### (17) a very significant turnover in the union and the provision of a core platform service in at least three member states constitute compelling indications that the provider of a core platform service has a significant impact on the internal market. this is equally true where a provider of a core platform service in at least three member states has a very significant market capitalisation or equivalent fair market value. therefore , a provider of a core platform service should be presumed to have a significant impact on the internal market where it provides a core platform service in at least three member states and where either its group turnover realised in the eea is equal to or exceeds a specific , high threshold or the market capitalisation of the group is equal to or exceeds a certain high absolute value. for providers of core platform services that belong to undertakings that are not publicly listed , the equivalent fair market value above a certain high absolute value should be referred to. the commission should use its power to adopt delegated acts to develop an objective methodology to calculate that value. a high eea group turnover in conjunction with the threshold of users in the union of core platform services reflects a relatively strong ability to monetise these users. a high market capitalisation relative to the same threshold number of users in the union reflects a relatively significant potential to monetise these users in the near future. this monetisation potential in turn reflects in principle the gateway position of the undertakings concerned. both indicators are in addition reflective of their financial capacity , including their ability to leverage their access to financial markets to reinforce their position. this may for example happen where this superior access is used to acquire other undertakings , which ability has in turn been shown to have potential negative effects on innovation. market capitalisation can also be reflective of the expected future position and effect on the internal market of the providers concerned , notwithstanding a potentially relatively low current turnover. the market capitalisation value can be based on a level that reflects the average market capitalisation of the largest publicly listed undertakings in the union over an appropriate period. ### (17) a very significant turnover in the union and the provision of a core platform service in at least three member states constitute compelling indications that the provider of a core platform service has a significant impact on the internal market. this is equally true where a provider of a core platform service in at least three member states has a very significant market capitalisation or equivalent fair market value. therefore , a provider of a core platform service should be presumed to have a significant impact on the internal market where it offers its services in at least three member states and where either its group turnover realised in the eea is equal to or exceeds a specific , high threshold or the market capitalisation of the group is equal to or exceeds a certain high absolute value. a provider should be considered to be offering its service in a member state if the service is , for example , translated in one of official languages of the member state or if the provider is actively seeking business opportunities in that member state. a plain availability of a service in a member state should not be considered as a proactive offering of a service by the provider. for providers of core platform services that belong to undertakings that are not publicly listed , the equivalent fair market value above a certain high absolute value should be referred to. the commission should use its power to adopt delegated acts to develop an objective methodology to calculate that value. a high eea group turnover in conjunction with the threshold of users in the union of core platform services reflects a relatively strong ability to monetise these users. a high market capitalisation relative to the same threshold number of users in the union reflects a relatively significant potential to monetise these users in the near future. this monetisation potential in turn reflects in principle the gateway position of the undertakings concerned. both indicators are in addition reflective of their financial capacity , including their ability to leverage their access to financial markets to reinforce their position. this may for example happen where this superior access is used to acquire other undertakings , which ability has in turn been shown to have potential negative effects on innovation. market capitalisation can also be reflective of the expected future position and effect on the internal market of the providers concerned , notwithstanding a potentially relatively low current turnover. the market capitalisation value can be based on a level that reflects the average market capitalisation of the largest publicly listed undertakings in the union over an appropriate period.


### (26) a particular subset of rules should apply to those providers of core platform services that are foreseen to enjoy an entrenched and durable position in the near future. the same specific features of core platform services make them prone to tipping: once a service provider has obtained a certain advantage over rivals or potential challengers in terms of scale or intermediation power , its position may become unassailable and the situation may evolve to the point that it is likely to become durable and entrenched in the near future. undertakings can try to induce this tipping and emerge as gatekeeper by using some of the unfair conditions and practices regulated in this regulation. in such a situation , it appears appropriate to intervene before the market tips irreversibly. ### (26) a particular subset of rules should apply to those providers of core platform services that are foreseen to enjoy an entrenched and durable position in the near future for instance because the commission has been notified of an intended concentration in line with article 12(1) and assessed its impact on the contestability of digital markets. the same specific features of core platform services make them prone to tipping: once a service provider has obtained a certain advantage over rivals or potential challengers in terms of scale or intermediation power , its position may become unassailable and the situation may evolve to the point that it is likely to become durable and entrenched in the near future. undertakings can try to induce this tipping and emerge as gatekeeper by using some of the unfair conditions and practices regulated in this regulation. in such a situation , it appears appropriate to intervene before the market tips irreversibly.


### (26) a particular subset of rules should apply to those providers of core platform services that are foreseen to enjoy an entrenched and durable position in the near future. the same specific features of core platform services make them prone to tipping: once a service provider has obtained a certain advantage over rivals or potential challengers in terms of scale or intermediation power , its position may become unassailable and the situation may evolve to the point that it is likely to become durable and entrenched in the near future. undertakings can try to induce this tipping and emerge as gatekeeper by using some of the unfair conditions and practices regulated in this regulation. in such a situation , it appears appropriate to intervene before the market tips irreversibly. ### (26) a particular subset of rules should apply to those providers of core platform services that are foreseen to enjoy an entrenched and durable position in the near future for instance because the commission has been notified of an intended concentration and assessed its impact on the contestability of digital markets. the same specific features of core platform services make them prone to tipping: once a service provider has obtained a certain advantage over rivals or potential challengers in terms of scale or intermediation power , its position may become unassailable and the situation may evolve to the point that it is likely to become durable and entrenched in the near future. undertakings can try to induce this tipping and emerge as gatekeeper by using some of the unfair conditions and practices regulated in this regulation. in such a situation , it appears appropriate to intervene before the market tips irreversibly.


### (31) to ensure the effectiveness of the review of gatekeeper status as well as the possibility to adjust the list of core platform services provided by a gatekeeper , the gatekeepers should inform the commission of all of their intended and concluded acquisitions of other providers of core platform services or any other services provided within the digital sector. such information should not only serve the review process mentioned above , regarding the status of individual gatekeepers , but will also provide information that is crucial to monitoring broader contestability trends in the digital sector and can therefore be a useful factor for consideration in the context of the market investigations foreseen by this regulation. ### (31) to ensure the effectiveness of the review of gatekeeper status as well as the possibility to adjust the list of core platform services provided by a gatekeeper , the gatekeepers should inform the commission of all of their intended and concluded acquisitions of other providers of core platform services or any other services provided within the digital sector. such information should not only serve the review process mentioned above , regarding the status of individual gatekeepers , but will also provide information that is crucial to monitoring broader contestability trends in the digital sector and can therefore be a useful factor including for consideration in the context of the market investigations foreseen by this regulation , as well as trigger behavioural or structural remedies on gatekeepers to restore contestability and fairness on digital markets.


### (31) to ensure the effectiveness of the review of gatekeeper status as well as the possibility to adjust the list of core platform services provided by a gatekeeper , the gatekeepers should inform the commission of all of their intended and concluded acquisitions of other providers of core platform services or any other services provided within the digital sector. such information should not only serve the review process mentioned above , regarding the status of individual gatekeepers , but will also provide information that is crucial to monitoring broader contestability trends in the digital sector and can therefore be a useful factor for consideration in the context of the market investigations foreseen by this regulation. ### (31) to ensure the effectiveness of the review of gatekeeper status as well as the possibility to adjust the list of core platform services provided by a gatekeeper , the gatekeepers should inform the commission of all of their intended and concluded acquisitions of other providers of core platform services or any other services provided within the digital sector. such information should not only serve the review process mentioned above , regarding the status of individual gatekeepers , but will also provide information that is crucial to monitoring broader contestability trends in the digital sector and can therefore be a useful factor , including for consideration in the context of the market investigations foreseen by this regulation , as well as trigger behavioural or structural remedies on gatekeepers to restore contestability and fairness on digital markets.


### (32) to safeguard the fairness and contestability of core platform services provided by gatekeepers , it is necessary to provide in a clear and unambiguous manner for a set of harmonised obligations with regard to those services. such rules are needed to address the risk of harmful effects of unfair practices imposed by gatekeepers , to the benefit of the business environment in the services concerned , to the benefit of users and ultimately to the benefit of society as a whole. given the fast-moving and dynamic nature of digital markets , and the substantial economic power of gatekeepers , it is important that these obligations are effectively applied without being circumvented. to that end , the obligations in question should apply to any practices by a gatekeeper , irrespective of its form and irrespective of whether it is of a contractual , commercial , technical or any other nature , insofar as a practice corresponds to the type of practice that is the subject of one of the obligations of this regulation. ### (32) to safeguard the fairness and contestability of core platform services provided by gatekeepers , it is necessary to provide in a clear and unambiguous manner for a set of harmonised obligations with regard to those services. such rules are needed to address the risk of harmful effects of unfair practices imposed by gatekeepers , to the benefit of the business environment in the services concerned , to the benefit of users and ultimately to the benefit of society as a whole. given the fast-moving and dynamic nature of digital markets , and the substantial economic power of gatekeepers , it is important that these obligations are effectively applied without being circumvented. to that end , the obligations in question should apply to any practices by a gatekeeper , irrespective of its form and irrespective of whether it is of a contractual , commercial , technical or any other nature , including through product design or by presenting end-user choices in a non-neutral manner , or by otherwise subverting or impairing user autonomy , decision-making , or choice via the structure , function or manner of operation of a user interface or a part thereof , insofar as a practice corresponds to the type of practice that is the subject of one of the obligations of this regulation.


### (32) to safeguard the fairness and contestability of core platform services provided by gatekeepers , it is necessary to provide in a clear and unambiguous manner for a set of harmonised obligations with regard to those services. such rules are needed to address the risk of harmful effects of unfair practices imposed by gatekeepers , to the benefit of the business environment in the services concerned , to the benefit of users and ultimately to the benefit of society as a whole. given the fast-moving and dynamic nature of digital markets , and the substantial economic power of gatekeepers , it is important that these obligations are effectively applied without being circumvented. to that end , the obligations in question should apply to any practices by a gatekeeper , irrespective of its form and irrespective of whether it is of a contractual , commercial , technical or any other nature , insofar as a practice corresponds to the type of practice that is the subject of one of the obligations of this regulation. ### (32) to safeguard the fairness and contestability of core platform services provided by gatekeepers , it is necessary to provide in a clear and unambiguous manner for a set of harmonised obligations with regard to those services. such rules are needed to address the risk of harmful effects of unfair practices imposed by gatekeepers , to the benefit of the business environment in the services concerned , to the benefit of users and ultimately to the benefit of society as a whole. given the fast-moving and dynamic nature of digital markets , and the substantial economic power of gatekeepers , it is important that these obligations are effectively applied without being circumvented. to that end , the obligations in question should apply to any practices by a gatekeeper , irrespective of its form and irrespective of whether it is of a contractual , commercial , technical or any other nature , including through product design , structure , function or manner of operation capable of influencing users' choice or autonomy , or through agreements with third party business partners of the gatekeepers insofar as a practice corresponds to the type of practice that is the subject of one of the obligations of this regulation.


### (32) to safeguard the fairness and contestability of core platform services provided by gatekeepers , it is necessary to provide in a clear and unambiguous manner for a set of harmonised obligations with regard to those services. such rules are needed to address the risk of harmful effects of unfair practices imposed by gatekeepers , to the benefit of the business environment in the services concerned , to the benefit of users and ultimately to the benefit of society as a whole. given the fast-moving and dynamic nature of digital markets , and the substantial economic power of gatekeepers , it is important that these obligations are effectively applied without being circumvented. to that end , the obligations in question should apply to any practices by a gatekeeper , irrespective of its form and irrespective of whether it is of a contractual , commercial , technical or any other nature , insofar as a practice corresponds to the type of practice that is the subject of one of the obligations of this regulation. ### (32) to safeguard the fairness and contestability of core platform services provided by gatekeepers , it is necessary to provide in a clear and unambiguous manner for a set of harmonised obligations with regard to those services. such rules are needed to address the risk of harmful effects of unfair practices imposed by gatekeepers , to the benefit of the business environment in the services concerned , to the benefit of users and ultimately to the benefit of society as a whole. given the fast-moving and dynamic nature of digital markets , and the substantial economic power of gatekeepers , it is important that these obligations are effectively applied without being circumvented. to that end , the obligations in question should apply to any practices by a gatekeeper , irrespective of its form and irrespective of whether it is of a contractual , commercial , technical or any other nature , including through product design , structure , function or manner of operation capable of influencing user’s choice or autonomy , or through agreements with third party business partners of the gatekeepers insofar as a practice corresponds to the type of practice that is the subject of one of the obligations of this regulation.


### (37) because of their position , gatekeepers might in certain cases restrict the ability of business users of their online intermediation services to offer their goods or services to end users under more favourable conditions , including price , through other online intermediation services. such restrictions have a significant deterrent effect on the business users of gatekeepers in terms of their use of alternative online intermediation services , limiting inter-platform contestability , which in turn limits choice of alternative online intermediation channels for end users. to ensure that business users of online intermediation services of gatekeepers can freely choose alternative online intermediation services and differentiate the conditions under which they offer their products or services to their end users , it should not be accepted that gatekeepers limit business users from choosing to differentiate commercial conditions , including price. such a restriction should apply to any measure with equivalent effect , such as for example increased commission rates or de-listing of the offers of business users. ### (37) because of their position , gatekeepers might in certain cases restrict the ability of business users of their online intermediation services to offer their goods or services to end users under more favourable conditions , including price , through other online distribution channels. such restrictions have a significant deterrent effect on the business users of gatekeepers in terms of their use of alternative online distribution channels , limiting inter-platform contestability , which in turn limits choice of alternative online intermediation channels for end users. to ensure that business users of online distribution services of gatekeepers can freely choose alternative online services and differentiate the conditions under which they offer their products or services to their end users , it should not be accepted that gatekeepers limit business users from choosing to differentiate commercial conditions , including price. such a restriction should apply to any measure with equivalent effect , such as for example increased commission rates or de-listing or less favourable ranking of the offers of business users.


### (37) because of their position , gatekeepers might in certain cases restrict the ability of business users of their online intermediation services to offer their goods or services to end users under more favourable conditions , including price , through other online intermediation services. such restrictions have a significant deterrent effect on the business users of gatekeepers in terms of their use of alternative online intermediation services , limiting inter-platform contestability , which in turn limits choice of alternative online intermediation channels for end users. to ensure that business users of online intermediation services of gatekeepers can freely choose alternative online intermediation services and differentiate the conditions under which they offer their products or services to their end users , it should not be accepted that gatekeepers limit business users from choosing to differentiate commercial conditions , including price. such a restriction should apply to any measure with equivalent effect , such as for example increased commission rates or de-listing of the offers of business users. ### (37) because of their position , gatekeepers might in certain cases restrict the ability of business users of their online intermediation services to offer their goods or services to end users under more favourable conditions , including price , through other online intermediation services or through direct business channels. such restrictions have a significant deterrent effect on the business users of gatekeepers in terms of their use of alternative online intermediation services or direct business channels , limiting inter-platform contestability , which in turn limits choice of alternative online intermediation channels for end users. to ensure that business users of online intermediation services of gatekeepers can freely choose alternative online intermediation services or other direct distribution channels and differentiate the conditions under which they offer their products or services to their end users , it should not be accepted that gatekeepers limit business users from choosing to differentiate commercial conditions , including price. such a restriction should apply to any measure with equivalent effect , such as for example increased commission rates de-listing or less favourable display of the offers of business users in the ranking.


### (37) because of their position , gatekeepers might in certain cases restrict the ability of business users of their online intermediation services to offer their goods or services to end users under more favourable conditions , including price , through other online intermediation services. such restrictions have a significant deterrent effect on the business users of gatekeepers in terms of their use of alternative online intermediation services , limiting inter-platform contestability , which in turn limits choice of alternative online intermediation channels for end users. to ensure that business users of online intermediation services of gatekeepers can freely choose alternative online intermediation services and differentiate the conditions under which they offer their products or services to their end users , it should not be accepted that gatekeepers limit business users from choosing to differentiate commercial conditions , including price. such a restriction should apply to any measure with equivalent effect , such as for example increased commission rates or de-listing of the offers of business users. ### (37) because of their position , gatekeepers might in certain cases restrict the ability of business users of their online intermediation services to offer their goods or services to end users under more favourable conditions , including price , through other online intermediation services or through direct business channels. such restrictions have a significant deterrent effect on the business users of gatekeepers in terms of their use of alternative online intermediation services or direct business channels , limiting inter-platform contestability , which in turn limits choice of alternative online intermediation channels for end users. to ensure that business users of online intermediation services of gatekeepers can freely choose alternative online intermediation services or other direct distribution channels and differentiate the conditions under which they offer their products or services to their end users , it should not be accepted that gatekeepers limit business users from choosing to differentiate commercial conditions , including price. such a restriction should apply to any measure with equivalent effect , such as for example increased commission rates , de-listing or less favourable display of the offers of business users in the ranking.


### (37) because of their position , gatekeepers might in certain cases restrict the ability of business users of their online intermediation services to offer their goods or services to end users under more favourable conditions , including price , through other online intermediation services. such restrictions have a significant deterrent effect on the business users of gatekeepers in terms of their use of alternative online intermediation services , limiting inter-platform contestability , which in turn limits choice of alternative online intermediation channels for end users. to ensure that business users of online intermediation services of gatekeepers can freely choose alternative online intermediation services and differentiate the conditions under which they offer their products or services to their end users , it should not be accepted that gatekeepers limit business users from choosing to differentiate commercial conditions , including price. such a restriction should apply to any measure with equivalent effect , such as for example increased commission rates or de-listing of the offers of business users. ### (37) because of their position , gatekeepers might in certain cases restrict the ability of business users of their online intermediation services to offer their goods or services to end users under more favourable conditions , including price , through other online intermediation services or through direct business channels. such restrictions have a significant deterrent effect on the business users of gatekeepers in terms of their use of alternative online intermediation services or direct distribution channels , limiting inter-platform contestability , which in turn limits choice of alternative online intermediation channels for end users. to ensure that business users of online intermediation services of gatekeepers can freely choose alternative online intermediation services or other direct distribution channels and differentiate the conditions under which they offer their products or services to their end users , it should not be accepted that gatekeepers limit business users from choosing to differentiate commercial conditions , including price. such a restriction should apply to any measure with equivalent effect , such as for example increased commission rates , de-listing of the offers or less favourable display of business users in the ranking.


### (39) to safeguard a fair commercial environment and protect the contestability of the digital sector it is important to safeguard the right of business users to raise concerns about unfair behaviour by gatekeepers with any relevant administrative or other public authorities. for example , business users may want to complain about different types of unfair practices , such as discriminatory access conditions , unjustified closing of business user accounts or unclear grounds for product de-listings. any practice that would in any way inhibit such a possibility of raising concerns or seeking available redress , for instance by means of confidentiality clauses in agreements or other written terms , should therefore be prohibited. this should be without prejudice to the right of business users and gatekeepers to lay down in their agreements the terms of use including the use of lawful complaints-handling mechanisms , including any use of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms or of the jurisdiction of specific courts in compliance with respective union and national law this should therefore also be without prejudice to the role gatekeepers play in the fight against illegal content online. ### (39) to safeguard a fair commercial environment and protect the contestability of the digital sector it is important to safeguard the right of business users and end users to raise concerns about unfair behaviour by gatekeepers with any relevant administrative or other public authorities. for example , business users and end users may want to complain about different types of unfair practices , such as discriminatory access conditions , unjustified closing of business user and end users accounts or unclear grounds for product de-listings. any practice that would in any way inhibit such a possibility of raising concerns or seeking available redress , for instance by means of confidentiality clauses in agreements or other written terms , should therefore be prohibited. this should be without prejudice to the right of business users and gatekeepers to lay down in their agreements the terms of use including the use of lawful complaints-handling mechanisms , including any use of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms or of the jurisdiction of specific courts in compliance with respective union and national law.


### (39) to safeguard a fair commercial environment and protect the contestability of the digital sector it is important to safeguard the right of business users to raise concerns about unfair behaviour by gatekeepers with any relevant administrative or other public authorities. for example , business users may want to complain about different types of unfair practices , such as discriminatory access conditions , unjustified closing of business user accounts or unclear grounds for product de-listings. any practice that would in any way inhibit such a possibility of raising concerns or seeking available redress , for instance by means of confidentiality clauses in agreements or other written terms , should therefore be prohibited. this should be without prejudice to the right of business users and gatekeepers to lay down in their agreements the terms of use including the use of lawful complaints-handling mechanisms , including any use of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms or of the jurisdiction of specific courts in compliance with respective union and national law this should therefore also be without prejudice to the role gatekeepers play in the fight against illegal content online. ### (39) to safeguard a fair commercial environment and protect the contestability of the digital sector it is important to safeguard the right of business users to raise concerns about unfair behaviour by gatekeepers with any relevant administrative or other public authorities. for example , business users may want to complain about different types of unfair practices , such as discriminatory access conditions , unjustified closing of business user accounts or unclear grounds for product de-listings. any practice that would in any way inhibit such a possibility of raising concerns or seeking available redress , for instance by means of confidentiality clauses in agreements or other written terms , should therefore be prohibited. this should be without prejudice to the right of business users and gatekeepers to lay down in their agreements the terms of use including the use of lawful complaints-handling mechanisms , including any use of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms. this should therefore also be without prejudice to the role gatekeepers play in the fight against illegal content online.


### (41) gatekeepers should not restrict the free choice of end users by technically preventing switching between or subscription to different software applications and services. gatekeepers should therefore ensure a free choice irrespective of whether they are the manufacturer of any hardware by means of which such software applications or services are accessed and should not raise artificial technical barriers so as to make switching impossible or ineffective. the mere offering of a given product or service to end users , including by means of pre-installation , as well the improvement of end user offering , such as better prices or increased quality , would not in itself constitute a barrier to switching. ### (41) gatekeepers should not restrict the free choice of end users by technically preventing switching between or subscription to different software applications and services. gatekeepers should therefore ensure a free choice irrespective of whether they are the manufacturer of any hardware by means of which such software applications or services are accessed and should not raise artificial technical barriers so as to make switching impossible or ineffective.


### (41) gatekeepers should not restrict the free choice of end users by technically preventing switching between or subscription to different software applications and services. gatekeepers should therefore ensure a free choice irrespective of whether they are the manufacturer of any hardware by means of which such software applications or services are accessed and should not raise artificial technical barriers so as to make switching impossible or ineffective. the mere offering of a given product or service to end users , including by means of pre-installation , as well the improvement of end user offering , such as better prices or increased quality , would not in itself constitute a barrier to switching. ### (41) gatekeepers should not restrict the free choice of end users by technically preventing switching between or subscription to different software applications and services. gatekeepers should therefore ensure a free choice irrespective of whether they are the manufacturer of any hardware by means of which such software applications or services are accessed and should not raise artificial technical barriers so as to make switching impossible or ineffective. the commercial terms , including pricing , for the provision of services to a business user or end user should not be made dependent upon whether or to what degree business user or end user uses other applications or services from the same provider , or a related entity.


### (58) to ensure the effectiveness of the obligations laid down by this regulation , while also making certain that these obligations are limited to what is necessary to ensure contestability and tackling the harmful effects of the unfair behaviour by gatekeepers , it is important to clearly define and circumscribe them so as to allow the gatekeeper to immediately comply with them , in full respect of regulation (eu) 2016/679 and directive 2002/58/ec , consumer protection , cyber security and product safety. the gatekeepers should ensure the compliance with this regulation by design. the necessary measures should therefore be as much as possible and where relevant integrated into the technological design used by the gatekeepers. however , it may in certain cases be appropriate for the commission , following a dialogue with the gatekeeper concerned , to further specify some of the measures that the gatekeeper concerned should adopt in order to effectively comply with those obligations that are susceptible of being further specified. this possibility of a regulatory dialogue should facilitate compliance by gatekeepers and expedite the correct implementation of the regulation. ### (58) to ensure the effectiveness of the obligations laid down by this regulation , while also making certain that these obligations are limited to what is necessary to ensure contestability and tackling the harmful effects of the unfair behaviour by gatekeepers , it is important to clearly define and circumscribe them so as to allow the gatekeeper to immediately comply with them , in full respect of regulation (eu) 2016/679 and directive 2002/58/ec , consumer protection , cyber security and product safety. the gatekeepers should ensure the compliance with this regulation by design. the necessary measures should therefore be as much as possible and where relevant integrated into the technological design used by the gatekeepers. however , it may in certain cases be appropriate for the commission , following a dialogue within legally binding deadlines with the gatekeeper concerned , to further specify some of the measures that the gatekeeper concerned should adopt in order to effectively comply with those obligations that are susceptible of being further specified. this possibility of a regulatory dialogue should facilitate compliance by gatekeepers and expedite the correct implementation of the regulation.


### (58) to ensure the effectiveness of the obligations laid down by this regulation , while also making certain that these obligations are limited to what is necessary to ensure contestability and tackling the harmful effects of the unfair behaviour by gatekeepers , it is important to clearly define and circumscribe them so as to allow the gatekeeper to immediately comply with them , in full respect of regulation (eu) 2016/679 and directive 2002/58/ec , consumer protection , cyber security and product safety. the gatekeepers should ensure the compliance with this regulation by design. the necessary measures should therefore be as much as possible and where relevant integrated into the technological design used by the gatekeepers. however , it may in certain cases be appropriate for the commission , following a dialogue with the gatekeeper concerned , to further specify some of the measures that the gatekeeper concerned should adopt in order to effectively comply with those obligations that are susceptible of being further specified. this possibility of a regulatory dialogue should facilitate compliance by gatekeepers and expedite the correct implementation of the regulation. ### (58) to ensure the effectiveness of the obligations laid down by this regulation , while also making certain that these obligations are limited to what is necessary to ensure contestability and tackling the harmful effects of the unfair behaviour by gatekeepers , it is important to clearly define and circumscribe them so as to allow the gatekeeper to immediately comply with them , in full respect of regulation (eu) 2016/679 and directive 2002/58/ec , consumer protection , cyber security and product safety. the gatekeepers should ensure the compliance with this regulation by design. the necessary measures should therefore be as much as possible and where relevant integrated into the technological design used by the gatekeepers. however , it may in certain cases be appropriate for the commission , following a dialogue , within legally binding deadlines , with the gatekeeper concerned , to further specify some of the measures that the gatekeeper concerned should adopt in order to effectively comply with those obligations that are susceptible of being further specified. this possibility of a regulatory dialogue should facilitate compliance by gatekeepers and expedite the correct implementation of the regulation.


### (72) the commission should be able to take the necessary actions to monitor the effective implementation and compliance with the obligations laid down in this regulation. such actions should include the ability of the commission to appoint independent external experts , such as and auditors to assist the commission in this process , including where applicable from competent independent authorities , such as data or consumer protection authorities. ### (72) the commission should be able to take the necessary actions to monitor the effective implementation and compliance with the obligations laid down in this regulation. such actions should include the ability of the commission to appoint independent external experts , such as and auditors to assist the commission in this process , including where applicable from competent independent authorities , such as data or consumer protection authorities. the commission should be adequately staffed to ensure the successful implementation and effective enforcement of this regulation.


### (75) in the context of proceedings carried out under this regulation , the undertakings concerned should be accorded the right to be heard by the commission and the decisions taken should be widely publicised. while ensuring the rights to good administration and the rights of defence of the undertakings concerned , in particular , the right of access to the file and the right to be heard , it is essential that confidential information be protected. furthermore , while respecting the confidentiality of the information , the commission should ensure that any information relied on for the purpose of the decision is disclosed to an extent that allows the addressee of the decision to understand the facts and considerations that led up to the decision. finally , under certain conditions certain business records , such as communication between lawyers and their clients , may be considered confidential if the relevant conditions are met. ### (75) in the context of proceedings carried out under this regulation , the undertakings concerned should be accorded the right to be heard by the commission and the decisions taken should be widely publicised. while ensuring the rights to good administration and the rights of defence of the undertakings concerned , in particular , the right of access to the file and the right to be heard , it is essential that confidential information be protected. furthermore , while respecting the confidentiality of the information , the commission should ensure that any information relied on for the purpose of the decision is disclosed to an extent that allows the addressee of the decision to understand the facts and considerations that led up to the decision. finally , under certain conditions certain business records , such as communication between lawyers and their clients , may be considered confidential if the relevant conditions are met. other parties with sufficient interest should also have a right to be heard. parties that are directly affected by the obligations contained in articles 5 and 6 should be considered to have sufficient interest. consumer associations that apply to be heard shall be regarded as having a sufficient interest , where the proceedings concern products or services used by end users.


### (75) in the context of proceedings carried out under this regulation , the undertakings concerned should be accorded the right to be heard by the commission and the decisions taken should be widely publicised. while ensuring the rights to good administration and the rights of defence of the undertakings concerned , in particular , the right of access to the file and the right to be heard , it is essential that confidential information be protected. furthermore , while respecting the confidentiality of the information , the commission should ensure that any information relied on for the purpose of the decision is disclosed to an extent that allows the addressee of the decision to understand the facts and considerations that led up to the decision. finally , under certain conditions certain business records , such as communication between lawyers and their clients , may be considered confidential if the relevant conditions are met. ### (75) in the context of proceedings carried out under this regulation , the undertakings concerned should be accorded the right to be heard by the commission and the decisions taken should be widely publicised. natural or legal persons demonstrating sufficient interest shall also have the right to be heard. parties that are directly affected by the obligations under articles 5 and 6 shall be considered to have sufficient interest but also organisations representing consumers interests where the proceedings concern products or services provided to end users. while ensuring the rights to good administration and the rights of defence of the undertakings concerned , in particular , the right of access to the file and the right to be heard , it is essential that confidential information be protected. furthermore , while respecting the confidentiality of the information , the commission should ensure that any information relied on for the purpose of the decision is disclosed to an extent that allows the addressee of the decision to understand the facts and considerations that led up to the decision. finally , under certain conditions certain business records , such as communication between lawyers and their clients , may be considered confidential if the relevant conditions are met.


### (75) in the context of proceedings carried out under this regulation , the undertakings concerned should be accorded the right to be heard by the commission and the decisions taken should be widely publicised. while ensuring the rights to good administration and the rights of defence of the undertakings concerned , in particular , the right of access to the file and the right to be heard , it is essential that confidential information be protected. furthermore , while respecting the confidentiality of the information , the commission should ensure that any information relied on for the purpose of the decision is disclosed to an extent that allows the addressee of the decision to understand the facts and considerations that led up to the decision. finally , under certain conditions certain business records , such as communication between lawyers and their clients , may be considered confidential if the relevant conditions are met. ### (75) in the context of proceedings carried out under this regulation , the undertakings concerned should be accorded the right to be heard by the commission and the decisions taken should be widely publicised. natural or legal persons demonstrating sufficient interest should also have the right to be heard. parties that are directly affected by the obligations under articles 5 and 6 , but also organisations representing consumers interests where the proceedings concern products or services provided to end-users , should be considered to have sufficient interest. while ensuring the rights to good administration and the rights of defence of the undertakings concerned , in particular , the right of access to the file and the right to be heard , it is essential that confidential information be protected. furthermore , while respecting the confidentiality of the information , the commission should ensure that any information relied on for the purpose of the decision is disclosed to an extent that allows the addressee of the decision to understand the facts and considerations that led up to the decision. finally , under certain conditions certain business records , such as communication between lawyers and their clients , may be considered confidential if the relevant conditions are met.


### (77) the advisory committee established in accordance with regulation (eu) no 182//2011 should also deliver opinions on certain individual decisions of the commission issued under this regulation. in order to ensure contestable and fair markets in the digital sector across the union where gatekeepers are present , the power to adopt acts in accordance with article 290 of the treaty should be delegated to the commission to supplement this regulation. in particular , delegated acts should be adopted in respect of the methodology for determining the quantitative thresholds for designation of gatekeepers under this regulation and in respect of the update of the obligations laid down in this regulation where , based on a market investigation the commission has identified the need for updating the obligations addressing practices that limit the contestability of core platform services or are unfair. it is of particular importance that the commission carries out appropriate consultations and that those consultations be conducted in accordance with the principles laid down in the interinstitutional agreement on better law-making of 13 april 201636 . in particular , to ensure equal participation in the preparation of delegated acts , the european parliament and the council receive all documents at the same time as member states' experts , and their experts systematically have access to meetings of commission expert groups dealing with the preparation of delegated acts. ### (77) the advisory committee established in accordance with regulation (eu) no 182//2011 should also deliver opinions on certain individual decisions of the commission issued under this regulation. the commission should involve third parties in this committee , representing both affected business users and end-users , such as consumer rights organisations. in order to ensure contestable and fair markets in the digital sector across the union where gatekeepers are present , the power to adopt acts in accordance with article 290 of the treaty should be delegated to the commission to supplement this regulation. in particular , delegated acts should be adopted in respect of the methodology for determining the quantitative thresholds for designation of gatekeepers under this regulation and in respect of the update of the obligations laid down in this regulation where , based on a market investigation the commission has identified the need for updating the obligations addressing practices that limit the contestability of core platform services or are unfair. it is of particular importance that the commission carries out appropriate consultations and that those consultations be conducted in accordance with the principles laid down in the interinstitutional agreement on better law-making of 13 april 201636 . in particular , to ensure equal participation in the preparation of delegated acts , the european parliament and the council receive all documents at the same time as member states' experts , and their experts systematically have access to meetings of commission expert groups dealing with the preparation of delegated acts.


### (77) the advisory committee established in accordance with regulation (eu) no 182//2011 should also deliver opinions on certain individual decisions of the commission issued under this regulation. in order to ensure contestable and fair markets in the digital sector across the union where gatekeepers are present , the power to adopt acts in accordance with article 290 of the treaty should be delegated to the commission to supplement this regulation. in particular , delegated acts should be adopted in respect of the methodology for determining the quantitative thresholds for designation of gatekeepers under this regulation and in respect of the update of the obligations laid down in this regulation where , based on a market investigation the commission has identified the need for updating the obligations addressing practices that limit the contestability of core platform services or are unfair. it is of particular importance that the commission carries out appropriate consultations and that those consultations be conducted in accordance with the principles laid down in the interinstitutional agreement on better law-making of 13 april 201636 . in particular , to ensure equal participation in the preparation of delegated acts , the european parliament and the council receive all documents at the same time as member states' experts , and their experts systematically have access to meetings of commission expert groups dealing with the preparation of delegated acts. ### (77) the advisory committee established in accordance with regulation (eu) no 182//2011 should also deliver opinions on certain individual decisions of the commission issued under this regulation. in order to ensure contestable and fair markets in the digital sector across the union where gatekeepers are present , the power to adopt acts in accordance with article 290 of the treaty should be delegated to the commission to supplement this regulation. in particular , delegated acts should be adopted in respect of the methodology for determining the quantitative thresholds for designation of gatekeepers under this regulation and in respect of the update of the obligations laid down in this regulation where , based on a market investigation the commission has identified the need for updating the obligations addressing practices that limit the contestability of core platform services or are unfair. it is of particular importance that the commission carries out appropriate consultations , including with interested third-parties , and that those consultations be conducted in accordance with the principles laid down in the interinstitutional agreement on better law-making of 13 april 201636 . in particular , to ensure equal participation in the preparation of delegated acts , the european parliament and the council receive all documents at the same time as member states' experts , and their experts systematically have access to meetings of commission expert groups dealing with the preparation of delegated acts.


### it operates a core platform service which serves as an important gateway for business users to reach end users; and ### it operates a core platform service which serves as an important gateway for business users or end users to reach other end users; and


### it operates a core platform service which serves as an important gateway for business users to reach end users; and ### it operates a core platform service which serves as an important gateway for business users or end users to reach other business users or end users; and


### it operates a core platform service which serves as an important gateway for business users to reach end users; and ### it operates a core platform service which serves as an important gateway for business users or end users to reach other end users or business users; and


### the requirement in paragraph 1 point (a) where the undertaking to which it belongs achieves an annual eea turnover equal to or above eur 6.5 billion in the last three financial years , or where the average market capitalisation or the equivalent fair market value of the undertaking to which it belongs amounted to at least eur 65 billion in the last financial year , and it provides a core platform service in at least three member states; ### the requirement in paragraph 1 point (a) where the undertaking to which it belongs achieves an annual eea turnover equal to or above eur 5 billion in the last three financial years , or where the average market capitalisation or the equivalent fair market value of the undertaking to which it belongs amounted to at least eur 65 billion in the last financial year , and it provides a core platform service in at least two member states;


### the requirement in paragraph 1 point (b) where it provides a core platform service that has more than 45 million monthly active end users established or located in the union and more than 10 000 yearly active business users established in the union in the last financial year; ### the requirement in paragraph 1 point (b) where it provides one or more core platform service that combined has more than 45 million monthly end users established or located in the union or more than 10 000 yearly business users established in the union in the last financial year;


### the requirement in paragraph 1 point (b) where it provides a core platform service that has more than 45 million monthly active end users established or located in the union and more than 10 000 yearly active business users established in the union in the last financial year; ### the requirement in paragraph 1 point (b) where it provides a one or more core platform services that combine more than 30 million monthly active end users established or located in the union or more than 10 000 yearly active business users established in the union in the last financial year;


### the requirement in paragraph 1 point (b) where it provides a core platform service that has more than 45 million monthly active end users established or located in the union and more than 10 000 yearly active business users established in the union in the last financial year; ### the requirement in paragraph 1 point (b) where it provides one or more core platform service that combine more than 30 million monthly active end users established or located in the union or more than 10 000 yearly active business users established in the union in the last financial year;


### 3. where a provider of core platform services meets all the thresholds in paragraph 2 , it shall notify the commission thereof within three months after those thresholds are satisfied and provide it with the relevant information identified in paragraph 2.. that notification shall include the relevant information identified in paragraph 2 for each of the core platform services of the provider that meets the thresholds in paragraph 2 point (b). the notification shall be updated whenever other core platform services individually meet the thresholds in paragraph 2 point (b). ### 3. where a provider of core platform services meets all the thresholds in paragraph 2 , it shall notify the commission thereof without undue delay and no later than one month after those thresholds are satisfied and provide it with the relevant information identified in paragraph 2.. that notification shall include the relevant information identified in paragraph 2 for each of the core platform services of the provider that meets the thresholds in paragraph 2 point (b). the notification shall be updated whenever other core platform services individually meet the thresholds in paragraph 2 point (b).


### 3. where a provider of core platform services meets all the thresholds in paragraph 2 , it shall notify the commission thereof within three months after those thresholds are satisfied and provide it with the relevant information identified in paragraph 2.. that notification shall include the relevant information identified in paragraph 2 for each of the core platform services of the provider that meets the thresholds in paragraph 2 point (b). the notification shall be updated whenever other core platform services individually meet the thresholds in paragraph 2 point (b). ### 3. where a provider of core platform services meets all the thresholds in paragraph 2 , it shall notify the commission thereof within without undue delay and no later than one month after those thresholds are satisfied and provide it with the relevant information identified in paragraph 2.. that notification shall include the relevant information identified in paragraph 2 for each of the core platform services of the provider that meets the thresholds in paragraph 2 point (b). the notification shall be updated whenever other core platform services individually meet the thresholds in paragraph 2 point (b).


### 3. where a provider of core platform services meets all the thresholds in paragraph 2 , it shall notify the commission thereof within three months after those thresholds are satisfied and provide it with the relevant information identified in paragraph 2.. that notification shall include the relevant information identified in paragraph 2 for each of the core platform services of the provider that meets the thresholds in paragraph 2 point (b). the notification shall be updated whenever other core platform services individually meet the thresholds in paragraph 2 point (b). ### 3. where a provider of core platform services meets all the thresholds in paragraph 2 , it shall notify the commission thereof undue delay and no later than one month after those thresholds are satisfied and provide it with the relevant information identified in paragraph 2. that notification shall include the relevant information identified in paragraph 2 for each of the core platform services of the provider that meets the thresholds in paragraph 2 point (b). the notification shall be updated whenever other core platform services individually meet the thresholds in paragraph 2 point (b).


### 6. the commission may identify as a gatekeeper , in accordance with the procedure laid down in article 15 , any provider of core platform services that meets each of the requirements of paragraph 1 , but does not satisfy each of the thresholds of paragraph 2 , or has presented sufficiently substantiated arguments in accordance with paragraph 4. ### 6. the commission may identify as a gatekeeper , in accordance with the procedure laid down in article 15 , any provider of core platform services that meets each of the requirements of paragraph 1 , but does not satisfy each of the thresholds of paragraph 2.


### where the provider of a core platform service that satisfies the quantitative thresholds of paragraph 2 fails to comply with the investigative measures ordered by the commission in a significant manner and the failure persists after the provider has been invited to comply within a reasonable time-limit and to submit observations , the commission shall be entitled to designate that provider as a gatekeeper. ### deleted


### where the provider of a core platform service that does not satisfy the quantitative thresholds of paragraph 2 fails to comply with the investigative measures ordered by the commission in a significant manner and the failure persists after the provider has been invited to comply within a reasonable time-limit and to submit observations , the commission shall be entitled to designate that provider as a gatekeeper based on facts available. ### where the provider of a core platform service that does not satisfy the quantitative thresholds of paragraph 2 fails to comply with the investigative measures ordered by the commission and the failure persists after the provider has been invited to comply within a reasonable time-limit and to submit observations , the commission shall be entitled to designate that provider as a gatekeeper based on facts available.


### refrain from requiring business users to use , offer or interoperate with an identification service of the gatekeeper in the context of services offered by the business users using the core platform services of that gatekeeper; ### refrain from requiring business users or end users to use , offer or interoperate with an identification service of the gatekeeper in the context of services offered by the business users using the core platform services of that gatekeeper;


### refrain from requiring business users to use , offer or interoperate with an identification service of the gatekeeper in the context of services offered by the business users using the core platform services of that gatekeeper; ### refrain from requiring business users or end users to use , offer or interoperate with an identification service of the gatekeeper in the context of services offered by the business users using the core platform services of that gatekeeper , which shall not result in a lower level of security for users and shall not prevent the gatekeeper from limiting access to third party recommender systems temporarily and in exceptional circumstances , when justified by an obligation under article 18 of nis 2 directive or article 32(1)(c) of regulation (eu) 2016/679;


### refrain from using , in competition with business users , any data not publicly available , which is generated through activities by those business users , including by the end users of these business users , of its core platform services or provided by those business users of its core platform services or by the end users of these business users; ### refrain from using , in competition with business users , any data not publicly available , which is generated through activities by those business users , including by the end users of these business users and end users , of its core platform services or provided by those business users of its core platform services or by the end users of these business users;


### refrain from using , in competition with business users , any data not publicly available , which is generated through activities by those business users , including by the end users of these business users , of its core platform services or provided by those business users of its core platform services or by the end users of these business users; ### refrain from using , in competition with business users , any data not publicly available , which is generated through activities by those business users and end users , including by the end users of these business users , of its core platform services or provided by those business users of its core platform services or by the end users of these business users;


### refrain from treating more favourably in ranking services and products offered by the gatekeeper itself or by any third party belonging to the same undertaking compared to similar services or products of third party and apply fair and non-discriminatory conditions to such ranking; ### refrain from embedding or treating more favourably in ranking services and products offered by the gatekeeper itself or by any third party belonging to the same undertaking compared to similar services or products of third party and apply fair and non-discriminatory conditions to such ranking; the gatekeeper shall also refrain from favouring additional services or products offered by the gatekeeper or by a third party belonging to the same undertaking compared to similar services or products of third party , or from discriminating third parties in any way with unequal treatment on core platform services of the gatekeeper to similar services offered by the gatekeeper or a third party belonging to the same undertaking;


### refrain from technically restricting the ability of end users to switch between and subscribe to different software applications and services to be accessed using the operating system of the gatekeeper , including as regards the choice of internet access provider for end users; ### refrain from technically restricting , or restricting in any other way , the ability of end users to switch between and subscribe to different software applications and services to be accessed using the operating system of the gatekeeper , including as regards the choice of internet access provider for end users;


### refrain from technically restricting the ability of end users to switch between and subscribe to different software applications and services to be accessed using the operating system of the gatekeeper , including as regards the choice of internet access provider for end users; ### refrain from technically restricting the ability of end users to switch between and subscribe to different software applications and services , including as regards the choice of internet access provider for end users;


### refrain from technically restricting the ability of end users to switch between and subscribe to different software applications and services to be accessed using the operating system of the gatekeeper , including as regards the choice of internet access provider for end users; ### refrain from technically restricting the ability of end users to switch between and subscribe to different software applications and services , including as regards the choice of internet access provider for end users.


### allow business users and providers of ancillary services access to and interoperability with the same operating system , hardware or software features that are available or used in the provision by the gatekeeper of any ancillary services; ### allow business users , end users and providers of services access to and interoperability with the same operating system , hardware or software features that are available or used in the provision by the gatekeeper of any services;


### allow business users and providers of ancillary services access to and interoperability with the same operating system , hardware or software features that are available or used in the provision by the gatekeeper of any ancillary services; ### allow business users , end users and providers of ancillary services access to and interoperability with the same operating system , hardware or software features that are available or used in the provision by the gatekeeper of any core platform or ancillary services; provide the information to allow third-party operating systems , software applications or ancillary services to interoperate with the gatekeeper's core platform services by making the core platform service's features and functionality available to the fullest extent as technically supported by the core platform service , for use with the third-party software application or service;


### allow business users and providers of ancillary services access to and interoperability with the same operating system , hardware or software features that are available or used in the provision by the gatekeeper of any ancillary services; ### allow business users , end users and providers of ancillary services access to and interoperability with the same operating system , hardware or software features that are available or used in the provision by the gatekeeper of any ancillary services;


### allow business users and providers of ancillary services access to and interoperability with the same operating system , hardware or software features that are available or used in the provision by the gatekeeper of any ancillary services; ### allow business users end users and providers of services access free of charge to and interoperability with the same operating system , hardware or software features that are available or used in the provision by the gatekeeper of any services;


### allow business users and providers of ancillary services access to and interoperability with the same operating system , hardware or software features that are available or used in the provision by the gatekeeper of any ancillary services; ### allow business users , end users and providers of services free of charge access to and interoperability with the same operating system , hardware or software features that are available or used in the provision by the gatekeeper of any services;


### provide business users , or third parties authorised by a business user , free of charge , with effective , high-quality , continuous and real-time access and use of aggregated or non-aggregated data , that is provided for or generated in the context of the use of the relevant core platform services by those business users and the end users engaging with the products or services provided by those business users; for personal data , provide access and use only where directly connected with the use effectuated by the end user in respect of the products or services offered by the relevant business user through the relevant core platform service , and when the end user opts in to such sharing with a consent in the sense of the regulation (eu) 2016/679; ; ### provide business users , or third parties authorised by a business user , free of charge , with effective , high-quality , continuous and real-time access and use of aggregated or non-aggregated non-personal data , that is provided for or generated in the context of the use of the relevant core platform services by those business users and the end users engaging with the products or services provided by those business users;


### provide business users , or third parties authorised by a business user , free of charge , with effective , high-quality , continuous and real-time access and use of aggregated or non-aggregated data , that is provided for or generated in the context of the use of the relevant core platform services by those business users and the end users engaging with the products or services provided by those business users; for personal data , provide access and use only where directly connected with the use effectuated by the end user in respect of the products or services offered by the relevant business user through the relevant core platform service , and when the end user opts in to such sharing with a consent in the sense of the regulation (eu) 2016/679; ; ### provide business users , or third parties authorised by a business user , free of charge , with effective , high-quality , continuous and real-time access and use of aggregated or non-aggregated non-personal data , that is provided for or generated in the context of the use of the relevant core platform services by those business users and the end users engaging with the products or services provided by those business users; for personal data , provide access and use only where directly connected with the use effectuated by the end user in respect of the products or services offered by the relevant business user through the relevant core platform service , and when the end user opts in to such sharing with a consent in the sense of the regulation (eu) 2016/679; and ensure that the functionalities for providing information and offering of the opportunity to give consent are as user-friendly as possible;


### provide business users , or third parties authorised by a business user , free of charge , with effective , high-quality , continuous and real-time access and use of aggregated or non-aggregated data , that is provided for or generated in the context of the use of the relevant core platform services by those business users and the end users engaging with the products or services provided by those business users; for personal data , provide access and use only where directly connected with the use effectuated by the end user in respect of the products or services offered by the relevant business user through the relevant core platform service , and when the end user opts in to such sharing with a consent in the sense of the regulation (eu) 2016/679; ### provide business users , or third parties authorised by a business user , free of charge , with effective , high-quality , continuous and real-time access and use of aggregated or non-aggregated non-personal data , that is provided for or generated in the context of the use of the relevant core platform services by those business users and the end users engaging with the products or services provided by those business users; for personal data , provide , with the consent of the data subject , access to and use of those data only where directly connected with the use effectuated by the end user in respect of the products or services offered by the relevant business user through the relevant core platform service , and when the end user opts in to such sharing with a consent in the sense of the regulation (eu) 2016/679;


### 2. where the commission finds that the measures that the gatekeeper intends to implement pursuant to paragraph 1 , or has implemented , do not ensure effective compliance with the relevant obligations laid down in article 6 , it may by decision specify the measures that the gatekeeper concerned shall implement. the commission shall adopt such a decision within six months from the opening of proceedings pursuant to article 18. ### 2. where the commission finds that the measures that the gatekeeper intends to implement pursuant to paragraph 1 , or has implemented , do not ensure effective compliance with the relevant obligations laid down in article 6 , it shall by decision specify the measures that the gatekeeper concerned shall implement. the commission shall adopt such a decision within six months from the opening of proceedings pursuant to article 18.


### 2. where the commission finds that the measures that the gatekeeper intends to implement pursuant to paragraph 1 , or has implemented , do not ensure effective compliance with the relevant obligations laid down in article 6 , it may by decision specify the measures that the gatekeeper concerned shall implement. the commission shall adopt such a decision within six months from the opening of proceedings pursuant to article 18. ### 2. where the commission finds that the measures that the gatekeeper intends to implement pursuant to paragraph 1 , or has implemented , do not ensure effective compliance with the relevant obligations laid down in article 6 , it shall by decision specify the measures that the gatekeeper concerned shall implement. the commission shall adopt such a decision within six months from the opening of proceedings pursuant to article 18. the decision shall be public.


### 2. where the commission finds that the measures that the gatekeeper intends to implement pursuant to paragraph 1 , or has implemented , do not ensure effective compliance with the relevant obligations laid down in article 6 , it may by decision specify the measures that the gatekeeper concerned shall implement. the commission shall adopt such a decision within six months from the opening of proceedings pursuant to article 18. ### 2. where the commission finds that the measures that the gatekeeper intends to implement pursuant to paragraph 1 , or has implemented , do not ensure effective compliance with the relevant obligations laid down in article 6 , it shall by decision specify the measures that the gatekeeper concerned shall implement. the commission shall adopt such a decision within six months from the opening of proceedings pursuant to article 18. the decision shall be made public without delay.


### 3. paragraph 2 of this article is without prejudice to the powers of the commission under articles 25 , 26 and 27. ### 3. paragraph 2 of this article is without prejudice to the powers of the commission under articles 25 , 26 and 27. in case of a non-compliance decision under article 25 resulting in fines and penalties under article 26 , the period for non-compliance shall be presumed to start from the deadline set under article 3(8).


### 3. a gatekeeper shall be deemed to have engaged in a systematic non-compliance with the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6 , where the commission has issued at least three non-compliance or fining decisions pursuant to articles 25 and 26 respectively against a gatekeeper in relation to any of its core platform services within a period of five years prior to the adoption of the decision opening a market investigation in view of the possible adoption of a decision pursuant to this article. ### 3. a gatekeeper shall be deemed to have engaged in a systematic non-compliance with the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6 , as soon as the commission has issued at least two non-compliance or fining decisions pursuant to articles 25 and 26 respectively against a gatekeeper in relation to any of its core platform services within a period of 10 years.


### 3. a gatekeeper shall be deemed to have engaged in a systematic non-compliance with the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6 , where the commission has issued at least three non-compliance or fining decisions pursuant to articles 25 and 26 respectively against a gatekeeper in relation to any of its core platform services within a period of five years prior to the adoption of the decision opening a market investigation in view of the possible adoption of a decision pursuant to this article. ### 3. a gatekeeper shall be deemed to have engaged in a systematic non-compliance with the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6 , as soon as the commission has issued at least two non-compliance or fining decisions pursuant to articles 25 and 26 respectively against a gatekeeper in relation to any of its core platform services within a period of ten years.


### be accompanied by a delegated act amending articles 5 or 6 as provided for in article 10. ### be accompanied by a proposal for a delegated act amending articles 5 or 6 as provided for in article 10.


### 1. the commission may take the necessary actions to monitor the effective implementation and compliance with the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6 and the decisions taken pursuant to articles 7 , 16 , 22 and 23. ### 1. the commission shall monitor the effective implementation and compliance with the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6 and the decisions taken pursuant to articles 7 , 16 , 22 and 23.


### 1. the commission may take the necessary actions to monitor the effective implementation and compliance with the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6 and the decisions taken pursuant to articles 7 , 16 , 22 and 23. ### 1. the commission shall take the necessary actions to monitor the effective implementation and compliance with the obligations laid down in articles 5 and 6 and the decisions taken pursuant to articles 7 , 16 , 22 and 23.


### 3. in the non-compliance decision adopted pursuant to paragraph 1 , the commission shall order the gatekeeper to cease and desist with the non-compliance within an appropriate deadline and to provide explanations on how it plans to comply with the decision. ### 3. in the non-compliance decision adopted pursuant to paragraph 1 , the commission shall order the gatekeeper to cease and desist with the non-compliance within an appropriate deadline and to impose any appropriate remedies to ensure effective compliance with the obligations laid down under articles 5 and 6 and to restore constestability and fairness on the markets in line with this regulation.


### 3. in the non-compliance decision adopted pursuant to paragraph 1 , the commission shall order the gatekeeper to cease and desist with the non-compliance within an appropriate deadline and to provide explanations on how it plans to comply with the decision. ### 3. in the non-compliance decision adopted pursuant to paragraph 1 , the commission shall order the gatekeeper to cease and desist with the non-compliance within an appropriate deadline and to impose any appropriate remedies to ensure effective compliance with the obligations laid down under articles 5 and 6 and restore contestability and fairness on the markets in line with this regulation.


### 1. in the decision pursuant to article 25 , the commission may impose on a gatekeeper fines not exceeding 10% of its total turnover in the preceding financial year where it finds that the gatekeeper , intentionally or negligently , fails to comply with: ### 1. in the decision pursuant to article 25 , the commission may impose on a gatekeeper fines not exceeding 10% of its total worldwide turnover in the preceding financial year where it finds that the gatekeeper , intentionally or negligently , fails to comply with:


### 2. the commission may by decision impose on undertakings and associations of undertakings fines not exceeding 1% of the total turnover in the preceding financial year where they intentionally or negligently: ### 2. the commission may by decision impose on undertakings and associations of undertakings fines not exceeding 2% of the total worldwide turnover in the preceding financial year where they intentionally or negligently:


### 1. the commission may by decision impose on undertakings , including gatekeepers where applicable , periodic penalty payments not exceeding 5 % of the average daily turnover in the preceding financial year per day , calculated from the date set by that decision , in order to compel them: ### 1. the commission may by decision impose on undertakings , including gatekeepers where applicable , periodic penalty payments not exceeding 10 % of the average daily worldwide turnover in the preceding financial year per day , calculated from the date set by that decision , in order to compel them:


### 1. the powers conferred on the commission by articles 26 and 27 shall be subject to a three year limitation period. ### 1. the powers conferred on the commission by articles 26 and 27 shall be subject to a five year limitation period.


### 3. the commission shall base its decisions only on objections on which gatekeepers , undertakings and associations of undertakings concerned have been able to comment. ### 3. the commission shall base its decisions only on objections on which gatekeepers , undertakings and associations of undertakings concerned and interested third parties have been able to comment.


### 3. the commission shall base its decisions only on objections on which gatekeepers , undertakings and associations of undertakings concerned have been able to comment. ### 3. the commission shall base its decisions only on objections on which gatekeepers , undertakings and associations of undertakings concerned and interested third-parties have been able to comment.


### 3. the commission shall base its decisions only on objections on which gatekeepers , undertakings and associations of undertakings concerned have been able to comment. ### 3. the commission shall base its decisions only on objections on which gatekeepers , undertakings , associations of undertakings and interested third-parties concerned have been able to comment.


### 1. when three or more member states request the commission to open an investigation pursuant to article 15 because they consider that there are reasonable grounds to suspect that a provider of core platform services should be designated as a gatekeeper , the commission shall within four months examine whether there are reasonable grounds to open such an investigation. ### 1. when one or more member states request the commission to open an investigation pursuant to article 15 because they consider that there are reasonable grounds to suspect that a provider of core platform services should be designated as a gatekeeper , the commission shall within four months examine whether there are reasonable grounds to open such an investigation and adopt a decision. in case the commission decides there is no grounds for opening a market investigation , it shall publish a reasoned opinion.


### 1. when three or more member states request the commission to open an investigation pursuant to article 15 because they consider that there are reasonable grounds to suspect that a provider of core platform services should be designated as a gatekeeper , the commission shall within four months examine whether there are reasonable grounds to open such an investigation. ### 1. when one or more member states request the commission to open an investigation pursuant to article 15 because they consider that there are reasonable grounds to suspect that a provider of core platform services should be designated as a gatekeeper , the commission shall within four months examine whether there are reasonable grounds to open such an investigation and adopt a decision. in case the commission decides that there is no grounds for opening a market investigation , it shall publish a reasoned opinion.


### (36) the conduct of combining end user data from different sources or signing in users to different services of gatekeepers gives them potential advantages in terms of accumulation of data , thereby raising barriers to entry. to ensure that gatekeepers do not unfairly undermine the contestability of core platform services , they should enable their end users to freely choose to opt-in to such business practices by offering a less personalised alternative. the possibility should cover all possible sources of personal data , including own services of the gatekeeper as well as third party websites , and should be proactively presented to the end user in an explicit , clear and straightforward manner. ### (36) the conduct of combining end user data from different sources or signing in users to different services of gatekeepers gives them potential advantages in terms of accumulation of data , thereby raising barriers to entry.


### (36) the conduct of combining end user data from different sources or signing in users to different services of gatekeepers gives them potential advantages in terms of accumulation of data , thereby raising barriers to entry. to ensure that gatekeepers do not unfairly undermine the contestability of core platform services , they should enable their end users to freely choose to opt-in to such business practices by offering a less personalised alternative. the possibility should cover all possible sources of personal data , including own services of the gatekeeper as well as third party websites , and should be proactively presented to the end user in an explicit , clear and straightforward manner. ### (36) the conduct of combining end user data from different sources or signing in users to different services of gatekeepers gives them potential advantages in terms of accumulation of data , thereby raising barriers to entry. individual consent , expressed in accordance with gdpr is always needed in order to combine personal data across services. article 5(a) of this regulation should not be understood as suggesting that platforms that are not designated as gatekeepers can act without the individual’s consent. it needs to be recalled that consent is not the only necessary requirement for data processing , and data limitation should guide the collection and use of data in all online activities.


### (42) the conditions under which gatekeepers provide online advertising services to business users including both advertisers and publishers are often non-transparent and opaque. this opacity is partly linked to the practices of a few platforms , but is also due to the sheer complexity of modern day programmatic advertising. the sector is considered to have become more non-transparent after the introduction of new privacy legislation , and is expected to become even more opaque with the announced removal of third-party cookies. this often leads to a lack of information and knowledge for advertisers and publishers about the conditions of the advertising services they purchased and undermines their ability to switch to alternative providers of online advertising services. furthermore , the costs of online advertising are likely to be higher than they would be in a fairer , more transparent and contestable platform environment. these higher costs are likely to be reflected in the prices that end users pay for many daily products and services relying on the use of online advertising. transparency obligations should therefore require gatekeepers to provide advertisers and publishers to whom they supply online advertising services , when requested and to the extent possible , with information that allows both sides to understand the price paid for each of the different advertising services provided as part of the relevant advertising value chain. ### (42) the conditions under which gatekeepers provide targeted online advertising based on contextual information services to business users including both advertisers and publishers are often non-transparent and opaque. this opacity is partly linked to the practices of a few platforms , but is also due to the sheer complexity of modern day programmatic advertising. this often leads to a lack of information and knowledge for advertisers and publishers about the conditions of the advertising services they purchased therefore their ability and possibility to switch to alternative providers of online advertising services increased. furthermore , the costs of online advertising are likely to be higher than they would be in a fairer , more transparent and contestable platform environment. these higher costs are likely to be reflected in the prices that end users pay for many daily products and services relying on the use of online advertising. transparency obligations should therefore require gatekeepers to provide advertisers and publishers to whom they supply targeted online advertising services based on contextual information , when requested and to the extent possible , with information that allows both sides to understand the price paid for each of the different advertising services provided as part of the relevant advertising value chain.


### (42) the conditions under which gatekeepers provide online advertising services to business users including both advertisers and publishers are often non-transparent and opaque. this opacity is partly linked to the practices of a few platforms , but is also due to the sheer complexity of modern day programmatic advertising. the sector is considered to have become more non-transparent after the introduction of new privacy legislation , and is expected to become even more opaque with the announced removal of third-party cookies. this often leads to a lack of information and knowledge for advertisers and publishers about the conditions of the advertising services they purchased and undermines their ability to switch to alternative providers of online advertising services. furthermore , the costs of online advertising are likely to be higher than they would be in a fairer , more transparent and contestable platform environment. these higher costs are likely to be reflected in the prices that end users pay for many daily products and services relying on the use of online advertising. transparency obligations should therefore require gatekeepers to provide advertisers and publishers to whom they supply online advertising services , when requested and to the extent possible , with information that allows both sides to understand the price paid for each of the different advertising services provided as part of the relevant advertising value chain. ### (42) the conditions under which gatekeepers provide online advertising services including targeted online advertising services based on contextual information to business users including both advertisers and publishers are often non-transparent and opaque. this opacity is partly linked to the practices of a few platforms , but is also due to the sheer complexity of modern day programmatic advertising. this often leads to a lack of information and knowledge for advertisers and publishers about the conditions of the advertising services they purchased and undermines their ability to switch to alternative providers of online advertising services. furthermore , the costs of online advertising are likely to be higher than they would be in a fairer , more transparent and contestable platform environment. these higher costs are likely to be reflected in the prices that end users pay for many daily products and services relying on the use of online advertising. transparency obligations should therefore require gatekeepers to provide advertisers and publishers to whom they supply targeted online advertising services based on contextual information , when requested and to the extent possible , with information that allows both sides to understand the price paid for each of the different advertising services provided as part of the relevant advertising value chain. contextual information may include keywords , the language setting communicated by the device of the end user or the geographical region of the end users to whom an advertisement is displayed , without allowing for the identification of one or more natural persons. the targeting of end users using personal data should be phased out.


### (42) the conditions under which gatekeepers provide online advertising services to business users including both advertisers and publishers are often non-transparent and opaque. this opacity is partly linked to the practices of a few platforms , but is also due to the sheer complexity of modern day programmatic advertising. the sector is considered to have become more non-transparent after the introduction of new privacy legislation , and is expected to become even more opaque with the announced removal of third-party cookies. this often leads to a lack of information and knowledge for advertisers and publishers about the conditions of the advertising services they purchased and undermines their ability to switch to alternative providers of online advertising services. furthermore , the costs of online advertising are likely to be higher than they would be in a fairer , more transparent and contestable platform environment. these higher costs are likely to be reflected in the prices that end users pay for many daily products and services relying on the use of online advertising. transparency obligations should therefore require gatekeepers to provide advertisers and publishers to whom they supply online advertising services , when requested and to the extent possible , with information that allows both sides to understand the price paid for each of the different advertising services provided as part of the relevant advertising value chain. ### (42) the conditions under which gatekeepers provide targeted online advertising services based on contextual information to business users including both advertisers and publishers are often non-transparent and opaque. this opacity is partly linked to the practices of a few platforms , but is also due to the sheer complexity of modern day programmatic advertising. this often leads to a lack of information and knowledge for advertisers and publishers about the conditions of the advertising services they purchased and undermines their ability to switch to alternative providers of online advertising services. furthermore , the costs of online advertising are likely to be higher than they would be in a fairer , more transparent and contestable platform environment. these higher costs are likely to be reflected in the prices that end users pay for many daily products and services relying on the use of online advertising. transparency obligations should therefore require gatekeepers to provide advertisers and publishers to whom they supply targeted online advertising services based on contextual information , when requested and to the extent possible , with information that allows both sides to understand the price paid for each of the different advertising services provided as part of the relevant advertising value chain. contextual information may include keywords , the language setting communicated by the device of the end user or the geographical region of the end users to whom an advertisement is displayed , without allowing for the identification of one or more natural persons. the targeting of end users using personal data should be phased out.