### 21. reiterates its deep regret that parliament was not formally consulted or asked to give its approval to the creation or extension of this facility and was only involved as one arm of the budgetary authority , thereby undermining the democratic accountability of the frt; ### 21. reiterates its deep regret that parliament was not formally consulted or asked to give its approval to the creation or extension of this facility and was only involved as one arm of the budgetary authority , thereby undermining the democratic accountability of the frt; affirms that it should not be confronted with this situation again;


### 22. reiterates its request that turkey respect the principle of non-refoulement , in particular on the syrian border , and that it not use the flows of refugees against the eu; ### 22. reiterates its request that turkey respect the principle of non-refoulement , in particular on the syrian border , and calls on both turkey and the eu not to instrumentalise concerns of migration management and refugees reception for broader political purposes; calls on the turkish authorities to grant full access to unhcr to the removal centres at the turkish syrian border to be able to monitor the respect of the principle of non-refoulement;


### 23. underlines the necessity of better addressing the funding needs in situations of protracted crisis and with a view to the coordination and transition between humanitarian relief , reconstruction and development in a flexible and interconnected manner; ### 23. underlines the necessity of better addressing , in the long-and medium-term , the funding needs in situations of protracted crisis and with a view to the coordination and transition between humanitarian relief , reconstruction and development in a flexible and interconnected manner , while respecting the fundamental principles of humanity , neutrality , impartiality and independence at the heart of humanitarian action , as set in the european consensus on humanitarian aid and the humanitarian aid regulation;


### 25. reiterates parliament’s long-standing insistence that external assistance be financed in full from the union budget and be implemented in a coherent way , following a streamlined set of rules , based on co-legislated instruments and in full respect of parliament’s legislative , budgetary and monitoring prerogatives , and of the principles of accountability , transparency , effectiveness and sound budgetary management; ### 25. while noting that the financial regulation allows for the creation of trust funds for external action , reiterates further parliament’s long-standing insistence that external assistance be financed in full from the union budget and be implemented in a coherent way , following a streamlined set of rules , based on co-legislated instruments and in full respect of the eu treaties , in particular article 208 tfeu , and of parliament’s legislative , budgetary and monitoring prerogatives , and of the principles of accountability , transparency , effectiveness and sound budgetary management; calls on the commission to delete the eutf-related articles in the financial regulation in the next revision of the financial regulation;


### 26. expects the commission to fully make use of the possibilities afforded by the programme-based approach under the geographic pillar of the ndici-global europe and ipa iii , complemented by global thematic programming , rapid response funding and the large unprogrammed reserve under the ndici-global europe; ### 26. calls on the commission to fully and primarily make use of the possibilities afforded by the programme-based approach under the geographic pillar of the ndici-global europe and ipa iii , complemented by global thematic programming; insists that the rapid response funding and the emerging challenges and priorities cushion under the ndici-global europe be targeted at well-defined emergency situations in coherence and consistency with all programmes and actions , to allow for proper monitoring and reporting on the results of eu’s intervention;


### 27. is confident that the ndici-global europe will allow for increased flexibility and responsiveness , allowing it to continue the activities of the existing trust funds and thereby safeguard the unity of the union budget; ### 27. is confident that the ndici-global europe will allow for flexibility and responsiveness , while learning from past experiences and assessments of the existing trust funds , allowing it , when relevant , to continue and adapt their activities within the objectives of the regulation and thereby safeguard the unity of the union budget;


### 28. in the event of greater needs in the mff 2021-2027 , advocates increasing the ndici-global europe envelope through a revision of the mff and the ndici-global europe regulations , or a strengthening of the relevant ndici-global europe budget lines with contributions in the form of external assigned revenue; stresses that , should a need for a duly justified new trust fund nevertheless arise , it insists that parliament must be fully involved from the very outset; ### 28. in the event of greater needs in the mff 2021-2027 , advocates increasing the ndici-global europe envelope through a revision of the mff and the ndici-global europe regulations , or a strengthening of the relevant ndici-global europe budget lines with contributions in the form of external assigned revenue; stresses that , any flexible funding mechanism established in the framework of the ndici-global europe should comply with the thematic spending targets defined in the regulation; insists that parliament be fully involved in the potential transition process of existing trust funds towards the ndici from the very outset; calls on the commission not to create any new trust fund or equivalent mechanism outside of the union budget;


### 29. calls on the commission to prioritise the nexus approach in the implementation of the ndici-global europe , and calls for the cooperation between eu humanitarian and development actors , notably in post-crisis settings and in protracted crises , to be increased in order to better adapt to local needs and deliver more efficient results; ### 29. calls on the commission to consider the nexus approach in the implementation of the ndici-global europe , and calls for the cooperation between eu humanitarian and development actors in compliance with the principle of independence of humanitarian aid , notably in post-crisis settings and in protracted crises , to be increased in order to better adapt to local needs and deliver more efficient results;


### 30. notes that the close-to-ground decision-making procedure and adaptation to the local realities of the eutfs and the frt is of high added value , and needs to be mainstreamed in the future programming exercises linked to budgetary instruments for eu external policy; ### 30. welcomes the close-to-ground decision-making procedure , adaptation to the local realities and the possibility to implement cross-border and multi-year funded projects in the eutfs and the frt; calls for mainstreaming such aspects in the future programming exercises linked to budgetary instruments for eu external policy;


### — having regard to the edpb opinion of xxxx on the draft adequacy decisions for the uk , ### — having regard to the edpb opinion of 13 april 2021 on the draft adequacy decisions for the uk ,


### a. whereas the ability to transfer personal data across borders has the potential to be a key driver of innovation , productivity and economic competitiveness; ### a. whereas the ability to transfer personal data across borders in full respect of fundamental rights has the potential to be a key driver of innovation , productivity and economic competitiveness;


### enforcement of the gdpr ### the uk’s new approach to data protection


### 4. expresses its concern about the lack and sometimes non-existent enforcement of the gdpr by the uk when it was still a member of the eu; points to the lack of proper enforcement by the uk information commissioner’s office in the past; ### 4. expresses its concern about the lack and sometimes non-existent enforcement of the gdpr by the uk when it was still a member of the eu; points to the lack of proper enforcement by the uk information commissioner’s office in the past; points to the example of the information commissioner (ico) closing a complaint into adtech after holding two stakeholder events , writing a report (the 'update report on adtech') and stating that “the adtech industry appears immature in its understanding of data protection requirements” , but having used none of their enforcement powers;1a is concerned that this non-enforcement is a structural problem , which is laid out in the ico’s 'regulatory action policy’ , which explicitly states that "in the majority of cases we will reserve our powers for the most serious cases , representing the most severe breaches of information rights obligations. these will typically involve wilful , deliberate or negligent acts , or repeated breaches of information rights obligations , causing harm or damage to individuals"1b; underlines that in practice , this has meant that routine breaches of data protection law have not been remedied;


### 5. is concerned that uk data protection law contains a broad derogation from aspects of the fundamental data protection principles , such as the right of access and the right of a data subject to know with whom their data has been shared , if such protection would ‘prejudice effective immigration control’15 ; points out that this exemption is available to all data controllers in the uk; is concerned about the recently revealed information that the immigration exemption was used in over 70 % of data subject requests to the home office in 202016 ; ### 5. is concerned that uk immigration uses a system that undertakes large-scale data processing , deciding people’s right to remain in the country; notes that uk data protection law contains a broad derogation from aspects of the fundamental data protection principles , such as the right of access and the right of a data subject to know with whom their data has been shared , if such protection would ‘prejudice effective immigration control’15 ; points out that this exemption is available to all data controllers in the uk including local authorities , health providers and private contractors involved in the immigration system; is concerned about the recently revealed information that the immigration exemption was used in over 70 % of data subject requests to the home office in 202016; underlines that monitoring and compliance of the use of the exemption must be carried out in line with standards required in the adequacy referential which require consideration of practice as well as principle , by pointing out that “it is necessary to consider not only the content of the rules applicable to personal data transferred to a third country… but also the system in place to ensure the effectiveness of such rules”;


### 6. notes that this exception now applies to eu citizens who reside or plan to reside in the uk; is strongly concerned that the exemption removes key opportunities for accountability and remedies; ### 6. notes that this exception now applies to eu citizens who reside or plan to reside in the uk; is strongly concerned that the exemption removes key opportunities for accountability and remedies , and; underlines that this is not an adequate level of protection;


### 7. points out that it has repeatedly voiced its concern about an exception for data subjects’ rights in the uk’s immigration policy , including in its resolution of 12 february 2020 on the new partnership with the uk17 and the opinion of the committee on civil liberties , justice and home affairs of february 2021 , which held that the exemption for the processing of personal data for immigration purposes of the uk data protection act needed to be amended before a valid adequacy decision could be reached18 ; ### 7. points out that it has repeatedly voiced its concern about an exception for data subjects’ rights in the uk’s immigration policy , including in its resolution of 12 february 2020 on the new partnership with the uk17 and the opinion of the committee on civil liberties , justice and home affairs of 5 february 2021 , which held that the exemption for the processing of personal data for immigration purposes of the uk data protection act needed to be amended before a valid adequacy decision could be reached18 ;


### 8. recalls the revelations of mass surveillance by the us and the uk , as revealed by whistle-blower edward snowden; recalls that the uk ‘tempora’ programme run by the government communications headquarters (gchq) intercepts communications in real time through fibre-optical internet backbone cables , and records the data so it can be processed and searched at a later time; ### 8. recalls the revelations of mass surveillance by the us and the uk , as revealed by whistle-blower edward snowden; recalls that the uk ‘tempora’ programme run by the government communications headquarters (gchq) intercepts communications in real time through fibre-optical internet backbone cables , and records the data so it can be processed and searched at a later time; recalls that this mass surveillance of communications content and metadata takes place without any individual suspicion or targeting;


### 9. recalls its resolution of 12 march 2014 , which found that the indiscriminate and non-suspicion-based mass surveillance programmes conducted by the uk intelligence agency gchq are incompatible with the principles of necessity and proportionality in a democratic society and are not adequate under eu data protection law; ### 9. reminds that in the judgments on “schrems i / safe harbour” and “schrems ii / privacy shield” , the cjeu held that mass access to the content of private communications touches upon the essence of the right to privacy , and that in such cases , a necessity and proportionality test is not even needed any more; underlines that these principles apply to data transfers to other third countries than the us , including the united kingdom;


### 11. is concerned that the draft adequacy decisions fail to take into account either the actual use of uk bulk data powers or uk-us surveillance operations; points out that furthermore , in relation to the us , uk citizens are subject to some informal safeguards between gchq and the national security agency (nsa); expresses deep concern that these safeguards would not protect eu citizens or residents whose data may be subject to onward transfers and sharing with the nsa; ### 11. is concerned that the draft adequacy decisions fail to take into account the actual use of uk bulk data powers or uk-us surveillance operations as exposed by edward snowden , including


### 12. takes note of the fact that the european union (withdrawal) act 2018 provides that cjeu case law generated before the end of the transition period will become ‘retained eu law’ and thus legally binding for the uk; points out that the uk is bound by the principles and conditions defined in the schrems ii judgment of the cjeu when assessing the adequacy of other non-eu countries; considers this an important safeguard to ensure the legality of onward transfers; ### 12. takes note of the fact that the european union (withdrawal) act 2018 provides that cjeu case law generated before the end of the transition period will become ‘retained eu law’ and thus legally binding for the uk; points out that the uk is bound by the principles and conditions defined in the schrems ii judgment of the cjeu when assessing the adequacy of other non-eu countries; is however concerned that uk courts will not apply the eu charter of fundamental rights anymore , points out that the uk is not under the jurisdiction of the cjeu anymore , which is the highest instance to interpret the charter;


### 14. is strongly concerned that a uk adequacy status would therefore lead to the bypassing of the eu rules on transfers to countries or territories not deemed adequate under eu law; ### 14. is concerned that the uk has granted itself the right to declare that other third countries or territories provide adequate data protection , irrespective of whether the third country or territory in question has been held to provide such protection by the eu; reminds that the uk has already declared that gibraltar provides such protection even though the eu has not done so; is strongly concerned that a uk adequacy status would therefore lead to the bypassing of the eu rules on transfers to countries or territories not deemed adequate under eu law;


### 16. is concerned that if the uk includes provisions on data transfers in any future trade agreements , inter alia us-uk trade agreements , the level of protection offered by the gdpr would be undermined; ### 16. is concerned that if the uk includes provisions on data transfers in any future trade agreements , inter alia us-uk trade agreements , the level of protection offered by the gdpr would be undermined; takes note that on 1st february 2021 , the uk has sent a request1a to join the comprehensive and progressive trans-pacific partnership (cpptp) , in particular to “benefit “from “modern digital trade rules that allow data to flow freely between members , remove unnecessary barriers for businesses ,” , notes with concern that the cpttp membership includes eight countries that do not have an adequacy decision from the european union , namely australia , brunei , chile , malaysia , mexico , peru , singapore , and vietnam; is strongly concerned about the potential onward transfer of personal data from eu citizens to these countries if the uk would be granted an adequacy decision; notes with concern that the eu-uk trade and cooperation agreement deviated from the eu's 2018 horizontal position on cross-border data flows and the protection of personal data , which could create risks for the protection of citizens' rights to privacy and personal data protection;


### 17. highlights that the uk is the first country for which the commission has suggested adopting an adequacy decision under directive (eu) 2016/680; underlines that this is particularly important given the close partnership with the uk in the area of security and law enforcement; ### 17. highlights that the uk is the first country for which the commission has suggested adopting an adequacy decision under directive (eu) 2016/680;


### 21. is concerned about recent reports that a mass data collection and retention scheme is part of a trial by the uk home office conducted under the ipa 2016; ### 21. is concerned about recent reports that two uk internet access providers are tracking and collecting the websites visited by their customers , as part of a secretive home office mass data collection and retention trial under the ipa 2016 , which is set to work out if a national bulk surveillance system would be “useful for national security and law enforcement”1a


### 22. is concerned about the shortcomings and violations identified in the way the uk implemented data protection law while it was still a member of the eu; recalls that the uk was recording and maintaining an illegal copy of the schengen information system; is therefore concerned about data being exchanged with uk law enforcement agencies , and about the uk maintaining access to eu law enforcement databases; ### 22. reminds that in its resolution of 12 february 20201a , the european parliament stressed that “the uk cannot have a direct access to eu information systems data or participate in the management structures of the eu agencies in the area of freedom , security and justice , while any sharing of information including personal data with the uk should be subject to strict safeguards , audit and oversight conditions , including an equivalent level of protection of personal data to that provided by union law”; is concerned about the shortcomings and violations identified in the way the uk implemented data protection law while it was still a member of the eu; recalls that the uk was recording and maintaining an illegal copy of the schengen information system; is therefore concerned about data being exchanged with uk law enforcement agencies , and about the uk maintaining access to eu law enforcement databases;


### 23. notes that the draft adequacy decision fails to take account of the uk’s actual surveillance practices and reflects an inaccurate and limited understanding of the types of communications data that fall under uk data retention and lawful interception powers; ### 23. notes that the draft adequacy decision fails to take account of the uk’s actual surveillance practices and reflects an inaccurate and limited understanding of the types of communications data that fall under uk data retention and lawful interception powers; points out that the draft decision reads as if the uk definition of 'telecommunication system' mirrors that used in european law; reminds that in uk law , a “telecommunication system” means a system that exists (whether wholly or partly in the united kingdom or elsewhere) for the purpose of facilitating the transmission of communications by any means involving the use of electrical or electromagnetic energy (investigatory powers act 2016 s 261(13)); underlines that this is significantly wider than the eu definitions of 'publicly available electronic communications services’ , and can include over-the-top services , cloud platforms , and the like; is worried that even if data is running on eu-based systems whose code is controlled by entities which can be required by the uk intelligence agencies to alter such code to exfiltrate such data , it can be accessed; is equally worried that if data enters the uk , even for the purposes of caching during transit , and the entity falls within the wide definition of telecommunications operator , the latter can be required to retain such data and provide it to the uk intelligence services;


### 24. points out that the eu-uk trade and cooperation agreement (tca) includes titles regarding the exchange of dna , fingerprints and vehicle registration data , the transfer and processing of passenger name record data (pnr) , cooperation on operational information and cooperation with europol and eurojust , which will apply regardless of the adequacy decision; recalls , however , the concerns expressed in the opinion of the committee on civil liberties , justice and home affairs of february 2021 on the tca regarding the special use and longer retention of personal data granted to the uk under the prüm and pnr titles of the tca , which are not in line with the uses and retentions by the member states; ### 24. points out that the eu-uk trade and cooperation agreement (tca) includes titles regarding the exchange of dna , fingerprints and vehicle registration data , the transfer and processing of passenger name record data (pnr) , cooperation on operational information and cooperation with europol and eurojust , which will apply regardless of the adequacy decision; recalls , however , the concerns expressed in the opinion of the committee on civil liberties , justice and home affairs of february 2021 on the tca regarding the special use and longer retention of personal data granted to the uk under the prüm and pnr titles of the tca , which are not in line with the uses and retentions by the member states; reminds of the right to bring an action before the court of justice in order to seek verification of the legality of the projected international agreement and , in particular , the compatibility thereof with the protection of a fundamental right1a


### 25. calls on the commission to assure eu businesses that the adequacy decision will provide a solid , sufficient and future-oriented legal basis for data transfers; underlines the importance of making sure that this adequacy decision will be deemed acceptable if reviewed by the cjeu and stresses that all recommendations made in the edpb opinion should therefore be taken on board; ### deleted


### 26. welcomes the fact that the adequacy decision will be reviewed every four years and will include a sunset clause , and calls on the commission to keep monitoring the level of data protection in the uk in law and practice in the meantime; ### 26. points out that there are other legal possibilities for transfers of personal data to the uk in chapter v of the gdpr; recalls that in line with edpb guidelines , transfers relying on derogations for specific situations pursuant to article 49 gdpr must be exceptional;


### 27. calls for the commission to consult with parliament on any future changes to the uk data protection regime , and for a scrutiny role for parliament in the new institutional framework , including for relevant bodies such as the specialised committee on law enforcement and judicial cooperation; ### 27. calls on the commission to closely monitor the data protection law and practices in the uk; calls for the commission to consult with parliament on any future changes to the uk data protection regime , and for a scrutiny role for parliament in the new institutional framework , including for relevant bodies such as the specialised committee on law enforcement and judicial cooperation;


### 1. underlines the important role of the european union agency for law enforcement cooperation (‘europol’) in supporting member states’ criminal investigations; emphasises also the extension of its tasks and its growing role in the prevention and combating of serious crime , including terrorism; ### 1. underlines the important role of the european union agency for law enforcement cooperation(‘europol’) in supporting member states’ criminal investigations and in preventing and combating serious crime affecting two or more member states;


### (1) the schengen information system (‘sis’) constitutes an essential tool for maintaining a high level of security within the area of freedom , security and justice of the union by supporting operational cooperation between national competent authorities , in particular border guards , the police , customs authorities , immigration authorities , and authorities responsible for the prevention , detection , investigation or prosecution of criminal offences or execution of criminal penalties. regulation (eu) 2018/1862 of the european parliament and of the council28 constitutes the legal basis for sis in respect of matters falling within the scope of chapters 4 and 5 of title v of part three of the treaty on functioning of the european union (tfeu). ### (1) the schengen information system (‘sis’) constitutes one of the existing tools for maintaining a high level of security within the area of freedom , security and justice of the union by supporting operational cooperation between national competent authorities , in particular border guards , the police , customs authorities , immigration authorities , and authorities responsible for the prevention , detection , investigation or prosecution of criminal offences or execution of criminal penalties. regulation (eu) 2018/1862 of the european parliament and of the council28 constitutes the legal basis for sis in respect of matters falling within the scope of chapters 4 and 5 of title v of part three of the treaty on functioning of the european union (tfeu).


### (3) the european union agency for law enforcement cooperation (europol) , established by regulation (eu) 2016/794 of the european parliament and of the council29 , plays an important role in the use of sis and in the exchange of supplementary information with member states on sis alerts. nevertheless , according to existing rules , alerts in sis can only be issued by member states’ competent authorities. ### (3) the european union agency for law enforcement cooperation (europol) , established by regulation (eu) 2016/794 of the european parliament and of the council29 , could play an important role in the use of sis and in the exchange of supplementary information with member states on sis alerts. nevertheless , alerts in sis can only be issued by member states’ competent authorities.


### (4) given the increasingly global nature of serious crime and terrorism brought about by growing mobility , the information that third countries and international organisations , such as the international criminal police organization and the international criminal court , obtain about criminals and terrorists is increasingly relevant for the union‘s security. such information should contribute to the comprehensive efforts to ensure internal security in the european union. some of this information is only shared with europol. while europol holds valuable information received from external partners on serious criminals and terrorists , it cannot issue alerts in sis. member states are also not always able to issue alerts in sis on the basis of such information. ### (4) given the global nature of serious crime and terrorism , the information that third countries and international organisations , such as the international criminal police organization and the international criminal court , obtain about criminals and terrorists may be relevant for the union‘s security. such information should contribute to the comprehensive efforts to ensure internal security in the european union. some of this information is only shared with europol. while europol may hold valuable information received from external partners in accordance with article 17(1)(b) and article 25(1) of regulation (eu) 2016/794 , on the people engaged in a serious crime or act of terrorism , it shouldn’t issue alerts in sis.


### (5) in order to bridge the gap in information sharing on serious crime and terrorism , in particular on foreign terrorist fighters – where the monitoring of their movement is crucial – it is necessary to ensure europol is able to make this information available directly and in real-time to front-line officers in member states. ### (5) in order to bridge the gap in information sharing on serious crime and terrorism europol should be able to make this information available directly and in real-time to member states , although such updated powers may go beyond article 88 of the tfeu which provides the legal basis for europol.


### (6) europol should therefore be authorised to enter alerts in sis pursuant to regulation (eu) 2018/1862 , in full respect of fundamental rights and data protection rules. ### (6) europol could therefore be authorised to propose to the member states to enter alerts in sis pursuant to regulation (eu) 2018/1862 , in full respect of fundamental rights and data protection rules.


### (7) to that end , a specific category of alert should be created in sis , to be issued exclusively by europol , in order to inform end-users carrying out a search in sis that the person concerned is suspected of being involved in a criminal offence in respect of which europol is competent , and in order for europol to obtain confirmation that the person who is subject to the alert has been located. ### (7) to that end , europol could propose to the member states to enter alert in sis in order to inform end-users carrying out a search in sis that the person concerned is suspected or accused of having committed a criminal offence in respect of which europol is competent , and in order for europol to obtain confirmation that the suspected or accused person who is subject to the alert has been located.


### (8) in order to assess whether a concrete case is adequate , relevant and important enough to warrant the entry of an alert in sis , and in order to confirm the reliability of the source of information and the accuracy of the information on the person concerned , europol should carry out a detailed individual assessment of each case including further consultations with the third country or international organisation that shared the data on the person concerned , as well as further analysis of the case , in particular by cross checking it against information it already holds in its databases , to confirm the accuracy of the information and complement it with other data on the basis of its own databases. the detailed individual assessment should include the analysis of whether there are sufficient grounds for considering that the person has committed or taken part in , or will commit a criminal offence in respect of which europol is competent. ### (8) in order to assess , based on objective criteria and in line with the principle of necessity and proportionality , whether a concrete case is adequate , relevant and important enough to warrant the entry of an alert in sis , and in order to confirm the reliability of the source of information and the accuracy of the information on the person concerned , europol should carry out a detailed individual assessment of each case including further consultations with the third country , provided that the conditions in article 25(1) of regulation (eu) 2016/794 are met , or international organisation in accordance with article 17(1)(b) of that regulation that shared the data on the person concerned , as well as further analysis of the case , in particular by cross checking it against information it already holds in its databases , to confirm the accuracy of the information and complement it with other data on the basis of its own databases. the detailed individual assessment should include the analysis of whether there are sufficient grounds for considering that the person has committed or taken part in , or there are reasonable and concrete grounds to believe that such person will commit a criminal offence in respect of which europol is competent.


### (9) europol should only be able to enter an alert in sis if the person concerned is not already subject to a sis alert issued by a member state. a further precondition for the creation of such an alert should be that member states do not object to the alert being issued in sis. therefore , it is necessary to establish rules on the obligations of europol prior to entering data in sis , in particular the obligation to consult the member states in line with regulation (eu) 2016/794. it should also be possible for member states to request the deletion of an alert by europol , in particular if they obtain new information about the person who is the subject of the alert , if their national security requires so or when it is likely that the alert would represent a risk for official or legal inquiries , investigations or procedures. ### (9) europol should only be able to propose to the member states to enter an alert in sis if the suspect or accused person concerned is not already subject to a sis alert issued by a member state. a further precondition for the creation of such an alert should be that member states do not object to the alert being issued in sis. therefore , it is necessary to establish further rules on the obligations of europol to consult the member states in line with regulation (eu) 2016/794. it should also be possible for member states to request the deletion of an alert , in particular if they obtain new information about the suspect or accused person who is the subject of the alert , if their national security requires so , when it is likely that the alert would represent a risk for official or legal inquiries , investigations or procedures , or when the alert would lead to a disproportionate interference with the fundamental rights of the person concerned. europol should duly justify each proposal made to member states for entry an alert in sis.


### (10) europol should keep records of the individual assessment of each case , which should include the grounds for entering the alert , for the purposes of verifying the lawfulness of the data processing , self-monitoring and ensuring proper data integrity and security. in accordance with regulation (eu) 2016/794 , europol should co-operate with the european data protection supervisor and make these records available upon request , so that they can be used for monitoring processing operations. ### (10) europol should keep records of the individual assessment of each case , which should include the grounds for proposing the alert , for the purposes of verifying the lawfulness of the data processing , self-monitoring and ensuring proper data integrity and security , while ensuring full respect for fundamental rights enshrined in the charter and data protection rules in accordance with regulation (eu) 2018/1725 , with particular focus on vulnerable persons , including children , unaccompanied minors and other persons in a vulnerable situation , as well as on persons seeking international protection. in accordance with regulation (eu) 2016/794 , europol should co-operate with the european data protection supervisor and make these records available to him or her , so that they can be used for monitoring the lawfulness of processing operations.


### (11) it is necessary to establish rules concerning the deletion of alerts entered in sis by europol. an alert should be kept only for the time required to achieve the purpose for which it was entered. it is therefore appropriate to set out detailed criteria to determine when the alert should be deleted. an alert entered by europol in sis should be deleted in particular if a member state objects , another alert is entered in sis by a member state , or if europol becomes aware that the information received from the third country or international organisation was incorrect or was communicated to europol for unlawful purposes , for example if sharing the information on the person was motivated by political reasons. ### (11) it is necessary to establish additional rules concerning the deletion of alerts entered in sis on the proposal of europol. an alert should be kept only for the time required to achieve the purpose for which it was entered. it is therefore appropriate to set out detailed criteria in accordance with regulation (eu) 2018/1725 to determine when the alert should be deleted. such an alert should be deleted in particular if a member state objects , another alert is entered in sis by another member state , or if europol or any member state become aware that the information received from the third country or international organisation was incorrect or was communicated to europol for unlawful purposes , for example if sharing the information on the person was motivated by political reasons or in contradiction with international human rights standards.


### (12) when entering alerts in sis , europol should be bound by the same requirements and obligations applicable to the member states pursuant to regulation (eu) 2018/1862 when they enter alerts in sis. in particular , europol should comply with common standards , protocols and technical procedures established to ensure the compatibility of its technical interface with central sis for the prompt and effective transmission of data. requirements concerning general data processing rules , proportionality , data quality , data security , reporting and obligations related to collecting statistics applicable to member states when entering alerts in sis should apply to europol as well. ### deleted


### (14) since the objectives of this regulation , namely the establishment and regulation of a specific alert category issued by europol in sis in order to exchange information on persons who represent a threat to the internal security of the european union , cannot be sufficiently achieved by the member states , but can rather , by reason of their nature be better achieved at union level , the union may adopt measures in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity , as set out in article 5 of the treaty on european union (teu). in accordance with the principle of proportionality , as set out in that article , this regulation does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve those objectives. ### (14) since the objectives of this regulation , namely providing for the possibility that europol proposes to the member states to enter a specific alert in sis in order to exchange information on suspects or accused persons who have committed or taken part in a criminal offence , or on whom there are reasonable and concrete grounds to believe that will commit a criminal offence in respect of which europol is competent , cannot be sufficiently achieved by the member states , but can rather , by reason of their nature be better achieved at union level , the union may adopt measures in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity , as set out in article 5 of the treaty on european union (teu). in accordance with the principle of proportionality , as set out in that article , this regulation does not go beyond what is strictly necessary in order to achieve those objectives.


### (15) this regulation respects fundamental rights and observes the principles recognised in particular by the charter of fundamental rights of the european union. in particular , this regulation fully respects the protection of personal data in accordance with article 8 of the charter of fundamental rights of the european union while seeking to ensure a safe environment for all persons residing on the territory of the union. ### (15) this regulation fully respects fundamental rights and observes the principles recognised in particular by the charter of fundamental rights of the european union. in particular , this regulation fully respects the protection of personal data in accordance with article 8 of the charter of fundamental rights of the european union and regulation (eu) 2018/1725. this regulation also seeks to ensure a safe environment for all persons in the union.


### 2. this regulation also lays down provisions on the technical architecture of sis , on the responsibilities of the member states , the european union agency for law enforcement cooperation (‘europol’) and of the european union agency for the operational management of large-scale it systems in the area of freedom , security and justice (eu-lisa) , on data processing , on the rights of the persons concerned and on liability. ### 2. this regulation also lays down provisions on the technical architecture of sis , on the responsibilities of the member states , the european union agency for law enforcement cooperation (‘europol’) and of the european union agency for the operational management of large-scale it systems in the area of freedom , security and justice (eu-lisa) , on data processing , on the rights of the persons concerned , on liability and accountability.


### (2) in article 3 , the following point is added: ### deleted


### 1. where a member state considers that to give effect to an alert entered in accordance with article 26 , 32 , 36 or 37a is incompatible with its national law , its international obligations or essential national interests , it may require that a flag be added to the alert to the effect that the action to be taken on the basis of the alert will not be taken in its territory. flags on alerts entered in accordance with article 26 , 32 or 36 shall be added by the sirene bureau of the issuing member state , flags on alerts entered in accordance with article 37a shall be added by europol. ### 1. where a member state considers that to give effect to an alert entered in accordance with article 26 , 32 , 36 or 37a is incompatible with its national law , its international obligations or essential national interests , it may require that a flag be added to the alert to the effect that the action to be taken on the basis of the alert will not be taken in its territory. flags on alerts entered in accordance with article 26 , 32 , 36 or 37a shall be added by the sirene bureau of the issuing member state.


### paragraph 3 is replaced by the following: ### deleted


### alerts entered by europol on persons of interest ### alerts proposed by europol on persons suspected or accused of having committed a criminal offence


### 1. europol may enter alerts on persons in sis for the purpose of informing end-users carrying out a search in sis of the suspected involvement of those persons in a criminal offence in respect of which europol is competent in accordance with article 3 of regulation (eu) 2016/794 , as well as for the purpose of obtaining information in accordance with article 37b of this regulation that the person concerned has been located. ### 1. europol may propose to the member states to enter alerts on suspects and accused persons in sis for the purpose of informing end-users carrying out a search in sis of the involvement of those persons in a criminal offence in respect of which europol is competent in accordance with article 3 of regulation (eu) 2016/794 , as well as for the purpose of obtaining information in accordance with article 37b of this regulation that the person concerned has been located. the fundamental rights officer and the data protection officer shall be involved whenever europol uses this prerogative. the edps shall be informed and may also be involved if he or she deems it necessary.


### 2. europol may only enter an alert in sis on persons who are third-country nationals on the basis of information received from a third country or an international organisation in accordance with article 17(1)(b) of regulation (eu) 2016/794 , where the information relates to one of the following: ### 2. europol may propose to the member states to enter such an alert in sis on suspects or accused persons who are third-country nationals on the basis of information received from a third country , subject to the conditions referred to in article 25(1) of regulation (eu) 2016/794 , or an international organisation , in accordance with article17(1)(b) of regulation (eu) 2016/794 , where the information relates to one of the following:


### persons regarding whom there are factual indications or reasonable grounds to believe that they will commit criminal offences in respect of which europol is competent in accordance with article 3 of regulation (eu) 2016/794. ### persons regarding whom there are concrete and reasonable grounds to believe that they will commit criminal offences in respect of which europol is competent in accordance with article 3 of regulation (eu) 2016/794.


### 3. europol may only enter an alert in sis after it has ensured all of the following: ### 3. europol shall ensure the following:


### an analysis of the data provided in accordance with paragraph 2 confirmed the reliability of the source of information and the accuracy of the information on the person concerned , permitting europol to determine that that person falls within the scope of paragraph 2 , where necessary , after having carried out further exchanges of information with the data provider in accordance with article 25 of regulation (eu) 2016/794; ### an analysis of the data provided in accordance with paragraph 2 confirmed the reliability of the source of information and the accuracy of the information on the suspect or accused person concerned , permitting europol to determine that that person falls within the scope of paragraph 2 , after having carried out further exchanges of information , where necessary and in accordance with the provisions set out in the sirene manual , with the data provider , and provided that the conditions in article 25(1) of regulation (eu) 2016/794 are met;


### a verification confirmed that entering the alert is necessary for achieving europol’s objectives as laid down in article 3 of regulation (eu) 2016/794; ### a verification confirmed that the alert is strictly necessary for achieving europol’s objectives as laid down in article 3 of regulation (eu) 2016/794;


### a search in sis , carried out in accordance with article 48 of this regulation , did not disclose the existence of an alert on the person concerned; ### a search in sis , carried out in accordance with article 48 of this regulation , did not disclose the existence of an alert on the suspect or accused person concerned;


### a consultation , involving the sharing of information on the person concerned with member states participating in regulation (eu) 2016/794 in accordance with article 7 of that regulation , confirmed that: ### a consultation , involving the sharing of information on the suspect or accused person concerned with member states participating in regulation (eu) 2016/794 in accordance with article 7 of that regulation , confirmed that no objection was expressed by any member state regarding the proposed entry of an alert in sis on the suspected or accused person.


### no intention was expressed by a member state to enter an alert in sis on the person concerned; ### deleted


### (ii) no reasoned objection was expressed by a member state regarding the proposed entry of an alert in sis on the person concerned by europol. ### deleted


### 4. europol shall keep detailed records relating to the entry of the alert in sis and the grounds for such entry to permit verification of compliance with the substantive and procedural requirements laid down in paragraphs 1 , 2 and 3. such records shall be available for the european data protection supervisor on request. ### 4. europol shall keep detailed records relating to the alert in sis and the grounds for proposing the entry to permit verification of compliance with the substantive and procedural requirements laid down in paragraphs 1 , 2 and 3. such records shall be made available to the european data protection supervisor.


### 5. europol shall inform all member states of the entry of the alert in sis through the exchange of supplementary information in accordance with article 8 of this regulation. ### deleted


### 6. the requirements and obligations applicable to the issuing member state in articles 20 , 21 , 22 , 42 , 56 , 59 , 61 , 62 and 63 shall apply to europol when processing data in sis. ### 6. the requirements and obligations applicable to the issuing member state in articles 20 , 21 , 22 , 42 , 56 , 59 , 61 , 62 and 63 shall apply.


### 1. in the event of a hit on an alert entered by europol , the executing member state shall: ### 1. in the event of a hit on an alert proposed by europol , the executing member state shall:


### collect and communicate the following information: ### collect and communicate to the issuing member state and to europol the following information:


### the fact that the person who is the subject of an alert has been located; ### the fact that the suspect or accused person who is the subject of an alert has been located;


### (ii) the place , time and reason for the check; ### (ii) the place , time and reason for the check.


### in accordance with national law , decide whether it is necessary to take any further measures. ### deleted


### 2. the executing member state shall communicate the information referred to in paragraph 1(a) to europol through the exchange of supplementary information. ### 2. the executing member state shall communicate the information referred to in paragraph 1(a) through the exchange of supplementary information in accordance with the provisions set out in the sirene manual.


### the title is replaced with the following: ### deleted


### europol shall , where necessary to fulfil its mandate , have the right to access and search data in sis and to enter , update and delete alerts pursuant to article 37a of this regulation. europol shall enter , update , delete and search sis data through a dedicated technical interface. the technical interface shall be set up and maintained by europol in compliance with the common standards , protocols and technical procedures defined in article 9 of this regulation and shall allow direct connection to central sis. ### europol shall , where strictly necessary and duly justified to fulfil its mandate , as well as in consultation with the fundamental rights officer and the data protection officer , have the right to access and search data in sis and to propose to the member states the entry of alerts pursuant to article 37a of this regulation , while ensuring compliance with fundamental rights and the data protection rules in accordance with regulation (eu) 2018/1725.


### europol shall exchange supplementary information in accordance with the provisions of the sirene manual. to that end , europol shall ensure availability to supplementary information related to its own alerts 24 hours a day , 7 days a week. ### europol may also exchange and further request supplementary information in accordance with the provisions of article 37b and of the sirene manual.


### 4. europol's use of information obtained from a search in sis or from the processing of supplementary information shall be subject to the consent of the member state that provided the information either as issuing member state or as executing member state. if the member state allows the use of such information , its handling by europol shall be governed by regulation (eu) 2016/794. europol shall only communicate such information to third countries and third bodies with the consent of the member state that provided the information and in full compliance with union law on data protection. ### 4. europol's use of information obtained from a search in sis or from the processing of supplementary information shall be subject to the consent of the member state that provided the information either as issuing member state or as executing member state. if the member state allows the use of such information , its handling by europol shall be governed by regulation (eu) 2016/794 and the requirements and safeguards set out in regulation (eu) 2018/1725 shall be met. europol shall only communicate such information to third countries that are subject to the conditions in article 25(1) of regulation (eu) 2018/1725 , with the consent of the member state that provided the information and in full compliance with union law on data protection and with the charter. where europol uses and communicates information obtained from a search in sis , the fundamental rights officer and the data protection officer shall be informed.


### 7a. the european data protection supervisor shall carry out an audit of the data processing operations of europol under this regulation in accordance with international auditing standards at least every four years. ### 7a. the european data protection supervisor shall carry out regular audits of the data processing operations of europol under this regulation in accordance with international auditing standards at least every four years. the edps shall also carry out specific additional audits when he or she deems it necessary. a report on that audit shall be sent to the european parliament and to the joint parliamentary scrutiny group provided for in article 51 of regulation (eu) 2016/794.


### the following paragraph 5a is inserted: ### deleted


### 6. within the review period referred to in paragraphs 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 and 5a , the issuing member state , and in the case of personal data entered in sis pursuant to article 37a of this regulation , europol , may , following a comprehensive individual assessment , which shall be recorded , decide to retain the alert on a person for longer than the review period , where this proves necessary and proportionate for the purposes for which the alert was entered. in such cases paragraph 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 or 5a of this article shall also apply to the extension. any such extension shall be communicated to cs-sis. ### 6. within the review period referred to in paragraphs 2 , 3 , 4 and 5 , the issuing member state , may , following a comprehensive individual assessment , which shall be recorded , decide to retain the alert on a person for longer than the review period , where this proves necessary , proportionate and limited to the purpose for which the alert was entered. in such cases paragraph 2 , 3 , 4 or 5 of this article shall also apply to the extension. any such extension shall be communicated to cs-sis.


### 7. alerts on persons shall be deleted automatically after the review period referred to in paragraphs 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 and 5a has expired , except where the issuing member state or in the case of alerts entered in sis pursuant to article 37a of this regulation europol , has informed cs-sis of an extension pursuant to paragraph 6 of this article. cs-sis shall automatically inform the issuing member state or europol of the scheduled deletion of data four months in advance. ### 7. alerts on persons shall be deleted automatically after the review period referred to in paragraphs 2 , 3 , 4 and 5 or the extension period referred to in paragraph 6 have expired. cs-sis shall immediately inform the issuing member state or europol of the scheduled deletion of data four months in advance and also once the data is deleted.


### 6a. alerts on persons entered by europol pursuant to article 37a shall be deleted upon: ### 6a. alerts on persons entered pursuant to article 37a shall be deleted upon:


### a decision to delete them by europol , in particular when after entering the alert europol becomes aware that the information received under article 37a (2) was incorrect or was communicated to europol for unlawful purposes , or when europol becomes aware or is informed by a member state , that the person who is the subject of the alert no longer falls under the scope of article 37a(2); ### a decision to delete them by the issuing member state , in particular when after entering the alert it becomes aware that the information received under article 37a (2) was incorrect or was communicated to europol for unlawful purposes , or when the issuing member state becomes aware or is informed by a member state or europol , that the person who is the subject of the alert no longer falls under the scope of article 37a(2).


### a notification , through the exchange of supplementary information , of europol by a member state , that it is about to enter , or has entered an alert on the person who is the subject of the alert issued by europol; ### deleted


### a notification of europol by a member state participating in regulation (eu) 2016/794 in accordance with article 7 of that regulation , of its reasoned objection to the alert. ### deleted


### 5. with regard to the alerts laid down in articles 26 , 32 , 34 , 36 , 37a , 38 and 40 of this regulation , any processing of information in sis for purposes other than those for which it was entered into sis has to be linked with a specific case and justified by the need to prevent an imminent and serious threat to public policy and to public security , on serious grounds of national security or for the purposes of preventing a serious crime. prior authorisation from the issuing member state or from europol if the data was entered pursuant to article 37a of this regulation , shall be obtained for this purpose. ### 5. with regard to the alerts laid down in articles 26 , 32 , 34 , 36 , 37a , 38 and 40 of this regulation , any processing of information in sis for purposes other than those for which it was entered into sis has to be linked with a specific case and justified by the need to prevent an imminent and serious threat to public policy and to public security , on serious grounds of national security or for the purposes of preventing a serious crime. prior authorisation from the issuing member state shall be obtained for this purpose.


### 1. where upon a new alert being entered it becomes apparent that there is already an alert in sis on a person with the same description of identity , the sirene bureau shall contact the issuing member state or if the alert was entered pursuant to article 37a of this regulation europol , through the exchange of supplementary information within 12 hours to cross-check whether the subjects of the two alerts are the same person. ### 1. where upon a new alert being entered it becomes apparent that there is already an alert in sis on a person with the same description of identity , the sirene bureau shall contact the issuing member state through the exchange of supplementary information within 12 hours to cross-check whether the subjects of the two alerts are the same person.


### 2. where the cross-check reveals that the subject of the new alert and the person subject to the alert already entered in sis are indeed one and the same person , the sirene bureau of the issuing member state shall apply the procedure for entering multiple alerts referred to in article 23. by way of derogation , europol shall delete the alert it has entered as referred to in point (c) of article 55(6a). ### 2. where the cross-check reveals that the subject of the new alert and the person subject to the alert already entered in sis are indeed one and the same person , the sirene bureau of the issuing member state shall apply the procedure for entering multiple alerts referred to in article 23.


### (1) data subjects shall be able to exercise the rights laid down in articles 15 , 16 and 17 of regulation (eu) 2016/679 , in the national provisions transposing article 14 and article 16 (1) and (2) of directive (eu) 2016/680 and in chapter ix of regulation (eu) 2018/1725. ### (1) data subjects shall be able to exercise the rights laid down in articles 15 , 16 and 17 of regulation (eu) 2016/679 , in the national provisions transposing article 14 and article 16 (1) and (2) of directive (eu) 2016/680 and in chapter ix of regulation (eu) 2018/1725 , including the right to obtain the immediate erasure of all the information entered in the system in the cases foreseen in article 55(6a).


### (2) a member state other than the issuing member state may provide to the data subject information concerning any of the data subject's personal data that are being processed only if it first gives the issuing member state an opportunity to state its position. if the personal data was entered in sis by europol , the member state that received the request shall refer the request to europol without delay , and in any case within 5 days of receipt , and europol shall process the request in accordance with regulation (eu) 2016/794 and regulation (eu) 2018/1725. if europol receives a request concerning personal data entered in sis by a member state , europol shall refer the request to the alert issuing member state without delay , and in any case within 5 days of receipt. the communication between those member states and between the member states and europol shall be carried out through the exchange of supplementary information. ### (2) a member state other than the issuing member state may provide to the data subject information concerning any of the data subject's personal data that are being processed only if it first gives the issuing member state an opportunity to state its position. the communication between those member states shall be carried out through the exchange of supplementary information.


### (3) a member state in accordance with its national law , including law transposing directive (eu) 2016/680 and , in the case of personal data entered in sis under article 37a of this regulation , europol in accordance with chapter ix of regulation (eu) 2018/1725 , shall take a decision not to provide information to the data subject , in whole or in part , to the extent that , and for as long as such a partial or complete restriction constitutes a necessary and proportionate measure in a democratic society with due regard for the fundamental rights and legitimate interests of the data subject concerned , in order to: ### (3) a member state in accordance with its national law , including law transposing directive (eu) 2016/680 shall take a decision not to provide information to the data subject , in whole or in part , to the extent that , and for as long as such a partial or complete restriction constitutes a necessary and proportionate measure in a democratic society with due regard for the fundamental rights and legitimate interests of the data subject concerned , in order to:


### in cases referred to in the first subparagraph , the member state or , in the case of personal data entered in sis pursuant to article 37a of this regulation , europol , shall inform the data subject in writing , without undue delay , of any refusal or restriction of access and of the reasons for the refusal or restriction. such information may be omitted where its provision would undermine any of the reasons set out in points (a) to (e) of the first subparagraph of this paragraph. the member state or , in the case of personal data entered in sis pursuant to article 37a of this regulation , europol , shall inform the data subject of the possibility of lodging a complaint with a supervisory authority or of seeking a judicial remedy. ### in cases referred to in the first subparagraph , the member state shall inform the data subject in writing , without undue delay , of any refusal or restriction of access and of the reasons for the refusal or restriction. the member state shall inform the data subject of the possibility of lodging a complaint with a supervisory authority or of seeking a judicial remedy.


### the member state , or , in the case of personal data entered in sis pursuant to article 37a of this regulation , europol , shall document the factual or legal reasons on which the decision not to provide information to the data subject is based. that information shall be made available to the competent supervisory authorities. for such cases , the data subject shall also be able to exercise his or her rights through the competent supervisory authorities. ### the member state shall document the factual and legal reasons on which the decision not to provide information to the data subject is based. that information shall be made available to the competent supervisory authorities. for such cases , the data subject shall also be able to exercise his or her rights , including the right to seek remedy , through the competent supervisory authorities.


### (4) following an application for access , rectification or erasure , the member state or , in the case of personal data entered in sis pursuant to article 37a of this regulation , europol , shall inform the data subject about the follow-up given to the exercise of the rights under this article without undue delay and in any event within one month of receipt of the request. that period may be extended by two further months where necessary , taking into account the complexity and number of the requests. the member state or , in the case of personal data entered in sis pursuant to article 37a of this regulation , europol , shall inform the data subject of any such extension within one month of receipt of the request , together with the reasons for the delay. where the data subject makes the request by electronic means , the information shall , where possible , be provided by electronic means unless otherwise requested by the data subject. ### (4) following an application for access , rectification or erasure , the member state shall inform the data subject about the follow-up given to the exercise of the rights under this article without undue delay and in any event within one month of receipt of the request. that period may be extended by two further months where necessary , taking into account the complexity and number of the requests. the member state shall inform the data subject of any such extension within one month of receipt of the request , together with the reasons for the delay. where the data subject makes the request by electronic means , the information shall , where possible , be provided by electronic means unless otherwise requested by the data subject.


### (1) without prejudice to the provisions on remedies of regulation (eu) 2016/679 and of directive (eu) 2016/680 , any person may bring an action before any competent supervisory authority or a court , under the law of any member state to access , rectify , erase , obtain information or obtain compensation in connection with an alert relating to him or her. ### (1) without prejudice to the provisions on remedies of regulation (eu) 2016/679 and of directive (eu) 2016/680 , any person may bring an action before any competent supervisory authority or a court , under the law of any member state to access , rectify , erase , obtain information or obtain compensation in connection with an alert relating to him or her. the competent supervisory authority shall regularly inform the person of the progress and the outcome of the action.


### (2) without prejudice to the provisions on remedies of regulation (eu) 2018/1725 , any person may lodge a complaint with the european data protection supervisor in order to access , rectify , erase , obtain information or obtain compensation in connection with an alert relating to him or her entered by europol. ### (2) without prejudice to the provisions on remedies of regulation (eu) 2018/1725 , any person may lodge a complaint with the european data protection supervisor in order to access , rectify , erase , obtain information or obtain compensation in connection with the information related to him or her provided by europol in accordance of paragraph 2 of article 37a. the european data protection supervisor shall inform the complainant of the progress and the outcome of the complaint , including of the possibility of a judicial remedy pursuant to regulation (eu) 2018/1725.


### (3) the member states and europol undertake mutually to enforce final decisions handed down by the courts , authorities or bodies referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this article , without prejudice to article 72. ### (3) the member states undertake mutually to enforce final decisions handed down by the courts , authorities or bodies referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this article , without prejudice to article 72.


### (4) member states and europol shall report annually to the european data protection board on: ### (4) member states shall report annually to the european data protection board on:


### any observations on cases of mutual recognition of final decisions handed down by the courts or authorities of other member states on alerts entered by the issuing member state or europol. ### any observations on cases of mutual recognition of final decisions handed down by the courts or authorities of other member states on alerts entered by the issuing member state.


### (5) the reports from the member states and europol shall be included in the joint report referred to in article 71(4). ### (5) the reports from the member states shall be included in the joint report referred to in article 71(4).


### a member state , europol or eu-lisa shall be exempted from their liability , in whole or in part , if they prove that they are not responsible for the event which gave rise to the damage. ### deleted


### (3) claims for compensation against a member state for the damage referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall be governed by the national law of that member state. claims for compensation against europol for the damage referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall be governed by regulation (eu) 2016/794 and subject to the conditions provided for in the treaties. claims for compensation against eu-lisa for the damage referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall be subject to the conditions provided for in the treaties. ### (3) claims for compensation against a member state for the damage referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall be governed by the national law of that member state. claims for compensation against europol for the damage referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall be governed by regulation (eu) 2016/794 and subject to the conditions provided for in the treaties. any person who has suffered material or non-material damage as a result of an infringement of regulation (eu) 2016/794 shall have the right to receive compensation in accordance to article 65 of regulation (eu) 2018/1725. claims for compensation against eu-lisa for the damage referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall be subject to the conditions provided for in the treaties.


### 3. eu-lisa shall produce daily , monthly and annual statistics showing the number of records per category of alerts , both for each member state , europol and in aggregate. eu-lisa shall also provide annual reports on the number of hits per category of alert , how many times sis was searched and how many times sis was accessed for the purpose of entering , updating or deleting an alert , both for each member state , europol and in aggregate. the statistics produced shall not contain any personal data. the annual statistical report shall be published. ### 3. eu-lisa shall produce daily , monthly and annual statistics showing the number of records per category of alerts , both for each member state and in aggregate. eu-lisa shall also provide annual reports on the number of hits per category of alert , how many times sis was searched and how many times sis was accessed for the purpose of entering , updating or deleting an alert , both for each member state and in aggregate. the statistics produced shall not contain any personal data. the annual statistical report shall be published. the statistics concerning alerts based on europol’s information shall be included in europol's multiannual programming and annual work programme.


### (14) in article 79 , the following paragraph 7 is inserted: ### deleted


### 1. acknowledges that the need to respond swiftly and effectively to a crisis often has a direct impact on the balance between the different powers of the state and recognises that governments and local authorities may be forced to adopt emergency measures with less public consultation than would generally be expected; calls attention to the great importance of upholding an effective system of checks and balances for all actions taken in response to an emergency; ### 1. acknowledges that crisis measures often have a direct impact on the balance between the different powers of the state; believes that emergency powers should never be used as a pretext for changing the balance of powers more permanently; believes that emergency measures should always be temporal , proportionate and necessary; calls attention to the great importance of upholding an effective system of checks and balances , respect of the rule of law , fundamental rights and democratic accountability for all actions taken in response to an emergency;


### 2. is of the opinion that the response to the current covid-19 crisis may have increased the risk and instances of corruption; believes that the response to the covid-19 crisis is also a reminder that openness , transparency , accountability and law enforcement are essential components of democratic governance; ### 2. is of the opinion that the prolonged situation of emergency in response to the current covid-19 crisis has created a favourable environment for criminal activities and , specifically , for corruption and bribery; considers that therefore , responses to this crisis from international organisations , states , and private entities should also include mechanisms for preventing , detecting , and prosecuting corruption and bribery; believes that the response to the covid-19 crisis is also a reminder that openness , transparency , accountability and law enforcement are essential components of democratic governance;


### 3. calls on the member states and the commission to carefully review the policies they enacted during the covid-19 crisis and to define new mechanisms and protocols for any future emergency spending; ### 3. recalls that whenever member states implement the union budget , including resources allocated through the european union recovery instrument and through loans and other instruments guaranteed by the union budget , and whatever method of implementation they use , respect for the rule of law and the effective prevention and prosecution of fraud , including tax fraud , tax evasion , corruption and conflicts of interest are essential preconditions for compliance with the principles of sound financial management enshrined in article 317 of the treaty on the functioning of the european union (tfeu); calls on the member states and the commission to carefully review the policies they enacted during the covid-19 crisis and to define new mechanisms and protocols for any future emergency spending; underlines the necessity of ex ante verification of existing anti-corruption legislation and practices in member states; calls on the commission to include anti-corruption milestones in the proposals for a council decision on the approval of the assessment of the recovery and resilience plans in cases where a risk of misuse of funds exist; stresses the fact that the eu public procurement directive already allows for quick and less administratively burdensome procedures and that member states’ governments should not manage these procedures outside of the legal requirements;


### 4. points out that corruption in general undermines the functioning of the state and public authorities at all levels and is one of the key enablers of organised crime; emphasises that effective anti-corruption frameworks and transparency and integrity in the exercise of state power can strengthen legal systems and trust in public authorities and democratic processes; ### 4. points out that corruption in general undermines the functioning of the state and public authorities at all levels and is one of the key enablers of organised crime; emphasises that effective anti-corruption frameworks and transparency and integrity in the exercise of state power can strengthen legal systems and trust in public authorities and democratic processes; reiterates the need to increase the overall transparency of the economic and financial environment of the union , as the prevention of economic and financial crimes cannot be effective unless criminals are prevented from seeking shelter for their acts through non-transparent structures;


### 5. stresses that the incorrect management of public funds and ineffective responses to a crisis may intensify growing distrust in government; believes that the public has the right to be informed and to be provided with up-to-date , transparent and reliable information and data during crises; ### 5. stresses that the incorrect management of public funds and ineffective responses to a crisis may intensify growing distrust in government; believes that the public has the right to be informed and to be provided with up-to-date , transparent and reliable information and data during crises; believes that if relevant data on public procurement were to be made publicly available for analysis , freely and easily accessible , in an open and standardised format , together with data on court convictions and on company registries , this could significantly foster the prevention and detection of potential cases of corruption; is of the opinion , therefore , that all public procurement contracts (using public money) should be publicly available , published on a dedicated website and with the minimum of redaction;


### 6. welcomes the critical role of civil society organisations in fighting corruption; emphasises that the success of any emergency response greatly depends on the active participation of all actors in society; believes that the current covid-19 crisis has highlighted the importance of maintaining a robust system of citizen participation in public decision-making; ### 6. welcomes the critical role of civil society organisations in fighting corruption; emphasises that the success of any emergency response greatly depends on the active participation of all actors in society; believes that the current covid-19 crisis has highlighted the importance of maintaining a robust system of citizen participation in public decision-making; notes the particular importance of the protection of whistleblowers reporting suspicions of corruption; recalls in this regard that the eu directive on whistleblowing must be transposed into the national legal systems of all 27 member states before 17 december 2021; states its concern about recent reports from whistleblowing international network (win) and transparency international which show that 14 member states did not start or have made minimal progress towards implementing the directive;


### 6. recalls that governments need efficient and transparent reporting , independent ex post audits and accountability procedures , and open channels of communication with civil society and the private sector to ensure that the funds and measures are helping the people who need it most; ### 6. recalls that governments need efficient and transparent reporting , independent ex post audits and accountability procedures , and open channels of communication with civil society and the private sector to ensure that the funds and measures are helping the people who need it most; points out the importance of providing an up-to-date , transparent and reliable information to the public during the crisis;


### 7. acknowledges the current role and future potential of using artificial intelligence and big data in fighting corruption and the misuse of public funds; points out that all information and data must be processed in a proper way to ensure data protection and the privacy of citizens; ### 7. acknowledges the current role and future potential of using artificial intelligence and big data in fighting corruption and the misuse of public funds; calls on the commission and the member states to make full use of the available tools , such as the early detection and exclusion system (edes) , arachne and the irregularities management system (ims) to effectively and efficiently identify the problematic economic operators and the private individuals (or natural persons) linked to them in both direct and indirect management; encourages member states to exchange information both among themselves and with the commission and to cooperate more closely with a view to improving data collection and enhancing the effectiveness of controls; regrets the fact that olaf does not have full access to the arachne risk scoring tool; points out that all information and data must be processed in a proper way to ensure data protection and the privacy of citizens;


### 8. calls on the member states to follow the recommendations of the group of states against corruption (greco) and welcomes the possibility of the eu joining greco as a full member. ### 8. notes that in its 21st general activity report , the group of states against corruption (greco) states that governments should rigorously manage the corruption risks that have emerged due to the need to take extraordinary measures to combat the covid-19 pandemic; calls on the member states to follow the recommendations and guidelines issued by greco in 2020 to prevent corruption risks; welcomes the possibility of the eu joining greco as a full member.


### 8. believes that it is important to keep citizens engaged in the fight against corruption and fully protected from negative personal consequences; calls on the commission to provide the right platforms for engagement; ### 8. emphasises the critical role of the civil society organisations and believes that it is important to keep citizens engaged in the fight against corruption and fully protected from negative personal consequences; calls on the commission to provide the right platforms for engagement;


### j. whereas corruption is a major threat in the private and public sphere and has a disproportionate impact on the poor and most vulnerable , increasing costs and reducing access to services; ### j. whereas corruption is a major threat in the private and public sphere and has a disproportionate impact on the poor and most vulnerable , increasing costs and reducing access to services , including health , education and justice , undermining the trust and confidence which are necessary for the maintenance and development of sustainable economic and social relations and it poses a threat to the very foundations of the union core values;


### k. whereas a rising number of organised crime groups are active in the eu , often with cross-border reach; ### k. whereas a rising number of organised crime groups are active in the eu , often with cross-border reach; the phenomenon being increasingly complex with new criminal markets and new modi operandi emerging due to globalisation and new technologies;


### 29. takes the view that a centralised procurement administration to which contractors and contracting authorities are obliged to systematically report highly detailed project data and progress (in a standardised format) should be created , in order to facilitate data collection and treatment on an eu level; ### 29. takes the view that a centralised procurement administration to which contractors and contracting authorities are obliged to systematically report highly detailed project data and progress (in a standardised format) should be created , in order to facilitate data collection and treatment on an eu level , however , an intermediate level on the national level (i.e. decentralised collection point) could be introduced in order to facilitate the data collection exercise , given the language differences and the local characteristics (such as regional responsibilities);


### 2. points out that the court has issued a qualified audit opinion on the legality and regularity of the payments underlying the accounts of easo for the financial year 2019; notes the court’s explanation that the qualified opinion was issued in relation to payments worth eur 13 ,8 million made in the framework of irregular procedures started up in the years 2016-2018 and payments worth eur 111 304 associated with a selection procedure for expert consultants lacking information to allow for a proper audit trail , and that these amounts represent 14 ,6 % of all payments made by easo in 2019; notes that corrective actions were implemented by easo in 2019 to address the irregularities; ### 2. points out that the court has issued a qualified audit opinion on the legality and regularity of the payments underlying the accounts of easo for the financial year 2019; notes the court’s explanation that the qualified opinion was issued in relation to payments worth eur 13 ,8 million made in the framework of irregular procedures started up in the years 2016-2018 and payments worth eur 111 304 associated with a selection procedure for expert consultants lacking information to allow for a proper audit trail , and that these amounts represent 14 ,6 % of all payments made by easo in 2019; welcomes that corrective actions were implemented by easo in 2019 to address the irregularities;


### 2. notes that , following receipt of a report of the european anti-fraud office at the end of 2018 , which was extensively covered in the discharge report for 2018 , the office has initiated three disciplinary procedures , which are currently ongoing; ### 2. notes that , following receipt of a report of the european anti-fraud office at the end of 2018 , which was extensively covered in the discharge report for 2018 , the office has initiated three disciplinary procedures , which are currently ongoing; calls on the office to report to the discharge authority the outcomes of these disciplinary procedures once completed;


### 4. recalls that , according to the reports of the court for the financial years 2016 and 2017 , the office’s procurement procedures for interim workers in greece and for the office’s rented premises in lesbos were irregular; recalls that , according to the report of the court for the financial year 2018 , the court concluded that the office’s procurement procedures for interim workers in italy were irregular , though no payments were made on those contracts yet; notes that , according to the report of the court for the financial year 2019 , the office’s procedures for selecting and contracting external experts systematically lacked a solid audit trail , which in turn resulted in a lack of evidence that the office had treated experts equally in its selection procedures; notes the court’s opinion that , except for the effects of the qualified opinion on the legality and regularity of payments for the financial years 2016 , 2017 and 2018 , amounting to eur 13 979 880 , and the error found in 2019 , amounting to eur 111 304 , payments underlying the accounts for the year ended 31 december 2019 are legal and regular in all material aspects; ### 4. recalls that , according to the reports of the court for the financial years 2016 and 2017 , the office’s procurement procedures for interim workers in greece and for the office’s rented premises in lesbos were irregular; recalls that , according to the report of the court for the financial year 2018 , the court concluded that the office’s procurement procedures for interim workers in italy were irregular , though no payments were made on those contracts yet; notes with concern that , according to the report of the court for the financial year 2019 , the office’s procedures for selecting and contracting external experts systematically lacked a solid audit trail , which in turn resulted in a lack of evidence that the office had treated experts equally in its selection procedures; notes the court’s opinion that , except for the effects of the qualified opinion on the legality and regularity of payments for the financial years 2016 , 2017 and 2018 , amounting to eur 13 979 880 , and the error found in 2019 , amounting to eur 111 304 , payments underlying the accounts for the year ended 31 december 2019 are legal and regular in all material aspects;


### 5. notes that the office executed a total of 9 871 payments in 2019 , 1 312 of which (13 ,29 %) were late; notes that interest amounting to eur 25 652 ,34 was paid for 46 invoices; notes the improvements in the timely payments of invoices in november and december 2019; encourages the office to maintain and improve its performance in that regard and to continue reporting about that matter in its annual activity report; ### 5. notes with regret that the office executed a total of 9 871 payments in 2019 , 1 312 of which (13 ,29 %) were late; notes that interest amounting to eur 25 652 ,34 was paid for 46 invoices; notes the improvements in the timely payments of invoices in november and december 2019; encourages the office to maintain and improve its performance in that regard and to continue reporting about that matter in its annual activity report;


### 6. notes that , on 31 december 2019 , the establishment plan was 75 ,35 % executed , with 214 temporary agents appointed out of 284 temporary agents authorised under the union budget (compared to 214 authorised posts in 2018); notes that , in addition , 72 contract agents and 9 seconded national experts worked for the office in 2019; notes with satisfaction that the office’s recruitment plan provides for a staff of 500 by 2020; ### 6. notes that , on 31 december 2019 , the establishment plan was 75 ,35 % executed , with 214 temporary agents appointed out of 284 temporary agents authorised under the union budget (compared to 214 authorised posts in 2018); notes that , in addition , 72 contract agents and 9 seconded national experts worked for the office in 2019; notes with satisfaction that the office’s recruitment plan provides for a staff of 500 by 2020; calls on the office to report to the discharge authority about the status of implementation;


### 8. notes the office’s reply to the discharge authority on the declaration of interests , which stated that all staff sign a declaration of interests upon entry into service; notes that the declaration of interests of the executive director has been published on the office’s website; calls on the office to publish the declarations of interests of the other senior management members on its website; ### 8. notes the office’s reply to the discharge authority on the declaration of interests , which stated that all staff sign a declaration of interests upon entry into service; notes that the declaration of interests of the executive director has been published on the office’s website; calls on the office to publish , without delay , the declarations of interests of the other senior management members on its website; stresses that such declarations should be established independently and should not solely rely on self-declarations;


### 1. emphasises the important role of the european data protection supervisor (‘edps’) , namely to ensure the protection of personal data and privacy of individuals by monitoring personal data processing by the union institutions and bodies , by advising them on all matters related to personal data processing and by cooperating with national supervisory authorities with a view to ensure the consistent protection of individuals’ privacy rights irrespective of where they live in the union; ### 1. emphasises the important role of the european data protection supervisor (‘edps’) , namely to ensure the protection of personal data and privacy of individuals by monitoring personal data processing by the union institutions , bodies and agencies , by advising them on all matters related to personal data processing and by cooperating with national supervisory authorities with a view to ensure the protection of individuals’ fundamental rights and freedoms , including the rights to data protection and privacy irrespective of where they live in the union;


### 8. observes that the supervisor staff consists of 19 union nationalities and has a gender representation of 39 % male staff and 61 % female staff in 2019; notes that the most important actions supporting gender equality were the nominations at middle management level (one male and three female heads of unit); notes further the introduction of greater flexibility as concerns remote working; appreciates an equal opportunity clause , included both in the recruitment materials and vacancy notice , stating that the supervisor is an equal opportunities employer and welcomes applications from those with disabilities; ### 8. observes that the supervisor staff consists of 19 union nationalities and has a gender representation of 39 %male staff and 61 % female staff in 2019; notes that the most important actions supporting gender equality were the nominations at middle management level (one male and three female heads of unit); notes further the introduction of greater flexibility as concerns remote working; appreciates an equal opportunity clause , included both in the recruitment materials and vacancy notice , stating that the supervisor is an equal opportunities employer and welcomes applications from those with disabilities; believes that such a clause shall be maintained and included by default in all future vacancy notices;


### 10. asks the supervisor to envisage the preparation of a code of conduct for the edpb chair and vice chairs; highlights that the two revised codes of conduct (for staff and for the supervisor) were adopted on 6 december 2019; notes that the revised code of conduct for staff has paid particular attention to whistle blower protection; welcomes the fact that all newcomers are provided with an awareness-raising session on the supervisor’s ethical framework and the new code of conduct for staff. ### 10. calls on the supervisor to envisage the preparation of a code of conduct for the edpb senior management (chair , vice chairs , etc); highlights that the two revised codes of conduct (for staff and for the supervisor) were adopted on 6 december 2019; notes that the revised code of conduct for staff has paid particular attention to whistle blower protection; welcomes the fact that all newcomers are provided with an awareness-raising session on the supervisor’s ethical framework and the new code of conduct for staff;


### 15. encourages the supervisor to explore the possibility of joining the transparency registry on the basis of a sla; acknowledges the inter-institutional cooperation through sla between the supervisor and other union institutions and bodies; is interested to see if any cost benefit analysis takes place before entering in any agreement; ### 15. invites the supervisor to explore the possibility of joining the transparency registry on the basis of a sla; acknowledges the inter-institutional cooperation through sla between the supervisor and other union institutions and bodies; is interested to see if any cost benefit analysis takes place before entering in any agreement;


### 17. appreciates the fact that the supervisor continued to work with its regional and international partners to mainstream data protection in international agreements and ensure consistent protection of personal data worldwide over the past five years; welcomes the fact that the supervisor has dedicated significant time and energy to the development of greater data protection convergence globally , as data flows internationally , across borders , while data protection rules are still decided on a largely national , and even regional basis; ### 17. appreciates the fact that the supervisor continued to work with its regional and international partners to mainstream data protection in international agreements and ensure consistent protection of personal data worldwide over the past five years; welcomes the fact that the supervisor has dedicated significant time and effort to the development of greater data protection convergence globally , as data flows internationally , across borders , while data protection rules are still decided on a largely national , and even regional basis;


### 24. is aware that the supervisor uses a number of key performance indicators (kpis) to help the monitoring of its performance; welcomes the fact that the supervisor met or surpassed - in some cases significantly - the targets set in six out of the eight kpis , e.g. the number of cases dealt at international level were 62 in 2019 (exceeding a target of 10) , and the number of opinions/comments issued in response to consultation requests (26 consultations in 2019 , exceeding a target of 10 consultations); ### 24. is aware that the supervisor uses a number of key performance indicators (kpis) to help the monitoring of its performance; welcomes the fact that the supervisor met or surpassed - in some cases significantly - the targets set in six out of the eight kpis , e.g. the number of cases dealt with at international level were 62 in 2019 (exceeding a target of 10) , and the number of opinions/comments issued in response to consultation requests (26 consultations in 2019 , exceeding a target of 10 consultations); invites the supervisor to closely monitor and adapt where needed weaker performing objectives;


### 26. is aware that the commission’s internal auditor (ia) is the internal auditor of the supervisor; notes that during 2019 , the ia did not perform any audit , but rather issued its annual internal audit report for 2019 with only two statements and there are no open recommendations; ### 26. is aware that the commission’s internal auditor (ia)is the internal auditor of the supervisor; notes that during 2019 , the ia did not perform any audit , but rather issued its annual internal audit report for 2019 with only two statements and there are no open recommendations; asks the supervisor to facilitate closer cooperation with the ia and ensure proper annual auditing;