### (10) articles 101 and 102 tfeu and the corresponding national competition rules concerning anticompetitive multilateral and unilateral conduct as well as merger control have as their objective the protection of undistorted competition on the market. this regulation pursues an objective that is complementary to , but different from that of protecting undistorted competition on any given market , as defined in competition-law terms , which is to ensure that markets where gatekeepers are present are and remain contestable and fair , independently from the actual , likely or presumed effects of the conduct of a given gatekeeper covered by this regulation on competition on a given market. this regulation therefore aims at protecting a different legal interest from those rules and should be without prejudice to their application. ### (10) articles 101 and 102 tfeu and the corresponding national competition rules concerning anticompetitive multilateral and unilateral conduct as well as merger control have as their objective the protection of undistorted competition on the market. this regulation pursues an objective that is complementary to , but different from that of protecting undistorted competition on any given market , as defined in competition-law terms , which is to ensure that markets where gatekeepers are present are and remain contestable and fair , independently from the actual , likely or presumed effects of the conduct of a given gatekeeper covered by this regulation on competition on a given market. this regulation therefore aims at protecting a different legal interest from those rules and complements their application.


### (10) articles 101 and 102 tfeu and the corresponding national competition rules concerning anticompetitive multilateral and unilateral conduct as well as merger control have as their objective the protection of undistorted competition on the market. this regulation pursues an objective that is complementary to , but different from that of protecting undistorted competition on any given market , as defined in competition-law terms , which is to ensure that markets where gatekeepers are present are and remain contestable and fair , independently from the actual , likely or presumed effects of the conduct of a given gatekeeper covered by this regulation on competition on a given market. this regulation therefore aims at protecting a different legal interest from those rules and should be without prejudice to their application. ### (10) articles 101 and 102 tfeu and the corresponding national competition rules concerning anticompetitive multilateral and unilateral conduct as well as merger control have as their objective the protection of undistorted competition on the market. this regulation pursues an objective that is complementary to , but different from that of protecting undistorted competition on any given market , as defined in competition-law terms , which is to ensure that markets where gatekeepers are present are and remain contestable and fair , independently from the actual , likely or presumed effects of the conduct of a given gatekeeper covered by this regulation on competition on a given market. this regulation therefore aims at protecting a different legal interest from those rules and complement their application.


### (10) articles 101 and 102 tfeu and the corresponding national competition rules concerning anticompetitive multilateral and unilateral conduct as well as merger control have as their objective the protection of undistorted competition on the market. this regulation pursues an objective that is complementary to , but different from that of protecting undistorted competition on any given market , as defined in competition-law terms , which is to ensure that markets where gatekeepers are present are and remain contestable and fair , independently from the actual , likely or presumed effects of the conduct of a given gatekeeper covered by this regulation on competition on a given market. this regulation therefore aims at protecting a different legal interest from those rules and should be without prejudice to their application. ### (10) articles 101 and 102 tfeu and the corresponding national competition rules concerning anticompetitive multilateral and unilateral conduct as well as merger control have as their objective the protection of undistorted competition on the market. this regulation pursues an objective that is complementary to , but different from that of protecting undistorted competition on any given market , as defined in competition-law terms , which is to ensure that markets where gatekeepers are present are and remain contestable and fair , independently from the actual , likely or presumed effects of the conduct of a given gatekeeper covered by this regulation on competition on a given market. this regulation therefore aims at protecting a different legal interest from those rules and should complement their application.


### (11) this regulation should also complement , without prejudice to their application , the rules resulting from other acts of union law regulating certain aspects of the provision of services covered by this regulation , in particular regulation (eu) 2019/1150 of the european parliament and of the council26 , regulation (eu) xx/xx/eu [dsa] of the european parliament and of the council27 , regulation (eu) 2016/679 of the european parliament and of the council28 , directive (eu) 2019/790 of the european parliament and of the council29 , directive (eu) 2015/2366 of the european parliament and of the council30 , and directive (eu) 2010/13 of the european parliament and of the council31 , as well as national rules aimed at enforcing or , as the case may be , implementing that union legislation. ### (11) this regulation should also complement , without prejudice to their application , the rules resulting from other acts of union law regulating certain aspects of the provision of services covered by this regulation , in particular regulation (eu) 2019/1150 of the european parliament and of the council26 , regulation (eu) xx/xx/eu [dsa] of the european parliament and of the council27 , regulation (eu) 2016/679 of the european parliament and of the council28 , directive (eu) 2019/790 of the european parliament and of the council29 and directive 2002/58/ec29a , directive (eu) 2015/2366 f the european parliament and of the council30 , directive (eu) 2019/88230a , directive(eu) 2018/180830b , and directive (eu) 2010/13 of the european parliament and of the council31 , as well as national rules aimed at enforcing or , as the case may be , implementing that union legislation.


### (11) this regulation should also complement , without prejudice to their application , the rules resulting from other acts of union law regulating certain aspects of the provision of services covered by this regulation , in particular regulation (eu) 2019/1150 of the european parliament and of the council26 , regulation (eu) xx/xx/eu [dsa] of the european parliament and of the council27 , regulation (eu) 2016/679 of the european parliament and of the council28 , directive (eu) 2019/790 of the european parliament and of the council29 , directive (eu) 2015/2366 of the european parliament and of the council30 , and directive (eu) 2010/13 of the european parliament and of the council31 , as well as national rules aimed at enforcing or , as the case may be , implementing that union legislation. ### (11) this regulation should also complement , without prejudice to their application , the rules resulting from other acts of union law regulating certain aspects of the provision of services covered by this regulation , in particular regulation (eu) 2019/1150 of the european parliament and of the council26 , regulation (eu) xx/xx/eu [dsa] of the european parliament and of the council27 , regulation (eu) 2016/679 of the european parliament and of the council28 , directive 2002/58/ec28a , directive (eu) 2019/790 of the european parliament and of the council29 , directive (eu) 2015/2366 of the european parliament and of the council30 , and directive (eu) 2010/13 of the european parliament and of the council31 , as well as national rules aimed at enforcing or , as the case may be , implementing that union legislation.


### (11) this regulation should also complement , without prejudice to their application , the rules resulting from other acts of union law regulating certain aspects of the provision of services covered by this regulation , in particular regulation (eu) 2019/1150 of the european parliament and of the council26 , regulation (eu) xx/xx/eu [dsa] of the european parliament and of the council27 , regulation (eu) 2016/679 of the european parliament and of the council28 , directive (eu) 2019/790 of the european parliament and of the council29 , directive (eu) 2015/2366 of the european parliament and of the council30 , and directive (eu) 2010/13 of the european parliament and of the council31 , as well as national rules aimed at enforcing or , as the case may be , implementing that union legislation. ### (11) this regulation should also complement , without prejudice to their application , the rules resulting from other acts of union law regulating certain aspects of the provision of services covered by this regulation , in particular regulation (eu) 2019/1150 of the european parliament and of the council26 , regulation (eu) xx/xx/eu [dsa] of the european parliament and of the council27 , regulation (eu) 2016/679 of the european parliament and of the council28 and directive 2002/58/ec28a , directive (eu) 2019/790 of the european parliament and of the council29 , directive (eu) 2015/2366 of the european parliament and of the council30 , and directive (eu) 2010/13 of the european parliament and of the council31 , as well as national rules aimed at enforcing or , as the case may be , implementing that union legislation.


### (11) this regulation should also complement , without prejudice to their application , the rules resulting from other acts of union law regulating certain aspects of the provision of services covered by this regulation , in particular regulation (eu) 2019/1150 of the european parliament and of the council26 , regulation (eu) xx/xx/eu [dsa] of the european parliament and of the council27 , regulation (eu) 2016/679 of the european parliament and of the council28 , directive (eu) 2019/790 of the european parliament and of the council29 , directive (eu) 2015/2366 of the european parliament and of the council30 , and directive (eu) 2010/13 of the european parliament and of the council31 , as well as national rules aimed at enforcing or , as the case may be , implementing that union legislation. ### (11) this regulation should also complement , without prejudice to their application , the rules resulting from other acts of union law regulating certain aspects of the provision of services covered by this regulation , in particular regulation (eu) 2019/1150 of the european parliament and of the council26 , regulation (eu) xx/xx/eu [dsa] of the european parliament and of the council27 , regulation (eu) 2016/679 of the european parliament and of the council28 , and directive 2002/58/ec28a , directive (eu) 2019/790 of the european parliament and of the council29 , directive (eu) 2015/2366 of the european parliament and of the council30 , and directive (eu) 2010/13 of the european parliament and of the council31 , as well as national rules aimed at enforcing or , as the case may be , implementing that union legislation.


### (12) weak contestability and unfair practices in the digital sector are more frequent and pronounced for certain digital services than for others. this is the case in particular for widespread and commonly used digital services that mostly directly intermediate between business users and end users and where features such as extreme scale economies , very strong network effects , an ability to connect many business users with many end users through the multi-sidedness of these services , lock-in effects , a lack of multi-homing or vertical integration are the most prevalent. often , there is only one or very few large providers of those digital services. these providers of core platform services have emerged most frequently as gatekeepers for business users and end users with far-reaching impacts , gaining the ability to easily set commercial conditions and terms in a unilateral and detrimental manner for their business users and end users. accordingly , it is necessary to focus only on those digital services that are most broadly used by business users and end users and where , based on current market conditions , concerns about weak contestability and unfair practices by gatekeepers are more apparent and pressing from an internal market perspective. ### (12) weak contestability and unfair practices in the digital sector are more frequent and pronounced for certain digital services than for others. this is the case in particular for widespread and commonly used digital services that mostly directly intermediate between business users and end users and where features such as extreme scale economies , very strong network effects , an ability to connect many business users with many end users through the multi-sidedness of these services , lock-in effects , a lack of multi-homing or vertical integration are the most prevalent. often , there is only one or very few large providers of those digital services. these providers of core platform services have emerged most frequently as gatekeepers for business users and end users with far-reaching impacts , gaining the ability to easily set commercial conditions and terms in a unilateral and detrimental manner for their business users and end users. accordingly , it is necessary to focus on all of those digital services that are most used by business users and end users and where , based on current market conditions , concerns about weak contestability and unfair practices by gatekeepers are pressing from an internal market perspective.


### (12) weak contestability and unfair practices in the digital sector are more frequent and pronounced for certain digital services than for others. this is the case in particular for widespread and commonly used digital services that mostly directly intermediate between business users and end users and where features such as extreme scale economies , very strong network effects , an ability to connect many business users with many end users through the multi-sidedness of these services , lock-in effects , a lack of multi-homing or vertical integration are the most prevalent. often , there is only one or very few large providers of those digital services. these providers of core platform services have emerged most frequently as gatekeepers for business users and end users with far-reaching impacts , gaining the ability to easily set commercial conditions and terms in a unilateral and detrimental manner for their business users and end users. accordingly , it is necessary to focus only on those digital services that are most broadly used by business users and end users and where , based on current market conditions , concerns about weak contestability and unfair practices by gatekeepers are more apparent and pressing from an internal market perspective. ### (12) weak contestability and unfair practices in the digital sector are more frequent and pronounced for certain digital services than for others. this is the case in particular for widespread and commonly used digital services that mostly directly intermediate between business users and end users and where features such as extreme scale economies , very strong network effects , an ability to connect many business users with many end users through the multi-sidedness of these services , lock-in effects , a lack of multi-homing or vertical integration are the most prevalent. often , there is only one or very few large providers of those digital services. these providers of core platform services have emerged most frequently as gatekeepers for business users and end users with far-reaching impacts , gaining the ability to easily set commercial conditions and terms in a unilateral and detrimental manner for their business users and end users. accordingly , it is necessary to focus on all of those digital services that are most broadly used by business users and end users and where , based on current market conditions , concerns about weak contestability and unfair practices by gatekeepers are more apparent and pressing from an internal market perspective.


### (12) weak contestability and unfair practices in the digital sector are more frequent and pronounced for certain digital services than for others. this is the case in particular for widespread and commonly used digital services that mostly directly intermediate between business users and end users and where features such as extreme scale economies , very strong network effects , an ability to connect many business users with many end users through the multi-sidedness of these services , lock-in effects , a lack of multi-homing or vertical integration are the most prevalent. often , there is only one or very few large providers of those digital services. these providers of core platform services have emerged most frequently as gatekeepers for business users and end users with far-reaching impacts , gaining the ability to easily set commercial conditions and terms in a unilateral and detrimental manner for their business users and end users. accordingly , it is necessary to focus only on those digital services that are most broadly used by business users and end users and where , based on current market conditions , concerns about weak contestability and unfair practices by gatekeepers are more apparent and pressing from an internal market perspective. ### (12) weak contestability and unfair practices in the digital sector are more frequent and pronounced for certain digital services than for others. this is the case in particular for widespread and commonly used digital services that mostly directly intermediate between business users and end users and where features such as extreme scale economies , very strong network effects , an ability to connect many business users with many end users through the multi-sidedness of these services , lock-in effects , a lack of multi-homing or vertical integration are the most prevalent. often , there is only one or very few large providers of those digital services. these providers of core platform services have emerged most frequently as gatekeepers for business users and end users with far-reaching impacts , gaining the ability to easily set commercial conditions and terms in a unilateral and detrimental manner for their business users and end users. accordingly , it is necessary to focus on all those digital services that are used by business users and end users and where , based on current market conditions , concerns about weak contestability and unfair practices by gatekeepers are pressing from an internal market perspective.


### (13) in particular , online intermediation services , online search engines , operating systems , online social networking , video sharing platform services , number-independent interpersonal communication services , cloud computing services and online advertising services all have the capacity to affect a large number of end users and businesses alike , which entails a risk of unfair business practices. they therefore should be included in the definition of core platform services and fall into the scope of this regulation. online intermediation services may also be active in the field of financial services , and they may intermediate or be used to provide such services as listed non-exhaustively in annex ii to directive (eu) 2015/1535 of the european parliament and of the council32 . in certain circumstances , the notion of end users should encompass users that are traditionally considered business users , but in a given situation do not use the core platform services to provide goods or services to other end users , such as for example businesses relying on cloud computing services for their own purposes. ### (13) in particular , online intermediation services , online search engines , operating systems , online social networking , video sharing platform services , number-independent interpersonal communication services , cloud computing services , including business-to-business clouds , online advertising services , embedded digital services in vehicles , browsers , virtual assistant , connected tv and collaborative economy services all have the capacity to affect a large number of end users and businesses alike , which entails a risk of unfair business practices. collaborative economy services , especially short term rental and online hotel reservation services are present in a market characterised by a high level of concentration. due to their position on the market and their capacity to connect end users and business users they have substantial influence on the strategy and price setting of their business users. they therefore should be included in the definition of core platform services and fall into the scope of this regulation. online intermediation services may also be active in the field of financial services , and they may intermediate or be used to provide such services as listed non-exhaustively in annex ii to directive (eu) 2015/1535 of the european parliament and of the council32 .


### (13) in particular , online intermediation services , online search engines , operating systems , online social networking , video sharing platform services , number-independent interpersonal communication services , cloud computing services and online advertising services all have the capacity to affect a large number of end users and businesses alike , which entails a risk of unfair business practices. they therefore should be included in the definition of core platform services and fall into the scope of this regulation. online intermediation services may also be active in the field of financial services , and they may intermediate or be used to provide such services as listed non-exhaustively in annex ii to directive (eu) 2015/1535 of the european parliament and of the council32 . in certain circumstances , the notion of end users should encompass users that are traditionally considered business users , but in a given situation do not use the core platform services to provide goods or services to other end users , such as for example businesses relying on cloud computing services for their own purposes. ### (13) in particular , online intermediation services , online search engines , operating systems , online social networking , video sharing platform services , number-independent interpersonal communication services , cloud computing services , including business to business cloud , online advertising services embedded digital services in vehicles , browsers , voice assistant , connected tv and collaborative economy services , and online advertising services all have the capacity to affect a large number of end users and businesses alike , which entails a risk of unfair business practices. they therefore should be included in the definition of core platform services and fall into the scope of this regulation. online intermediation services may also be active in the field of financial services , and they may intermediate or be used to provide such services as listed non-exhaustively in annex ii to directive (eu) 2015/1535 of the european parliament and of the council32 . in certain circumstances , the notion of end users should encompass users that are traditionally considered business users , but in a given situation do not use the core platform services to provide goods or services to other end users , such as for example businesses relying on cloud computing services for their own purposes.


### (13) in particular , online intermediation services , online search engines , operating systems , online social networking , video sharing platform services , number-independent interpersonal communication services , cloud computing services and online advertising services all have the capacity to affect a large number of end users and businesses alike , which entails a risk of unfair business practices. they therefore should be included in the definition of core platform services and fall into the scope of this regulation. online intermediation services may also be active in the field of financial services , and they may intermediate or be used to provide such services as listed non-exhaustively in annex ii to directive (eu) 2015/1535 of the european parliament and of the council32 . in certain circumstances , the notion of end users should encompass users that are traditionally considered business users , but in a given situation do not use the core platform services to provide goods or services to other end users , such as for example businesses relying on cloud computing services for their own purposes. ### (13) in particular , online intermediation services , online search engines , operating systems , online social networking , video sharing platform services , number-independent interpersonal communication services , cloud computing services including business to business clouds , and online advertising services embedded digital services in vehicles , browsers , voice assistant , connected tv and collaborative economy services all have the capacity to affect a large number of end users and businesses alike , which entails a risk of unfair business practices. they therefore should be included in the definition of core platform services and fall into the scope of this regulation. online intermediation services may also be active in the field of financial services , and they may intermediate or be used to provide such services as listed non-exhaustively in annex ii to directive (eu) 2015/1535 of the european parliament and of the council32 . in certain circumstances , the notion of end users should encompass users that are traditionally considered business users , but in a given situation do not use the core platform services to provide goods or services to other end users , such as for example businesses relying on cloud computing services for their own purposes.


### (13) in particular , online intermediation services , online search engines , operating systems , online social networking , video sharing platform services , number-independent interpersonal communication services , cloud computing services and online advertising services all have the capacity to affect a large number of end users and businesses alike , which entails a risk of unfair business practices. they therefore should be included in the definition of core platform services and fall into the scope of this regulation. online intermediation services may also be active in the field of financial services , and they may intermediate or be used to provide such services as listed non-exhaustively in annex ii to directive (eu) 2015/1535 of the european parliament and of the council32 . in certain circumstances , the notion of end users should encompass users that are traditionally considered business users , but in a given situation do not use the core platform services to provide goods or services to other end users , such as for example businesses relying on cloud computing services for their own purposes. ### (13) in particular , online intermediation services , online search engines , operating systems , online social networking , video sharing platform services , number-independent interpersonal communication services , cloud computing services , including business to business clouds , online advertising , embedded digital services in vehicles , browsers , voice assistants , connected tv and collaborative economy services all have the capacity to affect a large number of end users and businesses alike , which entails a risk of unfair business practices. they therefore should be included in the definition of core platform services and fall into the scope of this regulation. online intermediation services may also be active in the field of financial services , and they may intermediate or be used to provide such services as listed non-exhaustively in annex ii to directive (eu) 2015/1535 of the european parliament and of the council32 .


### (15) the fact that a digital service qualifies as a core platform service in light of its widespread and common use and its importance for connecting business users and end users does not as such give rise to sufficiently serious concerns of contestability and unfair practices. it is only when a core platform service constitutes an important gateway and is operated by a provider with a significant impact in the internal market and an entrenched and durable position , or by a provider that will foreseeably have such a position in the near future , that such concerns arise. accordingly , the targeted set of harmonised rules laid down in this regulation should apply only to undertakings designated on the basis of these three objective criteria , and they should only apply to those of their core platform services that individually constitute an important gateway for business users to reach end users. ### (15) the fact that a digital service qualifies as a core platform service in light of its widespread and common use and its importance for connecting business users and end users does not as such give rise to sufficiently serious concerns of contestability and unfair practices. it is only when a core platform service constitutes an important gateway and is operated by a provider with a significant impact in the internal market and an entrenched and durable position , or by a provider that will foreseeably have such a position in the near future , subject to a market investigation or to an assessment by the commission based on a notification submitted in line with article 12 , that such concerns arise. accordingly , the targeted set of harmonised rules laid down in this regulation should apply only to undertakings designated on the basis of these three objective criteria , and they should only apply to those of their core platform services that individually constitute an important gateway for business users to reach end users.


### (57) in particular gatekeepers which provide access to software application stores serve as an important gateway for business users that seek to reach end users. in view of the imbalance in bargaining power between those gatekeepers and business users of their software application stores , those gatekeepers should not be allowed to impose general conditions , including pricing conditions , that would be unfair or lead to unjustified differentiation. pricing or other general access conditions should be considered unfair if they lead to an imbalance of rights and obligations imposed on business users or confer an advantage on the gatekeeper which is disproportionate to the service provided by the gatekeeper to business users or lead to a disadvantage for business users in providing the same or similar services as the gatekeeper. the following benchmarks can serve as a yardstick to determine the fairness of general access conditions: prices charged or conditions imposed for the same or similar services by other providers of software application stores; prices charged or conditions imposed by the provider of the software application store for different related or similar services or to different types of end users; prices charged or conditions imposed by the provider of the software application store for the same service in different geographic regions; prices charged or conditions imposed by the provider of the software application store for the same service the gatekeeper offers to itself. this obligation should not establish an access right and it should be without prejudice to the ability of providers of software application stores to take the required responsibility in the fight against illegal and unwanted content as set out in regulation [digital services act]. ### (57) in particular gatekeepers which provide access to software application stores , online search engine and online social networking service serve as an important gateway for business users that seek to reach end users which can result in an adverse effect on end users' right to receive and impart information and ideas , and ultimately affect media pluralism , diversity of opinion as well as competition. in view of the imbalance in bargaining power between those gatekeepers and business users of their software application stores , especially those that are smes on a given sectorial market , such as small press publishers , particularly when accessing online search engine and online social networks , on the other hand , those gatekeepers should not be allowed to impose general conditions , including pricing conditions , data usage conditions or conditions related to the licensing of rights held by the business user that would be unfair or lead to unjustified differentiation. pricing or other general access conditions should be considered unfair if they lead to an imbalance of rights and obligations imposed on business users or confer an advantage on the gatekeeper which is disproportionate to the service provided by the gatekeeper to business users or lead to a disadvantage for business users in providing the same or similar services as the gatekeeper. the following benchmarks can serve as a yardstick to determine the fairness of general access conditions: prices charged or conditions imposed for the same or similar services by other providers of software application stores; prices charged or conditions imposed by the provider of the software application store for different related or similar services or to different types of end users; prices charged or conditions imposed by the provider of the software application store for the same service in different geographic regions; prices charged or conditions imposed by the provider of the software application store for the same service the gatekeeper offers to itself. determining the fairness of general access conditions should lead to the opportunity to make the revenue stream of digital content providers , such as press publishers being in a dominant position on their market , more transparent , notably in terms of revenues deriving from advertisement , and in terms of distribution of appropriate shares of revenues to the authors of works incorporated in press publications. this obligation should not establish an access right and it should be without prejudice to the ability of providers of software application stores to take the required responsibility in the fight against illegal and unwanted content as set out in regulation [digital services act]. it should also be without prejudice to the ability of business that are smes on a given sectorial market , such as small press publishers , to offer royalty-free licenses in order to ensure access to their content , visibility on online search engines and online social networking services , and it should be without prejudice to the ability of end-users to perform acts of hyperlinking in according to article15(1) of directive (eu) 2019/790.


### (57) in particular gatekeepers which provide access to software application stores serve as an important gateway for business users that seek to reach end users. in view of the imbalance in bargaining power between those gatekeepers and business users of their software application stores , those gatekeepers should not be allowed to impose general conditions , including pricing conditions , that would be unfair or lead to unjustified differentiation. pricing or other general access conditions should be considered unfair if they lead to an imbalance of rights and obligations imposed on business users or confer an advantage on the gatekeeper which is disproportionate to the service provided by the gatekeeper to business users or lead to a disadvantage for business users in providing the same or similar services as the gatekeeper. the following benchmarks can serve as a yardstick to determine the fairness of general access conditions: prices charged or conditions imposed for the same or similar services by other providers of software application stores; prices charged or conditions imposed by the provider of the software application store for different related or similar services or to different types of end users; prices charged or conditions imposed by the provider of the software application store for the same service in different geographic regions; prices charged or conditions imposed by the provider of the software application store for the same service the gatekeeper offers to itself. this obligation should not establish an access right and it should be without prejudice to the ability of providers of software application stores to take the required responsibility in the fight against illegal and unwanted content as set out in regulation [digital services act]. ### (57) in particular gatekeepers which provide access to software application stores online search engine and online social networking service serve as an important gateway for business users that seek to reach end users , which can result in an adverse effect on end users right to receive and impart information and ideas , and ultimately affect media pluralism , diversity of opinion as well as competition. in view of the imbalance in bargaining power between those gatekeepers on the one hand , and business users of their software application stores , especially those being in a minority position on a given sectorial market , such as small press publishers , particularly when accessing online search engine and online social networks , on the other hand , those gatekeepers should not be allowed to impose general conditions , including pricing conditions , that would be unfair or lead to unjustified differentiation. pricing or other general access conditions should be considered unfair if they lead to an imbalance of rights and obligations imposed on business users or confer an advantage on the gatekeeper which is disproportionate to the service provided by the gatekeeper to business users or lead to a disadvantage for business users in providing the same or similar services as the gatekeeper. the following benchmarks can serve as a yardstick to determine the fairness of general access conditions: prices charged or conditions imposed for the same or similar services by other providers of software application stores; prices charged or conditions imposed by the provider of the software application store for different related or similar services or to different types of end users; prices charged or conditions imposed by the provider of the software application store for the same service in different geographic regions; prices charged or conditions imposed by the provider of the software application store for the same service the gatekeeper offers to itself. determining the fairness of general access conditions should lead to the opportunity to make the revenue stream of digital content providers , such as press publishers being in a dominant position on their market , more transparent , notably in terms of revenues deriving from advertisement , and in terms of distribution of appropriate shares of revenues to the authors of works incorporated in press publications. this obligation should not establish an access right and it should be without prejudice to the ability of providers of software application stores to take the required responsibility in the fight against illegal and unwanted content as set out in regulation [digital services act]. it should also be without prejudice to the ability of business users being in a minority position on a given sectorial market , such as small press publishers , to offer royalty-free licenses in order to ensure access to their content , visibility on online search engines and online social networking services , and it should be without prejudice to the ability of end-users to perform acts of hyperlinking in according to article 15(1) of directive(eu) 2019/790.


### (57) in particular gatekeepers which provide access to software application stores serve as an important gateway for business users that seek to reach end users. in view of the imbalance in bargaining power between those gatekeepers and business users of their software application stores , those gatekeepers should not be allowed to impose general conditions , including pricing conditions , that would be unfair or lead to unjustified differentiation. pricing or other general access conditions should be considered unfair if they lead to an imbalance of rights and obligations imposed on business users or confer an advantage on the gatekeeper which is disproportionate to the service provided by the gatekeeper to business users or lead to a disadvantage for business users in providing the same or similar services as the gatekeeper. the following benchmarks can serve as a yardstick to determine the fairness of general access conditions: prices charged or conditions imposed for the same or similar services by other providers of software application stores; prices charged or conditions imposed by the provider of the software application store for different related or similar services or to different types of end users; prices charged or conditions imposed by the provider of the software application store for the same service in different geographic regions; prices charged or conditions imposed by the provider of the software application store for the same service the gatekeeper offers to itself. this obligation should not establish an access right and it should be without prejudice to the ability of providers of software application stores to take the required responsibility in the fight against illegal and unwanted content as set out in regulation [digital services act]. ### (57) in particular gatekeepers which provide access to software application stores , online search engines and online social networking services serve as an important gateway for business users that seek to reach end users , which can have an adverse effect on the end users' right to receive and impart information and ideas , and ultimately adversely affect media pluralism. in view of the imbalance in bargaining power between those gatekeepers on the one hand , and business users of their software application stores , particularly when accessing their online search engine and online social networks , on the other hand , those gatekeepers should not be allowed to impose general conditions , including pricing conditions , that would be unfair or lead to unjustified differentiation. pricing or other general access conditions should be considered unfair if they lead to an imbalance of rights and obligations imposed on business users or confer an advantage on the gatekeeper which is disproportionate to the service provided by the gatekeeper to business users or lead to a disadvantage for business users in providing the same or similar services as the gatekeeper. the following benchmarks can serve as a yardstick to determine the fairness of general access conditions: prices charged or conditions imposed for the same or similar services by other providers of software application stores; prices charged or conditions imposed by the provider of the software application store , online search engine or online social networking service for different related or similar services or to different types of end users; prices charged or conditions imposed by the provider for the same service in different geographic regions; prices charged or conditions imposed by the provider of the software application store for the same service the gatekeeper offers to itself. determining the fairness of general access conditions should allow for the revenue stream of digital content providers to be more transparent , notably in terms of revenues deriving from advertisement , and in terms of distribution of appropriate shares of revenues to the authors of works incorporated in press publications. this obligation should not establish an access right and it should be without prejudice to the ability of providers of software application stores to take the required responsibility in the fight against illegal and unwanted content as set out in regulation [digital services act].


### (57) in particular gatekeepers which provide access to software application stores serve as an important gateway for business users that seek to reach end users. in view of the imbalance in bargaining power between those gatekeepers and business users of their software application stores , those gatekeepers should not be allowed to impose general conditions , including pricing conditions , that would be unfair or lead to unjustified differentiation. pricing or other general access conditions should be considered unfair if they lead to an imbalance of rights and obligations imposed on business users or confer an advantage on the gatekeeper which is disproportionate to the service provided by the gatekeeper to business users or lead to a disadvantage for business users in providing the same or similar services as the gatekeeper. the following benchmarks can serve as a yardstick to determine the fairness of general access conditions: prices charged or conditions imposed for the same or similar services by other providers of software application stores; prices charged or conditions imposed by the provider of the software application store for different related or similar services or to different types of end users; prices charged or conditions imposed by the provider of the software application store for the same service in different geographic regions; prices charged or conditions imposed by the provider of the software application store for the same service the gatekeeper offers to itself. this obligation should not establish an access right and it should be without prejudice to the ability of providers of software application stores to take the required responsibility in the fight against illegal and unwanted content as set out in regulation [digital services act]. ### (57) in particular gatekeepers which provide access to software application stores , online search engine and online social networking service serve as an important gateway for business users that seek to reach end users , which can have an adverse effect on the end users' right to receive and impart information and ideas , and ultimately adversely affect media pluralism , diversity of opinion as well as competition. in view of the imbalance in bargaining power between those gatekeepers on the one hand , and business users of their software application stores , especially those being in a minority position on a given sectorial market , such as small press publishers , particularly when accessing their online search engine and online social networks , on the other hand , those gatekeepers should not be allowed to impose general conditions , including pricing conditions , that would be unfair or lead to unjustified differentiation. pricing or other general access conditions should be considered unfair if they lead to an imbalance of rights and obligations imposed on business users or confer an advantage on the gatekeeper which is disproportionate to the service provided by the gatekeeper to business users or lead to a disadvantage for business users in providing the same or similar services as the gatekeeper. the following benchmarks can serve as a yardstick to determine the fairness of general access conditions: prices charged or conditions imposed for the same or similar services by other providers of software application stores; prices charged or conditions imposed by the provider of the software application store for different related or similar services or to different types of end users; prices charged or conditions imposed by the provider of the software application store for the same service in different geographic regions; prices charged or conditions imposed by the provider of the software application store for the same service the gatekeeper offers to itself. determining the fairness of general access conditions should lead to the opportunity to make the revenue stream of digital content providers , such as press publishers being in a dominant position on their market , more transparent , notably in terms of revenues deriving from advertisement , and in terms of distribution of appropriate shares of revenues to the authors of works incorporated in press publications. this obligation should not establish an access right and it should be without prejudice to the ability of providers of software application stores to take the required responsibility in the fight against illegal and unwanted content as set out in regulation [digital services act]. it should also be without prejudice to the ability of business users being in a minority position on a given sectorial market , such as small press publishers , to offer royalty-free licenses in order to ensure access to their content , visibility on online search engines and online social networking services , and it should be without prejudice to the ability of end-users to perform acts of hyperlinking according to article 15(1) of directive (eu) 2019/790.


### (57) in particular gatekeepers which provide access to software application stores serve as an important gateway for business users that seek to reach end users. in view of the imbalance in bargaining power between those gatekeepers and business users of their software application stores , those gatekeepers should not be allowed to impose general conditions , including pricing conditions , that would be unfair or lead to unjustified differentiation. pricing or other general access conditions should be considered unfair if they lead to an imbalance of rights and obligations imposed on business users or confer an advantage on the gatekeeper which is disproportionate to the service provided by the gatekeeper to business users or lead to a disadvantage for business users in providing the same or similar services as the gatekeeper. the following benchmarks can serve as a yardstick to determine the fairness of general access conditions: prices charged or conditions imposed for the same or similar services by other providers of software application stores; prices charged or conditions imposed by the provider of the software application store for different related or similar services or to different types of end users; prices charged or conditions imposed by the provider of the software application store for the same service in different geographic regions; prices charged or conditions imposed by the provider of the software application store for the same service the gatekeeper offers to itself. this obligation should not establish an access right and it should be without prejudice to the ability of providers of software application stores to take the required responsibility in the fight against illegal and unwanted content as set out in regulation [digital services act]. ### (57) in particular gatekeepers which provide access to software application stores online search engine and online social networking service serve as an important gateway for business users that seek to reach end users , which can result in an adverse effect on end users' right to receive and impart information and ideas , and ultimately affect media pluralism , diversity of opinion as well as competition. in view of the imbalance in bargaining power between those gatekeepers on the one hand , and business users of their software application stores , especially those that are smes on a given sectorial market , such as small press publishers , particularly when accessing online search engine and online social networks , on the other hand , those gatekeepers should not be allowed to impose general conditions , including pricing conditions , data usage conditions or conditions related to the licensing of rights held by the business user that would be unfair or lead to unjustified differentiation. pricing or other general access conditions should be considered unfair if they lead to an imbalance of rights and obligations imposed on business users or confer an advantage on the gatekeeper which is disproportionate to the service provided by the gatekeeper to business users or lead to a disadvantage for business users in providing the same or similar services as the gatekeeper. the following benchmarks can serve as a yardstick to determine the fairness of general access conditions: prices charged or conditions imposed for the same or similar services by other providers of software application stores; prices charged or conditions imposed by the provider of the software application store for different related or similar services or to different types of end users; prices charged or conditions imposed by the provider of the software application store for the same service in different geographic regions; prices charged or conditions imposed by the provider of the software application store for the same service the gatekeeper offers to itself. determining the fairness of general access conditions should lead to the opportunity to make the revenue stream of digital content providers , such as press publishers being in a dominant position on their market , more transparent , notably in terms of revenues deriving from advertisement , and in terms of distribution of appropriate shares of revenues to the authors of works incorporated in press publications. this obligation should not establish an access right and it should be without prejudice to the ability of providers of software application stores to take the required responsibility in the fight against illegal and unwanted content as set out in regulation [digital services act]. it should also be without prejudice to the ability of business that are smes on a given sectorial market , such as small press publishers , to offer royalty-free licenses in order to ensure access to their content , visibility on online search engines and online social networking services , and it should be without prejudice to the ability of end-users to perform acts of hyperlinking , according to article 15(1) of directive (eu) 2019/790.


### (57) in particular gatekeepers which provide access to software application stores serve as an important gateway for business users that seek to reach end users. in view of the imbalance in bargaining power between those gatekeepers and business users of their software application stores , those gatekeepers should not be allowed to impose general conditions , including pricing conditions , that would be unfair or lead to unjustified differentiation. pricing or other general access conditions should be considered unfair if they lead to an imbalance of rights and obligations imposed on business users or confer an advantage on the gatekeeper which is disproportionate to the service provided by the gatekeeper to business users or lead to a disadvantage for business users in providing the same or similar services as the gatekeeper. the following benchmarks can serve as a yardstick to determine the fairness of general access conditions: prices charged or conditions imposed for the same or similar services by other providers of software application stores; prices charged or conditions imposed by the provider of the software application store for different related or similar services or to different types of end users; prices charged or conditions imposed by the provider of the software application store for the same service in different geographic regions; prices charged or conditions imposed by the provider of the software application store for the same service the gatekeeper offers to itself. this obligation should not establish an access right and it should be without prejudice to the ability of providers of software application stores to take the required responsibility in the fight against illegal and unwanted content as set out in regulation [digital services act]. ### (57) in particular gatekeepers which provide access to software application stores , online search engine and online social networking service serve as an important gateway for business users that seek to reach end users which can result in an adverse effect on end users' right to receive and impart information and ideas , and ultimately affect media pluralism , diversity of opinion as well as competition. in view of the imbalance in bargaining power between those gatekeepers and business users of their software application stores , especially those that are smes on a given sectorial market , such as small press publishers , particularly when accessing online search engine and online social networks , on the other hand , those gatekeepers should not be allowed to impose general conditions , including pricing conditions , data usage conditions or conditions related to the licensing of rights held by the business user that would be unfair or lead to unjustified differentiation. pricing or other general access conditions should be considered unfair if they lead to an imbalance of rights and obligations imposed on business users or confer an advantage on the gatekeeper which is disproportionate to the service provided by the gatekeeper to business users or lead to a disadvantage for business users in providing the same or similar services as the gatekeeper. the following benchmarks can serve as a yard stick to determine the fairness of general access conditions: prices charged or conditions imposed for the same or similar services by other providers of software application stores; prices charged or conditions imposed by the provider of the software application store for different related or similar services or to different types of end users; prices charged or conditions imposed by the provider of the software application store for the same service in different geographic regions; prices charged or conditions imposed by the provider of the software application store for the same service the gatekeeper offers to itself. determining the fairness of general access conditions should lead to the opportunity to make the revenue stream of digital content providers , such as press publishers being in a dominant position on their market , more transparent , notably in terms of revenues deriving from advertisement , and in terms of distribution of appropriate shares of revenues to the authors of works incorporated in press publications. this obligation should not establish an access right and it should be without prejudice to the ability of providers of software application stores to take the required responsibility in the fight against illegal and unwanted content as set out in regulation[digital services act]. it should also be without prejudice to the ability of business that are smes on a given sectorial market , such as small press publishers , to offer royalty-free licenses in order to ensure access to their content , visibility on online search engines and online social networking services , and it should be without prejudice to the ability of end-users to perform acts of hyperlinking in according to article 15(1) of directive (eu)2019/790.


### 6. for the purposes of specifying the obligations under article 6(1) points (j) and (k) , the commission shall also assess whether the intended or implemented measures ensure that there is no remaining imbalance of rights and obligations on business users and that the measures do not themselves confer an advantage on the gatekeeper which is disproportionate to the service provided by the gatekeeper to business users. ### 6. for the purposes of specifying the obligations under article 6(1) points (j) and (k) , the commission shall also assess whether the intended or implemented measures ensure that there is no remaining imbalance of rights and obligations on business users and end users and that the measures do not themselves confer an advantage on the gatekeeper which is disproportionate to the service provided by the gatekeeper to business users.


### 7. a gatekeeper may request the opening of proceedings pursuant to article 18 for the commission to determine whether the measures that the gatekeeper intends to implement or has implemented under article 6 are effective in achieving the objective of the relevant obligation in the specific circumstances. a gatekeeper may , with its request , provide a reasoned submission to explain in particular why the measures that it intends to implement or has implemented are effective in achieving the objective of the relevant obligation in the specific circumstances. ### 7. a gatekeeper may request within the time-limits set under article 3(8) the opening of proceedings pursuant to article 18 for the commission to determine whether the measures that the gatekeeper intends to implement or has implemented under article 6 are effective in achieving the objective of the relevant obligation in the specific circumstances. a gatekeeper may , with its request , provide a reasoned submission to explain in particular why the measures that it intends to implement or has implemented are effective in achieving the objective of the relevant obligation in the specific circumstances.


### 7. a gatekeeper may request the opening of proceedings pursuant to article 18 for the commission to determine whether the measures that the gatekeeper intends to implement or has implemented under article 6 are effective in achieving the objective of the relevant obligation in the specific circumstances. a gatekeeper may , with its request , provide a reasoned submission to explain in particular why the measures that it intends to implement or has implemented are effective in achieving the objective of the relevant obligation in the specific circumstances. ### 7. a gatekeeper may request within the time limits set under article 3(8) the opening of proceedings pursuant to article 18 for the commission to determine whether the measures that the gatekeeper intends to implement or has implemented under article are effective in achieving the objective of the relevant obligation in the specific circumstances. a gatekeeper may , with its request , provide a reasoned submission to explain in particular why the measures that it intends to implement or has implemented are effective in achieving the objective of the relevant obligation in the specific circumstances.


### public morality; ### deleted


### 1. the commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with article 34 to update the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6 where , based on a market investigation pursuant to article 17 , it has identified the need for new obligations addressing practices that limit the contestability of core platform services or are unfair in the same way as the practices addressed by the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6. ### 1. the commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with article 34 to update the existing obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6 , and add obligations where , based on a market investigation pursuant to article 17 , it has identified the need for new obligations addressing practices that limit the contestability of core platform services or are unfair in the same way as the practices addressed by the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6.


### 1. the commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with article 34 to update the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6 where , based on a market investigation pursuant to article 17 , it has identified the need for new obligations addressing practices that limit the contestability of core platform services or are unfair in the same way as the practices addressed by the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6. ### 1. the commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with article 34 to update or adapt the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6 where , based on a market investigation pursuant to article 17 , it has identified the need for new obligations addressing practices that limit the contestability of core platform services or are unfair in the same way as the practices addressed by the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6.


### there is an imbalance of rights and obligations on business users and the gatekeeper is obtaining an advantage from business users that is disproportionate to the service provided by the gatekeeper to business users; or ### there is an imbalance of rights and obligations on business users and end users , and the gatekeeper is obtaining an advantage that is disproportionate to the service provided by the gatekeeper either on business or end users; or


### there is an imbalance of rights and obligations on business users and the gatekeeper is obtaining an advantage from business users that is disproportionate to the service provided by the gatekeeper to business users; or ### there is an imbalance of rights and obligations on business users and end users and the gatekeeper is obtaining an advantage from business users that is disproportionate to the service provided by the gatekeeper to business users; or


### there is an imbalance of rights and obligations on business users and the gatekeeper is obtaining an advantage from business users that is disproportionate to the service provided by the gatekeeper to business users; or ### there is an imbalance of rights and obligations on business users or end users and the gatekeeper is obtaining an advantage from business users or end users that is disproportionate to the service provided by the gatekeeper to business users or end users ; or


### there is an imbalance of rights and obligations on business users and the gatekeeper is obtaining an advantage from business users that is disproportionate to the service provided by the gatekeeper to business users; or ### there is an imbalance of rights and obligations on business users or end users and the gatekeeper is obtaining an advantage from business users that is disproportionate to the service provided by the gatekeeper to business users or end users; or


### there is an imbalance of rights and obligations on business users and the gatekeeper is obtaining an advantage from business users that is disproportionate to the service provided by the gatekeeper to business users; or ### there is an imbalance of rights and obligations on business users and end users and the gatekeeper is obtaining an advantage that is disproportionate to the service provided by the gatekeeper either on business or end users; or


### there is an imbalance of rights and obligations on business users and the gatekeeper is obtaining an advantage from business users that is disproportionate to the service provided by the gatekeeper to business users; or ### there is an imbalance of rights and obligations on business users or end users , and the gatekeeper is obtaining an advantage that is disproportionate to the service provided by the gatekeeper either to business or end users; or


### 1. a gatekeeper shall ensure that the obligations of articles 5 and 6 are fully and effectively complied with. while the obligations of articles 5 and 6 apply in respect of core platform services designated pursuant to article 3 , their implementation shall not be undermined by any behaviour of the undertaking to which the gatekeeper belongs , regardless of whether this behaviour is of a contractual , commercial , technical or any other nature. ### 1. a gatekeeper shall ensure that the obligations of articles 5 and 6 are fully and effectively complied with. while the obligations of articles 5 and 6 apply in respect of core platform services designated pursuant to article 3 , their implementation shall not be undermined by any behaviour of the undertaking to which the gatekeeper belongs , regardless of whether this behaviour is of a contractual , commercial , technical or any other nature , including product design , structure , function or manner of operation capable of influencing user choice and autonomy or through agreements with third party business partners of the gatekeepers.


### 1. a gatekeeper shall ensure that the obligations of articles 5 and 6 are fully and effectively complied with. while the obligations of articles 5 and 6 apply in respect of core platform services designated pursuant to article 3 , their implementation shall not be undermined by any behaviour of the undertaking to which the gatekeeper belongs , regardless of whether this behaviour is of a contractual , commercial , technical or any other nature. ### 1. a gatekeeper shall ensure that the obligations of articles 5 and 6 are fully and effectively complied with. while the obligations of articles 5 and 6 apply in respect of core platform services designated pursuant to article 3 , their implementation shall not be undermined by any behaviour of the undertaking to which the gatekeeper belongs , regardless of whether this behaviour is of a contractual , commercial , technical or any other nature. the end-user’s rights or choices laid down in articles 5 and 6 must be presented in a neutral manner and must not be undermined through product design or by impairing user autonomy , decision-making , or choice via the structure , function or manner of operation of a user interface or a part thereof.


### 1. a gatekeeper shall ensure that the obligations of articles 5 and 6 are fully and effectively complied with. while the obligations of articles 5 and 6 apply in respect of core platform services designated pursuant to article 3 , their implementation shall not be undermined by any behaviour of the undertaking to which the gatekeeper belongs , regardless of whether this behaviour is of a contractual , commercial , technical or any other nature. ### 1. a gatekeeper shall ensure that the obligations of articles 5 and 6 are fully and effectively complied with. while the obligations of articles 5 and 6 apply in respect of core platform services designated pursuant to article 3 , their implementation shall not be undermined by any behaviour of the gatekeeper or any part of the undertaking to which the gatekeeper belongs , regardless of whether this behaviour is of a contractual , commercial , technical or any other nature , including through product design or by presenting end user choices in a non-neutral manner , or by otherwise subverting or impairing user autonomy , decision-making , or choice via the structure , function or manner of operation of a user interface or a part thereof.


### 2. where consent for collecting and processing of personal data is required to ensure compliance with this regulation , a gatekeeper shall take the necessary steps to either enable business users to directly obtain the required consent to their processing , where required under regulation (eu) 2016/679 and directive 2002/58/ec , or to comply with union data protection and privacy rules and principles in other ways including by providing business users with duly anonymised data where appropriate. the gatekeeper shall not make the obtaining of this consent by the business user more burdensome than for its own services. ### 2. where consent for collecting and processing of personal data is required to ensure compliance with this regulation , a gatekeeper shall take the necessary steps to either enable business users to directly obtain the required consent to their processing , where required under regulation (eu) 2016/679 and directive 2002/58/ec , or to comply with union data protection and privacy rules and principles in other ways including by providing business users with duly anonymised data where appropriate. the gatekeeper shall not make the obtaining of this consent by the business user more burdensome than for its own services including product design , structure , function or manner of operation capable of influencing user choice and autonomy or through agreements with third party business partners of the gatekeepers.


### 2. where consent for collecting and processing of personal data is required to ensure compliance with this regulation , a gatekeeper shall take the necessary steps to either enable business users to directly obtain the required consent to their processing , where required under regulation (eu) 2016/679 and directive 2002/58/ec , or to comply with union data protection and privacy rules and principles in other ways including by providing business users with duly anonymised data where appropriate. the gatekeeper shall not make the obtaining of this consent by the business user more burdensome than for its own services. ### 2. where consent for collecting and processing of personal data is required to ensure compliance with this regulation , a gatekeeper shall take the necessary steps to either enable business users to directly obtain the required consent to their processing , where required under regulation (eu) 2016/679 and directive 2002/58/ec , or to comply with union data protection and privacy rules and principles in other ways including by providing business users with duly anonymised data where appropriate. the gatekeeper shall not make the obtaining of this consent by the business user more burdensome than for its own services , including product design , structure , function or manner of operation capable of influencing user choice and autonomy.


### 2. where consent for collecting and processing of personal data is required to ensure compliance with this regulation , a gatekeeper shall take the necessary steps to either enable business users to directly obtain the required consent to their processing , where required under regulation (eu) 2016/679 and directive 2002/58/ec , or to comply with union data protection and privacy rules and principles in other ways including by providing business users with duly anonymised data where appropriate. the gatekeeper shall not make the obtaining of this consent by the business user more burdensome than for its own services. ### 2. where consent for collecting and processing of personal data is required to ensure compliance with this regulation , a gatekeeper shall take the necessary steps to either enable business users to directly request the required consent to their processing , where required under regulation (eu) 2016/679 and directive 2002/58/ec , or to provide business users with duly anonymised data. the gatekeeper shall not make the obtaining of this consent by the business user more burdensome than for its own services.


### 2. where consent for collecting and processing of personal data is required to ensure compliance with this regulation , a gatekeeper shall take the necessary steps to either enable business users to directly obtain the required consent to their processing , where required under regulation (eu) 2016/679 and directive 2002/58/ec , or to comply with union data protection and privacy rules and principles in other ways including by providing business users with duly anonymised data where appropriate. the gatekeeper shall not make the obtaining of this consent by the business user more burdensome than for its own services. ### 2. where consent for collecting and processing of personal data is required to ensure compliance with this regulation , a gatekeeper shall take the necessary steps to either enable business users to directly obtain the required consent to their processing , where required under regulation (eu) 2016/679 and directive 2002/58/ec , or to comply with union data protection and privacy rules and principles in other ways including by providing business users with duly anonymised data where appropriate. the gatekeeper shall not make the obtaining of this consent by the business user more burdensome than for its own services , including through product design , structure , function or manner of operation capable of influencing user choice and autonomy or through agreements with third party business partners of the gatekeepers.


### 2. where consent for collecting and processing of personal data is required to ensure compliance with this regulation , a gatekeeper shall take the necessary steps to either enable business users to directly obtain the required consent to their processing , where required under regulation (eu) 2016/679 and directive 2002/58/ec , or to comply with union data protection and privacy rules and principles in other ways including by providing business users with duly anonymised data where appropriate. the gatekeeper shall not make the obtaining of this consent by the business user more burdensome than for its own services. ### 2. where consent for collecting and processing of personal data is required to ensure compliance with this regulation , a gatekeeper shall take the necessary steps to either enable business users to directly obtain the required consent to their processing , where required under regulation (eu) 2016/679 and directive 2002/58/ec , or to comply with union data protection and privacy rules and principles in other ways including by providing business users with duly anonymised data where appropriate. the gatekeeper shall not make the obtaining of this consent by the business user more burdensome than for its own services including but not limited to , through product design , structure , function or manner of operation capable of influencing user choice and autonomy or through agreements with third party business partners of the gatekeepers.


### 3. a gatekeeper shall not degrade the conditions or quality of any of the core platform services provided to business users or end users who avail themselves of the rights or choices laid down in articles 5 and 6 , or make the exercise of those rights or choices unduly difficult. ### 3. a gatekeeper shall not degrade the conditions or quality of any of the core platform services provided to business users or end users who avail themselves of the rights or choices laid down in articles 5 and 6 , or make the exercise of those rights or choices unduly difficult. the end-user’s rights or choices laid down in articles 5 and 6 must be presented in a neutral manner and must not be undermined through product design or by impairing user autonomy , decision-making , or choice via the structure , function or manner of operation of a user interface or a part thereof.


### 12 obligation to inform about concentrations ### 12 prior notification of concentrations


### obligation to inform about concentrations ### prior notification of concentrations


### 1. a gatekeeper shall inform the commission of any intended concentration within the meaning of article 3 of regulation (ec) no 139/2004 involving another provider of core platform services or of any other services provided in the digital sector irrespective of whether it is notifiable to a union competition authority under regulation (ec) no 139/2004 or to a competent national competition authority under national merger rules. ### 1. a gatekeeper shall notify to the commission of any intended concentration within the meaning of article 3 of regulation (ec) no 139/2004 irrespective of whether it is notifiable to a union competition authority under regulation (ec) no 139/2004 or to a competent national competition authority under national merger rules.


### 1. a gatekeeper shall inform the commission of any intended concentration within the meaning of article 3 of regulation (ec) no 139/2004 involving another provider of core platform services or of any other services provided in the digital sector irrespective of whether it is notifiable to a union competition authority under regulation (ec) no 139/2004 or to a competent national competition authority under national merger rules. ### 1. a gatekeeper shall notify to the commission any intended concentration within the meaning of article 3 of regulation (ec) no 139/2004 irrespective of whether it is notifiable to a union competition authority under regulation (ec) no 139/2004 or to a competent national competition authority under national merger rules.


### a gatekeeper shall inform the commission of such a concentration prior to its implementation and following the conclusion of the agreement , the announcement of the public bid , or the acquisition of a controlling interest. ### a gatekeeper shall notify the commission of such a concentration prior to its implementation and following the conclusion of the agreement , the announcement of the public bid , or the acquisition of a controlling interest.


### a gatekeeper shall inform the commission of such a concentration prior to its implementation and following the conclusion of the agreement , the announcement of the public bid , or the acquisition of a controlling interest. ### a gatekeeper shall notify to the commission such a concentration prior to its implementation and following the conclusion of the agreement , the announcement of the public bid , or the acquisition of a controlling interest.


### 2. the notification pursuant to paragraph 1 shall at least describe for the acquisition targets their eea and worldwide annual turnover , for any relevant core platform services their respective eea annual turnover , their number of yearly active business users and the number of monthly active end users , as well as the rationale of the intended concentration. ### 2. the notification pursuant to paragraph 1 shall at least describe for the acquisition targets their eea and worldwide annual turnover , for any relevant core platform services their respective eea annual turnover , their number of yearly active business users and the number of monthly active end users , the categories of personal data they process , as well as the rationale of the intended concentration.


### 2. the notification pursuant to paragraph 1 shall at least describe for the acquisition targets their eea and worldwide annual turnover , for any relevant core platform services their respective eea annual turnover , their number of yearly active business users and the number of monthly active end users , as well as the rationale of the intended concentration. ### 2. the notification pursuant to paragraph 1 shall at least describe for the acquisition targets their eea and worldwide annual turnover , for any services their respective eea annual turnover , their number of yearly active business users and the number of monthly active end users , the categories of personal data they process , as well as the rationale of the intended concentration.


### 3. if , following any concentration as provided in paragraph 1 , additional core platform services individually satisfy the thresholds in point (b) of article 3(2) , the gatekeeper concerned shall inform the commission thereof within three months from the implementation of the concentration and provide the commission with the information referred to in article 3(2). ### 3. if , following any concentration as provided in paragraph 1 , it is demonstrated that additional core platform services individually satisfy the thresholds in point (b) of article 3(2) , the gatekeeper concerned shall inform the commission thereof within three months from the implementation of the concentration and provide the commission with the information referred to in article 3(2).


### within six months after its designation pursuant to article 3 , a gatekeeper shall submit to the commission an independently audited description of any techniques for profiling of consumers that the gatekeeper applies to or across its core platform services identified pursuant to article 3. this description shall be updated at least annually. ### within six months after its designation pursuant to article 3 , a gatekeeper shall submit to the commission an independently audited description of any techniques for profiling of consumers that the gatekeeper applies to or across its core platform services identified pursuant to article 3. this description shall be updated at least annually. the commission shall develop , in consultation with the eu data protection supervisor , the european data protection board , civil society and experts , the standards and process of the audit.


### within six months after its designation pursuant to article 3 , a gatekeeper shall submit to the commission an independently audited description of any techniques for profiling of consumers that the gatekeeper applies to or across its core platform services identified pursuant to article 3. this description shall be updated at least annually. ### within six months after its designation pursuant to article 3 , a gatekeeper shall submit to the commission an independently audited description of any techniques for profiling of consumers that the gatekeeper applies to or across its core platform services identified pursuant to article 3. this description shall be updated at least annually. the commission shall develop , after consulting the european data protection supervisor , the european data protection board , civil society and experts , the standards and process of the audit. the commission shall share the audited description , as well as any relevant materials that are collected in the context of supervising the gatekeepers that relate to the processing of personal data , with any competent supervisory authority upon its request.


### 1. the commission may conduct a market investigation for the purpose of examining whether a provider of core platform services should be designated as a gatekeeper pursuant to article 3(6) , or in order to identify core platform services for a gatekeeper pursuant to article 3(7). it shall endeavour to conclude its investigation by adopting a decision in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in article 32(4) within twelve months from the opening of the market investigation. ### 1. the commission may conduct a market investigation for the purpose of examining whether a provider of core platform services should be designated as a gatekeeper pursuant to article 3(6) , or in order to identify core platform services for a gatekeeper pursuant to article 3(7). it shall conclude its investigation by adopting a decision in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in article 32(4) within six months from the opening of the market investigation.


### 1. the commission may conduct a market investigation for the purpose of examining whether a provider of core platform services should be designated as a gatekeeper pursuant to article 3(6) , or in order to identify core platform services for a gatekeeper pursuant to article 3(7). it shall endeavour to conclude its investigation by adopting a decision in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in article 32(4) within twelve months from the opening of the market investigation. ### 1. the commission may conduct a market investigation for the purpose of examining whether a provider of core platform services should be designated as a gatekeeper pursuant to article 3(6) , or in order to identify core platform services for a gatekeeper pursuant to article 3(7). it shall endeavour to conclude its investigation by adopting a decision in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in article 32(4) within six months from the opening of the market investigation.


### 2. in the course of a market investigation pursuant to paragraph 1 , the commission shall endeavour to communicate its preliminary findings to the provider of core platform services concerned within six months from the opening of the investigation. in the preliminary findings , the commission shall explain whether it considers , on a provisional basis , that the provider of core platform services should be designated as a gatekeeper pursuant to article 3(6). ### 2. in the course of a market investigation pursuant to paragraph 1 , the commission shall communicate its preliminary findings to the provider of core platform services concerned within three months from the opening of the investigation. in the preliminary findings , the commission shall explain whether it considers , on a provisional basis , that the provider of core platform services should be designated as a gatekeeper pursuant to article 3(6).


### 2. in the course of a market investigation pursuant to paragraph 1 , the commission shall endeavour to communicate its preliminary findings to the provider of core platform services concerned within six months from the opening of the investigation. in the preliminary findings , the commission shall explain whether it considers , on a provisional basis , that the provider of core platform services should be designated as a gatekeeper pursuant to article 3(6). ### 2. in the course of a market investigation pursuant to paragraph 1 , the commission shall endeavour to communicate its preliminary findings to the provider of core platform services concerned within three months from the opening of the investigation. in the preliminary findings , the commission shall explain whether it considers , on a provisional basis , that the provider of core platform services should be designated as a gatekeeper pursuant to article 3(6).


### 2. in the course of a market investigation pursuant to paragraph 1 , the commission shall endeavour to communicate its preliminary findings to the provider of core platform services concerned within six months from the opening of the investigation. in the preliminary findings , the commission shall explain whether it considers , on a provisional basis , that the provider of core platform services should be designated as a gatekeeper pursuant to article 3(6). ### 2. in the course of a market investigation pursuant to paragraph 1 , the commission shall communicate its preliminary findings to the provider of core platform services concerned within six months from the opening of the investigation. in the preliminary findings , the commission shall explain whether it considers , on a provisional basis , that the provider of core platform services should be designated as a gatekeeper pursuant to article 3(6).


### 3. where the provider of core platform services satisfies the thresholds set out in article 3(2) , but has presented significantly substantiated arguments in accordance with article 3(4) , the commission shall endeavour to conclude the market investigation within five months from the opening of the market investigation by a decision pursuant to paragraph 1. in that case the commission shall endeavour to communicate its preliminary findings pursuant to paragraph 2 to the provider of core platform services within three months from the opening of the investigation. ### deleted


### 4. when the commission pursuant to article 3(6) designates as a gatekeeper a provider of core platform services that does not yet enjoy an entrenched and durable position in its operations , but it is foreseeable that it will enjoy such a position in the near future , it shall declare applicable to that gatekeeper only obligations laid down in article 5(b) and article 6(1) points (e) , (f) , (h) and (i) as specified in the designation decision. the commission shall only declare applicable those obligations that are appropriate and necessary to prevent that the gatekeeper concerned achieves by unfair means an entrenched and durable position in its operations. the commission shall review such a designation in accordance with the procedure laid down in article 4. ### 4. when the commission pursuant to article 3(6) designates as a gatekeeper a provider of core platform services that does not yet enjoy an entrenched and durable position in its operations , but it is foreseeable that it will enjoy such a position in the near future based on a notification in line with article 12(1) , it shall declare applicable to that gatekeeper only obligations laid down in article 5 and article 6 as specified in the designation decision. the commission shall only declare applicable those obligations that are appropriate and necessary to prevent that the gatekeeper concerned achieves by unfair means an entrenched and durable position in its operations. the commission shall review such a designation in accordance with the procedure laid down in article 4.


### 4. when the commission pursuant to article 3(6) designates as a gatekeeper a provider of core platform services that does not yet enjoy an entrenched and durable position in its operations , but it is foreseeable that it will enjoy such a position in the near future , it shall declare applicable to that gatekeeper only obligations laid down in article 5(b) and article 6(1) points (e) , (f) , (h) and (i) as specified in the designation decision. the commission shall only declare applicable those obligations that are appropriate and necessary to prevent that the gatekeeper concerned achieves by unfair means an entrenched and durable position in its operations. the commission shall review such a designation in accordance with the procedure laid down in article 4. ### 4. when the commission pursuant to article 3(6) designates as a gatekeeper a provider of core platform services that does not yet enjoy an entrenched and durable position in its operations , but it is foreseeable that it will enjoy such a position in the near future , based on a notification in line with article 12(1) , it shall declare applicable to that gatekeeper the obligations laid down in article 5 and article 6 as specified in the designation decision. the commission shall only declare applicable those obligations that are appropriate and necessary to prevent that the gatekeeper concerned achieves by unfair means an entrenched and durable position in its operations. the commission shall review such a designation in accordance with the procedure laid down in article 4.


### 16 market investigation into systematic non-compliance ### 16 market investigation into systematic non-compliance or concentration that weakens the contestability of markets


### market investigation into systematic non-compliance ### market investigation into systematic non-compliance or concentration that weakens the contestability of markets


### 1. where the market investigation shows that a gatekeeper has systematically infringed the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6 and has further strengthened or extended its gatekeeper position in relation to the characteristics under article 3(1) , the commission may by decision adopted in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in article 32(4) impose on such gatekeeper any behavioural or structural remedies which are proportionate to the infringement committed and necessary to ensure compliance with this regulation. the commission shall conclude its investigation by adopting a decision within twelve months from the opening of the market investigation. ### 1. where the market investigation shows that a gatekeeper has systematically infringed the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6 or where the commission assesses under article 12 that any intended concentration has an adverse impact on the contestability of markets , the commission shall by decision adopted in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in article 32(4) impose on such gatekeeper any behavioural or structural remedies which are proportionate to the infringement committed and necessary to ensure compliance with this regulation. the commission shall conclude its investigation by adopting a decision within six months from the opening of the market investigation.


### 1. where the market investigation shows that a gatekeeper has systematically infringed the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6 and has further strengthened or extended its gatekeeper position in relation to the characteristics under article 3(1) , the commission may by decision adopted in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in article 32(4) impose on such gatekeeper any behavioural or structural remedies which are proportionate to the infringement committed and necessary to ensure compliance with this regulation. the commission shall conclude its investigation by adopting a decision within twelve months from the opening of the market investigation. ### 1. where the market investigation shows that a gatekeeper has systematically infringed the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6 or where the commission assesses under article 12 that any intended concentration has an adverse impact on the contestability of markets , the commission shall by decision adopted in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in article 32(4) impose on such gatekeeper any behavioural or structural remedies which are proportionate to the infringement committed and necessary to ensure compliance with this regulation. the commission shall conclude its investigation by adopting a decision within twelve months from the opening of the market investigation.