### 10. recalls that for rules-based , effective , results-oriented and networked multilateralism to flourish , it is important to involve democratically elected parliaments to ensure broader access to a wide-range of stakeholders and expand dialogue and cooperation to non-state entities such as regional governments , municipalities and the economic sector; recalls that democratically elected parliaments can give visibility to and empower the voices supporting multilateralism as an avenue for effective policy responses for the benefit of all mankind and can further secure the necessary link between the international organisations and multilateral fora making decisions and the citizens; points to the synergic role that the european parliament can play in its regular political and policy outreach to the parliaments of the eu member states and third countries , as this outreach can reinforce and further expand the coalition and the ability of like-minded countries in international organisations and multilateral fora to make positive impacts; considers that parliament should reflect on the possibility of creating a delegation devoted to the un , with particular regard to the un general assembly and other parliamentary dimensions of international organisations and multilateral fora to reinforce the parliamentary link and dialogue with the un system and other relevant multilateral fora and ensure democratic dialogue and strategic considerations at the eu inter-institutional level; believes that parliament’s offices in cities with un bodies or international organisations that are relevant for the external action of the eu should reach out to and cover the activities of these bodies and organisations to establish a closer link with the efforts , commitments and visions related to multilateralism at eu and european parliament level; takes the view that parliament should carry out a reflection on how to maximise the synergies between inter-parliamentary delegations , committees and parliament’s services devoted to election observation and democracy support to further reinforce the external action of the eu through the activities of these parliamentary bodies; ### 10. recalls that for rules-based , effective , results-oriented and networked multilateralism to flourish , it is important to involve democratically elected parliaments to ensure broader access to a wide-range of stakeholders and expand dialogue and cooperation to non-state entities such as regional governments , municipalities , academia and the economic sector; recalls that democratically elected parliaments can give visibility to and empower the voices supporting multilateralism as an avenue for effective policy responses for the benefit of all humankind and can further secure the necessary link between the international organisations and multilateral fora making decisions and the citizens; points to the synergic role that the european parliament can play in its regular political and policy outreach to the parliaments of the eu member states and third countries , as this outreach can reinforce and further expand the coalition and the ability of like-minded countries in international organisations and multilateral fora to make positive impacts; considers that parliament should reflect on the possibility of creating a delegation devoted to the un , with particular regard to the un general assembly and other parliamentary dimensions of international organisations and multilateral fora to reinforce the parliamentary link and dialogue with the un system and other relevant multilateral fora and ensure democratic dialogue and strategic considerations at the eu inter-institutional level; believes that parliament’s offices in cities with un bodies or international organisations that are relevant for the external action of the eu should reach out to and cover the activities of these bodies and organisations to establish a closer link with the efforts , commitments and visions related to multilateralism at eu and european parliament level; takes the view that parliament should carry out a reflection on how to maximise the synergies between inter-parliamentary delegations , committees and parliament’s services devoted to election observation and democracy support to further reinforce the external action of the eu through the activities of these parliamentary bodies;


### 15. calls for extending multilateralism to new challenges and realities such as biodiversity , cybersecurity , biotechnology and artificial intelligence , which need to be developed alongside experts and scientists who should be party to multilateral , multi-stakeholder arrangements; ### 15. calls for extending multilateralism to new challenges and realities such as biodiversity , cybersecurity , biotechnology , artificial intelligence , and emerging threats such as the technology-enabled spread of fake news , fake science , and disinformation; argues that experts and scientists should be party to multilateral , multi-stakeholder arrangements;


### b. whereas the world has entered a new era of ‘unpeace’ , characterised by great geopolitical competition involving ‘semi-conflicts’ , which happen away from the public eye , but have significant implications for eu and global security; ### b. whereas the world has entered a new era of ‘unpeace’ , characterised by great geopolitical competition involving non-traditional threats and conflicts , such as hybrid and cyber-attacks , which happen away from the public eye , but have significant implications for eu and global security and for which we do not have proper tools to counter and react to;


### c. whereas at the same time , the global order is increasingly confronted with policy issues and challenges that require effective global policy dialogue and convergence of positions in order to devise real solutions and common agreed upon standards that can deliver effectively in the interest of all; ### c. whereas at the same time , the global order is increasingly confronted with policy issues and challenges that require effective global policy dialogue and convergence of positions in order to devise real solutions and common agreed upon standards that can deliver effectively in the interest of all and are promoting human rights and the rule of law;


### d. whereas multilateralism is in crisis , resulting in part from the emergence of new actors on the global stage , the tensions derived from the nature of multilateral institutions , the growing gap between public opinion and institutions , the decline of traditionally dominant geopolitical powers and the subsequent decline of global freedoms and democracy; whereas we are on the cusp of a new era that threatens to undermine more than seventy years of progress and relative peace and consolidate an era of strongman politics striving to undermine the rule of law , responsibility and diversity; whereas the combination of national populist impulses , divergent and changing objectives and a lack of application and accountability methods is forcing the multilateral system to face three connected crises: a crisis of power , of relevance and of legitimacy; ### d. whereas multilateralism is in crisis , resulting in part from the emergence of new non-state actors and authoritarian state networks on the global stage , the tensions derived from the nature of multilateral institutions , the growing gap between public opinion and institutions , the decline of the liberal democratic powers and the subsequent decline of global freedoms and democracy; whereas we are on the cusp of a new era that threatens to undermine more than seventy years of progress and relative peace and consolidate an era of strongman politics striving to undermine the rule of law , responsibility and diversity; whereas the combination of national populist impulses , divergent and changing objectives and a lack of application and accountability methods is forcing the multilateral system to face three connected crises: a crisis of power , of relevance and of legitimacy , which are a result of a lack of political will and coordination , mostly from the west;


### e. whereas multilateralism is in need of swift revitalisation to tackle this multidimensional crisis; whereas peace and security , climate change , global public health and the deepening of poverty and inequalities at the global level are some of the pressing challenges that the world is facing right now; whereas only through a reinforced multilateral order will the international community be able to find lasting and sustainable answers to these challenges; ### e. whereas multilateralism is in need of swift revitalisation to tackle this multidimensional crisis; whereas threats to peace and security , climate change , global public health challenges , disinformation , foreign interference , and the deepening of poverty and inequalities at the global level are some of the pressing challenges that the world is facing right now; whereas only through a reinforced multilateral order and political leadership will the international community be able to find lasting and sustainable answers to these challenges;


### g. whereas the increasing positions of strength by illiberal third countries in multilateral fora and international organisations , including through a strong presence as regards the management and decision-making processes of relevant international organisations and multilateral fora , can lead to asymmetric and less effective , if not biased , policy responses , absent the level playing field for all members of the international community , and to a much weaker commitment by the international community to the defence of universal values and universal rights; whereas individual agendas , unilateral actions and a lack of engagement and support for multilateral solutions can further undermine multilateralism as an essential organising principle to tackle transnational challenges; whereas , in this context , it is essential to reaffirm the value of rules-based governance , international cooperation , a commitment to fundamental rights and a true level playing field for all members of the international community; whereas relevant international organisations and multilateral fora will be key to achieving these objectives; whereas these objectives will not only allow a more effective positive policy impact on global challenges , but will also curb and prevent the risk of conflict; ### g. whereas the increasing positions of strength by illiberal third countries in multilateral fora and international organisations , including through a strong presence as regards the management and decision-making processes of relevant international organisations and multilateral fora , can lead to asymmetric , less effective , and biased , policy responses , absent the level playing field for all members of the international community , and to a much weaker commitment by the international community to the defence of universal values and universal rights; whereas individual agendas , unilateral actions and a lack of engagement and support for multilateral solutions can further undermine multilateralism as an essential organising principle to tackle transnational challenges; whereas , in this context , it is essential to reaffirm the value of rules-based governance , international cooperation , a commitment to fundamental rights and a true level playing field for all members of the international community; whereas relevant international organisations and multilateral fora will be key to achieving these objectives; whereas these objectives will not only allow a more effective positive policy impact on global challenges , but will also curb and prevent the risk of conflict;


### h. whereas the un secretary-general’s report entitled ‘our common agenda’ , which was presented to the un general assembly in september 2021 and drafted through a wide-ranging consultation process including un member states , thought leaders , young people , civil society , relevant stakeholders and citizens , as well as the un system and its many partners , attests to the need for a more effective , inclusive and networked multilateralism for the future; whereas this will be essential for the un system and other multilateral fora in order to continue being an effective venue for global consultation and decision-making; whereas , in this context , the eu is uniquely positioned to support the un and other relevant international organisations in pursuing a process of reform and in revitalising their delivery capacity and their ability to connect to relevant stakeholders , such as young people or the communities most impacted by climate change; whereas in doing so the eu should seize the opportunity to engage constructively and effectively with rival powers , while maintaining a firm stance on fundamental rights and pursuing closer cooperation with like-minded countries to reinforce the primacy of universal values and fundamental rights and to advance effective solutions to global challenges; whereas parliamentary diplomacy will be a key component of reinforcing rules-based , inclusive , networked and effective multilateralism; ### h. whereas the un secretary-general’s report entitled ‘our common agenda’ , which was presented to the un general assembly in september 2021 and drafted through a wide-ranging consultation process including un member states , thought leaders , young people , civil society , relevant stakeholders and citizens , as well as the un system and its many partners , attests to the need for a more effective , inclusive rules-based , and networked multilateralism for the future; whereas this will be essential for the un system and other multilateral fora in order to continue being an effective venue for global consultation and decision-making; whereas , in this context , the eu is uniquely positioned to support the un and other relevant international organisations in pursuing a process of reform and in revitalising their delivery capacity and their ability to connect to relevant stakeholders , such as young people or the communities most impacted by climate change; whereas in doing so the eu should maintain a firm stance on fundamental rights and pursue closer cooperation and coordination with like-minded countries to reinforce the primacy of universal values and fundamental rights and to advance effective solutions to global challenges; whereas parliamentary diplomacy will be a key component of reinforcing rules-based , inclusive , networked and effective multilateralism;


### 2. reiterates its strongest support for the programme of reforms introduced by un secretary-general antónio guterres; stresses the importance of a un system that can continue to deliver effectively; points to the value of the ‘one un’ vision of the un secretary-general for the un system , where the various agencies and components of the un can truly be interlinked and function together on the basis of a single budgetary and managerial structure and can reinforce the attainment of the un’s objectives; points , in particular , to the enhanced role of the un resident coordinators provided for by the reform of the un development system and considers that these un resident coordinators should not only take the lead in coordinating the implementation of un programmes on the ground to reinforce the unity of un action , but should also liaise and consult closely with eu delegations in the relevant un member state to pursue synergies and mutual reinforcement with the eu’s thematic and geographic programmes for that country; recalls that the eu can greatly reinforce the outreach and impact of un programmes in third countries and can define its programming and assistance in synergic and reinforcing fashion in conjunction with the objectives of the un; stresses , therefore , the value of close eu-un consultation and cooperation and invites the un to regularly consult with the eu at un headquarters , but also on the ground in third countries; takes the view that the eu and the un should hold annual summits with the possibility for the un secretary-general to confer with council , commission , eeas and parliament; calls on the un to ensure a steady presence of high-level un interlocutors at the european parliament to further policy dialogue and give enhanced visibility to un efforts; ### 2. reiterates its strongest support for the programme of reforms introduced by un secretary-general antónio guterres; stresses the importance of a un system that can continue to deliver effectively; points to the value of the ‘one un’ vision of the un secretary-general for the un system , where the various agencies and components of the un can truly be interlinked and function together on the basis of a single budgetary and managerial structure and can reinforce the attainment of the un’s objectives; points , in particular , to the enhanced role of the un resident coordinators provided for by the reform of the un development system and considers that these un resident coordinators should not only take the lead in coordinating the implementation of un programmes on the ground to reinforce the unity of un action , but should also liaise and consult closely with eu delegations in the relevant un member state to pursue synergies and mutual reinforcement with the eu’s thematic and geographic programmes for that country; recalls that the eu can greatly reinforce the outreach and impact of un programmes in third countries and can define its programming and assistance in synergic and reinforcing fashion in conjunction with the objectives of the un; stresses , therefore , the value of close eu-un consultation and cooperation and invites the un to regularly consult with the eu at un headquarters , but also on the ground in third countries; takes the view that the eu and the un should hold annual summits with the possibility for the un secretary-general to confer with council , commission , eeas and parliament; calls on the un to ensure a steady presence of high-level un interlocutors at the european parliament to further structured and consistent policy dialogue and give enhanced visibility to un efforts;


### 3. takes the view that the eu should identify the un bodies and other multilateral organisations that are key to promoting policy dialogue , convergence and policy solutions to global challenges and standard setting and should define clear objectives and clear priorities for dialogue with and support , including budgetary support , to such bodies and organisations; recalls , in this regard , that the eu and its member states are already the leading donors to the un and many of its agencies and programmes , but that this commitment to and support for the un does not always translate into a stronger presence by the eu and its member states in key un agency positions; calls on the eu and its member states to further improve their coordination when it comes to establishing joint support for candidacies for leadership positions in multilateral fora; points to the positive potential of also enhancing this coordination with like-minded partners in other world regions and looking at the importance of the principle of the equitable geographical distribution of leadership positions; ### 3. takes the view that the eu should identify the un bodies and other multilateral organisations that are key to promoting policy dialogue , convergence and policy solutions to global challenges and standard setting and should define clear objectives and clear priorities for dialogue with and support , including budgetary support , to such bodies and organisations; recalls , in this regard , that the eu and its member states are already the leading donors to the un and many of its agencies and programmes , but that this commitment to and support for the un does not always translate into a stronger presence by the eu and its member states in key un agency positions; points to the increased geopolitical importance of standards , especially in technology , and urges the eu to act strategically to become a standard-setting superpower in multilateral fora; calls on the eu and its member states to further improve their coordination when it comes to establishing joint support for candidacies for leadership positions in multilateral fora; points to the need to coordinate with like-minded partners in other world regions and looking at the importance of the principle of the equitable geographical distribution of leadership positions , keeping a strong focus on democratic values;


### 5. calls on the eu and its member states to further their ability to share information , consult and coordinate , including in the governing bodies and boards of multilateral bodies where the eu is not represented; shares the view of the vp/hr and the commission that the eu should establish coordination mechanisms in all international financial institutions; believes that the same coordination ability should be expanded to the boards of all un bodies , such as , for example , the food and agriculture organization; ### 5. calls on the eu and its member states to further their ability to share information , consult and coordinate on strategies , policies , and positions including in the governing bodies and boards of multilateral bodies where the eu is not represented; shares the view of the vp/hr and the commission that the eu should establish coordination mechanisms in all international financial institutions; believes that the same coordination ability should be expanded to the boards of all un bodies , such as , for example , the food and agriculture organization;


### a. whereas the european union has extensive experience in deploying multinational missions abroad in order to promote peace , security and progress in europe and in the world; whereas these common security and defence policy (csdp) missions regularly operate alongside and complement missions of the member states , united nations , international organisations and third countries; ### a. whereas the european union has a long standing experience in deploying multinational missions abroad via 19 completed and 18 ongoing civilian missions and military operations since 2003 in order to promote peace , security and progress stability in europe and in the world; whereas these common security and defence policy (csdp) missions regularly operate alongside with and complement member states’ , united nations’ , international organisations and third countries’ missions and implement un security council mandates;


### b. whereas csdp missions regularly depend on the effective performance of third-party missions , reliable cooperation , timely information sharing and sincere host nation support; whereas the lack of any of these can jeopardise the implementation of a csdp mission’s mandate and could ultimately lead to the withdrawal of eu forces; ### b. whereas csdp missions regularly depend on a good operationalisation of the eu’s integrated approach , but also the effective performance of third party missions , on reliable cooperation , and on timely information sharing as well as on sincere host nation support and the respect for international human rights law and international humanitarian law as well as democratic and transparency standard; whereas the absence of any of those could jeopardize the implementation of a csdp mission’s mandate and could ultimately lead to the withdrawal of eu forces;


### c. whereas the premature termination of csdp missions leaves populations unprotected and makes weak host nation authorities vulnerable , thereby opening up opportunities for state and non-state actors , including terrorists and extremists , and including those sponsored by our global competitors; ### c. whereas the premature termination of csdp missions leaves populations unprotected and makes weak host nation authorities vulnerable , thereby opening up opportunities for state and non-state actors , including terrorists and extremists , and including those sponsored by our global competitors; whereas there is also the need to adopt a more cooperative approach , which is less centred around european interest regarding counter-terrorism and migration control and which has a strong emphasis on the overall development of democratic governance and a democratically controlled security sector which respects human rights law and humanitarian law while combatting impunity;


### d. whereas the european union and its member states should strive for autonomy when preparing , conducting and sustaining their csdp missions; whereas the union should be capable of rapidly deploying multidimensional forces , swiftly reinforcing them where needed and sustaining them as long as required and without depending on third-party support; ### d. whereas the european union and its member states should strive for autonomy in the preparation , conduct and sustainment of its csdp missions , which do not fall under the berlin plus arrangements; whereas the union should be capable of rapidly deploying multinational forces , swiftly reinforce them in the case of need , and sustain them as long as required and without dependency on third party support;


### i. whereas the battlegroup concept has helped develop multinational defence cooperation and interoperability , as well as transformation for rapid deployment and force modernisation; ### i. whereas the battlegroup concept has helped to a deplorably low degree to increase multinational defence cooperation and interoperability , as well as transformation for rapid deployment and force modernisation; whereas in general , member states have not mobilised sufficient political will over years to make important instruments such as the battle groups a reliable and well-functioning capability;


### j. whereas in cases when eu battlegroups have not been used , individual eu member states have often acted outside the eu framework instead , either on their own or with other eu or non-eu states; ### j. whereas in cases when eu battlegroups were not used , often due to lack of political will of the framework nation or a lack of financial solidarity , it was instead often individual eu member states who then acted outside the eu framework , either on their own , or with other eu or non-eu states;


### l. whereas joint declarations on eu-nato cooperation should define areas of cooperation and coordination , establish the tasks to be fulfilled within each framework and be accompanied by roadmaps for their implementation; ### l. whereas joint declarations on eu-nato cooperation should define areas of cooperation and coordination , establish the tasks to be fulfilled within each framework and be accompanied by roadmaps for their implementation and put a strong emphasis on a high level of precision as regards common technical interoperability standards and norms;;


### n. whereas article 44 has never been used , and is ambiguous in terms of how it would work in practice in specific cases; ### n. whereas article 44 has never been used , and is ambiguous in terms of how it would work in practice in specific cases in particular as regards the dilemma between decision-making autonomy of a specific group of member states and the council as representation of all 27 member states;


### p. whereas , in line with article 41 of the teu , the administrative and operating expenditure for the rdc should be charged to the union budget except for expenditure that is covered by the european peace facility , notwithstanding the possibility for participating member states to make free-of-charge contributions to the rdc; ### p. whereas , in line with article 41 of the teu , the administrative for the rdc should be charged to the union budget except for expenditure that is covered by the european peace facility , notwithstanding the possibility for participating member states to make free-of-charge contributions to the rdc;


### q. whereas the relevant union acts should be updated to reflect all of the foregoing; ### q. whereas it could be necessary to update eu secondary law or to propose new acts to reflect all of the foregoing;


### 1. welcomes the vp/hr’s proposal , enshrined in the strategic compass , to establish an rdc; stresses the importance of the eu having the necessary capabilities and structures to take action rapidly and decisively during crises in order to serve and protect the union’s citizens , interests and values across the world; ### 1. welcomes the vp/hr’s proposal , enshrined in the strategic compass , to establish an rdc; stresses the importance of the eu having the necessary capabilities and structures to take action rapidly and decisively during crises in order to serve and protect the union’s citizens , interests , principles and values of article 21 teu across the world;


### 2. strongly encourages the vp/hr to propose a council decision on establishing an eu rdc to protect the union’s values and serve its interests along the following lines: ### 2. in line with point (r) of its recommendation of 8 june 2022 , strongly encourages the vp/hr to propose a council decision on establishing an eu rdc to protect the union’s values and serve its interests along the following lines:


### the rdc should be established as a european union structure with its own legal and institutional identity; ### the rdc should be established as a european union structure with its own legal and institutional identity in 2024;


### the rdc’s tasks should include , but not be limited to , rescue and evacuation operations , initial entry and initial phase of stabilisation operations , temporary reinforcement of other missions , and acting as a reserve force to secure exit; the council could assign further tasks as referred to under article 44 of the teu , and the duration and scope of the assignments should be consistent with resources allocated to the rdc; ### in line with article 43(1) teu , the rdc’s tasks should include , but not be limited to , rescue and evacuation operations , initial entry and initial phase of stabilisation operations , temporary reinforcement of other missions , and acting as a reserve force to secure exit; the council could assign further tasks as referred to under article 44 of the teu , and the duration and scope of the assignments should be consistent with resources allocated to the rdc;


### the rdc should number at least 5 000 troops , excluding strategic enablers such as air and sea lift personnel , intelligence assets , special operations forces and medical evacuation and care units; the target number for the rdc should be at least between 7 000 and 10 000 troops in total; ### the rdc should number at least 5 000 troops , excluding strategic enablers such as air and sea lift personnel , intelligence assets , special operations forces and medical evacuation and care units; the target number for the rdc should be at least between 7 000 and 10 000 troops in total and should be ready to move within two or three days;


### the rdc should frequently simulate scenarios and hold joint exercises following uniform training and certification standards such as those in nato; ### the rdc should frequently simulate scenarios and hold joint exercises following uniform training and certification standards such as those in nato and it could generalise and use the french guépard readiness system;


### all force elements of the rdc should be assigned exclusively to it and not to any other international high-readiness forces , notwithstanding the possibility for member states to call them up for national duty in the event of an emergency; ### all force elements of the rdc should be assigned exclusively to it and not to any other international high-readiness forces such as nato's vtfj , notwithstanding the possibility for member states to call them up for national duty in the event of an emergency;


### in line with article 41 of the teu , the rdc’s administrative expenditure should be funded from the union budget; ### in line with article 41 of the teu , the rdc’s administrative expenditure could be funded from the union budget provided that the cfsp budget is considerably increased and that ongoing civilian csdp missions would not see their budget being reduced as a consequence;


### similarly , its operating expenditure should be funded from the union budget with the exception of expenditure that is charged to the european peace facility; ### in line with the strict provisions of article 41(2) teu , its operating expenditure should be funded via a new and dedicated off-budget facility or a revised european peace facility with an increased budget;


### 3. calls on the member states to transform the eu battlegroup system to match the needs of the rdc; considers that the eu battlegroups should be funded from the union budget during their stand-up , stand-by and stand-down phases; ### 3. calls on the member states to transform the eu battlegroup system to match the needs of the rdc; considers that the eu battlegroups should be funded , during their stand-up , stand-by and stand-down phases , via a revised and increased epf or a new off-budget facility;


### 5. points out that the rdc should have permanent operational headquarters under the military planning and conduct capability in order to ensure its effectiveness; ### 5. points out that the rdc should have permanent operational headquarters under the military planning and conduct capability (mpcc) in order to ensure its effectiveness and one of the existing four national operational headquarters (ohq) should be designed as fall-back option;


### acting by qualified majority after deliberation in the council; ### acting by qualified majority after deliberation in the council and endorsement of its mandate by unanimity;


### 8. considers that the political and economic incentives need to change in order to improve the prospects for using article 44; ### 8. considers that the political and economic incentives need to change in order to improve the prospects for using article 44 and financial solidarity needs to be implemented via epf or a new off-budget financial facility;


### 10. calls on the commission to propose the appropriate changes to the eu’s financial and staff regulations , to the relevant interinstitutional agreement on budgetary matters , and to other union acts as necessary; ### 10. calls on the vp/hr to propose the appropriate changes to the european peace facility , or to propose a new such facility , and to other union acts as necessary;


### 1. reiterates its concern about the persistent distance between the eu and turkey , despite it being a candidate country , in terms of values and standards , and the continuing lack of political will to carry out the necessary reforms to address , in particular , the serious concerns about the rule of law and fundamental rights that continue to negatively affect the accession process; considers that without clear progress in this field , parliament cannot envisage any resumption of accession negotiations with turkey , which have effectively been at a standstill since 2018; ### 1. reiterates its concern about the persistent distance between the eu and turkey , despite it being a candidate country , in terms of values and standards , and the continuing lack of political will to carry out the necessary reforms to address , in particular , the serious concerns about the rule of law and fundamental rights that continue to negatively affect the accession process; considers that without clear progress in this field , parliament cannot envisage the resumption of accession negotiations with turkey , which have effectively been at a standstill since 2018; firmly insists , therefore , that a structured and comprehensive high-level dialogue aimed at discussing and re-framing the current state of eu-turkey relations urgently take place , while maintaining the formal freezing of the accession negotiations with turkey;


### 3. reiterates its firm conviction that turkey is a country of strategic relevance in political , economic and foreign policy terms , a partner that is key for the stability of the wider region , and an ally with which the eu wishes to pursue the best possible relations; welcomes , in this view , the recent statements expressed at the highest level by the turkish authorities about the recommitment of the turkish government to the eu path , but urges the turkish authorities to put their words into action and demonstrate this commitment with specific facts and decisions; ### 3. reiterates its firm conviction that turkey is a country of strategic relevance in political , economic and foreign policy terms , a partner that is key for the stability of the wider region , and an ally with which the eu wishes to pursue the restoration of relations based on dialogue , respect and mutual trust; welcomes , in this view , the recent statements expressed at the highest level by the turkish authorities about the recommitment of the turkish government to the eu path , but urges the turkish authorities to put their words into action and demonstrate this commitment with specific facts and decisions;


### 5. deplores the continued deterioration of the human rights situation in turkey , including backsliding on fundamental freedoms , democracy and the rule of law; considers that the current repressive form of rule , whose main pillars are abuse of the legal framework and a lack of independence of the judiciary , is a deliberate , relentless and systematic state policy developed to suppress any critical activities either-directly or through a chilling effect; is appalled by the fact that in order to pursue this policy , the turkish state authorities are ready to blatantly and persistently disregard their international and domestic legal obligations , such as those derived from turkey’s membership of the council of europe; ### 5. deplores the continued deterioration of the human rights situation in turkey , including backsliding on fundamental freedoms , democracy and the rule of law; considers that the current repressive form of rule , whose main pillars are abuse of the legal framework - particularly through the application of terrorism charges and by restriction of the freedom of expression - and a lack of independence of the judiciary , is a deliberate , relentless and systematic state policy developed to suppress any critical activities either-directly or through a chilling effect; is appalled by the fact that in order to pursue this policy , the turkish state authorities are ready to blatantly and persistently disregard their international and domestic legal obligations , such as those derived from turkey’s membership of the council of europe;


### 6. insists that the crucial area of fundamental rights and freedoms , which is at the core of the accession process , cannot be disconnected and isolated from overall relations with the eu and stresses that for parliament , it remains the main obstacle to further progress on any positive agenda that could be offered to turkey; ### 6. insists that the crucial area of fundamental rights and freedoms , which is at the core of the accession process , cannot be disconnected and isolated from overall relations with the eu and stresses that for parliament , it remains the main obstacle to further progress on any positive agenda that could be offered to turkey; considers that the adoption on march 2021 of an action plan on human rights shows a willingness to improve the overall situation of fundamental rights in turkey; notes nevertheless that the commitment of the government will be measured by the extent of its implementation and the reforms undertaken to ensure its application to all citizens without discrimination;


### 7. reiterates its strong condemnation of turkey’s withdrawal , by presidential decree , from the council of europe convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence (the istanbul convention); ### 7. reiterates its strong condemnation of turkey’s withdrawal , by presidential decree , from the council of europe convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence (the istanbul convention); particularly condemns this decision against the background of the high number of femicides in the country; reiterates its call on turkey’s government to reverse this regrettable decision; calls on turkey , in the meantime , to prevent and combat violence against all women and girls , support survivors , and to hold abusers to account by fully implementing turkey’s own law no. 6284 and all measures identified in the european court of human rights opuz group of cases under enhanced supervision by the council of europe committee of ministers;


### 8. notes the importance of upholding the freedom of assembly in turkey , which is enshrined in its constitution; ### 8. notes the importance of upholding the freedom of assembly in turkey , which is enshrined in its constitution and constitutes a positive obligation , derived from its membership of the european convention of human rights (echr); condemns the systematic and selective violation of this freedom extending to any critical activity such as peaceful kurdish civil and political engagement , peaceful protest by women rights activists , including by cumartesi anneleri (saturday mothers) , protests by the students of boğaziçi university for academic freedom as well as lgbti activists; denounces protracted bans on peaceful protests , the excessive use of force against demonstrators and journalists covering protests as well as trials against activists;


### 8. notes the importance of upholding the freedom of assembly in turkey , which is enshrined in its constitution; ### 8. notes the importance of upholding the freedom of assembly in turkey , which is enshrined in its constitution and a positive obligation derived from its membership of the european convention of human rights;


### 9. reiterates its serious concern about the disproportionate and arbitrary measures curtailing freedom of expression; welcomes the further decrease in the number of journalists in prison in turkey; ### 9. reiterates its serious concern about the disproportionate and arbitrary measures curtailing freedom of expression; condemns the large number of investigation and prosecution of persons for allegations of insulting the president or on broadly-worded and vague terrorism charges; is concerned that , of all council of europe members , turkey was the member country with the highest number of judgments on violations of freedom of expression at the european court of human rights in 2021; calls for the immediate release of journalist sedef kabaş who was arrested on 22 february 2022 following her citation of a proverb on television that was interpreted as an insult directed at the turkish president recep tayyip erdoğan; takes note of the worrying presidential circular from 28 february 2022 entitled “press and publication activities” which may be used by turkish authorities as a tool to strengthen the arm of monitoring agencies such as rtük , the radio and television supreme council and further limit the freedom of expression; urges turkey to guarantee media freedom as a matter of priority and to immediately and unconditionally release and acquit detained journalists , writers and social media users for exercising their profession and civil rights;


### 10. asserts that the continued prosecution , censorship and harassment of journalists and independent media remains an issue of concern; ### 10. asserts that the continued prosecution , censorship and harassment of journalists and independent media remains an issue of concern; is concerned that today about 90% of the national media are controlled by the turkish government by means of regulators such as the high council for broadcasting (rtük); is concerned about rtükʼs threat to block the international media outlets deutsche welle , euronews and voice of america if they do not apply for broadcasting licenses which allow the watchdog oversight of the outlet’s content; calls on an end to the discriminatory issuing of punitive measures against independent broadcasters by rtük;


### 11. takes note of the adoption of the fourth and fifth judicial packages in turkey during 2021; asserts , however , that the current problems stem not only from problematic legislation , but are often caused by a failure to implement existing adequate provisions; remains concerned about the erosion of the rule of law and judicial independence in turkey; ### 11. takes note of the adoption of the fourth and fifth judicial packages in turkey during 2021 asserts , however , that the current problems stem not only from problematic legislation , but are often caused by a failure to implement existing adequate provisions; remains concerned about the erosion of the rule of law and the lack of independence of the judiciary in turkey , coupled with the chilling effect of the mass dismissals carried out by the government in the past years which undermine the capacity of the judiciary as a whole to provide an effective remedy for human rights violations , both in regard to measures taken under the state of emergency , and in general; notes with regret that in this context , the judicial reforms do not tackle these fundamental shortcomings; is highly concerned by the application of vague and overly broad terrorism measures including by restricting due process guarantees , prolonging the duration of pre-trial detention and allowing for continued dismissals of public officials because of alleged links to terrorist organisations , aiming to pursue politically motivated prosecutions of political opponents and mute human rights defenders , journalists and academic; strongly condemns the dismissals and forced removals of a large number of turkish judges and prosecutors; recalls that any dismissals and appointments within the judiciary should be subjected to particularly exacting scrutiny , that the executive branch shall be prohibited to interfere with or attempt to exert influence over the judiciary and that the appointment of the judiciary shall respect the principles of independence and impartiality; is appalled by a reported pattern of persecution of lawyers representing individuals accused of terrorism , whereby lawyers were prosecuted for the same crime as that attributed to their client , or a related crime , in a context where this constituted a clear obstacle to the enjoyment of the right to fair trial and access to justice; urges the turkish government to guarantee the independent work of lawyers and to release anyone illegally detained simply for performing their legal duties;


### 13. regrets the sustained pressure on civil society and human rights defenders and the continuously shrinking space to operate freely in turkey; ### 13. regrets the sustained pressure on civil society and human rights defenders and the continuously shrinking space to operate freely in turkey; denounces the legal and administrative harassment and violence against human rights defenders , lawyers , journalists , academics , which particularly the kurdish community suffers from; denounces the arbitrary closure of renowned civil society organisations and media outlets; calls on turkey to view critical or dissenting voices , including human rights defenders , academics and journalists , as valuable contributors to social dialogue , rather than destabilising forces; notes with concern the grave impediment on the freedom to associate peacefully through the law on preventing financing of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; is concerned by the observations from the council of europe’s commissioner for human rights and parliamentary assembly , who point that human rights organisations were the first to be audited pursuant to this law; urges turkey to review the law and to repeal the 36 articles of the law which are not related to the prevention of financing or proliferation of weapons of mass destruction , in particular those articles which unduly target civil society;


### 13. regrets the sustained pressure on civil society and human rights defenders and the continuously shrinking space to operate freely in turkey; ### 13. regrets the sustained harassment of civil society and human rights defenders and the continuously shrinking space to operate freely in turkey; notes the grave impediment on their freedom to associate peacefully through the law on preventing financing of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; is concerned by the observations from the council of europe’s commissioner for human rights and parliamentary assembly , who point that human rights organisations were the first to be audited pursuant to this law; urges turkey to review the articles of the law which are not related to the prevention of financing or proliferation of weapons of mass destruction , in particular those articles which unduly target civil society;


### 14. continues to urge the turkish government to release osman kavala after more than four years of detention; reiterates its call on the turkish authorities to abide by the final judgment of the european court of human rights in this case; ### 14. continues to urge the turkish government to release osman kavala after more than four years of unjust and unlawful detention; reiterates its call on the turkish authorities to abide in full by the final judgment of the european court of human rights in this case; condemns the attempts to prolong osman kavalaʼs detention through judicial tactics including the merging and disjoining of case files; notes that the infringement proceedings by the committee of ministers of the council of europe against turkey highlight the seriousness of turkeyʼs violations of its obligations as a member of the coe and an eu candidate country.


### 15. expresses deep concern about the deterioration in the human rights situation for lgbti people , in particular with regard to physical attacks – especially against transgender persons – the protracted bans on pride marches across the country , restrictions on the freedoms of assembly , association and expression , and censorship in the media; ### 15. expresses deep concern about the deterioration in the human rights situation for lgbti people , in particular with regard to hate crimes – especially against transgender persons –the protracted bans on pride marches across the country , restrictions on the freedoms of assembly , association and expression , and censorship in the media and online; recalls the need to adopt measures to ensure all citizens can enjoy these freedom safely; notes with concern the increasing hate speech and smear campaigns by high-ranking central government and public officials against lgbti persons; is concerned about the examples of the criminal investigations against the istanbul , ankara and diyarbakir bar associations and the case of the participants in the 2019 metu pride; welcomes the acquittal of the latter; recalls that turkey’s obligations under the echr entail a responsibility to combat discrimination and violence against lgbti persons; calls on authorities to align its criminal legislation concerning homophobic and transphobic hate crimes with ecri’s general policy recommendation 7; urges turkey to drop all charges against peaceful participants of lgbti events and lift the protracted bans on pride events;


### 15. expresses deep concern about the deterioration in the human rights situation for lgbti people , in particular with regard to physical attacks – especially against transgender persons – the protracted bans on pride marches across the country , restrictions on the freedoms of assembly , association and expression , and censorship in the media; ### 15. expresses deep concern about the state-sponsored deterioration in the human rights situation for lgbti people , in particular with regard to hate crimes – especially against transgender persons – , the protracted bans on pride marches across the country , restrictions on the freedoms of assembly , association and expression and censorship in the media and online; recalls the need to adopt measures to ensure all citizens can enjoy these freedom safely; calls on authorities to align its criminal legislation concerning homophobic and transphobic hate crime with ecri’s general policy recommendation 7 ,1aas requested by ecri in its 2019 conclusions1b; urges authorities to lift the protracted bans on pride events;


### 16. is deeply concerned about the constant attacks and pressure on the opposition parties , particularly the hdp and the republican people’s party (chp) , which undermine the proper functioning of the democratic system; stresses that democracy presupposes an environment in which political parties , civil society and the media can function without threats or arbitrary restrictions; ### 16. is deeply concerned about the constant attacks and pressure on the opposition parties , particularly the hdp and others , including the republican people’s party (chp) , which undermine the proper functioning of the democratic system; stresses that democracy presupposes an environment in which political parties , civil society and the media can function without threats or arbitrary restrictions;


### 17. notes with great concern that the hdp and its party organisations have been specifically and continuously targeted by the turkish authorities , leading to a situation where over 4 000 hdp members are currently in prison; continues to strongly condemn the continued detention since november 2016 of selahattin demirtaş and figen yüksekdağ , the former co-chairs of the hdp; ### 17. notes with great concern that the hdp , its elected mayors and its party organisations , especially its youth organisation have been specifically and continuously targeted and criminalised by the turkish authorities , leading to a situation where over 4 000 hdp members are currently in prison; continues to strongly condemn the continued detention since november 2016 of selahattin demirtaş and figen yüksekdağ , the former co-chairs of the hdp and calls for their immediate release; condemns in strongest terms the turkish authorities’ disregard and refusal to abide by rulings of the ecthr calling for the immediately release of mr demirtaş; denounces the governing coalitionʼs relentless attempts to criminalise the legitimate political activities of the opposition peoples’ democratic party (hdp); is highly concerned that the constitutional court accepted an indictment filed by the court of cassation chief prosecutor to permanently shut down the hdp and ban 451 politicians from political life; is gravely concerned by the ongoing so-called “kobani case" against 108 individuals including many hdp politicians which began on 26 april 2021;


### 18. condemns the recurrent use of revocation of the parliamentary status of opposition mps , which seriously damages the turkish parliament’s image as a democratic institution; ### 18. condemns the recurrent use of revocation of the parliamentary status of opposition mps , which seriously damages the turkish parliament’s image as a democratic institution; reiterates its condemnation of the decision made by the turkish authorities to remove hdp’s over 150 democratically elected kurdish mayors from office since 2016 on the basis of questionable evidence and replace them with unelected trustees , which undermines local democracy; strongly criticizes the turkish authorities decision to paralyse municipalities run by mayors of opposition parties in istanbul , ankara and izmir; condemns that after the last local elections on 31 march 2019 alone , 32 of the 65 democratically elected hdp mayors in south eastern turkey were removed by the government and many replaced by trustees;


### 19. recognises that turkey has legitimate security concerns and the right to fight terrorism; stresses , nevertheless , that this must be done with full respect for the rule of law , human rights and fundamental freedoms; reiterates its firm and unambiguous condemnation of the violent terrorist attacks by the kurdistan workers’ party (pkk) , which has been on the eu list of terrorist organisations since 2002; ### 19. recognises that turkey has legitimate security concerns and the right to fight terrorism; stresses , nevertheless , that this must be done with full respect for the rule of law , human rights and fundamental freedoms; reiterates its firm and unambiguous condemnation of the violent terrorist attacks by the kurdistan workers’ party (pkk) , which has been on the eu list of terrorist organisations since 2002; stresses the urgent need for a resumption of the peace process and calls upon the turkish government to reinitiate dialogue with the kurdish movement towards a peaceful settlement of the conflict;


### 20. calls on turkey to abide by a zero-tolerance policy on torture and to duly investigate persistent and credible reports of torture , ill-treatment and inhumane or degrading treatment in custody , in order to put an end to impunity and hold those responsible to account; ### 20. calls on turkey to abide by a zero-tolerance policy on torture and to duly investigate persistent and credible reports of torture , ill-treatment and inhumane or degrading treatment in detention , interrogation and custody , in order to put an end to impunity and hold those responsible to account; calls on turkey to terminate forced disappearances as well as all incommunicado detention and detention in unofficial detention locations; is deeply concerned by the hygienic and sanitary situation in turkey’s overcrowded prisons exacerbating the deadly danger of the covid 19 pandemic for prisoners; highlights that according to data of the ihd (human rights association in turkey) there are currently 1 ,605 sick prisoners , 604 of whom are seriously ill; is appalled by the continued detention of hdp politician and former deputy , ms aysel tuğluk despite her deteriorating health situation; highlights that kocaeli university hospital diagnosed aysel tuğluk with dementia and that in their final report , issued on 12 july , the university's department of forensic science stated that the dementia might progress , that there might be problems about medical support and care , and that it was not possible for tuğluk to continue her life without help; calls for aysel tuğlukʼs immediate release; is appalled by the reported practice of arrests of pregnant and post-partum women and urges turkey to release them and to end the practice of arresting them just before or immediately after giving birth;


### 20. calls on turkey to abide by a zero-tolerance policy on torture and to duly investigate persistent and credible reports of torture , ill-treatment and inhumane or degrading treatment in custody , in order to put an end to impunity and hold those responsible to account; ### 20. reiterates that turkey refuses to implement the recommendations from 2018 of the european committee for the prevention of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; calls on turkey to abide by a zero-tolerance policy on torture and to duly investigate persistent and credible reports of torture , ill-treatment and inhumane or degrading treatment in custody , in order to put an end to impunity and hold those responsible to account;


### 21. commends the efforts made by turkey to continue hosting the largest refugee population in the world; welcomes , in this regard , the continued provision of eu funding for refugees and host communities in turkey , and expresses its commitment to sustain this support in the future; ### 21. commends the efforts made by turkey to continue hosting the largest refugee population in the world; welcomes , in this regard , the continued provision of eu funding for refugees and host communities in turkey , and expresses its commitment to sustain this support in the future; insists that the respect for fundamental freedoms needs to be at the centre of the implementation process of the eu-turkey statement; highly commends the essential contribution of civil society in turkey to the integration of refugees; calls on the turkish government to enhance access to the labour market for syrian refugees , notes with concern the mounting anti-immigration sentiment in turkish politics and society; calls on the eu and its member states to substantially increase resettlement of refugees and support local integration efforts by turkey actively;


### 21. commends the efforts made by turkey to continue hosting the largest refugee population in the world; welcomes , in this regard , the continued provision of eu funding for refugees and host communities in turkey , and expresses its commitment to sustain this support in the future; ### 21. commends the efforts made by turkey to continue hosting the largest refugee population in absolute numbers; welcomes , in this regard , the continued provision of eu funding for refugees and host communities in turkey , and expresses its commitment to sustain this support in the future;


### 22. acknowledges that turkey can pursue its own foreign policy in line with its interests and goals , but expects this policy to be defended through diplomacy and dialogue based on international law and , as a candidate country , to be increasingly aligned with that of the eu; ### 22. acknowledges that turkey can pursue its own foreign policy in line with its interests and goals , but expects this policy to be defended through diplomacy and dialogue based on international law and , as a candidate country , to be increasingly aligned with that of the eu; commends the recent rapprochement between turkey and armenia; calls upon both sides to build on the momentum and continue normalising their relations which has a positive impact for prosperity and security in the region; further welcomes turkey’s diplomatic efforts to normalise relations with various countries of the middle east , especially israel;


### 23. welcomes the decrease in tensions in the eastern mediterranean during the past year , but remains fully aware that these positive dynamics could be reversed at any moment while the underlying issues remain unresolved; ### 23. welcomes the decrease in tensions in the eastern mediterranean during the past year , but remains fully aware that these positive dynamics could be reversed at any moment while the underlying issues remain unresolved; urges turkey and all stakeholders involved to engage in bona fine in the peaceful settlement of disputes and to refrain from any unilateral and illegal action or threat; calls on collective efforts to delimitate the exclusive economic zones as well as the continental shelf in accordance with international law;


### 25. insists that democracy , the rule of law and fundamental rights should remain at the heart of eu-turkey relations under any framework; reaffirms its support for keeping the accession process and its value-based approach as the main framework for eu-turkey relations , as it is still the most powerful tool to exercise normative pressure and sustain the democratic and pro-european aspirations of turkish society; nevertheless remains open to the possibility of both sides reviewing , in a realistic manner , the appropriateness of this framework and its ability to function , or , if necessary , exploring other possible models for future relations; ### 25. insists that democracy , the rule of law and fundamental rights should remain at the heart of eu-turkey relations under any framework; believes that it is high time to define a comprehensive , unified and coherent strategy for the medium to long term , among all eu institutions and member states; recalls that the strong relapse in the area of fundamental rights , the deteriorating human rights situation , the lack of freedom of the press and expression , the arbitrary detention of opposition politicians and journalists and the non-recognition of democratic elections show that turkey's future cannot lie within the eu; the accession negotiations with turkey must therefore be dissolved;


### b. whereas the guidelines , adopted in 2004 and revised in 2008 , have gradually become the framework of reference for eu institutions , eu delegations , member states’ diplomatic missions and eu leaders to promote and ensure respect for the rights of hrds and to protect hrds at risk of attacks and threats from state and non-state actors; ### b. whereas the guidelines , adopted in 2004 and revised in 2008 , have gradually become the framework of reference for eu institutions , eu delegations , member states’ diplomatic missions and eu leaders to promote and ensure respect for the rights of hrds and to protect hrds at risk of attacks and threats from state and non-state actors; whereas member states , alongside the eu institutions , are also committed to implementing the guidelines , which include a range of specific commitments such as regular reporting , coordination and action in support of hrds;


### d. whereas the eu has developed a wide range of instruments to support hrds , from coordination tools to financial aid; whereas the european instrument for democracy and human rights (eidhr) was previously the main eu financial instrument used to support hrds , including through both emergency grants and the eu’s hrd protection mechanism , protectdefenders.eu; whereas the eidhr has been replaced by a thematic programme on human rights and democracy as part of the global europe: neighbourhood , development and international cooperation instrument (ndici); ### d. whereas the eu has developed a wide range of instruments to support hrds , from coordination tools to financial aid; whereas the european instrument for democracy and human rights (eidhr) was previously the main eu financial instrument used to support hrds , including through both emergency grants and the eu’s hrd protection mechanism , protectdefenders.eu; whereas the eidhr has been replaced by a thematic programme on human rights and democracy as part of the global europe: neighbourhood , development and international cooperation instrument (ndici); whereas the respect for human rights , democracy and the rule of law is a cross-cutting objective throughout the whole ndici – global europe instrument;


### f. whereas the eu , as a powerful economic actor , has the capacity to influence the situation of human rights and hrds worldwide by integrating a human rights-based approach into its trade and investment policies in a coherent manner; ### f. whereas the eu , as a powerful economic actor , has the capacity to influence the situation of human rights and hrds worldwide by integrating a human rights-based approach into its trade and investment policies in a coherent manner; whereas the 2021 trade policy review commits the eu to take a more assertive stance in defending its interests and values , ‘notably the promotion and protection of human rights’;


### g. whereas the new eu global human rights sanctions regime allows the eu to target serious human rights violations and abuses worldwide; ### g. whereas the new eu global human rights sanctions regime allows the eu to target serious human rights violations and abuses worldwide; whereas the fate of hrds should be an integral dimension of the eu’s global monitoring of human rights abuse worldwide , including in relation to the designation of sanctions;


### i. whereas there has been a substantial increase in the number , range and severity of attacks on hrds and their families and lawyers in recent years; whereas the global analysis published by the ngo front line defenders reported that 358 hrds had been killed across 35 countries in 2021 alone , and since under-reporting is common , the actual figure is likely to be much higher; whereas 227 environmental defenders were killed in 2020 , with more than half of those killings occurring in only three countries , colombia , mexico and the philippines , according to the ngo global witness; whereas a large number of hrds are under threat and attack because they raise concerns about the adverse human rights impacts of business operations , often in the context of large development projects that affect access to land and livelihoods; ### i. whereas there has been a substantial increase in the number , range and severity of attacks on hrds and their families and lawyers in recent years; whereas the global analysis published by the ngo front line defenders reported that 358 hrds had been killed across 35 countries in 2021 alone , and since under-reporting is common , the actual figure is likely to be much higher; whereas 227 environmental defenders were killed in 2020 , with more than half of those killings occurring in only three countries , colombia , mexico and the philippines , according to the ngo global witness; whereas a large number of hrds are under threat and attack because they raise concerns about the adverse human rights impacts of business operations , often in the context of large development projects that affect access to land and livelihoods; whereas in recent years , the majority of the murdered hrds were working on land , environmental and indigenous peoples’ rights;


### 4. considers , however , that the overall application of the guidelines by the european external action service (eeas) , the commission and the member states has been uneven , largely focusing on reactive measures , lacking a consistent overall implementation of the strategy and being characterised by insufficient visibility of eu action and channels of support for hrds; ### 4. considers , however , that the overall application of the guidelines by the european external action service (eeas) , the commission and the member states has been uneven , largely focusing on reactive measures , lacking a consistent overall implementation of the strategy and being characterised by insufficient visibility of eu action and channels of support for hrds; regrets that the hrd dimension is yet to be integrated in a systematic and coherent manner in all eu external action , including in eu country , regional or thematic policy documents and at all relevant levels of eu diplomatic engagement and decision-making , up to the highest levels;


### 5. calls for the eu to put its ambitious rhetoric and hrd policy framework into practice through concrete and effective action , in particular in its relations with authoritarian regimes in places where the eu and the member states have substantial commercial , energy , security , migratory and other interests; ### 5. calls for the eu to put its ambitious rhetoric and hrd policy framework into practice through concrete and effective action , in particular in its relations with authoritarian regimes in places where the eu and the member states have substantial commercial , energy , security , migratory and other interests; calls on the commission and the member states to ensure their financial support to hrds is also matched by sustained political engagement with the authorities of the countries concerned;


### 10. regrets , however , the fact that , due to the voluntarist nature of the guidelines , the intensity and quality of eu delegations’ engagement with and on hrds vary considerably from country to country and are in practice largely dependent on the local political context or the individual dedication and political will of the specific eu ambassador or staff in question , or of the officials at the eeas and commission headquarters; calls for greater consistency and a strategic overall approach in this regard and for a firm personal commitment by the vp/hr to ensuring the consistent implementation of the guidelines across all delegations , particularly in the countries where hrds are most at risk; ### 10. regrets , however , the fact that , due to the voluntarist nature of the guidelines , the intensity and quality of eu delegations’ engagement with and on hrds vary considerably from country to country and are in practice largely dependent on the local political context or the individual dedication and political will of the specific eu ambassador or staff in question , or of the officials at the eeas and commission headquarters; calls for greater consistency and a strategic overall approach in this regard and for a firm personal commitment by the vp/hr to ensuring the consistent implementation of the guidelines across all delegations , particularly in the countries where hrds are most at risk; expects all eu and member states ambassadors to ensure that their mission effectively integrates the support to hrds across their daily work and evaluates staff’s work performance accordingly;


### 11. is encouraged by reports of improved coordination between eu delegations and member states in the area of hrd protection , particularly through the practice of burden sharing and joint public diplomacy; regrets the fact that only a few member states , such as ireland and finland , have adopted their own national hrd guidelines; calls on member states to step up their efforts to achieve broader and more consistent engagement on the protection of hrds; ### 11. is encouraged by reports of improved coordination between eu delegations and member states in the area of hrd protection , particularly through the practice of burden sharing and joint public diplomacy; remains concerned , however , that less than half of the member states are in practice actively engaged in this area and selective engagement remains the norm; regrets the fact that only a few member states , such as ireland and finland , have adopted their own national hrd guidelines; calls on member states to step up their efforts to achieve broader and more consistent engagement on the protection of hrds;


### 12. welcomes the regular training on human rights , including on hrd policy , for staff members working as focal points in both the political and cooperation sections of eu delegations; is , however , concerned by reports that awareness and knowledge of the guidelines remain inadequate; calls for this training to be expanded; ### 12. welcomes the regular training on human rights , including on hrd policy , for staff members working as focal points in both the political and cooperation sections of eu delegations; is , however , concerned by reports that awareness and knowledge of the guidelines remain inadequate; calls for this training to be expanded; suggests to consider building eu and member states' commitments on hrds into job profiles of relevant staff members of the eeas and the eu delegations , and member states' missions , with a view to ensuring a systematic approach on hrds and that knowledge and practice on hrd protection is institutionalised , and thus avoiding a person-dependent approach and minimising the effects of staff rotation;


### 13. calls for more public engagement by the vp/hr and the eu special representative for human rights with regard to individual hrds; encourages the vp/hr and the commissioners to commit to systematically meeting with hrds during their visits abroad and to raise at the highest level the plight of hrds under attack , including through public statements when appropriate; ### 13. calls for more public engagement by the vp/hr and the eu special representative for human rights with regard to individual hrds; encourages the vp/hr and the commissioners to commit to systematically meeting with hrds during their visits abroad and to raise at the highest level the plight of hrds under attack , including through public statements when appropriate; calls on eu special representatives on country and regional situations to engage with national authorities specifically on hrds;


### 15. welcomes the eu’s substantial and steadily increasing financial contribution to supporting hrds worldwide , which makes it the lead donor in this regard , as well as its efforts to heighten flexibility and the development of various programmes to support human rights and hrds , including when hrds work in exile; emphasises the unique role of the civil society-run protectdefenders.eu mechanism in providing invaluable practical support for hrds at risk; ### 15. welcomes the eu’s substantial and steadily increasing financial contribution to supporting hrds worldwide , which makes it the lead donor in this regard , as well as its efforts to heighten flexibility and the development of various programmes to support human rights and hrds , including when hrds work in exile; emphasises the unique role of the civil society-run protectdefenders.eu mechanism in providing invaluable practical support for hrds at risk; calls for a qualitative jump to a more holistic approach aiming at the integral security of whole communities mobilised to defend rights; calls on the commission to fund local and regional networks and gatherings of hrds where these can share experiences , learn from each other’s strategies , successes and best practices , and build alliances; calls on the commission to strictly refrain from supporting , including financially , gongos;


### 19. stresses the importance of joining forces with un agencies and special procedures , particularly the un special rapporteur on the situation of hrds; calls for the eu to provide financial and political support for existing regional protection mechanisms for hrds , including the un economic commission for europe’s special rapporteur on environmental defenders , the escazú agreement and the inter-american , african and council of europe regional mechanisms on hrds; calls on the eu delegations and member states’ missions in geneva and new york to take effective action in response to reprisals by third countries against hrds for their cooperation with un bodies and to facilitate hrds’ accreditation and interaction with multilateral forums; welcomes the practical collaboration on hrd cases between eu delegations , member states’ missions and like-minded third countries , such as switzerland , norway , the united kingdom , canada and the usa; ### 19. stresses the importance of joining forces with un agencies and special procedures , particularly the un special rapporteur on the situation of hrds; calls for the eu to provide financial and political support for existing regional protection mechanisms for hrds , including the un economic commission for europe’s special rapporteur on environmental defenders , the escazú agreement and the inter-american , african and council of europe regional mechanisms on hrds; calls on the eu delegations and member states’ missions in geneva and new york to take effective action in response to reprisals by third countries against hrds for their cooperation with un bodies and to facilitate hrds’ accreditation and interaction with multilateral forums; further calls on the eu missions in geneva and new york to play a leading role in promoting and defending human rights gains at multilateral fora , including by pushing back against attacks on the definition of an hrd and by mainstreaming and safeguarding key language on the role of hrds both across thematic and country specific resolutions at the un; to this end , calls on the eu and its member states to ensure these efforts are consistently prioritized in the annual council conclusions on eu priorities in the un human rights fora; welcomes the practical collaboration on hrd cases between eu delegations , member states’ missions and like-minded third countries , such as switzerland , norway , the united kingdom , canada and the usa;


### 20. welcomes the recent efforts by eu delegations and member states’ missions in some third countries to reach out to activists who do not match the traditional notion of hrds; encourages the eu to pursue a broad approach to hrds , particularly by engaging with and providing support for local and grassroots hrds and especially marginalised and vulnerable hrds , such as those operating in remote areas and women , all of whom are at greater risk of experiencing violence and restrictions; ### 20. welcomes the recent efforts by eu delegations and member states’ missions in some third countries to reach out to activists who do not match the traditional notion of hrds; encourages the eu to pursue a broad approach to hrds , particularly by engaging with and providing support for local and grassroots hrds and especially marginalised and vulnerable hrds , such as those operating in remote areas and women , all of whom are at greater risk of experiencing violence and restrictions; calls on the eu to take advantage of online technologies , where possible and bearing in mind digital security , as well as to enhance coordination of efforts and resources of eu missions , to connect with more marginalised hrds;


### 22. stresses that the eu should address climate activism as an integral human rights issue under its hrd policy and step up its action in support of those defending the environment , especially those environmental and indigenous peoples’ rights defenders who are most at risk; ### 22. stresses that the eu should address climate activism as an integral human rights issue under its hrd policy and step up its action in support of those defending the environment , especially those environmental and indigenous peoples’ rights defenders who are most at risk; highlights the need to integrate hrd issues into eu climate diplomacy and assistance , including by promoting the genuine involvement of hrds in the implementation and monitoring of climate cooperation programmes , projects and schemes and by vocally addressing restrictions to their effective participation and monitoring activities;


### 24. calls on the eeas , the commission and the member states to address the threats against and attacks on hrds by non-governmental actors , including criminal groups and local communities , as well as threats in conflict and transition settings; urges the eu to integrate violence against hrds into its crisis management policy and provide an effective protection response to hrds in need of relocation in crisis situations; ### 24. calls on the eeas , the commission and the member states to address the threats against and attacks on hrds by non-governmental actors , including criminal groups and local communities , as well as threats in conflict and transition settings; urges the eu to integrate violence against hrds into its crisis management policy and provide an effective protection response to hrds in need of relocation in crisis situations; in this regard , calls on the eu to draw lessons from the lacklustre european response to the evacuation needs of afghan hrds and their families following the takeover by the taliban; calls in particular for a more rapid reaction of the commission to funding hrds in sudden crises where needs are both urgent and massive , in both supplementing funding for initiatives such as protectdefenders.eu and on reorienting country funding and diplomatic efforts to help hrd relocation; calls on the commission and the eeas to consider hrds as key actors and partners of any effective and sustainable post-conflict response;


### 25. calls on the eeas , the commission and the member states to prioritise the fight against the misuse of surveillance technology to undermine the work of hrds , particularly through the development of robust national and international legislation and , in the immediate future , the adoption of a global moratorium on the sale and transfer of such technology; ### 25. calls on the eeas , the commission and the member states to prioritise the fight against the misuse of surveillance technology to undermine the work of hrds , particularly through the development of robust national and international legislation and , in the immediate future , the adoption of a global moratorium on the sale and transfer of such technology; reiterates its call on the commission to support initiatives relating to the development and dissemination of digital security technologies to empower hrds by providing secure collection , encryption and storage mechanisms in order to avoid monitoring by repressive governments;


### 26. believes that , in the light of the large and growing number of threats and attacks faced by hrds who raise concerns about the adverse human rights impacts of business operations , the eu should coherently integrate the promotion and protection of the rights of hrds , particularly trade union representatives and defenders of land , indigenous peoples’ rights and the environment , into its trade agreements and instruments , such as the generalised scheme of preferences; ### 26. believes that , in the light of the large and growing number of threats and attacks faced by hrds who raise concerns about the adverse human rights impacts of business operations , the eu should coherently integrate the promotion and protection of the rights of hrds , particularly trade union representatives and defenders of land , indigenous peoples’ rights and the environment , into its trade agreements and instruments , such as the generalised scheme of preferences; considers that systematic and widespread attacks against hrds should lead to the triggering of the human rights and democracy clause of a trade and investment agreement or of the overarching framework agreement with the given country , and in case of a manifest failure of the national authorities to improve the situation , the commission should take appropriate measures , including leading to the suspension of the said agreement;


### 31. stresses that visas are a key protection tool and that , in order to effectively assist hrds at risk , the commission should take a proactive role towards the establishment of an eu-wide scheme for issuing short-term visas for such hrds; believes that , in particular , member states should facilitate the issuance of visas 1) procedurally , by ensuring that their embassies’ and consulates’ processes are swift , comprehensible , accessible and achievable , and 2) structurally , by creating a specific category in the eu visa code9 for hrds at risk , amending the temporary protection directive10 to allow hrds at risk to be granted temporary protection status in the eu , and including dedicated instructions in the eu visa code handbook11 on granting facilitation procedures to hrds and their family members; underlines the need to make visa requirements and conditions less stringent for hrds in need of emergency evacuation; calls for efforts to raise member states’ officials’ awareness of the particular needs and challenges of applications by hrds; suggests making full use of meps and their networks to help secure visas; ### 31. stresses that visas are a key protection tool and that , in order to effectively assist hrds at risk , the commission should take a proactive role towards the establishment of an eu-wide scheme for issuing short-term visas for such hrds; believes that , in particular , member states should facilitate the issuance of visas 1) procedurally , by ensuring that their embassies’ and consulates’ processes are swift , comprehensible , accessible and achievable , and 2) structurally , by creating a specific category in the eu visa code9 for hrds at risk and including dedicated instructions in the eu visa code handbook11 on granting facilitation procedures to hrds and their family members; underlines the need to make visa requirements and conditions less stringent for hrds in need of emergency evacuation; calls for efforts to raise member states’ officials’ awareness of the particular needs and challenges of applications by hrds; suggests making full use of meps and their networks to help secure visas;


### 32. calls on eu delegations’ human rights focal points to identify and raise particular emergency relocation needs with member states’ missions and make recommendations on the issuance of visas to individual hrds; ### 32. calls on eu delegations’ human rights focal points to identify and raise particular emergency relocation needs with member states’ missions and make recommendations on the issuance of visas to individual hrds; believes that providing space for a cooling period can help hrds avoid risks; calls on the eeas to report back annually on the number of emergency visas delivered by eu member states to hrds;


### 33. calls on the commission and the member states to step up their provision of temporary protection and shelter for hrds at risk and their families; highlights initiatives in france , germany , the netherlands and spain and encourages further efforts on relocation , particularly through the involvement of regional and local authorities; welcomes the growing number of shelter initiatives at local level across the eu; ### 33. calls on the commission and the member states to step up their provision of temporary protection and shelter for hrds at risk and their families; highlights initiatives in france , germany , the netherlands and spain and encourages further efforts on relocation , particularly through the involvement of regional and local authorities; welcomes the growing number of shelter initiatives at local level across the eu; calls for dg home to establish a special fund for practical support to facilitate the temporary stay , work and mobility of hrds and their families in the eu;


### 35. reiterates its commitment to playing a leading role in shaping and enhancing the eu’s action in support of hrds; ### 35. reiterates its commitment to playing a leading role in shaping and enhancing the eu’s action in support of hrds notably through its plenary urgency resolutions and debates , the work of its subcommittee on human rights (droi) notably its reports and hearings , its missions to third countries and international and regional organizations , and its annual sakharov prize , including the work with the sakharov community; highlights as well the role of individual meps in raising the attention of the eu executive and member states to human rights situations of concern and to hrds under attack , notably through parliamentary questions , opinion pieces and public events; considers that parliamentary engagement with hrds and civil society actors is an indispensable dimension of its work on external affairs;


### 40. resolves to ensure that its key resolutions on human rights , in particular urgency resolutions , are translated into the local languages of the countries concerned and published and distributed accordingly; ### 40. resolves to ensure that its key resolutions on human rights , in particular urgency resolutions , are translated into the local languages of the countries concerned and published and distributed accordingly; expects eu delegations in the country concerned to make such resolutions available on their website and to follow-up systematically with the national authorities and to report back to parliament; calls for the revision of the 2011 guidelines for ep interparliamentary delegations on promoting human rights and democracy in their visits to non-eu countries;


### 41. calls for more strategic coordination between eu institutions in relation to urgent hrd cases; is convinced that parliamentary diplomacy may prove an effective and complementary mechanism for engaging with third countries on urgent hrd cases; calls for an interinstitutional task force on hrds to coordinate efforts , particularly in relation to priority hrd cases; ### 41. calls for more strategic coordination between eu institutions in relation to urgent hrd cases; is convinced that parliamentary diplomacy may prove an effective and complementary mechanism for engaging with third countries on urgent hrd cases; calls for an interinstitutional task force on hrds to coordinate efforts , particularly in relation to priority hrd cases and that would include the droi chair , droi coordinators , eusr on hr and the heads of the human rights units of the eeas and dg intpa and the chair of the council working group on human rights (cohom);


### 42. regrets the lack of an in-depth , specific analysis by the eeas and the commission of the implementation of the guidelines since 2008; calls for a comprehensive assessment of eu action on hrds in the framework of the mid-term review of the implementation of the action plan on human rights and democracy 2020-2024 , scheduled for june 2023; ### 42. regrets the lack of an in-depth , specific analysis by the eeas and the commission of the implementation of the guidelines since 2008; calls for a comprehensive assessment of eu action on hrds in the framework of the mid-term review of the implementation of the action plan on human rights and democracy 2020-2024 , scheduled for june 2023; calls for this review to include the identification and dissemination of best practices by eu delegations and member states missions , and for continuous monitoring of the implementation of the guidelines;


### 44. stresses that the revision of the guidelines should also expand the scope of eu engagement with hrds beyond the traditional interlocutors in capitals to include individuals and groups in remote or rural areas , and those working to defend the rights of refugees and migrants; ### 44. stresses that the revision of the guidelines should also expand the scope of eu engagement with hrds beyond the traditional interlocutors in capitals to include individuals and groups in remote or rural areas , and those working to defend the rights of refugees and migrants; considers it timely to allow for a broader and innovative approach to the notion of hrds that encompasses more fluid and temporary groups , including whistle-blowers;


### 46. calls for the inclusion of a specific section in the guidelines on the internal dimension of the eu’s action on hrds , in particular on visas for hrds (and their families) at immediate risk , on relocation and shelter , as well as on handling transnational threats from third countries against hrds; ### 46. calls for the inclusion of a specific section in the guidelines on the internal dimension of the eu’s action on hrds , in particular on visas for hrds (and their families) at immediate risk , on relocation and shelter , as well as on handling transnational threats from third countries against hrds; calls for the inclusion of a specific section in the council and eeas’ annual report on human rights and democracy dedicated to eu action on this dimension in the chapter on hrd policy;


### 47. recognises that silent diplomacy may be an effective tool to improve the situation of some hrds in third countries; stresses , however , that eu actors need to be vocal about urgent and serious cases and strike an appropriate balance between private and public diplomacy , particularly when silent diplomacy has proven ineffective; ### 47. recognises that silent diplomacy may be an effective tool to improve the situation of some hrds in third countries; stresses , however , that eu actors need to be vocal about urgent and serious cases and strike an appropriate balance between private and public diplomacy , particularly when silent diplomacy has proven ineffective; regrets in this regard the limited recourse by the eu executive to public statements , which remain largely weak in tone , primarily focused on high-profile cases and are often inconsistent in tone and messaging depending on the level and forum at which they are delivered; further regrets the insufficient consideration of alternative communication strategies or options in cases where an eu statement is impeded , including possible recourse to media , social media or other interventions;


### 52. calls on the eeas and the commission to systematically consult civil society representatives and hrds prior to any human rights dialogue , for the consultation to be genuine , and for these interlocutors to be debriefed thereafter; reiterates the need for a systematic and firm eu response to any act of reprisal against hrds that occurs after they have attended eu events or that is connected to contact with eu interlocutors; ### 52. calls on the eeas and the commission to systematically consult civil society representatives and hrds prior to any human rights dialogue , for the consultation to be genuine , and for these interlocutors to be debriefed thereafter; furthermore , calls on the eeas and commission to engage in a more results-oriented approach in relation to individual cases and effective follow-up in-between sessions; calls for the systematic holding of a civil society segment to any bilateral and regional human rights dialogue , as well as the establishment of a civil society advisory body with all countries benefiting from the gsp arrangement and other preferential trade arrangements with the eu; reiterates the need for a systematic and firm eu response to any act of reprisal against hrds that occurs after they have attended eu events or that is connected to contact with eu interlocutors;


### — having regard to the association agreement between the european union and the european atomic energy community and their member states , of the one part , and the republic of moldova , of the other part (aa) , which includes a deep and comprehensive free trade area (dcfta) and fully entered into force on 1 july 2016 , ### — having regard to the association agreement between the european union and the european atomic energy community and their member states , of the one part , and the republic of moldova (hereinafter referred to as moldova) , of the other part (aa) , which includes a deep and comprehensive free trade area (dcfta) and fully entered into force on 1 july 2016 ,


### — having regard to the completion of the current emergency covid-19 eu macro-financial assistance programme for moldova , with the first tranche of eur 50 million disbursed in november 2020 and a second 50 million eur instalment on 7 october 2021 , following significant progress achieved in fulfilling the policy conditions of the memorandum of understanding , ### deleted


### — having regard to the recommendations by and activities of the euronest parliamentary assembly , the eastern partnership civil society forum and other representatives of civil society in the republic of moldova , ### — having regard to the recommendations by and activities of the eu-moldova parliamentary association committee , euronest parliamentary assembly , the eastern partnership civil society forum , eu-moldova civil society platform and other representatives of civil society in the republic of moldova ,


### b. whereas the economic recovery plan for the republic of moldova was proposed as part of the renewed agenda for recovery , resilience and reform for the eastern partnership countries , underpinned by an economic and investment plan for post-covid-19 socio-economic recovery and long-term resilience , under the motto ‘build back better’; ### b. whereas the economic recovery plan for the republic of moldova was proposed as part of the renewed agenda for recovery , resilience and reform for the eastern partnership countries , underpinned by an economic and investment plan (eip) for post-covid-19 socio-economic recovery and long-term resilience , under the motto ‘build back better’; whereas the eip flagship initiatives for moldova foresee investments in energy efficiency , infrastructure and connectivity but not in the clean energy transition;