### 1. the commission and the board shall encourage and facilitate the drawing up of codes of conduct at union level to contribute to the proper application of this regulation , taking into account in particular the specific challenges of tackling different types of illegal content and systemic risks , in accordance with union law , in particular on competition and the protection of personal data. ### 1. the commission and the board may facilitate the drawing up of voluntary codes of conduct at union level to contribute to the proper application of this regulation , taking into account in particular the specific challenges of tackling different types of illegal content and adverse impacts , in accordance with union law , in particular on competition and the protection of personal data.


### 1. the commission and the board shall encourage and facilitate the drawing up of codes of conduct at union level to contribute to the proper application of this regulation , taking into account in particular the specific challenges of tackling different types of illegal content and systemic risks , in accordance with union law , in particular on competition and the protection of personal data. ### 1. the commission and the board shall encourage and facilitate the drawing up of codes of conduct at union level to contribute to the proper application of this regulation , taking into account in particular the specific challenges of tackling different types systemic risks , in accordance with union law , in particular on competition and the protection of personal data.


### 3. member states shall ensure that the maximum amount of penalties imposed for a failure to comply with the obligations laid down in this regulation shall not exceed 6 % of the annual income or turnover of the provider of intermediary services concerned. penalties for the supply of incorrect , incomplete or misleading information , failure to reply or rectify incorrect , incomplete or misleading information and to submit to an on-site inspection shall not exceed 1% of the annual income or turnover of the provider concerned. ### 3. the commission shall ensure that the maximum amount of penalties imposed for a failure to comply with the obligations laid down in this regulation shall not exceed 6 % of the annual income or turnover of the provider of intermediary services concerned. penalties for the supply of incorrect , incomplete or misleading information , failure to reply or rectify incorrect , incomplete or misleading information and to submit to an on-site inspection shall not exceed 1% of the annual income or turnover of the provider concerned.


### 2. when communicating the decision referred to in the first subparagraph of paragraph 1 to the very large online platform concerned , the digital services coordinator of establishment shall request it to draw up and communicate to the digital services coordinator of establishment , the commission and the board , within one month from that decision , an action plan , specifying how that platform intends to terminate or remedy the infringement. the measures set out in the action plan may include , where appropriate , participation in a code of conduct as provided for in article 35. ### 2. when communicating the decision referred to in the first subparagraph of paragraph 1 to the very large online platform concerned , the digital services coordinator of establishment shall request it to draw up and communicate to the digital services coordinator of establishment , the commission and the board , within one month from that decision , an action plan , specifying how that platform intends to terminate or remedy the infringement.


### where the digital services coordinator of establishment has concerns on the ability of the measures to terminate or remedy the infringement , it may request the very large online platform concerned to subject itself to an additional , independent audit to assess the effectiveness of those measures in terminating or remedying the infringement. in that case , that platform shall send the audit report to that digital services coordinator , the commission and the board within four months from the decision referred to in the first subparagraph. when requesting such an additional audit , the digital services coordinator may specify a particular audit organisation that is to carry out the audit , at the expense of the platform concerned , selected on the basis of criteria set out in article 28(2). ### where the digital services coordinator of establishment has concerns on the ability of the measures to terminate or remedy the infringement , it may request the very large online platform concerned to subject itself to an independent audit to assess the effectiveness of those measures in terminating or remedying the infringement. in that case , that platform shall send the audit report to that digital services coordinator , the commission and the board within four months from the decision referred to in the first subparagraph. when requesting such an audit , the digital services coordinator may specify a particular audit organisation that is to carry out the audit , at the expense of the platform concerned , selected on the basis of criteria set out in article 28(2).


### (11) it should be clarified that this regulation is without prejudice to the rules of union law on copyright and related rights , which establish specific rules and procedures that should remain unaffected. ### (11) it should be clarified that this regulation is without prejudice to the rules of national laws implemented in line with union law on copyright and related rights , which establish specific rules and procedures that should remain unaffected.


### (25) in order to create legal certainty and not to discourage activities aimed at detecting , identifying and acting against illegal content that providers of intermediary services may undertake on a voluntary basis , it should be clarified that the mere fact that providers undertake such activities does not lead to the unavailability of the exemptions from liability set out in this regulation , provided those activities are carried out in good faith and in a diligent manner. in addition , it is appropriate to clarify that the mere fact that those providers take measures , in good faith , to comply with the requirements of union law , including those set out in this regulation as regards the implementation of their terms and conditions , should not lead to the unavailability of those exemptions from liability. therefore , any such activities and measures that a given provider may have taken should not be taken into account when determining whether the provider can rely on an exemption from liability , in particular as regards whether the provider provides its service neutrally and can therefore fall within the scope of the relevant provision , without this rule however implying that the provider can necessarily rely thereon. ### deleted


### (28) providers of intermediary services should not be subject to a monitoring obligation with respect to obligations of a general nature. this does not concern monitoring obligations in a specific case and , in particular , does not affect orders by national authorities in accordance with national legislation , in accordance with the conditions established in this regulation. nothing in this regulation should be construed as an imposition of a general monitoring obligation or active fact-finding obligation , or as a general obligation for providers to take proactive measures to relation to illegal content. ### (28) providers of intermediary services should not be subject to a monitoring obligation with respect to obligations of a general nature. this does not concern monitoring obligations in a specific case and , in particular , does not affect orders by national judicial authorities in accordance with national legislation , in accordance with the conditions established in this regulation. nothing in this regulation should be construed as an imposition of a general monitoring obligation or active fact-finding obligation , or as a general obligation for providers to take proactive measures to relation to illegal content. providers of intermediary services should not be obliged to use automated tools for content moderation. nothing in this regulation should be construed as preventing providers of intermediary services from offering end-to-end encrypted services , or make the provision of such services a cause for liability or loss of immunity.


### (29) depending on the legal system of each member state and the field of law at issue , national judicial or administrative authorities may order providers of intermediary services to act against certain specific items of illegal content or to provide certain specific items of information. the national laws on the basis of which such orders are issued differ considerably and the orders are increasingly addressed in cross-border situations. in order to ensure that those orders can be complied with in an effective and efficient manner , so that the public authorities concerned can carry out their tasks and the providers are not subject to any disproportionate burdens , without unduly affecting the rights and legitimate interests of any third parties , it is necessary to set certain conditions that those orders should meet and certain complementary requirements relating to the processing of those orders. ### (29) depending on the legal system of each member state and the field of law at issue , national judicial authorities may order providers of intermediary services to act against certain specific items of illegal content or to provide certain specific items of information. the national laws on the basis of which such orders are issued differ considerably and the orders are increasingly addressed in cross-border situations. in order to ensure that those orders can be complied with in an effective and efficient manner , so that the public authorities concerned can carry out their tasks and the providers are not subject to any disproportionate burdens , without unduly affecting the rights and legitimate interests of any third parties , it is necessary to set certain conditions that those orders should meet and certain complementary requirements relating to the processing of those orders.


### (32) the orders to provide information regulated by this regulation concern the production of specific information about individual recipients of the intermediary service concerned who are identified in those orders for the purposes of determining compliance by the recipients of the services with applicable union or national rules. therefore , orders about information on a group of recipients of the service who are not specifically identified , including orders to provide aggregate information required for statistical purposes or evidence-based policy-making , should remain unaffected by the rules of this regulation on the provision of information. ### (32) the orders by judicial authorities to provide information about one or more specific suspects or serious threat to public security or orders by national authorities about a specific item of information about service providers licence numbers , address or rental , or number of nights let , regulated by this regulation concern the production of specific information about individual recipients of the intermediary service concerned who are suspect or suspects of a serious threat to public security , identified in those orders for the purposes of determining compliance by the recipients of the services with applicable union or national rules. therefore , orders about information on a group of recipients of the service who are not specifically identified , including orders to provide aggregate information required for statistical purposes or evidence-based policy-making , should remain unaffected by the rules of this regulation on the provision of information.


### (33) orders to act against illegal content and to provide information are subject to the rules safeguarding the competence of the member state where the service provider addressed is established and laying down possible derogations from that competence in certain cases , set out in article 3 of directive 2000/31/ec , only if the conditions of that article are met. given that the orders in question relate to specific items of illegal content and information , respectively , where they are addressed to providers of intermediary services established in another member state , they do not in principle restrict those providers’ freedom to provide their services across borders. therefore , the rules set out in article 3 of directive 2000/31/ec , including those regarding the need to justify measures derogating from the competence of the member state where the service provider is established on certain specified grounds and regarding the notification of such measures , do not apply in respect of those orders. ### (33) orders to act against illegal content and to provide information are subject to the rules safeguarding the competence of the member state where the service provider addressed is established and laying down possible derogations from that competence in certain cases , set out in article 3 of directive 2000/31/ec , only if the conditions of that article are met. given that the orders to provide information relate to specific information where they are addressed to providers of intermediary services established in another member state , they do not in principle restrict those providers’ freedom to provide their services across borders. therefore , the rules set out in article 3 of directive 2000/31/ec , including those regarding the need to justify measures derogating from the competence of the member state where the service provider is established on certain specified grounds and regarding the notification of such measures , do not apply in respect of those orders.


### (38) whilst the freedom of contract of providers of intermediary services should in principle be respected , it is appropriate to set certain rules on the content , application and enforcement of the terms and conditions of those providers in the interests of transparency , the protection of recipients of the service and the avoidance of unfair or arbitrary outcomes. ### (38) whilst the freedom of contract of providers of intermediary services should in principle be respected , it is appropriate to set certain rules on the content , application and enforcement of the terms and conditions of those providers in the interests of transparency , the protection of the fundamental rights of recipients of the service and the avoidance of discriminatory , unfair or arbitrary outcomes. terms and conditions of providers of intermediary services should respect the essential principles of human rights as enshrined in the charter and international law , including the right to freedom of expression. the freedom and pluralism of media should be respected , to this end , member states should ensure that editorial content providers` and media service providers` possibilities to contest decisions of online platforms or to seek judicial redress in accordance with the laws of the member state concerned is unaffected.


### (39) to ensure an adequate level of transparency and accountability , providers of intermediary services should annually report , in accordance with the harmonised requirements contained in this regulation , on the content moderation they engage in , including the measures taken as a result of the application and enforcement of their terms and conditions. however , so as to avoid disproportionate burdens , those transparency reporting obligations should not apply to providers that are micro- or small enterprises as defined in commission recommendation 2003/361/ec.40 ### (39) to ensure an adequate level of transparency and accountability , providers of intermediary services should annually report in a standardised and machine-readable format , in accordance with the harmonised requirements contained in this regulation , on the content moderation they engage in , including the measures taken as a result of the application and enforcement of their terms and conditions. however , so as to avoid disproportionate burdens , those transparency reporting obligations should not apply to providers that are micro- or small enterprises as defined in commission recommendation 2003/361/ec , or as a not-for-profit service with fewer than 100.000 monthly active users.


### (48) an online platform may in some instances become aware , such as through a notice by a notifying party or through its own voluntary measures , of information relating to certain activity of a recipient of the service , such as the provision of certain types of illegal content , that reasonably justify , having regard to all relevant circumstances of which the online platform is aware , the suspicion that the recipient may have committed , may be committing or is likely to commit a serious criminal offence involving a threat to the life or safety of person , such as offences specified in directive 2011/93/eu of the european parliament and of the council44 . in such instances , the online platform should inform without delay the competent law enforcement authorities of such suspicion , providing all relevant information available to it , including where relevant the content in question and an explanation of its suspicion. this regulation does not provide the legal basis for profiling of recipients of the services with a view to the possible identification of criminal offences by online platforms. online platforms should also respect other applicable rules of union or national law for the protection of the rights and freedoms of individuals when informing law enforcement authorities. ### (48) an online platform may in some instances become aware , such as through a notice by a notifying party of information relating to certain activity of a recipient of the service , such as the provision of certain types of illegal content , that reasonably justify , having regard to all relevant circumstances of which the online platform is aware , the suspicion that the recipient may have committed , may be committing or is likely to commit a serious criminal offence involving a threat to the life or safety of person , such as offences specified in directive 2011/93/eu of the european parliament and of the council44 . in such instances , the online platform should inform without delay the competent law enforcement authorities of such suspicion , providing all relevant information available to it , including where relevant the content in question and an explanation of its suspicion. this regulation does not provide the legal basis for profiling of recipients of the services with a view to the possible identification of criminal offences by online platforms. online platforms should also respect other applicable rules of union or national law for the protection of the rights and freedoms of individuals when informing law enforcement authorities.


### (58) very large online platforms should deploy the necessary means to diligently mitigate the systemic risks identified in the risk assessment. very large online platforms should under such mitigating measures consider , for example , enhancing or otherwise adapting the design and functioning of their content moderation , algorithmic recommender systems and online interfaces , so that they discourage and limit the dissemination of illegal content , adapting their decision-making processes , or adapting their terms and conditions. they may also include corrective measures , such as discontinuing advertising revenue for specific content , or other actions , such as improving the visibility of authoritative information sources. very large online platforms may reinforce their internal processes or supervision of any of their activities , in particular as regards the detection of systemic risks. they may also initiate or increase cooperation with trusted flaggers , organise training sessions and exchanges with trusted flagger organisations , and cooperate with other service providers , including by initiating or joining existing codes of conduct or other self-regulatory measures. any measures adopted should respect the due diligence requirements of this regulation and be effective and appropriate for mitigating the specific risks identified , in the interest of safeguarding public order , protecting privacy and fighting fraudulent and deceptive commercial practices , and should be proportionate in light of the very large online platform’s economic capacity and the need to avoid unnecessary restrictions on the use of their service , taking due account of potential negative effects on the fundamental rights of the recipients of the service. ### (58) very large online platforms should deploy the necessary means to diligently mitigate the adverse impacts identified in the fundamental rights impact assessment. very large online platforms should under such mitigating measures consider , for example , enhancing or otherwise adapting the design and functioning of their content moderation , algorithmic recommender systems and online interfaces , so that they discourage and limit the dissemination of illegal content , adapting their decision-making processes , or adapting their terms and conditions. they may also include corrective measures , such as discontinuing advertising revenue for specific content , or other actions , such as improving the visibility of authoritative information sources. very large online platforms may reinforce their internal processes or supervision of any of their activities , in particular as regards the detection of adverse impacts. they may also initiate or increase cooperation with trusted flaggers , organise training sessions and exchanges with trusted flagger organisations , and cooperate with other service providers. any measures adopted should respect the due diligence requirements of this regulation and be effective and appropriate for mitigating the specific adverse impact identified on the fundamental rights of the recipients of the service.


### (60) given the need to ensure verification by independent experts , very large online platforms should be accountable , through independent auditing , for their compliance with the obligations laid down by this regulation and , where relevant , any complementary commitments undertaking pursuant to codes of conduct and crises protocols. they should give the auditor access to all relevant data necessary to perform the audit properly. auditors should also be able to make use of other sources of objective information , including studies by vetted researchers. auditors should guarantee the confidentiality , security and integrity of the information , such as trade secrets , that they obtain when performing their tasks and have the necessary expertise in the area of risk management and technical competence to audit algorithms. auditors should be independent , so as to be able to perform their tasks in an adequate and trustworthy manner. if their independence is not beyond doubt , they should resign or abstain from the audit engagement. ### (60) given the need to ensure verification by independent experts , very large online platforms should be accountable , through independent auditing , for their compliance with the obligations laid down by this regulation. they should give the fundamental rights agency and the audit or access to all relevant data necessary to perform the audit properly. the fundamental rights agency and the auditors should also be able to make use of other sources of objective information , including studies by vetted researchers. the fundamental rights agency and the auditors should guarantee the confidentiality , security and integrity of the information , such as trade secrets in line with directive(eu) 2016/943 , that they obtain when performing their tasks and have the necessary expertise in the area of risk management and technical competence to audit algorithms. auditors should be independent , so as to be able to perform their tasks in an adequate and trustworthy manner. if their independence is not beyond doubt , they should resign or abstain from the audit engagement.


### (70) the provision of online advertising generally involves several actors , including intermediary services that connect publishers of advertising with advertisers. codes of conducts should support and complement the transparency obligations relating to advertisement for online platforms and very large online platforms set out in this regulation in order to provide for flexible and effective mechanisms to facilitate and enhance the compliance with those obligations , notably as concerns the modalities of the transmission of the relevant information. the involvement of a wide range of stakeholders should ensure that those codes of conduct are widely supported , technically sound , effective and offer the highest levels of user-friendliness to ensure that the transparency obligations achieve their objectives. ### (70) the provision of online advertising generally involves several actors , including intermediary services that connect publishers of advertising with advertisers. codes of conducts may support and complement the transparency obligations relating to advertisement for online platforms and very large online platforms set out in this regulation in order to provide for flexible and effective mechanisms to facilitate and enhance the compliance with those obligations , notably as concerns the modalities of the transmission of the relevant information.


### article 6 ### deleted


### 2. providers of intermediary services shall act in a diligent , objective and proportionate manner in applying and enforcing the restrictions referred to in paragraph 1 , with due regard to the rights and legitimate interests of all parties involved , including the applicable fundamental rights of the recipients of the service as enshrined in the charter. ### 2. providers of intermediary services shall act in a coherent , predictable , non-discriminatory , transparent , diligent , non-arbitrary and proportionate manner in applying and enforcing the restrictions referred to in paragraph 1 , in compliance with procedural safeguards and with due regard to the rights and legitimate interests of all parties involved , including the applicable fundamental rights of the recipients of the service as enshrined in the charter and relevant national law.


### 2. providers of intermediary services shall act in a diligent , objective and proportionate manner in applying and enforcing the restrictions referred to in paragraph 1 , with due regard to the rights and legitimate interests of all parties involved , including the applicable fundamental rights of the recipients of the service as enshrined in the charter. ### 2. providers of intermediary services shall act in a fair , transparent , coherent , predictable , non-discriminatory , diligent , non-arbitrary and proportionate manner in applying and enforcing the restrictions referred to in paragraph 1 , with due regard to the rights and legitimate interests of all parties involved , including the applicable fundamental rights of the recipients of the service as enshrined in the charter.


### 2. providers of intermediary services shall act in a diligent , objective and proportionate manner in applying and enforcing the restrictions referred to in paragraph 1 , with due regard to the rights and legitimate interests of all parties involved , including the applicable fundamental rights of the recipients of the service as enshrined in the charter. ### 2. providers of intermediary services shall act in a transparent , non-discriminatory , coherent , predictable , diligent , non-arbitrary and proportionate manner in applying and enforcing the restrictions referred to in paragraph 1 , with due regard to the rights and legitimate interests of all parties involved , including the applicable fundamental rights of the recipients of the service as enshrined in the charter.


### a clear indication of the electronic location of that information , in particular the exact url or urls , and , where necessary , additional information enabling the identification of the illegal content; ### a clear indication of the exact electronic location of that information , such as the exact url or urls or other identifiers where appropriate , and , where necessary , additional information enabling the identification of the alleged illegal content;


### the name and an electronic mail address of the individual or entity submitting the notice , except in the case of information considered to involve one of the offences referred to in articles 3 to 7 of directive 2011/93/eu; ### deleted


### 4. where the notice contains the name and an electronic mail address of the individual or entity that submitted it , the provider of hosting services shall promptly send a confirmation of receipt of the notice to that individual or entity. ### 4. the individual or entity that submitted the notice shall be given the option to provide an electronic mail address to enable , the provider of hosting services to promptly send a confirmation of receipt of the notice to that individual or entity. where individuals decide to include their contact details in a notice , their anonymity towards the recipient of the service who provided the content shall be ensured , except in cases of alleged violations of personality rights or of intellectual property rights.


### where applicable , information on the use made of automated means in taking the decision , including where the decision was taken in respect of content detected or identified using automated means; ### where applicable , information on the means used in taking the decision , including where the decision was taken in respect of content detected or identified using automated means;


### 1. online platforms shall provide recipients of the service , for a period of at least six months following the decision referred to in this paragraph , the access to an effective internal complaint-handling system , which enables the complaints to be lodged electronically and free of charge , against the following decisions taken by the online platform on the ground that the information provided by the recipients is illegal content or incompatible with its terms and conditions: ### 1. online platforms shall provide recipients of the service and qualified entities as defined in article 3 , point (4) of directive (eu) 2020/18281a of the european parliament and of the council , for a period of at least six months following the decision referred to in this paragraph , the access to an effective internal complaint-handling system , which enables the complaints to be lodged electronically and free of charge , against the following decisions taken by the online platform:


### 1. online platforms shall provide recipients of the service , for a period of at least six months following the decision referred to in this paragraph , the access to an effective internal complaint-handling system , which enables the complaints to be lodged electronically and free of charge , against the following decisions taken by the online platform on the ground that the information provided by the recipients is illegal content or incompatible with its terms and conditions: ### 1. online platforms shall provide recipients of the service and qualified entities as defined in article 3 , point (4) of directive (eu) 2020/1828 , for a period of at least six months following the decision referred to in this paragraph , the access to an effective internal complaint-handling system , which enables the complaints to be lodged electronically and free of charge , against the following decisions taken by the online platform on the ground that the information provided by the recipients is illegal content or incompatible with its terms and conditions:


### 5. online platforms shall ensure that the decisions , referred to in paragraph 4 , are not solely taken on the basis of automated means. ### 5. online platforms shall ensure that the decisions , referred to in paragraph 4 , are not solely taken on the basis of automated means and are reviewed by qualified staff to whom adequate initial and ongoing training on the applicable legislation and international human rights standards as well as appropriate working conditions are to be provided , including , where relevant , professional support , qualified psychological assistance and legal advice.


### 5. online platforms shall ensure that the decisions , referred to in paragraph 4 , are not solely taken on the basis of automated means. ### 5. online platforms shall ensure that the decisions , referred to in paragraph 4 , are not solely taken on the basis of automated means and always includes meaningful human oversight.


### 1. recipients of the service addressed by the decisions referred to in article 17(1) , shall be entitled to select any out-of-court dispute that has been certified in accordance with paragraph 2 in order to resolve disputes relating to those decisions , including complaints that could not be resolved by means of the internal complaint-handling system referred to in that article. online platforms shall engage , in good faith , with the body selected with a view to resolving the dispute and shall be bound by the decision taken by the body. ### 1. recipients of the service addressed by the decisions referred to in article 17(1) and qualified entities as defined in article 3 , point (4) of directive (eu) 2020/1828 , shall be entitled to select any out-of-court dispute settlement body that has been certified in accordance with paragraph 2 in order to resolve disputes relating to those decisions , including complaints that could not be resolved by means of the internal complaint-handling system referred to in that article. online platforms shall engage , in good faith , with the body selected with a view to resolving the dispute and shall be bound by the decision taken by the body.


### 2. the digital services coordinator of the member state where the out-of-court dispute settlement body is established shall , at the request of that body , certify the body , where the body has demonstrated that it meets all of the following conditions: ### 2. the digital services coordinator of the member state where the independent out-of-court dispute settlement body is established shall , at the request of that body , certify the body for a maximum of three years , which can be renewed , where the body has demonstrated that it meets all of the following conditions:


### it is impartial and independent of online platforms and recipients of the service provided by the online platforms; ### it is impartial and independent of online platforms and recipients of the service or any third party involved in dispute , provided by the online platforms and its members are remunerated in a way that is not linked to the outcome of the procedure;


### it is impartial and independent of online platforms and recipients of the service provided by the online platforms; ### it is impartial and independent of online platforms and recipients of the service provided by the online platforms and its members are remunerated in a way that is not linked to the outcome of the procedure;


### it has the necessary expertise in relation to the issues arising in one or more particular areas of illegal content , or in relation to the application and enforcement of terms and conditions of one or more types of online platforms , allowing the body to contribute effectively to the settlement of a dispute; ### it has the necessary expertise in relation to the issues arising in one or more particular areas of illegal content , or in relation to the application and enforcement of terms and conditions of one or more types of online platforms , allowing the body to contribute effectively to the settlement of a dispute as well as a general understanding of law;


### it has the necessary expertise in relation to the issues arising in one or more particular areas of illegal content , or in relation to the application and enforcement of terms and conditions of one or more types of online platforms , allowing the body to contribute effectively to the settlement of a dispute; ### it has the necessary legal expertise in relation to the issues arising in one or more particular areas of illegal content , or in relation to the application and enforcement of terms and conditions of one or more types of online platforms , allowing the body to contribute effectively to the settlement of a dispute;


### the dispute settlement is easily accessible through electronic communication technology; ### the dispute settlement is easily accessible , including for persons with disabilities through electronic communication technology;


### the dispute settlement takes place in accordance with clear and fair rules of procedure. ### the dispute settlement takes place in accordance with clear and fair rules of procedure which are easily and publicly accessible;


### the dispute settlement takes place in accordance with clear and fair rules of procedure. ### the dispute settlement takes place in accordance with clear and fair rules of procedure which are easily and publicly accessible.


### 3. digital services coordinators shall communicate to the commission and the board the names , addresses and electronic mail addresses of the entities to which they have awarded the status of the trusted flagger in accordance with paragraph 2. ### 3. digital services coordinators and the commission shall communicate to the board the names , addresses and electronic mail addresses of the entities to which they have awarded the status of the trusted flagger in accordance with paragraph 2.


### 3. online platforms shall assess , on a case-by-case basis and in a timely , diligent and objective manner , whether a recipient , individual , entity or complainant engages in the misuse referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 , taking into account all relevant facts and circumstances apparent from the information available to the online platform. those circumstances shall include at least the following: ### 3. online platforms shall assess , on a case-by-case basis and in a timely , diligent and objective manner , whether a recipient , individual , entity or complainant engages in the misuse referred to in paragraph 2 , taking into account all relevant facts and circumstances apparent from the information available to the online platform. those circumstances shall include at least the following:


### the absolute numbers of items of manifestly illegal content or manifestly unfounded notices or complaints , submitted in the past year; ### the absolute numbers of items of manifestly unfounded notices or complaints , submitted in the past year;


### the gravity of the misuses and its consequences; ### the gravity of the misuses and its consequences in particular on the exercise of fundamental rights , regardless of the absolute numbers or relative proportion;


### 4. online platforms shall set out , in a clear and detailed manner , their policy in respect of the misuse referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 in their terms and conditions , including as regards the facts and circumstances that they take into account when assessing whether certain behaviour constitutes misuse and the duration of the suspension. ### 4. online platforms shall set out , in a clear and detailed manner , with due regard to their obligations under article 12(2) in particular as regards the applicable fundamental rights of the recipients of the service as enshrined in the charter , their policy in respect of the misuse referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 in their terms and conditions , including as regards the facts and circumstances that they take into account when assessing whether certain behaviour constitutes misuse and the duration of the suspension.


### 4. online platforms shall set out , in a clear and detailed manner , their policy in respect of the misuse referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 in their terms and conditions , including as regards the facts and circumstances that they take into account when assessing whether certain behaviour constitutes misuse and the duration of the suspension. ### 4. online platforms shall set out , in a clear and detailed manner , their policy in respect of the misuse referred to in paragraph 2 in their terms and conditions , including as regards the facts and circumstances that they take into account when assessing whether certain behaviour constitutes misuse and the duration of the suspension.


### 1. where an online platform becomes aware of any information giving rise to a suspicion that a serious criminal offence involving a threat to the life or safety of persons has taken place , is taking place or is likely to take place , it shall promptly inform the law enforcement or judicial authorities of the member state or member states concerned of its suspicion and provide all relevant information available. ### 1. where an online platform becomes aware of any information giving rise to a suspicion that a serious criminal offence involving a threat to the life of persons is imminent , it shall promptly inform the law enforcement or judicial authorities of the member state or member states concerned of its suspicion and provide the information that gave rise to it.


### the number of suspensions imposed pursuant to article 20 , distinguishing between suspensions enacted for the provision of manifestly illegal content , the submission of manifestly unfounded notices and the submission of manifestly unfounded complaints; ### the number of suspensions imposed pursuant to article 20 , distinguishing between the submission of manifestly unfounded notices and the submission of manifestly unfounded complaints;


### 4 additional obligations for very large online platforms to manage systemic risks ### 4 additional obligations for very large online platforms


### risk assessment ### fundamental rights impact assessment


### risk assessment ### impact assessment


### 1. very large online platforms shall identify , analyse and assess , from the date of application referred to in the second subparagraph of article 25(4) , at least once a year thereafter , any significant systemic risks stemming from the functioning and use made of their services in the union. this risk assessment shall be specific to their services and shall include the following systemic risks: ### 1. very large online platforms shall identify , analyse and assess , from the date of application referred to in the second subparagraph of article 25(4) , at least once a year thereafter , the impact of the functioning and use made of their services in the union on fundamental rights. this impact assessment shall be specific to their services and shall include the following adverse impacts:


### 1. very large online platforms shall identify , analyse and assess , from the date of application referred to in the second subparagraph of article 25(4) , at least once a year thereafter , any significant systemic risks stemming from the functioning and use made of their services in the union. this risk assessment shall be specific to their services and shall include the following systemic risks: ### 1. very large online platforms shall identify , analyse and assess , from the date of application referred to in the second subparagraph of article 25(4) , on an ongoing basis , the probability and severity of any significant systemic risks stemming from the functioning and use made of their services in the union. this risk assessment shall be specific to their services and shall include the following systemic risks:


### 1. very large online platforms shall identify , analyse and assess , from the date of application referred to in the second subparagraph of article 25(4) , at least once a year thereafter , any significant systemic risks stemming from the functioning and use made of their services in the union. this risk assessment shall be specific to their services and shall include the following systemic risks: ### 1. very large online platforms shall identify , analyse and assess , from the date of application referred to in the second subparagraph of article 25(4) , at least once a year thereafter , any adverse impact stemming from the functioning and use made of their services in the union. this impact assessment shall be specific to their services and shall include the following systemic risks:


### the dissemination of illegal content through their services; ### the dissemination of manifestly illegal content through their services;


### the dissemination of illegal content through their services; ### deleted


### any negative effects for the exercise of the fundamental rights to respect for private and family life , freedom of expression and information , the prohibition of discrimination and the rights of the child , as enshrined in articles 7 , 11 , 21 and 24 of the charter respectively; ### any negative effects for the exercise of fundamental rights , in particular the rights to respect for private and family life , freedom of expression and information including freedom and pluralism of media , the prohibition of discrimination and the rights of the child , as enshrined in the charter;


### any negative effects for the exercise of the fundamental rights to respect for private and family life , freedom of expression and information , the prohibition of discrimination and the rights of the child , as enshrined in articles 7 , 11 , 21 and 24 of the charter respectively; ### any negative effects for the exercise of the fundamental rights listed in the charter , in particular the right to respect for private and family life , freedom of expression and information , the prohibition of discrimination , the right to gender equality and the rights of the child , as enshrined in articles 7 , 11 , 21 , 23 and 24 of the charter respectively;


### any negative effects for the exercise of the fundamental rights to respect for private and family life , freedom of expression and information , the prohibition of discrimination and the rights of the child , as enshrined in articles 7 , 11 , 21 and 24 of the charter respectively; ### any negative effects for the exercise of fundamental rights , in particular the rights to respect for private and family life , freedom of expression and information , the prohibition of discrimination , algorithmic biases and the rights of the child , as enshrined in the charter respectively;


### intentional manipulation of their service , including by means of inauthentic use or automated exploitation of the service , with an actual or foreseeable negative effect on the protection of public health , minors , civic discourse , or actual or foreseeable effects related to electoral processes and public security. ### malfunctioning or intentional manipulation of their service , including by means of automated exploitation of the service , with an actual or foreseeable negative effect fundamental rights.


### intentional manipulation of their service , including by means of inauthentic use or automated exploitation of the service , with an actual or foreseeable negative effect on the protection of public health , minors , civic discourse , or actual or foreseeable effects related to electoral processes and public security. ### intentional manipulation of their service , including by means of automated exploitation of the service , with an actual or foreseeable negative effect on the protection of public health , minors , civic discourse , or actual or foreseeable effects related to electoral processes and public security.


### intentional manipulation of their service , including by means of inauthentic use or automated exploitation of the service , with an actual or foreseeable negative effect on the protection of public health , minors , civic discourse , or actual or foreseeable effects related to electoral processes and public security. ### malfunctioning or intentional manipulation of their service , including by means of automated exploitation of the service , with an actual or foreseeable negative effect on fundamental rights


### 2. when conducting risk assessments , very large online platforms shall take into account , in particular , how their content moderation systems , recommender systems and systems for selecting and displaying advertisement influence any of the systemic risks referred to in paragraph 1 , including the potentially rapid and wide dissemination of illegal content and of information that is incompatible with their terms and conditions. ### 2. when conducting impact assessments , very large online platforms shall take into account , in particular , the effects of their content moderation systems , recommender systems and systems for selecting and displaying advertisement , including the potentially rapid and wide dissemination of manifestly illegal content and of information that is incompatible with their terms and conditions.


### 2. when conducting risk assessments , very large online platforms shall take into account , in particular , how their content moderation systems , recommender systems and systems for selecting and displaying advertisement influence any of the systemic risks referred to in paragraph 1 , including the potentially rapid and wide dissemination of illegal content and of information that is incompatible with their terms and conditions. ### 2. when conducting risk assessments , very large online platforms shall take into account , in particular , how their content moderation systems , recommender systems and systems for selecting and displaying advertisement influence any of the systemic risks referred to in paragraph 1 , including the potentially rapid and wide dissemination of manifestly illegal content and of information that is incompatible with their terms and conditions.


### 2. when conducting risk assessments , very large online platforms shall take into account , in particular , how their content moderation systems , recommender systems and systems for selecting and displaying advertisement influence any of the systemic risks referred to in paragraph 1 , including the potentially rapid and wide dissemination of illegal content and of information that is incompatible with their terms and conditions. ### 2. when conducting risk assessments , very large online platforms shall take into account , in particular , the effects of their content moderation systems , recommender systems and systems for selecting and displaying advertisement.


### mitigation of risks ### mitigation of adverse impacts


### 1. very large online platforms shall put in place reasonable , proportionate and effective mitigation measures , tailored to the specific systemic risks identified pursuant to article 26. such measures may include , where applicable: ### 1. very large online platforms shall put in place reasonable , proportionate and effective mitigation measures , tailored to the specific adverse impacts identified pursuant to article 26 , where mitigation is possible without adversely impacting other fundamental rights. such measures may include , where applicable:


### 1. very large online platforms shall put in place reasonable , proportionate and effective mitigation measures , tailored to the specific systemic risks identified pursuant to article 26. such measures may include , where applicable: ### 1. very large online platforms may put in place reasonable , proportionate and effective mitigation measures , tailored to the specific adverse impact identified pursuant to article 26 , where mitigation is possible without adversely impacting other fundamental rights. such measures may include , where applicable:


### 1. very large online platforms shall put in place reasonable , proportionate and effective mitigation measures , tailored to the specific systemic risks identified pursuant to article 26. such measures may include , where applicable: ### 1. very large online platforms may put in place reasonable , proportionate and effective measures to cease , prevent and mitigate the specific systemic risks identified pursuant to article 26 without disproportionately impacting fundamental rights. such measures may include , where applicable:


### targeted measures aimed at limiting the display of advertisements in association with the service they provide; ### targeted measures aimed at limiting the display of advertisements or illegal content in association with the service they provide;


### initiating or adjusting cooperation with other online platforms through the codes of conduct and the crisis protocols referred to in article 35 and 37 respectively. ### deleted


### identification and assessment of the most prominent and recurrent systemic risks reported by very large online platforms or identified through other information sources , in particular those provided in compliance with article 31 and 33; ### identification and assessment of the most prominent and recurrent adverse impacts reported by very large online platforms or identified through other information sources , in particular those provided in compliance with article 31 and 33;


### best practices for very large online platforms to mitigate the systemic risks identified. ### best practices for very large online platforms to mitigate the adverse impacts identified.


### 3. the commission , in cooperation with the digital services coordinators , may issue general guidelines on the application of paragraph 1 in relation to specific risks , in particular to present best practices and recommend possible measures , having due regard to the possible consequences of the measures on fundamental rights enshrined in the charter of all parties involved. when preparing those guidelines the commission shall organise public consultations. ### 3. the commission , in cooperation with the digital services coordinators , may issue general recommendations on the application of paragraph 1 in relation to specific adverse impacts , in particular to present best practices and recommend possible measures , having due regard to the possible consequences of the measures on fundamental rights enshrined in the charter of all parties involved. when preparing those recommendations the commission shall organise public consultations.


### 3. the commission , in cooperation with the digital services coordinators , may issue general guidelines on the application of paragraph 1 in relation to specific risks , in particular to present best practices and recommend possible measures , having due regard to the possible consequences of the measures on fundamental rights enshrined in the charter of all parties involved. when preparing those guidelines the commission shall organise public consultations. ### 3. the commission , in cooperation with the digital services coordinators , may issue general recommendations on the application of paragraph 1 , in particular to present best practices and propose possible measures , having due regard to the possible consequences of the measures on fundamental rights enshrined in the charter of all parties involved. when preparing those recommendations the commission shall organise public consultations.


### 3. the commission , in cooperation with the digital services coordinators , may issue general guidelines on the application of paragraph 1 in relation to specific risks , in particular to present best practices and recommend possible measures , having due regard to the possible consequences of the measures on fundamental rights enshrined in the charter of all parties involved. when preparing those guidelines the commission shall organise public consultations. ### 3. the commission , in cooperation with the digital services coordinators , may issue general recommendations on the application of paragraph 1 in relation to specific risks , in particular to present best practices and recommend possible measures , having due regard to the possible consequences of the measures on fundamental rights enshrined in the charter of all parties involved. when preparing those recommendations the commission shall organise public consultations.


### 1. very large online platforms shall be subject , at their own expense and at least once a year , to audits to assess compliance with the following: ### 1. very large online platforms shall be subject , at their own expense and at least once a year , to audits to assess compliance with the:


### 1. very large online platforms shall be subject , at their own expense and at least once a year , to audits to assess compliance with the following: ### 1. very large online platforms shall be subject , at their own expense and at least once a year , to audits to assess compliance with the


### 1. very large online platforms shall be subject , at their own expense and at least once a year , to audits to assess compliance with the following: ### 1. very large online platforms shall be subject , at their own expense and at least once a year , to independent audits to assess compliance with the following:


### any commitments undertaken pursuant to the codes of conduct referred to in articles 35 and 36 and the crisis protocols referred to in article 37. ### deleted


### 2. audits performed pursuant to paragraph 1 shall be performed by organisations which: ### 2. audits performed pursuant to paragraph 1 shall be performed the european union agency for fundamental rights. the agency may decide to perform the audit in collaboration with by organisations which:


### 2. audits performed pursuant to paragraph 1 shall be performed by organisations which: ### 2. audits performed pursuant to paragraphs 1 and 1a shall be performed by organisations which:


### 2. upon a reasoned request from the digital services coordinator of establishment or the commission , very large online platforms shall , within a reasonable period , as specified in the request , provide access to data to vetted researchers who meet the requirements in paragraphs 4 of this article , for the sole purpose of conducting research that contributes to the identification and understanding of systemic risks as set out in article 26(1). ### 2. with regards to moderation and recommendation systems , very large online platforms shall make publicly available and communicate to the digital services coordinator of establishment and/or the commission upon request access to algorithms by providing the relevant source code and associated data that allow the detection of possible biases or threats to fundamental rights including freedom of expression. when disclosing these data , very large online platforms shall have a duty of explainability and ensure close cooperation with the digital services coordinator or the commission to make moderation and recommender systems fully understandable. when a bias is detected , very large online platforms should correct it expeditiously following requirements from the digital services coordinator of establishment or the commission. very large online platforms shall be able to demonstrate their compliance at every step of the process pursuant to this article.


### 5. the commission shall , after consulting the board , adopt delegated acts laying down the technical conditions under which very large online platforms are to share data pursuant to paragraphs 1 and 2 and the purposes for which the data may be used. those delegated acts shall lay down the specific conditions under which such sharing of data with vetted researchers can take place in compliance with regulation (eu) 2016/679 , taking into account the rights and interests of the very large online platforms and the recipients of the service concerned , including the protection of confidential information , in particular trade secrets , and maintaining the security of their service. ### 5. the commission shall , after consulting the board , adopt delegated acts laying down the technical conditions under which very large online platforms are to share data pursuant to paragraphs 1 and 2 and the purposes for which the data may be used. those delegated acts shall lay down the specific conditions under which such sharing of data can take place in compliance with regulation (eu) 2016/679 , taking into account the rights and interests of the very large online platforms and the recipients of the service concerned , including the protection of confidential information , in particular trade secrets in line with directive (eu) 2016/943 and maintaining the security of their service.


### 6. within 15 days following receipt of a request as referred to in paragraph 1 and 2 , a very large online platform may request the digital services coordinator of establishment or the commission , as applicable , to amend the request , where it considers that it is unable to give access to the data requested because one of following two reasons: ### deleted


### it does not have access to the data; ### deleted


### giving access to the data will lead to significant vulnerabilities for the security of its service or the protection of confidential information , in particular trade secrets. ### deleted


### 7. requests for amendment pursuant to point (b) of paragraph 6 shall contain proposals for one or more alternative means through which access may be provided to the requested data or other data which are appropriate and sufficient for the purpose of the request. ### deleted


### the digital services coordinator of establishment or the commission shall decide upon the request for amendment within 15 days and communicate to the very large online platform its decision and , where relevant , the amended request and the new time period to comply with the request. ### deleted


### 2. where significant systemic risk within the meaning of article 26(1) emerge and concern several very large online platforms , the commission may invite the very large online platforms concerned , other very large online platforms , other online platforms and other providers of intermediary services , as appropriate , as well as civil society organisations and other interested parties , to participate in the drawing up of codes of conduct , including by setting out commitments to take specific risk mitigation measures , as well as a regular reporting framework on any measures taken and their outcomes. ### 2. where significant adverse impacts within the meaning of article 26(1) emerge and concern several very large online platforms , the commission may invite the very large online platforms concerned , other very large online platforms , other online platforms and other providers of intermediary services , as appropriate , as well as civil society organisations and other interested parties , to participate in the drawing up of codes of conduct , including by setting out commitments to take specific risk mitigation measures , as well as a regular reporting framework on any measures taken and their outcomes.


### 2. where significant systemic risk within the meaning of article 26(1) emerge and concern several very large online platforms , the commission may invite the very large online platforms concerned , other very large online platforms , other online platforms and other providers of intermediary services , as appropriate , as well as civil society organisations and other interested parties , to participate in the drawing up of codes of conduct , including by setting out commitments to take specific risk mitigation measures , as well as a regular reporting framework on any measures taken and their outcomes. ### 2. where significant systemic risk within the meaning of article 26(1) emerge and concern several very large online platforms , the commission may invite the very large online platforms concerned , other very large online platforms , other online platforms and other providers of intermediary services , as appropriate , as well as civil society organisations , including civil society organisations working on gender equality , experts on fundamental rights and other interested parties , to participate in the drawing up of codes of conduct , including by setting out commitments to take specific risk mitigation measures , as well as a regular reporting framework on any measures taken and their outcomes.


### 3. when giving effect to paragraphs 1 and 2 , the commission and the board shall aim to ensure that the codes of conduct clearly set out their objectives , contain key performance indicators to measure the achievement of those objectives and take due account of the needs and interests of all interested parties , including citizens , at union level. the commission and the board shall also aim to ensure that participants report regularly to the commission and their respective digital service coordinators of establishment on any measures taken and their outcomes , as measured against the key performance indicators that they contain. ### deleted


### 4. the commission and the board shall assess whether the codes of conduct meet the aims specified in paragraphs 1 and 3 , and shall regularly monitor and evaluate the achievement of their objectives. they shall publish their conclusions. ### 4. the commission and the board may assess whether the codes of conduct meet the aims specified in paragraphs 1 and 3 , and may regularly monitor and evaluate the achievement of their objectives. they shall publish their conclusions.


### displaying prominent information on the crisis situation provided by member states’ authorities or at union level; ### displaying prominent information on the crisis situation provided by member states’ authorities or at union level which are also accessible for persons with disabilities;


### 3. the commission may involve , as appropriate , member states’ authorities and union bodies , offices and agencies in drawing up , testing and supervising the application of the crisis protocols. the commission may , where necessary and appropriate , also involve civil society organisations or other relevant organisations in drawing up the crisis protocols. ### 3. the commission may involve , as appropriate , member states’ authorities and union bodies , offices and agencies in drawing up , testing and supervising the application of the crisis protocols.


### the obligations set out in chapter iii; ### obligations set out in chapter iii


### 5. the board may invite experts and observers to attend its meetings , and may cooperate with other union bodies , offices , agencies and advisory groups , as well as external experts as appropriate. the board shall make the results of this cooperation publicly available. ### 5. the board may invite experts and observers to attend its meetings , in particular on fundamental rights and gender equality , and may cooperate with other union bodies , offices , agencies and advisory groups , as well as external experts as appropriate. the board shall make the results of this cooperation publicly available.


### the content moderation engaged in at the providers’ own initiative , including the number and type of measures taken that affect the availability , visibility and accessibility of information provided by the recipients of the service and the recipients’ ability to provide information , categorised by the type of reason and basis for taking those measures; ### the content moderation engaged in at the providers’ own initiative , including the number and type of measures taken that affect the availability , visibility and accessibility of information provided by the recipients of the service and the recipients’ ability to provide information , categorised by the type of reason and basis for taking those measures , as well as the measures taken to qualify content moderators and to ensure that non-infringing content is not affected;


### the content moderation engaged in at the providers’ own initiative , including the number and type of measures taken that affect the availability , visibility and accessibility of information provided by the recipients of the service and the recipients’ ability to provide information , categorised by the type of reason and basis for taking those measures; ### the content moderation engaged in at the providers’ own initiative , including the number and type of measures taken that affect the availability , visibility and accessibility of information provided by the recipients of the service and the recipients’ ability to provide information , categorised by the type of reason and basis for taking those measures , as well as the measures taken to train content moderators and the safeguards to ensure that non-infringing content is not affected;


### a statement confirming the good faith belief of the individual or entity submitting the notice that the information and allegations contained therein are accurate and complete. ### a statement confirming the good faith belief of the individual or entity submitting the notice that the information and allegations contained therein are accurate and complete.


### whether the decision entails either the removal of , or the disabling of access to , the information and , where relevant , the territorial scope of the disabling of access; ### whether the decision entails either the removal of , or the disabling of access to or the restricting of proposals by recommender systems of , the information and , where relevant , the territorial scope of the disabling of access or the restricting of proposals;


### 4. providers of hosting services shall publish the decisions and the statements of reasons , referred to in paragraph 1 in a publicly accessible database managed by the commission. that information shall not contain personal data. ### 4. providers of hosting services shall publish the decisions and the statements of reasons , referred to in paragraph 1 in a publicly accessible and machine-readable database managed by the commission. that information shall not contain personal data.


### 3. if the body decides the dispute in favour of the recipient of the service , the online platform shall reimburse the recipient for any fees and other reasonable expenses that the recipient has paid or is to pay in relation to the dispute settlement. if the body decides the dispute in favour of the online platform , the recipient shall not be required to reimburse any fees or other expenses that the online platform paid or is to pay in relation to the dispute settlement. ### 3. if the body decides the dispute in favour of the recipient of the service , the online platform shall reimburse the recipient for any fees and other reasonable expenses that the recipient has paid or is to pay in relation to the dispute settlement. if the body decides the dispute in favour of the online platform , the recipient shall not be required to reimburse any fees or other expenses that the online platform paid or is to pay in relation to the dispute settlement. out-of-court dispute settlement procedures shall preferably be free of charge for the recipient of the service. in the event that costs are applied , the procedure shall be ac-accessible , attractive and inexpensive for recipients of the service. to that end , costs shall not exceed a nominal fee.


### 3. if the body decides the dispute in favour of the recipient of the service , the online platform shall reimburse the recipient for any fees and other reasonable expenses that the recipient has paid or is to pay in relation to the dispute settlement. if the body decides the dispute in favour of the online platform , the recipient shall not be required to reimburse any fees or other expenses that the online platform paid or is to pay in relation to the dispute settlement. ### 3. if the body decides the dispute in favour of the recipient of the service , the online platform shall reimburse the recipient for any fees and other reasonable expenses that the recipient has paid or is to pay in relation to the dispute settlement. if the body decides the dispute in favour of the online platform , the recipient shall never be required to reimburse any fees or other expenses that the online platform paid or is to pay in relation to the dispute settlement.


### for the purpose of this article , the member state concerned shall be the member state where the offence is suspected to have taken place , be taking place and likely to take place , or the member state where the suspected offender resides or is located , or the member state where the victim of the suspected offence resides or is located. ### for the purpose of this article , the member state concerned shall be the member state where the offence is suspected to be taking place and likely to take place , or the member state where the suspected offender resides or is located , or the member state where the victim of the suspected offence resides or is located.


### reinforcing the internal processes or supervision of any of their activities in particular as regards detection of systemic risk; ### reinforcing the internal processes or supervision of any of their activities;


### initiating or adjusting cooperation with trusted flaggers in accordance with article 19; ### deleted


### (69) the rules on codes of conduct under this regulation could serve as a basis for already established self-regulatory efforts at union level , including the product safety pledge , the memorandum of understanding against counterfeit goods , the code of conduct against illegal hate speech as well as the code of practice on disinformation. in particular for the latter , the commission will issue guidance for strengthening the code of practice on disinformation as announced in the european democracy action plan. ### (69) the rules on codes of conduct under this regulation could serve as a basis for already established self-regulatory efforts at union level , including the product safety pledge , the memorandum of understanding against counterfeit goods , the code of conduct against illegal hate speech as well as the code of practice on disinformation.


### union law on copyright and related rights; ### deleted


### 3. very large online platforms shall provide access to data pursuant to paragraphs 1 and 2 through online databases or application programming interfaces , as appropriate. ### deleted


### 3. very large online platforms shall provide access to data pursuant to paragraphs 1 and 2 through online databases or application programming interfaces , as appropriate. ### 3. very large online platforms shall provide access to data pursuant to paragraphs 1 and 2 through online databases or application programming interfaces , as appropriate. this shall include personal data only where it is lawfully accessible to the public.


### a report setting out the results of the risk assessment pursuant to article 26; ### a report setting out the results of the impact assessment pursuant to article 26;


### the related risk mitigation measures identified and implemented pursuant to article 27; ### the related mitigation measures identified and implemented pursuant to article 27;


### 1. member states shall lay down the rules on penalties applicable to infringements of this regulation by providers of intermediary services under their jurisdiction and shall take all the necessary measures to ensure that they are implemented in accordance with article 41. ### 1. the commission shall lay down the rules on penalties applicable to infringements of this regulation by providers of intermediary services.


### 2. penalties shall be effective , proportionate and dissuasive. member states shall notify the commission of those rules and of those measures and shall notify it , without delay , of any subsequent amendments affecting them. ### 2. penalties shall be effective , proportionate and dissuasive.


### right to lodge a complaint ### right to lodge a complaint and right to an effective judicial remedy


### the number and subject matter of orders to act against illegal content and orders to provide information issued in accordance with articles 8 and 9 by any national judicial or administrative authority of the member state of the digital services coordinator concerned; ### the number and subject matter of orders to act against illegal content and orders to provide information issued in accordance with articles 8 and 9 by any national judicial authority of the member state of the digital services coordinator concerned;


### 1. if , during proceedings under this section , the very large online platform concerned offers commitments to ensure compliance with the relevant provisions of this regulation , the commission may by decision make those commitments binding on the very large online platform concerned and declare that there are no further grounds for action. ### 1. if , during proceedings under this section , the very large online platform concerned offers lawful commitments to ensure compliance with the relevant provisions of this regulation , the commission may by decision make those commitments binding on the very large online platform concerned and declare that there are no further grounds for action.


### where the very large online platform concerned acts contrary to its commitments; or ### where the very large online platform concerned acts contrary to its lawful commitments; or


### without prejudice to directive 2020/xx/eu of the european parliament and of the council52 , recipients of intermediary services shall have the right to mandate a body , organisation or association to exercise the rights referred to in articles 17 , 18 and 19 on their behalf , provided the body , organisation or association meets all of the following conditions: ### without prejudice to directive 2020/xx/eu of the european parliament and of the council52 , recipients of intermediary services shall have the right to mandate a body , organisation or association to exercise the rights referred to in articles 12 , 13 , 14 , 15 , 17 , 18 and 19 on their behalf , provided the body , organisation or association meets all of the following conditions:


### 2. the status of trusted flaggers under this regulation shall be awarded , upon application by any entities , by the digital services coordinator of the member state in which the applicant is established , where the applicant has demonstrated to meet all of the following conditions: ### 2. the status of trusted flaggers under this regulation shall be awarded , upon application by any entities , by the digital services coordinator of the member state in which the applicant is established or by the commission , where the applicant has demonstrated to meet all of the following conditions:


### a copy of the identification document of the trader or any other electronic identification as defined by article 3 of regulation (eu) no 910/2014 of the european parliament and of the council50 ; ### deleted


### 4. member states shall ensure that the maximum amount of a periodic penalty payment shall not exceed 5 % of the average daily turnover of the provider of intermediary services concerned in the preceding financial year per day , calculated from the date specified in the decision concerned. ### 4. the commission shall ensure that the maximum amount of a periodic penalty payment shall not exceed 5 % of the average daily turnover of the provider of intermediary services concerned in the preceding financial year per day , calculated from the date specified in the decision concerned.


### 7. for each gatekeeper identified pursuant to paragraph 4 or paragraph 6 , the commission shall identify the relevant undertaking to which it belongs and list the relevant core platform services that are provided within that same undertaking and which individually serve as an important gateway for business users to reach end users as referred to in paragraph 1(b). ### 7. for each gatekeeper identified pursuant to paragraph 4 or paragraph 6 , the commission shall identify within the deadline set under paragraph 4 the relevant undertaking to which it belongs and list the relevant core platform services that are provided within that same undertaking and which individually serve as an important gateway for business users and end users to reach end users as referred to in paragraph 1(b).


### 7. for each gatekeeper identified pursuant to paragraph 4 or paragraph 6 , the commission shall identify the relevant undertaking to which it belongs and list the relevant core platform services that are provided within that same undertaking and which individually serve as an important gateway for business users to reach end users as referred to in paragraph 1(b). ### 7. for each gatekeeper identified pursuant to paragraph 4 or paragraph 6 , the commission shall identify the relevant undertaking to which it belongs and list the relevant core platform services that are provided within that same undertaking and which individually serve as an important gateway for business users or end users to reach end users or business users as referred to in paragraph 1(b).


### 8. the gatekeeper shall comply with the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6 within six months after a core platform service has been included in the list pursuant to paragraph 7 of this article. ### 8. the gatekeeper shall comply with the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6 within three months after a core platform service has been included in the list pursuant to paragraph 7 of this article.


### 3. the commission shall publish and update the list of gatekeepers and the list of the core platform services for which they need to comply with the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6 on an on-going basis. ### 3. the commission shall publish and update the list of gatekeepers and the list of the core platform services for which they need to comply with the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6 on an on-going basis. the commission shall publish an annual report setting out the findings of its monitoring activities and present it to the european parliament and the council.


### refrain from combining personal data sourced from these core platform services with personal data from any other services offered by the gatekeeper or with personal data from third-party services , and from signing in end users to other services of the gatekeeper in order to combine personal data , unless the end user has been presented with the specific choice and provided consent in the sense of regulation (eu) 2016/679. ; ### refrain from combining personal data sourced from these core platform services with personal data from any other services offered by the gatekeeper or with personal data from third-party services , and from signing in end users to other services of the gatekeeper in order to combine personal data;


### refrain from combining personal data sourced from these core platform services with personal data from any other services offered by the gatekeeper or with personal data from third-party services , and from signing in end users to other services of the gatekeeper in order to combine personal data , unless the end user has been presented with the specific choice and provided consent in the sense of regulation (eu) 2016/679. ; ### refrain from combining personal data sourced from these core platform services with personal data from any other services offered by the gatekeeper or with personal data from third-party services , and from signing in end users to other services of the gatekeeper in order to combine personal data.


### refrain from combining personal data sourced from these core platform services with personal data from any other services offered by the gatekeeper or with personal data from third-party services , and from signing in end users to other services of the gatekeeper in order to combine personal data , unless the end user has been presented with the specific choice and provided consent in the sense of regulation (eu) 2016/679. ; ### refrain from combining personal data sourced from these core platform services with personal data from any other services offered by the gatekeeper or with personal data from third-party services , and from signing in business users or end users to other services of the gatekeeper in order to combine personal data , unless the end user has been presented with the specific choice and provided consent in the sense of regulation (eu) 2016/679;


### refrain from combining personal data sourced from these core platform services with personal data from any other services offered by the gatekeeper or with personal data from third-party services , and from signing in end users to other services of the gatekeeper in order to combine personal data , unless the end user has been presented with the specific choice and provided consent in the sense of regulation (eu) 2016/679; ### refrain from combining personal data sourced from these core platform services with personal data from any other services offered by the gatekeeper or with personal data from third-party services , and from signing in business users or end users to other services of the gatekeeper in order to combine personal data;


### allow business users to offer the same products or services to end users through third party online intermediation services at prices or conditions that are different from those offered through the online intermediation services of the gatekeeper; ### allow business users to offer the same products or services to end users through third party online intermediation services or through direct business channels at prices or conditions that are different from those offered through the online intermediation services of the gatekeeper;


### allow business users to offer the same products or services to end users through third party online intermediation services at prices or conditions that are different from those offered through the online intermediation services of the gatekeeper; ### allow business users to offer the same products or services to end users through third party online intermediation services or through their own direct sales channels at prices or conditions that are different from those offered through the online intermediation services of the gatekeeper;


### (1) digital services in general and online platforms in particular play an increasingly important role in the economy , in particular in the internal market , by providing new business opportunities in the union and facilitating cross-border trading. ### (1) digital services in general and online platforms in particular play an increasingly important role in the economy , in particular in the internal market , by providing new business opportunities in the union and facilitating cross-border trading but also to the benefit of consumers with a greater choice in products and services provided.


### (1) digital services in general and online platforms in particular play an increasingly important role in the economy , in particular in the internal market , by providing new business opportunities in the union and facilitating cross-border trading. ### (1) digital services in general and online platforms in particular play an increasingly important role in the economy , in particular in the internal market , by providing new business opportunities in the union and facilitating cross-border trading but also to the benefit of consumers leading to a greater choice in products and services provided.


### (1) digital services in general and online platforms in particular play an increasingly important role in the economy , in particular in the internal market , by providing new business opportunities in the union and facilitating cross-border trading. ### (1) digital services in general and online platforms in particular play an increasingly important role in the economy , in particular in the internal market , by providing new business opportunities in the union and facilitating cross-border trading and a greater choice in products and services provided to the consumers and business users.


### (2) core platform services , at the same time , feature a number of characteristics that can be exploited by their providers. these characteristics of core platform services include among others extreme scale economies , which often result from nearly zero marginal costs to add business users or end users. other characteristics of core platform services are very strong network effects , an ability to connect many business users with many end users through the multi-sidedness of these services , a significant degree of dependence of both business users and end users , lock-in effects , a lack of multi-homing for the same purpose by end users , vertical integration , and data driven-advantages. all these characteristics combined with unfair conduct by providers of these services can have the effect of substantially undermining the contestability of the core platform services , as well as impacting the fairness of the commercial relationship between providers of such services and their business users and end users , leading to rapid and potentially far-reaching decreases in business users’ and end users’ choice in practice , and therefore can confer to the provider of those services the position of a so-called gatekeeper. ### (2) core platform services , at the same time , feature a number of characteristics that can be exploited by their providers. these characteristics of core platform services include among others extreme scale economies , which often result from nearly zero marginal costs to add business users or end users. other characteristics of core platform services are very strong network effects , an ability to connect many business users with many end users through the multi-sidedness of these services , a significant degree of dependence of both business users and end users , lock-in effects , a lack of multi-homing for the same purpose by end users , vertical integration , and data driven-advantages. all these characteristics combined with unfair conduct by providers of these services can have the effect of substantially undermining the contestability of the core platform services , as well as impacting the fairness of the commercial relationship between providers of such services and their business users and end users , and lowering of consumer protection standards; leading to rapid and potentially far-reaching decreases in business users’ and end users’ choice in practice , and therefore can confer to the provider of those services the position of a so-called gatekeeper. end users are similarly affected by unfair practices by gatekeepers and their interests should be taken into account in the obligations to be imposed under this regulation.


### (2) core platform services , at the same time , feature a number of characteristics that can be exploited by their providers. these characteristics of core platform services include among others extreme scale economies , which often result from nearly zero marginal costs to add business users or end users. other characteristics of core platform services are very strong network effects , an ability to connect many business users with many end users through the multi-sidedness of these services , a significant degree of dependence of both business users and end users , lock-in effects , a lack of multi-homing for the same purpose by end users , vertical integration , and data driven-advantages. all these characteristics combined with unfair conduct by providers of these services can have the effect of substantially undermining the contestability of the core platform services , as well as impacting the fairness of the commercial relationship between providers of such services and their business users and end users , leading to rapid and potentially far-reaching decreases in business users’ and end users’ choice in practice , and therefore can confer to the provider of those services the position of a so-called gatekeeper. ### (2) core platform services , at the same time , feature a number of characteristics that can be exploited by their providers. these characteristics of core platform services include among others extreme scale economies , which often result from nearly zero marginal costs to add business users or end users. other characteristics of core platform services are very strong network effects , an ability to connect many business users with many end users through the multi-sidedness of these services , a significant degree of dependence of both business users and end users , lock-in effects , a lack of multi-homing for the same purpose by end users , vertical integration , and data driven-advantages. all these characteristics combined with unfair conduct by providers of these services can have the effect of substantially undermining the contestability of the core platform services , as well as impacting the fairness of the commercial relationship between providers of such services and their business users and end users , leading to rapid and potentially far-reaching decreases in business users’ and end users’ choice in practice , lowering of consumer protection standards , and therefore can confer to the provider of those services the position of a so-called gatekeeper. end users are similarly affected by unfair practices by gatekeepers and their interests should be taken into account in the obligations to be imposed under this regulation.


### (2) core platform services , at the same time , feature a number of characteristics that can be exploited by their providers. these characteristics of core platform services include among others extreme scale economies , which often result from nearly zero marginal costs to add business users or end users. other characteristics of core platform services are very strong network effects , an ability to connect many business users with many end users through the multi-sidedness of these services , a significant degree of dependence of both business users and end users , lock-in effects , a lack of multi-homing for the same purpose by end users , vertical integration , and data driven-advantages. all these characteristics combined with unfair conduct by providers of these services can have the effect of substantially undermining the contestability of the core platform services , as well as impacting the fairness of the commercial relationship between providers of such services and their business users and end users , leading to rapid and potentially far-reaching decreases in business users’ and end users’ choice in practice , and therefore can confer to the provider of those services the position of a so-called gatekeeper. ### (2) core platform services , at the same time , feature a number of characteristics that can be exploited by their providers. these characteristics of core platform services include among others extreme scale economies , which often result from nearly zero marginal costs to add business users or end users. other characteristics of core platform services are very strong network effects , an ability to connect many business users with many end users through the multi-sidedness of these services , a significant degree of dependence of both business users and end users , lock-in effects , a lack of multi-homing for the same purpose by end users , vertical integration , and data driven-advantages. all these characteristics combined with unfair conduct by providers of these services can have the effect of substantially undermining the contestability of the core platform services , as well as impacting the fairness of the commercial relationship between providers of such services and their business users and end users , leading to rapid and potentially far-reaching decreases in business users’ and end users’ choice in practice , and therefore can confer to the provider of those services the position of a so-called gatekeeper. it is important to note that end users are similarly affected by unfair practices by gatekeepers and their interests should be taken into account in the obligations to be imposed under this regulation.


### (10) articles 101 and 102 tfeu and the corresponding national competition rules concerning anticompetitive multilateral and unilateral conduct as well as merger control have as their objective the protection of undistorted competition on the market. this regulation pursues an objective that is complementary to , but different from that of protecting undistorted competition on any given market , as defined in competition-law terms , which is to ensure that markets where gatekeepers are present are and remain contestable and fair , independently from the actual , likely or presumed effects of the conduct of a given gatekeeper covered by this regulation on competition on a given market. this regulation therefore aims at protecting a different legal interest from those rules and should be without prejudice to their application. ### (10) articles 101 and 102 tfeu and the corresponding national competition rules concerning anticompetitive multilateral and unilateral conduct as well as merger control have as their objective the protection of undistorted competition on the market. this regulation pursues an objective that is complementary to , but different from that of protecting undistorted competition on any given market , as defined in competition-law terms , which is to ensure that markets where gatekeepers are present are and remain contestable and fair , independently from the actual , likely or presumed effects of the conduct of a given gatekeeper covered by this regulation on competition on a given market. this regulation therefore aims at protecting a different legal interest from those rules and complement their application.