### 7. recommends that the commission ensure that the level of personal data protection and the protection of individuals’ fundamental rights and freedoms currently guaranteed under eu primary and secondary law is maintained in exchanges of personal data with interpol; the commission’s negotiation strategy should not lead to a weakening of the fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons , and in particular of their rights to data protection and to privacy; ### 7. recommends that the commission ensure that the level of personal data protection and the protection of individuals’ fundamental rights and freedoms currently guaranteed under eu primary and secondary law is maintained in access to databases of interpol; the commission’s negotiation strategy should not lead to a weakening of the fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons , and in particular of their rights to data protection and to privacy;


### 8. recommends that the commission guarantee that the transfer of personal data is adequate , relevant and limited to what is necessary for the purpose for which it has been transferred; ### 8. recommends that the commission guarantee that no transfer of personal data takes place from eu agencies to interpol;


### 9. recommends that the commission guarantee that the processing of data is limited to what is necessary in individual cases for the purposes of the agreement and that any further data processing incompatible with the initial purpose is prohibited; the agreement has to clearly indicate that decisions based solely on the automated processing of personal information without human involvement are not allowed; ### 9. recommends that the commission guarantee that the processing of data is limited to what is necessary in individual cases for the purposes of the agreement and that any further data processing incompatible with the initial purpose is prohibited; the agreement has to clearly indicate that decisions based solely on the automated processing of personal information without meaningful human involvement are not allowed;


### 10. recommends that the commission ensure an oversight system for the use by interpol of personal data collected by consulting eu systems; ### 10. recommends that no direct or indirect access is granted for interpol to eu databases;


### 11. recommends that the commission guarantee that data is not retained for longer than is necessary for the purpose for which it was transferred; in this context the agreement has to provide rules on storage , including storage limitation , on review , correction and deletion of personal data; ### 11. recommends that the commission guarantee that data is not retained for longer than is necessary for the purpose for which it was transferred; in this context the agreement has to provide rules on storage , including storage limitation , on review , correction and deletion of personal data; recommends the agreement would foresee monitoring mechanism on data retention;


### 12. recommends that the commission ensure the rights to administrative and judicial redress for any person whose data are processed under this agreement and that it guarantee effective remedies; ### 12. recommends that the commission ensure in the agreement that the rights to administrative and judicial redress for any person whose data are processed under this agreement and that it guarantee effective remedies are properly upheld;


### 14. recommends that particular attention should be paid to fundamental rights challenges and the necessity of adequate mitigating measures and non-discrimination mechanisms as well as enhanced data quality and protection with a view to the establishment of frameworks for interoperability between eu information systems and future interoperability with the non-eu systems and databases in the fields of police and judicial cooperation , asylum and migration , as well as integrated borders management and visas , providing a pivotal legislative framework for current and future developments in the eu’s digital infrastructure; ### 14. recommends that particular attention should be paid to fundamental rights challenges and the necessity of adequate mitigating measures and non-discrimination mechanisms as well as enhanced data quality and protection with a view to the establishment of frameworks for interoperability between eu information systems;


### 18. recalls that according to the eu’s current legislative framework , the transfer of data from the eu to third countries and international organisations is allowed only if the recipients of this information are able to guarantee an adequate level of personal data protection; recommends in this context that in the absence of an adequacy decision on interpol , the agreement should constitute the legal basis allowing the transfer of personal data to interpol , provided that it is legally binding and enforceable against all parties to the agreement and that it includes appropriate data protection safeguards; ### 18. recalls that according to the eu’s current legislative framework , the transfer of data from the eu to third countries and international organisations is allowed only if the recipients of this information are able to guarantee an adequate level of personal data protection; recommends in this context that in the absence of an adequacy decision on interpol , the agreement should not constitute a legal basis allowing the transfer of personal data to interpol;


### 19. recommends limiting the application of derogations for onward transfers to the cases already allowed for eu agencies and bodies concerned when transferring personal data; ### deleted


### 20. recommends that the agreement ensure that transfers must be necessary for the purposes specified in the agreement , namely prevention , investigation , detection or prosecution of criminal offences , safeguarding against threats to public security and protecting external borders; ### deleted


### 21. recommends that the agreement explicitly lay down that personal data transferred by the eu to interpol will not be used to request , hand down or execute a death penalty or any form of cruel and inhuman treatment; ### deleted


### red notices ### red notices and diffusions


### 22. stresses , with a view to future cooperation , that despite recent reforms transparency remains a challenge both at the individual and the organisational level in interpol , as does a lack of available statistical information on the operation of its notices systems; encourages the commission , therefore , to take actions to ensure that interpol further develops the legal framework and substantive tools allowing consistent and transparent processing of requests , reviews , challenges , corrections and deletions; ### 22. stresses , with a view to future cooperation , that despite recent reforms , transparency and accountability remains a challenge both at the individual and the organisational level in interpol , as does a lack of available statistical information on the operation of its notices and diffusions systems; encourages the commission , therefore , to take actions to ensure that interpol publish statistical information on the operation of its notices and diffusions systems; encourages the commission , therefore , to take actions to ensure that interpol further develops the legal frameworks and substantive tools allowing consistent and transparent processing of requests , reviews , challenges , corrections and deletions;


### 23. calls on the commission , in the context of this agreement , to explore possible ways the esp could address the problem of politically-motivated red notices , which in practice would be one of tools that could prove effective against politically motivated red notice requests in some situations; ### 23. calls on the commission , in the context of this agreement , to establish safeguards that ensure the esp can address the problem of politically-motivated red notices and diffusions;


### 24. notes the announcement by interpol’s secretary-general that it would implement enhanced monitoring measures to identify and prevent further abuse of interpol’s systems by russia; remains concerned , however , that monitoring alone will not fully mitigate the risks of russian abuse; stresses , therefore , that given the current special circumstances interpol should take immediate and firm measures to exclude the russian federation from the organisation; ### 24. notes the announcement by interpol’s secretary-general that it would implement enhanced monitoring measures to identify and prevent further abuse of interpol’s systems by russia; remains concerned , however , that monitoring alone will not fully mitigate the risks of russian abuse; stresses , therefore , that given the current special circumstances interpol should take immediate and firm measures to prevent the russian federation's access to interpol system; strongly recommends enhanced monitoring measures would apply to notices and diffusions issued before the war in ukraine by russian authorities; calls on the commission to advice member states on specific measures to apply on notices and diffusions issues by russian authorities before the war and in the current context;


### 25. recommends providing for the possibility of suspending or terminating the agreement in cases of breaches of its provisions on personal data by one of the parties , specifying that personal data falling within the scope of the agreement transferred prior to its suspension or termination may continue to be processed in accordance with the terms of the agreement; ### 25. recommends providing for the possibility of suspending or terminating the agreement in cases of breaches of its provisions on personal data and fundamental rights by one of the parties;


### a. ensure that personal data transferred by eu bodies to interpol is sufficiently protected from misuse , by including adequate safeguards in the agreement; ### a. ensure that no personal data is transferred by eu agencies to interpol and that no direct or indirect access is granted to interpol and third countries to eu databases;


### d. increase transparency , for instance by disclosing statistical data on requests for red notices; ### d. increase transparency , notably by disclosing statistical data on how many requests for interpol alerts are received and refused annually (including reasons for refusals);


### (7) to combat terrorism effectively , efficient exchange of information for investigation or prosecution of terrorist offences between competent authorities and union agencies is crucial. it is essential to have the most complete and updated information possible. the persistence of the terrorist threat and the complexity of the phenomenon raise the need for an ever greater exchange of information. ### (7) to combat terrorism effectively , efficient exchange of information for investigation or prosecution of terrorist offences between competent authorities and union agencies is crucial. it is essential to have the most complete and updated information possible.


### (9) in order to enable eurojust to identify cross-links between cross-border judicial proceedings against suspects of terrorist offences as well as cross-links between judicial proceedings against suspects of terrorist offences and information processed at eurojust relating to other cases of serious crimes , it is essential that eurojust receives sufficient information to enable eurojust to cross-check this data. ### (9) in order to enable eurojust to identify cross-links between cross-border judicial proceedings against suspects of terrorist offences as well as cross-links between judicial proceedings against suspects of terrorist offences and information processed at eurojust relating to other cases of serious crimes , it is essential that eurojust receives from the competent authorities the information that is necessary to identify these cross-links.


### (10) the competent authorities need to know exactly what kind of information they have to transmit to eurojust , at what stage of the national proceedings and in which cases , in order to provide such data. this is expected to increase the information eurojust receives significantly. ### (10) the competent authorities need to know exactly what kind of information they have to transmit to eurojust , at what stage of the national criminal proceedings and in which cases , in order to provide such data. this is expected to increase the quality and relevance of the information eurojust receives.


### (11) directive (eu) 2017/541 of the european parliament and of the council34 is the reference point for national authorities to define terrorist offences as implemented in national law. ### (11) directive (eu) 2017/541 of the european parliament and of the council34 is the reference point for national authorities to define terrorist offences as implemented in national law. information provided to eurojust for the purpose of this regulation should be strictly related to crimes of terrorism and serious organised crimes , as exhaustively listed in directive (eu) 2017/541. information provided to eurojust should therefore not relate to criminal proceedings initiated on the basis of extended or political definitions of terrorism or organised crime , or to criminal proceedings initiated for politically-motivated purposes or in manifest breach of fundamental rights.


### (12) for the identification of cross-links between terrorism investigations and judicial proceedings against suspects of terrorist offences , reliable identification data is crucial. due to the uncertainties regarding alphanumerical data especially for third country nationals , it should be possible to exchange biometric data. due to the sensitive nature of biometric data and the impact processing of biometric data has on the respect for private and family life and the protection of personal data , as enshrined in articles 7 and 8 of the charter of fundamental rights of the european union , a strict necessity test should be applied by the competent authorities and eurojust in each case. ### (12) for the identification of cross-links between terrorism investigations and judicial proceedings against suspects of terrorist offences , reliable identification data is crucial. due to the uncertainties regarding alphanumerical data especially for third country nationals , it should be possible to provide to eurojust biometric data , provided such data has been collected in accordance with national law in the context of criminal proceedings and in full respect of the procedural rights set out in directives 2010/64/eu1a , 2012/13/eu1b , 2013/48/eu1c , 2016/3431d , 2016/8001e and 2016/19191f of the european parliament and of the council. due to the sensitive nature of biometric data and the impact processing of biometric data has on the respect for private and family life and the protection of personal data , as enshrined in articles 7 and 8 of the charter of fundamental rights of the european union , a strict necessity and proportionality test should be applied by the competent authorities and eurojust in each case.


### (13) as information about existing cross-links to other judicial proceedings is most useful at an early stage of the investigation , it is necessary that the competent authorities provide information to eurojust as soon as judicial authorities are involved. if the competent national authorities are already aware of cross-links , they should inform eurojust accordingly. ### (13) as information about existing cross-links to other judicial proceedings is most useful at an early stage of the investigation , it is necessary that the competent authorities provide information to eurojust as soon as the case is referred to a judicial authority in accordance with national law. depending on the national law , the moment at which a case is considered to be referred to a judicial authority is when the authority is informed of an ongoing investigation or authorises or orders an investigation. if the competent national authorities are already aware of cross-links between criminal proceedings , they should inform eurojust accordingly.


### (14) in order to ensure the accuracy of the data in the european judicial counter-terrorism register , to identify cross-links early and to ensure time limits are respected , the competent national authorities should update the information provided regularly. such updates should include new information relating to the person under investigation , judicial decisions such as pre-trial detention or opening of the court proceedings and judicial cooperation requests or identified links with other jurisdictions. ### (14) in order to ensure the accuracy of the data in the european judicial counter-terrorism register , to identify cross-links or clear suspects as early as possible in an investigation and to ensure time limits are respected , the competent national authorities should provide updated information whenever it emerges. such updates should include new information relating to the person under investigation , judicial decisions such as pre-trial detention , opening of court proceedings , judicial cooperation requests or identified links with other jurisdictions as well as not guilty verdicts and acquittals.


### (16) for the purposes of exchanging and processing sensitive data between competent national authorities and eurojust for protecting such data against unauthorised disclosure and cyber attacks , and without prejudice to future technological developments , secure communication channels , such as the secure communication connections referred to in article 9 of council decision 2008/976/jha35 or the decentralised it system as defined in regulation (eu) […/…] of the european parliament and of the council36 [regulation on the digitalisation of judicial cooperation] should be used. in order to exchange data securely and protect the integrity of the communication and data exchange , the case management system should be connected to such secure communication systems and meet high cybersecurity standards. ### (16) for the purposes of exchanging and processing personal data related to suspects and accused persons in criminal proceedings between competent authorities and eurojust and for protecting such data , which by nature is sensitive , against unauthorised disclosure and cyber attacks , and without prejudice to future technological developments , secure communication channels , such as the secure communication connections referred to in article 9 of council decision 2008/976/jha35 or the decentralised it system as defined in regulation (eu) […/…] of the european parliament and of the council36 [regulation on the digitalisation of judicial cooperation] should be used. in order to exchange data securely and protect the integrity of the communication and data exchange , the case management system should be connected to such secure communication systems and meet high cybersecurity standards.


### (18) the transmission of unstructured data makes manual intervention necessary , creates additional administrative burden , and reduces the quality of the results of cross-checking. therefore , national competent authorities should transmit the data in a structured manner while respecting minimal interoperability requirements as defined in the european interoperability framework39 . in addition , the transfer of data should be automated as much as possible to lessen the administrative burden of national authorities and to ensure the necessary data is provided regularly and quickly. ### (18) the transmission of unstructured data makes manual intervention necessary , creates additional administrative burden , and reduces the quality of the results of cross-checking. therefore , competent authorities should transmit the data in a structured manner while respecting minimal interoperability requirements as defined in the european interoperability framework39 . in addition , the transfer of data should be automated to lessen the administrative burden of national authorities and to ensure the necessary data is provided regularly and quickly. transfer of sensitive data related to suspects and accused persons in criminal proceedings should not be fully automated , but subject to a transmission mode which is , at least partly , human controlled. for the purpose of data transfers under this regulation , human control in the transmission mode should entail the verification of the quality and quantity of data to be transferred and of the transfers of data having been authorised by competent national authorities as well as the verification of necessity and proportionality requirements. the national authorities competent for the transfer of information should be responsible for the accuracy and legality of the acquisition of the information provided to eurojust.


### (19) a modernized case management system is necessary for eurojust to process the sensitive personal data securely. the new system needs to integrate and enable the functionalities of the european judicial counter-terrorism register and improve the capacities of eurojust regarding link detection. ### (19) a modernized case management system is necessary for eurojust to process the sensitive personal data securely. the new system needs to integrate and enable the functionalities of the european judicial counter-terrorism register and improve the capacities of eurojust regarding the detection of cross links.


### (20) it is important to maintain the control and responsibility of the national members for the data , which they receive from the national competent authorities. no operational personal data should be shared with another member state by default. operational personal data should only be shared in as far as national competent authorities authorise the exchange of data. in order to digitalise and speed up the follow up on potential links while ensuring full control over the data , handling codes should be introduced. ### (20) it is important to maintain the control and responsibility of the national members for the data , which they receive from the national competent authorities. no operational personal data should be shared with another member state by default. operational personal data should only be shared by national members in as far as national competent authorities authorise the exchange of data after carrying out a necessity and proportionality assessment in each individual case. in order to digitalise and speed up the follow up on potential links while ensuring full control over the data , handling codes should be introduced.


### (21) terrorist activities often affect two or more member states. terrorism already had a strong transnational component in the past. however , with the use and availability of electronic communication , transnational collaboration between terrorist offenders has increased significantly. therefore , terrorist offences should be considered per se transnational in their nature , if the specific circumstances of the case do not clearly indicate a purely national character. ### (21) terrorist activities often affect two or more member states. terrorism already had a strong transnational component in the past. the use and availability of electronic communication can increase transnational collaboration between terrorist offenders. therefore , terrorist offences should be considered transnational in their nature , if the specific circumstances of the case do not clearly indicate a purely national character.


### (22) investigations and prosecutions in terrorism cases are often impeded by the lack of information exchange between national investigation and prosecution authorities. in order to be able to cross check new terrorist investigations also with previous investigations and establish potential links , it is necessary to store the data on any previous investigations , not only on convictions and to extend the time limits for storing data in the european judicial counter-terrorism register. however , it is necessary to ensure that such data is processed for prosecution purposes only. the information may not be used for anything else but identifying links with ongoing investigations and prosecutions and for the support of those investigations and prosecutions. ### (22) investigations and prosecutions in terrorism cases could be impeded by the lack of information exchange between national investigation and prosecution authorities. in order to be able to cross check new terrorist investigations with previous investigations and identify potential links , it might be necessary to store the data on previous investigations and convictions related to terrorist cases. it should be possible to extend the time limits for storing data in the european judicial counter-terrorism register on a case by case basis to the extent that such extension is necessary and proportionate for the purpose of ongoing operational activities. data on previous investigations and convictions should be retained and processed for purposed related to cross-checking links with other investigations and prosecutions only. information on previous investigations or prosecution related to persons who are not guilty , acquitted or otherwise rehabilitated should not be stored beyond the time that is necessary to perform the cross-checking and should be deleted if links between judicial proceedings are not identified. the information may not be used for anything else but identifying links with ongoing investigations and prosecutions and for the support of those investigations and prosecutions.


### (24) while regulation (eu) 2018/1727 provides a legal basis for the cooperation and exchange of data with third countries , it does not contain any rules on the formal and technical aspects of the cooperation with third country liaison prosecutors seconded to eurojust , in particular their access to the case management system. in the interest of legal certainty , regulation (eu) 2018/1727 should provide an explicit legal basis for the cooperation between eurojust and the third country liaison prosecutors and their access to the eurojust case management system. eurojust should ensure adequate safeguards and security measures for the protection of data and fundamental rights through the technical setup and internal rules. ### (24) while regulation (eu) 2018/1727 provides a legal basis for the cooperation and exchange of data with third countries , it does not contain any rules on the formal and technical aspects of the cooperation with third country liaison prosecutors seconded to eurojust , in particular their access to the case management system. in the interest of legal certainty , regulation (eu) 2018/1727 should provide an explicit legal basis for the cooperation between eurojust and the third country liaison prosecutors and their access to the eurojust case management system. eurojust should implement adequate safeguards and security measures for the protection of data and fundamental rights through the technical setup and internal rules.


### (25) in the interest of clarity , the relationship between the exchange of information between national competent authorities on terrorism cases with eurojust under decision 2005/671/jha and regulation (eu) 2018/1727 should be clarified. therefore , the relevant provisions should be deleted from decision 2005/671/jha and be added to regulation (eu) 2018/1727. ### (25) the relationship between the exchange of information between national competent authorities on terrorism cases with eurojust under decision 2005/671/jha and regulation (eu) 2018/1727 should be clarified. therefore , the relevant provisions should be deleted from decision 2005/671/jha and be added to regulation (eu) 2018/1727.


### regulation (eu) 2017/1727 is amended as follows: ### regulation (eu) 2018/1727 is amended as follows:


### 2a. each member state shall designate a competent national authority as eurojust national correspondent for terrorism matters. this national correspondent for terrorism matters shall be a judicial or other competent authority. where the national legal system requires , more than one authority can be designated. the national correspondent for terrorism matters shall have access to all relevant information in accordance with article 21a(1). it shall be competent to collect such information and to send it to eurojust.; ### 2a. each member state shall designate a competent national authority as eurojust national correspondent for terrorism matters. this national correspondent for terrorism matters shall be a judicial or other competent authority. where the national legal system requires , more than one authority can be designated. the national correspondent for terrorism matters shall have access to all relevant information in accordance with article 21a(1). it shall be competent to collect information about investigations and prosecution of terrorist offences , including those which ended in an acquittal or which were concluded in another way , judicial decisions such as pre-trial detention or opening of court proceedings , and judicial cooperation requests or identified links with other jurisdictions , to send such information to eurojust and to carry out necessity and proportionality assessments. before sending information to eurojust , the national correspondent shall obtain the authorisation from the responsible national authority to verify the quality and quantity of information to be transferred , and to assess the necessity and proportionality of the transfers of information , where the responsible national authority is different from the national correspondent;


### 2. terrorist offences for the purpose of this article are offences referred to in directive (eu) 2017/541 of the european parliament and of the council*. the obligation referred to in paragraph 1 shall apply to all terrorist offences regardless whether there is a known link to another member state or third country , unless the case , due to its specific circumstances , clearly affects only one member state. ### 2. terrorist offences for the purpose of this article are offences referred to in directive (eu) 2017/541 of the european parliament and of the council*. the obligation referred to in paragraph 1 shall apply to all terrorist offences regardless of whether there is a known link to another member state or third country , the obligation referred to in paragraph 1 shall not apply to terrorist offences that , due to their specific circumstances , clearly affect only one member state.


### 4. the competent national authorities shall inform their national member without delay about any relevant changes in the national proceedings. ### 4. the competent national authorities shall inform their national member about any relevant changes in the national proceedings without delay , and not later than 10 days after the occurrence of the relevant change.


### 5. paragraph 1 shall not apply where the sharing of information would jeopardise current investigations or the safety of an individual , or when it would be contrary to essential interests of the security of the member state concerned. ### 5. paragraph 1 shall not apply where the sharing or updating of information would jeopardise current investigations or the safety of an individual , or when it would be contrary to essential interests of the security of the member state concerned.


### 3. the competent national authorities shall transmit the information in accordance with articles 21 and 21a to eurojust in a semi-automated manner from national registers and in a structured way determined by eurojust. ### 3. the competent national authorities shall transmit the information to eurojust in accordance with articles 21 and 21a in a semi-automated manner , subject to human control , from national registers and in a structured way determined by eurojust. operational personal data shall only be transmitted to the extent that that transmission is necessary and proportionate and subject to authorisation by competent national authorities on a case-by-case basis.


### 4. in the performance of their duties , national members may process personal data on the individual cases , on which they are working , in accordance with this regulation or other applicable instruments. ### 4. in the performance of their duties , national members may process personal data on the individual cases , on which they are working , in accordance with this regulation or other applicable instruments. information on previous investigations and convictions related to terrorist cases may be processed by national members , on a case by case basis , to the extent that such processing is necessary and proportionate to the purpose of identifying links with ongoing investigations and prosecutions and for the support of those investigations and prosecutions.


### they shall allow the data protection officer to have access to the personal data processed in the case management system. ### they shall allow the data protection officer to have access to the personal data processed in the case management system. the data protection officer shall be informed by the national member of the processing of operational personal data for the purposes indicated under paragraph 2 of this article.


### the national members may , however , temporarily store and analyse personal data for the purpose of determining whether such data are relevant to eurojust’s tasks and can be included in the operational data management system. that data may be held for up to three months. ### the national members may , however , temporarily store and analyse personal data for the purpose of determining whether such data are relevant to eurojust’s tasks and can be included in the case management system. that data may be held for up to three months.


### 2. the national member shall decide , on a case-by-case basis , whether to keep access to the information restricted or to give access to it or to parts of it to other national members , to liaison prosecutors seconded to eurojust , to authorised eurojust staff or to any other person working on behalf of eurojust who has received the necessary authorisation from the administrative director. ### 2. the national member shall decide , on a case-by-case basis , whether to keep access to the information restricted or to give access to it or to parts of it to other national members , to liaison prosecutors seconded to eurojust , to authorised eurojust staff or to any other person working on behalf of eurojust who has received the necessary authorisation from the administrative director. decisions by the national members to give access to information transmitted in accordance with articles 21 and 21a to other national members , to liaisons prosecutors seconded to eurojust , to authorised eurojust staff or to any other person working on behalf of eurojust , shall be made on a case by case basis , and access shall only be given to the extent such access is necessary and proportionate to the purpose of identifying links with ongoing investigations and prosecutions and for the support of those investigations and prosecutions. the decision to disclose information shall be communicated to the competent national authority and shall be included in the case file. unless such communication would jeopardise the investigation or prosecution , the decision of the national member to disclose information shall also be communicated to the suspects and to accused persons.


### eurojust may continue to process the operational personal data referred to in point (a) of the first subparagraph also after the proceedings have been concluded under the national law of the member state concerned , even in case of an acquittal. where the proceedings did not result in a conviction , processing of personal data may only take place in order to identify links with other ongoing or concluded investigations and prosecutions as referred to in article 23(2) , point (c).; ### eurojust may continue to process the operational personal data referred to in point (a) of the first subparagraph also after the proceedings have been concluded under the national law of the member state concerned , even in case of an acquittal. where the proceedings did not result in a conviction , processing of personal data may only take place in order to identify links with other ongoing or concluded investigations and prosecutions as referred to in article 23(2) , point (c). if links between judicial proceedings are not identified , information related to a person which is acquitted or to proceedings that ended on grounds that do not imply that person's guilt should be removed.


### 5 years after the date on which the judicial decision of the last of the member states concerned by the investigation or prosecution became final , 3 years in case of an acquittal.; ### 2 years after the date on which the judicial decision of the last of the member states concerned by the investigation or prosecution became final , 1 year in case of an acquittal or a final decision of non-prosecution; where the investigation or prosecution has resulted in a final verdict of not guilty or acquittal , operational personal data in relation to that investigation shall be removed”;


### if operational personal data referred to in article 27(4) are stored for a period exceeding five years , the edps shall be informed thereof. ### if operational personal data referred to in article 27(4) are stored for a period exceeding two years , or for a period exceeding one year in case of an acquittal or a final decision of non-prosecution , the edps shall be informed thereof.


### the college shall lay down the detailed conditions of access.; ### the college shall lay down the detailed conditions of access and processing of data included in the case management system by the liaison prosecutors. in accordance with articles 45 and 46 , eurojust is liable for the personal data processing by the liaison prosecutors;


### — photographs.. ### — photographs that have been collected in accordance with national law during criminal proceedings.


### (2) easy access to data is important in order for decision makers in the economy and society to make sound decisions that serve the efficient functioning of the market. rolling out common european data spaces in crucial sectors , including the financial sector , would serve that purpose. the financial sector is undergoing a digital transformation , which is expected to continue in the coming years , and the union should support that transformation , in particular by promoting data-driven finance. furthermore , putting sustainable finance at the heart of the financial system is a key means to achieving a green transition of the economy of the union. for the green transition to succeed through sustainable finance , it is essential that information related to the sustainability of businesses is easily accessible to investors so that they are better informed when making decisions about investments. for those purposes , public access to entities’ information such as companies , businesses , financial institutions , financial and non-financial information needs to be improved. an efficient means to do so at union level is to establish a centralised platform , a european single access point (“esap”) , giving electronic access to all relevant information. ### (2) easy and structured access to data is important in order for decision makers in the economy and society to make sound informed , and environmentally and socially responsible investment decisions that serve the efficient functioning of the market. rolling out common european data spaces in crucial sectors , including the financial sector , would serve that purpose. the financial sector is undergoing a digital transformation , which is expected to continue in the coming years , and the union should support that transformation , in particular by promoting data-driven finance. furthermore , putting sustainable finance at the heart of the financial system is a key means to achieving a green transition of the economy of the union. for the green transition to succeed through sustainable finance , it is essential that information related to the sustainability of businesses is easily accessible to investors so that they are better informed when making decisions about investments. for those purposes , public access to entities’ information such as companies , businesses , financial institutions , financial and non-financial information needs to be improved. an efficient means to do so at union level is to establish a centralised platform , a european single access point (“esap”) , giving electronic access to all relevant information.


### (2) easy access to data is important in order for decision makers in the economy and society to make sound decisions that serve the efficient functioning of the market. rolling out common european data spaces in crucial sectors , including the financial sector , would serve that purpose. the financial sector is undergoing a digital transformation , which is expected to continue in the coming years , and the union should support that transformation , in particular by promoting data-driven finance. furthermore , putting sustainable finance at the heart of the financial system is a key means to achieving a green transition of the economy of the union. for the green transition to succeed through sustainable finance , it is essential that information related to the sustainability of businesses is easily accessible to investors so that they are better informed when making decisions about investments. for those purposes , public access to entities’ information such as companies , businesses , financial institutions , financial and non-financial information needs to be improved. an efficient means to do so at union level is to establish a centralised platform , a european single access point (“esap”) , giving electronic access to all relevant information. ### (2) easy access to data is important in order for decision makers , civil society , investors , as well as other stakeholders in the economy and society to make sound decisions that serve the efficient functioning of the market. rolling out common european data spaces in crucial sectors , including the financial sector , would serve that purpose. the financial sector is undergoing a digital transformation , which is expected to continue in the coming years , and the union should support that transformation , in particular by promoting data-driven finance. furthermore , putting sustainable finance at the heart of the financial system is a key means to achieving a green transition of the economy of the union. for the green transition to succeed through sustainable finance , it is essential that information related to the sustainability of businesses is easily accessible to investors so that they are better informed when making decisions about investments. for those purposes , public access to entities’ information such as companies , businesses , financial institutions , financial and non-financial information needs to be improved. an efficient means to do so at union level is to establish a centralised platform , a european single access point (“esap”) , giving electronic access to all relevant information.


### (5) apart from the information in relation to financial services , capital markets and sustainability that has to be made public under union law , investors , market participants , advisors and the public at large may have an interest in obtaining other information that an entity wants to make accessible. small and medium-sized enterprises may want to make more information publicly accessible in order to become more visible to potential investors and thereby increase funding and diversify funding opportunities. also , market participants may want to provide more information than that required by law or to make public the information required by national law but not available at union level in order to complement the information provided to the public at the union level. any entity should therefore be allowed to make financial , sustainability-related and other relevant information accessible on esap. pursuant to the principle of data minimisation , entities should ensure that no personal data are included , except where those data constitute a necessary element of the information about their economic activities , including when the name of the entity coincides with the name of the owner. where such information contains personal data , the entities should ensure that they can rely for such disclosure on one of the lawful grounds of processing laid down in article 6 of regulation (eu) 2016/679 of the european parliament and of the council26 . ### (5) apart from the information in relation to financial services , capital markets and sustainability that has to be made public under union law , investors , market participants , advisors and the public at large may have an interest in obtaining other information that an entity wants to make accessible. micro , small and medium-sized enterprises may want to make more information publicly accessible in order to become more visible to potential investors and thereby increase funding and diversify funding opportunities. also , market participants may want to provide more information than that required by union law or to make public the information required by national law but not available at union level in order to complement the information provided to the public at the union level. any entity should therefore be allowed to make financial , sustainability-related and other relevant information accessible on esap. pursuant to the principles of data minimisation , accuracy , and data protection-by-design and by default entities should ensure that no personal data are included , except where those data constitute a necessary element of the information about their economic activities , including when the name of the entity coincides with the name of the owner. where such information contains personal data , the entities should ensure that they can rely for such disclosure on one of the lawful grounds of processing laid down in article 6 of regulation (eu) 2016/679 of the european parliament and of the council26 . entities submitting information to esap should remain responsible for the accuracy and reliability of such information.


### (13) to promote data-driven innovation in finance , help integrate capital markets in the european union , channel investments into sustainable activities , and bring efficiencies for consumers and businesses , esap should improve access to information that include personal data. esap should , however , only improve access to those personal data that have to be processed pursuant to union law , or that are processed voluntarily provided that there is a lawful ground for such processing pursuant to regulation (eu) 2016/679 of the european parliament and of the council. for any processing of personal data in the context of providing information via esap , the collection bodies , and esma in its capacity as operator of esap , should ensure that regulation (eu) 2016/679 and regulation (eu) 2018/1725 of the european parliament and of the council28 are complied with. ### (13) to promote data-driven innovation in finance , help integrate capital markets in the european union , channel investments into sustainable activities , and bring efficiencies for consumers and businesses , esap should improve access to information that include personal data. esap should , however , only improve access to those personal data that have to be processed pursuant to union law , or that are processed voluntarily provided that there is a lawful ground for such processing pursuant to regulation (eu) 2016/679 of the european parliament and of the council. for any processing of personal data in the context of providing information via esap , the collection bodies , and esma in its capacity as operator of esap and when performing its role of data processor and data controller , should ensure that regulation (eu) 2016/679 and regulation (eu) 2018/1725 of the european parliament and of the council28 are complied with. as regards the publication of information concerning administrative measures and other penalties , which may also include information concerning criminal convictions and offences within the meaning of article 10 of regulation (eu) 2016/67928a , and article 11 of regulation (eu) 2018/172528b , the processing of such data should be carried out only under control of a competent official authority , or when the processing is authorised by union law providing for appropriate safeguards for the rights and freedoms of data subjects.


### 2. esap shall not provide access to information submitted before 1 january 2024. ### 2. if available , esap shall provide access to information submitted before 1 january 2024.


### 1. any natural or legal person may submit to a collection body the information referred to in article 1(1) , point (b) to make that information accessible on esap. when submitting that information , the natural or legal person shall: ### 1. any natural or legal person acting as a market participant may submit to a collection body the information referred to in article 1(1) , point (b) to make that information accessible on esap. when submitting that information , the natural or legal person shall:


### 1. any natural or legal person may submit to a collection body the information referred to in article 1(1) , point (b) to make that information accessible on esap. when submitting that information , the natural or legal person shall: ### 1. any entity in the meaning of article 1 , paragraph 2 may submit to a collection body the information referred to in article 1(1) , point (b) to make that information accessible on esap. when submitting that information , the natural or legal person shall:


### ensure that the information referred to in article 1(1) remains available to esap for at least 10 years , unless stated otherwise in the legal acts referred to in article 1(1) , point (a). personal data in the information submitted pursuant to article 1(1) shall not be retained and made available for longer than 5 years , unless stated otherwise in the legal acts referred to in article 1(1) , point (a). ### ensure that the information referred to in article 1(1) remains available to esap for at least 10 years , unless stated otherwise in the legal acts referred to in article 1(1) , point (a). personal data in the information submitted pursuant to article 1(1) shall not be retained for longer than necessary and in any event it shall be not made available for longer than 5 years , unless stated otherwise in the legal acts referred to in article 1(1) , point (a).


### ensure that the information referred to in article 1(1) remains available to esap for at least 10 years , unless stated otherwise in the legal acts referred to in article 1(1) , point (a). personal data in the information submitted pursuant to article 1(1) shall not be retained and made available for longer than 5 years , unless stated otherwise in the legal acts referred to in article 1(1) , point (a). ### ensure that the information referred to in article 1(1) remains available to esap for at least 10 years , unless stated otherwise in the legal acts referred to in article 1(1) , point (a).


### ensure that the information referred to in article 1(1) remains available to esap for at least 10 years , unless stated otherwise in the legal acts referred to in article 1(1) , point (a). personal data in the information submitted pursuant to article 1(1) shall not be retained and made available for longer than 5 years , unless stated otherwise in the legal acts referred to in article 1(1) , point (a). ### ensure that the information referred to in article 1(1) remains available to esap for at least 20 years , unless stated otherwise in the legal acts referred to in article 1(1) , point (a). personal data in the information submitted pursuant to article 1(1) shall not be retained and made available for longer than 5 years , unless stated otherwise in the legal acts referred to in article 1(1) , point (a).


### 4. entities shall ensure the accuracy of the information they submit to the collection bodies. ### 4. entities shall ensure the quality , completeness , reliability , and accuracy of the information they submit to the collection bodies.


### 4. entities shall ensure the accuracy of the information they submit to the collection bodies. ### 4. entities shall ensure and be accountable for the accuracy of the information they submit to the collection bodies.


### 4. entities shall ensure the accuracy of the information they submit to the collection bodies. ### 4. entities shall ensure the accuracy , completeness and reliability of the information they submit to the collection bodies as well as for the accompanying metadata.


### esma shall put in place an effective and proportionate it security policy for esap and shall ensure appropriate levels of authenticity , availability , integrity and non-repudiation of the information made accessible on esap and of the protection of personal data. ### esma shall put in place an effective and proportionate it security policy for esap and shall ensure appropriate levels of authenticity , availability , integrity and non-repudiation of the information made accessible on esap and of the protection of personal data. esma shall carry out periodic reviews of the it security policy and the cybersecurity situation of esap in consideration of evolving european and international cybersecurity trends and latest developments.


### a web portal with a user-friendly interface in all the official languages of the union to provide access to the information in esap; ### a web portal with a user-friendly interface taking account of special access needs of individuals with disabilities , in all the official languages of the union to provide access to the information in esap;


### 2. esma shall ensure that esap provides for the functionalities referred to in paragraph 1 , points (e) and (g) by 31 december 2025. ### 2. esma shall ensure that esap provides for the functionalities referred to in paragraph 1 , points (e) and (g) by 31 december 2025. esma shall introduce appropriate technical and organisational measures to avoid excessive disclosure of personal data via the download service and the api. additional safeguards shall be provided by esma where the disclosure of personal data via the download service and the api concerns personal data of a particularly sensitive nature , such as information concerning administrative measures or other penalties regarding natural persons. such safeguards shall be specified by the commission by way of an implementing act.


### 4. for the purposes of paragraph 2 , second subparagraph , esma may develop draft implementing technical standards to determine the nature and extent of the specific services for which fees may be charged and to determine the associated fee structure. ### 4. for the purposes of paragraph 2 , second subparagraph , esma shall develop draft implementing technical standards to determine the nature and extent of the specific services for which fees may be charged and to determine the associated fee structure.


### 1. esma shall perform automated validations to verify compliance of the information submitted by the collection bodies with the requirements laid down in article 5(1) , point (b). ### 1. esma shall perform at least every six months automated periodic validations to verify compliance of the information submitted by the collection bodies with the requirements laid down in article 5(1) , point (b).


### 3. esma shall not store information containing personal data except for automatic , intermediate and transient processing , including storage of that information insofar as strictly necessary for the purpose of giving access to information provided by the collection bodies. ### 3. esma shall not store information containing personal data except for automatic , intermediate and transient processing , including storage of that information insofar as strictly necessary for the purpose of giving access to information provided by the collection bodies. esma shall also take appropriate technical and organisational measures to ensure that the information is not retained or made available for longer period that the one provided for in point (f) of article 5(1) of the proposal.


### (12) esap should provide users with access to information for free and without discrimination and should make it possible for those users to search , access and download the information through esap. however , taking into account the need to protect esma from an excessive financial burden in relation to costs incurred for serving the needs of intensive users , if any , esma should have the ability to generate revenues. therefore , by way of derogation from the principle that information should be accessible free of charge , esma should be allowed to impose fees for those specific services , including for services with high maintenance costs due to searches for very large volumes of information or to frequent access to esap. any fees imposed should , however , not exceed the cost of the service provided. ### (12) esap should provide users with access to information for free and without discrimination and should make it possible for those users to search , access and download the information through esap. however , taking into account the need to protect esma from an excessive financial burden in relation to costs incurred for serving the needs of intensive users , if any , esma should have the ability to generate revenues. therefore , by way of derogation from the principle that information should be accessible free of charge , esma should be allowed to impose fees for those specific services , including for services with high maintenance costs due to searches for very large volumes of information or to frequent access to esap and where those services are for commercial re-use of data. any fees imposed should , however , not exceed the cost of the service provided.


### provide the collection body with its legal entity identifier as specified pursuant to article 7(4); ### provide the collection body with its legal entity identifier as specified pursuant to article 7(4) , and where applicable , the legal identifier of the group it belongs to and the legal identifiers of its own subsidiaries;


### 2. the joint committee of the european supervisory authorities shall develop draft implementing technical standards to specify all of the following: ### 2. the joint committee of the european supervisory authorities and the european financial reporting advisory group (efrag) shall develop draft implementing technical standards to specify all of the following:


### where the information is manifestly inappropriate , abusive , or clearly outside the scope of the information referred to in article 1(1). ### where the information is inappropriate , abusive , or outside the scope of the information referred to in article 1(1).


### esma may , however , charge fees for specific services that involve searches for a very large volume of information or for frequently updated information. those fees shall not exceed the cost incurred by esma for the provision of the service. ### deleted


### esma may , however , charge fees for specific services that involve searches for a very large volume of information or for frequently updated information. those fees shall not exceed the cost incurred by esma for the provision of the service. ### esma may , however , charge fees for specific services that involve searches for a very large volume of information or for frequently updated information and when those services are for commercial re-use of data. those fees shall not exceed the cost incurred by esma for the provision of the service.


### 1. esma shall , in close cooperation with the european banking authority (eba) and the european insurance and occupational pensions authority (eiopa): ### 1. esma shall , in close cooperation with the european banking authority (eba) , the european network of supervisory authorities for corporate sustainability due diligence and the european insurance and occupational pensions authority (eiopa):


### 1. esma , in close cooperation with the eba and eiopa , shall monitor the functioning of esap based on at least the qualitative and quantitative indicators laid down in paragraph 2 , and shall publish an annual report about the functioning of esap. ### 1. esma , in close cooperation with the eba , the european network of supervisory authorities for corporate sustainability due diligence and eiopa , shall monitor the functioning of esap based on at least the qualitative and quantitative indicators laid down in paragraph 2 , and shall publish an annual report about the functioning of esap.


### the type of information submitted by the entity that submitted the information; ### the type of information including information on sustainability where applicable , submitted by the entity that submitted the information;


### 7. reminds that the edps workload is expected to further increase due to the growing digitalisation trend in the union , the revision of agencies’ mandates and the initiatives presented by the commission especially in the field of justice and home affairs; appreciates the contribution of the epds to the legislative work in cooperation with the european data protection board; stresses the importance to adapt human and financial resources to the increasing workload and to increase the edps's budget accordingly; ### 7. reminds that the edps workload is expected to further increase due to the growing digitalisation trend in the union , the revision of agencies’ mandates and the initiatives presented by the commission especially in the field of justice and home affairs , namely the opinions on europol’s mandate , dsa/dma , the nis 2.0 directive and the joint opinions on the artificial intelligence act and digital green certificate; appreciates the contribution of the epds to the legislative work in cooperation with the european data protection board; stresses the importance to adapt human and financial resources to the increasing workload and to increase the edps's budget accordingly;


### 1. highlights the role of international investigative journalism and whistleblowers in exposing tax avoidance and evasion , corruption , organised crime and money laundering; deems it necessary to further protect the confidentiality of the sources of investigative journalism , including whistleblowers; ### 1. highlights the role of international investigative journalism and whistleblowers in exposing tax avoidance and evasion , corruption , organised crime and money laundering; deems it necessary to further protect the confidentiality of the sources of investigative journalism , including whistleblowers; looks forward to the commission's report , due to be published in december 2023 , on the implementation of the 2019 eu whistleblowers directive; calls on the commission , in that regard , to consult stakeholders on improvements to make to the directive;


### 1. denounces the existence of a shadowy offshore financial system with offices all over the world , which is allowing enrichment at the public’s expense; ### 1. denounces the existence of a shadowy offshore financial system with offices all over the world , which is allowing enrichment at the public’s expense; stresses that the lack of transparency , including international information sharing , is a key underlying cause of tax-related illicit financial flows;


### 2. emphasises that the practices brought to light by the pandora papers revelations have a severe impact on the fiscal space of developing countries; ### 2. emphasises that the practices brought to light by the pandora papers revelations have a severe impact on the fiscal space of developing countries; recalls that tax avoidance by wealthy individuals and corporations shifts the tax burden from larger businesses to smaller and medium-sized businesses that do not have the resources to access similar sophisticated tax planning arrangements. it also shifts the tax burden onto consumption through personal income tax and value-added tax , which is particularly problematic in ldcs where small , medium and micro-enterprises (smmes) and informal traders make up the bulk of economic activity and are more vulnerable to significantly reduced income and insecurity;


### 3. considers that tax avoidance by multinationals and the existence of tax havens offering no or extremely low effective tax rates are heavily detrimental to the fair collection of tax in countries in the global south; ### 3. reminds that globalisation has affected the ability of countries to generate domestic government revenues and to choose their taxation structure; considers that tax avoidance by multinationals and the existence of tax havens offering no or extremely low effective tax rates are heavily detrimental to the fair collection of tax in countries in the global south; stresses that multinational corporations should pay taxes in the countries where economic activity occurs and value is created;


### 4. emphasises the structural implications of the tax avoidance practices of both multinationals and individuals for developing countries’ fiscal capacities and mid to long-term growth prospects; highlights the increase in inequality and poverty caused by the lack of fiscal space as a result of tax avoidance; ### 4. emphasises the structural implications of the tax avoidance practices of both multinationals and individuals for developing countries’ fiscal capacities and mid to long-term growth prospects; highlights the increase in inequality and poverty caused by the lack of fiscal space as a result of tax avoidance; recalls that the fight against cross-border tax evasion is crucial as a means to expand the tax base; increase tax revenue and to protect the integrity and fairness of tax systems;


### 5. recalls that the upcoming global corporate minimum tax will define a fixed baseline for corporate taxation , thereby combating corporate tax avoidance , and calls for the resulting fiscal capacities to be used to build resilient , sustainable and equal societies; calls for international cooperation on the corporate minimum tax to be utilised in such a way as to introduce better transparency measures for the prosecution of tax avoiders; ### 5. recalls that the upcoming global corporate minimum tax will define a fixed baseline for corporate taxation , thereby combating corporate tax avoidance , and calls for the resulting fiscal capacities to be used to build resilient , sustainable and equal societies; calls for international cooperation on the corporate minimum tax to be utilised in such a way as to introduce better transparency measures for the prosecution of tax avoiders; recalls that the distribution of taxing rights between countries must be fair , equitable and in line with the goal of reducing inequalities among countries;


### 6. calls for full international transparency on the real owners of letterbox companies and real estate; considers that the international exchange of information needs to be expanded to identify tax evaders and calls for greater efforts to tackle financial secrecy , including supporting capacity-building for tax administrations and tax investigations in developing countries. ### 6. recalls that transparency of ownership and control of companies , trusts and other legal entities is critical to combat illicit financial flows; in this regards calls on member states to ensure a full implementation of directive (eu) 2018/843 of the european parliament and of the council of 30 may 2018 amending directive (eu)2015/849 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing; calls for full international transparency on the real owners of letterbox companies and real estate; considers that the international exchange of information needs to be expanded to identify tax evaders and calls for greater efforts to tackle financial secrecy , including supporting capacity-building for tax administrations and tax investigations in developing countries.


### 12. ‘border surveillance’ means the surveillance of borders between crossing points and of border crossing points outside fixed opening hours , including preventative measures to detect and prevent unauthorised border crossings or the circumvention of border checks. ### 12. ‘border surveillance’ means the surveillance of borders between crossing points and of border crossing points outside fixed opening hours , in order to prevent unauthorised border crossings or the circumvention of border checks.


### 27. ‘instrumentalisation of migrants’ refers to a situation where a third country instigates irregular migratory flows into the union by actively encouraging or facilitating the movement of third country nationals to the external borders , onto or from within its territory and then onwards to those external borders , where such actions are indicative of an intention of a third country to destabilise the union or a member state , where the nature of such actions is liable to put at risk essential state functions , including its territorial integrity , the maintenance of law and order or the safeguard of its national security; ### deleted


### (2) in article 5 , a new paragraph 4 is added: ### deleted


### 1. the main purpose of border surveillance shall be to detect and prevent unauthorised border crossings , to counter cross-border criminality and to take measures against persons who have crossed the border illegally. ### 1. the main purpose of border surveillance shall be to prevent unauthorised border crossings , to counter cross-border criminality and to take measures against persons who have crossed the border irregularly.


### 2. the border guards shall use stationary or mobile units to carry out border surveillance. ### 2. the border guards shall use stationary or mobile units to carry out border surveillance.


### 3. surveillance between border crossing points shall be carried out by border guards whose numbers and methods shall be adapted to existing or foreseen risks and threats. it shall involve frequent and sudden changes to surveillance periods and other methods or techniques , so that unauthorised border crossings are effectively detected or prevented. ### 3. surveillance between border crossing points shall be carried out by border guards whose numbers and methods shall be adapted to existing or foreseen risks and threats. it shall involve frequent and sudden changes to surveillance periods , so that unauthorised border crossings are always at risk of being detected.


### 4. surveillance shall be carried out by stationary or mobile units which perform their duties by patrolling or stationing themselves at places known or perceived to be sensitive , the aim of such surveillance being to prevent unauthorised border crossings or apprehend individuals crossing the border illegally. surveillance may also be carried out by technical means , including electronic means , equipment and surveillance systems. ### 4. surveillance shall be carried out by stationary or mobile units which perform their duties by patrolling or stationing themselves at places known or perceived to be sensitive , the aim of such surveillance being to prevent unauthorised border crossings or apprehend individuals crossing the border irregularly. surveillance may also be carried out by technical means , including electronic means , equipment and surveillance systems , and shall be conducted in accordance with the standard and obligations provided for in the regulation (eu) .../... of the european parliament and of the council laying down harmonised rules on artificial intelligence (artificial intelligence act) and amending certain union legislative acts.


### 5. in a situation of instrumentalisation of migrants , the member state concerned shall intensify border surveillance as necessary in order to address the increased threat. in particular , the member state shall enhance , as appropriate , the resources and technical means to prevent an unauthorised crossing of the border. ### deleted


### 6. without prejudice to the support that the european border and coast guard agency may provide to the member states , in the event of a situation of instrumentalisation of migrants , the agency may carry out a vulnerability assessment as provided for in articles 10(1) , point (c) , and article 32 of regulation (eu) 2019/1896 of the european parliament and council57 , with a view to providing the necessary support to the member state concerned. ### deleted


### 7. the commission shall be empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with article 37 concerning additional measures governing surveillance , including the development of standards for border surveillance , in particular the use of surveillance and monitoring technologies at the external borders , taking into account the type of borders , the impact levels attributed to each external border section in accordance with article 34 of the regulation (eu) 2019/1896 and other relevant factors. ### 7. for the purpose of paragraph 4 , the commission shall be empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with article 37 concerning additional measures governing surveillance , including the development of standards for border surveillance , in particular the use of surveillance and monitoring technologies at the external borders , taking into account the type of borders , the impact levels attributed to each external border section in accordance with article 34 of the regulation (eu) 2019/1896 and other relevant factors.


### (4) chapter v is renamed as follows: “specific measures relating to the external borders” ### (4) after chapter v the following chapter vi is inserted: “specific measures in the event of infectious diseases with epidemic potential”


### 1. this article shall apply to situations where the european centre for disease prevention and control or the commission identify the existence in one or more third countries of an infectious disease with epidemic potential as defined by the relevant instruments of the world health organization. ### 1. this article shall apply to situations where the european centre for disease prevention and control identifies the existence in one or more third countries of an infectious disease with epidemic potential as defined by the relevant instruments of the world health organization.


### 2. the council , on the basis of a proposal by the commission , may adopt an implementing regulation , providing for temporary restrictions on travel to the member states. ### 2. the council , on the basis of a proposal by the commission , and after having consulted the european parliament , may adopt an implementing regulation , providing for temporary restrictions on travel to the member states.


### b) identify any geographical areas or third countries from which non-essential travel may be subject to restrictions or exemptions from restrictions , having regard to the particular situation of the areas or countries concerned on the basis of objective methodology and criteria , including , in particular , the epidemiological situation; ### b) identify any geographical areas or third countries from which non-essential travel may be subject to restrictions or exemptions from restrictions , having regard to the particular situation of the areas or countries concerned on the basis of objective methodology and criteria , in particular the epidemiological situation;


### in chapter v , the following article 21a is inserted: ### in chapter vi , the following article 21a is inserted:


### a) the exercise of police or other public powers by the competent authorities of the member states in their territory , including in their internal border areas , as conferred on them under national law , insofar as the exercise of those powers does not have an effect equivalent to border checks. ### a) the exercise of police powers by the competent authorities of the member states in their territory , including in their internal border areas , as conferred on them under national law , insofar as the exercise of those powers does not have an effect equivalent to border checks.


### ii) are based on general information and experience of the competent authorities regarding possible threats to public security or public policy and aim , in particular , to: ### ii) are based on specific and substantiated police information and experience of the competent authorities regarding possible threats to public security and aim , in particular , to:


### — combat irregular residence or stay , linked to irregular migration; or ### deleted


### iv) are carried out , where appropriate , on the basis of monitoring and surveillance technologies generally used in the territory , for the purposes of addressing threats to public security or public policy as set out under ii); ### iv) are carried out , where appropriate , on the basis of monitoring and surveillance technologies generally used in the territory , for the purposes of addressing threats to public security as set out under ii);


### e) checks for security purposes of passenger data against relevant databases on persons traveling in the area without controls at internal borders which can be carried out by the competent authorities under the applicable law. ### deleted


### (6) the following article 23a is inserted: ### deleted


### activities relating to terrorism or organised crime; ### a direct and immediate threat of acts of terrorism or of serious organised crime;


### a situation characterised by large scale unauthorised movements of third-country nationals between the member states , putting at risk the overall functioning of the area without internal border control; ### deleted


### 3. where the same threat continues to persist , border controls at internal borders may be prolonged in accordance with articles 25a , 28 or 29. ### deleted


### procedure for cases requiring action due to unforeseeable or foreseeable events ### procedure for temporary reintroduction or prolongation of border control at internal borders


### 2. the member state shall , at the same time as reintroducing border control under paragraph 1 , notify the commission and the other member states of the reintroduction of border controls , in accordance with article 27(1). ### 2. the member state shall , at the same time as reintroducing border control under paragraph 1 , notify the commission , the european parliament and the other member states of the reintroduction of border controls , in accordance with article 27(1).


### 3. for the purposes of paragraph 1 , border control at internal borders may be immediately reintroduced for a limited period of up to one month. if the serious threat to public policy or internal security persists beyond that period , the member state may prolong the border control at internal borders for further periods , leading to a maximum duration not exceeding three months. ### 3. for the purposes of paragraph 1 , border control at internal borders may be immediately reintroduced for a limited period of up to one month. if the serious threat to public policy or internal security persists beyond that period , the member state may prolong the border control at internal borders for further periods , leading to a maximum duration not exceeding three months. in doing so , the member state concerned shall carry out an assessment of the necessity and the proportionality of the measure as referred to in article 26 , and make a new notification in accordance with article 27(1).


### 4. where a serious threat to public policy or internal security is foreseeable in a member state , the member state shall notify the commission and the other member states and the commission in accordance with article 27(1) , at the latest four weeks before the planned reintroduction of border controls , or within a shorter period where the circumstances giving rise to the need to reintroduce border controls at internal borders become known less than four weeks before the planned reintroduction. ### 4. where a serious threat to public policy or internal security is foreseeable in a member state , the member state may , on exceptional basis and as a last resort , reintroduce border controls at internal borders following the assessment provided for in article 26 and a notification to the commission , the european parliament and the other member states in accordance with article27(1). the notification shall be transmitted at the latest four weeks before the planned reintroduction of border controls , or within a shorter period where the circumstances giving rise to the need to reintroduce border controls at internal borders become known less than four weeks before the planned reintroduction.


### 5. for the purposes of paragraph 4 , and without prejudice to article 27a(4) , border control at internal borders may be reintroduced for a period of up to six months. where the serious threat to public policy or internal security persists beyond that period , the member state may prolong the border control at internal borders for renewable periods of up to six months. ### 5. for the purposes of paragraph 4 , and without prejudice to article 27a(4) , border control at internal borders may be reintroduced for a period of up to three months. where the serious threat to public policy or internal security persists beyond that period , the member state may prolong the border control at internal borders for renewable periods of up to three months.


### 6. the period referred to in paragraph 5 shall not include periods referred to in paragraph 3. ### deleted


### 1. to establish whether the reintroduction of border control at internal borders is necessary and proportionate in accordance with article 25 , a member state shall in particular consider: ### 1. to establish whether the reintroduction of border control at internal borders is necessary and proportionate in accordance with article 25 , a member state shall assess , before adopting any relevant measure , in particular:


### the likely impact of such a measure on: ### the likely impact of any measure provided for in paragraphs (a) and (aa) on:


### — movement of persons within the area without internal border control and ### — free movement of persons within the area without internal border control;


### 2. where a member states decides to prolong the border control at internal borders pursuant to article 25a(5) , it shall also assess in detail whether the objectives pursued by such prolongation could be attained by: ### 2. where a member states decides to prolong the border control at internal borders pursuant to article 25a(5) , it shall carry out a further risk assessment in accordance with paragraph 1.


### a) the use of alternative measures such as proportionate checks carried out in the context of the lawful exercise of powers as referred to in article 23 point (a); ### deleted


### b) the use of the procedure as referred to in article 23a; ### deleted


### c) forms of police cooperation as provided for under union law , including on matters such as joint patrols , joint operations , joint investigation teams , cross-border hot pursuits , or cross-border surveillance. ### deleted


### the considerations as to the necessity and proportionality referred to in article 26(1) and , in the case of a prolongation , in article 26(2); ### the outcome of the assessment as to the necessity and proportionality referred to in article 26(1) , 26(2) and 26(2a) and the accompanying mitigating measures adopted pursuant to article 26(3);


### 2. where border controls have been in place for six months in accordance with article 25a(4) , any subsequent notification for the prolongation of such controls shall include a risk assessment. the risk assessment shall present the scale and anticipated evolution of the identified serious threat , in particular how long the identified serious threat is expected to persist and which sections of the internal borders may be affected , as well as information regarding coordination measures with the other member states impacted or likely to be impacted by such measures. ### 2. where border controls have been in place for three months in accordance with article 25a(5) , any subsequent notification for the prolongation of such controls shall include a risk assessment in accordance with article 26(2). in addition to the aspects listed in article 26(1) , the risk assessment shall present the scale and anticipated evolution of the identified serious threat , in particular how long the identified serious threat is expected to persist and which sections of the internal borders may be affected , as well as information regarding coordination measures with the other member states impacted or likely to be impacted by such measures.


### 3. where the reintroduction of border controls or its prolongation refers to large scale unauthorised movements referred to in article 25(1) point (b) , the risk assessment shall also provide information on the scale and trends of such unauthorised movements , including any information obtained from the relevant eu agencies in line with their respective mandates and data analysis from relevant information systems. ### deleted


### 4. the member state concerned shall upon request by the commission , provide any further information , including on the coordination measures with the member states affected by the planned prolongation of border control at internal borders as well as further information needed to assess the possible use of measures referred to in article 23 and 23a . ### 4. the member state concerned shall upon request by the commission , provide any further information , including on the coordination measures with the member states affected by the planned prolongation of border control at internal borders as well as further information needed to assess the possible use of measures referred to in article 23.


### 5. member states submitting a notification under paragraphs 1 or 2 may , where necessary and in accordance with national law , decide to classify all or parts of the notified information. ### 5. member states submitting a notification under paragraphs 1 or 2 may , where necessary and in accordance with national law , decide to classify all or parts of the notified information.


### 1. following receipt of notifications , submitted under article 27(1) , the commission may establish a consultation process , where appropriate , including joint meetings between the member state that is planning to reintroduce or prolong border control at internal borders , and the other member states , especially those directly affected by such measures and the relevant union agencies. ### 1. following receipt of notifications , submitted under article 27(1) , the commission may establish a consultation process , where appropriate , including joint meetings between the member state that is planning to reintroduce or prolong border control at internal borders , and the other member states , especially those directly affected by such measures , the european parliament and the relevant union agencies.


### the consultation shall concern in particular the identified threat to public policy or internal security , the relevance of the intended reintroduction of border controls taking into account the appropriateness of alternative measures , as well as the ways of ensuring implementation of the mutual cooperation between the member states in relation to the reintroduced border controls. ### the consultation shall concern in particular the identified threat to public policy or internal security , the relevance and the impact of the intended reintroduction of border controls , in line with the criteria set out in article 26(1) and taking into account the appropriateness of alternative measures , as well as the ways of ensuring implementation of the mutual cooperation between the member states in relation to the reintroduced border controls.


### 2. following the receipt of notifications , submitted in relation to the reintroduction or prolongation of border controls at internal borders , the commission or any other member state may , without prejudice to article 72 tfeu , issue an opinion , if , based on the information contained in the notification and risk assessment , where appropriate , or any additional information , they have concerns as regards the necessity or proportionality of the planned reintroduction or prolongation of border control at internal borders. ### 2. following the receipt of notifications , submitted in relation to the reintroduction or prolongation of border controls at internal borders , the commission or any other member state may issue an opinion , if , based on the information contained in the notification , assessment and risk assessment or any additional information , they have concerns as regards the necessity or proportionality of the planned reintroduction or prolongation of border control at internal borders.


### 3. following receipt of notifications submitted in relation to a prolongation of border control at the internal border under article 25a(4) which leads to the continuation of border controls at internal borders for eighteen months in total , the commission shall issue an opinion on necessity and proportionality of such internal border controls. ### 3. following receipt of notifications submitted in relation to a prolongation of border control at the internal border under article 25a(4) which leads to the continuation of border controls at internal borders for six months in total , the commission shall issue an opinion on necessity and proportionality of such internal border controls.


### 4. where an opinion referred to in paragraphs 2 or 3 is issued , the commission may establish a consultation process in order to discuss the opinion with the member states. where the commission or a member state issues an opinion expressing concerns on the necessity or proportionality of reintroduced internal border controls the commission shall launch such a process. ### 4. where an opinion referred to in paragraphs 2 or 3 is issued , the commission may establish a consultation process , within the meaning of paragraph 1 , in order to discuss the opinion with the member states. where the commission or a member state issues an opinion expressing concerns on the necessity or proportionality of reintroduced internal border controls the commission shall launch such a process.


### 5. where a member state considers that there are exceptional situations justifying the continued need for internal border controls in excess of the maximum period referred to in article 25(5) , it shall notify the commission in accordance with article 27(2). the new notification from the member state shall substantiate the continued threat to public policy or internal security , taking into account the opinion of the commission given pursuant to paragraph 3. the commission shall issue a follow up opinion. ### deleted


### 1. where the commission , establishes that the same serious threat to internal security or public policy affects a majority of member states , putting at risk the overall functioning of the area without internal border , it may , make a proposal to the council to adopt an implementing decision authorising the reintroduction of border controls by member states where the available measures referred to in articles 23 and 23a are not sufficient to address the threat. ### 1. where the commission receives notifications as referred in article 27(1) that a serious threat to internal security or public policy , as defined in article 25 , points (a) and (b) , affects several member states at the same time , putting at risk the overall functioning of the area without internal border , it may , make a proposal to the council to adopt , after having consulted european parliament , an implementing decision authorising the reintroduction of border controls by member states where the available measures referred to in articles 23 are not sufficient to address the threat.


### 2. the decision shall cover a period of up to six months and may be renewed , upon proposal from the commission , for further periods of up to six months as long as the threat persists , taking into account the review referred to in paragraph 5. ### 2. the decision shall cover a period of up to six months and may be renewed , upon proposal from the commission , for further periods of up to six months as long as the threat persists , taking into account the review referred to in paragraph 5. the maximum duration of the internal border controls on the basis of the particularly serious threat identified shall not exceed two years.


### 5. the commission shall review the evolution of the identified threat as well as the impact of the measures adopted in accordance with the council decision referred to in paragraph 1 , with a view to assess whether the measures remain justified. ### 5. the commission shall review the evolution of the identified threat as well as the impact of the measures adopted in accordance with the council decision referred to in paragraph 1 , with a view to assess whether the measures remain justified and to propose the lifting of the internal border controls.


### 6. member states shall immediately notify the commission and the other member states in the council of a reintroduction of border controls in accordance with the decision referred to in paragraph 1. ### 6. member states shall immediately notify the commission , the european parliament and the other member states in the council of a reintroduction of border controls in accordance with the decision referred to in paragraph 1.


### 7. the commission may issue a recommendation indicating other measures as referred to in articles 23 and 23a that could complement internal border controls or be more suitable to address the identified threat to internal security or public policy as referred to in paragraph 1. ### deleted


### 2. where a member state notifies the commission and the other member states of the reintroduction of border controls in accordance with article 27(1) , it shall at the same time inform the european parliament and the council of the following: ### 2. where a member state notifies the commission and the other member states of the reintroduction of border controls in accordance with article 27(1) , it shall at the same time provide the same notification to the european parliament and the council.


### a) the details of the internal borders where border control is to be reintroduced; ### deleted


### b) the reasons for the proposed reintroduction; ### deleted


### c) the names of the authorised crossing-points; ### deleted


### d) the date and duration of the planned reintroduction; ### deleted


### e) where appropriate , the measures to be taken by the other member state. ### deleted


### 3. the provision of information may be subject to classification of information by member states pursuant to article 27(4). ### 3. the provision of information may be subject to classification of information by member states pursuant to article 27(5).


### member states shall not be required to provide all the information referred to in the paragraph 2 in cases justified on public security grounds. ### deleted


### 2. without prejudice to the first paragraph 1 , where border controls are prolonged as referred to in article 25a(5) , the member state concerned shall submit a report at the expiry of twelve months and every twelve months thereafter if border control is exceptionally maintained. ### 2. without prejudice to the first paragraph 1 , where border controls are prolonged as referred to in article 25a(5) , the member state concerned shall submit a report at the expiry of six months if border control is exceptionally maintained.


### 3. the report shall outline , in particular , the initial and follow-up assessment of the necessity of border controls and the respect of the criteria referred to in articles 26 , the operation of the checks , the practical cooperation with neighbouring member states , the resulting impact on the movement of persons in particular in the cross-border regions , the effectiveness of the reintroduction of border control at internal borders , including an ex-post assessment of the proportionality of the reintroduction of border control. ### 3. the report shall outline , in particular , the initial and follow-up assessment of the necessity and proportionality of border controls in line with articles 26 , the operation of the checks , the practical cooperation with neighbouring member states , the resulting impact on the movement of persons in particular in the cross-border regions , the effectiveness of the reintroduction of border control at internal borders , including an ex-post assessment of the necessity and proportionality of the reintroduction of border control.


### 6. the commission shall present to the european parliament and to the council , at least annually , a report on the functioning of the area without internal border control entitled (‘state of schengen report’). the report shall include a list of all decisions to reintroduce border control at internal borders taken during the relevant year. it shall also include information on the trends within the schengen area as regards the unauthorised movements of third country nationals , taking into account available information from the relevant union agencies , data analysis from relevant information systems and an assessment of the necessity and proportionality of the reintroductions of border controls in the period covered by that report. ### 6. the commission shall present to the european parliament and to the council , at least annually , a report on the functioning of the area without internal border control entitled (‘state of schengen report’). the report shall include a list of all decisions to reintroduce border control at internal borders taken during the relevant year , as well as all the actions and decisions taken by the commission with regard to the reintroduction or prolongation of border controls. it shall also include an assessment of the necessity and proportionality of the reintroductions of border controls in the period covered by that report and be accompanied by the report foreseen in article 25 of regulation (eu) 2022/922.


### vi. passengers travelling for imperative family reasons; ### vi. passengers travelling for family reasons , in line with the right to family life;


### [...] ### deleted


### article 2 ### deleted


### article 3 ### deleted


### having regard to the treaty on the functioning of the european union , and in particular article 77(2)(b) and (e) and article 79(2)(c) thereof , ### having regard to the treaty on the functioning of the european union , and in particular article 77(2)(b) and (e) thereof ,