authority should be appointed by the executive board based on a shortlist from the commission. the executive director of the authority should be a senior administrative official of the authority , in charge of the day-to-day management of the authority , and responsible for budget administration , procurement , and recruitment and staffing. ### (46) the executive director of the authority should be appointed by the executive board based on a gender-balanced shortlist from the commission after approval by the european parliament. the executive director of the authority should be a senior administrative official of the authority , in charge of the day-to-day management of the authority , and responsible for budget administration , procurement , and recruitment and staffing.


### (46) the executive director of the authority should be appointed by the executive board based on a shortlist from the commission. the executive director of the authority should be a senior administrative official of the authority , in charge of the day-to-day management of the authority , and responsible for budget administration , procurement , and recruitment and staffing. ### (46) the executive director of the authority should be appointed by the executive board based on a shortlist from the commission , after the binding approval of the european parliament. the executive director of the authority should be a senior administrative official of the authority , in charge of the day-to-day management of the authority , and responsible for budget administration , procurement , and recruitment and staffing.


### (48) to guarantee the proper functioning of the authority , funding should be provided by a combination of fees levied on certain obliged entities and a contribution from the union budget , depending on the tasks and functions. the budget of the authority should be part of the union budget , confirmed by the budgetary authority on the basis of a proposal from the commission. the authority should submit to the commission a draft budget and an internal financial regulation for approval. ### (48) it is necessary to provide the authority with the requisite human , financial resources and advanced it tools accompanied by adequate safeguards so that it can fulfil the objectives , tasks and responsibilities assigned to it under this regulation. in order to ensure that the authority can respond flexibly to human resource needs , it is in particular appropriate that it has autonomy regarding the recruitment of contract agents. to guarantee the proper functioning of the authority , funding should be provided by a combination of fees levied on certain obliged entities and a contribution from the union budget. the budget of the authority should be part of the union budget. the contribution from the union budget is to be decided by the budgetary authority through the budgetary procedure. to that end , the authority should submit to the commission a statement of estimates. it should also adopt financial rules after consulting the commission.


### (48) to guarantee the proper functioning of the authority , funding should be provided by a combination of fees levied on certain obliged entities and a contribution from the union budget , depending on the tasks and functions. the budget of the authority should be part of the union budget , confirmed by the budgetary authority on the basis of a proposal from the commission. the authority should submit to the commission a draft budget and an internal financial regulation for approval. ### (48) to guarantee the achievement of the objectives and the proper functioning of the authority , funding should be provided by a combination of fees levied on certain obliged entities and a contribution from the union budget , depending on the tasks and functions , with a transparent methodology for the levies in order to ensure a predictable budget for the authority. the budget of the authority should be part of the union budget , confirmed by the budgetary authority on the basis of a proposal from the commission. the authority should submit to the commission a draft budget and an internal financial regulation for approval.


### (49) to ensure that the authority can also fulfil its tasks as direct and indirect supervisor of obliged entities , an adequate mechanism for the determination and the collection of the fees should be introduced. as regards the fees levied on selected obliged entities and certain non-selected obliged entities , the methodology for their calculation and the process of collection of fees should be developed in a delegated act of the commission. the methodology should be based on the risk of the directly and indirectly supervised entities as well as their turnover or revenue. ### (49) to ensure that the authority can also fulfil its tasks as direct and indirect supervisor of obliged entities , an adequate mechanism for the determination and the collection of the fees should be introduced. as regards the fees levied on selected obliged entities and certain non-selected obliged entities , the methodology for their calculation and the process of collection of fees should be developed in a delegated act of the commission. the methodology should be based on the risk of the directly and indirectly supervised entities as well as their turnover or revenue. the methodology established should ensure sufficient and stable revenue for the authority and therefore predictability in terms of the contribution from the union budget. we include sufficient funding so we make a clear indication they need funds.


### (60) public-private partnerships (‘ppps’) have become increasingly important cooperation and information exchange fora between fius , various national supervisory and law enforcement authorities and obliged entities in some member states. where the authority would act as direct supervisor of selected obliged entities which are part of a ppp in any member state , it could be beneficial for the authority to also participate therein , on conditions determined by the relevant national public authority or authorities that set up such ppp , and with their explicit agreement. ### (60) public-private partnerships (‘ppps’) have become increasingly important cooperation and information exchange fora between fius , various national supervisory and law enforcement authorities and obliged entities in some member states. where the authority would act as direct supervisor of selected obliged entities which are part of a ppp in any member state , the authority should also participate therein.


### monitor and support the implementation of asset freezes under the union restrictive measures across the internal market; ### monitor and support the implementation of all financial sanctions , including asset freezes , imposed under international , union and national law against individuals , entities and bodies , across the internal market;


### the heads of the supervisory authorities referred to in the first subparagraph , point (b) in each member state shall share a single vote and shall agree on a single common representative for each meeting and voting procedure. that common representative shall be the ad-hoc voting member for the purposes of that meeting or voting procedure. the public authorities in a member state may also agree on a single permanent common representative who shall be a permanent voting member. where items to be discussed by the general board in supervisory composition concern the competence of several public authorities , the ad-hoc or permanent voting member may be accompanied by a representative from up to two other public authorities , who shall be non-voting. ### the heads of the supervisory authorities referred to in the first subparagraph , point (b) in each member state shall share a single vote and shall appoint a single common representative , either a permanent voting representative or an ad-hoc voting representative for the purposes of a specific meeting or voting procedure. they shall take due account of the principles of gender balance when agreeing on the representatives to the general board. where items to be discussed by the general board in supervisory composition concern the competence of several public authorities , the single common representative may be accompanied by a representative from up to two other public authorities , who shall be non-voting.


### the heads of the supervisory authorities referred to in the first subparagraph , point (b) in each member state shall share a single vote and shall agree on a single common representative for each meeting and voting procedure. that common representative shall be the ad-hoc voting member for the purposes of that meeting or voting procedure. the public authorities in a member state may also agree on a single permanent common representative who shall be a permanent voting member. where items to be discussed by the general board in supervisory composition concern the competence of several public authorities , the ad-hoc or permanent voting member may be accompanied by a representative from up to two other public authorities , who shall be non-voting. ### the heads of the supervisory authorities referred to in the first subparagraph , point (b) in each member state shall share a single vote and shall agree on a single common representative for each meeting and voting procedure. that common representative shall be the ad-hoc voting member for the purposes of that meeting or voting procedure. the public authorities in a member state may also agree on a single permanent common representative who shall be a permanent voting member. where items to be discussed by the general board in supervisory composition concern the competence of several public authorities , the ad-hoc or permanent voting member may be accompanied by a representative from up to two other public authorities , who shall be non-voting. in their appointments to the general board , the public authorities of member states shall ensure gender balance , in particular with regard to the composition of the board as a body.


### 7. during a period of one year after ceasing to hold office , the former members of the executive board , including the chair of the authority , are prohibited from engaging in a gainful occupational activity with ### 7. during a period of two years after ceasing to hold office , the former members of the executive board , including the chair and the vice-chair of the authority , are prohibited from engaging in a gainful occupational activity with


### 7. during a period of one year after ceasing to hold office , the former members of the executive board , including the chair of the authority , are prohibited from engaging in a gainful occupational activity with ### 7. during a period of two years after ceasing to hold office , the former members of the executive board , including the chair of the authority , are prohibited from engaging in a gainful occupational activity with


### 1. the chair of the authority shall be selected on the basis of merit , skills , knowledge , recognised standing and experience in the area of anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism and other relevant qualification , following an open selection procedure which shall be published in the official journal of the european union. the commission shall draw up a shortlist of two qualified candidates for the position of the chair of the authority. the council , after approval by the european parliament , shall adopt an implementing decision to appoint the chair of the authority. ### 1. the chair of the authority shall be selected on the basis of merit , skills , knowledge , recognised standing and experience in the area of anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism and other relevant qualification , following an open selection procedure which shall respect the principle of gender balance and shall be published in the official journal of the european union. the commission shall draw up a shortlist of two qualified candidates for the position of the chair of the authority. the shortlisted candidates shall be invited to appear before the council and the competent committees of the european parliament. the council shall adopt an implementing decision to appoint the chair of the authority having obtained the consent of the european parliament. where the european parliament is of the opinion that none of the shortlisted candidates sufficiently fulfils the qualifications set out in the first subparagraph , the open selection procedure shall recommence.


### 1. the chair of the authority shall be selected on the basis of merit , skills , knowledge , recognised standing and experience in the area of anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism and other relevant qualification , following an open selection procedure which shall be published in the official journal of the european union. the commission shall draw up a shortlist of two qualified candidates for the position of the chair of the authority. the council , after approval by the european parliament , shall adopt an implementing decision to appoint the chair of the authority. ### 1. the chair of the authority shall be selected on the basis of merit , skills , knowledge , recognised standing and experience in the area of anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism and other relevant qualification , and have no prior criminal conviction; following an open selection procedure which shall be published in the official journal of the european union. the commission shall draw up a gender-balanced shortlist of two qualified candidates for the position of the chair of the authority. the council , after approval by the european parliament , shall adopt an implementing decision to appoint the chair of the authority.


### 1. the chair of the authority shall be selected on the basis of merit , skills , knowledge , recognised standing and experience in the area of anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism and other relevant qualification , following an open selection procedure which shall be published in the official journal of the european union. the commission shall draw up a shortlist of two qualified candidates for the position of the chair of the authority. the council , after approval by the european parliament , shall adopt an implementing decision to appoint the chair of the authority. ### 1. the chair and the vice-chair of the authority shall be selected on the basis of merit , skills , knowledge , recognised standing and experience in the area of anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism and other relevant qualification , following an open selection procedure , which shall respect the principle of gender balance and shall be published in the official journal of the european union. the commission shall draw up a gender-balanced shortlist of four qualified candidates for the position of the chair and vice-chair of the authority. before the approval , the candidate(s) shall be heard by the competent committee(s) of the european parliament. after conducting hearings , the european parliament shall select one of those candidates for each position. the council , after approval by the european parliament , shall adopt an implementing decision to appoint the chair and the vice-chair of the authority.


### 1. the chair of the authority shall be selected on the basis of merit , skills , knowledge , recognised standing and experience in the area of anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism and other relevant qualification , following an open selection procedure which shall be published in the official journal of the european union. the commission shall draw up a shortlist of two qualified candidates for the position of the chair of the authority. the council , after approval by the european parliament , shall adopt an implementing decision to appoint the chair of the authority. ### 1. the chair of the authority shall be selected on the basis of merit , skills , knowledge , recognised standing and experience in the area of anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism and other relevant qualification , following an open selection procedure which shall be published in the official journal of the european union. the commission shall draw up a shortlist of three qualified candidates for the position of the chair of the authority. before the binding approval , candidates shall subject themselves to hearings by the competent committee(s) of the european parliament after which hearings the european parliament shall select one of the three candidates for the position of chair. following the binding approval by the european parliament , the council shall adopt an implementing decision to appoint as the chair of the authority the candidate selected by the european parliament.


### 2. the authority’s budget shall be balanced in terms of revenue and of expenditure. ### 2. the authority’s budget shall be adequate to ensure sufficient staff and up-to-date equipment in order to allow the authority to achieve the objectives and tasks set by this regulation.


### 3. on the occasion of every second evaluation , there shall be an assessment of the results achieved by the authority having regard to its objectives , mandate and tasks , including an assessment of whether the continuation of the authority is still justified with regard to these objectives , mandate and tasks. ### 3. on the occasion of every second evaluation , there shall be an assessment of the results achieved by the authority having regard to its objectives , mandate and tasks , including an assessment of whether a review of the authority is justified with regard to these objectives , mandate , tasks and powers.


### (29) the authority should have the opportunity to request a transfer of supervisory tasks and powers relating to a specific obliged entity on its own initiative in case of inaction or failure to follow its instructions within the provided deadline. since the transfer of tasks and powers over an obliged entity without the specific request of the financial supervisor to the authority would require a discretionary decision on the part of the authority , the authority should address a specific request to that end to the commission. in order for the commission to be able to take a decision coherent with the framework of the tasks allocated to the authority within the aml/cft framework , the request of the authority should enclose an appropriate justification , and should indicate a precise duration of the reallocation of tasks and powers towards the authority. the timeframe for the reallocation of powers should correspond to the time the authority requires to deal with the risks at entity level , and should not exceed three years. the commission should adopt a decision transferring powers and tasks for supervising the entity to the authority swiftly , and in any case within a month. ### (29) the authority should have the opportunity to exercise itself all powers relating to a specific obliged entity in case of inaction or failure to follow its instructions within the provided deadline. the authority shall notify the commission. the notification of the authority should enclose an appropriate justification , and should indicate a precise duration of the exercise of tasks and powers through the authority. the timeframe for the exercise of powers through the authority should correspond to the time the authority requires to deal with the risks at entity level , and should not exceed three years.


### (29) the authority should have the opportunity to request a transfer of supervisory tasks and powers relating to a specific obliged entity on its own initiative in case of inaction or failure to follow its instructions within the provided deadline. since the transfer of tasks and powers over an obliged entity without the specific request of the financial supervisor to the authority would require a discretionary decision on the part of the authority , the authority should address a specific request to that end to the commission. in order for the commission to be able to take a decision coherent with the framework of the tasks allocated to the authority within the aml/cft framework , the request of the authority should enclose an appropriate justification , and should indicate a precise duration of the reallocation of tasks and powers towards the authority. the timeframe for the reallocation of powers should correspond to the time the authority requires to deal with the risks at entity level , and should not exceed three years. the commission should adopt a decision transferring powers and tasks for supervising the entity to the authority swiftly , and in any case within a month. ### (29) the authority should be able to take over supervisory tasks and powers relating to a specific obliged entity on its own initiative in case of inaction or failure to follow its instructions within the provided deadline. the authority should notify the commission , providing an appropriate justification and indicating the precise duration of the reallocation of tasks and powers towards the authority. the timeframe for the reallocation of powers should correspond to the time the authority requires to deal with the risks at entity level , and should not exceed three years.


### (32) in order to analyse suspicious activity affecting multiple jurisdictions , the relevant fius that received linked reports should be able to efficiently conduct joint analyses of cases of common interest. to this end , the authority should be able to propose , coordinate and support with all appropriate means the joint analyses of cross-border suspicious transactions or activities. the joint analyses should be triggered where there is a need to conduct just such joint analyses pursuant to the relevant provisions in union law. upon the explicit consent of the fius participating in the joint analyses , the staff of the authority supporting the conduct of joint analyses should be able to receive and process all necessary data and information , including the data and information pertaining to the analysed cases. ### (32) in order to analyse suspicious activity affecting multiple jurisdictions , the relevant fius that received linked reports should be able to efficiently conduct joint analyses of cases of common interest. to this end , the authority should be able to propose , coordinate and support with all appropriate means the joint analyses of cross-border suspicious transactions or activities. the joint analyses should be triggered where there is a need to conduct just such joint analyses pursuant to the relevant provisions in union law. it shall also be empowered to settle potential disagreements between the participating fius. the staff of the authority coordinating the conduct of joint analyses should be able to receive and process all necessary data and information , including the data and information pertaining to the analysed cases.


### (32) in order to analyse suspicious activity affecting multiple jurisdictions , the relevant fius that received linked reports should be able to efficiently conduct joint analyses of cases of common interest. to this end , the authority should be able to propose , coordinate and support with all appropriate means the joint analyses of cross-border suspicious transactions or activities. the joint analyses should be triggered where there is a need to conduct just such joint analyses pursuant to the relevant provisions in union law. upon the explicit consent of the fius participating in the joint analyses , the staff of the authority supporting the conduct of joint analyses should be able to receive and process all necessary data and information , including the data and information pertaining to the analysed cases. ### (32) in order to analyse suspicious activity affecting multiple jurisdictions , the relevant fius that received linked reports should be able to efficiently conduct joint analyses of cases of common interest. to this end , the authority should be able to organise , coordinate and support with all appropriate means the joint analyses of cross-border suspicious transactions or activities. the joint analyses should be triggered where there is a need to conduct just such joint analyses pursuant to the relevant provisions in union law. the staff of the authority coordinating the conduct of joint analyses should be able to receive and process all necessary data and information , including the data and information pertaining to the analysed cases.


### (34) in order to facilitate and improve cooperation between fius and the authority , including for the purposes conducting joint analyses , the fius should be able to delegate one staff member per fiu to the authority on a voluntary basis. the national fiu delegates should support the authority’s staff in carrying out all the tasks relating to fius , including the conduct of joint analyses and the preparation of threat assessments and strategic analyses of money laundering and terrorist financing threats , risks and methods. apart from the joint analyses , the authority should encourage and facilitate various forms of mutual assistance between fius , including training and staff exchanges in order to improve capacity building and enable the exchange of knowledge and good practices amongst fius. ### (34) in order to facilitate and improve cooperation between fius and the authority , including for the purposes conducting joint analyses , the fius should delegate one staff member per fiu to the authority. the national fiu delegates should support the authority’s staff in carrying out all the tasks relating to fius , including the conduct of joint analyses and the preparation of threat assessments and strategic analyses of money laundering and terrorist financing threats , risks and methods. apart from the joint analyses , the authority should encourage and facilitate various forms of mutual assistance between fius , including training and staff exchanges in order to improve capacity building and enable the exchange of knowledge and good practices amongst fius.


### (41) the chair of the authority should chair the general board meetings and have a right to vote when decisions are taken by simple majority. the commission should be a non-voting member on the general board. to establish good cooperation with other relevant institutions , the general board should also be able to admit other non-voting observers , such as a representative of the single supervisory mechanism and of each of the three european supervisory authorities (eba , eiopa and esma) for the general board in its supervisory composition and europol , the eppo and eurojust for the general board in its fiu composition , where matters that fall under their respective mandates are discussed or decided upon. to allow a smooth decision making process , decisions of the general board should be taken by a simple majority , except for decisions concerning draft regulatory and implementing technical standards , guidelines and recommendations which should be taken by a qualified majority of member state representatives in accordance with voting rules of the tfeu. ### (41) the chair of the authority should chair the general board meetings and have a right to vote when decisions are taken by simple majority. the commission should be a non-voting member on the general board. a representative of the civil society advisory body should be entitled to participate as an observer. to establish good cooperation with other relevant institutions , the general board should also be able to admit other non-voting observers , such as a representative of the single supervisory mechanism and of each of the three european supervisory authorities (eba , eiopa and esma) for the general board in its supervisory composition and europol , the eppo and eurojust for the general board in its fiu composition , where matters that fall under their respective mandates are discussed or decided upon. to allow a smooth decision making process , decisions of the general board should be taken by a simple majority , except for decisions concerning draft regulatory and implementing technical standards , guidelines and recommendations which should be taken by a qualified majority of member state representatives in accordance with voting rules of the tfeu.


### (41) the chair of the authority should chair the general board meetings and have a right to vote when decisions are taken by simple majority. the commission should be a non-voting member on the general board. to establish good cooperation with other relevant institutions , the general board should also be able to admit other non-voting observers , such as a representative of the single supervisory mechanism and of each of the three european supervisory authorities (eba , eiopa and esma) for the general board in its supervisory composition and europol , the eppo and eurojust for the general board in its fiu composition , where matters that fall under their respective mandates are discussed or decided upon. to allow a smooth decision making process , decisions of the general board should be taken by a simple majority , except for decisions concerning draft regulatory and implementing technical standards , guidelines and recommendations which should be taken by a qualified majority of member state representatives in accordance with voting rules of the tfeu. ### (41) the chair of the authority should chair the general board meetings and have a right to vote when decisions are taken by simple majority. the commission should be a non-voting member on the general board. to establish good cooperation with other relevant institutions , the general board should also be able to admit other non-voting observers , such as a representative of the single supervisory mechanism and of each of the three european supervisory authorities (eba , eiopa and esma) and of the european union agency for fundamental rights (fra) for the general board in its supervisory composition and europol , the eppo and eurojust for the general board in its fiu composition , where matters that fall under their respective mandates are discussed or decided upon. to allow a smooth decision making process , decisions of the general board should be taken by a simple majority , except for decisions concerning draft regulatory and implementing technical standards , guidelines and recommendations which should be taken by a qualified majority of member state representatives in accordance with voting rules of the tfeu.


### (45) the chair of the authority should be appointed based on objective criteria by the council after approval by the european parliament. he or she should represent the authority externally and should report on the execution of authority’s tasks. ### (45) the chair of the authority should be appointed based on objective criteria by the council after approval by the european parliament. he or she should represent the authority externally and should report on the execution of authority’s tasks. the chair and the vice-chair of the authority should be appointed on the basis of a gender-balanced shortlist of candidates proposed by the commission based on objective criteria by the council after approval by the european parliament. the shortlisted candidates should be heard by the competent committees prior to their approval by the parliament. the chair and , when he or she is prevented from attending to his duties , the vice-chair should represent the authority externally and should report on the execution of authority’s tasks.


### (45) the chair of the authority should be appointed based on objective criteria by the council after approval by the european parliament. he or she should represent the authority externally and should report on the execution of authority’s tasks. ### (45) the chair of the authority should be appointed based on objective criteria by the council after the binding approval by the european parliament. he or she should represent the authority externally and should report on the execution of authority’s tasks.


### (56) without prejudice to the confidentiality obligations that apply to the authority’s staff and representatives in accordance with the relevant provisions in union law , the authority should be subject to regulation (ec) no 1049/2001 of the european parliament and of the council.39 in line with the confidentiality and professional secrecy restrictions related to supervisory and fiu support and coordination tasks of the authority , such access should not be extended to confidential information handled by the staff of the authority. in particular , any operational data or information related to such operational data of the authority and of the eu fius that is in the possession of the authority due to carrying out the tasks and activities related to support and coordination of fius should be deemed as confidential. with regard to supervisory tasks , access to information or data of the authority , the financial supervisors , or the obliged entities obtained in the process of carrying out the tasks and activities related to direct supervision should in principle also be treated as confidential and not subject to any disclosure. however , confidential information listed that relates to a supervisory procedure can be fully or partially disclosed to the obliged entities which are parties to such supervisory procedure , subject to the legitimate interest of legal and natural persons other than the relevant party , in the protection of their business secrets. ### (56) without prejudice to the confidentiality obligations that apply to the authority’s staff and representatives in accordance with the relevant provisions in union law , the authority should be subject to regulation (ec) no 1049/2001 of the european parliament and of the council and apply its principles in the light of the relevant jurisprudence of the court of justice.39 in line with the confidentiality and professional secrecy restrictions related to supervisory and fiu support and coordination tasks of the authority , such access should not be extended to confidential information handled by the staff of the authority. in particular , any operational data or information related to such operational data of the authority and of the eu fius that is in the possession of the authority due to carrying out the tasks and activities related to support and coordination of fius should be deemed as confidential. with regard to supervisory tasks , access to information or data of the authority , the financial supervisors , or the obliged entities obtained in the process of carrying out the tasks and activities related to direct supervision should in principle also be treated as confidential and not subject to any disclosure. however , confidential information listed that relates to a supervisory procedure can be fully or partially disclosed to the obliged entities which are parties to such supervisory procedure , subject to the legitimate interest of legal and natural persons other than the relevant party , in the protection of their business secrets. in order to allow for the public and other institutions to scrutinize the handling of the implementation of the regulation (ec) no 1049/2001 , the authority should issue an annual report on its implementation with regard to the access to documents held by it.


### (59) the authority should establish cooperative relations with the relevant union agencies and bodies , including europol , eurojust , the eppo , and the european supervisory authorities , namely the european banking authority , the european securities and markets authority and the european insurance and occupational pensions authority. to improve cross-sectoral supervision and a better cooperation between prudential and aml/cft supervisors the authority should also establish cooperative relations with the authorities competent for prudential supervision of financial sector obliged entities , including the european central bank with regard to matters relating to the tasks conferred on it by council regulation (eu) no 1024/201343 , as well as with resolution authorities as defined in article 3 of directive (eu) 2014/59/eu of the european parliament and the council44 and designated deposit guarantee schemes authorities as defined in article 2 (1) , point 18 of directive 2014/49/eu of the european parliament and the council45 . to this end , the authority should be able to conclude agreements or memoranda of understanding with such bodies , including with regard to any information exchange which is necessary for the fulfilment of the respective tasks of the authority and these bodies. the authority should make its best efforts to share information with such bodies on their request , within the limits posed by legal constraints , including data protection legislation. in addition , the authority should enable effective information exchange between all financial supervisors in the aml/cft supervisory system and the aforementioned authorities , such cooperation and information exchanges should take place in a structured and efficient way. ### (59) the authority should establish cooperative relations with the relevant union agencies and bodies , including europol , eurojust , the eppo , the edps , the fra and the european supervisory authorities , namely the european banking authority , the european securities and markets authority and the european insurance and occupational pensions authority. to improve cross-sectoral supervision and a better cooperation between prudential and aml/cft supervisors the authority should also establish cooperative relations with the authorities competent for prudential supervision of financial sector obliged entities , including the european central bank with regard to matters relating to the tasks conferred on it by council regulation (eu) no 1024/201343 , as well as with resolution authorities as defined in article 3 of directive (eu) 2014/59/eu of the european parliament and the council44 and designated deposit guarantee schemes authorities as defined in article 2 (1) , point 18 of directive 2014/49/eu of the european parliament and the council45 . to this end , the authority should be able to conclude agreements or memoranda of understanding with such bodies , including with regard to any information exchange which is necessary for the fulfilment of the respective tasks of the authority and these bodies. the authority should make its best efforts to share information with such bodies on their request , within the limits posed by legal constraints , including data protection legislation. in addition , the authority should enable effective information exchange between all financial supervisors in the aml/cft supervisory system and the aforementioned authorities , such cooperation and information exchanges should take place in a structured and efficient way.


### 8. the authority shall refer matters for criminal prosecution to the relevant national authorities where , in carrying out its duties under this regulation , it finds that there are serious indications of the possible existence of facts liable to constitute criminal offences. in addition , the authority shall refrain from imposing administrative pecuniary sanctions or periodic penalty payments where a prior acquittal or conviction arising from identical facts , or from facts which are substantially the same , has acquired the force of res judicata as the result of criminal proceedings under national law. ### 8. the authority shall refer matters for criminal prosecution to the relevant national authorities or , when relevant , to the eppo , where , in carrying out its duties under this regulation , it finds that there are serious indications of the possible existence of facts liable to constitute criminal offences. in addition , the authority shall refrain from imposing administrative pecuniary sanctions or periodic penalty payments where a prior acquittal or conviction arising from identical facts , or from facts which are substantially the same , has acquired the force of res judicata as the result of criminal proceedings under national law.


### requests to act in exceptional circumstances ### transfer of tasks and powers in exceptional circumstances


### requests to act in exceptional circumstances ### power to act in exceptional circumstances


### 4. where the financial supervisor concerned does not comply with the request referred to in paragraph 2 and does not inform the authority of the steps it has taken or intends to take to comply with the request within ten days from the day of the notification of the request , the authority may request the commission to grant permission to transfer the relevant tasks and powers referred to in article 5(2) and article 6(1) related to direct supervision of the non-selected obliged entity from the financial supervisor concerned to the authority. ### 4. where the financial supervisor concerned does not comply with the request referred to in paragraph 2 or does not inform the authority of the steps it has taken or intends to take to comply with the request within ten days from the day of the notification of the request , the authority may exercise directly itself all relevant tasks and powers referred to in article 5(2) and article 6(1) related to direct supervision of the non-selected obliged entity from the financial supervisor concerned.


### 4. where the financial supervisor concerned does not comply with the request referred to in paragraph 2 and does not inform the authority of the steps it has taken or intends to take to comply with the request within ten days from the day of the notification of the request , the authority may request the commission to grant permission to transfer the relevant tasks and powers referred to in article 5(2) and article 6(1) related to direct supervision of the non-selected obliged entity from the financial supervisor concerned to the authority. ### 4. where the financial supervisor concerned does not comply with the request referred to in paragraph 2 or does not inform the authority of the steps it has taken or intends to take to comply with the request within ten days from the day of the notification of the request , the authority may take over the relevant tasks and powers referred to in article 5(2) and article 6(1) related to direct supervision of the non-selected obliged entity from the financial supervisor concerned to the authority.


### 5. the request from the authority shall contain: ### 5. the authority shall notify the commission. the notification shall contain:


### 5. the request from the authority shall contain: ### 5. the notification from the authority to the commission shall contain:


### a time limit , which shall not exceed three years , for the requested transfer of the relevant tasks and powers; ### a time limit , which shall not exceed three years , for the transfer of the relevant tasks and powers;


### a time limit , which shall not exceed three years , for the requested transfer of the relevant tasks and powers; ### a time limit , which shall not exceed three years , for the take over of the relevant tasks and powers;


### 6. the commission shall have one month from the date of receipt of the request from the authority to adopt a decision whether to authorise the transfer of the relevant tasks and powers or to oppose it. the decision shall be notified to the authority , which shall immediately inform the financial supervisor and the non-selected obliged entity thereof. ### deleted


### 7. on the tenth working day after the notification of the decision authorising the transfer of tasks and powers in relation to the non-selected obliged entity , the non-selected obliged entity referred to in paragraph 2 shall be deemed a selected obliged entity for the purposes of the exercise of the tasks referred to in article 5(2) and the powers referred to in article 6(1) and articles 16 to 22. the commission decision shall set a time-limit for the exercise of these tasks and powers , upon the expiry of which they shall be automatically transferred back to the financial supervisor concerned. ### deleted


### 7. on the tenth working day after the notification of the decision authorising the transfer of tasks and powers in relation to the non-selected obliged entity , the non-selected obliged entity referred to in paragraph 2 shall be deemed a selected obliged entity for the purposes of the exercise of the tasks referred to in article 5(2) and the powers referred to in article 6(1) and articles 16 to 22. the commission decision shall set a time-limit for the exercise of these tasks and powers , upon the expiry of which they shall be automatically transferred back to the financial supervisor concerned. ### 7. one month after the notification of the decision by the authority authorising the take over of tasks and powers in relation to the non-selected obliged entity , the non-selected obliged entity referred to in paragraph 2 shall be deemed a selected obliged entity for the purposes of the exercise of the tasks referred to in article 5(2) and the powers referred to in article 6(1) and articles 16 to 22. the authority shall set a time-limit for the exercise of these tasks and powers , upon the expiry of which they shall be automatically transferred back to the financial supervisor concerned.


### 4. where the supervisory authority in the non-financial sector has not complied with union law within one month from receipt of the authority’s recommendation , the commission may , after having been informed by the authority , or on its own initiative , issue a formal opinion requiring the supervisory authority in the non-financial sector to take the action necessary to comply with union law. the commission’s formal opinion shall take into account the authority’s recommendation. ### 4. where the supervisory authority in the non-financial sector has not complied with union law within one month from receipt of the authority’s recommendation , the authority may on its own initiative , issue a formal opinion requiring the supervisory authority in the non-financial sector to take the action necessary to comply with union law.