### 1. the coordinating authority of establishment shall have the power to request the competent judicial authority of the member state that designated it or another independent administrative authority of that member state to issue a detection order requiring a provider of hosting services or a provider of interpersonal communications services under the jurisdiction of that member state to take the measures specified in article 10 to detect online child sexual abuse on a specific service. ### 1. the coordinating authority of establishment shall have the power to request the competent judicial authority of the member state that designated it to issue an investigation order requiring a provider of hosting services or a provider of publicly available number-independent interpersonal communications services under the jurisdiction of that member state to take the measures specified in article 10 to assist in investigations of a specific person , specific group of people , or a specific incident related to online child sexual abuse on a specific service.


### the coordinating authority of establishment shall , before requesting the issuance of a detection order , carry out the investigations and assessments necessary to determine whether the conditions of paragraph 4 have been met. ### the coordinating authority of establishment shall , before requesting the issuance of an investigation order , carry out the assessments necessary to determine whether the conditions of paragraph 4 have been met.


### where the coordinating authority of establishment takes the preliminary view that the conditions of paragraph 4 have been met , it shall: ### where the coordinating authority of establishment takes the view that the conditions of paragraph 4 have been met , it shall:


### establish a draft request for the issuance of a detection order , specifying the main elements of the content of the detection order it intends to request and the reasons for requesting it; ### establish a draft request for the issuance of an investigation order , specifying the factual and legal grounds upon which the request is based , the main elements of the content of the investigation order it intends to request and the reasons for requesting it;


### afford the provider an opportunity to comment on the draft request , within a reasonable time period set by that coordinating authority; ### deleted


### where , having regard to the comments of the provider and the opinion of the eu centre , that coordinating authority continues to be of the view that the conditions of paragraph 4 have met , it shall re-submit the draft request , adjusted where appropriate , to the provider. in that case , the provider shall do all of the following , within a reasonable time period set by that coordinating authority: ### where , having regard to the opinion of the eu centre , that coordinating authority continues to be of the view that the conditions of paragraph 4 are met , it shall request the judicial validation of the inquiry/investigation order from the competent judicial authority responsible for the issuing of such orders pursuant to paragraph 4. upon receipt of judicial validation of the order , the coordinating authority shall submit the order , adjusted where appropriate , to the provider. prior to requesting the judicial validation of the investigation order , the coordinating authority shall request the provider to do all of the following within a reasonable time period:


### draft an implementation plan setting out the measures it envisages taking to execute the intended detection order , including detailed information regarding the envisaged technologies and safeguards; ### draft an implementation plan setting out the incident that the authority intends to investigate , the measures it envisages taking to execute the intended investigation order , including detailed information regarding the envisaged technologies and safeguards;


### where the draft implementation plan concerns an intended detection order concerning the solicitation of children other than the renewal of a previously issued detection order without any substantive changes , conduct a data protection impact assessment and a prior consultation procedure as referred to in articles 35 and 36 of regulation (eu) 2016/679 , respectively , in relation to the measures set out in the implementation plan; ### where the draft implementation plan concerns an intended investigation order concerning the solicitation of children other than the renewal of a previously issued investigation order without any substantive changes , conduct a data protection impact assessment and a prior consultation procedure as referred to in articles 35 and 36 of regulation (eu) 2016/679 , respectively , in relation to the measures set out in the implementation plan;


### where point (b) applies , or where the conditions of articles 35 and 36 of regulation (eu) 2016/679 are met , adjust the draft implementation plan , where necessary in view of the outcome of the data protection impact assessment and in order to take into account the opinion of the data protection authority provided in response to the prior consultation; ### where point (b) applies , or where the conditions of articles 35 and 36 of regulation (eu) 2016/679 are met , adjust the draft implementation plan , where necessary in view of the outcome of the data protection impact assessment and in order to utmost account of the opinion of the data protection authority provided in response to the prior consultation;


### submit to that coordinating authority the implementation plan , where applicable attaching the opinion of the competent data protection authority and specifying how the implementation plan has been adjusted in view of the outcome of the data protection impact assessment and of that opinion. ### submit to that coordinating authority the implementation plan , where applicable attaching the opinion of the competent data protection authority and specifying how the implementation plan has been adjusted to take full account of the outcome of the data protection impact assessment and of that opinion.


### where , having regard to the implementation plan of the provider and the opinion of the data protection authority , that coordinating authority continues to be of the view that the conditions of paragraph 4 have met , it shall submit the request for the issuance of the detection , adjusted where appropriate , to the competent judicial authority or independent administrative authority. it shall attach the implementation plan of the provider and the opinions of the eu centre and the data protection authority to that request. ### where , having regard to the implementation plan of the provider and taking taking utmost account of the opinion of the data protection authority , that coordinating authority is of the view that the conditions of paragraph 4 have met , it shall submit the request for the validation and issuance of the investigation order , adjusted where appropriate , to the competent judicial authority. it shall attach the implementation plan of the provider and the opinions of the eu centre and the data protection authority to that request.


### the coordinating authority of establishment shall request the issuance of the detection order , and the competent judicial authority or independent administrative authority shall issue the detection order where it considers that the following conditions are met: ### based on a reasoned justification , the coordinating authority of establishment shall request the issuance of the investigation order , and the competent judicial authority shall issue the investigation order where it considers that the following conditions are met:


### there is evidence of a significant risk of the service being used for the purpose of online child sexual abuse , within the meaning of paragraphs 5 , 6 and 7 , as applicable; ### there is evidence of a specific risk of the service being used for the purpose of online child sexual abuse by one or more suspects , within the meaning of paragraphs 5 , 6 and 7 , as applicable;


### the reasons for issuing the detection order outweigh negative consequences for the rights and legitimate interests of all parties affected , having regard in particular to the need to ensure a fair balance between the fundamental rights of those parties. ### the issuing of the the investigation order is necessary and proportionate and outweighs negative consequences for the rights and legitimate interests of all parties affected , having regard in particular to the need to ensure a fair balance between the fundamental rights of those parties.


### when assessing whether the conditions of the first subparagraph have been met , account shall be taken of all relevant facts and circumstances of the case at hand , in particular: ### deleted


### the risk assessment conducted or updated and any mitigation measures taken by the provider pursuant to articles 3 and 4 , including any mitigation measures introduced , reviewed , discontinued or expanded pursuant to article 5(4) where applicable; ### deleted


### any additional information obtained pursuant to paragraph 2 or any other relevant information available to it , in particular regarding the use , design and operation of the service , regarding the provider’s financial and technological capabilities and size and regarding the potential consequences of the measures to be taken to execute the detection order for all other parties affected; ### deleted


### the views and the implementation plan of the provider submitted in accordance with paragraph 3; ### deleted


### the opinions of the eu centre and of the data protection authority submitted in accordance with paragraph 3. ### deleted


### as regards the second subparagraph , point (d) , where that coordinating authority substantially deviates from the opinion of the eu centre , it shall inform the eu centre and the commission thereof , specifying the points at which it deviated and the main reasons for the deviation. ### deleted


### 5. as regards detection orders concerning the dissemination of known child sexual abuse material , the significant risk referred to in paragraph 4 , first subparagraph , point (a) , shall be deemed to exist where the following conditions are met: ### 5. as regards investigation orders concerning the dissemination of known child sexual abuse material , the specific risk referred to in paragraph 4 , first subparagraph , point (a) , shall be deemed to exist where the following conditions are met:


### it is likely , despite any mitigation measures that the provider may have taken or will take , that the service is used , to an appreciable extent for the dissemination of known child sexual abuse material; ### it is likely , despite any mitigation measures that the provider may have taken or will take , that the service is being used by the suspect or suspects , to an appreciable extent for the dissemination of known child sexual abuse material;


### there is evidence of the service , or of a comparable service if the service has not yet been offered in the union at the date of the request for the issuance of the detection order , having been used in the past 12 months and to an appreciable extent for the dissemination of known child sexual abuse material. ### there is evidence of the service , having been used in the past 12 months by one or more suspects for the dissemination of known child sexual abuse material.


### 6. as regards detection orders concerning the dissemination of new child sexual abuse material , the significant risk referred to in paragraph 4 , first subparagraph , point (a) , shall be deemed to exist where the following conditions are met: ### deleted


### 7. as regards detection orders concerning the solicitation of children , the significant risk referred to in paragraph 4 , first subparagraph , point (a) , shall be deemed to exist where the following conditions are met: ### deleted


### the coordinating authority of establishment when requesting the issuance of detection orders , and the competent judicial or independent administrative authority when issuing the detection order , shall target and specify it in such a manner that the negative consequences referred to in paragraph 4 , first subparagraph , point (b) , remain limited to what is strictly necessary to effectively address the significant risk referred to in point (a) thereof. ### the coordinating authority of establishment when requesting the judicial validation and the issuance of investigation orders , and the competent judicial when issuing the investigation order , shall target and specify it in such a manner that the negative consequences referred to in paragraph 4 , first subparagraph , point (b) , remain limited to what is strictly necessary and proportionate to obtain the information required to to effectively investigate the case , and collect the information required to assess the existence of a criminal offence.


### to that aim , they shall take into account all relevant parameters , including the availability of sufficiently reliable detection technologies in that they limit to the maximum extent possible the rate of errors regarding the detection and their suitability and effectiveness for achieving the objectives of this regulation , as well as the impact of the measures on the rights of the users affected , and require the taking of the least intrusive measures , in accordance with article 10 , from among several equally effective measures. ### to that end , they shall take into account all relevant parameters , including the availability of sufficiently reliable investigative technologies in that they limit to the maximum extent possible the rate of errors regarding the investigation and their suitability and effectiveness for achieving the objectives of this regulation , as well as the impact of the measures on the rights of the users affected , and require the taking of the least intrusive measures , in accordance with article 10 , from among several equally effective measures.


### where necessary , in particular to limit such negative consequences , effective and proportionate safeguards additional to those listed in article 10(4) , (5) and (6) are provided for; ### where necessary , in particular to limit such negative consequences , effective and proportionate safeguards additional to those listed in article 10(4) , and (5) are provided for;


### the competent judicial authority or independent administrative authority shall specify in the detection order the period during which it applies , indicating the start date and the end date. ### the competent judicial authority shall specify in the investigation order the period during which it applies , indicating the start date and the end date.


### the start date shall be set taking into account the time reasonably required for the provider to take the necessary measures to prepare the execution of the detection order. it shall not be earlier than three months from the date at which the provider received the detection order and not be later than 12 months from that date. ### the start date shall be set taking into account the time reasonably required for the provider to take the necessary measures to prepare the execution of the investigation order.


### the period of application of detection orders concerning the dissemination of known or new child sexual abuse material shall not exceed 24 months and that of detection orders concerning the solicitation of children shall not exceed 12 months. ### the period of application of investigation orders shall be proportionate , taking all relevant factors into account.


### additional rules regarding detection orders ### additional rules regarding investigation orders


### 1. the competent judicial authority or independent administrative authority shall issue the detection orders referred to in article 7 using the template set out in annex i. detection orders shall include: ### 1. the competent judicial authority shall issue the investigation orders referred to in article 7 using the template set out in annex i. investigation orders shall include:


### information regarding the measures to be taken to execute the detection order , including the indicators to be used and the safeguards to be provided for , including the reporting requirements set pursuant to article 9(3) and , where applicable , any additional safeguards as referred to in article 7(8); ### information regarding the measures to be taken to execute the investigation order , including the person , group of person or incident concerned , the temporal scope , the indicators to be used and the safeguards to be provided for , including the reporting requirements set pursuant to article 9(3) and , where applicable , any additional safeguards as referred to in article 7(8);


### identification details of the competent judicial authority or the independent administrative authority issuing the detection order and authentication of the detection order by that judicial or independent administrative authority; ### identification details of the competent judicial authority issuing the investigation order and authentication of the investigation order by that judicial authority;


### the specific service in respect of which the detection order is issued and , where applicable , the part or component of the service affected as referred to in article 7(8); ### the specific service in respect of which the investigation order is issued and , where applicable , the part or component of the service affected as referred to in article 7(8);


### whether the detection order issued concerns the dissemination of known or new child sexual abuse material or the solicitation of children; ### whether the investigation order issued concerns the dissemination of known or previously unknown child sexual abuse material or the solicitation of children;


### the start date and the end date of the detection order; ### the start date and the end date of the investigation order;


### a sufficiently detailed statement of reasons explaining why the detection order is issued; ### a detailed statement of reasons explaining why the investigation order is issued;


### a reference to this regulation as the legal basis for the detection order; ### the factual and legal grounds justifying the issuing of the order , and a reference to this regulation as the legal basis for the detection order;


### the date , time stamp and electronic signature of the judicial or independent administrative authority issuing the detection order; ### the date , time stamp and electronic signature of the judicial authority issuing the investigation order;


### easily understandable information about the redress available to the addressee of the detection order , including information about redress to a court and about the time periods applicable to such redress. ### easily understandable information about the redress available to the addressee of the investigation order , including information about redress to a court and about the time periods applicable to such redress.


### the competent judicial authority or independent administrative authority issuing the detection order shall address it to the main establishment of the provider or , where applicable , to its legal representative designated in accordance with article 24. ### the competent judicial authority issuing the investigation order shall address it to the main establishment of the provider or , where applicable , to its legal representative designated in accordance with article 24.


### the detection order shall be transmitted to the provider’s point of contact referred to in article 23(1) , to the coordinating authority of establishment and to the eu centre , through the system established in accordance with article 39(2). ### the investigation order shall be securely transmitted to the provider’s point of contact referred to in article 23(1) , to the coordinating authority of establishment and to the eu centre , through the system established in accordance with article 39(2).


### the detection order shall be drafted in the language declared by the provider pursuant to article 23(3). ### the investigation order shall be drafted in the language declared by the provider pursuant to article 23(3).


### 3. if the provider cannot execute the detection order because it contains manifest errors or does not contain sufficient information for its execution , the provider shall , without undue delay , request the necessary clarification to the coordinating authority of establishment , using the template set out in annex ii. ### 3. if the provider cannot execute the investigation order because it contains errors , or it appears unnecessary or disproportionate , or does not contain sufficient information for its execution , the provider shall , without undue delay , request the necessary correction or clarification to the coordinating authority of establishment , using the template set out in annex ii.


### redress , information , reporting and modification of detection orders ### redress , information , reporting and modification of investigation orders


### 1. providers of hosting services and providers of interpersonal communications services that have received a detection order , as well as users affected by the measures taken to execute it , shall have a right to effective redress. that right shall include the right to challenge the detection order before the courts of the member state of the competent judicial authority or independent administrative authority that issued the detection order. ### 1. providers of hosting services and providers of publicly available number-independent interpersonal communications services that have received a investigation order , as well as users affected by the measures taken to execute it , shall have a right to effective redress. that right shall include the right to challenge the investigation order before the courts of the member state of the competent judicial authority that issued the investigation order.


### when the detection order becomes final , the competent judicial authority or independent administrative authority that issued the detection order shall , without undue delay , transmit a copy thereof to the coordinating authority of establishment. the coordinating authority of establishment shall then , without undue delay , transmit a copy thereof to all other coordinating authorities through the system established in accordance with article 39(2). ### when the investigation order becomes final , the competent judicial authority that issued the investigation order shall , without undue delay , transmit a copy thereof to the coordinating authority of establishment. the coordinating authority of establishment shall then , without undue delay , transmit a copy thereof to all other coordinating authorities through the system established in accordance with article 39(2).


### for the purpose of the first subparagraph , a detection order shall become final upon the expiry of the time period for appeal where no appeal has been lodged in accordance with national law or upon confirmation of the detection order following an appeal. ### for the purpose of the first subparagraph , an investigation order shall become final upon the expiry of the time period for appeal where no appeal has been lodged in accordance with national law or upon confirmation of the investigation order following an appeal.


### where the period of application of the detection order exceeds 12 months , or six months in the case of a detection order concerning the solicitation of children , the coordinating authority of establishment shall require the provider to report to it on the execution of the detection order at least once , halfway through the period of application. ### where the period of application of the investigation order exceeds 12 months , or six months in the case of a investigation order concerning the solicitation of children , the coordinating authority of establishment shall require the provider to report to it on the execution of the investigation order at least once , halfway through the period of application.


### (36) given the impact on the rights of victims depicted in such known child sexual abuse material and the typical ability of providers of hosting services to limit that impact by helping ensure that the material is no longer available on their services , those providers should assist victims who request the removal or disabling of access of the material in question. that assistance should remain limited to what can reasonably be asked from the provider concerned under the given circumstances , having regard to factors such as the content and scope of the request , the steps needed to locate the items of known child sexual abuse material concerned and the means available to the provider. the assistance could consist , for example , of helping to locate the items , carrying out checks and removing or disabling access to the items. considering that carrying out the activities needed to obtain such removal or disabling of access can be painful or even traumatic as well as complex , victims should also have the right to be assisted by the eu centre in this regard , via the coordinating authorities. ### (36) in order to prevent children from falling victim of abuse , providers of very large online platforms which have identified the risk of use of their service for the purpose of online child sexual abuse in line with article 3 should provide reasonable assistance , by putting in place alert and alarm mechanisms in a prominent way on their platforms. the alert mechanism could consist of , for example , linking potential victims to the local organisations such as helplines , victims` right organisations or hotlines. providers of very large online platforms should ensure adequate follow-up , when a report or alert is made , in the language chosen by the user for using their service. given the impact on the rights of victims depicted in such known child sexual abuse material and the typical ability of providers of hosting services to limit that impact by helping ensure that the material is no longer available on their services , those providers should assist victims who request the removal or disabling of access of the material in question. that assistance should remain limited to what can reasonably be asked from the provider concerned under the given circumstances , having regard to factors such as the content and scope of the request , the steps needed to locate the items of known child sexual abuse material concerned and the means available to the provider. the assistance could consist , for example , of helping to locate the items , carrying out checks and removing or disabling access to the items. considering that carrying out the activities needed to obtain such removal or disabling of access can be painful or even traumatic as well as complex , victims should also have the right to receive adequate psycho-social , age appropriate , child-friendly support and to be assisted by the eu centre and its relevant partners , such as child helplines or other psycho-social support mechanisms in this regard , via the coordinating authorities. member states should establish and improve the functioning of child helpline and missing children hotline , including through funding and capacity building , in line with article 96 of directive (eu) 2018/1972. victim identification is key not only for tracking down online child sexual abuse , but also for preventing victimisation , stopping the further spread of damaging material and ensuring that victims can benefit from available assistance. however , such victim identification requires a high degree of specialisation and adequate resources. therefore , the european cybercrime centre`s efforts in victim identification should be complemented at national level.


### (59) to support the implementation of this regulation and contribute to the achievement of its objectives , the eu centre should serve as a central facilitator , carrying out a range of specific tasks. the performance of those tasks requires strong guarantees of independence , in particular from law enforcement authorities , as well as a governance structure ensuring the effective , efficient and coherent performance of its different tasks , and legal personality to be able to interact effectively with all relevant stakeholders. therefore , it should be established as a decentralised union agency. ### (59) to support the implementation of this regulation and contribute to the achievement of its objectives , the eu centre should serve as a central facilitator , carrying out a range of specific tasks. the performance of those tasks requires strong guarantees of independence , in particular from law enforcement authorities , a governance structure ensuring the effective , efficient and coherent performance of its different tasks , and legal personality to be able to interact effectively with all relevant stakeholders as well as an autonomous budget. therefore , it should be established as a decentralised union agency and provided with the necessary human and financial resources to fulfil the objectives , tasks and responsibilities assigned to it under this regulation. it should be mainly financed by a contribution from the general budget of the union , with the necessary appropriations drawn exclusively from unallocated margins under the relevant heading of the multiannual financial framework and/or through the mobilisation of the relevant special instruments. in order to ensure that the agency can respond flexibly to human resource needs , it is in particular appropriate that it has autonomy regarding the recruitment of contract agents.


### (67) given its central position resulting from the performance of its primary tasks under this regulation and the information and expertise it can gather in connection thereto , the eu centre should also contribute to the achievement of the objectives of this regulation by serving as a hub for knowledge , expertise and research on matters related to the prevention and combating of online child sexual abuse. in this connection , the eu centre should cooperate with relevant stakeholders from both within and outside the union and allow member states to benefit from the knowledge and expertise gathered , including best practices and lessons learned. ### (67) given its central position resulting from the performance of its primary tasks under this regulation and the information and expertise it can gather in connection thereto , the eu centre should also contribute to the achievement of the objectives of this regulation by serving as a hub for knowledge , expertise and research on matters related to the prevention and combating of online child sexual abuse , including education and awareness raising , and prevention programmes available for potential offenders and offenders during and after criminal proceedings. the collection and analysis of data should include the list of education and awareness raising material made part of the official curricula. in this connection , the eu centre should bring together practitioners and researchers. the eu centre should also cooperate with relevant stakeholders from both within and outside the union and allow member states to benefit from the knowledge and expertise gathered , including best practices and lessons learned.


### supporting the commission in the preparation of the guidelines referred to in article 3(8) , article 4(5) , article 6(4) and article 11 , including by collecting and providing relevant information , expertise and best practices , taking into account advice from the technology committee referred to in article 66; ### supporting the commission in the preparation of the guidelines referred to in article 3(8) , article 4(5) , article 6(4) and article 11 , including by collecting and providing relevant information , expertise and best practices , taking into account advice from the technology committee and the survivors’ advisory board referred to in articles 66 and 66a (new);


### collecting , recording , analysing and providing information , providing analysis based on anonymised and non-personal data gathering , and providing expertise on matters regarding the prevention and combating of online child sexual abuse , in accordance with article 51; ### collecting , recording , analysing and providing information , providing analysis based on anonymised and non-personal data gathering , and providing expertise on matters regarding the prevention and combating of online child sexual abuse , in accordance with article 51 , including education and awareness raising programmes , and intervention programmes;


### preparing the consolidated annual activity report (caar) on the eu centre’s activities and presenting it to the executive board for assessment and adoption; ### preparing the consolidated annual activity report (caar) on the eu centre’s activities , including the activities of the technology committee and the survivors’ advisory board , and presenting it to the executive board for assessment and adoption;


### 1. the technology committee shall consist of technical experts appointed by the management board in view of their excellence and their independence , following the publication of a call for expressions of interest in the official journal of the european union. ### 1. the technology committee shall consist of technical experts appointed by the management board in view of their excellence and their independence from corporate interests , following the publication of a call for expressions of interest in the official journal of the european union. its members shall be appointed for a term of four years , renewable once. on the expiry of their term of office , members shall remain in office until they are replaced or until their appointments are renewed. if a member resigns before the expiry of his or her term of office , he or she shall be replaced for the remainder of the term by a member appointed by the management board.


### 2. procedures concerning the appointment of the members of the technology committee and its operation shall be specified in the rules of procedure of the management board and shall be made public. ### 2. procedures concerning the appointment of the members of the technology committee and its operation shall be further specified in the rules of procedure of the management board and shall be made public.


### 4. when a member no longer meets the criteria of independence , he or she shall inform the management board. alternatively , the management board may declare , on a proposal of at least one third of its members or of the commission , a lack of independence and revoke the person concerned. the management board shall appoint a new member for the remaining term of office in accordance with the procedure for ordinary members. ### 4. when a member no longer meets the criteria of independence , he or she shall inform the management board. alternatively , the management board may declare , on a proposal of at least one third of its members or of the commission , a lack of independence and revoke the appointment of the person concerned. the management board shall appoint a new member for the remaining term of office in accordance with the procedure for ordinary members.


### victims’ right of assistance and support for removal ### victims’ right of assistance and support


### the coordinating authority shall be responsible for all matters related to application and enforcement of this regulation in the member state concerned , unless that member state has assigned certain specific tasks or sectors to other competent authorities. ### the coordinating authority shall be responsible for all matters related to the application and enforcement of this regulation , and to the achievement of the objective of this regulation in the member state concerned , unless that member state has assigned certain specific tasks or sectors to other competent authorities.


### the coordinating authority shall in any event be responsible for ensuring coordination at national level in respect of those matters and for contributing to the effective , efficient and consistent application and enforcement of this regulation throughout the union. ### the coordinating authority shall in any event be responsible for ensuring coordination at national level in respect of those matters , including matters related to prevention and for contributing to the effective , efficient and consistent application and enforcement of this regulation throughout the union.


### supporting the development and dissemination of research and expertise on those matters and on assistance to victims , including by serving as a hub of expertise to support evidence-based policy; ### supporting the development and dissemination of research and expertise on those matters and on assistance to victims , including by serving as a hub of expertise to support evidence-based policy and by linking researchers to practitioners;


### (4) ensuring the same high level of consumer protection across the internal market is best achieved through full harmonisation. full harmonisation is necessary in order to ensure that all consumers in the union enjoy a high and equivalent level of protection of their interests and to create a well-functioning internal market. member states should therefore not be allowed to maintain or introduce national provisions other than those laid down in this directive , with respect to aspects covered by the directive , unless otherwise provided in this directive. where no such harmonised provisions exist , member states should remain free to maintain or introduce national legislation. ### (4) ensuring the same high level of consumer protection across the internal market is best achieved through harmonisation. harmonisation is necessary in order to ensure that all consumers in the union enjoy a high and equivalent level of protection of their interests and to create a well-functioning internal market. member states should however be allowed to maintain or introduce national provisions other than those laid down in this directive , with respect to aspects covered by the directive to address specific situations or in light of the public interest. therefore , member states should remain free to maintain or introduce national legislation.


### (7) in order to address the fact that the progressive introduction of union sector specific legislation has led to significant overlaps of that legislation with directive 2002/65/ec and that digitalisation exacerbated some aspects that are not fully addressed by the directive , including how and when information should be provided to the consumer , it is necessary to revise the rules applicable to financial services contracts concluded between a consumer and a trader at a distance , while at the same time ensuring the application of the ‘safety net’ feature. ### (7) in order to address the fact that the progressive introduction of union sector specific legislation has led to significant overlaps of that legislation with directive 2002/65/ec and that digitalisation exacerbated some aspects that are not fully addressed by the directive , including how and when information should be provided to the consumer , it is necessary to revise the rules applicable to financial services contracts concluded between a consumer and a trader at a distance and off-premises , while at the same time ensuring the application of the ‘safety net’ feature.


### (10) while not all the provisions of directive 2011/83/eu should apply to financial services contracts concluded at a distance due to the specific nature of those services , a number of provisions of directive 2011/83/eu , such as relevant definitions , rules on additional payments , on enforcement and penalties , should also apply to financial services contracts concluded at a distance. the application of those provisions ensures complementarity between the different types of contracts concluded at a distance. the extension of the application of the rules on penalties of directive 2011/83/eu will ensure that effective , proportionate and dissuasive fines are imposed on traders responsible for widespread infringements or widespread infringements with a union dimension. ### (10) while not all the provisions of directive 2011/83/eu should apply to financial services contracts concluded at a distance due to the specific nature of those services , a number of provisions of directive 2011/83/eu , such as relevant definitions , rules on additional payments , rules on ancillary contracts , rules on inertia selling , on enforcement and penalties , should also apply to financial services contracts concluded at a distance. the application of those provisions ensures complementarity between the different types of contracts concluded at a distance. the extension of the application of the rules on penalties of directive 2011/83/eu will ensure that effective , proportionate and dissuasive fines are imposed on traders responsible for widespread infringements or widespread infringements with a union dimension.


### (12) since distance financial services contracts are most commonly concluded by electronic means , rules on ensuring online fairness when financial services are contracted at a distance should contribute to the achievement of the goals laid down in article 114 tfeu and article 38 of the charter of the fundamental rights of the eu. the rule on adequate explanations should ensure added transparency and provide the consumer with the possibility to request human intervention when he or she interacts with the trader through online interfaces , such as a chatbox or similar tools. the trader should be prohibited to deploy measures in his or her online interface that could distort or impair the consumers’ ability to make a free , autonomous and informed decision or choice. ### (12) since distance financial services contracts are most commonly concluded by electronic means , rules on ensuring online fairness when financial services are contracted at a distance should contribute to the achievement of the goals laid down in article 114 tfeu and article 38 of the charter of the fundamental rights of the eu. the rule on adequate explanations should ensure added transparency and provide the consumer with the right to request human intervention when he or she interacts with the trader through online interfaces , such as a chatbox or similar tools. the trader should be prohibited to deploy measures in his or her online interface or any other practices relating to dark patterns that could distort or impair the consumers’ ability to make a free , autonomous and informed decision or choice.


### (13) certain consumer financial services are governed by specific union acts , which continue to apply to those financial services. in order to ensure legal certainty , it should be clarified that where another union act governing specific financial services contains rules on pre-contractual information or on the exercise of the right of withdrawal , only the respective provisions of those other union acts should apply to those specific consumer financial services unless provided otherwise in those acts. for instance , when article 186 of directive 2009/138/ec of the european parliament and of the council19 applies , the rules concerning the 'cancellation period' laid down in directive 2009/138/ec apply and not the rules on the right of withdrawal laid down in this directive and when article 14(6) of directive 2014/17/eu of the european parliament and of the council20 applies , the rules on the right of withdrawal under this directive should not apply. likewise , certain union acts governing specific financial services21 contain extensive and developed rules designed to ensure that consumers are able to understand the essential characteristics of the proposed contract furthermore , certain union acts governing specific financial services , such as directive 2014/17/eu on credit agreements for consumers relating to residential immovable property22 , already lay down rules on adequate explanations to be provided by the traders to the consumers with respect to the proposed contract. in order to ensure legal certainty , the rules on adequate explanations set out in this directive should not apply to financial services falling under union acts governing specific financial services that contain rules on the information to be provided to the consumer prior to the conclusion of the contract. ### (13) certain consumer financial services are governed by specific union acts , which continue to apply to those financial services. in order to ensure legal certainty , it should be clarified that where another union act governing specific financial services contains rules on pre-contractual information or on the right of withdrawal , only the respective provisions of those other union acts should apply to those specific consumer financial services unless provided otherwise in those acts. for instance , when article 14(6) of directive 2014/17/eu of the european parliament and of the council20 applies , the rules on the right of withdrawal under this directive should not apply. likewise , certain union acts governing specific financial services21 contain extensive and developed rules designed to ensure that consumers are able to understand the essential characteristics of the proposed contract furthermore , certain union acts governing specific financial services , such as directive 2014/17/eu on credit agreements for consumers relating to residential immovable property22 , already lay down rules on adequate explanations to be provided by the traders to the consumers with respect to the proposed contract. in order to ensure legal certainty , the rules on adequate explanations set out in this directive should not apply to financial services falling under union acts governing specific financial services that contain rules on adequate explanations to be provided to the consumer prior to the conclusion of the contract.


### (16) in order to delimit the scope of application of this directive , the rules concerning consumer financial services concluded at a distance should not apply to services provided on a strictly occasional basis and outside a commercial structure dedicated to the conclusion of distance contracts. ### deleted


### (17) the use of means of distance communications should not lead to an unwarranted restriction on the information provided to the consumer. in the interests of transparency , requirements should be laid down with regard to when the information should be provided to the consumer prior to the conclusion of the distance contract and how that information should reach the consumer. in order to be able to make their decisions in full knowledge of the facts , consumers should receive the information at least one day prior to the conclusion of the distance contract. only in exceptional cases can the information be provided less than a day before the conclusion of the distance contract for financial service. in case the contract is concluded less than one day before , the trader , within the established timeframe , should be obliged to remind the consumer about the possibility to withdraw from the distance contract for financial service. ### (17) the use of means of distance communications should not lead to an unwarranted restriction on the information provided to the consumer. in the interests of transparency , requirements should be laid down with regard to when the information should be provided to the consumer prior to the conclusion of the distance contract and how that information should reach the consumer. in order to be able to make their decisions in full knowledge of the facts , consumers should receive the information at least two days prior to the conclusion of the distance contract. only in exceptional cases can the information be provided less than two days , i.e. one day at the latest , before the conclusion of the distance contract for financial service. in any case , the trader , within the established timeframe , should be obliged to remind the consumer about the possibility to withdraw from the distance contract for financial service.


### (18) the information requirements should be modernised and updated to include , for example , the email address of the trader and the information on the risk and reward related to certain consumer financial services. consumers should also be clearly informed when the price presented to them is personalised on the basis of automated processing. ### (18) the information requirements should be modernised and made future-proof. this directive updates those to include , for example , the email address of the trader and others means of communication. information requirements should also be adapted to include the information on the risk and reward related to certain consumer financial services. consumers should also be clearly informed when the price presented to them is personalised on the basis of automated processing.


### (25) for distance contracts concluded by electronic means , the trader should provide the consumer with the possibility to use a withdrawal button. in order for ensure the effective use of the withdrawal button , the trader should ensure that it is visible and , when the consumer uses the button , the trader should adequately document its use. ### (25) for distance contracts concluded by electronic means , the trader should provide the consumer with the possibility to use a withdrawal button. this withdrawal button should be introduced not only for contracts concluded at a distance for financial services but also for contracts concluded at distance for goods and services to ensure easy exercise of the right of withdrawal for consumers. in order for ensure the effective use of the withdrawal button , the trader should ensure that it is visible and , when the consumer uses the button , the trader should adequately document its use , allowing the consumers to easily identify themselves and to confirm the withdrawal from the contract through a dedicated button.


### (26) consumers may need assistance in order to decide which financial service is the most appropriate for his or her needs and financial situation. therefore , member states should ensure that before the conclusion of a financial service contract at a distance , traders provide such assistance in relation to the financial services which they offer to the consumer , by providing adequate explanations about the relevant information , including the essential characteristics of the products proposed. the obligation of providing adequate explanations is particularly important when consumers intend to conclude a financial service contract at a distance and the trader provides explanations through online tools. in order to ensure that the consumer understands the effects that the contract may have on his or her economic situation , the consumer should always be able to obtain human intervention on behalf of the trader. ### (26) in addition to the pre-contractual information received , consumers may need assistance in order to understand and decide which financial service is the most appropriate for his or her needs and financial situation. therefore , member states should ensure that before the conclusion of a financial service contract at a distance , traders provide such assistance in relation to the financial services which they offer to the consumer , by providing adequate explanations about the relevant information , including the essential characteristics of the products proposed. where relevant , the explanations provided should encompass the social and environmental objectives of the offer , as well as how the achievement of such objectives is monitored. the provision of such information should be free of charge for consumers. the obligation of providing adequate explanations is particularly important when consumers intend to conclude a financial service contract at a distance and the trader provides explanations through online tools. in order to ensure that the consumer understands the effects that the contract may have on his or her economic situation , the consumer should always be able to request and obtain human intervention on behalf of the trader.


### ‘articles 1 and 2 , article 3(2) , (5) and (6) , article 4 , articles 16a to 16e , article 19 , articles 21 to 23 , article 24(1) , (2) , (3) and (4) and articles 25 and 26 shall apply to distance contracts concluded between a trader and a consumer for the supply of financial services. ### ‘articles 1 and 2 , article 3(2) , (5) and (6) , article 6a , article 8(6) , article 11(a) , article 15 , articles 16a to 16e , article 19 , articles 21 to 23 , article 24(1) , (2) , (3) and (4) and articles 25 , 26 and 27 shall apply to distance and off-premises contracts concluded between a trader and a consumer for the supply of financial services.


### rules conerning financial services contracts concluded at a distance ### rules conerning financial services contracts concluded at a distance and off-premises


### information requirements for distance contracts for consumer financial services ### information requirements for distance and off-premises contracts for consumer financial services


### the geographical address at which the trader is established as well as the trader’s telephone number and email address; in addition , where the trader provides other means of online communication which guarantee that the consumer can keep any written correspondence , including the date and time of such correspondence , with the trader on a durable medium , the information shall also include details of those other means; all those means of communication provided by the trader shall enable the consumer to contact the trader quickly and communicate with him efficiently; where applicable , the trader shall also provide the geographical address and identity of the trader on whose behalf he is acting; ### the geographical address at which the trader is established as well as the trader’s telephone number , email address and other means of online communication which guarantee that the consumer can keep any written correspondence , including the date and time of such correspondence , with the trader on a durable medium , the information shall also include details of those other means; all those means of communication provided by the trader shall enable the consumer to contact the trader quickly and communicate with him efficiently; where applicable , the trader shall also provide the geographical address , identity , telephone number and email address of the trader on whose behalf he is acting;


### if different from the address provided in accordance with point (b) , the geographical address of the place of business of the trader , and , where applicable , that of the trader on whose behalf he is acting , where the consumer can address any complaints; ### if different from the information provided in accordance with point (b) , the geographical address of the place of business of the trader , telephone number and email address , and , where applicable , those of the trader on whose behalf he is acting , where the consumer can address any complaints;


### in the case of telephone communications , the identity of the trader and the commercial purpose of the call initiated by the trader shall be made explicitly clear at the beginning of any conversation with the consumer. ### member states shall prohibit any offer or sale of financial services to consumers without their prior request and explicit agreement. in the case of telephone communications , the identity of the trader and the commercial purpose of the call shall be made explicitly clear at the beginning of any conversation with the consumer.


### the trader shall provide the information referred to in paragraph 1 at least one day before the consumer is bound by any distance contract. ### the trader shall provide the information referred to in paragraph 1 at least two days before the consumer is bound by any distance contract.


### when the information referred to in paragraph 1 is provided less than one day before the consumer is bound by the distance contract , member states shall require that the trader sends a reminder , on a durable medium , to the consumer of the possibility to withdraw from the distance contract and of the procedure to follow for withdrawing , in accordance with article 16b. that reminder shall be provided to the consumer , at the latest , one day after the conclusion of the distance contract. ### when the information referred to in paragraph 1 is provided less than two days , and in all cases , no later than one day before the consumer is bound by the distance contract member states shall require that the trader sends a reminder , on a durable medium , to the consumer of the possibility to withdraw from the distance contract and of the procedure to follow for withdrawing , in accordance with article 16b. that reminder shall be provided to the consumer , at the latest , one day after the conclusion of the distance contract.


### the information referred to in paragraph 1 shall be made available to the consumer on a durable medium and laid out in a way that is easy to read , using characters of readable size. ### the information referred to in paragraph 1 shall be provided to the consumer on a durable medium and laid out in a way that is easy to read , using characters of readable size.


### the information referred to in paragraph 1 shall be made available upon request in an appropriate format to consumers with a visual impairment. ### the information referred to in paragraph 1 shall be provided upon request in an accessible format to persons with disabilities , including for consumers with a visual impairment.


### the member states shall ensure that the consumer shall have a period of 14 calendar days to withdraw from a contract without penalty and without giving any reason. ### the member states shall ensure that the consumer shall have a period of 14 calendar days to withdraw from a contract without penalty and without giving any reason. this period shall be extended to 30 calendar days in distance contracts relating to personal pension operations and life insurances.


### 3. the consumer shall have exercised his right of withdrawal within the withdrawal period referred to in paragraph 1 if the communication concerning the exercise of the right of withdrawal is sent or the withdrawal button referred to in paragraph 5 is activated by the consumer before that period has expired. ### 3. the consumer shall have exercised his right of withdrawal within the withdrawal period referred to in paragraph 1 if the communication concerning the exercise of the right of withdrawal is sent or the withdrawal button referred to in article 11(a) is activated by the consumer before that period has expired.


### 5. member states shall ensure that , for distance contracts concluded by electronic means , the trader provides a possibility to use a withdrawal button in order to facilitate the consumer’s exercise of the right of withdrawal. such button shall be clearly labelled with the words ‘withdraw from contract’ or a corresponding unambiguous formulation. ### deleted


### 1. member states shall ensure that traders are required to provide adequate explanations to the consumer on the proposed financial services contracts that make it possible for the consumer to assess whether the proposed contract and ancillary services are adapted to his or her needs and financial situation. the explanations shall include the following elements: ### 1. member states shall ensure that traders are required to provide adequate explanations to the consumer on the proposed financial services contracts that make it possible for the consumer to assess whether the proposed contract and ancillary services are adapted to his or her needs and financial situation. the provision of information shall be free of charge for consumers and take place not later than two days before the conclusion of the contract. the explanations shall , as a minimum , include the following elements:


### a. whereas the functioning of the digital single market should be improved by reinforcing legal certainty for providers of artificial intelligence (ai) , and reinforcing users’ trust by strengthening safeguards to ensure the rule of law and fundamental rights; ### a. whereas the functioning of the digital single market should be improved by reinforcing legal certainty for providers of artificial intelligence (ai) , and reinforcing users’ trust by strengthening safeguards to ensure the rule of law and fundamental rights in particular the right to privacy and protection of personal data , right to equality and non-discrimination , and the right to good administration and a fair trial;


### a. whereas digital technologies in general and artificial intelligence (ai) in particular bring with them extraordinary promise; whereas ai is one of the strategic technologies of the 21st century , generating substantial benefits in efficiency , accuracy , and convenience , and thus bringing positive change to the european economy; whereas ai should not be seen as an end in itself , but as a tool for serving people , with the ultimate aim of increasing human well-being; ### a. whereas digital technologies in general and artificial intelligence (ai) in particular bring with them extraordinary promises and risks;; whereas ai should not be seen as an end in itself , but as a tool for serving people , with the ultimate aim of increasing human well-being;


### a. whereas the right to fair trial is a fundamental right which also applies to enforcement of the law; ### a. whereas fundamental rights and freedoms enshrined in the charter of fundamental rights of the european union , such as the respect for private life , the protection of personal data , the freedom of thought , conscience and religion , the freedom of assembly and of association , but also equality before the law , such as non-discrimination , as well as citizen's rights , such as the freedom of movement and of residence , the right to a fair trial and the presumption of innocence and right of defence should not be undermined by the use of ai and related technologies and apply to the enforcement of the law in all circumstances;


### 1. considers that ai used by police and judicial authorities has to be categorised as high-risk , given that the role of these authorities is to defend the public interest; considers that the eu should take the lead in laying down basic rules on the development and use of ai to ensure the same high level of consumer protection across the eu; ### 1. considers that ai used by police and judicial authorities has to be categorised as high-risk , given that the role of these authorities is to defend the public interest and in view of the nature of their responsibility; considers that the eu should take the lead in laying down basic rules on the development and use of ai to ensure the same high level of consumer protection and uniform industry standards across the eu;


### 1. emphasises the importance of considering the ethical and operational implications of the use of ai and related technologies within criminal justice systems; ### 1. emphasises the high importance of duly assessing the risks and considering all the ethical and operational implications of the use of ai and related technologies in our society , in particular by state authorities , the police and judicial authorities in criminal matters , as well as within criminal justice systems;


### 2. underlines the importance of being able to access ai-produced or ai-assisted outputs for notification procedures and the role of ai and related technologies in criminal law enforcement and crime prevention; recalls the importance of questions related to governance , transparency and accountability; ### 2. underlines the importance for the developers of ai and related technologies to provide for a sufficient level of transparency of algorithms and of algorithmic decisions towards competent authorities and citizens , and to enable access to ai-produced or ai-assisted outputs , particularly for notification procedures in criminal matters; recalls the importance of questions related to governance , transparency and accountability , while ensuring human oversight at all times; insists on the obligation of the judicial authorities to motivate their decisions , including when using elements of proof provided by ai assisted technologies ,the latter requiring the a high level of judicial scrutiny and of admissibility;


### 3. considers that such tools should be released as open source software under the public procurement procedure , and that a fundamental rights audit should be part of a prior conformity assessment; believes that – while ensuring the respect of eu law and values and the applicable data protection rules , and without jeopardising investigations or criminal prosecutions – training data must be open data; ### 3. considers that articles 18(2) , 42 and 43 , and annex x of directive 2014/24/eu on public procurement need to be updated so that police and judicial authorities can require that such tools should be released as open source software under the public procurement procedure , and that a fundamental rights audit should be part of a prior conformity assessment; believes that – while ensuring the respect of eu law and values and the applicable data protection rules , and without jeopardising investigations or criminal prosecutions – training data must be open data;


### 3. welcomes the recommendations of the commission’s high-level expert group on ai for a proportionate use of biometric recognition technology and suggests that the application of such technology must be clearly warranted under existing laws and urges the commission to assess how to effectively incorporate these; ### deleted


### 4. highlights the importance of preventing mass surveillance by means of ai technologies , and of banning applications that would result in it; ### 4. considers data collected and monitoring of individuals shall be limited to suspects of criminal acts , or suspects in preparation of committing a crime as opposed to automated , and indiscriminate data collection; highlights the importance of preventing mass surveillance by means of ai technologies , and of banning applications that would result in it; calls on the commission to implement , through legislative and non-legislative means and if necessary infringement proceedings , a ban on any biometric processing of personal data for law enforcement purposes that leads to mass surveillance in public spaces; calls on the commission to stop funding biometric research or deployment which could contribute to mass surveillance in public spaces; reminds that mass surveillance by third countries’ authorities implies that their level of data protection is not adequate , as confirmed by the court of justice in its judgment on schrems i1a;


### 4. considers it necessary to clarify whether law enforcement decisions can be delegated to ai and stresses the need to develop codes of conduct for the design and use of ai to help law enforcers and judicial authorities; refers to the ongoing work in the committee on legal affairs. ### deleted


### 5. insists that effective complaint and redress procedures , including judicial redress be made available to citizens; ### 5. insists that member states shall ensure that citizens are informed when they are subject to the use of artificial intelligence and that effective complaint and redress procedures , including judicial redress should be made available to them;


### 5. stresses the potential for bias and discrimination arising from the use of machine learning and ai applications; notes that biases can be inherent in underlying datasets , especially when historical data is being used , introduced by the developers of the algorithms , or generated when the systems are implemented in real world settings; ### 5. stresses the potential for bias and discrimination arising from the use of machine learning and ai applications; notes that biases can be inherent in underlying datasets , especially when historical data is being used , introduced by the developers of the algorithms , or generated when the systems are implemented in real world settings; reminds of its resolution of of 19 june 2020 on the anti-racism protests following the death of george floyd; points out that wide-spread real-world racism in the police forces is still prevalent; underlines that such racism will inevitably lead to racist bias in ai-generated findings , scores , and recommendations; therefore reiterates its call on member states to promote anti-discrimination policies in all areas and to develop national action plans against racism , including in policing and in the justice system; in close cooperation with civil society and the communities concerned; , and to step up measures to increase diversity within police forces and to establish frameworks for dialogue and cooperation between police and communities;


### 6. recalls the high risk of abuse of certain types of ai , including facial recognition technologies in public spaces , automated behaviour detection and profiling to divide people into risk categories at borders , and calls on the commission to ban them; ### 6. recalls the high risk of abuse of certain types of ai , including facial recognition technologies in public spaces , automated behaviour detection and profiling to divide people into risk categories at borders , autonomous lethal weapons , biometric detection and recognition for mass surveillance , mass-scale citizen scoring , and predictive policing , and calls on the commission to ban all applications that are in the highest risk category and welcomes the fact that some technology companies already enacted such bans;


### — having regard to the treaty of the european union , in particular articles 2 and 6 , and the treaty on the functioning of the european union , ### — having regard to the treaty of the european union , in particular articles 2 and 6 , and the treaty on the functioning of the european union , in particular article 16 ,


### — having regard to the charter of fundamental rights of the european union , ### — having regard to the charter of fundamental rights of the european union , in particular article 6 , article 7 , article 8 , article 11 , article 12 , article 13 , article 20 , article 21 , article 24 , and article 47 thereof;


### — having regard to the council of europe convention for the protection of individuals with regard to automatic processing of personal data (ets 108) , ### — having regard to the council of europe convention for the protection of individuals with regard to automatic processing of personal data (ets 108) , and its amending protocol (“convention 108+”);


### b. whereas the development of ai must respect the values on which the union is founded , in particular human dignity , freedom , democracy , equality , the rule of law , and human and fundamental rights; ### b. whereas fundamental rights and freedoms enshrined in the charter of fundamental rights of the european union , such as the respect for private life , the protection of personal data , the freedom of thought , conscience and religion , the freedom of assembly and of association , but also equality before the law , such as non-discrimination , as well as citizen's rights , such as the freedom of movement and of residence , the right to a fair trial and the presumption of innocence and right of defence should not be undermined by the use of ai and related technologies and apply to the enforcement of the law in all circumstances;


### b. whereas technologies such as artificial intelligence (ai) and related technologies will contribute to the reducing of crime rates , the use of statistical data analytics in crime analysis and prevention , and the operation of criminal justice systems; ### deleted


### d. whereas the union together with the member states bear a critical responsibility for ensuring that policy choices surrounding the development , deployment and use of ai applications in the field of the judiciary and law enforcement are made in a transparent manner , respect the principles of necessity and proportionality , and guarantee that the policies and measures adopted will fully safeguard fundamental rights within the union; ### d. whereas the union together with the member states bear a critical responsibility for ensuring that policy choices surrounding the development , deployment and use of ai applications in the field of the judiciary and law enforcement are made in a transparent manner , respect the principles of necessity and proportionality , and guarantee that the policies and measures adopted will fully safeguard fundamental rights within the union , in particular that any ai applications do not perpetuate existing discriminations , biases or prejudices;


### e. whereas ai applications offer great opportunities in the field of law enforcement , in particular in improving the working methods of law enforcement agencies and judicial authorities , and combating certain types of crime more efficiently , in particular financial crime , money laundering and terrorist financing , as well as certain types of cybercrime; ### e. whereas ai applications may offer opportunities in the field of law enforcement , in particular in improving the working methods of law enforcement agencies and judicial authorities , and combating certain types of crime more efficiently; whereas any blanket application of ai to all financial or other transactions without initial suspicion would be disproportionate;


### f. whereas a clear model for assigning legal responsibility for the potential harmful effects of ai systems in the field of criminal law is imperative; ### f. whereas a clear model for assigning legal responsibility for the potential harmful effects of ai systems in the field of criminal law is imperative; whereas the first and foremost aim must be to avoid that any harmful effects materialise to begin with;


### g. whereas ai applications in use by law enforcement include applications such as facial recognition technologies , automated number plate recognition , speaker identification , speech identification , lip-reading technologies , aural surveillance (i.e. gunshot detection algorithms) , autonomous research and analysis of identified databases , forecasting (predictive policing and crime hotspot analytics) , behaviour detection tools , autonomous tools to identify financial fraud and terrorist financing , social media monitoring (scraping and data harvesting for mining connections) , international mobile subscriber identity (imsi) catchers , and automated surveillance systems incorporating different detection capabilities (such as heartbeat detection and thermal cameras); whereas the aforementioned applications have vastly varying degrees of reliability and accuracy; ### g. whereas ai applications in use by law enforcement include applications such as facial recognition technologies , automated number plate recognition , speaker identification , speech identification , lip-reading technologies , aural surveillance (i.e. gunshot detection algorithms) , research and analysis of databases , forecasting (predictive policing and crime hotspot analytics) , behaviour detection tools , tools to identify financial fraud and terrorist financing , social media monitoring (scraping and data harvesting for mining connections) , , and automated surveillance systems incorporating different detection capabilities (such as heartbeat detection and thermal cameras); whereas the aforementioned applications have vastly varying degrees of reliability , accuracy , and effectiveness; whereas many of these tools are used in third countries , but would be illegal under the unions data protection legislative framework and case-law; whereas the routine deployment of algorithms , even with a small false positive rate , can result in false alerts by far outnumbering correct alerts;


### h. whereas ai tools and applications are also used by the judiciary worldwide , including in sentencing , calculating probabilities for reoffending and in determining probation; ### h. whereas ai tools and applications are also used by the judiciary worldwide , including in sentencing , calculating probabilities for reoffending and in determining probation; whereas this has led to distorted and diminished chances for people of colour and other minorities;


### i. whereas use of ai in law enforcement entails a number of potential risks , such as opaque decision-making , different types of discrimination , and risks to the protection of privacy and personal data , the protection of freedom of expression and information , and the presumption of innocence; ### i. whereas use of ai in law enforcement entails a number of potential risks , such as opaque decision-making , a chilling effect , different types of discrimination , and risks to the protection of privacy and personal data , the protection of freedom of expression and information , and the presumption of innocence , and the right to an effective remedy and a fair trial;


### j. whereas ai systems used by law enforcement are also vulnerable to ai-empowered attacks; whereas in these situations the resulting damage is potentially even more significant , and can result in exponentially greater levels of harm to both individuals and groups; ### j. whereas ai systems used by law enforcement are also vulnerable to attacks against information systems ; whereas in these situations the resulting damage is potentially even more significant , and can result in exponentially greater levels of harm to both individuals and groups;


### 9. considers it necessary to create a clear and fair regime for assigning legal responsibility for the potential adverse consequences produced by these advanced digital technologies; ### 9. considers it necessary to create a clear and fair regime for assigning legal responsibility for the potential adverse consequences produced by these advanced digital technologies; underlines however that the first and foremost aim must be to avoid that any such consequences materialise to begin with; calls for the consequent application of the precautionary principle for all applications of ai in the law enforcement context;


### 10. underlines that in judicial and law enforcement contexts , the final decision always needs to be taken by a human , who can be held accountable for the decisions made , and include the possibility of a recourse for a remedy; ### 10. underlines that in law enforcement contexts , the final decision always needs to be taken by a human , who can be held accountable for the decisions made , and include the possibility of a recourse for a remedy; points out however that if humans only rely on the data , profiles and recommendations generated by machines , they will not be able to do an independent assessment; is of the opinion that the sovereign discretion of judges , and decision-making on a case-by-case basis has to be upheld; calls on the commission to declare a ban on the use of ai and related technologies for the assistance of judicial systems and of judicial decisions;


### 11. calls for algorithmic explainability and transparency in order to ensure that the development , deployment and use of ai systems for judiciary and law enforcement comply with fundamental rights , and are trusted by citizens , as well as in order to ensure that results generated by ai algorithms can be rendered intelligible to users and to those subject to these systems , and that there is transparency on the source data and how the system arrived at a certain conclusion; ### 11. calls for algorithmic explainability and transparency in order to ensure that the development , deployment and use of ai systems for judiciary and law enforcement comply with fundamental rights , and are trusted by citizens , as well as in order to ensure that results generated by ai algorithms can be rendered intelligible to users and to those subject to these systems , and that there is transparency on the source data and how the system arrived at a certain conclusion; points out that in order to ensure technical transparency , robustness , and accuracy , such tools should be released in open source software and should provide documentation in clear intelligible language about the nature of the service , the tools developed , the performance and conditions under which they can be expected to function and the risks that they might cause;


### 15. calls for a moratorium on the deployment of facial recognition systems for law enforcement , until the technical standards can be considered fully fundamental rights compliant , results derived are non-discriminatory , and there is public trust in the necessity and proportionality for the deployment of such technologies; ### 15. reminds of the scandal around the revelations that law enforcement agencies in several countries are using clearview face recognition technology where the database was filled with faces of persons scraped illegally from social networks and other parts of the internet;


### 16. calls for greater overall transparency from member states , and for a comprehensive understanding of the use of ai applications in the union , broken down by member state law enforcement and judicial authority , the type of tool in use , the types of crime they are applied to , and the companies whose tools are being used; ### 16. calls for greater overall transparency from member states , and for a comprehensive understanding of the use of ai applications in the union , broken down by member state law enforcement and judicial authority , the type of tool in use , the types of crime they are applied to , and the companies whose tools are being used; calls on all competent public authorities , especially law enforcement authorities like the police and the judiciary , to inform the public and provide sufficient transparency as to their use of ai and related technologies when implementing their powers , especially in criminal law matters , including public access to the source code as well as disclosure of false positive and false negative rates of the technology at hand;


### 1. welcomes the fact that the commission proposed a new dedicated programme to support the effective functioning of the single market , which brings together six predecessor programmes as well as numerous measures from different policy areas; ### 1. welcomes the fact that the commission proposed a new dedicated programme to support the effective functioning of the single market , which brings together six predecessor programmes as well as numerous measures from different policy areas; calls on the commission and member states to maintain high level of commitments for the new single market programme , including former cosme actions , in the context of the recovery plan and in view of supporting businesses , especially smes , in the green and digital transition , and take full advantage of it;


### — having regard to regulation (eu) 2016/679 of the european parliament and of the council of 27 april 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data , and repealing directive 95/46/ec (‘general data protection regulation’)2 , ### — having regard to regulation (eu) 2016/679 of the european parliament and of the council of 27 april 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data , and repealing directive 95/46/ec (‘general data protection regulation’ , gdpr)2 ,


### — having regard to directive 2011/93/eu of the european parliament and of the council of 13 december 2011 on combating the sexual abuse and sexual exploitation of children and child pornography , and replacing council framework decision 2004/68/jha4 , ### deleted


### — having regard to the judgment of the court of justice of 3 october 2019 in case c-18/185 , ### deleted


### c. whereas the amount of user-generated content , including harmful and illegal content , shared via cloud services or online platforms has increased exponentially; ### c. whereas the spread of legal and illegal content , shared via cloud services or online platforms , has been facilitated by advanced technologies;


### d. whereas a small number of mostly non-european service providers have significant market power and exert influence on the rights and freedoms of individuals , our societies and democracies; ### d. whereas a small number of mostly non-european service providers have significant market power and exert influence on the rights and freedoms of individuals , our societies and democracies; whereas such service providers have to comply with the gdpr when offering services in the union:


### e. whereas the political approach to tackle harmful and illegal content online in the eu has mainly focused on voluntary cooperation thus far , but a growing number of member states are adopting national legislation to address illegal content; ### e. whereas the political approach to tackle illegal content online in the eu has mainly focused on voluntary cooperation thus far , but a growing number of member states are adopting national legislation to address illegal content in a non-harmonised manner;


### f. whereas some forms of harmful content may be legal , yet detrimental to society or democracy , with examples such as opaque political advertising and disinformation on covid-19 causes and remedies; ### f. whereas some forms of content are legal , yet may have negative effects on society or democracy , with examples such as opaque political advertising and disinformation;


### g. whereas a pure self-regulatory approach of platforms does not provide adequate transparency to public authorities , civil society and users on how platforms address illegal and harmful content; whereas such an approach does not guarantee compliance with fundamental rights; ### g. whereas a pure self-regulatory approach of platforms does not provide adequate transparency , accountability and oversight to public authorities , civil society and users on how platforms address illegal content and how they curate content in general; whereas such approaches may not guarantee compliance with fundamental rights;


### j. whereas the lack of robust public data on the prevalence and removal of illegal and harmful content online creates a deficit of accountability; ### j. whereas the lack of robust public data on notices and follow-up by competent authorities about , and data on the prevalence and removal of illegal content online creates a deficit of accountability;


### k. whereas child sexual exploitation online is shaped by technological developments; whereas the vast amount of child sexual abuse material circulating online poses serious challenges for detection , investigation and , most of all , victim identification efforts; ### deleted


### l. whereas according to the court of justice of the european union (cjeu) , jurisprudence host providers may have recourse to automated search tools and technologies to assess if content is equivalent to content previously declared unlawful , and should thus be removed following an order from a member state; ### deleted


### 2. believes in the clear economic benefits of a functioning digital single market for the eu and its member states; stresses the important obligation to ensure a fair digital ecosystem in which fundamental rights and data protection are respected; calls for a minimum level of intervention based on the principles of necessity and proportionality; ### 2. believes in the clear economic benefits of a functioning digital single market for the eu and its member states; stresses the important obligation to ensure a fair digital ecosystem in which fundamental rights , including freedom of expression , privacy and data protection , are respected; calls for a minimum level of intervention based on the principles of necessity and proportionality;


### 3. deems it necessary that illegal content is removed swiftly and consistently in order to address crimes and fundamental rights violations; considers that voluntary codes of conduct only partially address the issue; ### 3. deems it necessary that illegal content is removed without undue delay and consistently where the hosting service provider has actual knowledge of it and its illegal nature in order to address crimes and fundamental rights violations; considers that voluntary codes of conduct and standard contractual terms of service are not appropriate for addressing illegal content in line with fundamental rights; stresses that the responsibility for enforcing the law , deciding on the legality of online activities and ordering hosting service providers to remove or disable access to illegal content as soon as possible shall rest with independent judicial authorities;


### 4. recalls that illegal content online should not only be removed by online platforms , but should be followed up by law enforcement and the judiciary; finds , in this regard , that a key issue in some member states is not that they have unresolved cases but rather unopened ones; calls for barriers to filing complaints with competent authorities to be removed; is convinced that , given the borderless nature of the internet and the fast dissemination of illegal content online , cooperation between service providers and national competent authorities should be improved; ### 4. recalls that illegal content online should not only be removed by online platforms , but should be followed up by law enforcement and the judiciary where criminal acts are concerned ; finds , in this regard , that a key issue in some member states is not that they have unresolved cases but rather unopened ones; calls for barriers to filing complaints with competent authorities to be removed; is convinced that , given the borderless nature of the internet and the fast dissemination of illegal content online , cooperation between service providers and national competent authorities should be regulated based on the principles of necessity and proportionality;


### 5. acknowledges the fact that , while the illegal nature of certain types of content can be easily established , the decision is more difficult for other types of content as it requires contextualisation; warns that some automated tools are not sophisticated enough to take contextualisation into account , which could lead to unnecessary restrictions being placed on the freedom of expression; ### 5. acknowledges the fact that , while the illegal nature of certain content can be easily established , the decision is more difficult for other content as it requires contextualisation; warns that automated tools are not sophisticated enough to take contextualisation into account and differentiate illegal content from content that is legal in a given context , which leads to unnecessary restrictions being placed on the freedom of expression and information; highlights that a review of automated reports by service providers , their staff or their contractors does not solve this problem as private staff lack the independence , qualification and accountability of public authorities; therefore stresses that the digital services act shall explicitly prohibit any obligation on hosting service providers or other technical intermediaries to use automated tools for content moderation , and refrain from imposing notice-and-stay-down mechanisms; content moderation procedures used by providers shall not lead to any ex-ante control measures based on automated tools or upload-filtering of content;


### 6. underlines that a specific piece of information may be deemed illegal in one member state but is covered by the right to freedom of expression in another; ### 6. underlines that a specific piece of information may be deemed illegal in one member state but is covered by the right to freedom of expression in another; highlights that in order to protect freedom of speech standards , to avoid conflicts of laws , to avert unjustified and ineffective geo-blocking and to aim for a harmonised digital single market hosting service providers shall not be required to remove or disable access to information that is legal in their country of origin;


### 8. deems it indispensable to have the widest-possible harmonisation of rules on liability exemptions and content moderation at eu level to guarantee the respect of fundamental rights and the freedoms of users across the eu; expresses its concern that recent national laws to tackle hate speech and disinformation lead to a fragmentation of rules; ### 8. deems it indispensable to have the widest-possible harmonisation and clarification of rules on liability at eu level to guarantee the respect of fundamental rights and the freedoms of users across the eu; believes that such rules should maintain liability exemptions for intermediaries not having actual knowledge of the illegal activity or information on their platforms; expresses its concern that recent national laws to tackle hate speech and disinformation lead to a fragmentation of rules and to a lower level of fundamental rights protection in the eu;


### 9. calls , to this end , for legislative proposals that keep the digital single market open and competitive by requiring digital service providers to apply effective , coherent , transparent and fair procedures and procedural safeguards to remove illegal content in line with european values; firmly believes that this should be harmonised within the digital single market; ### 9. calls , to this end , for legislative proposals that keep the digital single market open and competitive by requiring digital service providers to apply effective , coherent , transparent and fair procedures and procedural safeguards to tackle illegal content in line with the law and european values; firmly believes that this should be harmonised within the digital single market;


### 10. believes , in this regard , that online platforms that are actively hosting or moderating content should bear more , yet proportionate , responsibility for the infrastructure they provide and the content on it; emphasises that this should be achieved without resorting to general monitoring requirements; ### 10. believes , in this regard , that online platforms that are hosting content should bear proportionate liability for third-party content they host only where they have actual knowledge of illegal content and its illegal nature; emphasises that this should be achieved without resorting to general monitoring requirements and ex-ante control measures based on automated tools or upload-filtering of content; highlights that the legal regime for digital providers liability should not depend on uncertain notions such as the ‘active’ or ‘passive’ role of providers;


### 11. highlights that this should include rules on the notice-and-action mechanisms and requirements for platforms to take proactive measures that are proportionate to their scale of reach and operational capacities in order to address the appearance of illegal content on their services; supports a balanced duty-of-care approach and a clear chain of responsibility to avoid unnecessary regulatory burdens for the platforms and unnecessary and disproportionate restrictions on fundamental rights , including the freedom of expression; ### 11. highlights that the new legislative framework should include rules on the notice-and-action mechanisms in order to address the appearance of illegal content online while refraining from imposing notice-and-stay-down mechanisms; applicable legislation shall exhaustively and explicitly spell out the obligations of digital service providers rather than imposing a general duty of care to avoid unnecessary regulatory burdens for the platforms and unnecessary and disproportionate restrictions on fundamental rights , including the freedom of expression , access to information and the right to privacy;


### 12. stresses the need for appropriate safeguards and due process obligations , including human oversight and verification , in addition to counter notice procedures , to ensure that removal or blocking decisions are accurate , well-founded and respect fundamental rights; recalls that the possibility of judicial redress should be made available to satisfy the right to effective remedy; ### 12. stresses the need for appropriate safeguards and due process obligations , including a requirement for human oversight and verification , in addition to counter notice procedures , to ensure that removal or blocking decisions are accurate , well-founded and respect fundamental rights; highlights that persons who systematically and repeatedly submit wrongful or abusive notices shall be sanctioned; recalls that the possibility of judicial redress should remain available to satisfy the right to effective remedy;


### 13. supports limited liability for content and the country of origin principle , but considers improved coordination for removal requests between national competent authorities to be essential; emphasises that such orders should be subject to legal safeguards in order to prevent abuse and ensure full respect of fundamental rights; stresses that sanctions should apply to those service providers that fail to comply with legitimate orders; ### 13. supports the preservation of the current framework on the limited liability for content and the country of origin principle , but considers improved coordination for removal requests between national competent authorities to be essential; emphasises that such orders should be issued by a judicial authority of the member state in which a hosting service provider is located and subject to legal safeguards in order to prevent abuse and ensure full respect of fundamental rights; stresses that enforcement mechanisms should apply to those service providers that fail to comply with legitimate orders;


### 14. believes that terms of services of digital service providers should be clear , transparent and fair; deplores the fact that some terms of services from content platforms do not allow law enforcement to use non-personal accounts , which poses a threat both to possible investigations and to personal safety; ### 14. believes that terms of services of digital service providers should be clear , transparent and fair; underlines that the fairness and compliance with fundamental rights standards of standard contractual terms imposed by intermediaries to the users of their services shall be subject to judicial review; considers that standard contractual terms unduly restricting users’ fundamental rights , such as the right to privacy and to freedom of expression , shall not be binding;