### 12. calls on the commission to stimulate the production of affordable and abundant renewable and low-carbon energy; calls on the commission to increase the coordination of the planning and financing for needed electricity , energy , hydrogen , co2 and heating/cooling infrastructure; ### 12. calls on the commission and member states to accelerate the production capacities for affordable , safe and abundant sustainable renewable energy; calls on the commission to increase coordination of the planning and financing of the needed related infrastructure , in particular as regards renewable electricity , energy , renewable hydrogen , and renewable heating/cooling infrastructure;


### 13. calls on the commission and the member states to bring down the time needed to issue permits substantially and create fast-track permitting procedures for infrastructure that supports industry in the energy transition; ### 13. calls on the commission and the member states to bring down the time needed to issue permits substantially and create fast-track permitting procedures for infrastructure that supports industry in the energy transition and the reduction of air , land and water pollution , while maintaining and enforcing strong environmental safeguards and public participation;


### 14. calls on the member states and the commission to accelerate the implementation of instruments , including important projects of common european interest , and industrial alliances that develop innovative breakthrough technologies needed for the energy transition , such as clean steel , clean aviation , e-fuels , clean fertilisers , e-cracking and small modular reactors; ### 14. calls on the member states and the commission to accelerate the implementation of instruments , including important projects of common european interest , and industrial alliances that develop innovative breakthrough technologies needed for the ecological transition , such as zero-emission steel , clean aviation , e-fuels , e-cracking , next generation renewables and pre-fabricated sustainable building materials; stresses further the importance of the de-risking of funding , such as through investeu or the innovation fund , which are essential for enhancing the eu’s manufacturing capabilities in key strategic sectors , such as the solar industry , enabling it re-build a solid european manufacturing base;


### 15. welcomes the commission analysis on strategic dependencies and capacities; calls on the commission to finalise the analyses and technology roadmaps as soon as possible and propose actions to reduce dependence on the identified critical products and supplies; highlights the necessity of a strategy based on further in-depth analysis of mutual dependencies to strengthen the eu’s capacity in critical value chains; ### 15. welcomes the commission analysis on strategic dependencies and capacities; calls on the commission to finalise the analyses and technology roadmaps as soon as possible and propose actions to reduce dependence on the identified critical products and supplies; highlights the necessity of a strategy based on further in-depth analysis of mutual dependencies to strengthen the eu’s capacity in critical value chains and manufacturing;


### 16. calls on the commission to broaden the scope of the observatory of critical technologies to include continuously monitoring , evaluating and reporting on resilience indicators for eu industries , such as mutual dependencies in key technologies , strategic dependencies and foreign subsidies in strategic sectors; ### 16. calls on the commission to broaden the scope of the observatory of critical technologies to include continuously monitoring , evaluating and reporting on resilience indicators for eu industries , such as mutual dependencies in key technologies , manufacturing capacities , strategic dependencies and foreign subsidies in strategic sectors;


### 17. is strongly concerned about unfair competition , investments and takeovers by non-eu state-financed companies on the single market , especially in strategic sectors; calls on the commission to analyse and prevent this interference; ### 17. is strongly concerned about unfair competition , investments and takeovers by non-eu state-financed companies on the single market , especially in strategic sectors; calls on the commission to analyse and prevent this interference and to guarantee a level playing field , especially for smes;


### 18. calls on the commission to broaden the framework for foreign direct investment to address the effect of foreign subsidies on economic security in the eu and of technology transfers by eu companies in non-eu countries in strategic sectors; ### 18. calls on the commission , in view of the next review , to broaden the framework for foreign direct investment to address the effect of foreign subsidies on economic security in the eu and of technology transfers by eu companies in non-eu countries in strategic sectors by also considering the inclusion of outbound investment;


### (6) whilst always acting within the framework of international law , it is essential that the union possess an appropriate instrument to deter and counteract economic coercion by third countries in order to safeguard its rights and interests and those of its member states. this is particularly the case where third countries take measures affecting trade or investment that interfere in the legitimate sovereign choices of the union or a member state by seeking to prevent or obtain the cessation , modification or adoption of a particular act by the union or a member state. such measures affecting trade or investment may include not only actions taken on , and having effects within , the territory of the third country , but also actions taken by the third country , including through entities controlled or directed by the third country and present in the union , that cause harm to economic activities in the union. ### (6) whilst always acting within the framework of international law , it is essential that the union possess an appropriate instrument to deter and counteract economic coercion by third countries in order to safeguard its rights and interests and those of its member states. this is particularly the case where third countries take or threaten to take measures affecting trade or investment that interfere in the legitimate sovereign choices of the union or a member state by seeking to prevent or obtain the cessation , modification or adoption of a particular act by the union or a member state. such measures affecting trade or investment or threat thereof may include not only actions taken or actions threaten to be taken on and having effects within , the territory of the third country , but also actions taken or threatened to be taken by the third country , including through entities controlled or directed by the third country and present in the union , that cause harm to economic activities in the union , such as , among others , some extraterritorial effects of third county sanctions.


### (6) whilst always acting within the framework of international law , it is essential that the union possess an appropriate instrument to deter and counteract economic coercion by third countries in order to safeguard its rights and interests and those of its member states. this is particularly the case where third countries take measures affecting trade or investment that interfere in the legitimate sovereign choices of the union or a member state by seeking to prevent or obtain the cessation , modification or adoption of a particular act by the union or a member state. such measures affecting trade or investment may include not only actions taken on , and having effects within , the territory of the third country , but also actions taken by the third country , including through entities controlled or directed by the third country and present in the union , that cause harm to economic activities in the union. ### (6) whilst always acting within the framework of international law , it is essential that the union possess an appropriate instrument to deter and counteract economic coercion by third countries in order to safeguard its rights and interests and those of its member states. this is particularly the case where third countries take , fail to take or threaten to take measures affecting trade or investment that interfere in the legitimate sovereign choices of the union or a member state by seeking to prevent or obtain the cessation , modification or adoption of a particular act , policy or stance by the union or a member state. such measures affecting trade or investment may include not only actions taken on , and having effects within , the territory of the third country , but also actions taken by the third country , including through entities controlled or directed by the third country and present in the union , that cause harm to economic activities in the union.


### (7) this regulation aims to ensure an effective , efficient and swift union response to economic coercion , including deterrence of economic coercion of the union or a member state and , in the last resort , countermeasures. ### (7) this regulation aims to ensure an effective , efficient and swift union response to economic coercion , including deterrence of economic coercion of the union or a member state and , in the last resort , countermeasures. this regulation shall be complementary to other existing union instruments and relations such as the regulation (eu) 2021/167 of the european parliament and of the council1a and the review of the blocking statute 1b


### (7) this regulation aims to ensure an effective , efficient and swift union response to economic coercion , including deterrence of economic coercion of the union or a member state and , in the last resort , countermeasures. ### (7) this regulation aims to ensure an effective , efficient and swift union response to economic coercion , especially deterrence of economic coercion of the union or a member state and , if necessary because other instruments cannot protect the union interest adequately , countermeasures.


### (8) the objectives of this regulation , in particular counteracting third countries’ economic coercion of the union or a member state , cannot be sufficiently achieved by member states acting on their own. this is because member states as distinct actors under international law may not be entitled under international law to respond to economic coercion directed against the union. additionally , because of the exclusive competence conferred on the union by article 207 of the treaty on the functioning of the european union , member states are prevented from taking common commercial policy measures as a response to economic coercion. therefore , those objectives can be achieved with greater effectiveness at union level. ### (8) the objectives of this regulation , in particular counteracting third countries’ economic coercion of the union or a member state , cannot be sufficiently achieved by member states acting on their own , especially in the context of the union internal market. this is because member states as distinct actors under international law may not be entitled under international law to respond to economic coercion directed against the union. additionally , because of the exclusive competence conferred on the union by article 207 of the treaty on the functioning of the european union , member states are prevented from taking common commercial policy measures as a response to economic coercion. therefore , those objectives can be achieved with greater effectiveness at union level.


### (9) in accordance with the principle of proportionality , it is necessary and appropriate , for creating an effective and comprehensive framework for union action against economic coercion , to lay down rules on the examination , determination and counteraction with regard to third countries’ measures of economic coercion. in particular , the union’s response measures should be preceded by an examination of the facts , a determination of the existence of economic coercion , and , wherever possible , efforts to find a solution in cooperation with the third country concerned. any measures imposed by the union should be commensurate with the injury caused by the third countries’ measures of economic coercion. the criteria for defining the union response measures should take into account in particular the need to avoid or minimise collateral effects , administrative burdens and costs imposed on union economic operators as well as the union’s interest. therefore , this regulation does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve the objectives pursued , in accordance with article 5(4) of the treaty on european union. ### (9) in accordance with the principle of proportionality , it is necessary and appropriate , for creating an effective and comprehensive framework for union action against economic coercion , to lay down rules on the examination , determination and counteraction with regard to third countries’ measures of economic coercion. in particular , the union’s response measures should be preceded by an examination of the facts , a determination of the existence of economic coercion , and , wherever possible and when the third country shows willingness to engage in good faith , efforts to find a solution in cooperation with the third country concerned. any measures imposed by the union should be commensurate with the injury caused by the third countries’ measures of economic coercion and aimed at obtaining the cessation of the economic coercion or the reparation for the injury caused. the criteria for defining the union response measures should take into account in particular the effectiveness of the measures in inducing the cessation of the economic coercion and the potential of the measures to provide relief to the economic operators within the union affected by the economic coercion. the need to avoid or minimise collateral effects , administrative burdens and costs imposed on union economic operators as well as the union’s interest may also be taken into account. therefore , this regulation does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve the objectives pursued , in accordance with article 5(4) of the treaty on european union.


### (10) any action undertaken by the union on the basis of this regulation should comply with the union’s obligations under international law. international law allows , under certain conditions , such as proportionality and prior notice , the imposition of countermeasures , that is to say of measures that would otherwise be contrary to the international obligations of an injured party vis-à-vis the country responsible for a breach of international law , and that are aimed at obtaining the cessation of the breach or reparation for it.10 accordingly , response measures adopted under this regulation should take the form of either measures adhering to the union’s international obligations or measures constituting permitted countermeasures. under international law , and in accordance with the principle of proportionality , they should not exceed a level that is commensurate with the injury suffered by the union or a member state due to the third country’s measures of economic coercion , taking into account the gravity of the third country’s measures and the union’s rights and interests in question. in this respect , injury to the union or a member state is understood under international law to include injury to union economic operators. ### (10) any action undertaken by the union on the basis of this regulation should comply with the union’s obligations under international law. the union should continue to support the rules-based multilateral trading system , with the world trade organisation (wto) at its core. out of the wto's framework , international law allows , under certain conditions , such as proportionality and prior notice , the imposition of countermeasures , that is to say of measures that would otherwise be contrary to the international obligations of an injured party vis-à-vis the country responsible for a breach of international law , and that are aimed at obtaining the cessation of the breach or reparation for it.10 accordingly , response measures adopted under this regulation should take the form of either measures adhering to the union’s international obligations or measures constituting permitted countermeasures. under international law , and in accordance with the principle of proportionality , they should not exceed a level that is commensurate with the injury suffered by the union or a member state due to the third country’s measures of economic coercion , taking into account the gravity of the third country’s measures and the union’s rights and interests in question. in this respect , injury to the union or a member state is understood under international law to include injury to union economic operators.


### (10) any action undertaken by the union on the basis of this regulation should comply with the union’s obligations under international law. international law allows , under certain conditions , such as proportionality and prior notice , the imposition of countermeasures , that is to say of measures that would otherwise be contrary to the international obligations of an injured party vis-à-vis the country responsible for a breach of international law , and that are aimed at obtaining the cessation of the breach or reparation for it.10 accordingly , response measures adopted under this regulation should take the form of either measures adhering to the union’s international obligations or measures constituting permitted countermeasures. under international law , and in accordance with the principle of proportionality , they should not exceed a level that is commensurate with the injury suffered by the union or a member state due to the third country’s measures of economic coercion , taking into account the gravity of the third country’s measures and the union’s rights and interests in question. in this respect , injury to the union or a member state is understood under international law to include injury to union economic operators. ### (10) any action undertaken by the union on the basis of this regulation should comply with the union’s obligations under international law. international law allows , under certain conditions , such as proportionality and prior notice , the imposition of countermeasures , that is to say of measures that would otherwise be contrary to the international obligations of an injured party vis-à-vis the country responsible for a breach of international law , and that are aimed at obtaining the cessation of the breach or reparation for it.10 accordingly , response measures adopted under this regulation should take the form of either measures adhering to the union’s international obligations or measures constituting permitted countermeasures. under international law , and in accordance with the principle of proportionality , they should be equivalent to a level that is commensurate with the injury suffered by the union or a member state due to the third country’s measures of economic coercion , taking into account the gravity of the third country’s measures and the union’s rights and interests in question. in this respect , injury to the union or a member state is understood under international law to include injury to union economic operators.


### (11) coercion is prohibited under international law when a country deploys measures such as trade or investment restrictions in order to obtain from another country an action or inaction which that country is not internationally obliged to perform and which falls within its sovereignty , when the coercion reaches a certain qualitative or quantitative threshold , depending on both the ends pursued and the means deployed. the commission should examine the third-country action on the basis of qualitative and quantitative criteria that help in determining whether the third country interferes in the legitimate sovereign choices of the union or a member state and whether its action constitutes economic coercion which requires a union response. ### (11) coercion is prohibited under international law when a country deploys measures such as trade or investment restrictions in order to obtain from another country an action or inaction which that country is not internationally obliged to perform and which falls within its sovereignty , when the coercion reaches a certain qualitative or quantitative threshold , depending on both the ends pursued and the means deployed. the commission may take into account qualitative and quantitative criteria that help in determining whether the third country interferes in the legitimate sovereign choices of the union or a member state and whether its action constitutes economic coercion which requires a union response.


### (13) the commission should examine whether third-country measures are coercive , on its own initiative or following information received from any source , including legal and natural persons or a member state. following this examination , the commission should determine in a decision whether the third-country measure is coercive. the commission should communicate any affirmative determination to the third country concerned , together with a request that the economic coercion cease and a request , where appropriate , that any injury be repaired. ### (13) the commission should examine whether third-country measures are coercive , on its own initiative or following information received from any source , including legal and natural persons , the european parliament or a member state. following this examination , the commission should determine in a decision whether the third-country measure is coercive. the commission should communicate any affirmative determination to the third country concerned , together with a request that the economic coercion cease and a request , where appropriate , that any injury be repaired.


### (13) the commission should examine whether third-country measures are coercive , on its own initiative or following information received from any source , including legal and natural persons or a member state. following this examination , the commission should determine in a decision whether the third-country measure is coercive. the commission should communicate any affirmative determination to the third country concerned , together with a request that the economic coercion cease and a request , where appropriate , that any injury be repaired. ### (13) the commission should examine whether third-country measures are coercive , on its own initiative or following information received from any source , including legal and natural persons , the european parliament or a member state. following this examination , the commission should determine in a decision whether the third-country measure is coercive. the commission should communicate any affirmative determination to the third country concerned , together with a request that the economic coercion cease and a request that any injury be repaired.


### (14) the union should support and cooperate with third countries affected by the same or similar measures of economic coercion or other interested third countries. the union should participate in international coordination in bilateral , plurilateral or multilateral fora that are geared towards the prevention or elimination of the economic coercion. ### (14) the union should support and cooperate with like-minded partners affected by the same or similar measures of economic coercion or other interested partners. the union should participate in international coordination in bilateral , plurilateral or multilateral fora that are geared towards the prevention or elimination of the economic coercion.


### (15) the union should only impose countermeasures when other means such as negotiations , mediation or adjudication do not lead to the prompt and effective cessation of the economic coercion and to reparation of the injury it has caused to the union or its member states , and where action is necessary to protect the interests and rights of the union and its member states and it is in the union’s interest. it is appropriate that the regulation sets out the applicable rules and procedures for the imposition and application of union response measures and permits expeditious action where necessary to preserve the effectiveness of any union response measures. ### (15) the union should only impose countermeasures when other means such as negotiations , mediation or adjudication do not lead to the prompt and effective cessation of the economic coercion and to reparation of the injury it has caused to the union or its member states , and where action is necessary to protect the interests and rights of the union and its member states. it is appropriate that the regulation sets out the applicable rules and procedures for the imposition and application of union response measures and permits expeditious action where necessary to preserve the effectiveness of any union response measures.


### (16) union response measures adopted in accordance with this regulation should be selected and designed on the basis of objective criteria , including: the effectiveness of the measures in inducing the cessation of coercion by the third country; their potential to provide relief to economic operators within the union affected by the third-country measures of economic coercion; the aim of avoiding or minimising negative economic and other effects on the union; and the avoidance of disproportionate administrative complexity and costs. it is also essential that the selection and design of union response measures take account of the union’s interest. union response measures should be selected from a wide array of options in order to allow the adoption of the most suitable measures in any given case. ### (16) union response measures adopted in accordance with this regulation should be selected and designed on the basis of objective criteria , including: the effectiveness of the measures in inducing the cessation of coercion by the third country; the effectiveness of the measures in repairing the injury caused by the economic coercion; their potential to provide relief to economic operators within the union affected by the third-country measures of economic coercion; the aim of avoiding or minimising negative economic and other effects on the union; and the avoidance of disproportionate administrative complexity and costs. it is also essential that the selection and design of union response measures take account of the union’s interest. union response measures should be selected from a wide array of options in order to allow the adoption of the most suitable measures in any given case.


### (16) union response measures adopted in accordance with this regulation should be selected and designed on the basis of objective criteria , including: the effectiveness of the measures in inducing the cessation of coercion by the third country; their potential to provide relief to economic operators within the union affected by the third-country measures of economic coercion; the aim of avoiding or minimising negative economic and other effects on the union; and the avoidance of disproportionate administrative complexity and costs. it is also essential that the selection and design of union response measures take account of the union’s interest. union response measures should be selected from a wide array of options in order to allow the adoption of the most suitable measures in any given case. ### (16) union response measures adopted in accordance with this regulation should be selected and designed on the basis of objective criteria , including: the effectiveness of the measures in inducing the cessation of coercion by the third country and their potential to provide relief to economic operators within the union affected by the third-country measures of economic coercion. the commission may also consider other relevant factors such as the aim of avoiding or minimising negative economic and other effects on the union , and the administrative feasibility. union response measures should be selected from a wide array of options in order to allow the adoption of the most suitable measures in any given case.


### (18) in pursuing the objective of obtaining the cessation of the measure of economic coercion , union response measures consisting of restrictions on foreign direct investment or on trade in services should only apply with regard to services supplied , or direct investments made , within the union by one or more legal persons established in the union which are owned or controlled by persons of the third country concerned where necessary to ensure the effectiveness of union response measures and in particular to prevent their avoidance. the decision to impose any such restrictions will be duly justified in implementing acts adopted pursuant to this regulation in the light of the criteria specified in this regulation. ### (18) in pursuing the objective of obtaining the cessation of the measure of economic coercion and the reparation of the injury caused , union response measures consisting of restrictions on foreign direct investment or on trade in services should only apply with regard to services supplied , or direct investments made , within the union by one or more legal persons established in the union which are owned or controlled by persons of the third country concerned where necessary to ensure the effectiveness of union response measures and in particular to prevent their avoidance. the decision to impose any such restrictions will be duly justified in implementing acts adopted pursuant to this regulation in the light of the criteria specified in this regulation.


### (21) it is important to ensure an effective communication and exchange of views and information between the commission on the one hand and the european parliament and the council on the other , in particular on efforts to engage with the third country concerned to explore options with a view to obtaining the cessation of the economic coercion and on matters that may lead to the adoption of union response measures under this regulation. ### (21) it is important to ensure dialogue and exchange of views and information between the commission on the one hand and the european parliament and the council on the other , in particular regarding ongoing examinations or third country measures , on efforts to engage with the third country concerned to explore options with a view to obtaining the cessation of the economic coercion , on matters that may lead to the adoption of union response measures under this regulation and on the effectiveness on union response measures.


### (21) it is important to ensure an effective communication and exchange of views and information between the commission on the one hand and the european parliament and the council on the other , in particular on efforts to engage with the third country concerned to explore options with a view to obtaining the cessation of the economic coercion and on matters that may lead to the adoption of union response measures under this regulation. ### (21) it is important to ensure an effective communication and exchange of views and information between the commission on the one hand and the european parliament and the council on the other , in particular on efforts to engage with the third country concerned to explore options with a view to obtaining the cessation of the economic coercion and the reparation of the injury caused and on matters that may lead to the adoption of union response measures under this regulation.


### 1. this regulation lays down rules and procedures in order to ensure the effective protection of the interests of the union and its member states where a third country seeks , through measures affecting trade or investment , to coerce the union or a member state into adopting or refraining from adopting a particular act. this regulation provides a framework for the union to respond in such situations with the objective to deter , or have the third country desist from such actions , whilst permitting the union , in the last resort , to counteract such actions. ### 1. this regulation lays down rules and procedures in order to ensure the effective protection of the interests of the union and its member states where a third country seeks , through measures affecting trade or investment or relevant threats thereof , to coerce the union or a member state into adopting or refraining from adopting a particular act , policy or stance. this regulation provides a framework for the union to respond in such situations with the objective to deter , or have the third country desist from and fully cease such actions , or repair the injury caused , whilst permitting the union , in the last resort , to counteract such actions when necessary because other instruments cannot protect the union interest adequately.


### 1. this regulation lays down rules and procedures in order to ensure the effective protection of the interests of the union and its member states where a third country seeks , through measures affecting trade or investment , to coerce the union or a member state into adopting or refraining from adopting a particular act. this regulation provides a framework for the union to respond in such situations with the objective to deter , or have the third country desist from such actions , whilst permitting the union , in the last resort , to counteract such actions. ### 1. this regulation lays down rules and procedures in order to ensure the effective protection of the interests of the union and its member states where a third country seeks , through measures , failure to act or threat thereof affecting trade or investment , to coerce the union or a member state into adopting or refraining from adopting a particular act. this regulation provides a framework for the union to respond in such situations with the objective to deter , obtain the cessation and the reparation of the injury caused or have the third country desist from such actions , whilst permitting the union , in the last resort , to counteract such actions.


### 1. this regulation applies where a third country: ### 1. this regulation applies in the event of economic coercion , where a third country:


### — interferes in the legitimate sovereign choices of the union or a member state by seeking to prevent or obtain the cessation , modification or adoption of a particular act by the union or a member state ### — interferes in the legitimate sovereign choices of the union or a member state by seeking to prevent or obtain the cessation , modification or adoption of a particular act by the union or a member state , including some extraterritorial effects of third countries' sanctions;


### — interferes in the legitimate sovereign choices of the union or a member state by seeking to prevent or obtain the cessation , modification or adoption of a particular act by the union or a member state ### — interferes in the legitimate sovereign choices of the union or a member state by seeking to prevent or obtain the cessation , modification or adoption of a particular act , policy or stance by the union or a member state


### — by applying or threatening to apply measures affecting trade or investment. ### — by applying , failing to adopt or threatening to apply measures affecting trade or investment.


### for the purposes of this regulation , such third-country actions shall be referred to as measures of economic coercion. ### deleted


### 2. in determining whether the conditions set out in paragraph 1 are met , the following shall be taken into account: ### 2. in determining economic coercion and whether the conditions set out in paragraph 1 are met , the commission shall take into account the following:


### 2. in determining whether the conditions set out in paragraph 1 are met , the following shall be taken into account: ### 2. in determining whether the conditions set out in paragraph 1 are met , the following may inter alia be taken into account:


### the intensity , severity , frequency , duration , breadth and magnitude of the third country’s measure and the pressure arising from it; ### the intensity , severity , frequency , duration , breadth and magnitude of the third country’s measure , failure to act or threat thereof as well as the pressure arising from it;


### the extent to which the third-country measure encroaches upon an area of the union’s or member states’ sovereignty; ### the extent to which the third-country measure , failure to act or threat thereof encroaches upon an area of the union’s or member states’ sovereignty;


### whether the third country is acting based on a legitimate concern that is internationally recognised; ### whether the third country is acting based on a concern that is well defined and recognised as legitimate by international law and conventions ;


### 1. the commission may examine any measure of a third country in order to determine whether it meets the conditions set out in article 2(1). the commission shall act expeditiously. ### 1. the commission may examine any measure of a third country , failure to act and threat thereof in order to determine whether it meets the conditions set out in article 2(1). the commission shall act expeditiously.


### 1. the commission may examine any measure of a third country in order to determine whether it meets the conditions set out in article 2(1). the commission shall act expeditiously. ### 1. the commission may examine any measure of a third country or relevant threats thereof in order to determine whether it meets the conditions set out in article 2(1).the commission shall act within three months.


### 2. the commission may carry out the examination referred to in paragraph 1 on its own initiative or following information received from any source. the commission shall ensure the protection of confidential information in line with article 12 , which may include the identity of the supplier of the information. ### 2. the commission may carry out the examination referred to in paragraph 1 on its own initiative , and including based on information and assessments provided by the resilience office referred to in article 11a , or following information received from any source. the european parliament and the council may also provide information to the commission. the commission shall ensure the protection of confidential information in line with article 12 , which may include the identity of the supplier of the information.


### 2. the commission may carry out the examination referred to in paragraph 1 on its own initiative or following information received from any source. the commission shall ensure the protection of confidential information in line with article 12 , which may include the identity of the supplier of the information. ### 2. the commission shall carry out the examination referred to in paragraph 1 on its own initiative or following information received from any reliable source , notably a member state , the european parliament , economic operators or trade unions. the commission shall ensure the protection of confidential information in line with article 12 , which may include the identity of the supplier of the information.


### the commission may publish a notice in the official journal of the european union or through other suitable public communication means with an invitation to submit information within a specified time limit. in that event , the commission shall notify the third country concerned of the initiation of the examination. ### the commission shall notify the third country concerned of the initiation of the examination , as well as publish a notice in the official journal of the european union about the launch of the examination of third-country measures for a maximum duration of three months. in the same notice , the commission may also provide an invitation , in particular to the third country concerned , to submit observations or information within a specified time limit.


### the commission may publish a notice in the official journal of the european union or through other suitable public communication means with an invitation to submit information within a specified time limit. in that event , the commission shall notify the third country concerned of the initiation of the examination. ### the commission shall duly and in a timely manner inform the european parliament and the council of any development in the examination of third country measures. it shall publish a notice in the official journal of the european union or through other suitable public communication means with an invitation to submit information within a specified time limit which shall not exceed 4 months. in that event , the commission shall notify the third country concerned of the initiation of the examination.


### following an examination carried out in accordance with article 3 , the commission shall adopt a decision determining whether the measure of the third country concerned meets the conditions set out in article 2(1). the commission shall act expeditiously. ### following an examination carried out in accordance with article 3 , the commission shall adopt a decision , within ten working days , determining whether the measure of the third country concerned meets the conditions set out in article 2(1).


### prior to adopting its decision , the commission may invite the third country concerned to submit its observations. ### deleted


### prior to adopting its decision , the commission may invite the third country concerned to submit its observations. ### prior to adopting its decision , the commission may invite the third country concerned to submit its observations within a reasonable and specified time limit that shall not unduly delay the commission's decision.


### where the commission decides that the measure of the third country concerned meets the conditions set out in article 2(1) , it shall notify the third country concerned of its decision and request it to cease the economic coercion and , where appropriate , repair the injury suffered by the union or its member states. ### where the commission decides that the measure of the third country concerned meets the conditions set out in article 2(1) , it shall notify the third country concerned of its decision and request it to cease the economic coercion and , where appropriate , repair the injury suffered by the union or its member states within a reasonable and specified period of time.


### where the commission decides that the measure of the third country concerned meets the conditions set out in article 2(1) , it shall notify the third country concerned of its decision and request it to cease the economic coercion and , where appropriate , repair the injury suffered by the union or its member states. ### where the commission decides that the measure of the third country concerned meets the conditions set out in article2(1) , it shall notify the third country concerned of its decision and request it to cease the economic coercion immediately and , where appropriate , repair the injury suffered by the union or its member states.


### the commission shall be open to engage on behalf of the union with the third country concerned , to explore options with a view to obtaining the cessation of the economic coercion. such options may include: ### following the notification referred to in article 4 , the commission shall be open to engage on behalf of the union with the third country concerned , to explore options with a view to obtaining the cessation of the economic coercion , and , where appropriate , reparation of the injury it has caused to the union or its member states. such options may include:


### — direct negotiations; ### — direct negotiations if the country concerned agrees , within 10 working days , to engage in such negotiations;


### — mediation , conciliation or good offices to assist the union and the third country concerned in these efforts; ### — mediation , conciliation or good offices to assist the union and the third country concerned in these efforts under the conditions provided in article 10(2);


### — submitting the matter to international adjudication. ### — submitting , in parallel , the matter to international adjudication , without implying any undue delay in the commission's decision.


### — submitting the matter to international adjudication. ### — submitting the matter to international adjudication under the conditions provided in article 10(2).


### the commission shall seek to obtain the cessation of the economic coercion by also raising the matter in any relevant international forum. ### the commission shall seek to obtain the cessation of the economic coercion by raising , in addition to the commission's determination of the third country's measures , the matter in any relevant international forum.


### the commission shall keep the european parliament and the council informed of relevant developments. ### the commission shall keep the european parliament and the council fully , regularly and in timely manner informed of all the developments.


### the commission shall keep the european parliament and the council informed of relevant developments. ### the commission shall keep the european parliament and the council fully informed of relevant developments.


### the commission shall enter into consultations or cooperation , on behalf of the union , with any other country affected by the same or similar measures of economic coercion or with any interested third country , with a view to obtaining the cessation of the coercion. this may involve , where appropriate , coordination in relevant international fora and coordination in response to the coercion. ### the commission may enter into consultations or cooperation , on behalf of the union , with any other like-minded partners affected by the same or similar measures of economic coercion or with any interested partners , with a view to obtaining the cessation of the coercion , as well as a long-term deterrence effect of anti-coercion instruments. this may involve , where appropriate , coordination in sharing related information and experiences to facilitate a collective and coherent response to such coercive measures , and coordination in relevant international fora and coordination in response to the coercion


### 1. the commission shall adopt an implementing act determining that it shall take a union response measure where: ### 1. the commission shall adopt an implementing act taking a union response measure where:


### 1. the commission shall adopt an implementing act determining that it shall take a union response measure where: ### 1. the commission shall adopt an implementing act whereby it takes a union response measure where:


### action pursuant to the articles 4 and 5 has not resulted in the cessation of the economic coercion and reparation of the injury it has caused to the union or a member state within a reasonable period of time; ### action pursuant to the articles 4 and 5 has not resulted in the cessation of the economic coercion and reparation of the injury it has caused to the union or a member state within the reasonable period of time set in the decision referred to in article 4;


### action pursuant to the articles 4 and 5 has not resulted in the cessation of the economic coercion and reparation of the injury it has caused to the union or a member state within a reasonable period of time; ### action pursuant to the articles 4 and 5 has not resulted in the cessation of the economic coercion and reparation of the injury it has caused to the union or a member state;


### action is in the union’s interest. ### deleted


### in the implementing act , the commission shall also determine the appropriate union response from among the measures provided for in annex i. such measures may also apply with regard to natural or legal persons designated in accordance with article 8. the commission may also adopt measures which it can take pursuant to other legal instruments. ### in the implementing act , the commission shall also determine the appropriate union response including from among the measures provided for in annex i. such measures may also apply with regard to natural or legal persons designated in accordance with article 8.


### in the implementing act , the commission shall also determine the appropriate union response from among the measures provided for in annex i. such measures may also apply with regard to natural or legal persons designated in accordance with article 8. the commission may also adopt measures which it can take pursuant to other legal instruments. ### in the implementing act , the commission shall also determine the appropriate union response from among the measures provided for in annex i. such measures may also apply with regard to natural or legal persons designated in accordance with article 8. the commission may also adopt measures which it can take pursuant to other legal instruments , notably the blocking statute 1a .


### 2. the union response measures shall apply from a specified date after the adoption of the implementing act referred to in paragraph 1. the commission shall set this date of application , taking into account the circumstances , to allow for the notification of the third country concerned pursuant to paragraph 3 and for it to cease the economic coercion. ### 2. the union response measures shall apply from a specified date after the adoption of the implementing act referred to in paragraph 1 and in any case within 3 months from its adoption. if it is clear from lack of reactions to the notification referred to in article 3(3) or from the engagement or lack thereof under article 5 that the third country has no intention to cease the coercion , the implementing act shall apply 15 days after its adoption.


### 2. the union response measures shall apply from a specified date after the adoption of the implementing act referred to in paragraph 1. the commission shall set this date of application , taking into account the circumstances , to allow for the notification of the third country concerned pursuant to paragraph 3 and for it to cease the economic coercion. ### 2. the union response measures shall apply from a specified date after the adoption of the implementing act referred to in paragraph 1. the commission shall set this date of application , taking into account the circumstances , to allow for the notification of the third country concerned pursuant to paragraph 3 and for it to cease the economic coercion and to repair the injury caused.


### 3. the commission shall , upon adoption of the implementing act , notify the third country concerned of the union response measures adopted pursuant to paragraph 1. in the notification , the commission shall , on behalf of the union , call on the third country concerned to promptly cease the economic coercion , offer to negotiate a solution , and inform the third country concerned that the union response measure will apply , unless the economic coercion ceases. ### 3. the commission shall , upon adoption of the implementing act , notify the third country concerned of the union response measures adopted pursuant to paragraph 1. in the notification , the commission shall , on behalf of the union , call on the third country concerned to immediately cease the economic coercion , offer to negotiate a solution including with regard to the reparation of the injury caused by the third country to the union and its member states , and inform the third country concerned that the union response measure applies , unless the economic coercion ceases.


### 3. the commission shall , upon adoption of the implementing act , notify the third country concerned of the union response measures adopted pursuant to paragraph 1. in the notification , the commission shall , on behalf of the union , call on the third country concerned to promptly cease the economic coercion , offer to negotiate a solution , and inform the third country concerned that the union response measure will apply , unless the economic coercion ceases. ### 3. the commission shall , upon adoption of the implementing act , notify the third country concerned of the union response measures adopted pursuant to paragraph 1. in the notification , the commission shall , on behalf of the union , call on the third country concerned to promptly cease the economic coercion , offer to negotiate a solution and the reparation of the injury caused by it to the union and its member states , and inform the third country concerned that the union response measure will apply , unless the economic coercion ceases.


### 4. the implementing act referred to in paragraph 1 shall state that the application of the union response measures shall be deferred for a period specified in that implementing act , where the commission has credible information that the third country has ceased the economic coercion before the start of application of the adopted union response measures. in that event , the commission shall publish a notice in the official journal of the european union indicating that there is such information and the date from which the deferral shall apply. if the third country ceases the economic coercion before the union response measures start to apply , the commission shall terminate the union response measures in accordance with article 10. ### 4. the implementing act referred to in paragraph 1 shall state that the application of the union response measures shall be deferred for a period specified in that implementing act , where the commission has credible information that the third country has ceased the economic coercion before the start of application of the adopted union response measures. in that event , the commission shall publish a notice in the official journal of the european union indicating that there is such information and the date from which the deferral shall apply. if the third country ceases the economic coercion before the union response measures start to apply , the commission shall terminate the union response measures in accordance with article 10 making sure that the injury caused by the economic coercion to the union and its member states has been repaired.


### 4. the implementing act referred to in paragraph 1 shall state that the application of the union response measures shall be deferred for a period specified in that implementing act , where the commission has credible information that the third country has ceased the economic coercion before the start of application of the adopted union response measures. in that event , the commission shall publish a notice in the official journal of the european union indicating that there is such information and the date from which the deferral shall apply. if the third country ceases the economic coercion before the union response measures start to apply , the commission shall terminate the union response measures in accordance with article 10. ### 4. the implementing act referred to in paragraph 1 shall state that the application of the union response measures shall be deferred , but only for a period that is necessary for the commission to verify the actual cessation of the coercion and to be specified in that implementing act , where the commission has credible information that the third country has ceased the economic coercion before the start of application of the adopted union response measures. in that event , the commission shall publish a notice in the official journal of the european union indicating that there is such information and the date from which the deferral shall apply. if the third country ceases the economic coercion before the union response measures start to apply , the commission shall terminate the union response measures in accordance with article 10.


### 5. notwithstanding paragraphs 2 , 3 and 4 , the union response measures may apply without the commission , on behalf of the union , first calling , once more , on the third country concerned to cease the economic coercion or without the commission first notifying it that union response measure will apply , where this is necessary for the preservation of the rights and interests of the union or member states , notably of the effectiveness of union response measures. ### 5. the commission may exceptionally waive from the principle of notifying the third country concerned that union response measure will apply , where this is necessary for the preservation of the rights and interests of the union or member states , notably of the effectiveness of union response measures.


### 6. on duly justified imperative grounds of urgency to avoid irreparable damage to the union or its member states by the measures of economic coercion the commission shall adopt immediately applicable implementing acts imposing union response measures , in accordance with the procedure referred to in article 15(3). the requirements set out in paragraphs 2 to 5 shall apply. those acts shall remain in force for a period not exceeding three months. ### 6. on duly justified imperative grounds of urgency to avoid irreparable damage to the union or its member states by the measures of economic coercion the commission shall adopt immediately applicable implementing acts imposing union response measures , in accordance with the procedure referred to in article 15(3). the requirements set out in paragraphs 2 to 5 shall apply. those acts shall remain in force for a period not exceeding three months after which an implementing act pursuant paragraph 1 shall be adopted , if the conditions referred in that paragraph continue to apply.


### 6. on duly justified imperative grounds of urgency to avoid irreparable damage to the union or its member states by the measures of economic coercion the commission shall adopt immediately applicable implementing acts imposing union response measures , in accordance with the procedure referred to in article 15(3). the requirements set out in paragraphs 2 to 5 shall apply. those acts shall remain in force for a period not exceeding three months. ### 6. on duly justified imperative grounds of urgency to avoid irreparable damage to the union , its internal market , or its member states by the measures of economic coercion the commission shall adopt immediately applicable implementing acts imposing union response measures , in accordance with the procedure referred to in article 15(3). the requirements set out in paragraphs 2 to 5 shall apply. those acts shall remain in force for a period not exceeding three months.


### 7. the commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with article 14 to amend the list provided for in annex i in order to provide additional types of measures to respond to a third country’s measure. the commission may adopt such delegated acts where the types of response measures would: ### deleted


### provide as effective or more effective relief to economic operators within the union affected by the measures of economic coercion; ### provide as effective or more effective relief to the internal market and the economic operators within the union affected by the measures of economic coercion , including via internal measures such as an ad hoc compensation fund for those economic operators;


### 1. any union response measure shall not exceed the level that is commensurate with the injury suffered by the union or a member state due to the third country’s measures of economic coercion , taking into account the gravity of the third country’s measures and the rights in question. ### 1. any union response measure shall be commensurate to the level of the injury suffered by the union or a member state due to the third country’s measures of economic coercion , and shall be effective in preserving the union and its member states’ rights in making legitimate sovereign choices with regard to particular acts , policies or stances.


### 2. the commission shall select and design an appropriate response measure taking into account the determination made pursuant to article 4 , the criteria set out in article 2(2) and the union’s interest , on the basis of available information , including as collected pursuant to article 11 , and the following criteria: ### 2. the commission shall select and design an appropriate response measure taking into account the determination made pursuant to article 4 , the criteria set out in article 2 , on the basis of available information , including as collected pursuant to article 11 , and the following criteria:


### the potential of the measures to provide relief to economic operators within the union affected by the economic coercion; ### the potential of the measures to provide relief to economic operators within the union internal market affected by the economic coercion;


### the avoidance or minimisation of negative impacts on affected actors by union response measures , including the availability of alternatives for affected actors , for example alternative sources of supply for goods or services; ### deleted


### the avoidance or minimisation of negative effects on other union policies or objectives; ### deleted


### the avoidance of disproportionate administrative complexity and costs in the application of the union response measures; ### deleted


### the existence and nature of any response measures enacted by other countries affected by the same or similar measures of economic coercion , including where relevant any coordination pursuant to article 6; ### deleted


### any other relevant criteria established in international law. ### deleted


### 3. the commission may decide to apply union response measures under articles 7 or 8 consisting of restrictions on foreign direct investment or on trade in services also with regard to services supplied , or direct investments made , within the union by one or more legal persons established in the union and owned or controlled by persons of the third country concerned where necessary to achieve the objectives of this regulation. the commission may decide on such application where union response measures not covering such situations would be insufficient to effectively achieve the objectives of this regulation , in particular where such measures could be avoided. in assessing whether to adopt such a decision the commission shall consider , in addition to the criteria in paragraphs 1 and 2 , amongst other things: ### 3. the commission may decide to apply union response measures under articles 7 or 8 consisting of restrictions on foreign direct investment or on trade in services also with regard to services supplied , or direct investments made , within the union by one or more legal persons established in the union and owned or controlled by persons of the third country concerned where necessary to achieve the objectives of this regulation. the commission may decide on such application where union response measures not covering such situations would be insufficient to effectively achieve the objectives of this regulation , in particular where such measures could be avoided or circumvented. in assessing whether to adopt such a decision the commission shall consider , in addition to the criteria in paragraphs 1 and 2 , amongst other things:


### 3. the commission may decide to apply union response measures under articles 7 or 8 consisting of restrictions on foreign direct investment or on trade in services also with regard to services supplied , or direct investments made , within the union by one or more legal persons established in the union and owned or controlled by persons of the third country concerned where necessary to achieve the objectives of this regulation. the commission may decide on such application where union response measures not covering such situations would be insufficient to effectively achieve the objectives of this regulation , in particular where such measures could be avoided. in assessing whether to adopt such a decision the commission shall consider , in addition to the criteria in paragraphs 1 and 2 , amongst other things: ### 3. the commission may decide to apply union response measures under articles 7 or 8 consisting of restrictions on foreign direct investment or on trade in services also with regard to services supplied , or direct investments made , within the union by one or more legal persons established in the union and owned or controlled by persons of the third country concerned where necessary to achieve the objectives of this regulation. the commission shall decide on such application where union response measures not covering such situations would be insufficient to effectively achieve the objectives of this regulation , in particular where such measures could be avoided. in assessing whether to adopt such a decision the commission shall consider , in addition to the criteria in paragraphs 1 and 2 , amongst other things:


### 2. where the third country concerned suspends the economic coercion , or where it is necessary in the union’s interest , the commission may suspend the application of the respective union response measure for the duration of the third country’s suspension , or as long as necessary in light of the union’s interest. the commission shall suspend the union response measures if the third country concerned has offered , and the union has concluded , an agreement to submit the matter to binding international third-party adjudication and the third country is also suspending its measures of economic coercion. the commission shall , by means of an implementing act , decide to suspend the union response measure. these implementing acts shall be adopted in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in article 15(2). ### 2. where the third country concerned suspends the economic coercion and where the injury caused to the union and its member states has been repaired , the commission may suspend the application of the respective union response measure for the duration of the third country’s suspension , if it is in the union’s interest. the commission shall suspend the union response measures if the third country concerned has offered , and the union has concluded , an agreement to submit the matter to binding international third-party adjudication and if the third country is also suspending its measures of economic coercion as well as if the injury caused to the union and its member states by the economic coercion has been repaired. the commission shall , by means of an implementing act , decide to suspend the union response measure. these implementing acts shall be adopted in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in article 15(2).


### 2. where the third country concerned suspends the economic coercion , or where it is necessary in the union’s interest , the commission may suspend the application of the respective union response measure for the duration of the third country’s suspension , or as long as necessary in light of the union’s interest. the commission shall suspend the union response measures if the third country concerned has offered , and the union has concluded , an agreement to submit the matter to binding international third-party adjudication and the third country is also suspending its measures of economic coercion. the commission shall , by means of an implementing act , decide to suspend the union response measure. these implementing acts shall be adopted in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in article 15(2). ### 2. where the third country concerned entirely suspends the economic coercion , the commission shall suspend the application of the respective union response measure for the duration of the third country’s suspension. the commission shall suspend the union response measures if the third country concerned has offered , and the union has concluded , an agreement to submit the matter to binding international third-party adjudication as referred to in article 5 and the third country has also discontinued its measures of economic coercion and commits to support and abide by the third-party adjudication. the commission shall , by means of an implementing act , decide to suspend the union response measure. these implementing acts shall be adopted in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in article 15(2).


### 3. where it is necessary to make adjustments to union response measures taking into account the conditions and criteria laid down in articles 2 and 9(2) , or further developments , including the third country’s reaction , the commission may , as appropriate , amend union response measures adopted in accordance with article 7 , by means of an implementing act , in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in article 15(2). ### 3. where it is necessary to make adjustments to union response measures taking into account the conditions and criteria laid down in articles 2 and 9(2) , or further developments , including the third country’s reaction , the commission shall , as appropriate , swiftly amend union response measures adopted in accordance with article 7 , by means of an implementing act , in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in article 15(2).


### where the economic coercion has ceased; ### where the economic coercion has ceased and the injury caused has been repaired;


### where a binding decision in international third-party adjudication in a dispute between the third country concerned and the union or a member state requires the withdrawal of the union response measure; ### where a binding decision in international third-party adjudication in a dispute between the third country concerned and the union or a member state requires the withdrawal of the union response measure , provided that the third country has taken part to the third-party adjudication procedure in good faith as referred to in art. 10.2;


### where it is appropriate in light of the union’s interest. ### deleted


### 1. before the adoption of union response measures or the amendment of such measures , the commission shall , and before the suspension or termination of such measures , respectively , the commission may , seek information and views regarding the economic impact on union operators and union's interest , through a notice published in the official journal of the european union or through other suitable public communication means. the notice shall indicate the period within which the input is to be submitted. ### 1. before the adoption of union response measures and within the framework of the examination , the determination with regard to third country measures and the engagement with the third country and within the respective timelines as referred to respectively in articles 3 ,4 and 5 , the commission shall seek information and views as necessary regarding the economic impact on union operators , through a notice published in the official journal of the european union or through other suitable public communication means. the notice shall indicate the period within which the input is to be submitted. the commission shall also seek information and views in the case of amendments of union measures. the commission may seek information and views before the suspension or termination of union measures. the resilience office referred to in article 11a shall conduct permanent impact analyses , including on the basis of consultation of union operators and eu social partners , of possible patterns of union response measures.


### 2. the commission may start the information gathering at any time it deems appropriate. ### 2. the commission may start the information gathering at any time it deems appropriate , including before the formal activation of the examination of a third country measure as referred to in article 3.


### 3. in conducting the information gathering under paragraph 1 , the commission shall inform and consult stakeholders , in particular industry associations , affected by possible union response measures , and member states involved in the preparation or implementation of legislation regulating the affected fields. ### 3. in conducting the information gathering under paragraph 1 , the commission shall inform and consult stakeholders , in particular industry associations and eu social partners , affected by possible union response measures , and member states involved in the preparation or implementation of legislation regulating the affected fields.


### 4. without unduly delaying the adoption of union response measures , the commission shall , in particular , seek information on: ### 4. the commission shall , in particular , seek information on:


### the administrative burden which may be occasioned by such measures; ### the effect of such measures on diminishing the negative impacts of the third country’s coercive measures;


### the union’s interest. ### deleted


### 5. the commission shall take utmost account of the information gathered during the information gathering exercise. an analysis of the envisaged measures shall accompany the draft implementing act when submitted to the committee in the context of the examination procedure referred to in article 15(2). ### 5. the commission shall take utmost account of the information gathered during the information gathering exercise. an analysis of the envisaged measures and their potential impacts shall accompany the draft implementing act when submitted to the committee in the context of the examination procedure referred to in article 15(2).


### 6. prior to the adoption of an implementing act in accordance with article 7(6) or article 10(5) , the commission shall seek information and views from relevant stakeholders in a targeted manner , unless the imperative grounds of urgency are such that information seeking and consultations are not possible or not needed for objective reasons , for instance to ensure compliance with international obligations of the union. ### 6. prior to the adoption of an implementing act in accordance with article 7(6) or article 10(5) , the commission shall seek information and views from relevant stakeholders , especially the economic operators affected by the economic coercion , unless the exceptional situation of imperative grounds of urgency are such that information seeking and consultations are not possible or not needed for objective reasons , for instance to ensure compliance with international obligations of the union.


### 6. prior to the adoption of an implementing act in accordance with article 7(6) or article 10(5) , the commission shall seek information and views from relevant stakeholders in a targeted manner , unless the imperative grounds of urgency are such that information seeking and consultations are not possible or not needed for objective reasons , for instance to ensure compliance with international obligations of the union. ### 6. the commission shall seek information and views from relevant stakeholders in a targeted manner as a general principle prior to the adoption of an implementing act in accordance with article 7(6) or article 10(5) , unless the imperative grounds of urgency are such that information seeking and consultations are not possible or not needed for objective reasons , for instance to ensure compliance with international obligations of the union.


### 3. paragraph 2 shall not preclude the commission to disclose general information in a summary form , which does not contain information allowing to identify the supplier of the information. such disclosure shall take into account the legitimate interest of the parties concerned in not having confidential information disclosed. ### 3. paragraph 2 shall not preclude the commission to disclose general information in a summary but meaningful form , which does not contain information allowing to identify the supplier of the information. such disclosure shall take into account the legitimate interest of the parties concerned in not having confidential information disclosed.


### 16 review ### 16 reporting and review


### 1. the commission shall evaluate any union response measure adopted pursuant to article 7 six months after its termination , taking into account stakeholder input and any other relevant information. the evaluation report shall examine the effectiveness and operation of the union response measure , and draw possible conclusions for future measures. ### 1. the commission shall evaluate any union response measure adopted pursuant to article 7 six months after its termination , taking into account stakeholder input , information provided by the european parliament and the council , and any other relevant information. the commission shall publish yearly an evaluation report where it examines the effectiveness and operation of the union response measure , and draw possible conclusions for future measures. the commission shall present such report to the european parliament and the council.


### 2. no later than three years after the adoption of the first implementing act under this regulation or six years after the entry into force of this regulation , whichever is earlier , the commission shall review this regulation and its implementation and shall report to the european parliament and the council. ### 2. no later than three years after the entry into force of this regulation , the commission shall review this regulation and its implementation , in ensuring complementarity with the review of the blocking statute1a and the review of the enforcement regulation1b , and shall report to the european parliament and the council , notably in the relevant reporting of the chief trade enforcement officer.


### 2. no later than three years after the adoption of the first implementing act under this regulation or six years after the entry into force of this regulation , whichever is earlier , the commission shall review this regulation and its implementation and shall report to the european parliament and the council. ### 2. no later than three years after the adoption of the first implementing act under this regulation or four years after the entry into force of this regulation , whichever is earlier , and every four years thereafter , the commission shall review this regulation and its implementation and shall report to the european parliament and the council.


### (4) the behaviour of companies across all sectors of the economy is key to success in the union’s sustainability objectives as union companies , especially large ones , rely on global value chains. it is also in the interest of companies to protect human rights and the environment , in particular given the rising concern of consumers and investors regarding these topics. several initiatives fostering enterprises which support value-oriented transformation already exist on union77 , as well as national78 level. ### (4) the behaviour of companies across all sectors of the economy is key to success in the union’s sustainability objectives as union companies , especially large ones , rely on global value chains. it is also in the interest of companies to protect human rights , the environment , climate and more globally all planetary boundaries , in particular given the rising concern of consumers and investors regarding these topics. several initiatives fostering enterprises which support value-oriented transformation already exist on union77 , as well as national78 level. furthermore , ensuring that social inequalities resulting from human rights , environmental and climate related impacts and policies are prevented and resolved and that measures taken to protect human rights , the environment and climate are carried out in a socially just and inclusive way , including by incorporating a gender perspective at all stages of the due diligence process.


### (4) the behaviour of companies across all sectors of the economy is key to success in the union’s sustainability objectives as union companies , especially large ones , rely on global value chains. it is also in the interest of companies to protect human rights and the environment , in particular given the rising concern of consumers and investors regarding these topics. several initiatives fostering enterprises which support value-oriented transformation already exist on union77 , as well as national78 level. ### (4) the behaviour of undertakings across all sectors of the economy is key to success in the union’s sustainability objectives as union undertakings , especially large ones , rely on global value chains. it is also in the interest of undertakings to safeguard good governance and protect human rights , the environment , the climate and more globally all planetary boundaries , in particular given the rising concern of consumers and investors regarding these topics. several initiatives fostering enterprises which support value-oriented transformation already exist on union77 , as well as national78 . furthermore , ensuring that social inequalities resulting from human rights , good governance , environmental and climate related impacts and policies are prevented and resolved and that measures taken to safeguard good governance and protect human rights , the environment and climate are carried out in a socially just and inclusive way , including by incorporating a gender perspective at all stages of the due diligence process.


### (8) international agreements under the united nations framework convention on climate change , to which the union and the member states are parties , such as the paris agreement84 and the recent glasgow climate pact85 , set out precise avenues to address climate change and keep global warming within 1.5 c degrees. besides specific actions being expected from all signatory parties , the role of the private sector , in particular its investment strategies , is considered central to achieve these objectives. ### (8) international agreements under the united nations framework convention on climate change , to which the union and the member states are parties , such as the paris agreement84 and the recent glasgow climate pact85 , set out precise avenues to address climate change and keep global warming within 1.5 c degrees. besides specific actions being expected from all signatory parties , the role of the private sector , in particular its investment strategies , is considered central to achieve these objectives. indeed , just 100 companies have been the source of more than 70% of the world’s greenhouse gas emissions since 1988 , representing nearly 1 trillion tonnes of greenhouse gas emissions2a. however , there is a fundamental mismatch between corporate climate commitments and their actual investments to fight against climate change. in 2021 , 60% of public communications material from top five supermajor oil companies included a green claim , but only 12% of their capital expenditure (capex) was forecasted to be dedicated to 'low carbon' activities2b. this directive is therefore an important legislative tool to avoid any misleading neutrality or other misleading claims and to stop greenwashing and fossil fuels expansion worldwide in order to achieve international and european climate objectives , also recommended by the latest scientific reports2c.


### (8) international agreements under the united nations framework convention on climate change , to which the union and the member states are parties , such as the paris agreement84 and the recent glasgow climate pact85 , set out precise avenues to address climate change and keep global warming within 1.5 c degrees. besides specific actions being expected from all signatory parties , the role of the private sector , in particular its investment strategies , is considered central to achieve these objectives. ### (8) international agreements under the united nations framework convention on climate change , to which the union and the member states are parties , such as the paris agreement84 and the recent glasgow climate pact85 , set out precise avenues to address climate change and keep global warming within 1.5 c degrees. besides specific actions being expected from all signatory parties , the role of the private sector , in particular its investment strategies , is considered central to achieve these objectives. indeed , just 100 undertakings have been the source of more than 70% of the world’s greenhouse gas emissions since 1988 , representing nearly 1 trillion tonnes of greenhouse gas emissions8a. however , there is a fundamental mismatch between corporate climate commitments and their actual investments to fight against climate change. in 2021 , 60 % of the public communications material from the 5 supermajor oil undertakings included a green claim , but only 12 % of their capital expenditure (capex) was forecasted to be dedicated to 'low carbon 'activities8b. this directive is therefore an important legislative tool to avoid any misleading neutrality or other misleading claims and to stop greenwashing and fossil fuels expansion worldwide in order to achieve international and european climate objectives , also recommended by the latest scientific reports8c.


### (14) this directive aims to ensure that companies active in the internal market contribute to sustainable development and the sustainability transition of economies and societies through the identification , prevention and mitigation , bringing to an end and minimisation of potential or actual adverse human rights and environmental impacts connected with companies’ own operations , subsidiaries and value chains. ### (14) this directive aims to ensure that companies active in the internal market contribute to sustainable development and the sustainability transition of economies and societies through the identification , prevention and mitigation , bringing to an end and minimisation of potential or actual adverse human rights and environmental impacts connected with companies’ own operations , goods throughout their life cycle and services , and those of their subsidiaries and value chains.


### (14) this directive aims to ensure that companies active in the internal market contribute to sustainable development and the sustainability transition of economies and societies through the identification , prevention and mitigation , bringing to an end and minimisation of potential or actual adverse human rights and environmental impacts connected with companies’ own operations , subsidiaries and value chains. ### (14) this directive aims to ensure that companies active in the internal market contribute to sustainable development and the sustainability transition of economies and societies through the identification , prevention and mitigation , bringing to an end and minimisation of potential or actual adverse human rights , environmental and climate impacts connected with companies’ own operations , products throughout their life cycle and services , subsidiaries and value chains.


### (14) this directive aims to ensure that companies active in the internal market contribute to sustainable development and the sustainability transition of economies and societies through the identification , prevention and mitigation , bringing to an end and minimisation of potential or actual adverse human rights and environmental impacts connected with companies’ own operations , subsidiaries and value chains. ### (14) this directive aims to ensure that undertakings active in the internal market contribute to sustainable development and the sustainability transition of economies and societies through the identification , prevention and mitigation , bringing to an end and minimisation of potential or actual adverse human rights , good governance , and environmental and climate impacts connected with undertakings’ own operations , goods throughout their life cycle and services , and those of their subsidiaries and value chains.


### (15) companies should take appropriate steps to set up and carry out due diligence measures , with respect to their own operations , their subsidiaries , as well as their established direct and indirect business relationships throughout their value chains in accordance with the provisions of this directive. this directive should not require companies to guarantee , in all circumstances , that adverse impacts will never occur or that they will be stopped. for example with respect to business relationships where the adverse impact results from state intervention , the company might not be in a position to arrive at such results. therefore , the main obligations in this directive should be ‘obligations of means’. the company should take the appropriate measures which can reasonably be expected to result in prevention or minimisation of the adverse impact under the circumstances of the specific case. account should be taken of the specificities of the company’s value chain , sector or geographical area in which its value chain partners operate , the company’s power to influence its direct and indirect business relationships , and whether the company could increase its power of influence. ### (15) companies should take appropriate steps to set up and carry out due diligence measures , with respect to their own operations , produced goods and services throughout their life cycle , and those of their subsidiaries , as well as their established direct and indirect business relationships throughout their value chains and therefore beyond the first tier of the value chain , in accordance with the provisions of this directive. this directive should not require companies to guarantee , in all circumstances , that adverse impacts will never occur or that they will be stopped. for example with respect to business relationships where the adverse impact results from state intervention , the company might not be in a position to arrive at such results. therefore , the main obligations in this directive should be ‘obligations of means’. the company should take the appropriate measures which can reasonably be expected to result in prevention or minimisation of the adverse impact under the circumstances of the specific case. the action should be proportionate to the significance and scale of the adverse impact and to the contribution of the company’s conduct to the adverse impact. account should be taken of the specificities of the company’s value chain , sector or geographical area in which its value chain partners operate , the company’s power to influence its direct and indirect business relationships , and whether the company could increase its power of influence.


### (15) companies should take appropriate steps to set up and carry out due diligence measures , with respect to their own operations , their subsidiaries , as well as their established direct and indirect business relationships throughout their value chains in accordance with the provisions of this directive. this directive should not require companies to guarantee , in all circumstances , that adverse impacts will never occur or that they will be stopped. for example with respect to business relationships where the adverse impact results from state intervention , the company might not be in a position to arrive at such results. therefore , the main obligations in this directive should be ‘obligations of means’. the company should take the appropriate measures which can reasonably be expected to result in prevention or minimisation of the adverse impact under the circumstances of the specific case. account should be taken of the specificities of the company’s value chain , sector or geographical area in which its value chain partners operate , the company’s power to influence its direct and indirect business relationships , and whether the company could increase its power of influence. ### (15) companies should take appropriate steps to set up and carry out due diligence measures , with respect to their own operations , products and services throughout their life cycle , their subsidiaries , as well as their direct and indirect business relationships throughout their value chains in accordance with the provisions of this directive. this directive should not require companies to guarantee , in all circumstances , that adverse impacts will never occur or that they will be stopped. for example with respect to business relationships where the adverse impact results from state intervention , the company might not be in a position to arrive at such results. therefore , the main obligations in this directive should be ‘obligations of means’. the company should take the appropriate measures which can reasonably be expected to result in prevention or minimisation of the adverse impact under the circumstances of the specific case. the action should be proportionate to the significance and scale of the adverse impact and to the contribution of the company’s conduct to the adverse impact. account should be taken of the specificities of the company’s value chain , sector or geographical area in which its value chain partners operate , the company’s power to influence its direct and indirect business relationships , and whether the company could increase its power of influence.


### (15) companies should take appropriate steps to set up and carry out due diligence measures , with respect to their own operations , their subsidiaries , as well as their established direct and indirect business relationships throughout their value chains in accordance with the provisions of this directive. this directive should not require companies to guarantee , in all circumstances , that adverse impacts will never occur or that they will be stopped. for example with respect to business relationships where the adverse impact results from state intervention , the company might not be in a position to arrive at such results. therefore , the main obligations in this directive should be ‘obligations of means’. the company should take the appropriate measures which can reasonably be expected to result in prevention or minimisation of the adverse impact under the circumstances of the specific case. account should be taken of the specificities of the company’s value chain , sector or geographical area in which its value chain partners operate , the company’s power to influence its direct and indirect business relationships , and whether the company could increase its power of influence. ### (15) undertakings should take appropriate steps to set up and carry out due diligence measures , with respect to their own operations , produced goods and services throughout their life cycle , and those of their subsidiaries , as well as their direct and indirect business relationships throughout their value chains and therefore beyond the first tier of the value chain , in accordance with the provisions of this directive. this directive should not require undertakings to guarantee , in all circumstances , that adverse impacts will never occur or that they will be stopped. for example with respect to business relationships where the adverse impact results from state intervention , the undertaking might not be in a position to arrive at such results. therefore , the main obligations in this directive should be a standard of conduct. the undertaking should take the appropriate measures which can reasonably be expected to result in prevention or minimisation of the adverse impact under the circumstances of the specific case. the action should be proportionate to the significance and scale of the adverse impact and to the contribution of the undertaking s conduct to the adverse impact. account should be taken of the specificities of the undertaking’s value chain , sector or geographical area in which its value chain partners operate , the undertaking’s power to influence its direct and indirect business relationships , and whether the undertaking could increase its power of influence.


### (15) companies should take appropriate steps to set up and carry out due diligence measures , with respect to their own operations , their subsidiaries , as well as their established direct and indirect business relationships throughout their value chains in accordance with the provisions of this directive. this directive should not require companies to guarantee , in all circumstances , that adverse impacts will never occur or that they will be stopped. for example with respect to business relationships where the adverse impact results from state intervention , the company might not be in a position to arrive at such results. therefore , the main obligations in this directive should be ‘obligations of means’. the company should take the appropriate measures which can reasonably be expected to result in prevention or minimisation of the adverse impact under the circumstances of the specific case. account should be taken of the specificities of the company’s value chain , sector or geographical area in which its value chain partners operate , the company’s power to influence its direct and indirect business relationships , and whether the company could increase its power of influence. ### (15) companies should take appropriate steps to set up and carry out due diligence measures , with respect to their own operations , produced goods and services throughout their life cycle , and those of their subsidiaries , as well as their direct and indirect business relationships throughout their value chains in accordance with the provisions of this directive. this directive should not require companies to guarantee , in all circumstances , that adverse impacts will never occur or that they will be stopped. for example with respect to business relationships where the adverse impact results from state intervention , the company might not be in a position to arrive at such results. therefore , the main obligations in this directive should be ‘obligations of means’. the company should take the appropriate measures which can reasonably be expected to result in prevention or minimisation of the adverse impact under the circumstances of the specific case. the action should be proportionate to the significance and scale of the adverse impact and to the contribution of the company’s conduct to the adverse impact. account should be taken of the specificities of the company’s value chain , sector or geographical area in which its value chain partners operate , the company’s power to influence its direct and indirect business relationships , and whether the company could increase its power of influence.