### 3. country of production and all plots of land of production , including geo-localisation coordinates , latitude and longitude. where a product or commodity contains materials , ingredients or components produced in different plots of land , the geo-location coordinates of all different plots of land shall be included; ### 3. country of production and all plots of land of production , including geo-localisation coordinates , latitude and longitude , and date or time range of production. where a product or commodity contains materials , ingredients or components produced in different plots of land , the geo-location coordinates of all different plots of land shall be included;


### 6. member states , may facilitate the exchange and dissemination of relevant information , in particular with a view to assisting operators in assessing risk as set out in article 9 , and on best practices regarding the implementation of this regulation. ### 6. member states shall facilitate the exchange and dissemination of relevant information , in particular with a view to assisting operators in assessing risk as set out in article 9 , and on best practices regarding the implementation of this regulation.


### 7. assistance shall be provided in a manner which does not compromise the independence , legal obligations and responsibilities of competent authorities in enforcing this regulation. ### 7. assistance shall be provided by entities that are functionally and structurally separated from competent authorities , in a manner which does not compromise their independence , legal obligations and responsibilities in enforcing this regulation


### 13. the competent authorities shall keep records of the checks indicating in particular their nature and results , as well as on the measures taken in case of non-compliance. records of all checks shall be kept for at least 5 years. ### 13. the competent authorities shall keep records of the checks indicating in particular their nature and results , as well as on the measures taken in case of non-compliance. records of all checks shall be kept for at least 10 years.


### any technical and scientific means adequate to determine whether the relevant commodity or product are deforestation-free , including earth observation data such as from copernicus programme and tools , and ### deleted


### 5. at the request of a competent authority , member states shall provide to it the necessary information to ensure compliance with this regulation. ### 5. at the request of a competent authority , member states shall provide to it , without undue delay , the necessary information to ensure compliance with this regulation.


### 2. the commission services shall make publicly available , on an annual basis , a union-wide overview of the application of this regulation based on the data submitted by the member states under paragraph 1. ### 2. the commission services shall make publicly available , on an annual basis , a union-wide overview of the application of this regulation based on the data submitted by the member states under paragraph 1. where appropriate , and in order to promote the effective implementation of this regulation , the commission shall make recommendations with a view to encouraging the harmonisation of sanctions between member states.


### 1. member states shall lay down rules on penalties applicable to infringements of the provisions of this regulation by operators and traders and shall take all measures necessary to ensure that they are implemented. member states shall notify the commission of those provisions and without delay of any subsequent amendments affecting them. ### 1. the commission shall lay down administrative and penal sanctions applicable to infringements of the provisions of this regulation by operators and traders , in order to ensure harmonised standards are applied across the union. member states shall take all measures necessary to ensure that they are implemented.


### 2. the penalties provided for shall be effective , proportionate and dissuasive. penalties shall include as a minimum: ### 2. the administrative and criminal penalties for natural and legal persons shall be effective , proportionate and dissuasive. penalties shall include as a minimum:


### temporary exclusion from public procurement processes. ### temporary exclusion from public procurement processes and from access to public funding , including tendering procedures , grants and concessions.


### proposal for a ### proposal for a


### cattle ### ex 0102 live cattle ex 0201 meat of cattle , fresh or chilled ex 0202 meat of cattle , frozen ex 0206 10 edible offal of cattle , fresh or chilled ex 0206 22 edible cattle livers , frozen ex 0206 29 edible cattle offal (excluding tongues and livers) , frozen ex 4101 raw hides and skins of cattle (fresh , or salted , dried , limed , pickled or otherwise preserved , but not tanned , parchment-dressed or further prepared) , whether or not dehaired or split ex 4104 tanned or crust hides and skins of cattle , without hair on , whether or not split , but not further prepared ex 4107 leather of cattle , further prepared after tanning or crusting , including parchment-dressed leather , without hair on , whether or not split


### 2. harmonised system code , free-text description , and quantity70 of the relevant commodity or product that is intended to be placed on the union market by the operator; ### 2. harmonised system code , free-text description , including the trade name as well as , where applicable , the full scientific name , and quantity of the relevant commodity or product that is intended to be placed on or exported from the union market by the operator


### (11) the european parliament highlighted that ongoing destruction of the world’s forests is linked , to a large extent , to the expansion of agricultural production — in particular by converting forests to agricultural land dedicated to producing a number of high-demand products and commodities. the parliament adopted on 22 october 2020 a resolution32 in accordance with article 225 of the treaty on the functioning of the european union (tfeu) requesting the commission to submit , on the basis of article 192(1) tfeu , a proposal for an “eu legal framework to halt and reverse eu-driven global deforestation”. ### (11) the european parliament highlighted that ongoing destruction and degradation of the world’s forests and natural ecosystems , as well as human rights violations , are linked , to a large extent , to the expansion of agricultural production — in particular by converting forests to agricultural land dedicated to producing a number of high-demand products and commodities. the parliament adopted on 22 october 2020 a resolution32 in accordance with article 225 of the treaty on the functioning of the european union (tfeu) requesting the commission to submit , on the basis of article 192(1) tfeu , a proposal for an “eu legal framework to halt and reverse eu-driven global deforestation” based on mandatory due diligence.


### (23) the existing eu legislative framework focuses on tackling illegal logging and associated trade and does not address deforestation directly. it consists of regulation (eu) no 995/2010 of the european parliament and of the council , laying down the obligations of operators who place timber and timber products on the market40 , and council regulation (ec) no 2173/2005 , on the establishment of a forest law enforcement , governance and trade licensing scheme for imports of timber into the european community41 . both regulations were evaluated in a fitness check which determined that , while the legislation has had a positive impact on forest governance , the objectives of the two regulations – namely to curb illegal logging and related trade , and to reduce the consumption of illegally harvested timber in the eu – have not been met42 and it was concluded that focusing solely on legality of timber was not sufficient to meet the set objectives. ### (23) the existing eu forest framework is the eu action plan on forest law enforcement governance and trade that focuses on tackling illegal logging and associated trade and does not address deforestation directly. it consists of regulation (eu) no 995/2010 of the european parliament and of the council , laying down the obligations of operators who place timber and timber products on the market40 , and council regulation (ec) no 2173/2005 , on the establishment of a forest law enforcement , governance and trade licensing scheme for imports of timber into the european community which operationalises the voluntary partnership agreements (vpas). the performance and implementation of the two regulations underwent a fitness check which found that , while both achieved some success , a number of implementation challenges have held back progress towards achieving fully their objectives. the eutr application and functioning of the due diligence scheme on the one hand , and the limited number of countries involved in the vpa process with only one having thus far an operating licensing system in place (indonesia) on the other , curtailed effectiveness in meeting the objective of consumption of illegally harvested timber in the eu.


### 2. unless otherwise provided by other eu legislative instruments that lay down requirements regarding sustainability value chain due diligence , operators which are not smes shall , on an annual basis , publicly report as widely as possible , including on the internet , on their due diligence system including on the steps taken by them to implement their obligations as set out in article 8. operators falling also within the scope of other eu legislative instruments that lay down requirements regarding value chain due diligence may fulfil their reporting obligations under this paragraph by including the required information when reporting in the context of other eu legislative instruments. ### 2. operators shall , on an annual basis , publicly report as widely as possible , including on the internet , on the following elements:


### 5. in line with the eu’s open data policy , and in particular the directive (eu) 2019/102451 , the commission shall provide access to the wider public to the complete anonymised datasets of the information system in an open format that can be machine-readable and that ensures interoperability , re-use and accessibility. ### 5. in line with the eu’s open data policy , and in particular the directive (eu) 2019/102451 , the commission shall provide access to the wider public to the complete datasets of the information system in an open format that can be machine-readable and that ensures interoperability , re-use and accessibility.


### (6) those objectives remain relevant in the current global context and they are consistent with the analysis and perspective of the recent commission communication trade policy review “an open , sustainable and assertive trade policy”16 (‘tpr’). according to the tpr , the union has a “strategic interest to support the enhanced integration into the world economy of vulnerable developing countries” and it “must fully use the strength provided by its openness and the attractiveness of its single market” to support multilateralism and to ensure adherence to universal values. for gsp specifically , the tpr notes its important role in “promoting respect for core human and labour rights” and sets the objective for the gsp “to further increase trading opportunities for developing countries to reduce poverty and create jobs based on international values and principles”. moreover , the scheme should assist beneficiaries in recovering from the covid-19 impact and in re-building their economies in a sustainable manner , including with respect to international human rights , labour , environmental and good governance standards. coherence should be ensured between the gsp and its objectives and the assistance provided to beneficiary countries , in line with union’s policy coherence for development (pcd) , which constitutes a key pillar of union’s efforts to enhance the positive impact and increase effectiveness of development cooperation17 . ### (6) those objectives remain relevant in the current global context and they are consistent with the analysis and perspective of the recent commission communication trade policy review “an open , sustainable and assertive trade policy”16 (‘tpr’). according to the tpr , the union has a “strategic interest to support the enhanced integration into the world economy of vulnerable developing countries” and it “must fully use the strength provided by its openness and the attractiveness of its single market” to support multilateralism and to ensure adherence to universal values. for gsp specifically , the tpr notes its important role in “promoting respect for core human and labour rights” and sets the objective for the gsp “to further increase trading opportunities for developing countries to reduce poverty and create jobs based on international values and principles”. moreover , the scheme should assist beneficiaries in recovering from the covid-19 impact and in re-building their economies in a sustainable manner , including with respect to international human rights , labour , environmental and good governance standards. coherence should be ensured between the gsp and its objectives and the assistance provided to beneficiary countries , in line with union’s policy coherence for development (pcd) , which constitutes a key pillar of union’s efforts to enhance the positive impact and increase effectiveness of development cooperation17 . union’s assistance should provide support to the beneficiary countries in fulfilling their commitments with regards to the ratification and implementation of the international conventions under the gsp schemes. such support should target in priority those countries benefiting from the special arrangements , given their economic vulnerability. in addition , ndici-global europe shall assist countries of the gsp scheme in raising their human rights and environmental standards in line with the obligations in the un guiding principles on business and human rights.


### (8) the scheme should consist of a basic arrangement (‘standard gsp arrangement’) , and two special arrangements , namely the ‘special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance – gsp+’ and the ‘special arrangement for the least-developed countries - eba’. it , therefore , continues the structure of the previous ten years , which is considered a success , as it focuses on the countries most in need and addresses the varying developmental needs of beneficiaries. ### (8) the scheme should consist of a basic arrangement (‘standard gsp arrangement’) , and two special arrangements , namely the ‘special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance – gsp+’ and the ‘special arrangement for the least-developed countries - eba’. it , therefore , continues the structure of the previous ten years , which focuses on the countries most in need and addresses the varying developmental needs of beneficiaries , which shall include their regional integration process.


### (9) the standard gsp arrangement should be granted to all those developing countries which share a common development need and are in a similar stage of economic development. there is no definition of ‘developing country’ at the level of the wto , and it is left to preference granting countries to determine the list of gsp-eligible developing countries. countries which have successfully completed their transition from centralised to market economies , and are today powerful economies with a strong position in international trade , such as china , hong kong , macao and russia , should not be considered as developing countries in the context of the gsp , and should , therefore , be removed from the list of eligible countries. countries which are classified by the world bank as high-income or upper-middle income countries have per capita income levels allowing them to attain higher levels of diversification without the scheme's tariff preferences. they are at a different stage of economic development and do not , therefore , share the same development , trade and financial needs as lower income or more vulnerable developing countries. in order to prevent unjustified discrimination , they need to be treated differently; therefore , they do not benefit from the standard gsp arrangement. furthermore , the use of tariff preferences provided under the scheme by high-income or upper-middle income countries would increase the competitive pressure on exports from poorer , more vulnerable countries and , therefore , could impose unjustifiable burdens on those more vulnerable developing countries. the standard gsp arrangement should take account of the fact that the development , trade and financial needs are subject to change and ensure that the arrangement remains open if the situation of a country changes. ### (9) the standard gsp arrangement should be granted to all those developing countries which share a common development need and are in a similar stage of economic development and have committed to ratifying the core international conventions mentioned in annex vi within five years upon the application of the arrangement. there is no definition of ‘developing country’ at the level of the wto , and it is left to preference granting countries to determine the list of gsp-eligible developing countries. countries which have successfully completed their transition from centralised to market economies , and are today powerful economies with a strong position in international trade , such as china , hong kong , macao and russia , should not be considered as developing countries in the context of the gsp , and should , therefore , be removed from the list of eligible countries. countries which are classified by the world bank as high-income or upper-middle income countries have per capita income levels allowing them to attain higher levels of diversification without the scheme's tariff preferences. they are at a different stage of economic development and do not , therefore , share the same development , trade and financial needs as lower income or more vulnerable developing countries. in order to prevent unjustified discrimination , they need to be treated differently; therefore , they do not benefit from the standard gsp arrangement. furthermore , the use of tariff preferences provided under the scheme by high-income or upper-middle income countries would increase the competitive pressure on exports from poorer , more vulnerable countries and , therefore , could impose unjustifiable burdens on those more vulnerable developing countries. the standard gsp arrangement should take account of the fact that the development , trade and financial needs are subject to change and ensure that the arrangement remains open if the situation of a country changes.


### (9) the standard gsp arrangement should be granted to all those developing countries which share a common development need and are in a similar stage of economic development. there is no definition of ‘developing country’ at the level of the wto , and it is left to preference granting countries to determine the list of gsp-eligible developing countries. countries which have successfully completed their transition from centralised to market economies , and are today powerful economies with a strong position in international trade , such as china , hong kong , macao and russia , should not be considered as developing countries in the context of the gsp , and should , therefore , be removed from the list of eligible countries. countries which are classified by the world bank as high-income or upper-middle income countries have per capita income levels allowing them to attain higher levels of diversification without the scheme's tariff preferences. they are at a different stage of economic development and do not , therefore , share the same development , trade and financial needs as lower income or more vulnerable developing countries. in order to prevent unjustified discrimination , they need to be treated differently; therefore , they do not benefit from the standard gsp arrangement. furthermore , the use of tariff preferences provided under the scheme by high-income or upper-middle income countries would increase the competitive pressure on exports from poorer , more vulnerable countries and , therefore , could impose unjustifiable burdens on those more vulnerable developing countries. the standard gsp arrangement should take account of the fact that the development , trade and financial needs are subject to change and ensure that the arrangement remains open if the situation of a country changes. ### (9) the standard gsp arrangement should be granted to all those developing countries which share a common development need and are in a similar stage of economic development and have committed to ratifying and implementing the core international conventions mentioned in annex vi. the ratification should occur within five years upon the application of the arrangement. there is no definition of ‘developing country’ at the level of the wto , and it is left to preference granting countries to determine the list of gsp-eligible developing countries. countries which have successfully completed their transition from centralised to market economies , and are today powerful economies with a strong position in international trade , such as china , hong kong , macao and russia , should not be considered as developing countries in the context of the gsp , and should , therefore , be removed from the list of eligible countries. countries which are classified by the world bank as high-income or upper-middle income countries have per capita income levels allowing them to attain higher levels of diversification without the scheme's tariff preferences. they are at a different stage of economic development and do not , therefore , share the same development , trade and financial needs as lower income or more vulnerable developing countries. in order to prevent unjustified discrimination , they need to be treated differently; therefore , they do not benefit from the standard gsp arrangement. furthermore , the use of tariff preferences provided under the scheme by high-income or upper-middle income countries would increase the competitive pressure on exports from poorer , more vulnerable countries and , therefore , could impose unjustifiable burdens on those more vulnerable developing countries. the standard gsp arrangement should take account of the fact that the development , trade and financial needs are subject to change and ensure that the arrangement remains open if the situation of a country changes.


### (11) the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance (gsp+) is based on the integral concept of sustainable development , as recognised by international conventions and instruments such as the 1986 un declaration on the right to development , the 1992 rio declaration on environment and development , the 1998 international labour organisation (ilo) declaration on fundamental principles and rights at work , the 2000 un millennium declaration , the 2002 johannesburg declaration on sustainable development , the ilo centenary declaration for the future of work of 2019 , the outcome document of the un summit on sustainable development of 2015 "transforming our world: the 2030 agenda for sustainable development" , the un guiding principles on business and human rights , and the paris agreement on climate change under the un framework convention on climate change. consequently , the additional tariff preferences provided for under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance should be granted to those developing countries which , due to a lack of diversification , are economically vulnerable , have ratified core international conventions on human and labour rights , climate and environmental protection and good governance , and commit to ensuring the effective implementation thereof. the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance should help those countries to assume the additional responsibilities resulting from the ratification and effective implementation of these conventions. the list of conventions relevant for gsp should be updated to better reflect the evolution of core international instruments and standards and take a proactive approach to sustainable development in keeping with the sustainable development goals and agenda 203018 . in this regard , the following conventions are added: the paris agreement on climate change (2015) – replacing the kyoto protocol; the convention on the rights of persons with disabilities (crpd); the optional protocol to the convention on the rights of the child on the involvement of children in armed conflict (op-crc-ac); ilo convention no 81 on labour inspection; ilo convention no 144 on tripartite consultation; and the un convention against transnational organized crime. ### (11) the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance (gsp+) is based on the integral concept of sustainable development , as recognised by international conventions and instruments such as the 1986 un declaration on the right to development , the 1992 rio declaration on environment and development , the 1998 international labour organisation (ilo) declaration on fundamental principles and rights at work , the 2000 un millennium declaration , the 2002 johannesburg declaration on sustainable development , the ilo centenary declaration for the future of work of 2019 , the outcome document of the un summit on sustainable development of 2015 "transforming our world: the 2030 agenda for sustainable development" , the un guiding principles on business and human rights , and the paris agreement on climate change under the un framework convention on climate change. consequently , the additional tariff preferences provided for under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance should be granted to those developing countries which , due to a lack of diversification , are economically vulnerable , have ratified and started implementing core international conventions on human and labour rights , climate and environmental protection and good governance , and commit to pursuing the effective implementation thereof , including through a public , ambitious and time-bound plan of action , adopted in accordance with this regulation. the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance should help those countries to assume the additional responsibilities resulting from the ratification and effective implementation of these conventions. the list of conventions relevant for gsp should be updated to better reflect the evolution of core international instruments and standards and take a proactive approach to sustainable development in keeping with the sustainable development goals and agenda 203018 . in this regard , the following conventions are added: the paris agreement on climate change (2015) – replacing the kyoto protocol; the convention on the rights of persons with disabilities (crpd); the optional protocol to the convention on the rights of the child on the involvement of children in armed conflict (op-crc-ac); the first optional protocol to the international covenant on civil and political rights; the rome statute of the international criminal court; ilo convention no 81 on labour inspection; ilo convention no 144 on tripartite consultation; and the un convention against transnational organized crime.


### (11) the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance (gsp+) is based on the integral concept of sustainable development , as recognised by international conventions and instruments such as the 1986 un declaration on the right to development , the 1992 rio declaration on environment and development , the 1998 international labour organisation (ilo) declaration on fundamental principles and rights at work , the 2000 un millennium declaration , the 2002 johannesburg declaration on sustainable development , the ilo centenary declaration for the future of work of 2019 , the outcome document of the un summit on sustainable development of 2015 "transforming our world: the 2030 agenda for sustainable development" , the un guiding principles on business and human rights , and the paris agreement on climate change under the un framework convention on climate change. consequently , the additional tariff preferences provided for under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance should be granted to those developing countries which , due to a lack of diversification , are economically vulnerable , have ratified core international conventions on human and labour rights , climate and environmental protection and good governance , and commit to ensuring the effective implementation thereof. the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance should help those countries to assume the additional responsibilities resulting from the ratification and effective implementation of these conventions. the list of conventions relevant for gsp should be updated to better reflect the evolution of core international instruments and standards and take a proactive approach to sustainable development in keeping with the sustainable development goals and agenda 203018 . in this regard , the following conventions are added: the paris agreement on climate change (2015) – replacing the kyoto protocol; the convention on the rights of persons with disabilities (crpd); the optional protocol to the convention on the rights of the child on the involvement of children in armed conflict (op-crc-ac); ilo convention no 81 on labour inspection; ilo convention no 144 on tripartite consultation; and the un convention against transnational organized crime. ### (11) the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance (gsp+) is based on the integral concept of sustainable development , as recognised by international conventions and instruments such as the 1986 un declaration on the right to development , the 1992 rio declaration on environment and development , the 1998 international labour organisation (ilo) declaration on fundamental principles and rights at work , the 2000 un millennium declaration , the 2002 johannesburg declaration on sustainable development , the ilo centenary declaration for the future of work of 2019 , the outcome document of the un summit on sustainable development of 2015 "transforming our world: the 2030 agenda for sustainable development" , the un guiding principles on business and human rights , and the paris agreement on climate change under the un framework convention on climate change. consequently , the additional tariff preferences provided for under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance should be granted to those developing countries which , due to a lack of diversification , are economically vulnerable , have ratified and started implementing core international conventions on human and labour rights , climate and environmental protection and good governance , and commit to pursuing the effective implementation thereof , including through a public , ambitious and time-bound plan of action , adopted in accordance with this regulation. the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance should help those countries to assume the additional responsibilities resulting from the ratification and effective implementation of these conventions. the list of conventions relevant for gsp should be updated to better reflect the evolution of core international instruments and standards and take a proactive approach to sustainable development in keeping with the sustainable development goals and agenda 203018 . in this regard , the following conventions are added: the paris agreement on climate change (2015) – replacing the kyoto protocol; the convention on the rights of persons with disabilities (crpd); the optional protocol to the convention on the rights of the child on the involvement of children in armed conflict (op-crc-ac); ilo convention no 81 on labour inspection; ilo convention no 144 on tripartite consultation; the un convention against transnational organized crime; the rome statute of the international criminal court; undrop-un declaration on the rights of peasants and other people in rural areas; vggt - voluntary guidelines for responsible governance of tenure of land , fisheries and forests and the undrip-un declaration on the rights of indigenous people and its principles on free prior and informed consent.


### (16) the commission and where appropriate the european external action service should monitor the status of ratification of the international conventions on human and labour rights , environmental protection and good governance and their effective implementation , by examining the relevant information , in particular where available the conclusions and recommendations of the relevant monitoring bodies established under those conventions. every three years , the commission should present to the european parliament and the council a report on the status of ratification of the respective conventions , the compliance of the beneficiary countries with any reporting obligations under those conventions , and the status of the implementation of the conventions in practice. ### (16) the commission and where appropriate the european external action service should monitor the status of ratification of the international conventions on human and labour rights , environmental protection and good governance and their effective implementation , by assessing the progress made in the implementation of the plan of action , examining the relevant information , in particular where available the conclusions and recommendations of the relevant monitoring bodies established under those conventions , this reporting should also be based on high-level monitoring missions on the ground. every three years , the commission should present to the european parliament and the council a report on the status of ratification of the respective conventions , the compliance of the beneficiary countries with any reporting obligations under those conventions , and the status of the implementation of the conventions in practice , notably on the basis of the implementation of the plan of action. the monitoring should also aim at addressing shortcomings. in their conclusions , the commission and the european external action service should provide clear recommendations on issues and actions to be prioritised.


### (26) orderly international migration can bring important benefits to the countries of origin and destination of migrants and contribute to their sustainable development needs. increasing coherence between trade , development and migration policies is key to ensure that the benefits of migration accrue mutually to both the origin and destination countries. in this respect , it is essential for both origin and destination countries to address common challenges , such as , stepping up cooperation on readmission of own nationals and their sustainable reintegration in the country of origin , in particular in order to avoid a constant drain in active population in the countries of origin , with the ensuing long-term consequences on development , and to ensure that migrants are treated with dignity. ### deleted


### (27) return , readmission and reintegration are a common challenge for the union and its partners. in particular , every state has the obligation to readmit its own nationals under international customary law , and multilateral international conventions such as the convention on international civil aviation signed in chicago on 7 december 1944. improving sustainable reintegration and capacity building would significantly strengthen the local development in the partner countries. ### deleted


### it has ratified all the conventions listed in annex vi (the 'relevant conventions') and the commission has not identified , based on available information , in particular the most recent available conclusions of the monitoring bodies under those conventions , a serious failure to effectively implement any of those conventions; ### it has ratified all the conventions listed in annex vi (the 'relevant conventions') and the commission has not identified , based on available information , in particular the most recent available conclusions of the monitoring bodies under those conventions as well as information submitted by civil society organizations , a serious failure to effectively implement any of those conventions;


### it has ratified all the conventions listed in annex vi (the 'relevant conventions') and the commission has not identified , based on available information , in particular the most recent available conclusions of the monitoring bodies under those conventions , a serious failure to effectively implement any of those conventions; ### it has ratified all the conventions listed in annex vi (the 'relevant conventions') and the commission has not identified , based on available information , in particular the most recent available conclusions of the monitoring bodies under those conventions , including information provided by civil society organisations , human rights defenders and trade unions , a failure to effectively implement any of those conventions;


### it gives a binding undertaking to maintain ratification of the relevant conventions and to ensure the effective implementation thereof , accompanied by a plan of action for the effective implementation of the relevant conventions; ### it gives a binding undertaking to maintain ratification of the relevant conventions and to ensure the effective implementation thereof , accompanied by a time-bound plan of action of measures that are necessary to effectively implement the relevant conventions. the beneficiary country and the commission should reach a common understanding on the plan of action , which shall thereafter be made public;


### it gives a binding undertaking to maintain ratification of the relevant conventions and to ensure the effective implementation thereof , accompanied by a plan of action for the effective implementation of the relevant conventions; ### it gives a binding undertaking to maintain ratification of the relevant conventions and to ensure the effective implementation thereof , accompanied by a time-bound plan of action , which shall include a roadmap and benchmarks for the effective implementation of the relevant conventions. once agreed between the eu and the gsp beneficiary , the plan of action should be made publicly available;


### the commission considers , based on examination of the request , that the requesting country fulfils the conditions laid down in article 9. ### the commission considers , based on examination of the request , including of the plan of action as indicated in article 9 paragraph 1 (d) , as well as on the results of the human rights impact assessment referred to in article 3 , paragraph a (new) , that the requesting country fulfils the conditions laid down in article 9.


### 2. the requesting country shall submit its request to the commission in writing. the request shall provide comprehensive information concerning the ratification of the relevant conventions and shall include the binding undertakings referred to in article 9 , pointes (d) , (e) , and (f). ### 2. the requesting country shall submit its request to the commission in writing. the request shall provide comprehensive information concerning the ratification of the relevant conventions and shall include the binding undertakings referred to in article 9 , pointes (d) , (e) , and (f) , including a finalized plan of action.


### 2. the requesting country shall submit its request to the commission in writing. the request shall provide comprehensive information concerning the ratification of the relevant conventions and shall include the binding undertakings referred to in article 9 , pointes (d) , (e) , and (f). ### 2. the requesting country shall submit its request to the commission in writing. the request shall provide comprehensive information concerning the ratification of the relevant conventions and shall include the binding undertakings referred to in article 9 , pointes (d) , (e) , and (f) , including a finalised plan of action.


### 4. after examining the request , the commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts , in accordance with article 36 , to amend annex i in order to grant a requesting country the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance by including that country in the list of gsp+ beneficiary countries. ### 4. while examining the request , the european commission shall consult the european parliament and the council and the advisory body referred to in article 13a (new). after examining the request , the commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts , in accordance with article 36 , to amend annex i in order to grant a requesting country the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance by including that country in the list of gsp+ beneficiary countries.


### 1. as of the date of the granting of the tariff preferences provided under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance , the commission shall , with regard to each of the gsp+ beneficiary countries , keep under review and monitor the status of ratification of the relevant conventions and their effective implementation , as well as the cooperation of the gsp+ beneficiary country with the relevant monitoring bodies. in doing so , the commission shall examine all relevant information , in particular the conclusions and recommendations of the relevant monitoring bodies. ### 1. as of the date of the granting of the tariff preferences provided under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance , the commission shall , with regard to each of the gsp+ beneficiary countries , keep under review and monitor the status of ratification of the relevant conventions and their effective implementation , as well as the cooperation of the gsp+ beneficiary country with the relevant monitoring bodies. in doing so , the commission shall assess the progress made by the gsp+ beneficiary countries in implementing their plans of action , as well as examine all relevant information , in particular the conclusions and recommendations of the relevant monitoring bodies as well as duly substantiated information submitted by individual citizens , private sector actors , civil society organisations , representatives of trade unions and other relevant stakeholders. the information may also be submitted via the single entry point , which shall be accessible to stakeholders from both the union and gsp+ beneficiary countries. the commission , including through the eeas and the delegations , should hold regular contacts with local and international civil society to assess the beneficiary countries’ implementation of the conventions listed in annex vi. a cycle of 3 years for the review , monitoring and assessment (hereinafter monitoring cycle) is hereby established.


### 1. as of the date of the granting of the tariff preferences provided under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance , the commission shall , with regard to each of the gsp+ beneficiary countries , keep under review and monitor the status of ratification of the relevant conventions and their effective implementation , as well as the cooperation of the gsp+ beneficiary country with the relevant monitoring bodies. in doing so , the commission shall examine all relevant information , in particular the conclusions and recommendations of the relevant monitoring bodies. ### 1. as of the date of the granting of the tariff preferences provided under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance , the commission shall , with regard to each of the gsp+ beneficiary countries , keep under review and monitor the status of ratification of the relevant conventions and their effective implementation , as well as the cooperation of the gsp+ beneficiary country with the relevant monitoring bodies. in doing so , the commission shall assess the progress made by the gsp+ beneficiary countries in implementing their plans of action , as well as examine all relevant information , in particular the conclusions and recommendations of the relevant monitoring bodies as well as duly substantiated information submitted by civil society organisations , representatives of trade unions , human rights defenders and other relevant stakeholders. the information may also be submitted via the single entry point , which shall be accessible to stakeholders from both the union and gsp+ beneficiary countries. the commission , including through the eeas and the delegations , should hold regular contacts with local and international civil society to assess the beneficiary countries’ implementation of the conventions listed in annex vi. a cycle of 3 years for the review , monitoring and assessment (hereinafter monitoring cycle) is hereby established.


### 2. a gsp+ beneficiary country shall cooperate with the commission and provide all information necessary to assess its respect of the binding undertakings referred to in article 9 , points (d) , (e) , and (f) and its situation as regards article 9 , points (b) and (c). ### 2. a gsp+ beneficiary country shall cooperate with the commission and provide all information necessary to assess its respect of the binding undertakings referred to in article 9 , points (d) including the implementation of its plan of action , (e) , and (f) and its situation as regards article 9 , points (b) and (c).


### 2. a gsp+ beneficiary country shall cooperate with the commission and provide all information necessary to assess its respect of the binding undertakings referred to in article 9 , points (d) , (e) , and (f) and its situation as regards article 9 , points (b) and (c). ### 2. a gsp+ beneficiary country shall cooperate with the commission and provide all information necessary to assess its respect of the binding undertakings referred to in article 9 , points (d) , including the implementation of its plan of action , (e) , and (f) and its situation as regards article 9 , points (b) and (c).


### 1. by 1 january 2027 , and every three years thereafter , the commission shall present to the european parliament and to the council a report on the status of ratification of the relevant conventions , the compliance of the gsp+ beneficiary countries with any reporting obligations under those conventions and the status of the effective implementation thereof. ### 1. by 1 january 2027 , and every three years thereafter , the commission shall present to the european parliament and to the council a report on the status of ratification of the relevant conventions , the compliance of the gsp+ beneficiary countries with any reporting obligations under those conventions and the status of the effective implementation thereof , also based on the assessment of the implementation of the plans of action.


### the commission's and where appropriate the european external action service’s conclusions on whether each gsp+ beneficiary country respects its binding undertakings to comply with reporting obligations , to cooperate with relevant monitoring bodies in accordance with the relevant conventions and to ensure the effective implementation thereof; ### the commission's and where appropriate the european external action service’s conclusions on whether each gsp+ beneficiary country respects its binding undertakings to comply with reporting obligations , to cooperate with relevant monitoring bodies in accordance with the relevant conventions and to ensure the effective implementation thereof , including through an assessment of the implementation of its plan of action;


### the report may include any information from any source the commission considers appropriate. ### the report may include any information from any source the commission considers appropriate , including from civil society organizations and social partners.


### 3. in drawing their conclusions concerning effective implementation of the relevant conventions , the commission and where appropriate the european external action service shall assess the conclusions and recommendations of the relevant monitoring bodies , as well as , without prejudice to other sources , information submitted by the european parliament or the council as well as third parties , including governments and international organisations , civil society , and social partners. ### 3. in drawing their conclusions concerning effective implementation of the relevant conventions , the commission and where appropriate the european external action service shall assess the implementation of the plans of action , also based on the conclusions and recommendations of the relevant monitoring bodies , as well as , without prejudice to other sources , information submitted by the european parliament or the council as well as third parties , including governments and international organisations , civil society , and social partners. the commission and where appropriate the european external action service shall provide recommendations on issues and actions to be prioritised in the following monitoring cycle. in case of major shortcomings with effective implementation or persistent failure to effectively implement the plans of action , the report shall indicate which measures the country shall undertake in order to comply with obligations under article 9(d).


### 3. in drawing their conclusions concerning effective implementation of the relevant conventions , the commission and where appropriate the european external action service shall assess the conclusions and recommendations of the relevant monitoring bodies , as well as , without prejudice to other sources , information submitted by the european parliament or the council as well as third parties , including governments and international organisations , civil society , and social partners. ### 3. in drawing their conclusions concerning effective implementation of the relevant conventions , the commission and where appropriate the european external action service shall assess the implementation of the plans of action , also based on the conclusions and recommendations of the relevant monitoring bodies , as well as , without prejudice to other sources , information submitted by the european parliament or the council as well as third parties , including governments and international organisations , civil society , and social partners. the commission and where appropriate the european external action service shall provide recommendations on issues and actions to be prioritised in the following monitoring cycle. in case of failure to effectively implement the plans of action , the report shall indicate which measures the country shall undertake in order to comply with obligations under article 9(d).


### 1. the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance shall be withdrawn temporarily , in respect of all or of certain products originating in a gsp+ beneficiary country , where that country does not respect its binding undertakings as referred to in article 9 , points (d) , (e) and (f) , or the gsp+ beneficiary country has formulated a reservation which is prohibited by any of the relevant conventions or which is incompatible with the object and purpose of that convention as established in article 9 , point (c). ### 1. the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance shall be withdrawn temporarily , in respect of all or of certain products originating in a gsp+ beneficiary country , where that country does not respect its binding undertakings as referred to in article 9 , points (d) , (e) and (f) , including in case of major shortcomings in implementing or of systemic failure to implement the plan of action referred to in article 9 point (d) are identified , or the gsp+ beneficiary country has formulated a reservation which is prohibited by any of the relevant conventions or which is incompatible with the object and purpose of that convention as established in article 9 , point (c).


### 1. the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance shall be withdrawn temporarily , in respect of all or of certain products originating in a gsp+ beneficiary country , where that country does not respect its binding undertakings as referred to in article 9 , points (d) , (e) and (f) , or the gsp+ beneficiary country has formulated a reservation which is prohibited by any of the relevant conventions or which is incompatible with the object and purpose of that convention as established in article 9 , point (c). ### 1. the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance shall be withdrawn temporarily , in respect of all or of certain products originating in a gsp+ beneficiary country , where that country does not respect its binding undertakings as referred to in article 9 , points (d) , (e) and (f) , including in case of failure to implement the plan of action referred to in article 9 point (d) are identified , or the gsp+ beneficiary country has formulated a reservation which is prohibited by any of the relevant conventions or which is incompatible with the object and purpose of that convention as established in article 9 , point (c).


### 3. where , either on the basis of the conclusions of the report referred to in article 14 or on the basis of the evidence available , including evidence submitted through a complaint , the commission has a reasonable doubt that a particular gsp+ beneficiary country does not respect its binding undertakings as referred to in article 9 , points (d) , (e) and (f) , or has formulated a reservation which is prohibited by any of the relevant conventions or which is incompatible with the object and purpose of that convention as established in article 9 , point (c) , it shall , in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in article 39(2) , adopt an implementing act to initiate the procedure for the temporary withdrawal of the tariff preferences provided under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance. the commission shall inform the european parliament and the council thereof. ### 3. where , either on the basis of the conclusions and of the gsp+ beneficiary country's follow up to the recommendations and priority actions as provided by the report referred to in article 14 or on the basis of the evidence available , including evidence submitted through a complaint , the commission has a reasonable doubt that a particular gsp+ beneficiary country does not respect its binding undertakings as referred to in article 9 , points (d) , (e) and (f) , including with regards to the implementation of its plan of action , or has formulated a reservation which is prohibited by any of the relevant conventions or which is incompatible with the object and purpose of that convention as established in article 9 , point (c) , it shall , in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in article 39(2) , adopt an implementing act to initiate the procedure for the temporary withdrawal of the tariff preferences provided under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance. the commission shall inform the european parliament and the council thereof.


### 3. where , either on the basis of the conclusions of the report referred to in article 14 or on the basis of the evidence available , including evidence submitted through a complaint , the commission has a reasonable doubt that a particular gsp+ beneficiary country does not respect its binding undertakings as referred to in article 9 , points (d) , (e) and (f) , or has formulated a reservation which is prohibited by any of the relevant conventions or which is incompatible with the object and purpose of that convention as established in article 9 , point (c) , it shall , in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in article 39(2) , adopt an implementing act to initiate the procedure for the temporary withdrawal of the tariff preferences provided under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance. the commission shall inform the european parliament and the council thereof. ### 3. where , either on the basis of the conclusions of the report referred to in article 14 or on the basis of the evidence available , including evidence submitted through a complaint , the commission has a reasonable doubt that a particular gsp+ beneficiary country does not respect its binding undertakings as referred to in article 9 , points (d) , (e) and (f) , including with regards to the implementation of its plan of action , or has formulated a reservation which is prohibited by any of the relevant conventions or which is incompatible with the object and purpose of that convention as established in article 9 , point (c) , it shall , in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in article 39(2) , adopt an implementing act to initiate the procedure for the temporary withdrawal of the tariff preferences provided under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance. the commission shall inform the european parliament and the council thereof.


### 5. the commission shall provide the gsp+ beneficiary country concerned with every opportunity to cooperate during the period referred to in paragraph 4 , point (b). ### 5. the commission shall provide the gsp+ beneficiary country concerned with every opportunity to cooperate and engage with a view to addressing the violations of its binding undertakings as referred to in paragraph 3 during the period referred to in paragraph 4 , point (b).


### 6. the commission shall seek all information it considers necessary including , inter alia , the conclusions and recommendations of the relevant monitoring bodies. in drawing its conclusions , the commission shall assess all relevant information. ### 6. the commission shall seek all information it considers necessary including , inter alia , the conclusions and recommendations of the relevant monitoring bodies. in drawing its conclusions , the commission shall assess all relevant information , including from civil society organisations and social partners.


### 6. the commission shall seek all information it considers necessary including , inter alia , the conclusions and recommendations of the relevant monitoring bodies. in drawing its conclusions , the commission shall assess all relevant information. ### 6. the commission shall seek all information it considers necessary including , inter alia , the conclusions and recommendations of the relevant monitoring bodies. in drawing its conclusions , the commission shall assess all relevant information , including from civil society organisations , human rights defenders and social partners.


### to terminate the temporary withdrawal procedure; ### to terminate the temporary withdrawal procedure , either because the grounds for the reasonable doubt are not confirmed in the assessment referred to in paragraph 6 , or because the gsp+ beneficiary country has engaged and committed to address the violations of its binding undertakings as referred to in paragraph 3;


### 8. where the commission considers that the findings do not justify temporary withdrawal , it shall adopt an implementing act to terminate the temporary withdrawal procedure in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in article 39(2). that implementing act shall be based inter alia on evidence received. ### 8. where the commission considers , based on the elements referred to in paragraphs 5 and 6 , that a temporary withdrawal is not justified , it shall adopt an implementing act to terminate the temporary withdrawal procedure in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in article 39(2). that implementing act shall be based inter alia on evidence received.


### 9. where the commission considers that the findings justify temporary withdrawal for the reasons referred to in paragraph 1 of this article , it is empowered to adopt delegated acts , in accordance with article 36 , to amend annex i and annex ii in order to temporarily withdraw the tariff preferences provided under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance referred to in article 1(2) , point (b). in adopting the delegated act the commission may , when appropriate , consider the socio-economic effect of the temporary withdrawal of tariff preferences in the beneficiary country. ### 9. where the commission considers , based on the outcome of the cooperation and engagement and the findings referred to in paragraphs 5 and 6 , and after consulting the advisory body referred to in article 13a (new) , that temporary withdrawal is justified for the reasons referred to in paragraph 1 of this article , it is empowered to adopt delegated acts , in accordance with article 36 , to amend annex i and annex ii in order to temporarily withdraw the tariff preferences provided under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance referred to in article 1(2) , point (b). the commission shall clearly and publicly state the grounds for withdrawing preferences and set clear benchmarks that the beneficiary country should meet for the preferences to be reinstated; such benchmarks may also guide a phased approach , including the progressive withdrawal or reinstatement of part of the benefits against clear benchmarks and conditions. in adopting the delegated act the commission may , when appropriate , consider the human rights and socio-economic effect of the temporary withdrawal of tariff preferences in the beneficiary country , especially when considering a partial withdrawal , with a view to minimising the negative socio-economic impact on the gsp+ beneficiary country's population while maximising the leverage on its government.


### 9. where the commission considers that the findings justify temporary withdrawal for the reasons referred to in paragraph 1 of this article , it is empowered to adopt delegated acts , in accordance with article 36 , to amend annex i and annex ii in order to temporarily withdraw the tariff preferences provided under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance referred to in article 1(2) , point (b). in adopting the delegated act the commission may , when appropriate , consider the socio-economic effect of the temporary withdrawal of tariff preferences in the beneficiary country. ### 9. where the commission considers , based on the outcome of the cooperation and engagement and the findings referred to in paragraphs 5 and 6 , and after consulting the advisory body referred to in article 13a (new) , that temporary withdrawal is justified for the reasons referred to in paragraph 1 of this article , it is empowered to adopt delegated acts , in accordance with article 36 , to amend annex i and annex ii in order to temporarily withdraw the tariff preferences provided under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance referred to in article 1(2) , point (b). the commission shall clearly and publicly state the grounds for withdrawing preferences and set clear benchmarks that the beneficiary country should meet for the preferences to be reinstated. in adopting the delegated act the commission may , when appropriate , consider the human rights and socio-economic effect of the temporary withdrawal of tariff preferences in the beneficiary country , including with regard to impacts on women’s employment and empowerment and accordingly , consider a partial withdrawal , with a view to minimising the negative socio-economic impact on the gsp+ beneficiary country's population while maximising the leverage on its government.


### v temporary withdrawal provisions common to all arrangements ### v enhanced engagement and temporary withdrawal provisions common to all arrangements


### 1. the preferential arrangements referred to in article 1(2) may be withdrawn temporarily , in respect of all or of certain products originating in a beneficiary country , for any of the following reasons: ### 1. the preferential arrangements referred to in article 1(2) may be withdrawn temporarily , fully or partly , in respect of all or of certain products originating in or of all or some economic sectors of a beneficiary country , for any of the following reasons:


### 1. the preferential arrangements referred to in article 1(2) may be withdrawn temporarily , in respect of all or of certain products originating in a beneficiary country , for any of the following reasons: ### 1. the preferential arrangements referred to in article 1(2) may be withdrawn temporarily , fully or partly , in respect of all or of certain products originating in , or of all or some economic sectors of a beneficiary country , for any of the following reasons:


### serious shortcomings in customs controls on the export or transit of drugs (illicit substances or precursors) , or related to the obligation to readmit the beneficiary country’s own nationals or serious failure to comply with international conventions on antiterrorism or anti-money laundering; ### serious shortcomings in customs controls on the export or transit of drugs (illicit substances or precursors) , or serious failure to comply with international conventions on antiterrorism or anti-money laundering;


### 3. where the commission , acting upon a complaint or on its own initiative , considers that there are sufficient grounds justifying temporary withdrawal of the tariff preferences provided under any preferential arrangement referred to in article 1(2) on the basis of the reasons referred to in paragraph 1 of this article it shall adopt an implementing act to initiate the procedure for temporary withdrawal in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in article 39(2). the commission shall inform the european parliament and the council of the adoption of that implementing act. ### 3. where the commission , acting upon a complaint or on its own initiative , considers that there are sufficient grounds justifying temporary withdrawal of the tariff preferences provided under any preferential arrangement referred to in article 1(2) because the beneficiary country has failed to deliver in the framework of the enhanced engagement or on the basis of the reasons referred to in paragraph 1 of this article it shall adopt an implementing act to initiate the procedure for temporary withdrawal in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in article 39(2). the commission shall inform the european parliament and the council of the adoption of that implementing act.


### state that the commission will monitor and evaluate the situation in the beneficiary country concerned during the monitoring and evaluation period referred to in paragraph 5. ### state that the commission will continue to pursue dialogue in the framework of the enhanced engagement and monitor and evaluate the situation in the beneficiary country concerned during the monitoring and evaluation period referred to in paragraph 5.


### 5. the commission shall provide the beneficiary country concerned with every opportunity to cooperate during the monitoring and evaluation period of six months from the date of publication of the notice. ### 5. the commission shall provide the beneficiary country concerned with every opportunity to start engaging with and cooperate at any time during the monitoring and evaluation period of six months from the date of publication of the notice.


### 6. the commission shall seek all information it considers necessary , inter alia , the available assessments , comments , decisions , recommendations and conclusions of the relevant monitoring bodies , and relevant information from other sources , including evidence submitted through a complaint or provided by third parties , as appropriate. in drawing its conclusions , the commission shall assess all relevant information. ### 6. the commission shall seek all information it considers necessary , inter alia , the available assessments , comments , decisions , recommendations and conclusions of the relevant monitoring bodies , and relevant information from other sources , including evidence submitted through a complaint or provided by third parties , as appropriate. in drawing its conclusions , the commission shall assess all relevant information and consider the progress made by the country in delivering on its roadmap in the framework of the enhanced engagement as referred to in paragraph 2a.


### 7. within three months from the expiry of the period referred to in paragraph 5 , the commission shall submit a report on its findings and conclusions to the beneficiary country concerned. the beneficiary country has the right to submit its comments on the report. the period for comments shall not exceed one month. ### 7. within three months from the expiry of the period referred to in paragraph 5 , and after consultation of the advisory body referred to in article 13(a) , the commission shall submit a report on its findings and conclusions to the beneficiary country concerned. the beneficiary country has the right to submit its comments on the report. the period for comments shall not exceed one month.


### 9. where the commission considers that the findings do not justify temporary withdrawal , it shall adopt an implementing act , in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in article 39(2) , on the termination of the temporary withdrawal procedure. ### 9. where the commission considers , based on the elements referred to in paragraph 6 , that a temporary withdrawal is not justified , it shall adopt an implementing act , in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in article 39(2) , on the termination of the temporary withdrawal procedure.


### 10. where the commission considers that the findings justify temporary withdrawal for the reasons referred to in paragraph 1 of this article , it is empowered to adopt delegated acts , in accordance with article 36 , to amend annex i and annex ii , in order to temporarily withdraw the tariff preferences provided under the preferential arrangements referred to in article 1(2). in adopting the delegated act the commission may , where appropriate , consider the socio-economic effect of the temporary withdrawal of tariff preferences in the beneficiary country. ### 10. where the commission , based on the elements referred to in paragraph 6 , considers that the temporary withdrawal is justified for the reasons referred to in paragraph 1 of this article , it is empowered to adopt delegated acts , in accordance with article 36 , to amend annex i and annex ii , in order to temporarily withdraw the tariff preferences provided under the preferential arrangements referred to in article 1(2). in adopting the delegated act the commission may , where appropriate , consider the socio-economic effect of the temporary withdrawal of tariff preferences in the beneficiary country , especially when considering a partial withdrawal , with a view to minimising the negative socio-economic impact on the gsp+ beneficiary country’s populations while maximising the leverage on its government.


### 10. where the commission considers that the findings justify temporary withdrawal for the reasons referred to in paragraph 1 of this article , it is empowered to adopt delegated acts , in accordance with article 36 , to amend annex i and annex ii , in order to temporarily withdraw the tariff preferences provided under the preferential arrangements referred to in article 1(2). in adopting the delegated act the commission may , where appropriate , consider the socio-economic effect of the temporary withdrawal of tariff preferences in the beneficiary country. ### 10. where the commission considers that the findings justify temporary withdrawal for the reasons referred to in paragraph 1 of this article , it is empowered to adopt delegated acts , in accordance with article 36 , to amend annex i and annex ii , in order to temporarily withdraw the tariff preferences provided under the preferential arrangements referred to in article 1(2). in adopting the delegated act the commission may , where appropriate , consider the socio-economic effect , including with regard to impacts on women’s employment and empowerment , of the temporary withdrawal of tariff preferences in the beneficiary country and accordingly , consider a partial withdrawal , with a view to minimising the negative socio-economic impact on the gsp+ beneficiary country's population while maximising the leverage on its government.


### (12) countries graduating from the least-developed countries (ldc) category established by the un should be incentivised to continue on the path of sustainable development. for this purpose , the economic vulnerability criteria to qualify for the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance should be eased compared to regulation (eu) no 978/2012 , to facilitate access by a larger number of countries graduating from the least developed country category. ### (12) countries graduating from the least-developed countries (ldc) category established by the un should be incentivised to continue on the path of sustainable development. for this purpose , the economic vulnerability criteria to qualify for the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance should be eased compared to regulation (eu) no 978/2012 , to facilitate access by a larger number of countries graduating from the least developed country category. the continued and sustained progress towards ratifying and implementing the core international conventions should be closely monitored , and eu development finance programming should be designed to duly take this objective into consideration.


### (15) countries that have been granted the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance in accordance with regulation (eu) no 978/2012 should submit a new application within two years after the date of application of this regulation. in order , however , to ensure continuity and legal certainty for economic operators , the tariff preferences under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance provided for in regulation (eu) no 978/2012 are to be maintained during the period in which their application is assessed. requests for technical and financial assistance from applicant countries related to the ratification and implementation of the conventions can be looked upon favourably. ### (15) countries that have been granted the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance in accordance with regulation (eu) no 978/2012 should submit a new application within two years after the date of application of this regulation. in order , however , to ensure continuity and legal certainty for economic operators , the tariff preferences under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance provided for in regulation (eu) no 978/2012 are to be maintained during the period in which their application is assessed. the continued and sustained progress towards ratifying and implementing the core international conventions should be closely monitored , and eu technical and financial assistance should be designed to duly take this objective into consideration.


### (19) the special arrangement for the least-developed countries (eba) should continue to grant duty free access to the union market for products originating in the least developed countries , as recognised and classified by the united nations (un) , except for trade in arms. for a country no longer classified by the un as a least-developed country , a transitional period should be established , to alleviate any adverse effects caused by the removal of the tariff preferences granted under that arrangement. tariff preferences provided under the special arrangement for the least-developed countries should continue to be granted for those least developed countries , which benefit from another preferential market access arrangement with the union. ### (19) the special arrangement for the least-developed countries and least-developed regions should continue to grant duty-free and quota free access to the european union market for products originating in the least-developed countries or countries belonging to least-developed regions , as recognised and classified by the united nations , except for trade in arms. for a country no longer classified by the un as a least-developed country or a country formerly belonging to a least-developed region , a transitional period should be established , to alleviate any adverse effects caused by the removal of the tariff preferences granted under this arrangement. tariff preferences provided under the special arrangement for the least-developed countries and least developed regions should continue to be granted for those countries belonging to a least-developed region , which benefit from another preferential market access arrangement with the european union.


### (25) the reasons for temporary withdrawal of the arrangements under the scheme should include serious and systematic violations of the principles laid down in international conventions concerning core human rights (including certain principles of international humanitarian law enshrined in those conventions) , labour rights , climate and environmental protection , and good governance , so as to promote the objectives of those conventions. tariff preferences under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance should be temporarily withdrawn if the beneficiary country does not respect its binding undertaking to maintain the ratification and effective implementation of those conventions or to comply with the reporting requirements imposed by the respective conventions , or if the beneficiary country does not cooperate with the union's monitoring procedures as set out in this regulation. the temporary withdrawal should continue until the reasons justifying it no longer apply. in situations characterised by an exceptional gravity of the violations , the commission should have the power to respond rapidly by adopting measures within a shorter timeline. under the union’s zero tolerance approach for child labour the reasons for temporary withdrawal should include exports of goods made by internationally prohibited child labour , as well as forced labour including slavery and prison labour , as identified in the relevant conventions in annex vi. ### (25) the reasons for temporary withdrawal of the arrangements under the scheme should include violations of the principles laid down in international conventions concerning core human rights (including certain principles of international humanitarian law enshrined in those conventions) , labour rights , climate and environmental protection , and good governance , so as to promote the objectives of those conventions. tariff preferences under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance should be temporarily withdrawn if the beneficiary country does not respect its binding undertaking to maintain the ratification and effective implementation of those conventions or to comply with the reporting requirements imposed by the respective conventions , or to maintain the effective implementation of the plan of action provided in its request to benefit from the arrangement or if the beneficiary country does not cooperate with the union's monitoring procedures as set out in this regulation. the temporary withdrawal should continue until the reasons justifying it no longer apply. in situations characterised by an exceptional gravity of the violations , the commission should have the power to respond rapidly by adopting measures within a shorter timeline. under the union’s zero tolerance approach for child labour the reasons for temporary withdrawal should include exports of goods made by internationally prohibited child labour , as well as forced labour including slavery and prison labour , as identified in the relevant conventions in annex vi.


### (29) in order to achieve a balance between the need for better targeting , greater coherence and transparency on the one hand , and better promoting sustainable development and good governance through a unilateral trade preference scheme on the other hand , the power to adopt acts in accordance with article 290 tfeu should be delegated to the commission in respect of amendments to the annexes to this regulation and temporary withdrawals of tariff preferences due to serious and systematic violations of the principles set out in the relevant conventions with respect to human and labour rights , climate and environmental protection , and good governance and other relevant grounds set out in this regulation , as well as procedural rules regarding the submission of applications for the tariff preferences granted under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance , the conduct of a temporary withdrawal and safeguard investigations in order to establish uniform and detailed technical arrangements. it is of particular importance that the commission carry out appropriate consultations during its preparatory work , including at expert level , and that those consultations be conducted in accordance with the principles laid down in the interinstitutional agreement of 13 april 2016 on better law-making21 . in particular , to ensure equal participation in the preparation of delegated acts , the european parliament and the council receive all documents at the same time as member states' experts , and their experts systematically have access to meetings of commission expert groups dealing with the preparation of delegated acts. in order to provide a stable framework for economic operators , the power to adopt an act in accordance with article 290 tfeu should be delegated to the commission in respect of repealing a decision on temporary withdrawal under the urgent procedure before that decision to temporarily withdraw tariff preferences becomes applicable , where the reasons justifying temporary withdrawal no longer apply. the commission should also be empowered to adopt delegated acts to postpone the date of application of an act imposing the temporary withdrawal , or to modify its scope , for reasons related to a global sanitary emergency or other exceptional circumstances. ### (29) in order to achieve a balance between the need for better targeting , greater coherence and transparency on the one hand , and better promoting sustainable development and good governance through a unilateral trade preference scheme on the other hand , the power to adopt acts in accordance with article 290 tfeu should be delegated to the commission in respect of amendments to the annexes to this regulation and temporary withdrawals of tariff preferences due to violations of the principles set out in the relevant conventions with respect to human and labour rights , climate and environmental protection , and good governance and other relevant grounds set out in this regulation , as well as procedural rules regarding the submission of applications for the tariff preferences granted under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance , the conduct of a temporary withdrawal and safeguard investigations in order to establish uniform and detailed technical arrangements. it is of particular importance that the commission carry out appropriate consultations during its preparatory work , including at expert level , and that those consultations be conducted in accordance with the principles laid down in the interinstitutional agreement of 13 april 2016 on better law-making21 . in particular , to ensure equal participation in the preparation of delegated acts , the european parliament and the council receive all documents at the same time as member states' experts , and their experts systematically have access to meetings of commission expert groups dealing with the preparation of delegated acts. in order to provide a stable framework for economic operators , the power to adopt an act in accordance with article 290 tfeu should be delegated to the commission in respect of repealing a decision on temporary withdrawal under the urgent procedure before that decision to temporarily withdraw tariff preferences becomes applicable , where the reasons justifying temporary withdrawal no longer apply. the commission should also be empowered to adopt delegated acts to postpone the date of application of an act imposing the temporary withdrawal , or to modify its scope , for reasons related to a global sanitary emergency or other exceptional circumstances.


### a special arrangement for the least-developed countries (everything but arms (‘eba’)). ### a special arrangement for the least-developed countries and least developed regions.


### (5) ‘eba beneficiary countries’ means beneficiary countries of the special arrangement for least developed countries as listed in annex i; ### (5) ‘eba beneficiary countries’ means beneficiary countries of the special arrangement for least developed countries and least developed regions as listed in annex i;


### (12) ‘complaint’ means a complaint submitted to the commission through the single entry point. ### (12) ‘complaint’ means a complaint submitted to the commission through the single entry point by third parties , including stakeholders or civil society established in the eu or in the beneficiary countries covered by the schemes referred to article 1 paragraph 2 and relating to conditions and reasons referred to articles 9 and 19;


### 2. points (a) and (b) of paragraph 1 shall not apply to least-developed countries , as identified by the united nations. ### 2. points (a) and (b) of paragraph 1 shall not apply to least-developed countries , as identified by the united nations , or least-developed regions.


### serious and systematic violation of principles laid down in the conventions listed in annex vi; ### violation of and failure to implement effectively the principles laid down in the conventions listed in annex vi;


### serious and systematic unfair trading practices including those affecting the supply of raw materials , which have an adverse effect on the union industry and which have not been addressed by the beneficiary country. for those unfair trading practices , which are prohibited or actionable under the wto agreements , the application of this article shall be based on a previous determination to that effect by the competent wto body; ### serious and systematic unfair trading practices as established by wto appeal mechanism;


### (2) at the same time , undertakings might receive subsidies from third countries , that provide public funds which are then used , for instance , to finance economic activities in the internal market in any sector of the economy , such as participation in public procurement tenders , or acquisitions of undertakings , including those with strategic assets such as critical infrastructure and innovative technologies. such subsidies are currently not subject to union state aid rules. ### (2) at the same time , undertakings might receive subsidies from third countries which are then used , for instance , to finance economic activities in the internal market in any sector of the economy , such as participation in public procurement tenders , or acquisitions of undertakings , including those with strategic assets such as critical infrastructure and innovative technologies. such subsidies are currently not subject to union state aid rules.


### (2) at the same time , undertakings might receive subsidies from third countries , that provide public funds which are then used , for instance , to finance economic activities in the internal market in any sector of the economy , such as participation in public procurement tenders , or acquisitions of undertakings , including those with strategic assets such as critical infrastructure and innovative technologies. such subsidies are currently not subject to union state aid rules. ### (2) at the same time , undertakings might receive subsidies from third countries , which are then used , for instance , to finance economic activities in the internal market in any sector of the economy , such as participation in public procurement tenders , or acquisitions of undertakings , including those with strategic assets such as critical infrastructure and innovative technologies , or to otherwise provide unjust advantages that may distort the functioning of internal market. such subsidies are currently not subject to union state aid rules.


### (7) to ensure a level playing field throughout the internal market and consistency in the application of this regulation , the commission should be the sole authority competent to apply this regulation. the commission should have the power to examine any foreign subsidy to the extent it is in the scope of this regulation in any sector of the economy on its own initiative relying on information from all available sources. to ensure effective control , in the specific case of large concentrations (mergers and acquisitions) and public procurement procedures above certain thresholds , the commission should have the power to review foreign subsidies based on a prior notification by the undertaking to the commission. ### (7) to ensure a level playing field throughout the internal market and consistency in the application of this regulation , the commission should be the sole authority competent to apply this regulation. the commission should have the power to examine any foreign subsidy to the extent it is in the scope of this regulation in any sector of the economy on its own initiative relying on information from all available sources , including member states , member states’ trade associations and eu-wide social partners. to ensure effective control , in the specific case of large concentrations (mergers and acquisitions) and public procurement procedures above certain thresholds , the commission should have the power to review foreign subsidies based on a prior notification by the undertaking to the commission.


### (7) to ensure a level playing field throughout the internal market and consistency in the application of this regulation , the commission should be the sole authority competent to apply this regulation. the commission should have the power to examine any foreign subsidy to the extent it is in the scope of this regulation in any sector of the economy on its own initiative relying on information from all available sources. to ensure effective control , in the specific case of large concentrations (mergers and acquisitions) and public procurement procedures above certain thresholds , the commission should have the power to review foreign subsidies based on a prior notification by the undertaking to the commission. ### (7) to ensure a level playing field throughout the internal market and consistency in the application of this regulation , the commission should be the sole authority competent to apply this regulation. the commission should have the power to examine any foreign subsidy to the extent it is in the scope of this regulation in any sector of the economy on its own initiative relying on information from all available sources , including member states , member states’ trade association and eu-wide social partners. to ensure effective control , in the specific case of large concentrations (mergers and acquisitions) and public procurement procedures above certain thresholds , the commission should have the power to review foreign subsidies based on a prior notification by the undertaking to the commission.


### (7) to ensure a level playing field throughout the internal market and consistency in the application of this regulation , the commission should be the sole authority competent to apply this regulation. the commission should have the power to examine any foreign subsidy to the extent it is in the scope of this regulation in any sector of the economy on its own initiative relying on information from all available sources. to ensure effective control , in the specific case of large concentrations (mergers and acquisitions) and public procurement procedures above certain thresholds , the commission should have the power to review foreign subsidies based on a prior notification by the undertaking to the commission. ### (7) to ensure a level playing field throughout the internal market and consistency in the application of this regulation , the commission should be the sole authority competent to apply this regulation. the commission should examine any foreign subsidy to the extent it is in the scope of this regulation in any sector of the economy on its own initiative relying on information from all available sources. to ensure effective control , in the specific case of large concentrations (mergers and acquisitions) and public procurement procedures above certain thresholds , the commission should review foreign subsidies based on a prior notification by the undertaking to the commission.


### (9) there should be a financial contribution provided , directly or indirectly , by the public authorities of a third country. the financial contribution may be granted through public or private entities. whether a public entity provides a financial contribution should be determined on a case-by-case basis with due regard to elements such as the characteristics of the relevant entity and the legal and economic environment prevailing in the country in which the entity operates including the government’s role in the economy. financial contributions may also be granted through a private entity if its actions can be attributed to the third country. ### (9) there should be a financial contribution or an economically equivalent support measure provided , directly or indirectly , by the public authorities of a third country. the financial contribution or an economically equivalent support measure provided may be granted through public or private entities. whether a public entity provides a financial contribution or an economically equivalent support measure provided should be determined on a case-by-case basis with due regard to elements such as the characteristics of the relevant entity and the legal and economic environment prevailing in the country in which the entity operates including the government’s role in the economy. financial contributions or economically equivalent support measures provided may also be granted through a private entity if its actions can be plausibly attributed to the third country.


### (9) there should be a financial contribution provided , directly or indirectly , by the public authorities of a third country. the financial contribution may be granted through public or private entities. whether a public entity provides a financial contribution should be determined on a case-by-case basis with due regard to elements such as the characteristics of the relevant entity and the legal and economic environment prevailing in the country in which the entity operates including the government’s role in the economy. financial contributions may also be granted through a private entity if its actions can be attributed to the third country. ### (9) there should be a financial contribution or an economically equivalent support measure provided , directly or indirectly , by the public authorities of a third country. the financial contribution or an economically equivalent support measure may be granted through public or private entities. whether a public entity provides a financial contribution or an economically equivalent support measure should be determined on a case-by-case basis with due regard to elements such as the characteristics of the relevant entity and the legal and economic environment prevailing in the country in which the entity operates including the government’s role in the economy. financial contributions or economically equivalent support measures may also be granted through a private entity if its actions can be attributed to the third country.


### (9) there should be a financial contribution provided , directly or indirectly , by the public authorities of a third country. the financial contribution may be granted through public or private entities. whether a public entity provides a financial contribution should be determined on a case-by-case basis with due regard to elements such as the characteristics of the relevant entity and the legal and economic environment prevailing in the country in which the entity operates including the government’s role in the economy. financial contributions may also be granted through a private entity if its actions can be attributed to the third country. ### (9) there should be a financial contribution or an economically equivalent support provided , directly or indirectly , by the public authorities of a third country. the financial contribution or the economically equivalent support may be granted through public or private entities. whether a public entity provides a financial contribution should be determined on a case-by-case basis with due regard to elements such as the characteristics of the relevant entity and the legal and economic environment prevailing in the country in which the entity operates including the government’s role in the economy. financial contribution or economically equivalent support may also be granted through a private entity if its actions can be attributed to the third country.