### (16) evaluation and monitoring activities should be carried out by teams consisting of commission representatives and experts designated by member states. these representatives and experts should have appropriate qualifications , including a solid theoretical knowledge and practical experience. in order to ensure the participation of sufficient number of experienced experts in a faster and less burdensome way , a pool of experts should be established and maintained by the commission in close cooperation with the member states. the pool should be the primary source of experts for evaluation and monitoring activities. ### (16) evaluation and monitoring activities should be carried out by teams consisting of commission representatives and experts designated by member states. these representatives and experts should have appropriate qualifications , including a solid theoretical knowledge and practical experience. in order to ensure the participation of sufficient number of experienced experts in a faster and less burdensome way , a pool of experts should be established and maintained by the commission in close cooperation with the member states. the pool should be the primary source of experts for evaluation and monitoring activities. the experts can be assisted in their evaluation and monitoring activities by observers designated by the european parliament and by the relevant union bodies , offices and agencies involved in the implementation of the schengen acquis as well as by the european union agency for fundamental rights. for each evaluation and monitoring activity , the commission should always invite the european parliament to designate a representative as an observer.


### (19) evaluation reports should be concise and succinct. they should focus on deficiencies with significant impact and highlight areas where important improvements could be made. minor findings should not form part of the reports. the team should nevertheless communicate these findings to the evaluated member state at the end of the evaluation activity , including to the authorities responsible for the relevant national quality control mechanism. the team should actively seek to identify best practices which should be added to the reports. in particular , new and innovative measures that significantly improve the implementation of the common rules and that could be put in practice by other member states should be highlighted as a best practice for the purposes of the report. ### (19) evaluation reports should give an account of deficiencies identified and highlight areas where improvements should be made. the team should nevertheless communicate these findings to the evaluated member state at the end of the evaluation activity , including to the authorities responsible for the relevant national quality control mechanism. the team should actively seek to identify best practices which should be added to the reports. in particular , new and innovative measures that significantly improve the implementation of the common rules and that could be put in practice by other member states should be highlighted as a best practice for the purposes of the report.


### (22) in addition , where evaluations identify a serious deficiency , specific provisions should apply to ensure the prompt adoption of remedial measures. given the risk posed by such deficiency , as soon as the evaluated member state is informed about a serious deficiency , the evaluated member state should start immediately implementing actions to remedy the deficiency including , where necessary , mobilising all available operational and financial means. remedial action should be subject to tighter deadlines and closer political scrutiny and monitoring throughout the process. in this regard , the commission should immediately inform the council and the european parliament when an evaluation establishes the existence of a serious deficiency and organise a ‘serious deficiency’ revisit no later than one year from the date of the evaluation to verify whether the member state has remedied the shortcomings concerned. the commission should present a revisit report to the council following the revisit. ### (22) in addition , where evaluations identify a serious deficiency , specific provisions should apply to ensure the prompt adoption of remedial measures. given the risk posed by such deficiency , as soon as the evaluated member state is informed about a serious deficiency , the evaluated member state should start immediately implementing actions to remedy the deficiency including , where necessary , mobilising all available operational and financial means. remedial action should be subject to tighter deadlines and closer political scrutiny and monitoring throughout the process. in this regard , the commission should immediately inform the council and the european parliament when an evaluation establishes the existence of a serious deficiency and organise a ‘serious deficiency’ revisit no later than six months from the date of the evaluation to verify whether the member state has remedied the shortcomings concerned. the commission should present a revisit report to the council following the revisit. considering the severe impact that a serious deficiency might have on the schengen area as a whole and on individuals’ fundamental rights , in case the revisit report concludes that the identified serious deficiency has not been adequately remedied , the commission should launch without delay an action pursuant to article 258 of the treaty on the functioning of the european union in order to address the identified shortcomings.


### (23) the identification of a serious deficiency requires a thorough case-by-case assessment on the basis of clear criteria regarding the nature , scale and potential impact of the problems , which may be different for each policy area. different key elements for the effective implementation of the schengen acquis and different combination of factors could lead to the classification of a finding as a serious deficiency. however , if it is considered that a shortcoming identified is or in a short-term has the potential of putting the overall functioning of the area without internal border control at risk , or have a significant negative impact on the rights of individuals , such shortcoming is to be regarded as a serious deficiency. where a serious deficiency in the carrying out of external border control is identified in an evaluation report , articles 21 and 29 of regulation (eu) 2016/399 of the european parliament and of the council37 may apply. ### (23) the identification of a serious deficiency requires a thorough case-by-case assessment on the basis of clear criteria regarding the nature , scale and potential impact of the problems , which may be different for each policy area. different key elements for the effective implementation of the schengen acquis and different combination of factors could lead to the classification of a finding as a serious deficiency. however , if it is considered that a shortcoming identified is or in a short-term has the potential of putting the overall functioning of the area without internal border control at risk , or of negatively impacting the rights of individuals , such shortcoming is to be regarded as a serious deficiency. where a serious deficiency in the carrying out of external border control is identified in an evaluation report , articles 21 and 29 of regulation (eu) 2016/399 of the european parliament and of the council37 may apply.


### (24) the evaluation and monitoring mechanism should comprise a robust follow-up and monitoring component which should be ensured by the commission , in close cooperation with the council and the european parliament , without creating a disproportionate burden for the actors involved. evaluations should be followed up by action plans. while drawing up the action plans , the evaluated member states should fully take into consideration the funding possibilities provided by the union and make the best use of these resources. to speed up the process , the commission should provide observations on the adequacy of the action plans for example in the form of a letter. in order to ensure a timely follow up , if the commission services do not consider the action plan adequate , the member state concerned should be required to submit a revised action plan within one month from the receipt of the observations. the frequency of the follow-up reporting by the member state to the commission and the council on the implementation of the action plans should , as a rule , be six months. ### (24) the evaluation and monitoring mechanism should comprise a robust follow-up and monitoring component which should be ensured by the commission , in close cooperation with the council and the european parliament. evaluations should be followed up by action plans. while drawing up the action plans , the evaluated member states should fully take into consideration the funding possibilities provided by the union and make the best use of these resources. to speed up the process , the commission should provide observations on the adequacy of the action plans for example in the form of a letter. in order to ensure a timely follow up , if the commission services do not consider the action plan adequate , the member state concerned should be required to submit a revised action plan within one month from the receipt of the observations. the frequency of the follow-up reporting by the member state to the commission and the council on the implementation of the action plans should , as a rule , be six months.


### (25) as part of its monitoring activities , it should be possible for the commission to organise revisits and verification visits. revisits should be organised to monitor the progress of the implementation of an action plan following an evaluation that identified serious deficiency or following an evaluation which preceeds the full schengen accession of a member state (‘first time evaluation’) and concluded that the evaluated member state did not fulfil the necessary conditions to apply the schengen acquis in the respective evaluated policy area. the revisit report should be limited to present the progress made to implement the recommendations. otherwise , verification visits may be carried out to monitor the implementation of an action plan , following an evaluation that did not identify serious deficiency where deemed necessary. verification visits should always be organised before the closure of an action plan following a first time evaluation. in terms of the organisational and reporting requirements , verification visits should be lighter than evaluation visits. in particular , they should comprise smaller teams and should not lead to new findings or require the adoption of a separate report. the council should be more actively involved in the monitoring phase and should express its position on the proposed closure of action plans. ### (25) as part of its monitoring activities , it should be possible for the commission to organise revisits and verification visits. revisits should be organised to monitor the progress of the implementation of an action plan following an evaluation that identified serious deficiency or following an evaluation which preceeds the full schengen accession of a member state (‘first time evaluation’) and concluded that the evaluated member state did not fulfil the necessary conditions to apply the schengen acquis in the respective evaluated policy area. the revisit report should be limited to present the progress made to implement the recommendations. otherwise , verification visits may be carried out to monitor the implementation of an action plan , following an evaluation that did not identify serious deficiency where deemed necessary. verification visits should always be organised before the closure of an action plan following a first time evaluation. in terms of the organisational requirements , verification visits could comprise smaller teams and focus on the previously identified deficiencies , without prejudice to any additional issues identified by the experts. there should always be a report , either separate or annexed to the original report to document findings. the council should be more actively involved in the monitoring phase and should express its position on the proposed closure of action plans.


### (29) in view of the particular role entrusted to the european parliament and to the national parliaments under the last sentence of article 70 of the treaty on the functioning of the european union (tfeu) , as underlined in article 12 , point (c) , of the treaty on european union (teu) as regards the national parliaments , the council and the commission should fully inform the european parliament and the national parliaments of the content and results of the evaluations. in addition , should the commission submit a proposal to amend this regulation , the council would , in accordance with article 19(7) , point (h) , of its rules of procedure39 , consult the european parliament in order to take into consideration its opinion , to the fullest extent possible , before adopting a final text. ### (29) in view of the particular role entrusted to the european parliament and to the national parliaments under the last sentence of article 70 of the treaty on the functioning of the european union (tfeu) , as underlined in article 12 , point (c) , of the treaty on european union (teu) as regards the national parliaments , the council and the commission should fully inform the european parliament and the national parliaments , at all stages , of the content and results of the evaluations. in addition , considering the central function that the monitoring framework has in the overall architecture underpinning the schengen acquis , should the commission submit a proposal to amend this regulation , this amended proposal would be based on article 77(2)(b) of the of the treaty on the functioning of the european union.


### (39) given that the verification in accordance with the applicable schengen evaluation procedures concerning bulgaria , cyprus , romania and croatia , has already been completed pursuant to their respective act of accession , the verification under article 1(2)(b) of this regulation should not be relaunched in respect of those member states , ### (39) given that the verification in accordance with the applicable schengen evaluation procedures concerning bulgaria , cyprus and romania , has already been completed pursuant to their respective act of accession , the verification under article 1(2)(b) of this regulation should not be relaunched in respect of those member states ,


### ‘schengen acquis’ means the provisions integrated into the framework of the union in accordance with protocol no 19 annexed to the teu and to the tfeu , together with the acts building upon them or otherwise related to them; ### ‘schengen acquis’ means the provisions integrated into the framework of the union in accordance with protocol no 19 annexed to the teu and to the tfeu , together with the acts building upon them or otherwise related to them , including the full implementation of the fundamental rights and freedoms enshrined in the charter of fundamental rights of the european union;


### ‘unannounced evaluation’ means an evaluation , which is not included in the multiannual and annual evaluation programmes , to verify the application of the schengen acquis by one or more member states in one or more policy fields; ### ‘unannounced evaluation’ means an evaluation , which is conducted without any prior notice and is not included in the multiannual and annual evaluation programmes , to verify the application of the schengen acquis by one or more member states in one or more policy fields;


### ‘serious deficiency’ means one or more deficiencies which concern the effective application of key elements of the schengen acquis and which individually or in combination , have , or risk to have over time , a significant negative impact on the rights of individuals or on the functioning of the schengen area; ### ‘serious deficiency’ means one or more deficiencies which concern the effective application of the schengen acquis , or part of it , and which individually or in combination negatively impact or risk to negatively impact the rights of individuals or the functioning of the schengen area;


### ‘team’ means a group comprising experts designated by member states and commission representatives who carry out evaluations and monitoring activities. ### ‘team’ means a group comprising experts designated by member states and by the commission , and observers designated by relevant union institutions , bodies or agencies , who carry out evaluations and monitoring activities.


### 3. the member states and the commission shall cooperate fully at all stages of evaluations in order to ensure the effective implementation of this regulation. ### 3. the member states , the commission and the council shall cooperate fully at all stages of evaluations in order to ensure the effective implementation of this regulation.


### 2. the commission may organise unannounced evaluations , in particular: ### 2. the commission shall organise unannounced evaluations , in particular:


### to evaluate practices at internal borders; ### to evaluate practices at internal and external borders;


### when it becomes aware of emerging or systemic problems that could potentially have a significant negative impact on the functioning of the schengen area; ### when it becomes aware of emerging or existing problems that could have a negative impact on the functioning of the schengen area;


### when it has grounds to consider that a member state is seriously neglecting its obligations under the schengen acquis including allegations of serious fundamental rights violations at the external borders. ### when it has grounds to consider that a member state is neglecting its obligations under the schengen acquis including allegations of fundamental rights violations at the internal and external borders.


### 3. the commission may organise thematic evaluations in particular to assess the implementation of significant legislative changes , as they start to apply , and of new initiatives , or to assess issues across policy areas or practices of member states facing similar challenges. ### 3. the commission may organise thematic evaluations in particular to assess the implementation of significant legislative changes , as they start to apply , and of new initiatives , or to assess issues across policy areas or similar policies and practices across member states.


### 1. the commission shall cooperate with relevant union bodies , offices and agencies which are involved in the implementation of the schengen acquis as well as with the european union agency for fundamental rights. ### 1. for the purpose of the implementation of this regulation , the commission shall cooperate with relevant union bodies , offices and agencies which are involved in the implementation of the schengen acquis as well as with the european union agency for fundamental rights , including by exchanging relevant information.


### evaluations and monitoring activities referred to in articles 4 and 5 may be carried out by means of announced or unannounced visits , and questionnaires or other remote methods. ### evaluations and monitoring activities referred to in articles 4 and 5 may be carried out by means of announced or unannounced visits , and questionnaires or other remote methods. unannounced evaluations shall take place by means of unannounced visits and in-person surveys.


### the commission may enter into arrangements with the union bodies , offices and agencies to facilitate the cooperation. ### deleted


### 2. the commission may request union bodies , offices and agencies referred to in paragraph 1 in accordance with their respective mandates to provide information , statistical data or risk analyses to improve situational awareness within the meaning of regulation (eu) 2019/1896 regarding the implementation of the schengen acquis by the member states. ### deleted


### 2. the risk analysis referred to in paragraph 1 shall cover all relevant aspects related to integrated border management and it shall also contain recommendations for unannounced visits in the following year , irrespective of the order of member states to be evaluated each year , as established in the multiannual evaluation programme in accordance with article 12. ### 2. the risk analysis referred to in paragraph 1 shall cover all relevant aspects related to integrated border management , including an assessment of the implementation of regulation (eu) 656/2014 by the member states and frontex , and it shall also contain recommendations for announced and unannounced visits in the following year , irrespective of the order of member states to be evaluated each year , as established in the multiannual evaluation programme in accordance with article 12.


### article 9 ### deleted


### 1. the commission shall use the results of relevant mechanisms and instruments , including evaluation and monitoring activities of union bodies , offices and agencies which are involved in the implementation of the schengen acquis and of the european union agency for fundamental rights as well as of independent national monitoring mechanisms and bodies and other national quality control mechanisms in preparing the evaluation and monitoring activities , to improve awareness on the functioning of the schengen area and to avoid the duplication of efforts and conflicting measures. ### 1. in its programming , evaluation , monitoring and follow-up activity , the commission shall rely on and make full use of the findings and recommendations of existing monitoring and reporting mechanisms , instruments , and bodies operating at national , european and international level , including:


### 2. recommendations under this regulation shall be complementary to recommendations made pursuant to article 32(7) of regulation (eu) 2019/1896 under the vulnerability assessment. ### deleted


### in the programming and implementation of the evaluations and monitoring activities , the commission shall take into account information provided by third parties , including independent authorities , non-governmental organisations and international organisations. ### in the programming and implementation of the evaluations and monitoring activities , the commission shall take into account information provided by third parties , including independent authorities , national human rights organisations , ombudspersons , national preventive mechanisms , non-governmental or civil society organisations and international organisations such as the united nations’ and the council of europe’ institutions and bodies.


### in each multiannual evaluation cycle , each member state shall undergo one periodic evaluation and at least one unannounced evaluation or thematic evaluation. ### in each multiannual evaluation cycle , each member state shall undergo one periodic evaluation and at least one unannounced evaluation pursuant to article 4(2)(a) or one thematic evaluation. unannounced evaluations pursuant to articles 4(2)(b) and 4(2)(c) shall be organised by the commission whenever the circumstances provided for in those articles arise.


### 2. the commission shall adopt the multiannual evaluation programme by means of an implementing act. those implementing acts shall be adopted in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in article 29(3). the commission shall transmit the multiannual evaluation programme to the european parliament and to the council. ### 2. the commission shall adopt the multiannual evaluation programme by means of an implementing act. those implementing acts shall be adopted in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in article 29(3). the commission shall transmit the multiannual evaluation programme to the european parliament and to the council which shall have the opportunity to express their views on it.


### 3. the multiannual evaluation programme shall identify the specific priority areas to be covered by the periodic evaluations and shall include a provisional time-schedule of those evaluations. ### 3. the multiannual evaluation programme shall identify the specific priority areas to be covered by the periodic evaluations , which shall include , for each evaluated member state and as part of the annual thematic evaluation , a fundamental rights’ assessment covering the respect and promotion of the provisions of the charter of fundamental rights of the european union in the implementation of the schengen acquis.


### it shall set out a provisional list of member states to be subject to periodic evaluations , without prejudice to adjustments made under paragraph 4 , in a given year. the provisional order in which the member states are to be subject to a periodic evaluation shall take into account the time which has elapsed since the previous periodic evaluation. it shall also take into account the outcome of previous evaluations , the pace of implementation of the action plans and other relevant information at the commission’s disposal as regards the practices of the member states. ### it shall set out a provisional list of member states to be subject to periodic evaluations , together with the relevant union institutions , bodies , offices and agencies performing functions related to the implementation of the schengen acquis in the relevant member states , without prejudice to adjustments made under paragraph 4 , in a given year. the provisional order in which the member states are to be subject to a periodic evaluation shall take into account the time which has elapsed since the previous periodic evaluation. it shall also take into account the outcome of previous evaluations , the pace of implementation of the action plans and other relevant information at the commission’s disposal as regards the practices of the member states.


### 1. the commission shall establish , by means of an implementing act , an annual evaluation programme by 15 november of the year preceding that to which the programme relates , based on in particular the risk analyses and other information obtained by the commission in accordance with articles 7 , 8 , 9 , 10 and 11. those implementing acts shall be adopted in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in article 29(3). ### 1. the commission shall establish , by means of an implementing act , an annual evaluation programme by 15 november of the year preceding that to which the programme relates , based on in particular the risk analyses , findings , recommendations and other information obtained by the commission in accordance with articles 7 , 8 , 10 and 11. those implementing acts shall be adopted in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in article 29(3).


### 3. the commission shall transmit the annual evaluation programme to the european parliament and to the council. ### 3. the commission shall transmit the annual evaluation programme to the european parliament and to the council which shall have the opportunity to express their views on it.


### in drawing up the questionnaire , the commission may consult relevant union bodies , offices and agencies referred to in article 7. ### in drawing up the questionnaire , the commission may consult relevant union bodies , offices and agencies referred to in article 7. the commission , in cooperation with the european union agency for fundamental rights , shall develop and include in the questionnaire specific benchmarks against which the evaluation teams assess the fundamental rights’ compliance.


### 3. the standard questionnaire shall cover the implementation of the relevant legislation and the organisational and technical means available for the implementation of the schengen acquis , including the ones referred to in handbooks , the schengen catalogues and relevant statistical data. ### 3. the standard questionnaire shall cover the implementation of the relevant legislation , including the charter of fundamental rights of the european union , and the organisational and technical means available for the implementation of the schengen acquis , including the ones referred to in handbooks , the schengen catalogues and relevant statistical data.


### 7. the observers referred to in paragraphs 5 and 6 shall support the team as requested by the lead experts , but they shall not participate in the internal decision-making process of the team. ### 7. the observers referred to in paragraphs 5 , 5b and 6 shall support the team as requested by the lead experts , but they shall not participate in the internal decision-making process of the team.


### 2. the detailed programme for the visits in a member state or in its consulates shall be established by the commission in close cooperation with the lead experts and the member state concerned. ### 2. the detailed programme for the visits in a member state or in its consulates shall be established by the commission in close cooperation with the lead experts and , for announced visits , the member state concerned. in the latter case , the commission shall send the detailed programme also to the relevant national parliament.


### it may include visits to and meetings with national authorities and bodies , non-governmental and international organisations as well as other entities , agencies and bodies involved in , participating in or concerned by the implementation of the schengen acquis while cooperating with the member state subject to the evaluation or monitoring activity. ### it may include visits to and meetings with national authorities and bodies , non-governmental and international organisations as well as other entities , agencies and bodies involved in , participating in or concerned by the implementation of the schengen acquis and the union and international human rights framework while cooperating with the member state subject to the evaluation or monitoring activity.


### 4. unannounced visits shall take place without prior notification to the member state concerned. by way of exception , the commission may notify the member state concerned at least 24 hours before such visit is to take place when the main purpose of the unannounced visit is a random verification of the implementation of the schengen acquis. ### 4. unannounced visits shall take place without prior notification to the member state concerned.


### the commission shall establish the detailed programme for unannounced visits. where member states have been notified , the commission may consult the timetable and detailed programme with the member state concerned. ### the commission shall establish the detailed programme for unannounced visits.


### the commission , in cooperation with the member states , may establish guidelines for conducting evaluation and monitoring activities by questionnaire or other remote methods. ### the commission , in cooperation with the member states , may establish guidelines for conducting evaluation and monitoring activities by questionnaire or other remote methods as complementary evaluation methods to physical visits.


### 2. in preparing the evaluation report , the teams shall take account of the replies to the standard questionnaire , any additional information obtained in accordance with articles 7 , 8 , 9 , 10 and 11 and the findings of the evaluation activity. the evaluation reports may include documentary and digital material to support the findings. where an evaluation is carried out by means of a visit , the team shall draft the evaluation report during the visit. ### 2. in preparing the evaluation report , the teams shall take account of the replies to the standard questionnaire or to the in-person surveys , any additional information obtained in accordance with articles 7 , 8 , 10 and 11 and the findings of the evaluation activity. the evaluation reports may include documentary and digital material to support the findings. where an evaluation is carried out by means of a visit , the team shall draft the evaluation report during the visit.


### 5. the evaluation report shall contain recommendations for remedial actions aimed at addressing the deficiencies and areas for improvement identified during the evaluation and give an indication of the priorities for implementing them. the evaluation report may set deadlines for the implementation of recommendations. where the evaluation identifies a serious deficiency , the specific provisions set out in article 23 shall apply. ### 5. the evaluation report shall contain recommendations for remedial actions aimed at addressing the deficiencies and areas for improvement identified during the evaluation and give an indication of the priorities for implementing them. the evaluation report shall set deadlines for the implementation of recommendations. where the evaluation identifies a serious deficiency , the specific provisions set out in article 23 shall apply.


### 6. the commission shall transmit the draft evaluation report to the evaluated member state within four weeks of the end of the evaluation activity. the evaluated member state shall provide its comments on the draft evaluation report within two weeks of its receipt. a drafting meeting shall be held at the request of the evaluated member state , no later than five working days from the receipt of the comments from the evaluated member state. the comments of the evaluated member state may be reflected in the draft evaluation report. ### 6. the commission shall transmit the draft evaluation report to the evaluated member state within four weeks of the end of the evaluation activity. the evaluated member state shall provide its comments on the draft evaluation report within two weeks of its receipt. a drafting meeting shall be held at the request of the evaluated member state , no later than five working days from the receipt of the comments from the evaluated member state. the comments of the evaluated member state shall be reflected in the evaluation report.


### if the commission does not consider that all the recommendations have been sufficiently addressed , the evaluated member state shall submit a revised action plan within one month of the receipt of the observations. ### if the commission does not consider that all the recommendations have been sufficiently addressed , also on the basis of the information , findings and recommendations obtained according to articles 7 , 8 , 10 and 11 , the evaluated member state shall submit a revised action plan within one month of the receipt of the observations.


### where the commission considers the action plan implemented , it shall inform the evaluated member state about the closure of the action plan. ### where the commission considers the action plan implemented , it shall inform the evaluated member state about the closure of the action plan. if , after 24 months from the evaluation report , the commission does not consider that all the recommendations have been sufficiently addressed and the action plan fully implemented , it shall invite the european parliament and the council to express their position on the matter through a reasoned decision , which shall be made public. this is without prejudice to the commission’s prerogatives under article 258 tfeu.


### the commission shall inform the european parliament and the council at least twice a year about the state of implementation of the action plans. the commission shall in particular provide information about its observations on the adequacy of the action plans referred to in paragraph 2 , the outcome of revisits and verification visits and whether it observes considerable lack of progress in the implementation of an action plan. ### the commission shall inform the european parliament , the council and the national parliaments concerned at least twice a year about the state of implementation of the action plans and made available to them , in accordance with the provisions of article 26 , all relevant documents referred to in paragraph 1 , 2 and 3 of this article. the commission shall in particular provide information about its observations on the adequacy of the action plans referred to in paragraph 2 , the outcome of revisits and verification visits and whether it observes considerable lack of progress in the implementation of an action plan.


### the evaluated member state shall take immediate remedial actions including , where necessary , mobilising all available operational and financial means. the evaluated member state shall inform without delay the commission and the member states about the immediate remedial actions taken or planned. in parallel , the commission shall inform the respective union bodies , offices and agencies referred to in article 7 of the serious deficiency in view of their possible support to the evaluated member state. the commission shall also inform the council and the european parliament. ### the evaluated member state shall take immediate remedial actions including , where necessary , mobilising all available operational and financial means. the evaluated member state shall inform without delay the commission and the member states about the immediate remedial actions taken or planned. in parallel , the commission shall inform the respective union bodies , offices and agencies referred to in article 7 of the serious deficiency in view of their possible support to the evaluated member state. the commission shall also immediately inform the council , the european parliament and member states’ national parliaments of the identified serious deficiency and the remedial actions , if any , already taken by the evaluated member state.


### on duly justified imperative grounds of urgency relating to the serious deficiency , the commission shall adopt the evaluation report no later than six weeks after the end of the evaluation activity by means of an implementing act in accordance with the procedure referred to in article 29(4). ### the commission shall adopt the evaluation report no later than six weeks after the end of the evaluation activity by means of an implementing act in accordance with the procedure referred to in article 29(4).


### 4. in light of the findings , the team shall draft recommendations for remedial actions aimed at addressing the serious deficiency identified in the draft evaluation report. ### 4. in light of the findings , the comments provided by the evaluated member state and of other information as referred to in articles 7 , 8 , 10 and 11 , the team shall draft recommendations for remedial actions aimed at addressing the serious deficiency identified in the draft evaluation report. the comments of the evaluated member state shall be reflected in the evaluation report.


### the commission shall submit a proposal to the council to adopt the recommendations concerned. ### the commission shall transmit a proposal to the european parliament to express its observations and submit the proposal to the council to adopt the recommendations concerned.


### 6. the evaluated member state shall submit to the commission and the council its action plan within one month of the adoption of the recommendations. the commission shall transmit that action plan to the european parliament. ### 6. the evaluated member state shall submit to the commission and the council its action plan within one month of the adoption of the recommendations. the commission shall immediately transmit that action plan to the european parliament.


### the commission shall provide the evaluated member state observations on the adequacy of the action plan within two weeks from its submission. the commission shall transmit its observations to the council and the european parliament. ### the commission shall provide the evaluated member state observations on the adequacy of the action plan within two weeks from its submission. the commission shall transmit its observations to the council and the european parliament which shall be invited to express their views on them.


### 7. to verify the progress made in the implementation of the recommendations related to the serious deficiency , the commission shall organise a revisit that is to take place no later than one year from the date of the evaluation activity. ### 7. to verify the progress made in the implementation of the recommendations related to the serious deficiency , the commission shall organise a revisit that is to take place no later than six months from the date of the evaluation activity.


### 10. if the serious deficiency is deemed to constitute a serious threat to public policy or internal security within the area without internal border controls , or a serious and systematic fundamental rights violation , the commission , on its own initiative or at the request of the european parliament or of a member state , shall immediately inform thereof the european parliament and the council. ### deleted


### 1. the rules laid down in paragraphs 2 and 3 shall apply in relation to first time evaluations. ### 1. the rules laid down in paragraphs 2 to 5 shall apply in relation to first time evaluations.


### 2. the evaluation report drafted in accordance with article 21(2) , (3) and (4) shall not contain recommendations. in light of the findings , the team shall draft recommendations for remedial actions identified in the draft evaluation report. the timelines in article 21(1) and (6) shall apply. ### 2. the evaluation report drafted in accordance with article 21(2) , (3) and (4) following first time evaluations shall not contain recommendations. in light of the findings and of other information as referred to in articles 7 , 8 , 10 and 11 , the team shall draft recommendations for remedial actions aimed at addressing the deficiencies and areas for improvement identified in the draft evaluation report. the timelines in article 21(1) and (6) shall apply.


### the council may set time limits for the implementation of specific recommendations. ### the council shall set time limits for the implementation of specific recommendations.


### the commission shall organise a revisit in case the evaluation report concluded that the evaluated member state did not fulfil the conditions necessary to apply the schengen acquis. the commission shall adopt , by means of an implementing act the revisit report in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in article 29(3). the commission shall submit the revisit report to the council. ### the commission shall organise a revisit in case the evaluation report concluded that the evaluated member state did not fulfil the conditions necessary to apply the schengen acquis. the commission shall adopt , by means of an implementing act the revisit report in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in article 29(3). the commission shall submit the revisit report to the council , which shall adopt a reasoned decision.


### article 24(2) and (3) shall apply to thematic evaluations. ### article 24 shall apply to thematic evaluations.


### 3. the transmission and handling of classified information and documents for the purposes of this regulation shall take place in compliance with the applicable security rules. such rules shall not preclude information being made available to the european parliament and to relevant union bodies , offices and agencies referred to in article 7. ### 3. the transmission and handling of classified information and documents for the purposes of this regulation shall take place in compliance with the applicable security rules. such rules shall not preclude information being made available to the european parliament , national parliaments and to relevant union bodies , offices and agencies referred to in article 7.


### (33) this regulation imposes reporting obligations on eu-lisa regarding the development and functioning of the jits collaboration platform in light of objectives relating to the planning , technical output , cost-effectiveness , security and quality of service. furthermore , the commission should conduct an overall evaluation of the jits collaboration platform four years after the start of operations of the jits collaboration platform and every four years thereafter. ### (33) this regulation imposes reporting obligations on eu-lisa regarding the development and functioning of the jits collaboration platform in light of objectives relating to the planning , technical output , cost-effectiveness , security and quality of service. furthermore , the commission should conduct an overall evaluation of the jits collaboration platform taking into account also the objectives in terms of scope , efficiency and usability , as well as aggregated results of the evaluations of the individual jits , two years after the start of operations of the jits collaboration platform and every two years thereafter.


### (39) the european data protection supervisor was consulted in accordance with article 42(1) of regulation (eu) no 2018/1725 and delivered an opinion on xxxx , ### (39) the european data protection supervisor was consulted in accordance with article 42(1) of regulation (eu) no 2018/1725 and delivered an opinion on 25 january 2022 ,


### a communication software , which allows for local storage of communication data; ### a communication software , which allows for local storage of communication data and local instant in-house machine translation;


### evidence traceability through a business logging mechanism allowing to keep track of all evidence exchanged through the jits collaboration platform; ### evidence traceability through a business logging mechanism allowing to keep track of all evidence , and its access and processing , exchanged through the jits collaboration platform;


### technical statistics in accordance with article 22; ### technical statistics and additional data in accordance with article 22;


### 7. eu-lisa shall ensure the provision of training on the practical use of the jits collaboration platform. ### 7. eu-lisa shall ensure the provision of training on the practical use of the jits collaboration platform , including provision of online training materials.


### 8. eu-lisa shall not have access to the jit collaboration spaces. ### 8. eu-lisa shall not have access to the content of the jit collaboration spaces.


### 8. the programme management board's secretariat shall be ensured by eu-lisa. ### 8. the programme management board's secretariat shall be provided by eu-lisa.


### 1. the jit space administrator or administrators may decide to grant eurojust , including the jit secretariat , access to a jit collaboration space for the purpose of fulfilling its tasks set out in regulation (eu) 2018/1727 of the european parliament and of the council29 . in particular , the jit space administrator or administrators may decide to grant the jit secretariat access to a jit collaboration space for the purpose of technical and administrative support , including access rights management. ### 1. the jit space administrator or administrators shall , where provided for in the jit agreement , decide to grant eurojust , including the jit secretariat , access to a jit collaboration space for the purpose of fulfilling its tasks set out in regulation (eu) 2018/1727 of the european parliament and of the council29 . in particular , the jit space administrator or administrators may decide to grant the jit secretariat access to a jit collaboration space for the purpose of technical and administrative support , including access rights management.


### 2. the jit space administrator or administrators may decide to grant europol access to a jit collaboration space for the purpose of fulfilling its tasks set out in regulation (eu) 2016/794 of the european parliament and of the council30 . ### 2. the jit space administrator or administrators shall , where provided for in the jit agreement , decide to grant europol access to a jit collaboration space for the purpose of fulfilling its tasks set out in regulation (eu) 2016/794 of the european parliament and of the council30 .


### 3. the jit space administrator or administrators may decide to grant olaf access to a jit collaboration space for the purpose of fulfilling its tasks set out in regulation (eu , euratom) no 883/2013 of the european parliament and of the council31 . ### 3. the jit space administrator or administrators shall , where provided for in the jit agreement , decide to grant olaf access to a jit collaboration space for the purpose of fulfilling its tasks set out in regulation (eu , euratom) no 883/2013 of the european parliament and of the council31 .


### 4. the jit space administrator or administrators may decide to grant the european public prosecutor’s office access to a jit collaboration space for the purpose of fulfilling its tasks set out in council regulation (eu) 2017/1939. ### 4. the jit space administrator or administrators shall , where provided for in the jit agreement , decide to grant the european public prosecutor’s office access to a jit collaboration space for the purpose of fulfilling its tasks set out in council regulation (eu) 2017/1939.


### 5. the jit space administrator or administrators may decide to grant other competent union bodies , offices and agencies access to a jit collaboration space for the purpose of fulfilling tasks set out in their basic acts. ### 5. the jit space administrator or administrators shall , where provided for in the jit agreement , decide to grant other competent union bodies , offices and agencies access to a jit collaboration space for the purpose of fulfilling tasks set out in their basic acts.


### 1. for the purposes listed in article 5 , the jit space administrator or administrators may decide to grant access to a jit collaboration space to the competent authorities of third countries which have signed a particular jits agreement. ### 1. for the purposes listed in article 5 , the jit space administrator or administrators shall , where provided for in the jit agreement , decide to grant access to a jit collaboration space to the competent authorities of third countries which have signed a particular jits agreement.


### 2. with regard to data uploaded to the jits collaboration platform by the competent authorities of third countries , one of the jit space administrators is to be considered data controller as regards the personal data exchanged through , and stored in the jits collaboration platform. ### 2. with regard to data uploaded to the jits collaboration platform by the competent authorities of third countries , one of the jit space administrators , as designated in the jits agreement upon signing , is to be considered data controller as regards the personal data exchanged through , and stored in the jits collaboration platform.


### 3. the logs shall be protected by appropriate technical measures against unauthorised access and shall be kept for three years or for such longer period as required for the termination of ongoing monitoring procedures. ### 3. the logs shall be protected by appropriate technical measures against modification , unauthorised access and shall be kept for three years or for such longer period as required for the termination of ongoing monitoring procedures.


### 2. the procedures referred to in paragraph 1 shall provide for the possibility to produce regular technical statistics for monitoring purposes. ### 2. the procedures referred to in paragraph 1 shall provide for the possibility to produce regular technical statistics for monitoring purposes. the procedures referred to in paragraph 1a shall contribute to the overall evaluation.


### tasks relating to training on the technical use of the jits collaboration platform , including provision of online training materials. ### deleted


### (1) the union's common visa policy has been an integral part of the establishment of an area without internal borders. visa policy should remain an essential element in helping counter security risks and the risk of irregular migration to the union , while facilitating tourism and business. the common visa policy should contribute to generating growth and be consistent with other union policies , such as those concerning external relations , trade , education , culture and tourism. in march 2018 commission communication on visa policy addressed the concept of “e-visas” and announced a feasibility study on digital visa procedures and the intention to assess options and promote pilot projects to prepare the ground for future proposals. when revising the eu visa code in 2019 , the european parliament and the council explicitly stated the aim of developing a common solution in the future to allow schengen visa applications to be lodged online , thereby making full use of recent legal and technological developments43 . ### (1) the union's common visa policy has been an integral part of the establishment of an area without internal borders. in march 2018 commission communication on visa policy addressed the concept of “e-visas” and announced a feasibility study on digital visa procedures and the intention to assess options and promote pilot projects to prepare the ground for future proposals. when revising the eu visa code in 2019 , the european parliament and the council explicitly stated the aim of developing a common solution in the future to allow schengen visa applications to be lodged online , thereby making full use of recent legal and technological developments43 .


### (2) the initiative is in line with the general eu approach to encourage the modernisation and digitalisation of public services and the commission communication on the 2030 digital compass: the european way for the digital decade44 . since the entry into force of regulation (ec) no 810/2009 of the european parliament and of the council45 in 2010 and the start of operations of the visa information system (vis) in 2011 under regulation (ec) no 767/2008 of the european parliament and of the council46 , migration and security challenges faced in recent years have considerably transformed the visa policy context. in addition , significant technological developments provide new opportunities to make the schengen visa application process smoother and more effective for third-country nationals and member states authorities. ### (2) the initiative is in line with the general eu approach to encourage the modernisation and digitalisation of public services and the commission communication on the 2030 digital compass: the european way for the digital decade44 . in addition , significant technological developments provide new opportunities to make the schengen visa application process smoother and more effective for third-country nationals and member states authorities.


### (7) the eu online application platform should provide the applicant with up-to-date information on schengen short-stay visas and a guidance tool with which the applicant can find all the necessary information regarding the requirements and procedures , such as , but not limited to , whether a visa is required and what type of visa; the amount of the visa fee; the member state competent for handling the application; the supporting documents required; the need for an appointment to collect biometrics or the possibility to apply online without an appointment. the eu application platform should also allow to establish a secure electronic communication between the applicant and the competent consulate or the central authorities of the competent member state by electronic means , should additional documents or an interview be required. ### (7) the eu online application platform should provide the applicant with up-to-date information on schengen short-stay visas , as well as on the entry criteria in the schengen area as provided for in article 6 of regulation (eu) 2016/399 , and a guidance tool with which the applicant can find all the necessary information regarding the requirements and procedures , such as , but not limited to , whether a visa is required and what type of visa; the amount of the visa fee; the member state competent for handling the application; the supporting documents required; the need for an appointment to collect biometrics or the possibility to apply online without an appointment. the eu online application platform should also provide information on the processing of personal data in the context of the visa information system (vis). the eu application platform should also allow to establish a secure electronic communication between the applicant and the competent consulate or the central authorities of the competent member state by electronic means , should additional documents or an interview be required.


### 3. repeats its concern that cepol continues to suffer from a high staff turnover and a limited number of applications from other member states; reiterates its worries that this might impact the operations of the agency; notes in this regard that the staff regulations offer the necessary flexibility for labour market conditions prevailing in the union to be taken into account when recruiting officials in order to address the specific needs of the institutions; calls on cepol to take measures to improve the situation; ### 3. repeats its concern that cepol continues to suffer from a high staff turnover and a limited number of applications from other member states; reiterates its worries that this might impact the operations of the agency; notes in this regard that the staff regulations offer the necessary flexibility for labour market conditions prevailing in the union to be taken into account when recruiting officials in order to address the specific needs of the institutions; calls on cepol to take measures to improve the situation; also expresses concern that cepol has not yet completed the outstanding recommendations of the court concerning the publication of vacancy notices on the european personnel selection office website; calls on cepol to take the necessary steps to finalise these corrective actions in a timely manner;


### (31a) in order to increase the efficiency of procedures and to reduce the risk of absconding and the likelihood of unauthorised movements , there should be no procedural gaps between the issuance of a negative decision on an application for international protection and of a return decision. a return decision should immediately be issued to applicants whose applications are rejected. without prejudice to the right to an effective remedy , the return decision should either be part of the negative decision on an application for international protection or , if it is a separate act , be issued at the same time and together with the negative decision.’ ### (31a) a return decision should swiftly be issued in a separate decision to applicants whose applications are rejected , provided that the decision rejecting the claim is final , the applicant does not fulfil the conditions to apply for a residence permit or other authorisation offering a right to stay for compassionate , humanitarian or other grounds under national law and that their return would not lead to risks of violations of the principle of non-refoulement or the provisions of the charter of fundamental rights and other eu and international obligations. without prejudice to the right to an effective remedy , the return decision may be issued at the same time as the final negative decision , in a separate decision.’


### (39a) ‘in the interest of swift and fair procedures for all applicants , whilst also ensuring that the stay of applicants who do not qualify for international protection in the union is not unduly prolonged , including those who are nationals of third countries exempt from the requirement to be in a possession of a visa pursuant to regulation (eu) no 2018/1806 , member states should accelerate the examination of applications of applicants who are nationals or , in the case of stateless persons , formerly habitual residents of a third country for which the share of decisions granting international protection is lower than 20% of the total number of decisions for that third country. where a significant change has occurred in the third country concerned since the publication of the relevant eurostat data and taking into account the guidance note pursuant to article 10 of regulation xx/xx on the european asylum agency , or where the applicant belongs to a specific category of persons for whom the low recognition rate cannot be considered as representative of their protection needs due to a specific persecution ground , examination of the application should not be accelerated. cases where a third country may be considered as a safe country of origin or a safe third country for the applicant within the meaning of this regulation should remain applicable as a separate ground for respectively the accelerated examination procedure or the inadmissible procedure. ### deleted


### 3. ‘for third-country nationals subject to the screening referred to in article 3(1) of regulation (eu) xxx/xxx [screening regulation] , paragraphs 1 and 2 shall apply only after the screening has ended.’ ### deleted


### 5. ‘for third-country nationals subject to the screening referred to in article 3(1) of regulation (eu) no xxx/xxx [screening regulation] , paragraphs 1 to 4 shall apply only after the screening has ended. ### deleted


### 6. where biometric data could not be taken during the screening in accordance with regulation (eu) no xxx/xxx [eurodac regulation] or where the applicant was not subject to a screening , the competent authorities shall take the biometric data at the latest upon the registration of the application for international protection and transmit them together with the data referred to in article 12 (c) to (p) of regulation (eu) no xxx/xxx [eurodac regulation] to the central system and to the common identity repository respectively in accordance with that regulation.’ ### 6. biometric data shall be taken by the competent authorities at the latest upon the registration of the application for international protection and transmit them together with the data referred to in article 12 (c) to (p) of regulation (eu) no xxx/xxx [eurodac regulation] to the central system and to the common identity repository respectively in accordance with that regulation.


### where an application is rejected as inadmissible , unfounded or manifestly unfounded with regard to both refugee status and subsidiary protection status , or as implicitly or explicitly withdrawn , member states shall issue a return decision that respects directive xxx/xxx/eu [return directive]. the return decision shall be issued as part of the decision rejecting the application for international protection or , in a separate act. where the return decision is issued as a separate act , it shall be issued at the same time and together with the decision rejecting the application for international protection.’ ### where an application is rejected as inadmissible , unfounded or manifestly unfounded with regard to both refugee status and subsidiary protection status , or as implicitly or explicitly withdrawn and that decision has become final , member states shall issue a separate return decision that respects directive xxx/xxx/eu [return directive] , provided that the applicant does not fulfil the conditions to apply for a residence permit or other authorisation offering a right to stay for compassionate , humanitarian or other grounds under the applicable national legal framework and that their return would not lead to risks of violations of the principle of non-refoulement and other fundamental rights obligations under the charter of fundamental rights and other eu and international obligations.. the return decision is issued as a separate act , it may be issued at the same time and together with the final decision rejecting the application for international protection , provided that there has been an individual assessment of the full scope of the principle of non-refoulement.


### ‘the applicant is of a nationality or , in the case of stateless persons , a former habitual resident of a third country for which the proportion of decisions by the determining authority granting international protection is , according to the latest available yearly union-wide average eurostat data , 20% or lower , unless a significant change has occurred in the third country concerned since the publication of the relevant eurostat data or the applicant belongs to a category of persons for whom the proportion of 20% or lower cannot be considered as representative for their protection needs;’ ### deleted


### ‘the applicant is of a nationality or , in the case of stateless persons , a former habitual residence of a third country for which the proportion of decisions granting international protection by the determining authority is , according to the latest available yearly union-wide average eurostat data , 20% or lower , unless a significant change has occurred in the third country concerned since the publication of the relevant eurostat data or the applicant belongs to a category of persons for whom the proportion of 20% or lower cannot be considered as representative for their protection needs;’ ### deleted


### 1. following the screening procedure carried out in accordance with regulation (eu) no xxx/xxx [screening regulation] , and provided that the applicant has not yet been authorised to enter member states’ territory , a member state may examine an application in a border procedure where that application has been made by a third-country national or stateless person who does not fulfil the conditions for entry in the territory of a member state as set out in article 6 of regulation (eu) 2016/399. the border procedure may take place: ### 1. a member state may examine an application in a border procedure where that application has been made by a third-country national or stateless person who does not fulfil the conditions for entry in the territory of a member state as set out in article 6 of regulation (eu) 2016/399. the border procedure may take place , after an individual assessment of the circumstances of the case , including an examination of vulnerabilities and potential special reception and procedural needs:


### following an application made at an external border crossing point or in a transit zone; ### following an application made at an external border crossing point or in a transit zone; or


### following apprehension in connection with an unauthorised crossing of the external border; ### following apprehension during or immediately after an unauthorised crossing of the external border , provided there is a direct connection to the act of the irregular border crossing.


### following disembarkation in the territory of a member state after a search and rescue operation; ### deleted


### following relocation in accordance with article [x] of regulation (eu) no xxx/xxx [ex dublin regulation]. ### deleted


### 2. where a border procedure is applied , decisions may be taken on the following: ### 2. where a border procedure is applied , decisions may be taken on the merits of an asylum application with full respect of all procedural rights and safeguards in this regulation without prejudice to article 41 paragraph 11.


### the inadmissibility of an application in accordance with article 36; ### deleted


### the merits of an application in an accelerated examination procedure in the cases referred to in article 40(1). ### deleted


### 3. member state shall examine an application in a border procedure in the cases referred to in paragraph 1 where the circumstances referred to in article 40(1) , point (c) , (f) or (i) , apply. ### deleted


### 4. a member state may decide not to apply paragraph 3 to nationals or stateless persons who are habitual residents of third countries for which that member state has submitted a notification to the commission in accordance with article 25a(3) of regulation (ec) no 810/2009. ### 4. a member state shall not examine an application in a border procedure with respect to nationals or stateless persons who are habitual residents of third countries for which that member state has submitted a notification to the commission in accordance with article 25a(3) of regulation (ec) no 810/2009.


### where , following the examination carried out in accordance with article 25a(4) of regulation (ec) no 810/2009 , the commission considers that the third country is cooperating sufficiently , the member state shall again apply the provisions of paragraph 3. ### deleted


### where the commission considers that the third country concerned is not cooperating sufficiently , the member state may continue not to apply paragraph 3: ### where the commission considers that the third country concerned is not cooperating sufficiently , the member state shall not apply border procedures:


### 5. the border procedure may only be applied to unaccompanied minors and to minors below the age of 12 and their family members in the cases referred to in article 40(5) (b). ### 5. the border procedure shall not be applied to unaccompanied minors or to minors and their family members.


### a. whereas financial and economic crime includes corruption , fraud , coercion , collusion , obstruction , money laundering and financing of terrorism; ### a. whereas financial and economic crime makes use of corruption , fraud , coercion , violence , collusion , obstruction and intimidation for unlawful gain , concealing the money of illegal origin through money laundering , with the option of using it for further unlawful purposes , including the financing of terrorism;


### c. whereas a rising number of organised crime groups are active in the eu , often with cross-border reach; whereas the phenomenon is increasingly complex with new criminal markets and new ways of operating that are emerging due to globalisation and new technologies; ### c. whereas a rising number of organised crime groups are active in the eu , often with cross-border reach; whereas the phenomenon is increasingly complex with new criminal markets and new ways of operating that are emerging due to globalisation and new technologies; whereas mafia-style organisations are particularly active in their attempts to intercept eu funds in various member states;


### d. whereas technology brings new detection and monitoring capabilities , reducing the burden on investigators and enabling the design of smarter enforcement measures; ### d. whereas technology brings new detection and monitoring capabilities , making the action of investigators more effective and enabling the design of smarter enforcement measures;


### 2. notes that value-added tax (vat) fraud is another major component of revenue fraud; is concerned by the fact that criminal groups have been proven to exchange knowledge , information and intelligence in the area of vat fraud; ### 2. notes that value-added tax (vat) fraud is another major component of revenue fraud; points out that one of the sectors most at risk is the fuel sector , where criminal networks abuse vat exemption rules and price differences among different types of fuel , resulting in huge losses of tax revenue; is concerned by the fact that criminal groups have been proven to exchange knowledge , information and intelligence in the area of vat fraud;


### 3. expresses its regret that subsidies are an area affected by fraud on the expenditure side of the union budget; notes that subsidy fraud happens in many areas of eu spending , such as agriculture policy , cohesion policy , research and development and environmental policy; points out that many such fraudulent activities are carried out by organised crime gangs; ### 3. expresses its regret that subsidies are an area affected by fraud on the expenditure side of the union budget; notes that subsidy fraud happens in many areas of eu spending , such as agriculture policy , cohesion policy , research and development and environmental policy; points out that many such fraudulent activities are carried out by organised crime gangs , including mafia-style gangs;


### 3. highlights that the member states are responsible for the eu agricultural funds under shared management with the commission; considers the new delivery model and the new national strategic plans to be a great opportunity to reinforce member states’ and the commission’s controls pertaining to the distribution and management of funds; ### 3. highlights that the member states are responsible for the eu agricultural funds under shared management with the commission; considers that , because compliance checks on expenditure are transferred from the commission to the member states under the new delivery model for cap reform and the new national strategic plans , there is a danger not only of disparities among the checks carried out in each country , but also of less rigorous checks on the use of european public funds , which could result in a number of irregularities that are extremely harmful to the cap’s image and its budget;


### 4. takes note of the special impact of organised crime in the misuse of common agricultural policy (cap) funds; reiterates its concern that the current structure of cap subsidies incentivises land grabbing by criminal and oligarchical structures; stresses that limited transparency in combination with corruption enables criminal organisations to keep their actions out of sight and prevent eu funding from reaching its intended beneficiaries; reiterates that the development of proper union-level legal instruments against land grabbing and the enabling effective information sharing are crucial in this regard; ### 4. takes note of the special impact of organised crime in the misuse of common agricultural policy (cap) funds; reiterates its concern that the current structure of cap subsidies incentivises land grabbing by criminal and oligarchical structures; stresses that limited transparency in combination with corruption enables criminal organisations to keep their actions out of sight and prevent eu funding from reaching its intended beneficiaries; reiterates that the development of proper union-level legal instruments against land grabbing and the enabling effective information sharing are crucial in this regard; reiterates firmly that an improved cooperation between the commission and member states is necessary , as well as tightening of rules with regard to data collection and management for final beneficiaries of cap subsidies;


### 4. takes note of the special impact of organised crime in the misuse of common agricultural policy (cap) funds; reiterates its concern that the current structure of cap subsidies incentivises land grabbing by criminal and oligarchical structures; stresses that limited transparency in combination with corruption enables criminal organisations to keep their actions out of sight and prevent eu funding from reaching its intended beneficiaries; reiterates that the development of proper union-level legal instruments against land grabbing and the enabling effective information sharing are crucial in this regard; ### 4. takes note of the special impact of organised crime in the misuse of common agricultural policy (cap) funds; reiterates its concern that the current structure of cap subsidies incentivises land grabbing by criminal and oligarchical structures; stresses that limited transparency in combination with corruption enables criminal organisations to keep their actions out of sight and prevent eu funding from reaching its intended beneficiaries; reiterates that the development of proper union-level legal instruments against land grabbing and the enabling effective information sharing are crucial in this regard; points to the need for greater scrutiny by the commission or the relevant agencies , including with regard to livestock , with particular reference to the funds granted per head of cattle , whose actual existence must be properly verified;


### 5. notes with concern that the commission and olaf have identified fraud in public tenders and procurement as a major trend among fraudsters; points out that fraud schemes often take place on a transnational level and can span several (eu and non-eu) countries , making them difficult to identify and dissolve; ### 5. notes with concern that the commission and olaf have identified fraud in public tenders and procurement as a major trend among fraudsters; regrets that in many member states there is no specific legislation against organised crime in the face of fraud schemes which often take place on a transnational level and can span several (eu and non-eu) countries , making them difficult to identify and dissolve;


### 5. underlines the importance of transparency for the early detection of fraud , conflicts of interest or other irregularities; stresses the importance of eu-wide database interoperability , common rules and data exchange , cross-border cooperation and better use of it tools; ### 5. underlines the importance of transparency for the early detection of fraud , conflicts of interest or other irregularities; stresses that it is important to have unique identifiers within reporting systems and databases to make it clear who the final beneficiaries are – whether they are individuals or belong to one or more companies in receipt of funds , including via several companies registered in several member states – and to have shared databases to ensure eu-wide database interoperability; lastly , emphasises the importance of having common data-exchange rules , stepping up cross-border cooperation and improving the use of it tools;


### 6. notes that the covid-19 pandemic creates new opportunities for fraudsters and organised crime; notes with concern that europol observed a rise in coronavirus-related criminal activities in the form of cybercrime , fraud and counterfeiting; recalls the scams and fake offers of vaccines detected by eu countries , as one of many harmful examples , where fraudsters tried to sell more than 1.1 billion vaccine doses for a total price of over eur 15.4 billion; ### 6. notes that the covid-19 pandemic creates new opportunities for fraudsters and organised crime; notes with concern that europol observed a rise in coronavirus-related criminal activities in the form of cybercrime , fraud and counterfeiting , including that of medical equipment and personal protective equipment (ppe); recalls the scams and fake offers of vaccines detected by eu countries , as one of many harmful examples , where fraudsters tried to sell more than 1.1 billion vaccine doses for a total price of over eur 15.4 billion;


### 7. is concerned by the assessment of the pif report , which found that seven member states detected fraud in relation to health infrastructure in 2019 and that health infrastructure was particularly affected by violations of public procurement rules; points out that the dependence on emergency procurement procedures in response to the covid-19 crisis may have aggravated these problems; ### 7. is concerned by the assessment of the pif report , which found that seven member states detected fraud in relation to health infrastructure in 2019 and that health infrastructure was particularly affected by violations of public procurement rules; points out that the dependence on emergency procurement procedures in response to the covid-19 crisis may have aggravated these problems and calls on the commission and member states to carryout a representative sample of ex-post controls in cases where emergency procurement procedures were used;


### 8. is worried by europol’s expectation that the recession following the pandemic will create new opportunities for organised crime; warns that as organised crime follows the money , the unprecedented increase in eu spending in the context of the nextgenerationeu recovery plan offers major potential for misuse of funds by organised crime; ### 8. is extremely worried by europol’s expectation that the recession following the pandemic will create new opportunities for organised crime; warns that as organised crime follows the money , the unprecedented increase in eu spending in the context of the nextgenerationeu recovery plan offers major potential for misuse of funds by organised crime; reiterates its call to the council to agree with additional 40 posts for auditors with the european court of auditors and to the olaf and eppo to make sure they allocate sufficient resources in discovering and prosecuting criminal activities targeting the nextgenerationeu;


### 9. takes note with concern of the facilitators of organised crime , such as money laundering , cybercrime , document fraud , corruption and the use of shell companies; stresses that these actions impact on the authorities’ ability to effectively monitor whether eu money is spent as intended; ### 9. takes note with concern of the facilitators of organised crime , such as money laundering , cybercrime , document fraud , corruption , fake registration and the use of shell companies; stresses that these actions impact on the authorities’ ability to effectively monitor whether eu money is spent as intended;


### 11. notes that the 2019 pif report counted 514 fraudulent irregularities on the expenditure side with a financial value of eur 381.4 million , and 425 fraudulent irregularities on the revenue side , totalling eur 79.7 million; emphasises that these numbers do not capture the true extent of fraud , which is likely to be significantly greater; further highlights that not all fraud is committed by organised crime gangs , especially on the expenditure side , where fraud is frequently committed by individuals or individual companies; ### 11. notes that the 2019 pif report counted 514 fraudulent irregularities on the expenditure side with a financial value of eur 381.4 million , and 425 fraudulent irregularities on the revenue side , totalling eur 79.7 million; emphasises that these numbers do not capture the true extent of fraud , which is likely to be significantly greater; further highlights that not all fraud is committed by organised crime gangs , especially on the expenditure side , where fraud is frequently committed by individuals or individual companies and can even include high public or government officials;


### 16. welcomes the establishment of the european public prosecutor’s office (eppo) , with its mandate to investigate , prosecute and bring to judgment crimes against the eu budget , as an important asset in the fight against fraud and organised crime in the eu; calls for effective funding for the eppo; regrets that five member states have not yet joined the eppo; regrets the lack of nominations of european delegated prosecutors , in particular by slovenia , and considerable delays in many other member states; highlights that this may represent a substantial hindrance in the eppo’s effective fight against cross-border crime; ### 16. welcomes the establishment of the european public prosecutor’s office (eppo) , with its mandate to investigate , prosecute and bring to judgment crimes against the eu budget , as an important asset in the fight against fraud and organised crime in the eu; calls for effective funding for the eppo; regrets that five member states have not yet joined the eppo; regrets the lack of nominations of european delegated prosecutors , in particular by slovenia , and considerable delays in many other member states; points out that eppo’s lack of mandate to operate in member states who did not join eppo severely weakens the efficiency and effectiveness of the pan-european fight against cross-border crimes;


### 16. welcomes the establishment of the european public prosecutor’s office (eppo) , with its mandate to investigate , prosecute and bring to judgment crimes against the eu budget , as an important asset in the fight against fraud and organised crime in the eu; calls for effective funding for the eppo; regrets that five member states have not yet joined the eppo; regrets the lack of nominations of european delegated prosecutors , in particular by slovenia , and considerable delays in many other member states; highlights that this may represent a substantial hindrance in the eppo’s effective fight against cross-border crime; ### 16. welcomes the establishment of the european public prosecutor’s office (eppo) , with its mandate to investigate , prosecute and bring to judgment crimes against the eu budget , as an important asset in the fight against fraud and organised crime in the eu; calls for effective funding for the eppo; regrets that five member states have not yet joined the eppo and for those countries calls for greater oversight on the part of the commission; regrets the lack of nominations of european delegated prosecutors , in particular by slovenia , and considerable delays in many other member states; highlights that this may represent a substantial hindrance in the eppo’s effective fight against cross-border crime;


### 19. regrets that the national approaches to tackle organised crime vary significantly across member states in terms of legislation , strategies and operational capacity; notes that this is partly due to varying levels of adoption and implementation of eu legislation; ### 19. regrets that the national approaches to tackle organised crime vary significantly across member states in terms of legislation , strategies and operational capacity; notes that this is partly due to varying levels of adoption and implementation of eu legislation; regrets greatly that some member states continuously choose not to implement olaf’s recommendations following the conclusion of an investigation and do not launch judiciary actions aiming at recovering defrauded eu funds;


### 20. notes that although the commission has encouraged member states to develop national anti-fraud strategies (nafs) , only 13 member states have done so and none of them used the template provided by the commission; notes with concern that these differences across member states pose obstacles for efficient cooperation; ### 20. notes that although the commission has encouraged member states to develop national anti-fraud strategies (nafs) , only 13 member states have done so and none of them used the template provided by the commission; notes with concern that these differences across member states pose obstacles for efficient cooperation; calls , therefore , on the commission to take more resolute action with a view to making it mandatory for the member states to lay down rules to prevent fraud against the eu;


### 22. is concerned that the current system of differing national approaches prevents an effective , cross-border approach to address the problem , which gives criminals an opportunity to continue their actions without being held accountable; calls on the member states to cooperate closely with eu bodies and each other and to make use of the union’s tools and services in the fight against organised crime; ### 22. is concerned that the current system of differing national approaches prevents an effective , cross-border approach to address the problem , which gives criminals an opportunity to continue their actions without being held accountable; calls on the member states to cooperate closely with eu bodies and each other and to make use of the union’s tools and services in the fight against organised crime in order to excel data exchange and facilitate cross-border operations targeting organised crime activities against the eu budget;


### 23. calls on the member states and the commission to consider a more coherent use of all the available tools to detect and tackle fraud , in particular the arachne it platform and edes; emphasises that the interoperability of arachne , edes , institutional and national databases is crucial for ensuring an effective information exchange aimed at preventing and identifying fraud against the eu budget; calls on the commission to consider the extension of the application of edes to funds under shared management; ### 23. calls on the member states and the commission to consider a more coherent use of all the available tools to detect and tackle fraud , in particular the arachne it platform and edes; emphasises that the interoperability of arachne , edes , institutional and national databases is crucial for ensuring an effective information exchange aimed at preventing and identifying fraud against the eu budget; calls on the commission to consider the extension of the application of edes to funds under shared management; calls on the commission to make the use of arachne , especially for funds under cap , mandatory for the member states;


### 24. calls on the member states , with the support of the commission , to provide training to national authorities to equip them with adequate knowledge for using tools such as edes and arachne effectively and in accordance with eu reporting standards; ### 24. calls on the member states , with the support of the commission , to provide training to national authorities to equip them with adequate knowledge for using tools such as edes and arachne effectively and in accordance with eu reporting standards; calls for anti-money laundering trainings schemes allowing authorities to detect risk of potential fraud before the funds are disbursed , particularly in area of kyc and unrevealed involvement of peps in cap subsidies , projects and grants;


### 25. highlights that an important step in fighting organised crime is making it less profitable; recalls in this regard the work of olaf , whose investigations are a crucial tool in the fight against fraud; regrets that the indictment rate following recommendations by olaf to member states is low and follows a downward trend , as it decreased from 53 % in the 2007-2014 period to 37 % in the 2016-2020 period; further notes that the extent to which financial amounts recommended for recovery are actually recovered has not been assessed in recent years , and that the most recent assessment covering the years 2002 to 2016 indicates a recovery rate of 30 %; calls on olaf and the commission to investigate the underlying reasons and on the member states to cooperate closely with the union bodies , to ensure that funds misused by organised crime are effectively recovered; ### 25. highlights that an important step in fighting organised crime is making it less profitable; recalls in this regard the work of olaf , whose investigations are a crucial tool in the fight against fraud; regrets that the indictment rate following recommendations by olaf to member states is low and follows a downward trend , as it decreased from 53 % in the 2007-2014 period to 37 % in the 2016-2020 period; further notes that the extent to which financial amounts recommended for recovery are actually recovered has not been assessed in recent years , and that the most recent assessment covering the years 2002 to 2016 indicates a recovery rate of 30 %; calls on olaf and the commission to investigate the underlying reasons and on the member states to cooperate closely with the union bodies , to ensure that funds misused by organised crime are effectively recovered; takes the view that decisive action to recover funds , including through preventive or value-based seizures , can deter criminal organisations from committing fraud against the european union , thereby protecting its financial interests;


### 2. where no member state responsible can be designated on the basis of the criteria listed in this regulation , the first member state in which the application for international protection was registered shall be responsible for examining it. ### 2. where no member state responsible can be designated on the basis of the criteria listed in this regulation , the applicant shall be automatically relocated in accordance with article 23a.


### 3. where it is impossible for a member state to transfer an applicant to the member state primarily designated as responsible because there are substantial grounds for believing that there are systemic flaws in the asylum procedure and in the reception conditions for applicants in that member state , resulting in a risk of inhuman or degrading treatment within the meaning of article 4 of the charter of fundamental rights of the european union , the determining member state shall continue to examine the criteria set out in chapter ii of part iii in order to establish whether another member state can be designated as responsible. ### 3. where it is impossible for a member state to transfer an applicant to the member state primarily designated as responsible because there are substantial grounds for believing that is a real risk of a serious violation of fundamental rights for the applicant or there are systemic flaws in the asylum procedure and in the reception conditions for applicants in that member state , the determining member state shall continue to examine the criteria set out in chapter ii of part iii in order to establish whether another member state can be designated as responsible.


### where a member state cannot carry out the transfer pursuant to the first subparagraph to any member state designated on the basis of the criteria set out in chapter ii of part iii or to the first member state with which the application was registered , that member state shall become the member state responsible. ### deleted


### if a security check provided for in article 11 of regulation (eu) xxx/xxx [screening regulation] has been carried out , but the first member state in which the application for international protection was registered has justified reasons to examine whether there are reasonable grounds to consider the applicant a danger to national security or public order of that member state , that member state shall carry out the examination as soon as possible after the registration of the application , before applying the criteria for determining the member state responsible pursuant to chapter ii or the clauses set out in chapter iii of part iii. ### deleted


### where the security check carried out in accordance with article 11 of regulation (eu) xxx/xxx [screening regulation] or in accordance with the first and second subparagraphs of this paragraph shows that there are reasonable grounds to consider the applicant a danger to national security or public order of the member state carrying out the security check , that member state shall be the member state responsible. ### where the security check carried out in accordance with article 11 of regulation (eu) xxx/xxx [screening regulation] shows that there are reasonable grounds to consider the applicant a genuine , present and sufficiently serious threat to national security of the member state carrying out the security check , that member state shall be the member state responsible.


### 5. each member state shall retain the right to send an applicant to a safe third country , subject to the rules and safeguards laid down in regulation (eu) xxx/xxx [asylum procedure regulation]. ### deleted


### 1. where a third-country national or stateless person intends to make an application for international protection , the application shall be made and registered in the member state of first entry. ### 1. where a third-country national or stateless person intends to make an application for international protection , the application shall be made and registered in the member state in which that third-country national or stateless person is present.


### 2. by derogation from paragraph 1 , where a third-country national or stateless person is in possession of a valid residence permit or a valid visa , the application shall be made and registered in the member state that issued the residence permit or visa. ### 2. where a third-country national or stateless person who intends to make an application for international protection is in possession of a residence permit or visa which has expired , the application shall be made and registered in the member state where he or she is present.


### 3. the applicant shall fully cooperate with the competent authorities of the member states in matters covered by this regulation , in particular by submitting as soon as possible and at the latest during the interview referred to in article 12 , all the elements and information available to him or her relevant for determining the member state responsible. where the applicant is not in a position at the time of the interview to submit evidence to substantiate the elements and information provided , the competent authority may set a time limit within the period referred to in article 29(1) for submitting such evidence. ### 3. the applicant shall fully cooperate with the competent authorities of the member states in matters covered by this regulation , in particular by submitting as soon as possible and at the latest during the interview referred to in article 12 , all the elements and information available to him or her relevant for determining the member state responsible. where the applicant is not in a position at the time of the interview to submit evidence to substantiate the elements and information provided , the competent authority shall set a reasonable deadline for submitting such evidence taking into account the circumstances of the individual case and shall inform the applicant thereof. it shall be made possible that additional evidence is submitted after the take charge request is sent.


### 5. where a transfer decision is notified to the applicant in accordance with article 32(2) and article 57(8) , the applicant shall comply with that decision. ### 5. where a transfer decision has become final , the applicant shall comply with that decision.


### 1. the applicant shall not be entitled to the reception conditions set out in articles 15 to 17 of directive xxx/xxx/eu [reception conditions directive] pursuant to article 17a of that directive in any member state other than the one in which he or she is required to be present pursuant to article 9(4) of this regulation from the moment he or she has been notified of a decision to transfer him or her to the member state responsible , provided that the applicant has been informed of that consequence pursuant to article 8(2) , point (b) of regulation (eu) xxx/xxx [screening regulation]. this shall be without prejudice to the need to ensure a standard of living in accordance with union law , including the charter of fundamental rights of the european union , and international obligations. ### 1. an applicant shall not be sanctioned for entering a member state other than the member state in which he or she is obliged to be present where article 31 of the geneva convention applies.